Analysing desecuritisation: the case of Israeli and Palestinian peace education and water management

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ANALYSING DESECURITISATION:
THE CASE OF ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN
PEACE EDUCATION AND WATER MANAGEMENT

By

Bezen Coskun

Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

28 July 2009
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Abstract
This thesis applies securitisation theory to the Israeli-Palestinian case with a particular focus on the potential for desecuritisation processes arising from Israeli-Palestinian cooperation/coexistence efforts in peace education and water management. It aims to apply securitisation theory in general and the under-employed concept of desecuritisation in particular, to explore the limits and prospects as a theoretical framework.

Concepts, arguments and assumptions associated with the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School are considered. In this regard, the thesis makes a contribution to Security Studies through its application of securitisation theory and sheds light on a complex conflict situation. Based on an analytical framework that integrates the concept of desecuritisation with the concepts of peace-building and peace-making, the thesis pays attention to desecuritisation moves involving Israeli and Palestinian civil societies through peace education and water management. The thesis contributes to debates over the problems and prospects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, so making a significant empirical and theoretical contribution in the development of the concept of desecuritisation as a framework for analysing conflict resolution.

The thesis develops an analytical framework that combines political level peace-making with civil society actors’ peace-building efforts. These are seen as potential processes of desecuritisation; indeed, for desecuritisation to occur. The thesis argues that a combination of moves at both the political and societal levels is required. By contrast to securitisation processes which are mainly initiated by political and/or military elites with the moral consent of society (or ‘audience’ in Copenhagen School terms), processes of desecuritisation, especially in cases of protracted conflicts, go beyond the level of elites to involve society in cultural and structural peace-building programmes. Israeli-Palestinian peace education and water management cases are employed to illustrate this argument.

Key Words: Copenhagen School, Securitisation Theory, Desecuritisation, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Education, Water Management, Conflict Resolution, Peace-making, Peace-building
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Collaborative for Development Action</td>
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<td>COPRI</td>
<td>Copenhagen Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>FoEME</td>
<td>Friends of Earth Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCRI</td>
<td>Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information</td>
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<td>JWC</td>
<td>Joint Water Committee</td>
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<td>JSETs</td>
<td>Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIME</td>
<td>Research Institute in the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWA</td>
<td>Palestinian Water Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United National Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nation Relief and Works Administration</td>
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This thesis dedicated to mum, Hikmet Balamir who always wished to see me as a Doctor.
INTRODUCTION

Securitisation has been developed by a number of scholars affiliated to the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) as a theoretical framework to answer the question of what really makes something a security problem (Wæver 1995:54). It emerged in the context of security debates during the 1990s and in less than two decades it has become one of the most controversial approaches of contemporary Security Studies. The work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and others has made a major contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of security by introducing the concepts of 'securitisation' and 'desecuritisation.' However, while the securitisation framework has made a major theoretical contribution few attempts have been made at empirical application and most of these deal with European cases only. They also largely ignore the concept of desecuritisation.¹

Of the few scholars who have attempted to analyse desecuritisation within the context of empirical cases, Paul Roe (2004) analyses the conditions of desecuritisation in the context of minority rights in Europe, Rens Van Munster (2004) explores the desecuritisation of illegal migration in Europe and Andrea Oelsner (2005) attempts to explain regional peace in South America through desecuritisation analysis.

The starting point of this thesis is a recognition of the gap between the theory and application of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework particularly with reference to desecuritisation. It addresses the need for the securitisation framework to be applied to other conflict/peace analysis cases. The thesis argues that an application beyond European-based cases will enrich the framework and so applies it to an analysis of the complex Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict, it is argued, provides an interesting case for analysing

¹ The terms securitisation and desecuritisation refer both a scholarly tool and an effect of policy. Throughout the thesis the terms securitisation and desecuritisation are used to refer to a concept, an approach, a process, and a move/initiative. These various meanings are used deliberately. Mainly the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation are developed by Wæver as part of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework. While securitisation/desecuritisation refer to the Copenhagen School’s approach to analyse securitisation/desecuritisation processes empirically, the terms securitisation/desecuritisation moves and securitisation/desecuritisation initiatives are used interchangeably to refer attempts which do not end up as fully-fledged securitisation/desecuritisation processes.
securitisation processes which have been shaped by military and political elites, and
desecuritisation processes which have been initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil societies.

The thesis has two related goals. The principal one is to apply the securitisation framework in
general and the under-theorised desecuritisation concept in particular. Stemming from the
application of the securitisation framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it explores the
limits and prospects of securitisation as a theoretical framework. In this way it aims to
contribute to the development of Copenhagen School’s desecuritisation concept as a
framework for analysing conflict resolution and peace. The secondary goal is to contribute to
debates over the problems and prospects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.
The thesis thus explores the prospects for reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian case through
an analysis of both desecuritising and securitising processes. Within this context, the thesis
sheds light on how the securitisation framework can be better applied and also on the ways in
which antagonistic relationships can be changed over time. In short, the thesis makes a
contribution to Security Studies by applying securitisation framework in a complex conflict
situation, and by analyzing the Israeli and Palestinian coexistence/cooperation efforts with
their potential for desecuritisation.

The originality of the thesis lies in three main areas. The first is the application of
securitisation framework to a complex conflict situation. Almost two decades after its
emergence, the Copenhagen School is undergoing a process of revision and reconsideration.
This thesis constitutes a timely contribution to this process. Second, by developing an
innovative analytical framework, the thesis integrates the concept of desecuritisation with the
concepts of peace-building and peace-making. Third, and related, the thesis goes beyond the
analysis of ongoing securitisations and argues that in the Israeli-Palestinian context, there
exist important desecuritisation moves involving Israeli and Palestinian civil societies. Hence,
the thesis analyses bottom-up peace-building efforts with a particular focus on several peace
education and water management projects.

The Time Period and the Case Studies Selected
Following the Copenhagen School’s approach to desecuritisation the discussion will start by
first analysing how particular issues are securitised in the Israeli-Palestinian context (Chapters
2 and 3), and then analysing desecuritisation itself (Chapters 5 and 6). Within this context, the
thesis provides an analysis of the securitisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well. Chapter 2 covers the period beginning with the World Zionist Organisation’s meeting in 1897 and ends with the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2004. This long timeframe is divided into four consecutive periods that cover different phases of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: from the 1897 World Zionist Organisation’s meeting to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948; from 1948 to the end of the Six Day War in 1967; from 1967 to the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987; and from 1988 to the Second Intifada in 2000. Chapter 3 then focuses on the conflict following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. In this chapter the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is explored as a securitisation process through an analysis of Israeli and Palestinian security discourses regarding the ‘other’ and the exceptional measures taken to deal with the threat posed by this manifestation. In this part of the study, mainly military and political leaders’ statements and public speeches are taken into consideration. In the Israeli case, members of the ruling elite - prime ministers, the foreign affairs and defence ministers and the opposition leaders - are considered to be the main securitising actors. In the Palestinian case it was quite difficult to name the securitising actors since the Palestinian leadership has been divided since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994. As a consequence, besides the public speeches and declarations of leaders of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the various Chairmen of the PNA, the statements of Hamas and other Islamic resistance movements are also explored since these movements have appeared as powerful securitising actors in Palestinian politics.

Even though this thesis is primarily concerned with the analysis of the efforts to secure cooperation and coexistence between Israeli and Palestinian civil society during and after the peace process (1993–2007), earlier attempts to reconcile Israelis and Palestinians are also briefly reviewed. The analytical framework based on the concept of desecuritisation is applied in two cases, namely, peace education and water management; both of these cover important aspects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. These two cases are employed to illustrate the bottom-up desecuritisation attempts, or in the Copenhagen School’s terminology ‘desecuritisation moves’. Within this context, the Israeli Palestinian Centre for

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2 Here LSE’s Centre of Civil Society’s definition of civil society is taken into consideration which refers to the arena of volunteer collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. Civil societies often consist of organisations such as registered charities, non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. See ‘What is Civil Society’ http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm [accessed 15 June 2008]
Research and Information (IPCRI), Windows, the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME), Seeds of Peace’s peace education projects, the Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), Friends of Earth Middle East (FoEME), the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies and the Water and Environmental Development Organisation’s water management projects are analysed.

The peace education projects were chosen based on the following criteria: First they are run jointly by Israeli and Palestinian directors, second they aim at reaching both Israeli and Palestinian recipients and third they are developed by a project team consisting of Israeli and Palestinian participants. Similarly, water management projects were chosen based on their promotion of collaboration between both Israelis and Palestinians. All the civil society organisations considered in the thesis have contributed to Israeli-Palestinian joint efforts regarding the management of shared water resources between Israelis and Palestinians. It is important to note that this part of the thesis does not engage in measuring the impact of these desecuritisation moves on the public in general and their impact on participants of these projects in particular. Rather, it aims to analyse the Israeli and Palestinian civil societies’ coexistence/cooperation efforts as desecuritising moves.

Methodology

This thesis is an example of adaptive approach as proposed by Derek Layder which underlines the interplay between theory and empirical data. According to Layder, “the theory both adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence at the same time as the data themselves are filtered through (and adapted to) the extant theoretical materials” (Layder 1998:38). By using an adaptive approach, the researcher finds the opportunity to formulate or reformulate the theory under consideration, in this case that of (de)securitisation, on the basis of empirical findings, which, in turn, contribute to the further development of the theory in question. Unlike grounded theory, adaptive theory “attempts to combine an emphasis on prior theoretical ideas and models which feed into and guide research while at the same time attending to the generation of theory from ongoing analysis of data” (Layder 1998:19) The adaptive approach puts emphasis on the employment of prior or extant theory as well as the generation of new theory. Furthermore, the adaptive approach attempts to trace the reciprocal influences and interconnections between social activities and the wider systemic environment. Hence, an adoptive approach is considered to be the most suitable one to the application of
securitisation theory in order to analyse securitisation/desecuritisations in the particular case of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

In this study, the principle of triangulation implied using various types of data. The basic idea of triangulation is to obtain data from a wide range of different and multiple sources. Triangulation serves two purposes: confirmation and completeness (Arksey and Knight 2007:21). According to Denzin (1970:27) there is no single method which provides completely sound casual propositions. Thus the application of a series of complementary methods of testing is required in order to confirm results and to validate causality. Triangulation is regarded as a strategy to overcome problems of validity and bias. By collecting diverse sets of data there is a less chance of making errors, or drawing inappropriate conclusions than relying on just one data set (Arksey and Knight 2007:22).

Hence, this study involves the analysis of six different corpora, i.e. political speeches/statements, primary historical documents, newspaper articles, public opinion polls, documents produced by selected civil society entities and semi-structured interviews. Triangulation helps provide a detailed picture of both securitisation processes and desecuritisation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Bringing together a range of views has the potential to generate explanations that better capture the complexity of the case. It is believed that the use of different data collection methods allows for a more comprehensive and accurate analysis.

Since the analysis of securitisation requires the analysis of speech acts, Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis mainly relies on discourse analysis of primary texts, such as declarations, agreements, peace treaties as well as discourse analysis of speeches and statements of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Here the analysis of text and speech depends as much on focusing on what is said, and how a specific argument regarding the existence of particular security threats is developed. The analysis is also interested in the rhetorical work of the text, how the specific issues it raises are structured and organised and chiefly how it seeks to persuade audience about the authority of its understanding of the issue. Within this context, word repetitions and repeat patterns (particularly which words having been used repetitively), content words (what kind of words having been used to refer to the other side) and the use of personal pronouncements (us/we - them/they particularly in relation to respective identity construction processes) are taken into consideration for the analysis of security/enmity discourses in these sources.
The analysis of discourse (both text and speech) in Chapter 2 specifically focuses on how ideas, practices and identities emerge, transform, have mutated through Israeli-Palestinian interactions during the period 1948-2000. The analysis of security/enmity discourse in Chapter 2 seeks to understand and describe the historical trajectory of the contemporary securitisations, which constitutes the main focus of Chapter 3. For a brief overview of security/enmity speech acts for the period of 1948 – 2000 the historical documents and official speeches and statements of Israeli Prime Ministers and of PLO (later on PNA) leaders were studied. For this investigation Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ archive (in English), Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information Database and Yale University Avalon Project’s Middle East Documentary Record served as the main databases. Chapter 3 deals with more recent period of Israeli-Palestinian relations by analysing the tensions between securitisations and normalisation attempts of 2000 – 2007. The discourse of this period is investigated through an analysis of declarations, statements and speeches of Israeli Prime Ministers and PNA Chairman as well as the extracts from the discourses of their opponents which are mainly provided through extracts from magazines and newspapers. Major historical documents, statements and speeches of Israeli Prime Ministers and Palestinian leaders related to the Palestinian issue and peace process will be taken into consideration. The analysis particularly deals with documents, speeches and statements that refer to the key issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; that constitute the bases of security/enmity speech acts and those that contain historical conceptions, narratives about how the other side has been perceived as an existential threat. For this analysis, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ archive (in English), the Office of the Israeli Prime Minister’s speech archive, the Israeli-Palestinian Centre for Research and Information Database and Yale University Avalon Project’s Middle East Documentary Record were consulted as main databases.

The data for desecuritisation analysis was collected between April 2005 and March 2007. Most of the data was collected from research centres, think tanks, universities and joint

3 Mainly English medium Israeli and Arab media resources such as Haaretz, Haaretz Magazine, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem Times, Al-Ahram Weekly, Palestine-info, The Middle East Media Research Institute and international media such as BBC news, CNN.com, The Guardian, The Times and The New York Times were used as main media resources.

4 During the pre-PNA period, the PLO was dominant in the Palestinian security discourse, even though the PLO leadership had developed outside the Palestinian territories. Hence, in chapter 3 the PLO elites are considered as the main securitising actors. Besides the PLO and, after 1994 PNA elites, other fedayeen groups’ like Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders’ securitising moves are also taken into consideration.
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation/coexistence projects. For desecuritisation analysis, the text in selected civil society organisations' publicity materials, projects reports and related conference/workshop proceedings were consulted as the basic primary documents.

In this study interviews are considered as complementary source of data and provide a source for checking and deepening the data available from texts. In general, interviews provide data on understandings, opinions, attitudes and feelings that informants have in common. Qualitative interviews in particular, concentrate on the distinctive features of situations and events, and the beliefs of individuals or subcultures. Through the interviews researcher underlies the claim is that perception, memory, emotion and understanding are human constructs and yet, this construction takes place within cultural and sub-cultural settings that provide a framework for meaning-making. According to this view people share similar understandings of things that are common experiences and subject to society-wide interpretations (Arksey and Knight 2007:2-3). In this regard, the interviewees' responses were considered supportive to the data collected from documents and texts for analysing desecuritisation moves in this highly securitised case.

In general by conducting semi-structured interviews the researcher has a specific agenda to follow and has selected beforehand the relevant topic areas and themes to pursue. The interviews were loosely structured around key questions. This allowed the interviewer to follow up ideas, probe responses and ask for clarification or further elaboration. For their part informants can answer the questions in terms of what they see as important. (Arksey and Knight 2007:7) In this study 10 semi-structured interviews were carried out with Israeli and Palestinian academics, NGO workers and directors in order to explore interviewees' attitudes, motivations and perceptions regarding Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and reconciliation. Furthermore, a more spontaneous and unstructured talks were conducted with NGO volunteers. The answers that were given by informants, particularly by anonymous volunteers

\[\text{The interviewees were selected based on two criteria: their specialisation and their affiliation. As far as the criterion of specialisation is concerned, all of the 10 interviewees are working either for peace education or water management projects/research that includes both Israelis and Palestinians. The second criterion, affiliation, is particularly important for the selection of interviews from NGOs. The NGOs, most of the interviewees are affiliated with, are chosen based on the following criteria: (1) it is run jointly by Israeli and Palestinian directors, (2) it aims at reaching both Israeli and Palestinian recipients and (3) it is developed by a project team consisting of Israeli and Palestinian participants. All the interviewees selected have participated/contributed to Israeli-Palestinian joint efforts for peace education and/or water management which constitute the case studies of this dissertation.}\]
and participants, represent the personal versions of the story written on web-sites and publicity documents. Formal interviews on the other hand were particularly effective in providing guidance for the document analysis and structuring the analysis. Interviews were also expected to go beyond the formal language of text and exploring personal attitudes, motivations and perceptions of the members of civil society who are working on peace-building projects. It is believed that the enthusiasm, determination and commitment of these people are only be observed through face-to-face encounters.

Interviewees were willing to share their views about the projects in which they are participating and related problems. Most of the interviews were recorded, with only a few cases arising in which interviewees objected to a record being made. The places of interviews were chosen by interviewees, which gave them a sense of comfort. The semi-structured nature of the interview provided flexibility regarding how the conversation developed even though a number of the topics to be covered during the interviews were chosen beforehand. The flexible nature of the interview allowed for the raising of additional questions when necessary. In spite of their various benefits, the interviews also contained certain drawbacks. Given the emotional conditions of intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, daily developments regarding the conflict might affect interviewees' responses. Indeed, the interview period coincided with a turbulent political situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Besides the diplomatic and economic isolation of the Hamas-led Palestinian government by the international community, internally, there were also clashes between Hamas and Fatah all over the Palestinian territories. As a result of this turbulent political situation, Palestinian respondents were not able to focus their attention on joint cooperation/coexistence projects with Israelis. On the other hand, Israeli interviewees were very upset because of the first ever suicide bombing attack in Eilat on 31 January 2007. As was eloquently put by one respondent, during times such as these it was really difficult to talk about peace education and coexistence.

Besides the primary sources and semi-structured interviews secondary sources such as scholarly journals and books, articles and contributions to edited collections are also consulted.
**Thesis Outline**

The first chapter explores the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. This chapter reviews the concepts, arguments and assumptions introduced by the Copenhagen School with a particular emphasis on the notion of desecuritisation. Furthermore, based on the notion of desecuritisation, an analytical framework for analysing the desecuritisation moves of Israeli and Palestinian civil societies will be presented at the end of the chapter.

Chapter 2 gives an historical account of Israeli-Palestinian security discourses. Beginning with an exploration of the political and historical conjuncture that brought Jews against Palestinian Arabs, this chapter examines the competing claims of Zionists and Palestinian Arabs regarding the land of Palestine, claims which constitute the roots of Israeli and Palestinian securitisations. The chapter covers a long period from 1897 till the 2000s and considers how both sides securitised the other side as an existential threat to their respective existence in Palestine.

Chapter 3 provides a securitisation analysis of the period following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. This chapter involves a detailed analysis of post-Oslo security discourses by the Palestinian and Israeli political and military elites; how particular policies and actions were affected by security discourses; and public opinion of the Palestinian and Israeli societies. The continuities and changes in securitisation processes in the Israeli Palestinian context will also be analysed. In this chapter the following questions are explored: How is support for security measures achieved and viewed as a legitimate exercise of state power? What is the position of the Israeli and Palestinian publics regarding threats that have been securitised?

Before proceeding, however, Chapter 4 reviews the development of the idea of reconciliation and peace, as opposed to the continuous securitisation processes, in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

In Chapter 5, given its cooperation potential, it is argued that water management could be a means for desecuritisation in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Therefore, this chapter discusses
the place of water as part of the peace-making and structural peace-building processes in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

In Chapter 6, joint Israeli-Palestinian peace education projects are considered as examples of cultural peace-building and the following questions are answered: What is the impact of joint peace education efforts on the desecuritisation of the other? How is peace education work affected by ongoing securitising moves?

The conclusions summarise the findings and reflect on securitisation theory. This last chapter outlines issues of policy relevance; revisits the questions/issues raised in introduction and analysis chapters and draws out implications for the development of the desecuritisation approach.
CHAPTER ONE

Securitisation Theory

Thanks to its mixed roots, which come from both traditional Security Studies and from the more recent critical and post-structuralist approaches to security, securitisation theory has become one of the most controversial approaches in contemporary Security Studies in less than two decades.

The literature associated with the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory is less concerned with the application of securitisation as a framework of analysis. There have been a few attempts to apply the theory to empirical cases. Moreover, most of the empirical work on securitisation theory analyses Western European and American cases, contrary to the Copenhagen School's claim to have produced a conceptualisation of security that can escape the European orientation of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular. For example, the securitisation of migration in Europe has generated a considerable literature (Boswell 2007, Nyers 2003; Bigo 2001a/b, 2002; Huysmans 1995). However, only a few works can be found regarding the application of securitisation theory in non-European cases (Coskun 2008, Wilkinson 2007, Jackson 2006, Kaliber 2005, Smith 2000). Given this gap between theory and application, this thesis aims to apply securitisation theory to an analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most complex conflicts of modern history.

Neither Barry Buzan nor Ole Wæver explicitly discuss whether securitisation is considered as a theory as they do for the regional security complex theory (2003). From time to time they refer it as theory and the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation as theoretical tools (ie. in Buzan and Wæver 2003, Wæver 2003). Similarly, most of the scholars who write on securitisation (or criticise it) refer it as theory (Williams 2003, Oelsner 2005, Taureck 2006, Jackson 2006, Stritzel 2007, Wilkinson 2007), others refer it as an approach (Booth 2005, Kaliber 2005, Roe 2004, Behnke 2000). In this chapter the term securitisation theory is used to refer to the theoretical framework and tools as a whole including the concepts of
securitisation, desecuritisation, (de)securitising actor, audience and facilitating factors as developed by the Copenhagen School.

The objective of this chapter is to overview securitisation theory with a particular emphasis on the notion of desecuritisation. By taking on Copenhagen School's arguments and assumptions the chapter claims to provide a more comprehensive framework to analyse (de)securitisation. The chapter is divided as follows: the first section reviews the general arguments, assumptions and main premises of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. After this review the main components of the theoretical framework suggested within the context of securitisation theory namely securitising actors, audience and context as well as facilitating conditions of securitisation are explored. The theoretical framework presented in this section will be employed in analysing security discourses of protagonists in their historical context (Chapter 2) with a special emphasis on the security discourse of the post-Arafat era (Chapter 3). The second section studies the Copenhagen School's notion of desecuritisation. Stemming from this review, an analytical framework will be developed to analyse Israeli-Palestinian civil society's cooperation/coexistence efforts as desecuritisation moves in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

### 1.1 Securitisation Theory

Securitisation theory was developed by the Copenhagen School during the 1990s. The Copenhagen School refers to the work of Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. Buzan's book *People, States and Fear* published in 1983 and revised in 1991 constitutes the foundation stone for the Copenhagen School. Since 1985, the Copenhagen School has explored how to move Security Studies beyond a narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states. Within this context, together with Buzan, a number of scholars including Ole Wæver, Jaap De Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer from the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research have developed the following concepts/frameworks: the notion of security sectors, regional security complex theory and the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation. This group of scholars came to be dubbed the Copenhagen School by Bill McSweeney (1996). As indicated in the title of their reply to Bill McSweeney's criticism in 1997 this tag was embraced by the group and has been widely accepted to refer as the collective shorthand to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies.
To broaden up the security agenda by adding economic, political, societal and environmental security sectors (Buzan et al. 1998) was the first step in the Copenhagen School’s reconstruction of Security Studies. The second step was to conceptualise security as a multi-level concept by introducing the regional security complex theory (Buzan and Wæver 2003). Last but not least, as a third step, Wæver’s securitisation theory was integrated in the Copenhagen School’s approach to security analysis. Even though there are a number of scholars involved in Copenhagen School, along with Buzan, Wæver has had the most influence on the Copenhagen School’s security approach.

As Wæver claims, the aim of securitisation theory is to construct a “neo-conventional security analysis (which) sticks to the traditional core of the concept of security (existential threats, survival), but is undogmatic as to both sectors (not only military) and referent objects (not only states)” (Wæver 1996:110). According to the Copenhagen scholars, what is needed is an understanding of the cultural process of securitisation; by which actors construct issues as threats to security. Within this context, Wæver argues that threats and security are not objective matters; rather “security is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue. Security discourse is characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an absolute threat...” (1996:108).

Securitisation theory is based on an interdisciplinary approach which ranges from linguistic theories to sociology. Throughout his many writings, Wæver makes references to various theoretical thinkers including John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Carl Schmitt and Kenneth Waltz that inspired the securitisation theory.

For the Copenhagen School, the contemporary security environment is deeply related to the politicising of an issue. Security politics is not just about underlining pre-existing threats; but also a performative activity that makes certain issues visible as a threat. Within this context, security refers to a concept that is more about how a society or any group of people come to designate, or not designate, something as a threat. It is about the process by which threats get constructed. This view thus proposes the concept of securitisation be defined as “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and
A successful securitisation consists of three steps: the identification of existential threat(s); emergency action; and the legitimisation of exceptional measures even by breaking free of norms and rules of normal (Taureck 2006:55). For a securitisation move to be successful, a certain level of support from an audience is required. At the very least, political groups that are willing to act to secure the threatened object should be mobilised through the securitisation process.

As far as the Copenhagen School is concerned, two elements of the traditional security approach have been influential: survival and existential threat. In this sense Kenneth Waltz’s reading of security has had considerable influence on the securitisation theory. According to Waltz, in international politics, albeit that there are differences in their aims and strategies, all the states have one common desire: survival (2001:203). By placing survival at the heart of their concept of security, the Copenhagen School shares a similar position to Waltzian neorealism and defines security as “survival in the face of existential threats” (Buzan et al. 1998:33). Buzan and Wæver define a security issue as being “posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:71). It is argued that securitisation rests on political choices. “Security can never be based on the objective reference that something is in and of itself a security problem. That quality is always given to it in human communication” (Buzan and Wæver 1997:246). The threat can thus be used to legitimate political action which might not otherwise appear as legitimate.

The theory of securitisation underlined two intertwined logics, namely the claim about existential threats and the legitimisation of exceptional measures. Through the securitisation process, it is claimed that a particular security issue necessitates priority over others; therefore, the securitising actor claims the special right to handle the issue using exceptional measures. Securitisation results in a confrontational mind-set. Hence, positing an issue as an existential threat requires a move from normal to emergency politics since the usual political procedures do not apply in a state of war or emergency and responses to existential threats fall outside standard political practices. The Copenhagen School presents the exception as a deviation from normal deliberative politics but does not give a definition of normal politics. Rather, it views normal politics as being not fixed but as historically changing through action.
Roughly, the Copenhagen School differentiates securitisation from politicisation whilst recognising both processes as intersubjective\(^6\) (Buzan \textit{et al.} 1998:30). The politicisation of an issue makes it a matter of public choice, which is part of the normal politics of public deliberation. On the other hand, securitisation of an issue removes it from the context of normal politics and justifies the necessity of emergency politics and leaves it to the decisive action of securitising actors (Fierke 2007:108). Proclaiming an issue to be a security threat can confer legitimacy on the methods employed by the state to protect citizens from such threats. That is to say, securitisation justifies introducing security practices and technologies, which would not be introduced under normal conditions. Moreover, in democratic polities the suspension of normal politics as a result of a successful securitisation may occur at the expense of liberal democratic principles and may lead to an erosion of civil liberties.

The analysis of securitisation focuses on “the questions of when and under what conditions who securitises what issue” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:71). As far as the question of what issue can be securitised is concerned, according to the Copenhagen School’s approach, issues in sectors (political, societal, environmental and human security) other than the military may also be subject to securitisation. Social groups (ethnic, religious etc.) are considered by the Copenhagen School to be equally important as distinctive referent objects of security. Societal security, more specifically concerns “the ability of the society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats...Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms” (Wæver \textit{et al.}, 1993: 23). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the Palestinian political elite have extensively securitised issues in the societal and human sectors of security; in parallel, the Israeli elite has securitised issues in the political and societal sectors of security. According to the Copenhagen School, societal insecurity occurs “when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to the survival of their community” or more accurately the identity of their community as such (Buzan \textit{et al.} 1998:119). Societal security highlights the role of identity or the sense of \textit{we-ness} in security relations. This concept has been criticised by McSweeney (1996) who argues that the Copenhagen School defines societal identity as being singular,

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\(^6\) According to the Copenhagen School the process of securitisation is \textit{intersubjective} since it is neither a question of an objective threat or a subjective perception of a threat. Instead securitisation of a subject depends on an \textit{audience accepting} the securitisation speech act (Buzan \textit{et al.} 1998, 30).
thereby denying the fluidity and multiplicity of social identities. Michael Williams argues, however, that McSweeney’s criticism misses the point of the Copenhagen School that illustrates how a securitising speech act creates the conditions for the reification of identity in a monolithic form. As Williams argues, “a successful securitisation of identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity ... to cast this as a relationship of threat and even enmity and to have this decision and declaration accepted by [a] relevant group” (2003:519).

Human security deals with security issues that directly or indirectly endanger human lives and human wellbeing. As in the Israeli-Palestinian case, human security may be endangered because of states’ unrestrained quest for their own security. As far as the political sector of security is concerned, Buzan (1991:118) considers threats which are aimed at the organisational stability of the state within the context of the political sector. Within this context, the existence of a particular state can be the target of political security threats. Political threats are typically about recognition, support, or legitimacy. They are made to the internal legitimacy of the political unit and/or the external recognition of the state (external legitimacy). Generally, however, threats from outside are directed at a particular state’s legitimacy (Buzan et al. 1998:144).

The idea of securitisation as a process of threat construction has drawn attention to the symbiotic relation between securitisation and the formation of collective political identities. In this regard Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political is of particular importance. Schmitt’s concept of the political was defined in relation to ‘the other’, which represents an existential threat. (Meier et al. 1995:33) He claims that the essence of politics lies in the relationship between friend and enemy, and the possibility of conflict. Because enmity lies at the heart of his concept of the political, Schmitt suggested that enmity also presupposes the existence of other political entities. For Schmitt, friendship and enmity provide the foundations of allegiance and solidarity. The commonality of friendship is inextricable from enmity and from the possibility of a life and death struggle with that enemy (Williams 2003:517). Schmitt’s discussion of the political was the decision that constituted the unity of the political group in the exceptional situation, the face of the existential enemy (Schmitt 1996:32). According to Williams, this line of thought can be clearly seen in the process of securitisation, where a securitising actor is at its most efficient exactly because of operating ‘legitimately’ beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations (Williams 2003:518). The securitising actor only
achieves this status by underlining the existence of 'the other' as an 'existential' threat for two reasons: first, because security is always relational in the sense that one's insecurity/security centres on other(s') insecurity/security – the classical formulation of a security dilemma. Second, it makes little sense to speak of one's security without recognising the source of the threat, 'the other'. In the absence of 'the other' one cannot speak about security (Wæver 1997:353). In this sense, securitisation is about the process through which a state/society is consolidated vis-à-vis an enemy-other (Fierke 2007:112). In the following chapter, this point will be illustrated through an examination of the parallel processes of Israeli and Palestinian state/society consolidation.

1.1.1 Analysing Securitisations

The Copenhagen School distinguishes itself from the broader category of Critical Security Studies through its emphasis on security as a process of threat construction. Accordingly, the task of securitisation analysis is to understand how the dynamics of security work. For Buzan and others

> [o]ur approach links itself more closely to existing actors, tries to understand their modus operandi, ... our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to always be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is (Buzan et al. 1998: 35).

The Copenhagen School's securitisation theory rests on two central concepts: three components of securitisation, the speech act, the securitising actor and the audience, and three facilitating factors that affect the success of a securitising move (Figure 1.1). Therefore, the analysis of securitisation processes requires attention to both the components of securitisation and the facilitating factors.

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7 The security dilemma is a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors. The first level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others; the second level consist of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding (Booth and Wheeler 2008:5).
1.1.1 Security as a *Speech Act*

The main argument of securitisation theory is that *security is a speech act*. According to Wæver, security is not an objective condition; rather it is a speech act: "The utterance itself is the act. By saying it something is done" (Wæver 1995:55). Wæver defines security as a *speech act*, where "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act...By uttering 'security', a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it" (Wæver 1995:55). That is to say, the mere invocation of something using the word 'security' declares its threatening nature and "invokes the image of what would happen if security did not work" (Wæver 1995:61). Thus, a specific security rhetoric which underlines survival, priority of action and urgency defines the contours of securitisation.

The Copenhagen School's conceptualisation of security as a speech act draws on John L. Austin's concept of *performative utterances*. According to Austin, performative utterances do not just describe but also create a new reality. As stated by Austin, the name is derived from the verb to 'perform', which indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an
action (Austin 1975:6). Stemming from this concept Wæver argues that the utterance of security is more than just saying or describing something; it is the performance of an action.

Besides Austin, Wæver also draws on insights from Jacques Derrida. Derrida is important for securitisation theory on a metatheoretical level. Wæver acknowledges Derrida’s famous claim that “there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida 1998: 158). By claiming this, Derrida points out that meaning is only in the sentence itself, and not above and beyond that. Within this context, in securitisation analysis, the answers to how we study the context can only be given by analyzing narrative. Narrative provides the vital hermeneutic which links definitions and practices, meaning and action. Hence, it is crucial to read the context in order to understand specific security-related policies. In this sense, discourse analysis provides an analytical tool for analyzing securitisation processes. As was pointed out by Buzan et al. (1998:25), the way to study securitisation is to study discourse, which shows the extent to which an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieves sufficient effect to make the particular audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed.

Discourse analysis here does not claim to ascertain an actor’s intentions. As Wæver states, “discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors...What interests us is neither what individual decision makers really believe, not what are shared beliefs among a population, but which codes are used when actors relate to each other” (2001:26-27). That is to say, securitisation theory does not mean to analyse how actors think but what they say aloud. The analyst has to work with what has actually been said or written in order to explore patterns in and across the statements and to identify the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality.

As was stated above, performative speech acts can neither be true nor false but depend upon certain conditions that can be called the ‘facilitating (felicity) conditions’ of security as a speech act. For a successful securitisation, two constitutive rules are required: the internal, linguistic (grammatical rule) and the external, contextual (social rule). As Williams suggests, the securitisation process is structured first “by the different capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats; second, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognised and accepted as convincing by the relative audience, and third, by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference” (Williams 2003:514). According to Buzan et al., securitisation is only possible if players follow these
rules (1998:32). Hence, the following section presents the other components of securitisation as well as the facilitating factors that determine the success or failure of a securitising move.

1.1.1.2 Securitising Actor, Audience and Facilitating Factors

As discussed above, the Copenhagen School posits securitisation as being founded upon a speech act by an actor claiming to speak in defence of a collectivity and demanding the right to act on its behalf. As a speech act is one of the basic components of securitisation, by definition it is an inter-subjective communication process that requires, as a rule, at least two sides: a securitising actor and an audience. Securitisation necessitates the use and perpetual repetition of the rhetoric of existential threat by the securitising actor, which is usually the government and/or its military and bureaucratic elites. For Wæver “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites” (1995:57). Hence, by “naming a certain development a security problem, the ‘state’ can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites” (Wæver 1995:54). Therefore, securitisation is utilised as a technique of governance.

Through the articulation of danger and existential threat, the securitising actor demands justification from the audience to use all necessary means to eliminate the threat. To decide whether an issue is a security issue is not something the securitising actor can decide alone (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 2000). According to Paul Roe, securitisation is a kind of ‘call and response’ process. An actor makes a call that something is a matter of security and the audience must respond with their acceptance. If there is no such level of acceptance, securitisation will have failed (Roe 2004:281). As Buzan et al. state “presenting something as an existential threat does not by itself create securitisation – this is a securitising move, but the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (1998:25) However, as they note that “acceptance does not necessarily mean [... ] civilised, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as consent” (Buzan et al. 1998:23 [emphasis original]). In the case of consent, through his/her ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests, the securitising actor can persuade the audience by playing with language in accordance with the audience’s experience. If a securitising actor succeeds in obtaining the audience’s identification with his/her security statements, some sort of cognitive and behavioural change can occur among the audience (Balzacq 2005:184).
According to Thierry Balzacq, the securitising actor can get two kinds of support from the audience: **formal** and **moral**. The more harmonious these forms are, the more likely that securitisation will be successful. Securitising actors seek moral support from respective societies which are embodied in the form of public opinion. As securitisation is an attempt to legitimise the use of exceptional measures to prevent an existential threat, securitising actors mainly require formal backing for a successful securitisation. To illustrate this, Balzacq has given the example of to wage a war in order to rid a threat. Besides the political agents’ appeal for the public support for waging a war, a degree of formal support is required. In the case of waging a war the formal approval of the parliament is necessary whether the public opinion had been persuaded by securitising actor to wage a war or not (Balzacq 2005:184-185). In most of the cases, securitising actors securitise an issue without the moral backing of the public.

To complement the speech act, securitising actor and audience triumvirate, the Copenhagen School considers ‘facilitating conditions’ that influence the success of the securitisation process. Inspired by Austin’s concept of ‘felicity conditions’, these refer to: the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security and constructing a plot with existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out; the social capital of the enunciator, the securitising actor, who has to be in a position of authority, although this should neither be defined as official authority nor taken to guarantee success with the speech act; and conditions historically associated with a threat: it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if there are certain objects to refer to which are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters. In themselves they never make for necessary securitisation, but they are definitely facilitating conditions (Buzan et al. 1998:33, Wæver 2003:15). Only if these three conditions are met, a securitising act has a chance to be successful, in other words a securitising actor has been able to convince her/his audience of the need to mobilize extraordinary measures.

As argued by scholars like Stritzel, “facilitating conditions offer a more specific framework for analysing securitisation than the securitisation framework as a whole” (2007:364). Buzan and Wæver introduce these conditions as important factors in understanding securitising speech acts with a particular focus on power and the inter-subjective establishment of threat (1998: 25, 31-32). In this regard, they claim that “it is important to be specific about who is
more or less privileged in articulating security. To study securitisation is to study the power politics of a concept” (Buzan et al. 1998:32).

As far as the aforementioned context is concerned, the Copenhagen School’s position is to assume that language is performative. Hence, a secure place can be insecure as a result of the speech act. As Balzacq points out, the context is shaped by the use of the concept of security and “what is key here is the ‘abductive power’ of words; indeed, as an abductive tool, the concept of security permits the activation of a new context, or converts the existing one into something different” (2005:180). Hence, security utterances operate as instructions for the construction and interpretation of a security threat. Within this context, ‘security’ does not always point out an objective reality. It is the securitising actor who uses discourses on existential threats. Given this internalist view of the context, Balzacq suggests that, in order to win an audience, security statements must be related to an external reality. That is to say, the success of securitisation rests on whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive to its vulnerability (2005:182).

It is argued that the capacity to mobilise security expectations depends on the position, status, and authority of the would-be securitising actor (Huysman 1999:19). Wæver’s restrictions on who is likely to succeed in securitisation are based on the realist notion of the distribution of capabilities and powers. The more capabilities a securitising actor has the more likely this actor will succeed in attempted securitisation. In other words, individuals or groups deprived of powers and capabilities in the society can seldom act as securitising actors. They may speak about security to and of themselves, but they never have the power and capability to securitise the particular issue they perceive as an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998:27).

What is important for the previous discussion is that securitisation in Buzan and Wæver’s scheme and in Balzacq’s analysis is an elite process – because it leads to policy. The securitisation approach is so much elite-oriented and there is a general tendency to ignore the role of the audience and other segments of society who could speak security in this process. As stated by Balzacq, the securitising actor also needs the moral support of society. In the securitisation process, how the things are securitised can be mapped through the analysis of whom or what is defined as the threats and whom the actor targets in countermeasures (Buzan

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8 Abductive reasoning starts from a set of accepted facts and infers their most likely or best explanations.
and Wæver 2003:462). This process can be viewed through an analysis of who speaks security (securitising actor), who listens to it (audience) and how something gets put together and accepted as a threat (facilitating conditions):

In his article, Stritzel argues that there are two centres of gravity of securitisation theory; each reflects two rather autonomous readings of securitisation. According to Stritzel, the first understanding focuses on the speech act and it is grounded in the concept of performativity. This understanding corresponds with an internalist, more poststructuralist (Derridarian) reading of securitisation. The second understanding studies the process of securitisation based on the idea of embeddedness (Stritzel 2007:359). This would correspond with an externalist, more constructivist reading of securitisation. While not undermining the role of the speech act in securitisation analysis, this study takes sides with an externalist position – as suggested by Stritzel - and claims that securitisations should be analysed within the context of “their broader discursive contexts from which both the securitising actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain their power” (Stritzel 2007:360). Thus, a specific emphasis would be put upon facilitating conditions in order to explore the embeddedness of security articulations in social relations of power in the Israeli-Palestinian case. For the analysis of securitisation speech acts in the Israeli-Palestinian case, a number of facilitating conditions would be taken into consideration, including global political changes, regional power asymmetries (as between Israel and the Palestinians) and other discourses confirming or limiting the security discourse such as the discourse on terror and the Axis of Evil and the discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

1.2 Desecuritisation
Even though securitisation theory refers to processes of both securitisation and desecuritisation, desecuritisation, the return of issues from emergency politics to normal politics, has been left undertheorised by Copenhagen scholars. As this thesis particularly aims to apply the desecuritisation concept in the Israeli-Palestinian context, it is necessary to review the Copenhagen School’s take on desecuritisation. Thus, this section presents the arguments and debates related to desecuritisation.

Considering the dangers of framing certain issues in the language of security, the Copenhagen School has underlined the preference for desecuritisation and defines desecuritisation as “a
process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan and Wæver 2003:489).

Desecuritisation is best understood as the fading away of a particular issue from the security agenda and implies that issues, for which the potential use of exceptional measures had previously been legitimised, gradually start to take steps backward so that violence will no longer be considered as a legitimate option. As Wæver makes clear, particular issues, such as the environment, can often be dealt with through normal political processes since the logic of war may not be conducive to ecological concerns (Wæver 1995:57). In much the same way, human security may be better dealt with through the normal political process.

The ultimate goal of desecuritisation is the achievement of a situation in which the issue in question is no longer seen as threatening, and thus is no longer defined in security terms. As far as the question of how to desecuritise is concerned, the Copenhagen School outlines three options for policy makers: not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place, once an issue is securitised, try not to generate security dilemmas and vicious circles and to move security issues back into normal politics (Wæver 2000:253). Since it is too late for the first and second strategies in situations such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the only viable desecuritisation strategy is the third one: to move security issues back into the realm of normal politics. Dealing with the third strategy can be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Particularly in the societal sector of security, the defence of societal identity might constitute the security discourse since securitising actors argue that the other identity threatens the existence of their own identity. Desecuritisation in the societal sector requires a level of acceptance that two identities could and should be able to coexist. As Roland Bleiker stresses, accepting the other’s sense of identity requires tolerance. Hence, for a fully-fledged desecuritisation in the societal sector, the two sides of a conflict should accept their different and perhaps incompatible identities (Bleiker 2002:301).

Stemming from the Copenhagen School’s approach, Jef Huysmans’ work provides an ethical-political approach to the issue of why to desecuritise. He suggests that “desecuritisation unmakes politics which identify the community on the basis of the expectations of hostility. Instead of simply removing policy questions from the security sector and plugging them into
another sector, desecuritising turns into a political strategy which challenges the fundamentals of the political realist constitution of the political community” (Huysmans 1998:576).

As argued by Wæver, securitised issues can be managed or transformed. However, there exists a distinction between the management of securitised issues (normalisation) and desecuritisation. The management of securitised issues may bring with it the notion of normalising the situation - an insecurity situation. Security and insecurity do not constitute an opposition. A security situation means that a threat is articulated and sufficient counter-measures are available, in contrast, insecurity has a security threat but no, or insufficient, response (Wæver 1998:81). Both conditions share the security problematique. In the case of desecuritisation there is neither security nor insecurity. If the situation is taken out of the realm of security conceptualisation, the situation can be inelegantly described as one of ‘a-security’ or ‘non-insecurity’ (Wæver 1998:81). The challenge lies in the transformation of the securitised issues, the shifting of an issue from something that is security to something that is ‘asecurity’ (Roe 2004:285). Security and insecurity are not exhaustive options and more attention needs to be given to asecurity (Wæver 1998:71). As Wæver states, “transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen through thematisation in security terms, only away from such terms” (1995:56 original emphasis). For Wæver, the best way is to prevent issues from being framed in terms of security in the first place, which is not an option in the Israeli-Palestinian case. Thus, Wæver’s solution is not satisfactory at all in cases like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for which desecuritisation requires a drastic transformation of the securitised issue to make it part of the normal political process. For a long time in the Israeli-Palestinian context the situation has swung from security to insecurity but never reached a condition of a-security. In between the periods of violent attacks following securitisations, both sides have managed to have periods of in-security. The periods of in-security have mainly been marked by declarations of ceasefire by Palestinian liberation/resistance movements and by successive Israeli governments’ introduction of strong defence measures. Yet, because the securitising actors continue to securitise during these periods of in-security, desecuritisation has not been realised.

Desecuritisation is conceived by the Copenhagen School as travelling in the opposite direction to the securitisation process driven by speech acts. This suggests that the same components of the securitisation process (securitising actor, audience, speech act and
facilitating conditions) can be applied to the analysis of desecuritisation processes with adjustments (Figure 2.1).

**Figure 1.2 Concepts of Desecuritisation Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Components of Desecuritisation</th>
<th>Facilitating Conditions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Desecuritising Language</td>
<td>1. The change in the language used to define the previously securitised issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desecuritising Actor</td>
<td>2. The social conditions regarding the position of the desecuritising actor (the relation between desecuritising actor and audience).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Audience</td>
<td>3. Conditions that point out the necessity for desecuritisation</td>
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By contrast to securitising actor(s), the Copenhagen School does not explicitly define who could be a desecuritising actor. In this regard, Andrea Oelsner who has applied the concept of desecuritisation on the case of regional peace in Latin America suggests that in the desecuritisation process, the crucial actors may be policy-makers and other political, economic, and intellectual elites, who will try to convey to the public (the audience, in the language of securitisation theory) their re-interpreted perceptions (Oelsner 2005:15). The same actors that had previously advocated securitisation may now encourage the process of desecuritisation by renegotiating appropriate responses with relevant audiences as well as other actors. This time, the aim will be to remove certain issues from the security agenda. On the other hand, in her critique of the Copenhagen School's approach to desecuritisation, Claudia Aradau argues that the agents should not be the self-same agents of securitisation. For

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9 As they are not defined by the Copenhagen School explicitly, here the components of desecuritisation analysis and its facilitating conditions are inferred from the components and facilitating conditions that are suggested for securitisation analysis by Copenhagen School (Figure 1).
Aradau, desecuritising actors should be from within the previously silenced 'other'. In this sense Aradau thinks of desecuritisation in terms of the local (2003:20). As is the case in the Israeli Palestinian context, in most of the cases the securitising actors are unwilling of desecuritisation and consider normalisation or conflict management as an option. At its best political elites initiate and/or agree to participate official peace-making processes but that does not end up with desecuritisation necessarily. Therefore, actors other than the securitising actors should initiate the process.

As far as the language of desecuritisation is concerned, according to Andreas Behnke, desecuritisation as a speech act is contradictory. As Behnke points out, to declare that a particular issue no longer constitutes a threat opens up a language game. Once desecuritised, the issue does not leave the discourse on security. An issue is desecuritised through a lack of speech, not through speech acts affirming its new status (Behnke 2006:65). On the other hand, since desecuritisation requires a process of redefinition and reinterpretation of previously securitised issues, the changes in language thorough the process should be taken into consideration: What kind of language is used by desecuritising actors? To what extent has the language changed compared to the language used to define the previously securitised issue? In order to answer these questions the discourse suggested by desecuritising actors should be analysed thoroughly.

Since the Copenhagen School does not suggest as explicit a framework for its analysis as it has done for securitisation, different scholars have interpreted desecuritisation differently. Oelsner’s analysis is directly related to the possible strategies that might be employed by desecuritising actors. Oelsner analyses the ways in which an issue transcends the security language and is then desecuritised. According to Oelsner, an issue can transcend security language in two ways: either it loses its threatening image because agent and audience’s perception of the nature of the threat change in a positive manner or they perceive a qualitative change in the relationship between them and the securitised threat. They gradually begin to trust the fact that it no longer poses an existential threat (2005:4). The first mechanism is a rather passive one. It seems to involve almost no effort on the part of agent and audience; the threat seems to just lose its power or capabilities. On the other hand, the second mechanism requires a more active qualitative transformation, because the relationship itself has been reassessed. Several different factors can encourage this move which need detailed examination in each empirical case. They can range from changes in the constitution
of domestic governments, changes in domestic preferences, pressure from interest groups in one direction or another, emergence or decline of related concerns that make actors reconsider priorities and regional and global transformations, etc (Oelsner 2005:5). In some cases, the beginning of the process is to be found at the regional and/or global level and will encourage domestic desecuritisation. That is to say, the desecuritisation process can start as a bottom-up process or a top-down one. It is important to note that even though external conditions might have effects on them, both securitisation and desecuritisation processes are essentially domestic developments. In the Israeli-Palestinian case both global and regional developments led to the initiation of the peace process between Israel and Palestine. During the Oslo Process the peace-making efforts of official negotiators and mediators aimed to promote the bottom-up peace-building efforts of the two peoples, as will be discussed in the following section. The expected transformation from securitisation to desecuritisation was not realised at the official level and the failure of peace-making paved the way for a renewal of securitisation processes. However, in spite of the outbreak of a new wave of securitisation, civil society’s efforts at desecuritisation have continued.

One can expect peace to be more stable and solid in the absence of mutual security concerns or when issues have been effectively desecuritised. Oelsner identifies two stages of desecuritisation. The first phase is about peace stabilisation and the first few steps towards domestic desecuritisation; the second involves peace consolidation, the expansion of mutual desecuritisation and the growth of mutual trust. According to Oelsner, the first phase involves a change of direction to a gradually improving one. The second phase, meanwhile, refers to the development and consolidation of the desecuritisation process (2005:11).

Once desecuritisation is perceived as a convenient and feasible policy option, Oelsner believes that a more stable peace may occur. This first stage opens the door to a different type of relationship between former antagonists. If the initial changes continue to develop in a positive manner, they will facilitate the advance to the second stage of the process, that involving a redefinition of the relationship. It is this latter phase that leads to more durable changes, which in turn will result in a consolidated type of peace and a domestic situation dominated by a sense of asecurity (Oelsner 2005:13). To redefine the relationship implies a simultaneous re-evaluation of the vision of ‘the other’ and of the self as well. According to Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, this complex learning process ‘requires a redefinition or re-evaluation of the parties’ national interests, so that each party will perceive a mutual interest
in establishing and maintaining the peace between them as the most important factor in assuring each other's security and even existence" (2000: 24-25). The development towards a more consolidated peace involves a process of redefinition and reinterpretation of the perceptions of 'the other'. According to Adler and Barnett, during this process social actors "manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities" (1998:43-44).

Changing negative perceptions and initiating a desecuritisation process cannot be realised quickly. Negative perceptions and attitudes towards 'the other' often have deep roots and serve in strengthening societal identities, maintaining unity and justifying one's own aggression. Eventually, incremental changes facilitate, at least among the elites, a degree of working trust that focuses on the common interests that exist amid continuing differences in perceptions and attitudes. Within this context, Marc Howard Ross argues that the problem in attempting to resolve a conflict is not merely to seek "a formula on which the parties can agree but also to first find a way to alter the hostile perceptions and mutual fears that lock the parties into a zero-sum view of any proposals" (1993:160). To this end, two factors can help to desecuritise the relations: rhetoric, as the manifestation of political will, and the construction of co-operative institutions and organisations (Oelsner 2005:14). When the conflicting sides show signs of readiness to cooperate and/or coexist, shared discourses, common projects and even common institutions can be expected to evolve. As a consequence of this, the relationships between the parties become desecuritised (Oelsner 2005:14). Common institutions, high levels of interdependence and compatible domestic regimes, among others, point to the existence of efforts to desecuritise (Adler and Barnett 1998:104).

As was stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis aims to apply the desecuritisation concept to the Israeli-Palestinian context. Stemming from this review of the Copenhagen School's notion of desecuritisation and Oelsner's application of desecuritisation as a framework for the analysis of regional peace in Latin America, the following section presents an analytical framework for the analysis of Israeli-Palestinian desecuritisation attempts. It is argued that the analytical framework developed here contributes to the development of the Copenhagen School's notion of desecuritisation as a framework for analysing conflict resolution and peace.
The analytical framework suggested at the end of this chapter aims at dealing with the third option of the Copenhagen School for desecuritisation: to move the security issue back into normal politics. That is to say it suggests a framework for analysing the transformation from security to a security. Partly based on Oelsner's model that view desecuritisation through steps towards peace, namely peace stabilisation and peace consolidation, the analytical framework integrates the concepts related to conflict resolution such as peace-making and peace-building with the Copenhagen School's desecuritisation concept. By differentiating structural and cultural peace-building the framework aims at analysing positive changes in relations between former adversaries as suggested by Oelsner (2005) and their perceptions towards each other as suggested by Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov (2000) as desecuritising moves. Last but not least, for the analysis of desecuritisation almost all of the components of the securitisation analysis will be implied: the (de)securitising actor, the audience and facilitating conditions. But instead of analysing desecuritisation through speech acts, the differences in the language used by securitising actors and desecuritising actors will be explored. As far as the question of the desecuritising actor is concerned the framework suggests the necessity of the existence of a variety of desecuritising actors both from societal and official level.

1.3 Securitisation Theory as a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Israeli-Palestinian Relations

Even though securitisation theory offers one of the most concise and attractive analytical tools in Security Studies, it has attracted several criticisms. First of all, it is argued that the analytical field is rather narrow and centred around the state, focusing overwhelmingly on state behaviour. As Huysman (1999) has argued, the Copenhagen School approaches securitisation from a rather classical International Relations perspective in which the state is considered as a privileged security actor. This position is, however, defensible. According to Knudsen, the state remains important in Security Studies because it performs essential security functions that are rarely performed by other types of organisations, such as being the major collective unit processing notions of threat; the major unit for the exercise of elite power; the organisational expression that gives shape to communal identity and culture and the legitimiser of authorised action and possession (Knudsen 2001:363). Yet while the state remains central, the Israeli-Palestinian case provides a test case for securitisation theory since one of the actors involved in the conflict is a state whilst 'the other' is not.
A second major criticism concerns the use of the concept of securitisation within the societal sector. The Copenhagen School explicitly states that referent objects other than a state are possible. However, their definition of society and societal insecurity is criticised as focusing on an inherently European understanding of collective identity based on nations and ethnic groups which links collective identities to the state. In other words society is defined by the Copenhagen School within a given politico-territorial identity (Wilkinson 2007:10). Hence, securitisation theory is criticised as a consequence of its inherently Eurocentric assumptions about the social and political context within which securitisation occurs (Wilkinson 2007:11). Given the critiques regarding its Eurocentricism (see Wilkinson 2007, Jackson 2006, Aradau 2004 and Hansen 2000), it is one of the objectives of this thesis to apply securitisation theory in an extra-European context to discuss the limitations and prospects of securitisation theory.

The Copenhagen School’s speech act formulation has been criticised, thirdly, for being overly discursive because of its privileging of speech over other means of expression (van Munster 2002, Bigo 2001a and 2001b, Hansen 2000). The implications of this focus on speech have been explored by Hansen who discusses the issue of who can and cannot ‘speak security’ (2000: 285-287). Hansen’s critique is particularly relevant in non-Western countries where most of the population cannot express their security concerns as a result of censorship, imprisonment and threats. It is argued that the central position of speech in the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory sets restrictive criteria for analysis of security. In this regard, Williams (2003) underlines the increasing importance of media images in political communication and calls for securitisation theory to develop a broader understanding of the mediums and structures of political communication. This is particularly important in settings where politics is not a participatory process. According to Williams, one has to consider the means through which security is expressed and how securitising actors and referent objects are constructed.

A further criticism concerns the discursive formation of security portrayed as a dramatic act before a passive audience (Williams 2003, Hansen 2000, Eriksson 1998). Securitisation theory has been criticised because the audience is insufficiently theorised. As securitisation can be pushed by powerful securitising actors, who use security to pursue their own ends, and the success of a securitisation is dependent on the power and capabilities of the securitising actor, the role of the audience has been underplayed. Another problematic issue regarding the
audience is the difficulty of defining precisely who the audience is. It is not made up of the entire population, but rather varies according to the political system and the nature of the issue. The more immediate groups to be involved, or rather to be convinced, are the political elite and military officials, who are part of the securitising actor already, which, in turn, blurs the idea of inter-subjectivity.

Much of the criticism stems from the Copenhagen School’s under-theorisation of the desecuritisation concept. This critique constitutes the starting point of the thesis in that it attempts to develop the notion of desecuritisation in the Israeli-Palestinian context. More specifically, the concept of the desecuritising actor will be put under scrutiny since the choice of desecuritising actor as members of the civil society, challenges the Copenhagen School’s view of securitisation and desecuritisation as political processes initiated by the political elite.

Lastly, securitisation theory has been subjected to criticism regarding its moral and ethical motives. Particularly, Claudia Aradau criticises the moral/ethical dimension in the process of securitisation. For Aradau, the analyst using securitisation theory has a political responsibility (2004). In this regard, securitisation is no longer viewed as a theoretical tool but merely as a political method. Taureck draws attention to the two different things: securitisation the theory and securitisation as a normative practice and underlines that the Copenhagen School views securitisation/desecuritisation “as a political choice by a securitising actor, which the analyst seeks to uncover by means of using securitisation theory” (2006:58). Therefore, the question of whether the analyst agrees with securitisation/desecuritisation practices is irrelevant. In this thesis securitisation is viewed as a theoretical tool to analyse Israeli and Palestinian securitisations and not as a normative practice.

While keeping in mind all those critiques, at this level the aim of this thesis is to present an analytical framework and apply it to the Israeli-Palestinian case. Stemming from the application of securitisation theory in general and the analytical framework presented in the following section, it is believed that this will provide a theoretical reflection and conceptual restructuring for the securitisation theory.
1.4 An Analytical Framework: Desecuritisations as a Framework for Analysing Conflict Resolution

Desecuritisation by downgrading or ceasing to treat ‘the other’ as an existential threat is an indispensable part of conflict resolution between former adversaries. Conflict resolution addresses the deep-rooted sources of conflict. The aim of conflict resolution is to transform actually and potentially violent conflict into a non-violent process of social and political change (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:30). The ideal outcome of conflict resolution is reconciliation. Reconciliation refers to a situation other than a peace agreement between former adversaries and requires the active participation of peoples who were divided by enmity. Reconciliation means to learn to accommodate differences and live together. Hence, it requires forgiving the past and being in a position to move forward together. As noted by Louis Kriesberg, “after intense struggle between large-scale adversaries, it is not likely that reconciliation will be universal among all members of the opposing sides” (Kriesberg 1998:184). Nonetheless, reconciliation has a social function of restoring a neutral or more positive relationship between former enemies.

Both peace-making and peace-building efforts constitute a process of desecuritisation with reconciliation being a possible outcome. Peace-making, which aims at ending direct violence between the adversaries, refers to the attempts “through traditional diplomatic activities [to reach] a settlement between conflicting parties” (Fisher 1997:10). Peace-making is used in the sense of moving towards a conflict settlement where conflicting parties are induced to reach an agreement (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:30). Peace-building, meanwhile, refers to the attempts to make peace from the bottom up. Ronald J. Fisher defines peace-building as “efforts for improving the relationship between adversaries toward greater trust and cooperation, more accurate perceptions and attitudes, a more positive climate, and a stronger political will to deal constructively with their differences” (1997:11). Peace-building underpins peace-making by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationship between conflicting parties (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:30).

Johann Galtung suggests that peace-making aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists and brings negative peace, whereas peace-building tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict and brings positive peace (1996:112). Galtung defines negative peace as the cessation of direct violence and positive peace as the
overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well. Based on Galtung’s models of conflict, violence and peace, peace-building is classified as structural and cultural peace-building. Structural peace-building addresses the issues such as security concerns, civil and human rights, economic stability and growth, the sharing of resources and the distribution of power. If successful, structural peace-building leads to normalisation. On the other hand, cultural peace-building addresses issues like education, peace and conflict awareness, cultural exchanges and people-to-people encounters. If successful, cultural peace-building leads to reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al. 2007:14). In this sense, structural peace-building paves the way for the re-definition and re-evaluation of relations between former adversaries and cultural peace-building paves the way for the re-definition and re-evaluation of the perceptions regarding the other side of the conflict.

However, not all conflict resolution initiatives end up with reconciliation. The renewal of violence is not a rare event in the history of conflicts. The failure of the political process indicates that conditions are not ripe for conflict resolution. As in the Israeli-Palestinian case, in most of the cases, the collapse of conflict resolution results in the construction of a conflict management approach that involves new strategies and tactics aimed at advancing each side’s interests according to the new violent confrontation (Bar-Siman-Tov 2007:10). According to Bar-Siman-Tov, conflict management is considered to be a prefatory stage toward resolution or transition to resolution (2007:10). A distinction is drawn between three types of conflict management: unilateral, joint and external. Unilateral management refers to the efforts made by each side separately to prevent the other side from initiating violence. The erection of the separation barrier between Israeli and Palestinian lands and Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip are among the examples of unilateral management of conflict. Joint management refers to the official and unofficial efforts made by both sides to prevent violence. In this case, both sides adopt a certain degree of coordination and cooperation. External management on the other hand refers to the efforts made by a third party. The European Union’s monitoring mission on the Rafah border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is considered as an example of external conflict management (Bar-Siman-Tov 2007:11).

Since peace-making often faces with political considerations and other distortions, it is the responsibility of peace-builders to become active in exploring various peace avenues and to help in activating peace initiatives throughout all levels of society. In general, peace-building incorporates official-level conflict settlement efforts with bottom-up conflict resolution.
efforts. In this process, civil society tries to bring about changes by taking direct action themselves through peace-building. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, one of the main faults of the Oslo agreements, which marked the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, was the lack of attention and care to the concept of peace-building. The agreement was made in 1993 by politicians who failed to incorporate peace-building within official peace-making efforts. The investment in people-to-people activities following the signing of the peace agreement was not sufficient to prevent the deterioration of the Palestinian-Israeli peace. Ultimately, the diplomatic peace-making efforts did not succeed in preventing the collapse of the process and the re-emergence of severe violence from 2000. However, peace-building activities have continued even under a situation of mutual violence. The continuation of Israeli and Palestinian civil societies' peace-building activities becomes extremely important for the desecuritisation of relations and for the reconciliation as a long-term outcome of the desecuritisation process.

As shown in Figure 1.3, the analytical framework suggested here links both peace-building and peace-building efforts with desecuritisation. It is argued that for a successful desecuritisation both official level political will to end conflict through peace-making and societal or civil society level determination for peace-building is necessary. It is argued that a fully-fledged desecuritisation requires more than one set of desecuritising actors both among the political elite and from civil society. Ideally both sides' desecuritising efforts should complement each other.

Figure 1.4 shows the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian case. Peace-making was interrupted in 2000 and since then official level support for the peace-building has decreased drastically. Hence, the continuation of peace-building activities has become extremely important to desecuritising moves. It is argued that for a full-fledged desecuritisation these moves would complement the peace-making process when it is reinitiated. In the mean time by continuing their peace-building work and putting pressure on respective leaderships, civil society actors of Israel and Palestine have been contributing in the initiation of the desecuritisation process.
Figure 1.3 Transformation from Security to Asecurity

Securitisation

Security

Breakthrough

Peace-making ⇔ Peace-building

Conflict Resolution

Desecuritisation

Asecurity

Reconciliation
Figure 1.4 Transformation from Security to Asecurity: The Israeli – Palestinian Case

Securitisation

Security

Breakthrough

Peace-making

Conflict Resolution

Peace-building

Desecuritisation

Asecurity

Reconciliation
One of the key areas which can be instrumental in encouraging cooperation between conflicting parties and peace-building is water management. In terms of peace-building, issues regarding water resources potentially offer a window of opportunity for cooperation and coexistence between former adversaries. Since cooperation among conflicting parties involved in water disputes increases access to water and lowers the risk of armed conflict over scarce resources, water can be utilised as a catalyst for conflict resolution and peace-building. Hence, cooperation over the management of shared water resources will be discussed in Chapter 5 as part of structural peace-building, and thus as desecuritisation moves in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

As far as cultural peace-building is concerned, it is extremely important, particularly in intractable conflicts where a history of hostility and frequent eruption of violence disrupts the normal functioning of society. One of the common devices of cultural peace-building used by civil society is peace and conflict awareness through education and training. Peace education aims at transforming the perceptions and related language through dialogues and other people-to-people encounters involving grassroots and middle-level participants from both sides. It is expected that individuals involved in peace education understand the other's point of view and could change his/her perception vis-à-vis 'the other'. Here it is argued that peace education is one of the means for cultural peace-building that contributes to the desecuritisation process in the long term. In this context, Israeli-Palestinian peace education efforts will be analysed in Chapter 6.

1.5 Reflecting on Peace Practice: Criteria to Judge the Potential for Desecuritisation

Since the end of the Cold War, civil society groups have been increasingly involved in peace-building activities. The end of superpower rivalry brought possibilities for the civil society to play a role in conflict resolution. Civil society efforts are undertaken in all stages of conflict, from situations of latent conflict tension and threatened violence, to full-blown civil war, to unstable periods after peace agreements are reached. Within this context, civil society agencies offer peace education programs, or training in conflict analysis, peace skills, or non-violent activism. They organise people-to-people exchanges or they develop programs to promote reconciliation through specially targeted reconstruction or economic development
efforts. They facilitate unofficial negotiation channels among political leaders, or bring representatives of divided communities together for dialogue (Andersen and Olson 2003:8).

In general few civil society agencies involve in conflict resolution aim to forge peace accords or end all violence. For civil society which has limited resources, leverage, programming expertise, and funding building the broader peace is a high goal. Instead they focus on one of the aspects of cultural or structural peace-building as peace education and water management. The question then is what are the criteria by which civil society actors can assess whether their peace-building efforts have contributed to progress of conflict resolution and desecuritisation? How can they judge whether their approach will have a positive impact on the conflict resolution?

The analytical framework suggested here does not offer any criteria to assess the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian peace-building efforts. In this regard, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project's criteria for assessing the effectiveness of peace-building efforts will be employed. Reflecting on the Peace Practice Criteria was developed by Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) and it involves exploring its effectiveness on two levels: the programme level and the conflict resolution/peace level. The assessment of programme level\textsuperscript{10} effectiveness is generally measured by independent academicians or independent research companies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the effectiveness of individual peace-building programmes, in this thesis the Israeli-Palestinian peace education and water management programmes' effectiveness at a broader level will be discussed. The effectiveness question at this level will ask whether the programmes under consideration make a contribution to the bigger picture of conflict resolution, therefore, desecuritisation (Anderson and Olson 2003:14).

For the assessment of the effectiveness of civil society's peace-building efforts four criteria were defined by Reflecting on Peace Practice Project. These criteria capture how practitioners and communities think about meaningful impacts on conflict resolution. In 'Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners' Mary Anderson and Lara Olson suggest that a peace-

\textsuperscript{10} Assessing effectiveness at the program focuses on whether a specific activity (for example, peace education, a dialogue workshop, advocacy, or an international accompaniment effort) achieving its intended goals. This usually includes the project design, the selection of participants, how well the methodology was implemented, how well problems and follow-up were managed, how participants responded, and what were the immediate results (Anderson and Olson 2003:14)
building programme contributes to conflict resolution if/when he effort causes participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace; the effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict; the effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence; and the effort results in an increase in people's security (2003:16-18).

According to first criterion a peace-building activity is effective if, as a result of an agency's activities, people undertake independent initiatives, working in creative ways within their own communities to cross lines of division or to influence outside constituencies. These efforts should continue in the face of difficulty, threats, or other overt pressure. This criterion focuses on the shift made by people who are caught in conflict from being supporters, bystanders, or victims of conflict to being actors and activists undertaking personal efforts to bring about peace (Anderson and Olson 2003:16).

The second criterion suggests that a peace building activity is considered effective if it develops or supports institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities and injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Such grievances may include inequity in the administration of justice and social benefits, or observance of people's basic rights. Peace-building activities can focus on political institutions and address weaknesses in or the lack of structures to manage conflicts non-violently.

The third criterion is whether to increase people's ability to resist manipulation and provocation. This can be achieved through programs that increase skills for analyzing, managing, and responding to conflict, or that change values and attitudes toward the use of force (Anderson and Olson 2003:17).

The last criterion suggests that a peace-building programme is effective if it results in concrete reductions in the threat of violence and/or changed perceptions of vulnerability. This criterion has two dimensions: The first one is that if perceptions of threat are reasonable, then the impact will be seen in concrete efforts to protect vulnerable groups and reduce the threat of violence; and the second one is if perceptions of threat are exaggerated, then the impact will be seen in efforts that reduce the perception of threat. This can happen, for example, through efforts to promote contact and accurate information (Anderson and Olson 2003:18).
These criteria will be employed in Chapter 5 and 6 to discuss the potential impact of water management and peace education programmes on the Israeli-Palestinian desecuritisation. But before proceeding, the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian water management and peace education programmes as desecuritising moves, in Chapters 2 and 3 the Israeli and Palestinian securitisations will be explored with a particular focus on the period following the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 till the end of 2006. It is argued that analysis of securitisation is significant in assessing the parameters of desecuritisation as well as in understanding the problems and prospects for desecuritisation.
CHAPTER TWO

A Tale of Two Peoples: The Origins of Israeli and Palestinian Securitisations

ERETZ-ISRAEL [the Land of Israel, Palestine] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance...

The Israeli Declaration of Independence 1948

Palestine ... is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land, and its history.

The Palestinian Declaration of Independence 1988

As discussed in Chapter 1, the Copenhagen School analyses security as a cultural process of securitisation by which particular issues are constructed as threats. This chapter presents the constructions of the respective securitisation processes in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Due to the fact that the two sides of the conflict have interpreted the same reality through different lenses, which are deeply steeped in their respective pasts, it is argued that most of the recent securitisations of Palestinians and Israelis are rooted in perceptions of that past. Any attempt, therefore, to analyse desecuritisation requires a careful investigation of competing/conflicting discourses and claims which have evolved through mutual interaction. This understanding is crucial in terms of assessing the problems and prospects of desecuritisation.

In general, the Israeli discourse regarding the Palestinian issue was shaped and developed particularly after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. On the other hand, the Palestinian national discourse, apart from the pan-Arabist discourse, was developed under Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership after the end of the Six-Day War in 1967. Unlike the Jews, who have constructed a strong national identity based on Zionist ideology, as far as Palestinian nationality is concerned no similar historical precursor exists. Palestine was part of two Ottoman provinces and its inhabitants were part of the Arab section of the Ottoman Empire. The people of Palestine did not consider themselves as Palestinians but as Arabs in general and Syrians in particular. Palestinians have constructed
their distinct national identity and security discourse with regard to this national identity throughout their struggle with the Zionist national movement, particularly after the defeat of the Arab coalition in the 1967 War.

In order to contextualise the contemporary securitisation process in the Israeli-Palestinian case and before advancing to the securitisation analysis of Palestinians and Israelis in the post-Arafat era, this chapter takes a snapshot of the development of the security discourse on both sides. The year 1897, when the World Zionist Organisation set out a programme (the Basel Programme) for the establishment of a national home for Jewish people on Palestinian land, is considered here as the turning point regarding the antagonisms between the two parties. It goes on to excavate some overarching securitisations that have developed throughout the respective nation-building processes of Palestinians and Israelis. Thus, the chapter starts with examining the pre-1948 official documents/agreements to trace back the beginning of the tensions and violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine (Table 2.1).

After this section, the development of the security discourses of both sides is reviewed in three consecutive sections: from the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 to the Six-day War in 1967, from 1967 to the first Intifada in 1987 and from 1987 to the second Intifada in 2000. It is important to note that it is not the aim of this chapter to engage in decades-long historical debates regarding the roots and the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, the chapter aims at exploring speech acts and facilitating conditions that led to Israeli-Palestinian securitisations. In this chapter, major historical documents and statements related to the Palestinian issue and the peace process and speeches by Israeli Prime Ministers and PLO leaders11 (Table 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4) will mainly be taken into consideration in order to analyse the securitisation of ‘the other’ as a threat. Most of the extracts in these sections are taken from these political speeches/statements and from official documents/agreements. It is argued that a discursive analysis of these documents and speeches will examine the speech acts as well as the analysis of facilitating conditions. The analysis particularly deals with those passages and extracts from speeches/statements that refer to the key issues of a particular period – such as the refugee issue, the legitimacy of the State of Israel, the Palestinian liberation movement vs.

11 During the pre-PNA period, the PLO was dominant in the Palestinian security discourse in the international arena, even though the PLO leadership had developed outside the Palestinian territories. Hence, in this chapter, mainly the PLO elites are considered as securitising actors. Besides the PLO and after 1994 PNA elites, other fedayeen groups’ like Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders’ securitising moves are also taken into consideration.
Palestinian terror and peace - that constituted the basis of security/enmity speech acts and those that contain historical conceptions: narratives about how the other side has been perceived as an existential threat. Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been influenced by both domestic and external factors, the analysis will also focus on facilitating factors including global political changes, regional power asymmetries (as between Israel and the Palestinians) and other discourses confirming or limiting the security discourse such as the discourse on terror and the Axis of Evil, discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

2.1 When Zionists Met Palestinians: The Political and Historical Context (1897 – 1948)

Zionism was first developed as a coherent political philosophy by Theodor Herzl in Der Judenstaat - the Jewish State' (1896). In The Jewish State Herzl demanded for Jews the right to national self-determination and proposed a secular state that would be bound by laws that derived from European civil codes.

In a short time Herzl’s book become a blueprint for action. Based on Herzl’s proposal, in 1897 the World Zionist Organisation met in Basel in order to organise the establishment of a Jewish state. Two geographical alternatives were discussed: Palestine and Argentina. The obvious candidate for a homeland was Palestine. As was stated by Herzl, Palestine was the Jewish people’s “ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvellous potency” (Herzl, 1896). After the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine by the Roman Empire in 70 AD, Jewish people had urged a return to those ancient lands. As formulated by the Zionist leadership, the Jews’ right to Palestine derived from three interrelated claims: the Jewish people’s bond with the land of Palestine was sui generic, the Arab inhabitants of Palestine were not a separate nation but part of a greater Arab nation, and the Jewish people had historical right to Palestine whereas the indigenous Arab population had mere residential rights (Finkelstein 1995:14). Based on these claims, Palestine was chosen for the establishment of Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel). The plan was based on a gradual continuous migration (aliyah) of the Jews to Palestine.

Until Jewish migration following the Basel Conference (1897) within the framework of the Zionist movement, the native Arabs paid little attention to the Jewish settlers who were already living in Palestine. However, with the influx of Jews, the native Palestinian population began to
feel threatened. The Zionist project of Jewish immigration and land acquisition in Palestine led to a growing friction between Arab and Jewish communities (Guyatt 1998:4).

The situation got worse with British involvement in the Middle East. When World War I broke out, Britain sought to gain the support of the Arabs against Ottoman rule. According to the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (1915), Sharif Hussein, the leader of the Arab nationalists, agreed to support Britain in return for independence for the Arabs. With this letter, Sir Henry McMahon (1862-1949), the British High Commissioner in Cairo, negotiated in 1915-16 with Husain Ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. The British government promised to support his bid for the restoration of the Caliphate and leadership in the Arab world. While the negotiations with Arabs were taking place, Britain made other agreements, which contradicted the promises of independence contained in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence: the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916) with France, a plan for the post war division of the Middle East, and the Balfour Declaration (1917) with the Zionists, which offered the British government’s support for the establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine (See Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916 and Balfour Declaration 1917).

At the end of the War, the Arab countries were not given independence as promised. Instead, the League of Nations assigned allied states to administer the Arab countries within the mandate system. The mandate for Greater Palestine (Israel and Jordan of today) was given to Britain with a clause inserted providing for the application of the Balfour Declaration. According to Article 2 of The Council of the League of Nations’ Palestine Mandate, “the Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.” Furthermore, with Article 4 of the Mandate, the Zionist organisation was recognised “as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine …”. The Zionist organisation was assigned “to take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home” (The League of Nations Palestine Mandate 1922).
In order to alleviate Arab anxieties and prevent a possible Arab resistance movement, at the Zionist Congress meeting at Carlsbad in September 1921, a resolution was passed expressing the official statement of Zionist aims, which was quoted in the British White Paper of 1922:

[...] the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the up building of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development (British White Paper of 1922).

Within this context, the Zionist leadership offered indigenous Palestinians institutional safeguards that their civil rights would not be violated once the Jewish state was established (Finkelstein 1995:10). However, the fear of expulsion from Palestine urged Palestinian opposition to Zionism.

Since the mandate system did not recognise the existence of the indigenous Arabs as a community, during the Mandate period Palestinian Arabs were alienated and marginalised. In most of the official documents of that time, the Palestinian Arabs were described as 'non-Jewish communities' or 'the other sections of population'. In accordance with the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour's Memorandum of 1919, in practice no self-governing institutions were ever developed for the country at large:

In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country...The four great powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism ... is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land (Balfour in Said 1980:16).

The policies and actions of Mandate administration accompanied with statements like this caused Palestinian Arabs to be fearful of the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language and culture in Palestine. As a result Palestinian Arabs organised a resistance, which escalated from delegations, petitions, demonstrations and strikes, to riots and violent clashes with the British security forces and Jewish settlers. Palestinian Arabs were
demanding the cessation of Jewish immigration and the prohibition of Jewish land purchases in Palestine (Segev 2000:107).

In the wake of the 1929 Arab revolt, Zionist leaders came up with compromise formulae and promises to ease Palestinian Arabs’ worries. Within this context Ze’ev Jabotinsky, one of the most prominent Zionist leaders, promised to Palestine’s Arabs full and equal rights as a national entity but the principle of a Jewish majority or Jewish state would not be compromised under any circumstances. However, for many Zionists, Palestine was just for the Jews as Joseph Weitz, the director of the Jewish National Fund, wrote in his diary on December 19, 1940: “It must be clear that there is no room for both peoples in this country... If the Arabs leave the country, it will be broad and wide-open for us. And if the Arabs stay, the country will remain narrow and miserable” (Weitz 1965:181). By contrast, Khalil al-Sakakini, one of the leading Palestinian nationalists, wrote that Arab nationalists rejected the idea of binationalism and believed that the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews would be solved in one of two ways: “Either the country will remain ours [Arabs’] or it will be taken ...by force” (Sakakini in Segev 2000:410).

Following the 1929 Arab rebellion, proposals for a partially elected legislative council were presented by the Administration but they were rejected by the Jews. In 1936, Arabs started a general strike to support their demands “for self-government, the prohibition of land transfers to Jews and the immediate cessation of Jewish immigration” (Appendix IV of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report 1946). The strike and the violence that followed brought the Palestine problem to the attention of the British Government. A Royal Commission was established to investigate the situation and reached the conclusion that the Mandate had become unworkable and must be abolished. The Commission suggested a Partition Plan, also known as the Peel Proposal: A Jewish State that would include Galilee, the Plain of Esdraelon and the coastal plain and an Arab State that included most of the rest of Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Permanent mandates were proposed for the Jerusalem area and certain Christian Holy Places (Appendix IV of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report 1946). The Peel Report was published on 7th July 1937 but the partition proposal was considered by the Jewish Agency as a breach of the Balfour Declaration which had promised a National Home in the whole of Palestine. The Arab leaders, both the Arab Higher Committee and the National Defense Party, denounced the partition and reiterated their
demands for independence (Appendix IV of Anglo-American Committee of inquiry Report 1946).

The outbreak of World War II dramatically affected the situation in Palestine. The Jews and Palestinian Arabs became more and more hostile towards each other. Given the conditions they faced in Palestine and the fear of losing their lands and livelihoods, the Palestinian Arab leadership supported the Axis Powers. Muhammad Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine, proposed the establishment of an Arab-Islamic army in Germany. By contrast, Zionist leaders supported the Allies to secure the defeat of Nazi Germany and units of volunteer Jewish armed groups (Haganah) served alongside British forces to prepare for resistance in case of an Axis occupation of Palestine. The Jewish units were secretly armed and trained by British and deployed at strategic points. Furthermore, the reports regarding the horrors of concentration camps resulted in the Zionist leaders' call for a complete end to controls on Jewish immigration to Palestine and the granting of authority to the Jewish Agency to develop the uncultivated land in Palestine. Given the Nazi regime's systematic persecution of Jews in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the Anglo-American Inquiry Commission (1946) called for the lifting of the restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine (Smith 1984:71).

The Arab rebellions and radical Jewish groups' attacks on British targets convinced the British Mandate Administration that there was no chance of creating a single community of Jews and Arabs. Therefore, the British Mandate Administration decided to pass the issue to the United Nations. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly called for an end to the British Mandate and the establishment of two independent states and an international administration for Jerusalem (See Map 1 UN Partition Map).
Table 2.1 Historical Documents and Statements Related to the Palestinian Issue (Pre-1948 period)

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<th>Document/Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hussein-McMahon Correspondence</td>
<td>1915</td>
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<td>Sykes-Picot Agreement</td>
<td>1916</td>
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<td>Balfour Declaration</td>
<td>2 November 1917</td>
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<td>The League of Nations’ Palestine Mandate</td>
<td>24 July 1922</td>
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<td>British White Paper</td>
<td>June 1922</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anglo-American Committee of inquiry Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom</td>
<td>20 April 1946</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan)</td>
<td>29 November 1947</td>
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Map 2.1 UN Partition Plan for Palestine 1947

The UN Partition Plan Map is downloaded from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2.2 One's Ha'atzma'ut (Independence) was Another's Nakba (Catastrophe) (1948 – 1967)

Following the British withdrawal, on 14 May 1948 members of the People's Council, representatives of the Jewish Community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement, declared the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.

The wording of the Declaration was carefully chosen. The Israeli proclamation claims explicit international recognition for the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to reconstitute their national home. Within this context, the Declaration gave references to Balfour Declaration, the Mandate of the League of Nations and the UN General Assembly’s resolution 181. Moreover, it is also significant to note that three paragraphs of this short proclamation were devoted to the effects of the Holocaust suffered by the Jews in World War II in order to underline the humanitarian dimension of the Zionist project.

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State.

Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.

In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations (Declaration of Israel’s Independence 1948 [Emphasis added]).

In the Declaration of Israel’s Independence full and equal citizenship for the Arab inhabitants of Palestine was offered. As with the general Zionist approach to Palestinian Arabs during the
1930s, the founders of the State of Israel also ignored Palestinian Arabs' claims, but by offering this olive branch attempted to convince them to give up their claims for independence.

WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the up building of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions (Declaration of Israel's Independence 1948 [Emphasis original]).

On 11 May 1949 in UN General Assembly Israel's membership to the UN was agreed with resolution 273. However, Palestinian Arabs did not recognise the State of Israel as the legitimate authority of Palestine. Consequently, a few months after the proclamation of the State of Israel on 1 October 1948, Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, stood before the Palestine National Council in Gaza and declared the short-lived All-Palestine Government (Hukumat Umum Filastin). In this declaration, Palestinians were referred to as the owners of Palestine and declared the independence of the Palestinian state in its entirety:

The Arabs of Palestine who are the owners of the country and its indigenous inhabitants and who constitute the great majority of its legal population ... declare Palestine in its entirety and within its boundaries as established before the termination of the British mandate an independent state and constitute a government under the name of the all-Palestine government. (Declaration of All-Palestine Government 1948)

In the Declaration, the founders of the State of Israel also offered their hand to neighbouring states "in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land" (Declaration of Israel's Independence 1948). But this appeal was far from persuasion. The day after the Declaration, the Arab League declared a statement about the Declaration of the State of Israel. In this declaration the members of the Arab League criticised Britain disregarding the Palestinian Arabs' rights for independence and pointed out Zionism as an obstacle to find a just solution of the Palestinian problem. In this statement the members of the Arab League accused Zionists for the disruption of security and stability in the region in general and in Palestine in particular:
The Zionist aggression resulted in the exodus of more than a quarter of a million of its Arab inhabitants from their homes and in taking refuge in the neighbouring Arab countries. The events which have taken place in Palestine have unmasked the aggressive intentions and the imperialist designs of the Zionists, including the atrocities committed by them against the peace-loving Arab inhabitants ... (Arab League 1948 [emphasis added]).

Therefore, in their statement upon the Declaration of the State of Israel Arab states compelled to intervene in Palestine “to help its inhabitants restore peace and security” (Arab League 1948). Thus, a few days after the state of Israel was proclaimed, six Arab League members launched an attack on the State of Israel. The coalition of Arab states decided to go to war against Israel and explicitly stated the destruction of the newly-formed Jewish state as their goal. The war ended in February 1949. The defeated Arabs signed separate armistice agreements with Israel. It is remembered by the two sides under different names: Israelis refer to it as the ‘War of Independence (Ha'atzma'ut’), for Palestinian Arabs the war marked the beginning of the events referred to as ‘Catastrophe (Al Nakba)’. During the war around 750,000 Palestinian Arabs transferred out of the villages, towns and cities, which came under Israeli control. Thus, thousands of Palestinians were exiled and continued their lives in refugee camps on the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan and elsewhere (Guyatt 1998:6).

Israel did not accept any active responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem during the 1948 war. It was claimed that by launching the war and by encouraging Palestinians to leave, it was the Arabs who were responsible for the refugee issue.

The number of the Arabs who before the UN Resolution lived in the area allocated to the Jewish State by the UN, and who left it voluntarily or at the orders of their leaders, is not larger than the number of the Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, so that what has taken place is an unplanned, but de facto exchange of populations, and there is no practical possibility or moral justification for putting the clock back (Ben-Gurion 1961).

The responsibility, however, for the fact that Arabs became refugees must squarely lie with those who, instead of accepting the verdict of the United
Nations, went to war to undo it and perpetrated the aggression of 15 May 1948 against the State of Israel. Large numbers of the refugees left the country at the call of the Arab leaders, who told them to get out so that Arab armies could in (Meir 1961).

According to this claim, since Palestinians left voluntarily because of the war, Israel has no moral or practical responsibility for the consequent situation. For Prime Minister Ben-Gurion there was only one practical and fair solution to the problem of the Arab refugees: to settle them among their own people.

As Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch argues, this narrative prevailed in the political and historical arguments from 1948 until the 1990s (2007: 242). The repatriation of thousands of Palestinians is perceived as a threat to Israel since the return of a large number of Palestinians would change the demographic balance and threaten the Jewish character of the State of Israel. Hence, for the Israeli leadership the return of Palestinian refugees was not acceptable under any conditions:

The primary and most decisive consideration is security. A flood of returning Arabs is liable to blow up our State from within. ... A mass repatriation of refugees without peace with the neighbouring countries would thus be an act of suicide on the part of Israel. No State in the world placed in our position would think of doing anything of the sort (Sharett 1949).

The refugees issue made it impossible for Palestinians to acknowledge the State of Israel and to make any compromise between their claims and those of the Israeli settlers. In his statement in 13th UN General Assembly in 1958, ten years after the establishment of Israel, come up with a radical proposal for the de-Zionisation of Palestine:

[The solution] lies in a return to the situation which existed in 1947, where the legitimate Jewish inhabitants had lived in a flourishing community as fellow citizens with the Muslim and Christians of Palestine Shukairy 1958).

For the de-Zionisation of Palestine, Shukairy proposed a five-steps plan to the UN: the restoration of geographic unity of Palestine as part of Arab homeland, the repatriation of Arab
refuges in their homes in Palestine and the Jewish new-comers to their former countries, the constitution of Palestine as a democratic state, the demilitarisation of the whole country whose neutrality is guaranteed by the Security Council and the appointment of a representative to report to General Assembly (Shukairy 1958). Shukairy’s this proposal did not lead any change and the situation in Palestine remained same.

Given the severity of conditions exiled Palestinian Arabs faced, the Palestinian Arab leadership had gradually securitised the exile issue and attempted to justify the possibility of the use of force against Israel. In his statement in the UN General Assembly in 1961 Shukairy gave signals for the possibility of the use of force: “...to be a refugee...in exile means hate...war, and the right to war means defence of your fatherland and what your fatherland stands for...” (Shukairy 1961).

During this period Israeli governments tried to deal with the Palestinian refugee problem that emerged after the 1948 – 49 war based on the assumption that Palestinians formed a part of a larger entity, Arab or Syrian, and consequently they could be absorbed into the surrounding Arab countries. From the initial days of Zionism, the Zionist elite had denied the existence of Palestinian Arabs. However, their existence according to Edward Said “was not simply as an inconvenient nuisance, but as a population with an indissoluble bond with the land” (Said 1980:8). Hence, in spite of Israeli rejection of the Palestinian Arabs as a distinct identity, under the constant sense of foreign invasion, Palestinian Arabs formed a community. Although feeling that they belonged to a large Arab nation, they also believed themselves to belong in a land they called Filastuna (our Palestine) (Said 1980:118). This position is clearly seen in PLO leader Ahmed Shukairy’s statements in the UN General Assembly in 1958 and 1961 and in the Proclamation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (1964).

The people of Palestine have pre-existed the existence of Israel...and no sovereignty can be exercised to bar the people from their country. To exclude a people from their homeland is no sovereignty – it is banditry (Shukairy 1961).

Similarly, the Statement of Proclamation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (1964) underlined the link between the Palestinian Arabs and Palestine:
[...] the right of the Palestinian Arab people to its sacred homeland Palestine and affirming the inevitability of the battle to liberate the usurped part from it, and its determination to bring out its effective revolutionary entity and the mobilisation of the capabilities and potentialities and its material, military and spiritual forces.

As a summary, the Palestinian Arabs' rejection of Jewish statehood and the Zionists' rejection of Palestinian Arabs as a distinct identity drew the contours of security discourses of the political elites of the respective societies during the early years of the State of Israel. During this period, while the Zionist leadership had disregarded Palestinian existence as a national identity, the Palestinian political elite had attempted to securitise the establishment of the State of Israel as an existential threat:

[…] with Zionism there cannot be peaceful co-existence...when the very existence of your people is the question, there cannot be peaceful co-existence. Self-defence becomes over-riding and paramount (Shukairy 1961).

In 1965 al-Fatah was founded under Yasser Arafat’s leadership and eventually became the most powerful and publicised element within the PLO. Fatah’s rhetoric was mainly affected by the 1960s’ anti-imperialist discourse. Particularly, the branding of the State of Israel and Zionism as colonialism lay at the heart of Fatah’s and the PLO’s discourse as illustrated in Article 7 and 8 of the Fatah Constitution (1964):

7. The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, organisation and method.
8. The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international imperialism.

According to the same discourse, Article 4 of the Fatah Constitution defines “the Palestinian struggle [... as] part and parcel of the world-wide struggle against Zionism, colonialism and international imperialism.” Therefore, the Palestinians had the right to use all possible means, including terrorist attacks, to resist Israeli colonialism and liberate their fatherland.
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<td>Statement by the Arab League upon the Declaration of the State of Israel</td>
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<td>Statement to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett about Arab Refugees</td>
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<td>Fatah Constitution</td>
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2.3 One’s Liberation Fighter was Another’s Terrorist (1967 – 1987)

The 1967 Six Day War became a watershed event in the respective securitisation processes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the Six Day War, Israel gained control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (Map 3).

Map 2.2 Israel after 1967 War

Following the end of the Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the UN General Assembly and it was referred the Security Council, which adopted a resolution (UNSC Resolution 242) on 22 November 1967. The Resolution affirmed that the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East requires the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict. Furthermore the necessity “for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem” and “for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area” was underlined in this Resolution (1967). According to Chomsky (1999, 2003), UNSC Resolution 242 was rejectionist by denying the national rights of Palestinian Arabs and referring to them solely in terms of a refugee problem. For this reason, initially the PLO refused to accept the resolution. However, this resolution eventually became the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank served as a catalyst for Palestinian nationalism. The Six Day War made clear to most Palestinians that their struggle with Zionism could not be resolved on their behalf by other Arab states. Palestinian resistance had turned the 1967 defeat into an opportunity. Before 1967, as a result of the general Arab nationalist trend of that time, the Palestinian elite expected that Arab states would unite and eliminate Israel. The new circumstances, the defeat of the Arab states which were regarded as champions of the Palestinian cause, and Israel’s control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip - known among Palestinians as the occupied territories - paved the way for the development of a liberation discourse accompanied by the enmity speech acts that refer the State of Israel as an existential threat to the Palestinian nation’s rightful existence in Palestine.

The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council (July 1968) repeatedly gives references to Palestinian Arabs’ material, spiritual and historical connection with Palestine and views the Zionist movement as being “associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world” (Article 22). Throughout the Charter, the Zionist movement/Zionist occupation/Zionist invasion is seen as an existential threat to the Palestinian community. It points out that “The liberation of Palestine is a national (qawmi) duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine” (Article 15). In the Charter, the word “liberation” is repeated 29 times. The Charter also has several references to armed struggle for liberation: “struggle for liberation” (Article 8 and 22), “liberation through armed struggle” (Article 8), “armed struggle and armed popular revolution for the liberation” (Article 9), “Palestinian popular
As discussed in Chapter 1, security utterances operate as instructions for the construction and interpretation of a security threat. It is the securitising actor who conveys a self-referential practice using discourses of existential threats. Given this internalist view of the context, in order to win an audience, security statements must be related to an external reality. That is to say, the success of securitisation rests on whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive to its vulnerability (Balzacq 2005:182). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the occupation of the Palestinian territories after the 1967 war had triggered the events leading to securitisation processes. In particular, Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO, underlined the threat posed by the Zionist State of Israel to the existence of the Palestinian Arabs in their homeland. The Israeli occupation was securitised as a threat to the Palestinian people’s survival. The goals of the Palestinian movement were to weaken the State of Israel and delegitimise it in the eyes of Jewish people and international society.

As far as the interactions between audience and securitising actor are concerned, the securitising actor’s ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests plays an important role in a successful securitisation. The audience’s identification with the securitising actor’s security statements can cause some sort of cognitive and behavioural change to occur amongst the audience. In this case, PLO statements were relatively successful in terms of mobilising the audience, the Palestinian people, around their cause: liberation of Palestine. Between 1969 and 1985, outside the Occupied Territories a number of attacks against Israeli Jews were committed by different Palestinian groups, including the Black September attack at the 1972 Olympics in Munich while in the West Bank and Gaza, a resistance movement arose. This pattern of civic resistance developed in a short time and persisted for the next twenty years, consisting of strikes, demonstrations, the display of Palestinian flags and slogans calling for independence (Peretz 1990:7).

Both the attacks outside Israel and the resistance in the Territories paved the way for the ‘security trauma’ in Israel. The Palestinian liberation movement’s anti-Zionist discourse and the attacks on Israeli citizens and institutions were seen as the incarnation of the threat to the Jewish State. The kidnapping and the murder of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team
during the 1972 Munich Olympics by armed militants from Black September, a faction of PLO, was the last straw.

Prime Minister Meir’s statements following the attacks at the Munich Olympics were full of negative definitions of Arabs as terrorists, murderers and so on, and the war on Arab terrorism was defined as vital for survival. Throughout her speech, she use terror-related words 30 times, 12 of which directly refer to “preventing terrorism”, “war against terror” and “war against Arab terrorism”. Another theme that prevailed throughout the speech was “security”. Meir skillfully used the security speech act to point at Palestinian terror as the security threat. The speech ended by highlighting the inevitability of the use of extraordinary means – war against Arab terrorists, operations against the terrorists’ bases and stamping out terrorist organisations - to guarantee the security and the survival of the Jewish people of Israel as a last resort:

Our war against the Arab terrorists is a vital mission demanding devotion and concentration. From its very nature, it cannot be limited to defensive means, to safeguarding and self-defence, but must be active in all that has to do with the detection of murderers, of their bases, their actions and operations, to foil their designs and, in particular, to stamp out the terrorist organisations (Meir 1972).

We have no choice but to strike at the terrorist organisations wherever we can reach them. That is our obligation to ourselves and to peace. We shall fulfil that obligation undauntedly (Meir 1972).

As part of the ongoing Zionist rejection of Palestinians as a distinct community apart from Arabs in general, Meir used “Arabs” and “Arab terrorism” throughout her speech. This rejectionist position towards Palestinian identity and the possibility of a sovereign Palestinian Arab state was also repeated in Prime Minister Meir and Foreign Minister Eban’s statements on the Palestinian issue in the Knesset in 1973.

The process of labelling an organisation or a group as a terrorist organisation constitutes an act of securitisation. If the securitising actor can successfully attach the label ‘terrorist’ to a group, and persuade others to adopt this point of view and use all possible means to stop the ‘terrorist group’, the acts of the particular group would be successfully securitised (Coskun 2007:11). As a response to the Black September attack, Israeli warplanes bombed Palestinian
military bases, killed many militants, but also took the lives of civilians and children. When Germany released the three Black September guerrillas who survived the Munich massacre, the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir launched a secret operation, known by some as “Wrath of God”, to kill those responsible for Munich (Independent 2006). The attack and the nature of the Israeli response, brought the Israeli-Palestinian crisis to the forefront of world attention.

According to securitisation theory, the success of the securitising actor is based on the distribution of capabilities and powers within the system. The more power a securitising actor has, the more likely this actor will succeed in attempted securitisation and gaining the consent of the audience (Buzan et al. 1998:27). In the Israeli-Palestinian context, Israel, with the support of the US, had securitised Palestinian attacks on Israeli and Jewish civilians as an existential threat to the Israeli state and society and identified the Palestinian movement with terrorism. The worldwide attention and sensitivity towards international terrorism after the Black September attacks in Munich served as an important external facilitating condition for the Israeli securitisation of Palestinian terror. During the 1970s, special bodies were set up by individual states to fight terror and security measures were intensified. In 1972, the President of the US, Richard Nixon, set up a committee at ministerial level to combat terror. The US administration has also intensified its fight on terror on the international scene. In the UN, the US administration even proposed international penalties against countries harbouring terrorists (Associated Press 2005).

Black September’s attack led to the West turning against the Palestinians and labelling those within the Palestinian movement as terrorists. The Israeli-Palestinian case illustrates the classic rhetorical dilemma of “one’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist.” In his address to the UN General Assembly in November 1974, Arafat highlighted this dilemma and defended the acts of the PLO and underlined the difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist. He denied the charges of terrorism and presented the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians:

The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist (Arafat 1974).
Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defence (Arafat 1974).

In this speech, Arafat portrayed Zionism and Israel as imperialist, colonialist and racist; the Palestinians were the victims of oppression, violence and racial discrimination.

Throughout the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s Arafat and PLO gained international recognition as the representative of Palestinian liberation movement. Within this context, Palestinian cause succeeded to get UN General Assembly’s open support. During the 1970s, the UN was dominated by the Soviet Bloc and third-world countries, which pursued anti-Western and anti-imperialist policies. This antagonism was fuelled by the war in Vietnam and Apartheid policies of South Africa. Through the votes in the General Assembly, National Liberation Movements were supported politically. Within this context, a broad international consensus had taken shape that advocated a political settlement along the pre-1967 borders. As a consequence of this consensus, the United Nations invited Yasser Arafat to address the General Assembly. Shortly after his speech on 22 November 1974, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 3236 to recognise the Palestinian people’s “right to self-determination without external interference”, “right to national independence and sovereignty” and reaffirmed “the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return” (UNGA 1974a). Another resolution (3237) was also passed on 22 November 1974 to invite the PLO “to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations” (UNGA 1974b). Furthermore, a UN General Assembly Resolution (Resolution 3379) was passed to condemn “Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology” and to determine that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination” was passed (UNGA 1975).

Despite its international recognition, the US and Israel refused any direct contacts with the PLO on the grounds of its unwillingness to accept Resolution 242 and rejected the idea of a Palestinian state. According to Chomsky, US-Israeli rejectionism had consistently blocked the achievement of a comprehensive settlement during this period (Chomsky 1999). As PM
Menachem Begin, who came to power in 1977, stated during the Camp David peace negotiations with Egypt, a Palestinian State on the West Bank was considered as a ‘mortal danger’ to Israel. According to Begin, such a state would become a Soviet base. Jerusalem would be under crossfire ‘from three directions’: Jordanian, Palestinian and Soviet (Gilbert 1988:481).

At the end of the Camp David negotiations, Israel signed a peace accord with Egypt to implement an autonomy plan for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With this accord, Israel agreed to the establishment of an elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. This accord was the first indication of the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people by the State of Israel. This was the first time that Israel acknowledged the national aspirations of the Palestinians as a people. The acceptance of a Palestinian identity and of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people was a major step forward for Israel.

Despite the peace accord signed by Egypt on behalf of the Palestinians, Palestinians who lived in occupied territories were upset that the accord did not mention the sovereignty of the Palestinian people and it did not obligate Israel to withdraw from Arab territories (Metzger et al. 1983: 212). The severity of conditions in the occupied territories accompanied by the disappointment with the Camp David Accords and the autonomy plan, paved the way for the outbreak of civil resistance in occupied Palestinian territory, which was harshly responded by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) attacks on the PLO’s bases in Lebanon.

To summarise, for two decades following the Six Day War, the Israeli leadership together with the US continued the rejectionist position that denied Palestinian Arabs national and sovereign rights in Palestine and securitised the Palestinian Liberation Movement as terrorism, while Arafat referred to the Palestinian movement as revolutionaries and accused the Israeli government of using the issue of terrorism as a cover for its violent acts against the Palestinians. The international environment of the 1960s and 1970s, which was dominated by the anti-Western and anti-imperialist discourses of the the communist bloc and the third world, was a facilitating factor for the PLO to gain international recognition of their cause for

12 On 6 October 1973 Egypt and Syria launched an attack on Israel on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. The war lasted around two weeks and the Arab alliance was defeated. The Yom Kippur war had significant implications regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations even though the Palestinians were not part of the Arab coalition. One of the implications was the peace agreement signed between Egypt and Israel in 1977, known as the Camp David Accords.
liberation. In a short time, the international community’s negative opinion of the PLO as terrorists after the Munich attacks had changed. In spite of Israeli and American rejectionism, the PLO was recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian liberation movement. The US and Israel were isolated internationally over the Palestinian issue.

During this period, Israel appeared to be a monolith to outside observers. However, the Israeli elites were internally divided concerning the future of the occupied territories and the peace solution. In the aftermath of the Six Day War a number of different views were developed concerning how to rule Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On the one hand, groups motivated by a romantic vision of Jewish history argued in favour of settlements on the West Bank. The discourse of the religious and nationalist extremist groups such as Gush Emunim and the Land of Israel Movement was based on biblical references and a romantic vision of Jewish history. These groups urged the Israeli government to expand settlements throughout historical Palestine and put pressure on respective governments not to compromise the entirety of Eretz Yisrael (Gilbert 1988: 470). On the other hand, leftist groups, who called for reconciliation with the Palestinians in particular and the Arabs in general, argued for the recognition of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, complete withdrawal from the occupied territories and the discontinuation of settlements if they presented an obstacle to peace (Metzger et al. 1983:259). This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis, which analyses desecuritisation processes.

For almost two decades following the Israeli control over the Palestinian territories after 1967 war, the PLO in general, and Yasser Arafat in particular, appeared to be the securitising actor on the Palestinian side. Arafat’s active securitisations based on the societal insecurity of Palestinians as a result of the Israeli occupation and different fedayeen groups’ attacks against Jewish/Israeli targets outside Israel resulted in the Palestinian cause being associated with terror by Israeli securitising actors. During the 1980s, the disunity of the Palestinian political elites became more apparent and gradually local elites arose under occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an alternative to the PLO leadership in exile. Until the mid-1980s, the PLO elite in exile made most of the decisions on behalf of Palestinians, so marginalising groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After the mid-1980s, a new generation of national and Islamist elites from the territories began to assert pressure to influence Palestinian politics. This change was supported by the new generation of Palestinians who had lived under Israeli occupation (Jamal 2005:5). At the more radical end of the spectrum, Hamas,
formerly one of the armed wings of the revivalist Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) in Gaza, was formed during the first year of the Intifada to allow the participation of the brotherhood in the Intifada. In August 1988, Hamas published its covenant, ‘The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)’, and rejected the legitimacy of the PLO as sole leader of the Palestinian people. The covenant returned Hamas to the PLO’s previous uncompromising position, namely that Palestinians should aim for the destruction of Zionism: “Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step that inevitably should be followed by other steps. … until the enemy is vanquished and Allah’s victory is realised” (The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] 1988). In its Covenant, Hamas clearly pointed out the threats posed by the Zionist State of Israel to Palestinian society and the Palestinians’ right to establish their own state. Besides a nationalistic dimension, Hamas underlined the religious dimension of their fight against Israel and called for Jihad against Zionists.

This new generation of national elites from the territories were well aware of Palestinians’ worries about their livelihoods and economy and articulated a security discourse based on human insecurity. For instance, the announcement of the Israeli Water Commission’s scheme in 1987 to utilize West Bank water in Jerusalem and the surrounding areas caused great concern. Arab administrators of the Bethlehem area, which had been already suffering acute water shortages, securitised the Israeli scheme as an existential threat to the survival of Palestinians. As expressed by Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij: “This plan threatens our [Palestinians’] very existence… (It is) a matter of ‘to be or not to be’ for us” (Freij in Peretz 1990:29). As was stated by Pastor Rantisi, the deputy mayor of Ramallah: “[t]he Israelis are constantly talking about security. We are the ones who need security! There is no security for us Palestinians in our own country…we are fed up with the occupation; we are simply fed up with it” (Rantisi in Metzger et al. 1983:3).

There is no doubt that Israel was facing serious security problems but evidently the Palestinian Arab population had security-related problems in their daily lives under occupation. The fact that Palestinians in the occupied territories felt a total absence of physical security in their daily lives was successfully securitised by the Palestinian elite in the occupied territories. Increasingly marginalised, local Palestinians took matters into their own hands and changed the dynamics of the conflict with Israel. Thus, by 1987, an indigenous Palestinian struggle, the Intifada, was under way. In December 1987 a traffic accident in Gaza
served as the catalyst for riots that quickly erupted into a general uprising throughout the occupied territories (Makovsky 1996:7). This struggle was concerned with the immediate questions of daily survival. This uprising was developed as a grassroots movement independent of the PLO leaders abroad.

Even though the Intifada was different from the PLO-style struggle, the Intifada discourse consisted of the central themes of the PLO such as the expansionism of the Zionist movement and the victimisation of the Palestinians, with a few new additions: heroism and martyrdom. As commented by Mubarak Awad, founder of the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence and Daud Kuttab, the well-known Palestinian journalist, not just political groups but all sections of Palestinian society were involved in this struggle. Influenced by Gandhi and Martin Luther King, non-violent resistance became the main tactic of the Intifada. It was believed that removing the irrational fear of ‘Arab violence’, which cemented Israeli society together, would contribute to the disintegration of hostile Israeli elements (Awad 1984:25).

The main goal of the Intifada was to isolate Israel politically and morally. It was believed that non-violence would increase “any beneficial, public, international attention to [the Palestinian cause] by revealing the racist and expansionist features of the Zionist movement and denying it the justification built on its purported ‘security’” (Awad 1984:22-36). Initially, Israeli officials viewed the unrest as one of the occasional disturbances. As stated by Makovsky, the broad participation in the Intifada undermined the Israeli hardliners’ claim that Palestinian nationalism in the territories was provoked by the PLO and, given a choice, most of the Palestinian Arabs from the territories would prefer to remain under Israeli rule (1996:8). The Intifada convinced most Israelis that the status quo of occupation was untenable. Even though the Intifada did not constitute an existential threat to Israel’s existence, it undermined the sense of personal security among Israelis.
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As intended, the Intifada succeeded in drawing international attention to the Palestine and enhancing international support in for the Palestinian cause. Hence, it significantly weakened the State of Israel and caused Israel's diplomatic isolation. The international attention occasioned by the Intifada contributed in the accumulation of international support to the Palestinian cause. Yasser Arafat used this opportunity to declare Palestine independent on occupied lands on behalf of the Palestinians on 15 November 1988: “The Palestine National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem (Al-Quds Ash-Sharif).”

As far as the wording used in the State of Palestine Declaration of Independence is concerned, the declaration underlined the hostility to the organised terror of the Israeli forces. The document consists of sentences referring to the Palestinians' pain such as “willed dispossession and expulsion” and assertions of romantic nationalism like “long years of trial in ever mounting struggle” and “one and indivisible in its triumphs” (Declaration of Palestinian Independence 1988). Immediately after the declaration, UN General Assembly issued a resolution to acknowledge “the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988” and affirm “the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967” (UNGA 1988).

UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, which called for “the establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State in Palestine and its affirmation of the urgent need to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East to provide peaceful coexistence for all States in the region”, encouraged Arafat to take one step forward. A historic turn occurred and the PLO indicated its readiness to consider a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under UN auspices. Consequently, the PLO stated its willingness to consider negotiations with Israel, which meant a dramatic change from the total rejection of Israel as a negotiating partner and a revision of the position of rejecting Israel’s right to exist. In accordance with the terms of the declaration of independence and the political statement of the 19th session of the Palestine National Council (Algiers) in 1988, the PLO recognised Israel as a state in the region.
 […] our people’s right to freedom and national independence according to Resolution 181 and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and as I have mentioned including the state of Palestine and Israel and other neighbours according to the Resolutions 242 and 338.

 […] Our statehood provides salvation to the Palestinians and peace to both Palestinians and Israelis. Self-determination means survival for the Palestinians. And our survival does not destroy the survival of the Israelis as their rulers claim. (PLO’s statement of the 19th session of the Palestine National Council (Algiers) 1988)

By the late 1980s both the US and Israel found themselves ready to reconsider their positions regarding the PLO and the Palestinian issue. The Intifada threatened Israeli control of the territories and the PLO’s recognition of Israel caused the US administration to consider the diplomatic efforts of the PLO and others (Chomsky 2003:185). The PLO’s recognition of, and its willingness to start negotiations with, Israel also put pressure on the Israeli government. In February 1989, the Soviet Union called for an international conference under the five permanent members of the Security Council. Pressure was building on Israel to formulate a peace initiative. Even though Washington opened the door for dialogue with the PLO, Americans were not keen for an international conference to take place (Chomsky 2003:185). To that end, the US encouraged Israel to pursue a peace plan and the Israeli Government presented a unilateral peace initiative on 14 May 1989. Prime Minister Shamir and Defence Minister Rabin formulated a peace initiative based on the Camp David Accords. This proposal presented the principles of a political initiative of the Government of Israel which pursued the continuation of the peace process, in other words Israel’s conditions for peace: “the termination of the state of war with the Arab states; a solution for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district; peace with Jordan; and a resolution of the problem of the residents of the refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district” (Israel’s Peace Initiative 1989). While Israel proposed free and democratic elections among the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza for their representatives to conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule, the Israeli government highlighted their opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state and their opposition to conducting negotiations with the
PLO. Only in August 1990 did Foreign Minister Levy propose a two-track negotiation arrangement that included a Palestinian track designed to bring about a transition period and autonomy but another regional crisis, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, shifted the focus of the international community to another regional conflict.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the First Gulf War changed the political landscape of the Middle East and provided necessary facilitating conditions for Arab-Israeli peace in the region. The Gulf War neutralised Iraq, which was considered as one of the greatest regional threats to Israel’s security, divided the Arab states and eroded the position of the PLO who supported Saddam Hussein. As a result of the PLO’s support for Saddam, financial and political support from the Gulf States dried up. Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cut payments to the PLO. The US saw the political upheaval in the region as an opportunity to advance the peace process and, together with the Soviet Union, launched a diplomatic initiative based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 that resulted in the Madrid peace conference in 1991 (Makovski 1996:11).

The disintegration of the Soviet Union drastically changed the balance of power in the Middle East. The Gulf War, on the other hand, consolidated US hegemony and weakened the viability of the PLO. All these changes in regional dynamics and the US’ policy change regarding the Arab-Israeli peace in general and Israeli-Palestinian peace in particular served as external facilitating conditions that led to a historic shift in Israeli foreign policy. However, the political composition of the Labour government elected in 1992 constituted the internal facilitating condition for a rapprochement between Israel and the PLO. Despite the initial rejection of talks with the PLO in 1992, with the return of the Labour Party to power and the formation of a dovish Cabinet, Israel agreed to resume an official dialogue with the PLO (Aranoff and Aranoff 1998).

In his speech to the Knesset presenting his government, Yitzhak Rabin gave signals of the new government’s readiness to resume the peace process with its Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians. Even though Israel’s willingness and determination to make peace with its Arab neighbours was underlined by Rabin, alongside “peace” the word “security” was the recurring theme of his speeches, in most of which the words peace and security were used together. Even in the context of speeches and statements about peace, the security speech acts had continued to dominate the Israeli political discourse on the Palestinian issue:
This Government is determined ... to do everything necessary, everything possible, and more, for the sake of national and personal security, to achieve peace and prevent war ... We shall do so based on the recognition by the Arab countries, and the Palestinians, that Israel is a sovereign state with a right to live in peace and security ... The Government presented here today sees itself as responsible for the security of every one of Israel's citizens, Jews and Arabs, within the State of Israel, in Judea, in Samaria and in the Gaza District (Rabin 1992a [emphasis added]).

[...] peace constitutes a very important component as a factor to guarantee the security of the State of Israel, [since] a peace without security is meaningless to me. However, a true peace increases the security of the State of Israel ... the Government indeed tries to extract the chance to achieve peace that will provide security for the State of Israel ... I believe that the chance exists in the promotion of the realisation of peace in the format of the framework of the Madrid Conference and its consequences, in different settings that will guarantee the peace and achieve security for the State of Israel (Rabin 1992b [emphasis added]).

Rabin also urged Palestinian in the territories “to give peace a chance” and “to cease all violent and terrorist activity” (1992a). In order to sustain peace and security (mostly security), Rabin underlined Israel’s determination to end terror.

The continuation of talks that led to a peace process between the Israeli government and the PLO representatives caused an intensification of the activities of Hamas, a group opposed to the recognition of Israel. It challenged the PLO’s reconciliatory turn and, together with Palestinian fedayeen groups and Hezbollah from Lebanon, attacked Israeli soldiers. Well aware of Israeli sensitivities regarding terror, the objective of these attacks against Israeli targets was to spoil the ongoing peace process.

In his speech to the Knesset following the attacks, Rabin repeated Israel’s determination to achieve peace with Arab countries and the Palestinians in the territories “despite the murderous acts and the terror” (Rabin 1992c). While underlining Israel’s commitment to seek
peace, Rabin made clear that this was not to be peace at any price: “Before any decisions are taken and certainly before any signing, the security of the state will stand before our eyes. Only when we have security, will there also be peace” (Rabin 1992c). Once more, Israel’s preference for security over peace was underlined.

In a short time the Rabin government effectively securitised Hamas and Islamic Jihad as a threat to both Israel and the peace process.

This Government is serious, sincere, and true in its ... determination to bring peace to Israel. Nevertheless, with the same degree of willingness and determination ... this Government will fight any manifestation of violence and terror, and will not permit, and will not allow, neither Hamas nor the Islamic Jihad, to harm citizens of the State of Israel - and it will take all legal steps at its disposal, to battle murderous terrorist organisations ... the battle for peace and the battle against terror. In both we shall be victorious (Rabin 1992d).

Within this context, the Israeli government took harsh measures against Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Hamas was accused of killing an Israeli Sergeant and this incident used as a pretext for the Israeli government to deport 415 Hamas members and supporters from Israel and to include Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the list of terrorist organisations (Cabinet Declaration 1992). The Cabinet decision to deport Hamas activists was criticised by the UN and Arab states. As a result, the peace talks were interrupted in December 1992 and continued until April 1993 when all parties met in Washington and, after the exchange of letters between Arafat and Rabin, a Declaration of Principles that signalled both sides’ agreement for an interim arrangement until the permanent solution negotiations were to commence in two years was signed on 13 September 1993.

In his letter to Yitzhak Rabin, Arafat reaffirmed the PLO’s recognition of “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.” Moreover, the letter continued “the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators” (Arafat, 1993).
Following the Declaration of Principles, in 1994 the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was founded, after which thousands of PLO leaders returned to the territories. Consequently, the tension between the national elite that emerged in exile and the elite groups in the occupied territories took a new form. With the establishment of the PNA, Hamas and Islamic Jihad became central opponents of the peace process and sought to block negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (Jamal 2005:2).

Hamas and Islamic Jihad were not alone in their efforts to spoil the peace process. Radical elements within Israeli society also organised attacks to spoil peace. On 25 February 1994, in Hebron a Jewish settler opened fire on Moslem worshippers killing 29 and wounding 90. The response was a suicide bomb attack organised by Hamas. Such attacks either from Hamas and Islamic Jihad or from radical Jews threatened the peace process.

Despite the efforts of Israeli and Palestinian peace spoilers, several agreements were signed between the PLO and Israel: the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO (29 April 1994), an agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (4 May 1994) and the Agreement on the Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (24 August 1994). Finally, on 28 September 1995, the Interim Agreement, also known as Oslo II, between the government of Israel and the PLO was signed. Even Rabin’s assassination by a radical right wing Orthodox Jew on 4 November 1995 did not halt the Israeli withdrawal and transfer of powers to the Palestinian Authority in six cities in the West Bank.

Following the withdrawal and the yielding of power to the Palestinian Authority, Shimon Peres’ government, which had succeeded that of Rabin, facilitated the first-ever national elections in the West Bank and Gaza. This development was considered as the highest point in the struggle for peace (Rosenblum 1998:37). But the hopes were dashed when military units of Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched several suicide bombings in Jerusalem, Ashkelon and Tel Aviv. These attacks once again resulted in the Israeli Government’s linking of additional Israeli withdrawals to security-related moves on the Palestinian side. Peres demanded that Arafat and the Palestinian Authority should wage war against Palestinian terrorism. In addition to these demands, the Peres government imposed a total closure on the West Bank and Gaza that stopped all movement of people and goods into Israel from the Palestinian self-
governing areas. At this point, the peace process was subordinated to the issue of Israelis' personal security.

Since March 1993, the Palestinians had already been experiencing the closures, which were detrimental for Palestinians and did not help to achieve the expected improvement in Israelis' personal security. Closures resulted in a sharp decline in Palestinian living standards and the Palestinian Authority's revenues that led to a severe social crisis and strengthened Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Their suicide attacks in major Israeli cities triggered an Israeli security retaliation that had devastating social and economic consequences for the West Bank and Gaza.

The suicide attacks allowed Binyamin Netanyahu, who had been elected as Prime Minister in 1996, to securitise the Palestinian terrorism once again and gave signals for the possibility of extreme measures that would be taken to stop these attacks.

In the last years, the security situation has deteriorated throughout the country and its borders. To stop this deterioration we will have to wage a continuous battle against terror. The participants in terror should know that they will encounter a harsh response. I refer not only to the terrorists themselves but also to their patrons and those who sent them, to their operators and collaborators (Netanyahu, 1996a [emphasis added]).

With Netanyahu ‘the war against (Palestinian) terror’ reassumed a prominent place in the Israeli security discourse. Furthermore, the suicide attacks were widely interpreted as proof of the inability of the Palestinian leadership to stop the terrorist activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Arafat was accused of being unable to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. This was one of the justifications for delaying the withdrawal from the occupied territories. Netanyahu insisted that peace should not be sought at the expense of security and suggested that what Israel needed was less peace and more security (Guyatt, 1998:39). In the Guidelines of the Government (1996), the Likud government under Netanyahu repeated their commitment to achieve peace with Israel’s neighbours while safeguarding national and personal security. It was also clearly stated that “the Government will negotiate with the Palestinian Authority, with the intent of reaching a permanent arrangement on condition that the Palestinians fulfil
all their commitments.” However, security remained the precondition for peace. During 1996 and 1997, in his speeches and statements Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly highlighted that security was essential for a stable and lasting peace (1996a, 1996b). Another recurring theme in his speeches was the ‘reciprocal implementation of commitments.’ Throughout his period of office, Netanyahu criticised the Palestinian Authority in general, and Arafat in particular, for not “honouring their commitments” and not preventing Palestinian violence against Israeli targets.

The Netanyahu government’s security discourse that swung between the securitisation of ‘Palestinian terror’, with a particular emphasis on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and normalisation efforts by reiterating its commitment to peace, reflected the chasm between external and internal facilitating conditions. Externally, the US administration and the international community had put pressure on Israel to move forward to achieve the final status agreement. As a reflection of international pressures on the question of Palestine and the peace process, fifteen UN General Assembly Resolutions (51/23, 51/26, 51/27, 51/29, 51/82, 51/124-51/130, 51/131, 51/133, 51/134 and 51/150) were passed in the first half of December 1996. On the other hand, internally the government was under pressure from the security hawks who dominated the Knesset and government, as well as from the public concerns regarding personal security.

The Israeli government’s one-sided preconditions that required the Palestinian Authority to become fully compliant with obligations, threatened the essence of peace-making. In fact it was not just the Palestinians who did not fulfil their obligations, the Israeli government also violated some of its commitments in the Oslo agreements such as delaying Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, not freeing female prisoners, not providing safe passage between Gaza and Jericho and placing road blocks in forbidden places (Rosenblum 1998:55). Furthermore, the development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem had continued during the peace process, which raised doubts about Israeli leaders’ commitment to a permanent settlement. Between 1993 and 2000, Israel had built over 20,000 housing units in the Occupied Territories. The Jewish population living in the territories increased from about 110,000 in 1993 to close to 200,000 in 2000. According to Gordon (2003:41), these numbers suggest that Israel was employing the rhetoric of peace while changing demographics to create an irreversible situation on the ground.
In summary, the capacity to mobilise security expectations depends on the position, status and authority of the would-be securitiser. As securitisation can be pushed by powerful securitising actors, who use security to pursue their own ends, the success of securitisation is dependent on the power and capabilities of the securitising actor. The same assumption is also valid for the transition from securitisation to normalisation. As has been illustrated in the Israeli-Palestinian context, both internal and external facilitating conditions play a significant role in persuading the securitising actors to pursue policies for returning securitised relations to normal politics. Moreover, normalisation of the relations with the other - at least returning the issues from the security sphere to the political sphere - depends on the consensus within their respective societies and the leaders' monopoly over the use of legitimate force. Despite the external conditions that accommodate normalisation between Israelis and Palestinians through a peace process, the fragmentations in the respective audiences challenged the return to the political sphere. Jewish radicals in Israel and militant groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the Palestinian side effectively spoiled the chances of returning Israeli-Palestinian relations into the realm of normal politics.

Besides, the existence of obvious spoilers from both sides, the consequences of Arafat and Netanyahu's pragmatic approaches to the peace process to secure their leadership had caused opposition to both men. In 1999, a protest movement against Arafat's rule began. Twenty prominent West Bank and Gaza Palestinians signed a petition condemning the Palestinian Authority's corruption and abuse of power. In a short time the protests escalated and new elections were demanded. According to Said, this was a direct consequence of the despair at the inequities and injustices of the Oslo Process (Said 2000:xx). For Said, the Oslo agreement was merely a reflection of the colonial spirit. Israel and the US just gave Palestinians the symbols of sovereignty and withheld the essentials of real sovereignty: the right of return for Palestinian refugees and independence (Said 2000:xx). The disillusionment created throughout the Oslo Process, despite some symbols of peace and limited Palestinian autonomy, grew from the failure to address the acute issues of conflict such as the return of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem. Israeli settlements continued to be built; closures had become part of the daily lives of Palestinians. Furthermore, the policies of the Palestinian Authority were far from satisfying the expectations of Palestinians from the peace process. According to Chomsky (1999), since the Oslo Process was based on the convergence of interests between Arafat and the Israeli state, the Israeli-Arafat agreement, as Chomsky puts it, was destined to fail.
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Table 2.4 Historical Documents (1988 - 2004)
2.5 Conclusion: The Vicious Circle of Israeli and Palestinian Securitisations

The origins of today's Palestinian conflict are rooted in a series of political and historical events that occurred at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Historical and political events like the emergence and development of Zionism as a result of the persecutions of the Jews in Eastern Europe, British involvement in Palestine after the end of World War I and the Holocaust during World War II, brought the Jews to Palestine and constituted milestones in the conflict formation in Palestine. According to Parkes, the "[two] communities ... in Palestine ... each emphasizing one of two totally different histories of the same country; each fearing to be a minority under the other; each legitimately determined to secure its own rights..." (Parkes 1940:16) were destined to conflict.

Since the beginning of their encounter in the land of Palestine, both Israelis and Palestinian Arabs have entrapped themselves in a vicious circle. The actions of the Israelis have reinforced the Palestinian view of Israelis, which has resulted in the Palestinians feeling threatened both communally and nationally. On the other hand, the Palestinian discourse and the liberation movement have served to reinforce the Israeli securitising actors' belief that Palestinians threaten the existence of the State of Israel and the well-being of the Jewish people. Thus, the gradual threat construction has resulted in extreme measures that are taken by Israel, which the Palestinians have tried to prevent through posing further threats to the existence of Israel. Through continuous securitisations both sides generated security dilemmas and vicious circles. This makes it extremely difficult to move back into normal politics.

As each community denied the other's legitimacy as a collective, a perpetual conflict has prevailed. Yet this delegitimisation has been vital for both sides as it has enabled them to assert the distinctiveness of their own claims. Since it has been a question of survival, the securitising actors (leaders of the Palestinian Arab and Israeli societies) have claimed their right to use extraordinary means to ensure the survival.

After decades of securitisation, the 1990s witnessed Israeli and Palestinian efforts for normalisation. The changing global and regional dynamic following the end of the Cold War served as external facilitating conditions for the return of normal politics in Arab-Israeli relations. The external dynamics were supported by changes in domestic politics in Israel. As a
consequence of these changes in internal and external facilitating conditions, at least Israel and the PLO recognised each other and opened channels for dialogue. At the end of the day, the social and political conditions were not conducive to securing a resolution to the problems of the area and the normalisation of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
CHAPTER THREE

Analysing Post-Oslo Israeli and Palestinian Securitisations
(September 2000 – January 2007)

In Chapter 2, the historical events through which particular issues became constructed as threats in the Israeli-Palestinian context were presented. As a result of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, for a long time both Israeli and Palestinian securitising actors rejected any dealings with each other in the context of normal politics except during the short period of the peace process. Following the collapse of the peace process the rise of Palestinian factional infighting, accompanied by poverty and the tremendous gap between Palestinians and Israelis in terms of per capita income caused further hostility to Israel. In parallel, the Israeli political elite has rejected dealing with Palestinian political movements diplomatically. As a result of Palestinian armed resistance, Israeli securitising actors have moved from normal politics to emergency politics.

This chapter involves a detailed analysis firstly of post-Oslo securitisations as well as normalisation attempts by Palestinian and Israeli political elites, second how particular policies and actions were affected by ongoing securitisations and third public opinion regarding the Palestinian and Israeli securitising actors’ securitising moves. The continuities and changes in securitisation processes in the Israeli-Palestinian context will also be analysed.

Throughout this chapter, both security and enmity speech acts that led to the most recent wave of securitisations in the Israeli-Palestinian context and the facilitating conditions that made securitising moves possible/impossible will be explored. Furthermore, the position of the Israeli and Palestinian publics (the audience) regarding the threats that were securitised will be discussed. The analysis is based on both Israeli and Palestinian political elites’ public speeches and declarations. The US administration of President George W. Bush was committed to a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which would be signed before the end of Bush’s second term. During this period, the US exerted pressure on
both Israeli Prime Ministers and the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority. Hence, the analysis, particularly in the second and third sections, involves a consideration of Israeli Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert’s and the Palestinian National Authority’s Chairman Mahmoud Abbas’ speeches, statements and official declarations made in front of their constituencies as well as the ones made in the US, including official and public speeches and press conferences on Israeli-Palestinian relations. Furthermore, both sides’ opposition leaders’ public speeches and interviews with the local and international media will be explored. As noted previously, since securitisation is a social phenomenon, its effectiveness depends on its acceptance by the target audience. Hence, the success or failure of securitisation depends on the constituencies’ (in securitisation language: the audience) level of acceptance of the securitising actors’ claims regarding security threats. Here it is assumed that public opinion and election results may reflect the audience’s level of acceptance with regard to securitisation moves.

The first section of the chapter briefly covers the political and diplomatic developments of the period from the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000 to the death of Yasser Arafat on 11 November 2004. The outbreak of the second Intifada and the collapse of peace process brought Israeli-Palestinian relations at the brink of conflict formation. The period marked by suicide attacks, closures, house demolitions, assassinations and the use of lethal military force against civilian populations. The period following the death of Arafat -and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as President of the Palestinian National Authority- reflects the normalisation and conflict management attempts of the then Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, and Palestinian Authority’s Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. The second section will focus on the period following the death of Arafat to the election of Hamas-led government in February 2006. The last section covers the period of the Hamas-led government in Palestine (February 2006 – January 2007), the formation of which caused an escalation of tensions between, on the one hand Hamas, which has not recognised the State of Israel’s right to exist and, on the other, the new Israeli government, which had replaced that of Ariel Sharon. The ups and downs of this period have been reflected in respective securitisation attempts.


Since the early twentieth century, both Israelis and Palestinians have operated in accordance with their quest for identity and security. Zionism transformed the Jews’ needs for identity
and security into a political project and succeeded in establishing the State of Israel at the expense of the national rights of Palestinian Arabs. The Palestinian national movement also transformed Palestinians’ needs for identity and security by securitising the establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine. The search for ways to accommodate the Israeli and Palestinian quest for national identity and security had been addressed in the peace process. However, the failure of the Oslo Process to touch on the most critical issues of Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation, namely Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, the Jewish settlements in the territories, the borders of the Palestinian State and the widening gap between the vision of peace and the grim reality of violence and suffering, paved the way for a second Palestinian uprising.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Oslo agreements were repeatedly challenged by intragroup oppositions who criticised Israeli and Palestinian leaders’ stand on the peace process. In Israel, the right wing opposition challenged the legitimacy of the Rabin government and the peace process. Similarly, the Palestinian opposition, which included not only Islamic and leftist fractions but also some members of the Arafat’s Fatah, also rejected the Oslo accords and attempted to obstruct the peace process by launching attacks on Israel.

The culmination of public dissatisfaction with the Oslo process and the opposition groups’ efforts to spoil the peace process ended up with the outbreak of a second Intifada. The Palestinian Authority’s ill-management combined with accelerated Israeli settlement activity, by-pass roads and check points negatively influenced Palestinians’ support for the peace process. Ariel Sharon’s visit to al-Aqsa compound in September 2000 triggered the second Intifada. This second Intifada, which was identified with suicide bomb attacks targeting Israeli civilians, was followed by aggressive Israeli responses throughout 2001 and 2002.

The cycle of violence led Israelis to perceive an existential threat to their state and society posed by the suicide bombers and the Islamic terrorists. On the other hand, Palestinians feared that Israel would expel them from their homes (Said 2003:2).

During the second Intifada, Hamas became even more active, both politically and militarily. It joined with the Fatah and al-Aqsa brigades in several suicide attacks, and also began plotting to usurp the leadership of the Palestinian Authority from the PLO. Following the Palestinian attacks in order to destroy the terrorist networks, strict curfews were enforced by Israeli forces.
in Palestinian areas and shops were demolished by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Palestinians considered these actions as collective punishment against innocent Palestinians (BBC News 2003). As a result of the continuous attacks of the IDF, the popularity of Hamas increased among Palestinians. In towns and refugee camps besieged by the Israeli army, Hamas organised clinics and schools that served for Palestinians' welfare.

The 9/11 attacks and the following war on terror have increased the global intolerance towards terrorism and provided pretext for regional governments to eradicate militant groups operated against the governments. US-led global securitisation of terrorism also served as an external facilitating condition for Israeli governments for their use of force in the West Bank and the Gaza to eradicate Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. During this period, as a part of global war on terror, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were listed as terrorist group internationally. In securitising Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups as terrorist organisations, the Israeli government was very successful. The ongoing global war on terror also put pressure on the Palestinian Authority to abandon and to combat manifestations of armed resistance. The Palestinian Authority found itself in a difficult position between pleasing its constituency whose support was sliding towards Hamas and trying to manage the violence to maintain international legitimacy. Despite the Palestinian Authority’s attempts to curb violence according to PSR Survey Research Unit’s public opinion poll conducted in December 2001 the level of (hypothetical) support among Palestinians for different types of armed attacks was high: 92 percent for attacks against soldiers, 92 percent for attacks against settlers, and 58 percent for attacks against civilians inside Israel. Furthermore, 61 percent of respondents believed that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not (PSR Survey 2001).13

A similar turn occurred among Israeli public and the support for hard-line policies was increased. Ariel Sharon was elected as Prime Minister in February 2001 and re-elected in January 2003. Sharon came to power under the slogan of 'peace and security'. He declared his government’s readiness to deliver the 'painful compromises' necessary to achieve peace. In reality, Sharon demanded dismantling of the terror infrastructure, extensive reforms in the

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13 The opinion poll was conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in December 2001. The poll dealt with the ceasefire, immediate return to negotiations, support for Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, and domestic affairs. The total sample size of this poll was 1357 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 851 in the West Bank and 506 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error was ± 3 percent and the non-response rate was 3 percent.
Palestinian Authority and the removal of Arafat from political scene. The escalating violence was used as pretext by Sharon to postpone any meaningful political negotiations with Palestinian Authority.

 Mostly as a result of the increasing internal opposition to the continuation of the peace process, Arafat and Barak left Camp David without reaching a final agreement. The Clinton Administration’s further efforts to persuade Israel and the Palestinian Authority to sign the permanent agreement in Taba (January 2001) failed again. Once more, internal considerations (coming general elections in Israel) blurred the peace process. As stated in the joint declaration following the Taba talks “the sides have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections” (Joint Declaration 2001). In mid 2003, in the wake of several failed attempts to end the renewed cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the US administration announced a Roadmap for a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Roadmap, which was also sponsored by the Middle East Quartet of the United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union (see also UNSC Resolution 1515) proposed a two-state solution that was defined as ‘performance-based’ and which stipulated a gradual peace process whereby the implementation of each step would be a condition for launching the next (US Department of State 2003). However, for PM Sharon, peace was impossible without the full eradication of Hamas and other resistance movements: “Without the achievement of full security within the framework of which terror organisations will be dismantled it will not be possible to achieve genuine peace... This is the essence of the Roadmap” (Sharon 2003). Even though Sharon supported the Roadmap, he underlined the lack of a “partner to advance peacefully towards a settlement” in his letter to President George Bush (Sharon 2004a).

 For the first time, a practical and just formula was presented for the achievement of peace, opening a genuine window of opportunity for progress toward a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, involving two states living side-by-side in peace and security ... We are committed to this formula as the only avenue through which an agreement can be reached. We believe that this formula is the only viable one (Sharon 2004a).
Once again in this letter Sharon identified terrorism as the main obstacle to the achievement of peace and repeated his claim that the Palestinian Authority was unable to eradicate terrorism. Sharon also underlined Israel’s right to take action against terrorism. This position was also repeated in Sharon’s Knesset speech on the Disengagement Plan:

The Palestinian Authority under its current leadership has taken no action to meet its responsibilities under the Roadmap (Sharon 2004a).

The attempts at attacks, the terror, the violence and the incitement have not ceased during this period, even for a day, and the leadership on the Palestinian side has not taken any steps to stop these actions ... They have not done anything: they made no arrests, did not fight, did not confiscate weapons, did not even bother to try and stop the horrible incitement in the media, education system and mosques under their control which call for the genocide of Jews, not even for a moment ... The Palestinians must understand that the only way they will live in security and peace will be if they fight the terror, violence and incitement which originate in their area. There will be no peace; there cannot be peace, before terror is defeated (Sharon 2004b).

Official Israeli policy advocated not just the destruction of the armed elements of the Palestinian resistance but also the eradication of the entire organisation. This position was backed by the Bush administration within the context of the global war on terror.

At this point in time, the Israeli government gave up hope of a negotiated settlement to the conflict and pursued a unilateral policy of physically separating Israel from Palestinian communities by beginning the construction of the separation wall on 16 June 2002. Whereas the non-violent protests of the first Intifada had earned global sympathy for the Palestinian cause, the violence of the second Intifada proved counterproductive and caused the Palestinians to lose the rights they had gained over the previous decade. The al-Aqsa Intifada provided the context for Israeli securitising actors to build the separation wall, to intensify checkpoints, roadblocks and closures and to issue special permits for Gazans and West Bankers who wanted to enter Israeli land, including East Jerusalem. Israeli securitising actors claimed that such a barrier was necessary to prevent Palestinian attackers from entering Israeli cities. It was claimed that these measures were merely ‘defensive actions’ aimed at
preventing Palestinian terror: “Whenever we relax the restrictions on the Palestinians, the terrorists strike on Israelis,” said Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry (Amayra 2005). These Israeli security measures were, of course, received very differently by Palestinians for whom the barrier separating Palestinian communities from each other and the plan for the construction of the separation wall was a *de facto* annexation of Palestinian territory. Palestinians have defined Gaza as ‘a single huge prison’ and the West Bank as being divided into dozens of wards (Amayra 2005).

In sum, after the collapse of the peace process in 2000, the Israeli government had argued that as long as Arafat continued to lead the Palestinians they would refuse to negotiate. Arafat was perceived as being indirectly responsible for terrorist attacks and suicide bombings inside Israel. Besides the Roadmap, which was drafted by the US Administration, Saudi King Abdallah also drafted an Arab Peace Initiative. Both the Roadmap and the Arab Peace Initiative did not persuade Sharon’s government. The Israeli government rejected any resumption of negotiations with Arafat who was held responsible for the collapse of the Oslo Process. The lack of a partner with whom to negotiate paved the way for Ariel Sharon, the then Israeli Prime Minister, to carry out unilateral conflict management policies including a disengagement plan, which was approved by the Israeli Cabinet on 6 June 2004 and by the Knesset on 25 October 2004.

Having reached the conclusion that, for the time being, there exist no Palestinian partner with whom to advance peacefully toward a settlement and since the current impasse is unhelpful to the achievement of our shared goals, I have decided to initiate a process of gradual disengagement with the hope of reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians. The Disengagement Plan is designed to improve security for Israel and stabilize our political and economic situation. It will enable us to deploy our forces more effectively until such time that conditions in the Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation of the Roadmap to resume (Sharon 2004a).
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3.2 The New Palestinian Leadership and Gaza Disengagement: Give Peace One More Chance?

Following the death of Yasser Arafat on 11 November 2004, on 9 January 2005 Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, was elected as his successor as Chairman of the Palestinian Authority with a majority of 62 percent (CNN 2005a). As aforementioned, Arafat was accused of encouraging violence by Israel and the US and regarded as an obstacle to peace. In this regard, the death of Arafat and the election of Mahmoud Abbas, who was widely regarded as a more moderate figure among the Israeli and American political elites, had left the Bush administration and the Sharon government no alternative but to empower the new Palestinian Chairman who seemed committed to ending the violence and the resumption of peace negotiations. In a statement, Bush called Arafat's death "a significant moment in Palestinian history" and stated his "hope that the future will bring peace and the fulfilment of their aspirations for an independent, democratic Palestine that is at peace with its neighbours" (CNN 2004). In a similar vein, Tony Blair pointed out that the death of Mr Arafat meant that the Middle East could be entering a new era in which progress could be made with a new Palestinian leadership (Telegraph 2004). It was expected that with the support of the majority of Palestinians, Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) would be able to revive the political process and bring an end to violence. According to Ariel Sharon, "with new leadership there is a new possibility to discuss issues together" (cited in The Sunday Times 2004).

As was expected, Mahmoud Abbas started his Presidency by declaring the Palestinians' readiness to resume negotiations with Israel and presented themselves as a partner for peace. This can be seen through Mahmoud Abbas' earlier statements and speeches:

"We extend our hands to our neighbours. We are ready for peace, peace based on justice" (Abbas quoted in The Guardian 2005).

"It is ... a basic step, an important step that provides a new opportunity for restoring the peace process and its momentum and so that the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples restore hope and confidence in the possibility for achieving peace. I believe that we all understand our big responsibilities and joint responsibilities to consolidate this opportunity. This can be achieved through an..."
urgent work of restoring the spirit of partnership and reciprocity and to avoid unilateral steps (Abbas 2005a).

We are calling for a Palestinian-Israeli partnership for the sake of creating a better future for the entire region that can end decades of wars, occupation, and open the doors wide open. We were promised peace, independence and freedom, and we hope that all of this will be achieved (Abbas 2005c).

Abbas made it clear that he sought to build a political culture of responsibility. He said that violence is counterproductive to Palestinian aspirations.

We have worked and we will continue to work to continue to ensure the calm and maintain it. We are also intensifying our work in the field of security. We have taken active steps in imposing the rule of law and public order and banned armed demonstrations (Abbas 2005c).

The main challenge for Abbas was the uncompromising position of the Palestinian Islamist movements (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) and factions belonging to Fatah itself (the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades). These Islamist groups had their own agenda and their vision was inherently interlinked with the rejection of the legitimacy of the State of Israel. Within this context, after his election, militant groups in the Gaza Strip warned Abbas to reserve the option of armed struggle since they saw Israel's disengagement plan as a culmination of their achievements. As was stated by Khaled Batch, a spokesman for Islamic Jihad, militants succeeded where moderates had failed. "The resistance ... has convinced the occupation to change its ideology" (cited in The Guardian 2005). Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad stated that they were keen to give Mahmoud Abbas a chance to establish a Palestinian state according to UN resolutions, with East Jerusalem as its capital and the right of Palestinians to return to Palestine.

During this period, Hamas challenged Chairman Abbas' normalisation attempts. The Hamas leadership continued its uncompromising stand against Israel and the occupation. This period was marked by competing discourses of Mahmoud Abbas and the Hamas leadership regarding peace with Israel. As discussed previously, since its formation in 1988 during the first Intifada, Hamas had rejected the legitimacy of the State of Israel and aimed at the
destruction of Zionism. For the Hamas leadership, the Palestinian movement is a resistance movement against Zionist occupation. During the last two decades, Hamas has become the dominant force in denouncing Israeli occupation and enhancing welfare and health services for the Palestinian population. Hamas' popularity increased among Palestinians in towns and refugee camps besieged by the Israeli army, Hamas has provided social and welfare services and gained public support. They have even managed to find supporters for the martyrdom operations as the best way to avenge their own losses and counter Israel's settlement-building in the West Bank.

Even in his speech to the Palestinians on Nakba Day, Abbas did not follow traditional the Nakba speech that blames Israel for Palestinian sufferings. Instead he underlined the Palestinians' desire for peace and independence:

> Peace, security and stability in the Middle East hinges on finding a just solution for a just cause based on international legitimacy, the right of our people to establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital and to find a just and agreed solution to the issue of refugees... (Abbas cited in Jerusalem Post 2005c).

On the same occasion, in spite of Abbas' attempts at moderation, Hamas leaders issued a statement referring to Israel as a “cancer” and promising to continue fighting until the liberation of the last inch of Palestinian land and until the last refugee heads back to his home (Jerusalem Post 2005c).

On the Israeli side, Hamas' continuous attempts to securitise Israeli occupation and their call for the end of the State of Israel was underlined as a threat to the State of Israel by Ariel Sharon's opponents, particularly by Binyamin Netanyahu. Furthermore, he accused the Palestinian people of lacking the strength to challenge these groups.

Palestinian radicalism defines itself at the heart by the nullification of Zionism. It is an integral part of their self-definition. This is the tragedy. The Palestinian people are moderate and sensible people but they are weak and they do not stand before the combined force of the radicals who are pushing toward a gradual elimination of Israel (cited in Jerusalem Post 2005b).
Gradually the Israeli security discourse regarding the Palestinian issue changed direction. As a result of the rise of Hamas as a political actor in Palestinian territories, the Israeli government’s worries about state security were increased. Hamas’ anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli discourse paved the way for the Israeli securitisation of the rise of Hamas.

Albeit Ariel Sharon’s stress on Mahmoud Abbas’s good intentions, a number of people within the Israeli political elite saw the problem as larger than Arafat, one resulting from a radicalisation of Palestinian politics. Throughout this period, the importance of fighting terror constituted the main theme of the Israeli security discourse. The Israeli political elite wanted the Palestinian Authority to combat armed groups and to eradicate the infrastructure of terrorism in Palestinian territory. This time the task of fighting terror was assigned to the Palestinian Authority by the Israeli leadership. It was underlined that if the Palestinian Authority failed in this task the IDF would take action.

Despite his repeated insistence on his dedication to preventing lawlessness in Palestinian territory, the Israeli political and military elites have repeatedly accused Abbas of not being able to impose the ‘one authority one weapon’ rule in Palestine. Specifically, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu constantly pointed out the dangers of trusting the Palestinian Authority. According to Netanyahu, Mahmoud Abbas “doesn’t dispatch terrorists like Arafat, [but] he does not do anything to stop them... He doesn’t start educating his people on the idea that the war is over” (cited in Jerusalem Post 2005b).

Statistics published by the Israeli Security Service, Shin Bet, almost one month before the disengagement suggested that Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas’ rhetoric to return to normal politics, and Sharon’s and the US administration’s support for Mahmoud Abbas’ empowerment, had not brought an improvement in the level of security for Israelis. According to this report of July 2005, Palestinian attacks had reached a record level during the previous 18 months (Jerusalem Post 2005g) and seemingly confounded Sharon’s expectations that Israeli-Palestinian relations could be normalised.
The other development that was promoted as an Israeli compromise for advancing peace with Palestinians was Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. At the end of August 2005, Israeli settlers were evacuated from the Gaza Strip and in the middle of September Israel completed its disengagement from Gaza and from the northern West Bank. Responsibility for these areas was handed over to the Palestinian Authority in September 2005. The Israeli government’s willingness to withdraw from Gaza had also raised hopes for an awakening of the sleeping roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian peace, further Israeli withdrawals and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In order to support Gaza disengagement, President Bush pledged USD 50 million in direct aid to the Palestinian Authority during President Mahmoud Abbas’ visit to Washington DC in May 2005. It was the first direct aid the United States had given to the Palestinian Authority. Previous donations had gone through non-governmental organisations (CNN 2005b).

While Ariel Sharon’s determination to remove Israeli settlements from Gaza was supported by the US it paved the way for severe internal criticism in Israel because of the concerns regarding the inability of the Palestinian Authority to prevent terrorist activities in the Territories a few months before the disengagement. Ariel Sharon’s decisive unilateral move towards Gaza disengagement was criticised by Israeli radical groups, the Labour Party and even by Sharon’s very own colleagues in government.

It was Hamas and other Palestinian factions’ insistence on reserving the option of armed struggle that was the main worry of the Israeli elite and public. Hence, the withdrawal was linked to a new wave of Palestinian terror by the opponents of Ariel Sharon. The Intifada, which was identified with terror and blood in the eyes of Israeli society, had become one of the most popular themes of Sharon’s opponents’ securitising moves. Moshe Ya’lon, Israeli Chief of Staff, openly warned Israelis to be ready for new rounds of violence and terrorist attacks during and after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005. Within this context, Ya’lon said that the IDF was preparing for a third Intifada that could break out after disengagement (Jerusalem Post 2005e). Ya’lon claimed that withdrawal would not bring peace and security as promised and Israel must be ready to overcome further threats: “We are a society of struggle. Without false belief that we will resolve it with one move or another. It will not be resolved” (Ya’lon in Haaretz Magazine 2005b).
Political opponents of Ariel Sharon, such as Labour Party leader Ehud Barak and Sharon’s Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, also linked withdrawal with a new wave of Palestinian terror:

The Palestinians will interpret the act of disengagement as a victory... Therefore, they will go back to terrorism. There will be another round. We will bury hundreds of people in a third Intifada (Barak in Haaretz Magazine 2005a).

The principal problem with the withdrawal ... is that it may set in Palestinian minds the belief that there is a pattern of Israeli behaviour: We received terror in Lebanon we withdrew. We received terror in Gaza, we withdrew. We received terror in Judea and Samaria, we will withdraw. And then under terror the Jews will withdraw from Palestine (Netanyahu in Jerusalem Post 2005b).

However, Sharon had underlined that the authorities would not show tolerance of any terrorist attacks during and after disengagement and reserved Israel’s right to use extraordinary measures to stop them: “If there are Qassams, there would certainly be a very harsh response” (Sharon in Jerusalem Post 2005a). Up to the final days before the disengagement, Israel demanded that the Palestinians crack down on terrorists.

Before the disengagement, Abbas convinced the leaders of militant groups to declare a ceasefire for the period of disengagement. Within this context, Hamas declared that they would not attack Israeli forces evacuating the Gaza Strip but, as Hamas spokesman Sheikh Hassan Yousef clearly stated, that situation did not mean that the resistance had ended (Jerusalem Post 2005d). In a statement called the Cairo Declaration, agreed on 17 March 2005, Mahmoud Abbas and the Hamas leaders emphasised their devotion to the Palestinian principles. The wording of the declaration clearly reflected the main themes of the Palestinian resistance movement’s security discourse which had been underlined through the securitisation of the Israeli occupation: continuation of settlements, construction of the wall and the Judaization of Jerusalem.

Those gathered confirmed their adherence to Palestinian constants, without any neglect, and the right of the Palestinian people to resistance in order to end the
occupation, establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty with Jerusalem as its capital, and guaranteeing the right of return of refugees to their homes and properties (Al-Ahram Weekly 2005).

Mahmoud Abbas’s initiative to reach an agreement with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, considered terrorist organisations by Israel, was severely criticised by Ariel Sharon:

Mahmoud Abbas has made things even more difficult for himself by signing agreements with the terrorist organisations ..., where he promised that he wouldn’t seize their weapons and wouldn’t dismantle them...This is going to make it very difficult for him to enter into the roadmap phase (Sharon in Jerusalem Post 2005a).

Before and after the disengagement, Israeli security officials particularly underlined the issue of the security of Gaza and the security of the Rafah border between Gaza and Egypt. The breaches in the border caused fears over the smuggling of arms and the infiltration of militants and al-Qaeda terrorists into Gaza and Israel. During this period, the Israeli military elite often underlined that the IDF would intervene in the Gaza Strip if security conditions required it. Israeli officials warned the Palestinian Authority that the continuation of lawlessness in relation to the border crossing would make Israeli military intervention inevitable. Within this context, in the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, which is an Israeli NGO founded as part of the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, report in September 2005, Hamas was blamed for taking advantage of the uncontrolled Rafah Border: “... the terrorist organisations, headed by Hamas, took advantage of the uncontrolled crossing to smuggle arms and ammunition, (small arms, RPG launchers, and maybe more advanced weapons).” Yov Samia, the former Head of the Southern Command of the IDF, warned that “in just a few days more weapons were smuggled into Gaza than in years of smuggling through the illegal tunnels in Rafah” (Samia in Jerusalem Times 2005). As a response to missiles fired from Gaza and continuous breaches in the Rafah border, almost ten days after the Gaza withdrawal the Israeli security cabinet decided to fire artillery against the Qassam launchers in the Gaza Strip (Haaretz 2005b).

Israeli worries over the security situation in Gaza helped shape the classic Israeli security argument that the dismantling of terrorist groups operating in Palestinian territories was the
main precondition for reconciliation between Israel and Palestine. This securitising move did not, however, lead to direct intervention; instead, the Israeli government looked to political means first. It argued that it was the Palestinian Authority’s responsibility to put an end to terror and terrorist infrastructures, if this failed then military intervention would be a necessity for Israel to protect its people. In this context, Sharon underlined the significance of dismantling groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad for the revitalisation of the roadmap. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 15 September 2005, Sharon stated that it was time for the Palestinians to prove their desire for peace. Within this context, he argued that “the most important test the Palestinian leadership will face is in fulfilling their commitments to put an end to terror and its infrastructure and to eliminate the anarchic regime of armed gangs” (Sharon 2005a). Accordingly, in his speech to the Saban Forum (Jerusalem) on 13 November 2005, he stated that:

Advancing to the second phase of the roadmap will be done only after the Palestinian Authority implements the first phase of the plan - by dismantling the terrorist organisations and implementing the comprehensive reforms to which they are committed. We cannot accept a situation in which terrorist organisations do not disarm, yet gain legitimacy for their existence, under the cloak of democracy (Sharon 2005b).

After the disengagement and as part of the normalisation efforts of Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, some concrete actions were undertaken. These included the opening of the Rafah border under the control of Palestinians (though a monitoring mission was given to the EU), the setting up of a joint transport office to initiate and plan Israel-Palestinian Authority transportation projects and the promotion of cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian private sectors.

However, Abbas’ normalisation policy with Israel attracted criticism from religious groups. As an example, just a few days after the Gaza pullout, the Palestinian Religious Scholars Society issued a Fatwa (Islamic religious decree) forbidding normalisation with Israel. According to this Fatwa, normalisation with Israel was considered “like sharing with the infidel in his evil deeds” (Jerusalem Post 2005h). According to this Fatwa, any relationship with the occupiers of Muslim lands meant recognition of their aggression. Furthermore,
Hamas urged the Palestinian people to escalate their resistance to the Israeli occupation until their departure from all Palestinian lands was complete.

Hamas' calls to escalate resistance reaffirmed the Israeli securitising actors’ anxieties. Through its statements issued in September 2005, Hamas warned of the evil Israeli schemes meant to spark off internal conflicts in the Palestinian lands with the goal of undermining national unity (Palestine-info 2005).

The period following the demise of Arafat could have provided an occasion for the normalisation of relations. On the Palestinian side, the election of a moderate leader as Arafat’s successor by the majority of Palestinians was promoted as a window of opportunity for this transformation by Ariel Sharon himself and by the US administration. From the other side, Ariel Sharon’s disengagement plan could have provided a concrete step towards permanent status negotiations. Both the Palestinian Authority’s Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, underlined that they considered each other as partners for negotiation. For the first time since the breakdown of the Oslo Process a Palestinian leader’s name had been recognised as being a partner for peace by the Israeli leadership.

Within this context, in his speech to journalists during a visit to the US President on 20 October 2005, Abbas underlined that “[the] time has come to put an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The time has come that the Palestinian people will attain their freedom and independence. The time has come to move quickly towards the resumption of permanent status negotiations” (Abbas 2005c)

During this period Abbas almost removed from his speeches statements identifying Israel as an existential threat. For example, through his speech at Sharm Al-Sheik in February 2005 when he announced the ceasefire, he underlined the Palestinian and Israeli leaders’ responsibility for achieving peace. Moreover, he referred to the Israeli people together with Palestinian people.
We have agreed with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to cease all acts of violence against the Israelis and against the Palestinians wherever they are. ... It is ... an important step that provides a new opportunity for restoring the peace process and its momentum and so that the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples restore hope and confidence in the possibility for achieving peace.

We look forward to that day and hope it will come as soon as possible in order that the language of negotiations will replace the language of bullets and cannons and in which neighbourhood and livelihood will prevail instead of the war; and in order to provide our grandsons and our future generations, Palestinian and Israeli, a different tomorrow, a promising tomorrow (Abbas 2005a).

Similarly, in a speech in London on 1 March 2005, Abbas expressed the Palestinians' intention to live side-by-side in peace with their neighbour Israel. Briefly he talked about "... ending the occupation which began in 1967 and the emergence of an independent, viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with our neighbour Israel" (Abbas 2005b).

By contrast, in his speeches and statements Sharon often underlined the terror issue. Sharon wanted to see Mahmoud Abbas eradicate the infrastructure of terrorism on Palestinian territory. For the Israeli political and military elites:

[i]n order to proceed beyond the disengagement plan - in other words to progress to the roadmap - there must be a total end to terror, violence and incitement. The terror groups must be dismantled...Only after all that will we able to progress to the roadmap (Sharon in Jerusalem Post 2005a).

In his speech at the UN on 15 September 2005 mentioned above, Sharon clearly pointed out that "[the] most important test the Palestinian leadership will face is in fulfilling their commitments to put an end to terror and its infrastructure and to eliminate the anarchic regime of armed gangs" (Sharon 2005a).
Both Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas had been challenged domestically and had difficulties in persuading their opponents of the necessity of normalising relations with the other. They failed to secure a return to normal politics.

In Israel, a few months after disengagement, Sharon resigned from the Likud Party to found a new party called the Kadima (in English, ‘Forward’) Party. The action plan of the Kadima reflected Sharon’s latest stand regarding Palestine. While it mentions the advancement of the peace process, the Kadima Party’s action plan still underlines the priority of safeguarding Israel’s security in the war against terrorism.

Kadima sees the advancement of the peace process with the Palestinians as a primary goal. The party is willing to make major compromises to further the path leading to the determination of Israel’s permanent borders and peace for its citizens – whilst safeguarding Israel’s security, continuing to wage an unremitting war against terrorism and upholding the country’s national and security interests.

Given that Hamas' ongoing securitisations required the nullification of the State of Israel, the Israeli political and military elites had attempted to securitise Hamas’ participation in the Palestinian general elections in January 2006. On the brink of these elections, the existential threat posed by a Palestinian Authority governed by Hamas, which did not recognise the Israeli State’s right to exist, was underlined by different Israeli political actors.

Unfortunately, our Arab neighbours still do not recognise the ancestral right of the Jewish people to a country in their homeland - the land of Israel. This recognition will be a decisive step towards genuine peace in our region (Sharon 2005b).

[...] the external existential threat is the Palestinian threat...a combination of terrorism and demography ... [the] ... question marks among us about the rightness of our way are a recipe for a situation in which there will not be a Jewish state ...in the end. ... What is now on the agenda is the question of our
right of existence as an independent Jewish state. That is what we are still struggling for (Ya’lon in Haaretz Magazine 2005b).

Israeli securitising actors thus constantly expressed the view that Hamas' commitment to violence was incompatible with participating in elections (Jang News 2005). As a result, the Israeli government put a halt to talks on further disengagements and reconciliation until after the outcome of the Palestinian elections was known.

In sum, the post-Arafat period was often seen as a window of opportunity for a return to normal politics. Even though a sort of moderation had been seen in the respective leaders' speeches, desecuritisation was never attempted. Hence, neither Sharon nor Abbas succeeded in normalisation. In spite of positive references to peace, justice, partnership, putting an end to terror and truce, they did not convince each other to go back to the negotiation table for the permanent status. Given their domestic pressures, both sides clearly underlined firm conditions for peace, which proved unacceptable to the other. Albeit the rhetoric of change, the Palestinian leadership did not actually compromise its demands: a state with its capital in the holy city of Jerusalem, and the right of refugees to return to their homes and their land. Palestinian insistence on the total right to return has been considered an existential threat for the State of Israel. According to General Moshe Ya’lon “[the] implication of this is that there will not be a Jewish state here ... The State of Israel is ready to give the Palestinians an independent Palestinian state, but the Palestinians are not ready to give us an independent Jewish state” (Ya’lon in Haaretz Magazine 2005b). In this light, Israeli securitising actors constantly underlined the requirement of an end to terrorism for reconciliation to occur. During this period the importance of the Palestinians’ fight with terror constituted the main theme of Israeli security discourse.

According to securitisation theory, through the articulation of danger and an existential threat, the securitising actor demands justification from the audience to use all necessary means to eliminate the threat. In this sense, securitisation is a process of call and response. In the post-Arafat Israeli-Palestinian case, the audience found themselves in the middle of a discursive battle between the leaders and their opponents, between normalisation attempts and securitisation attempts. As far as the Israeli audience’s position is concerned during the period after the demise of Arafat till the Gaza disengagement, the moderation of the official
discourse reflected Israeli public opinion. The disappearance of Arafat from the scene was of
great significance for the Israeli public since Yasser Arafat had been identified with the
Palestinian struggle and terrorism in the minds of Israelis while Mahmoud Abbas was
identified with the cadre of the Palestinian leadership who believed political negotiations to
be the only way forward. The demise of Arafat and the election of Abbas thus signified for
many Israelis an opportunity for reconciliation. According to a poll conducted by the Truman
Institute for Peace Research at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in September 2005, 66
percent of Israelis stated that “they [would recognise] Palestine as the state of the Palestinian
people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all
issues in dispute” (Joint Israeli and Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, September 2005). This
shift demonstrated a growing Israeli recognition that only the two-state solution could resolve
the conflict. Furthermore, according to a Peace Index Poll of October 2005, 49 percent of
Israeli respondents believed in the idea that the “basic idea of the Oslo process - ceding
territories for peace - is today part of the Israeli national consensus.” However, the general
pessimism was apparently ascribed to the gloomy predictions regarding the revival of terror
and a third Intifada on the eve of disengagement. This led an overwhelming majority (74
percent) of Israelis to think that, even if Israel withdrew from all the territories beyond the
Green Line and the occupation was to end, Palestinian violence would not stop and could
even intensify.

In the post-Arafat period, the two leaders attempted to articulate the political will for
normalisation. However, their normalisation attempts were challenged by other influential
securitising actors from within their respective societies. The domestic rivals of both leaders
further complicated the situation and limited their freedom of action. On the Palestinian side,
Abbas was challenged by Hamas. In opposition to Abbas’ non-violent strategy, Hamas
claimed that it was violence that pushed Israel out of Palestinian lands. In spite of Hamas’

14 The Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research
Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem conducted a joint survey of
Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in September 2005. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with
a representative sample of 499 Israeli Jews and a representative sample of 451 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample
was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors in the population to produce the
overall Israeli estimates (overall sampling error of 3.9 percent). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew,
Arabic and Russian between September 11 and 19.

15 The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Studies and the Evans Program
for Conflict Resolution Research at Tel Aviv University. The telephone interviews were conducted on October
31 – November 1, 2005 and included 585 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of
Israel (including territories and kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5 percent in
each direction.
ongoing securitisations of Israeli occupation, the majority of the Palestinian people came to the same conclusion as Abbas regarding the use of violence against Israel. As far as the Palestinian audience’ position was concerned, on the eve of disengagement, 84 percent of Palestinian respondents saw the withdrawal as a victory for armed resistance and 40 percent gave Hamas most of the credit for this. However, 62 percent of Palestinian people declared their opposition to continued attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip and 60 percent of respondents stated that they supported the collection of arms from armed groups in Gaza. Moreover, 73 percent of respondents supported the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip that would gradually extend to the West Bank16 (The Palestinian Public Opinion Poll September 2005). According to another opinion poll which was conducted two months after the disengagement, 41.1 percent of Palestinians thought a peace with Israel was somewhat likely and 7.3 percent thought it very likely17 (The Palestinian Public Opinion Poll November 2005).

After the death of Arafat, Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas appeared ready to resume cooperation as a prelude to negotiations. Sharon offered a number of relief measures to ease the conditions under which Palestinians lived and to empower Mahmoud Abbas. Evidently, the efforts of Sharon and Abbas were supported by their respective constituencies despite the ongoing securitising attempts of their opponents. According to a public opinion poll conducted after the disengagement, 67 percent of Israeli Jews and 63 percent of Israeli Arabs supported mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinians. A parallel poll by the Palestinian Research Institute found a similar rate of support (63 percent) among Palestinians in the territories. However, neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian public had been persuaded by their leaders’ normalisation efforts. Only 37 percent of Israeli and 30 percent of Palestinian respondents stated their belief in the other side’s willingness for a comprehensive solution. A majority of Israelis (50 percent) and Palestinians (53 percent) stated that if an agreement was reached, Sharon had the power to get the Israeli public to approve it. In contrast, while half of Palestinians believed that Abbas was strong enough to persuade Palestinians to support the necessary compromises, only 18 percent of Israelis believed that the Palestinian public would stand behind Abbas (Peace Index,

16 The opinion poll was conducted at The Palestinian Centre for Public Opinion (PCPO) during the period from 7-9 September 2005. A random sample of 1368 adult Palestinians from the West Bank (892) and Gaza Strip (476) were interviewed.
17 The opinion poll was conducted by PCPO during the period of 5 – 8 November 2005. A random sample of 825 adult Palestinians over 18 years old representing the various demographic groups from the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip were interviewed.
October 2005). These results showed that the ongoing securitisation of the Palestinian terror remained an obstacle to peace and reconciliation and had negatively affected Israeli public opinion. The Palestinian Authority’s inability to control armed groups and Hamas’ decisiveness in participating in democratic elections led the Israeli public to lose its faith in peace with the Palestinians.
Table 3.2 Documents and Statements (November 2004-February 2006)

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3.3 The Hamas-led Government: Two Steps Backward?

Israel considered the issue of Hamas' participation in elections as a security threat to Israel since Hamas had not recognised, and continued to threaten, the State of Israel. Given Hamas' decision to participate in the parliamentary elections in Palestine, the Israeli political and security elite constantly expressed the incompatibility of engaging in violence and participating in local elections. The Israeli elites were frustrated with the possibility of international recognition of Hamas if it was elected (Haaretz 27 May 2005a, Jerusalem Post 2005f). Moreover, the actions of Hamas were shown as evidence of their commitment to the destruction of the Israeli state. Given the fears of the possibility of removal of Hamas from the international terrorist organisations list, the Israeli government warned the international community that it would harm the global war on terrorism, undermine Palestinian Authority
Chairman Abbas and set the diplomatic process back. The Israeli elite used the position of Hamas as a terrorist organisation and the threats it could pose in case of its election as government.

In spite of Israel's opposition, on 27 January 2006 Hamas was declared the winner of the elections. The election results put Hamas, listed as an international terrorist organisation, in charge of the Palestinians' political future, and put at least a temporary halt to efforts to restart peace talks. It posed a great challenge to acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his ministers.

With the formation of the Hamas-led government in Palestine, the question of Hamas' ideological position of not recognizing the State of Israel raised questions about the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Even under the threat of international sanctions, Hamas leaders reiterated their position vis-à-vis the existence of Israel. In an interview with MEMRI on 8 May 2006, Moussa Abu Marzouk, Deputy Head of Hamas' Political Bureau, stated that:

One of Hamas' founding principles is that it does not recognise Israel. We [participated in] the elections and the people voted for us based on this platform. Therefore, the question of recognizing Israel is definitely not on the table ... How can we be expected to recognise an occupying entity when millions of our people are refugees, and thousands of others are prisoners?

Despite these kinds of statement, in its 39-point government programme (2006) Hamas did not call for the destruction of, or an end to, negotiations with Israel. But the programme included statements to underline the uncompromised demands of the Palestinians. In its programme, the putative Hamas-led Palestinian Government pledged to:

Remove the occupation and settlements and demolish the apartheid-separation wall; establish an independent, fully sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; and reject all partial solutions, dictated policies, and faits accomplis;

Uphold Palestinian refugees' Right of Return to their homes and properties, as an individual and general right on which there is no compromise;
Uphold the belief that resistance in its various forms is a legitimate right of Palestinians to bring an end to the occupation and to secure their national rights.

The main themes of the programme reflect the ongoing securitisation themes of the Hamas leadership regarding the Israeli occupation. In this document the State of Israel is referred to as the “occupier” and an “apartheid state”. Moreover, the Palestinians’ right to resistance was underlined as their legitimate right to act against occupation.

The enmity speech act was dominant in Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh’s statement presenting his government programme to the Palestinian Council. From the start, Hanieh underlined the harsh conditions Palestinians were facing as a result of the Israeli occupation and asserted the Palestinians’ right to resist the occupation:

I was hoping that this council would convene under better conditions and that we could meet all in Jerusalem, the capital of our independent Palestinian state, but this condition where the various parts of our homeland are fragmented gives a clear proof on the harshness and oppression of the occupation; we can see how the occupation is launching a vicious war against our unarmed people and we can see how they incite against their democratic choice and how the occupation insists on keeping the region in this vicious circle of this bloody conflict. ... Council convenes today to witness the birth of a new Palestinian government which is the tenth government as the occupation and aggression continue and as the numbers of martyrs and injured increases along with the continuation of the policies of assassinations, arrests, and siege and the land confiscation and the construction of the apartheid wall and the Judaization of Jerusalem (Hanieh 2006a).

“The occupation and its ugly measures against the land, the human being and the holy sites” was defined as the first of the main challenges that awaited the new Palestinian government. Hanieh also stressed his determination “to protect the right of our people in defending themselves in confronting the occupation and removing the settlements and the apartheid wall and to continue their struggle towards the establishment of the independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty ... and to reject the partial solutions and the temporary borders and the
status quo policy ... such as the disengagement plan that aims to transform our homeland into cantons that will close the path in front of the establishment of a viable Palestinian state” (Hanieh 2006a).

The formation of a new Palestinian government by Hamas meant for Israel the loss of its partner for peace. This became the main theme of Olmert’s speeches and throughout his term Olmert underlined the need for a government change in Palestine. Furthermore, by supporting Mahmoud Abbas against the Hamas-led government, the Israeli government deepened the divisions within Palestinian politics.

A Palestinian Government led by terrorist factions will not be a partner for negotiation, and we will not have any practical or day-to-day relations....The State of Israel is prepared to wait for this necessary change in the Palestinian Authority. We will closely follow the conduct of the Authority. We will continue to strike at terror and terrorists. We will not hesitate to reach terrorists, their dispatchers and operators anywhere – I repeat – anywhere, but we will give the Authority an opportunity to prove that it is aware of its responsibilities and willing to change (Olmert 2006a).

In his address at the opening of the Knesset Winter Session on 16 October 2006, Prime Minister Olmert stated that:

[...] this [Hamas] government does not fulfil the minimal preconditions outlined by the international community, which would enable it to become a possible partner for negotiations. As long as the Hamas government fails to recognise the State of Israel, accept and implement the agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and act to terminate violence and eradicate terrorism, including attacks on our southern communities, we cannot conduct dialogue with it (Olmert 2006c).

Thus, in this period, a revival of securitisation processes at governmental level occurred. For the Israeli political and military elites, having Hamas as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian Authority was the worst-case scenario. Consequently, a Palestine governed by a ‘terrorist organisation’, which is determined to destroy the State of Israel has become one of
the themes of the Israeli security discourse. The Hamas government was an object of securitisation discourse and its deligitimisation became one of the priorities of the Israeli government. During this period the Israeli government maintained its contact with President Abbas whom they considered as the legitimate leader of the Palestinians, whereas they did not have any contact with the Hamas-led government.

Before becoming directly involved in Palestinian politics to overthrow the Hamas government, the Israeli government kept the door open for political and diplomatic means: imposing sanctions, diplomatic isolation and seeking the Palestinian Presidency’s support against the Hamas government. The continuous missile attacks launched on Israeli settlements and military positions scattered around the Gaza Strip, accompanied by the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, triggered an Israeli reaction. On 25 June 2006 two Israeli soldiers were murdered, four were wounded, and one soldier was abducted after a Palestinian attack at Kerem Shalom IDF base. Israel considers the Palestinian Authority and its Hamas government to be fully responsible for the Kerem Shalom attack and for the fate of the kidnapped soldier, Gilad Shalit. The securitisation of Hamas terror resulted in a military operation in Gaza. Even though Hamas was not the only group launching attacks on Israeli settlements Hamas became the subject of Israeli securitisations and Hamas government was deliberately delegitimised.

Three days after Gilad Shalid was kidnapped, the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners (2006) was presented. Basically, the document proposed an exchange of Gilad Shalid in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons. Besides the exchange proposal, the document listed the conditions required for an independent and free Palestinian state. The document repeated the classical enmity speech acts that held Israeli “occupation” and “apartheid policies” responsible for the suffering of Palestinians.

Hamas’ proposal to exchange the kidnapped soldier in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners was not accepted by the Israeli government. Rather, it caused rage and frustration on the Israeli side as expressed by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in his address to the Knesset on 17 July 2006:

When missiles are launched at our residents and cities, our answer will be war with all the strength, determination, valour, sacrifice and dedication which
characterise this nation. On the Palestinian front, we will conduct a relentless battle until terror ceases, Ghilad Shalit is returned home safely and the shooting of Qassam missiles stops (Olmert 2006b).

The kidnapping of Ghilad Shalit provided a pretext for the IDF intervention in the Gaza Strip. As Prime Minister Olmert pointed out in the same speech, the terrorist attacks had reached boiling point: "[w]e are at a national moment of truth. Will we consent to living under the threat of this Axis of Evil or will we mobilize our inner strength and show determination and equanimity?" (Olmert 2006b). Particularly after the US-led global war on terrorism, the Israeli political and military elites have linked Palestinian terror with global-level terror to justify their actions vis-à-vis Palestinian militant groups. By labelling the Palestinian militant groups as part of the Axis of Evil, the Israeli government is clearly seeking a pretext to justify its actions against Hamas and the other fedaayen groups. Furthermore, in order to get public support for the rightness of a military operation in Gaza against Hamas militants, Olmert chose words that would be emotive to Israeli society.

Citizens of Israel,
There are moments in the life of a nation, when it is compelled to look directly into the face of reality and say: no more!
And I say to everyone: no more!
Israel will not be held hostage — not by terror gangs or by a terrorist authority (Olmert 2006b).

Olmert concluded his speech by underlining the inevitability of defending Israeli citizens and the measures they would need to take to destroy terrorist infrastructures:

We will search every compound, target every terrorist who assists in attacking the citizens of Israel, and destroy every terrorist infrastructure, everywhere.
We will persist until Hezbollah and Hamas comply with those basic and decent things required of them by every civilised person. Israel will not agree to live in the shadow of missiles or rockets aimed at its residents (Olmert 2006b).

Olmert’s speech indicated a dead-end for overcoming the security threats posed by Hamas with normal politics and pointed out what kind of extraordinary measures they would have to
take to stop the terrorist attacks. Finally, on 8 November 2006, an IDF artillery shell intended
to disrupt the launching of Qassam rockets landed in a residential area in Beit Hanoun and
killed 23 Palestinians. The military operation in Gaza was an affirmation of the determination
of Israel regarding the terror issue.

For its part, the military operation in Gaza re-affirmed Hamas' enduring securitisation of the
Israeli occupation as an existential threat to Palestinian society. Meanwhile, given the Gaza
Strip residents' sufferings as a result of the violence between Hamas and IDF, the Israeli
leadership attempted to persuade Palestinian society of the economic and humanitarian costs
of the Hamas-led government for Palestinian society. As Olmert made clear in his address at
the opening of the Knesset Winter Session on 16 October 2006:

\[ \text{We do not wish the Palestinian people to continue suffering. On the}
\text{contrary we prefer a thriving Palestinian society, free of humanitarian hardship}
\text{– a society which enjoys economic welfare and which operates in cooperation}
\text{with the State of Israel (Olmert 2006c).} \]

Israel's undermining of the democratically elected Hamas government caused internal
tensions and created a chasm between the internally legitimate government and the
externally recognised Presidency. The clashes between Hamas supporters and those of
Abbas paved the way for the worrying possibility of a civil war. Moreover, through
blocking international finance and aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian government and
isolating it diplomatically, the Israeli government and military tried to show Hamas that
they were trapped. International sanctions and the isolation of the Hamas government had
become destructive in terms of the lives and livelihoods of Palestinians, particularly
Gazans. Ultimately, this strategy would be successful if it persuaded Hamas at least to
join the sought-after unity government with Abbas but it did not resolve the conflict.

Through an article he wrote for the Washington Times on 11 July 2006, Ismail Hanieh,
the Palestinian Prime Minister, blamed both Israel and the US for the deterioration of the
political and humanitarian situation in Gaza. According to Hanieh, the current Gaza
invasion was “only the latest effort to destroy the results of fair and free elections held
early this year” and it was “the explosive follow-up to a five-month campaign of
economic and diplomatic warfare directed by the United States and Israel” (Hanieh
At the end of his article, Hanieh sent a message to Israel which summarised the classical Palestinian enmity speech acts directed at the State of Israel:

If Israel will not allow Palestinians to live in peace, dignity and national integrity, Israelis themselves will not be able to enjoy those same rights. Meanwhile, our right to defend ourselves from occupying soldiers and aggression is a matter of law, as settled in the Fourth Geneva Convention. If Israel is prepared to negotiate seriously and fairly, and resolve the core 1948 issues, rather than the secondary ones from 1967, a fair and permanent peace is possible (Hanieh 2006c).

As a result of the increasing number of civilian casualties and suffering, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh agreed to negotiate with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to form a National Unity Government, which could end international sanctions and isolation. At the end of November 2006, the Palestinian Authority announced a ceasefire in Gaza on behalf of all Palestinian factions. Palestinian Prime Minister Ismael Hanieh asserted that “contacts with the political leaders of factions were made and there have been assertions to commit truce. The entire matter is hostage to halting Israeli aggressions against the Palestinian people” (Hanieh 2006b). Considering its meaning for Islam, declaring a ceasefire (in Arabic, ‘Hudna’) was a significant step for Hamas. Hudna is recognised in Islamic jurisprudence as a legitimate and binding contract and refers to something beyond the Western concept of cease-fire. It obliges the parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences. It refers to a period of non-war, a partial resolution of a conflict. As stated by Ahmed Yousef, a senior adviser to the Palestinian Prime Minister, in his editorial in The New York Times “[when] Hamas gives its word to an international agreement; it does so in the name of God and will therefore keep its word” (New York Times 2006).

The ceasefire was immediately reciprocated by Israel. In his address at the Memorial Ceremony for David and Paula Ben-Gurion on 27 November 2006, Ehud Olmert performed one of the most conciliatory and far-reaching discursive gestures of any Israeli leader in recent years: “I extend my hand in peace to our Palestinian neighbours, hoping that it will not be rejected.” However, even in this speech Olmert underlined the terrible consequences of
terrorist attacks and called upon Palestinians to put an end to the terror, violence, murders and incessant attacks against the citizens of Israel.

The terror, violence, murders and incessant attacks against the citizens of Israel are liable to lead us closer to a new and painful wave of terrible violence. The uncompromising radicalism of your terror organisations did not bring you closer to attaining the goal which I am convinced many of you share – the establishment of a Palestinian state, which will guarantee you a future of prosperity and which will exist in good neighbourly relations side-by-side with the State of Israel (Olmert 2006d).

His wording was more conciliatory than normal in the official positions of Israel. However, his message was not drastically different from previous Israeli official stands. By using 'your' (possessive form) for indicating the possession of terror organisations he pointed out that the Palestinians as people were responsible for the end of terror against Israeli citizens. That is to say, he warned Palestinians about the consequences of their continuous support for radical groups and kept open the door for possible Israeli military intervention in Palestinian territories if terror attacks continued.

As far as the Israeli and Palestinian audiences’ positions regarding ongoing securitisations and normalisation efforts, the Israeli public was in favour of returning to normal politics and negotiations with the Palestinian national unity government, even though it included Hamas. According to the Joint Israeli Palestinian Public Opinion Poll conducted by The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in September 2006, 67 percent of the Israelis stated their support for negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which included Hamas if that is what was needed to reach a compromise agreement. Even where a Hamas-led government was concerned, an increased moderation among Israelis, 56 percent support, was observed regarding talks with a Hamas government if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. This audience position resembles that of Ariel Sharon and

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18 The total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly-selected locations between September 14 and 16, 2006. The margin of error was 3 percent. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of 500 Israeli Jews and a representative sample of 401 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors in the population to produce the overall Israeli estimates (overall sampling error of 3.9 percent). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between September 10 and 19.
his successor Ehud Olmert regarding normalisation. However, according to the same survey, some hardening was observed among Palestinians in this regard. Before Israel's intervention in Lebanon and Gaza, 70 percent of Palestinian respondents thought that a Hamas-led PA should negotiate with Israel and 26 percent believed it should not; after Israel's military interventions in Lebanon and Gaza, support for negotiations with Israel dropped to 59 percent. On the other hand, as far as the abduction of Israeli soldiers for exchange with Palestinian prisoners was concerned, 75 percent of the Palestinians supported such operations compared to 23 percent who opposed them. Despite the militant views of the Palestinians in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, 77 percent of the Palestinians supported the call for a ceasefire between Palestinians and Israelis and 74 percent believed that Palestinians cannot depend on armed action only and must reach a political settlement (Joint Israeli Palestinian Public Opinion Poll September 2006).

Despite Ehud Olmert's conciliatory rhetoric, Palestinians continued to perceive Israel as a state that does not want fully-fledged reconciliation. But the percentage of Palestinians who believe that there is a peace partner for Palestinians in Israel increased from 13 percent in April 2006 to 36 percent in November 2006 (NEC Monthly Bulletin 2006).\(^1\) By contrast, Israeli expectations that the ceasefire would lead to calm in the region were very low (27 percent), apparently because of the prevailing view in the Israeli-Jewish public that the Palestinians would most likely violate the truce. It was commonly believed that Israel agreed to the ceasefire because the military measures that were taken did not stop the Qassam fire. At the same time, a clear majority (57 percent) rejected the idea that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip even if this was the only way to end the shelling. Moreover, there existed broad support among the Israeli public for holding talks with the Palestinian Authority despite the fact that only a minority believed it would eventually lead to a peace agreement (Peace Index November 2006).\(^2\) As public opinion polls show, both Israeli and Palestinian audiences were convinced by the normalisation discourse. Given the negative effects of ongoing violence and destructions to their lives, both the Israeli and Palestinian publics were keen on returning to normal politics. Even after the Israeli military intervention in Lebanon to eliminate the

\(^1\) NEC's Monthly Bulletin on Palestinian Perceptions towards their political, economic and social conditions, November 2006.

\(^2\) The Peace Index, November 2006 - The telephone interviews were conducted in 28-29 November 2006, and included 598 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5 percent.
Hezbollah leadership, the Palestinian public showed their preference for a ceasefire. Considering the audiences' position in favour of normalisation, the call of the securitising actors has not received a positive response by the respective audiences. In this case, the extraordinary measures taken by the Palestinian Islamist elite and the Israeli military elite - continuous firing of rockets into Israeli settlements and the Israeli military interventions in Gaza - have not been legitimised in the eyes of the respective audiences. That is to say the extraordinary measures regarded as necessary by the securitising actors have been taken without the audiences' consent.
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3.4 Post-Oslo Israeli and Palestinian Securitisations

As discussed in Chapter 1, for the Copenhagen School, the language of security politics is a performative activity that makes certain issues visible as a threat. Within this context, Wæver argues that security is a specific way of framing an issue and security discourse is characterised by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority (1996:108). Positing an issue as an existential threat requires a move from normal politics to emergency politics. Thus, the securitising actor claims a special right to handle the issue using extraordinary measures and to legitimise the political action.

Depicting certain phenomena as security threats can confer legitimacy on the state and/or government, by portraying it as being able to protect its people from such threats. As a result, securitisation can justify introducing security practices and technologies. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories has been constructed as a threat to the existence of Palestinian society. The occupation has been used by different Palestinian political elites to legitimise their acts against Israel. In parallel, Palestinian terror has been securitised as an existential threat to the Israeli state and society. This situation did not change in the post-Oslo period. The attacks launched by Palestinian factions such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah’s military wing al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade were effectively securitised and used as a pretext for the IDF’s interventions in Gaza. Particularly after the death of Arafat, Israeli discourse has changed from securitising Palestinians as an existential threat to the Israeli state and society to the securitising of Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas as an existential threat to both the Israeli state and society, and the peace process. During this period Israeli government sought to eliminate potential threats, in Wæver’s term they pursued policies of security management. The period following the death of Arafat era clearly shows the characteristics of security management. Instead of reviving the peace process and initiating a normalisation process, both Ariel Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert preferred to manage the security situation. In this regard, the security measures that can be taken for the sake of risk management, like check points, strict security controls, regimes of identification and preventive detentions, cover both the discursive and practical aspects of securitisation. These practices are ranged across domestic and external security practices, most of which are among the daily practices of the Israeli state in order to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks.
Throughout the period after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 until the beginning of 2007, both Palestinian and Israeli security discourses showed some signs of normalisation, which marked a slight change from previous security discourses. However, as a result of the rise of Hamas, the Israeli government's worries about state security increased. Hamas' anti-Zionist, anti-State of Israel discourse paved the way for the Israeli securitisation of the rise of Hamas and of terror. During this period, first Hamas as a terrorist organisation and later Hamas as a Palestinian government that does not recognise the State of Israel were identified as security threats.

As discussed in Chapter 1, in cases of societal security, security is about defending established identities and establishing boundaries with the other as has been experienced in the Israeli-Palestinian case. For Israeli securitising actors the right to exist is the main concern and the security discourse has developed around this theme. Within this context, Abbas' rhetoric recognizing the State of Israel makes him a friend of Israel. Consequently, Israeli governments have empowered Abbas against Hamas, the enemy.

The Palestinian securitisation of Israeli occupation is propagated mainly by Hamas, which has a vested interest in depicting Israel as a security threat. As was assumed by securitisation theory, securitising an issue can help the securitising actor to justify harsh approaches, which are reflected in the Palestinian case as attacks against Israeli settlements and military targets in order to resist the occupation. Through its security discourse, Hamas attempted to legitimise the use of violence against Israelis. Hamas' leaders have securitised the continuation of the Israeli occupation by successfully operationalising the resistance discourse, which has been among the core themes of the Hamas movement since its foundation. In this sense, securitisation provided a site of struggle between the Zionist Israeli State and the Islamist Palestinian movements. Even though Palestinian society is not purely a Muslim society, Hamas and other militant groups have developed their security discourses around Islamic themes like martyrdom and Jihad. Hamas has continued to securitise Israeli security measures as apartheid policies and used them to legitimise the so-called resistance against Israeli occupation. Constructing a boundary between 'us and them' along national lines, Hamas leaders have attempted to construct a community around the ideal of a liberated Palestinian state, by making the Israeli occupation the major theme of a security discourse.
As far as the facilitating conditions of the period are concerned, post-Oslo securitisations were influenced by external as well as domestic facilitating factors. President George W. Bush's ambition to resolve Israeli Palestinian conflict by the end of his second term put pressure on Israeli government and Palestinian Authority. By introducing Roadmap and gain Quartet’s support the US administration attempted to encourage Israeli government and Palestinian authority Chairman Abbas to turn back to negotiation table. Domestically neither Abbas nor Sharon (later Olmert) was in a position to restart negotiations and made concessions necessary for permanent status agreement. With Washington the key to delivering Israeli agreement on a two-state solution, Abbas saw little alternative but to do what the Americans asked of him. But the US and Israel declined to give him the concessions necessary to validate his choices in Palestinian eyes, resulting in Abbas' losing even more ground to Hamas over the past two years. Similarly, Sharon had to show some political will to resume peace talks especially after the death of Arafat. By unilaterally withdrawing from Gaza Sharon paid a lip service without really engaging in negotiations. American-led war on terror had a significant influence on Israeli security policies and provided pretext for harsh Israeli response against Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups. It was also provided pretext for Israeli governments to delay peace negotiations with Palestinian government which was led by Hamas’ political wing. Given their opponents’ continuous securitisations both Israeli and Palestinian policy-makers were reluctant to normalize the relations. On the other hand, as is demonstrated in the following chapter, at the civil society level a number of Israelis and Palestinians have assumed a responsibility to initiate a desecuritisation process for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Chapters 5 and 6 will consider respective civil society efforts for changing the perceptions vis-à-vis the other side and their efforts to initiate a desecuritisation process which could lead to reconciliation on the long run.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Development of the Idea of Reconciliation, Cooperation and Co-existence in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

From the very beginning of their interaction there have always been individuals or groups whose rhetoric regarding the other challenges the mainstream security discourse. Alongside ongoing securitisations, there have been reconciliatory approaches that defend and support coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. Moreover, the idea of cooperation and people-to-people coexistence activities is not a phenomenon developed during the Oslo process alone. However, the Oslo process contributed to the development of peace-building projects initiated by local organisations in order to improve the relationship between the two sides at the community level.

As was stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis aims to apply the concept of desecuritisation. A detailed analysis of the desecuritisation concept in the Israeli-Palestinian context will thus be presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Before proceeding, this chapter presents the development of the idea of reconciliation and peace between Israel and the Palestinians, as opposed to the continuous securitisation processes.

4.1 The Development in Israel of the Idea of Reconciliation and Peace with Palestinians

On the part of Israelis, the earlier traces of reconciliatory discourse are rooted in the mid-1920s. In the wake of the 1929 Arab revolt, a number of Jews from Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine initiated the establishment of an organisation called Brit Shalom (Peace Alliance). Its members were bounded by a common belief in cooperation between the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs and were influenced by the seminal Israeli writer Ahad-Haam, who was one of the earliest critics of the policies of the Zionist Movement. The title of his essay ‘Lo zeh ha-derech’ (This is not the way), become a slogan of Brit Shalom’s criticisms of Zionist policies in Palestine.
The earliest signs of reconciliation discourse underlining the possibility of coexistence, cooperation and peace with the Palestinians are to be found in Brit Shalom's statements. As was stated by Judah Magnes, the first president of the Hebrew University, Brit Shalom believed that:

Arab-Jewish cooperation is not only necessary for the peace of this part of the world, but that it is also possible. We contend ... that Arab-Jewish cooperation has never been made the chief objective of major policy ... We regard this as a great sin of omission which has been committed throughout all these years (Magnes in Reisel 2001).

Chaim Margaliut Kalvaryski, one of the early inspirations of Brit Shalom, similarly argued: “[w]e must find a way of reconciling the two national movements, the Zionist and the Arab, which seem conflicting and mutually exclusive, but which are in reality complementary to each other and able to live side-by-side in peace and harmony (Kalvaryski in Reisel 2001). The founders and leaders of Brit Shalom often used the words, cooperation, peace, harmony and reconciliation. This was in contrast to the Zionist political elite of the early 1930s who preferred to think of Palestinian Arabs as just a nuisance in Palestine who would soon leave and amalgamate with Arabs elsewhere. Cooperation with Palestinian Arabs or reconciliation with their national aspirations was the least of the concerns of the Zionist leadership.

In 1942, Brit Shalom founded a small political party, the Ihud (Union) Association of Palestine, and continued to lobby mostly for international support and recognition. Based on a belief in Arab-Jewish cooperation, Ihud proposed an Economic Union in Palestine, which was supported by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 and then by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947.

According to Ihud (or Brit Shalom) there could also be a great degree of cooperation albeit the differences of opinion between and among the Jews and the Arabs. They believed that issues such as economic development, social security, standards of life, trade, agriculture, industry, labour and commerce, would draw Jews and Arabs together (Reisel 2001).
Brit Shalom's ideas were progressive for the time. With their emphasis on both official and people-level cooperation between Jews and Palestinian Arabs, Brit Shalom's proposals resemble contemporary ideas of structural and cultural peace-building. Compared to the Zionist leadership, Brit Shalom stressed the importance of the recognition of the Arab reality for the peace and stability of Palestine. However, despite its initial influence on the Anglo-American Committee, Brit Shalom was not able to command any serious public support. Over the years, the group became marginalised.

The Israeli radical left had always been a supporter of the principle of Palestinian self-determination and saw the issue as part of the anti-imperialist struggle. Following the establishment of the State of Israel and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, small, mostly Marxist-Leninist, political factions challenged the policies of the Zionist leadership and continued to advocate the national rights of Palestinian Arabs. The most outspoken of those was the Israeli Communist Party with its commitment to its anti-Zionist stand (Bar-On 2005:8). From the inception of the State of Israel, the Communist Party of Israel appeared as the chief advocate of Palestinian national rights. The Communist Party saw the recognition of the right of the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and the mutual recognition of these rights as the key factors for peace (Kaminer 1996:26). Similarly, the United Labour Party (MAPAM) also advocated the idea of a binational state in which Jews and Arabs would live side-by-side. Regarding the Palestinian issue, MAPAM advocated compromises and reconciliation (Bar-On 2005:9). Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 confirmed, in the eyes of those movements, the correctness of the Marxist view, which held that Zionism was inherently colonialist. In a short time, Communist student cells had considerable political presence in Israeli universities. Ideologically driven, determined to fight against the government’s settlement and annexation policy in the Occupied Territories, a student movement was started against the occupation (Kaminer 1996:10-15).

The ideas of the Israeli radical left constituted the basis for the development of the Israeli 'peace camp', which refers to movements which claim to strive for peace with the Arab neighbours of Israel, including the Palestinians, and encourage co-existence with the Arab citizens of Israel.

During 1970s the Israeli Council for Israeli Palestinian Peace (ICIPP) was formed by a group of prominent Israeli Zionists in response to signs of moderation in the Palestinian national
movement, which the Israeli government was accused of ignoring. In February 1976, the founders of the organisation published a Manifesto setting out their belief that Israel should challenge the PLO to make peace on the basis of Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in June 1967. The group attempted to put pressure on the Israeli government to initiate peace negotiations with the PLO, a move at that time considered unacceptable by the Israeli government. Also innovative, the organisation spoke in favour of a two-state solution. In their Manifesto of 25 February 1976, ICIPP affirm that:

[...] the only path to peace is through co-existence between two sovereign states, ... [that] the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state ... should be the outcome of negotiations between the government of Israel and a recognised and authoritative representative body of the Palestinian Arab people, ... [and that] the two states will aim to conduct a continuing dialogue in order to forge closer relations between them, to solve common problems in a spirit of cooperation (ICIPP Manifesto 1976).

Following ICIPP, the Peace Now movement was founded in 1978 during the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks by hundreds of reserve officers and soldiers from Israeli army combat units. In their letter to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the group underlined that the precondition for the true security of Israel was to make peace with its neighbours. With this letter, the group called upon the Prime Minister to refrain from taking any steps that might cause further conflicts with Israel’s neighbours. The group saw the existence of Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line as the major obstacle to peace:

[...] when new horizons of peace and cooperation are for the first time being proposed to the State of Israel, we feel obliged to call upon you to prevent taking any steps that could cause endless problems to our people and our state. ... We are aware of the security needs of the State of Israel and the difficulties facing the path to peace. But we know that true security will only be reached with the arrival of peace (Peace Now 1978).

Gradually, Peace Now has become the largest extra-parliamentary movement in Israel. Since the early 1980s Peace Now has been in the fore front of the struggle against Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. As opposed to the Israeli government’s arguments, it
defends the idea that the right of Israel to live within secure borders must not challenge the rights of its neighbours, including the right of Palestinians to self-determination. In 1988, after the PLO's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the principle of the two-state solution, Peace Now led a massive demonstration calling on the government to negotiate with the PLO. Peace Now has consistently continued to press all Israeli parties in power to initiate steps to bring about an end to occupation and to pursue peace negotiations.

Although Peace Now is an Israeli movement, it has also been engaged in dialogue and joint activities with Palestinians in the occupied territories. The largest such activity was a massive demonstration called Hands Around Jerusalem in 1989 in which some 15,000 Israelis and 15,000 Palestinians called for peace.

Even though Peace Now has become one of the generic names of the Israeli peace movement, Peace Now's positions on several issues, particularly the group's acceptance of the Jewish state paradigm and its position that sees an undivided Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel, have been criticised (Kaminer 1996, Gordon 2003).

Besides the activist peace groups, other kinds of initiatives also exist. For example, after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a peace coalition, composed of political and public figures as well as grass-roots activists from both the Israeli and Palestinian mainstream, was established in July 2001. On the Israeli side were 24 civil society groups, including Peace Now as well as the parliamentary opposition, represented by Meretz, and the left wing of the Labour party involved in the Coalition. On the Palestinian side, the Coalition involved the main secular/nationalist actors. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition engaged in demonstrations against occupation as well as public diplomacy and peoples' diplomacy activities. The Coalition proposed a framework for peace and appealed for the normalisation of relations. The Peace Coalition's proposal was based on the idea of peace from below and the necessity to start negotiation on the real issues, such as settlements, the right to return, Jerusalem and terrorism, for a peaceful settlement (Said 2003).

The Geneva Initiative (2003), a peace proposal similar to the one proposed by the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition, was initiated by Israeli politician Yossi Beilin, one of the architects of the Oslo agreements, and former Palestinian Authority minister Yasser Abed Rabbo. The Geneva Initiative, which is an extra-governmental, therefore unofficial, peace
proposal, seeks to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The proposal suggests a Palestinian concession on the right of return to lands within the State of Israel in exchange for sovereignty over the Temple Mount. The plan also calls for an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip (Geneva Initiative 2003).

The Geneva Initiative’s proposal was prepared by some of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who had actively participated in the Oslo process. The draft was written in simple language and the Preamble of the Geneva Accord contained specific statements underlining the most ideal peace situation between Israel and the PLO. This Preamble (Draft Permanent Status Agreement), published in October 2003, underlined the need “to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security based on a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace and achieving historic reconciliation” and frequently refers to both sides’ “right to peaceful and secure existence within secure and recognised boundaries” (Geneva Initiative 2003). Throughout the document, words and phrases such as “cooperation”, “the commitment to live side-by-side” and “good neighbourliness” are used.

According to Jacob Shamir, the Geneva Initiative illustrates the role that NGOs can assume in conflict resolution processes by modifying public discourse and preparing public opinion for compromise when the political elite is unwilling or unable to do so (2007:8). The draft has not, however, attracted much official support. The Ariel Sharon government accused the Israelis involved in the initiative of trying to act in place of a democratically-elected government (Haaretz 2004). On the Palestinian side, both Yasser Arafat and Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia declared that the Palestinian participants represented neither the PLO nor the Palestinian government (Haaretz 2003).

Another Israeli politician who initiated the establishment of an independent, non-profit NGO is Shimon Peres, former Israeli Prime Minister and President of the State of Israel. Shimon Peres, who was one of the Nobel Peace Laureates in 1994, founded the Peres Centre for Peace in 1996 to “build an infrastructure of peace and reconciliation by and for the people of the Middle East that promotes socio-economic development, while advancing cooperation and mutual understanding” (Peres Centre 2006). The Peres Centre has been involved in several peace-building projects with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. The Peres Centre’s peace-building activities are based on four main pillars, all of which require
cooperation and encounters with counterparts: people-to-people dialogue and interaction, capacity-building through cooperation, nurturing a culture of peace in the region's youth and humanitarian responses.

The Oslo process has encouraged NGOs and independent, non-profit groups working for different aspects of peace and reconciliation. Currently, there are hundreds of Israeli NGOs and non-profit organisations on the ground who claim that they make up the 'other Israel' and point out that there are not simply two sides - Israelis and Palestinians - but there are Israelis who join with Palestinians in working for a future of reconciliation and peace built on a foundation of justice (Carey and Shainin 2002). The spectrum of groups stretches from religious groups like Rabbis for Human Rights, which was founded in 1998, in response to serious abuses by the Israeli military authorities in the suppression of the Intifada, to groups that oppose and resist demolition of Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories like the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions and to women's groups such as New Profile and Bat Shalom. Albeit the differences regarding their focus, Israeli peace movement organisations are united on a number of core positions: almost all of them criticise the security policies of the Israeli government and have oriented themselves around a common goal: a sovereign independent Palestinian state based on the principles of equality, justice and freedom (Levin 2005:91).

The ideas of peace and reconciliation have also prevailed in Israeli public opinion. According to the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Public Opinion Research project, since mid-2001, more than 50 percent of Israelis have supported the dismantling of Jewish settlements which had been built on Palestinian territories (Shamir 2007:29). The same project also indicates that, despite the ongoing securitisations, in 2006 79 percent of the Israeli public stated their support for reconciliation. Only 40 percent expected reconciliation to actually take place within the next decade (Shamir 2007:40).

As explored in this section, since the end of the 1920s, the idea of peace and/or reconciliation with Palestinians has gradually been developed particularly through non-governmental groups. Particularly after 1967, a peace movement emerged as a response to both religious nationalist movements like Gush Emunim which viewed the 1967 victory as a divine directive to expand the State of Israel (Hermann and Newman 1992) and secular nationalists who viewed the occupied territories as necessary for security. By insisting on the importance
of mutual recognition of rights and freedoms, the two-state solution and reconciliation the Israeli peace camp has introduced an alternative set of values and ideas into Israeli society.

4.2 The Development of the Idea of Reconciliation and Peace with Israel among Palestinians

As discussed in Chapter 2, since the influx of Jews after the 1897 Basel Zionist Conference’s decision to reclaim Palestine as the historic home of the Jewish people, the native Palestinian population has felt threatened by Jewish immigration. Particularly during the British Mandate period, friction between Arab and Jewish communities grew. Administratively, the only area common to Jews and Arabs under the Mandate was municipal government in mixed cities such as Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Tiberias. During the Mandate period, despite of their absence from decision-making processes, Arabs were still the dominant group in municipal governments throughout Palestine. The development of the Jewish-Arab conflict underlined the importance of the municipal administration since it was considered as an institution to accumulate political power in mixed cities. During the Mandate period, albeit the general resentment among Palestinian Arabs against Jewish participation in municipal activities, the Mayor of Haifa, Hasan Bey Shukri, insisted on the necessity of integrating Jews into municipal activities in the cities with both Jewish and Palestinian communities.

Hasan Bey Shukri believed in cooperation with Jews for the benefit of the city’s development. He formed the municipal council with the participation of Jews together with Arabs, he appointed Jewish clerks, which had not been previously allowed, and initiated the gradual introduction of Hebrew into municipal operations (Goren 2006:24). Contrary to his Arab counterparts in the municipalities of Jerusalem and Safed, Shukri succeeded in separating the municipal affairs of the city from political matters and laid the foundations of cooperation between Arabs and Jews in Haifa. Shukri argued that Jews and Arabs living together would provide a basis for making peace. Based on this idea, and despite the intensification of violence in Palestine, members of Haifa municipal council continued to work in cooperation till Hasan Bey Shukri died in 1940 (Goren 2006:33). In this detailed work on Hasan Bey Shukri, Goren identifies him as one of the first of the Palestinian elite to underline the necessity of cooperation between Arabs and Jews for a peaceful settlement in Palestine. His ideas and rhetoric challenged the mainstream Arab discourse of the time, which was based on the securitisation of Jewish immigration into Palestine.
Between Hasan Bey Shukri and the Oslo process there was little obvious development among Palestinians of the idea of reconciliation and cooperation with Israelis. After the establishment of the State of Israel, Palestinians, together with other Arabs in the region, securitised the State of Israel as a threat to their existence. Palestinian frustration mounted with Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank after the 1967 war. The first Palestinian NGOs were established after the June 1967 in order to prevent and raise international awareness of human rights violations.

During the first Intifada, Palestinian NGOs grew into a self-reliant driving force and worked in the absence of an elected authority (Hassasian and Kaufman 1999). Despite the existence of NGOs to raise awareness among the public of human rights, women’s rights, democracy and transparency, NGOs that support the peace process were established only very recently. Particularly during the Oslo process, organisations sprang up in the West Bank and Gaza whose aim was to build peace and reconciliation between the two sides. However, coexistence has never been a popular term amongst Palestinians who are involved in peace-building. According to Hassasian and Kaufman (1999), since a Palestinian state has not yet come into existence, any efforts towards any other solution are considered to be insufficient. Hence, coexistence within undefined borders is perceived as a false normalisation.

From the Palestinian point of view, Palestinians have shouldered the sufferings going all the way back to the refugee crisis of 1948. Given the difficulties they have faced as a result of occupation, it is difficult for Palestinians to believe in peace. For most Palestinians, Israel must be the one to make concessions and initiate peace-building and reconciliation. Palestinians who work on peace projects with Israelis have faced the risk of being labelled collaborators by some sections of Palestinian society.

Yet in spite of these material and psychological barriers, quite a number of Palestinian individuals and groups have initiated and continued peace-building efforts. The Palestinian peace movement can be classified in accordance with the aims of these organisations and groups. First of all, most of the works done by Palestinian peace NGOs have focused on raising awareness regarding the Palestinian cause. These groups mainly aim at gaining international recognition for the Palestinian cause based on historical narratives and the securitisation of Israel as an occupier. A second category involves groups focused on
democratisation and peace within Palestinian society. The third category covers all individual and organisational efforts for integrating Palestinian peace-building efforts with Israelis. Within this context, there exists a range of groups and individuals working as the Palestinian partners of Israel in people-to-people projects. Some examples from this third category will be taken into consideration below.

Compared to the established peace bloc tradition in Israel, the idea of reconciliation and peace with Israel has remained underdeveloped in Palestine. In Palestine the idea of peace-building (peace and reconciliation with Israel) has developed at the civil society level after the Oslo process. Since then a number of NGOs and individuals have continued to cooperate with Israelis in order change the perceptions of the other. The continuation of joint peace-building efforts helps Palestinians to retain their faith in reconciliation. As shown by the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll project, for the period 2000 to 2006, general support for reconciliation among Palestinians has oscillated between a minimum of 65 percent and a maximum of 81 percent. However, it is understandable that when the respondents were asked to estimate when this reconciliation would be achieved, no more than one-quarter of Palestinians believed that it would be within the next decade or the next few years (Shamir 2007:39).

Table 4.1 Documents and Statements Related to the Development of the Idea of Reconciliation, Cooperation and Co-existence in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document/Statement</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press Release by the General assembly of Palestinian NGO Network</td>
<td>22 October 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition Draft Peace Agreement</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli Forum for People-to-People Organisations’ ads to counteract the growing entrenchment of Israeli public opinion after the outbreak of Intifada</td>
<td>3 July 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. 3 Oslo and after: Israeli – Palestinian Peace-building

Within the Israeli-Palestinian context, the respective civil societies have been actively involved in the peace movement and initiated joint practice-oriented projects. While before the Oslo agreements, peace-based NGOs initiated cross-society contacts and put pressure on their respective leaderships to start negotiations, since the peace process, NGOs have focused on helping to prepare their societies for coexistence and cooperation.

In general, civil society cooperation builds “constituencies for peace from the ground up, [involving] conflict resolution, learning the political narrative of the other, bringing people into creative interaction and learning from each other” (Baskin and al-Qaq 2004:544). While academic and intellectual projects and contacts have been developed since the first Intifada, most of the dialogue and cooperation programmes have started after 1993 through the people-to-people peace-building initiatives of the Oslo process. In the Oslo Peace Accord, a provision was inserted to support the undertaking of people-to-people activities. By bringing together Israelis and Palestinians for dialogue and cooperative schemes, the aim was to create the relational infrastructure necessary to advance the official peace process. Since the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreements in 1993, numerous programmes aimed at cultural and structural peace-building have, therefore, been conducted. These programmes have ranged from one-time, single events to long-term and continuous series of meetings, and from youth encounters to dialogues among schoolteachers, university students and professors (Kupermintz and Salomon 2005).

Since agents of civil society involving peace-building activities are indigenous to the societies in which they operate, they are open to the influences of external events, particularly adverse circumstances of violence, human suffering and the escalation of tensions. Hence, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli NGOs involved in pursuing peace-building activities with Palestinian partners experienced a dramatic and traumatic change in the nature and frequency of the activity they undertook (Baskin and al-Qaq 2004:544). In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the violence, the Israeli Forum for People-to-People Organisations placed ads in Israeli and Palestinian newspapers to counteract the growing entrenchment of Israeli public opinion. On 3 July 2001, Israeli NGOs specialising in people-to-people encounters called for an end to the use of the language of violence, racism and intimidation.
We, the Israeli Organisations who work to advance Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, dialogue and peace between the two peoples... call upon the sides to stop all incitement and to end the use of [the] language of violence, racism and intimidation. In these days, we are also working to convene peaceful encounters between Israelis and Palestinians through dialogues which are based upon equality, mutual recognition and respect, in order to bring the two peace camps closer together (IPCRI 2002:77 [Emphasis original]).

The outbreak of the second Intifada caused a decline in the legitimacy of peace-building efforts in Israel and the Israeli public had lost faith in Israeli-Palestinian peace-building. Consequently, civil society agents involved in peace-building have been relegated to the unavoidable role of simply advocating the basic legitimacy and relevance of their positions, while continuing to maintain the web of communication and cooperation with their Palestinian colleagues (IPCRI Report 2002:8). On the Palestinian side, Palestinian civil society cautiously, and usually discreetly, chose to reconsider the strong anti-normalisation line in Palestinian society, which has incrementally enabled a growing re-engagement of Palestinian civil society with their former or new Israeli partners for the continuation of peace-building efforts (IPCRI Report 2002:9).

Even though peace-building activities did not prevent the outbreak of violence, they produced positive results at the micro level. According to follow-up studies, peace-building activities succeeded in terms of improving the mutual attitudes of Israeli and Palestinian participants (Adwan and Bar-On 2000, Chaitin et al. 2002). Another indicator of the success of people-to-people peace-building activities is the number of peace-building activities that have continued even following the collapse of the peace process. The peace-building activities that have successfully continued their work are those operated jointly with a process of joint decision-making involving Israelis and Palestinians in accordance with the principles of partnership in project implementation, joint operations and ownership (Baskin & Qaq 2004:552). Through insisting on the idea of reconciliation and cooperation, these civil society efforts have tried to contribute to a change of direction from negative relations to an improving one.

The first case that is analysed here to illustrate the Israeli-Palestinian civil society’s peace-building efforts is water management. Water management is one particular issue that is susceptible to a normal political process. As a consequence of this, water management has
become part of both peace-making during the Oslo negotiations and structural peace-building. Although control over, and access to, water resources is one of the conflict-causing issues between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it was the first issue agreed upon by the two conflicting parties. In order to facilitate the water allocation issues and water-related projects and improve the efficiency of water systems, especially in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a Joint Water Committee was established between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. During the Oslo process, besides the establishment of the Joint Water Committee, several projects dealing with shared water resources between Israel and the Palestinian Authority were also launched. Even though most of these projects were coordinated by international environmental NGOs and/or international agencies like the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the US Aid Agency (USAID), the project teams consisted of Palestinian and Israeli experts. Through this process, besides the international NGOs, local Palestinian and Israeli environmental NGOs initiated cooperation projects aimed at improving the quality and quantity of shared water resources. As a natural result of such interdependency, these water management projects have been instrumental in providing grounds for cooperation and reconciliation between adversaries. It is assumed that working together with the other for the improvement of valued natural resources like water will contribute to a re-definition and re-evaluation of relations with the other, and thus positively influence the desecuritisation process.

Following the analysis of water management as a means for desecuritisation, in Chapter 6, among the successful civil society efforts that are involved in cultural peace-building activities, peace education activities of the Israeli-Palestinian civil societies will be analysed. IPCRI, PRIME and Windows have become involved in joint Israeli-Palestinian peace education as part of cultural peace-building activities and have thereby aimed to transform perceptions and language relating to the other, thereby contributing to the initiation of a desecuritisation process.
CHAPTER FIVE

Cooperation over Water Resources as a Tool for Desecuritisation: the Israeli – Palestinian Case

Water is vital to human survival and concerns regarding quality, quantity and the allocation of water resources in arid regions are often considered to be issues of water security. Considering the vital importance of water for human beings and societies, access to this precious commodity has security implications when water-sharing issues are perceived as threats to national security. In most cases, the notion of national sovereignty can be interpreted as exclusive rights of ownership and use over all water resources within or flowing through a state’s territory. This may cause tensions between states and societies which share the particular water resource. However, the scarcity of fresh water is not always a source of conflict and disputes over freshwater access and quality do not generally lead to conflicts. In some cases the need to deal with transboundary water issues facilitates cooperation. Cooperation takes place on large water-development projects where no other option exists and the outcomes are perceived to be mutually beneficial. Within this context, a school of thought emerged throughout the 1990s, denying a link between water scarcity and international war. According to scholars like J.A. Allan (1992), empirical evidence shows that arid states have far more to gain from cooperation than in wars against each other to claim the other’s water. Based on his extensive survey of water crises and treaties, Aaron Wolf (1998, 1999) claimed that water has brought about much more interstate cooperation than conflict. He analysed crises among riparian states between 1918 and 1994 and identified only a few cases where water issues contributed to the dispute.

The strength of Allan’s opinion is supported by the Israeli-Palestinian case, which has transformed from conflict formation over fresh water resources to conflict management with a decade of conflict resolution efforts in between. During the peace process, water management was considered as one of the key issues that facilitated conflict resolution in other areas. This
chapter views Israeli and Palestinian environmental NGOs' cooperation over shared water resources as means of desecuritisation that will contribute to a fully-fledged desecuritisation process in the long run.

The first section provides a review of points of conflict over fresh water that have arisen between Israelis and Palestinians after the establishment of the State of Israel. The second section discusses the place of water as part of the peace-making and peace-building processes in the Israeli-Palestinian context. The final section is an analysis of water management as a means of desecuritisation. In this connection, three joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs concerned with water management projects, IPCRI, Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME) and the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies along with one Palestinian NGO in collaboration with Israelis in water management, the Water and Environmental Development Organisation, were taken into consideration for the analysis. Data was gathered from websites and printed material provided by these NGOs as well as the project reports that they produced. In addition, three semi-structured interviews were conducted with Gershon Baskin, Co-Director of IPCRI; Robin Twite, Programme Coordinator of IPCRI Water and Environment Programs and Nader al Khateeb, Regional Coordinator of FoEME (Bethlehem) and General Director of the Water and Environmental Development Organisation. The interviews provided background information about the water issues in the Israeli-Palestinian context and gave insights into water cooperation as it affects water resources shared by Israelis and Palestinians.

5.1 Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Context: From Conflict Formation to Conflict Management

Israel is considered as a water stressed country according to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) standards, which define water stress as existing where average per capita consumption is less than 500m³. A rising birth rate, 17.71 births/1,000 population in 2007 according to CIA estimates (The World Factbook 2007), and immigration have led to population growth and an increase in the demand for drinking water. The concentration of settlements, the rising standard of living of Israeli society and economic activities have resulted in growing demand for water.

Israeli water problems are not limited to considerations of scarcity. Lonergan and Brooks regard them as being the result of three interrelated and interacting crises. The first is the
water supply and demand crisis while the second involves the deterioration in water quality. The third issue is about the geopolitical dimension of the water problem due to the fact that around one-third of the water consumed in Israel comes from the West Bank. The dependence of both Israelis and Palestinians on the same water has led to a zero-sum game (Lonergan and Brooks 1994:8).

During the initial stages of the Zionist movement, territorial aspirations were guided by economic criteria. Thus, a secure supply of fresh water was among the priorities of early Zionists. Even before the creation of the State of Israel, the Zionist movement made the quest for water a priority. It was argued that without sufficient water supplies, the dream of returning to the Jewish homeland could not be fulfilled. This concern was specifically expressed at the World Zionist Organisation's Paris Peace Conference in 1919: “The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid country depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to conserve and control them [sic] at their sources” (quoted in Lowi 1995:40).

The quest for the development and acquisition of water resources continued to play an important role in the definition of national policy after independence. For instance, Levi Eshkol, the third Prime Minister of the State of Israel, referred to water as “the blood flowing through the arteries of the nation” (Eshkol in Rouyer 2000:80). Since agriculture was considered vital in the early stages of Israeli statehood, irrigation and cultivation of the Negev Desert was an ideological and economic priority for successive Israeli governments. As a consequence, the agricultural sector had the lion's share of total Israeli water demand compared with domestic and industrial uses (Rouyer 2000).

The Israeli public has always been aware of its vulnerability to water shortages. Both of Israel’s main political parties, Labour and Likud, use water for propaganda purposes. Water has even been used as a pretext for Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Raphael Eitan, Minister of Agriculture between 1988 and 1991, ran a full-page advertisement in the Jerusalem Post in the late 1980s arguing that Israel had no choice but to maintain occupation of the West Bank to secure its access to water:

This intense interdependence and the scarcity of water supplies accentuate even more the severity of the problem of authority…It is important to realise that the
claim to continued Israeli control over Judea and Samaria is not based on extremist fanaticism or religious mysticism but on a rational, healthy, and reasonable survival instinct (Reproduced in Wolf 1995, 233-234).

Water is regarded as strategic and important foreign policy concern by Israeli governments since water is viewed important to state security. It is argued that water is ideologically important to Israeli state and society (see Galnoor 1980 and Rouyer 2000). The importance of water for Israel is also seen as a product of the specific pattern of Israeli state formation. Selby argues that the contention between Israel and the Palestinians can be explained with certain historically emergent features of the Israeli politics and political economy. Within this context Selby discusses the rise and fall of agricultural activity parallel to changing dynamics of Israeli political economy which has been influential in dynamic of Israeli water policies (Selby 2003a and 2005).

As far as Palestine is concerned, it is by far the most water-stressed of the co-riparians to the Jordan River. As we can see in Map 4, most of the water resources in the Palestinian Territories come from the three water aquifers in the West Bank and the coastal aquifer in the Gaza Strip. Generally, Israel’s policies to control the West Bank’s water resources are seen as the main reason for the gap between water supply and water demand in Palestinian territories (Abu-Eid 2007:297).
Map 5.1 Major Water Resources in Israel

Mountain and Coastal Aquifers

Legend
- Lake & Sea
- International Boundary
- Armistice Demarcation Line
- Boundary of former
  Palestine Mandate
- River
- Main City
- Ground Water Flow
- Ground Water Divide
- Area of Aquifer

The map was downloaded from http://mapsomething.com/demo/waterusage/hydrology.php
Prior to the Interim Agreement, Palestinians claimed that the flow of the western and eastern sectors of the mountain aquifer derived from rainfall over the West Bank. Consequently it was argued that it is Palestinian water and should be allocated for their use (Shuval 2000:40). Furthermore, Palestinians also had concerns regarding the growing demands of the agricultural lobby in Israel for more and more water, which resulted in the depletion of the Palestinian share (Shuval 2000). Both Israelis and the Palestinians have supported their claims by referring to the principles of the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention. The Palestinians have claimed that water flows from the West Bank that end in the mountain aquifer should be allocated for their use. The Palestinian argument is based on the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty and the social and economic needs of the Palestinian people, which they argue are more acute than the Israelis’. The argument behind this claim is not just the high level of inequity in per capita water consumption but also the nature of economic developments (Rouyer 2000). By contrast, based on the prior use principle, Israel has insisted on its historic use of the water from the mountain aquifer.

Israel’s dependency on water supplies that originate in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has been a source of internal and international criticism. Elmusa (1993) has argued that about half of the issues raised over Israeli-Palestinian water use derive from the problems of occupation. However, two developments changed the course of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts over water relations. First of all, during the 1990s in Israel the primacy of agriculture and agricultural independence policy gradually lost its relevance. Secondly, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders were engaged in the peace process. Water was one of the five issues being treated in separate multilateral peace negotiations that paralleled the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (Elmusa 1993).

In his seminal book Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace (1994), Daniel Hillel pointed out the catalytic role that water can play in reconciliation and cooperation in the Middle East:

[...] water in nature can be either a bearer of life or an agent of death, so in a desperately thirsty region the issue of water can either bring the parties together or set them apart ... The hydrological imperative thus presents a challenge and an opportunity. Water can catalyse and lubricate the peace process, smooth the edges and soften the transition to regional cooperation ... (1994:283, 287)
In the Israeli-Palestinian case, achieving long-term cooperation in transboundary water management has become imperative for the benefit of all riparian states. However, it has been subordinated to higher political factors. As an earlier example, the US-mediated efforts during the 1950s to construct a water regime in the Jordan basin can be given. The US government proposed the Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley. According to the Eisenhower administration, cooperation in sharing and managing water resources could inspire a political settlement (Lowi 1995b). Within this context, in 1953 the United Nation Relief and Works Administration (UNRWA) commissioned a report for a basin-wide project which was named after the US envoy, Eric Johnston, who was sent to the region to mediate a settlement over the Basin allocations (Jagerskog 2003). The plan was objected to both by the Arab states and the Israelis, thus they prepared their own alternative plans. The only positive outcome of the plan was the informal but regular meetings between technical experts from Jordan, Israel and the West Bank. These informal meetings were called ‘Picnic Table Talks’ and constituted the basis for the Oslo accords between Israel and Jordan as well as between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Elhance 1999). As stated by Lowi, the US attempts to promote cooperation over water during the 1950s and 1970s had failed since they did not address the high politics: “States that are adversaries in the ‘high politics’ of war and diplomacy do not allow extensive collaboration in the sphere of ‘low politics’ centred around economic and welfare issues” (Lowi 1995:196).

The water allocation issue has been considered to be extremely important for Palestinians because a future Palestinian State cannot be viable without a reliable and secure source of water. Control of water was thus central to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the Oslo Process. At the beginning of the bilateral negotiations, Israel refused to discuss Palestinian water rights, preferring instead to discuss cooperation on future water needs. On the other hand, during the negotiations, the Palestinians stated that the restrictions on well-drilling and imposition of quotas were a reflection of Israel’s denial of the principle of reasonable and equitable shares. Furthermore, the Palestinians accused Israel of causing significant harm by over-pumping the mountain aquifer and drilling deep wells for Jewish settlements (Rouyer 2000).

In spite of these initial disagreements, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority signed the Interim Agreement on 28 September 1995. Topics related to water and waste water were
addressed by Annex III (The Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs) and Appendix I, Article 40, entitled Water and Sewage. The agreement entailed recognition by Israel of the existence of Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. Under the Interim Agreement, Israel agreed to provide an additional 28.6 mcm of water a year to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to the establishment of a Joint Water Committee (JWC) to coordinate management of water and waste water in the West Bank during the interim period.

As stated in Article 40 of the Interim Agreement, a JWC was established with the aim of implementing the undertakings of the parties. The Committee was to be composed of an equal number of participants from each side and to reach decisions through consensus. Due to the fact that the JWC is not an independent, non-governmental committee, water remains a feature of high politics between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

After the establishment of the JWC, Palestinians have continued to criticise the Israeli occupation regarding water shortages in Palestinian territories (Trottier 1999). Despite the Palestinian water authorities' insistence on the Palestinian water rights issue, they have not rejected the necessity of joint efforts. As expressed by Marwan Haddad, one of the leading Palestinian water experts, a joint Palestinian Israeli water utility operating and serving both peoples along this line has been considered to be a the most feasible option for resolving the water conflict (Haddad 2005).

As far as the implementation of the Interim Agreement is concerned, from the very beginning there have been delays in decisions. Palestinians have attributed these problems to Israeli unwillingness, whereas Israelis have insisted that they have hydrological reasons for turning down Palestinian proposals (Jagerskog 2006). Even though various problems have hampered the implementation of the agreement, both Israelis and Palestinians have acknowledged the importance of the continuation of the work of the JWC. After the outbreak of the second Intifada, in 2001 a joint Israeli-Palestinian call to protect water supplies was concluded at a meeting of the JWC, which aimed at keeping the water infrastructure out of the cycle of violence. The document declared that:

The two sides wish to bring to public attention that the Palestinian and Israeli water and wastewater infrastructure is mostly intertwined and serves both populations. . . . We call on the general public not to damage in any way the
water infrastructure, including pipelines, pumping stations, drilling equipment, electricity systems, and any other related infrastructure (Joint Israel–Palestinian Call to Protect Water Supply, 2001).

After the declaration the JWC has continued to meet, yet irregularly. With the failure of the peace process, both sides wanted to avoid the destructive effects of the resumption of violence on shared water resources thus they ensured that they were jointly managed. Through official and non-official means both sides attempted to prevent/control violence regarding water resources by adopting a certain degree of coordination and cooperation (Bar-Siman-Tov 2007:11).

There are, however, contrasting views regarding the success of the JWC. The Interim Agreement and the establishment of the JWC are seen by some water experts as a turning point by which responsibility for the water sector was given to the Palestinian Authority (see Jagerskog 2003, Rouyer 2000, Shapland 1997). According to Rouyer, for example, the Interim Agreement contained the first explicit and unequivocal recognition of Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. In addition, it stimulated a formal system for the coordinated management of the West Bank’s water resources, supplies and systems and established teams for supervising and monitoring the joint water-management system (Rouyer 2000). On the other hand, scholars like Mark Zeitoun and Jan Selby view the development of cooperative mechanisms for managing the West Bank’s water resources as a reflection of asymmetric power relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Zeitoun and his colleagues who have participated in the Hydro-Hegemony Workshops argue that the signing of the agreement does not reflect a reciprocity. Rather, it was inevitable due to the great power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Zeitoun 2008a). Zeitoun argues that power asymmetries have caused the weaker side of the conflict, in this case the Palestinians, to lose out to the strong. According to Zeitoun, the advantageous position achieved by Israel through its access to power has resulted in its securitisation of access to water resources even without resorting to violent conflict to achieve its goals (Zeitoun 2008b).

Similarly, Selby argues that the patron-client relations between Israel and Palestinians during the pre-Oslo period were repackaged and represented as instances of Israeli-Palestinian
cooperation during the Oslo period. (Selby 2003a, 2003b, 2006). Selby argues that the water regime established under Oslo is a recipe for 'joint mismanagement' of the water sector (Selby 2006). For example, Selby criticised the JWC system as the formalisation of a "discriminatory management regime that was, for the most part, already in existence" (Selby 2006:325). According to Selby, the Oslo water regime did not change either the water structure or the distribution and monitoring system which had been constructed during the course of the occupation. In other words, the water regime of the Oslo agreements just formalised the existing supply management system, hence it was not 'joint' and 'coordinated' as presented. The Oslo agreement enabled Israel to transfer the burden for improving Palestinian water supplies from the Israeli water agency, Mekorot, to the Palestinian Authority (Selby 2006). Furthermore, the establishment of the JWC, Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs) and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) means "extra layers of bureaucracy which had few powers, and which ... served to symbolise and dissimulate Palestinian authority." In this regard, Selby sees the water regime established during the Oslo Process as "[dressing] up domination as cooperation" (Selby 2003b).

Interviewees also expressed contrasting views regarding the JWC. According to Robin Twite, coordinator of the IPCRI Water and Environmental Programme, the JWC is the first political mechanism between Israelis and Palestinians and it was affected less by the outbreak of the Intifada than by the formation of the Hamas government in 2006 (Twite 2007). By contrast, Nader al-Khateeb, General Director of the Water and Environmental Development Organisation, defines the JWC as a political committee not a technical one, and thus a body not functioning as intended (Khateeb 2007). As stated by Khateeb, particularly within the Israeli-controlled West Bank, Palestinians' well-drilling proposals were turned down while almost all of the proposals from the Israeli side were approved. Khateeb (2007) underlined that the constraints set by the JWC on Palestinian development projects, including the construction of new water supply systems in the West Bank, leave Palestinians with an old infrastructure and cause significant disruptions to water supplies.

5.2 Water Management as Part of Israeli-Palestinian Peace-building

Of all the issues in the Israeli-Palestinian context, access to fresh water has been one of the most visible since water is considered an issue of vital importance to both sides. Therefore,
water was seen as an issue in negotiations that has the potential for resolution. It has also provided opportunities for peoples from both sides of the conflict to work together.

Even before the signing of the Interim Agreement and the establishment of the JWC, Israeli and Palestinian environmental experts were well aware of water-related problems. Within this context, the IPCRI initiated a meeting called Our Shared Environment in December 1994. This conference was particularly important since it was the first time that Israeli and Palestinian civil society and water experts from governmental level had met in an informal context to discuss their mutual concerns. During the conference, both Israeli and Palestinian delegates pointed out the need for cooperation on water management and linked environmentalism to the structural peace-building process (1994:1-2). Referring to the importance of sustainable water systems, Yoram Avnimelech from Haifa University Faculty of Agricultural Engineering pointed out the necessity for Israelis and Palestinians to work together by saying that “...this problem of water quality knows no borders. Israelis and Palestinians share the same watersheds and aquifers and have to deal with this together” (1994:29). As an example of Palestinian views, Karen Assaf from the PNA Ministry of Planning underlined the importance of overcoming the lack of trust between the two sides when dealing with water-related problems by saying that “there is a problem of conflicting entities and the attitude over the years that either we use it (water) or lose it. In essence, as Palestinians and Israelis, we have to get over this lack of trust and begin to coordinate and work positively” (1994:57).

In general, civil society can play a key role in transboundary water management. The Transboundary Water Management Report from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001) underlines the roles of civil society in water management as follows:

- The initiation of civil diplomacy between neighbouring groups; moving towards dialogue through networks of civil society groups,
- The development of networks to feed into policy development and data collection,
- Capacity building, independent monitoring of process; assistance in feedback of ideas and impacts from local communities,
- Implementation and co-funding, provision of technical expertise in development management works including social and environmental impact analysis (2001:66).
The report goes on to underline the strengths of various lobbies that have affected particular politicians and parties and have had major repercussions for water use (2001:xii). As far as civil society is concerned, it was after the initiation of the Oslo Process that Israeli-Palestinian environmental NGOs developed and performed the duties outlined in the above-mentioned report. Particularly in Israel, civil society has been an integral and powerful part of the political scene and has had a considerable impact on water management policy.

Even though civil society is supposed to supplement governmental work in the water management area, particularly after the collapse of peace process, civil society has taken the initiative in project development and implementation in the water sector (Twite 2007). Water departments of Israeli and Palestinian universities and NGOs, for example the IPCRI, FoEME, and the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, have cooperated in the Israeli-Palestinian water sector.

During the early 1990s, Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in the environmental field in general and water management in particular was viewed as a means to support the peace-making efforts. Hence, parallel to the bilateral and multilateral peace-making efforts during the Oslo peace process, numerous joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs were created to deal with environmental issues, including water-related problems. These NGOs became complementary to the peace-making efforts during the peace process by supporting policy development in the water management area, offering technical expertise, developing capacity-building and implementing transboundary water projects.

Most of the joint Israeli-Palestinian environmental NGOs are funded from the Israeli side or from international partners such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the EU and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), although all of them claim to be equally Israeli and Palestinian in their orientation and focus. All of them conduct their work primarily in English and all have faced crises associated with the Intifada. In spite of the violence that erupted in 2000, most of the joint Israeli and Palestinian environmental NGOs survive and continue to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian transboundary water management. These projects have faced several challenges and obstacles after the collapse of the peace process in 2000, such as restrictions on movement, social legitimacy and funding.
Despite these challenges, in October 2004 a second Israeli-Palestinian International Conference on Water for Life was held. Editors of the conference proceedings, Hasan Dwiek from Al-Quds University and Hillel Shuval from the Hebrew University, opened the conference with the following call:

[... ] resolving the water issues through a much needed and much wanted long-term peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is far from encouraging ... through this Conference the delegates have participated in the process of promoting peace through dialog among scientist in what is called "second track diplomacy" (2006:7-8).

As stated by Michael Zwirn (2001), the success of joint environmental NGOs depends on the creation of lasting institutional and personal ties between Israeli and Palestinian partners, such as those created in the above-mentioned conferences. These networks have maintained and withstood the security and political crises that erupt every so often between Israelis and Palestinians. Among all the conflicting issues, fresh water has linked Israelis and Palestinians both at the governmental and societal levels. In the next section these cooperation and coexistence activities will be analysed by reference to the notion of desecuritisation.

5.3 Water Management as a Means of Desecuritisation in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

As was discussed in Chapter 1, securitised issues can be managed or transformed through desecuritisation. Desecuritisation refers to a process through which violence ceases to be a legitimate option regarding a previously securitised issue.

Waever views desecuritisation as the best option when it comes to particular issues such as environmental threats (1995:57). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, a joint recognition of the futility of zero-sum thinking regarding water resources led to the transformation from conflict formation to conflict resolution during the 1990s and transboundary water management between Israel and the Palestinian Authority became part of both peace-making and peace-building processes. With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, the peace process collapsed but civil-society-level cooperation and official-level-coordination over water-related issues continued. In the absence of political will for conflict resolution, on their
own, Israeli and Palestinian environmental NGOs' structural peace-building efforts have not succeeded in desecuritising the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. However, their efforts have led improvement in their relations concerning the water sector.

The ultimate goal of desecuritisation is the achievement of a situation in which the issue in question is no longer seen as threatening, and thus is no longer defined in security terms. Several different factors can encourage desecuritising moves. In the Israeli-Palestinian water management case, a number of internal and external factors affected the development of an environment conducive to cooperation. First, following the drought of 1990-91, a major shift in Israeli water policy occurred and water re-emerged in the public agenda. After the drought, Israeli water experts underlined the importance of, and to the threats to, water quality. This shift towards the importance of water quality has constituted the basis for the many calls by professionals for joint management of the shared aquifers (Feitelson 1996, Rouyer 2000). The second was reconciliatory atmosphere of the peace process which changed Israeli views regarding the Palestinians' water rights. Within this context, the notion that all people have a right to a basic minimal water allocation for domestic use gained popularity among the Israeli public and consequently a human rights perspective has been added to the Israeli-Palestinian water relations (Shuval 1992, Rouyer 2000). As Feitelson found out, despite the disparate perceptions of the water issues within Israel, a dominant view emerged during the 1990s in favour of cooperation with the Palestinians (2002:315). The widespread acceptance of this discourse was seen in the statements made by Israeli officials even during the Netanyahu administration and it was admitted that Palestinian domestic water use has a priority over Israeli agricultural water use.21 When the conflicting sides showed signs of readiness to cooperate this reflected in governmental level policies by the establishment of a management structure between Israel and Palestinian Authority, including the JWC, JSETs and PWA with the Interim Agreement in 1995.

As was discussed in Chapter 1, changing negative perceptions and initiating a desecuritisation process is not easy. In most cases, realisation of common interests eventually facilitates a degree of working trust. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, interdependencies regarding the water resources have served as a catalyst to finding a formula on which the parties can agree, which could alter their hostile perceptions and mutual fears and hence contribute to the

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21 For the quotations from various interviews and newspaper reviews see Rouyer (2000: 195, 207 and 242).
desecuritisation of their mutual relationship. Gradually, competing claims and accusations regarding the access and control of water have been replaced by securitisation of conflict as a threat to shared water resources by Israeli and Palestinian water experts and environmental NGOs. From this perspective, the issue is seen as more than a zero-sum game but rather a situation where both Israelis and Palestinians stand to lose if they do not carefully manage the aquifers they share. As a reflection of this shift in the Israeli-Palestinian water context in favour of cooperation over shared water resources, several Israeli-Palestinian environmental NGOs were established to institutionalise cooperation between the two sides. Since then, water experts and civil society from both sides have been working together. Currently, there are several bi-national and/or regional environmental NGOs dealing with transboundary water management (Table 5.1) and several Palestinian agencies collaborating with Israelis on water projects (Table 5.2).
Table 5.1 Joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs with Water Management Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the organisation</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Israel Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI)(^\text{22})</td>
<td>IPCRI was founded in 1988 and the IPCRI Water and Environment programme was founded in 1992.</td>
<td>IPCRI's activities are at the policy and training level with the goal of developing capacity in a range of management issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Earth Middle East (FoEME)(^\text{23})</td>
<td>FoEME was founded in 1994 as an umbrella organisation, representing a number of environmental NGOs in Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and Israel.</td>
<td>Education about protection of water resources in the Middle East, lobbying about water quality protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arava Institute for Environmental Studies(^\text{24})</td>
<td>Arava was founded in 1996.</td>
<td>Arava is not a typical Israeli-Palestinian joint organisation since its key role is to educate Palestinian environmentalists.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 Palestinian NGOs in Collaboration with Israelis in Water Management\(^\text{25}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the organisation</th>
<th>Main areas of interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soil, Water and Environment Institute</td>
<td>Water, wastewater and soil analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Environmental Studies Centre</td>
<td>Applied research in the fields of water, wastewater and soil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Environmental Development Organisation</td>
<td>Research and studies in the environmental field, consultancy, training and education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an example of the work of these bodies, FoEME launched the Good Water Neighbours Project in 2001, despite the outbreak of the second Intifada. This project aimed “to foster

\(^{22}\) IPCRI, About the Environmental Programme, [http://www.ipcri.org/projects and programs//Environmental Programs](http://www.ipcri.org/projects and programs//Environmental Programs)

\(^{23}\) FOEME, Friends of Earth Middle East, [http://www.foeme.org/](http://www.foeme.org/)

\(^{24}\) Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, [http://www.arava.org/](http://www.arava.org/)

information-sharing, dialogue and cooperation among communities regarding water and environmental issues... An essential component of the project is to advance the peace dividend – the peace building potential created through the trust developed by community partnerships and cooperative ventures" (FoEME 2005:6). Good Water Neighbours invested in peace-building at the community level to create the necessary foundations for a long-lasting peace. It is argued that “while at a national level a conflict can prevent progress in problem-solving, at the community level there can remain a willingness to cooperate. This is often the case concerning water supply and pollution problems” (FoEME 2005:38). Within this context, five Israeli, five Palestinian and one Jordanian community have participated in Phase I of the project (2001-2005). Six additional communities have been included in Phase II (2005 – present). As was stated in its project report, FoEME encouraged the participation of Palestinians as well as Israelis and Jordanians to promote cooperation between conflicting sides but avoided the use of words like ‘antagonists’, ‘foes’ etc.: In a conflict area, it is important to have staff members that are representative of the different peoples involved in conflict.

Through a carefully planned and implemented program, individuals can be encouraged to lead their communities, take actions that will improve livelihoods and deal with the urgent needs of their community through working with the ‘other’ side. Water issues are an excellent bridge to promote cooperation between neighbouring communities (FoEME 2005:37-8).

Through Good Water Neighbours project FoEME also managed to bring Israeli and Palestinian local authorities together to cooperate over shared water resources. Within the context of the FoEME’s Good Water Neighbours project the Mayors of the Palestinian town of Baka el Sharkia and the Israeli city of Baka el Gharbia-Jat signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 19 July 2007. The mayors agreed to strengthen cooperation between their municipalities in order to preserve the natural heritage in the region in respect to environment and water concerns. With this memorandum the Mayors declared their commitment to the protection of the Mountain Aquifer, their agreement to connect their sewage networks to the new treatment plant in Baka el Gharbia-Jat and the importance of cleaning up Wadi Abu Nar, a stream that flows through both municipalities. The Mayors recognised the necessity of allocating resources and funding for joint projects between the two towns, to increase
exchange visits between officials of the two towns. The social and geographical connections that tie both municipalities necessitate increased cooperation for the benefit of the region. The agreement between the mayors is significant since most of the towns in the West Bank lack waste water treatment plant. Due to the geographic proximity of these two communities and their use of the Mountain Aquifer’s waters, both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have a clear interest in promoting solutions like this for waste water as well as solid waste in the West Bank.

Besides FoEME, IPCRI’s Water and Environment Programme almost exclusively focuses on the role of water in peace-building. As stated in IPCRI’s web site the Environment and Water Programme of IPCRI is working to promote effective cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians in the field of environment with a special emphasis on water issues. Compared to FoEME, IPCRI operates at the institutional rather than the implementation level, with participants from environmental NGOs, business leaders and ministries from both sides. Besides its participation in regional water management projects such as the Glowa Jordan River Project and the OPTIMA (Optimisation of Sustainable Water Management) Project, IPCRI is serving to create lasting institutional and personal ties between Israeli and Palestinian water experts and activists through organising regular conferences and workshops. Given the restrictions on movement to/from areas under the Palestinian Authority’s control, these conferences and workshops seem to be unique platforms for face-to-face meetings between Israelis and Palestinians dealing with water management. As was declared in the Joint Statement of the Participants of IPCRI’s Conference on Water for Life, held in October 2004, both Israeli and Palestinian participants continue to work together to deal with the acute water problems of the region.

[…] the Palestinian and Israeli participants, along with their international partners remain committed to solving the many challenges associated with water quantity and quality in our region ... Human activities caused most of our water problems and [we] can solve them. But this will require coordination and cooperation (Twite 2006: 19).

Gershon Baskin, Israeli co-director of the IPCRI, pointed out that a number of Israeli-Palestinian joint projects were initiated following the conference. In this sense, the conference was extremely successful in terms of the continuation of work in the transboundary water
management area. Baskin stated that, even if the conflict goes on, civil society continues cooperating, as was the case during the Hamas government’s administration. He gave the example of Israeli army personals’ dialogue with Palestinian municipalities regarding water-related emergencies despite the temporary freeze in official Israeli dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, including the work of JWC. (Baskin 2007).

The Arava Institute for Environmental Studies’ academic programs also provide a platform for Palestinian and Israeli networks on environmental issues in general and water management in particular. The Arava Institute organises environmental teaching and research programme in the Middle East, preparing future Arab and Jewish leaders to cooperate on environmental issues. Since the participants in Arava programs spend longer times together—a minimum of a semester and a maximum of two years—Israeli and Palestinian participants develop longer-term relationships.

On the Palestinian side, a number of Palestinian NGOs have been collaborating with their Israeli counterparts in water management either being the Palestinian partner of joint Israeli-Palestinian projects or providing consultancy for Israeli environmental NGOs. As al-Khateeb has put it, Palestinian civil society works with Israeli civil society based on equality and mutual respect: “Both Israeli and Palestinians have common interests, particularly when it comes to water issues. It is a win-win case otherwise it would be lose-lose” (al-Khateeb 2007). However, he goes on to point out that, despite the good work done by NGOs from both sides in the water sector, “civil society cannot substitute [for] governments. NGOs can work for awareness, for education but [are] not able to develop infrastructure, which is the most needed thing for Palestinians” (al-Khateeb 2007). As Twite has pointed out, besides financial and logistical problems that obstruct joint water management efforts, there is still the problem of distrust between Israeli and Palestinian political elites. According to Twite, in the water sector one can know all the facts about water but the problem is one of attitude and mind: getting people to change their opinions, and think more creatively. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, since governments of Palestinians and Israelis do not have the same mentality, neither side has considered the needs of the other (Twite 2007). Both al-Khateeb and Twite underlined that the uncompromising positions of Israeli and Palestinian governments do not serve the good of both peoples. For a more efficient water management, Israeli and Palestinian governments have to think differently and develop an understanding of their mutual water needs.
In order to attract Israeli and Palestinian authorities' attention, Israeli and Palestinian civil societies have prepared reports on water as a human right and pressurised the respective authorities. To illustrate the necessity for governmental-level cooperation in the water sector, in its Environmental Newsletter, IPCRI draws attention to Palestinians and Israelis who do not have access to piped water:

It is a miserable comment on the situation in the region that so many people living there go without clean, drinkable water. Resolution is in the interests of both Israel and Palestine, and most of all in the interest of those who struggle each day to find clean water to drink (IPCRI 2007).

Palestinian sources claim that these problems are exacerbated by the negative attitude of the Israeli authorities dealing with water while Israeli experts claim that the various Palestinian authorities hinder positive action by their inefficiency. In the same newsletter, IPCRI calls for cooperation and coordination of Water Authorities on both sides. In their call, Israeli and Palestinian NGOs underlined the necessity for the Israeli and Palestinian water authorities to take the lead to end “unnecessary suffering to thousands of people who are deprived of their basic human right to drinkable water” (IPCRI 2007).

As discussed in Chapter 1, two stages of desecuritisation are identified by Andrea Oelsner, the first stage involves a positive change in relations between conflicting sides. These initial changes, if developed in a positive manner, will eventually allow a redefinition of the relationship. Given the cooperation and coexistence work, those environmental NGOs and water management experts have already become an indispensable part of structural peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians. However, with the lack of a genuine political will to initiate a peace-making process, one cannot talk about a fully-fledged desecuritisation process. The Israeli-Palestinian situation in general and the Israeli-Palestinian water sector in particular remains one of conflict management. Particularly in the water sector, both sides have succeeded in managing securitised issues and kept water out of the ongoing conflict. In this regard, Israeli and Palestinian civil society efforts illustrate the potential for desecuritisation between Israelis and Palestinians in the long run.
5.4 Water Management as a Means of Desecuritisation and the Prospects and Problems in Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation

This chapter has analysed Israeli-Palestinian water management programmes and both sides’ attempts to re-evaluate and re-define their relations. It has been argued that, parallel to the ongoing securitisation processes, the continuous peace-building efforts of Israeli and Palestinian environmental NGOs and water experts have appeared as one of the main areas of cooperation that has considerable potential for triggering a desecuritisation process.

As far as the assessment of the extent and quality of the cooperation over transboundary water resources is concerned, varying degrees of cooperation are identified by Sadoff and Grey (2005 cited in Zeitoun 2008a). They suggest an incremental model from unilateral action to coordination, collaboration and to joint action. Similarly, the UNDP 2006 Human Development Report identifies the range of cooperation from coordination (such as sharing information), collaboration (developing adaptable national plans) and joint action (which includes joint ownership of infrastructure assets) (UNDP 2006:224). The reaching of an international agreement or establishment of an international regime is generally seen as cooperation. But when the components of the agreement are not implemented properly, or favour one side at the expense of a collective win, the agreement result in poor cooperation as experienced in the implementation of the Interim Agreement. In this regard, it is important to move beyond the assessment of conflict resolution in water sector as treaties to a more dynamic view of transboundary water cooperation as a non-linear process in which state and non-state actors establish, challenge, modify and legitimize multi-layered governance structures (Kistin 2007 cited in Zeitoun 2008a). A similar view was expressed in the 2006 UNDP Human Development Report:

Cooperation [over transboundary waters] need not always be deep – in the sense of agreeing to share all resources and engaging in all types of cooperative ventures – for states to derive benefits from rivers and lakes. Indeed, given the different strategic, political and economic contexts in international basins, it makes sense to promote and support cooperation of any sort, no matter how slight (UNDP 2006: 228).
Given the deeper and broader view of conflict resolution in transboundary waters, the work of FOEME and other Israeli and Palestinian civil society efforts are acknowledged by the United Nations as a positive achievement. Referring to the FOEME's Good Water Neighbours project the UNDP report states that:

A variety of cooperative programmes have been set up in Jordan, Palestine and Israel to promote exchange of information and ideas between different communities in the region. These programmes have also furthered the campaign to protect the Jordan River, which brings stakeholders from the entire region together to work on sustaining the flow of this important river (UN 2006: 380).

The Israeli and Palestinian civil societies' campaign for the protection of the Jordan River through unprecedented transboundary cooperation and the actual cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli civil societies played a considerable role in structural peace-building. According to the first criterion of the CDA's Reflecting on Peace Practice, which helps to assess the effectiveness of peace-building efforts, it is considered as effective if people undertake independent initiatives, working in creative ways within their own communities to cross lines of divisions or to influence outside constituencies. These efforts should continue in the face of difficulty, threats, or other overt pressure. This criterion focuses on the shift made by people who are caught in conflict from being supporters, bystanders or victims of conflict to being actors and activists undertaking personal efforts to bring about peace (Anderson and Olson 2003:16). The Israeli-Palestinian water projects explored in this chapter in general, and FOEME's Good Neighbour Project in particular, are considered as successful examples regarding this criterion. Given the political considerations that hinder the effectiveness of the JWC in the water sector, Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors resumed responsibility for the development and implementation of projects to improve the quality and quantity of shared water resources. Particularly, FOEME's Good Water Neighbours project has succeeded in bringing 11 Israeli and Palestinian communities, as well as water experts, together for a common solution to water-related problems. The installation of rain water harvesting systems in school and municipal buildings of the communities which participated in the Good Water Neighbours project, the cooperation between Tulkarem in the West Bank and Emek Hefer in Israel to collect the olive mill waste with a truck and take it to Israel for treatment in order to prevent the dumping of olive mill wastes into the Alexander River which flows through Emek Hefer to the Mediterranean Sea, and Israeli environmental activists' cooperation with
residents of the Palestinian village of Umm al-Reihan in the northern West Bank on the green basin project to purify the sewage water in the village (Haaretz 2008) are a few examples to illustrate Israeli-Palestinian joint activities to improve the quality and quantity of their shared waters. Besides these technical initiatives, activities exist to raise awareness among Israelis and Palestinians. IPCRI’s regular conferences and workshops and FOEME’s workshops bring together Israeli and Palestinian youngsters from the communities involved in the Good Neighbours Project in order to overcome language, cultural and political issues and establish a basis for working together. These are examples of civil society initiatives in the water sector that encourage community involvement in peace-building activities. The most important fact of all is that these programmes have continued to be designed and implemented, even in the face of severe challenges and ongoing conflict.

The second criterion for an effective peace-building activity is if it develops or supports institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities and injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Such grievances may include inequity in the administration of justice and social benefits, or observance of people’s basic rights. Peace-building activities can focus on political institutions and address weaknesses or the lack of structures to manage conflicts non-violently. With regard to this criterion, the scorecard of Israeli-Palestinian NGOs has mixed results. In the water sector, at the political level both sides have succeeded in managing securitised issues and kept water out of ongoing conflicts. Through the establishment of institutions to deal with water-sharing issues between Israelis and Palestinians, a conflict management mechanism has been constructed. However, the governmental level efforts to keep water out of violence and conflict have hindered the development of conflict resolution efforts. Despite the failure of the peace process and the problematic nature of the JWC system, Palestinian and Israeli water experts have continued to work together to improve the quality and quantity of shared water resources. Based on the belief that they have common interests in the water sector, they have attempted to turn water management from a zero-sum game into a win-win case. This joint effort has contributed to a re-evaluation and re-definition of relations between the two sides. In the absence of governmental level support, Israeli and Palestinian environmental NGOs and water experts have developed systems and infrastructure to address the water-related issues that negatively affect the quality of Israeli and Palestinian livelihoods. For the realisation of these projects they have effectively managed to get financial support from international development agencies. In spite of the effectiveness of the NGOs in addressing localised, relatively small-scale problems arising the mismanagement of water
resources, they are still far from addressing the macro-level structural issues in Israeli-Palestinian water management that require a restructuring of the joint water management regime, as distinct from the ongoing Israeli domination over the existing system, and the creation of a well-regulated Palestinian water sector (Selby 2003a, 2006).

The third criterion, the effectiveness in increasing people's ability to resist manipulation and provocation to violence, is not something that could be assessed for structural peace-building activities like water management. This can be achieved through programmes that increase skills for analyzing, managing, and responding to conflict, or that change values and attitudes toward the use of force, which is part of cultural peace-building activities and will be discussed in Chapter 6.

The last criterion suggests that a peace-building programme is effective if it results in concrete reductions in the threat of violence and/or changed perceptions of vulnerability. In this regard, the possible contribution of joint water management programmes might be in human sector security since the majority of programmes aim at improving water resources and waste water systems which have enhanced the quality of Israeli and Palestinian lives. This however will be seen as a long-term effect of joint water management efforts.

In summary, the civil society efforts in the water sector have not been supported politically. As the securitising actors are incapable of desecuritisation, as illustrated in the water management case, Israeli and Palestinian civil society has been acting as the main desecuritising actor. At the official level, Israeli and Palestinian water authorities have been acting in favour of conflict management, thus preferring to keep water-related issues in the context of normal politics. On the other hand, through cooperation over concerns regarding the quality and quantity of shared water resources, Israeli and Palestinian civil society organisations and water experts have attempted to contribute to the process of redefining and reinterpreting their mutual relationship. As discussed here, to some extent they have succeeded in contributing to a moderation of negative perceptions by working together over the improvement of the quality and quantity of shared water resources.

As argued by the analytical framework developed in Chapter 1, desecuritisation requires both political level and civil society level involvement and the instruments of civil society do not hold power and resources for the realisation of a fully-fledged desecuritisation. In the
Copenhagen School’s terms, the second facilitating condition, the social conditions regarding
the position of authority for the desecuritising actor (the relation between desecuritising actor
and audience), fall short. As stated by Lowi (1995), the ‘high politics’ of war and diplomacy
do not allow extensive collaboration in the sphere of ‘low politics’ as illustrated by the water
sector. But, by managing cooperation between a number of Israeli and Palestinian
communities over shared resources and by securitising the ongoing conflict and violence as
an existential threat to shared water resources, they have contributed a change in public
opinion about the necessity for desecuritisation (the third facilitating condition). Through
encouraging interaction at community level, water management programmes have also
contributed to a change in the language used to define previously securitised relations (the
first facilitating condition for desecuritisation). In other words, they proved their potential to
contribute to the desecuritisation process.
CHAPTER SIX

Peace Education as a Tool to Desecuritise the Other:
the Israeli-Palestinian Case

As argued in Chapter 4, despite ongoing securitisations and conflict, the idea of peace, cooperation and reconciliation has gradually developed in Israel and Palestine. Particularly after the Oslo Agreements, cultural peace-building activities were encouraged. Within this context, Israelis and Palestinians have started to cooperate to change societal perceptions vis-à-vis the other side in the conflict, thereby helping initiate a desecuritisation process. Reconciliation requires going beyond the traditional focus on peace-making by encouraging reconciliation between peoples. It has become evident that formal peace agreements fall far short of establishing genuine peaceful relations. In the case of formal peace agreements it is likely that the majority of the public may not accept the officially-negotiated compromises. In this regard, peace education is considered a means of changing societal perceptions vis-à-vis the other side of the conflict, thereby contributing to the success of the formal peace-making process. Here it is argued that, if peace education is successful in changing perceptions, attitudes and feelings, it will lead to a different way of relating to the other collective side of the conflict. In this way it can be instrumental in the process of desecuritisation in the long run.

The term peace and coexistence education often describes attempts to educate people to value these concepts and to learn to live in line with the ideas of peace and coexistence by acquiring corresponding beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns (Bar-Tal 2004:253). Peace education is generally practised in educational and community settings. The most practised approach to peace education is considered as the face-to-face encounter between members of groups in conflict. Bar-Tal (2004) suggests two approaches to peace/coexistence education: a narrow approach (school approach) and a broad approach (societal approach). The school approach focuses on peace education within the school system. It views school as a major agent of
socialisation and concentrates on its use to change perceptions towards the other (Bar-Tal 2002). The societal approach of peace education on the other hand does not limit itself to the school system, but envisages changing the psychological outlook of society at large (Bar-Tal 2004:264).

In the case of Israeli-Palestinian peace education, joint programmes have continued to be designed and implemented even under the worst conditions of violent conflict and continued animosity. In this chapter, selected Israeli and Palestinian peace education projects will be analysed within the context of the notion of desecuritisation and the analytical framework presented in Chapter 1. The first section presents a general review of Israeli and Palestinian peace education. This review is followed by analysis of joint Israeli-Palestinian peace education efforts as a means of desecuritisation. The impact of joint peace education efforts on the desecuritisation of ‘the other’ and the effect of ongoing securitising moves on peace education work will be discussed here. In this connection, data were gathered from the NGOs websites and printed material provided by major Israeli-Palestinian joint peace education projects. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with academics and NGO staff involved in Israeli-Palestinian peace education as well as less formal talks with some project participants and facilitators of face-to-face encounters. Interviews were instrumental in structuring the analysis and data collection by providing background information about the history of peace education in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Daniel Bar-Tal pointed out that peace education in the Israeli-Palestinian context is not something developed during the Oslo Process. Bar-Tal briefly gave background information about peace education activities in Israel that constituted particulars of current peace education programmes. The informants also drew attention to the obstacles that have hindered peace education work on the ground. For example, during the interview, most of the interviewees also talked about the challenges and problems peace education programmes have faced. Furthermore, the answers that were given by informants during the interviews and informal talks were assumed to be supportive of the analysis of websites and publicity documents since they represent the personal versions of the story.

6.1 Peace Education in the Israeli - Palestinian Context

In general, the goals of peace education in intractable conflict situations are to change attitudes, increase tolerance, reduce prejudices, weaken stereotypes and change conceptions
of self and of other (Bar-Tal 2004:262). It deals with collective narratives and deeply rooted historical memories and societal beliefs. Primarily it aims to legitimise the perspective of the other side, its collective narratives, fears and experiences. In this way peace education programmes hold the potential to generate changes in perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and consequently in behaviour towards the enemy that might lead a transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace (UN 1999).

According to Daniel Bar-Tal (2004: 258) only after cementing the phase of coexistence is it possible to transform gradually toward reconciliation. Here, education for peace and coexistence is considered as a means of desecuritisation since it refers to "the process through which society members ... acquire the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that are in line with the ideas of coexistence" (Bar-Tal 2004:261). Peace education programmes in general aim to create the conditions of optimal contact in which inter-group acceptance and understanding is promoted. Therefore, it is argued here that peace and coexistence education programmes make a positive impact on the advancement of desecuritisation processes even in situations of ongoing conflict.

In the Israeli-Palestinian context, several phases have characterised the evolution of peace education and coexistence activities. Parallel to the efforts of successive Israeli governments to integrate Palestinians into Israeli economic and social life after the 1967 Six Day War, from the 1970s to the early 1980s coexistence activities were heavily influenced by the cultural approach, which aimed at exploring the possibility of Palestinian integration into Israeli life. Both Jews and Palestinian Arabs were encouraged to participate in these activities. Cultural encounters provided Jewish participants with an opportunity to learn about Palestinian Arabs through food, folklore, dancing and other practices (Abu-Nimer 2004:409). Based on his analysis of the coexistence programmes' reports of the time and interviews with the Arab and Jewish facilitators of these programmes, Mohammed Abu-Nimer found that by the late 1970s and early 1980s, these initial coexistence encounters between Jews and Palestinian Arabs aimed at dealing with negative stereotypes and images of the other (Abu-Nimer 1999). In this phase of coexistence, until the 1990s, the primary focus was on the reduction of stereotypes and of increasing cultural understanding (Abu-Nimer 2004:409).

The Director General of the Ministry of Education published a circular in 1984 entitled Education for Coexistence between Jews and Arabs outlining the principles of the new
educational policy for coexistence in Israel (Bar-Tal 2004:262). The document referred to “relations between Jews and Arabs inside Israel as an issue of civil equality and way of life in a multicultural country and relations of Israel and its Arab neighbours as an issue of relations between nations” (in Bar-Tal 2004:262-263). The programme focused in particular on Jewish-Arab relations within the state of Israel and aimed at developing “skills of tolerance and of the ability to listen and understand the other, and treat him or her as an individual without using stereotypes” (Bar-Tal 2004-263). Yitzhak Navon, Minister of Education during the period 1984-1990, implemented this programme. In 1986, a new unit called Education for Democracy and Coexistence was established in the Ministry. During Navon’s period of office, wide-scale in-service training was organised to train teachers in education for coexistence, an attempt was made to extend Arabic language instruction in Jewish schools and encounter programmes between Jewish and Arab students of all ages were initiated. New educational programmes to advance the coexistence between Jews and Arabs were implemented in the schools (Bar-Tal 2004:263, Interview with Bar-Tal 27 January 2007). With the outbreak of the first Intifada at the end of 1987, however, the efforts began to fade and eventually disappeared from the Israeli Ministry of Education’s agenda (Bar-Tal 2007, Firer 2007).

A second wave of peace education occurred during the Oslo peace process with a particular focus on the Palestinian education system and coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. Since the early 1990s, the impact and nature of peace education programmes has generated an interest among academics, politicians and the general public. Over the last two decades, the Israeli-Palestinian field of peace education has expanded and diversified. Mostly organised and conducted by Israeli and Palestinian civil society, the bringing together of Jews and Arabs for dialogue in peace education encounters remains the primary tool for coexistence (Bar-Tal 2007 and Firer 2007).

Following the 1993 Oslo Agreement, the most comprehensive coexistence and peace education programme was initiated in Israel to change Israeli Jews’ perceptions of the Palestinian people and their legitimate representatives. When the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and signed the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in 1993. Within this context, peace became a unifying national theme for the school year 1994–1995. This trend somewhat changed during the premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu, who was less supportive
of the peace process with the Palestinians. Finally, it came to a complete halt in the Autumn of 2000 when the second Intifada began and the peace process collapsed (Bar-Tal 2004:264-265).

The outbreak of the second Intifada on October 2000 negatively affected peace-building efforts in general and peace education efforts in particular. As was stated by Ruth Firer, a pioneer of peace education programmes in Israel, "when the Palestinian youngsters and children have been involved in the uprising, at first by stoning Israelis and later by suicide terrorist bombs, Israelis felt disillusioned by the prospect of peace" (Firer 2007). Following the outbreak of the Intifada, the Israeli Ministry of Education withdrew its support for peace education programmes. The Ministry declared that it was not involved in any peace education activities with the PNA (Firer 2004). However, despite the second Intifada, peace education and coexistence activities did not stop in Israel. According to the Abraham Fund’s survey, in 2002 there were still 275 organisations involved in coexistence activities and 150,000 people engaged in structured coexistence and peace education activities.

6.2 Desecuritising the ‘Other’? Peace Education in Israel and Palestinian

As was discussed in Chapter 1, Buzan and Wæver define desecuritisation is "a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat... and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (2003: 489). The first phase of desecuritisation involves a change of direction from animosity to normalisation along with a redefinition of the relationship, which implies a complex learning process of re-evaluation of the perceptions of the other and of the self. In this regard, peace education as a means of cultural peace-building potentially contributes to the re-evaluation of perceptions. Hence, it becomes instrumental in the normalisation of relations in the first instance, and in reconciliation in the long run.

Furthermore, by initiating peace education programmes, Israeli and Palestinian peace NGOs have been acting as a desecuritising actor, therefore taking the initial steps towards desecuritisation at societal level. Hence, the Israeli-Palestinian peace education programmes offer opportunities for reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. According to Abu-Nimer (2004: 406), for Arab participants, these joint projects provide an opportunity to interact with Jews and voice their ideas and perceptions. Similarly for Jewish participants, these programmes are a chance to learn about the political perceptions and culture of
Palestinians. However, given the lack of political will among the political elite regarding desecuritisation and respective reconciliation, the civil efforts to develop a different type of relation other than antagonism have remained limited.

The limitations of persuading the whole society of the importance of coexistence can be overcome by focusing on schools. According to Bar-Tal, school is an important agent in peace education for several reasons. First, since schools are compulsory, all children and adolescents are required to attend until a certain age, hence, schools reach a whole segment of a society, namely the young generation. Second, the young generation is relatively least affected by the dominant narratives within society. Third, in comparison to other socialisation agents, society has maximum control over the messages transmitted in schools. Educational authorities such as the Ministry of Education or the Board of Education can decide on curricula, educational programmes and school textbooks. Fourth, the young generation is required to learn the messages and information transmitted in schools, therefore, it is possible to be assured that students will at least be exposed to them (Bar-Tal 2004:262). Given the value of the school system as a major agent of socialisation, the insertion of peace education into formal education can thus serve as a significant medium of desecuritisation. Consequently, the majority of peace education programmes in the Israeli-Palestinian context focus on schools and pupils.

Under the agreements following Oslo, both Israel and the PLO (later PNA) were required to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda. Within this context the initial efforts directed towards formal education formed an important part of peace education. Israeli and Palestinian curricula and textbooks were reviewed in order to detect the elements of incitement, racism and hostile propaganda. Within this context, some of the joint Palestinian and Israeli NGOs developed projects for the development of new learning materials to contribute to the advancement of reconciliation and coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.
Table 6.1 Joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs Dealing with Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education since 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Mission statement</th>
<th>Peace Education Programmes</th>
<th>Reach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Adam Institute for Democracy &amp; Peace1</td>
<td>The Adam Institute aims at breaking down stereotypes and teaching non-violent methods of conflict resolution.</td>
<td>Peace Education Programme</td>
<td>Each year, the Institute's programmes, including the Peace Education Programme reach over 16,000 Arabs and Jews, Israelis, Palestinians and international participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli Palestine Centre for Research &amp; Information (IPCR)2</td>
<td>IPCRI’s peace education department aims to implement a programme for the creation of a joint Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education Centre for the development of curricula, the training of teachers and linking academic research in peace education with the field.</td>
<td>Pathways into Reconciliation: a Peace Education Curriculum for 10th and 11th grades. Lesson Plans in Peace Education (Grades 1st-12th)</td>
<td>220 teachers, around 5,000 students from 50 high schools from Israel and 30 high schools from the West Bank participated in these projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME)3</td>
<td>To transform two hate filled single narratives into two mutually sensitive ones through developing textbooks.</td>
<td>Learning Each Other’s Historical Narratives.</td>
<td>2 of the 3 books were published in Arabic and Hebrew and 14 teachers participated in the preparation of the textbooks and started to teach these books in 9th and 10th grades. But the exact number of students who have been taught with these books is not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds for Peace Middle East Programme4</td>
<td>Seeds of Peace has focused primarily on bringing Arab and Israeli teenagers together to see the human face of their enemy. It reverses the legacy of hatred by nurturing lasting friendships that have become the basis for mutual understanding and respect.</td>
<td>Advanced Coexistence Programme. Seasonal Seminars.</td>
<td>200 Israeli and Palestinian participants are coming together for weekly meetings as part of the Advanced Coexistence Programme. Over 150 Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian youngsters involved in intensive, four-day winter seminar programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows – Channels for Communication5</td>
<td>We are Jews and Palestinians from both sides of the Green Line working together to promote acquaintance, understanding and reconciliation between both peoples through educational programmes, media and art.</td>
<td>Friendship Centres in Tel Aviv and Tul Karem. Bi-lingual Youth Magazine.</td>
<td>Approximately 40 young people from both sides participate in quarterly programmes. Each issue of Windows magazine reaches up to 40,000 children and adults.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace, About the Institute, http://www.adaminstitute.org.il/english/who_r_we.html
4 Seeds for Peace Middle East Programme, http://www.seedsforpeace.org/programs/middleeast
As an example, IPCRI, one of the leading Israeli-Palestinian NGOs involved in peace education, views the formal education system as a primary vehicle for “promoting the principles of tolerance, peace, respect for diversity, human rights and citizenship, and for promoting the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians” (IPCRI 2004a:5). Within this context, in 1997 IPCRI launched a peace education programme to penetrate the school systems of the two societies, and to turn the classroom into a vehicle for rapprochement. The basic idea was “to develop models of peace education and to train teachers and to reach a spill-over effect and have a wide-reaching impact” (IPCRI 2005:1). IPCRI’s Peace Education team developed two different curricula for Israelis and Palestinians, Pathways into Reconciliation for Israeli schools and Education for Peace for the Palestinian schools. Both curricula highlighted the necessity to include learning basic values which stand as a basis of peace and democracy, such as equality, liberty and social involvement; learning and understanding control mechanisms such as majority-minority relations and personal, gender, cultural and national control; discussing questions like what history is and whose history it is as well as learning skills of conflict transformation.

By August 2002, this programme had reached more than 60 high schools in Israel and in the West Bank and there were more than 400 teachers and 4,500 students in participating 9th and 10th grade classes (Baskin 2002). The long-term goals of the project were to develop an educational package including curricula, teacher training and encounters between Israeli and Palestinian students. It was planned that this programme would eventually be adopted and used by the Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Education. IPCRI’s Peace Education Programme succeeded in developing classroom study, conducting a number of encounter programmes, teacher training and research with the participation of Israeli and Palestinian teachers and students from participating schools. However, as a result of ongoing conflict, the Ministries of Education have not adopted the peace education programme.

As part of its holistic approach, IPCRI’s programme has included workshops and encounters as well as a curriculum development programme. As has been pointed out by Gershon Baskin, Israeli co-director of IPCRI, student encounters were one of the most important components of the programme. The aim of the student encounter was
to give an opportunity to Palestinian and Israeli youngsters to meet ‘the other’ and to challenge their own assumptions about ‘the other.’ The programme for the encounter included personal-level activities, like looking at the issue of names, family history, place of birth, influential people; culture-level activities which deal with values related to boy/girl relations, music, customs, parent/children relations and folklore as well as political-level activities that comprise a design exercise provided to illustrate the different narratives of the conflict through making multi-media posters. By the end of the encounter, the participants were able to identify both similarities and differences between them (Baskin 2007).

Through the introduction of curricular and encounter activities, IPCRI’s peace education project succeeded in changing perceptions regarding ‘the other’ among the 15 and 16 years old Israeli and Palestinian participants. According to Ifat Maoz’s study to examine the impact of IPCRI’s encounter activities, comparisons of respondents’ ratings before and after participating in the workshops reveal positive changes in their stereotypical perceptions of each other, as seen at Table 4 (2000:730). In total 67 Palestinian students from three Palestinian high schools in the area of Bethlehem and 64 Jewish-Israeli students from three Jewish-Israeli high schools in Israeli towns participated in the workshops.

Another study to measure the impact of IPCRI’s peace education programmes was conducted by Yifat Biton and Gavriel Salomon from the University of Haifa Centre for Research on Peace Education. Biton and Salomon chose IPCRI’s Pathways into Reconciliation programme that was then carried out in Israeli and Palestinian high schools. The participants in the study were Israeli-Jewish tenth-grade male and female youngsters (ages 15–16) from four high schools in different urban regions of Israel and same-age Palestinian male youngsters from four schools in major Palestinian urban areas. 484 Israeli students participated in the pre-test data collection (259 experimental and 225 control students), of whom 320 (186 experimental and 134 control) participated also in the post-test. On the other hand, 334 Palestinian male students participated in the pre-test data collection (150 experimental and 184 control), of whom 244 (99 experimental and 145 control) also participated in the post-test. No female Palestinians participated in the study because the schools for girls in
the Palestinian Authority declined to participate in the peace education programme owing to the onset of the Intifada (2006:170).

Biton and Salomon’s study argued that a well-constructed peace education programme leads to the familiarisation of each side with the perspectives of the other, hence affecting one’s views of the conflict in a more complex way. In a way, peace comes to be perceived more positively. Biton and Salomon’s study shows “a shift towards viewing peace as a matter of cooperation and friendship” (2006:176). The study has also confirmed that participation in a peace education programme can serve as a barrier against the deterioration of views and feelings. While expressions of mistrust and hatred of Jews by Palestinian non-participants doubled from pre- to post-test, it barely changed at all among the programme participants. It became evident that participation in the programme served to prevent what appears to be an Intifada-induced deterioration among non-participants. Furthermore, the study also confirmed that participation in a peace education programme disconnected the link between conflict and individuals in participants’ minds (Biton and Salomon 2006:177).

Table 6.2 Jewish and Palestinian Participants’ Ratings of Each Other on Stereotypic Attributes Before and After Participation in the Workshop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes</th>
<th>Jews Before</th>
<th>Jews After</th>
<th>Palestinians Before</th>
<th>Palestinians After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willing to sacrifice for peace</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open to changes</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeps promises</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad-minded</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considerate</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good-hearted</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale from 1 Not at all to 5 to a very high extent

Despite the success in achieving changes in perceptions regarding the other side among participants in the project, after eight years of implementation, the IPCRI team reached the conclusion that they had still not achieved a spill-over effect and that their

26 Extracted from Maoz Table 1. Jews’ and Palestinians’ Ratings of Each Other on Stereotypic Attributes Before and After Participation in the Workshop; Means (SD), 2000:727
peace education activities remained limited to the schools where IPCRI was working directly. As Baskin explained, the demand was much greater than IPCRI could handle financially and the programmes they had developed would need eventually to be taken over by Ministry of Education; this was, in fact, one of the main objectives of the programme (Baskin 2007). As this did not happen, in 2005 the IPCRI Peace Education team decided to shift its strategy and focus its efforts more systematically. Since then, the team has focused on different means of contributing to peace education, such as curriculum writing and organising conferences and workshops. Specifically, through the International Conference on Education for Peace and Democracy, which was held in November 2006, IPCRI has aimed to create a community of Israeli and Palestinian peace educators. Within this context, IPCRI has also created a joint Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education Centre in order to develop new curricula for peace education. This new project is based on the idea that there is a need to create space in the curriculum for peace education and this must be done through the formal education system. As opposed to their previous efforts to develop different texts for the Israeli and Palestinian school systems, the IPCRI team agreed on preparing only one set of texts for both Israeli and Palestinian schools. The materials have been preparing by an Israeli-Palestinian joint team, which was naturally considerate towards both sides' sensitivities. Through the prepared textbooks, the IPCRI team aims “to intervene with life-skills-based peace education that helps children and adults understand how conflicts arise and how to work towards peaceful, non-violent solutions to the underlying problems” (IPCRI 2005:2). The books in preparation emphasise the following principles: affirmation of self and others, cooperation, communication skills and problem-solving.

Considering the ongoing securitisations and the respective security responses that follow, the idea of delivering the same reconciliatory messages to both the Israeli and Palestinian children was different from other approaches. As Baskin has pointed out, one of the main obstacles Israeli-Palestinian peace educators have to face is the question of how to teach peace alongside an ongoing conflict. Delivering the idea of coexistence and a method of teaching it to youngsters on both sides of the conflict is a crucial step towards changing perceptions and re-defining inter-group relations. According to Baskin, it is time now “to teach young people chances of peace and also to teach them peace is a possibility” (Baskin 2007). As was underlined by Baskin,
IPCRI’s effort requires long-term continuity since it is aiming at a gradual mind-set change. Education for peace will thus take many years. At the time of the interview, IPCRI was in search of funds to continue its project. Besides the financial challenges, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, political events such as the election of a Hamas-led government in the Palestinian territories have significantly affected peace education efforts. In spite of their determination and constant work for peace education, the scale of IPCRI’s projects has remained limited. Furthermore, the lack of political will and support of Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Education has left civil society efforts all alone in the peace education area. After the outbreak of the second Intifada on October 2000 the Israeli Ministry of Education withdrew its support for peace education programmes. More recently, the temporary halt of diplomatic relations with Palestinian Authority during the Hamas-led government in 2007 caused the freeze of all official activities between Israel and Palestine. Moreover, international funds for Palestinian governmental and non-governmental activities were also stopped during this period. This economic and political crisis had a negative impact of the effectiveness of peace education programmes.

Another Israeli-Palestinian joint effort involved in the development of learning materials for both Israelis and Palestinians is the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East’s (PRIME) project entitled Learning Each Other’s Historical Narratives. As was discussed in Chapter 2, both Palestinians and Israelis have constructed narratives of the same history, which have ignored the other’s perspective. Both Palestinian and Israeli history writing has focused attention on the protracted conflict between Jews and Arabs in political terms, on the competing struggles for statehood by the Israeli Zionists and their Palestinian neighbours. In this context, mainstream Israeli historiography worked for almost half a century to legitimize and consolidate the national memory by tracing the main events of the process of nation-building. Similarly, Palestinian historiography has focused on the same political events from a totally different perspective. Furthermore, as part of securitisation process, Israelis and Palestinians alike have focused on their own narrative while dehumanising the other and de-legitimising the other’s narrative. These competing narratives have been injected into respective schoolbooks and curricula, which is referred to by the report evaluating Israeli and Palestinian textbooks during the ten-year period following the
peace process as one of the problems with Israeli and Palestinian textbooks. In some cases, each set of texts presents identical events and dates but offers conflicting interpretations. For example, Israeli textbooks present the Balfour Declaration as a legitimisation of the Zionist endeavour, whereas Palestinian textbooks show the declaration as an international conspiracy against them. While the Israeli textbooks call the 1948 war ‘the War of Independence’, the Palestinian textbooks refer to it as ‘al Nakba’ (The Catastrophe). Israeli textbooks discuss *aliyah* (gradual Jewish migration to Palestine), but Palestinian textbooks call this the ‘forced Judaization of Palestine.’ In this regard, the textbooks reflect the official perspectives and security discourses of each side and aim to teach these particular perspectives to their younger generations. Moreover, while Israeli textbooks view the Zionist leadership’s acceptance of the partition plan as proof of its desire for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Palestinian textbooks either justify its rejection or ignore it completely. As in the official discourse, the terminology used in the books reflects different and nearly diametrically opposed emotional associations (Adwan and Firer 1997, 1999; Maoz 2000a, 2000b).

In order to reconcile these conflicting narratives, PRIME has developed a project of a joint school textbook with Israeli and Palestinian teachers. The project has been co-directed by Sami Adwan from Bethlehem University and Dan Bar-On from Ben Gurion University. The PRIME team has prepared two pilot textbooks that have been jointly authored by six Israeli history teachers, six Palestinian history and geography teachers and six international delegates with the guidance of two history professors, Adnan Massallam of Bethlehem University and Eyal Nave of Tel Aviv University. As was pointed out by Bar-On, in spite of the difficult political and military conditions following the second Intifada, joint meetings between Israeli and Palestinian teachers continued for three years and two of the three books have already been published (Bar-On 2007).

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27 The Middle East Media Research Institute’s (MEMRI) study of the new Palestinian Textbooks, The Centre for Monitoring the Impact of Peace (CMIP) reports on both new Palestinian textbooks and Israeli textbooks, IPCRI’s examination of the Israeli and Palestinian textbooks and The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace’s comparative study of Palestinian and Israeli textbooks are among the most comprehensive evaluation reports.
Each book contains three chapters covering crucial historical events which have determined the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Each page is divided into three columns; the Israeli and Palestinian narratives mirror each other on opposite sides of the page with a blank column in the middle that creates space for students to think for themselves (An example of these pages is attached as Appendix 1). The main idea behind this project is that “at the present stage of hostility, the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians are not able to develop a joint narrative of their history... in the meantime they could learn to acknowledge and live with the fact that there are at least two competing narratives to account for their past, present, and future” (Adwan and Bar-On 2004:514). The PRIME team argued that this is an essential intermediate phase between learning about each other and legitimising the other’s valid reasoning. Instead of criticizing the existing narratives or creating a narrative to deliver a more co-existential message, PRIME’s textbook project simply aims at transforming “two hateful single narratives into two mutually sensitive ones” (Adwan and Bar-On 2007). In other words, a transformation from a conflict to a post-conflict narrative was intended as a way for Israelis and Palestinians to find a mutual level of respect for the other’s narrative, which is instrumental for desecuritising the other.

24 teachers have taught the pilot textbooks in 9th and 10th grade history classes. As Bar-On stated, “the teachers’ experience was unique since they introduced the other’s narrative while the conflict was going on” (Bar-On and Adwan 2006:3). Parents’ and pupils’ reactions reflected the tense political situation. Despite initial resentment towards the idea of learning the others’ narratives, many of the students who have been taught using PRIME’s books have re-affirmed the importance of learning the other’s narratives and seeing the differences between them and their own.28 At the time of interviews (January/February 2007) the project was not yet complete. Only two of the three books were published and the teachers participating in the preparation of the books were teaching by using them in their classes. The formal evaluation of the use of the shared history booklet in Israeli and Palestinian classrooms had only just started.29 Therefore, it was too early to predict the impact of

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28 For the examples from students’, parents’ and teacher’s comments on the use of Learning Each Other’s Historical Narrative textbooks see Adwan, S. and Bar-On, D. (2006) Learning Each Other’s Historical Narratives: Palestinians and Israelis Part Two, Beit Jallah: PRIME
29 The evaluation was planned to be conducted by a team of 18 Palestinian and Israeli observers and four Israeli and Palestinian professional evaluators during the time of interviews.
these books on the aim of teaching both sides’ narratives together in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

Besides the joint peace education efforts involving formal education, there exist other peace education activities aimed at bringing Israeli and Palestinian teenagers together in contexts other than the classroom. Organised and conducted primarily by non-profit organisations and jointly led by Israeli and Palestinian facilitators, these encounter activities bring Israeli and Palestinian participants together for brief periods of contact. The Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace Peace Education program, Seeds of Peace Middle East’s Advanced Coexistence Programme and Seasonal Programmes and Windows’ encounters programmes are among the peace education initiatives aiming to bring Palestinian and Israeli teenagers together. The Adam Institute mainly focuses on encounters between different sections of Israeli society to promote democracy and peace and is not very influential at the Israeli-Palestinian encounters level, in spite of its Peace Education programme. By contrast, both Seeds of Peace, which is originally an American NGO, and Windows are more active in terms of encounters between Israeli and Palestinian youngsters.

The main objective of the Seeds of Peace Programme is to empower youngsters from regions of conflict with the leadership skills required to promote reconciliation and coexistence. The main focus of the programme has been on the Middle East, although it has expanded its programmes to include South Asia, Cyprus and the Balkans. Seeds of Peace’s Middle East Programme has focused primarily on bringing Arab and Israeli teenagers together to cement a basis for mutual understanding and respect. Through the Center for Coexistence in Jerusalem, Seeds of Peace organizes year-round programmes to support Israeli and Palestinian teenagers’ encounters. Advanced conflict resolution workshops, school presentations, cross-cultural exchanges, educational seminars and the publication of The Olive Branch magazine are among the activities that bring Israeli and Palestinian youth together. The most important of the Seeds of Peace’s activities is the Advanced Coexistence Programme which was launched in 2003-2004. This involves around 200 Israeli and Palestinian teenagers from dozens of cities all over Israel, both sides of Jerusalem, and the West Bank coming together for weekly meetings in twelve different groups and in four different locations. Both Israeli and Palestinian participants reported that they have learned
each other's concerns and perspectives as an Israeli participant was cited in Winter/Spring 2006 issue of The Olive Branch: "We had many wonderful conversations, really getting to know one another as human beings... These dialogues... were calmer and more open to getting to know "the other side" (The Olive Branch 2006).30

In 2005 the impact of Seeds of Peace's Israeli-Palestinian Programme from 1993 to 2003 was evaluated externally by an independent research company called Social Impact.31 The assessment included surveys of 206 Seeds of Peace graduates, 149 parents of participating students and 33 educators, as well as extensive interviews with Seeds of Peace staff and key stakeholders, including Ministry of Education officials, school principals, teachers and political leaders. Results of the evaluation indicated significant shifts in attitudes: 60 percent of the graduates felt that they had improved their understanding of the other side and 50 percent stated that they gained the ability to empathize with the plight of others. Furthermore, in 2005 both Seeds of Peace Camp participants and Delegation Leaders were surveyed before and after the camp to determine whether and to what extent the Seeds of Peace International Camp experience had altered their attitudes and opinions related to trust of the other side. Survey results for 279 Middle Eastern campers in 2005 show that 58 percent of Palestinians left camp profoundly more trusting of Jewish Israelis, 41 percent of Palestinians left camp believing in the possibility of friendships with Jewish Israelis (Seeds of Peace Annual Report 2005).

Compared to Seeds of Peace, Windows Channels for Communication is a local organisation that has conducted several encounter programmes for Israeli and Palestinian youngsters. Windows aims at promoting mutual acquaintance, understanding and reconciliation between Israeli and Palestinian youth through educational and cultural programmes, media and art. As stated in its publicity documents, the members of Windows believe that "in order to reach a just and lasting peace, it is important ... to deepen knowledge and understanding of ... the 'other'

30 For more examples please see the other issues of The Olive Branch Magazine which can be downloaded from http://www.seedsofpeace.org/node/1830
31 The impact evaluation has been conducting for every ten years. The latest evaluation that was conducted in 2005 by Social Impact covers the period of 1993 and 2003. The 2005 evaluation report included the Seeds of Peace Camp participants of 1993-2003 period.
Through various programmes, Windows aims at empowering young people to change their perceptions. Since 1995, Windows has been publishing an Arabic/Hebrew magazine called Windows, which is written by and for youngsters (ages 12-14) from both peoples. During the publication process, young contributors to the magazine are involved in a process of joint work that enables them to get to know each other and learn about their past, the harsh present reality and their aspirations for the future. As stated by one of the Israeli Arab editors of the November 2006 issue of Windows Magazine, meeting with Jewish children has helped to change his perceptions of Jews:

Despite all of the difficulties, the joint meeting helped us to understand the other side. Because in Jaffa, for example, where I live, when something happens, people say that it happened because of the Jews and when I spent time with the Jewish children, I saw that not everything that happens in Jaffa is because of the Jews and even when it is, it is not because of all of them. I learned that one should not make generalisations (Windows Magazine 2006).

The magazine provides an opportunity for Israeli and Palestinian youth to learn about each other's lives, feelings and opinions. The magazine also gives readers an opportunity to examine the attitudes they have towards each other and helps them to recognise their similarities and differences. For most, the Hebrew-Arabic Youth Magazine is the only means of communication with youth from the other community.

As stated by one of the volunteers from Windows, from an early age both Palestinians and Israelis are exposed to misinformation and stereotypes of each other. They grow up in segregated communities and generally they do not have much chance to meet the young people from the other side. In this sense, reading the magazine allows children to view one another as individuals, free of their respective national lenses (anonymous Windows volunteer 2007). This enables Palestinian and Israeli youth to learn things about one another, many of which could not have been learned in any other way, and potentially become instrumental in descuritisation processes at
societal level. During an informal talk with an Israeli Jewish student who participated in the Windows Magazine Project, it was pointed out that:

Meeting and talking with the others is extremely important. Before participating in the Windows encounters I was against the occupation but now I have realised that I was ignorant about the extent of occupation and its effects on Palestinian people (Anonymous Participant in Windows Magazine Project 2007).

A Palestinian participant shares similar views in Windows magazine’s 22nd issue:

It’s important for me to know the others, to know their opinions. They might have different opinions than my own. I did not believe that there were Jews who wanted peace — I thought that they all wanted to kill us (Windows Magazine 2006).

Even though the impact of Windows’ encounter programmes has not yet been evaluated, unlike those of IPCRI and Seeds of Peace, the views of participants and the continuous contacts between Israeli and Palestinian participants demonstrate that the Windows’ activities have achieved the aim of changing perceptions of some youngsters vis-à-vis the other. Every issue of the magazine reflects the changes in their perceptions of the other and their views regarding peace after the encounters. In a recent issue, a Palestinian teenager expressed his wish for peace: “Peace with the Israelis is possible, if the war ends. I hope that each of us can live securely in our independent states” (Windows Magazine 2006).

It is estimated that the Windows magazine reaches up to 40,000 children and adults with each issue and the messages given through the magazine help young people to cope with the reality of the conflict and encourage them to think about ways to bridge differences. As stated by one of the Windows participants, “although what we [volunteers and participants] do is relatively small, it has an impact” (Anonymous Windows volunteer 2007).
In spite of their efforts, the general impact of encounter projects like Windows and Seeds of Peace has remained limited in initiating a desecuritisation process. Besides the limited numbers of participants compared to the total population of Israeli and Palestinian youngsters, as an encounter facilitator put it, most of the participants in encounter projects are from social backgrounds sympathetic to reconciliation and peace. Even though encounters with the other side reinforce their position vis-à-vis peace and reconciliation, they do not have a significant impact among young people with radical views. Another problem is the social perception by their respective societies of those participating in encounter projects with the other side. In most of the cases, particularly Palestinian young people who participate in encounter activities with Israelis, participants are criticised/blamed by their communities for collaborating with the occupier. This is not simply something faced only by young people participating in encounter programmes, it is also a general problem regarding most of the Palestinians and to some extent Israelis involved in peace education.

Desecuritisation would require both top-down political processes as well as bottom-up psychological processes. Peace education addresses the latter aspect, however, there is a need for more extensive political, social and cultural change, which is something that extends beyond civil society’s peace education efforts. As Biton and Salomon argue, teaching to view peace as a central concept may well be a step in the right direction (2006:178). Reducing hatred and a more positive view of peace, constitutes a part of peace as Rothman defines (1992) and incrementally contributes to the process of desecuritisation by enabling antagonists to reconcile their differences with less violence and a greater willingness to accept each other’s existence and identity.

6.3 Prospects and Problems of Desecuritisations in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

In this chapter peace education has been selected as an important sphere of joint Israeli-Palestinian attempts at desecuritisation since peace education programmes directly aim to re-define and re-evaluate the image of the other through textbooks, curricula and face to face encounters. In particular, peace education programmes aiming to teach coexistence and peace, like IPCRI and PRIME’s, have aimed at
influencing the first phase of the desecuritisation process, peace stabilisation. In this chapter the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian peace education efforts on potential desecuritisation processes have been analysed.

Applying effectiveness criteria introduced in Chapter 4 to assess Israeli-Palestinian peace education efforts, their potential to contribute in desecuritisation process can be seen. According to the first criterion, if a particular peace-building activity causes people to undertake independent initiatives and find out creative ways within their own communities to cross lines of division it is considered as effective. These efforts should continue in the face of difficulty, threats, or other overt pressure (Anderson and Olson 2003:16). Specifically, Windows and Seeds of Peace's programmes have succeeded in promoting involvement, particularly among the young, in these programmes not just as participants but as volunteers as facilitators, group leaders and technicians. Further, some of the former participants of Windows and Seeds of Peace programmes have initiated activities such as the publication of magazines (Windows and Olive Branch), organisation of sporting events and the launching of chat rooms and other means of electronic communication (i.e. seedsnet) through which Israeli and Palestinian participants in encounter programmes can continue their interactions. The electronic means of communication are particularly important for the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza where merely visiting Israel means spending days or weeks to obtain permits. The involvement of the participants of these programmes in advancement of the ways and means building bridges to the other side can be considered as an indicator of the effectiveness of the Israeli-Palestinian peace education efforts.

The second criterion is about the particular peace-building activity's success in developing or supporting institutions or mechanisms to address the inequalities and injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Peace-building activities can focus on political institutions and address weaknesses in or the lack of structures to manage conflicts non-violently (Anderson and Olson 2003:17). Through the development of new textbooks and curricula for peace education in schools, both IPCRI and PRIME have attempted to improve the formal education system to eliminate prejudices towards the other side of the conflict. However, given the existence of 1.5 million Israeli and 1.2 million Palestinian students, the scope of these projects has remained
limited (Bar-Tal 2007). Hence, the programmes in question have not been as effective as they set out to be.

The third criterion concerns increasing people's ability to resist manipulation and provocation, an outcome that can be achieved through programmes that increase skills for analyzing, managing, and responding to conflict, or that change values and attitudes toward the use of force (Anderson and Olson 2003:17). Both through joint works to change narratives and through efforts to provide grounds for encounters, a change in perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and consequently in behaviour towards 'the other' has been aimed at. According to Gavriel Salomon, the Director of Haifa University's Centre for Research on Peace Education, despite the ongoing violence, participation in various programmes has yielded positive attitudinal, perceptual and relational changes among participating students (Interview with Salomon 1 February 2007). Through the books developed and produced by the IPCRI and PRIME peace education teams, a redefinition and re-evaluation of the image of 'the other' has been aimed at. It is believed that at least the young people who read these books at school will eventually learn and re-evaluate each other's point of views. As Bar Tal pointed out during the interview, the changes manifested as more positive views of peace, a better ability to see the other side's perspective and a greater willingness for contact.

The last criterion suggests that a peace-building programme is effective if it results in concrete reductions in the threat of violence and/or changed perceptions of vulnerability. The contribution of the Israeli and Palestinian peace education activities reductions in the threat of violence is almost insignificant since it is something beyond the power of civil societies. Thus, it is not fair to assess peace education programmes' effectiveness in accordance this criterion.

As discussed, peace education programmes have been challenged by a lack of political will to implement these programmes. During the interviews, the civil society organisations involved in peace education pointed out that they could not achieve the long-term goals of peace education programmes since they do not have sufficient finance and authority. At the time of interviews, governmental level support for coexistence programmes in general peace education programmes in particular were
suspended as a result of the temporary halt of all political and economic relations with
the Hamas-led government in Palestine. Given the existence of ongoing
securitisations even before the Palestinian elections, respective Ministries of
Educations were reluctant to support peace education activities other than during of
Oslo period.

Interviews conducted in February 2007 with Israeli and Palestinian team members
from selected peace education programmes, demonstrated their dedication to the
advancement of peace education in the Israeli-Palestinian context. All interviewees
agreed that when there is no top-down peace-making initiative, peace-building
activities from below cannot bring peace about by themselves. Therefore, they should
become modest in their goals and focus on maintaining the opportunity for mutually
positive interactions between peace-builders and prepare the ground by initiating
small projects that could become widespread making possible a future
synchronisation with top-down initiatives should these take place.

Along with the unwillingness of the respective governments to implement peace
education programmes, a further major challenge for peace education project teams
has been the restrictions on movement. Since Palestinians from the territories are
required to have special permission to enter Israeli cities and towns, and Israelis are
not allowed to enter Palestinian territories at all, the coordination of joint projects has
been extremely difficult. The alienation of young generations from each other has
posed serious challenges for youth projects that aim to develop better understanding
between Israeli and Palestinian youngsters and teachers. Last but not least, through
2006 and the first half of the 2007, the deterioration of diplomatic relations with the
Hamas-led Palestinian Authority and the temporary freeze in international finance to
Palestine caused a pause in coexistence works in general and peace education projects
in particular.

As a summary, the success in transforming overtly securitised relations between
Israel and the Palestinians and in accelerating a full-fledged desecuritisation process
has been constrained by ongoing political securitisation on the one hand and the lack
of political will for widespread implementation of the suggested peace education
programmes. As argued by the analytical framework developed in Chapter 1
Desecuritisation requires both political level and civil society level involvement. In the Israeli-Palestinian case political elite was not willing to initiate a desecuritisation process as a result of different political considerations. Hence, in spite of their normalisation attempts after the demise of Arafat desecuritisation was never become an option. As the civil society does not hold enough power, authority and resources to desecuritise the relations, a fully-fledged desecuritisation has not occurred. In spite of desecuritising attempts of both Israeli and Palestinian civil society organisations by introducing several peace education activities, a societal-level desecuritisation process has not been realised since the second facilitating condition, the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the desecuritising actor (the relation between desecuritising actor and audience) fell short. Since desecuritising actors (civil society) do not possess authority and power to exert their influence on the whole society they were not able to desecuritise overtly securitised Israeli-Palestinian relations as a whole. Still, as part of general peace-building efforts of the Israeli-Palestinian civil societies’ peace education programmes have succeeded in a change in the language used to defined previously securitised relations (the first facilitating condition for desecuritisation). Last but not least, through several peace education programmes directed at different segments of society they have contributed to changing public opinion about the necessity for desecuritisation (the third facilitating condition).
CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusions: Towards a more Comprehensive Approach for Analysing Desecuritisation as a Conflict Resolution Framework

This final chapter aims at revisiting the questions and issues addressed in the thesis, summarising its findings, drawing out implications for the development of the desecuritisation approach and outlining the policy relevance by exploring prospects and problems for desecuritisations in the Israeli-Palestinian context. After a brief summary of the content of the previous chapters, this concluding chapter reflects on the application of securitisation theory as an analytical framework for analysing desecuritisations. By discussing the problems and prospects of desecuritisation in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the last section highlights the policy relevance of this research.

7.1 Research Summary

In this thesis the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory has been applied to the Israeli-Palestinian case with an in-depth focus on the notion of desecuritisation. The primary goal has been to apply securitisation theory to assess its limits and prospects as a theoretical framework. The novelty of this thesis is its particular focus on the desecuritisation concept through the development of an analytical framework for the analysis of conflict resolution. The Israeli-Palestinian case was chosen for analysis since it is argued that Israeli-Palestinian relations have the potential to be analysed according to the parties' attempts at both securitisation and desecuritisation. It is important to note that from the beginning it was not argued that an actual desecuritisation process existed. Rather, it has been argued that the Israeli-Palestinian case does not just present a case for securitisation; but also has the potential for desecuritisation, a potential which was affirmed by the empirical cases in spite of the prevailing political tensions and violence.
The aim of Chapter 1 was to review the concepts, arguments and assumptions introduced by the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory with a particular emphasis on desecuritisation. A framework for analysing conflict resolution was then provided, one which encompassed a concept of desecuritisation. In Chapters 5 and 6, this framework was applied to Israeli-Palestinian civil society’s peace-building efforts.

First of all, in this thesis it was argued that in order to analyse the problems and prospects for a potential desecuritisation process it is important to understand the processes of securitisation in their social and historical context. It is believed that the analysis of securitisation processes is beneficial both for the discussion regarding the limits and prospects of securitisation as a theoretical framework and for the empirical analysis of the desecuritisation potential in the Israeli-Palestinian case.

In order to analyse desecuritisation potential in the Israeli-Palestinian case, threat constructions and respective securitisations were examined through the application of securitisation theory in Chapters 2 and 3. Within this context, beginning with the exploration of the political and historical circumstances that brought Jews and Palestinian Arabs into conflict in Palestine, Chapter 2 gave an historical account of Israeli and Palestinian threat constructions from 1897 till the 2000s. This chapter demonstrated how securitisations have developed and have been shaped by Israeli and Palestinian securitising actors. The idea that by denying each other's legitimacy both Israelis and Palestinian Arabs have entrapped themselves in a vicious circle of securitisations was explored. Since the situation was presented as a question of survival by numerous Israeli and Palestinian securitising actors, extraordinary means were employed to prevent the threat posed by 'the other'. Chapter 3 provided a detailed analysis of the more recent post-Arafat period (2004-2007). In this chapter the answers to the following questions were sought: How is support for security measures achieved and viewed as a legitimate exercise of state power? What is the audience (Israeli and Palestinian public) position regarding security threats that have been securitised by securitising actors? As discussed in Chapter 3, immediately after the death of Arafat, both Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the Palestinian National Authority, and Ariel Sharon, the then Israeli Prime Minister, showed some signs of
normalisation. This was considered as a positive change from previously uncompromising positions regarding conflict resolution. But still, the peace process was not revived and a desecuritisation process was not initiated. The rise of Hamas as a political power in Palestine made things harder for Ariel Sharon since Hamas was known for its opposition to the State of Israel’s right to exist. This period was marked by a change of direction in the Israeli discourse from securitising Palestinians as an existential threat to the Israeli state and society to the securitising of Hamas as an existential threat to both the Israeli state and society and the peace process. However, during this period, Israeli leaders in particular tried to find ways to neutralize the threat posed by Hamas through conflict management instead of by utilising exceptional means. Instead, both Ariel Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert preferred to manage the security situation by initiating unilateral conflict management strategies by arguing that they were needed because of the uncompromising position of the Hamas-led Palestinian government regarding the State of Israel’s right to exist. In Palestine, during this period, as opposed to Abbas’ normalisation efforts, Hamas leaders continued to securitise Israeli security measures as apartheid policies and used them to legitimise their resistance against Israeli occupation. By contrast, both the Israeli and Palestinian publics were keen to return to normal politics given the negative effects of the ongoing violence on their lives. By the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, public opinion polls showed that the majority of both the Israeli and Palestinian publics did not support the securitising actors’ calls. The extraordinary measures which were regarded as being necessary by the securitising actors, such as the continuous firing of rockets into Israeli settlements by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and Israeli military interventions in Gaza, had been taken without the respective audiences’ consent. Stemming from the analysis of securitisations in the Israeli-Palestinian case, the prevailing neglect of the public preferences in the securitisation process appear as empirical challenges to securitisation theory, which argues the necessity of audience’s consent for a successful securitisation. Furthermore, the existence of several securitising and desecuritising actors with competing claims regarding the nature of the security threat challenges the securitisation framework that implicitly assumes the agreement of a group of political elite claiming a particular issue as a security threat.
Chapter 4 presented a review of the development of the idea of reconciliation and peace, as opposed to the continuous securitisation processes, in the Israeli-Palestinian context. This chapter demonstrated that, even though both the Israeli and Palestinian communities have outwardly presented a monolithic façade, alongside ongoing securitisations there have been more reconciliatory approaches that defend and support coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. Among all peace-building efforts, two sets of projects were chosen for the analysis of desecuritisation potential: water management and peace education. These cases were chosen as a result of their focus on coexistence, the former at the structural level and the latter at the cultural level of peace-building.

Chapter 5 analysed Israeli and Palestinian coordination and cooperation over the management of shared water resources with their potential for desecuritisation. Water has appeared as an issue where both sides have succeeded in managing the securitised issues and kept water out of ongoing conflicts. Throughout the chapter, the place of water as part of the peace-making and structural peace-building processes in the Israeli-Palestinian context was discussed. The chapter demonstrated that the joint effort in the Israeli and Palestinian water sector contributed to a re-evaluation and re-definition of relations between both sides.

In Chapter 6, joint Israeli-Palestinian peace education projects were analysed as examples of cultural peace-building along with their potential for desecuritisation. Through Chapters 5 and 6, the answers to the following questions were sought: What is the impact of selected peace-building efforts on the desecuritisation of the other? How are those efforts affected by ongoing securitising moves?

Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that both water management programmes and peace education projects have continued to be designed and implemented even in the face of severe challenges. As the securitising actors (i.e. the governing elites) seem incapable of desecuritisation, Israeli and Palestinian civil society has been acting as a potential desecuritising actor. Applying the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project’s criteria for the assessment of the effectiveness of peace-building programmes, through cooperation concerns regarding the quality and quantity of shared water resources and working for the creation of a culture of peace, Israeli and Palestinian civil society
actors have proved the potential for desecuritisation. However, as desecuritisation requires both political (peace-making) and civil society (peace-building) level involvement and determination in conflict resolution, the Israeli and Palestinian civil society have not succeeded in the realisation of a full-fledged desecuritisation process as a result of political elite's lack of willingness for desecuritisation.

Overall, the application of securitisation theory was not flawless and a number of issues had to be tackled regarding the Copenhagen School's securitisation approach as a theoretical framework. The next section revisits securitisation theory and draws out a number of issues that could be adapted or shaped as an empirical case.

7.2 Assessment of the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory as a Framework for Analysis

Since the initial publications of the Copenhagen School, securitisation theory has provided a theoretical framework for analysing different international actors' security policies and actions. However, empirical application of securitisation theory shows a variation in how the theoretical framework has been applied. Given these differences, Wæver argues that:

There is by now a surprising amount of empirical studies done with full or partial use of the securitisation theory. These do not follow a standardised format... The theory does not point to one particular type of study as the right one... Optimistically, diversity is a sign that the theory... can generate/structure different kinds of usage... (Wæver 2003 in Stritzel 2007:359).

As a response to Wæver's optimism, Stritzel argues that inconsistent applications of the theory indicate problems regarding its consistent conceptualisation. In this regard, this thesis empirically applies securitisation theory to a very complex conflict situation in order to acquire insights which can help to assess securitisation theory as a theoretical framework. Based on the adaptive approach taken in this thesis, the theory both adapted to, and was shaped by, empirical evidence. At the same time, the data were adapted to the extant theoretical materials. This thesis argued that the adaptive
approach paves the way for the theoretical reflection and conceptual restructuring of the securitisation theory. Stemming from the application of the theory, the issues set out below arose.

As securitisation theory is based on the notion that security is a performative/speech act, the centrality of speech in the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation has attracted critiques (van Munster 2002, Bigo 2001a and 2001b, Hansen 2000). First of all, as the analysis shows, Austinian speech act analysis is not always practical. It is not just the speech act as a linguistic form at which securitisation analysis should look, rather, the words that refer to the specific issue also constitute an integral part of the analysis of the security discourse and threat construction. In this sense, the Derridian approach appears to be better for analysing securitisations. For example, the constant use of negative terms in referring to a particular issue gradually contributes to the threat construction, and therefore to securitisation. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, Israeli securitising actors’ constant use of the terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ have gradually become the main theme of Israeli securitisations and have constituted the pretext for the exceptional measures taken against Palestinians. In return, Palestinian securitising actors have constantly referred to the State of Israel as a colonial, imperialist, occupier and apartheid state. These connotations have led to an uncompromising position of not recognising the Israeli state’s right to exist. As the securitisation analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian case affirmed, the analysis of security as a speech act should go beyond the grammatical limits of an Austinian speech act and focus on the contents and contexts of the speech acts. In this regard, the context could even be extended by including televisual images since, as Williams (2003:512) argues, “as political communication becomes increasingly entwined with the production and transmission of visual images, the processes of securitisation ... cannot be fully assessed by focusing on the speech-act alone”.

By being a conflict between a state actor and a non-state actor, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a particularly challenging case for any international relations theory, not just for securitisation theory. Palestinian securitising actors’ securitisations of the State of Israel paved the way for a resistance movement and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict evolved as an intractable conflict between a resistance movement and a state actor. Conceptually, by accommodating actors and referent objects other than the
state, the Copenhagen School is well-placed to consider non-state actors as well as state actors. However, the existence of non-state actors poses challenges to the particulars of the theory such as securitising actors, audiences and facilitating conditions.

As far as the question of who can speak security is concerned, the Palestinian case underlines a particular dilemma. For a long time the PLO leadership that emerged outside the Palestinian territories spoke security in the name of Palestinians by prioritising the societal level security which involves the survival of Palestinians as a whole. The PLO securitised the State of Israel as an existential threat to the survival of the Palestinian community and ignored the fact that the basic security threat perceived by Palestinians within the territories was not societal security but human security. The focus moved from threats to Palestinian livelihoods to threats to the Palestinian collective identity. Till the emergence of local leadership, Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip did not find a platform to express the threat which Israeli occupation posed in terms of human security. The lack of legitimate local representation on the Palestinian side gave rise to several securitising actors. Thus the Palestinian political elite and a number of militant groups have acted as securitising actors. In this regard, the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitising actor has been challenged analytically. For example, since the mid 1990s, the Hamas movement has arisen as a strong political force in Palestine and developed a distinctive security discourse competing with first the PLO’s and then the Palestinian Authority’s discourse regarding Israel. Particularly, the post-Arafat era became a discursive battlefield as the polarisation between the secular Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas and the Islamist and more radical Hamas movement became increasingly intense. Certainly, the rise of Hamas poses an analytical problem for securitisation theory, which presupposes a dominant security discourse, which in turn implies a certain ruling elite. In general in the Palestinian case one cannot speak accurately of a single Palestinian security discourse since 1967.

Moreover, getting a better insight into Israeli and Palestinian security discourses must reflect the actors that are influential in the formulation and transmission of the discourse and the relationships between them. This brings an understanding of domestic power structures, which is something ignored by securitisation theory. As in
the Israeli-Palestinian case, in most of the securitisation cases it is difficult to point out one securitising actor or a monolithic security discourse. Since the competing and conflicting security discourses reflect the domestic power structures and social dynamics within a particular society, the inclusion of domestic/social considerations into securitisation theory would be beneficial.

Buzan and Wæver introduce facilitating conditions by pointing out that both power and the intersubjective establishment of a threat are important in understanding securitisations (Buzan et al. 1998:25). They claim that security can be conceived as a “structured field” since “some actors are placed in a position of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having power to define security” (Buzan et al. 1998:31). Even though the Copenhagen School has positioned power as an important factor in securitisation, in the theoretical framework, they do not concentrate on the domestic power structures. In this regard, the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian case suggests that domestic power structures and social considerations could be integrated into the facilitating conditions. Since Israeli-Palestinian case is being a case one cannot understand just with internal facilitating conditions this study took side with an externalist approach as suggested by Stritzel. Thus, a specific emphasis put upon facilitating conditions in order to explore the embeddedness of security articulations in social relations of power both internally and externally. It was argued that for the analysis of securitisation speech acts in the Israeli-Palestinian case a number of external facilitating conditions had also be taken into considerations including global political changes, regional power asymmetries and other discourses confirming or limiting security discourse such as discourse on terror and the Axis of evil, discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

The position of the audience as one of the components of the securitisation process is left ambiguous by the Copenhagen School. As pointed out by Wæver, the success of any attempt to securitise an issue is contingent upon the existence of an audience that accepts and tolerates acts by the securitising actor that are not otherwise legitimate (2000:251). However, neither Buzan nor Wæver explain whether an explicit endorsement by an audience is necessary. Even if they concede that the securitising move is realised through either coercion or consent and is achieved through negotiations between the securitising actor (ruling elite) and the audience (society),
they are not clear regarding the nature of the negotiation process. This is also something dependent upon the domestic power structures. Methodologically, the measurement of the audience's approval is also very problematic. In this study the audience position on the official security discourse was illustrated through opinion polls and election results. But both in Israel and in Palestine generally, the audience’s approval was not always necessary for securitisation. According to opinion polls regularly conducted in Israel and Palestine, the audience preference is for normalisation yet with some obvious doubts about the other side's good intentions.

The empowerment of the audience by the Copenhagen School derives from the principles of democracy and free speech. This may function in Western contexts but can be problematic in non-Western contexts as discussed by Hansen (2000) and Wilkinson (2007). The Israeli-Palestinian case shows that in intractable conflict situations most of the time the audience's support could be disregarded and securitising actors take drastic actions when they think necessary. As securitisation refers to “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:491), structures and the characteristics of the particular political community must be taken into consideration. In this respect, securitisation theory should avoid presumptions that derive from Western contexts and be open to consider those from other cultures.

Another problematic aspect of securitisation theory is the vagueness of the desecuritisation concept. Many elements of the desecuritisation concept have been left implicit by the Copenhagen Scholars. Thus, it is generally assumed that, as the idea of desecuritisation is conceived as the opposite direction of a process driven by speech acts, one can hence assume that essentially the same elements, with some adjustments as seen in Figure 2, used to explain the outcome of security can be used to explain the outcome of a desecuritisation process. Given paucity of empirical application dealing with desecuritisation analysis, this thesis argues that the application of desecuritisation as a theoretical concept requires the reconsideration of a number of issues if a more comprehensive concept is to be achieved. The following section draws out implications for the development of the desecuritisation approach as a framework for analysing conflict resolution and reconciliation.
7.3 Desecuritisation as a Framework for Analysing Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation

As far as the analysis of the desecuritisation process is concerned, since the Copenhagen School does not suggest an explicit framework for analysis, different scholars have interpreted desecuritisation differently. This gives researchers room for manoeuvre to develop different frameworks for analysing desecuritisation. Within this context, this thesis has provided an analytical framework for analysing conflict resolution and applied it in Israeli-Palestinian civil societies' desecuritisation attempts at peace-building in the cultural - peace education - and structural - water management - spheres. It was argued that both peace-making and peace-building efforts together constitute a process of desecuritisation with a possible outcome of reconciliation. Therefore, the analytical framework presented peace-making and peace-building as steps towards desecuritisation with a particular emphasis on the significance of peace-building in the desecuritisation process. It was argued that peace-building underpins peace-making by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationship between conflicting parties, thus, it tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict in order to bring positive peace. Since peace-making is often tackled with political considerations and other distortions, it was assumed that civil society actors as peace-builders play an active role in exploring various peace avenues and aiding active peace initiatives throughout all levels of society. Within this context, the analytical framework developed here incorporates official-level conflict settlement efforts with bottom-up conflict resolution efforts and seeks to identify their desecuritisation potential. The following issues have been drawn out from the application of this framework, based on the notion of desecuritisation, to Israeli-Palestinian peace education and water management activities.

Starting with the definition of desecuritisation as "a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan and Wæver 2003:489), the empirical application of the concept underlines the problems and prospects of desecuritisation as a framework for analysis. The definition suggested by Buzan and Wæver is problematic in referring to
political community as the agent of desecuritisation. Since political community is not a monolith and several dynamics play roles in the desecuritisation process as well as securitisation, it is not possible to talk about the political community as a desecuritising actor. As seen in the Israeli-Palestinian case, even within a particular community it was difficult to point out only one agent for securitisation/desecuritisation. Furthermore, the definition misses the point that desecuritisation is a process driven by a plurality of actors. Within this context, it is important to clarify the definition and to underline the interplay between actor and process. As far as the question of the identity of the desecuritising actor(s) is concerned, in contrast to the details given about the quality of securitising actor(s), the Copenhagen School does not explicitly identify them. In this regard, by distinguishing peace-making and peace-building processes in their contributions to a potential desecuritisation, the analytical framework presented in this thesis also distinguishes official-level desecuritising actors from grass roots and/or civil society desecuritising actors. Hence, it is argued that the same actors that had previously advocated securitisation may initiate the process of desecuritisation by renegotiating appropriate responses with relevant audiences as well as other actors. However, in the Israeli Palestinian context, in most of the cases the securitising actors appear incapable of desecuritisation. Therefore, actors other than the securitising actors may need to initiate the process. This thesis has shown that, given the reluctance of the policymakers to initiate desecuritisation processes through peace-making, at the civil society level a number of Israelis and Palestinians have assumed the responsibility to initiate a desecuritisation process through peace-building. Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian case highlighted a tension between elite securitisation and desecuritisation moves pursued by civil society. In this respect, the analytical framework provided in Chapter 1 was successful in capturing the inconsistent security situation in an intractable conflict. Furthermore, by employing facilitating factors, the Copenhagen School’s desecuritisation approach provided conceptual tools to understand the potential effectiveness of grassroots/civil society desecuritising actors vis-à-vis the current batch of power/elite securitising actors.

As far as the language of desecuritisation is concerned, the analysis of Israeli-Palestinian desecuritisation attempts illustrates Behnke’s argument that desecuritisation as a speech act is contradictory. According to Behnke, an issue is
desecuritised through a lack of speech, not through speech acts affirming its new status (2006:65). The analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 focused on the questions of what kind of language is used by desecuritising actors and to what extent the language has been changed compared to the language used to define the previously securitised issue. As the desecuritisation framework employed here considers the desecuritisation as a process of redefinition and reinterpretation of a previously securitised issue, the changes in language in referring to both the perceptions towards the other and relations with the other were analysed. Attention was paid to the desecuritising actors' choice of terms with positive connotations, such as partner, peace, reconciliation and coexistence. In this respect, desecuritisation as a speech act does not appear as a conceptual tool to analyse desecuritisation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

Another problematic point of the desecuritisation analysis is the question of how to desecuritise. As the three options, not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place, once an issue is securitised, try not to generate security dilemmas and vicious circles and lastly to move security issues back into normal politics, outlined by the Copenhagen School (Wæver 2000:253) are too imprecise and vague when it comes to empirical application, these strategies do not provide an explanatory framework of how to desecuritise. Particularly in the societal sector, desecuritisation requires a level of acceptance that two identities could and should be able to coexist. However, both Israelis and Palestinians have developed their identities vis-à-vis an enemy other; therefore desecuritisation would be extremely difficult. Stemming from this analysis, it was found that in the societal sector, conflict management or normalisation appears as a more viable option. As stated by Wæver, there exists a distinction between the management of securitised issues (normalisation) and desecuritisation. The management of securitised issues bring the notion of normalising the situation - an insecurity situation, which still denotes a security threat but no, or insufficient, response (Wæver 1998:81).

Last but not least, the Copenhagen School's definition of asecurity seems to be lacking in precision. The Copenhagen School defines asecurity as taking certain issues outside the realm of security thinking but they fail to give a precise conceptualisation. Partly because of the broad definition of asecurity, it was realised
that there was not a meaningful threshold provided by which one could judge whether or not an issue reaches asecurity. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, for instance, how much civil society interaction or peace-building has to happen before interlocutors in bargaining situations shift dialogue into the asecurity domain? What causal mechanisms or linkages to move a situation from being one of peace-building to a state of asecurity? Since in the Israeli-Palestinian case asecurity has not yet been reached, this thesis cannot answer the question of how certain issues reached the asecurity level in protracted conflict settings. For a better understanding the application of this analytical framework elsewhere - e.g. Northern Ireland or the Western Balkans - is required as a particular area for future research. This is particularly important for the development of the desecuritisation approach as a framework for conflict resolution that could be applied to different types of conflicts.

7.4 Desecuritisation in the Israeli-Palestinian Context: Prospects and Problems

In this thesis, the idea of applying securitisation theory to the Israeli-Palestinian case stemmed from the prior assumption that it provides a case for analyzing desecuritisation processes as well as securitisations. The background and analysis chapters for desecuritisation analysis (Chapters 4-6) demonstrate that there exists a group of individuals and civil society actors both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories who have committed themselves to peace-building and reconciliation. However, their success in transforming overtly securitised relations between Israel and Palestine and in accelerating a full-fledged desecuritisation process has been constrained by ongoing political securitisations.

Through the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace education and water management projects, the potential for a desecuritisation process through the use of effectiveness criteria was demonstrated. In this regard, the thesis shows that the continuation of peace-building efforts of Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors have constituted a stepping-stone for future desecuritisations. It is argued that bottom-up desecuritisation efforts alone cannot bring about a shift from security to asecurity, but they can strengthen the belief that Israelis and Palestinians could and should be
able to co-exist. However, for there to be a genuine shift to a security, the political will for peace-making is required as well.

As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the temporary freeze in official level contacts between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority during the Hamas government’s administration had negatively affected civil society efforts. Only since the establishment of the Palestinian Unity Government in March 2007, have negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian governments restarted in the Annapolis Conference of 27 November 2007. Within this context, a number of positive developments have occurred in 2008 strengthening the potential for desecuritisation in the long term.

In April 2008, a petition was prepared by IPCRI for the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Tzipi Livni, and the Head of the Palestinian Negotiating Team, Ahmad Qureia. It presented a joint request to the international donor community during their meeting in London on 2 May 2008 for the creation of the International Fund for Palestinian-Israeli Peace. In the petition, the importance of integrating peace-building with the official-level peace-making process was highlighted by saying “It should be clear to you that even prior to reaching full agreement on the core issues; it is necessary and even urgent to build support for peace amongst the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. We must have constituencies for peace in order to build support both now and after agreement is reached” (Petition to the Governments of Israel and Palestine 2008). In the petition, the variety of bottom-up peace-building activities and their impact of bringing together tens of thousands of Israelis and Palestinians were underlined. The petition also called for the resources necessary to truly realise the potential of these efforts to be committed. While the petition did not succeed in the establishment of the International Fund for Palestinian-Israeli Peace, the call was taken seriously by Livni and Qureia. The determination of the Israeli and Palestinian civil societies had not been disregarded by the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. Within the framework of the current negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on a final-status agreement, Livni and Qureia have agreed to review school textbooks with a view to removing content that incites violence or a lack of tolerance on national or religious grounds. Even though the talks deal mainly with the core issues of the conflict, a number of joint teams dealing with
structural and cultural issues have been set up. Within this context, one of the committees established deals with the culture of peace and is to focus mainly on issues of incitement. The committee has had numerous meetings and has prepared several preliminary proposals for ways in which incitement could be dealt with in the framework of a final-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Haaretz 2008b).

Given the lack of official support for the Israeli and Palestinian peace education efforts of the civil society, the inclusion of culture of peace is considered as an important step towards official-level peace-building. The initial proposals presented to Livni and Qureia targeted the elimination of incitement in the media, with emphasis on the electronic media as well as schoolbooks. The focus will be “the content that incites to violence, content that harms the right to self determination of the other side or content that encourages a lack of recognition of the other side’s right to exist” (Haaretz 2008b). The inclusion of the media is particularly important regarding both sides’ recognition of the need for societal-level peace education, which constitutes an integral part of the desecuritisation process. This development brings the issue of effectiveness of peace education programmes. According to the second criterion the particular peace-building activity is considered as effective if it involves in developing or supporting institutions or mechanisms to address the inequalities and injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Given their success, particularly IPCRI’s constant pressure through media and petition campaign, to persuade Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to include peace education in negotiation agenda the Israeli-Palestinian peace education activities proved to be effective.

The official-level support for the creation of a peace culture is an extremely important step for desecuritisation as well as the public support for a two-state solution and the renewal of negotiations. Fortunately, the political turbulence experienced both in Israel, political scandals involving Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and, in Palestine, infighting and political tension between Fatah and Hamas, which delayed the negotiations, have not changed Israeli and Palestinian public support for reconciliation. As far as Israeli and Palestinian public opinions are concerned, as discussed in Chapter 4, the general support for reconciliation was significantly high within both communities by the end of 2006 (Shamir 2007:40). According to the most
recent public opinion polls conducted in April 2008, both the Israeli and Palestinian public opinions were still in favour of the renewal of negotiations. According to Tel Aviv University Tami Steinmetz Centre’s War and Peace Index results, 57 percent of Israeli Jewish respondents declared that they were in favour of holding negotiations with the PA and an even larger majority of 70 percent support the formula of two states for two peoples. Similarly, 56 percent of Palestinians support the mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Also, 58 percent of Palestinians prefers the two-state solution according to a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Public Opinion Poll held in June 2008.

Given the difficulty of reaching an agreement over the controversial issues like Jerusalem, borders and the right to return, Israeli and Palestinian peace-makers have a long way to go to reach a final status agreement. While the resolution of the political aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is important, it seems beyond doubt that the desecuritisation of relations is also essential for reconciliation. In this regard, the most recent developments, such as the inclusion of the creation of a peace culture between the Israelis and Palestinians in the negotiation process, have strengthened the potential for Israeli-Palestinian desecuritisations. However, the fragile state of the relations between the two sides and the existence of a number of competing security discourses continue to make things extremely difficult for desecuritising actors. Recent developments can be seen to be making valuable ground for the initiation of a desecuritisation process, but then, in an instant of violence, (from members of either group) that progress can come crumbling down.

32 The data for the index are collected in a monthly telephone survey that is based on a probabilistic representative sample of the entire adult population of Israel (age 18+) including Arabs, kibbutzim and moshavim, and the settlements in the territories. The size of the sample is about 600 men and women and the sampling error is about 4.5 percent.

33 The poll was conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between May 27 and June 7, 2008. The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 5 and 7, 2008. The margin of error was 3 percent.
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