International sporting events, nationalism and sport diplomacy

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International Sporting Events, Nationalism and Sport Diplomacy:
The evolving relationships between North and South Korea from 1978 to 2007

by

Hyunjoo Cho

A Doctoral Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

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Ⓒ by Hyunjoo Cho (2012)
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Abstract

Scholarship concerning relations between North and South Korea has focused on the political and economic areas of relations between the two Koreas’, and the ‘unification’ issue has been mainly considered a work of ‘government’ conducted in the formal political domain. However, this thesis examines the Olympics and international sporting events as major sources and vehicles of discourse reflecting but also shaping relations between North and South Korea.

The thesis, adopting a Critical Realist ontology, applies a constructivist theory of International Relations to establish how the framework of North and South Korean sports relations contributes to, and at times drive, political relations. The study adopts Critical Discourse Analysis as method, and the analysis protocols employed were established by adapting frames of reference from the work of Fairclough (2005) and Jäger and Meyer (2009). In terms of the sources employed the North Korean newspaper Roh-Dong, which is subject to state control we take to represent the view of the North Korean regime. This was selected as a resource to illustrate how the North Korean government sought to construct a particular discourse concerning national identity, political position and sport. South Korean newspapers Dong-A and Hankyoreh were chosen to identify two relatively different (relatively ‘right’ and ‘left’ in Korean terms) political views evident in the South Korean context and their constructions around these issues. In addition, the summaries of North and South Sports Talks published by the South Korean government provide a source of data reflecting South Korean governmental interests.

From 1978 to 2007, the changes in the international context from Cold War to post-Cold War and the domestic political changes in particular in South Korea, framed each decade’s North and South Korean sports relations. The shared notion of national identity and of nationhood, reflected in the ‘primordial nationalism’ evident in both North and South Koreans’ view of themselves (and of one another) as drawn from the same ‘bio-cultural stock’, is a factors shaping the actions of governments and other stakeholders. This ideology of shared heritage goes some way to explain why despite regularly occurring political tensions, there was a recurring appeal to common identity which manifest itself in sporting activity in for example the consideration of building unified teams in major competitions, or marching together at Olympic opening ceremonies.
Thus the role of sport in developing relations between North and South Korea is one which is more than simply a reflection of the state of diplomatic relations, but is actually a significant shaper of such relations. Sport diplomacy, though a form of ‘soft’ diplomacy, is in this case a key factor to be incorporated with the explanation of developing political relations.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, henceforth North Korea in this thesis) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, henceforth South Korea) represent a divided nation, and this division is one of the remnants of World War II. A considerable amount of academic analysis has centred on national security and the unification of the two Koreas, mainly involving consideration of 'hard politics' employed to ensure cessation of the war between the two countries. However, little attention has been paid to the relations between North and South Korea in respect of cultural relations between the two. In particular the peculiar tension between on the one hand nationalisms emerging through national pride in sporting and in particular Olympic performance, and on the other the 'universalist' and inclusive ideology of Olympism has been little debated in the Korean context. The fact that sport has played a key and often sensitive role in the diplomatic relations between the two Koreas is reflected in the explicit concerns of government. For example, reflecting the sensitivity of both governments, the South Korean press reported in January 1989 that:

......The Ministry of Sport (South Korea) announced that it will limit the North Korean and South Korean sports interaction to discussions concerning international matches which are organised by International federations and Asian federations......(Translated from Korean by the author)

(Dong-A 13, January, 1989; 1959)

In some senses, given the adversarial relationship between their political systems North and South Korea have exhibited a relatively generous attitude concerning the development of interaction through international sporting events. This illustrates the significance of the role of sport diplomacy in developing links between the North and South which have otherwise been frustrated by national differences in political and economic ideology. The antagonism between the North and South has not just been a domestic issue. Rather it was the result of the international political climate of the Cold War. North and South Korea sought to resolve this tension between them by employing various methods, such as cultural interaction and humanitarian aid. These links also included sporting events under the governance of international organisations. This thesis focuses on the development of interaction of the
North and South through sport, and in particular on how sporting events, and the negotiations surrounding them, have contributed to be countering all the reinforcement of political, economic, and social divisions or tensions between the two.

In the contemporary context, governments' use of sport for domestic political ends and foreign affairs is a well-known phenomenon. At the same time, these political rationales have been criticised as ‘impure’ motives for engagement in the sporting domain, for political purposes which can ‘corrupt’ the nature of sporting events. It is argued for example that in the case of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the South Korean government used sporting events as a tool to deflect people’s attention away from domestic political issues as well as a vehicle for attracting inward economic investment rather than promoting sport for its intrinsic value. In recent years there has been a more explicit acknowledgement of the role of sport as a positive tool of international politics. This is illustrated for example in the developing of a close relationship between the IOC and the UN in the use of sport for development and peace, and the subsequent provision of ‘observer status for the IOC at the UN (IOC 2009:10). The question of how to use this ‘soft power’ of areas such as sport has been engaged current scholarship across a range of fields. This thesis will investigate the role which sport has played in the ‘soft politics’ of relations between North and South Korea by analysing the development of ‘Inter-national’ and ‘intra-national’ relations through sport across three time periods. It will do so by reference to the analysis of discourses used in media sources in North and South Korea, and in South Korean documents relating to the ‘Sports Talks’ between North and South from 1978 to 2007.

1.1 Research Aims
The study will focus in particular on the role of international sporting events in the evolution of relations between the divided nations of North and South Korea. It will outline the ways in which the different forms of nationalism and national identity evident in this case reflect attitudes toward patriotism in the Olympic Games and in sport interaction more broadly, with
the existence of, or support for, separate/joint teams or entities. It also seeks to demonstrate how this has (been) reflected in and influenced by sport diplomacy between North and South. The role of the superpowers in the Cold War period will be reviewed and also in the multi-polar context of the Post-Cold War period, when dominant powers have sought to influence the ways in which Olympic politics are played out. The research will also address the issue of the contexts within which the Olympic Movement can act as a stimulus for promoting positive or negative relations between North and South Korea.

The study of the case of North and South Korea can generate insights into the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ uses of sport in particular diplomatic contexts. Drawing on theoretical material associated with international context, and concepts and understandings of nationalism and national identity, the study will consider ways in which the relationship between sport and nationalism has changed over time. The contemporary context of the early 21st century is very different from that of the Cold War and the political roles which sport can play in diplomacy have evolved accordingly. Moreover the status of the IOC in international politics has also changed and the impact on the international context requires consideration. A major goal of the Olympic Movement is in part to promote positive international relations among different cultural entities through sport, as evidenced in the Olympic Charter (IOC 2011:10).

“The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”

Thus the Olympic value of peace through sport is potentially a critical diplomatic good.

A major focus of this thesis is therefore on how international sporting events, in particular the Olympics and beyond that, been used as a tool in the management of diplomatic relations between North and South Korea. Critical to understanding the relationship between North and South, is an understanding not simply of international relations but also of the nature of
nationalism and national identity in the two Koreas which has developed with its own specificities (Shin and Robinson 2000).

1.2 Research Structure

This research seeks to evaluate the role played by sport in the developing relations between the North and the South. In particular claims that the Olympic movement and specifically the Olympic opportunity provided by the 1988 Seoul Games, possibly used to enhance the development of peaceful relations between the two entities will be considered. The sporting dialogue which will be the focus of analysis in this thesis takes place in the context of what are often increasingly conflicting relations between the two states and their respective allies, conflict which other forms of international interaction such as that under the auspices of the UN, and forms of ‘hard politics’ have found it difficult to counter.

Chapter 1, the introduction, outlines the research aims, structure and context of the study.

Chapter 2 provides an account of the methods and findings of a systematic review of the literature. The review culminates in a thematic analysis of the literature identified in the systematised search.

In Chapter 3, methodological issues are discussed including the philosophical position adopted in terms of ontology and epistemology, the identification of appropriate primary sources to be subject to analysis, as well as the process of conducting that analysis through Critical Discourse Analysis.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the analysis of the three periods selected for consideration in this research. Chapter 4 incorporates analysis of materials from 1978 to 1987. The year of 1978 was chosen as of the start date, since this reflects the beginnings of interest in Sports Talks while 1987 is the year before the staging of the Games when North
Korean attempts to have the IOC remove the Games from South Korea were beginning to recede, to be replaced by the ultimately frustrated proposal to have the Games held jointly in the North and the South. The famous boycotting in 1980 in Moscow and in 1984 in Los Angeles, and the discourse exchanges around these events between the two Koreas are included together with the reaction of North Korea to the awarding to Seoul of the 1988 Olympic Games are dealt with as major discourse themes. This chapter provides examples of North and South interactions in the Cold War context and of discourse which illustrates the specific (and largely common) character of nationalism in the two Koreas.

Chapter 5 covers the decade from the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, up to the 1997 financial crisis in which the International Monetary Fund had to come to the aid of South Korea. In this context of flux, discourses relating to joint and separate participation in international sporting events are described and analysed. With the success of 1988 Seoul Games, the awareness of political usages of sporting events was well understood by both regimes, and the North and South Korean Sports Talks to some extent became a regular feature of the period. In particular the discussion associated with the concept of a unified team for North and South Korea was a major theme, and the significance of a unified team (where one was formed or when it was resisted) was elaborated in the official Sports Talks between the two Koreas.

Chapter 6 deals with the period from 1998 to 2007 in which the North and South Korean sport interactions took place in the post-Cold War context. Any optimistic expectations of the North and South Korean Sport interactions for the previous two decades had not been realised, and the limitations of inter-governmental negotiations had become evident. Therefore, the leading role of governments in the discourses of sport relations gave way to, or was at least joined by, private sector initiatives. Hyundai, for example, followed its founder’s wish to develop North-South cooperation in sport, and made various contributions to the promotion of sporting relations between the two Koreas, generating practical legacies.
such as private-sector led sporting events, and the cross-border movement of people and materials.

The conclusions of this research in Chapter 7 include the summary of North and South Korean sporting interactions from 1978 to 2007 to highlight the issues which have been discussed between two Koreas. The final chapter also seeks to identify the contribution of this research to knowledge in the field of sports diplomacy.

### 1.3 Background to the Research

#### 1.3.1 The Rhetoric of ‘Peace’ in the context of the Seoul Olympic Games

The 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul was a ‘popular’ event in its own right but was expressly used by the national political leaders. In the 1960s, South Korea, supported by the US, was not as strong in military and economic terms as its northern counterpart, which was under the patronage of the Soviet Union. In this period, the balance of power between two Koreas was complicated and peace was not assured. The South Korean political leaders wanted to use the Olympics as an opportunity to gain world recognition, and to persuade IOC members that the Games would help to promote peace, but also to use the Games to promote economic development.

The major goal of the Olympic Movement is to promote positive international relations between different cultural groups through promoting Olympic values. Indeed although the IOC is seen the world over as primarily a sporting body, the Olympic Charter describes sport as a ‘means’ (to achieving broadly humanitarian goals) rather than as an end in itself. However in the context of international competition, an understanding of nationalism and within/between nation rivalry will be critical to an understanding of how the Olympic message might be spread. Olympism as a philosophy emphasises peace, and this is a cornerstone of the Olympic Charter. The goal of Olympism is “to place sport at the service of the
harmonious development of man (sic), with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity" (IOC 2011:10). This prioritising of humanitarian goals goes some way to explaining why the UN and the IOC’s relationship have deepened in recent years, in particular in relation to the UN’s adoption of the programme ‘Sport for Development and Peace’.

1.3.2 Sport and the International Relations

The concept of ‘power’ in International Relations (IR) is generally agreed as an “ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want” (Nye 2008:94). Power is one of the essential units of analysis in international relations, not only for academic purposes, but also as the driver of practical applications of foreign policy. In relation to US foreign policy, discussion about the failure of ‘Hard power’ and the subsequent need to exercise influence via ‘Soft power’ in its relations with the Arab world emerged following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A traditional realist approach towards foreign policy, which characterised the approach of the Bush administrations, was dominantly activated on the basis of a ‘hard power’ approach – the use of economic and military strength to influence others in the form of either ‘incentives’ or ‘coercion’. However, this approach had limitations, and an alternative approach which used persuasion and image, so-called soft power, to achieve compliance, has thus also been employed. ‘Soft power’ is defined by the initiator of the term as the ability to influence others through persuasion and attraction (he refers to the attractiveness of US culture, political values, institutions and policies as assets of national power) which can be used to persuade others to align themselves with the interests of another nation (Nye 2008:94-95).

Since the Cold War system disintegrated, despite differences among nations in terms of political ideology, these differences became less serious obstacles in inter-nation interaction, and this produced a power structure which was ‘relative rather than absolute and defined along different dimensions. In this context, the cultural aspects of national power gained more recognition and were more valued than had been the case. ‘Public Diplomacy’ is a
relatively new term in the academy, and had tended to be treated as a purely symbolic activity which was not taken ‘seriously’ and treated as peripheral. However, since the end of Cold War era with the emergence of various regional networks of nations the relationship between soft and hard power has been much investigated with the focus primarily on the potential of ‘Soft power’ (Kim 2009:337-338).

The necessity of proper public diplomacy encourages governments to look for more efficient soft power resources. However, this does not mean that hard power is no longer considered as a central feature of foreign policy, but rather heralds a new approach which combines hard and soft power, framed as a new concept, ‘Smart power’ (Nye 2008:107-108). Wilson III (2008) emphasises ‘Smart power’, since hard power shows limitations in terms of using military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions as foreign policy resources, based on the neo-realist theoretical tradition, and soft power influences are seen as more evident in the approaches adopted by emerging nations on the international stage. Wilson suggests that the efficient use of smart power is the key to the success of one nation’s foreign policy, and this can be achieved by the use of smart strategies (Wilson 2008:120-122).

1.3.3 The United Nations (UN) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC)

On 19th October 2009, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) achieved observer status in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. This is not surprising news if the relationship between the UN and the IOC is looked back on. The year 2005 was designated as the year of Sport and Physical Education by the UN and many practical projects were planned and conducted by the UN and the IOC. There is an office of Sport for Development and Peace (UNOSDP) in the UN (introduced by Kofi Annan in 2001), and various projects are systematically implemented and on-going with the cooperation with IOC. Therefore observer status was not just a diplomatic gesture but based on ‘real’ cooperation in areas such as
humanitarian assistance, peace-building, education, gender equality, environment and the fight against HIV/AIDS.

As the IOC president Jacques Rogge said, “This is huge recognition of the role sport can play in contributing to a better and peaceful world” (IOC 2009:9), the IOC promotes sport at a new level. He also added that “The Olympic values clearly match with the UN philosophy. Today’s decision further strengthens the partnership between the IOC and the UN system” (IOC 2009:9) This does not just mean general agreement on the concept of peace, but goes back to the tradition of the Olympic Truce. The Truce was revived by the IOC in 1992, and recognised by UN resolution 48/11 on 25 October 1993 as a means of harnessing the cultural and moral power of Olympism in reducing war and conflict.

With regard to the issues relating to North and South Korea, the UN and the IOC are both deeply involved as significant actors in international relations. However, compared to the political and legislative status of the UN, the IOC’s role was to act as something of a ‘lubricant’ between the North and South. Dependent on political circumstances, the voice of sport has on occasions proposed and rejected various ideas, and despite being a ‘non-political area’, has worked as a useful communication channel for both nations. Consequently, those capabilities of the IOC and sport events to promote peace and other goals of the UN have resulted in the UN assuming the role of a co-obligated international organisation for peace.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the systematic review for this research will be explained as vehicle for understanding the present progress of this field of interdisciplinary research. However, prior to the systematic review, a consideration of two areas of theory is undertaken namely, fundamental theories drawn from the fields of International Relations and Nationalism. These preliminary elements were regarded as crucial to the development of the research framework for this study. In this chapter, more specifically a constructivist theory of International Relations will be briefly described as the basis for analysis the use of sport in the socially constructed relations between North and South Korea. In addition, exploration of the concept of ‘two state, one nation’ requires acknowledgment of Nationalism theory in explaining the phenomenon of Korean national identity. The chapter then moves on the main part of the literature review, the process of the systematic review methodology adopted and the result of this review.

2.1.1 Theoretical Framework

In North and South Korean sport relations, the international geopolitical situation of two Koreas is well-known with their ideological differences. This research evaluates a constructivist approach to fulfil the purpose of this research to understand how North and South Korea described and thus construct and respond to their international context and position as ‘a reality’ in their sport interactions. The constructivist approach argues that while there are real interests at play in international relations these are socially constructed in the interaction between nations (Wendt 1999; Zehfuss 2001:72-74).

The approach adopted here seeks to understand the emerging pattern of relationships between North and South Korea as forged in their interaction in part (and significantly) around sport, and the differing understandings they adopt or promote in their interactions.
Alongside the concern with the construction of inter-‘nation’ relations is a concern with nationalism and national identity, both as a resource in this constructing of inter-‘nation’ relationships, but also as a product of these unfolding relationships across the period which is the focus of this study. North and South Korea as we demonstrate later in this text, are known to share a strong sense of ethnic nationalism, drawing on what Smith (2001) termed Primordial Nationalism (Smith 2001:51).

This has clear implications as to how they (both North and South Koreans) perceive themselves and how they wish to be portrayed to the world through sport. Since in the period which concerns us there were major shifts in terms of ideology at the global level, these had significant impact on, or relevance to, the relations between North and South and the significance of nationalist ideology in the two Koreas. It is part of our contention that this emerging negotiation of interests of and through an ideology of nationalism was to a significant degree carried out in the sport field.

2.1.2 Constructivism in International Relations Theory

The term ‘Constructivism was known to be introduced by Onuf (1989) in International Relations, and the genealogy of constructivism was rooted philosophically in the work of Wittgenstein and subsequently various other philosophers and theorists (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001:4-7). Constructivism suggests that even though there is no objective international system, still there are ideas which are mutually shared among the public as a conceptualised international order. Wendt (1999) argued that the term ‘constructivism or constructivist’ does not simply apply to the international relations field but is more widely evident as a form of “structural idealism” in sociology. From this perspective, constructivism attempts to explain how international contexts are constructed by actors such as politicians and international organisations. Thus, the world is made by human consciousness and such constructions are evidenced in language, discourse, signs and symbols and other forms of human understanding and communication (Jackson and Sørensen 2003:254)
The constructivist position which is subject to evaluation may seem to be inconsistent with the critical realist ontology adopted for the overall study. However, though socially constructed, the structures which exist – for example the Sports Talks, or the structure of the economy in the North and the South, are nevertheless real, thus there are real implications for the North and South interactions.

2.1.3 Primordial Nationalism in Theory

Anthony Smith (2001) recognized that a “‘Nation’ is a named human community occupying a homeland and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members” (Smith 2001:12-13). The discussion of this definition opens up interesting possibilities that a nation is a rich legacy of memories with the “desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage that has been received in common” (Renan 1996:57-58 cited in Özkirimli 2000). ‘Nationalism’ is a controversial concept, from its definition to the question of its actual existence while its treatment is social theory terms in stretched across the fields of sociology, politics, international relations, anthropology and history. Consequently, the interests from scholars from these various fields tend not to be effectively focused to establish a thorough discourse of nationalism (Özkirimli 2000:2-3).

The idea of nations as cultural units and the firm idea of nations' ontology have been challenged by Benedict Anderson with the famous notion of the nation as 'imagined community', since the 1980s. Anderson believes that whatever seems like 'nation' is imagined community, and it is constructed based on the 'idea' of nationalism. This notion is applicable particularly to the decolonised third world, such as south eastern Asia and Africa. Because they experience a colonial period, following independence, they possess nationalism which is associated with anti-colonial identities (During 2005:99).
However, the concept of primordial nationalism has been challenged, and the biological basis for assuming ‘nation’ differences among ethnic group, or ‘race’ group is weak. Nevertheless, some groups hold to a form of primordial nationalism, such that the ethnic group has an attachment which is a ‘cultural given’ of social existence (Smith 2001:7). While modernisation might see the nation-state as a recent invention are fundamental requirement to operate effectively in a global economy and polity, primordial-nationalist argue that nations are (or ought to be) the politicked expressions of shared ethnic (cultural and biological) terms. This ideology is particularly strong in Korean context (Shin and Robinson 2000; Shin 2006) and goes some way to explaining why the overwhelming majoring of North and South Koreans event thought ideologically divided continued to think of themselves as a single ethnic, with common history, culture, language, and biological roots, and thus continued to seek ways of engaging with one another through sport and constructing teams to represent the ethnic rather than the political entity of the state.

Nationalism is a motive and also a main ideology that a nationalist follows. Anthony Smith mentioned three common elements of the nationalist belief-system. The first one is a set of basic propositions which most nationalists adhere to. Secondly, there are some fundamental ideals which are present in every manifestation of nationalism, although in varying degrees. Thirdly, there is a range of cognate concepts that give more concrete meaning to the core abstractions of Nationalism. However, Nationalism may be seen not only as a belief-system, but also as a form of culture and type of religion. During the French Revolution, nationalists insisted on their national autonomy which involved a centralised economic and political territory and a single public culture. The unity which nationalists look for is thus a kind of social and cultural unification of the members of the nation (Smith 2001:21-42).
2.2 Systematic Review

2.2.1 The Rationale of Systematic Review

The aim of this section is to identify the outcomes of the previous related research in order to inform research questions and structure the groundwork for a research synthesis. This chapter will also outline and explain the systematic review process and the merits and limitations of such a procedure as a research tool in conducting a literature review. Following this, the second element of this section will draw attention to the thematic analysis of the resources identified. In an exploration of the systematic review, the issue of cultural interaction and usage of sport as a diplomatic method among divided nations will be discussed. The aim of using a systematic review process is to address a specific and very relevant question. Such a review can work to reduce bias and make it easier to notice any gaps between previous and present research outcomes in the literature (Torgerson 2003:58).

As with traditional descriptive literature review methods, the idea of a systematic review implies its own ontological and epistemological methodology. Therefore this section includes not only the systematised review process but also the purpose of this design method to rationalise the research process.

As a result of the systematic review process, a thematic analysis is undertaken. The thematic analysis consists of a series of key concepts and subject headings which have been deduced from the systematic review process. Whilst the key themes originated from the resources of the systematic review, they are reconstructed and reinterpreted from their original source contexts. The thematic analysis will cover a range of multidisciplinary research topics drawing on the disciplines of history, politics, international relations and economics.

The idea of a systematic review is relatively recent, but nevertheless the principle has a long history in the research arena. It has been explained as analogous to a ‘harvesting strategy’
in which all relevant studies on a particular topic are brought together to create a ‘meta-
synthesis (Chalmers and Torgerson 2003:55). It is not without its critics, however, and is
considered by some to be a ‘mechanical review process’ that takes risks concerning the
quality of interpretation of its sources (Eysenck 1995 and Torgerson 2003:61). As a literature
review method, a systematic review is done through meta-synthesis. Despite the limitations
of such a methodology, notably concerning the difficulty of assuring a good understanding of
the raw data, meta-synthesis is still considered worthy of use for investigators because it
provides an auditable trail. This means that the reviewing process and the judgments made
in literature section and synthesis will be explained through a clear methodology. Moreover,
any inherent bias created by the selection of sources in the research could be limited
through the application of a careful process of identification of the keywords used to uncover
the available evidence, mediated and validated by an expert panel (Torgerson 2003:58).
Therefore, the decision has been taken to use the process of systematic review for this
research as a means of tracing and synthesising highly relevant literature whilst taking steps
to minimize the inherent bias caused by the data selection process.

The uses of systematic review methods have historically been the domain of health research
and there have been objections raised to the transference of this methodology to other
research areas (Torgerson 2003:58). Alongside this concern, there remain questions over
the inherent subjectivity of the process itself. Subjectivity arises during the sorting of
resources from original data bases, because a procedure of value judgment has to be
applied. In addition, once the data has been sorted, there is the need for an acceptable
extraction procedure. In each of these stages, the exclusion/inclusion criteria are selected by
the researcher, which means there are various stages at which the outcome could be
different for each researcher. This is a critical point concerning the systematic review
process itself because its credibility and validity depends upon its being a repeatable and
duplicable method of research (Torgerson 2003:58). However this source of researcher bias
is mediated by the use of the expert panel to which each decision of inclusion and exclusion is reported.

### 2.2.2 The Process of Systematic Review

This current area of research has been carried out whilst utilising the systematic review protocol. The first stage consisted of identifying appropriate key databases which will contain and reference as high a proportion as possible of the studies relating to the field of research and the specific topic. The next part of the process is selecting suitable key words to find the relevant resources from the existing databases and this was done using the following research topic: International Sporting Events, Nationalism and Sport Diplomacy. As result of previous discussion and trial work on a few databases, the following sets of key words were selected:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Keywords Combinations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Korea* and International relations* and Olympic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Korea* and International relations* and Sport*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Korea* and National identity* and Olympic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Korea* and National Identity* and Sport*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Korea* and Nationalis* and Olympic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Korea* and Nationalis* and Sport*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Korea* and Politic* and Olympic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Korea* and Sport policy*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Korea* and Sports policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these key words, the following ten databases selected by reference to the expert panel were searched:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Databases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DB 1</td>
<td>ANTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 2</td>
<td>BHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 3</td>
<td>Physical Education Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 4</td>
<td>Socio Abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 5</td>
<td>World Cat. Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 6</td>
<td>ECO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 7</td>
<td>Article First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 8</td>
<td>Sport Discus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 9</td>
<td>Web of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB 10</td>
<td>LA web</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The result of the search by the key word in each database is as follows.

### Table 2.3 The Number of Sources by the Keywords search in the Databases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key word</th>
<th>DB1</th>
<th>DB2</th>
<th>DB3</th>
<th>DB4</th>
<th>DB5</th>
<th>DB6</th>
<th>DB7</th>
<th>DB8</th>
<th>DB9</th>
<th>DB1 0</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Korea* &amp; International relations* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Korea* &amp; International relations* &amp; Sport*</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Korea* &amp; National identity* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Korea* &amp; National identity* &amp; Sport*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Korea* &amp; Nationalis* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Korea* &amp; Nationalis* &amp; Sport*</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Korea* &amp; Politic* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Korea* &amp; Sport policy*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Korea* &amp; Sports policy*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>253</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of sources identified including duplications of sources was 747.

### Table 2.4 The Total Number of Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key word</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Selected Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Korea* &amp; International relations* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Korea* &amp; International relations* &amp; Sport*</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Korea* &amp; National identity* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Korea* &amp; National identity* &amp; Sport*</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Korea* &amp; Nationalis* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Korea* &amp; Nationalis* &amp; Sport*</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Korea* &amp; Politic* &amp; Olympic*</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Korea* &amp; Sport policy*</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Korea* &amp; Sports policy*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number** 747 263
The first criterion for extraction was source duplication. The second criterion was source format: the following formats were excluded: books, conference presentation notes, news articles and other non-academic journal articles, etc. The third criterion for extraction was the relevance of the contents of the journal abstracts. Thereafter, the resulting number of resources was reduced in number 92.

The process of data extraction was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extraction Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraction 1</strong></td>
<td>Exclusion of non-English languages and unmanageable database sizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraction 2</strong></td>
<td>Exclusion by the data format (non-research based article formats excluded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraction 3</strong></td>
<td>Exclusion by the relevance of the contents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraction 4</strong></td>
<td>Exclusion by the availability of obtaining full data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extraction 5</strong></td>
<td>Exclusion by the relevance of the contents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example of descriptive analysis for inclusion / exclusion decisions regarding sources is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Too Weak for the Job: Corporate Codes of Conduct, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Regulation of International Labour Standards</td>
<td>Not Selected – Due to the lack of relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Wells, Don</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Descriptors</td>
<td>&quot;Nongovernmental Organizations; *Organizational Effectiveness; *Codes of Conduct; *Corporations; *Factories; *Consumers; *Government Regulation; *Labor&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>The shift of economic production from higher labour standard regimes in the global North to lower standard regimes in the South is undermining enforcement of global labour standards. Responding to criticisms from the 'anti-sweatshop' movement, consumers &amp; governments, many transnational corporations (TNCs) have adopted codes of conduct to regulate labour standards in their supplier factories. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly used to monitor compliance with these codes. This article analyses the monitoring effectiveness of three kinds of such 'third party' NGOs. It concludes that major monitoring deficiencies reflect, first, significant organizational weaknesses of the NGOs &amp; their dependence on TNCs for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
whom they monitor; second, powerful limits imposed on NGO effectiveness by corporate restructuring & market competitiveness; & third, inadequate pressures from anti-sweatshop movements, consumers & governments. These constraints suggest that this NGO-centered, 'soft law' policy approach is 'too weak for the job'. References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reluctant Mediator: Hong Kong, the Two Koreas and the Tokyo Olympics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Author**

Bridges, B

**Source**


**Descriptors**

Article Subject Terms: International sports; Olympics; Participation; Team sports; Article Geographic Terms: China, People's Rep., Hong Kong; Japan; Korea, Dem. People's Rep.; Korea, Rep.

**Abstract**

This essay examines the complex, and ultimately unsuccessful, negotiations between North and South Korea, undertaken with the encouragement of the International Olympic Committee during 1962-63 to form a united Korean team to participate in the Tokyo Olympics of 1964. In particular, it focuses on the role of Hong Kong, chosen as a 'neutral' site for the two Korean delegations to meet. It shows how the IOC's optimism for a 'sporting' solution was to founder on continued mutual suspicion and recriminations between the two Koreas and how the Hong Kong government's reluctance to get involved, the US political intervention, and North Korean participation in the GANEFO Games were all to complicate the process.

The extraction processes were continued, including duplication, until finally 92 sources were included.

[Table 2.7] The Specific Titles of Final Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight: China's national identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The 2010 Football World Cup as a political construct: The challenge of making good on an African promise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>An introduction to the sociology of sports mega-events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Using History to Think about the Beijing Olympics: The Use and Abuse of the Seoul 1988 Analogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Long-Term Impact of a Mega-Event on International Tourism to the Host Country: A Conceptual Model and the Case of the 1988 Seoul Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Seoul-Moscow relations: looking to the 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>South Korea: striving for success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The dangers of hateful rhetoric: lessons of flight 007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Televised Constructions of the Seoul Olympic Opening Ceremony in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The Political Culture of the 1990s Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel and Their Views toward the Indigenous Arab Minority: A Case of Ethnocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Psychology of Worldviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>No Turning Back?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The World Cup and Sports Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Korea/Japan or Japan/Korea? The Saga of Co-Hosting the 2002 Soccer World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Recentering Beijing: Sport, Space, and Subjectivities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Accounting for Mega-Events: Forecast and Actual Impacts of the 2002 Football World Cup Finals on the Host Countries Japan/Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Olympic Spectacle: Opening Ceremonies and Some Paradoxes of Globalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>The Invention of Korean Ethnic Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>(Re)Constructing Identities: International Marriage Migrants as Potential Agents of Social Change in a Globalising Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mega-events and modernity revisited: Globalisation and the case of the Olympics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>South Korea and the Asian Games: The First Step to the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport - Transformation, 1945-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Coercion for Asian Conquest: Japanese Militarism and Korean Sport, 1938-45</td>
</tr>
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After reviewing these sources related to this research question and topics, particular themes were induced. These are considered in the following section on thematic analysis.
2.3 The Result of Thematic Analysis

Through descriptive analysis as a first stage of the process for systematic review, the following specific themes emerged.

[Table 2.8] Contents of the Thematic Analysis

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Grouping into these themes was undertaken on an intuitive basis, clustering themes to reflect both chronological development and conceptual and policy development in the unfolding use of sport as a vehicle for conducting interaction between nations for non-sporting ends.

2.3.1 History of Modern Sport in Korea

In Korean history, reference to the ‘Modern’ period begins at the end of 19th century, when most European countries had already established the modern concept of the ‘nation’.
Moreover this late modernisation occurred parallel to the colonial period and this causes difficulties in the interpretation of this concept due to its confusion with the movement against Japanese colonialism. As with other previously colonised countries, ‘Modernity’ and ‘Modernisation’ has often simply been interpreted the result of progress which implies learning from, and becoming like, ‘developed’ Western countries. Due to this simplified concept, the meaning of Korean modernisation and its merits to its failings in Korean history have certainly divided critics into different schools of thoughts.

A leading interpretation can be classified as ‘colonial modernity’, which claims the colonial period to be the main driver of progress and dismisses the idea that Korea had within itself the possibility of transformation into a ‘modernised’ country. Another interpretation of events concludes that the potential for progress was latent in Korea, but that it just had not come to fruition until the beginning of the twentieth century and that it would have occurred independently of Japanese influence anyway. The first is an explanation of modernisation of Korea by Korean nationalist and the latter is relying on the Colonial Modernisation theorist. Recently, a new standpoint has been taken: this is termed ‘Colonial modernity’ and it seeks to explain modernisation in the framework of hegemonic nation structures rather than simply as ‘progress’. The concept of modernisation here is not about progress but rather about the process of interacting among actors in the structure (Shin and Robinson 2000). Also, this analysis is focused upon the construction of structures by dominant societal powers and the reasons for this.

The origins of the modernisation of sport in Korea, however, seem less disputable: they appear to be the result of novel evolution or sudden paradigm transition rather than organic neutral progress. Until 1880, the philosophy of Confucianism was what primarily (and deeply) influenced the Korean people’s perception of physical activities, particularly affecting the educated upper class (the ‘Yang Ban’ in Korean), ruling their daily lives: the Yang Ban were
not supposed to run and women were not supposed to do outdoor activities in public (Mangan and Ha 2001:49-76).

Radical changes occurred in Korean sport during the Japanese colonial period between 1910 and 1945. Japanese administrative policy intended to assimilate Korean people by utilising the Korean physical education system as a means to create strong second citizens. However, it is paradoxical that the germination of Korean's sport occurred as a part of independent movements associated with Western-established Christian institutions. It is analysed that modernisation of Korean sport had followed and at the same time had forced by the imperialism, then it went through Japanese colonial period with mobilisation of strong nationalism (Mangan and Ha 2001:49-76).

A. The Colonial Period

Physical training as a form of military exercise was considered a necessity for the Korean people by both the Japanese rulers and the Korean independent army. The Japanese needed physically well-trained Korean soldiers as weapons in their plans for their pan-Asian expansion policy. Particularly between 1937 and 1945, Korean sport was intensively controlled by the Japanese authorities. In this period Japan was focused solely upon its military goals: they approached Korean society and Korean sport merely as a means of creating support for their army and as a way of merging most of Korea's sport organisations into Japanese organisations (Ok 2007:338-356). Despite this imperialistic usage of Korean sport by the Japanese, sport grounds such as football stadiums kept their symbolic meaning for Korean nationalists and were seen as representations of national pride which could be used as symbols of an independence from Japan (Lee, Jackson et al. 2007:283-301). Moreover, it was also seen as urgent to obtain higher numbers of well-trained patriotic Koreans in the independent army. Therefore, in order to prevent this, Physical Education and Sport activities were supported by Japanese government policy even though this had a hidden purpose for Koreans which support the Independence movement.
As has already been explained, sport clearly played a prominent role in the Korean independence movement and nationalistic motivations helped develop Korean modern sport in some ways. Ha and Mangan (1994) specified the ‘YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association)’ as a booster organisation in Korean modern sport. It supported people who tried to mobilise Korean nationalism for the purposes of future independence. They convinced those Koreans who joined the YMCA that their main motivation should be assisting the Korean independence movement. Even though the motive for participation in modern sport activities was not publicly proclaimed certainly the YMCA was also aware of this hidden meaning of Korean participants’ activities (Ha and Mangan 1994:329-354).

However in Korea at that time, the organisation which led the movement of nationalists into involvement in the independence movement used a different name from the YMCA. Instead, they worked in other organisations such as the ‘Hwangsong Kidogkyo Chonggnyon Hoi (The Association of the Christian Youth)’, which was essentially the same organization as the YMCA, only under a different title. This makes possible the assumption that there was a strong link between the Korean nationalists and the YMCA. Particularly, Ha and Mangan found that the YMCA tended to embrace the Korean people’s traditional Confucian cultural attitudes in their promotion of the Christian religion and the nationalist independent movement (Ha and Mangan 1994:329-354).

The literature gave a plausible explanation for the reason as to why the Korean independence movement group mobilised in the YMCA: it was because the missionaries did not easily be suppressed by the Japanese colonial government. From the Japanese perspective, if that suppression were to happen, it could become a diplomatic problem. Needless to say, at that time the Western imperialist nations were strong allies of the Japanese. Modern sport training was affected by Christianity in ways of discipline. With that purpose, it has emphasised the control of body and mind by training. Mind control emphasised from the Confucian tradition, contrary, emphasis of body strengthens evolved
as a counteraction of the Japanese colonialism. Particularly, girls’ outdoor activity has been fully emancipated by Christianity’s notion of equality (Ha and Mangan 1994:329-354).

It was emphasised that Korean modern sport has been significantly influenced by Western imperialism. Along with this, Japanese colonialism which Ok (2005) defined as ‘Eastern imperialism’ had an essential role. Sport was seen as a non-direct way of resisting, helping people retain their national pride and strong will for independence. This colonial legacy has continued even until the present day as Podoler (2008) encapsulates the importance of Korean nationalism in a sporting context, when he describes a football match between Japan and Korea during which one of Korea’s coaches was heard to tell a player, ‘You are not just playing football. You are fighting for the independence of the Korean people’ (Podoler 2008:1-17).

Western imperialism showed itself in the form of the missionaries’ educational initiatives and Eastern imperialism designated Japanese intentions to spread their control across the continent (Ok 2005:649-670). Nowadays, these imperialist forces include not only economic dominance, but also very much a cultural hegemony. In many aspects, imperialism has not disappeared; it was transformed into a more complicated global interaction. Globalisation, which is the result of a neo-liberal market economy and cultural conquest by Western centralism, also began to spotlight a huge Eastern market with China as its icon.

When the Japanese colonial policy swung from exclusionism towards internationalism, the Korean independent groups also diversified. As Japanese policy was never fully successful in uniting the whole of Korea as a Japanese colony, none of the Korean ideologies of independence were fully embraced by the whole independent movement. This separation of the Korean independence movement is reflected in the later formations of the North Korean and South Korean entities (Ok 2005:649-670). Both the North and the South had their own armies fighting for independence, though their character was subtly different. The North
emphasised the importance of military strength for independence, while the South was more focused on the welfare of the country. Both North and South emphasised the importance of sport and physical activity for military purposes.

B. Independence

At the end of World War II, Korea became independent from Japan as a result of the Japanese defeat. From that point, Korean society struggled to establish a new tradition of democracy since democracy had not existed prior to Japanese occupation. The subsequent history of achieving a new modern political regime based in an underdeveloped economy saw Korea experience authoritarian presidencies until the early 1990s.

After independence, Korean modern sport became a significant tool of political propaganda. The development of modern sport in Korea can be split into three eras related to modern political regimes. These are Rhee Syngman’s regime from 1945-1960 and Park Jung Hee regime from 1961-1979, as the first, then Chun Doo Hwan regime, as the second, and Roh Tae Woo regime between 1980 and 1992. It is reasonable to note these three eras, because through 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Korea came to be recognised as a part of the modern world. As Ha and Mangan (2002) explained, the nature of the Korean government regime is important in the investigation of Korean modern sport. Korean sport was characterised by government control and initially an elitist emphasis (Ha and Mangan 2002:213-242).

Ha and Mangan (2002) investigated the Korean modern sport movement throughout each regime, and claimed that the Park Jung Hee regime began the resuscitation of Korean modern sport, based on the ideal of the militarisation of Korea. Since then, military dictators had inherited Park’s policies and added political propaganda. Ha and Mangan (2002) focused on the motivation behind the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic games which were the result of a governmental plan to bring Korea into the world spotlight (Ha and Mangan 2002:213-242).
C. North and South Korean Relations

Since the Korean War (1950-1953), North and South Korea have been typical of divided nations with the division having been caused by ideological conflict during the Cold War era. The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was a watershed moment in the East/West ideological conflict, even though North Korea itself did not participate in the Games. Nevertheless other countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, and East European socialist countries joined the Games. MacLauchlan (2001) has found that the South Korean government used the circumstances of their division with North Korea as an argument for hosting the FIFA World Cup through showing the possibility of co-hosting the Games with North Korea. This implied that a symbolic ‘unification’ of nations through sport had considerable significance. Moreover, North and South Korea already had experience of this, for example McLauchlan (2001) has mentioned the 1991 World Table Tennis tournament where North and South Korea formed a joint women’s team and won the event. Also, the North and South Joint team reached the quarter finals of the 1999 Youth Soccer World Cup. The last example of such a gesture of peace through sport was the joint march of the North South Korean team in the 2000 Sydney Olympics’ opening ceremony (McLauchlan 2001:481-507).

The North and South Korea division process was not sought or supported by the Korean people but was the inevitable result of the power struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union following World War II. It is understandable that during this era of history Korea was seen as “a shrimp in a sea of whales” (Skak 1989:19-33). This can be explained by international relations around the Korean peninsula during the Cold War era. With North Korea supported by the Soviet Union, and South Korea cooperating significantly with the USA, the Korean peninsula was no more than a playground for this conflict. As cited by Skak, commentators have concluded that the political framework of the North-South conflict as a Cold War phenomenon was generally accepted. This East–West framework also showed clearly on the map around the Korea peninsula. The reason why the Korean peninsula is the
last bloc in Asian Pacific was because the USA wanted to keep the Soviet Union and China at bay (Polomka and Kihl cited by Skak 1989:19-33).

In the field of sport, North and South Korea had interesting relations which did not always parallel or follow the international political context. As Podoler (2008) illustrates, North and South Korean nationalism that was demonstrated in football matches certainly fluctuated between rivalry and the manifestation of one single ethnic notion of nationalism. In terms of how the two Koreas’ domestic political power tried to use football, Podoler (2008) was sure that football could be one of the methods for showing themselves distinct from another as a result of reflect the nationalists’ goals of promoting nationalism (Podoler 2008:1-17)

Bridges (2007) highlights North and South Korean tensions, before the Korean War. When Korea gained independence from Japan, there were two independent governments. Both Koreas had a ‘One Korea’ policy, which would not accept the other Korea as an independent nation. This policy directly affected international relations, and in terms of diplomacy the rest of the world also needed to choose one of the two sides. In the process of joining the IOC as a member nation, North Korea did not want to join with South Korea. However with a powerful ally in the USSR, the North was able to negotiate joining as an NOC, to be recognised as a nation by the rest of the world (Bridges 2007:375-391).

2.3.2 Nationalism, Nation Identity and Sport

In modern Western nations, the mobilisation of nationalism has specific traceable origins and is mostly based upon popular national identity, whatever perspective that comes from. This is supported by the definition of national identity as “the relationship between nation and state that obtain when the people of those nations identify themselves by the state” (Suzuki 2007:23-47).

Suzuki (2007) applies a sociological conceptual framework, a ‘Self/Other’ approach, to the debate on nationalism, particularly concerning the formation of China’s national identity and
the role of Japan in that process. The process of how the Japanese are ‘Othered’ is similar to the process for China and Korea, as both of them experienced a Japanese colonial period. The criteria for the separation between ‘Self’ and ‘other’ depend on the group. However, here Suzuki (2007) considered China’s position within international society, which compared with Japan, was in relative terms, on the periphery (Suzuki 2007:23-47). In other words, even though China ‘Othered’ Japan, it was still itself ‘Othered’ by dominant world nations. In the end, Suzuki (2007) conceptualised China’s ‘victimhood’ in their national identity as a product of their being ‘Othered’ by Japan in the eyes of the major world powers. With the ‘Self/Other’ concept, China has always differentiated itself from Japan by regarding itself as an ‘out-group’ and Suzuki (2007) has argued that this is an on-going process of formation within China’s identity (Suzuki 2007:23-47).

In the case of North and South Korea, the academic field of the study of the nationalism has been built upon critically contrasting viewpoints. Nevertheless, there remain a few unexplained aspects. Koh (2005) has argued in his research that Korean ‘nationalism’ is mainly understood as the ‘pride in, and loyalty to, one’s ethnicity’ rather than ‘pride and loyalty in one’s nation’. The nationalism that is dominant in the Korean context is an abstract ‘ideology’ rather than the concrete legalistic ‘stricture’ which emerged with modern nation building. Korean nationalism had evolved throughout the Japanese colonial period, more or less to its own pattern. The key feature of Korean nationalism is its ethnic element and this has now been replaced by modern citizenship (Koh 2005:468-478). Throughout the 5,000 years of Korean history Korea has been interacting only with its big and small neighbours, such as China, Mongolia and Japan. These Eastern Asian nations generally adapted to China’s cultural advances; however, they kept their identity by clearly differentiating themselves from the others. Nevertheless, Korea shared certain cultural similarities with the other neighbours as they shared borders with each other (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). Korean traditional sport, which is called ‘ethnic sport’, had a key role in the promotion of nationalism. Whoever the leaders were, they used these sports for their nationalistic
purposes. However, Lee (2005) focused on the fact that ‘ethnic sport’ was not only used at a government level but also by the people themselves. This analysis differs from that of Koh, where only an outside force, Japan, affected the formation of Korean nationalism. Lee (2005) has argued that the Korean government had the intention of creating an ‘ethnic sport’ culture in order to promote Korean national identity. However, individuals also had their own particular purposes for taking part in the ‘ethnic sport’. In his conclusion, Lee (2005) concludes that there are two driving forces involved in the development of ‘ethnic sport’ and that these are firstly, government and secondly, individuals (Lee 2005:125-130). This may mean that, even though it has been used to boost national sport in international competition, the anti-Japanese perspective of Korean nationalism is only an historical reflection of people’s emotions not nationalism per se.

The 1986 Asian Games was the first moment when sport was used as a tool for the promotion of Korean nationalism (Lee 2005:125-130). Since then, the Korean government’s motivation for hosting international sport mega events has grown stronger. The passion which the Korean people recently showed to the world when holding the 2002 World Cup cannot be separated from their national pride. At the same time, through this sporting event, the Korean people reshaped their national identity and they themselves were aware of this (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107).

Pirozhenko (2003) found that the Korean media mainly dealt with the successful achievements of the 2002 World Cup performance not as a sport but as a political and a cultural success. However, Pirozhenko (2003) has analysed differently, in that he believes that the strong nationalistic bond of the Korean people originates from the unique bond of the family in Confucianism. Confucianism was dominant throughout the Cho Sun dynasty, and Pirozhenko would not be surprised about Korea’s special nationalism, if all Koreans recognized themselves as being part of a ‘big family’ (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107).
Korea’s nationalistic attitude which originated from the Confucian tradition was not only shown in international sport competition but also became well known through the process of overcoming its economic crisis in the late 1990s. In this sense, Pirozhenko (2003) has reached the conclusion that Korean nationalism is not an absolute product of Western modernity (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). Thus the modernist perspective of nationalism, he argues, is not suitable for the Korean case.

With regard to other countries, political issues have often been addressed during the Olympic Games: for example, under Hitler’s regime, the torch flame was used to emphasize the legitimacy of their ethnic inheritance from the ancient Greeks in Hitler’s Nazi Germany. However, the actual motive for using the torch flame in the beginning of the modern Olympics was to symbolize peace and harmony which the founders wanted. There is also an exception: Cahill (1999) researched the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games relay, and found that it was remembered as one of the ‘pure’ torch relays that had successfully avoided political influence or otherwise. This was also the ideal intention of both the organising committee and the IOC (Cahill 1999:181-190).

2.3.3 Sport Diplomacy

Richard Pound, an International Olympic Committee member in Canada, wrote a thesis which concerns the role or value of sport particularly on the perspective of national development programmes which mostly dealt with a global political economy perspective. He specifically argued that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Official Development Assistance criteria had not included sport in the range of activities which they funded (Pound 1992:301-307). He also said that politicians’ ignorance and misconception of sport is based on their presumption of the hierarchy of importance among sport, politics and economy (Pound 1992:301-307). Pound(1992) suggested a clear strategy for obtaining certain funds through cooperation between the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and other International Governmental organisations such as UNESCO,
WHO, the EC and others (Pound 1992:301-307). In addition he also included not only International Federations and National Olympic Committees, which are obviously elements in the ‘Olympic family’, but also the private sector, academics and scholars, and governments (Pound 1992:301-307).

As Weinberg mentioned, there is a background to hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games which is related to the peacekeeping reputation of the IOC. With the history of the ancient Olympic Truce, nations agreed not to make war during the Games and provided peaceful passage for their enemies (Weinberg 2001:19-27). As Polley (1998) points out, among the many big and small diplomatic dialogues between nations, sport though only one part of the issue could be the important one (Polley 1998:1-18). In that sense, Polley (1988) assumed that the diplomatic process which dealt with ‘Sport’ as a topic is Sport diplomacy. There are several cases, for example, like the 1966 World Cup finals, when North Korea qualified in an abnormal way. This is the case where international sport issues confronted normal diplomatic circumstances which were considered ‘formal’. Surprisingly, the formal procedure had changed for some international sport events. Technically, the British government were supposed to refuse North Korean players’ visas, in general, in the middle of the Cold War era. However, with a significant proportion of the world’s population watching the decision, the sport diplomatic context rapidly changed.

Concerning this particular sport diplomatic issue in the UK, Polley (1998) also addressed each department’s responsibility in central British government. However, as a part of the Government, each would need to consider British tax payers’ interests, so they had to find a visa solution; otherwise they might have been be blamed by the world for bringing politics into sport (Polley 1998:1-18). Why the Foreign Office was involved here was investigated. The simple answer was that as long as North Korea was a member of FIFA, they had a right to join the competition. Moreover, it was not only the Foreign Office which intervened in this issue. The Far Eastern Department actually had to lead this project, due to North Korea’s
The New Olympic Games procedure was evaluated and praised the UK government. The Central government process of sharing information was efficient and well organised (Polley 1998:1-18). Whether Olympic and other sports intended it or not, sport as part of culture was now a well-known tool of diplomacy.

A. The Context of Korean Sport Diplomacy

The purposes of hosting sporting events are mostly related to domestic political issues in most nations. Nevertheless, there was a football boom in South Korea in 2002, even though South Korea was not the sole host. However, Pirozhenko (2003) claims that South Korean society’s reaction is a unique social phenomenon (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). South Korea concentrated on hosting sport events and noticed their impact, particularly following the 1988 Olympic Games. Through this event, even Eastern European countries recognised South Korea as an independent nation. More significantly South Korea had been admitted to the UN and this global recognition through the Olympic Games strongly affected the process of joining the UN (Howe, 1989:15 cited by Macintosh and hawes 1992:2-13).

The context and the limitation of Korean diplomacy are obvious, at least concerning North Korean relations. Korea won the bid for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games even though relations at that time between North and South Korea were poor. The weak point of South Korea’s bid to host the Games was clearly stated in Weinberg’s work, which summarised three main issues. The first is that technically South Korea and North Korea had merely ceased the Korean War. This meant that there was a possibility of war during Olympic Games and this was too much of a risk for the IOC. The second issue was that the South Korean political system was a relatively unstable dictatorship and this political instability fuelled concerns for the financial support of the Games. The third issue was the communist bloc in the IOC which did not have any national relations with South Korea, since they were closer to North Korea. This clearly showed the limitations that Korea had, compared to Japan, which had diplomatic relations with most communist countries (Weinberg 2001:19-
However, this context also represented an opportunity for South Korea. If a successful Olympics could be held in South Korea, it could contribute to recovering diplomatic relations with the Socialist bloc nations and offer a unique opportunity to pursue the remodelling of an independent foreign policy. This would consequently create an international climate more helpful to Korean reunification (Larson and Park 1993:171).

B. The Position of the IOC in the International Context

Most of the political problems facing the IOC faced originated from the Cold War era. For instance, the 1976 Montreal Olympics needed to consider recognising Taiwan and that was just beginning of a series discussion in relation to Taiwan's position. The 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games, held in Moscow and Los Angeles, were global sporting events which manifested the conflict over ideology during the Cold War. The IOC’s transnational influence was evident in the Taiwan issue in the 1976 Montreal Olympic in its direct negotiations with the Canadian government. During this process, the IOC opposed the American position and had to face its allies’ pressure and obtained US agreement to an exception in relation to their ‘One-China’ foreign policy (Macintosh, Greenhorn et al. 1991:423-448).

With scandals related to the Salt Lake City Olympics, the IOC and Olympic movement suffered serious damage to the IOC’s legitimacy in representing the Olympic spirit and to its positive image (Booth 1999:43-68). The IOC had also previously played a role as an international actor for example when mediating North and South Korea’s first sport talks in Lausanne, Switzerland, on 24th January 1963. The IOC also showed its exceptional diplomatic influence in securing visas for North Korea, despite Hong Kong’s reluctance when the North Korean delegation visited Hong Kong for the North and South sport talks about participation at the Tokyo Olympic Games (Bridges 2007:375-391). Bridges (2007) pointed out that “sport may be very easily integrated into the political projects of governments” (Bridges 2007:375-391). Nevertheless, during Juan Antonio Samaranch’s presidency of the IOC, he believed it to be important to position the IOC properly in international relations.
The IOC’s biggest political intervention would happen with Juan Antonio Samaranch. In 1980 and 1984, there were two Summer Olympics in a row held in the respective states which led the conflict over East and West ideologies. Seoul was nominated as the venue for the 1988 Olympic Games in 1981. Considering the North and South Korean situation, it was hard to imagine the successful operation of the Olympic Games without any engagement. Samaranch, however, accepted the possibility of holding some events in North Korea, even though this was not formally possible under the IOC’s rules. The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was possible because the Soviet Union and China promised that they would join the Games no matter what the political circumstances were (Taylor, 1988 cited by Macintosh and Hawes 1992:2-13).

2.3.4 Seoul Olympics and North and South Korea

Within this context a strong rivalry continued to be present. North Korea did not want to merely be a guest at South Korea’s festival, missing out on what it saw as an excellent opportunity to be in the world spotlight. No one could be sure that North Korea would not provoke a military situation either. In terms of diplomacy, before the Games 37 states did not have official relations with South Korea, because of their positive relations with North Korea. This meant that there was significant potential for many nations to boycott the 1988 Olympic Games. Ha (1998) has mentioned that South Korea’s domestic political situation was very tense due to the political leadership changing hands just after the Olympic Games. There could be serious rioting or a military coup.

As was expected, North Korea protested against the IOC’s decision to award Seoul the 1988 Seoul Olympics, but this had no effect. Subsequently North Korea changed its strategy and attempted to persuade the IOC to divide the Olympics between the two venues of Seoul and Pyongyang. North Korea wanted to host half of the events and also wanted the two Koreas to participate as one united team. Despite the IOC and South Korea’s willingness to compromise in some respects, North Korea’s proposition meant that it would be a full co-
host of the Games, which was not acceptable either to the IOC or South Korea. Samaranch suggested modified conditions and North Korea seemed to take part in the negotiations with an affirmative attitude, but at the fourth set of talks, they reverted to their first proposition again, and thus North Korea rejected the final offer from the IOC (Ha 1998:11-13).

2.3.5 The Implication of the Impact of the International Sporting Event

The political impact of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were obvious to the South Korean regime. As President Chun’s government expected, the successful performance at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games caused the Korean people to celebrate a sporting nationalism whilst putting to one side any political problems. However, the host government was unable to fully control the political impact of the mega sport event in ways it wished. As Manheim (1990) explained, the South Korean government did not anticipate the amount of attention it would receive from the world. Consequently, it was not prepared to deal with the political opposition’s movement for increased democratisation in South Korea. Manheim has said that the international media and other interested parties played a significant role in pressurising the Korean government (Manheim 1990:279-295), and Larson and Rivenburgh (1989) conclude that most of the nations’ goals for participating in the Olympic Games are to achieve their political purposes (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-43).

The 2002 Korean World Cup occurred in the same year as the South Korean presidential election. The ruling party wanted to use the success and popularity of football for their own political ends. For example, the scandal of corruption in the government of December 14, 2001 was treated as a small media issue, and instead the South Korean football team’s performance was reported as the major issue (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107). Moreover, an independent candidate, M.J. Chung, who was head of the World Cup organisation, was regarded as being a firm and smart leader by the South Korean people, and his popularity rose to become higher than the ruling party’s candidate. Pirozhenko (2003) has made clear that this was a result of the success of the South Korean team in the football World Cup
Pirozhenko (2003) has also analysed how South Korean society accepted football not only as a sport but also as a part of Western culture with the implication that success in football matches was considered as success in the modernisation of South Korea. From this it is clear that the 2002 World Cup was a huge political event, and not simply a purely football event, which was organised solely by the government rather than by independent groups (Pirozhenko 2003). Meanwhile, the ‘Hiddink syndrome’ proved during the 2002 World Cup that the Korean people were willing to accept that the traditional features of Korean nationalism could be changed by globalisation or at least were aware of the possibility of this transformation (Lee, Jackson et al. 2007:283-301).

A. Sport as a Domestic Political Vehicle

The South Korean regime believed that the success of the Seoul Olympic Games would be dependent upon sustained social and political stability, thus for the Games to be successful the regime planned to use ‘strong arm tactics’ to control rioting or unrest on the part of those supporting the political opposition (Pravda 1987:17-24). At this time, the association of Korean students’ movement attempted to hold a meeting with a group of North Korean students to discuss the topic of the Olympic Games. A significant proportion of the South Korean people believed that hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games amounted to a declaration that North and South Korea were not a nation (Han 1989:29-38).

The reasons as to why the South Korean government wanted to host the Olympic Games and how much they felt it concerned the national reputation were made clear in a speech by President Mr Roh:

“Our national sense of confidence and advanced national consciousness, given the success of the Olympics, pose for us a new challenge and obligation that we should fulfil[,] the task of joining the advanced nations and achieving full democracy in the country.” (Ha 1998:11-13)

Despite the South Korean government’s clear willingness to host the Olympic Games, the IOC’s attitude to the hosting of the Games by South Korea was not that positive. Richard
Pound, whilst talking about the nomination of the Seoul Olympic Games, concluded that it was “at best as risky and at worst as recklessly foolhardy, depending on one’s degree of optimism and place on the political spectrum” (Ha 1998:11-13). Worries from the outside world resulted in an address made by President Roh in June of 1987 which promised political change in South Korea after the Olympic Games. Thus we can argue that the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games definitely played a role in the changing of the South Korean leadership (Manheim 1990:279-295).

As a result of the Games, South Korea achieved major political advantages, particularly in the growth of democracy, as a result of the negotiation between the ruling party and its opponents. The South Korean ruling party realised that there was no way to ignore the eagerness for freedom of its citizens if it was to protect its political regime. South Korea also gained external benefits: China, the Soviet Union and East European communist bloc nations decided to participate in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and this meant that diplomatic relations with communist nations were started, even though the opening of new relations with socialist nations did not result in North and South Korea cooperating in the Olympic Games (Han 1989:29-38). Black and Bezanson (2004) have argued that the Olympic impact can backfire in an uncontrollable manner on the host government. The South Korean military regime illustrated this fact. Even though South Korea’s 1988 Seoul Games was not the only ‘fuse’ in the setting off of South Korean democracy, it recognised the role of the Olympic Games in stimulating nationalism (Black and Bezanson 2004:1245-1261).

B. Sport and Diplomatic Usage

The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a typical example of a government attempting to use the games for its own diplomatic purposes. Alongside the circumstances of a rapidly developing economy, the Korean people demonstrated a wish for political freedom and an eagerness for democracy. In South Korea, this diversification of political propensities was seen as a huge
threat to the dictatorial government. For this reason, the government used anti-communist propaganda as a tool for repressing people’s expressions of oppositional political perspectives. In response, North Korea kept provoking tensions in the Korean peninsula and this all affected the South Korean government’s decision to host the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Manheim 1990:279-295).

It has been said that the staging of the Olympic Games is effectively just ‘rhetoric’ and that it is relatively less important than ‘hard politics’ in international relations. However Payne (1984) has argued that the rhetoric of the bipolar powers during the Cold War which showed in Korean peninsula was inappropriate to explain several successful achievements such as unified team for table tennis championship (Payne 1984:55-65). Payne (1984) cited Reagan’s words when Reagan described the Soviets as evil and Russia as an ‘evil empire’ in order to express how different their political ideologies were. Relations between Russia and the United States worsened not because of the gap in their political ideologies, or changes in material conditions, but because of the nature of the rhetoric employed (Payne 1984:55-65).

In the middle of the Cold War era, in order to demonstrate the superiority of their political regime, the South Korean government wanted to gain a better international reputation as a developed country using the opportunity of televising the Olympic Games. Larson and Rivenburgh (1989) have researched South Korea’s decision to televise the Olympic Games and concluded that it was motivated by the South Korean government’s intention to become a ‘world player’ (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-43). Following the shift in the balance of power in international relations between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War era, the meaning of sport mega-events became more complicated due to the focusing of the spotlight upon particular individuals. Pirozhenko (2003) notes what Hope had already mentioned, that is, that the Korean football World Cup had an influence upon the Korean people’s perceptions of a reunified North and South Korea. At least, he claims that the Red Devils
movement would provide another impetus for a national unity process (Pirozhenko 2003:92-107).

C. The Economic Impact of International Sporting Events

The South Korean government learnt the lesson of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, and dreamt of achieving the same order of success. At the same time it ignored the Mexican case which was known as being less satisfactory and continued to push the policy of hosting the Games (Manheim 1990:279-295). Even though the South Korean government wanted to emulate the success of the Japanese Olympic Games, which was regarded as a triumph in economic and external relations, domestic political confusion meant that the political situation seemed closer to the circumstances in Mexico (Manheim 1990:279-295).

Generally it is thought that sport mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, provide both long and short term economic benefits. However, surprisingly, research suggests that economic impact decreases year after year. Kang & Perdue (1994) concluded that the effect of the mega-event in terms of the number of foreign visitors was positive and, note that despite increasing only slightly for the very first year, increased significantly the following year. They have deduced that this is because customers, who were attracted to the nation through the sport event, would need time to react to the media publicity and schedule their holiday (Kang and Perdue 1994:205-225).

There are three main reasons for the economic impact of sport mega-events. Development of mass communication technology can be the principal factor. Through television, people are able to enjoy sport competitions held all around the world. This is possible because organisations such as FIFA and the IOC sell the rights to broadcasting companies in each region or country for huge amounts of money. This money is usually the main source of income for each organization and this makes them less dependent on other financial support. Secondly, the spread of sport’s popularity creates the potential for new links between
sponsors and the professional sport leagues. This, in turn, produces further opportunities for broadcasters. The third reason is that the city or region which hosts the mega-event has the chance to promote it. Through hosting mega-events, they are potentially able to be recognised as ‘world class’, or at least as players on the world stage, by influential people (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006:1-24).

2.3.6 The Media and International Sporting Events

A. The Approaches of Media Research

Media is one element of society whose role significantly grows during sport mega-events. The focus here will be on how media is used not only as a tool to represent certain ideologies but also as a mechanism which shows the interactions between production of discourse and its recipients. Particularly in relation to a sport mega-event, technical progress in media coverage means that their public popularity increased and resulted in many aspects of the events changing. Sriramesh (2003) for example, has agreed that as a part of the globalization process, advances in media technology have caused the broadening of communication and maximized information exchange. This is not limited to commercial products, but also includes services and life style choices (Sriramesh 2003:1-20).

Sriramesh (2003) has focused on the conditions of various international communications which adopted the use of developed media technology such as the internet. Media is now recognized as a strategic tool in international public relations. The impact of internet communication itself is different from the ‘global village’ effect which emerged due to television (Roche 2006:26-40). Castells (2001) has argued that media research needed to become focused upon internet communication and this had to take full account of any socio-political aspects. The global organization has become the social and political reality of the 21st century, which contrasts with the dominance of the nation state in the 19th and 20th centuries (Castells, 2011 cited in Roche 2006:26-40). Progress in media technology has
affected all structures of society, despite the complexity of international relations and differences in political ideology in those structures. Therefore, media itself has the power to show a multiplicity of structures and bring huge attention to that diversity.

B. Power and Role of Media and International Sporting Event

Horne (2006) has identified three reasons as to why mega-events kept growing throughout the ‘global era’. The first reason is that the development of technology made it possible to see events through television wherever there was a broadcast satellite. Alongside this, the second reason is that advertising on television during the event became more lucrative to the commercial market and so corporations naturally supported professional sport leagues. The third reason, which will be explored more deeply in this thesis, is the political and economic attraction to the hosts of these mega-events (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006:1-24). During the Olympic Games, the host nation presents their national culture and identity symbolically through media installations using sentimental music and images. Through the various channels of the media, national identity is exposed to countries all over the world. Once this construction of national identity begins to influence the people of the nation itself, national unity can be affected either positively or negatively (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-43).

Horne (2006) has analysed the process related to the 2002 World Cup finals from a globalization perspective. He has explained that the World Cup itself stimulated the globalization process because mega-events also include economic interests and have cultural significance. He has claimed that mega-events are hosted generally only for economic and political reasons, but those cultural areas are also influenced and develop (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006:1-24). The characterization of the host nation by the media during the Olympic Games represents the host nation’s nationalism and Olympic ideology. Particularly, concerning the Seoul Olympic Games, the existence of Korean media corporations resulted in the establishment of different political views. Larson and Rivenburgh
(1989) have added the conclusion that media creates not only a national representation, but also reflects a particular world view (Larson and Rivenburgh 1989:1-43). Tomlinson (1996) has concluded that the Olympic opening ceremony includes various ideological values and the history of Olympic movement itself, even though the original Olympic values are being contested by its recent reformation and destabilization (Tomlinson 1996:583-602).
Chapter 3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The ‘method’ is clarified as a technique and a skill for collecting data and analysis and ‘methodology’ as a strategy which leads us to find the answer to our questions by revealing social reality. Methodology rather tells us how to proceed by situating the choice of method in terms of its relationship with theory, applying certain logic (Blaikie 1993). In this research the critical realist ontological and epistemological approach has been adopted as a framework through which to analyse the relations between structure and agency of North and South Korean sporting relations across three decades from 1978 to 2007, from the perspective of a constructivist view of International Relations. Thus, this research focuses on how the discourses associated with the Olympics, (and sport more broadly) are entangled with, but also shape and mediate North and South Korean relations. In this sense the thesis is not simply arguing for the constructivist position because it acknowledges the material changes taking part in the wider world and how those are mediated by rather than solely constructed by the discourse between the two nations.

3.2 Philosophical Approaches

3.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology

Ontology is a claim in philosophy which refers to what exists. The ontological traditions or claims of various perspectives (in particular within and between the social and natural sciences) may vary considerable. This research is about the social ‘reality’ which is fundamentally the object of most social enquiry. Therefore, as Grix (2004) stated, whether ‘a particular thing’ exists in the real world or not, and in what sense it exists, is an essential and fundamental question to be answered in the beginning of any form of research (Grix 2004:60). Lewis (2002) also implies the necessity for identifying one’s ontological position because of the conceptual link between social enquiry and its objects of analysis to develop
a coherent and convincing research strategy which needs to be consistent with epistemological assumptions and research strategy (Lewis, 2002:17 cited in Grix 2004:60).

Even so, ontological assumptions are not amenable to ‘proof’ but may be subject to a test of reasonableness whether one’s assumptions about reality are defensible and consistent with methods employed to investigate a social phenomenon (Grix 2004:60).

There are two main roots of dominant positions in the ontology question: the first is Foundationalism. Foundationalism means that so called ‘reality’ exists independently of whether we acknowledge it or not, and that claims about reality have a rational and universal value (Flyvberg 2001:130; Grix 2004:60). This implies that objective notions of truth are ‘foundational’. The positivists and realists start their position on this basis and share the umbrella term ‘foundationalism’. In addition to the term foundationalism, reference may be made to ‘realism’ or ‘objectivism’ in arguing for this view (Hughes and Sharrock 1997:4-5 cited in Grix 2004:61). In contrast to Foundationalism, some people would argue that the world and what we call ‘reality’ is ‘constructed’ by our acts. So called anti-foundationalism suggests that the world does not exist independently from our knowledge of it, emphasising that we are involved in the constructing of an external social world. Consequently, the nature of ‘reality’ cannot be rationally or universally grounded (Grix 2004:61). This is related to constructivist ontological traditions, which indicate that social reality which includes phenomena and meanings are constantly reconstructed by social actors. Therefore, reality is a fully constructed phenomenon (Bryman 2001:16-18).

If a simple definition of ontology is that it is about what exists, then epistemology is about how we know about the things which exist. It is also understood as ‘theories of knowledge’, those are statements about the methods of attaining knowledge. More broadly, it includes the justification and criteria of knowledge. By doing so, it differentiates knowledge from belief (Grix 2004:63). There is no doubt that ontology and epistemology are fundamental philosophical concepts relating to the search for ‘truth’ in various fields of science (Schwandt
There are three dominant traditions of epistemology. One is based on the ‘Positivist’ paradigm; another is ‘Interpretivism’ with Critical Realism as a form of ‘compromise’ between these two poles. Firstly, the Positivist and Interpretivist approaches will be discussed. Critical Realism will subsequently be discussed in more detail since my own research will start from this perspective.

Positivism is well known as an approach used in the natural sciences. However, it is one which is also used in social analysis (Grix 2004:64). It has several distinctive features. Firstly, positivism’s ontological foundation is foundational (Guba and Lincoln 1998:204). As Denscombe (2002) points out the association of chronologically prior occurrences of an ‘independent’ variable and the subsequent occurrences of a ‘dependent’ variable may be taken to support causal inferences. Positivist method is regarded neutral simply noting these (statistical) associations and drawing inductive inferences about caused relationships (Grix 2004:80-81). Positivists believe that reality can be ‘captured’ and that with this knowledge; it is possible to predict things which will happen later in the same circumstances. They focus on ‘facts’ rather than ‘values’, in other words on what the result is, or might imply. This is because positivists want to find ‘objectivity’ in research results (Marsh and Furlong 2002:18 cited in Grix 2004:80-81).

Interpretivism focuses on the difference between the human in social reality and objects in natural science. It emphasises that the meaning of social action tends to be subjective, so it requires a different approach from that of the natural sciences (Bryman 2001:12-13; Grix 2004:63-64) Interpretivism approaches can be explained with reference to several features. Firstly, the ontology of Interpretivist is broadly Anti-Foundationalism, which means what which constitutes knowledge is bound up with the nature of the world we consume. Because ‘this world is socially constructed’ by its components, what is ‘fact’ and what is ‘value’ cannot be clearly differentiated. Unlike natural science, social phenomena are not separately observable by the researcher. Therefore, social reality is the result of social interaction and
the researcher's interpretation of it (Williams and May 2002:59-63 cited in Grix 2004:18). Knowledge is subjectively concluded with selected theories and discourses as interpretivist focuses on understanding rather than explanation. Moreover, for the understanding of social reality, Interpretivist tend to see the role of language as a key element in the constructing of ‘reality’ (Grix 2004:18).

In this research, a Critical Realist approach was as adopted in relation to its ontological and epistemological position. Therefore, the Critical Realist perspective of ontology and epistemology will be considered separately and more importantly after explaining general concepts of epistemology. Critical Realism shares some interpretivist ideas; however, it is more focused on a practical research strategy based on its ontological assumption that there is a certain real structure which we can observe indirectly, but scientifically. There is a critical realist epistemology position based on the compromised and developed logical flow of strategy between inductive and deductive methods.

3.2.2 Critical Realism

Critical realism shares some aspects of the foundationalism-based approach of positivism in that it adopts the assumption that real structures exists which may not be observed but also that the effects of these may be observed. However, in fundamental agreement with Realist ontology, Critical Realism argues for the nature of a constructivist view, particularly in social science. In other words, Critical Realists claim that real structures are both real and exist independent of our perception of them, but are also constructed (and reproduced or modified) in social interaction. Social structures are real, subject potentially to change, but social actions can only be explained by reference to the structural context which exists at a given point in time (Peter Kerr 2003:122-123 cited in Grix 2004:85).

The ontological account provided by Critical Realism which ‘ties in’ both social action and deep structure which are socially reproduced is argued by some commentators to share a
Structuralism position. Hay (2002) for example is concerned with the idea of mutually constitutive structure and agency. “Structure and agency are best seen, not so much as flip-sides of the same coin, as metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged.” However, though these are mutually constitutive we can separate them out, Hay (2002) argues, for analytical purposes (Hay 2002:127). Given this analytic distinction between structure and agency, we may distinguish between them in terms of our research focus. We may choose to focus on the individual at micro level, or on the structure itself, conducting research at the macro level. However, reconciling research at different levels is also feasible and may indeed be desirable (Penins et al. 1999:9 cited in Grix 2004:48-49).

Of course, Critical Realists acknowledge that real structures are not directly observable, but that though hidden from direct observation, their ‘effects’ will be visible as Bhaskar (1989) argues, through practical and theoretical investigation (Bhaskar cited in Grix 2004:86). Positivist (and Post-Positivist) methodologies may be employed to understand the association between structure and agency, while Interpretivist, qualitative approaches may be used to obtain individual (group) perspectives on ‘local’ situations, and actors’ perceptions of reasons for individual choice and to perceive opportunities or constraints which a given structural context affords. In other words, mixed methods aimed at understanding structural context and actors’ perceptions of such context (both of which may explain their past behaviours) are promoted by a Critical Realist approach (Bhaskar, 1989:79 cited in Hay 2002:19)

Van Fraassen’s criticism of Critical Realism is a significant position to be considered. He (1980) argues that, once the Realist ontological positions and Interpretivist epistemology have been chosen, then it could be said that the research itself is a ‘construction’ rather than a finding of truth’. Van Fraassen terms this a form of “constructive empiricism” which is ontologically opposed to Realism (Van Fraassen 1980:5 cited in Blaikie 1993:3). Stockman (1983) criticised Critical Realism by citing Habermas’s “objectivist illusion”, which considered
that realism can be used as a doctrine, and thus as a good excuse for conceptualising one’s own reality (Stockman 1983:224 cited in Blaikie 1993:3).

3.2.3 Retroductive Strategy

Inductive and Deductive strategies serve as two main traditional philosophical views on developing theories in both the natural and social sciences. Seen from a Critical Realist point of view, relatively new strategies such as Retroduction and Abduction are developed and tend to be advocated in both the natural and the social sciences (Blaikie 1993:159). The Inductive strategy can be adapted by following four stages. Firstly, without any previous assumptions, all factors are supposed to be observed and recorded. Based on that, analysis begins and subsequently there will be comparison and classifications. With this analysis, the result will be inductively generalised and relations among the findings will be discussed. Consequently the generalisations are further tested (Blaikie 1993:137-138). Fundamentally, this logic is based on a belief in objective observations, and relies on being convinced that researchers are neutral in their analysis. In other words, the Realist ontology assumes that reality can be explained with epistemological trust that there are no problems in objective procedures. By doing so, Inductive interpretation can be sensible, and reveals laws and principles (Blaikie 1993). There is also a weak point in this Inductive strategy, since it is based on observation without basic assumptions. The justification of Induction itself could be an issue. It has been mentioned that the truth of Inductive strategy is upon the experiences, to which Popper (1959) has responded by claiming involvement of an infinite regress. This implies that no logic can be pure and that it is hard to establish the validity of mechanical induction processes (Popper, 1959 cited in Blaikie 1993:137-140).

A deductive strategy in the social sciences is adopted in recognition of the fact that Inductive claims can never be ‘proven’. Given the claim that ‘all swans are white’, no matter how many white swans are observed, one cannot ‘prove’ the claim. However, falsification of a hypothesis can ‘prove’ that a claim is false. If I see a black swan, I can, in theory, reject the
claim. In effect, I can prove that not all swans are white. This view has however significant flaws. What happens when a ‘black swan’ or its equivalent is spotted may be that scientists simply argue over whether this is a swan, or a swan-like bird. The ‘discourse’, the language used to define what the bird is, a character that has been seen, rather than reflecting what has been seen in a neutral, objective fashion. In this study, we will be considering not swans, but sporting events and their relationship to national identity.

Critical Realist epistemology can also be called ‘Retroduction’, which is neither looking to falsify hypotheses, nor to inductively uncover general laws and statistical associations. Rather, this focus on discourse and the ‘framing’ of ‘realities’ about sport does not necessarily imply a lack of ‘real’ deep structures which frame the interaction between North and South Korea, but rather it is a focus on the social (and language) constituting those structures. This strategy is concerned with understanding how sport is ‘reacted to’ or ‘marshalled’ in support of different ideological positions. Our focus is thus on using press accounts, policy documents and interview material to illustrate these approaches. What we are effectively considering are the discursive strategies which have been employed to define the nature of social interaction in the sporting domain between the two elements of the ‘divided nation’.

3.3 Method Appropriateness

3.3.1 Qualitative Research
No research methods approach can be perfect for every research inquiry. Quantitative approaches also have several weak points, particularly when it comes to social science. One of them is related to the tendency of what quantitative research wants to do. It is more often used to predict results from the causal facts that it has found, and therefore tends to make a statement of causality as opposed to correlation. Moreover, by implying that facts are supposed to be ‘variable’ and ‘measurable’, many things may be ignored that are considered
part of cultural, social contexts. However, some aspects of human reality cannot be ‘measured’ (Grix 2004:19).

In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative studies do not tend to be concerned with the systematic calculation of numerical results (Knussen 2002:27). Qualitative research admits that the nature of study is already value-laden, since it is part of social reality. Researchers need to actively read and reflect on the gathering of sources for the field. Consequently, the research products will be written with the voices of those involved, including the researcher themselves. It is relatively clear that a qualitative research approach needs more interpretive inquiry and assumes that researchers’ interpretations involve their own culture, history and experiences. Moreover, a qualitative researcher tries to capture a broader picture of social reality, which includes various perspectives, not just simple cause and effect relations (Creswell 2007:19).

### 3.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

In the earlier sections, the ontological and epistemological perspective adopted in conducting this research was identified. This was the Critical Realist’s ontology, which as ‘realist’ infers that ‘reality’ exists independently of our knowledge. However, Critical Realism is also constructionist, arguing that people do produce ‘shared reality’, meaning that reality and real structures exist in the extended world but that this reality and these structures are the product of agency i.e. of the interaction of human agents. This Critical Realism can appeal to Post-Positivist approaches in the sense of qualitative, hypothesis driven, evaluation of the relationships between variables, as well as qualitative, interpretive approaches which seek to understand how actors’ understandings frame, produce, reproduce and amend such structures.

In the systematic review, a lack of research was identified relating to the role of sport in North and South relations. Although many do address aspects of sport and domestic politics,
little focus is given to issues relating to sports diplomacy, and there are no major empirical studies which focus on sport diplomacy in the two Koreas. Sport diplomacy takes place within a set of structures from the diplomatic world; the UN, the communist and capitalist blocs etc. In addition, it takes place within the structures of the sport world, e.g. The Olympic Family (IOC, NOCs, and IFs), sport markets (media, sponsors, producers and manufactures).

In the context of this study, the ‘constructed reality’ of international relations between North and South Korea will be identified through the discourses, and the roles which sport and sport related events have played in reflecting, reproducing and changing that ‘reality’. This will be done by analysing the structures of international relations within which this interaction takes place and the process of construction of these structures through the qualitative analysis of documents. The decision to choose the documents as primary sources of this research is based on the assumption that by analysing the language in the documents, and by identifying their meaning, it is possible to understand the real structural and cultural context of the phenomena (Altheide 1996:2).

This analysis requires the selection of official documents as sources from the field along with the purpose of written for (Grix 2004:131). This includes an encounter with documentary analysis for evaluation under four categories: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. Authenticity can be identified relatively easily by checking the origin of the document. Credibility refers to the document not having errors or misrepresentations. It is a little more complicated in terms of the meanings of documents. There are two levels. The data are documents that have literal meaning as most context of the literature has. Secondly there is also interpretative understanding. These two levels of meanings are clearly different, but need to be considered together (Gilbert 2001:204-205).

Fairclough (2005) approaches discourse analysis from a Critical Realist ontological position and tries to explain the relations between structure and existing events which means
focusing on the role of discourse in the construction of and challenge to dominant power from various groups in the various areas (Dijk 1993:301). He (2005) sees discourse analysis as bridging between social practices and real structures which are in an on-going process of establishment (Fairclough 2005:923). He (2005) uses the concepts of genre and style, which make the order of discourse. It is interesting that he identified the structured order of discourse, like the “stratified” view of ontology in critical realism. Fairclough (2005) said that discourse, which includes physical, social and psychological elements, represents part of the world. The genre is mainly associated with social action; who acts together. Then the style means a particular identity, such as leadership in certain organisations (Fairclough 2005:925).

Fairclough (1995) proposes a three-dimensional model of the communicative events which consists of text, discourse practice and socio-cultural practice. Text includes both written and spoken forms that one can read and listen to with or without visual aids through the media. Three main aims of text analysis can be identified as follows. Firstly, text analysis focuses on particular representations of social practices which may contain ideological meanings. With regard to the current study, an attempt will be made to reveal the way in which Olympic Games are represented and some ideological meanings embedded in the coverage such as capitalism and Olympism. In addition, it pays attention to specific constructions of producer and audience identities. National identity politics in the media coverage of the Olympic Games will be a good example. Finally, the relation between the reader and the writer that the text signifies is also a main concern of the text analysis. Whether the media considers the audience as consumers or critical audience can be clarified by investigating the manner in which Olympic related news items are introduced.

The differentiation of the order of discourse is related to the power discussion which is one of the useful points that Jäger and Meyer (2009) made, by differentiating ‘Power of discourse’ and ‘Power over discourse’, the former concerns the general argument of discourse which
has power to constitute individual and collective action, which includes material reality by repeating certain statements constantly. The latter, power over discourse, emphasised that the discourse itself, which developed, after it became the discourse. This shows the interaction of discourse between individual or collective, therefore one specific actor cannot say a certain discourse has a certain purpose (Jäger and Meyer 2009).

3.3.3 Issues of Warrantibility

Validity in social science research refers to internal and external validity. Internal validity deals with the question of whether the concepts or indicators that the researcher adopts really do relate to the ‘truth’. For example, do claims about real structures, or empirical data which give clues as to the nature of real structures, truly relate to what they claim they do? In quantitative research this may be interpreted as ‘does concept X or observation Y really relate to phenomenon Z?’ (Is for example occupational status truly an indicator of social class?). In terms of the emphasis on judgements of the ‘truth’ of a statement, the criterion of truth here is truth as correspondence ‘does the truth claim about phenomenon Z correspond to the observations made?’ In qualitative research however internal validity as a concept is often replaced by the notion of Warrantibility (Wood and Kroeger 2000). Demonstrating that my claim is warrantable is a matter of assessing whether my claims are ‘reasonable’ given other assumptions. Thus, the emphasis here is on the criterion of truth as coherence, or perhaps more accurately on network theories of truth which suggest that a claim can be said to be truth-like if it is consistent with a network of other claims which we take to be truth-like.

External validity relates to whether one can generalise from the case or sample under review to a wider population. In quantitative studies this means assessing the statistical strength and significance of claims made concerning the relationship between sample and population. However, in qualitative studies we refer to what (Yin 2003) terms ‘theoretical generalisations’ rather than statistical generalisations. Thus, the question thus is not ‘can I generalise from
this sample to the wider population?’ but ‘how likely is it that the theoretical claims made in relation to my case studies might be applicable to other cases in other similar contexts?’

In this research we address in the systematic literature review the concerns of generalisation, in terms of whether we can generalise from the sample of papers, and other sources we obtain to claim that this is a representative sample. This is a question of validity (evident in relation to a quantitative element of a mixed methods approach’. However the question of whether the themes identified in analysing the literature are the critical ones for our study, this is much more a matter of Warrantibility. How coherent are our claims concerning the themes raised in the literature. Warrantibility is thus a criterion to address, both in the analysis of the literature which was systematically obtained for our review, and of course in conducting the critical discourse analysis itself.

3.4 Data Collection and Analysis

For the purposes of analysis the three decades from 1978 to 2007 are selected as periods for research. In 1978, China declared a policy of ‘opening up its economy’, and this became the sign for a change of diplomatic tactics on the part of a number of communist countries. The first period selected is thus from the 1978 until 1987, which was the period during which the North-South Sport Talks took place between the two Koreas before the World Table Tennis Championship in Pyongyang. This was the event over which the North and South had their first official dialogue relating to sporting events which held in Korean peninsula. This period also fell within the context of the Cold War.

The second period is from 1988 until 1997. In this period, further North-South Sports Talks relating to establishing a ‘unified team’ and other sporting interactions between the two were held. In terms of the international context, this was the time during which the collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union took place, signaling the beginning of the Post-Cold War, or emergent multi-polar era. The third period is from 1998 till 2007. Just after the 2002
World Cup, North and South Korea started to talk about participation as a unified team in other international sporting events. This third period can be considered as the fully Post-Cold War Era, which is considered an era with the further development of a multi-polar International order.

As the main sources of analysis, South Korean summaries of the Sports Talks for North and South Korea were selected (together with other relevant government papers). North and South Korean newspapers have been chosen to investigate additional discourses surrounding North and South Korea which could construct and reflect the reality of North and South Korean sporting relations. Roh-Dong from North Korea, Hankyoreh and Dong-A from South Korea, 1978 to 2007 are selected as analysis material and are analysed using a critical discourse analysis protocol as described below.

3.4.1 Data Collection Process

This data collection has been conducted using various documents from the Korean government archive, which are based on the record of the dialogue and the response of both nations. The primary documents are the summaries of the Sports Talks (see Table 3.1). These documents need to be investigated to understand the general circumstances of North and South Korean sport relations. North Korea’s official position will be perceived through its main news print medium, which provides responses to the dialogues and the North Korean regime’s interpretation of the circumstances. Along with South Korea’s summary of the Sports Talks, the North and South Korean media have been selected as reflections of how the discourses in the two Koreas concerning their sporting interactions were constructed and displayed. Roh-Dong was chosen as the North Korean medium, because it is the first newspaper published by the government, and there is no ‘private’ newspaper coverage in North Korea. Thus, Roh-Dong as the voice of the establishment reflects what the North Korean government wanted to construct as the ‘reality’ of the North and South Korean sporting relations. From South Korea, two newspapers have been chosen, as
representatives of a North Korea / unification friendly political position (regarded as ‘left-wing’ in Korean terms), and a more skeptical approach to North Korea (though also pro-unification) position (described as ‘right wing’ in Korean terms). The analysis seeks to compare the difference and similarity between these two newspapers, Hankyoreh and Dong-A, to know their different views of North and South Korean sporting relations. South Korean newspapers from 1990 were collected from the national database of South Korean media archives and articles before 1990 were captured by recently published private newspaper archives in PDF picture format. The collection of materials from the North Korean newspaper Roh-Dong was more time consuming because of the lack of electronic materials. The Roh-Dong website recently constructed a database system for its articles, but this was not accessible in South Korea due to National Security law. Roh-Dong was only available in three media archives in South Korea, and only on-site viewing was allowed. Therefore, to allow thoroughness and repeated cross checking of the articles, photos of all the selected articles which were related to the theme of ‘North and South Korean sporting relations’ were taken manually.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1</th>
<th>South Korean Government List of Sports Talks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The 1st North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2nd North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 3rd North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the LA Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the LA Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the LA Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks with IOC Arbitration for the Seoul Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</th>
<th>1989.03.09</th>
<th>Panmunjom Southern area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1989.03.28</td>
<td>Panmunjom Northern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1989.10.20</td>
<td>Panmunjom Southern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1989.11.16</td>
<td>Panmunjom Northern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 5th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1989.11.24</td>
<td>Panmunjom Southern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 6th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1989.12.22</td>
<td>Panmunjom Northern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 7th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1990.01.18</td>
<td>Panmunjom Southern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 8th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1990.01.29</td>
<td>Panmunjom Northern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 9th North and South Korean Sports Talks Principal Meeting for Unified Team for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games</td>
<td>1990.02.07</td>
<td>Panmunjom Southern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the International Games</td>
<td>1990.11.29</td>
<td>Panmunjom Northern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the International Games</td>
<td>1991.01.15</td>
<td>Panmunjom Southern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the International Games</td>
<td>1991.01.30</td>
<td>Panmunjom Northern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the International Games</td>
<td>1991.02.12</td>
<td>Panmunjom Southern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The 1st Administrative Discussion of North Korean Participation to the Busan Asian Games</td>
<td>2002.08.17-19</td>
<td>The Geumgang Mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2nd Administrative Discussion of North Korean Participation to the Busan Asian Games</td>
<td>2002.08.26-28</td>
<td>The Geumgang Mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Administrative Discussion concerning the Daegu Summer Universiad</td>
<td>2003.07.04-06</td>
<td>The Geumgang Mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Administrative Discussion concerning the Athens Olympic Games Joint March</td>
<td>2004.06.23-25</td>
<td>Beijing in China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The 1st Administrative Discussion for the 2005 8.15 North and South Korean 'Unification Football Match'</td>
<td>2005.07.26</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2nd Administrative Discussion for the 2005 8.15 North and South Korean 'Unification Football Match'</td>
<td>2005.07.28</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The 1st North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team of Two Koreas</td>
<td>2005.12.07</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2nd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team of Two Koreas</td>
<td>2006.06.29</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team of Two Koreas</td>
<td>2006.11.30-12.02</td>
<td>Doha in Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team of Two Koreas</td>
<td>2007.02.13</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The 1st Administrative Discussion for Using of Gyeongui Rail Road for participation the Beijing Olympic Games of Joint Cheer Team</td>
<td>2007.12.28</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>The 2nd Administrative Discussion for Using of Gyeongui Rail Road for participation the Beijing Olympic Games of Joint Cheer Team</td>
<td>2008.02.04</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.2 Newspapers Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Dong – A Il Bo</td>
<td>Hankyoreh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyword</td>
<td>‘North and South Sports’</td>
<td>Nam Book Che Yook (in Korean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1997</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2007</td>
<td>Available</td>
<td>Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.4.2 Data Analysis Protocol

To understand the North and South Korean sport relations by identifying what sort of discourses emerged from whom, specific summaries of North-South Korean Sports Talks were investigated. In the process of undertaking the document analysis, a protocol was adopted and modified for reviewing documents. In terms of designing the approach for this research, the discourse analysis protocols of two leading theorists were compared and adapted, to allow the flexibility to deal with the two kinds of materials (Government Summary of Sports Talks and newspapers) and to identify the difference of language context between North and South Korean accounts. The two protocols were those of Fairclough (2005) and Jäger and Meyer (2009). After consideration of various approaches to critical discourse analysis, key research protocols were adopted from the categories of Fairclough for this research. Those are Format, Frame, Genre, Theme, Discourse and Style and the contents which explained the meaning of each category were briefly organised as the following figure demonstrates.

Jäger and Meyer (2009) suggest a structural process of analysing the dispositive by identifying discursive practices, non-discursive practices and materialisations. Their approach recommends identifying discourses by identifying discourse fragments. Based on the argument that “discourses do not exist independently: they are elements of dispositive”, what composes this dispositive needs to be analysed together. Here, discursive practices are mainly language and thought, non-discursive practices refers to actions, and
materialisations are the product created by these non-discursive practices. If this applied to the North and South Korean sporting interactions, the motivations and claims made by both sides for hosting Talks between them is discursive practice. The Talks held under this initiative and the responses on represent the non-discursive practices. As a result of the Talks, the concrete materisations produced are for example the uniform and the anthem for the unified team of North and South Korea.

In this research, the discourse of the contents will be the centred focus of analysis while the format, frame, theme and genre of the data represent the contacts for frames the discourse and will be subject to secondly analysis. The first draft of the analysis of the summaries of Sports Talks which adopted used the given protocol is outlined below [Table 3.3]. The format and genre were analysed for the general understanding of the material as a source of analysis.

**[Table 3.3] Contents of Analysis Protocol**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>1. Pertain to the underlying organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Assumptions of time, space and manner of experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) Temporal flow and rhythm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Place and visual editing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame</td>
<td>1. What will be discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. How it will be discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. How it will not be discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genre</td>
<td>1. Activity – Purpose of activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Social Relations – Power vs. Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Technology Intertextuality – included/excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Assumptions – Ideological assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>1. General meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mainframes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. General definitions or interpretive frames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>1. How abstractly or concretely are social events represented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. How are social actors represented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61
| 3. What was the occasion for the article |
| 4. How do these topics relate to each other and overlap |
| 5. What logic underlines the composition of the article |
| 6. What actors are mentioned, and how are they portrayed |
| 7. What concept of society does the article presuppose and convey |
| 8. Other peculiarities of the article |

### Style

| 1. What do authors commit themselves to in terms of truth |
| 2. What level of commitment is there |
| 3. To what values do authors commit themselves |

### Table 3.4 Application Sample of Analysis Protocol for Sports Talks – Common Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Category</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Format</strong></td>
<td>South Korean Government Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The author is sure about the North Korean motivation from the beginning of the Talks. Therefore, all the responsibility for the result, which is that the South Korean team cannot join the game, is with North Korea. The tones of voice / words are firm and clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Genre</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of Genre chains:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Pre-genre: Narrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Genre: Summary of the Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Situated genre: Summary of the North and South Korean Sports Talks from the South Korean Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of Genre mixtures:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Descriptive narration and explanatory narration of political propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of individual genres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Purpose of activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inform (Education) and propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Social Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North and South Korean People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North and South Korea with Foreign Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; Communication Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One way - mediate : Website</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The summary of Sports Talks between North and South Korea have been analysed by other categories such as format and Genre as above [Table 3.4] and frame, theme, discourse and style as [Table 3.5].

[Table 3.5] Application Sample of Analysis Protocol for Sports Talks – Detailed Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1st Document</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>The 1st - 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Panmunjom JSA (Joint Security Area)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>From NK (event host country) to SK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The meaning of ‘unified team’ in North and South Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation of both North and South Korea, what do they expect from this talk?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Result : Failure to organise unified team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of South Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frame</td>
<td>North and South Korean Sports issue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>‘North Korea suggested having discussion on the 27th of February, concerning the matter of organising unified team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championship which will be held in North Korea on 25th of April.</td>
<td>Organising North and South Korean unified team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Motivation: Why did North Korea suggest a unified team?</td>
<td>In terms of ‘one nation, one state’ nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Context: In the process of the contact between the North and South Korean Control Committee …on behalf of the president of the North Korean Table Tennis Association, a letter was sent to the Chief of South Korean Sport Association (KSA) and the Chief of South Korean Table Tennis Association (KTA).</td>
<td>The mood between NK and SK was not predictable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 1:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK side……</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK Table Tennis Association’ VS ‘Korean Sport Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do NK media present each organization in their perspective? (guess: Cho Sun VS Nam Cho Sun) Each side argues that it has the legitimacy of united Korean authority and using different name to call another.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Language 2: |
| By acceptance of South Korean Sport organisations, the Talks held and proceeded totally 4 times |
| ‘Acceptance’ is a rather ‘emotion’ involved word. In formal, official and relatively neutral word could be ‘answer’, or ‘response’. |

<p>| Logic or Ideology Statement 1: |
| In the Talks, the representative of KTA emphasises that if North and South Korea cannot reach the agreement for organising a unified team by 12th of March, North Korea should guarantee the participation of the South Korean team and cross the board through Panmunjom by arranging other procedures. |
| South Korea agreed on a unified team discussion, but there is an assumption that this will not reach a positive conclusion. South Korea asked the North to promise the participation of South players in the game, through the Panmunjom route to show the progress of the ‘peaceful’ relationship between the two Koreas. This means that South Korea concerns the symbolic harmony of one nation and ethnic nationalism not only by the organising unified team, but also other represented feature such as crossing the border. But the ‘arrange other procedure’ part has a nuance of blaming or transferring all the responsibility to North Korea whatever the result is. It certainly shows the passive attitude of South Korea in the Talks. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic or Ideology Statement 2:</th>
<th>North Korea wanted to reach the conclusion for a unified team first, but its motivation is not clear.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea suggested a principal agreement of a unified team and also suggested details of procedures……..</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic or Ideology Statement 3:</td>
<td>South Korea clearly made a statement concerning North Korean motivation to try to obstruct South Korean players to the game. If South Korea assumed North Korean motivation like this, why did South Korea not focus on the detail of conditions of a unified team? - Just simply to blame North Korea?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The representatives of STA pointed out that the purpose of North Korea’s suggestion of a unified team seems to obstruct the separate participation of South Korean players and thus, requested to secure the right to separate participation of the game first.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic or Ideology Statement 4:</td>
<td>South Korea expressed that North Korea “avoided answering” and were “obstinate’ concerning the unified team which showed some degree of reluctant attitude in South Korea on the unified team issue discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea avoided answering this question, and were obstinate to agree on the principle of a unified team. By doing so, North Korea clearly stated that they will refuse the separate participation of South Korean players.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Style</strong></td>
<td>The tone of the summary implied the ‘hidden’ motivation of North Korea and its suggestion related to organising unified team.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The newspapers of North and South Korea, Roh-Dong, Dong-A and Hankyoreh, provided a relatively large number of articles, since they cover the general theme of ‘North and South Korean Sports’ during three decades from 1978 to 2007. Therefore, software for qualitative research analysis, N-Vivo, was used to code the relevant themes emerging from the application of the analysis protocol to the individual articles and government statements. This was a first order descriptive level of analysis which was followed by a more detailed
analytic analysis of the discourse teasing out the subtleties of rhetoric, meaning and context.

The detailed discourse analysis was conducted in a chronological reviewing of the sporting events and related issues between North and South Korea. The articles were retyped in Korean in order that the files could be used with N-vivo, and after detailed discourse analysis, the final selected article segments which are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 were translated into English.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme of discourse 1</th>
<th>Theme discourse 2</th>
<th>Number of Sources</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blaming North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming South Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Festival</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dae Jung Kim</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic perspective on Sport</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flame for Games</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly Exchange Games</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incheon Asian Games</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Context</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and West Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC related</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea &amp; US relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and South Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN related</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sporting Events</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 World Cup</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st World Table Tennis</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th World Table Tennis Championship</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Seoul Olympic Games</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 World Table Tennis Championship</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aomori Winter Asian Games</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens Olympic Games</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta Olympic</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Conclusion

We began this chapter by arguing for a critical realist standpoint, which intimates that there are underlying these social interactions between North and South Korean actors, a real set of structures. These structures and ideological positions are nevertheless socially
constructed by, and reflected in, the discursive performance of government actors in the controlled press of the North and the official statements of the South Korean Government concerning the Talks, as well as in the discourses of the partisan press reflecting ‘right’ and ‘left’ (in South Korean context) in terms of relations with the North. In the three chapters which follow we will seek to disentangle the evolving relationship between discourse and context in the three periods selected.
Chapter 4 North and South Korean sports relations from 1978-1987

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is intended to provide an analysis of the various media discourses concerning North and South Korean sport relations from 1978 to 1987. In exploring the questions of North and South Korean sport relations, media sources will be limited to consideration of three newspapers, which are Roh-Dong in North Korea and Dong-A and Hankyoreh in South Korea. As explained in the methodology chapter, Hankyoreh was not published until April 1988 and so is not included in the analysis for this chapter. The summary of Sport Talks between the two Koreas which was produced by the South Korean government has also been considered to be material that manifests a South Korean government perspective, while Roh-Dong newspaper is considered as expressing the perspective or voice of the North Korean government, since it is generally acknowledged that the North Korean regime controls media output (Byman and Lind 2010:44-74).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Roh-Dong (North Korea)</th>
<th>Dong-A (South Korea)</th>
<th>Summary of Sport Talks from the South Korean government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government documents from the web data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frame</td>
<td>The North and South Korean Sport Relations</td>
<td>The North and South Korean Official Sport Talks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>1978 Bangkok Asian games</td>
<td>The 35th World Table Tennis Championship</td>
<td>The 35th World Table Tennis Championship, 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, 1986 Seoul Asian Games, 1988 Seoul Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genres</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Informative, Constructive, Ideological</td>
<td>Informative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Informative, Constructive, Ideological</td>
<td>Constructive, ideological</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style</td>
<td>Nationalistic/Anti-Separationist</td>
<td>Nationalistic/Strong Anti-Communism</td>
<td>Nationalistic/Pro-Unification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The items employed in the analysis protocol: Format, Frame, Theme, Genre, Discourse, and Style have been defined in the methodology chapter. Here the contents of the materials are briefly identified by item. The two formats of items reviewed are newspaper and government document data from websites. The articles which are selected from the databases were in the framework of the North and South Korean sport relations, so sporting events are mainly those under the governance of the Olympic movement and/or International Federations. Specific themes in newspapers are sought in the context of the International sport events of the time such as World Championships, Asian Games and the Summer and the Winter Olympics from 1978 to 1987. The themes from the Sports Talks, however, relate to only two contexts. North and South Korea held Talks concerning the matter of the 35th World Table Tennis Championship; and the 1984 LA Olympics. These Talks relate to the issues of participation, organising ‘A Korean Team’ and other related processes such as team selection. Genre is contingently related and limited by the Format, Frame and Talks, yet it is more flexible and various in newspaper than in White Paper summary. Whether it has been a column, interview, a factual script, description of the scene or the ‘discursive argument’ of the reporters themselves, there are complicated elements of information about an event, construction of the event as it was interpreted and understood according to ideologies whether ‘official’, ‘formal/political’ or ‘personal’. In the discourses, even more specific and dynamic subjects emerged in terms of the context of various word usages and connotations since their interpretation extends beyond the simple understanding of the language itself but even more so of the realities which they embody, as they evolved and were reflected upon by people at particular points in time. Lastly the style may be a vehicle for expressing various beliefs and values through format which may be manipulated by those in power in order to control the themes or discourses in the writings.

Despite Talks relating to the participation of “A Korean Team” in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, these Talks failed and both South Korea and North Korea competed as separate teams, which manifested a stark rift between North and South Korea in terms of sport
relations. A decade later, Talks were initiated by the IOC, in February, 1979. The context of international relations from 1978 to 1987 was defined by the Cold War and the Korean peninsula was one of the last examples of this opposition. The reasons for the Korean peninsula having been chosen as the ground for this confrontation were various. Some blamed the lack of national capability following independence from Japan, after Japan was defeated in World War II. Others blamed the ignorance of the dominant countries, which infringed upon the Korean nation’s sovereignty by making decisions on Korea’s behalf while the country was too immature to function effectively. However, in this research, the above dispute will not be a subject for discussion rather the analysis will start from awareness of the context, which was the Cold War era in international relations and the place, the Korean peninsula and its geopolitical location.

International sporting events could not be an exception to the rule of the Cold War political order. Rather, the Games were an open theatre of the expressions of political ideologies of the Cold War. The 1980 Moscow Olympics and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were the so called ‘half Games’ since the confrontation of ideological blocks manifested itself in the boycotting of the Games hosted by the opposing side. Nevertheless, the discourses around the Olympics as a sporting vehicle of peace and harmony, particularly around the period of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were considerable, and this type of discourse was certainly used as part of government propaganda by the South Korean military regime. The meaning of the Olympics for North and South Korean regimes and the ways in which international sport was used by them within the context of the Cold War will be the primary focus of analysis in the forgoing chapter.
4.2 The North and South Korean intra-relations since the Korean War

4.2.1 The Cold War as a context of International Sport Relations

As the Korean War itself manifests, the relations between North and South Korea during the last 60 years have been basically hostile, even though there are some differences of degree at certain junctures. Nevertheless, the matter of organising ‘A Korean Team’ was first raised as issue in 1957. From that date North Korea was formally recognised by the IOC. However, the permission to participate in the Olympic Games given at the 53rd IOC session in Bulgaria in 1957 was expressly made conditional on South Korea assent’s to their required participation as ‘A Korean Team’ a sporting union of North and South Korea. The 59th IOC session in 1962 again proposed ‘A Korean Team’ for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, following a similar decision taken in relation to the East and West German case. This was the first time that North and South Korea had engaged in Sports Talks face to face. After the first Talks in January 1963 in Lausanne, North and South Korea agreed to follow the German approach in terms of athlete selection procedure, and choice of anthem ‘Arirang’. About 20 years later, they adopted a 1920 version of the national anthem predating the national divide. However, continued Talks held in Hong Kong in May 1963 fell apart with disagreement over the Tokyo arrangements. The atmosphere of hostility between North and South Korea changed in the early 1970s since the mood of détente in international politics began to affect the Korean Peninsula. This produced several North and South Korean dialogues and a ‘Joint Statement of 7.4’ in 1972 was announced by both sides. Thus, the 7.4 Joint Statements became the starting point for a period of ‘Conflict with Dialogue’ as opposed to the previous ‘Conflict without Dialogue’. The President of the South Korean Sport Association, Kim, and the President of North Korean NOC, Oh, adopted a new statement that they would work for the realisation of the North and South Korean interaction in sport. Even though this was a fundamental agreement, there still remained the issue of a single team which was raised in relation to the 1972 Scandinavian Table Tennis Open and the 1973 Shooting Championship in Japan. These steps proved to be significant achievements for North Korea-South Korea.
relations. Nevertheless, this did not mean that all the discussions between North and South Korea from the 7.4 Statement were productive and fruitful. North and South Korea continuously imposed their respective views and judgements upon one another, which resulted in forced acceptance of decisions that would have otherwise not been accepted or preferred, and as a consequence, the Talks ended in controversy most of the time. A significant example of this is reflected in Roh-Dong commentary on Yugoslavia's boycott of an international shooting competition in Seoul.

......A clear statement has been made by the Yugoslavian people who refuse to participate in the World Shooting Championship which will be held in Seoul, where the South Korean ‘stooge’ governs without the legitimacy of representing all Koreans. The Park Jung Hee Regime is based on a fascist violence stand against National unity. This just decision by Yugoslavia is significantly damaging to Park’s regime which has tried to use sport strategy of ‘Two Cho-Sun (Korea)’ to promote its tainted political purpose......

(Roh-Dong 20, Mar., 1978)

By broadcasting this statement in the North Korean media, the North Korean regime wanted to stress several points by way of representing the Cold War confrontation between North and South Korea. The words “Stooge” and “Fascist violence” are particularly critical of the South Korean regime as lacking political legitimacy since this was a military regime established by military coup. Roh-Dong also characterises South Korea's motivation for hosting this event as arising out of a ‘tainted political purpose’ that is one which reinforces national division to gain diplomatic recognition for itself. North Korea was not alone in being concerned by the diplomatic acknowledgment of the North-South spilt by the rest of the world. South Korean interests also manifest anxiety about the activities of North Korea in the international sport diplomacy arena. Dong-A for example published the following in 1978.

...... North and South Korea have been divided even in the sport world by nomination of a North Korean person to represent the IOC in the North Korean NOC in the 80th IOC session......Since North Korea also has an IOC member, the North Korea’s political attacks through international sport organisations are likely to grow in strength......

(Dong-A 22, May, 1978)

In Dong-A’s articles, it is understood that South Korea has valued the combined representation of North and South Korea in the international sport arena. Thus South Korea sees the nominating of an IOC member from North Korea as a threat and thus a cause for
alarm. The use of IOC membership can be an ideological weapon which legitimates the state. These ideas reflecting the Cold War positions were also articulated in the discussion of international sport issues concerning the Asian Games and the Olympics.

......South Korean National team for the '82 New Delhi Asian Games has met for its official team gathering ceremony to encourage good results in the Games, aiming to be ranked 3rd after China and Japan with a victory in the competition between North and South Korea......

(Dong-A 9, November, 1982)

In the article, Dong-A clearly acknowledges defeating North Korea as a national 'goal' for participating in the Games. Coincidentally, the first gold medal for South Korea in the New Delhi Asian Games was from the cycling competition in which North and South Korea confronted each other directly. Dong-A thus reinforces the distinction between North and South Korea (Dong-A 22, November, 1982). In the following sections, we shall proceed to consider sport as an arena for competing ideology and how Korean national identity has often been the subject of media discourse.

4.2.2 Unification, national wish or burden to be forgotten?

The critical incident which secured the North and South Korean separation was the Korean War. Kim Il Sung’s decision to attack South Korea in 1950 had made North Korea an enemy to the South and the situation has thus far been irreversible, incapable of reverting to status quo ante. Therefore, since the Korean War, North and South Korea have developed recognition of each other as a perceived ‘enemy’, so that the relations between North and South Korea had become characterised as competitive and antagonistic. It is obvious that a genuine growth of the wish for peaceful unification was in large part based on the Korean concept of harmony among a homogeneous Korean ethnic grouping. South Korea’s official recognition of North Korea was first provided in a statement of celebration of Korean Independence Day on the 15th August in 1970 by President Park. It has been said that this statement represents the first attempt to suggest the possibility of establishing the North and South Korean contacts. Subsequently, the Joint Statement of 4th of July (7.4) was announced in 1972. Whatever political implication of the Joint Statement there might have
been, the contents as a whole are interpreted as expressing a determination to solve national unification issues based on a ‘clean slate’ without the ideology of separation and a divided Korea.

South Korea’s official systematic unification plan was announced from the statement of celebration of Korean Independence Day on the 15th August in 1974 through the ‘Three basic principles for Peaceful Unification’. The gist of this document is that peace must be settled first between North and South Korea by gaining mutual trust through intensified contact with each other and the subsequent consideration of unification by national election. This ‘First: Peace; second: Unification’ strategy is still the basis of South Korea’s unification policy. North Korea’s unification policy is represented in the so called ‘Koryo Federal (Union) Republic system’, which would preserve both regimes thus encouraging both of the present regimes to support the idea. The basic framework of the unification policy of North and South Korea has some fundamental commonalities which can be expressed in the light of three aspects: the first is respect for the opposite regime; the second is the emphasis on interaction and cooperation; and the third is peaceful unification. There has been a dispute on the matter of priority between Unification and Democracy, and both are important in the Korean peninsula since unification will be hard to realise without the solid democratic order of society. In addition, unification for its own sake is just as dangerous an ideology as the dogma of Anti-Communism, and therefore caution must be given to both extremes. In terms of analysing North and South Korean sport relations, the background of the North and South Korean unification stories must be understood for deeper analysis within its context.

4.2.3 Sport: war without casualty or grounds of self-expression?

In the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games, North and South Korea played several matches competing for medals against one another. The North Korean newspaper, Roh-Dong, and Dong-A, newspaper from South Korea were responsible for a certain skewed projection of ‘reality’ seen through the subjective lens of what they understood or wished to project, while
also participating in the very construction of the reality of the North and South Korean relations through media discourses as such relations developed.

......It is so painful to struggle against each other as a divided nation, in sport competitions abroad......On the following picture in the news, the head of our team asked to shake hands with North Korean representatives, but a North Korean player just stood bearing no expression. What I felt from that was 'There is no freedom at all'. There were no words from any other team members, so we were even sorry to have asked to shake hands when they refused......Whatever the politicians do between North and South Korea, sport and cultural relations it is hoped will get better......

(Dong-A 4, November, 1978)

Dong-A described the confrontation of North and South Korea on the sport field as "so painful". It is interesting to encounter this sad expression particularly from a Dong-A news reporter. Although North and South Korea have had a cease-fire agreement and have been physically divided as two separate entities for about 25 years, whether or not the two nations openly acknowledge each other as a separate nation or not, the reality of the ‘split’ itself is considered to be both an ‘obvious sorrow’ and a ‘wound’ for the Korean Nation. Furthermore, the following description of the scene of people from North and South Korea meeting provides a valuable insight helping not only to understand the North Korean people and their attitudes toward uninhibited, spontaneous communication with South Korea people, but also entailing a symbolic implication, that is, by saying that ‘we [South Korea] felt sorry’ about North Korea’s refusal to shake hands, the gap that exists between North and South Korea was emphasised, creating a greater rift between the two regimes in the minds of readers.

Interestingly enough, in the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games, North and South Korea used and was cheered by the same name ‘Korea’. This name originated from one of the dynasties in the Korean peninsula called ‘Koryo’ (918-1392), which had ruled most of the peninsular area and this was therefore a well-known term among neighbouring countries through trade along the Silk Road. It was thus noted that North Korea had also cheered for their team by the name of ‘Korea’, even though North Korean people call themselves ‘Cho-Sun’ in Korean referring to the last Korean dynasty.

......Our players keep winning medals in the 8th Asian Games......Particularly, Choi gave a great performance and spectators raised their thumbs and shouted ‘Korea, Korea’ with loud applause......
Roh-Dong emphasised the achievement of North Korean athletes winning a medal in the competition, but did not show much enthusiasm for promoting the propaganda of its regime or advancing its political values by means of the Games.

……Our shooters have achieved various Games records in the 8th Asian Games with 4 gold medals and 2 silvers……The spectators showed enormous support and cheering for our players……

However, Dong-A showed that South Korea was significantly concerned about winning the Games (outperforming the North) for the benefit of its national reputation, so it established a sport training facility for elite athletes. It was even critical in the Asian Games that national reputations tended to be judged more by national ranking, so the South Korea wanted to affirm its ranking in 3rd place behind China and Japan. In the following article, the intention to use sport as a tool of diplomacy by identifying ‘position in Sport’ as a ‘position in the International Status’ can be clearly noted through the words from the president of the KOC.

……President Kim of the KOC emphasised that ‘South Korea kept its third place in the Asian Games because of the consistently intensive preparation provided in the athletes’ camp, and only with such preparation can we maintain the strong position of the South Korean team among the World’s top countries.’……

4.3 The 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang

4.3.1 The issues surrounding the organising of ‘A Korean Team’

The issue of North Korea’s hosting the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in Pyung Yang was certainly a subject of considerable discussion between the two Koreas, and it was uncertain whether South Korea would participate in the championships or not, with organising a unified team for this International competition. Dong-A cited the Minister of Culture and Education of South Korea who was responsible for South Korean sport policy indicating that he had given his assent. South Korea’s agreement to participate in the competition was to be on condition that the South Korean team’s security would be guaranteed by the North Korean administration. This is not only a sign of the state of the
North and South Korean interactions through sport, but also provides evidence to counter claims of the shallow and tenuous mutual trust that existed between the North and South Korean people.

……The Minister of Culture and Education said that he would dispatch a South Korea team when he is officially invited on the 35th World Table Tennis Championship in Pyongyang in April, with an official invitation and guarantee of our security on the way to and returning from Pyongyang……

(Dong-A 9, January, 1979)

The principal source of mistrust at this time was made manifest in Dong-A article, and it is possible that since these championships were held in North Korea, Dong-A publishers were not at liberty to be supportive of the success of North Korea’s international sport events because of South Korea’s own totalitarian regime. This claim can be supported by the following articles, which describe Dong-A’s attitudes toward the ‘expected letters’ from North Korea on this sport issue. North Korea suggested a round table discussion to talk about the matter concerning the “North Korea-South Korea Unified Team” for the World Table Tennis Championship. In the article, Dong-A had called North Korea a “stooge regime”, but had acknowledged the benefits of “A Korean Team” which would hasten national unity between North and South Korea.

……The North Korea stooge regime broadcast that the North Korean Sport Governing Committee and Table Tennis Association had sent a letter to President Park, of the Korean Sport Association and the President of the Table Tennis Association of South Korea and has suggested the idea of having a North Korea-South Korean unified team……This letter said that it would be a great achievement for North and South Korea to participate as a unified team in the Pyongyang World Table Tennis and promote the unity of North and South Korea……

(Dong-A 21, February, 1979-1)

……The discussion about organising a unified North and South Korean team has taken place several times in the past. However, constructive dialogue has also broken-down several times due to disagreement about the basic conditions for a North and South Korean team such as team name, team song and team flag……

(Dong-A 21, February, 1979-2)

Although South Korea refers to the Korean Team as ‘a unified team’ of North and South Korea, there were still many things to be decided such as the ‘team name, team song and team flag’ and so forth. Dong-A treats these issues in a style and manner of writing that seem to describe a sense of passivity and resignation, due to the failure of previous Talks and a sense of pessimism with regard to future Talks. The South Korean government simply
noted that the suggestion of a unified North Korean team was a bold statement, but even in this dispassionate tone which implies that it has been written objectively, South Korea used the term ‘Unified Team’ instead of ‘Unification Team’ which must be used by South Korean representatives as a requirement of the North Korean representatives at the Talks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>North Korea has suggested having a discussion on the 27th of February, concerning the matter of organising <strong>Unified Team</strong> for the 35th World Table Tennis Championship which will be held in Pyongyang on the 25th of April.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Roh-Dong article, which was written the very next day after the Talks, clearly shows a rather different tone of excitement about the suggestion of a unified team. In addition, North Korea sought to persuade its people that a strong national reputation as ethnic Korean people would be achieved by a good performance by the unified team, and it must therefore be an ideal, or a firm objective, for all Korean people. This statement not only represented the wishes of the North Korean government, but also contributed to readers’ perception of the ‘reality’ of the Korean peninsula as it is. So the Roh-Dong newspaper sought to manipulate the discourses as Dong-A has done with its destructive forecast of the Talks.

......Let’s participate in the World Table Tennis Championship as a ‘Unification Team’ so that we can provide great pleasure to all the ethnic Korean peoples by showing the power of ethnic unity and wisdom to the world......There has been a first meeting between the North and South Korean sport representatives from each table tennis association......

(Roh-Dong 28, Feb. 1979-1)

Roh-Dong had proposed a possible solution to the issues facing both sides such as the creation of a team name ‘Koryo’. Furthermore, Roh-Dong forced South Korea to create an impression of progress by saying that it had accepted its suggestion of organising a unified team. North Korea had seemed to believe that the ITTF (International Table Tennis Federation) would have to accept the decision made by North and South Korea concerning the Korean team by expressing the fact that it ‘welcomed’ the resolution. The anxiety...
surrounding the subject of a ‘Unification Team’ of North Korea was expressed with the unusual suggestion of producing a joint statement indicating basic agreement on the issue.

……We have suggested to use the name ‘Koryo’ as the name for our Unification Team…….The point is that whether South Korea wants to organise a Unification Team or not……If we agree on the organising of a single team, then the international Table Tennis Association will welcome the result…..At last, let’s announce this basic agreement as a joint statement……

(Roh-Dong 28, Feb. 1979-2)

However, the dialogue appears to have not been going well based on the following article of Dong-A. It was explained that there were ‘fundamental differences’ in terms of ‘language (not the Korean itself but the meaning and uses of it) and ways of thing’. It has been noted that South Korea lacked ‘compassion’ in refusing to call the team a ‘Unification Team’ and for organising the team with little time before the games. It seems that the reasons for this ‘destructive’ South Korean response were that it was “practical but too idealistic”. Dong-A characterized these Talks as non-cooperative dialogue. The one part that is at least somewhat optimistic in South Korea’s response was that it had admitted the potential of sports rather than politics.

……Something which can be more progressive than politics is sport, but the 1st North and South Korean Table Tennis Talks have shown too many gaps between North and South Korea. The fundamental difference is language. The expression concerning the Unified Team discussion of North and South Korea is as a unified team of North and South Korea and the unifying factor is the ‘collaboration of Sport’……The language gap is nothing. The dissimilar way of thinking has been more problematic. North Korea has proposed that the selection of players, practice together in Pyongyang and the title of ‘Koryo’ be used for the Unified Team. These seem to be very practical and rational proposals, but too idealistic when the game is just 50 days away……It was not a very cooperative dialogue……

(Dong-A 2, March, 1979-2)

With the acrimonious response of South Korea to the North’s proposals for a ‘Unification Team’, North Korea responded strongly. First, North Korea pointed out that South Korea had been asked to guarantee the South Korean team’s independent participation in the games in case these unified team Talks were to break down. What increased the ambiguity and level of suspicion on the part of North Korea was the fact that South Korea had never referred to the team as a ‘Unification Team’. This must have been a point at the discussion table, and actually, it should have been impossible to proceed with proper communication between two representatives of the Talks without maintaining these fundamental differences of
terminologies. As Bertrand Russell once said, we can only say the words that we know, so the difference of terms implies basically the gap between the terms that have been used.

......South Korea has proposed North Korea to guarantee the South Korean team’s independent participation and the competition......South Korea has never even mentioned the ‘Unification Team’ once......’Is it that scary to say the word ‘Unification’? In the discussion for the Unification Team, they even never speak of a ‘Unification Team’ and try to use vague terms such as a ‘Unified Team’ and ‘Interactions’, which appear tedious and stuffy......

(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-1)

North Korea tried to solve this disagreement between North and South Korea by using its diplomatic power in the wider world. The reason why North Korea concluded the Talks with this solution is that North Korea had always considered South Korea as a puppet regime of the United States of America, so North Korea might have attempted to speed up its dialogues with the South Korea by using pressure from the rest of the world to cooperate in North Korea’s international sport events. The following commentary of North Korea shows its concern about the USA’s involvement on this issue.

......The organising of a Unification Team of the single ethnic nation Cho Sun (Korea) is a matter which needs to be solved by ourselves, so nobody else should get involved in this matter......

(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-2)

However, it is ironic that the North Korean representatives kept insisting on ‘independence’ from a single Korean nationality, while at the same time also using a diplomatic strategy as a way of achieving its unified team objective. Here, it can be said that sport diplomacy can not only utilize sport as a tool to promote diplomatic relations, but also diplomatic relations may be manipulated in order to advance cooperation in sporting activities for the sake of sports. The former concept can be called ‘sport for diplomacy’ while the latter can be entitled as ‘diplomacy for sport’.

4.3.2 International support for establishing ‘A Korean Team’

Once North Korea had endeavoured to make a ‘Unification Team, it started to use diplomatic approaches as well, to put South Korea in a position wherein it could not refuse its proposal. Roh-Dong published the statements from various organisations and the people from the countries with which North Korea had diplomatic relations. One of the best allies of North
Korea was Palestine since Palestine also confronted Israel in the international sport arena, as a proxy battlefield. In the following article, messages of support for a ‘Unification Team’ were sent from both Palestine and Indonesia although the level of support from respective countries varied to a certain degree.

......The Rabetik [name as spelt by the author] Palestine sport spokesperson said that......Cho Sun must participate in the 35th World Table Tennis Championship as a ‘Unification Team’......The leader of the Indonesia Table Tennis Association team said that Indonesia enthusiastically welcomed the participation of the Unification Team......

(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-3)

Palestine’s backing of the idea of a ‘Unification Team’ was more aggressive than that of Indonesia which was expressed in a comment on the matter saying that it would ‘welcome the participation of unified team’. In addition, the Czechoslovakian Table Tennis Association had sent a letter to the ITTF to accept the North and South Korean unified team well before its inception, since the ITTF’s reluctance to accept a Korean team was clearly a barrier that hindered South Korea’s decision-making and participation in the Talks. The symbolic allusion to the significance of a unified team was briefly mentioned in the letter, stating that the ‘North and South Korean division was a clear threat to World Peace’, and that the ITTF as an International sport organisation, indeed had a duty to do what they could to contribute to World peace by accepting the application of the unified team.

......The Czechoslovak table tennis association sent a letter to the International Table Tennis Federation asking that the ITTF would accept the Unification Team......The Vice President of the ITTF Aminabuheif [name as spelt by author] sent letters to ITTF and the Japanese Table Tennis Association arguing that the division of North and South Korea is not only a tragedy but also harmful to World peace, so the ITTF should help them to participate in the 35th World table tennis championship as a Unification Team......

(Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-5)

Czechoslovakia was not the only country to demonstrate backing of the North Korea’s ‘Unification Team’ suggestion, and Roh-Dong had correspondingly cited the news for the national table tennis associations from Africa. It utilised tools of diplomacy by identifying or analogising position in sports with position in the context of international relations as expressed in the words from the president of the KOC (Korean (South Korea) Olympic Committee). The University council of the UN in Namibia argued for the peaceful unification of Cho Sun, and the Ghana Table Tennis Association expressed through a
statement that South Korea should have accepted the unified team for the World Table Tennis Championship, which would have been helpful in the matter of North and South Korea’s mutual understanding.

......The university council of UN Namibia for the Cho Sun peaceful unification supporter has pointed out that South Korea must accept North Korea’s proposal for organising the Unification table tennis team in a statement of 3rd April......On the other hand, Ghana Table Tennis Association said through their statement that they strongly supported the North Korea’s proposal of a Unification Team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championship and this proposal could be more meaningful by helping North and South Korea to better understand each other more deeply......

(Roh-Dong 19, April 1979-2)

The method of playing supportive messages from abroad was part of the North Korea’s strategy for organising the ‘Unification Team’ by maintaining pressure on South Korea to accept the proposal. It might be more persuasive for both the North and South Korean people, to hear the comments published in Roh-Dong as opinions of foreign countries, even though they are obviously allies of North Korea. Therefore, whether North Korea had intended it or not, the above articles had performed a significant role as a tool of public diplomacy, to support the interpretation of the news provider. In this case, North Korea already had certain diplomatic purposes for hosting this event. Once hosted successfully, the event would provide North Korea with considerable propaganda to promote its regime to the wider world with ‘evidence’ that North Korea ‘developed continually under the guidance of the great leader Kim Il Sung’.

......The preparation for the 35th World Table Tennis Championship has been finished......Through this event, our guests from the world will know that the real situation of North Korea which has developed continually under the great guidance of the dear leader Kim Il Sung. And also peoples will know of our friendship to them since we all love peace and therefore, we will be able to grow in friendship......

(Roh-Dong 20, April 1979-1)

Such an approach was a typical example of Cold War diplomacy. However to fully seize on the opportunity, North Korea had to persuade the South Korea regime to participate in effect under the dominance of the North Korean host team.
4.3.3 The different perspectives on ‘A Korean Team’

With respect to issues associated with organising ‘a unified team of North and South Korea’, many interesting discourse elements emerged in the discussion. These were not simply technical matters about the pros and cons of team arrangement or the views of North Korea and the South Korea government, reflected in the context of Roh-Dong and Dong-A, but there were also reported views of other countries. In the following articles, the political values of North and South Korea were displayed in the discussion about the team. The term ‘Unification Team’ was deeply symbolic for North Korea. Roh-Dong suggested that it would contribute to bridge the 30-years divide between North and South Korea and would provide a vital step to the Korean national unification.

……The participation of the 35th World Table Tennis Championship as a Unification Team will………open the door to unification……… (Roh-Dong 8, Mar. 1979-4)

The implication of this message demonstrates the level of passion which is required to progress national unification, and was reflected in the attitude toward organising a Unification Team in this sport event. On balance, however, North Korea was clearly trying to steer South Korea into a no-win situation. If South Korea agreed to have a ‘Unification Team’ then clearly North Korea could be seen as a leading the process, if they disagreed with the proposal, North Korea could take the moral high ground because it would appear as the side that had actually tried to pursue unification through sports while South Korea refused to do so. Roh-Dong had written that South Korea ‘decided in advance not to make a Unification Team and ‘tried to participate in the games by themselves as a separate team from North Korea. North Korea had blamed South Korea for failing to agree to the announcing of a joint statement which included the fact that North and South Korea generally agreed on the basic principles of organising ‘a Unified Team’.

South Korea has already decided in advance not to make a Unification Team and has pursued its purpose of participating as a separate nation in the Games……Give consideration to the matter of whether South Korea has been passionate enough about organising a Unification team or not……We have clear evidence that South Korea is against organising a Unification Team. South Korea has not even agreed to announce that we both have agreed on the fundamental principle of organising a Unification Team, and South Korea keeps asking us to guarantee their right to participate in the Games as a separate team……
North Korea sought to reach the conclusion of establishing a Unification Team first without agreement on the details of the negotiation. This tactic of agreeing unconditionally to organise a Unification Team was interpreted simply as a way to prevent South Korea players’ participating in the championship. In the South Korea government’s Talks summary, it is noted that South Korea had received pressure with the ‘North Korea going into the Talks’ with a predetermined position on this ‘unified team’ discussion, with the South Korea government deeply suspicious of its purposes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Table 4.3] The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
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</table>

South Korea had also understood that this was the case as demonstrated in the South Korea summary of Talks as well. South Korea had basically agreed on having the sport Talks and on having a ‘unified team’ discussion, but South Korea considered the outcome of reaching a successful agreement by these Talks to be doubtful as it alluded to the timeline for this Talks. At the very least, South Korea wanted to prepare for the consequences of these Talks, which they had presumed. North Korea had responded that as South Korea played the Korean people and the rest of the world for fraud

……However, South Korea has just come to the Talk as if they agreed on the idea of Unification Team but they have made unreasonable excuses from the beginning displaying an insincere attitude……South Korea now has revealed its position to the whole Korean people and to the world that they don’t have any intention of making a Unification Team for the Pyongyang World Table Tennis Championship……

(Roh-Dong 13, Mar. 1979)

However, from the South Korea perspective this labelling was an unfair and an unreasonable conclusion to draw, since the South Korean government was against accepting North Korea’s unilateral suggestions without safeguards. The South Korea had asked North Korea to promise the participation of South Korea players in the Championship,
through the Panmunjom route (located in the Demilitarised Zone between North and South Korea) to show the progress of the 'peaceful' relationship to the Korean people. Thus, South Korea was also concerned with the symbolic representation of ‘one nation, ethnic nationalism’, an ideology shared by both the North and the South Korean regimes and thus forming a cornerstone of the dominant discourse of Korean nationalism. The phrase ‘arrange everything’ seemed to imply the transfer of all responsibility for managing the process to North Korea whatever the result of discussions. The following lines describe South Korea’s passive attitude in terms of the issue and result of unified team-related Talks.

<table>
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<th>Table 4.4</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>In this discussion, the representatives of South Korea emphasized that if North and South Korea will not reach an agreement on the organising of a unified team by 12th of March, North Korea should guarantee the participation of South Korea players through Panmunjom and make all the appropriate arrangements.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Roh-Dong expressed the points made in the North Korea’s condemnation of South Korea by quoting the exact dialogue of the Talks. North Korean representatives had characterized South Korea representatives as ‘cold-hearted’ and even had stated that “South Korea is afraid of collaboration with the North Korea”, which is a significant claim whether it is true or not. If it were true, then South Korea was deceiving not only the Korean people but also international society and if it were not true, then it was nevertheless still the case that mutual distortion and misunderstanding was a huge barrier to the realisation of their ‘national wish’ for Unification.

…… ‘How cold-hearted the representatives are, how can they just ignore the Korean people’s wishes’……even the reporters from South Korea said that ‘people want a Unification Team but they (South Korea sport representatives) are against these wishes’ and they criticised their own representatives. The attitudes reflect the fact that South Korea representatives are afraid of collaboration between North and South Korea on the sport field……

(Roh-Dong 11, Mar. 1979-3)

It was plainly indicated in the following article by Roh-Dong when South Korea had just entered the Talks that the South Korea people were allegedly willing to agree on the idea of
a ‘Unification Team’ but “the attitude and reasons for objection are nonsense”. This is not all; Roh-Dong cited the comment of South Korea reporters blaming their own representatives for acting with ‘shamelessness’. Since this was the North Korea’s perception of the South Korea, it would not have been expected that a unified team would enter the 35th International Table Tennis Championship, and such a view was also stated in an April 25th article of Roh-Dong.


South Korea was against organising the Unification Team and openly sought to participate as separate teams. They also removed themselves from the Talks…..South Korea representatives have just acted according to scripts. We have asked South Korea reporters and they answered that ‘This is just shamelessness’……

(Roh-Dong 15, Mar. 1979-6)

……However, I am afraid that we cannot participate as a Unification Team due to the insincere attitude which is bringing about permanent separation of our ethnic people……

(Roh-Dong 25, April 1979-1)

The following Roh-Dong article, demonstrates North Korea’s flawed logic when judging South Korea’s intention with regards to national unification by means of organising a ‘Unification Team’.


If South Korea doesn’t agree to the organising of a ‘Unification Team’, then it would mean that South Korea doesn’t want unification of the South Korea and North Korea……, we want to have a positive achievement of the Talks in DMZ, Panmunjom……

(Roh-Dong 9, Mar. 1979)

Additionally, North Korea had also articulated their desire to know whether the Talks represented a ‘positive achievement’ and not something entirely dependent on the issue of whether the unification team would be organised or not. What then had been the logic behind South Korea’s response to North Korea’s suggestion? The following article in Dong-A explains the intent of South Korea in some sense.


The representative Chae said that North and South Korean sport relations and organising a unified team for North and South Korea is fundamentally one matter, and discussions about a Unified Team are part of North and South Korean sport relations…..It can only interpret North Korea’s refusal to acknowledge the South Korea team’s right to participate as a violation of the regulations of the ITTF, if North Korea doesn’t guarantee the South Korea team’s participation in the Pyongyang Games before the discussions of the organising the North Korean team are held……

(Dong-A 9, March, 1979-2)

The above article demonstrates the differing views of North and South Korea regarding the framework of organising the North and South Korean team. South Korea views the organisation of a single team as something that ought to be accomplished over time.
Therefore, for South Korea, if the Unification Team was not achieved on this occasion, it would be achieved at some point in the future and at the right time, but participation in this competition as simply a South Korea team was still important for them. However, North Korea considered the first stage to have been accomplished already. Thus there was a significant gap between the speed and scheduling of this procedure on the part of North and South Korea.

……The socialist group of people in Japan has criticised South Korea which has ruined the Talks between North and South Korea to organise a Korean National Unification Team……We believe that the proposal of a Unification Team was a good way to advance the unification of the Cho Sun (Korea)……

(Roh-Dong 18, Mar. 1979)

In the above article, Roh-Dong accuses South Korea of ruining ‘the Unification team’ discussions which had been seen as having great benefit for national unification. However, South Korea’s perception of the Talks seems different. In the following summary, South Korea used the word ‘acceptance’, which has a meaning similar to ‘answer’ or ‘response’ but with the nuance of ‘allowing’ and ‘permitting’. Thus, these Talks were made possible because of South Korea’s openness to the fact that North Korea had been willing to organise a unified team.

<table>
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<th>Table 4.5</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>By the acceptance of Korean Sport Association and Korean Table Tennis Association, these Talks were held and were carried out four times in total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The argument between North and South Korea seems to have been treated as a practical matter, but the realisation came clear early on that sport relations were too significant to be treated as mere administrative work. Nevertheless, North Korea had been confident that the decision made by the Korean people regarding a unification team would be accepted by international sport organisations, such as the ITTF, and North Korea condemned South Korea’s assumption that it would not have been easily accepted by such bodies. The world view of North Korea authorities was clearly evident in the following articles.
'As it was clearly presented during the process of the Talks, we have requested that South Korea be allowed to participate in the Pyongyang International Competition, however, South Korea has created obstacles by saying that it is not rational that we organise the Unification Team. We are the ethnic who want to form The Unification Team so we can do it ourselves. In other words, there won't be any problem which we cannot resolve ourselves for organising a Unification Team……

(Roh-Dong 10, Mar. 1979-2/3/4)

The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) was ready to accept a National Unification Team……

(Roh-Dong 16, Mar. 1979)

There was a connection between the North Korea’s emphasis on the proposal that South Korea can “make our (Korean) Unification Team us (both North and South Korea)” and “the ITTF will then accept our unification team”. This is consistent with the Ju-Che ideology of North Korea which emphasizes its independence in international relations. In addition political allies of North Korea (legacy left wing totalitarian regimes) and socialist parties in other states continued to relay messages of support through National Table Tennis Associations in order to persuade the ITTF. On the other hand, South Korea stated in the summary of Talks that the motivation behind the North Korea’s proposal was to prevent South Korea from participating in the 35th International Table Tennis Competition. Given the suspicion, there was a fundamental problem of trust between the two regimes which would have to be addressed.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 4.6</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-5</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Content</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>The representatives of the Korean Table Tennis Association pointed out that the purpose of organising this united team at the suggestion of North Korea is to obstruct the South Korea players’ right to participate in the championships……the South Korea was requested to secure the right of separate participation in the games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vivid differences in the realities constructed by North and South Korea through the media and the record of the official Talks became very obvious. Although the rhetoric concerning the ‘inevitable’ national unification might not seem to have been that different, while the organising processes proposed were quite similar in terms of approach, the two
parties suffered from a complete breakdown of trust, blaming each other for ruining the Talks, and accusing each other of bad faith.

......The Talks have happened four times but have not concluded anything on the matter of organising a Unification Team as the Korean people would have wished, due to the allegedly unreasonable excuses and disturbance of South Korea...... Unification of the two separated ethnic entities of the homeland is our wish...... We want to foster collaboration through sports by means of arranging a table tennis unification team, and spread that same notion to art, science and all other areas to take a short cut towards unification...... Unification is the only way to true nationalistic patriotism and separation is rebellion against the nation - and against ethnicity......

(Roh-Dong 14, Mar. 1979-1)

In the above articles, North Korea has explicitly assumed that the establishing of a Unification Team would provide an important easy step or ‘short cut’ in the journey towards national unification, while North Korea considers other forms of ‘collaboration between North and South Korea’.

| Table 4.7 The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion-6 |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Content**                     | The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion |
| **Date**                        | 1979.02.27/03.05/03.09/03.12                                      |
| **Venue**                       | Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns |
| **Summary**                     | North Korea avoided answering this question, and was obstinate on the agreement of having a unified team. By doing so, North Korea clearly stated that they will refuse the separate participation of South Korea players in the games |

However, South Korea suggested that North Korea deliberately evaded the South Korea’s question concerning whether North Korea would accept the separate participation of South Korea when the Talks failed since North Korea remained ‘obstinate’ about having a unified team. North Korea used vague and ambiguous language without explaining to South Korea readers exactly what North Korea’s true intentions might be and this caused South Korea’s suspicion of the North Korea’s approach to the Talks. Furthermore, this statement was interpreted to mean that ‘This is the position of North Korea which has tried to prevent South Korea’s participation in the Championship’. If South Korea interpreted North Korea’s attitude as one of trying to ensure South Korea’s absence from the Championship, then South Korea’s attitude also can be interpreted as one of trying to ensure that the ‘creation of a unified team’ is not the ultimate goal of the Talks and is considered as just a ‘modest’
gesture trying not to provoke North Korea or its supporters. Hence, on balance, an analysis of this argument would demonstrate that both parties were seeking their own interests in the Sports Talks, and so the purpose of the same was to find common interests to aid both parties to more towards unification. The context of North and South Korean relations still seemed to be based on Cold War conflict despite the purported ‘progressive’ standpoint. Nevertheless, Roh-Dong consistently and publicly expressed the North Korea’s own enthusiasm for the organising of a Unification Team.

……We will continue to put effort into organising a Unification Team and we are ready to restart Talks whenever it is necessary. We want South Korea to respond to this clear gesture……

(Roh-Dong 4, April 1979)

North Korea advertised the fact that it had made great efforts to politely suggest holding the 5th Talks with South Korea.

……We politely suggested to the South Korea Table Tennis Association to open the 5th Talks with representatives from the North and South Korean table tennis associations……

(Roh-Dong 19, April 1979-1)

The question therefore presents itself as to why South Korea had not responded positively (as evidenced by its version of the Talks) and why it interpreted the North Korea’s version of the event (as reflected in Roh-Dong’s articles) in a negative manner. Was this South Korea’s intention all along or was it an inevitable outcome of South Korea’s original intention which had eventually become so negative? In considering these issues account needs to be taken of the political context and of North Korea’s actions in the broader political spheres. The period was marked by incidents of North Korean spies seeking to penetrate South Korea. Additionally it was also known that North Korea tried to disrupt a meeting between representatives of South Korea and the president of Czechoslovakia. These circumstances, it is not surprising that South Korea would be suspicious of the North Korea’s purported aim to promote “cooperation and peaceful unification”. So South Korea had grave suspicions that the North Korea’s reason for inviting South Korea to the Talks to discuss the establishment of a unification team had an ulterior negative political purpose.

……It is regrettable that the ITTF has made a statement that North Korea is still making an effort to organise a unified team for North and South Korea and that the
ITTF considers this as a ‘Promise being kept’……How can the ITTF see this trick as a promise being kept?…… North Korea anti-nationalists have made this play to deceive South Korea and world opinion. North Korea only suggested the proposal for a single team two months ahead of the Championship in order to make it impossible to achieve. We, South Korea, saw these motives and asked them to guarantee our right to participate separately but they refused, revealing their true motive. It is strange that North Korea suggested organising a unified team only a few days ago, continually, repeating this impossible proposal as though talking in their deception……

(Dong-A 25, April, 1979)

Interesting claims are made here, suggesting that the reason why North Korea continued to ask to host the Talks was that they wanted to show the world that they were leading the effort on national unification through this sporting event. This tactic seemed to have paid off at least with the sporting authorities when the ITTF concluded that North Korea, though unsuccessful, had made real efforts to promote unification of North and South Korea.

4.3.4 Propaganda of the 35th World Table Tennis Championships in 1979

Just prior to, and during the 35th World Table Tennis Championship, portraying North Korea’s involvement in international relations through sport became a goal of Roh-Dong. This event was seen as a great opportunity for North Korea to deliver its message to the world through the voices of its guests. The teams from Cyprus, the Lebanon and Tanzania had tours around the Pyongyang city, and were interviewed about what they had seen.

……Various countries’ players and representatives who are participating in the 35th World Table Tennis Championship are looking around Pyongyang and other landmarks in rural areas……Cypriot table tennis players visited the Cho Sun rebellion museum and said that they were impressed by the great achievement made under the wise guidance of the great leader Kim Il Sung……The leader of the Lebanon delegation said that Cho Sun people will surely achieve unification……The leader of the Tanzanian delegation said that they knew clearly that foreign powers were directly interfering with North and South Korean relations……Now North and South Korea are very different. The North Korean people are living a happy life while the South Korean people are not……

(Roh-Dong 6, May 1979-3)

Ordinarily, a visiting delegate might have commented on their impressions of the city, or thoughts about the people or even on the weather, but here, the leaders of these delegations were reportedly commenting on political issues such as the ‘Cho Sun (Korea) people’s unification’ and the interference of ‘Foreign Powers’. Thus, the article implies the political and moral superiority of the North Korean position, as well as its material superiority in terms of the happiness of its citizens. A frequent tactic employed by the North Korean
regime was to draw sympathy on the plight of families divided by the political split, as when North Korea invited a family member from the USA for a visit to their relatives in North Korea in order to underscore the sorrow and anguish brought about by the political divide. The insinuated implication here is that this position was concocted and sustained by the west.

......The 35th World Table Tennis Championship has allowed Korean American family members to visit North Korea to meet family and relatives......the USA has occupied half of our homeland for 30 years, and it caused huge damage through the Korean War. Now it is even interfering in the process of unification......
(ROH-Dong 29, April 1979-1)

The implication of the above quote is that the tragic circumstances that were created by the political divide were a product of US foreign policy. The South Korean version of this story is one which sees the Korean War as sparked by the aggression of North Korea. On the other hand, the South Korean media sought to portray North Korea as technically incompetent in terms of staging major sporting Championships.

......There is a considerable gap between North and South Korea in terms of their ability to organise international competitions. The North Korea has trouble in managing its records......North Korea didn't record properly and even had difficulties in terms of keeping appropriate records of various mistakes......This is part of what Michael Cossack from Hungary's column from AIPS 'International Sport' the 3rd of 1979, since he participated the 35th World Table Tennis Championship......By contrast, AIPS Basketball Commission, General Secretary Medellin Bell (spelling by author) has written about the 8th World Women's Basketball Competition in Seoul in April that 'it was a perfectly organised Championship executed by perfectly trained and high performance. This was demonstrated just next to Cossack's writing'......
(Dong-A 8, December, 1979)

Regrettably, the Cold War conflict-based notion has been a part of the activities that were taking place on the international sport field at this time. Particularly, this time it was the 35th World Table Tennis Competition in Pyongyang, so other than the South Korean government summary, there was not much in the way of overt propaganda in Dong-A's article. However, in the above article, South Korea clearly wanted to infer that the systems and operations in Seoul were superior to those of Pyongyang, in terms of the skill of operating International sport events by emphasising that the complement of Seoul sits alongside the insulting remarks of Pyongyang on the foreign newspaper articles.
4.4 The 1980 Moscow Olympic Games

4.4.1 The issues of organising ‘A Korean Team’

At the time of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, North Korea suggested organising a unified team to South Korea. Previously, North Korea had used the term ‘Unification Team’ for a unified team for both the North and the South, and now they called it ‘The Only National (Homogeneous) Team (Dan Il Min Jok Team)’ of North and South Korea. Since both had already experienced the failure of Sport Talks, North Korea pledged its commitment to fostering a ‘sincere attitude and carrying out a patient discussion’ until a conclusion could be reached.

......The president of the North Korea Sport Association has sent a letter to the president of South Korea Sport Association which suggests a Team as the only National Team for the 22nd International Olympics......This will come about if both sides have a sincere attitude and engage in patient discussion to reach a conclusion...... (Roh-Dong 21, Dec. 1979-1)

It is important to note here that the North Korea had initiated the request to organise a unified team. The occasion of the 1980 Moscow Olympics was hosted by one of North Korea’s most significant allies. Diplomatically, it would have been a great achievement if North and South Korea were to organise a team and participate in the Moscow Olympics since it would be a symbolic representation and example of peace gained under the leadership of socialist nations. South Korean interests infused that as with the Table Tennis World Championships; North Korea was seeking to ‘prevent South Korea’s independent participation in the Games’ by insisting on the single National Team to be in the Games.

......Practically, organising a unified team is difficult (due to domestic obstacles) but North Korea has raised this issue to prevent South Korea’s participation in the 22nd Moscow Olympics separately. This is just the same as the proposal of organising a Unified Team for the 35th World Table Tennis Championship......Now North Korea has claimed differences in approaches nationalism from South Korea and will ask for the withdrawal of the USA army by persuading the generation born after independence (60% of the South Korea population)...... (Dong-A 28, December, 1979)

The above commentary by Dong-A contains a curious comment. The earlier commentaries on both sides relating to nationalism explicitly referred to a shared ‘ethnos’, implying two political systems but one people in terms of a ‘Primordial Nationalism’ (Smith 2001:51).
There is no explanation given about how the concepts of national identity employed by both sides have diverged. In the following article, South Korea refused the proposal of a single team and this time explained that it would not accept North Korea’s proposal due to the lack of history of interaction with each other, and the resulting lack of trust in the North Korea.

……The president of the Korean Sport Association, Park, said that ‘North Korea’s proposal of a Unified Team for the Moscow Olympics won’t be possible without a history of sport relations which is based on trust. Therefore, after the Moscow Games, let’s start to establish such a relationship as a foundation for further sport relations.’ And he sent a letter with this message to North Korea to clarify the refusal to organise a Unified Team for the Moscow Games……Park also added that ‘North Korea prevented us from participating in the 35th World Table Tennis Championship last May in Pyung Yang, and this resulted in great mutual distrust……Show some sincerity by sending a North Korean team to the Asian Lifting Competitions and Asian Junior Volleyball Competitions in Seoul this coming April and October to establish a foundation of trust between North and South Korea through sport interactions……’

(Dong-A 11, January, 1980)

Clearly, South Korea wanted to initiate the sport interaction which is necessary to develop an accumulated trust between the North and the South, and to do so in a context which would be much more helpful to South Korea’s cause as these two events were to be hosted in South Korea. On the other hand, South Korea recalled the case of the 35th World Table Tennis Championship, which South Korea had not even participated in, so South Korea had enough reason to have lost trust in North Korea. Additionally, South Korea perhaps sought another chance to build mutual trust by sending North Korean players to the competition in Seoul for the April and October Volleyball and Lifting competitions. However, Roh-Dong argued that this was ‘not a matter of time limitation or technical issues’ rather, it was about the true intentions of South Korea and North Korea, as Roh-Dong had continued to insist from the last discussions between the teams of the North and the South. Furthermore, the article claimed that the previous failure of organising discussions was due to the South Korea’s sudden interruption with irrelevant excuses.

…… (Your refusal of the Sports Talks) It is against the earnest wishes of not only the sport people of North and South Korea, but also of all the Korean people who want to open the Talks and organise the Only Team of the Nation Team……The problem is about real intentions concerning whether or not they welcome the Only Team of the Nation rather than the matter of time limitations or technical issues……In the previous Table Tennis Championship, South Korea also had brought forth non-related issues to the organising of the Unification Team and broke down the Talks……

(Roh-Dong 22, Jan. 1980-1)
4.4.2 International supporting for establishing ‘A Korean Team’

Roh-Dong went through the same pattern of citing the foreign media’s support for the North’s opinion that it should organise ‘The Only Team’ of North and South Korea for the Olympic Games. In the following article, Madagascar, Bulgaria, Egypt, the Sudan, the Republic of Benin expressed their assent and support to the North Korea.

……The president of the Madagascar Olympic Committee, the president of the Bulgaria Olympic Committee, and the president of Egypt the Committee, the president of the Sudan Olympic Committee and the president of the Benin Committee have announced their support for ‘the proposal of North Korea to promote the ‘Only Team of the Nation’ at the 22nd Olympic Games.’……

(Roh-Dong 27, Jan. 1980)

The International relations strategy of North Korea has been revealed through the various supporting statements from abroad. North Korea maintained several research centres all over the world to promote their unique political ideology (‘Ju-Che’) and associations which try to promote friendly relations in addition to the traditional socialist alliances. The countries which possessed these organisations were Italy, Norway, France, Sweden, Portugal and Chile.

……The World socialist society has emphasised that they support the proposal of the ‘Only Team of Nation’ for the Olympics. ‘We Italian People Sport Alliance think it (the North Korea’s proposal) is fair to accept……The Norway – Cho Sun friendly association……support this……The France – Cho-Sun friendly association……also agreed……The director of the research centre for Kim Il Sung ideology ‘Ju-Che’ in Sweden, Bert Anderson said that Unified Team the for one nation is just so natural and this is a duty of the people……The researchers of the research centre for Kim Il Sung-ism in Portugal requested South Korea to participate in the Talks for organising the ‘Only Team of Nation’……Also the Chileans, who had been Korean War participants strongly exhorted South Korea to accept this North Korean suggestion……

(Roh-Dong 9, Feb. 1980)

It seems rather surprising that there is no relevant news article responding on this matter in Dong-A, but that is also understandable since Dong-A could deny foreign support or stand in opposition on this issue. Other than making an alluding to the subject of having ‘a Unified Team’, Dong-A did not talk much about ‘the Moscow Games’ themselves. South Korea and the Liberal block allies boycotted the Games (even PRC did not participate), and as a result we experienced the Cold War-influenced ‘Half Olympics’ (Dong-A 19, Feb. 1988).
4.5 The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games

4.5.1 The issues of organising ‘A Korean Team’

A major element in the argument which I wish to promote is that the differing positions on national unity were not only simply reflected in the usage of the terminology but actually emerged and were identified more clearly, in part, because of the debates which mixed the political and sporting issues. There are claims on both sides of the divide that sport and politics should remain separate domains. And equally there are those from both sides of the divide that recognize the deeply symbolic and political nature of sporting ‘intra-nation’ interaction. The use of terminology in relation to the configuration of a single team differs in ways which are difficult to express in English. The North Korean side invariably refers to a ‘Unification Team’ [Tong Il Team], ‘The Only Team’ [Yu Il Team] while South Korea authorities tend to use the term ‘Unified Team’ [Dan Il Team]. Both sets of terms imply ‘unity of nation (by unification)’ of one sort or another, as we shall see later in this chapter, but they do not imply the same approach to national unity.

In 1981, South Korea made a request to North Korea to jointly organise the team for the 1984 Olympics in much the same way as North Korea had invited South Korea to establish ‘The Only Team’ (using its own preferred terminology for the 1980 Moscow Olympics). The rhetoric that South Korea employed in the rationale for organising the united team was similar to that used by the North Korean regime, when it asked South Korea to organise a team for the Moscow Games, that this represented an opportunity for promoting ‘National Unity’ of North and South Korea as reflected in the following articles in Dong-A.

……The president of the Korean Sport Association, Cho has suggested to North Korea making Unified Team to participate together in the ‘84 Los Angeles Olympics. And he has requested to host Talks to discuss the details of Unified Team in Pyongyang, Seoul or Panmunjom……He also has added that this organising of Unified Team and participation in the Olympics together will be a great opportunity for ‘National Reconciliation’ between North and South Korea……

(Dong-A 19, June, 1981-2)

……There were several North and South Korean Sports Talks, but they have failed. The reasons for their failure are mostly due to the idealistic claims of North Korea,
rather than rational approach of South Korea……In particular South Korea proposed the ‘Unified Team’ of the ‘84 LA Olympics to show that South Korea was consistent in its stance on this matter…….The difference between South Korea and North Korea’s approach to promotion of the Unified Team is that on this occasion South Korea’s proposal allowed more time for discussion…….The Korean Sport Association said that North Korea asked for Unified Team for the ’79 Pyongyang Table Tennis Competition 3 months in advance, and six months ahead for the ’80s Moscow Olympics in which South Korea did not participate, but on this occasion there were 3 years, so success would be more likely attained if North Korea makes an effort. (Dong-A 19, June, 1981-4)

As suggested in the above articles, the most ‘reasonable’ excuse for South Korea to refuse the request to organise the united team for the 35th World Table Tennis Competition and the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games was a lack of time for both sides to discuss the details. Therefore, South Korea pointed out that since the 1984 LA Olympics was still three years away, there would be enough time to discuss the details of establishing the united team. In addition, Dong-A commented that the South Korean proposal represented a ‘rational approach’ in contrast to the ‘idealistic’ approach of North Korea, while the North Korean authorities were suspicious of South Korea’s reasons for not engaging with the proposals for 1979 and 1980, the South Korean media certainly supported the South Korean authorities’ argument.

……Actually there are many things left to be solved for organising the Unified Team…… (Dong-A 20, June, 1981)

South Korea pressed North Korea to accept the proposal if their proposals for a united team were sincere. More interestingly, South Korea intimated that it knew North Korea’s hidden motive to utilise this event as a route to national unification, with a nuance that South Korea did not wish to accept it. The South Korean explanation of its motives for a single team was that it would be a ‘celebration of National Talents’ by the youth of ‘Both Countries’ rather than the political implication which North Korea promoted.

……It has been 5 weeks since South Korea had suggested the Unified Team for the ’84 LA Olympics, but there is no response from North Korea……the Korean Olympic Committee and Korean Sport Association have reminded North Korea that it had suggested the Unified Team before. So if North Korea really had in mind to adopt a Unified Team then it would accept this proposal……Even though for North Korea there was a political motivation to make unification in its own way, this non-political area must be an interaction between young people in both countries to celebrate ‘national talents’……

(Dong-A 28, July, 1981)
The message that Dong-A represented as the view of South Korea seems to question not the degree of nationalism that both parties promote but rather whether they are promoting the same goal in relation to this nationalism. Ethnic based primordial nationalism has largely been treated and interpreted as synonymous with ‘Nationalism’ in Korea, but what is suggested here is that North Korea’s perception differs from that of South Korea, with the former seeing Nationalism as ‘a single Korean ethnic’ and the latter regarding Nationalism as ‘South Korean’ and relating to the nation state while sharing ethnicity with ‘North Korean’ people. This issue of how to translate the term ‘Nationalism’ in Korean has been a matter of debate in the Korean academy and has become even more complicated as the study of Nationalism has developed. One thing which is clear is that at this time, Nationalism in Korean was referred to as ‘Min Jok’ ideology, which is interpreted as ‘ethno-centrism’. Both Roh-Dong and Dong-A had used the term ‘Min Jok’ ideology as a term to refer both to ethnic-based Nationalism and to state-based Nationalism. The following article illustrates how Dong-A understood the usage of sport interactions through the Talks with North Korea from a South Korean perspective.

……It is hard to change the ideology and policy of North Korea at once by ‘Ping Pong Diplomacy since it has been left as the most closed society in the World. But This 'Ping Pong Diplomacy will expose North Korean people to another world so North Korea can be more innovative and responsible in their attitude……

(Dong-A 29, August, 1981)

What Dong-A implies here is that while North Korea was a closed society which South Korea did not therefore know well, it nevertheless had many things in common with North Korea under the umbrella of shared ‘Korean’ ethnicity, and so Sport Diplomacy might be used as a tool for instructing North Korea in the way of communication with the wider world as an independent nation-state. This analysis suggests that North and South Korea were not yet ready to overcome the Cold War division, but rather that their differences seemed to be fixed. Therefore, the arguments relating to Unification had developed from agreement that ethnic nationalism was sufficient justification, to a position in which Dong-A is blurring the boundaries between ethnic and nation-state nationalism. This represents a crucial point in
the discussion of whether a single team will be organised or not as a symbol of Unification of the two nation states.

### 4.5.2 The Talks for the Organising ‘A Korean Team’

When South Korea proposed to organise the unified team for the 1984 LA Olympics first, North Korea refused this suggestion. However, when the Games were just two months away, the North Korean government sent a letter to South Korea inviting South Korea to Sports Talks on the 1984 LA Olympics and some other International sport competitions.

**Table 4.8** The 1st – 3rd North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games Unified Team-1

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 3rd North Korea &amp; South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games Unified Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1984.04.09/04.30/05.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>In this letter, North Korea suggested participation as Unified Team in the 23rd International Olympic Games and further Asian Games and World Championships</td>
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There was however no Sports Talks held as a consequence of a bomb incident in Myanmar during the ceremony when most of the South Korean cabinet members were together. A number of South Korean ministers and officers died and newspapers from South Korea alleged this to have been carried out by North Korea, although it never admitted this.

**Table 4.9** The 1st – 3rd North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games Unified Team-2

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<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 3rd North Korea &amp; South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games Unified Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1984.04.09/04.30/05.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>In the middle of the highest tension between North and South Korea due to the terror in Myanmar on 9th October, 1983…….</td>
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The situation was one in which mutual distrust was compounded by anger and suspicion of North Korea by its South Korean counterpart. In Dong-A, doubts about North Korea’s motivation for raising again the proposal for a unified team for the LA Games is guessed at
but Dong-A still suggests that sport interaction might be a way of reducing the tension between North and South Korea.

......Actually, the KOC has suggested having the Unified Team for '84 LA Olympics and '82 New Delhi Asian Games......But North Korea had avoided all those suggestions and then suddenly asked to organise the Unified Team just 4 months before the Games again. Nevertheless, we want to reduce the tension between North and South Korea so we hope this will become a foundation of national unity......

(Dong-A 3, April, 1984-1)

The estimation that mutual understanding would be accomplished by the Sports Talks appears to have motivated South Korea to accept the suggestion of Talks, even though South Korea had not anticipated success in the realisation of a unified team for the LA Olympics given the lack of time (there were only two months left before the Games). Obviously, this also implies that the attitude of South Korea towards the Talks was not that positive and consequently, the mood between North and South Korea was not constructive.

[Table 4.10] The 1st – 3rd North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games Unified Team-3

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<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
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Thus, South Korea's motive for attending Talks with North Korea was not so much about organising 'a unified team' for the LA Olympics or other international sport events, than of taking this opportunity as a stepping stone in the interaction to share human resources and economic interchange. In the summary of the Talks, which certainly reflected the South Korea government's voice, no mention was made of unification between North and South Korea as the purpose of the Talks. Moreover, in the summary South Korea mentioned the non-sport related circumstances.
Clearly, South Korea had thus brought non-sport issues to the table from the beginning of the Sports Talks, in particular these two incidents, even though they were vehemently denied by North Korea. It is important to note here that South Korea officially included reference to these non-sport issues in its official summary and cited them as the reason for their reluctance to cooperate. This illustrates how sport and politics cannot be separated in relations between North and South Korea. Also, South Korea blamed North Korea for further tension which caused the breakdown of this discussion.

…… North and South Korea Sports Talks have broken-down just after 2 hours and 26 minutes. In this the first North and South Korean Sports Talks, North Korea was asked for an apology for the Myanmar explosion and the kidnapping of the two South Korea Actors. North Korea just left the Talks……

(Dong-A 9, April, 1984-1)

The Talks concluded in failure, with Dong-A describing South Korea as having demanded an apology for the Myanmar explosion and the actors’ kidnapping, with North Korea simply leaving the venue’. The description itself seems quite interesting since South Korea was portrayed as right to make such requests and North Korea as impolite for leaving the venue in this way. The position of North Korea was also expressed in the following summary as well.
Since North Korea had brought political discussion into sport, South Korea also began to use this rhetoric as an element of its approach to the 'Sports Talks' between the two states. South Korea had argued through Dong-A that the breakdown of Talks between North and South Korea was ‘very disappointing’. However, the South Korean side still argued that “North Korea had been unreasonably persistent about the Myanmar bomb”. North Korea claimed that South Korea had even made this whole story up to blame North Korea, and as a consequence Dong-A commented saying: “This has shown how stupid the North Korean character is, since it is full of stupidity, treachery and blackmail”. Both governments were not willing to back down and they blamed one another. The language employed thus appears to be a trading of insults.

......It is very disappointing that the bloodthirsty mood and the breakdown of Talks were caused by provocative actions by North Korea. The head of the South Korea delegation, Kim, started his speech saying ‘we will start to state our opinion from now on.......’ and the head of North Korea delegation, Park, intervened and started into his speech....... North Korea was unreasonably persistent about the Myanmar bomb suggesting that ‘Even a baby knows that this has not been done by North Korea and it was actually something perpetrated by South Korea’. This has shown how stupid the North Korean character is since it is full of stupidity, treachery and blackmail...... (Dong-A 10, April, 1984-2)

In the following article from Roh-Dong, North Korea suggested that the result of future Talks would depend on the attitude of the South Korea side, which should be sincere in its response to the ‘national wishes’ of the Korean people. One reason why North Korea had kept insisting on the ‘national wishes’ of the people was that this was the one way of representing that ‘we, North Korea have national legitimacy’ and are thus guardians of the nation. Since each represented one half of the Korean Nation, whoever dominated the high ground of the discourse of ‘ethnic Nationalism’ was assumed to appear more suitable, or reasonable as a basis for the foundation of a future Korean Nation. That is also why North Korea had called South Korea’s attempts to separate North and South Korea as an ‘impure political challenge against National Unity’.

......The vice spokesman of the North Korean National Olympic Committee has announced on 10th, that ‘the future of the North and South Korean Sports Talks depends on the attitude of South Korea’......We did our best to realise the wishes of all ethnic Koreans and sport persons hope for Unified Team by showing a sincere attitude [toward unification]. Nevertheless, South Korea has shown its impure political purpose
This was the end of the First Sports Talks between North and South Korea and nothing had yet been decided. So South Korea proposed the Second Talks on the 18th to North Korea which in response had re-recommended the date as 26th April. But South Korea requested re-scheduling for 30th April, and finally North Korea accepted this date. A principal reason for the breakdown of the first North and South Korean Sports Talks was, as we can see above, the different starting point of the Talks between two Koreas. North Korea had assumed that the two parties should first mutually agree to participate in the LA Olympics as a single team, rather than as two separate ‘half teams’, even though North Korea’s ulterior motive, became evident later in its attempt to prevent the participation of South Korea as a separate team in the LA Olympics. On the other hand, the starting point for South Korea was that an apology from North Korea was necessary for its criminal activities such as the Myanmar bomb for which South Korea held North Korea responsible. The bottom line which had to be settled at the beginning of the Talks was resolved in the Second Talks.

……The Head of the South Korean representatives stressed that the Myanmar bombing and the kidnapping of the movie stars [Shin and Choi] must have admitted by North Korea first and this is the foundation of trust. The head of the North Korean delegation responded that the bomb story was a ‘fabrication’ and the kidnapping was not a kidnapping but a voluntary ‘exile’……

(Dong-A 30, April, 1984-1)

Thus the North Korean delegation denied having any involvement in the terrorist incident and argued that the movement of the South Korea film stars to the North was voluntary and not something North Korea had planned. In addition, North Korea claimed that the first Sports Talks demonstrated that South Korea had never really intended to make a National Team for International sport competition. Thus, until the Second Talks, nothing had been concluded and North and South Korea continued to blame one another for the failure of the Talks.

……South Korea has, by ruining the Sports Talks, revealed their true position which is that they do not want to make a Unified Team …… Therefore, to continue these Unified Team Talks properly and to prevent them from being ‘polluted’ by political concerns, we are suggesting the following: first that North and South Korea will not mention non-sport matters; and second that North and South Korea will focus on the
Unified Team discussions for unity and cooperation by participating in the Talks with a sincere commitment……

(Roh-Dong 1, May, 1984)

By contrast, Dong-A consistently asked North Korea for an apology and an explanation for the two incidents, and since North Korea did not respond to this request, Dong-A expressed doubt about the sincerity of the North Korean intentions in relation to establishing a unified team. One other issue which was raised was that South Korea had asked for a security guarantee for the players during the period of the formation and performance of the team. Such a request would of course be unnecessary if both parties had agreed to cooperate in forming a team for the Games. Neither side would be foolhardy enough to hold the players to ransom, and nor would such action clearly harm their diplomatic reputation. This sort of concern may originate from the misunderstanding of International relations, which both bipolar entities seek for the sake of harmony and peace-making.

……Regarding the Talks which ended without conclusion, the Head of the South Korean representatives has emphasised that North Korea didn’t provide any reasonable solutions concerning the Myanmar bomb and kidnapping of the movie star and her partner, and moreover North Korea had ignored the minimal request for a guarantee of security for the South Korea players. So North Korea has shown that it was not seriously committed to the success of the Talks from the beginning. And whether there are further Talks or not is entirely a matter of North Korea’s attitude……And he added that ‘the North Korean head of delegation had even thrown a box of matches onto the table, and the North Korean reporters also had hit the desk to raise tension in the venue……

(Dong-A 1, May, 1984)

Nevertheless, although the ideological conflict between East and West elsewhere in the world was waning, the level of distrust between North and South Korea remained high. In the article above, the description of the scene with the North Korean reporters’ ‘hitting the desk’ illustrates the tense nature of the Talks. However, the foreign minister of South Korea made a conciliatory gesture announcing South Korea’s

…….Official position in favour of the Unified Team discussion of South Korea and North Korea so that this will open the door for dialogue between both sides……

(Dong-A 7, May, 1984)

The response of North Korea is characterised by the South Korean government in terms of two major demands: first that South Korea should not bring any ‘political’ issues to the table during the Sports Talks; and second that South Korea should admit that it had obstructed the
organising of ‘a unified team’ and should therefore apologise for that. The North Koreans stated that they would not join the Talks if there was no agreement on this.

**Table 4.13** The 1st – 3rd North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games

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<th>Unified Team-6</th>
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<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
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Even though this was the third set of discussions, it did not even begin to address the main issue. This incident represents a typical case of the discourse concerning the relationship between ‘politics and sport’ in the ideological context of the Cold War. The conflict between North and South Korea despite the cultural specificity of their shared ethnic nationalism was still far from the intention to unify the states. As Dong-A had emphasised the principles which South Korea had announced at the beginning of the Talks were the only things that had generated practical outcomes.

> ……Due to the insincere attitude of North Korea, the 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks broke down after just 2 hours and 31 minutes without any fruitful result other than 7 principles which were suggested by South Korea…..
> (Dong-A 25, May, 1984)

At the 3rd Talks, North Korea had asked for two principles to be accepted as the foundation for successful discussions. The North Korean team commented that whether South Korea accepted this or not would be a test of South Korea’s willingness to promote ‘a unified team’. North Korea had said that it had ‘Saved the North and South Korean Sports Talks’ and implied that the Talks were ruined by South Korea which didn’t follow the fundamental principles which North Korea had stated in the article.

> ……We tried to save the Korean Sports Talks which had already been ruined twice and to ensure progress we suggest two conditions to South Korea. The first is that South Korea needs to admit responsibility and apologise for constructing artificial barriers in the organising of ‘Unified Team’ and interrupted participation of the LA Olympics. And the second is a guarantee that it won’t use the Sports Talks for its own political purposes and won’t provoke us politically. And these principles are the
As we have seen, both sides had different goals. It seems that North Korea wanted to use the Talks to ensure that a separate team would not be formed by South Korea, and South Korea’s objective was to demonstrate that it was not refusing to be cooperative. In addition the understanding of the problem on both sides was also very different. Dong-A commented that the “insincere attitude of North Korea” as a reason for the failure to organise the ‘Unified Team’ (Dong-A 1, June, 1984-2).

South Korea interpreted North Korea’s reasons for proposing a unified team as a way of escaping from the diplomatic corner into which Kim Il Sung had placed himself over the Myanmar Bomb incident. It is interesting to consider North Korea’s motivation for requesting the Sports Talks in this way. If North Korea had intended to make this gesture for an ‘impure’ diplomatic purpose, it is questionable whether this was valuable or not. Furthermore, one might wonder whether from South Korea’s perspective, concluding the Talks without any outcomes would meet the North’s strategic objectives.

......Kim Il Sung was confronted about his international refutation over the Myanmar Bomb outrage. Therefore, they (the North Koreans) suggested organising Unified Team to make the world forget about the Terrorist incident by spreading the impression of reconciliation......

(Dong-A 2, June, 1984)

If the motivation of North Korea was simply to draw attention away from the political context while appearing to favour establishing a unified team, then the failure to organise a unified team was perhaps the best conclusion from their point of view, and from this perspective, they won the diplomatic battle.

......we have done our best to organise the ‘Unified Team’ for the 23rd Olympics to respect the wish of all ethnic Koreans and sports people to join the Games......

(Roh-Dong 3, June 1984)

The President of the South Korean NOC, Mr Chung invited North Korea to the 4th Sports Talks, but the North Korea’s position had not changed and it once more asked South Korea
to agree to the two conditions first. And in the South Korea summary, that led to the official closure of the Sports Talks regarding the organising of a unified team for LA Olympics.

**Table 4.14** The 1st – 3rd North Korea & South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games Unified Team

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<td><strong>Title</strong> The 1st – 3rd North Korea &amp; South Korea Sports Talks for the LA Olympic Games Unified Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong> 1984.04.09/04.30/05.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong> Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong> The president of the South Korean Olympic Committee, Chung Ju Young suggested the 4th discussion to take place on 1st of June, but North Korea refused on the two previous premises.......thus the Sport discussions was finished without product</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above analysis shows that diplomatic goals played a significant role in relations between North and South Korea, and that when it comes to politics, just as in sports, one side must lose. Thus, what was at issue here was not a matter of sport but rather a game of diplomatic manoeuvring.

**4.5.3 The Boycott of the LA Olympics**

North Korea is not the only nation to have decided not to participate in the 1984 LA Olympics. The world was still divided between two ideologies. Just as many of the Liberal/Capitalist block of nations had not participated in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, a number of Socialist countries announced a boycott of the 1984 LA Olympics, Roh-Dong thus had a simple role to play, which was to buoy up the boycott movement, by broadcasting all boycott decisions of other socialist countries. As a rationale for the boycott, North Korea firstly cited news about a potentially violent anti-USSR campaign, and promoted suspicion among socialist countries about the consequences of participation at the 1984 LA Olympics.

…….A Russian newspaper has pointed out that a violent anti-USSR campaign has been conducted in the USA around the time of the LA Olympics to undermine the North Korea’s participation……

(Roh-Dong 8, April 1984)

The North Korean newspaper quoted the contents of the Soviet account, which had indicated that there was mounting anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiment in American society, even though the American administration tried to neutralise the residual effects of
the Cold War. A Bulgarian newspaper also implied that this boycott situation had been caused by the American administration and had even blamed the US for the 1980 Moscow boycott. In this context, Roh-Dong relayed the voice of the North Korea’s various Socialist allies to demonstrate the role as a leading media element of the socialist group in order to confront South Korea more powerfully.

......The Soviet newspaper said that the USA had attempted to ruin the 23rd Olympics by constructing anti-USSR and anti-Communist hysteria......The newspaper also mentioned that the US administration had tried to manipulate the social environment as a Cold War tactic and also has threaten the sports men and women and citizens of socialist countries. It also said that the great Olympic spirit must not to be distorted by political purposes. And the Bulgarian newspaper stated that International Olympic Movement was being made to suffer again by the USA administration just as it had done so four years before......

(Roh-Dong 21, April 1984-3)

This anti-USA diplomatic position of Roh-Dong’s is also shown in the following article, where it quotes Polish and Czechoslovakian newspapers.

......The News from Warsaw made a statement criticising the USA for using the LA Olympics as a way of attacking the opposition......The Polish National Olympic Committee said that the most serious problem was that the US has encouraged a mood of Cold War conflict in the Olympic period......The Czechoslovak newspaper announced that anti-communists were planning a dangerous accident to take place in the Olympic Venue to block the participation of communist countries......

(Roh-Dong 24, April 1984)

The Polish newspaper was reported as accusing the USA of using the LA Olympic Games as a political propaganda tool, which encouraged confrontation and Cold War conflict in international politics. The Czechoslovakian newspaper warned of potential attacks from anti-communist groups against athletes from socialist countries. Roh-Dong relayed these comments and contributed to the spread of these Eastern European perspectives on the LA Olympic Games to the rest of the world. The Cuba news source quoted by Roh-Dong also accused the West of political misuse of the LA Olympic Games.

......Recently, the Cuba National Olympic Committee published a statement which criticised the US for using the LA Olympics for impure political purposes......

(Roh-Dong 6, May, 1984)

The USSR, one of the strongest of the socialist countries along with China, made a diplomatic gesture to the IOC as indicated in the following article. Nevertheless, the diplomatic power of the IOC was not strong enough to exert direct influence on the US which continued to promote an Anti-Communist Campaign to stop the Games.
The USSR Olympic Committee made a statement indicating that they could not let their sports people participate in the 23rd Olympics which will be held in LA, USA. Concerning the huge anti-communist campaign which is going on in the USA at this time, we have raised this as an issue with the IOC. Even the IOC pointed this out and delivered comments to the US Olympic Committee which seemed to be ignored by USA. In this circumstance we cannot send our players to the LA Olympic Games.

(Roh-Dong 10, May, 1984)

The strong Anti-Communist mood in the USA explained by Roh-Dong was a reminder of the gap between the two ideological blocks which many had hoped would gather harmoniously in the Olympic arena. Consequently, Bulgaria and East Germany were also reported as blaming the USA using the term ‘craziness’ to describe its approach. Thus, the North Korean decision to boycott was justified under the argument of keeping ‘their sport people’s honour, dignity and life’.

(Roh-Dong 12, May, 1984)

Countries like Mongolia and Vietnam voluntarily declared that they would not participate as a way of supporting their allies’ diplomatic decisions. Vietnam used the term ‘Conspiracy’ to express the distrust toward the US National Olympic Committee and described this as an attempt to demolish the Olympic Movement. There are two levels of questioning of this material that might be adopted. The first is whether or not the statements reported represent what was actually stated in the Mongolian and Vietnamese press, and secondly whether such statements make appropriate claims.

(Roh-Dong 13, May, 1984-3)

Czechoslovakia and Laos also joined the boycott (Roh-Dong 14, May 1984). Other than these countries, the boycotter included the Afghan National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 16, May 1984-2), the Hungarian National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 18, May 1984) and the Polish National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 19, May 1984) whose positions on the
boycott was represented in Roh-Dong's articles. Along with these countries, North Korea announced officially its boycott of the LA Olympic Games. Dong-A explained that ‘North Korea’s boycott was led by the USSR’, thus the “autonomy which North Korea emphasised and the theme of blaming South Korea-USA relations is a sham”. Dong-A also commented that North Korea suggested the ‘Unified Team’ just ‘to prevent South Korea from broadening its diplomatic influence to Communist Countries’ by blocking South Korea’s participation in the Olympic Games.

……North Korea officially announced their absence from the LA Olympic Games……By joining the Olympic boycott which was led by the USSR, North Korea revealed how much of a sham their ‘principle of autonomy’ was……And the proposal for the Unified Team was just a means of preventing South Korea’s sport interaction with communist countries by blocking the South Korea’s participation of the Games……

(Dong-A 25, May, 1984)

In addition to North Korea, other countries (Roh-Dong 30, May 1984-2), such as the Ethiopian National Olympic Committee (Roh-Dong 5, June 1984-2), Bolivia (Roh-Dong 27, June 1984-2), Bulgaria (Roh-Dong 18, July 1984-1) and Libya (Roh-Dong 29, July 1984-1) also expressed their objections to participating in the LA Olympic Games. North Korea forecast that the LA Olympics would become a ‘half Games’ since all of the World Lifting Championship winners would not participate.

……Half of the world record holders and 100% of the World Lifting Champions will not be in the 23rd LA Olympics. And other sports are also losing their light as an event in the Olympic Games……

(Roh-Dong 10, June 1984-2)

4.6 The 1986 Seoul Asian Games

4.6.1 The Conflicts and Challenges of the 1986 Asian Games

Before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the 1986 Asian Games was hosted in Seoul. North Korea also conducted a campaign against that event, while it argued for changing the host city of 24th Olympic Games from Seoul, as we have seen its argument moved to promotion of the co-hosting of the Olympic Games. Dong-A wrote very little news about North Korea’s negative attitude, since Dong-A sought to construct the image of a smoothly prepared
Olympics which was the only view which the regime of the South Korea allowed it to present. The South Korean regime had to persuade the South Korean people to maintain domestic stability which was a key success factor for the Olympic Games. That was a strong motive for South Korea to persuade North Korea to be involved in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics as the ‘Unified Team’.

……South Korea truly wants to have a Unified Team with North Korea for the ‘86 Asian Games and ‘88 Olympics which will be held in our land, so we are expecting to have Talks to promote further discussions……

(Dong-A 21, August, 1984-3)

President Chun even made a statement and broadcast that South Korea would ‘guarantee favourable conditions and all security issues’ for North Korea, if it would participate in both Games as a ‘Unified Team’ with South Korea (Dong-A 5, June, 1986). That statement was considered a major gesture taken very close to the Asian Games, and contrasted with Mr Chun’s usual policy towards North Korea. However, there was insufficient time to wait for a positive response from North Korea. North Korea maintained its negative attitude towards the Asian Games and this attitude was worsening.

…… North Korea disturbed the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics continually. And recently this opposition had become more intense. At this point, the domestic conflicts within South Korea could be used by North Korea……

(Dong-A 22, January, 1986)

Actually, North Korea insulted South Korea by pointing out the criminal incidents that had happened in South Korea (dictator regime’s policy referred to above). The purpose of North Korea was probably to generate a lack of trust in the South Korean context by putting a spotlight on the nation’s political instability at a time when it prepared to host this International sport event. However, it was also regarded as helpful to South Korea, in the sense that South Korean administrative personnel noticed what might be its weak points from an international perspective, so it could pay more attention to reinforcing its areas of weakness. For example, in the following article, North Korea mentioned faulty food distribution in South Korea as an example of ‘social crimes’ detected in the South. There was some potential to undermine the international reputation of South Korea by making people doubt the fundamental trustworthiness of South Korea’s social system, but at the
same time it became an opportunity for the South Korea to show how it could handle problems like this.

......South Korean society produced fake canned food which made by noxious material to circulate during Asian Games with labels as though it was imported from a foreign country......cheating on the quality of beef, fake foreign alcohol......

(Roh-Dong 22, Mar. 1986-2)

North Korea pointed to the fact that the South Korea regime had expelled small businesses from certain areas to impress foreign Olympic guests by building a clean image of the city. This strategy on the part of the South Korean regime was understandable given the priority of the South Korean military dictatorship to use the event in their regime's propaganda. Concern about where the ‘poor people’ lived was thus low on the agenda. The fate of these people was not known but it is clear that they were badly affected.

......The ‘stooge government’ of South Korea was criticised by small business people when South Korea ordered staff to use violence on these people to remove their business without notice......

(Roh-Dong 19, May, 1986)

North Korea broadcast the fact that members of the South Korean population had staged demonstrations to express their opposition to hosting the Asian Games. Indeed, there were many demonstrations which were against hosting the Asian Games, and they were often also associated with many other issues, such as the promotion of domestic political democracy and the achievement of labour justice. Of course, the Asian Games could have acted as a fuse for this people’s movement, and it was the reason why it was spotlighted by the world. In other circumstances the foreign media did not receive much attention in South Korea.

......South Korea people held a resistance demonstration on the matter of the hosting Asian Games......

(Roh-Dong 9, Aug. 1986-2)

There were several foreign media sources, which criticised the South Korean regime for its ‘fascistic’ approach to law and order, so the hosting of such significant events by the South Korean regime was portrayed as inappropriate since they should be associated with peace and harmony. Not only the citizens of Seoul, but also other nations expressed objections against the Seoul Asian Games; through their own newspaper such as: Japan (Roh-Dong 16,
Aug 1986-1), Malaysia and India (Roh-Dong 16, Aug 1986-3) a Czechoslovak, and Syrian newspaper (Roh-Dong 17, Aug 1986-1). The first reason that North Korea gave for its opposition to the Seoul Asian Games was the social instability of the nation due to the anti-government movement which protested against the violation of human rights by the South Korean regime. North Korea criticised the military dictatorship of South Korea as the origin of these problems (Roh-Dong 20, Aug 1986-1). The second reason was that, just like the Olympic Games, the Asian Games could reinforce and further institutionalise the North and South Korean division, so that it would render the national unification of Korean more difficult (Roh-Dong 20, Aug 1986-3). Thirdly, North Korea cited the example of the ‘Scotland Games’, which had an impact on athletes’ health because of ‘serious air pollution’ and compared this case to South Korea’s situation. A Peruvian newspaper and American newspaper allegedly expressed objections to the hosting of the Asian Games in Seoul (Roh-Dong 28, Aug 1986-1). In the following article, a demonstration by South Korean students was discussed and Roh-Dong proclaimed that the Asian Games would bring too much pain since it would manifest the separation of North and South Korea. It also implies that these students had the same view of national identity as the North Korean regime, since they are reported as using the term ‘Cho Sun’.

……It is true that South Korea students are fighting against the staging of the Asian Games [in South Korea]. The students have said that Asian Games is not only giving pain to South Korea people but also using as a justification of Two Cho Sun Policy……

(Roh-Dong 29, Aug 1986-2)

Since the opening event of the Asian Games was relatively imminent, North Korea accentuated the lack of popularity of the Asian Games for the domestic audience in Roh-Dong’s article which comments that the South Korean regime was struggling with “……unsold tickets for Asian Games [which were] driving the South Korean regime crazy…….” (Roh-Dong 29, Aug. 1986-4). For the reasons, North Korea finally expressed its official position concerning its intended absence from the Seoul Asian Games. The main concern was that this Asian Games would promote the conflicts between North and South Korea. Hence, North Korea considered the ‘conflict’ to have already been established by
South Korea’s hosting of the event on its own, which would of itself be more divisive in relations between North and South Korea.

……We will not participate in flawed Games…these Games run counter to Olympism and sportsmanship with their impure political purposes, using the Games to promote conflict between North and South Korea……

(Roh-Dong 1, Sept. 1986-1)

Nevertheless, North Korea’s announcement of its boycott was made by foreign media such as the France AFP agency. Qatar, Pakistan and Thailand also declared that they would not participate in the Games (Roh-Dong 7, Sept. 1986-2). Roh-Dong started to announce the cases of boycotts as ‘the boycott’ to give an impression of ‘an international boycott movement’. This action had the potential to influence the international nature of the Games, giving them a negative image. Roh-Dong noted that the boycott by Syria and Brunei and the absence of matches involving the Philippines, Hong Kong, Japan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

……The participant countries and organisation continue to decrease……

(Roh-Dong 14, Sept. 1986-7)

Those participants who might have been expected to boycott but who had decided not to tended to be given more attention by the South Korean media, and the participation of China, Iran and Iraq were highlighted by Dong-A. Since countries such as China, Iran, Syria and Bhutan which did not have diplomatic relations with the South Korea were coming to the Games, this international recognition of the Seoul Asian Games provided additional legitimacy for the South Korean regime’s decision to host the Games. Of course, the case of China was differ from the others, since China was a member of the Asian Games Federations (AGF) and its status in Olympic arena needed choose of participation without direct relations with South Korea.

……The PRC is coming and ‘Iran and Iraq’ will come after their six year war. Pakistan which recently has established popular democracy will come. Not only Malaysia and Hong Kong, but also the PRC, Iran, Syria and Bhutan which are countries without diplomatic relations [with the South Korea] will also participate……

(Dong-A 1, September, 1986)

North Korea highlighted the ‘strange’ situation of the South Korea in reporting the declaration of the temporary closure of the universities due to student demonstrations which had the
potential to ruin the Asian Games. By this time, North Korea had already declared its boycott of the Games, so the intention of the article was to ‘find fault’ with the Seoul Asian Games of South Korea as the host nation.

……The South Korean stooge has declared the closure of many universities……
(Roh-Dong 16, Sept. 1986-2)

In contrast, instead of countering all the points raised by North Korea, Dong-A quoted an article from a UK newspaper, which raised suspicion that North Korea had been behind the Kimpo (name of the locale in South Korea, near the international airport) bomb explosion. It was also unusual for the South Korean media to cite an indirect source relating to news of a South Korean domestic incident. Furthermore, the results of the investigation had not been conclusive, thus it was inappropriate to broadcast the incident as having been caused by students of North Korean descent. But Dong-A cited a UK newspaper, allegedly having a South Korean officer as its source, such that it felt it was “quite clear” that the responsibility for the incident lay with individuals associated with North Korea.

……The UK newspaper, The Times, has announced that the evidence of Kimpo bomb investigation has not yet been released, but it said that it seems quite clear that the North Korean agents or students might have done this……
(Dong-A 17, September, 1986)

4.6.2 The 1986 Seoul Asian Games: a test for the 1988 Seoul Olympics

The 1986 Asian Games which were held in Seoul from the 20th of September 1986 was the fruit of the efforts of both South Korea and the IOC. They ran relatively smoothly given all the negative comments beforehand, and Dong-A reported that the foreign media started to ignore North Korean arguments or treated North Korea as a politically peripheral entity on the Korean peninsula. In the same context, Dong-A delivered the news from the UK newspaper, as follows.

……The UK newspaper, the Times, stated that whatever offers are provided to North Korea, North Korea will refuse them anyway……it added that the attitude of North Korea is vague and that North Korea is just interested in making propaganda for its regime……
(Dong-A 20, September, 1986)
The UK media illustrates the image of North Korea as that of the ‘problematic relative’ which was against South Korea “anyway”, and thus seeking to cause any harm that it could to the Asian Games in order to serve its own propaganda. Dong-A explained this as motivated by ‘jealousy’ on the part of North Korea. Through the successful running of the Asian Games, South Korea attained international recognition of its status in terms of sport realising North Korea’s fears, and consequently the gap between North and South Korea grew ever larger.

…….The Asian Games blow the coals of North Korea……With jealous eyes, North Korea is staring at South Korea as it opens the Asian Games……Now South Korea will have developed its profile in international society……What makes North Korea anxious is the economic gap between North and South Korea……

(Dong-A 22, September, 1986)

Roh-Dong consistently attempted to advocate the promotion of an anti-Seoul Asian Games movement whether North Korea was directly involved or not. The media of various countries’, such as Tanzanian and Bangladeshi newspapers were cited (Roh-Dong 22, Sept. 1986-10). Even during the Games, North Korea’s negative propaganda continued. It talked about the foreign players’ complaints to demonstrate the lack of preparation for the Asian Games.

…….The athletes from abroad have complained about the facilities and inconveniences of the Asian Games in South Korea……

(Roh-Dong 25, Sept. 1986-7)

It was not only a matter of facilities but the operating system which was adopted to run the whole Games. Complaints about unfair horse inspections were raised (without giving details of how they were unfair). This criticism was raised by members of the Indian team but since South Korea was not a strong candidate for medals in equestrian races little credibility was likely to be given to claims that South Korea might be advantaging itself. However Roh-Dong used this issue as a means of damaging the reputation of the Asian Games’.

…….Reuters broadcast that a member of the Indian sport staff falsely complained about the South Korean organisers. South Korea tried to prevent good quality Indian horses’ participation of the Game by making an unfair inspection……

(Roh-Dong 29, Sept. 1986-2)

However, the following story gives some insight into the impact of domestic security issues and the Asian Games itself. On one occasion during the Games, some Nepalese players were not allowed to take their lunch, because they had not followed the procedure, which was to submit an application form in order to be able to obtain lunch from the
accommodation for the day. Thus, they should have obtained lunch when they arrived at the stadium and they could not leave the stadium because of heavy security surrounding the facility, which (as explained by a South Korean security officer) was protecting players from attack by ‘angry’ Korean citizens. This incident was highlighted by Roh-Dong to emphasise the domestic instability of South Korea.

......Nepalese players could not have their lunch, due to an army blockade all around the stadium and they had not submitted their application for lunch to the organising committee on the morning of that day......

(Roh-Dong 29, Sept. 1986-4)

Dong-A was able to argue that if North Korea had participated they would not only have been able to win more medals for the Korean ethnic group but also would have provided a successful experience of peaceful atmosphere which North Korea claimed was something that they longed for.

......However, International Sport Competitions are still affected by political issues and North Korea is a typical example of that......Had they participated as well, then the number of the North and South Korean medals would have been much greater......

(Dong-A 6, October, 1986)

Dong-A displayed sufficient confidence in the matter of embracing North Korea, just after the successful hosting of the Asian Games, and it refers to hope for a positive future for the Korean Peninsula, in particular in relation to Unification. This was the most radical change in the Dong-A’s tone towards North Korea, since the Korean War. Dong-A even reported that South Korea needed to prepare its political foundation for the unification by reforming the domestic political systems of South Korea.

......The fact that North Korea attempted to interrupt the Olympics, and was not supported by any other countries, and it is therefore, caused self – isolation......For our part we just keep focusing on national unity and develop our politics in this way, and then unification will come about in the 90s......

(Dong-A 12, January, 1987)

The Asian Games were deemed to be a success, so that South Korea felt that it had demonstrated its ability to act as a host country for the Seoul Olympics, and the prospect of the Seoul Olympic Games thus became ‘promising’. As a consequence, when North Korea called for a change of venues or to cancel the event, its requests carried very little weight in international circles.
4.7 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games

4.7.1 The North Korean Antagonism toward the 24th Seoul Olympics

When Seoul became the host city for the 24th Olympic Games at the IOC session in Baden-Baden, North Korea appealed against this decision. From the North Korean perspective, the hosting of the Olympic Games by Seoul alone was not an acceptable option and was at odds with the ‘one ethnicity, one nation’ rationale which it had adopted as the basis of its unification policy. As a result, North Korea asked the IOC to change its decision. In Roh-Dong articles, the reasons for the North Korea’s objection were repeated regularly for a while. The first reason for objecting was the domestic political context of South Korea, which was described as featuring conflict between government, and the people who wanted political democracy, a claim which was associated with a nationalist approach to unification and with opposition to the Seoul Games if it was not to be a co-hosting event of North and South Korea. In the following article, North Korea criticised Chun Du Hwan’s regime which ruled South Korea after the military coup in 1981 and attempted to establish itself in power. Since North Korea thought that this regime wanted to achieve domestic political legitimacy and international recognition as a sovereign nation, by hosting the Olympic Games.

......The conspiracy by Chun’s regime of establishing its period in power is the fundamental background to the hosting of the Olympic Games......

(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981)

Roh-Dong used the term ‘conspiracy’ concerning the attempt to extend Chun’s presidential term, and it was certainly true that Chun was actively seeking a way to change the law to make this possible, and it was not sure that Chun’s regime would respect the South Korean constitution as it stood. The general population seemed largely unaware of the threat to the constitution or else seemed apathetic. Moreover, Roh-Dong pointed to the fact that President Chun sought to become President of the OCOG after leaving political office.

......President Chun Du Hwan has clearly shown his ambition at the recent Olympics. Chun has appointed himself as a president of the Organising Committee of the Seoul Olympics for a term which would last even longer than his presidential term......

Would it be appropriate for the president to serve in a ‘diplomatic’ position after his honourable retirement, or would he wish to maintain the role of national president until the time of the Olympic Games in 1988? The South Korean regime did not explicitly respond to such questions but the general flow of South Korea’s domestic politics suggested that North Korean suggestions might be well founded. However, subsequently, Chun’s regime excused its plan to go beyond his term of office by explaining that the nation should not lose face by prejudicing the chance of a successful Seoul Olympic Games. The previous President, Park Jung Hee who had also been a military dictator was killed by his own body guard when he tried to gain a third term by changing the law which limited the term of the presidency. The leader of the coup which had followed, Chun Du Hwan, also ignored the people’s wish to develop national democracy, and this became one of the targets that North Korea attacked.

……First of all, the South Korean regime wants to hide its fascistic brutality by arresting many democratic politicians and to hide the Kwangju Citizen Massacre from the eyes of the nation people……

(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981)

As Roh-Dong stated, the South Korean regime brutally oppressed democrat activists since the democrats were arguing for the development of North Korean friendly policy when anti-communism was the dominant theme of South Korean politics. As a consequence, none of the media were permitted to broadcast the situation as it really was, since Chun’s regime inspected all media output applying its own regulations. While Chun’s regime ruled South Korea, it used the Cold War structure to protect its interests, becoming the best ally of the USA as a means by which to gain international recognition. As Roh-Dong declared:

……The strategy of South Korea is to promote the international recognition of its regime by hosting the Olympics……

(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981)

The Olympic Games was the world’s biggest international sporting and cultural festival, and both participation in the Games and more importantly the hosting of the Games, provided a stage on which to boost recognition as an autonomous nation-state by demonstrating that the nation could manage this great event at an international level. Not only would that but the stage be ‘decorated’ by sport, making it an attractive means of ‘public diplomacy’. The
diplomatic fruits which South Korea might obtain after hosting the Games were what North Korea was most afraid of, not only due to the rivalry with South Korea, but also because of its own anti-Americanism and foreign policy of promoting independence from foreign intervention in the affairs of the Korean peninsula.

......One thing which must be emphasised here is that this hosting was achieved through the power of its alliance with the USA......

(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981)

However, still, North Korea believed that the South Korean regime’s lack of legitimacy was an appropriate target to attack, and thus the fact that this was something the South Korean people’s movement alighted on was a good sign for North Korea in providing evidence of its superiority over the South Korean regime in terms of grassroots support of the people. North Korea sought to make the point in the following article that the hosting of the Olympic Games could be a vehicle by which to change the South Korean people’s mind.

......The secret intention is to change the Korean people’s perception of its own regime so that it sees Chun’s regime as a military government......

(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981)

Public opinion would, it was anticipated, affect the South Korean stock market by encouraging foreign investors to have greater confidence in the South Korea market with its stable political circumstances and its embedded or entrenched regime. Investment in the South Korean economy was also receiving strong backing by the USA and Japan. The Olympics could become a great commercial media event itself, which would introduce the details of Korean Culture and images of a developed country in contrast to the scenes of the ruins from the Korean War. North Korea was afraid that the political stability and financial independence of South Korea would reinforce the division of the North and the South. Ultimately this might lead to separate membership of the UN as a nation-state by itself, which would mean that not only would North and South Korea remain a divided nation, but also would become internationally recognised as separate and independent nation-states.

...... Chun’s fascist regime has camouflaged its subordination and the embers of war by hosting the Olympics. South Korea has tried to bring foreign investment to the country. The Japanese and USA government investors and business people will invest in South Korea to help maintain the stability of its regime......This will delay democracy and the unification of South Korea and it makes the decision to hold the Olympics in the Seoul Olympics a wrong one......
North Korea proclaimed that it identified South Korea’s goal of hosting the Seoul Games from a South Korean officer. In addition to South Korea’s political usage of the Olympic Games, North Korea also raised the issue of South Korea’s economic goals and the dependence of the South Korea economy on the former colonising powers in the Cold War era. Therefore, through the discourse, we can identify how North Korea assumed the political and economic usage of the Olympics along with the associated diplomatic benefits.

Roh-Dong claims that this Norwegian newspaper supported North Korea’s suspicions concerning South Korea’s reasons for hosting the Olympic Games, because the Norwegian newspaper also recognised that the Olympic Games would contribute to the ‘Two Cho Sun’ policy. This newspaper, it is claimed by Roh-Dong, used the term ‘Cho Sun’ which is a typical North Korean term in place of ‘Korea’ in English. Roh-Dong implied that it is a rational approach to maintaining a balance between North and South Korea which would make the achievement of national unification more feasible. However, the military competition between North and South Korea was becoming more serious. The diplomatic rivalry was even worse and the context of Cold War international relations further contributed to this confrontation.

As the result of this unproductive rivalry, North Korea argued that the South Korea should renounce its approach to exploiting the Olympic Games.

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(Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1982-2)
South Korea did not answer this accusation directly but continued to stress that it would keep on trying to promote sporting relations with North Korea and to organise ‘unified team’ for future Games.

……No matter what North Korea does, South Korean sportspeople will continue the policy of promoting sport relations between North and South Korea and organising a unified team for the International Sport Competition……The president of Korean Sport Association, Cho said that ‘Our fundamental principle is still the same as before……we are still waiting for a positive response on [these] proposals’……

(Dong-A 22, January, 1982-2)

4.7.2 World voices on the 24th Seoul Olympics

A. Voices from Abroad Against the Seoul Olympics

The Seoul Olympic Games became not only a controversial domestic issue but also an international dispute. When the venue for the Games was decided at the IOC session in Baden-Baden, North Korea immediately raised an objection to the result. Roh-Dong outlines the response in an Austrian newspaper as follows:

……An Austrian newspaper has written a column that is entitled ‘unbearable insult to the Olympic Movement’ suggesting that Seoul had been chosen as the International Olympics Venue … [even though] Seoul is ruled by a dictatorship regime. In addition it points out that a French newspaper has [also] written that it is problematic to vote for Seoul as the International Olympics Venue due to the dictatorship of this country……

(Roh-Dong 2, Jan. 1982-1)

Roh-Dong further claims that the Norwegian and the Finnish newspapers expressed socialist sympathies. The Norwegian newspaper forecast that the Eastern European countries would not participate in the Games, and Roh-Dong alleges that the Finnish newspaper claimed that the president of the South Korea ordered a ‘massacre’ of the South Korean people, and that there was therefore, insufficient freedom of political expression. There were countries which understood that co-existence of various political ideologies was possible; and thus that the North and South Korean situation was a domestic political issue to be resolved locally.
……A Norwegian newspaper has written that it was a stupid and objectionable decision to decide that Seoul would be the International Olympics venue since many countries including those from Eastern Europe would not participate……

……A Finnish newspaper stated that Seoul was not a proper venue for the Olympics and that many sportspeople would not go there……and it said that selecting Seoul was really a serious problem……it also said that South Korea was responsible for the massacre (Referring to the killing of students at a protest)……and that the Olympics must held in politically safe place……

(Roh-Dong 2, Jan. 1982-1)

The Council of a Swedish Province pointed out that the South Korean regime was fascist and that making Seoul the Olympic city was a problem.

……The Gotland province even has adopted a statement that cites the decision of making fascist South Korea as the venue of the Olympics……

(Roh-Dong 2, Jan. 1982-1)

Roh-Dong also cites a Czechoslovak newspaper which suggested that the regime had used money from its major business corporations to help to influence the hosting decision.

……A Czechoslovakian newspaper wrote in its columns that it was a debasement of the Olympic Spirit to allow the South Korean regime to host the Olympic Games……This regime had basically trampled over fundamental human rights and had killed, tortured and arrested many South Korean people. In these circumstances, allowing this dictatorial regime to host the Olympics was a disgrace to the Olympic Spirit……The newspaper went on to say that the real hosts of the Games would actually be a few western corporations and that South Korea had lobbied with money from these people because the regime wanted to be the Olympic host for political purposes……

(Roh-Dong 18, Feb. 1982)

Roh-Dong cites a Bulgarian newspaper as pointing to President Chun’s nomination as president of the Organising Committee of Olympics, and claiming that the Olympic movement had basically become a supporter of the dictatorship of South Korea.

……A Bulgarian newspaper has written that it is a debasement of the Olympic Spirit to allow the South Korean regime to host 24th Olympic Games……The worst thing is the appointment of Chun, who is the head of the fascist military regime, as president of the Organising Committee of Olympic Games……

(Roh-Dong 26, Feb. 1982)

The Japanese press commented on the economy of Seoul and the debts the nation would incur as a result of hosting the games. The news circulation suggested according to Roh-Dong, that the Olympic Games could be a great festival internationally, but a disaster nationally. Since economic aspects of hosting the Games and its contribution to national development were one of the biggest propaganda elements that the South Korean regime had been promising to the South Korean people, Roh-Dong argued that the accusations of
this Japanese newspaper should be clearly answered by the South Korean government based on rational argument and objective data. However, it suggested that Chun’s dictatorship had no intention of proving or revealing this fact rationally.

……One Japanese magazine exposed the delusion of Chun’s regime of using the Olympics to promote for itself a permanent place in government……It mentioned that many nations had been left with a huge debt though their hosting of the Olympics, and it wrote that ‘The Olympics will cost a great amount of money and will threaten Chun’s regime because of the collapse of the South Korean economy……

(Roh-Dong 14, Mar. 1982-1)

Zimbabwe’s media was cited as saying that it could not agree to the use of the Olympic Games for ‘imperialist’ political propaganda, and that Seoul was viewed not only as the capital of South Korea, but also as a place that was under the US influence. This particularly showed the Olympics and its recognition in international politics which implied the hosting of the Games was the result of the power politics in the international relations framework.

……At the end, he asked the president of the IOC to ensure that the Olympics should not be used for the imperialists’ political purposes and the Olympic Movement should follow its own principles in conducting the Olympics……

(Roh-Dong 21, Jan. 1985)

The Korean Diaspora also raised its voice in support of the beloved homeland. Nevertheless, the Korean diaspora was divided between pro-North Korea and pro-South Korea, or rather conservatively ‘Nationalistic’ placing national unification as a top priority of all. In particular, the Min-Dan group, for example, who possessed North Korea passports in Japan, were excited about strongly expressing their position through Roh-Dong as follows.

……Min-Dan [The North Korean nationality Japanese-Korean group] newspaper said that hosting the Seoul Olympics had become an opportunity to extend its regime and that the Seoul Olympics would help to maintain the oppression and plundering of this fascist regime, so we must stop this. It is an irony that hosting the Olympics had becomes a way of reinforcing the North and South Korean division making Korean people’s lives more painful by abandoning their commitment to Unification. Notwithstanding the delays to the process of unification, such a process has no meaning in North and South Korean national history……

(Roh-Dong 27, Jan. 1982)

The Japanese-Korean press worried whether the Seoul Olympic Games would become an excuse for continuing the dictatorship. Moreover, they reinforced the view that the ‘national will’ was for Unification and they looked forward to see it realised as the appropriate teleological direction of national progress so that whatever delayed the unification was useless because it delayed progress. A Korean-American newspaper in the US was also
cited as saying that the issue was associated with the anti-Olympic Games, pro-Unification and anti-Chun regime movements.

……A newspaper in the US published for a Korean audience a column by Professor Song who publicises the criminal actions of Chun’s regime as the Olympic host……If Chun’s regime is to be successful with simply hosting the Olympics, then we must be against the Seoul Olympics without equivocation……We have endured a negative anti-Unification, National Security and economic development approach for so long. Now we cannot be a victim again for the Olympics……We must be against the Olympics, before it turns out to be a political curse……The most shameful thing is if we have supported or maintained Chun’s regime just for the Olympics……

(Roh-Dong 14, Mar. 1982-2)

Roh-Dong reported that in an effort to stop the Seoul Olympic Games, North Korea had sent an official letter to the IOC arguing that.

……Seoul is not a suitable place to host Olympic Games……

(Roh-Dong 17, Dec. 1984)

By sending this letter to the IOC, North Korea hoped to persuade the IOC to reconsider its decision to award the 1988 Games to Seoul. It showed the North Korean sincerity in opposing the Seoul Olympics, since what North Korea wished to avoid was a ‘separation’ of itself from the ‘unified’ concept of Korea.

……North Korea asked the IOC to reconsider its decision on the ‘88 Seoul Olympic Games……

(Roh-Dong 21, Dec. 1984-2)

Roh-Dong cited comments and messages from many other countries, which were mainly their allies, but included a number which were not necessarily close to North Korea as well. After Seoul had been chosen as a host city in 1981, North Korea continued to object to the decision itself until July 1985. From that point in time, North Korea moved to an argument for co-hosting the Olympic Games with Seoul. They persisted with their resistance to the approval of the 24th Seoul Olympic Games and received support from around the world according to the nations in Appendix-1.

A negative sentiment against the hosting Seoul Olympic Games was appeared to grow until 1987, with the countries’ (in Appendix-2) media being cited in Roh-Dong as issuing serious warnings about the hosting of the Games in Seoul.
B. Changes of the Olympic Venue from Seoul

The Finnish Student Association requested the IOC to change the venue from Seoul for the 1988 Olympic Games. Roh-Dong cited the statement of the Finnish students who said that ‘they cannot accept the decision’ of the IOC, because of the political circumstance of South Korea. For a Scandinavian country, with a political context which incorporated a socialist party and liberal entities in its democratic political system, both the regimes of North and South Korea might be similarly negatively regarded as dictatorships. Thus the Finnish students might have thought that it would not be fair to give the chance of hosting Games to South Korea only.

……The ten Finnish student associations said that when we consider the present situation of South Korea, we cannot accept the decision of the IOC to give the right to host 1988 Games to Seoul. The Olympics must be the stage for peace, friendship and a common sporting field for the world’s youth, so it must be held in a place where we can guarantee our participation. So our associations asked for a change of the venue for the 1988 Olympics from Seoul to another country……

(Roh-Dong 27, Jan. 1982)

In addition, another Finnish newspaper supported the above article by saying that the IOC started to look for another venue as an option, and that Finland had become one of the candidates. The Finnish newspaper mentions at the end of the article that the IOC had suggested a change of venue and the outcome was to be decided by the Finnish decision to answer positively or not. Therefore, behind the support for North Korea’s claims, there might have been the Finnish nationalistic purpose of considering the hosting of the Games.

……The Finnish newspaper said that the unstable South Korean circumstances cast a shadow over the Olympic Games. The IOC has started to select another venue as an option and Finland has become a candidate. Seoul is a very dangerous place. The IOC has said that Finland will become the host nation if they accept to this decision……

(Roh-Dong 11, Dec. 1983)

The news from Finland cited by Roh-Dong was made more plausible by citing of comments from a Vice President of the IOC about the Olympic venue changes. Moreover, the President of the IOC, Samaranch was quoted as saying that “it is not right to hold the Olympic Games in a venue where international tension exist” which could be a dangerous aspect of Seoul.

……The Vice President of the IOC has mentioned that ‘it has a possibility that the IOC will change the host city of the 24th Olympics from South Korea to a politically neutral venue……and President Samaranch also said that ‘it is not right to hold the Olympics in a venue where international tension exists……
If North Korea was able to harness this momentum, it was thought that it might be possible to change the venue of the Olympics. In the following article of Roh-Dong, its hope to change the venue was confirmed, and this was advocated as a “rational” decision in the light of all circumstances domestically and internationally.

……Now sport people from around the world started to support North Korea about moving ’88 Olympic venue from Seoul as an unstable site to somewhere else……And this opinion was the product of a rational decision made taking account of all the circumstances……

(Roh-Dong 24, May, 1984)

Interestingly, The New York Times argued to change the venue, and forecast that the Seoul Olympics would suffer the same fate as the LA Olympics which had experienced a communist boycott. If the pressure from the world media became too huge to ignore, eventually the IOC would change its decision.

……The New York Times argued for changing the venue of the 1988 Olympics from Seoul to other places. It mentioned that the LA Olympics had struggled due to the boycott from many countries, and Seoul will experience the same……

(Roh-Dong 31, May 1984-1)

There were many other media sources arguing for changing the Olympic venue including newspapers from Syria and Sweden. Another example was Nicaragua, which declared South Korea to be a colony of the USA, and therefore argued that the venue must be changed from Seoul to somewhere else. It has become clear, that what these writers disagreed with was that the dominant power in international politics, the USA, was achieving its ends through the backing of its ‘friend’ in the sport arena.

……The director of the Nicaraguan Sport Association said that South Korea is absolutely a colony of the USA so the venue of 1988 Olympics must be changed……

(Roh-Dong 9, June 1984)

Roh-Dong reported that the NOC of Yugoslavia had also expressed an interest in hosting the 1988 Olympic Games. Roh-Dong cited this with the expectation that such a change could be better for North Korea than hosting of the Games by South Korea alone.

……The president of Yugoslavia Olympic Committee said that Yugoslavia has a mind to host 1988 Olympic Games and has enough facilities to operate this International Sport Event……

(Roh-Dong 22, Oct. 1984)
4.7.3 The Talks for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games by the IOC arbitration

A. The ‘Co-hosting’ issue for the 1988 Seoul Olympics

The idea of the co-hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics began to appear in the international media while North Korea argued for changing the venue from the Seoul. North Korea changed its strategy from seeking to change the venue, to promoting the co-hosting of the Olympic Games. One of the reasons that North Korea had refused to accept Seoul was because it realised the potential of the Olympic Games themselves as a way to promote the North and the South division. Thus, the co-host issue was raised in the same context as the discussion of ‘organising a unified team’ to emphasise Korean national unity. The co-host proposal was presented in a Roh-Dong article as follows.

……The great leader Kim taught us that once it had been decided to host the 24th Olympics in our great land then there should be a right for the Korean people to make a decision of co-hosting and this would be fair in terms of respecting national independence and all Koreans’ wish for National Unity. Even though we are divided we are still one nation and [share] one ethnicity. We therefore, have a huge interest in the Olympics being held in our land and we have a right to ask to be a co-host……

(Roh-Dong 26, June 1985)

In the above article, ‘the right to co-host’ was declared by the North Korean great leader ‘Kim Il Sung’ and that meant it became the most important objective in North Korea since the order came from the Kim Il Sung directly and was thus to be given top priority in the practice of the national policy. The basis of this claim was that North and South Korea were a single Nation (in terms of a shared ethnicity). Moreover, North Korea expressed the concept of its ‘territory’ including the Seoul. Thus, the view of Seoul which North Korea promoted changed from that of a dangerous city, ruled by a dictatorship; to that of being part of the Korean homeland through which North Korea could claim to a right to act as co-host. Thus if Seoul must hold the Olympic Games, then it should be organised by sharing responsibility including hosting authority between North and South Korea.

……After we considered all of the circumstances, we concluded that the 24th Olympics should be co-hosted by North and South Korea. The title of the Games needed to be changed to the ‘Cho Sun Olympics’ or ‘Cho Sun Pyongyang-Seoul’ Olympics and divides the matches to both sides. North and South Korea also can participate as ‘a unified team’ in this Olympics……

(Roh-Dong 31, July 1985-4)
After a month of promoting its official request to co-host the Games, North Korea brought up the issue of the title for the Olympic Games. They argued for using the ‘Cho Sun’ instead of the name ‘Korea’ with that of the city of Pyongyang also added to emphasise the North Korea’s role as the partner of the co-host. Moreover, in that case, it was argued that the participation of both North and South Korea as a unified team ought to be compulsory. North Korea recognised the charter of the IOC which declares that all the matches should be held in the stadium of the host city or in or around that area, and the venue must be formed as part of the territory under the governance of the host nations’ NOC (Charter 34/1). Thus, if North Korea wanted to co-host the Seoul Olympic Games, the Charter of the IOC would have to be changed. If the IOC fully accepted the co-hosting of the Games, it had made a mistake in awarding the Games to Seoul and thus it would need to open an emergency session for an election of a new host city. If this were the case, it would be hard to guarantee the participation of the IOC members and there would be additional costs as well. Under such circumstances, the chances of changing the arrangements were greatly reduced.

……North Korea’s suggestion of dividing the Olympics between North and South Korea came about due to the rejection of the plan to change the Olympic venue which has been confirmed by the IOC and communist countries……The sport minister of South Korea Lee said that North Korea revealed its impure motives for using the Olympics for political purposes, and he asked North Korea to withdraw its appeal……. We want North Korea to withdraw the suggestion of co-hosting the Olympics and to focus on establishing a unified team for the North and South Korean sport……

(Dong-A 2, August, 1985)

In the meantime, South Korea responded to North Korea’s suggestion. South Korea proclaimed that the request of co-hosting was merely rhetoric, as part of an attempt by North Korea to ruin the 24th Seoul Olympics. As South Korea pointed out, North Korea’s discourse regarding its involvement in the Olympic Games was transformed. Initially, North Korea refused to accept Seoul’s nomination as a host city for the 24th Olympics. Then, it argued for changes of venue, and subsequently it asked to co-host the Games and started preparations for the event. As North Korea announced its willingness to co-host the Games, Roh-Dong reported international allies expressing their support through the media. The
Czechoslovakian newspaper stated that its communist allies supported North Korea’s proposal.

……The Czechoslovakian newspaper column announced details of the meeting of the Heads of Sport from communist countries in Hanoi. It said that North Korea’s suggestion was supported by (several) of the nations in the meeting……

(Roh-Dong 2, Dec.1985)

However, the surprising news announced by Dong-A, was that ‘Cuba was the only nation, who agreed to the co-hosting of the Games among the 13 communist nations’. Roh-Dong and Dong-A both reported on the communist countries’ meeting in the Hanoi, but the accounts that they provided were completely at odds with one another. Roh-Dong cited the news from the Czechoslovakian newspaper, which had been their long term ally, and Dong-A cited a Tokyo broadcast company which had provided its source. Roh-Dong had made the innuendo that North Korea’s idea had been accepted by most of the participants in the discussion.

……The Tokyo News Company has broadcast that Cuba is the only nation which has agreed to the co-hosting of North and South Korea among the 13 communist nations meeting in Hanoi……

(Dong-A 30, November, 1985)

News from Dong-A were proved to be more trustworthy at this time due to the many communist participants in the Seoul Olympics. Thus, one might conjecture that many communist countries were reluctant to reveal that they would only participate in a co-hosted Game, but that they did not prevent the reporting of unofficial statements by private organisations to this effect. In this way, the communists could still accept their invitation to the Games while also retaining their diplomatic alliance with North Korea. However this strategy revealed the priority which these countries gave to not offending South Korea or the IOC.

After the success of the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, North Korea focused more attention on the Olympic Games, which might have represented the last chance for them to be involved in the International sport arena.

……The most important issue in the World sport field is co-host of the 24th Olympics……
Therefore, North Korea explored all avenues to becoming a co-host, and the exposure of its argument in the international media became one such strategy. Developing sport facilities was seen as beneficial for the nation. In the following article, a Yugoslavian newspaper reported the preparation of the North Korea’s (Cho Sun) Olympic stadium. North Korea started to publicise its preparation for the staging of the Olympic event.

......Cho Sun established sports facilities quickly......North Korea answered the questions from Yugoslavian newspaper reports that ‘we will welcome foreign guests with all the great facilities in North Korea if we would co-host Olympics......

(Roh-Dong 7, Jan. 1987)

While North Korea stated its plan to continue to request co-hosting, Dong-A presented the opinion of the South Korean NOC, suggesting that there was not enough time for organising a unified team, even though they would do their best to cooperate to achieve that goal.

......We will keep asking to co-host the Olympics......

(Roh-Dong 26, Nov. 1987)

......The president of the KOC said about the unified team of Seoul Olympics, ‘since there is only 300 days left before the Olympics, actually it will be hard to have a unified team, but we will do our best to provide every assist......

(Dong-A 27, November, 1987)

Ever since North Korea announced that it would request co-hosting of the Olympic Games, the support from its international allies had been publicised through Roh-Dong. Most sources were the voices belonging to various non-governmental organisations and thus it was not appropriate to consider these as their national positions. The following extracts illustrate the diversity and frequency of offered support.

B. The ‘Co-hosting’ discussion at the Talks, by North, South Korea and the IOC

Following comments by Samaranch cited below, South Korea became officially ‘the first developing country’ to host the Olympic Games. However, it did not seem right to accept this literally, since many other host cities before Seoul had been located in even less ‘developed’ countries. In that sense, it would be more accurate to say that there was no absolute conceptual standard dividing Global North and South, such as the division of developing and developed nations before the Seoul Olympics, when the dominant ideological division of the
world was in fact the East and West. Therefore, the usage of this term meant that Samaranch understood the context of the Cold War and the status of the IOC in the world order (Reuveny 2007).

“...Samaranch, the president of the IOC said that it is such a great turnover of the Olympic Movement since Seoul was selected as host city of the Olympics, because Korea is the first developing country to host the Olympics......

(Dong-A 2, October, 1981-2)

Even though the president of the IOC mentioned the value of Seoul as a host city, this did not mean that there was no concern over the circumstances and the situation in Seoul. In a South Korean press conference of the IOC members, reported in the following article, the ‘domestic politics of Seoul’ was a primary issue. Dong-A delivered the president of the South Korean Olympic Committee’s answer that South Korea would not expect any problems to occur during the Olympic Games.

“...Domestic political matters were the first question. And we answered that we do not expect any political and social confusion which will negatively influence Olympics. And if so there would be no political question at all. (From the president of the KOC, Cho)......

(Dong-A 5, October, 1981)

It was not certain that these were the ‘exact words’ of Samaranch’s speech or the North Korea’s interpretation, Roh-Dong mentioned Samaranch’s complements concerning North Korea’s sport facilities. As cited below, Roh-Dong claimed that North Korea prepared ‘great facilities for the Olympics’ but it did not mention the quality of infrastructure in Seoul.

“...I can confirm that North Korea has modern sport facilities, so it can be a great venue to host and organise the International Olympics......

(Roh-Dong 31, Mar. 1982-1)

However, the consistent media interplay and North Korea’s announcement that it should co-host the Olympics, finally lead the IOC to arbitrate between the two Koreas. On the suggestion of the IOC, North Korea responded that ‘basically, it is a matter to be discussed between North and South Korea without the IOC’; thus it clearly stated the North Korea’s fundamental diplomatic notion of independence.

“...In the 90th IOC session, the president of the IOC, Samaranch, suggested that the IOC should arbitrate in relation to the ‘88 Seoul Olympics participation in the North and South Korean Sport Talks......The North Korean Sport representative Chang said, the North and South Korean Sports Talks is something which the North and South Korea must discuss apart from the IOC's intervention in this matter ......

(Dong-A 3, June, 1985)
Later, it also was obvious that the decision about the host city could not be changed and the IOC wished all the other countries including North Korea to participate. Therefore, the request for co-hosting was officially denied by the IOC, but the IOC tried to play some role between North and South Korea through the Talks.

The ‘noise’ made by North Korea in the international context could hardly be ignored by the IOC, since the Olympics and Olympism have carried out roles not only as protectors of fair play and sportspersonship and as advocates and messengers of peace. Therefore, from the IOC’s perspective, the claims of North Korea that it was acting against the fundamental ideology of the IOC would therefore need to be addressed.

[Table 4.15] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games-1

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The first of the IOC arbitration Talks in relation to the Seoul Olympic Games were held at Panmunjom, located in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) of the Korean peninsula. However, the attitude of South Korea seemed to favour North Korea, as was demonstrated in the following Talks summary.

[Table 4.16] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games-2

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South Korea summarised that it had suggested that North Korea should be free to join in the Seoul Games. This implied that there would not be any special treatment for the other state with the ‘same ethnic (national) groups’ vis-à-vis North Korea being the ‘co-host’. North Korea pressed strongly for the development of an ‘innovative alternative’ for the Games, and threatened that South Korea might experience an ‘extremely dangerous incident’ which might happen (at the Seoul Olympics).

[Table 4.17] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games-3

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North Korea viewed the process of co-hosting the Olympic Games in parallel with the process of the nation’s unification. Therefore, unification discourse was closely entangled with North Korea’s response to South Korea on the Olympics. Since the Olympic Movement was considered as a symbolic image of world peace, North Korea placed more value on the venue of the Games, which could become a strong allegorical symbol of the unification of the two Koreas.

[Table 4.18] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games-4

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Title of Game: The Cho Sun Olympic Games, or the Cho Sun Pyongyang-
North Korea suggested several conditions and associated details for the co-hosting of the Games. It asked along with co-hosting for a changing of the title of the Games from the ‘Seoul Olympic Games’ to the ‘Cho-Sun Olympic Games or Cho Sun Pyongyang – Seoul Olympic Games’ which underlined the homogeneous ethnic make-up of Korea. The familiar name for South Korea and North Korea is ‘Korea’ which had been developed from the name of ‘Koryo’; a dynasty that had existed in the Korean peninsula from AD 918 to 1392. The name was known to the world through its active trade, particularly via the Silk Road, and thus the name ‘Koryo’ came from the pronunciation ‘Core’ and becomes ‘Korea’ (Cumings 1997). This was related to the way in which the North Korean regime traced its legitimacy through the traditional legacy of the Cho Sun dynasty, which ruled the Korean peninsula after the Koryo dynasty. Thus, both names Koryo and Cho Sun were based on ethnic nationalism relating to present Korea. This was behind North Korea’s request to change the name of the Olympics if it were to become a co-host with South Korea. Even though North and South Korea had their own governments and political and economic systems, North Korea wanted to unify symbolically at least, by reinforcing the ideology of primordial nationalism. A fascinating element of the proposal related to the traffic of people during the Games. North Korea suggested free entry and exit by land, sea and air. At the time this proposal was made, North Korea had not engaged in any Talks to discuss such ideas, which as proposals did not take account of the political conflict and tension of the Korean War and the context of the cease-fire. None of the negotiations which had been conducted between North and South Korea had reached a conclusion this easily and this quickly. Moreover, issuing visas which each nation must issue to regulate human traffic solved the need for special permission to be given to enter North Korea. This reflected how North and South
Korean relations could be transformed through mutual flexibility, treating this issue as a special case.

[Table 4.19] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games

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As the president of the IOC, Samaranch had private contact with the South Korean officers, and indicated that the IOC would respect the decision made in the IOC session and thus that the IOC would keep its contract with the South Korean NOC. He asked the South Korean officers whether there was anything more attractive to North Korea which would make its meaningful participation in the Games more likely. It showed that, even though these Olympic Games were governed by the IOC, South Korea had a virtual veto on a decision on whether to accept North Korea’s proposals. Therefore, several issues such as changing the title of the Games, the portion of the matches to be located in the North Korean regions, the opening and the closing ceremony venue and TV license sharing were never acceptable, and so these became the reasons for blaming North Korea for the breakdown of the Talks. However, Dong-A commented on each request from South Korea and how much South Korea intended to accept them or not.

……The North and South Korean Sports Talks in Lausanne have broken down without result due to North Korea’s determined work…… North Korea requested to change the title of the Games as 'Cho Sun Pyongyang-Seoul Olympics' and to share all the matches to 50:50. Moreover, North Korea asked to separate the opening and closing ceremonies allocating one each to North and South Korea, and proposed joint marketing of the TV licence……Furthermore, the ’88 Olympics will be held in the Seoul which is a City, not a South Korea which is a State……

(Dong-A 10, October, 1985-1)
The Talks bore little fruit because the requests from North Korea were regarded by the South as excessive. North Korea admitted that they asked for certain conditions, and they acknowledged what they could make for the Korean people in Korean peninsula.

……We asked for the changing of the Olympics’ title to express unification rather than separation…….What we asked for in sharing matches equally is also the result of the consideration of the circumstance of the nation and emotion of the people……

(Roh-Dong 11, Oct. 1985-2)

Even though the First Talks for the Seoul Olympic Games ended without any conclusion, the IOC arranged another set of Talks for North and South Korea. It was held in early 1986, but the parties found it hard to reach the point of agreement. During the Second Talks, North Korea broadcast the news from an Austrian newspaper which was enough to ruin the reputation of South Korea and the IOC.

……This rumour spread that South Korea brought around 140 staff including [presidential] bodyguards of the Blue House, and 20 prostitutes to help in the lobbying for the Seoul Olympics in the 84th IOC sessions in Baden-Baden. One of the newspapers in Austria commented that ‘the Seoul is an Olympic Venue which was selected by a Women’s Body’……

(Roh-Dong 8, Jan. 1986)

Ostensibly, North Korea agreed on the Talks suggested by the IOC, but still had in mind that the decision by the IOC to award the games to Seoul was wrong, and wanted to find critical faults in the decision-making process for the hosting of the Olympics. Nevertheless, the IOC was under pressure since the Talks would provide the only means by which to persuade North Korea to join the Games.

……When we proposed that we can consider three events which are men’s volleyball, handball and the football preliminaries, Samaranch asked whether any of final matches could be held in North Korea…….The head of our representation Kim said in the keynote speech that our right of hosting Seoul Olympics is undeniable and we are nearly at the end of the preparations so we cannot accept the suggestion of co-hosting which goes against the IOC Charter…….Samaranch said that it was a fundamental position of the IOC to try not to make North Korea withdraw from the Talks……

(Dong-A 9, January, 1986)

Five months after the second Talks in June 1986, the IOC suggested a better option for North Korea after discussion with South Korea which involved staging two finals matches in North Korea. In addition, the IOC asked for a few more events or matches to be staged in North Korea such as football and cycling along with other cultural events.
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<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>'The IOC suggested holding, in particular including final matches, for 2 sport events in North Korean region.'</td>
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<td>'IOC suggested to hold an additional, partial sport event in the North Korea region, and also proposed that North Korea participate in the Olympic related cultural events</td>
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During the Third Talks which followed, South Korea made up its mind to accept the options given at the Talks. However, South Korea needed a public ‘excuse’ for the purposes of the domestic population who did not understand the circumstances under which South Korea felt that it had to share the Olympic Games with the North, especially given the strong anti-communist mood of the local population. South Korea therefore suggested the term of the ‘Sharing Games’ rather than referring to the ‘co-hosting’ of the Games. Dong-A mentioned that this was just a matter of “different words” in the same context, but that was for a comment aimed at persuading North Korea.

……South Korea recognised the need to compromise on two items for the Olympics including the hosting of a final match, with North Korea for the Seoul Olympics…… Also, the South Korean head of representatives Kim used new terms, namely the ‘Sharing Games between North and South Korea’ rather than using the term of ‘co-host’ which meant the same outcome but different words……

(Dong-A 20, June, 1986)

North Korea did not share the same view of the Talks with South Korea and the IOC, since North Korea responded with sarcastic comments such as ‘South Korea announced we had made great progress and this was due to South Korea’s compromise made out of good will’.

Once the Talks were in progress, South Korea and the IOC anticipated, given the South Korean gesture that that would have been enough to ensure that the North Koreans to participate, albeit reluctantly.

……In the Talks in Lausanne, South Korea adopted a position in which they would give 1-2 events to us and that this would be a hosting by Seoul rather than together with North Korea……Nevertheless, South Korea announced that we had made great progress due to their compromise made out of goodwill……

(Roh-Dong 22, June 1986-1)
South Korea and the IOC attempted to negotiate with North Korea concerning the various
sport events to transfer, even though the number of matches suggested did not meet North
Korea’s expectations. However, those were what North Korea could be provided with by the
time of these contacts and the Fourth Talks which were scheduled in the following year.

[Table 4.21] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the
1988 Seoul Olympic Games - 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>The 1st - 4th North Korea &amp; South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>The IOC corrected and sent the previous proposal, and requested to know whether it would be accepted or not by the end of the August 1987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the time of the scheduled Fourth Talks, it was less than one year ahead of the Seoul
Olympic Games. Thus, in the Fourth Talks the discussion had to reach certain conclusions.
South Korea did not agree with the revised proposal of the IOC by the Third Talks, but
changed its position in the Fourth Talks because of the limited time and to save the face of
the IOC, rather than as a result of any willingness by to compromise.

[Table 4.22] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the
1988 Seoul Olympic Games - 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>The 1st - 4th North Korea &amp; South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games</th>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>1985.10.09-10/1986.01.08-09/06.10-11/1987.07.14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>If North Korea withdraws the co-host proposal, and guaranteed free traffic between North and South Korea and unconditional participation in the opening and closing ceremony, then South Korea will accept the proposal of the IOC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fundamentally, co-hosting was not appropriate given the IOC charter, particularly when just
a couple of sport events could be held in North Korea. Thus, South Korea asked North
Korea to step back from the position of insisting on the co-host label. North Korea could
choose between the official title of co-host and the transfer of half of the matches, but the
IOC could not guarantee either of these options. Samaranch described North Korea as a
‘problem’ which ‘threatened’ the IOC with ‘boycotting’ the Games. It seemed that the IOC
had done all that it was prepared to do for the time being.
……Samaranch pointed out that the only problem at this moment is North Korea. North Korea threatened that they would boycott the Olympics if there would be no more events from the Games held in North Korea for the ’88 Seoul Games……
(Dong-A 26, February, 1987)

The IOC may have had the intention of gaining enhanced status in terms of its role in diplomacy by performing as an arbitrator for the Seoul Olympics. In the following article, a particular request from the IOC is identified when IOC representatives came to Seoul for discussions about the Games with North Korea in Pyongyang. The IOC wanted its representatives to be the first to travel to Seoul by land from Pyongyang as a way of symbolising the development of harmony between North and South.

……On the 6th, the IOC staff said that ‘We expect that North Korea will allow us to cross the border on our way to Seoul. Then we can become the first International Organisational delegates permitted to do this……
(Dong-A 7, May, 1987)

However, North Korea did not approve the request of the IOC. Moreover, the USSR, China and many other Eastern European countries so called allies of North Korea-decided to participate in the Seoul Games. The isolation of North Korea in diplomatic relations around the Seoul Olympics became increasingly apparent.

……It was a pity that North Korea refused the request of the IOC to travel by road on their way to Seoul from Pyongyang……The only obstacle affecting the hosting of the Seoul Games is the co-hosting claim of North Korea……The USSR, China and Eastern Germany will participate, so North Korea is isolated even in the discussion of the boycott……
(Dong-A 28, May, 1987)

South Korea’s refusal to compromise over the term ‘co-hosting’ gained support as evidenced by the IOC’s confirmation of its members’ decision to award the Olympic Games to Seoul. The IOC emphasised that even though the Talks had produced no fruitful outcome, they were still valuable as an ‘attempt’ to achieve mutual cooperation between North and South Korea through the Olympics.

……On the other hands, Samaranch confirmed that ‘what North Korea wants, ‘co-hosting’, is impossible, and the 24th Olympics will be hosted in Seoul as the IOC session has decided in 1981, Baden Baden. However, the Talks helped in mediating relations between the two. We, the IOC and South Korea, have based our approach on mutual cooperation rather than just negotiation……
(Dong-A 15, July, 1987)
Nevertheless, the impression recorded by South Korea in relation to these Talks with North Korea was not that positive. The South Korean government’s summary of the Talks referred to the stubborn attitude of North Korea in pursuing the co-hosting proposal for the Games.

[Table 4.23] The 1st - 4th North Korea & South Korean Sports Talks with IOC arbitration for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games

<table>
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<th>Content</th>
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<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

North Korea was not satisfied with the IOC’s mediation and continued to argue for its ‘One nation’ policy in the Olympic context. Dong-A blamed North Korea for the breakdown of the Fourth Talks, because of its unacceptable ‘greedy’ request which was not considered as ‘fair’ or ‘generous’ from the perspective of the IOC (Dong-A 20, July, 1987).

4.7.4 The issues near the time of the 1988 Seoul Olympics

The Talks for the co-hosting of the Olympic Games between North and South Korea with the IOC officially broke down after the series of four meetings. When Seoul was designated as the host city of 1988 Olympic Games, Dong-A mentioned two benefits which it expected to obtain by hosting the Games. The first was the establishing of better recognition of the importance of Sport in Korea with the influx of international spectators. The second was the development of sport facilities in general which would provide a better environment for people to get involved in the various sport activities.

......What will be achieved by the Olympics in South Korea? First of all, the judgemental attitude about the sport will change......Many people will participate in sport activity and will enjoy it......One other factor is that of sport facilities. When the facilities are properly equipped, then 80% of the goal to develop sport participation will be achieved......And this will be good opportunity to attract people to participate in sport......

(Dong-A 1, October, 1981-1)

The article mentioned the domestic influence of hosting the Olympics while the article below refers to the diplomatic impact of the Games. In the article, Dong-A described South Korea’s
diplomatic goals which were 'not yet accomplished', and argued that the Olympics would be the best opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with new countries, such as the Communist bloc of nations.

Diplomats considered that the success of ‘Seoul Olympics’ will affect International Political relations. First of all, the 46 countries with which South Korea had no diplomatic relations including the Communist Bloc, Eastern European and anti-Korean African countries……This Olympics is definitely the chance to develop Korean diplomatic relations in a way which has not been accomplished since independence……

(Dong-A 1, October, 1981-2)

On the other hand, North Korea was worried about South Korea’s enhancement of its diplomatic status, and warned about the problems of international recognition of the ‘Two Koreas’ by emphasising diplomatic relations with ‘One Korea’. This demonstrates that North Korea recognised the potential of the Olympic Games to enhance South Korea’s diplomatic status.

In relation to the fascist South Korean regime of Chun Du Whan and its hosting of the Seoul Games, the way in which the Seoul Games are used for political propaganda is pretty suspicious……South Korea will attempt to achieve permanent separation of the countries by joining the UN separately through these Olympics……South Korea will improve its isolated IR position and will want to be recognised as a ‘Nation State’ following by its ‘Two Cho Sun’ policy……

(Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1981)

North Korea blamed South Korean ‘legalisation of the Two Cho Sun Policy’, and proclaimed that this was against the notion of the homogeneous nationalism of Korea.

The stooge South Korean prime minister has confessed the purposes of ‘86 Asian Games and ‘88 Olympics. What they want to achieve through the games was just legalisation of the ‘Two Cho Sun’ policy by being recognised as North and South Korea separately in an international context. South Korea has misused the Olympic for its own wrongful purposes……

(Roh-Dong 6, June 1986-2)

When the staging of the Seoul Olympic Games was imminent, a popular movement asking the regime for democracy began to grow. The South Korean regime therefore needed to address the unstable framework of national security which had aimed to distract people’s attention away from domestic issues to focus on the external enemy, and in particular the military threat from North Korea.

The Olympics has been used as a tool in South Korea for suppressing democracy by concreting the North and South Korean War situation. South Korea mentioned the ‘military invasion’ or ‘military provocation’ of North Korea continually……

(Roh-Dong 21, Mar. 1986)
However, the president of the USA, as a strong ally of South Korea announced that he would support South Korea in its bid to make a success of the Games. The Prime Minister of the UK even underlined the need for caution in relation to North Korean activities which might be designed to undermine the Games.

……Reagan has mentioned that it is ‘good’ to host Asian Games and the Olympics in South Korea and the USA will do its best to support the successful Games…
(Dong-A 12, April, 1986-2)

……The Prime Minister Thatcher said that whatever North Korean motivation and actions, South Korea and the UN army must remain alert to danger……
(Dong-A 1, May, 1986)

South Korea named the North Korean diplomatic policy a ‘closed policy’ which would result in North Korea being isolated in international relations. Dong-A advised North Korea to become engaged in international relations by participating in the Seoul Olympics for its own sake, since the USSR and its entire group of allies would join the Games.

……If South Korea’s Olympic Games are successful, then the isolation of North Korea will become obvious. Moreover, it will be hugely damaged if it continues with its ‘closed policy’ as South Korea progressively improves its democracy……The participation of China and the USSR means ‘more recognition’ for South Korea, so North Korea must be confused in terms of its political position and I had heard that North Korea is now in deep consideration on this matter……
(Dong-A 5, August, 1987)

North Korea, aware of this circumstance, requested a further round of Talks with the IOC. However as Dong-A noted;

……The IOC announced that they had refused the request of North Korea to have one more set of Talks for the Olympics….
(Dong-A 25, August, 1987-2)

Dong-A makes explicit its view as to why the IOC had refused in the following terms

……It is because North Korea kept asking for co-hosting [of the Games] which was against the IOC Charter, thus any Talks could not progress……
(Dong-A 15, September, 1987-2)

In the meantime, the opening of the 1988 Seoul Olympics was just one year away. The IOC started to send the invitations to participants (NOCs) for the Games. Chang, who represent the IOC in North Korea identified this as the ‘official break down of the Talks’ and requested that the IOC delay the dispatch of the letters of invitation. However, the IOC stated that it would not conduct any further action on behalf of North Korea which might cause any
inconvenience to the scheduling and preparation of the South Korean Organising Committee, thus it refused what North Korea had proposed.

......The North Korean IOC member, Chang exclaimed that the preparations for sending invitations for the Olympics to all other countries meant a break down in the Talks which had lasted, until now......

(Dong-A 15, September, 1987-1)

...... The North Korean NOC asked the IOC for a delay in dispatching invitations to the Olympics, and Samaranch simply has answered that 'there is nothing further we can expect from North Korea and the IOC must do what it has to do'......

(Dong-A 16, September, 1987-1)

In relation to the Talks, the IOC acknowledged the hegemony of South Korea in relation to the agenda for the Talks, and the best the IOC could expect would be minimum disruption and the willing participation of North Korea in the Games. Despite the recognition of the role, or authority of, South Korea by the IOC, South Korea did not maximise the political capital from these Talks. The president of the South Korean NOC expressed a passive attitude in relation to participating in the Talks by saying that the decision would depend upon the decision of the IOC and until the IOC became involved, South Korea should wait for North Korea to make a further move.

......The president of the KOC, Kim, said that there is no idea of having further Talks between North and South Korea, and since this is a matter relating to the Olympics, the IOC must be involved. However, we will wait until the last minute for North Korea’s participation......

(Dong-A 18, September, 1987)

South Korean university students who demonstrated for national democracy insisted on the co-hosting of the Olympic Games with slogans in favour of co-hosting. Student support for this type of slogan was based on the idea that co-hosting would help promote national unity on the Korean peninsula, and this became welcome news to Roh-Dong and implied evidence for the suppression of the South Korean people.

......University students used the slogans as follows; ‘Let’s recover national identity independence by co-hosting the Olympics’, ‘let’s support the peoples’ movement’......

(Roh-Dong 22, Sept. 1987)

Roh-Dong said that North Korea could not cooperate with this South Korean regime of President Chun. Roh-Dong had expected to engage with the new ‘Democratic’ regime, thus the ‘present’ regime was defined as ‘Non-Democratic’. This implied that North Korea
believed that the sport interaction between North and South Korea was not separable from a
domestic political agenda, even though this sporting event is highly international.

……As long as the present military dictatorship regime exists in South Korea, the co-hosting of the Games cannot happen. Therefore, we think it is fair to delay all the Talks until there is a new democratic regime elected……

(Roh-Dong 27, Oct. 1987-3)

Ironically, this ‘Non-Democratic’ South Korean regime was supported in hosting ‘its Olympics’
by expressions of participation from other socialistic countries. Samaranch had said that the
official answer from these countries would be late due to the diplomatic relations with North
Korea, but he found that they would definitely participate in the Games from various sources.
Moreover, the foreign minister of Poland announced that he refused to boycott the Games
when asked to do so by North Korea. ‘Nothing lasts forever.’ Would it be too much of an
exaggeration to say that today’s friend becomes tomorrow’s enemy in this context?

……Samaranch mentioned that socialist countries had just delayed announcement of
their participation at the Seoul Olympic Games because of diplomatic relations with
North Korea, but most of the socialist countries would participate in the Seoul
Olympics……And the Undersecretary of State forecast that the USSR, China and
other Eastern countries, and Cuba would participate in the Games so North Korea
would not be able to use terror tactics……

(Dong-A 21, November, 1987)

The Polish Foreign Minister said that he would refuse the request from North Korea to
boycott the Seoul Olympics as long as the co-host issue is not solved properly……

(Dong-A 23, November, 1987)

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to sketch out the main characteristics of North-South Korean
sport relations in the Cold War international context. Since China declared a policy of
opening up its economy in 1979, this had a ‘knock-on’ effect on other Socialist countries
such as North Korea, and the confrontational relationship between North and South Korea
began to show potential to decrease when the 35th Table Tennis Championships were held
in Pyongyang, North Korea provided a timely stimulus for Sports Talks between two Koreas.
The discussion of the adoption of a ‘unified team’ was introduced at this time with a positive
lead by North Korea, although ultimately agreement could not be reached.
In this period of Olympic history, there were Games which became the source and location of confrontation between the two political blocs, led by the USA and the USSR. The 1980 Moscow Games and the 1984 LA Games were known as ‘half games’ and North and South Korea played complementary roles in this division by boycotting one Games each. Each of them tried to persuade the other to participate in the Games hosted by their own allies and in both cases the two Koreas attempted to organise unified team for the Games, even though North and South Korea withdrew in 1980 and 1984 respectively. The failure of these Talks reflected the limits of diplomatic action within this Cold War context.

In 1981, South Korea was nominated as the host country for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games by the IOC and this provoked strong resistance from North Korea. These circumstances reflected the paradoxical nature of the North and South Korean dialogues, which tried to achieve agreement on establishing a unified team while each was also trying to ensure that the ‘other party’ was given no advantage in the international sport context. This explains North Korea’s strong opposition toward the proposed South Korean hosting of the 1988 Olympics. North Korea used diplomatic relations to place pressure on the IOC to change its decision, and when this proved unsuccessful it looked to promote the idea of North Korea being co-hosts, co-hosting, rather than a unified team became the primary focus of discussion.

Sport interactions were live and relevant in this period but the sports discourse was always to be seen as part of the wider context of Cold War relations, and sporting discourses were inevitably entangled in wider and more generic discursive strands.
Chapter 5 North and South Korean sports relations from 1988 to 1997

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the discourses of the North and South Korean governmental and media sources with respect to sporting relations between the two states will be analysed. The time period of the analyses is from 1988 to 1997 and, particular emphasis will placed on studying ‘international level’ matches which the South Korean government officially announced as an ‘area for the support of sport interchange with North Korea’ (Korea 1990, 2005). From an international relations perspective, the mood of détente increased during this timeframe. Certainly, the Korean peninsula went from a state of conflict to détente, with North and South Korea representing the political super powers in their diplomatic dialogues. It is therefore not surprising therefore that the complex patterns of conflict and harmony prevalent in inter-Korean relations were interwoven into their domestic and socio-economic situations. South Korean national politics began to move away from the military dictatorship regime, which was established by Chun Doo Hwan’s military coup in 1979, to the first democratic government elected by the people. The next President, Roh Tae Woo, had participated in Chun’s military coup (as his friend) and subsequently collaborated with the military government as a member of the cabinet. Therefore, Roh Tae Woo’s regime essentially pursued the same political direction as Chun had done, following a simple transfer of power between two close allies. On the other hand, in North Korea, the death of the ‘great leader’, Kim Il Sung in 1994 created the need for a sudden transition of political authority to his son, Kim Jong Il.

From 1988 to 1997, South Korea rapidly enlarged its national infrastructures and enhanced the social welfare of its citizens, whereas North Korea focused on increasing its military capability. Developments in North and South Korea were closely followed by the international community as North Korea tried to gain legitimate its political authority. Thus, North and South Korea’s relationship might be described as ‘peace in progresses’ and a
decision to co-exist in relative harmony. After the right to host the 1988 Olympic Games was awarded to Seoul, various attempts were made to develop North and South Korean relations, and these interactions will be illustrated in this chapter.

5.2 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and International Relations

5.2.1 Samaranch and the IOC as a diplomat of the Games
The particular circumstances of North and South Korean relations offered the IOC the opportunity to become involved as a sporting and diplomatic mediator. Dong-A highlighted that Samaranch performed a significant role in encouraging the member countries of the IOC to take part in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. In the end, the official number of NOCs who participated was 159; at the time the largest number for any Olympics. Building on the IOC’s governance of the Olympic Movement during the Cold War years, the President of the IOC, Samaranch, viewed the situation in Korea peninsula as the ‘perfect’ opportunity to act, as a mediator in the international sporting arena.

Since North and South Korea had become members of the IOC, there was international recognition of their ‘separate’ political expression through spotlighted sports. Ironically, one of the reasons that Seoul was chosen as the host city for the 1988 Olympic Games was its symbolic value of ‘peace’, even though there was no formal ceasefire in place on the Korean Peninsula.

Samaranch said that ‘The IOC had put most of its effort into making the Seoul Games a festival for the whole of humanity, and we also did our best to make a success of the North and South Korean Sports Talks. If North Korea had accepted our suggestion, then we would have supported their participation with the cooperation of all the IFs.
(Dong-A 19, January, 1988)

Samaranch, the former Spanish diplomat, did his best to encourage North Korea to participate in the Seoul Olympic Games, and tried to get them to become partial ‘co-hosts’ by asking South Korea to give up hosting some matches. However, after several meetings
with North Korea, Samaranch reached the conclusion that this co-hosting 'dream' could not be realised.

*In Calgary on the 6th, after 45min. of discussions with the president of the North Korean NOC on North Korea's participation in the Seoul Olympic Games, he agrees to a further meeting with North Korea, if North Korea accepts some of the required conditions. However, he also mentions that North Korea's attitude had not changed at all, and at this stage, more North and South Korean Sports Talks would be meaningless.*

(Dong-A 8, February, 1988)

Despite Dong-A's praise for the way Samaranch performed his role, Roh-Dong alleged that a member of the Cuban media denounced Samaranch's statement at a press conference. Samaranch said that he did not expect North Korea to cooperate to any significant degree. The following article shows how North Korea felt during and just after the Talks had broken down. The article complained about the speech made by Samaranch, claiming that he acted 'as if he opened the door for North Korea'.

*......The newspaper made its point under the title of <what door did Samaranch open for North Korea?>. The president of the IOC, Samaranch, said at the press conference in Lausanne that the door for Pyongyang to participate in the 1988 Olympics had not yet closed. But realistically, what door is opening? ......What door has Samaranch opened? Will it be the door which disregards the Olympic idea which originated from Love and Unity through the Seoul Olympic Games? Is it the door that threatens to make North Korea accept the leftovers of the dictatorship of South Korea?*

(Roh-Dong 24, Jan. 1988)

North Korea complained that Samaranch did nothing but force North Korea to accept the 'leftovers' that the South Korean regime did not want. Certainly Roh-Dong’s claim illustrated North Korea’s disappointment with South Korea’s offer and the IOC’s efforts which were insufficient in the eyes of North Korea. Roh-Dong repeatedly reported that the North Korean regimes denigrated Samaranch’s work as a mediator between North and South in the Talks relating to co-hosting the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, Roh-Dong reported the positive comments of Fidel Castro on the work of Samaranch. Castro stated that he believed Samaranch’s desire for co-hosting to be sincere, and thus Castro’s evaluation of Samaranch’s diplomatic actions was certainly not negative.

*......Samaranch sent me (Castro) a letter saying that he would keep trying to find the solution. We were happy with this. If he could find a solution that satisfied the DPRK (North Korea) then we would support that and participate in the Games. Now although that would be a miracle, I think it is positive that Samaranch put in the effort here.....*

(Roh-Dong 2, Mar. 1988)
5.2.2 The Cold War VS Détente in North and South Korea

The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games showed (with the symbolic meaning of the location of the games) that ‘World Peace’ in the ‘Cold War’ era could be achieved. There were official announcements to that effect by the participating countries including the USSR and other Eastern European Nations. Analysis of the media discourse reveals that the mood of détente at the end of the Cold War did indeed have an impact on the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games

...... Staff from the USA gave indications on a number of occasions that the USSR would participate in the Games, since they had already been made aware of the intention of the USSR to do so from meetings with the Foreign Minister and other high-level officials. Moreover, during the summit in December, last year, President Ronald Wilson Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev declared together that ‘We both wish for a successful hosting of the ’88 Seoul Olympic Games’......

(Dong-A 12, January, 1988)

This international context was also referred to in a press statement by Samaranch. Samaranch was clearly aware of the two international leaders’ intentions, the effect this would have on the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and on the negotiations between the two Koreas.

Samaranch said that ‘......the number of participants in the 88’ Seoul Olympic Games, will exceed that of previous Games, and the support of Reagan and Gorbachev has helped significantly......’, In addition, Samaranch met Gorbachev again to obtain ‘positive support’ to persuade North Korea and Cuba to participate.

(Dong-A 19, January, 1988)

Dong-A admitted that South Korea had broken new diplomatic ground with the Socialist nations, and this was a significant milestone in communications between South Korea and the USSR. The North Korean alliance, (including Cuba), proclaimed that the Olympic Games was similar to a Cold War confrontation, with South Korea being perceived as a major ally of the USA. Roh-Dong referred to the South Korean regime as a “puppet government”, and the USA as the ‘boss’ of South Korea. This view explained how Roh-Dong defined the relations of South Korea and the USA, ‘which had a conspiracy to engage in military manoeuvres as a means of intimidation (Roh-Dong 21, Jan. 1988). Roh-Dong published an article about the “USA’s nuclear weapons” located in South Korea, and denigrated the efforts of the IOC for ‘Peace’ by using the metaphor of ‘a dream of a dove, which had grown an Eagle’s claw”. It implied that the ‘real danger’ was “nuclear weapons” provided by the USA to South Korea.
Roh-Dong tried to show a clear contradiction between the issues of sports and military deals in North and South Korean relationships (Roh-Dong 24, Jan. 1988). North Korea objected to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games because of South Korea’s military armament strategy, which the latter had developed in cooperation with the USA. The issue of security in the Korean Peninsula was further highlighted when Seoul was chosen as the host city of the Olympic Games. North Korea believed this to be an ironic choice, because it simultaneously involved both positive and negative relations, viz., a ‘Peaceful sport and cultural festival’ and a ‘military confrontation’. In addition, Roh-Dong argued that South Korea was completely controlled by the USA.

"...On the grounds of <Olympic Security>, the USA has noticeably increased its military force based in South Korea and this is obviously a threat to North Korea. This is blasphemous for the Olympic Movement which is a search for Peace. At the same time, it is also a real challenge for North Korea which is seeking a peaceful solution and unification of the Korean peninsula. The actions of the USA cannot be understood in any way other than that the USA is controlling the 24<sup>th</sup> Olympics behind the scenes......"

(Roh-Dong 10, Feb. 1988)

The existence of international support from the foreign media was alleged by Roh-Dong. The headline of a Finnish newspaper defined the USA’s military presence in South Korea as “the American threat”. And concerns about this practice seemed right, since the USA officially warned that the tension between North and South Korea might escalate during the Seoul Olympic Games. This encouraged South Korea to prepare for potential incidents that might occur during the Games.

"...A Finnish Newspaper <Kansan Uutiset> published an article under the title of <The Military Practice of the USA: A threat to the ideology of peace in the Olympics>, that criticised <Team Sprit 88>the military manoeuvres which were planned for this autumn in South Korean home waters in cooperation with the US army. It pointed out that it this was a shocking announcement on the part of the USA, which sought to exercise its ‘War-games during the ‘Seoul Olympic Games’ and warned that the tension between North and South Korea could be severe......"

(Roh-Dong 16, Feb. 1988)

The Eastern European Socialist countries, which decided to participate in the Seoul Olympic Games, expected benefits from improved international cooperation. Nevertheless, they needed to maintain their rhetoric of joining the Seoul Olympic Games without detrimentally impacting their alliance with North Korea and their reputation for supporting a socialist
ideology by referring to ‘Seoul’ as a ‘city’, rather than ‘Seoul’ as a city of ‘South Korea’. A
diplomatic relations dilemma existed between North Korea and the USSR. Samaranch
revealed that Gorbachev’s leadership played an enormous role as the USSR’s primary
decision maker. Moreover, the diplomatic actions of the USSR were not a single country’s
actions; rather they were signals of collective diplomatic decisions taken by the socialist
countries.

When the USSR announced that they would support North Korea in the argument
regarding the Co-hosting of the Games, this was interpreted as political rhetoric......
The participation of the USSR was not limited to the symbolic meaning of backing from
a leader of socialist nations, but also a clear message to North Korea to not involve the
international Olympic arena in this matter and to follow the principle of ‘separation
between politics and sport’.
(Dong-A 12, January, 1988)

Dong-A clarified that the USSR shared the same perspective as the USA and China in
matters pertaining to relations between the two Koreas. The USSR persuaded North Korea
through diplomatic means to change its policy towards South Korea and to be more open in
its diplomatic relations to the world by participating in the Seoul Olympic Games. The
USSR’s decision to participate in the Seoul Games was thus no coincidence. The decision
was made in the ‘mood of détente’ and the efforts of the IOC were considered as sincere
attempts to foster peaceful relations. The decision on the part of the socialist countries to
participate undoubtedly eased security concerns in relation to the Games.

Now people say that world politics has arrived at a ‘new détente’. This is inferred from
the fact that the USSR and the USA have changed their policy from one of pursuing
increased military pressure to one of economic competition, thereby promoting world
peace. Under these circumstances, the Seoul Olympics can be viewed as a stage for
manifesting this ‘New Détente’
(Dong-A 17, September, 1988-2)

In early 1988, before the socialist countries’ decision to take part in the Games was
confirmed, a security threat to the Games still existed. While North Korea criticised the
military manoeuvres of South Korea and the USA, South Korea justified this activity as an
essential procedure for the security of the Olympic Games, i.e., they were necessary in order
to protect the venues and participants from terrorist threats. However, from North Korea’s
perspective, the South’s military manoeuvres were seen as rehearsals for further conflict in
Korean peninsula. In the following article Roh-Dong draws a parallel between the German
government’s activities prior to the Nazi Olympics of 1936 in Berlin (which immediately preceded World War II) and the pre-Games military activities of the USA and South Korea.

......USA and its South Korean stooge increased the size of their military forces just before the Korean War, and enhanced their military presence along the cease fire line. What we have now is a similar situation. All circumstances point to the fact that the USA is misusing the Olympics to develop a new invasion strategy. This is not simply a guess; the USA clearly wants to use this Olympics in the same way as the Berlin Olympics were used prior to World War II.

(Roh-Dong 17, Mar. 1988)

The following article reflects Roh-Dong’s perception about the relationship between USA and the South Korean regime by linking the Olympics to the North and South Korean unification policy. The reason that North Korea could not agree to the ‘USA controlled’ Olympic Games was because the USA was regarded as an opponent of a Korean unification.

Why is South Korea against the co-hosting of Olympics?......The USA doesn’t want Korean Unification. Korea is located near China and the USSR, and is thus strategically important. For this reason the USA, allotted 40,000 military personnel and stored nuclear weapons in South Korea permanently......South Korea has not changed at all. Oppression and demonstrations have continued. The USA and the South Korean government officers don’t want national integration and unification.

(Roh-Dong 28, Mar. 1988)

Nevertheless, the military aspect was not the only issue of the Seoul Games. In terms of athletic performance at the Olympic Games, the prospect of North and South Korean confrontation in Olympic competitions generated huge pressures for both the North and South Korean Olympic teams. This was revealed in the following interview with the director of the South Korean national team.

Lee Erisa, Director of the Team – I have anticipated North and South Korean match situations, and we have prepared for matches against North Korea and against China more intensively......

(Dong-A 19, May, 1988)

The tension between North and South Korea was captured in other cases, such as at an awards ceremony for table tennis in which the acting chair of Asian Table Tennis Association, a North Korean national, handed the medals to the winning South Korean players. When a North Korean man awarded the medals to the South Korean team, the South Korean and the Korean-Japanese cheering squad could not hide their views. North and South Koreans never dreamed that an encounter between two people from opposite sides could be possible, since private contact between the peoples of North and South Korea had been prohibited by
law in both North and South Korea. This significant event reflected how North and South Korean relations were perceived, and illustrated how sports events could produce the ideal context for promoting peace. Dong-A cited a South Korean politician’s statement that such situations would provide the opportunity to develop a process by which real interaction between North and South Korea, in terms of the interchange of people and materials, could be managed.

One of the opposition party leaders Kim Dae Jung said ‘Olympic Security will becomes a greater concern if North Korea does not participate in the Game’ and ‘the establishing of friendship and peace is what the Olympics is about, and if the tensions and conflicts are increased by this, then the value of the Olympics is decreased.’

(Dong-A 2, June, 1988)

North and South Korea, since their separation, had a wish for unification. A number of North Korean allies boycotted the Seoul Olympics to express their support for North Korea’s wish for symbolic national unity in the Games. From a North Korean perspective, the co-hosting of the Games with South Korea would be a great achievement and would contribute to ‘real peace’ in the Korean peninsula. In that sense, North Korea understood that it had the right to secure a co-hosting position as the reward for ‘an official truce’. This was an idealistic approach, but many South Korean people supported the idea of having North Korea co-host the games for that same reason. For example, the Student Association for the Democracy and Unification in South Korea announced in an official statement that the Seoul Olympic Games must be organised by North and South Korea together for national unity, peace and democracy.

5.2.3 North Korea, Cuba and other alliances

With regards to the peoples’ protest over the issue of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the support from diplomatic allies of North Korea was significant. The chief method of support was the media. For example, Roh-Dong reported that allies of North Korea advocated North Korea’s claim for co-hosting the Games and its position on other issues associated with the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The following article shows that Roh-Dong’s claim was empowered through this international support.
The 24th Olympics must be held by North and South Korea together......and North Korea clearly publicised that they will not participate if the Games were not Co-hosted......The effort of Co-hosting of the Game was sponsored by various societies......

(Roh-Dong 16, Jan. 1988)

One of most loyal allies of North Korea, Cuba, held marches demonstrating support for its official decision to boycott the 24th Olympic Game. These marches cited the ‘tainted (political) motives’ of South Korea in hosting the Games. North Korea and its ally considered South Korea’s refusal to co-host the games as unpatriotic (Roh-Dong 21, Jan. 1988). Cuba raised its voice to encourage North Korea highlighting the political and moral justifications for supporting North Korea’s co-hosting claim. Cuba stated that holding the Olympic Games in South Korea was akin to having the Games in Guantanamo, since it considered Seoul a closed city, much like the famous jail, Guantanamo of the USA. Cuba complained that the Olympic venue had become a stage for ideological conflict, and that the ‘security issue’ of the participants had become critical, when it decided to boycott the LA Olympic Games. Consequently, this ideological conflict constituted a threat to “Security”, and had affected the Cuban decision not to participate in the Olympic Games (Roh-Dong 2, Mar. 1988). The Cuban Minister of Education commented indirectly on Castro’s policy when addressing the importance of having North Korea co-host the Seoul Games. He stated that South Korea’s refusal to co-host made the “sweat (effort)” of the IOC to have both of the Koreas co-hosting the Games worthless. Thus, Cuba blamed South Korea for ruining the opportunity to have the Olympic Games hosted jointly (Roh-Dong 24, Jan. 1988). It can be interpreted that Cuba did not value the international status of the Olympic Games as much as other nations, since Cuba also viewed the Olympic Games and the two Koreas differently. Cuba believed that whatever the world said about North and South Korean co-hosting of the Olympics, its claim had a moral superiority above that of South Korea solely hosting the Games.

......It cannot be a strange decision for the people who know Cuba and the people of Cuba that Cuba will not join the 24th Olympics, unless an agreement had been reached with respect to the co-hosting of the games by Pyongyang and Seoul. These are examples of moral decisions, which imply that principles are more important than winning medals. Cuba supported co-hosting under the notion that co-hosting is the fair solution for the Korean people who were forced to divide by USA......

(Roh-Dong 2, Mar. 1988)
Concerning the military cooperation of South Korea and USA, a Cuban newspaper said that “South Korea would make an Olympic War”. The Olympic Security issue was critical, particularly at the Seoul Olympic Games, as even though a mood of détente existed; nothing could guarantee the security of international sporting events in South Korea.

The statements which portrayed South Korea’s preparations for the Olympic Games as inappropriate were spread to the rest of the world. In particular, these politically charged statements were constantly being picked up by Roh-Dong. In the following article Madagascar’s decision to participate in the Games was conditional on the co-hosting of the games, which it viewed as an act in “support of peace and unification of the two Koreas”.

Madagascar will join the Olympics only under the condition of the co-hosting of North and South Korea……and this decision was made independently…… Madagascar felt that it had to follow its own principles and the support peaceful unification of North and South Korea……

(Roh-Dong 20, Jan. 1988)

Roh-Dong alleged that Ethiopia believed that the Seoul Olympic Games would have a negative influence on North and South Korean relations unless it became a co-hosted event (Roh-Dong 22, Jan. 1988). Therefore, it decided not to participate in the Games as a way of indicating its political and diplomatic position. Syria, which supported the idea of North Korean co-hosting, criticised South Korea’s pursuance of a “two countries strategy”. It felt that South Korea’s preferred policy was that of a permanent separation between North and South Korea (Roh-Dong 5, Mar. 1988). China expressed hope that the Seoul Olympic Games and the World Youth Sport Games of North Korea would forge a ‘bond’ between the two Koreas. The media in China mentioned that the Olympic Games had certain “influences” in “Asia”, such as the changes of China and its position on the matter of North and South Korea (Dong-A 17, September, 1988-1). These announcements by North Korean allies highlight the relationship between the sports issue of whether the Games should be co-hosted and the political issue of North and South Korean Unification.
5.3 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and Domestic Issues

5.3.1 The meaning of hosting the Olympics to the South Korean regime

As the opening ceremony of the Seoul Olympic Games drew closer, the co-hosting of the Games became increasingly impractical. The following article presents a narrative of how decisions about the hosting the Games were made and what it meant to the South Korean regime.

"Hosting and preparing for the Games is 'a Glory and a Burden' for the 5th Republic......The 5th Republic won the bid for the Seoul Games just 1 year after the regime had begun, and it focused on the national goal of governing the '88 Olympics. Moreover, the successful opening of the Games was directly related to the internal and external 'Pressure for constitutional improvement'."  
(Dong-A 19, February, 1988)

Dong-A claimed that President Chun’s regime in South Korea had achieved a great diplomatic advance by hosting the Olympic Games, even though the regime’s capacity to manage the event was questionable. Thus, it could be perceived as both a “Glory and a Burden” to the South Korean regime in terms of the financial cost to the national infrastructure, and the political legitimacy of the non-democratically established regime. This latter issue became the greatest obstacle for Chun’s regime in terms of its original aim of gaining international recognition by hosting the Games. In the process of lobbying to host the Games, South Korea stressed its ‘role as a bridge between the East and the West’ by referring to the ‘special’ circumstances of the Korean Peninsula. After successfully bidding for the Games, the ‘role’ undertaken by South Korea had stretched far beyond its ‘capability’.

Consequently, support from the USA and the IOC was essential, and eventually the responsibility for the success of the Olympic Movement overwhelmed South Korea.

"......'Maximum participation' became a mission of the Games, and this became a real problem for the 5th Republic Regime......"  
(Dong-A 19, February, 1988)

After holding two ‘Half Olympic Games’ (the 1980 Moscow Games, and the 1984 LA Games), the IOC recognised the necessity of encouraging participation in the Games and South Korea accepted the authority of the IOC in its desire to “maximise participation in the Games". Whether or not South Korea had any real intention of facilitating North Korea’s co-
hosting of the Olympics was another matter. In an article by Dong-A, it was described as the application of extreme pressure, which pushed South Korea to a significant compromise in order to achieve international status, while at the same time facing the challenge of establishing a ‘democratic’ set up in national politics.

......It is a huge pressure as a host country for the Seoul Games, since there is social instability and confusion concerning the legitimacy of the regime, and the constitutional revision, and this eventually gives impetus to the promotion of democratic decision-making......

(Dong-A 19, February, 1988 )

Nevertheless, South Korea had the option of not having open relations with North Korea about the Olympic Games. The following article explained the struggle South Korea faced in its decision-making on issues related to the Olympic Games and the results thereof.

Howevether it (the Olympic Games) has been planned and however it has been used in politics, we will host the Games 93 days from now......We will see whether the Olympics will increase North and South Korean distrust or hurt national pride, whilst deepening North and South Korean conflicts. We will evaluate this after the Olympics and take responsibility for whatever happens.

(Dong-A 16, June, 1988)

Domestically, the ‘responsibility’ of the South Korean regime was to accomplish political reforms for democracy. Other countries only focused on negotiations concerning the two Koreas co-hosting the Olympic Games. Intentionally or not, the IOC provided an impetus by pressing South Korea to establish a politically democratic process of surveying public opinion in the host city. It also expressed concern about the need for political innovation on the part of the South Korean regime.

Samaranch said that “the political development of South Korean Democracy is one of the key elements for the guaranteed success of the Seoul Olympics”.

(Dong-A 19, January, 1988)

As Samaranch emphasised the condition of the domestic politics of South Korea, he arranged a meeting to share some ideas with South Korea’s major politicians concerning the issue of the Olympic Games. At the meeting, the leader of Pyung Min Dang, Kim Dae Jung met Samaranch. Kim enquired about the diplomatic position of China and the USSR regarding North Korea’s participation in the Olympic Games. Samaranch answered that the IOC wanted North Korea to participate in the Games (Dong-A 2, June, 1988). On another occasion, Samaranch performed the role of international messenger by relying opinions from
one side to another and even visited North Korea twice as a mediator. While the IOC encouraged the South Korean regime to reform its politics to make Seoul a more suitable venue for the Olympic Games, Roh-Dong highlighted the shortcomings of Seoul as an Olympic venue to justify North Korea’s position as a co-host for the Games.

The head of the ‘Korean ethnic democracy group’ Lee said that broad classes of South Korean people have a strong belief that we are one ethnic group and thus they support Olympic co-hosting. He reminds us that even though there is a violent dominant power in the South Korea, many students are asking for Olympic co-hosting and demonstrating on the street.

(Roh-Dong 14, May, 1988)

The Korean Ethnic Democracy Group’s promotion of the co-hosting was emphasised by Roh-Dong, since it was a good example of the existence of groups pressing for the co-hosting of the Games in South Korea. Associated with domestic political issues, the Olympic Games co-hosting issue represented the nationalists’ argument and gained the support of student activists. The demands of student demonstrators centred on the “release of political prisoners”, “Olympic Games co-hosting” and the “withdrawal of the US military”. The argument for co-hosting the Olympic Games became a political and nationalist issue (Roh-Dong 17 May. 1988).

The slogans chanted by students, and by a student committing suicide convey how strongly the people of South Korea wanted to achieve a certain level of democracy. The supporters for co-hosting the games were not only reported in Roh-Dong, but also well presented in Dong-A as the voices of various actors in South Korean society. In particular, the organisations working for the unification of North and South Korea spoke out strongly for the co-hosting of the Olympic Games for “National Unity and Peace of the Ethnicity” (Dong-A 27, May, 1988). However, the South Korean regime’s stance on the death of the aforementioned student was harsh. President Roh stated that ‘the movement of the students and the Nationalistic organisations were the result of direct control by the North Korean regime’ and that any individual contact with North Korea, without permission from the South Korean government would be a direct violation of South Korean law. Thus, the South Korean
government was not willing to discuss the demands of the organisation or the students on issues such as national unification and the co-hosting of the Olympics.

Hankyoreh wrote about regrets concerning the breakdown of the co-hosting discussions between North and South Korea. Hankyoreh perceived the opportunity to co-host the Seoul Olympic Games with North Korea as a potential pathway to national unity.

......We must remember that we failed to co-host the ‘88 Olympics, due to a lack of preparation and misunderstanding on the part of both regimes. If that co-hosting had succeeded, the issue of the unification of North and South Korea wouldn’t be in this helpless situation......

(Hankyoreh 21, January, 1996-2)

5.3.2 The Co-hosting discussions of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games

When Seoul was selected to host the 1988 Olympic Games, North Korea reacted with extreme negativity. The changes in the North Korean discourses concerning the Olympic Games were addressed in the previous chapter, and the discourses of co-hosting that occurred when it was almost time to open the Games, were displayed in Dong-A. It represented the perspective of the South Korean regime and of people in prominent positions in society, including Dong-A itself. Dong-A stated that the request for co-hosting was “too much” and that it meant North Korea would “sink into a diplomatic quagmire” (Dong-A 12, January, 1988). The negative tone of Dong-A on the issue of co-hosting was revealed through different expressions including ‘co-hosting’ and the ‘distribution of some matches’. Since the Games were only four months away, the cooperative gesture could work and help achieve a ‘moral justification’ for building mutual trust. However, Dong-A had already set limits to what the Olympic Games could attain.

Is it possible to implement the co-hosting of the ‘88 Seoul Games or to hold some matches in North Korea with only 4 months left? Can North and South Korea become a single team and participate in the Olympics together?...... However, the relevant organisations which have been preparing for the Seoul Games for the last 6 years, said that this claim can only become a moral justification for the foundation of reconciliation, by the annulment of distrust between North and South Korea......

(Dong-A 17, September, 1988-1)
On the other hand, Hankyoreh reported the voices of the South Korean people and other organisations, which agreed with the idea of co-hosting the Games. The Democratic Unification Peoples’ Movement Association, along with the Association of Buddhism made statements which encouraged the South Korean regime to accept the co-hosting proposal (Hankyoreh 20, May, 1988). Influential people in politics gathered and conducted press conferences, making statements to support the proposal for co-hosting the Games to help achieve the goal of national unification (Hankyoreh 20, May, 1988). These movements and statements, reported on by Hankyoreh, implied that there were a significant number of people who were against the government and who could not be ignored (Hankyoreh 29, May, 1988-1). It is particularly interesting to note that the majority of these articles were detailed in Hankyoreh, but were disregarded by Dong-A.

In the following article, Dong-A interpreted the IOC’s approval of “allocating some matches” to North Korea as an important acknowledgement of the ‘two Koreas’ situation. This was with the emphasis that the Games did not belong to any domestic political group but were directly governed by the IOC and the IFs. Nevertheless, the policy of North Korea was described in Kim Il Sung’s speech as one where ‘the two Koreas can (thus, they must) decide major decisions, associated with the Olympic Games, independently by themselves since it was a ‘National matter’.

……The IOC argues that the Olympics are basically an event of the IFs and IOC, therefore only the Organising committee can operate the Games. Therefore the request of North Korea to co-host is too much for the South Korean organising committee.

(Dong-A 21, May, 1988)

Roh-Dong consistently criticised the South Korean regime for its resistance to those South Korean voices which supported North Korea’s position on the issue of co-hosting the Games (Roh-Dong 10, June 1988). Roh-Dong defined the Seoul Olympic Games as a tool “to fix the North and South Korean division” and a way of “masking all the domestic political faults” of South Korea (Roh-Dong 12, July 1988). North Korea drew attention to the lobbying process for awarding Seoul the Olympic Games. Previously North Korea had announced that South
Korea had influenced the IOC members by providing ‘women’s bodies’ (i.e., providing prostitutes). In the following article, one more issue was pointed out by Roh-Dong- South Korea’s lack of professional human resources for operating the Games. The efficient management of human resources for operating a huge event like the Olympic Games was an absolute necessity. Thus the South Korean regime urgently needed to train professional human resources in the field of sports to run the event properly.

……The USA and president Roh’s regime prevented normal people’s participation in the Seoul Olympics illegally. All the processes for arranging the hosting of the event were made in secret, and only 13% of the 600 staff of the Olympic Organising Committee were professionals in the sports arena……

(Roh-Dong 5, Aug. 1988)

Nearer the time of the Seoul Olympic Games, foreign journalists from the various countries participated in a press conference in Greece organised by South Korea and the IOC. The journalists were interested in the impact of the Olympic Games on North and South Korean relations and how they would organise ‘A Korean Team’. Particularly, the reporters asked questions about how ‘A Korean Team’ would operate. This is reflected in the following article. Through this, Hankyoreh tried to emphasise the idea that organising ‘A Korean Team’ and ‘co-hosting’ reflected not only the wishes of North Korea, but also the general wishes of the international media.

A reporter said that for the harmony of North and South Korea, South Korea should try its best to encourage North Korea’s participation and that if there are some people who do not want North Korea’s participation, then they are wrong……another reporter said that if co-hosting is the only way to gaining North Korean participation then, the IOC must be more flexible towards the Korean Nations……

(Hankyoreh 23, August, 1988-2)

A South Korean officer, Kim, admitted that South Korea was in the unique position of hosting the Games while being subject to dual pressures - one from the IOC and the other from international rivalry groups. Therefore, South Korea needed to try every available option to make this event succeeded success. From the South Korean officer Kim’s perspective, it was clear that the South Korean regime blamed North Korea for its absence from the Seoul Olympic Games which occurred in spite of South Korea’s great compromise (such as marching at the last in the opening ceremony to show the ‘symbolic statuses’ of the co-hosting country). This could be interpreted as not the invisible ‘real statuses of co-hosting
that North Korea really wanted to achieve, but as the ‘obvious statement’ without ‘real authority’ of co-hosting that was ‘hidden’ in the management of the Olympics.

*Under this particular context, we could be blamed more than we should, so we had to do our best……..we provided all the reasons for the participation. Particularly as the hosting country, we suggested that marching in last in the opening ceremony……. It was their mistake to decide not to participate……*

(Hankyoreh 12, September, 1989-3)

### 5.3.3 Issues of Nationalism in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games

Hankyoreh reported an analysis of the 7.7 declaration, which articulated the South Korean regime’s policy on unification. This followed the German approach to national unification based on the independence of the two nations in the Korean peninsula (Hankyoreh 8, July, 1988-3). The contents of this statement would affect North and South Korean sports relations. Thus, the changes in ideas about nationalism can be seen in further discussions about nationalism and the two Koreas. In terms of the impact of the Seoul Olympic Games, Professor Cho mentioned the powerful international status of South Korea which had ‘forced’ the USSR and China to participate in the Games. And others forecasted that North and South Korea case would parallel the East and West German case, which was based on the ‘absorption’ of one into another. Dong-A implied that the “superior” South Korea would absorb North Korea for the sake of “National Unity” and permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula. This article conveyed a different viewpoint from that of North Korea; since it insisted that the South Korean people should be liberated from the governance of the ‘imperialist South Korea’, which was itself controlled by the USA (Dong-A 19, February, 1988).

The communication channels between North and South Korea were blocked following several incidents of conflict. Under these circumstances, the Olympic Games became the only premise for Talks between North and South Korea. In these Talks, the IOC became the mediator. The Roh’s South Korean regime produced the 7.7 statement, which included an innovative policy regarding North Korea. President Roh’s regime was established with the
promise of promoting national democratisation, and it was thus expected to display in that process, an achievement of peaceful relations between North and South Korea.

...... Regarding the ‘7.7.Statement’, Foreign minister Choi has explained that the North and South Korean relationship is not that of ‘one ethnie and two nation-states’ but of ‘one ethnie and two government system’. It is doubtful whether North Korea will accept and understand this. What we mostly want to mention as regards the unification is the German case and how they approved the ‘one ethnic group and two nation-states’ approach in the beginning......

(Hong-A 9, July, 1988)

Hankyoreh expressed clear sympathy for the failure of co-hosting the Games by using language such as the “absence of North Korea” as a “lost brother in the family festival”. Hankyoreh was relieved in some sense that the ‘Unification’ issue was raised in South Korean society through the debate about the Olympic Games. In other words, whether the purpose was achieved or not, the Olympic Games provided momentum for the unification of the two Koreas through an international sporting event (Hankyoreh 31, August, 1988-3).

Hankyoreh pointed out the political dimension of the Olympic Games could be have been used as a propaganda tool for Korean nationalism by questioning the reason why South Korea emphasised ‘ethnic identity’ without any real emphasis on the “political unification” of this Korean ‘ethnic’ nation (Hankyoreh 7, September, 1988). This implied that Hankyoreh had same aspirations of realising a ‘unified team’ or ‘co-hosting’ of the Games to promote the political unification of two Koreas.

The people who said the Olympics must be run with the spirit of sport instead of using politics have ended up using the Olympics for a political ceasefire which is ironic...... People use the term ‘ethnicity’ with ‘Festival of Ethnicity’ and ‘the foundation of the great achievement of ethnicity’. What does the South Korea mean by ‘ethnicity’?

(Hankyoreh 7, September, 1988)

The primordial nationalism of Korea was the dominant reason for justifying North Korea’s inclusion as a co-host of the Games. By contrast, South Korea did not use much of the rhetoric of ‘ethnic nationalism’ before the Olympic Games. The South Korean authorities might have been reluctant to concur with that type of primordial Korean nationalism, but were certainly more reluctant to co-host the Games. Dong-A and Hankyoreh naturally covered the issue of nationalism in Korea in a way which promoted the mood of a successful Olympic Games for the diaspora of Korean nationals who were due to visit Korea during the
Games as athletes and spectators. Consequently, Korean nationalism became a news topic as illustrated in the following article of Dong-A.

The number of Korean-Chinese, who visited South Korea during the 24th Seoul Olympics, the biggest event in South Korean history, has increased……These people knew that their home country had developed sufficiently to host the Olympics but could not come and meet their family who had been left in South Korea due to the ‘wall of ideology’.

(Dong-A 20, September, 1988)

Based on the non-political clauses of the 7.7 statements, Dong-A expressed an expectation of an increase in the interactions between students from North and South Korea after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The areas of interaction announced by the Minister of Culture and Education of South Korea were rather vague as it indicated that the ‘non-political’ range of activities was broadened to incorporate ‘sport’ and ‘culture’. Therefore, the declaration itself along with the Olympics became the impetus for the development of North and South Korean non-political relations.

After the ’88 Games, interactions between students from North and South Korea will be promoted positively. Regarding this, a government officer said that an ‘Institute for Unification and Ministry of Culture and Education administrative officer has finished an investigation into the same after the ’88 Games. This is also a part of the ’7.7 Statement’ which advocates the interaction in non-political activities by the people who are in cultural areas such as artists and athletes.

(Dong-A 29, September, 1988)

Hankyoreh strongly expressed its sadness at the failure of the co-hosting proposal. Nevertheless, it admitted that the Olympic Games played a huge role in overcoming the ideological conflict among the people. This was achieved by highlighting the issues ‘of co-hosting’ and organising ‘A Korean Team’, despite the previous animosity of North and South Korea toward each other (Hankyoreh 3, October, 1988-1). Hankyoreh emphasised the role of the Olympic Games in “reconciling the conflict and confirming a national identity for unification”. Thus, the fundamental belief was that the symbolic scene of national unity would affect people’s motivations towards unification in line with the lessons learnt from previous Olympic Games in which the East and West German teams had participated. This article clearly confirmed what Hankyoreh wanted to promote through the Games.

North and South Korea had considered the Olympic Games an essential process to overcoming a divided ideology through reconciliation and a confirming of national identity that would encourage unification……the East and West German case, in which
Dong-A concluded that the Seoul Olympic Games was "an opportunity for maximising national pride", observing that the Olympic Games had become a world celebration of ‘Nationalisms,’ which was represented by, for example, ‘Koreanism’, ‘Americanism’ and ‘Sovietism’. Dong-A commented that the Olympic Games were both an “opportunity and burden” for the South Korean regime. Thus political and economic development became an obligation for South Korea. The festival of ‘Nationalism’ could have been an ‘opportunity’, yet North Korea did not take advantage of this opportunity. However, though Dong-A acknowledged the role of the Olympic Games in promoting peoples’ national pride, it focused more on the ‘competitive’ character of this festival of nationalism, rather than the harmonious mood of international relations at this time (Dong-A 3, October, 1988).

During a meeting of North and South Korean representatives on 9th September, the North Korean representatives spoke proudly about the successful hosting of their own international festival (held at the same time as the Seoul Games), with more than a million foreign participants. His South Korean counterpart responded that the Seoul Olympic Games was also successful, but he expressed a wistful sense of loss at North Korea’s absence. The North Korean representatives replied that the Olympic Games might be recognised as an international success, but it couldn’t be described as ‘perfect’ since a ‘family’ member had been absent. Thus, North and South Korea still recognised each other as ‘family’ from a nationalistic perspective. It was however ironic to see both claim to be ‘family’ while still being unable to agree on the ‘family organising’ of this event. Even though North Korea did not participate in the Seoul Olympic Games, this became the first step in establishing a new North and South Korean sports relationship. Since then, several changes have taken place in the international sport arena through the gatherings of the people of North and South Korea. That was how the Olympic Games led to the transformation of society and to
changes in peoples’ perceptions. The following article highlights these changes in the interactions among sportsmen and women and shows that this was a unique outcome of the sport interactions. The article also provides an insight into the Unification policy-making process, in relation to what the two Koreas actually tried to achieve through the ‘Unification’.

A friendly meeting of the North and South Korean sports people – ‘Even just a while ago, the North and South Korean sports people avoided each other when they met at international competitions or at coaching conferences. Recently, however, they stayed at the same hotel, and had meals at the same table. They also pointed out each other’s strong and weak points and cheered each other when they were competing against foreign players…….The Director of Gymnastics Association Chung said ‘We naturally get along; for example, a North Korean referee smiled at us at the restaurant. I have known this North Korean referee since 1984, but we did not share greetings. But this time we shared our friendship, and even talked about how husbands are cheating [their wives]…….’

(Dong-A 6, January, 1989)

Even though the co-hosting of the Games had failed, North and South Korea expressed and confirmed their ethnic nationalism in discussions. This ‘clear’ shared notion of nationalism promoted a certain expectation of unity between North and South Korea. Other than that, the diplomatic relations of both blocks were enhanced through the Games. North and South Korea re-established diplomatic contact and made plans to cooperate. Obviously, this sudden openness towards each other brought about some confusion in South Korean society. Greater clarity was needed on issues relating to regulations and their interpretation, particularly those relating to contact with the North Korean people.

Next follows a series of stories from North Korea. For example, even just a year ago it would have been impossible for such a variety of North Korean products to be sold in South Korean shops…….While changes in relations within the Communist bloc were attributed to the Olympics, issues such as the potential for North Korea to co-host the Olympics, their participation in the Games and the ‘unification’ of both countries became public issues in North Korea and were topics of discussion in the Students’ movement……. In South Korea, this led to a questioning of ideology albeit with some degree of confusion and chaos…….There was thus a political softening on the part of North Korea which, essentially, had a mixed reaction in South Korea…….

(Dong-A 12, January, 1989)

Despite the agreement on ethnic nationalism, Dong-A claimed that North Korea had a hidden agenda in suggesting the formation of ‘A Korean Team’. Thus, Dong-A did not agree with the notion of ethnic nationalism, even though ‘A Korean Team’ could be a symbolic realisation of national unity.

…….Despite the positive outcome forecast for the North and South Korean Sports Talks, there is also need for precaution. Ostensibly, the North Korean suggestion for a unified
team rooted in sport diplomacy and was intended as a peace-making gesture. However the aim was to achieve greater mileage for its political propaganda. (Dong-A 6, March, 1989)

Using the notion of realising the ethnic nationalism of Korea, Hankyoreh expressed the idea that no matter how much the Seoul Olympic Games was valued; it was nevertheless, ‘half’ of the Olympic Games to Koreans (Hankyoreh 31, January, 1990). This showed the specific priority of Hankyoreh with respect to sports relations between North and South Korea. It certainly reflected nationalistic positions of Hankyoreh. The paper supported the co-hosting of the Olympic Games, taking the view that this was promoting peace-making within the Korean Peninsula and it indicated that this was in line with the views of the Korean people. Hankyoreh was persistent in its support for ethnic nationalism between the two Koreas in sports. The political usage of sports was, thus, strongly emphasised (Hankyoreh 3, February, 1990). Hankyoreh characterised the result of the Seoul Olympic Games as a failure, in terms of their effect on national unity - it was described as a ‘heart-breaking memory’ for the Korean people (Hankyoreh 19, September, 1990). Thus, Hankyoreh put the Korean people’s identity and the unity of the two Koreas as a top priority for the international sporting event to achieve. Hankyoreh explained that the long term “success in the hosting of the Games” would be a “transformation of North Korea”. Thus, one of the intended effects of sport interactions was to encourage an open North Korean regime. Hankyoreh admitted ‘soft power’ was the way to achieve public diplomacy.

......After the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympic Games and the rapid changes to the political order, it (North Korea) showed the effort needed to transform the previous attitude and to become accustomed to changes in external circumstances. (Hankyoreh 9, July, 1994)

5.4 The 1990 Beijing Asian Games

5.4.1 The Issues for the Talks for Organising ‘A Korean Team’ for the Games
Discussion about organising ‘A Korean Team’ became ‘routine’ in North and South Korean sports relations. Particularly so for major International sporting events, such as the Olympic
Games and the World Cup, which were held regularly under the governance of the IOC and FIFA. Therefore, these international sporting events provided the grounds for a discussion on establishing ‘a unified team’. North Korea could not easily ignore the opportunity of this sports-based platform, and thus proposed a unified North and South Korean team for the Asian Games, even though the North had previously refused to participate in the Seoul Olympic Games. Hankyoreh suggested that South Korea should accept North Korea’s proposal in order to have another chance to discuss the setting up of ‘a unified team’ during the Asian Games (Hankyoreh 23, December, 1988). The attitude of North Korea during these discussions was one that was closely related to maintaining the façade of real and substantial negotiations, i.e. ‘Playing the game of engaging in Talks so as not to lose face’ by keeping the ‘fundamental principle’ and ‘logic’ rather than actual progress through the Talks or negotiations. In the following article, however, Hankyoreh uses the failure to organise ‘a unified team’ to highlight the faults in North Korea’s elaboration of the ‘One Cho-Sun’ Logic. Just like North Korea, Hankyoreh was concerned about the symbolic entity of Korea and its realisation in the sporting field. Hankyoreh defined ‘a unified team’ as potentially the ‘monument of unification’ and a symbolic realisation of the unification as a national hope.

......Once a Unified Team is formed, North and South Korea will become one symbolic entity and both countries will be represented together for the first time since their division. And this will be a great monument for unification which is a national wish......This can be analysed as North Korea recognising that the Unified Team is an important step to aid in recovering from the damage of the Seoul Olympic Games and an initiative of peace and diplomatic opening for the ‘One Cho Sun’ logic......

(Hankyoreh 5, January, 1989-2)

Hankyoreh talked about the expectation of organising 'a unified team', since it believed that the prefatory procedures for this could become a great opportunity to help achieve a mutual understanding between the two Koreas and to rebuild the broken bridges between the two peoples. Hankyoreh emphasised that the construction of the ‘we’ identity is a key issue in the reconciliation of North and South Korea.

......There are many obstacles on the path to organising a Unified Team, indeed, as many as the expectations for the Unified Team......If both parties agree on the basic elements, then the North and South Korean sport interactions can be continued until
the Unified Team is established. Through this process, players will escape from the prior perceptions of conflict, and can construct the identity of ‘We’……

(Hankyoreh 8, January, 1989-1)

From the South Korean perspective, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was successful in terms of achieving a new level of international recognition. South Korea showed its enhanced diplomatic and economic relations with socialist countries at the ANOC (Association of National Olympic Committee) session in Vienna. This forced North Korea to seriously consider the potentially significant diplomatic impact of the ‘Sports Talks initiative’. Hence the North Korean proposal to organise ‘a unified team’ for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, in which it had to participate since China was the host nation. In the international relations context, North Korea had struggled with the boycott of the Seoul Olympic Games and other controversial issues. Dong-A claimed that using sports as the basis for diplomatic exchanges between North and South Korea was the easiest method by which to re-establish relations from many perspectives.

If we consider that there were appreciations and congratulations for the success of the Seoul Olympic Games in ANOC (Assembly of National Olympic Committee) in Vienna, North Korea could no longer deny that they were in a tight corner vis-a-vis their international status. This was due to the lack of moral justification for their decisions. One further significant point to note is that North Korea’s proposal of establishing a Unified Team for the Beijing Asian Games and the resulting sport interchange that it would entail is the simplest in procedural terms. Other Talks such as the Red Cross Talks took a long time to yield results. ‘But a sport interchange is always possible when both sides are in agreement.’

(Dong-A 22, December, 1988-1)

Nevertheless, Dong-A identified the negative aspects of organising a ‘Unified Team’ for the two Koreas for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games as a lack of time and a hidden agenda that underpinned North Korea’s suggestion (Dong-A 30, December, 1988). However, as stated in the aforementioned article, the cooperation between North and South Korea with regards to sports could be different. The South Korean regime’s lack of will with regards to the cooperation of North and South Korean sport is reflected in Dong-A’s article, which covers the case of the “Ministry of Sport” disapproving a research trip to investigate the East and West German cases. The reason given was an “issue about the validity of this project”. However this was an unusual decision since the South Korean Sport Association was a partner in the sport interactions between North and South Korea. They appealed on the
grounds that they wanted to investigate the details of the German case in order to see how it could be applied to North and South Korea.

The Ministry of Sports had not approved the South Korean Sport Association’s plan which was to send three people to Germany to investigate the East and West German Talks in order to help them prepare for the North and South Korean Sports Talks. The Ministry of Sports took issue with the validity of this project, and refused to prepare a budget.

(Dong-A 19, January, 1989)

Dong-A admitted that the attitude of the South Korean regime was affected by the ‘rigid foreign policy of the USA towards North Korea. Even though Dong-A was not a supporter of North and South Korean cooperation, its stance shows the level of concern about “foreign intervention in national issues”. In issues relating to North and South Korean relations, the intervention of ‘a foreign actor’ became the one point where both parties reached agreement.

On the other hand, there is a powerful opinion that the underlying reason for the hesitation of South Korea in progress its policy towards North Korea is the worries of the USA about expanding North Korean influence towards South Korea. In. Indeed, President Bush of the USA, who will visit South Korea on 27th will deliver this opinion to President Roh concerning the direction and speed of the North’s policy……And this may become a dangerous situation involving a national issue being solved by a foreign power.

(Dong-A 21, February, 1989)

While the fever of the Olympic Games was growing domestically, the international impact of the Olympic Games was also growing. It was at this moment that North Korea proposed its Talks for organising ‘a unified team’. The official Talks for organising ‘a unified team’ of both Koreas for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games were held a total of nine times on the Northern and Southern sides of Panmunjom. The first Talks were held on the 9th of March in 1989 and five more sets of Talks took place in the same year. There were two more Talks in the following January and the last one was held on 7th February 1990. The staging of these Talks was suggested by the president of the North Korean NOC, by sending a letter to the president of the South Korean NOC to have discussions about ‘a unified team’ for the Games. The summary of the Talks, which was written by the Ministry of Unification of the South Korean government, contained several allusions to North and South Korean sports issues, and were closely aligned to political issues as well (which also could be termed ‘diplomatic’ matters).
In the summary of the Talks, South Korea expressed strong doubts about North Korea’s motives. South Korea claimed that North Korea was responsible for the distrust between the two, as evidenced by its uncooperative attitude in prior Talks. From another point of view, as South Korea confessed from the beginning, the Talks started with very little confidence of achieving beneficial harmony with North Korea. This was clearly a self-contradicting logic for justifying the Talks by South Korea, when it had already accepted the proposal of these Talks. The distrust between North and South Korea originated from the tragic Korean War, which started on June 25th 1950. South Korea argued that this war began as a result of the invasion staged by the North Korean army to ‘liberate’ South Korea from suppression by the US imperialists’. If North and South Korea respected each other’s political ideology after Korea became independent from Japan on 15th August 1945 and parted peacefully or not parted, the hatred and scars of North and South Korea would not be that deep and complicated. Since the two Koreas had experienced combat between themselves historically, there was always a coexistence of love and hatred, which was associated with a strong ethnic sentiment. Consequently, the Korean peninsula became an icon for an ideological conflict of the Cold War. The atmosphere of détente could not be reached easily, since the cease-fire treaty between North Korea and the US was not permanent. Realistically, North and South Korea are still in the middle of a war, and their distrust of each other is natural, even in the sports arena. The ‘Unification’ issue is particularly significant in divided nations, and it became apparent in North and South Korean relations. This was because that the dominant notion of ethnic nationalism clearly defined political ‘Unification’ as the goal of the
nation. Although North and South Korea identified themselves as of one ethnicity and had a national desire for unification, the procedure of ‘Unification’ could not be agreed upon easily.

According to the summary of the Talks, the statement made by South Korea was devoted mostly to what South Korea would do to reach a cooperative result from these Talks. With its passive attitude of hopelessness to the Talks, it absolved itself from blame. ‘A unified team’ discussion started with the decision of the team title, flag, anthem and selection of players. It presented, in highly figurative discourses, the breach between the two Koreas, in terms of different interpretations of the meaning of ‘a unified team’. As an anthem of the team, North and South Korea agreed on the 1920 version of ‘Arirang’, which was sung by Koreans before the country divided. Indeed, this was a relatively easy issue to be resolved since it was based on a shared history as one nation and was part of their common culture. ‘Arirang’ is one of the symbolic Korean folk songs, and contains unique emotions of Korean ethnicity.

To understand the relationship between the two Koreas and Korean nationalism, it is necessary to broaden one’s focus on Korean history, which includes the period of Japanese colonialism. Koreans felt a strong attachment to this traditional song, since it described loss, travail, and self-affirmation even amidst Japanese brutality. Therefore, it was no wonder that the 1920 version of this song was chosen as the theme song of ‘a unified team’.

‘Arirang, Arirang, A-ra-ri yo, (we are) Climbing up to the Arirang hill,
My love that has left me
His feet will be injured before he reaches to 4 km…

In addition, both Koreas roughly agreed on the criteria for selecting the participants, namely choosing the best performing players for a unified team. However, they realised that there could be ‘different’ interpretations of this principle. Dong-A provides details of the selection process for players from each side. This had become a critical concern to the players in terms of their career; as they would be representing their nation. Both Koreas had their own competitive strengths in different sports, and the selection procedure varied with each sport.

And they agreed on the anthem (the 1920s version of Arirang), which was suggested by North Korea…. Concerning the athletes’ selection procedure, players will participate in a joint training camp first. Each player’s record during practice will then
be used to gauge their competence. For games that use a scoring system, a public competition involving foreign teams will be held. For team sports and sports of a combative nature, the skills of the players will be observed during practice. This process thus guarantees a balanced approach to selecting players from both nations. (Dong-A 9, March, 1989-2)

Hankyoreh represented North Korea’s views, which was consistent in its requests for ‘a unified team’, thereby placing it in direct opposition with South Korea’s ‘two Koreas’ policy (Hankyoreh 10, March, 1989-3). The discussions surrounding this perception and the issue of unification will be detailed later, but certainly, Hankyoreh understood the intention of North Korea’s proposal.

The following figure shows the initial suggestion from both sides during the first Talks. Although the themes and issues look similar, this can be attributed to their broad and general scope. The real problems of the Talks lay in the practical details if how to reach the goals.

**[Table 5.2] The Suggestion from Both Sides (The 1st Talks)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 11th Beijing Asian Games North and South Korean Unified Team organising, participation</td>
<td>The 11th Beijing Asian Games Unified Team participation organising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>KOREA. The North and South Korean Unified Team (Nam Book Dan II team, 남북 단일팀)</td>
<td>KORYO. (Abb. KRY. Koryo Team, Ko Ryo Sun Su Dan, 고려 선수단)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag</td>
<td>White background. Green Korean Peninsula, KOREA at the bottom</td>
<td>White background, brown Korean peninsula, KORYO at the bottom in blue or red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthem</td>
<td>Arirang</td>
<td>Arirang 1920 version</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Player selection**

1. Best from North and South Korea
2. Exchange matches for the selection
3. A selection competition from Each side more than 1 time

**Player selection and practice time**

As soon as possible through joint discussions

**Director and staff**

1. Dependent on player numbers, president
2. Fewer number of players, vice president
3. Greater number, director, less number, coach

1. One person from each for all staff
2. Following the OCA charter, but keep the balance of North and South Korea
During the second round of the Talks, both Koreas progressed to the issues of designing a team flag in the shape of the Korean peninsula, in a sky blue colour. These symbolic images represented a unified team and are closely linked to Korean ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism clearly had a significant influence on the success of decisions at the Talks.

[Table 5.3] The 1\textsuperscript{st} – 9\textsuperscript{th} North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 1\textsuperscript{st} – 9\textsuperscript{th} North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the 90’ Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Korean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM BOOK DAN IL TIM- Unified Team of North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KO RYO – originates from Korea, name of the dynasty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KORYO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

North Korea prepared the 1920s version of the Arirang as an anthem of ‘a unified team’. There was no specific reason for South Korea to disagree with North Korea’s choice of this particular song. Hankyoreh commented that the song carried the typical emotions of the Korean people (Hankyoreh 29, March, 1989-4). In contrast to the decision of the anthem choice for a unified team, which was easily agreed to on the basis of ethnic nationalism, the decision of the title for the ‘unified team’ was more sensitive since it was interwoven with the political and diplomatic views of North and South Korea. South Korea wanted to use ‘Nam Book Dan IL Tim’ as the Korean name for the team. This was a direct translation of ‘Unified Team of South Korea and North Korea’. And for the English name for the team, South Korea expressed a preference for ‘KOREA’. North Korea proposed ‘KORYO’ as the team name in both Korean, and in English. Both Koreas had thus settled on a slightly different English name for the team. In doing so, they both borrowed from a name derived from the unified Korean ethnic dynasty, ‘KORYO’. The modern name ‘KOREA’ is derived from the name, ‘KORYO’ as explained previously. What decisively differentiated North Korea from South Korea was the fundamental difference between ‘KORYO’ and ‘NAM BOOK DAN IL TIM’, the Korean titles proposed for the unified team. North Korea consistently identified with the
notion of ethnic nationalism; however, South Korea reflected separate entities within the title of the unified team. This variation reflected their differing views towards political unification as well. During the second round of the Talks, South Korea approved the Korean title as ‘KORYO’, insisting, however, on the use of ‘KOREA’ as the English name for the team.

As shown in the following articles, the tension between the two Koreas made it difficult to predict how ‘a unified team’ would be organised until it was actually confirmed. However, Dong-A believed in the potential and uniqueness of the impact of sport which was illustrated by the successful ‘Ping Pong diplomacy’ as it was in the relations between the ‘East and West German’. Dong-A was clear that one role of the Olympic Games was as a way to achieve ‘peace’ in international relations (Dong-A 20, March, 1989). The first barrier to organising a unified team of North and South Korea was the title of the team in English. At this point, it was not anticipated that South Korea’s proposal to use ‘Korea’ as the English name would be acceptable to North Korea. Nevertheless, ‘Korea’ was decided as the name of ‘a unified team’. North Korea’s approval of the name was a turning point in the Sports Talks (Dong-A 29, March, 1989).

With these positive signs in sport interactions between the two Koreas, Dong-A predicted that Pastor Moon’s North Korean visit would not affect the second round of Sports Talks, which were scheduled for March 28th. However, since his visit was not legally approved, sanctions were predicted after his return to South Korea. The ‘Law of National Security’ in South Korea was controversial, particularly on the matter relating to North Korea. Thus, the decision to arrest Moon was fully dependent on the will of the South Korean regime. At the time, the dominant discourse of the South Korean regime on North Korean policy was one of anti-communism. Thus, the incident involving Moon became a ‘political sensation’ for the South Korean regime. Pastor Moon was a famous leader of the Korean national unification movement. He was previously an independence movement fighter against Japanese colonialism. The second round of Talks was held on March 28th as planned. However, North
Korea criticised pastor Moon’s arrest and postponed the third round of Talks by three months. This case was directly against the notion of ‘Sport and Politics being separate issues in North and South Korean relations’. It was revealed that sports lacked independence from political intervention, particularly in the areas of the Cold War conflict like that between North and South Korea, which symbolised a wider ideological conflict. Along with this, nationalism found its most powerful expression in sport, and political decisions could be presented at sporting venues as well. Pastor Moon gave an interview to Hankyoreh. He chose Hankyoreh to deliver his comments unbiased to both Korean audiences. Hankyoreh delivered the words from Kim Il Sung as narrated by Moon.

……What does he (Kim Il Sung) think about ‘A Korean Team’?……He absolutely agreed with that……

(Hankyoreh 7, April, 1989)

In addition to delivering Kim Il Sung’s ideas to South Korea, North Korea complained about South Korea’s decision to arrest pastor Moon. In one sense it seemed right to question why visiting a ‘partner’ (who South Korea called ‘family’ because of the same ethnicity) became a crime that warranted arrest. This question became the justification for the redefining of North and South Korean relations.

……North Korea blaming South Korea for its arrest of pastor Moon reflects the South Korean view of North Korea as an enemy rather than a partner. They thus postponed the Talks. South Korea responded by stating that North Korea was intervening in domestic issues and ‘Using Pastor Moon by hiring a jet and taking him to Pyongyang for political propaganda purposes’. Therefore, North Korea has to take responsibility for the relations deteriorating……

(Hankyoreh 19, April, 1989-2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.4</th>
<th>The 1st – 9th North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content</strong></td>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>North Korea unilaterally postponed the third round of Talks which was planned to be held on the 18th of April 1989 to the 18th of July 1989, blaming South Korea of taking the legal action against Pastor Ik Whan Moon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third round of Talks, which was scheduled to be held on the 18th of April, 1989, was ‘unilaterally’ cancelled by North Korea, because of the judicial treatment of pastor Moon Ik Hwan who had visited North Korea without the permission of the South Korean government. North Korea argued that this amounted to political suppression. This political incident directly affected the North-South Korean Sports Talks. Dong-A illustrated the different aspects of North Korea’s request to postpone the Talks. Dong-A inferred that the reason for requesting the delay was North Korea’s motivation to host the World Student Youth Festival successfully, since there would be many students from all over the world, including South Korea. Later, this became another reason for blaming South Korea because a female student, Yim, was arrested for participating in this festival without approval from the South Korean government. Nevertheless, the direct reason for postponing the Talks was Pastor Moon’s arrest. South Korea could handle this issue without postponing the Talks by treating it in a flexible manner.

The South Korean regime did not intend to make the Talks more productive. Moreover, the postponement of the Talks was not accepted by South Korea. South Korea had prior negative experiences with North Korea wherein the latter failed to apologise for several political incidents on which South Korea had specifically asked for apologies with the excuse that the issues were not relevant to sport. The position this time was different and South Korea asked North Korea not to drag political issues into the sports Talks. Dong-A cited the comments of a South Korean government official as follows.

*Our head of representation Chang sent a telegram to North Korea on the morning of 15th, that the 3rd Talks were planned on 18th which was suggested by North Korea as not proper since North Korea’s political conspiracy was not removed. And he added that ‘Now, North Korea regrets that they lead these Talks into a corner by making a connection between this and the other matter which is not relevant to these Talks. We sincerely hope to discuss the forming of Unified Team from North and South Korea soon.’*

(Dong-A 15, July, 1989)

Even Dong-A pointed out that it could not agree with the attitude of the South Korean regime towards the Sports Talks. Some reporters expressed the wish that South Korea should
reflect more unambiguously its support for the concept of ethnic nationalism in terms of applying the Koreans' unity policy. The South Korean regime's rationale for its reluctance to participate in the Talks with North Korea was revealed in the following article.

*Of course, North Korea cast a chill over the North and South Korean Sports Talk......I do understand our point that 'we cannot trust them' since North Korea has broken the first promise - 'let's reach a good conclusion, just consider sports between sport people' - and then they revealed their political motivation......*

(Dong-A 10, August, 1989)

Hankyoreh interpreted the absence of North Korea in the Seoul Olympic Games as an event that revealed the discord between the two Koreas and one that eventually affected the attitude of South Korea to further cooperation with North Korea. Hankyoreh drew two conclusions on why the South Korean people did not celebrate the anniversary of the Seoul Olympic Games. The first is that the Seoul Olympic Games was not hosted for populist motives. The other was that the cost for these Games became a great debt to the economy. Fundamentally, this could be understood as a criticism of the non-democratic decision making process in the bidding for, and hosting of, the Olympics.

*......After the Olympics, the voice of national unity was transformed into discord, thus the 'positive' expectation that Olympic fever would act as an impetus for national development has failed......*

(Hankyoreh 12, September, 1989-2)

Dong-A admitted that the matter of democracy is related to the active North and South Korean relations. If South Korea had strong appealed to a sense of nationalism as a way of supporting North and South Korea relations, it would be more easily that domestic democratisation accomplished based on this mutual understanding of different political ideologies. Thus, the democratisation of South Korea was closely related to a change in perspectives towards North Korea, with a transformational shift away from the view of North Korea as an enemy.

In the following article, an officer of South Korea reveals that the South Korean administration was not committed to reopening the Talks for a 'Unified Team' since South Korea thought that it would not be fruitful. While South Korea foresaw that it would be difficult to draw any productive result from the 'Unified Team' discussions, the interactions among
the sports people in the international sport arena had a positive stance on the issue. This reflects the possibility that there might be a ‘valuable trial’ after several ‘failed’ Talks, since the Talks affected the North and South Korean people who competed with each other at sporting events. It made people start seeing each other not only as former ‘enemies’ but also as ‘partners’ in the near future. With the uncertainty surrounding the establishment of the ‘Unified Team’, North and South Korea’s intentions of peaceful relations would have influenced the actual encounter between their respective sportsmen in the field. Dong-A described the scene at the North and South Korean players gathering in the 5th Asian Women’s Volleyball Championship where they had drinks together. This scene could be interpreted as reflecting the strengthening of the bond between the two Koreas. Nevertheless, the South Korean sport officer was still negative about the ‘Unified Team’ but excused his view by reference to sporting criteria, arguing that a unified team would not be that beneficial to the performance of the athletes in the long run (Dong-A 14, October, 1989).

The North Korean Director of Sport suggested that a brighter future for the Korean people should be considered in the discussion of ‘a Unified Team’. He confidently stated that these Talks could have been concluded in two months if North and South Korea shared a fundamental ‘patriotism’ for Korea. In the following article of Dong-A, North Korea changed the title of ‘a unified team’ from ‘Unification Team’ (Tong li Team in Korean) to ‘the only team of North and South Korea’ (Nam Book Yu Il Team in Korean). Given this change, it appeared that North Korea sensed the reluctance of South Korea to use the term ‘Unification’ during the Talks to organise ‘a unified team’. Thus North Koreans changed the term to ‘the only team’, which incorporates the meaning that North Korea implied by using the term of ‘Unification’. As the article stated ‘On the other hand’, the notion of ‘Unification’ could become the gap between North and South Korea, and against Dong-A’s position on the matter.

On the other hand, the North Korean director Kim said that ‘let’s escape from the conflict situation of North and South Korea in the matter of making ‘the only team of
Hankyoreh argued that “sport was more persuasive than politics”. An identical view was promoted in North Korea in Roh-Dong, which emphasised the ‘symbolic meaning’ of a unified team as opposed to ‘Political Unification’ itself. Hankyoreh highlighted “actual sporting interactions” such as football matches as showing how actual contact between North and South Korean people is important (Hankyoreh 20, October, 1989-1).

The South Korean people demanded more effort from the South Korean regime in the Sports Talks, specifically, by not bringing political issues, such as those of Pastor Moon and Ms Yim’s visit to North Korea without South Korea’s legal permission, to the table. The initial clue for interpreting the South Korean people’s wish of active cooperation with North Korea was provided by the peoples’ request to the South Korean regime to continue with the sports Talks despite these political issues. Thus, the tone of Dong-A had changed from previous occasions when its contents were inspected by the South Korean dictatorship regime which had an anti-North Korea stance.

On the other hand, there were criticisms of our side for the lack of effort on the Talks in the matter of a ‘team name’ and ‘the speed of progress’, since North Korea has shown a relatively positive attitude to these 3rd Talks without mentioning Pastor Moon or Ms Yim.

(Dong-A 21, October, 1989)

The South Korean regime intended to sum up the discussions in as simple a manner as possible in order to avoid pressure from the people of the two Koreas. Hankyoreh criticised South Korea, which started the discussions by first setting a deadline. This could be considered a way of speeding up the Talks. North Korea, on the other hand, focused on the ‘meaning’ of the Talks from which it wished to achieve ‘national benefits’ by overcoming the context of the conflict. Hankyoreh identified the more appropriate attitude to achieving ‘a unified team’.

The South Korean representative Chang suggested, in a key note speech, that ‘There are only 8 months left till the Games, so let’s finish the organisation of the team by 20th June 1990 and let’s select the players in as balanced a manner as possible’……and the North Korean representative Kim said that ‘Let’s think of the organisation of the
South Korea wanted to start small interactions with North Korea, before it making any joint agreement on the fundamental principles for organising ‘a unified team’. It was understood that organising a team would be the result of various interactions based on frequent cooperation between the two Koreas. This indirectly indicated that the interactions between North and South Korea could be difficult to start. However, North Korea wanted to establish the team to overcome the image of ‘Two Cho Sun’. This was why North Korea was dedicated in realising the symbolic meaning as the North and South Korean joint representatives of the team. Hankyoreh identifies the fundamental differences of these two approaches in the following article.

They both agreed that the ‘team’ is what we should concentrate on, but the fundamental difference is that South Korea has focused on the North and South Korean interactions and North Korea has focused on the symbolic meaning of organising the team……

The date for the fourth round of Sports Talks was not settled easily due to the ‘absurd’ reason of the South Korean representative, who insisted that a private matter was more important than a national issue. It could be understood that the South Korea’s regime did not know how to approach North Korea in a manner that would produce a better result; rather South Korea simply identified matters that they could insist on. If this was not the case, it could be perceived that South Korea had a mind not to respond positively to progress in the Talks.

When North Korea’s representative, Kim announced the date for Talks as 2nd, Nov. The representative Chang requested a change to 22nd, Nov. (since it was the anniversary of his university). North Korea’s Kim stated that ‘a national matter cannot be delayed due to a private issue’……therefore the date for the next Talks has been set as 16th Nov……

Hankyoreh held the view of a ‘Nationalist’ and encouraged both North and South Korea to make compromises for a unified team for the Beijing Asian Games. Hankyoreh gave multiple interpretations of the meaning. It mentioned the people of ‘Korea’ who lived in China, and imagined the scene of singing ‘Arirang’ together with them, which highlighted the ethnic
nationalism of Korea (Hankyoreh 22, October, 1989). Thus, here, the organising of a team by Korean representatives was not only a matter for North and South Korea. Rather, it had a symbolic meaning of unity for Koreans around the world.

The South Korean NOC forced the representatives for the Talks to obtain North Korea’s confirmation of a ‘separate participation’ at the Beijing Games, if the Talks did not go well. This request made apparent the view that South Korea was not committed enough to participating in the Games as ‘a unified team’ as it was seen to be preparing for the failure of the Talks. Moreover, South Korea did not try to hide its intentions. Hankyoreh told its readers that the “South Korean NOC’s suggestion could be a bomb which shook these Talks to their roots” and “implied a negative result of the Talks from the beginning”, It revealed that the South Korean regime “did not expect much progress in these Talks” (Hankyoreh 12, November, 1989).

Hankyoreh evaluated the result of the Sports Talks as being simultaneously bright and dark. The agreements were a great achievement, but they were a product of nationalism. All these Talks and sporting interactions between North and South Korea were ultimately related to the discussion of unification. Thus, it was questionable whether the result of the Talks, such as the anthem, flag and title of the team, would relate to the long term discussions between North and South Korea. Nationalistic ‘pro-unification’ position of Hankyoreh was expressed clearly (Hankyoreh 17, November, 1989-3). Hankyoreh consistently approved the role and effectiveness of using sporting events for the North and South Korean relations. Based on this belief, the paper advised the South Korean representative to consider both North and South rather than focusing solely on ‘our side’ during the Sports Talks.

Sport has a strong function to unite people, unlike politics and economics. We have already seen the emotional scenes in which the North and South Korean people become one on the sport field......The North and South Korean Sports Talks representatives must lead these Talks to success by considering their entire ethnicity rather than ‘our side’......

(Hankyoreh 19, November, 1989)
The appointment of the director who represented ‘a unified team’ became an issue since the position itself had the symbolic meaning of representing a unified Korea (Hankyoreh 24, Nov. 1989). Therefore, this would not be solved simply through a nationalistic approach. Whether two people represented ‘a team’ from each side in turns, or one person was selected based on agreements from both sides was different. Moreover, this case could become an example for other forms of representation in cases, such as the UN, which would have to deal with membership issues relating to North and South Korea.

North and South Korea discussed the date for the sixth round of the sports Talks, which came to a conclusion when North Korea compromised fully. It clearly showed that South Korea did not attempt to make any concessions for the progress of the Talks. The change in South Korea’s attitude since the Seoul Olympic Games was not that surprising, since South Korea did not need North Korea’s cooperation.

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......The North and South Korean representatives debated for one hour and a half for the date of the 6th Talks and they reached an agreement when North Korea accepted South Korea’s argument......
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(Hankyoreh 25, November, 1989-1)

Hankyoreh highlights the contrasting positions of North and South Korea concerning the attitude towards participation in the Talks. Even South Korea admitted that North Korea was relatively more sincere and positive in the Talks than South Korea. Hankyoreh pointed this out to encourage South Korean representatives to become more actively involved in the Talks and achieve a better result for the Korean nation (Hankyoreh 2, December, 1989-2). It looked like the South Korean official was performing his diplomatic duties with North Korea’s ally, the USSR.

The South Korean regime’s consideration of the international context was revealed in the following article.

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......The problem is South Korea’s attitude on which they don’t wish to compromise......The officer of the Ministry of Sport said that ‘We have delivered all the arguments to the officer of the USSR and they agreed with our opinions. And they said that they couldn’t understand North Korea’s arguments......
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(Hankyoreh 16, December, 1989-2)
As the issues surrounding North and South Korea became more complicated, North Korea tried to implement ‘a unified team’ as evidence of the potential of sport to improve the relations with South Korean. That required compromises of North Korea even in political issues. Hankyoreh suggested that the compromises North Korea made in the Talks led to South Korea being ‘frustrated’ and it affected the ‘Northern Policy’ of the South Korean regime. Thus, the sport relationship between the North and South Korea was not only the product of the ‘Northern Policy’, but also the source of that policy (Hankyoreh 23, December, 1989-2). Hankyoreh also reported on the ridiculous attitude of the South Korean representatives during the Talks. One of the South Korean representatives, Cho actually complained about North Korea compromising its position ‘too much’.

……One of the representatives, Cho, said that ‘North Korea agreed on the proposal of South Korea without reading it’……and also had said that ‘How can North Korea agree on that so easily as there are many issues which couldn’t be solved during one year of discussions……’. South Korea, who used delaying tactics, was frustrated with the tactics of North Korea who gave the impression of rushing……. North Korea had accepted all the proposals of South Korea, but South Korea still didn’t agree that they had reached, an ‘agreement’ Instead, South Korea explained that this was just ‘closeness of opinion’…….North Korean reporters had expressed many opinions on Yim’s pictures and on the speech and South Korean reporters have taken pictures of them. Some of the lucky reporters who had received this calendar had to return this to the officers for the North and South Korean Talks……

(Hankyoreh 23, December, 1989-4)

When Ms Yim came back to the South Korea after her visit to Pyongyang for the World University Student Festival, South Korean reporters were blocked from reporting on this. South Korea considered invoking a severe anti-communism law for journalists who sought to contact North Korea. Even some reporters, who had by ‘luck’ obtained the aforementioned calendar containing Yim’s pictures, had to return it to South Korean inspectors who worked for the South Korean side of the DMZ (Demilitarised Zone) Peace Office. The South Korean representatives’ reaction towards the compromises made by North Korea can be seen as evidence of the complicated decision-making process of South Korea, which needed to consider the wider, international context, domestic regime, sportspersons’ voices and the general views of the South Korean people. The real intention of the South Korean Sport Federation, which reflected sports people’s ideas, was one wherein they did not want any negative influence brought to bear upon organising the unified team or national unity
(Hankyoreh 29, December, 1989). Even Dong-A argued that the ‘Unified Team’ could bring a clear recognition of Korea as one ethnic entity, and that this was in the national interest (Dong-A 22, December, 1989-2).

The ten fundamental principles were agreed in the discussions on organising ‘a unified team’ for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games. However, a South Korean representative requested North Korea to “guarantee to respect these principles” since South Korea distrusted North Korea and was concerned about North Korea disrupting the Talks (Dong-A 22, December, 1989-1). South Korea even asked for an additional regulation. North Korea responded that South Korea’s request was not justified. Nevertheless, Dong-A referred to South Korea as ‘our side’ and did not consider the “additional request” as being excessive.

……Our side suggested a draft of the agreement and included ten principles and additional regulations. However, it didn’t proceed as North Korea had an issue with the additional regulations……North Korea argued that the additional regulations were inadequate……

(Dong-A 10, January, 1990-1)

Within contrast to Dong-A, Roh-Dong expressed many requests and additional statements for success of the Talks. North Korea mentioned that it even agreed to South Korea’s postponement of the next meeting. Thus, if the Talks had been terminated, then it would not have been the fault of North Korea.

…… We have repeatedly asked South Korea to confirm the 10 principles related to the Unified Team. But South Korea claimed that it is not relevant to the organisation of the Unified Team. We had tried to reach an agreement with South Korea on the matter of the introduction, the guarantee statement and the day of starting the agreement……And we asked South Korea to have a sincere attitude for next time. We have suggested holding the next meeting on the 11th; however South Korea has insisted on the 15th, which we finally agreed on……

(Roh-Dong 11, Jan. 1990)

Roh-Dong blamed South Korea’s change of tone concerning the organising of ‘the only team’. North Korea believed that the South Korean regime did not have a strong motivation for organising ‘the only team’, but was just pretending that it did, with the intention of avoiding blame for the failure of the Talks. The evidence for this argument was revealed in contradicting of the interviews of the South Korean government officer and the President himself.
To interrupt organising the Unified Team for the Olympics is obviously because it is controlled by the Roh Tae Woo Regime. President Roh has advertised that they will solve the problem of organising the ‘Unified Team’, but on the same day of the administrative Talks, Roh’s staff showed a passive attitude to ruin the Talks. Roh’s regime looks positive on the issues, but they actually don’t want to have the ‘Unified Team’.

(Roh-Dong 14, Jan. 1990)

Another case in support of the argument that South Korea lacked any intention of establishing a unified team was the letter sent by South Korea to the IOC consulting on the matter of organising ‘the team’. North Korea argued that South Korea had abandoned the ‘simple’ way to solve the problem by ‘ourselves’ and had intentionally chosen a complicated way of asking a ‘third party’ to intervene in their bilateral discussions (Roh-Dong 16, Jan. 1990). The framework for viewing this Olympic issue was different between North and South Korea. North Korea’s view on this was that the matter should be decided between itself and South Korea, whereas South Korea considered this as an issue that needed permission or approval from the IOC.

[Table 5.5] The 1st – 9th North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation

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<td>The 1st – 9th North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation</td>
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<td>1989.03.09/03.28/10.20/11.16/11.24/12.22/ 1990.01.18/01.29/02.07</td>
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<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
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<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
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<td>Particularly, North Korea argued that, concerning the sending of a letter to the organising committee of Beijing Asian Games and OCA (the resolution of guarantee for unified team, as South Korea wanted to), ‘what can be done to secure this agreement if either of us fail to fulfil this, not allow them to participate as a separate team at the Games’. But, this is the exposure of North Korea’s motivation to obstruct South Korea’s separate participation’</td>
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Eventually, the principle suggested by South Korea for organising ‘a unified team’ led to a deadlock. North Korea insisted that responsibility for this deadlock lay with South Korea, which was trying not to organise ‘a unified team’. North Korea claimed that a genuine resolution for ‘a unified team’ should be based on a confirmation of participation in the Asian Games. South Korea interpreted this as an obstacle to participating in the Games separately on any condition set by North Korea. Actually, North Korea stated that it would not attend the Asian Games without organising ‘a unified team’. This could be interpreted either as a
suicidal tactic on the part of North Korea or a lack of endeavour on the part of South Korea in organising ‘a unified team’.

Table 5.6 The 1st – 9th North and South Korea Sports Talks, principle meeting for the ‘90 Beijing Asian Games Unified Team organising and participation-5

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The ninth round of Talks centred on the quarrels and blames of each other by both parties for various disagreements. Even the summary of the Talks drawn up by the South Korea government evidenced this. As shown above, both sides wanted to organise ‘a unified team’, and asked the other side to be cooperative. There was however a mutual distrust of one another. It was not appropriate to judge who was right and wrong in this case. It was rather the matter of identifying the differences between them and how large these differences were. In that sense, ‘a unified team’ was not just a one-off event of making ‘a Team’. It would rather become a mirror of the symbolic expectation of Koreans in future sporting events. Roh-Dong described the South Korean representatives’ attitude during the Talks. The South Korean representatives could not justify their excuses, and North Korean representatives pressed them for logical explanations on issues concerning the principles of the Talks. Roh-Dong argued that South Korea’s attitude to organising the ‘Unified Team’ was also a reflection of its attitude towards the political unification of the nation. This, therefore, became
the basis for North Korea blaming South Korea for the failure to establish ‘the team’. It further characterised this failure as a crime committed against the nation and Korean people (Roh-Dong 8, Feb. 1990).

On February 8th, 1990, just after the ninth round of Talks failed, Dong-A and Hankyoreh claimed that the ‘distrust’ between South Korea and North Korea was the reason for the Talks’ failure. Even though Dong–A wrote considerably more about the negative aspects of the Talks than Hankyoreh, the same cause of the failure was identified, viz., the suspicion between the North and South Korea. Since Hankyoreh had consistently supported the Talks, it minimised any negativity in its report. Hankyoreh blamed South Korea for the breakdown by commenting that “the safety-net regulation became a trap” (Hankyoreh 8, February, 1990). The additional safety-net regulation, which South Korea had requested in order to guarantee North Korea’s sincere attitude, was rejected by North Korea. In fact, as long as both Koreas focused on the main purpose of the discussions, the additional regulations might not have been necessary. Roh-Dong added that the comments made by South Korea during the Talks were aimed at propagating it’s the success of the “Northern Policy”.

……South Korean officers who pursue a permanent division of the Korean ethnie, from the beginning, were not interested in Unification or the One Team for Unification. They just tried to use the 11th Asian Games as propaganda for the Northern Policy. Under this, the government officers were ordered to not agree on the issue of organising the One Team……

(Roh-Dong 22, Feb. 1990)

Dong-A criticised the conduct of the South Korean government on its negotiations with North Korea and recommended that the South Korean government should have a strict mind-set on the matters that South Korea was supposed not to compromise. It emphasised a more careful approach towards opening a conversation with North Korea since North Korea had not approved of the Red Cross Talks which, in South Korea’s view, was the top priority. By contrast, Hankyoreh covered the full version of the statement on ‘arms reduction’ in the Korean peninsula and the peaceful unification that was signed by 312 South Korean
persons. This was a symbolic gesture that Hankyoreh used to represent the people who wanted to achieve the unification of the two Koreas, no matter what it took.

5.4.2 The Talks for Organising ‘A Korean Team’ for International Games

Hankyoreh forecast that both Ministers could have a meeting for the Beijing Games as a continuation of the North and South Korean presidential summit. It might have been easier for both regimes to solve substantial issues under a cooperative framework.

……The North and South Korean sports Talks will reopen at the Beijing Asian Games. The Minister of sport will start to talk again during the games and the mood will be quite good, since it follows the success of the presidential summit……

(Hankyoreh 19, September, 1990)

As the 1990 Beijing Asian Games approached, the hope of a symbolic unification through sports grew, and the people of both North and South Korea faced a situation where they would congregate as ‘Koreans’ in the sporting arena. A particular Korean, Cho Sun, who is from a minority community in China and who lived in the host city of the Games, Beijing, would play a part. Dong–A treated this issue as a symbol of ‘national unity’ rather than, political ‘unification’.

……In this team, around 500 Korean diaspora were included……and 4,000 Korean-Chinese would participate in the unified team……

(Dong-A 18, September, 1990-1)

International sporting events were well known for promoting nationalism, and nationalism was popular in the media, as it always gripped the public interest. Despite the different opinions of North and South Korea on unification, Dong-A produced a generous quantity of articles that encouraged Korean nationalism. These included topics associated with Japan, which showed that the Korean nationalism issue was not only related to North and South Korean unification, but was also a common feature of the Japanese colonial period. On September 18th, 1990, an article of Dong-A highlighted the attitude of a Japanese reporter, who wanted to know more about the relationship between North and South Korea. This reflected a change in positions compared to previous decades, when Japan reported relatively more on North Korean news than that of South Korea. The article called this the
“Japanese reporter’s privilege” (Dong-A 18, September, 1990-2). Consequently, this “Japanese reporter’s privilege” was considered to be potentially non-existent through the sharing of an ideal for the unification of North and South Korea. Korean nationalism could be the key to unification even though there were differences in the degree of responsiveness to the idea of unification.

During the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, the team players of North and South Korea, participated in the Games separately, and the public who supported both teams created a very harmonious scene.

......In the meantime, North Korea forecasted that organising a unified team will happen for the Beijing Asian Games, thus, they brought ‘the team’ flag which the North and South Korea had agreed on, to the Sports Talks for Beijing......

(Dong-A 19, September, 1990-3)

That mood was delivered through the media to all Koreans abroad. This might have affected sport governance in both North and South Korea. At the very least they could not ignore the people’s feelings about using this sporting event for the purpose of national unification. Finally, they organised time to discuss the arrangements of future events. Before the meeting, a ‘North and South Unification Football Match’ was identified as a topic to be discussed during the meeting. This was actually an exchange of football matches, and the title of the matches was to be decided later.

On September 20th, 1990, Dong-A simply considered this as a normal exchange event, and then published a column which expressed concern about North Korea’s motivation in agreeing to this event. Moreover, Dong-A was worried that this could be of benefit solely to North Korea. However, Hankyoreh provided a broader view of the symbolic unification of this experience. Therefore, it came to be expected that this would be a sign of advancement in the relations between the North and South Korea. On the following day, September 21st, 1990, a Hankyoreh column titled ‘Football Match as a stepping stone for the achievement of unification’ demonstrated the attitude of Hankyoreh towards unification and the diplomatic
role of sports. However, Dong-A betrayed an unfortunate suspicion in its article on the 22nd of September, when it reported on the negativity of the North Korean sports people regarding the agreement.

......However, Pyongyang’s [Unification event] was limited to the well fabricated playground and business on the Stage......the reason for the North Korea’s cold attitude to the Talks was that it was first frustrated by South Korea’s aggressive policy and the unilateral act of ‘football team's Pyongyang visit’......

(Dong-A 22, September, 1990)

On September 23rd 1990, during the Beijing Asian Games, the Ministries of Sport of North and South Korea made arrangements to hold a Talk. In fact, a North and South Korean football exchange was given the go-ahead before these Talks were actually held, and thus, the meeting was assumed to be a formulation of the football match interchange. After these Talks, both nations had a clearer idea on a joint squad. However, nothing was decided on the schedule of the football match. Participants in the meeting publicly announced that they did not reach an agreement. The disappointment of the people, contrasting as it did with the previous ‘positive’ news, was emphasised in both newspapers. Hankyoreh attributed the reason for this ‘nonsense’ to the limited ambition of the South Korean government. Dong-A had a slightly different view on this matter and focused on the individuals in the government rather than the government itself, i.e., it blamed the individuals who attended the Sports Talks. It also clarified that this problem evolved from the impatience of those individuals. In the meantime, however, Dong-A kept releasing articles, such as the scene of a ‘united team’ that could boost Korean ethnic nationalism, since the Beijing Asian Games was proving to be of great public interest.

......While the opening ceremony progressed the North and South Korea team encouraged each other and performed a joint cheer. The Chinese-Korean cheer team started to cry with pleasure......

(Dong-A 23, September, 1990-3)

......Until the Games were finished, the North and South Korean players and the team had confirmed they enjoyed it and that the ‘passionate heart’ was one, just as Korea was of one ethnicity. Since the 45 years of division, was there a time that the North and South Korea became ‘one heart, one will’?......The softball related person in China said that ‘the friendly scene of the North and South Korean teams was totally different to the North and South Korean relations’ and that ‘it was also the first occasion on which the scene of the North and South Korea’s flags flying together had been witnessed. Even foreign journalists said that ‘if we consider that the North Korea had boycotted the ’86 Seoul Asian Games, this was extraordinary and it seemed that the
North and South Korean people are of one ethnicity beyond the political system and ideology’…….

(Dong-A 24, September, 1990-4)

Hankyoreh interpreted the result of the exchange football match between the North and South Korea, as a signal of ‘private’ relations (of the people rather than the government) between North and South Korea. Dong-A emphasised the determinations of ‘governments’. It was a coincidence that an opposite attitude to unification discussion was being displayed, whether it was a product of the willingness of the people or a ‘policy driven’ intention of the government. Dong-A insisted that unification needed to be discussed in an objective manner, and it strongly criticised the South Korean government that for having arranged this football exchange through a series of secret discussions with North Korea. The South Korean government searched for an effective method to achieve a resolution to the discussions with North Korea.

Table 5.7 The 1st – 4th North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games unified team organising and participation-1

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As shown above, this joint statement clearly promised that further sporting interchanges would be planned between North and South Korea. It was noticeable that there were a considerable number of world sports championships, which could provide opportunities for developing cooperation in peaceful harmony between two Koreas. Both were aware of this opportunity.
In the summary of the Talks, it is mentioned that the mood became an impetus for the success of the Talks. It proved how powerful for expressing the wish for unification than sporting events, where the North and South Korea both could play and cheer each other. Hankyoreh kept reporting the progress of the Talks, but Dong-A did not pay that much attention to them, until they showed promising results.

The summary above overlooks North Korea’s drive to organise ‘a unified team’. They led the procedures and prepared detailed documents. The fact that this summary was written by the South Korean government is further evidence of how hard North Korea was trying to reach a positive result. However, the second set of Talks ended on a negative note with South Korea blaming the attitude of North Korea for the eventual failure of the Talks.

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<th>Table 5.8</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games unified team organising and participation</th>
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<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30</td>
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<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>In the middle of the growing mood of harmony and unity of the Korean people through the joint cheer team during the Beijing Asian Games……</td>
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<th>Table 5.9</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International Games unified team organising and participation</th>
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<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>North Korea argues for and brings out a draft letter to send to the IOC, FIFA, OFA, ITF on behalf of both countries.</td>
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<th>Table 5.10</th>
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<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>North Korea remains consistently with the attitude of avoidance of South and North Sport interchange. The Talks concluded without any outcome due to North Korea’s passive attitude.</td>
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[Table 5.11] The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks for further International Games unified team organising and participation

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This content was written as a summary after the Fourth Talks, and illustrates how momentum had been reinjured into cooperation in sport. It indicates that ‘a unified team’ would participate at the 41st World Table Tennis Championship and the 6th FIFA U-20 World Cup. The media covered all aspects of the same. The agreement of organising ‘a unified team’ was compared to the German case, since they had participated in the Olympic Games as Unified Team three times.

5.4.3 The 41st World Table Tennis Championships in Chiba, Japan

Four rounds of Talks were held relating to the issue of the 41st World Table Tennis Championship. North Korea suggested discussing the issue of organising ‘a unified team’ on the 11th of November 1990. Throughout the event, South Korea had its doubts about North Korea’s motivation in organising ‘a unified team’. Roh-Dong concluded that the South Korean officers were not interested in the unification since South Korea was not interested in the ‘symbolic unification’ as ‘a unified team’. Thus, South Korea would not support ‘the only team’ even though this would be helpful for the goal of unification.

……No matter how beneficial the Unification would be, the South Korean officers won’t support the realisation of unification, and therefore, the Talks for organising the Only Team were not welcomed……

(Roh-Dong 16, Jan. 1991-8)

Dong A stated that the Korea team would not be beneficial in terms of its unification policy and nationalism. However, a Hankyoreh article on the same issue argued for the opposite point of view. Hankyoreh showed real enthusiasm for ‘a unified team’ at the 41st World Table Tennis Championship and the 6th World Youth Football Championship. Hankyoreh
commented that this historical scene was exciting for Korea since it was an opportunity for “the people to become as one”. Hankyoreh expressed the special meaning of this project for national unification.

......The wish of organising a Unified Team for North and South Korea for the last 30 years becomes a reality as the North and South Korean representatives signed the agreement in the last month (12th), at the North and South Korean Sports Talks, for the Unified Team of the 41st World Table Tennis Championship and the 6th World Youth Football Championship in April and June. 70 million of both the North and South Korea people must smile. People cannot hide their excitement when they imagine this historical scene as a divided people becomes one. The meaning of this agreement cannot be exaggerated when described as an ‘epochal event in the 46 years of division’ and an ‘historical event in ethnic history’. We have great expectations of this agreement since this will be the first step in the divided people’s reconciliation and the start of the North and South Korea unification project.  
(Hankyoreh 14, February, 1991-1)

There must be a mutual understanding of ‘national identity’ between both North and South Korea, even though the nationalism that defines the modern nation state became the origin of the difference between the separate regimes and their ultimate goals.

......Here (on this agreement) lays the fundamental compromise and understanding of a strong ethnic identity and humanity from the North and South Korean sports people......  
(Dong-A 1, March, 1991)

Dong-A emphasised the increased trade between the North and South Korea as one of the benefits achieved from the North and South Korean sport relations. The uniform for the players would be delivered through the DMZ, and it would be the first material dispatched through that avenue. It was further expected that there would be benefits through increased economic interchange between the North and South Korea. This would be a unique achievement and an example of what can be achieved through sporting interactions.

......The success of the Unified Team of North and South Korea at Table Tennis is making a breakthrough after 46 years of divided history. What we have agreed on in the Unified Team’s participation in international competition, is a first in history. Moreover, the exchange of uniform for the North and South Korean team members in the DMZ is the first material only exchange, and there has been no interchange of products only, even though there were the North and South Korean musicians and sports people who crossed the border for the unification music festival and football match.  
(Dong-A 21, March, 1991)

Roh-Dong announced that the North Korean players would travel to South Korea by train, and this would become one of the events that would advance the cause of national unification. Thus, Roh-Dong had the perspective that these interactions, through sporting
events, could be helpful for achieving unification (Roh-Dong 21, Mar. 1991-1). Roh-Dong reported the joyful news of ‘the only team’ under the notion of ‘one ethnic people, one nation’. It showed a strong will for achieving unification and was fully supportive of the sports people.

\[ \ldots \text{Korean table tennis was ‘the only team’ had won all its matches on that day. For the first time since the North and South Korea division, it displayed that our ethnic people is one and our nation is one, so we must achieve unification in the nineties with great support from the players and cheers from the Korean-Japanese.} \ldots \]

Roh-Dong 25, April 1991

Roh-Dong described the moment of North and South Korea marching toward the stadium as ‘imposing’ and that it reflected ‘the pride of the nation’. The team’s participation in the Games was officially announced by the organising committee during the opening ceremony and it was covered by Roh-Dong. Roh-Dong expressed the pressure on the team to display a stronger, ‘united’ Korea. Thus, the team had a symbolic meaning and represented the ‘power’ of a unified Korea. The argument was that ‘the only team’ would encourage the unification for Korean ethnic people, which would be good for the supporters of Unification.

\[ \ldots \text{The North and South Korean players (who were against each other) marched together with an imposing attitude.} \ldots \text{Especially noteworthy was that, the Director of the organising committee and Mayor of Chiba commented that the ‘significant feature of this event is the participation of a Korean Team’.} \ldots \text{(Participant’s declare) ‘We must show the world how our great people have become one. Let’s all fight together by gathering all of our power.’} \ldots \text{the Director of the Korean team said that ‘there were huge worries after a Korean team was formed, about how the two different teams could harmonise, but that was not necessary.} \ldots \text{As soon as we met we became one. We can harmonise so fast since we are of one ethnicity.’} \ldots \text{The will of players and the Koreans’ unification wish, reminds us of the Korean people’s advance to Unification through ‘the only team’.} \ldots \text{We are proud to encourage the wish of unification for the Korean people.} \]

(Roh-Dong 26, April 1991-4)

Roh-Dong connected this progress in sport relations to the ‘unification’ discussion through interpretations of ‘the only team’, ‘unification cheer team’ and ‘unification cheer flag’ as symbolic expressions in politics. By paralleling sport and politics, Roh-Dong might want to address the necessity of political advances on the ‘unification’ issue (Roh-Dong 27, April 1991-2). Roh-Dong emphasised that the unity between North and South Korea players was extraordinary and the shared national identity played a great role in achieving this intimacy. The players carried the pressure that their results would reflect the justification for Korean unification. They, thus, wanted to have good results.
Then how did our players unite so easily? All the players said that it is because they are of one ethnic root. Our people lived as one people with one language near the Han River. The reason for our division did not come from us, but it was from a foreign power. The unity of the ‘Korean’ team proved that blood is thicker than water. But that is not all. What makes the ‘Korean’ team play as a strong team, which is bonding closely, is the strong passion for the unification in their mind. To the question from one reporter about the forecast of the match result, player Lee Moon Hee said that ‘I will do my best as if one single action of mine will advance the unification’ and another player Hong said that ‘we must succeed to win since we had made the first the only team. Then we can make the only team again and it will promote the Unification.’

(Roh-Dong 27, April 1991-3)

Many Korean-Japanese who live in Japan came to cheer the team. The slogans chanted were such as “Korea won!” “Our Player Won!” and “Our hope is Unification!” which might have seemed irrelevant to sport, but in this context appeared to be highly relevant. The students were so happy to chant that they even danced (Roh-Dong 29, April 1991-1). Dong-A expected a better result in terms of the athletes’ performance. Interestingly, Dong-A was reluctant to use the word ‘unification’. However, the victory of ‘the team’ must have been more meaningful as the competition was held in Japan, which had once colonised the Korean peninsula.

The victory of the Korean Women’s team in the 41st World Table Tennis Championship was valued highly as it became an opening conquest of the last 46 years of division to both the North and South Korea. A Korean team have made it possible to forecast that if North and South Korea cooperate and unite for a single purpose, then we can bring about a good result. North and South Korea have trained together just for one month in Japan and defeated the Chinese team who had been in the top position for 18 years and who were seeking their 9th victory at a World Championships.

(Dong-A 30, April, 1991-2)

Hankyoreh stated that the stadium was full of the symbols of unification such as the flag and the song. The anthem was particularly significant since Arirang reminded the people of the former colonised homeland (Hankyoreh 30, April, 1991-1). Roh-Dong reflected upon the team’s play as the desire of the Korean people for unification. At the same time, North Korea showed the great pride in the national team, and described how, as the flag was ‘raised’, so too was its national pride.

At that moment, all the Koreans stood up and shouted ‘Hooray Korea’, ‘National Unification’, ‘We, Korea Won’ and sang songs like ‘Arirang’ and ‘Our wish is Unification’……

(Roh-Dong 30, April 1991-1)
Through Roh-Dong, it can be seen that the expectation of unification among the people was reflected through the ‘unified Korean team’ for the table tennis championship. This interview helped capture how ‘normal’ individual Koreans would think about North and South Korean relations.

"A woman said that ‘...Now in the table tennis match we became ‘the team’, thus, we must go to the UN as ‘the team’ and all other areas must be unified’..."

(Roh-Dong 30, April 1991-2)

5.5 The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games

Dong-A explained that the successful performance of the table tennis team pushed the North and South Korean regimes to plan the next step for Sports Talks for the coming Barcelona Summer and Albertville Winter Olympic Games (Dong-A 30, April, 1991-2). Despite the previous success in organising ‘a unified team’ for table tennis, Dong-A suggested that this would take considerable effort and it was reluctant to use the word ‘unification’ which was not the case for Hankyoreh and Roh-Dong.

"Both the North and South Korea must try to achieve a Unified Team to participate at the Barcelona Olympic Games. This sort of unity in Sport must also lead to the road for improvement of the North and South Korean interactions and harmony."

(Dong-A 30, April, 1991-2)

Roh-Dong warned that there was an anti-unification tendency in the South Korea regime, and requested that North and South Korea cooperate during their discussions.

"However, recently the South Korean regime has suppressed participation and publicising of North Korea’s ‘91 National festival and Youth Unification festival. To contribute to National Unity and Unification through the Sports Talks, South Korea’s anti-unification activity must be stopped and the mood for the Talks needs to change. Thus, now we suggest having the North and South Korean Sports Talks on 17th August in the Panmunjom on our side..."

(Roh-Dong 6, June 1991-1)

5.5.1 North Korean Judo Player, Lee Chang Soo defection case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.12</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games unified team organising and participation-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korea Sports Talks for further International Games unified team organising and participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>1990.11.29/1991.01.15/01.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>Panmunjom JAS (Joint Security Area) Northern and Southern areas in turns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>North Korea dispersed the 5th Talks due to the defection of the North Korean Judo player</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first obvious inference to be drawn from this text was the significance of the political issues which emerged from these sport relations. The defection of a well-known North Korean Judo player differed from previous cases, since the exile occurred during an international sporting competition. Consequently, this incident directly affected subsequent sport interactions between North and South Korea. Hankyoreh calls attention to the negative impact of this incident on North and South Korean sport relations.

......This defection will have a negative effect on the North and South Korean sport interchange, since it is now a critical moment of escalating expectations about the North and South Korean discussions about organising Unified Team for Barcelona Olympic Games. (Hankyoreh 6, August, 1991)

Due to the defection of the North Korean Judo player Lee, Hankyoreh predicted that North Korea would postpone the Talks, which were planned for the 5th of the month. North Korea blamed South Korea as it believed that South Korea had helped Lee to seek asylum.

......The president of the North Korean NOC Kim sent a telegram to the president of the South Korean NOC Kim on the 12th. They announced that they would postpone the 5th Sports Talks which were planned for the 17th due to the exile of North Korea Judo player Lee (24). They claimed that Lee had participated at the ’91 World Judo Championships which were held in Spain, and South Korea had ‘seduced him.’ (Hankyoreh 13, August, 1991)

The interaction in sports between the North and South Korea was affected by the general diplomatic relations between the two Koreas. This was so because both regimes were governed by top-down dictatorship systems, with most of the decisions being made by a few cabinet members. The channels of communication could be mixed and often overlapped. The Minister of Sport and Youth, Park, announced the news of hosting the next Sports Talks as a result of other high level Talks that were held on the 13th.

......The Minister of Sport and Youth, Park broadcast that the North and South Korean Sports Talks will be held again around January of next year for the discussion for the organising of Unified Team since he received a positive answer from one of the officers of North Korea while they were in other high level Talks on 13th. (Hankyoreh 14, December, 1991-1)
5.5.2 Korea, as Divided Nations in the Olympics

Hankyoreh pointed out that ‘the unified team’ issue was not a matter that was limited to North and South Korea. The IOC had already experienced organising ‘Unified Teams’ with countries of the former USSR, and they knew how to handle the matter. Hankyoreh expressed its sympathy on the failure to establish ‘a unified team’, as there had been a total of 29 sets of Talks since the two Koreas started planning for the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games (Hankyoreh 3, April, 1992). Hankyoreh stated that the situation of North and South Korea is ‘the only case’ of a divided ethnic people, and that it had become a shameful ‘Olympic Record’. It further stressed the point that ‘We’ have ‘never’ participated as a ‘Unified Team’. Hankyoreh referred to North and South Korea as ‘we’, which belied its strong nationalistic sentiment. Its sympathy towards the situation was also reflected in the word ‘never’.

In this Olympics, the athletes from 171 countries will participate and we are the only case of an ethnic people who are separated and participate. This is our shameful Olympic Record in terms of the fact that we have never participated as a ‘Unified Team’ of our ethnic people since the modern Olympic Games began, which has lasted for 96 years and was the 25th Olympic Games.

(Hankyoreh 24, July, 1992)

Kim Jong Il, the leader of North Korea, announced that they must host more international matches, and this would become the top priority of their policy. Once North Korea appealed to the international community to host international sport matches, it was considered a positive step towards improving North and South Korean relations in the international arena.

Dear leader Kim Jong Il pointed as follows. <……We have to host international matches often.>……

(Roh-Dong 2, Aug. 1992-1)

Roh-Dong cited the letter from the president of the International Taekwondo Federation. It published the political opinion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty. In a personal voice, the paper warned that the diplomatic pressure on North Korea would lead to a physical conflict. Interestingly, the president of the ITF was used as a diplomatic medium for political issues.

The President of the International Taekwondo Federation has sent a letter, which contained his support for the demand of the dear commander [not to pressure North Korea] and his statement of the (Cho-Sun) republic about the withdrawal from the NPT
(Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) to the General Secretary of the UN and the US House of Representatives......The letter said that it did not want another tragedy in Cho-Sun territory and the military threat to North Korea might evolve into physical conflict in the Cho-Sun peninsula, demolishing World Peace......

(Roh-Dong 26, Mar. 1993-1)

5.6 The 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games and the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games

North Korea did not participate in the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games due to the death of Kim Il Sung. Hankyoreh expressed regret at North Korea’s absence from the Games.

...... First of all, the absence of North Korea is heart-breaking news for the North and South Korean people. It would be great to send a Unified Team or just to warmly cheer each other as separate teams......

(Hankyoreh 4, October, 1994-2)

Surprisingly North Korea registered to participate in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and it implied that the Olympic Games were relatively highly valued in North Korea’s foreign policy.

...... North Korea shows great changes recently. North Korea registered for the participation in the Atlanta Olympic Games ...North Korea had disappeared from international sport arena since the 1st East Asian Games, on May 1993......

(Hankyoreh 21, January, 1996-2)

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter reviews the various issues which emerged in the period at the end of Cold War, and the beginning of international detente. South Korean domestic politics was in a period of turbulence. In its broader pursuit of democratisation, the matter of relations with North Korea became a critical issue for South Korean society. At this time, with South Korea hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the two Koreas’ discussions about organising a unified team and co-hosting of the Games North and South Korea used the Sports Talks as a potentially important means of solving intra-Korean issues.

Within the various Sports Talks between North and South Korea, a ‘Primordial’ Korean nationalism is revealed (Shin 2006). In the relatively frequent Sports Talks between the two Koreas at this time, subtle differences of meaning emerge in terms of what either side implied through the terms adopted to signify a ‘unified team’ or ‘unification’. At this time, the
First unified team was established for the 41st Table Tennis Championships in Japan, and this became a lesson or example to be emulated in further Sports Talks. It also represented the limits of what North and South Korea could achieve through sport interactions. Since there was no dominant diplomatic frame such as the Cold War international context which had influenced and constrained the Sports Talks in the previous decade, domestic politics and the attitudes of individuals became more prominent. Particularly, the issue of Pastor Moon’s visit to North Korea and the defection of a North Korean Judo players’ to South Korea impacted directly and negatively on the progress of the Sports Talks.
Chapter 6 North and South Korean Sports Relations from 1998 to 2007

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will cover the analysis of the discourse related to North and South Korean sporting relations from 1998 to 2007. This 10-year period can be generally described as a period of multi-polar international relations replacing the bi-polar relations of the Cold War period. It is a period in which several levels of actors on the global stage gave prominence to various aspects of culture such as sport. In consequence, the hosts of international sporting events found that these were increasingly recognised as being not only of cultural significance but also of economic and political importance. Previously, sport was considered rather as ‘soft power’ in North-South Korean relations that was only important on the cultural level, thus the role and meaning of sport in international relations in this period certainly needed to be re-interpreted.

By analysing the summary of Talks between the two Koreas, and selected newspaper articles from both sides in this period, the interactions of political and cultural dimensions of North and South Korean sport relations are illustrated. The policy of South Korea towards the North during Kim Dae Jung’s presidency was termed ‘Sunshine policy’. The South Korean media did not always have a supportive view of this policy, but it seemed to work for better relations between the two Koreas, because eventually Summits were held in June, 2000. Although the sport relations between the two Koreas were not consistently smooth due to the fluctuating international context over the two preceding decades, they at last agreed to organise ‘a unified team’ for the 2006 Doha Asian Games and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This was considered both as a good sign for the two Koreas but also from an international relations perspective. During this period of time, depending on the nuclear and security issues in North Korea, South Korea sometimes faced situations in which expressing its diplomatic position on North Korea’s actions was necessary, and this significantly affected their general political relationship.
6.2 The Privately led Sporting Interactions

The South Korean newspaper Dong-A stated that the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was one of the impetuses for the economic development of South Korea, and provided a foundation to build competence in the domestic sport industry. The incidents related to South Korea’s use of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) SAP (Structural adjustment Program-to address the national financial crisis) in 1997 became a tragic occasion that led to North and South Korea being recognised as separate economic entities. Thus, it clearly brought ‘reality’ to the situation between the two Koreas. While South Korea went through the economic strictures advised by the IMF SAP, sport became one of the few sources for South Korea to maintain pride in its national identity at this difficult time of financial crisis. Nonetheless, there were not many articles in Dong-A about international sporting events, since the period was not one of festive mood, rather the whole nation was in suppressed mood because of the problems associated with the unstable economic situation which South Korean society faced, such as increased early retirement and high inflation. While South Korea was in debt to the IMF, the South Korean people criticised the government’s emphasis on economic cooperation with North Korea, which mainly consisted of unilateral aid from South to North. Thus, South Koreans worried about further damage to their national economy due to this ‘additional cost’.

Dong-A and Hankyoreh illustrated opposite views concerning the impact of sporting events in this period. Dong-A valued South Korea’s economic development most. In the meantime, Hankyoreh considered an ethnic-centered national unity as one of its top priorities. In the following article, Hankyoreh wrote about the expectations of the Seoul Olympic Games and the 2002 World Cup to contribute to establishing ‘national unity and a concrete Korean national identity’.

......We had to regret two things after hosting successful the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. One is the anger that sport and the Olympic spirit became degraded as the tools of preservation of a dictatorial regime. Another is a sense of shame that North Korea who shares our blood-line could not join in the party events which many other countries were invited to......One more thing to add is that we must be a ‘unified team’ in the
2002 World Cup. Even during this 50 year tragic period, sometimes sport has filled our hearts with pure love of the ethnic North and South Korean brotherhood. …Like these, sport contributes enormously to national unity and making concrete identity, and that is much more than the meaning given in sport history……

(Hankyoreh 9, May, 1998)

The 10th anniversary of the 24th Seoul Olympic Games was portrayed in Dong-A as a great success achieved by South Korea rather than a ‘legacy of Korean ethnicity’. It focused on the high standard of the Olympic Games was that was hosted in the “capital of South Korea, Seoul” (Dong-A 15, September, 1998). In this comment, it was emphasised that South Korea was a separate entity, which contrasted with Hankyoreh, which rather highlighted the unity of the two Koreas. Dong-A cited a speech made by the Mayor of Seoul, who was in office during the Seoul Olympic Games. In his speech, the Mayor proudly articulated that the Seoul Olympic Games was the bridge to restore the relations between the East and West from both an international and inter-Korean perspective. The Mayor was sure that this was only possible because the Games were held in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. He also added that from a diplomatic point of view the Games projected a bright future for North and South Korea’s membership of the UN. The domestic and international impact of the Seoul Olympic Games, which was evaluated by Dong-A, should be taken into consideration.

……The Seoul Olympic Games brought a great impact, internationally and intra-nationally. Most of all, the '76 Montreal Olympic Games, '80 Moscow Olympic Games and '84 LA Olympic Games were held under failure to breakdown the wall of ideology and race, but the Seoul Olympic Games rewrote an Olympic history through 160 nations’ athletes and coaches from the East and West of the world gathering in one place. It also affected South Korea immensely. It helped us open the door to Eastern European Socialist Countries and developed the relationship and established diplomatic relations. Moreover, it was realised that North and South Korea’s joining of the UN will come together…….<written by Mayor of Seoul in 1988>

(Dong-A 15, September, 1998)

By this time, North Korea and the IOC started to discuss mutually cooperating through the NOC, and this was considered a positive gesture for both. At least North Korea showed its presence in the international sport diplomacy arena, in contrast to the period of boycotting. The NOC of North Korea obtained more recognition from the IOC, and the IOC tried to demonstrate that it could put more effort into establishing a ‘constructive’ relationship by
donating a Benz bus to the North Korean NOC to symbolise its support. This was exceptional and quite a unique gesture from the international organisation.

......The vice prime minister Kwak met the people from the IOC and German Corporate Daimler Benz presenters......the leader of this representatives, Thomas Bach, and the North Korean leader declared that they will provide energetic support for the development of the North Korean NOC and cooperation with the IOC ......

(Roh-Dong 20, Sept. 1998_1)

Those ‘friendly’ gestures seemed to have given the IOC a positive impression that North and South Korean sport relations would bear fruit. Consequently, the IOC gained status as effectively a diplomatic organisation, which in the eyes of some would not be ‘proper’ for a ‘non - political’ international sport organisation.

......The possibility is growing to restore the North and South Korean sport relationship. Thomas Bach, who is an IOC performance member visited North Korea and announced the possibility on the 21st.

(Hankyoreh 23, September, 1998)

6.2.1 Hyundai and the Private Sporting Interactions

At this time, Hankyoreh focused on the private sport interactions between North and South Korea. Privately, Hyundai, as a company in South Korea, was well-known for its enthusiastic efforts in this particular contact with North Korea. The founder of Hyundai, Chung Ju Young, is a man who left his hometown in North Korea due to the Korean War, thus he was one of the ‘Sil Hyang Min’, who lost their home town. Therefore, Chairman Chung was determined and passionate about reviving relations between North and South Korea by whatever means.

In the nick of time, he became president of the South Korean NOC and thus, he attempted to use this position to maximise North and South sporting interactions. This was made possible by the fund from Hyundai plus Chung’s determination, and had the approval of the North and South Korean governments. In the following article Hankyoreh explained this circumstance in a positive tone by commenting on the ‘expectation’ of South Korean government.

......Concerning ‘the agreement of the construction of an Indoor stadium and private sport relations’, which was agreed by HYUNDAI and North Korea, it clearly declared ‘Let’s make an environment within which we can participate in international competitions jointly by creating concrete trust in North and South Korean relations. One involved in this said ‘When HYUNDAI agreed on those issues they might have already shared them with the South Korean government, who want to open the door to North and South Korean relations. The South Korean government also presented its
expectation that ‘the natural dialogue will be possible if private sector North and South Korean relations on the matter of economy and other forms of cooperation become popular. Actually, sport talks are a non-political issue and already have had some fruitful results before. Thus, sport was viewed as the easiest channel.

(Hankyoreh 5, November, 1998)

Unlike the previous two decades, in this period North and South interaction tended to be driven by private sector entities and, thus, their interests were reflected in the actions taken. One of these interests was in Korean nationalism among the people of North and South Korea, because the half a century of division meant that the first generations that had been separated from their family were in a hurry to find a way to be reunited with their family members. At this time, Hyundai was in a good position to take the role of leading the two Koreas’ sporting interactions, since one of the sons of Chairman Chung was a vice president of FIFA, and South Korea won the bid for co-hosting the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup. Therefore, another form of co-hosting’ became an issue between North and South Korea. However, even though Hankyoreh emphasised the “recognition of one ethnicity” for the sake of an ethnic dominant national unity, the dialogue between the two Koreas was not as effective as it wished for. An international sporting event, however, could be one of the arenas in which a strong recognition and sharing of a national identity can represent the ‘symbolic unity’ of North and South Korea officially in public.

……Even though sporting interactions cannot make huge changes, it can be more frequent. And then it will be helpful to release the extreme tension of the cease fire line between North and South Korea. Whatever the price is, North and South Korea must meet more often. We need to consistently have dialogues to recognise ourselves as one ethnicity. There is nothing more effective than becoming one on the ground and sharing a fever together to be closer to each other.

(Hankyoreh 6, November, 1998)

Chairman Chung visited North Korea to discuss further interactions with Hyundai, and Hankyoreh spotlighted what Chung Ju Young’s visit implied for North and South relations by describing the gesture demonstrated by Kim Jong Il while Chairman Chung was in North Korea. As revealed in the article, North Korea showed a strong interest in interaction with South Korea and it displayed great potential for what ‘a motivated person outside the political arena’ could contribute to North and South Korean relations.

……Honourable Chairman Chung Ju Young said that Kim Jung Il visited his accommodation very politely and made him stand in the middle row for the photograph,
even though he refused to do so. And they represented a strong motivation towards North and South Korean economic cooperation and promised to operate all the agreements......

(Hankyoreh 7, November, 1998)

At this time, Hyundai and the North Korean Asian Pacific committee agreed to set up a task office on each side to establish an indoor stadium in North Korea and to hold further sport interactions. The son of Chairman Chung, Chung Mong Jun was strongly recommended as a representative, which should be underlined as Chung Mong Jun was a vice president of FIFA and the president of the KFA (Korean Football Association), involved in the discussion of organising ‘a unified team’ of North and South Korea for the 2002 World Cup. Moreover, the issue of unification between North and South Korea was not only a national matter to Chairman Chung but was an element in his private wish for national unification.

As the leader of a private company, Chairman Chung was motivated to utilise his corporate resources as a weapon to increase encounters with North Korea that would eventually contribute to the progress of North and South Korean relations. Chairman Chung met the great leader of North Korea, Kim Jong II, and discussed several issues relating to what North Korea and Hyundai could do together. Chairman Chung and Hyundai were closely associated with South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, as strongly motivated actors in the matter. Particularly, the son of Chairman Chung was the vice president of FIFA and KFA at the same time, thus football matches were used as a platform for interactions.

.....Chairman Chung and one of his sons, who is a chairman of HYUNDAI construction, said ‘we agreed to open a basketball match in Pyongyang around April, and the location for the indoor stadium construction is around Bo Tong River in Pyongyang......

(Dong-A 7, February, 1999)

Roh-Dong did not ‘explain’ the usefulness of sport in terms of North and South relations but it rather focused on results from the ‘interactions’ such as ‘exchange football matches’. North and South Korean groups of workers agreed on hosting a football match. Above the symbolic meaning of the match, the match was titled ‘Unification Wish’, while a “drawing of the Korean peninsula” was on the ball. Thus, Korean ethnic nationalism was present in the private sporting interactions between North and South Korea (Dong-A 11, February, 1999).
As Dong-A did not release many articles regarding the ‘Unification Worker’s Football Match’, the game was not fully spotlighted compared to the events organised by the governments. But the unification wave that was based on Korean nationalism was becoming popular due to the moments created during the matches.

……As time went by, the football match encouraged unification fever in ‘one nation’ and ‘one ethnicity’ and great scenes were produced among players with their strong ethnic based family membership……

(Roh-Dong 14, Aug. 1999-1)

The people, who actually participated in that event, naturally expressed a ‘special’ ethnic sense of identity based on national attachment to North and South Korea (Roh-Dong 15, Aug. 1999-7).

A month after the ‘Unification Workers’ Football Match’, Hyundai achieved another opportunity, which was titled the ‘Unification Basketball Match’. This is meaningful since it became another ‘private’ encounter of sports between North and South Korea that was led by corporate Hyundai. With the chance of its broadcasting in South Korea, this became a doorway to North and South Korean sport relations reaching another level.

…… And also, this unification basketball match will be broadcast through the satellite since South Korean reporters and announcers were not permitted to broadcast anything in North Korea.

(Hankyoreh 22, September, 1999)

Chairman Chung Ju Young obtained another positive outcome after meeting with North Korean officers. Hyundai’s offer of building an indoor stadium in North Korea was accepted by North Korea, with the condition of naming the stadium after Chung Ju Young.

The name of the stadium in Pyongyang would become ‘Pyongyang Ah-San Chung Ju Young Multi-Stadium’……

(Hankyoreh 27, September, 1999-1)

When the Hyundai basketball team arrived in Pyongyang, Dong-A referred to this as just a ‘private initiative’ of less valued than ‘public interaction’ driven by both regimes. What made Dong-A’s devaluation of this private initiative between North and South Korea more plausible was the fact that Dong-A did not mention the more recent ‘Workers’ Unification Football Match’ as the latest North and South Korea friendly sporting event.
It is the first time ever since North and South Korea were divided that there has been a North and South Korean friendly basketball match and is 9 years after the North and South Korean Unification Football Match in October 1990.

(Dong-A 28, September, 1999-1)

Another exceptional case was made by the effort of Chairman Chung, when he visited Pyongyang for the opening ceremony of the Indoor Stadium constructed by Hyundai. The group of people crossed the border between the two Koreas, through DMZ area to North Korea. Although this was just one of the private encounters with North Korea, the permission to cross the DMZ for this particular event seemed a special favour granted by the South Korean regime. Thus, this could be considered a ‘private event’ that was ‘unofficially authorised as a public’ initiative (Hankyoreh 29, September, 1999-2).

Extraordinary expressions can be found in a Dong-A article about the scene and matches in which North and South Korea players played. Dong-A reported that the players shared a friendship and assumed that this originated from belonging to the same ethnicity. The article also alluded to the playing of these matches in a spirit of great harmony originating from the national identity of Korea (Dong-A 29, September, 1999). Interestingly, there were not as many articles in Roh-Dong about sporting interactions with Hyundai, since it was the case that North Korea was receiving aid from South Korea, particularly from a ‘bourgeois’ private company and this could damage the North Korean regime’s notion of Communism. Nevertheless, North Korea did express its great appreciation to Chairman Chung Ju Young from the perspective of shared ethnic nationalism. Hankyoreh argued that Hyundai and Chairman Chung had contributed greatly to North and South Korean relations.

(Hankyoreh 30, September, 1999-1)

The North and South Korean Unification Basketball Match was planned to be held in Seoul as well. Kim Jong Il ordered the game to be held in December (Hankyoreh 4, October, 1999). Thus, it was expected that North Korean players would visit Seoul. A Hyundai family member, the son of the chairman, Chung, who was also the KFA chairman, announced that
he had received positive feedback from North Korea about organising ‘a unified team’ for the 2002 World Cup (Hankyoreh 20, November, 1999). In Dong-A, it was identified that Hyundai would issue free tickets for the North and South Korea Friendly Match to the South Korean people (Dong-A 16, December, 1999). This was evidence for the assumption that the North and South Korean Unification Basketball Match was an ‘unofficially authorised public event’.

The following article captures the changes in broadcasting procedures during the period, when North and South Korean relations were good. Previously, North Korea did not allow South Korean journalists’ to visit Pyung Yang in protest against South Korea’s military activities. However, North Korea allowed the broadcasting of the Unification Basketball Matches by the South Korean Broadcasting System (SBS, Seoul Broadcasting System) and sent its journalists to South Korea as well. Moreover, North Korea would directly receive the pictures and sound from SBS (Dong-A 22, December, 1999). Dong-A explained why the South Korean government could not support this event ‘officially’ and why the North Korean regime was reluctant to emphasise this event as an ‘official’ achievement of North and South Korean relations. Dong-A implied that the South Korean government could not officially contribute to this event as it intended to, because of the attitude of the North Korean regime, which wanted to treat this event as an entirely ‘private matter’.

……However, it is not easy to see this event from the South Korean government’s perspective. North Korea minimised the meaning of this match by referring to it as just a ‘private sport event’, rather than developing the North and South Korean relationship. Thus, the South Korean government could not easily be seen to be involved in this match.

(Dong-A 23, December, 1999-1)

6.2.2 Other Issues in Private Sporting Interactions

Another private sector organisation, Koryo University in South Korea, followed its nationalistic academic tradition and suggested a discussion about sport interactions in relation to the Bangkok Asian Games, for the sporting people of North Korean universities. Dong-A covered this proposal by Koryo University, since it was the first attempt made by a
private university, and the impact that the university itself had in terms of its academic reputation could not be ignored, especially in the area of North and South Korean relations. Contrary to Hankyoreh, Dong-A’s view was not presented in this article (Dong-A 4, December, 1998).

The coverage of the matches between North and South Korea in Hankyoreh was focused on personal motivation, which was portrayed through personal interviews based on the recognition of the ethnic nationalism of the two Koreas. This international sporting event reaffirmed the shared relations based on the common ethnicity of the two Koreas, and justified the reason for their co-existence. One of the North Korean players demonstrated his feelings towards the cheering squad, spectators and those watching from home, by voluntarily bowing to people who cheered for him after playing against a South Korean player. At this moment, the separation between North and South among the players and spectators was not the issue at all.

......*The match between Shim of South Korea and Kang of North Korea might be a litmus test of our nationalism… the North Korean Kang stepped down from the mat and bowed to South Korean coaches and cheer group.*

(Hankyoreh 14, December, 1998)

One of the participants in the Worker’s football match escaped North Korea during the Games (Hankyoreh 3, June, 1999). This was the first known incident of defection associated with sporting activities between North and South Korea, since the North Korean Judo player Lee. However, this news did not have an influence on the match itself. This might be related to the fact that the Workers’ football match and the defection incident were three months apart. Thus, neither North nor South Korea could regard the staging of this football match as being solely responsible for his defection. In addition to this incident, increasing military tension between North and South Korea affected sporting relations. Traditionally, sporting relations were affected by military issues between North and South Korea, as illustrated by an article in Hankyoreh that reported the concerns made by people involved in sport. Thus, it
appeared that the various circumstances of North and South Korea were combined in constructing the reality of North and South sport relations.

......People in sport worried about the negative influence on sport interactions of the military conflict between the North and South Korea navies on the 15th. In particular, the friendly match of the HYUNDAI basketball team will be directly affected, thus the result of negotiations gains more attention......And this will be an influence on the 2002 World Cup and organising a 'unified team'......

(Hankyoreh 16, June, 1999)

The military conflict between North and South Korea affected the South Korean journalists’ visit to North Korea while the North and South played a basketball match which had been scheduled previously. This match was not cancelled because this was a friendly match between North Korea and the Hyundai team, but North Korea expressed its protest about South Korea’s military manoeuvres by restricting journalists’ entry into North Korea (Hankyoreh 22, June, 1999).

There were cases of private interactions between North and South Korea which were mediated by a Japanese university. The Cho Sun University of North Korea, Tsukuba University, a university in Japan famous for its sport performance, and Seoul National University, gathered to play football together. In this case, the uniqueness of Tsukuba as a Japanese university worked effectively. Pro-North Korean residents in Tsukuba University contributed to weakening anti-Japanese sentiments in North Korea, whereas the Seoul National University agreed and participated in this interchange by emphasising the ‘private’ and ‘Japan-friendly’ aspect of the event. Thus, this case could explain the complexity of the involvement of Japanese organisations in North and South Korean relations and its usefulness in terms of promoting the interactions.

......Cho Sun University and Tsukuba University had played this match for 40 years. Seoul National University and University of Tsukuba have met for the last 18 years. About 3 years ago, the professors from three universities randomly mentioned this sort of gathering. This is the first match played under this arrangement......Sport doesn’t have a border. Study doesn’t have a border. They are not related to politics at all. (Hankyoreh 6, August, 1999)

Contrary to the previous emphasis on Korean nationalism by North Korea, the attitude of North Korea when it broadcast its players’ winning against South Korea was different. The
emphasis on victory against South Korea implied that Roh-Dong treated the domestic regime’s propaganda as important. Therefore, the stability of domestic politics was also a priority for North Korea in terms of broadcasting the result of the sporting event (Roh-Dong 26, Aug. 1999-1). Moreover, the good performance of the North Korean players provided a perfect opportunity to praise the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Il, and Roh-Dong did not miss this chance (Roh-Dong 29, Aug. 1999-16).

6.2.3 The Potential of Sporting Interactions

The potential role of sport in the two Koreas’ relations was evident founded in the following article. Dong-A admitted that sport became “one of the easiest areas” to induce interactions between North and South Korea, and further, general interactions, mainly political, were affected by the result of “sporting interactions” (Dong-A 8, February, 1999). Dong-A started to recognise the multi-dimensional aspect of North and South Korean relations and moreover emphasised the accessibility and effects of sporting interactions. Nevertheless, Dong-A expressed some worries about sporting interactions, as sports could be the best method for the integration of the two Koreas, but at the same time it could be the root of ‘emotional conflicts’ based on excessive competitiveness (Dong-A 11, February, 1999).

Hankyoreh considered the visit of North Korean players to South Korea as an ‘historic event’ and made a comment that even though this visit did not yet signal ‘full spring’, the hope for a ‘spring’ to bloom for North and South Korean relations remained alive. When the sporting interaction between North and South Korea was led by the private sector, then the politically symbolic value seemed weaker compared to that of a state-led approach.

......North Korea’s visit to Seoul will be enough to be recognised as another historical event......The North Korean team limits itself by calling this event a private affair, which excludes political meaning and makes contacts with the South Korean people seem reluctant. Nevertheless, this visit was interpreted as signalling that the ‘real spring’ won’t be far away.

(Hankyoreh 23, December, 1999-1)

Dong-A compared the North Korean Basketball players’ visit to Seoul and the Unification Football Exchanges in 1990. It is interesting to see that the mood of the people changed this
time since the visit was made for a ‘pure’ sporting purpose. Thus, Dong-A explained that sport interactions organised by the regime were certainly used to achieve a political purpose in 1990, and that gave a special meaning to the South Korean people. Dong-A considered this private sport interaction to be based on a ‘pure sport’ purpose, thus it created a different mood (Dong-A 24, December, 1999-2). Nevertheless, North and South Korean sport relations could not be a ‘pure’ sporting event. Hankyoreh commented that “to win or lose is not important” and implied that North and South Korean matches meant more than the results of the matches. The emotions people experience through sporting events such as this have more meaning than the match itself, and in this aspect this sporting event is closely related to the political relations between North and South Korea. Thus, sporting events are never considered as just about ‘pure’ sport (Hankyoreh 24, December, 1999). Dong-A quoted a visitor from North Korea, who embraced ethnic nationalism as a reason for organising a unified Korea (Dong-A 27, December, 1999). North Korean players visiting Seoul meant that North Korea was ready to ‘mutually’ interact with South Korea, at least in the sporting arena. Thus, Hankyoreh expressed its excitement and expectation at this new way of relating. North and South Korea spoke the same language, ‘Korean’, yet their communication seemed to be always interpreted by each in their own way.

……Therefore, the unification basketball match became an opportunity to change the one-way communication to bilateral communications.

(Hankyoreh 27, December, 1999-2)

6.3 Development of the Sport Relations of Two Koreas

6.3.1 Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and Sporting Interactions

In the following article, Hankyoreh appraised the previous year’s private interaction between South and North Korea as a success. Moreover, the South Korean government seemed to lean towards encouraging more ‘private’ led interactions with North Korea, which was part of the policy of Kim Dae Jung’s presidency, since he was a great supporter of broadening interactions with North Korea until the unification of the two Koreas could be accomplished.
President Kim wished for North and South Korean unification for a long time, and his effort to bring peace to the Korean peninsula through seeking national unification was appreciated internationally by his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Thus, during Kim Dae Jung’s presidency, the South Korean regime supported the relations with North Korea even in the private sector including the field of sport.

......The Security Council announced that they will grow North and South Korean interactions in this year, in the private level in economy, culture, religion and sport, based on the results of last year’s effort at interaction ......President Kim said that if necessary, the government would give its best support.  
(Hankyoreh 6, January, 2000)

President Kim mentioned that the South Korean regime intended to promote private leadership in its interactions with North Korea and promised the full support of the government.

...... “With the Presidential Summit on the 13th, the sport relations will develop like a storm. Kim Dae Jung’s government has been sticking to the ‘private leads principle’ in North and South Korean relations…….However, the presidents of both will agree on sport interactions, then it means that the government will lead last of all.”  
(Dong-A 13, June, 2000)

Under this supportive attitude of the South Korean government, Chairman Chung of Hyundai was admired for his contribution and investment in North and South Korean sporting interactions, and several universities including the Korean Sport University awarded him an honorary Doctorate (Dong-A 11, February, 2000). The peaceful relation between North and South Korea was supported by the South Korean administrative leadership which resulted in the historical Presidential Summit of North and South Korea. Thus, sporting interactions were also expected to be achieving active communication with North Korea. President of the KSA (Korean Sport Association) Kim Un Yong, who was also an IOC member for South Korea, expressed his ideas about the significance of sport in the interactions of the two Koreas. At this time, North and South Korea sporting interaction involved joint training and friendly exchange matches in various sporting events.

......People in sport are expecting to have epochal progress towards organising one team and North Korea’s participation in Busan Asian Games after the historical Pyongyang Presidential Summit on the 12th of June……the President of the Korean Sport Association Kim Un Yong has revealed that ‘We will do our best to improve reconciliation between North and South Korea through joint training of elite sport players and friendly matches……

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How much the South Korean leadership valued sport interactions between North and South Korea is well presented in the following article of Dong-A. After the Presidential Summit, President Kim ordered a plan be drawn up to maximise the impact on North and South Korean relations. As one of the best supporters of the unification of North and South Korea, President Kim knew how important this sport interaction would be to North and South Korean relations.

......President Kim Dae Jung has ordered on the 1st to ‘Prepare plans after the North and South Korean Presidents’ Summit for the growth of North and South Korean sport relations since sport is the easiest and the fastest way to make North and South Korean relations move towards reconciliation and mutual understanding.

(Dong-A 2, May, 2000)

The significance of this sporting event is explained in the following article of Hankyoreh. The character of sporting interactions, which includes ‘physical contact’, has a great potential to influence people’s emotion. Particularly, sporting events that promote unity on the basis of a shared nationalism are expected to demolish the ideological conflict, which was constructed by historical and social environments.

......Amongst all, sport relations are non-political in character and already we have a lot of experience, so that this has the potential to become the easiest area for recovery of good relations. Sport relations are not only for the display of sporting ability, but also promoting national unity and physical contact which cannot happen through other interactions.’......

(Hankyoreh 7, June, 2000)

Hankyoreh emphasised the ‘experience’ of organising ‘a unified team’ of the two Koreas. That claim was plausible since it could be one of the social construction mechanisms by which unity was constructed. Hankyoreh predicted that the unity among the people through physical activities would contribute to the real unification of North and South Korea (Hankyoreh 8, June, 2000-1).

Even in the Presidential Summit, several sport issues were discussed. This implied that the sport interaction between North and South Korea had become a significant part of the North and South Korean leaders’ interests. Specifically, the joint marching of the teams in the Sydney Olympic Games became the most positive interaction to be realised during that time.
The joint marching was regarded as a positive sign for the future, since East and West Germany had marched together before they organised a single team in the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games (Hankyoreh 15, June, 2000). Therefore, it was a positive sign that Kim Un Yong explained the conditions for a joint marching in details such as the choice for an anthem and flag. The positive atmosphere in North and South Korean sport relations made specialists foresee future interactions among professional sport players (Dong-A 16, June, 2000). This would represent great progress for North and South Korean relations, since the professional sport market was considered a major economic aspect of the interactions and could be highly effective in terms of impact due to its popularity. While the North Korean team arrived in South Korea, North Korean IOC member Chang Ung discussed the joint marching issue with South Korean representatives. Hankyoreh reported that the decision to organise a joint march was a ‘great achievement’ by the time it was finalized. Hankyoreh generally expressed the positive tone of North and South Korean relations, but in this case, it was important since it was fixed after a long time of positive expectation (Hankyoreh 16, June, 2000).

Hankyoreh explained what Chairman, Chung’s achievement meant for North and South Korean relations. As an entrepreneur, who contributed to the development of South Korea, Chung utilised all his assets for South Korea to host the Olympic Games. Hankyoreh cited in his biography, that his effort to host the Olympic Games was purely patriotic.

......The honourable chairman of Hyundai, Chung, who passed away on the 21st had left behind him great achievements in Korean Sport History......His biggest achievement was the hosting of the Seoul Olympics......He had written in his biography every detail from the day of winning the bid for the Seoul Olympics to the successful hosting and said proudly that ‘I did not earn any personal benefit from the Olympics.’......

(Hankyoreh 23, March, 2001)

As a person who led private sport interactions between North and South Korea, Chairman Chung became a highly trusted figure in the North Korean regime. The following article presents how North Korea accepted Chairman Chung’s investment in developing the Keumgang Mountain Project. North Korea publicised that the investment was Chung’s wish
to contribute to his hometown economy even though it was located in North Korea. Thus, Dong-A argued in a Confucian tone that North Korea needed to send its people to South Korea to express their condolences upon the news of Chung’s death. But since North and South Korean relations were not on good terms at that time, Chung’s indoor stadium in North Korea would be utilised for the opening ceremony. In other words, Dong-A did not think that North Korea would send a representative to South Korea to deliver their condolences for Chairman Chung’s death.

......People from the Ministry of Unification said that ‘North Korea considered Keum Kang Mountain as the deceased Chairman Chung’s investment project in his hometown, so there is a possibility for revival. Therefore, Chung’s death has indirectly affected North and South Korean relations.’ Concerning the possibility of expressing sympathy on behalf of the North Korean people, the North Korean officer said ‘North Korea will express sympathy anyway, but now the timing of the North and South Korean Ministry Talks means that it will be difficult to have a direct visit to South Korea by a North Korean. And it might be possible to visit North Korea’s indoor stadium construction site.’

(Dong-A 23, March, 2001)

Surprisingly, the prediction made by Dong-A was wrong. HYUNDAI AH SAN informed that there would be three representatives from North Korea to send their condolences. It was the first case of its kind, thus it showed how North Korea appreciated and respected Chairman Chung, as a partner who could discuss North and South Korean relations.

......HYUNDAI AH SAN announced that ‘The vice president of the Asia Pacific Peace Council, Mr Song, and another three people will come to Seoul to visit the mortuary where the honourable Chairman Chung of HYUNDAI lies. This is the first visit of North Korean high level officers to a South Korean mortuary.’......

(Dong-A 24, March, 2001)

6.3.2 The 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and the Joint March of Two Koreas

Despite the peaceful mood between North and South Korea, the prospects of organising ‘a unified team’ of North and South Korea for the Sydney Olympic Games was not bright. Therefore, South Korea put its last effort for symbolic realisation of national unity into the Games, by organising a joint march for North and South Korea at the opening ceremony. The ‘Sydney’ Games did not have strong meanings for North and South Korea unlike the earlier ‘LA’ and ‘Moscow’ Games, and thus it became one of the first events to represent the
unity of Korea through the Olympic Games as a non-political interaction between the two
Koreas.

......Kim Un Yong, the president of Korean Sport Association, broadcast on the 29th that
"there are many difficulties in organising a unified team for the Sydney Olympics so
instead we promote the joint marching of North and South Korea in the opening
ceremony at the Games."

(Hankyoreh 30, May, 2000)

The decision made by the IOC to allow the two Koreas to use the Olympic flag instead of
carrying two national flags during the joint marching at the opening ceremony reflected
support from the international sport organisation. Moreover, the IOC added that the decision
to use the Olympic flag symbolised how neutral the Olympic Games were on issues related
to political conflict and how it could be supportive in the process of negotiating controversial
issues (Hankyoreh 29, July, 2000-2). Contrary to Hankyoreh’s coverage on the confirmation
of the joint march at the Sydney Olympic Games, Dong-A expressed its doubt about this
decision. It rather implied that there was potential for a joint march by recalling the theme
song of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, “Hand in Hand” (Dong-A 15, August, 2000).

Dong-A confirmed that there would be no Presidential Summit in Sydney despite the great
expectation in relation to sport. Nevertheless, Dong-A argued that the South Korean regime
would try its best to draw the best result from the discussions, and supported this idea by
referring to the actors in this effort as ‘we’.

......We will do our best to reach an agreement on the North and South Korean joint
marching, joint cheer team and using the flag of the Korean peninsula at the last
minute. Furthermore, we also work towards the organising of one team for North and
South Korea in each sport......

(Dong-A 7, September, 2000)

While Hankyoreh and Dong-A predicted a bright future after a joint march in the Sydney
Olympic Games, Hankyoreh quoted Samaranch as saying that the IOC still had not received
confirmation from North Korea that it would participate in the joint march, but it would wait
until the last minute. Hankyoreh also presented the strong will of the South Korean, Kim Un
Young, who expected good news from North Korea. The wish of KSA (Korean Sport
Association) president would be the same as that of Hankyoreh (Hankyoreh 7, September,
2000). The uncertainty of a joint march showed how unpredictable the result of the dialogue between North and South Korea would be, and the difficulty of achieving this ‘symbolic’ conclusion. Nevertheless, even Dong-A expressed its expectation of the joint march, since by that time Koreans accepted the situation as finalised. And Dong-A added that the joint march could be realised if the South Korean representative was more flexible. Surprisingly, Dong-A encouraged South Korea’s active attitude towards a compromise. This implied how important it was to South Korean society to make the joint march a reality.

......There is still a high possibility that the North and South Korean teams will march together in the Olympic opening ceremony. At this moment, the problems are the number of people who will be marching and which flag to use.

(Dong-A 8, September, 2000-2)

When the joint march was reconfirmed, Dong-A explained how the news came out at Hankyoreh and Dong-A. It was ‘agreed’ in the 111th IOC session, but North Korea changed its mind at the last minute by not sending any sign of its confirmation to the IOC. This was a very serious matter not only for the Presidents of North and South Korea, but also for the president of the IOC, as he became involved in the ‘pointless promise' which made Koreans dream about a symbolic national reunification (Dong-A 14, September, 2000-1).

The Sydney Morning Herald released an article with the title ‘North and South Korea would march together toward a national unification’. Korean people who lived in Australia arranged their schedule to cheer for the North and South Korean teams. Particularly, Dong-A reported the scene of a joint training session between North and South Korean players. It was shown that the announcement of the joint march became the North and South Korean players’ excuse to claim that they were part of this symbolic unification, thus allowing them to show a warmer attitude toward each other based on a shared national identity.

......North Korean player Choi has trained together with South Korean players from 11th......Coach Kim has a good manner so he gets along well with coaches from South Korea. He said generously that ‘Why do we have to avoid each other? At the end of the day, far from the political conflicts, we are one ethnicity.’......

(Dong-A 14, Septemberl, 2000-2)

North Korean IOC member Chang said that this joint march was not a result of the effort made by the IOC, but the fruit of the Presidential Summit between North and South Korea.
This reflected the independent character of North Korea, which consistently emphasised that there should be no foreign power allowed to intervene in a ‘national’ matter (Hankyoreh 14, September, 2000-1). Thus, based on the ethnic nationalism, North Korea saw North and South Korea together as a nation when they were against intervention by international powers. North and South Korea’s joint march was compared to the East and West German case even though they participated in the Olympic Games three times as one team. East and West Germany was one of the models which North and South Korea needed to consider as a model of unification. Thus, in a sport relations perspective, the East and West German case was mentioned and compared.

……North and South Korea decided to do the joint march in a symbolic place of peace, the Sydney Olympics…….This is the first time in Olympic history that the divided nation is represented by separate teams but is marching together……

(Hankyoreh 14, September, 2000-2)

Hankyoreh described the scene of North and South Korean people gathering in Sydney. This could be unique to the sporting event, which could have been easily compromised since it was not directly, but symbolically, significant for national unity. Additionally, people were directly included in the process, and people in sport were the main actors in this ‘symbolic scene’, thus they could amplify the impact of the interactions. North and South Korean people had not normally been allowed to have direct contact with each other; therefore they must have been excited to be in the middle of this ‘historical’ moment.

……The head of North Korea, Yoon, carefully brought out Vodka and said ‘Let’s drink; we must celebrate this historical event.’ …..the head of South Korea, Lee, said ‘It is an unforgettable night, we could not imagine this even just a few days ago, and we hope to have similarly great memories from other area such as politics, society and culture,’……

(Hankyoreh 14, September, 2000-3)

The encounter between the people of North and South Korea was shown in archery training as well. This demonstrated that sporting events have more of a chance to enable communication between North and South Korean people, since the sporting competition was an additional common issue they could share based on their shared national identity.

……Last 11th, North and South Korean archery players had a joint training session and helped each other. The South Korean team will give presents to the North Korean team of Korean bows since North Korea has used bows from the USA,’……

(Hankyoreh 15, September, 2000)
For the North and South Korean joint march in the Sydney Olympic Games, ‘Arirang’ was played as the theme song. This was the first time that this Korean folk song ‘Arirang’ was delivered from North Korea to South Korea as a sheet of music, although the recording was arranged by South Korea to be officially played at the Games.

……Our North and South Korean players marched together with the big Korean flag which has the Korean peninsula on it. And the Orchestra played the Korean folk song ‘Arirang’. The AP broadcast that this was the first joint marching in the Olympics and this has a symbolic meaning for North and South Korean reconciliation……

(Roh-Dong 17, Sept.2000-1)

6.3.3 The 2002 World Cup and Other Football Matches

As for the football matches during 2002 World Cup, the president of KFA, Chung, requested that North Korea allow the use of Pyongyang Neunglado 5.1 Stadium for the event. Over concern for the scheduling of all the matches, South Korea suggested North Korea host two events from the total 32. He also suggested organising ‘a unified team’ for the Asian Cup in October and the 2001 Argentina World Youth Football Match. Hankyoreh projected that the realisation of organising a ‘unified team’ for the 2002 World Cup was not far away (Hankyoreh 16, June, 2000-2). Officially, North Korea failed to pass the preliminary rounds, but the AFC (Asian Football Confederation) gave permission to North Korean players to participate in the matches if it became part of a single team with South Korean players. This showed how flexible the governance of the international sport organisation had been in the matter of North and South Korean sport relations compared to the hard political aspect of international relations.

Dong-A was relatively negative about the potential of sharing some of the matches of the 2002 World Cup due to the time limitation. The article also added that North Korea wanted this very much. Dong-A perceived that there was a conflict of opinions within the leadership of FIFA. Thus, North Korea’s decision needed to be made quickly in order to have time to develop an international consensus.
North Korea proposed to host the discussion with South Korea and FIFA concerning the matter of the 2002 World Cup dispatch. Hankyoreh pointed out that South Korea’s attitude in this discussion was important, since this would affect other issues such as organising one team for the Sydney Olympic Games (Hankyoreh 13, July, 2000). This showed that the tone of Hankyoreh was hopeful unlike that of Dong-A. Dong-A argued that there was not enough time to discuss issues relating to the 2002 World Cup, but Hankyoreh claimed that the discussion would have a positive influence on the matter of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games.

The revival of the Seoul-Pyongyang Football exchange was one of the achievements made through the lively interactions between North and South Korea. The following article reveals that North and South Korean officers wanted to have more regular cultural interactions. It was time for the two Koreas to think seriously about how to manage real ‘peace’ between them.

In its article, Hankyoreh reflected the expectation of organising one team for the 46th World Table Tennis Championship. It would have been meaningful since North and South Korea had experienced the taste of victory through playing against China at the 1991 World Table Tennis Championship in Japan. At this time Hankyoreh even received information that North Korea was interested in that issue and that the South Korean minister would discuss this with the North Korean representative while he was in the meeting (Hankyoreh 8, March, 2001-1). The tone of Hankyoreh became softer and its ‘expectation’ of having ‘one team’ was not written in a hurry to label it as a symbolic achievement, but rather in that the hope for ‘one team’ was a ‘fresh and light’ wish under a more relaxed and patient mood.
Nevertheless, Hankyoreh emphasised that if the ‘one team’ was successfully organised then this could be ‘real progresses in North and South Korean sport relations (Hankyoreh 15, March, 2001).

Dong-A pointed out the impact of the US-North Korean relations, which influenced North Korea’s decision-making in relation to South Korean policy on certain issues. Dong-A explained that North Korea’s stance in its interaction with South Korea had changed according to its relations with the US and provided an analysis that North Korea was more influenced by its relations with the US than the progress made through its relations with South Korea (Dong-A 15, March, 2001-2).

……The Unification football match has started with the excitement of the participants, and both teams’ players have fought together well with the motive of contributing to our national pride and advancing unification……

(Roh-Dong 2, May, 2001-5)

Unlike Roh-Dong’s interests in the ‘workers’ football matches’, Dong-A revealed that the South Korean president of KSA hoped for North Korea to participate in the Busan Asian Games. Since South Korea failed to invite North Korea to the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, this became the third opportunity to invite North Korea to participate in an international sporting event hosted by South Korea.

……The president of the Korean Sport Association Kim Un Young came back from Pyongyang after a 4 day visit to North Korea and said at a press conference on the night of the 22nd that ‘It has been revealed that North Korea is considering its participation in the Busan Asian Games positively.’……

(Dong-A 23, June, 2001)

6.3.4 The failure of establishing a unified team for the World Table Tennis Championships

Particularly, the movements at this time of North and South Korea’s strong allies, such as Russia and the USA respectively, significantly influenced the decisions made by North and South Korea. The nationalistic voice revealed in this article by Dong-A implies that as one nation, North and South Korea needed to keep their sovereignty to themselves, against foreign intervention.
Putin, the president of Russia, stated on the 20th that peace on the Korean peninsula must be dealt with by the Korean people themselves, and in that sense, the historical presidential summit of North and South Korea is very important. Along with this, North and South Korea agreed that we should not allow foreign intervention and should solve the unification issues by ourselves under the guidelines of ‘6.15 declaration.

(Dong-A 21, July, 2000)

The private-led sport interactions between North and South Korea were dominantly conducted through professional sports teams owned by a private corporation such as Hyundai’s basketball team and Samsung’s table tennis team. Hyundai offered to construct an indoor stadium and Samsung was known to have provided an electronic scoreboard. With corporate entities, the scale of interactions were small, but were multifaceted.

(Dong-A 29, July, 2000)

Hankyoreh emphasised the significance of this table tennis interaction and recalled the experience of organising one team for the 1991 World Table Tennis Championship. Hankyoreh used the metaphor of ‘small unification’ for this interaction, and this is an indication of the discourse which reflected the connection between sporting relations and unification in North and South Korea (Hankyoreh 29, July, 2000-1). The 6.15 statement was about independent decision-making around North and South Korean relations. Nevertheless, the discussion between North and South Korea about organising a unified team for the 46th World Table Tennis Championship was cancelled. In consequence, this became a case in which sport relations could not overcome the political blockages between North and South Korea.

(Hankyoreh 30, March, 2001)

Even though organising a unified team for North and South Korea had failed, North and South Korean Sports officials and players in Osaka felt that they were one ethnic group and expressed a special attachment to one another (Dong-A 24, April, 2001). Since the North and South Korean people could communicate in the same Korean language, they could
interact and communicate when they were in the same location. Hankyoreh even referred to the North and South Korean Table Tennis players as ‘sisters’. This showed how strong an ethnic based nationalism was implied in Hankyoreh (Hankyoreh 27, April, 2001). There was an interview with the Korean international referee, Lee who also called North and South Korean players ‘daughters’ and expressed his sincere admiration for them. Despite the great performance by North and South Korean players in the finals, he admitted that this sporting confrontation itself was a ‘tragedy’ to all Koreans (Hankyoreh 28, April, 2001).

6.4 The 2002 Busan Asian Games

The second joint march of North and South Korean teams at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games was agreed at the IOC session. The president of KSA and IOC member for South Korea, Kim, announced that he obtained a positive answer from the IOC member for North Korea, Mr Chang. It would be much easier for North and South Korea to agree on a second joint march as they had experienced a positive outcome in a joint march at the Sydney Olympic Games (Dong-A 14, December, 2001). Unfortunately, the planned joint march at the Salt Lake Winter Olympic Games was cancelled. Dong-A explained that this was due to the oppressive attitude of the President of the USA toward North Korea. In any case, North Korea was not so active in relation to the Winter Olympics (Dong-A 5, February, 2002). Nevertheless, it was regrettable that North and South Korea’s agreement on the joint march at the event failed to bear fruit.

North Korean newspapers in Japan expressed Korean nationalism by mentioning the victory of the South Korean football team against the USA. Even though North Korea could not co-host this World Cup, North Korean newspapers mentioned “South Korea’s football performance” as a tool to spread ‘Korean national power’. Moreover, it added that this could bring national unification ‘closer’ (Hankyoreh 11, June, 2002).
6.4.1 North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games

Hankyoreh had a more positive opinion on the possible participation of North Korea in the Busan Asian Games. This reflects the strong confidence it had in its North Korean source (Hankyoreh 23, June, 2001). Dong-A argued that North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games could become a historical moment. This seemed to not only reflect the wishes of Dong-A, since the organising committee for the Busan Asian Games planned the route of the torch relay to begin from the northernmost border of North Korean territory to the bottom tip of the southern peninsula. The torch from the North Korean region would be handed over to South Korea at the DMZ. This in itself conveyed that North and South Korea could hold this event with a shared supportive approach.

......It is the first time that North Korea will participate in an international match which will be hosted in South Korea. In particular the organising committee have a plan to get the torch from Chongjin Baekdu Mountain on the North Korean side to Baekrokdam of Hanra Mountain on the South Korean side followed by a historical meeting in DMZ, JSA......

(Dong-A 5, August, 2002)

The Busan Asian Games would become the first international sporting event to which North Korea would dispatch its players. Hankyoreh explained that the scene of gathering North and South Korean people together would portray the power of the Korean people. Despite the current conflict between North and South Korea, Hankyoreh strongly emphasised that this sporting event would become an opportunity for the reconciliation of the Korean ethnic group (Hankyoreh 5, August, 2002-2).

The circumstances of the international relations surrounding North and South Korea are illustrated in the article of Hankyoreh. The USA restrained from commenting on the future of North and South Korean relations. The newspaper Yomiun in PRC projected a negative mood in North and South Korean relations, due to the military tension in the West Sea of South Korea. The Japanese newspaper, the Mainichi, by contrast had a relatively positive stance on the relation between North and South Korea, but was still cautious of the existence of oppositional voices in South Korea. These different perspectives on the North
and South Korean relations reflected the different positions of the nations which surrounded the Korean peninsula (Hankyoreh 6, August, 2002-1). Dong-A agreed on the significance of North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games (Dong-A 10, August, 2002-1). This influenced the sponsorship of the Games since the exposure of North Korea to this event drew attention from the media internationally. Particularly, as an exception, North Korea announced that a ‘Cheer Team’ would be dispatched as well (Dong-A 10, August, 2002-2). This in its own right was interesting enough to attract attention from the world.

The first visit by North Korean people caused many concerns for the South Korean regime; particularly, the conservative group was worried that the visit would provide a socialist boost in South Korean society through exposing its flag. Hankyoreh cast aside these concerns, and quoted the opinion of an ordinary citizen about the visit. Showing North Korea’s flag while North Korean people cheer for their team would make South Korean people more familiar with North Koreans and their attitudes. Furthermore, considering that this sort of situation would occur during a sporting event, it would be unlikely that this would affect South Korean people’s preference of political ideology. Rather, Hankyoreh wanted to emphasise the meaning of the North Korean cheer team for particular reasons, such as stressing national identity (Hankyoreh 14, August, 2002).

North and South Korea had official talks about North Korea’s participation at the Busan Asian Games. According to the summary made by South Korea, North Korea’s participation was considered to have great potential not only for the South Korean regime, but also for the AOC (Asian Olympic Committee). Domestically, North and South Korean unity at a peaceful sport event was a first, and internationally, breaking the record of the number of participants in the Asian Games would be an achievement attributable to the Olympics.

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<th>Table 6.1</th>
<th>The 1st – 2nd Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The 1st – 2nd Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games Participation</td>
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231
Nevertheless, South Korea's enthusiasm for North Korea's participation in the Games was limited. According to the summary of the Talks, South Korea insisted on having a separate entrance at the Game’s venue if North Korea decided to participate in the Games. South Korea commented that since this event would be held in the Korean peninsula, North and South Korea needed to enter separately. It can be assumed that South Korea considered that this sporting event could 'symbolically' represent North and South Korean unity, but not reflect the real intention behind political unification by showing the scene in the Korean peninsula.

In the South Korean summary, North Korea seemed determined to insist on a joint march during the opening ceremony and on both using the same flag. North Korea’s voice was expressed particularly strongly, not with particularly forceful words, but with an unusually soft tone given North Korea’s normal way of speaking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>2002.08.17-19/08.26-28</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>The Geumgang Mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>The South Korean government and Busan city council positively forecasted North Korea's participation of the Games, under the estimate that if North Korea participates in the 14th Asian Games, then it becomes the first Games in which all member states of the OCA will have participated and also provides a good chance to show our nation’s unity and harmony to the world.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>The 1st–2nd Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>2002.08.17-19/08.26-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>The Geumgang Mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Our side said that it is proper to march separately in the opening ceremony since this game is held in the Korean Peninsula…….</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>The 1st–2nd Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>2002.08.17-19/08.26-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>The Geumgang Mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>North Korea said that doing a joint march and using one flag are a ‘fundamental issue’ and a ‘prior issue’ upon which there can be no compromise…….</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The two Koreas could not reach an agreement about the joint march, it being opposed by South Korea. The decision was simply described in the summary of the Talks in a dry tone. It is explained in the summary that both teams would wear the uniform that was worn at the Sydney Olympics.

Even though the joint march was realised as North Korea insisted, each athlete of the North and South Korean team represented their own nation, thus when they won a medal, each nation’s flag would be raised and anthem performed. This was a symbolic reference to the ‘unseen’ national identity of Korea.

The following article from Dong-A reveals the discourse concerning the “Korean Peninsula flag”. In regards to North Korea’s participation in the Busan Asian Games and the joint march of North and South Korea, North Korea’s decision seemed significant. However, as a host nation, it was hard for South Korea to give up the chance of using its own national flag for national pride. Thus, it was implied that South Korea did want to present a scene of a harmonious Korean peninsula. This meant that there could be a potential conflict between North and South Korea about using the Korean peninsula flag for the Games.

**Table 6.4** The 1st – 2nd Administrative work Contact for the Busan Asian Games-4

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<th>Content</th>
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<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
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……However, North Korea must understand the ‘significant meaning’ of why South Korea accepted this ‘Korean Peninsular flag’ proposal even though there was domestic pressure. What South Korea ‘gave up’ in not using the South Korean flag solely as a
host country showed 'a willingness to make this event a real grounds for reconciliation of North and South Korea.....

(Dong-A 30, August, 2002-1)

Dong-A made an observation that the military tension between North and South Korea seemed to decrease by the time the discussion of the Unification Football Match and Asian Games were held. By making a convincing argument based on the ethnic nationalism of Korea, Dong-A expressed its support for Korean Unification unusually. The belief in diplomatic sporting interactions between North and South Korea seemed to have grown since the last two decades during which the differences between North and South Korea were overcome through sporting interactions.

......The real significance of the North and South Korean sport event is that it overcomes North and South Korean differences and recovers National Identity......We are expecting to see a touching scene in which those people of Korean ethnicity shout for a 'Unified Korea' as one voice......

(Dong-A 5, September, 2002)

By this time, North Korea also showed its excitement at visiting South Korea through Roh-Dong. The director of the North Korean team, Lee, expressed that his belief in ethnic nationalism of Korea was tangible. Through the 2002 North and South Korean Football Matches, North and South Korean sport people were actually coming and going between the two countries under the theme of ‘unification’ (Roh-Dong 6, Sept. 2002-1).

The 14th Busan Asian Games torch relay route implied how Korean ethnic identity is represented across the boundaries of the territory. It was from the top of the North, Baekdu and Keumgang Mountain, to the tip of the South, the host city, Busan. Roh-Dong emphasised that this torch relay route and the mountains had a nationally symbolic meaning for Korean ethnicity, with the mountains all being on the North Korean side (Roh-Dong 7, Sept. 2002). Thus, the territorial division of North and South Korea was symbolically connected through the torch relay for this sport event. That explains why Roh-Dong described the torch as ‘the patriotic fire of National Unity’. Roh-Dong explained that the sporting event between North and South Korea represented a ‘Will for Unification’. One of the characteristics of sports is the ability to establish national unity and people’s sense of
unity. Roh-Dong reported that the sporting event between the two Koreas could imply the wish for national unification. Moreover, Roh-Dong’s view on the political statement of 6.15 can be found in this article. The 6.15 statement was recognised as a contributor to this sport interaction between North and South Korea.

......The 2002 North and South Korean Unification Football match became a great opportunity to represent a concrete will for unification of the strong nation and was followed by the 6.15 statements which encouraged trust between North and South Korean sport people......

(Roh-Dong 8, Sept. 2002)

North Korean players recognised themselves to be on a ‘diplomatic’ mission for North Korea at the Asian Games. Although the division between North and South Korea was clearly apparent, a strong will for the reconciliation of national unity was present as well. As a way of expressing the intimacy of a shared national identity, North Korean players delivered good wishes from North Korea. The statement also showed a consistent political wish for ‘national unification’. Dong-A was reluctant to admit this as the newspaper’s perspective, and instead cited direct comments made by North Korean people.

......On their arrival statement, they said that “North Korean people have sent their best regards to all South Koreans and we will do our best to show our will for unification and national power’......

(Dong-A 24, September, 2002)

The controversial dispute, concerning North Korea’s flag in South Korea is revealed in the following article. Under these circumstances, Hankyoreh reminded readers that this was a radical transformation of the relations between North and South Korea; from the tension of war to the joint march undertaken at the Games. Moreover, it is considered an ‘out-dated’ result of the Cold War if the situation of North and South Korea is portrayed as the two Koreas having antagonism toward each other. The side that fully welcomed this change in the relations between North and South Korea fundamentally accepted the ethnic national identity of Korea.

......We are warmly welcoming North Korean players under the name of Korean ethnicity......This is the first time that North Korea has sent a great number of players to South Korea for an international match......The North Korean flag will be displayed under the permission of South Korea and their cheer team can use the flag as well......There are some people who do not agree on a North and South Korean joint march under the Korean peninsula flag and the display of the North Korean flag under
Like Hankyoreh, Roh-Dong also emphasised the unity of North and South Korea that was realised through this sporting event. This could be one of the cases where Hankyoreh and Roh-Dong admitted to the same primordial nationalism as a reason for national unification (Roh-Dong 24, Sept. 2002). Dong-A tended not to express its own view of the North and South Korean sporting events; Instead, it rather described the scene of the people at the sporting venue. Through the sporting event, the scene of North and South Korean people communicating was portrayed in media such as Dong-A. It particularly used terms like ‘warmly’ and ‘lively’, thus the North and South Korean sporting relation was looking positive.

......In many sports such as table tennis, gymnastics, shooting and rowing in which they trained today, North and South Korean players have met each other and shared conversation warmly. South Korea’s rowing team coach Son has shared greetings with North Korean coach Choi and they cheered each other just for a short time, but it was lively......

(Dong-A 25, September, 2002)

The participation of North Korea in the Busan Asian Games encouraged North and South Korea to expect an image of unity between the two Koreas. Idealistically, Hankyoreh pictured the warm atmosphere at the sporting venue and the accommodation in which the athletes would stay together. However, the South Korean government viewed the circumstances of the North Korean players differently (Hankyoreh 26, September, 2002). They seemed to believe that North Korean players needed to be ‘protected’ such as the South Korean players would be if they were visiting North Korea. Hankyoreh criticised the South Korean regime’s policy and rigid attitude.

The official name of the flag in Korean is the ‘Korean Peninsula Flag (Han Ban Do Gi)’. Hankyoreh emphasised the ethnic nationalism behind the flag, but Roh-Dong interpreted the meaning of the flag, which has one colour, as a political goal of Korean ethnic nationalism to be accomplished.

......When the North and South Korea jointly marched, the Busan Asian Games stadium seemed almost to explode. The Korean Peninsula flag, the North Korean flag and the South Korean flag were displayed all together among the spectators and it was
such a melting pot. There is no ideology and there are no nationalities only the same faces and same languages……there is only ‘one ethnicity’ (Hankyoreh in Korean)’. There is no border in the background music Arirang…… (Hankyoreh 30, September, 2002)

6.4.2 North and South Korean Peoples’ Contact through the Games

Other than appealing for a policy of appeasement toward North Korean players and dealing with big and small issues, Hankyoreh also tried to show the practical aspects of North and South Korean interactions during the Games in cases of cooperation during the sporting events. The Games were like two sides of the same coin: players were competing but also sharing tips on how to perform better during training sessions before matches, which implied more than a simple interaction between players from the two Koreas.

......North and South Korean gymnasts have trained together. They provided training materials such as 'sugar water' which is used for preventing slippery hands...... (Hankyoreh 27, September, 2002)

Roh-Dong reported that North and South Korean sports players were under the ‘unification flag’. Moreover, the paper stated that the players were also welcomed by a cheering squad that waved the ‘unification flag’. The positive image of unification that was illustrated by Roh-Dong also encouraged people to recognise their national identity as a unified Korea. Since the flag was used in 1991 in Chiba for the United Table Tennis Team, North and South Korea used this flag to jointly march at the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games (Roh-Dong 30, Sept.2002).

North and South Korea marched together in the opening ceremony under the same flag and anthem. Nevertheless, this didn’t mean that North and South Korea became the ‘Korea team’. Thus, whenever North Korea or South Korea won a medal during the Games, competitors on both sides experienced the clear division between North and South Korea by seeing different national flags, and listening to different national anthems. At the same time, this self-recognition touched the people’s emotional attachment to the Korean ethnicity, and it made people express their wish of national unity with tears. A scene was described of
North Korean players and South Korean people being touched by the North Korean national anthem.

......The first Gold medallist for North Korea, Lee, has made a wish reminding us of the meaning of this event, which is ‘national unification’, by saying that ‘I hope this medal can contribute to unification.’ Lee started to cry when the first North Korean anthem first played in the stadium. Other North Korean supporters also cried. And South Korean people who cheered the North Korean Lee had tears in their eyes. They also made a big applause the first time the North Korean anthem was heard......

(Dong-A 2, October, 2002-1)

Roh-Dong, instead of differentiating between people from North and South Korea, emphasised one Korean ethnicity as the ultimate goal of political unification, even though Roh-Dong called North Korean players ‘our players’. And it also called North and South Korean people ‘Korean’ and told us that the song titled ‘we are one’ was sung.

......Our player Lee had won the women’s lifting Gold medal, breaking the World record, and the Korean people again waved the unification flag, and sang the song <we are the one> and congratulated her......

(Roh-Dong 2, Oct. 2002-1)

The position of Hankyoreh seemed to be in the middle between Dong-A and Roh-Dong. The paper reported the victories of both North and South Korea when they won a medal in Judo, and also referred to them as ‘we’. This article reflects the national positioning of North and South Korea as separate entities.

......It was a day of North and South Korean Judo......We won all 4 medals......

(Hankyoreh 3, October, 2002-1)

Hankyoreh reported that there was a small quarrel between the people from North and South Korea concerning the matter of how to refer to one another. A North Korean competitor raised this issue with a South Korean journalist and requested that they call them by their official national name. South Korea referred to the two sides as ‘North Korea and South Korea’, while North Korea called the two sides “North Cho Sun and South Cho Sun”. This is related to the self-legitimacy of nation building, as each were naming themselves after their inheritance from the dynasty of united Korea before becoming colonised. The official name of South Korea is Republic of Korea and North Korea is Democratic People’s Republic of Cho Sun. This could be one of the cases that represent Korean ethnic nationalism(Hankyoreh 3, October, 2002-2). Despite the many parts of North and South
Korea that represent their common national identity through ethnicity, culture and language, nationalism is apparent in each political entity through the selection of different names.

North Korean Judo player Kye’s match reminded the North and South Korean people of a strong attachment as a single ethnic group. Even though there were several differences between North and South Korea, the matches against foreign players made people from both sides cheer together as if they were one nation (Hankyoreh 3, October, 2002-3). There were situations in which North and South Korea would confront each other, but whenever they faced a foreign power, the fundamental unity of North and South Korea was revealed. Hankyoreh particularly used the word ‘power’ which showed that it was convinced by the effect of the ‘situation’.

At this time, Roh-Dong also focused on the results of North Korean athletes, and it became an issue that the good performances of North Korean players were broadcast on South Korean media. Since the Games were held in South Korea, it looked natural that the victories and excellent performances achieved by all participating nations would be broadcast. Particularly, as North Korea was a ‘special’ guest of the Games, the media of South Korea was interested in North Korea’s performance.

......Our player Ham has been prominent in the South Korean media since she won the Women’s marathon ......Ham said in the interview that <Kim Jong Il had waited for my winning news, so I was very touched>

(Roh-Dong 16, Oct. 2002-2)

Hankyoreh referred to it as playing a role in adding impetus to North and South Korean relations. This shows that the South Korean media was aware of its impact on political relations related to sport issues.

......The participation of North Korea is a great achievement of these Games...... Hankyoreh played a great role here. We have done our best to deliver North and South Korean reconciliation......

(Hankyoreh 17, October, 2002)

Hankyoreh broadcast the positive views of South Korean people concerning North Koreans who visited South Korea to cheer for the North Korean team in the Busan Asian Games.
This became the official route for civilians of North and South Korea to contact one another, and therefore, another possibility that could happen through this sport event was captured. Hankyoreh seemed to be aware that there was not only positive opinion among the public in this private encounter between North and South Korea. Some of the South Korean media also pictured negative aspects of these visits. Some said that the members of the North Korean cheering squad were too pretty so it became a criticism of the anti-feminist social environment of North Korea.

......The North Korean cheer team was the star of the Busan Asian Games. Wherever they were, lots of people gathered and media even from abroad were busily filming them......The young people who are products of the Cold War conflicts that North Korea experienced had more ideas about unification......But there were negative views as well......Nevertheless, they could not deny the impact of the Games on the spirit of peace and harmony which is needed for unification......

(Hankyoreh 25, December, 2002)

6.4.3 The Impact of the Games

The following script of an interviewee from South Korea clearly represents the view of Hankyoreh, in terms of the effect of the match, as a way of re-constructing the national identity of individual Koreans. The action of the sport was expressed discursively in terms used by Hankyoreh such as “reconciliation and harmony” to describe the match between North and South Korea.

......The North Korean Cheer Team bowed to the South Korean spectators before they started to cheer, and received great applause......Kim who brought his 6 year old daughter to the stadium said that ‘I came to show my child that North and South Korean matches are not about conflict but concern reconciliation and harmony and I certainly felt more than excitement for sport, which was rather touching.’......

(Hankyoreh 4, October, 2002)

Dong-A reported that there was an irresistible urge to cheer for ‘both Koreas’ when they achieved the medals. Dong-A even expressed an expectation of reconciliation between North and South Korea, which could show the intention of Dong-A to support the present South Korean regime’s policy toward North Korea (Dong-A 5, October, 2002-2). Hankyoreh did not stop ‘cheering’ North and South Korea and named the day ‘Korean day’, a term which has potential to be used in other similar situations.

......This was a ‘Korean day’, the North and South Korean gymnasts flew high......
The new trend of discussions about North Korea and North Korean people emerged on the internet. It seems that there were enormous changes in the discursive environment in South Korea even though this occurred in internet-based communication. Moreover, Hankyoreh publicised the existence of this type of discussion, thus it became part of the revealed history of North and South Korea.

Atypically, Dong-A released the words spoken by the North Korean IOC member Chang when he congratulated the organisers of the Busan Asian Games. The reason that this article cited Chang was that he represented the views of North Korea commenting on the concept of national unity between North and South Korea.

During the North and South Korean matches, the political slogan ‘National Unification’ was revealed as the real desire of North and South Korea. ‘National unification’ became the public aspiration as North and South Korea confronted each other on the football field (Roh-Dong 10, Oct. 2002-1). Even though they were competing against each other on the football field, the competition made people yearn for the ‘political’ unification of the nation. People may have felt that the physical division between the teams did not accord with their Korean identity, which was spiritually united. One more condition of North and South Korean relations was revealed through a Dong-A article, which was about the financial cost of North Korea’s participation in the Games. This showed one special circumstance of the North and South Korean relations in which South Korea gave some sort of material reward for North Korea’s positive response to North-South Korean interactions. Nevertheless, in the case of sport relations,
The South Korean government has decided to pay the expenses, 2,120,000,000 won (about 1,177,780 Pounds) of the North Korean players and Cheer Team in the name of North and South Korean cooperation......

(Dong-A 12, October, 2002)

The Busan Asian Games became more significant since they made history through having all the member countries including North Korea participating in the Games. As the host city, Busan in South Korea put great efforts into achieving this level of participation and must have had full support from the national government. The conduct of sport relations between North and South Korea at this time was led by the NOC in South Korea rather than by the main government administration, and the NOC was less obliged to be concerned about the boundaries of political ideology or other differences. The North’s wholehearted participation was taken as a major indicator of success, in particular because it was in an Asian Games in South Korea that

......It is the first time that North Korea has participated with such a great number of players.'......

(Dong-A 15, October, 2002-1)

The flexibility of sport relations can be captured in the attitude of the North Korea IOC member Mr Chang, who, as an IOC member had the freedom to express his views concerning the Busan Asian Games. He was known as the key North Korean person in the area of sport and became the IOC member during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics together with Lee of South Korea. Mr Chang stated openly that the North Korea participation was not planned because it best suited North Korea’s (political) position, rather it was done to promote the realisation of positive relations between North and South Korea which as suggested in the 6.15 Statement1. He also mentioned the positive impression of Dong-A, since he knew that Dong-A had traditionally taken a nationalistic stance against Japan. This implied that Korean nationalism involved not simply cohesion of North and South but also an element of exclusion of other ethnicities, particularly the Japanese because of its colonial history, but also the US with its own more recent history of imperialism (Dong-A 15, October, 2002-2).

1 This is the statement announce by the President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea in 1988 for initiative of North and South Korean dialogue for the new era and suggests six practical principles.
Even though Dong-A showed a change in its attitude to the South Korean government’s policy on relations with the North, moving from disapproval to support, Hankyoreh confirmed that enhancing sporting relations would promote the unity of ‘Korean National identity’ (Hankyoreh 15, October, 2002). Dong-A legitimated its shift to support for promoting sporting relations between North and South by appealing to ‘nationalism’.

6.5 The 2003 Daegu Summer Universidad

6.5.1 Chung Ju Young Stadiums in Pyongyang

In the following article, Dong-A named the joint march of North and South Korea at the Aomori Winter Asian Games as a ‘small unification’ (Jak Eun Tong II, ‘작은 통일’) rather than a ‘symbolic unification’ (Sang Jing Jeuk Tong II, ‘상징적 통일’). This could be considered a significant development in the expressions used by Dong-A, since ‘small unification’ implied a ‘unification’ that included political and cultural aspects. It is also meaningful in that the status of the international sporting event and the performance of both North and South Korea was given great value by media such as Dong-A.

......North and South Korea have achieved a ‘small unification’ by jointly marching in the opening ceremony of the 5th Aomori Winter Asian Games......
(Dong-A 3, February, 2003)

Several major issues in North and South Korean sporting relations had been resolved after a series of sporting events. North and South Korean athletes practiced for the games together, and the players drew closer to one another as time went by. The athletes felt that these interactions were beneficial, and they welcomed joint training sessions. Nevertheless, the athletes were restrained from developing relations beyond sport (Hankyoreh 8, February, 2003).

Another significant feature that is apparent within the North and South Korean sporting relations at this time was the positive mutual support for hosting an international sporting event. The following article reflects North Korean support for South Korea’s Pyongchang bid
for the Winter Olympics proposing the possibility of a unified team. This was shown to be an efficient way of cooperating since the president of the IOC recognised it as a ‘contribution of sport to Humanity’.

......North Korea announced that they supported the 2010 Pyongchang Winter Olympics, and the possibility of organising a unified team of North and South Korea for the Athens Games......The effort of working for North and South Korean reconciliation will be a great help......Jacque Rogge also said that ‘this is a great proof that sport can contribute to humanity’.

(Hankyoreh 17, May, 2003)

The peaceful mood between North and South Korea was supported by their private relations in sports. The legacy of the Hyundai Company Chairman, Chung, continued after his death. The newly built stadium that was named after him became the opportunity to hold a North and South Korean unification basketball match which had not been held for the last four years (Hankyoreh 3, July, 2003). Nevertheless, the response from abroad had a different tone. The emphasis on peace between North and South Korea in cooperating to host the Pyongchang Olympics became a ‘political gesture’, which reflected the changes in international circumstances of the time in contrast to the Cold War era. This claim also implied that the Olympics valued ‘universalism’ (promoting shared interests and participation by all) over the narrow ‘political’ agendas of certain nations, though its reception by the IOC members was described as cool by Dong-A.

......Pyongchang emphasised the slogan the ‘Peace Olympics’ which was seen by the IOC members as ‘too political’......

(Dong-A 4, July, 2003)

However, these sporting matters brought to the fore once more political issues between the two Koreas, such as the flying of national flags during the matches. The Korean Peninsula flag had been used to represent ‘the two’ but this could only operate at the level of symbolic representation rather representation of the nation state. This harked back to the previous discussion in South Korea of the relatively recent past about whether or not it would allow the flying of the North Korean flag before a South Korean audience at the Busan Asian Games (Hankyoreh 7, July, 2003). South Korea decided to send young people to the opening ceremony of the Chung Ju Young Stadium, thus the legacy of sport interaction through the Universiad Games influenced the scheduling of further interactions between
North and South Korea (Hankyoreh 10, July, 2003). From a private perspective, Chung Ju Young left a great legacy on North and South Korean relations in terms of taking the lead in building on sporting relations between North and South Korea, through for example hosting a 'unification basketball match' for the opening ceremony of the Chung Ju Young stadium in Pyongyang (Hankyoreh 4, September, 2003).

The occasion of the unification basketball match became an opportunity to create greater interaction through broadcasting on both North and South Korean networks. It was the first time that North Korea had accepted South Korean broadcast staff and facilities who had previously been refused entry to North Korea through the Demilitarised Zone.

"...SBS (Seoul Broadcast System) will broadcast the Unification Basketball match at the Chung Ju Young Stadium opening ceremony on the 7th from half past 2 to half past 3... SBS said 'this is the first time that we will bring two broadcast cars to North Korea through the DMZ. And this is different to previous broadcasting experience in North Korea when we used North Korea's facilities. This time we will bring our set, costumes and light facilities.'..."

(Hankyoreh 20, September, 2003)

The ‘famous’ ‘Cows visit of North Korea’ was announced during this period, which was an event that became possible since it was organised on a private level with 'pure' private friendship based on the ethnic attachment.

"...1, 100 people from South Korea will visit North Korea by road on the 6th. These people will visit the opening ceremony of Chung Ju Young Stadium and will come back to South Korea on the 9th by road. On this occasion one hundred cows will be donated [to the North] by Hyundai Constructions and Hyundai Motors..."

(Hankyoreh 6, October, 2003)

The staging of the unification basketball game and the opening ceremony for the Chung Ju Young stadium received a positive response from both Hankyoreh, and Dong-A. Hyundai gave added value to this occasion by acknowledging this initiative as providing new impetus for the development of closer North and South Korean relations.

"South Korean people have visited North Korea to participate in the opening ceremony of 'Chung Ju Young stadium' which was invested in by HYUNDAI AH-SAN with North Korea's technical support. This will become an opportunity for the promotion of North and South Korean relations including sport... a representative from HYUNDAI AH-SAN said that 'This will become a new era for North and South Korean relations in culture and sport. And it is significant that the way has been opened for a road to North Korea from South Korea...."

(Dong-A 7, October, 2003)
Roh-Dong agreed that the establishment of the Chung Ju Young stadium had a positive influence on North and South Korean unity in terms of national integration. It is also exceptional since this relationship was developed based on a private partner from South Korea even though the social status of the honourable Chairman Chung and HYUNDAI was in many aspects that of a major public figure.

......North and South Korean Unification Basketball Match will be held in the Ryu Kyung Jung Ju Young Stadium......Spectators had welcomed North and South Korean players, waving the Unification flag and chanting the slogan “We are one (unified)”......North and South Korean basketball players had strengthened the North and South Korean sports people and the proud features of our ethnicity which can create national unity and unification......

(Roh-Dong 8, Oct. 2003)

6.5.2 Participation of North Korea in the Games

Even though North Korea had suggested that it would potentially participate in the Universiad Games, securing its actual participation was not that easy. North Korea officially announced that they would not be participating in the games frustrating the wish of the South Korean people to welcome North Korea to the Games. Dong-A expressed the sadness and regret of the South Korean people at the decision.

......Although North Korea declared its absence from Daegu Olympiad, the organising committee and citizens of Daegu are still preparing to welcome guests from North Korea......Park, who is the South Korean cheer leader for North Korean competitors, said that ‘We have lost our momentum since we prepared to welcome our relatives......We will wait until the last minute. We believe that they will come.’......

(Dong-A 19, August, 2003)

Unlike Dong-A, Hankyoreh did not mention the gloomy future of the Universiad games, but focused on the possibility of North-South cooperation at the Athens Olympics. IOC members from both North and South Korea expressed their support for each other regarding particular sport issues, as well as practical matters that occurred during the establishing of the route for the cross border travel of people on the Korean peninsula.

......North and South Korea have agreed on a joint march and an organising a Unified Team for the Athens Olympics. Kim Un Young (South Korea) and Chang Ung (North Korea) participated in the press conference and proclaimed that ‘we will cooperate in the joint march and organising a Unified Team at the Athens Olympics for peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula’......

(Hankyoreh 21, August, 2003)
In the South Korean government summary of North-South Relations South Korea’s wish to have North Korea participate in the Daegu Universiad Games is well documented. The aim of the organising committee was not only to become a ‘successful host’ of the games, but also to maintain the ‘sustainability of North and South Korean cooperation’, and thus North Korea’s participation in the Games was important to enable the committee to accomplish this aim.

**[Table 6.6] The Administrative work contract for the Daegu Summer Universiad-1**

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What made the Daegu Universiad Organising Committee believe that North Korea’s participation would have a positive influence on the Games is provided in the following description. By having North Korean participation in the 14th Busan Asian Games, South Korea experienced great success not only in the public relations of the Games, but also in establishing a harmonious mood in North and South Korean cooperation. This showed the changes of the South Korean government’s attitude, becoming more flexible in terms of using sport events as a lubricant for the North and South Korean relations.

**[Table 6.7] The Administrative work contract for the Daegu Summer Universiad-2**

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<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
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In order to make North Korea's participation in the Universiad a reality, the organising committee needed to first discuss the matter with FISU and obtain their commitment to support North Korea's participation. This showed the international dimension of inter-Korean
relations, with each organisation having its own view on the diplomacy of North and South Korean relations.

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<th>Table 6.8</th>
<th>The Administrative work contract for the Daegu Summer Universiad-3</th>
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<td><strong>Content</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>The Administrative work Contact for the Daegu Summer Universiad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>2003.07.04-06</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Venue</strong></td>
<td>The Geumgang Mountains</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Summary</strong></td>
<td>First, the organising committee shared the response with FISU concerning North Korea's participation of the Games, and sent an official invitation to North Korea in August of 2002.</td>
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Hankyoreh painted the scene in colours drawn from a palette of primordial nationalism. Hankyoreh tended employ emotive words or expressions when discussing issues of North and South Korean nationalism. People’s individual accounts of the shared national feeling were emphasised.

……Among the North and South Korean players, 322 people cannot be distinguished one from the other, with their common uniform of a bright dark blue upper garment and beige-coloured trousers. North and South Korean players marched together and shared jokes with each other and also ran and chased as if they were university students……The North Korean Cheer Team shouted ‘Unification of our homeland!’ and ‘We are one’……one of the North Korean supporters Kim said that ‘I can feel the warm friendship between Korean nationals.’……

(Hankyoreh 22, August, 2003-2)

The North Korean newspaper, Roh-Dong, also mentioned the participation of North Korea in the Universiad games. The paper reported that the significance of North Korea’s participation in the games originated from a wish for unification rather than being a reflection of the fact that South Korea would be the host of the games. The North Korean newspaper focused on the ethnic nationalism of Korea by mentioning having the same language and culture that provides a rationale for the unification of Koreans.

……North and South Korean players participated together in these Games after overcoming the challenge of anti-unification……

(Roh-Dong 22, Aug. 2003)

The political statement of the North Korean representative also suggested that there was a group of people in South Korea who were against harmonious relations between North and South Korea due to their anti-North Korean political stance. Roh-Dong’s reference to this as
'crazy' clearly illustrates its leanings in terms of nationalism and its desire for national unification (Roh-Dong 25, Aug.2003-2).

The matter of North Korea’s participation in the Daegu Universiad was settled at last after a considerable number of complications. However, following North Korea’s participation in the Games, there was an incident in which some South Koreans burnt North Korean flags, and North Korea sought an official apology from the South Korean government. Despite opposition from members of his cabinet, President Roh of South Korea apologised for the incident. This clearly illustrates the wish of the president and the South Korean regime to continue to have cooperative relations with North Korea. The criticism directed towards the South Korean president concerned that he had apologised after president of the organising committee had already done so. The South Korean government of explained that it wanted to confirm its position both within the Korean peninsula but also to the outside world, as well as to express that political messages should be controlled during sporting events.

…… There was a criticism of president Roh’s expressions of ‘regret’ to North Korea on the matter of burning North Korean flags. We need to understand the differences between each other and extend our interaction so as not to repeat this conflict again……

(Hankyoreh 22, Aug. 2003-1)

As shown above, papers like Hankyoreh judged his action in a very positive light but Dong-A’s reaction was different. The view of Dong-A was that president Roh’s action was improper. Nevertheless, Dong-A also used the nationalistic terms, such as ‘brother and sister’ to refer to North and South Korea, when players from both sides won their Judo matches. The tone of Dong-A towards North Korea became more nationalistic and positive towards the unified team when it achieved a better result than had been achieved when they were separated.

……North and South Korean Judo brothers and sisters have enjoyed their joint victory at the Daegu Universiad……

(Dong-A 28, August, 2003-1)
6.5.3 Aftermath of the Games

A negative view of North Korean participants at the Universiad Games is however clearly shown in the following article. The article describes the attitude of North Korean participants as insincere and motivated by political factors. It does not provide any material evidence on that issue, but Dong-A expresses these ideas as personal opinions rather than as an official or formal observations. It is clear that international sporting events cannot be isolated from their political framework. The use of the team flag, which was the Korean peninsula flag in this case, was already a major political gesture. National anthems are not played at the Universiad, but the flag represents the nation instead. Thus, even though the Organising Committee would rather minimise the political nature of its Games, an individual still had the right to express her or his national / political identity during the games.

......One of the interesting points of this Daegu Universiad was that of the 302 North Korean women......they are very welcome but the uniform and political slogan created a negative image of them......The North Korean Cheer team doesn't seem to have any freedom......I took freedom for granted but I realise it is very important, since I saw them......

(Dong-A 28, August, 2003-3)

The conservatives in South Korea were concerned with the side effects of an overly-friendly policy towards the North Korean regime that could make the difference between the two Koreas vague. Consequently, it encouraged the view that South Korean people who have a pro-unification position, similar to that held by the North Korean regime, should be considered to have loyalties to the North Korean regime and its political ideology.

......North and South Korea look like one but actually they are two, and this is the reality that we are faced with......In a situation in which North Korea's motivation for participation in the games is not clear, the South Korean government better keep its position stably even though North Korean teams go back to North Korea......

(Dong-A 29, August, 2003)

The next day's article in Dong-A seemed to be more critical about North Korea in a political sense. The article mentioned the reaction of the North Korean cheering squad beside the picture of its president, and expressed that this would not have been a normal attitude towards the North Korean president. It rather said that this action by the cheering squad may have had a political purpose to persuade South Korean people of their devotion to their
leader. Thus, what Dong-A criticised was not the “political meaning of unification”, but the “political propaganda of the North Korean regime”.

……The women cried, shouting ‘We cannot leave our president’s picture in the rain.’ This is far more than a simple gap between North and South Korea. It is hard to believe that they cried because of the president’s picture……There is a clear motivation behind North Korea sending a women’s cheer team to South Korea. They want a propaganda impact for their regime. The beautiful cheer team is not a group of volunteers. They are hand-picked from certain classes and trained……

(Dong-A 30, August, 2003)

Roh-Dong tended to directly connect North and South Korean sport relations to a national ‘unification’ issue as the following article illustrates. Thus, the issues of North and South Korea cooperating in the field of sports would have been resolved if they both had a real intention to promote national unification.

……Through these Games North and South Korean students had claimed that we are one ethnicity that cannot be separated and we must overcome the anti-unification movement to advance our national wish which is unification……

(Roh-Dong 1, Sept. 2003)

In the following article, the close interactions between North and South Korea in sports were directly related to the issue of national unification, just as the importance of a unified Korea was directly related to the shared ethnicity of the Korean people. The core ‘memory of the Games’ was thus their role in the ‘history of unification’. Moreover, since the notion came from the instruction of the ‘great leader’ Kim Jung Il, it was naturally treated seriously, and had priority over the national policy of North Korea (Roh-Dong 3, Sept. 2003-1). Roh-Dong showed its typical tendency towards an ‘emotional’ description of the situation concerning the public reaction towards the performance of the joint cheering team. It emphasised the claim that the sporting experience contributed to or reflected ‘national unity’ on a micro-level.

……The North and South Korean cheer team had one voice for unification, and it echoed……The North and South Korean cheer team had performed together and felt national unity in their hearts……

(Roh-Dong 3, Sept. 2003-3)

Roh-Dong included another article that placed an emphasis on the regional festival of South Korea entitled ‘The National Unification and Peace, Sport and Cultural Festival’ for North and South Korean participants. This was a sport and cultural festival organised by the Je-Ju regional government rather than the national government (Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 2003-1). Thus
this might be the start of a private (non-governmental) initiative, even though both governments were supporting the initiative from behind the scenes. Roh-Dong highlighted the meaning and value of the National Unification and Peace, Sport and Cultural Festival by emphasising the impact of the Games on unity based on ethnic nationalism. Roh-Dong valued the cooperation between North and South Korea more than other South Korean newspapers, thus the development or improvement of the cooperation between North and South Korea would be regarded as more valuable than any other cooperation. Obviously, this may be taken as a positive aspect of national unification.

……Let's develop a national economy and sport by trusting our fellow ethnic group that has the same bloodline, instead of believing 'the other', so the fever of unification will be an impetus for national cooperation……he said that he felt the warm love of the nation so the chances must be growing for us to meet like this, for national unification, even though we are apart……

(Roh-Dong 27, Oct. 2003)

Roh-Dong made it clear how it regarded this festival and how important the value of participation was to ‘national unity’ and ‘independence’ for the realisation of national unity.

……The statement declared that the fundamental spirit of these Games was preserving national unity and achieving unification……

(Roh-Dong 29 Oct. 2003)

6.6 The 2004 Athens Olympic Games

6.6.1 The Scandals surrounding the Sport Relations of Two Koreas

Since there were many sporting interactions in relation to the Olympics and other international sporting events, the view of Dong-A on North and South Korean exchanges related to sports focused on hidden motivations in relation to these events rather than on the positive impact on the Korean peninsula. As the IOC member from South Korea, Kim Un Yong, confessed that he used some money for North Korea as a reward for their visit to South Korea and compensated them for expenses incurred by their participation at the sporting event.

……If Kim's claim is right, the suspicion about the North and South Korean 'bribe scandal' for sport interaction in the 2002 Busan Asian Games and last year's Daegu Universiad must be true. North Korea had sent players and North and South Korean
relations were lively but there were suspicious rumours about South Korea’s payment for the result. The North and South Korean sport relations that are based on money must be stopped, and also must not to be advocated under the excuse of the necessity of North and South Korean reconciliation……

(Dong-A 7, January, 2004-1)

This case showed the gap between the idealistic expectations of South Korean society toward North and South Korean relations and the ‘legal’ limitations placed on the promotion of North and South Korean relations. The relationship between the two Koreas though part of a consensus of ‘international relations’, was required to operate in terms of paying compensation within the limits of national legislation. This time, the money delivered from a South Korean IOC member to a North Korean IOC member seemed not to have been officially approved by the government, and was not considered an appropriate means by which to conduct North and South Korean sport relations.

……And he also added that here the money includes funds from the South Korean government and they had obtained government approval unofficially……

(Dong-A 7, January, 2004-2)

Dong-A explained in the following article that the public could not accept this financial compensation to North Korea. The IOC member from South Korea, Kim, was already starting to be blamed for his diplomatic gesture, which was not welcomed by the South Korean public. Nevertheless, if one considers that an IOC member is not a representative of their country to the IOC, but a representative of the IOC in the nation, then his action of promoting and funding participation at the Winter Olympic Ceremony might be more understandable. However, he tried to play a role as a sport messenger between North and South Korea by using his international sporting status, and thus it would be difficult to excuse this as a private IOC matter. The IOC member in South Korea, Kim, was considered a legendary figure in sport diplomacy for Korea, since he had been at the centre of the sports domain since the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. With the status of being an IOC member, he had various and regular opportunities to contact the IOC member of North Korea, therefore North and South Korean sport relations must have been discussed on several occasions.

…… Kim’s trouble started from the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics. And now here once it is revealed that he paid for the joint march with North Korea in the Sydney Olympics, and collected money illegally for his election as president for the IOC, then he will be in big trouble……
Despite the scandal of the South Korean IOC member Kim, North and South Korean sport relations proceeded following the Olympic schedule. Since North and South Korea had several chances to discuss similar issues, they arranged to meet to make a practical decision. As the two Koreas had already experienced a Joint March at the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics, it became a fundamental point that North and South Korea could easily reach an agreement. Dong-A simply asserted that,

......North and South Korea will do a Joint March in August at the 2004 Athens Olympics......

(Dong-A 7, February, 2004)

The IOC members of North and South Korea fully agreed with the plan for a joint march. Nevertheless, the IOC regarded this case as an exception Hankyoreh commented cautiously based on the wish of North and South Korea to make the best effort to achieve unity in the sporting arena (Hankyoreh 26, February, 2004). The sympathetic tone of Hankyoreh concerning the accusation against Kim Un Yong is revealed in the article cited below. Hankyoreh, unlike Dong-A, tended to explain the contextual circumstance behind the involvement of money and its ‘public purpose’ towards North Korea (Hankyoreh 17, March, 2004). The article may be related to the intention of Hankyoreh, which was to not prejudice the South Korean government’s North Korean policy that aimed to establish peaceful relations with North Korea. The policy direction of the South Korean government in relation to North Korea was understood throughout South Korean society, which made Dong-A realise the importance of the interactions between North and South Korea. In the following article, Dong-A emphasised the importance of the role of the symbolic gesture of peace through sports in the ‘changing times’. Here the ‘times’ may imply both the domestic and international circumstances of North and South Korea, a context within which South Korea needed to consider its North Korean policy.

......Particularly, we need special wisdom to use the Athens Olympics as a chance to promote peace in the Korean peninsula and stimulate the North and South Korean national bonds......the case of the joint march in Sydney shows the apparent power of sport in North and South Korean relations. Considering the cost of other areas of interaction, sport can have a huge role at a relatively small as cost......Now, the times have changed. The regime of South Korea is not weak as it was before when we used
sport as a tool of social integration. In the post-Cold War era, North and South Korea don’t need to compete in sport. Thus, the consequence is a focus on the agenda of a ‘contribution to peace in the Korean peninsula through the Olympics.’ ……

(Dong-Ä 30, March, 2004)

While the hopeful expectation for the joint march of North and South Korea in Athens was growing in the South Korean media, Hankyoreh reported that North Korea suggested holding talks on the issue. It also showed how North Korea was positive on the matter of this international sport event or at least wanted to express its willingness for a successful discussion (Hankyoreh 29, April, 2004).

……North Korea has suggested an administrative meeting for the joint march of the 2004 Athens Olympics opening and closing ceremony……

(Hankyoreh 29, April, 2004)

6.6.2 The Second Joint March at the opening ceremony of the Olympics

Even though the mood of South Korea was supportive in realising the Joint March of North and South Korea in the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics, South Korea had a different attitude that was reflected in the summary made by South Korea. Previously, the major obstacles in the North-South Korean relationship were ‘political’ and ‘economic’. However, in the following summary, the detailed procedure for preparation became the issue.

| [Table 6.9] The Administrative work Contact for the Athens Olympic Games Joint March-1 |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Title**        | The Administrative work Contact for the Athens Olympic Games Joint March                                         |
| **Date**         | 2004.06.23-25                                                                                                    |
| **Venue**        | Beijing in China                                                                                                 |
| **Summary**      | It was an impossible situation to reverse, since the uniform was already chosen by our internal processes.      |

However, South Korea’s minor obstruction was simply accepted by North Korean representatives. The following summary by South Korea shows how North Korea was positive in working to progress the talks for the realisation of the Joint March by accepting most of the suggestions made by the South Korean representatives.
In the following article, the agreed items for the 2004 Athens Olympic Joint March were announced. North and South Korea both agreed that Arirang would be the official music and the Korean peninsula flag was chosen for the flag-bearer to carry.

……North and South Korea have agreed on a joint march at the 2004 Athens Olympic opening and closing ceremonies with the music Arirang and the Korean peninsula flag……North and South Korean players will have the sign ‘KOREA’ on their uniform with Arirang and the Korean Peninsula flag……

(Hankyoreh 25, June, 2004)

Roh-Dong also reported that North and South Korea would have a meeting, but was not explicit about the expected result, in contrast to the article in Hankyoreh published the day before. This shows that even though North Korea was so positive about holding these talks, they were still very cautious about announcing any decisions. Thus, Roh-Dong just wrote about the issue in a bold tone.

……North and South Korean NOCs have held a practical meeting to discuss the North and South Korean joint march at the 28th Olympics Opening and Closing ceremony……

(Roh-Dong 26, June 2004-1)

Hankyoreh wanted to reveal more ways in which North and South Korea interacted in the sport arena. The following article introduced the case of the North and South Korean Table Tennis teams training together for the Athens Olympics. It seemed like this reflected great progress for the two Koreas, since it was the first official case of joint training and the leader of the North and South Korean teams expressed the wish that this would be extended to other sporting disciplines. The joint training of North and South Korea involved more practical interactions than the Joint March, since it produced direct contact between the sports people of North and South Korea, and this meant there was great hope for growing the potential of a cross-cultural understanding between North and South.
North Korea showed a cautious attitude to reporting the result of the talks, but once it had actually happened in the Olympic arena, there was no hesitation about communicating this issue to the North Korean people. Instead of the ‘Korean peninsula flag’, Roh-Dong called the flag the ‘unification flag’ which made explicit the symbolic meaning of this Joint March, represented by two people from North and South Korea (Roh-Dong 15, Aug. 2004-1).

Dong-A viewed the joint march in the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics as a celebration of South Korean culture. Despite the opportunity to show North and South Korea in harmony to the world, Dong-A rather focused on the South Korean cultural diplomatic impact through this march.

In the following article, Dong-A revealed the funding source for the uniforms to be worn in the joint march, and argued that the fund for North and South Korean relations had been used appropriately in this instance, unlike the case of the IOC member of South Korea, Kim (Dong-A 18, August, 2004). Hankyoreh was also aware of the criticism regarding the IOC member Kim, so the paper revealed an accurate figure for the amount of funding used for the Athens Joint March (Hankyoreh 18, August, 2004). Now the North and South Korean relations needed to be clearer in terms of the cost behind the procedure to reflect the ‘pure’ intention of both Koreas. However, there was no news that was reported in Roh-Dong regarding the sponsorship made by South Korea for the Joint March. There was only a bald statement concerning the closing of the Athens Games.

......The Table Tennis team of North and South Korea have trained together for the first time for the Athens Olympics......A leader of the North and South Korean teams has said that they will enlarge the number of the sports in which they have joint training......
(Hankyoreh 13, August, 2004)

......The highlight of this opening ceremony was the joint march of North and South Korea with loud applause from the spectators. We are trying to create cultural diplomacy to present South Korea as not only a developed country of sport and peaceful but also a dynamic country with a sparkling cultural legacy......
(Dong-A 16, August, 2004)

......The 28th Olympic Games has been closed in Athens......
Roh-Dong 31, Aug. 2004-1
6.6.3 The 2005, 8.15 North and South Korean Unification Football Match

With mutual agreement in the sport relationship between North and South Korea, the two Koreas started to discuss the Unification Football Match, which would commemorate 8.15, the Independence Day of Korea. In the following summary of talks, the official title for the North and South Korean players was discussed. The controversial issue was whether North and South Korea wanted to use ‘Cho Sun’ Korea, in its name, but it was finally decided that they would call each other ‘Northern and Southern’ which did not imply reference to the nation-state.

[Table 6.11] The 1st – 2nd Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South Korean Unification Football Match-1

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Since this was a friendly match between North and South Korea, South Korea agreed to pay all the expenses, and the meaning of ‘Unification’ was to be particularly emphasised in all the details, such as the selection of organising team members for the Talks. These included the officer from the Ministry of Unification in South Korea as it was written in the following summary.

[Table 6.12] The 1st – 2nd Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South Korean Unification Football Match-2

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[Table 6.13] The 1st – 2nd Administrative work Contact for the 2005. 8.15 North and South Korean Unification Football Match-3

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### 6.7 The 2006 Doha Asian Games and Unified Team of Two Koreas

……*OCA (Olympic Council of Asia) has opened the administrative committee and all adopted the resolution ‘Recommendation of the Unified Team of the North and South Korea to their Olympic Committees.’……*

(Hankyoreh 7, February, 2005)

Since the OCA recommended a unified team of North and South Korea for the next sporting event, the Organising Committee of the Doha Asian Games publicly requested the participation of North and South Korea as a unified team (Dong-A 5, April, 2005). Discussion of a unified Korean team was becoming a routine procedure when organising an international sporting event. However it was pointed out that there was no unified team of North and South Korea. It had been discussed for more than a decade, but the Talks for a unified team continued to fail. Hankyoreh emphasised the fundamentally symbolic purpose of this unified team of North and South Korea. The biggest issue of organising a unified team was a matter of selecting athletes, whether, for example, it would be the same number from both North and South Korea or the best players from both sides. This is why Hankyoreh pointed that achieving the ‘best results’ was not the main goal of this unified team. In terms of Hankyoreh, organising the team in the way that can represent national unification was the principal criterion for this unified team.

……*A unified team is symbolically significant rather than aiming for a good result in the matches. This will be not only the foundation of national identity and reconciliation, but also an important opportunity to promote North and South Korean relations……*

(Hankyoreh 10, September, 2005)

Instead of focusing on how the unified team would be realised, Dong-A rather spotlighted the perspective of individual athletes in terms of their career and the chance of participating in an international sporting event. This implied that the South Korean athletes could not be forced to give up the chance to represent their nation in an international sporting event, since the event itself symbolised national unity.
The North and South Korean Unified Team is matter of ‘life or death’ to athletes…Sport relations seem relatively easy but they shouldn’t be arranged in a hurry, especially not North and South Korean relations. This sort of announcement for an ‘event’ is not good psychologically for the players…..

(Dong-A 22, September, 2005)

Interestingly enough, a similar perspective was taken by the South Korean government according to their summary of the Talks.

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<th>Table 6.14</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team-1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>2005.12.07/2006.06.29/2006.11.30-12.02/2007.02.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea/Doha in Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>There may be no objection that the best players are supposed to be selected throughout South and North, and the most rational method of selecting players is open completion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It also includes a contradicting comment in terms of the principle of organising a unified team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.15</th>
<th>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sport Talks for the Unified Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>2005.12.07/2006.06.29/2006.11.30-12.02/2007.02.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>Gaeseong in North Korea/Doha in Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>The unified team must be constituted based on the principle which is attributed to the unity of the nation’s people and unification of the nation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in the above articles and summary, the Talks ended without any agreement reached, just one month after Hankyoreh had released a positive article about the potential for a North and South agreement.

……North and South Korea have agreed on organising a unified team for 2006 Doha Asian Games and 2008 Beijing Olympics……. (Hankyoreh 2, November, 2005)

……The North and South Korean Sport Talks for Unified Team in 2006 Doha Asian Games and 2008 Beijing Olympics have ended without any good news…….'

(Dong-A 8, December, 2005)

In the meantime, Roh-Dong repeatedly mentioned how important the fundamental idea behind the unified team was, and the way to realise it should proceed independently. Roh-Dong reflected the view that all the sporting interactions between the two Koreas were a way of achieving a national purpose mentioned in the joint statement of 6.15, which emphasised broad peace and unification for North and South Korea (Roh-Dong 8, Dec. 2005-1).
Concerning the Doha Asian Games and the Beijing Olympics, Hankyoreh expressed clear expectations for a positive outcome from the discussion about organising a unified team.

"...There is high possibility of organising a North and South Korea unified team for the 2006 Doha Qatar Asian Games and 2008 Beijing Asian Games. Therefore, we have to start the discussion on the Unification flag and Unification song to show the harmony of Korean national identity..."

(Hankyoreh 7, March, 2006)

About three months and a half later, Hankyoreh reported the special interests of the president of the IOC, who requested that the two Koreas participate as a unified team in the Beijing Olympics. By employing the support of the IOC president in organising a unified team for North and South Korea, Hankyoreh might have wanted to pressurise the South Korean government into making compromises with regard to agreeing details in the process of organising a unified team:

"...It has been revealed that Jacques Rogge has sent a letter requesting a unified team to the presidents of North and South Korea for the 2008 Beijing Games. It is the first time that Jacques Rogge has sent a letter to North and South Korea. Rogge has been involved in the discussion of organising a unified team for North and South Korea. Several Times Jacques Rogge has expressed his opinion that 'the IOC will positively support a North and South Korean agreement.'..."

(Hankyoreh 24, June, 2006)

However, Dong-A still had a negative perspective on the Talks, despite Roh-Dong having adopted a softer tone in announcing the joint statement that resulted, which included a mutual agreement between the two Koreas to participate in the Beijing Games as a unified team (Dong-A 30, June, 2006). The significance of the announcement of this agreement is apparent, since it was the first time the idea of organising a unified team had been acknowledged in a written statement, even though there had seemed to be agreement on the idea on previous occasions.

"...The North and South Korean sport Talks have proceeded to organise one team for the 29th Beijing Olympic Games. In this Talks both had discussed the associated matters sincerely, and published a joint statement. The statement said that North and South Korea both agreed on the 'Unified Team' participants for the Beijing Olympic Games so they will do their best in compromising on practical matters..."

(Roh-Dong 1, July 2006)

Dong-A and Hankyoreh each had different standpoints on the intervention made by the IOC president. On the one hand, Dong-A first questioned whether the IOC should be involved or
not, then explained that North Korea did not have a positive attitude, and that there were limitations on the actions that South Korea could take (Dong-A 29, August, 2006). On the other hand, Hankyoreh cited a comment made by the president of the IOC, which implied his strong support for North Korea’s participation in the Olympics, in terms of maximising the number of participating countries.

......Jacques Rogge has promised that he will do his best to enlarge the entry of the organising team of North and South Korea......He said that 'If North and South Korea request certain conditions, then we will discuss these with IFs positively.'......
(Hankyoreh 7, September, 2006)

Although the Doha Asian Games were getting close, there was still no feedback from North Korea about participating in the Games as a unified team with South Korea. From an international relations perspective, North Korea’s nuclear weapon became an issue that was directly related to the national security of North Korea, and North Korea was thus distracted from any concern about sporting issues. However, the president of the IOC still wanted to believe that North Korea could participate in the Games, and so did Hankyoreh (Hankyoreh 17, November, 2006). Even though a unified team was not realised for the Doha Asian Games, the joint march of North and South Korea in the Games did come about. Dong-A suggests that it was nearly cancelled due to international problems and other issues surrounding North and South Korea (Dong-A 23, November, 2006). Moreover, this joint march became a reality due to the positive effort made by the South Korean government, which placed emphasis on the maintaining of peace between North and South Korea.

Nevertheless, the South Korean government and the sportspeople could not reach an agreement or find a compromise for the plan of a unified team. Unlike Dong-A, which reported the breakdown of the Talks in a bold tone (Dong-A 2, December, 2006), Hankyoreh showed a hopeful expectation of realising a unified Korean team for the Beijing Olympics.

......And the talks will be held again at the end of this year, so we are expecting great news of national reconciliation through sport......
(Hankyoreh 16, December, 2006)
6.8 Conclusion

From the evidence at hand, one can identify two trends. The first is that privately-led North and South Korean sporting discussions and interactions began to characterise this period. The second is that domestic politics, rather than the international context became a determining feature of sport interactions.

In terms of the nature of the sport issues under discussion, North and South Korea were focused on a joint march at the opening of the Olympic Games, implying a symbolic peace between the two Koreas (rather than the delicate issue of symbolising political unification of the Korean nation). Since North and South Korea started to seek the ‘practical’ and ‘realistic’ progress in terms of peace in the Korean peninsula rather than promoting the political unity of ‘the nation’, both North and South seemed to acknowledge that discussing political unification through the Sports Talks was simply too ambitious. Thus, instead of trying to establish a platform for unification talks sport came to be seen as a location for increasing interaction through private initiatives.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters this research sought to explore the ‘role’ of the Olympics and other major international sporting events in the development of North and South Korean relations by analysing the discourses of the North and South Korean governments' documents and their newspaper media. The newspapers Roh-Dong, Dong-A and Hankyoreh represent their particular political and nationalism related perspectives on the relations between the North and the South entangled with various sporting interactions. Proceeding from an analysis of these perspectives represented in the discourse produced in these media, we have sought to evaluate the nature of the unique contexts of the two Koreas, and have attempted to sketch out what were the various circumstances which have affected North and South Korean sport relations (and been reflected in the discourse) but also how the inter-nation context has itself been constructed in part by the sporting interactions of the two Koreas (and thus been in part constructed by the discourse). In this chapter we will identify theoretical implications, seek to summarise our findings and clarify the ways in which the thesis is intended to make a contribution to knowledge.

7.2 Contribution to Theory
This thesis has adopted a critical realist ontological and epistemological position, which is based on a depth realist ontological belief (Bhaskar 1989) and a form of interpretivist epistemological position. However, that which is real may be socially constructed and part of the aim of the thesis is to analyse the process of construction of the positions adopted within and between North and South Korea in relation to sporting relations specifically and inter-state relations more broadly. Such an analysis is undertaken through a deconstruction of the discourses reflected in the data employing a protocol adapted from Fairclough (2005) while also referencing ‘non-discursive practices and materialisations’ in North and South sport
relations, following Jäger and Meyer (2009). As a method, CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) was adopted for reviewing the discursive construction of relations and to deconstruct the process of constructed relations between the two Koreas. The approach is ‘critical’ in the sense that it seeks to uncover the relative strength of interests and associated aspects of power represented in the discourse.

Table 7.1 Summarises the assumptions and strategy adopted for the research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meta-Theoretical Level</td>
<td>Critical Realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Realist but socially/discursively constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Interpretivist approach to discourse construction together with analytic evaluation of underlying structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>Neo-constructivism – International relations are socially constructed based on real structures. Sporting relations have the potential to both reflect and reconstruct or at least to mediate the reality of such structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Strategy</td>
<td>Mixture of retroductive and abductive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of the critical discourse analysis, the context of international relations and the perceptions of North and South of one another have been analysed through the official South Korean summary of the Sports Talks and through newspapers from the North and the South. Many of the articles in the three newspapers selected, Hankyoreh, Dong-A and Roh-Dong address the reasoning behind the construction of North and South Korea sporting relations in the domestic political context and highlight the intentions of the two regimes. A common thread however running through the accounts from both North and South is a commitment (sometimes weaker and sometimes stronger, but virtually always visible), of what Smith (2001) has termed primordial nationalism. In other words regardless of how difficult political relations have been between the two states there has been a commitment on both sides to the notion of a single ethnic entity which is the Korean people.

The Figure 7.1 displays the sources of discourse and concisely summarises the outcomes contained in the analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Figure 7.1 Conceptualisation of the ‘Truth(s)’ of the North and South Korean Sport Relations

**Depth of Reality**

- **The Empirical (The observed)**
  - The Actual (Observable in principle)
  - The Real (Not observable directly)

**Dispositive**

- **Discursive practices**
  - Significance of the events (and of non-events) in the Political and sports world

- **Non-Discursive practices**
  - Sporting events and matches
  - Joint Marching, boycotting

**Materializations**

- Uniform, Anthem, Flag, stadium etc.

**e.g. Motivations for construction of elements of the dispositive**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>International Relations</th>
<th>Domestic Political Relations</th>
<th>Relations of Ideologies of Nationalism</th>
<th>Sporting Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978 - 1987</td>
<td>Cold War (Bi-Polar)</td>
<td>Totalitarian vs. Military Dictatorship</td>
<td>Culture of Primordial Nationalism</td>
<td>Non-Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 - 1997</td>
<td>Multi-Polar International Order</td>
<td>Totalitarian vs. Liberal Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperative but government lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 - 2007</td>
<td>Totalitarian vs. Liberal Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperative but private lead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As it was noted in Chapter 3, although the approach adopted employs discourse analysis it follows Fairclough’s approach in adopting realist ontology. This implies a concern with ‘the depth of reality’ and what might be abductively/retroductively concluded about warrantable explanations of the findings from the analysis of the discursive outcomes. While reports of sporting events and other issues dealt with in the Sports Talks are directly observed in their written form, they represent ‘empirical reality’. However, this is only part of the picture. In terms of the ‘dispositive’ (Jäger and Meyer 2009:57) which incorporates discursive practices, non-discursive practices and materialisations, we recognise the significance of other forms of empirical observed reality beyond the discourse itself.

In addition, there are aspects of reality which can in principle be observed, but in practice were not observed, the ‘actual’ in Bhaskar’s terms. We for example may not have had explanations of writers’ motivations for their actions, but we could in principle have had access to some information (were writers, for example, to be available for interview, and willing to be frank and open). The third level of reality, deep structures, which by definition are not observable directly, include the structure of international and domestic political relations, shared ideologies of nationalism and ethnic national identity and sporting relations. Our account throughout the thesis represents an attempt to use abductive and where possible retroductive analysis to identify the nature of these deep structures and their impact on, or implications for, the actions of agents and institutions. This has implications for our understanding of the nature of international relations at play. The constructivist tradition implies that the international context of North-South relations is socially / politically constructed in interaction between the two. However as our historical analysis of the North-South context suggests, the realist tradition of international relations theory suggests the limits to the extent to which actors within the Korean domain can determine the context of their interaction. External factors such as the heightening and decline of Cold War relations and the potential intervention of the super powers clearly limit the ability of the two Koreas to define their own ‘universe of possibilities’.
7.3 Research Findings

The research which forms the core of this thesis has sought to ‘unpick’ the role of sport in competing discourses between North and South across more than three decades. Running through this discourse has been the ‘distinctive’ character of Korean nationalism and its ‘small but clear’ transformations through the time. General trends of two Korea’s sport relations in the early part of the period (1978-1987) were inaugurated in the midst of the Cold War as it was identified in their Sport Talks. Although the battle between the two parties was on-going, after 1988 (the year of the Seoul Olympics) the South maintained a major economic advantage (until the on-set of the Asian economic crisis in 1997). During the middle period (1988-1997) diplomatic competition was replaced to some degree by sporting competition. Consequently, whether sport diplomacy can be an independent variable between two Korean relations was evidenced in some part in this period. In the last decade (1998-2007) the South Korean regime developed a relatively positive view on the ‘Two Koreas’ relations and North Korea showed signs of empowerment under a new leader. Nevertheless what each government sought to achieve was different and depended on their interpretation of the meaning of establishing a ‘Unified Team’, differentiating for example notions of cultural sporting unification and those of political unification. By using the discourses in newspaper media of both Koreas, the characters of the domestic regimes were expressed through their selection of topics, the perspective and tone of writing. This is reflects how the two Koreas, and the selected media sources represented different perceptions of ‘reality’ in terms of the North and the South sporting interactions and its potential.

7.3.1 Assessment of sport diplomacy as an independent or dependent variable in North-South Korea relations

Following the Korean War, the confrontation of North and South Korea became a fact of life, and the context of political conflict between the two Koreas was plainly evident, recognised as such by leading scholars. While North and South Korea saw themselves as legitimate
government in the Korean peninsula, the North saw the South as a ‘political colony’ of the West, while the South views the North as a totalitarian state. Neither saw the other as legitimate and the matter of unification is thus complicated by these negative projections of ‘the other’.

At the time of the Cold War, from 1978-1987 the ‘diplomatic competition’ between the North and South in the sporting arena was more than simply a matter of sporting events. The Cold War context placed the two Koreas in the roles of icons or symbols representing their allies, in particular the USSR and the US, as evidenced in the Moscow Olympics of 1980 and in the 1984 Los Angeles Games. The Cold War implied ‘no interaction’ other than ‘War itself’ in the Korean peninsula. However in the lead up to the Moscow Games when ideological divides were very apparent in the Olympic world, North Korea suggested to South Korea that they should participate in 1980 in Moscow as a ‘single team’. Thus, it can be said that at this moment, North Korea considered sport diplomacy as a way of affecting inter-Korean relations. The regime of the South Korea seemed to interpret this as North Korean tactic of blocking independent participation by a South Korean team, but it is doubtful that the conditions provided by North Korea were the reason for South Korea joining the US-led boycott. Since the 1980 Olympics had become a ‘Soviet-led Olympics’ it was predictable that the next Olympics would become the ‘US-led Games’, and it was the turn of the South to promote to the North the idea of participation in a common team.

One other reason that promotes sport diplomacy as potentially an independent variable in relations between the two Koreas is that the international sport governance system sought to intervene in North and South Korean international relations, if only to maintain the IOC’s claim to represent a global movement. When the North and South Korean Sports Talks started in relation to participation at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the IOC sought to arbitrate and set the boundaries of discussion between the two Koreas, the IOC asked them to organise a unified team for participation in the Games since North Korea did not have a
NOC and thus could not participate on its own. Thus, the approach adopted by the IOC, in relation to whether it would accept the North Korea as an independent nation or not, was a key factor at this, and at subsequent junctures for the two Koreas (providing some support for a liberal international relations perspective, one which. The outcome of this episode was that North Korea successfully sought recognition for its NOC and was thus able to participate in the Games in its own right instead of organising a unified team. The leadership of the IOC which had emphasised ‘World Peace’ was not able to be ‘practically’ effective in this Cold War confrontation, and therefore ceded to the North’s request for recognition.

It should be remembered that the strength of the bi-polar international order was such that the countries of the ‘Third World’ were insufficiently strong to argue effectively for their interests, as the failure of the GANEFO Games movements illustrates (Connolly 2012:1311-1324). North and South Korean relations were consequently tense at this time in the particular circumstances of the temporary truce after the Korean War. Fortunately, the Olympics was one place where North and South Korea were able to talk about mutual cooperation under the notion of ‘non-political, sport’, even though the intention of both regimes (below the surface) seems to have been to maximise their own diplomatic power, and to achieve recognition as the dominant independent state in the Korean peninsula.

When it came to the issues of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, sport diplomacy was more evident than other forms of diplomatic interaction. The President of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, presented his own role and that of the IOC as one of strong leadership, and as a significant actor in the diplomatic field. The role sought for the IOC, even though it was not an international governmental organisation, was one of a central actor in international sporting relations. The sporting relations between North and South and the related sporting issues were discussed with the intensive involvement of the IOC. The IOC brokered talks between North and South and Samaranch engaged in a form of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ visiting the North and South Korea (see Table [3.1]).
Whether sport diplomacy is sustained as a significant if not entirely independent variable in North and South Korean relations seems clearer when we consider the direct contact and interactions of the North and South Korean people in sporting events. From 1998 to 2007 sporting events became not only an opportunity for the North and South players and coaching staffs to exchange views with one another but for the spectators (at least those permitted to travel) in the venue, and for the people who were watching the scene at home, to experience a sense of attachment as a ‘member of a bigger family’. This represented a major improvement in relations at this level since there had been a time in which North and South Korean contacts were described as ‘tense’ moments for North and South Korean players and spectators. The provision of the indoor stadium in Pyongyang by Chairman Chung Ju Young of Hyundai showed how material exchanges between North and South Korea provided an impetus toward friendly relationships. Whether this was an independent variable bringing about better relations or a product of the better relations manifesting themselves in positive action is debatable. Nevertheless with the sporting related resources of Hyundai such as its professional basketball team participating in these ‘practical’ interactions between North and South, this provided a chance for the ordinary citizens of South Korea to engage with their counterparts, by being spectators at friendly matches. While North and South Korean interaction was developing in the sporting arena, this showed how private organisations with missionary and humanitarian goals could play a critical role in developing links between North and South.

The implications of this line of argument are not to dismiss the role which social construction can play in the framing of international relations, but it is to say that the space for constructing that reality is mediated framed and to a certain extent structured by the reality of international relations, and the efforts of the wider sporting community. A realist perspective on international relations may be too constraining in the picture it paints of interaction between nations, particularly since it does not acknowledge the independent efforts of the IOC and other international sporting institutions which a liberal IR position would advocate,
but the constructivist perspective is too agency-centred in the space it gives for social construction of the international relations environment. Thus sport and sport diplomacy, although not an independent variable nevertheless is a medium through which improving or deteriorating relations between nations are evidenced.

7.3.2 The Primordial Nationalism of Korea and its challenges
From 1978 to 1987 was a critical period in North and South Korean sport relations in terms of an emerging ‘new area of Talks’ which was being developed. Following the Korean War, the existence of a shared notion of nationalism was almost the only theme which two Koreas could agree on, and their disputes were based on the different choices of ‘political and economic ideology’ for the “Korean Nations” development. Before they confronted each other, they were one nation, and fought against Japanese Imperialism for independence. No matter which side they were on both populations and governments dreamt about the future of the ‘Korean Nation’ as a political entity.

In the dialogue between North and South Korea, the rhetoric of ‘nationalism’ had been a ‘sensitive’ issue, since it was one of the controversial themes with which South Korean domestic politics had been struggling. This is evidenced in the various issues relating to the different ‘terminology’ used by the two sides. Both use the same language which called ‘Han Geul’ (which refers to the language of those of Han ethnic identity), and thus if the intention is to refer to the same phenomenon, one would anticipate use of shared terminology with only a difference of dialect. However, for example, when North and South were referring to each other South Korea used the terminology of ‘South Korea and North Korea’ (in Korean, Nam Han and Book Han), while the North used ‘South Cho Sun and North Cho Sun’ (Nam Cho Sun and Book Cho Sun). The use of ‘Cho Sun’ for Korea harks back to the Cho Sun dynasty which existed in the Korean peninsula until the Japanese invasion. What North Korea wanted to emphasise through its choice of terminology was that it was the inheritor of
the historical tradition of the independent Korean Nation. South Korea, however, used the terminology which had its origins in the expression of an independent nation emerging from the Japanese colonial period.

Nevertheless, North and South Korean generally shared a ‘common’ perspective on nationalism and there were enough sources to express this unique identity in the international sporting events through the lens of Dong-A, Hankyoreh and Roh-Dong. For example, in the 1978 Bangkok Asian Games when North and South Korea were in opposition in a number of international sporting events and both were eager to win, the two Koreas faced each other on the field of sport and the media from each side expressed mixed emotions which reflected ‘attachment’ based on shared nationalism as well as ‘antagonism’ deriving from political confrontation. This ironic situation may explain how the North and South Korean ‘enemies’ continued to attempt to organise a single team from 1979, based on shared wish to realise the symbolic representation of a single Korean national identity in the sporting arena.

With the 1988 Seoul Olympics Games, North and South Korea were known to the world as ‘separate’ states, and the political and economic gaps between the two Koreas increased rapidly. Nevertheless, the symbolism produced in the international sporting arena, with for example the fielding of a ‘unified team’ of two Koreas and the ‘joint march’ in the Olympic opening ceremony in Sydney Olympics, effectively promoted the notion of a unity of interest, and a mood of ‘peace’ between the two Koreas. In addition it reproduced a powerful sense of common identity among the younger generation for whom primordial nationalism as an ideology was weaker. Moreover, the North and South Korean sport interactions were a vehicle for various political and socio-economic national interests of the two Koreas even though these ‘interests’ were subject to change over time by the political regimes in power. Also, the domain of sporting interaction was one which generally was relatively protected even at times of high tension. Therefore, the fact that sporting relations between North and
South did not simply parallel political relations can only be explained with reference to this shared sense of primordial nationalism.

Through the three decades covered by this research, the political tension between the two Koreas has moved slightly from ‘extremely dangerous’ to ‘relatively less dangerous’. However, the progress achieved in the sport arena over this period was significant. North and South had organised a ‘unified team’ in certain sporting events, and North Korean athletes, coaching staff and cheer leader teams had visited South Korea, with South Korean basketball players and workers visiting North Korea for friendly matches. However, these expressions of shared nationalism are mediated through the discourses of the two Koreas’ media. Although media from both sides strongly supported the notion of ‘Korean ethnic nationalism’ this only applied when it did not cross the boundary of ‘state-oriented nationalism’. The North Korean media, through Roh-Dong considered the ‘Great Leader’s’ orders to be more important than maintaining North and South Korean interactions, while the South Korean newspaper Dong-A put South Korean national security before commitment to a unified team for the two Koreas. Thus, the central commitment to ‘primordial nationalism’ and its expression in sport policy needs to be identified within its proper context.

7.3.3 Assessment of the significance of the newspaper discourse

This research analysed discourses of printed media from both Koreas which represent certain views in terms of political perspectives on the question of Korean unification. The North Korean newspaper, Roh-Dong provided an insight into North Korean government thinking and the messages it wished to convey to its people and to the wider world.

The newspaper discourses evaluated are significant since they represent a ‘reflection’ of reality while the discourses identified were also seeking to ‘construct’ that reality to a degree in line with the ideological leaning of the source. This ‘immanent’ approach (reflecting and constructing) was essential to understanding the competing realities of the two domains. The
North Korean newspaper Roh-Dong for example clearly represents what the North Korean government wanted to state rather than simply objectively conveying information and news, while the South Korean government’s account of the sports talks also reflects the ‘government view’ of how these phenomena should be understood, with ideological variations on the South Korean press examples analysed. Nevertheless it is not simply a matter of any of these sources constructing a position regardless of external events. The message and its timing were clearly contingent on external events, lending support to a realist interpretation of international relations. The periodization of events provided below in Table 7.2 underlines this argument. The ‘realities’ of external political, economic, and sporting events frames the production of sporting discourse in North-South Korean relations rather than vice versa. However the importance of sport and the activities fo the Olympic movement also provides support for the significance of non-state actors in this domain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Sporting Event</th>
<th>Issues and Talks</th>
<th>Implications of Discourse Elements/ Outcomes and their dispositive construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 1979 World Table Tennis Championships</td>
<td>The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Table Tennis Association Discussion</td>
<td>a. North Korean requesting for organising unified team as a unique way for the South Korean team to participate in the Championships in Pyongyang. Nothing was agreed and South Korean Team did not participate in this Championships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1987</td>
<td>The 1980 Moscow Olympic Games</td>
<td>North and South Korean Unified Team and its participation of the Games</td>
<td>a. The meaning of South Korea’s participation in Moscow Games in Cold War context of IR. South Korean Team boycotted the 1980 Moscow Games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|           | Seoul’s nomination for the 1988 Olympics Games |                                                                                  | a. The objection of North Korea to South Korea’s nomination to host the 1988 Olympics  
|           |                                        | b. Critical change of North Korean position/strategy from demanding a changing of venue for the Games to asserting its ‘right’ to ‘co-host’ the Games  
|           |                                        | c. North Korea uses diplomatic responses from abroad to support these strategies  
|           |                                        | d. The arbitration of the IOC relations to the North Korean co-hosting of the Games  
|           |                                        | e. As a result, North Korea did not participate in the Seoul Games even though most of all communist nations participated including the USSR  
|           |                                        | f. The only major Olympic nation not to participate in the Games was Cuba          |
|           | The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games       | The 1st – 3rd North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team for the LA Olympic Games | a. South Korea requested North Korea to from a unified team  
<p>|           |                                        | b. North Korea refused and boycott the Games with most of the communist states    |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The 1986 Seoul Asian Games        | a. North Korea emphasized the social and economic difficulties South Korea is experiencing  
b. North Korea announced that the Games were not successful                                                                                   |
| The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games      | a. North Korea published in Roh-Dong negative views on the Seoul Olympics Games from about 60 nations and foreign organisations  
b. Also International Media from 14 countries warn of the potential failure of the Seoul Olympics and these warnings are re-published Roh-Dong  
c. North Korea claims that about 200 foreign media, organisations and national government expressed their support for the co-hosting of the Games between North and South (through Roh-Dong)  
d. North and South Korean could not reach on the agreement for co-hosting and for organising a unified team for the 1988 Seoul Games |
| 1988-1997                         | a. North Korea published in Roh-Dong negative views on the Seoul Olympics Games from about 60 nations and foreign organisations  
b. Also International Media from 14 countries warn of the potential failure of the Seoul Olympics and these warnings are re-published Roh-Dong  
c. North Korea claims that about 200 foreign media, organisations and national government expressed their support for the co-hosting of the Games between North and South (through Roh-Dong)  
d. North and South Korean could not reach on the agreement for co-hosting and for organising a unified team for the 1988 Seoul Games |
| The 1990 Beijing Asian Games      | a. North and South Korea both had interests to organise a unified team for the Beijing Asian Games  
b. Two Koreas Sports Talks showed progression in terms of deepening the discussions of practical matters such as the title of the team  
c. Even though a unified team for the 1990 Beijing Games could not in the end be organised, potential for the further discussion |
| The 1991 U-20 Football Championships | a. North and South Korea agreed on participation in these sporting events as a unified team  
b. This unified team achieved better results than they expected                                                                                   |
| The 1991 41st World Table Tennis Championships | a. North and South Korea agreed on participation in these sporting events as a unified team  
b. This unified team achieved better results than they expected                                                                                   |
<p>| The 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games  | a. Pastor Moon’s visit to North Korea without permission of South Korean government and a North Korean Judo players defection to South Korea affected the Sports Talks and no positive result |
| The 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games    |                                                                                                                                           |
| The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games    |                                                                                                                                           |</p>
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<th>1998-2007</th>
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| | Hyundai and North and South sport relations | a. The Chairman of Hyundai Jung Ju Young played a major role in hosting 1988 Seoul Games, and he started to lead the South Korean private sector initiatives for practical interaction with North Korea using sport as a tool  
b. Hyundai provided the indoor stadium in Pyung Yang and had a regular friendly basketball match between the professional players of Hyundai and the North Korean national team |
| The 2000 Sydney Olympic Games | | a. The First Joint March of North and South Korea for the opening ceremony of the Games |
| The 2002 Busan Asian Games | The 1st – 2nd Administrative Discussion for North Korean Participation to the Busan Asian Games | a. The first occasion on which a North Korean team participated in Games in South Korea  
b. North Korea dispatched the ‘cheer team’ consisting of ‘young beautiful North Korean ladies’ |
| The 2003 Daegu Summer Universiad | The Administrative Discussion for the Daegu Summer Universiad | a. The second North Korean team participated in the Games in South Korea  
b. North Korea again dispatched a cheer team of ‘young North Korean women’ |
| The 2004 Athens Olympic Games | The Administrative Discussion for the Athens Olympic Games Joint March | a. The Second Joint March of North and South Korea for the opening ceremony of the Games |
| The 2005 8.15 North and South Korean Unification Football Match | The 1st – 2nd Administrative Discussion for the 2005 8.15 North and South Korean ‘Unification Football Match’ | a. 8.15 is the Korean Independent Day  
b. The game is specifically given the titled of the ‘unification’ match |
| The 2006 Doha Asian Games | The 1st – 4th North and South Korean Sports Talks for Unified Team of Two Koreas | a. The OCA(Olympic council of Asia) recommended a unified team of North and South Korea for the Games  
b. North Korea did not confirm the agreement of organising a unified team, thus two Koreas participated in the Games separately |
7.4 Research Limitations and Future Research

One might argue that data selection on which this analysis of discourse is based may tend to be imbalanced since North Korean governmental documents and state media resources were not as available as those of their South Korean counterparts. However, while this may well be the case to some degree, I remain conscious and explicit about my position as a South Korean researcher seeking to understand the way in which both sets of parties put together their perspective in the media sources some of which might be regarded as directly state controlled (Roh-Dong and South Korean record of the Sports Talks) and some of which may be less directly influenced by the perspective the state wishes to present (Dong-A and Hankyoreh) but which nevertheless have their own ideological leaning.

A further challenge is represented by the fact of my reading materials in Korean while presenting the results of my discourse analysis in English. Translation requires the communication of both the ‘denotational’ meaning of a word while conveying its ‘connotational’ meaning also and my translations seek to respect this requirement. Mine is therefore a particularly reflexive analysis of discursive construction. My analysis does not however limit itself solely to the discourse about North-South Korean sports relations per se, but also focuses on the ‘materialisation’ of those relations in actions and events (Jäger and Meyer 2009:56-60). A further dimension of the analysis to emphasise is that identified by Hewitt (2009) concerning the relationship between narrative, positions and identity reflected in the discourses, since sport and sporting nationalisms both reflect and construct national identities, an aspect which is crucial to understanding the attitudes of the various parties to North-South relations (Hewitt 2009:1-16).

This thesis has sought to illustrate the nature of ‘sport diplomacy’ between North and South Korea with various interactions in the arena of international sport, mainly in the case of the international sporting events. Also, the particular nature of nationalism of Koreas in sport was identified as an ideological factor which is central to understanding the evolving nature
of relations between the two Koreas. It illustrates both the process of construction and the limits to construction of the position of the two sides.

At the same time, there are new research questions which emerge to be explained by further research. Since North Korea is still a relatively closed and little known nation, there are inevitable limitations to our interpretation of the view of North Korea. To address this it would be useful for North Korean international sporting relations to be analysed through various additional sources such as North Korean dialogue with nations other than the South Korea such as China, Cuba, or the USSR, and with international organisations such as the IOC, in particular through sources such as IOC correspondence with the North and South (when this becomes available post-embargo). These sources remain closed, however, and we have sought to provide the best available analysis through the sources which are available, while recognising the limitations of the sources employed as data. Several accounts of how North and South Korea constructed their sporting relations were identified both shaping and shaped by the structures of international relations, domestic economic-political contexts, and the ideology of primordial nationalism traditionally prevalent in Korea.

7.5 Conclusion
This research has focused on the process of the social construction of North and South Korean sports relations in the period from 1978 to 2007 within key sources. We have tried to capture in this thesis the ‘reality’ of the sports relations of the two Koreas in a qualitative manner, by analysing the dispositive of the North and South relations (that is through discourse, non-discursive elements, and materialisations relating to the development of such relations (Jäger and Meyer 2009).

Overall, the period from 1978 to 1987 was one dominated by the Cold War and the confrontation of North and South. The two domestic political regimes both refused to recognise the ‘other’ as a legitimate entity and both were thus occupied in presenting
themselves as the legitimate voice in discussions concerning sports relations as with other aspects of the politics of nationhood. The notion of nationalism in sporting interactions represented very different forms of self-recognition as a ‘Korean nation’ and the North and South in this early period each presented their own picture of a ‘developed Korean nation’. However, from 1988, consistent attempts to host international sporting events and competitions in the international sporting arena represented recognition of the importance of these events and reflected changes of attitude between North and South Korea in their attempts to separate sport and politics. Even though their efforts were insufficient to allow organisation of a ‘united team’ of the two Koreas for any Olympics up to the time of writing, there were partial successes in terms of organising a unified team for the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships and the FIFA Youth Football Championships.

Since 1998, it seems that ‘the joint march’ of the North and South in the Opening Ceremony of the Sydney Olympics has represented the limit of what was able to be achieved between the two states. Subsequently, various private sector actors from South Korea initiated projects to develop another route by which to maintain the sometimes stuttering momentum in interaction between the two Koreas. In this manner, sport became more ‘popular’ as a tool of ‘soft politics’ providing a domain within which talk about North and South Korean relations could take place. Discussions about sport and actions to promote sport, led to exchanges of material and of people, and for example the development of debate about using a North-South rail connection for travel from South Korea to the Beijing Games. ‘Sport diplomacy’ was thus literally opening up peaceful channels of communication between the two Koreas but under conditions established by political and economic contexts.

A major element of the argument we have developed is that sport relations on the Korean peninsula both reflect but also reinforce and sometimes even challenge the structures underpinning North-South relations, for example in the international relations of the Cold War period. In this sense the thesis evaluates the discursive construction of relations but also
acknowledges the impact of wider sporting and non-sporting structures, factors and events. It thus explores the discursive construction of international relations while reaffirming the limits to such discursive construction in the face of ‘real’ external events.

South Korea’s hosting of the 1988 Olympics reflected the growing strength of its economy while at the same time North Korea’s economy began to decline in absolute and comparative terms. Indeed the cooperation of the North and South in terms of joint participation in the Busan Asian Games and the Daegu Universiad was only made possible by the South meeting the North’s costs. However this fact was kept secret to try to ensure that the North did not lose face by being seen to have to rely on the South’s ‘charity’.

The significance of the advent of aid provided by private individuals to the North was that this was not understood as receiving aid from an external source, since this was simply philanthropy from one Korean to another. Thus the emergence in the post-military dictatorship era of a vibrant and, in places, powerful private sector in South Korea meant that private sector actors (not simply affluent industrialists but workers’ organisations for example) were able to engage with the North in providing not only sport aid but also subsequently food aid. Thus sport kept alive (or was kept alive as) a conduit for discussions between North and South at times when other forms of interaction had been stifled, but has also reflected and contributed to the nature of North-South relations and in this sense sport diplomacy has taken on a special and perhaps unique form in the Korean peninsula.
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**APPENDIX**

[Appendix-1] The List of Nations announced statement of against Seoul Olympics

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 10, May 1985</td>
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| 2   | Angola                 | Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1984-2  
                                    Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 |
| 3   | Austria                | Roh-Dong 4, June 1984-1 |
| 4   | Bangladesh             | Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985  
                                    Roh-Dong 5, Jan. 1985-2  
                                    Roh-Dong 22, Jan. 1985  
                                    Roh-Dong 19, Feb. 1985 |
| 5   | Barbados               | Roh-Dong 13, Feb. 1985 |
| 6   | Belgium                | Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 10 Jan. 1985 |
| 7   | Bulgaria               | Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 29, Dec. 1984-2  
                                    Roh-Dong 5, Jan. 1985-2 |
| 8   | Burundi                | Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 |
| 9   | Canada New Korea Times | Roh-Dong 17, Apr. 1985 |
| 10  | Cuba                   | Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2  
                                    Roh-Dong 18, Dec. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 12, July 1985-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 29, July 1985 |
| 11  | Czechoslovakia         | Roh-Dong 27, Nov. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 2, Dec. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984 |
| 12  | Egypt                  | Roh-Dong 13, Nov. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 19, Dec. 1984 |
| 13  | France                 | Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2 |
| 14  | Finland                | Roh-Dong 2, Nov. 1984-2  
                                    Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984 |
| 15  | Ghana                  | Roh-Dong 9, Sept. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 18, Dec. 1984  
                                    Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1985 |
| 16  | Ghana newspaper        | Roh-Dong 7, June 1986-1 |
| 17  | Guiana                 | Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1 |
| 18  | Hungary                | Roh-Dong 10, Nov. 1984-2  
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                                    Roh-Dong 29, Dec. 1984-1  
                                    Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1985-2 |
|   | 19 | India | Roh-Dong 2, Nov. 1984-1  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 12, Dec. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 6, Jan. 1985-1  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 29, July 1985  
|   | 20 | Indonesia | Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1985-2  
|   | 21 | Iran | Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 13, Dec. 1984-2  
|   | 22 | Italy | Roh-Dong 11, Oct. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 15, Oct. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 18, Oct. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 24, Oct. 1984-2  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 30, Oct. 1984-3  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984  
|   | 23 | Jamaica | Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985  
|   | 24 | Japan | Roh-Dong 14, Dec. 1984-2  
|   | 25 | Lebanon | Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985  
|   | 26 | Lesotho | Roh-Dong 14, Sept. 1984-2  
|   | 27 | Libya | Roh-Dong 12, Nov. 1984  
|   | 28 | Madagascar | Roh-Dong 4, June 1984-2  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 11, Nov. 1984-3  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 4, Dec. 1984-2  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 15, Dec. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 3, Jan. 1985-2  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 4, Mar. 1985  
|   | 29 | Malaysia | Roh-Dong 18, Oct. 1984  
|   | 30 | Mali | Roh-Dong 17, Jan. 1985  
|   | 31 | Mali-Cho Sun Friendship Association | Roh-Dong 7, June 1986-1  
|   | 32 | Mauritania | Roh-Dong 17, Nov. 1984-2  
|   | 33 | Mongolia | Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 8, Jan. 1985  
|   | 34 | Mozambique | Roh-Dong 29, July 1985  
|   | 35 | Nepal | Roh-Dong 4, Sept. 1984-3  
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|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 6, Jan. 1985-2  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 5, Apr. 1985  
|   | 36 | Norwegian newspaper | Roh-Dong 6, May 1982  
|   | 37 | Nicaragua | Roh-Dong 6, Dec. 1984-1  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 31, Dec. 1984  
|   |    |       | Roh-Dong 4, Jan. 1985  
|   | 38 | Niger | Roh-Dong 18, Dec. 1984  
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 10, Dec. 1984-1</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>South Korean People</td>
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<td>France newspaper</td>
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<td>LA Times</td>
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<td>Norway Broadcast</td>
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<td>NY Times</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
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[Appendix-3] The List of Nations which support for the Co-hosting of the Seoul Games

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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Angola Newspaper</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 19, July 1986-4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Association of Support of Cho-Sun Unification and pro-Chosun</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 19, Dec. 1985</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Canada Communist Party</td>
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<td>Central Africa cites Cuba</td>
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<td>Central Committee of Norway Communist Party</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Central Committee of Swedish Communist Youth Alliance</td>
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<td>Chair of the Tanzania Parliament</td>
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<td>Chairman of Nicaragua Committee</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Chairman of the Ethiopia temporary military executive board</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 12, April 1986-1</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Chairman of the USSR Sport Association</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 19, Mar. 1986-6</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Chilean Ju-Che Ideology research Centre in Sweden</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 14, Sept. 1985</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 3, Aug. 1985-4</td>
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<td>China Newspaper and China Sport Newspaper</td>
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<td>China NOC</td>
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<td>China Shin Hwa Broadcast</td>
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<td>China Sport newspaper</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Citizen of Seoul</td>
<td>Roh-Dong 12, May 1986</td>
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<td>Column of Poland newspaper</td>
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<td>Committee member of Yugoslavia Sport Alliance, Director of India New deli Ju-Che ideology Research Centre</td>
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<td>Cuba Communist Party</td>
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<td>Cuba in the Meeting for the Non-Block Associated Countries' Foreign Minister</td>
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<td>Cuba Minister</td>
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