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and Korean society: causes, 
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The Seoul Olympic Games and Korean Society: Causes, context and consequences

by

Ji Hyun Cho

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in Partial fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

September 2009
Supervisor: Professor Alan Bairner
School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences

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The overall aim of the research project is to investigate the aims and the consequences of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. The Seoul Olympics took place over twenty years ago, and the event has had a significant impact on South Korean society which is best explained by reference to theories of globalization and mega events. The project uses qualitative methods and a variety of data sources to evaluate the domestic impact of the Games in relation to culture, politics, sport, and economics.

The analysis is contextualised within an understanding of Korean history with specific reference to Japanese colonialism and relations between North and South Korea. Particular attention is paid to the decision by most of the Communist bloc to participate in the Seoul Olympics, despite a North Korean boycott. The thesis also examines the reasons that lay behind Seoul winning the right to host the Games, as well as the post-Games consequences, both of which are addressed using empirical data drawn from interviews and documentary evidence.

Having addressed the evidence within the context of wider sociological debate concerning globalisation, the thesis concludes that South Korea’s political, economic, cultural and sporting interests were well served by the Seoul Olympic Games, and that hosting a mega-event of this scale helped to accelerate South Korea’s modernisation process and its emergence on the global stage.

**Keywords:** Seoul Olympics, Olympism, globalisation, mega events, Korea, KOC, IOC
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis has felt like a performance involving my entire life. The hosting of the Seoul Olympic Games was a great influence on my ambition to become an elite athlete and enhanced my interest in sport. My thanks go to the SLOOC (Seoul Olympic Organisation Committee) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for making the Seoul Games happen.

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Fourthly, much thanks go to the Korea Olympic Committee (KOC) for providing me with the scholarship necessary to have the opportunity to do a PhD programme. I am so pleased and proud to have been the first ever South Korean elite athlete to receive a PhD scholarship to study in the West. Because of this opportunity and the motivation it gave me, I will try my best to work for South Korea’s future sport development in the future. In addition, my thanks go to the Europe-Korea Foundation (EKF) and The United Kingdom Education Office (UKEO) for their support, which helped me to realise my original goal of working towards a PhD degree in a Western country. Deep thanks also go to my interviewees, Dr Park She-Jik, Dr Lim Burn-Jang, Mr Kim
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Lastly, Mum and Dad, thank you very much for your great mental and financial support. I know that Mum and Dad are always concerned about my work and miss me very much. My PhD studies may have been difficult and involved hard times; however, it's time now for me to start to make my parents happy and work for a brighter life in the future!!
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<tr>
<td>ANOC</td>
<td>Association of National Olympic Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COEX</td>
<td>Corean Exhibition Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Federation International Football Association</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTCs</td>
<td>General Trading Companies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>KASA</td>
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<td>Korea Football Association</td>
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<td>KOC</td>
<td>South Korea Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNTO</td>
<td>Korea National Tourism Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KTO</td>
<td>Korea Tourism Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Council of Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>SLOOC</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Organising Committee</td>
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<td>SOSFO</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WTF</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Understanding globalization processes and dynamics, and thus the potential for 'global society', is one of the greatest social scientific challenges of our period; and controlling globalization, or indeed even steering it, through the development of forms of global governance, is one of the greatest political challenges we face in the 21st century (Roche, 2006: 27).

For many people, the Seoul Olympic Games of 1988 are best remembered for the final of the men’s 100 metres, won magnificently by Canada’s Ben Johnson, who was subsequently stripped of his gold medal having been discovered to have used a performance enhancing drug. For the host nation, however, these Games had more substantial lasting consequences.

At the time, the Seoul Games were the largest to have taken place since the modern Olympics started. In total 167 countries were members of the IOC in the 1980s and 159 of those countries participated in the 1988 Games, with 8,391 athletes (6,197 men and 2,194 women) competing in a total of 237 events, with 27,221 volunteers assisting the organisers and 11,331 media representatives (4,978 written press and 6,353 broadcasters) transmitting their reports on the Games to a worldwide audience (IOC, online). In addition, the sporting contests were supervised by 10,288 referees and officials. Three thousand, four hundred VIPs from 162 countries attended and 240,000 tourists visited the Seoul Olympics festival (Kim, 1990). The official slogan of the Seoul Olympics read: “Seoul to The World, The World to Seoul” and also, the opening ceremony theme was entitled: “Toward One World, Beyond All Barriers” (The Seoul Olympic Official Report, 1988).

The Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 took place against a dramatic historical background. Korea had been the site of major conflict between the communist bloc and the West, and was still seen, to some extent, as unstable. South Korea was still at that point considered a peripheral country, and there were a number of difficulties for hosting a mega event such as the Olympics on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, not many really believed that Seoul had a chance of successfully bidding for the Games.
With 20 years having elapsed, this is an ideal time to study the Games, the political, economic, cultural and sporting context and impact of which this thesis examines.

Over the past few decades, a number of social scientists (Roche, 2000; Bairner, 2001; Miller et al 2001; Preuss, 2002; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2002; Essex and Chalkley, 2003; Puig, 2006) have assessed the nature of the impact of hosting mega events on a city or country. This research has demonstrated that through the Seoul Olympics, several significant influences were felt in Korean society, making these Games an exemplary case study for analysing the consequences of the Olympics for politics, economics, the socio-cultural sphere and the national sports establishment. South Korea’s democratic consolidation in 1987 and a number of Korean social movements against the former authoritarian government ushered in a new era for South Korean society. In particular, this research seeks to explain the phenomenon of the country’s “Modernisation”, “democratisation”, and “globalisation” processes, which are connected with the hosting of the Seoul Olympics, the actual consequences of which are still felt today.

The researcher grew up in South Korea within a sporting family, and was inspired by the Seoul Olympics to become an elite athlete. This athletic career lasted for eight years, involving national representation through participating at many international Judo competitions, providing personal experiences which have combined with a sociological academic background to stimulate the desire to undertake this project.

After the democratic consolidation in 1987, South Korea has seen rapid development of its industry, reform of its politics and the growth of socio-cultural democratic ideas, which have boosted its transformation into a global society. Hosting mega events has provided experiences which have accelerated South Korea’s elite sport development and promoted their cultural products to the world. However, there are also crucial negative issues arising in the elite sport era. In this regard, a number of sports scholars have debated the interrelation of globalisation and mega sports events, exploring the interplay of positive and negative social consequences stemming from such events (e.g. Maguire, 1999; Bairner 2001; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004; Roche 1992-2006; Bridges, 1986-2008).
Between the pre- and post-Seoul Olympic period, it is evident that there have been various transformations in South Korean society. A number of scholars (Larson and Park, 1993; Kim and Lim, 1994; Ha, 1997; Kim, 2000; Bridges, 2008) have argued that the Seoul Olympic Games was one of the most successful examples of a country hosting a global mega event. This research has shown that South Korea has undergone rapid political, economic and social developments which are highly linked to the process of globalisation and the democratisation of the country. However, it is important to remember that since the advent of the two ‘divided countries’ (Merkel, 2008), North and South Korea have had different social standards, and an ideological conflict has existed between them ever since the Korean War. In addition, the post-war condition has impacted on the two Koreas’ development with regard to ideology, politics, society and economic performance along radically different lines (Ha and Mangan, 2003).

The purpose of this case study, exploring the Seoul Olympics, is to explain South Korea’s political, economic and socio-cultural development and ultimately evaluate the Seoul Olympics’ consequences for Korean society. In addition, however, the issue of the possible unification of North and South Korea is seriously addressed. To these ends, the project has investigated how South Korea has become a democratic society, and has also examined the causes of South Korea’s ‘sporting miracle’. Finally, the study asks what actual consequences (political, economic, socio-cultural and sporting) still exist in South Korean society today, and considers how these are linked to hosting mega events and the globalisation of Korea.

This project has generated empirical data gathered from interviews, newspapers and other secondary sources. It is organised into eight chapters which discuss the many issues related to this research topic. The first chapter starts with a literature review focused on theories of globalisation and mega events; the second chapter examines South Korea’s history (including the Japanese colonial period and the military regime following the Korean War), and the initial idea of hosting the Olympic Games in South Korea. The third chapter explores Korea’s sporting developments, which stem from the origin of modern sport in Korea, and were affected by Japanese colonisation, the ‘sport republic’ era (1960-88), and finally, the planning of the Seoul Olympic Games. The fourth chapter concerns methodological debates (Positivism, Relativism,
Realism and Critical Realism), revealing that this research will take a critical realist position to evaluate the 1988 Seoul Olympics’ consequences. Continuing on the theme of sport development in South Korea, chapter five investigates the Seoul Olympics with specific reference to their effects on international relations, associated with the bidding profiles, the relationships between the Korea Olympic Committee (KOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and North and South Korea’s joint demand to host the 1988 Summer Olympics. The project’s interview data (Chapter 6) and discussion sections (Chapter 7) reveal original insights into the themes previously discussed, mainly the result of empirical data from interviews with some of South Korea’s key experts on the Seoul Games, including politicians, sport organisation officials, university professors and other social scientists. Finally, the report concludes (Chapter 8) with a summary of all the contents and offers an evaluation of the project’s limitations, as well as suggestions for future research.

Aims of the Project

The aims of the research will now be introduced, and the rationale for undertaking the research project will be explained. This section maps out the approach that has been adopted in addressing the motives and methods for bidding to host the Games, and assessing the consequences of staging the Games.

There are three significant research questions addressed in this project. The research will seek:

1. To investigate the reasons why there was a desire to bring the Games to Seoul.

2. To evaluate what was expected to be achieved as a consequence of the Games.

3. To investigate what the actual consequences have been.

To sum up, this PhD thesis is primarily concerned with understanding globalisation processes and the transformation of South Korean society regarding politics,
economics, socio-cultural forms and sporting practice and policy. Thus, the project will draw upon sociological viewpoints from existing literature, and interview data taken from South Korea’s key experts’ to address the significant impact the Seoul Games had in terms of the globalisation of South Korea. This research is timely because of the pressing importance of the issue of relations between North and South Korea, currently considered a major concern for global civil society and for the peace and security of the rest of the world.

In conclusion, the project debates the consequences of the changes that have occurred and seeks to make a contribution not only to the social science field but also the sport policy area by making available empirical data and analysis relating to the consequences of the Seoul Olympics.
Chapter 1: Globalisation, Sport and the Growth of Mega-Events

1-1. Introduction

In order to establish the theoretical context within which the Seoul Olympics can best be understood, the literature review begins with an examination of theories of globalisation and the concept of mega-events. In the social sciences, 'globalisation' has been one of the most hotly debated issues in relation to its economic, political, cultural, and environmental aspects and the interconnections among these, most notably with regard to the relationships of cause and effect on a world scale. According to several definitions (Held and McGrew, 2000; Haywood, 2003), globalisation is a phenomenon that is leading to the standardisation of people's ways of life and of economic systems around the world. Globalisation is a complex phenomenon due to different regional and cultural perspectives (Steger, 2003). Therefore, some social scholars have argued that the relationship between the drivers and consequences of globalisation are almost impossible to assess (Guillen, 2001).

Any examination of globalisation has to take into consideration different ideological or disciplinary views of its economic, political and cultural consequences. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to focus on the negative effects of globalisation, in particular from the Western scholars who have frequently debated globalisation's negative outcomes (e.g. Donnelly, 1996; Bairner, 2001; Heywood, 2003). For example, Rigg (2001) has tended to focus on how globalisation has influenced the decline and erosion of state powers and authority in relation to the traditional understanding and conception of the state, and the notion of citizenship. Furthermore, according to Heywood (2003: 325) 'globalization has had a significant impact upon a number of ideological traditions, notably socialism, nationalism and religious fundamentalism, but it also has wider implications for ideology as a whole'.

This chapter will discuss globalisation and the mega events phenomenon with regard to their economic, political, cultural and sporting dimensions. In particular, Giddens' (1990), Robertson's (1995), Maguire's (1999), Bairner's (2001), Steger's (2003), and Schirato and Webb's (2003) works are examined. This will provide a better
understanding of globalisation and the mega events phenomenon, which will help to provide a conceptual and theoretical context for the current project.

1-2. The Globalisation Phenomenon

In the 19th century, closer relationships among countries throughout the world grew rapidly and trade and investment conducted by the European imperial powers and also the United States had their impact on their overseas colonies. This period is often called 'The First Era of Globalisation' and was severely disrupted by World War I. It has also been asserted that during the Cold War period, which lasted from the 1940s to the 1990s, 'globalisation was principally ideological, present more in the discourse than in reality' (Schirato and Webb, 2003: 7). A number of scholars have nonetheless attempted to identify the essential qualities of globalisation processes' (Steger, 2003: 9).

Globalisation has been viewed as a social condition that, 'like all conditions, is destined to give way to new, qualitatively distinct constellations' (Steger, 2003: 7). As a result, globalisation has been subjected to various definitions. For example, political scientist, Gilpin (1987: 389) points out that globalisation pertains to the 'increasing interdependence of national economies in trade, finance, and macroeconomic policy'. From a sociological perspective, on the other hand, Robertson (1992: 8) argues that 'globalisation refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole'. Moreover, another sociologist Albrow (1997: 88) defines 'globalisation as the diffusion of practices, values and technology that have an influence on nation's lives worldwide'. Meanwhile, Steger (2003: 13) emphasises that 'globalisation refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant'.

Most analysts associate the term 'globalisation' with worldwide economic, cultural, political and technological changes. However, some scholars argue that globalisation
‘really exists for everyone - as access to technology, as a world view, or simply as an instrumental name and set of discourses’ (Schirato and Webb, 2003: 9).

In order to address the question of whether globalisation is ‘real’, it is necessary to consider how the concept has evolved. For the past four decades, it has been argued that work on post-industrialism captures globalisation’s contemporary features and that globalisation has been an ‘extension of complex processes that began with the emergence of modernity and the capitalist world system’ (Steger, 2003: 18). However, others have refused to adhere to the opinion that globalisation can be measured in decades or centuries, because they maintain that it has resulted from processes which have been in existence for thousands of years.

Describing the emergence of ‘modernity’ in terms of the European Enlightenment, where objective, scientific rationality and universal forms of government began to replace pre-modern religious, feudal, political tyrannies, Steger (2003: 28) explains that:

European metropolitan centres and their affiliated merchant classes represented another important factor responsible for strengthening globalisation tendencies during the early modern period. European economic entrepreneurs laid the foundation of what later scholars would call the ‘capitalist world system’.

Moreover, between 1850 and 1914 the volume of world trade dramatically increased due to the favourable prices charged for the global merchandising of grains, cotton, and a diverse array of metals. In particular, Australia and the Pacific islands began to combine with the European-controlled network to build cultural, political and economic exchange.

Steger (2003) has stated that prior to World War I, merchandise trade measured as a percentage of gross national output totalled almost 12 percent for industrialised countries, a level that was unmatched until the 1970s. From that period onwards, the global merchandise system became increasingly important through the advertising of various brand products such as ‘Coca-Cola drinks, Campbell soups, Singer sewing machines, and Remington typewriters’ (Steger, 2003: 32).
Ironically, Marx and Engels predicted in the 19th century that the advances in science and technology would help to stimulate global communications and the rise of the bourgeoisie. Another important development was that the new industries associated with electricity and petroleum began to be investigated. As a result, there was a growth in railway networks, sea freight and air transportation which served to overcome not only geographical difficulties but also led to the establishment of a global infrastructure, thereby lowering the cost of transportation to the lowest levels achieved hitherto. However, these developments also brought harmful environmental side effects for humans and natural resources across the globe. After 1866, there were major developments in the use of the telegraph, telephone and wireless radio communication, while the period of the mass media began at the start of the 20th century, with, the increased provision of newspapers, magazines, television and film to the global population.

In the modern period, globalisation has intensified as a consequence of migration with the associated exchange between cultures and the transformation of social patterns. Furthermore, as Steger (2003: 35) has emphasised, 'there is no question that interstate rivalries intensified at the outset of the 20th century as a result of mass migration, urbanization, colonial competition, and the excessive liberalization of world trade'. In 1945, the decolonisation period slowly began to revive global exchanges and the United Nations set out to encourage the spread of democratic governance. During the 1950s, however, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the world into two antagonistic spheres of influence in the 40-year Cold War. While never using direct military intervention against each other, the United States and the Soviet Union confronted one another for nearly half a century and supported their partner countries militarily and politically around the world. Conflicts such as the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1959-1975), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) were largely precipitated by the antagonism fuelled by the Cold War (Grau and Gress, 2002).

In the 1960s Galtung (1967) and Nettl and Robertson (1966, 1968) studied whether the processes of modernisation were positively or negatively influenced by political elites. Later, Robertson (1992) emphasised that globalisation and the world-systems analysis of 'cultural issues' (see Sklair, 1999) are actually rival perspectives.
However, in recent years different organisations and interest groups have offered their own perspectives, which are linked to the multiple interests of the globalisation phenomenon. Albrow and King (1990: 6-8) point out that the history of sociology has significant interconnections with subjects such as 'universalism, national sociologies, internationalism, indigenisation, and globalisation'. Yet, Robertson (1992) has argued that globalisation is closely related to modernity and modernisation, as well as to post-modernity and post-modernisation. Luhmann (1985) merely points out that the outcome of a global system is not a simple process.

Therefore, it is important that the concept of globalisation is considered from a wide range of perspectives; including the economic, political, cultural and social. Moreover, Robertson (1992) has suggested that globalisation significantly interfaces with concepts such as 'westernisation', 'imperialism' and, in a dynamic and diverse sense, 'civilisation'.

1-2-1. The Economic Dimension of Globalisation

One of the most common conceptions of globalisation concerns the economic dimension. In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference was held in Washington D.C. The 45 allied nations participated in setting up a monetary exchange system and arranged a gold value for the US currency. Moreover, in 1947 as a result of the conference they established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): two organisations whose influence has expanded into developing countries around the world (Steger, 2003). These global trade organisations' activities had their effect on the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. Steger (2003: 38) notes that over a period of 30 years the 'Bretton Woods regime contributed greatly to the establishment of what some observers have called the “golden age of controlled capitalism”. Moreover, its impact was apparent in the growth of a full employment system and the spread of improved welfare conditions. However, the Bretton Woods system broke down in the 1970s.

In addition, in the 1980s, the United States President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher led the neoliberal revolution against
Keynesianism, consciously linking the notion of globalisation to the liberation of economies around the world' (Steger, 2003: 40). Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the enforcement of the new liberal economic order had the effect of provoking the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As a result, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO gave rise to the development of economic globalisation and also an increase in the internationalisation of trade and finance, accompanied by the increasing power of Trans-National Corporations (TNC) (Steger, 2003). In addition, Guillen's (2001: 13) case study has demonstrated that 'firms and labour unions in Argentina, South Korea and Spain diverged in their patterns of behaviour, organisational form, and growth even as their home countries became more integrated with the global economy during the post World War II period'. Between 1870 and 1990, there was a five-fold gap between per capita incomes in developed and developing countries (Pritchett 1997; Temple 1999). Krugman (2005) noted that the exports percentage of world gross domestic production rose from 7 percent in 1950 to 17 percent in 1995.

However, since 1960 some developing countries have reduced the gap between their average incomes and those of the rich countries, amongst them previously underdeveloped countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. A small number of developing countries have exhibited some spectacular economic progress since 1980. For instance, during the 1990s the 'tiger economies' of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong were able to increase their profits and the standard of living of their people. Thus, their activities on the world stage have helped such economies to grow fairly successfully and to become more active participants in the global market (Schirato and Webb, 2003). Nevertheless, Guillen (2001: 14) points out that 'development levels appear not to be converging as a result of globalisation'.

Historically, 'capitalism won a decisive victory over fascism with end of World War II and again over communism, with the end of Cold War' (Schirato and Webb, 2003: 80). Marx's work emphasised that 'capitalism driven as it is by the need for ever bigger markets and ever cheaper raw materials, would necessarily spread across the globe' (cited in Schirato and Webb, 2003: 81). Indeed, a number of analysts (Cohen, 2006, Held and McGrew, 2002, Nye and Donahue, 2000) have pointed out that the world economy has achieved a
significant level of integration of production, distribution and labour. Schirato and Webb (2003) have added to the debate by suggesting that territoriality is an irrelevant issue even to the most trans-nationally inclined of corporations. This means that perhaps most global political issues are responding to the spread of global trade and finance.

1-2-2. The Political Dimension of Globalisation

It is also important to take into account global governance and its link to the relationship between international and national organisations. During the 1970s, globalisation tendencies were strongly growing in the world. It seemed that the international society of separate states was rapidly turning into what Steger (2003: 61) has referred to as 'a global web of political interdependencies that challenged the sovereignty of nation-states'. Moreover, it has been shown that in 1909 there were 37 inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and 176 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and by 1996 there were 260 IGOs and 5,472 INGOs (Held and McGrew, 2000).

In the post-war period the power of IGOs had an increasing influence on individual nations and also, at the global level, on the formation of governments. Some of the most influential organisations in this respect are the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Group of Eight (G8: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States).

However, the European Union (EU) developed a strategy towards increased involvement with Asian nations. During the 1990s, Asian countries experienced huge growth in their economic markets and the EU was actively involved with Asian partners (The Asia and Europe Meeting (ASEM), 1994). It was suggested that the basic objective of the policies towards Asia was to increase Asian interest in and knowledge of the EU and to demonstrate to Asian countries the ability and
commitment of Europe to make a positive contribution to the peaceful development and stability of their region.

More specifically, this Asia strategy had six objectives, which were:

1. Contribute to peace and security in the region and globally.
2. Further strengthen mutual trade and investment flow.
3. Promote the development of the less prosperous countries.
4. Contribute to the protection of Human Rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; constructive exchanges such as the EU-China human rights dialogue should allow for improved cooperation.
5. Build global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries.
6. Help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia (and vice versa) (ASEM, 1994).

Political globalisation has had significant repercussions. As a result, global markets have frequently undermined the capacity of governments to set independent national policy objectives and impose their own domestic standards (Steger, 2003). Moreover, Steger (2003: 67) believes that ‘political globalisation might facilitate the emergence of democratic transnational social forces anchored in this thriving sphere of global civil society’. However, the outcome of political globalisation is based on a cosmopolitan democracy that tends to occur within the context of mutual toleration and accountability (Steger, 2003). Held (1995: 96-120) has suggested that to achieve global democracy there are certain key requirements:

1. A global parliament connected to regions, states, and localities;
2. A new charter of rights and duties locked into different domains of political, social, and economic power;
3. The formal separation of political and economic interests;
4. An interconnected global legal system with mechanisms of enforcement from the local to the global.
Globally, most nation states are concerned with political, economic and cultural interactions that might include problems linked to environmental degradation, refugees and mass migration, weapons issues, and organised crime, including terrorism.

1-2-3. The Cultural Dimension of Globalisation

The concept of cultural globalisation is very broad. Cultural globalisation refers to the international exchange of cultural practice through, for instance, the distribution of cultural expressions via the internet and other technologies. As a result, much research has investigated how technologies such as air travel, mass media, and the internet have helped to create a burgeoning range of consumers. Media associated with popular music, films, and high profile sporting events have dramatically increased people's exposure to new and different cultures. Held and McGrew (2000) acknowledge that television has been a major factor in the development of advertising, the spread of popular music and exposure to global news services and sporting events.

Schafer's (2001: 312) work suggests that:

Not too many people care about global civilisation at this moment, in fact, most people are prepared by their local culture to dismiss a singular civilisation or consider it a dangerous thing. Yet, world music, global email, human rights, green politics and other global pursuits and holistic interests are showing the seeds for more intense global identifications.

At the same time, the English language is one of the most influential communication tools on the global stage. According to Steger (2003: 84), it has a long history that dates back to the 16th century when only approximately seven million people used English. However, by the 1990s there were 350 million native speakers and 400 million more using English as a second language. While the English language has spread, several other languages have also gained in popularity around the world, such as Spanish, French and Mandarin. Nonetheless, Steger (2003) suggests that the power
of the Anglo-American culture industry has significantly contributed towards making English the global lingua franca of the 21st century.

An important aspect of cultural globalisation is that it allows people to share similar and diverse thoughts and ideas across the globe. For example, consider the global spread of merchandise and products associated with the USA, sometimes termed as the ‘Americanisation of the world’ or ‘McDonaldisation’. American sociologist Ritzer (1993) explains that ‘McDonaldisation’ describes the wide-ranging sociocultural processes by which the principles of the multinational ‘fast-food’ restaurant chain are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world. It can be argued that such ‘fast food’ products have contributed towards harming people’s health and generating problems such as diabetes, heart disease, cancer, and juvenile obesity (Steger, 2003). However, it is not only the health problems associated with ‘fast food’ that are a concern. Held and McGrew (2000) have suggested that while key multinational businesses such as Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, and Microsoft have been making huge profits from their global expansion, they do not consider political identity and legitimacy.

Cultural globalisation has both positive and negative effects on people’s lives. For example, Herman and McChesney (cited in Held and McGrew, 2000) show that media outputs tend to be commodified because they are designed to serve market ends, not citizenship needs. Cultural globalisation takes highly complex forms that result in shifting patterns of cultural understanding (Held and McGrew, 2000). On the other hand, Smith (1991) has posited that vernacular mobilisation, the politicisation of cultures, the intensification of cultural wars and the role of the intelligentsia and other strata are some of the reasons why national cultures continue to divide the world into discrete cultural blocs, which show little sign of homogenisation, let alone integration.

As mentioned earlier, new technology can assist with global cultural exchanges across the world whilst also promoting the expansion of communications industries. Yet, there are many concerns about the implications of issues related to cultural differences, a topic that social scientists still need to understand better.
1-2-4. The Ideological Dimension of Globalisation

Ideological conceptualisation consists of economic, social, and political history as well as human discourse. According to Heywood (2003: 319), ideology 'is simply a means by which a social group or an entire society achieves a measure of self-consciousness, by establishing a common identity or a set of collective goals'. This means that ideology should not be identified as true or false but only that it has been developed for social and political purposes (Heywood, 2003).

In addition, Steger (2003: 93) asserts that 'an ideology can be defined as a system of widely shared ideas, patterned beliefs, guiding norms and values, and ideals accepted as truth by a particular group of people'. What is relevant to this discussion is that an ideology can convey an individual's or a particular group of people's experiences. In social science it is possible, if not easy, to evaluate fact and value statements. However, globalisation is not easy to measure because ideologies are generally assumed to provide stronger motivational ideas than either matters of fact or values (Henry, 2002).

Ideologies can be very powerful mechanisms. However, they can also be problematic because of potentially key differences between facts and values and the complex combination of both religious and mystical beliefs. Some ideologies can manifest themselves through violent activity, such as war and terrorism. It is, therefore, unfair to judge historical events as 'good' or 'bad' because the ideological contexts were different from that of the present day (Henry, 2002). For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand embraced free-market policies (Steger, 2003). However, Steger (2003: 98) questions whether 'the spread of market principles really happen because there exists a metaphysical connection between globalisation and the expansion of markets? Or does it occur because globalists have the political and discursive power to shape the world largely according to their ideological formula?'. For instance, the United States is one of the most powerful countries in the world, possessing strong economic and military aspects. Furthermore, the largest TNCs are based in North America. Thus conditions are perhaps shaped by American domestic and foreign policy (Steger, 2003).
Frequently, many argue that ‘globalisation has benefits from liberalisation: rising
global living standards, economic efficiency, individual freedom, and unprecedented
technological progress’ (Steger, 2003: 103). However, Steger (2003: 104) also
stresses that ‘the opportunities and rewards of globalisation are spread unequally,
concentrating power and wealth amongst a select group of people, regions, and
corporations at the expense of the multitude’. Yet, Henry (2002) points out that
globalisation must be developmental because a secular ideology about processes of
change must state that the world will change and for the better. On the other hand, it
is important to question whether globalisation is associated with the spread of
democracy globally. In the late 1980s, ‘democratic’ countries accounted for more
than half of all US imports from the global south. Ten years later democratic
countries supplied barely one-third of US imports from developing countries.
Apparently, even as more of the world’s countries adopt democracy, more American
businesses appear to deal with dictatorships (Steger 2003).

Heywood (2003: 321) points out that in the 1960s, an ‘ideology of welfare capitalism
or social democracy had triumphed over its rivals, although this triumph proved to be
only temporary’. On the other hand, Marxist works note that radical modern
ideologies such as feminism and ecologism grew in the 1960s (Heywood, 2003).
Ideological globalisation has impacted on social traditions, which possess inter­
connections between economic activity and trade. However, importantly, Heywood
(2003: 325-326) emphasises two alternative versions of globalism: ‘the first,
neoliberal globalism, links it to the expansion of market-based economic structure and
values. The second version of globalism is a state-security version’. Heywood’s
perspectives suggest that globalisation is the construction of a global capitalist
economy, which is geared to the interests of transnational corporations and
substantially reduces the power of the state particularly in its ability to transform
social structures. Moreover, state-security globalism has been viewed both as a
defence of humanitarian ideals and embattled liberal-democratic values and as an
attempt by the USA to establish global hegemony (Heywood, 2003).

However, the secular ideology of globalisation emerges from various interpretations
such as social reformism, liberal democracy, deliberative democracy or global
capitalism which are linked to a political creed (Heywood, 2003). Therefore, it is
important to discuss and investigate these issues with an open mind in relation to the myriad perspectives. It is also clear that ideological debate is alive and well, and that ideology is a continuing and unending process (Heywood, 2003). Another highly visible feature of the modern world is sport and it too interacts significantly with globalisation.

1-3. Sport and Globalisation

In modern society, sport has a socially important function that has stretched across the globe. The world has witnessed an increase of intensive global interconnections that are symptomatic of a ‘world economy, an international nation-state system, a diffusion of technology and division of labour and also, a system of military alliances and treaties’ (Giddens, 1990: 63-77). Maguire’s work (1999) points out in this context that the globalisation of sport is a cross-cultural process. As a result, Roudometof and Robertson (1995: 284) explain that:

Cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity are consequences of the globalisation process. Although cultural diffusion can transform a locale, the recurrent invention of tradition makes it possible to preserve, create or recreate cultural heterogeneity at the local level.

Furthermore, Harvey and Houle (1994: 346) demonstrate that:

Linking sport to globalisation leads to an analysis of sport as part of an emergent global culture, as contributing to the definition of new identities, and to the development of a world economy. Therefore, the debate between globalisation and Americanisation is more than a question of vocabulary. Indeed, it is a question of paradigmatic choice, which leads to completely different interpretations of a series of phenomena.

Bairner (2001) points out that sports sociologists have been prominent in the struggle to make sure that the globalisation process should not become identified with a relentless and irresistible surge toward complete homogenisation. Appadurai (1990) and Hannerz (1990) have emphasised that globalisation consists of ‘cultural flows’ and ‘global flows’ and that ‘the world has become one network of social relationships, and between its different regions there is a flow of meanings as well as of people and goods’ (Hannerz, 1990: 237). Moreover, Robertson (1992) has identified four
different ways to conceptualise this in the global field: nations/societies; individuals or selves; relations between nations/societies; and humankind as a whole. In addition, Featherstone (1995: 1) notes that the ‘global human condition requires new types of thinking, and for them, the global problematique represents the spatialization of social theory’.

According to Houlihan (1994: 200-201), ‘Globalisation, as related to sport, is...most evident and significant in providing governments with a further medium through which to conduct international politics’. However, the sporting goods industry has also used merchandise to promote the homogeneity of global sport (Maguire, 1999). Obviously, these goods are mainly designed in European nations and the United States. This suggests that globalisation of sport processes can be ‘one-dimensional’ or ‘multidimensional’ and this in turn leads either to ‘homogenisation’ or heterogenisation’. It is vital though to progress from a general discussion of the relationship between globalisation and sport to a more detailed consideration of the economic, political, cultural and ideological characteristics of this relationship.

1-3-1. Economic Globalisation of Sport

In globalisation processes, the economic sport arena has been a recent and important global phenomenon. The modern international sport industry is intrinsically linked to economic factors. According to Tomlinson (2007: 17):

Sport is an activity involving the circulation of money and capital and is thus totally immersed in the financial and economic network of ‘monopoly capitalism’. This suggests that ‘bourgeois industrial society is an exact reflection of capitalist categories’, ‘economic categories reflect the structures and principles of organisation of the capitalist mode of production (in Marx’s point view).

For example, the structure of bureaucratic capitalism promotes or forces the performance and competitiveness of sport; records are directly carried over from the driving forces of capitalism which contribute towards profit in production (Tomlinson, 2007).
The major international sports organisations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and their associated competitions are linked to huge economic networks of monopoly capitalism. Moreover, transnational corporations are linked to a sports goods industry and media-sports complexes that have been argued to pollute the environment, exploit indigenous workers and fundamentally market homogeneity (Sage, 1995).

It has been suggested (Dickens, 1992; Johnson et al, 1995) that one of the key features of globalisation in recent years has been the restructuring of the global economy. Increasingly, global networks of groups, organisations and regional groups structure the production and distribution of services and goods. As a result, economic development in the sports area is intrinsically tied to the industrial markets (Korzeniewicz, 1994). According to Rowe (1999), as sport becomes ever more professional and commodified, it does not disappear from the local print media, but local sport becomes secondary - even in provincial newspapers - to national and international sporting events.

Moreover, Bairner’s (2001) study points out that the American approach to sport, if not some of the great American sports themselves, have clearly been influential well beyond the boundaries of the United States. For example, if we look at football, the best players tend to appear in the Europe. However, Bairner argues that soccer in Europe may have been influenced by the American way of packaging sport. Furthermore, in NHL games (which are televised across the globe) players typically use equipment designed by North American and European companies but manufactured in developing countries (Maguire, 1999).

To sum up, sports businesses have been highly influential on global sport and its political economy. Perhaps this will become more inextricable with Americanisation’s impact on the globalisation of economic factors. On the other hand, according to Giddens (1990), Robertson (1992), Wallerstein (1974) the world has become one network. This means that the global sporting arena and the human condition often subscribe to co-ownership in the global arena, thereby actually reducing the power of the United States.
1.3.2. Political Globalisation of Sport

The governance and structure of international sports organisations have been critical in the global sports arena. For example, in the shape of major official sport organisations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It could be argued that huge global sporting organisations such as these possess large amounts of political and economic power (Matthew et al., 2001). Recently, the IOC announced that one of its key objectives is 'the development of the sport and environment agenda, by establishing a policy that seeks to provide greater resources to sustainable development in and through sport at national, regional and international level, and particularly at the Olympic Games' (IOC, 2007: Online).

There are two main purposes of the IOC, (IOC, 2007: Online):

1. It strives to promote Olympic Games which respect the environment and meet the standards of sustainable development.

2. It also aims to promote awareness among and educate the members of the Olympic family and sports practitioners in general of the importance of a healthy environment and sustainable development.

Major claims are made for global sport regarding the role it can play in the connection with health, disease control, economic development and environmental concerns (Maguire, 2005). Through global sporting initiatives, the United Nations have contributed towards policy formulation and implementation regarding sports at local, national and global levels (Maguire, 2005). The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, (2003: online), claims that:

Sport can play a role in improving the lives of individuals, not only individuals, I might add, but whole communities. I am convinced that the time is right to build on that understanding, to encourage governments, development agencies and communities to think how sport can be included more systematically in the plans to help children, particularly those living in the midst of poverty, disease and conflict.
Kofi Anan (2005: online) also announced that ‘Sport is a universal language that can bring people together no matter what their origin and background, religious beliefs or economic status’.

The political globalisation of sports related processes has ironically been developed by different states. Linklater (2004) argues that the primary effect of globalisation is to extend, or contract, emotional identification between members of different societies. However, Bairner (2001: 163) provides a different opinion, in that:

If the world is becoming homogenised, then nationalism or national identities in all their manifestations are rapidly losing their social significance. If however one adopts [a] more sophisticated approach...than it becomes obvious that nationalism coexists alongside globalisation and is at times strengthened by it.

On the other hand, (Maguire, 2005) has emphasised that standardisation, organisational development and global diffusion reflected and reinforced the entrenched global processes that were being powered by the West and by representatives of the US-in both the private and public sectors. It is therefore clear that the history of global political sport organisations emerged from western countries and was ultimately most heavily influenced by the United States.

1-3-3. Cultural Globalisation of Sport

Some sociological perspectives stress that every human’s life condition, knowledge, beliefs, and actions are intertwined with unfolding globalisation (Maguire, 1999). The process of the globalisation of sport shows that all cultural movements contribute to the development of international sport organisations (Maguire, 1999). Eichberg (1984: 97), discussing Olympism, points out that ‘a social pattern materializes which forms everyday life above and beyond sport - the everyday culture of the western (and east European) industrial society’. Robertson (1992: 130) points out that ‘globalisation processes do not lead to homogeneity, and global processes involve both the particularisation of universalism and the universalisation of particularism’. Robertson (1992) also argues that globalisation is more clearly understood as
indicating the problem of the form in terms of which the world becomes united but not integrated.

However, Maguire (1999) explains that ‘Sportization’ is, in certain respects, more symptomatic of the emergence of a transnational culture than other aspects of society. In addition, it is important to note that ‘globalisation research should be concerned with the multidimensional interrogation of these intercivilizational encounters’ (Robertson, 1995: 287). In the global sport era, military-industrial processes have impacted on the national character of sporting activities and achievements at the elite sporting level. If we look at the history of the pre – and inter World War period and the Olympic Games, the expansion of modern sport has occurred most decisively during periods of militarization. However, today state, sports science and the sports industry have afforded athletes and nations an increasing level of sporting quality. As a result Maguire (2002) points out that people within societies, and across different cultures and societies, have contributed to the making of modern sports and the expanding spatial dimensions of the sporting world.

In conclusion, within society there are many schisms associated with class, gender, race and disability which may be linked to global sporting-industrial interactions. However, global sports research needs above all to appreciate the differences between local and global interdependences and the state (Maguire, 2005).

1-3-4. Ideological Globalisation of Sport

In the modern global era, sport can provide multiple functions in people’s lives. However, social life is also associated with different political systems and different national and sub-national ideological backgrounds. The growing globalisation of sporting processes is often a complex relationship between sport and nationalism (Bairner, 2001). Heywood (2003) explains that some key implications for nationalism and for other ideological projects are based upon the national ideology. For example, some nations’ self-determination and national political ideologies have been operating under post-sovereign and/or post-colonialist conditions.
The debates over political ideology have been influenced by tendencies towards globalisation which is then linked to national economic strategies. As a result Heywood (2003: 23) emphasises that:

Modern liberalism and social democracy have been compromised by the declining viability of national economic strategies, such as Keynesian demand management, and conservatism is having to grapple with globalization's tendency to weakening tradition and national identity. Globalisation is by no means a neutral ideological force in its own right.

In the case of elite sporting competitions, the majority of countries involved are focused on winning medals. The particular issues that need to be considered are why governments invest money in the development of national sport? And why is it that people want to excel in sports? Is this intrinsically linked to capitalism? Or are there other reasons?

In the modern era, football has grown as a national sport in many countries and it has seen dramatic growth across the globe. As a result, Duke and Crolley (1996), Sugden and Tomlinson (1994) and Wagg (1995) have demonstrated that the global football phenomenon is worthy of a concentrated study. However, Bairner (2001: 167) argues that in addition, 'most societies do have their own peculiar traditions as regards sport and leisure activities'.

In the Olympic Games, most of the key sporting events originated in Western countries, with the exception of some martial art sports, such as Judo and Taekwondo. More generally, globalisation is influenced by Western nations and neo-imperialism. The profile of global sports can be significantly affected by the influence of organisations such as the IOC and FIFA. The next discussion will examine the relationship mega-events to sports and to broader political and economic trends.

1- 4. The Concept of Mega-Events

On the world stage, mega-events are 'large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance' (Roche, 2001: 1). In addition, Hall (1992) believes that
mega-events refer to hallmark or special events, major fairs festivals, expositions, cultural and sporting events which are held on either a regular or a one-off basis. As a result, Ritchie and Beliveau (1974), Law (1993, 2000) and Malecki (2004) have emphasised that mega-events can promote urban and regional tourism marketing and that they impact on the business market place. Such events can increase the inflow of foreign tourists (and their money), and they leave long-term social, economic and physical legacies in host cities/countries (Hall, 2006). For example, mega-events typically include the development of large scale facilities such as stadiums, hotels, restaurants and a variety of entertainment and commercial facilities (such as shopping centres).

Thus, Hall (1992), Essex and Chalkley (1998), Eisinger (2000) point out that mega-sports events such as the Olympic Games are associated with large-scale public expenditure, the construction of facilities and infra-structure, and urban redevelopment and revitalisation strategies. However, despite these apparent benefits, such expenditure may have undesirable long-term consequences for public stakeholders despite (or because of) the significant short-term gains for some corporate interests.

1-4-1. Mega-Events and Sociological Perspectives

The sociological analysis of sport has been concerned with ritualized, 'civic events and ceremonies (Durkheim); rationalized, bureaucratically organized, science driven behaviour (Weber); commercial, global spectacles (Marx); expressivity and the everyday (Simmel and postmodernism); and male cultural displays and cultural centres (feminism)' (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 1). Yet, the sociology of sport appears to be disdained by most sociologists, and despised by most sportspeople (Bourdieu, 1990). Using a sociological approach, this chapter discusses large-scale sports events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA football World Cup. It has been argued (Tomlinson and Young 2005; Young and Wamsley, 2005; Vigor et al, 2004) that mega-events should not merely be focused on key urban centres but that other (more peripheral) locations can also benefit (as an element of urban modernity) from hosting such large scale events. Moreover, Horne and Manzenenreiter (2006) have proposed that world mega-events research has three objectives;
1. to demonstrate the social, economic, political and cultural significance of sports and sports mega-events;
2. to outline the sociological and social scientific significance of sports mega-events, by reviewing research and debates about their impact from the disciplines of political science, human geography, international relations, economics as well as sociology; and
3. to suggest why sociologists and other social scientists should be interested in analysing them and ask what sociologists and social scientists can learn from analysing sports mega-events (Horne and Manzenenreiter, 2006: 2).

Table 1-1 provides a list of major mega events (Roche, 2000).

Table 1-1: Structuring international public culture: key mega-events 1980-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>City/nation</th>
<th>Mega-event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989 period</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Moscow, USSR</td>
<td>Olympics</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Spain (Final in Madrid)</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Los Angeles, USA</td>
<td>Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984b</td>
<td>New Orleans, USA</td>
<td>Expo</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986a</td>
<td>Mexico (Final in Mexico City)</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986b</td>
<td>Vancouver, Canada</td>
<td>Expo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul, South Korea</td>
<td>Olympics</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2000 period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Italy (Final in Rome)</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992a</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td>Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992b</td>
<td>Seville, Spain</td>
<td>Expo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>USA (Final in New York)</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta, USA</td>
<td>Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998a</td>
<td>France (Final in Paris)</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998b</td>
<td>Lisbon, Portugal</td>
<td>Expo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000a</td>
<td>Sydney, Australia</td>
<td>Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000b</td>
<td>London, UK</td>
<td>Expo (Millennium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000c</td>
<td>Hanover, Germany</td>
<td>Expo (International)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early 21st century</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Japan and Korea</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Athens, Greece</td>
<td>Summer Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing, China</td>
<td>Summer Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010a</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>World Cup (FIFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010b</td>
<td>Vancouver, Canada</td>
<td>Winter Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>London, UK</td>
<td>Summer Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Sochi, Russia</td>
<td>Winter Olympics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Roche (2000: 2)
Such mega-events have grabbed the attention of billions of people. For example during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, 40 billion people watched TV coverage consisting of 35,000 broadcast hours contributed. This was a 27 per cent increase compared with the Sydney Olympics in 2000 (see www.olympic.org/uk). Moreover, the 2002 FIFA World Cup, that was staged in Japan and South Korea, provided even more hours of programming (41,000) in 213 countries and produced an estimated cumulative audience of 28.8 billion viewers (Madrigal et al, 2005).

As suggested above, many mega-events have brought dramatic tensions to modern society but also excitement on the global stage. Furthermore, importantly, Hall (2006: 1) points out that ‘mega-events can be regarded as one of the hallmarks of modernity and have long managed to integrate industrial and corporate interests with those of government with respect to urban development and imaging’. Manzenreiter and Horne (2002: 1) explain that;

The way the global game is displayed has a lot to tell us about the way it is positioned in contemporary processes of globalisation and its significance for governance, economy and civil society.

Furthermore, Roche (2001: 17) has highlighted that mega-events can create ‘even if only periodically, problems of the real world for many citizens in modern societies, and that, as they always have done throughout the modern period, they continue to provide periodic focal points and symbolic expressions, and arenas of debate and struggle in relation to many ‘big issues?’.

Conversely, Scambler (2005) explains that sports mega-events can only be completely comprehended through adopting a multidimensional ‘jigsaw’ theoretical model of social reality such as that derived by Habermas. Thus theoretical considerations would need to take into account the economy and relations of the state and class, relations of command, patriarchy and relations of gender, tribalism and relations of ethnicity, and honour and relations of status (Scambler, 2005). Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) suggest that sports mega-events reflect contemporary socio-economic conditions and their study highlights matters pertaining to the cultural turn applied to sociology and the sociology sport. Sports-mega events have attracted large
scale involvement from people across the globe, despite cultural differences and ideological forces.

1-4-2. Growth of the Mega-Events in Global Era

The end of the 19th and early years of the 20th century experienced high profile initiatives such as the development of the modern Olympic Games and the world Expo in the United States in St. Louis (1904). Roche’s (2001: 16) work considers such historical mega-events, and is ‘focused on their various reasons and forces behind their creation, and their various impacts’, which are linked to ‘national cultural assertiveness and international cultural diplomacy’. Roche also investigates the connections between, the cultural, the political and the economic aspects of modern society in relation to mega events (Roche, 2001).

Table 1-2: shows Roche’s understanding of the key dimensions of Mega-events and their extraordinary character;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTER-NATIONAL EVENT:</th>
<th>OK Lead nation: National Elites + Publics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>But International NGOs involved (e.g. IOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AND ‘Host’ Role: ‘Welcoming the World’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN EVENT:</td>
<td>International Event is ‘localised’ in a ‘Host’ City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extra-Ordinary = Beyond Urban Event Calendar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Elites + Publics involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA EVENT:</td>
<td>Press, than Radio + than TV traditionally involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TV Corporations central to Mega-Sport Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extra-Ordinary = Beyond normal programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCALE:</td>
<td>‘Size Matters’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMPORALITY:</td>
<td>‘Time Matters’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Roche’s Presentation (2001)

The growth of sports mega-events, such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, is such as to increase people’s enthusiasm to be hosts. For example, at the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, 140 countries were represented, 6797 athletes competed, and 221 events took place in 23 sports. However, by 2004 in Athens, 201
countries were involved and 11,099 athletes took part in 301 events in the 28 Olympic sports (Malfas et al, 2004; www.athens2004.com). The main reasons for the expansion of mega-events is that new developments in the technologies of mass communication, especially the development of satellite television and the World Wide Web, have created unprecedented global audiences for events such as the Olympics and the World Cup. In addition, since the 1960s, broadcasting networks in the US have substantially competed to buy the Olympic Games (Horne, 2006).

The cost of TV rights has been growing dramatically, as have relationships between the media and the IOC and FIFA. For example, in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the US corporation NBC paid the IOC US$ 300 million (for coverage the Games) and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) paid just over the US$ 30 million with Canada paying US$4 million for media broadcasting rights. For the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, NBC paid US$894 million, the EBU paid over US$443 million, and Canadian broadcasters paid US$45 million merely for the rights to transmit pictures of the action (Coakley and Donnelly, 2004).

Sports mega-events are clearly linked to business purposes. Since the 1980s, the IOC encouraged the investment of millions of dollars through the establishment of The Olympic Partnership (TOP). The TOP encouraged business partnerships with the IOC and many organisations paid for the privilege of obtaining ‘partner status’ (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). The TOP programme idea was formed by Horst Dassler, son of the founder of Adidas, and at the time chief executive of the company. With the blessing of the then FIFA President Joao Havelange, Dassler established the International Sport and Leisure (ISL) which set up the TOP programme (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). Since the 1980s, the IOC and FIFA have both demonstrated a sound strategy for the success of their global businesses. However, sociological research concerned with the impact of this success has focussed on political, economic and social implications: what have been the actual positive and negative outcomes of hosting mega-events? (Malfas et al, 2004).
1-4-3. How Sporting Competitions become Mega Events

Sport in general and the Olympic Movement in particular, have frequently been promoted as a force for good in the world (Black and Bezanson, 2004). The Olympic movement has been regarded as highly compatible with the movement to promote universal human rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Black and Bezanson, 2004). In addition, Horne’s (2007) work has emphasised that sport mega-events are highly attractive for legacies that are social, cultural, environmental, political, economic and sporting. Black and Westhuzen (2004) also point out that such mega events increase the appeal of global games, perhaps most obviously in developing economies.

When hosting the Olympic Games, there are various advantages and also disadvantages for the hosting nation. However, anticipated ‘economic benefit is the prime motive’ for hosting them (Malfas et al, 2004: 218). These include new facilities, higher employment (rather than unemployment), increased numbers of foreign visitors (Hiller, 1989) but also national prestige. Yet, the host the city does not always experience positive impacts. In some cases, high taxes and short and long-term environmental issues mean that citizens can become disillusioned about the effect of mega sports events on their lives (Lenskyj, 2008).

Historically, the Montreal Olympic Games (1976) had a negative economic impact, largely attributed to an ongoing boycott by some nations. However, the Los Angeles Olympic Games (1984) showed that dramatic economic success was achievable despite ongoing boycotts. The Los Angeles Olympic Organising Committee (LAOOC) devised an excellent strategy for success in the business market because ‘the LAOOC sold TV rights to ABC for $225 million; the European networks, Eurovision and Intervision, together paid another $22 million, and Japanese added some $11 million to the coffers’ (Guttmann, 2002: 160). They also, made huge profits from corporate sponsors that included American Express, Anheuser Busch, Canon, Coca-Cola, Levi’s, IBM, Snickers, and Sanyo’ (Guttmann, 2002). Moreover, the McDonalds fast food restaurant chain began to market official Olympic products from 1984. The LAOOC and the IOC were able to ‘crow about glories of capitalism
and the critics of the games were free to sermonize about the horrors of capitalism' (Guttmann, 2002: 163).

Once mega-sport events have finished, there are popular beliefs about many of the positive impacts on the hosting city, specifically a range of 'legacies' (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). For example, economically hosting a mega event has been viewed as an industry around which cities can devise urban regeneration strategies. Socially mega-sports events have been viewed as a tool for the development of urban communities, and the reduction of social exclusion and crime.

To sum up, hosting sporting mega-events impacts in different ways on host cities and nations. There is much evidence of the influence of mega sports events on the political, economic and social aspects of nations and on international relations. The main aim of this study is to investigate the impact of the Seoul Olympic Games on the social, political and economic dimensions of South Korean society. To achieve this aim it is essential to understand first the political, economic and social development of the Korean peninsula and, specifically, of South Korea.
Chapter 2. Korean Politics, Economics and Society

2-1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to review the context for the subsequent enactment of South Korea's bid to host the 1988 Olympics. The chapter begins with an account of the late Chosun period at the end of the nineteenth century. Modernisation, however, took particular forms in the context of the Japanese occupation of Korea up to the end of the Second World War. It is impossible, therefore, to understand the aspirations of Korean society in the post-World War II period without an understanding of the roots of the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of modern Korea. Each of these four dimensions is thus considered in the sections which follow.

First of all, from the Chosun period onwards, Korea witnessed several events that influenced its progress towards becoming a developed country. The Europeans, Americans and Japanese made formal contacts with the country and opened up commercial relationships which heralded the modernisation of Korea. In 1876, Korea concluded the "Kanghwa Treaty" with Japan. The Treaty of Kanghwa introduced Japanese-style reforms that impacted on Korean society in a beneficial way to the economy, but were disadvantageous as well. This treaty was followed within a decade by the establishment of relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other Western powers. In addition, many western businessmen came to Korea and diplomatic relations were brokered with Korea alongside some attempts to alter the Korean political system (Columbia University, 2007: online).

The key factors in the country's modernisation are the Donghak Movement and the Kabo reformation of 1896. Eckert et al (1990) state that the Donghak Movement was one of the strongest proponents of change in Korean society, on account of its vigorous campaigning effort. Historically, Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945. During this period the economic, cultural, political and social situation in Korea changed dramatically. In addition, the Korean nation tried to consolidate its national identity through sporting events.
At the end of World War II Korea was liberated from the Japanese occupation. However, a unitary Korean government could not be established at that time. Initially, the Soviet Union and the United States handled problems of international policy on behalf of Korea. In the same year, two zones (North and South Korea) were established and divided at the 38th parallel by the Soviet Union and the United States. Korea had been liberated from Japanese domination, but it was now divided into North and South Korea (Hatada, 1969). As a result, Korea experienced a war between the North and the South from 1950 to 1953. This period reduced a large part of the country's infrastructure and many of its facilities, including housing and the economy (Song, 1990). Kihl (1984) actually believes that Koreans were victims of global rivalry and ideological conflict between socialism and capitalism, in the post-World War era.

The political system has a direct impact on every country's society, economy and culture and Korea is no exception. South Korea enjoyed a strongly developing economy under President Park Jung-Hee (1963-1979) and also during the era of President Chun Du-Hwan (1980-1987) with implications for sport as well. Each political period in modern Korean history will now be examined.

2-2. The Chosun Period

2-2-1. Politics

During the late 19th century, European nations, Russia, Japan and the United States requested commercial relations with Korea. This began to affect the modernisation of Korean society. From 1392 until 1897, Korea had a typical traditional culture with a monarchy (Chosun). The Chosun Dynasty was possibly the longest-lived in East Asia and was also the longest continuous royal dynasty in world history (see Appendix I). During the Chosun Dynasty, there were six ministerial agencies to conduct the principal tasks of administration, namely Personnel, Taxation, Rites, Military Affairs, Punishments, and Public works. Local government was divided into eight provinces. During this period, it may be said that local government was designed to satisfy local
as opposed to national interests. In addition, during this period an examination system was important for the selection and appointment of officials (Eckert et al, 1990).

The social and economic structure of the “Yangban” (high social class) bureaucratic state was different from that of commoners. The “Yangban” only resided on the land and were free from all labour, focusing only on official examinations because they belonged to families that were powerfully provided for (Hatada, 1969).

“Yangban” denotes well educated people in the Chosun Dynasty whose family background gave them high social status. However, in the late Chosun period, people could buy their entry into the Yangban class without having to pass exams.

Between 1592 and 1598, the Japanese invaded the Korean Peninsula. The war (Imjin) saw victories for the Japanese on land but failures at sea. The Korean navy besieged and starved the Japanese forces into submission by successfully intercepting their supply fleets in the western waters of the peninsula, into which most of its major rivers flow.

During the pre-war period, a large increase in the number of tribute-tax collectors and heavy taxation caused peasants to hand over their land to the powerful Yangban. The Yangban were able to withdraw the land from registration, allowing them to collect the tax themselves. There was notable growth in the population from 1657 to 1669. The principal causes of this were better agricultural techniques and tax reforms.

The Hanyang (Seoul) dealers accumulated wealth because of their guaranteed business. The licensed dealers of local products in Hanyang gradually accumulated capital with their lucrative guaranteed transactions. Wealth was now measured by the value of commodities and not by the amount of land.

In the 17th century, as foreign ideas and European trade practices gained respect, the Korean economy and conditions flourished. A complete reform of national finance was proposed by some officials and examined by the government. Its implementation was thwarted, however, by a struggle for power involving numerous agrarian revolts which gradually led to political upheaval.
At the end of the 18th century, British merchant ships first appeared in Korean waters and in the 1840s, Russian and French vessels made their first appearances, causing great excitement among the people. The aristocratic Yangban officials maintained their grip on political power including every policy formulated in the 19th century.

In the Chosun period some Korean scholars welcomed Catholics from China. However between 1801 and 1839, the government persecuted Catholics, causing their dispersal to outlying areas and a spread of Catholicism amongst farmers and Yangban. At this time most Yangban were driven to bankruptcy as a result of economic and social changes. The government tried to suppress the peasants’ and merchants’ attempts to rid themselves of social constraints. One aspect of social dynamism was the increase in the number of children of Yangban and lower class women. Emancipation of bondsmen increased the number of taxable people, but the ruling classes’ exploitation of farmers decreased tax revenues. Furthermore, from 1868 to 1876, Korea and Japan negotiated an open market and diplomatic relations. Lankov (2004: online) explains that ‘The most important of the westerners’ demands was the requirement to open the country to overseas trade’. As seen by the Seoul government, this was impossible for a long time. Korean authorities had carefully controlled even the trade with China, Korea’s major ally, and forbade any sea travel for their own subjects. Japanese traders were confined to their office in Pusan and ventured outside the port-area under pain of death.

The Kanghwa Treaty was the treaty whereby in 1876, aided by the reform group in Korea which advocated a break with isolationism, Japan succeeded in negotiating terms which provided for the inauguration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. These promised Japan three open ports in Korea, and described Korea as ‘an independent state’ enjoying the same ‘sovereign rights’ as Japan (Reeve, 1963).

2-2-2. Economy and Society

During this period, according to some Korean scholars, the opening up of trade enabled Korea to become a strong and rich country. At that time, Japan tried
increasingly to bind itself to Korea with a commercial relationship. As a consequence, Korea signed the "Kanghwa Treaty". This caused Korean trade to develop rapidly. The total amount of imports multiplied eight times between 1877 and 1881. However, in the rural society, the Donghak Movement's purpose was to rally opposition to western invasion and to campaign for freedom for farmers.

The Treaty of Kangwha provided a way for Japan to advance its political, economic, and military aims on the Asian continent, but it was nevertheless also of great historical significance for Korea. It was the first time that Korea had opened its doors to so many countries and experienced an introduction to Western civilisation (Hatada, 1969).

In 1893, Donghak supporters demonstrated in Hanyang (Seoul) and were dispersed by the army. 20,000 Donghak supporters also protested at Boeun in Chungcheong-do province against the Japanese and Europeans. Jeon Bong-Jun (1854-1895) assumed leadership of the Donghak movement in Jeolla-do province in 1894. The government countered the farmers' violence with draconian measures and mass executions. The government army was defeated by a large uprising led by Jeon in the provincial capital of Jeonju and a ceasefire and a reform plan were agreed to. The Chinese military were, however, requested by the royal court to provide their assistance and 2000 Chinese troops landed in Korea. With their help, government troops recaptured Jeonju on June 11, dispersing the peasant army. 400 Japanese marines landed on 10 June and a mixed brigade on 16 June. They soon entered Hanyang and the war between China and Japan began (Choe, 1982). The Chinese troops were beaten and the Japanese forces then turned on the Donghak fighters. Facing government and Japanese troops, the Donghak were crushed at Taein in Jeolla-do province. Jeon himself was captured and beheaded in the capital, while other Donghak troops were massacred.

National autonomy, independence and separation of the royal court from government were aimed for by the Korean government. A budgetary system was introduced under the Ministry of Finance with statutory rates of taxes. Universal conscription and education of officers were brought into effect in order to reform the military.
Talented young men were allowed to study abroad and competent persons were employed in government offices (Shin, 1974).

In the same year (1894), Korea experienced the Kabo Reform movement as a response to the fact that Donghak Movement had not been successful. The Kabo movement reformed Korean politics and accepted foreign cultures. Its first purpose (Eckert et al., 1990) was to establish Korea’s independence as a nation. Reform officials sought to transform the traditional political structure of Chosun into a cabinet-centred constitutional monarchy, developing a sound system of fiscal management, and then to use the government’s fiscal resources to create wealth for the country. A fourth objective was to improve Korea’s international security and fundamentally reform the Korean educational system, introducing a modern administration system, as well as social reform. The Kabo Reform Movement dramatically changed Korean society and began Korea’s commercial development (Eckert et al., 1990).

2-2-3. The Russo-Japanese War

The Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905 began when the Japanese attacked Port Arthur in February, 1904. That same month they forced Korea to agree to be bound by a protocol providing for Japanese advisors to play a role in Korean government. At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Korea proclaimed its neutrality, but soon Japan stationed six and a half battalions in Korea. The Japanese assumed control of the country’s financial and foreign affairs and posts and telegraphs in Korea.

Durham White Stevens, an American, was sent by Japan as a consultant to the foreign office and Megata Tanetaro was made an official of the Ministry of Finance, taking full control of Korea’s financial administration. Under the pretext of currency reform, the Korean currency was devalued by 20% and brought within the Japanese monetary system (Nish, 1985). In 1905, Korea was placed “at Japan’s free disposal” under the second Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance with the United States, to which Great Britain and Russia acquiesced. Reeve explains:
As victor of the war Japan was then in effect given, by this treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, complete power over Korea. A protectorate treaty signed on 17 November 1905 authorised the transfer of the administration of Korea affairs to Japan and provided for the installation of a Japanese Resident-General (Reeve, 1963: 17).

As a result, Japan sent large numbers of troops into Seoul and, on 23 February, 1904, forced the Korean government to sign the so-called Japanese-Korean Protocol. The Russo-Japanese war was not only a war between Japan and Russia. It was also the back-drop to the support given by the United Kingdom and the United States to Japan. On the other hand, France supported Russia. The main consequence of the war was that it caused to Korea to become a total colony of Japan (Reeve, 1963).

2-3. The Japanese Colonial Period

2-3-1. Korea under Japanese Policy

In modern Korea, the predominant historical memory relates to its period as a Japanese colony for 36 years (1910-1945). During this period, Korea’s domestic situation changed in various ways. The economy, in particular, gradually grew, with repercussions for society, culture, and sport. Although the Japanese colonial period brought some advantages to Korea, the majority of Koreans would prefer to be able to forget the period of Japanese domination (Breen, 2004).

Japan was the first country in Asia to become fully modernised and militarily powerful, with the result that Japanese colonisation changed modern society in Korea. However, Koreans lost their political, economic and cultural freedom, even as the Japanese created new employment possibilities for them (Nahm, 1988). Under Japanese domination, Koreans began to nurture anti-Japanese sentiments and were wary of domination by a powerful country.

The Japanese colonial period can be divided into three periods (Eckert et al, 1990; Nahm, 1996). The first period (1910-1918) was characterised by the forceful control of Korea by the Japanese. During the second period the focus was more on Korean
nationalism and the independence movement (1919-1930). Lastly, the third period (1931-1945) raised critical issues about Japanese colonial policy.

During the first period (1910-1919), the Japanese controlled Korea absolutely. This was called the "dark period" when the country was controlled economically, politically, and culturally by Japanese politicians (Ok, 2005). During this decade, the Japanese colonial rulers operated a high-handed policy towards the Korean population which even extended to bans on the mass media. For example, they only allowed a few magazines and some scholarly journals to be published. Moreover, they stopped the publication of the most important Korean newspapers such as Korea Daily News (Thehan Maeil) from 1905 to 1910 (Eckert at al, 1990). In addition, Japanese domination changed the Korean education system. In particular, the Japanese prohibited the use of all Korean textbooks in schools and taught the Japanese language, customs and culture instead, thereby controlling the school curriculum (Nahm, 1996). Under this domination, the Korean people protested against Japanese rule. However, as a consequence, the Japanese rulers arrested over 50,000 Korean people in 1912 (Kang, 1994). Moreover, during the Japanese domination many Korean nationalists were exiled to places outside of Korea, although they continued to organise anti-Japanese political societies.

The second period (1919-1930) included the movement of independence on 1 March 1919. Korean citizens formed an independence movement against Japan and established the National University. A provisional government was established in Shanghai, China on 9 April, 1919, providing a chance for nationalist reform. In response, the Japanese went to further lengths to suppress expressions of Korean national identity and managed to instil their own, alien social customs into the Korean population to a certain extent, in spite of the Koreans' will to resist (Bridges, 1986).

The 1st of March independence movement initiated activities amongst Korean people at home and abroad (Rees, 1988). During this time, Korean nationalists were well organised and Lee Syng-man, An Chang-Ho, Yi Tong-Hwi, Kim Kyu-Sik, Mun Chang-Bom, and Choe Chae-Hyong were all given cabinet posts in the main Korean nationalist organisations in China, Manchuria, Siberia, and the United States. They stimulated the independence movement and organised political action, both
domestically and abroad. Japan’s new colonial administrators accepted that controlling the Korean population would henceforth be difficult (Eckert et al, 1990).

The second main Korean independence movement began in 1929 when a number of Korean students (54,000) protested against the Japanese colonial political system. They tried to create a new independence movement in Kwangju, South Jella Province (Han et al, 1996). This extract from The Korea Times briefly explains the history of this movement:

Historically, Kwangju had been a bastion of opposition to oppression. It was in Kwangju that an anti-Japanese student movement occurred in 1929 against the oppressive and by then well-entrenched Japanese occupation of Korea. The movement touched off a series of sporadic student protests and strikes in many parts of the country in subsequent months, but to no avail against the overwhelming military strength of the occupying Japanese. It was pathetically ineffectual resistance as there were a limited number of students and those who could support them in Korea in 1929.

The third period (1931-1945) witnessed the forced assimilation and mobilisation of the Korean people by the Japanese (Eckert et al, 1990). Korea is situated in a geographically important location between Japan and China. As a result, Japan tried to develop its relationship with Korea and promoted Korean industry in fields such as modern technology. Japanese political activity decreased between 1931 and 1937 and permission was given for mass media such as Chogwang and Sindonga to be published.

From 1935 to 1941, Korean groups organised political parties to achieve independence. These included Kim Ku’s National Party, the United Association of Movements for the Revival of Korea (Han-Guk Gwangbok Undong Danche Yeonhaphoe). They cooperated with the Chinese Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) in Chungchung. Mr Lee Seung-Man, who later became the first president of South Korea, had American backing and Mr Kim Il-Seong subsequently became leader of North Korea in 1948 (Hatada, 1969). During this period, Korea’s national identity became associated with modernity and it is recognised that sport was used for anti-colonial purposes (Ok, 2005). Patriotic Koreans built a few secondary schools and it was in these nationalistic schools that students engaged in rigorous physical drills to develop fitness and a strong mentality (Lee, 2000).
During this period, although students began to use the Korean language in school, all businesses and banks still had to work in the Japanese language. Korea’s Japanese rulers tried to change the whole Korean cultural system to be in acceding with the Japanese style. Moreover, they mobilised Koreans to take part in the World War; not only men but even young Korean women were expected to contribute to the Japanese war effort. Research (Soh, 2004: 170-177) has demonstrated that:

Countless young girls and women in colonized Korea (1910-1945) and elsewhere in East Asia and the Pacific islands, whose estimated numbers are up to 200,000, were forced to engage in sexual servitude by the imperial Japanese military during the Asia Pacific War (1931-1945). The majority of the young females recruited as comfort women came from lower classes. Many were deceived by "human traders" who lured them with promises of well-paying jobs only to deliver them to brothels and military comfort stations.

While Korea was a Japanese colony, the Korean people were almost completely dominated by the Japanese, both politically and culturally. After World War II, however, Japan surrendered to the United States and Korea was liberated.

2-3-2. Korea Economy under Japanese Rule

Although the Japanese dominated Korea for 35 years (1910-1945), Korea’s economic situation nevertheless underwent development throughout the Japanese colonial period. Japanese investors introduced innovations to Korean society such as an electric system, communication facilities and the construction of railroads. During the First World War, Japan experienced serious difficulties in providing itself with foodstuffs, particularly from 1918 to 1919. As a result, the Japanese put the emphasis on increasing rice production in Korea and thereby dramatically changed Korea’s economic situation and its related transportation system. In addition, the rice-production programme in Korea had the benefit of not only increasing rice production but developing the land as well. During this period, industry in Korea was also gradually developing (Song, 1990).

Song (1990) points out that domestic production on the Korean peninsula grew significantly but the income accruing to Koreans was low and most of the profit went
to the Japanese. Modern industrial sectors grew increasingly larger but the Korean national product per income was reduced. In addition, in this period about half of Korea's rice production was exported to Japan (Hatada, 1969).

The commercial and industrial growth of Japan's leading pre-war colony has led some to suggest that the colonial experience contributed greatly to subsequent economic policy in South Korea. Some scholars have demonstrated that as a Japanese colony, Korea benefited from growth in its economy, agricultural production and trade, accompanied by a rise in the urban population from 3 percent to 7 percent of total citizens from 1910 to 1935 and reaching 13 percent in 1944 (Kim, 1974). However, Koreans expressed strong anti Japanese sentiments in spite of these benefits and consistently sought to forge their independence through the nationalist movement.

2-3-3. Society

Under Japanese colonisation, Korean life styles, working practices and markets changed dramatically. From 1935 to 1944, the urban Korean population increased from 7 percent of total to 13.2 percent, and much of the Korean rural population moved to Manchuria and Japan. According to Park (1999), 1.3 million Korean labourers worked in foreign industry: 700,000 in Japan and 600,000 in Manchuria. Pay was often higher than in the Korean workers' labour market. During the war period, Korean workers were also forced to help the Japanese military. This involved around 720,000 people in 1939 (Kihl, 2005). On the other hand, Kang (1963: 3) offers the following evaluation:

During the thirty-six year annexation period, Koreans were never allowed to participate in any political activities in the modern sense. However, in the fields of thought, literature and religion, they had access to the trends of the times to some extent; in the economic aspect, although they lived under a capitalistic economic system, the Japanese had complete control over the Korean economy. And in the social aspect, Korean society, whether compulsorily or spontaneously, was gradually growing into a modern society.

One negative effect of colonial rule was that the Japanese generally gave Koreans lower positions in society, so that they had little chance to gain experience of
fulfilling high positions in politics or the economy. It can be demonstrated that this was a disadvantage in the colonial period and latterly in the postcolonial period as well. During this period there were many other harmful results for Korea. For example, Korean culture was changed as Japanese style religion was brought into Korea. Yet, during the Japanese colonial period there were some advantageous effects on Korean society. For example, Koreans learned business, managerial and economic skills from the Japanese because the Japanese employed them in various institutions (Song, 1990). Under Japanese rule, Korea also acquired greater experience in the international arena.

2-4. The Development of the Korean Peninsula (1945-1987)

2-4-1. The Impact of U.S Policy on South Korean Society

After its liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Korea was divided into North and South Korea along the 38th parallel. South Korea introduced a system of democracy during this period, under the guidance of the United States, whereas North Korea was introduced to communism by the Soviet Union. As an outcome of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Great Powers’ discussions provided for a U.S-Soviet Joint Commission to work during a 5-year period, the culmination of which was the establishment of a unified provisional Korean government. This was the origin of U.S. trusteeship in South Korea. However, a number of South Korean nationalists were against the trusteeship of the United States and they tried to negotiate with the North Korean people (Eckert et al, 1990).

During this period major changes took place in political relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States supported South Korea’s development of a democratic system from 1945 (Leland, 1956). The United States and the Soviet Union maintained that they were both committed to an international solution to the Korean issue, but in practice both sides foresaw a unified Korean government that excluded, respectively, the left or the right. Supported by the occupation forces, this was a view that Koreans of both extremes on the political
spectrum held. In fact, the Soviet Union and the United States had already taken a step in that direction in 1946 when they gave their support to the formation of separate advisory and administrative bodies for the South (in Seoul) and North (in Pyongyang) (Eckert et al, 1990).

South Koreans and Americans had been joined together as allies and friends since 1945 (Armstrong, 2002). Nevertheless, in this period Korea still had a culture, political system and society that were heavily influenced by the Japanese. The relationship between the United States and South Korea gradually brought about the development of South Korean society. North Korea and the Soviet Union also developed a close relationship.

At this time, many members of the United Nations supported the General Assembly's programme for Korea. They pointed out that the United Nations' Commission on Korea would foster broader cooperation among the prominent political parties and politicians in South Korea. As a result, the regime would become less authoritarian and much-needed social, economic and political reforms would be taken forward more energetically (Leland, 1956).

The United States provided US$500 million to set up the Republic of Korea with a five-Year development plan. In 1947 they also submitted to the United Nations the Korean problem. South Korean nationalists tried to establish a unified government of North and South, but North Korea refused. In 1948, South Korea established a government on the peninsula and became the Republic of Korea with Syngman - Lee as its leader, the country's first president. In the same year, North Korea took Ilsung-Kim as its president.

Eventually, war broke out between North and South Korea, starting on 25 June, 1950 and lasting until 27 July, 1953. During the three-year war, none of North and South Korea's problems was solved and about 1.3 million people went missing, having been wounded or killed in the fighting. Many industrial facilities and houses were destroyed. In addition, the terror of the war and bombing separated many families. This experience of war is still a major issue in Korean society today (Eckert et al, 1990).
Moreover, from 1950 onwards the Soviet Union and China supported North Korea with large quantities of military equipment, including automatic weapons and various types of tanks and fighter planes. On the other hand, the United States and more than fifteen members of the United Nations supported South Korea. This war involved almost 20 countries’ armies with the American General Douglas MacArthur commanding the South Korean troops. At the end of the war, Korea continued to be divided along the line of the 38th Parallel in exactly the same way as at the start. The war created animosity between the communist and non-communist camps and further promoted the East-West arms race. Moreover, United States military personnel would continue to be stationed in South Korea until the present day (Hickey, 1999).

President Lee’s dictatorship led to the South Korean students’ democratic movement in 1960. However, Lee’s government had been in power for 12 years. During these 12 years, South Korea was weak and dependent on the United States. The Korean population and university students sustained the democratisation movement against the dictatorial government. The purpose of the democratic movement was to achieve political and economic freedom:

It is indisputable that through the April student Revolution there emerged genuine intellectual thought, which was as yet obscure and immature, because it was only a bud. As an ideology, this intellectual thought had not yet reached the level of theory with a systematic structure. Nevertheless, it was an invaluable guide, a new thought that we must not throw away (Park, 1961: 46-47).

The movement was successful and, as a result, President Lee relinquished his presidency and went into exile in Hawaii in 1960.

2-4-2. Return to dictatorship, Park Chung Hee’s Policy
(South Korea 1961-1979)

The junta under Park Chung Hee quickly consolidated its power and removed those it considered corrupt and unqualified from their posts in the government and army. The thirty-two member Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) became all-powerful. In 1961, Park and his fellow military leaders tried to organise and create
the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The KCIA had far more powers than its American counterpart and these included domestic as well as international surveillance. It possessed an almost unstoppable power in having the ability to investigate other official intelligence agencies. The Park military junta’s rule over South Korea was based on anti-communism and economic development (Eckert at al, 1990). Furthermore, the military leaders focused on establishing a political party, which was effective from 1963 to 1979. At first President Park was elected by a narrow margin of 46.6 percent of the vote, compared with the 45.1 percent of votes cast for Yoon Bo-Sun, the New Democratic politician. However, he continued to exercise supreme power from 1963 to 1979 at the head of a military dictatorship.

2-4-3. The Korean Economy

From 1945 to 1953, Korea’s economic development was interrupted and confusion reigned. Following its liberation from Japan in 1945, Korean society was hardly willing to submit to the control of the United States and there was widespread turmoil. Moreover, the Korean War had reduced the country’s economy, industry and facilities, and as a result the Korean people had the burden of rebuilding the economy. After the war, Korea was in fact one of the poorest countries in the world. For example, Korea’s per capita GNP was only US $80 at current prices (Song 1990).

Chang (1980) explains the process by which South Korea had to undergo many trials and tribulations as it grew into a country in its own right. When the Japanese occupation ended, South Korea's economy had depended largely on agriculture. Now it was confronted with the challenge of becoming an independent and self-sustaining unit, at a time when its population was increasing more rapidly than at any time in its previous history.

2-4-4. The Origins of Korea’s Economic Growth, Social Change and The Chaebol
Many researchers (including Jones and Sakong, 1980) mention that South Korea's economic development started during the presidency of Park Chung-Hee era. The rate of economic growth and South Korea's social structure changed very rapidly during this period (Ha, 1997) and the urban population continued to increase. Park Chung-Hee planned intensive economic development, focussing on export-oriented trade and increased incomes in both the countryside and urban industry as well. As a result, from 1965 onwards, there was a rough equivalence between household incomes in the town and the country. However, by 1970, rural incomes had decreased when compared with those in urban areas. Because most of the population settled in the largest city, “over-urbanisation” in Seoul became a social issue (Song 1990). On the other hand, during this time Korean troops were sent to participate in the Vietnam War and qualified miners and nurses were recruited to jobs in Germany, thereby contributing to growth in the economy.

In 1971, the government started “Saemaul Undong, or the “New Village Movement”, the purpose of which was to bring development to the rural population and encourage people to stay in country areas. Government investment created a fund available to rural populations that was intended not only for developing rural areas, but also deliberately to reform the standard of living in Korea as a whole. At the same time, the government tried to give support to commerce, for example by providing manufacturing firms with financial loans and tax subsidies. As a result, Korean per capita income increased and household incomes improved from 1965 to 1970. One of the large projects undertaken by Park Chung-Hee’s government was the building of the Seoul-Pusan highway. This highway connected the two largest cities in South Korea but at the time of its construction it served more of a symbolic purpose than a transportation need based upon benefits versus costs (Kim, 2005).

During the Park Chung-Hee period of rapid economic development, Chaebol (a major business consortium) businesses were supported strongly by the government. In this phase of Park’s regime, ‘economic power’ was strong and its impact on South Korean society was maintained by a government with a friendly and co-operative relationship with the Chaebol (Lee, 1997). Three factors made the Chaebol achieve measurable expansion and diversification between 1961 and 1972.
First, the Chaebol participated in the first and second five-year economic development plans with the Park Chung-Hee government (1962-1966 and 1967-1971) and thus achieved remarkable growth. As Park Chung-Hee himself (Kim, 2004: 79) noted, "Where the appalling power of mammoth enterprise is concerned only with private profit under a self-assumed assertion of contribution to national development, there is no free competition". Secondly, the government promoted various initiatives in favour of the export industries, for example, by supporting domestic bank loans and international borrowing (Kim, 2004). Thirdly, the special incomes that came with the end of the Vietnam War were used to finance capital construction and the transportation industries. During the next period from 1972 to 1979 (the Fourth Republic period), the Park government invested strongly in the economy, so that in 1973 the highest GNP growth rate in Korean economic history was attained, a rate of 16.5 percent as compared with 7.0 percent in 1972.

Over the 1970s, the Chaebol companies increased notably and the government relationship with Chaebol was intimate and friendly in order to prevent the latter from monopolising the economy. The government also strongly promoted the building of heavy/chemical industries in the course of the third five-year economic development plan from 1972 to 1976. As a result, the share of GNP taken up by the whole of the heavy/chemical manufacturing industry increased from 34.9 percent in 1972 to 45.9 percent in 1976 (Lee, 1997).

The Chaebol thrived on their relationship with the government. As demonstrated by Kim (2004), the protectionist policies adopted by the government in the period from 1972 to 1979 allowed Chaebol to derive extraordinary profits from their investments in the heavy/chemical industries. These accounted for 85.8% of the growth in the assets of the ten largest Chaebol, for which the manufacturing sector as a whole provided 57.4% of that growth. For example, Hyundai was not included in the top ten Chaebol companies in 1965. However, by 1975, it had become the third largest company behind Samsung and Lucky. The Blue House (South Korea's equivalent of the White House in the US) ruled for Chaebol to develop a system of national duty in 1960s and 1970s. At this stage the Chaebol supported Park's personal plans.
The Blue House-style business rules were highly unconventional, with Park acting as on-the-job superintendent. Steer’s interview with a former engineer, who worked closely with Park during the construction of the Seoul-Pusan Expressway completed by Hyundai in June 1970, illustrates the Park-style or “Korean Way” of state-guided development (Kim, 2004: 156).

2-4-5. The South Korean Student Movement for Democracy of the 1980s

After the post-war period, students continued to protest against the military and authoritarian government. Through this means, the student movement eventually contributed to democratic reform in South Korean society. In 1987, the students organised large-scale demonstrations to be shown to western people on TV screens, which had an impact on the dictatorial presidency of Chun Doo-Hwan. In addition, international pressures were applied to try to end Chun’s dictatorship and the Korean government began holding democratic elections in 1987. Kim (1991) implies that the student movement made a vital contribution to the political democratisation of South Korea and the ending of the Chun regime.

Especially noteworthy was the Kwangju massacre of May 1980, called “5.18”, which resulted from a protest against the military and authoritarian government by Kwangju citizens (at least 165 people died) who had not forgotten how, during the military government, the Korean police had handled the student demonstrations violently. As a result, they could not demonstrate openly on campus or off campus. However, they organised ideological discussion groups to investigate Korea’s political, economic and social system. Before the Kwangju massacre, most Korean students had not adopted a negative attitude towards the United States. However, when the massacre took place, the U.S military supported Chun’s government and from that time onwards many Korean people began to become more anti-American (Ha and Mangan, 2003).

To sum up, in the 1980s, Korean students provided the most important opposition to the military government, as demonstrated by the Kwangju massacre, and everywhere a new political movement sprung up in favour of democratic politics.
Armstrong (2002: 137) notes that "a typical protest demanding democracy and educational freedom began with students' diagnoses of present political conditions". As a result, South Korea began a policy of democratisation from 1987 under President Roh Tea-Woo's government.

2-4-6. Chun and Roh's Economy

Both the Chun and Roh regimes had close familiarity with the Chaebol companies. At this time economic policy-making was a mutual relationship in South Korea. In 1982, the Government planned long-term for the promotion of small and medium-size enterprises. The government supported and encouraged small and medium size enterprises to produce merchandise. These enterprises were joined by four political parties (Democratic Justice Party, Peaceful Democratic Party, United Democratic Party, and the New Democratic-Republican Party) funded with 370 billion Won. They also helped and had joint investment through share facilities, factories, R&D, and a technology research association. The Government allocated money to small and medium size enterprises from 1980 to 1992 (Lee. 1997).

Investment was gradually increased in the Citizens' National Bank, the Industrial Bank of Korea and the Korea Long Term Credit Bank. Chun was convinced of the success of his economic polices. He expressed the intention not to forcibly regulate the Chaebol any longer so that they could fully devote themselves to export and economic development (Kim, 1992).

During the 1980s, South Korea dramatically changed its social situation. As we shall see, one of the main factors was the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics prepared by the Government. First-class hotels, sophisticated restaurants, boutiques, and many subway lines were constructed. Geographically, Japan and Korea are only two hours apart by airplane and it was of benefit to both countries to exchange culture and growth of the capitalist economy. In 1982, Chun Do-Hwan negotiated with Japan a loan agreement for $4 billion, which helped to support the hosting of the 1988 Olympics. In addition the United States and South Korea relationship allowed for special access to American markets for South Korea.
Summary

In the late 19th century Korea began to modernise in line with Western countries and together with Japan and China. Historically, a variety of events had paved the way for such changes in Korean society. Geographically, Korea is very near to Japan and China and its development have been strongly influenced by those countries. As discussed above, Korea was a Japanese colony for 36 years. During that period Korea obviously had experience of independence movements because many people wanted to have freedom and tried to secure their national identity. In addition, at that time Korea, underwent some major changes in its traditional culture, politics, economy and society. Many researchers have demonstrated that the economy was growing and the political system was changing. Moreover, Koreans have experienced ongoing developments in their life styles to the present day.

In 1945, Korea was liberated from Japan and, in the same year, the United States and the Soviet Union occupied the southern and northern zones of the country. Finally, the territory was split between North and South Korea, the division being made along the 38th parallel. After three years presidential elections were conducted in South Korea for the first time. The United States and the United Nation supported the new Republic of Korea, headed by President Lee Syng-Man. Politically, the United States and the Soviet Union, however, had very different policies, which impacted on the Korean peninsula politically, economically and culturally.

North and South Korea both had highly centralised political systems with an overwhelming concentration of power in the hands of a powerful leader. Three South Korean presidents, who held office from 1963 to 1992, came from a military background. North Korea's communist system meanwhile has supported a continuous dynastic succession, which has endured until the present day. Eventually, North and South Korea went to war with one another from 1950 to 1953. During those three years, 1.3 million people went missing, having been wounded or killed in the fighting. Moreover, many families were separated because of the bombardment of their towns and villages.
During the forty years between 1948 and 1988, South Korea experienced a long period of authoritarian presidential dictatorship which shaped Korean identity and forged expressions of Korean nationalism. From the 1960s, President Park Chung-Hee focused on formulating an economic development plan that initiated the relationship between the Chaebol companies and, subsequently, a number of the Chaebol companies became involved in Korean government investment programmes. Park's government invested heavily to expand the funds available to rural people in order to develop country areas, where manufacturing firms were also provided with financial loans and tax subsidies. Among developments in the country's infrastructure, the Seoul-Pusan highway was built to connect the two largest cities contributing greatly to South Korea's economic development. As we shall see in the chapter that follows the Park Chung-Hee regime had a highly-motivated policy for physical education and the improvement of the nation's physical health, as part of which elite sports were encouraged. After the 1960s more Korean athletes participated in various international Games and won a number of medals. During this period the Teanung Athletic Village was constructed and a Lifelong Annuity System was created for medal winners from such high-profile events as the Olympics, World Championships and Asian Games.

South Koreans forced a number of issues during the Chun regime. The pro-democracy movement in Kwangju in May 1980 involved anti-government demonstrations and attempts at insurrection. In addition, basic democratic freedoms were denied. In 1980, President Chun Doo-Hwan decided to bid for Seoul to host the 1988 Olympic Games and thereby laid the foundations for further political, economic and cultural change.
Chapter 3. The Development of Sport in Korea

3-1. Introduction

Within Korea, sport has been an important tool of modernisation since the 19th century. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the historical background of modern sport in Korea, its links to the political dimension and its influence in Korean society.

In the history of the Olympic Games, the Seoul Olympics was not just a sports event because, before 1988, there had been three major Olympic boycotts (in 1976, 1980, and 1984). The IOC had to carefully consider the choice of future host cites. This meant that the IOC decision had to take account of the political dimension during the relevant period. Modern sports are global. The well-informed sports family knew that Korea had the experiences of Japanese colonial rule and of the Korean War (1950-1953). However, South Korea's effort to develop elite sports was in accordance with government objectives during the Sport Republic period. From the 1960s to 1980s, the South Korean governing body got closer to the Korea Amateur Sports Association. Lee (1990) emphasises that South Korean elite sports began in the 1960s, owing to a growing recognition of the value national sporting representation and success could have for national identity formation.

This chapter will discuss the history of Korea's sport developments, with particular focus on how South Korea has managed to become a strong international sporting country.

3-2. Pre-Modern Sport in Korea

In the late 19th century, with its open-door policy, Korea accepted western culture and modern sports activities as introduced by Christian missionaries. During this period (1894-1897), many secondary schools were established, and there also emerged a physical education programme with language courses in the school curriculum.
However, before it opened its doors to the western world, Korea had enjoyed a long tradition of physical activities, educational sports and traditional Korean life sports because Koreans regarded these sports as being important for developing health and good physical condition.

Early Korean history is usually reviewed in terms of the Three Kingdoms: Koguryo (37 B.C. - 668 A. D.) located in Southern Manchuria and northern Korea; Pakje (18 B.C. - 600 A. D.) along the Han River and South western Korea; and Silla (57 B.C. - 936 A. D.) in the south eastern part of the peninsula (Kim, 1980). During this period each kingdom sought to exercise control over the whole peninsula. Indeed, under the Silla dynasty (670 A. D), the kingdoms were unified, the outcome being the “HWA RANG DO” which was organised by nobles. In the Three Kingdom period in Silla (528) Buddhism became the official religion. With Buddhist soul and HWARANG DO young people become educated. Kim (1980: 385) explains that “the purpose of this organisation was to develop individuals physically, intellectually, socially, and mentally as well as to develop and improve military proficiency for the nation”. Moreover, HWA RANG DO activities influenced the Korean way of life and provided for physical education. In particular, during the Koryo dynasty most of the population practised martial arts developed by military people and the spirit of martial arts was ensured by expert masters. In addition, the royal family invited expert masters and military officers to the royal court to take part in competitions once a year.

Traditionally, Korea had its own physical activities “such as YU SUL (a form of Korean Jujitsu), TAE KYON (the forerunner of Tae Kwon Do), GOON SUL (archery), SSIRUM (or Si-room, a form of Korean wrestling), SUK CHUN (stone throw fighting), KUM SUL (a form of swordsmanship), MA SUL (horsemanship) and others; general sports activities such as CHOOK KU (a form of soccer), CHANG CHI KI (a game similar to the present field hockey), SUL MAE TA GI (sleigh riding), JOOL DA LEE GI (a game of Tug of War) and others; recreation activities such as YON RAL LEE GI (kiting game), NEU NAE (swing), NUL DEU GI (a form of see-saw games where two women stand at each edge of a board and jump alternatively) and others”(Kim, 1980: 384-385). Undeniably Korean people had many physical activities in their lives.
However, with the signing in 1876 of the ‘Kanghwa Treaty’ with Japan, Korea began to forge a relationship with foreign countries and accept modern sports. During this time (1881 to 1886), Korea had diplomatic relationships with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Russia, France and Japan. This had an effect on the reception of international modern sports by the Korean population. Originally, American and English missionaries introduced modern sports into Korean schools. They promoted modern sport in Korean society not least by establishing in 1903 the YMCA which helped to spread modern sports throughout Korean society and began to introduce modern physical education (Lee, 2000).

Kim (1980) explains that the Western sports programme was introduced during the period from 1894 to 1924. Among the activities initiated (with approximate dates in parenthesis) were soccer (1890), track and field (1896), competitive swimming (1898), cycling (1900), basketball (1904), skating (1905), and tennis (1909).

Although the majority of the Olympic sports originate from Western countries, the Eastern sports of taekwondo and judo were accepted into the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964 (Judo) and Sydney Olympic Games in 2000 (Taekwondo). Cashman (2004: 122) notes that ‘the Korean martial art of taekwondo has increased its global spread in recent decades, becoming an Olympic sport...while politics was obviously a factor in the selection of taekwondo as an Olympic demonstration sport in 1988 and an Olympic sport in 2000, taekwondo could not have achieved this status without some degree of global spread’.

To sum up, Korean people started to play modern sports from the late 19th century, but there was also a history of indigenous physical activities in Korean society. In general, many Korean intellectuals come to believe that physical activities can help to improved health benefits and enhanced quality the life (Lee, 2000).

3-3. The Effect of Japanese Colonisation on Sport in Korea

3-3-1. Establish the YMCA its impact on Physical Education in Korea
Under Japanese rule, Koreans acquired a stronger sense of solidarity amongst themselves and promoted a physical education programme in modern western-type schools as well as organised community athletics meets (Ok, 2005). However, as mentioned earlier, Christians introduced modern sports schools into Korean society. Historically, the YMCA was formally established on 28 October, 1903 when the United States sent missionaries to Korea. They taught English and general education as well as sports. In 1906, the YMCA set up the Physical Education Community of which Korea's best athletics instructors were members. As a result, the best Korean athletes joined the YMCA where Christian missionaries taught various sports such as gymnastics, basketball, volleyball, baseball, swimming, wrestling and winter sports. In addition, more importantly, the YMCAs served as meeting places for Korean nationalists and the Japanese did not disturb their activities (Lee, 2000). During this period, Christianity had rapidly spread, although subsequently Japanese public service workers tried to eradicate the religion without success.

In this period, the Korean education system was deeply influenced by the Japanese who changed the nature of the Korean school curriculum and introduced modern education. The Japanese purpose was not only the general well-being of popular and physical education but also the use of education for the Japanisation of Korean society.

3-3-2. Sport and Korean Resistance to Japanese rule

The Japanese gave training to Koreans in martial skills such as shooting, skirmishing and carrying out surprise attacks that were immediately useful for the Japanese military. However, football became popular with Koreans who were able to express their anti-Japanese colonial feeling through the sport (Ok, 2005). Lee Hak-Rae (2000) suggests that during the Japanese colonial period, Korean people expressed those feelings through a variety of other sports and games. For example, in 1936, Korean marathon runners (Sohn Gi Jung and Nam Sung Yong) participated in the Berlin Olympic Games, with one of the runners winning the gold medal and another the bronze. However, Korea was still a Japanese colony so that, during the medal ceremony, the Korean marathon runners had to wear Japanese uniforms, stand beneath the Japanese flag and sing the Japanese national anthem. That said, reports in
the Korean newspaper Dong-ah ilbo, (24 August, 1936) did not show the Japanese flag which it had erased from the photographs. The following day, the editor and reporter were arrested. Lee (2000) points out that Sohn had a strong national identity such that when foreign sport reporters asked him “where are you from?” He said that “I am from Korea” and, when he signed autographs to people he always wrote KOREA next to his name on the paper.

During this period the Korean people tried to express their national identity and their anti-colonial aspirations by means of sport (Lee, 2000). In addition, however, Koh (2005: 474) explains that ‘the experience of colonial rule and its passive modernization had a huge effect on modern sports development as well as forming a modern nation in Korea’.

The physical education programmes and sports events were effective and gave some chance for Korean identity to be highlighted. However, it was hard for most Koreans to enjoy life on their own peninsula because they had been under Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945. Moreover, only once Korea was liberated from Japan did people acquire a much stronger national identity.

### 3-3-3. The Creation of the Korea Sports Council

Although the Korean Sports Council (KSC) was established on 13 July, 1920 (see Appendix II), it was forcibly dismantled disorganised by the Japanese imperial authority in 1938 (KSC, 2007). Even during Japanese domination, however, the Korean nation organised several sports associations (for example, the football association was organised in 1925) and after liberation from Japan, the country had the freedom to establish and restructure various sport associations.

Kim (2000) points out that during this period (1945-1947) amongst the organisations that were established were Chosun Junior Athletic Association, Chosun Athletic Competition Management Association, Chosun Track and Field Federation, Chosun Athletic Federation, Chosun Amateur Boxing Federation, Chosun Rugby Association, Chosun Boxing Association, Chosun Ssirum (Folk wrestling) Association, Chosun
Baseball Association, Chosun Mountain Climbing Club, Chosun Soft Tennis Association, National Student Track and Field Federation, and Chosun Table Tennis Association.

The KSC was a powerful association in South Korea between 1963 and 1980 because the most important executives and government services were located there and cooperated with the President's aims. However, some of the members cared more about their own self-promotion than the development of sport in Korea (Kim, 2000).

Looking at the KSC's historical background in terms of its Presidents (1962 – 1980), it is worth noting that Lee Joo-Il (1962) became the Vice Chairman of the Supreme Council, and 18 members of the Board of Directors of the Association resigned after ten months to clear the way for a reorganisation of the executive. Secondly, Min Kwan-Sik (1964-1971) was an executive committee member of the ruling Democratic Republican Party, and was not only regarded as a veteran politician but as an outstanding sport leader (Kim, 2000). Min Kwan-Sik planned to host the 6th Asian Games in South Korea in 1970. The government supported this modernisation of the South Korean sports environment. Lastly, Kim Teak-Soo (1971-1979) was leader of 30 sports associations in South Korea and former chairman of the Korea Boxing Association. In 1977 he became an IOC member. However, Kim (2000) points out that KSC did not become a well organised sports association until 1979.

3-4. The Sport Republic in South Korea (1960-1988)

3-4-1. South Korean Participation the Olympic Games

Although South Korea had been liberated from Japanese rule, the Japanese imperialist system of education still remained in place until the 1950s (see Appendix III). Nevertheless, the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) was established in 1946 and formally joined the International Olympic Committee in 1947. In addition, the KOC participated in the 14th modern Olympic Games in 1948, the first occasion on which the Summer Olympic Games was attended by a team bearing the flag of the Republic of Korea. The KOC also participated in the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952, even though these took place during
the war between North and South Korea. From 1953 onwards, with the partition of Korea, South Korean schools emphasised anti-Communism and tried to strengthen physical education which had a role to play alongside military training. However, in the 1960s, during Park Chung-Hee’s era the emphasis in the country’s educational policy was ‘to provide for the hard-working’ and ‘to foster the healthy’ (Kim, 2000). As a result, physical education became an important stage for politics in South Korea. The Park Chung-Hee regime had a highly-motivated policy for physical education and in the 1970s it had two main purposes: to develop the nation’s physical health and to promote the development of elite sport.

In the 1960s, the representative system introduced domestic and elite sports and athletics was promoted by the government. As a result, most elementary, middle, and high schools encouraged outstanding athletes and supported their training. A variety of scholarships were awarded as well (Ha, 1997). Before the 1960s, Korea had participated in very few international sporting events and winning a medal was uncommon. However, from the 1960s, more Korean athletes participated in various international Games and succeeded in winning a number of medals. At this stage sport was used in order to enhance Korea’s prestige in the world and Korean people readily assumed that sporting prowess contributed to the nation’s standing (Koh, 2005). The KOC participated in most of the Olympic Games so as to maintain good relations with foreign people and share experiences with Olympians from all over the world. However, it did not participate in the Oslo Winter Olympic Games in 1952 (during the Korean War period) or the Moscow Summer Olympic Games in 1980.

3-4-2. Sport Policy in South Korea

During the eighteen years of the Park Chung-Hee era, the government paid greater attention to sport and exerted its power in the interests of sports promotion. President Park’s ruling ideology combined ‘nationalism’, ‘developmentalism’ and ‘centralism’. Kim (2000) claims that Park’s ruling ideology was linked to sport policy in this era as demonstrated by the following table.
Figure 3-1: Ruling Ideology and its relationship with sport

Figure 3-1 shows that President Park's ideology was focused on three major objectives. Park's government promoted sport more actively and directly for the nation. As a result, the strategy was often linked to the political and economic situation.

In 1962, the government announced the national sport promotion law which was promulgated by the Ministry of Education. Kim (2000: 89) lists the aims of the law as follows:

To promote the nation's fitness and to improve morale and enable the public to enjoy a sports week each year
   To promote sport in cities
   To promote sport in schools and companies
   To create sports competition departments
   To construct public sports stadia and support elite players
   To grant tax-free supports and subsidies to regions which organize sports event.
Moreover, it was during this period (in 1966) that the construction of the Teanung Athletic Village began, for the development of elite sports and to ensure that Korean sports people gained medals at major international events. The government supported competitors in elite sports and their coaching staff. As a result, Korean people became more interested in elite sports and sought to develop the elite sporting athletes’ talent (Kim, 2000). Today, the Teanung Athletic Village is home to the Korea Institute of Sport Science, the purpose of which is to develop elite athletes and sport policy and to research on behalf of the sport industry. For athletes, this village is very important because free training facilities and living costs are provided by government.

During the President Park Chung-Hee (1970) era, it was strongly emphasised that sport and physical fitness are important to national well-being:

> We must realize that high physical fitness is very important to build a strong nation. And high physical fitness of our people is a symbol of the strong nation. We all should accumulate a great store of energy by building physical strength and sound minds through the national games. The balanced improvement in people’s physical fitness will contribute to strengthening the nation’s power as well as enhancing its prestige (The Korea Herald, 6 October 1970: 1).

Supported by Park’s government, in 1976, Korean wrestler Yand Jung-Mo won a gold medal at the Montreal Olympic Games. This was the first Olympic gold medal for the Republic of Korea. In total, South Korea received one gold medal, one silver medal and four bronze medals at the Montreal Olympic Games, thereby attracting the attention of other nations to sport in the country.

President Park Chung-Hee sent a congratulatory message to the KOC as follows:

> I, together with all our people, offer my wholehearted congratulations on Yang Jong-mo’s winning of a gold medal in the Olympic wrestling category, by outpointing the world’s strong opponents, and also praise all members of the Korean Olympic delegation for their efforts in the 21st Montreal Olympic Games for our national honour (The Korean Times, 1 August 1976: 1).

With the President’s support the KSC & KOC requested that the government exempt Olympic medallists from regular military service (Kim, 2000). Thus, although most men had to go to military service, from this period those who won medals at the Olympic Games or international championships would be exempt.
The Park Chung-Hee era allowed Korean sports people to develop international relations with western countries and even with a few hostile communist countries. From the 1970s, South Korea tried to improve its relationships with communist countries, viewing sports diplomacy as one of the best ways to improve those relations. Therefore, in 1973, South Korea participated at the World University Games in Moscow and subsequently began sporting exchanges with communist countries by extending invitations to communist athletes for sports meetings, competitions and exchanges for training camps (Ha, 1997). Moreover, the Ministry of Education re-structured the Department of Sport so that “the Sport Division took charge of sport in schools, sport for All and school nutrition on 10 January 1970” (Kim, 2000: 95). They also announced the new sport policies as follows:

To encourage physical education in school and improve the fitness level of the people; To find potential athletes for international sports compactions and make them elite athletes for national prestige through scientific training; To reorganise the administration of sports and set up the Physical Education Council directly responsible to the Prime Minister; To establish the Division of Sport (Ministry of Education, 1971: 130).

3-4-3. Sport Diplomacy in South Korea (1971 – 1980)

In 1979, the KSC elected as its President Park Chong-Kyu. He was originally the President of the Korean Shooting Federation and Vice President of the International Shooting Union (UIT) and also a member of parliament. During the Park Chong-Kyu era the KSC developed a new strategy for sport diplomacy. In fact, it ‘conducted a sweeping reshuffle of their executive staff, replacing many athletes with diplomats, politicians and businessman’ (Kim, 2000: 112). In particular, Presidents of KASA (Korea Amateur Sports Association), Park Chong-Kyu organised with three vice presidents (Mr. Kim Se-Won, Cho Sang-Ho, Chang Chi-Ryang) all of them former ambassadors, with skills useful to President Park. The KSC claimed that:

Sport diplomacy is invisible but decisive in enhancing national prestige. It is particularly important for such a nation as South Korea, which had been experiencing a wave of sport-political attacks manoeuvred by North Korea (The Korea Times, 17 February 1979: 4).
KSC President Park, appointed Kim Un-Young, President of the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) and also Han Ki-Uk (WTF) and together, they concentrated on the development of international relationships. According to Kim (2000), KSC President Park changed many of the (15-30) directors and auditors in KSC, supported by Kim Woo-Jong the President of the ‘business titans’ who was one of strong financial supporters of national sport development. During this period KASA tried to encourage elite athletes and improve results in international sport events, such as the Olympic Games, World Championships and the Asian Games. Moreover, nationally, the KSC organised the National Sports Festival once a year from 1920. This event also had the purpose of improving relationships with other regions.

From the 1970s, South Korea had improved relationships with other countries and developed sport diplomacy activities. In particular, sport exchanges with the Soviet Union began in 1973, when Korean athletes attended the Moscow World University Games. This sport relationship became the basis for the exchange of training camps (Ha, 1997). According to Ha (1997: 14-15):

Between 1976 and 1978, there was a large increase in South Korea’s sport diplomacy. In 1976, South Korean team sent only 238 athletes to international games, and 184 athletes from the non-aligned and communist countries visited South Korea. In 1978, the KSC hosted 44 international events and dispatched 198 teams, totalling 2,395 athletes, to events in 33 countries, several of them communist.

As seen above, South Korea began to actively promote sport diplomacy with communist countries. In addition, from 1978, South Korean sport politicians began to express an interest in hosting the Olympic Games in Seoul. The next year, the Seoul Mayor announced that “Seoul would officially propose to the IOC that the 24th Olympic Games be held in that city” (Ha, 1997: 19).

3-4-4. Planning the Seoul Olympic Games in the Chun Doo-Hwan Era (1980-1987)

In 1979, Park Chung-Hee was assassinated by Kim Jea-Kue. The following year General Chun Doo-Hwan used his military power successfully to become the South
Korean president. In protest, Korean students formed a pro-democracy movement against Chun’s government in the same year. Nevertheless, President Chun’s presidency would last from 1980 to 1987.

Chun Doo-Hwan ruled in an authoritarian manner but he had far less power than Park and for the most part his rule was much milder. Sport was still strongly supported in order to promote the South Korean nation and it was Chun Doo-Hwan who finally decided to host the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. This period began with the “Sports Republic” which was initiated by Chun Doo-Hwan who perceived that international sports events were an excellent vehicle for the purposes of South Korean foreign policy. Chun also believed that sport could enhance his authority. As a result his regime came to be known as the “Sports Republic” (Ha, 1997).

Ha (1997) suggests that the Sports Republic saw two major developments that helped the Chun regime. The first of these was Seoul’s selection, in 1981, to host two major international sporting events, the Olympic Games and the Asian Games. The fact that sport’s international governing bodies had conferred these honours on South Korea served to enhance the country’s image dramatically throughout the world. The second factor was the inauguration of South Korea’s first professional baseball league. Ha (1997) states that baseball helped to divert the public’s attention away from politics.

Under the Basic Press Act of December 1980, Chun established thorough control of the news media, which was even stronger than that exercised during the Korean War. Independent news agencies were absorbed into a single state-run body, central newspapers were forbidden to station correspondents in provincial cities, and many provincial newspapers were closed. Two independent broadcasting companies were absorbed into the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and others were strictly controlled and banned from broadcasting news (Lee, 2000).

During President Chun’s regime, sport was seen as a very important implement to stimulate the interest of the South Korean people. As a result, the president focused on elite sports policy.
Although hosting the Seoul Olympics was originally the idea of Park Chung-Hee, Chun retuned Park’s idea. Many Korean politicians did not agree with hosting the Olympic Games in Seoul because at that time South Korea was not a sufficiently developed country, was in a difficult economic situation and did not have the confidence to host the Games. During the Chun regime, it was argued that state control over sport was possible partly because of state control over mass communications. According to Kim (2000: 188) ‘President Chun Doo Hwan tried to involve businessmen because of financial problems in developing sports at that time’ (Kim 2000: 188). Thus, businesses donated a considerable amount of money to the affiliated sports organisations.

However, when Chun Doo-Hwan invited Chung Ju-Young to become the President of KASA, Chung was not happy to accept his suggestions. According to Chung’s (1992) speech:

In July 1982, President Chun Doo-Hwan called me up and told me that the President of KASA would be a good position for me! Why do you refuse a position in KASA? Do you think it’s not high enough for you? Chung replied that most of the affiliated sports associations had presidents who also held positions as members of Parliament. How could I manage, so I refused the title of President of KASA. Chun Doo-Hwan said that he would change the presidents of affiliated sports associations immediately, and many presidents of businesses would the presidents of affiliated sports associations in KASA. So you do not have to worry about handling them (Chung, 1992: 204).

Furthermore, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo (President of South Korea 1988-1992), together with Park Jong-Kyue (President of KSC) forwarded the Seoul Olympic plan to diplomats and Park Jong-Kyue strongly urged that South Korea should host both the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics. According to Park, Jong-Kyue, Korea’s aims in hosting the Olympics were;

- to demonstrate Korea’s economic growth and national power;
- to improve Korea’s status in the international sporting community;
- to promote friendship with foreign countries through sports;
- to create favourable conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with both Communist and non-aligned nations; and
to consolidate national consensus through these international sports events primarily the Olympic Games (Park, 1991: 5).

Before submitting the Seoul Olympics application, the KOC had a meeting with major figures in the country, and concluded that to host the Games would be of great importance for the nation’s pride and promote Korea's prestige in the world. However, they anticipated that there were possible disadvantages as well as advantages in hosting the Olympic Games.

Table 3-2: The advantages and disadvantages of bidding for the Seoul Olympics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Korean national prestige will be enhanced.</td>
<td>- Korea could lose credibility in the international sports community if it should inadvertently make any error after submitting the application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The bid proposal will help to win the 1986 Asian Games.</td>
<td>- Popular support in economic and social areas might not be easy to attain, even if the project is actively promoted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Even if the application is rejected, Korea will be honoured as a candidate host nation.</td>
<td>- The international sporting community might consider the Korean application premature, distrusting Korea because of the political situation of territorial division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The task itself of preparing the application will provide valuable experience to the KOC.</td>
<td>- The lack of experience in hosting an inclusive international sports event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- If it becomes necessary, conceding to another country at the last minute may bring benefits not now apparent.</td>
<td>- The possible shortage of funds to underwrite all expenses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By itself the application is important. This may be the last opportunity for any nation to apply for hosting the Games because the IOC is seriously considering a proposal to institute a permanent venue.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Park (1991: 6-7)

After the meeting, the KOC submitted the Seoul application papers to the IOC on 26 February, 1981. In the competition between Nagoya and Seoul, it was difficult to predict the result since it could be assumed that both South Korea and Japan would try their best to prepare bidding campaigns. Finally, the Korean Olympic bid was successful in September, 1981. Most IOC members voted for Seoul, the result being 52 (Seoul) and 27 (Nagoya).
It should be noted that Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979), Chun Doo-Hwan (1981-1988) and Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1992) were all from a military background and Park Chung-Hee (1961) and Chun Doo-Hwan (1979) had experience of a coup d'etat. This may help to explain how the Chun-Doo-Hwan and the Roh Tae-Woo regimes aimed to host the Olympic Games (1988) and the Asian Games (1986) as symbolic of the development of Korea's image in the world of sport. Moreover, Chun Doo-Hwan installed the Ministry of Sports in the Central Intelligence Agency Administrative Organisation and devoted almost all his energy to developing a sports section with powerful business people and preparing for the Olympics and the Asian Games. Chun investigated outstanding young athletes in schools and the three presidents' regime promoted the 'Sport for All' programme. The Chun Doo-Hwan era developed equipment and encouraged many professional sports. For example, before 1980, Korea only had boxing and golf (as professional sports). However, from 1982, professional baseball (1982), football (1983) and Korean wrestling (Sircum) (1983) were amongst a number of new professional sports.

Ha (1997) demonstrates that the major reasons for South Korea's sporting successes in the 1980s were first, because from the 1960s to the 1970s, the government followed Park Chung-Hee's regime in promoting development policies, second, because there was rapid change in the social situation in terms of economic development and third because there was stable political authority.

President Chun's resolve to host the Seoul Olympic Games had implications for various aspects of Korean society. However, this research will investigate and explain the key factors in the 1980s such as relationship between KOC members and politicians and also, the details of the bidding process and ultimately the consequences of the Seoul Olympic Games. The next chapter will examine the methodological assumptions upon which the research is founded and the research methods that have been employed.
Chapter 4. Methodology and Methods

4-1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodological strategy and includes a discussion of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the different paradigms and theoretical frameworks associated with the research design. The differences between the ontological and epistemological positions adopted underlie the various methodological orientations based on the preferences underpinning the research (Grix, 2002). However, 'it is not to imply that any one position is better than another' (Green, 2003: 45). The ontological and epistemological assumptions indicate the choice of specific methods or particular data collection-related techniques. The analysis, therefore, of documentary material or the texts of interviews will constitute the chief means of achieving the purposes of this research. Moreover, an adequate philosophical basis will aid the understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, so the theoretical interaction is essential for the understanding of this project.

In this research, it is important to remember that 'the preference for a particular set of epistemological assumptions may also be the result of personality factors; the choice between an ‘outsider’ or an ‘insider’ research strategy is likely to be determined by a perceived preference for predetermined' (Blaikie, 1993: 201). The researcher's position as ‘insider’, based on a personal background as a South Korean elite athlete, has an influence on the particular strategies and approaches used and the ontological and epistemological implications of the research.

For social scientists, the philosophy of knowledge is the point of departure in their quest to interpret social phenomena (Chatziefstathiou, 2005). Methodology is linked to theory and methods and techniques are connected to ontological and epistemological assumptions. It is important to acknowledge that fundamentally different theoretical positions give rise to different research results. The key aim of this research is to evaluate the Seoul Olympic Games' impact on Korean society. As
a result, a particular research design has been chosen to form the basis of this research strategy.

In short, this research adopts a critical realist ontology and epistemology as it undertakes to explain the origins and impact of the Seoul Olympic Games by linking them to their background. In particular, the core epistemological assumption leads to an interpretivist position, through which interview data and various other materials have provided findings toward realising the research aims. Issues related to the ontological and epistemological assumptions are addressed throughout the following discussion.

4-2. Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

Social scientists begin with the ontological and epistemological questions that are identified with their own positions, which have particular methodological implications and influence the reliability of data (Hay, 2002).

**Figure 4-1: The interrelationship between the building blocks of research**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What’s out there to know?</td>
<td>What and how can we know about it?</td>
<td>How can we go about acquiring that knowledge?</td>
<td>Which precise procedures can we use to acquire it?</td>
<td>Which data can we collect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source adapted from Hay (2002: 64)*
Ontological questions reflect different perceptions of 'what constitutes reality'. As a result, different cultural contexts can lead to different assumptions (Grix, 2002). For example, different groups might assume those which are socially constructed or what we believe constitutes social reality. Moreover, Blaikie (2000: 8) notes that 'ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality'. However, naturalists stress that 'basic methodological principles (for instance, models of explanation) are shared between natural and social sciences, while interpretivists emphasize the meaningfulness of social life and the alleged irrelevance of natural scientists' modes of analysis and explanation' (Lazar, 2004: 8). Above all, those two positions' (naturalism and interpretivism) assumptions involve fundamentally different departures (ontologies) for obtaining information.

Epistemology ('how can we know' / 'the nature of knowledge') is concerned with knowledge and with how we can know. Epistemology reflects the ontological position (Marsh and Furlong, 2002) and what researchers think about this is linked to an epistemological approach which logically precedes a methodological approach. Epistemology is concerned with 'how we gather information about the external world' (Grix, 2002). On the other hand, Blaikie (2000) points out that it has been confused with methods and techniques of collecting and analysing data. As a result, Grix (2002: 179) expresses that 'methodology is concerned with the logic, potentialities and limitations of research methods that the term is often confused and used interchangeably with the research methods themselves'. Moreover, Marsh and Furlong (2002: 17) point out that:

They [ontological and epistemological positions] are like a skin not a sweater: they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the researcher sees fit. In our view, all students of political science should recognise and acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological positions and be able to defend these positions against critiques from other positions.

In doing social science research, beginning with an ontology and epistemology is necessary and important for the transparency of knowledge. Therefore, Grix (2002: 176) makes the following points about certain key steps in the development of a methodology: '(1) to understand the interrelationship of the key components of research (including methodology and methods); (2) to avoid confusion when
discussing theoretical debates and approaches to social phenomena; and (3) to be able to recognise others’, and defend our own, positions’.

Blaikie (1993: 203) notes that there is ‘a fundamental choice to be made by the social researcher: a choice between very different ontological (realist v. constructivist) and epistemological (outside v. inside) positions’. In addition, Blaikie (1993: 202-203) points out that the major social science approaches, such as ‘Interpretivism, Critical Theory, Structuration Theory and Feminism, are all fully or partly constructivist in their ontological assumptions’. Therefore, those positions may be adopted as a consequence of being a part of different social circumstances and groups. It could be said that multiple realities exist within such mechanisms (Blaikie, 1993).

However, in social science, knowledge and meanings can be both straightforward and logical, or complex and irrational, such that Lazar (2004) points out that social science is a field characterised by competing epistemological blocs, including:

- Naturalists who advocate the adoption of some preferred conception of science and scientific method as a model for the social sciences; interpretive social scientists, who reject the scientific model because they believe that the nature of human social life is not appropriately grasped by scientific methods; and reconcilers, who wish to bridge the divide between naturalism and humanism (Lazar, 2004: 8).

As discussed above, it is generally recognised that ontology is concerned with ‘what we may know’ and epistemology with ‘how we come to know what we know’ (Grix, 2002: 177). Yet different researchers’ ontological and epistemological assumptions (positions) can lead to different perceptions of social reality. According to Blaikie (1993: 203) ‘social enquiry has a range of purposes: exploration, description, understanding, explanation, change and evaluation’. Blaikie’s list of primary purposes are ‘concerned with exploring some social phenomenon’ that are mostly ‘not well understood, possibly to inform further stages of an investigation’ (Blaikie, 1993: 203). However, the researcher exploring an individual’s actions influenced by social structures can also investigate the social context linked to an individual’s agency. Additionally, theory is required to explain this social context in different ways (Cruickshank, 2003). For example, Marsh and Smith (2001: 532) point out that:
The role of theory in realism is to conceptualise observable behaviour by using theory to infer the underlying structure of a particular social situation...theory provides a way of constructing a narrative that helps us identify and explain the underlying structural relationships. Indeed it is impossible to make any sense of the world without some sort of theoretical framework (Marsh and Smith, 2001: 532).

In short, it is important to set out ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted for this research which then helps the processes of theory construction, and gives meaning and relevance to the notions of objectivity and truth (Blaikie, 1993: 202). The concern of epistemology is to form ‘branches of philosophy’ which are ‘concerned with the theory of knowledge’. In addition, it provides ‘the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be’ (Blaikie, 2000: 8). In social science it is possible to adopt a pragmatic position to match strategy to the research project and considerations of ontology and epistemology to the specific research questions (Blaikie, 1993).

According to Ritzer (2008), in his sociological methodology reflections, there are three paradigms that are associated with “social-facts”, “social-definition”, and “social-behaviour”. In the following quote Ritzer (1975: 7) essentially agrees with Kuhn’s position:

A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or subcommunity) from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it.

The next sub-section will discuss the fundamental differences between theories in the social sciences.

4.3. Paradigmatic Parameters

Table 4.1 sets out the core assumptions of three related paradigms – positivism, realism, relativism- that have had a major impact on debate in social/political research in recent years (Marsh and Smith, 2001).
### Table 4-1: Core assumptions of, and differences between, Positivism, Relativism and Realism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Relativism</th>
<th>Realism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The world exists independently of our knowledge of it- thus Positivism is at odds with Relativism and at one with Realism</td>
<td>The world does not exist independently of our knowledge of it- unlike the Positivist and Realist paradigms</td>
<td>Realists, like Positivists are against Relativists, contend that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular relationship can be established between social phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested, and falsified, by direct observation</td>
<td>The world is socially, or discursively, constructed- totally at odds with Positivism but, with significant differences, a view shared with Realism</td>
<td>For Realists, there are deep structures which cannot be directly observed- unlike Positivists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Positivist there are no deep structures which cannot be observed unlike the Realist</td>
<td>There is no extra-discursive social sphere, no ‘real’ social world beyond discourse a view at odds with Positivism and Realism</td>
<td>Realist, unlike Relativists but like Positivists, argue that there is necessity in the world- objects/structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positivism assumes that there is no dichotomy between appearance and reality; that the world is real and not mediated by our senses or socially constructed</td>
<td>Social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them, it is this interpretation/understanding of them which affects outcomes-and it is the interpretation of these social phenomena which is crucial</td>
<td>While social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation, or discursive construction, of them, nevertheless that discursive construction affects outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>However, meanings can only be established and understood within discourses- objective analysis is therefore impossible-knowledge is discursively laden</td>
<td>Source: Adapted from Marsh et al (1999: 11-14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Positivism

The positivist’s goal is simply to describe social phenomena while rejecting any application of metaphysics. Basically, positivists are foundationalists (Grix 2002). Moreover, they believe that ‘the world exists independently of our knowledge of it’ (Marsh et al, 1999: 11). One of the main positivists, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), developed a logical method for social research ‘devoted to methodological issues, ranging from arguments in favour of sociological explanations to assaults on a priori accounts of ethical problems’ (Baert, 2005: 10). Positivists typically argue that ‘based on the results of our studies, we may learn that our theory doesn’t fit the facts well and so we need to revise our theory to better predict reality’ (William, 2006: 1).
In addition, positivists believe in the value of empirical research conducted through scientific observation and measurement. For example, they emphasise the usefulness of ‘objective’ measures of social phenomena, such as ‘hard data’ (e.g. from the statistics of government election results) rather than ‘soft data (e.g. from interviews or participant observation)’ (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 23).

Positivists rely crucially in their approach on scientific experimentation and the direct manipulation of their observations. In summarising the key features of logical positivism, for example, Buckler (2002: 173) states that it ‘prioritised the methods of natural science, which sought true knowledge through quantitative measurement of material phenomena and through physical experiments that established facts concerning the behaviour of these phenomena’. The positivist needs to concentrate on utilising only ‘specific procedures to ensure that observations are verifiable, accurate and consistent’ (William, 2006: 2).

Durkheim pointed out that ‘the principle of causality has been applied effectively in various domains of inquiry, ranging from the physical world to psychology’ (Patrick, 2005: 13). Durkheim’s argument was that in sociology, researchers can obtain certainty about the facts of social life just as in other scientific fields such as mathematics or the natural sciences (Patrick, 2005).

In addition, Durkheim’s (1982: 60) stress in ‘The Rules of Sociological Method’ is follows:

"Reflective thought precedes science, which merely employs it more methodically. Man cannot live among things without forming ideas about them...because these notions are closer to us and more within our mental grasp than the realities to which they correspond, we naturally tend to substitute them for the realities, concentrating out speculations upon them. Instead of a science which deals with realities, we carry out no more than an ideological analysis."

In short, Durkheim’s arguments are that ‘social scientists should attempt, through the rigorous application of these methodological procedures, coupled with the demand to expose their methods and findings to a critical scientific community, to achieve objectivity’ (Lazar, 2004: 15). Moreover, Durkheim’s truth is ‘something that is independent of the facts of sensitivity and individual impulse’ (Baert, 2005: 21).
For the purposes of this research the positivist approach is deemed to be unsuitable because the central aim of this study is to understand and interpret accurately the key factors affecting the Seoul Olympic Games, such as the bidding process and the economic, social and sporting impact of the Games on Korean society. As a result, there is a need for a description and explanation of people’s different perceptions or points of view. If this research adopted a positivist position, it would not be possible to realise these research aims. For example, in the assessment of the economic factors many different influences have to be taken into account which are linked to social actors and structures and which cannot simply be observed empirically. Positivist assumptions foreground certain research methods. Therefore a positivist approach is not suitable for this research for which an understanding of the key factors and their deep underlying social structures cannot be achieved through empirical testing or direct observation.

Relativism

Relativism is the philosophical position according to which all perceptions are equally valid and all reality is relative to the individual (Slick, 2006). Although by implication relativists believe that all truth is relative, the counter-argument has been raised that since human beings are ‘culturally and historically situated creatures, that justification cannot go on forever’ (Stanford, 2003: 1). In addition, Plato reproved the advocates of relativism in the following manner, arguing that ‘if the way things appear to me, in that way they exist for me, and the way things appears to you, in that way they exist for you, then it appears to me that your whole doctrine is false’ (Ross, 2009). Hume (2005: 88) argues that ‘all determinations of the understanding is real matter of fact’. Indeed, Young (2009: 222) points out that ‘a judgment is true if and only if it accords with real (objective) matter of fact’. Young (2009) has concluded that ‘although several plausible positions lead to relativism about aesthetic properties, relativism about truth-values of aesthetic judgments remains elusive’ (2009: 221). Moreover, MacFarlane imagines that aesthetic judgments ‘depend on how the world is when the judgment is made and on the One True Aesthetic Standard’ (MacFarlane, 2005: 308). As discussed previously, relativists believe that reality is socially
constructed and all points of view are the measure of what is true for that individual person.

Relativists share some viewpoints with constructivism — ‘constructivist psychologies... argue that each person perceives the world differently and actively creates their own meanings form events’ (Burr, 2003: 19). Therefore, constructivists stress that ‘we perceive the world in terms of these constructs and our actions, although never predictable, can be understood in the light of our construal of the world...we have the capacity to change our own constructions of the world and thereby to create new possibilities for our own action’ (Burr, 2003: 19).

Edkey (2001) has explained that constructionism refer to the issue of language, an example of which follows:

Contrary to the view of some critical realists, most social constructionists do not see language as the only reality. When they travel to conferences or go on holiday, for example, they consult their map books just like everyone else. They do not suppose that, say, Nottingham appears in the middle of the M1 motorway because it says so on the page and neither do they imagine that it somehow springs into existence at the moment it is mentioned. The way that constructionism upsets our common-sense understandings is much more subtle than this. Instead, a constructionist might point out that Nottingham is a city by virtue of a text (i.e. by royal decree) and that its boundaries — where it begins and ends — are also a matter for negotiation and agreement. The argument is not, therefore, that Nottingham doesn’t really exist, but that it does so as a socially constructed reality (Edley, 2001: 439).

The constructionist focus on the textual nature of reality in this way invites a focus on the possibility of multiple realities, and also leads to research practices which are centred around exploring social interchange and the generation of mutual understandings of the world (Gergen, 1999).

Relativism implies that social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation. Yet its proponents believe that our individual interpretation or understanding of those phenomena may have an impact on them which is important. Finally, relativists can only understand their own belief, which means that it is impossible to gain pure knowledge of all others’ positions (Marsh et al, 1999). As a result, the view adopted for this study is that the relativist position should be rejected.
Rather in this research, we adopt the realist assumption which argues that ‘not all social phenomena are directly observable, structures exist that cannot be observed empirically and those that can may not present the social/political world as it actually is’ (Green, 2003: 49).

**Realism**

The view that the world has an existence that is independent of our perceptions of it, so that science is an attempt to explain in thought the things that act independently of thought. Realism is not the same as empiricism, but it has some similarities (Filmer et al., 2004: 36).

The ontological assumptions of realism are similar to those of positivism. Realists believe, however, that there are deep structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be directly observed, but which are crucial for any explanation of behaviour. Such underlying relationships can be exposed by means of a specific epistemological position. Baert (2005) points out that realists have both a weak sense and a strong sense of the world - ‘It is realist in a weak sense in that it assumes that there is an external reality that exists independently of people gaining access to it. It is realist in a strong sense in that it assumes that scientists are, in principle, able to gain access to this reality’ (Baert, 2005: 90). Moreover, ‘realists acknowledge that social researchers do not operate in a positivist fashion, but insist that natural scientists do not either’ (Baert, 2005: 96). This means that the social sciences and the natural sciences ‘attempt to uncover underlying social structures or mechanisms to account for observed “demi – regularities”’ (Baert, 2005: 96).

In addition, Parker (1992) has explained that people’s physical and social environments are both aspects of the social structure:

In a capitalist economy, for example, industrial workers are physically located for much of the time together with others, and certain types of collective action make sense. In patriarchal societies in the West, women are physically located in homes for much of the time and certain types of collective action do not make sense. In a world organised by structures of imperialism, victims outside and inside the industrial centres can only act, accept or resist, in particular ways (Parker, 1992: 36).
In this research, attention will focus on 'hidden' causal power relationships existing between structures and actors which cannot be observed directly. According to the realist position, it is possible to make causal statements through interpretative or discursive routes. Its advocates believe that the discursive construction of knowledge affects the outcomes of research. As a result, Hollis and Smith (1991) point out that the use of the philosophy of science can lead through inference to the best explanation.

Realists suggest that there is often a divide between 'reality' and 'appearance'. For example, classical realism argues that there is a 'difference between real interests, which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which might be manipulated by the powerful forces in society' (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 31). Realism may thus provide an interpretation or understanding of social phenomena which can enable us to identify or understand both external reality and socio-political phenomena (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). However, Baert (2005: 93) points out that since 'realists are (influenced by) the evidence provided, a scientist or a community of scientists can hold erroneous beliefs about their research object'.

This research holds to some of these realist assumptions, although simultaneously makes use of interpretivism, with its emphasis on multiple perspectives, to more closely explain the problem under investigation.

**Interpretivism**

This research utilises the interpretivist epistemological assumption that reality is socially constructed by establishing an 'interpretation' or 'understanding of social phenomena'. Interpretivists believe that 'the world is socially or discursively constructed' (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). As stated by Denzin and Lincoln (2003: 33), 'all research is interpretive; it is guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied'. Although this view is opposite to that of positivism, realists share certain epistemological assumptions with relativism. The interpretivist approach sets out on the basis of discursive psychology to identify, for example, the possible linguistic resources from people's accounts of phenomena (Burr, 2003).
According to Williams (2002: 135), interpretivists 'draw conclusions from their data about the necessary relationships that exist among categories of phenomena'. As stated by Hammersley (1992b), there are three type of explanation for theoretical inference:

(a) the claim that ethnographic work produces theoretical insights whose validity and value are to be judged by the reader;
(b) the idea that theories are universal claims that can be derived from the study of a single case which exemplifies a type;
(c) the argument that by studying critical cases we can, on the basis of the hypothetico-deductive method, draw inferences about the truth or falsity of universal laws (Hammersley, 1992b: 91)

The researcher examines different speakers' perceptions and tries to identify the variability of each individual's particular repertoire. As a result, as Burr (2003: 167) points out, 'variability can be expected within a single interview, because respondents can be expected to make use of different repertoires to suit their current purposes'. Interpretivists often use transcriptions of interviews or natural speech but sometimes they may use materials extracted from the press, such as newspaper articles or TV documentaries (Burr, 2003). Discussing the issue of interview transcripts (which are structured within the rules of a particular language), Heritage (1984: 238) provides the following summary:

The use of recorded data is an essential corrective to the limitations of intuition and recollection. In enabling repeated and detailed examination of the events of interaction, the use of recordings extends the range and precision of the observations which can be made. It permits other researchers to have direct access to the data about which claims are being made, thus making analysis subject to detailed public scrutiny and helping to minimise the influence of personal preconceptions or analytical biases. Finally, it may be noted that because the data are available in 'raw' form, they can be re-used in a variety of investigations and can be re-examined in the context of new findings.

Interpretivist repertoires are, consequently, focused on small-scale entities rather than structures. In addition, interpretivists use qualitative methods such as interviews to understand people's social reality, which is in keeping with their argument that 'there are no objective truths, and quantitative methods are not a sharp tool; moreover, it
may produce missing data' (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 27). Thus, interpretive research creates rich evidence via in-depth interviews.

Williams (2002: 126) notes that ‘sensitive topics or difficult research populations (for example) can be known only through interpretive methods'. In addition, if interpretivism can be used in ‘social policy formulation or evaluation it must be able to say something authoritative about instances beyond the specific ones of the research’ (Williams, 2002: 126). Moreover, the sociologist is interested in knowing about ‘how social structures are created, maintained or destroyed and must therefore look to evidence manifested in the specific features of the social world to do so’ (Williams, 2002: 126). Interpretivist work has attempted to find out such evidence of social structures and explain particular issues in society.

In short, interpretivists aim to examine social actors’ activities and the language on which they focus their attention is considered to describe and explain the differences between social phenomena. As a result, the interpretivist approach is used in this research to explain and understand key factors by using, for example, documentary analysis to investigate the impact of political factors on South Korea in relation to the world stage. Thus, the analysis of documents that reproduce the key actors’ speeches will be used in this project for the insights that they can provide.

**Critical Realism**

According to Pratten (2009: 189):

A prominent feature of critical realist contributions to the philosophy of science and methodological debates within the social sciences has been an opposition to Humean accounts of causality...Moreover, critical realists demonstrate that many conventional approaches in the social sciences can be best understood as being ultimately rooted in a Humean notion of causality.

Critical realism undertakes to provide an explanation of social phenomena by discovering the mechanisms underlying them and seeks to demonstrate the real existence of hypothetical relations (Fitzpatrick, 2000). The critical realist believes
that there is a reality independent of our knowledge but that it is accessible to scientific research. However, critical realism has not had a long history (Baert, 2005). The prominent critical realist, Roy Bhaskar (born in May, 1944), was originally a realist scientist and naturalist.

Both critical realist and Marxist critiques of civil society, which share some similar viewpoints, aim to develop the modern social formation (Baert, 2005). Based on social science arguments, critical realism stresses ‘both the scientific and the critical potential of social research, and therefore provides a welcome boost for the morale of social researchers, especially at a time when their activities have come under criticism’ (Baert, 2005: 89). Moreover, it aims to explain underlying social mechanisms, sharing some assumptions with realism. Importantly, Baert (2005: 95) points out that ‘there is some dispute among critical realists as to what explanatory power means, but most would agree that it indicates how wide a rage of significant empirical phenomena has been “accounted for”, “illuminated” or “covered”…’. In addition, Kurki (2007: 361) points out that ‘critical realism seeks to reformulate currently dominant understandings of the role and nature of causal analysis in the social sciences and in IR (international relations)’.

Critical realists have favourably utilised qualitative methods for obtaining knowledge about people’s individual experiences. Furthermore, critical realism argues that ‘the perceptual criterion of reality is not the only criterion, and adds to it the causal criterion, which turns on the capacity of an entity to bring about changes in material things’ (Porter, 2002: 61). This coincides with Marx and Engels’ (1970 [1847]: 123) view that ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways, the point is to change it’. Post-modernists and critical realists stress that ‘all observation is fallible and has error and that all theory is revisable’ (William, 2006: 2). In addition, Bhaskar (1989b: 80) notes the relationship between society and people as follows:

People, in their conscious human activity, for the most part unconsciously reproduce (or occasionally, transform) the structures that govern their substantive activities of production. Thus people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family, or work to reproduce the capitalist economy. But it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and inexorable result) of, as it is also the necessary condition for, their activity.
As stated by Lewis (2002: 21), critical realists refer to the fact that 'social and political events are generated by a complex causal nexus that involves both the efficient causation of actors and the material causation of social structure'. In addition, Hay (1995: 191) points out that 'one person’s agency is another person’s structure', which means that agency is 'attributing power both causal and actual' (Green, 2004: 380). Moreover, critical realists argue that 'all human activity presupposes a set of antecedent social structures' (Lewis, 2000: 251) and 'structure and agency need to be linked' (Cruickshank, 2003). As Bhaskar (1989a: 34) explains, 'critical realists contend that the existence of social structures is a necessary condition for human agency, arguing that activities like speaking, driving on public roads, cashing cheques, giving lectures, and so forth, would be impossible in the absence of social structures such as (respectively) rules of grammar, the highway code, banking systems, teacher-student relationships, and so on'. Kuhn (1970) also argued that people are reflexive, reflect on what position they should adopt and often change their actions as a consequence of social structures.

In relation to the above, critical realist assumptions draw upon various research designs — using in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews and document analyses to provide for an enhanced interpretive position. In addition, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is useful in the critical realist approach. However, this research has focused on qualitative methods (interview analysing — statistical data) according to the interpretivist epistemological approach.

4-4. Methodological Considerations

In the light of the foregoing discussion, this research adopts a critical realist approach in its ontological and epistemological assumptions. According to Grix (2002: 179), 'methodology is concerned with the logic of scientific inquiry; in particular with investigating the potentialities and limitations of particular techniques or procedures'. The fundamental proposition is that 'knowledge is a process' by which the researcher moves towards an understanding of the social world and 'knowledge never stops because the world is constantly changing' (Haralambos and Holborn et al, 2004: 881).
Critical realist assumptions will be used to explore the inside story of the Seoul Olympics, linking it to politics, economics and sport and the Games' social impact on Korean society while paying regard, also, to the global context. Critical realists believe that deep structural, social phenomena cannot be directly observed (in the way that events in the external world can) but an understanding of the relative significance of the deep structure for future action is crucial for understanding human behaviour (Marsh and Smith, 2001). In-depth interview and focus groups' viewpoints are addressed (see Chapter 6, Data Findings). However, Krueger (1988: 19) points out that 'the open-ended approaches allow the subject ample opportunity to comment, to explain, and to share experiences and attitudes as opposed to the structured and directive interview that is dominated by the interviewer'. As Rice (1931: 561) points out:

A defect of the interview for the purposes of fact-finding in scientific research, then, is that the questioner takes the lead. That is, the subject plays a more or less passive role. Information or points of view of the highest value may not be disclosed because the direction given the interview by the questioner leads away from them. In short, data obtained from an interview are as likely to embody the preconceived ideas of the interviewer as the attitude of the subject interviewed.

As part of this research it is necessary to explore underlying structures as well as to understand the beliefs and attitudes of the actors/agents involved with the Seoul Olympics. This is the reason for adopting critical realism through which 'one can explore social structure using our interpretation or discursive construction' (Green, 2003). For example, the research approach adopted here is that an understanding of structure and agency can explain links to the Cold War, the economic structure of Tiger economies, and social networks in South Korea. The main agents of the Seoul Olympics were Juan Antonio Samaranch (1980-2001), Chun Doo-Hwan (President of South Korea 1980-1987), Kim Un-Yong and Richard W. Pound.

As mentioned earlier, this research seeks to use the interpretivist approach. As Denzin (1983: 133) argues, 'the interpretivist rejects generalization as a goal and never aims to draw randomly selected samples of human experience'. Because of this, 'individual consciousnesses are free to attach different meanings to the same actions or circumstances' (Williams, 2002: 130).
In short, it is important to emphasise that the relationship between structural context and agents’ behaviours is a central feature of this research. Thus, it is important to understand the social context in the 1980s.

4-4-1. Structure and Agency

Social science has emphasised that the ‘structure-agency’ relationship is highly important to theoretical issues in the human sciences (Carlsnaes 1992; Archer 1996). However, structuralists have argued that individual power can be a dangerous illusion which can obscure the overriding influence of structures (Marsh and Stoker, 2002).

Regarding the complex phenomenon between structure and agency in social science, Sugden and Baimer (1993: 133) emphasise that ‘there is no single, all powerful agency involved in the instrumental manipulation of sport’. In addition, social constructionism stresses that ‘the constructive work of individuals in interaction that is the focus of the micro approach implicitly affords us personal agency … macro social constructionism tends toward the death of the subject where the person can be conceptualised only as the outcome of discursive and societal structures’ (Burr, 2003: 23). This means that ‘individual persons, either alone or collectively, have no capacity to bring about change’. However, constructionism allows for ‘the vision of personal agency seen in mainstream psychology, since both would deny that structures such as beliefs, values or attitudes exist as part of our intra-psychic make-up, forming the basis for our action’ (Burr, 2003: 23-24). Moreover, King (2009: 263) points out that ‘knowledgeable individuals effectively reproduce society unknowingly’.

This research shows how important the conceptual relation between structure and agency is in determining the outcomes of social phenomena. For example, President Chun’s idea of hosting the Seoul Olympics only came to fruition, thanks to the complex interweaving of the KOC and IOC’s powerful influence and the larger social movements in Korea and the rest of the world, such that hosting the Games in Seoul happened but not in the precise way that Chun had hoped for. Additionally, critical
realists argue that 'structure and agency need to be linked, however, it is not a good idea to only focus on one of these' (Cruickshank, 2003: 3).

The fundamental question is to what extent we, as individuals, have the ability to direct our own lives. In addition, Archer (1996: 12) argues that 'structure-agency is confronting the most pressing social problem of the human condition'.

4-5. Methods/Techniques

This section compares Qualitative Methods and Quantitative Methods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Image of social reality</td>
<td>Static and external to actor</td>
<td>Processual and socially constructed by actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Nature of data</td>
<td>Hard, reliable</td>
<td>Rich, deep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) The role of values</td>
<td>Value neutral; value-free inquiry</td>
<td>Normativism; value-bound inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Methods</td>
<td>Quantitative, mathematical, extensive of statistics</td>
<td>Qualitative, with less emphasis on statistics; verbal and qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Researcher's role</td>
<td>Rather passive; is the 'knower'; is separate from subject - the known/unknown</td>
<td>Active; 'knower' and 'know' are interactive and inseparable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Generalisations</td>
<td>Inductive generalizations;</td>
<td>Analytical or conceptual generalizations; time-and-context specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Natural and social sciences</td>
<td>Deductive; model of natural sciences; nomothetic; based on strict rules</td>
<td>Inductive; rejection of the natural sciences model; no strict rules; interpretations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from Bryman (1988: 94); Sarantakos (1998: 54)

Table 4-2 shows the different focuses and functions linked to quantitative and qualitative methods/techniques. In this research, the methods involved use principally qualitative techniques. General qualitative methods, including participant observation, intensive individual interviews and focus group interviews, seek to understand key experiences and information. In addition, relevant statistical data are also made use of.
4-5-1. Qualitative Research

The purpose of qualitative research is to find out about others' knowledge and communication, whilst studying people in their own, that is, 'natural' location (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Therefore, Hammersley (1990: 598) points out that the world is 'discovered and this can only be achieved by first-hand observations and participation in natural settings, guided by an explanatory orientation'. In addition, Denzin and Lincoln (2003: 31) emphasise that there are 'no objective observations' and no clear window into the inner life of an individual. Consequently, qualitative researchers organise 'a wide range of interconnected interpretive methods... seeking better ways to make more understandable the worlds of experience they have studied' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 31). Qualitative work therefore consists of a set of interpretive approaches which utilise research material for observing the social world from the points of view of others. The qualitative approach is able to explain the world from various theoretical viewpoints. As Flick (2002: 4) notes:

The essential features of qualitative research are the correct choice of appropriate methods and theories; the recognition and analysis of different perspectives; the researchers' reflections on their research as part of the process of knowledge production; and the variety of approaches and methods.

Qualitative research is not simply a matter of using particular methods. It is the wise arrangement of methods and approaches for data collection that as Mason (1996: 36) points are as follows:

As a researcher you do not simply work out where to find data which already exist in a collectable state. Instead you work out how best you can generate data from your chosen data sources. For this reason, the term method in qualitative research generally is meant to imply more than a practical technique for gaining data. It implies also a data generation process involving activities which are intellectual, analytical and interpretive.

Regarding the ongoing debate between qualitative and quantitative research, Denzin and Lincoln (2003: 13) stress that:

Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. They seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given meaning. In contrast, quantitative studies emphasize the
measurement and analysis of causal relationship between variables, not processes. Proponents of such studies claim that their work is done from within a value-free framework.

The qualitative approach utilises data from ‘field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 4-5). However, Bryman (2001: 265) claims that ‘unless we can talk to a certain degree about the nature of qualitative research, it is difficult to see how it is possible to refer to qualitative research as a distinctive strategy’.

The main theoretical traditions that have popularised qualitative research are naturalism, ethnomethodology, emotionalism and postmodernism (Gubrium and Holstein, 1997). Bryman (2001) emphasises that the different interpretation of data is largely influenced by a researcher’s theoretical assumptions:

Methods of social research are closely tied to different visions of how social reality should be studied. Methods are not simply neutral: they are linked with the ways in which social scientists envision the connection between different viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it should be examined (Bryman, 2001: 4).

On the other hand, Silverman (2005: 14) emphasises that ‘we must not draw too sharp a distinction between quantitative and qualitative research’. Because of that, ‘qualitative research can mean many different things, involving a wide range of methods and informed by contrasting models’. Moreover, Bateson (1972: 320) points out that ‘all qualitative researchers are philosophers in that universal sense in which all human beings...are guided by highly abstract principles’.

Finally, Flick (2002: 5) implies that qualitative research’s central criterion is ‘whether findings are grounded in empirical material and whether the methods have been appropriately selected and applied to the object under study. The relevance of findings and the reflexivity of proceedings are further criteria’.

This research has generally used lived experience and qualitative methods – utilised based on the core epistemological assumptions – to explore individuals’ points of view. In addition, an efficient qualitative approach must address, explain or evaluate the ‘causal relationships between variables’, seeking to uncover ‘the socially constructed nature of reality, and the intimate relationship between the researcher and
what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 13).

4-5-2. Documentary Analysis

As discussed above, this research employs qualitative methods and techniques for the analysis of the data. Therefore, the questions posed in the research are linked to the techniques used for achieving these study aims. According to Punch (1998: 190), 'documents, both historical and contemporary, are a rich source of data for social research'. By means of an analysis of the documentary evidence, an explanation will be sought for the historical background to the Seoul Olympics and an understanding obtained of the key factors underpinning this research.

The study of the secondary materials and official records serves the purposes of an epistemological approach that supports a critical realist position. As Ericson et al. (1991) have indicated, the analysis of the quantitative content 'seeks to show patterns of regularities in content through repetition, and qualitative content analysis' and thereby 'emphasises the fluidity of the text and content in the interpretive understanding of culture' (1991: 50).

In this research, in addition to interviews, official documents of the South Korean Olympic Committee will be scrutinised in relation to consultations with the International Olympic Committee. Documents such as 'The Seoul Olympic Games'* (SOSFO, 1982a, 1982b) and 'The History of Seoul Olympic Games XXIV'* (SOSFO, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c) and also the IOC presidential announcements (cited in The Korean Times, 1985, 1987, 1988) are addressed. In the course of two visits to South Korea, many other sources were accessed at the Korea Olympic Committee (KOC) library, the Olympic Museum and the National Assembly Library in Seoul. These included PhD and MSc theses, and various other such materials as newspapers, official documents and articles. Data were also collected at the Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation (SOSFO) and also the Olympic Research Centre. Furthermore, recent data were sourced (using keyword searches) from several newspapers including The Korea Times, The New York Times and Dong-A Ilbo. Collectively these revealed
the ways in which South Korea prepared its bidding strategy on the domestic and then on the world stage. Moreover, the differences in perception between communist and democratic countries are investigated in terms of newspaper analyses that explain the social context.

One of our assumptions is that 'many important relationships between social phenomena cannot be observed' (Marsh and Smith, 2001: 531). Therefore, analysis of the documentary evidence will be used to interpret 'what they do not say, as well as what they contain' (Green, 2003: 67) in this research. In addition, Hodder (2003: 156) points out that 'texts are of importance for qualitative research because, in general terms, access can be easy and low cost, because the information provided may differ from and may not be available in spoken form, and because texts endure and thus give historical insight'. At the same time, a quantitative analysis of the documentary data might also be interesting for the measurement of economic factors that it permits. Ministry of Sport documents and the IOC records provide insights into the economic situation at the time of the Seoul Games for the benefit of this research.

4-5-3. The Interviews

For understanding different groups' or individuals' opinions, one can make use of interviews as a method for social research. Punch (1998: 174-175) points out that 'the interview is one of the main data collection tools in qualitative research and it is a very good way of accessing people's perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations and constructions of reality'.

Some political scientists and sociologists prefer to use intensive interviewing techniques rather than participant observation, because in-depth interviews can extend informal probing to discussion of key questions and semi-structured or unstructured methods (Devine, 2002). Lofland (1985) explains that intensive interviews are 'guided conversations'. In addition, the transcriptions constitute data which can be analysed and interpreted. Furthermore, interviewers 'engage in observing the interviewee and the setting in which they are found and these observations facilitate the interpretation of the material' (Devine, 2002: 198). However, Hodder (2003:
158) points out that 'what people say is often very different from what people do'. Works by Rathje and Thompson (1981) and Rathje and Murphy (1992) demonstrated that 'this point has perhaps been most successfully established over recent years' (Hodder, 2003: 158). Intensive interviews are open and flexible and accept that those interviewees' actions, opinions and values can be explored (Mann 1985; Brenner et al, 1985). The following passage illustrates the diverse range of different interview strategies:

Interviewing has a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of uses. The most common type of interviewing is individual, face-to-face verbal interchange, but it can also take the form of face to face group interviewing, mailed or self-administered questionnaires, and telephone surveys. Interviewing can be structured, semi-structured, or unstructured. It can be used for marketing purposes, to gather political opinions, for therapeutic reasons, or to produce data for academic analysis. It can be used for the purpose of measurement or its scope can be the understanding of an individual or a group perspective (Fontana and Frey: 1994: 361).

Academic researchers also frequently use focus group interviews. However this is still closely linked to voting organisations and politicians (Barbour and Kitzinger 1999). For example, Gamson (1992) considers the process of 'how people deal with media information, and how they draw on their own experiences in life and also those people they know in talking politics'. He points out that 'people are able to conduct informed and reasoned discussions about political issues and have a political consciousness often dismissed by opinion pollsters' (Devine, 2002: 199). In addition, intensive interviewing should allow people to talk freely and to offer their interpretation. It is important to obtain their pre-dominant perspective (Harvey, 1990). Qualitative methods can also be explored as people tell their own stories, 'placing an interviewee's attitudes and behaviour in the context of their individual biography and the wider social setting (Devine, 2002: 199). Academic researchers usually choose techniques in relation to 'what they want to explore' and any single technique raises epistemological issues about different perceptions of the social world (Bryman, 2001).

4-5-5. Unstructured and Semi-Structured Interviews

Different types of interview such as unstructured, semi-structured or highly structured can be used, depending on the researcher's purpose. It is important to recognise that
different interviewees and interview groups might have different perceptions, opinions and reasons for agreeing to be interviewed (Punch, 1998). The traditional unstructured interview, characterised by a non-standardized, open-ended, in-depth method, is a useful way of understanding peoples' life histories and the complex reasons underscoring their behaviour, as it gives them freedom to talk about an issue on their own terms with very little input from the researcher (Punch, 1998). The highly structured interview, on the other hand, is useful for producing standardized sets of responses but leaves little scope for people to tell their own stories and can therefore overlook what might be most important to them. Semi-structured interviews, as a middle ground between these two, can produce standardised and theoretically relevant responses whilst allowing interviewees a relative amount of freedom to express their own particular interests.

Therefore, semi-structured interviews were used in this research. Frequently, qualitative research is used to ask more ‘natural’ and open questions in the interview setting. A semi-structured interview has a greater focus on exploring ‘patterns of behaviour, more holistically and more macroscopically’ (Punch, 1998: 186), than closed or questionnaire-type interviews. According to Mason (2002: 225):

Good interviewing is clearly in no small part about an interviewer’s skills in asking, listening and interpretation, but these are more than skills which can simply be acquired and deployed. Asking, listening and interpretation are theoretical projects in the sense that how we ask questions, what we assume is possible from asking questions and from listening to answers, and what kind of knowledge we hear answers to be, are all ways in which we express, pursue and satisfy our theoretical orientations in our research.

In addition, Fontana and Frey (2000: 668) point out that ‘human beings are complex, and their lives are ever changing; the more methods we use to study them, the better our chances to gain some understanding of how they construct their lives and the stories they tell us about them’. Also, Oakley (1981: 41) notes that ‘interviewing is rather like a marriage – everybody knows what it is, an awful lot of people do it, and yet behind each closed front door there is a world of secrets’.

For this study, a total of eleven people were interviewed. These included politicians (for example, the Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism), sport officials, diplomats and university professors. The process of selecting interview respondents was as
follows. Firstly, the aim was to identify people who have a particularly deep understanding of South Korean society from the 1980s to present and a specific appreciation of the impact of the Seoul Olympic Games themselves. Secondly, contact was initially established through the researcher’s own network. Thereafter, interviewees suggested other potential respondents – a ‘snowballing’ strategy. Thirdly, the researcher contacted interviewees by telephone and e-mail to arrange times and dates for interviews. The interviewees can best be described as key stakeholders in South Korean society from the late 1980s to the present. They were asked a series of questions about South Korea’s development since 1998 in order to more fully realise the overall research aims. It was important to have their voice to support this research, so the method used was the semi-structured interview, allowing for deep investigation. Whilst twice visiting South Korea (June to July, 2007 and June to August, 2008), the researcher interviewed the eleven respondents, after having contacted them by e-mail or phone following networking (KOC and Personal networks- see Appendix VII). Each interview lasted between one and two hours and was recorded using a digital voice recorder. Interviews were conducted in Korean, and transcribed in Korean also. After this, the researcher translated the interviews from Korean to English so that the transcripts could be used as data findings. During the interviews, the researcher behaved as a conversation facilitator, in line with the semi-structured interview method. The resultant data will be outlined in categories relating to the over-arching themes of the political, economic, social and sporting consequences of the 1988 Games.
Chapter 5. The Seoul Olympic Games and International Relations

5-1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on a framework for understanding how the Seoul Olympics were linked to relationships between the Korea Olympic Committee (KOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and aims to provide an evaluation of the bidding process in the 1980s. From the post-World War II period up until the Games, there was serious political conflict between Western countries and the Soviet bloc, which will be addressed.

During the 1980s, South Korea needed to overcome the ongoing consequences of their victimisation during the period of Japanese colonisation, the continuing repercussions of World War II, and the Korean War and its divisive legacy. According to Rojek (2000: 104-105), 'the Cold War, environmental risks, economic destabilization all pointed to the need for a wider canvas in which critical policy must operate'.

Historically, the 1988 Seoul Games was a major turning point for re-constructing the Olympics. However, twenty years ago, hosting the Olympics was not a simple project. This chapter will examine the background by asking questions such as “why did South Korea want to host the Olympic Games in the 1980s?”, “why did the IOC support Korea to win the bidding for the Games?” and finally, “how did South Korea prepare for the Olympic Games, even though there were difficult circumstances?” In particular, the chapter will evaluate the relationship between North and South Korea, from the award of the Seoul Olympics in 1981 to the pre-Seoul Olympic period in early 1988. Each section will be supplemented with evidence from sources such as Seoul Olympics research journals, official documents, newspapers, and other IOC and KOC material.
5-2. Towards the Seoul Olympic Games

5-2-1. The Origins of an Idea

Based on their previous experience of international sports events, some Koreans began to harbour ambitions to host the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988. Historically, the modern Olympic Games have been the longest standing and largest of the world’s mega-events, and South Korea was not exceptional in hoping that it could host the Summer Games. However, it was no simple matter to prepare a bid for the Olympic Games, not least because of political problems and economic concerns. Nevertheless, other external circumstances were favourable to South Korea’s efforts to host the 1988 Olympics.

After the 42nd World Shooting Championships, which were held in Seoul in 1978, Park Jong-Kyue, the President of the Korean Shooting Federation, suggested to the South Korea President Park Chung-Hee, that it would be a good idea to host the Olympic Games in South Korea. During the World Shooting Championships, the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC) and IOC members held a meeting in Seoul. This meeting was influential in encouraging KOC members to consider hosting the Olympic Games in Seoul (Park, 1991). During this period, the relationship between South Korean politicians and IOC members had a positive impact on Korean sporting diplomacy and sports development for the future. In addition, Park Jong-Kyue became the KASA President between 1979 and 1980 and was one of the key players who helped to bring the Olympic Games to South Korea.

Since the 1970s, South Korea had enjoyed a good sporting relationship with the Soviet Union particularly after the World University Games in Moscow in 1973. At the time, the South Korean team only needed health cards to enter the Soviet Union (Korea Times, 29 May and 12 August, 1973). Moreover, the Soviet Union security police escorted the South Korean team, because North Korean diplomatic staff had taken pictures of the team at the airport for use in political propaganda (Ha, 1997). There was no official contact between the North and South Korean teams and only limited informal contact during the Games. As a result, North Korea boycotted the Moscow Universidad Games because the South Korean competitors were in
attendance (Korea Herald, 19 August, 1973). However, the South Korean team continued to attend various international events such as the 1977 World University Games in Sofia, Bulgaria, the 1978 Asian Games in Bangkok, Thailand and training sessions in Moscow for the 1980 Olympics Games. Ha (1997: 17) comments that 'South Korean sport diplomacy had shown itself to be a useful tool in developing a broader perspective of the world by the end of the 1970s'. However, South Korea did not attend the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980, due to the boycott led by the United States and involving 62 other countries. Yet, during this period, 1979 to 1981, South Korea was preparing domestically and internationally to bid for a future Olympic Games that would be held mainly in Seoul.

5-2-2. The influence of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games

Until 1980, Japan was the only Asian country that had experienced hosting the Olympic Games (in Tokyo in 1964). Espy (1979: 76) states that the 'Japanese experience in question was that of the Tokyo Olympic Games of 1964, which are generally regarded as the “coming out party” of the Japanese economy'.

During the Tokyo Olympics, South Korean government officials reached the conclusion that hosting the Olympic Games would be a good idea for the political and economic development of South Korean society. According to the Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation (SOSFO, 2000a), when Korean sporting politicians visited Japan in 1979, Japanese politicians told Park Sung-Kyue about the Tokyo Olympic Games and how they had been an important tool for developing the Japanese economy and had contributed to increased Japanese self-respect after the Second World War. However, afterwards, when Korea started to prepare for an Olympic bid, Mr Yanagawa, a Japanese politician, invited Park Sung-kyue to Japan (in February, 1981) and asked Korea that 'it should give up with this preparation for the Olympic bid' (SOSFO, 2000a). As Manheim (1989: 283) suggests, 'Korea’s relationship with Japan can truly be described as a love-hate one'.

In fact, the Japanese city of Nagoya had a diplomatic relationship with IOC members before Seoul began to bid for the games. IOC members started visiting Nagoya from
1979 (Hill, 1992). Moreover, the IOC member and Executive Board member Mr Masaji Kiokawa had a dream of hosting the Olympic Games in his home town. He had also helped Samaranch become the IOC President in 1981 (SOSFO, 2000a). However, the citizens of Nagoya had protested against hosting the Olympics in their city, because of concerns about environmental problems and increased council taxes. Nevertheless, Park Jong-Kyue reported back to President Park Chung-Hee the importance of hosting the Olympics in South Korea. The first reason for this was that hosting the Games could be a catalyst for achieving greater economic development for the country. Secondly, it could be an opportunity to terminate the state of confrontation with North Korea. Thirdly, it was also important that Korean people would enjoy increased national pride (Park, 1991). However, President Park Chung-Hee was concerned about the cost of hosting the Olympic Games. Ironically, given subsequent economic difficulties, Park Jong-Kyue explained to the President about the Montreal Olympic Games and the fact that they had secured income from TV rights to the tune of $250 million on top of further deals through sponsorship with Olympic-related companies. Moreover, IOC members were encouraged to support 'less prosperous countries that should be given a chance to host the Olympics' (Park, 1991: 3).

The Seoul Olympic TV rights income issue will be discussed in the next chapter. Park Jong-Kyue promptly approved the plan and President Park in agreeing with Park Jong-Kyue’s suggestion offered the following advice:

Try to get in touch with all IOC members and related dignitaries attending the Puerto Rico convention so that Korea can win the venue for sure, because it would be worse than not even trying if we tried and failed (Park, 1991: 3).

In light of the President's positive response, Park Jong-Kyue forged ahead with the Seoul Olympics plan. He organised several meetings focused on hosting the Olympic Games and also the 10th Asian Games from 16 March to 22 August, 1979. Those who attended the meetings included Education Ministry members and Seoul city government officials, plus key KASA members. During the meetings KASA announced that the direct expenses for the Olympic Games would be 250 million won (Won 780: US$1) and that there would be six other countries competing in the bidding process in addition to South Korea and Japan (the United Kingdom, Brazil,
Belgium, Australia, Algeria and China). Moreover, Park Jong-Kyue emphasised that the success of the 42nd World Shooting Championships in Korea would benefit the case for hosting the Olympic Games and the Asian Games. Not all those who attended were positive about hosting mega sport events in Seoul (Park, 1991). On the other hand, Mr Kim Un-Yong (IOC member from 1986 to 2005) was very positive about the meeting (Kim 1990). After the meeting President Park Chung-Hee announced his plans and set out these aims;

- To demonstrate Korea’s economic growth and national power;
- To improve Korea’s status in the international sporting community;
- To promote friendship with foreign countries through sport;
- To create favourable conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with both Communist and non-aligned nations; and
- To consolidate national consensus through these international sports events, primarily the Olympic Games (Park, 1991: 5).

However, President Park Chun-Hee was assassinated by Kim Je-Kyue (Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) on 26 October, 1979 and Olympic bid planning was effectively suspended. Moreover, Park Jong-Kyue had to resign from the KASA Presidency for political reasons.

5-2-3. The Influence of President Chun Du-Hwan

In 1980, Chun Du-Hwan introduced military powers within the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), leading to violent confrontations during the 1980s. Chun became the new president of South Korea following the breakdown of President Park Chung-Hee’s political regime. Chun appointed Roh Tae-Woo (who shared a military background with Chun) as the President of the Seoul Olympic Organising Committee (SLOOC). Roh Tae-Woo was given huge powers during the Fifth and Sixth Republics (Kim, 2000).
In due course, President Chun re-initiated the Seoul Olympic bidding. However, on 27 November, 1980, the Seoul city government received negative news from the Education Ministry: 'The Olympics cannot be brought to Seoul because of the unfavourable financial condition of the city treasury' (Park, 1991: 7). Nevertheless, President Chun responded, ‘We cannot nullify a major decision by the former head of state without authentic reasons, and we must not give up a historic project of this magnitude without even trying our best’ (cited in Park, 1991: 7). In addition, the Ministry of Education went ahead with plans to host the Olympics with a meeting during which they could negotiate with other key governmental and civic organisations. The following table summarises some of the key issues that Korean politicians identified whilst considering the rival strengths and weaknesses of Seoul and Nagoya.

Table 5-1: Comparative profiles of Seoul and Nagoya’s advantages and disadvantages in bidding for the 1988 Olympic Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Korea (Seoul)</th>
<th>Japan (Nagoya)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>advantages</strong></td>
<td><strong>advantages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea had not previously hosted the Games.</td>
<td>Free to communicate with East and West countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul is the capital city of South Korea.</td>
<td>The world recognised that Japan could host mega-sport events and had considerable economic strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perhaps developing countries or neutral power counties would vote for Korea.</td>
<td>Japan has many international organisations, networks and various sport diplomatic activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sporting facilities were better than in Nagoya.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>disadvantages</strong></td>
<td><strong>disadvantages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided North and South Korea, likely to lead to opposition from Communist centuries.</td>
<td>Had already hosted the Olympic Games in Tokyo 1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared with Japan, Korea had less power in the world.</td>
<td>Nagoya is a more provincial city than Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No experience of hosting even the all Asian Games until 1980.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from SOSFO (2000a)
Between 1980 and 1988, the military authority of President Chun exerted a powerful influence on Korean society. The SOSFO (2000a) announced that if the President did not want to host the Olympic Games, it was possible for him to cancel the Olympic plan. However, the KOC submitted the Seoul application to the IOC headquarters in Lausanne on 26 February, 1981.

During 1980-1981, South Korea had many political challenges according to Kim (1990: 54) who stresses that ‘Minister Roh Tae-Woo persuaded President Chun and all factions of the leadership who liked sports that they needed a way to show a new emerging Korea to the world’. President Chun was not democratically elected which meant that he needed to divert the nation’s attention to other issues such as a successful Olympic Games and other mega-sporting events in Korea. According to Gleysteen and Romberg (1987: 1039), South Korean political problems demonstrated that ‘South Koreans felt the Chun government lacked legitimacy because of its origins, and large numbers opposed the regime because of its conduct’. Hosting the Olympic Games would be a tool to demonstrate Chun’s leadership in political and economic terms to both domestic and world audiences.

5-2-4. Economic Challenges

As mentioned earlier, South Korea experienced financial treasury problems during the preparations for the Olympic Games. Moreover, the experience of the Montreal Olympics (1976) demonstrated to the Korean people that it was not necessarily economically beneficial to the host city. The 1980 Moscow Olympics had suffered from the boycott by the United States and many other nations. Furthermore, it was assumed that the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics would also experience major problems due to the proposed boycott by the ‘Eastern Bloc’ countries and this would have a knock on effect on the Olympic Games to be held in 1988 (SOSFO, 2000a).

The Fifth Republic (Chun Du-Hwan regime 1980-1987) had such political and economic difficulties that the students’ movement for democracy and other improvements in South Korean society was established. In addition, people in general found it hard to enjoy a life of leisure because of the growing economic
difficulties. During this period the mass media in South Korea were controlled by the government. As a result, as Kim (2000: 186) points out, 'the state could control people’s moral and spiritual attitudes and prevent alternatives from being presented'. President Chun had the idea of inviting the business community to become involved in the preparations for the Seoul Olympic Games. Kim (2000: 188) stresses that 'the businesses donated lots of money to the affiliated sports organisations and the rewards for the companies were tax exemptions or other political benefits'. These companies included Hyun-dai which contributed much financial support to the campaign to host the Seoul Olympic Games. In particular, Chung Ju-Young gave most financial support to the Seoul Olympic Games. Chung had a dramatic plan for the Seoul Olympic bid. He collected a majority of important overseas employees to help the strategy for the Olympic bidding in 1981. On the other hand, the relationship between the government and Chaebol companies also contributed towards corruption.

5-3. Seoul versus Nagoya: the Bidding Process Unfolds

Finally, there were only two city candidates – Seoul and Nagoya - with the final decision to be taken in Baden-Baden in 1981. During the bidding presentation ‘most of the audience did not know much about Korea and they were impressed with the modern Korea they saw in the film, a nation rich in ancient culture and tradition’ (Kim, 1990: 55).

Before the bidding, Kim Un-Young told the Korean press that ‘IOC members were 80 people, they do not vote by countries, South Korea had lacked a diplomatic relationship with socialist countries, yet socialist IOC members are only about 10 people’ (Kim, 1990: 56-57). He also explained to Samaranch that Seoul had seriously prepared with government support and Samaranch assured him that ‘I should not worry but that I should work hard for the bidding’ (Kim, 1990: 54).

Kim Un-Young was an important sports diplomat for the Seoul Olympic bid. According to Kim (2000) and Ha (1997), he engaged in many sporting diplomatic activities in the bidding process. However, the problem was that the Eastern bloc was
influenced by a North Korean government that demanded that South Korea was not a safe place and had few advantages compared with Nagoya in Japan.

According to SOSFO (2000a) reports, South Korea was able to approach 64 members of the IOC. However, they could not contact 19 members of the IOC — those who were from communist countries. At the time (26 June, 1981), the IOC members were as follows;

1. IOC members: 66 countries, 83 members
2. With Republic of Korea embassies: 48 countries, 64 members (19 members in the communist countries)
3. Negotiation status: 30 countries with 34 IOC members altogether

These countries and their respective IOC members can be put in three separate categories in relation to their attitude to hosting the Games in Seoul (see Appendix IV).

Firstly, fully-supporting members came from Taiwan, the United States, Italy, New Zealand, Panama, Turkey, Colombia, and Spain; secondly, qualified supporting members came from India, Netherlands, Egypt, Cameroon, Peru, Pakistan, Libya, Argentina, and Spain. Lastly, Korea was unable to contact members from France (2), Italy, Canada (2), Tunisia, Uruguay, Mexico, Kenya, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Ecuador, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Finland, and Brazil until 26 June, 1981, because those members were on holiday and Korea thus still had to arrange meetings with those countries’ members (SOSFO, 2000a).

If we look at the KOC’s diplomatic activities for Africa’s votes, there were 14 votes that KOC members tried to win from African IOC members during international meetings and sport events. In particular, for Ethiopian, Libyan and Sudanese members, the KOC suggested that if they supported Korea, it could provide flight tickets and the cost of the Olympic Games for their teams. Moreover, KOC member, Mr Chun Sang-Jin, who was the ambassador to the African continent, visited Egypt, Tunisia and Kenya, where he approached IOC members and talked about hosting the Olympic Games in Seoul.
For the bidding, South Korea prepared an effective presentation, because they assumed that the presentation time would provide the best opportunity to convince IOC members that Seoul had the ability to host the Olympic Games. Moreover, Korean officials identified potential questions and rehearsed the replies in the following way.

Q1). In the city of Seoul, what accommodations and facilities are available for visitors? Are there any plans to expand these facilities?
Answer) In Seoul, there are 47 international tourist hotels such as Hotel Lotte, Sheraton Walker Hill Hotel, Hotel Shilla, Hyatt Regency Hotel, Seoul Plaza, and the Chosun Hotel and so forth. These international-standard hotels with a total capacity of 10,589 rooms provide conference facilities and an entire entertainment complex centralized on location. They boast spacious, comfortable and strikingly decorated rooms, the courteous efficiency of service personnel, and dining facilities serving delicious meals and fine beverages. There are also a number of new hotels currently under construction, and others are being planned to meet the growing inflow of foreign tourists. Therefore, there will be a total of 90 hotels with a total capacity of 20,900 rooms by 1988.

Q2). How is the foreign exchange system practised in Korea?
Answer) Korea adopts S.D.R Peg method. Exchange with 53 countries' currency is possible, and the fluctuating exchange rate system of 20 currencies is publicized.

Q3). Can dollars, travellers' cheques, and credit cards be used directly?
Answer) Dollars, travellers' checks, and credit cards can be used directly at all tourist hotels, and major department stores, as well as those shops and restaurants where the money exchanges are authorized (SOSFO, 2000: 259-261).

There were almost 60 pages of expected questions and answers that representative members had prepared for. There were several expectations of facilities in Seoul (transportations, accommodations, cultural relations, security, and weather), of the KOC (competitions facilities, medical affairs), of the Seoul Olympic Organisation (Volunteers, Currency relationship, structure of organisation relationship), the media (General matter, technology, equipment) and lastly, of the relationship between North and South Korea (SOSFO, 2000a).

However, it was clear that most people thought Nagoya would be awarded the Games. According to Hill (1992: 198) Japanese people had more confidence until Seoul was
eventually awarded the 1988 Games. However, Kim (1990: 59) also stresses that ‘Nagoya’s exhibition room was not impressive; only two young women were there with some photos’. On the other hand, ‘the Korean room was open for the IOC President and Executive Board members and it was lively with photos of construction work and preparations, booklets, brochures, Ginseng tea and wine’ (Kim, 1990: 59). Moreover, the exhibition staff included three Misses Korea and five Korean Air flight attendants.

In fact, the idea for exhibition staff originated from Japan. Nagoya had planned to employ Japanese Airline (JAL) flight attendants for the exhibition room. As a result, the KOC added further ideas including using Miss Korea to adorn the exhibition room from 22 September to 29 September. The Seoul members were very confident about the exhibition room because the IOC members (including Samaranch the IOC President) expressed positive reactions. The German press announced that Nagoya was a superior location but the Seoul exhibition room was better than that of Nagoya. Almost 10,000 people visited the Seoul exhibition hall during the eight days (SOSFO, 2000a).

A positive outcome of the exhibition could change the IOC members’ perceptions of Seoul’s abilities to host the Olympics. Because of that, the exhibition hall was very significant and Korea was able to show Seoul’s potential by way of videos and pictures increasing knowledge and understanding amongst visitors. Moreover, Seoul invited Mr Shon Gi-Jung (the Korean 1936 Olympic gold medallist) who showed pictures of when he received his gold medal. Seoul also, gave postcards to visitors with Mr Shon’s signature. Candidates were not allowed to spend over US$100 on the IOC members. As a result, Chung Ju-Young and the committee came up with an idea to deliver flowers to the IOC members’ rooms during the exhibition days (80 rooms). In response, he received many greetings from the IOC members.

In the final bid presentation, each candidate city was given half an hour (including a video presentation) and another 30 minutes of questioning time. They could use six presenters, a group that included governmental officials, sports experts and technical persons for the bidding preparations. The key moment was when ‘USSR President of FIG asked how Seoul could organise the Olympics when it was asking for a loan of
US$6 billion from Japan. Former Deputy Premier Yu Chang-Soon said convincingly that the loan was for economic development” (Kim, 1990: 60). The implication of the question was that Korea was borrowing from Japan in order to host the Games.

Japan had had two previous experiences of hosting the Games with the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics. Thus, Korean people claimed that ‘it was their turn; it was time that an Asian Olympics take place somewhere outside Japan, which had had its share of Games’ (Weinberg, 2001: 21). In addition, some Japanese were actually against hosting the Olympics in Nagoya; they brought picket signs that said ‘No Olympics for Nagoya!’ because they were worried about environmental issues associated with constructing the Olympic facilities. When the IOC members visited the two candidate cities, Seoul and Nagoya, Weinberg’s (2001: 26) observation is that ‘in Seoul most Olympic capital construction had either been completed or was in the process of being built on two tracts within a few miles of each other’. Furthermore, ‘when IOC members visited the two cities they noted the comparatively advanced status of the Korea sites, coming away positively impressed’. Of course, South Korea had weaknesses connected to the political and economic instability of the country (Weinberg, 2001). However, it was consistently pointed out that ‘it is our turn’ and if Korea hosted the Olympic Games this would contribute to Olympism, especially if it developed a more peaceful relationship between North and South Korea with the possibility that some of the Games could take place in North Korea and long distance events (e.g. cycling) could progress from Pyongyang to Seoul, including the crossing of the 38th parallel and Demilitarised Zone, thereby ‘creating an aura of Olympian dignity and reconciliation as an example to the universe’ (Weinberg, 2001: 26).

After a solid presentation, on 30 September, 1981, Seoul, the capital of city in South Korea, was duly awarded the 1988 Olympic Summer Games by the IOC members. The result of the vote was 52 to 27 (Kim, 1990). This result was a surprise to many Koreans as well as to the international community. Kim (1990: 60-61) acknowledges that ‘it was a competition between Nagoya and Korea, not really Nagoya and Seoul’ because Korea’s leaders and financially powerful business interests had supported the Olympic bid. They worked hard and tried their best to approach IOC members. After
Korea was awarded the Games, the president of Hyun-dai (Chung Ju-Young) became the KASA and KOC President from 1982 to 1984.

5-3-4. Why Did the IOC Members Choose Seoul?

Several researchers (Kim, 1992; Hill, 1992; Ha, 1997; Kim, 2000) have explained why Seoul would have difficulties in winning the bid to host. But, a majority of IOC members had voted for Seoul, for which there are several reasons.

When Mr Don Miller (USA NOC’s Secretary General and ANOC member) visited Seoul, he was surprised to observe Seoul’s development, compared with the situation 25 years earlier. This was because he had experience of working in Seoul, when he was involved in the USA Army from 1954 to 1955. Miller, and other investigators from the IOC, ANOC and ISF, formed positive impressions when they visited Seoul from 28 March to 9 June, 1981 (SOSFO, 2000a).

As previously stated, Nagoya appeared to be better placed as Seoul to host the Olympic Games. Nagoya was supported by the Japanese IOC member, and the Japanese Olympic Committee supported preparing the bid for the 1988 Olympics. In the 1980s, Japan was more economically developed, and enjoyed a better political situation than South Korea. Japan also had more experience of modern sport than South Korea. But Nagoya also made an irrevocable mistake, and as Hill (1992: 199) points out, ‘destroyed its own credibility or rather its environmentalist protesters had done so’. In addition, Kim (1992) stressed that Nagoya was over confident of winning the Olympic bid.

Furthermore, concerning the 1988 Summer Olympics, several cities, including Melbourne and Athens, had shown initial interest, yet their bids for the Olympic Games were withdrawn. The KOC assumed that it was advantageous for Nagoya to compete with only one other Asian city. The KOC also mentioned that if Korea could not host the 1988 Olympics, they would need to wait until the 21st century (SOSFO, 2000a).
The KOC had made a bid for the 1988 Olympic Games and at a diplomatic meeting with the IOC members, they demanded that it is time to host the Olympic Games in Korea. They also suggested that North and South Korea could be united as one nation, and stressed that this could contribute to Olympism and peace in the world (Park, 1991). In addition, Hill (1992: 199) points out that ‘there seems also to have been general feeling in Lausanne that it was time to award the games to an eastern city, as they had been held in the Americas or Europe ever since the Tokyo games of 1964’.

As seen above Seoul had a reasonable chance of success in the Olympic bidding competition. However, one major stumbling block remained if the Seoul Olympic Games were to take place.

5-4. Relationship between North and South Korea and the IOC

5-4-1. Origins of the Political Confrontation between North and South Korea

Following the partition of the peninsula after World War II, North and South Korea adopted different political systems and life styles under the influence, respectively, of the two contemporary world superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. The impact of that schism can still be felt in South Korean society and perhaps even more so in North Korea. According to Clough (1987), North Korea remains one of the the world’s most totalitarian and isolated communist nations. Before the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, North and South Korea attempted to form a single unified team under the auspices of the IOC. However, the negotiations were not successful, as North and South Korea each demanded primacy for their separate opinions and requested advantages on a partisan basis.

The citizens of North and South Korea were living and continue to live under different political systems and their life styles have been affected by the division between them established by the 38th parallel. Economically, South Korea has undergone more rapid development than the North, although as Clough states (1987) this has depended on the effective support that it has received from the United States.
People belonging to the separate nations of North and South Korea cannot enjoy any straightforward means of communication, unless it is through sporting events – a mode of communication that has its origins in the Moscow Session of 1962 (U.S. Congress, 1980), at which the relationship between the two countries began to be discussed.

Within the Olympic Movement, North and South Korea tried to construct a unified team for the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. They also made a serious attempt to produce a combined team for the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. However, the most that they have achieved until the present has been to form a single team for the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. This was only a ceremonial gesture, however, and North and South Korea did not enter the actual Sydney Olympic competitions as a joint team. There were several reasons for their failure to do so but ‘the political questions of deciding on the name, flag, and anthem to represent a unified delegation were among the most controversial issues’ (Ha, 1997: 102). North and South Korea were clearly demanding that their different opinions should be taken into account and that consideration should be given to their individual interests.

As a result of this history of disunity, in 1979 the Chairman of the North Korean Olympic Committee, Kim Yu-Soon sent a letter to Park Jong-Kyue (KASA President) requesting a meeting at which the issue of sending a unified North and South Korean team to participate in the Moscow Olympics in 1980 could be discussed (Kim, 2000). Kim Yu-Soon’s proposal received the following rebuttal from KASA President Park Joung-Kyue, a statement that is worth quoting in full:

I wish to state the Korean Amateur Sports Association’s view regarding your proposal to hold a meeting between the representatives of the sports associations of South and North Korea to form a single South-North team to take part in the 22nd Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in July 1980.

In the light of our past experience and precedents in the case of a foreign country, I came to the conclusion that without first building up considerable mutual confidence and acquiring experience in sports exchanges with each other, it is difficult to conceive, under the circumstances, the realisation of forming a single Olympic team representing both
South and North Korea. For the 35th World Championships held in Pyongyang in May last year, you blocked our team's participation, only aggravating the mistrust between the two sides. Therefore, I believe it is impossible to expect, in terms of available time and the technical problems involved, any successful outcome from a meeting with the sports representatives of South Korea to organise a single team for the forthcoming Moscow Olympic Games. The Korean Amateur Sports Association wholeheartedly hopes to welcome the visit of North Korean athletes to Seoul in the spirit of sportsmanship and fraternity of fellow brethren. I earnestly hope that sports exchanges will pave the way for promoting mutual trust and initiating cooperation in the field of sports between the two sides. In conclusion, I wish to propose to hold a meeting between sports representative of South and North Korea to discuss overall matters related to sports exchanges at a place to be agreed on by both sides after the Olympic Games in July are over (The Korea Herald, 4 January, 1980: 7).

The KASA President Park Jong-Kyue indicated that not enough time remained to prepare a single team for the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. In addition, although South Korea had invited North Korea to take part in several international sporting events, such as the 1980 Seoul International Coaching Seminar, the 1980 Seoul Asian Weightlifting Championship and the 1980 Seoul Asian Handball Championship, the North Koreans had not only failed to participate but had not even sent any reply to South Korea's invitations (Kim, 2000). Finally, no further progress was possible because of South Korea's decision to join the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which was led by the United States (Hill, 1992). From 1984 to 1985, however, North and South Korea engaged in a further round of serious negotiations concerning reuniting separated families, trading, sharing legislation, and also the possible sharing of the 1988 Olympic Games (Clough, 1987).

After the award of the 1988 Olympic Games to Seoul, North Korea endeavoured to disturb the preparations by interventions such as the Korean Airlines plane bombing in 1987, which cost the lives of 115 people, and an attempt to assassinate the South Korean President.
5-4-2. North Korea's Efforts to Disrupt the Seoul Olympics (1981-1988)

On 3 December, 1981, North Korea denounced the award of the Games in the Rodong-Sinmun (a North Korean newspaper) in the following manner:

Recently South Korean military fascists have been mobilizing high ranking officials and related staff of the puppet government as well as pro-government trumpeters to raise a ridiculous hullabaloo every day about the Olympics, which are said to be held in Seoul in 1988. Now the puppets of South Korea are approaching socialist nations and non-aligned countries in the hope of establishing diplomatic and official relations in order to have their 'state' recognized as a legitimate one (cited in Park, 1991: 8).

In 1983, North Korea instigated an attempt to assassinate Chun Do-Hwan, the President of South Korea, in Burma. One of the North Koreans' aims was to cause turmoil in South Korean society by eliminating the President so that the Seoul Olympic Games could not proceed. As a result, seventeen South Korean government officials died while trying, successfully, to protect their President (Park, 1991).

Moreover, the North Koreans tried to foment an anti-Seoul Olympics campaign with the help of the President of Cuba. They sent a letter to IOC President Samaranch on 10 December, 1984 containing the following statement from the North Korean Prime Minister, Kang Sung-San:

We deliver out earnest support to the constructive opinions Comrade Fidel Castro Ruan expressed in his letter. Seoul is an insecure city where the danger of war is constantly lurking, and the political situation there is more strained than in any other place in the world. It is evident that an international sports event such as the Olympics, aiming for good will and harmony, cannot be held successfully in Seoul, a city dominated by a warlike atmosphere (Park, 1991: 15).

However, just six days later, the North Korean NOC President sent a letter to the IOC President affirming that North Korea also wanted to host the 1988 Olympic Games in Pyongyang. The North Korean NOC President Kim Yu-Sun expressed this demand forcibly, as follows:

Since a combat situation is ever present along the Military Demarcation Line in Korea, we urge the International Olympic Committee to take prompt and proper action specified in the Charter to cancel the Olympic Games if the designated venue is in a state of war. We do not object to the Olympics being held in the South of this country, nor do we want them to be held in the North (Park, 1991: 15).
As seen above, North Korea had an idea of co-hosting the Games in both Seoul and Pyongyang. However, this was clearly not a simple matter and the Seoul Olympic Organising Committee had already progressed to the point of submitting the Seoul report to the IOC meeting held in Los Angeles on 26 July, 1984 (SOSFO, 2000a).

5-4-3. The IOC President’s Efforts to avert a Boycott of the 1988 Olympic Games

In the years preceding the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the IOC had given serious consideration to the issue of a possible boycott of the Games. According to Hill (1992: 156), ‘the Los Angeles Games of 1984 will no doubt be remembered largely as an exercise in super-power politics, but they were also significant for domestic Olympic reasons’. The IOC President Samaranch strongly hoped that all nations could be persuaded to participate in the 1988 Seoul Olympics (Pound, 1995).

With the experience of the 1984 Olympics boycott fresh in his mind, Samaranch needed to ensure that there would be no boycott of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. After the Los Angeles Olympic Games, Samaranch decided to visit Moscow for the first time in his role as IOC President. From that time onwards, Samaranch attended various sport meetings in socialist countries with the purpose of proclaiming the Olympic Movement’s message to those countries' members. In addition, Samaranch tried to arrange individual meetings with groups of people, since this was a good opportunity to establish better, more friendly, relationships with socialist countries' politicians. President Samaranch aimed thereby to involve them more thoroughly in the IOC’s political agenda (Pound, 1995).

In the light of the boycott experiences of 1980 and 1984, President Samaranch and the IOC members had the idea of co-hosting the 1988 Olympics in North and South Korea. There was recognition that ‘the most difficult area in which to evaluate the effects of the boycott was that of the international political standing of the two superpowers’ (Hulme, 1990: 87). The IOC assumed that the proposal to co-host the 1988 Olympic Games would be acceptable both to democratic and socialist countries.
However, as Hulme (1990: 88) emphasises, it was essential for the IOC to 'recognize that it oversees a highly political event, and that it must, at the very least, restrict the quest for national advantage through the Olympic Games to within reasonable parameters'. On the other hand, as Lee (1985: 36) points out, the fact that '(South) Korea is bordering on the most dangerous country in the world, North Korea, along the 155 mile-demilitarized zone' meant that 'holding the Olympics in 1988 is a remarkable event'. In that context, by agreeing to host the Olympic Games the people of South Korea had enabled themselves to make a valuable historic contribution (Lee, 1985).

During the Seoul Olympics preparation period (1981 to 1988) several specific 'Sport Talks' were held between North and South Korea, focussing on such highly-charged issues as the formation of a unified team for the Olympic Games. At that time a worldwide audience paid attention to discussions about the possible unification of North and South Korea into a single country.

5-4-4. North and South Korean Sport Talks: Co-hosting the 1988 Olympics

As soon as the 1988 Olympics were awarded to Seoul, North Korea began trying to effect a change of the host city. Eventually this led to North Korea's demand to be permitted to co-host the 1988 Olympics with South Korea (Kim, 2000). Accordingly, the IOC President Samaranch arranged a meeting in Lausanne that was to be attended by associated IOC members and members of the North and South Korean NOCs and was to take place from 8 to 9 October, 1985 (Park, 1991).

In the background to the Lausanne Sport Talks, it was clear that, as a consequence of North Korea's efforts, the IOC meeting was obliged to consider the possibility of hosting the Games in both the north and south of the Korean peninsula. In September, 1984, the North Korean NOC President Kim Yu-Sun asked the IOC President Samaranch about the co-hosting issue. President Samaranch replied that 'if North Korea makes the recommendation officially, we may consider the possibility' (Park, 1991: 16). Indeed, during President Samaranch's visit to Seoul from 25 to 28
August 1985, which therefore preceded the Lausanne meeting, he had addressed the issue of North and South Korean co-hosting of the Games in the following terms:

The IOC is preparing to put forward suggestions acceptable to both halves of Korea and I am quite sure that the coming talks will be fruitful. I came to know the exact position of South Korea regarding the talks through meetings with relevant officials during this visit and I already knew the North Korean position through my talks with its IOC member, Kim Yu-sun, in Moscow a month ago (The Korea Times, 29 August 1985: 12).

In fact, as a result of his meeting with the SLOOC President Roh Tea-Woo, Samaranch had been informed of the official South Korean attitude to the North and South Korea co-hosting issue. Roh Tea-Woo had emphasised that 'the issue of co-hosting should be off the agenda and that North Korea should be prohibited from making further political statements for propaganda purposes at the joint meeting with the IOC' (Park, 1991: 17).

Subsequently, on 8 October, 1985, in Lausanne, the IOC President Samaranch arranged the first meeting on the subject of co-hosting the 1988 Olympic Games at which both North and South Korean NOC members were present. Before the formal meeting President Samaranch had separate short talks with the North and South Korean delegates in order to ensure that the following plenary ran smoothly and was not emotionally overcharged. When the plenary began, South and North Korean representatives set forth their different positions with regard the hosting the Games. The meetings, which are referred to as the First Round to the Fourth Round of the Sports Talks, failed to produce any simple resolutions of the problem, as will be discussed below (Ha, 1997).

The First Round meeting was attended by IOC President Samaranch, five IOC members, and NOC delegates from North (12 people) and South (12 people) Korea.

The following Table shows the lists of demands put forward by South and North Korean delegations on 8 and 9 October, 1985;
Table. 5-2: Different demands from North and South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- North and South Korea should make their entrance at the Olympic opening</td>
<td>- North and South Korea shall co-host the Olympics and participate in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ceremony, side by side.</td>
<td>games as one unified team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- South Korea is willing to transfer to North Korea preliminary of men’s</td>
<td>- The Olympics shall be named the ‘Chosun Olympics’ or ‘Pyongyang-Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>handball, preliminary of men’s volleyball, and preliminary of two groups</td>
<td>Olympics’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of soccer- and to unite North and South Korea for men’s team road-cycling.</td>
<td>- The event shall be shared equally by Pyongyang and Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- North Korea is welcome to participate in the Olympic cultural programmes.</td>
<td>- Opening and closing ceremonies shall be held separately in Pyongyang and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Profits from telecast rights shall be shared equally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- A joint organising committee shall be activated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Park (1991: 17)

As can be seen from the above table, North and South Korea had very different and ultimately incompatible aims. After this meeting, a South Korean newspaper (Chosun Ilbo) criticised the North Korean requests, saying that ‘any sensible person would be dumbfounded at them, perhaps even some people in Moscow and Beijing could not help scoffing’ (cited in Park, 1991: 17). In addition, the Dong-a Ilbo newspaper expressed the view that ‘nobody could make such absurd demands, unless he was the kind of person who tries to steal somebody else’s delicious rice, and failing to do so, spits in that rice so that nobody else can eat it’ (cited in Park, 1991: 17). Thus, the South Korean press expressed their feelings that the North Korean demands were unreasonable. It was possible, nonetheless, that the North Koreans had powerful support for their ideas. During the North and South Korean Talks period, North Korea regularly demanded a ‘socialist countries’ boycott’ of the Games if South Korea refused to divide the Games equally between Seoul and Pyongyang. As a result it was possible that the 1988 Olympic Games would be faced with boycott on the part of countries such as the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. Moreover, in November 1985, socialist countries had a meeting (in Vietnam) to demand co-hosting by North and South Korea. Participants included Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. However, the result of the meeting was that only Cuba agreed with the North Korean plan for co-hosting the 1988 Games (SOSFO, 2000a).
One outcome of the talks was that the IOC offered the North the opportunity to host several competitions such as table tennis and archery in Pyongyang province during the Games. The IOC also proposed that two or three cycling races could start in the North and finish in a province of South Korea and that there could be separate cultural programmes in North and South Korea (Kim, 2000). However, North Korea demanded the right to host all or some of six sports competitions, namely football, archery, judo, wrestling, gymnastics and table tennis. Moreover, they hoped to host the first game in the football competition and also to host cultural performances separately.

From 14 to 15 November, 1986, IOC President Samaranch held meetings with sports ministers from the socialist bloc in Berlin. He made the following positive observation about the forthcoming Olympic Games:

I returned very optimistic from this meeting and I can tell you today I am quite confident that nearly all the socialist countries will attend the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. The Eastern bloc countries including the Soviet Union, would participate in the Seoul Games, even if the South - North Korea sports talks fail (The Korea Times, 1 January 1987: 12).

The IOC was serious in its wish to consider North Korea's request to host the six sports in Pyongyang. Therefore it was constantly in touch with the KOC and suggested having another round of the North and South Korea sports talks in July 1987. Although the President of the South Korean Olympic Committee, Kim Jong-Ha, responded encouragingly to the IOC that 'South Korea had no objection to convening the fourth round of talks' (Kim, 2000: 325), he did not agree with the number of events that North Korea was proposing to host. Moreover, Mr Kim stressed that 'South Korea would not wish to discuss further unless North Korea agreed to participate in the Seoul Olympic Games, ensure free visits to North Korea, and hold the opening and closing ceremonies in Seoul' (Kim, 2000: 325).

South Korea thus expressed strong opinions about hosting the Games in Seoul. The IOC President was nevertheless anxious about the prospects of another boycott of the Games on the part of the socialist countries and such fears lay behind Mr Samaranch's preparations for the fourth round of sport talks on 14-15 July 1987. He spoke in the
following terms on 13 July, 1987, to a representative of the KOC just one day before the official meeting:

We will have to induce the North Koreans to reach a conclusion and declare it themselves. For that purpose we will enhance the IOC arbitration proposal and offer it to North Korea. It is very dangerous for us to let them say “We want eight events” and then do the answering ourselves. It is desirable for us to make the proposal and let them find the answer. By making North Korea responsible for the final decision, we will relieve pressure on the socialist countries. Accordingly, at this session, the IOC will make the proposal to transfer the additional event of women’s volleyball, in which socialist countries are superior. You in South Korea will say that you will review the IOC proposal of this additional transfer, and then some time later announce that you accept the proposal because you trust in the IOC’s decision (cited in Park, 1991: 19).

Finally, at the Fourth Round of sports talks, North Korea demanded that North and South Korea should host the Games equally or that 13 sports events should be held in the North. If any tournament was hosted in the North, it should be called ‘the 24th Olympic Games in Pyongyang’. In response the IOC proposed that some ‘main sports events’ should be held in North Korea, such as table tennis, archery and volleyball, and one qualifying group in soccer would be transferred to North Korea, and men’s individual road-cycling to be exclusively held in the North Korean section of Kyonggi Province’ (Kim, 2000: 328). North Korea’s reaction was not positive and it sent a letter to South Korea expressing the opinion that ‘a positive outcome to the Seoul Olympic Games is not expected with the present government and there are no reasons for further discussions’. The door remained slightly open, however ‘if a new government results from the elections’, and ‘then we would consider joint-hosting issues’ (Kim, 2000: 329).

On 16 December, South Korea held its first round of presidential elections and the new President Roh Tea-Woo suggested holding a meeting with North Korean officials to discuss issues related to the 1988 Olympic Game (The Korea Times, 16 December 1987). Moreover, President Roh Tea-Woo’s government invited North Korea to participate in the 1988 Olympic Games, even though South Korea had a serious protest to make over the bombing of a Korea Airlines passenger jet on 29 November, 1987. A number of stories circulating in South Korean people linked the occurrence of the KAL blast with the ensuing presidential elections and the Olympic Games. Although she was a North Korean, the KAL bomber Kim Hyun-He had been living in South Korea prior to the terrorist incident.
Eventually, when the IOC President visited Seoul to check on the preparations for South Korea’s hosting of the Olympic festival, he stated that he was still open to considering the co-hosting of the Games in North and South Korea. In response, SLOC President Park She-Jik, reminded him of Seoul’s position, as follows:

The North Korean co-hosting demand is out of the question. Seoul bid for the Olympic Games, Pyongyang did not. Yet, Seoul, in the Olympic spirit of friendship has been prepared to give up a part of the Games namely the five events offered by the International Olympic Committee. South Korean athletes are prepared to go to Pyongyang, and Pyongyang should allow its athletes to come to Seoul. It is not fair to deny them their Olympic dream (The Korea Times, 9 June 1988: 12).

The SLOC President Park had ambitions to host the Olympic Games on the Korean peninsula. However, he was clearly surprised that despite South Korea’s strenuous efforts to prepare for the Games, the IOC was still interested in negotiating with North Korea. According to Ha (1997: 163), there were two apparent reasons for this. Firstly, ‘the IOC needed to create the impression of having tried its best to accommodate Pyongyang’s position up to the last moment, in order to smooth the way for the communist countries and North Korea’s other allies to participate in the Seoul Olympics in spite of pressure from Pyongyang for a boycott. Secondly, by keeping Pyongyang tied down in negotiations to the last minute, even in the absence of an agreement, the IOC hoped to prevent North Korea from attempting any terrorist acts that might endanger the Games in Seoul for reasons of inadequate security’.

Ultimately, North Korea rejected the IOC’s suggestions because they were not satisfied with the option of simply sharing some of the Games. On 4 September, 1988, they announced that North Korea would not participate in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. At this juncture, the Sport Talks between North and South Korea ceased. In reality, the proposed solution of co-hosting the Olympic Games would not have been a simple matter to put into effect because historically the Olympic Games are awarded to cities rather than countries, and have never before been divided between two cities. If North and South Korea had agreed to co-host the Games, the IOC would have needed to change its constitution for the sake of the 1988 Games. As a result, SOSFO (2000b) mentioned that it was not possible to demand the co-hosting the Games.
On the other hand, there were some positive legacies of the North and South Korea Sport Talks, derived especially from the negotiating experiences gained by representatives from the two parts of Korea. In addition, the IOC President Samaranch's efforts contributed greatly to the development of international relationships between socialist and democratic countries. Importantly, however, more than 20 years later, North and South Korea still have to find ways of resolving their political disharmony, as their citizens continue to live under fundamentally different political systems. At the time, cultural exchanges would have been highly desirable as a way of trust building, to improve understanding between the two Korean populations, and preparing for eventual political unification (Clough, 1987).

5-5. Build up to the Seoul Olympic Games

5-5-1. The Harmony of the Olympics

The ideological ethos chosen for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was that of Harmony and Progress. During the 1980s, the world had been gradually moving towards greater peace and recovering from the experience of the Cold-War. However, after the IOC meeting in Baden-Baden had decided that Seoul should be the host city for the 1988 Games, huge questions remained as to how the matter of the socialist bloc countries' participation in the 1988 Olympics could be dealt with. As Kim (1990) points out, South Korea did not have bilateral relationships with any of the socialist bloc nations, possessing only multi-national relations with them within the framework of sporting world championships or conferences. Furthermore, as a result of North Korea's protest against the Seoul Games, the socialist bloc countries had come out in support of the North Korean campaign with its demand for the location of the 1988 Olympic Games to be changed.

In view of these circumstances, IOC President Samaranch had to advocate and encourage more strongly the participation of as many countries as possible in the 1988 Games. During the preparatory period for the Games, the Western press put the following questions to SLOOC President Roh Tea-Woo: 'Do you think that the Russians will come to Seoul?' and 'Do you think the Korean public will forgive
them?’ Roh’s answer was that ‘It is a very unhappy incident but SLOOC and the Olympic Family have the job of organizing the Olympics and contributing to the Olympic Movement’ (Kim, 1990: 116). However, in the 1980s South Korea had also experienced serious national political demonstrations against the government in support of establishing a more democratic society. Moreover, the Korean nation was still participating in military confrontation on account of the territorial division between North and South (Park, 1991). The world press consequently announced that Seoul was not a safe place to host the Olympic Games. In addition, realising that the Korean War (1950-1953) had finished only thirty years previously, the nations of the world and members of the Olympic family were afraid that the outcome would be a boycott of this unstable land on the Korean peninsula. The primary problem, however, was that the socialist countries had given notice of their intention not to attend the 1988 Games (SOSFO, 2000b).

According to Kim (1990: 292), ‘some observers commented that the Seoul Games were a perfect example of what a divided and developing country could accomplish’. Of course, this was largely achieved through the efforts of the South Korean government and the IOC by whom most countries were persuaded to join in the 1988 Games. However, as Clough and Hopkins (1988: 379) have stressed, the rift between North and South continued to be as profound as ever: ‘autonomous regimes with differing systems would remain intact in North and South, but the confederal government would have a combined Army and a Standing Committee that would “supervise” the two “regional” regimes’. On the other hand, SOSFO (2000b) indicates that one effective influence on the relaxing of attitudes in the socialist bloc to the Seoul Games was the Soviet Union’s reform of its own political system. Beginning in the 1980s, the Soviet Union under the leadership of President Gorbachev had initiated a series of changes to its political systems, in accordance with the policies of ‘Perestroika’ (Reconstruction) and ‘Glasnost’ (Openness). The reason for the Soviet Union’s urgent need of reform was the development of a parlous economic situation within the country. Through the reforms, the Soviet Union had deliberately endeavoured to improve its relationship with the United States. As a result, SOSFO (2000b) emphasises that those trends were impelling the Eastern bloc countries to emerge from their political and economic isolation.
Meanwhile, Park Seh-Jik (SLOOC President) was resorting to the principles of Korean philosophy in his deliberations as to whether Seoul provided a good location for the 1988 Olympics. Park launched his discussions with a famous Korean historian and Confucian scholar. Their analysis of the nature of the omens affecting Seoul considered whether 1988 was a propitious year for holding the Olympic Games there, and reached the following result:

The year 1988 is the year of the dragon, and it is the year 4320 according to the Korean calendar; if 4320 is divided by the Oriental zodiac cycle of sixty years, the number seventy-two is arrived at. In other words, the year 1988 is the seventy-second dragon year since the foundation of Korea by Tangun. Also, seventy-two is a perfect number consisting of one unit, for it comprises two returns of thirty-six, which represents the 360 degrees of a circle. Therefore, 1988 is a year of great auspiciousness when everything attempted will be accomplished (Park, 1991: 78).

As a result, Park She-Jik (SLOOC President) found historical and supernatural justification for the assumption that the year 1988 would be appropriate for hosting the Olympics in Seoul. Park (1991: 78) mentions that 'the Heaven-Earth-Man philosophy worships heaven, and heaven will respond when men achieve harmony among themselves and pray to heaven to grant the blessing of the factors of success, such as security, harmony and good weather'. Park She-Jik tried to further develop his philosophical leadership of the 1988 Games, applying his own style for devising the administrative strategy and bringing into consideration the motto of harmony and progress as a characteristic of the Seoul Olympics.

5-5-2. The National Olympics

Although the 1988 Seoul Olympics were strongly supported by the South Korean government, the festival did not only belong to the governing body. The SLOOC had mobilised 223,893 people for the Games, including people working in operations (49,712), performances (26,143), safety (112,009), torch relay (21,207), and support services (14,822) (Kim, 1990). Even Korean nationals who were living abroad were devoted to the success of the Seoul Olympics. The majority of Koreans were very proud of the fact that the Olympic Games were hosted in South Korea. On the other hand, there was some unrest domestically, as certain groups (students, workers)
undertook extreme forms of protest to put pressure on the government to implement a more democratic style of politics. The world audience began to concentrate its attention on South Korea.

Koreans abroad had volunteered to co-operate with SLOOC during the prelude to the launch of the Seoul Olympics. Park (1991: 80) notes that 'in this spirit of cooperation 118 Koreans living abroad joined in the relay of the Olympic flame, and 440 worked as volunteer interpreters'. During the 1986 Asian Games, the language services offered to participants in Seoul had been unsatisfactory, and the South Korean government committee therefore contacted foreign embassies with requests for help with the provision of intensive language educational programmes for SLOOC (Ricquart, 1988). For these language programmes, SLOOC benefited from the assistance of some very enthusiastic students. As Ricquart (1988: 68) observed at that time, 'the Korean students feel they are doing something very important for their country'.

The Seoul Games provide an example of the successful use of volunteers. The KSC started from 2 October to 10 November, 1985, to invite volunteers to come forward in five cities, before the 1986 Asian Games in Seoul. After assembling that volunteer resource, SLOOC had to check on the strength of their dedication and then began assigning individuals to appropriate working roles. There were 27,221 volunteers, including students (15,513), employees (3,929), housewives (1,300), self-employed people (767) and others (5,712) (SOSFO, 2000b). The most important aspect of assembling volunteers was giving priority to speakers of foreign languages. They were only provided with uniforms, watches and transportation fees but SLOOC also promised them that they would be awarded certificates of participation in the Olympics (SOSFO, 2000b). Since a considerable number of Korean nationals living overseas had applied to work as interpreters, there was such strong competition for those jobs that SLOOC had to take care to select the best candidates. The examiners focused on candidates' language skills (at least two languages should be spoken), appearance, motivation, and common sense, ability to concentrate, communication skills and maturity of character. According to SOSFO (2000b), the volunteers were exemplary citizens and patriots and they were devoted to the ideal of achieving a greater development of Korea's national self-esteem as a result of the Olympics.
In addition, Koreans living abroad in Japan, the United States, Australia and West Germany organised a society for providing support to the Seoul Olympics, with the funds donated amounting to 52,400,000,000 won (Korean currency), (US$ 5,240,000)

Furthermore, Korean residents in Japan organised the Seoul Olympics promotion festivals in Tokyo, Osaka, Sapporo, Fukuoka, Hiroshima and other Japanese cities (SOSFO, 2000b). The majority of Korean residents in Japan consisted of people who had migrated from Korea to Japan during the Japanese colonial period and Korean War.

Through the Seoul Olympics campaigns, Korean overseas residents could attempt to change the image and social status of Korea in the eyes of foreigners. Korean people who had adopted other countries to live in shared the honour bestowed upon their country of origin as it was chosen to host the Olympic Games. Yet, before the Seoul Games, few foreign people had even known where Korea was.

SLOOC President Park set forth a specific strategy to be adopted by the Organising Committee as it prepared for the Games. The five underlying concepts of this strategy were as follows (Park, 1991: 84-85):

1. Professionalism: This goal involved high levels of knowledge and information with constant communication through meetings, bulletins, circulars, seminars, and personal conferences.

2. Concentration of wisdom: With our expertise combined with wisdom, we had the best 'think tank' in Korea. Top experts in many fields staffed our thirty subcommittees.

3. Fair decisions and dedicated execution: Consensus and fairness were at the centre of each administrative decision. Once the decision was made, vigorous execution and a high level of performance were expected.

4. Harmony in modesty: The second term was defined as 'discretion in discourse', which was required to reduce discord and factionalism and to maintain order and harmony in the work environment in order to increase productivity.
5. Time control: This was a practical matter related to punctuality and effective use of time, as exemplified in our on-the-spot meetings and in the remarkable record of the Seoul Olympics in adhering to time schedules.

The President of SLOOC believed that adherence to the five codes would enable the organising staff and Committee to combine their efforts and ensure the harmonious running of the Seoul Games. With 100 days to go before the start of the Seoul Olympic Games, SLOOC checked all of its operational plans, including its language service, transportation and, most importantly, the security section (Park, 1991).

5-5-3. The Safety of the Olympics

During the preparatory period for the Seoul Olympics, the nations of the world had become seriously concerned about issues of security. SLOOC was aware of these anxieties and it set for itself an aim ‘to provide optimum security with minimum inconvenience’ (Park, 1988: 391). Through the efforts made to confront the security fears during the difficult preparation period, SLOOC was able to claim with a high degree of confidence that the safety of the Games was assured and they could unreservedly invite members of the Olympic family and tourists from the whole world to come to Seoul (Park, 1988).

However, before the Seoul Olympics, athletes from socialist countries preferred to train in Japan rather than in Korea and fewer foreign tourists visited Seoul. Although one of reasons for this reluctance to visit Korea was that it was still perceived as a developing country, foreign people also assumed that South Korea was not a safe place to visit (SOSFO, 2000b). As a result, Korea had to demonstrate that it could provide a secure environment for people to visit. According to SLOOC President Park’s presentation in 1988, there were four major themes to be embodied in the Seoul Games, as follows:

One is an Olympics of Unity which, it is clear, we shall achieve through the participation of so many nations. Our arts and culture programs will give us an Olympics of Culture. Through the hosting of the Paralympics in October, we plan an
Olympics of Compassion. These Games will be the Olympics of a Future Legacy and, we hope, serve as an inspiration to other developing countries (Park, 1988: 391).

In addition, Japan and the United States co-operated in providing the supervision of safety arrangements made by South Korea. In particular, the United States sent a State Department official, the Deputy Director of the State Department, to Korea to check the safety management (SOSFO, 2000b). Moreover, the Soviet Union helped South Korea by seeking to persuade the North Koreans to refrain from acts of terrorism. The reason was that the Soviet Union had already decided to participate in the Seoul Olympics and wanted, therefore, to ensure the success of the Games (SOSFO, 2000b).

The SLOOC prepared the insurance arrangements for Seoul 1988. After conducting a thorough analysis of previous Olympics' insurance provision they chose an insurance company by virtue of the economic benefits of that choice. According to the IOC Charter at point 24, each NOC needed to join the insurance scheme to give cover to its team and the requirement of other third parties participating in the Olympic Games. In this way, the SLOOC prepared insurance for representatives of the Olympic family before the Seoul Olympics (SOSFO, 2000b).

As the last 100 days before the 1988 Seoul Games began, the SLOOC President Park gave the following press interview:

Q: What work remains to be done in the last 100 days before the Games?
Answer: All our facilities are in place so it is mainly a question of going through our Games operation plans to ensure everything is in place and all our services are ready.

Q: Have you been receiving any new information on potential threats to the Games?
Answer: Our security forces are constantly in contact with international agencies to ensure we have the latest information on all matters. We are confident of providing absolute security for the Olympic Family and other visitors.

Q: Are you worried about student or labour unrest in the next 100 days which could deter people or even athletes from attending the Games?
Answer: Not at all. The Olympics is not a political issue in Korea. Everyone is behind them and I think the world has come to realize this.

Q: Administratively and logistically, at what stage would it become impossible for you to hand over events to the north?
Answer: I think we have already reached the stage where it would be extremely difficult. If the north was to come back now and say yes to the IOC offer, we would do everything possible to help them stage those five events, if it is feasible.

Q: Have you now achieved your target of break-even on the hosting of the Games?
Answer: Yes, I believe so, although we are still working on the exact breakdown of the figures. SLOOC started with a budget of around 747 billion won and thanks to the strong corporate, television and general interest in the Games, it looks like our revenue will cover that budget.

Q: Can you disclose a breakdown of that revenue?
Answer: An exact breakdown is not yet available and obviously will not be until after the Games when all accounting is completed. However, television rights have formed a major part of our revenues, accounting for some $407 million.

Q: Do you expect more money from NBC because of its advertising sales?
Answer: There is a clause in our agreement to that effect but we do not know now.

Q: Do you think you will eventually end up making a profit?
Answer: I don’t know. Our intention is to break-even and, the figures coming in indicate that will be the case. We will be happy with that. I think profit on the Games is better measured in other terms, such as the prestige for the country (The Korea Times, June 9, 1988: 12).

As seen above, the SLOOC President expressed his confidence about hosting the Games, having taken special care to prepare adequate security measures and excellent facilities, and he felt able to forecast economic benefits for his country that would derive from the event. One economic issue that had still to be resolved related to TV broadcasting rights.
5-5-4. The Broadcasting Negotiations

From the 1980s onwards, the assignment of the TV broadcasting rights had been an important tool for the development of the Olympic Games and a major source of income for the host cities. In modern society, life has been made highly convenient for the Olympic audience and the Olympic family by television. Historically, until the 1976 Montreal Games, the TV rights business had not been successful, but beginning with the Los Angeles Olympics the TV coverage of successive Games had resulted in huge benefits for sporting organisations (Preuss, 2004). The Seoul Games provided a further example of the successful management of the TV rights income from which the SLOOC drew considerable advantage. It was particularly successful in its negotiations with global TV broadcasting companies such as NBC, EBU and NHK (Kim, 1990).

The Seoul Olympics TV right negotiations started in September 1985 in Lausanne. Those present at the meeting included the IOC Vice-President Pound, SLOOC members Lee Young-Ho, Kim Un-Yong and Park Se-Young and representatives from the TV network companies. The negotiations were not straightforward because careful consideration had to be given to the benefits accruing to each party. According to Kim (1990), the TV rights estate belonged to the IOC, which meant that the SLOOC could not enter into any negotiations with the broadcasting networks without obtaining the IOC’s prior agreement. In the course of the negotiations, NBC had to contend strongly with the other networks, because of the difficult experience that they had faced during the Moscow Olympics. Under the influence of the United States’ boycott, NBC had lost $30 million even though they had subsequently recovered their losses from the insurance. When the first negotiations were unsuccessful, the TV rights panel had to hold several other meetings in New York. Finally, SLOOC suggested that NBC should commit itself to paying ‘a $300 million guarantee plus $200 million on a risk-sharing basis for a total of $500 million’ (Kim, 1990: 90). Kim Un-Yong assumed that the $500 million was a reasonable price for its negotiations with NBC. NBC agreed with the SLOOC proposal and they became the official TV partners for the Olympic Games (Kim, 1990). Kim (1990: 96-97) comments that the ‘NBC brought to Korea many sponsors, advertisers, engineers, commentators and corporate executives’ and also that ‘they spent a lot more than the
During the Seoul Olympic period the NBC paid around 3,000,000,000 (won) ($US 3,000,000) to Korea and they brought 93 individual cameras, 158 VTRs, 17 relay mobiles and 1075 people who were stationed in the main Olympic stadiums. Moreover, the world’s TV broadcasting companies made a series of special programmes introducing Korean food, culture and pop music which were shown on TV channels worldwide, apart from in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. The latter countries did not show programmes about Korea to their TV audiences perhaps because they were conscious of the danger of offending North Korea (SOSFO, 2000b).

The table shows the TV rights fees obtained from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics to the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Table 5-3: TV Right Fees (USD $1,000)

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA (NBC)</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>309,000</td>
<td>302,110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (SLOJP)</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>Right fee 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (EBU)</td>
<td>19,800</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>7,330</td>
<td>Tech Spt 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Net 10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Australian 10,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong (HTV/TVB)</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America (OTI)</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>2,920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (ABU)</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Europe</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OIRT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td>130</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (URNTA)</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Philippine (PTV 4)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (TTV)</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>550</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (CBC)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs (ASBU)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>875</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(WAPA TV)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (KBS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,450</td>
<td>Minimum guarantee basis of USA NW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>287,609</td>
<td>324,388</td>
<td>408,635</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>NBC Royalty, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Subtotal + Other Income)</td>
<td>288,343</td>
<td>324,813</td>
<td>408,763</td>
<td>(140 countries 227 Broadcasting networks)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Kim (1990: 111)
Before the Seoul Olympic Games, the 1986 Seoul Asian Games served as a dress rehearsal and the experience gained from that event provided useful information for the organisation of the Seoul Olympics. The SLOOC realised that the Seoul Olympics needed to have an improved system for its communications with the journalists. As a consequence, a Main Press Centre (MPC) was installed where all journalists could obtain information about the results of the individual Olympic competitions. It was important for the results details to be sent to the MPC more rapidly than had been the case at the Los Angeles Olympics, where the results were sent to the MPC within 10 minutes. At the Seoul Olympics it was possible to reduce the transfer time to five minutes.

As SOSFO (2000b) knew, the world journalists were eager to praise the Korean system for the excellence of its technology. In fact, the Los Angeles Olympic Organisation had planned to sell its computer system to SLOOC, but it was too expensive. As a result, the Koreans tried to investigate the possibility of developing their own technology. Four different research groups were involved in the research and development stage and the innovative system resulting from their collaboration was three times faster than that of the computer system used in Los Angeles.

The preparations for the Seoul Olympics had been dramatic in various respects and this was borne in mind by the IOC President Samaranch when he gave his greetings to the South Korean people with 100 days remaining before the commencement of the 1988 Games:

As Seoul's historic countdown to the Olympic Games reaches the 100-day mark, it is a great pleasure for me to send my greetings and my gratitude to the people of Korea. Since 1981, when the members of the International Olympic Committee chose Seoul to host the Games of the 24th Olympiad, we have looked on with admiration at the efforts made by the citizens of Korea to prepare to welcome the world. It has been an inspiring time for the entire Olympic Movement to see a people so dedicated to living up to the high ideals of the Olympic Games (see Appendix V).

The Seoul Olympics would bequeath various legacies to the city, such as the Olympic stadium area, the Olympic Park in Seoul, the express way, the Olympic Apartments and many sports facilities. Furthermore, the Seoul Olympics had already contributed to changes occurring in the political system in South Korean society and the
development of the country's international relations. The more general impact on South Korean society is also considerable, and will become clearer in discussion based upon interview data.
6-1. Introduction

This chapter explores the consequences of the Seoul Olympics on an assortment of related political, economic, social (cultural) and sporting matters. In terms of the significance of the Seoul Olympics, South Korea has arguably undergone various transformations owing to the positive and negative legacies of the Games. These transformations will be discussed in this chapter, with reference to key sociological works on globalisation and mega events to contextualise and explain the findings of the present research.

In particular, key works from the sociology of sport (Maguire, 1999; Roche, 2000; Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004; Jarvie, 2006) as well as the political historian Bridges’s research (1986 to 2008) are discussed in relation to the interview data which were collected for this study. Furthermore, the current researcher’s perspective has benefited from an insider position as a former South-Korean elite athlete. Moreover, the Seoul Olympics included important “power” issues which will be discussed in line with Sugden and Tomlinson’s (2002: 5) suggestion that ‘social scientists should recognise and seek to understand and explain when, why and how power transforms from one of its dimensions, or balance of dimensions, to another’.

6-2. Political Consequences

6-2-1. The Three Political Consequences

In recent memory, the South Korean nation had an authoritarian government, but in the last two decades of the twentieth century, ‘the new notions of democracy and prosperity arose to capture the national imagination and to become the primary concern of the government leadership’ (Kihi, 2005: 3). In this section, it is important to evaluate the democratisation of Korea in 1987, which began just before the 1988
Seoul Olympic Games. In addition, we shall examine how the Seoul Games themselves greatly impacted on South Korea’s international relations particularly in relation to its “Northern Policy” (Bridges, 1994).

We must also recognise that within the Olympic movement, South Korea’s influence increased significantly, ‘especially with respect to the future place of Asian nations in that movement’ (Larson, 1993: 172). According to Kihi (2005: 4), since 1988, South Korean administrations have played ‘a significant part in the creation of the modern state and committed to both liberal democracy and a market-oriented economy’. Larson (1993: 237) points out that ‘the Olympics provided an ideal vehicle for leaders in Seoul to push their Northern policy in foreign affairs, even as they helped progressive elements domestically to begin removing the heavy-handed influence of the military in government’. Moreover, Espy (1979) comments that ‘the confluence of changes in communications and politics made Seoul an especially cogent example of the role played by the Olympics as “actor and stage” in the world political system (cited in Larson, 1993: 238-239).

South Korea’s political development is associated with “Modernisation”, “democratisation”, and “globalisation” which are linked to each other in a variety of ways (Kihi, 2005).

Figure 6-1: Development of Korea’s Modernisation, democratisation and globalisation

Ideas adapted from Kihi (2005)
In this discussion, three important political consequences will be discussed. First of all is the most important issue of “Democratic consolidation” in the 1980s. During this period, South Korea faced certain ‘core political issues’, which were being dealt with by President Chun’s ‘3S’ policy (sex, screen and sports)’ (cited in Seoul Olympic International Congress, 18-20, September, 2008: 32). Secondly, South Korea acquired improved relations with socialist countries against the dramatic background of the hosting of the Olympics. It was not a simple matter for South Korea to host the 1988 Olympics due to the ongoing conflict between the Eastern Bloc and the West, making it difficult to bring both East and West together to compete. Thirdly, there is the subject of relations between North and South Korea, and the possibility of national unification.

A number of Korean scholars, including Kim (2000), Ha (1997) and Kim and Lim (1994), have indicated that during the period of the military government, political manipulation through sport was commonplace; the military regime had the ambition of diverting the public’s interest from politics to sports, encouraging the boom in professional sports such as baseball, and an increase in the provision of colour TVs in the 1980s. This was a major reason, even though South Korea was facing a difficult economic situation, why Chun’s government aspired to host the Olympics in the 1980s. Ironically, South Korea changed its political system in 1987 (the Democratic Consolidation), although this was certainly not President Chun’s objective in seeking to host the Olympics.

Korean scholars who have researched the political issues relating to the Seoul Games (Choi, 1990; Park, 1990; Kang, 1990; Kim and Lim, 1994; Kim, 2000) have argued that the Seoul Olympics had a positive impact on Korea’s democratic development and may actually have contributed to the end of military rule. Oh (1991) and Yoo (1991) point out that the Seoul Olympics might also have been able to help consolidate the democratisation of South Korean society. The Polish scholar Wolfgang (cited in Kim and Lim, 1994) stresses that the occasion of the Seoul Games may also have put an end to South Korea’s negative image in the Eastern Bloc societies, because the latter were able to receive more accurate information about the country. Generally, Kim and Lim (1994) indicate that the influence on South Korea of the Seoul Olympics in such areas as international relations, the domestic political
structure and national unity were positive. However, in this period South Korea’s relations with the United States worsened, and their relations with North Korea remained negative. Kim (1988) points out that even after the Seoul Games, Koreans felt more anti-American sentiment, while actually expressing a greater preference for the Soviet Union and China.

There were several significant political agendas within the IOC and the KOC, according to KOC official Kim Seng-Gon (Interview, 10 July, 2007):

The IOC’s main considerations were for peace in the world given the fact that Korea is divided into North and South. If the Korean peninsula was to host the Games, it could be the embodiment for peace and harmony across the world under Olympism. The Seoul Olympics’ historical impact was that the 159 East and West countries participated together in the Seoul Games. It was true to the united name of the event.

Interview data also reveal the background story to the Soviet Union’s participation and that of other socialist countries. The President of the SLOOC Park Sea-Jik (Interview, 17 July, 2007) explained of the 1980s situation:

The important thing was the Eastern Bloc countries’ participation. When they came to Korea, they could have the impression of Korea’s development. They had a communist system for 70 years and their nations were in poor situations, such that they had to criticise themselves. As a result, it indirectly influenced the change of political system in the Soviet Union led by Gorbachev. So, it had a pretty good influence on the ceasing of the Cold War. After the Seoul Olympics, East and West Germany became a united country and there was no more Berlin Wall in Germany. I think those kind of events were pretty much influenced by the Seoul Olympics.

Of course, this view is by no means universally held.

Zassoursky’s comments (cited in Lee, 1992: 27-28) help to reveal the attitudes of the Soviet Sports publication, Sovetsky:

Q: Did the Games make for better relations between the ROK and the USSR?
A: Yes, of course.

Q: Did it make diplomatic relations between the two countries come nearer?
A: Yes.
Q: Did it influence the perestroika process and its concept in the USSR?
A: I do not think so.

Q: Will you characterize today's political situation in Korea and the status of the regime?
A: I have just come from another trip to the ROK. I saw student unrest, felt the tear gas, but the regime is not a dictatorship.

Q: Is it a democracy?
A: Probably. Yes.

Q: How will you evaluate coverage of the Olympiad by your publication?
A: It was the best coverage Sovetsky Sport did in many years.

Q: In what way did your views change after your trip to Korea?
A: I would love to go again. (Interview was conducted on 18 August, 1991).

Regarding the political system in the USSR, Zassoursky (cited in Lee, 1992: 58) asked several people: “Did the Seoul Olympics influence the perestroika process and its concept in the USSR?” He received a variety of answers from negative to very positive. One interview prompted these points from Mr. Vitaly Ignatenko (Director-General of the TASS news agency in Soviet Union): ‘Yes. The reason is the Korean experience of transfer from a totalitarian regime to a market economy, and so forth, the leap made by Korea in the last 10-15 years, all that shows the way to cure an economy dying under the pressure of totalitarianism and severe military rule. Korea's example has become very fruitful for us’ (cited in Lee, 1992: 59).

The following is taken from a speech delivered by South Korean President Kim Young Sam (1993-1997), in Moscow on 3 June, 1994: (see Appendix VI, more information)

It is a great pleasure for me to meet with you today and exchange ideas on how to further promote economic cooperation between Russia and Korea as we meet in the ancient city Moscow, rich in tradition and culture. Before I became the President of the Republic of Korea, I was able to visit Russia twice, once in 1989 and once in 1990. I am quite amazed at the remarkable changes that I have witnessed in Russia during this visit. The ambience of the city has become brighter and freer, and business activity has become more brisk and active. Russia and Korea share in common their pursuit of
change and reform in not only the political and social sectors but in the economic sector as well. (The Presidential Secretariat The Republic of Korea, 1995: 58).

Since the Seoul Olympic period, South Korea and the Soviet Union had been improving their relationship in various ways. It might be said that the Soviet Union’s participation in the Seoul Games was influenced by a number of ‘cross-cultural’ (Maguire, 1999) links between Korea and the USSR.

6-2-2. Democratic Consolidation

The term “Nordpolitik” was introduced by the South Korean foreign minister Lee Beom-Suk in 1983 (during the Chun period), but it was not officially announced until 1988, during the Roh Tea-Woo regime. The purposes and origins of Nordpolitik were, according to Kim, Lee, Yoo, Koo and Hyung (1989: 4):

The Korean people having lived for forty years as a divided nation have as their greatest desire the reunification of their homeland, and the most urgent matter at hand is to overcome the suffering resulting from this division. From a more realistic point of view, Koreans aspire toward a daily life without the fear of a constant threat to security from the North Korean communist regime, to mitigate the suicidal competition of national struggle carried out against North Korea in international relations and to act freely in the international arena. To create an atmosphere conducive to improved South-North relations, Korea is interested in establishing friendly relations with socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, supporters of North Korea.

Larson (1993: 159) pointed out in 1993 that ‘with the events of 1991 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the continued presence of U.S military forces in South Korea is perhaps the world’s most prominent vestige of the cold war’. However, after hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea experienced significant political change, particularly regarding its reach in the global arena, as well as becoming a democratic society after the long-term military dictatorship.

As mentioned earlier, before the Seoul Olympics, South Korea had experienced a long-term period of military government, under the presidencies of Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan (from 1960-1988). During that period, South Korea had witnessed a number of student protests in support of democratic reform. Kihl (2005:
26) mentions that 'the concept of democratisation was not taken seriously until the 1960 Student Revolution but democratisation becomes the main focus of political analysis in the 1980s'. Moreover, South Korea did not have amicable relationships with the Eastern Bloc and had a difficult relationship with North Korea in particular.

Minister of Cultural Tourism and Sport, Kim Myung-Gon (Interview, 30 June, 2008), stresses that:

The Seoul Olympics preparing period was during President Chun Doo-Hwen's government, so I think various political considerations were involved. Through the 1960s to the 1980s, South Korea had a negative image in international society, for example regarding international relationships, human rights and the divided peninsula problem. Also, there was the Kwang-Ju protest for democratic reform which had a negative effect on the Korean image. Therefore, the Korean government had to be considering those problems in the 1980s.

Journalist Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008), expressed the following opinion:

The South Korean government had been a military dictatorship for a long time, and the Korean people had long protested against the government for democratization; a movement which included students, intellectuals and other members of the general Korean population. Therefore, the government needed ideas for silencing the nationwide protests and the Olympics could provide a distraction to that end. Also, domestically, the Seoul Olympics made a huge contribution to Korea's democratization. After the Seoul Olympic bid, President Roh Tea-Woo changed the voting system for Presidential elections in Korea and Korea experienced a subsequent boom in the growth of democracy.

Korean Football Association official Park Yong-Soo (Interview, 22 July, 2008) commented:

I think the government wanted to showcase its achievements to earn national prestige in the eyes of the rest of the world. Because hosting the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup are good tools for gaining national prestige in the global society, so, Korea was enthusiastic about hosting the Olympics in the 1980s.

Chung Hee-Jun (Interview, 11 July, 2007) referred to the background to the Northern Policy and how its links to the Communist Bloc began to influence cultural performances in Korean society:
President Roh Tea-Woo says that a northern policy is his work. However, when we hosted the Olympics South Korea could achieve that policy. If we didn't host the Olympics we couldn't carry out the northern policy. Therefore, before the Seoul Olympics, Russian artists visited Seoul such as ballet and orchestra groups, and before the opening ceremony a number of eastern bloc cultural performance artists visited Seoul. During that period Korea had begun to form relationships with communist countries, and in particular, South Korea had much better diplomatic relations with the communist bloc than with North Korea.

Before 1988, as discussed earlier, South Korea had a totalitarian regime under President Chun (1980-1988). As a result, there were major student movements in support of the democratisation of society in South Korea. Moreover, until the Seoul Games, North Korea was suspected of continuous efforts to disrupt the Games, as indicated in the following interview excerpt. According to President of the SLOOC Park Sea-Jik (Interview, 17 July, 2007):

North Korea still continued to disrupt the Seoul Olympics as they tried to abuse the South Korean military government, meaning that we had this ongoing psychological warfare with North Korea even after the Seoul Olympics. For example, North Korea said that the Korean War was not a North Korean invasion of the South but was a South Korean invasion of the North. The United States is our enemy, and South Korea needed to be left out because it was created by a pro-Japanese group. Also, North Korea announced that we needed to follow Kim Il-Sung's Juche ideology that all university town students start a movement against the government, so that we would have social disturbances caused by this influential group.

Professor of the Sociology of Sport, Chung Hee-Jun (Interview, 11 July, 2007) points out that:

The Seoul Olympics had a bilateral political purpose, with positive and negative impacts on the nation's politics. Firstly, it was an indulgence of the dictatorship government; secondly, it extended the dictatorial government; thirdly, another military leader (Roh Tea Woo) continued in power in Korea, extending the period of dictatorial government; and lastly, during the preparations for the Seoul Olympics, a number of Korean people experienced suppression, and many died...on the other hand, in 1987, the Chun government planned to mobilize the military, but the Seoul Olympics made President Chun hesitate to use the military against protesters.

South Korea faced considerable obstacles to hosting the Olympics. On the television, the world could see the problems in South Korean society, where the situation was 'usually violent, burning cars, bursting tear gas grenades, enraged police, and infuriated rioters' (Lidstone, 1989: 189). As has already been discussed, South Korea’s ability to host the 24th Summer Games was questioned by the rest of the
world. Outsiders needed to acquire a clearer understanding of South Korea’s political, economic and cultural situation before committing to participation in the Seoul Games.

In 1987, the doubts surrounding Korea’s ability to host the Olympics became an urgent issue for the IOC and the KOC. IOC member Richard Pound announced that:

> Everyone in Korea wants the Games to be a success and recognizes their great importance for Korea. The opposition people say they’d like [political changes] before the Games, but they don’t go as far as to say that they will ruin it all for their own political purposes. Korea will be around for a long time after 1988, and it will be great for the national legacy if the Olympics are a success (cited in Lidstone, 1989: 191).

In 1987, several cities, including New York, Berlin, and Los Angeles, expressed an interest in hosting the 1988 Summer Games if Seoul was unable to do so (Mladen, 1987). However, in July 1987, IOC president Samaranch stated that:

> It will be Seoul only. I don’t know any other solution. If there will be no games in Seoul, there will be no games at all next year. We are not considering any other city as an organizing post. They’ve had outstanding preparations in Seoul and I can say that never has any city showed such a degree of preparation. They do have some internal problems in South Korea, but I think that situation is improving. We have received some very good news recently’ (cited in Larson, 1993: 160).

Only two days later, SLOOC President Roh Tea Woo ‘proposed his package of democratic reforms - the now-famous June 29 declaration’ (Larson, 1993: 161). Roh became President of South Korea in 1988, marking the most popular political reformation in the history of Korean society. Kihl (2005: 14) points out that ‘the Roh Tae-Woo administration, for instance, was affected by two separate National Assembly elections (1988 and 1992)’ and had important political consequences for South Korea. The following table shows that from democratisation in 1987, South Korea was invested with the development of a more open and fair electoral system in presidential and parliamentary elections between 1988 and 2008.
6-2-3. The Seoul Olympics and Improved International Relationships

Historically, before the Seoul Olympics, the IOC had experienced episodes of political turmoil which had led to the cancellation of several Olympic Games and to boycotts. After awarding the 1988 Olympics to South Korea, president Samaranch tried to ensure all the NOC countries’ participation in the Seoul Olympics, which was made difficult by the international political conflict between the socialist and democratic nations (New York Times, 11 September, 1988). For the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, the IOC was unable to ensure Communist Bloc participation. That experience put considerable pressure on the IOC to secure wide participation at the Seoul Olympics. The USSR and other socialist countries not only participated in the Seoul games, but also met with great success. This is perhaps explicable by the fact that they had missed the previous Olympics, and were determined to take the chance to demonstrate the ongoing superiority of the Communist Bloc compared with the rest of the world.

According to the Korean sports diplomat and columnist Yoon (S.O.S. Online Newsletter, 20 January, 2009), the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics is the best and most monumental achievement for sport diplomacy in Korea. He stated that

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**Table 6-1: Institutional Basis of Electoral Cycles in the Six ROC (1988-2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrations</th>
<th>National Elections</th>
<th>Presidential Election (5-year single term)</th>
<th>Parliamentary Election (4-year term with no limits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Roh Tea-Woo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kim Young-Sam)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kim Dea-Jung)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Roh Moo-Hyun)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Kihl (2005: 15)
the Seoul Olympics was the 'Most Exemplary', 'Most Impressive', 'Longest Remembered', 'Most Valuable', 'Most Universal' and 'The Best Games Ever'. Yoon (2009) suggests that the ongoing influence of the Seoul Games culminated in shared North and South Korean entry during the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics – a profound statement of unity and of potential future unification.

The character of Olympism 'can unify people where economic, political, and even scientific ideas and events may divide' (KOC Report, 1986: 17). However, there were several political reasons behind the hosting of the Games in South Korea by the military government. Given that 'in the years and months leading up to the 1988 Olympic Games, many expressed misgivings and even doubts about whether or not South Korea could host a trouble free Olympics given the country's history of internal strife and lack of relations with key nations' (Lidstone, 1989: 189), the question of the legitimacy of Chun's military government was paramount. Before the Seoul Games, there were a number of critical views expressed within the West regarding this. The sport scholar John Hoberman (1986: 2) observed that:

The 1988 Olympic Games have been assigned to Seoul, South Korea, currently a military dictatorship under the leadership of General Chun Doo Hwan, who assumed power in 1980 by means of a coup d'etat. Chun's term in office under the present constitution runs until 1988 and it is unclear whether he will permit a free election of a successor. South Korea has not experienced a peaceful transfer of power since 1945; 1988 should be an interesting Olympic year.

Nevertheless, 'the IOC's decision to award the games automatically and almost immediately conferred the sort of international legitimacy that could hardly have been gained in any other way' (Larson, 1993: 158). Further, in 1981, 'for the North American public, the action likely reinforced whatever legitimacy had already been conferred in the White House meeting between Chun and President Reagan' (Larson, 1993: 158).

According to Larson (1987: 12), 'the global reach and frequency of televised images surrounding the 1988 Olympics raises a series of questions about their impact on public perceptions of Korea in other parts of the world'. In addition, MacAlloon and Kang's (1990) wide-ranging work suggests that the changes in the ritual practice of the torch relay and opening ceremonies between the Asian Games of 1986 and the
Seoul Olympics can be seen to relate to the political changes taking place in Korea at that time. Importantly, Larson (1993: 150) stressed that ‘such developments at the beginning of the Olympic period helped to make the Seoul Games both an important new criterion in Korean politics and also a project of more than passing interest to the Olympic movement and international community’.

With this in mind, Korean Football Association official Park Yong-Soo (Interview, 22 July, 2008) commented that:

I think the government wanted to showcase its achievements to earn national prestige in the eyes of the rest of the world. Because hosting the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup are good tools for gaining national prestige in the global society so Korea was enthusiastic about hosting the Olympics in the 1980s. So I would say that there were three factors. Firstly, in the 1980s Korea became economically developed to the point that they could able to host the Olympics. Secondly, the government wanted to achieve the national prestige that hosting the Olympics in Korea would bring. Lastly, the rivalry between Japan and Korea boosted Korea’s desire to succeed with the bidding.

6-2-4. Two Koreas: The Relationship between North and South

Although most communist countries took part in the Games, North Korea did not participate in 1988 as the possibility of co-hosting the Olympics disappeared. Over the two decades following the democratic consolidation of 1987, South Korea has successfully acquired ‘international recognition, (promoting) relations with pro-communist countries’ (Merkel, 2008: 289) and the rest of the world. But what of the relationship between North and South Korea? According to Na (2008):

South Korea’s relations with North Korea are expected to go from bad to worse as a row between the two sides over the killing of a South Korean tourist by a North Korean soldier is showing signs of deepening (cited in The Korea Times, 27 July 2008).

Before the division of the nation, the two Koreas were united for a long period – approximately 5000 years – with the division occurring after World War II and the subsequent Korean War. During the six decades since then, is there any positive news for the re-unification of the two Korean states? And within the Olympic movement,
what is the experience of North/South Korean collaboration? Bridges (2007: 375-376) asserts that ‘sport has nothing to do with politics’. However, North and South Korea have ‘little doubt that the two are closely linked for divided nations, which by their very rationale are involved in a highly-charged competition for legitimacy with their other part-nation’ (Bridges, 2007: 375-376). Arguably, ‘sport may be very easily integrated into the political projects of governments’ (Arnaud, 1998: 8). In addition, Ha and Mangan (2003: 214) have argued that ‘the post-war development of South Korean sport was politically-driven, resourced and endorsed and it was the direct product of...ideological purpose’.

Historically there have been only two instances of a joint team involving North and South Korea - at the 1991 Table Tennis Championships in Japan, and the Junior World Football Championships held in Portugal in 1991. Bridges (2008b: 2) points out that ‘this achievement, which came at a time of renewed North-South political dialogue at the prime ministerial level, may have had a Chinese dimension, since joint cheering of each others’ athletes by South and North Korean supporters attending the Beijing Asian Games in 1990 was an important impetus’. However, this was not to influence civilian exchanges, and was largely the result of “government contracts” (Bridges, 2008b: 2).

Returning to the lively issue of the two Koreas’ joint team, Bridges (2008b: 1-2) points out that during the two decades since the Seoul Games, North and South Korea have had a number of formal talks about the possibility of a joint Olympic team but ‘no solution was achieved’. There are several considerable problems with this idea, ‘such as the flag (the unification flag), the national anthem to be played when medal winners are on the podium (the 1920s version of the traditional Korean folk song “Arirang”), and the uniforms (following earlier designs but all supplied by the South), in addition, how to choose the athletes to compete’ (Bridges, 2008b: 2).
In 2000, Kim Jong-Il and Kim Dae-Jung (President of South Korea) 'opened the way for greater cooperation and collaboration in North-South Korean relations' (Bridges, 2008b: 2). Furthermore, the two Koreas entered the 2000 Sydney Olympics under a joint flag, 'the so-called “unification flag”, (consisting of a blue outline of the undivided Korean Peninsula on a white background) and wearing identical uniforms at the opening ceremonies' (Bridges, 2008b: 2). Following this, North Korea participated in the 2002 Busan Asian Games, the first time that North Korean athletes had participated in an international sporting event held in South Korea. An interview with Kim Jin-Sun, the governor of the Kangwon province, reveals signs of an improved relationship between North and South Korea via the inter-Korean sports exchange:
We have been trying to hold various inter-Korean sports exchanges to help ease the tension between the South and North. I think holding joint sports events is the best way to improve the relations and bring peace to the Korean Peninsula....Prospering sports exchanges and cooperation will give Pyeongchang an advantage over other contenders because hosting a Winter Olympics here will help promote world peace and solidarity through sports, which is the true Olympic spirit (cited from Merkel, 2008: 303).

However, as yet there has never been a joint team at either the Olympics or the Asian Games. The issue of a joint team complements that of the political unification of the two Koreas. Northern and South Korean people have been living under different political systems with difficult economic standards for so long that this is not a simple or straightforward matter to them.

North Korea is a one party state. The ideology of totalitarian government developed by Kim Il-Sung created a very different political system, leading to North Korea’s isolation from the democratic world. Moreover, North Korea has attempted to develop nuclear weapons. The following statement reveals a difference of opinion between the USA and North Korea, from the United States’ perspective: ‘North Korea has been a terrorist regime which not only has threatened South Korea directly and Japan indirectly, but through its missile and suspected nuclear weapons programmes, has also undermined US weapons non-proliferation objectives on a global scale’ (Bridges, 2001: 99). However, from North Korea’s viewpoint, ‘the USA is of course the sole superpower, whose influence over the South is pervasive and whose armed forces, still developed on South Korean soil, reasons the USA has become the external power with which the North most wants to interact’ (Bridges, 2001: 99). The matter of the unification of the two Koreas is therefore a ‘high political goal and an essential element of both Koreas’ political discourse’ (Merkel, 2008: 294). An article in the Korea Times (27 July, 2008) explains the “Problems with North Korea” as follows;

The atmosphere on the Korean peninsula today is déjà-vu of the undesirable situation under the government of Kim Young-Sam 10 years ago. The North denounces the Seoul government as a “sycophant traitor” who only wants to depend on the United States. As the denuclearization process is making progress, North Korea and the United States are moving in the direction of improved relations. The North keeps its back turned against the South, rejecting any humanitarian aid, while accepting huge amounts of food from the U.S.
Moreover, the main consideration is North Korea's economic situation since, as Chamberlin (2005: 52) points out, 'South Korea has become North Korea's second biggest trade partner and aid provider'. Through sport, including the Olympic Games, the two Koreas have been able to discuss the idea of partnership, as one interview with a politician and researcher reveals:

Sport is very complex. The Seoul Olympics and the Soccer World Cup have been good for this country's reputation and economy. So, whenever the North and South do sports together, it is good for the whole nation - whatever kind of sports this is, wherever it happens, who wins, it does not matter as it is all about unity (Merkel, 2008: 298).

To summarise, Chun's military government was enthusiastic about hosting the Olympics, commensurate with its underlying political agenda. Ironically, the Chun government did not survive beyond 1987, contrary to Chun's own objectives for political survival. South Korea became the democratic society that it remains today, after the "1987 Democratic Consolidation".

Fortunately, the atmosphere of the 1988 Olympics was able to ensure Eastern Bloc participation, and the IOC's ideal of Olympism offered new opportunities to South Korea. In addition, after the Seoul Games, various side effects accrued in South Korean society, such as improved relationships with socialist countries in the economic, cultural, and technological spheres. In particular, the Soviet Union had the opportunity to access and discover Korean society more broadly. The USSR felt the lively excitement of events at the 'most attended and best reported Games in history in the capital of a dynamic and rapidly expanding country' (Zassoursky, cited in Lee, 1992: 60-61). Perhaps this influenced the perestroika process and the restructuring of the political system. South Korea could now also enjoy smooth relationships with multinational co-operations. Overall, the experience of the Seoul Games was able to dramatically improve South Korea's image to the world (especially regarding East-West diplomacy). This, together with the consolidation of the change in the political system of 1987, was the biggest political legacy of the Games. In addition, the Northern Policy allowed North and South Korea to join the United Nations simultaneously in 1991. Indeed, after fifteen years, the South Korean, Ban Ki-Moon (from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) became the Secretary of General of the United Nation in 2006.
6-3. Economic Consequences

6-3-1. From Third World Nation to Olympic Hosts

Even before Seoul was awarded the Olympics, there was considerable debate concerning “Third World” involvement with the Games. However, as a candidate to host the Olympics, South Korea appeared to have good potential as a developing country (Ricquart, 1988).

According to Bridges (2008a: 1939), ‘the 1988 Olympics in Seoul were a coming out party for South Korea – a culmination of its efforts to be recognised as an accomplished economic power and a serious international actor’. In addition, ‘there were economic benefits and a more subtle impact on South Korean society, national pride, collective memory and sporting culture’ (Bridges, 2008a: 1939).

After the Seoul Olympics, South Korea experienced improved relationships with Western and pro-Eastern countries; however, South Korea was also forced to take an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan of $19.5 billion in 1997 (Lee and Lee, 2003). This was not a South Korean problem alone, since most Asian countries were suffering from economic turmoil during that period (Entrepreneur.com, 1999).

Mo and Moon (1999: 152-153) point out that the economic crisis in Korea was caused by ‘internal and external factors, (including) a premature opening of the capital account, a commitment to fixed or heavily managed exchange rates and the related problems of overvaluation, current accounts deficits, and loss of investor confidence that combined to exert downward pressure on the exchange rate’. As a result, President Kim Dae-Jung’s regime (1998-2003) ‘faced the classical dilemma of reconciling two possibly conflicting goals - democratic consolidation and economic reform’ (Mo and Moon, 1999: 152). South Korea finally repaid the IMF loan in 2001. The international trade policy and other global activities, such as massive export-import business with the United States, Canada and European countries, gradually enabled South Korea to become a wealthy country.
Concerning the economic legacies of the Seoul Olympics, these can be divided into direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) types, with both being considered as important to the South Korean government and the people of Korea (Bridges, 2008a). A number of researchers have demonstrated that the Seoul Games had a direct positive economic impact on Korean society; however, there were also huge intangible economic consequences in both the domestic and global contexts. Of course, it is not easy to measure the economic impact of the Olympics, in terms of ‘how much’ benefit there was to the host city. Therefore, Bridges (2008a: 1943) points out that ‘different organizations and different scholars have come up with varying estimates, depending on the methodologies and definitions employed’. Preuss (2002: 5) also mentions that ‘on the one hand the economic dimension depends on why the city wants to host the Games, on the other hand it strongly depends on the development level and size of the host city’. Associated with Preuss’s (2002) point is the fact that the Seoul Olympics case not only relates to the direct economic advantages of hosting the Olympics, but is also linked to a consideration of the enhancement of national image and of a country’s self-respect, according to the political agendas already outlined. Importantly, Essex and Chalkley (2003: 7) stress that ‘political motivations can sometimes be reflected in the scale of investment in new facilities for the Olympics’. As mentioned before, the preparations and decisions involved were generated by the government so that the amount of investment involved was of international standard. For example, ‘the scale of investment for the Berlin Games of 1936 owed much to the ideology of the Third Reich and to Hitler’s determination to use the Games as a showcase for National Socialism, and Barcelona’s preparations were also partly motivated by a desire to express the achievements of Catalonia’ (Essex and Chalkley, 2003: 7-8). The Seoul Olympics case was also primarily a political exercise, intended to show South Korean development to the world.

Journalist Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008) mentioned the indirect economic impacts on Korean society resulting from the Seoul Olympics:

After the Seoul Olympics’ opening ceremony, foreign affairs reporters admired Korea, asking ‘how come such a small country could do something like this!’ Through hosting the Olympics, Korean people obtained self-confidence and pride, thinking things like
'we can do it', 'we are very proud to be Korean', and this hugely positive impact of hosting the Games cannot be calculated in terms of money.

The Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Kim Myung Gon (Interview, 30 June, 2008) pointed out that multiple advantages were experienced by South Korea as a result of the Seoul Olympics:

Korea's national image was greatly improved by the impact of the Seoul Games, through changing the negative image of a divided country to a more positive image of a successful Olympic host. In addition, it gave a chance to advertise the Korean brand name, creating a positive impact on trade and diplomacy in international society.

Moreover, Kim Seung-Gon (Interview, 10 July, 2007) noted:

I think that hosting the Olympics could impact in various ways, for example, employment and the expansion of facilities. Through this South Korea could have an opportunity to progress from being a developing country to a developed nation. Korea advertised the Korean brand to the world. The Korean brand was useful for economic development, such as the growth of the export industry.

In addition, SLOOC President Park Sea-Jik (Interview, 17 July, 2007) observed that:

The most important things were that through the Olympics, the people could have confidence and pride in the Korean nation. This was very important; after the process of the Olympic preparations there was an economic revival and much development to our country. We promoted our country to the world in terms of trade, such that Korea could sell our products to the world with the right price and at a high valuation. As a result, the Seoul Olympics contributed economically to the trade surplus.

The experienced South Korean sport diplomat, Yoon Kang-Roh (Interview, 26 June, 2008) also commented on the Seoul Olympics' economic advantages:

After the LA Olympics and the Seoul Games, the hosting cities began to have a black-ink balance. Korea earned an income from the Seoul Olympics through the various sport industry business, such as the construction of the apartments in the Chamsil area and the sale of Samsung mobile phones, and other business operations around the world. I think if we hadn't hosted the Seoul Olympics, the Korean social situation or economic situation would be more like Thailand.

Undoubtedly, hosting the Seoul Olympics impacted on South Korea's economic development with both 'direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible)' advantages accruing (Bridges, 2008a). Since the 1980s, South Korea has gained a global
reputation and created a positive image for itself in the international community. In addition, South Korea’s major companies, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG, have been significant players in the global economy. The Samsung and Hyundai companies have co-operated with the IOC and FIFA respectively by sponsoring sporting mega-events whilst simultaneously becoming major businesses in the domestic and international arena. Coakley (2003: 449) notes that in relation to sponsorship, ‘the 1988 Summer Olympic Games was an announcement to the world of its [South Korea’s] emergence as a developed nation with a strong economy’. A more detailed examination of the activities of South Korea’s global companies such as Samsung and Hyundai, and the growth of global capital investment in South Korea, will appear in the following section. Arguably, hosting the Seoul Olympics worked as a catalyst for South Korea’s transition from being a developing country to becoming a semi-peripheral one.

6-3-2. The Urbanisation of Seoul

South Korea ‘invested around US$3.6 billion in Olympic-related infrastructure developments, of which the central government and the city contributed roughly one-third each, with the remainder coming from private companies’ (Bridges, 2008a: 1941). The Hyundai group Chairman, Chung, contributed to the development of a new Olympic Village in the Song-Pa Gu district. He had a vision of athletes’ apartments and other construction work, including world class sport facilities (Steers, 1999). Chung and the SLOOC had a business plan, proposing that ‘after the Olympics, the apartments would be sold to pay for their construction and to help meet Seoul’s chronic housing shortage; the sports complex would serve future generations of athletes’ (Steers, 1999: 156). Those strategies have doubtless had a positive impact on the Song-Pa Gu district (around the Olympic Village).
After 20 years, the Song-Pa Gu was proclaimed the most beautiful city in Korea on 22 September, 2008. The mayor of Song-Pa Gu, Ms Kim, said that Song-Pa Gu is one of Korea’s most historical and cultural cities because, 20 years previously, Song-Pa Gu had held the Olympics and promoted Korea’s name to the world (Hankooki.com, on 22 September 2008). In addition, Bridges (2008a: 1941-1942) points out that:

Three new underground railway lines in Seoul were completed, additional capacity was added to Kimpo international airport, roadsides within Seoul were improved and
'beautified', parks and gardens within the city were expanded or renovated, and a massive project to clean up the Han river, which flows through the centre of Seoul, and make it more accessible to the public was carried out, as was the cleaning up of the polluted Suyong Bay, Pusan, where the sailing events were held.

According to KOC official Kim Seung-Gon (Interview, 10 July, 2007):

The biggest legacies are the '88 express way, Olympic apartments and Olympic Park in Seoul. The '88 express way was able to make an exclusive line from the airport to the Olympic stadium. Also, it is still a very important highway for the South Korean people. After the Olympic Games, the government sold apartments to private citizens. This was at a high premium, because of the good environment and facilities in this area. This means that the country and its people could share in the benefits and that we could have a 'win-win' effect.

The journalist Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008) mentioned the direct economic impacts of the Seoul Olympics on Korean society:

The Seoul Olympics afforded the opportunity for improvements to the underground railway and Song-Pa Gu (Cham-Sil) also became a fashionable place, where the Olympics stadium and athletes’ apartments are. As you know, in Korea the big 3 premium areas are Kang-Nam Gu, Song-Pa Gu and Seo-Cho Gu, and through the Olympics, Song-Pa Gu underwent development and became more like a city. Also, the background to the name of the '88 Express Way' is that because of the Olympics, we built this road and gave it this name; since it links Kim-Po airport to the Cham-Sil Olympics stadium. We also had to expand more express ways in Seoul.

However, Park Gun-Man is also critical of aspects of the economic legacies of the Seoul Olympics:

Economically, there was not enough satisfaction. After the Seoul Olympics, Korea wasn't able to reach a new turning point. It was not like the Tokyo Olympics case, where the Games were used for economic growth. In some ways, Korea didn't develop its economic growth very well. Even though we hosted the Olympics successfully, we actually had misunderstood the fact that the country’s economy was not strong; Korea’s economy still needed to grow.

6-3-3. The Economy, the Olympics, and Relations with the USA

The SLOOC staff acquired high social status since they worked long hours for low wages for the sake of South Korea’s development and the glory of hosting the Olympics. Some people were not confident about hosting the Olympics in Seoul, but
finally, the South Korean people achieved the mega-event experience, putting Seoul on the map and into the consciousness of the rest of the world. Because during the 1980s, South Korea was a developing country, many people did not even know where it was. However, as the Seoul Olympics and the 2002 World Cup history demonstrate, South Korea is one of the more able countries in the world; moreover, the Olympics successfully changed Korea's image in the world. According to Manguno (cited in Lee 1992: 76) 'the Olympics were unquestionably successful by any standard', with hundreds of millions having watched the Seoul Games, including many Americans. In the US, opinions were collected through surveys among tourists, the media, and newspapers and magazines such as Time, Newsweek, The Washington Post, The New York Times and others; ‘the Korean “can-do” spirit and the sheer energy of Korean people’ were celebrated. The following points highlight the American perspective on South Korea after the Seoul Olympics:

- phenomenal reconstruction of Seoul since the Korean War;
- impressive erection of state-of-the-art Olympic facilities;
- professional handling of the complex Olympic logistics;
- unobtrusive, but rigorous security precautions;
- availability of top-quality tourist facilities;
- number and quality of automobiles on the road;
- efficiency of the public transportation system;
- vibrancy and distinction of Korean culture;
- orderliness of the Korea public;
- highly developed state of Korean cuisine;
- marketing sophistication;
- high-quality of Korean-made products—from color television, video recorders, microwave ovens and computers, to clothing, noodles and beer (Manguno cited in Lee 1992:76-77).

This highly positive image of Korea perhaps still influences opinion in the US and in global business. According to Armacost et al (2009: 5), ‘South Korea is the world’s thirteenth-largest economy and one of Asia’s most democratic countries, its economic and political development has made it a model of the virtues of a market economy and democracy – and of alignment with the United States’. Respect for Korean companies, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Kia automobiles, remains high; moreover, Samsung’s electrical technology is amongst of the most famous in the world. As mentioned before, the SLOOC worked closely with the government and with companies, such as the Chaebol group, which supported the Seoul Games from before
the bidding process onwards. During the two decades since the Games, those companies have experienced further growth and have become major enterprises at home and abroad.

The Korean diplomatic official Baek (Interview, 13 July, 2007) commented that:

Through the Seoul Olympics, South Korea was able to advertise to the world, which is like an indirect effect; how can we calculate this effect? We can't. Through the Olympics, we could introduce our culture to the world and enhance our national image, both of which would exert a huge influence on the economy. For example, these days, it is really expensive to advertise for your company or country. However, through the Seoul Olympics, we could cover for those advertisements for the country. As a result, the Korean nation could have greater confidence.

Professor Lim Bum-Jang (Interview, 9 July, 2008) said improved relationships between South Korea and Eastern European countries may also have helped to develop Korea's economy:

After the Seoul Olympics, bundle sellers were coming out in Korean society. The Korean sellers went to East Europe to sell Korean products and bring those countries' products to Korea. Yet the East European countries' products were not good quality, such that we did not use those products, but mostly exported Korean products for sale to those countries, such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, who bought Korean products to sell to their people because our products were much better quality than their countries' products and also were a good price. At that time, our labourers made products for the world's most popular companies, who outsourced their manufacturing to Korea, so we developed good quality skills for making such products.

Moreover, Professor Roh Mung-Woo (Interview, 24 July, 2007) explained the indirect aspect of the economic legacy as follows:

There was an economic impact. When I studied in Germany, I heard from a senior about the Korean student life there. Therefore foreigners treated the Korean people differently after the Seoul Olympic Games. Korea could advertise to foreign people, which was influential to Korean people, who could thus receive indirect benefits when they studied abroad. Also, those kinds of positive Korean images impacted on Korean business companies that could have economic advantages to Korea after the Seoul Olympics.

In addition, Professor Ok (email correspondence, 12 August, 2008) briefly explained the economic impact in the following way:
- Profits from the occasion stood at $490,000,000 and it eventually contributed to the advancement of Korean economy;
- The broadcasting revenue of the Games was $403 million and Seoul received about 20% of that amount;
- Above those aspects, various economic relations were promoted after the Games in conjunction with the global recognition that Korea was capable of economic advancement;
- Indirectly, the Games injected self-confidence into Korean modern society, aiding the economic leap.

Journalist Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008) pointed out that:

Through the Olympics, there was a really huge success in the promotion of the Korean brand name which can't be calculated in terms of money. There is no doubt that through the Seoul Olympics, Korean group companies began to have success in global business. For example, Samsung and Hyun-Dai’s images became highly valuable images. I think Samsung joined the IOC’s TOP programme at the 1998 Nagano Olympics and became fashionable.

On the other hand, Korean Football Association official, Park Yong-Soo (Interview, 22 July, 2008) said that:

The Olympic Games is an international event that we can only analyse in abstract terms. However, foreign people don't know that Samsung is a Korean brand. Therefore, the Seoul Games could not directly promote Korean business companies and the Seoul Games could not effectively increase Korea's GNP.

In an interview with The Korea Times on 21 June, 2007, a Polish Member of Parliament, Mr. Ludwik Dorn, described how 'South Korean companies will become one of the biggest employers in Poland':

Nowadays, Korea and Koreans are known through their companies that invest in Poland such as Daewoo and LG Philips...Korean companies will probably become the biggest employers in the private sector in our country. Korean brands are well-known in Poland.

The table shows Samsung, Hyundai and other South Korean business groups’ exports and imports activities between 1985 to 1995.
Table 6-2: Exports and imports by general trading companies (GTCs), 1985-95
(US$ million)

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<td>Samsung Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>3,018</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>6,281</td>
<td>3,096</td>
<td>16,515</td>
<td>6,606</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hyundai Corporation</td>
<td>3,977</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>5,783</td>
<td>3,453</td>
<td>13,797</td>
<td>4,831</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deawoo Corporation</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>4,749</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>10,746</td>
<td>4,714</td>
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<tr>
<td>LG (Lucky-Goldstar) Corporation</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>6,999</td>
<td>4,496</td>
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<td>Ssang-young Corporation</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>3,766</td>
<td>2,578</td>
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<td>Sunkyoung Corporation</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>3,396</td>
<td>1,205</td>
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<td>Hyundai Corporation</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>570</td>
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<td>Korea International Trading Ltd.</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>Total of above</td>
<td>14,680</td>
<td>5,556</td>
<td>24,794</td>
<td>10,032</td>
<td>58,059</td>
<td>25,071</td>
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<td>GTCs as a percentage of total trade</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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Adapted from World Trade Organization (1996: 78)

This table demonstrates the rapid growth of these companies from the mid 1980s.

6-3-4. The Samsung & Hyundai Groups and the TOP Programme

Samsung joined the IOC’s TOP programme in 1997, just one year after Samsung Chairman (Lee Kun-Hee) became an IOC member. The Samsung company has been an official sponsor at the Games ever since, ‘including the 1998 Nagano Olympics, the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the 2002 Salt Lake Olympics, the 2004 Athens Olympics, the 2006 Torino Olympics and the 2008 Beijing Olympics; on 23 April, 2007’, ‘Samsung signed a contract with the IOC to sponsor the Olympic Games through to 2016’ (website, vancouver2010.com).

According to the Chairman of Samsung, Lee Kun-Hee, the company aims to:

Devise strategies that can raise brand value, which is a leading intangible asset and the source of corporate competitiveness, to the global level." Samsung decided to sponsor the Olympic Movement to strengthen its global corporate image and brand value and has been carrying out a global marketing campaign with the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement as the single theme’ (imaginginfo.com, 8 July, 2008).
The Olympic Programme (TOP) was first employed in the run-up to Seoul, and suggested by Horst Dassler the chief executive of Adidas, whose marketing agency (ISL) cooperated with the IOC (Bridges, 2008a: 1942). Sponsorship companies were important for Seoul. For example, the Coca-Cola company paid $22 million, Visa paid $15 million, and other world class companies were also involved (Gratton and Taylor, 1988). The table shows the Olympic sponsors from 1985 to 2008.

Table 6-3: Global Olympic Sponsors (1985-2008)

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that the SLOOC was ‘convinced the U.S. broadcast rights for the 1988 games was worth up to $1 billion’ (cited in Seoul Olympic Congress, 2008: 312). They ended up receiving only about a third of this amount because the broadcast landscape had changed. In addition, Miller (2003) points out that the success of the Seoul Games saw the value of broadcasting rights increase rapidly; furthermore, ‘over the last 20 years, the U.S. broadcast rights have almost tripled in price, while the world broadcast rights have gone up close to five-fold’ (cited in the Seoul Olympic Congress, 2008: 312).

According to Bridges (2008a: 1943) ‘the economic success of South Korea – the so-called “miracle on the Han river” – had been predicated on a strong government role, especially in promoting key sectors of industry and underpinning the exporting machine, while at the same time being more restrictive of imports and inward foreign investment’. Since the growth of the TOP sponsorship programme and the general boom in the sport marketing area, the South Korean government has been ambitious to exploit the financial benefits of hosting sports mega-events in the country.

After the Seoul Olympics, Chung Ju-Young (Chairman of Hyundai) visited North Korea several times by crossing the Chinese border, to discuss trade and investment. In 1989, he was also the first South Korean businessman to visit the Soviet Union (Steers, 1999). According to Steers (1999: 161), Chung was interested in the Soviet Union for two reasons: firstly, ‘the area was rich in natural resources, including timber, oil, and minerals - he was convinced that with Korean technology and investment and Russian labour, Siberia could grow into a prosperous economic region from which Korea could obtain much-needed resources for its own development; secondly, the Soviet government had the potential to influence the pace of reunification talks with North Korea’. Chung also assumed that the Soviet Union’s ‘influence could be used to further lasting peace in the region’ (Steers, 1999: 161). There emerged a number of business relationships between South Korea and the Soviet Union such as the ‘Hyundai-Samsung-Daewoo consortium to help Russia develop a natural gas field in Yakutsk’ (Steers, 1999: 163). However, progress was slow.
The Hyundai Company is a world leader, employing a great number of people in Korea and co-operating well with other global companies. In 1995, Time magazine identified 'Chung as one of the top six business leaders in Asia who were most responsible for the region's striking economic achievements during the past fifty years' (Steers, 1999: 5). On 16 June, 1998, Chung organised a business tour of North Korea, but before that project he brought 500 cows to North Korea, which were called "unity cows", and had a meeting with Kim Jong-Il. Chung's activities influenced the opening-up of the Mt Geumgang tour for South Korean people, from 1998 to 2008.

As shown above, the Seoul Olympics had various positive economic consequences for Korean society. South Korea's major companies, such as Samsung and Hyundai, closely cooperated with the government before and after the Games and have since become key economic powers not only in South Korea but also in the global marketplace. Furthermore, the Seoul Olympics brought the sports marketing industry to Korea.

The Olympic stadium, the Sports Complex, the Olympic Park and the athletes' apartments are based in the Song-Pa Gu neighbourhood, Chamshil, an area east of Kangnam, which nowadays contains the most expensive metropolitan land in South Korea. After the Seoul Olympics, the Chamshil area has seen remarkable development, becoming one of the most prized regions in the Seoul area. The main Olympic stadium has been used every season for professional baseball and basketball matches and various cultural performances have been held there. In the Chamshil area, there are sports complexes, the Korean National Sports University and the Olympic Parktel (Hotel), the KSC & KOC headquarters, the Olympic Culture Centre and the Seoul Olympic Art Museum (SOMA), the Seoul Olympic Museum, and Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation (SOSFO). In addition, the huge project of the reconstruction of the Lotte-World amusement park will begin soon in the Chamshil region.

The South Korean government's urban planning actions were massive in transforming the Olympic Park area in Seoul. According to Ricquart (1988: 81), 'the Olympics not only provided a new stadium, apartment complexes and monuments; they triggered a transformation of the entire urban landscape of the host city'. Seoul has
around 10 million inhabitants, making it one of the largest metropolitan cities in the world. In the 1980s, the SLOOC had the goal that ‘Seoul must show its best face to the world when tourists, athletes, and journalists arrive in droves for the Olympic Games’ (Ricquart, 1988: 82). South Korea joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, further increasing the economic gap between the two Koreas.

The economic consequences of the Seoul Olympics were not totally positive. Seoul citizens and South Korean people generally had to pay higher taxes (including paying for the Lifelong Annuity System for medal winners and various causes for elite sport development) and were encouraged to contribute to national fund-raising lotteries (Preuss, 2004). In addition, South Korea’s major companies were implicated in corruption with damaging consequences for Korean society during the two decades after the Games. Overall, however, it is clear that the 1988 Olympic Games brought far more economic benefits than disadvantages to South Korea.

6-4. Social and Cultural Consequences

6-4-1. Seoul as a Global City

Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, has seen massive changes and now parallels the standards of global cities such as New York, London and Tokyo (Hill and Kim, 2000). According to Ryoo (2008: 873), ‘globalisation encompasses multiple changes in all areas of social life, especially economics and culture’. By hosting the Seoul Olympics, South Korea began to open up in various ways to the ‘world city paradigm’ (Hill and Kim, 2000).

Globalists believe that ‘a single global system is becoming superimposed on nation-states which are losing importance as a result’ (Hill and Kim, 2000: 2167). However, Seoul’s case demonstrates that nation states are also agents in terms of social and cultural change allowing for a major city to become global. Resulting from the experience of hosting the Olympics, the development of Tokyo (1964) and Seoul (1988) differs fundamentally from the rest of the ‘world system’ (Hill and Kim, 2000)
in terms of how they become global cites. As mentioned before (in economic consequences 6.3), since the 1980s South Korea has seen much multinational industrial activity, notably involving exporting to overseas markets. Of course, there were and remain social and cultural differences between Japan and Korea, yet together with Japan, South Korea also managed to successfully develop an increased global capability following their Olympic experience. There are many factors associated with Seoul becoming a global city. However, this section will focus on those that are related to the social and cultural legacies of the Seoul Olympics.

6-4-2. Social Changes

During the 37 years from 1945 to 1982, South Korea had a night curfew system for maintaining safety and the social order. However, under President Chun’s regime in the 1980s, the curfew system ended and with this, South Korea began to undergo a series of other social changes; for example, a relaxation of the school dress code, the liberalisation of travel rules for overseas trips, and pardons for criminals (Shon, 2009).

The lifting of the curfew system was an essential condition for hosting the Olympics in Seoul and was required for foreign visitors. In addition, just one year after the Seoul Olympics, it was made much easier for citizens to travel overseas, and South Korean people have since been able to grow up with overseas trips, while also seeing a dramatic increase in the number of foreign tourists visiting the Korean peninsula. Before the Seoul Olympics, social and cultural relationships with foreign countries were limited. After the Seoul Games, however, South Korean people had a chance to open their eyes to the broader global horizons. In addition, as discussed above, throughout the 1980s and until the mid ‘90s South Korea had a number of students’ movements advocating democracy. Today, university students accept that democracy has been realised. Yet, other social issues have emerged in Korean society about which students and other social groups are concerned and Korean people continue to make demands on their democratic society in various ways and for various reasons. As an example, the United States – Korea beef trade problem led to South Korean groups protesting against beef imports in 2008. The New York Times, (26 June 2008) reported that:
South Korea lifted an import ban on American beef on Thursday, despite an overnight protest in which thousands of people rallied in central Seoul to protest the government move and the police fired water cannons and detained at least 120 protesters. More than 3,000 protesters rallied well past midnight, chanting, "Out with Lee Myung-bak!" They accused Mr. Lee, the South Korean president, of opening the door for meat that they believe is not safe from mad cow disease.

In addition, the protest group threatened to organize a boycott of American beef, McDonald's restaurants and Outback steakhouses in South Korea. There are several reasons for beef's importance to South Korea (The New York Times, 26 June, 2008):

South Korea was the third-largest overseas market for United States beef exporters, buying $800 million worth of American meat a year, until an import ban was imposed in 2003 after a case of mad cow disease was found in the United States.

Eventually, South Korea and the U.S published the beef protocol in 2008, ensuring that once again American beef is part of Koreans' culinary experience.

As seen above, South Korean people expressed their opinions liberally and Lee's government (2008 to present) dealt with Korean protest very differently compared with Chun's regime (1980s). This demonstrates the realization of an ideal – since 1987, South Korean people have increasingly enjoyed a more democratic society. A former opponent of the Seoul Games, Professor Roh (Interview, 24 July, 2007) highlighted the Seoul Olympics' impact on Korean society:

In the 1980s, I didn't know about the Olympics benefits to us. Because I was involved with protesting against hosting the Olympics in Korea. Also, I had negative perspectives on hosting the Olympics in Seoul that I didn't think about the positive influences on the Korean nation. However, now if I think about the history of the development of Korean society, it had been from the starting point of the Seoul Olympics. For example, the most popular example is the perception of foreign counties. Because before the Seoul Olympics Korean people found it difficult to go abroad, we had to have permission to go to a foreign country. We were isolated.

Yoon Kang-Roh (Interview, 26 June, 2008) stressed that there were mostly positive consequences for Korean society as a result of the 1988 Seoul Olympics:

I think much of the Olympic experience was advantageous to the Korean people. I don't think we experienced any disadvantage through the Seoul Games. From the 1980s,
Korea started to globalise. For example, we began to have more friendly relationships with foreign countries and Korean people were free to travel abroad. Also, domestically, there was a relaxation of rules such as freedom from restrictions on people's hair styles, and also the promotion of democracy in Korean society. I think, by hosting the Olympics, Beijing will automatically improve regarding the human rights issue.

Journalist Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008) mentioned other positive effects on Korean society resulting from the Seoul Olympics:

The Seoul Games contributed to cleaning up Korean society. Through the Seoul Games, Korean people worked confidently and they respected the rules; it gave an opportunity to get rid of corrupt and immoral behaviour. In particular, through hosting the Olympics, Koreans obtained a mindset of 'we can do it'. Which helped the progress of Westernisation in Korean society. Also, during the Olympic period, the government prepared a traffic reduction scheme using an 'odd-even' system, helping to reduce traffic jams, and also, Korean people had a chance to show their mature citizenship to the world.

However, the manager of the International Relations Bureau KFA, Park Yong-Soo (Interview, 22 July, 2008) was critical of the westernisation of Korea which he claimed has led to a number of problems for Korean society:

Korean society needs to be considerate of social problems; such as how income is shared, democracy and the quality of economic development. These are important issues in Korean society. However, through the Seoul Games, these issues could have been diluted, preventing them from having negative impacts on Korean society.

Many, if not all, of these issues will be examined later in relation to the concept of globalisation.

6-4-3. Tourism

According to Chon and Weber (2002: 173), through the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics, South Korea saw a 'massive development of tourist infrastructure, the expansion of international air service, and tremendous media coverage that substantially enhanced the country's image worldwide'. Under a democratic government, South Korea has successfully promoted its tourist industry, such that in 2006 alone, over six million foreign tourists visited Korea and spent $2.92 billion, while foreign business trips accounted for $2.31 billion (KTO, 2009). In addition,
Ahn and Ahmed (1994: 84) point out that the 1988 Seoul Olympics ‘drew attention to Korea as a destination and provided the impetus for continued tourism growth’.

The development of the tourism industry in South Korea was closely linked to the government’s plans for Korea’s general development. Since the Seoul Olympics, the number of international travellers visiting Korea has increased dramatically. In addition, Korean airline companies, such as Korean Air and Asiana Airlines, have increased their schedules for visiting international destinations (Ahn and Ahmed, 1994). Importantly, ‘with government liberalisation of travel rules’ in 1989, South Korean people have been increasingly able to travel abroad, while the two major South Korean airlines ‘maintain a monopoly on domestic flights and also transport more than half of all international passengers’ (Ahn and Ahmed, 1994: 85). Most foreign tourists therefore arrive in Seoul, not at other domestic airports, because it is not easy to reach those airports owing to difficult connections by flight, thus making Seoul the favoured destination for South Korea’s leading airlines.

Because of increased tourism, a new international airport was opened at Incheon in 2001, with its predecessor, Kimpo, thereafter used only for domestic flights and flights to Japan and China. The idea of a new airport first emerged in 1992. According to Incheon airport CEO Mr. Lee (2009, cited in IIAC website):

Incheon International Airport’s dramatic ascent to the ranks of the world’s top airports in the seven years since we opened in March 2001 is a testament to creative management, pragmatic operations, and the effort and passion of the 35,000 members of our “airport family”. Incheon International Airport is the world’s 2nd and 10th busiest airport in terms of international passengers and cargo handling, respectively. We have also been rated No.1 in airport service quality for an unprecedented three consecutive years, and our operations and logistics systems are second to none. Indeed, our development—both quantitative and qualitative—into one of the world’s premier airports has made Incheon International Airport a symbol of national pride for all Koreans.

Along with the realisation that the Olympics had been a major factor in the growth of international tourism has come an awareness of the massive interaction between Seoul becoming a global city and hosting mega events in Korea. The following table shows the history of the Korea Tourism Organisation (KTO) and the increase of foreign tourists in South Korea.
Table 6-4: History of KTO

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>The Tourism Promotion Law is enacted</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>The International Tourism Corporation (ITC) is established and given the responsibility for promoting Korea’s undeveloped tourism industry through the direct management of some major hotels, taxis and the Korea Travel Bureau, as well as by training human resources to support the travel trade.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The number of foreign visitors passes the 100,000 mark.</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>The Hotel Institute is opened. The first overseas office opens in Tokyo.</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>Development of Bomun Lake Resort in Gyeongju began.</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Korea attracts over one million foreign visitors (1.08 million).</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>The International Tourism Corporation is renamed as Korea National Tourism Corporation (KNTC).</td>
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<td>1986-1988</td>
<td>The number of foreign visitors passes over two-million (2.34 million).</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>• Supported ’86 Asian Games, ’88 Olympic Games</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>The number of foreign visitors passes over three-million (3.2 million).</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>“Visit Korea 1994” Events (318 events including the 600th Anniversary of Seoul)</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>The company’s name is changed from Korea National Tourism Corporation to Korea National Tourism Organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Kumgangsan Diamond Mountains tour begins. Hit 4 Million in number of foreign tourists to Korea (4.25 Million)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Korea attracts over 5 million foreign visitors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Kumgangsan Diamond Mountains land route tour begins. Hallyu (Korea Wave) becomes the major theme of the KTO’s overseas marketing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>KTO reshuffles its organizational structure into 6 divisions. KTO introduces its new corporate identity. Korea attracts over 6 million visitors from abroad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Official Launch of Brand name for Korean Tourism &quot;Korea, Sparkling</td>
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Source adopted from KTO (2009)

South Korea has hosted a number of mega-events and seen increases in the convention industry in the past decade. As a result, Chon and Weber (2002: 173) point out that ‘it is becoming a major player in the Asia-Pacific region, and its future prospects are promoting with expanding markets, strong government support, and constant improvements to both the infrastructure and superstructure’.

Since the late 1980s, South Korea has seen a dramatic increase in the number of tourists at home and abroad, and a number of travel agencies have been set up in Korea. Furthermore, under the Ministry of Tourism, travel agencies are charged with maintaining the quality of travel services for the tourists. In Seoul city, there are numerous world-standard, five-star hotels (e.g. Hyatt, Inter-Continental and Marriott), convention centres (COEX), and various museums, art centres, and leisure facilities.
and attractions to entice travellers. The Korea Tourism Organisation (2008) refers to tourist facilities throughout the Korean peninsula:

As of March 2007, 601 tourist hotels nationwide offer a total of 63,221 guestrooms, 52% (i.e. 32,842 guestrooms in 216 hotels) of which are concentrated in Seoul, Busan and Jeju. Recently, the number of the users of deluxe hotels is increasing, apparently as a result of the improvement in income level. The number of inbound visitors is projected to increase to 10 million a year by 2010. In such a case, the country will suffer from a shortage of guestrooms by a margin of about 60,000 guestrooms a day unless measures are taken to supplement the current number of rooms.

Since the 1990s, South Korea has also been in the spotlight of transnational media corporations, and has experienced a much improved media profile as well as a growth in the development of technology along with other Asian countries, causing it to become a popular cultural tourist destination in the Asian tour industry. KTO (2008) reported that international tourists visit Korea particularly from Japan and China:

In 2007, the number of inbound tourists visiting Korea stood at 6,448,240, a 4.8 percent year-on-year increase. Early in the year, the number of Japanese visiting Korea, particularly group visitors, posted an increase, while the number of Chinese visitors led the increase during the lunar New Year holidays. In the ensuing period, the number of Japanese visitors decreased apparently due to the won’s strength, recording a modest (2.2%) increase. There was a noticeable increase in the number of Chinese visitors following adoption of the H-2 visa, which allows ethnic Koreans to enter and leave the country freely for three years, while those from Japan and Southeast Asia decreased, recording a 1.4 percent increase, from China and Southeast Asia increased noticeably. Also, North America has a great increase (4.6 percent) amid efforts to attract stopover passengers. In the lastly, the decrease in the number of Japanese visitors was mitigated on the back of group student visitors.

Professor Roh (Interview, 24 July, 2007) remarked on the increase of tourists in Korea since the Seoul Olympics:

During the Seoul Olympic Games, many foreign people visited Seoul and we could see so many different races of people on the TV. Therefore I had the chance to know what the world and various people were like. I think the most important impact from the Olympics was that the Korean people could change their perceptions of being isolated to the world.

Professor Lim Bum-Jang (Interview, 9 July, 2008) commented on the increased number of South Korean people embarking on foreign holidays after the Seoul Olympics:
After the Seoul Olympics, Korean people could have the chance to go to other European countries. In my case, before the Seoul Games, I had only been to the USA, East Asia and Australia. But, after the Seoul Games, we began to have relationships with Europe. Perhaps, who studied music, French or fine arts, they might have had the chance to go to European countries. Yet, other major groups had not had the chance to have interchanges with Europe.

6-4-4. South Korea’s Cultural Industry

Under the authoritarian government, ‘the Korean film industry lost ground while Hollywood majors become main players in the Korean film market’ (Dal, 2006: 5). Additionally, as Dal (2007: 756) points out, ‘the importing of foreign television programs began to increase after the government eased the quota system in the early 1990s’ but South Korea had only three television channels in the early 1980s. However, since 1993, the government established a new cultural policy, particularly in the film sector and, between 1999 and 2003, the South Korean government became directly involved in the industry. With the government’s support, South Korea industry successfully developed the promotion of its films at home and abroad (Dal, 2006). The film industry has not been the only beneficiary of the new cultural policy, for general cultural content such as ‘television dramas, movies and pop songs have become popular in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other East and Southeast Asian countries’ (Shim, 2006: 25). According to Shim (2006: 29):

Korean stars have had a big impact on consumer culture (in Asia), including food, fashion, make-up trends and even plastic surgery. It is not uncommon to find Asian youth decorating their backpacks, notebooks and rooms with photographs of Korean stars. In the streets of Hanoi and Beijing, it is common to find young members of the Korea Tribe, or Koreanophiles, sporting multiple earrings, baggy hip-hop pants, and the square-toed shoes of Seoul fashion.

Indeed, over the last decade, Korean popular culture has become dominant in East and Southeast Asia, and as a result the news media and travel magazines have begun to refer to what has become known as the ‘Korean Wave’ (‘Hallyu’ or ‘Hanryu’ in Korean), even gaining recognition from Hollywood: ‘Korea has transformed itself from an embattled cinematic backwater into the hottest film market in Asia’ (Segers, 2000: 14-16; Visser, 2002). The Korean Wave began in around 1997, through the national China Central Television Station (CCTV), with several big hit dramas in
China and Taiwan. Moreover, Korean TV drama was watched in Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia, following the media liberalisation of the 1990s (Shim, 2006). Finally, South Korean television dramas become fashionable and programmes were exported considerably from 2003 onwards, generating an income of $37.5 million that year, compared with $12.7 million in 1997 (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004). The success of South Korean films in other Asian countries generated interest further afield, and they have since arrived in European countries and in North America. In particular, ‘major US-based distribution companies such as Fox and Columbia have started to take Korean movies on for their global distribution runs (Frater, 2003). Han and Lee (2008: 118) point out that ‘the Korean Wave campaign, initiated by KTO in 2004, has provided significant momentum for Korea to promote itself to the global community and its neighbours, in addition to the stimulation of its tourism industry’. This has seen great success for the ‘actual quality of Korean tourism and customer satisfaction’ (Han and Lee, 2008: 118).

Those foreign ‘Koreanophiles’ from countries across Asia also began to learn the Korean language. Furthermore, some travel agencies arrange trips for tourists to meet popular Korean actresses and actors at ‘Meet camps’ in Korea. According to Park Young Su (assistant bureau chief at the Korea National Tourism Organisation, (KNTO) ), ‘thanks to the success of shows like Autumn in My heart and Winter Sonata, we’ve had 130,000 tourists from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand coming to visit the locations where the dramas were filmed’ (Shim, 2006: 30).

In addition, Samsung Electronics and LG have advertised their products in China and Vietnam using Korean models such as Lee Young-Ae, Song Hae Gyo, Kim Hee-Sun, and Jeon Ji-Hyun to the extent that it has been reported that they have fans in Taiwan and China who request their facial features when going for cosmetic surgery (in Korea) (Shim, 2006). In addition, the famous Korean singer ’BoA’ made a major impact (from the early 2000s) on Japanese society. Since that period, more active cultural exchange has taken place between South Korea and Japan (Shim, 2006). In particular, fans from Asian countries have helped make Korean culture more popular in global society. Choe (cited in Shim, 2006: 40) points out that ‘Korean pop culture
skilfully blends Western and Asian values to create its own, and the country itself is viewed as a prominent model to follow or catch up, both culturally and economically'.

As seen above, South Korea's culture became popular since the South Korean government established its new cultural policy in 1993. Supported by the government, South Korea's cultural and social project has been elevated to a global standard, whilst the country has simultaneously experienced a number of mega sports and other international events which enabled even greater cultural exchange with other nations. In December 2008, Korea, Japan and China held a meeting about cultural ties:

Korean Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Yu In-chon, Chinese Cultural Minister Cai Wu, and Japanese Commissioner for the Cultural Affairs Agency Tamotsu Aoki adopted a joint declaration, rounding up their 3-day meeting held from Dec. 24 to 26. The joint declaration stated that Korea, Japan and China will cooperate to create common cultural values by enhancing mutual understanding of each culture. The three agreed to work together to preserve their cultural assets, enlarge related human resources network, expand exchange between young people through the Internet and intensify intellectual property rights protection, said the declaration (Ro, 2008: Dynamic Korea.com).

But what has any of this to do with the 1988 Olympics? The Minister of Cultural Tourism and Sport, Kim Myung Gon (Interview 30, June, 2008) stressed the links between tourism and hosting mega sport events as follows:

My concern is culture, so I would say that the 'Hallyu' (Korean Wave) are affected by mega-sport events. Through the hosting of various mega-events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup in Korea, foreign people's perceptions of Korea changed from negative to positive, and now foreign people have started to have a more favourable impression of Korean people. They have watched Korean cultural performances on the TV and received good impressions of the Korean people, which have in turn helped to promote Korean drama, film and pop music as well.
All of this suggests that the impact of the Seoul Games has been wholly positive. There is, however, a darker side.

6-4-5. Corruption

Power refers to the capacity of an individual or group to command or influence the behaviour of others. Power is vested in people who are selected or appointed by a socially approved procedure, is regarded as legitimate and is often referred to as authority (Jarvie, 2006: 66).

Despite strong governmental support for cultural and social development in Korea, Kim (1994: 215) points out that ‘South Korea has been described as a ROTC (Republic of Total Corruption) by the people and media’, since almost all of the country’s presidents have been reported to have had corrupt dealings of some sort. This began during Park Chung-Hee’s presidency, supposedly to ‘defend the country from communism and its incompetence in initiating economic and social change’ (Han, 1989: 273). Next, President Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime suffered from a great deal of corruption. When Chun became President, he re-affirmed that his government’s roots lay in the pre-Olympic era and in developments surrounding the Games, and that it would take a firm ‘anti-corruption stance by purging corrupt
officials, introducing ethics laws to reward honest officials, and enhancing civil service reforms’ (Jun, 1985: 63). However, Chun’s regime had ‘lacked legitimacy in the eyes of rival political parties, student leaders, intellectuals, and progressive Christians’ (Han, 1989: 282-284). Eventually, Chun’s family were charged with ‘massive corruption’ (Quah, 2004); ‘Chun and his wife apologised for their misbehaviour and returned 13.9 billion won (US$20 million) to the government’ (Quah, 2004: 68), even though larger amounts had supposedly been embezzled.

Moreover, President Roh Tea-Woo’s regime engaged in political corruption with various business groups, such as the Hando Construction Company, to hasten the South Korean land development (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1992). In 1995, the government (under President Kim Young-Sam) found out that ‘major business (conglomerates) and numerous individuals had contributed almost US$ 600 million to Roh’s private political fund, which he had used both to reward supporters and for himself and his family’ (Macdonald and Clark, 1996: 159-160). In addition, both President Kim Young Sam’s (1993-1997) and Kim Dae Jung’s (1998-2002) sons were implicated in serious corruption scandals.

South Korea is a democratic country. However, institutional corruption experienced ‘rapid growth since the 1970s and 1980s’, and still exists today. Quah (2004: 75) points out that ‘the relationship between democratization and corruption is complex and reciprocal’. Moreover, ‘corruption grew as people became more affluent, and it was probably because of people’s new thinking that put material values ahead of moral values’ (Straits Times, 1993: 11).

In the two decades since the Seoul Olympics, South Korea has undergone rapid development in its standards of economic, social and cultural values; however, what actual consequences has this had for South Korean society? There were certain crucial incidents such as the collapse of the Sung-Su Bridge and SamPhung Department store in 1994 and 1995, for which the government was responsible and which undeniably had negative effects on Korean socio-cultural development.
The Sung-Su Bridge in Seoul was destroyed on the morning of 21 October, 1994, when students and workers were commuting to schools and workplaces. Thirty two people died and 17 people were injured in the incident. There were a number of reasons for the bridge’s collapse, but not surprisingly, the causes were linked to construction companies and the government.

Source from: Seoul News (www. Seoul.co.kr)
On 29 June, 1995, the Sam-Phung Department Store collapsed. In this accident, 510 people died and 937 people were injured – the highest number of casualties in such an incident recorded since the Korean liberation (Seoul News, 2008). This department store was one of the few luxury shopping malls in the Seoul, and was surrounded by expensive apartments, the university (Seoul National University of Education) and a court of justice.

These two incidents are crucial in the collective memory of South Korean people, despite the subsequent and dramatic development of the economy, society and culture. There are few doubts among South Koreans that the government had knowledge of the structural inadequacies of the Sang-Su bridge and the Sam-Phung department store, and yet failed to take preventative action, thereby underestimating the importance of human life and of making the right decision for the Korean people.

Professor Roh (Interview, 24 July, 2007) points out that through the Seoul Olympics bidding process, the South Korean government has enjoyed close relationships with the Chaebol group since the process consisted of a number of state-Chaebol co-operations:

The bid to host the Seoul Olympics was a national effort. The government organised all the movers and shakers for the Seoul Olympics bid. Also, the Korean government arranged the diplomatic officials and world networks for the bid. For example, Chung Ju-Young (of the Hyun-dai Group) organised an overseas network to make full use of their infrastructure for the Seoul Games. That’s why Korea succeeded in the bid to host the Seoul Olympic Games. Also, there was a completely different level of support level for the Olympics bidding process between Nagoya and Seoul.

Of course, the support of the Chaebol group has proven to have a financially positive influence on sport development in Korea. However, theoretically, it is necessary to understand the relation between politics, economics and sport in the context of Korean society (Jarvie, 2006). After the Seoul Olympics, South Korea’s strong governmental support for cultural and social development sharpened and highlighted globalisation issues impacting on Korean society. There is no doubt that Seoul is a global city, since it has dramatically developed and promoted Korea’s culture and society whilst also being increasingly open to global influence. Moreover, South
Korea plays a key role in Asia’s economic, social and cultural performance along with Japan and China. Interestingly, these Asian countries have now all had experience of hosting the Olympic Games (1964 Tokyo, 1988 Seoul, and 2008 Beijing).

The results of all the interview data and Kim Myung-Gon’s (Minister of Cultural Tourism) views in particular can be summarised as the Seoul Olympics’ cultural and social consequences; firstly, the Seoul Olympics had a generally significant impact on Korean society, in terms of economics, politics, social life and culture. Secondly, Korean peoples’ psychological inheritance (confidence in themselves and national pride) is important insofar as they catalysed South Korea’s development in various ways as well. Thirdly, hosting sports mega-events is closely linked to the promotion of Korean culture and social development and has also contributed to the ongoing sporting success of South Korea in the global arena.

In the context of strong governmental support for South Korea’s sport development, the next section of this chapter will examine the division between consequences for elite sport and for leisure sport.

6-5. Sporting Consequences

6-5-1. South Korea’s Sporting Miracle

Before examining the sporting consequences of the Seoul Games, it is necessary to understand South Korea’s sport development system, in terms of the fact that ‘the growth of modern sport in Korea paralleled the modernization, or more accurately westernization, process of Korea’ (Lee, cited in Horne and Manzenreiter, 2002: 73). It is also important to remember that since the 1980s South Korea became a country of “sporting miracles”.

In the past decade, there have been a number of arguments concerning sport and politics, based on the contention that ‘politics should not interfere with sports’ (Guttmann, 2003: 364). However, in the case of President Chun’s regime in South Korea, called the “Sport Republic”, sports were undeniably used to underline Chun’s
political aims. Kim (2008: 370) points out that ‘the government used sport as part of its long-term policy goals and to win prestige abroad’ and ‘Korean dictators promoted sport to mollify and to distract the public from seeking legitimate human rights demands’. The “Sport Republic” was intended by Chun to lead to two major objectives: firstly, hosting mega sports events, which included the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics; and secondly, dramatically promoting professional sports in the domestic arena (Ha, 1997). President Chun’s influence no doubt impacted on South Korea’s sporting development and continues to have repercussions in South Korean society today.

The KOC official, Kim Seung-Gon (Interview, 10 July, 2007), explained the background to hosting the Seoul Olympics:

During the 1980s, South Korea had relied on student demonstrations and the labour movement for democratic politics. The military government needed to have the nation’s attention and bring communities together. In particular, President Chun Do-Hwan wanted to capture the nation’s attention through hosting the Olympic Games. To sum up, the main motivations behind hosting the Seoul Olympics in Korea during the 1980s were mainly due to political factors.

Professor Roh Mung-Woo (Interview, 24 July, 2007) also commented on President Chun’s aims to host the Seoul Olympics:

The new government (Chun Doo-Hwen) needed to justify for their politics. For that reason, the military government might have needed a showcase event (Seoul Olympic Games). The Chun government showed the world about South Korea and its stable social form that will help it to become a sustainable political power.

The Korean diplomat, Baek Gi-Moon (Interview, 13 July, 2007), noted the background to the Seoul Olympic bidding process:

When President Chun decided to host the Olympics in Korea, several committee members were against to host the Games. The reason was that economical difficulties to hosting the Olympics in Korea. Moreover, people thought that Korea can not win the bidding competition with Japan. Even though that situation, Korea decided to prepare for the Olympic bidding.

The sport diplomacy official Yoon Kang-Roh (Interview, 26 June, 2008) explained President Chun’s goals through sport:
President Chun Doo Hwen wanted to use sport to achieve his own political goals, and therefore we called the fifth republic of Korea the Sport Republic, with professional sports flourishing from the beginning of the 1980s. In addition, through sport, President Chun wanted to attract the attention of the World.

South Korea’s status as a country of “sporting miracles” is more closely linked with elite sport development than the promotion of leisure or recreational sport. Obviously, South Korea has seen remarkable sport development since the 1980s; in particular, the government has paid attention to the development of elite sports. Initially, according to Kim (2008: 371), ‘sport was a political diversion, not a means of advancing the nation’s physical fitness’.

Sport development in South Korea was intended to ‘maintain political stability and promote economic growth’ (An and Sage, 1992: 372), with some part of this involving South Korean people who naturally enjoyed leisure sport and were enthusiastic to support the nation’s international athletes at home and aboard. For example, the government frequently sought the co-operation of the Chaebol companies, in particular for the sake of sports development, because sport has considerable ability to attract people’s attention. However, sport in Korea can be divided along social group lines. As a capitalist country, South Korean sport can be considered to be a part of the state’s capitalist legitimisation strategy: ‘the state plays an indispensable role in ensuring the reproduction of capitalist social relations, and the powers of the state are used to sustain the general institutional framework of capitalist enterprise’ (An and Sage, 1992: 372). South Korea is an industrialised country, and perhaps the enjoyment of dramatic sports results helps to promote the development of the sport industry. Moreover, Korean people began to be more interested in “sport for all” after the Seoul Olympic period.

South Korea has hosted many mega sport events, including the 1988 Olympics, the 2002 FIFA World Cup (co-hosted with Japan) and numerous other international competitions. In addition to these mega events, South Korea has achieved much success in international competition: ‘gold or silver medals shone on the chests of South Korea’s athletes’ (Kim, 2008: 371). In addition, professional sport development in Korea including golf, football, and baseball has resulted in the production of many internationally-recognised star athletes.
6-5-2. Elite Sport Development in South Korea

The South Korean military regime (1960s-1980s) had paid considerable attention to the development of elite sport. According to An and Sage (1992: 377), President Chun's 'attention was focused on the (1988 Seoul) Olympic Games as an instrument of domestic and international policy'. Chun's government realised that sport might be able to emphasise 'national unity grounded in traditional Korean loyalty and patriotism' and also improve Korea's image in the eyes of the world (Ha, 1997: 35). Kim (2008: 371) points out that 'a prestigious elite sports programme reflected well on the politicians', and during the 1980s, Korean sport 'constituted elite commercialization'. In terms of elite sport development in Korea, questions must be asked such as: 'What was the nature of the development of this system? What cost was paid in talent and national treasure to achieve success?' (Kim, 2008: 371). In the development of elite sport in South Korea, objectives have usually been focused on 'winning a medal at the Olympics, no matter the cost' and there is little consideration of other problems in sport policy. During the two decades since the Seoul Games, South Korea has enjoyed rapid success in its elite sport development, largely owing to financial and human resources investment on the part of the government.

The following table shows the growth of South Korean government's budget for sport development from 1989 to 2007.

Table 6-5: Budget for Sport Development from 1989 to 2007

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,586</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>2,291</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>8,760</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>2,324</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>8,505</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>1,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebration</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralympics</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
According to the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, South Korea’s sport has been a great tool for achieving national prestige and pride even though South Korea has been in difficult situations, such as the economic crisis of 1997. Success in hosting a number of mega sport events has also managed to (temporarily) unify South Korean society (Sport White Paper, 2007). As the table demonstrates, the elite sport budget is much greater than the budget allocated to other areas of sport development, particularly before and after the mega sports events (such as the 1988 Seoul Olympics and 2002 FIFA World Cup).

At the Seoul Olympics, South Korea finished 4th in the medals table and has managed to maintain a position around the top-10 rankings at almost all subsequent Olympic Games. The following table shows that since the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea has won increasing numbers of medals up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.

Table 6-6: The history of Olympic Games ranking and medal tally results for the South Korean team, 1936-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Host City</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>32nd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>37th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>30th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>27th</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>37th</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>34th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source adapted from IOC and Seoul Olympics Museum (2009)
South Korea is a small country. Yet, as seen above, since the 1980s, it has had impressive Olympic competition results. In this respect, one must ask if there are some deep structures underlying South Korean elite sport development, to have achieved so much for a relatively tiny nation. This is an important question for the KOC and the rest of the Olympic family: accounting for relative size, how has South Korea become such a strong elite sport country?

Historically, under the authoritarian government, South Korea used sport in various ways, and sport came to serve important functions in the promotion of the economic development of South Korea. During Chun’s regime, the Chaebol group was responsible for supporting each sport organisation, and the government and Chaebol companies placed themselves in a win-win situation through profiting from the rapidly growing sports industry. In addition, through elite sport, the government’s main objectives were to enhance the country’s international prestige; elite sport was utilized for improving and maintaining the reputation of being a strong sporting country in the world. An and Sage (1992: 376) point out that ‘governments and politicians as well as business elites and the mass media recognize the potential of sport for stabilizing political order, popularizing political figures, engendering national pride, and making profits’. Because of the failings of Chun’s authoritarian regime – such as the Kwangju massacre, which was certainly recognised by most Korean people as aggressive political behaviour – Chun ‘used sport to maintain social order, promote economic growth, and establish an image of South Korea on the international front as a leading developed country’ (An and Sage, 1992: 376). Moreover, the first democratically-elected president, Roh Tea Woo ironically also established an authoritarian regime, with Roh himself having supported Chun’s military coup in 1979 to 1980, and having been ‘groomed and eventually anointed as an official successor to Chun until the last minute’ (Armstrong, 2002: 98).

Under the ongoing military regime, South Korean elite sport grew rapidly, in particular with regard to Chun’s objectives of enhancing the political advantages and economic profits that sport could offer (An and Sage, 1992). However, partly as a consequence, South Korea’s elite sport system is not an ideal type, and a number of problems occur; for example, in relation to the issue of human rights, the widespread experience of corporal punishment for athletes, problems such as doping, and failings
regarding the athletes’ education system structure and the limitation of athletes’ future professional job prospects (Cho, 2003; Kim and Cho, 2004). These have been considered important. For example, several athletes died due to reducing weight before competition, and many athletes have had difficulties in finding jobs after retiring from competition. Of course, with strong government support and the Chaebol group’s sponsorships, the development of elite sport performance was fast and efficient, but remained solely focused on winning medals with little regard for the athletes’ well being or future.

Following the construction of the Taenung Athletic Village, built in 1966 (under President Park Chung-Hee), South Korea’s representative athletes are usually confined to training in the village, even during school time, and as a result they miss school classes for training and competition. They are focused solely on enhancing performance at the Olympics and international competitions. In this respect, Cho (2003) emphasises that through elite sport, South Korea managed to promote its national prestige and economic development, but the Korean government failed to address the need to change its sport policy for the benefit of the athletes and to look after the athletes’ future life plans. Elite sport development in South Korea, as discussed above, has seen sport — and athletes — used to meet successive governments’ political agendas. Therefore, it is not easy to change the South Korean sport policy system, since arguably athletes and coaches do not want to be distracted by other matters which may hinder the achievement of competition results. However, many people in South Korea’s sporting family (athletes, coaches, etc) and in Korean society in general realise that the system is not correct and in no way ideal for the athletes’ future lives (Cho, 2003).

Professor Lim Bun-Jang (Interview, 9 July, 2008) outlined the background to elite sport development in Korea:

*Elite sport training in Korea has been really intensive. For example, we had the motto that 300 days training per year was the goal in the athletes’ village. One year is 365 days, so if you except the weekend [Saturday/ Sunday] that is almost every day of the year spent training for competitions. That motto still continues with the national team athletes. Sometimes, we have 180 days’ or 150 days’ training before international competitions. Those styles of training are really excessive. I think other foreign countries do not do training like that.*
Journalist Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008) explained how elite sport development have problems, particularly for the athletes:

We are focussing mostly on elite sport development for the Olympic Games had an after-effect in Korean society because of not balancing between leisure sport and elite sport development. It has problems, since these days we have issues where athletes are only focused on their training, and do not pay attention in school, which is obviously not good for them, even though this could have a good effect on their competitive results.

Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008) went on:

From winning at elite sport, Korea could gain various advantages. However, we have experience and we know that we can’t rise up our young athletes like sports machines. In society we don’t accept these kinds of systems, so the best way is that athletes should study hard and do their training as well. It will be like following Western countries’ systems.

Park Yong-Soo (Interview, 22 July, 2008) also explained how the South Korean sport policy system was too focused on elite sport development:

In the sport area, there had been various problems such as the focus of the Korean government only on the development of elite sport. I feel that Korean sport policy has experienced problems through focussing on elite sport development which was only a short term plan. At the 2002 World Cup, we finished 4th, and I think this was a chance to develop youth sport development for Korea’s sporting future. However, we were captivated by the 4th place result, so much that after the 2002 World Cup we failed to develop our competitive performance.

Nevertheless, most interviewees stressed the importance of elite sport development in Korean society resulting from the hosting of the Seoul Olympics.

President of the SLOOC, Park Sea-Jik (Interview, 17 July, 2007), mentioned that:

The development of elite sport is very important. In the host country, many athletes had harboured an ambition for good competitive results which would enhance the country’s prestige, such that we had a number of gold medals (12) and many elite athletes at the Seoul Olympics. This has continued until now; but it was not only through elite sport that we could had have a chance to be recognised as a developed country.
The KFA official Park Yong-Soo (Interview, 22 July, 2008) suggested that South Korean people became more interested in sport, after the Seoul Olympics:

Through the Seoul Olympics, Korean people gained a high interest in sport. Also, nationally, we realised that sport could be used to promote our national brand image and people recognised the importance of such functions of sport. After the Seoul Olympics, Korean people began to show greater interest in the sport industry and facilities; however, the government did not change its emphasis on funding elite sport from before the Games to after.

Yoon Kang-Roh (Interview, 26 June, 2008) also pointed out the importance of sport development for South Korea:

We have a strong level of elite sport in Korea and this is linked to the development of our economy and diplomatic activity. Moreover, elite sport could give Korean people greater pride in their country. Also, we made supporter groups such as the Red Devil football fans in Korean society.

Similarly, Lim Burn-Jang (Interview, 9 July, 2008) commented:

If we do not support elite sport development in Korea, we can’t have good results from the Olympics and Korean people will be disappointed, and the nation will complain about the Olympics result. That’s why the government and KSC try to get good results from the Olympic Games.

Lim Burn-Jang (Interview, 9 July, 2008) went on to describe the sport policy system and described the functions of the KSC and KOC:

If the KOC and KSC divided the organisation of the system, perhaps we can develop both elite sport and leisure sport together. In Korea the KOC and KSC are united organisations that have problems because the KSC manages both elite sport development and leisure sport development, but that organisation has focused on elite sport development when actually its mission is also to develop leisure sport for the nation. Moreover, these days, people don’t want to do the hard training that Korean elite sport athletes do, so there are not so many elite athletes, especially in hard sports. I stress that the KSC and KOC must be divided and should work separately because the KSC is not able to work properly as its mission dictates.

The Korean diplomat, Baek Gi-Moon (Interview, 13 July, 2007), identified the importance of elite sport in terms of its relationship to diplomatic activities and for South Koreans’ national confidence:
I think the importance of elite sport still exists in Korean society. Before I said that the effects of national prestige from athletes’ gold medals can’t compare to the work of diplomatic officials who go abroad for publicity activities. One example is Park Se-Ri (Professional Golfer). I really appreciate her. Even she is a professional athlete. When we had the IMF crisis (1997), Park Se-Ri gave much happiness to our nation! At that time I lived in Australia, so I read the newspaper and in the first page, the title said “Se-Ri Pak Come, Tiger Woods Go”. Because at that time, Tiger Woods had not competed well, whereas Se-Ri Park had good results from the match. When I did diplomacy activities I used that news for diplomacy.

More generally, Ok Gwang (email correspondence, 12 August, 2008) outlined the 1988 Seoul Olympic sporting legacies:

- Taekwondo was introduced for an event of the Games and it still is. Its legacy is still strong;
- The Taeneung Sports Village played important role for training national athletes into higher level and it still performs its role in preparation for international events;
- Peoples who witnessed the Games held in Korea were strongly influenced by the hosting and the society still has its legacy in various professional fields as well as cultural environment;
- Governmental policies on sports were useful to develop sports infrastructure at least 10 years after the Games;
- It significantly influenced on the advancement of national identity and on the development of Korean modern society;
- Though Korea is still divided nation, however the Games brought recognition by the globe that South Korea is a potential and trustworthy partner in many aspects.

As mentioned earlier South Korea’s elite sport development is closely linked to the government’s political agenda, with various underlying objectives. At present, South Korea remains one of the strongest elite sporting nations (see the Olympic Games result table 6-6) in the world. With substantial government support, South Korea’s elite sport system continues to develop. However, more consideration needs to be given to athletes’ future prospects and the Korean government must also raise the standard of the sport system with regard to human rights and the further maturation of South Korea’s democratic society.

6-5-3. Leisure Sport in South Korea

In the capitalist country of South Korea, many people demonstrate their social status through sporting activities. With the rapid economic development of the last twenty years, leisure time has increased dramatically and people have realised the importance
of physical activity. However, leisure sport activities are divided among different social groups (working-, middle- and upper-class) which display their sports interests ‘as symbols of social status’ (An and Sage, 1992: 379), while modern sport has become a recognisable feature of contemporary consumption lifestyle and an element of the commercialisation of South Korean society.

Since the 1980s, the Korean government and the Chaebol companies began to promote commercialised sport and since the Seoul Olympics, ‘entire pages in newspapers are regularly devoted to sports, many hours of sport are televised, professional sport leagues have evolved, and there is a growing desire among the general public for sports participation’ (An and Sage, 1992: 376). During the Roh-Tea-Woo regime, the development of golf courses was encouraged, and with this ‘the minister of sport and physical education announced that “golf is no longer a luxurious sport”, so approval for golf course construction should be easier’ (Han Gea Re, 1990: 10). In addition, Roh’s government used the “sport for all” slogan to increase the number of new golf courses. However, access to golf in Korea is not easy since this involves membership of clubs, which always costs a great deal of money. This means that golf has a specific social status; only wealthy Korean people are able to enjoy playing golf (An and Sage, 1992), not the general population. The playing of golf is ‘creating a new form of leisure activity for the elite, a form of leisure that gives them the feeling and pleasure of high social status’ (An and Sage, 1992: 379).

However, after the Seoul Olympics, the South Korean government established the Hodoly plan (for national sport promotion) on March 1990, to promote leisure sport activities. This plan’s aims are that everyone can easily use sport facilities, such as playgrounds, gyms, public sport facilities, and workplace fitness clubs for encouraging participation in leisure sport. The first National Sport Promotion 5 Year Plan extended from 1993 to 1997, during which time the government provided public gyms, swimming pools, town-scale sports halls, public parks, etc.; moreover, for hosting the 1997 Winter Universiade, the government supported the building of indoor and outdoor ice skating rinks, ski jump facilities, and cross-country skiing routes. The second plan covered 1998 to 2002, and during that period, popular participation in sport increased such that the government provided even more public sport facilities. The third plan was for 2003 to 2007, under the slogan of governmental
promotion of participation, when it was found that there were not enough sports facilities to match the demand for participation, and so the government again planned to increase the number of available public sport facilities including a new national sport centre, a farmers' and fishermen culture centre, sport parks, gate ball facilities, school playgrounds and public leisure sport centres. In addition, the government continued with its support for the development of elite sport facilities (remodelling, and giving incentives to employees) for annual national-level competitions (Sport White Paper, 2007).

In 2004, the South Korean government officially introduced the five-day working week. The expectation behind this was that it would effectively increase the amount of leisure time available for having a better quality of life focused on the family, rather than a drinking culture in business-based social circles. In addition, through the five-day working week, and with increased female participation in the world of work, came the development of the service industry and cultural tourism in particular. With the increase in available leisure time, South Korean people have been participating more in leisure sport. The Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism reported that the number of Koreans exercising 2-3 times per week has increased dramatically between 2003 and 2006 (Sports White Paper, 2007). According to the Sports White Paper (2007) survey, the preferred sports for spectating are football (48.7%), baseball (27.1%), basketball (12, 3%), tennis (1.5%) and golf (1.4%). Thus, football has the highest percentage of spectatorship in Korean society.

After the Seoul Olympics, South Korea established the Seoul Olympic Sport Promotion Foundation (SOSFO) in April 1989, which was funded from the Seoul Olympics' income. It has been responsible for various sports developments. The SOSFO has the following mission statement:

To support projects relating to national sports promotion, sports science research, and wholesome youth development; to raise, operate & manage the national sports promotion funds and to implement projects commemorating the Seoul Olympic Games. For the past 17 years the foundation has been steadily exerting efforts in order to make Korea an advanced sports welfare nation where Korean people can become united through sports and sustain healthy lives through the proliferation of sports and fitness (SOSFO, 2009: online).
The SOSFO has specific projects for fostering “sport for all”, developing elite sport, school sports, athlete welfare, and the construction of sports facility infrastructures and the provision of sports industry loans (SOSFO, 2009). The following table shows the history of SOSFO activities in the overall project of South Korea’s sport development.

Table 6-7: SOSFO Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2006</td>
<td>Gwangmyeong Velodrome (Speedom) opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2006</td>
<td>Olympic Medallists Hand Printing Square opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2005</td>
<td>Motorboat rating international rank (rank: Hydro Sprint) registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2005</td>
<td>1 Company 1 Village sisterhood relationship established (Songjeong-Iri, Jinbu-myeon, Pyeongchang-gun, Gangwon-do)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2004</td>
<td>Nami Golf Course completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2004</td>
<td>Seoul Olympics Museum of Art (SOMA) opened / Love-sharing Volunteer Group established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2003</td>
<td>Cycle Racing, Motorboat Racing Clinic opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2003</td>
<td>Olympic Hall opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2002</td>
<td>Motorboat Racing Course opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2002</td>
<td>Cycle Racing Training Centre opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2001</td>
<td>International Olympic Fair Seoul (SPOEX) 2001 held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Museum opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2001</td>
<td>Sale of Sports Toto (Sports promotion betting tickets) commenced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2000</td>
<td>Korea Sports Television Inc. sold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2000</td>
<td>Motorboat Racing Association inaugurated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2000</td>
<td>Sports Promotion Betting Ticket Business Team inaugurated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2000</td>
<td>Olympic Parktel privatized (4 places leased, 2 service contracts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1999</td>
<td>Korea Sport Science Institute merged with SOSFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1995</td>
<td>Olympic Park and Misa-Ri Boat Racing Course opened to the general public free of charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1994</td>
<td>Bundang Olympic Sports Centre opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1994</td>
<td>Camsil Velodrome opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1993</td>
<td>Cycle Racing Association inaugurated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1993</td>
<td>Korea Sports Television Inc. established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1990</td>
<td>Korea Sports Industry Co., Ltd. established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1990</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Parktel opened (Hotel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1989</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adopted from SOSFO (2009)

As seen above, after the 1988 Seoul Olympics, SOSFO invested in and provided various sport facilities and promoted the growth of the sports industry in Korea.

Kim Seung-Gon (Interview, 10 July, 2007) underlined the Seoul Olympics’ legacies in terms of the differences between elite sport and leisure sport development in Korea:

Before the Seoul Olympics, we didn’t have enough sport facilities for our nation, even though people wanted to play sport. However after the Seoul Games, Koreans began to become interested in sport and because of that the Seoul Olympics made sports athletes famous. As a result, many people started participating in sports. It is important that
leisure sports develop further in order to reach elite sport status. The development of sport should include development in both leisure sport and elite sport together.

President of the SLOOC, Park Sea-Jik (Interview, 17 July, 2007), saw a direct relationship between elite sport and leisure sport development:

Through the encouragement of elite sport, South Korea has had a level of sport development that has enabled the Korean nation to become naturally willing to do sport for their health...Because we need to consider our health and wealth, life sport and leisure sport could have greater development.

The diplomat, Baek Gi-Moon (Interview, 13, July, 2007), commented specifically on leisure sport development in Korea, since the President Kim Young-Sam regime:

After the Seoul Olympics, the new government (President Kim Young-Sam) tried to reduce the sport department (for the elite sport) and encourage leisure sport. Because, they demanded that elite sport-focussed policy was disadvantageous to the nation’s life.

However, Professor Roh Mung-Woo (Interview, 24 July, 2007) stressed how South Korea’s sports culture (elite and leisure) and the Korean peoples’ leisure sport activities are divided by social class:

If we want to do leisure sport it really costs lots of money. For example, upper class people and middle class people do leisure sport, such as golf or do aerobics. However, if we looking at the working class then there are class distinctions. These phenomena are linked to the cost of leisure sport means Korean policy is wrong. Also, there is a big difference between public sport facilities and industrial sport facilities. Industrial sport has been really well developed in Korean society. For example, private sport clubs have really good quality facilities compared to public sport centres.

Furthermore, Yoon Kang-Roh (Interview, 26 June, 2008) had this to say about the function of leisure sport and importance of sport development in South Korea:

I don’t think that any country in the world supports leisure sport development. People do leisure sport for themselves. I think leisure sport development just comes naturally, as for example with the golfer Park Sea Ri. Also, it is important that University professors need to do more fields research for the development of sport because, for example, if we do not have inside experience then we cannot effectively judge what is going on.

Minister of Cultural Tourism, Kim Myung-Gon (Interview, 30 June, 2008), gave his opinion on elite and leisure sport developments in Korea:
Before and after the Seoul Games, we only focused on elite sport development; however, these days, we pay greater attention to leisure sport matters in Korean society. One reason why is that we need to maintain our sport complexes and can do so through the people’s use of them. Also, we need to identify talented sports people in the leisure sport area for elite sport development. Yet, we still focus on the development of elite sport. On the other hand, I think we have a good chance to prepare for leisure sport development now.

As a capitalist country, South Korea has witnessed the construction of many good private sports facilities. In addition, increases in the GNP (Gross National Product) and GDP (Gross Domestic Product) have meant that people are more interested in the ways that sports participation can improve their health and the quality of their lives. The interview data show that South Korea’s leisure sport development is inextricably linked to income and to the degree to which certain social groups are interested in particular sports.

6-5-4. Professional Sport Development in South Korea

According to Korean national surveys (Ministry of Culture and Sports), ‘baseball and football have been very popular in Korea in recent times’ (Koh, 2003: 67). These two sports are Koreans’ favourites for watching and playing. As discussed before, professional baseball was launched by President Chun’s regime in 1982. The development of professional, commercial baseball has been a major catalyst for the growth of South Korea’s massive sport industry. According to a report of 2007, South Korea has in football, baseball, basketball, volleyball, Ssirem (traditional Korean wrestling), golf, bowling, boxing and wrestling, a total of nine professional sports (Sport White Paper, 2007).

The professional boom in Korea has produced popular sports stars at home and abroad. In particular, professional players belonging to foreign sports teams, such as Park Ji-Sung (Manchester United: football) and Park Chan-Ho (Philadelphia Phillies: baseball), have become some of the most popular celebrities in Korean society, and the South Korean people are enthusiastic about supporting their teams when they compete. Such internationally-renowned athletes are considered to enhance Koreans’ national pride and have become an expression of South Korean sporting ability in
global society. Moreover, since football and baseball have featured in the Olympic programme, and the FIFA World Cup is such a high profile event in its own right, such athletes as Park Ji-Sung and Park Chan-Ho have helped to enhance the Korean sporting reputation on the grandest global stages.

In 1995, the Korean Professional Baseball League (KPBL) enjoyed the peak of its popularity, with total match attendances estimated at 5.4 million for the year. However, this decreased to ‘only 2.5 million 5 years later’ (Lee, 2006: 187). The KPBL reported that the 2002 attendances were ‘the lowest ever recorded in the history of the KPBL’ (Lee, 2006: 187). However, KPBL players have since improved their performances, with impressive results in international competition. As a result, the emergence of Park Chan-Ho, ‘eventually a starting pitcher for the L. A. Dodgers in 1996 appears to have been a watershed event’, since Korean people started to watch MLB games and eventually these were broadcasted on Korean national television (Lee, 2006: 190). The success of Park Chan Ho with the L.A. Dodgers was later emulated by Kim Byung Hyun with the Arizona Diamondbacks, while several other Korean baseball players (e.g. Choi He-Sop, Kim Sun-Woo and Seo Jae) began to feature in the regular line-ups of American teams (Lee, 2006). In recent years, the KPBL player transfer market has gradually begun to open up:

The KPBL players were the adoption of free agency at the end of the 1999 season. Players with 9 or more years of KPBL service were allowed to sell their services to the highest bidder. The free agency system reallocated player talents gradually. Because of a harsh compensation rule, mediocre players would not dare to declare themselves free agents, but star players could change teams (Lee, 2006: 191).

Both the KPBL and MLB have ‘reflected and constructed governmental rationality in the global era’ (Cho, 2008: 240), and have generated large incomes from the sale of TV broadcasting rights in South Korea. In particular, following Park Chan-Ho’s performances, South Korean people have been more interested in watching MLB. This was during an otherwise gloomy period when South Korean people were experiencing economic crisis between 1997 and 2001 (Cho, 2008). During this “IMF period”, the Korean baseball players – and particularly Park Chan-Ho – played excellently in America, and Park became a ‘national hero’. This success in MLB symbolized Korean national competitiveness on a global stage and offered “proof” of
the country’s ability to overcome the crisis (Cho, 2008). Importantly, Cho (2008: 252) emphasises that South Korean ‘governmentality was closely related to neoliberal ideas such as the encouragement of global competition, free market principles, and responsible individuals’, but still at the end of the 1990s the Korean government was ‘rooted in national identity’. Moreover, Kim (2008: 382) points out that ‘the political use of sport was an immediate despotic ambition’. Eventually, the KPBL saw renewed success in the Korean market. However, they became serious rivals with MLB and perhaps also with the Japan Professional Baseball League (JPBL). Following the rapid development of baseball in Korea, South Korea won the gold medal for the sport at the 2008 Beijing Games.

The Korean football league started in 1983 with five teams (consisting of two professional and three amateur teams), and over the next 20 years – culminating in the hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup – the professional football teams become huge sporting icons (Sports White Paper, 2007). Obviously, hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup influenced a massive number of fans and motivated a great number of young Koreans to become football players. Historically, football has carried specific meanings for South Koreans, such that through football they were able to express their national identity (during the Japanese colonisation period). Football has also been used as a tool for sports diplomacy, and has certainly played a role in enhancing the national prestige of South Korea and in the economic developments the country has experienced. During the 2002 World Cup in Japan and Korea, a massive football supporters’ base emerged in Korean society, named the ‘Red Devil (nationwide football support group)’, clear evidence of the Korean people’s enthusiasm to support football at home and overseas.

Even though it was a co-hosted event, the 2002 World Cup had a huge impact on South Korean society, most notably through the increase in football players’ migration (to European, American and Japanese teams), and further sports industry development (at home and abroad). Therefore, the government was given further proof that hosting mega sports events can have various major benefits (economic, cultural and social).
After the Seoul Olympics, South Korea opened its eyes to the global stage. Modern sports are globally celebrated and can allow nations to communicate across language barriers. The South Korea Football Association (KFA) invited Guus Hiddink to become the head coach of the national team prior to the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Hiddink’s strategy fitted well with the South Korean football style, and South Korea managed to finish within the top four teams in the 2002 tournament. This result surpassed all expectations of the South Korean team, even those of the South Koreans themselves. Therefore, Hiddink became a hero (Lee, Jackson, and Lee, 2007: 284) perhaps a “glocal” hero (Robertson, 1994) given his trans-nationally recognised status. But, Lee, Jackson and Lee (2007: 296) mention that ‘it was not that Hiddink had some novel, magic formula for transforming teams, let alone economic or political systems’. The President of the KFA, Chung Mong-Jun (son of the former Hyundai group chairman, Chung Ju-Yong), has given strong support to South Korea’s football development. After the 2002 World Cup, Hiddink became the most popular foreign coach in Korean society, and Lee, Jackson and Lee (2007: 286) point out that ‘Hiddink’s case went well beyond this for two reasons: it was the first time the Korean government had ever bestowed honorary citizenship, and the nature and degree of his impact across a wide spectrum of Korean society have come to be known as the Hiddink syndrome’. In fact, through the success in the World Cup, Hiddink’s style of leadership has become fashionable in Korean society. However, Lee, Jackson and Lee (2007: 296) note that ‘Korea’s success was not simply one of finishing fourth in the 2002 World Cup; it was also linked to its superior position relative to its historic rival, Japan’. As we discussed above, for the South Koreans, football carries various meanings. Even though South Korea has a strong nationalist sentiment, people accepted a foreign coach in order to achieve on the global sporting stage. Moreover, one can say that hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Korea could have contributed to the ‘new way of thinking about Korean society and what it might achieve on the global stage in the future’ (Lee, Jackson and Lee, 2007: 296). But without the 1988 Olympics, perhaps the FIFA World Cup would not have come to South Korea.

As seen above, the 1988 Seoul Olympics has had various impacts on South Korea’s sport development (elite sport, leisure sport and professional sport). South Korea is small and has only limited resources. Yet, there is evidence that South Korea is a
“miracle” or “mystery” sports country. It has been shown that since the Seoul Olympics, the South Korean government accelerated elite sport development. The reasons behind this are connected with sport policy structure, government goals, and also the Chaebol companies’ willingness to support global elite sport. For example, ‘the Korean government’s Chaebol-driven growth policies enabled domestic conglomerates such as Samsung and LG to suppress workers’ attempts to organize and unionize’ (Lee, 2008: 16). In addition, through the Seoul Olympics, the IOC and KOC have enjoyed improved relationships, influenced by a South Korean business company (Samsung) becoming involved in the TOP programme, and several Korean IOC members’ activities naturally promoting South Korea’s elite sport development. Ok (2004: 277) points out that ‘the ‘88 Seoul Olympics can be considered as the outcome of international sports movement, government policies and socio-economic transformation’. Furthermore, since the Seoul Olympics, South Korea has hosted a number of other mega sport events (2002 FIFA World Cup, Asian Games and other various international sporting championships, with the only major exception being the Winter Olympics), the experience of which has enabled the country to maintain its place as a strong sporting nation. These observations lead to the following questions: why should the South Korean government still be enthusiastic to host mega sport events in Korean society? Why is it focused on elite sport development, even though this leads to a number of problems? Perhaps, hosting mega events is not only a matter of sporting celebration to South Korea. It might also be associated with the political, economic and social achievements needed to underpin stable global status. For elite sport development, South Korea adopted global technology, human resources and athletic performance overseas. The Seoul Olympics left a number of legacies, both direct and tangible and indirect and psychological. As has already been discussed, it is doubtless that elite sport development, and professional sport progress, have helped the Korean people to become more interested in sport participation and thus to encourage greater leisure sport development as well as the growth of a massive fan base. But there remain crucial considerations about the lives of athletes which still need to be taken into account. The next chapter however will discuss in more depth the relevance of globalisation and of theories of mega events to South Korean society.
Chapter 7. Discussion

7-1. Introduction

This final chapter will attempt to discuss both theoretical conceptualisations and empirical data, with particular reference to globalisation and to the phenomenon of mega events. Beginning with sociological perspectives, Maguire’s (1999), Bairner’s (2001), Rowe’s (2003), and Robinson’s (2004) works are used to help theorise the concept of globalisation. There are significant debates surrounding globalisation in the social sciences and the Seoul Olympics case study provides a good example of the globalisation phenomenon, which is specifically relevant for those debates in terms of the complex global processes at work from the time of the Cold War period to the 21st century.

The transformation of South Korea’s political, economic, and socio-cultural forms, during the two decades after the Seoul Olympics, has been discussed by Horne and Manzenreiter (2004) and by Roche (2000), (2006), whose works will be addressed in this chapter. Roche (2006: 28) has argued that ‘the study of sport mega-events and the Olympics has got to learn from the study of globalization’, suggesting that mega-events and globalisation are closely linked in modern society. Roche (2006: 28) also points out that ‘the general study of globalization and of the development of global society has got to learn from the study of sport mega-events and the Olympics’. To summarise, the issues raised within globalisation and mega-events debates are central to the development of South Korean society, and will be discussed with particular reference to the consequences of the Seoul Olympics.

7-2. Globalisation and South Korea

In modern times, there are complex or different debates around the issue of globalisation. According to Ritzer (2008:16) ‘globalization is the spread of worldwide practices, relations, consciousness, and organization of social life’. Maguire (1999) argues that globalisation is a matter of ‘cross cultural processes’
whilst Bairner (2001) has noted that according to some theorists, globalisation tends towards 'homogenization' where people come to share similar commodities such as music, film and sports in a hybrid global mono-culture. Moreover, Marxist or neo-Marxist theories claim that 'globalisation is rooted in the capitalist economic process' (Bairner, 2001: 8). Thus, Bairner (2001: 9) points out that globalisation has been seen by some as part of the 'triumphant march of world capitalism and, indeed, (a) worldwide hegemonic domination of American cultural forms'. Holton (1998: 2) argues that globalisation 'is the key idea of one single world or human society, in which all regional, national, and local elements are tied together in one interdependent whole'. Globalisation also has other negative connotations given that the phenomenon can involve 'the dominance of Western economic and cultural interests over the rest of the world' (Holton, 1998: 2).

This case study has shown that globalisation has led South Korea to become a modern society, perhaps through the significant boosting of the economy and related socio-cultural reforms. Over the course of one century, several significant factors have caused Korea to accelerate towards becoming a global country; in particular, modern sport development might be seen as beneficial in associating 'cultural practices as global phenomena' as part of this process (Rowe, 2003: 281). Since the 19th century, Korea adopted more modern social forms, including sports, which variously affected the country's rise to the global level. Along with those processes, and particularly during the military regime period (1960s to 1980s), the government promoted sport performance to encourage transformations in South Korea's politics, its economy and its cultural practices (Ok, 2007).

Regarding the issue of globalisation, Maguire's (1999: 11-12) argument concerning 'cross-cultural processes' helps to make sense of 'the basis of a taken-for-granted international rank order of worth and a valorization of identities, values, customs and cultural forms'. In addition, Maguire et al (2002: 7) note that globalisation processes 'involve multidirectional movements of people, practice, customs and ideas that involve a series of power balances'. Furthermore, Donnelly (1996) points out that the cultural hegemony involved with 'Americanisation' is actually a matter of the contestation of global capital, and not one of straightforward imperialism. Donnelly's concluding view refers to 'cultural hegemony' which 'may be seen as a
two-way but imbalanced process of cultural exchange, interpenetration, and interpretation’ (Donnelly, 1996: 243).

Schirato and Webb (2003: 93) explain that ‘global capitalism’ operates within the G-8 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia and Japan); however, it is primarily two countries, the United Kingdom and United States, that have ‘made the activities of global capitalism possible through their military and economic power, and their technological ascendancy, reaped the greatest rewards, and have openly and at times violently promoted the opening up of the globe to capitalism in their own interests’.

After the Second World War, South Korea largely came under the influence of the United States in politics, economics and culture and in so doing, became a capitalist country. As has already been discussed, South Korea has seen substantial development, in terms of modernisation and globalisation, and of the move to democracy. However, what sort of phenomena caused South Korea to accelerate toward its present status as a global country? According to Maguire (1999), the vast expansion of modern, institutionalised sport has far-reaching and profound effects at a global level. Modern sport development in South Korea was greatly influenced by President Chun Doo-Hwan’s decision to host the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Nevertheless, South Korea also follows the global order more generally in politics, economics and social developments. The military government ended in 1987, and the South Korean government ‘began to take a variety of active policy measures to become a winner of the globalisation era from the early 1990s’ (Lee, W. D and Lee, B. H., 2003: 505). In this respect, South Korea began to become increasingly capitalist since the 1990s and as Robinson (2004: 191) argues, ‘the essence of globalization is global capitalism, which has superseded the nation-state stage of capitalism’. Furthermore, ‘globalisation can be regarded as a long-standing tendency within modernity that compresses time and space, and so links, in new and accelerated ways, localities that hitherto had little direct connection’ (Giddens, 1990, cited in Rowe, 2003: 282). According to Armacost et al (2009: 10), ‘President Lee’s (South Korean President since 2008 to present) desire to “globalize” his country and revitalize relations with the United States offers an important opportunity to develop the alliance into a true partnership engaged in worldwide cooperation‘.
7-2-1. Politics and the Globalisation of South Korea

Through hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the military government (under Chun Doo-Hwan) hesitated to use authoritarian, military power. As a result, in 1987, the Democratic Consolidation was able to take place and South Korea became a democratic country. Subsequently, democratic South Korea has experienced accelerated economic and social development within the global era.

However, President Chun Doo-Hwan's decision to host the Seoul Olympics was closely linked to the continuation of his presidency and various related political aims. Since 1987, South Korea has become a democratic society, which has impacted in various ways on its development and contributed to the modernisation of the country (Ha, 1997; Kim, 2000; Ok, 2004). The following interview data help to answer the question as to why South Korea wanted to host the Olympic Games in 1980s, with particular regard to the issue of political change.

According to KOC official, Kim Seung-Gon (interview, 10 July, 2007):

During the 1980s, South Korea had relied on student demonstrations and the labour movement for democratic politics. As a result, when the military seized power in 1980, they needed to have the nation's attention and bring communities together.

In agreement, Professor Roh Mung-Woo (interview, 24 July, 2007) pointed out that:

The new government (Chun Doo-Hwan) needed to justify their politics. For that reason, the military government might have needed a showcase event.

Furthermore, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Kim Myung Gon (interview, 30 June, 2008), noted the international importance of political appearances:

There was the Kwang-Ju protest for democratic reform which had a negative effect on the Korean image internationally. Therefore, the Korean government (under Chun Doo-Hwan) had to be considering those problems in the 1980s.

In addition, according to the President of the SLOOC, Park Sea-Jik (interview, 17 July, 2007):
The president decided that hosting the Olympics would be good for national interests, for stabilizing the domestic situation, improving the relationship with North Korea, to communicate with the world and stabilize the politics, etc. There were multiple reasons that the president decided to host the Olympics.

The Olympic Games is a global event, and as has already been noted, during the 1980s, there was serious political conflict between the communist bloc and the West. South and North Korea were not exempt from this political conflict. According to Macintosh and Hawes (1992: 38), ‘the breakdown of the Cold War in the late 1980s was one of the most important events that signalled the effective end to adversarial, state-centred, world politics’. The Seoul Olympic period took place on the very precipice of this change, at a time of intense global tensions.

Before the start of the Seoul Olympics, the world’s attention turned to South Korea - ‘the whole world is watching’ (Rowe, 2003: 284). Unsurprisingly, given the global political context, there were a number of democratic protests in South Korea, giving the impression that the country was not a stable place for hosting the Olympics. Therefore, the Chun Doo-Hwan regime needed to attain the global standard required by the IOC – or at least give the appearance of reaching such a standard.

The following interview data assist in reaching answers concerning the Seoul Olympics’ legacies and the social transformation of South Korea. In particular, the interview data highlight the political issues of globalisation.

KOC official Kim Seung-Gon (interview, 10 July, 2007) explained his perception of the Seoul Olympics legacies:

The Seoul Olympics historical impact was that the 160 East and West countries participated together in the Seoul Games. It was true to the united name of the event. At that time Korea was a developing country in that the nation’s income was very low. However, through the Olympics, I feel that the South Korean nation could change the world’s conception of South Korea as a developing country.

Lim Burn-Jang (interview, 9 July, 2008) also sought to explain the background to South Korea’s globalisation, and alongside this its growing association with communist countries as a consequence of the 1988 Seoul Olympics:
South Korea began to globalise in the Seoul Olympics period. For example, before the Seoul Olympics, South Korea had an interchange relationship only with democratic countries. However, through the Seoul Olympics we could have interchange with communist countries, which was a phenomenon with really huge consequences.

In addition, SLOOC President Park Sea-Jik (interview, 17 July, 2007) pointed out the possibility that the communist countries' participation in the 1988 Games even promoted political change in the Soviet Union after the Seoul Olympics:

The important thing is the Eastern bloc countries' participation in the Seoul Olympics. When they came to Korea, they got an impression of Korea's development. Actually, they had a communist system for 70 years and their nation was in a poor situation, and they had to criticise themselves. As a result, there was an indirect influence towards changing the political system in the Soviet Union lead by Gorbachev. So, it was a pretty good influence to ending the Cold War.

The Seoul Olympics had several significant political legacies, all relevant for the globalisation of South Korea. First of all, since 1987, South Korea has had a democratic political system. Although Koreans had previously aspired to democracy, it was not until the effects of the global political structure of the mid-1980s were felt — thanks to the pressures associated with hosting the Olympics — that South Korea was able to become a democratic society. Secondly, the Seoul Games led to improved, friendly relationships with a number of countries (including many within the Eastern bloc). This research discovered that these relationships had a massive impact on South Korea's economic development and later socio-cultural changes. However, the relationship between North and South Korea is still not improved with regard to the matter of unification, perhaps mainly because North Korea has been isolated by the global capitalist formation of which South Korea is a part. According to Gilpin (1987: 389), globalisation is associated with an 'increasing interdependence of national economies in trade, finance and macroeconomic policy', yet North Korea (from the time of the Korean War onwards) has hardly experienced any such interdependence, and in fact has undergone quite the opposite and become more and more isolated — even from South Korea.
This research has examined how since the 1980s (the Seoul Olympics period), South Korean people have faced what can realistically be described as global challenges at home and overseas. In particular, South Korea has undergone rapid economic development, which is reasonably explained by Marx’s assertion that ‘capitalism driven as it is by the need for ever bigger markets and ever cheaper raw materials, would necessarily spread across the globe’ (cited in Schirato and Webb, 2003: 81). One aspect of this economic globalisation, with the expansion of markets around the world facilitated by technological developments which enhance the effectiveness of capitalist accumulation, is the global mass-media. Held and McGrew (2000) point out that television has a significant capacity for advertising, particularly during mega sporting events – global business companies use the events to popularise and enhance the prestige of their brand name, in much the same way as such companies use popular music, film, etc.

As South Korea became a modern capitalist country, it was greatly influenced by the United States (owing also to the Korean situation following World War II and the Korean War). But on the other hand, South Korea has also worked towards realising its own place as an important player in the global capitalist economy. The following interview excerpts explain the origins of South Korea’s negotiations with this globalisation process and its impacts on Korean people becoming global citizens while their country underwent economic and socio-cultural development.

Professor Roh Mung-Woo (interview, 24 July, 2007) said that:

During the Seoul Olympic Games, many foreign people visited Seoul and we could see so many different races of people on the TV. Therefore I had the chance to know what the world and various people were like. I think the most important impact from the Olympics was that the Korean people could change their perceptions of being isolated to the world. I would say that the Seoul Olympics gave the Korean nation actual feelings about foreign countries.

Yoon Kang-Roh (interview, 26 June, 2008) pointed out that since the 1980s South Korea began to experience accelerated globalisation forces:
I think from the 1980s, Korea started to globalise. For example, we began to have more friendly relationships with foreign countries and Korean people were free to travel abroad. Also, domestically, there was a relaxation of rules such as freedom from restrictions on people's hair styles, and also the promotion of democracy in Korean society. I think, by hosting the Olympics, Beijing will automatically improve regarding the human rights issue.

Journalist Park Gun-Man (Interview, 17 July, 2008) noted the following legacies, emphasising in particular South Korea’s image:

I think that through the Olympics we could promote the Korean brand name, national prestige and Korean national pride. In addition, Korea was able to become a more developed country through greater economic development. If we didn't host the Seoul Olympics, it would have been much more difficult to advertise Korea to the rest of the world.

On the other hand, President of the SLOOC, Park Sea-Jik (interview, 17 July, 2007) pointed out that the Seoul Olympics’ legacies have been both positive and negative:

We can divide between the macro level and the psychological level. If we are looking at what we can see in the legacies, for example, in sport facilities, culture facilities and 200 spectacular sculptures from the world artists in the Olympic Park. Also, we can see that the Korean people are proud, confident and have love for their country. On the other hand, we can see that Korean people have displayed arrogance and haughtiness also, having no manners or respect when visiting the developing countries for example, in China etc., so that's why we hear bad things said and this is a big shame in some ways.

Moreover, KFA official Park Young-Soo (interview, 22 July, 2008), commented on the overall influence of globalisation in South Korea:

Through the Seoul Olympics Korean people may have been given clearer ideas about globalisation and thus become more able to do business in the global arena. Also, Korean business companies realised the importance of global business.

South Korea's business companies such as Samsung (the Olympics sponsor), Hyundai and Kia motors (FIFA World Cup Partners) have become recognised globally. There is no doubt that South Korea has a new ‘brand name’, enhanced ‘national prestige’ and ‘Korean national pride’ thanks to the Seoul Games (Journalist Park Gun-Man, interview, 17 July, 2008). These have consequently impacted on the acceleration of South Korea's various national developments (economic, cultural and social).
According to Lee and Lee (2003: 505), South Korea’s industrial globalisation had a two-fold effect on the government’s policy agenda in the 1990s; ‘the government and business groups view globalisation not only in the given context of irresistible worldwide economic integration, but also as imperative for economic reforms to enhance national competitiveness under the growing competition of global markets’.

7-2-3. Globalisation and the Seoul Olympic Games

General arguments about globalisation have long been studied in social science (Maguire, 1994; Robertson, 1995; Donnelly, 1996; Barner, 2001; Rigg, 2001; Robinson, 2004). Competing explanations of the phenomenon traditionally include ‘the modernization perspective, theories of imperialism, dependency theory, world system theory, and globalisation research’ (Maguire, 1994: 399). As previously discussed above, Korea’s modern era begins with Japanese colonisation and the post-World War II period, following which South Korea became a capitalist country. The history of Korea’s circumstances emphasise how modernisation came about as a process of gradual change. Butler (2005: 75) points out that ‘within the globalisation debate, modernisation comes under criticism as it neglects to examine changes in terms of inter-societal relations and sees development as a result of internal forces’. This research has shown that during the three decades of the military regime (from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s), South Korea has undergone a rapid globalisation process, which when associated with Giddens’ argument (cited in Butler, 2005) can be understood in relation to modernisation theory. Giddens has noted that there are four key dimensions of modernisation including ‘capitalism, the inter-state system, military order, and industrialism’ (Butler, 2005: 75). South Korea’s economic development, political system change and socio-cultural formations are closely linked to broader global flows. In particular, the close relationship between the United States and South Korea has been the result of increasing economic, cultural and political interdependence. Donnelly’s (1996) argument is that Americanisation has privileged dominant cultures (that is, particularly American culture) throughout the world. However, Maguire (1994: 400) points out that the ‘global process is itself a parody of a set of complex arguments...it is more difficult to understand local or national experiences without reference to these global flows’. Maguire (1994: 401-
argues that ‘there is no single global flow... globalisation processes involve multidirectional movement of people, practices, customs, and ideas’. Through the Seoul Olympics, South Korean people came face-to-face with global society, through the ‘cross-cultural processes’ which the hosting of mega sport events brings. The following interview will provide insights into the South Korean people’s perspective on globalisation processes including Westernisation, Americanisation, and Olympism.

Journalist Park Gun-Man (interview, 17 July, 2008) highlighted the various positive impacts on Korean society resulting specifically from the Seoul Olympics:

The Seoul Olympics impacted on Korea’s development in many ways toward Westernisation. First of all, politically, there was the opportunity that the Olympics provided for ending the period of military dictatorship in favour of democracy. Also, the Seoul Games contributed to cleaning up Korean society. In particular, through hosting the Olympics, Koreans obtained a mindset of ‘we can do it’ which helped the progress of Westernisation in Korean society.

Moreover, Professor Roh (interview, 24 July, 2007) drew attention to the psychological legacy of the Seoul Olympics:

I think, the biggest legacy is a memorable Olympics for the people. For example, for those Olympics which were memorable Olympics, people will talk about them again and again about the Olympics having a positive impact... that kind of thing is the legacy of Olympism. One aspect of the mental part was that the Seoul Olympics were unfortunate in Korean history. That is because the Seoul Olympics had an undemocratic preparation compared to the Pheong-Chang preparation. However, at least, we now live with the world’s attention, and Korean people have self-satisfaction; also, they want to receive consolation from others.

However, the manager of the International Relations Bureau in the Korean Football Association (KFA), Park Yong-Soo (interview, 22 July, 2008), was critical of the general Westernisation of Korea which has led to a number of problems:

It is extreme to talk about the Westernisation of Korea. However, when we hosted the Seoul Games, we had a chance to meet foreign people and through the experience of hosting them we enhanced our own national pride. So I think there were certain indirect advantages from the Seoul Olympics. I think Westernisation is like this; democracy and a correct concept of capitalism, and during this period Korea began to take those steps. Yet, I think Korea is still at an early stage of this process even now.
The minister of Cultural Tourism Kim Myung-Gon (interview, 30 June, 2008) also commented on 'globalisation' and 'Westernisation' in Korean society:

After the Seoul Olympics, the words 'globalisation' and 'Westernisation' became fashionable in Korea. Before the 1990s, we didn’t have a perfect knowledge of 'globalisation' and 'Westernisation'. We just had some limited experience with foreign people. Also, because we were showing the Korean brand name to the world, we ourselves began to have more active relationships with foreign countries. However, after the 1990s, globalisation issues became a hot topic; for example, we worried about whether it represented the Americanisation of Korea, or whether globalisation promoted world peace.

Miller et al (2001) emphasise that global sport has taken shape following the development of new international divisions of cultural labour and through complicated interactions between ‘Americanisation’ and ‘governmentalisation’, and also, through ‘commodification’ and ‘televisualisation’. Those processes have impacted strongly on South Korea’s socio-cultural forms from the 1980s to the present with the 1988 Olympics being particularly influential. South Korean people acquired ‘self-satisfaction’ - ‘we put in hard work and effort to prepare for the Seoul Games, then the world awards respect to Korea’ (Professor Roh Mung-Woo, interview, 24 July, 2007).

Roche (2000: 226) points out that mega sport events are elements of ‘interconnected political, economic and cultural institutions, systems and processes’. As has been discussed above, the 1988 Seoul Olympics were the product of intensive co-operation between the IOC and KOC; the event became one of huge importance to the Olympic movement because of the combined participation of a large number of both communist and democratic countries. The showcasing of peaceful, joint participation by the two ideological blocs at the 1988 Games was to have a great symbolic effect in the global arena. As Rowe (2003: 285) has indicated, ‘sport certainly has manifest advantages for the project of globalization’, and this can be seen to be the case with Eastern bloc – Western bloc relations in the late 1980s.

Bairner (2001: 1) asks to ‘what extent is the linkage between sport and national identity likely to be weakened as a result of major transformations in global society?’; ‘Most societies do have their own peculiar traditions as regards sport and leisure
activities' (Bairner, 2001: 167). In this respect, it is important to consider what might be the origins of the differences between Western countries and Asian countries regarding the history of modern sport. Traditionally Korea has had a number of traditional sport activities (Chapter 3) and has expressed its own identity through these sports. However, Korea also adopted modern sports (brought to the country by Western Christian missionaries in the late 19th century) and the concurrent process of modernisation through the adoption of much of the Western cultural formation subsequently led (among other consequences) to the enhanced status of Olympic sport in Korean society. These processes of modernisation and globalisation have undeniably influenced Korea's activities in the world. In addition, Reid and Jarvie's (2000: 83) arguments have relevance for the Seoul Olympic case study and are worthy of consideration. They ask,

(can sports) contribute to international and cultural understanding? Does sport provide opportunities for celebrating cultural diversity and difference? Why do governments invest in sport? How do governments and other agencies justify support for international events? Does sport contribute to a sense of national community and pride? Can sport be a vehicle for reconciliation and unity in divided societies?

Through the Seoul Olympics, South Korean sports policy focused on elite sport development, and the government has subsequently involved itself with and invested in commercial, elite sport. Ok (2007: 340) has noted that 'the evolution of modern sport in Korea has been closely linked to its national history' and particularly to transformations in politics, economics, culture and education. South Korea's investment in elite, commercial sport can thus be seen as part of the ongoing consequence of American/capitalist involvement in South Korea during the Cold War years, and may also therefore be implicated in the division between North and South Korea.

Since the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea has witnessed practical globalisation processes and the ongoing development of its democratic political system, massive increases in international relationships and, for the first time, the adoption of a direct election system for the nomination of the President. Those processes have resonated in the Korean society towards a socio-cultural transformation within the context of broader global institutions. In 1994, President Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998)
announced the ‘Grand Idea of Globalisation’ which ‘formulated national development strategies in the era of globalisation and undertook 43 projects, covering the following six major areas: government administration, diplomacy and unification, economy, social dimension, education and culture, and politics’ (Lee, W. D. and Lee, B. H., 2003: 507). However, during President Kim Young-Sam’s time in office, the government sports administration underwent a redirection, becoming more oriented towards the provision of leisure sport. The following interview data explain the strategy of the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1998) and attitudes towards elite sport. According to diplomatic official Baek Gi-Moon (interview, 13 July, 2007):

After the Seoul Olympics, the new government (President Kim Young-Sam) tried to reduce the sport department and encourage leisure sport. Because, they demanded that elite sport-focussed policy was disadvantageous to the nation’s life... Therefore, Korean sport policy was changed by the government, but, I think the importance of elite sport still exists...The effects of national prestige from athletes’ gold medals can’t compare to the work of diplomatic officials who go abroad for publicity activities.

As seen above, South Korea’s globalisation processes are closely linked to modern sport development phenomena and their influence on and from politics, economics and social development. In particular, through mega sport events, South Korea has eventually ‘established a Korean globally respected sport culture’ and ‘Korean sport is now part of (the phenomenon of) world globalisation’ (Ok, 2007: 357). Since the 1980s, South Korean governments have begun to encourage the hosting of mega sports events, starting with the 1986 Asian Games, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and the 2002 FIFA World Cup (co-hosted by Japan and South Korea). South Korea has also had the experience of hosting a number of other international mega-scale events. However, what actual consequences do these produce for Korean society? The next section will examine some practical and theoretical implications of the hosting of international mega-events.

7-3. Mega Events and South Korea

Over the past two decades, a number of researchers (Roche, 1992, 1994, 2000; Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998; Preuss, 2002; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2002; Essex and Chalkley, 2003; Puig, 2006; Bridges, 2008a) have demonstrated that mega sport
events 'have captured a leading position in the consumption-based economic development politics of many late capitalist societies' (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 187). As already discussed, South Korea is not an exceptional country in its ambition to host mega sport events. According to Sugden and Tomlinson (1998: 153) 'football in Asia has acquired – in this seriously developed, produced and marketed form – a wider global profile, in line with some very ambitious objectives'.

In the project of globalisation, such events can be seen to offer many advantages to their hosts. In particular, owing to the reach of the global media, Papandreou (1998: cited in Maguire, 1999: 144) points out that everyone, 'not just governments, but citizens of the world, and the man in the street through television and the media (are present) in this one local festival'. Such wide exposure doubtlessly generates direct and indirect commercial revenue and political status, making the Olympic Games a potentially highly profitable, global event.

On the other hand, the IOC and FIFA have been in co-operation with political actors for some time to promote their sponsorships and have had much experience of lobbying. Yet they remain 'the most outspoken proponents of the apolitical nature of sport in public', whilst continuing to wield considerable political power as they manage to 'exercise considerable pressure on political actors in the host countries’ of their respective tournaments (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). The decision to host the 1988 Seoul Olympics was supported by the President and his government; South Korea’s key actors co-operated with international organisations. As Horne and Manzenreiter (2004: 188) note:

While the public display of government commitment is a prerequisite for a successful bid, governmental involvement is essential not least because of the number of guarantees required that are too costly for private business, e.g. security and large-scale infrastructure investment. Despite all the financial risks, governments are willing to take their chances because such spectacular peak-time events attract national and international media recognition for the hosting cities.

Thus, Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Kim Myung-Gon (interview, 30 June, 2008) could argue that:
Through the hosting of mega-sport events in Korea, people gained national pride and they realised that they are global citizens, giving them a better understanding of other nations and international society.

The Samsung Economic Research Institute announced that the 1988 Seoul Olympics had dramatic economic benefits for South Korea in the context of global society. However, they ‘would not generate the (same) economic benefits’ from the 2002 FIFA World Cup (Korea Times, 5 October, 2001, cited in Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 191). Perhaps, the Seoul Olympics had better promoted Korea’s brand name and the images of its largest companies, to the benefit of South Korea’s economic development over the next two decades. Nevertheless, they had also been the starting point for hosting more mega sports events in South Korea. Based on the framework of ‘mega sport events’, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Kim Myung-Gon (interview, 30 June, 2008) highlighted the importance to South Korea of hosting such events:

I think that Korea’s high recognition has been earned through the success of hosting various mega-events. Hosting mega events has had an impact on our politics, economics and general society. Therefore, we can say that hosting mega-events has many beneficial outcomes and consequences, such that if it is possible, we need to continue to host various mega-events in Korea, and not only sport events; we should host various other events so that we can have various, similarly beneficial effects in Korean society. If we host various other events in different regions, we could have development in other cities and their residents could learn useful specialist knowledge and skills, which could also have an effect on the development of infrastructure.

In addition, the diplomat Baek Gi-Moon (interview, 13 July, 2007) talked about the role of hosting mega events in improving international relationships:

Through the success of hosting the Olympics, we have the confidence to host international events such as the 2002 FIFA World Cup, and also, we want to host the Pheong-Chang Winter Olympics as well. Through the Seoul Olympics, the Korean people could realise the importance of sport diplomacy, and therefore South Korea is encouraged to host various mega-events in Korea. Also, by hosting the Seoul Games, Korean international sport relationships began with many countries and improved the diplomatic relationships between Korea and the rest of the world; this process involved two factors. Firstly, the success of hosting the Seoul Olympics, and secondly, breaking away from the Cold War format. These factors combined enabled the success of Northward diplomacy. I think that sport has huge merit? That’s why I am a sport lover and believe that elite sport must be developed in and for our country.
However, the manager of the International Relations Bureau at the KFA, Park Yong-Soo (interview, 22 July, 2008) was more cautious about the value of hosting mega events:

I think hosting mega events puts strong pressure on each provincial organisation, as for example when we had Phyong-Chang and Yeu-Su bid for the Games. People became over-enthusiastic. Of course, the hosting of mega events is linked to the promotion of our national brand image and also impacts on the economy. However, I would like to say that first of all, Korea needs to solve its domestic problems and then host mega events in the future. For example, Korea should stop hosting mega events and develop the athletes' rights protection and focus on the development of the Korean national football league. So, my conclusion is that we need to have a long term plan for Korean sport.

For his part, Professor Roh Mung-Woo (interview, 24 July, 2007) expressed a strongly negative opinion about hosting mega sport events:

We don't need to host any Games in Korea. Because the Olympics has been just a big money party and it is not directly linked with happiness for me. Also, people say that after the hosting of the Olympics there would be a positive economic effect. However, it doesn't have the possibility to contribute to the common people. Also, I don't want to fall into the IOC's trick. Because its not a clearly principled decision. I feel really sorry for the members of the Pheong-Chang bid preparation committee; however, when we lost the bidding to host the Winter Games, I thought it was really good. Because if we look at the Korean IOC members who were corrupt, then if we were hosting the Pheong-Chang Games, we would need to give them absolution from their crimes so it was extremely fortunate.

The globalisation process and hosting the mega sport events, especially the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, can be seen as multi-dimensional projects in South Korea's ongoing political-economic development. According to Horne and Manzenreiter (2004: 193), 'the 1988 Seoul Olympics already showcased South Korea's newly industrialised economy and the end of military dictatorship' and also its 'having Asia's third-largest economy and one of the world's best educated and most technology-savvy populations'. Over the following twenty years, South Korea has undergone rapid development in various ways in politics, economics and society and, as a function of these, sport. In the process, the mega events phenomenon within the context of globalisation has worked as a vehicle for the further development of Korean society. It is important to remember that in the period directly before the Seoul Olympics, South Korea was considered a developing country. Indeed, one of the aims of hosting the Olympics was to obtain the economic
benefits necessary to ‘catch up’ with the developed world. By contrast, in 2002, South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Jin Nyum said to journalists before the FIFA World Cup that there was now more consideration being put to ‘the brand-making of Korea, rather than making money directly’ (Newsweek, 17 June, 2002: cited in Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 193). Thus, during the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korean people wore their now famous ‘Red T-shirts’, expressing Korean identity in loud, colourful, and memorable displays (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 194), while the South Korean company Samsung reportedly spent around 100 million (US) dollars on a global advertising campaign making the most of its Korean identity.

Since the Seoul Olympics, the first Games to officially run the TOP Programme, sports marketing has become a prominent, if not central, feature of Olympic TV broadcasts. As a result, over the two decades since Seoul, several researchers have paid attention to media case-studies of the Olympics, and Roche has identified the dimensions of sport media research (Roche, 2006: 33). He writes,

Substantial and systematic empirical media case studies were conducted into the Olympic Games of LA (Rothenbuhler, 1988, 1989), Seoul 1988(Larson & Park, 1993; also Rivenburgh, 1992), and Barcelona 1992 (Spa, Rivenburgh & Larson, 1995). Less comprehensive and more specialist media studies were conducted on the 1994 Killehammer Winter Olympics (Puijk ed., 1996; Puijk,1999), the 2000 Sydney Olympics (Rowe, 2000; Wilson, 2000, 2002) and the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics (Friedrich, Mikos & Stiehler, 2002).

In addition, Lee and Maguire (2009) and Cho (2009) have researched media representations of the Olympic Games, conducted within and through complex interactions between Korean nationalism and the goals of the global Olympic media. Moreover, the IOC, UN and UNESCO have encouraged research into the Olympics and held a number of conferences for popular physical education and world peace (see the IOC website, 2009). Sport media studies suggest that coverage of the Games is no doubt intended to contribute to the ‘global village’ festival and to secure a share in the ‘one world’ global experience (Roche, 2006). In particular, Olympics TV broadcasts encourage ‘great interest by large audiences around the world’ (Puijk, 2000: 310). However, TV broadcasts are displayed and watched by different countries in different ways, ‘influenced by societal and cultural conditions, whether
politics, economics, sport or folklore' (Moragas et al, 1995: 245). An example would be the Seoul Olympic opening ceremony:

As the result of the preceding analyses and transcripts of US, Spanish and Korean broadcasts demonstrates, it was not a single Olympic Ceremony as planned by the host organisers, but a multiplicity of Opening Ceremonies broadcast around the world; each was constructed in unique ways depending on the commercial obligations, financial resources, geopolitical or cultural perspectives of the various broadcasting networks. (Rivenburgh, 1991: 95)

This demonstrated that different cultural formations lead to diverse expressions through differential media coverage.

Olympic research, in terms of globalisation processes and the legacies of different Olympic Games, is better served by utilising the 'terms of a complex globalisation rather than a basic globalisation perspective' (Roche, 2006: 34). As a result, Roche (2006: 37) has emphasised that 'the Olympic Games are best seen, albeit against a background of basic globalization processes, in terms of more complex globalization processes of differentiation and agency'. In effect, as Lee and Maguire (2009: 8) point out, Olympic media broadcasts serve 'to extend, or contract, emotional identification between members of different societies'.

Two decades after the Seoul Olympics, following the process of globalisation in Korean society, and through the hosting of other mega sports events, it has become necessary and possible to evaluate the actual consequences of the Games for South Korean society. The following interview data provide some concluding insights into the consequences of the Seoul Games specifically in relation to mega events.

The Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Kim Myung-Gon (interview, 30 June, 2008) described the lasting effects of the Seoul Olympics on Korean society:

Through the hosting of mega-events, Korean people have developed a more mature society and have learnt cooperation skills that have made us confident about hosting mega-events in Korea. This means that if we have to do something, Korean people do their best to do very well. So at the time of the Seoul Games, the world was surprised with Korea, but Koreans were also surprised at themselves for their energy and commitment in preparation. As a result, Koreans considered their own national identity to be tied to the hard work and high-spiritedness shown during the preparation for the
Games. These impacts contributed to the maturation of Korean society and played a huge role in changing the oppressive politics of President Chun to democratic politics in Korea.

Moreover, Kim Myung-Gon (interview, 30 June, 2008) mentioned the following:

Through the hosting of various mega-events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup in Korea, foreign people’s perceptions of Korea changed from negative to positive, and now foreign people have started to have a more favourable impression of Korean people. Moreover, Korean people gained national pride and they realised that they are global citizens, giving them a better understanding of other nations and international society.

As seen above, through hosting the mega sport events, South Korea can be seen to have multidimensional, developmental legacies. For that reason, Professor Lim Burn-Jang (Interview, 9 July, 2008) placed emphasis on the importance of hosting mega sport events:

We have hosted mega sport events many times, and the knowledge from these experiences needs to be used for the development of the sports tourism industry and the national infrastructure for enhancing the economic benefits of sport. We should host a number of mega sport events in Korea.

Through mega sport events, South Korean people have had the chance to improve their national image, have shown greater enthusiasm for the annual domestic national Games, and have also been proud to become global citizens. For example, when South Korea won the quarter final game against Spain in the 2002 FIFA World Cup, President Kim Dea-Jung ‘awarded a one-off national holiday to the Korean people after the finals’; moreover, images of the Korean World Cup supporters, “Red Devils”, are used in ‘school levels feature text’ (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004: 195). After the FIFA World Cup, Guus Hiddink became South Korea’s hero and a number of celebratory books were published in Korea, such as “My Way”, “Hiddink Leadeishments” and “CEO Hiddink He Thinks” etc (www.kyobobook.co.kr). Hiddink is a Western person who had come to South Korea and led the 2002 national football team to considerable success.

In modern society, people generally demand to have ‘a lifelong and substantial experience of individual identity’ (Roche, 2000: 219). As shown above, hosting the
Seoul Olympic Games has delivered various benefits to Korean society. In the 1980s, South Korea had limited communications with global society, lacking opportunities for expressing its identity on the global stage. Roche (2000: 224) explains that ‘mega-events promote the localisation of international global event movement history in relation to host sites and cities’, and also, that ‘sport culture provides opportunities for people to reanimate a sense of effective agency in a number of ways’ (Roche, 2000: 224).

The first time that a global mega sport event was hosted in Korean society was the Olympic Games, following which the experience and knowledge gained from the event led South Korean people to have a substantial capacity to host further events in their more modernised society. According to the Minister of Cultural Tourism and Sport, Kim Myung-Gon (Interview 30, June, 2008), the starting point of hosting the Seoul Olympics impacted on the hosting of various subsequent (mega) events in South Korea, which in turn influenced the start of the Hallyu (Korean Wave – involving cultural exports around Asia). This means that South Korea’s globalisation experience is not only about the acceptance of Western cultural forms, but also that Korea has managed to advertise its own socio-cultural performances. In addition, there is no doubt that from the 1980s to the present, South Korea has undergone rapid development in politics and economics, and we can thus assert that sports mega-events can have a ‘social order-creating or cultural order-creating character and potential’ (Roche, 2000: 225). Importantly, South Korea changed its political system in 1987, becoming a democratic country, and the government has been more open in relation to both local and global society, allowing the country to engage in greater economic cooperation and to continue to develop in the global context. As Roche (2000: 227) argues, the mega event phenomenon is an element of the ‘global cultural economy’, which is complicated by processes of multinational market consumption, including ‘films, music, entertainment, news, sport and tourism’.

To sum up, by hosting the Seoul Olympics twenty years ago, South Korea was affected by what can be called the mega events phenomenon, which involves massive developments in politics, economics and socio-cultural performance on the global stage. Arguably, the South Korean government still has the ambition to host mega sport events on the Korean peninsula. However, before this matter is addressed, it
will be important to consider the problems with sport policy such as those affecting athletes' lives (education system, future employment plans), coaches' behaviour (violence, battery) and most significantly, concerns for the quality of human life.
Chapter 8. Conclusion

This research has evaluated how the hosting of the Seoul Olympics had various aims, impacts and consequences for South Korea. Examining the consequences of the Seoul Olympics over a period of twenty years, the research has considered South Korea's historical development, the bidding process, 'national cohesion - and the mobilization' involved at the time of the Games (Schaffer and Smith, 2000), as well as the actual consequences.

8-1. Evaluation of the Research

Methodologically, this project adopted the critical realist position, which is based on explanation by interpretive approaches (provided by interview data), with research seeking to find out "one truth". However, there are "multiple truths" that emerge from this research. Different social groups have multi-dimensional perspectives, and various opinions. MacClancy (1996: 3) points out that 'people may have multiple identities either simultaneously, seasonally or consecutively'. Therefore, the researcher remains aware that the social scientist's point of view can only approximate to an objective, "one truth", as individual, multiple "truths" are explained and positioned relative to one another.

So, what actual consequences have impacted on South Korean society? Working with sociological perspectives, in particular, the themes of globalisation and mega-events, have been primary considerations in this research. The Seoul Olympics have had multidimensional influences on the development of South Korean society. Analysis effectively demonstrates that through the Seoul Games, South Korea has had a chance to advertise the national brand name (1); Korean people have acquired self-satisfaction, confidence and greater love for their country (2); elite sport has been developed along with the creation of an inflated nationalist ideology (3); and hosting mega-events has contributed massively toward the globalisation of South Korea (4).

Finally, the following table explains the Seoul Olympics consequences, associated with sociological perspectives and methodological assumptions.
This study has identified five major consequences (four positive and one largely negative) of the Seoul Olympic Games. First of all, there was Democratic Consolidation. South Korea began to become a democratic country from 1987 (Consequence I), and simultaneously, South Korea became a semi-peripheral country, undergoing economic and social development in the global arena (Consequence II). Within the history of the Olympic movement, the Seoul Olympics was one of the largest peace-time festivals in the world (with the participation of both Western countries and the Eastern bloc) which meant that it facilitated the possibility of greater international harmony through a memorable symbolic event (Consequence III).

Because the Games were the starting point of hosting international sports mega-events in South Korea, there were ‘miracle’ sport developments such as the growing success in elite sport. The South Korean government intensively invested in elite sport which is in turn linked to commercialism and hierarchy characteristic of the capitalist system of South Korea (Consequence IV). Finally, the issue of North and South Korea’s unification (Consequence V) remains problematic. Regarding the ‘two countries, North and South Korea’, this research suggests that both North and South Korea continue to consider the issue of unification. However, before this, there remains the need to take into account different political systems and economic standards within the globalising world system.
In conclusion, hosting the 1988 Seoul Games involved various impacts, motivations and consequences explained in this research. There are multiple “truths” about the Games impact on South Korean society. Overall, however, it can be argued that through the Seoul Olympics, South Korea has experienced overall development linked to greater levels of globalisation.

In summary, through the Seoul Olympics, generally, South Korea has seen various positive impacts in terms of politics, economics, and socio-cultural development. Empirical data suggest that elite sport development in South Korea faces certain problems (elite and leisure sport imbalance, athletes’ issues etc.) which need to be considered for the future of the country’s athletic development. In addition, it has been broadly discussed above that the Seoul Olympics involved a time of peace for the world festival, but, North and South Korea’s relationship is still difficult and barriers to unification remain. Nevertheless, through the hosting of a number of mega-events, the capacity to advertise Korean cultural forms has impacted on the development of the country’s various cultural industries, such as film, drama and other entertainment production. This means that South Korea’s globalisation involves a ‘cross cultural process’ identified by Maguire (1999) and the involvement of ‘transnational corporations’ (Maguire et al, 2002) as ‘flexible and multidimensional’ (Cho, 2009).

8-2. Limitations of the Research

This research’s methodological strategy has certain specific weaknesses, such as the relatively small and specialist interview group, which consisted solely of South Korean sport politicians, professors and journalists. Thus the views expressed are those of an exclusive, limited group of people. In addition, the review of existing empirical research literature on the Seoul Olympics has revealed few qualitative studies in English, meaning that at least alternative groups’ viewpoints may be studied in the future, to the further benefit of our understanding of the Seoul Games. Despite the specific methodological/philosophical focus of this study, there are alternative ways to develop methodology which may lead to exploring a larger number of interview groups which could be of help in identifying different social groups’ perceptions. This research has approached the problem through interviewing several
South Korean key experts (politicians, sport officials and university professors) whose voices are considered particularly important for realising this study's primary aims. The reasons are that the research mainly explored South Korea's political, economic and sporting consequences. Therefore, owing to these experts' close position with the inner workings of the Seoul Games, and the specialist, insider knowledge this involves, the research focused on their perceptions. Nevertheless, the sample was biased towards reflecting the viewpoint of a particular segment of South Korean society: all interviewees were over 40 years old, all were middle-class professionals, and all were male. This effectively excludes the voices of many South Koreans who are not represented by these demographic characteristics; the young, the poor, the working classes, and women.

At this point it is worth recalling that the theoretical/methodological position adopted for this study has a limited capacity for providing clear answers. However, the underlying assumptions of "causal beliefs" still exist, and therefore the research has aimed at discovering the mechanisms and exploring the deep structures behind the Seoul Games. These mechanisms and structures are often complex, and 'all observation (of them) is fallible and has error' (William, 2006: 2). However, the critical realists' assumption is that there is "one reality" independent of our knowledge and it is possible to analyse this through scientific research (Fitzpatrick, 2000).

Therefore, this doctoral research has sought to undertake deep content analysis (interpretive analysis) of data drawn from South Korean key experts combined with associated sociological theory. In particular, regarding the Seoul Olympics and the globalisation of South Korea, the study has explored how South Korean policy makers' voices are essential to understanding South Korea's national development, even at the cost of not hearing the voices of other groups.

8-3. Future Research

There are a number of scholars who have debated the positive and negative impacts on the hosting cities of mega events (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998; Roche, 2000;
Horne and Manzenreiter, 2002; Essex and Chalkley, 2003; Puig, 2006; Lenskyj, 2008), with particular interest in the legacy for peoples' lives in those cities. This project has used qualitative research, and is the first study that has used interviews with South Korean key experts to examine the Seoul Olympics' impact on South Korean society — in the English-speaking academy, there have been few (insider researcher) studies of this kind.

In this respect, drawing upon the theoretical debates around globalisation and sporting mega events, some suggestions can be made for a future qualitative research in this area. First of all, comparative research could investigate the differences between Asian countries and Western countries hosting the Olympic Games, regarding the aims, context and consequences, and could generate a unique contribution to the sociology of sport.

Secondly, future research on the same specific topic as this study would do well to investigate the viewpoints of different groups within South Korea, such as contemporary Korean youth, the working classes, or women. Consequently, different social standards, economic situations, and other culturally-specific perceptive biases would be made visible in the research.

Thirdly, a direction for future research could take the shape of an analysis of the sporting mega events phenomenon more generally, asking why politicians have aspirations to host such events in their county. As discussed above, South Korea still holds the ambition to host mega sports events, such as future Winter Olympics and Summer Olympics (see interview data). It is reasonable to assume that politicians from other countries also have ambitions to host mega sport events. Research might look to the debate structure and agency in relation to how powerful interests are negotiated in the process of hosting mega events in a global capitalist society (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002). These are complex phenomena, and it is no simple matter to demonstrate the dynamic relationships involved.

Lastly, based on this research and looking at the subject of North and South Korea's potential unification, research could turn to exploring how sport, and sport diplomacy, have been used to improve international relations (especially between politically
different nations). Such research could explore the potentially unifying (or further dividing) effects of, for example, joint national representation for the two Koreas at future Olympic Games or other sporting mega events.

8-4. Summary

The original question of this research was what consequences have been felt in South Korean society following the Seoul Olympic Games? In particular, this case study of the Seoul Games has contributed to understanding various changes in South Korea's politics, its economics and its socio-cultural forms from within a sociological discussion. Importantly, theoretical frameworks, such as globalisation and mega events, are associated with South Korea's development (notably its emergence as a global capitalist country), whilst ideology and political dimensions are accounted for within the project. As such, this case study can be illuminating for scholars interested in developing countries' transition to democratic forms of government and capitalist economics.

Over the two decades following the Seoul Olympics period, various significant impacts have been felt throughout South Korean society. First of all, South Korea's globalisation process has had broadly positive impacts on the nation following the Seoul Olympic Games. These have involved the chance to change from a military regime to democratic politics (since the 1987) (I), rapid economic development in the world system (II), and the chance to advertise South Korean cultural performances in the global society, enhancing national prestige and the Korean 'brand name' (III). Additionally, South Korea's elite sport development has been considerable in the Olympic arena (IV). Although this has not been without controversy, given the many fundamental problems associated with elite sport, the Korean government and the KOC have begun to implement projects promoting support for elite athletes including such things as athletes' rights and career options for retiring competitors. However, through the Seoul Olympics, the relationship between North and South Korea has grown worse (V). During the 1980s, the IOC encouraged talks about the unification issue between North and South Korea within the Olympic movement. Nevertheless,
to some extent, the actual consequences for North and South Korea remain negative at present.

In this research, globalisation theories have been defined based on the works of Western scholars such as Maguire (1999), Bairner (2001), Robinson (2004) and Ritzer (2008). Ritzer (2008: 573) points out that globalisation theory has a 'Western bias, (with) pre-eminence accorded to developments in the West, and the idea that the rest of the world had little choice but to become increasingly like the West'. However, through the Seoul Olympics case study, it is possible to illustrate a different approach to globalisation derived from the largely positive impact of the Games on South Korea's own process of globalisation. This is in marked contrast to the predominantly negative reasoning that emerges from most Western perspectives. With regard to the assessment of the legacy of the Seoul Olympic Games, this research is different from previous research, since this is the first time that qualitative methods have been used (with interviews with targeted key stakeholders) in conjunction with the researcher's own 'insider' position (as a South Korean elite athlete) and lived experience.

Hosting mega sport events (such as the Olympics) are linked to South Korea's "modernisation" "democratisation" and "globalisation", which are complex and multidirectional phenomena. Since the starting point of hosting mega events in South Korea in the 1980s, the South Korean government has aspired to continue to host mega sports event on the Korean peninsula. There are various underlying factors for this. In the modern global era, Korea's international activity has been considerable, with Koreans becoming increasingly visible in the highest echelons of global society, such as the two current Korean IOC members, Lee Kun-Hee (President of Samsung Company – IOC Top sponsor) and Moon Dea-Sung (previous Taekwondo athlete – Sydney Olympic gold medallist), and current United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon. This presence on the world stage reflects South Korea's ambition to continue to participate at the highest levels of global politics, economics, and culture, an ambition that was arguably for which hosting the Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst as a consequence of its many positive effects on South Korea's national prestige, not least the creation of a 'brand name' which began to first take shape with the 1988 Seoul Games.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The late Chosun</td>
<td>Sun-Jong</td>
<td>Last Korean Monarch</td>
<td>Kingdom Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>priory (1852-1907)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Republic of</td>
<td>Lee Syng-Man</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (1948-1960)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Republic of</td>
<td>Yoon Bo-Sun</td>
<td>Democratic party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (1960-1962)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Republic of</td>
<td>Park Chun-Hee</td>
<td>Democratic Republican</td>
<td>Military Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (1963-1979)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Republic of</td>
<td>Chea-Gu-Ha</td>
<td>Democratic Republican</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (1979-1980)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Republic of</td>
<td>Chun-Doo-Hwan</td>
<td>Democratic Justice</td>
<td>Military Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Republic of</td>
<td>Roh Tea-Woo</td>
<td>Democratic Justice</td>
<td>Post-Military Rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Republic of</td>
<td>Kim Young-Sam</td>
<td>New Korea Party</td>
<td>IMF (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (1993-1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Republic of</td>
<td>Kim Dea-Jung</td>
<td>Millennium Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Republic of</td>
<td>Roh Moo-Hyun</td>
<td>Uri-Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (2003-2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Republic of</td>
<td>Lee Mung-Bark</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (2008-Now)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II

- Key Moments in the History of Sport in Korea -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 1920</td>
<td>Chosun Sports Council was founded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1938</td>
<td>It was forcefully disorganized by the Japanese imperialism authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 26, 1945</td>
<td>Chosun Sports Council was revived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 1947</td>
<td>Korean Olympic Committee was founded and joined IOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 3, 1948</td>
<td>Its name was changed to Korea Sports Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 1954</td>
<td>Korea Sports Council was authorized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1966</td>
<td>Taeneung Training Centre was built.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1968</td>
<td>Korean Olympic Committee and Korean School Sports council was combined to Korea Sports Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 31, 1982</td>
<td>Korea Sports Council was designated as a special entity by the National Sports Promotion Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 20, 1986</td>
<td>The 10th Asian Game was held in Seoul, Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 17, 1988</td>
<td>The 24th Olympic Games were held in Seoul, Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 1996</td>
<td>The 6th IOC World Living Sports Congress was hosted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 24, 1997</td>
<td>1997 Winter Universiad was hosted in the Muju-Jeonju region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1997</td>
<td>The 2nd Pusan (Pusan) East Asian Games was held in 1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 30, 1999</td>
<td>The 4th Winter Asian Games were held in Gangwon-do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 1999</td>
<td>The 109th IOC Congress was hosted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 27, 2002</td>
<td>The 14th Pusan Asian Games was held in 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 21, 2003</td>
<td>Daegu Summer Universiad was held in 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 23, 2004</td>
<td>A decision was made that 2006 ANOC General Assembly will be held in Seoul.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from KSC (2007)
### Appendix III

#### - Korean Sport and Politics Time-Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Political Event</th>
<th>Sports Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The late Chosun prior (1852-1907) | - Kanghwa Treaty: Open up commercial relationship with foreign countries (1876)  
<pre><code>                             | - Kabo Reformation: Culture and economic modernization (1896)          | - The 1st time Modern Sports start by missionary (1890s) |
</code></pre>
<p>|                               | - Donghak Movement (1896)                                            |                                                   |
|                               | - Uelsa Treaty with Japan (1905)                                      |                                                   |
|                               | - Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905)                                      |                                                   |
| Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) | - March 1st Independent Movement (1919)                                | - Chosun Sports Council was founded (1920)         |
|                               | - June 10th Independent Movement (1926)                                | It was forcefully disorganized by the Japanese imperialism authority (1938) |
|                               | - November Kwangju Student Movement (1929)                            | - Emphasized Women's Sports (1925)                 |
|                               | - Emancipated from Japan (1945)                                       | - Joseon Sports Council was revived (1945)         |
| 1st - 3th Republic of Korea (1948 -1960) | - Established Republic of Korea (1948)                                | - Korean Olympic Committee was founded and joined IOC (1947) |
|                               | - North and South Korean War (1950-1953)                              | - The 1st time participated in the London Olympic Games (1948) |
|                               |                                                                       | - Formally entered Asian Games Federation (1954)   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4(^{th}) Republic of Korea (1960-1962)</th>
<th>- April 19(^{th}) Revolution by Student (1960)</th>
<th>- Military Revolutionary Government decides to provide budget to KSC (1961)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- May 16(^{th}) Park Jung-Hee coup d’Etat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5(^{th}) – 9(^{th}) Republic of Korea (1963-1979)</td>
<td>- Mr. Park Chung Hee Presidency Until 1979</td>
<td>- Construction on Taenung Athletic Village, KSC Hall opened (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mr. Park Chung Hee assassinated by Kim Je-Kyu</td>
<td>- Government plan to unify sports organized KSC, KOC, KSSA are integrated into the Korean Sports Council (1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- KSC Lifelong Annuity System for medal winners: Olympics, World Championship, Asian Games (1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The 1(^{st}) time Korean gold medal in the Olympic Games (Freestyle wrestling 1976)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix IV**

Hosting the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, IOC members' reactions (on 26th June, 1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>IOC member</th>
<th>Negotiations status and IOC member’s reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Douglas Roby</td>
<td>Propriety recognition, expression of support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Baron de Guell</td>
<td>Support Korea, He will decide, after IOC meeting in Baden-Baden.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>R. Peper</td>
<td>Positive expression from NOC President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>C. Kerdel</td>
<td>Checking that Seoul’s environment and facilities are suitable for the Olympic Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>J. Worrall</td>
<td>Plan for meeting on 2nd July at 18:00.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>R. Pound</td>
<td>Plan for meeting on 14th July at 12:00.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Henry Hsu</td>
<td>Support Korea (10th June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* He hoped to visit Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>A. Touny</td>
<td>He understands Korea’s good points however, it has bad points as well. Neutral attitude, he will take an objective view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>J. Samaranch (IOC President)</td>
<td>The report of Seoul, very encouraging and positive, but problems with communist countries and North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>R.B. Singh</td>
<td>He will visit to Seoul and Nagoya. He can't express his opinion, before comparing Seoul and Nagoya (on 19th June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>C. Cross</td>
<td>He preferred Korea, because Japan had an experience of hosting the Olympic Games. He will support Korea as he can. (on 19th June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>M. Mzali</td>
<td>Tunisia NOC secretary-general (Mr. Baly) promised that he will tell Prime minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>minister)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>J. Veracierto</td>
<td>Uruguay's ambassador, trying to contact for meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Japanese Negotiation body visited on 10th June to 12th June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>R. Alezander</td>
<td>Kenya's ambassador, sent cooperation letter and trying to arrange the meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>P. Vazquez</td>
<td>Mexico’s ambassador, trying to arrange the meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Hay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>C. Gemayed</td>
<td>Contact is not possible because, Lebanon has political problem. When the situation improves, will contact for meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>M. Benjelloun</td>
<td>He is on holiday now, he will comeback around end of June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>E. Dibos</td>
<td>He will check in the Peru NOC meeting on 30th June 1981 (22nd June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>S. W. Ali</td>
<td>He will discuss with Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of culture and sport and the NOC. The official situation will be draw up. The Pakistan vice-minister said that Korea has more potential to host the Olympic Game (17th June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>J. de Beaumont</td>
<td>The two IOC members are on holiday now, Herzog will come back end of June and Beaumont will come back in July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Herzog</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>V. de Leon</td>
<td>Expressed Korea will be supported (28th April).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>A. Halim</td>
<td>Ramadan and summer holiday, so a meeting will be possible in August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Status and Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>A. Arroyo</td>
<td>He is on abroad trip now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>A. Ademola</td>
<td>He is on abroad trip now, he will come back middle of July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Y. Tessema</td>
<td>He is on abroad trip now. The Ethiopia ambassador trying to send to Foreign Minister and Sport Council, and he is trying to discuss with people in authority (23ed June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>P. Honkajuuri</td>
<td>They are on holiday now, will come back at the beginning of July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P. Tallnerg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>S. Erler</td>
<td>Japan had experience of the hosting the Olympics, so, he is supporting Seoul for the 1988 Olympic Games (24th June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>G. Onesti</td>
<td>Onesti IOC member promised that he will positively support Korea and also he will try to persuade the communist countries’ IOC members (20th June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Stefani</td>
<td>He is on holiday in Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>J. Havelange</td>
<td>They are on holiday now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Padilha</td>
<td>They will come back at the beginning of July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>J. Comelin</td>
<td>He will support Korea and will recommend to other IOC members (16th June).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* F. M. Carrasquilla, he is the Colombia Olympic President said that he doesn’t have voting rights, however, he will recommend to other IOC members, when he is in Baden-Baden meeting (23th June).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>B. Attarabulsi</td>
<td>He will check Korea’s answer from the IOC questions and then he will decide. He considers that each country has an equal chance of hosting the Olympic Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>R. Essomba</td>
<td>He recognised that Korea is well prepared for the Olympic Games (23rd June). He will contact the Cameroon ambassador again. <em>(A meeting in Milan will take place in July, to prepare for the IOC general meeting in September. The results will depend on Africa’s attitude)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted from SOSFO (2000a) *Consultation*
Appendix V

The IOC President Samaranch's Speech (The Korean Times, June 9, 1988:12).

As Seoul's historic countdown to the Olympic Games reaches the 100-day mark, it is a great pleasure for me to send my greetings-and my gratitude-to the people of Korea.

Since 1981, when the members of the International Olympic Committee chose Seoul to host the Games of the 24th Olympiad, we have looked on with admiration at the efforts made by the citizens of Korea to prepare to welcome the world. It has been an inspiring time for the entire Olympic Movement to see a people so dedicated to living up to the high ideals of the Olympic Games.

Your efforts, led by the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, have undoubtedly borne fruit. It is already guaranteed that the Seoul Olympics will be the biggest-ever Games and a genuine festival for mankind. This record level of participation is a tribute to the unity within the IOC and to the way in which Koreans are prepared to show their warmth and hospitality to all the peoples of the world.

I am also confident that these Games will be the greatest in the history of the Modern Olympics because Seoul has created the perfect sporting environment in which to stage them.

Last week, I had the pleasure of visiting Seoul for the final time before the Games open in September. During my stay, I was able to attend the dedication ceremonies of the last facilities to be completed—the Olympic swimming pool, the Olympic and Press Villages, and new International Broadcast Centre.

Seeing these magnificent new structures only served to reaffirm my view that the facilities for the Seoul Olympics are among the best I have ever seen.

In particular, I am pleased that the state-of-the-art IBC will be available to broadcast to the world televisions and modern development of Korea. I feel sure that this will give many developing countries confidence that they, too, can successfully stage the Olympics.

One hundred days from now, the athletes of the world will gather in the Olympic Stadium in an atmosphere of peace and friendship. The Seoul Olympics will make an enormous contribution to global harmony by bringing together the young people of both East and West, irrespective of race, religion or ideology. A
successful Game in Seoul will also assure the continued growth and strength of the Olympic Movement.

Again, my congratulations to the people of Korea for your efforts in reaching this historic landmark: I look forward to being with you all again this September (The Korean Times, June 9, 1988:12).
The following is taken from a speech delivered by South Korean President Kim Young Sam (1993-1997), in Moscow on 3 June, 1994:

Distinguished business leaders of Russia and businessmen from Korea,
It is a great pleasure for me to meet with you today and exchange ideas on how to further promote economic cooperation between Russia and Korea as we meet in the ancient city Moscow, rich in tradition and culture.
Before I became the President of the Republic of Korea, I was able to visit Russia twice, once in 1989 and once in 1990. I am quite amazed at the remarkable changes that I have witnessed in Russia during this visit. The ambience of the city has become brighter and freer, and business activity has become more brisk and active.
Distinguished business leaders,
Russia and Korea share in common their pursuit of change and reform in not only the political and social sectors but in the economic sector as well. Under the banners of reform and openness, the Russian people today are making a strong and united march toward liberty and prosperity. The Russian Federation has been steadfastly transforming its economy from a planned to a free market economy in which there is free competition among economic players. Prices have been liberalized, a number of state-run enterprises have been privatized and many new businesses have come into existence.
In Korea too great changes have taken place since last year's inception of a civilian democratic administration. The Korean people have been working toward the creation of a “New Korea” by making changes and reforms in the political, economic, and social sectors. In the economic sector in particular, Korea has been endeavouring to build a New Economy based on the spontaneous participation and creativity of the people instead of government directives.
These similar changes and reforms in our two countries will help consolidate the very foundation for co prosperity of our two nations in the new international order taking shape following the end of the Cold War and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade talks.
Distinguished business leaders,
You are probably aware of the fact that economic cooperation between our two nations dates back 110 years when our two countries signed a treaty of coope. Since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1990, relations between our two countries have been improving at renewed speed. The two-way trade between Russia and Korea last year rose to US$1.6 billion-double the figure for the previous year. This remarkable growth rate remain unchanged this year. Korean investments in Russia have been increasing steadily, from Moscow to the Russian maritime territory. Furthermore, the nature of economic cooperation between the two nations is being diversified, covering such fields as science and technology, development of natural resources, and construction, among others. However, we should not be satisfied with the present degree of mutual cooperation. We must endeavour to further elevate the level of economic cooperation through the concerted efforts of the businessmen and governments of our two nations. It is true that in the early days of interaction, our governments played active roles to effectively promote economic cooperation. This was necessary at that time to establish a legal and institutional framework for further development. Now that this has been accomplished to a certain extent, the future of our cooperation rests in your hands. Distinguished business leaders, I believe that we should focus on future-oriented joint economic projects that will yield greater results in the long run, rather than pursuing short-term projects that promise immediate but small benefits. As we look to the 21st century, it is readily apparent that we need to patiently resolve our current problems one by one and thus pave the way for greater economic cooperation and co-prosperity. Nobody will dispute the fact that the world economic order has been undergoing drastic and rapid changes. Various barriers impeding free trade are being removed, and the concept of national boundaries is growing weaker in regard to the global economy. An era of fierce international economic competition has opened amidst the new international trend of cooperation and reconciliation. We must squarely face the new international order being shaped and join hands, not only for the further development of our two nations but also for the common prosperity of Northeast Asia and the world community. Distinguished business leaders, please join me in a toast to your good health and to everlasting cooperation between Russia and Korea. Thank you (The Presidential Secretariat The Republic of Korea, 1995:58).
Appendix VII

List of Interviewees

1st Interview respondents (July 2007, Korea)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 July, 2007 (1 hour)</td>
<td>Mr. Kim Seung-Gone (KOC, KSC official)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 July, 2007 (1 hour, 40 min)</td>
<td>Prof. Chung Hee-Jun (Dong-A University)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July, 2007 (1 hour, 30 min)</td>
<td>Mr. Beack Ki-Moon (Sport Diplomatic official)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July, 2007 (1 hour)</td>
<td>Dr. Park She-Jik (SLOOC President)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July, 2007 (1 hour, 20min)</td>
<td>Prof. Roh Myung-Woo ( Ah-Ju University)</td>
<td>Suwon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interview questionnaire

1. Why did South Korea want to host the Olympic Games in 1980s?
2. Why the IOC supported the Seoul Olympic Games? (Which were liked to political influences or economics in the 1980s?)
3. Why do you think why the Seoul Olympics bidding was succeeded? Could you explain to me?
4. Can you explain to me what kind of advantages disadvantages were experienced by Korean society due to Seoul Olympics?

5. Do you think hosting the Seoul Olympic Games influenced the development of elite sports in Korea?

**2nd Interview respondents (June to July, 2008, Korea)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 June, 2008 (1 hour, 30min)</td>
<td>Yoon Kang-Roh, (ISCI Researcher &amp; Sport diplomatic official)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June, 2008 (1 hour 5min)</td>
<td>Kim Myung-Gon (Minister of Culture and Sports Tourism)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July, 2008 (1 hour)</td>
<td>Lim Burn-Jang, PhD (Chairman of Korea Foundation for the NEXT generation Sports Talent)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July, 2008 (1 hour)</td>
<td>Mr. Park Gun-Man (Journalist)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July, 2008 (1 hour)</td>
<td>Park Yong-Soo (Manager of International Relations Bureau KFA)</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August, 2008</td>
<td>Ok Kwang (Professor)</td>
<td>(e-mail response)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interview questionnaire

1. Why did South Korea want to host the Olympic Games in 1980s?
2. Why do you think the Seoul Olympics bid was successful?
3. Can you explain to me what kind of advantages and disadvantages were experienced by Korea as a result of the Seoul Olympics?
4. Did the Games reflect a globalisation process that has contributed to the ‘westernisation’ of Korean society?
5. How about economic impact?
6. What about infrastructure—transport, facilities etc?
7. Do you think hosting the Seoul Olympic Games influenced the development of sports in Korea and if so, in what ways?
8. What lasting impacts have the Games had on Korea and in what specific areas—for example, sport, society, international relations?
Appendix VIII

(Interview Transcripts)

I. Roh Mung-Woo (Prof. Ah-Ju University) 24/ July /2007

Q1). Why did South Korea want to host the Olympic Games in 1980s?

M R. I don’t know exactly the reasons, however, the rumour was that in the 1970s South Korea had changed from the Yusin Constitution to Military government. The new government (Chun Doo-Hwen) needed to justify their policies. For that reason, the military government might have needed a showcase event. The Chun government showed the world about South Korea and its stable social form that will help it to become a sustainable political power. However, in fact, Chun’s government was not elected in the justifiable process. For this reason, they wanted to host the Olympics to demonstrate their political power. During the Seoul Olympics preparation period, South Korea had put in new plans, such as colour TV broadcasting, which helped to establish professional baseball. However, those things were due to appear in Korean society some time after. The colour TV transformation had a very short start to finish time. In addition, professional baseball came out with very quickly. I can’t remember exactly but, it took around one year from the announcement date to completion.
As a result, I think the Chun government decided to host the Olympics for the purpose of politics....Of course, those exact reasons are only known by people who were preparing the Olympics or President Chun Doo-Hwen. Other people can only guess. However, I think my guesses are quiet dependable, because we didn’t have any news about the hosting of the Olympics from the Park Chun-Hee government and they then suddenly announced to host the Olympics, with underlying political objectives.

J C: Actually, according to the Seoul Olympics materials, Park Cung-Hee had planned to host the Olympics, however, he was assassinated by Kim Je-Kyu in order to stop Olympic plans.

M R. Really? When?

J C. After the World Shooting Championships 1978, Park Jong-Kue (President of Shooting Federation) proposed to President Park Cung-Hee about hosting the Olympics in Seoul. Because, during the World Shooting Championships, a number of the IOC members visited Seoul. At that time, they suggested to Park Jong-Kue about the hosting the Olympics in Seoul. However, President Park died .........

M R. Um.....Did the Park Chung-Hee period have a plan?

J C. Yes. That’s why Chun government decided to prepare for hosting the Olympic Games. Perhaps, they had a political purpose as well. According to your
answer, do you think many political objectives influenced the Chun
government's decision to host the Games?

**M R.** The political objective was the biggest reason. Of course, hosting the Olympics
can't be indicative of all political purposes, however, if I pick up the one big
reason, it was the political factor. For example, the period was quite a different
situation compared to now. During the 1970s to 1980s, South Korea was a
developing county. We didn't have any ideas for development of a sport
industry and leisure industry from 1970s to 1980s. So, this means that we
didn't have any desire for sport industry development. However, these days,
we have an economic consideration for hosting the Olympic Games. For
example, the Pheong-Chang Winter Olympics bid. Presently, if we host the
Olympics, it has a much greater appeal to industrial interests than national
ideology, however, if we are looking at the South Korean social situation in the
1980s, the political purpose was greater than industrial desire.

Q2. Why did the IOC support the Seoul Olympic Games?

**M R.** It is my guess that the IOC members' characters are very old fashioned.
Because of the bidding process, it is not made clear how their decisions are
formed. If I talk about the IOC members' dissatisfaction, I don't understand
why they make the decision regarding the host city a justifiable decision.
For example, nations elect for the Member of Parliament, a country elects the
President. However, the host city is elected only by the IOC members.
There are no open elections that decide the result, only the IOC members. If I think about why the IOC elected Seoul, I really want to know why they supported Seoul. Because at that time, Japan had much better conditions than Korea, yet, why did the IOC choose the Seoul? It is also my guess that perhaps Korea lobbied for hosting the Olympics; lobbying which included giving IOC members 'alcohol', 'money' and 'women.' Was this Korean style of lobbying accepted by the IOC? That is a rumour that only the IOC members know the truth. Also, I mentioned earlier that the preparation of the Seoul Olympics was led by Chung Ju-Young (Hyun-Dai President) and that he is our construction company President. I think he had a particular style for lobbying to the IOC members. Because, as you may already know, the construction company had its own styles of lobbying. That's why I think Chung Ju-Young used that style for bidding success. He was one of the most successful businessmen in Korean society from the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the reason that he became so successful in business in Korea was that he used 'alcohol', 'money', and 'women' for business lobbying. I could guess his lobbying style had not changed when he approached the IOC members.

Q3. Why do you think the Seoul Olympics bidding succeeded? Could you explain to me?

M R. The bid to host the Seoul Olympics was a national effort. However, I am not sure about the other countries’ bidding preparations. The government organised all the movers and shakers for the Seoul Olympics bid. Also, the
Korean government arranged the diplomatic officials and world networks for the bid. For example, Chun Ju-Young (of the Hyun-Dai Group) organised an overseas network to make full use of their infrastructure for the Seoul Games. That’s why Korea succeeded in the bid to host the Seoul Olympic Games. Also, there was a completely different level of support level for the Olympics bidding process between Nagoya and Seoul.

J C. You mean there was huge interference by President Chun’s decision?

M R. I think it was an important tool for managing the President’s image. For example, if he was elected via a normal route, he doesn’t need to host the Olympics during his presidential period. However it would have been beneficial.

For example, there are a number of differences between the current President Roh Moo-Hyun (Pheong-Chang Olympics bidding) and in the 1980s Chun Do-Hwen (Seoul Olympics bidding). This year (2008) Korea failed the bidding for the Winter Olympics and President Roh Moo-Hyun didn’t receive any disadvantage from the failed bidding result. However, in the 1980s President Chun Do-Hwan really wanted to host the Olympics, but the residents of Seoul disagreed. I think in 1980, the Prime Minister of Japan was indifferent to hosting the Olympics, yet President Chun had to host the Olympics for the sake of his own presidency. I think those factors impacted on the winning of the Olympic bid.
Q4. Can you explain to me what kind of advantages and disadvantages were experienced by Korean society due to the Seoul Olympics?

MR. In the 1980s, I didn’t know about the Olympics’ benefits to us. Because, I was involved with protesting against hosting the Olympics in Korea. Also, I had negative perspectives on hosting the Olympics in Seoul that I didn’t think about the positive influences to the Korean nation. That’s why I didn’t have any positive feelings. However, now if I think about the history of the development of Korean society, it had been from the starting point of the Seoul Olympics. For example, the most popular example is the perception of foreign counties. Because, before the Seoul Olympics Korean people found it difficult to go abroad, we had to have permission to go to a foreign country. We were isolated. These are the reasons that Korean people had no experience of foreign countries. We just had to imagine what other countries’ life was like, and we were not interested in foreign people’s culture and their life. However, through the Seoul Olympics, we were shocked. Because, we could have experience of different foreign people’s customs. During the Seoul Olympic Games, many foreign people visited Seoul and we could see so many different races of people on the TV. Therefore I had the chance to know what the world and various people were like. I think the most important impact from the Olympics was that the Korean people could change their perceptions of being isolated to the world.
The negative impact was that it created a large nationalist ideology. This means that in the Seoul Olympics the country achieved a really incredible result, and that Korean people always want to have a Top 10 result from the Olympics, it is like country-to-country competition and Korean people feel pressure from sporting competition as a result. I think that is a negative impact from hosting the Olympics in Korea.

J C. How about economic impacts?

M R. Of course there was an economic impact. When I studied in Germany, I heard from a senior about the Korean student life there. Therefore foreigners treated the Korean people differently after the Seoul Olympic Games. Korea could advertise to foreign people, which was influential to Korean people, who could thus receive indirect benefits when they studied abroad. Also, those kind of positive Korean images impacted on Korean business companies that could have economic advantages to Korea after the Seoul Olympics.

Q5. Do you think hosting the Seoul Olympic Games influenced the development of sports in Korea?

M R. It was really influenced in Korean society and I am really surprised about Korea’s Olympic competition results. Actually, South Korea is a really small country in the world, for example, if we compare with the United States and China, we look more like city-size than a country, but South Korea is usually in
the top 10 in the Olympic Games. I think it is like a mystery and doesn’t really make sense. Because, South Korea’s Olympic results are uncommon competition results if we consider the population scale of Korea. However, if we are thinking about that uncommon happening, than finally, Korea has focused on elite sport development. For example, in Korean life with a total 50,000,000 people, around 1,000,000 people really focus on exercise and around 49,000,000 people don’t do any exercise and only watch sport. To think that those extreme divisions could result in international competition success is quite a phenomenon.

J C.  What do you think about the sports phenomena in Korea?

M R.  It is a very negative phenomenon. Because, this kind of style of elite sport development is not good for human life. Accordingly, why is society encouraged to do sports? Because, sport can manage people’s health and basal metabolism in ways to benefit human life. This means that sport is not only for elite players but it is activity for all people. I speak critically about elite sport, because, we have very extremely divided lives in Korea. Actually, I studied in Germany. German people think that people must do swimming and ride bicycles, because swimming is useful for human survival. However, Korean people are divided between who is very good at swimming and who has never been to swimming pools. I mean, all things happen in extremely divided ways in Korean society.
J C. According to your answer, do you think there are policy problems on the divide between elite sport and recreational sport?

M R. Yes. There are Policy problems and Korean society problems. If we want to do recreational sport it really costs a lot of money. For example, if one can swim, this means one has a wealthy family. Because, those people graduated from private schools that have swimming pools. As a result, the private school students can learn swimming naturally but, those who did not graduate from private school, when they want to learn about swimming it is difficult to learn when they are adult. We have these kinds of divided phenomena in Korean society. This means that leisure sport participation depends on having economic power. For example, upper class people and middle class people do leisure sport. They play golf or do aerobics. However, if we looking at the working class then there are class distinctions. That these phenomena are linked to the cost of leisure sport means Korean policy is wrong. For example, if a person wants to do sport, the government should support a policy of facilities for the people. However, there is a big difference between public sport facilities and industrial sport facilities. Industrial sport has been really well developed in Korean society. For example, private sport clubs have really good quality facilities compared to public sport centres. The government needs to sort out the problem of those public sport centres not changing facilities from before when we hosted the Seoul Games in the 1980s. This means that Korean policy is only focused on the development of elite sport and industrial sport; they do not consider recreation sport development.
I hope there are three steps, firstly we continue to have top 10 Olympic results, secondly, the nations has exercise, thirdly, developments to industry so they can earn money...those three process are ideal solutions. But Korea has like a top 10 ranking in elite sport; however, recreation sport is ranking around 100 in the world. To conclude, there are really big gaps between elite sport and recreation sport in Korea.

Q6. What lasting impact have the Games had on Korea and in what areas-sport, society, international relations?

M R. I think, the biggest legacy is a memorable Olympics for the people. For example, for those Olympics which were memorable Olympics, people will talk about then again and again about the Olympics having a positive impact.... that kind of thing is the legacy of Olympism.

One aspect of the mental part was that the Seoul Olympics was unfortunate in Korean history. That is because the Seoul Olympics had an undemocratic preparation compared to the Pheong-Chang preparation. Because, at that time I was in my 20s (University Student), and was involved in anti-Olympics protest against the government. If the Seoul Olympics were hosted democratically in Korea, I might have a good memory of the Seoul Olympics, if the Seoul Olympics was not a politician’s decision.

J C. How about the sports part?
M R. Since when... have we been talking about the top 10 ranking at the Olympics very naturally? I think the sport part influenced the development of athletes to challenge high targets to improve them. Actually, I don’t remember the Seoul Olympics very well. At that time, I didn’t watch the Seoul Olympics opening and closing ceremony.

J C. How about international relationships?

M R. I would say that the Seoul Olympics gave the Korean nation actual feelings about foreign countries.

J C. What do you think was the greatest influence on Korean society?

M R. I think the nation’s pride. At least, we now live with the world’s attention, and Korean people have self-satisfaction; also, they want to receive consolation from others. I think it is like we put in hard work and effort to prepare for the Seoul Games, then the world awards respect to Korea.

J C. Do you think that hosting the Summer and Winter Olympics are positive or negative in Korea?

M R. No. I think we don’t need to host any Games in Korea. Because, the Olympics has been a big money party and it is not directly linked with happiness for me.
For example, in the 1980s I was in a movement against the Seoul Olympics, because I assumed that hosting the Olympics included political reasons. But, at present, I have other reasons to protest against hosting Olympics in Korea. Because, I don't want to have any inconvenience from the hosting of the Olympics in Korea. Also, people say that after the hosting of the Olympics there could be an economic effect. However, it doesn't have the possibility to contribute to the common people. Also, I don't want to fall into the IOC's trick. Because, it's not a clearly principled decision. I feel really sorry for Pheong-Chang preparation members, however, when we lost the bidding to host the Winter Games, I thought, it was really good. Because, if we look at the Korean IOC members who were corrupt, then if we were hosting the Pheong-Chang Games, we would need to give them absolution from their crimes so it was extremely fortunate.
J. C. Why did South Korea want to host the Olympic Games in 1980s?

Kim: This was during President Chun Doo-Hwen’s government, so I think various political considerations were involved. Through the 1960s to the 1980s, South Korea had a negative image in international society, for example regarding international relationships, human rights and the divided peninsula problem. Also, there was the Kwang-Ju protest for democratic reform which had a negative effect on the Korean image. Therefore, the Korean government had to be considering those problems in the 1980s. In addition, sport diplomatic activities and sport marketing were linked to economic development. Those reasons influenced the Korean decision to host the Olympics in Korea.

J. C. Why do you think the Seoul Olympics bid was successful?

Kim: I don’t know the exact situation of before and after the bidding process. However, at that time, we had a preparation organisation and various support systems, and these structures received strong support from the Korean government. I would therefore assume that Korea’s bidding system for the Olympic games worked perfectly. Also, when the IOC investigation team visited Seoul, they were impressed to see South Korea’s economic development and the Koreans’ effort to host the Olympics; for example, they could see the Koreans’
solidarity and enthusiasm to host the Games and moreover, the IOC realised that Korean business companies were very well developed. This affected the IOC evaluation team’s conclusion, and they decided that Seoul could host the Olympics.

**J. C.** Can you explain to me what kind of advantages and disadvantages were experienced by Korea as a result of the Seoul Olympics?

**Kim:** There have been more advantages than disadvantages. The official evaluation of the Seoul Games has seen a number of positive impacts, and also people have generally said that the Seoul Olympics were really successful. Also the process of the Games preparations and their conclusion improved the Korean people’s knowledge and awareness of sports events. Through the hosting of mega-sport events in Korea, people gained national pride and they realised that they are global citizens, giving them a better understanding of other nations and international society. Moreover, Korea’s national image was greatly improved by the impact of the Games, through changing the negative image of a divided country to a more positive image of a successful Olympic host. In addition, it gave a chance to advertise the Korean brand name, creating a positive impact on trade and diplomacy in international society. We had shown the world that both Eastern and Western Blocs could participate in the Seoul Olympics, demonstrating that Korea had the potential to become a united country. Because of the boycotts in recent Olympic history at the Moscow and LA
Olympics, the Seoul Olympics did well to arrange participation from most of the democratic countries and their socialist counterparts.

J C: How about disadvantages?

Kim: For the hosting of the Seoul Games, we invested a large amount of the national budget which had negative side effects on Korean society. For example, a number of problems with using and maintaining the new sports facilities arose, and there were also problems with the use of funding, some of which was used in ways not connected to the vision for long term sport development in Korea. These days, the government has started to prepare for the development of sports diplomacy, marketing and sporting talent; however, those subjects need a long term plan of at least 10 or 20 years. Yet, after the Seoul Games we didn’t prepare for the future. We only depended on a few people for sport diplomacy who couldn’t continue those developments well for Korea.

Q4. Did the Games reflect a globalisation process that has contributed to the ‘Westernisation’ of Korean society?

Kim: After the Seoul Olympics, the words ‘globalisation’ and ‘Westernisation’ became fashionable in Korea. I think it was during President Kim Young-Sam’s period of government that these issues were more widely discussed. Before the 1990s, we didn’t have a perfect knowledge of ‘globalisation’ and ‘Westernisation’. We just had some limited experience with foreign people.
Also, because we were showing the Korean brand name to the world, we ourselves began to have more active relationships with foreign countries. However, after the 1990s, globalisation issues became a hot topic; for example, we worried about whether it represented the Americanisation of Korea, or whether globalisation promoted world peace. So globalisation issues became fashionable for debate in Korea.

J C: The Seoul Olympics was 20 years ago now; what kinds of lasting effects do you think they brought to Korean society?

Kim: After hosting the Seoul Games, we went on to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup and these both have had great effects on Korean society. Through the hosting of mega-events, Korean people have developed a more mature society and have learnt cooperation skills that have made us confident about hosting mega-events in Korea. As you know, when we prepared for the FIFA World Cup, we worried about preparations for stadiums and environmental problems and also, before we prepared for the Seoul Games, we assumed that Korea couldn't win the bid over Nagoya, yet, we did well and met with great successes. This means that if we have to do something, Korean people do their best to do very well. So at the time of the Seoul Games, the world was surprised with Korea, but Koreans were also surprised at themselves for their energy and commitment in preparation. As a result, Koreans considered their own national identity to be tied to the hard work and high-spiritedness shown during the preparation for the Games. Through these mega-sport events we were able to experience our own energy for
preparing. These impacts contributed to the maturation of Korean society and played a huge role in changing the oppressive politics of President Chun to democratic politics in Korea.

Q5. How about economic impacts?

Kim: I think that the sports officials already know how much sport marketing can have economic impacts. Also, these days, many people are interested in sport marketing. Leaving that issue to one side, before the Seoul Games, Korea did not have an open relationship with the Eastern Bloc countries. However, after the Seoul Games, we began to have a more active relationship with them. Therefore, Korea could have the chance to promote the Korean brand name and the image of Korean companies, which was conducive to greater economic development in Korea. For example, foreign people have good perceptions about Korean products which continued after the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Further, this also improved our industry of sport tourism and has affected the ‘cold current hot wind’ with China and other East Asian countries.

Q6. What about infrastructure- transport, facilities?

Kim: If we want to know the exact results about that, we need to do a detailed analysis; for example, was the development of the infrastructure only during the Seoul Olympic Games period, or is it still continuing? However, transportation, directional signs and foreign services have been hugely developed in Korea. For
example, the tourism industry has benefitted from using sport facilities that were
developed before the Games. Also, the Jam-Sil athletes’ apartments and the
Olympic Park both had positive effects of the Olympic legacy in Korea.
However, the maintenance of the sport complex did present a difficult situation,
but we managed to overcome the problems involved. We use those sport
facilities in various areas and for numerous different events, such as for cultural
tourism.

Q7. Do you think hosting the Seoul Olympic Games influenced the development of
sports in Korea and if so, in what ways?

Kim: Before the Seoul Games, when we would think about sport we only focussed on
elite sport. For example, we usually considered the winning of medals in
international competitions. So, the reasoning behind the development of the Tea­
Nung athletes’ village grew from the idea of developing our athletes to get
medals. It had never been the purpose of our sports policy to encourage the
Korean people to enjoy sport. Actually, the project was made by the
authoritarian government.
That’s why we were raising questions such as ‘what is leisure sport?’, ‘what is
sport and culture?’, ‘what is the sport industry?’, ‘what is sport marketing?’, etc,
etc. Such debates became fashionable, as we tried to develop multiple
perspectives for defining sport in Korean society. Before and after the Seoul
Games, we only focused on elite sport development; however, these days, we
pay greater attention to leisure sport matters in Korean society. One reason why
is that we need to maintain our sport complexes and can do so through the
people’s use of them. Also, we need to identify talented sports people in the
leisure sport area for elite sport development. Yet, we still focus on the
development of elite sport. On the other hand, I think we have a good chance to
prepare for leisure sport development.

Q8. What lasting impact have the Games had on Korea and in what specific areas - for
example, sport, society, international relations?

Kim: The Seoul Olympic Games were one of the most important in Olympic history.
Through the success of the Olympics in Korea, the Olympic Movement still has
a good image in the world. That is also one of the big legacies in Korea. Also,
Korea has subsequently been in an important position in the global arena and in
international sport society, such that Korean people have taken great pride in our
country and have had the chance to project a good national image to the world.
Actually, through the Japanese colonial period, Korean people lacked national
self-assurance, lacking confidence in our country; however, after the Seoul
Games, we could have pride in ourselves and experience positive influences
from hosting the mega-event in Korea. Moreover, it gave Koreans an ambition
for the future. Of course, we can see the sport facilities as a lasting legacy.
However, I would say that the mental legacies are very well settled in our hearts.
Also, there have been influences from sport on the politics, economy and culture
in Korean society. For example, my concern is culture, so I would say that the
‘cold current hot winds’ are affected by mega-sport events. Through the hosting
of various mega-events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup in Korea, foreign people's perceptions of Korea changed from negative to positive, and now foreign people have started to have a more favourable impression of Korean people. They have watched Korean cultural performances on the TV and received good impressions of the Korean people, which has in turn helped to promote Korean drama, film and pop music as well. These cultural industries have been really successful in Korea. Therefore, Korean cultural recognition has dramatically increased, and is well received around the world. This is a momentous event in Korean history, because we have usually imported foreign cultures into Korea, but now we could start to advertise our own culture to foreign countries.

J C: What do you think about hosting sports mega-events in Korean society? Do you think we need to continue to host mega-events?

Kim: Actually, I was involved in organising the bid for hosting the Phyung-Chang Olympics and I went to the Dea-Gu and In-Chun World Games examination day and saw their situations. So, I would say that Korea's position is really different compared to when we prepared for the FIFA World Cup, because I could feel that we now have high prestige within the world sport organisations. I think this high recognition has been earned through the success of hosting various mega-events in Korea. In addition, hosting mega events has had an impact on our politics, economics and general society. So we can say that hosting mega-events has many beneficial outcomes and consequences, such that if it is possible, we
need to continue to host various mega-events in Korea. And not only sport
events; we should host various other events so that we can have various,
similarly beneficial effects in Korean society. If we host various other events in
different regions, we could have development in other cities and their residents
could learn useful specialist knowledge and skills, which could also have an
effect on the development of infrastructure.
J.C: Why did South Korea want to host the Olympic Games in the 1980s?

Park: At that time, we thought that it would be difficult to host the Olympics in Seoul. However, some government officials suggested to President Park Chung-Hee that it could be a good time to host the Olympics in Korea. On the other hand, a number of people disagreed and thought it would be quite difficult to prepare for the Olympics. Even though Korea was in a difficult economic situation, several politicians held the opinion that hosting the Olympics in Korea would be good for national prestige. In fact, during President Park Chung-Hee's period of government in South Korea there had been high-speed economic growth. Every year Korea's economy grew by more than 7–8%; the government managed to initiate this high rate of economic growth, so that Korea progressed from being a underdeveloped country to a more developed country. In 1979, when we first imagined hosting the Olympics, South Korea had already surpassed a GNP of USD$1242 per capita, in contrast to the hosts of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Japan, which had a GNP of $ 1,115, and Mexico, the host of the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, which had only $580 per capita. In particular, we expected that when we hosted the Seoul Olympics in 1988, the South Korean GNP would be over USD$3000 per
person, so we hoped that by that stage we would have become a fully-developed, core country.

However, the South Korean government had been a military dictatorship for a long time, and the Korean people had long protested against the government for democratization; a movement which included students, intellectuals and other members of the general Korean population. Therefore, the government needed ideas for silencing the nationwide protests and the Olympics could provide a distraction to that end. Furthermore, hosting the Games would be beneficial for Korea's economic development because it would focus the attention of the world on Korea. Those tactics and strategies were suggested to the President by the chief presidential bodyguard, Park Joung-Gue who subsequently became the KOC President and an IOC member.

J.C: Why do you think the Seoul Olympics bid was successful?

Park: At the time, even IOC President Samaranch was nervous about giving Seoul the Olympic Games. However, there were several factors involved in the decision. First of all, the most key factor was that during the 1980s not many countries had any enthusiasm for hosting the Olympic Games, not like nowadays. At that time, it was considered very difficult to host an economically successful Olympic Games, so not many developed countries wanted to host the Olympics. The other candidate cites were Nagoya and Melbourne, and also there were some opinions that Athens should host the Olympics as a constant
site for the Games. However, soon the Melbourne bid was withdrawn and the Athens idea went out of favour, so that only Nagoya and Seoul were left as candidate cities for 1988 – a much easier competition than nowadays. Nevertheless, Korea had a bidding strategy that included the powerful businessman Chung Ju-Young, Chairman of the Hyun-Dai Group as well as other businessmen, politicians and sports officials; it was a most effective strategy for bidding for the 1988 Olympics. For the 2014 Winter Olympics, I think President Putin also backed the Sochi bid very strongly; perhaps he took the initiative from Korea’s strategy.

J C: Can you explain to me what kind of advantages and disadvantages were experienced by Korea as a result of the Seoul Olympics?

Park: It has since been evaluated that there were many more advantageous consequences than disadvantageous ones. From hosting the Olympics, South Korea laid the groundwork for the country’s further development, not only for sport but in various other areas such as politics, economics, culture and society. Before the Seoul Games, the world didn’t know where Korea is, however, after the Olympics, they started becoming interested in Korea and were surprised at the Korean Olympics results and competition performances. After the Seoul Olympics’ opening ceremony, foreign affairs reporters admired Korea, asking ‘how come such a small country could do something like this!’ Through hosting the Olympics, Korean people obtained self-confidence and pride,
thinking things like 'we can do it', 'we are very proud to be Korean', and this hugely positive impact of hosting the Games cannot be calculated in terms of money. I was also very surprised by the opening ceremony. Also, the Seoul Olympics achieved a certain harmony between the Eastern and Western Bloc counties, meaning that Korea could be able to develop multi-national relationships with socialist countries through new forms of diplomatic activity. Furthermore, domestically, the Seoul Olympics made a huge contribution to Korea's democratization. After the Seoul Olympic bid, President Roh Tea-Woo changed the voting system for Presidential elections in Korea and Korea experienced a subsequent boom in the growth of democracy. In addition, during the Olympic period, the government prepared a traffic reduction scheme using an 'odd-even' system, helping to reduce traffic jams, and also, Korean people had a chance to show their mature citizenship to the world. The Seoul Olympics was a very important event for Korea's development and we finished 4th in the Games, earning the prestigious reputation of a strong sporting country through that great achievement. At that time, when Korea was the Olympic host city, we needed good competition results to appear as a successful host in the short term, so we prioritized a policy for developing elite sport. Several powerful business companies' chairmen became presidents of several sports bodies and provided huge financial support to help develop elite athletes' performance. The government introduced a new reward systems for elite athletes and imported famous coaches to Korea, as well as providing funding support for overseas training in preparation for the Olympics. In fact, those
supporting factors enabled Korea to make a success of the Seoul Olympics, and further to enjoy success at the Barcelona, Atlanta and Sydney Olympics. However, Korean sport policy was directed only toward elite sport development, so many critics pointed out the imbalance between leisure sport and elite sport policy.

**J C:** What do you think the rest of the world thought about Korea before we hosted the Olympic Games; what were your impressions when you went to foreign countries, and then also after Games?

**Park:** Actually I started to work as a sport journalist in 1987. Before 1987, I worked as a social journalist. Because of the Seoul Olympics, I moved into sport. It was really different between before the Seoul Games and after. When I flew from Brazil many people knew about the Seoul Olympics and they said to me it was really successful.

**J C:** Did the Games reflect a globalisation process that has contributed to the ‘Westernisation’ of Korean society?

**Park:** Yes. The Seoul Olympics impacted on Korea’s development in many ways toward Westernisation. First of all, politically, there was the opportunity that the Olympics provided for ending the period of military dictatorship in favour of democracy. Of course, it was not only the Olympic Games that caused this
change, but the Olympics clearly provided a vehicle for the processes responsible. Also, the Seoul Games contributed to cleaning up Korean society. Through the Seoul Games, Korean people worked confidently and they respected the rules; it gave an opportunity to get rid of corrupt and immoral behaviour. In particular, through hosting the Olympics, Koreans obtained a mindset of 'we can do it' which helped the progress of Westernisation in Korean society.

JC: What were the specific economic impacts experienced by Korea after the Seoul Games?

Park: Economically, there was not enough satisfaction. During the Seoul Olympics period, Korea had a good level of economic activity. The economic context at this time was good, such as the Korean currency strength and oil prices. However, after the Seoul Olympics, Korea wasn't able to reach a new turning point. It was not like the Tokyo Olympics case, where the Games were used for economic growth. In some ways, Korea didn't develop its economic growth very well. Even though we hosted the Olympics successfully, we actually had misunderstood the fact that the country's economy was not strong; Korea's economy still needed to grow. However, Korea's workers wanted to see a short-term return and demanded to have a share in the profits of the government's income. Of course, through the Olympics, there was a really huge success in the promotion of the Korean brand name which can't be calculated in terms of money. There is no doubt that through the Seoul Olympics, Korean group companies began to have success in global business. For example, before
the Seoul Games and after the Seoul Games there were really different values attached to Korean companies' image. For example, Samsung and Hyun-Dai's images became highly valuable images. I think Samsung joined the IOC's TOP programme at the 1998 Nagano Olympics and became fashionable.

Q6. What about impacts on Korea's infrastructure- transport, facilities, etc?

Park: The Seoul Olympics afforded the opportunity for improvements to the underground railway and Song-Pa Gu (Jam-Sil) also became a fashionable place, where the Olympics stadium and athletes apartment are. As you know, in Korea the big 3 premium areas are Kang-Nam Gu, Song-Pa Gu and Seo-Cho Gu, and through the Olympics, Song-Pa Gu underwent development and became more like a city. Also, the background to the name of the '88 Express Way's is that because of the Olympics, we built this road and gave it this name; since it links Kim-Po airport to the Cham-Sil Olympics stadium. We also had to expand more express ways in Seoul.

Q7. Do you think hosting the Seoul Olympic Games influenced the development of sports in Korea and if so, in what ways?

Park: Yes, of course. From when we were awarded the Olympics in 1981, we focussed on elite sport development in order to get good results in the 1988 Olympics. Before the Seoul Games, we hosted the '86 Asian Games in Seoul, which was like a rehearsal for the Seoul Olympics. But, even though this was a
short term strategy for elite sport development, we still had good results in the 
Seoul Games, finishing in 4th place, and became a powerful sporting country 
afterwards. For example, in the Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney and Athens 
Olympics, we went on to finish within the top 10, which was the result of our 
development from hosting the Seoul Olympics. However, focussing mostly on 
este sport development for the Olympic Games had an after-effect in Korean 
society because of not balancing between leisure sport and elite sport 
development.

**J C:** You mentioned that Korean sport policy is focused on elite sport development 
rather than leisure sport promotion; could you tell me more about that?

**Park:** Yes. Because we needed to have good results in the short term at the Olympics, 
we only have it that way. Those who have good sports ability are given training, 
and our focus is to support them as they become elite athletes. But this has 
problems, since these days we have issues where athletes are only focused on 
their training, and do not pay attention in school, which is obviously not good 
for them, even though this could have a good effect on their competitive results.

**J C:** So in the long term for sport development, we might need to change this 
system?

**Park:** Yes. From winning at elite sport, Korea could gain various advantages. 
However, we have experience and we know that we can’t raise up our young
athletes like sports machines. In society we don’t accept these kinds of systems, so the best way is that athletes should study hard and do their training as well. It will be like following Western countries’ systems.

J C: As you mentioned earlier, before we prepared the bid there were many people disagreeing about whether to host the Games; what were the key factors to host the Olympics in Korea?

Park: We knew that during the President Chun Du-Hwen period there had been the ‘3S policies’ which were Sport, Screen and Sex. Because he was not a democratically-elected President and became the President by force, he needed to have some strategy to justify his presidency, so he used that ‘3S policy’ to divert the Korean nation’s attention. I am not sure exactly what his purpose was but I accept that story, and sport was included amongst the ‘3S’ policy strategies. It was not only in Korea’s case. For example, some South American countries had also used those strategies to support the presidency in their countries. Anyway, Chun was really interested in sport and maybe Chun’s advisers suggested that hosting the Olympics could better focus the Korean nation’s attention on sport.

Q8. What lasting impacts have the Games had on Korea and in what specific areas - for example, sport, society, international relations?
Park: I think that through the Olympics we could promote the Korean brand name, national prestige and Korean national pride. In addition, Korea was able to become a more developed country through greater economic development. If we hadn’t hosted the Seoul Olympics, it would have been much more difficult to advertise Korea to the rest of the world. Also, I mentioned earlier other legacies such as this. I will e-mail you more material to answer these questions.