Political marketing and Party development in Britain: a ‘secret’ history

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INTRODUCTION.

During the 1992 general election analysts took great interest in scrutinising the work of once largely neglected party strategists. On one occasion a routine ITN lunchtime news item featuring presenter John Suchet and experienced Westminster based journalists Julia Langdon and Michael White ended a discussion on the now imminent campaign alluding to the supposed ability of the ‘marketing men’ to dictate the likely course of events. By no means an isolated event, such interchanges help highlight the way in which some of the most informed political commentators now view the modern electoral process. Nevertheless this view is not necessarily shared by the candidates, at least in public. Dennis Kavanagh has noted that leading politicians are often loathe to admit the important strategic role that marketing plays less it detracts from their own status or else upsets influential elements in the party[1]. For these and other reasons the history of political marketing in Britain cannot necessarily be found in official party sources.

EVOLUTIONARY MODELS OF MARKETING.

In their important analysis of the increasingly prominent role given to management theory and practice in the work of non-profit making organisations, Crompton and Lamb argue: ‘Marketing is about two things. First, it is a philosophy, an attitude and a perspective. Second, it is a set of activities used to implement that philosophy’[2]. This dichotomy is particularly useful when analysing the strategic development of a political party, itself an idiosyncratic form of non-profit organisation. Conceiving marketing as both a set of tools as
well as a guiding philosophy helps identify the key historical stages in the
evolution of electioneering, an activity which forms the principal manifestation of
this management process within the political sphere. This also makes it easier to
understand how alterations in campaign practices can be motivated by factors
other than environmental criteria such as the impact of mass media and
technological innovation. Rather, by placing greater emphasis on parties’ own
strategic change, it is possible to compare the development of electioneering with
that of a business marketing programme.

The peculiarly historical focus of this paper differentiates it from earlier work on
electoral marketing undertaken by both management and political scientists.
Some of this material has concentrated on establishing the feasibility of applying
marketing criteria to political analysis[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Others, mainly from a
political science perspective, assume the parallel exists and have proceeded to
consider the similarities and differences between strategies used by rival parties in
both domestic[1, 8, 9] and international settings[10, 11, 12]. Analysis of the way
in which electoral strategies have evolved over time can be found in the literature
examining party organisational change.

Since Duverger[13] identified the emergence of the mass party machine in Europe
during the early part of the 20th Century, other commentators have predicted its
gradual erosion and replacement with a more presidential type of organisation[14,
15, 16, 17]. Implicit in this work is the view that marketing, or what is more
commonly labelled ‘professionalism’, is an important catalyst for party change.
Many commentators regard the 1980s as the decade in which the revolution in
campaigning took place[11]. Hitherto, however, little consideration has been paid
to understanding how what might be broadly interpreted as marketing activities
and thinking have informed party development from the advent of mass
democracy at the beginning of this century.

Several management theorists have used a three phase evolutionary model
originally devised by Keith[18] to explain the evolution of marketing as a
commercial philosophy. Consequently from this viewpoint it becomes clearer
that the process is concerned with more than the use of tools such as advertising
and research. Within this framework the initial stage, the so-called ‘production’
orientation, takes a classical Fordist view of business and assumes the customer will, with minimal encouragement, purchase what the firm makes. With the advent of the next phase, the more complex ‘sales-led’ approach, organisations begin to invest in market research in order to better target selected consumer groups with more refined and often stylistic communications. The third and most sophisticated orientation, the ‘marketing concept’, is based around the organising principle that a successful business strategy starts and ends with the buying public. To use the standard Chartered Institute of Marketing definition, their subject of interest is: ‘the management process responsible for identifying, anticipating and satisfying customer requirements profitably’[19].

Whilst most historical accounts of political campaigning in Britain have tended to focus on the way media and technological developments have effected party organisation[20, 21], Smith and Saunders[22] utilise an evolutionary marketing model similar to that of Keith[18] to identify key strategic changes. Similarly Avraham Shama has adopted a comparable approach in his analysis of American electioneering[23]. It is possible to apply a derivative model of the latter to illuminate the major turning points in British campaign history. The following three sections will identify each key phase of strategic development.

In approaching the study of election campaigning in Britain it has become apparent that the major parties have been engaged in marketing related activities for most of this century. Few of the officials involved, however, would have consciously described their work in this way. It was chiefly during the 1950s that party organisers began to develop greater awareness of the possibilities presented them by the mass marketing methods being pioneered by commercial agencies at the time. Nevertheless it was only relatively recently, during the leaderships of Thatcher and Kinnock, that the term marketing became an acceptable organisational concept and even then only amongst the narrow but powerful elites within both party hierarchies.

In becoming the strategic norm, marketing first eroded and then effectively sidelined the importance of its Burkean critics in the Conservative party and socialist opponents on the Labour side. Today communicators like Tim Bell, the Saatchi brothers, Peter Mandelson and others are, in political terms, household
names. Unlike most predecessors their work has been widely interpreted and recognised as being of great strategic importance. In trying to put these actors’ contribution in historical context it is necessary to consult and reinterpret some of the existing material which deals with campaigning, especially official party records which tend to be sensitive about the involvement of professional outsiders in strategic decision-making processes. For this reason the history of political marketing in Britain has been, until recently, largely overlooked or else shrouded in secrecy.

THE ERA OF MASS PROPAGANDA.

Prior to the Second World War, commentators and political organisers regularly referred to the business of political communications work as ‘propaganda’. The term, now somewhat antiquated in electoral terms, usefully described a one-directional communication process in which passive audiences found themselves subjected to the sometimes manipulative appeals of political elites. As an agency of persuasion, propaganda can be compared with the production orientation stage in the development of conventional marketing, both approaches being primarily concerned with accommodating their own organisational needs rather than those of their publics. According to Shama, this lack of concern with voters’ wants manifested itself in an electoral strategy (which he describes as the ‘candidate orientation’) based around a simple principle: ‘...increased awareness would increase voter preference. The inputs to the promotion campaign to achieve increased awareness were designed on the basis of guess and intuition’[23].

In Britain the development of modern mass propaganda dates from the Representation of the People Act passed in 1918. The Act, a defining moment in British history, nearly trebled the electorate to a size of 21 million[24]. Prior to then campaigning had largely consisted of canvassing, leafleting and meetings. There had been limited innovations such as the use, by individual parliamentary candidates, of the Charles Barker agency for election advertising purposes in the early 1800s[25]. Later that century Gladstone’s stump oratory during the Midlothian campaign of 1880 succeeded in attracting considerable press interest, and thereby helped to cement the relationship between media and political elite[26]. Interest in the way leaders communicated to people in the emerging
‘mass society’ was heightened with the onslaught of the propaganda intensive Great War and beginnings of radio broadcasting. The changing environment presented strategists with what leading Labour official Egerton Wake called a ‘formidable problem in political engineering’[27]: the roots of modern political marketing lie in experimentation undertaken by electoral organisers during the inter-war years.

Four years after losing the 1906 election the Conservatives moved to embrace a propagandist orientation through the employment of their first press officer, Sir Malcolm Fraser[28]. A Press Bureau was established in 1911. More re-organisation came later with the appointment of J.C.C. Davidson as Party Chairman in 1926. In reforming the Central Office party headquarters, Davidson appeared to take heed of one guide popular amongst Conservative agents at the time: ‘Winning elections is really a question of salesmanship, little different from marketing any branded article’[24]. In 1927 Joseph Ball, a former military intelligence officer with MI5, was appointed head of publicity[28]. Together with Davidson he revolutionised party propaganda. The Press Bureau was expanded and specialist sub-sections formed to target stories at newspapers, many of whom were already pro-Conservative. During the 1929 election the Conservatives became the first party to use an agency, Holford-Bottomley Advertising Services, to help them design posters and leaflets later distributed in their millions[29]. The agencies S.H. Benson and Press Secretaries Ltd also played a role in the campaign[30]. Benson’s, soon to gain reknown for the ‘toucan’ advertisement ‘Guinness is Good for You’, faired less well in their first incursion into politics, receiving heavy criticism for the ‘Safety First’ campaign slogan. Despite this setback, the Conservatives re-employed the agency in the subsequent general elections of 1931 and 1935.

In preparing for the 1929 election, Central Office set-up a candidate training centre, the Bonar Law College. In addition Conservatives could also expect coaching prior to speaking in Party Election Broadcasts. At local level Streatham Association organised the first recorded telephone canvass[24]. There is also evidence of limited experimentation with direct mailing. But perhaps the most striking campaign innovation came in the shape of film propaganda. Guided by Albert Clavering, Alexander Korda and others, Conservative Central Office
purchased a fleet of mobile cinema vans and made, distributed and showed films to thousands of voters during the 1929 election[24]. By 1935 the programme had been extended, the vehicles’ costs contributing to the most expensive British campaign of all time[30].

The birth of Labour as a mass propagandist organisation was symbolised in the decision to set up a publicity department at headquarters in 1917. Head of the new section Herbert Tracey together with National Agent Egerton Wake were put in charge of party campaigning. Lacking in financial resources, Labour found compensation in the shape of strategic advice from assorted sympathisers such as leading Fabian intellectual Sidney Webb, founder of the London School of Economics and joint author of the Labour party constitution. In 1922 Webb developed the thesis that electioneering could be improved by deployment of ‘stratified electioneering’, a process akin to the market segmentation and targeting techniques which later formed the hallmarks of good marketing practice. Citing another famous scholar, he wrote:

'...it was an acute remark of H.G. Wells, twenty years ago, that modern Democracy was characteristically grey, not because any one of the units making up the mass was itself grey, but because the mixing of them together produced a dirty and unattractive grey. He looked forward to a time when we might be able to see Democracy, not as grey but as very highly coloured indeed, the units being all allowed their separate individuality of hue.'

Webb continued:

'Now, I should like to see a little variegated colour in electioneering, in addition to the common grey. Every elector has his own 'colour', if we could only discover it. He differs in character and circumstances, temperament and vocation, religion and recreation— and in a thousand other ways from his fellow men. At present we tend to address them all in the same way, with the result of achieving everywhere a certain amount of “misfit”.'[31]

Webb’s analysis is more than a matter of historical record: influential strategists including party secretary Arthur Henderson, the most senior official in the organisation, were keen for agents to operationalise the concept. Evidence
suggests several did by targeting electoral groups according to their occupation, age and lack of strong partisanship[32].

Many strategists, conscious of what one called the ‘psychology of the electorate’, were eager to promote ‘party image’ to use the phrase originally coined by the intellectual Graham Wallas in 1908[33]. Symptomatic of this was Labour’s decision to formally adopt a logo in 1924. Writing on the value of political advertising in the party agents’ journal the same year, strategist Gordon Hosking offered theoretical insights later popularised in the non-profit marketing studies involving Kotler[34, 35]:

‘Originally advertising was almost entirely of a commercial character, and was defined in many text-books as 'printed salesmanship'; but this definition is no longer adequate, for in recent years a form of advertising which has little to do with the selling of commodities has been developed extensively. For want of better title we shall call it 'Social Advertising', since it is concerned with arousing public interest in undertakings of a social character.’[36]

Despite such insight, advocates of advertising found themselves stalled by poverty coupled with the existence of a strong evangelical tradition in the party eschewing the use of what were perceived to be manipulative capitalist techniques. Together these factors help explain Labour’s decision to abandon plans to use an advertising agency for the 1935 campaign and why attempts to develop film propaganda proved problematic[29]. It was not until the 1937 local elections that the party, in the guise of London region, used agency professionals in their campaign preparations. London Labour leader Herbert Morrison proved to be instrumental in this process, persuading sympathetic contacts in public relations and advertising to volunteer their services to help what turned out to be a highly successful campaign[37].

THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDIA CAMPAIGNING.
The post-war growth in the television and advertising industries had a profound impact on society: writer J.B. Priestley famously termed them conduits of ‘admass’ culture[38]. Proliferation of these media had a particular impact on political communication in Britain, giving rise to a new kind of electoral strategy
akin to the ‘selling concept’ stage in the development of conventional marketing. Like their counterparts in the commercial sphere, political parties began to embrace market research in order to better plan and target potential groups of supporters with more sophisticated advertising communications: ‘(Opinion polling) studies were conducted concerning the effectiveness of different promotion appeals and media in reaching the voters’[23]. Again the primary focus, though increasingly conscious of public opinion, remained geared to understanding organisational objectives. In recognition of the processes involved, the new approach can be suitably termed ‘media campaigning’.

The origins of the Conservatives shift towards media campaigning lie in their massive 1945 defeat by Labour. In the following two decades leading figures Lord Woolton, Lord Poole and R.A. Butler would be instrumental in reconstituting their party as a formidable electoral machine. An early sign of Conservative determination to infuse their electioneering with a more media conscious feel came with the appointment of leading advertising agency Colman Prentis Varley in 1948[39]. It was the beginning of a longstanding and mutually profitable relationship. CPV executives proved to be the inspiration behind ‘Life's better with the Conservatives- don't let Labour ruin it’, the 1959 campaign slogan derived from ‘You've never had it so good’, itself a paraphrase of comments made by prime minister Harold Macmillan[40].

Whilst links between the Conservatives and advertisers were largely in the public domain, almost unknown was the decision by Central Office to set up the Public Opinion Research Department in 1948[41]. Marking the first attempt by a British party to incorporate polling methods into electoral strategy, the PORD is additionally significant because it coincided with a major repositioning of the Conservatives which ended with the party taking office in 1951 having moved towards the electoral ‘centre ground’ in recognition of the outgoing Labour government's popular public policies[42]. It would be simplistic to view this shift solely as a product of survey research but it is noteworthy that R.A. Butler, the chief architect of post-war Conservative policy, was a patron of the PORD and keen student of public opinion[39]. The service itself monitored polling trends, providing key figures in the bureaucracy and parliamentary party with regular briefing reports. In one of its most ambitious projects, the department
commissioned Market and Information Services Ltd. to undertake a large scale study of 5,000 electors in 1949. Entitled ‘The Floating Vote’, the report was significant in that it chose to analyse the newspaper readership, occupations, recreations, age and sex of uncommitted electors, thereby defining and acknowledging the importance of this constituency[41]. Though the PORD was disbanded in 1953 and its functions merged with other Central Office departments, private polling continued to be commissioned thereafter.

Under direction from a team led by Tony Benn and Woodrow Wyatt Labour began to produce sophisticated Party Election Broadcasts for television during the 1959 campaign[21]. More significant organisational change in favour of the new media campaign style came after this election defeat. One of the catalysts appeared in the form of an opinion research study commissioned by a magazine sympathetic to then Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell and his supporters on the centre-right, so-called ‘revisionist’ wing of the party. Entitled ‘Must Labour Lose?’, the report was interpreted as a call for the party to reshape its image in order to win support from a burgeoning middle-class[43]. Whilst many rejected the research findings, the fact that polling analysis managed to provoke a major debate provided support for those, notably Tony Crosland, committed to integrating these methods into the formulation of promotional campaigns[44]. Subsequently market researcher Dr Mark Abrams, co-author of Must Labour Lose?, became an integral member of Labour's strategic team in the successful general election campaign of 1964. Labour continued to use polling, contracting the services of the MORI company throughout the 1970s.

The period 1962 to 1964 was one of tremendous strategic change. After the untimely death of Hugh Gaitskell, Harold Wilson was elected to the leadership. The appointment of Len Williams and John Harris to the key posts of General Secretary and Director of Publicity helped further revitalise the party machinery culminating in the embrace of media campaigning[39]. Wilson proved to be an inspirational strategist, becoming pivotal in building links between his party and a group of sympathetic advertising and public relations professionals convened by David Kingsley, a London based executive, in preparation for the successful 1964 general election. Throughout his leadership Wilson maintained close links with professional advisers: on his retirement in 1976 the party was left in something of a strategic vacuum.
THE ADVENT OF POLITICAL MARKETING.

Over the past decade it is possible to discern a trend towards the reporting and analysis of what is termed ‘political marketing’. Interest in this phenomenon reflects the belief that electioneering in Britain has undergone a major transformation in recent times. This change can be seen to mirror the development of a marketing orientation in commercial terms. Unlike sales-led, media campaigning in which organisers are ‘simply called to investigate voters’ opinions’, modern political marketing requires a more comprehensive, holistic approach to electoral strategy, one which: ‘calls for research which goes far deeper than this. The new marketing concept is interested in the basic political needs and wants of the voters’[23]. Put simply opinion research, as representative of the electorate, begins to take on an important policy perspective in addition to its existing presentational role.

Margaret Thatcher's leadership proved to be a watershed in the development of political marketing in Britain. Elected Conservative leader in 1975, Thatcher set out to rejuvenate a party demoralised by defeat in the two general elections of 1974. Within four years a revitalised organisation had established a close working relationship with advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi. At the heart of this arrangement lay a partnership between party communications director Gordon Reece, Saatchi executive Tim Bell and the leader herself. The trio provided the inspiration behind the implementation of a series of campaign initiatives, most famously the ‘Labour Isn't Working’ poster, aimed at further undermining public confidence in a Labour administration already besieged by problems. In her analysis of Conservative organisation during this period, Margaret Scammell contends the party was undergoing a major re-orientation:

‘Most importantly there is evidence that the marketing concept shaped the manifesto and electoral strategy in all three elections under Lady Thatcher's leadership. This is not to say that market research dictated the details of policy but it did suggest the tone and tenor and indicate that certain policy options were electorally out of bounds.’[9]
The ability of the Thatcher leadership to transform Conservative strategy is partly explained by the nature of the party's internal structures. Because the Party Chairman, that is the chief bureaucrat, is an appointee of the leader the party organisation tends to operate on a hierarchical basis. Consequently on taking charge, Thatcher fundamentally restructured Central Office even though she was unable to initiate similar immediate surgery on her parliamentary frontbench team. Given Conservative leaders also draw up the party manifesto, keen polling analyst Thatcher was well placed to begin using the marketing concept to aid with policy development. Such a reading of recent history sits awkwardly with the popular perception of Thatcher as an ideologue led by conviction. However, as Scammell demonstrates, the new electoral approach understood the importance of the political environment and force of public opinion. Consequently the Conservatives exploited latent populist concerns over crime and immigration, tying them to more orthodox policy appeals such as the commitment to allow council house tenants the opportunity to buy their homes[9].

Following their emphatic 1979 victory the Conservatives continued to reorganise their campaign machinery. In 1981 Central Office employed Christopher Lawson to head a new marketing department. Lawson, a former executive of sweet manufacturer Mars, committed himself to distilling the party message into a few readily understandable appeals[45]. Research proved invaluable. Particularly important were polling findings indicating that though there was serious public concern over rising unemployment, most voters blamed the world recession not the government[9]. In 1983 the Conservatives secured re-election by an increased margin.

Though the general election of 1987 resulted in a third consecutive victory, campaign management became the focus of heated debate within leadership circles. Essentially the row revolved around the role of the prime minister. Fearing she was becoming increasingly unpopular, some advisors cautioned against leader-centred campaigning. Aggrieved by this view, Thatcher took comfort from other strategists’ belief in her value as an electoral asset. During the campaign itself these tensions exploded when, a week before voting, a rogue poll indicating Labour was gaining support ignited a furious row between the rival Central Office strategists on what became known as ‘Wobbly Thursday’[46].
Arguably these events, coupled with the dramatic Conservative leadership elections held in 1990 and 1995, reflect the power as well as the vulnerability of an office holder who is expected to deliver as both party chief and prime minister.

If the Labour electoral machine was ineffectual during the 1979 election it had virtually disintegrated by 1983 in a campaigning effort MP Austin Mitchell compared with the infamous marketing launch of the Ford Edsel[47]. This devastating defeat effectively marked the end to a long-running civil war in the party which had prevented the development of a coherent political programme and seen part of the Labour right-wing split off to form the rival Social Democratic Party in 1981. Following the 1983 debacle Labour elected Neil Kinnock as leader. Because of a party structure which made the leadership formally accountable to an Annual Conference and its National Executive Committee, Kinnock’s intention to reform Labour policy and organisation were always likely to face more formidable internal opposition than those piloted by Conservative counterpart Margaret Thatcher. Though initially fraught with problems, Kinnock’s eventual success in operationalising the political marketing concept helped transform party campaigning and, arguably of greater importance, shifted the balance of power in favour of his leadership.

Streamlining of Labour headquarters in 1985 resulted in the appointment of two officials who became central to Kinnock’s process of reform; these were General Secretary Larry Whitty and Director of Campaigns and Communications Peter Mandelson. The following year saw the launch of the Shadow Communications Agency(SCA), a voluntary network of sympathisers working in marketing and advertising[48]. Though they did not prevent the subsequent 1987 defeat, the SCA helped provide creative inspiration and rejuvenate campaign organisation. Some have concluded the election marked Labour's adoption of marketing but, as Nicholas O' Shaughnessy points out, it was perhaps more an object lesson in advertising[49]. Arguably events after the campaign proved to be of greater significance.

In strategic terms Labour embraced a marketing orientation during the Policy Review launched after the 1987 defeat. The initial stage of the Review involved the presentation of specially commissioned opinion research entitled 'Labour and
Britain in the 1990s' to a meeting of senior leadership figures. The report concluded by arguing that Labour ought to radically change direction in order to win uncommitted voters alienated by what was perceived to be the party's outdated image[48]. Ultimately the Review enabled the leadership to effectively reposition itself nearer the electoral centre ground, leading one analyst to conclude:

‘Neil Kinnock is certainly to be congratulated for being the first Labour leader to introduce marketing disciplines into his party's ideas and presentation’[50].

Arguably a legacy of the Review, and the shift to a marketing orientation, has been borne out in the party's collective decision to elect the apparently 'voter friendly' Tony Blair as leader and the subsequent support given him in his successful attempt to re-write Clause Four, Labour's 75 year old mission statement.

CONCLUSIONS.
Rather than viewing the historical transformation of campaigning in Britain as primarily the result of media or technological innovation it is useful to see the process as one of strategic change comparable to the development of a company engaged in conventional business activities. Like the plan of a commercial firm, the organisation of party campaigning can be seen to evolve greater sophistication through three stages, namely the so-called ‘production’, ‘selling’, and ‘marketing’ orientations. In electoral terms these are the equivalent of what have been termed here the ‘propaganda’, ‘media’ and ‘political marketing’ approaches to electioneering. With reference to the Conservatives, this three part sequence of strategic change can be traced through the implementation of initiatives launched following the party’s most serious electoral setbacks in 1906, 1945 and 1974. Similarly Labour developed as a mass propagandist party in response to the expansion of the franchise in 1918, moved towards a media orientation after losing in 1959, and more recently has embraced a political marketing approach after the 1987 defeat.

The two main parties of government in Britain have long been engaged in marketing related activities. The business of political image making and public
relations has a longer heritage in this country than is commonly supposed. As leading advertising executive Winston Fletcher notes:

‘So far from political advertisers copying baked beans and detergents, as the oft-repeated cliche has it, baked beans and detergents have been copying political advertisers, for ages. This should not be surprising. Persuasive communication is the essence of politics, and has been since the dawn of time. The marketing of branded consumer goods is a relative newcomer to the scene.’[25]

Neither is political marketing in this country a product of American importation: witness the Conservatives’ decision to hire Guinness advertisers’ S.H. Benson during the inter-war years. Similarly the highly original analysis of Labour strategists like Sidney Webb, specifically his insights into political market segmentation and targeting, help revise the notion that study of electoral organisation has little to offer the greater understanding of how marketing ideas and practices have emerged.
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ABSTRACT.

By utilising a standard evolutionary model of marketing it is possible to map out three key stages in the development of electioneering, each of which is directly comparable with the production, sales and marketing orientations in commerce. In politics the respective phases can be labelled the propaganda, media and marketing approaches to the electorate. Using this framework the differences between the three campaign orientations become self-evident. Interestingly it also becomes possible to trace the similarities in approach, specifically the important if previously largely unrecognised role that basic marketing concepts have played in British elections since the beginning of the century. Contrary to popular perception, professional advertising and image consciousness are not legacies of the 1980s but date back to the decade following the introduction of near universal suffrage in 1918. The realisation of popular television and consumer marketing in the 1950s exacerbated the need for more coherent party image management. Finally in the late 1970s and 1980s both main contenders for government underwent strategic changes akin to embracing a marketing orientation.
The Historical Role of Marketing in British Politics

Dominic Wring
Nottingham Trent University

1. **Introduction**: increasingly popular reference to role of ‘marketing’ in politics

2. **Evolutionary Models of Marketing**: Crompton & Lamb(1986) divide marketing into theory and practice-

   ‘Marketing is about two things. First it is a philosophy, an attitude and a perspective. Second, it is a set of activities used to implement that philosophy.’

   *So it is possible to view development of electioneering with reference to changes in strategic orientation adopted, not just the media and technologies used.*
3. **Era of Mass Propaganda.**
Parallel with production orientation in commerce- strategy essentially one-directional communication:

‘... increased awareness would increase voter preference. The inputs to the promotion campaign to achieve increased awareness were designed on the basis of guess and intuition.’(Shama, 1976)

*Marketing awareness- 1918 and rise of mass media/society/electorate. Conservative(1920s handbook); Labour(Egerton Wake; Sidney Webb)

*Press offices- Conservative, 1911; Labour, 1917

*Professional advertising- Conservative, 1929; Labour(London) 1937

*Film production- Conservatives/Clavering and Korda; Labour and Paul Rotha.
4. **The Introduction of Media Campaigning.**
Similar to the ‘selling concept’ in business strategy:

\[\text{‘(polling) studies were conducted concerning the effectiveness of different promotion appeals and media in reaching voters’ (Shama).}\]

*Introduction of party opinion polling*

*Intensification of advertising/rise of admass culture*
5. **The Advent of Political Marketing.**
Mirrors the development of marketing orientation in business strategy sense. The approach:

‘calls for research which goes far deeper than this(i.e. copy testing). The new marketing concept is interested in the basic needs and wants of the voters.’(Shama)

*Full service polling and advertising consultancy -Conservatives and Saatchi brothers, 1978-; Labour and the Shadow Agency, 1986-

*Marketing research/environmental analysis and leadership development of Margaret Thatcher and Neil Kinnock.

6. **Conclusions.**
‘Americanisation’ thesis limited- British parties making major strategic headway in inter-war period.