Framing the neocons: European media representations of US foreign policy making

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Additional Information:

- A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.

Metadata Record: [https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/12167](https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/12167)

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Abstract

There is a lively academic debate concerning US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era and especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Neoconservatism has become a cause célèbre in the literature of international relations with a variety of scholars disagreeing as to its supposed impact on Washington’s world affairs approach and the Bush administration’s decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power manu militari. This thesis is an analysis of the way this political ideology was interpreted in the European elite media. It will be demonstrated how a significant section of key opinion-forming newspapers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy framed neoconservatism during the administration of Bill Clinton and partly that of George W. Bush. There will be an exploration of whether and how newspapers vary in their coverage.

The thesis will outline that the influence of the neoconservatives in US foreign policy can be disputed and will suggest that their ideas can be hardly considered as revolutionary ones. It will then focus on the media coverage and will show that the prominence devoted to neoconservatism by the accessed print sources is a relatively recent phenomenon. The findings indicate that the newspapers differed in their representation of the political ideology only in the period before 9/11 when they mainly discussed it in the context of domestic affairs. By contrast, after the terrorist atrocities and especially since 2003 they linked neoconservatism to US foreign policy and largely focused on it - as opposed to competing international relations theories -, representing it in a remarkably similar way. With the exception of The Times, which followed a comparatively balanced approach, they constructed it as a driving force behind George W. Bush’s international politics approach and the war on Iraq. The media emphasis on neoconservatism will be attributed to different factors - such the scapegoat theory - which maybe influenced the journalistic work. The general consensus as to their understanding of neoconservatism and its supposed impact will not support the claim of a European public sphere but will be considered as a positive step towards its possible creation.

Key Words: Neoconservatism, US foreign policy, 9/11, democracy, preemption, unilateralism, war on Iraq, Strauss, agenda-setting, framing, European media, European public sphere
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Preface and acknowledgments

I was inspired to undertake this research project during my postgraduate studies in London, Nice, Berlin and Rome from September 2002 until June 2004. The reason was the Iraq war, the debate concerning the necessity of this military operation, and the highly anti-American feeling which dominated European public opinion. After reading relevant books and articles, attending lectures of scholars from several countries and at various universities and living the experience of many anti-war demonstrations, I found it also interesting to investigate the position of various media in the European Union. My main question was how they constructed US foreign policy and if their coverage could reflect and maybe reinforce the negative public attitude towards the US in Europe.

My education background had been based by 2004 on history and international relations. Therefore, a serious concern for me was to be supervised by a scholar who would not only have knowledge in the area of politics but who would be also an expert in media and communication studies. Dr. Dominic Wring offered me this broad guidance in the department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University. Without his help and support this PhD thesis would have been a non-starter from the beginning. Other scholars in the same department such as Professor Dennis Smith, Dr. David Deacon, Dr. John Richardson and Dr. James Stanyer also were ready to offer me a piece of advice every time I asked them.

This PhD thesis was a risky project. Its character was interdisciplinary. It had to be approached from three disciplinary perspectives, which had to be linked together. The first has its basis in international relations, the second in media studies and the third in European politics. This project also required translation of a high number of articles from French, German and Italian into English. All these issues made theoretically the implementation of the thesis difficult and perplexed because the time budget was limited as well. Acknowledging this difficulty, I had to limit the scope of the research in order to make it doable. In cooperation with my supervisor Dr. Dominic Wring I decided to focus on a particular aspect of US foreign policy. This was neoconservatism as the impact of this ideology was highly debatable in the aftermath of 11 September.

During my PhD studies I endeavoured to write essays and make presentations relevant to the chapters of my thesis in various conferences in order to receive feedback from professors with different backgrounds. There is a list of scholars I want to thank for the useful comments they gave me. Professor Alan Bryman helped me in my effort to
organise the methodology of the thesis and choose the appropriate research methods. In the area of US foreign policy, I am thankful to Dr. Steven Hurst from Manchester Metropolitan University, whom I met when I presented a paper on the history of neoconservatism at the American Politics Group's conference in January 2006. I also want to thank Professor Anne Norton. I had a valuable discussion with her after my presentation on 'Leo Strauss and the European media' on the occasion of 'The Legacy of Leo Strauss' conference, which took place in Nottingham in March 2006.

While my research was still in progress, I attempted to present some of the findings at the 'Internationalising Media Studies: Imperatives and Impediments' conference at the University of Westminster in September 2006. During this event I was lucky to exchange views with many scholars such as Professor of international communication Daya Thussu. In the area of European studies I am thankful to Dr. Stelios Stavridis from the University of Zaragoza with whom I co-authored a joint chapter concerning European public opinion in the book he edited: Understanding and Evaluating the European Union: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches. I want also to thank Professor Dimitris Chrysochoou from the University of Crete for his comments after my presentation on the European public sphere on the island of Spetses in July 2008.

The scholarship on American Studies I was awarded by the Hellenic Republic after pan-hellenic examinations in April 2005 and the subsequent co-operation I had with my supervisor in Greece Professor Kostas Ifantis were also significant for the implementation of my doctorate. Furthermore, my job as columnist in the Greek newspaper 'Apogevmatini' from January 2007 onwards has proved to be important as well. After coming across a significant part of the bibliography on media studies I started to combine my theoretical knowledge on journalism with practical experience. Finally, the comments and suggestions of John Downey from Loughborough University and Robin Brown from the University of Leeds during my viva voce examination on 10 November 2008 significantly contributed to improve the thesis.

Above all I want to thank my father, mother and friends for their love and support.

G. T.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been widely perceived to be the hyperpower in the international arena. The Soviet Union collapsed and the bipolar structure of the world changed into a unipolar one with the US remaining as the only superpower. As Joseph Nye observes, 'not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others' (Nye, 2002: 1). Washington's foreign policy has influenced areas and issues, which could not but affect its partnership with traditional allies, such as the European Union. This became largely evident in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were considered by the US as responsible for organising the multiple murderous suicide bombings. The fight against terror became the highest priority of the administration of George W. Bush. Responding to the onslaughts the US led a defensive war against Afghanistan in October 2001 and continued with a preemptive one against Iraq in March 2003.

The war the US had to wage and lead was one of a new type with a global battlefield. The fundamental conflict structure after 9/11 was not that of a confrontation between nation states but of a fight of an international coalition of countries against terror. Territorial borders are not respected by either the terrorists or the US as a limitation for their operations (Höijer et al., 2004, 7, 8). As Gary Hart puts it, ‘states no longer control when, where, and how violence - war - will be conducted and whether it will be organised and carried out in accordance with established international conventions’ (Hart, 2004: 6). Terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda, certainly operate across national borders and directly target civil society, as the Madrid and London bombings in March 2004 and July 2005 respectively highlighted. For their part, mainstream Muslims accuse the US of launching a total war against the entire Islamist movement (Gerges, 2005: 70).

One of the basic features of the way the US fought its war on terror and especially that against Iraq was its ignorance for multilateral institutions and its intention to go alone without cooperating with its strategic partners. For this reason transatlantic relations suffered a period of high tension. When George W. Bush, for instance, made his ‘axis of evil’ speech in January 2002 including Iraq, Iraq and North Korea in a list of countries Washington might invade, the response of France was that the US was following a
simplistic foreign policy (Dalley, *The New York Times*, 07/02/02). The war on Iraq was a watershed for EU-US relations. Many European countries, most notably France and Germany, opposed the idea of a military campaign against Baghdad. Their preference for the option of diplomacy and a peaceful solution contradicted the US decision of using military force without UN authorisation.

The war on Iraq did not only outline the transatlantic rift. It also highlighted the failure of the EU to speak with one voice in international politics. Britain, Italy, Spain and other European countries such as Denmark and Poland did not agree with the approach of France and Germany. By contrast, they openly backed US administration’s decision to start a military campaign against Iraq in order to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Nevertheless, in spite of EU’s disintegration and its split over US foreign policy, civil society in the member-states of the Union showed a remarkable degree of coherence. Not only European public opinion was not fragmented vis-à-vis the US but it also formed a common front. Anti-Americanism was on the rise in Europe while the picture of President Bush remained highly negative even in the countries the governments of which supported the Iraq war.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September and the subsequent US response arguably underlined American hegemony in world affairs. Numerous intellectuals embarked on an attempt to analyse US foreign policy after those atrocities. Their views are often contradictory. There are scholars who see continuity in the conduct of US foreign policy. For example, professor of American history Peter Leffler writes that the differences between George W. Bush and his predecessors ‘have more to do with style than with substance’ and that ‘there is nothing revolutionary in [his] goals or vision’ (Leffler, 2004: 23). On the contrary, other scholars do not agree with that approach. For instance, according to historian John Lewis Gaddis, in his first four years in office George W. Bush presided over the most sweeping redesign of US grand strategy since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Gaddis, 2005: 2).

Amid different interpretations of US foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 September, a specific political ideology started gradually to become a usual reference in the literature

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1 It is noted that the term ‘Europe’ or ‘European’ will be used to refer to the EU and subsequently to member states of the Union.
of international relations. This was neoconservatism. Although neoconservatism had preexisted in this literature before 11 September, scholars who dealt with the term afterwards, laid greater emphasis on its principles and main representatives. However, they mainly concentrated on its potential impact on US foreign policy. The way in which the 'so called' neoconservatives within the US administration influenced George W. Bush's world affairs approach has turned out to be a highly controversial issue. Within this context, the work and teaching of political philosopher Leo Strauss came to the forefront as well. His supposed influence on the neoconservatives, and subsequently, on Washington's decision to start its military operation against Iraq in 2003 developed into an additional debatable issue.

This research project focuses on European interpretations of neoconservatism. In this regard, European opinion-forming and agenda-setting newspapers offer a useful source for such an analysis. Specifically, newspapers from Britain, France, Germany and Italy that is to say of the 'Big Four' of the European Union are accessed. The study of the media is significant because they tend to represent and reinforce the views of their readers (Lambert, 2003: 63). Even before the beginning of the Second World War, E. H. Carr had already considered the press as an 'immensely powerful organ of opinion' (Carr, 1940: 6). As also Roger Silverstone puts it: 'It is all about power [...] The power the media have to set an agenda. The power they have to destroy one. The power they have to influence and change the political process. The power to enable, to inform. The power to deceive'. Media representations frame as well as inform experiences (Silverstone, 1999: 138, 143).

In the context of the EU and because of the globalization process the role of the media is also important as they can theoretically contribute to the creation of a European public sphere. In its white paper in 2006, for instance, the Commission considered the media as key players in its communication strategy (EU website, 01/02/06). Its purpose is to close the gap between the Union and the citizens of its member-states and to enhance the public debate in Europe. Although neoconservatism is not a European issue itself but is related to developments in the US, the analysis of its coverage can reveal something about political journalism at the EU level. It can also show if citizens of the 'Big Four',
understood US foreign policy in a similar way - through the perspective of neoconservatism - despite the division of their governments’ positions.

The thesis will analyse the coverage of neoconservatism by the European elite media for a period of 13 years, from the beginning of 1993 until the end 2005. This covers both terms of the administration of Bill Clinton and five years of that of George Bush. The main objective of the research project is to investigate how neoconservatism has impacted on the agenda of the elite newspapers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy. It will be demonstrated if the media of the ‘Big Four’ constructed the political ideology in a similar way and whether they represented the neoconservatives and political philosopher Leo Strauss as influencing Washington’s world affairs approach. This discussion will be associated to the debate concerning the potential existence of a European public sphere. In addition, explanations for the media stance will be given and the quality of the coverage will be assessed. What will be specifically considered is if the insistence on the neoconservative cause can provide a satisfactory background for the development of US foreign policy after 11 September.

The thesis will start with an examination of the relationship between neoconservatism and US foreign policy by placing it in a historical perspective. This will be the aim of Chapter 2. Although neoconservatism is related not only to world affairs but also domestic politics the chapter will mainly concentrate on the former aspect because of the supposed impact of this political ideology on the foreign policy of George W. Bush. It will be discussed how and why neoconservatism emerged, how it developed and what are its fundamental features and principles. The discussion will consider whether neoconservatism had an influence on US politics before the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The analysis will draw on the work of politicians and intellectuals who are either sympathetic towards or critical of the ideology and the neoconservatives.

The subsequent goal of the thesis will be to analyse the debate concerning the alleged neoconservative influence on the Bush administration. Chapter 3 will deal with this issue outlining that the supposed impact of the political ideology was disputed in the literature of international relations. It will discuss the role of non-neoconservative politicians in Washington’s planning of the Iraq war and will focus on other foreign policy schools shaping Bush’s world affairs approach such as nationalism and realism. It will also
explore if US foreign policy after 9/11 and especially its preemptive strategy can be regarded as a revolutionary one by concentrating on precedents in international relations and American history.

Chapter 4 will focus on the significance of neoconservatism and US foreign policy for the EU. The course of EU-US relations since 1945 will be discussed. The role of the media concerning the transatlantic rift before the war on Iraq of 2003 will also be outlined. In parallel with that the discussion will concentrate on their theoretical relationship with politics. Issues of major concern will include the way the media understand the world and perceive reality as well as their potential influence on public opinion. Subsequently, the methodological issues raised by this project will be analysed. It will be explained why both quantitative and qualitative methods will be used while a framework for the comparison of different media systems will be given. This chapter will also deal with the choice of specific European newspapers in the context of a potential creation of a European public sphere and with problematic aspects of the thesis such as the use of online resources and the translation from three European languages into English.

The results of the quantitative content analysis will be presented in Chapter 5. A particular focus will be the comparison of the volume of articles published before and after 11 September 2001. The data will be categorised according to the ideology and nationality of the newspapers accessed. With the use of specific histograms the stance of the given media will be explored at specific junctures as for example in the first eight months on the Bush presidency. This chapter will also explore if the accessed newspapers used the abbreviation ‘neocons’ in their articles demonstrating maybe a familiarity in their usage of the term neoconservatism or its equivalents.

The next sections of the thesis will be devoted to qualitative analysis of the coverage. As it is interesting to show how the term was used by the media over a several-years period, the nature of the articles will be examined in two periods having the day of the terrorist attacks as a dividing line. Chapter 6 will deal with the period prior to the atrocities and will indicate how the media interpreted neoconservatism and if they did so in relation to US foreign policy. Chapter 7 will discuss how the selected newspapers understood neoconservatism in the context of the new international environment after the
onslaughts of 11 September. The main figures and policies of neoconservatism as identified by the media will be described and compared to the relevant findings of the previous chapter.

Chapter 8 will analyse the way the newspapers interpreted the impact of the political ideology on US foreign policy. In particular, what will be explored is how the media assessed the role of the neoconservative group in influencing the Bush administration to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime manu militari in 2003. This chapter will also examine if other theories of international relations were discussed in the European press. In so doing it will conclude if the interest shown by the newspapers in neoconservatism was misplaced or not and if they significantly framed US foreign policy through the perspective of this political ideology.

Chapter 9 will attempt to complement the previous one. It will deal with the supposed influence of political philosopher Leo Strauss on the neoconservatives as mediated by the chosen European newspapers. Its main goal will be to explore if the media focused on Strauss in their interest in political ideology after 9/11 and if they saw him as a highly influential figure not only for members of the group but also for US contemporary politics. This will maybe constitute a case study of this project as it will be based on both quantitative and qualitative methods while it will also provide a theoretical framework for the alleged influence of Leo Strauss.

Chapter 10 will summarise the findings of the project. It will attempt to find potential explanations for the stance of the European elite newspapers and their position on neoconservatism. The media coverage of the political ideology will be placed within the framework of international relations and various interpretations of US foreign policy after 11 September. The chapter will also concentrate on the nature of journalism in the aftermath of 9/11. It will focus on the common political discourse of the media and will discuss the idea of the potential creation of a European public sphere. The chapter will finally suggest ideas for future research and ways this project can be complemented and expanded.
Chapter 2: The Genesis of Neoconservatism

The use of theories concerning foreign policy can provide a background of how states act in the international arena. US world affairs approach cannot be an exception. There are particular foreign policy schools which help explain US strategy in international relations from the era of the American Revolution onwards. Walter Russell Mead focuses on different debates which have shaped US foreign policy (Mead, 2001).\(^2\) Mead, who argues that the US has had a successful history in international relations from its very first beginning, defines four different foreign policy schools: the Hamiltonians, Jeffersonians, Jacksonians and Wilsonians (ibid; Mead, 2002: 165).

Hamiltonians, named after first Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton, pursue the national interest and commerce as business is their raison d’être for US foreign policy. Their main objective is to enhance US position in world’s market place. Jeffersonians, named after US President from 1801 until 1809 Thomas Jefferson, are those who put US domestic interest above its international one and aim at pursuing democracy at home in order to be a beacon to other nations. Jacksonians, named after US President from 1828 until 1836 Andrew Jackson, are populists who emphasise self-reliance and the use of coercion. Jacksonians are not against the use of military force in the international arena. Finally, Wilsonians, named after US President from 1913 until 1921 Woodrow Wilson, are interested in spreading democracy and champion international law. In other words, they want to make the world safe for democracy by taking the force out of international relations and replacing it with judicial norms (Mead, 2001).

The categorizations made by Walter Russell Mead offer a framework that can potentially explain the evolution of US foreign policy from 1776 onwards. Realism, isolationism, nationalism and liberal internationalism are the principles Hamiltonians, Jeffersonians, Jacksonians and Wilsonians respectively advocate. Many scholars employ all or some of those principles in order to analyse US foreign policy (Hurst, 2005; Krauthammer, 2004; Nye 2004; Podhoretz, 2005). In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September and especially a few months before the war on Iraq of 2003, the attention of scholars and intellectuals started to turn towards a comparatively new

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\(^2\) Walter Russell Mead is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
political ideology. This was neoconservatism, which contains some elements of both the schools of Jacksonians and Wilsonians, as to its support for a potential usage of military force and democracy promotion but not necessarily on the basis of international law. Neoconservatism was not born after the attacks of 11 September but many years before them. Consequently, it is important to examine its evolution in a historical perspective, that is to say before 11 September and the beginning of George W. Bush presidency.

**The Neoconservatives**

The term 'neoconservative' entered the modern American lexicon in the 1970s to define a new political tendency formed mainly by those who had turned towards the right having abandoned their often left-wing affiliation. The leading American socialist Michael Harrington and the editors of *Dissent* first used the word neoconservative in the 1970s as a derogatory description of former allies who had been either comrades in the US Socialist Party or traditional liberals (Dorrien, 2004: 7). Specifically, these ex-allies of Harrington in the Socialist Part or old liberals were a group of intellectuals including Edward Banfield, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, Irving Kristol, Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Michael Novak, Norman Podhoretz, Robert Tucker and James Q. Wilson.³

The intellectuals who became known as neoconservatives in the 1970s were not particularly satisfied with the label which had been attributed to them. They tended to reject the term as 'pejorative' (Podhoretz, 1996: 20). Nevertheless, as Norman Podhoretz points out, they eventually surrendered to the name because nothing these people could

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³ Edward Banfield was Professor of Urban Government at Harvard University while he also taught at the University of Pennsylvania. His best known work is *The Unheavenly City* in which he discussed the urban crisis. Daniel Bell, author of the books *The End of Ideology* and *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* was a sociologist and social theorist. Nathan Glazer was then professor of education and sociology at the University of California in Berkeley and co-authored along with Daniel P. Moynihan the book *Beyond the Melting Pot*. Sidney Hook was an American philosopher and professor at the New York University. Irving Kristol had graduated from the City College of New York in 1940 and was professor of social thought at the New York University Graduate School of Business. Seymour Martin Lipset was a sociologist and political scientist teaching at various universities such as at the University of California and Harvard. Daniel P. Moynihan was a social scientist specialised in urban affairs having studied at the City College of New York, Fletcher School of Law Diplomacy and London School of Economics. Michael Novak was a theologian and professor at various universities including Stanford and Harvard. Norman Podhoretz had studied English and Hebrew literature and was contributor to many journals. Robert Tucker was a political scientist and professor at John Hopkins University. Finally, James Q. Wilson was professor of political science at Harvard University.
say or do prevented them from being called neoconservatives (Ibid: 20, 21). In the words of Irving Kristol, 'a neoconservative was a liberal, who had been mugged by reality,' that is to say a person with a liberal past who had embraced liberal values and maybe never abandoned them (Kirkpatrick, 2004: 35). These intellectuals had not constituted a particular political entity previously. Almost all of them were born in the 1920s or shortly before or after. Many of them were Jews coming to age in a decade during which the triumph of fascism and Nazi power resulted in the outbreak of the Second World War and the Holocaust. They were also socialists and anti-Stalinists and combated Communists in the name of various socialist factions (Steinfels, 1979: 24-27). Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke comment that neoconservative thinkers like Bell, Glazer, Kristol, Lipset and Moynihan became an identifiable group in the 1930s as a non-communist entity in order to discuss the nature of their anti-Stalinism (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 45).

The early Marxism of the future neoconservatives was enough for critics to call them 'quasi-Marxists conservatives' (Steinfels, 1979:28). Original neoconservatives are often associated with Leon Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' theory. Examples of the critics who link the neoconservatives to Leon Trotsky include isolationist politician Patrick Buchanan who writes that the original neoconservatives were ex-Trotskyites (Buchanan, 2004: 37). Similarly, Michael Lind argues that most neoconservative intellectuals 'are products of the largely Jewish-American Trotskyist movement of the 1930.' (Lind, 2003: 10). In parallel, writing in Foreign Affairs John Judis compares the Trotskyists and the neoconservatives in terms of their approach to socialism and democracy respectively. Judis explains that Trotskyists were convinced internationalists who believed that Stalin was trying to build socialism in one country and not through world revolution had thereby created 'a degenerate worker's state instead of a genuine dictatorship of the proletariat.' He therefore argues that neoconservatism is a kind of inverted Trotskyism which seeks to export democracy [...] in the same way that Trotsky originally envisaged exporting socialism.'(Judis, 1995:126).

However, the connection between the philosophy of Leon Trotsky and that of neoconservatism has been disputed. According to Jonah Golberg, Trotsky is never quoted in neoconservative op-eds and journals or invoked in neoconservative debates and
conferences and the neoconservatives have never publicly expressed any fondness for Trotsky (Goldberg, 2003). In addition, Max Boot, who would become known as a neoconservative in the 1990s, considers as ‘absurd’ the charge that the neoconservatives are adherents to the ‘permanent revolution’ theory of Trotsky, noting that Trotsky was a communist who remained committed to establishing a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ on coming to power (Boot, 2004: 51). Furthermore, Murray Friedman writes in his account about neoconservatism that although Irving Kristol had backed Trotsky, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Bell had been anti-Trotskyites (Friedman, 2005: 28).

The intellectuals who would be called neoconservatives in the 1970s were mainly anti-communist liberals and loyal Democrats in the years after 1945, the 1950s and the 1960s. From the beginning of the Cold War, they were absorbed into the general liberal consensus. This implied an acknowledgment of the danger of communism, a support for the idea of containment and the US’s new world role in the Cold War era and a strong belief in democracy. With reference to domestic affairs, these liberals embraced the idea of a struggle against oppression, stagnation, pride and corruption (Ehrman, 1994: 15-17). Talking into account that the neoconservatives had expressed for many years a liberal ideology it is important to investigate the reasons that led to their reemergence as a new political group with a right-wing label.

There is little debate concerning the reasons that led the neoconservatives to constitute a particular political entity in the 1970s and most scholars whether neoconservative or not seem to agree on this issue. Specifically, the liberal consensus started to lose its coherence in the latter half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (Ehrman, 1994: 32; Frum, 1994: 126, 127). Developments in American society as well as within the framework of the Cold War and the US struggle against the Soviet Union became open to debate and caused many disturbances in liberal circles. A response was required to the revolutionary rhetoric and radicalism of the New Left and the counterculture which allegedly led to social disorders in the 1960s (Aronowitz, 2007, 57-58). The ambitious attempts for reform in America coincided with the spread of the use of violence. For instance, black and white militancy was on the rise because of the civil rights movement. Furthermore, the war in Vietnam also contributed to social disorder. Widespread protests,
campus militancy, urban rioting and clashes with the police caused alarm to the intellectuals who later be called neoconservatives (Berlet, 2007: 87).

The war in Vietnam also created scepticism about the purposes of American internationalism. The necessity of US involvement in international affairs and the extent to which it had to compete with the Soviet Union became major issues of discussion. Many liberals considered America’s role in this war as ‘evil.’ (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 52). As the war in Vietnam was escalating, revisionist theories of the Cold War gained strength (Ehrman, 1994: 21). Questions arose about the direction of US foreign policy under Lyndon Johnson and no theory appeared which could unify the liberals. As a result of these debatable issues, a new group emerged after the defeat of the Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey and the victory of Richard Nixon in the 1968 elections had freed liberals from responsibility for policy and allowed them a chance to develop alternatives.

The new group of liberals saw a threat to democracy caused by the afore mentioned domestic and international developments and reconsidered much of what they had believed earlier (Ehrman, 1994: 24, 33, 35). They turned away from what they viewed as the excess of the ‘counterculture,’ the racial conflict, the urban riots and the national divisions over the war in Vietnam (Steinfels, 1981: 39). They also feared the risks of Soviet expansionism abroad caused by a potential US hands-off approach in the Third World and expressed their dismay at the Left’s unwillingness to stand up to the Soviets (Frum, 1994: 126, 127). They also saw the debate over Vietnam as a mechanism to identify anti-American people (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 52). Their response was neoconservatism.

**Core Philosophy**

The main principles of neoconservatism cannot be easily identified. Neoconservatives themselves reject the idea of they constitute a movement meaning a body of persons with specific common goals. For instance, Irving Kristol writes that when two neoconservatives meet they are more likely to argue with one another than to agree. He talks about ‘a neoconservative persuasion’ and not a movement (Kristol, 2004: 33). This persuasion has been called ‘a neoconservative tendency’ by Norman Podhoretz
However, there was common ground which united neoconservative intellectuals in the 1970s. Although Irving Kristol did not agree with the idea of a movement, he attempted to define an ideological consensus synthesised around five main points in an article he wrote in Newsweek in 1976. Neoconservatism was not necessarily hostile to the idea of a welfare state but was opposed to the paternalistic state. It also had considerable respect for the market as long as individual freedoms were preserved. Furthermore, it respected traditional values such as religion and the family. It also rejected the egalitarianism in which everyone would have 'equal shares of everything.' Finally, with reference to foreign policy, neoconservatism expressed a fear that 'American democracy was not likely to survive for long in a world that was overwhelmingly hostile to American values' (Steinfels, 1979: 51, 52).

Scholars dismiss the contention of Kristol and Podhoretz that neoconservatism has not evolved as a movement since its emergence. Peter Steinfels uses the word movement to describe neoconservatism although he acknowledges there was no manifesto or programme, nor were statements issued from any association for neoconservatives (Steinfels, 1979: 49). Scholars also largely agree that the description offered by Irving Kristol captures the way the original neoconservative intellectuals were thinking in the 1970s. Thus, leading commentators Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke contend, the points made by Kristol provide a framework for understanding of the group's thinking (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 49).

During the 1970s the neoconservatives strongly opposed ideas and policies such as affirmative action, prison reform, the Equal Rights Amendment and more inclusive admissions to colleges and universities. Feminism, environmentalism and gay rights were anathema to their agenda. The neoconservatives were unsettled by Lyndon Johnson's Great Society (Noble, 2007: 111). They believed Johnson's war on the poverty mostly benefited a 'new class' of bureaucrats and social workers (Dorrien, 2004: 9). Neoconservative intellectuals as Irving Kristol and Robert Novak explained that liberalism was catering to emerging generational power bloc, in other words the 'new class' children of the 1960s, who greatly increased the ranks of the non-producing managerial class of America (Ibid, 2004: 9). As Novak observed: 'Over 35 percent of the GNP is now supplied by the knowledge industry: federal and local government workers,
researchers, lawyers, planners, consultants, educators, information systems operatives, journalists, social workers and others. Most of the workers in this industry depend for their livelihood on expanding and activist government expenditure' (quoted in Steinfelds, 1979: 57).

The neoconservatives did not oppose the idea of welfare state in the way traditional conservatism did (Steinfelds, 1979: 41). The leading neoconservatives had approved the New Deal reforms because they had been supporters of this policy of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. Irving Kristol recalled they were ‘children of the depression [...] and felt a measure of loyalty to the spirit of the New Deal if not to all its programs and policies’ (Kristol, 1995: 84). Although there was no neoconservative consensus on specific proposals and every government initiative would be judged separately, the neoconservatives generally supported programs that relieved potentially social tensions (Steinfelds, 1979: 41).

In the international arena, the neoconservatives supported Israel and were dubious about Arab intentions. This stance has become open to debate as to the real motivation of the group. Neoconservatives argue they viewed Israel as a democratic and vulnerable outpost in a strategically vital region and that their support for it can be explained on the basis of their staunch anti-Soviet and anti-Communist position during the Cold War years (Podhoretz, 1996: 22). They also observe that their support for Israel is often attributed to the fact that many of them are Jewish (Podhoretz, 1996: 22). This is a contention they obviously reject. However, Patrick Buchanan, a leading right-wing critic of neoconservatism, suggests this is a convenient distraction: ‘Neocons say we attack them because they are Jewish. We do not’ (Buchanan, 2003). Whatever their motivation, the neoconservatives’ support for Israel was sincere.4 After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the group feared that the US would force Israel to accept a settlement on the basis of what they saw as a detrimental ‘land for peace’ agreement.

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4 After the end of the Cold War scholars such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt linked the neoconservative group to the Israeli lobby in the US (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006)
Towards a 'Movement'

At the beginning of the 1970s the neoconservatives felt confident that their own views could offer the US a future of practical and efficient change. Leading figures in their group, consisted of social scientists, academics and important figures in literary circles who all endeavoured to promote their views. They were linked to two key journals. The one was *Commentary*, the monthly published since 1959 by the American Jewish Committee with Norman Podhoretz as its editor in chief. The other was *The Public Interest* founded by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell in 1965. Alongside these ventures, the neoconservatives made their presence felt through think tanks. A major base emerged in the American Enterprise Institute which was originally a right-wing exponent of unreconstructed free enterprise (Dorrien, 2004: 11). Leading neoconservatives also developed strong links with the Heritage Foundation, Georgetown Centre for Strategic Studies, Aspen Institute, Hudson Institute and the Freedom House.

The neoconservatives had little influence over Democratic Party thinking. Indeed, they became slowly isolated within it. The post 1968 reforms of the Party had introduced a largely primary based system that reduced the importance of the national party conventions. This helped shift the Democrats toward what the neoconservatives saw as ideas antipathetic to what they believed were the interests of the US (Ehrman, 1994: 62). By the time George McGovern had become the presidential candidate in 1972, the neoconservatives had become totally disenchanted. They were especially alienated by McGovern's call for co-operation with the Soviet Union and his more dovish foreign policy views (Friedman, 2005: 137; Kirkpatrick, 2004: 240). Irving Kristol, who had voted for Richard Nixon in 1968, now openly supported him, became a Republican in 1972 (Ehrman, 1994: 46).

Following the 1972 defeat, many neoconservatives lined up behind Democratic leaders such as Hubert Humphrey and Henry Jackson and founded the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in opposition to supporters of McGovern (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 55, Stelzer, 2004: 22, 23). The Coalition was organised by Ben Wattenberg and Midge Decter who was Norman Podhoretz's wife. Others involved were the prominent writer, Max Kampelman, political scientist and professor at Georgetown University Jeane Kirkpatrick and Penn Kemble. Sponsors were also Bell, Glazer, Lipset, Novak,
Podhoretz and the Harvard professor Richard Pipes. In defending a muscular American confrontation with the Soviet Union, the neoconservatives were fiercely critical of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy of détente. However, the coalition of the Democratic Majority was ineffective and by the end of 1974, they were only a minority faction within the Party. They lacked effective organisation and leadership and had little hope that their approach would bring success (Ehrman, 1994: 60-62).

Hitherto the neoconservative political philosophy was primarily the product of theory rather than practice. The group was mainly observing, analysing and criticising developments in domestic and foreign affairs from outside and not acting from inside. Daniel Patrick Moynihan was the first neoconservative to bridge the gap between the intellectual and practical political sphere (Ehrman, 1994: 63). A social scientist specialising in urban and ethnic affairs Moynihan had served as an assistant to Governor of New York Averell Harriman in the 1950s and to Secretary of Labour Arthur Goldberg in Kennedy’s administration. Although Moynihan was a Democrat, he also served as Secretary of the Urban Affairs Council and US ambassador in India during Nixon’s administration. While he was in India Moynihan argued that President Woodrow Wilson had been correct standing for a quest for legitimacy in the world order which envisaged the US had ‘to defend, and where possible, to advance democratic principles in the world at large’(Ehrman, 1994: 80).

Moynihan’s appointment as US ambassador at the UN during Ford’s administration gave him the opportunity to further express his beliefs. His support for Israel and condemnation of the 1975 UN Resolution, which equated Zionism with racism, were characteristic of his rhetoric (Friedman, 2005: 149, Halper and Clarke, 2004: 59). However, in early 1976 Moynihan resigned his position due to continuous disagreements with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. After his departure from the UN, he was elected Senator of New York and thus became the first neoconservative to hold public office. Moynihan opposed the Carter administration’s foreign policy of seeking greater cooperation rather than confrontation with Moscow (Friedman, 2005: 149). He agreed with Henry Jackson’s argument for a muscular US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.
President Carter did not entrust any administration positions to neoconservatives. Moynihan, Podhoretz and Lipset - being outside from government - strongly were able to criticise the foreign policy of Carter in public. During this period Jeane Kirkpatrick also emerged as a leading neoconservative. Months into the Iranian Revolution, Kirkpatrick published her article ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’ in Commentary magazine. She argued that the role of the US in the Third World should have been ‘the liberalization and democratization, provided that [...] proposed reforms are aimed at producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight’ (Kirkpatrick, 1979: 44). Kirkpatrick’s argument was that democratising Third World countries might take ‘decades or even centuries’ and that the Carter administration had to apply its belief in democracy to all countries equally (Mann, 2004: 92, 93). Accordingly, in seeking political liberalisation the Carter administration had to ensure that this attempt would not bring the opposite result as was the case of Iran. (Mann, 2004: 92-93).

The neoconservatives were largely against the second strategic nuclear arms treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet Union. Prominent advocates such as Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, Seymour Martin Lipset and Eugene Rostow joined the Committee on the Present Danger founded by Paul Nitze in 1976 (Friedman, 2005: 142, 143). The Committee was not solely a neoconservative but a politically independent organisation (Ehrman, 1994: 112). It aimed at offering a better understanding of the problems the US foreign policy was facing because of the enlargement of Soviet strategic and military forces. Because of this it was perhaps inevitable that it gained the support of the neoconservatives.

The neoconservatives hoped that Moynihan might challenge Carter for the Democratic nomination of the candidate of the Democratic Party leadership in the 1980 presidential election. When it became clear that this would not happen they realised they no longer had a credible figure within the Party to turn to as a leader (Ehrman, 1994: 99). Ronald Reagan proved a better alternative. Reagan’s victory in the elections of 1980 gave the group renewed hope. The ‘empire of evil’ rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and his strong anticomunism resembled neoconservative ambitions taking into account the foreign policy challenges the administration faced. The latter included the attacks by anti-government guerrillas and leftist rebels in Nicaragua, Grenada and El Salvador, the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the unrest in Poland (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 163).

The Politics of Realignment

Following Reagan's victory many neoconservatives sought to influence his administration. As Max Boot observes, 'following the 1980 election, US President Ronald Reagan became the new standard bearer of the neoconservative cause' (Boot, 2004). In February 1981 the Committee for the Free World was formed by Midge Decter. It aimed at defending and preserving the free world 'against the rising menace of totalitarian barbarism in books, newspapers, broadcasts, classrooms and in all public institutions' (Ehrman, 1994: 139). This committee helped put neoconservatives in touch with one another by organising conferences and supporting campus groups of students. One of those who supported financially the Committee for the Free World was Donald Rumsfeld (Ehrman, 1994: 140, 141).

Many of the neoconservatives took important positions in Reagan's administration. Reagan, who had read the article of Kirkpatrick about dictatorships and double standards, appointed her as US ambassador to the UN from 1981 until 1985. Young neoconservative politicians, who would hold governmental positions two decades later during George W. Bush's administration, served President Reagan. Elliot Abrams was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs, later for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and then for Inter-American affairs. Richard Perle became Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy with Douglas Feith as his special counsel. Feith also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations policy. Paul Wolfowitz was initially made Head of Policy Planning at the State Department and later Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Lewis Libby was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in the office of the Secretary of State and later served in the US Department of State as Director of Special Projects in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Friedman, 2005: 153).

The neoconservative politicians sought to establish new policies designed to restore the strength of the US and to defend liberal democracy in the world. At the same time, neoconservative intellectuals also saw the beginning of the Reagan administration as an
opportunity for the implementation of a US foreign policy in order to contain Soviet expansionism. Podhoretz argued that under Reagan the Republican Party would reassert the responsibility for restraining Soviet expansionism, which had been abandoned after the Vietnam War (Podhoretz, 1984: 449). In his first term, President Reagan followed a series of policies in the international arena which could maybe be described as neoconservative. For example, his plans for the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) showed his determination for a muscular confrontation with Moscow. In parallel with this, he followed a policy of assistance to anticommunist guerrillas and governments known as the Reagan Doctrine. In particular, the US president endeavoured to help the right-wing government in El Salvador, the contra rebels in Nicaragua, the anti-Marxist guerrillas in Angola and the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan. In October 1983, American forces invaded Grenada deposing a Cuban supported Marxist regime.

The foreign policy of Reagan's first term also saw disagreements between neoconservative politicians and intellectuals. Kirkpatrick and Abrams viewed his administration as greatly successful. For instance, the former told the New York Times in 1985 that the US was not isolated and humiliated as it has happened before 1980 (Ehrman, 1994: 161). By contrast, intellectuals as Kristol and Podhoretz were dismayed by Reagan's foreign policy. The first complained for a 'muddle' in his international affairs approach whilst the second talked about 'a case of mistaken identity' (Ehrman, 1994: 147; Halper and Clarke, 2004: 164 and 166). The disagreement between politicians and intellectuals over Reagan's foreign policy did not necessarily mean that neoconservatism was not united in theory and practice. The intellectuals were disillusioned by Reagan because - being free from policy responsibility - they may have expected action through the use of force to a greater extent to demonstrate a stronger anti-Soviet stance. For their part, the politicians could possibly have more limited expectations because they faced the realities of governing and were responsible for decisions and their consequences.

The second term of the Reagan administration hardly reflected a neoconservative dimension. The departure of Kirkpatrick from the UN deprived the neoconservatives from an important voice within the administration. They saw their anti-Soviet foreign policy approach gradually lose its dynamism. John Ehrman attributes this change to the
domestic developments of the Soviet Union (Ehrman, 1994: 173). In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader and thereafter followed a series of drastic domestic reforms in his country as well as a conciliatory policy towards the West. His perestroika and the new climate of cooperation between the Kremlin and the White House, notably the discussion for an arms control agreement, left advocates of a muscular anti-Soviet foreign policy - inter alia the neoconservatives - somewhat isolated.

Further to this, in the second term of Reagan a foreign policy based on democracy promotion was partly followed. In that regard, representatives of the second generation - as we will see - of neoconservatism William Kristol and Robert Kagan published an article in Foreign Affairs. They argued that ‘during the Reagan years, the USA pressed for changes in right-wing and left-wing dictatorships alike, among both friends and foes – in the Philippines, South Korea, Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union’ (Kristol and Kagan, 1996: 27). In other words, beyond pressing for changes in left-wing dictatorships on the basis of the Reagan Doctrine the Reagan administration also showed an interest in promoting democracy in right-wing countries such as Philippines and South Korea. Significantly, it withdrew its support from dictator Marcos in Philippines in 1986 and thus contributed to the transformation from a dictatorship to a democracy. Wolfowitz and his aide Scooter Libby together with Richard Armitage, the deputy assistant secretary of defence for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and assistant secretary of defence in the Reagan years, played a key role in the case of Philippines. In addition, administration put pressure on the president of South Korea Chun Doo Hwan to pave the way for democratic elections and political change in his country.

If the pressure for changes in left-wing dictatorships is explained in the interest of the US struggle against the Soviet Union, a similar policy in right-wing dictatorships can go beyond the specific goal of Moscow’s containment. As James Mann observes, anti-Communism was the main principle of the neoconservatives at that time and therefore right-wing dictators might be viewed as helpful to a US anti-Soviet foreign policy (Mann, 2004: 93). The spread of democracy, such as in the case of Philippines, shows maybe that some neoconservative politicians had started to envisage a different approach of
foreign policy. They were developing ideas which would be applied a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ibid, Mann, 2004: 136).

**New World Order**

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were seminal events. The collapse of the bipolar structure of the world, the decline of communism and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower required a reconsideration of international relations. Within this framework, neoconservatism suffered a critical crisis. Norman Podhoretz admitted that it did not exist any longer as a distinctive phenomenon (Podhoretz, 1996: 19-27). The struggle for the protection of democracy and against the spread of communism could not theoretically find any resonance in the post Cold War era.

Despite Podhoretz’s pronouncement, the neoconservatives started to get accustomed to the new conditions and to ponder over the future role of the US in the post Cold War era. They rejected the idea of isolationism and approved that of US involvement in world affairs. The scope and limits of this involvement, however, became open to debate within their circle. Original neoconservatives like Kristol, Tucker and Kirkpatrick expressed a more realist approach, insisting on a narrow definition of the national interest of the US and arguing that Americans should avoid open-ended crusades to spread democracy (Glazer, 1990: 31-35; Kirkpatrick, 1990: 40-44). Although they strongly supported liberal democracy in the 1970s and 1980s they had done so primarily as a matter of defence. For instance, Irving Kristol wrote in *The National Interest*: ‘All in all, it is perfectly possible to envisage a post-Cold War foreign policy for the United States which, constantly defining (even redefining our national interest as the world changes (and as we change too), would be sensible and realistic (Kristol, 1990: 25). According to the new approach of the neoconservatives, as Kirkpatrick argued, American interests abroad would have to be limited (Kagan and Kristol, 2000: 59).

The view of original neoconservatives differed from that of young intellectuals, influenced by the ‘movement’, such as Charles Krauthammer and Joshua Muravchik, who came to the forefront in the 1980s and early 1990s. The latter, in other words the

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5 Intellectuals as Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz remained silent concerning this foreign policy approach of the Reagan administration
new generation of neoconservative intellectuals saw the export of democracy as an important goal of US foreign policy. They envisaged a foreign policy based on this principle not for the sake of democracy itself but to bolster US security and further its world preeminence (Wolfson, 2004: 227). Krauthammer argued that the US had to be prepared to act alone to face down or disarm countries threatening to use their weapons to upset international stability (Krauthammer, 1991: 23-33). He named Iraq and North Korea as ‘weapon states’ and considered the proliferation of munitions of mass destruction as an imminent danger for the US in the post Cold War era (Ibid, 1991: 30).\(^6\)

In parallel, Muravchik argued that that the US should concentrate on spreading democracy in order to create a friendlier and more peaceful global environment in the world and prevent the outbreak of a large scale war (Muravchik, 1996: 152).\(^7\)

Furthermore, Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defence under George H. W. Bush, prepared a ‘Defence Planning Guidance’ for intra-Defence Department use in which he called for a US military sufficiently powerful to prevent the emergence of any rival in anywhere in the world. He also encouraged the spread of democracy and open economics and argued that military force had to be used, if necessary, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the post Cold War era, the second generation of neoconservative intellectuals and politicians such as Krauthammer, Muravchik, Wolfowitz and Abrams started to assume the positions of original neoconservatives (Friedman, 2005: 230, 231; Halper and Clarke, 2004: 78, 79, 99). The latter were approaching or were already over 70 and had adopted a more realist approach in international affairs as noted above. The views of Krauthammer and Muravchik as well as the ‘Defense Planning Guidance’ of Wolfowitz mirror the neoconservative foreign policy philosophy of the post Cold War era. Thus, the term neoconservatism will now be used to refer to the position of the new generation of neoconservative intellectuals and politicians.\(^8\)

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\(^6\) Elliot Abrams agreed with Krauthammer’s approach (Ehrman, 1994: 183).

\(^7\) Ben Wattenberg, who was former speechwriter for President Lyndon Johnson and adviser to Senator Hubert Humphrey, also agreed with the idea of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy (Dorrien, 2004: 77-79).

\(^8\) It should me mentioned that original neconservatives as Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick aligned with the position of the second generation as to the potential use of US military force after 11 September (PNAC website, 20/09/01).
Scholars who either are neoconservative or can be maybe associated with their group focus on particular foreign policy principles. Irving Kristol does not constitute an exception despite his preference to realism in the post Cold War era. He believes that the neoconservative group serves US interests in the international arena by considering patriotism as a natural and healthy sentiment and distinguishing friends from enemies (Kristol, 2004: 36). Subsequently, it does not describe national interest in geographical terms (Ibid: 36). Scholar Peter Walisson adds that this national interest is not defined as power but as values and identifies the success of liberty as its supreme value (Wallison, 2004). Another supporter, Irvin Stelzer believes that neoconservatives seek to promote democracy by deposing dictatorial regimes that threaten American security and by accepting the use force if diplomatic methods fail. He also adds they are prepared to follow regime change policy with nation-building relying. Stelzer summarises their position as such: ‘diplomacy if possible, force if necessary; the UN if possible, ad hoc coalition or unilateral action if necessary; and preemptive strikes if it is reasonable to anticipate hostile action on the part of America’s enemies’ (Stelzer, 2004: 9, 10).

The neoconservatives differ from President’s Woodrow Wilson ambition to remake the world in what they do not rely on multilateral institutions as the UN. Journalist William Shawcross argues that they cannot rely on the UN because it cannot treat the US any differently from other member states. In this way, the neoconservatives consider it absurd that the US should theoretically have parity with dictatorships such as Liberia, North Korea or Libya or that it has to be constrained by the power of veto of nations like France (Shawcross, 2004: 60, 61).

Non-neoconservative scholars also concentrated on the foreign policy principles of the group during the post Cold War era. There is an agreement over what the neoconservatives themselves argue. For example, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke

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9 The thesis focuses on neoconservatism and foreign policy. However, this does not mean that this political ideology ignored domestic affairs. Its political purpose of neoconservatism is to convert the Republican Party in the US into a new kind of conservative politics that would be suitable to govern. This implies cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady economic growth and prosperity for everyone. In Irving Kristol’s words, ‘it is a basic assumption of neoconservatism that, as a consequence of the spread of affluence among all classes, a property-owning and tax-paying population will, in time, become less vulnerable to egalitarian illusions and demagogic appeals and more sensible about the fundamentals of economic reckoning’ (Kristol, 2004: 33-35).
believe that the group analyses issues in black and white and that its watchword is global unilateralism (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 11). Lawrence Davidson portrays the neoconservatives as choosing between good and evil (Davidson, 2007: 248, 249). Moreover, Zbigniew Brzezinski compares their doctrine in the post-Cold War era to an updated version of imperialism (Brzezinski, 2007: 37). Steven Hurst also argues that the group insists on the promotion of American values and democracy (Hurst, 2005: 81, 82).

Famous scholar for his criticism over US foreign policy Noam Chomsky gives a different dimension about neoconservatism and its possible impact. In particular, he argues:

'It is not clear what the term is supposed to mean. In practice it is the programme of radical statist reactionaries, who believe that the US should rule the world by force if necessary, in the interests of the narrow sectors of concentrated private power and wealth that they represent, and that the powerful state they forge should serve those interests, not the interests of the public.[...] Within elite sectors, there is a great deal of concern over their brazen arrogance, remarkable incompetence, and willingness to increase serious threats to the country and to transfer a huge burden to coming generations for short-term gain' (Chomsky's website, 04/02/04).

Ironically, Chomsky's scepticism over the term reflects the view of many neoconservatives, as for example Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz.

The Senior Bush and Clinton Administrations

From the end of the Cold War until the end of the 1990s, the neoconservatives were marginalised from power. George H.W. Bush alienated the neoconservatives with his supposedly soft and pragmatic foreign policy (Muravchik, 1993: 15). US President, Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft were embarrassed by Wolfowitz's 'Defence Planning Guidance' (Dorrien, 2004: 41). Wolfowitz's plan was revised and a new less radical version was devised. The administration was cautious over the use of force for the protection of democracy, and, for instance, no action was taken in response to Tiananmen Square in 1989. In addition, it decided not to invade Baghdad in order to topple Saddam Hussein's regime after the
liberation of Kuwait in 1991. However, what greatly disillusioned the neoconservatives was the inactivity over the Yugoslav wars which was interpreted as encouraging Serbian aggression (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 82). The neoconservatives also criticised Bush's Senior Middle East policy because of his intention to promote the Arab-Israeli peace process by putting pressure on Israel to stop the settlements (Ehrman, 1994: 196, 197).10

Some neoconservative intellectuals, notably Joshua Muravchik and Ben Wattenberg, supported Bill Clinton for US President in the 1992 elections because the Democrat had presented himself as a strong defender of American foreign and economic interests abroad. Nonetheless, his foreign policy led those neoconservatives who supported him to regret their choice (Muravchik, 1994: 15-22). The group began attacking Clinton in the spring of 1993 because it believed that the President had failed to exploit what they saw as American global hegemony (Ehrman, 1994: 203; Haley, 2006: 109). The neoconservatives focused on Clinton's failure to rescue the Bosnians and on his supposedly ineffective multilateralism with the UN in the case of Somalia. In an article published in Foreign Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz wrote that Clinton had confused the meaning of the national interest (Wolfowitz, 1994: 28-43). The neoconservatives believed that countries such as Haiti and Somalia were of little strategic importance for the US while they were sceptical over the necessity of multilateralism and UN authorisation for American action.

**Conclusion**

The analysis shows that neoconservatism can arguably be considered as a movement. Irving Kristol and Joshua Muravchik call it a 'persuasion' and a 'distinctive sensibility'. Internal disagreements within the circle of the neoconservatives can also be acknowledged. As senior editor of the Weekly Standard David Brooks puts it: 'if you ever read a sentence that starts with neocons believe, there is a 99.44 per cent chance everything else in that sentence will be untrue' (Brooks, 2004: 42). However, all influential political tendencies can maybe have tensions. Further to this, many scholars

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10 For example, the US administration decided to postpone $10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel in 1991.
either sympathetic or critical towards neoconservatism elaborate and agree on its principles and thus show that a consensus which unites its adherents possibly exists.

The meaning of the term neoconservatism depends on the period it was invoked. There is a significant distinction between the philosophy of the group during the Cold War and that after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the former period, the ‘movement’ considered democracy an antidote to communism and was more interested in the fight against this threat rather than the democratisation of regimes which were friendly to the US. By contrast, in the post Cold war era, it saw the promotion of democracy as an important goal of US foreign policy as a means to create friendly regimes in the world. Within this context, original neoconservatives such as Irving Kristol and Jeane Kirkpatrick differ from younger advocates like Robert Kagan and Paul Wolfowitz. The former had been once Democrats and are former liberals who ‘had been mugged by reality.’ The latter have not gone through a liberal or leftist phase and have been always Republicans.

A period of US history before the presidency of George W. Bush which maybe saw neoconservatism find resonance in day-to-day politics was during the first term of the administration of Ronald Reagan. Despite disagreements between politicians and intellectuals of the group at that time, the strong anticommunist rhetoric of the President united them. In the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton years, however, the group was rather marginalised. What is interesting, at this stage, is to continue the analysis of neoconservatism by focusing on the period after these years when the political ideology became a highly debatable issue as to its supposed impact on the Bush administration. This will be the aim of Chapter 3.
Chapter 3: A Neoconservative Revolution?

Neoconservatism did not enter the literature of international relations after 11 September 2001. It preexisted. Various scholars had dealt with it analysing its principles in a foreign policy context as well as in a domestic one from the 1970s onwards. This political ideology, however, received more attention with the terrorist atrocities. In the period which followed this event, neoconservatism became a cause célèbre in international relations as to its supposed impact on George W. Bush’s administration and the US decision for a military operation against Iraq. This chapter will focus on the debate concerning the alleged influence of the neoconservative group on the US President. It will start with an analysis of George W. Bush foreign policy approach in his pre-election campaign and will then concentrate on his policy in the first eight months of his presidency.

The chapter will subsequently examine the period after 11 September 2001 by presenting the contradictory theories which developed as an explanation for US foreign policy. In particular, it will attempt to challenge the conventional wisdom that the neoconservative group led the Bush administration to the Iraq war. The analysis will do so in two ways. Firstly, it will assess the stance of non-neoconservative politicians, for example realist and nationalist ones, discussing US decision-making in the run up to the Iraq war. And secondly, it will employ foreign policy precedents in order to show that the idea of a preemptive military operation against Iraq was arguably a revolutionary one and that US foreign policy questionably showed signs of change in the aftermath of 9/11. The chapter will finally deal with the crisis the neoconservative group entered with the continuing instability of Iraq and the disassociation of once prominent adherent Francis Fukuyama from the ‘movement’.

Rise of the Neoconservatives

The pragmatism of the administration of George H.W. Bush and the assertive multilateralism of Bill Clinton formed obstacles to neoconservative views. However, the election of 2000 offered a new opportunity for the group. George W. Bush, the son of the
former US president, was not an expert in foreign policy. In the period before the presidential election discussions focused on what George W. Bush knew about world affairs (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 35). The Texas governor was often criticised for his lack of international policy experience. For example, he could not mention the name of important world leaders as the President of Pakistan and made gaffes confusing Slovakia and Slovenia and referring to Greeks as Grecians, to Kosovars as Kosovians and to East Timorese as East Timorians (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 17-20).

Bush responded by arguing that what mattered was his ability to select good people and that he had eminent advisers with more experience than the Democrats (Mann, 2004: ix). He therefore assembled a group of Republican experts, nicknamed ‘the Vulcans’ in honor of the Roman god of fire, the forge and metalwork to tutor him (Ibid, 2004: ix, x). The team was led by Condoleezza Rice, Brent Scowcroft’s adviser on the Soviet Union during his father’s administration and former professor at Stanford University, and Paul Wolfowitz who was spending the Clinton years outside government as the Dean of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Other Vulcans included Richard Armitage, Robert Blackwill, Stephen Hadley, Richard Perle, Dov Zakheim and Robert Zoellick (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 22). Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and Colin Powell played important roles in the campaign of Bush but were not members of his pre-election day-to-day activities (Mann, 2004: 251-252). Cheney and Rumsfeld had first worked together during the Nixon administration while the former as Secretary of Defence had selected Powell to be the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the first Bush administration.

It can be argued that Bush’s Junior foreign policy attitude was shaped by politicians from different schools of foreign policy thought: realism, nationalism and

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11 Armitage, after serving in Vietnam and in the Reagan administration had worked as a special envoy for a variety of jobs under George H. W. Bush. Blackwill had joined the Foreign Service in countries such as Kenya, Britain and Israel since 1967. He also had been the chief US negotiator at the Vienna talks on force reduction under Reagan as well as White House adviser on European and Soviet affairs in the first Bush administration. Hadley had worked for Scowcroft during the Ford Presidency and had been assistant secretary of defence for international security policy in the first Bush administration. Perle, as it has been already mentioned, had worked in the Defence Department in the Reagan years. Zakheim had been deputy undersecretary of Defence for planning and resources in the Reagan administration. Zoellick, an expert in economics and trade, had served at the Treasury Department in the Reagan years and as counsel to Secretary of State James Baker and later as his deputy chief of staff during George H. W. Bush administration (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 27-30).
neoconservatism. The balance of power approach is the basis of the first. Realism narrows down the definition of the national interest on the grounds of a tough-minded foreign policy and for this reason can be considered as the 'sworn enemy' of neoconservatism (Marshall, 2003: 146). Nationalism and neoconservatism share many commonalities such as a deep scepticism towards traditional Wilsonianism's commitment to the rule of law. This can be translated into a common antipathy for international organisations. In addition, both nationalism and neoconservatism believe in the importance of an increased US military budget and in the necessity for the use of military power. Their main difference is that the former is sceptical about nation-building and democracy spreading and reluctant to remake the world in American image (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 15-16). Scholars agree as to the foreign policy school of most of the Vulcans. Rice, Powell, Blackwill and Zoellick can be considered realists, Cheney and Rumsfeld nationalists and Wolfowitz, Hadley, Perle and Zakheim as neoconservatives. Richard Armitage cannot be easily identified as as his views appeared contradictory. James Mann writes that he was a 'centrist Republican' (Mann, 2004: 369).

During the preelection campaign of George W. Bush the neoconservatives generally did not support him in the Republican primaries. Instead, they were sympathetic to Senator John McCain. McCain became a hero for them because he had supported Clinton's intervention against Slobodan Milosevic which George W. Bush had strongly criticised.12 The neoconservatives had started since the mid 1990s to present their foreign policy views. In 1997, William Kristol, the son of Irving, along with Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Elliot Abrams founded the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). This was a centre of hawkish thinking combining foreign policy perspectives from nationalism with neoconservatism. Along with the PNAC, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage foundation, think tanks as the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the Centre for Security Policy (CSP) also became important places for the promotion of neoconservative views (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 103). During this period, Robert Kagan, Max Boot, Francis Fukuyama and Lawrence Kaplan also became prominent advocates.

12 Not all the neoconservatives agreed with this intervention. Charles Krauthammer was an exception and opposed US involvement in Kosovo. That is because he found the connection between Kosovo and the US interests tenuous (Krauthammer, 1999: 8).
The neoconservatives also expressed themselves in the *Weekly Standard* under the editship of William Kristol Junior since 1995. *The National Review* and the editorial pages of the *Wall Street Journal* also helped promote neoconservative views while the *Washington Post* boasted Charles Krauthammer as a columnist. A central figure of the relationship between the media and the neoconservatives is media entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch, who owns *The Weekly Standard*, has built an empire and financially assisted the neoconservative group. He mainly did so through his Fox Broadcasting Network. Murdoch can also be considered as crucial to the promotion of the neoconservative position in the European media because of his ownership of *The Times*. Other sponsors of the group include the New York based entrepreneur Bruce Kovner and chairman of Caxton Corporation and Roger Hertog, vice chairman of Alliance Capital management (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 188).

In June 1997 the members of the PNAC issued a document summarising their foreign policy views. This paper, known as the Statement of Principles, was signed by all the neoconservative members of the PNAC including Elliott Abrams, Eliot Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz and Paul Wolfowitz. Significantly, the statement was also signed by non neoconservative politicians such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. The document agreed that US foreign policy was adrift and criticised the Clinton Administration for 'cuts in foreign affairs and defence spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft and inconstant leadership' which had resulted in increasing difficulty for the US in sustaining its global influence in the world and dealing with threats and challenges (PNAC website, 03/06/1997). Thus, they wrote that the US had to increase its military budget, to challenge hostile regimes, and 'to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving an international order friendly to [its] security, prosperity and principles' (Ibid).

In January 1998 leading neoconservatives such as Abrams, Bolton, Robert Kagan, Kristol Junior, Perle, Wolfowitz and Zakheim sent a letter to President Clinton declaring their policy orientation over the Iraq issue. This was also signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Armitage and can be seen as anticipatory for the second Gulf War five years later. Here, the neoconservatives expressed their disapproval for the policy of
containment towards Iraq for it having not produced any positive results. They elaborated on a different US approach: ‘The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction.’ ‘In the near term this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing’ while ‘in the long term it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power’ (PNAC website, 26/01/98).

Other Republicans took different positions. Condoleezza Rice, for instance, wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, that rogue regimes such as Iraq and North Korea ‘are living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them’. She argued that ‘a clear and classical statement of deterrence’ was the appropriate strategy (Rice, 2000: 61). Nonetheless, it should be noted that realists, like Rice were sceptical about multilateralism. In this regard, Robert Zoellick argued that for the Republicans international agreements and institutions were a means to achieve ends. (Zoellick, 2000: 69). Realists such as Zoellick focused on the need of the US army to be able to defeat potential enemies (Zoellick, 2000: 69).

George W. Bush’s world affairs approach before 11 September was rather shaped by realism than by neoconservatism. Bush’ speeches before his election suggest the future President showed a neoconservative inclination only in areas this overlapped with realist thinking. With reference to US unilateral policy Bush had said in August 2000: ‘Now it’s time not to defend outdated treaties but to defend the American people’ (Bush’s speech, 03/08/00). Concerning the strategic needs of the US Bush called the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as an ‘artefact of the Cold War’ and said that if elected he would add 1$ billion a year to the defence budget aiming in order to build up the defence of the country against missiles, terrorism and technological invasions (CNN website, 23/09/99).

The position of Bush Junior had been evident since November 1999 when he had said that the president of the US must be ‘a clear-eyed’ realist’ (Bush’s speech, 19/11/99). In this speech, Bush championed the idea of a ‘distinctly American internationalism’ (Ibid). Significantly, he said that ‘military power is not the final measure of might,’ and thereby contradicted a fundamental neoconservative tenet (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 112). In addition, Bush focused on the importance of US involvement in the world only if its
vision and strategy were clear. The future US President was therefore not in favour of nation-building in what he saw as 'endless and aimless deployments' of US troops (CNN website, 23/09/99). The foreign policy priorities of George W. Bush would - inter alia - include the extension of peace throughout the world on the basis of cooperation between the US and its partners, the defence of his country's interests in the Persian Gulf, the advancement of the Middle East peace process and the check against the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (Bush' speech, 19/11/99). The further challenges were China and Russia. By contrast, little was made on two issues, which would eventually dominate the Bush presidency: terrorism and Iraq.

**Early Bush Administration**

The US presidential election of 2000 was one of the closest races in American history. After a dispute with Al Gore over the vote count in Florida, George W. Bush won the November election and took office in January 2001. He was in power for approximately eight months before the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The analysis of these first months can provide a background with which his policy after 11 September can be compared. It can also inform an important research question, specifically the continuity or discontinuity of US foreign policy after 11 September and the role of neoconservatism before and after the attacks.

After George W. Bush was elected president in the US, the influence of the neoconservative 'movement' mainly derived from its presence within the government. In particular, Paul Wolfowitz became Deputy Secretary of Defense, Douglas Feith Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Lewis 'Scooter' Libby Vice President chief of Staff. Elliot Abrams the National Security Council staffer for Near East, South-west Asian, and North African Affairs, Richard Perle a member of the Defense Policy Board, a civilian group that advised the Pentagon, and John Bolton assumed the role of Under Secretary of State. Neoconservatives did not have representatives in the top tier of the US administration, which comprised Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin

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13 Here we can possibly acknowledge a similarity with Colin Powell's doctrine during the first Gulf War. According to 'realist' Powell the US had to precisely define its aims in the case it plans to use its military forces abroad (Powell, 1995; Gordon and Trainor, 1995).
Powell, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.

Foreign policy was not a priority of George W. Bush when he came into power. He was more interested in domestic affairs and in particular in the administration’s $1.3 trillion tax cut, in the establishment of a White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to facilitate the use of federal funds, in privatisation of part of the Social Security system and in his education agenda (Pfiffner, 2004: 4). In this way, Bush contradicted the promises of his pre-election campaign by rejecting the idea of additional money for the Pentagon and decided to proceed with the Clinton administration’s proposal for a budget of $310 billion for 2002 (Daalder and Clarke, 2003: 63). Bush’s failure to increase defence spending provoked disappointment within neoconservative circles. This sentiment was mainly expressed in the pages of the *Weekly Standard* (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 129).

In foreign policy George W. Bush adopted a unilateralist stance in his first eight months in office. As James Mann notes, however, this policy was not an innovation of George W. Bush but had begun in the 1990’s (Mann, 2004: 287). For instance, the Clinton Administration had refused to sign the international treaty banning the use of land mines. What Bush Junior did was to strengthen unilateral policy by taking more drastic steps in this direction. His administration refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol which proposed a large cut in greenhouse gases. It also opposed a string of other international agreements such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a pact to control trafficking in small arms and a new protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 65). Furthermore, the Bush administration was preparing to withdraw from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; it finally did after the terrorist attacks, in December 2001. The unilateralist approach of the Bush administration had become evident not only through the abrogation of international treaties but also through his policy of disengagement from significant international issues which contradicted the more active involvement of Bill Clinton. His ‘hands-off’ approach regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and his policy of non-discussions with North Korea constitute examples (Gordon, 2003: 157).
The neoconservatives approved the unilateral policy of George W. Bush. However, the moderation of Colin Powell and his State Department tempered maybe a more hard-line approach. In the first eight months of the administration, the neoconservatives expressed their strongest displeasure over US relations with China (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 130). After the collision of American and Chinese planes, which caused the death of the latter’s pilot and the detention of the US crew by Beijing, neoconservatives were outraged that Bush had authorised a letter of regret to encourage the release of the prisoners. They saw this apology as ‘a national humiliation’ (Kagan and Kristol, 2001).

After the Terrorist Attacks

On 11 September 2001 an unprecedented event took place. Four US planes were hijacked by terrorists and crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania killing more than 3000 people in a matter of hours. The event was a national tragedy for the USA. It also marked a turning point and encouraged much debate over demanding a new vision for the future (Kissinger, 2002: 289). The overwhelming majority of the American people obviously wanted those responsible for the atrocities to be brought to justice. The fight against terrorism became the highest priority for US foreign policy. In his speech to the American public on 9/11, President Bush signalled the way the US would react when he said: ‘We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them’ (Bush’s speech, 11/09/01).

The beginning of the new post 9/11 era was marked by several developments. For example, the Patriot Act entitled authorities to ignore the private rights of the American people in their attempt to collect information about terrorists. The desire of Washington to use its military capability was highlighted with the war against Afghanistan. The invocation of article 5 of NATO and the cooperation of many countries, such as France and Germany, meant American unilateralism did not come to the forefront. The initial success of the war against Afghanistan boosted Washington’s confidence. The next step would see a shift from a strategy of self-defence, as happened with Afghanistan, to a pre-emptive one.
Bush’s State of Union address on 29 January 2002 was a crucial point. With his speech on that day, the President placed Iraq, Iran and North Korea in an ‘axis of evil’ countries which sought to produce chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (Bush’s speech, 29/01/02). According to Bush, the US had to act in order to prevent this development.

The new US strategy was officially laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002. In the document a particular passage linked US foreign policy to the necessity of preemption:

We will build defences against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain and curtail our enemies efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defence, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation’

(NSS, 2002).

The US subsequently undertook a military operation against Iraq in order for the regime of Saddam Hussein’s to be toppled. Washington’s decision was made irrespective of the UN and international law. The war on Iraq mirrors the desire and the core philosophy of the neoconservatives but can be arguably attributed to their supposed crucial role. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks international relations literature flourished with debates regarding the potential impact of the group on the US administration which remains a highly controversial issue. As it will be shown, two contradictory theories developed.

There are scholars who concentrate on the significant influence of the neoconservatives on Washington’s decision to start a war against Iraq. This point of view is propagated by Stephan Halper and Jonathan Clarke (2004). Other scholars who adopt this position are for instance Alex Callinicos (2003: 47), Layne Christopher (2007: 85), Robert Merry (2005: 156) and Dimitris Kairidis (2008: 77). For example, Alex Callinicos referring to the neocons talks about ‘a right-wing camarilla at the heart of the Bush administration’ (Callinicos, 2003: 47, 48). Furthermore, critics of neoconservatism such as Patrick Buchanan (2004) and Michael Lind (2003) also concentrate on this point of view. It is
striking what another critic of neoconservatism, former counsel to President Bill Clinton Sidney Blumenthal writes in his account: ‘Foreign policy was captured by neoconservative ideologues, a small group of sectarian rooted in the hothouse environment of the capital’s right-wing think tanks (Blumenthal, 2006: 8).

Other academics, on the contrary, disagree with the idea that the role of the neoconservatives was of great significance. Steven Hurst, for instance, argues that it was the nationalist conservative doctrine which continued to be the basic approach of US foreign policy after the terrorist attacks (Hurst, 2005). For their part, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay consider the supposed impact of the neoconservatives on US foreign policy as exaggerated (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003). George Lieber adopts a similar position and equates with a conspiracy theory the view that the group controlled the Bush administration (Lieber, 2005: 184-192). Neoconservatives themselves also contest the idea that they played a critical role in gaining the upper hand in the White House (Boot, 2004). Furthermore, there are scholars and politicians who analyse US foreign policy after 11 September without referring to neoconservatism. In their accounts Madeleine Albright (2006) and Al Gore (2007) do not mention the term, maybe connoting that the neoconservatives themselves - as a particular foreign policy group - do not deserve particular attention. The position of Noam Chomsky, who - as the previous chapter noted - is unsure about the meaning of the political ideology, constitutes an additional example. The following analysis will attempt to show why the view that the neoconservatives largely influenced US foreign policy after 9/11 can be challenged.

**Distributing the Responsibility**

The insistence on the neoconservative cause downgrades the role of other US politicians - many of them higher ranked than the neoconservatives - who also supported the Iraq war in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September. As Al Gore puts its: ‘We are all responsible for the decisions our country makes. We have a Congress. We have an independent judiciary. We have checks and balances. We are a nation of laws. We have free speech. We have free press. Have they all failed us?’ (Gore, 2007: 2).

Various politicians without the label ‘neoconservative’ publicly endorsed the idea of the Iraq war. On 2 October 2002, for example, American Congress authorised President
persuade the leaders of other countries of the world for the necessity of a US-led war against Iraq.

The role of another non-neoconservative but realist politician, Condoleezza Rice should be taken into account. Before becoming US Secretary of State in 2005 Rice had worked as Bush’s National Security Adviser. Although she had not favoured a military operation against Iraq before 11 September, she became a fervent supporter of the context of the US war on terror. Madeleine Albright, for instance, notes that former National Security Adviser ‘had conjured up the image of a mushroom cloud, as a warning that a failure on our part to attack might lead to nuclear annihilation’ (Albright, 2006: 252). In her attempt to explain the necessity of the war Rice published an article in New York Times in January 2003 entitled as ‘Why We Know Iraq is Lying’. In this article she concluded: ‘Iraq is proving not that it is nation bent on disarmament but that it is a nation with something to hide’ (Rice, 2003).

Powell and Rice publicly supported the war against Iraq after 9/11. Other important figures of Bush’s administration, however, had endorsed such an idea before the atrocities. These are Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld who can be considered as nationalist politicians. We know from Paul O’Neill, the Treasury Secretary from 2001 until 2003 that Cheney allegedly started to plan the war only one month after Bush Junior came to power, in February 2001 (Suskind, 2004: 96). As for Rumsfeld he had explicitly expressed his desire from 1998. It was mentioned before that former US Secretary of Defence had signed a letter of the PNAC in this year stressing the need for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Richard Clarke, who was special advisor to President Bush for Cyberspace Security from 2001 to 2003, also argues that Rumsfeld and Cheney focused on Iraq before the terrorist attacks of 11 September (Clarke, 2004: 228, 229, 237).

The position of Rumsfeld and Cheney was strengthened in the aftermath of 9/11. They believed that military force was the only option for the US (Von Hermann, 2006: 22). The 9/11 Commission Report provides valuable information concerning the stance of former US Secretary of Defence. According to the report, on the afternoon of 11 September Rumsfeld told General Myers that he was not ‘simply interested in striking empty training sites’ and said that ‘his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same
George W. Bush to use force in the case of Iraq in order ‘to defend the national security of the US against the continuing threat posed’ by this country (White House website, 02/10/02). This authorisation was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 296-133 and in the Senate by a vote of 77-23 (CNN website, 11/10/02). It is thus evident that numerous US politicians, among them Democrats, had expressed their agreement.

A characteristic example of Democrats favouring the Iraq war is presidential candidate in the 2004 elections John Kerry. Despite his criticism for Bush’s strategy in 2004, Kerry had supported military action in the crucial vote of October 2002 (CNN website, 10/08/04). He is certainly not a neoconservative. The speech of Howard Berman in the Congress debate is also indicative of the stance of some Democrats. He - inter alia - said:

'Mr. Speaker, I was a fervent opponent of the Vietnam war and a strong supporter of sensible détente with the Soviet Union. But under today's circumstances, the best way to give peace a chance and to save the most lives, American and Iraqi, is for America to stand united and for Congress to authorize the President to use force if Saddam does not give up his weapons of mass destruction'.

(See Berman’s speech in Sifry and Cerf, 2003: 360)

The analysis of US foreign policy before the Iraq war, however, should mainly focus on the stance of members of the Bush administration. Starting with realist politicians first, the attention is turned towards Colin Powell. Former US Secretary of State spoke to the UN General Assembly on 5 February 2003 and explained the reasons this war would be necessary. Powell - inter alia - said: ‘My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the US knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction as well as Iraq’s involvement in terrorism’ (Powell’s address, 05/02/03). Not only did he argue that Iraq had possessed weapons of mass destruction but he also focused on the connection between this country and al-Qaeda. Former US Secretary of State regretted for his speech a posteriori by calling it a ‘blot’ on his record (ABC website, 09/09/05). At a critical juncture, however, Colin Powell generally perceived to be a moderate politician was not reserved. On the contrary, he attempted with his speech to

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14 Congressman Howard Berman represented the 28th District of California. He was elected for the first time to Congress in 1982.
time – not only Bin Laden (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 334, 335). For his part, Dick Cheney openly supported the idea of a military operation against Baghdad in August 2002. In this month, he asserted that there was no doubt that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (Ricks, 2006: 49).

**Tenet’s ‘Slam Dunk’**

The responsibility of the CIA and its former non-neoconservative Director George Tenet also was high concerning the Iraq war. Bob Woodward notes that Tenet’s phrase ‘slam dunk’ in a meeting he had with George W. Bush on 21 December 2002 was crucial for US President’s decision to launch the war (Woodward, 2006: 303, 304). Tenet used this phrase when Bush asked him if the CIA could provide better information about the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein in order for the American people to be convinced for the necessity of the war. Tenet then argued that strengthening the public presentation was a ‘slam dunk’.

Former Director of the CIA did not put into question that he had said the phrase in his memoir (Tenet, 2007: 359-367). Although he argues that it was misused, he still believes that many people consider it as a crucial moment which shaped the view of US President (Ibid: 359). In order to downplay the impact of his phrase Tenet also writes that the decision for the war had been made many months before the meeting of 21 December 2002. He recalls that on 12 September 2001 he met Richard Perle, ‘one of the godfathers of the neoconservative movement’ who told him: ‘Iraq has to pay a price for what happened yesterday. They bear responsibility’ (2007: ix). For their part, the neoconservatives deny that meeting took place. William Kristol underlined that Perle had been in France on 12 September and went back to the US a few days later (Kristol, 29/04/07). Who says the truth remains unknown. In any case Tenet was certainly not detached from the US administration’s decision to attack Iraq.

George Tenet’s role in the US preparation for the military operation against Baghdad, however, is not only related to the supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam. Former CIA Director also suggested that Iraq had links with al-Qaeda. He sent, for example, a letter to Senator Bob Graham on 7 October 2002 after the latter requested that Tenet declassified the agency’s judgements in the likelihood of Iraq using
that kind of weapons against the US. In this letter, Tenet wrote that the understanding of
the CIA for the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda was based on ‘sources of varying
credibility. And he argued: ‘We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between
Iraq and al-Qaeda going back a decade’ (See this letter in Sifry and Cerf, 2003: 369).

Bush as a Puppet?

After discussing the role of the US Congress and individuals such as Colin Powell,
Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and George Tenet, an analysis of US
foreign policy in the period before the invasion of Baghdad cannot but focus on the
stance of George W. Bush. The illustration of the neoconservatives as responsible for the
Iraq war leaves an important question unanswered: Was US President a puppet in
Washington’s decision-making process? If American foreign policy was significantly
shaped by the neoconservatives after 9/11, Bush Junior could perhaps give the impression
of an irresolute president. The underestimation of the role of the US President contradicts
the position of scholars such as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay who argue that he is a
strong and decisive leader. Daalder and Lindsay explain that Bush learned a lot about
world affairs during his pre-election campaign and the first eight months of his
administration. They subsequently dismiss the claim that the neoconservatives had
captured his heart and mind (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003). In parallel with them, in his
book Fiasco, The Washington Post’s military correspondent Thomas Ricks analyses the
Iraq war and observes that ‘blame must lie foremost with President Bush himself’ (Ricks,
2006: 4).

George W. Bush can be hardly considered as a marionette in Washington’s decision-
making process. According to Richard Clarke, Bush started to become interested in
investigating a potential relationship between the terrorist attacks and Saddam Hussein
from the evening of 12 September 2001. On that day, US President told Clarke: ‘See if
Saddam did this’ (Clarke, 2004: 32). Bush himself believes the details of Clarke account
were incorrect but acknowledges that he ‘might well have spoken to Clarke at some point,
asking him about Iraq’ (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 334). We also know from
Bob Woodward that although Iraq was not the immediate priority for the US President,
this country had been on his agenda. As Woodward writes, on 16 September 2001 Bush
told Rice that the first target of the war on terror was Afghanistan and added: ‘We won’t do Iraq now, we are putting Iraq off. But eventually we’ll have to return to that question (Woodward, 2004b: 26).

A Lesson from History

The support of the neoconservatives for the Iraq war does not entail that they were responsible for this military operation or that they led the Bush administration to it. Their influence on American foreign policy after 9/11 can be disputed because many other politicians and figures in the US - often higher ranked - endorsed the idea of Saddam’s removal from power. Further to this, the conduct of US foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 September arguably shows signs of a significant change and one based on the alleged neoconservative influence. Historical literature generally assumes that war and the great power system go hand in hand (Kennedy, 1987: 537). The favoured by the neoconservative group war on Iraq where a powerful country - the US - attacked a weaker one because the latter failed to comply with the demands of the former - in this case to disarm - can be hardly considered as a new foreign policy model in international relations and one invented by the neoconservative group. It can be traced back to the classic work of Thucydides. The neoconservatives do not hesitate to argue that they admire this historian. Irving Kristol, for example, notes that the favourite neoconservative text in foreign affairs is Thucydides on the Peloponnesian war (Kristol, 2004: 36).

Thucydides’ history, which describes the war between Athens and Sparta from 431 until 404 BC, constitutes maybe an archetype for power politics. It shows that states -then cities-states or ‘poleis’ - act to enhance their own power (Glennon, 2003: 32). Scholar David Boucher explains that ‘in the Athenian justification of imperialism, and the Melian Dialogue, Thucydides articulates the Athenian belief that the international sphere is devoid of the notions of justice and injustice’. In his view ‘there is no national order in the relations between states and the order which exists is created and sustained by the powerful’ (Boucher, 1998: 153). In particular, Athens attacked then the island of Melos after the leaders of the latter had refused to satisfy its demand and surrender. The following excerpt of the Melian Dialogue can perhaps mirror the foreign policy philosophy of great powers from the 5th century BC onwards and is relevant to the US
stance concerning the Iraq war in 2003. The Athenians encouraged the Melians to surrender by arguing:

"For of the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by a necessity of their nature wherever they have power they always rule. And so in our case since we neither enacted this law nor when it was enacted were the first to use it, but found it in existence and expect to leave it in existence for all time, so we make use of it, well aware that both of you and others, if clothed with the same power as we are, would do the same thing."


In parallel with Thucydides, the 16th century diplomat and theorist Niccolo Machiavelli argues in The Prince that power and security are paramount concerns:

"The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms."

(Machiavelli, 1948, Chapter 12: 93).

Thomas Hobbes also observes in Leviathan originally published in 1651 that the natural condition of man is a state of war (Donnelly, 2000: 14). Hobbes illustrates this state of war by arguing: "The Notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no Common Power there in no Law" (Hobbes, 1996, Chapter XIII: 90).

**Preemption and Interventionism**

The doctrine of preemption often perceived as a revolutionary principle of the neoconservative philosophy, can be also questionably seen as a new element in US history. John Lewis Gaddis argues that this policy was followed by the US at the beginning of the 19th century (Gaddis, 2004: 12, 13). According to the distinguished historian the British attack and burning of Washington in August 1814 led John Quincy
Adams - first as Secretary of State and then as President of the US - to redefine his country’s approach in world affairs (Gaddis, 2004: 12, 13). In order to ensure US security in the future he included components of preemption and unilateralism in it. It was on that basis that in 1818 General Andrew Jackson invaded Spanish Florida, attacked Indian tribes and executed two Englishmen. John Quincy Adams told then the Spanish ambassador that the latter’s country’s failure to preserve order along the borderland led the US to act preemptively (Lefflyn, 2004: 23).

Further to this, US President Theodore Roosevelt championed a policy of preemption with his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the early 20th century. Theodore Roosevelt stressed the need for his country to intervene in the Western Hemisphere under certain circumstances. He said in 1904:

‘If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it needs fear no interference from the US. Brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilizing society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the US cannot ignore this duty’

(Harbaugh, 1975: 190).

For his part scholar Melvyn Leffler argues that US President Franklin Roosevelt had not eschewed the preventive use of force (Leffler, 2004: 23). According to Leffler when Nazi submarines attacked the US destroyer Greer in September 1941 Franklin Roosevelt declared: ‘this is the time for prevention of an attack’. US President explained then his thinking by arguing: ‘when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him’ (Ibid: 23). Condoleezza Rice also placed US preemptive foreign policy in a historical perspective while giving a speech in October 2002. US Secretary of State maintained that the US endorsed this policy in the second half of the 20th century for security reasons. Rice argued: ‘Preemption is not a new concept. There

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15 In December 1823 US President James Monroe warned the Europeans not to interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.
16 Scholars such as Lawrence Friedman argues that the term prevention better defines what is referred to as preemption (Friedman, 2004: 38)
has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats […] The US has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-defense—from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 1994’ (Rice, 01/10/02).

Moreover, the roots of US interventionism in the international arena can be found in the early history of the country and not in the statement of the Project for the New American Century in 1998. Scholar Michael Cox argues that ‘empire is not really new at all in US grand narratives’ (Cox, 2004: 26). He explains that this concept was first employed by the US Founding Fathers ‘to describe a political mission linked to a geographical aspiration in which liberty and continental expansion were intimately connected’ (Ibid: 27). A potential influence of American exceptionalism can be also acknowledged in this political mission. This is the prevailing assumption among political scientists and historians of the US that the political system of the country and its people’s values and beliefs are distinctive (Gonzalez and King, 2003: 34). Even as colonists the Americans believed that they were distinctive and that they could maybe produce an exceptional society by diffusing political power (Hoogenboom, 2006: 48).

In the 19th century the US acquired or seized land in order to ensure its vitality. After it completed this mission, however, the country required a vision for the future. University of Wisconsin professor Frederick Jackson Turner argued in 1896 that with the disappearance of one frontier ‘it was now more important than ever to engage in a vigorous foreign policy that would extend Americas’ influence to outlying islands and adjoining countries’ (Cox, 2003: 24). The Spanish-American war of 1898 was a crucial point for US intervention in world affairs (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 5). Spain was then expelled from Cuba and the US showed that its national interest had transcended its borderline. As for the 20th century it was of course marked by the US involvement in World War I and II. The sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania in 1915 and the attack at Pearl-Harbor in 1941 led the US to military intervene. In the Cold War era the US also played a significant role on the world stage. Its objective was Soviet Union’s containment for almost half a century. Between 1989 and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 Washington intervened again in various regional conflicts, as for example in Kosovo in 1999.
In this context, US foreign policy is maybe oversimplified if the supposed influence of the neoconservatives is overstated. The impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September should not be underestimated in the US administration’s decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Washington acted preemptively and used military force against Iraq in order to fight against terrorism and arguably because a few neoconservative politicians and intellectuals managed to promote their own foreign policy ideas. Its goal - at least according to the administration of George W. Bush - was to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in order to prevent an attack on its soil and possibly to spread democracy in the Islamic world and the Middle East region.

The Oil Factor

It was not only the US need to fight against terrorism and its willingness to bring the responsible for the terrorist attacks to justice, which led Washington to invade Iraq. Additional factors should be taken into account. These factors also downgrade the argument that the group of the neoconservatives was alone responsible for the military operation against Baghdad advocating for revolutionary foreign policy ideas and persuading the Bush administration for their implementation. It can, for example, be argued that the war was about control of oil. This does not mean that the neoconservatives were not interested in this parameter. It can hardly be claimed, however, that the control of oil was a revolutionary issue in foreign policy or that the neoconservatives were the only ones in Washington group which paid attention to its importance for energy security reasons.

We know that the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) set up by George W. Bush in 2001 and chaired by Dick Cheney discussed Iraq’s oil (Downey, 2008: 17; Klare, 14/08/2008). In parallel with this, Jim Holt reveals that under the draft Iraq oil law written by the US ‘the Iraq National Oil Company would retain control of 17 of Iraq’s 80 existing oilfields’ while it would leave the rest and any new fields to be discovered under foreign corporate control for 30 years (Holt, 2008). Ron Suskind also focuses on oil as a crucial parameter of the invasion of Baghdad. Writing that Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz were planning a war against Iraq from January 2001, he explains
that various documents were then prepared in order to map oil fields of the targeted country: In particular, Suskind asserted:

‘One document, headed Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts, lists companies from thirty countries – including France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom – their specialties, bidding histories, and in some cases their particular areas of interest. An attached document maps Iraq with markings for supergiant oilfield, other oilfield and earmarked for production sharing, while demarking the largely undeveloped southwest of the country into nine blocks to designate areas for future exploration’.

(Suskind, 2004: 96).

For his part, Stephen Gowans attempts to demonstrate the preeminent importance of oil by concentrating on the social conditions in Baghdad after the invasion. He says that when chaos broke out in Baghdad US forces let gangs of looters and arsonists run riots through all the Ministers except for that of Oil, where archives and files concerning the Iraqi oilfields were mainly stored (quoted in Griffin, 2004: 94).

Alan Greenspan, who was Federal Reserve Chairman at the time Washington decided to invade Baghdad, also considered the oil factor as a significant reason for the Iraq war. Greenspan published a book in 2007 in which he explained that the removal of Saddam Hussein had been ‘essential’ to secure world oil supplies (Greenspan: 2007:531). In an interview he gave he tried to clarify this by saying that while securing global oil supplies was ‘not the administration motive’, he had presented the White House with the case for why the removal of Saddam Hussein was significant for the global economy (Woodward, 17/09/2007: A03).

The importance of oil for the US is not only related to economic profit but also geopolitics. For the American government, the exertion of greater influence over the Persian Gulf might further strengthen its incomparable international power. Paul Rogers observes that the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf were of utmost importance because demand from China and India continued to grow (Rogers, 2004). The US was largely concerned over the country’s growing dependence on imported oil and especially from Saudi Arabia. Michal Klare also observed that the country relied in 2003 on imported oil
for 55% while this percentage was expected to rise to 65% in 2020. (Klare, 2003). And he continued: ‘This dependency is the Achilles heel for American power. Unless Persian Gulf can be kept under American control, our ability to remain the dominant world power would be put into question’ (Ibid).

**Beyond Iraq**

The analysis has demonstrated that the view which supports the idea of a large impact of neoconservatism on Washington’s decision to invade Baghdad can be contested. What can thus be said is that this decision can arguably be attributed to the neoconservatives or at least only to the group. US foreign policy after 9/11, however, is not only related to the Iraq war in spite of its increased significance. On the contrary, it is linked to a variety of issues, countries and regions. Therefore, an attempt to assess the impact of neoconservatism on US foreign policy should not only focus on the Iraq war. Bush’s policy concerning other fronts of the ‘Axis of Evil’, for example questionably reflected the neoconservative philosophy. US President did not seek to promote regime-change policy in the case of Iran. The neoconservatives were in favour of such a policy in respect of Tehran (Boot, 2004). At the same time, Bush did not push for a regime change in North Korea. For example, in January 2003 George W. Bush emphasised that the US would not invade this state (Haley, 2006: 161).

Foreign policy towards Russia and China continued to be based on the principle of realism as it was happening from 1 January until 10 September 2001. In terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict George W. Bush started gradually to endorse the idea of the creation of a Palestinian state attempting to put pressure on the Arabs to stop the use of violence (Gordon, 2003: 160). Subsequently, the US President started to push the Road Map for peace in the Middle East, cooperating with the European Union, Russia and the UN. In this case, as Max Boot saw it most neoconservatives could not be satisfied because they thought that such a plan would lead nowhere (Boot, 2004). In *Foreign Affairs* Colin Powell also outlined other aspects of US foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 September which were not on the agenda of the neoconservative group. He elaborated on the US intention to work on the basis of its alliances in the world. For example, it attempted to end strife in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo working as a partner (Powell,
2004: 27). It also sought to deal with new challenges, global in scope, such as HIV/AIDS and the poverty of Africa (2004: 26).

**Crisis in the Group**

The beginning of the war on Iraq in March 2003 demonstrated the success of the US military. Its forces marched easily into Baghdad without facing serious difficulties. But could the military victory of the US be translated into a political one? In the aftermath of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ developments were not satisfactory. The guerrilla war, the continuing bloodshed, the increase of innocent victims and the possibility of a civil war were reminiscent of Vietnam. Noting the growing instability of Iraq, many neoconservatives, who had supported the war, could not but feel embarrassed. Leading American neoconservative, scholar Francis Fukuyama, decided to disassociate himself from the group. In his opinion, the ideology had evolved into something he could no longer support. As he explains, the reason was that the principles of neoconservatism in the post-Cold War era ‘overemphasised the use of force and led logically to the Iraq war’ (2006: ix). The disassociation of Francis Fukuyama from neoconservatism marked a crisis for the movement.

Some neoconservative intellectuals, notably William Kristol, attacked Francis Fukuyama for his change of mind over Iraq. Kristol wrote *The Weekly Standard* that:

'It would be nice to believe as Fukuyama does, that a long-term process of social evolution is under way that will inevitably produce liberal democracy […] Indeed, it would be nice if we lived in a world in which we didn’t have to take the enemies of liberal democracy seriously […] It would be nice to wait until we were certain conditions were ripe before we had to act […] Unfortunately, that is not the world that we live in’

(Kristol, 2006).

There are also other examples of the crisis in the group of the neoconservatives. Several politicians resigned office. Douglas Feith stepped down from the Pentagon in January 2005 for ‘personal and family reasons’ (BBC website, 27/01/05). Lewis Scooter Libby was indicted on obstruction of justice and left the administration in October 2005. John
Bolton temporarily appointed as UN ambassador in Bush’s second term, quitted his job in December 2006. He was unable to win Senate confirmation after Democrats gained control in the Congress in the mid-term elections of 2006. Finally, Paul Wolfowitz, who became chief of the World Bank after the US President was reelected, resigned in May 2007. He was accused of a pay rise he arranged for his girlfriend who was an employee of the Bank.\footnote{Richard Perle resigned a few days after the Iraq invasion in March 2003.}

**Conclusion**

This chapter analysed the supposed influence of the neoconservative group on George W. Bush from the period of his preelection campaign until the war on Iraq. Some neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle had tutored him before he became president. The beginning of his administration also saw some of them have positions in it. Nevertheless, they did not greatly influence Bush’s his foreign policy approach before 11 September. His foreign policy before the attacks shows rather a realist approach. US President himself praised the virtue of realism in international politics giving a speech in 1999. Neither Iraq nor terrorism were issues of increased importance in the presidential campaign and during the first eight months George W. Bush was in power before 11 September 2001.

The terrorist atrocities of 9/11 meant the neoconservative agenda came to the forefront. The impact of the group on the US administration started gradually to become a debatable issue. The analysis shows, however, that the influence of the group cannot be assumed because of the military operations against Afghanistan and especially Iraq in March 2003. It was mentioned that neoconservative politicians had not been appointed in the top tier of the administration and subsequently their portrayal as a driving force behind the decisions of the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon was considered as underestimating the role of other figures who had been higher ranked. For example, former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld was regarded as favouring the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime from 1998. In parallel with him, politicians who had not advocated for a war against Iraq before the terrorist attacks, such as Condoleezza
Rice strongly supported it in their aftermath. US President George W. Bush also put Iraq on his agenda only a few days after the terrorist attacks according to the 9/11 Commission Report and the account of Richard Clarke. It was therefore argued that an analysis of American foreign policy after 11 September 2001 might not necessarily have had the neoconservatives as its starting or fundamental point.

Moreover, the ‘revolutionary’ character of US foreign policy after 11 September was contested. It was shown that the concept of preemption and interventionism were not new in the literature of international relations as well as in American history and were not invented by the neoconservatives. It was also argued that Washington’s decision to invade Iraq could arguably be attributed to role of the group because other factors - e.g. the need to fight against terror and the oil - were of increased significance for the Bush administration going beyond the interests of a few politicians and intellectuals. Finally, the chapter explained that although US foreign policy after 11 September had been prioritised by the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq, its analysis should include additional aspects where no neoconservative influence can be observed.
Chapter 4: The European and Media Dimensions

Transatlantic relations are of utmost significance to the European Union. Shared historical experiences, commitment to democracy and the rule of law as well as common interests, for instance economic and political cooperation and cultural exchanges, can explain their importance (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005: 75). As President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso puts it: ‘this is the most important economic relation in the world’ (EU website, 2007). The development of transatlantic relations certainly depends to a large extent on the evolution of US foreign policy. Given neoconservatism is intervowen into US foreign policy, this ideology cannot but be of interest to the EU. Washington’s world affairs approach after 11 September, however, and especially, the war on Iraq, influenced negatively the transatlantic partnership.

This chapter will discuss EU-US relations in a historical perspective focusing on their crisis in 2003. Although the governments of Britain, France, Germany and Italy were divided as to their foreign policies regarding the Iraq war, public opinion in the ‘Big Four’ of the EU was not fragmented. In other words, in spite of the failure of the political elites of above-mentioned countries to agree on a foreign policy agenda, European civil society found common ground. In this context, the attention will be turned towards the European media. Their role as a potential explanation for the transatlantic clash and as a basis for the creation of a European public sphere will be outlined. The chapter will also concentrate on the media themselves exploring the theoretical role of journalists and ways this research project can be structured. A framework for the comparison of media from different European countries will be given while problematic issues of the thesis will be explored and specific choices which had to be made will be explained.

Allies Driven Apart

During the Cold War transatlantic relations were marked by the strategic partnership between Western Europe and the US. From 1945 until 1989, Western Europe was dependent on US assistance in order to thwart the expansion of communism. (Kissinger, 2002: 36). In this regard, the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was crucial. NATO provided the basis for co-operation between the US and countries of
Western Europe during the Cold War. Their common interests ensured the anti-Soviet orientation of NATO. However, US-European relations have not always been particularly warm since 1945. There were internal divisions in the NATO in spite of the onset of the Cold War. Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro argue that, from its foundation the consensus of NATO was often stretched to breaking point because of its approaches towards regions outside Europe, notably the Middle East (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 19). The Suez crisis episode of 1956 is the obvious example whereby Britain and France co-operated with Israel and attacked Egypt without the support of the USA. France’s withdrawal from NATO integrated command structure in 1966 is an example of transatlantic tensions during the Cold War (Lundestad, 2003: 129).

During the Cold War the EU, which was then called as European Economic Community (EEC), had lacked any mechanism to handle external relations until the 1970s (Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1996: 103). The launch of the European Political Co-operation in the 1973 was the first significant attempt of the EEC to speak with one voice in the international arena. The promotion of peace in the Middle East, was a particular goal of the EEC’s foreign policy. For instance, an initiative of the EEC was the signing of the Venice Declaration in 1980, which called for self-determination for the Palestinians. However, it was not until the beginning of the 1990s when the EU made its most significant efforts to act united in foreign affairs as an international security actor.

The end of the Cold War was a turning point. Since 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the role of NATO has changed because of the demise of the Soviet Union. The new mission of the Organisation would be to participate in regional conflicts. Theoretically, Europe was less dependent on the USA and thus different strategic objectives and policies came to the forefront. The establishment of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 outlined EU’s ambition to follow its own foreign policy. The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) of 1995, which marked the first attempt of the EU and the US to identify an inventory of objectives for closer co-operation on political and economic issues, also illustrated the Union’s desire to act as a global leader (Marsh and Mackenstein, 2005: 79; Piening, 1997: 110). During the

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18 French President Nicolas Sarkozy decided in June 2008 that France would rejoin NATO (Lasserre, Le Figaro, 18/06/08, Politique, p. 3)
administration of Bill Clinton, the US did not look unfavourably on EU’s commitment to
develop a CFSP (Lundestad, 2003: 257). Nevertheless, the policy efforts under CFSP did
not differ in practice dramatically from EPC policy-making (White, 2001: 99). The
experience in Bosnia in the 1990s demonstrated that the EU could little without US input
(Forster and Wallace, 2000: 473). Furthermore, the crisis of Kosovo in 1999 highlighted
the disagreement of between Europe and the US over the role of the United Nations (UN).
The European allies, led by France, had then prioritised the importance of the UN.

Since the beginning of the first term of the George W. Bush EU-US relations have not
been marked by a spirit of solidarity. The main reason was the disappointment and
frustration created within the EU over Bush’s unilateralism (Mawle, 2004: 1). The
unilateral policy of US President differed from the more co-operative one of Bill Clinton,
as it has already been discussed in the second chapter. The terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 gave a new dimension, albeit briefly, to EU-US relations. The headline
of Le Monde declared: ‘Nous sommes tous Americains / We are all Americans’ two days
after the terrorist atrocities and was characteristic of most European media coverage
(Colombani, 13/09/01). The EU’s support for the US appeared to pave the wave for
closer transatlantic relations. Not only did the Union express its solidarity with the US
but it also cooperated in the subsequent military campaign against Afghanistan. NATO
invoked for the first time in its history its Article V mutual defence clause. However, the
spirit of solidarity started to loosen from the beginning of 2002, when George W. Bush
made his ‘Axis of Evil’ speech. It predisposed the world to what would follow with the
implementation of his military doctrine. European concerns for stability and aversion to
war led many member states to oppose the military operation against Iraq in 2003
(Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 156). When Washington decided to embark on a strategy of
pre-emption and attack without UN authorisation, EU countries such as Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece and Sweden expressed their vocal opposition (The Economist,
22/02/03: 41). Transatlantic relations entered a period of crisis and high tension.

The EU did not show signs of cohesion in its opposition to the US but remained divided.
While the Franco-German position at the UN was based on more patience and insistence
on giving the UN weapons inspectors more time, several European countries led by
Britain, Italy and Spain were prepared to send troops to Iraq. EU’s internal division was
highlighted on 30 January 2003 when Britain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain and three future member-states, namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland expressed in a joint statement their solidarity to the US (BBC website, 30/01/03). As a result, Europe seemed to be consisted of two branches, a new and an old one as US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld implied when he talked about ‘old Europe’ (Mowle, 2004: 1). Countries, which were in favour of the Iraq war, might be considered as being part of new Europe while those, which were against, might be seen as being part of the old one.

Although the EU did not forge a common position before the war on Iraq, public opinion in member states was not divided as to its anti-American stance. Anti-Americanism did not first come to the forefront with this war but has deep historical roots. As editor of Germany’s weekly magazine Die Zeit Josef Loffe puts it: ‘it is as old as the American Republic itself’ (Joffe, 2007: 95). During the Twentieth Century, and especially since the end of the Second World War, this developed as a result of concerns over growing American power, contempt for US culture and enmity for its military might and presence (Hollander, 1992: 369). After the collapse of the Berlin Wall anti-Americanism increased because it could no longer be balanced by anticommunism as it had happened in the Cold-War era. It reflected the perception that the US, as the only superpower, ‘was responsible for virtually all the world’s problems and evils’ (Rubin and Rubin, 2004: 153).

Polls organised by the Pew Research Institute in Washington indicate that from 1999 to 2003, the positive image of the US fell from a rating of 83% to 48% in Britain, from 62% to 31% in France, from 78% to 25% in Germany and from 76% to 34% in Italy (Pew Research Institute website, 18/03/03: 1). It is noteworthy that even in countries such as Britain and Italy, where governments supported the war on Iraq, the majority of their populations did not endorse their leaders’ policies. 51% of the British people opposed the war. Fewer than a quarter of Italians (17%) favoured their government joining the US in the military operation (Ibid: 1-3). In early February 2003 European public opinion began to express itself. The weekend of 15 February, one day after weapons inspectors spoke to the UN, saw some of the largest public protests in decades with nearly one million people in London, one to two million in Rome, 300,000 to 500,000 in Berlin and some 100,000 in Paris.
Mediating the Rift

Scholars argue that the media have potentially played a significant role in the development of the transatlantic rift. Columnist of The New York Times Paul Krugman argues that reporting prior to the Iraq was responsible for the differing way Europeans and Americans saw the world. Subsequently, he explains the divide on the basis of a ‘pervasive anti-American bias’ in the European media, (quoted in Lehmann, 2003: 63-64). Similarly, former editor of Financial Times Richard Lambert argues that the European media have demonstrated signs of anti-Americanism for years. He believes the coverage of the US reveals something about the status of the transatlantic partnership, noting that the media reflect and reinforce the views of their readers (Lambert, 2003: 62-63). Further to this, insights can be offered concerning the way Europeans understand the US in the light of the political ideology of neoconservatism.

The transatlantic divide cannot of course be only attributed to the role of the media. There are other factors, which should be taken into account, when considering the negative view of the US in Europe. In the case of Iraq, European opposition to US war plans can be explained by various political motivations. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder based his re-election campaign on his opposition to Washington’s decision to lead a military operation against the regime of Saddam Hussein (Hitchcock, 2004: 469, 470). Schröder managed to be re-elected against the more pro-American Stoiber. French President’s Jacques Chirac opposition reflected the country’s feeling and Charles de Gaulle’s longstanding desire for a more powerful Europe, which could act as counterweight or counterbalance to the US (Nicolaidis, 2006: 92; Shawcross, 2004: 77).

From an additional perspective, the negative perception of the US in Europe derives from their differing position over the necessity of a war. The thesis of the so-called neoconservative intellectual Robert Kagan is instructive because he emphasises on the differing philosophies of the two sides. In particular, Kagan argues that ‘Americans are from Mars and European from Venus’ and writes that while the US believes that security depends on the use of military force, Europe stresses the importance of law and international cooperation on the basis of Immanuel Kant’s notion of perpetual peace (Kagan, 2003: 3). It should be mentioned that the thesis of Kagan has received criticism.
Scholars who disagree with him write that since 1945 many Europeans have had American views and many Americans European ones (Ash, 2006: 73; Nye 2006: 79).

Thomas Mowle elaborates on three approaches analysing the divergence between the EU and the US, namely the realist, the liberal institutional and the epistemic one. The first approach advances hypotheses that focus on power, and therefore, on the dominant position of the US in the world. The second one stresses the role of international institutions suggesting that European institutions might encourage the adoption of a common policy based on multilateralism as opposed to the preferences of the US. The third approach, which is the epistemic one, concentrates on hypotheses based on cultural differences between the EU and the US. These cultural differences might lead the EU and the US to interpret their similar interests in different ways (Mowle, 2004: 17-33).

**Constructing the Reality and Setting the Agenda**

Given this research project will deal with media coverage, it is certainly connected to news production. Events, facts and developments do not have voice to speak for themselves but are reported by journalists. Their interpretation and depiction of the world can either mirror reality or be the product of a process of news construction. In a wider context, this dilemma reflects a potential clash between two theories of knowledge: empiricism and constructivism. Empiricists focus on the importance of experience. They believe that a real world exists and consider the human mind as ‘tabula rasa’ on the basis of the observation of John Locke in the 17th century. According to empiricists, the content of the human mind can only be formed through the senses and by experience. In principle, they investigate the social world as the natural one (Deacon et al, 1999: 4). As opposed to empiricists, constructivists believe in subjectivity and in an understanding of the world through a cognitive process emphasising the crucial role of human agency. What they argue is that knowledge is the product of humans who interpret the world. Without necessarily endorsing a postmodernist view that reality does not exist, this study is grounded on the notion of constructivism, and therefore, as we will see, on the construction of the news by the journalist (Tuchman, 1978).
Considering constructivism, Eric Louw makes reference to Plato’s *Republic* and his description of prisoners in a cave (Louw, 2005: 1-9). Plato’s allegory has a tangible contemporary resonance when the media are paralleled to the cave scene. The messages the media transmit can be as problematic for audiences as the shadows were for the prisoners in the allegory of Plato. In other words, consumers might only consider as real the messages constructed by the journalists and transmitted by the media. The reference to Plato’s allegory and the notion of constructivism raise questions concerning the quality of information provided to the audience by the media as well as the latter’s objectivity. The notion of constructivism implies that the scope for objectivity in the media is limited. Furthermore, different aspects of the function of journalism have to be outlined and separated. These vary from deeming the media as a ‘watchdog’ to considering them as a servant of the interests of the dominant elites.

The consideration of the media as a ‘watchdog’ in Western liberal democracies relates to the ideal norms of professional journalism (Curran, 2005: 122,123). Its theoretical freedom and independence paves the way for more objective coverage. The main features of the concept of objectivity refer to the detachment and neutrality of the journalists while reporting, the lack of partisanship and other motives and the attachment to accuracy (McQuail, 1994: 145). As James Curran argues: ‘true professionals check the accuracy of what is reported and are painstakingly neutral in the way in which the balance contending opinion’ (Curran, 2002: 127). Nevertheless, even if professional rules are followed journalists can hardly be regarded as objective in their work. The cannons of professionalism do not necessarily guarantee that the media reflect objective reality (Curran, 2002: 128). Journalists are confronted with a plethora of information, which they have to select the news from. This interpretation is essential for newspapers, radio and TV channels because of specific space or time budget. On these grounds,

19 In his allegory of the cave Plato described a scene with a group of chained prisoners, a fire burning behind them and a walkway between the fire and the prisoners carrying various objects the shadows of which were cast on the wall of the cave. The chained prisoners could only see the shadows of the various objects and hear their echoes believing they were real. A prisoner was then released but he continued to believe that the shadows of the various objects were more real than the objects themselves because his eyes were blinded first by the firelight and then by the sunlight. When this prisoner started finally to be enlightened and realised that the real objects were not the shadows, he decided to go back and liberate the other prisoners. Nonetheless, when he went back to the cave his eyes became blind by the darkness and he could see less than the other prisoners. The other prisoners decided then to stay there and kill anyone who would seek to bring them to the surface (Plato, Politeia, viving XII)
journalists have to emphasise and deemphasise on particular stories (Galtung and Ruge, 1999). This selection of news certainly limits the chances of an objective coverage. As Michael Schudson puts it: ‘the notion of objectivity in journalism appears anomalous’ (Schudson, 1999: 295).

The selection of news is an inevitable parameter of the journalistic work. Scholars identify specific factors, which lead or contribute to their choice. News selection by journalists cannot be easily described as a random reaction to random events (Golding and Elliott, 1979). In particular, a large number of media firms are corporations aiming at increasing their profits. This makes the relationship between firms and advertisers crucial for the economic survival and expansion of the former. Moreover, although most of radio and TV channels and newspapers claim to be non-partisan, they rarely escape the perception of a conservative or liberal bias. Journalists should also be seen as employees of firms, which control their hiring, firing and the news management as a whole (Bagdikian, 1999: 151). Although they are expected to follow the professional norms of journalism and to be objective, reporters and editors can be under pressure to include specific news stories or to give a particular political nuance in their piece of work.20 Concerning neoconservatism this is unquestionably a political ideology of the right. Therefore, a positive coverage could be expected in right-wing media. Journalists working for conservative media might theoretically show partiality for neoconservatism in their reports. By contrast, journalists working for liberal media might be expected to be negative. For this reason, media which cover both perspectives, will be selected for analysis, as it will be shown.

Media scholars have employed models of political economy explaining news production (Gandy, 1982). Peter Golding and Graham Murdock make a significant point: they acknowledge the structured relations between owners and journalists (Golding and Murdock, 1991). Golding and Murdock considered the widespread interplay between economic organisations and cultural, political and social life. Other models of political communication also dismiss the idea of objectivity in the media by considering them as exclusive servants of the dominant elites. This discussion has been greatly influenced by

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20 Not all journalists believe they should be objective in their work but must in some manner confront the widespread belief that they have to be so (Schudson, 1999: 291)
the ‘manufacturing consent’ thesis (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). According to this argument, pro-government propaganda is produced by the media and the independent flow of information is impeded. With particular emphasis on media influence over foreign policy, the ‘indexing approach’ to political communication is relevant. Here, the media remain a vehicle of the government but in the case of elite disagreement they can take positions which might affect foreign policy (Bennett, 1990).

James Curran enumerates eleven main factors which encourage the media to support dominant power interests. These are state censorship, high entry costs to establish new media enterprises in the mass market and media concentration as there has been partnership arrangements between leading companies. Additional factors include corporate ownership, mass-market pressures and advertising influence. Furthermore, after major considerations included, rise of public relations, news routines and values, unequal resources in media organisations and dominant discourses complete the list of those factors. All have the ability to influence and shape media perceptions (Curran, 2002: 148-151). Finally, what can be argued is that journalists ‘participate willy-nilly in slanting the news’ (Entman, 1989: 37). It is for this reason that the notion of constructivism is considered useful in relation to this project.

The theory of constructivism and the limits of objectivity can contribute to an understanding of the role of the journalists. Taken this, it should be also explored how the media can theoretically influence public opinion. Realising that the presentation of issues by the media can play a role in forming public attitudes and taking relevant media studies literature and political communication research into account, the concept of ‘agenda-setting’ is of increased significance for the implementation of this project. Walter Lipmann was the first who - without using the term ‘agenda-setting’ - argued that the press could connect the events that occurred in the world and the image of those events in the public’s mind (Lipmann, 1922). A few decades later, Bernard Cohen pointed out: ‘[The press] may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’ (Cohen, 1963: 13). The term ‘agenda-setting’ was first used by Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw in an article they published in the 1970s. (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 176, 187). McCombs and Shaw dealt with the presidential campaign of 1968 and
undertook research on a sample of 100 undecided voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina hypothesising that the mass media had set the agenda for each political campaign. They found that the media influenced the public on what issues to think about regarding the political campaigns. Since then, experimental evidence demonstrates that when news concentrate more on a particular issue, it is more likely that people consider that issue as more important. (Iyengar et al., 1982).

The traditional or first level of ‘agenda-setting’ refers to the capability of the media to set the order of importance of particular issues, and thus, raise the significance of those issues in people’s mind steering public opinion. As Maxwell McCombs puts it, ‘agenda-setting is a theory about the transfer of salience from the mass media’s pictures of the world to the pictures in our heads’ (McCombs, 2004: 68). In other words, on the basis of the ‘agenda-setting’ hypothesis, issues reported by the media become part of the public debate as opposed to issues not reported. However, the first level of ‘agenda-setting’ does not concentrate on nuances of media coverage. Although the notion of traditional ‘agenda-setting’ can explain why an object becomes salient in comparison to other objects in people’s mind, it does not focus on ‘attributes, those characteristics and properties that fill out the picture of each object’ (McCombs, 2004: 71). Therefore, a second level of ‘agenda-setting’ has been developed which deals with specific aspects of media content and aims at outlining how the news agendas of attributes influence the public agenda (McCombs, 2004: 71 and 85).

The second level of ‘agenda-setting’ is relevant to the concept of ‘framing’. ‘Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (Entman, 1993: 52). The theory of constructivism becomes tangible while discussing about ‘framing’. Constructing the news entails the placement of reality by the media into frame. To put it in a simple way, what does not appear on a newspaper page is considered as being out of frame.

Concluding, the first and second levels of ‘agenda-setting’ are significant for a theoretical understanding of the mediation of neoconservatism by the media. The first level of ‘agenda-setting’ can unquestionably highlight why neoconservatism might
become salient in public's mind. This point can contribute to a detection of the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September on the coverage of neoconservatism by the media. Was neoconservatism in the period before 11 September as important as in the aftermath of the terrorist atrocities? This is a significant research question which has to be investigated.

The second level of 'agenda-setting' and the concept of 'framing' can outline how the media discussed and presented neoconservatism. In this way, the topic of neoconservatism will be divided into specific themes and issues the coverage of which will be analysed. For example, it will be indicated which aspect of US politics was more relevant to the neoconservative ideology: US society or US foreign policy? It will be also shown which figures, instruments and principles were considered as neoconservative. With regard to US foreign policy, it will be additionally explored which countries were on the neoconservative agenda. Moreover, taking into account that neoconservatism has since 11 September proved to be a debatable issue, particular interpretations and judgements of the media will be sketched out. As it will be explained in detail, these interpretations and judgements of the media will principally refer to the impact of the neoconservatives on US foreign policy and to the extent to which they have been influenced by the political philosopher Leo Strauss.

Although the notion of 'agenda-setting' seems appropriate for the implementation of this research project, criticism about this model of political communication is certainly acknowledged. According to critics of 'agenda-setting' there is no sufficient evidence for a causal connection between the various issue agendas to be shown (McQuail, 1994: 356). Everett Rogers and James Dearing reviewed 112 empirical studies of the agenda-setting process and found out that 60% of those studied had supported a media agenda-public agenda relationship (1996: 92). Denis McQuail and Sven Windahl put into question whether researchers should look for direct effects from the media and challenge the potential intention attributed to the media. They also write about different kind of agendas, which are involved as those of institutions, political parties and governments (McQuail and Windahl, 1993: 106, 107). Additionally, Rogers and Dearing focus on the need for three different agendas to be distinguished: the priorities of the media, those of
the public and those of policy and work on the interaction of those agendas (Rogers and Dearing, 1996: 5, 6).

The Audience

Having already explored the notions of ‘agenda-setting’ and ‘framing’, what should be also investigated is the extent to which public opinion can be theoretically influenced by the media. This is related to the antibodies, if any, of the audience while receiving media information. The question which has to be posed is the following: Is the audience autonomous to escape from the influence of the media or is susceptible to media messages? In his work *Democracy without Citizens*, Robert Entman developed a critical approach, which challenged the audience autonomy assumption. Entman elaborated on a model of interaction between the media messages and how the audience perceives them (1989: 77). This model of interaction concerning the impact of the media on public opinion is regarded as useful for this thesis.

Entman points out that the media contribute but do not control the structure of publicly available information that shapes the political thinking of people (1989: 84). In this way, Entman expressed his opposition to the audience autonomy assumption which minimises the potential influence of the media on public opinion. In so doing, he dealt with two particular variants of the audience autonomy assumption. First, he did not agree with the idea that the audience thinks about communications selectively rejecting information it does not like. And second, he dismissed the idea that the audience understands so little that it only keeps its existing belief and cannot be seriously influenced by the media (Entman, 1989: 76-85).

Entman explains his point that the media only contribute to but do not control people’s political thinking by drawing on information-processing research. He argues that people filter the information they receive and can often respond positively to media messages. In particular, filtering the received information implies that ‘people have cognitive structures, called schemas, which organise their thinking. A person’s system of schemas stores substantive beliefs, attitudes values, and preferences along with rules for linking different ideas’ (Entman, 1989: 77). Therefore, people process the news ‘according to routines established in [their] schema system’ and can either store the information...
changing beliefs or discard it (Entman, 1989: 78). Entman’s argument goes beyond the autonomy model in what it concentrates on an additional aspect of media power. This is the possibility of exclusion of inferences by the media. By excluding some information, the media coverage can prevent the audience of acquiring new beliefs and knowledge. In Entman’s words ‘while audiences can ignore any conclusion that bothers them and stick to their existing beliefs, it is harder for them to come up with a new interpretation on their own, one for which the media do not make relevant information readily available’ (Entman, 1989: 85).

Entman’s points about people’s schemas, which filter the news, and the exclusion of inferences, which might prevent the public of thinking something different and new, seem appropriate to be applied in a project dealing with the mediation of a complex and obscure concept, such as neoconservatism. The discussion about schemas does not entail that people without an adequate knowledge background might not be able to read articles about neoconservatism and come up with their own interpretation. However, people reading those articles might be regarded as being part of an elite public opinion able to cope with their content. This observation can be reinforced by the nature of the newspapers accessed - exclusively quality newspapers – as we will see. Furthermore, if the exclusion of inferences by the media could prevent people of thinking something new, different media interpretations of neoconservatism at various periods would possibly influence their understanding of US foreign policy. This point is linked to the function of the first level of ‘agenda-setting’ and can also contribute to an understanding of the impact of 11 September for the coverage.

Alternatives to Entman’s model obviously exist in the literature of media studies. For instance, ‘limited-effects’ and ‘powerful-effects’ models suggest that the media have small and significant effects on a large number of people respectively (Severin and Tankard, 2001: 263, 264). However, the model of Entman provides a midway solution dealing with audience behaviour. In other words, his model could be seen as a golden mean. He rejects the idea of a mass audience and at the same, without endorsing the autonomy model, he recognises the fact that media audiences consist of human beings who can filter messages within certain cultural frameworks (Ang, 1995: 209-214, emphasis added).
**Research Design**

Taking the above-mentioned observations into account, a framework for the collection and the analysis of the data has to be developed for this project. The research design will have two aspects: it will be comparative as well as longitudinal. The comparative research format aims at bringing the coverage of neoconservatism by the British, French, German and Italian media together and subsequently highlight the contrast of this coverage. This will be synthesised around the nationality and ideology of the newspapers. Thus, commonalities and differences of the coverage of neoconservatism will be outlined.

Furthermore, the collection of data from each country’s media within a longitudinal design format allows some insight into the time order of variables (Bryman, 2004: 46). In other words, a longitudinal design will contribute to an analysis of the coverage of neoconservatism at different junctures. In this way, shifts in this coverage can be explored. The longitudinal design format within which the data will be collected certainly requires limits for the period of coverage to be placed. The years 1993 and 2005 are considered as such. These limits mark the beginning of Bill Clinton’s administration and the end of the first year of George W. Bush’s second term as US President. The analysis will cover a significant part of the post-Cold War period, which includes not only the aftermath of 11 September but also the first eight months George W. Bush was in power before the terrorist attacks and the eight years of Clinton’s administration. The year 2005 signals the beginning of the collapse of neoconservatism as it was explained in the previous chapter.

**The choice of neoconservatism and the case of the US media**

A significant point to be explained refers to the choice of neoconservatism as the key term of this project. This political ideology was selected for analysis for two reasons. The first is that it can refine the broad scope of a thesis dealing with the coverage of US foreign policy. Neoconservatism can be certainly considered as one of its parameters, especially in the aftermath of 11 September. The second reason is that its impact on George W. Bush’s world affairs approach was highly debatable. On that basis the
analysis of the coverage of the political ideology can possibly lead to interesting conclusions as to the position taken by the media accessed. This could hardly happen with other foreign policy ideologies such as nationalism or realism. Nationalism and realism did not dominate the literature of international relations after 9/11 spreading contradictory views. The analysis of the representation of the neoconservatives by the media provides finally a good opportunity to explore how they illustrated the 'other'. As Roger Silverstone puts it: ‘All of what we do, all of who we are, as subjects and actors in the social world, depends on our relationships to others: how we see them, know them, relate to them, care for or ignore them’ (Silverstone, 1999: 135).

Taken neoconservatism is interwoven into US politics a dilemma was to either confine the research to the European media or include American ones as well. US media were finally not used although no translation would have been required. The project could thus focus only on European representations of neoconservatism. In other words, without accessing the US media the thesis would be exclusively European-oriented and conclusions could be possibly put in the framework of the creation of a European public sphere. Professor of political thought at the University of Pennsylvania Anne Norton supported this view. In her opinion, the thesis had to concentrate on the European representation of neoconservatism per se.21

**A European Public Sphere?**

As this thesis will compare the media coverage of neoconservatism in different countries of the EU it can be linked to the debate concerning the existence of a European public sphere. As it will be explained the notion of the 'public sphere is a highly controversial one. There are scholars who accept the idea of its existence. For instance, Peter Dahlgren writes: ‘it is meaningful to speak about a public sphere that does exist today, but by any standard of evaluation it is in a dismal state’ (Dahlgren, 2001: 35). On the contrary, academics such as Nancy Fraser put its empirical status into question and recognise only a normative one (Fraser, 1992: 136).

21 The conversation between the author and Professor Anne Norton took place on the occasion of 'The Legacy of Leo Strauss' conference which took place in Nottingham in March 2006.
The concept of the public sphere was pioneered by Jürgen Habermas (1989). It refers to the scope of citizens' interaction and includes all locations where ideas relevant to politics can be expressed and debated. It implies the possibility for people to come together and freely and openly discuss issues of common interest and concern. It also envisages that all citizens have equal access to communication which is independent of government censorship and can simultaneously constrain the agendas of the state (Bennett and Entman, 2001: 3). Habermas explored the historical formulation of the public sphere and argued that it began to emerge within the bourgeois classes of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Key places for the exchange of ideas the coffee houses of London and the French salons. Clubs, coffee houses, salons, pamphlets and other traditional locations for the exchange of ideas started to cede their preeminent position to the rising media industry. Within this context, the role of mediated communication plays a crucial role in the contemporary public sphere (Bennett and Entman, 2001: 5). The media became principal institutions of the public sphere as they can theoretically distribute the information necessary for citizens to enable them to make an informed choice at election time, shape the conduct of government by articulating dissenting views and provide as a whole an independent forum of debate (Curran, 1991: 29).

The existence of a mediated public sphere has been the subject of much debate. This concept is difficult to realise and implement in modern societies. Colin Sparks argues that the media are only poor representatives of it (Sparks, 2001: 78). The real chances of citizens gaining political participation through the media are questionable. Nor do they necessarily offer adequate participation for people in political life. As Jim McGuigan puts its, ‘there is no single public sphere to which we all have access and in which we all participate equally.’ People have little power to influence what happens as ‘big decisions are made at the higher reaches of public and business administration, behind closed doors’ (McGuigan, 1996: 4). It is not expected that they treat official politics with the same passion they devote to their own personal lives (McGuigan, 2005: 435).

Only limited room for public access to the dominant media is available and this is restricted to specialised channels or letter pages (Sparks, 2001: 78). Lower status social groups can be alienated from various forms of information (Fraser, 1992: 137). Poverty
can also deny access to communication resources (Brown, 2001: 224) In addition, the opinion-forming press tends to be the preserve of elites and the rise of subscription services has led to a lack of universalism and ended the monopoly of the free-to-air broadcasters (Sparks, 2001: 78). Further to this, according to John Downey a destabilisation of the public sphere can be expected ‘as a consequence of increased use of new information and communication technologies’ because cyberspace is not necessarily inclusive and participatory (Downey, 1999: 135). Habermas himself, who had seen the public sphere growing during an era which witnessed the initial spread of the press, observed its decay in the twentieth century. He attributed this decay to the rise of commercialism and public relations which resulted in limited rationality on the part of media and journalists.

The media of Britain, France, Germany and Italy which will be used for this project do not of course constitute the European public sphere but can maybe partly represent it. Its possible existence is important because it relates to the so-called democratic deficit of the Union. The representation and democratic participation of European citizens within the Union has been problematic. The most recent expression of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Union was highlighted by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch publics in 2005 and the Irish referendum which said ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008. Citizens can be directly represented by the members of the European Parliament but not by the Commission, the European Council and the Council of Ministers. The dynamics and development of European integration have resulted in member-states gradually transferring some of their sovereignty to the EU. The political responsibility has been transferred to supranational bodies. It can then be argued this according to the ‘orthodox view’: ‘the democratic deficit of the Union derives from the fact that the transfer of national parliamentary responsibilities to the governmentally appointed Commission and the intergovernmental Council has not been matched by a commensurate increase in the competences of the European Parliament’ (Chrysochoou, 1998: 31).

According to the ‘orthodox view’, the lack of democracy in the EU depends on the role of the European Parliament. The democratic accountability of the Union might be enhanced if the powers of the body would be increased. Although the functions of the
Parliament have been expanded in the last years, the steady extension of its powers has only been partially successful in tackling the democratic deficit of the Union (Tsoukalis, 2003: 37). The legislative process of the EU is still complex and largely non-transparent and the large majority of European citizens are distant from the decision-making centres of the Union (Tsoukalis, 2003: 34). Scholars argue that the resulting structure of European governance is considered as 'remote, opaque and inaccessible' (Grundmann et al, 2000: 300). Exploring possible remedies leading EU specialist Loukas Tsoukalis has observed: 'Direct elections to the European Parliament have not generated any Europe-wide debates on issues dealt by EU institutions; and such debates that have taken place have been confined to small sections of the political elite, experts and intellectuals. European construction remains an affair for the cognoscenti; the people are expected to follow' (Tsoukalis, 2003: 37). In particular, Tsoukalis goes beyond the need for institutional reform by suggesting that a forum, in other words of a common ground for interaction and intermediation between public authorities and people might be beneficial. There, the concept of a European public sphere is relevant because many consider its development as a prerequisite for democracy within the EU (Chrysochoou, 1998: 87; Closa, 1998: 75; Kantner, 2003: 213 in Machill et al, 2006: 60).

The potential creation of a public sphere is linked to the shaping of a European citizenship and possibly a greater common identity within a Union polity. The EU has promoted the formation of such a notion of citizenship through the Maastricht Treaty. This Treaty introduced a concept, which entailed, inter alia, the right to participate in the political life of member-states other than their own, to reside freely anywhere in the Union and to enjoy consular protection in any member-state’s embassy in a third country. (Dell'Olio, 2005: 69; Tsoukalis, 1993: 37). Despite those provisions the chances for popular participation of EU citizens has remained low. The significance of the creation of a European public sphere is that it could theoretically go beyond already existing attempts to counter the democratic deficit because the former might lead to a transnational demos within the EU. This formation would be composed of members who would not be so fragmented and mutually alienated but would ideally have a new type of
collective identity. A politically aware transnational demos might be capable to direct its
democratic claims to and via EU central institutions (Chrysochoou, 1998: 87 and 91).

The creation of a European public sphere and a transnational demos are not easy tasks.
The Union consists of different nation states which have their own culture and history.
The strength of national identities has meant that few people identify themselves first as
European citizens (Grundman, 1999: 125; Tsoukalis, 2003: 35). In addition, the EU has
found itself in a process of transformation since its foundation and its territory often
changes, as the Eastern Enlargement in 2004 outlined. However, although it cannot be
considered as a state itself, the supranational elements in its structure show that it is an
emerging democratic polity gradually moving beyond the boundaries of nation-states. In
this case, the role of the media can be crucial. The media - along with cultural
institutions and various events, rituals and narratives - have contributed to the
construction of national identities (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). According to
Benedict Anderson, the nation is ‘an imagined political community’ and the development
of its identity of such a nation is tied to the spread of communication systems (Anderson,
1983: 15). Within the context of the EU, the media can maybe play a similar and
analogous role as the one they played in nation-states. In other words, it is theoretically
possible for a European identity to be cultivated through the media, as it happened with
nation-states.

The process of globalization has strongly influenced domestic governance. Domestic
polities are under pressure because of the increasing role of transnational and third sector
actors (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 36). Their actions affect interests of states.
Subsequently governments become willing to exchange some of their legal freedom in
order to influence the actions of those actors as well (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 20).
Globalization has contributed to a change to the meaning of the state and although it
remains at the heart of world politics, Robin Brown notes: ‘we need to modify our
understanding of state from state as a country, that is assuming that state incorporates
everything within the legal territory, to state as organisation’ (Brown, 1995: 63). In
other words, although states are not disappearing, their boundaries are being challenged
(Brown, 1995: 64). Furthermore, the concept of identity cannot be considered as fixed
but is being increasingly ongoing (Giddens, 1991). It has taken a global dimension and is
linked to that of citizenship. While citizenship has traditionally been conceptualised in terms of membership of a given society, it has become potentially more global since the end of the Second World War and the foundation of the UN (Gurevitch et al, 1991: 195). In addition the public sphere is not considered as being necessarily restricted to the nation-state (Habermas, 1989). Thus, in a changing economic, political and media environment marked by globalization, the creation of a transnational public sphere could help to engender more cosmopolitan political identities (Downey and Koenig, 2006: 166).

A hypothetical European public sphere can be based on the synchronisation and homogenisation of national public spheres (Grundmann, 1999: 136). Thomas Risse notes that its ideal form would emerge if the same themes were discussed at the same time at similar levels of attention, frames of reference and patterns of interpretation across national media; and if a transnational community of communication emerged and a common discourse was used by both speakers and listeners within the EU (Risse, 2003: 1). Philip Schlesinger also identifies three criteria for the creation of a European public sphere which would: a) involve the dissemination of a European news agenda, b) need to become a significant part of the everyday news-consuming habits of European audiences and c) entail that those living within the EU have begun to think of their citizenship, in part at least, as transcending the level of the member nation-states (Schlesinger, 1999: 277, 278).

Several studies have been undertaken which have analysed the coverage of various issues by the EU media. The available evidence suggests that although the salience of EU specific topics is low, similar frames of reference prevail in media reporting (Risse, 2003: 1). This research project can complement existing empirical studies. Its main difference is that it will not analyse the coverage of an EU topic per se but will deal with the coverage of a subject - neoconservatism - which is related to the external political developments on the other side of the Atlantic. Therefore a discussion about the 'dissemination of a European news agenda' is not applicable in this thesis. However, it

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22 The idea of the existence of a pan-European public sphere irrespective of nation-states seems utopian because there are no continental-wide mass media which inform its demos as a whole (Grundmann, 1999: 127). The absence of European-wide mass media can be partly explained by the different languages which inhibit communication between populations within the EU (Smith and Wright, 1999: 7). Although English is the most widespread language within the EU, it cannot be considered as a common language for EU citizens (Machill et al., 2006: 62).
will be noteworthy to find out if the coverage of neoconservatism in the media of the ‘Big Four’ shows signs of synchronisation and homogenisation in a period which saw not only EU’s split over its foreign policy but also high tensions in transatlantic relations.

Comparing Different Media

The selection of the EU member-states, the media of which would be accessed, is a significant issue of concern. Since its Eastern enlargement in 2004, the EU is composed of twenty-five countries and since the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 of two additional ones. Although it would be tempting to analyse the media of a high number of EU member states, this might exceed the limits of time budget for the implementation of this project. The media of Britain, France, Germany and Italy were selected because they constitute for economic, historical and political reasons the stronger powers in the EU and can be regarded as its ‘Big Four’. Moreover, these countries were chosen on the basis of the split of EU foreign policy before the war on Iraq. Such a selection can mirror its internal divisions, and mainly of its leading member states, over US foreign policy in 2003. Concerning European countries, which supported the war, Spain could have been an alternative. However, Britain and Italy were preferred to Spain for historical reasons. The latter entered the Community in 1986 while the former in 1973 and 1958 respectively. On the contrary, France and Germany were picked because of their anti-war front at the Security Council of the UN.

Further to this, quality newspapers of the ‘Big Four’ were considered as an appropriate source for analysis. These certainly constitute elite, influential and opinion-forming media, which may theoretically express an interest in a political ideology such as neoconservatism and take positions in its debatable issues. In addition, the variety of conservative and liberal newspapers that exists provides the chance for an analysis of the mediation of neoconservatism based on both perspectives. In other words, a careful choice of newspapers can offer a balanced approach in terms of the political spectrum they cover. By contrast, it would be more difficult to distinguish either conservative or liberal TV channels in Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

Media markets in the ‘Big Four’, as in many other countries, have shown signs of similarity in terms of their commercial liberalisation (Chada and Kavoori, 2005: 88, 89).
In the era of globalization, private competition is encouraged and large corporations have developed. Examples include companies Bertelsman AG and Time Warner as well as the corporations of Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi (McQuail, 1995: 153-164). International communication has changed. The development of new technologies was central to this evolution. Communication can more easily occur across international borders when millions of people can communicate with each other in real time irrespective of their national boundaries (Taylor, 1997: 22; Thussu, 2000). News organisations are less likely to be state-centric and have started to report from anywhere on the planet. The emergence of satellite broadcasting operations in the 1990s contributed to this shift (Brown, 2003: 89; McMillin, 2007: 11).

For its part, the EU has acquired much influence concerning the creation of an audiovisual internal market and since the Treaty of Amsterdam, it has extended neoliberalism not only in the private but also in the public sector (Humphreys, 2007: 101, 102). Its regulation of television services was established with the Television without Frontiers (TWF) Directive in 1989 (Harcourt, 2005: 9; Wheeler, 2007: 228). TWF was based on the free movement of European television programmes in the internal market and the requirement for TV channels to reserve transmission time for European works (EU website, 10/01/08, Humphreys 2007: 93, 94). The Audiovisual Media Services Directive in December 2005 broadened the scope of EU regulations (Wheeler, 2007: 228). Moreover, the policy initiatives of the EU were designed to provide viewers with news channels that could reflect their interests from a European perspective. Euronews is the most obvious example (Kevin, 2003: 39, 40). Europa by Satellite, which is the EU’s TV information service, offers related audiovisual material by satellite to media professionals.

The European Union lacks a substantial press policy concerning issues of pluralism and concentration of ownership as opposed to its audiovisual one. As David Hutchison explains, the main reason is the opposition from media businesses (Hutchison, 2007: 191, 200). In terms of professional regulation, the European Newspaper Publishers Association (ENPA) disagrees with the idea of a European enforced right-of-reply.\footnote{The European Newspaper Publishers Association claims to represent 5200 titles in 26 countries (ENPA website)}
ENPA supports this practice only according to each EU member state. It also rejects initiatives of the Union concerning regulation of media pluralism (Ibid: 190, 191). Subsequently, the general differences in national media systems of the ‘Big Four’ should be taken into account. Literature in comparative media research can provide a useful theoretical framework.

The work of Renate Köcher can be perhaps a starting point. Her study attempts to compare British and German journalism and is based on interviews with journalists from both countries. Köcher’s findings show that British journalism sees itself in the role of transmitter of facts while German journalism tends to place a lot of value on opinion and less on news. It is interesting that only 16% of German journalists made the claim to be an instructor or educator in contrast to 74% of their British colleagues (Köcher, 1986: 54). In parallel with Renate Köcher, Jean Chalaby has compared newsprint journalism in the Anglo-American world and in France and has argued that Anglo-American newspapers contained more news and had better organised news-gathering services (Chalaby, 1996: 305). According to Chalaby, American and British journalists have invented the modern concept of news.

In the discussion of comparative methodology in media research the study of Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini is certainly influential. It is different from that of Jean Chalaby as it primarily aims at understanding the interplay between media and politics. Hallin and Mancini distinguish three models concentrating on media systems in 18 countries although they acknowledge that these systems are not completely homogeneous. These are the polarized pluralist model, where France and Italy belong, the democratic corporatist one, where Germany is placed, and the liberal one, where Britain can be found (Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 217). The scholars focus on four dimensions comparing the above-mentioned models: development of mass press, political parallelism, journalistic professionalism and the role of the state (Ibid. 218, 219).

The analysis of the development of mass press is significant because the rates of newspaper circulation vary across different countries. In 1999, for instance, newspapers

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24 Likewise Hallin and Mancini along with Hutchison argue that the British press emphasises on information and narrative rather than commentary as in other European countries (Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 229; Hutchison, 2007: 189).
were more popular in Germany (63%) than in Britain (49%), Italy (29%) and France (26%), while the former had the lead with 65, 5% in 2001 as well (Pippa, 2000: 21; EU website, 08/09/01: 6). That is to say that while press circulation is high in Germany, it is medium in Britain and low in France and Italy. As opposed to circulation figures, political parallelism, in other words party-press parallelism shows a degree of relative similarity in the 'Big Four'. Theoretically, it should be lower in the polarized pluralist model and thus in France and Italy. Hallin and Mancini explain, however, that even in Germany the political views of journalists are fairly strong correlated with the orientation of the medium they work for (Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 225). They also argue that Britain constitutes an exception within the liberal model. Its newspapers differ from those in the US because they remain partisan (Ibid: 229).

As for journalistic professionalism it is stronger in the democratic corporatist and liberal models than in polarized pluralist one. Nevertheless, in this case - as it happened with political parallelism - differences in the ‘Big Four’ do not necessarily follow the theory of the three models. 27% of journalists in Italy, 15% in Britain and 7% in Germany report that ‘pressures from editors and senior management’ were an ‘important factor’ in their jobs (Ibid: 222). In France there was a strong reaction against instrumentalization of the press after World War II and journalists gained substantial control of many newspapers (Ibid: 222). France lacks a national code of ethics as opposed to the other three states selected for analysis (Hutchison, 2007: 190). It is also noted that Germany has established the right of reply while both this country and Britain have a Press Council. Concerning the role of the state there is a significant difference between countries of the polarized pluralist model and the democratic corporatist and liberal one. In particular, the role of the state has been strong in France and Italy. These two countries have the highest levels of press subsidy in the EU as opposed to Britain and Germany (Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 223, Tunstall, 2002: 231).

The comparison of media content from different countries is not a new idea in international communication studies. Three significant theories have been developed concerning the analysis of news exchanges (Archetti, 2008: 463, 464). The first one

25 Colin Seymour-Ure argues that newspaper affiliations in Britain have made a virtue of being political rather than partisan (quoted in Wheeler, 1997: 78)
claims the existence of unidirectional communications flows among countries (Nordenstreg and Varis, 1974). It predicts that this flow of news should run from richer countries to poorer ones. Such a model, however, can hardly be applied in this project because all the media accessed are based in Western industrialised countries. The second theory is based on globalization theory and supports the idea that news is becoming homogenised at a global level (Giddens, 1990). The third one is synthesised around and localization and advocates that news is diversified along national lines. These national lines are associated with political and cultural differences and diversities in journalistic culture (Gurevith et. al.1991).

Christina Archetti conducted a comparative study of eight newspapers across the US, Italy, France and Pakistan and analysed the way they covered 9/11 and its immediate aftermath (Archetti, 2008). Her data challenge some of strands the above-mentioned theories. Archetti’s research shows that globalization exists not as homogenisation of content, but as an overcoming of time and space barriers. That is because no universal way of interpreting the news was observed in her study. She also argues that ‘a country’s national interest and editorial policy at the level of the single newspaper is important in understanding what shapes news stories’ (Archetti, 2008: 471). For their part, Hallin and Mancini acknowledge the importance of globalization in ‘diminishing national differences in media systems’ but disagree with the idea of a complete homogenisation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 282, 295).

Sources Accessed

To make the research feasible and respond to the needs of time budget not more than two newspapers from each of the ‘Big Four’ respectively were used. The following eight quality newspapers were then selected for analysis:

- The Times and The Guardian (British press)
- Le Figaro and Le Monde (French press)
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung (German press)
- Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica (Italian press)

The population of Britain is approximately 60,500,000 people. In this country the newspaper sector is to a large degree national. Every discussion about its press would
normally have media entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch as a starting point. His News International owns since 1981 the conservative *The Times/Sunday Times*. However, from 1997 they had abandoned their traditional support for the Conservatives, as Murdoch has been keen to promote relationships with governments that could threaten his media empire. Blair was one such acquaintance (Wring, 2002). Murdochs's ownership of those newspapers and his particular relationship to the neoconservatives – as it has already been explained – facilitated their selection for the purpose of this project. These newspapers did not see the war on Iraq in a negative way. As a counterbalance for *The Times/Sunday Times*, *The Guardian/Observer* were used. These are controlled by non-profit organisation Scott Trust. As opposed to Murdoch, who often appoints compliant editors, Scott Trust board selects its own ones with some journalistic input (Wheeler, 1997: 77). *The Guardian/Observer*, which have a negative bias towards the Conservative Party and can be regarded as liberal newspapers, supply an analytical commentary on the news (Semetko, 2000: 365; Wheeler, 1997: 59, 65). They were opposed to the Iraq war.

France has a population of approximately 61,000,000 people. In this country, the newspaper sector is national as well as regional. Two newspapers based in Paris but with national circulation were accessed. National newspapers as opposed to regional ones devote space to international affairs (Lamizet, 1996: 82). The conservative *Le Figaro* had been owned by Socpresse but has been acquired by the arms manufacturer Serge Dassault since 2004. The liberal *Le Monde* is owned by Le Monde SA. Raymond Kuhn writes that *Le Figaro* is not controlled by a political party but is clearly partisan in terms of its coverage of domestic politics. The paper shows strong sympathies for the Gaullist party. For its part, *Le Monde* has no organisational connection whatsoever with a political party aiming at adopting a non-partisan approach to political coverage. This does mean that *Le Monde* always avoid to be involved in party politics. The newspaper is committed to socially progressive and politically left of centre goals which are

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\[26\text{In the first months of 2003, *The Times/Sunday Times* sold 616,308 and 1,639,130 copies per day, while *The Guardian/Observer* sold 386,585 and 430,546 ones respectively (Bell and Alden, 2003: 23) .}
\[27\text{In the analysis only the titles: *The Times* and the *The Guardian* will be used. These will also refer to their Sunday papers.}
\[28\text{In 2003, *Le Figaro* enjoyed a circulation of 326,800 copies per day while *Le Monde* 324,400 ones (BBC website, 25/11/04).}
described by its founder Hubert Beuve-Méry as ‘social liberalism’ or ‘liberal socialism.’ *Le Monde* provides in depth coverage of national and international politics, with detailed background and highly analytic articles. It covers national and international affairs in a comprehensive and balanced way giving space to the views of all sides and attributing rationality to the readers (Kuhn, 1995: 73-74). Both *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* were against the war on Iraq.

Germany, with a population of approximately 82,500,000 people, is a federal state. The federal structure of the country is reflected on its newspaper market which is to a large degree regional. The newspapers accessed are based in Frankfurt and Munich respectively but enjoy a national circulation. In particular, the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* is owned by the publishing firm of Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung GmbH while the liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* by Süddeutsche Zeitung GmbH (Hickethier, 1996: 105; Meyn, 1999: 108-109).29 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* are the most influential ‘papers of record’ in Germany and polls have revealed that that they are ‘journalistic opinion leaders’. Their coverage is most likely to have an impact on that of other mass media which tend to copy their agendas, arguments and frames (Weischenberg et al., 1994 quoted in Hafez, 2000: 182). Professor of journalism Jim Willis also considers *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* as serious influential newspapers (Willis, 1999: 91, 93). Both agreed with Germany’s opposition to the war on Iraq.

Finally, Italy has a population of approximately 58,000,000 people. The regional character of the country can be realised by the large number of newspapers, which are not national. In this case, the discussion might theoretically revolve around Italy’s former prime minister and business cavalieri Silvio Berlusconi. However, it should be underlined that the media empire of Berlusconi is mainly related to television. He is more a television tycoon rather than a newspaper baron (Ginsborg, 2004: 51). His efforts to invest on the press are only concerned with *Il Giornale* which is owned by his bother Paolo Berlusconi. According to Paul Ginsborg, however, Italy’s major conservative newspaper is *Il Corriere della Sera* and not *Il Giornale* (2004:52). This was selected for

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29 In 2003, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* sold 380,000 copies per day while *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 430,000 ones (Goethe Institut website).
analysis. *Il Corriere della Sera* is Milan based, had been initially owned by the Rizzoli-Corriere della Sera Group and was sold in early 1980s to Agnelli-Fiat (Sartori, 1996: 139). In parallel, the Rome based *La Repubblica* was accessed as a liberal newspaper.30 This was created in 1976 as an Italian version of *Le Monde* and is owned by the Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso (Sartori, 1996: 138). Although there was debate in Italy about the necessity of the war on Iraq, both *Il Corriere della Sera* and *La Repubblica* were not in favour of this military operation. It is striking that leading editor of *Il Corriere della Sera* Feruccio de Bortoli was pushed out of his job in May 2003. Journalists and opposition politicians attributed this resignation to his newspaper opposition to the war on Iraq (BBC website, 30/05/03).

### Electronic resources

The population of the research project refers to all articles published concerning neoconservatism from 1993 until 2005 by *The Times/Sunday Times, The Guardian/Observer, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Suddeutsche Zeitung, Il Corriere della Sera* and *La Repubblica*. All the articles accessed from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2005 were read for the purpose of the research. This was not particularly time-consuming as in many cases the term neoconservatism or its equivalents were used in the context of not more than one or two sentences. Articles which were totally devoted to neoconservatism could not often be found. However, there were exceptions in which journalists or columnists wrote comprehensive reports about this political ideology.

What has to be clarified is that electronic resources were used. Lexis-Nexis professional and executive databases as well as online newspaper archive engines provided the basis for searching for the term neoconservatism or its equivalents. In particular, the search was refined according to the following terms: neoconservatism, neoconservative, neoconservatives and neocons (British press), néoconservatisme, néoconservateur, néoconservatrice, néoconservateurs and neocons (French press), neokonservatismus, neokonservativismus, neokonservativ, neokonservative,

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30 In 2003 the circulation of *Il Corriere della Sera* was 614,000 copies per day while that of *La Repubblica* 583,000 ones (BBC website, 12/11/04).
neokonservativen and neokons (German press) and neoconservatorismo, neoconservatore, neoconservatrice, neoconservatori and neocons (Italian press).

The use of electronic resources can be problematic. Their reliability is not unquestionable. In this regard, the point of David Deacon is useful (Deacon, 2007). In his article, Deacon deals with the methodological implications of using digital newspaper archives. Specifically, he argues that the dependence on key words is problematic because it leads to the identification of things rather than themes. He also points out that another limitation of an electronic search is the loss of the visual dimension of news. Deacon contests the reliability of the results the electronic news archives produce. He notes that Lexis-Nexis can differ from a CD Rom database as to the volume of items occurred on the basis of a specific search. Deacon also comments on the possibility of an article produced by Lexis-Nexis to be duplicated and discusses about low and high level omissions (Deacon, 2007: 8, 10, 14, 17-21).

The argument of Deacon is acknowledged and taken into account for the implementation of this project. Nonetheless, this thesis would be a non-starter from the beginning if electronic resources were not used. It would impossible to analyse the mediation of neoconservatism by the newspapers without digital search engines. The use of newspaper indexes might theoretically offer an alternative. This method would be time-consuming. Even if an index was used, as in the case of The Times, there would be still limitations. For example, their index does not mention equivalents of the term neoconservatism, as for example neocon and neocons. The argument of Deacon about the lack of visual elements of the news is also less important. What matters more is the way the media use this term and not the photos, pictures or caricatures. Further to this, in the case of the coverage of neoconservatism, the Lexis-Nexis database produced indeed duplicated articles as Deacon suggests. However, this problem can be overcome by checking the articles one-by-one. As concerns Deacon's observation about omissions, the high volume of articles can maybe remove this obstacle. The reading of a few articles more or less could not influence significantly the general tendency concerning the construction of neoconservatism by the media.

A final point to me made refers to the relationship between printed and online newspapers. Safe conclusions on this issue cannot yet be reached. Contradictory views
as to the impact of internet newspapers on print ones exist. There are studies which show that digital news will soon be as important as printed ones. On the contrary, research also reveals that that effect of the internet on traditional newspapers is still slight (Ahlers, 2006; Cao and Li, 2006: 123).

**News and Comments**

Theoretically, press analysis has to be divided in two parts. First, news items should be examined. And second comments have to be analysed or vice versa. This distinction can offer comparative conclusions about news reporting and opinion-making in the editorial board of newspapers. Nevertheless, the separation of news items from comments cannot be easily applied into practice in the case of the coverage of neoconservatism in the elite press of the ‘Big Four’. The different structure of each of the eight European newspapers accessed can be identified as an initial reason. In newspapers with different sections it cannot be easily defined which items constituted news and which comments.

The main reason, which would make such a distinction a problematic issue for this project is that in many cases the same journalists wrote both news and comments. A particular example from the coverage of *Le Monde* can be mentioned. Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet were the authors of many articles about neoconservatism in the French liberal newspaper. They wrote in both the section of international affairs and that of the editorial board of *Le Monde*. An analysis based on the separation of news items from comments in different sections of the thesis might not avoid repetition. This does not mean that the specific position of articles in the newspapers will not be given. In most of the cases Lexis-Nexis database and online newspaper archives offered this information.

**Research Methods**

For the analysis of the data, both quantitative and qualitative techniques will be used. The research will be based on the logic of triangulation (Bryman, 2004: 454). The aim is to benefit from the strong points of both quantitative and qualitative research methods and to compare the findings of those methods. In this way, the possibility for cross-checked conclusions to be reached is increased. What should be taken into account, however, is that the researcher who uses both quantitative and qualitative methods must
ensure that his or her ontological and epistemological positions will not compromise (Read and Marsh, 2002: 241). This project, as it has been explained, is synthesised around the notion of constructivism. The positivist approach that social reality is out there is not endorsed. By contrast, the fundamental assumption of the thesis is that social realities are continually constructed through routine social practices (Deacon et al., 1999: 7). Therefore, the findings of the project will be seen as offering only one possible interpretation to the social phenomenon studied and will not be generalised (Read and Marsh, 2002: 241). In the case of the mediation of neoconservatism in the European elite media, the quantitative methods will be used as ancilliary to qualitative ones (Creswell, 1994: 177).

**Quantitative Content Analysis**

The quantitative dimension of the analysis of texts and documents is certainly interwoven with content analysis. Bernard Berelson defines content analysis as ‘a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson, 1952: 18). In other words, it aims at quantifying content of documents and texts in terms of predetermined categories. These can concern with themes, subjects and words. In this way, patterns of coverage can be outlined and the compartmentalisation or not of issues by the media can be highlighted. Quantitative content analysis is claimed to be a transparent research method. This is its greatest advantage. The consistency of the rules followed does not allow or at least limits subjective bias in the interpretation of the results. Although it is almost impossible that a coding manual does not reflect interpretation of the part of the coder on the basis of his or her interests, content analysis is an objective method of analysis (Bryman, 2004: 195 and 197). The manner quantitative content analysis is conducted can be replicable.

Quantitative content analysis, however, does not go into depth. It can give answers to predetermined straightforward questions but cannot enlighten a researcher concerning questions mainly revolving around ‘why’. The coding manual, which is its basic research instrument can also prove to be problematic with ‘naming’, especially with regard to nations (Richardson, 2006: 17-18). Furthermore, ‘the manifest content of communication’, which quantitative content analysis deals with, indicates that only the
apparent content of a document or text is of interest; by contrast the latent content is ignored. Further to this, the count of words can be possibly considered as an awkward tool of quantitative content analysis; the frequency a specific word is used does not suggest much if the meaning of the sentences in which this occurs is not taken into account. Quantitative content analysis does not pay attention to the context of language and render it meaningless or sterile (John, 2002: 218).

**Qualitative Content Analysis**

The shortcomings of the quantitative content analysis could be possibly overcome by also following qualitative research methods. An idea might be to interview British, French, German and Italian journalists. However, this was rejected because of the limits of time budget and the serious difficulties of arranging many interviews with various journalists in different locations. By contrast, qualitative content analysis was qualified as an appropriate technique. In this regard, some usage of Criticial Discourse (CDA) approach was useful.

CDA concentrates on the relationship between power and language. Media language is examined as discourse while emphasis is given to the sociological meaning of the latter. In other words, the nature of language is of great significance as it is viewed as socially shaped and shaping. The concepts of power and ideology are central to the approach of CDA. According to Ruth Wodak, CDA implies a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power-relations. It is concerned with social problems and with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures. Society and culture are dialectically related to discourse and language use may be ideological. Discourses are historical and can only be understood in relation to their context (Wodak, 1996: 17-20).

CDA has produced a lot of research and different frameworks for analysis by various scholars. Possibly the Dutch text linguist Teun van Dijk and the British discourse analyst Norman Fairclough could be considered as the leading theorists in the subject of CDA. Both van Dijk and Fairclough work within the framework of CDA and their versions of CDA are to a large extent similar. Nevertheless, their individual approaches differ as to the nature of the central mediating dimension between discourse and society. Van Dijk
sees cognitive structures and mental models mediating between discourse and society and elaborates on a cognitive model. Fairclough focuses on discourse practices through which texts are produced and received. His work is considered as crucial for the implementation of this project because it deals not only with the reception of media texts by the audience but also with the factors which influence the relations between media and politics. Fairclough believes that van Dijk’s approach has limitations because it does not concentrate on social relations and identities as well as on intertextual analysis (Fairclough, 1995: 30).

Fairclough conceptualises discourse in terms of three dimensions, which he calls text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. Discussing about texts first, what he argues is that the use of language can provide insights about social identity, social relations and systems of knowledge (Fairclough, 1995: 57-59). In this case, discourse analysis involves both micro and macro levels of text structure. The micro level of discourse deals with traditional linguistics. This can be problematic because for the reason that different languages are involved in the project. However, there are tools of analysis, which might be useful. An indicative list is given. CDA analysis principles will be based on the language of translation, which is English.

- Deconstruction of opposition’s argument: it means that a particular strategy is followed which recontextualises the opinion of the opposition in order to highlight its deficiencies.
- Metaphor: it is a means of representing one aspect of experience in terms of another having ideological significance (Fairclough, 1989: 119).
- Narrative: it refers to the sequence in which events are presented. The questions asked are related to who, what, where, when and why.31
- Polarity: it is the choice between positive and negative (Halliday, 1985: 85).
- Presupposition: the analysis of a text has to be concerned not only with what is ‘there’ in the text but with absences from the text (Fairclough, 1995: 106).

31 It has been mentioned that only a few articles were published which exclusively dealt with neoconservatism. In most of the cases, the media discussed about this political ideology in a wider context or only mentioned the term. Thus, it was not possible for the qualitative content analysis to focus extensively on particular narrative schemata. For instance, the examination of themes such as the main headline, secondary headline and lead paragraph did not apply. The analysis of the coverage of neoconservatism was not similar to that of events, as for example wars or elections.
Source credibility can be regarded as a propaganda technique (Jowett and O'Donnell, 1999: 291).

Vocabulary: the usage of specific words can reflect the representation of the world for a culture (Fowler, 1991: 82). Conclusions about emotions, judgements and evaluations can also be reached on the basis of particular semantic resources. Macro level of discourse goes further and examines notions such as topics and themes. This is the main point of interest for the implementation of the project because it goes beyond the limits of linguistic analysis per se. In this way, the nature of the coverage of neoconservatism can possibly be explored.

The second and third dimensions of Norman Fairclough's analysis deal with the production and reception of media texts. By discourse practices, Fairclough means 'the ways in which texts are produced, by media workers in media institutions, and the ways in which texts are received by audiences, as well as how media texts are socially distributed' (Fairclough, 1995: 16). The analysis of discourse practices involves the examination of construction, interpretation and distribution of texts. In this case, Fairclough concentrates on orders of discourse and deals with 'discourse practices' of different social domains. He refers to the social and cultural goings-on of the communicative event. Aspects of sociocultural practice include factors which are interwoven with news production, as we have already seen. The wider cultural context is also taken into account. Here Fairclough focuses more on the relation of discourse to power and ideology as well as value and identity (Fairclough, 1995: 57 and 62).

A final but crucial point to be made is that although CDA and especially Norman Fairclough's approach go beyond quantitative content analysis, they also suffers from a significant deficiency. CDA is lacking in objectivity which has been considered as the main advantage of quantitative content analysis. It emphasises on words and not numbers. This entails that the interpretation of the data maybe reflects the researcher's point of view. Subjectivity seems inevitable and the analysis heavily relies on his or her's view about what is important. For instance, transcripts are subject to numerous readings (Devine, 2002: 206). Several researchers might produce different results. Therefore findings based on qualitative research cannot be easily replicated.
Sampling in Qualitative Analysis

A significant point for discussion refers to the sample which will be used for the qualitative analysis of this project. Such an analysis focuses on relatively small cases (Patton, 1990: 169). In this case, a choice of particular examples of the media coverage of neoconservatism had to be made because repetition could hardly be avoided if all the examples found were presented. In qualitative analysis, however, representativeness is not the main issue and this method mainly relies on the researcher’s interaction and involvement with documents (Altheide, 1996: 24; 36). As qualitative research uses non-probability samples the population of the study has to be selected purposively (Gobo, 2004: 449).

There are several different strategies in purposive sampling. In this project, texts will be selected on the basis of typicality. The aim will be to present examples which can be considered as typical of the general coverage of neoconservatism by the European elite newspapers. As Jennifer Mason notes, qualitative researchers may argue that ‘the relationship between the context and phenomena they have sampled, and the wider universe that they are interested in, is an illustrative or evocative one’ (Mason, 2002: 126). This approach seeks to provide a flavour of the wider universe without making claims about how well it represents it (Ibid: 126).

In parts of the thesis analysing the coverage of the supposed neoconservative influence on the Bush administration and that of Strauss, the examples used will be presented in two different categories. In this way, the media debate on neoconservatism will be outlined and examples either emphasising or deemphasising the alleged neoconservative impact and that of Leo Strauss will be included in the discussion. The work of Peter Anderson and Tony Weymouth, which examines how the British press viewed both positive and negative developments of the European orientation of Britain, provides a useful practical example of the coverage of debatable issues by the media (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999).

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Translation

Finally, another important methodological issue of this project is concerned with the translation of three European languages into English. The translation, which is required to be done by the author, cannot guarantee that common ground will be found. Translation is linked to cultural social and political realities. Therefore, not only technical but also cultural knowledge is required for producing a text in another language (Snell-Hornby, 2000: 25, emphasis added).

In our time, however, the process of translation is influenced by that of globalisation. Cultural boundaries in the EU change because of social and political integration EU (Schaeffner and Adab, 1995: 327). Sociopolitical changes create the need for new text types. The intensive intercultural communication within the Union has resulted in what can be defined as the hybrid text (Schaeffner and Adab, 1995: 325). Hybrids reflect specific textual features which might clash with target language conventions in terms of vocabulary, syntax and style (Schaeffner and Adab, 1995: 325). Christina Schaeffner and Beverly Adab observe that 'in the process of establishing political unity, linguistic expressions are levelled to a common (low) denominator' and note that EU texts are usually based on reduced vocabulary, meanings that tend to be universal and reduced inventory of grammatical forms (Schaeffner and Adab, 1995: 327).

A number of research projects have already faced the problem of translation but have been implemented with success. These also can constitute a basis for the thesis. For example, The European Journal of Communication offers articles which compare the content of different media of the continent. Reiner Grundmann, Dennis Smith and Sue Wright attempted to analyse the coverage of the Kosovo war in the European elite press. For the purpose of their research, they selected one British, one French and one German newspaper: Financial Times, Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Grundman et al, 2000). Furthermore, John Downey and Thomas Koenig dealt with the mediation of the Berlusconi- Schultz case in the European media. They collected and compared data

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32 This research project is based on the author's knowledge of English, French, German and Italian. He has used these four languages during his postgraduate studies at King's College London and Loughborough University, Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes Internationales of Nice, Rostock Universität and Università degli Studi di Roma-La Sapienza. The common ground of the translation is based on the Greek nationality of the author.
from different European countries such as Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland by using the Lexis-Nexis database (Downey and Koenig, 2006).

Similar research projects have been carried out in the Joan Shorenstein center, politics and public policy of Harvard University. Ingrid Lehmann endeavoured to explore differences in reporting and published opinion in the US and Germany in the period before the beginning of the war on Iraq. Lehman used two newspapers and evening news programmes from each country respectively: The New York Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the NBC Nightly News and Die Tagenschau (Lehmann, 2005). In parallel with that, Jacqueline Jones examined if America and old Europe reconciled after the war on Iraq by analysing the way reporting in both continents covered the outcome of the 2004 presidential elections. The newspapers she accessed included Washington Post, New York Times, The Times, The Guardian, Le Figaro, Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt (Jones, 2005).

The above-mentioned examples outline that the language difference of various newspapers and TV programmes did not constitute an obstacle for researchers to conduct comparative studies. Given this a research project such as the mediation of neoconservatism in the elite press of the ‘Big Four’, is not an exception in which foreign languages have to be translated into English. In the final account, the methodological problems of translation can be overcome by the need for a comparison of the content of the media in Britain, France, Germany and Italy.
Chapter 5: Publishing on Neoconservatism

A research project, such as the mediation of neoconservatism in the European elite media, provides a large amount of press coverage. To this also contributes the long period of 13 years, which will be analysed. In this regard the development of a framework, which can offer insights about the pattern of coverage, might be useful. The following chapter aims at responding to this need as it looks at the mediation of neoconservatism by the European elite press from the perspective of a quantitative analysis. Its goal is to make comparisons on the basis of the nationality and political spectrum of the selected newspapers and draw conclusions about the synchronisation of the media coverage in Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

Quantitative analysis can be effectively used, if research questions are precisely defined (Bryman, 2004: 184; Deacon et al., 1999: 117). In this case, what has to be explored is the interest shown by the media in neoconservatism. Specifically, the questions are formulated as follows: Which newspapers were fastest in generating an interest in neoconservatism? And, in which periods did the newspapers focus more on neoconservatism?

What should be underlined is that no effort has been made for a categorisation of themes relevant to neoconservatism. In most of the cases, themes overlap and the coding schedule might not be satisfactorily completed. Theoretically, their categorisation could be based on the distinction of either neoconservative principles or specific countries the group wanted US foreign policy to focus on. However, principles, as for instance democracy promotion, regime change and war-based foreign policy might often be mentioned in the same article. In parallel with that, the same problem would come to surface with several countries of the Middle East as neoconservative foreign policy is to a large extent oriented towards this region. Examples include Iraq, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Further to this the analysis of the chapter will not seek to find out the specific neoconservative figures which got more voice in the European elite media. This question certainly falls within the sphere of interest for the thesis. However, it will be explored in the chapter about the ‘Leo-Cons’. That section will identify who were the
"Straussians" the media focused more on. Neoconservative politicians and intellectuals are mainly Straussians. Thus, repetition would be unavoidable.

**The Interest of the Media**

The first point to be explored is the amount of interest the European media paid to neoconservatism. In other words, what has to be outlined is the attention devoted by the European elite newspapers to neoconservatism on the basis of the volume of articles they published. Their total number from 1993 until 2005 for each newspaper is as follows:

Table 1: Number of articles published about neoconservatism from 1993 until 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suddeutsche Zeitung</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il Corriere della Sera</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Repubblica</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2860</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Le Monde* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* were the newspapers which published more about neoconservatism in the period of coverage. On the contrary, the volume of the articles of *The Times* and *The Guardian* was the lowest.

As concerns the nationality of the newspapers, figure 1 sketches out the percentage the national newspapers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy took out of the total coverage of neoconservatism. In this case, the British press (598 cases) published less articles compared to the French (792 cases), the German (728 cases) and the Italian one (742 cases). As a whole, the newspapers of the last three European countries show a balance
in terms of the articles they published about neoconservatism from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2005.

Figure 1: Nationality of the Newspapers

In respect of the ideological family conservative newspapers (1465 articles) dealt with neoconservatism to a slightly larger degree than liberal ones (1395 articles). However, the different amount of articles published is not remarkable as Figure 2 sketches out.

Figure 2: Ideology of the Newspapers

The above-presented findings can only offer an initial and general outline of the interest shown by the media in neoconservatism from 1993 until 2005. They cannot provide, at this early stage, a basis for safe conclusions. Furthermore, what is worth is to explore the specific junctures when the selected European elite newspapers focused more extensively on neoconservatism.
**Reporting a Media Phenomenon**

A line graph is a convenient graphical technique in order to compare the volume of articles published at different periods of time. The below-produced line graph (figure 3) outlines the interest shown in neoconservatism by the European elite newspapers from 1993 until 2005.

**Figure 3: Usage of the term neoconservatism or its equivalents from 1993 until 2005**

- **TI** = *The Times*
- **GU** = *The Guardian*
- **FI** = *Le Figaro*
- **MO** = *Le Monde*
- **FR** = *Frankfurter Allgemeine*
- **SU** = *Süddeutsche Zeitung*
- **CO** = *Corriere della Sera*
- **RE** = *Repubblica*

All the newspapers started to publish more extensively on neoconservatism from 2003 onwards. It seems that before 2003 neoconservatism had not been on the agenda of all the European elite media, at least to a large extent. On these grounds, the interest shown in this political ideology since 2003 can initially be connected to the evolution of US foreign policy from the same year onwards and especially to the war on Iraq. More light on this question will be shed in the next section.
Going back to the line graph of figure 3 this can certainly provide the basis for further discussion. The next step of the quantitative analysis will be grounded on a division on the phase from 1993 until 2005 to sub-periods. The objective is the finding of potential plausible explanations for the volume of articles published.

**Before 11 September**

As it was explained in Chapter Two, 11 September was a turning point for US foreign policy and the neoconservative position came to the forefront within the framework of the war on terror. At this stage, it is interesting to investigate if the attacks played a role for the coverage of neoconservatism by the European elite newspapers. This question will now be answered in terms of the volume of articles published before and after this event. Table 2 indicates the number of articles published by each newspaper from 1 January 1993 until 11 September 2001.

Table 2: Number of articles published about neoconservatism from 1993 until 11 September 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Times</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Figaro</em></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Monde</em></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</em></td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Süddeutsche Zeitung</em></td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Il Corriere della Sera</em></td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>La Repubblica</em></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: 413</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The British and French elite press - to a larger degree *Le Figaro* compared to *Le Monde* - seemed to have ignored the term neoconservatism and its respective terms before 11 September. On the contrary, this did not happen with the German and Italian newspapers. In particular, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Il Corriere della Sera*, and *La Repubblica* had published extensively on neoconservatism even before the
atrocities. As to the German and Italian elite media the two conservative papers dealt with conservatism to a higher degree compared to the liberal ones. The centre-right political spectrum of both Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Il Corriere della Sera might be considered as a possible reason for their focus on neoconservatism.

The German and Italian newspapers

It has been hypothesised that the high volume of articles published after 11 September and especially since the beginning of 2003 by all the newspapers can be attributed to the connection of neoconservatism to US foreign policy. However, the fact that only German and Italian media focused on this ideology before the attacks maybe entails that they had other reasons for publishing extensively on it, which were not necessarily linked to Washington’s world affairs approach. Before elaborating on potential motivations of the newspapers in these two countries, it might be helpful to represent their detailed coverage of neoconservatism from the beginning of 1993 until 11 September 2001. The line graph of figure 4 demonstrates the volume of articles published in this period. The German newspapers show a relative symmetry in the distribution of articles they published. On the contrary, Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica focused more on neoconservatism in the period from 1994 until 1996 (92 and 39 articles respectively) compared to the other years from 1997 until 11 September 2001 (34 and 13 articles respectively).

Figure 4: The coverage of neoconservatism in the German and Italian elite newspapers from 1 January 1993 until 11 September 2001

![Graph showing the coverage of neoconservatism in German and Italian newspapers from 1993 to 2001](chart.png)
The symmetrical interest shown in neoconservatism by the German newspapers can possibly be explained because of its specific meaning for the political history of the country. The term is relevant to the debate started among German intellectuals in the 1980s. This was synthesised around the importance of the history of the country, and especially of the role of Nazi past and the Holocaust for the construction of the German identity. The left school of intellectuals absolutely condemned the Nazi past. As opposed to them the right one was not prepared to forget this past and discuss it necessarily negatively. The intellectuals who belong to the latter school are also known as neoconservatives (Muller, 1989: 33-41).

Subsequently, neoconservatism refers maybe to the debate started after the unification of Germany over the orientation of the new foreign policy of the country. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, intellectuals, who led what is known as ‘Neue Rechte’ or ‘New Right’, were sceptical about its European orientation and challenged this model, which was advocated and implemented by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Heilbrun, 1996: 82). They were also prepared to attack the influx of immigrants in Germany (Heilbrun, 1996: 82). The ‘New Right’ recommended that Germans had to regain a national self-confidence and that the country should have followed a more assertive foreign policy as opposed to the cautious one of its Western part during the Cold War (Rittberger, 2001: 15, 16).

As concerns Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica the attention they paid to neoconservatism from 1994 until 1996 maybe reflects the developments of Italy during these three years. These are linked to the entrance of Silvio Berlusconi to the political arena of the country. Berlusconi’s centre-right Forza Italia was founded on 26 January 1994 and in the same year it already won the elections (Frattini, 2004: 40). It did not manage, however, to remain in power for five years. In 1995, the Italian Parliament was dissolved because the Northern League of Umberto Bossi left Berlusconi’s government. 1996 was another year of elections in Italy, which brought Romano Prodi and his ‘Olive Tree’ party to power (Bull and Newell, 2005: 77).

The entrance of Berlusconi to the Italian political scene and the power of Forza Italia changed the character of the Italian centre-right. In particular, he led a coalition consisting of the National Alliance (AN), former Christian Democrats and the Northern League (Bull and Newell, 2005: 56). Berlusconi’s leadership could not easily be
challenged, at least theoretically, as the power of his party was overwhelming and its allies faced strategic difficulties (Bull and Newell, 2005: 56, 57). Therefore, the cooperation of the AN, the former Democrats and the Northern League with *Forza Italia* was necessary for their political survival. Within this context, it can be possibly argued that the changes of the centre-right in the country might have led to the beginning of a debate about its new orientation. In such a debate neoconservatism was maybe relevant.

**The Early Bush Presidency**

Furthermore, a significant point to be explored is if articles about neoconservatism appeared in the European elite newspapers during the first eight months George W. Bush was in power. On that basis, it can be concluded if the change of the US administration in 2000 influenced the coverage of this ideology by the selected European newspapers in terms of the volume of articles published. Table 3 shows the number of articles found from 1 January 2001 until 11 September of the same year.

Table 3: Number of articles published from 1 January 2001 until 11 September 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Times</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Figaro</em></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Monde</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</em></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Süddeutsche Zeitung</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Il Corriere della Sera</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>La Repubblica</em></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: 31</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious that the European media did not show a great interest in neoconservatism in the first eight months of the Bush administration. The German elite newspapers published more articles than the British, French and German. However, it cannot be
argued that the George W. Bush's electoral win was a crucial point for their coverage of this political ideology. It was explained that Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung had published on neoconservatism at a symmetrical level from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2000. A continuation of this tendency can be also observed in the first eight months of Bush's Junior administration.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September did not significantly influence the number of articles published on neoconservatism. If their content has started to change immediately since 9/11, remains a question, which will be answered in the chapters devoted to the qualitative analysis. Nevertheless, as the line-graph of figure 3 presented, it was the year of 2003 which was the critical point for the explosion of articles. Table 4 indicates the number of articles found in the period from 11 September 2001 until 2005.

Table 4: Number of articles published per year from 12 September 2001 until 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001 after 9/11</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GU</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>2444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the period from 12 September 2001 until 31 December 2002 there is a slight increase of articles published by some of the newspapers. Le Monde, for example, published 36 articles about neoconservatism from the day after the attacks until the end of 2002, while it had only published 28 pieces from 1993 until the day of the terrorist attacks. However, this period was not remarkable in terms of the volume of articles found as opposed to the one which followed since the beginning of 2003. The below-produced bar chart (figure 5)
indicates the number of articles published from 1993 until 2002 and from 2003 until 2005 respectively.

Figure 5: Volume of articles containing the term neoconservatism or its equivalents

The bar-chart of figure 5 shows that in the period of the three years from 2003 until 2005 all the newspapers published a significantly higher number of articles about neoconservatism compared to the previous ten years (1993-2002). In order to highlight the increase of articles from 2003 until 2005, their percentage out of the total coverage of the political ideology can be given for each newspaper separately. The Times published 97.0%, The Guardian 96.3%, Le Figaro 97.8%, Le Monde 86.4%, Frankfurter Allgemeine 66.1%, Suddeutsche Zeitung 66.6%, Il Corriere della Sera 68.3% and La Repubblica 68.3% of their articles after 2003.

Le Monde has the lead in terms of the quantity of the articles it published about neoconservatism after 2003 (408 cases) while Le Figaro follows (313 cases). Süddeutsche Zeitung published less articles (196) compared to the other European newspapers. The particular attention paid to neoconservatism by Le Monde can be possibly attributed to the research done on this subject by two of its editors. Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet are the authors of a book entitled Messianic America: The Wars of the Neoconservatives (L’Amérique Messianique: Les Guerres des Néoconservateurs).

As a whole, the volume of articles in terms of newspaper nationality was as follows:

- British press: 578 articles
- French press: 721 articles
- German press 483 articles
- Italian press 556 articles
From the perspective of the ideological family of the newspapers an almost equal number of pieces can be observed. Conservative newspapers published 1172 articles while liberal newspapers published 1166 articles.

**Towards Iraq and After**

Concentrating on the period from 2003 until 2005 the line-graph of figure 6 outlines the coverage of neoconservatism per month. There seems to be a degree of synchronisation of the media coverage. In particular, there are four months when most of the European elite newspapers focused largely on neoconservatism. These months are March 2003, November 2004, March 2005 and September 2005. There are maybe different factors which can explain the increase of articles published in these months.

The European elite newspapers published a lot of articles about neoconservatism in March 2003. The plausible reason, which explains their stance is the war on Iraq. On 20 March the US troops invaded Baghdad. As it was explained in the second chapter the neoconservatives were in favour of such a military operation envisaging the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Given this it is not surprising that the invasion of this country constitutes possibly the main reason the elite press of the ‘Big Four’ published more extensively on the political ideology in March 2003.

A reasonable explanation the European elite media focused on neoconservatism in November 2004 can also be identified. The US presidential elections took place in this month. This event can possibly justify the attention paid by the media on neoconservatism in this month. For the selected newspapers the future of the Bush administration and its neoconservative members might be an issue of great interest. The presidential elections of 2004 could mark either the beginning of a new era under John Kerry or the continuation of George W. Bush’s ‘hegemony’. In this context, a discussion about neoconservatism, its impact during the first term of the US President and its potential future role was maybe on the agenda of the European elite media.
Figure 6: Usage of the term neoconservatism or its equivalents from 2003 until 2005.
An interesting point to be investigated is why the European elite newspapers largely dealt with neoconservatism in March 2005. What can be argued is that this month provided a good opportunity for a discussion for the new international environment, which had started to be created in the Middle East, and the role of the neoconservatives. The Middle East was showing for the first time after the invasion of Baghdad on 20 March 2003 signs of transformation. The desire of the neoconservatives to bring democracy to the world could not but link them to this development. The debate was revolved around the credit they deserved.

Signs of democratisation could arguably be seen at different fronts in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, in October 2004 the people of the country had the chance to vote democratically for the first time in their life. What is worth-mentioning is that not only Afghan men but also women did so. Mr. Karzai became the leader of the country. In parallel with that, in the occupied territories the situation was similar. The Palestinians had the opportunity to vote democratically for their leadership. After the death of Yasser Arafat, Mahmud Abbas became the elected chairman of the Palestinian Authority. He stressed the importance of peaceful problem solving and condemned suicide bombing as opposed to his predecessor. For his part, Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon announced his intention to evacuate all settlers from Gaza and the Northern West Bank (Makovsky, 2005: 52).

Further to this, the elections, which took place in Iraq at the beginning of 2005 could be perhaps considered as an initial reward for the US administrations’s decision to invade Baghdad in March 2003 and liberate the country from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people were able to cast a vote and elect a government, although no progress was achieved concerning the instability of their country and the bloodshed continuation. In addition, the assassination of Rafik Hariri, who was former primer minister of Lebanon, gave the people of the country the opportunity to protest against Syria. George W. Bush emphasised on the need of Syrian armed forces to withdraw from Lebanon (Ajami, 2003: 27). As a result, the pro-Syrian government in the country resigned. Moreover, in March 2005 there was also a discussion about elections taking place in Egypt and in Saudi Arabia.

The debate started in March 2005 about the potential democratic transformation in the Middle East and the credit the neoconservatives deserved can be confirmed by the content of magazines and journals such as *The Economist* and *Time*. In its front page in the week between 5\textsuperscript{th} and 11\textsuperscript{th} March 2005, *The Economist* dealt with the issue of
democratisation of the Middle East. Its main title was: ‘Democracy stirs in the Middle East’. In this regard, The Time published an article which was entitled: ‘When History Turns to a Corner’ (Duffy, 14/03/05: 20). The same also happened with Foreign Affairs two months later. The main headline of the volume which was published in May/June 2005 was: An Arab Spring? For instance, Bernard Lewis argued in his article: ‘The creation of a democratic political and social order in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East will not be easy. But it is possible, and there are increasing signs that it has already begun (Lewis, 2005: 51).

Finally, the reason the European elite newspapers published more extensively on neoconservatism in September 2005 compared to other months cannot be easily identified. The German elections took place in September 2005. Theoretically, this event might have been the reason for the increased interest shown by the selected newspapers in this political ideology. In other words the German elections might have contributed to the beginning of a debate about the potential neoconservative character of the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Angela Merkel and that of her policy program. Nevertheless, it is not certain that these constituted an obvious reason, which can justify the high volume of articles published in September 2005. Looking at the previous line-graph of figure 6, it is interesting that not an analogous interest was shown by the media before similar events in other European countries. For example, the British elections of May 2005 did not lead to the increase of the volume of articles published about neoconservatism.

Another factor which can maybe justify the focus on the selected newspapers on neoconservatism in September 2005 refers to the internal developments of the US. The attention of the European media might have turned towards the US in this month because of Hurricane Katrina and its devastating consequences. This hit the country in the last days of August 2005. September of the same year was the month the US government had to assess the catastrophes and respond to the needs of the victims. The failure of George W. Bush to take responsibility in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina might have led the European media to comment on his weaknesses and also compare his performance with that in the field of international politics.
In this case, a focus by the newspapers on the war on Iraq and the neoconservatives, who had supported it, could be possibly expected.

**The 'neocons'**

An additional point to be explored is when the European elite newspapers started to use the abbreviations 'neocon' or 'neocons'. A reply to this question can offer insights as to the easiness shown by the media in their usage of the term neoconservatism or its equivalents. This analysis was conducted having 2003 as its basis because it was this year which marked the explosion of articles published. It should be mentioned in the search of the archives of German press the abbreviations 'neokon' and 'neokons' were also used. The below-produced bar chart presents the results (figure 7).

**Figure 7: Volume of article containing the abbreviations 'neocon' and 'neocons'**

The bar-chart of figure 7 indicates that the European elite newspapers used the abbreviations 'neocon' or 'neocons' to a large extent in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. Only a few cases appeared, from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2002, in which the above-mentioned abbreviations had been evoked by the media. It seems that the European elite media have been particularly familiar with neoconservatism since 2003. The British (316 cases) and Italian elite press (371 cases) were keen on discussing the neocons. This finding is striking especially for *Il Corriere della Sera* and *La Repubblica*, noting that the abbreviations are not Italian based. *Frankfurter*
Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung also used them but to a less extent (60 cases). The German language is not a a latin-based one and this can maybe explain the fact that these newspapers did not largely used the abbreviation ‘neocon’ or ‘neocons’.

The case of the French elite press (25 cases) seems more interesting. Le Figaro and Le Monde were more cautious in using the abbreviations ‘neocon’ and ‘neocons’. This finding can hardly lead to the conclusion that French elite newspapers were not interested in neoconservatism and were not familiar with it. It was sketched out that both dealt to a large extent with neoconservatism, especially from the beginning of 2003 until the end of 2005. The potential reason for the reservation of these newspapers as to their use of the abbreviation is maybe linked to the traditional interest of the French people to defend their own language. Gaullism is applicable in modern France and can be deemed as an intellectual liberty for the protection of the country (Sarkozy, 2006: 271, emphasis added). As an example, it can be mentioned that in March 2006, President of France Jacques Chirac stormed out of a session during the EU summit when a French official spoke English and not French (BBC website, 24/03/06). As The Economist puts it France is known for ‘linguistic chauvinism’ and ‘the French have long considered their language to be more than a tool of communication: it is an embodiment of culture, identity and independence’ (The Economist, 19/01/08).

**Conclusion**

The quantitative analysis of the articles accessed from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2005 produced significant results. It was shown that it was the year of 2003 when all the European elite newspapers started to largely concentrate on neoconservatism. This observation is reinforced by the broad usage of the abbreviations ‘neocon’ and ‘neocons’ with the exception of the French elite press. It was also clarified that the terrorist attacks of 11 September as well as the beginning of the first term of George W. Bush in January 2001 did not influence the coverage of neoconservatism by the newspapers from the perspective of the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, it was indicated that in the period before 2003 the German and Italian newspapers had the lead in terms of the number of articles published. By contrast, the French elite press, and especially Le Monde have dealt more extensively with
neoconservatism since the beginning of 2003. In this case, the newspapers of Britain, Germany and France followed but still with a high volume of articles produced. In parallel with that, no particular differences were observed in terms of the ideological family of the newspapers accessed.

Media coverage of neoconservatism in the 'Big Four' showed signs of synchronisation only in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. During this period not only did the selected newspapers focus largely on this political ideology but they did also publish more extensively at common junctures: March 2003, November 2004, March 2005 and September 2005. On the contrary, in the period before 2003 media coverage had not been synchronised. The European newspapers had shown a different interest in neoconservatism, which had varied according to each title. Their potential readers might not turn their attention to it at the same time and to the same extent during the period from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2002.
Chapter 6: Before 11 September

The next step of the project is to analyse the qualitative nature of articles published in the period of 13 years covered. This will be divided in two parts: from 1 January 1993 until 11 September 2001 and from 12 September 2001 until 31 December 2005. This chapter will focus on the former. Its aim is to explore how the selected newspapers used the term neoconservatism or its equivalents regardless of the US war on terror and the foreign policy of Bush Junior. Although the quantitative analysis outlined that it was the beginning of 2003 and not the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks when the media started to concentrate largely on neoconservatism, 9/11 can constitute a dividing line. On that basis, it will be shown if this event influenced the way they interpreted neoconservatism. Potential changes of the meaning of the term and different uses of it before and after the atrocities will also be outlined. For the purpose of the analysis a categorisation based on specific themes will be made.

It is interesting that in the period before 11 September when neoconservatism was not a sine qua non parameter in the literature of international relations the selected European newspapers showed a partial understanding of an abstract phenomenon. Their coverage was often fragmented and foreign policy was not the main context in which the political ideology was discussed. The following analysis will present various examples of the newspapers accessed in order to highlight their interpretation of neoconservatism in the pre-11 September era. It will be shown that only in a few cases the coverage - as to the figures of the group and the principles of the ideology - was similar to the general academic consensus on the meaning of the term.

American Domestic Perspectives

In the period before 11 September the selected European print media associated neoconservatism with US politics. They mainly dealt with domestic issues when referring to it. As it will be shown, a consensus was observed as to the discussion of the political ideology in the context of US domestic politics. The selected newspapers, however, referred arbitrarily to various figures attributing them the label ‘neoconservative’. In some cases this political ideology was represented by the view of its different adherents individually. In other ones it was presented as being
consisted of a group of people that is to say that of a specific entity with concrete ideas and positions.

_Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_, for instance, endeavoured to find a definition for the neoconservatives as a whole and presented them as former leftists who had become critics of the left since the 1970s. It also asserted that they ‘came mainly from a Jewish or Catholic milieu / sie kamen meist aus einem jüdischen oder katholischen Milieu’ (Zöller, _Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_, 04/05/94, Feuilleton: 38 and Ritter, _Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_, 05/04/00: N5). _The Times_ agreed as to the former aspect. Christopher Hitchens quoted from Jacob Heilbrunn and argued that a strand of the conservative thought could be the neoconservatives who ‘are mainly secular and Jewish...and were intellectual authors of Reaganism.’ (Hitchens, _The Sunday Times_, 29/12/96, Features). Figures illustrated as neoconservative by the media were in some cases linked not only to the era or Ronald Reagan but also to that of Margaret Thatcher (Vignolo, _Il Corriere della Sera_, 01/07/95, Partiti: 6).

Most of the newspapers ignored figures of the second generation of the group while they only rarely mentioned some of its first one. For instance, Irving Kristol was linked to neoconservatism by only three of the eight European elite newspapers before 11 September: _The Times_, _Süddeutsche Zeitung_ and _Il Corriere della Sera_. Rare mentions of other ‘original neoconservatives’ were found. For example, _Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_ and _Il Corriere della Sera_ portrayed Norman Podhoretz as neoconservative. Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and James Q. Wilson were also illustrated as such by _The Sunday Times_ and _Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung_. In parallel with them, Allan Bloom and Francis Fukuyama were linked to the group according to _Süddeutsche Zeitung_ (Bödecker, 12/07/94 and Michalzik, 11/02/94). Further to this, the selected European newspapers did not concentrate on specific instruments, as for instance think tanks, which can be arguably associated to the political ideology. Exceptions were found in the coverage of _Frankfurter Allgemeine_
Zeitung and Il Corriere della Sera. The former considered Commentary and the latter The New Republic and The Weekly Standard as neoconservative journals respectively (Jäger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13/09/00: 53; Annunziata, Il Corriere della Sera 21/10/93, Donne: 9; Il Corriere della Sera, 12/09/95, Politica Interna: 8).

The newspapers of the ‘Big Four’ also portrayed many other personalities as neoconservative. Most of these figures do not belong to either the first or the second generation of the group as described in chapter 2. A variety of examples can be given. Scholar Jedediah Purdy (The Guardian, 08/03/00, Feature Pages: 16), political philosopher Edmund Burke (Patrick, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/06/01, Geistenwissenschaften: N5) and political theorist and editor of the City Journal of the Manhattan Institute Myron Magnet were depicted as neoconservative (Helmore, The Observer, 22/04/01: 2 and Menden, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24/04/01: 18). In addition, the same label was given to professor of journalism Marvin Olasky (Steinberger, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 05/12/01, Feuilleton: 15), politician Barry Goldwater, (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 15/01/00, Elezioni: 11), political scientist Charles Murray (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 02/11/94, Razzismo: 27) and the founder of the Heritage Foundation Paul Weyrich (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 17/02/00, Varie: 14).

Newt Gingrich

Amid different illustrations of figures as neoconservative ones by the media, Le Monde and to a much larger extent the Italian elite newspapers associated the political ideology to Newt Gingrich and the US internal political developments in 1994. This was a turning point for the American Congress. On 8 November, for the first time in forty years, the Republicans gained control of both the House of Representatives (230-204) and the Senate (52-48). Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich was the figure who led the Republican revolution in the Congress ending the Democratic domination was (Grant, 2004: 48). He was a rival for the Democrats and Bill Clinton who had been in power in the US since the beginning of 1993. Gingrich’s leadership in Congress was marked by his opposition to the policies of Clinton and the impeachment of the President. It is worth-mentioning that Madeleine Albright characterises as ‘political uprising’ the political activity of Gingrich and recalls with frustration Gingrich’s indifference to meet herself, US Secretary of State Warren

Le Monde noted that Newt Gingrich was the figure who launched his neoconservative revolution against Clinton in 1994 (Cojean, Le Monde, 16/05/01). Il Corriere della Sera focused on the domination of the moderate left in American Congress for 42 years and attributed its end not so much on the historic republicans as to the neoconservatives of Newt Gingrich. (Caretto, 10/11/94, Elezioni) This newspaper also emphasised on the impact of Gingrich on the American political life by using the phrase: ‘the neoconservative America / l’America neoconservatrice’ of Newt Gingrich (Farkas, Il Corriere della Sera, 04/03/95, Varie: 35). La Repubblica considered him as the president of the House of Representatives and the stage of the neoconservatives (Zampaglione, La Repubblica, 22/12/95: 13).

Il Corriere della Sera was the more representative newspaper as to the neoconservative portrayal of Newt Gingrich. It portrayed him as: ‘the leader of the neoconservative counterrevolution / capo dell'orrorivoluzione neoconservatrice and ‘neoconservative Lenin’ (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 11/11/94, Politica Interna: 9, Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 31/01/94, Armi: 29; Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 15/11/95, Economia: 9; Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 13/06/95, Politica Interna: 9). It also saw him as ‘Ayatollah’, ‘Khomeini’, and ‘prophet’ of the neoconservatives (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 05/12/94, Guerra: 11, Caretto, Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 31/01/95, Armi: 29; Il Corriere della Sera, 08/10/95, Varie: 5).37

Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica also depicted many of the colleagues of Newt Gingrich as neoconservative. The conservative newspaper illustrated US Vice President under George H. W. Bush Dan Quayle as such and also noted that Secretary of Education under Reagan William Bennett was ‘the guru of the neoconservatives’ (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 16/09/94: Politica Interna: 7). It depicted the Republican Senator Phil Gramm as ‘the flag-bearer of the neoconservatives / alfiere dei neoconservatori’ (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 25/02/95, Varie: 9) and considered former Texas Representative Steven Stockman and religious broadcaster Patrick Robertson as neoconservative (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 25/04/95, Reati:

37 For its part Le Monde portrayed Gingrich as ‘the herald of neoconservatism / heraut du néoconservatisme (Kaufmann, Le Monde, 24/06/95).
20; Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 26/04/95, Reati: 14; and Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 19/11/95, Varie: 9). For La Repubblica the Republican Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, who competed with George H. W. Bush in the Republican primaries of 1988, was labeled a neoconservative (Zampaglione, La Repubblica, 22/11/95: 2).

It is also interesting that Il Corriere della Sera presented Rupert Murdoch as an ally of Gingrich, who helped him to launch The Weekly Standard in 1995:

"Gingrich has a powerful ally, the media magnate Rupert Murdoch, who launched yesterday the new political magazine Standard in order to help him... Standard could be the intellectual forge of the neoconservatives, a vehicular of electoral propaganda / Gingrich ha un potente alleato, il magnate dei media Rupert Murdoch, che per aiutarlo ha ieri lanciato la nuova rivista politica Standard... Standard dovrebbe essere la fucina ideologica dei neoconservatori, un veicolo di propaganda elettorale."

(Il Corriere della Sera, 12/09/95, Politica Interna: 8).

The significance of the portrayal of Newt Gingrich is that it largely influenced the way the Italian elite newspapers mainly understood neoconservatism before 11 September. As it will be shown Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica synthesised in many cases the political views of the political ideology around this figure.38 This point does not refer to Le Monde. Although the French newspaper depicted in some cases former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich as a neoconservative politician it did not limit its references to the political ideology only to this figure.

The particular interest shown by Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica in Newt Gingrich can be possibly explained because of a similarity they saw between the new wave of conservatism he inspired in the US and that led by Silvio Berlusconi in Italy. As it will be discussed these newspapers saw a potential genesis of neoconservatism in Italy in the 1990s. The cavaliere was generally keen on developing US political marketing strategies in his own country. We know from scholar Giapietro Mazzoleni that the 1994 electoral campaign in Italy showed signs of Americanisation in terms of Berlusconi’s apparition on the political stage, his style of presentation and the wealth. Forza Italia also had ‘much more in common with the electoral machines of US

38 See the ‘European politics’ section in this chapter
presidential candidates' because of its loose links with voters and volatile structures (Mazzoleni, 1996: 200).

In the context of this Americanization, economic and political commentator Alan Friedman argues that Berlusconi aped the 'Contract with America' presented by Gingrich and proposed to the people of his country a similar plan, which was called 'Contract with the Italians' (Friedman, *International Herald Tribune*, 16/02/95). With the 'Contract with America' Newt Gingrich aimed at providing the Republicans with a common manifesto.\(^{39}\) If this was successful, it could offer the Republicans a mandate for party unity and legislation (McKeever and Davies, 2006: 217). Likewise, Silvio Berlusconi wanted maybe to strengthen the centre-right coalition in Italy, as the previous chapter suggested, in order to facilitate the implementation of his policy agenda.\(^{40}\)

**Economic Policy**

The selected newspapers did not largely agree as to the figures they attributed the label 'neoconservative'. However, their coverage as to the principles of neoconservatism in domestic policy context showed signs of homogenisation. The accessed newspapers, with the exception of *The Guardian* and *Le Figaro* were motivated by various problems of the American society while dealing with neoconservatism. They focused on issues such as injustice, poverty and unemployment by presenting various perspectives, inter alia the neoconservative one. The following examples will outline their general consensus as to the opposition of the neoconservatives to the active involvement of the state and their economic priorities. The case of *The Times* is examined separately as it maybe reflects a potential ideological bias.

*Le Monde* underlined the objection of the neoconservatives for a big state: 'the neoconservatives...were pleading for a minimal state / les

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\(^{39}\) Former US President Bill Clinton comments on the 'Contract with America: '[Gingrich] boldly asked the American people to give the Republicans a majority saying: If we break this contract, throw us out. We mean it. The contract called [inter alia] for a constitutional balanced budget amendment and the line-item veto, which enables the President to delete specific items in appropriations bills without having to veto the entire legislation' (Clinton, 2005: 621)

\(^{40}\) The main points of the program of *Forza Italia* included deregulation and liberalisation of the economy, more privatisation in the state sector and reduction of bureaucracy (Mack Smith, 2003: 488).
néoconservateurs...plaidaient pour l’Etat minimal’ (Ferenczi, Le Monde, 22/06/96). This newspaper also commented on their inclination to deal with social problems by focusing on their concern for the increased criminality but not for an extended social security. Cecile Prieur and Marie-Pierre Subtil wrote:

‘In France, security has become the priority of the government but only after it has been previously degraded to the level of physical (or criminal) security, arbitrarily separated from the salary, social, medical or educational one. This theme derives directly from the American neoconservative institutes / En France, la sécurité a été promue priorité gouvernementale mais seulement après avoir été au préalable ravalaée à la seule sécurité physique (ou criminelle) arbitrairement séparée de la sécurité salariale, sociale, médicale ou éducative. Cette thématique provient directement d’instituts néoconservateurs américains’

(Prieur and Subtil, Le Monde, 07/12/99).

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that the neoconservatives were against the concept of 'welfarisation which had been a custom in America since the 1970s / Welfarisation, die in Amerika seit den siebziger Jahren üblich ist' (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17/02/93, Geisteswissenschaften: 5). Süddeutsche Zeitung also agreed with this position. It presented the neoconservative change of the 1980s as contradictory to the classic welfare and social state. In parallel with that, it saw the neoconservatives as being in favour of the deregulation of the economy (Ditmar, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13/03/93; Habermas, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27/02/99, Feuilleton).

The Italian elite newspapers followed a similar approach. For instance, Il Corriere della Sera attempted to summarise their position for the US society by focusing on three aspects: less taxes, more federalism and ignorance of welfare services (Ugo, 27/01/95, Politica Interna: 27). 41 For its part, La Repubblica criticised the neoconservatives that they constituted a movement against the poor people (Colombo, La Repubblica, 17/01/01: 14). In this regard, the newspaper also elaborated on their philosophy. According to Newt Gingrich: ‘If we make the poor people to count on health care at the expense of the state they will never have a motivation to find a job / Se abituiamo i poveri a poter contare sulle cure mediche a carico dello stato non

41 See also: Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 03/01/96, Lavoro: 7
avranno mai nessun incentivo a trovarsi un lavoro' (Zampaglione, *La Repubblica*, 22/12/95: 13). In this article it is maybe connoted that the neoconservatives believed in the primacy of the individual over social groups. Therefore, state assistance is arguably not necessary.\(^{42}\)

Antonio Polito went further in an article he wrote for *La Repubblica* in March 1995 in which he attempted to compare neoconservatism to Marxism. Polito noted that the similarity between Marxism and neoconservatism was that both ideologies maintained that part of the inequality could not be cured in the existing political system of democracy and mixed economy. Nevertheless, while the Marxists advocate for a change of the actual system, neoconservatives find it is necessary to live with inequality. (Polito, *La Repubblica*, 31/03/95: 1). *La Repubblica* also focused on the main economic interest of the neoconservatives which was perceived to be related to the stock market. As Arturo Zampaglione put it: 'Wall Street is the place of departure and arrival of the neoconservative revolution / Wall Street è il luogo di partenza e d’arrivo della rivoluzione neoconservatrice’ (Zampaglione, *La Repubblica*, 31/12/95, Mondo: 12). The same newspapers gave an additional dimension of their economic policy which should be based on passive internationalism and denationalisations (Pirani, 05/03/95, *La Repubblica*, Cultura: 38).

As for *The Times* it also dealt with the economic policy of the neoconservatives. The approach of this newspaper, however, differed from that of the other European ones. *The Times* presented and explained an optimistic view summarising the neoconservative philosophy. This was based on Irving Kristol’s assumption that the economic system of capitalism would not lead to social unrest and demands for protectionism because of the high level of affluence of the American society. In particular, Irving Kristol asserted:

‘In our capitalist society income inequality is swamped by even greater social equality. So high is the general level of affluence that only experts can deduce a person's economic

\(^{42}\) In another article *La Repubblica* maintained: ‘the social problems do not seem to alarm the neoconservatives[...], who rather ask for a return[...], to a government less interventionist and less generous, in order to emphasise on capitalist individualism / Il malessere sociale non sembra preoccupare i neoconservatori[...], che anzi chiedono un ritorno[...], an un governo meno invadente e meno generoso, in modo da valorizzare l'individualismo capitalista’(*La Repubblica*, 27/12/95: 14). *Le Monde* agreed and presented the imperative for an individual responsibility as a neoconservative belief (Kaufmann, *Le Monde*, 18/02/95).
status from his clothing; anyone can buy an expensive car, paying in installments [...] The spectre of class war has faded away

(Kristol, *The Sunday Times*, 08/03/98).

Although an ideological bias in favour of neoconservatism can be observed, this was the only article of the newspaper which dealt with this political ideology in relation to economics before 11 September. Thus, no safe conclusions can be reached.

**Is It Neoliberalism?**

The coverage of the above-presented economic features of neoconservatism by most of the selected European newspapers, can give the impression that this political ideology was a synonym for neoliberalism. David Harvey notes that neoconservatism is consistent with the neoliberal agenda as - inter alia - to the maintenance market freedoms, and the rise of individualism and private enterprise (Harvey, 2005: 82). In this regard, the media referred to similar economic principles and focused, with the exception of *The Times*, on their extension into the field of welfare by outlining the low degree of state intervention. However, there was a specific distinction in the coverage which can distinguish neoconservatism from neoliberalism: that the former is against moral permissiveness (Harvey, 2005: 82). Most of the European newspapers saw the neoconservatives as seeking to restore a sense of moral purpose by focusing on various values the adherents of the political ideology had on their agenda.

Some newspapers, for example, dealt with neoconservatism in relation to affirmative action and agreed on its opposition to it. *The Observer* presented this opposition by noting that ‘creeping multi-culturalism is a dangerous road to take’ (*The Observer*, 22/04/01, News Pages: 2). *Frankfurter Allgemeine* asserted that neoconservative intellectuals were in favour of a colour-blind America (Klingenstein, 10/07/01, Neue Sachbücher: 46). *Süddeutsche Zeitung* was explicit and portrayed them ‘as enemies of affirmative action / Feinde der affirmative action’ (Steinberger, 05/02/01, Feuilleton: 15). *Il Corriere della Sera* concentrated on feminism. In an article Lucia Annunziata published she quoted from Norman Podhoretz and noted that he attacked the feminist campaign because in his view it puts the normal seduction and the initiative of the male into question (Annunziata, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 116)
The same newspaper presented the neoconservatives as supporters of white superiority (Caretto, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 02/11/94, Razzismo: 27).

In parallel with affirmative action there was consensus in the media as to the desire of the neoconservatives for a return to traditional values. For instance, *The Guardian* described their concern for the downgrading role of the family in modern society. The newspaper presented their view by asserting: ‘treat[ing] one-parent families the same as two-parent families has caused a generation of children to fail. It’s an enormous mistake to believe that all happy families are the same.’ (Edward, *The Observer*, 22/04/01, News Pages: 2). *Le Monde* was also explicit and asserted that the neoconservatives had started since the 1980s a crusade in order to control the morality and sexuality of the Americans (*Le Monde*, 14/02/99, Editorial). *Süddeutsche Zeitung* noted that the neoconservatives focused on the importance of the family and local authorities and condemned the moral decline of America. According to the neoconservatives this could be attributed to social pathologies such as crimes, violence, extra-marital births, abortion of teenagers, maltreatment of children, dependence on drugs, alcoholism, analphabetism and promiscuity (Steinberger, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 05/02/01, Feuilleton: 15). *Corriere della Sera* maintained that the neoconservatives were not in favour of gay rights. It explained that on the basis of their philosophy the marriage is only defined as the legal union between a male and a female. (Caretto, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 15/05/96, Matrimonio Sesso: 11).

Finally, in the context of the support of the neoconservatives for traditional values *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* gave an additional dimension. It concentrated on religion. The German conservative newspaper asserted that the neoconservatives protected the religious right (Bahners, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20/06/01, Geistenwissenschaften: N5).

**US Foreign Policy**

Neoconservatism and US foreign policy were not on the agenda of the European elite press before 11 September. This happened not only during the period Bill Clinton

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43 For a general discussion about the support of the neoconservatives for traditional values see: *Le Monde*, Grundberg, 15/08/99; Lazare, *Le Monde*, 20/10/00, Société; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15/02/99, Politik: 2; Annunziata, *Il Corriere della Sera* 08/09/93, Donne: 25
was US President but also in the eight months of George W. Bush’s administration before 11 September. Many newspapers completely ignored US foreign in their coverage of neoconservatism and only a few articles appeared in which the political ideology was linked to world affairs. Figures of neither the first generation nor the second one of the group were mentioned.

The selected newspapers used the term in relation to different goals of US foreign policy during the Cold War and in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As for the latter it is interesting that there was an absence of articles discussing issues like terrorism and neoconservative views for countries such as Iraq and Iran. An exception was acknowledged in the coverage of *Il Corriere della Sera* which portrayed the ‘neoconservative’ politician Newt Gingrich to be in favour of a US military intervention against Tehran in 1996 if Iran would not close its training camps for terrorists (*Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera*, 05/08/96, Politica Estera: 5). The following analysis will present examples found concerning neoconservatism and US foreign policy before 11 September.

*Le Monde* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* used the term in relation to the Cold War era. Daniel Vernet referred to the foreign policy philosophy of the group and compared the neoconservative principles to those of realists like Henry Kissinger. In particular, he mentioned that the neoconservatives wanted to impose the American democratic values in order to reveal their power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. By contrast, Henry Kissinger saw East-West relations as an opportunity to establish friendly relations. (*Vernet, Le Monde*, 27/10/00). For its part, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* approached neoconservatism in a different way and dealt with the view of its adherents concerning the UN in the 1980s and their impact on US President Ronald Reagan. The German newspaper illustrated Reagan as treating the international organisation with reluctance because of the influence of the neoconservatives (*Frankenberger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16/06/93: 12). This was the only case a newspaper had dealt with the neoconservative position regarding international institutions in the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

As for the post Cold War era *The Times* and *Il Corriere della Sera* published about neoconservatism and US foreign policy. The British newspaper discussed this theme within the context of the Russian elections and the Yeltsin-Zyuganoc face-off in 1996. Andrew Sullivan distinguished the neoconservatives as one camp of Washington’s foreign policy which advocated for a hardline approach towards
Russia. The other camps were the non-interventionists, the new nationalists, and the Kissingerites. Sullivan noted:

'The neoconservative hawks are still getting over the cold war, when their liberal anti-communism enjoyed its finest hour. Unfortunately, the new Russia fails to meet their emotional and political needs. There is no dangerous ideology of the scale of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow to galvanise their intellectual fervour, merely a decadent Russian nationalism with strains of anti-Semitism. Still, the neoconservatives have clearly been right to cavil at war crimes in Chechnya and to be irritated by Russia's occasional prickliness in the Balkans. They have also been shrewd in noticing that Russia's bullying in the Caucasus suggests a new imperialism in central Asia that the West should keep an eye on. Nevertheless, it is still unclear why the Russian belly is of vital interest to the West especially in comparison with Eastern Europe. And so the neocons continue to argue, without particular traction like an old car that refuses to start' 

(Sullivan, The Sunday Times, 26/05/96).

_Il Corriere della Sera_ gave an idea of the preference of the neoconservatives for unilateralism in the international arena in the 1990s. The newspaper dealt with their opposition to the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT). According to the journalist Ennio Caretto, the group saw GATT as harmful for US sovereignty (Caretto, _Il Corriere della Sera_, 17/11/94, Commercio: 19).

**Other Themes**

In the period before 11 September the selected European newspapers referred to neoconservatism not only discussing developments in the US but also describing events, figures and political parties in other parts of the world. As opposed to the former case, however, in the latter one the media used the term either arbitrarily or indirectly without giving further explanations. In other words, it was presupposed that the readers might be able to understand why each figure, political party, issue or event was considered as neoconservative and what this could maybe imply (Fairclough, 1995, 105-109). Further to this, the selected European newspapers constructed the political ideology in various different ways. With a few exceptions, as in the case of German intellectuals, a general dissensus in media coverage was observed. This was largely based on their nationality or the specific newspaper title.
German Intellectuals

Three European liberal newspapers, namely Süddeutsche Zeitung, Le Monde and La Repubblica and the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung used the term neoconservatism when referring to the intellectual debate concerning the importance of the Nazi past for the construction of the German identity. A second aspect of this debate was the potential European orientation of the country after its reunification. Süddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubblica were analytical in their coverage while Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung used the term without giving particular explanations. In this regard, the former set of newspapers labelled as ‘new right’ and ‘neoconservative’ the scholars who attempted to legitimate the German Resistance and did not consider the day of the capitulation of the Third Reich as a liberation day for Germany (Lamprecht, Süddeutsche Zeitung 08/05/00: 11; La Repubblica, Tarquini, 22/04/95, Mondo: 15). These intellectuals were also presented as being cautious for the Europeanisation of the foreign policy of Germany after the reunification of the country. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Gorkow, 14/09/93; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 05/01/94, Politica Estera: 12).

The European newspapers attributed to a wide range of intellectuals the label neoconservative without necessarily explaining its meaning. The historian Ernst Nolte, who had presented Nazism as a reaction and continuation of the mass killings of the Bolsheviks, is a figure the elite media mainly portrayed as such (Weill, Le Monde, 24/11/95; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 22/04/95, Mondo: 15; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 03/05/95, Cultura: 34). Dramatist Botho Strauss, historian Rainer Zitelman and the widow of Willy Brandt Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, whom La Repubblica saw as the muse / musa of the neoconservatives, constitute additional examples (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Kultur, 22/04/95; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 22/04/95, Mondo: 15; Tarquini, La Repubblica, 26/04/94, Cultura: 39). In parallel with them, Writer Ernst Jünger

44 German neoconservative intellectuals were criticised by those of the left school for showing signs of neo-Nazism in their work. According to the widow of Willy Brandt, however, that kind of signs could not be found in their studies (Tarquini, La Repubblica, 30/03/93: Cultura: 35; Tarquini, 26/04/94, Cultura: 39). As for Botho Strauss Le Monde wrote that the neoconservatives had assembled around his neoheideggerian manifesto (Adler, Le Monde, 27/02/99). Süddeutsche Zeitung illustrated his work Ithaka as a neoconservative one (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22/05/96). See also: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/03/99, Feuilleton: 45
was illustrated as ‘prophet / prophète ’ of neoconservatism (Mohr, Le Monde, 20/02/98). 45

European politics

The selected newspapers of the ‘Big Four’ associated neoconservatism in a few cases to their own political developments. Although, they did not extensively focus on this connection, a use of term in national context can be partly observed while an ideological difference in the coverage is also noted in the Italian media. With reference to British politics The Guardian used the term indirectly discussing the Third Way. Andrew Marr noted: ‘The Third Way can be described, so far, only by what it is not. It isn’t messianic, high-spending old socialism and it isn’t ideologically driven, individualist neoconservatism’ (Marr, The Observer, 26/07/98: 21). As concerns French political affairs, Le Monde anticipated in 1995 the evolution of a neoconservative ideology from within the classic right of the country but did not comment extensively on that diagnosis (Chobeau, Le Monde, 11/02/95).

The German elite newspapers also mentioned neoconservatism referring to the political arena of the country. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that according to young socialists the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had set up the same domestic affairs programme with that of the neoconservatives (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/10/95, Politik: 4). Süddeutsche Zeitung often used the term in order to describe the policy of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU). For example, the leader of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) Lothar Bisky was presented to advise his colleagues to attempt to create an alternative to the neoconservative policy (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/01/97, Politik). This newspaper also wrote that the German Minister of the Interior Otto Schilly was a neoconservative (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11/08/00).

The selected Italian newspapers did not constitute an exception as to the association of neoconservatism to domestic politics. For example, Il Corriere della Sera noted that a climate of neoconservatism started to be creating in Italy in 1993 (Fumagalli, Il

45 Examples of other intellectuals who were considered as neoconservative include writer Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, Hans Mommsen, Klaus Rainer Röhl, Heimo Schwilk, Herbert Kremp, Ansgar Graw, Heribert Fleissner and Heinz Brill (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Koch, 08/12/95, Feuilleton: 45; Süddeutsche Zeitung, Lamprecht, 08/05/00: 11; La Repubblica, Tarquini, 22/04/95, Mondo: 15 and Tarquini, 05/01/94, Politica Estera: 12)
Corriere della Sera, 13/02/93, Lavoro: 15). The newspaper also presented Silvio Berlusconi as dreaming for cooperation with the Italian neoconservative bourgeois (Ostellino, Il Corriere della Sera, 15/08/97, Politica Interna: 13). Nonetheless, although Il Corriere della Sera approached this political ideology in a neutral way, La Repubblica was rather critical. In a context of a negative discussion of the economic policy of Berlusconi it quoted from Romano Prodi and asserted:

'Prodi sees that a particular form of Thatcherism is being circulated in Italy, a strange political product which synthesises the neoliberalism...which is in reality the parody of the political programmes of the neoconservatives / Prodi vede in Italia circolare una forma particolare di Thatcherismo, uno strano prodotto politico che sintetizza un liberalismo ...che in realtà è la parodia di programme politici neoconservatori' (Buzzanca, La Repubblica, 21/03/95: 9).

The conservative Il Corriere della Sera might have seen Berlusconi’s entrance in the political arena of Italy with sympathy and could have envisaged a good future for country with his centre-right policy plans and political programme. On the contrary, La Repubblica possibly considered Berlusconi as a rival for Romano Prodi, the Olive Tree Alliance (Ulivo) and the centre-left. It maybe wanted to express its concern about the genesis of the new wave of conservatism the cavaliere brought. Despite their ideological bias, Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica, constituted a forum of debate about a political ideology - neoconservatism - which maybe impacted on Italian politics. This is an interesting finding as it refers to a period when serious questions had been posed for the quality of democracy in the country. The reason was Berlusconi’s political interference in the media sector (Marletti and Roncarlo, 2000: 229).

A final point to be made is that the selected elite newspapers used the term neoconservatism or its equivalents in order to illustrate other European political

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46 Il Corriere della Sera also associated the Italian politician Lamberto Dini with neoconservatism (Caro, Il Corriere della Sera, 29/12/95, Politica Interna: 6)
47 The television system, dominated by the RAI, which is state-regulated public-service broadcaster, and the privately owned Fininvest – later Mediaset, has undergone dramatic changes since 1994 (Mancini et al., 2000: 103, 104). Following his electoral victory in 1994, Berlusconi endeavoured to strongly influence political communication through the public sector of television broadcasting; the appointment of a new council for the administration of the RAI was the most characteristic example (Marletti and Roncarlo, 2000: 229, Ricolfi, 1997: 138).
parties or figures beyond the limits of Britain, France, Germany and Italy. For example, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung portrayed the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus and his Civic Democratic political party (ODS) and the Homeland Union political party of Lithuania as neoconservative. Süddeutsche Zeitung depicted the Spanish leader Jose Maria Aznar and the members of his political party as such (Kassenbeer, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30/05/95). La Repubblica considered the Austrian politician Jörg Haider in this way (Tarquini, La Repubblica, 04/10/96: 10).

Asian Politics

Some of selected European newspapers also referred arbitrarily to neoconservatism discussing about politics in Asia. Three of them, namely The Times, Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung observed signs of this political ideology in China. Politician Zhu Rongyi, philosopher Li Zehou and the New Party of Taiwan (NP) were considered as neoconservative (Sheridan, The Sunday Times, 31/08/97; Ming, 22/11/00, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton: 73; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/03/96, Politik: 2 ). For its part, Le Monde associated the problems of the Chinese society such as unemployment, reduction of the wealth and insecurity with neoconservatism (Bobin, Le Monde, 03/11/99).

In parallel with China, Japan was another case where the term found resonance. In 1993 the conservative Liberal Democratic Party of the country (LDP) failed to win a majority and a coalition of new parties was established. Le Monde noted that one of them, namely the Renewal party was formed by neoconservatives, who attempted to present themselves as reformists (Le Monde, Pons, 18/11/94). Other parties which were considered as neoconservative include the Buddhist party Komeito, New Party of Hosokawa and the New Party Sakigake (Le Monde, 26/06/94; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22/07/94, Zeitgeschehen: 12; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19/11/93: Politik). Politicians labelled as such are Ochiro Ozawa, Morihiro Hosokawa and Tsutomu Hata (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24/02/94, Politik: 6; Süddeutsche Zeitung 14/06/95).

48 See: Kohler, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28/01/03, Politik: 3; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13/04/93: 5; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03/05/93: 7
Miscellaneous

Neoconservatism was also arbitrarily linked to a plethora of different phenomena by the media. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and La Repubblica used the term in relation to jazz music. In this case, the label neoconservative was attributed to musicians who did not seek to forget the tradition of jazz but to follow it (Ricci, La Repubblica, 27/12/94: 32). A musician of this category was perceived to be Wynton Marsalis. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that Marsalis played the trumpet of Jazz in a neoconservative way (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15/04/01, Medien: 38). Süddeutsche Zeitung depicted him as leader of the neoconservative music experience (Dombrowski, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26/08/98, Feuilleton and Heilbrun, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26/01/01, Feuilleton: 17).

Le Figaro and Süddeutsche Zeitung linked French author Michel Houellebecq to neoconservatism (Le Figaro, Le Fol, 13/03/01, Kunisch, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28/10/99, Feuilleton: 20). The former focused on his book Les Particules élémentaires (The Elementary Particles). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung considered the architecture of Berlin as neoconservative (Wefing, 09/03/01, Feuilleton: 44; Wolfgang Stock, 27/08/95, Feuilleton). For its part, The Guardian used the term to describe the creation of new films about the Second World War. (Dyer, The Guardian, 20/08/98). Le Figaro linked neoconservatism to science and wrote about the fear of its adherents for its progress as it maybe constituted a threat for the humanity and should be controlled (Jannoud, Le Figaro, 09/09/99). The same newspaper also considered the Journal Stratégie et Management as neoconservative (Hauter, 31/01/00).

Le Figaro also used the term in relation to the revolutionary protests of May 1968 in France. In particular, approximately thirty years after May 1968, this newspaper reexamined the stance of those who had participated in the events. The result was that some of the protesters had regretted for their attitude a posteriori. Le Figaro attributed the repentance of some of the protesters of May 1968 to a kind of neoconservatism. An article published on 19 March 2001 pointed out:

′If the leaders and the ideologues of May 1968 claimed to be against the old establishment, anti-democratic and anti-consumerists, the repentance of the most popular of them would be obviously similar to neoconservatism / Si les meneurs et les idéologues de Mai 88 se voulaient anti-vieux, anti-démocratiques et anti-consoméristes,
la repentance des plus connus d'entre eux ressemble furieusement à du néoconservatisme'

(Le Figaro, 19/03/01: 20,21; de Belot, Le Figaro, 19/03/01).

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung linked neoconservatism to art and considered as neoconservative the accusation that it is banal, boring or hermetic in modern society (Basting, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/01/99, Geistenwissenschaften: N5). This newspaper also asserted that John Charmley was a neoconservative historian because he put the international picture of Winston Churchill into question when he noted that he was responsible for the loss of the Empire in his book Churchill: The End of Glory (Stuchtey, 01/06/94, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Geistenwissenschaften: N5). La Repubblica used the term when referring to the attitude of the men who do not contribute to housework by not helping their wives (La Repubblica, 17/01/97, Commenti: 2).

Conclusion

In articles published in the pre-11 September era, neoconservatism did not constitute a synonym for US foreign policy. On the contrary, the European elite media mainly discussed neoconservatism in relation to American domestic affairs. This was the only point they found common ground as to its meaning. All the newspapers, which covered this issue, agreed that the neoconservatives advocated for a minimal role of the state. This implied that they focused on the importance of the individual responsibility and strongly rejected the idea of a welfare state. Despite this common denominator, differences in media coverage are acknowledged concerning the specific figures who were connected to neoconservatism. For instance, only Le Monde, II Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica synthesised it around the initiative and leadership of Newt Gingrich.

With the exception of US domestic politics the European elite newspapers did not agree on a common definition of neoconservatism. The construction of its meaning took miscellaneous approaches in the period before the terrorist attacks. The wide range of its different interpretations could vacillate between politics and art. It could include not only the godfather of the political ideology Irving Kristol but also jazz musician Wynton Marsalis. It could entail not only the views of a number of political
figures for the American society but also the stance of the French intellectuals who regretted for their attitude in the events of May 1968. A few national and ideological differences, as for example in the case of the Italian media, were observed in the coverage while the word was often used arbitrarily.

Further to this, there was a lack of specific arguments or analytical texts which accompanied the term. For example, the print media attributed the label neoconservative to many political parties of Europe and Asia without defining what this meant for their programme and political stance. Neoconservatism could hardly give the impression that it was a movement with specific common goals. It was rather the view of a specific figure depicted as neoconservative by the media and not the position of a group of people which led the newspapers to deal with it. The European media rarely used plural to write about a group’s belief, and even in the case they did so it remained unclear who the neoconservatives were. It can be perhaps argued that a reader of the eight European elite newspapers accessed in the period before 9/11 might not be able to understand what the particular decoding of the term was.
Chapter 7: The Aftermath of 9/11

The analysis of the pre-11 September material showed that neoconservatism had been covered by the European elite press as a political ideology without particular reference to international politics. The accessed media did not pay attention to the position of neoconservative politicians and intellectuals concerning foreign affairs, although international relations literature had done so before 9/11. The main objective of the following chapter is to deal with the shift in the content of articles published in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. In the first instance, Chapter 5 provided evidence for the different content of articles in the post-11 September era demonstrating the high interest of the accessed newspapers in neoconservatism from 9/11 and especially from the beginning of 2003 onwards.

This chapter aims at going further and will explore how the selected newspapers framed neoconservatism and constructed the meaning of the political ideology. Its main objective is to explore if the selected print sources interpreted neoconservatism in a similar way and to conclude if a homogenisation in content of coverage can be observed. Having the results of the quantitative analysis as a starting point the chapter will first deal with the period from 9/11 until the end of 2002 and will then concentrate on that from 2003 onwards. The findings demonstrate that it was after the beginning of 2003 when the accessed newspapers showed a high degree of similarity in their understanding of neoconservatism. In spite of a few differences, which will be outlined, there is a general consensus in the media discourse as to the interpretation of the term and its principles as well as an agreement concerning the members and instruments of the group.

The Road to the Iraq War

In the immediate aftermath of 11 September neoconservatism did not largely impact on the agenda of the selected newspapers. The period from the terrorist attacks until the beginning of the US entanglement in Iraq in March 2003 was a transitional one for the coverage of the political ideology. Some of the newspapers - to a higher degree liberal than conservatives ones - started to express an interest in neoconservatism in relation to US foreign policy. Specifically they used the term in the context of Washington's world affairs approach and its war on terror in articles published in both
their news sections and editorial boards. *Le Monde* was the first newspaper to do so. In October 2001, the French newspaper referred to the neoconservative counsel in the Bush administration, Richard Perle and illustrated him as considering more important for the US the elimination of al-Qaeda than the capture itself of Osama bin Laden (Frachon, *Le Monde*, 29/10/01).

In December 2001 it was the turn of *The Guardian* to distinguish neoconservatism as a specific foreign policy ideology in the Bush administration. The newspaper saw its adherents as supporting the idea of a war against Iraq after the successful military campaign against Afghanistan (Alterman, *The Guardian*, 15/12/01). The selected German and Italian elite newspapers used for the first time the term in relation to the US war on terror in March, September and November 2002 (Berthold, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11/09/02; Raulff, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20/03/02; Caretto, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 22/09/02; Caracciolo, *La Repubblica*, 05/11/02). However, it was not until the beginning of 2003 when *The Times* and *Le Figaro* started to do so.

In the period from 12 September 2001 until March 2003 the accessed newspapers did not focus on the position of the neoconservatives concerning the war on Afghanistan. This can be perhaps explained because of the general support of the EU and NATO for this US-led military operation which would not make a particular reference to the view of the group worthwhile. Further to this, the media did not refer to neoconservatism in relation to George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech in January 2002. As a whole - in spite of some early signs of associating neoconservatism with US foreign policy - the newspapers did not concentrate on the supposed role of members of the group in promoting the Iraq war in the transitional period for the media coverage, from the terrorist attacks until the beginning of 2003. This contradicts their stance after the outbreak of the war as the following analysis will show.

**The Neoconservative Revolution**

The Iraq war was the springboard for the increased media interest in the foreign policy philosophy of the neoconservatives. From January and February 2003 onwards the selected newspapers largely dealt with neoconservatism as a parameter of Washington’s world affairs approach and constructed it in a similar way. They represented the political ideology as a movement and either concentrated on members
of the group as a specific entity or they personified it by referring to specific politicians and intellectuals. Journalists also showed a familiarity in using the term as they often utilised the abbreviation ‘neocon’ in their articles.

It can thus be argued that the media expressed a high interest in treating neoconservatism as an international relations theory in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. This contradicts their stance in the pre-9/11 era. The chosen newspapers did not follow the approach of politicians and scholars such as Madeleine Albright, Al Gore and Noam Chomsky as well as most members of the group who are not keen on referring to the political ideology. On the contrary, they focused on it by attributing the label ‘neoconservative’ to various politicians and intellectuals, by using the term in a routinised way even in articles which did not discuss US world affairs approach and by analysing various aspects of the group’s foreign policy philosophy.

**Personifications**

In the aftermath of 11 September and especially from 2003 onwards the accessed newspapers interpreted neoconservatism in a remarkably accurate way according to the relevant literature of international relations. In this period the content of Chapter 2 and 3 found resonance on the coverage as opposed to the pre-11 September era. This said it was not surprising that US politicians and intellectuals known as ‘neoconservative’ in books and academic journals were also illustrated as such by the media which in no case contested this label when they. The newspapers mentioned figures of both the first and second generation of the neoconservatives while they largely concentrated on the latter. 49 In this regard it is interesting to give some examples with particular phrases accompanying the adjectival complement ‘neoconservative’ or its equivalents.

Richard Perle, for instance, was presented as ‘notorious neoconservative’, ‘and ‘the most famous / le plus célèbre’ of the neoconservatives (Simms, The Times, 27/10/04, Features: 20; Krauze, Le Monde, 27/03/03, International). He was seen as ‘ultrahawk

49 Figures illustrated in media reportage as neoconservative of the first generation were: Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Jean Kirkpatrick, Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz while of the second one were politicians Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, Eliot Cohen, Douglas Feith, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Scooter Libby, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz. They also contain intellectuals such as Max Boot, David Brooks, Charles Krauthammer, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Lawrence Kaplan, William Kristol, and Joshua Muravchik and Daniel Pipes.
Paul Wolfowitz was one of the prominent neoconservatives the European elite media dealt with. He was depicted as 'a high priest of [Bush’s] Administration’s neoconservative cadres, and a driving force behind the war in Iraq’, ‘leading light among the neoconservatives in the Administration’ and as ‘the darling of the neocons’ (Duncan, The Times, 04/04/05, Business: 37; Baker, The Times, 29/10/04, Overseas News: 40; Baxter, The Times, 29/05/05, Overseas News: 24). He was also presented as ‘the most remarkable of the neoconservatives / le plus remarquable des néoconservateurs’ and as ‘a leading figure of neoconservatism within the administration / une des figures de proue du néoconservatisme dans l'administration’ (Chaliand, Le Figaro, 16/03/04, Débats et Opinions: 18; Vernet, Le Monde, 13/09/04).

Additional examples of his portrayal include: ‘superstar of the neocons / Superstar der Neokons’ and ‘neoconservative architect of the Iraq war / neokonservativer Architekt des Iraks Kriegs’ (Mejias, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/09/04, Feuilleton: 34; Süddeutsche Zeitung 31/03/05, Meinungsseite: 4).

Characteristic lexical items used by the European elite media for the neoconservative portrayal of Robert Kagan were the following: ‘the most articulate of America’s neocons’ and ‘one of the creators of the American neoconservative movement / un des créateurs de la doctrine néoconservatrice’ (The Observer, 15/08/04, Review Pages: 17; Rocard, Le Figaro, 28/05/04, Débats et Opinions). He was also seen as ‘one of the thinking masters of the American neoconservative school / un des maîtres à penser de l’école néoconservatrice américaine’ and as ‘spokesman / Porte-parole’ of neoconservatism (Frachon, Le Monde, 11/02/03; Vernet, Le Monde, 28/05/04, Documents Etats-Unis).

50 For the neoconservative portrayal of Richard Perle in other newspapers see for example: Burkeman, The Guardian, 15/03/03, Home News: 5; Girard, Le Figaro, Débats et Opinions, Editorial, 20/08/03; Rib, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24/03/04, Zeitgeschehen: 12; Kornelius, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Meinungsseite, 15/04/03: 4; Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina 11/06/04: 1.
51 For the neoconservative portrayal of Paul Wolfowitz see for example: Woollacott, The Guardian, 27/02/04, Leader Pages: 28; ‘Kornelius and Hujer, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Politik, 30/10/04: 6; Riotta, Il Corriere della Sera, 27/10/03, Guerra: 11; Stagliano, La Repubblica, Politica Estera, 20/11/04: 10.
52 For the neoconservative portrayal of Robert Kagan see for example: Gove, The Times, 16/05/03, Features: 4; Hassner, Le Monde, Page Une, 02/02/05; Wulf, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Feuilleton, 05/10/04.
Examples of the neoconservative illustration of William Kristol by the media include: ‘the godfather of the Washington neocons’ and ‘neoconservative guru’ (Charter, The Times, 13/10/05, Overseas News: 45; Sullivan, The Times, 09/10/05, Features: 4). William Kristol was also deemed as ‘one of the leaders / un des chefs de file’, as ‘neoconservative spokesman / neokonservativer Wortführer’ and as ‘one of the most influential neoconservative intellectuals in Washington / ein der einflussreichsten neokonservativen Intellektuellen in den USA (Lesnes, Le Monde, 12/05/05; Habermas, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06/06/05, Feuilleton: 15; Koydl, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 08/05/02, Themen aus dem Ausland: 9). 53 Along with William, Irving Kristol, who had also been associated with the political ideology before 9/11 by some of the newspapers, was represented as ‘godfather’, ‘father / père’, one of the‘ intellectual fathers / geistigen Väters’ and ‘mastermind / Vordenker’ of neoconservatism (The Sunday Times, 24/08/03, Features, News Review: 4; Vernet, Le Monde, 25/05/05, Chronique International; Müller, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10/01/05, Feuilleton: 34; Kreye, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16/09/04, Literatur, 16/09/04: 16).

If the neoconservative illustration of the above-mentioned politicians and intellectuals by the media was expectable, their portrayal of other figures not identified as such by scholars might be more interesting. Specifically the attention is turned towards Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. These politicians have ties to neoconservatism but are not considered as members of the group. On the contrary, scholars illustrate them as nationalists as chapter 2 suggested. The qualitative analysis showed that the selected European newspapers did not label them as neoconservative. In some cases the media also elaborated on the distinction between neoconservatism and nationalism. For example the Italian liberal newspaper La Repubblica asserted on its first page that Donald Rumsfeld could not be associated with the former political ideology (Rampini, La Repubblica, 19/09/03, Prima Pagina:

14; Wefing, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton, 29/06/04: 35; Fertilio, Il Corriere della Sera, 09/11/03, Varie: 33; Rampini, La Repubblica, Politica Interna, 15/12/03: 20.
53 For the neoconservative portrayal of William Kristol, see for example: Blumenthal, The Guardian, 27/01/05, Leader Pages: 26; Girard, Le Figaro, Débats et Opinions, Editorial, 20/08/03; Rüb, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26/10/03, Politik: 8; Kreye, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Politik, 24/12/04: 1; Ostellino, Il Corriere della Sera, 04/07/03, Politica Estera: 1; Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 15/06/03: 1)
In parallel with Cheney and Rumsfeld the media approached US President George W. Bush in a similar way and did not see him as a neoconservative. The European elite newspapers also depicted other figures of US politics as neoconservative. Although they found common ground as to the members of the first and especially the second generation of the group, in this case various newspapers portrayed different individuals as such. These include, for instance, former adviser to President Ronald Reagan Michael Horowitz (Baxter, *Sunday Times*, Overseas News, 27/02/05: 26), former director of CIA James Woolsey (*Vaisse, Le Monde*, 23/03/02), President of the US Committee on NATO Bruce Jackson (*Le Figaro*, 16/11/04: 6; *Zecchini, Le Monde*, 07/10/03), vice-President of the American Enterprise Institute Danielle Pletka (*Le Figaro*, 05/11/2004: 4), senator John Sununu (*Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera*, Politica, 01/07/03: 2) and Bush’s counsel Ed Gillespie (*Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera*, 26/01/04, Elezioni Presidenziali: 11).

**The Neoconservatives as an Entity**

We know that many neoconservatives disagreed with the idea of a neoconservative movement. As Chapter 2 mentioned members of the group argue that their ideas are often contradictory. For their part, the European elite newspapers accessed did not find themselves in a dilemma. As opposed to the period before the terrorist attacks, the way they treated neoconservatism in the post-11 September era can maybe give the impression that this political ideology constituted a movement with specific common goals and principles. This argument can be reinforced by the wide use of plural in media references to neoconservative beliefs as it will be shown.

Neoconservatism’s equation with a movement in media coverage can be hardly put into question as various credible sources also used the term attributing particular

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54 Only a few exceptions are acknowledged. For instance, in a comment written by Mary Ann Sieghart for *The Times*, the newspaper considered both US Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld as neoconservative politicians (Sieghart, *The Times*, 10/12/04, Features: 20). *The Times* also portrayed Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld as neoconservative quoting from George Soros (Billen, *The Times*, 03/02/04, Features: 8). Further to this Sarah Baxter asserted: ‘Cheney and Libby were at the vanguard of the hardcore group of neocon advisers’ (Baxter, *The Sunday Times*, 30/10/05, Features: 21). An exception was also found in *La Repubblica* when Washington correspondent Vittorio Zucconi associated Donald Rumsfeld with neoconservatism (Zucconi, *La Repubblica*, 23/03/03, Prima Pagina:1).

55 An exception includes an article published by *The Times*. This newspaper reported that according to George Galloway MP, George W. Bush was a neoconservative. In particular, Galloway said: ‘I have no expectation of justice from a group of Christian fundamentalist and Zionist activists under the chairmanship of a neocon George Bush who is pro-war’ (Bone, Overseas News, 17/05/05: 29).
importance to it. For instance, significant figures of European politics referred to it in articles they wrote or interviews they gave concerning US foreign policy. The most striking example comes from Süddeutsche Zeitung. Hans-Werner Kilz, Heribert Prantl and Urlich Schäfer conducted an interview with Gerhard Schröder, who was then chancellor of Germany. In this interview, Schröder spoke about a neoconservative ideology. (Kilz et al., Süddeutsche Zeitung, 02/10/04: 7). Not only Schröder but also other politicians did so. For example, Il Corriere della Sera conducted an interview with the vice-President of the European Convention Giuliano Amato who talked about the neoconservatives using the abbreviation 'neocons' (di Vico, Il Corriere della Sera, 16/03/04, Elezioni Politiche: 8).56

The interest of the European media in the neoconservative ‘movement’ led most of them to investigate its historical roots. This also contradicts the content of articles before 11 September. After 9/11 the media generally agreed on the early origins of the political ideology. They saw the early members of the group as leftists and liberals who were disenchanted with the Democratic Party and turned towards the right. They also noted that many members of the group had become involved in politics for the first time during Ronald Reagan’s administration. The following extract offers an example of the way the media elaborated on the origins of neoconservatism. In particular, its roots:

'lie mostly on the left. The original neoconservatives - also nicknamed Socialists for Nixon - were anti-communist leftists and liberals who became alienated from the Democratic Party when it endorsed the anti-Vietnam war candidate George McGovern for President in 1972. Appalled by what they saw as the refusal of liberals to defend their values and confront totalitarianism in the guise of Soviet power, the neoconservatives drifted to the right, contributing to a broader political realignment that swept Ronald Reagan to power. Many took jobs in the Reagan administration and found a permanent home in the Republican party in the process'.

(Clark, The Guardian, Comment and Debate Pages, 21/11/05: 28).57

56 Former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine also did so in a comment he wrote for Le Figaro (Vedrine, Le Figaro, 16/10/04: 13).
57 For a discussion about the origins of neoconservatism see: Simms, The Sunday Times, Features, Culture: 43; Buruma, The Guardian, 17/09/02, Features Pages: 5; Laurent, Le Figaro, 16/10/04: 13; Vaisse, Le Monde, 23/02/03; Frachon and Vernet, 16/04/03; Vaisse, Le Monde, 10/09/04, Essais Etats Unis; Kimmage, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feuilleton, 22/10/04: 44, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10/01/05, Feuilleton: 34; Rampini, La Repubblica, 14/05/04, Cultura: 39.
Instruments

Chapter 3 suggested that the neoconservatives had endeavoured to promote their views by giving speeches, lectures and interviews as well as by publishing pieces of work either in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium. Although this issue had not been of interest for the media in the pre-11 September era, in the aftermath of the attacks they largely focused on instruments, which were perceived as being used by the members of the group in order to propagate their ideas. These included specific think tanks, journals, newspapers or TV channels. We know from contributing editor to *The Weekly Standard* David Brooks that the leading neoconservative magazines are *The Weekly Standard*, *The Public Interest* and *Commentary* (*Foreign Policy, January/February 2004: 29*). Resident scholar of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Joshua Muravchik also notes that this think tank along with the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) are often described as constituting the command centre of neoconservatism (*Commentary*, September 2003: 26). The selected European newspapers largely agreed as to the neoconservative illustration of the above-mentioned instruments. They mainly focused on *The Weekly Standard*, the PNAC and the AEI.

*The Weekly Standard*, for instance, was illustrated as the 'bible / Bibel / bibbia' of the neoconservatives (*Burkeman, The Guardian, Foreign Pages, 23/09/03: 12; Winter, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 04/10/05: 39; *Matteo, Il Corriere della Sera*, 15/07/05: 6; *La Repubblica*, 19/09/03:1). It was also seen as neoconservative 'bastion', 'the central instrument of the neoconservative movement / Zentralorgan der neokonservativen Bewegung' and as its 'real executive instrument / vero organo dirigente' (*Frachon, Le Monde*, 27/06/03; *Geyer, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23/06/03: 37; *Müller, Süddeutsche Zeitung* 25/01/05: 13; *Rampini, La Repubblica*, Prima Pagina, 15/06/03:1).\(^5\)

As concerns the PNAC *The Times* discussed about its Statement of Principles in 1997 and deemed it as a ‘neocon manifesto’ (*Billen, The Times*, 19/10/04: 4). *Le Figaro* asserted that this think tank was founded ‘in order to promote a world leadership of the US / pour promouvoir un leadership mondial des Etats-Unis’

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Süddeutsche Zeitung referred to the ‘neoconservative’ PNAC: ‘which talked about a massive armament and a march against Baghdad / das einer massiven Aufrüstung und einem Marsch gegen Bagdad das Wort redete’ (Wernicke, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20/10/05, Meinungssseite: 4). As for the AEI this was illustrated as: ‘anthemion / fleuron’, ‘study centre / centre d’ études’, ‘headquarters / Hauptquartier’ and ‘representative / un esponente’ of neoconservatism (Jarreau et al., Le Monde, 18/09/03, Horizons; Vernet, Le Monde, 23/01/05; Rüb, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26/10/03, Politik: 8; Di Feo, Il Corriere della Sera, 03/10/02, Politica Estera: 10).

The newspapers accessed also illustrated other instruments as neoconservative. Most of them dealt with Fox News. For example, The Times noted: ‘Fox News, still the new kid on the block, pursues a ruthlessly neocon agenda’ (Appleyard, The Sunday Times, 02/01/05, Features, Culture: 14). Süddeutsche Zeitung and Il Corriere della Sera considered The Washington Times and The Washington Post as neoconservative. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16/02/03: 6; Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 31/01/04: 13). As for the latter this is an interesting point. Although it is known that intellectual Charles Krauthammer contributed to this newspaper with comments, this is not perceived as being consistently neoconservative in the literature of international relations. Other foundations which were illustrated as such by some of the print media include the Heritage foundation (de Barochez, Le Figaro, 19/04/04; Fontaine, Le Monde, 30/03/03, Analyse and Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera 14/10/03: 5) and the Hudson Institute (Krauze, Le Monde, 18/10/03).

**Attributes**

In their interest in neoconservatism after 9/11 all the selected newspapers focused extensively on various aspects of its world affairs approach. In most articles issues related to the political ideology overlapped. In spite of the risk of repetition in some

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59 For the neoconservative illustration of the PNAC, see also: Billen, The Times, Features, 13/07/04: 6; Meacher, The Guardian, Leader Pages, 06/09/03: 21; Reynie, Le Figaro, Débats et Opinions, 15/04/03, ‘Objectif Saddam’, Le Monde, Horizons, 11/04/03; Schwarz, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 01/03/03, Politik: 4; Flottau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Politisches Buch, 17/01/05: 15, Rampini, La Repubblica, Politica Estera, 07/04/03: 13.

60 For the media association of the neoconservatives with AEI, see also: Borger, The Guardian, Foreign Pages, 23/09/03: 12; Roy, Le Figaro, 03/01/04, Débats et Opinions; Steinberger, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Feuilleton, 13/09/04: 13; Zucconi, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 23/03/03: 1)

61 For similar examples in other newspapers see: The Guardian, Pappe, 28/11/05: 31; Jarreau, Le Monde, International, 03/10/02; Rampini, La Repubblica, Prima Pagina, 15/06/03: 1
cases an identification of themes could be made. The next section will explore the way the media constructed the foreign policy philosophy of the group on the basis of specific categories. A general consensus is observed as to the principles of the neoconservatives and the countries they mainly focused in their analysis of US foreign policy. It will be demonstrated that there is a common interpretation of the political ideology as well as a ‘European frame’ - among others - in the construction of the political ideology. Further to this, it will be shown that the newspapers did not endorse the ideas of the ‘movement’ and often commented ironically on it.

**Going Alone**

The chosen European print media agreed on the desire of the neoconservatives to follow the path of unilateralism in the international arena. The group was portrayed as ignoring multilateral institutions, as for instance the UN. It was also depicted as being hostile to the option of international negotiations. A plethora of articles were found which considered unilateralism as a fundamental parameter of the neoconservative philosophy. *The Guardian*, for instance, asserted: ‘Global cooperation [is] struggling under the tsunami of US neoconservatism’ (Toynbee, *The Guardian*, 31/12/04, Leader Pages: 20). Here the use of word ‘tsunami’ maybe connotes the severe consequences of the ‘movement’s policy for the application of international law. The French conservative newspaper *Le Figaro* also offers a characteristic example. Professor of Harvard University Stanley Hoffman argued:

"for the neoconservatives the US became so powerful that there would be no need to look at the limits imposed on them by the international law / Pour les néoconservateurs, l' Amérique serait devenue tellement puissante qu'elle n'aurait nul besoin d'observer les limites que lui impose le droit international"

(Messarovitch, *Le Figaro*, 05/11/04, Débats et Opinions : 13).

In this regard *Le Monde* explained in detail the position of the neoconservatives concerning multilateral institutions as the UN. Jan Krauze noted that for the group:

"The UN is not any longer in a position to treat the essential security questions and is less than ever the arbiter of international legality. As member of the political council of the Pentagon and famous hawk Richard Perle puts its, the UN is certainly always useful, very
useful but for health, culture and agriculture issues. For serious issues, for the great dangers to be confronted, the time from now on will be right for the coalitions of volunteers, formed around the US / L'ONU n'est pas plus en mesure de traiter les questions essentielles de sécurité, elle est moins que jamais l'arbitre de la légalité internationale. Certes, comme le dit Richard Perle, membre du Conseil politique du Pentagon et faucon illustre, les Nations Unies sont toujours utiles, très utiles même, pour la santé, la culture, l'agriculture. Pour les choses sérieuses, pour affronter les grands dangers, l'heure est désormais aux coalitions des volontaires regroupées autour des Etats-Unis’

(Krauze, Le Monde, 24/03/03).

Süddeutsche Zeitung also referred to the philosophy of the neoconservative politician Richard Perle and asserted: ‘If an alliance does not serve our interests any longer, then it is dead / Wenn eine Allianz nichts mehr nutzt, dann ist sie tot’ (Kornelious, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22/04/02, Die Seite Drei, p. 3). In parallel with that, the same German newspaper highlighted the antipathy of the group for the UN when it commented on a speech of Bush Junior in its General Assembly in September 2002: ‘Only the presence of the President at the UN committee should have been painful for the neoconservatives in Washington / Allein die Präsenz des Präsidenten im UN-Gremium muss die Neokonservativen in Washington geschmerzt haben’ (Kornelius, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14/09/02, Meinungseite: 4). A similar example as to the view of the neoconservatives for the UN was found in Il Corriere della Sera which maintained: ‘Iraq does not need a UN legitimation / L'Iraq non ha bisogno di legittimazione dall'Onu’ (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 17/04/03, Il Consigliere: 11).

For its part, La Repubblica concentrated on the necessity for an efficient functioning of the UN after the failure of its Security Council before the war on Iraq and asserted:

‘A reform is necessary and urgent at this particularly difficult moment for the now multiform international society especially after the foundations themselves of the multilateral system have so often been put in question by unilateralists and neocons who refuse to share global responsibilities and act in breach with all international organisations / una riforma è necessaria ed urgente soprattutto nel difficile trapasso che affronta la società internazionale diventata ormai multiforme, specie poi quando il fondamento stesso del sistema multilaterale è rimesso in causa ogni giorno da
Promoting Democracy by War

All the European newspapers accessed portrayed the neoconservatives as wanting to promote democracy in order to export the American values in the world. In so doing the neoconservatives were illustrated as being interested in the creation of a safe world environment for their country. Their perceived objective was to seek regime change. This could be achieved by military means as it happened in the case of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. The neoconservatives were mainly associated with the so-called doctrine of preemption in world affairs and the policy of nation-building.

The Times, for example, maintained that the project of the group envisaged the transformation of the Middle East and the creation of democratic regimes in the region. These would start to be established and expand like dominos having the case of Iraq as a beacon. (Maddox, The Times, 25/10/05, Overseas News: 36 and Billen, The Times, 19/10/04, Features: 4). Such a policy in their belief would guarantee peace in the world Le Figaro reported (Germon, Le Figaro, 18/10/04, Débats et Opinions: 14). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung focused on the desire of the neoconservatives for an interventionist, hard and military based US foreign policy and asserted:

‘Neoconservatism...propagated for a totally new foreign policy, sort of overlap of both models of idealism and realism, which...will spread democracy and peace by military means if necessary / Neokonservatismus...propagierte eine gänzlich neue Außenpolitik, eine Art Kreuzung der beiden Prototypen Idealismus und Realismus, die...Demokratie und Frieden notfalls mit militärischen Mitteln verbreiten will’

(Sattar, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27/10/04, Die Gegenwart: 5).
The selected print media perceived the neoconservative agenda as concentrating on specific countries. Iraq was considered as their first military target. The newspapers focused extensively on the support of the group for an invasion of this country. It has been already mentioned that neoconservative politicians such as Perle and Wolfowitz and think tanks line the PNAC had been deemed as advocating for this military operation. The fact that the neoconservative group had been in favour of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ often became a stereotype in the media. With respect to that The Observer can provide an example. This newspaper published an article dealing with former owner of The Daily Telegraph Lord Black, a business colleague of Richard Perle. Black’s admission to charges of fraud in a Chicago court and his cooperation with Perle were the pretext it remembered the neoconservatives and asserted: ‘The latest news from Chicago is a further reminder of the fact that criminality has never been a stranger to the neocons, and their agenda, which included the invasion of Iraq’ (The Observer, 02/10/05, News Pages: 28).

Beyond Iraq, Iran and Syria were examples the media concentrated on in order to explain the strategy of the group. Here it was also depicted as favouring the option of a US attack against both countries. For instance, The Times explored the specific plans of the neoconservatives concerning Tehran and suggested that according to their view ‘the West must surgically strike at Iran’s hidden nuclear facilities and robustly challenge Iranian state-sponsored terrorism’ (Toolis, The Times, 19/11/05, Features: 27). As for Syria Le Monde presented the position of the group by quoting from Charles Krauthammer. The French newspaper asserted:

‘It is necessary to change Damascus in order to change [the Middle East] region. These are our principles, which brought us to this moment, after Afghanistan and Iraq. They should now guide us towards Damascus, passing by Beirut / il faut changer Damas pour changer la région. Ce sont nos principes qui nous ont amenés à ce moment-là, après l’Afghanistan et l’Irak. Ils doivent nous guider maintenant à Damas, en passant par Beyrouth’

(Lesnes, Le Monde, 09/03/05, International).

Nye, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20/12/2005, Themen des Tages: 2; Miel, Il Corriere della Sera, 17/07/03, 39; Schlesinger Arthur Jr, Il Corriere della Sera, 18/10/03, Politica Estera: 35; Bonanni, La Repubblica, 09/06/04, Politica Estera: 16.

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For its part *La Repubblica* was also explicit: as to the neoconservative policy towards both Iran and Syria. 64 Federico Rampini noted:

'On 21 March of this year [2003], three days after the beginning of the war on Iraq, [the neoconservatives] preannounced the next stops: regime change in Iran and Syria / Il 21 marzo di quest'anno, tre giorni dopo l'inizio della guerra in Iraq...[I neoconservatori] hanno preannunciato le prossime tappe: cambio di regime in Iran e Siria'

(Rampini, *La Repubblica*, Politica Estera, 07/04/03: 13).

Although the media focused on the neoconservative position on three Middle East countries, they ignored another one although it had been placed in the 'axis of evil' by President Bush in January 2002: North Korea. No articles were found discussing the view of the group concerning Pyongyang.

The afore-mentioned examples indicate that the selected newspapers constructed as belligerent the philosophy of the group. They perceived as expansionist the foreign policy the neoconservatives advocated for and often regarded them as radical ideologues, who sought to use force for moral reasons and not only because of US security concerns. In many cases the political ideology was also linked to imperialism. *The Times*, for instance, illustrated the neoconservatives as ‘Bolsheviks’ and ‘jihadists’ discussing the arguments of the camp of John Kerry before the US presidential elections of 2004 (Jenkins, 30/10/04, *The Times*, Features: 28). 65 The same newspaper spoke about a ‘neocon mafia’. In this case Simon Jenkins commented on the memoir of Britain’s ambassador to Washington Sir Christopher Meyer but used his own words and not those of the author (Jenkins, *The Times*, 20/11/05, Features, Culture: 41).

The neoconservatives were also portrayed as: ‘warriors in the White House’, ‘war hungry’, ‘muscular Wilsonians / harte Wilsonianer’ and ‘war-based civilians / kriegerisches Ziviliste’ (Macintyre, *The Times*, 02/10/04, Features: 28; Read, *The

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64 For similar examples as concerns the neoconservative position for Iran and Syria see: Matthew Paris, *The Times*, 22/11/05, Features: 27; *The Guardian*, 08/11/05 Leader pages: 34; Girard, *Le Figaro*, International, 05/05/04: 3; Lambroschini, *Le Figaro*, 14/01/04, International; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19/01/05, Politik: 5; Kornelius, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 08/09/04: 2; Romano, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 20/06/03

65 The term Bolsheviks refers to those who led the communist revolution of 1917 in Russia while that of jihadists is related - according to the rhetoric of the West - to the group of Muslim terrorists who intend to destroy America and its allies.
Observer, 19/06/05: 18; Klingenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Geistenwissenschaften, 19/03/03: N3; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 09/09/02, Feuilleton: 11). They were also seen as 'moral crusaders' and 'imperial strategists' (Billen, The Times, 19/10/04, Features: 4; Drayton, The Guardian, 28/12/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 26). In parallel with these words which accompanied the term neoconservatism or its equivalents Le Monde quoted from Paul Wolfowitz who had said about his country: 'As a Moral nation, we exercise our power without conquest desire, we sacrifice ourselves for the liberty of others / Comme une Nation morale, nous exerçons notre puissance sans volonté de conquête, nous nous sacrifions pour la liberté des autres' (Frachon, Le Monde, 11/02/03).

Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that the neoconservatives compared the American Empire with that of ancient Rome. (Flottau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14/11/03, Meinungseite: 4). Il Corriere della Sera reported that the neoconservatives had spoken about a benevolent American empire by considering their country as a unique superpower (Caretto, 22/09/02, Favorevole: 10). It also published an article of historian Arthur Schlesinger Junior who asserted: 'The neoconservatives are visionists who want to remake the world in America’s image / I neoconservatori sono dei visionary che vogliono rifare in mondo secondo l’immagine americana' (Schlesinger Arthur Jr, Il Corriere della Sera, 17/10/03, Politica Estera: 35). Likewise La Repubblica included a comment of another scholar, Joseph Nye who noted that neoconservative writes such as Max Boot had expressed their support for a US administration over foreign countries following the model of Great Britain in the 19th century.  

Supporting Israel

In their interest in the view of the neoconservatives for the Middle East the selected newspapers concentrated on the relationship between the group and Israel. Neoconservative scholars, as chapter 2 suggested, do not contest their support for this country. The chosen print media agreed with this approach, saw Israel as an ally of the group and framed the group as defending the interests of this country. The Times,

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66 For the media association of neoconservatism with war, morality and imperialism see for example: West, The Times, 28/06/05, Features: 19; Colley, The Guardian, 17/12/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 32; Frachon and Vernet, Le Monde, 19/09/02; Vernet, 30/11/05, International Chronique; Frankenberger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Ansichten, 20/02/05: 13; Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 22/09/02: 10.
for example, spoke about a neoconservative ‘love for Israel’ (Kaletsky, *The Times*, 13/05/04, Features: 24). It pointed out, however, in another case that this country had not been their only interest: ‘the neocons are by no means exclusively preoccupied with the Middle East and the defense of Israel’ (Simms, 27/10/04, *The Times*, Features: 20). For its part *The Observer*, observed: ‘The [neoconservative] articles of faith include the notion that the interests of Israel and America are indivisible’ (*The Observer*, 01/09/02, News Pages: 16).

*Le Monde* noted that some of the neoconservatives had been close to the Israeli right. Yet it did not use a sweeping language and underlined that not all of them had been close to it (Frachon and Vernet, *Le Monde*, 02/02/04, Horizons Analyses). *Süddeutsche Zeitung* referred to neoconservatives ‘who mixed up the strategic facilities for Israel with the national Interest of the USA / die die strategischen Bedingungen Israels mit dem nationalen Interesse der USA verwechselten (Tim B. Müller, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25/01/05, Feuilleton: 13). *La Repubblica* was explicit and asserted that a fundamental feature of the foreign policy philosophy of the group was their ‘support / appoggio’ for this country (Rampini, *La Repubblica*, Prima Pagina, 15/06/03: 1).

The selected newspapers linked the interest of the neoconservatives in defending Israel to their desire to export democracy in the Middle East. They illustrated the group as wanting to protect this country by hoping to create - as we saw - free regimes in the region and not by seeking to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The following examples will indicate the fundamental parameters of the neoconservative approach as represented by the media. These include a policy of isolation for the Palestinians, a freeze of negotiations for the creation of their own state until they renounced terrorism, and a justification of the hard-line policy of Israel.

*The Guardian* published an article of politics fellow at St. Edmund Hall in Oxford and former PLO representative Karma Nabulsi. Nabulsi argued that the ‘myth’ of Yassir Arafat as an obstacle to the Middle East peace process ‘gave the neoconservative hawks in the US administration the opportunity to redesign the Middle East in harmony with the views of their ally Israel’ (Nabulsi, *The Guardian*, 15/11/2005, Comment and Debate Pages: 32). In this case it is connoted that the neoconservatives sought to isolate Arafat because of his supposed support for terrorism and terrorist organisations such as Hamas.
Further to this Le Figaro conducted an interview with Professor of political science Gilles Kepel who argued that the neoconservatives wanted to redesign the Middle East 'in order to mainly assure the security of Israel / afin d'assurer une fois pour toutes la sécurité d'Israël' and did not pay attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Girard, Le Figaro, 02/09/04, Débats et Opinions: 12; Girard, Le Figaro, 07/04/04: 10). Likewise Le Monde noted that the neoconservatives: 'construct their policy in the region on the basis of the continued existence of Israel / construisent leur politique dans la région en fonction de la pérennité d'Israel' (Le Bars, Le Monde, 29/10/04, International). The same newspaper also asserted that their logic was: 'to remove hostile regimes to Israel from the region / débarasser la région de regimes hostiles aux Etats-Unis et à Israel (Addi and Gèze, Le Monde, 03/08/04).67

For its part Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung concentrated on the ambition of the neoconservatives for positive repercussions of the war on Iraq and maintained:

'After a regime change in Baghdad Iraq will become a model for Near and Middle East, kind of a Mesopotamian city upon a hill the shine of which will probably unfreeze the (frozen) Arab-Israeli conflict / Nach einem Wechsel des Bagdader Regimes werde der Irak zum Modell für den Nahen und Mittleren Osten werden, zu einer Art mesopotamischer Stadt auf dem Hügel, deren Schein wohl auch den vereisten israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt auftauen'

(Frankenberger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20/02/05, Politik: 13).

Finally, Il Corriere della Sera offers an example of the way the neoconservatives assessed the foreign policy of Israel. It presented Richard Perle as considering 'more than legitimised / piu che legittima' the fact that former Primer Minister of the country Ariel Sharon had retaliated against the Palestinians (Caretto, Il Corriere della Sera, 22/08/03, Politica Estera: 6).

In this context another point to be explored is if the media referred to the group in relation to the Jewish ethnicity of some of its members. Neoconservative intellectuals such as Max Boot criticise European news outlets like the BBC and Le Monde for using the term as a synonym for a Jew (Boot, Foreign Policy, January/February 2004).

67 In this regard Il Corriere della Sera published an article of Arthur Sclesinger Jr. He also noted that according to Paul Wolfowitz a democratised Middle East might become less hostile to Israel (Schlesinger, Il Corriere della Sera, 18/10/03, Politica Estera: 35).
For its part *Le Monde* offers a response to Boot. Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet argue: ‘*Le Monde* never wrote or implied something like that / *Le Monde* n’ a jamais écrit ni insinué rien de tel’ (Frachon and Vemet, *Le Monde*, 02/02/04, Horizons Analyses).

The analysis of the coverage shows that some of the newspapers rarely dealt with the ethnicity of the neoconservatives. Sarah Baxter, for instance, noted that ‘neoconservative’ former adviser to President Reagan Michael Horowitz is a Jew (Baxter, *The Sunday Times*, 27/02/05, Overseas News: 26). Alain Frachon and Alain Vemet maintained the same for Richard Pipes, father of Daniel (Frachon et Vemet, *Le Monde*, 16104/03, Horizons). Likewise Robert Solé noted that Paul Wofowitz is a Jew (Solé, *Le Monde*, 05/05/03, L’Ombre des Mots). Furthermore, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* started a paragraph as follows: ‘The neoconservatives many of whom were Jews... / Die Neokonservativen, von denen viele Juden waren...’ (Kimmage, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Politik, 22/10/04: 44). In this case the newspaper did not assert that all members of the group are Jews. Using the word ‘many’ it avoids a possible generalisation.

As a conclusion what can be argued is that although a few references to the ethnicity of the neoconservatives could be found in the selected newspapers these cannot justify the point made Max Boot. A potential reader of the selected newspaper might in some cases be informed about the Jewish ethnicity of members of the group. Nonetheless this does not entail that the neoconservatives were represented as a synonym for a Jew. The connection between members of the group and their ethnicity was made so arbitrarily in the media discourse that this point would not have been examined in the thesis if Max Boot had not commented on it.

**Antipathy for Europe**

Another aspect of the neoconservative world affairs philosophy the media covered refers to the view of the group for the EU. This ‘EU frame’ goes partly beyond the content of the literature on neoconservatism as this does not largely focus on the position of members of the group towards Europe and regarding transatlantic relations. In this case a European sensitivity of the accessed print sources can be perhaps

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acknowledged. Although the context of their news and editorial accounts might not be the same - as the case with *Le Figaro* and Turkey's EU membership will highlight -, they agreed as to the philosophy of the neoconservatives. That is because the chosen newspapers portrayed the neoconservatives as dismissing the idea of a strong European Union. Their perceived antipathy for Europe was mainly concerned with France as the following examples will highlight. The group was also illustrated as being in favour of an EU split especially over foreign policy issues in order to prevent its emergence as a global political actor in the international arena with a potential to compete with the US. The main interest of the 'movement' was considered to be the remaining of America as the sole superpower in world politics without needing to compete with international bodies such as the EU.

*The Times*, for instance, elaborated on the different approach between American neoconservatives and European politicians. The newspaper noted that when French President Jacques Chirac spoke for the need of Europe to be: 'an equal partner with the United States on the world stage [he contradicted] the neoconservative view of America as the only superpower imposing its values on the rest of the world' (Webster, *The Times*, 19/11/04, Home News: 22). Further to this, it asserted: 'For American neoconservatives such as Richard Perle, Europe has lost its moral compass and France its moral fibre' (Mount, *The Sunday Times*, 04/07/04, Features, Culture: 52). It is noteworthy that the antipathy of the group for France was in another case taken for granted. This happened in an article Rod Liddle wrote discussing the life of people in Corsica. In this case the journalist remembered suddenly the neoconservatives by pointing out: 'They hate the French here [in Corsica] more than does a neocon Republican senator' (Liddle, *The Sunday Times*, 30/05/04, Features, Homes: 19).

*The Observer* was explicit commenting on the book *DC Confidential* of former British ambassador to Washington Sir Christopher Meyer. It asserted that the neoconservatives: 'see a strong Europe as a threat to American hegemony' (Stephen, *The Observer*, 13/11/05, Review Pages: 15). In parallel with that, in a comment former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine wrote for *Le Figaro* he noted that the neoconservatives were blaming the Europeans for providing no response to the problems of the world (Vedrine, *Le Figaro*, Débats et Opinions, 16/10/04: 13). The same newspaper concentrated in March 2004 on a potential improvement of
transatlantic relations should John Kerry won the US presidential elections a few
months later. Scholar Bruno Tertrais wrote:

‘Europe had a dream. John Kerry is elected president of the US and, as if by magic, it
finds again the US it loves. Goodbye neoconservatives and fundamentalists, war-based
hyperpower and enterprise of reshaping the world. We welcome a new supposedly pro-
French president - having passed part of his infancy in Bretagne, we close the Bush
parenthesis and we will be getting back to normal transatlantic relations / L'Europe a fait un
rêve. John F. Kerry est élu président des États-Unis et, comme par enchantement, elle
retrouve l’Amérique qu'elle aime. Adieu, néoconservateurs et fondamentalistes,
hyperpuissance guerrière et entreprise de remodelage du monde. Bienvenue à un
président supposé pro-français, ayant passé une partie de son enfance en Bretagne,
fermons la parenthèse Bush et retrouvons le cours normal des relations transatlantiques’

(Tertrais, Le Figaro, 11/03/04, Débats et Opinions: 13).

Tertrais noted in his article that a possible election of Kerry might not necessarily
ensure a better future for transatlantic relations. However with the afore-presented
excerpt he outlined the illusion of Europe as he explained. The use of the term
‘goodbye’ is emotional and implies an imaginary European relief for the potential
departure of the neoconservatives from the US administration.

Le Figaro also dealt with the view of the neoconservatives on a future adhesion of
Turkey in the Union. It interviewed senior research fellow at CERI Jacques Rupnik
who portrayed them as ‘the most fervent partisans of Turkey’s accession in the EU /
les plus fervents partisans de l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’ UE’ (Bollaert et al,
10/05/04, Le Figaro, Débats et Opinions: 12, 13). In this article it is maybe
connoted that the neoconservatives wanted to push hard for the enlargement of the EU.
The possible reason is that a Turkish membership might undermine the effort of the
Europeans to promote a strong political union. Here we can perhaps acknowledge a
national prejudice of Le Figaro in its coverage of neoconservatism. That is because it
is a significantly debatable issue in France if a Muslim country such a Turkey can

69 CERI (centre d'études et de recherches internationales) is a French centre for research on the
international political system founded in 1952 (CERI website).
become a full member of the EU and if the boundaries of the Union should enlarge further (Royal, 2007: 309, 310). 70

It should be mentioned that the support of the neoconservatives for a full membership of Turkey in the EU as Le Figaro connoted should not be taken for granted. It contradicts the view of former ambassador of the US in Turkey Mark Parris. Ambassador Parris writes that the neoconservatives were not in favour of Turkey’s accession in the Union in order to block the European orientation of this country and promote its American one. In particular he argues: ‘One occasionally hears the arguments, generally in American neoconservative circles that closer Turkish-European relations will be inevitably at American expense […] and that Turkey would be best advised to abandon its European vocation altogether’ (Parris, 2005, 149). The attention paid by Le Figaro to the contradictory position from that of Ambassador Parris maybe constitutes additional evidence for the concern of the newspaper regarding the stability of the EU.

Furthermore, Le Monde focused on another aspect of the attitude of the neoconservatives in its interest in transatlantic relations. This was the lack of cooperation between them and many European diplomats. The French liberal newspaper quoted from an unnamed diplomat who said: ‘With the neoconservatives it is almost impossible [to work with]. They are ideologues and we have no ideology / Avec les néoconservateurs, c’est quasi impossible [de travailler]. Ce sont des ideologues; et nous n’avons pas d’ideologie’ (Vernet, Le Monde, 16/02/05, Horizons Analyses, International). Le Monde also dealt with the negative view of the neoconservatives for France. Patrick Jarreau elaborated on potential explanations from the perspective of the group as to the real motives of the opposition of the French government to the war on Iraq in 2003 and noted:

‘The Weekly Standard, neoconservative weekly [magazine], published many articles and editorials presenting Jacques Chirac and his government as allies of Saddam Hussein for economic reasons – the oil – and the French like anti-Semites / Le Weekly Standard, hebdomadaire néoconservateur, a publié plusieurs articles et editoriaux présentant

70 Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also discussed about the support of the neoconservatives for Turkey but not in an EU context. The French newspaper considered this country as ‘favourite ally / allieé favourite’ of the neoconservatives (Hassner, Le Monde, 26/04/03, Page Une). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted that they ‘advocated for a quasi natural US partnership with moderate Muslim Turkey / von der gleichsam natürlichen Partnerschaft Amerikas mit der gemäßigt muslimischen Türkei verfochten [haben] (Rüh, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Politik, 31/01/03 : 4).

In a similar case Jan Krauze published an article which was entitled: ‘The American neoconservatives take it out on Paris / Les néoconservateurs Américains Se Déchaînent Contre Paris’ (Krauze, Le Monde, 27/03/03, International).

Süddeutsche Zeitung represented the neoconservatives as being against the project of further European integration when it interviewed Joschka Fisher. Former German Foreign Minister commented on the EU constitution and the French referendum in 2005 by asking a rhetorical question:

‘Why Will Eurosceptics and neoconservatives be so happy if the Constitution fails? Principally when it fails in France? The pleasure will be double and triple / Warum werden sich die Euroskeptiker und die Neokonservativen so freuen, wenn die Verfassung scheitert? Vor allem, wenn sie in Frankreich scheitert? Die Freude wird doppelt und dreifach sein’

(Jarreau et al, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06/05/05, Politik: 10).

Fischer implies that opponents of European integration might wish a failure of the Union’s Constitution. In this regard he places Eurosceptics and neoconservatives in the same category.

Il Corriere della Sera illustrated the neoconservatives as considering ‘opportunism / opportunismo’ a significant feature of the EU (Riotta, Il Corriere della Sera, 23/09/03, Guerra Dopoguerra). The newspaper also concentrated on the relationship between the group and France and pointed out: ‘the White House and the neoconservatives do not forgive France / La Casa Bianca e i neoconservatori non perdonano la Francia’ (Danilo, Il Corriere della Sera, 02/06/03, Economia: 3). It also reported that William Kristol had said in the US Senate on 8 April 2003:

‘In the best case the French government is not interested in the transatlantic alliance. In the worst one it wants to weaken it. The French priorities are the European Union (as counterweight to the US power) and/or the UN / Nella migliore delle ipotesi il governo
francese non è interessato all' alleanza transatlantica. Nella peggiore, la vuole indebolire. Le priorità francesi sono l'Unione Europea (come contrapasso al potere degli USA) e/o l'Onu'

(Ostellino, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 04/07/03, Politica Estera: 1).

In this case it is maybe connoted that for the neoconservatives the French support for the EU project was censurable. In the view of the group - as represented in *Il Corriere della Sera* - France arguably followed a foreign policy without attributing particular importance to the transatlantic partnership.

For its part *La Repubblica* associated the neoconservatives with the decision of several European countries to express their solidarity to the US before the war on Iraq. It maintained specifically that the Vilnius letter of ten former communist states in support of the military operation was 'inspired by the lobby of the American neoconservatives / ispirata dalla lobby dei neoconservatori americani' (Bonnani, *La Repubblica*, Prima Pagina, 14/06/04: 1). In this article it is possibly connoted that the group could be considered as a driving force behind the foreign policy divide of Europe by supporting future EU member states to alight with the US position.

**Miscellaneous**

The main discussion theme in the media coverage of neoconservatism after 11 September was American foreign policy. Articles which did not link the political ideology to Washington's reaction to the terrorist attacks were also of course found. Their content was not different from that of the period before 9/11. In a few cases the term was used in domestic context. The interpretation was similar to that analysed in Chapter 6. *Il Corriere della Sera*, for instance, linked again neoconservatism to a policy model of less taxes and a reduced state role (Gorodisky, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 05/04/04, Tasse: 9).

Further to this, the newspapers often referred arbitrarily to the political ideology outside the context of US foreign policy. An article published by *The Sunday Times*, for example, mentioned that in the view of Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel was a

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71 The Vilnius letter was signed on 5 February 2003. The European countries, which openly supported the US to launch a war against Iraq in 2003, were: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Albania

72 For a similar example in *Le Figaro* see: Duplouich, *Le Figaro*, 20/02/03, International

**Neoconservative Tories?**

It is noteworthy that *The Guardian* linked neoconservatism to the political developments in Britain towards the end of 2005. The main issue of interest was if the Conservative Party and its new leader David Cameron could be associated with it. 73 We know that neoconservative scholar Douglas Murray wants the Tories to follow the way of this political ideology. 74 In this regard, Labour MP Denis MacShane notes that British conservatives sought inspiration from the US and that the real example Cameron wanted to follow was that of George W. Bush who invented ‘compassionate conservatism’ (MacShane, *Tribune*, 14/04/06: 11). He also sees an effort from their part ‘to cast former US Senator Henry Jackson as a kind of closet Cameronite’ (Ibid: 11). 76 Nonetheless, the new Tory leader presented his own point of view on the issue in September 2006 by claiming: ‘I am a liberal conservative rather than a neoconservative’ (Murray, 12/09/06).

For its part *The Guardian* saw to some extent a neoconservative tendency in the Conservative Party after Cameron was elected its new leader. Although no safe conclusions can be reached because the political ideology was linked to this party in only four articles in the period covered, the newspaper seemed to reflect the view of Denis MacShane. A possible explanation can be that it showed ideological bias against the Conservative Party. It maybe sought to stigmatise the party by connecting

73 David Cameron became the leader of the conservatives in December 2005, a few months after the General Election of 5 May 2005 seeing a third consecutive win for the Labour Party. The leadership was mainly contested by this politician and David Davis.

74 Douglas Murray is author of the book *Neoconservatism: Why We Need it*

75 With respect to ‘compassionate conservatism’ Labour MP Dennis MacShane notes: ‘Bush was touring America talking the language of blacks, women, the poor, Hispanics and making sure on every platform he was flanked by new Americans […] Even in office Bush has been more Keynesian than a true follower of Milton Friedman. The massive expansion in public spending and hiring of government employees under Bush is without precedent in American history’ (MacShane, *Tribune*, 14/04/06: 11)

76 As it was shown in chapter 2 Henry Jackson had been a hero for the neoconservatives in the late 1960s and 1970s. This was mainly due to his support for a muscular US confrontation with the Soviet Union.
it with a term - neoconservatism - the meaning of which had been negative after 9/11 because of its perceived linkage to the Iraq war. Jonathan Freedland, for example, commented on the similarity of the policy advocated by Cameron and that followed by Bush:

‘Cameron is no chum of Bush - and the president is unlikely to alienate Blair by getting too cosy with him now - but the parallel is not entirely bogus. For one thing, Cameron too is surrounded by ideological neoconservatives, his campaign manager and shadow chancellor George Osborne chief among them’

(Freedland, *The Guardian*, 07/12/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 31).77

Freedland noted that Cameron ‘is a man of the right’ although ‘he may talk left’ and also added that the latter had shown its support for the US by backing the Iraq war (Ibid: 31). In parallel with Freedland, scholar Timothy Garton Ash maintained that Cameron admired neoconservative America. (Ash, *The Guardian*, 15/12/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 29).

Further to this *The Guardian* considered the creation of the Henry Jackson Society in Britain as an indication that various Tories wanted to apply the principles of neoconservatism in the country.78 Given this organisation was named after a hero for the neoconservatives the newspaper acknowledged that the political ideology had also adherents in Britain. In this regard Neil Clarke noted that conservative politicians Michael Gove and Ed Vaizey had been signatories to the statement of principles of the Henry Jackson Society (Clark, *The Guardian*, 24/10/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 29). For his part former Labour government adviser David Clark illustrated the society as a neoconservative one (Clark, 21/11/05, *The Guardian*, Comment and Debate Pages: 28).79

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77 Neil Clark also asserted that Cameron’s campaign was ‘masterminded by the neoconservative trio of Tory MPs George Osborne, Michael Gove and Ed Vaizey’ (Clark, *The Guardian*, 24/10/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 29).

78 The Henry Jackson Society named after US Senator for Washington State from 1953 until 1983 was founded in November 2005. The supporters of the society are ‘united by a common interest in fostering a strong British and European commitment towards freedom, liberty, constitutional democracy, human rights, governmental and institutional reform and a robust foreign, security and defense policy and transatlantic alliance’ (Henry Jackson society website, 2008).

79 It should be mentioned that *The Guardian* published a letter from members of the Henry Jackson Society who disagreed with Davis Clark’s articles and argued that their organisation was non-partisan across the board (Mendoza et al, *The Guardian*, 23/11/05, Leader Pages: 31)
As opposed to The Guardian it is interesting that The Times was hesitant in using the term in relation to David Cameron, his Conservative Party and the Henry Jackson Society. The Sunday Times, for instance, only did so once referring to the view of members of the Labour Party. In particular, the newspaper noted that the aim of the ‘Brownites was to stop Cameron occupying the political middle ground’ and that they ‘began briefing that he was not so much a new Tory as a neoconservative’ (Cracknell and Porter, The Sunday Times, 11/12/05, Features, News: 12). As for the Henry Jackson Society it did not see it as a purely neoconservative think tank by asserting that its members were also social democrats and traditional conservatives (Pollard, The Sunday Times, 27/11/2005, Feature, News Review: 4).

The stance of The Times to avoid linking David Cameron and his Conservative Party to neoconservatism can be perhaps explained if the special relationship of some of its editors with the Henry Jackson Society is taken into account. Gerard Baker and Stephan Pollard, for instance, had signed its statements of principles of this organisation which claims to be a ‘cross-partisan’ one (Henry Jackson society website, 2008). It could be therefore expected that these editors would not consider it as a purely neoconservative think tank in their writings. This argument can be strengthened by another factor. This is the negative meaning of the term neoconservatism in aftermath of the 11 September attacks of 2001. The association of the Henry Jackson Society with this political ideology might also ‘stigmatise’ this organisation.

**Conclusion**

There is no continuity in the coverage of neoconservatism by the selected newspapers in the period before and that after 11 September. Differential interpretations of the term prior to 9/11 were replaced by a common media approach in its aftermath which saw the political ideology and US foreign policy as almost interdependent issues. The selected newspapers largely dealt with neoconservatism and constructed the political ideology in a similar and accurate way. The adjectival complement ‘neoconservative’ accompanied members of the first and especially the second generation of the ‘movement’. Further to this, the foreign policy philosophy of the group was synthesised around the same frames: first, its ignorance for multilateral institutions
and international law, second, its willingness to promote democracy by war, third, its support for Israel and fourth, its antipathy for Europe.

The analysis also revealed differences in the coverage of neoconservatism by the newspapers. On that basis and in spite of its remarkable similarity it cannot be argued that the content of the accessed media was completely homogenised. It was shown that although the media mostly agreed as to whom and what they portrayed as neoconservative, in a few cases they also depicted different figures and instruments as such. *Il Corriere della Sera*, for instance attributed the label to Bush’s counsel Ed Gillespie while most of the other newspapers did not. It was also demonstrated that *Le Figaro* placed the antipathy of the neoconservatives for Europe within the context of their support for a full membership of Turkey in the EU while the other newspapers ignored this issue. Moreover, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Il Corriere della Sera* did not extensively deal with the roots of the political ideology while all the other print sources did so.

The differences, which are acknowledged, however, can be hardly considered as marked ones. They cannot distort the general conclusion that all the newspapers discussed neoconservatism within a US foreign policy framework as opposed to their stance before 11 September. They cannot put into question the fact that all the newspapers largely agreed as to the core philosophy and structure of the neoconservative group. Furthermore, the observed differences did not mirror national or ideological prejudices. The only exception is related to the depiction of David Cameron, the Tories and the Henry Jackson Society by the British elite press.

The findings of this chapter showed as a whole that the accessed newspapers expressed a great interest in dealing with the foreign policy principles of neoconservatism in the aftermath of 11 September. This interest of the media maybe forejudges that they also considered the role of the political ideology as significant in shaping Washington’s world affairs approach. The following chapter will attempt to put light to this question. It will explore the way the selected European newspapers covered the issue of the supposed influence of the neoconservatives on the administration of George W. Bush.
Chapter 8: The War of the 'Neocons'

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 constituted a turning point for US foreign policy. Washington’s reaction to the onslaufs, which culminated with the war on Iraq, inspired different explanations for its international affairs conduct. Neoconservatism became almost immediately a cause célèbre. There are scholars such as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke who emphasise on its significant impact on the Bush administration, and other academics such as George Lieber who disagree with this approach. Chapter 7 demonstrated that the accessed newspapers expressed an interest in decoding the foreign policy philosophy of the neoconservatives after 9/11. The following analysis will attempt to deal with the way these newspapers mediated the supposed impact of the group and its plan to promote democracy in the Middle East region.

It will be shown that with the exception of The Times, which followed a comparatively balanced approach, the selected media mainly considered as significant the influence of the group not only on Washington’s decision to invade Iraq but also on the whole establishment of US foreign policy. In parallel with this, it will be outlined - again with the exception of The Times - that they were pessimistic concerning the potential democratisation of the Middle East on the basis of the neoconservative plan. After presenting these findings the chapter will endeavour to go further. It will comment on the general coverage of the political ideology by the media and will explore what this coverage can reveal for their understanding of US foreign policy after 9/11. In this part it will be also examined if competing theories of neoconservatism - namely nationalism and realism - were discussed in the European elite press.

Influencing the Administration

Several articles were found in both news and comment sections of the accessed newspapers focusing on the supposed significant impact of the political ideology. In these articles the media considered the neoconservatives as a powerful elite group the role of which was catalytic in the Bush administration. It can be argued as a whole that they endorsed the position of scholars such as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke. The newspapers dealt with the supposed impact of the group referring either generally to the US administration or specifically to President Bush. This influence was in
many cases covered as an ‘action type’ in which the neoconservatives were involved as ‘inherent participants’ (Kress, 1976: 161). They often were the subject in active sentences or the agent in passive syntax. This happened not only in British articles but also in the original version of the French, German and Italian ones before their translation. The following analysis will attempt to outline the media debate on the neoconservative influence by giving various examples.

Starting with *The Times*, for instance, Dean Godson analysed in a comment he wrote the objectives of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. In so doing, research director of Policy Exchange referred to the group and asserted: ‘President Bush broadly accepted the neocons’ analysis and duly invaded Iraq’ (Godson, *The Times*, 30/12/05, Features: 18). What is maybe connoted in this case is that the neoconservatives persuaded Bush to endorse their plan and target Baghdad. In this regard Ann Mary Sieghart was explicit and noted that George W. Bush has ‘neocon beliefs’ (Sieghart, *The Times*, 10/12/04, Features: 20).

Furthermore Roland Watson wrote a news piece concerning Robert Zoellick’s confirmation as deputy of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice after the presidential elections of 2004. He argued that the neoconservatives might be disappointed with this development because Zoellick’s realist ideology could perhaps marginalise their influence in the second term of the Bush administration. According to the journalist this would come to contradiction with the previous four years as the group ‘dominated Mr Bush’s first term’ (Watson, *The Times*, 07/01/05, Overseas News: 44). In another case Elena Lappin commented on an interview Paul Wolfowitz gave to the *Vanity Fair* magazine in 2003 and considered him along with Richard Perle and William Kristol, ‘intellectual triumvirate shaping US foreign policy’ (Lappin, *The Times*, 20/06/03, Features: 21).

As for *The Guardian* senior adviser to President Bill Clinton Sidney Blumenthal wrote a comment in which he used Bob Woodward’s book *Plan of Attack* as a source of information. Blumenthal focused on the view of former US Secretary of State

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Colin Powell and asserted: ‘Powell believed the government had been seized by a Gestapo office of neoconservatives directed by Cheney. It was a separate little government that was out there’ (Blumenthal, The Guardian, 22/04/04, Leader Pages: 24). The use of the verb ‘seize’ certainly maximises the effect of the power of the neoconservatives. Likewise Will Hutton noted: ‘The radical neoconservatives who animated the first term have led the President and the country into a foreign policy mess’ (Hutton, 1 The Observer, 16/01/05, News Pages: 30). Stephanie Billen followed a similar approach and maintained: ‘the neoconservative movement now prevails in Washington as the President fights his War on Terror’ (Billen, The Observer, 17/10/2004, Magazine Pages: 81). The Guardian also reported that the Donald Rumsfeld’s strategy in the Iraq war ‘draws on the neoconservative idea of a revolution in military affairs’ (Burkeman and Watt, The Guardian, 28/03/03, Home Pages: 5).

For its part Le Figaro was explicit when it dealt with the supposed influence of the neoconservative group on the US administration. It discussed former Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s opposition to the war and included the following sub-clause in a sentence: ‘The neoconservatives who inspired George W. Bush’s crusade in order to redesign the map of the Middle East / les néoconservateurs qui inspirèrent à George W. Bush sa croisade pour redessiner la carte du Proche Orient...’ (Lambroschini, Le Figaro, 02/04/04, International: 2). In this way Charles Labroschini can maybe remind his readers the significant role - as he perceived it - the group played in the Washington.

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81 An almost similar phrase was used by Il Corriere della Sera which noted that the neoconservatives ‘animate the political laboratory of George Bush / animano il laboratorio politico di George W. Bush’ (Mieli, Il Corriere della Sera, 08/04/04, Religione Musulmana: 43)
82 Süddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubblica also used the word revolution in their coverage of neoconservatism. For instance, Andrian Kreye wrote a comment in the literature section of the German liberal newspaper about the historian Gertrude Himmelfarb. Given that she is the wife of Irving Kristol and the mother of William, founder of The Weekly Standard, Kreye linked this journal to the neoconservative revolution (Kreye, 16/09/04, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Literatur: 16). For its part La Repubblica attempted to comment on George W. Bush’s presidency and especially its foreign policy. In this way it started its analysis posing the following question: ‘What can be said about America today, which is in the hands of intellectuals and politicians of the neoconservative revolution? / Che cos’ è l’America di oggi in mano ai teorici a ai politici della rivoluzione neoconservatrice? (Salvadori, La Repubblica, 18/11/04, Commenti: 17).
83 A similar phrase was used by Il Corriere della Sera which asserted: ‘[The] neoconservatives... inspired the war against Iraq / [I] neoconservatori...hanno ispirato la guerra contro l’Iraq’ (Danilo, Il Corriere della Sera, 10/07/03: 14). This newspaper also maintained: ‘[the] neoconservative movement...inspires many choices of Bush’s foreign policy / [II] movimento neoconservatore...ispira molte scelte di politica estera dell’amministrazione Bush’ (Di Feo, Il Corriere della Sera, 18/04/03:10).
The French conservative newspaper also conducted an interview with John Le Carré. The British novelist is - inter alia - famous for blaming the neoconservatives for the conduct of US foreign policy after 9/11. The newspaper prefaced the interview by giving his following comment: 'the junta of the neoconservative which controls the United States / la junte néoconservatrice qui contrôle les Etats-Unis' (Corty, *Le Figaro*, 30/03/04, Culture: 27). The lexical item ‘junta’ connotes that the attitude of the group in Washington was not only crucial but also illegal. Dictatorial regimes do not survive on the basis of free elections but military means. The portrayal of the neoconservatives as a junta by John Le Carré and the reproduction of this comment by *Le Figaro* can give the impression that their influence on the US administration might be as harmful as it is the remaining of dictators in power. In parallel with that Renaud Girard argued in an editorial of the newspaper:

‘President Bush made his decision to invade Iraq under the influence of a powerful lobby of ideologues called as the neoconservatives / Le président Bush a pris la décision d'envahir l'Iрак sous l'influence d'un puissant lobby d'idéologues, appelés néoconservateurs’

(Girard, *Le Figaro*, 20/08/03, Débats et Opinions, Editorial). 84

With respect to *Le Monde* Patrick Jarreau saw an impact of neoconservatism approximately six months before the invasion of Iraq: ‘this ideology redefined the American right and does not stop to gain influence in the White House / ce courant a redéfini la droite américaine et ne cesse de gagner en influence à la Maison Blanche’ (Jarreau, *Le Monde*, 03/10/02, International). For her part Sylvie Kauffmann wrote an account on US foreign policy and acknowledged a success for the adherents of neoconservatism in promoting their foreign policy ideas. She referred to them as ‘a small group of triumphant neoconservatives in the shadow of the Pentagon / un petit

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84 In a similar case scholar of Brookings Institution Philip Gordon argued in *Le Figaro* that in the view of some of his French colleagues: ‘Bush was a president influenced accidentally, inexplicably and temporarily by the power of the neoconservative extremists / Bush était un président accidentel, inexplicablement et temporairement influencé par une poignée de néoconservateurs extrémistes’ (Gordon, *Le Figaro*, 08/11/04, Débats et Opinions: 12). An article with related content was also found in *Il Corriere della Sera*. Gianni Riotta quoted from Nick Amory British spy diplomat in Berlin in the 1970s who argued: ‘The White House is in the hands of the neoconservative extremists of Rumsfeld / La Casa Bianca è in mano agli estremisti neoconservatori di Rumsfeld’ (Riotta, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 18/02/04, Politica Estera: 9)
groupe de néoconservateurs triomphants à l’ombre du Pentagone’ (Kauffmann, *Le Monde*, 30/04/03, Horizons). A similar line was followed by Jan Krauze who illustrated them as ‘powerfully represented within and around the Bush administration / puissamment représentés dans et autour de l'administration Bush’ (Krauze, *Le Monde*, 07/04/03).

Furthermore Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet were emphatic in their approach. Although they rejected the idea that US diplomacy had been in ‘hostage / otage’ because of the neoconservatives they focused on the significant role of the group after 11 September. This is a characteristic excerpt of their analysis:

'It is not an imagination about a mysterious coup d'état of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration that of observing an increase of their influence and their views regarding the president's response to the challenge of Islamic terrorism / Ce n'est pas fantasmer sur un mystérieux coup d'Etat des néoconservateurs dans l'administration Bush que d'observer une montée de leur influence et de leurs thèmes dans la réponse que le président a apportée au défi du terrorisme islamiste. C'est une réalité'

(Frachon et Vemet, *Le Monde*, 02/02/04, Horizons Analyses).

Frachon and Vemet elaborated on the supposed influence of the neoconservatives since 9/11 by observing a difference in the foreign policy of the Bush administration before and after the onslaughts. In their view the project for the democratisation of the Middle East had not been on Washington's agenda prior to the attacks. Frachon et Vemet also attributed the tendency of some neoconservatives to refuse their influence to a specific reason. This was their desire to become disengaged from the strategy of democracy promotion when they started to realise that it could hardly flourish in the case of Iraq.

*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* illustrated the neoconservatives as exploiting the period of uncertainty for the Bush administration after 9/11 in order to implement their own foreign policy. Specifically Suzanne Klingenstein argued:

In the aftermath of 11 September, when the Bush administration was looking for new ideas, the neoconservatives were ready [to provide] thinking models, which included the so-called nation-building [strategy] / Nach dem 11 September 2001, als die Bush
Regierung nach Konzepten suchte, standen die Neokonservativen mit Denkmodellen bereit, die das sogennante nation-building vorsahen’

(Klingenstein, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 01/11/03: 37).

The same German newspaper also analysed the policy of democratisation followed by the US in the Middle East and possibly acknowledged an important role of the neoconservatives by asserting:

‘The ambitious concept seems to be tied up to the ideas represented by the neoconservatives / Das ehrgeizige Konzept scheint an die vor dem Irak-Krieg von Neokonservativen vertretene Idee anzuknüpfen’

(Bacia, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22/03/04, Zeitgeschehen: 12).85

Moreover, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* emphasised on the significant impact of the group by quoting from chief of Staff to former Secretary of State Colin Powell Lawrence Wilkinson. As the newspaper reported Wilkinson had asserted: ‘a band of neoconservative ideologues concocted the war / eine Bande neokonservativer Ideologen [haben] den Krieg ausgeheckt (Wernicke, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 31/10/05, Die Seite Drei: 3). In the same article the newspaper also noted without using this time quotation marks: ‘A cabal of neoconservative hawks managed to handle carefully the US foreign policy / Einer Clique neokonservativer Falken gelang es, den gesamten aussepolitik Apparat zu umgehen’. Here the word ‘cabal’ can perhaps indicate that the group was powerful and well organised in promoting its foreign policy ideas in the US.

*Süddeutsche Zeitung* also conducted an interview with governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger. The journalist Mark Huger started one of his questions as follows:

‘Mr. Governor, moderate Republicans complain that America followed a wrong course, that the neoconservatives kidnapped (hijacked) the party / Herr Gouverner, moderate...

85 In a similar case *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* asserted that the military-based democracy exportation: ‘mirrors the ideas of the neoconservative intellectuals / spiegelt Ideen neokonservativer Intellektueller wider’ (Klingenstein, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19/03/03; N3).
Republikaner beklagen, dass Amerika einen falschen Kurs eingeschlagen hat, dass die Neokonservativen die Partei entführt haben' (Huger, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18/12/04, Politik: 10).

The supposed impact of the neoconservatives seems here to be a conventional wisdom not only in Republican circles but also in Germany. The journalist of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reproduced it with his question to Arnold Schwarzenegger and maximised the effect of the group by using the verb kidnap. Likewise the same newspaper conducted an interview with journalist Seymour Hersh. Hersh asserted:

'The mistery is how eight or nein crazy neoconservatives could take over the administration / Das Rätsel is, wie acht oder neun verrückte Neokonservative die Regierung übernehmen konnten'

(Kreye, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 02/10/04, Feuilleton: 19).

As for *Il Corriere della Sera* it provided a striking example as to the impact of the group by dealing with *The Weekly Standard*. We saw that the Italian newspaper along with the other ones had agreed as to the neoconservative illustration of this journal. In this case, however, *Il Corriere della Sera* went further. It asserted that *The Weekly Standard*: ‘paralyses the President / paralliza il Presidente (Caretto, 06/10/03, Politica Estra, 06/10/03: 5). The metaphorical use of the verb ‘paralyse’ can imply that George W. Bush followed a consistently neoconservative policy without necessarily agreeing with it. In a less emphatic case the same Italian newspaper asserted that the neoconservatives: ‘found an administration which listens to them / hanno trovato un’amministrazione che li sta a sentire’ (Severginini, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 10/04/03, Guerra: 8). *Il Corriere della Sera* also quoted from the comic creator and winner of the Pulitzer price for his work Maus Art Spiegelman who spoke for a horrible neoconservative government of Bush (*Il Corriere della Sera*, 11/09/05, Letteratura: 35).

Finally, *La Repubblica* commented on the supposed significant role of the neoconservatives in Washington and noted that they: ‘built a solid theoretical castle based on the war on Iraq during these years around the White House of George Bush
intorno alla Casa Bianca di George W. Bush hanno costruito in questi anni un solido castello teorico, imperniato sulla guerra all'Iraq' (Menichini, *La Repubblica*, Politica Estera, 04/03/05: 17). *La Repubblica* also presented the neoconservatives as 'ideologues who define the policy line to the White House / ideologi che danno la linea alla Casa Bianca ' (Rampini, 19/09/03, *La Repubblica*, Prima Pagina: 1 and Zuconi, *La Repubblica*, 09/05/04, Prima Pagina: 1).86 In parallel with that it noted that they had felt confident within the US administration by quoting from editor-in-chief of *Foreign Policy* magazine Moises Naim (Stagliano, *La Repubblica*, 20/11/04. Politica Estera: 10). In this regard it also published an article of British writer Bryan Appleyard who observed:

'The neoconservative ministers of Bush – in particular Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz...led the country towards the war on Iraq / I ministri neoconservatori di Bush – in particolare il vice segretario alla Difesa, Paul Wolfowitz...[hanno condotto] il paese alla guerra in Iraq'


**The neoconservative failure**

The selected European newspapers often considered as significant the influence of the neoconservatives on the Bush administration. Seeing the Iraq war as an initiative of the group, they went further and commented on this military project. We saw in the previous chapter that the media regarded the promotion of democracy manu militari as a neoconservative principle. Here, it will be shown that they so much believed in the supposed impact of the group in Washington that they also assessed the efficiency of its ambitious plan to transform the Middle East into a democratic region. Such a theme would have been possibly ignored if the accessed newspapers had not largely insisted on the neoconservative cause. The findings suggest that they were not optimistic concerning the potential democratisation of the Middle East.

Starting again with *The Times*, Simon Jenkins asserted in: ‘the neocon bragging over a beacon of democracy now being raised over the Muslim world is absurd.’

86 Likewise *Il Corriere della Sera* noted that the neoconservatives: ‘guide nowadays the foreign policy of the USA / guidano oggi la politica estera Americana’ (Danilo, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 10/07/03: 14; Caretto, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 21/06/03: 15).
Jenkins explained this observation noting that both the US and Britain had invoked the need for free elections in the Middle East in order to serve their own foreign policy goals and not in the interest of the democratisation of the Arab world. Further to this Jenkins maintained in *The Sunday Times*: ‘Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defense Secretary, and Dick Cheney, the US vice-President were told by the neocons that freedom would blossom spontaneously from the ashes. They were fooled’ (Jenkins, *The Sunday Times*, 04/09/05, Features, News: 18). Anatole Kaletsky also expressed his pessimism in *The Times* and noted: ‘The hard military power beloved of braggart neoconservatives turns out to be largely an illusion – and one that America cannot sustain on its own’ (Kaletsky, *The Times*, 22/12/05, Features: 19).

*The Guardian* published a comment of Sidney Blumenthal who considered as ‘romantic’ the neoconservative rhetoric about ‘the march of freedom and democracy’ (Blumenthal, *The Guardian*, 10/03/05, Leader Pages: 22). *Le Figaro* conducted an interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski. National Security Adviser to President Carter commented: ‘La formule néoconservatrice est inefficace / the neoconservative model is ineffective’ and explained that democracy could not be implanted ‘ex machina’ (Germon, *Le Figaro*, 18/10/04, Débats et Opinions: 14). In this case the journalist, who conducted the interview Marie-Laure Germon also selected the above-mentioned phrase of Brzezinski as the title for her article. The same French newspaper also asserted that the US push for democratisation on the basis of a supposed ‘domino theory’ in the Middle East after 9/11 could arguably be compared with that in Europe during the Cold War which finally led to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Tertrais, *Le Figaro*, 19/03/05, Débats et Opinions: 14).

*Le Monde* was explicit and denied any credit for the neoconservatives even when signs of democratisations could arguably be observed in the Middle East. An editorial of the newspaper stated:

‘Can it be argued that George W. Bush and his neoconservative friends deserve the whole merit for the movement started in the Middle East? Certainly not / Est-ce dire

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87 Anatole Kaletsky expressed a similar opinion in a comment he wrote supporting the departure of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from the administration. Kaletsky turned against Rumsfeld although he had initially been in favour of the war on Iraq, as he explains. Discussing about the war which had been supported by the neoconservatives he notes that it ‘has so far had the opposite effect’ from what the group had wished (Kaletsky, *The Times*, 13/05/04, Features: 24).
que George W. Bush et ses amis néoconservateurs peuvent s'attribuer tout le mérite du mouvement amorcé au Moyen-Orient ? Certainement pas.'

(Le Monde, 09/03/05, Horizons Analyses, Editorial).

In this case the newspaper emphasised on its position by asking a question and answering with polarity ‘certainly not’. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was also explicit in its position from 2003. Wolfgang Günter Lerch noted:

‘The neoconservative big plan for a new, fundamentally changed Middle East...has already failed from its beginning phase / Das von den Neokonservativen...Großdesign eines neuen, grundlegend veränderten Nahen Ostens...scheitert schon in der Anfangsphase.

(Lerch, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 08/09/03, Politik: 1).

For its part Süddeutsche Zeitung quoted from the Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government Joseph Nye and considered as ‘mistake / Fehler’ the ‘dream / Traum’ of the neoconservatives to attempt to democratise the Middle East region (Nye, 20/12/05, Süddeutsche Zeitung Themen des Tages: 2). Il Corriere della Sera explained the lack of success of the neoconservative policy concentrating on the chaos in Iraq:

‘The president has realised that the strategy of his neoconservative counsels is not working. The USA has alone won the war but it cannot reconstruct Iraq / Il presidente ha compreso che la strategia dei suoi consiglieri neoconservatori non funziona. Da soli gli Stati Uniti hanno vinto la guerra ma non possono ricostruire l'Iraq’

(Riotta, Il Corriere della Sera, 09/09/2003, Politica Interna).

With respect to the instability in Iraq the same Italian newspaper made a comparison between the US war against this country and that in Vietnam. In doing so it published an article which was entitled: ‘Vietnam ghosts for Wolfowitz / Fantasmi Vietnamiti per Wolfowitz’ (Riotta, Il Corriere della Sera, 27/10/03: 11).
Finally, *La Repubblica* recognised the importance of some changes towards democratisation in the Middle East as for example the elections in Iraq. Nonetheless it was cautious to reach safe conclusions about a prosperous future in the region and underlined that the cost would be paid in human lives. Specifically Bernardo Valli argued:

‘Everyone who follows these events [in the Middle East] can hardly refuse their importance. So, it would be easy enough to draw reckless, optimist conclusions for those who, at a spontaneous moment of euphoria - partly justified- served precise, irresistible political interests. The massacre in Hilla was a shower of blood regarding the promising developments of the last weeks / Chi segue da tempo quelle vicende [in Medio Oriente] può difficilmente negarne l’importanza. E’ stato quindi assai facile arrivare a precipitose, ottimistiche conclusioni, per coloro che a una spontanea euforia, in parte giustificata, affiancavano un preciso, e irresistibile, interesse politico. La strage di Hilla...è stato una doccia di sangue sui tanti promettenti avvenimenti delle ultime settimane’

(Valli, *La Repubblica*, Prima Pagina, 01/03/05: 1).

**The Opposite Side: The Case of The Times**

The examples of the previous analysis indicate that all the newspapers portrayed the neoconservatives as playing a crucial role concerning US foreign policy and especially Washington’s decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power in 2003. Within this framework, all of them commented negatively on the ambition of the group to promote democracy in the Middle East region by war. This section will attempt to analyse if the media also deemphasised the supposed impact of the neoconservatives as it happens in the literature of international relations. Articles which did so, however, could hardly be found. In this case there was no need to select particular examples because all the articles which disagreed with the idea of the catalytic influence of the group will be mentioned.

In the analysis of articles deemphasising the supposed neoconservative impact on the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the attention is mainly turned towards *The Times*. This newspaper - as opposed to the other ones - systematically challenged the view advocating for a great influence of the group and
followed thus a comparatively balanced approach. Articles written by Gerard Baker are characteristic. Baker, for instance, noted:

'Miles of newsprint and documentary film footage have been spent in an effort to flush out the neocons in the past four years and by any measure the efforts have been spectacularly successful. Institutions generally identified as hotbeds of neoconservatism - think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and the Project for the New American Century - have received the kind of treatment usually accorded to Mafia families. This attention is mystifying. As one neocon puts it: Have you ever seen the Project for the New American Century? It consists of five men and a fax machine'

(Baker, *The Times*, 19/03/05, Overseas News: 56).

In this article, Baker attempted to deemphasise the interest shown by most Europeans and leftist Americans in the investigation of ‘how the neocons [...] came to seize the reins of political power in the US and subvert American foreign policy to their ends’. He ironically considered this attitude as a ‘Neocon-phobia’ and supported the neoconservative view that the group did not lead the Bush administration to the Iraq war.

In a similar case, Gerard Baker rejected the criticism that Paul Wolfowitz had been a leader of the neoconservatives who subverted US foreign policy ‘to their own, permanent-war, anti-Arab, anti-European, pro-Israel, objectives’. He maintained:

‘Through this barrage of misinformation the world gets occasional glimpses of the true Paul Wolfowitz, a softly-spoken academic, given to careful deliberation over the merits of a policy debate. He is a deeply cultured man with a firm and sometimes overly romantic belief in the centrality of human freedom as the defining theme of foreign policy’

(Baker, *The Times*, 18/03/05, Overseas News: 43).

Other articles are also typical of the comparatively balanced approach of *The Times*. Ferdinand Mount, for example, commented on the book *Neoconservatism* edited by Irwin Stelzer and argued: ‘The fairly obvious truth is that it was the blow of September 11 rather than any intellectual conversion which propelled Bush into his proactive policy’ (Mount, *The Times*, Features, 07/11/04: 48). In parallel with that, Ben Macintyre considered as a conspiracy theory the argument that the
neoconservatives had overrun the White House (Macintyre, The Times, 04/12/04, Features: 26).

The stance of The Times to openly support the position of the neoconservatives in some of its articles can be perhaps attributed to the particular sympathy of some of its journalists for the group’s core philosophy. It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that Gerard Baker, for instance, had signed the statement of principles of the Henry Jackson Society in Britain. Baker was the only journalist who also wrote articles endorsing neoconservative idea to export democracy in the Middle East. He asserted for instance:

‘There is growing confidence across the Bush Administration that the hard and unpopular choices made in the first term have begun to bear fruit...There is evident excitement and optimism about the broader Middle East; democratic change from a free and peaceful Palestine to Afghanistan is no longer a neocon fantasy’

(Baker, The Times, 15/04/05, Features: 21).

Even when Baker realised the difficulty of the neoconservative project to be applied in practice because of the instability in Iraq, he did not stop to qualify their strategy as a good option. In this regard he discussed about a song of the Rolling Stones, which was entitled ‘Sweet Neoccon’ attacking the neoconservatives within the Bush administration, and asserted:

‘The sweet neocons have got many things wrong. They may have been naïve about how easily and quickly a free Iraq would emerge from Saddam’s ruins. They may underestimate different levels of ethnic, religious and political resistance to democracy. But the path of chaotic freedom down which they want to nudge the world remains a better route than the alternative, supposedly realist approach to international affairs that we have tried in the past’

(Baker, The Times, 26/08/05, Features: 25).

Apart from the sympathy of some journalists of The Times for neoconservatism, the comparatively balanced approach followed by this newspaper in its coverage of the political ideology maybe reflects a general influence from the part of Rupert Murdoch.
The media magnate had started to support the neoconservative cause from the mid 1990s and was perhaps keen on promoting it. As for his influence on journalists of his newspaper the account of former editor of *The Sunday Times* Andrew Neil is useful. Neil notes:

'Editorial freedom, however, has its limits: Rupert has an uncanny knack of being there even when he is not. When I did not hear from him and I knew his attention was elsewhere, he was still uppermost in my mind. Rupert expects his papers to stand broadly for what he believes: a combination of right-wing Republicanism from America mixed with undiluted Thatcherism from Britain'


The comment of Andrew Neil becomes even more important in the context of the Iraq war. The media Murdoch owned did not see this military campaign in a negative way. The Fox News Channel constitutes a characteristic example. As Adel Iskandar observes the coverage of the war by this channel was marked by complete trust in the administration of George W. Bush, hyperpatriotic rhetoric and disqualification of all alternative narratives (Iskandar, 2005: 161 and 166). *The Times* was not an exception. Murdoch was prepared to back the prime minister of the Labour party Tony Blair in his decision to cooperate with the US. Within this framework and given the support of the neoconservatives for the Iraq war it can be hardly regarded as a paradox that the *The Times* endorsed in some cases the ideas of the group. *The Times* was the only newspaper which covered neoconservatism in a comparatively balanced way. The other newspapers did not publish either news or comment pieces which were optimistic concerning the promotion of democracy in the Middle East on the basis of the neoconservative plan. Further to this, they did not de-emphasise the supposed influence of the group on the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 adopting thus a one-sided approach in their coverage. It should be mentioned, nevertheless, that a few articles which referred to neoconservative sources presented the position of the group but without endorsing it. In only one case, *Il Corriere della Sera* disagreed with the idea of the supposed

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88 *Le Figaro* conducted an interview with the vice-President of the American Enterprise Institute Danielle Pletka who considered as ‘stupid’ the claim that the US president had been under contingent control of the neoconservatives. (Lambroschini, *Le Figaro*, 05/11/04, International: 4). Likewise, *Le Monde* presented the view supported by scholars such as Max Boot and Joshua Muravchik (Frachon et Vernet, *Le Monde*, 02/02/04, Horizons Analyses). For its part, *La Repubblica* mentioned Max Boot and
significant neoconservative influence. This happened when the newspaper published an interview it conducted with Bulgarian philosopher Tzvetan Todorov. Todorov argued he preferred to talk about ‘neofondamentalists’ instead of neoconservatives. In his view the promotion of democracy by military means could hardly be connected to conservatives whether they were ‘neo’ or not (Di Stefano, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 31/08/03, Varie: 25).89

**A neoconservative perspective for US foreign policy?**

The dominant position of the accessed newspapers was that the neoconservative group had been highly influential in Washington and had persuaded the Bush administration to accept its ‘revolutionary’ plan and invade Iraq. It can certainly be claimed that neoconservatism was an international relations theory they concentrated on in the aftermath of 11 September. Taken this, can it be also argued that the European media largely emphasised on the impact of neoconservatism or that they understood US foreign policy through the perspective of the political ideology? Such a claim cannot be made before a context for their general understanding of Washington’s world affairs approach after 2003 has been given.

There are two international relations theories, which can compete with neoconservatism as an explanation of the invasion of Iraq, namely: nationalism and realism. Chapter 3 suggested that many members of the US administration, notably Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice belong either to the former or the latter foreign policy school. An examination of the interest shown by the elite media in nationalism and realism with reference to American foreign policy can provide a necessary comparative basis to conclude if the focus on neoconservatism by the selected European newspapers was misplaced.

Nationalism and realism were selected for analysis instead of other possible explanations of the Iraq war such as the oil factor because they constitute distinctive foreign policy schools. These schools – along with neoconservatism – can mirror the

wrote that he attempted to defend the neoconservative position (*La Repubblica*, 19/04/04, Commenti: 16) 89 It is also worth-mentioning that *Süddeutsche Zeitung* published a translated piece of Turkish author Ahmet Ümit which - without contesting the influence of the neoconservatives - went further. In parallel with neoconservatism, the Turkish author attributed the cause of wars in the aftermath of 11 September to the imperial demands of the new world order and the unsolved problems of civilisation (*Neumann, Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 04/11/04, Feuilleton, 15).
thinking of the Bush administration. Findings demonstrating that the media insisted on oil as a reason for the invasion could not be particularly helpful as they would not necessarily challenge the claim that the newspapers exaggerated the influence of the neoconservatives in the US. That is because there is no evidence suggesting that neoconservative politicians and intellectuals were not interested in oil. Paul Wolfowitz, for example, assured Congress in the run up to the Iraq invasion that the country’s oil would pay for its reconstruction (Baer, 17/05/07). Therefore, as opposed to nationalism and realism, the oil factor can hardly be considered as a counterbalance of neoconservatism in a discussion of the reasons for the military operation against Baghdad but only as a complementary one.

It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 that the accessed newspapers largely published on neoconservatism in the aftermath of 9/11 and especially from the beginning of 2003 onwards. In order to compare the attention the media paid to neoconservatism with their interest in nationalism and realism, a quantitative analysis of the coverage of the two competing international relations theories is useful. The volume of articles published on the three different foreign policy schools within a US foreign policy context can provide a basis for conclusions. The period of interest starts in January 2003 and ends in December 2005. It thus includes the years which saw an explosion of articles produced regarding neoconservatism. Table 1 present the findings of the quantitative analysis.

Table 5: Volume of articles containing the term neoconservatism, nationalism and realism within a US foreign context from the 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Title</th>
<th>Neoconservatism</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Realism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suddeutsche Zeitung</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il Corriere della Sera</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Repubblica</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data presented in Table 1 show that all the selected newspapers paid much more attention to neoconservatism than to nationalism and realism. That is to say that they showed a preference in the international relations theory of neoconservatism discussing Washington’s foreign policy from 2003 until 2005. The bar chart of figure 1 highlights this by presenting the volume of articles published by the newspapers on the one hand on neoconservatism and on the other on both nationalism and realism.

Figure 3: Volume of articles published on neoconservatism and both nationalism and realism from 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2005.

The chart shows that TI = The Times, GU = The Guardian, FI = Le Figaro, MO = Le Monde, FR = Frankfurter Allgemeine, SU = Süddeutsche Zeitung, CO = Corriere della Sera, and RE = Repubblica.

Articles referring to nationalism and realism deemed these foreign policy schools as representing the thinking of members of the Bush administration such as Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell. In many cases, these two international theories – most notably nationalism - cooccurred with that of neoconservatism but did not compete with it. That is because the media often linked them together in their attempt to explain American foreign policy after 11 September 2001. The Guardian, for instance, spoke for a ‘marriage of the neocons and the Rumsfeld wing of the Bush administration before the war on Iraq (Burkeman, The Guardian, Foreign Pages: 12). In a similar case Jan Krauze argued in Le Monde that the neoconservatives had not
been isolated within the US administration but that Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld had stood near them (Krauze, Le Monde, 07/04/03). 90

The thesis certainly acknowledges that the selected European newspapers dealt in some articles with nationalism and realism in their coverage of US foreign policy. However, they focused to a much higher degree on neoconservatism. The above-presented data show that media emphasised on this political ideology and its alleged impact on the George W. Bush administration. We should also remember, at this stage, that they did not depict nationalist politicians such as Cheney and Rumsfeld as neoconservative in spite of the similarity between neoconservatism and nationalism in the literature of international relations. If Cheney and Rumsfeld had been deemed as neoconservative by the newspapers, their coverage of the supposed influence of the group would have taken a different dimension. In such a case, their focus on the neoconservative cause might not have been considered as being exaggerated or misplaced. That is because in their perception, the group would also have included the influential Vice President and Secretary of Defence in the run up to the Iraq war.

The argument that the media exaggerated the influence of the neoconservatives can perhaps lead to an additional conclusion. This is that they significantly framed US foreign policy through the perspective of neoconservatism, at least concerning the usage of international relations theories, in the aftermath of 9/11 and especially from 2003 onwards. There are two main reasons which can strengthen this observation. First, the selected newspapers had not shown an interest in neoconservatism and US foreign policy before 11 September. They had ignored even the 1998 letter of the PNAC considering as essential the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Noting that neoconservatism preexisted in the literature of international relations as a political ideology with specific foreign policy goals, the media focus on it only after 9/11 indicates that it was a new tool they used in their analysis of US foreign policy and the Iraq war.

And second, the selected newspapers - with the exception of The Times - did not publish articles deemphasising the supposed influence of neoconservatism. Although the impact of the political ideology on the Bush administration has been disputed in the literature of international relations, the media did not challenge the view that the

90 For similar examples in the other newspapers see: Lacroix, Le Figaro: 09/10/04, Débats et Opinions: 13; Sattar, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19/08/04, Zeitgeschehen: 5; Müller, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Feuilleton, 25/01/05; Schlesinger, 17/10/03, Il Corriere della Sera, Politica Estera: 35 and Rampoldi, La Repubblica, 19/04/04, Prima Pagina: 1.
role of the group was catalytic in Washington. By contrast, they insisted on the neoconservative cause and exaggerated the influence of the group by mediating it as an action type, by taking it often as granted and by using characteristic vocabulary in their news or comment articles. This stance of all the newspapers along with the familiarity they demonstrated in their usage of the term neoconservatism or its equivalents after 2003 cannot but show that they considered is a crucial theory shaping US foreign policy.

**Conclusion**

The dominant position of the media was that the neoconservatives had been highly influential in Washington. The political ideology was seen as a driving force behind George W. Bush's world affairs approach and his administration's decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. The supposed impact of the political ideology was in some cases expanded beyond the war in Iraq to the whole establishment of US foreign policy. The only newspaper demonstrating a comparatively balanced approach in its coverage was *The Times*. *The Times* not only published articles deemphasising the alleged impact of the group but it also supported in some cases the idea of democracy promotion in the Middle East. The stance of this newspaper was mainly attributed to the sympathy shown by some of its journalists, for example Gerard Baker, to neoconservatism. A possible influence from the part of Rupert Murdoch, who supported the Iraq war and the neoconservative cause, was also acknowledged. With the exception of *The Times* all the other accessed newspapers supported the view that the group played an important role in the US. They were also pessimistic concerning the potential democratisation of the Middle East region.

The chapter also argued that the European press exaggerated the influence of the neoconservatives on US foreign policy. Their emphasis on the political ideology was justified on the basis of the results of a quantitative analysis of the coverage of nationalism and realism. That is because the media dealt to a much larger extent with neoconservatism than with the other two theories of international relations from 2003 until 2005. Although they acknowledged that nationalism and realism mirrored the policy view of various members in the Bush administration, they did not saw them as competing with neoconservatism. The preference of the European press for neoconservatism along with its indifference in challenging the view that the group
was highly influential led to the conclusion that the media significantly framed US foreign policy after 9/11 through the perspective of this political ideology. The next chapter, which will deal with the representation of political philosopher Leo Strauss will attempt to complement the findings of this one. It will endeavour to show if the selected newspapers also focused on the eminent theorist in their interest in neoconservatism and if they portrayed him as an influential figure for the group and subsequently for the Iraq war.
Chapter 9: The 'Leo-Cons'

The particular attention paid to neoconservatism by the selected newspapers after 11 September 2001 and their concentration on its supposed impact can pave the way for another relevant theme to be discussed. This is the relationship between political philosopher Leo Strauss and the neoconservatives. It was seen in Chapter 7 that an important part of the media representation of the group had been based on personifications. The attention here is turned towards a long ago dead but seemingly still influential figure. It is thus interesting to investigate if the accessed newspapers combined their increased interest in neoconservatism with a similar one in the eminent theorist. The representation, however, of Leo Strauss by the media is significant not only because it is a personification issue. The results of the analysis can also outline the position taken by the newspapers on an important debatable issue regarding neoconservatism: the supposed influence of Strauss's philosophy on the group and on US politics after 11 September.

The chapter will explore the relationship between neoconservatism and Strauss as mediated in the European elite press by using both quantitative and qualitative methods. It constitutes a case study in the thesis. The chapter will start with an introduction of Leo Strauss, his teaching, philosophy and supposed impact. It will then concentrate on his representation by the chosen opinion-forming newspapers. The findings show that the prominence devoted to both the eminent theorist and his supposed acolytes is a relatively recent phenomenon. They also suggest that the newspapers accessed agreed generally as to their understanding of Leo Strauss philosophy and his supposed impact on the neoconservatives within the framework of the war on terror and its aftermath. They depicted him as a significantly influential figure and their coverage often exaggerated while describing his influential role.

Strauss and his Legacy

Leo Strauss was born in Germany and came to the United States as a Jewish refugee in 1938. Later he taught at the New School of Social Research and then at the University of
Chicago and by the time of his death in 1973, he had published fifteen books. Strauss' esoteric and obscure writings concentrated on the importance of the classic works of Aristotle, Xenophon, Plato, al Farabi, Machiaveli and Aristophanes as well as European philosophers like Locke, Rousseau, Nietzsche and Heidegger and had little concern with contemporary politics. Particular attention was devoted to Spinoza, Maimonides and Carl Schmitt's book *The Concept of the Political*.

Strauss came to greater public prominence after his death and has been routinely cited in an ongoing and complex debate as to his influence on neoconservatism and over its advocates. For instance, Alex Callinicos identifies Strauss as a significant intellectual influence for members of the group (Callinicos, 2003: 47). It is notable that Irving Kristol, the so-called 'godfather of neoconservatism' has acknowledged his debt to Strauss (Kristol, 1995: 6-7). Whilst Irving Kristol was a stalwart of the movement's first generation those associated with the second and who have since taken up influential leadership positions following the collapse of the Soviet Union have also been linked to the theorist. James Mann's *Rise of the Vulcans* argues that Paul Wolfowitz chose to study at the University of Chicago rather than Harvard in no small part because Leo Strauss was still teaching there (Mann, 2004: 26). Although Wolfowitz did not become especially close to Strauss, he did take two courses with him on political theory, one dealing with Plato, the other with Montesquieu (Ibid: 28).

Leo Strauss' posthumous influence has been such that he has come to be regarded as having bequeathed a legacy that has attracted devoted adherents, even 'disciples', some of whom have taken to identifying themselves as 'Straussians'. Their work has been seen to have had a more tangible impact on contemporary politics, particularly since the inauguration of George W Bush in 2001. Dominant intellectual Straussians include Joseph Cropsey of Chicago University, Harvey Mansfield of Harvard and Harry Jaffa of Claremont Graduate School. Other notable authorities influenced by Strauss include Albert Wohlstetter of Chicago University and Allan Bloom of Cornell and Chicago, both of whom tutored some of the future neoconservative intellectuals and politicians who would play influential roles once the Republicans had resumed power. The leading 'Straussians' include Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence in the first Bush administration and Richard Perle, a vocal member of the Defence Policy Board. Others

The nature and scope of Leo Strauss’ influence over contemporary neoconservatism is a complex and controversial issue and one informed by the US administration’s decision to undertake a military operation against Iraq. It has been suggested Strauss’ advocacy of liberal democracy and focus on the dangers of tyranny provided intellectual sustenance for those members of the Bush’s administration who advocated the war. Writing in The Public Interest William Kristol together with Steven Lenzner acknowledged the theorist as an influence on the Bush’s presidency policy of regime change (Kristol and Lenzner, 2003: 38). This stance chimed with Strauss’ critique of moral relativism and defence of moral judgments about good of American democracy versus evil of Soviet communism during the early stages of the Cold War. It is worth-mentioning that the neoconservative intellectual Joshua Muravchik writes that the reason the name of Leo Strauss has been so readily invoked is that he was a Jew noting that many neoconservatives are Jewish as well (Muravchik, 2003: 29).

Despite Strauss’ revered status, several neoconservatives have appeared reluctant to embrace his legacy and claim him as a leading inspiration for their cause. Moreover, since 2003, there has been an attempt to refute the link with Strauss in spite of a recognition that he was and continues to be a powerful teacher and thinker. Joshua Muravchik, for example, casts doubts on Strauss’ importance because he was ‘rarely if ever engaged in contemporary politics’ (Muravchik, 2003: 29). Paul Wolfowitz has also distanced himself from Strauss and the label Straussian (quoted in Mann, 2004: 29). Similarly Kristol and Lenzner, whilst prepared to cite Strauss as an authority, deny him much influence on contemporary US foreign policy suggesting those who suggest a link have not properly studied his writings nor understood his political thought (Lenzer and Kristol, 2003: 19). Max Boot, contributing editor to the Weekly Standard has suggested few neocons actively study or engage with the theorist’s work today (Boot, 2004: 26).

The attempts by leading neoconservatives to distance themselves from Strauss have been in part a response to what they see as negative publicity generated by opponents such as the radical Hollywood actor and director Tim Robbins. Robbins’ play Embedded
presented Leo Strauss' philosophy as a significant influence on the Bush administration and more especially its decision to undertake a military campaign against Iraq. The play depicted Strauss as a champion of Plato’s ‘noble lie’- the idea that a lie told to the masses by the elites can keep a stable social structure and the former under control of the latter. The neoconservative scholar Lawrence Kaplan vehemently dismissed the play as ‘a masterpiece of artless propaganda’ (Kaplan, 03/09/04). The neoconservatives also rejected the work of Professor Shadia Drury, who considers Strauss as one of the most influential individuals in the ‘neoconservative movement’ (1999). They also did so with the observations of presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. who went further than Robbins and labelled the political philosopher a ‘fascist thinker’.

Considerable neoconservative ire has been focused on criticising the media, particularly in Europe, in the aftermath of the Iraq war. Vice President of the Hudson Institute Kenneth Weinstein has suggested no intellectual has been as vilified in the mainstream European media as Leo Strauss. In particular, he notes: ‘Strauss was characterised as the force behind the [Iraq] war, the behind-the-scenes intellectual elitist who preached the politics of force and deception, and the philosopher-king of the neoconservative movement’ (Weinstein, 2004: 203). At this stage, it is interesting to outline how the European elite press represented Leo Strauss.

**Expressing an Interest in Strauss and the Strausians**

To begin with we should first remember that the term neoconservatism has become particularly popular in the selected newspapers since 2003. On that basis it could be hypothesised that Leo Strauss would be mainly connected to the political ideology in the media discourse from the same year onwards. bar chart of figure 1 attempts to explore this.91

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91 The analysis of the representation of Leo Strauss by the accessed newspapers does not cover the years before 2001. That is because it is placed within the context of the Bush presidency and especially the war on terror and its aftermath.
Figure 1: Number of articles where the name Leo Strauss and the term neoconservatism or its equivalents cooccurred from 2001 until 2005.

With the exception of one article found in The Guardian in 2002 it was the year of 2003 when the name of Strauss and the term neoconservatism or its equivalents started to cooccur. There seems to be a similarity in the extent to which the British, German and Italian press (19, 16 and 19 cases respectively) associated the eminent theorist with the political ideology. The French press did so to a higher degree (32 cases) while Le Monde had the lead (20 cases). Further to this the name and the term cooccurred more times in liberal (50 cases) than in conservative newspapers (36 cases). As the linkage between them has started to be established since 2003, the analysis will have the beginning of this year as its starting point. Articles published about Strauss before 2003 can be ignored because they cannot be placed in the framework of his supposed influence on the neoconservatives.

Another hypothesis which could be made is that the volume of articles containing the name of the political philosopher would be higher from 2003 onwards compared to the previous years. Indeed figure 2 indicates this. Specifically, the total number of articles containing the name was 32 in 2001, 34 in 2002, 57 in 2003, 71 in 2004 and 70 in 2005.
Once again the French press (68 cases) published more on Strauss than the British (35 cases), German (45 cases) and the Italian one (51 articles). Liberal newspapers (119 cases) dealt more extensively than conservative ones (80 cases). In particular, The Times (13 cases) and Il Corriere della Sera (14 cases) published less articles than Le Figaro (31 cases) and Frankfurter Allgemeine (22 cases). With reference to liberal newspapers Le Monde and La Repubblica (37 cases each) were keener in dealing with Strauss than The Guardian (22 cases) and Süddeutsche Zeitung (23 cases)

The differences as to the number of articles published by the accessed newspapers are arguably significant. The qualitative analysis will show that the nature of coverage in articles dealing with Leo Strauss and neoconservatism was rather similar. Neoconservatism was not of course the only theme in articles concerning Leo Strauss after 2003. It was, however, an important one. Figure 3 indicates that a significant percentage of articles containing the name of the theorist also mentioned the term neoconservatism or its equivalents.

Figure 3: Percentage of articles about Leo Strauss with and without the term neoconservatism or its equivalents from 2003 until 2005

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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
RE CO SU FR MO FI GU TI

0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Without With
TI GU FI MO FR SU CO RE
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Articles containing the name of Strauss but not referring to neoconservatism were mainly of philosophical content. They discussed his work or that of other theorists, as for instance Hobbes, Hegel, Kojève and Nietzsche, or reviewed forthcoming books or events. In many articles Leo Strauss was also mentioned indirectly. For example, an article of La Repubblica referred to Strauss discussing Karl Lowith: ‘Finally [it is] the philosophical vocation, which led [Karl Lowith] in front of the forthcoming star Heidegger side by side with Gadamer, Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss’ (Filoni, La Repubblica, 15/11/04: 36). For the purpose of the thesis, however, the attention is turned towards articles including both the name of Leo Strauss and the term neoconservatism. In these articles the selected newspapers focused not only on the political philosopher but also on his adherents. Table 1 illustrates how many times the name of various Straussians was mentioned in articles containing that of Leo Strauss.

Table 1: Cocitation analysis: Leo Strauss and the Straussians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bloom</th>
<th>Kagan</th>
<th>Fukuyama</th>
<th>Kristol W.</th>
<th>Perle</th>
<th>Schmitt G.</th>
<th>Shulsky</th>
<th>Wolfowitz</th>
<th>Wohlstetter</th>
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<td>TI</td>
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<td>GU</td>
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<td>FI</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

Neoconservative politician Paul Wolfowitz received more voice in the media (47 hits) compared to other Straussians. Attention was also dedicated to Richard Perle (19 hits) but to a lower degree. Newspapers focused to an equal extent on neoconservative
scholars such as Francis Fukuyama (12 hits) and William Kristol (14 hits) but they dealt less with Robert Kagan (7 hits). It is also interesting that the name of Allan Bloom (20 hits) was mentioned more than twice times more than that of Albert Wohlstetter (7 hits) while a balanced distribution of attention to both professors might have been expected. Further to this, the names of the intelligence experts Gary Schmitt and Abram Shulsky were rarely quoted.

In their interest in covering the relationship of the theorist to the neoconservatives the newspapers often followed in the international relations debate. They used reported speech and direct quotations based mainly on sources which were not sympathisers to the neoconservative position. Table 2 indicates this tendency of the media.

Table 2: Scholars and Sources mentioned in the selected newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Embedded (3), NY Times, New Yorker Magazine</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Power of Nightmares (3), The Economist</td>
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<tr>
<td>GU</td>
<td>Richard Drayton</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Embedded (3), Power of Nightmares (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Bernard-Henri Lévy, Alain Bauer and Xavier Raufer, Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet, Giles Gipel</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Harald Bluhm, Anne Norton</td>
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<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Greil Marcus, Eva Horn, Horst Bredekamp, Lyndon LaRouche</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Embedded, NY Times, New Yorker Magazine</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Mark Blitz</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Embedded, NY Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Shadia Drury, Slavoj Zizek, Patrick McGrath, Richard Rorty, Christopher Hitchens²²</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NY Times</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

²² Richard Drayton is senior lecturer in history at Cambridge University. Bernard-Henri Lévy is a philosopher, intellectual and writer. Alain Bauer and Xavier Raufer are criminologists. We saw that Alain Frachon and Daniel Verner are authors of the books: L’Amerique Messianique: Les Guerres des
Table 2 shows that the British elite newspapers mainly focused on Tim Robbins’s theatrical play *Embedded* and on Adam Curtis’ documentary *The Power of Nightmares*. The latter had been broadcasted by the BBC in the autumn of 2004 illustrating Leo Strauss as a major intellectual influence for the neoconservatives. That is to say that *Embedded* and *The Power of Nightmares* seem to have had a significant impact on the understanding of the political philosopher in Britain. Furthermore, four newspapers, namely *The Times*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Il Corriere della Sera* and *La Repubblica*, quoted from James Atlas’s article in *The New York Times* who portrayed the 

*Néoconservateurs* (The Messianic America: The Wars of the Neoconservatives). Giles Kepel is an expert on Middle East affairs and professor at Institut d’Etudes Politiques. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. is a historian who served as a special assistant to the President during the JFK administration as well. Harald Bluhm is a research associate in the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and author of the book: *Die Ordnung der Ordnung: Das Politische Philosophieren von Leo Strauss* (The Order of the Order: The Political Philosophy of Leo Strauss). Anne Norton is Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Pennsylvania and author of the book *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire*. Greil Marcus is a historian. Eva Horn is an Assistant Professor of at the Europe University Niadriva of Frankfurt teaching on Western European literature and cultural studies. Horst Bredekamp is Professor of history of art at Humboldt University. Mark Blitz is the Fletcher Jones Professor of political philosophy at Claremont McKenna College and was counsel during Ronald Reagan’s administration. Michael Ledeen is an expert on US foreign policy and author of the book *The War Against the Terror Masters*. Shadia Drury holds the Canada Research Chair in social justice at the University of Regina, Canada. Slavoj Zizek is a sociologist, philosopher and cultural critic. Richard Rorty was philosopher and professor at various US universities. Patrick MacGrath and Christopher Hitchens are British authors.
neoconservatives as 'Leo-Cons.' The Times and Süddeutsche Zeitung also quoted from Seymour Hersh's article in New Yorker Magazine who had illustrated members of the Pentagon as a 'cabal of Straussian'. Finally, Süddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubblica referred to Lyndon LaRouche and Shadia Drury who are both hostile to the neoconservatives.

The findings presented in Table 2 also reveal a difference in the media coverage on the basis of their nationality. While the British press was rather interested in quoting from commercial sources, the French, German and Italian one was keen on using references from academics. In other words, French, German and Italian newspapers showed a greater interest in analysing Strauss's influence more deeply. Further to this, The Times and The Guardian quoted from British and American sources while Le Figaro and Le Monde only from French ones. By contrast, the German and Italian newspapers did not show a national preference in the selection of their sources which were mainly American.

**Strauss as a 'Guru'**

In their discussion of the relationship between Leo Strauss and the neoconservatives all the accessed newspapers often portrayed the political philosopher by utilising specific words. Table 3 presents characteristic semantic features found in the coverage of each newspaper respectively.

**Table 3: Representation of Leo Strauss with specific lexical items**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Terms used</th>
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The use of specific lexical items can construct Strauss’s supposed impact as important and maximise his influence. This representation of the eminent theorist also seems to have ideological significance because some of the terms such as Karl Marx were certainly employed metaphorically (Fairclough, 1989: 119). What is necessary, however, is to deal not only with words but also with the general context: that is to say the meaning of the sentences these words appeared. The following section will aim to do so and will be based on a macro-propositional analysis.

**Mediating the Influence**

The chosen print media largely agreed on the catalytic role Leo Strauss supposedly played in shaping the philosophy of the neoconservatives. Even *The Times* did not seem to contest the impact of the philosopher. Gerard Baker, for instance, a neocon sympathiser, noted in this case that ‘many adherents were enthusiastic followers of Leo Strauss’ and that Wolfowitz ‘became intrigued by [his] neoconservative ideas’ at the University of Chicago (Baker, *The Times*, 19/03/05, Overseas News: 56 and 18/03/05, Overseas News: 43).

Strauss’s influence was not always explained or attributed to specific factors. By contrast, it was in some cases taken for granted because it was maybe presumed or presupposed (Van Dijk, 1998: 34). It seemed thus that his supposed influential role had become a recurrent feature in media coverage. Eric Homberger, for example, wrote an obituary in *The Guardian* after the death of intellectual Susan Sontag. His main proposition was:
'[Susan Sontag] formed strong bonds with teachers such as the political philosopher Leo Strauss, who later become the intellectual father of neoconservatives in the Bush administration'


What is interesting in this case is that Homberger did not hesitate to use a subordinate clause and to link Leo Strauss to neoconservatism although the content of his article was not relevant to either the eminent theorist or the political ideology. Likewise *Le Monde* considered Strauss as one of the ‘masters’ of the neoconservative thinking in an article which focused on a seminar on European politics at the University of Chicago. (Jarreau, *Le Monde*, 27/05/04, Page Une). In this case Patrick Jarreau remembered the political philosopher only because the venue of that event was the university where the latter had taught.93

As for articles which elaborated on Strauss’s alleged influence they saw a degree of homogenisation in their content. As it will be shown below the media largely agree - with a few exceptions - on the aspects of this influence. Not all of the selected newspapers, nevertheless, were analytical while approaching this issue. *The Times* and *The Guardian* did not devote many lines to it.94 This certainly contradicts their general coverage of neoconservatism. On the contrary, the French, German and Italian chosen media offered a more detailed analysis. They often endeavoured to introduce Leo Strauss to their readers and to elaborate on his work and teaching. Many of their articles were long and demanded high levels of literacy from the audience.

It is noteworthy that some newspapers concentrated on Strauss’ theoretical impact by attempting to deconstruct the argument of various neoconservatives and explain why the view of the latter had been wrong. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, for example, recontextualised the argument of Strauss’s daughter Jenny who argued that her father had

not influenced contemporary American politics. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18/06/03, Feuilleton: 35). Likewise La Repubblica published a translated comment of writer Bryan Appleyard who disagreed with Wolfowitz’s opinion that the work of the philosopher had not been relevant to contemporary American politics (Appleyard, La Repubblica, 08/08/04, Cultura: 34).

Muravchik’s point that Leo Strauss had been readily invoked because he was a Jew -as many members of the neoconservative group - cannot be confirmed by the findings of the project. The theorist was not connected to the political ideology in the selected newspapers on the basis of his ethnicity. Although some articles noted Strauss was a Jew this does not entail that they focused on him for this reason. In parallel with that, they often mentioned that the political philosopher was a German émigré. It seems logical therefore that the media dealt with his ethnicity in their interest in dealing with his biography and not because they were biased against it.

Learning to Defend Democracy

Chapter 7 suggested that according to the chosen newspapers the neoconservatives had advocated for a US policy of democratisation in the Middle East. This finding can be complemented here. The group’s support for liberty was considered by the media as an inspiration from Leo Strauss. In this regard, the newspapers constructed Strauss’ influence in two ways. First they dealt with theorists’ defence for democracy vis-à-vis totalitarian regimes. This was perceived to be based on his personal experience from Germany and his study of the work of ancient philosophers who had attributed particular importance to the notion of regime. And second the media also focused on Strauss’ insistence on morality and moral judgements and his criticism of moral relativism.

The Times, for instance, dealt with Strauss’ youth in the context of his relationship to the neoconservatives. It noted that political philosopher’s ‘experience of the Weimar Republic, overthrown by Adolf Hitler in 1933, convinced him that democratic values had to be fought for’ (Baxter, The Sunday Times, 11/05/03, Overseas News: 27).95 The

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95 Likewise Le Monde, posed a rhetorical question: ‘Is it not the dissolution of the Weimar Republic which led [Leo Strauss] to analyse the fragility of the democratic regimes vis-à-vis the tyranny / N’est-ce pas l’effondrement de la République de Weimar qui a conduit [ Leo Strauss] à analyser la fragilité des régimes démocratiques face à la tyrannie?’ (Solé, Le Monde, 04/05/03). Süddeutsche Zeitung interviewed art-
Guardian, had The Power of Nightmares as its source of information and commented on the view of Strauss for the US society after the end of World War II. The newspaper argued that he ‘rejected the liberalism of postwar America as amoral and…thought that the country could be rescued by a revived belief in America’s unique role to battle evil in the world’ (Beckett, The Guardian, 15/10/04, Feature Pages: 21). In parallel with that Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung illustrated as a fundamental aspect of Strauss’ philosophy his desire to see lawful states be led by moral individuals (Klingestein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19/03/03, Geistenwissenschaften: N3).

For their part Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet published a high analytical article concerning Leo Strauss and the political ideology in Le Monde. They - inter alia - acknowledged the concern of the theorist for the existence of totalitarian regimes or ‘tyrannies’ in Aristotle’s terminology in the 20th century (Frachon and Vernet, Le Monde, 16/04/03, Horizons). In this regard, Il Corriere della Sera concentrated on the use of classic works in politics and noted that the neoconservatives studied Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli thanks to Leo Strauss (Montefiori, Il Corriere della Sera, 04/10/03, Politica: 35). 96

Le Figaro, Süddeutsche Zeitung and La Repubblica were more explicit in their approach. The French newspaper, for example, published an interesting piece of Patrice Bollon. Bollon noted about the theorist:

‘It seems from his criticism for modern non-values and his rehabilitation of the classical values like a follower of a strategy of democracy expansion on the whole world, which was the intellectual basis for the American intervention in Iraq / Strauss apparait bien, par sa critique des non-valeurs modernes et sa rehabilitation des valeurs classiques, comme un adepte d’une stratégie de diffusion de la démocratie au monde entier, base intellectuelle de l’intervention américaine en Irak’

historian Horst Bredekamp, who also considered as crucial for Strauss’s defence for democracy the fall of the Weimar Republic (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 07/04/03: 14).

96 For similar examples about Strauss’ support for democracy and moral values in the context of his influence on the neoconservatives see: Hayoun, Le Figaro, 06/09/03, Débats et Opinions; Durin-Valois, Le Figaro, 29/10/04, Magazine: 48-50; Lacroix and Germon, Le Figaro, 03/11/03, Vivre Aujourd’hui, Modes: 13; Klingenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 01/11/03, Feuilleton: 37; Montefiori, Il Corriere della Sera, 04/10/03, Politica: 35; Riotta, Il Corriere della Sera, 07/05/03, Titanic: 12.
Bollon acknowledged here he was not sure that this was a safe conclusion which could reached from Strauss’ work. He did not hesitate, nonetheless, to produce this view in the text. Further to this, Andrian Kreye discussed *Embedded* in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and argued:

‘Leo Strauss ... formed decisively with his ultra-pragmatic antithesis concerning moral relativism the world image of the neoconservatives like Deputy Defence Minister Paul Wolfowitz and editor of the Weekly Standard William Kristol / Leo Strauss...prägte mit seinen ultrapragmatischen Antithesen zum moralischen Relativismus entscheidend das Weltbild von Neokonservativen wie dem stellvertretenden Verteidigungminister Paul Wolfowitz und den Chefredakteuer des Weekly Standard William Kristol’

(Kreye, 17/03/04, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Feuilletton: 15).

Kreye saw in this case a similarity between the play and the comment pages of *The New York Times* with respect to Strauss’ influence on the neoconservative group.

Finally, *La Repubblica* published a translated article of Patrick McGrath who quoted from the book *On Tyranny* of Leo Strauss in which the British author illustrated the theorist as stressing the importance for a democratisation of the whole world. McGrath argued that Bush’s Junior administration adjusted its policy to the ‘domination programme / programma di dominazione’ of Strauss (McGrath, *La Repubblica*, 24/08/03, Cultura: 37).

**Having Secrets and Telling Lies**

Another issue the elite media covered in their interest in Strauss’ relationship to the neoconservatives was the idea of noble lies. Not all the accessed newspapers, however, discussed this issue. The French ones and *Il Corriere della Sera* ignored it. *Il Corriere della Sera* did not deal with it even while reporting from *Embedded* (Rossi, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 11/01/04: 36). The other newspapers reproduced the view that Strauss had taught the neoconservatives the method of noble lies.
The media which paid attention to the idea of ‘Straussian lies’ mainly dealt with theorists’ esotericism and his view that hidden meanings found in classical texts could be understood by only few people. Subsequently they explored if this belief of the political philosopher could be transformed into a preoccupation for secrecy in the political arena where supposedly only the elite few might know the truth. The newspapers connected here Strauss either implicitly or explicitly to the neoconservatives. The reason is that the latter might have arguably deceived people in the context of the US war on terror by cultivating a climate of fear and by telling lies concerning the possession of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the links of this country to al-Qaeda.

In this regard, the British elite newspapers had mainly Adam Curtis’ documentary and Tim Robbin’s play as their source of information. *The Times*, for instance, noted that for Leo Strauss the solution was ‘a government that could unite the people through a myth of nationhood’ (Segal, *The Sunday Times*, Features, Culture, 17/10/04: 72). *The Guardian* published an article which reported that BBC world affairs editor John Simpson had endorsed *Embedded* despite the corporations’ demand for neutrality on the Iraq war. This included the following excerpt from the programme notes of the play: ‘One of the great services that Strauss performed for the Bush Administration (was) the provision of a philosophy of the noble lie, the conviction that lies, far from being simply a regrettable necessity of public life, are instead virtuous and noble instruments of wise policy’ (Pierce, *The Times*, 15/09/04, Home News: 6). *The Guardian* also illustrated the political philosopher as a ‘believer in national secrets’ (Andrew, *The Guardian*, 24/10/04, Review Pages: 20). Further to this Andy Beckett was emphatic and argued:

‘Strauss’ certainty and his emphasis on the use of grand myths as a higher form of political propaganda created a group of influential disciples such as Paul Wolfowitz, now the US deputy defense secretary. They came to prominence by talking up the Russian threat during the cold war and have applied a similar strategy in the war on terror’

(Beckett, 15/10/04, Feature Pages: 21). 97

97 See also: Audrey, *The Guardian*, 31/03/04, Feature Pages: 11 and Adams, *The Observer*, 24/10/04, Review Pages: 8
Moreover, *The Guardian* published a comment of senior lecturer in history at Cambridge University Richard Drayton. Drayton took part in the debate about 'Straussian lies' and argued: ‘Neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Lewis Scooter Libby, learned from Leo Strauss that a strong and wise minority of humans had to rule over the weak majority through deception and fear, rather than persuasion or compromise’ (Drayton, *The Guardian*, 28/12/05, Comment and Debate Pages: 26).98

*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* maintained that the assumed influence of Leo Strauss as to the use of ‘necessary lies / notwendigen Lügen’ was not an imaginary notion (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feuilleton, 18/06/03: 35).99 For its part, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* concentrated on Strauss’ elitism and noted that according to the position of the philosopher the masses should not necessarily know the truth (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 04/07/03:16). In a similar case, *La Repubblica* quoted from British author Christopher Hitchens who asserted:

‘For the Straussians truth and liberty are not suitable for the rough masses, premises and objectives of a political choice (such as the war in Iraq) do not have to be publicly confessed / Per gli straussiani verità e libertà non si addicono alle rozze masse, premesse e obiettivi di una scelta politica (come la guerra in Iraq) non possono essere pubblicamente confessati’

(*La Repubblica*, 04/11/03, Cultura: 42).

Not all the accessed newspapers, nevertheless, agreed with the idea of Strauss's supposed insistence on noble lies. It was mentioned that *Le Figaro, Le Monde* and *Il Corriere della Sera* had ignored this theme in their analysis of the influence of the philosopher on the neoconservative group. This stance of the three newspapers maybe indicates that they did not accept the claim that the eminent theories taught the group to deceive the masses. Further to this, articles explicitly rejecting the idea of 'Straussian lies' were found in *The Times*. Clive David, for instance, noted that *Embedded* had been based on the work of 'the notorious anti-Semitic conspiracy theorist' Lyndon Larouche (*Davis, *The Times*, 06/09/04, Features: 17). *The Sunday Times* also commented

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98 It should be mentioned that *The Guardian* published two days later a reply from Douglas Murray expressing his disagreement with Drayton’s view (Murray, *The Guardian*, 30/12/05, Leader Pages: 29).
99 See also Geyer, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 23/06/03, Neue Sachbücher: 37

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ironically on the Power of Nightmares and the view of Adam Curtis that Leo Strauss had influenced the neoconservatives in telling lies to the people:

'What the neocons are here to provide, is a collective crusade, a sense of shared moral value that can only come from the focusing on a shared fear. So bring on global terrorism and the big lies about orange alert, imminent threats, dirty bombs, ricin in your sock drawer, anthrax in the mailbox and exploding supermarket shelf-stackers, to keep the fear hot and focused'

(Gill, 24/10/04, The Sunday Times, Features, Culture: 12).

In the view of the journalist American politics work almost exclusively on the assumption of conspiracy and Curtis’ documentary did not constitute an exception.

Yes, But...

Leo Strauss’ influence on the neoconservatives was not disputed by the media in spite of a few converging or absent views as to whether the philosopher had been a champion of noble lies. What the selected newspapers put in some cases into question was the direct impact of Strauss on the foreign policy of Bush’s Junior administration. Although they considered him as a powerful teacher they also argued that he had never dealt with international politics and died many years before the war on Iraq. The Times, for example, commented ironically and in a humoristic way on theorists’ supposed impact on the US decision to attack this country. Gerard Baker noted that before the war ‘Paul Wolfowitz had contacted the spirit of Leo Strauss to get final authorisation’ (Baker, The Times, 17/06/05, Features: 24). Furthermore, Le Monde asserted that it would be ‘simplistic’ to judge Strauss’ work only in relation to its potential impact on modern politics because it is infinitely rich and complex (Droit, Le Monde, 16/05/03). In this regard, Il Corriere della Sera quoted from Professor of American Enterprise Institute Michael Ledeen who deemphasised Strauss’ impact on US politics by arguing:

"Everyone talks about Leo Strauss but only a few have studied him. It certainly creates a great fuss saying that people in America refer to Machiavelli or Strauss with respect to

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international politics / Tutti parlano di Leo Strauss ma pochi lo hanno letto. Certo fa scalpore che in America ci citino Machiavelli o Strauss quando si parla di politica internazionale'

(Montefiori, *Il Corriere della Sera*, 04/10/03, Politica: 35).

Likewise *La Repubblica* published an article which rejected the idea of Strauss' influence on American politics by quoting from philosopher Richard Rorty:

'There is no link between the ideas of Strauss and those of figures such as Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld. The idea that the thoughts of Strauss to some extent account for the actions of the Bush administration is ridiculous / Non c'è nessun legame tra le idee di Strauss e quelle di persone come Bush, Cheney e Rumsfeld. L'idea che i pensieri di Strauss in qualche modo motivino le azioni dell' amministrazione Bush è ridicola'


Here Richard Rorty noted that the only motivation of the Bush administration was to be reelected. He therefore rejected the idea that political philosophers such as Leo Strauss had inspired US foreign policy with their work and teaching.

Furthermore, *Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* attributed particular importance to the peculiar way Strauss' adherents interpreted his philosophy after his death. These newspapers explained that although the theorist provided Straussian with a significant intellectual background, the latter partly modified their views and adjusted them to the requirements of the post-Cold War era. The media explained that the political philosopher had not been aware of the collapse of the bipolar structure of the world while he was teaching and writing. His supposed influence could thus not reflect the crucial change of the international environment after 1989 and the fact that the US remained as the sole superpower of the world. And of course it could not mirror the beginning of the new era for US foreign policy in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September.
Alain Frachon and Daniel Vemet, for example, explained in *Le Monde* that the importance attributed by the neoconservatives in the Bush administration to the nature of political regime and their support for militant democracy and American values:

‘derive possibly from Strauss’ teaching [which is] sometimes revised or corrected by Straussian of the second generation. One thing distinguishes them from their putative maitre: the optimism of messianism the neoconservatives deploy in order to bring liberty in the world (in the Middle East in the future, in Germany and Japan in the past) as if political voluntarism could change human nature / peuvent etre tires de l'enseignement de Strauss, parfois revu et corrige par les straussiens de la deuxieme generation. Une chose les separe de leur maitre putatif: l'optimisme teinte de messianisme que les neoconservateurs deploient pour apporter les libertes au monde (au Moyen -Orient demain, hier a l'Allemagne et au Japon), comme si le volontarisme politique pouvait changer la nature humaine.

(Frachon and Vemet, *Le Monde*, 16/04/03, Horizons).


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101 In one case *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* also suggested that it was mainly Carl Schmitt the source of inspiration for the American neoconservatives (Müller, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 05/05/04, Natur und Wissenschaft: N3).
Conclusion

This chapter showed that the selected newspapers had paid particular attention to the work and teaching of Leo Strauss. It was indicated that the prominence devoted to both the eminent theorist and his supposed acolytes had started to come to the forefront from 2003 onwards. The media portrayed Strauss since 2003 as a significant intellectual reference for the neoconservatives and attempted to explore his impact on US contemporary politics. They agreed that political philosopher's support for democracy and morality was crucial in shaping the thinking of the group. Further to this, they were cautious as to the direct impact his philosophy could have exerted on the implementation of US foreign policy after 11 September and especially the Iraq war.

Differences were, however, observed as concerns technical issues of the coverage in the four countries. The French, German and Italian press was more analytical in its representation of Leo Strauss. By contrast, British newspapers did not devote many lines to the debate insisting mainly on commercial sources such as *The Power of Nightmares*. In parallel with this, there was an issue the selected print media did not agree on in their representation of the political philosopher. They were divided over Strauss’s debatable support for noble lies. In this case, the two French print sources along with *The Times* and *Il Corriere della Sera* either ignored or deemphasised in their accounts the idea of ‘Straussian lies’. This observation, nonetheless, is only related to one parameter of Strauss’ influence on the neoconservatives. It can hardly distort the general conclusion that the political philosopher was perceived to be a powerful teacher for the neoconservative group by the accessed newspapers, which is the most important finding of the chapter.

The attention paid by the selected newspapers to the philosophy of Leo Strauss can be placed in their general interest in neoconservatism in the aftermath of 9/11. It can subsequently confirm their tendency to focus and analyse aspects of the political ideology after the terrorist attacks. The general position of the media was not only that the neoconservatives were influential in the Bush administration and responsible for the Iraq war in 2003 but also that the group had a ‘guru’ who was political philosopher Leo Strauss. The last chapter of the thesis will attempt to bring the findings of the research project together and elaborate on various theories which maybe led the European elite
newspapers to extensively deal with neoconservatism and focus on its supposed impact after 11 September 2001, and especially from 2003 onwards.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

The thesis offered an analysis of the way eight selected opinion-forming newspapers of Britain, France, Germany and Italy interpreted neoconservatism from the beginning of 1993 until the end of 2005. It was shown that the political ideology had largely impacted on their agenda since 9/11 and especially from 2003 onwards. The content of articles published in the period before 11 September 2001 could not have predisposed potential
readers of the accessed newspapers for the coverage of neoconservatism after the atrocities. Media coverage was not synchronised, the political ideology was constructed irrespective of US foreign policy and most members of the group's second generation were ignored. The position of the neoconservatives concerning critical issues such as terrorism was ignored. The foundation of the Project for the New American Century was not an issue of interest either.

Before 11 September neoconservatism was interpreted in many different ways. In most of the cases the European newspapers did not agree as to its meaning with the exception of US domestic politics. A usage of the term in national context was partly observed as for example in the case of the Italian newspapers. The thesis asserted that they had maybe focused on US Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich because of the entrance of media magnate Silvio Berlusconi in Italian political scene and the genesis of a new wave of conservatism in the country. It was suggested that Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica had also showed an ideological bias as their neutral and negative coverage respectively.

In the aftermath of 11 September and especially since 2003 the newspapers largely published on neoconservatism as opposed to the period before the terrorist attacks. They linked the political ideology almost exclusively to the development of US foreign policy and the military campaign against Iraq, agreed as to its meaning and principles and mainly focused on the second generation of the 'movement'. They showed a familiarity in using the term and the abbreviation 'neocon' or 'neocons' taking often the supposed influence on the group for granted. The accuracy in the use of the term neoconservatism or its equivalents by the accessed print sources - with only a few exceptions - could not put its quality into question.

The coverage showed signs of international relations theory use in the interest of the media to analyse the war on terror and especially the invasion of Baghdad. In this context, the neoconservatives were framed as very influential within the administration of Bush Junior and were often portrayed as responsible for the war on Iraq. The selected newspapers - with the exception of The Times - were not keen on challenging the alleged impact of the group on US foreign policy. They adopted as a whole a similar framework to what has been developed by intellectuals who attribute particular importance to the
role of the neoconservatives in Washington. The work of Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order, for instance, found particular resonance. The dominant position of the chosen printed media also was that the impact of political philosopher Leo Strauss had been of great significance for the neoconservative group.

The thesis explained that the European elite press exaggerated the influence of the neoconservatives in US foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 September. This argument was based on the analysis of Chapter 2 and 3 which showed that neoconservatism had existed in the literature of international relations before 9/11 and challenged the view that the group had been highly influential in Washington. On that basis, it was demonstrated that the media, which had not considered the political ideology as a particular foreign policy school before 9/11, linked it to US foreign policy after the terrorist attacks and especially from January 2003 onwards and concentrated on it to a higher degree than they did with competing international relations theories such as nationalism and realism. The vocabulary they often used describing the alleged neoconservative influence along with their increased interest in Strauss’s impact on the group only after 2003 also contributed to the above-mentioned conclusion.

This last chapter of the thesis will attempt to go further and explain the media stance in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. It will concentrate on the general consensus of the newspapers and will identify and comment on different factors which maybe led them to extensively deal with the political ideology in the aftermath of 11 September. The analysis will be associated with a discussion about the possible existence of a European public sphere, an issue of growing interest among various scholars and academics.

**Scapegoating?**

A possible explanation for the media stance to consider the neoconservatives as responsible for the Iraq war is that they maybe sought to find someone to blame for the conduct of US foreign policy after 9/11. Neoconservatism could constitute a convenient device in their coverage of the US military operation against Baghdad. In other words, members of the group were maybe an appropriate scapegoat for the media. Such a tactic
is not a new one but can be traced back to Greek philosopher Apollonius of Tyana. In the 1st century AD this philosopher identified a beggar as an expiatory victim for the plague hitting then Ephesus. He thus successfully persuaded the Ephesians to attack the beggar in order to tackle the problem of the disease (Burkert, 1993: 188-191).

Scapegoating can be considered as a source of aid and comfort when general problems have to be faced and controversial policies have to be either justified or forgotten. In this case the media which opposed the Iraq war - with the exception of The Times - might have been keen on finding an ancillary way for articulating their opposition to this military campaign. In Britain and Italy neoconservatism was maybe a buffer of the criticism of Tony Blair and Silvio Berlusconi for their active cooperation with George W. Bush. In France and Germany the crucial role the neoconservatives supposedly played for the Iraq war was perhaps a good justification for the failure of Chirac’s and Schröder’s governments to put pressure on Washington to choose the option of diplomacy. This would have entailed to give Saddam Hussein more time to disarm as both countries had suggested at the UN.

The consideration of the neoconservatives as expiatory victims challenges the conventional wisdom that their role was catalytic in the Bush administration. John Macionis explains that a scapegoat is ‘a person or a category of people’, typically with little power, whom people unfairly blame for their own troubles (Macionis, 1997: 330, 331). So, can it be argued that the neoconservatives were unfairly blamed for the Iraq war? Partly yes. Although the analysis of US foreign policy since 9/11 certainly requires a reference to neoconservatism, the political ideology is arguably a key component in it. The fact that the neoconservatives supported the Iraq war does not entail that they led the US to this military campaign. As we saw in Chapter 3 they had not taken positions in the top tier of the administration and their role could not but have some limits.

**Oversimplification?**

Given neoconservatism is arguably a key component in US foreign policy after 9/11 the particular media attention to its supposed significant impact can be also attributed to another factor. The negative evaluation of the political ideology and the portrayal of the group as responsible for the Iraq war was maybe an easy, non-laborious way for some
journalists to deal with Washington’s world affairs approach. These journalists might have preferred to simply put the blame on the neocons than to elaborate on a complex, difficult and in-depth analysis of US foreign policy. Such an observation can be strengthened by the routinised use of the term ‘neoconservatism’ in the media discourse and the fact that its supposed impact along with that of Leo Strauss were often taken for granted.

International news coverage has received criticism by some analysts who note that it ‘tends to shallow’ (Sreberny, 1995: 430). Some scholars also put nowadays the quality of serious journalism into question and argue that its high standards based on rational analysis and thorough, dispassionate investigation are being undermined by triviality (McDonald, 2000: 251; Sparks, 2000: 1). Although neoconservatism is certainly not a trivial issue in US foreign policy, its core philosophy is questionably a revolutionary one as the newspapers constructed it. The question which can be raised is if Bush’s military doctrine after 9/11 was based on a supposed neoconservative revolution or on the fundamental principle in the history of international relations that great powers use force to serve their own interests. As we saw in Chapter 3 the US had shown an interventionist and preemptive tendency in its foreign policy long before the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the rise of the neoconservatives.

In this context, US foreign policy is maybe oversimplified if the supposed influence of the neoconservatives is overstated as it happened in the media discourse. The impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September should not be underestimated in the US administration’s decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Washington acted preemptively and used military force against Iraq in order to fight against terrorism. The oil parameter - as Chapter 3 explained - can be also considered as crucial. Therefore, US foreign policy can be arguably considered as being ‘hijacked’ by a few neoconservative politicians and intellectuals who managed to promote their own ideas.

**A conspiracy theory?**

Furthermore, the emphasis the media laid on the supposed crucial impact of neoconservatism can be also possibly attributed to their desire to concentrate on a story which seemed to be peculiar and could attract the attraction of readers. Some scholars
such as Robert Lieber consider the theory based on the idea that the neoconservatives promoted their own foreign policy after 9/11 as a conspiracy one (Lieber, 2005: 186). In fact it has similarities with a conspiracy one although it questionably constitutes one of that kind per se. According to Daniel Pipes the defining feature of a conspiracy theory is the belief in the existence of a narrow circle of powerful individuals who convert plans and schemes and determine the course of history' (Pipes, 1997: 15). A favourite topic of modish conspiracy theorists is concerned with the clandestine activities of a malign group which is taking over the government of the US (Idid: 15 and Byford, 2002: 26).

The selected newspapers focused indeed on the group of the neoconservatives, often called as a ‘cabal’, and depicted it as having managed to influence the US administration for the necessity of the Iraq war. This group was also illustrated to be inspired by a ‘guru’, political philosopher Leo Strauss. The main difference of the approach of the media which contradicts the definition of a conspiracy theory is that they did not refer to ‘clandestine activities’ of the neoconservatives and did not illustrate them as plotting in secret. Although the supposed influence of the group can be regarded as being exaggerated in the media discourse, its presence in the US and the Bush administration was not imaginary but visible. Further to this, the equation of the supposed significant influence of the neoconservatives with a conspiracy theory, certainly downgrades the work of scholars such as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke.

The media might be keen on largely reproducing a theory which can maybe give the impression of a conspiracy one. That kind of theories are very popular and often enjoy a high level of public acceptance (Pipes, 1997: 16). This is of course relevant to the fact that in the contemporary market-driven news order audiences are often regarded as consumers (Stanyer, 2007: 95, 96). The commercial success of conspiracy stories concerning US foreign policy after 11 September is remarkable. Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11, which developed the link between the family of George W. Bush family and those of prominent Saudis, constitutes an example. It not only attracted a significant number of viewers and broke records for the best-sold documentary ever when it was

102 In the US, for instance, a conspiracy theory with great success is that of the assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963. According to opinion polls, some two-thirds of Americans in 1963 suspected a conspiracy and 56 percent of the population still did so in 1991 (Washington Post, 19/05/1991 quoted in Pipes: 15).
released as a DVD and VHS but also won the Palme d’Or prize at Cannes Film festival in 2004. Another example is *Loose Change*. The creators of this film maintained that the terrorist attacks had been organised by the US government. They illustrated subsequently George W. Bush as implementing the pre-existing agenda promoted by the Project of the New American Century. 100 million people had watched the film by January 2007 (*The Guardian*, 26/01/07).

**Common Political Discourse**

Besides the factors which maybe led the accessed newspapers to largely focus on neoconservatism since 9/11 and mainly 2003, an additional observation can be made. This is relevant to the synchronisation and homogenisation of the coverage. Starting with the former concept this has its basis in the comparison of the volume of articles containing the term neoconservatism or its equivalents. The thesis showed that synchronisation can be confirmed by the explosion of articles published by all the newspapers from January 2003 onwards and the greater interest the media showed in the political ideology at the same periods of time, specifically in March 2003, November 2004, March 2005 and September 2005.

As for homogenisation it can be argued that the coverage showed a high degree of similarity. It cannot be claimed, nonetheless, that it was completely homogenised. Differences in coverage were acknowledged even in the aftermath of 9/11, although they rarely reflected a national sensitivity. This only happened in the case of the ‘neoconservative Tories’ in Britain and in that of the relationship between Turkey and the EU in France. Most of the differences were regarded as arbitrary ones. Some newspapers, for example, attributed the label ‘neoconservative’ to a few figures not known as such in the literature of international relations while others did not analyse in depth the origins of the political ideology.

Furthermore, in the case of Leo Strauss’s representation the British elite newspapers were less analytical than the French, German and Italian ones although *The Times* and *The Guardian* followed a similar approach with the other European print sources in their analysis of neoconservatism itself. In addition, attention had to be paid to the single newspaper (Archetti, 2008). Obviously, *The Times* constituted the most characteristic
example as it was keen on challenging the view that the neoconservatives had been highly influential in Washington. The increased interest of *Le Monde* on the political ideology and its high analytical coverage were also explained because its editors Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet are the authors of a book on neoconservatism.

In spite of the observed differences the coverage of neoconservatism by the media - with the exception of *The Times* - can be regarded as largely homogenised. That is because the selected newspapers understood neoconservatism within a US foreign policy context and decoded its meaning in a similar way in the aftermath of 9/11 as opposed to the period before the terrorist attacks. Although the context of news and comment pieces, in which the political ideology was discussed, was not always the same, their agreement on the interpretation of the term and in particular on the idea of the supposed influence of the group in Washington cannot be contested. In other words, the homogenisation in content is mainly related to their general consensus as to the role of the 'movement' in the US which led to them to similarly analyse its foreign policy philosophy. This said it seems that the media of the 'Big Four' have established a more globally oriented political discourse in their analysis of US foreign policy after 11 September (Volkmer, 2003: 236).

It is certainly acknowledged that journalists are inclined in favour of what is culturally familiar, many of the news values are common in most newsrooms in Europe (Manning, 2001: 68). Comparative studies confirm, however, that despite differences in social and cultural formation, subjects about political elites and powerful people, as in this project the neoconservatives were perceived to be, are common favourites among news editors (ibid: 68).

The emphasis of the selected European newspapers on neoconservatism after 9/11 reflects maybe their struggle to negotiate the complexities of the international crisis and especially the Iraq war. As Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan put it, 'September 11 has decisively transformed the everyday contexts within which many journalists routinely operate...News organisations - together with their sources - lacked a readymade script to tell their stories, a frame to help them and their audiences comprehend the seemingly incomprehensive' (Zelizer and Allan, 2003: 1). Neoconservatism was maybe the media response to this lack of 'a readymade script'. This research project can also complement existing empirical studies which deal with EU media coverage. Its main difference is that
it did not analyse the coverage of an EU topic per se but dealt with the mediation of a subject - neoconservatism - which is related to political developments in the US. Although, a discussion about the 'dissemination of a European news agenda' is not applicable in this thesis, an interesting conclusion can be reached. This is that the coverage of neoconservatism in the selected newspapers of the 'Big Four' showed signs of synchronisation and homogenisation in a period which saw not only EU’s split over its foreign policy but also high tensions in transatlantic relations.

It is a risky claim to suggest that the findings of the thesis can support the idea of a European public sphere. That is because the chosen print media of Britain, France, Germany and Italy do not necessarily represent it. No regional newspapers, for instance, were used in the project to investigate if they also largely dealt with neoconservatism. Further to this, the political ideology is not a European issue per se and therefore it could not be explored if the media of the ‘Big Four’ paid a similar attention to a theme exclusively related to the EU. In addition, the differences in their coverage, although they were generally not regarded as marked ones, cannot but underestimate the idea of the existence of a homogenised public sphere in the EU.

The consensus of the selected newspapers in their representation of neoconservatism, however, can be considered as a positive step towards the creation of a European public sphere. This observation does not only refer to the common interpretation of the political ideology by the media but also to their general understanding of Washington’s world affairs approach. As it was explained in Chapter 8, journalists of the ‘Big Four’ significantly framed US foreign policy through the perspective of neoconservatism after 2003 as they focused on it to a a larger degree than they did with competing international relations such nationalism and realism. This perhaps entails that citizens of Britain, France, Germany and Italy who had the chosen newspapers as their source of information could have possibly a common understanding of Washington’s international affairs approach.

The common understanding of US foreign policy by citizens of the ‘Big Four’ would have been highly negative as the accessed newspapers significantly criticised the neoconservatives for their supposed role for the Iraq war. The negative assessment of the group and its plan to export democracy by military means in the media discourse reflects
perhaps the negative picture of the US and its foreign policy in Europe. The possible common understanding of US foreign policy by citizens of the ‘Big Four’ would also have had another implication. It might have contradicted the divided stance of the governments of their countries over the Iraq war. British and Italian citizens might have interpreted US foreign policy as negatively as German and French ones although Blair and Berlusconi disagreed with the position of Chirac and Schröder and actively cooperated with Bush by sending troops to Iraq.

**Europeanized media discourse?**

The subsequent question which can be raised is if the concept of homogenisation in coverage - as it was explained in this project - shows signs of a potential Europeanization. Kevin Featherstone defines Europeanization as a process of structural change affecting - inter alia - ideas and interests. He adds that this change ‘must fundamentally be of a phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with Europe’ (Featherstone, 2003: 3). In this regard, three themes reflecting a particular European interest can be possibly acknowledged in the highly negative coverage of neoconservatism by the selected newspapers of the ‘Big Four’.

The first European interest which maybe led the chosen newspapers to criticise the neoconservatives is the support of the latter for a war-based policy. The EU is generally cautious to use force and is more prepared - compared to the US - to live with difficult situations than to try to solve problems by military means (Cameron, 2005: 162, 163). Europe has a sensitivity regarding a war-based policy maybe because of its historical experience which saw its ground to be the main battlefield of two World Wars. In this context, war is considered by the EU as the last resort in its approach in international affairs. The preservation of peace and the option of diplomacy constitute its fundamental foreign policy principles. Jeremy Rifkin outlines the policy of the EU by writing in his account: ‘European leaders ask rhetorically: Who knows better than us the terrible consequences that can result from nations attempting to assert their will over others by means of coercion and force?’ (Rifkin, 2005: 197).

The second possible European motivation predisposing perhaps negatively the media towards the neoconservatives was the ignorance of the group for international law.
Europe believes in the rule of law and legal norms. It does so not only as a matter of idealism but also realism. In the EU view, institutions offer a reliable framework where power is best exercised and where collective action increases efficiency (Haine, 2003: 121). In parallel with this, multilateralism based on global cooperation is considered in Europe as the most appropriate way to respond to problems and challenges of the world. After the terrorist attacks EU former External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten, for instance, doubted if the US could resolve the new security threats on its own (Cameron, 2005, 183, 184). In the case of Iraq many European countries - in spite if the Union's split - considered the UN route the most appropriate one to be followed.

And thirdly, the media stance towards the neoconservatives was perhaps influenced by the opposition of the latter to the project of European integration. The antipathy of the chosen newspapers for the group reflected maybe their interest in the smooth functioning of the Union. It also mirrored possibly their concern for a potential failure of the neoconservative plan for the Middle East which contradicted the EU policy. In particular, while the neoconservatives sought to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by hoping to export democracy in the region, Europe considered the resolution of the conflict itself as the fundamental presupposition for the establishment of peace. In the post-Cold War era the Union has emerged as a strategic actor towards the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a high priority in its foreign policy agenda (Dannreuther, 2004: 153; Soetendorp, 1999: 112). It therefore sought to continue playing a significant role in the region after 9/11 and not to be the observer of a possible expansion of democracies on the basis of a domino theory as the neoconservatives had wished.

In spite of the acknowledgement of the afore-mentioned potential European interests in the coverage, the selected media did not go further and comment on the potential development of a significant EU role vis-à-vis the neoconservatives. In other words, they did not regard the Union as a distinctive international actor which had maybe to promote its own views in the international arena and respond subsequently to the foreign policy of the neoconservatives. It can thus hardly be argued that in their coverage of the political ideology the selected newspapers saw the EU as needing to act united and speak with one voice in the world stage. Furthermore, although some signs of Europeanization can be
observed in the discourse of the selected newspapers, the negative predisposition towards neoconservatism with emphasis on its supposed significant impact does not constitute an exclusive EU phenomenon. It is a usual charge of opponents of the political ideology in the US, such as Patrick Buchanan, and many critics of the Iraq war which was welcomed and reproduced in the EU media. In parallel with that, the anti-American tinge of the coverage is not a distinctive European development. Anti-Americanism is not only concerned with countries of the Union but has rather a global dimension. It spans the globe from Europe to Asia and from South America to Asia (Pew Research Center website, 24/01/05).

*Post scriptum*

Neoconservatism is arguably a key component in US foreign policy after 11 September. The Iraq war was supported not only by members of the group but also by other US politicians many of whom had been higher ranked. In addition, the neoconservatives are questionably inventors of new foreign policy ideas and concepts. The US decision to use force preemptively in 2003 in order to serve its own national interest has precedents in the history of the country while Washington's perceived hegemonic role can be traced back to the work of Thucydides. In this context, although it was acknowledged that a reference to neoconservatism is necessary for the analysis of US foreign policy since 9/11, the media overemphasis on its supposed impact was attributed to various factors.

The particular focus of the selected newspapers - with the exception in some cases of *The Times* - on the neoconservatives and Leo Strauss was placed in their interest to find a plausible explanation for US foreign policy in the period of uncertainty after 11 September. The selected newspapers wanted maybe to find an appropriate scapegoat - the neoconservatives - for the Iraq war. Perhaps they also used sometimes the term as a convenient device in order to escape from a laborious analysis of US foreign policy. Moreover, the media possibly sought to attract the attention of readers by reproducing a story which had many similarities with a conspiracy theory. The thesis, however, did not equate the supposed impact of the neoconservatives with a conspiracy theory as for example scholar George Lieber argued.
In addition, the general consensus of the media as to the significant impact of neoconservatism in US foreign policy was regarded as the main reason the concept of homogenisation was used in this project in spite of a few observed differences. This homogenisation along with the synchronisation in the coverage of the accessed European newspapers since 2003 led to a discussion about the potential existence of a European public sphere. Although this claim was not supported, the fact that potential readers of the selected newspapers in the ‘Big Four’ might have understood US foreign policy in a similar way - that is to say through the perspective of neoconservatism - was considered as a positive development in the interest of further European integration. Finally, the similarity in the coverage of the political ideology was arguably seen as the result of a europeanization in the media discourse. It was rather seen as being part of a global phenomenon.

**Implications for further research**

The thesis offered some conclusions concerning the construction of neoconservatism by selected newspapers in the Big Four. However, there are certainly points it did not discuss or cover. As we saw the political ideology had been associated with Washington’s world affairs approach in the aftermath of 11 September. With respect to that a significant limitation of this project is that it did not provide an in-depth analysis of the context - that is to say of the general coverage of US foreign policy by the media. On the contrary, it is only based on articles referring to foreign policy schools such neoconservatism, nationalism and realism. Future research can maybe analyse the general coverage of US foreign policy after 9/11 by the European media on the basis of specific dates or events and not only focus on the usage of international relations theories.

This research project attempted to analyse why the media focused on the significant influence of the neoconservatives and Leo Strauss. Explanations, however, were mainly based on the literature of media studies. The opinion of journalists and editors who used the term neoconservatism or its equivalents remained unknown. Further to this, the project did not deal with elite public opinion in Britain, France, Germany and Italy in relation to its understanding of neoconservatism. The results of the thesis can be possibly
complemented if interviews with journalists of the selected newspapers will be arranged and focus groups - maybe with subscribers of the chosen print media - will be conducted.

Moreover, the thesis had the year of 2005 as its ending point. Although the analysis included the first year of the second term of Bush Junior's administration, a significant part of it was ignored. This was due to specific time budget and the high volume of articles which had to be read, especially between the year of 2003 and that of 2005. It will be interesting to complement the project with an analysis of the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. In so doing, the coverage of neoconservatism will be explored in both terms of the presidency of George W. Bush and comparisons will be possibly made.

This research can be also expanded with an analysis of the coverage of neoconservatism in other European newspapers. In this way, the European public sphere could be represented by the media of a higher number of countries of the Union and not only by four of them. The results of this thesis can finally constitute a basis for a comparison with the findings of a future project that will focus on the interpretation of the political ideology by the US media.

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