Corporate governance of NOCs: the case of Korean Olympic Committee

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Corporate Governance of NOCs: The case of Korean Olympic Committee

by

Kyung Su Jung

A doctoral thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

October 2013

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Abstract

This study identifies the characteristics of seven key principles of good/corporate governance at three levels: as notions that originated in business; in their applications to sport through systematic review; and in relation to the interpretations given to them in the Olympic Movement. The aims of this study are, thus, to establish and utilise the IOC’s definitions/interpretations and operationalisations of corporate and/or good governance developed in a western framework and apply to a non-western NOC, the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC).

This study adopts critical realist assumptions which give rise to the hypothesis that both the regularities of the Korean society and its unobservable social structures have an impact on the corporate governance of the KOC. It also uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine each interviewee’s discourse in order to identify the knowledge embraced by it and to interpret social practice(s) and the exercise of power. CDA is employed in relation to four selected events follows: the KOC/KSC merger, budgetary planning, the recruitment of staff in terms of gender and disability equity and the processes used for selecting the KOC President and the Chef de Mission.

The unobservable deep structure is shown to be real domain in Korean society by the social practices exhibited in the four events. The government and, in particular, the State President represent the highest and most influential authority in decision-making on Korean sports policy. That power relationship coupled with the pre-existing structure of the KOC/KSC’s financial dependency on the government has resulted in a situation where the government has been able to ‘interfere’ greatly in the KOC/KSC’s overall decision-making on sports policy including the election of the President of the KOC. The KOC/KSC President is the most influential stakeholder in the decision-making within the organisation including the selection of Chef de Mission. As the pre-existing structure of cultural expectations determines that women should usually quit their jobs after marriage and that people with disabilities are incapable of working, the strongly male with abilities-dominated organisational culture has resulted in a social phenomenon whereby few females or people with impairments have succeeded in being promoted to senior positions.

From the macro-level perspective, the first KOC/KSC merger accomplished on the orders of the State President shows the dominance of economic power as suggested in Marxist
influenced forms of analysis. The incumbent KOC President, who is at the pinnacle of the business elite, contributed to the KOC/KSC merger, which illustrates the aspect of elitism. In connection with the budgetary process, this may be viewed as evidence of the existence of a neo-corporatist structure in which the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way with the involvement of a limited number of actors. With respect to the meso-level perspective, the aspect of clientelism is exhibited since the government habitually appoints its political aides to be the heads of various sporting organisations. Concerning political governance, it becomes obvious that the government has direct control over KOC/KSC’s policy. In terms of systemic governance, the relations among the domestic stakeholders of the KOC are more likely to follow a hierarchical type of governance, as the government has adopted the highest position and the National Federations are under the ‘control’ of the KOC/KSC. With reference to Lukes (1974)’ second dimension of power this can be evidenced in the context of the non-decision making roles of women and the disabled.

The IOC’s interpretations of the key principles of corporate governance in a western framework are applied to the KOC. Accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy are established but the KOC’s governance practices are not equivalent, while effectiveness and efficiency are interpreted as the same ways of the IOC’s. In general, power centralisation is apparent throughout the Korean cultural context. The KOC’s power structure and organisational culture is likely to be concentrated to the KOC President within the organisation and broadly, the Korean government enjoys its power centralisation decision-making in the Korean context which gives rise to a peculiarly Korean way of interpreting and applying the principles of corporate governance. In such circumstances, nevertheless, where the KOC is making an effort to align its practices with the IOC’s recommendations as much as possible, the indication is that the KOC is on course to reflect the IOC’s governance practices.

Key words: corporate governance, accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, efficiency, effectiveness, systematic review, Critical Realism, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), political governance, systemic governance, stratified ontology: empirical, actual and real reality, organisational values and culture, national culture, leadership, Marxism, elitism, neo-corporatism and non-decision making.
Acknowledgements

This thesis has been produced after three years of full-time and two years of part-time study during which I experienced the most precious but the hardest time in my life. It was definitely a big challenge for me to commence on PhD thesis in a sport policy as someone coming from a non-sports background but I have completed it now and I’d like to express my sincere thanks to a number of people who have supported me. First of all, I greatly appreciate my supervisor Professor Ian Henry who guided and supported me with his expertise and knowledge in the academic field. Although I found such an interesting theme as ‘Corporate Governance of NOCs’ absorbing, it required a degree of creative thinking that made me struggle throughout the PhD course. Without Ian, I would not even have begun this thesis, let alone completed it. Ian also gave me an opportunity to attend the 2008 IOA in Olympia and the 2010 MEMOS Module One in Lausanne which broadened my knowledge and gave me the experience of being involved in the Olympic Movement. My special thanks are extended to Professor Jean-Loup Chappelet at IDEAP in Switzerland who shared his knowledge on the governance of sporting organisations during my visit to Lausanne.

I’d also like to thank Professor Barrie Houlihan who always answered my questions with a big smile and all the lecturers in the Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy who were willing to share their knowledge on ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’. Of course, their dedication to training and their warm and friendly attitude throughout my PhD studies enabled me to endure a difficult and lonely process. I would also like to thank my PhD colleagues who have shared with me the experience of life as PhD students.

I wish to express my gratitude to the senior, middle-ranking and junior KOC staff members who happily participated in a long interview at my request. This study would not have materialised without their valuable and honest comments and opinions with which they contributed the really important ‘raw’ information about the corporate governance of the KOC. They even encouraged me to produce a successful piece of work and I hope that the end-product will enable me to contribute to the development of sport in Korea.

I’d also particularly like to thank Dr. Brigette Vale from the Research Student Office and Mr. David Chapman of the International Office at Loughborough University. Without them, I would not have completed my thesis since they have taken care of some personal difficulties that I encountered and given me the best advice for solving them.
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<td>ANOC</td>
<td>Assembly of National Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>BUPs</td>
<td>Basic Universal Principles</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Chef De Mission</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>KISS</td>
<td>Korea Institute of Sports Science</td>
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<td>KOC</td>
<td>Korean Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>KOKOSA</td>
<td>Korea Council for Sport for All'</td>
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<td>KOSAD</td>
<td>Korea Sports Association for the Disabled</td>
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<td>KPC</td>
<td>Korean Paralympic Committee</td>
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<td>KSC</td>
<td>Korea Sports Council</td>
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<td>KSPO</td>
<td>Korea Sports Promotion Foundation</td>
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<td>MCST</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism</td>
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<td>MOPAS</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Administration and Security</td>
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<td>MOSF</td>
<td>Ministry of Strategy and Finance</td>
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<td>NACOSA</td>
<td>National Council for Sport for All'</td>
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<td>NFs</td>
<td>National Federations</td>
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<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Paralympic Committee</td>
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<td>OCA</td>
<td>Olympic Council of Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCOG</td>
<td>Organising Committee for the Olympic Games</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Salt Lake Organising Committee</td>
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<td>SOSFO</td>
<td>Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

This study explores the rising issue of governance in Olympic circles and focuses on the corporate governance of National Olympic Committees (NOCs), in particular, the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC). Corporate governance has grown in significance, generally, in the management of organisations, and it has become increasingly important, especially, in the wake of governance failures experienced by some sporting organisations, for examples, NOC’s Afghanistan and Iraq’s NOC. Corporate governance in the Olympic movement has not yet been greatly studied since the use of the term ‘governance’ only became current in Olympic circles when it was officially introduced with the Olympic Charter in 2004 (IOC 2004, Rule 19.3.2. cited in Chappelet, 2006: 1).

Since the occurrence of one of the most high-profile sporting scandals, the Salt Lake City Olympic bribery scandal (Jennings and Sambrook, 2000 cited in Henry and Lee, 2004: 26), the issue of ethics in the management of the IOC has become prominent. In fact, it was in 1998 that around 20 IOC members were allegedly involved in the 2002 Olympic Winter Games bid scandal and were accused of taking bribes from the Salt Lake Organising Committee (SLOC) in United States. The allegations was that the SLOC provided gifts to those involved IOC members during the bidding process to secure the games and made its successful bid in 1995. Consequently, at the 108th session of the IOC in March, 1999, votes were taken on the expulsion of six IOC members who had been involved, and a new bidding process for the 2006 Winter Olympics host city was approved.

In recognition of the need to address such failings in its corporate governance, the IOC introduced an independent Ethics Commission and an IOC 2000 Commission in 1999. The former was given the task of formulating a set of ethical principles, including a Code of Ethics, for IOC members and investigating subsequent complaints of breaches. Meanwhile, the latter was asked to examine and make recommendations on the selection process for future host cities and to guide the IOC over the structures to be put in place for choosing its members and distributing its revenue (Booth, 1999:55). The Report of the IOC 2000 Commission was released during the 110th IOC session in 1999:, it stated that “the topic of transparency, initially under sub-theme 7 ‘Communication’, is presented separately in view of its major importance” (IOC 2000 Commission, 1999).
In Olympic organisations, Hums and MacLean (2004: 261) outline three levels of Olympic organisation (IOC, NOC and OCOG) in terms of the overall structure of the Olympic Movement. The Olympics are organised under the jurisdiction of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and bids to host the Olympic Games are made by the National Olympic Committees (NOC) of interested countries. With a successful bid, the responsibility for organising the Olympics falls upon that country’s/city’s Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG). While examining the notions of corporate governance, the concern is principally with their application at the level of the NOC and this study attempts to determine whether the notions of corporate governance discussed in the business or financial sectors can be readily applied to sporting organisations and, in particular, NOCs. In addition it will consider whether western notions of governance are entirely transferable to non-western sporting contexts such as that of the KOC.

For reference, the governance of the IOC is referred to as the source of a model of corporate/good governance that has been recommended for the sporting organisations to emulate (see also Chappelet, 2010). After its foundation in 1894, the early IOC was based around the figure of Pierre de Coubertin but the size of the IOC was too small, according to Zakus (2000: 166), for governance and management, to be divided. During the post-World War I period the IOC experienced a size increase, leading to the formation of an Executive Board in 1921, which marked a change in the governance of the IOC and resulted in the establishment of a permanent Secretariat in Lausanne in 1926. During Berlioux’s 18-year tenure from 1967 to 1985, its Secretariat expanded and started to play a central role in the management of the IOC. It could be argued that this was the first time that governance and management took on significant and separate obligations (Zakus, 2000: 166). During the post-Berlioux period the IOC enjoyed its largest physical expansion. The top-down hierarchical control of Olympic sport by the IOC (if it was ever truly exercised) has subsequently been replaced by a network of interdependencies (see Henry and Lee, 2004)

In order to represent the current governing structure of the IOC, Chappelet (2012) uses Pérez (2009)’s work in identifying the organisation’s five successive levels of management and governance.

Table 1-1 The five levels of governance of the IOC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Level name</th>
<th>IOC structures, external entities and instruments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Management (strategic and)</td>
<td>IOC President and directors with IOC Administration</td>
</tr>
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</table>
At level one, the IOC Administration which is made up of paid staff based in Lausanne, carries out the IOC’s daily management. The Administration has been restructured into 15 departments; the management of the IOC’s management is handled by the institutional authorities such as the Session, the Executive Board and the IOC President. Of those, the Executive Board approves all internal governance regulations relating to its organisation. At level three, where the IOC’s regulatory mechanisms are overseen, the work is mainly focused on IOC members in association, since 1999, with the IOC Nominations Commission, the Athletes Commission (since 1981) and the Ethics Commission (since 1999). In particular, the IOC 2000 Commission was formed in 1999 as a consequence of pressure from the media. All IOC members should comply with the Code of Ethics adopted in 1999 and the IOC’s Ethics Commission has the right to investigate the members and the background to the bids made by individual cities to host major international events.

Unlike levels one, two and three, levels four and five are more associated with other organisations that are independent from the IOC. Level four aims at harmonizing the regulatory mechanisms. As the Code of Ethics is also widely applied to NOCs, the Organisation Committees and the Candidature Committees for the Games may have varying interpretations of the regulations. In fact, although the Olympic Charter states that the IOC’s decisions are final, several International Federations (IFs) and NOCs also have their own Ethics Commissions and codes of Ethics. It is also possible that the IOC’s rules of governance may, in certain instances, be contradictory to Swiss law. Accordingly, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established in 1999 to “harmonise the various sporting rules and legislative mechanisms related to doping” (Chappelet, 2012: 18). In a similar vein, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (Rule 15.4) “has incontestably contributed towards aligning sport regulations with natural law, and towards a certain degree of harmonization of the rules of the Olympic sports organisations” (Chappelet, 2012: 20).
Level five relates to the meta-governance of the IOC. To quote Chappelet, “The IOC functions within the framework of Swiss legislation as an Association in accordance with Articles 60 to 79 of the Swiss Civil Code, or through its foundations and limited companies (SA) that are also subject to Swiss law” (Chappelet, 2012: 20). Moreover, ‘The Federal Law of the Host State’ in force in 2008, allows the Swiss Government to “grant certain ‘other international entities’ privileges, immunities (Article 2.1m of the law) and other special waivers of Swiss law” and, thus, this enables the IOC to “avoid any cases being filed against itself in Swiss courts” (Chappelet, 2012: 20). Moreover, Rogge (2010) has claimed that it is necessary to create “harmonization between sporting rules and laws of the lands where sport is practised” (cited in Chappelet, 2012: 21).

Since CAS and WADA are separated from the IOC, both are formally autonomous independent global sports organisations. However, the IOC still exercises ‘invisible power’ in that its nominees may still be involved in governing those outside bodies (Forster, 2006: 73). Regarding CAS, Forster states that some athletes have questioned the impartiality of CAS but this has been rejected by the legal system of Switzerland (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 2003). Forster comments that this demonstrates “an interesting interplay between private global bodies and nation-states” (Forster, 2006: 73).

1.2 Research Aims and Objectives

This study identifies the primary ethical principles of corporate governance and evaluates the issue of corporate governance in Olympic circles, specifically with regard to their application to the NOC. This study, therefore, seeks to address the following questions and objectives:

- What characterises corporate/good governance in the literature and how have the principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?
- What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to the governance of Olympic organisations and how are these interpreted by the IOC body?
- How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of corporate/good governance in general and, specifically, those aspects recommended by the IOC and how are these interpreted in the KOC context?
- To what extent are practices of corporate/good governance developed in a western context applicable in a non-western context?
The first set of questions is discussed in the Systematic review (see Chapter 3) and the second set is covered in a discussion of the commentary and operationalisation of governance principles and the appropriate IOC documents (see Chapter 4). With respect to the third and the fourth sets of questions, the answers may be found by means of the analysis of the KOC events and its corporate governance.

1.3 A Normative Enquiry

Henry and Lee (2004: 30) indicate that “corporate or good governance is concerned with normative and ethically-informed standards of managerial behaviour”. According to Dellaportas et al., (2005: 5),

*Ethics* is a concept that signifies how we act in order to make the ‘right’ choice, and produce ‘good’ behaviour. It encompasses a thorough (and objective) examination of principles, values, duties and norms, the consideration of available choices or alternatives in order to make the right decision and the strength of character to act in accordance with the decision.

“It is often said that ethics is a ‘normative’ enquiry. This means that ethics is about ‘norms’ or ‘standards’”, as indicated by Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 6). Moreover, Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 6) add that regarding the use of the term ‘normative’ – a distinction can be drawn between a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ sense: “the ‘strong’ sense of ‘normative’ is a prescriptive one [advocating norms] and the ‘weak’ sense of ‘normative’ is a descriptive one [describing norms].” The former puts an emphasis on urging people to improve their ethics and persuading people to mend their ways, while the latter focuses on enabling readers to observe and understand the ethical views. In this research, the weak sense of normative is adopted along with analysis of corporate and other forms of governance of the KOC. In other words, the primary concern is to capture the way that norms have been interpreted in an accurate manner.

1.4 Rationale for selecting seven principles and the KOC as a case study

This study identifies the most important principles of corporate governance in three main areas, namely the business and sporting sectors, and the Olympic Movement. For the business sector and the Olympic Movement the literature mainly deals with accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy, whereas these principles do not receive much attention in the literature regarding sporting organisations. Unlike those four principles, the
concepts of equity and effectiveness have received greater emphasis in studies dedicated to the sporting field. Although efficiency is not discussed as much as the other principles in any area, it may be the main principle that should be considered in connection with accountability. With reference to the auditing of finance reports, it is not only a part of accountability as it poses the question ‘To whom is the organisation accountable?’ but it is also intrinsic to the enquiry: ‘Does the NOC spend its resources efficiently?’ The question ‘How is the NOC accountable?’ is aimed at investigating whether the NOC’s expenditure is in line with its resources. This study, therefore, covers seven principles in order to examine the governance practices of the NOCs, which are accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency.

The Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) is taken as a case study, since the Republic of Korea is regarded as one of the world’s sporting powers in terms of the performance of its athletes in international events. Its team ranked 7th overall in the medal tables at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, 5th in the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, and 5th in the 2012 London Olympic Games. It is also located in a non-western context in geographical and cultural if not geo-political terms. Therefore, the case of the KOC may be a good subject for a study that sets out to identifying the ways in which governance practices developed by the IOC’s interpretation of corporate and/or good governance in a western cultural context are interpreted and implemented in a non-western cultural milieu and the extent of the similarities and differences between them. Thus, the KOC’s organisational culture is discussed and, further, national culture of South Korea is analysed and discussed in comparison with this study’s and Hofstede (1997)’s findings.

1.5 Thesis structure

The introduction sets the background for a discussion of the emerging issue of the quality of corporate governance in the Olympic Movement. In addition to giving a brief history of the IOC’s governing structure, this chapter explains the current governing structure of the IOC and gives evidence of the effort taken to reform the IOC in order to promote corporate governance in the Olympic Movement. For the aims of this study, four sets of questions are provided and the objectives of each of them are listed in association with this study’s aim of achieving a clearer understanding of corporate governance in an NOC.

Prior to undertaking a systematic review, Chapter Two deals with four areas of social analysis ranging from governance and stakeholder to state and power theory. Regarding
governance this study discusses three types of governance (following Henry and Lee, 2004), one of which is corporate governance, which covers the principal elements, namely, accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. The other two types of governance, political and systemic governance, are also considered in the analysis to understand governance in the Korean context. Stakeholder theory aids our recognition of the main stakeholders of the KOC and additionally to discover their inter-relationships. State theory provides a context in which to identify the governing system of Korea and examine how this affects the practices of corporate governance in the KOC. Theories of power (which are of course linked to theories of the state) are also beneficial for understanding the power relations between the KOC and its stakeholders. By applying the concept of three types of power, as introduced by Lukes (1974), one can discover how the most influential stakeholders deal with emerging issues and with opposing interests in sports policy in Korea.

In Chapter Three, the systematic review is conducted and is divided into two main sections: ‘what the systematic review is’ and ‘what the emerging themes are’. The first section also provides details of each stage of the systematic review for this study. The second section includes descriptive and thematic analysis. The descriptive analysis examines the essential of corporate governance and how it has been constructed in a western context, while the thematic analysis distinguishes the emergent themes of corporate governance in the sport sector.

Chapter Four undertakes a process of operationalisation which aims to convert the abstract concepts of the seven key principles into observable and identifiable measures. The commentary provides a rational account of the interpretations and operationalisation and it is developed on the basis of the preceding literature review. Based on the commentary, the operationalisation provides an investigatory framework. This is followed by the analysis of official documents in connection with the recommendations on corporate/good governance published and released by the IOC. It deals with the issue of how the IOC adapts and interprets key governance principles and the ways in which the practice may be at variance with the commentary.

In Chapter Five, the methodology is discussed. With its adoption of a critical realist approach which makes use of realist ontological and interpretivist epistemological assumptions, this study develops its own analysis of corporate governance of NOCs by the application of
Critical Discourse Analysis. The Korean Olympic Committee is taken as a case study. With respect to methods, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis are applied in order to analyse four events and/or processes that have taken place in Korean sport, in the KSC and KOC, and to evaluate the corporate governance of the KOC.

Chapter Six identifies the features of the discourse relating to the four events and/or processes that took place in the KOC/KSC, which are analysed by applying Critical Discourse Analysis. These four events and/or processes are as follows: the merger of the KOC/KSC; the annual budget planning; the process of new staff employment; and the selection of the KOC president and the Chef de Mission. The analysis of these events/processes shows how the practices of corporate governance are discursively constructed by comparison with the western discourse and the notions of corporate governance constructed by the IOC in a western context. The analysis of a series of decision-making and social practices helps to elucidate the power relations existing between the KOC and its stakeholders. Particular attention is given to the hierarchical appropriation of power over and power of discourse, and to the organisational culture, as evidenced in the observations of KOC staff and Board members.

Chapter Seven deepens the investigation of the seven principles of corporate governance of the KOC on the basis of the operationalisation and commentary. The approach to analysis is illustrated diagrammatically (see Figure 5-4), and similarities and differences in the practices of corporate governance between the KOC and the IOC’s recommendations (which are taken as a ‘western’ construct) are also discussed in this chapter. The purpose, more specifically, is to identify the way in which corporate governance is interpreted in the Korean context.

The last chapter concludes with a brief overview of the study and draws together the strengths of the analysis. A principal result emerging from this study is that its examination of the corporate governance of the KOC reveals that the IOC’s definitions on corporate governance principles developed in a western context can be interpreted differently in different political, social, economic, historical and/or cultural contexts. Furthermore, the concept of the autonomy of sports organisations is reviewed in association with institutional isomorphism and the results of this study are explained in connection with national culture. The limitations of this research and its implications for future study are also addressed.
2 Theoretical grounding

2.1 Introduction
This chapter employs several theories in order to contribute to an evaluation of corporate governance of NOCs separately from a systematic review. It employs a basic understanding of governance which, according to Henry and Lee (2004), consists of three approaches: political, systemic and corporate governance. Since this study aims to learn about the corporate governance of NOCs, it firstly identifies and addresses the principles of corporate governance developed in the business and financial sectors, from where corporate governance stemmed before examining and their application to sport. Prior to the systematic review that examines how corporate governance has been studied in the field of sport, this study reviews key principles of corporate governance in the business field and discusses how these principles are defined or used in both business and sports sectors.

In addition, this section will deal with a range of theories including stakeholder theory and theories of the state and of power, which are closely related to issues of corporate governance in the NOCs. Stakeholder theory helps to identify the stakeholders in an NOC context. Through a study of theories of the state, an understanding of the governing system of the nation to which the NOC belongs can be developed. Theories of power can be applied to discover how decision-making in sport policy is conducted in a national or an organisational context, and thus they can operate at the meso, as well as the macro level.

2.2 Governance

2.2.1 Defining governance
The term ‘governance’ has in the past been defined by contrasting it with the notion of government. Government traditionally connotes a hierarchical system and one-way (top-down) policy making. It is claimed that traditional government is unlikely to be able to adapt to a fast-changing economic, social and cultural environment. Accordingly, a governability crisis has arisen in many diverse states and contexts in relation to the growing complexity of issues, an increase in the plurality of agents of government and the participation of civil society in the policy-making process (Dror, 1994 cited in Kazancigil, 1998: 70). Rhodes (1996: 652-3) argues that “governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed” (cited in Stoker, 1998: 17). Therefore, due to the
governability crisis, ‘governance’ has attracted wider attention, and has become an important item on the international agenda since the 1970s.

Governance has a broader meaning than government, in that it covers non-state actors as well. According to Stoker (1998: 17), government refers to “the formal institutions of the state in which they exercise their monopoly of legitimate coercive power, with its characteristics having an ability to make decisions and a capacity to enforce them”. By contrast, governance does not need to represent government activity. Thus, Rosenau (1996: 5) defines governance in Governance without government as “a set of regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity, which function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority” (cited in Smouts, 1998: 81). In addition, Stoker (1998: 17) notes that governance refers to “the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred”. This means that there is more emphasis on the interactions among influential actors. Those actors include mainly local, regional, national, and international level governments, as well as organisations in the private and voluntary sectors, for instance, non-profit and non-governmental organisations, enterprises, and the like. Through their partner organisations they form the networks that are able to fulfil their objectives by establishing mutual understanding and developing a shared vision.

In governance, moreover, Rhodes and Kooiman emphasise autonomy. Rhodes (1997: 53) states that governance refers to “self-organizing, interorganisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state”. Kooiman (1993) also underlines that “the governance model is attractive as it is supposed to have a greater capacity to cope with policy-making issues in increasingly differentiated modern societies, where the various social sub-systems and networks have become more autonomous” (cited in Kazancigil, 1998: 70).

2.2.2 Differences between Governance and Management

Governance involves the use of power in developing, controlling and regulating the high-level issues of strategic directions and activities (Olympic Solidarity, 2007: 23). Accordingly, the Cadbury Report (1992: 5) states that “Boards of directors should be responsible for the governance of their companies and supervising the management of the business.” Tricker (1984: 6-7) adds that they are also responsible for reviewing, monitoring and controlling the executive actions of management (Rhodes, 1997: 48). Management, on the other hand, is
concerned with daily operations in line with the strategic directions and activities adopted by the governing board (Olympic Solidarity, 2007: 23 & 27). Paid staff or volunteers are responsible for the day-to-day management of the organisation. Therefore, “all companies need governing as well as managing” (Tricker 1984: 6-7 cited in Rhodes, 1997: 48).

2.2.3 Differences between Good and Corporate Governance

Rhodes (1997) introduces six separate uses of governance, two of which are good governance and corporate governance. Hirst also lists five versions of governance, including good governance and corporate governance. By Hirst’s definition, good governance means “creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic action” (Hirst, 2000: 14), while corporate governance is “a watchword of those who wish to improve the accountability and transparency of the actions of management” (Roe, 1994 cited in Hirst, 2000: 17).

To begin with the concept of good governance, Leftwich (1994) outlines two main meanings. International financial institutions such as the World Bank use it in managerial and administrative terms. In the 1989 World Bank report, the notion of good governance first appeared (Leftwich, 1994: 370). When a government is poorly managed, this inevitably has as its consequence an economic crisis which usually results in a demand for loans from the World Bank (1992b). The Bank's ideas on this issue are clearly presented in its formal statement on Governance and Development (World Bank, 1992b cited in Leftwich, 1994: 368). The western countries often interpret good governance from a political perspective. Those countries in which democracy is well developed are more likely to claim to be in a good condition in terms of governance. Thus, along with ‘good’ management, a politically stable and democratic system should be taken into consideration as a required context.

The concept of corporate governance is highlighted in the Cadbury Report (1992), formally entitled The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, which was published by the Cadbury Committee in 1992 in the UK. Rhodes (1997) explains corporate governance, which is referred to as “the system by which organisations are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Report, 1992: 5). The Report considers the financial aspects and describes a wide range of thinking and ways of considering corporate governance issues.

“The Committee’s recommendations are focused on the control of reporting functions of boards, and on the role of auditors. This reflects the Committee’s
purpose, which was to review those aspects of corporate governance specifically related to financial reporting and accountability” (Cadbury Report, 1992: 1)

The narrower concept of good governance has managerial, administrative and political applications, while corporate governance is often more concerned with management ethics, though the terms overlap. As this study aims to identify the core principles of governance, and their ethical implications for NOCs, the notion of corporate governance is adopted. Nevertheless, ‘good’ is also just an adjective, qualifying the type of governance, for instance, ‘good political governance’, or ‘good corporate governance’ where ‘good’ may imply either ‘effective’ or ‘ethical’ or both. Accordingly, the terms ‘corporate governance’ and ‘good governance’ are used interchangeably in this research inasmuch as both terms are able to cover the concept of governance in management.

2.2.4 Types of Governance

Regarding types of governance, Leftwich (1994: 371) lists three approaches stemming from the meaning of good governance: systemic, political and administrative. His typology is particularly useful for this study following Leftwich (as do some others, such as Henry & Lee, 2004) which refers to three types of governance: systemic, political and corporate governance. However, it is possible to identify more than one form of typology. For example, Hindley (2002: 4) proposes the three categories of governance as steering, networks and good governance. Governance as steering can be taken to relate to political governance, governance as networks to systemic governance and good governance to corporate governance.

a) Political governance

Given that the emphasis on steering suggests a dispersal rather than a concentration of power, political governance focuses on the achievement of goals through the employment of regulations and inducements. As Pierre (2000: 4) argues, “political institutions no longer exercise a monopoly of the orchestration of governance,… but governance is about how to maintain the ‘steering’ role of political institutions despite the internal and external challenges to the state.” Henry and Lee (2004: 26) support the view that political governance relates to the processes by which governments and, in that case, also governing bodies seek to steer the sports system to achieve their desired outcomes. Hindley (2002: 15) adds that “greater emphasis is, therefore, placed on fostering partnerships and collective decision-making and marks a pronounced shift away from top-down, hierarchical authority.”
In this study, political governance is mainly discussed in connection with the relations between the KOC and the government. As the Korean government is the main stakeholder of the KOC in the Korean context, this study attempts to determine whether or not the government plays a critical/major role in sports policy making, or whether it exercises an absolute power or maintains a steering role as a political stakeholder (see Chapter 6).

b) Systemic governance

The second concept is systemic governance. This suggests partnership, cooperation or competition, and collaboration between stakeholders as an alternative to the exercise of hierarchical authority, which was perhaps the dominant paradigm until the later 1970s. Not only do sports organisations belong to networks of stakeholders but also different types of stakeholders are related to one another such as satellite broadcasters, players, associations, agents and sponsors. More interrelations between those various parties in the network are necessary if we are to gain a better understanding of policy change.

Furthermore, Kooiman (1993) develops the notion of social-political governance, which is based upon broad and systematic interactions. Social-political governance has the characteristics of complexity, dynamics and diversity. Unlike hierarchical governing systems, it tends to involve more actors, according to Kooiman (1993: 41), in terms of its complexity, the number of structural relations is greater; as regards its dynamics, relations are changing; and concerning diversity, different types of relations or mutual interdependencies of social-political systems are expressed. Thus, this is likely to be a form of ‘co-governing’ in terms of the mode of governing, in contrast to the self-governing and hierarchical governing modes. Co-governing is a horizontal system of governing where actors co-operate, co-ordinate and communicate without requiring a central or dominating governing actor (Kooiman, 1993).

Which actor dominates in a system may vary from one issue to the next, as can be seen in the corporate governance of the KOC. In the international context, it reveals whether and for which types of issue, for example, the IOC is a dominant actor or is simply a member of the KOC’s group of stakeholders in a cooperative, competitive or collaborative relationship. In the domestic context, this study seeks to determine under which circumstances, for which reasons and for which issues particular groups of actors may be dominant stakeholder(s) in decision making (see Chapter 6).
c) Corporate governance

To begin with its historical background, the term ‘corporate governance’ first started to be widely used in the business sector. It first became a subject of debate in the eighteenth century, according to Mallin (2004:11) who states that “the potential problems of the separation of ownership and control were identified in the eighteenth century by Smith (1838)”. Mallin (2004: 11) also cites the work of Berle and Means (1932) who drew attention to the way in which, “as countries industrialized and developed their markets, the ownership and control of corporations became separated”. Since then, many cases of governance failure in the business sector have led to a greater emphasis being placed on governance. Larson and Clute (1979) claim with relation to the reported corporate failures and crises, that the “characteristics shared by failed firms are directly related to personal decision-based characteristics of managers” (cited in Mellahi and Wood, 2003: 23). The focus on corporate governance has been broadened so as to encompass its invisible as well as its visible factors. Dellaportas et al. (2005: 5) note that corporate governance has traditionally been used as

“the way a corporation is directed and controlled to maximise shareholders’ profits, however, recent corporate events and the apparent failures of the governance system highlight the need to review not only systems and structures, but also relationships, cultures, ethics, and leadership within organisations.”

They also, thus, focus on culture and values in an organisation.

Accountability

In corporate governance the principle of accountability is particularly concerned with officials’ behaviours and ethics, as shown by Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 82), who note that “the issue of corporate governance is, in effect, identical to the issue of executive accountability” because Executive Committees can control companies in a number of ways. Stakeholder theory raises questions about responsibility and accountability (Mellahi & Wood, 2003; see also Kitson & Campbell, 1996: 166). “A broader and more inclusive definition” of corporate governance “encompasses accountability towards not only shareholders, but also the company’s relevant stakeholders” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 21). Broadly considered, accountability means that a company should pursue the benefit of all stakeholders. Also, “the board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting” (The Cadbury Committee, 1992: 15). Accountability requires, furthermore, that within an
organisation, a member of the Executive Committee should comply with its rules and regulations.

In terms of accountability, the responsibility of the internal auditors is “to oversee the firm’s financial and operating procedures, to check the accuracy of the financial record-keeping, to implement improvements with internal control, to ensure compliance with accounting regulations and to detect fraud” (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007: 27). Organisations support their own auditing team to enhance their accounting and control internal efficiency. On the other hand, external auditors should be independent of the organisation being audited, aiming to “review the firm’s financial statements and its procedures for producing them” (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007: 28), and to make sure of the fairness of its internal auditing.

Issues of moral responsibility concern first, ‘duty’, which might be general or role-specific, and secondly, a ‘causal’ sense that we are responsible for the consequences of our actions. The second concern is with causal responsibility which considers moral responsibility in the sense of ‘duty owed’ and this is also true of accountability, because what makes us morally liable for blame or punishment is also a result of failures to fulfil our duties. Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 66) point out that “duty thus sets the parameters within which accountability operates”, adding (1996: 69) that, in particular, “the big and possibly only issue of causal responsibility is the one of executive accountability”. Therefore, executive accountability is likely to overlap with responsibility.

Responsibility
According to the OECD (1999), "a corporate governance structure should specify the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, the managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs" (cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 21). Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 82) also state that the chief issue of corporate governance is “how companies should be governed”. It concerns the mechanisms for allocating powers and responsibilities within companies. The report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992: 21) argues that in terms of responsibility, “there should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of a company, which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 27).
Mellahi and Wood (2003: 26) state that responsibility is about “the strategic guidance of the organisation and the effective monitoring of management by the board” and how the board of directors “balance diverging interests and ensure the long-term viability of the firm” (2003: 21-2). The Cadbury Report (1992: 2) also claims that all directors are given a monitoring role, which endows them with a responsibility for ensuring that all the activities of their companies are in place.

**Effectiveness**

The Cadbury Report (1992) highlights its assertion that boards’ responsibilities are directly related to effectiveness, and that the unitary board system should be strengthened so as to increase its effectiveness. The unitary board system means “a board made up of a combination of executive directors, with their intimate knowledge of this business, and of outside, non-executive directors, who can bring a broader view to the company’s activities, under a chairman who accepts the duties and responsibilities which the post entails” (the Cadbury Report, 1992: 10). The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council (CGC) (2003) also suggests that “organisations should review and actively encourage enhanced board and management effectiveness. Organisations can facilitate this by providing directors and executives with the information required to assess the company’s performance” (cited in Dellaportas et al., 2005: 125).

Boards should provide a high level of quality of information to their directors so as to increase accountability and effectiveness, as monitoring is included as an aspect of accountability, and in order to realise this aim, the Boards of Directors should be provided with in-depth information (the Cadbury Report, 1992: 6).

Moreover, the Board's assumption of the responsibility for providing a strategic goal is also related to effectiveness. According to Slack and Parent (2006: 41), effectiveness is defined as “the extent to which an organization achieves its goal or goals” (cf. Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Sandefur, 1983). In particular, official goals and operational goals are described in the following manner: “official goals (an organisation’s reason for existence) help to ensure that everyone is working toward a common end” while “operational goals (referring to an organisation’s primary tasks) provide a sense of direction and motivation, guidelines for decision-making and standards for evaluating performance” (Kerr, 1991: 84).
Dellaportas et al., (2005: 125) argue that “key elements of the organisation’s culture and values must support good corporate governance principles.” This is also argued by Slack and Parent (2006) who state that, in relation to effectiveness, organisational culture is likely to have an impact on management in organisations. They maintain (2006: 275) that organisational culture is one of the most recent introductions into the field of organisation theory, but also add that culture is an important variable in determining the effectiveness of an organisation. It is not (as many popular writers have implied) the only variable. Apparently, it is important to understand organisational culture as a factor impacting upon corporate governance, for example in the NOCs.

**Efficiency**

Efficiency “takes into account the amount of resources used to produce the desired output” (cf. Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Sandefur, 1983). Furthermore, Jackson and Carter (2000: 198) stress that the ability to distinguish between what is structurally relevant to efficiency and what is not, is of crucial importance, adding that “efficiency is deeply implicated in organizational behaviour” (2000: 197).

**Transparency**

Kitson and Campbell (1996: 115) claim that large companies emphasise the need for openness in decision-making and for a clear demonstration that the company is being governed in accordance with perceived business virtues. Dellaportas et al. (2005: 125) also point out that “organisations should develop written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them”, as recommended by The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council (CGC) (2003).

**Democracy**

With respect to the integrity of the company’s financial reporting “organisations should implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard it” (cited in Dellaportas et al., 2005: 124).

**Equity**

Unlike the other ethical principles, the notion of equity does not appear much in discussions of corporate governance in the business sector, though increasingly it does so in terms of gender. Nevertheless, there is an issue over the correct definitions of the terms ‘equity’ and
‘equality’. According to UNESCO\(^1\) (2000: 5), the ILO (International Labour Organization) was quoted as saying that

Equality between men and women entails the concept that all human beings, both men and women, are free to develop their personal abilities and make choices without the limitations set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices. Gender equality means that the different behaviour, aspirations and needs of women and men are considered, valued and favoured equally. It does not mean that women and men have to become the same, but that their rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equity means fairness of treatment for women and men, according to their respective needs. This may include equal treatment or treatment that is different but which is considered equivalent in terms of rights, benefits, obligations and opportunities (ABC Of Women Worker’s Rights And Gender Equality, 2000: 48)

This study also distinguishes equity from equality in order to appraise the NOCs practices with regard to each of these concepts.

In summary, as far as its core notions are concerned corporate governance in the business sector is likely to focus on accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy and effectiveness. On the other hand, the principles of equity and efficiency do not tend to appear as frequently in the literature pertaining to the business as they clearly do in discussions of the sport sector. Henry and Lee (2004: 30) underline that “the notions of organisational governance and business ethics are clearly interrelated” and they refer (2004: 26) to corporate governance in the sporting context as “the accepted norms or values for the just means of allocation of resources, and profits or losses (financial or other) and for the conduct of processes involved in the management and direction of organisations in the sports business”. The notion of corporate governance will be discussed in connection with the sporting field in Chapter Three and with the Olympic Movement in Chapter Four.

2.3 Stakeholder theory

Stakeholder theory is a key concept used to understand the relations among any related individuals or groups and NOCs and this theory serves the interests of those who are identified as ‘stakeholders’ in a company (Evan & Freeman, 1993:255; Cragg, 2002:132-133 cited in Kaler, 2003: 71). Freeman (1984: 46) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives.” As Mellahi and Wood (2003: 20-1) mention, “the roots of both corporate governance and the

\(^{1}\) A summary review of UNESCO’s accomplishments since the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) released by the Unit for the Promotion of the Status of Women and Gender Equality in May, 2000
concept of ‘stakeholder’ are central issues in contemporary debates on business ethics." In addition, the Cadbury Committee (1992), in devoting a great deal of attention to corporate governance, also suggests that corporate governance refers to the relationships among stakeholders in shaping the direction and performance of companies.

The stakeholders include not only the shareholders, but also non-shareholder groups, such as employees, customers, suppliers, communities, et cetera (Kaler, 2003: 71). There are two types of stakeholders: one comprises the ‘primary’ and the other the ‘secondary’ stakeholders. “Primary stakeholders comprise those who have a formal and official relationship with the firm, for instance, suppliers, investors, employees, shareholders, managers and so forth” (Carroll, 1993 cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 28) and, furthermore, the public stakeholder group is also included, for instance, government and communities (Clarkson, 1995; see also Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 28). Others are classified as secondary stakeholders (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 28). In the context of the NOCs, the stakeholders can be listed as follows: at the international level, the IOC, the IFs, and/or Olympic Solidarity; at the domestic level, the State president, governmental bodies, political groups, business sponsors or partners, the NFs, the members of sporting organisations and the staff members of the NOC, the media, and the public.

Stakeholder theory is concerned with two aspects: decision-making and ethics. With respect to decision-making, a balance among stakeholders does not imply that they all have an equal voice or share in the outputs, and thus, having a voice in decision-making and a share in the organisational outcomes should be based on their contribution to the organisation. Therefore, the more a stakeholder group contributes to the organisation, the greater their voice and share of the value created should be (Phillips, 2004: 4). In reality, not all stakeholders want a voice in organisational decision-making, but those who do desire a voice should have it (Phillips, 2004: 2). Regarding ethics, "stakeholder theory begins with the assumption that values are necessarily and explicitly a part of doing business, and rejects the separation thesis which assumes that ethics and economics can be neatly and sharply separated" (Freeman 1994 cited in Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004: 364). Thus, ethics should be taken into account in business activities, and particularly in stakeholder theory. Verdeyen, Put and van Buggenhout (2004: 325) stress that corporate governance was traditionally seen as the solution to the disproportional relation between the company’s main stakeholders.
Corporate governance in the non-profit sector is viewed as a model of rules governing the mechanisms of the decision-making process and the mechanisms of control and liability. According to Denef (1998), "these rules (1) have to ensure that the powers and the interests of the stakeholders are balanced and (2) have to avoid the influences or considerations which may harm the balance in the above-mentioned mechanisms" (cited in Verdeyen et al., 2004: 327). These rules are closely related with the ethics of corporate governance, and accordingly, they should be assessed whenever and wherever power is exercised in the organisations.

Furthermore, there is a distinction between descriptive stakeholder theory and a normative approach. A descriptive stakeholder theory was developed by Mitchell et al. (1997), the central point of which is that "stakeholder salience will be positively related to the cumulative number of stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency" (Jawahar & McLanghlin, 2001 cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 30). However, Jawahar and McLanghlin (2001) claim that this model is open to criticism due to the fact that it only emphasises "attributes that makes a stakeholder salient, but ignores an issue central to stakeholder management: how to deal with stakeholders who vary in terms of salience" (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 30). Similarly, Donaldson and Preston (1995) also argue that stakeholder theory is unable to be explained along descriptive lines alone, but rather it is essential that a normative approach should be used. As Gibson (2000) highlights, they insist that "the descriptive approach looks at whether stakeholder interests are taken into account or not…the normative approach is concerned with the reasons why corporations ought to consider stakeholder interests even in the absence of any apparent benefit" (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 31). Donaldson and Preston (1995: 71) explain that “the normative stakeholder theory is used to interpret the function of the corporation, including the identification of moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and management of corporations.”

2.4 Theories of State

The theory of state is critical for conceptualising the governing system at the nation-state level to which the NOC belong. It is also fundamental to explaining the roles of the government concerned, and the power relations or interactions between different major institutional actors in a process of decision-making, such as takes place in the NOC or sports organisations and the relevant governmental bodies. Seemingly, the governing system of a nation is highly likely to impact on its NOC’s governing system and it is believed to be a crucial element for understanding either observable or unobservable social phenomena,
which may possibly influence the corporate governance of NOCs. The state theory in this study covers neo-pluralism and pluralism, neo-elitism and elitism, neo-corporatism and corporatism, neo-Marxism and Marxism and clientelism.

2.4.1 Pluralism and Neo-Pluralism
As opposed to the absolute, unified and uncontrolled power of the state, pluralism emphasises the virtues of diversity in the presence of more than one source of authority in political, institutional and social practices. With a representative government, “institutional checks and balances” are necessary in association with “the vertical separation like executive, legislature and the judiciary, and the horizontal division of sovereignty through federalism and provisions for the exercise of vetoes in a western context” (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 14). Pluralism in the social context concludes that various social groups in different areas should be included as “non-institutional checks and balances” (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 14-15). The citizens living in a polyarchic culture tend to share certain characteristics. People try to take part in decisions affecting them and are willing to examine their governments critically. Elections are one of the major ways of their participation in policy making and, thus, pluralists agree with the fact that political competition and elections are important factors in polyarchies. Although the interest group process has less impact than elections, it is nevertheless a crucial aspect of pluralist thought. Therefore, from the pluralists perspective, checks and balances should be maintained in a polyarchic system, and emphasis should be placed on the importance of elections and competition among related groups.

After a period in the 1950s and early 1960s when pluralist thought prevailed, neo-pluralism was developed in response to a background of economic growth and the emergence of political and social crises in liberal democracy in the late 1960s. Neo-pluralists accept both the views of neo-elite theorists and neo-Marxists, while pluralists pay little attention to the immediate political influences or the general structural influence of a big business elite. They acknowledge that all interest or pressure groups can exert a disproportionate influence on policy making, and that the increasing role of business is a prominent factor. At the same time, business actors are likely to win a greater advantage by utilising their resources to assert their preferences. In addition, Lindblom (1977: 175) observes that “public affairs in market oriented systems are in the hands of two group leaders: government and business, who must collaborate and that to make the system work government leadership must defer to business leadership” (cited in Lee, 2005: 16). In this context, Neo-pluralists recognise that
“power can be exercised in an unobservable way through structures, anticipated reaction and ideology” (Smith, 1995 cited in Lee, 2005: 16). In particular, corporations deal with their governments by using their resources in investments, or in cooperation with government policy making and, in return, government officials are likely to defer to business interests. In market-oriented systems, government and businesses have a tendency to be closely related and be main actors in decision-making.

2.4.2 Elitism and Neo-Elitism

In a classical eliteist theory, with a strong idea of oligarchic government, power is given to a small number of rulers who thereby justify their rule over the government. Mosca (1939: 50) asserts that “two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled” (cited in Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 136). The classical elite theorists, Mosca, Pareto and Michels, oppose Marxist theory in claiming that a classless society and a liberal democracy establishes the possibility for the ascent to power of a new elite group of industrial capitalists. However, Mosca in his later life recognised “the virtues of representative politics” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 140). Given multiple social forces in industrial society, the ruling class should be open and competitive and there should be the assimilation of a plurality of interests.

Building on Mosca’s thinking with regard to representative politics, Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter developed another approach to elite theory, namely ‘democratic elitism’ which partly combines elitism and pluralism. Here the two major elements are “the compatibility of bureaucracy and democracy” and “the stress on elite competition” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 141). Using Weber’s new term ‘bureaucracy’ which is defined as “the emergence of a dominant system of rational-legal administration inside large-scale businesses and government agencies” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 141), Weber and Schumpeter explain that modern bureaucracies have developed with politically democratic tendencies. However, political leadership is necessary to supervise the bureaucratic machine. Additionally, Joseph Schumpeter states that democracy is a method of elite competition for mass electoral endorsement and of refining “political inputs to produce elite pluralism (Aron, 1950) rather than mono-elite domination” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 142-3). Pluralist theory has largely been influenced by both sets of ideas, bureaucracy and democracy.

Unlike its course of development at its European origins, elite theory in the United States has moved in a radical/left-leanig direction. According to the left-wing view of urban politics
adopted by some US sociologists is characterised as pertaining where “only a handful of people were influential in setting major decisions” (the Lynds, 1937; Warner, 1943 cited in Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 144). C. Wright Mills (1956) developed the concept of a ‘power elite’ composed of leadership groups from various areas including business, the military and politics, who exercise most control over decision-making in the USA. This power elite disregards the possessors of “middle level power” such as the Congress and the state governments (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 144). A small number of elites have become the core of the decision-making group and, thus, state organisations are likely to respond by acting in the interests of those who are able to access the policy decision-making process. Given the compatibility of bureaucracy and democracy, and the elite competition for electoral endorsement, the power elite is possibly at the core of the decision-making group.

From the elitist perspective, another way in which corporate organisations or individuals may weaken the competition from their electoral opponents is by gaining control of the mass media. By exercising power over the mass media one can change people's perceptions of the issues or use certain social topics to threaten people. This is especially prevalent, in cases where the government owns its media because this is likely to lead to a strong linkage between the media and political elites. They are thus enabled to exclude minority views and certain issues of political controversy or debate, and their media monopoly also affects the choice of politicians. This is termed “mobilisation of bias” by Schattschneider (1960; Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 158). The “mobilisation of bias” is defined as a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 11).

As a result, elite theorists fail to demonstrate that the system which they advocate can defend the interests of the powerless. Consequently, the neo-elitists in the 1960s raised the issue of non-decision making over issues, which have never reached the political agenda or where the decision makes are prevented from reaching any decision after the emergence of such issues. The most obvious instance of this is the process of agenda setting, “whereby an issue of importance to B is deliberately left off the agenda by A”(cited in Haugaard, 2002: 26).

2.4.3 Corporatism and Neo-Corporatism

According to Schmitter (1979: 8), corporatism is found in countries with “singular,
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalised, interest associations exercising representational monopolies" (cited in Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 9). With reference to the example of Germany in the twentieth century, state corporatism is referred to by Schmitter (1974) as “dictatorial state rule (which) often uses state-instituted corporate bodies as transmission belts of a governing party” (cited in Streeck & Kenworthy, 2005: 441). By contrast, neo-corporatism or liberal corporatism, which is synonymous with Schmitter’s societal corporatism (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 8), is defined as a “territorial rule sharing the public space with social groups organised on a more voluntary basis and entitled to various forms of collective participation and self-government, provided they recognised the primacy of parliamentary democracy” (Schmitter, 1974; Lehmbuch, 1977 cited in Streeck & Kenworthy, 2005: 441). In the circumstances both of liberal parliamentary democracy and a market economy, a number of organised groups were integrated in many European countries in the 1970s. Neo-corporatist arrangements are believed to be possible in societies in which labour and labour unions are well organised. Neo-corporatism is expected to "involve a limited number of actors and therefore, the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way" (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007: 203). Thus, corporatism represents the exercise of non-competitive monopoly power in decision-making while neo-corporatism integrates liberal parliamentary democracy, market economy, and a number of organised groups.

2.4.4 Marxism and Neo-Marxism

Marxism undertakes the strongest and the most radical critique of capitalism and liberal democracy. Between 1840 and 1880, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels developed the core Marxist system of ideas by referring to three principal influential factors in the early nineteenth-century: British economics, German philosophy and French revolutionary thinking (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 204). Marxist theory argues that there is a class of the exploiter and a class of the exploited within all class-divided societies. “Class is seen as a property of social relationships which stems from the basic antagonism between those who own the means of material production (capitalists) and those who depend for their livelihood on selling labour power” (Cawson, 1986: 50 cited in Lee 2005: 18). Accordingly, the concept of the ‘proletariat’, the new working class, is introduced whose mission is considered to be the breaking down of capitalism. The proletariat is suited to that task because it is a subordinate class in capitalism, without autonomy or any capacity for exercising political power, according to Marx and Engels. Thus, Marxism reinforces a view of the importance of class interests and the power of capital over decision-making (Lee 2005: 18; see also, Castells,
Marxists consider the state as an instrument of the dominant class. According to Marsh (2002: 154),

"The state is an agent of the ruling class. The economy caused or determined how the rest of the social system evolved and functioned. So, economic relations determined social relations between classes, the form and actions of the state."

The ‘bourgeoisie’, being the capitalist class, possesses economic and political power, therefore the modern state is organised so as to manage the affairs of the ruling class, the class of capitalists with power, as Marsh explains. By contrast the new ‘proletariat’ class is a subordinate class without political power in decision-making.

Furthermore, Marxists give a warning about the dangers resulting from notion of “false consciousness”, which is the main concept of the third dimensional power introduced by Lukes (1974). They argue that biases are inherited from the past in the form of the structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups (Haugaard, 2002: 38). For these influences Lukes introduces the concept of ‘false consciousness’, which encapsulates the view that less powerful groups are not aware of their ‘real interests’. He argues that individuals may not even recognise that they have interests that need to be represented in the decision-making process. He also sees actors as being motivated by their subjective interests, but also as having ‘real interests’ of which they may be unaware (Lukes, 1974 cited in Scott, 2001: 60).

As traditional or structuralist Marxists argue, "individuals in a capitalist society are unlikely to be aware of their real interests, a state of affairs which is explained by reference to the effects of ideology generating ‘false consciousness’ and therefore they are unable to struggle to realize those interests" (Althusser, 1969; Poulantzas, 1973 cited in Henry, 2001: 8).

2.4.5 Clientelism

Clientelism is also represented as a system of patron-client relationships, and its form of social organisation has been common in many developing regions. Clientelism involves “strategies for the acquisition, maintenance and aggrandizement of political power on the part of patrons, and strategies for the protection and promotion of their interests on the part of the clients” (Piattoni, 2001 cited in Henry, Lee & Nassis, 2007: 82). In political clientelism, powerful political groups or leaders use their politically closely-related people to secure their
political stance, and in personal clientelism, powerful groups or leaders accept the services of those who are in their educational, familial, societal, or ethnic background so as to obtain the support of their own people. Under this definition of clientelism, therefore, as a strategy for securing his political power, the patron creates clientelist networks of patronage in return for his protection and promotion of the clients’ interests.

2.5 Theories of Power

Power theory is concerned with the exercises of power in decision-making, with its application in this study to sporting organisations, how that occurs and who is responsible for it. Lukes (1974), in his work on power, outlines three dimensions of power: power in decisions, power in non-decisions, and power in structured interests. ‘Decisions’ are the focus of pluralists’ discussions of power (Dahl, 1961). In their account, power is exercised in battles over decisions, which is the first dimension of power. Second, along with decision-making, non-decision making also occurs due to an institutional bias. The third dimension of power, Lukes (1974) argues, is reflected in the fact that individuals may not even recognise that they have interests that need to be represented in the decision-making process. He also sees actors as being motivated by their subjective interests, but as also having ‘real interests’ of which they may be unaware.

Firstly, the one-dimensional view of power is concerned with Dahl’s (1961) pluralist view of comprehension between groups. Dahl contends that resources, (potential power), may or may not be used in decision-making and, consequently, he finds that despite an unequal distribution of resources there is no single elite which exercises power. As a plurality of elites uses power, Dahl argues that the outcomes of decision making are decided through a competition between elites, which is the concept proposed by the pluralists. Here, Lukes (1974: 13) points out that the pluralists see their focus on behaviour in the making of decisions over key issues, as involving actual, observable conflict. Accordingly, plural interest groups struggle openly to gain their desired goal, and the competition to gain power is visible in the battle between groups. In addition, building upon Weber’s (1978: 53) definition of power “as the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (cited in Hauggard, 2002:5-6), Dahl has a view of democracy as “a set of institutional procedures for ensuring relative equality in decision-making” (Hauggard, 2002: 6).
The second dimension of power is developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) as a critique of the one-dimensional view introduced by Dahl. According to Lukes's (1974) explanation, the central thrust of Bachrach and Baratz's critique of the pluralists' one-dimensional view of power is, up to a point, anti-behavioural. They suggest that pluralists put too much emphasis on overt/visible behaviour, and this may not be able to account for the fact that power may be exercised by confining decision-making to relatively 'safe' issues. Their specific critique of Dahl is that he fails to account for institutional bias. Bachrach & Baratz (1970) argue that

Not only does A exercise power over B in overt decision-making (as in Dahl) but A may equally well exercise power over B by limiting the scope of the political process to issues which are relatively innocuous to A. The most obvious instance of this is the process of agenda setting whereby an issue of importance to B is deliberately left off the agenda by A (cited in Haugaard, 2002: 26).

When the agenda raised by B is omitted on purpose by A whose power is stronger than that of B, it is called non-decision making. Accordingly, two-dimensional power involves examining aspects both of decision-making and non-decision making.

Moreover, under Dahl's definition of 'key political issues' “a necessary although possibly not a sufficient condition of power is that the [key] issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 10). The group members may agree or disagree with what are important and unimportant issues. This is termed as “mobilisation of bias” by Schattschneider, (1960 cited in Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 158), a concept which is most often used in the argument for the existence of a second dimension of power developed by Bachrach and Baratz as a critique of the one-dimensional view. Their specific critique of Dahl is that he fails to account for institutional bias. The ‘mobilisation of bias’ is defined (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970: 11) as “a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others”.

The last concept of power, the third dimension, is introduced by Lukes (1974) following criticism that the first and second-dimensional views place too great an emphasis on the behavioural focus. He claims that three-dimensional power has two aspects. The one is in regard to “the issue of the structural constitution of relations of domination” (Haugaard, 2002: 38). The other recognises that “the concept of false consciousness concerns the relationship
between power and knowledge and, consequently, includes the premise that power distorts knowledge” (Haugaard, 2002: 39). Relating to the first aspect, Lukes argues that “biases are inherited from the past in the form of structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups”, adding that “power relations are shaped by structurally constituted social relations” (cited in Haugaard, 2002: 38). With respect to the second aspect, Lukes introduces the concept of “false consciousness” which considers that the less powerful are not aware of their ‘real interests’. Thus, Lukes argues that without being aware of their real interests, people will not attempt to raise them as an issue and, thus, it is not even necessary to exclude them from decision-making (Scott, 2001: 60).

Apart from Lukes three dimensions of power, other concepts of power have been proposed as consisting in the possession of ‘authority’ and ‘legitimacy’, and of power as ‘discourse’. In terms of power as authority, Bachrach and Baratz (1970: 34 & 37) define authority as being evidenced by the situation in which “B complies because he recognizes that [A’s] command is reasonable in terms of his own values – either because its content is legitimate and reasonable or because it has been arrived at through a legitimate and reasonable procedure” (Lukes, 1974: 21-2). Handy (1985) also supports the view that the word ‘authority’ is used when one wants his power to be seen to be legitimate. Accordingly, authority is different from power in terms of the existence of legitimacy, while power without legitimacy can still be exercised by A over B. Therefore, authority may be exercised in its legitimised form with reference to their collective goals.

‘Hierarchical power’ denotes the system whereby power is exercised by those who occupy a high position in an organisation. The power comes from the person because of his/her role within the organisation and it is present not only in the relations among people but also among departments or subunits. As Perrow (1970: 59) argues, “the preoccupation with interpersonal power has led us to neglect one of the most obvious aspects of this subject: in complex organisations, where tasks are divided up between a few major departments or subunits, and all of these subunits are not likely to be equally powerful” (Pfeffer, 1981: 3). However, the power is more likely to reside with the people who wield authority in organisations. As Slack and Parent (2006: 199) argue, “authority is in fact one form of power”, since those belonging to an organisation should follow and accept those who have the authority. It means that subordinates follow the instructions related to their work. In this way, Pfeffer (1981: 6) states that power becomes transformed into authority and control can be exercised almost regardless of the balance of power possessed by the interacting groups.
With respect to legitimacy, Weber (1947) emphasized the critical role of legitimacy in the exercise of power (Pfeffer, 1981: 4). Slack and Parent (2006: 199) support the view that “authority is only legitimate within the sport organisation that grants the authority”, adding that “the power by which managers exercise strategic choice is, in essence, authority-the power they derive from the position they hold in the organization”. Therefore, legitimate power is considered to be the same as authority.

Regarding the concept of power as discourse, Foucault (1986: 229) argues that in any society, “there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse.” Following Foucault, Hall (1992: 291) observes that “when statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed.” According to Foucault and Hall, discourse is about the production of knowledge that is constructed by language. In other words, discourse can be produced differently by individuals in certain settings. This will be a critical point for the analysis of the manner in which western notions of corporate governance have been adopted by the KOC, or modified to its context. In association with Critical Discourse Analysis, power as discourse will be discussed in the context of the KOC.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter provides the theoretical background that is prerequisite for enhancing the study of the corporate governance of the KOC. The review on principles of corporate governance in the business sector mainly focuses on internal process, values and tasks. This can be explained in a sense of the nature of business in that it should be accountable to its internal stakeholders’ interests. As this review is a part of literature review, this study continues to review the key principles in the following two chapters, which are in the sport sector and in the Olympic Movement.

Apart from the concepts of corporate governance it is necessary to discuss stakeholder theory, theories of power and state to identify (and understand) the real or most influential stakeholder and understand power relations among the KOC’s possible internal and external stakeholders. State theory aids our understanding of the governing system of Korea, which
is expected to make a direct impact on the practices of corporate governance of the KOC at a macro level. Governance and power theories also identify the governing systems and power relations obtaining between stakeholders who are involved in sports policy making at a meso level. Consequently, the following analysis of corporate governance of the KOC covers both the macro and meso levels.
3 Systematic Review

3.1 Literature review

The data contained in a literature review are categorised as secondary data as they are not collected at first hand but are obtained by searching any forms of resource available for the research. Tranfield et al. (2003: 208) say that the aim of conducting a literature review is often to enable a researcher to map and assess the existing intellectual territory, and to specify a research question to develop the existing body of knowledge further. Torgerson (2003: 5) argues that the research literature included in traditional narrative reviews tends to be a ‘biased’ sample of the full range of the literature on the subject. Due to the reviewers’ different perspectives, each reviewer may gather data from different literature and, even though gathering from the same literature, they may interpret them differently in a given field.

The notions of the seven principles of corporate governance identified in the business and financial sectors for application in this study to the sports sector are first reviewed in a narrative form to map out the original framework. This chapter employs a systematic review with the aim of finding all the relevant literature available in the field of sport to learn how the notions of the seven principles have been applied to a sports organisation.

3.2 What is a systematic review?

A systematic review differs from a traditional narrative review in that its method is explicit and open to scrutiny and it seeks to identify all the available evidence with respect to a given theme (Torgerson, 2003: 6). Accordingly, the study tends to be replicable and reliable. Systematic reviews are traditionally associated with meta-analysis of research based on quantitative epistemological traditions and methodologies (Torgerson, 2003: 7; see also Badger et al., 2000; Hammersley, 2001). As stated by Tranfield et al (2003: 209), “whereas a systematic review identifies key scientific contributions to a field or question, meta-analysis offers a statistical procedure for synthesizing findings in order to obtain overall reliability unavailable from any single study alone”. A systematic review which produces a summary of the results of primary studies without statistically combining results may, thus, be called a ‘qualitative systematic review’ (Cook, Mulrow & Haynes, 1997).

3.3 Stages of systematic review

The two tables shown below demonstrate the stages in the process of conducting a systematic review. Table 3-1 outlines the most commonly used systematic review process.
Table 3-1 Stages of systematic review

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Source: Tranfield et al. (2003)

This study follows the sequence of stages set forth in Table 3-2 in which the stages of a systematic review are rearranged on the basis of ‘Systematic Reviews’ written by Torgerson (2003) and two journal articles by Leseure et al (2004) and Tranfield et al (2003).

Table 3-2 Stages of systematic review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Forming a review panel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>Scoping study and establishing a protocol of the research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>Commencing the literature search</td>
</tr>
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<td>Stage 5</td>
<td>Extracting data &amp; appraising quality</td>
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<td>Stage 6</td>
<td>Conducting double data extraction, if necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 7</td>
<td>Synthesising the extracted data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 8</td>
<td>Interpreting the synthesized data</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from Torgerson (2003), Leseure et al. (2004) and Tranfield et al. (2003))

**Stage 1: Forming a review panel**

As the first stage of conducting a systematic review, a review panel should be established that is composed of a wide range of expertises, including review methodology, information science and the field that is going to be searched. A practitioner has to work together with other researchers and specialists who enable the practitioner to find the appropriate review data. On the basis of regular meetings, the practitioner is able to obtain their advice and opinions. Throughout the process of systematic review, it is essential that the panel members should maintain good communications among themselves.

**For the purposes of this research**

To meet the aims of this study, the panel members were as follows: the supervisor Prof. Ian Henry from the School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, the library and information scientist specialised in sports science Ms. Louise Fletcher and the researcher Ms. Kyung Su
Jung. The panel provided feedback on the research to ensure that main/sub and other field(s) within the research area were explored, and, furthermore, that relevant databases were accessed.

**Stage 2: The scoping study and establishing the protocol of the research**

The scoping study should be completed before the protocol of the research is established. As Tranfield *et al.* (2003: 214) point out, it is necessary to conduct a scoping study to obtain an overview of the literature, to estimate an approximate number of relevant articles available and in turn, to delimit the subject area or topic. The scoping study should be done on the basis of the existing reviews and primary studies relevant to the review’s objectives.

Prior to conducting a review the panel should develop and approve the protocol. At this stage, according to Torgerson (2003: 24), “the protocol should include the theoretical, empirical and conceptual background to the review; the research question(s); the objectives; the scope of the review and the methods for searching, screening, data extraction, quality appraisal and synthesis”. He also adds (2003: 24) that within the protocol a set of predetermined written inclusion and exclusion criteria must be specified. If those criteria are not defined, the review panel may be exposed to the risk of selection and inclusion bias. In order to avoid this problem, the criteria should be clearly set up in accordance with the questions to be posed in the review.

**For the purposes of this research**

There are three main categories in the scoping study: ‘corporate governance’, ‘organisation’ and ‘power’. The category of corporate governance includes the notions of corporate governance in the business and the financial sectors, the seven associated ethical principles: accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. The aim is to understand what corporate governance is, how these seven selected key principles are defined and how they are recommended in companies. While the first category provides a general concept of corporate governance, the other two cover theories which form the basis for understanding how organisations function: organisation and power. Organisational theory covers the principles of structure, leadership, organisational culture, national culture, Mintzberg’s configuration theory and stakeholder theory. Theories of power theory mainly deal with issues connected with decision making and non-decision making, as proposed by Lukes (1974).

The protocol for this study sets out the following objectives: it aims to explore the rising issue
of corporate governance in Olympic circles, in particular the NOCs. Firstly, what characterises good corporate governance and how have the principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?; What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to the governance of Olympic organisations and how are these interpreted by the IOC body?; How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of good governance in general and more specifically in those aspects recommended by the IOC? How are these principles interpreted in the KOC context?; To what extent are the practices of good/corporate governance developed in a western context applicable in a non-western context?

Therefore, the objectives are as follow: to identify the key concepts of the seven principles of corporate governance, namely accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, as applied in the western context; to compare the key concepts constructed on the basis of the literature review with several documents, including the Basic Universal Principles issued by the IOC; to analyse four main events that have taken place in the KOC in order to discover the power relations between stakeholders and furthermore, to examine corporate governance in the KOC context; to identify similarities or differences with regards to the concept of corporate governance between the western context and the Korean political, economic and social context.

The criteria used in the data search are defined below:

Types of publication: only journal articles published in English were accepted in this review and books and symposium documents were eliminated. Of the journal articles, only peer-reviewed or scholarly reviewed articles were selected in order to use the most qualified resources. Systematic reviewing databases were chosen because they contain the full range of published materials in a given academic domain. English is a dominant language in major international conferences and is, in fact, an official language in most international conferences. Irrespective of participants’ nationality, journals are always published in English. Thus, although this study accepted only English-written journal articles, it was still possible to obtain the latest and largest number of journals which are related to ‘corporate/good governance’ in the sport sector.

Books were reviewed at the stage of scoping study which was conducted prior to systematic review. The scoping study was conducted over several months to obtain as many sources as possible. Most relevant books written in English and Korean were reviewed apart from
systematic review. The books written in English were well-reviewed and as a result, the key words were identified and selected for systematic review (see Table 3-3). However few relevant materials in Korean were identified.

Date range: It is set to be between 1984 and 2008. As the Los Angeles Olympic Games were recorded as the first commercially successful Olympic Games with a huge surplus and since corporate governance is related with money flow in Olympic circles, 1984 was chosen as the starting point for this study and the endpoint was the year 2008 when this review was conducted. However, CSA-provided databases such as PsycINFO, Sociological Abstract, and ASSIA only covered the period between 1985 and 2008.

Length of article: Only articles with a length of more than four pages are included.

Language: Articles written in English are the only ones included.

Stage 3: Commencing the literature search

The systematic search begins with the identification of keywords, which are found from the results of the scoping study and discussions with the review team, according to Tranfield et al., (2003: 215), who recommend that the search strategy should be reported in sufficient detail to ensure that the search could be replicated.

For the purposes of this research

Keywords: As a principle of the search strategy, main and refining keywords were combined together. The main keywords are ‘Sport’ OR ‘Olympic’ OR ‘Organisation’ OR ‘Governance’ Or ‘Corporate Governance’. The additional refining keywords are ‘organisational structure’, ‘leadership’, ‘organisational culture’, ‘national culture’, ‘stakeholder theory’, ‘configuration theory’ and ‘Mintzberg’, which were selected from the category of organisational theory. The two refining words, ‘power’ and ‘decision-making’, were chosen on the basis of power theory, while ‘ethics’, ‘accountability’, ‘responsibility’, ‘transparency’, ‘democracy’, ‘equity’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ were selected as representing corporate governance. The refining word ‘Korea’ was chosen by the review panel unanimously as the case study is concerned with the Korean Olympic Committee. As shown in Table 3-3, these main keywords are combined with one another as, for example, in the first category, ‘Sport’ and ‘Olympic’ are first combined with another keyword, ‘Organisation’, and the refining keywords are then introduced in sequence. In relation to the other two categories the same method of combining keywords is also followed.
Databases: These were originally defined as follows: ‘ANTE’, ‘ASSIA’, ‘PsycInfo’, ‘Sociological Abstracts’, ‘Article First’, ‘ABI Research’, ‘Emerald’, ‘LA84’, ‘Zetoc’, ‘Web of Science’ and ‘SportDiscus’. However, ‘ANTE’, ‘Zetoc’, and ‘Emerald’ were excluded due to their lack of both relevance to the subject and accessibility: ‘ANTE’ did not provide databases in the area of sport; ‘Zetoc’ seemed less likely to be related to the issue of corporate governance; and ‘Emerald’ was mostly relevant to a search of journals devoted to business or management subjects.

Following the panel’s suggestion ‘ERIC’ and ‘Leisurertourism.com’ were subsequently added after ‘ANTE’, ‘Zetoc’, and ‘Emerald’ had been omitted. Unfortunately, ‘ERIC’ seldom listed journals including keywords selected from the scoping study and ‘Leisurertourism.com’ allowed only a few users to access the site. Accordingly, both ‘ERIC’ and ‘Leisurertourism.com’ were excluded and a total of eight databases were used for this study.
### Table 3-3 Results of data search

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**Stage 4: Screening the results of the search**

This is the stage at which the data were selected, according to whether they should be included or excluded on the basis of the selection criteria. With respect to the method used for screening the search results, Torgerson (2003: 24) argues that the results of the search should then be screened by at least two independent reviewers and he also suggests that this should be done in two stages: firstly on the basis of titles and abstracts (first-stage screening), and secondly on the basis of full papers (second-stage screening). Furthermore, an extraction form should be completed before the data extraction begins.

**For the purposes of this research**

Unlike the other search databases on the Google Search engine ‘LA84’ mainly provide papers in relation to Olympic circles, including mega-events such as the summer and winter Olympic Games, the Olympic movement and sports organisations like the IOC, IFs or NOCs. The search range was, however, intended to be wide, so as to cover a variety of publications ranging from periodicals, including peer-reviewed journals, magazines and bulletins, to books and official Olympic reports. In the process of searching the data, it was therefore difficult to collect only peer-reviewed journals when conducting an advanced search due to the different search methods. Consequently, the number of papers indicated in Table 4 included all types of publications and they were then selected on the basis of the criteria. Accordingly, as shown in Table 3-3, unlike the other databases that are divided into three categories, ‘LA84’ was divided into two categories. i.e. ‘Sport/Olympic’ & ‘Organisation’ and ‘Sport/Olympic’ & ‘Governance’ or ‘Sport/Olympic & ‘Corporate Governance’.

**Stage 5: Extracting data & Appraising quality**

Since this stage is prone to human error, accuracy and consistency are extremely important. In order to avoid error, each reviewer should perform the data extraction independently in order to produce the best-quality evidence. Regarding the form of extracting data sheet, Tranfield et al (2003: 215) emphasise the importance of documenting the sources included and excluded at each stage of the review with the reasons given for each case. Moreover, they also add (2003: 217) that data extraction forms should include the details of the information source, such as the title of the paper, the author, the journal name, the publication details and any other features of the study such as its context and an evaluation of the study’s methodological quality. They also recommend that additional notes should be included in the data-extraction form.

The studies are also assessed to determine their quality, i.e. a quality appraisal is performed.
This is usually based on internal validity, but it also includes some analysis of external validity. These identified reviews should be appraised by referring to a checklist which focuses on, for example, the review’s objective, the sources used for identifying primary studies, the inclusion criteria, the method of application, the means of data extraction and, data synthesis, etc.

For the purposes of this research
At the data screening stage all the papers derived from the data search were entered into the extraction forms because all the papers should be recorded on the forms as evidence obtained from the search. After duplicate journals had been discarded, the total number remaining was 767 journal papers. At the same time, the papers were first extracted by the researcher and then by the supervisor based on their titles and the search criteria, such as data range and type of publication. All papers were indicated on the forms, whether they were included or excluded, along with the appropriate reasons.

Stage 6: Conducting double data extraction
If possible, a second data extraction is strongly recommended. Torgerson (2003: 25) mentions that once relevant papers have been identified the data need to be extracted, using a standard data extraction sheet, and this again should be done by at least two independent researchers. In addition, Leseure et al. (2004: 172) suggest that key references which have been missed by the systematic review process may be added at this point.

For the purposes of this research
Regardless of the result of the first extraction, those articles over which there was uncertainty regarding their inclusion or exclusion were attached with their abstracts. Concerning the abstracts, double data extraction was conducted by the researcher and the supervisor and therefore in the extraction forms the papers to which abstracts were attached underwent double extraction. Unfortunately, some papers that could have been included were impossible to collect due to the difficulty of accessing them, but they were also indicated as having been ‘extracted’. As a result, 27 journal articles were included in the category of ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation’; 5 journal articles under ‘Sport/Olympic & Governance’; and 31 journal articles under the heading of ‘Sport/Olympic organisation & Corporate governance’. Please refer to Appendix 1 and Figure 3-1.

Stage 7: Synthesising the extracted data
The aim of data synthesis is to collect and integrate the extracted data from the review. Mulrow (1994) defines it as “a family of methods for summarising, integrating, and, where
possible, cumulating the findings of different studies on a topic or research question” (cited in Tranfield et al., 2003: 217). It can be carried out by means of a descriptive or non-quantitative synthesis, following Torgerson (2003:25) who states that the data synthesis can be performed as a ‘qualitative’ overview if the data are not in a form that permits a statistical summary. Another type of synthesis used in qualitative research is an analytic synthesis, which is a thematic analysis of data extracted from the relevant journals.

For the purposes of this research
Descriptive analysis provides new categories. Ultimately, the extracted papers were categorised by theme following the refining keywords and emergent themes that arose in the process of conducting the review. In the first category, ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation’, during the data search, the sub-keywords were ‘organisational structure’, ‘leadership’, ‘organisational culture’, ‘national culture’, ‘configuration theory’, ‘Mintzberg’, ‘stakeholder theory’ and ‘power’ and ‘decision-making’. However, after the data extraction stage, it was found that no papers fell under the sub-keywords ‘configuration theory’ and ‘Mintzberg’. Instead, several papers emerged concerning the IOC or the Olympic movement, and organisational issues in general, such as organisational values. The second category pertains to ‘Sport/Olympic & Governance’ and it contains only five articles connected with sports policy at the macro- and/or meso-levels. The system of governance is discussed, principally. Although the sub-keyword is ‘Korea’, no article appeared regarding Korea under ‘Sport/Olympic & Governance’. The last category is ‘Sport/Olympic Organisation & Corporate Governance’. This includes papers devoted to the seven principles of corporate governance but no articles regarding transparency were found.

Stage 8: Interpreting the synthesised data
As the last stage of a systematic review, “the synthesized data will be interpreted within a report, which should be exposed to peer-review before publication”, according to Torgerson (2003: 25). Writing a report is an integral part of a systematic review and it should meet the requirements of the target readers. Tranfield et al., (2003) explain that “linking themes across the various core contributions wherever possible and highlighting such links is an important part of the reporting process” (Aquilina, 2009: 15). Accordingly, the report should provide a full descriptive analysis of the field and the findings of the thematic analysis. A descriptive analysis that categorises a simple set of results derived from the data extraction gives a broad account of the field of study. It is followed by the thematic analysis which outlines themes emerging from the literature. Furthermore, the report enables researchers to use the findings from the review as evidence provided by the research for their decisions.
For the purposes of this research

In conjunction with the meta-analysis based on the research themes, as a part of the descriptive analysis this study also provides a table of ‘key principles and related elements on the basis of target countries studied’. Table 3-4 supplies evidence of when and where the principles of corporate governance have mainly been studied, together with the sub-themes, target nations studied, authors and the years of publication. This analysis aims to establish whether or not corporate governance in sports organisations has mainly been developed and produced/reproduced in western countries. It is also critical to determine whether other factors affecting an evaluation of the seven principles of sports organisations have also mainly been developed in western countries. Thus, Table 3-4 demonstrates that ‘the notions of corporate governance have been constructed in a western-context’.

The thematic analysis discusses the existing and emergent themes and lists all the emergent themes, as shown in Figure 3-1. Apart from the seven principles, various themes were identified and they were interpreted and synthesised into the seven categories on the basis of the principles. This analysis matches each principle with the relevant theoretical background and links them with the definitions and operationalisations of the seven principles of corporate governance, which are discussed in the following chapter. The commentary is produced based on the thematic analysis.
Total retrieved articles (1357)
Duplicate & Non-Journal (590)

First Extraction (767):
Included articles (195) Excluded articles (572)

50 of them are excluded as being:
- Not relevant to the subject: 30
- Less than four pages: 8
- Non-English: 2
- Non-Journal: 3
- Unobtain: 7

Second Extraction (767):
Included articles (145) Excluded articles (622)

Articles of little relevance (82)

Relevant articles (63)

Meta-categories
- Sport/Olympic & Organisation (27)
- Sport/Olympic & Governance (5)
- Sport/Olympic organisation & Corporate governance (31)

Emergent themes
- Macro- & meso-level analysis of government system
  - Governing system
  - Governmentality
- Interorganisational relations
- Power
  - Power & organisational change
    - Structure & leadership in the transition process
    - Volunteer & professional staff in state or national sport organisations
  - Types of power and their utilisation within sports organisations
• Corporate governance
  - Reforming the IOC: issues of corporate governance
  - Corporate governance in sports organisations
  - Role of ethics in professionalised sporting organisations

• Accountability
  - Non-profit organisations

• Responsibility
  - Responsibility of the board

• Democracy
  - Autonomy

• Equity
  - Social ideology on gender
  - Issue of gender in the membership of the boards of national sports organisations
  - Meanings & practices of equity and organisational culture (masculinities)
  - The process of integrating disabled and able-bodied sports organisations
  - Improvement of equity and sporting culture in UK
  - The fairness of the distribution (or reduction) of resources

• Effectiveness
  - Voluntary boards and effectiveness
  - Organisational values
  - Values and beliefs, and organisational structure
  - Organisational culture
  - Leadership and organisational culture (transformational leadership)
  - Leaders’ perceptions
  - Leadership of the board
  - Managing diversity
  - Measures of effectiveness

• Efficiency
  - Efficiency gains resulting from government subsidies
  - Similarity and diversity in non-profit sports organisations (Institutional Isomorphism)
Figure 3-2 Systematic Review Analysis Strategy

Research Questions

*What characterises good/corporate governance and how have the principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?*

*What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to the governance of Olympic organisations? And how are these interpreted by the IOC body?*

*How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of corporate governance in general, and, specifically those aspects recommended by the IOC? and How are these interpreted in the KOC context?*

*To what extent are practices of good/corporate governance developed in a western context applicable in a non-western context?*

Descriptive Analysis

First-Order Themes

Meta-categories and Key words

Thematic Analysis

Second-Order Themes

Emergent themes
3.4 Descriptive analysis

The descriptive analysis is the first stage in the analysis conducted within a systematic review and it aims to outline the three categories drawn up by the research panel. The three ‘meta-categories’ adopted in this study are as follows: ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation'; ‘Sport/Olympic & Governance'; and ‘Sport/Olympic Organisation & Corporate Governance'. Each category was cross-searched with a number of other sub-key terms. These sub-keywords give an insight into the extent to which principles of corporate governance and/or supplementary studies have been investigated in the field of sport. Since the term ‘corporate governance’ is derived from the business sector, the number of papers found in searching each sub-key word demonstrates the authors’ biases as measured by the popularity or frequency of application of the seven principles of corporate governance to the sports area. It also indicates whether these principles are conceptualised in the western context and in what ways.

3.4.1 Sport/Olympic & Organisation

In the category ‘Sport/Olympic & Organisation', two major groups of papers were revealed. In the first group articles were generated concerning ‘corporate governance in the Olympic movement', and in particular, in the IOC: The central themes are transparency and democracy in the bidding process (Booth, 1999), democratic accountability and transparency (Schineider, 2000), transparency and accountability (Zakus, 2000), and equity and female leadership (Rintala & Bischoff, 1997; and Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008).

In the category of ‘organisations in general’ the articles relate mainly to non-profit organisations, voluntary boards (Papadimitriou, 1999; Doherty & Carron, 2003), volunteer and paid staff (Booth & Hassen, 1990), organisational values (Danisman, Hinings & Slack, 2006; Fenton & Inglis, 2007; Hinings, Thibault, Slack & Kikulis, 1996; Slack & Thibault, 1988), factors perceived as being critical to organisational success (Weinberg & McDermott, 2002) and interorganisational relations (Babiak, 2007). A wider range of issues is also discussed, including leadership (Rowold, 2006; Hoye, 2006; Kent & Weese, 2000), female leadership (Rintala & Bischoff, 1997; Eagly, 2007), structural isomorphism (Leiter, 2005; Augustad, Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006), managing organisational culture (Scott, 1997; Colyer, 2000) and power and organisational change (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Hoye & Stewart, 2002; Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2004; and Auld & Godbey, 1998).
3.4.2 Sport/Olympic & Governance

The articles relating to governance in the Sport/Olympic category mainly discuss governing systems and sports organisations. More specifically, they are concerned with policy making (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007), sports policy and governmentality (Green & Houlihan, 2006; Sam, 2005; Sam & Jackson, 2004), and changes in sports policy (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006). This category is more likely to relate to the theories of state, on the one hand and policy as discourse on the other.

3.4.3 Sport/Olympic Organisation & Corporate Governance

This category includes the largest number of articles among the three meta-categories. Despite the fact that there are seven principles of corporate governance, most articles are largely related to equity, covering especially gender, with a further small number of articles devoted to equity issues concerning ethnicity (race) and disability. With respect to equity, the articles may be classified according to the following themes: gender and leadership (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007), diversity in sport (Fink & Pastore, 1999; Spracklen, Hylton & Long, 2006), racial equality (Long, Robinson & Spracklen, 2005; Cunningham & Sagas, 2005), gender and the top management level (White & Kay, 2006; Hovden, 2000; 2000), gender equity for athletes (Hoeber, 2008), meaning and practices of gender equity (Hoeber, 2007; Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2001), masculinities (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2005), alternative gender equity frame (Shaw & Frisby, 2006), gender representation at board level (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2007; 2008), gender diversity (Cunningham, 2008), gender structure (Hall, Cullen & Slack, 1989), the marginalisation of women (Whisenant, Pedersen & Obenour, 2002; Whisenant, 2003), disability (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006; Hums, Moorman & Wolff, 2003), and the fair allocation of resources (Mahony, Riemer, Breeding & Hums, 2006).

The next major issue is how to measure the effectiveness of sports organisations. Two main topics may be distinguished in the two groups of papers dealing with effectiveness. The first one is how to identify the relationship between the effectiveness of an organisation and its leadership and/or organisational culture and the articles cover subjects such as effectiveness and leadership (Kent & Weese, 2000; Rowold, 2006; and Eagly, 2007); and effectiveness and organisational culture (Kent & Weese, 2000; Colyer, 2000; Fink & Pastore, 1999; and Scott, 1997). The other group of papers mainly examines ways of measuring organisational effectiveness in sports organisations (Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991; Shilbury & Moore, 2006; Frisby, 1986; and Chelladurai, Szyszlo & Haggerty, 1987).
The remaining articles are concerned with accountability and responsibility (Hoye & Inglis, 2003), the role of ethics (Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007), board assessment (Schaffer, 2002), ethic audits covering overall corporate governance (McNamee & Fleming, 2007), financial dependence in connection with democracy (Riiskjaer & Nielsen, 1987) and efficiency (Barros, 2003).

3.4.4 Are the principles identified conceptualised in a Western frame of reference?

In general, the most significant point is that all the articles regarding the corporate governance of sporting organisations have been authored by specialists in western countries, for instance, Australia, Canada, the UK, Norway, Greece and the USA. The western countries concerned may be divided into two groups according to their location: within Europe, for example the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece or outside of Europe such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

When all the journal papers relating to the study had been identified, as shown in Table 3-4, they were matched against the seven major principles as listed in the table on the basis of those principles’ appearance on the list prepared during the systematic review. It is apparent from the Table that certain topics have been chiefly studied in particular countries. For example, researchers based in the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the USA have broadly concentrated on topics pertaining to equity issues, ranging from gender to race, while those in Canada have tended to focus more on the effectiveness of sporting organisations. They have, thus, given their attention to that subject much earlier than their counterparts in any of the other nations such as Australia, Greece, and New Zealand where researchers have also been interested in studying effectiveness. With respect to the number of findings, both equity and effectiveness have often been studied in the sporting field, in 22 and 19 papers respectively, while accountability has only one article dedicated to it: responsibility, three; democracy, one; and efficiency, three. Transparency is not the subject of any of the articles. In terms of the history of research publications concerning the seven principles, all seven principles apart from effectiveness have been studied only in recent years since 1999, while studies on effectiveness date back to the 1980’s.

When articles concerning gender equity are considered specifically, as shown in Table 3-4, they may be divided according to their countries of origin with reference to five main western countries: the Netherlands (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2007; 2008; Knoppers & Anthonissen,
Canada (Hall, Cullen, & Slack, 1989; Hoeber, 2007; 2008), Norway (Hovden, 2000; 2000), the UK (White & Kay, 2006) and the USA (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007; Fink & Pastore, 1999; Cunningham, 2008; Whisenant, Pedersen & Obenour, 2002; Whisenant, 2003; Shaw & Frisby, 2006). When racial equality is the keyword, the total number of articles studied is three: two in the UK (Long, Robinson & Spracklen, 2005; Spracklen, Hylton & Long, 2006) and one in the USA (Cunningham & Sagas, 2005). Of the two articles covering both gender and racial equity, one was written in the Netherlands (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2001) and one in the USA (Fink & Pastore, 1999). Disability is lightly touched upon under the title ‘Diversity in Sport?’ in a paper where the discussion mainly concerns gender and racial equity in the USA (Fink & Pastore, 1999). An article based on studies conducted in Norway mainly discusses disability (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006) while another article concerning disability is from the USA (Hums, Moorman & Wolff, 2003).

In summary, in terms of the number of articles developed in relation to it, the concept of equity has been studied the most and has received greater emphasis than the other governance principles in the sports field. Overall, the sub-issues comprise gender equity in terms of the treatment of sports participants and the positions occupied by males and females within sporting organisations and equity in the treatment of sports participants (and employees) with disabilities. In addition, equity with regard to racial origins is also a prominent issue of equity in a sporting context. The fair allocation of resources is also touched upon.

This demonstrates, therefore, that a variety of issues of organisational governance or corporate governance in sport or Olympic organisations have been subjected to frequent study in western countries, whereas these issues have not been discussed in non-western countries, particularly in Asia (see Table 3-4). There is good cause, therefore, to hypothesise that the notions of corporate governance used in the extracted articles are constructed by western writers in western contexts. This study discusses whether or not these westernised notions can be applied to sporting organisations in a non-western context, such as that of Korea.
Table 3-4 Key principles and related elements on the basis of target countries studied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Sub-Issues</th>
<th>Target Countries</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>government system (5)</td>
<td>Governmentality</td>
<td>The UK, Australia</td>
<td>Green &amp; Houlihan (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-organ</td>
<td>Democracy/ Efficiency/</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Sam (2005); Sam &amp; Jackson (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relations (1)</td>
<td>Organisational (structural)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Babiak (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>changes</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Amis, Slack &amp; Hinings (2004); Auld &amp; Godbey (1998);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sam &amp; Jackson (2004); Sam &amp; Jackson (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Hoye &amp; Steward (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power (4)</td>
<td>I O C</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Hoye &amp; Inglis (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate governance (7)</td>
<td>Accountability/ Transparency</td>
<td>Zakus (2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Accountability</td>
<td>Schneider (2000)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>/ Transparency</td>
<td>Booth (1999);</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency/Democracy</td>
<td>Claringbould &amp; Knoppers (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equity/Female leadership</td>
<td>Claringbould &amp; Knoppers (2008)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethic audits</td>
<td>McNamee &amp; Fleming (2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role of ethics</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Sherry, Shilbury &amp; Wood (2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability (1)</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Hoye &amp; Inglis (2003)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Hoye &amp; Inglis (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility (3)</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Hoye &amp; Inglis (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board assessment</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Schaffer (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer &amp; paid staff</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Booth &amp; Hassen (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency (0)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (1)</td>
<td>Financial dependence</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Risksjaer &amp; Nielsen (1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity (22)</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Hall, Cullen, &amp; Slack (1989); Hoeber (2007; 2008)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Hovden. (2000; 2000)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>White &amp; Kay (2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>Region/Country</td>
<td>References</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Shaw &amp; Frisby (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Cunningham &amp; Sagas (2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Sørensen &amp; Kahrs (2006)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hums, Moorman &amp; Wolff (2003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender &amp; Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Knoppers &amp; Anthonissen (2001)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Fink &amp; Pastore (1999) (disability is a little touched)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair allocation of resources</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Mahony, Riemer, Breeding &amp; Hums (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Frisby (1986); Chelladurai, Szyszlo &amp; Haggerty (1987); Chelladurai &amp; Haggerty, (1991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Weinberg &amp; McDermott (2002)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leaders’ perceptions</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Hoye (2006)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.I.</td>
<td>Rowald (2006); Eagly (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Scott (1997)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational values &amp; beliefs</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Fenton &amp; Inglis (2007);</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture framework</td>
<td>N.I.</td>
<td>slack &amp; Thibault (1988);</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Hinings, Thibault, Slack, &amp; Kikulis (1996);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.I.</td>
<td>slack &amp; Thibault (1988);</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational culture</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Colyer (2000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntary board</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Papadimitriou (1999);</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Doherty &amp; Carron (2003);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity &amp; effectiveness</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Fink &amp; Pastore (1999); Doherty &amp; Chelladurai (1999)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency (3)</td>
<td>Input and output of resources</td>
<td>Barros (2003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural similarity &amp; diversity</td>
<td>Norway Augestad, Bergsgard &amp; Hansen (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Leiter (2005)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*N.I. non-identified

The number in brackets after each principle indicates the total number of journals involved (some of the journals cover more than two issues).
3.5 Thematic Analysis

3.5.1 Macro-& meso-level analysis of the government (governing) system

Governing system

Enjolras and Waldahl (2007) analyse the way in which public sports policy making is effected through interactions between different major institutional actors. Neo-corporatism is expected to “involve a limited number of actors and, therefore, the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way” (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007: 203). These authors (2007) explain that, in most European countries, neo-corporatist structures prevailed until the 1990s when the structure shows evidence of having undergone a transformation to competitive pluralism.

Following Heinz et al. (1993), Bergsgard and Rommetvedt (2006: 8) introduce four typologies of government systems in terms of the degree of power concentrated in private and government hands: corporatism, private government, pluralism and state directed systems.

Figure 3-3 Concentrations of Power, Government Systems and the Norwegian Development

Source: Bergsgard & Rommetvedt (2006: 9)
Figure 3-3 shows that corporatism may be characterised as being a hierarchically ordered and monopolistic system, whereas neo-corporatism or societal corporatism, as defined by Schmitter (1979), entails relatively autonomous and competitive electoral processes, for example, in Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. The segmented state is characterised by “sectorized concentrations of power” (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 9), with the result that, for example, sports departments which form a segment in government with participants coming from a variety of institutions, “share certain basic values and perceptions”, according to Christensen and Egeberg (1979: 253 cited in Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 9). The term ‘neo-pluralism’ is used for the situation in which “the state in a modern pluralist welfare state is much stronger and plays a more comprehensive role than the traditional and rather weak ‘nightwatchman state’ under classic pluralism and liberalism” (Bergsgard & Rommetvedt, 2006: 10). Obviously, pluralisation implies dispersion of power.

Based on the theoretical approaches in sports policy discussed above, policy making in Norway has traditionally followed neo-corporatism which “entails that the organised interests are recognised by the state and are granted a representational monopoly by the state” (Enjolras & Waldahl, 2007: 202). According to Bergsgard & Rommetvedt (2006: 10), however, Norway has been engaged in a process of pluralisation since the 1980s, whereby it has been moving from the neo-corporatism that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, by way of the segmented state of the 1970s. More precisely, Enjolras & Waldahl, (2007: 202) see Norwegian pluralism as embodying a system of competitive pluralism in which “interest associations no longer have a monopoly on interest representation and have to compete with a wide variety of players of different and uncertain statuses” (see also Streeck, 1991). Accordingly, power dispersion has been evident in contemporary Norwegian society and politics, which means that the sporting field has become more heterogeneous and more conflicts have arisen between its various parts. Apparently, signs of the same development have appeared in most European countries and not only in Norway.

**Governmentality**

Green and Houlihan (2006) examine the changing repertoire of techniques adopted by the governments in Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) through which they have shaped the behaviour of NSOs. Based on neo-Foucauldian analysis of ‘governmentality’, they aim to identify the aspects of sport culture and to problematise governmental activities shaping and directing the conduct of NSOs. Foucault’s conception of governmentality “promoted not simply a change in the substantive focus of academic investigation of the concept of power
in the policy process but also, and more fundamentally, an epistemological change” (Green & Houlihan, 2006: 48). The epistemological change implies that the government's former concentration on juridical and repressive forms of power has been replaced by forms of “shaping, guiding, and directing of the conduct of others by using persuasive processes of signification and legitimation to work through their desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs”, as explained by Scott (2001: 94 cited in Green & Houlihan, 2006: 48).

The policy analysis that is driven by governmentality is “a different way of conceptualising and investigating political power that is not structured so strongly in terms of the hegemonic role of the state’’(Green & Houlihan, 2006: 48) and, thus, in the ‘advanced liberalist’ (cf. Rose, 1999) nations, governments are increasingly networked with a variety of non-state and/or quasi-governmental authorities. More specifically, neo-Foucauldian post-structuralism draws attention to “the kinds of knowledge, and power through which social activity is regulated and through which actors -citizens, workers, institutions- are constituted as self-disciplining subjects”, according to Newman (2001: 20 cited in Green & Houlihan, 2006: 48). As Raco and Imrie (2000: 2,191) elaborate, “increasingly, government seeks not to govern society per se, but to promote individual and institutional conduct that is consistent with government objectives” (cited in Green & Houlihan, 48)

With neo-Foucauldian governmentality aiming to understand aspects of sport culture, meso-level analysis serves to identify the role of the state and government in relationships with NSOs. In the case of New Zealand, Sam (2005: 78) points out that “commissions of inquiry, national taskforces, and advisory committees are significant institutional features in the development of government sport policy” and he argues that a range of constraints such as procedural, organisational, and political considerations may affect their work significantly. Sam’s study addresses two main points, that 1) taskforces or inquiries are ad hoc organisations in nature and they “play significant roles in defining issues and shaping policy agendas” (Sam, 2005: 79, see also Aucoin, 1990; Bradford, 1999; Prasser, 1994); and 2) contradictions arising from the use of them are caused by their capacity to investigate and the political context in which they conduct their work.

In particular, Sam and Jackson (2004) investigate ‘how a paradigm stressing administrative reforms shaped the findings and recommendations of New Zealand’s Ministerial Taskforce’. This taskforce’s recommendation of a rationalisation of regional boundaries was seen as “a powerful policy paradigm for the Taskforce to consistently apply to all levels of sport, including club, regional, school and elite sport”, according to Sam and Jackson (2004: 214).
They (2004) also argue that by the 1990s, the neo-liberal ideology had fully trickled down into the central sport agency and consequently, the sports policy paradigm shifted to rationalisation, centralisation, integration and hierarchical structures. These changes are expected to bring about a better and more efficient result, but Sam and Jackson (2004) express their concern that fewer voices would be involved in decision making. Thus, the rationalisation and centralisation of sporting structures leads to the weakening of support for those who “are either involved with minor sports or coming from regions with unique economic and political backgrounds (such as rural Maori)” (Sam & Jackson, 2004: 219).

Extending Sam and Jackson (2004)’s work, Green and Houlihan (2006: 49) provide

“a detailed analysis of the ways in which the governments in two countries, the UK and Australia, have implemented programs designed (ostensibly) to empower and autonomise NSOs on the one hand, while imposing centralised targets, directives and, indeed, sanctions on the other”.

As a result, both Neo-liberal governments have increased their influence, by means of rationalisation, modernisation and policies which bestow managerial privileges. The authors, thus, conclude that the relationships between governments and NSOs in both countries have changed from “relative deference to disciplining” (Green & Houlihan, 2006: 55). They quote Rose (1999: 22) who stated that “discipline is constitutively linked to the emergence of new ways of thinking about the tasks of political rule in terms of the government of the conduct of the population” (cited in Green & Houlihan, 2006: 54).

3.5.2 Interorganisational relations

Babiak (2007) examines aspects of the determinants and necessities of IORs (inter-organisational relations). She (2007) adopts Oliver’s (1990) conceptual framework in which six determinants of inter organisational relations are outlined: 1) asymmetry where one organisation’s desire to exercise power over another organisation or its resources can motivate the development of partnerships between, in particular, government and other organisations; 2) reciprocity, in which the desire is to pursue common or mutually beneficial goals or interests but which might lead to disadvantages such as the loss of autonomy in decision making and the cost of managing it; 3) necessity, which suggests that “IORs are formed in order to meet the legal or regulatory requirements or mandates from higher authorities such as government agencies or legislation” (Babiak, 2007: 341), although an individual organisation’s perception may be that the power it may exercise over its
environment has been diminished; 4) institutional pressures, where the implication is that organisations have pressures imposed on them by their environments to justify their activities and/or outputs. “Institutional pressures motivate organisations to increase their legitimacy in order to appear congruent with the prevailing norms, rules, beliefs, or expectations of external constituents” (Babiak, 2007: 342); 5) efficiency that is more focused internally is driven by an attempt to improve ‘the organisation’s internal input-output ratio’, with partnership leading to a better performance in that IORs increase the return on assets or decrease unit costs; and 6) stability, whereby it is suggested that IORs can respond to environmental uncertainty caused by a lack of information about the environment and resource scarcity.

Sporting organisations interact with a broad spectrum of stakeholders, ranging from their government to their partners. Babiak (2007: 338) stresses that organisational strategic value and effectiveness are commonly created within networks of all types of organisation in a variety of forms of relationship, adding that “in practice, governments are embracing public-private partnerships (see Boase, 2000; Coulson, 2005; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Lehman & Tregoning, 2004), whereas for-profit organisations are creating strategic alliances and joint ventures (see Das & Teng, 2002; Spekman, Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 1998), and nonprofit organisations are establishing collaborative relationships with non-traditional partners (Alexander, 2000; Andreasen, 1996; Provan, Veazie, Staten, & Teufel-Shone, 2005; Roussin Isett & Provan, 2005)”.

When the NOC’s interorganisational relations are viewed in this perspective, as Mills (1998) argues, NOCs seem to have to deal with a great number of expectations as regards excellent performance and in particular, the need to meet their medal targets at international events such as the Olympic Games (Babiak, 2007: 340). Consequently, the importance of partnerships in sports organisations has been strongly emphasised and the necessity for even stronger partnerships to be built between the various levels of organisations (Babiak, 2007: 340) is recognised.

3.5.3 Power

Power and organisational change

Power in organisations is determined by authority relations that are specified by organisational rules and hierarchies, the possession of resources that can be used to reward others and deference gained through interpersonal hierarchies (Berger et al. 1977;
Although Greve and Mitsuhashi (2007) also study the relationship between power and organisational change, they focus more on power concentration. With respect to organisational structure, a concentrated power structure shows that power is held by a few people. By contrast, a dispersed power structure is found when power is spread to various subunits. Thus, “power concentration plays a significant role in shaping group dynamics” (Mannix 1993 cited in Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007: 1201). Greve and Mitsuhashi (2007) describe the relationship of power concentration and organisational change and Goodstain and Boeker (1991) affirm that “there is a broad agreement that power concentration is important for understanding rates of organizational change” (cited in Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007: 1198). Power concentration enables those who hold power to limit the degree of flexibility in the interpretation of organisational goals and external environments (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007; see also Clark, 2004; Devenport & Leitch 2005). It also allows them to develop organisational norms and value systems in order to reflect their own preferences and to create greater opportunities for them to lead their organisations towards their anticipated goals.

Power concentration also gives rise to an unequal distribution of power in decision-making processes, as decision making is highly related to the exercise of power in organisations. Whyte and Levi (1994) explain that “less powerful members are prone not to voice their concerns or to be ignored if they do, leading to domination by the powerful members” (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007: 1203). As this is a case of non-decision making, groups who are not equally empowered have a tendency to make decisions favourable to the centre of power. Accordingly, power concentration leads to potential inequality in the decision-making process.

Structure and leadership in the transition process
Amis, Slack and Hinings (2004) examine three dynamics, namely interests, power and capacity that are inherent to the process of organisational change toward greater professionalism and bureaucratisation. Interests are concerned with the allocation of resources within sports organisations and the roles of participants in decision making processes. The interests of subgroups serve to protect their decision-making authority and, thus, individual subunit interests should be taken into consideration in the transition process. Power structure also plays a great role in the transition process of organisations, whether power is dispersed or concentrated. Capacity refers to the exercise of sufficient commitment and skill by individual managers. A transformational leadership is widely
recognised as an important factor. These three dynamics can individually affect the change process but, on the other hand, these three dynamics can also affect each other in the transition process.

Amis, Slack and Hinings (2004) argue that good leadership is essential for managing the relationship between power, organisational change and capacity. Due to specialisation within organisations, organisations are divided into subunits that are interdependent and mutually related. Consequently, their relationships are highly affected by the distribution and usage of power which is mainly exercised in decision-making. Power is used to “protect valued interests over time by establishing, maintaining, and sometimes transforming the rules by which the organisation operates” (DiMagio, 1988 cited in Amis et al, 2004: 160). In particular, as Fligstein (1991) says, organisational change has a tendency to occur when newly powerful actors appear or when the interests of powerful actors induce changes in the direction of the organisation (Amis et al, 2004: 161). As a result, transformation may cause a challenge to the main and dominant power in organisations. Here, leadership is an important factor as leadership should possess the ability to steer organisations through the transformation process successfully.

Volunteer and professional staff members in state or national sports organisations
Auld and Godbey (1998) suggest that increasing managerial professionalism and bureaucratisation have changed the nature of sports organisations that used to be volunteer staff-oriented. Sports organisations with a mixed nature have emerged in which volunteer and professional staff co-exist in managerial roles, such as has been the case with national sports organisations in Canada (see also, Schrodt, 1983; Beamish, 1985; Frisby, 1986; Macintosh, 1988; MacMillan, 1991; Thibault, Slack, & Hinings, 1991; and Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings, 1995). Such a tendency has, however, resulted in a weakening of the levels of power and influence in decision-making wielded by volunteer board members.

Types of power and its utilisation within sports organisations.
Hoye and Stewart (2002) describe the types of power existing within volunteer sport organisations and the ways in which power may be achieved and exploited. The types of power that they distinguish are: 1) legitimate power, which is acquired by virtue of one’s occupancy of a senior position; 2) reward power, which consists in the granting of privileges or the conferring of a prestigious position; 3) coercive power, which involves force and compliance; 4) referent power, by means of which the possessor influences others through his ability; and 5) expert power, which is derived from a person’s knowledge or skills (Hoye & Steward, 2002: 55). As power plays a significant role in achieving a change within
volunteer sport organisations, these forms of power can be utilised by individuals or groups.

Hoeber (2007) also follows the exclusionary power theory developed by Rao et al. (1999). Exclusionary power refers to the idea that not all organisational members have access to or can exercise power, because power relations are determined by gender. The four key ways of employing exclusionary power are “positional power, agenda-setting power, hidden power and power of dialogue, each of which has an impact on the production of knowledge regarding gender equity” (Rao et al., 1999 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 262). Positional power is connected with a person’s status and title in an organisation. In a male-dominated organisational culture those who are in upper management positions are involved in the formal decision-making processes for resources distribution, which enables them to influence the policy on gender equity. When agenda-setting power is exercised, the topics for discussion are informally selected as being acceptable or unacceptable. For instance, male administrators may effectively sideline the issue of gender inequity as a topic of discussion so that attention is not paid to it (Hoeber, 2007: 262, see also Hall et al., 1989, 1990; McKay, 1997; Shaw, 2001). Hidden power “exists when those who are oppressed do not recognise their situations and fail to question dominant knowledge and practise, even when there are apparent inequities” (Rao et al., 1999 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 262). The last form of exclusionary power, the power of dialogue is exerted to determine “whose voices are included” and “whose voices are silenced and ignored” in decision-making processes. (Rao et al., 1999 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 263).

3.5.4 Corporate governance

Reforming the IOC: issues of corporate governance

In this section, a number of researchers have examined the IOC reforms in terms of the principles of corporate governance (Zakus, 2000; Schneider, 2000; Booth, 1999; Rintala & Bischoff, 1997; Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008). Owing to the pervasive gift culture in the Olympic movement, Booth (2000) points out that more transparency and democracy in the bidding process are necessary. However, all theorists concurred with each other in the view that gift giving is, fundamentally, a highly complicated process of exchange. As the chief executive officer of the Sydney Olympic Bid Committee observes, in order to win the bid the Olympic Bid Committee should build really strong bonds with IOC members and he adds that “if friends make gifts, gifts make friends” (cited in Booth, 1999: 45). Consequently, the initial and the second IOC Ad Hoc Commissions were established in 1998 and 1999 respectively to investigate allegations regarding the bribery of IOC members. The formation
of the Ethics Commission and the IOC 2000 Commission took place in the same context. The former was established to devise a set of ethical principles for IOC members and the latter mainly examines and recommends the method for conducting the bidding process and the structure of the IOC.

The view that greater democracy is needed is also supported by Schneider (2000) who also emphasises accountability with regard, in particular, to the issue of reforming the IOC's structure and governance, procedures to deal with doping and bidding cities. With respect to democracy, IOC members should represent the IOC to their countries in such a way as to guard the independence of the IOC from national politics. Reform of the structure of the IOC must guarantee its international independence and also ensure that democratic and structural forms of accountability are introduced. As the concept of accountability is closely related to stakeholders and openness, the IOC should demonstrate its willingness to be accountable for all of its decisions and to open the bidding process to all stakeholders. Furthermore, democratic accountability should be introduced in its decision making and executed by means of elections. Similarly, the newly created anti-doping agency should be given sufficient independence to allow it to perform its role.

Concerning an issue of corporate governance, Zakus (2000: 168) quotes McIntosh et al. (1998: 86) who argue that NGB boards should be transparent in their decision-making and consider to whom they should be accountable, who they should be working for, what competencies the directors should have, whether or not a wider range of stakeholders should be involved and how companies hold their employees accountable.

In relation to gender equity, men have traditionally dominated IOC decision-making as well as participation in the Olympic Games though broadly equal participation had been achieved by London 2012. In fact, “women were not eligible for selection for membership on the IOC until a rule change was instituted in 1973… there were still only 9 women on the 111 member IOC – approximately 8% of the total membership in 1997” (Rintala & Bischoff, 1997: 2). “By 2012 there were 20 number of women representing 18.8 % of the 106 IOC members” (IOC, 2002). Male dominance is also conspicuous in the leadership of the National Olympic Committees and the International Sports Federations. Regarding the proportion of women among the high ranking officials, Wilson (1996: 186) reveals that “in 1995, of the 34 International Federations with sports on the Olympic program, only 2 listed women as Presidents; 2 other Federations had women as Executive Directors. There were 5 National Olympic Committees out of 196 which could point to a woman as president,
while women served as Secretary General in 12 more” (cited in Rintala & Bischoff, 1997: 2). The figures had improved but not dramatically as more recent IOC commissioned research has shown (Henry et al., 2004; and Henry & Robinson, 2010).

Accordingly, the International Olympic Committee has shown its concern about the low level of female involvement in decision making structures in sports organisations and it has strongly urged each country to live up to the IOC requirements that “ensure that the benefits of wider involvement in decision making by women are realised” (Women 2004: 4 cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81). Nevertheless, the IOC has recognised that fixing a target percentage for women’s involvement may not be sufficient to increase the number of women holding senior positions in sports organisations since affirmative action policies “do not directly address the circumstances or attitudes which cause such an imbalance in the first place” (Women 2004: 6 cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81).

Rintala and Bischoff (1997: 4) survey the ratio of women performing leadership roles at the level of “the Executive Committee members and Presidents of national governing bodies of women’s Olympic medal sports.” In terms of the overall percentage of women’s involvement, the highest numbers appear in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). By contrast, “the lowest percentage of women Executive Committee members was in Asia and the lowest percentages for women in President positions were in Asia (1.1%) and Europe (1.3%)2” (Rintala & Bischoff, 1997: 8).

**Corporate Governance in sports organisations**

McNamee and Fleming (2007) provide a conceptual framework for the evaluation of corporate governance in public sector sports which also enables us to evaluate the ethical dimensions of organisational culture. This ethics audit is likely to be limited to large sports organisations which receive public funding, operate in the public sector and are, in turn, vulnerable to non-market driven forms of financial, legal and political constraints. Regarding audits of corporate governance and ethics, according to McNamee and Fleming (2007: 427), “their heterogeneous meanings and uses are themselves the product of a range of perceptions about organisational culture and the proper methods for ensuring standards of conduct within them”. Hindley (2003) distinguishes three types of governance, namely steering, networks and corporate governance, and he categorises the former two

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2Asia: Indonesia, Japan, China, South and North Korea.
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland
as being descriptive and the latter as normative, McNamee and Fleming (2007), on the other hand, suggest that corporate governance involves both descriptive and normative features.

Sternberg (1994: 241) remarks that the ethics audit is a “key management tool”, arguing that it is necessary to evaluate the entire organisational culture and key decision-making processes (McNamee & Fleming, 2007: 428). The ethics audit starts from the position that “an organisation’s aims and its procedures for achieving them must be open to critique, and may be stimulated by a set of drivers” (McNamee & Fleming, 2007: 428). Moreover, for establishing a more ethically sound organisational culture, all members of an organisation must pledge to engage in the promotion of good corporate governance. This study introduces a framework for the ethics audit which is divided into three categories: respect, equity and responsibility. Respect relates to the way in which the individual is treated, equity covers the social level with respect to social justice, and responsibility is concerned with the political dimension of staff members’ organisational roles and conduct. The model of three categories covers accountability, responsibility, transparency, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. However, democracy is not included.

**Role of ethics in professionalised sporting organisations**

Since the relationship between business and sport has intensified dramatically, Sherry, Shilbury and Wood (2007) discuss the ways in which such a relationship has increased the complexity of ethical issues impacting on sport management. The conceptual discussion of the issue of conflict of interest is a main aspect in understanding sports organisations. Conflicts of interest can arise in a decision-making process that impacts on diverse groups of people, for example, athletes, business people, fans and the media. In the business field, the ethics program should address potential conflicts of interest and “business executives generally view potential conflicts of interest as ethical issues that firms should address” (Felo, 2001 cited in Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007:268)

In Australia, the system for governing and managing sporting organisations has become increasingly professionalised and bureaucratised with the result that the links between professionalisation and ethical management behaviours have been highlighted. Several researchers have noted the connection between professional sport management and ethics (cf. Branvold, 1996; Zeigler, 1992). Accordingly, corporate governance has become an important element to aid our understanding of conflict of interest situations. Milton-Smith (1997) argues that “corporate governance has developed into an expectation of setting
higher standards of accountability for decision-makers in response to the public demand for greater transparency" (Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007: 269). The Australian Sports Commission (1999) demands that “board members of national sport organisations declare any kind of conflicts of interest” (Sherry, Shilbury & Wood, 2007: 274). The focus is also thereby placed on the balance between the roles and responsibilities of business. As roles are professionalised, greater independence and autonomy are apparent in judgments made in the decision-making process. This underlines the role of ethics in the governance of sporting organisations.

3.5.5 Accountability

Non-profit organisations
Hoye and Inglis (2003) focus on three key governance issues for non-profit leisure organisations. Firstly, non-profit organisations should balance the distribution of roles between the executive and volunteer board members. Executive members should be involved in strategy and policy development whereas volunteer board members should take legal and moral responsibility for the governance function. Secondly, the board should evaluate individual members and the board as a whole at the same time, including its executive members. The last point is that organisation members should be directly and openly involved in the governance of their organisations.

3.5.6 Responsibility

Responsibility of the board
Following agency theorists who emphasise the importance of the board’s decision control function (Westphal, 1999; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the major responsibilities of the board in a broad sense are “to address conflicts of interests between ownership and management (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and to make sure that top management is directing the organisation in a fashion that is consistent with the established mission and strategic plan” (Schaffer, 2002: 96). On top of its control function, “the board is also responsible for assuming roles related to service and the attainment of resources” (Schaffer, 2002: 96; see also Johnson et al., 1996). In particular, Schaffer (2002) focuses on the board’s duty to assess managerial performance.

Schaffer (2002) undertakes to integrate attribution theory and corporate governance. The board is likely to fall into one of two groups in terms of its composition depending on the proportion of its members who hold positions in the firm, so that the board may be insider-
dominated or outsider-dominated. In the managerial assessment process initiated by the board of directors when the firm is undergoing a period of poor performance, each group faces different constraints in assessment. ‘Insider’ directors are subject to social constraints such as their desire to maintain their loyalty to the CEO and fears of possible retaliation, while ‘outsider’ directors are subject to lack of information and time, and they may not be so wholly committed to the organisation. When observing an individual’s behaviour to assess managerial performance, according to Schaffer (2002: 103), we apply attribution theory which “determines whether the behaviour was internally caused (i.e. by the person), or externally caused (by the context or the situation)” (see also Ferris et al., 1995; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Heider, 1958). Obviously, ‘insider’ directors have, to some extent, a tendency to make external attributions for poor organisational performance, and ‘outsider’ directors tend to make internal attributions.

Booth and Hassen (1990) look at the division of responsibilities between volunteer and paid staff in national sports organisations in Canada. Despite episodes of friction and conflict between the two groups, their cooperation and reciprocity are essential since their mutual responsibilities imply overlapping boundaries.

### 3.5.7 Democracy

**Autonomy**

The question of autonomy in national sports organisations is likely to be closely related to economic concerns. A non-profit organisation is thought to be strongly dependent on public financing (and to some extent on commercial financing), both at the local and at the national level, as suggested by Riiskjær and Nielsen (1987: 193). Consequently, Weisbrod (1980) argues that the behaviour of voluntary non-profit organisations is dependent upon the structure of its revenues (Riiskjær & Nielsen 1987: 193).

### 3.5.8 Equity

**Social ideology on gender**

A number of researchers apply a symbolic interactionist approach to social ideology, “which posits that the multiple identities of an individual are manifested through behavioural, cognitive, and emotional responses to patterned societal symbols and language” (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 245, see also Blumer, 1969; Burke, 1980; 1991; Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1980). On this basis it is argued that societal symbols and languages through interactions are thought to be reproduced in social ideologies and, in particular, sporting ideologies, for
instances, gender stereotypes. Issues of power relations are also deeply related with social interactions and relations (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 246, see also Pastore, Inglis, & Danylchuk, 1996; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999). As noted by Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1999), “societal status and power are possibly gendered, in that men generally occupy senior positions and perform the leading roles whereas women are predominantly engaged in lower-status and less powerful societal homemaker roles” (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 246). Furthermore, this is also closely related to the gender imbalance seen in the leadership of sports organisations. To some extent, societal stereotypes make people believe that women are not as competent as men to perform leading roles and this may be particularly true of the leadership positions within sports organisations. In fact, as Slack (1997: 303) points out, “it is obvious that little attempt has been made to confront such an unbalanced situation regarding gender equity in leadership in sport” (Whisenant, Pedersen & Obenour, 2002: 487).

Research suggests, according to Sartore and Cunningham (2007: 247), that “one’s organisational status and level of associated power are often a reflection of society at large” (see also Ely, 1995; Heilman, 2001; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Jost & Kay, 2005; Shaw & Hoeber, 2003; Shaw & Slack, 2002). In particular, male/female stereotypes tend to be subsumed within this notion of social ideology and they may play a role in either positive or negative ways, so as to undermine perceptions of women’s ability to exercise competence and power (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248, see also Eagly & Mladinic, 1989, 1993; Jost & Kay, 2005).

Such a stereotype is likely to be a mirror reflecting the organisational and national culture in question. Stereotypes may be applied at both the individual and social or cultural level and their use at the social or cultural level implies some form of agreement or consensus of beliefs (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248, see also Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001). The traditional social stereotypes bring into power inequalities between men and women, impacting the organisational domain. Sartore and Cunningham (2007:247) maintain that “gender stereotypes permeate organisational settings and are recreated there through everyday interactions” (see also Davidson & Burke, 2000; Ely, 1995; Heilman, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Shaw & Hoeber, 2003).

**Issue of gender in the boards of national sports organisations**
As the centre of power in national sports organisations, the board of directors establishes the goals for senior management and draws up organisational policies and conditions. With
so much power at stake, “the percentage of women in the board is much lower than that in senior management”, according to CDWI (2004 cited in Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2007: 495). Apparently, through the process of interaction and the creation of meanings, or “common sense” (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2005), male dominance is reinforced, whether intentionally or unintentionally, by its very masculinity.

Following Witz’s (1990, 1992) perspective, the possession of or the lack of ‘fitness’ (entitling the individual to inclusion or exclusion from the board) is determined by the process of negotiation between the dominant (here, male) and subdominant (female) groups. Claringbould and Knoppers (2007: 497) explore the ways in which men and women negotiate during the selection process. For both groups ‘fitness’ is more important than ‘gender’ and this results in the male-dominant culture on the board being reproduced through male controlling strategies. This conclusion is also supported by Hovden (2000; 2000) who discusses the gendering of selection processes for positions of leadership (at a managerial level) in Norway, indicating that leaders should be fit according to the criteria produced by the male-dominant, or “male heavyweight”, group.

Claringbould and Knoppers (2007; 2008) also believe that meanings shape the behaviours of the members of an organisation and their expectations for the behaviour of others, following the argument proposed by Kanter (1977) that “the gender ratio or composition of a group is a structural determinant of (gendered) organisational behaviour…in particular, in male dominated contexts” (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 82). In a gender-balanced group, the members seem unlikely to police the group boundaries or to use stereotypes. However, sense making is a process that takes place continuously whenever individuals interact with each other. Accordingly, meanings about gender are continually renegotiated on the boards of national sports organisations.

Claringbould and Knoppers (2008: 84) aim to “understand how board members make sense of gender composition and how that reflects ways of doing and undoing gender.” On gendered boards, the members are not aware of any gender skewedness, whereas the balanced board members have a greater awareness of gender composition and behaviours and, in turn, they will even notice the outcomes of a shift from a gendered to a balanced ratio.

**Meanings and practices of equity and organisational culture (masculinities)**

As Knoppers and Anthonissen (2005:123) point out, most senior managers who, in general,
hold a great deal of power over decision-making, impact on organisational culture through their practices and discourses which reflect a part of societal discourses. Furthermore, the managers’ masculinity may also be influenced by the athletic masculinity which pervades sport through their images and discourses. Consequently, the purpose of Knoppers and Anthonissen' research is to discover whether the meanings given to male athletes and managers intersect and support each other in terms of their masculinity. The most obvious male athletic masculinities are easily accessible on a daily basis because they are shown in men’s professional/national sports by means of the worldwide media. Since the early image of the sporting manager was associated with masculinities, managerial positions in sport are still dominated by men.

Relating the dominant meanings to performance Knoppers and Anthonissen (2001: 302) seek to find “how such meanings contribute to organisational process in terms of gender and ethnicity”. They argue that the relationship between meanings and performance may partly be a reason for the slow increase in the number of women and members of ethnic minorities in leadership positions. They (2001: 302) also indicate that since white masculinities prevail in organisational culture, women and ethnic minorities have often been marginalised or excluded (see also Collinson & Hearn, 1994; Kerfoot & Knights, 1998; Lapchick, 1996; Moodley, 1999; Witz & Savage, 1992). However, the meanings given to performance in gender and racial/ethnic contexts imply that the processes of gender and racial discrimination in sports organisation are fluid and contradictory.

Hoeber (2007; 2008), who also analyses the gaps between meanings and practices of gender equity with respect to athletes in a sports organisation following Post-structuralist feminism, acknowledges the “gendered nature of knowledge production and the way it maintains and reinforces the power relationships between the sexes” (Fletcher, 1999a: 21 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 260). Importantly, the dominant group holding power is likely to impact on organisational culture in such a way that it can define the appropriateness of guidelines and boundaries about what is right and normal, or what is expected in the organisation. Thus, it is necessarily cautious in the way that it defines and interprets of gender equity.

Hall, Cullen and Slack (1989) focus on explanations of the ways in which male dominant groups work to retain their power and how female subdominant groups collude in this process in terms of gender structure. Apparently, junior positions are much more likely to be held by women, who comprise a much smaller proportion of staff in senior positions in an
organisational structure. This implies that women are relatively excluded from involvement in decision-making. “Organisations are understood and analysed not mainly in economic or material terms but in terms of their expressive, ideational, and symbolic aspects” (Smircich, 1983 cited in Hall, Cullen & Slack, 1989: 34). The suggestion is that each sports organisation has its own culture and that, obviously, more male dominant organisational cultures have prevailed. This in turn, has resulted in women's acceptance of male culture with respect to its attitudes, interests and goals.

The marginalisation of women's positioning at the administrative level (Whisenant, 2003; Whisenant, Pedersen & Obenour, 2002) seems to have been reinforced in US intercollegiate sport, which implies that women may only occupy administrative positions in women-related sports. Such practices have resulted in a limited number of jobs being available to women which has served to “deny them the power associated with controlling the ‘revenue generating’ sports”, according to Whisenant, Pedersen and Obenour (2002: 489).

The process of integrating disabled and able-bodied sports organisations

“In Norway, the Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (Norges Iderettsforbund og olympiske komite, NIF) made a commitment to integrate disability sport into sport federations for the able-bodied in 1996” (NIF, 1996 cited in Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006: 184). After the three main bodies for disability sport had been merged into one organisation named ‘The Norwegian Sports Organisation for the Disabled (NIF)’, the organisation was evaluated in terms of its integration process. The evaluation intentionally included not only physical or organisational measures but also social and pedagogical (instructional) practices. Through the application of these measures, criteria were developed for determining “what an ideal sport organisation that includes disability sports would be like” (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006: 186).

Sørensen and Kahrs (2006: 186) state that all organisational bodies should demonstrate their willingness to integrate individual workers with disabilities and an efficient way should be established of organising the integration work, the legislation, rules and finance. The important point here is that individuals with disabilities should be enabled to participate as members of the decision-making bodies. Moreover, the social aspects of the working environment also had a crucial role to play in improving that environment for them in terms of colleagues' positive attitudes, acceptance and willingness to prioritise the benefits accruing to participants with disabilities. “These criteria were used as indicators for how far
in the process the various parts of the organisation had come toward the ideal goal of integration” (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006:186).

The consensus opinion of the evaluation was that although the integration process was truly under way in the NIF in a positive direction, it was proceeding at a much slower pace than had been expected due to the top-down approach of the power structure. This needed to be combined with a bottom-up approach, for example, more activities for individuals with disabilities, or enhancing the development of competence on disability issues in the organisation.

Hums, Moorman and Wolff (2003) also study the integration process among disability and able-bodied sports organisations and they state (2003: 262) that “the governance of sport for people with disabilities in the United States has come to the forefront of amateur sport with the 1998 passage of the Stevens Amendment to the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. This amendment resulted in a new name (The Olympic and Amateur Sport Act)... and the term ‘Paralympic’ is included.” Beaver (1998) claims that the Act has promoted equal status for athletes with disabilities, since the Paralympics is mandated under the USOC (Hums, Moorman & Wolff, 2003: 264). However, the law does not specify that its implementation is obligatory or that there should be a change in the governance structure of the USOC (United States Olympic Committee). Thus, although the USOC and NGBs appear to be involved in the integration process, DSOs (Disabled Sports Organisations) are unfortunately excluded from participation in the determination process and from the exercise of power. The challenges that have arisen for the USOC consist in 1) the lack of compatibility between the integration process and USOC governance structures and 2) the absence of a relevant financial resource allocation. Consequently, in April, 2000, the USOC decided to help to establish a separate Paralympic organisation (USPSC, United States Paralympic Sports Corporation) (Hums, Moorman & Wolff, 2003: 267).

**Improvement of equity and sporting culture in the UK**

White and Kay (2006) have developed the research findings from the study conducted by White and Brackenridge (1985) regarding the changes in women’s involvement in power positions in sports organisations in three areas: national pan-sport organisations; the professional fields of administration, management and coaching; and the governing bodies of individual sports. White and Brackenridge (1985: 105) assert that for the preceding 20 years power positions had been “firmly in the hands of men” (White & Kay, 2006: 472). Fortunately, in overall terms, women’s representation in sports organisations has positively
increased in UK sport organisations. This finding is supported by the Chartered Management Institute which released statistics showing that “the proportion of female managers had risen from under two percent in 1975 to 22 percent in 2000, and to 31 percent in 2004” (cited in White & Kay, 2006: 472).

Long, Robinson and Spracklen (2005) report on the achievement of racial equity following the promotion of racial equity in governing bodies and national sports organisations in the UK. Since the inception of the UK’s ‘Sport for All’ policy in the early 1970s, the issue of racial equity has emerged more clearly. When the structure and culture of sports organisations in the UK are examined, it becomes apparent that most organisations are small and possess limited resources and that the majority of their staff are volunteers. With respect to sporting cultures in the UK, according to Spracklen (1996), a racist hegemony has given rise to a stereotyping of racial qualities and, in turn, the underrepresentation and lack of involvement of ethnic minority representatives in positions of power has become a part of the culture of sports. Therefore, progress towards greater racial equity has been slow since the launch in December, 2000 of ‘Achieving Racial Equality: A Standard for Sport (Commission for Racial Equality, 2000)’ (Long, Robinson & Spracklen, 2005: 45). In fact, Spracklen, Hylton and Long (2006: 300) reveal that although the Racial Equality Standard was rapidly embedded within the list of preliminary-level policy objectives by sports managers and policy makers because of their fears over a possible loss of funding, it was not generally put into practice.

The fairness of the distribution (or reduction) of resources
Mahony, Riemer, Breeding and Hums (2006) survey the fairness of resource distribution from college athletes and other college students’ perspectives. Distributive justice refers to “the fairness, or justice, of the distribution of resources to participants” (Hums & Chelladurai, 1994b cited in Mahony et al., 2006: 160) and is categorised into three sub-divisions: 1) equity (more resources go to those who contribute more); 2) equality (an equal share to everyone); and 3) need (more resources go to those who have less). As a result, women tend to give strong support to its equal distribution or reductions in resources, while men tend to be in favour of basing decisions regarding resource distribution or reduction on need or on rewarding contributions to the program.

3.5.9 Effectiveness

Voluntary boards and effectiveness
Papadimitriou (1999) develops normative standards to evaluate the effectiveness of
voluntary boards of directors in Greece. From the normative perspective, suitable qualifications and competency are prerequisites of board membership in addition to commitment and motivation for performing their responsibilities. Effectiveness is closely related to decision making outputs for the achievement of the interests of national sports organisations. The board members should also be able to attract financial resources for their operation. The last of the normative standards identified by Papadimitriou concerns the organisation’s external relations and the extent to which they can be monitored so that appropriate action can be taken to adapt the organisation to its environment. In order to make an improvement in decision-making, the decentralisation of authority to paid members of staff is another option for delegating the power of voluntary board members.

Regarding the Executive Committee’s effective performance, Doherty and Carron (2003) support Papadimitriou’s (1999) finding that various members of national sports organisations believe that “well-integrated and coherent boards” are an essential factor for achieving successful performance. They emphasise, in particular, that success is closely related with effective decision making (Doherty & Carron, 2003: 117-8). The Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation (1990) points out that volunteer sports executives identified team building as a necessary factor for committee effectiveness (Doherty & Carron, 2003: 118). Moreover, Doherty and Carron (2003: 118) state that research has shown that cohesive groups are better able to perform more effectively than less cohesive groups (e.g., Carron, Colman, Stevens & Wheeler, in press; Mullen & Copper, 1994).

Organisational values
Organisational values are likely to be sensitive to cultural differences (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 335) and Martin (2002) considers that “culture is a lens to examine organisational values” (cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 337). Thus, McShane (2004) points out that when an organisation clearly expresses its values, the values are used as “standards to guide decisions and actions in order to increase productivity, improve efficiencies and to meet its social responsibility” (cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 335).

Following Martin’s cultural framework (2002) that is inclusive of an integration perspective, a differentiation perspective and a fragmentation perspective, Hoeber and Frisby (2001) develop a way of understanding the values held by individual members through the interpretations of the meanings of values (Fenton & Inglis, 2007). Fenton and Inglis (2007) use a matrix framework which integrates the three perspectives mentioned above to summarise the results of research and the underlying patterns of interpretation found in the
data. Each of the three perspectives has its own characteristics which are shown in terms of three core values, namely accessibility, innovation and responsible relationships. From the integrative viewpoint, consistency, consensus and clarity are the features that stand out. By contrast, the differentiation perspective exposes inconsistencies and fractures in the consensus. Lastly, the essential feature of the fragmentation perspective is that it shows a variety of different perspectives, a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Hinings, Thibault, Slack and Kikulis (1996) and Danisman, Hinings and Slack (2006) conclude that due to organisational homogenisation, integrated perceptions of institutional values and norms are held by individuals in the organisation. At the same time, however, each subgroup also retains differentiated sets of values and norms based on their own understandings and cognitions. The important conclusion to draw from this is that “organisational values and norms are not adopted by organisational actors collectively in the same way” (Danisman et al., 2006: 313).

Scott (2001: 55) claims that individual roles can affect institutional value differentiation (Danisman et al., 2006: 303). Trice and Beyer (1993) and Cox (1993) argue that “demographic groupings based on age (‘old-timers’ and ‘new comers’) and gender are likely to be pervasive sources of cultural differentiation” (Danisman et al, 2006: 304). This is a general cultural differentiation but it tends to arise strongly. Therefore, in operationalisation it will identify whether or not there is a cultural differentiation between old-timers and new comers, and male and female staff members. In addition, according to Danisman et al. (2006: 304), the differences in the value orientation of volunteers and professional paid staff are also prominent (see also Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1992).

Values and beliefs and organisational structure
The increase in government involvement has led to an increased level of bureaucratisation and professionalisation in organisations and, in turn, these aspects of structural change have given rise to specialisation and standardisation in organisations. According to Greenwood and Hinings (1988), “organisational structures…are reflexive expressions of intentions, aspirations, and meanings that are embodied in the dominant values and beliefs found in an organisation” (cited in Slack & Thibault, 1988: 141). Basically, organisational changes occur through a process of changes in a set of values and beliefs, and structures. As Ranson, Hinings, Greenwood and Walsh (1980: 218) conclude, “organisational members embody their frameworks of values and beliefs in the structural arrangements and policy processes of the organisations in which they work” (cited in Slack & Thibault,
Therefore, the structure is more likely to reflect and represent the values and beliefs which prevail in the organisation and is adopted in accordance with them (see also Hinings, Thibault, Slack & Kikulis, 1996).

The theme of values and beliefs can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the NOCs and culture is also an important element to take into account in such an evaluation as each NOC needs to be viewed through the lens of its own particular culture. This helps to determine whether or not the members of the organisation share similar or different values and beliefs.

**Organisational culture**

Organisational culture is also strongly believed to affect organisational effectiveness (Kent & Weese, 2000; see also Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Frost *et al*., 1985; Schein, 1985). Schein (1985), especially, notes that the leader of an organisation should set the priority of managing and embracing a designed organisational culture (cited in Kent & Weese, 2000: 5). As Colyer (2000: 321) says, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that organisational culture affects an organisation’s performance and that culture contributes in an important way to organisational effectiveness (see also Cameron & Freeman, 1991; Deal & Kennedy, 1988; Denison & Spreitzer, 1991; Smircich, 1983).

Scott (1997) connects the concept of organisational culture to the management of sport organisations. He defines cultural strength as the existence of a strong positive culture that is unlikely to be suppressive, controlling or authoritarian and which discovers its key role in promoting organisational effectiveness. Schein (1993: 51) defines a strong culture as one that is characterised by “the homogeneity and stability of group membership and the length and intensity of shared experiences of the group”, adding that a strong culture thus possesses a high degree of agreement among its members about “what the organisation stands for” (cited in Scott, 1997: 407). Scott (1997) views organisational culture in relation to transformational leadership, thereby following Weese (1995: 130) who states that “a transformational leader….helps influence a culture that perpetuates and reinforces a philosophy of excellence and continual improvement” (cited in Scott, 1997: 408). Organisations with highly transformational leaders are seen to possess significantly stronger cultures than those with leaders whose transformational abilities are relatively low-level. Furthermore, some researchers also note that the concept of organisational culture is rooted primarily in a corporate philosophy that is characterised by authoritarian control and an absence of workplace democracy. Institutional sports organisations are said to exhibit
characteristics of this type of organisational structure and leadership (see also Eitzen, 1996; Massengale & Sage, 1995)

Furthermore, the existence of a strong culture plays a crucial role in safeguarding organisational effectiveness. In discussing the elements of a strong culture that are important for organisational effectiveness, O’Reilly (1989) states that “it is only when there exist both intensity and consensus that strong cultures exist: intensity was related to the amount of approval of the cultural norms and consensus was related to the degree of consistency with which a norm is shared” (cited in Scott, 1997: 410).

Colyer (2000) uses the study of organisational culture developed by Quinn and Spreitzer (1991) following Quinn and Rohrbaugh whose competing values framework reveals differences in the values of the fundamental factors of organisational behaviours. Colyer points out that the analysis of organisational culture can make a useful contribution to organisational effectiveness and performance (see also Cameron & Freeman, 1991; Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Denison & Spreitzer, 1991). If there are subcultures, or counter cultures, in an organisation they may generate conflict due to the competing values within the organisation and, in turn, reduce its effectiveness in achieving its desired outcomes.

**Leadership and organisational culture**

The quality of an organisation’s leadership is more likely to be related to its effectiveness and in this study two major types of leadership have emerged: transactional and transformational leadership. In particular, transformational leadership is conducive to a good organisational culture which, in turn, benefits the effectiveness of the organisation.

Kent and Weese (2000) hypothesise that leadership and organisational culture play important roles in establishing an effective organisation. With regards to the two types of leadership, transactional and transformational, the former focuses on reciprocal relationships and the latter is based on the leader-follower relationship (a leader puts more emphasis on the follower’s motivation) which is thought to be more effective. Rowold (2006) discusses transformational and transactional leadership in respect of martial arts. Bass (1997) claims that, unlike transactional leadership, transformational leadership has been proven to have a positive impact on organisational performance and subordinates’ satisfaction levels, and this has been demonstrated in a wide range of different organisations (Rowold, 2006: 314), for instance, in sports management (see Davis, 2002; Ristow, Amos & Staude, 1999). As Eagly (2007:2) also comments, the fact that
transformational leadership is highly likely to be associated with greater effectiveness is demonstrated in “87 studies of meta-analysis on testing the relationships between leadership styles and measures of leaders’ effectiveness” (see also Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996).

Moreover, with respect to any possible differentiation in styles of leadership in terms of gender, researchers argue that men and women should essentially behave in the same ways while fulfilling similar roles since particular leadership tasks demand certain types of leadership (e.g., Kanter, 1977; Nieva & Gutek, 1981; van Engen, van der Leeden & Willemsen, 2001). Following this argument, Eagly (2007: 4) affirms the validity of this claim because, irrespective of gender, one has to meet similar requirements to gain a leadership role in the first place. Also, the expectations held for leaders shape their behaviour in particular directions, which results in the existence of relatively small differences in leadership style among men and women. As a style of leadership, thus, transformational is found to be more effective than transactional leadership according to measures used for leaders’ effectiveness (see also Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996). Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt and Engen (2003) discover gender differences, however, in terms of leadership styles in that female leaders are likely to be more transformational than male leaders while still exhibiting more contingent reward behaviours, which is a feature of transactional leadership, while male leaders show a strong tendency to employ transactional and laissez-faire styles of leadership (Eagly, 2007). This also reflects an organisational culture that is in the process of being transformed from a highly authoritative to a motivation-driven culture. However, Eagly finds that transactional leadership may be almost as effective as transformational leadership, owing to its ‘contingent reward’ component, which grants recognition to subordinates for their appropriate behaviour.

Leaders’ perceptions

Weinberg and McDermott (2002: 282) investigate leaders’ perceptions of organisational effectiveness in the area of group dynamics including (a) leadership, (b) group cohesion, and (c) communication. In terms of leadership, specifically, three aspects are identified as being critical to organisational effectiveness. First of all, the leader should display the characteristics of honesty, consistency, decisiveness and good organisation. Secondly, the leader should possess good interpersonal skills and notably the ability to focus on interacting with a variety of people, listening to people and trusting others’ abilities. The third aspect is the style of leadership, whether it is a democratic, interactional or autocratic
style. Essentially, effective leadership should involve every single member of the organisation in that the leader should be good at listening to their opinions and receiving their inputs into decision making (Weinberg & McDermott, 2002: 291). However, the leadership style is likely to be dependent on the circumstances that the leader faces and, consequently, a different style may be preferable in individual situations. Along with leadership, the authors also touch upon group cohesion and communication as factors determining organisational effectiveness. With respect to group cohesion, it is highly likely to be related to the organisation’s productivity. Regarding communication, top executives should emphasise clear lines of communication and open-door policies, according to Waterman (1994 cited in Weinberg & McDermott, 2002: 285).

**Leadership of the board**

Hoye (2006) focuses on leadership within the boards of voluntary sports organisation in Australia. He defines the leaders as the board chairs and executives and the followers as the board members. In applying Leader and Member Exchange Theory to this case, Hoye (2006: 299) suggests that “effective leadership processes occur when leaders and followers are able to develop mature leadership relationships”, and his study reveals that the relationships between paid executives, board chairs and board members impact directly on board performance. In order to establish a mature relationship and become a high performing board, mutual respect and trust are the prerequisites.

**Managing diversity**

Researchers argue that “the best way to engender an organisational commitment to valuing diversity is to connect employee diversity, and the successful management of it, to improvement in organisational effectiveness” (Cox & Beale, 1997; Johnson, 1992; Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Thomas, 1991 cited in Fink & Pastore, 1999: 314). Robinson and Dechant (1997) state that a company which lacks diversity management will face more difficulty in attracting, retaining, and utilising the best employees (cited in Fink & Pastore, 1999: 315). The explanation for this is that successful diversity management is also likely to engender greater employee creativity (Joplin & Daus, 1997 cited in Fink & Pastore, 1999: 315) and, perhaps more importantly it may lead to an increase in organisational productivity (Fink & Pastore, 1999: 315).

At the level of leadership positions in US Intercollegiate athletics it is claimed that prejudice and discrimination have been manifested with respect to gender, race, disability and sexual orientation and that little changes has been seen as such attitudes, values and leadership priorities have continued to be propagated (Fink & Pastore, 1999; see also Cunningham &
Sagas, 2005; Boutlier & San Giovanni, 1994; Uhlir, 1987). Accordingly, Fink and Pastore (1999) utilise business literature to obtain a perspective concerning the lack of diversity in Division IA intercollegiate athletic organisations. Their conclusion is that organisation where the management of diversity is embedded within the organisational culture can achieve high levels of effectiveness, productivity and creativity. An interesting finding reported by Cunningham and Sagas (2005) is that it is a common practice for members of the same racial group to be selected for employment. Their study provides a possible explanation of our finding that the personnel selection process within a sporting context is often influenced by whom you know. Rintala and Bischoff (1997: 19) also apply the term ‘homologous reproduction’ to be tendency for people in decision-making positions to select/elect persons for inclusion in their leadership domains who hold similar points of view.

Doherty and Chelladurai (1999) focus on the implications of demographic and cultural diversity. “Cultural diversity is felt in the organisation as a result of individual members who identify with a cultural group(s) based on sharing some personal characteristics with others” (Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 283). Adler (1991: 15) states that “individuals express personal culture and its normative qualities through the values that they hold about life and the world around them” and he notes that “these values in turn affect their attitudes about the form of behaviour considered more appropriate and effective in any given situation” (cited in Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 283-4). They influence both their behaviour within their cultural group(s) and in society at large (Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 284). Consequently, Doherty and Chelladurai (1999: 284) assert that “personal culture can manifest itself in an organisation through symbolic behaviours (e.g., clothing, language, foods, life-style preferences) and substantive behaviours (e.g., value-laden perceptions and reactions about organizational phenomena such as decision making, power relations, and social networks)

The effective management of cultural diversity depends on “whether there is an organisational culture of diversity” (Loden & Rosener, 1991; Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999). Organisational cultures of similarity and diversity should be distinguished from one another. An organisational culture of similarity is fostered by dominant groups who compel individuals to submit to their main culture for the organisation. It has the aim of reducing ambiguity and ensuring that organisationally ‘fit’ individuals gain promotion. By contrast, an organisational culture of diversity may stem from “a social responsibility to treat all organisational members fairly” (Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 288). Its characteristics that it is people-oriented, flexible and two-way communicable. Doherty and Chelladurai (1999: 76
288) insist that although the organisational culture of diversity is more effective, sports organisations have typically exhibited an organisational culture of similarity by which its members are expected to follow the culture of heterosexual, able-bodied, white males.

**Measures of effectiveness**

Several articles mainly deal with how to measure the effectiveness of sporting organisations: Frisby (1986), Chelladurai and Haggerty (1991), Chelladurai, Szyszlo and Haggerty (1987) and Shilbury and Moore (2006). Two major models of organisational effectiveness are the ‘goal’ and ‘systems’ models with the former placing the emphasis on “the ability to achieve desired objectives” and the latter concentrating on “the ability to acquire scarce resources” (Frisby, 1986: 95). Chelladurai and Haggerty (1991) and Chelladurai et al. (1987) also make use of goal and systems models but they include one further type of model entitled the ‘process model’ which “focuses on the internal organisational processes that enable the conversion of the inputs into desired outputs” (Pfeffer, 1977; Steers, 1977 cited in Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991: 127). Nevertheless, they also stress the importance of a multiple constituency approach. The multiple constituents may be providers, recipients or members who are engaged in the three models and, thus, the focus is on “who should evaluate rather than on what should be evaluated” in this approach, which “subsumes all other models of effectiveness” (Chelladurai, 1985: 181 cited in Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991: 127). By contrast, Shilbury and Moore (2006) apply the competing values approach (CVA) which is proposed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981; 1983). This approach takes into account human relations, open systems, internal process and rational-goal models. However, Slack (1997: 34) notes that “the biggest problem with the CVA is determining which constituents are important to an organisation, and then measuring the criteria they value and use in determining the effectiveness of their organisation” (Shilbury and Moore, 2006: 13).

**3.5.10 Efficiency**

**Efficiency resulting from government subsidies**

Barros (2003: 33) investigates whether government subsidies lead to an increase in “the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency” of the training activities of sporting organisations in Portugal. “Technical efficiency refers to the ability of a federation to obtain maximum output from a given set of inputs using efficient production techniques, and allocative efficiency refers to the ability of a federation to use inputs and outputs in optimal proportions, given their relative prices” (2003: 38). In Portugal, the organisational structure is vertical, and the government at the top level executes its sports policy by applying laws
and subsidies to the sport federations. Incentive regulation, which is defined as “the implementation of rules that encourage a regulated federation to achieve desired goals by granting some, but not complete, discretion to the federations” (Barros, 2003: 33) is an important regulatory issue in sports activities. The result of a non-parametric approach empirical work shows that technical efficiency and allocative efficiency are highly correlated.

Furthermore, the managerial implications for the Portuguese government are that it needs to: 1) change its follow-up inspection procedures of federations’ training activities and thereby provide explicitly binding incentives for increasing productive efficiency; 2) include contextual factors beyond managerial control; 3) publish the data gathered to establish transparency; and 4) conduct a benchmark analysis for poorly performing federations. (Barros, 2003: 47).

**Similarity and diversity in non-profit sports organisations (Institutional Isomorphism)**

Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 294) attempt to analyse the structure and organisation of “the Olympiatoppen”, which is “a central coordinating organisation for the development of elite sport in Norway”, in relation to the international trend “towards an increased focus on the organisation and arrangement of elite sport”. Oakley and Green (2001), who analyse the similarities and/or local diversities among elite sport systems in several Western countries, also argue that similarities emerge among all the countries in their move towards the adoption of ‘a single uniform model’ for sport associations dealing with elite sports in spite of local differences in cultural and political traditions. Neo-institutional approaches to organisational theory focus on the organisation’s “rational appearance with respect to the institutional environment” (Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen 2006: 296), whereas traditional organisational theory puts an emphasis on the organisation’s efficiency in terms of resource input and output. Thus, Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 296) explain that “theorists of the neo-institutional school concentrate on how and to what degree organisations adapt to both formal and informal expectations in the institutional environment.”

With respect to similarities, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), “mimetic isomorphism implies that organisations during a period of change (technological/economic) and uncertainty imitate what seems to be the most successful and/or legitimate organisations” (cited in Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006: 296). Olympiatoppen became a stronger and more centralised sports organisation in order to win more medals by following a model that had succeeded elsewhere. Following Green and Oakley (2001),
Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006) explain that Olympiatoppen in Norway has been termed “DDR-light referring to the centralised and highly scientific and systematic elite sport regime of the former German Democratic Republic”. In terms of Norwegian government involvement, although it wishes to promote elite sports development, its direct involvement is still more limited than that of many other Western countries. Accordingly, Olympiatoppen appears to be autonomous despite its close ties with its government.

Local factors in Norway, of course, ensure that it differs from international trends in elite sport development systems. First of all, “sport for children is meant to stimulate the child’s physical and psychological and social development” (Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006: 306). All children should be included in sporting activities regardless of each one’s level of skill and this seems to have resulted from the traditional idea that “children’s sport should first and foremost be play-oriented” (2006: 306). Secondly, the Norwegian sporting system has such strong democratic tendencies that sports organisations do not exercise power over the elite sport development system. Evidence of this situation is given by the fact that, according to Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 307), “the use of high altitude chambers should be prohibited by the General Assembly of the NIF in 2003”. Consequently, such a “self-imposed norm” (2006: 307) could result in Norwegian athletes having less chance of winning medals in international sports competitions.

Anheier (2003) suggests that “the non-profit sector have five criteria for the organisations in it: at least somewhat institutionalised; separate from government; self-governing; not profit distributing; and including voluntary participation” (cited in Leiter, 2005: 4). Furthermore, similarities are apparent among non-profit organisations since they are subject to coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphic forces, according to Leiter (2005: 5). Each force is explained in the following terms: ‘coercive’ means that the organisation is expected to be highly dependent on financial sources; ‘mimetic’ indicates that the non-profit mission is often unclear and the methods for its pursuit are unsettled and there is therefore a tendency for such organisations to learn by copying structures and approaches from others in the same field i.e. sport; and ‘normative’ means that different types of organisation provide expert advice and professionally trained managers are on the increase. This is particularly the case in governance, where normative recommendation has proliferated in recent years.

3.6 Conclusion
The systematic review witnesses how the notions of corporate governance that are
stemmed from the western business and finance sectors have been applied to sporting organisations for more than two decades. Unlike the notions of corporate governance in business and finance sectors, ‘equity’ and ‘effectiveness’ are mainly studied in sporting organisations, while ‘accountability’, ‘responsibility’, ‘transparency’, ‘democracy’ and ‘efficiency’ are rarely touched upon. The result of systematic review shows that business and sport sectors are likely to have interests towards different key principles. Also, there are several journals which focus on reforming the IOC in terms of corporate governance. The review will be discussed in comparison with the documents published and released by the IOC in the following chapter. Moreover, the review will be the basis of operationalisation of seven principles of corporate governance, which transforms invisible notions of corporate governance to measurable or visible ways and enables to evaluate corporate governance of the KOC.

Systematic review reveals that power relations, government system and organisational values and culture are also importantly discussed. However, although ‘national culture’ was included as a key word, few materials were found in relation to the key principles of corporate governance. As this study aims to identify the ways in which governance practices developed by the IOC’s interpretation of corporate and/or good governance in a western cultural context, are interpreted and implemented in a non-western cultural context, this study deals with national culture developed by Hofstede (1997) in association with operationalisations to be provided. The analysis of governance practices in the Korean context in Chapter Six and Seven enables discovery of ‘national culture’ of Korea and, further, it also discusses a difference between the KOCs case and the Hofstede’s findings, if any, in Conclusion.
4  Findings of key principles of corporate governance

4.1  Introduction
This chapter examines the characteristics of the key principles of good/corporate governance presented predominantly in the western literature and in the Olympic Movement providing a commentary including explanations of the definitions and operationalisations of the key principles within the ‘meaning frames’ of the Olympic Movement in a western framework. The commentary refers to the key principles of corporate governance in both the business and sport sectors on the basis of a literature review and the IOC’s official documents. Its aim is to investigate the ways in which these key principles are defined and how they are implemented in practice so as to turn the abstract concepts of the principles into operational entities. In addition, features of these key principles in the Olympic Movement are also identified.

This study analyses the selected IOC main documents in chronological order as follows: a Preliminary Document entitled the Basic Universal Principles released on 1 February 2008; the documents released at the XIII Olympic Congress Copenhagen 2009 including Congress Contributions; the Olympic Movement in Society that was released in Copenhagen on 5 October, 2009; and the IOC Code of Ethics adopted by the IOC Executive Board on 26 October 2010 in Acapulco. In addition to these, the Olympic Charter in force as from 11 February 2010 is discussed below. The features of each document are as follows:

The Olympic Charter in force as from 11 February 2010
The Olympic Charter provides broad regulations and recommendations to direct or guide the sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement. As the Charter (2010: 9) states:

The Olympic Charter (OC) is the codification of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, Rules and Bye-Laws adopted by the IOC. It governs the organisation, action and operation of the Olympic Movement and sets forth the conditions for the celebration of the Olympic Games.

The Olympic Charter is regarded as outlining the main directions or directives with which the constituents should comply and thus, is intended to function as a set of statutes for the IOC.
Preliminary Document: Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (hereinafter BUPs)

The document (2008: 1) claims that “all members of the Olympic Movement should adopt, as their minimum standard, the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement, as proposed by the IOC”, which is the Extract of the Olympic and Sport Movement Congress Recommendation 41. This is divided into seven categories to promote the IOC’s policy on good governance practices in detail.

The Olympic Movement in Society

This document was released on 5 October, 2009 on the final day of the XIII Olympic Congress. The document (2009: 12) claims that “the Olympic Movement is founded on the concept of autonomy and good governance of sports” and focuses on the understanding of the global nature of sport, which constructs the future structure of the Olympic Movement, and in turn, leads to “successful development strategies and educational initiatives within its core activities” (2009: 12). The selected themes, which are discussed in this study, are as follows: ‘the Athlete’, ‘the Olympic Games’, ‘Structure of the Olympic Movement’, ‘Olympism and Youth’, and ‘the Digital Revolution’. In particular, theme 3 entitled ‘the Structure of the Olympic Movement’ contains a section on ‘Good governance and ethics’ which is a main focus of the commentary and operationalisations below.

The XIII Olympic Congress in Copenhagen 2009 Contributions (hereinafter Copenhagen Congress Contributions)

Along with the Olympic Movement in Society, the XIII Olympic Congress in Copenhagen 2009 introduced contribution articles, covering a wide range of topics associated with ethics of good governance, written by various figures in the Olympic Movement (i.e., Bach and Baumann). In comparison with the other IOC official documents analysed above, this paper contains a much wider range of ethical principles. In fact, the aspects of equity, effectiveness and efficiency are much more prevalent in these papers.

‘The IOC Code of Ethics adopted by the IOC Executive Board on 26 October 2010 in Acapulco’ (hereinafter The IOC Code of Ethics)

This document contains seven categories of corporate governance, which are: ‘Dignity’; ‘Integrity’; ‘Good governance and resources’; ‘Candidatures’; ‘Relations with states’; ‘Confidentiality’; and ‘Implementation’. The IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 1) encourages all sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement to “undertake to respect and ensure respect
of the present Code”.

4.2 Commentary and operationalisations on the key principles

4.2.1 Accountability

The discussion of accountability in the literature is particularly concerned with ‘high’ officials’ behaviour and ethics and thus, within an organisation, a member of the Executive Committee should comply with the rules and regulations. With respect to auditing, internal auditors should “oversee the firm’s financial and operating procedures, to check the accuracy of the financial record-keeping, to implement improvements with internal control, to ensure compliance with accounting regulations and to detect fraud” (Kim & Nofsinger, 207: 27). On the other hand, external auditors are supposed to be independent of the organisation that is being audited, as they aim to “review the firm’s financial statements and its procedures for producing them” (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007: 28) and to make sure that the internal audit has been conducted fairly. Thus, three definitions of accountability are identified, namely: (1) ‘a member of the Executive Committee should comply with the rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ needs’; (2) ‘a group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the Executive Committee’; and (3) ‘the organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit.’

Accountability in the Olympic Movement

The features of some recommendations contained in IOC documents show a mixture of accountability and other principles. The Olympic Charter (2010: 66) introduces the operationalisation of accountability broadly as below:

Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29,

1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members of the executive body.

In these terms, accountability relates to the need for an organisation to be accountable to its stakeholders. The General Assembly should be held at least once a year and the NOC should provide all relevant documents to its stakeholders, including annual reports and audited financial statements. Releasing annual and financial reports can help to satisfy the
requirement for transparency but this study regards both accountability and transparency as being closely connected. Opening annual and financial reports to the public can be closely regarded as being conducive to transparency, while presenting them to the General Assembly can be closely seen to promote accountability.

The Olympic Movement in Society (2009) also contains a mixture of principles. Article 44 (2009: 15) indicates that the provisions to be made in their statutes would introduce rules and regulations with which the Executive Committee should comply and it emphasises the importance of holding regular general meetings and democratic elections for the sake of accountability.

44. All constituents of the Olympic Movement should further develop and embrace democratic and representative structures and procedures, making provisions in their statutes for the holding of regular general meetings and democratic elections for specified terms of office.

Although Article 44 includes a mixture of two principles, namely accountability and democracy, it is more likely to focus on accountability, which requires high-level officers to provide written rules and regulations in order to achieve democratic elections for specified terms of office. More examples in which the need to comply with the rules and regulations in association with democracy is underlined are given in Articles 37 and 38 in the Olympic Movement in Society:

37. In accordance with the principles and values of Olympism, the practice of sport must be run by independent, autonomous sport organisations, which are in full compliance with applicable laws. Co-operation between governments and institutions of the Olympic Movement in every area where it may be mutually beneficial should underlie the relationship between sport and state bodies, so that the autonomy of the Olympic Movement is fully respected by governments (2009: 13-4)

38. The relationships between the Olympic Movement, public bodies and governments, as well as those between all national organisations belonging to the Olympic Movement and their respective governments, should be based on the principle of respect for applicable law by all constituents of the Olympic Movement,
while at the same time seeking to influence public policy makers wherever possible to ensure that national and supra-national laws and regulations are consistent with the fundamental principles of Olympism. (2009: 14)

While Article 37 underlines the independence of NOCs from their governments, Article 38 puts more emphasis on the relationship between the NOCs and their governments when it enjoins them to follow the applicable law of the Olympic Movement. Accountability in the interpretation that is suggested by the Olympic Movement is, thus, likely to focus on the compliance with laws, rules and regulations provided by the IOC. Accountability is also recommended in Article 42 in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 14):

42. All members of the Olympic Movement should keep annual accounts in accordance with acknowledged standards of accounting; ensure they have an independent audit or verification of their accounts; adopt rules, norms and practices under which those who cannot comply with good governance may lose financial support or be sanctioned; adopt and implement a code of ethics based on the principles and rules of the IOC Code of Ethics; and always seek to protect and promote the interests of the athletes they represent.

This Article contains references to various aspects of accountability as described in the literature, with four major points being made: compliance with rules and regulations is a prerequisite for living up to the IOC’s standards; a general meeting of stakeholders must be held; an independent audit must be conducted; and the interests of the stakeholders should be promoted and in particular attitudes. More specifically, the role of an independent and qualified audit committee inside the organisation is given particular prominence.

The purpose of the BUPs is to provide clearer, more detailed recommendations about what good governance is and how to implement it. While BUPs category 2 that puts a greater emphasis on the importance of compliance with rules and regulations and attention to stakeholders’ needs, category 4 is concerned more specifically with the auditing system of the organisation.

Table 4-1 BUPs Category 2 regarding accountability

| 2. Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process |
### Table 4-2 BUPs Category 4 regarding accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Accountability, Transparency and Control</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **4.1 Accountability** | *All bodies, whether elected or appointed, shall be accountable to the members of the organisation and, in certain cases, to their stakeholders*  
*In particular, the executive body shall be accountable to the General Assembly of the organisation*  
*Management shall be accountable to the executive body*  
*All employees shall be accountable to management* |
| **4.4 Financial matters – applicable laws, rules, procedures and standards** | *For all organisations, annual financial statements are to be audited by independent and qualified auditors*  
*Accountability and financial reports should be produced on a regular basis*  
*Accounts should be established in accordance with the applicable laws and “True and fair view” principle*  
*The application of internationally recognised standards should be strongly encouraged in all sports organisations, where possible, and required for an international body* |
Information about remuneration and financial arrangements of the governing bodies’ members should be part of the annual accounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.5</th>
<th>Internal Control system</th>
<th>*Audit committees should be appointed for large sports organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(The IOC, 2008: 7-8)

2.1 and 2.4 state that the organisation should embrace all stakeholders, while 4.1 maintains that the organisation should be accountable to its stakeholders, [which is one of the operationalisations examined in this study]. On the other hand, 2.2, the first clauses of 2.7 and 2.8 depend for their implementation on the provision of written documents on regulations and adequate procedures. 2.7 indicates that a pre-condition for decision-making should be that all relevant information is provided and that meetings are held on a regular basis. The clauses in 4.4 and 4.5 clearly state that the organisation should be audited by proper independent and qualified auditors on a regular basis and stress the importance of appointing an audit committee in sporting organisations.

*The IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 2-3)* also states:

> 4. The Olympic parties recognise the significant contribution that broadcasters, sponsors, partners and other supporters of sports events make to the development and prestige of the Olympic Games throughout the world. However, such support must be in a form consistent with the rules of sport and the principles defined in the Olympic Charter and the present Code. They must not interfere in the running of sports institutions. The organisation and staging of sports competitions are the exclusive responsibility of the independent sports organisations recognised by the IOC.

Paragraph 4 is mainly concerned with the aspects of responsibility and accountability, in that the Olympic parties should take the relationships with their stakeholders into consideration. Sporting organisations’ determination to be accountable is also in compliance with the laws and rules defined in *the Olympic Charter* and the present code. The statement that “they must not interfere in the running of sports institutions” is linked both to their advocacy of democracy and to the pursuit of independent decision-making.

The analysis of the major documents containing the IOC’s recommendations and the literature review conducted in this study reveal that two main definitions of ‘accountability’
are clearly specified. The first is that ‘a member of an Executive Committee should comply with its rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ needs’ and the second determines that ‘a group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the Executive Committee and an organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit’. In association with those documents, financial reports should be provided to the audit committee on a regular basis. This specifies not only how accountability is to be accomplished but also accountability for what, to whom and how this takes place. The case of accountability ‘for what’ and ‘how’ are connected with effectiveness and efficiency and, thus, these points will be explained in the sections of effectiveness and efficiency.

From this it can also be understood that the purposes for which finance has been used should be clearly demonstrated in the accounts and an auditing committee should secure the correct usage of finance. These prescriptions are clearly expressed in the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 2) with regard to accountability:

3.1. The income and expenditure of the Olympic parties shall be recorded in accounting principles. An independent auditor will check these accounts
3.2. In cases where the IOC gives financial support to Olympic parties:
   a) the use of these Olympic resources for Olympic purposes must be clearly demonstrated in the accounts;
   b) the accounts of the Olympic parties may be subjected to auditing by an expert designated by the IOC Executive Board

Therefore, the definitions and operationalisations of accountability in this study can be arranged as below:

Table 4-3 Accountability: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Accountability| A member of the Executive Committee should comply with rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ needs | - To whom is the NOC accountable?  
- To what extent are stakeholders included in the decision-making?  
- Does the NOC indicate rules and regulations that an Executive Committee member should comply with?  
- How often is the General Assembly |
### 4.2.2 Responsibility

According to the OECD (1999), “the corporate governance structure should specify the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs” (cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 21). Chryssides and Kaler (1996: 82) also state that the issue of corporate governance is centred upon “how companies should be governed”, which concerns the mechanisms for allocating powers and responsibilities within companies. The Cadbury Report (1992) also proposes that, in terms of responsibility, the head of a firm has to ensure a balance of power and authority (cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 27). Thus, one definition/interpretation of responsibility would be that (1) ‘the Executive Committee should balance diverging interests, power and authority.

Moreover, Mellahi and Wood (2003: 26) state that it is the head of the firm’s responsibility to safeguard “the strategic guidance of the organisation, and the effective monitoring of management by the board” and that the board of directors should “balance diverging interests and ensure the long-term viability of the firm” (2003: 21-2). Accordingly, responsibility is defined as follows: (2) ‘the Executive Committee should provide the strategic guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term viability of the organisation’; and (3) ‘the Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring of management’.
Responsibility in the Olympic Movement

Whereas statements concerning responsibility are hardly present in the Olympic Charter, the BUPs’ first category entitled ‘Vision, Mission and Strategy’ is much more likely to be related to responsibility.

Table 4-4 BUPs Category 1 regarding responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vision</td>
<td><strong>Vision</strong> *The vision and overall goals of the organisations have to be clearly defined and communicated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1.2 Mission  | **Mission** *The mission should include*  
- Development and promotion of sport through non-profit organisations  
- Promotion of the values of sport  
- Organisation of competitions  
- Ensuring a fair sporting contest at all times  
- Protection of the members and particularly the athletes  
- Solidarity  
- Respect for the environment |
| 1.3 Strategy | **Strategy** *The strategy is to be aligned with the vision and regularly adapted to the environment*  
*The strategy of sporting organisations should be elaborated at the highest level of the organisation. |

(The IOC, 2008: 2)

In keeping with the definition given above, that ‘the Executive Committee should provide the strategic guidance of the organisation and ensure the long-term viability of the organisation’, category 1 of the BUPs suggests that the vision and overall goals should be clearly provided in the context of the long term viability of the organisation. This view is also well explained in item 2.3 under the category 2 heading ‘Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process’. The tasks of the Executive Committee should be defined in the applicable regulations.

Table 4-5 BUPs Category 2 regarding responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2. Structures    | **Governors** *The tasks and responsibilities of the governing bodies should be clearly defined in the applicable regulations and should be adapted and reviewed as necessary*  
*Governors should be entitled to create standing or ad hoc committees with specific responsibilities, in order to help them in their tasks |
In particular, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 related to the definition of responsibility whereby ‘the Executive Committee should balance diverging interests, power and authority’. More specifically, 2.7 regarding ‘Decision-making’ advises that all members of sports organisations should have opportunities to express their opinions. The process of decision-making, thus, enables us to understand the method by which divergent power, interests and authority may be balanced. 3.2 below also pertains to responsibility in that it says that adequate rules need to be monitored at the highest level. It is thus related to the third definition of responsibility given above according to which ‘the Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring of management’, and is also coherent with the clause stating that ‘the processes of decision making should be open to scrutiny in order to avoid the imbalanced exercise of power’. As one of important roles of the Executive Committee’s important functions is to be in charge of the effective monitoring of management, the BUPs encourage the Executive Committee to perform a proper financial monitoring role as stated in 3.2.

Table 4-6 BUPs Category 3 regarding responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Power of signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Good governance implies proper financial monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*In order to avoid any abuse of powers of representation (in particular signing), adequate rules should be set up, approved and monitored at the highest level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Precise, clear and transparent regulations should be established and applied, and effective controlling systems and checks and balances should be put in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Code of Ethics and ethical issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Develop, adapt and implement ethical principles and rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Ethical rules should refer to and be inspired by the IOC Code of Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Monitor the implementation of ethical principles and rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, 3.6 suggests that the Executive Committee should also perform the effective monitoring of management based on an ethical code of conduct. In order to achieve this, 4.2 and 4.4 mainly point out that ‘clear adequate rules and regulations should be established and applied’.

Table 4-7 BUPs Category 4 regarding responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 4.2 Processes and mechanisms               | *Adequate standards and processes for accountability should be in place and available to all organisations, and consistently applied and monitored  
* Clear and measurable objectives and targets must be set for the organisation, its boards, management and staff, including also appropriate tools for assessment |
| 4.4 Financial matters – applicable laws, rules, procedures and standards | *Clear rules regarding remuneration of the members of governing bodies and managers should be enforced  
*Remuneration procedures should be transparent and predictable |
| 4.5 Internal Control system                | *Internal control of the financial processes and operations should be established within the sports organisations  
*The adoption of a compliance system, document retention system and information security system should be encouraged  
The structure of the internal control system should depend on the size and importance of the organisation |

In the Olympic Movement in Society, it can be observed that several clauses encourage the Olympic Movement to adopt the BUPs as their minimum standard for achieving the legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement, which depends on the fulfilment of the highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. The IOC seeks to lay down clear, adequate rules and regulations including a code of conduct in which significant indications are given of ways to achieve responsibility. In particular, clause 41 (2009: 14) states that the BUPs can be a good source of rules and regulations that have been framed and recommended by the IOC in order to promote greater responsibility.

41. The legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement depends on upholding the highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. All members of the Olympic Movement should adopt, as their minimum standard, the Basic Universal
Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement, as proposed by the IOC. All members of the Olympic Movement must always demonstrate integrity, accountability and transparency, as well as the highest level of management skills; and they must ensure that at all times their legal status is both fully consistent with their activities and responsibilities and wholly compliant with the laws of the land (applicable laws).

In summary, responsibility can be defined and operationalised as below:

Table 4-8 Responsibility: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Definitions/Interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>The Executive Committee members should also balance diverging interests, power and authority.</td>
<td>- Does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference to ensuring an appropriate balance of power?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Executive Committee should provide the strategic guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term viability of the organisation.</td>
<td>- Does the Executive Committee clearly provide the vision and overall goals in the context of the long term viability of the organisation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring of management.</td>
<td>- Does it establish and evaluate the execution of clear, adequate rules and regulations by which management should conduct its activities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Does it monitor a code of conduct and finance within the organisation?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.3 Transparency

Reporting procedures are key to any claims of transparency. The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council (CGC) (2003) points out that “organisations should develop written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them” (cited in Dellaportas et al., 2005: 125). In addition, Oliver (2004) states that transparency places power in the hands of the stakeholders in that the information required should be made available to them. Accordingly, transparency may be defined as the product of those actions, i.e. (1) ‘organisations should develop and provide written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them.’ This includes not only what should
be done (written policies and procedures) but also what may have been done (reporting of performance).

Kitson and Campbell (1996) claim that large companies emphasise the need for openness in decision-making and for a clear demonstration that the company is being governed in accordance with perceived business virtues. Consequently, the second step towards achieving transparency would involve the stakeholders, i.e. (2) *organisations should open the process of decision making to all stakeholders*.

**Transparency in the Olympic Movement**

As the Olympic Charter (2010: 66) indicates below:

Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29 of the Olympic Charter,
1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members of the executive body.

In relation to accountability, NOCs should hold a General Assembly at least once a year to give an opportunity for their stakeholders to listen to the presentation of annual reports and audited financial statements, an action which is clearly recommended by the IOC in order to secure transparency in the Olympic Movement. Thus, at this point transparency can be said to overlap with accountability. The disclosure of annual reports and audited financial statements to the stakeholder can be regarded as being essential both for accountability and transparency, while the public may perceive it mainly as an aid to transparency. The BUPs also recommend that the financial information should be made public.

**Table 4-9 BUPs Category 4 regarding transparency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Accountability, Transparency and Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4.3 Transparency and communication | *Financial information should be disclosed gradually and in appropriate form to members, stakeholders and the public*  
| | *Disclosure of financial information should be done on an annual basis*  
| | *The financial statements of sports organisations should be presented in a consistent way in order to be easily understood* |
This view leads to operationalisation in terms of ‘whether or not a financial report is open to the public/stakeholders’, as the IOC also gives importance to the disclosure of financial information on the basis of 4.3. Moreover, the BUPs suggest that regulations should be transparent and published openly.

Table 4-10 BUPS Category 2 regarding transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clear regulations</td>
<td>*All regulations of each organisation and governing body, including but not limited to, statues/constitutions and other procedural regulations, should be clear, transparent, disclosed, publicised and made readily available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*The procedure to modify or amend the regulations should also be clear and transparent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-11 BUPs Category 2 regarding transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attributions of the respective bodies</td>
<td>*A clear allocation of responsibilities between the different bodies such as general assembly, executive body, committees or disciplinary bodies, should be determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*There should be a balance of power between the bodies responsible for the management, supervision and control of the sports organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Principle of checks and balances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>*All members of the sports organisations shall have the right to express their opinion on the issues on the agenda through appropriate channels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, the transparency mentioned in *the Olympic Movement in Society* (2009: 15) can be discussed as a part of the transparent regulations.

43. Transparent and enhanced dispute resolution mechanisms must be in place in all sports organisations, at all levels. All disputes which cannot be settled amicably or through local arbitration or mediation should be submitted to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). While fully respecting the sovereignty and independence
of the CAS, the constituents of the Olympic Movement may submit to the CAS proposals or contributions so that litigation may be simplified, accelerated and legal costs reduced.

The category entitled ‘Confidentiality’ in the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 3) also mainly discusses the aspect of transparency. At the same time, it also takes confidentiality into account in connection with transparency for the protection of information shared confidentially. This may cause a difficulty if information is provided as confidential but which is clearly against the interests of the spirit of Olympic.

The Olympic parties shall not disclose information entrusted to them in confidence. The principle of confidentiality shall be strictly respected by the IOC Ethics Commission in all its activities. Disclosure of other information shall not be for personal gain or benefit, nor be undertaken maliciously to damage the reputation of any person or organisation.

In connection with responsibility, as discussed earlier, ‘the Executive Committee should balance diverging interests, power and authority with individuals’ unfettered power of decision-making’, 2.6 and 2.7 of the BUPs above, in particular, are closely related to responsibility. In specific, 2.7 regarding ‘decision-making’ declares that all members of sports organisations should have an opportunity to express their opinion. This element can be explained in accordance with the second definition of transparency, which is that, in order to be transparent, ‘an organisation should open the process of decision-making to all stakeholders’. One of the ways, therefore, in which operationalisation can occur is to put into action the statement that ‘the process of decision-making should be opened’, as the extent to which transparency has truly been attained can be monitored when the question as to whether or not all members have been involved in decision-making is answered. The process of decision-making enables us to understand the degree in which power, interests and authority can be said to be in balance. Moreover, the BUPs 3.2 below is a mixture of several principles, for instance, accountability, responsibility and transparency. 3.2 states that adequate rules need to be monitored by means of effective controlling systems at the highest level, which is also related to the proposal that ‘the process of decision-making should be opened or monitored’ in order to avoid the imbalanced exercise of power.
Table 4-12 BUPs Category 3 regarding transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Highest Level of Competence, Integrity and Ethical Standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 3.2 Power of signature | *Good governance implies proper financial monitoring*  
*In order to avoid any abuse of powers of representation (in particular signing), adequate rules should be set up, approved and monitored at the highest level*  
*Precise, clear and transparent regulations should be established and applied, and effective controlling systems and checks and balances should be put in place* |

(The IOC, 2008: 5)

Therefore, definitions and operationalisations regarding transparency are as below:

Table 4-13 Transparency: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Transparency | Organisations should develop and provide written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them. | - Is an organisational progress report annually released?  
(If not, how often is it released?)  
- Are there clear rules and procedures on how to get ‘material matters’ which are of concern on to the organisation’s agenda?  
- Is any information including all regulations required open to the public/stakeholders?  
- Is a financial report open to the public/stakeholders? |
| Organisations should open the process of decision making to all stakeholder | - Is the process of decision making open or monitored?  
(If so, by whom and for what purposes?) |

4.2.4 Democracy

Pluralism emphasises the importance of diversity in pursuit of more than one source of authority in political, institutional and social practices. With a representative government, "institutional checks and balances" are necessary in association with "the vertical separation of the powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, and the horizontal division of sovereignty through federalism, and provisions for the exercise of vetoes" (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 14). Pluralism is exemplified in a social context when various social groups in
different areas are included as “non-institutional checks and balances” (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 14-15). It is characteristic of the citizens in a polyarchic culture that they try to take part in decisions affecting them and are willing to examine their governments. Elections are one of the major ways of participating in policy making and, thus, pluralists agree with the view that political competition and elections are important factors in polyarchies. Thus, a first definition of democracy is driven by the pluralist’s perspective, according to which (1) ‘a democratic system should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of high officials.’

In addition, a range of political elites are externally controlled by business and social elites, which allows diverse elite interests to be integrated. Therefore, “in Western Europe sub-national governments are tied to national elites by networks of patronage, clientelism, and control over public expenditure” (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 179). Since centralisation and bureaucratisation are deemed to be inevitable and desirable features of the modern state, democratic elitists emphasise the correlation of centralised resource distribution and policy control with the continuing role of policy implementation performed by sub-national governments. In contrast, modern organisation theory focuses on the decentralisation of policy implementation into sub-organisations, which enables those sub-organisations to employ their own operating procedures and problem solving methods. Thus, another definition is that (2) ‘high officials in the organisation including President and Executive Committee members should maintain their independence from internal/external interests within the organisation’. This can be operationalised to identify whether or not the General Assembly elects Executive Committee members and the President and if there is an auditing system to ensure that independent judgement is guaranteed. In this latter respect there is an overlap with accountability and responsibility.

Considering democracy, the second definition is based on Hindley (2002: 21), who says that “in common with democracy, good governance promotes the decentralisation of decision-making, implementation and monitoring.” This may not be a ‘requirement’ of democracy, however, since we can still vote for centralised systems. All pluralists regard decentralisation as the best form of governance in all cases, as decentralisation is believed to preserve democracy against the emergence of democratic tyranny. In contrast, although a decentralised system may exist, elitists are more concerned that the real power should be concentrated in the hands of a small number of political leaders and radical elites advocate the “de facto centralisation of ‘real’ decision-making power in the hands of a core executive”,

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a situation which is associated with power elites (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 166). The definition of democracy is thus based on the principle that (3) ‘no matter what structure the NOC follows, either centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually decentralised in decision-making.’

**Democracy in the Olympic Movement**

In general, *the Olympic Charter* (2010: 62) emphasises the importance of the NOCs’ autonomy in the interests of achieving harmonious relations and cooperation with their governments and it makes the following recommendation:

Rules 28-5. In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with governmental bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious relations. However, they shall not associate themselves with any activity which would be in contradiction with the Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental bodies.

This is also clearly notified in *the BUPs* and in *the IOC Code of Ethics*. The relevant BUPs (2008: 12) are quoted below:

**Table 4-14 BUPs Category 7 regarding democracy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 7.1 Cooperate, coordination and consultation | *Sports organisations should coordinate their actions with governments  
*Cooperation with governments is an essential element in the framework of sporting activities  
*Cooperation, coordination and consultation are the best way for sporting organisations to preserve their autonomy |
| 7.3 Maintain and preserve the autonomy of sport | *The right balance between governments, the Olympic Movement and sporting organisations should be ensured |

(The IOC, 2008: 12)

The theme regarding ‘Relations with States’ in *the IOC Code of Ethics* (2010: 3) also states that:

1. The Olympic parties shall work to maintain harmonious relations with state authorities, in accordance with the principle of universality and political neutrality of
the Olympic Movement.

2. The Olympic parties are free to play a role in the public life of the states to which they belong. They may not, however, engage in any activity or follow any ideology inconsistent with the principles and rules defined in the Olympic Charter and set out in the present Code.

The IOC encourages the NOCs to maintain their independent status in relationship with the government in keeping with the principle of universality and political neutrality of the Olympic Movement, as stated in the second article of the theme ‘Relations with States’. This spirit in the Olympic Movement is closely related to the definition of the NOC’s autonomy, under which ‘high officials in NOCs should be independent of its higher level organisation’. In this way the IOC still places an emphasis on the need for compliance with the applicable laws in the Olympic Movement, which implies that sporting organisations should safeguard their independence.

In broader terms, it is not only the government but also various stakeholders with which the NOCs are urged to uphold harmonious relationships. *The Olympic Charter* (2010: 62) states it thus:

**Rules 28-6.** The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter.

This message is also clearly delivered in the wording of the other written documents released by the IOC, such as *the IOC Code of Ethics* (2010: 2-3) below:

4. The Olympic parties recognise the significant contribution that broadcasters, sponsors, partners and other supporters of sports events make to the development and prestige of the Olympic Games throughout the world. However, such support must be in a form consistent with the rules of sport and the principles defined in the Olympic Charter and the present Code. They must not interfere in the running of sports institutions. The organisation and staging of sports competitions are the exclusive responsibility of the independent sports organisations recognised by the IOC.
Article 4 mainly refers to the aspect of compliance with rules and regulations and a balanced relationship with various stakeholders. This implies that the Olympic parties should take the relationships with its stakeholders into consideration to maintain their harmonious cooperation. However, the precautionary statement that ‘they must not interfere in the running of sports institutions’ is more likely to be linked with its dedication to democracy than the pursuit of independent decision-making. Article 37, which highlights the autonomy of NOCs as proposed in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 13-4) also takes account of both issues:

37. In accordance with the principles and values of Olympism, the practice of sport must be run by independent, autonomous sport organisations, which are in full compliance with applicable laws. Co-operation between governments and institutions of the Olympic Movement in every area where it may be mutually beneficial should underlie the relationship between sport and state bodies, so that the autonomy of the Olympic Movement is fully respected by governments.

Article 37 underlines the independence of NOCs from their governments, while emphasising the need for the relationship between the NOCs and their government to conform to the applicable law of the Olympic Movement. In association with these issues so far, two operationalisations of democracy are considered: ‘What kind of system exists for elections to the Executive Committee and the Presidency?’; and ‘who nominates candidates for the Presidency and the Executive Committee?’. The IOC recommends that the electoral system should be established in order to maintain checks and balances. The Olympic Charter (2010: 65) clearly declares that the government’s direct involvement in the selection of NOC officials should be avoided and that an independent electoral system is preferable.

Rules 29-4. Governments or other public authorities shall not designate any members of an NOC. However, an NOC may decide, at its discretion, to elect as members representatives of such authorities.

In accordance with Rules 29-4, the Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29 in the Olympic Charter (2010: 66) also mention the election system.

1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the
agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members of the executive body.

1-5. The officers and members of the executive body of an NOC shall be elected in accordance with the NOC’s statutes, for a term of office not exceeding four years; they may be eligible for re-election.

The definitions of democracy, which are that ‘the NOCs should maintain checks and balances in their procedures for the election of high officials’ and ‘high officials in the organisation including President and Executive Committee members should keep its autonomy from its higher organisations through electoral procedures’ coheres with these IOC recommendations. More specifically, the IOC suggests that clear rules and regulations on electoral system should be established in the NOC’s Statutes through the BUPs (2008: 3-4), which can be one of the operationalisations, to meet the requirement for the NOC to, ‘provide clear criteria on the electoral system?’

Table 4-15 BUPs Category 2 regarding democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Governing bodies</td>
<td>*The organisation should set out and adopt reliable and appropriate criteria for the election or appointment of members of the governing bodies so as to ensure a high level of competence, quality and good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Democratic processes</td>
<td>Democratic processes, such as elections, should be governed by clear, transparent and fair rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 Conflicts of interests</td>
<td>*As a general principle, members of any decision-making body should be independent in their decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 Election or renewal of office-bearers on a regular Basis</td>
<td>*The duration of the terms of office should be pre-determined in order to allow election / renewal of office-bearers on a regular basis (e.g. every four years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Access for new candidates should be encouraged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The IOC, 2008: 3-4)

The category 2 clearly states that the NOC should have regulations or rules for its elections in order to practise democratic processes. The Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 15) also states this point of view, as below:
44. All constituents of the Olympic Movement should further develop and embrace democratic and representative structures and procedures, making provisions in their statutes for the holding of regular general meetings and democratic elections for specified terms of office.

To judge from the analysis of the documents released by the IOC, none of the written statements pronounces on the need for decentralisation in decision-making. It seems that the concept of democracy in terms of decision making at managerial and departmental levels has not been directly raised in the Olympic Movement. The IOC’s recommendations are, thus, mostly concerned with the aspect of democracy in terms of its relationship with other stakeholders, in particular, the government. As a result, democracy is defined and operationalised as below:

Table 4-16 Democracy: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisatoinos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>It should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of high officials. High officials in the organisation including President and Executive Committee members should maintain their independence from internal/external interests within the organisation.</td>
<td>- What kind of system exists for elections to the Executive Committee and the Presidency? (If not, who nominates candidates for the Presidency and the Executive Committee?) -Does NOC provide clear criteria on the electoral system? - Are high officials in NOCs independent from internal/external interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No matter what structure the NOC follows, either centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually decentralised in decision making.</td>
<td>- Is power in decision-making decentralised or centralised at a managerial level, i.e. an Executive Committee? - To what extent are all members of each department able to be involved in decision-making process? - Are all departments independent in decision-making?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.5 Equity

Societal symbols and languages through interactions are thought to be reproduced in social ideologies such as sporting ideologies, where a gender stereotype is an example. Issues of power relations are also deeply related with social interactions and social relations (Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 246; see also Pastore, Inglis & Danylchuk, 1996; Ridgeway & Smith-
Lovin, 1999), associated with which are the terms ‘meanings’ and ‘practices’. Through the process of interaction, ‘meanings’ or ‘common sense’ perceptions (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2005) are created and, in consequence, the minority or subordinate groups continue to be marginalised. Therefore, ‘meanings’ are produced in ‘the ways in which dominant groups produce common understandings through the processes and patterns of interactions’. Furthermore, Claringbould and Knoppers (2007; 2008) also believe that ‘meanings’ shape the behaviour of the members of an organisation and their expectations of the behaviour of others, in accordance with the argument proposed by Kanter (1977) that “gender ratio or composition of group is a structural determinant of (gendered) organisational behaviour, in particular, in male-dominated contexts” (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008). Following Hoeber (2007: 271-2), evidence of ‘meanings’ can be found when the existence of gender inequalities is denied or a justification is given for them. i.e. the denial of gender inequalities may be expressed by claiming that there has been a gradual improvement or that gender inequity is not a problem i.e. the presence of gender inequalities may be justified by saying that these are inconsequential; or that other organisational values are more important. Alternatively, people may exonerate themselves by saying that such inequalities are ‘not their responsibility’ and they may be accepted and normalised as being ‘just the way things are’.

Additionally, Knoppers and Anthonissen (2005:123) point out that most senior managers who hold a great deal of power of over decision-making can make a considerable impact on organisational culture through their practices and discourses, which reflect societal discourses. Thus, ‘practices’ are understood through ‘obtaining insight into the ways in which members of dominant and subordinate groups negotiate meanings when a member of the subordinate group attempts to enter the dominant group’. Accordingly, this study attempts to identify how dominant groups produce ‘meanings’ and how ‘meanings’ shape the behaviour of their members and subsequently how such ‘meanings’ capture or define governance practices. In the context of gender equity, it aims to understanding how an organisation makes sense of the organisation’s gender composition and how that is reflected in the ways of practices of gender policy (Claringbould & Knoppers, 2007).

Moreover, with regard to a wide range of equity issues, Long, Robinson and Spracklen (2005: 48) also argue that dealing with complaints about discrimination and harassment is an important part of any policy implementation (instituting formal written complaints and disciplinary procedure). Accordingly, this study takes account of this point of view as
representing another definition of equity, namely that ‘a sports organisation should establish a channel of policy implementation to deal with complaints about discrimination and harassment’. Its operationalisation is apparent in the ways in which sports organisations deal with discriminatory complaints and harassment.

**Gender equity**

In terms of gender equity, the IOC has traditionally shown a tendency to be male-dominated in its decision making and in its participation in the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, the IOC has expressed its concern about the low female involvement in decision-making structures in sports organisations and has strongly urged each country to live up to the IOC’s requirements and “ensure that the benefits of wider involvement in decision making by women are realised” (Women 2004: 4 cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81). The IOC itself also fixed the number of members at a maximum of 115 and set a target of minimum 20% female participation in all the decision-making structures of the Olympic Movement (Chappelet, 2006: 8) and additionally, “as of June 2012, 20 women are active IOC members out of 106 (more than 18.8%)” (The IOC, 2012: 2). It is obvious that gender equality within the Olympic Movement should receive serious attention. Thus, with reference to IOC policy, this study indicates that, if the NOC fulfils the policy of the IOC, ‘female involvement in decision making should reach a minimum of 20 per cent’. Equality in this study also relates to the percentage of female employees at a working level.

**Disability equity**

All organisational bodies should demonstrate their determination to integrate individual workers with disabilities and this should be realised in an efficient way by establishing appropriate legislation, rules, and finance (Sørensen & Kahrs, 2006:186). Consequently, disability equity may be promoted by pursuing the ideal that ‘organisations should demonstrate their integration of individual workers with a disability through legislation, rules and finance.’ Moreover, Hums, Moorman and Wolff (2003: 262), who have studied the integration process among disability and able-bodied sports organisations in the USA, conclude that, although the USOC and NGBs appear to espouse the integration process, DSOs (Disabled Sports Organisation) are unfortunately excluded from participation in the decision-making process and from occupying positions of power. The percentage of individuals with disabilities who take part in decision making should be taken into account. Thus, another definition of equity is that ‘people with impairments should also be involved in decision making’.
Ethnicity equity
Long, Robinson and Spracklen (2005) report on the achievement of racial equity following its promotion among the sports governing bodies and national sporting organisations in the UK. Since the establishment of Sport for All in the early 1970s, the issue of racial equity has emerged. In keeping with the traditional structures and culture of sport in the UK, most organisations are small-scale with limited resources and tend to rely significantly on a volunteer workforce. With respect to the sporting culture in the UK, according to Spracklen (1996), racist hegemony has led to the stereotyping of certain racial qualities and this, in turn, has resulted in the under-representation and lack of involvement of ethnic minority members in positions of power (Long, Robinson and Spracklen, 2005). On the basis of these studies, therefore, ethnicity equity is defined as the situation where ‘irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone capable should be involved at the working and managerial levels’.

Fair allocation of resources and opportunities
Following the definition given by CAAWS, gender equity may be defined as “the principle and practice of fair allocation of resources, programs and decision-making to both women and men, and includes the redressing of identified imbalances in the benefits available” (Kent & Robertson, 1995: 43 cited in Hoeber, 2007: 266). This study defines equity in terms of resource allocation with relation to the ‘fair allocation of resources and opportunities in terms of the size of organisation, and high- or low-profile athletes or NFs’.

Equity in the Olympic Movement
In the Olympic Movement, there is a tendency for the aspect of equity and/or equality to be treated in terms of the sense of ‘human dignity’. Article 30 in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 12-3) deals with the preservation of human dignity by means of the harmonious development of men and women, which can be interpreted as being the embodiment of equity.

30. The preservation of human dignity is a fundamental tenet of the Olympic Movement. All members of the Olympic Movement should work together in pursuit of the harmonious development of men and women in order to promote through sport a peaceful society based on the most fundamental common principles and values inherent in a civilised society.

3 CAAWS: the Canadian Association for the Advancement of Women and Sport and Physical Activity
The IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 1) also alludes to equity under the category of ‘Dignity’. In particular, it states that there should be no discrimination in terms of covering various aspects of equity.

2. There shall be no discrimination between the participants on the basis of race, gender, ethnic origin, religion, philosophical or political opinion, marital status or other grounds.

Nevertheless, it excludes the aspect of equity regarding people with disabilities, whereas the definition of equity discussed in the literature considers the aspects of gender, race and disability.

This study has distinguished between the concepts of equity and equality, as discussed earlier (see Chapter 2). These two notions, however, are unlikely to be clearly defined in the documents released by the Olympic Movement. Article 29 in the Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 12) uses the term ‘equality’. It emphasises the need for the autonomy of sports organisations to be protected from the encroachments of any relevant intergovernmental or governmental organisations. It is suggested that equality should be respected along with ‘fairness’ in sport and sports administration.

29. The relevant intergovernmental organisations and governments should acknowledge the necessary and essential autonomy of the Olympic Movement including, in particular, respect for and enforcement of the rules of good governance, equality and fairness in sport and sport administration, as established by the Olympic Movement and set out in the Olympic Charter, to ensure the best and fairest possible practice of sport.

The concept of ‘fairness’ may be interpreted as pertaining to the fair allocation of resources or opportunities, which is consistent with the element of equity as recommended in the BUPs (2008: 9) where equity is mainly discussed in terms of the distribution of resources, as listed in 5.1 and 5.2. Gender equity can be identified by looking at types of task which female employees are confined to and thus, it focuses on how the gender equity is operationalised in terms of giving equal opportunities and treatment. The other concept of ‘fairness’ of resources is included in the elements of equity. The second element in 5.2 is not expressed clearly but is implicit in the general suggestion that ‘equity in sport should be reinforced’.
Table 4-17 BUPs Category 5 regarding equity

5. Solidarity and Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 5.1 Distribution of resources | *As a principle, financial resources which are proceeds of sport should be allocated to sport and in particular to its development after covering all necessary sports-related costs
  *Financial revenues should be distributed in a fair and efficient manner
  *A fair distribution of the financial revenues contributes to having balanced and attractive competitions
  *A clear and transparent policy for the allocation of the financial revenues is essential |

| 5.2 Equity | *Resources should be distributed equitably
  *The equity in sport should be reinforced
  *The right to participate in competitions should be encouraged and secured for those at an appropriate level for the athletes concerned
  *The opportunity to organise large sports events should be open
  *The criteria for choosing venues for events should be fair and transparent |

(The IOC, 2008: 9)

The BUPs 2.4 gives a more general view on equity at a decision-making level.

Table 4-18 BUPs Category 2 regarding equity

2. Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Representative governing bodies</td>
<td>*Special care should be taken for protection and representation of minority groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The IOC, 2008: 3)

In summary, the definitions and operationalisations of equity can be arranged as below:

Table 4-19 Equity: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>In general</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|           | *Meanings are produced in the ways in which dominant groups produce common understandings through the processes and patterns of interactions.
  *Practices are understood through |
|           | -Is there any evidence in the ‘meanings’ showing how, in particular, high officials make sense of equity? |
|           | -Is there any evidence of the |

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## Equity (continued)

| **Gender** | Obtaining insight into the ways in which members of dominant and subordinate groups negotiate meanings when a member of the subordinate group attempts to enter the dominant group. 
Sports organisations should establish a channel of policy implementation to deal with complaints about discrimination and harassment. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>practices</em>?</td>
<td>'practices’?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Disability** | -Is there a written policy (laws and rules) on gender, disability, ethnicity, and resource allocations? (in general) 
-Is there a team or a monitoring system handling such matters? |
| **Gender** | Gender involvement in decision making should reach a minimum of 20 per cent at both the managerial and non-managerial levels. |
| What percentage of women is involved in decision making? | -What percentage of women is involved in decision making? 
-What is the ratio of females at the non-managerial level? 
-May male and female staff members benefit from the same treatment, salaries and access to the higher positions? |
| **Disability** | People with impairments should also be involved in decision making 
Organisations should demonstrate the integration of individual workers with disabilities through legislation, rules, and finance. |
| What percentage of people with disabilities take part as members of the decision-making bodies and in the non-decision making positions? | -What percentage of people with disabilities take part as members of the decision-making bodies and in the non-decision making positions? 
-Does the NOC provide relevant rules and legislation on disability and disability sport? 
-Does the NOC provide a better working environment for staff members with disabilities? |
| **Ethnicity** | Irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone capable should be involved at the working and managerial levels |
| What percentage of people in different ethnic groups participates at both managerial and non-managerial levels? | |
| **Fair allocation of resources** | There should be a fair allocation of resources, programs and decision making in terms of gender, disability, the size of the organisation, and high- or low- profile athletes or NFs’ |
| How are resources to NFs and athletes distributed? | |

### 4.2.6 Effectiveness

Many studies refer to effectiveness as "the extent to which an organization achieves its goal"
or goals” (Slack, 1997: 23; see also Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Sandefur, 1983). Specifically, official goals and operational goals are referred to in the following terms: “official goals (an organisation’s reason for existence) help to ensure that everyone is working toward a common end” while “operational goals (referring to an organisation’s primary tasks) provide a sense of direction and motivation, guidelines for decision-making and standards for evaluating performance” (Kerr, 1991: 84, editorial in the Canadian Journal of Sport Science). Therefore, effectiveness in this study is defined as ‘the achievement of official and operational goals’. This is closely related to accountability in that achievement that is in line with the NOC’s aims is that ‘for which the NOC is accountable’. It is also related with responsibility in that the governing body within an organisation should clearly indicate the vision, mission and goals that it is committed to fulfil.

a) Leadership

Leadership is also very likely to be associated with effectiveness (see Kent & Weese, 2000; Rowold, 2006; Eagly, 2007; Weinberg & McDermott, 2002). The following discussion focuses mainly on the style of leadership in NOCs and two types of leadership in particular, which are transactional and transformational leadership. Under a system of transactional leadership, the leaders clearly outline the tasks and how they should be performed in exchange for commensurate material or psychological compensation (e.g., recognition, awards) (Rowold, 2006: 313). By contrast, a transformational leader has the ability to inspire his/her subordinates to go beyond expected levels of commitment and contribution. This inspirational process relies on emphasising task-related values and a strong commitment to a mission (Rowold, 2006: 313). Moreover, as stated by Weese (1995: 130), “a transformational leader…..helps influence a culture that perpetuates and reinforces a philosophy of excellence and continual improvement” (cited in Scott, 1997: 408). In this study, transactional leadership is exercised in situations where ‘subordinates perform within clearly outlined tasks given to them by their leaders in exchange for commensurate material or psychological compensation’ and transformational leadership is associated ‘with emphasising task-related values and a strong commitment to a mission, where leaders inspire their subordinates to reach higher levels of performance in commitment and contribution’.

In general, Weinberg and McDermott (2002: 282) investigate leaders’ perceptions of organisational effectiveness in the area of group dynamics. Good leaders are characterised as exhibiting qualities of consistency, decisiveness, good organisation and the ability to
interact with a variety of people. Essentially, leadership should involve every single member of the organisation in that a leader should be good at listening to subordinates’ opinions and receiving inputs into decision making (Weinberg & McDermott, 2002: 291). However, the adoption of a leadership style is likely to be independent of the circumstances that the leader faces and consequently, different leadership styles would be preferable according to the relevant situation. Thus, a general definition of effective leadership is that ‘a leader should be professional, interactional, communicative and capable of dealing with a contingency’. Therefore, an examination of the operationalisation of a leadership style would focus on identifying if a leader carries out effective two-way and horizontal communications with his/her subordinates, and is regarded as having inspired colleagues to commit to organisational values and their realisation.

b) Organisational values and culture

The other factor, along with leadership, which is believed to strongly affect organisational effectiveness is the organisational culture (Kent & Weese, 2000; see also Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Frost et al., 1985; Schein, 1985). Schein (1985), especially, notes that an organisational leader should prioritise management and embrace a carefully premeditated organisational culture (Kent & Weese, 2000: 5). As Colyer (2000: 321) says, there is growing evidence that organisational culture affects an organisation’s performance and that the prevailing culture contributes importantly to organisational effectiveness (see also Cameron & Freeman, 1991; Deal & Kennedy, 1988; Denison & Spreitzer, 1991; Smircich, 1983).

Broad concept of culture

Many researchers agree with the view that values and norms constitute the core elements of culture (Danisman et al., 2006: 303, see also Enz, 1986; O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Wiener, 1988). Hofstede (1997) explains it in terms of a broad concept of culture which manifests itself in four principal ways: symbols, heroes, rituals and values. He likens these to the skins of an onion, as shown in Fig 4-1 below when he observes that “symbols, heroes and rituals have been subsumed under the term practices. They are visible to an outside observer; their cultural meaning, however, is invisible and lies precisely and only in the way these practices are interpreted by the insiders. Values are the deepest manifestations of culture…and the core of culture is formed by value” (1997: 7-8).
Figure 4-1 The 'onion diagram': manifestations of culture at different levels of depth

Source: Hofstede (1997: 9)

Organisational values and culture
Organisational values and beliefs are also criteria that are used to evaluate effectiveness. Values should be carefully interpreted in distinguishing between the desirable and the desired. Hofstede (1997: 10) argues that “what distinguishes the desirable from the desired is the nature of the norms involved and norms are the standards for values that exist within a group or category of people”. With respect to the desirable, the norm has absolute authority and is supposed to be ethically right. On the other hand, the desired is much more practical and constitutes the majority’s choice. Schein (1985) conceptualises organisational values as “windows into the deep structure of organisations” and Agle and Caldwell (1999) view them as being “preferences about desired behaviours (e.g., cooperation, efficiency) or organisational outcomes (e.g., profit, success)”. Thus, organisational values are considered to serve as ‘windows into the deep structure of an organisation and its preferences about desired behaviours or organisational outcomes’.

Organisational values are likely to be sensitive to cultural differences (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 335) and Martin (2002) considers that “culture is a lens to examine organisational values” (cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 337). There are several definitions of organisational culture which may be said to consist in “an underlying system of shared values, beliefs and assumptions about how things are done in the organization” (Schein, 1992 cited in Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999: 286) and or “deep-rooted beliefs, values, and assumptions widely shared by organisational members that powerfully shape the identity and behavioural norms for the group” (Wallace & Weese, 1995: 183 cited in Scott, 1997: 404). Accordingly, the definition of organisational culture to be used in this study is that it encompasses a set of ‘deep-rooted and widely shared beliefs, values and assumptions among organisational members about how things are done in the organisation’. 
The conceptualisation of organisational values and beliefs is suggested by Agle and Caldwell (1999), following Martin’s (1992; 2002) three-perspective framework: integration, differentiation and fragmentation. Within this framework, Martin (2002: 91) distinguishes organisational cultures by asking whether “cultural manifestations are consistent or not, cultural members appear to agree or not, and interpretations are singular and clear or multiple and ambiguous” (cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). The integration perspective is based on the premise that there should be “an organisation-wide consensus and consistency between the intent of organisational values and employee behaviour” (Martin, 2002; cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). Fenton and Inglis (2007: 338) also add that “this perspective assumes strong alignment between words and deeds”. Thus, integration is defined as a state in which there is ‘a strong alignment between words and deeds, an organisation-wide consensus and consistency between organisational values and employee behaviour’. By contrast, a differentiation perspective puts the emphasis on “inconsistencies and the existence of subcultures that are characterized as different from the norm” (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). This perspective is an essential means for understanding the power structures in organisations that are characterised by the existence of hierarchies, based in, e.g. class or gender. Schmidt and Posner (1992) say that “this perspective assumes a contradiction between words and deeds and challenges the espoused beliefs by exposing the influence and role that power structures place on organisational behaviour” (cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). The differentiation perspective may, thus, be defined as being relevant to a situation in which there is ‘a contradiction between words and deeds and where inconsistencies and subcultures arise due to the power relations’. Finally, the fragmentation perspective “brings ambiguity and complexity to the forefront in recognition of the multiple perspectives that exist” and it “assumes there is uncertainty and temporality between words and deeds” (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). Weick (1985) says that it is suitable for figuring out organisational cultures nowadays, at a time of rapid change, technological innovation and blurring of the lines of professional practice (Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). Such an accelerated pace of change creates an environment where an understanding of the meaning of absences, gaps and silences is essential and it brings “the hidden dynamics of power inequity into focus illuminating why widespread consensus is unlikely” (Martin, 1992: 151 cited in Fenton & Inglis, 2007: 338). Fragmentation may, thus, be said to occur, in a situation of ‘uncertainty and temporality between words and deeds which give rise to ambiguity and complexity’.

For the operationalisation of organisational values, it is helpful to identify what kinds of
organisational value are available within the organisation, whether those values and assumptions are shared by all its members or subgroups, and whether there are different ways in which individuals may register their opinions and affect decision making in that organisation. In particular, Scott (2001: 55) claims that individual roles can affect institutional values manifesting inconsistencies and/or subcultural differences (Danisman et al., 2006: 303). Trice and Beyer (1993), and Cox (1993) argue that demographic groupings such as those based on age (old-timers and new comers) and gender are likely to be pervasive sources of cultural differentiation (Danisman et al., 2006: 304). In addition, according to Danisman et al. (2006: 304), the differences in the value orientations of voluntary and professional paid staff are also appreciable (see also Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1992). Therefore, it is important to determine whether or not there is a cultural differentiation between those groups.

With respect to the operationalisation of organisational culture, Schein (1993: 58) suggests that the following steps should be taken when attempting to decipher an organisation's culture: “analyse the process and content of socialisation of new members; analyse responses to critical incidents in the organisation’s history; analyse beliefs, values, and assumptions of culture creators; and discuss puzzling features of culture with insiders of the organisation” (Scott, 1997: 409). Ultimately, Scott (1997) connects the concept of organisational culture with the management of sports organisations. Schein (1993: 51) states that a strong culture has as its main features “the homogeneity and stability of group membership and the length and intensity of shared experiences of the group”, adding that a strong culture therefore possesses a high degree of unanimity among its members about “what the organisation stands for” (cited in Scott, 1997: 407). Scott (1997), in particular, emphasises the importance of organisational culture in relation to transformational leadership and Weese (1995) finds that organisations with highly transformational leaders exhibit significantly stronger cultures than those whose leaders have low transformational ability (Scott, 1997: 408). When organisational values, culture and leadership are considered together, it can be inferred from the point of view of effectiveness that ‘clear homogeneity of organisational values and highly transformational leaders are conducive to the formation of a strong positive organisational culture, which is more effective’.

Extending the concept of organisational values and culture above, Brown (1998: 42) suggests the three of the most important elements of organisational culture which identify governance practices in a cultural context:
1. The societal or national culture within which an organisation is physically situated;
2. The vision, management style and personality of an organisation’s founder or other dominant leader; and
3. The type of business an organisation conducts and the nature of its business environment.

He (1998: 42) points out that “an important point to bear in mind is that all the factors described as sources of culture tend to be interrelated in fundamental ways” and, in fact, he (1998: 43) adds that “Hofstede (1991) has demonstrated that managers in different countries differ in the strength of their attitudes and values regarding various issues”.

As the interpretation of the concept of governance is affected by the cultural context in which it is being operationalised, this study discusses how the KOC’s governance practices have been affected by the Korean cultural context, although national culture is not directly included in the IOC’s interpretations/definitions and operationalisations. Following Brown (1998), thus, this study defines and explains the concepts of three sources of organisational culture in Chapter 4 and illustrates the significance of the distinctive South Korean culture in discussing how governance has been interpreted in relation to the KOC in Chapter 7. The second element has been dealt with in terms of leadership and organisational values above and, thus, national culture and the nature of the business and the business environment are followed.

c) National Culture

According to Sartore & Cunningham, (2007: 247), “one’s organisational status and level of associated power are often a reflection of society at large” (see also Ely, 1995; Heilman, 2001; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004; Jost & Kay, 2005; Shaw & Hoeber, 2003; Shaw & Slack, 2002). Stereotypes are subsumed within this notion of social ideology and they may play a role in either positive or negative ways to undermine perceptions of competence and power, as various authors have suggested (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989, 1993; Jost & Kay, 2005 cited in Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248). Thus, “stereotypes are also suggested to be applied at both the individual and social or cultural level, the latter indicating some form of agreement or consensus of beliefs” (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius et al., 2001 cited in Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248). For example, research suggests that gender stereotypes embrace the traditional social roles, status differences, and power inequalities that exist between men and women (Engly & Mladinic,
Of particular relevance to the current model is the manner in which culturally held gender stereotypes have penetrated and impacted on the organisational domain, to such a degree that many jobs have become sex-typed (Heilman et al., 2004; Jawahar & Mattsson, 2005; Schein, 1973 cited in Sartore & Cunningham, 2007: 248). Thus, national culture is also an important factor to be taken into account when one is seeking to comprehend the organisational practices or culture of NOCs. Hofstede (1997: 181) argues that there is a tendency for values at the deeper, underlying level to be overlooked despite the effect that these may have in determining for people the meaning of their practices. The management practices of organisations thus reflect the national values.

**Five dimensions of national culture**

The five dimensions of national culture that may be drawn from Hofstede's IBM company studies are as follows. First, *power distance* is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1997: 28). With high-power distance cultures, organisations exhibit such features as the prevalence of inequality and an inordinate respect for authority with the result that subordinates have less chance of becoming involved in the decision-making process. In the case of low power distance nations, by contrast, there is a tendency for the inequalities among people to be minimal, for activities to be decentralised and for subordinates to expect to be consulted by their superiors. The second dimension, *individualism/collectivism*, “pertains to the extent to which individual independence or social cohesion dominates” (Brown, 1998: 43). In individualistic societies individuals are likely to have looser ties with other people and to take care of themselves. On the contrary, in collective societies people live in groups which are strong and cohesive and are protected in return for their loyalty. Third, *masculinity/femininity* refers to “the degree to which social gender roles are clearly distinct” (Brown, 1998: 45). In high-masculinity societies, there is a very clear distinction between social gender roles: “men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on material success, while women are supposed to be more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life” (Brown, 1998: 45). In the case of high-femininity societies, unlike masculinity societies, “social gender roles overlap” (Brown, 1998: 45) with a greater tendency in femininity societies for both men and women to perform similar roles. Brown (1998: 45) defines the fourth dimension of national culture, *uncertainty avoidance*, as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown
situations”. Brown (1998: 46) also explains that “in strong uncertainty avoidance societies there is a fear of ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks, there is a feeling that times is money, there is an emotional need to be busy, precision and punctuality come naturally, novelty is resisted, and people are motivated by security, and by esteem or belongingness”. Finally, **Confucian dynamism** is referred to as “the degree to which long-termism or short-termism is the dominant orientation in life”, and is linked to the Confucian conception of ‘virtue’ which Hofstede (1997) contrasts with a Western preoccupation with ‘truth’” (Brown, 1998: 46). “Long-term orientation societies stress the adaptation of traditions to a modern context, place definite limits on respect for social and status obligations, are sparing with resources, stress perseverance, and are concerned with ‘virtue’” (Brown, 1998: 46).

In addition to Hofstede (1997), Brown (1998: 47) also commented the national culture on business of the Republic of Korea below:

In South Korea the economy is dominated by enormous family controlled conglomerates, or ‘**chaebol**’. Korean chaebol are vertically integrated and centrally control a variety of functions and activities: that is, they are far less specialised than their Japanese and Chinese counterparts. Research suggests that they have successfully diversified into heavy industry, as well as newer industries such as construction and financial services. Although they appear disinclined to interconnect for economic reasons, they are liable to co-ordination by state agencies and political alliances. As with the Chinese managers, Korean bosses are highly directive, making little attempt to explain their decisions or justify their actions to their employees. Interestingly, there is a much higher labour turnover in Korean companies than in Japan or Taiwan, and loyalties here are much less emotional and intense than in Japan.

**Criticism**

Tayeb (1988: 39-40), however, argues that despite Hofstede’s remarkable contribution to the study of organisations in the cultural context, his investigation was not empirical and “the relationships between the four dimensions…and the structures of the organisations…are conceptual and speculative”. Tayeb (1988: 64) also remarks that “although they are meant to measure power distance and uncertainty avoidance as cultural dimensions, they [the five dimensions] are heavily influenced by non-cultural factors common to all modern civilised cultures, such as level of education, occupation, age and sex. Moreover, the effects of these
non-cultural factors on the scales are not, at least as far as the findings of the present research demonstrate, consistent”. In addition, the present study has been conducted since 2008 which means that approximately four decades have passed since the index was first studied. Hofstede (1997) carried out his original study between 1967 and 1973 in two survey rounds and in the 1980s a new cross-national study led to the addition of a fifth dimension. Since the Republic of Korea has been passing through a phase of accelerated economic development, the society has also changed rapidly.

d) The nature of the business and the business environment


Utilities (such as electricity, gas and telephone companies) which have evolved in a relatively slow-changing environment tend to develop cultures which value stability, integration, clear communication, support from senior managers, fair compensation and opportunities for employees to grow. In contrast, dynamic-marketplace companies formed in highly competitive and changeable environments generally develop cultures which set ambitious goals and value innovative behaviour and individual initiative.

As this study identifies the governance practices of the KOC, which is a non-profit organisation, slow-changing environment is expected to be presented during the analysis.

In addition, the most significant source of understanding of the business environment of an organisational culture is stakeholders, which includes customers, the Government, the public and shareholders. Customers are regarded as an important stakeholder, however, are not dealt with in this study as the KOC is a non-profit organisation. The government and the public are greatly concerned in this study. The Government holds considerable power to influence the organisational culture within its territory and might regulates a non-profit organisation by the Government policy. As the KOC is a governmental umbrella body, the Government is expected to be an important stakeholder. With respect to the public, the strong public opinion worldwide or nationwide leads a company to attempt to follow it.
“Shareholders have little influence on the cultural development of an organisation” (Brown, 1998: 50).

e) Typologies of organisational cultures

Typology of organisational culture enables understanding broad overviews of “the sorts of variations that exist between cultures” (Brown, 1998: 65). Following Harrison (1972) who suggests the four cultures, “called power, role, task and person” (Brown: 1998: 66) Handy (1978) modifies them into the simple classification scheme as shown Figure 4-2 below.

Figure 4-2 Handy's four organisational culture


- The power culture

The characteristic of power culture is that “a power culture has a single source of power from which rays of influence spread throughout the organisation…the structure of a power culture may thus be pictured as a web” (Brown, 1998: 66). Thus, individuals are encouraged to follow what their leaders say with few questions “though important decisions are likely to be made as a result of political manoeuvring…employees who are naturally political animals confident about the use of power, and unconcerned about taking risks or issues of job security will thrive in this environment” (Brown, 1998: 67).

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- The role culture
This is more or less bureaucracy and thus, it focuses on logic and rationality. The functions or specialities are important in this culture. “Rules, procedures and job descriptions dominate the internal environment of a role culture, and promotion is based on the satisfactory performance of individuals in their jobs” (Brown, 1998: 67). The role culture is “pictured as a Greek temple” (Brown, 1998: 67).

- The task culture
This culture appears in an organisation which puts an emphasis on specific jobs or projects and accordingly, power is somewhat diffuse based on expertise rather than power. “Structurally, the task culture may be thought of as a net or matrix…Flexibility, adaptability, individual autonomy and mutual respect based on ability rather than age or status are the most important organising principles here” (Brown, 1998: 67-7).

- The person culture
The individuals comprising an organisation tend organise on a collective basis in their own interests. For example, specialists such as doctors and architects band together in order to share the costs of utilities. “The individuals themselves decide on their own work allocation, with rules and co-ordinative mechanisms of minimal significance…the individual has almost complete autonomy, influence is shared, and if power is to be exercised it is usually on the basis of expertise” (Brown, 1998: 69).

The typology of organisational culture introduced above is applied to the case of KOC and the analysis of the KOC’s governance practices in the Korean cultural context is characterised and pictured as one of them in Chapter 7.

**Effectiveness in the Olympic Movement**
The requirement for effectiveness in the Olympic Movement is mainly indicated in the BUPs below:

Table 4-20 BUPs Category 7 regarding effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Complementary missions</td>
<td>*Governments, constituents of the Olympic Movement, other sports organisations and stakeholders have a complementary mission and should work together towards the same goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2 above indicates that it is necessary for NOCs to cultivate harmonious relationships with their governments to work together towards the same goals. As one aspect of the definition of effectiveness concerns "the achievement of official goals and operational goals", 7.2 can be categorised as a summons to effectiveness in the collaboration of the NOCs and their higher organisations in order to achieve their common goals by fostering harmonious relations. Differences may occur however when NOCs disagree with their governments' actions or politics in relation to sport-related themes.

Table 4-21 BUPs Category 3 regarding effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3  Internal Management,</td>
<td>*Good internal communication reinforces the efficiency of sporting organisations&lt;br&gt;Good information flow inside sporting organisations ensures good understanding by membership of activities undertaken and allows managers to make timely and informed decisions&lt;br&gt;Good working conditions and atmosphere as well as motivation and incentive policies are essential for the smooth functioning of the organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication and coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5  Appointment of the members of the management</td>
<td>*Leadership is above management&lt;br&gt;The majority of the members of management should be professional&lt;br&gt;Candidates should have professional competency and an impeccable professional history&lt;br&gt;The selection process should be based on objective criteria and should be set out clearly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elements discussed in Category 3 above are clearly dependent on good leadership which is described in the literature as being a supplementary factor to effectiveness, along with organisational culture, indeed, 3.5 alludes directly to the term 'leadership'. Moreover, 3.3 states that good internal communication can positively affect the efficiency of an organisation. ‘A good internal communication’ is considered as an aspect of effectiveness in the literature and it seems that effectiveness and efficiency are used interchangeably in some elements of the Olympic literature. In addition, motivation and incentive policies are likely to be implemented by transformational and transactional leaders, respectively. As outlined above, leaders should have professional competency and good interactional communication skills, which are considered as factors that are beneficial when operationalised.
### Theme 4.6: Education and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements to be considered</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>There should be an induction programme for all new members of staff, volunteer officers and all board members</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ongoing education and training of executives, volunteers and employees should be integral to operations</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The promotion of self-education and regular training within the sport organisations should be encouraged</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The IOC, 2008: 8)

Theme 4.6 can be categorised as pertaining to organisational culture in that the induction programme for new members of staff is considered as an important element for increasing the integration of organisational values in that they indicate the aims that the organisation seeks to promote and pursue. *The IOC Code of Ethics* (2010: 1) encourages the Olympic Movement to live up to “the Olympic Charter and, in particular, its Fundamental Principles”, but this document mainly deals with a wider range of ethics than those introduced above. In terms of the ethics of corporate governance it identifies seven categories of ethical concern, which are Dignity; Integrity; Good governance and resources; Candidatures; Relations with states; Confidentiality; and Implementation.

Article 48 from *the Olympic Movement in Society* (2009: 15) can be interpreted as relating to aspects of effectiveness to be delivered by enhancing human capital.

48. In order to improve the quality and levels of services, all constituents of the Olympic Movement should unite in their efforts to place a higher priority on supporting programmes for the training of sport administrators, coaches and entourage.

In the case of article 49, another example is presented of the interchangeable use of the terms effectiveness and efficiency in the Olympic Movement. In the literature, it is stated that the revenue distribution should provide a measure of efficiency in sporting organisations and, therefore, this topic will be examined in the section on efficiency.

49. The Olympic Movement should look at ways to broaden the effectiveness of its revenue distribution models.
Although effectiveness is discussed in the Olympic Movement, the operationalisation of this concept is mainly constructed on the basis of the literature:

Table 4-23 Effectiveness: definitions/interpretations and operationalisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Definitions/Interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Effectiveness** | The achievement of official goals and operational goals. | -What are the official goals of the NOC?  
-What are its operational goals? (objectives whose attainment is desired)  
-Does the organisation clearly set forth the organisation’s goals?  
-To what degree are the official and operational goals achieved? |

**Organisational Culture**

*Clear homogeneity of organisational values* and *highly transformational leaders* are conducive to the formation of a strong, positive organisational culture, **which is more effective.**

1. **Organisational Values**

*Integration*: with a strong alignment between words and deeds, an organisation-wide consensus and consistency between organisational values and employee behaviour may be achieved.

*Differentiation*: when there is a contradiction between words and deeds, inconsistencies and subcultures may arise due to unbalanced power relations.

*Fragmentation*: if uncertainty and temporality exist between words and deeds, ambiguity and complexity are the consequences.

-Do staff members clearly understand and share the organisation’s official and operational goals?  
-Are organisational values shared by all members?  
-Is there a sub-culture within the NOC?  
-Are organisational values differentiated along these lines: individual roles; age and gender; volunteer and professional paid staff?  
-Is there an activity like an induction, or a social engagement to help staff to identify with the organisation?

2. **Leadership**

*Transactional leadership*: subordinates perform within a clearly outlined framework as tasked by their leaders in exchange for commensurate material or psychological compensation.

-Does a leader elicit respect and from his/her subordinates and stimulate their sense of pride?
### Effectiveness (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformational leadership: leaders emphasise task-related values and a strong commitment to a mission, and inspire their subordinates to reach higher levels of performance in their commitment and contribution</th>
<th>Does a leader carry out effective two-way and horizontal communications and interactions with his/her subordinates?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders should be professional, interactional and communicative in their conduct, and/or capable of dealing with a contingency</td>
<td>Does a leader clearly communicate organisational values, purpose and mission?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2.7 Efficiency

This section deals with traditional perspectives on efficiency. Considering the definition of efficiency from the perspective of traditional organisational theory, Slack (1997: 23) defines it by saying that “it takes into account the amount of resources used to produce the desired output” (see also Pennings & Goodman, 1977; Sandefur, 1983). Efficiency may also be measured by comparing the results from using the same amount of funds in different categories (Elster, 1992: 180-1), a calculation that is driven by an organisation’s attempt to improve its internal input-output ratio (Babiak, 2007: 342). Thus, in traditional organisational theory, efficiency is referred to as ‘the amount of resources or funds (the input) used to improve or produce the desired output’ (This is closely related to accountability in that expenditure that is in line with the NOC’s aims is that ‘how the NOC is accountable’).

The Northern Ireland Assembly (2010) conveys that how problematic the measurement of the outcomes of public-spending programmes can be, adding a list of budgeting methods as follows:

- Incremental (Historic) budgeting is defined as “the previous year’s budget for a department or division is carried forward for the next annual budget” (2010: 5). This is carried out on the basis of the previous financial year’s allocation.
- Zero-based budgeting starts “from the basis that no budget lines should be carried forward from one period to the next simply because they occurred previously, instead, everything that is included in the budget must be considered and justified (2010: 7).
- Priority-based budgeting “focuses on corporate priorities and allocates growth and savings in budgets accordingly” (2010: 13).
- Performance-based budgeting, the aim of which “is to connect performance information with the allocation and management of resources” (2010: 15).
Fixed budgeting means that “the level of resources often determines the level of activity and service provision and these resource levels are usually established in advance of the financial year (2010: 24).

**a) Institutional Isomorphism**

As discussed earlier in Chapter three, Neo-institutional approaches to organisational theory focus on the organisation’s “rational appearance with respect to the institutional environment” (Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen 2006: 296), whereas traditional organisational theory puts an emphasis on the organisation’s efficiency in terms of resource input and output. Thus, Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 296) explain that “theorists of the neo-institutional school concentrate on how and to what degree organisations adapt to both formal and informal expectations in the institutional environment.”

Similarities are apparent among non-profit organisations since they are subject to coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphic forces, according to Leiter (2005: 5). Each force is explained in the following terms: ‘coercive’ means that the organisation is expected to be highly dependent on financial sources; ‘mimetic’ indicates that the non-profit mission is often unclear and the methods for its pursuit are unsettled and there is therefore a tendency for such organisations to learn by copying structures and approaches from others in the same field i.e. sport; and ‘normative’ means that different types of organisation provide expert advice and professionally trained managers are on the increase. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) address that “mimetic isomorphism implies that organisations during a period of change (technological/economic) and uncertainty imitate what seems to be the most successful and/or legitimate organisations” (cited in Augestad, Bergsgard & Hansen, 2006: 296).

**Efficiency in the Olympic Movement**

For the operationalisation, this study identifies how the budget allocations are decided by applying the five types of budgeting methods above to its subject, a sporting organisation. For instance, it poses the question: ‘Are resources allocated to a sporting organisation in terms of cost per medal, per coach or participant?’ The best practice of resource allocation in a NOC should take into account the most efficient way that permits it to economise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Definitions/Interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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Efficiency

The amount of resources or funds (the input) to be used to improve or produce the desired output:

- **Historic budgeting**: budgeting on the basis of the previous financial year’s allocation
- **Zero-based budgeting**: no budget lines should be carried forward from one period to the next
- **Priority-based budgeting**: budgeting on the basis of priorities
- **Performance-based budgeting**: budgeting on the basis of performance
- **Fixed budgeting**: budgeting on the basis of the level of activity and service provision

-How are the budget allocations decided?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.3 Features of key principles in the Olympic Movement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Following the commentary on key principles, this section explores how those principles are characterised by the IOC body. The same IOC documents are discussed to identify any similarity or difference between them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.3.1 Encouraging compliance with rules and regulations of the IOC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The IOC Code of Ethics and the Olympic Movement in Society indicate one similarity in that the two documents strongly encourage sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement to live up to the rules and regulations which receive the strongest emphasis in the Olympic Charter and the BUPs. The section regarding ‘Good Governance and Resources’ in the IOC Code of Ethics indicates (2010: 2-3) that:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The Olympic parties recognise the significant contribution that broadcasters, sponsors, partners and other supporters of sports events make to the development and prestige of the Olympic Games throughout the world. **However, such support must be in a form consistent with the rules of sport and the principles defined in the Olympic Charter and the present Code.** They must not interfere in the running of sports institutions. The organisation and staging of sports competitions are the exclusive responsibility of the independent sports organisations recognised by the IOC.
In addition, the section concerning ‘Relations with States’ also emphasises that sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement should be in compliance with the principles established by the Olympic Movement.

1. The Olympic parties shall work to maintain harmonious relations with state authorities, in accordance with the principle of universality and political neutrality of the Olympic Movement (the IOC Code of Ethics, 2010: 3).

2. The Olympic parties are free to play a role in the public life of the states to which they belong. They may not, however, engage in any activity or follow any ideology inconsistent with the principles and rules defined in the Olympic Charter and set out in the present Code (the IOC Code of Ethics, 2010: 3).

Along with the IOC Code of Ethics, clauses 29, 37, 38 and 42 of the Olympic Movement in Society also contain recommendations for compliance to be observed with the rules and regulations of the Olympic Movement.

29. The relevant intergovernmental organisations and governments should acknowledge the necessary and essential autonomy of the Olympic Movement including, in particular, respect for and enforcement of the rules of good governance, equality and fairness in sport and sport administration, as established by the Olympic Movement and set out in the Olympic Charter, to ensure the best and fairest possible practice of sport (2009: 12).

37. In accordance with the principles and values of Olympism, the practice of sport must be run by independent, autonomous sport organisations, which are in full compliance with applicable laws. Co-operation between governments and institutions of the Olympic Movement in every area where it may be mutually beneficial should underlie the relationship between sport and state bodies, so that the autonomy of the Olympic Movement is fully respected by governments (2009: 13-4).

38. The relationships between the Olympic Movement, public bodies and governments, as well as those between all national organisations belonging to the Olympic Movement and their respective governments, should be based on the
principle of respect for applicable law by all constituents of the Olympic Movement, while at the same time seeking to influence public policy makers wherever possible to ensure that national and supra-national laws and regulations are consistent with the fundamental principles of Olympism (2009: 14).

42. All members of the Olympic Movement should keep annual accounts in accordance with acknowledged standards of accounting; ensure they have an independent audit or verification of their accounts; adopt rules, norms and practices under which those who cannot comply with good governance may lose financial support or be sanctioned; adopt and implement a code of ethics based on the principles and rules of the IOC Code of Ethics; and always seek to protect and promote the interests of the athletes they represent (2009: 14).

These clauses all underline the importance of accomplishing the applicable laws and rules of the Olympic Movement. As can be seen above, the IOC Code of Ethics and the Olympic Movement in Society recommend above all that the sporting organisations in the Olympic Movement should perform in accordance with the principles and rules defined by that Movement.

4.3.2 Highlighting accountability, responsibility, transparency & democracy

Another feature shared by the IOC Code of Ethics and the Olympic Movement in Society is that both documents focus on accountability, responsibility and transparency. In the case of the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 2), the third category entitled ‘Good Governance and Resources’ deals with those three principles. In fact, while introducing an overall view of good corporate governance, Article 1 of the category singles out the three principles for special mention:

1. The basic universal principles of good governance of the Olympic and sports movement, in particular transparency, responsibility and accountability, must be respected by all Olympic Movement constituents.

The Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 14) also places emphasis on the need for accountability, responsibility and transparency in the Olympic Movement.
41. The legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement depends on upholding the highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. All members of the Olympic Movement should adopt, as their minimum standard, the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement, as proposed by the IOC. All members of the Olympic Movement must always demonstrate integrity, accountability and transparency, as well as the highest level of management skills; and they must ensure that at all times their legal status is both fully consistent with their activities and responsibilities and wholly compliant with the laws of the land (applicable laws).

In the case of the Olympic Charter principles such as accountability, transparency and democracy are implied to be the cornerstones of the Movement’s ethical governance. A total of six recommendations are selected from the Charter below for discussion in relation to corporate governance principles. The first three recommendations bear more closely on aspects of democracy, in that they accentuate the NOCs’ independent position in their cooperation with their governments or non-governmental bodies. Specifically, Rules 29-4 indicates explicitly that the president or members of the NOC should not be appointed by the government.

Rules 28-5. In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with governmental bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious relations. However, they shall not associate themselves with any activity which would be in contradiction with the Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental bodies (2010: 62).

Rules 28-6. The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter (2010: 62).

Rules 29-4. Governments or other public authorities shall not designate any members of an NOC. However, an NOC may decide, at its discretion, to elect as members representatives of such authorities (2010: 65).

The following Bye-laws in the IOC Charter, concern transparency and accountability in that they state that NOC should release and open any related documents, such as annual
reports and audited financial statements, to their stakeholders in order to be accountable to them.

Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29,
1-4. Each NOC shall hold a General Assembly of its members at least once a year, in accordance with the NOC’s statutes. NOCs shall, in particular, include on the agenda of their General Assemblies the presentation of annual reports and audited financial statements and, as the case may be, the election of officers and members of the executive body. (2010: 66)

1-5. The officers and members of the executive body of an NOC shall be elected in accordance with the NOC’s statutes, for a term of office not exceeding four years; they may be eligible for re-election. (2010: 66)

1-4 embodies the principle of accountability following the interpretation of accountability under which ‘a member of the Executive Committee should comply with its rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ need’. It recommends that the NOC should hold a General Assembly in order to be more accountable to its stakeholders, as indicated in the operationalisation ‘how often is the General Assembly held?’ The second point regarding audited financial statements is also important as a means of improving accountability, following the guidance whereby ‘an organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit’. In addition, regarding the presentation of annual reports, in the interests of greater transparency, the definition states that ‘organisations should develop and provide written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them’. Moreover, the last part of 1-4 of Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29 may be said to promote greater democracy in that ‘the NOC should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of high officials’, which is supported and amplified by 1-5. Thus, 1-4 indicates a mixture of three aspects of corporate governance, namely accountability, democracy and transparency. Therefore, those documents from the Olympic Movement raise accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy to a position of being the most important ethical principles to be considered in sporting organisations affiliated to the Olympic Movement.

4.3.3 Limited inclusion of equity, effectiveness and efficiency
Whereas equity and/or equality and effectiveness have been studied in depth in the literature
in relation to sporting organisations, the IOC’s recommendations make only limited reference to them and pay still less attention to efficiency. Regarding equity, in the category of ‘Dignity’ in the IOC Code of Ethics, one clause has a bearing on it, where equity may be seen to be promoted by the call for eradication of discrimination in terms of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, philosophical or political opinion, marital status or other grounds. The definitions of equity discussed in this study consider the aspects of gender, race, disability and resource allocation, while the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 1) covers a wider range of aspects of equity without, however, including equity for people with disabilities.

2. There shall be no discrimination between the participants on the basis of race, gender, ethnic origin, religion, philosophical or political opinion, marital status or other grounds.

The Olympic Movement in Society (2009:12-3) also deals with the preservation of human dignity in terms of equitable treatment irrespective of gender:

30. The preservation of human dignity is a fundamental tenet of the Olympic Movement. All members of the Olympic Movement should work together in pursuit of the harmonious development of men and women in order to promote through sport a peaceful society based on the most fundamental common principles and values inherent in a civilised society

These clauses show a tendency whereby the issue of equity is mostly handled by the Olympic Movement under the aspect of ‘dignity’. The Copenhagen Congress Contributions give relatively more attention to the issue of equity than the other documents. In the Copenhagen Congress Contributions, with respect to achieving greater gender equality in the Olympic Movement, Allen from the IOC (2009: 299) argues that due to the exclusion of women from decision-making, the Olympic movement has been responsible for perpetuating gender inequality. Accordingly, the IOC should review the representation of women in its management structures throughout the Olympic Movement. According to Defrantz from the IOC, in 1996 “the IOC aimed to have at least 10% of the policy making positions occupied by women by 2001 and increasing to 20% by 2005” (2009: 313). The 2009 Congress highlights the importance of women's participation at all levels of sport.
With respect to effectiveness and efficiency, *The Copenhagen Congress Contributions* make recommendations for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of NOCs. In *The Copenhagen Congress Contributions*, Coates (2009: 312) from the Australian Olympic Committee proposes a way to achieve increased effectiveness when he states that “NOCs should have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge their responsibilities and duties”. McLin (2009: 327) from the Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI) notes that “the effectiveness and impact of the Olympic Movement is limited by the structure and efficiency of its institutions”. When the best good governance structures are applied to these organisations “in order to effectively manage their affairs internationally” (McLin, 2009: 327), efficiency and autonomy would be considerably extended, and in turn, the Olympic Movement would be greatly empowered. Thus, the NOC should not ignore each stakeholder’s interests or needs in its mode of governance and its processes should be efficiently managed. In summary, several articles in *The Copenhagen Congress Contributions* raise the importance of principles that have had such a low profile in the Olympic Movement.

### 4.3.4 The concept of ‘autonomy’

Since the term, ‘autonomy’ has often been used in IOC documents, this section discusses what principles can be related to achieving ‘autonomy’. ‘The Structure of the Olympic Movement’ in *The Olympic Movement in Society* (2009: 12) begins by citing Article 27 in which it is said that “a definition of autonomy of sport reflecting the principles of respect, responsibility and reliability should be adopted by all within the Olympic Movement”. As the document directly states, autonomy confers on the body concerned a duty of responsibility. Another case showing the relation between responsibility and autonomy is discussed in the Copenhagen Congress Contributions. According to Al-Hussein (2009: 256) of the Jordanian Olympic Committee:

Under the Olympic Charter, each NOC is *an autonomous body* with clearly defined rights, duties, and responsibilities to sport and the Olympic Movement. The Charter emphasises the need to maintain positive relationships with government and it is clearly not in the interests of NOCs or of sport for these relationships to deteriorate…… but the relationship tends to be built on a solid recognition by governments of the importance of the role of NOCs and the way that reflects on their country.
Al-Hussein’s point is that the NOCs should guard their autonomy by observing clearly delineated rights and duties in compliance with the IOC’s recommendations. Their autonomy should be respected by their governments within the framework of a positive relationship. Article 29 in *the Olympic Movement in Society* (2009: 12) recommends that NOCs should comply with the rules and regulations of the Olympic Movement in order to establish their autonomy in the same way as the principle of accountability presupposed that ‘a member of the Executive Committee should comply with its rules and regulations’. Article 29, therefore, indicates that organisations concerned with sport should comply with the rules and regulations of the Olympic Movement and thereby acknowledge the Movement’s autonomy.

29. The relevant intergovernmental organisations and governments should acknowledge the necessary and essential autonomy of the Olympic Movement including, in particular, respect for and enforcement of the rules of good governance, equality and fairness in sport and sport administration, as established by the Olympic Movement and set out in the Olympic Charter, to ensure the best and fairest possible practice of sport.

Article 29 is also relevant to the issue of democracy, as it emphasises the autonomy of sporting organisations from any intergovernmental organisations and governments. It also states that “equality and fairness” are essential to the autonomy of the Olympic Movement.

Bach (2009: 257), who is the President of the German Olympic Committee, suggests in the same document that the autonomy of sporting organisations and the Olympic Movement needs to be defined carefully. Bach believes that, in reality, since we need our partners in politics, economics and society in order to carry out our mission, it is impossible for us to be fully independent. Therefore, in the interests of autonomy, Bach (2009: 257) argues that “we (should) respect and abide by our own rules of good governance”. In the opinion of Baumann and Bach, accountability is fundamental to autonomy, in that sporting organisations should respect and abide by the rules suggested by the IOC.

In addition, Bach (2009: 257) relates three stances of governmental intervention in sports organisations. In one case, “a government itself convened a general meeting of the national sports organisations”; in another, “a government completely circumnavigated the general meeting”; and lastly, a particular government acted unilaterally to “directly appoint the members of the executive board of the sports organisation”. In order to avoid this, NOCs
should cooperate with their governments and/or governmental bodies but they should take a firm stance in that partnership, while the government should respect the autonomy of sport. Bach’s argument against direct government’ intervention is related to the principle of subsidiarity, as the government should not interfere in the decision-making of sporting organisations or in the selection of the Executive Committee where such ‘interference’ is unwarranted. The General Assembly and Executive Committee are both the highest decision-making units in sporting organisations. This can be directly related to the call for democracy on the part of the NOC which ‘should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of high officials’.

In accordance with that demand, the Olympic Charter (2010: 62) also uses the term ‘autonomy’, as below:

Rules 28-6. The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter.

The clause that “the NOCs must preserve their autonomy” can be interpreted as a summons to NOCs to safeguard their independence and resist all external pressures by instituting their own independent decision-making procedures. In particular, as explained earlier, the five related Rules and Bye-laws are mostly concerned with encouraging NOCs to maintain their democracy and freedom from government control. Thus, if the principles of good governance are not respected, then autonomy may be under threat.

4.3.5 Considering cultural and historical aspects

Unlike the other selected documents released by the IOC, the Copenhagen Congress Contributions give consideration to the specificity of the cultural and historical aspects of each NOC. It argues that the IOC should understand and admit that each nation in which a sporting organisation is situated has its own historical, political, economic and cultural background, and the relations between a sporting organisation and its government should thus be considered in a different way depending on their national context. Baumann (2009) argues that it is also necessary to consider the cultural aspects and historical background of each organisation. Karfoul (2009: 274) of the Syrian Olympic Committee also says that the independence of the NOCs is strongly related to “the level of awareness and management culture of the organisation” and furthermore, sport should not be isolated from “the social,
economic and political systems of the country” to which they belong. Maglione (2009: 276) of the IOC also comments that each nation has developed different social, political, and economic systems just as it is characterised by different religions, cultures, and customs. These elements should be taken into account if the NOCs’ degree of autonomy from their respective governments is to be understood.

The importance of viewing NOCs from this perspective is especially evident when the governance practices of NOCs in non-western contexts are being examined as those governance practices can be interpreted differently in different political, cultural, social and economic contexts. As discussed earlier, while the underlying concepts of corporate governance have been developed in a western context, individual NOCs’ different understandings of the fundamental ethical principles should be considered to some extent.

4.4 Conclusion

On the basis of a review of the literature and the selected IOC documents, it may be concluded that there are seven key ethical principles which define the theory and practice of good governance in sporting organisations: accountability, responsibility, transparency, democracy, equity, effectiveness and efficiency. This examination of the sources indicates that those principles such as accountability, responsibility and transparency are identified in similar ways in the literature and the byelaws of the Olympic Movement but that some principles in the IOC documents are not clear enough to cover all these necessary points. Thus, sport/business sections were useful to supplement the lack of definitions. In particular, democracy is not addressed by the IOC movement and the main concept of pluralism in the theories of states is borrowed as it is relevant to democracy. Equity is turned out to be a major principle in the sport sector, while it is much less appearance in the Olympic Movement. The concepts of ‘meanings’ and ‘practices’ are borrowed to reinforce the definitions of the theme, equity. Effectiveness, which is the other major principle in the sport sector, greatly supports the concept of effectiveness. The leadership and organisational culture are well explained by the literature review and, thus, this enables to establish the operationalisations of effectiveness. In the case of efficiency, the concept of it is clearly described in the Olympic Movement but its way of operationalisation is not clearly illustrated. Consequently, additional document that is from the Northern Ireland Assembly (2010) indicates its operationalisation.
There seems no unified ‘western’ conceptualisation of corporate governance. Thus, this chapter examines the concepts of corporate governance which were discussed in the three main areas: the business and sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement. This is not to say that other western based definitions of good or corporate governance do not exist. Nevertheless, As this study is regarding a corporate governance of NOCs, the documents in the Olympic Movement are regarded as the main and powerful regulations to the NOC. Also, the IOC is the headquarters of the Olympic Movement and, thus, the operationalisations are much likely to adapt the IOC’s recommendations which are constructed in a western-context.

An interpretation is constructed in English and in a ‘western’ business context – the IOC being physically and ‘legally’ located in the west (Switzerland). Further, the cultural aspect has been regarded as an important element in order to take a consideration of each NOC and, thus, it is essential to identify how NOCs in non-western contexts interpret and practise ethical principles constructed in the western-context. Therefore, the following analyses show how governance practices have been interpreted in a different national and cultural context. The operationalisations are applied to the KOC with taking a cultural aspect of Korea into consideration.
5 Research Methodology

5.1 Introduction

This study seeks to address four key research questions. In order to justify the choice of method in relation to answering these questions, it is necessary to map out the assumptions about the nature of the world under investigation (ontological assumptions) and ways in which knowledge may be searched (epistemological assumptions). These are methodological issues rather than concerns of method 'per se', since methodology is about the link between theory and method. This chapter, thus, (a) rehearse the research questions, (b) highlight and justify the ontological and epistemological assumptions and the opportunities and constraints such choices imply, (c) clarify the theoretical position and (d) outline practical implications for method.

5.2 Aims of the research

Corporate governance, as have already stated, has grown in significance generally in the management of organisations, and in particular has become increasingly important as some prominent sporting organisations have experienced aspects of governance failure. This study therefore seeks to address the following questions and objectives:

- What characterises good/corporate governance in the literature and how have the principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?
- What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to the governance of Olympic organisations? And how are these interpreted by the IOC ‘body’?
- How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of good/corporate governance in general, and specifically those aspects recommended by the IOC? And how are these interpreted in the KOC context?
- To what extent are practices of good/corporate governance developed in a western context applicable in this non-western sporting context?

5.3 Philosophical considerations

Ontology and epistemology involve a wide range of approaches although such approaches may not be clearly categorized as either ontology or epistemology due to the points of view of different authors. Blaikie (1993: 6) suggests that “ontology refers to the claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social enquiry makes about the nature of social
reality” and epistemology is “the claims or assumptions made about the ways in which it is possible to gain knowledge of this reality, whatever it is understood to be”. Green (2003: 45) observes that “ontological assumptions lead to epistemological assumptions which have methodological implications for the choices made regarding particular methods or techniques of data collection and the interpretation of findings arising from the research” (cf. Sparkes, 1992: 14; Grix 2002).

What then are the critical ontological and epistemological questions? In terms of ontological questions, Burrell and Morgan (1979: 1) state:

“Whether the ‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual or the product of individual consciousness; whether ‘reality’ is of an ‘objective nature’, or the product of individual cognition; whether ‘reality’ is a given ‘out there’ in the world, or the product of one’s mind.”

The epistemological questions are “whether knowledge is something that can be acquired on the one hand, or something that has to be personally experienced on the other” (Green, 2003: 47). Following the questions noted above, major ontological and epistemological assumptions are discussed, as noted in Table 5-1, along with the categories of research strategies, which might be adopted.

Table 5-1 Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research strategy</th>
<th>Inductive</th>
<th>Deductive</th>
<th>Retrospective</th>
<th>Abductive</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontological assumptions:</strong></td>
<td>Realist Social phenomena exist independently of both the observer and social actors</td>
<td>Realist Social phenomena exist independently of both the observer and social actors</td>
<td>Structuralist Constructivist Social reality is viewed as social arrangements that are the products of material but unobservable structures of social relations (Bhaskar 1979)</td>
<td>Relativist Constructivist Social reality is viewed as the social construction of social actors. Regarded as the product of processes by which social actors together negotiate the meanings for actions and situations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To begin with ontological assumption, as one of the core branches of philosophy, there are two major ontological assumptions: realism and constructivism. Realism is also equivalent to foundationalism or objectivism that “assume that social phenomena exist independently of both the observer and social actors” (Blaikie, 2000: 119). The world is seen as external reality and thus, the realist starting point is “always a foundational description of what this reality out there is, whether in experiential or material terms” (Gergen, 1994: 72 cited in Aquilina, 2009). On the contrary, constructivism, which is called anti-foundationalism and also anti-positivism, develops the constructivist paradigm which “entails the assumption that social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors and it is a pre-interpreted, inter-subjective world of cultural objects, meanings and social institutions” (Blaikie, 1993: 203).

The other core branch of philosophy is epistemology which, as mentioned earlier, concerns the way of gaining knowledge of the reality, and thus, focuses on the knowledge gathering process. There are two main approaches: positivism and interpretivism. A positivist approach adhering to realist ontological assumption aims to explain observable and measurable social phenomena by means of establishing universal generalisations. This position is, however, contrasted in an interpretivist approach in association with constructivist ontological assumptions. It seeks to explain social phenomena by virtue of social actors’ explanations. Blaikie (2000: 115) points out that “interpretivists are concerned with understanding the social world people have produced and which they reproduce through their continuing activities”. Social reality is constituted by the meanings and interpretations given by social actors who navigate their way around the world and have to interpret their activities together.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epistemological approach</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Critical Rationalism</th>
<th>Transcendental Realism &amp; Scientific Realism (Critical Realism)</th>
<th>Interpretivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phenomena observation</td>
<td>Objectivist (directly observable)</td>
<td>Objectivist (directly observable)</td>
<td>Subjectivist (indirectly observable)</td>
<td>Subjectivist Hermeneutics Phenomenology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Quantitative strategy (survey and questionnaire)</td>
<td>Quantitative strategy (survey and questionnaire)</td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative strategy (survey, interview and document analysis)</td>
<td>Qualitative strategy (interview, document analysis and participant observation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Blaikie (2000) & Green (2003)
to make sense of it.

With respect to research strategy, it is closely related to a research process and method. As induction is the logic of positivism, the inductive strategy follows a process of data collection, data analysis, and development of generalisations, while the deductive strategy goes in the reverse order (Blaikie 2000: 100). The retroductive strategy is designed to establish an existence of “a possible structure or mechanism that could have produced regularity” after finding an observed regularity (Blaikie, 2000: 100). Thus, the retroductive strategy views reality as “social arrangements that are the products of material but unobservable structures of social relations” (Bhaskar 1979 cited in Blaikie, 2000: 108). Following Bhaskar, Sayer (1992: 40) argues that the explanation of social phenomena should include critical evaluation of “their associated practices and the material structures which they produce and which in turn help to sustain those practices” (Green, 2003: 47). The abductive strategy, according to Blaikie (2000: 100), “begins by exploring through everyday language the knowledge that social actors use in the production, reproduction and interpretation of this everyday account into a social scientific account, and, possibly, into a grounded explanation.” Interpretivism focuses on understanding social phenomena, which are constructed/reconstructed by social actors through language.

As reflecting the research objectives that include identifying power relations between stakeholders of KOC, specifically, the Korean government and the KOC, and to find similarities or differences of concept or practices of principles of corporate governance between the IOC in western context and the KOC in Korean context, this study adopts critical realist assumptions, following retroductive strategy that hypothesizes the regularities of the Korean society and its unobservable social structures, which impact on the corporate governance of the KOC. As critical realism accepts an interpretivist epistemological assumption, it also uses critical discourse analysis as following abductive strategy to understand how knowledge is socially structured through the members of KOC staff’s language.

5.3.1 Critical Realism

Critical realism shares a realist ontological position with an interpretivist epistemological position. As Blaikie (2000: 108) states, “the aim of realist science is to explain observable phenomena with references to underlying structures and mechanisms”. Hollis and Smith add (1991: 207), “the role of theory in realism is to contextualize observable behaviour by using
theory to infer the underlying structures of a particular social and political situation”. When comparing mechanisms in natural and social sciences, the mechanisms in the natural sciences are hidden because they reside in the real domain of reality that still has to be ‘discovered’, while in the social science, mechanisms are regarded as the social constructions, and ‘hidden’ mechanisms mean that they are not able to be observed directly, and that social actors may not be aware of them.

On top of the aim of realist science, the critical realists’ additional aim is to draw conclusions about unobservable structures of social relations. In addition to this, for critical realists, “social and political events are generated by a complex causal nexus that involves both the efficient causation of actors and the material causation of social structure” (Lewis 2002: 21 cited in Green, 2003: 47). What should be taken into account here is that the participants’ activities do not entirely result in the social conditions in which a social episode occurs, or within which any social group or community exists. “This means that social actors may have little or no awareness of the mechanisms, and, in particular, the structures, which are involved in the production of the regularities in their social activities.” (Blaikie, 2000: 111)

In addition, the ‘stratified ontology’ of critical realism is that “processes/events and structures are seen as different strata of social reality with different properties” (Fairclough, 2005: 922).

Table 5-2 Bhaskar's three domains: populating entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Domain of Real</th>
<th>Domain of Actual</th>
<th>Domain of Empirical</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bhaskar (1978: 13)

Following Bhaskar’s analysis, Henry (2007: 199) describes these in the following terms:

“the real (mechanisms, powers, tendencies or deep structures which the natural and social sciences seek to identify); the actual (sequences of events which may be produced under experimental conditions or are in principle observable under certain conditions in the social world); and the empirical (observed events)".
Fairclough (2005: 922) also distinguishes between them as: “the real is the domain of structures with their associated ‘causal powers’; the actual is the domain of events and processes; and the empirical is the part of the real and the actual that is experienced by social actors.”

The actual does not reflect the real in a simple or a direct way as “the extent to which and ways in which the particular causal powers are activated to affect actual events is contingent upon the complex interaction of different structures and causal powers in the causing of events” (Fairclough, 2005: 922). Not only do the properties of structures but also social agents have the causal powers which affect the actual. Actual reality is, in principle, observable, however it is, in practice, unobservable. It implies that we can see that the problems and explanations are observable phenomena in principle, however, we cannot see the problems because there are intervening elements in the process. The description of the process would not incur intervening elements which we cannot see. Thus, there are two aspects to take into account: one is to conceptualise observable behaviours; and the other is to conceptualise unobservable behaviours.

The actual level includes three sets of questions: first, ontological discussion questions what is really happening, or what will result in these factors being realised. Certain principles or practices, if respected, will be associated with particular outcomes which are ethically desirable; second, a normative account will be following those principles or practices, because they are associated with particular (desired) outcomes. A normative or an ethical account is regarding what organisations ought to be; and lastly, descriptive factors discuss what counts as principles or practices which are operational indicators. The empirical research provides basic or confirmatory data and theorises explanatory frameworks to “identify real linkages between structures or mechanisms and social phenomena” (Henry, 2007: 199).

5.3.2 Structuration Theory

Along with Critical Realism, an important development has been presented by Pawson and Tilley (1997) in the application of the retroductive research strategy to the social sciences and their work draws on “Giddens’s (1979; 1984) discussions of the duality of agency and structure, [and] they have endeavoured to bring [together] both elements of the structuralist and constructivist versions of realism” (Blaikie, 2000: 112), as shown in Figure 5-1. They argue that the aim of social inquiry is to explain social regularities which are generated by
some underlying mechanism acting in social contexts. Thus, the explanation comprises propositions about “how the interplay between structure and agency has constituted the regularity” (Pawson and Tilley 1997: 71 cited in Blaikie, 2000: 112). Furthermore, Pawson and Tilley argue that “all social regularities are embedded in a wider range of social processes, within different layers of social reality.”

Figure 5-1 Structuration theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structuralism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology:</strong> inclines toward objectivism.</td>
<td><strong>Ontology:</strong> social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology:</strong> strongly emphasizes the pre-eminence of the social whole over its individual parts i.e., its constituent actors, human subjects; the language which social scientists use to communicate their theoretical ideas and research findings to each other; it is the language of both abstract theoretical notions as well as a means of identifying observable phenomena.</td>
<td><strong>Epistemology:</strong> instead of taking the view that order in organisations is a pre-existing characteristic, they argue that it is worked at. Instead of seeing culture as an external reality that acts on and constrains people, it can be taken to be an emergent reality in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction.</td>
</tr>
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**Structuration Theory**

| **Ontology:** it is recurrent social practices and their transformations; It is concerned with the nature of human action, the acting self, social institutions and the interrelations between action and institutions - with the relationship between agency and structure | **Epistemology:** structuration theory does not conform to a predetermined set of epistemological principles, it nevertheless provides the grounds for gaining knowledge of the social world. |


There are however, some criticisms of Structuration Theory. According to Figure 5-1, Structuration Theory does not conform to a predetermined set of epistemological principles and, thus, does not assume what forms of knowledge are acceptable (Blaikie 1993: 99). Besides, there is another issue of a limitation of usefulness of Structuration Theory in social research. Against Giddens’s insistence that Structuration Theory represents a social research rather than an ontological framework, Gregson (1989) criticises the relevance of it.
to empirical research on two grounds: first, if it is impossible to explain and clarify social life, it fails to accomplish the main objective of social science; and second, it must be able to relate to what happens ‘out there’ in order to offer a process of social transformation (Blaikie, 1993: 120). The key questions of empirical research are “which actors, which skills and which temporal and spatial structures we choose to investigate; and how we investigate them, where and when” (Gregson 1989: 240-1 cited in Blaikie, 1993: 120). Gregson concludes, therefore, that Structuration Theory should be regarded as “second-order theory (or meta-theory)” as it is concerned with “conceptualising the general constituents of human society” (Blaikie, 1993: 120).
Figure 5-2 Structuration Theory

Source: adapted from Blaikie (2000: 132)
5.3.3 Similarities and Differences between CR and Structuration Theory

There are a number of similarities and differences between the assumptions of critical realism and Structuration Theory. With respect to the similarities, first, critical realism and Structuration Theory both permit realist ontological and interpretivist epistemological positions. Second, in methodological terms, these two approaches invite us to use quantitative and qualitative approaches to data collection and analysis, as shown in Table 5-1 above. From his various writings Giddens (1976a; 1991) emphasises the importance of empirical work and accepts quantitative and qualitative methods where appropriate. Critical realism also adopts both methods.

In addition, they both suggest that structures are produced by human actions or agency and are reproduced and/or transformed by such action. As Marsh et al. (1999: 15) suggest, agents are “bearers of structural positions”, but are also interpreters of those structures, while structures are changeable because of “the strategic decisions of the agents operating within the structure” (Green, 2003: 49). This is a dialectical relationship in which structure and agency logically involve each other. “Policy outcomes, for example, cannot be explained only with reference to structures – elsewhere characterised as the conditions of action within which actors operate” (Green, 2003: 49; see also Betts 1986: 39; Sibeon 1999). For Structuration Theorists following Giddens (1976a: 1984; 1991) structure and agency cannot be separated substantively as they are ‘imminent’, which means that they both occur at the same time and cannot exist, one without the other. However, though structure and agency are imminent and thus cannot be practically separated, they can be analytically separate categories.

The differences between these two approaches are evident in four elements. First, concerned with structure and agency, critical realism focuses on the relational and transformational view of society and the individual, and neither can be neglected (Bhaskar, 1979), while Structuration Theory focuses more on social practices “ordered across space and time” and their transformations, rather than the individual actor or societal totality (Giddens, 1984). The duality of structure suggested by Giddens (1979; 1984) is that “the social structure is as the conditions and the consequences of social interaction” (Blaikie, 1993: 99). Critical realism explores how individuals are influenced by the social context. There are two assumptions: one is that individuals have free will to some extent; and the other is that individuals are constrained by structures to some extent. Accordingly, both assumptions seek to explain “how different individuals are enabled and constrained by the
social context in different ways” (Cruickshank, 2003: 2).

Next, critical realism is ‘critical’ in the sense of accepting that the critical role of social theory is emancipatory, which is defined as generating knowledge which will provide actors with an ability to enhance the social world. As Groff (2004: 19) suggests, following Bhaskar’s (1976) argument, that “knowledge claims are social-historical artifacts; they are produced, … and they change over time” and that “knowledge production is best thought of…as a process whereby existing ideas are transformed into new ones”. In relation to this claim, critical realists view social structures as “emergent properties”, which leads to an argument that “structures were created by the actions of individuals in the past, and now have causal properties in their own right” (Cruickshank, 2003: 3). Thus, critical realism argues structures are pre-existing while Structuration Theory does not (structures can only exist in social action).

Thirdly, unlike Structuration Theory, critical realism argues that the real world is explained causally. Following the hypothesis of naturalism, which assumes the existence of generative structures, “knowable to men, and producing manifest phenomena”, the question “can reasons be causes?” is raised: the category of reasons is explanations of human conducts; and the category of causes is generative structure (Bhaskar, 1979: 102). Critical realists argue that we cannot see facts through variables, but variables are always “conceptual interpretations” (Cruickshank, 2003: 2). “Correlations between variables are taken as descriptions rather than explanations in themselves, because for critical realists correlations between variables are contingent effects of underlying causal processes” (Cruickshank, 2003: 2). Moreover, Groff (2004: 11) also sees a shift of the ontological focus from entities to processes, power and causality itself are key features of critical realism.

The last important element is that critical realism is critical in political and methodological issues. It is critical in a political sense as the task of research is to “enable the move from facts to values” (Cruickshank, 2003: 3). It explores the inequality, or exploitation created through existing political, social and economic relations and develops a normative critique about those relations. With respect to methodology, critical realism is also critical because of the concepts which “inform the meta-theory that defines structure and agency can only be developed via a critical dialogue with alternative social ontologies” (Cruickshank, 2003: 3). Social ontology linking structure and agency is especially important in that many researchers have turned to a mixture of methods and theory, or “methodological pluralism” (Cruickshank,
2003: 4). However the differences are not so great when one considers that as Giddens (1984: 287) argues, “Structuration Theory is intrinsically incomplete if not linked to a conception of social science as critical theory” (cited in Blaikie, 1993: 121-2).

### 5.3.4 Difficulties of Critical Realism

In relation to methodological pluralism, “the nature of the critical realist account accommodates methodological pluralism” (Henry, 2007: 199). Henry (2007: 200-1) raises two main difficulties with critical realism: first, causal necessity in the social world is problematic in the discussion of deep structure; and secondly, some phenomena can be described differently in different ‘language games,’ thus the notion of ‘facts’ based on language is also challengeable. With respect to the first point, society, over an extended period of time, has produced “a social practice with its own structures” (Henry 2007: 200). Learning these structures or learning how social agency behaves or thinks does not imply that structures cause social constituents to behave or think as they do. In terms of the second point, the nature and role of language in reaching consensus as demonstrating difference is problematic. These points are addressed in order.

Regarding the first problem mentioned above that ‘causal necessity in the social world is problematic in the discussion of deep structure’, Structuration Theory is borrowed to discuss deep structure. As in the framework of Structuration Theory shown in Figure 5-2 above, structure is clarified in details as semantics, moral, material and non-material. Semantics and moral display culture and material and non-material present power.

The second problem is that critical realism does not deal with the issue of the fact of language: it describes one true explanation and fails to recognise any other explanations. However, simply identifying events without discussing language is problematic. Language is not theory-neutral and thus, general truth becomes generally accepted rather than universal truth (Henry, 2007). The nature of events is produced by language: despite describing the ‘same’ events, it may interpret them differently. Language is not just showing or reflecting the reality but producing/reproducing reality which shows the real structure.

### 5.4 Critical Discourse Analysis

In the methodological aspects of Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) suggested by Jäger and Maier (2009: 34) “knowledge refers to all kinds of contents that make up a human consciousness, or in other words, all kinds of meanings that people use to
interpret and shape their environment”. Thus, knowledge is dependent on the discursive surroundings in which people are born, and in which people live. Accordingly, the top priority of discourse analysis is to identify the knowledge embraced in discourses. Discourse here is defined as “an institutionalised way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Link, 1983: 60 cited in Jäger & Maier, 2009: 35). Discourses express the social practice and the exercise of power, and furthermore, they can exercise power in a society through the ability to regulate people’s way of thinking, acting and so on.

As Jäger and Maier (2009: 36) suggest, CDA aims at discovering “what is said and can be said in a given society at a given time with regard to its qualitative spectrum”. It especially, reveals how discourses are used to make particular statements seem rational and reasonable although they are limited in certain circumstances. When CDA identifies the way of connection between discourse and reality, the connections between power and discourse are also likely to be clarified. As discourses are able to shape and to determine social reality “via intervening active subjects as co-producers and co-agents of discourses” (Jäger & Maier, 2009: 37), discourse analysis focuses on not only “the retrospective analysis of allocations of meaning, but also the ongoing production of reality through discourses, conveyed by active subjects” (Jäger & Maier, 2009: 37).

Jäger and Maier (2009: 37) also underline two types of connection between discourses and power: ‘the power of discourse’ and ‘the power over discourse’. The former is about two effects of discourse. Individual and collective consciousness which determine his/her and their actions are constructed by discourses that transfer knowledge, and in turn, discourses instruct the creation of reality of the individual and/or collective, discursive and non-discursive as well. The latter is concerned about different chances of influences between individuals and/or groups. Undoubtedly, some individuals and groups exercise more power over discourse using their privilege, authority, and resources. Holzscheiter (2005: 57) puts it that power over discourse “refers to means through which various groups of actors are denied or granted ‘access to the stage’ through processes of inclusion and exclusion” (Kwon, Clarke & Wodak, 2009: 278)

Fairclough (2005: 925) states that texts are contextualised because of their relations to other elements of social events, and to social practices. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 21) define practices as “habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world”. They are constituted in
the domains of the economy and politics, and of culture and “the advantage of focusing upon practices is that they constitute a point of connection between abstract structures and their mechanisms, and concrete events - between ‘society’ and people living their lives” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 21). “Connections between the use of language and the exercise of power are often not clear to people, yet appear on closer examination to be vitally important to the working of power” (Fairclough, 1996: 54 cited in Thompson, 2004: 5). Accordingly, texts show articulation and tension between two causal forces: social structures mediated through social practices; and the agency of the social actors who interpret them.

Following Fairclough (1993; see also Titscher et al., 2000) attributing three dimensions such as text, discursive practice and social practice, CDA aims for linking “texts at a micro-level (the ‘textual level’) with macro-level power structures (‘sociocultural practice’)... and ‘discursive practice’ is thus the mediator between the macro- and micro-levels” (Thompson, 2004: 5).

Figure 5-3 Dimensions of discourse and discourse analysis

As shown in Figure 5-3 above, the textual level discusses content and form of the text. The discursive practice level which links between text and social practice analyses “the socio-cognitive aspects of text production and interpretation” (Titscher et al., 2000: 150). Thus, it
includes both an explanation of the ways of interpretation, and the relationship of events and orders of discourse. The third dimension of social practice analyses in relation to “the situation, the institutional context, the wider group or social context” (Titscher et al., 2000: 151).

Having identified the broad theoretical context of CDA drawing on Fairclough (2005) and Titscher et al. (2000), how does this directly inform the approach to analysing corporate governance in the KOC/KSC context? Figure 5-4 illustrates the three phases to identify governance issues in the KOC/KSC contexts in relation to the four main events or processes, which have taken place in the KOC: the KOC/KSC merger; budget planning; the recruitment of new staff (gender and disability equity); and the selection of Chef de Mission and a president of the KOC. They are analysed in three phases to identify governance issues in the KOC/KSC contexts. In relation to these events one can ask which regularities occur. Can these be encapsulated as social practices? What are the implications of these social practices? Are these social practices substantially apparent from those in other organisations or domains?

The discursive events review (interview and documentary analysis) seek to identify ‘regularities’, e.g. evidence of how governance activities are undertaken. These regularities represent social practices. According to Figure 5-4, Phase 1 deals with a thematic analysis which mainly discusses social practices in relation to four events or processes to discovering patterns of explanation or description. This illustrates what is actually happening in the Korean context. In particular, focus is examination of each interviewee’s discourse to identify the knowledge embraced in his/her discourse, and to interpret the nature of particular social practices and the exercise of power. Power relations between stakeholders in KOC and each interviewee’s beliefs representing the culture are revealed. The second phase focuses on ‘hypothesising’ real structures and mechanisms. In analysing the structures, which underlie or are embedded in organisations, this study is drawn to consider the (organisational) cultural elements of structures and the power structures bound up in the organisation’s structures ‘per se’. Phase 3 identifies how corporate governance is undertaken differently (or in the same way) in Korea, for which an explanation is provided to post the existence of deep structures which provide the culture and power resources required to sustain a different (or similar) approach to the aspect of governance.
5.5 Methods

This research entails two main research methods which are document analysis and qualitative method, in specific, semi-structured interviews. Although the retroductive research strategy can use both qualitative and quantitative methods, this study also takes critical discourse analysis as a part of the abductive research strategy. Thus, a qualitative method is appropriate for this study. Through document analysis and interviews, the meaning of seven principles of corporate governance should be defined, and another aim is to find any possibility that the interviewees from the KOC may come to different interpretations regarding corporate governance.
Interviews and document analysis are useful tools used to discover clues regarding social practices in the political, economic and social contexts in which the KOC/KSC is situated in (cultural) Korea. The analysis is based on various documents published by the IOC, the KOC, the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism and some related governmental organisations, along with the interviews with selected members of the KOC and the KSC staff. The study of corporate governance of NOCs takes the KOC as its core case study, and therefore, the interviewees are all selected from the KOC and the KSC in various categories including position, age, gender and length of service. The document and interview analysis are divided into four sections, which are shown in Table 5-3 below.

Table 5-3 The four divisions of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOC / a western context</th>
<th>Governmental organisations (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism &amp; other relevant organisations)</th>
<th>NOC (KOC/KSC)</th>
<th>Interviews (KOC/KSC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| To identify understandings, definitions and applications in relation to seven core principles of corporate governance from the management literature (systematic review), IOC official documents and the KOC/KSC | - Possibility of different implications or terms  
- This implies addressing the question of whether or not western notions on corporate governance are applied in this non-western context. | Documentary analysis of four events & corporate governance-related:  
- KOC/KSC merger  
- Budget planning  
- Employment in terms of gender and disability  
- Selections of KOC President & Chef de Mission | CDA of four events:  
- Identify whether or not individual discourse is occupied by structural positions/ age/ gender/ service length of interviewees.  
- Discover any differences between documentary and interviews (CDA) analysis |

The first division is to identify ideal types of each of the core principles of corporate governance in the IOC in a western context and provide two main papers: first, the operationalisation of each principles and/or related elements providing a way of evaluating corporate governance; and second, the commentary addressing the theoretical background of definitions of key principles of corporate governance and also accommodating framework of a western notion of seven principles of corporate governance.
The analysis of the KOC/KSC takes as its starting point the dominant normative elements of governance in the Olympic Movement in a western framework and sporting literature. It seeks to uncover how the discourse of actors within the system identifies ways in which the norms of governance are interpreted and acted upon. Thus it takes as its starting point (for example, conducting interviews, selecting events and processes to consider) key normative principles identified in the governance literature.

5.5.1 Documentary Analysis

As Bryman (2001: 387) states “the question of credibility raises the issue of whether the documentary source is biased”. This study aims to identify any evidence of a biased perspective by using CDA in terms of governance practices within Korean context. According to the Oxford Dictionary, bias is defined as “inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair.” Bias is limitations of individuals’ perspective and in particular, claims of bias are a departure from commonly held views, norms, or consensus. Also, such limitations are maybe explained by looking at events concerning different interests of actors. Thus, CDA aims at identifying interests and different perspectives of particular agents, and is also designed to intend to identify particular form of discourse and ways in which these forms of discourse promote certain interests implicitly.

Furthermore, documents may be “interesting in bringing out the role and significance of subcultures within the organisation” (Bryman, 2001: 388; see also Forster 1994) though official documents are likely to promote the dominant culture of the organisation. The main purpose is to discover the social practices, which go together to make up or support governance activities. Thus, key comparison is between documents from governmental organisations, the KOC/KSC and the IOC, as shown Table 5-4. This Table also includes additional sporting organisations that are related to analysis of corporate governance of the KOC as stakeholders but they are infrequently included in the key comparison: The Korea Sports Association for the Disabled/Korean Paralympic Committee (KOSAD/KPC); The Korea Sports Promotion Foundation (KSPO); Korea Council for Sport for All (KOCOSA); National Federations (NFs); and local Branches.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of publishing</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOSF</td>
<td>Goven orgs. : Gyeong Young Gong Shi</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td><a href="http://www.mosf.go.kr">www.mosf.go.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOPAS</td>
<td>Improvement of working level public officers' human resources’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.mopas.go.kr">www.mopas.go.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISS</td>
<td>Under MCST : The way of strengthening of the KOC' roles for national sport promotion</td>
<td></td>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSC / KOC</td>
<td>Under MCST : KOC in fifty years</td>
<td>A historical background of the KOC &amp; the KSC</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report of business outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>List of budget planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report of budget outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KOC Statutes</td>
<td>Corporate governance practices of the KOC</td>
<td>Before /after June 2009</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sports.or.kr">www.sports.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code of Conduct for Employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Int' org : Olympic Charter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VIII Olympic Congress Copenhagen 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including ‘Contributions’ &amp; ‘The Olympic Movement in Society’</td>
<td>The IOC recommendations on governance practices</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.olympic.org">www.olympic.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Basic Universal Principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘The IOC Code of Ethics’ adopted by the IOC Executive Board</td>
<td></td>
<td>26 October 2010 in Acapulco.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOSAD/KPC</td>
<td>Under MCST : Additional sport orgs: an overview organisational chart</td>
<td>Relations with the KOC as stakeholders</td>
<td>After the KOC/KSC merger in 2009</td>
<td><a href="http://www.kosad.or.kr">www.kosad.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSPO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.kspo.or.kr">www.kspo.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOCOSA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.portsal.or.kr">www.portsal.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.sports.or.kr">www.sports.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Branches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.sports.or.kr">www.sports.or.kr</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the governmental documents, the ‘Sports White Paper’ released by the Ministry of Culture Sports & Tourism (MCST)’s is a major source for understanding sport policy from the Korean government perspective. Additionally, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) operates the Alien System (All Public Information In One) which provides a document titled ‘경영공시’ or ‘Gyeong Young Gong Shi’ which is a programme releasing a wide range of relevant documents concerning all governmental organisations. Since the KOC is regarded as a governmental organisation, it is also possible to obtain information with regard to the KOC. Moreover, some sport related organisations such as the Korea Institute of Sports Science (KISS) also released documents regarding the sport policy of the KOC/KSC and these are used as additional information but also reflect the relationship between government and the KOC. As another governmental organisation, some supportive information is found in the document title ‘the improvement of working level public officers’ human resources’ released by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS)

As both the KOC and the KSC had been regarded as the head body of Korean sport until 2009 when these two sporting organisations merged, their documents or books are analysed to identify power relations and organisational cultures in relation with practices of corporate governance. Apart from the major documents listed in Table 5-4 the KOC has openly released a wide range of documents on its Internet site including its organisational chart, the list of KOC/KSC President and the like.

However, some documents that contain sensitive issues such as gender or disability equity, and the principles or manual of recruitment of new staff were not found in either the official documents or the Internet. In fact, an official recommended percentage of employment of people with disabilities could not be found in any documents from the KOC/KSC. One interviewee suggested that it would be possible to find the information on this matter on the website organised by the Korea Employment Agency for the Disabled (KEAD), www.kead.or.kr. This was, thus, an additional analysed document.

5.5.2 Qualitative methods (semi-structured interview)

This study aims to collect and evaluate data concerned with agents’ subjective thoughts, beliefs and norms within the Korean cultural and social context. This data is discussed to identify evidence of different discourses and comparison is also made with the perspectives provided by the analysis of documents. In order to facilitate this, the key qualitative method is the semi-structured interview based on an interview guide, with open-ended questions.
Such interviews lead to interviewees talking freely and facilitate the explanations of agent-informed interpretations of events/processes, and furthermore, provide clues as to deeper social structures, which may enable and constrain corporate governance practices of the KOC. Young (1977) uses the term “assumptive worlds” of key actors to indicate their beliefs, activities that make up their world view (Green, 2003: 53). The interviews were designed to identify the nature of the assumptive worlds of actors in KOC contexts. Using semi-structured interviews, as Devine suggests, “draws particular attention to contextual issues, placing an interviewee’s attitudes and behaviour in the context of her/his individual biography and wider social setting” (1995: 138 cited in Green, 2003: 53-4). Figure 5-4 shows the flow of selection of interviewees and incurs the reasons of choosing different categories of interviewees.

Figure 5-4 The flow of selection of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection of interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design of interview approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions about (purpose of interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance elements practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the key social practices involved in the governance process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) what do the above reveal about underlying social structures?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) These may be organisational cultures/structures/general aspects (e.g. gender, age structure etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) How are these structures related to power relations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Top down and bottom up approaches

There are two aspects of the interview data and data analysis, which are critical as shown Figure 5-4: One relates to a top down or deductive approach; and the other relates to a bottom up or inductive approach. The former analyses responses to directed questioning, the latter is a more open ended, an interviewee-driven form of questioning. The interviews contain two main elements. One relates to interviewer-determined concepts (features of governance). Key concepts of governance are operationalised and interviewees are asked about these. To give a simple example, a key operational feature of accountability is the reporting process. Interviewees may be asked –‘to whom is the KOC/KSC accountable?’ Here is accountability achieved (eg. through formal and informal reporting) etc.

The other relates to the bottom-up approach. Interviewee-led discussion is achieved by asking how certain policy actions came about. Thus the interviewer asks ‘how was the president elected?’ with the answer reflecting perhaps on level of democracy, or on some other unpredicted aspect of organisational behaviour. Thus, this twofold approach identifies aspects of the interviewees’ understanding of corporate governance ‘per se’ but also indicates whether interviewees share similar or different perspectives on western norms including the IOC’s norms as recommendations for governance.

Selection criteria for Interviews

The interviews were conducted in the period immediately after the KOC/KSC merger which took place on 29 June, 2009. Fifteen former or current employees in both the KOC and the KSC were selected for interviews: seven respondents from the KSC; and eight respondents from the KOC. According to Figure 5-4, there are two aspects of questions: the first regarding elements of governance practice; and the second relating to four key events related to practices relevant to governance. This allows ‘uncovering’ of aspects of social structures, organisational cultures and power relations. Thus the selection criteria for interviewees allows for diverting in terms of position, gender, age and length of service (see Table 5-5 below). Interviewing ‘actors’ at various levels within the organisational structure is key to identifying similar or different perspectives on power relations and organisational culture between the KOC and the KSC, male and female, and senior and junior staff members at both meso and micro levels.

The high-ranking officials were approached (four from the KOC and three from the KSC) through contacting some other higher positions outside the KOC and the KSC. As it was not
possible to approach them directly, the author’s personal network was utilised. Each high-ranking officer was approached by different connectors (sources). There was only one case that one senior officer introduced another senior officer to help obtaining the better knowledge on the four events. Otherwise, none of senior-officers who conducted interviews introduced some other senior officers for the interview.

The three middle-ranking officers, one from the KOC and two from the KSC, were chosen by direct contact. In the case of junior officers, two middle-ranking officers introduced some of them. However, this does not mean that one interviewee introduced all of them. Only one middle-ranking interviewee introduced the two junior staff, otherwise another middle-ranking officer introduced one and the other introduced none. The rest of the junior interviewees were directly contacted. Thus, the ‘snowball effect’ was unlikely to be applied to this study which aimed at avoiding obtaining the similar opinions from the similar group.

Each interviewee was contacted through either email or phone to negotiate the date and the place for interview. Some interviewees preferred conducting interviews in their offices, in particular, most high-ranking officers had their own premises. The middle-ranking and junior officers preferred conducting interviews outside the building of the KOC and the KSC without their work colleagues present.

Table 5-5 Selection criteria for interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>KOC / KSC</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Length of employment / service</th>
<th>Male / Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The former Secretary General</td>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>Less than 5 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The former Director General of International Affairs</td>
<td>KOC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Director of Clean Sport</td>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The former Director General of International Affairs</td>
<td>KOC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Director General of International Affairs</td>
<td>KOC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The KSC Board member before &amp; after its merger.</td>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The former Board member</td>
<td>KOC</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Planning &amp; Budget Team</td>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Director of Union</td>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Staff of Public Relations</td>
<td>KSC</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The protocol adopted for the conduct of the interview

With respect to anonymity, names and positions were not disclosed and most interviewees were not informed who else were involved in the interviews. According to the policy of the KOC and the KSC, personnel positions were changed every certain year and, thus, some interviewees did not mind exposing their job titles. In fact, more than half of interviewees turned out to be involved in different sections or positions in 2012 in compared to the year 2009 when the interviewee was conducted. Also, this study avoids attributing statements to any individuals. The actual quotations of interviews were all categorised into three: senior, middle-ranking and junior staff. However, the former Secretary General, the KSC Board member and the former KOC Board member were indicated as their positions possibly delivered the fact that they were directly involved in decision-making of the KOC or the KSC.

The questions for the interview were not exposed until the actual conduct of the interview. However, they were informed what topic it would be about and approximated time it would take when negotiating the interview. All interviews were recorded to MP3 under the interviewees’ agreement in order not to miss any single point from the interviewees. Each interview took at least 40 minutes and at most one and a half hour. No field notes were kept. Transcripts were produced, covering all questions and responds as soon as possible after the interviews.

The transcript followed the thematic analysis. As this study aims to obtain two ways of knowledge on the KOC’s governance practices, one is interviewer-determined concepts regarding governance practices which were conceptualised by the IOC and the other is interviewee-led discussion regarding the four events taken place in the KOC. As each interviewee was approached by the same questions, the former was used to all but the latter showed some limitations to some middle-ranking and junior staff. For instance, the process
of selection of the KOC President and the Chef de Mission was likely to be more familiar to senior staff who may be involved in the real process or decision-making. Nevertheless the views of junior staff are likely to be relevant not necessarily in providing more accurate accounts, but in indicating their perspectives on, and beliefs concerning, this critically important feature of governance. Of course those directly involved, or with access to information about the selection process (six interviewees in senior positions were selected) will differ in their perspective from junior staff who claim little or no knowledge of the perspective of selection of leaders. However, this ‘discourse of ignorance’ of the junior staff revealed something about governance principles in the organisation in so far as it indicates a lack of transparency about leadership selection. Similarly in relation to gender equity, it will be important to judge whether the perspectives of men and women or of different age groups differ.

5.6 Validity and Reliability

Qualitative research employing semi-structured interviews may often raise questions of validity and reliability. Discourse analysis approaches are not exempt from such criticisms. Validity is referred to as “the problem of whether the data collected is a true picture of what is being studied” (McNeill 1990: 15). Two aspects of validity are mainly discussed: internal and external validity. Internal validity in the case of discourse analysis incorporates those questions: (a) are my methods valid? and (b) are my interpretations valid? Establishing the internal validity and demonstrating credibility of the findings of discourse analysis are regarded as largely a matter of coherence, or ‘warrantability’, which is that “an analysis is warrantable to the extent that it is both trustworthy and sound” (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 167). This study identifies certain discourses on behaviours of governance practices and formal/informal practices related to governance, which lead to revealing the nature of social practices involving social structure and power relations.

In terms of external validity the case study approach adapted is one which is driven by theoretical generalisation (rather than generalisation from a sample to a population). The theoretical generalisation being tested is the claim that (a) governance principles are generally derived from western perspectives; but that (b) governance principles are culturally relative. In effect, the case study of the KOC/KSC is one of ‘pattern matching’. In other words the research question relates to whether or not the governance principles in the discourse in the KOC/KSC match the pattern of governance principles prescribed in western accounts, indicating the universal principles of governance for international sporting bodies prescribed
by the IOC (see Figure 5-5 below)

Perspectives on what actually happens are important but we wish to make reference to real structures and real practices. Concerning the four events or processes which have taken place in the KOC, there is a possibility that each interviewee delivers in his/her perspective and that he/she can fabricate his/her opinion in order not to reveal a sensitive issue in public. The CDA enables us to identify different perspectives in governance practices and the example we cited above of the ‘discourse of ignorance’ allows us to draw warrantable conclusions about a principle of governance i.e. transparency. So we are interested in both interviewees’ perspectives and in real structures or processes.

Figure 5-5 Case study method of the study

Define & Design

Prepare, Collect & Analyse

Analyze & Conclude

Select cases: A single case of KOC/KSC in a non-western context

Conduct Case study: KOC/KSC:
1. Bottom-up approach: Four events and/or processes by means of CDA
2. Top-down approach: governance principles prescribed by the IOC

Write individual case report:
Analysing various perspectives in particular governance practices, which allow us to uncover social structures and power relations.

Conclusions: Governance practices are interpreted differently in different contexts.

Modify theory: Western-constructed governance practices are culturally relative.

Develop policy implications:

Develop theory:
Governance practices are western constructed and culturally relative

Data collection protocol:
1. Interview (position, age, gender and the length of service)
2. Document analysis

Source: adapted from Yin (1994: 49)
Bryman (2008: 149) suggests that “reliability is fundamentally concerned with issues of consistency of measures” and thus, Yin (1994: 36) claims that “the goal of reliability is to minimise the errors and biases” to obtain the same results by doing the same case over again by other investigators. As Figure 5-5 shows, the KOC/KSC has been chosen as a single case as this sporting organisation fully meets the conditions for “the critical test” “a well-formulated theory”, which is that governance practices are western-constructed and culturally relative (Yin, 1994: 38). The KOC/KSC represents a sporting organisation which is in a non-western context in which its cultural background is expected to differ from the sporting organisations in the west and thus, this allows us to make generalisations about ways in which governance practices exercise.

Concerning reliability in discourse analysis, Wood and Kroger (2000: 164) note that concepts or meanings can be differently interpreted within a particular context in the social world in which “meaning is inseparable from context”. They add that “the repetition of concepts or meanings” is thus “something that is negotiated within a particular context”. Therefore, reliability in discourse analysis “always involve some sort of inference or theoretical interpretation,… in terms of which aspects or features of an event are important” (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 165) and “interpretations themselves are always contextualised and provisional” (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 165). The concepts or meanings of key principles of governance developed and used by the IOC, which are constructed in a western society can be different in a particular social world, for example, the KOC in a non-western social milieu. Therefore, the meaning of principles of governance in the context of KOC is always likely to be in some respects similar (it is part of the wider milieu of sport) and in some respect different i.e. in ways specific to the Korean context. In addition, the concepts of governance can be newly interpreted over time as the Korean context is always changing.

5.7 Conclusion

This study aims to identify governance practices within Korean contexts by means of Critical Discourse Analysis from a critical realist perspective, which follows realist ontological and interpretivist epistemological assumptions. With two difficulties of critical realism, which are that causal necessity in the social world is problematic in the discussion of deep structure and that some phenomena can be described differently in different language paradigms, Structuration Theory is borrowed to discuss deep structure and the CDA is applied to solve those two difficulties respectively.
Looking back to issues of social practice in this chapter, we take about terms of social practices which are attributes to governance practices in the following chapter. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 21) define practices as “habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world”. They are constituted in the domains of the economy and politics, and of culture and “the advantage of focusing upon practices is that they constitute a point of connection between abstract structures and their mechanisms, and concrete events - between ‘society’ and people living their lives” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 21). What we have been identifying here is interviewees’ discursive construction of organisational or governance practices, that is social practices occurring in or constituting the organisation and the way that it is run. This of course is related to the core research question, namely, are these social practices different in the Korean context and if so how.

This study aims to identifying any evidence of a biased perspective by using DCA in terms of governance practices within the Korean context. Accordingly, documentary analysis and qualitative method, in a semi-structured interview, are the two main research methods in this study. The top-down and the bottom-up approaches are both applied for this study: the former relates to interviewer-determined concepts of governance and the latter relates to interviewee-led discussion on the four events of the KOC/KSC.

With normative governance practices recommended by the IOC (see Chapter 4), which are constructed in a western context, this study seeks to identify if the KOC/KSC shows similar or different approaches to, or understandings of governance practices and, thus, allows us to examine the extent to which, and how governance practices are culturally relative. Understanding events or processes that took place in the KOC/KSC lead to uncover social practices reflecting the deep social structure of Korea which forms part of the context for the development of governance practices. Therefore, in the following chapter, the ‘stratified ontology’ of critical realism including domains of empirical, actual and real is to be identified through analysing the KOC/KSC’s main events.
6 Four events/processes analysed in association with CDA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in relation to four selected events that have taken place in the recent history of the Korea Sports Council and/or the Korean Olympic Committee in order to understand how the KOC/KSC governs. The four events chosen are as follows: the KOC/KSC merger, budget planning, the recruitment of staff in terms of gender and disability equity, and the process used for selecting the KOC President and the Chef de Mission. By analysing these four main events, first, it permits different or similar interpretations of the same terminologies or phenomena by different agents to be identified; second, the configuration of social practices on specific social occasions may be examined and explained; and third, the deep structure of the organisations can be induced, illustrating the underlying power relations and culture, as Figure 5-4 shows in the Methodology chapter.

This section also draws upon a range of theories from state and power to governance types, which are discussed in Chapter two. State theory is used to provide an overall picture of the Korean governing system, which is closely connected to the practices of corporate governance implemented by the KOC. Power theory is also applied to explain the power relations between the stakeholders of the KSC/KOC, which are evident in the social practices adopted in sports governance in the Korean context. In this process, stakeholder theory serves to identify the primary stakeholders who are involved in decision-making on major issues of sports policy in the Korean context.

As of 29 June 2009, the KOC and the KSC were merged into one organisation, whose title became the KOC. Although the interviews were conducted after the merger had taken place, the interviewees are categorised into those pertaining to the KSC and the KOC so as to explore the aspect of the power relations between both sports organisations. In order to find and arrange emerging themes through interviews and published documents, NVivo software was used to construct a set of tree node(s) that could be specifically arranged into subordinates. Thus, this study focuses on emerging themes to discover as many related social practices as possible.
6.2 The KOC/KSC Merger

6.2.1 Introduction

The merger of the two organisations is seen as an event. Prior to the analysis, the discussion focuses on how the term ‘government’ was defined by the interviewees. Most respondents’ proposal to the question ‘which stakeholder is the most influential in decision making in Korean sports policy?’ was ‘the government’. Interestingly, here under the term ‘government’, the KOC and KSC respondents indicated that they identified not only governmental bodies such as the MCST or the Blue House, which is equivalent to the White House in the USA, but also a wide range of policy making individuals from the State President to the elected politicians and/or professional administrators (civil servants) involved in decision making. These included the Minister, the 1st Vice-Minister, or the Director of the MCST. In addition, a political group such as the ruling party was also classified as belonging to the government, according to a former KOC board member and a middle-ranking staff member of the KSC:

I think that is the government (what do you mean by the government?) The government can be the Blue House, it can be a ruling party which produces and directs a policy, or the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism

(a former KOC Board member)

I can see that is the government. (What does ‘government’ mean?) It doesn’t necessarily include the President but it does include the Minister, the 1st vice-minister, and the Director of the Sport Bureau of the MCST

(a middle-ranking staff member of the KSC)

More specifically, most respondents understood by ‘the government’ either the MCST or the State President. It was likely that the respondents regarded the government as any types of governmental bodies and government-related groups or individuals that were directly implicated in decision making on national sporting policy. It seems, moreover, that those groups who had been influential in national sport decision making at governmental level were also regarded as ‘the government’. In this study, however, the State President, the MCST, and the ruling party all tended to be regarded as a single individual stakeholder. The answers to the question should, however, be clearly distinguished and, thus, the respondents needed to specify which stakeholder they intended to mean. The government
and the state are not necessarily a single actor.

6.2.2 Map of themes

A total of six tree nodes are constituted in relation to the issue of the KOC/KSC merger, as shown in Figure 6-1: The first KOC/KSC merger; the KSC; the KOC; the structure of the KOC/KSC before its merger in 2009; the second KOC/KSC merger in 2009; and the Korea Council of Sport for All. The emerging themes are categorised as follows: the KSC’s dominance in Korean sporting history; the power of the State President; politicians’ misuse of power in the organisation of sport; politicians’ involvement in decision making, and economic power.

Figure 6-1 The KOC/KSC merger
6.2.3 Explanations of social practices

a) The KSC’s dominance in Korean sport history

The KOC/KSC merger provides an opportunity to learn about the historical background of both organisations, the KOC and the KSC, and, furthermore, to observe the power structure that had grown naturally between them. The viewpoints of a middle-ranking official of the KSC and of a high-ranking member of the KOC are taken into account first of all:

The KSC was created in 1920 with the name of Chosun Sport Council… but then, the KOC was founded around 30 years after that. Was it in 1946 or 1948? Sometime around that… So history and authority are practically more on the side of the KSC. So from the time of its establishment, the KSC was already… I mean, the reason for creating the KOC was simply to allow participation in the Olympics… there’s got to be the NOC in order to participate in the Olympics, right? So this additional organisation was created but the actual work of taking human resource decisions was all done by the other part of the organisation [the KSC]. Naturally, the rules were drawn up in such a way that a president designated by the KSC was also automatically the president of the KOC. This resulted in the formation of two organisations under one president.

(a middle-ranking KSC official)

There was conflict between the KOC and the KSC, … but unlike the US, we combined them under a KSC-led structure. The reason for this was that the KSC was created in 1920 and in 1946, after the liberation (in 1945), the KOC was established under the KSC. So the original organisation was thought to be the KSC, which made it natural to proceed on the assumption that things centered around the KSC, but when we hosted the Olympics in 1988, the roles of KOC were highlighted.

(a senior KOC officer)

On the basis of the officials’ discourse where they say “just for participation in the Olympics” and “the KOC was established under the KSC”, it is clear that they share the same perception of the reason for the KOC’s establishment and the organisational structure within the KOC/KSC context.

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which the KSC and the KOC collaborated with the KSC ‘on top’. Their same perception can be driven by the KOC’s official document, *KOC in fifty years* relating the historical background of the two organisations:

The Chosun (Korea) Sports Council was founded by more than 70 members on June 13, 1920 in Seoul. The Sports Council was not exactly a sports organization. Rather, it was a national education organization dedicated to developing the physical and "spiritual" powers of the entire nation. A considerable number of proponents were made up of nationalists and national opinion leaders, with few representatives from the sports world. The Chosun Sports Council selected as its leader, Tu-Hyon Chang, the President of the Dongyang Trading Company...

(KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 32)

The Chosun (Korea) Olympic Committee was created from the Chosun Sports Council. Because it was not possible to create a National Olympic Committee (NOC) while under Japanese rule, prior to 1945 all matters related to sports were handled by the Chosun Sports Council, and all athletes were members of the Council. After liberation, the Chosun Sports Council was reorganized and played a key role in establishing the Chosun Olympic Committee in preparation for the London Olympic Games in 1948.

(KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 39)

As the quotation makes clear, the KSC Executive Committee members consisted of a variety of socially well-known figures in various fields, therefore, the KSC’s legitimacy was not only limited to sport but it played a critical role in fostering the “spiritual” power of the entire nation”. The implication of the statement that the KSC played an important role in developing the spiritual power of the entire nation is that people not only in sporting but also in other circles regarded the KSC as the real centre of all sports organisations in Korea. Subsequently, this official publication helped to justify the greater empowerment of the KSC and the establishment of the legitimacy of the KSC's dominant position in Korean society. The discourse of the people involved in the KSC and KOC embraced their knowledge of the organisations' wider function in Korean society.

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5 Intended to introduce Korean sporting achievements in an international context, this book was entitled ‘KOC in Fifty Years’.
The viewpoints of the two interviewees recorded above about the significance of the role of the KOC are, however, different. The high-ranking member of KOC staff emphasised the function of the KOC in saying that ‘it has been highlighted’ since the Seoul Olympic Games were hosted, while the middle-ranking KSC staff member minimized it by saying ‘simply to allow participation’ in the Games. This demonstrates the different viewpoints held by staff members of the KSC and the KOC.

In addition, in comparing the organisational charts of the KSC and the KOC before and after June 2009, as shown in Figures 6-2 and 6-3, one notices that before their complete combination, the KSC and the KOC employed a system of having one shared President, two Secretaries General responsible for each organisation and two groups of Executive Committee members. Under the single president system, the elected president of the KSC automatically became responsible for the presidency of the KOC. At a working level, although all the employees of the KOC and KSC were working together, they belonged either to the staff of the KOC or the KSC depending on their tasks and the departments they belonged to. As of 29 June, 2009, the organisation was united into one entity called the KOC with a single President, Secretary General and group of Executive Committee members. Nevertheless, the same distribution of jobs remained among the employees at the working level. This shows that in spite of the slightly different titles given to departments, little change to the structure of the KOC had actually been made. It was only the structure of high officials and Executive Committee members that became unified.
Figure 6-2 Organisational Chart of KOC & KSC before its merger (as of May, 2009)

Figure 6-3 Organisational Chart of KOC after its merger (as of December, 2011)

Source: the KOC home page (this organisational chart is no longer available)

Source: The KOC home page
In association with the interviews above, as the function of the KOC was limited to managing the country's participation in the Olympic Games, it was expected that the KSC would have been responsible for any other tasks as a centre of sports organisation in the Korean sporting field. Thus, as demonstrated by the views expressed by the interviewees above, the KSC was considered to be the actual decision maker in terms of human resource management, with the President of KSC being automatically designated as the President of the KOC until the 2009 merger. With respect to human resource management, in particular, all members of KSC and KOC staff were internally employed in the same organisation, which meant that the same people were designated as belonging to the KSC or the KOC, depending on their tasks. In fact, the KOC staff members were those who belonged to the Department of International Affairs alone, whereas the remaining departments of General Management, Sport Development and Training Centre Operations were all regarded as constituents of the KSC, as shown in Figure 6-2 above. Thus, the KSC was even responsible for appointing members of the KOC. Consequently, the Department of International Affairs was merely a part of the KSC and, thus, the KSC president was concurrently the KOC president. The interviewees' perspectives are drawn from the organisational structure that tells us that the KOC was only a part of the KSC.

In addition, another interviewee’s point of view on Executive Committee-level interactions between the KSC and the KOC gives insights into their practice as regards decision-making.

Since decision-making was done separately by the KOC and the KSC, a large number of people had to gather each time and, although the president/chairperson was the same person, the board members were different. Hence, an already-decided issue had to be reviewed for a second time by the other body while seeking to reach an agreement. Of course it was mostly just a matter of formality. When something had been decided by the KSC, KOC agreed with it most of the time. Even when there were board meetings, for example the General Assembly of Representatives took place at 2:00, then the KOC Standing Committee would have their meeting at 4:00. If the KSC had their Executive Board meeting at 2:00, then the KOC Executive Board meeting would be held at 4:00. Matters [to be dealt with in the KOC Standing Committee or Board meeting] had already been approved in the KSC. They would even say ‘It's all been decided prior to our meeting, so what is there left to say?’ There were even minutes that recorded these talks. (Laughter) That's how different their status was.
This informant’s comment about KOC Executive Committee members saying resignedly that “it’s all been decided prior to our meeting, so what is there left to say?”, indicates that KOC members who were involved in decision making themselves acknowledged and accepted the superiority of the KSC. It also implies that the KOC was regarded as a sort of affiliate tasked with accomplishing only international affairs as the Korean NOC.

The officially published KOC history and the interviewees from the KOC/KSC quoted above declare unequivocally that power, legitimacy and authority had been granted to the KSC. The KSC was established during the Japanese occupation under “the spiritual power of the entire nation” (KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 32) and people regarded the KSC as the real centre of all sports organisations in Korea which, in turn, established the legitimacy of the KSC’s dominance at home. This is evidence of power over discourse whereby the KSC rather than the KOC had preeminent power and more privileged access to decision-making over sports policy.

In association with the KSC’s position of dominance in Korean society, the event of the KOC/KSC merger highlighted issues about the terms used to describe the process of integration. Through the interviews, two terms emerged, in particular: ‘merger’ and ‘absorption’

_Tong hap (Merger) or Heup su (Absorption)_

Following the general meaning of ‘통합’, ‘tong hap’, the KOC and the KSC became one organisation without the implication of any imbalance of power between them. Of the fifteen KOC and KSC respondents all used the term ‘tong hap, or merger’ and none used the term ‘heup su, or absorption’. No-one disputed the appropriateness of the word ‘tong hap’ unless they were asked. All staff in responding to this question regarding the merger used the term ‘merger’ without expressing any concern about its possibly problematic nature. Thus, by asking an additional question as to whether it was really merger or absorption, the focus could be placed on how respondents interpreted the term ‘tong hap’ and whether their perception was that the tendency for the power relation between the KSC and the KOC to be unbalanced had been resolved. This is another example of the way in which knowledge is dependent on the discursive surroundings in which people live.
Absorption

Two officers stressed that internally, fundamentally, the KSC had absorbed the KOC in terms of the power bias resulting from the previous organisational structure. Reference can be made to one KSC senior staff who argued about the use of the term ‘merger’ because of the persistent power bias:

(Is it merger or absorption?) Absorption. The reason is that the conditions are different. It’s not the integration of two independent bodies. [The KOC] is more similar to a dependent sporting organisation, whereas the KSC is [an independent body].

(a senior KSC staff member)

In essence, the KSC was an independent body while the KOC used to belong within the KSC as the NOC. This has obviously caused the power bias toward the KSC as the acknowledged headquarters of sporting organisations in Korea. Due to its organisational structure people naturally accepted the fact that the KSC had absorbed the KOC. This was also expressed by the other middle-ranking KSC officer:

(In terms of the way of joining two into one, there are different terms, for example, ‘merger’, ‘integration’, or ‘absorption’; which would you like to choose?) Absorption. Ok, you have to take a closer look at this. The KSC did absorb the KOC, in terms of organisational power!

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

Merger

Most interviewees described it as a ‘merger’ and two interviewees above both also ended up agreeing with the use of the term ‘merger’. This produces insights to explain how their knowledge about the two organisations’ unification was constructed by the discursive surroundings to which they belonged. The analysis listed three different interpretations of ‘merger’ in terms of the three perspectives taken by the KSC staff, the KOC staff and the government.

- ‘Merger’ from the KSC perspective

As mentioned above, although the two KSC staff interviewees admitted above that it had been a case of the absorption of the KOC, they ended up arguing that the KSC and the KOC
had in fact merged.

The basic purpose of the merger from now on will be NOC-oriented. So it's all centered on the NOC. (what do you mean by that?) The integration is. Germany gives another recent example of this. (the NOC in Germany plays a leading role but in our case, isn’t the KSC the main organisation?) But from now onwards it will be a KOC-focused system.

(a senior KSC staff member)

According to this account, the merger was ultimately oriented towards empowering the NOC rather than the KSC in the short term and, therefore, ‘merger’ should be more appropriate than ‘absorption’. It implies that the interpretation would differ depending on where the focus mainly lay. In terms of its organisational power, the KSC virtually absorbed the KOC, but in terms of the final aim of permitting the KOC to play a leading role in the future, the KSC and the KOC had become one by means of a sort of merger. The middle-ranking KSC officer who argued above that the KSC had absorbed the KOC in terms of its organisational power also supported the view that the President of the joint body was aiming to orientate the organisation towards strengthening the NOC.

You have to take a close look at these considerations. The KSC did absorb the KOC, in terms of its organisational power! But the potential leverage was set to rest with the KOC, at least that’s the policy of our president. So in some sense, you can look at it from the opposite side, or inversely, as the KOC being absorbed. The one action could differentiate the KOC from the KSC, namely the designation of new people onto the board, performed by the president. So it’s sort of ambiguous to say who absorbed whom.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

As far as the reality of the situation is concerned, the KSC has absorbed the KOC in terms of its organisational structure. However, following the KOC/KSC president’s decision to focus policy towards the KOC, the members of both organisations could describe it as a ‘merger’ and this shows how discourses are used to make this point appear rational and reasonable. As discourse can exercise power in a society, the usage of the term ‘merger’ has the capacity of ‘regulating’ people’s way of thinking. This will be further explained in connection with power.
Additionally, there is another respect in which ‘merger’ could be regarded as a more appropriate term than ‘absorption’ since the Executive Committee was completely re-constituted after the merger. None of the former KSC or KOC Executive Committee members except for one member were selected as new Executive Committee members to avoid creating the impression that the KSC was ultimately planning to acquire a more powerful status than the KOC in decision-making.

Looking at the Committee members before and after the merger, they became totally distinct from each other. The number of members used to be 130 people but now it was reduced to 20, so their influence is… well… a lot probably happens at random but it’s hard to say the KOC did this and the KSC did that.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

As argued by the interviewees hitherto, the merger between the KOC and the KSC gave the appearance of being a process of absorption since the KSC was placed in the more powerful position in terms of the organisational structure than the KOC, considered superficially. Internally, however, the KSC staff believed that the KOC would take the leading position in respect of organisational power since the President of the KOC was intent on pursuing an NOC-centred policy. Consequently, the term ‘tong hap’ has purposely been used in this context rather than any other term implying ‘absorption’.

- ‘Merger’ from the KOC perspective

While the KSC staff emphasised that the KSC had been the main organisation since the KOC was dependent on it, the KOC staff put more focus on the KOC’s independence by observing that the KOC had been an independent committee which accomplished its international affairs as the NOC.

The KSC was the headquarters for all sports, so it was fair enough to say that the KSC led in main-stream Korean sport. Nevertheless, the KOC was an independent committee inside the KSC and it could take its own line. Thus, in keeping with the status given to it by the IOC charter, the KOC was acting with more independent influence on matters pertaining to international relations.

(the former senior KOC official)
This implies that because the KSC and the KOC had been given equal treatment externally and internationally, the term ‘merger’ was more appropriate. Owing to the fact that the KOC had been representing the Republic of Korea as the NOC for a long time, the senior KOC staff member who had been working in International Affairs for many years believed that the KOC and the KSC had been regarded equally in terms of their organisational status.

- ‘Merger’ from a government perspective

Even the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism used the term ‘merger, or combination’ rather than ‘absorption’ in its official document, the Sports White Paper (2009) regarding the unification of KSC and KOC. The White Paper stated categorically that:

“…With respect to the KSC, in 2009, it became completely integrated with the KOC, which would be restructured on the basis of the NOC…”

(Sports White Paper, 2009: 475)

The word, ‘통합’, ‘tong hap’ in Korean was also adopted with an adverb meaning ‘completely, or totally’ and the clause ‘which would be restructured on the basis of the NOC’ added for clarification. This implies that the MCST was also prepared to admit that the headquarters of Korean sporting organisations was to be restructured on the basis of the NOC. It seems, therefore, that the word ‘merger’ or ‘integration’ was used purposely to denote the original purpose of the structural change.

As an example of the power of discourse, the use of the word ‘merger’ in the strategic policy devised by the incumbent KOC/KSC President in the process of restructuring the KOC/KSC serves as good evidence of its power. As the President pursued a KOC-centred policy, and agencies at all levels, for instance, the government, the KOC/KSC and other related sporting organisations in Korea, all expressed the view that ‘merger’ was the appropriate term, the organisational structure was still obviously KSC-centred, so that ‘absorption’ suited the situation more accurately. This is obous evidence of how discourses are used to make particular statements seem rational and reasonable and how they are able to shape and determine social reality. The ‘power of discourse’ influences individual and collective consciousness to such an extent that people’s actions are constructed by discourses that transfer knowledge, and in turn, discourses inform the creation of reality at the individual and/or collective levels.
b) The power of the State President

As Figure 6-1 illustrates, the KSC and the KOC were integrated for the first time in 1968. According to the high-ranking KOC officer,

Due to the conflict between the KOC and the KSC back in the 1960s, President Park Jung Hee\(^6\) ordered the three organisations to be combined together but, unlike the US, we combined them under a KSC-led structure.

(a senior KOC official)

He also explained that the conflict had arisen between the KOC and the KSC due to their different roles. The KSC used to be responsible for finding and fostering new athletes while the KOC used to have the right to supervise those athletes during international events. This gave rise to the conflict between the two organisations and President Park ordered in 1968 that the three major sporting organisations in Korea should be formed into one. Consequently, the KSC, the KOC and the Korea School Sports Council were combined on 1 March 1968 (History of KOC, n.d.). The word ‘order’ conveys the absolute power of the State President in the 1960s and it is evident, therefore, that the President played a critical role in decision-making about the merger of those organisations. This was highlighted in an interview with another senior member of the KSC staff, who stated that after the KOC/KSC merger he even believed that only the State President could unify the newly-integrated KOC and Korea Council of Sport for All (KOCOSA), which was a sign of the [absolute] power of the State President in decision-making in sporting circles. From this interviewee’s perspective, KOCOSA was also one of the sports organisations affected by the issue of the integration.

(What about KOCOSA after the merger of the KOC/KSC then?) That has a lot to do with the President’s will. The incumbent President is probably not going to be able to solve this but the next president will have his Presidential Preparatory Committee, won’t he? [The merged KOC and KOCOSA] had to be integrated, if this was accepted by the new President then they would be unified.

(a senior member of KSC staff)

\(^6\) The 5\(^{th}\)-9\(^{th}\) President, 1963-1979.
In view of his comment that the merger of the two sports organisations, that are the merged KOC and KOCOSA, was mainly dependent on the State President’s will, this interviewee obviously believed that the President was the most active and powerful agent in policy decision making and even that the President wielded exclusive authority in sporting circles. The period of President Park’s administration back in 1960s when he ordered that the three organisations should be formed into one was close to dictatorship, on the other hand, the KOC/KSC merger took place in 2009 when Korea was known as a democracy. Although the difference in the political system might affect the extent of the State President’s involvement, according to two senior staff members’ opinions no matter what the political system is, the State President has constantly been a critical stakeholder in decision-making in the sporting field in Korea. As the two senior staff interviewees are over 50 years old and have worked in sports organisation for more than 20 years, their perspective on the power of the State President might have been fixed by social practices. The first merger that took place in 1968 demonstrated the power over discourse of the State President who exerted his power in combining three sporting organisations, including the KSC, the KOC and the Korea School Sports Council.

From the state theory perspective, as stated by the senior KOC official, the first KOC/KSC merger was accomplished to follow what the State President had ordered. The President Park Jung Hee was one of the most powerful Presidents in Korean political history, since he ruled Korea for approximately 20 years. This intimates that Korean society used to have a Marxist tendency because, without any grievance from the masses, the ruling class alone, here the government, was involved in decision-making and the majority of people, in particular, those who were involved in the sporting field, accepted the State President’s decision-making without question. This relationship between the state and the people in the sporting field reflects Marxism.

Moreover, in terms of systemic governance, thus, the relations between domestic stakeholders are more likely to follow a hierarchical type of governance. As the government has adopted the highest position in relation to the national sports organisations, it can exercise power in such a way as to control national sports organisations directly.

In relation to the first and second KOC/KSC mergers, this study revealed different points of view on the organisational structure of the KSC and the KOC. Some interviewees argued that the KSC and the KOC had remained a single organisation since 1968 when they were
first integrated. In terms of the structure of the KOC and the KSC, some respondents regarded it as a divided organisation while some saw it as being one organisation based on the previous discussions. The three respondents who argued on the basis of the organisations’ structural characteristics were all senior KSC staff members:

The KSC and the KOC haven’t been divided. They were integrated in 1968 and were divided in 1972….ehh, integrated again. They had been divided before 1968 but since then they have remained as one.

(an Executive Committee member before & after the merger)

It wasn’t really divided, it was just formally divided... the members of KOC and the KSC staff were all the same with different organisational structures at the top level,

(a high-ranking KSC officer)

The KOC’s tasks have been carried out by the Department of International Affairs and Relations which belong to the KSC. This enabled the KOC to be shown as an independent organisation but, in reality, the two organisations have been operating as one organisation.

(the former KSC Secretary General)

Actually, the KOC President and the KSC Chairman was one and the same person and the functions of the NOC were performed by the International Relations Department, which used to be one of the departments in the KSC. Externally, the KOC was an independent body but internally it was operated as the same organisation jointly with the KSC. To put it simply, they were unified into one structure. This shows that they were moving in a positive direction.

(the former KSC Secretary General)

The arguments mainly resulted from the organisational structure in common: the same President managed both organisations and the same members of staff were allocated different tasks to deal with in each department. The second interview said ‘formally divided’, which also indicates that the KOC is the part of the KSC. This implies that the KSC’s senior officers believed that the KOC was the main organisation and that the KOC was a dependent one. In fact, although International Affairs had played a critical role as representing the basic role of the KOC, it belonged to the KSC as one of its departments as shown in the organisational chart (see also Figure 6-2 & 6-3).
Looking at the two mergers between the KOC and the KSC, these two organisations had been totally separated sporting organisations until its first merger in 1968 when the KSC and the KOC had systematically formed one organisation, although each one had still been called the KOC and the KSC. In fact, the Department of International Affairs had been regarded as the KOC, while the remaining departments had been identified as the KSC. This organisational structure induced a senior officer to say that they had been ‘formally divided’. The second merger of the KOC and the KSC taken place in 2009 was, however, fully integrated both organisations into one organisation under the one title of the organisation that is the KOC. Therefore, the second merger of the organisation actually formed the unified organisation in terms of organisational structure.

c) Politicians’ misuse of power in sports organisations

With regard to the power of the State President, a senior member of KSC staff explained the background to the establishment of KOCOSA.

After the Seoul Olympics, [was it] in 1991?, Mr Park Cheol On founded KOCOSA due to his ambition… for the purpose of running for the presidency… It ended when he was jailed. (laughter)

(a high-ranking KSC officer)

According to what this interviewee said “his ambition…for the purpose of running for the presidency”, his opinion is that sports organisations have been utilised to extend politicians’ power and to accomplish their political ends and, in turn, the KOCOSA is a typical case. Two other senior members of KOC staff also support the point made above about the political misuse of sports organisations in relation to the KOCOSA.

A typical instance of that was in 1989 when KOCOSA was established. The Minister of Sport was Mr. Park Cheol On. The KSC was against his idea. He was trying to use it in his political endeavours. As Korea was under a military government, no one seemed to be able to really oppose it on the surface and the organisation grew in size over time…

(a senior KOC officer)
Originally, the KSC used to be partially in charge of sport for all. During the sixth republic administration\(^7\) (Roh Tae Woo’s administration during which the Seoul Olympic Games were held)... the politicians in power set up KOCOSA for the purpose of expanding their political influence. Rather than for pure purposes... in spite of the promotion on the surface of sport for all it was mainly led by people who became politically active. Even to this day, in fact, many politicians are involved.

( the former senior KOC officer)

The three respondents above considered that KOCOSA was established to help a politician with his aim to win the presidency. Despite its allowed purpose of promoting sport for all, reportedly, it was allegedly used as a source of power to obtain political support. This illustrates how sports organisations tended to be used by unscrupulous politicians for exercising political power to extend their influence and achieve their political aims. These events suggest that a political figure, who was a presidential-hopeful, had been able to gain influence by establishing or organising a sports organisation in Korea. For reference, the Ministry of Sport was established on 20 March, 1982 in aid of Korea’s success in the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Sports White Paper, 2009: 17). Its establishment as an independent Ministry is significant as an indication that sport was regarded as an important element in national policy and since 1990, the system has expanded and the Ministry of Sport was changed into the Ministry of Youth Sport (Sports White Paper, 2009: 27). In addition, as the senior KOC officer says “in 1989..., Korea was under a military government”, which means that the political system was still similar to that in the period of President Park. Consequently, the President held a strong influence in decision-making of Korean sport policy.

Another possible explanation is that the three senior staff members interviewed attributed KOCOSA’s existence in the sporting field to unjust causes in order to make the idea of integrating the KOC/KSC with KOCOSA legitimate. In particular, one of them also expressed the opinion below that the formation of KOCOSA was not even justified by the IOC. As the IOC is the top organisation in the Olympic Movement and the IOC Charter is supposed to be the most authoritative document internationally, this is a strong argument for regarding KOCOSA as unauthorised and irredeemable organisation in the Korean sporting field.

\(^7\) Roh Tae Woo’s administration, (the 13th President) 1988-1993.
There is no organization like that. Not anywhere… Even in the charter of the IOC, NOC is the head of sport for all and it is allowed to do all kinds of elite sports. It’s just awkward in this country.

(a senior member of KSC staff)

d) Politicians’ involvement in decision-making

When questioned about the individuals who were involved in the process of decision making about the merger, many interviewees expressed their view about the deep involvement of politicians. One senior KOC staff member argued that the government’s insistence on maintaining the division between the KOC and the KSC had been the main obstacle to the KOC/KSC merger:

It is fair to say that the KOC/KSC themselves led the way in bringing about the unification. (Were any other organisations involved?) Other organisations insisted on their separation. Our government was holding them in check so... they [the government] fundamentally didn’t want us to grow into a large-scale organisation after the integration.

(the former high-ranking KOC officer)

The implication here was that the government wanted to keep the KSC and the KOC within its boundaries of power. A junior KSC staff member also added that there would be a conflict if the ideas of the KOC/KSC differed from those of the government. The KOC and the KSC had themselves pushed ahead with their structural rearrangement and the government did not agree with the KOC/KSC.

What we wanted was to revise the National Sports Promotion Act in order for a complete integration to take place...but the government had stated that this would be difficult. Since the government had shown that it wanted to keep us apart, we were bound to be in ongoing conflict with the government.

(A junior KSC staff member)

The government raised the issue of the National Sports Promotion Act, which determined that the KSC should be Korea’s only overarching sports organisation. This had prevented the KOC/KSC from integrating and, accordingly, the KSC and the KOC had made an effort to amend it. However, the government rejected the KSC/KOC’s suggestion. Additionally, as the
former KSC senior staff also indicated, the National Assembly was also involved in the matter of the KOC/KSC’s association with KOCOSA.

The Integration Bill was already submitted to the National Assembly back then. But since the political circles began to insist on separation, it hasn’t been solved up to this day and as the issue of KOCOSA was also involved, things have become more and more complicated.

(the former KSC Secretary General)

The issue of political connections was brought up by the former senior member of the KSC:

But in this country, ‘sport for all’ strays beyond the understanding that sports specialists have of this term and now there is a political dimension to it. So the members of the prefectures gather to form an organisation and by using the power of that organisation they try to influence the local politicians and to obtain support from them… In this process, as the organisation has degenerated, its scale of operation has grown, so that it has become much bigger and stronger and turned into a political group.

(the former KSC Secretary General)

As KOCOSA was established to accomplish political aims, it is possible that many politicians would seek to gain political advantage through their activities in relation to sporting affairs and this enables KOCOSA to continue its activities and to secure its existence in sporting circles. KOCOSA has had a broad base of political support in the local governments of counties across Korea and its power has reached the lawmakers in the National Assembly. Consequently, KOCOSA has been able to prevent the National Assembly from agreeing to the integration of the three sports organizations. As a result, this has impeded the plans of the KOC and the KSC to reorganise into a single organisation. It shows how wide the involvement of politicians has been in sports policy, ranging from the lawmakers in the National Assembly to the government.

e) Economic power

Interestingly, all the interviewees believed that the KOC had been the main agent in bringing about the merger that took place in 2009 and that it was the main beneficiary of the merger. When the responses to the two questions, ‘Who are the most influential stakeholders in
Korean sports policy decision-making?’ and ‘who were the most influential stakeholders in the decision-making about the merger?’ are compared, they turn out to be different. Referring to Figure 6-4, no matter which organisation they belong to, all the interviewees indicated that the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was the most powerful agent in decision-making concerning general sports policy in Korea. At the same time, seven interviewees added the government and three the Blue House. Figure 6-4 illustrates the fact that seven KSC staff members on the left and eight KOC staff at the bottom all referred to the governmental body, the MCST, as the most powerful stakeholder in Korean sports decision-making. As stated earlier, by the ‘government’, respondents may mean the State President or any type of governmental body. In this context, it appears that the State President was indicated separately as the MCST had already been rated as the most powerful stakeholder by all interviewees.

Meanwhile, only three KSC and four KOC respondents answered that the KOC or the KOC President was the most influential agent, according to Figure 6-4. In terms of their positions, six of these interviewees held senior or Board-level positions and only one was a junior staff member.
Figure 6-4 Most influential stakeholders in general decision-making in Korean sports policy.
Looking at Figure 6-4, some respondents answered only ‘the government’ or ‘any governmental bodies’ while some also added the KSC president as a possible powerful stakeholder along with the government or the governmental bodies. Moreover, three KSC and four KOC members of staff also added the KOC or the KOC President. Here, the KOC President means the KSC President as the KSC President used to be automatically designated as the KOC President too.

However, when the question relates to the most influential stakeholder in the decision-making about the KOC/KSC merger in 2009, 13 out of 15 respondents indicated that ‘the KOC President, Park Yong Sung’ was the most influential stakeholder, as shown in Figure 6-5. This implies that staff members believed that the KOC/KSC merger was led by the KOC/KSC staff members and the Executive Committee members, and that the incumbent KOC/KSC President Park Yong Sung exercised as strong an influence as the politicians did.

Figure 6-5 The most influential stakeholder in the decision-making about the merger
The President of the KOC, Park Yong Sung, was the 27th KOC & the 37th KSC President before its merger and became the 1st KOC President after its merger from 19 February 2009 to the present, according to History of the KOC and KSC President (KOC, n.d.). On the strength of his background, the incumbent President occupies a powerful economic position. He is a family member of the Doosan group, one of Korea’s Chabeols, or conglomerates, and he has played key roles previously and been appointed to high positions with various major titles in the industrial context. Furthermore, ‘he has also made outstanding contributions to Korea’s Olympic Movement in his capacity as an IOC member (2002-2007) as well as the president of the International Judo Federation (1995-2007)’ (the KOC News and Events, n.d., 2009). After taking power, he was appointed as a member of the International Relations Commission of the IOC in 2010, according to the KOC News and Events (n.d., 2010). Consequently, his power is not ignored by people involved in politics. In fact, since the KOC President Park Yong Sung had taken up power, he had pushed ahead to revise the two bodies’ Constitutions in order to achieve the goal of forming them into one organisation.

According to a former KOC Executive Committee member and a junior KSC member of staff, they believed strongly in the potential authority of a powerful figure:

Since a major economic figure, the President of the KOC Park Yong Sung, is backing us, we have survived…. He said to us, ‘This is my opinion, so trust and follow me’.

(a former KOC Executive Committee member)

The MCST used to have greater power but it is said that the balance of power has shifted slightly towards us since our new President Park Yong Sung took up office.

(a junior KOC staff member)

‘A major economic figure’ implies that this informant expressed the concept of economic figures who have had as strong power as politicians have had in Korea. The junior staff member even said that ‘the balance of power has shifted slightly towards us’. In relation to the KOC/KSC merger that took place in 2009, the possession of economic power is an essential feature shared by powerful decision makers in sports policy in Korea, as is borne out by the interviewees’ accounts. This implies that President Park exercised somewhat greater power than any other former Presidents of the KSC and the KOC when pursuing
their project of merger. As explained earlier, due to opposition from the government and the lawmakers, this project had been dragged out for a decade under two former Presidents’ tenure. This situation can be explained in terms of power over discourse in that the KSC/KOC’s incumbent President could exert his economic power to push ahead and persuade the government and political groups which formerly had a greater chance of influencing the KOC/KSC merger. The KOC/KSC decided to revise the Statutes to avoid entering into conflict with the government that had insisted on the separation of the KSC/KOC. This was successful since the new President Park Yong Sung could take advantage of his economic power. The interviewees expressed their view that economic power holds sway in Korean society and they believed, thus, that the KOC/KSC could accomplish the merger. The interviewees, therefore, all strongly insisted that KOC President Park was the most influential stakeholder in the KOC/KSC merger.

The KOC/KSC merger shows the aspect of elitism in Korean society. The economic elite represented by the Chaebol, or industrial conglomerates, in the Korean context have contributed to the country’s economic development and have also been one of the most influential centres of power throughout Korean sporting history. The KOC President Park Yong Sung is the economic power as the President of the Doosan conglomerate and at the same time, also has considerable social status in sport as a former IOC member. When Park Yong Sung was designated as the KOC/KSC President, he secured his stance in the process of decision-making over the KOC/KSC merger and the government also accepted it despite a history of opposition. His influence reflects the power of the elite in Korean society. He uses his economic, social and political resources to overcome government resistance, in particular, in the sport field. Such an elite-driven practice may manifest a significant difference from a western theory relating to good governance practice since political position (reflected in the support by governance) economic and social position appear to have been conclusive in achieving his ends.

6.2.4 One organisation with two different titles at home and abroad

As discussed previously, although the government and politicians were deeply opposed to the KOC/KSC merger project, the incumbent KOC President was a sufficiently major economic figure in the national elite to persuade them to accept it. This situation underlies the choice of title for the newly-merged KOC. Although the two organisations have been integrated into one, their titles have not been unified. The titles ‘KSC’ and ‘KOC’ are still variously used domestically and internationally. A ‘schizophrenic’ attitude to the merged
organisation’s identity allows it to be referred to within Korea as the KSC with the common understanding that this incorporates the KOC. In international discourse the KOC may be referred to. Two titles is a discursive trick. Two junior members of KSC staff explained the background to the continuing existence of the two titles:

While the KOC President Park Yong Sung managed to integrate them after a great struggle, he did it in a more indirect way. In his view, the government didn’t seem to be affirmative or positively disposed towards a revision of the Constitutions, and the separation itself was opposed by many sports-related people, because it seemed problematic and likely to result in inefficiency... Therefore, although the need to change the system was recognised, avoiding a confrontation with the government was another important issue so the idea was to make a difference while staying within the boundaries and not altering the existing system. Domestically the KSC would run things and internationally the KOC...

(a junior KSC staff member)

In the past, the titles KOC and KSC were [officially] used side by side, but [now] KOC [for domestic use] has disappeared from the Korean title. KSC has remained as the only title used in the Korean language. As a parallel in the English title KSC is no longer in use [internationally] and only the title KOC is current [internationally]. Since the integration took place under the title of ‘KSC’... to be in accordance with the National Sports Promotion Act, the title ‘KSC’ is the only real one in existence.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

Referring to both interviewees, the title ‘KSC’ is still in use in sporting circles in Korea, whereas ‘KOC’ no longer appears in Korean language. Consequently, it is a single organisation with two different titles to represent it internally in Korea and externally. An analysis of documents based on the ‘Sports White Paper’ published by the MCST and two official documents, ‘the Statues’ and ‘KOC in Fifty Years’ written by the KSC/KOC, clearly demonstrates that the two titles are used at home and abroad. Originally, the KOC was called ‘대한올림픽위원회’, while the KSC was called ‘대한체육회’ in Korean. In the case of the Sports White Paper, examples are:
The first case:

(before the merger)
The main tasks of the KOC [대한올림픽위원회] are carried out in connection with International Relations and International Games within the KSC [대한체육회]...
(Sports White Paper, 2008: 461)

(after the merger)
The tasks in relation to international affairs are carried out in International Relations and International Games by the KOC [대한체육회]...
(Sports White Paper, 2009: 473)

The second case:

(before the merger)
With respect to the KSC [대한체육회], International organisations and International Affairs are the main functions for which the KOC is responsible...
(Sports White Paper, 2008: 462)

(after the merger)
With respect to the KOC [대한체육회], in 2009 it was completely integrated with the KOC when it was restructured on the basis of the NOC...
(Sports White Paper, 2009: 475)

With regard especially to the comments published in 2009, the nomenclature in common use still focused on ‘KSC’ as the main title of the organisation without any changes being made even after its integration. It implies that KSC still continues to be the title used domestically even after the integration with the KOC in contrast to the disappearance of ‘KSC’ in an international context. It can thus be inferred that the KSC is still a more important entity than the KOC in sporting circles in Korea.

Another crucial piece of evidence for this is given in the Statutes of the KSC and the KOC. Examples may be found in the latest versions of the Statutes, revised on 29 March 2006, which was before the merger:
Article 1 (foundation and title) The corporate body was established on the basis of article 23 of the National Sports Promotion Act with the title of Korea Sports Council and it is called the Korea Sports Council abroad. (revised on 2 April, 1994)

Article 33 (establishment) ① The Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) reserves the right to make independent decisions and to implement them with respect to its own business.

Before the revision of the Statutes for the merger, the title KSC existed and the KOC was deemed to be more narrowly responsible for its own matters, which are international relations and affairs. In contrast, the fully revised Statutes of 24 June 2009, prepared for the merger, says:

Article 1 (foundation and title) The corporate body was established in accordance with article 33 of the 「National Sports Promotion Act」 as the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of the Republic of Korea, which is a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Its title [in Korean] is Korea Sports Council (KSC) and its title in English is Korean Olympic Committee (KOC).

Article 3 (aims and status) ③ the KOC is a representative of the Republic of Korea in international sports organisations including the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Assembly of National Olympic Committees (ANOC), the Olympic Council of Asia (henceforth OCA) and so on.

Article ③ has been newly added whereas article 33 regarding the KOC’s roles has been deleted from the revised Statutes of 2009. Although the title has officially been changed to the KOC, its Korean title of ‘KSC’ is still retained.

Another piece of evidence of power over discourse is that the government has denied the decision of the KSC/KOC’s merger by means of giving more legitimacy to the KSC’s existence. The KSC is the sole officially constituted sports organisation under the National Sports Promotion Act and it continues to be the principal sports organisation domestically in Korea. The Sports White Paper published by the MCST represents the KSC as the top Korean sports organisation even after its integration with the KOC. In contrast to the KSC’s
disappearance from the international scene, it has still retained its title in the domestic context. From this it can be inferred that the KSC still remains in a higher or more powerful position than the KOC in sporting circles in Korea. In a social context, some interviewees claim that the MCST still believes that the KSC’s maintenance of its identity is indispensable in sporting circles. This has resulted in the two titles being indicated in the KOC Constitution so that its title in Korean is still given as the KSC despite the fact that its international title is the KOC.

6.3 Budget Planning

6.3.1 Introduction

As the second event/process to be discussed, the annual budget plan has been chosen. The process of budget plan shows a series of decisions to be made that reflect social practices. The analysis reveals where the financial resources come from, who exercises the power in decision making and how it is done.

6.3.2 Map of themes

The themes that emerged from the interview, a government document and various documents from the KOC/KSC are arranged by NVIVO in one tree nodes with seven subordinate nodes. The three themes to emerge are as follows: Government’s involvement in the external process of budget application; KSC’s superior position in the internal process of budget application; and the politicians’ involvement in decision-making. Figure 6-6 illustrates the sources of the majority of the funds and identifies the most influential external and internal stakeholders in the decision-making involved in the processes of budget planning.
6.3.3 Explanations of social practices

a) Government’s involvement in the external process of budget applications

This theme identifies external stakeholders involved in the processes of KOC/KSC budget planning and how their roles are ‘produced’ in the discourse. It provides information about cases in which particular stakeholders explain sources of finance and their perspectives on which organisation(s) is/are the most powerful in decision making. First of all, the member of KSC staff who was formally responsible for budget planning explained his view of its external processes identifying the external stakeholders. He described them as taking place in four stages:

The budgetary plan for the present year is to be submitted to the Ministry of Culture,
Sports and Tourism by May of the previous year. Once delivered, it goes through a process of deliberation for about a month. Sports organisations including us and their respective departments have to determine each individual budget plan with the MCST before submitting it to the Ministry of Strategy and Economy. This usually takes a month.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

From this interviewee’s point of view, the process began with the KOC/KSC submitting its budget plan to the MCST which was the first external stakeholder involved in the external processes. As he testified, this governmental body examined the size of the total budget proposed by the KSC/KOC. This implies that the MCST was directly involved in budget planning and that, furthermore, there was a possibility that this governmental body could even actually exercise its power in decision making in terms of the size of the KOC/KSC budget.

Then at the end of June, the budget plan is submitted to the Ministry of Strategy and Economy, which deliberates over and reviews it.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

The Budget Plan should then be delivered to the Ministry of Strategy and Economy which was another external stakeholder engaged in the process of the KSC/KOC’s budget planning. The interviewee stated that this was also one of the governmental bodies in which the budgetary deliberation and review were conducted. It was possible, however, for the Ministry of Strategy and Economy to be simply involved as a body in the process of approving the whole national budget. In fact, the Ministry of Strategy and Economy did not only work at the level of processing the detailed budgets of sports organisations.

In our case, one of the standing committees of the National Assembly in charge of culture and sports has to decide where to add to or subtract from the necessary budget. The committee on budget planning gives a presentation before the budget plan is brought to the regular session as a scheme before it can be approved and signed off.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

The third external stakeholder was thought to be the National Assembly. In the light of the
previous interviewee’s comment that ‘in the third stage it decides where to add to or subtract from the necessary budget’, the National Assembly was also involved once more as a political group with the function of applying checks and balances to the governmental bodies. This was seen as a rubber-stamping process which implies that the National Assembly held annual meetings to approve or disapprove the budget plans of a wider range of governmental bodies. In a similar way to the Ministry of Strategy and Economy, it was also possibly regarded as a body that processed the whole national budget. Apparently, neither the Ministry nor the National Assembly exercised direct power over the KOC/KSC in budget planning as they were responsible not only for sports organisations but also for the entire national budget. This may be inferred from the informant’s following comment:

We can then estimate the scale of our budget as it passes through the MCST and, subsequently we plan and organise our business for the coming year until the end of December. Based on the budgetary deliberation materials, we announce our next year’s business and then the MCST approves our business. Starting from January, we request that our budget be granted.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

At the final stage, the KOC/KSC should return to the MCST to acknowledge the total amount granted for its budget and to obtain an endorsement of its business plan. The interviewee obviously implies that the action on policy taken by the MCST and its decision-making with regard to budgetary and business planning merited a more powerful role for it than that of any other external stakeholder.

Figure 6-7 The flow of the external process of budget planning

Clearly, the KOC/KSC was not an independent body but was subject to control by
governmental bodies. Accordingly it did not have the power to determine its budget allocation. It could make its budget proposals to the MCST but that Ministry was the key determiner of the size of the organisation’s budget. All of the external stakeholders involved in budget planning were apparently political organisations: the MCST; the Ministry of Strategy and Economy; and the National Assembly, listed in order of their interventions in the budget process. In its external processes of budget planning, the social practices inherent in the budgetary system thus defined the limits of the KSC/KOC’s budgetary freedom. The KOC/KSC was likely to be heavily dependent, financially, on the government and this signified that the KOC/KSC was mainly influenced by government policy.

With respect to the most influential stakeholders, some interviewees assumed that the MCST was the most influential whereas one interviewee from the KSC argued that it was the National Assembly (which is equivalent to Parliament).

*The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism*

When it comes to judgements about where the actual power lies in decision-making in relation to the KOC’s budget planning, most interviewees from the KOC/KSC in fact believed that the MCST was the most influential and closely involved stakeholder. One middle-ranking officer from the KSC claimed that,

> When it comes to the total budget, after all, it is the MCST that decides. Basically it’s the MCST that reviews and decides whether to add to or deduct from our initial budget plan. (are there many cases of items being omitted?) Frequently… in most cases. (are there any cases of receiving more than we bid for?) We refer to it as the ‘balloon’ [easily inflated and/or deflated] but internally some restructuring has to be done.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

The size of the budget was actually controlled by the MCST in that it reviewed the total amount of the initial budget suggested by the KSC/KOC. In fact, before the budget plan reached the National Assembly for its approval, the MCST usually adjusted its actual size. The respondent added another reason for according superiority to the MCST in terms of financial decision-making:

> I told you about our general accounting and funds, right? We talk about ‘state coffers’
[directly from the government], and ‘funds’ [from KSPO]… Funds are more freely disposable but the government has designated the Korea Sports Promotion Foundation (KSPO) as an entity that manages this fund under the Financial Act. While the KSPO gives us the funds, the MCST finances us directly from the state coffers. There is a difference according to whether it’s done on a quarterly or monthly basis but we continuously receive money from January onwards.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

For reference, the KSPO has its own funds by virtue of the government allowing it to control various forms of profitable business such as gambling (horse riding, cycling and lottery) and managing various properties (the Olympic Park, Parktel which mainly accommodates sports-related events and is located inside the Olympic Park, along with the main building of the KSPO which the KOC/KSC has been renting). Thus, the KSPO has been generating its own funds and the KOC/KSC receives funding direct from the KSPO, apart from the direct funds that it receives from the government.

There are thus two providers of finance for the KSC/KOC: one is the KSPO and the other is the MCST. However, the KSPO’s impact on its budget plans seems smaller because it is also an organisation coming under the MCST. It implies that, in general, sports organisations are funded and controlled by the MCST. Accordingly, most staff believed that the MCST had been deeply involved in the decision-making at a working level on the KOC’s budgetary processes. Another point argued by another KSC staff member below is that even after the National Assembly had ratified the size of its budget, the KOC still needed to receive approval for its business plans within the agreed budgetary total. Thus, as over the length of the whole process, the MCST was seen as the most influential stakeholder:

In our case, one of the standing committees of the National Assembly in charge of culture and sport, adds to or subtracts from the proposed budget. The committee on budget planning gives a presentation before it is brought to the regular session [of the National Assembly] as a scheme. During the regular session, it gets approved and signed off. We can then estimate the scale of our budget in discussion with the MCST and with that we can plan and organise our business for the coming year until the end of December. Based on the budgetary deliberation materials, we announce our next year’s business and then the MCST approves our business.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)
National Assembly

One interviewee believed that the National Assembly was a more influential stakeholder than the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in the budget planning processes. This senior KSC member of staff claimed that

If the National Assembly doesn’t approve any of this, it’s useless... The final approval is given by the National Assembly.

(a senior KSC staff member)

This interviewee contends that all governmental organisations should obtain the approval of the National Assembly which functioned as a political group in operating a system of checks and balances. Accordingly, the National Assembly was possibly seen as the most influential stakeholder in the sense that it would have controlled the final stage in approving the KOC/KSC budget, if the process of budget planning is considered in isolation.

The different perspectives of these interviewees should be taken into account when considering whether the National Assembly or the MCST was more influential or whether the National Assembly and the MCST were both influential in their different ways in the shaping, approval and implementation of the budget. The question also arises as to whether the National Assembly’s role was merely a formal one or it could really affect decision-making during the budget planning process. In terms of the formalities, the National Assembly intervened at the last stage of approving the total amount recommended by the MCST, as this governmental organisation was the source of financing for all sport organisations. Thus, the budgetary responsibilities of the Ministry did not relate only to the KSC/KOC. The KSC interviewee argued that the MCST was the most influential stakeholder because, although the National Assembly took charge of approving the overall budget, the details were decided by the MCST which recommended a reasonable amount for the budget to the National Assembly. Consequently, the National Assembly was possibly a less influential stakeholder in terms of the real substance of the budget process.

In connection with the budget process, this may be viewed as evidence of the existence of a neo-corporatist structure in which the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way with the involvement of a limited number of actors in order to integrate liberal parliamentary democracy, the market economy and a number of organised groups. The decision-making about the allocation of a budget to the KOC/KSC is mainly dependent on the MCST and not
the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the National Assembly still plays a minor ‘rubber stamping’ role in investigating the government bodies. The KSPO is also involved in the decision-making of the KOC/KSC as a fund supplier but the organisation itself is also supervised by the MCST as one of governmental sporting organisations that falls beneath its umbrella. The Korean government, thus, plays a central role through the involvement of the National Assembly and the KSPO. Accordingly, the KOC has a low degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the State government.

From the discussion of the KOC/KSC budget planning it becomes obvious that the government has direct control of KOC/KSC policy. This ‘direct control’ contrasts markedly with political governance in the ‘western’ sense, as rehearsed by Henry and Lee (2004), by which governments seek to ‘steer’ policy. The government seeks to exercise its direct control by supplying major resources and, in turn, it has become a main stakeholder in sports policy making. In connection with the KOC/KSC merger, for example, after the KSC and the KOC had been pursuing its merger unsuccessfully for a decade, the government acted as the main obstacle in the process.

b) KSC’s superior position in the internal process of budget applications

After the endorsement of a total budget amount by the MCST, the KSC/KOC’s budget team conducted detailed internal checks to determine where and how the money was to be spent, according to a middle-ranking KSC officer who was responsible for budget planning:

Our budget team is responsible for rearranging the budget allocated to each department.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

With respect to its position in the KOC/KSC’s internal system, the budget team was portrayed as playing a critical role in rearranging the budget allocation. In terms of its power relations, it was suggested that the budget team had enjoyed a higher status than other teams as a decision maker in terms of budget planning. Furthermore, preceding the KOC/KSC merger, the Budget Team had been a department belonging to the KSC, which had previously controlled the budgets of both organisations. The interviewee’s implication that the budget team had borne the key responsibility suggests that the KOC was hardly involved in making budgetary decisions and that the KSC had taken a superior position in making decisions on the budget plans. This exposes another element of budgeting as a
social practice, namely that the KSC was entirely engaged in the budget planning.

When it came to identifying the ultimate decision-making stakeholder inside the KOC/KSC, a senior KSC officer argued as follows:

“(Who would be the final decision maker with regard to the KSC/KOC’s budget?)
The President had the final say...since it had to be reported to him. It could have been done by the Secretary General, but anyway, it had to be reported to the President in the same way as the budgets for all major projects for the coming year would have to be, blah blah blah ... .

(a senior KSC officer)

From this informant's point of view, there were two stakeholders who might be considered as being engaged in the final decision-making: the KOC/KSC President and the Secretary General. Although the Secretary General was possibly the final decision maker, he/she was still required to report to the President. Thus, our interviewee hinted that the President had the right to make the final decision in any case. Again, regarding the power relations between the KSC and the KOC, the Secretary General also belonged to the KSC and the President was usually the head of both organisations. This is further evidence that the KSC was centrally involved in decision making on its budget plans and that the KSC had a more powerful status than the KOC in terms of deciding on the budget allocation.

Two of the KSC interviewees expressed different opinions as to who the most influential stakeholder was inside the organisation. According to the first respondent’s account, the budget team exerted a real influence in terms of the informal processes conducted at the end of the process. As the team which held the technical responsibility for rearranging the budget allocation, it could be maintained that the budget team was the most influential stakeholder in the internal processes. In its local context, the budget team was able to assert its authority instantly. As this was a relational power following the sequencing of elements of social practice in the budget process, the budget team had an opportunity to be influential at certain points in the cycle of social practices. The external process of budget planning gave the budget team space to exert its power at that point in time.

In contrast, the second respondent indicated that the KOC/KSC President should be considered as the most influential internal stakeholder in that he was the final decision
maker to approve the budget allocation. However, the President played a formal role in the process and it could be argued that, in practical terms, the budget team was a more powerful stakeholder than the President since it shaped and presented the options from within which the President made his choices.

A senior KSC staff member also explained how the process continued informally at higher decision-making levels:

And then the General Assembly of Representatives deliberates on the budget settlement.... Budget deliberation... after the project planning has been resolved, finally everything is determined. Actually the Chairperson of the General Assembly of Representatives is our President so, as for the individual is concerned, we can say that it is done by the President but, anyway, it's decided at the meeting... [however] the total amount of the budget has already been decided by the government so there is not really any significance to it...

(a senior KSC officer)

The officer's explanation of the internal process was that the KOC/KSC should submit its proposal and obtain confirmation of the permissible yearly budget amount and the annual business plans from the General Assembly of Representatives, which was the highest decision-making level in the KSC. It can be noted here that although the KOC's Standing Committee was its highest decision-making body, the KSC was authorised to take the highest-level decisions alone. Another social practice may be observed here, namely that the KSC alone was involved in the final decisions on budget planning. In the same way as with the power relations between the KSC and the KOC, as discussed above, this case again implies that the KSC played a superior role to the KOC in decision-making.

In addition, from this respondent's perspective, the position occupied by the President in the General Assembly of Representatives accounts for the extent of his power. Although the KSC General Assembly of Representatives seemed to play a critical role in decision-making on budget planning, its Chairman was in fact the President of the KSC/KOC. As a senior staff member indicated in his discourse when he said that 'the President had the final say', the KOC/KSC President was expected to have a real impact on decision making in the General Assembly of Representatives. This implies that the representatives of the National Federations usually follow the KOC/KSC President's decisions, which illustrates another
power relation between the KOC/KSC and the National Federations.

From the respondent’s perspective, two points should be taken into account here. Even though the President of the KSC was formally the final internal decision-maker, he was unable to be directly involved in decision-making about the size of budget. Secondly, the General Assembly of Representatives was considered to perform a ‘token’ role by demonstrating that the KOC/KSC was an independent policy maker with a proper process of budget planning. It was obvious that the KOC/KSC should be represented as predominating over all other sports organisations in Korea and therefore as having its own internal process of budget planning but the government was deeply involved in the decision-making on its budget plan in respect of the overall size of the budget and specifically in decisions about whether new projects should be financed.

c) Political involvement in decision-making.

According to the discursive construction represented in interviewees’ accounts cited above, the overall processes of budget planning demonstrate that the political authorities were directly involved in the decision-making about the KOC/KSC budget. Evidence will now be provided of the ways in which this point is discursively constructed by other respondents. In particular, in terms of the KOC/KSC’s financial independence, various governmental documents and the KOC/KSC expressed different points of view.

*From a Government perspective*

To give a broader context to the discussion of the significance of the discourse in the KISS report (KISS 2003), the place of KISS among governmental sporting organisations should be explained. Reference should be made to Figure 6-8 displayed below showing the place of KISS.

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Figure 6-8 The place of KISS
KISS has been a part of KSPO, which is one of the governmental sporting organisations. For reference it was founded on 29 December 1980 as the Sports Science Research Centre within the KSC and it was re-launched as the KISS on 8 July, 1989. As of 1st January 1999, the KISS was integrated into the SOSFO which was renamed as the KSPO in April, 2009 (KISS, n.d.). From the positions reported by KISS and the other related bodies one can identify the discursive construction of the role played by KISS as a ‘representative’ of the government’s point of view in the sense of providing normative statements constructed by government actors declaring the government’s stance as to how these bodies should operate. The KiSS (2003) account of the management of the KSC budget (also financially incorporated within the KOC's budget) illustrates the government’s concern that sport should begin to generate funds to meet its own needs.

The government document published by KISS criticises the lack of effort on the part of the KOC/KSC to pursue its financial independence. This document relates to the financial position of the KSC/KOC.

(Financial issues)
Out of the total budget at the disposal of the KSC\(^8\), its own revenue generation accounted for 7.4% in 2001, 6.4 in 2002, and 6.2% in 2003, which means that it was continuously decreasing…. In our estimation, such a tendency results from the KSC’s lack of effort in developing its own income or its marketing ability in spite of the fact that its total budget has increased each year. (KISS, 2003:39)

When this Report was published, KISS was already under the authority of the Korea Sports

\(^8\) As this study was conducted in 2003 before the merger of the KSC and the KOC, the KSC is represented as the main sports organisation rather than the KOC
Promotion Foundation (KSPO) which was a governmental sports organisation. Owing to its close relation with the government, its discourse is favourable to a governmental perspective, as may be expected. The report indicates that the KSC had been viewed by the government as having been ‘negligent’ in terms of its lack of effort to achieve a measure of financial independence.

*From the KOC/KSC perspective*

In contrast, two members of KSC staff argued that, in truth, the government had prevented the KOC/KSC from developing its own profitable business. One middle-ranking KSC member of staff asserted that, contrary to KISS’s statement, the government had prevented the KSC from becoming more financially independent:

> We wanted a new Secretary General who would be competent in marketing…. We were unable to be independent because 95% of our funds come from the government…. So we had to do something about it. To find a capable person…. in order to focus on marketing, we asked the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism to approve [our new Secretary General] after passing a resolution in the Board [of the KSC/KOC], but we failed.

(a middle-ranking KSC manager)

This interviewee also believed that its reliance on government funding prevented the KOC/KSC from becoming an independent policy-making organisation. From his perspective, the KOC/KSC had made a significant effort to generate its own funds, so that it was at least trying to be independent, however, the Ministry did not give any leeway for this. His example of the failure to appoint a Secretary General with commercial expertise illustrates one of the ways in which direct political involvement worked. In fact, the government could control the KSC/KOC’s policy making in part by either endorsement or failing to endorse new staff.

His additional explanation, given below, indicates that although the KOC/KSC was an organisation which was independent according to its own Constitution, its independence was limited in real terms.

> In our Statutes, we are allowed to do business to make a profit. However, that can happen only in those areas which the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism permits…all the profitable business has been allocated to and is managed by the
KSPO..... Why do you think the State President appointed his man as Chairman of the KSPO? It’s all about money. ⁹Lee’s administration has just recently been launched, hasn’t it? It means that someone from the administration will be made President of the KSPO.

(a middle-ranking staff member of the KSC)

From this interviewee’s perspective, the MCST has allowed the KSPO to run a profitable business and it is evident that the government has generated funds from sporting activities through the KSPO. He also pointed out that the Chairman of the KSPO had been directly appointed by the state President. Thus the State President has also played a critical role by appointing his political aides to the role of President of this important sports organisation. This is evidence of the way in which the KSPO, another sports organisation, was indirectly controlled by the MCST and the funds generated by the KSPO were also under government control.

Apart from the above example of a human resource decision, where the government refused to endorse the appointment of a new high-ranking official, the KOC/KSC was similarly reliant on the MCST to approve the creation of any new business. According to the excerpt from the Statutes below, the government may allow the KOC to establish a profitable business but only with its specific approval.

Article 58 (Approval of business, budget, and settlement of accounts) ① the business and budget plans should be drawn up by the KSC President, be endorsed by the KSC Executive Board and the General Assembly of Representatives. Then they should be approved by the Minister of its related governmental body in each fiscal year.

Due to its receipt of governmental funds, the KOC/KSC has been unable to make its own independent entrepreneurial decisions, as another junior KSC staff member claims:

Actually, we are also a decision-making organisation as regards policy but that is more of a formality and most policy is made by the government, the MCST. They exercise something more like a direct control... Even if we promote a certain policy,
if it stands against the government, it’s not likely to work out. Receiving a budget...hmmm, even though we may want to, we can't do certain things that are not desired by the government. There are situations like that.

(a junior KSC staff member)

Although the KOC/KSC was formally an independent sports organisation, this respondent’s explanation that the government’s influence was exercised ‘more like a direct control’ implies that the government was deeply involved in the policy making of the KSC/KOC. This was, no doubt, the result of the organisation’s heavy financial dependence on the government.

The implication of these two interviewees’ comments is that financial dependency is a good vehicle through which the government can intervene in the policy making of the KSC/KOC. Given the dependency of the KOC/KSC on the government, the ability of the Ministry to veto the appointment of senior officers can be seen to represent a social (and governance) practice in which the government (through the Ministry) can exercise its ultimate influence.

In relation to the case of KOC/KSC merger, thus, one junior KSC member of staff explained why the KSC and the KOC had not been able to merge without the permission of the government:

It’s written in the charter of the IOC that cooperative relations with the government must be maintained but subordinating relations must be rejected. Of course, the government doesn’t like that. From the government’s point of view, when it’s an organisation that they support by paying for up to 96% of its budget, the government may acknowledge its independent nature but at the same time the KOC is a public organisation and it even receives inspections from the government and the internal Board of Audit and Inspection as well. The government interferes, allocates budgets, does the accounting… obviously it’s not welcomed by the government that the KOC seeks to gain independence.

(a junior KSC staff member)

In his view, its reliance on the budget allowance from the government has kept the KOC/KSC from operating its policy independently and he refers to interference by the government. By comparing this situation with the recommendations contained in the IOC charter, the interviewee emphasised that what the Korean government had done was not
strictly speaking in compliance with the requirements of the Olympic Movement. The government sees itself as the financial guarantor. Thus the government opposed the KOC/KSC decision to merge initially as it believed that it would lose its control over the joint organisation. As a result, it has been impossible for the KOC/KSC to accomplish its ends.

As a major financial supplier, the government has exerted its *power over discourse* with the result that the KOC/KSC is almost excluded in the decision-making about budget size. Governmental bodies such as the MCST and sporting organisations under the control of governmental bodies like KSPO have long enjoyed superior positions to the KOC/KSC in sports policy decision-making by virtue of their ability to deliver financial resources to the KOC. The Statutes of the KOC also indicate that the budget size and business activities should be endorsed by the MCST. The KISS also expressed the view that the KOC/KSC had shown a lack of effort in generating its own funds and had, in turn, been overreliant on the government funding. However, the KOC/KSC staff members interviewed for this study claimed that the government had not allowed them to develop a programme to generate their own funds, and they believed that the Korean government had tried to restrict the KSC/KOC’s independence through its direct involvement in the approval of the KSC/KOC’s internal human resources management and business affairs. The result for the organisation has been its huge financial dependence on the government and, in turn, the KOC’s lack of power. The interviewees even argue that the government has deliberately prevented the KOC/KSC from initiating any new business to support themselves so as to be able to control the KSC/KOC. Thus, the government’s power to regulate the organisation’s financial resources has been a good means for it to handle the KOC/KSC in ways that are preferable to the government. Accordingly, since the KOC/KSC lacks any financial independence, they assert that it is not able to defend its autonomy in decision-making.

Another external power relation appears between the KOC/KSC and the NFs. Given that the President of the KOC/KSC is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives, he has been able to exercise his decision-making authority over the representatives of each National Federation, although the General Assembly of Representatives is the body which approves the final report and settlement, which has been the highest level decision-making body in the KSC. This is also a good illustration of opportunities *power over discourse* in that the KOC/KSC President has more chance to influence decision-making than the Representatives of the NFs because he can exclude their preferred items from the agenda. Budget planning is also influenced by the internal power relations that existed between the
KSC and the KOC before their integration. Before their merger, an examination of the internal power relations between the KSC and the KOC shows that the KSC used to exercise wider power the KOC in that the budget planning was solely managed by the budget team, which belonged to the KSC. As the KOC is excluded from the budget planning, this is further evidence of the effect of power over discourse.

As in the case of the KOC/KSC merger, the hierarchic systemic governance serves to explain the relations among domestic stakeholders. With a financial resource supply, the government's higher position enables it to be deeply involved in decision-making, such that the KOC/KSC should follow its orders. The NFs, in their turn, are under the 'control' of the KSC/KOC, so they exert less power. Their subordinate position is evidence of the hierarchic systemic governance.

6.4 Gender and Disability Equity

6.4.1 Introduction

This section mainly deals with the aspects of gender and disability equity in the KSC/KOC. In terms of the issue of gender, it takes new staff selection and employment for analysis as a continuous event that is revelatory of social practices. Equity for people with disabilities is analysed on the basis of the opinions of members of KOC/KSC staff.

The analysis is based on the data from interviews conducted with 11 male and 4 female respondents. As Table 6-1 shows, the interviewees can be categorised by means of six features, namely-their gender, seniority at work, the organisation they belong to, age, length of employment and post. According to their gender, there are eleven men and four women among the 15 interviewees. In terms of their working status, all of the interviewees who occupy high-ranking positions are male. In fact, nine of them are involved in relatively senior decision making roles. In the case of the female interviewees, there is only one middle-ranking female officer and the other three are junior staff members. Since the interviews were carried out only two weeks after the merger of the KOC and the KSC, questions, analysis and subsequent of practices were undertaken on the basis of the separate identities of the organisations to which each interviewee belonged in order to identify the power relations between the two organisations. Seven interviewees were, thus, from the KSC and eight from the KOC. Concerning their ages, nine of the male staff were over the age of 30 whereas only one female staff member was aged over 30. Comparing their length of employment, eight male interviewees had served either in the KSC or the KOC for more than
10 years while only one female staff member had served for this long. Two different types of post in the KSC and the KOC are represented. All the male interviewees serve in ‘administrative roles’\(^\text{10}\) (through senior and junior levels) while three of the female staff are categorised as occupying ‘administrative roles’ and the other female respondent is categorised as working in ‘clerical and technical support roles’\(^\text{11}\) (These terms are defined and explained by the interviewees.)

Table 6-1 A list of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Male / Female</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>KOC / KSC</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Length of employment/service</th>
<th>Post (role)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>KSC Board member before &amp; after its merger, KSC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Former Board member, KOC</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Former Secretary General, KSC</td>
<td>60s</td>
<td>Less than 5 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Former Director General of International Affairs, KOC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Director of Clean Sport, KSC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Former Director General of International Affairs, KOC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Director General of International Affairs, KOC</td>
<td>50s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Director of Union, KSC</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Planning &amp; Budget team, KSC</td>
<td>30s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Staff member of Management Strategy Team, KSC</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Less than 5 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Staff member of International Affairs, KOC</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Less than 5 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Staff member of Public Relations, KSC</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>More than 20 yrs</td>
<td>Clerical &amp; Technical Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Manager of International Affairs, KOC</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Between 5 &amp; 10 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Staff member of International Affairs, KOC</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Less than 5 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Staff member of International Affairs, KOC</td>
<td>20s</td>
<td>Less than 5 yrs</td>
<td>Admin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the course of the interviews, an issue arose over defining the terms ‘equity’ and ‘equality’. 

\(^{10}\) ‘Administrative’ role is responsible for carrying out all major front-line administrative work in all departments within the organisation

\(^{11}\) ‘Clerical and technical support’ role can be equivalent to manual employment in the UK and is only for supporting for the administrative posts by performing simple tasks such as typing, or taking care of goods and equipment and the like.
As noted in Chapter Two, “equality means that the different behaviour, aspirations and needs of women and men are considered, valued and favoured equally… equity means fairness of treatment for women and men, according to their respective needs” (ABC Of Women Worker’s Rights And Gender Equality, 2000: 48). On analysing the interviewees’ responses, they were all found to have used a Korean word which incorporates the meanings of both ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ as defined above, that is ‘평등’, or ‘Pyung Deung’ in the Korean language. Accordingly, when the respondents argued about gender equity in terms of the percentage of females in employment, this sense of the Korean word is rather close to the term ‘equality’. On the other hand, some interviewees raised the issue of creating different posts which would only be available to women, which covers the meaning of ‘equity’. In fact, the Korean government also used the term ‘Pyung Deung’ in the sense of ‘equality’ in relation to this matter in designating the Ministry established for this purpose as the ‘Ministry of Gender Equality’.

Themes focusing on issues of equity that emerged from the interviews with the selected members of KOC/KSC staff and documents published by the KOC/KSC fall into six categories including five of gender and one of disability. This is all developed under one tree node, entitled ‘Equity’, with two major subordinate tree nodes under the headings of ‘gender’ and ‘disability’: ‘gender’ comprises eight subordinate nodes while ‘disability’ includes two subordinate nodes. The issue of equity regarding gender and disability is discussed separately.

6.4.2 Map of themes regarding gender

According to Figure 6-9, the following subjects may be grouped under the heading of gender equity issues: policy changes concerning gender equity; gender equality: redressing imbalances at the non-managerial level; male dominance in the KOC/KSC organisational structure and culture; relative absence of females at the managerial level; vertical segregation: ‘clerical and technical support posts’ as the highest aspiration for female staff; vertical segregation: the under-representation of females among decision-making at the managerial or Executive Committee level.
6.4.3 Explanations of social practices

a) Policy changes concerning gender equity

One senior male member of KOC staff indicates that a gender equity movement has become active in the IOC in an attempt to break its male-dominated atmosphere, which has resulted in the more active promotion of female involvement in Olympic circles. From his perspective, this has encouraged the KOC to match the targets set by the IOC’s recommendations.

There are recommendations for each NOC within the administrative structure of the IOC. They have also striven to increase women’s participation. They have tried to break through the far too male-dominated organisational culture as well. We, the KOC, have also agreed to that and have actively tried to involve women’s participation. (when was it that it actually started?) I would say it started in the early 1990s.

(the former Director of International affairs, male)
This respondent's comment indicates three points that are possibly triggers for policy changes in the KOC on gender equity: the IOC has striven to increase women's involvement in the Olympic Movement; the Olympic Movement has been very male-dominated; and as an NOC, the KOC has followed the suggestions made by the IOC in the international context. In reflecting upon the IOC's policy on gender equity for the past, the IOC has shown its concern about the low level of female involvement in the decision-making structures of sports organisations and has strongly urged each country to live up to the IOC requirement that they should "ensure that the benefits of wider involvement in decision making by women are realised" (Women 2004: 4 cited in Claringbould & Knoppers, 2008: 81). The IOC itself also fixed the number of members at a maximum of 115 and set a target of 20% participation by women in all the decision-making structures of the Olympic Movement (Chappelet, 2006: 8) and additionally, "as of June 2012, 20 women are active IOC members out of 106 (more than 18.8%)" (The IOC, 2012: 2).

Following the IOC policy change a senior interviewee stated that the KOC had made an effort to live up to the IOC's recommendation. In an international context, the IOC has encouraged the NOC's to increase female participation in the Olympic movement. This has been likely to have a direct impact on the gender policy of the KOC, as each NOC should meet the expectations of the IOC, and as a result, it could be the trigger for the KOC to raise women's involvement to the level recommended by the IOC recommends. This demonstrates that the KOC/KSC has been cooperating with international sporting organisations, in particular, the IOC in a type of web or network system at an international level. The IOC's recommendation does not force the KOC/KSC to comply but it encourages the KOC/KSC to live up to the international standards or policies. Since the IOC has promoted gender equity in the ratio of employment, the KOC has claimed to try to meet the IOC's expectations.

The fact, however, that the KOC's former Director of International Affair comments in the interview quoted above on the greater involvement of women in KOC business as having started in the early 1990s seems to indicate that it was more closely related to the policy change on gender equity in the Korean political context. According to the IOC policy on gender discussed above, it appears that in the 1990s, gender equity had yet to be developed as a policy goal. Before the IOC encouraged the NOCs to improve their performance on gender equity, such a movement and an improvement in the situation for women seemed to have appeared in the domestic context too. This interviewee added that:
In the case of Korea, female participation has accelerated since the Ministry of Gender Equality was established... I would say the rate of women's participation is currently higher, relatively, than in other countries.

(the former Director of International affairs, male)

In the Korean political context, the government has begun to put an emphasis on gender equity following societal changes that have raised people's consciousness of the need to improve women's rights. Consequently, the government established the Ministry of Gender Equality. In fact, if the history of the Ministry of Gender Equality is examined more closely, the Department of Women's Affairs was newly founded within the Ministry of Political Affairs in 1988. This study hypothesises that this might have been an important factor influencing the gender policy of the KOC/KSC in the 1990s.

A female member of KSC staff supported the previous interviewee's comment about the way in which the change in people's attitudes towards women's participation in society has led to a higher employment rate for females in the KSC/KOC.

The idea was that as the percentage of women workers in society became higher, women should be given more responsible roles. Since then, from around 1995, when two or three female staff were recruited ... women have gained a stronger voice now, right? So recently I think the ratio has been half and half.

(a female KSC staff member)

According to both respondents, it was approximately in the early and/or mid-1990s when the tendency regarding recruitment inside the KOC/KSC became more favourable to the employment of women, and two or three more female staff are said to have joined the organisation in around 1995. This is likely to reflect the linked phenomena of a more favourable attitude developing in society towards women's active participation in society and of a change in the political conditions that led to the establishment of a governmental body for dealing with women's affairs. The following interviewees report on the time when the increase in women's participation became noticeable:

12 It started under the Ministry of Political Affairs in 1988 and became independent as the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001. It was then inaugurated as the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in March, 2010. The History of MOGEF (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family). Retrieved June 14, 2011 from http://english.mogef.go.kr/sub01/sub01_31.jsp
This is a very authoritarian workplace and women were supposed to be nothing but assistants... even those women who were employed in administrative posts worked like that. (When was it that the atmosphere changed?) Probably around 2002. (Who was the president at that time?) It’s 2009 now, right? Oh.. the President was Kim Jeong Gil... That’s when a lot of women were hired. I guess it started with President Kim Yun Yong... yes, since President Kim Yun Yong... In 1998, 1999, 2000? That’s when it changed dramatically.

(a female KSC staff member)

The ratio was adhered to and this difficult ratio of 30% [sic] of women as recommended by the IOC was respected during the hiring of executive members of the KOC by President Kim Jeong Gil, who took great efforts to do so. It was groundbreaking at that time. We nominated the female head of the training centre, and a few more females were appointed to the Board and the vice president... we surely satisfied the 30% requirement.

(the former KSC Secretary General, male)

Many women have been employed. Especially during President Kim Jeong Gil’s period in office.

(the former senior male KOC staff member)

The three interviewees above claimed that since 2005 when Kim Jeong Gil was elected as the 25th KOC President, the rate of female involvement has dramatically increased in administrative posts. Looking at the first respondent’s assertion, from the late 1990s or early 2000s onwards when President Kim Yun Yong took power, women’s involvement actually started to increase. As mentioned earlier, female participation accelerated when the Ministry of Gender Equality became independent in 2001 and Kim Yun Yong’s tenure was at the time when the Ministry gained its independence in the Korean political context. As already discussed above, the changing environments in international, political and social contexts have led two former presidents of the KOC to try to make an effort to improve gender equity in terms of the ratio of female involvement. Thus, it is clearly acknowledged, especially in the opinions of female staff members employed since 2005 that gender equity has been

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successfully established in the KSC/KOC.

In relation to policy change on gender equity, it is interesting to discover the way in which gender equity is defined by members of the KOC/KSC staff. Different definitions are given by some KOC and KSC respondents in terms of the ratios of females to males recruited by the organisation. Only one respondent among the other interviewees who agreed with the assertion that the KOC had achieved its target for gender equity (for which there is an absence of ‘objective’ evidence cited) said that the policy of appointing a certain percentage of new female staff had been successfully implemented. On the other hand, five other interviewees argued that gender equity should mean that the same ratio was observed between male and female and they also expressed their view that the level of gender equity had already reached half and half. When the different views of respondents are taken into account, it reveals how their different knowledge about gender equity is embraced in the discourse. It is noteworthy that none of the interviewees made reference to the types of role women played within the organisation. In other words, the problems of vertical and horizontal segregation were ‘invisible’ in the discourses.

The fixed percentage of female recruitment
A number of interviewees referred to the establishing of a 7:3 target minimum ratio for male to female appointments. One middle-ranking female KOC-based staff member concluded that the policy on gender equity had been fulfilled because a certain percentage in staff recruitment had been allocated to females.

I don’t think there is any unfairness in recruitment. Above all, as far as I am concerned, for example, if 10 people are being recruited, a certain percentage of them at least ought to be women… as I know.

(a middle-ranking KOC officer, female)

This interviewee joined the KOC during the tenure of the 25th KOC President Kim Jeong Gil, when gender equity was being promoted within the KOC in order to reach the IOC’s recommended target ratio. Her view was supported by a senior male staff member of the KSC, who pointed out that

The ratio was kept and this difficult ratio of 30% [sic] women as recommended by the IOC was respected during the hiring of Executive Committee members of the
KOC by President Kim Jeong Gil, who made great efforts to do so. We surely satisfied the 30% [sic] requirement.

(the former Secretary General, male)

It should be noted here that this middle-ranking female officer claimed that when she joined the KOC, the organisation promoted gender equity based on the ‘30%’ IOC recommendation. Although she is citing an incorrect minimum target level for the IOC, it may be assumed that her concept of gender equity is possibly influenced by the discursive surroundings in which she was employed, that is working for an Olympic organisation in which there is a predisposition to be led by IOC recommendations.

**A larger or equal number of female versus male staff recruited**

Apart from the first interviewee, there are two more junior female members of KOC staff who joined during Kim Jeong Gil’s tenure.

I don’t think there is any inequity. I don’t know if that applies to my generation only, or it’s just me, but last year the newly recruited members are 8 people and among them there are 3 men and 5 women.

(junior KOC staff member, female)

At the non-managerial level, err… I don’t feel that there’s any gender discrimination or anything like that. hmm…there is also a tendency to employ more females or half males and half females…hmm…I don’t know.

(junior KOC staff member, female)

Those two junior staff members expressed their opinions about gender equity at a time when the number of female staff was even higher than that of males. They seem simply to have noted the fact that a higher percentage of female staff had been employed in the KOC. For that reason, they responded that the KOC had achieved its target for gender equity since there was a tendency to recruit more female than male staff and their knowledge about gender equity is a reflection of the time when they were employed. However, the second interviewee quoted above does note that there is a lack of discrimination at non-managerial levels.
The next interviewee is a female staff member from the KSC:

Of course it's unfair. Why 7:3? It should be 5:5... Recently, it has been almost half and half

(a female KSC staff member)

She also insisted that gender equity should be considered to have been achieved when there was a half and half ratio between male and female employees. Her comment that ‘it has been almost half and half’ implies that the application of the policy on gender equity has moved towards achieving balanced gender participation in the KSC/KOC, again without reference to vertical or horizontal segregation.

The next contribution was made by a junior male member of KOC staff who maintained that female involvement was relatively higher than in the past.

Now, it is likely to be equal. (in what aspects?) Looking at the new employees, the ratio of females is relatively high. Looking at my colleagues and juniors, some of them really are competent.

(a junior KOC staff member, male)

Unlike the female interviewees cited above, this male interviewee comments on the ratio being ‘relatively high’ and this implies that this is, by reference to appointments made, though no indication is given of the category of employment, as discussed above. His point could simply be that the state of female recruitment had merely improved by comparison with the past. This male interviewee was hired after the first middle-ranking female KOC staff member and he is also assumed to have been employed in the period of the fixed minimum gender ratio.

There are three issues here. One is the use of a target figure of 30% female employment rather than the minimum target of 20% for women as the proportion of those in executive decision-making roles. The inconsistency between the 30% target of the KOC and the 20% minimum target of the IOC is something no action commented on. In addition there were comments conceiving the fact that the KOC figures related to all employment while the IOC figures related to female recruitment to position of executive authority. It is supposed that the members of the KOC/KSC have their own perceptions/interpretations of gender equity
requirements in accordance with the policy of the organisation. Finally, having minimum targets of percentage of females at all levels relates clearly to gender equality, than to gender equity.

This is evidence of the power over discourse that the concept of gender equity (here, the term equality is more suitable) is discursively constructed by KOC/KSC by promoting a target of 30 per cent for the achievement of gender equity. This reflects the opinion of the dominant male decision-making group that such a level of female employment could be said to imply that gender equity had been realised, an opinion that the middle-ranking officer subscribed to without questioning.

If we consider the nature of the way in which gender equity is treated by the IOC, and the way it is dealt with in the discourses of our interviewees, key differences are evident. Taking the IOC approach, first the IOC adopted the following policy to gender equality/equity. In 1997 it adopted a minimum target of 10% of executive decision-making positions an NOC or IF Executive Committees to be occupied by women by December, 2001 and 20% by December 2005 (Henry et al., 2004; Henry & Robinson, 2010). This adopted measure implicitly conveys a number of elements of gender discourse. The first is that the measure adopted is a minimum target not a quota, the difference being that a target is simply an aspirational goal, whereas the use of the term quota implies a requirement, one for which failure implies a sanction.

The second element is that the minimum target is set at a IOC level. Equality would imply 50:50 ratio or as near as practicable. The third element relates to this in that the concern is within equality not equity since the measure simply seeks to locate equal number of women at the top of the organisation (in the Executive Committee). The fourth element is that vertical segregation is recognised as an issue since the target set relates to senior executive decisions. However, the IOC approach ignores issues of horizontal segregation, which are evident in NOCs (Henry et al., 2004). In the respondents comments on gender equity in the KOC/KSC a somewhat different approach is suggested even though the approach is attributed to the IOC, or its inference.

b) Gender equality: redressing imbalances at the non-managerial level

Since the comments on gender equality in executive decision making made by the IOC are perceived as relating to gender equality in all employment throughout the KOC/KSC as
discussed above, there is an evident mis-match between what the IOC is advocating and what the KOC/KSC is doing, even though interviewees refer to the KOC/KSC approach as reflecting ‘IOC’s requirements’. We should carefully consider whether gender equality has been achieved at all levels within the KOC/KSC. In terms of the interviewees’ opinions on gender equality at the non-managerial level, all four female interviewees and seven out of eleven male interviewees expressed the opinion that gender equality had been achieved at the non-managerial level in the KOC/KSC since 2005. As mentioned above, several interviewees implied that the middle-ranking female interviewee (there is only one middle-ranking female interviewee who was employed in 2005 in an administrative role and no females in more senior’s positions) was regarded as the first generation who enjoyed gender equality, which may also imply that gender equality may be assumed to have been limited to date to the non-managerial level.

According to the organisation to which they belonged, either the KSC or the KOC, all KOC interviewees considered that gender equity had been achieved at the non-managerial level in the KOC, whereas in the KSC only four respondents made such a claim for their organisation. The results probably give insights into the respect for seniority at the institutional level. Given that the KOC might have perceived the IOC’s recommendations as a requirement as the NOC because of the IOC’s stipulation, the KOC has claimed to try to live up to the IOC’s target minimum percentage of female employment. However, as the KSC seemed to be more related with domestic sport affairs, there was a tendency to show less concern the IOC’s wishes. This phenomenon is explained by a KSC middle-ranking officer as follows:

You have to take a look at it while distinguishing between KOC and KSC. In the case of KOC, it seems like they were abiding by the guidelines.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer, male)

From this interviewee’s perspective, as the KOC has been representing the Republic of Korea as an NOC, it is much more likely to be sensitive to the need to follow the IOC’s recommendations. Apparently, the KOC seems to have put more emphasis on gender equality than the KSC and thus, all respondents from the KOC agreed with the view that gender equality had been attained at the non-managerial level.
In connection with gender equality, furthermore, one junior male employee even raised the issue of the KSC/KOC’s having perhaps taken positive discriminatory action.

During the process of recruitment, I have no idea whether there is any positive discrimination on the grounds of gender. Due to sex (gender) discrimination, it would be a problem if only one female were hired among ten new employees. However, if the nine male candidates were better qualified than the female candidates, yet more female candidates were hired to meet the external expectation, it could bring up the issue of positive action… I am not sure about that but it is certain that the number of female staff has increased.

(a junior KSC staff member, male)

Only this male interviewee of the KSC gave a ‘negative’ impression about gender equality given that the KOC/KSC has recently employed a relatively high ratio of female staff. As he expressed a concern on positive action, his implication might be that he did not ensure of the competence of the female employees but that gender equality had been achieved within the organisation.

However, the former Secretary General’s implication was that positive action is unavoidable as an essential pre-requisite for the successful advancement of gender equality and equity.

It will take at least another 5-10 years for the chiefs to have the willingness and the sympathy to let women enlarge their role. For women to achieve their potential, the willingness of the chief is important since it is still culturally difficult for women to compete against men for promotion.

(the former Secretary General, male)

This interviewee implied that the organisational structure is still in vertical segregation as most female employees are in the non-managerial level and are limited in their access to important roles. However, it can be inferred that he has been aware of horizontal segregation as more roles should be enlarged to female employees in administrative roles and these experienced female employees are entitled to go forward to the higher positions.

c) Male dominance in the KOC/KSC organisational structure and culture

As a reason for low female participation in the KOC/KSC before 2005, several interviewees
mentioned the prevalence of a male-dominated organisational culture in the KOC/KSC. One senior male KOC staff member added that this had been the situation for a long time and he admitted that there had been discrimination against women in the KOC/KSC.

It has been mainly men who have dominated until now. Since staff recruitment has been more open to public scrutiny, although more men have been employed than women, nowadays it has been changing.

(Director General of International Affairs, male)

More particularly, one female KSC staff member argued that:

There was a social atmosphere in which women were expected to quit their jobs after marriage, especially given the fact that the KOC/KSC is a conservative and authoritarian organisation...

(a female KSC staff member)

This answer of KSC staff claimed that women in general quit their jobs after marriage in the context of traditional Korean accepted social practice and that the approach to gender equity issues at the KOC/KSC was unlikely to have become sufficiently mature for women employees to be able to continue working after marriage. In relation to this, an interesting issue arising in the discourse is whether or not the presence of a male-dominated organisational culture has affected the aspect of gender equity in the KSC/KOC.

*The male-dominated organisational culture has affected gender equity.*

Two respondents discussed the KOC/KSC organisational culture that led to female employees leaving work after marriage.

In the past, even though female staff were hired, the organisational culture used to be such that it was very likely to be male-dominated and this made female staff quit after their marriages.

(a junior KSC staff member, male)

There used to be the assumption in our culture that a woman would quit her job after marriage. In cases where a female staff member had still joined the organisation after her marriage, there was thought to be a problem in her married life. This is
especially the case with the KSC/KOC, which has been conservative and authoritarian for a long time. If a woman was pregnant, she had to keep it secret to avoid having to quit her job.

(a KSC staff member, female)

These two interviewees commented that the KOC/KSC staff members tended to believe that women should quit their jobs after marriage. Whereas the male junior KSC staff member simply conveyed that the organisational culture is male-dominated, the female KSC staff member added the detailed cases of gender inequity that had been taken. From the female interviewee’s perspective, such a male-dominated organisational culture justified the description of the KOC/KSC as being ‘conservative’ and ‘authoritarian’.

The male-dominated organisational culture does not directly affect gender equity.

However, the next interviewee, who is a junior male KOC member of staff, believed that no pressure had been placed on women to leave but that, in keeping with Korean social practice, female staff in general quit their jobs earlier than male staff. His implication that social practice was involved shows that he considered it to be a very common aspect of Korean society rather than just limited to the KSC/KOC.

As the position in the job hierarchy gets higher there are fewer women… no-one asks them to leave but, in any case, women usually quit when they get older…. The lower the position the more women there are compared with men. Hmm… I can’t really say anything because I don’t really know if that’s because there are fewer chances for women or it was always like that.

(a junior KOC staff member, male)

Comparing his point of view with those of the two previous interviewees, the difference is over their opinion as to whether pressure had been placed on female staff to leave their jobs after marriage. The two previous male and female interviewees believed that female staff had been forced to quit their jobs due to pressure from the organisation. On the other hand, the junior male informant expressed the opinion that the KOC/KSC had never compelled female staff to leave; it was, rather, a natural occurrence in keeping with social practices in Korean society. In any case, although they adopted two different perspectives, all three interviewees agreed that, in their experience, female staff commonly quit their jobs after marriage. Although both perspectives explain the same phenomena, two different discursive
behaviours are exhibited.

At the same time, this phenomenon can be obviously explained with reference to Lukes’ (1974) second dimensional power, according to which women are in the non-decision making role in this context. Men constituted the power group and women could not access this process due to the social phenomenon whereby women should leave their jobs after marriage. This phenomenon is also explained as a reason of appearance of vertical segregation which shows that female staff usually were not able to be promoted to the higher position.

d) Relative absence of females at the managerial level

The next issue to be considered is whether the male-dominated organisational culture has resulted in the phenomenon of a low level of female participation at the managerial level.

In the past, more men were employed so most of the managerial positions are still occupied by men but I think women will take more of these roles in the future. (what is the proportion of females in managerial positions?) None [up to the level of Director General except for the Executive Committee level]. There are more or less 20 people in posts as high as Director General or still higher positions [such as Secretary General] but no women are there yet. The average age for staff in these positions is in the 40s or 50s but there is no woman over the age of 40 at this point.

(the Director General of International Affairs, male)

There weren’t many opportunities for women to be promoted to higher posts. When you take a look at the average age of the women employees right now, or their career experience, it’s apparent that it hasn’t been long since they [female employees who are in ‘administrative’ roles] joined the KOC. So they aren’t really a target for promotion yet. Although they are gradually moving up into the higher posts…there aren’t any candidates for higher positions [at the moment]. That’s why there are no women in the higher positions.

(the former Secretary General, male)

It’s only been less than 4 years since women began to be recruited as regular employees [in ‘administrative’ posts]. For them to have a chance of reaching the managerial level, they [female staff members in ‘administrative’ roles] have to stay
for at least 10 to 15 years. They are not at a disadvantage, but they have started late. And it’s a recent phenomenon for women to wish to enter the realm of sports as part of their dream of being active in sports diplomacy.

(the former KOC Director General of International Affairs, male)

These three senior respondents thought that the short history of female employment at KOC/KSC was the cause of the shortage of female staff who were competent to work at the managerial level in terms of their working experience or length of service in the organisation and this resulted in gender inequity at that level. In this way, their implications are that the culture of male dominance may be said to have directly affected the women’s attainment in terms of competency and working experience. The interviewees above expressed an opinion in stating female involvement at the decision-making level was not acceptable yet because the promotion of gender equity had only been underway for a short time. Within the ‘administrative’ posts, female officers are limited to being involved in the managerial level at this stage which can be viewed as evidence of vertical segregation.

Unlike these three senior interviewees, although the junior and/or middle-ranking KOC staff expressed the opinion that they had experienced gender equality at the non-managerial level, one of them also carefully pointed out that the existence of gender equity at the managerial level was in doubt. A junior female KOC staff member expressed her concern about the situation:

hmm... I don’t know... I think there might be gender inequity in terms of promotions but there aren’t many women employees who can expect to reach that high position, so I don’t know... maybe when that time comes, there can be disadvantages...

(a junior KOC staff member, female)

This comment implies that a female staff member would have less chance of reaching the managerial level irrespective of her competencies. From the interviewee’s perspective, the issue of promotion per se might be a cause of gender inequity and her contention that ‘female staff’s expectations were low’ implies that while the KOC/KSC might redress gender imbalances at the non-managerial level the opportunities available to women at higher decision-making levels were still inequitable.
e) Vertical segregation: clerical & technical support posts as the highest aspiration for female staff

Associated with the issue of women’s low involvement at the managerial level is the claim of a lack of fairness of job opportunities, which is evidenced by the scarcity of female participation at the managerial and executive decision-making level. A former senior KOC staff member put forward another reason for it:

Just one thing, and it’s a chronic problem in Korea, is that within KOC and KSC there are no women in high positions. None at the managerial level….. in the past, women were mostly contract workers…which means they cannot reach the executive level. It’s only been less than 4 years since women began to be recruited as regular employees.

(the former KOC Director General of International Affairs, male)

One female KSC staff member also testified that members of female staff were not allocated to front-line ‘administrative’ roles but to ‘clerical and technical support’ posts alone.

When I joined, there were no administrative positions for women. There were social prejudices and so women were hired through an informal recruitment process and were given assistant roles … This is a very authoritarian work place and women were supposed to be nothing but assistants.

(a KSC staff member, female)

These respondents implied that in the Korean social context, there was a stereotype of women as being incapable of building their careers and of men as being preferable as employees. In spite of an increase in women’s participation, they claimed that job opportunities were obviously unequal, so female staff used to be hired to fill ‘clerical and technical support’ posts by means of an unofficial recruitment process, and most ‘administrative’ posts were ‘de facto’ allocated only to men. The interviewees pointed out that women had been excluded from promotion or they have had less opportunity to reach the managerial level not simply in the KOC or KSC but also in Korean society. For instance, one interviewee was a female KSC staff member who had worked in a ‘clerical and technical support post in the KSC for more than 20 years, yet she had failed to gain promotion. She had not enjoyed the same job opportunities or salary as an ‘administrative’ post employee and had remained at the lower levels of the organisation. The discourse of the above
interviewees contrasts with that of those interviewees who claimed that the gender equality or equity situation had improved. Here the discourse is critical of the current situation but only for some. Thus different discourses prevail amongst different groups.

More specifically, the long-term prevalence of inequity in job opportunities open to women is observable in the discourses of their employment rates in the two different categories of post, the so-called ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical support’ posts. In the following responses two junior KOC and KSC staff members also explain what the main duties of females in ‘clerical and technical support’ posts really are:

Many of the KOC/KSC’s women employees are in ‘clerical and technical support’ posts… (what is a ‘clerical and technical support’ post?) Many female staff were employed originally to do jobs such as typing or something like that and they are still working. Nowadays they’re not responsible for ordinary tasks. (what kinds of thing do they do?) There is one in each department (team). They do internal clerical work including typing, documentary work, filling and archiving, internal tasks like refilling stationary, cups, coffee, tea and so on.

(a junior KOC staff member, female)

‘Clerical and technical support’ posts are, let’s say, the jobs of drivers or those who work in the boiler rooms, elevator girls, and some clerical workers such as typists, [or manual workers such as] kitchen workers, and the like…

(a KSC staff member, female)

For reference, in the Korean social context, for the recruitment of public officers such a division (clerical/technical/manual versus front-line administrative roles) has been established for a while and, recently, it has become an issue of debate over the situation of inequity in terms of salary, promotion opportunities, job opportunities, and so on. For example, although the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) has been forced by public opinion to abolish this system, unfortunately it still persists. Public posts are classified numerically on a scale from 1 to 9 for ‘administrative’ posts, but ‘clerical and technical support’ posts used to be categorized from 1 to 10. The Ministry only changed its system slightly by reducing the number of categories in the ‘clerical and technical support’ roles from 1 to 9 (MOPAS, n.d.). The category 10 for ‘clerical and technical support’ posts was lower than category 9 at the bottom of the scale for ‘administrative’ posts. Clearly,
‘clerical and technical support’ post holders were endowed with less chance of being promoted, smaller salaries, and fewer job opportunities for career development. The division of posts for females into the two categories of ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical support’ in the Korean social context is shown as a form of vertical segregation. The KOC/KSC as an organisation under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism is subject to the same conditions (and gendered outcomes) as other such public bodies.

f) Vertical segregation: the under-representation of females among decision-making at the managerial or Executive Committee levels

The middle-ranking KSC officer also made an important point about the issue of women’s participation at two levels of decision-making.

As I just mentioned, there aren’t any women in higher posts [at the managerial level in ‘administrative’ posts]. They only went up to category 5 [so far]. There was one woman who went up higher than category 5, but that’s a recent story… It tells us that women are completely excluded from the decision-making process…

(a middle-ranking KSC officer, male)

There are women [on our newly-formed Executive Committee]. Here, if you look, you’ll see that there are women… only two though… it seems likely that they can suggest their opinions in decision-making. (female members?) yes.. yes.. however, they might think differently… Although those women members may be allowed to convey their opinions in decision-making processes it might be a different matter. Because they don’t have so much power, those female members, I mean.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer, male)

His implication is that the exclusion of female staff at the managerial level could be related to policy making in the organisation. As women are unable to be involved in policy making, decision-making would tend to be the exclusive prerogative of male employees even when women are members of decision-making bodies. He claimed that the critical issue raised at this point centres on the fact that the increase in female participation has not enabled female Executive Committee members to have their voice in decision-making. However, the following KSC officer’s comment suggests that gender equity should be achieved by the same attainment a balanced ratio between female and male staff at the managerial level,
which is gender equality.

It might be hard to say that there is equality. Equality means that, in the case of 20 managerial staff, the ratio should be 10 to 10 in order to lead to a change in policy making.

(a middle-ranking staff member of the KSC, male)

This male staff member argues, thus, that without having the same ratio between male and females is a necessary condition of gender equity, and that a situation in which female members were able to express their opinions freely and positively would “lead to a change in policy making”. These informants conveyed that vertical segregation prevailed at the managerial and Executive decision-making level within the organisation. However, the interviewee implies that there is still a tendency for the male-dominated status quo to be preserved at the decision-making level.

As interviewees indicate, there is a widely held belief among male staff members that women are not capable of working as well as men, and the implication that women should quit their jobs after marriage, which is a factor that contributes to male dominance in the managerial positions. The persistence and widespread nature of this kind of discourse (with little evidence but strong assertion) is evidence of the power of the discourse of hegemonic masculinity. A further consequence is that clerical and technical support posts are mainly allocated to women with limited prospects of promotion and salary differences in the public sector that disadvantage female employees. The recent policy change on gender equity, however, has brought about greater participation by female staff members at the non-managerial level. Nevertheless, women are severely under-represented at the managerial and Executive Committee levels, which can be seen as limiting their ability to influence decision making.

6.4.4 Map of themes regarding disability and equity

Disability has two subordinate nodes under one main tree node as examined earlier and two main themes are developed, namely the recruitment of people with disabilities, based on the Korean government’s suggestion; and the responsibility taken by the Korean Paralympic Committee (hereinafter KPC) and Korea Sports Association for the Disabled (hereinafter KOSAD) for people with disabilities, as shown Figure 6-10.
6.4.5 Explanations of social practices

a) The discourses on recruitment of people with disabilities on the recommendation of the Korean Government

The interviewees all acknowledged that the KOC/KSC had been officially obliged to employ a certain percentage of people with physical impairments in order to comply with the Korean Government’s recommendations. Regarding the discourse on disability equity, by their responses the interviewees fell into two main groups on the subject of the policy for employing people with physical impairments. Some interviewees pointed out that the ratio had been well maintained and the KOC/KSC had lived up to the government’s recommendations while others argued that this had not been the case. A negative or positive view was taken concerning the extent to which the KOC/KSC had complied with the government-recommended target rate for the employment of people with physical impairments.
**Employment rate of people with disabilities meets the recommendation**

With respect to the employment of people with disabilities there were five respondents who considered that the KOC/KSC had complied with the regulations set by the government. Among these interviewees, there was the understanding that a certain percentage of the total number of employees should comprise people with physical impairments. More particularly, the other four respondents answered with certainty while one interviewee from the KOC replied affirmatively but without certainty.

The four interviewees all answered by saying that the KOC/KSC had lived up to the government’s recommendations.

> It’s a certain percentage, in keeping with the government-recommended rate, as far as I know. It has been complied with successfully. (Can you tell me the recommended rate?) I have no idea.
>  
> (a junior KOC staff member)

> With respect to the recruitment of the disabled, there is a government recommended rate. We’ve hired enough disabled people to match that rate
>  
> (a junior KSC staff member)

The next interviewee even commented that the employment of people with disabilities had surpassed the target rate, which demonstrated his belief that the organisation has fulfilled its obligations satisfactorily.

> We comply with the regulations. People with disabilities are hired in accordance with the rules. It could be that more disabled people are recruited, but never less.
>  
> (a middle-ranking KSC officer)

This senior officer from the KOC below also declared that in his view the KOC/KSC’s policy of employing people with physical impairments had been accomplished.

> As far as employing those with disabilities is concerned, we comply with the rules and laws. According to the law, there is a certain fixed rate for the number of disabled employees. It has been accomplished.
>  
> (a senior KOC officer)
Apart from the four respondents above, one of five interviewees who claimed that the KOC/KSC had complied with the regulations set by the government expressed her point of view with a degree of uncertainty but she still claimed that the KOC/KSC had a system whereby preferential treatment was given to people with physical impairments.

I don’t know much about it but there is a system of preferential treatment. (for example?) I don’t know it well but there is probably an extra point or an extra position of employment

(a junior KOC staff member)

All of the interviewees concurred in stating that there was a government recommended rate for the number of employees with physical impairments, although none of them could provide the relevant actual percentage. When asked whether an official document could be provided in confirmation of it, they said that they were unaware such official document in use in the KOC/KSC. On examining the relationship between the interviewees’ perspectives and their seniority, it is seen that only one of those respondents was a senior officer and the others were all either middle-ranking or junior staff. This implies that the interviewees felt that the organisation had internally promoted its system for discriminating positively in favour of people with disabilities without providing any actual data.

Employment rate of people with disabilities does not meet the recommendation

While there were respondents who believed that the KOC/KSC had achieved the recommended rate based on the law above, two high ranking officers confessed that in reality things had been different. They maintained, nevertheless, that there had been a policy on disability equity.

Employment is not always accessible to the disabled. Fortunately, the KPC and the KOSAD have allocated posts to disabled people. We should also follow a recommended ratio for the disabled but we have not complied with it well.

(the former Director General of International Affairs)

We are obliged to employ the disabled. Those who are a bit deaf… but the blind would be unable to work here as there are many events that require sighted people. Some people are handicapped in their mobility… others are handicapped with their hearing… after all, it is not easy to live up to the recommended ratio. (would you
please tell me the official recommended rate?) there is....a total of...... 10%?  2 or 3%? I am not sure.

(Director of Clean Sport)

From their perspective, as the KOC/KSC has usually been engaged in working in the domain of physical activities, it would not be pertinent to hire people with disabilities. This point of view was supported by another member of KOC staff.

Employing people with disabilities.... Well...most of the work in this organisation involves physical activity, so it wouldn’t be easy for them to work here, and they also have the KOSAD and the KPC

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

Furthermore, this Executive Committee member of the KOC even claimed that the KOC and the KSC did not purposely ignore the disabled.

I don’t see it as inequity. If we didn’t employ any disabled people who were capable of working that would be a problem. However, we can’t just employ those who are unable to accomplish physical activities, can we? Also, there is the KOSAD and the KPC... in Korea... we have the KOSAD and the KPC.

(a KOC Executive Committee member before and after the merger of KOC/KSC)

His comment on the roles of people with physical impairments gives the impression that people with disabilities’ fulfil inappropriate roles within the organisation. Especially, in saying that ‘I don’t see it as inequity’, compared to the previous respondents’ similarly positive views of KOC/KSC compliance, he appears to have been seeking to justify the organisation’s negligence in complying with the governmental regulation by denying that equal treatment was possible. His approach to this matter was rather to advocate the KOC’s stance, whereas the previous interviewees had simply explained its reality. Other interviewees also gave their opinion that physical impairment could be an obstacle in preventing disabled people from being involved in most activities offered by the KSC/KOC. Most interviewees who gave ‘negative’ responses also supported the point of view that the KOSAD and the KPC should be responsible for absorbing people with disabilities.

In a similar way to those respondents who replied with a positive perspective, all the
interviewees who replied negatively were unable to confirm the actual percentage of disabled people employed. This also indicates that the KOC/KSC had internally promoted its compliance with the governmental regulations in a vague manner. With respect to the relationship between the interviewees’ perspectives and their seniority, most interviewees who voiced negative opinions were high-ranking officers with the exception of one middle-ranking officer. Again, this may imply that as the organisation had promoted its policy on the employment of people with disabilities, junior and some middle-ranking staff had a tendency to accept it at face value whereas senior members of the KOC/KSC had more opportunity to recognise the reality of its policy on employing people with disabilities. The discourses of the ‘ethically compliant organisation’ is thus in evidence despite a lack of data to support their perspective.

b) The KPC and KOSAD should be responsible for people with disabilities

No matter whether the interviewees whose responses have been analysed previously agreed or disagreed with the view that the KOC/KSC had complied with the recommendations made by the Korean Government, they were united in claiming that the KOSAD and/or KPC had accepted the main responsibility for employing people with disabilities.

The disabled usually work for the KOSAD and KPC. I don’t see that they have to deal with inequity. I’ve never heard of it.. never.. never…

(the former Director General of International Affairs)

As far as I know, the KOSAD and KPC hire a larger number of disabled than of able-bodied people.

(a junior KOC staff member)

Fortunately, the KPC and KOSAD have absorbed disabled workers.

(the former Director General of International Affairs)

There is KOSAD and KPC in Korea…we have the KOSAD and KPC.

(a KOC Executive Committee member)
Although the KOC/KSC has employed people with physical impairments in order to comply with the government recommendations, the interviewees below said that the number was not likely to be high enough due to its organisational characteristics, which is that as the KOC/KSC were so heavily engaged in physical activities, it would not be appropriate to hire people with disabilities. This point of view was supported by other members of KOC/KSC staff.

Employing people with disabilities…. Well…most of the work in this organisation involves physical activity, so it wouldn't be easy for them to work here

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

The blind would be unable to work as there are many events that require sighted people. Some people are handicapped in their mobility…

(Director of Clean Sport)

With respect to the organisation’s policy regarding the employment of people with impairments, *power of discourse* appears in this case, that is a ‘discourse of incapability’ and of horizontal segregation in that employment of people with disabilities is treated by some respondents as primarily or solely the responsibility of organisations dealing with disability sport. With respect to the achievement of equitable employment opportunities for people with impairments, most members of KOC/KSC staff claim their belief that people with disabilities are employed in sufficient numbers for the organisation to be in compliance with the regulations set by the government (though they were unable to say what the proportion required by government was). The claim that the KOC/KSC deals with physical activity and thus the disabled would not be able to work effectively in such organisations seems irrational since the tasks required of administrations do not involve participation in sports per se. the decision not to consider people with disabilities for such posts may be considered as an example of Lukes’ second dimensional power, that is of non-decision making.

6.5 Elections of KOC President & Chef de Mission

6.5.1 Introduction

The last event to be considered encompasses the election processes for both the presidency of the KOC and the post of Chef de Mission. Themes relating to the election of the KOC President in interviews are illustrated in Figure 6-11 in which there is one main tree node containing seven subordinate nodes, while for the election of the Chef de Mission there
is one main tree node including seven subordinate nodes. The analysis takes account of the interviewees’ perspectives on the election process and the ways will be identified in which social practices and, specifically, those which relate to the Korean political context over a certain time period have impacted on the process for electing the President and Chef de Mission of the KOC. Regarding the KOC’s presidential election, the middle-ranking and senior officers were sufficiently well-informed to express an opinion but regarding the Chef de Mission elections it was only the senior officers who felt able to comment on the reality of the election process, as only senior staff are entitled to be involved in these elections.

6.5.2 Map of themes regarding selection of the KOC/KSC President

Two themes emerge with regard to the presidential election: one is the influence that the government exerts by screening the appointees to the headship of sports organisations; the other concerns the differences between election practices in reality and the KOC Statutes (see Figure 6-11).

Figure 6-11 Election of KOC President
6.5.3 Explanations of social practices

a) The Government uses its influence to appoint its close aides as the heads of sports organisations.

With respect to the election process for the KOC Presidency, the former senior KOC staff member illustrated the close connection between the KOC and the government as follows:

This is off the record but a candidate who has been screened and pre-selected by the government is encouraged or even urged by them to stand for the presidency. As he/she thinks that the government is giving its backing to their candidature, they can run for the presidency with confidence. Since the person recommended by the government has to be elected, there have been heaps of cases like that.

(the former Director General of International Affairs)

The implication of his statement is that the government exerts a profound influence on the KOC’s presidential election process since it usually makes one of its close aides run for that post. He added that even when the candidate has merely been encouraged to stand for election by the government, he/she can be confident of winning. His claim that there had been ‘heaps of cases like that’ indicates that many KOC Presidents were former close aides of the State President. Another female KSC staff member also stated that, in her opinion, the government could exercise its direct influence on the election:

(what kind of process does the election of the President follow?) The outcome is not actually decided at a higher level – it’s more of a case of pushing the chosen person forward. Someone is virtually parachuted into the position. (who do you mean by the ‘higher level’?) The State President! Government and sports are inseparable.

(a female KSC staff member)

The inference to be drawn from her account is that the presidential election has been conducted as a virtually ‘token’ exercise and that, as a result, an aide of the State President is selected as the KOC president. Both respondents above shared the idea that the government was the most powerful entity in the selection of the KOC president and the government sent a political ally to be a candidate for the presidency and helped him/her to win the election. When the former officer said that ‘the person recommended by the government has to be elected’, he asserted that the government used its power directly in
the election.

The interviewee below pointed out that the presidency of the Korea Sports Promotion Foundation (KSPO) is another example of an appointment made at the direction of the government.

Now, Lee’s administration has newly been launched, hasn’t it? It means that someone from Lee’s government will come here, as the President of the KSPO...(what do you mean by ‘here’?) the KSPO.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

As stated earlier, the KSPO is the sporting organisation which is allowed to look after a wide range of profitable businesses, from the lottery to horse racing. This informant above implied that since it produces a huge amount of funds, the KSPO can be a good financial resource for the government and, as a result, its president has always been appointed by the government.

The aspect of clientelism also appears in the KOC context since the government habitually appoints its political aides to be the heads of various sporting organisations such as the KOC/KSC and the KSPO. In the case of the KSPO, it is observable that the chairman of the KSPO was directly appointed by the State President. However, the KOC/KSC holds a meeting of the General Assembly of Representatives to elect a president and, thus, it seems that the government’s power does not affect the presidential election. Nevertheless, according to the staff members of the KOC/KSC interviewed, the government does in fact impact on the decision-making of the Representatives of NFs and, as a result, the candidate who was encouraged by the government has regularly been elected President. This shows that the government’s manipulation of the KOC/KSC election is conducted behind the scenes, in an indirect and largely ‘unobservable’ way.

b) Divergence in practice from the Statutes

One factor that has to be taken into consideration is that the Statutes of KOC tell us a different story. Interestingly, under these terms, the election should be carried out by a secret ballot of the representatives of the National Federations in the General Assembly of Representatives. The KSC staff member below admitted that, although they followed the election process as indicated in the Statutes, the fact was that the Constitution was one thing
and the reality was something else.

(What you said is a different story from the Constitution?) [This part is in connection with the interview by a female KSC staff member above who addressed her opinion on the Presidency of KOC] What does it say about it? (the President is elected at the General Assembly) Right… that’s correct. But… But it doesn’t work in the way it’s written. It may correspond formally with those articles but everything is actually worked out beforehand. There is a political logic to it.

(a female KSC staff member)

According to Article 14 of the Statutes of the KOC, revised on 29.March, 2006 and concerning the manner of electing the President:

① Those who wish to be candidates for the presidential election should submit a certain type of application form to the administration for its registration and the administration should announce the registration of the candidates no later than four days before the General Assembly. (fully amended on 16.May.2002)
② The candidate should be a person who possesses intelligence, virtue, and good experience and should either make a contribution or a commitment to domestic sports promotion and the Olympic movement. (fully amended on 16 May, 2002)
③ The president is elected by a secret ballot in the General Assembly of Representatives.

According to Article 26 of the Statutes of the KOC ‘the election of the President’, revised on 29.June, 2009 :

- The President is elected in the General Assembly of Representatives.
- Those who wish to run for the Presidential election must receive references from as many as five representatives
- The manner of election follows this procedure:
  1. The election of the President follows a secret ballot and the one who wins more than half of the votes cast by the representatives attending is elected as the president. (101-8)
According to the KOC Statutes, there is no provision for governmental involvement and the result of the secret ballot is fully dependent on the representatives of NFs. Although the formal requirements of the Statutes are adhered to and the formal requirements of democracy are achieved, the KOC staff members argued that the State President was the one who decided who should be the KOC President. This may tend to indicate that the National Federations are also unable to avoid falling under government influence and, as a result, this acts presumably as a restriction on their autonomy. The Statutes can be described as being an ‘observable phenomenon’ but the underlying power of the government is ‘unobserved’. This is evidence once more that, as a social practice, ‘election’ to such senior posts tends to be a reflection of the power of the political elite, the State President, and that despite appearances voting reflects this.

Two different views are rehearsed of the elections for the KOC Presidency. Some actors shall give the ‘formal’ story arguing that the KOC has preserved its democratic processes and independence from the government, while others suggest that the government has ‘interfered’ or intervened unduly in the KOC’s affairs.

**The KOC/KSC is independent from the government**

From one middle-ranking KSC officer’s perspective, the KOC/KSC has maintained the democratic status given to it by the Korean Government in that the KOC/KSC President has always been elected by the representatives of the National Federations:

The selection of the President follows a process of secret balloting. Our government is never involved in it. I would say that we are proud of this. According to the IOC amendments, the government should not interfere in the NOC’s business but should give freedom to it.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

He affirms his strong belief in the KOC/KSC’s independence. On the grounds that the election of the president is conducted in the form of a secret ballot by the Representatives of the General Assembly he views this as adherence to democratic processes and reason for pride. He also gives the example of the IOC’s recommendations concerning the proper relationship between the government and the NOC and he implied that the KOC had conformed to the IOC recommendations without any government interference.
The KOC/KSC is dependent on the government

The next interviewee argued that the situation could be different depending on the actual selection process:

Some people put more emphasis on the aspect whereby the Representatives of the General Assembly select our President, while others focus on the other aspect and say that our government is actually involved in controlling the elections. Those who say that we are strongly independent from our government care about the image that we show to the outside world. As our President is supposedly elected by the Representatives of our General Assembly and is endorsed by the government, that wouldn’t be a problem. However, the question arises as to whether a candidate who doesn’t have the government’s backing can still be elected to the General Assembly of Representatives. In fact, there are many representatives of National Federations who are under the power of the government.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

This interviewee’s implication is that without ‘government’s backing’ none of the candidates should be elected in the General Assembly. He even suggests that ‘caring about the image’ was the reason of their insistence on the ‘myth’ of the KOC/KSC’s independence. The government has exercised its power over sporting organisations by placing a close aide of the State President in the organisations’ presidency. As the interviewee above claimed, in this way, the government has been able to secure its power over those organisations.

6.5.4 Map of themes regarding selection of the Chef de Mission (CDM)

The second analysis concerns the process for choosing the Chef de Mission, comments about which were also provided by, mainly, senior staff in both organisations. Unlike the process for electing the president of the KOC where the most influential stakeholder(s) was seen to be external to the organisation, in the CDM elections it was internal stakeholder(s) who exerted the greatest influence. The emerging theme is the KOC President’s absolute power over the process for selecting a CDM, which provides a different perspective on the aspect of democracy and transparency, as illustrated in Figure 6-12.
6.5.5 Explanations of social practices

a) KOC President’s absolute power in the selection of CDM

In the case of the selection of the CDM only senior officers provided detailed answers as they were entitled to attend the meeting. In fact, four senior staff had witnessed the internal practice involved in the appointment of a Chef de Mission. Their responses were divided into two categories in connection with the different perspectives taken on the degree to which the CDM’s selection could be said to be democratic and transparent. It transpired from the discussion that democracy and transparency are major issues in the selection of a CDM and, thus, these respondents are divided into two categories: those who maintained that there was neither democracy nor transparency, and those who stated that the process was partly democratic and transparent.

The figure 6-12 shows that the CDM is selected at a presidential meeting. The interviewees answered that the government did not bring any influence to bear and it was solely the KOC/KSC President’s right to manage the process. The two respondents below explained the selection process for the CDM.
The procedure is based around a residential meeting, with the Secretary General of the KSC and Secretary General of the KOC [before the KOC/KSC merger], President of the KOC/KSC holds a breakfast meeting together

(a senior KSC staff member)

The gathering with the vice-members is called the presidential meeting. The Secretary General participates too…During the breakfast meeting [presidential meeting] his/her name [of candidate] is mentioned…then they [two Secretary Generals before the KOC/KSC merger] naturally agree to it. (do the Director Generals attend it too?) They participate but do not really have a say.

(the former Director General of International Affairs)

As explained by those informants, the presidential meeting usually convened with the KOC/KSC President, the Secretary Generals of both the KSC and the KOC and the Director Generals of each department present, and it was held as a type of breakfast meeting.

There are the vice-presidents of NFs, who have never attended the Olympic Games. For the winter Olympics, the ones from the Federations with winter entries are usually present… one of them is internally chosen and is then promoted to Chef de Mission by the Executive Committee which approves and announces it.

(a senior KSC staff member)

By this account, the CDM for the winter Olympic Games was selected from the winter sports’ NFs while the CDM for the summer Olympic Games came from the summer sports’ NFs. The candidates should not have occupied the post of CDM before. This gives the impression that each NF president took it in turn to be the CDM. With regard to the number of people involved in the decision making, these interviewees pointed out that only high-ranking officers were involved in the presidential meeting.

However, in terms of those senior officials’ involvement in the actual decision-making, the responses were divided into two points of view. While one interviewee focused on the participation in the presidential meeting, the other interviewees all argued that the meeting was a ritual formality. The interviewees agreed that their involvement in decision-making was almost none. This was discussed from two perspectives in relation to the aspect of democracy and transparency.
Partial democracy and transparency

Those who believed in the senior staff’s involvement in decision-making put the emphasis on the process of selection of CDM and observed that only the most senior staff members could attend the presidential meeting to convey their opinions to the KOC/KSC president.

The director’s opinion is heard. The opinion of the Secretary General is also heeded… but the final decision is made by the president… (is there any case where someone else is consulted?) Within the organisation, the president tries to listen to various opinions. He speaks with the Secretary General about it, with the advisors and so on. As there is a high level of confidentiality about it…it is possible that certain standards and qualifications can cause external pressures too…

(the former Director General of International Affairs)

His statement indicates that the most senior staff members were able to deliver their opinions actively to the president, which implies that the selection of the CDM was carried out in compliance with democratic and transparent principles to some extent. As high-ranking officials are presented in the meeting, this respondent claims that a certain level of transparency and democracy is achieved despite its high level of confidentiality in order to avoid external pressures.

Neither democracy nor transparency

Some senior staff claimed, on the other hand, that their participation in the presidential meeting was simply a ‘token’ gesture. From the first interviewee’s point of view, the presidential meeting gave the KOC/KSC president the opportunity to secure his own choice of CDM instead of having to gather the suggestions of a wider group of advisors.

Director Generals or those departments in charge of international affairs cannot contribute their opinions. There’s a presidential meeting. There, we discuss who is to become Chef de Mission this time. It’s decided in advance…through the presidential meeting…The president is probably able to decide in his own mind who he wants…You can’t really say anything in front of the others at the presidential meeting…

(a senior KSC staff member)
The next interviewee also asserted that the selection of the CDM was wholly dependent on the KOC/KSC President and that none of the participants in the presidential meeting would contest the president’s verdict:

> Usually they say “we’ll entrust the president with the appointment”…then the president says “I think ~~~ will be adequate for this occasion. What do you think?” then after answering “Sure” they give a round of applause and the business is over. No voting. (anyone against that?) No…(any objections?) Not at all… after all, it’s all decided by the president.

(a senior KSC staff member)

(Who’s the most influential stakeholder in that?) more or less the opinion of the president …During the breakfast meeting [presidential meeting] his/her name is mentioned…then we naturally agree to it. We participate but do not really have a say.

(the former Director General of International Affairs)

It can be inferred from these comments that the KOC/KSC senior staff all believed that the CDM should be selected by the president as usual and they accepted it as a practice. Other respondents also agreed that everything was done ‘according to the scenario’. The previous responses claim that the President held the presidential meeting as a ritual only, but that he was the actual decision maker.

> Usually according to the scenario, if we don’t have anyone specific in mind, then we just go with the flow, unless there’s any flaw in the person suggested by the President…

(a senior KSC officer)

Thus, the group of interviewees who claimed a lack of democracy and transparency emphasised the fact that the participation of presidential meeting per se should not be seen as the aspects of democracy or transparency as it was a ‘token’ practice. An interesting point to make might be that one of the interviewees describes the President as asking “what do you think?” but this is not a real invitation to respond.

Overall, the process of selection of Chef de Mission is a good illustration of *power over discourse* in that the KOC President existed as the main actor in decision-making of CDM.
Even though the Director Generals are invited in the meeting, they are excluded in the actual decision-making. The beliefs of the Director Generals are also obvious that the selection of CDM is a president's absolute role and these high-ranking officers do not give rise an opposite idea on that.

6.6 Conclusion from a critical realist's perspective

In the overall analysis of the four events it is evident that social events are generated by a complex causal nexus that involves both causations by actors and by the social structure. In terms of the 'stratified ontology' of critical realism, the unobservable deep structure is shown to be real in Korean society by the social practices exhibited in the four events as summarised in Table 6-2 below:

Table 6-2 The stratified ontology of critical realism in terms of four events

<table>
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<th><strong>Empirical</strong></th>
<th><strong>Actual</strong></th>
<th><strong>Real</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The KOC/KSC merger</strong></td>
<td>The KSC and the KOC have merged into one sporting organisation with allegedly equal status.</td>
<td>The KSC’s position is internally more secure than that of the KOC. The Korean government opposed the merger. The incumbent President of the KSC/KOC, who is an economic tycoon, pushed ahead his economic power in urging for the integration of the two organisations. The joining of KOC/KSC can be seen as having taken place by a process of absorption.</td>
<td>The government, in particular, the State President is the highest and most influential organisation in decision-making in Korean sport policy in the pre-existing structure of the KOC/KSC’s financial dependency on the government has resulted in a situation where the government has been able to ‘interfere’ greatly in the KOC/KSC’s business activities and its overall decision-making on sports policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Budget planning</strong></td>
<td>The KOC/KSC has a structure that renders it dependent on the government in terms of its acquisition of resources gaining and that the General Assembly of Representatives has the right to approve the size of the budget and its business content.</td>
<td>The governmental body, MCST, does not allow the KOC/KSC to generate its own funding. The KOC is also structurally dependent on the KSC as the KSC is the main organisation in budget planning. The General Assembly of Representatives is a ‘token’ practice in the process of budget planning.</td>
<td>The economic power has also been closely associated with politics and business leaders have been able to exercise as much power as politicians.</td>
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### Election of KOC President
- Anyone can be run for presidency of the KOC/KSC and the president is selected by means of secret ballot at the General Assembly of Representatives.
- The government encourages its political allies to run for the presidency and most likely, those candidates are successfully selected through the form of election in the General Assembly of Representatives, which is a ‘token’ practice.

### Selection of CDM
- The KOC/KSC President and high-ranking officers are involved in the selection of the CDM through a presidential meeting.
- The KOC/KSC president is the one who decides CDM.
- High-ranking officers do not have much chance to contribute to decision-making.
- The KOC/KSC President is the most influential stakeholder in the decision-making within the organisation.

### Gender equality/equity
- In the past, only a few female staff members were selected.
- Since 2005, equality of female staff employment has been improved at the non-managerial level but not at the managerial level.
- The IOC’s gender equality policy has triggered the KSC/KOC’s policy.
- The lack of work experience has prevented females from having the opportunity to be promoted to posts at the decision-making level.
- The issue of equity relates to ‘clerical and technical support’ and ‘administrative’ roles has resulted from the fact that the KOC/KSC is one of the umbrella organisations.
- As the pre-existing structure of cultural expectations determines that women should usually quit their jobs after marriage, the strong male-dominated organisational culture had resulted in the social phenomenon that few females succeed in being promoted to senior positions.

### Disability equality/equity
- One believes that the KOC/KSC has a sufficient number of employees with disabilities on the basis of government regulation while the other group does not agree.
- The KOC/KSC probably does not employ ‘enough’ people with disabilities as the KOC/KSC does not provide any written policy on the employment of people with disabilities.
- The main responsibility should be borne by the KOSAD/KPC
- The social structure is not favourable for people with disabilities and job opportunities are not generally open to them.
- The able-bodied staff members’ beliefs about the problems caused by the immobility of people with disabilities are factors that contribute to disability inequity.

Several aspects of the cultural contexts explain the real reality of the four events, which are the KOC/KSC merger, the budget planning, the election of KOC President and selection of CDM, gender and disability equity. The government is the highest and most influential
organisation in decision-making in Korean sport policy in the pre-existing structure of the KOC/KSC’s financial dependency on the government has resulted in a situation where the government has been able to interfere greatly in the KOC/KSC’s business activities and its overall decision-making on sports policy. Thus, the government has much influenced its power in choosing its ally in the election of the KOC/KSC President. In addition, the economic power has also been closely associated with politics and business leaders have been able to exercise as much power as politicians.

Within the KOC/KSC, the KOC/KSC President is the most influential stakeholder within the organisation as he/she has the sole power to decide the Chef de Mission and holds greater power than the representatives of the NFs. Also, the KSC’s position is internally more secure than that of the KOC owing to the KSC’s longer history and stronger authority in Korea.

Female staff were unable to build adequate careers owing to their lack of working experience, or service length. This has prevented females from having the opportunity to be promoted to posts at the decision-making level. This situation, which has resulted from the social structure in Korea, means that, in general, there are ‘clerical and technical support’ and ‘administrative’ posts in the public services sector, including the KSC/KOC, which is one of the umbrella organisations. From this, the real is that Korean society has placed this impediment in the way of women’s career development. Most clerical and technical support posts are allocated to women, because women have traditionally been regarded as being less capable than men. As the pre-existing structure determines that women should usually quit their jobs after marriage, men naturally accept it without question and, in turn, the effect of this on the organisational culture of the KOC is to reinforce its highly male-dominated culture.

In terms of disability equity, although there is the government regulation that the KOC/KSC should employ people with disabilities up to a certain percentage, the able-bodied staff members’ beliefs about the problems caused by the immobility of people with disabilities are factors that contribute to disability inequity. Coupled with the view that the main responsibility should be borne by the KOSAD/KPC, these attitudes are drawn from the domain of the real, where the social structure is not favourable for people with disabilities. Job opportunities are not generally open to them and they are still ignored by society.
Based on the analysis of the KOC/KSC’s four events, seeking to reveal the real social structure of Korea, the analysis of corporate governance of the KOC in the next chapter mainly focuses on if the KOC’s practices reflect the principles of corporate governance recommended by the IOC which are constructed in a western context. Therefore, the analysis identifies how the corporate governance of the KOC is interpreted in a cultural aspect of Korea which is located in a non-western context.
7 Corporate Governance of the KOC

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter the corporate governance of the KOC is examined on the basis of the key principles and their operationalisation discussed in Chapter Four and also draws upon stakeholder theory in relation with accountability. It enquires whether the KOC’s practice can be said to reflect/respect the principles of corporate governance recommended by the IOC and it evaluates the ways in which these are interpreted in the KOC context. Thus, the main purposes of this chapter consist not only in the analysis of the KOC’s corporate governance but also an analysis of the ways in which corporate governance is perceived in Korean society. In association with the previous chapter where four events/processes of the KOC were studied in order to gain an understanding of how that organisation is governed, the present chapter takes account of evidence obtained from more detailed interviews and documentary analysis in the attempt to reveal similarities and/or differences between the KOC and the IOC in their governance practices. Unlike the previous chapter, the title ‘KOC’ covers both the KSC and the KOC (since these two organisations were merged) but rather the analysis undertaken is between the IOC and the KOC. However, the interviewees are still distinguished from these two organisations for a consistency of interviewees’ identity.

7.2 Accountability

Nine operationalisations under three definitions of accountability will be examined in this section, as Table 7-1 below.

Table 7-1 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A member of the Executive Committee should comply with rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ needs.</td>
<td>- To whom is the NOC accountable?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To what extent are stakeholders included in the decision-making?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Does the NOC indicate rules and regulations that an Executive Committee member should comply with?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How often is the General Assembly meeting held?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Is an annual report open to scrutiny by the General Assembly?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Is the election of officers &amp; members undertaken by the General Assembly?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the Executive Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there an independent audit? &amp; how often is an audit held?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the NOC have an effective programme for managing the auditing?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the NOC produce and provide enough references which encompass all of the financial statements?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit.

Under the first definition by which ‘a member of the Executive Committee should comply with rules and regulations as well as stakeholders’ needs’, the first suggested question is ‘To whom is the KOC accountable?’ The responds enable identification of the official and unofficial stakeholders of the KOC. According to the following four respondents, these stakeholders consist of the KOC-related sporting organisations and/or individuals officially represented as stakeholders.

There is no doubt that we should be accountable to the NFs and athletes as well.

(a senior KOC officer)

Local branches, the NFs, and the athletes

(a junior KOC staff member)

The NFs, Local Branches, which means all sporting organisations in connection with the KOC, and the IOC

(a junior KOC staff member)

The IOC

(a junior KOC staff member)

The individuals and/or groups of stakeholders recognised by the informants above are the KOC-affiliated organisations such as the NFs, the local branches and the athletes themselves, which are perceived as the main subjects in Korean sport as shown in Figure 7-1 below. The IOC is also recognised to be an important stakeholder by the interviewees above and the KOC, since it is the headquarters of the Olympic Movement which directly influences the KOC’s sport policy and, thus, the KOC staff members said that they should be accountable to the IOC. Figure 7-1, which is officially published by the KOC, shows that the IOC, ANOC, OCA, FISU, IFs and AFs are the main stakeholders at an international level,
while the General Assembly, the Executive Committees, NFs and Local Branch Offices perform the leading roles at the domestic level. The stakeholders of KOC/KSC listed below are all categorised as forming a group of ‘primary’ stakeholders, where ‘primary’ is used to denote a formal and official relationship with the organisation. This implies that the staff members of the KOC interviewed for this study are indeed able to recognise their official stakeholders as indicated in the statements of the organisation.

Figure 7-1 The KOC organisation

Nevertheless, while the next group of interviewees also agreed that the KOC should be accountable to the athletes and their affiliated sporting organisations, on the other hand, they also expressed the opinion that it should be accountable to the government and/or the governmental sporting organisation, the MCST and the KSPO respectively, which have been the main financial providers (see also Chapter 6).

Of course, we should be accountable to athletes the most. In reality, however, the MCST should not be ignored either.

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

The NFs and our local branches are our top priority, and we also have a closer relationship with the Korean Government and the KSPO as well.

(the former senior KOC staff member)
We should be accountable to all sporting organisations and athletes. They should come in the first place in our consideration. The next should be the Korean people and our government (the former senior KSC staff member).

Interestingly, these governmental bodies do not appear on the official organisation diagram (see Figure 7-1). However, through the analysis of four events of the KOC conducted in the previous chapter, it has emerged that governmental bodies are the most powerful stakeholders in sport policy in Korea. The list of stakeholders of the KOC which may be drawn up on the basis of an analysis of documents and interviews can be markedly different from that given in the KOC’s Table (Fig.7-1).

As discussed earlier, stakeholder theory is concerned with two aspects (see Chapter Two): decision-making and ethics. The process of decision-making is a source of insights into the power relations among stakeholders in order to identify the ethical principles of corporate governance. The relations between the MCST as the umbrella organisation and major sporting organisations in Korea, which were drawn from the analysis of documents and interviewees’ comments earlier, helps to clarify the position of the MCST as the most influential and powerful stakeholder. This implies that sports policy in all sporting organisations is likely to be influenced by policies driven by the Korean government. Also, as the KOC is a national sporting organisation, normative stakeholder theory may be brought to bear on it concerning the reasons why the KOC “ought to consider stakeholder interests in the absence of any apparent benefit” (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: 31). This is used to interpret the function of the KOC and to identify moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation and management of organisation.

The second question to be addressed is, ‘To what extent are stakeholders included in the decision-making?’ As analysed in the previous chapter, the government-related organisations, in particular, the State President and the MCST are deeply involved in decision-making. Although the KSPO is another financial resource provider, it is also an organisation that falls under the umbrella of the MCST and, in fact, the President of KSPO is appointed by the State President. These aspects indicate that the KSPO is also dependant on the MCST’s decision-making. Accordingly, it can be said that the KSPO’s influence is quite negligible in its effect on the decision-making of the KOC and, therefore, the government is the most powerful stakeholder in decision-making.
In addition, Article 13 of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 4) regarding ‘General Assembly Members’ states that:

(1) General Assembly members are as follows:
A. IOC members with Korean nationality;
B. Presidents of the Full Member organizations as set out in Article 10(1) of these statutes; and
C. A representative from the athletes.

There are two groups of stakeholders. The NFs can participate in decision-making by means of their right to vote in the General Assembly of Representatives. However, as discussed earlier, the KOC President is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives and this may limit the extent to which the representatives of the NFs may be involved in decision-making. In the case of the athletes, their representative is officially included in the highest decision-making assembly, but having only a single representative restricts their influence greatly. Furthermore, there seems to be no official channel for Local Branches to participate in decision-making since their right to do so is not formally confirmed in any of the relevant documents. Furthermore, Article 16-5 of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 5) indicates that:

The General Assembly may only vote on agenda that have been notified to its members in advance. However, if the entire body of members attending agrees, the General Assembly may discuss and vote on other agenda.

The General Assembly can usually deal with agenda which have been confirmed prior to the meeting but if all of its members’ are in agreement, an alternative agenda may be discussed and voted on. This may restrict the members’ ability to express their opinions candidly, because the environment for debate seems to be less open and this seems to constrain a free exchange of views. Ironically, although the KOC staff members all recognised the need for the KOC to be accountable, as a first priority, to the NFs, the local branches and the athletes, the government-related organisations are undeniably the most influential stakeholders in the decision-making over sports policy.

This implies that the KOC is ostensibly willing to follow the lead given by the Olympic Movement and to be accountable to its major stakeholders, such as the NFs, Local Councils and the athletes. Nevertheless, the interviewees and documents above claimed that the
KOC shows a tendency to be more strongly accountable to the Korean government, which is identified as the most influential stakeholder in decision-making. In particular, although stakeholders should not interfere in the management of sporting organisations, the State President and the governmental body seem to directly exert their power over decision-making in sports policy in the Korean context. This difference in the way in which the policy of accountability is implemented by comparison with a western context follows to some extent the advice of the IOC which encourages the NOCs to keep a harmonious relationship with their governments. In summary, therefore, although the KOC’s interpretation of accountability is similar to that recommended by the Olympic Movement in respect of the list of important stakeholders to whom it should be accountable its implementation is exercised in certain aspects that are at variance with IOC recommendations.

Another matter for consideration is ‘whether or not the KOC indicates rules and regulations that the Executive Committee members should comply with’. The KOC sets forth the relevant rules and regulations in both The Code of Conduct of Employees and The Statutes of KOC. With regard to the requirement that ‘the Executive Committee members should comply with stakeholders’ needs’, the KOC states it clearly through Articles 11 to 13 of the Code of Conduct (2007: 3). Article 11 regarding ‘Respect Stakeholders’ puts it in the following terms:

> Employees and Executive Board members should be aware of the fact that stakeholders are the very reason of KOC existence and that satisfying stakeholders is the objective of KOC, therefore employees and Executive Board members should respect, think with and prioritise its stakeholders.

Article 12 concerning ‘Stakeholder Satisfaction’ declares that:

1) Employees and Executive Board members should be committed to delivering the best performance and service to fully satisfy stakeholders’ needs based on the accurate understanding of stakeholders’ demands and expectations.

2) Employees and Executive Board members should be well prepared to humbly accept stakeholders’ proposals by carefully listening to their opinion while swiftly and fairly responding to their complaints.
Article 13 concerning the ‘Protection of Stakeholder’s Interests’ says that:

1) Employees and Executive Board members should value and protect the assets, intellectual property rights, confidential sales information, and personal information of stakeholders. Employees and Executive Board members should not undermine stakeholder’s interests with their immoral behaviour.

2) Employees and Executive Board members should swiftly deliver accurate information which customers should know or have the right to know.

In the case of compliance with rules and regulations, Article 8 states with regard to ‘Compliance’ of the Code of Conduct (2007: 3) that:

Employees and the Executive Board members should comply with laws and regulations related to their business tasks and work based on their conscience pursuing fairness and justice.

As detailed above, the KOC code clearly expresses a determination to ensure that the Executive Committee members and employees obey the laws and regulations given to them and fulfil the stakeholders’ needs. Thus, the KOC’s specification for the operationalisation of accountability is clearly similar to that contained in the Olympic Movement’s core documents.

The fourth question is ‘How often is the General Assembly held?’ Although the Statutes of KOC (2009) state that the highest level of decision-making should be the General Assembly of Representatives, there is no comment on how frequently meetings of the Assembly should be held. According to item (1) of Article 16 which is concerned with the ‘Ordinary General Assembly and Extraordinary General Assembly’ (2009: 6), “the President of the KOC shall call a General Assembly within two months from the closing of the fiscal year”. This implies that the Executive Committee meetings should be held at least once each year and that the number of meetings can also be determined by the KOC president.

In response to the question ‘Is an annual report open to scrutiny by the General Assembly?’ although none of the interviewees or documents directly raised this issue, the annual report is easily found on the KOC website and is, in fact, open to the public. In terms of the history and the nature of contents, given that the KOC provides two websites written in both English and Korean, a wide range of information on finance, business activities, the budget proposal,
business report, business plan, the activities of the Executive Committee have been open to public domestically on a regular basis. More specifically, as the KOC is one of governmental sporting organisations under the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, the KOC has been obliged to provide the information on The Business Plan, The Business Report and The Goals of Management on the ALIO system which is operated by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). For reference, the Aio System (All Public Information In One) provides a document titled ‘경영공시’ or ‘Gyeong Young Gong Shi’, which is a programme releasing a wide range of relevant documents concerning all governmental organisations (see also Chapter on Methodology).

On the other hand, an English-written annual report has been officially provided since 2011 and in fact, only the 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports have been so far available to the public. Regarding the Annual Report in English version the contents are follows: mission of KOC, financial statement, monthly highlights in 2010, participation in international sports events, domestic sports activities, the Olympic Movement, youth exchange programs between NOCs, bidding for 2018 Olympic & Paralympic Winter Games, support for National Governing Bodies, KOC marketing and National Federations & major sports events. While the Korean-written website covers more various official documents such as the results of audits on the KOC itself and National Federations, the Korean Customer Satisfaction Index on the KOC as a public organisation and the like, the English version is relatively simpler without these documents. The implication is here that the Korean site is officially open to meet the domestic requirement as a governmental organisation, whereas the English version is limited to provide some important elements, i.e. finance report.

However, when it comes to transparency in relation with finance in the Korean website, the finance status is likely to be transparent as the resources are mainly given by the Korean government and the KOC’s obligation to report to the government. Moreover, most reports are simply a description rather than following an evaluation form. The inference is that the KOC implements a policy of accountability that was constructed by the IOC in a western context as providing a report represents a minimal requirement of the accountability. However, the actual information on these main elements should be more evaluated rather than just delivering the information ‘per se’.

Another question concerning a point of operationalisation is ‘Is the election of officers and members undertaken by the General Assembly?’ As discussed in Chapter 6, regarding the
election of the KOC President, the election of the President and Executive Committee members should be approved by the General Assembly and in this way too the interpretation of accountability is in tune with the western one. However, several KOC officials have revealed that in fact the pre-eminent power lies with the Korean government, which influences the election of the KOC President. Moreover, Executive Committee members are chosen by the KOC President without necessarily obtaining the agreement of the General Assembly. Thus, the procedures for the selection of high officials in the KOC are interpreted rather differently in the Korean context, where the KOC President holds the overriding power. These ‘appointments’ do not appear to be competence-based, since no inference described them in these terms. Rather the implication seems to have been that appointments reflected political sensitivities.

The second and third definitions of accountability are related to the audit requirement: ‘A group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the Executive Committee’; and ‘an organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit.’ The operationalisations of the former definition should answer two sets of questions satisfactorily, i.e. ‘Is there an independent audit?’, ‘How often is the audit held?’ and ‘Does the NOC have an effective programme for managing the auditing?’ In their responses, two interviewees informed us about the frequency of auditing and the position of the auditors with relation to the KOC.

There are two auditors within the Executive Committee. When they conduct an audit, we support them.

(a senior KSC staff member)

We have two auditors on the Executive Committee. They conduct an internal audit every year. There is auditing of the financial and administrative aspects. One of them is an accountant and the other belongs to one of the NFs... (Do you think that the internal audit is conducted properly?) I can’t say that it has been done properly. Financial auditing takes quite a long time but administrative auditing takes only a few days.

(a senior KSC staff member)

According to these respondents, two auditors who belong to the Executive Committee members are responsible for performing the internal audit which is held once each year.
While the two interviewees said that the two auditors belonged to the Executive Committee, Article 25 of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 7), which concerns ‘Officers’, lists two auditors and separates them out from the Executive Committee:

The KOC Officers consist of the following:
1. One President;
2. Fifteen or more but not more than twenty, members of the Executive Board with no more than five Vice-Presidents included; and
3. Two Auditors.

Seemingly, although the two auditors are not included in the Executive Committee, the KOC staff members regard them as being on the same level as the Executive Committee members. The next respondent explained what constitutes an internal audit:

Our internal auditors usually scrutinise our administrative tasks. For example, as the KOC has been a single organisation since 2009, [they consider] whether or not the KOC’s business has been carried out properly, or a financial aspect has been well executed... like that.

(a KSC staff member)

This interviewee said that the two internal auditors mainly dealt with the KOC’s administrative tasks rather than assessing the work of the Executive Committee ‘per se’. None of these three informants above said that there are auditors who oversee the Executive Committee members’ activities and performance. Article 28-4 concerning ‘Duties’ in the Statutes of KOC (2009: 9) states that ‘auditors are responsible for auditing accounting records and the conduct of business’. The implication of this account is that the auditors’ power is limited to the auditing of the internal business and administration and, thus, audits of the performance of the Executive Committee are either not conducted or not a priority. Another respondent also claims that there used to be, in addition, an external audit:

We used to be audited annually by the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. However, the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea no longer audits us as we are an organisation under the umbrella of the MCST, so it now only audits the MCST. When there is something that is related to us, we may need to answer their questions but it is not official.
None of the KOC’s official documents makes any reference to the conduct of external audits. This is further evidence that the KOC has obviously been treated as one of the MCST’s dependent sporting organisations for which reason the KOC is not itself subject to an external auditing system. Thus, although the KOC recognises that having in place a proper auditing system is an essential condition if it is to live up to the IOC’s recommendations, the auditing system and its detailed operationalisation within the actual context of the KOC’s practice is perhaps less direct and visible than it has been.

Another question posed to the interviewees was ‘Does the NOC produce and provide enough references which encompass all of the financial statements?’ A KSC staff member insisted that a clear and transparent set of data would invariably provide for the members of the audit team:

(To what extent do you provide documents to the auditors?) All documents should be opened to the auditors. They should know everything.

(a female KSC staff member)

This point is reinforced in a KOC document where employees and Executive Committee members are required to make financial management documents accessible for scrutiny. The KOC foresees this situation in the Code of Conduct (2007: 8) as below:

**Article 32 (Transparent accounting management)**

Accounting records or other financial management should be accurately, and transparently recorded and managed based on facts, according to the law and to generally accepted accounting principles.

Since all relevant documents should be opened to the auditors, this can be also related with the aspect of transparency which can be improved by this practice, according to the KOC’s own guidance. Nevertheless, although the Code of Conduct requires above that the financial statement should be made accessible and should be transparently recorded, none of the documents mentions to what extent the financial information was really provided and made open to scrutiny.
In the IOC’s interpretation developed in a western context, the existence and role of an independent and qualified audit committee is seen as an important aspect of accountability, as demonstrated in the literature and in major documents in the Olympic Movement. By contrast, the KOC is unlikely to have a well-formed internal auditing team. There are only two internal auditors whose function is quite limited in the KOC, in comparison with the recommendation of the IOC. As the KOC is a governmental sporting organisation, its auditing system is also dependent on the government, and as a result, it is unable to use its own system. This is also explained by the fact that the government is the principal and most influential stakeholder in decision-making in sports policy in Korea. Moreover, the auditing serves in practice not to scrutinise the work of the Executive Committee but the management of the KOC. Therefore, the audit cannot be said to meet the highest standards.

7.3 Responsibility

Responsibility has three definitions and four operationalisations as shown in Table 7-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Executive Committee members should also balance diverging interests, power and authority.</td>
<td>Does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference to ensuring an appropriate balance of power?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Executive Committee should provide the strategic guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term viability of the organisation.</td>
<td>Does the Executive Committee clearly provide the vision and overall goals in the context of the long term viability of the organisation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring of management.</td>
<td>Does it establish and evaluate the execution of clear, adequate rules and regulations by which management should conduct its activities? Does it monitor a code of conduct and finance within the organisation?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first interpretation of responsibility is that ‘the Executive Committee members should also balance diverging interests, power and authority’ and its operationalisation may be seen in answer to the question: ‘Does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference to ensuring an appropriate balance of power?’ The KOC and the KSC used to have separate high-level decision-making bodies, namely, the Standing Committee and the Executive Committee, respectively. Although the interviews were conducted immediately after the KOC/KSC merger, this study attempts to discover whether staff members of the two
previous organisations held different opinions. The responses from the KOC staff members are as below:

I would say that each member exercises power unequally (laughter), invisibly.

(a former KOC Executive Committee member)

When they suggest a policy, they probably have an equal influence but the President of KOC may have more power because he is the President of the Executive Board.

(a former senior KOC staff member)

Well, I can’t see that their power is equal.

(an incumbent KOC Executive Committee member)

Officially yes, but I suppose that those who have been involved in the Board for a longer time than others probably have more power.

(a junior KOC staff member)

Irrespective of the position of the informants, most KOC staff members shared the common viewpoint that there may be an unequal distribution of power between members within the Standing Committee of the KOC (which is equivalent to the Executive Committee in the KSC). Moreover, the former senior KOC staff member also explained that by becoming the chairperson of the Standing Committee, the KOC President may be inferred to have acquired a greater degree of empowerment to push through his opinions. Similarly, the five KSC staff members in the following extracts from their interviews also agreed that each Executive Committee member possessed an unequal share of power on the Committee.

Power sharing is not equal among the members.

(the former senior KSC staff member)

Of course it is not equal. (laughter)

(a senior KSC officer)

Each member has the right to speak up, in principle, well… it can’t be helped as some are eager to express their ideas while others simply wish to participate in the
meeting.
(a junior KSC staff member)

I won’t say it is equal.
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

It depends on their background, where they are from and what they do….
(the former Secretary General of the KSC)

The responses obtained from the KSC staff members also conveyed a similar set of views on the distribution of ‘de facto’ power within the Executive Committee. Concerning the composition of the newly-formed Executive Committee after the KOC/KSC merger, it is mostly made up of business figures along with a few sports-related ones. This may imply that the emphasis in the new Executive Committee lies more heavily on its ability to wield power in economic rather than sporting terms. Another point not to be ignored is that two members come from the governmental body and the KSPO, which are the KOC’s main sources of financing, as listed below:

Table 7-3 A membership list of the newly-formed Executive Committee, as of 16 July 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Park Yong Sung</td>
<td>Chairman of Doosan conglomerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Kim Jung Haeng</td>
<td>President of Yong In University / Chairman of the Korea Judo Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Board Members</td>
<td>Lee Kun Hee</td>
<td>IOC member / Chairman of Samsung conglomerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mun Dae Sung</td>
<td>IOC member / the Olympic Taekwondo gold medallist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oh Dong Jin</td>
<td>President of the Korea Athletics Federation / former President of Samsung North America Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jo Joong Yun</td>
<td>President of the Korea Football Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jo Yang Ho</td>
<td>President of the Korea Table Tennis Association / CEO of Han Jin &amp; Korean Air conglomerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Choi Tae Won</td>
<td>President of the Korea Handball Federation / Chairman of SK conglomerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Jae Youl</td>
<td>President of the Korea Skating Union / President of Samsung Engineering conglomerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Byun Tak</td>
<td>President of the Korea Ski Association / Vice-President of Tae Young company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Jung</td>
<td>President of the Korea Shooting Federation / Hanwha Galleria conglomerate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lee Yoon Jae</td>
<td>President of the Korea Wushu Association</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kwon Yoon Bang</td>
<td>President of the Korean Federation of Dancesport</td>
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<td></td>
<td>You Byong Jin</td>
<td>President of the Korea University Sports Board</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shin Dong Pa</td>
<td>Vice-President of the Korea Basketball Association</td>
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</table>
The middle-ranking KOC officer who contributed to this investigation was convinced that power was distributed unequally among the members of the unified Executive Committee in the view of the presence there of an officer from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, which could be expected to be the most influential stakeholder in decision-making as it is the main financial resource provider:

Of course, they don’t share power equally. One of the Executive Committee members is the Director of the Sport Bureau of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in the newly-formed Executive Committee. He seems to express his opinion more often and to exercise more power than any of the other members

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

As demonstrated above, the findings of this study indicate that although there is a set of rules about how the Executive Committee should take decisions, in practice power is exerted by a limited member of individuals: all the interviewees’ responses pointed to the issue of an unequal power distribution. This may bring about an environment of non-decision making, which fails to involve all of the different voices from different backgrounds. In particular, athletes or the representatives of sporting organisations share only a limited place within the Executive Committee.

Whereas the IOC has encouraged NOCs to apportion power within the Executive Committee in an even-handed way as ‘de jure’, the main key persons, i.e. the President, usually hold de facto power in decision-making and it has been similarly implemented within the Korean context, where the Korean government or leading business figures are permitted to play critical roles in decision-making. The unequal power distribution, therefore, probably results from the composition of the Committee, whose members are mainly drawn from non-sports related organisations. This is also good evidence of the extent to which the government is
involved in the formation of national sports policy in Korea. Moreover, the fact that the KOC President holds a disproportionate amount of power within the organisation serves to bolster his position within the Executive Committee and, thereby, also affects the imbalanced distribution of power in the KOC.

The second definition of responsibility identified earlier is that ‘the Executive Committee should provide the strategic guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term viability of the organisation’ and its operationalisation is seen in the reply given to the question: ‘Does the Executive Committee clearly provide the vision and the overall goals for the organisation in the context of the long term viability of the organisation?’ This is well expressed in the Statutes of KOC (2009: 1), Article 3 regarding ‘Mission and Role’:

(1) The KOC shall promote public health by encouraging school sports and sport-for-all and shall contribute to enhance national prestige by supporting the sports organisations under the KOC membership and encouraging the development of high performance sports.
(2) The KOC shall have the exclusive authority over all matters pertaining to the representation of Korea at the Olympic Games and at the regional, continental or world multi-sports competitions patronised by the IOC and contribute to international cooperation and world peace by promoting the fundamental principles and values of Olympism through the Olympic Movement.
(3) The KOC shall represent the Republic of Korea in international sports organisations such as the IOC, the Association of the National Olympic Committees (the “ANOC”), and the Olympic Council of Asia (the “OCA”).
(4) The KOC shall comply with the civil laws and regulations on pertaining to an incorporated body in accordance with Article 33(7) of the National Sports Promotion Act.

While Article 3 mainly states the vision for the KOC’s long-term viability, Article 21-2 concerning ‘Composition and Functions’ of the statutes of KOC (2009: 6-7) enumerates various aspects in more detail:

The Board is responsible for discussing and voting on the following agenda:
A. Business plans and budget;
B. Reviewing the KOC’s conduct of business and financial accounting;
C. Any matters concerning the operation of various commissions under the KOC;
D. Asset acquisition and disposition;
E. Approval of the appointment of an Executive Vice-President;
F. Establishment and amendment of the KOC’s rules and regulations;
G. Any matters that have been directed by the General Assembly;
H. General Assembly agenda-setting; and
I. Other matters of importance.

Article 21-2 sets forth the wide range of responsibilities of the Executive Committee per se. Furthermore, the Executive Committee should also be responsible for agenda-setting to the General Assembly, as stated in Article 21-2 (H) above, which can be related to the question ‘does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference to ensuring an appropriate balance of power?’ In particular, the fulfilment of item H could give rise to an institutional bias if the agenda setting is mainly in the hands of the Executive Committee.

Apart from the Executive Committee, a wide range of Commissions also support the development of strategic guidance of the organisation. Article 34 concerning ‘Establishment of Commissions’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 10-1) lists those bodies below:

(1) In order to conduct its business of the KOC and fulfill its mission, the KOC may establish the following commissions as advisory bodies:
A. School Sport Commission;
B. Sport-for-All Commission;
C. International Relations Commission;
D. National Sports Festival Commission;
E. Performance Development Commission;
F. Athletes’ Commission;
G. Women and Sport Commission;
H. Culture, Environment, and Education (KOA) Commission;
I. Medical Commission;
J. Sport and Law Commission; and
K. Communications Commission.

The eleven Commissions, which were established after the KOC/KSC merger, are expected to play an important role as supplementary advisory bodies in the strategic guidance of the KOC.
Subsequently, the Executive Committee and Commissions have indeed accomplished their responsibility for advising the merged KOC and providing it with strategic guidance for its activities in the long term.

Apparently, some interviewees whose responses are recorded below were involved in, or observed, the workings of the Executive Committee of the KOC in providing a range of strategic guidance and directions for organisation’s management.

Well, we discuss and direct any business that the KOC is planning to promote and we also play a critical role in giving it a better direction.

(a KOC Executive Committee member)

The Board gives a lead on decision-making and giving approval about the KOC’s overall strategy and business. The KOC president is also a member of the Board.

(a middle-ranking female KOC staff member)

The role of the Board is mainly to make decisions about the major sports policy issues of the KOC. We staff members actually carry out tasks designated by the Executive Board.

(a female KSC staff member)

The Standing Committee of the KOC was equivalent to the Executive Board in the KSC, as the KOC and the KSC were separated previously. The function of the Standing Committee was to draw up strategic guidance.

(A senior male KOC official)

In connection with this latter comment, the third definition of responsibility states that ‘the Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring of management’ and this should be operationalised in answer to the question: ‘Does the Executive Committee establish and evaluate the execution of clear, adequate rules or regulations by which management should conduct its activities?’ As demonstrated earlier, the Statutes of KOC and a Code of Conduct are well-established to provide clear rules or regulations that the staff members should comply with. In particular, Article 21-2 (F) of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 6-7) indicates ‘Establishment and amendment of the KOC rules and regulations’ as a main responsibility of the Executive Committee.
Nevertheless, Article 3-(1) of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 1) can be discussed in terms of evaluating the achievement of the strategic guidance which covers the promotion of high performance sport, school sport and sport for all, which may be directly related to the monitoring of management. It is evident that the KOC should promote three areas of policy evidenced by the list of Commissions which includes the School Sport and the Sport for All Commissions in addition to its elite sport activities. Subsequently, three out of the fifteen respondents stated that in their opinion the KOC should consider both ‘elite sport’ and ‘sport for all’ as important aspects of its vision:

Elite sport and sport for all should both be considered as important.

(a former senior KOC officer)

The KOC has put more emphasis on elite sport but the Statutes of KOC indicate our primary goals as consisting in the development of elite sport, school sport and sport for all. The KSC used to place the main emphasis on sport for all.

(a former KSC & incumbent KOC Executive Board member)

Obviously, elite sport is receiving greater focus as a primary goal but sport for all should be given more consideration because elite athletes can be nurtured in the well-organised environment created by sport for all.

(a former KSC senior staff member)

Although they all expressed the opinion that the KOC should promote elite sport and sport for all, which are stated as strategic goals in the Statutes of KOC above, they also revealed that the KOC had mainly focused on elite sport. Apart from the three respondents above, twelve other interviewees all argued that the promotion of elite sport had been the core area of the activities of the KOC.

Of course it is elite sport that we’re concerned with and we don’t deal with sport for all.

(a former KOC Board member)

Elite sport has been at the centre of our work.

(a former senior KOC officer)
I would say elite sport.  
(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

In any case, elite sport is the one.  
(a senior KOC staff member)

As the KOC used to be called the Department of International Affairs, it may be natural for its staff members to express the view that elite sport has been the KOC’s main goal. However, the KSC staff members also stated that, in their judgement, that elite sport had clearly been the main goal of the KSC.

No matter what, we focus on it is elite sport, which bears fruit. What the government wants is medals at international sporting events, even though the government also talks about sport for all.  
(a junior KSC staff member)

Our goal is to perform in elite sport.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

At the moment, elite sport is the core mission.  
(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

Of course, elite sport. The KOC believes that high performance sport brings national glory and gives hope to Korean people, unlike sport for all.  
(a KSC staff member)

Before the KOC/KSC merger, the KOC was responsible for international affairs and the KSC was expected to play an important role in developing sport for all and school sport. However, according to the interviewees from the KSC/KOC, it is obvious that the KOC/KSC before its merger had both put much more emphasis on high-performance or elite sport. The respondents are clearly in agreement in perceiving that the Executive Committee, along with the Commissions, officially provides the vision for promoting elite sport, school sport and sport for all in accordance with the Statutes of KOC. Nevertheless, as the government also expects some visible results of sports policy, high performance sport has dealt with the most important goals at the centre of Korean sport. Moreover, despite the fact that school sport is
an area of responsibility on the list, none of the KOC interviewees raised the issue of school sport performance. This shows that the actual activities of the KOC may differ from the goals provided by the Executive Committee and the Statutes of KOC.

The IOC also considers that the issue of responsibility is an important aspect of the functioning of the Executive Committee and the interpretations of responsibility within the KOC appear to be quite similar. Specifically, the Executive Committee provides long-term strategic guidance for the organisation and, if necessary, the Commissions also help to design or provide guidance on the goals that the KOC should achieve. Several documents serve to provide clear rules and regulations such as the Statutes of KOC and a Code of Conduct. In this sense, the western notion of the concept of responsibility in governance has been well interpreted by the KOC. However, the actual activities undertaken by the KOC/KSC before merged as replied by interviewees turn out to be far from the mission proposed by the high-level decision makers. This raises a question as to whether the Executive Committee has directed and led the organisations in terms of the accomplishment of the KOC’s vision.

With regard to the last operationalisation, for which the question is: ‘*Does the Executive Committee monitor a code of conduct and finance within the organisation?*’, the Statutes of KOC and a Code of Conduct are well-established to provide clear rules or regulations with which the staff members should comply. Nevertheless, there are only two internal auditors employed to oversee the performance of management. Thus only limited monitoring by the Executive Committee can be undertaken, whereas the IOC has emphasised the importance of monitoring a code of conduct and finance as a core responsibility of the Executive Committee.

### 7.4 Transparency

This section deals with two definitions and four operationalisations with respect to transparency as Table 7-4 shows below:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitions/Interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisations should develop and provide written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all</td>
<td>- Is an organisational progress report annually released?</td>
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</table>
material matters that concern them. (If not, how often is it released?)
- Are there clear rules and procedures on how to get ‘material matters’ which are of concern on to the organisation’s agenda?
- Is any information including all regulations required open to the public/stakeholders?
- Is a financial report open to the public/stakeholders?

Organisations should open the process of decision making to all stakeholders
- Is the process of decision making open or monitored? (If so, by whom and for what purposes?)

The first definition is that ‘organisations should develop and provide written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them’ and the second one is that ‘organisations should open the process of decision-making to all stakeholders’. The operationalisations of the first definition answers the question as to ‘whether or not an organisational progress report is released annually and, if not, how often it is released’ and ‘Are there clear rules and procedures on how to get ‘material matters’ which are of concern on to the organisation’s agenda?’ In connection with this issue, Article 34 regarding ‘Transparent Information Disclosure’ of the Code of Conduct of the KOC (2007: 9) decrees that:

Employees and Executive Board members, responsible for information disclosure, should sincerely and honestly respond to any request for management information disclosure by the media and by the public in order to secure management transparency and credibility.

Thus, there is a ‘rule’ or policy relating to disclosures, but this does not deal with issues of agenda setting. Under this rule the KOC is obliged to disclose information that holds (i.e. what it has been ‘discussing’) but there is no indication of a ‘rule’ as to how items are formally considered as the Executive agenda. In other words, decision-making or information collection must be transparent, non-decisions about what will not be discussed are nevertheless not dealt with by this ‘rule’

Article 45 concerning ‘Disclosure’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 13) also adds:

The KOC shall disclose its major business plans and performance to enhance the
transparency of the organisation.

However despite the issue of non-decision making these two main documents regulating the KOC’s governance practices conveyed in general the importance of information disclosure for the enhancement of transparency. Moreover, Article 40 concerning ‘Budget Planning and Annual Report’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 12) adds:

(3) The KOC shall prepare an annual report within two months from the end of each fiscal year and submit the report to the Minister of the relevant government ministry upon the Board’s and General Assembly’s approval.

Apart from the documents, more specifically, the two KOC officers expressed their view that most management-related documents were open to the public on the KOC’s official web site.

In these days, we open up documents concerning our management through an official site, which is entitled Gyeong Young Gong Shi. This is the site that opens up all management-related documents on the site of the KOC. The less important documents are also released, though. We try to provide access to most relevant documents.

(a former senior KOC official)

We provide access to most relevant documents on the site of Gyeong Young Gong Shi on the KOC’s official web site. All management-related documents are accessible on this site. (Do you mean all of them?) Well, I would say, most of them.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

The next respondent explained why the KOC should provide access to those documents to public scrutiny.

It is necessary to open all management-related documents according to laws that all government umbrella organisations should follow.

(a senior KSC officer)

The first two informants simply deliver access the documents on the KOC’s website, while the last respondent added the phrase ‘according to laws’, which implies the force of stronger
regulations than the Statutes of KOC or the Code of Conduct. The last informant’s comment indicates that the KOC, as one of the government umbrella organisations, is obliged to improve the aspect of transparency in its management. Additional evidence in support of the claim that the KOC is an umbrella organisation is its appearance on the governmental Gyeong Young Gong Shi website. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance organises the Alio System (All Public Information In One) which annually provides a document entitled Gyeong Young Gong Shi. Under the provisions of this programme a wide range of relevant documents concerning all governmental organisations should be released to the public. Since the KOC is regarded as one of the governmental organisations, it is, thus, possible to obtain information on the KOC through the Internet site of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, www.mosf.go.kr.

The third operationalisation of the first definition supplies the answer to the question ‘whether or not any information including all regulations required is open to the public/stakeholders’. The interviewees above all declared that most management-related documents were open to the public. Nevertheless, some interviewees also admitted that some documents containing discussion of sensitive issues were not open to the public.

Open to the public? We open most documents but I think there are some that we don’t open.

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

There are documents that we usually open to the public, but there are some that we should not. (What kinds of documents are you talking about?) Something about diplomacy, I think. Well, I don’t know it well.

(a junior female KOC staff member)

As the KOC is a sporting organisation, I don’t think there are many documents on sensitive issues. However, we don’t open up documents on some issues about which a decision-making has not yet taken place.

(a junior KSC staff member)

These informants’ opinions are supported by Article 33 concerning ‘Prohibition against Information Leakage’ of the Code of Conduct (2007: 8) below:
Employees and Executive Board members should not disclose critical information acquired during the course of their work to a third party without any permission or approval of the organisation.

The official document of the KOC also stipulates that critical information should not be publicised without the permission or approval of the KOC. Consequently, although the need for transparency is mainly encouraged and respected on the part of the KOC as a government-umbrella organisation, at the same time, documents on sensitive issues are also kept secure and confidential. This interpretation of the limits to transparency as witnessed in the Korean context is shared with the Olympic Movement in general. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the category entitled ‘Confidentiality’ in the IOC Code of Ethics (2010: 3) also states that the confidentiality of certain information should be protected:

The Olympic parties shall not disclose information entrusted to them in confidence. The principle of confidentiality shall be strictly respected by the IOC Ethics Commission in all its activities. Disclosure of other information shall not be for personal gain or benefit, nor be undertaken maliciously to damage the reputation of any person or organisation.

Moreover, Article 32 regarding ‘Transparent Accounting Management’ of the Code of Conduct of the KOC (2007: 8) adds:

Accounting records or other financial management should be accurately, and transparently recorded and managed based on facts, according to laws and generally accepted accounting principles.

This ensures the transparent and accurate financial management of the KOC and this aspect is in accordance with the last operationalisation, which relates to the question: ‘is a financial report open to the public/stakeholders?’ The KOC publishes a range of annual financial documents, for instance, Business lists of budget proposal, Business plan including aspects of its finances, and the Financial report. In addition, the KOC’s official site, www.sports.or.kr, also plays a role in disclosing most finance-related information including audited financial statements on 재무현황, or Jae Mu Hyun Hwang, which is translated into English as the Status of Finance. This site is a part of Gyeong Young Gong Shi and provides most financial information.
The aspect of transparency as it has been constructed in a western context is clearly reflected by the IOC. Overall, the IOC encourages the NOCs to live up to its recommendations, according to which the sporting organisations are required to release an annual report, a financial report and other related documents to their stakeholders and the public. In compliance with this IOC recommendation, the KOC also regularly releases most main documents and financial reports to the public and its stakeholders, except for some documents which need to be kept confidential. This implies that the aspect of transparency as practised in the IOC in a western context is also interpreted in the same way in the Korean context.

The second definition of transparency by which ‘organisations should open the process of decision-making to all stakeholders’ should be operationalised in keeping with the following questions, as to ‘whether or not the process of decision-making is monitored? and if so, by whom and for what purposes?’ On the official website of the KOC, regular or annual meetings of the Executive Committee, the Commissions and the General Assembly of Representatives have been reported as a part of Gyeong Young Gong Shi. They are organised and managed by the Management Strategy Team in the KOC. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the process of decision-making is monitored. As an example, the process of selecting the Chef de Mission is not monitored and it is only open to those who attend the presidential breakfast meeting as discussed in the previous chapter (See Chapter 6). More specially, the KOC’s Executive Committee is unlikely to be effectively monitored in such a way as to avoid an unequal distribution of power. Those members who are based in governmental bodies might be able to exert stronger power than any other members. In order to achieve a situation in which power is balanced evenly, it may be necessary to open the process of decision making to all stakeholders. Similarly, none of the documents of the IOC refer to this issue (see also Chapter 4)

7.5 Democracy
As shown Table 7-5, the sets of definition and operationalisation are as follows:

Table 7-5 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of democracy

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
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<tr>
<td>It should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of high officials.</td>
<td>- What kind of system exists for elections to the Executive Committee and the Presidency? (If not, who nominates candidates for the</td>
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High officials in the organisation including President and Executive Committee members should maintain their independence from internal/external interests within the organisation.

Presidency and the Executive Committee?

- Does NOC provide clear criteria on the electoral system?
- Are high officials in NOCs independent from internal/external interests?

No matter what structure the NOC follows, either centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually decentralised in decision making.

- Is power in decision-making decentralised or centralised at a managerial level, i.e. an Executive Committee?
- To what extent are all members of each department able to be involved in decision-making process?
- Are all departments independent in decision-making?

The operationalisations are related to questions arising from the first definition, such as: ‘what kind of system exists for elections to the Executive Committee and the Presidency? and If not, who nominates candidates for the Presidency and Executive Committee?; ‘does NOC provide clear criteria on the electoral system?; and ‘are high officials in NOCs independent from internal/external interests?’ First of all, the system of selection of the Executive Committee members and the KOC President are hinted at in Article 15 regarding ‘Composition and Functions’ in the Statutes of KOC (2009: 4-5):

(2) General Assembly shall deliberate and make decisions on the following:
A. Dissolution of the KOC and any amendments of its Statutes;
B. Membership admission and expulsion;
C. Election and dismissal of KOC Officers;
D. Review of KOC’s business performance, accounting, and, other activities; and
E. Other matters of importance.

It states that the General Assembly should deliberate and make decisions on the election and dismissal of KOC officers, which implies that the General Assembly should be responsible for elections within the KOC. The KOC officers here may be the President, Secretary General, and the Executive Committee members. The Statutes of the KOC indicate that the General Assembly of Representatives is the highest decision-making in that they elect the main officers of the KOC. Nevertheless, as witnessed by the officers in the previous chapter, the election of the KOC President is more likely to be affected by the invisible power of the Korean government. The presidential election, has, in fact been conducted as a ‘token’ exercise with the result that an, aide of the State President is usually
selected as the KOC President. Thus, the government has turned out to be the most powerful entity in the selection of the KOC President. Consequently, the electoral system inside the KOC has been in effect a ‘token’ exercise and the actual power is exerted by the government to manipulate the General Assembly.

In the case of the Executive Committee Members and Secretary General, they are appointed by the KOC President without following a process of election, according to Article 44 which is concerned with the ‘Establishment and Operation’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 13):

(1) The KOC shall establish a Secretariat, and the Secretary General and employees shall perform their duties in the Secretariat.
(2) The Secretary General shall be appointed by the President with the Board’s consent and the approval of the Minister of the relevant government ministry.

In addition, Article 27 regarding ‘Appointment of Vice-Presidents, Executive Board Members and Auditors’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 8-9) indicates the following:

(1) Vice Presidents and Executive Board members shall be appointed in the General Assembly from among candidates nominated by the President. The number of Executive Board members representing sports included in the program of the Olympic Games hosted after a General Assembly called to elect the KOC Officers shall be the majority of the members with voting rights (the members with voting rights include the President and Vice-Presidents).
(2) The President may appoint one standing Vice-President among the Vice Presidents with the Board’s approval.
(3) The Auditors shall be appointed in the General Assembly. One Auditor shall be appointed from among the General Assembly Members representing a sport included in the program of the Olympic Games, and the other Auditor shall be appointed from among the certified public accountants.

The phrases ‘appointed by the General Assembly’ and ‘nominated by the President’ imply that the electoral system does not exist. The KOC President holds the power to appoint most major high-ranking officers, including the Secretary General and Executive Committee members. One thing that should be taken into consideration at this point is that the final approval is given by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. On a closer reading of the
Articles, it may be seen that even any change of the Statutes should be approved by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, as Article 47 concerning ‘Amendments’ of the Statutes of KOC (2009: 14) indicates:

Any amendments to the Statutes of the KOC shall be proposed with the Board’s approval or one-third vote of the members with voting rights and shall be approved with a two-thirds vote of the attending members and the approval of the Minister of the relevant government ministry.

As a result, the Statutes of KOC also legally admit that the governmental body is the higher decision-making body. In fact, the membership list of 37th KOC Executive Committee (see also Table 7-1), which was the first Executive Committee, as released on 16 July, 2009 after the KOC/KSC merger, includes two members of governmental organisations such as the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism and the Korea Sports Promotion Foundation. This element can also be elucidated by testimony gathered from the KOC staff members discussed in Chapter 6. As some interviewees revealed, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism decides the broad direction of sports policy in advance, which therefore affects the KOC’s decision-making structure. It is, thus, possible to say that the KOC’s high-ranking officers are not independent of its superordinate organisation, which is the Korean government. This can be an answer to the question posed about the operationalisation, namely ‘are high officials in NOCs independent from internal/external interests?’

Ironically, the Code of Conduct (2007: 5) addresses the need for a prohibition of political intervention in Article 19.1 concerning ‘Prohibition against inappropriate political intervention’:

1) Employees and Executive Board members should not illegally intervene in politics such as by joining in a specific party or politician-sponsor group.
2) Employees and Executive Board members should be careful not to cause any misunderstanding that their personal and legally-allowed political activity is in line with the political activity that the KOC pursues.

Article 19.2 of the Code of Conduct (2007: 5) regarding ‘Response to the unreasonable request by politicians’ also states that no member of the KOC, including at the working and managerial levels, should be allowed to be influenced by political parties.
1) When Employees and Executive Board members are influenced or bribed by political parties for party interests, they should report it to the President or counsel with the official guidance of the code of conduct in order to appropriately respond to it.

Although the written statements provide regulations on the election of the president by emphasising the need for independence of decision-making in accordance with the operationalisation which is ‘whether or not the NOC provides clear criteria on the electoral system of high officers’, the KOC’s written statements on this matter do not seem to provide any clear criteria on that.

Looking at the IOC’s concept of democracy in a western context, the IOC encourages NOCs to maintain harmonious relationship with their governments but to safeguard their independence from them by holding their own autonomous elections for high officials. In the Korean context, these rules and regulations are well covered in the Statutes of KOC and the Code of Conduct. Nevertheless, although the KOC provides criteria on the electoral system for the KOC Presidency, in the actual election it is more likely that the Korean government will be deeply involved and this can be explained as a consequence of the system of governance that emerges from the basis of the analysis of the election of the KOC president detailed in the previous chapter. Thus, although the interpretation of democracy in this sense is well implanted within the Korean context, its implementation cannot avoid the influence of Korean political circumstances. In fact, The KOC staff members shared the opinion that the government was the most powerful entity in the selection of the KOC President as the government sent a politically favourable person to be a candidate for the presidency and helped him/her to win the election.

Moreover, in contrast to the IOC’s recommendations that the NOC should also provide the electoral system for the Executive Board members, the Statutes of the KOC indicate that the Executive Board members and Secretary General are all designated by the KOC President with the approval of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. This also implies that the KOC is not independent from internal/external interests. At the same time, it shows that the strongest power has been with to the KOC President in the selection of most officers at the managerial level.
In accordance with the second definition, which is that ‘no matter what structure the NOC follows, either centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually decentralised in decision-making’, there are three related operationalisations namely: ‘is power in decision-making decentralised or centralised at the managerial level, i.e. the Executive Committee?’, ‘to what extent are all members of each department able to be involved in decision-making process?’ and ‘are all departments independent in decision-making?’

The first operationalisation poses the question: ‘is power in decision-making decentralised or centralised at the managerial level?’ As already discovered in the previous chapter, the decision-making process within the KOC Executive Committee is not decentralised as there is a tendency for the Committee to be in a non-decision making situation on critical issues. More specifically, the KOC President is entitled to appoint the Executive Committee members and the Secretary General, which means that the KOC president can exert his/her power to lead the decision-making in connection with his/her preferences and that decision-making is therefore centralised.

The operationalisations regarding the degree to which individual departments are centralised or decentralised in their decision-making are as follows: ‘to what extent are all members of each department able to be involved in a decision-making process?’; and ‘are all departments independent in decision-making?’ At the departmental level, there are two perspectives among the KOC staff members. Some interviewees claimed that a centralised decision-making process did indeed exit, while some argued that there was partial decentralisation in decision-making. In the former case, two respondents conveyed their views that a higher level organisation conceptualises a broader and larger-scale direction of policy and, thus, the actual decision-making is dependent on the higher level organisation from the outset.

At the departmental level we can’t make a decision but all decisions are made at the upper level. For example, in the case of the Department of International Affairs, when the IOC demands something, the KOC should comply with the IOC’s directions or plans, and the officers at the upper level in the KOC/KSC make a broad decision and then their decision will be delivered to the working level in each department.

(a former senior KOC staff member)
In the case of the business or management of the organisation, it is quite free. The big framework is set by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST), but the department can handle the detailed policy such as that of implementation and management. Of course, it should be accepted by the Secretary General.

(a KSC middle-ranking officer)

The two interviewees expressed their view that the IOC and the MCST are the main decision makers. More specifically, the IOC is the highest decision making level for the KOC staff members, while the MCST performs the same role for the KSC staff members. Nevertheless, the informants also delivered their opinion that the highest level officers in the KOC/KSC are the final decision-makers inside the organisation, for example, the President and Secretary General. As demonstrated by the views expressed by the interviewees about the KOC/KSC merger, the President of the KSC automatically defers to the KOC President. Accordingly, the KSC and the KOC both needed to have their President's final decision for them to be allowed to do their work. This perspective is supported by the next group of interviewees who demonstrated their common view of the power of the KOC President.

When the KOC President or Secretary General makes a decision, all departments should follow it.

(a former senior KOC staff member)

The decisions made in a department are delivered to the President and he might accept or reject them. In any cases, everything depends on our President.

(a former senior KSC staff member)

Decisions made by a department? Some are possibly decided at a department level but others are not. Sometimes, the Secretary General can decide but if it is an important issue, the KOC President is the final decision maker.

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

In this case, none of the staff members can give an opinion against the President's or Secretary General's decisions. So we just follow it in spite of holding different opinion.

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)
Although the final decision-maker in the organisation is the KOC President, in some cases, the Secretary General also plays a role in deciding the overall policy. These interviewees are all senior or middle-ranking officers who are in working-level positions in which they are obliged to inform the KOC President of their decisions and, in turn, the final decision-making is done by the President. Their opinion is, thus, that the KOC President or the Secretary General holds the ultimate power in decision-making, which implies the existence of a centralised decision-making structure.

The other group of respondents claims that the organisation of decision-making in the KOC is rather close to decentralisation. They put an emphasis on whether or not the members of each department may actually be involved in working in practice at a departmental level.

Decisions are made by a department but the president is the last decision maker. If he accepts a proposal, we can continue with it.

(a KSC staff member)

Of course, what a department decides will be shown to a Director General or Secretary General. Then, the Executive Board will give us back their decision and thus, each department can work on that basis in practice.

(a former senior KOC staff member)

Each department is responsible for different tasks. So the tasks of which a department is in charge are all dependent on that department. Of course, we should inform the President of our decisions, though

(a junior KOC staff member)

Most of tasks are done by us at the working level. We are doing what we have done so far. If we pass our opinions to the upper level, we may need to discuss which way is better with the higher officers. Anyway, the President or the Secretary General does not know every single thing which is dealt with in a department.

(a senior KSC staff member)

The comment received from these informants focuses on the fact that each department is responsible for its actual work at the in practical level and, thus, the decision-making is partly decentralised. Although they can make decisions over detailed policy at the departmental
level, however, the higher level post-holders, for instance, the KOC President and the Secretary General should be informed about their decisions. Therefore, the decision-making process is neither fully centralised nor fully decentralised. One matter that should be considered is the extent to which the President has the power to accept or reject departmental decision-making. If decision-making at the departmental level is only referred to the President or the Secretary General for their information, this can be seen as evidence of a more decentralised structure. On the other hand, in the case where the President or Secretary General is deeply involved in decision-making, this is more likely to come close to centralisation. Therefore, from the different perspectives the same structure of decision-making can be interpreted in various ways.

The next operationalisation asks: ‘to what extent are all members of each department able to be involved in decision-making process?’ This may be identified by examining the ways in which communications are conducted between senior and junior staff members in a department. More specifically, it is a matter of whether or not the junior staff members can openly discuss or suggest their opinions within a department. The first opinion below is that of a KSC staff member.

When you consider the age gap between the senior and junior staff members, some of them have a 20-year age difference. There is at least a 10-year gap. Now, looking carefully within a department, when the junior staff members raise a question, the senior staff members might urge them just to follow the seniors.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

This officer’s comment implies that, due to the generation gap, the senior staff members of the KSC tend to force their junior staff members to follow their seniors. This gives rise to a centralised decision-making structure inside the department without a free and open environment. By contrast, the two interviewees from the KOC considered that the staff members were able to exchange their opinions freely:

It can go either way… some should follow orders from the upper level but some can be decided in a department. So, either way…

(a senior KOC staff member)

We are acting at the working-level and we send our opinions to the higher level for
the final decision. Nevertheless, we are the ones who can give our opinions. I think that we have an open system to be able to suggest our opinions but this is dependent on a team leader’s style.

(a junior KOC staff member)

As discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 6), which concluded that the atmosphere of the KOC was more likely to be open than that of the KSC, the KOC staff members expressed approval of their relative degree of involvement in decision-making by means of free communication between junior and senior staff members.

Through the analysis of the documents released by the IOC it emerged that none of the written statements makes explicit recommendations regarding decentralisation in decision-making. This implies that this concept of democracy may be a sensitive issue to deal with and the IOC recommendations are, thus, mostly related with the aspect of democracy in terms of the relationship with other stakeholders and, in particular, the government.

7.6 Equity

Equity consists of five categories as shown in Table 7-6.

Table 7-6 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of equity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitions/Interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In general</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Meanings</em> are produced in the ways in which dominant groups produce common understandings through the processes and patterns of interactions.**</td>
<td>-Is there any evidence in the ‘meanings‘ showing how, in particular, high officials make sense of equity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Practices</em> are understood through obtaining insight into the ways in which members of dominant and subordinate groups negotiate meanings when a member of the subordinate group attempts to enter the dominant group.**</td>
<td>-Is there any evidence of the ‘practices’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports organisations should establish a channel of policy implementation to deal with complaints about discrimination and harassment.</td>
<td>-Is there a written policy (laws and rules) on gender, disability, ethnicity, and resource allocations? (in general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Is there a team or a monitoring system handling such matters?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female involvement in decision making should reach a minimum of 20 per cent at</td>
<td>-What percentage of women is involved in decision making?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Prior to undertaking a detailed discussion of equity in relation to gender, disability, ethnicity and resources, initially, it is necessary to examine the ways in which ‘meanings’ and ‘practices’ feature: ‘meanings are produced in the ways in which dominant groups produce common understandings through the processes and patterns of interactions’, while ‘practices are understood through obtaining insight into the ways in which members of dominant and subordinate groups negotiate meanings when a member of the subordinate group attempts to enter the dominant group’. The operationalisation poses the question as to ‘whether or not there is evidence in the actions of high officials, in particular, of the ‘meanings’ and/or ‘practices’ (see Table 4-19). In the case of the KOC this is discussed in the light of evidence concerning these ‘meanings’ and ‘practices’ in terms of gender and disability. For instance, how does the dominant group, in this case, the high-ranking male officers including the Executive Committee members, make sense of gender composition and how does that reflect the way in which they seek to achieve gender equity?

As revealed in Chapter 6, there was some inconsistency regarding the interpretation of gender equality in terms of the percentage of female staff members resulting from the new
process of staff recruitment. Some informants below stated that the policy on gender equity had been fulfilled because in the targets set for the recruitment of new staff members a certain percentage had been allocated to females.

I don't think there is any unfairness in recruitment. Above all, as far as I am concerned, for example, if 10 people are being recruited, a certain percentage of them at least ought to be women... as I know.

(a middle-ranking KOC officer, female)

The ratio was maintained and this difficult ratio of 30% women as recommended by the IOC was respected during the period of the KOC President Kim Jeong Gil, who took great efforts to do so. We surely satisfied the 30% requirement.

(the former Secretary General, male)

The middle-ranking female KOC officer who answered above joined the KOC during the tenure of the 25th KOC President Kim Jeong Gil. At that time, gender equity was being promoted within the KOC in order to reach the IOC’s recommended target ratio, which was interpreted as constituting 30 per cent female to 70 per cent male. Following the organisation’s promotion of this policy, the dominant groups, formed in this context by senior male officers and Executive Committee members, came to the common understanding that employing 30 per cent female staff complied with the gender equity requirement. In practice, therefore, the subordinate group, here the female staff members, were presented with the negotiating position that for the achievement of gender equity 30 per cent of staff recruitment should be of females.

Meanwhile, evidence obtained from the interviews indicates that gender equity was being defined differently by some employees, who thought that it could be accomplished only when the ratio of female to male participation rose to 50:50. Two other junior female KOC staff members who joined during Kim Jeong Gil’s tenure expressed the opinion that gender equity was accomplished when half or a larger proportion of posts were allocated to female staff members.

I don't think there is any inequity. I don't know if that applies to my generation only, or if it’s just me, but last year the newly recruited members consisted of 8 people and among them there were 3 men and 5 women.
At the non-managerial level... err...I don’t feel that there’s any gender discrimination or anything like that.. hmm...there is also a tendency to employ more females or half males and half females...hmm...I don’t know.

This implies that practices may be also changed by the change of meanings. As mentioned earlier, the IOC did not make clear suggestions about the percentage of female involvement to be realised at all levels. However, the KOC’s dominant group interpreted it as ‘meaning’ 30 per cent and this could thus become its ‘practice’. As time has gone by, the KOC has promoted this meaning of gender equity as a female to male ratio which approximates to half and half. Consequently, the members of the KOC/KSC have also constructed their knowledge of gender equity in accordance with the policy of the organisation.

Another example is given by the employment of people with disabilities. The Executive Committee member of KOC below claimed that the KOC and the KSC did not purposely ignore the disabled.

I don’t see it as inequity. If we didn’t employ any disabled people who were capable of working that would be a problem. However, we can’t just employ those who are unable to accomplish physical activities, can we? Also, there is the KOSAD and the KPC... in Korea... we have the KOSAD and the KPC.

His comment on the roles of people with physical impairments gives the impression that people with disabilities may be unable to fulfil appropriate roles within the organisation on account of their disabilities. In particular, when he said ‘I don’t see it as inequity’, this can be compared to the previous respondents’ similarly positive views of KOC/KSC compliance with the IOC’s recommendations concerning gender equity. He appears to have been seeking to justify the organisation’s negligence in its failure to comply with the governmental regulation on the employment of disabled people by denying that equal treatment was actually possible for them. This is a ‘meaning’ developed by a member of the dominant group, namely by an Executive Committee member who is involved in decision-making.
Other interviewees who are staff members at the working level also gave their opinion that physical impairment could be preventing disabled people from being involved in most activities offered by the KSC/KOC. All of those interviewees who gave negative responses also supported the point of view that the KOSAD/KPC should be responsible for absorbing people with disabilities. From their perspective, as the KOC/KSC has usually been engaged in working in the domain of physical activities, it would not be pertinent to employ people with disabilities. This point of view was supported by another member of KOC staff.

Employing people with disabilities…. Well…most of the work in this organisation involves physical activity, so it wouldn’t be easy for them to work here, and they also have the KOSAD and the KPC

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

Furthermore, the respondents whose replies are quoted below, including the KOC Executive Committee member, insisted that the KOSAD/KPC should be responsible for absorbing people with disabilities who seek to work in sporting organisations.

The disabled usually work for the KOSAD and KPC. I don’t see that they have to deal with inequity. I’ve never heard of it.. never.. never…

(a former senior KOC officer)

As far as I know, the KOSAD and KPC hire a larger number of disabled than of able-bodied people.

(a junior KOC staff member)

Fortunately, the KPC and KOSAD have absorbed disabled workers.

(a former senior KOC official)

Employing people with disabilities…. Well…most of the work in this organisation involves physical activity, so it wouldn’t be easy for them to work here

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

The blind would be unable to work here as there are many events that require sighted people. Some people are handicapped in their mobility…

(a senior KSC officer)
There is KOSAD and KPC in Korea…we have the KOSAD and KPC.

(a KOC Executive Committee member)

The KOC’s implementation of government policy on the employment of people with physical impairments has allegedly been insufficient for the reason that the KOC/KSC is involved, to a large extent in physical activities for the able-bodied. Most middle-ranking and junior staff members conveyed their belief that the organisation’s policy on the disabled lived up to the government’s recommendations, whereas most senior level officers admitted that the reality was different. Nevertheless, staff members sought to justify the KOC/KSC’s neglect in its policy on disability equity by alleging that the KOSAD/KPC are the organisations that bear the greatest responsibility for employing people with disabilities. This is further evidence of a ‘meaning’, which has been constructed by the dominant, able-bodied, group. As regards the ‘practice’ of disability equity, since employees with disabilities did not present themselves as members of a subordinate group, representatives of such a group were not available for interview in this context. This may imply that the subordinate groups also accepted the ‘meanings’ of the dominant group and that people with disabilities therefore applied for positions in the KOSAD/KPC, which is the more conventional ‘practice’.

Another general interpretation concerning equity is that ‘a sporting organisation should establish a channel of policy implementation to deal with complaints about discrimination and harassment’. Two of the relevant operationalisations answer the questions as to ‘whether or not there is a written policy (laws and rules) on gender, disability, ethnicity and resource allocations’ and ‘whether or not there is a team or a monitoring system handling such matters’. The Code of Conduct (2007: 12-3) clearly states the KOC’s policy on violation in Chapter 10 concerning ‘Actions against Violation’. However, this does not mean that it specifically addresses cases of alleged discrimination or harassment. Thus, the KOC has established the Code of Conduct as the written policy to be followed in relation to the broad concept of disciplinary punishment:

Article 50 (Consulting for judging violation)

① When the breach of the code is not clear, “employees and the Board members” should consult with the responsible person before dealing it with.

② The President should take necessary measures for effective counselling in accordance with Clause ①, including establishing a hotline and counselling room.
Article 51 (Violation reporting and its processing)
① If anyone finds out the code breach by "employees and the Board members", he or she can report to the head or the instructor of the Code of Conduct in the organisation or report to the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission.
② In the case of Clause 1, the reporter should state his/her own personal details and the violator’s personal information including the content of the breach.
③ The official responsible for code compliance should confirm the violation, reported in accordance with Clause 1, before reporting it to the President by submitting relevant documents.

Clause ① of Article 51 shows that there is a channel of reporting within the KOC and the monitoring is conducted by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission. With regard to monitoring, the officer who is in charge should be chiefly responsible for it and recourse may be had to the KOC President as a final step, according to the series of actions prescribed in Article 51 ③ above and Article 51-2 ① below.

Article 51-2 (Disciplinary Punishment)
① The President should take necessary actions against the violator.
② The type, process, and validity of the punishment stated in Clause ③ follows the punishment rules of the KOC. However, if the violator gives a disadvantage to the reporter, which is a breach of Article 51, the violator may be subjected to a more severe punishment.

Article 52 (Protection of reporter) (13)
① The President and the officials responsible for code compliance should make the reporter and the reported document confidential and ensure that the reporter is not exposed to any discrimination or disadvantage due to reporting.
② Despite Clause ① above, when the reporter is discriminated against or disadvantaged, the reporter can request protection measures and mediation from the head or supervisor. In this case, the head and supervisor should take action.
③ If the reporting exposes any irregularity on the part of the reporter, the level of punishment can be reduced or exempted.
④ Clauses ① and ③ are respected in commensurate with order non-compliance of Article 20 and other counselling regarding the Code of Conduct.
More specifically, there is no official document regarding the entitlement of people with disabilities to receive equitable treatment on employment issues within the KOC, as witnessed by several staff members. Moreover, in the case of resource allocations, resources may be allocated either to Local Branches and the NFs. *The Business Plan*, *The Business Report* and the *Report on Business Activities* deal with the measures for the allocation of resources to Local Branches and the NFs. Nevertheless, while the way in which money is allocated to Local Branches is clearly addressed, that is not the case where the NFs’ resources are concerned (this will be discussed in the section on resource allocation below).

**Gender equity**

The definition regarding gender equity (see Table 4-19) is that ‘female involvement in decision making should reach a minimum of 20 per cent at both the managerial and non-managerial levels’. The focus in this study is on the ratio of female participation at both levels, which operationalises as ‘what is the ratio of males and females at decision-making and non-managerial levels?’ Taking account, first of all, of female participation at the Executive Committee level in the KSC and the KOC, the figures have been separately recorded for each organisation before the KOC/KSC merger which took place on June 29, 2009. The officially published statistics on gender equality are provided in Table 7-7 below:

Table 7-7 The ratio of gender participation in the Executive Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>The ratio of male/female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KSC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Executive Committee level along with President, Secretary General, and auditors</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>87% : 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KOC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>79% : 21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the KSC and the KOC

As discussed earlier, the KOC represents the Republic of Korea as its NOC within a global organisation of NOCs whose highest authority is the IOC. The ratios of female involvement shown in Table 7-7 indicate that the KOC tried harder than the KSC to live up to the IOC’s recommendations. Thus, female participation in the KOC is nearly 21%, which meets up with
the minimum level recommended by the IOC, while that of the KSC is just 13%. However, after the KOC/KSC merger, the new Executive Committee consisted of only one female member out of 21 members. With female participation having decreased so greatly in the new Executive Committee, the implementation of gender equity has evidently been moving in a negative direction since the KOC/KSC merger.

Concerning the ratio of gender participation at the working level in the KSC and KOC, the data released by the KOC/KSC on the overall gender composition of its workforce as of May 2009 showed that women workers accounted for 27.3 per cent and men 72.7 per cent of the total. The ratio per se is quite similar to that recommended by the IOC with regard to female participation. In the case of administrative posts, however, such positions were occupied by 83 male workers versus only 16 female workers, whereas 20 male workers versus 24 female workers were engaged in clerical and technical support posts. Accordingly, although the ratio per se represents the figures as being very positive in terms of the overall numbers, most female workers are categorised as filling ‘clerical and technical support posts’, which conveys a situation of gender inequity with respect to administrative-level employment.

In association with the operationalisation of gender equity the following question arises: ‘may male and female staff members benefit from the same treatment, salaries and access to the higher positions?’ With respect to salary, the 2009 Business Lists of Budget Proposal (2009: 65) introduces the salary differences between ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical support’ posts and shows that employees in these categories are not treated the same in terms of their salaries. As discussed earlier in Chapter 6, this is related to the gender issue as most female staff are usually appointed to clerical and technical support posts.

Table 7-8 Salary differences between ‘administrative’ & ‘clerical and technical support’ posts

(单位: Korean Won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative posts (101 employees)</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- First grade</td>
<td>3,380,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Second grade</td>
<td>3,021,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Third grade</td>
<td>2,905,000</td>
<td>Difference: 723,000 Won more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fourth grade</td>
<td>2,657,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fifth grade</td>
<td>2,282,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sixth grade</td>
<td>1,725,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Seventh grade</td>
<td>1,365,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and technical support posts (38 employees)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Third grade</td>
<td>2,182,000</td>
<td>Difference: 723,000 Won less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>Salary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>1,875,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>1,718,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>1,433,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>974,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KOC (2009: 65)

In addition, one female staff member employed in a clerical and technical support role expressed her view that different treatment had been given to staff in ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical support’ posts.

Workers in clerical and technical support posts receives lower salaries than the male staff in administrative posts. We also have little chance to go abroad for a business trip and we receive fewer benefits. For example, only employees in administrative posts may be supported to the extent of approximately 70% of the school fees for learning a foreign language.

(a female KSC staff member)

Apart from the issue of the salary differentials, staff members in clerical and technical support posts benefit from fewer opportunities to be involved in other business-related activities. Only the staff serving in administrative posts are responsible for carrying out projects within the KOC, while the holders of clerical and technical support posts are only responsible for fulfilling subsidiary helpers’ roles. In terms of access to the higher positions, staff in clerical and technical support posts remain at the lowest level. For example, the female interviewee in the clerical and technical support post has been working for the KOC for more than twenty years but she has not been entitled to receive a promotion. The clerical and technical support posts are mainly filled by female staff, which shows that the gender equity between the administrative and clerical and technical support posts has not been attainable. Nevertheless, gender equity is more likely to be achieved among the administrative posts at the non-managerial level, since female staff are appointed to such positions more frequently and thereby benefit from the same treatment and salaries as their male colleagues.

In the Korean context, the situation regarding gender equality has been dramatically improved since efforts have been taken to achieve the IOC’s recommended target rate. As discussed in the previous chapter, female employees testified that equal numbers of women and men had been recruited at the non-managerial level. However, in view of our
examination of the KOC’s recent performance, the disparity in gender ratios at the managerial level has not been successfully resolved. Given that female staff members have mainly been allocated to clerical and technical support posts, this also implies that gender inequity still exists within the KOC.

**Equity on disability**

The first interpretation, which is that ‘people with impairments should also be involved in decision-making’, received a generally negative reaction from the KOC staff members. The operationalisation asks: ‘what percentage of people with disabilities take part as members of the decision-making bodies and in the non-decision making positions?’ According to their organisational structures, the KOC and the KOSAD/KPC are totally separated as two different sporting organisations. The interviewees from the KOC believed that, thus, the KOSAD and the KPC should be responsible for absorbing people with disabilities. From their perspective, as the KOC/KSC has usually been engaged in working in the domain of physical activities, it would not be pertinent for it to hire people with disabilities.

The second interpretation is that ‘organisations should demonstrate their integration of individual workers with disabilities through their legislation, rules, and finance’ and its operationalisation answers the questions: ‘does the NOC provide relevant rules and legislation on the disability and disability sport?’ and ‘does the NOC provide a better working environment for staff members with disabilities?’ With respect to the second interpretation, it is unlikely that the KOC provides the prerequisite legislation, rules and finance. No written documents regarding disability have been found and one female officer who has been working for the KOC/KSC for more than 20 years confirmed that she was not aware of their existence. In terms of the working environment for the disabled, as demonstrated by the interviewees above, a physical impairment could be an obstacle preventing disabled people from being involved in most activities offered by the KSC/KOC. This implies that the organisation does not provide an adequate working environment for people with impairments, and the respondents did indeed express negative opinions of the possibilities for people with disabilities to become involved in the KOC.

The interviewees from the KOC believed that the KPC (Korean Paralympic Committee) should be responsible for providing sport and working activities to people with disabilities as a result of the separat organisational structures of the KOC and the KPC. Similarly, since the IOC and IPC (International Paralympic Committee) are separated, there may be the
assumption that the IOC has deliberately excluded issues relating to disability from its recommendations. The phenomenon observed in the KOC can thus be explained on similar grounds in the case of the IOC.

**Equity on ethnicity**

The interpretation concerning ethnicity equity is that 'irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone capable should be involved at the working and managerial levels'. Accordingly, the operationalisation poses the question: *what percentage of people in different ethnic groups participates at both managerial and non-managerial levels?*. Article 31 of the Statutes of the KOC (2009: 10) concerning 'Disqualification' states that:

(1) A foreign national and a person who is disqualified by any clause in Article 33 of the State Public Officials Act may not become an Officer of the KOC.

(2) In case an Officer is disqualified according to Clause (1) of this Article, he or she shall be removed from the office.

On this evidence, the KOC is seen to make appointments to its managerial-level posts conditional on the possession of Korean nationality. In July and August 2009 when the interviews were conducted, there were officially no foreign employees working for the KOC. The limited access of people from different ethnic groups to the KOC probably results from the Korean national context in which the Republic of Korea is seen as consisting of one ethnic nation.

**Fair resource allocation**

'There should be a fair allocation of resources, programs and decision-making in terms of gender, disability, the size of organisation, and high or low profile athletes or NFs': this is the interpretation of a fair allocation of resources within a sporting organisation, and its operationalisation is *how are resources to NFs and athletes distributed?* According to the Report on Business Activities (The KOC, 2009: 9), the criteria on which the funding of the 56 NFs and 16 Local Branches should be based are provided below:

Table 7-9 Funding criteria for the 56 National Federations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of performance</td>
<td>12,046</td>
<td>5-level differences in support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(295)
In the case of funding for the administrative and for employees’ salaries, all NFs are allocated the same undifferentiated amount of funding, as Table 7-4 shows. However, none of the reports directly states the criteria which allow NFs to qualify for five different levels of funding. Another example concerns the funding of Local Branches. As Table 7-5 illustrates, the same amount is allocated to each Branch for administration, while different levels of funding are available for training.

Table 7-10 Funding criteria for the 16 Local Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>Different level application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Same amount application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The KOC usually allocates funds to its Local Branches across Korea on the basis of performance and participation. As the KOC Business Report (2008: 41) notes, resources are allocated “depending on the performance and participation results from the previous year’s National Sports Competitions”. Nevertheless, the criteria by which performance and participation are judged are not made explicit. This issue will be discussed in association with the principle of efficiency.

7.7 Effectiveness

The interpretations of effectiveness are discussed in terms of the achievement of organisational goals and the formation of a strong organisational culture, as shown in Table 7-11.
The achievement of official goals and operational goals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Goals</th>
<th>Operational Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-What are the official goals of the NOC?</td>
<td>-What are its operational goals? (objectives whose attainment is desired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Does the organisation clearly set forth the organisation’s goals?</td>
<td>-To what degree are the official and operational goals achieved?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organisational Culture: **clear homogeneity of organisational values** and **highly transformational leaders** are conducive to the formation of a strong, positive organisational culture, which is more effective.

**Organisational Values**

- **Integration**: with a strong alignment between words and deeds, an organisation-wide consensus and consistency between organisational values and employee behaviour may be achieved.
- **Differentiation**: when there is a contradiction between words and deeds, inconsistencies and subcultures may arise due to unbalanced power relations.
- **Fragmentation**: if uncertainty and temporality exist between words and deeds, ambiguity and complexity are the consequences.

**Leadership**

- **Transactional leadership**: subordinates perform within a clearly outlined framework as tasked by their leaders in exchange for commensurate material or psychological compensation.
- **Transformational leadership**: leaders emphasise task-related values and a strong commitment to a mission, and inspire their subordinates to reach higher levels of performance in their commitment and contribution.

Leaders should be professional, interactional and communicative in their conduct, and/or capable of dealing with a contingency.

- Do staff members clearly understand and share the organisation’s official and operational goals?
- Are organisational values shared by all members?
- Is there a sub-culture within the NOC?
- Are organisational values differentiated along these lines: individual roles; age and gender; volunteer and professional paid staff?
- Is there an activity like an induction, or a social engagement to help staff to identify with the organisation?

The first interpretation of effectiveness is that it consists in ‘the achievement of the official and operational goals’ and thus, it is necessary to identify ‘what the official and operational goals of the KOC are’ as an operationalisation. This is closely related with the KOC’s performance on the basis of the missions and roles that the KOC has promoted. ‘The missions and roles’ embodied in *The Statutes of KOC* are seen as the KOC’s official goals, while ‘the activities’ are considered as operational goals (see also Chapter 4). Article 9 of
The Code of Conduct concerning ‘Responsibility’ (2007: 3) declares that:

Employees and Executive Board members should share the founding spirit of the KOC and understand its objectives and values in order completely to fulfil their responsibilities in accordance with the KOC’s steering rules, particularly with diligence and creativity.

In other words, the KOC staff and Executive Board members should be responsible for working and cooperating to achieve the objectives of the organisation on the basis of sharing the same values. As Article 3 of The Statutes of KOC regarding ‘Mission and Role’ (2009: 1) indicates:

(1) The KOC shall promote public health by encouraging school sports and sport-for-all and shall contribute to enhancing the national prestige by supporting the sports organizations under the KOC membership and encouraging the development of high performance sports.

(2) The KOC shall have the exclusive authority over all matters pertaining to the representation of Korea at the Olympic Games and at the regional, continental or world multi-sports competitions patronized by the IOC and contribute to international cooperation and world peace by promoting the fundamental principles and values of Olympism through the Olympic Movement.

(3) The KOC shall represent the Republic of Korea in international sports organizations such as the IOC, the Association of the National Olympic Committees (the “ANOC”), and the Olympic Council of Asia (the “OCA”).

(4) The KOC shall comply with the civil laws and regulations on an incorporated body in accordance with Article 33(7) of the National Sports Promotion Act.

As stipulated in Clause (1), the KOC should be responsible for school sports, sport for all and elite sports. Nevertheless, a part of clause (1) and clauses (2) and (3) highlight the official reason for the KOC’s existence as the national sporting organisation that represents the Republic of Korea through elite sports performance. This may imply that the KOC is skewed towards elite sport.

The ‘operational goals’ are indicated in Article 7 of The Statutes of KOC regarding ‘Activities’ (2009: 2-3).
(1) In order to accomplish its mission and roles as stated in Article 3 of these statutes, the KOC shall perform the following activities:

A. Promoting school sports and sports-for-all;

B. Organizing, sending, and managing a delegation representing Korea to participate in the Olympic Games, Asian Games, regional, continental or world multi-sports competitions patronized by the IOC, and other international multi-sports competitions;

C. Designating a city which wishes to host a competition described in Clause (1)(B) of this Article in Korea and supervising overall management of the competition in the event of the candidate city being elected as the host city;

D. Organizing activities on international sports cooperation, meetings of international sports organizations, the Olympic Movement, and educational and cultural programs;

E. Organizing activities promoting continuous development of sports and the overall sports environment;

F. Supporting KOC member organizations and Local Branches;

G. Organizing various sports competitions such as a National Sports Festival and a National Junior Sports Festival;

H. Promoting the scientific development of sports; supporting athletes and coaches; and encouraging research on sports;

I. Improving the privileges and well-being of athletes;

J. Implementing a marketing program to finance various KOC activities; and

K. Any other activities that may be necessary for the fulfilment of the KOC’s mission.

In the same way as the official goals, the operational goals are also mainly focused on and related to elite sport. The phrase ‘organising various national sports competitions’ that is indicated in G is a little vague. National sports competitions can be seen as an opportunity for promoting sport for all, however, and it also has a relationship with elite sport in the final analysis, since the medallists from these national sport competitions are subsequently selected and trained as elite athletes. Thus, the majority of operational goals are also likely to bear a strong relationship to elite sport, while organisational goals such as enhancing standards in school sport and encouraging sport for all receive some coverage. Consequently, the operationalisation ‘does the organisation clearly set forth its goals?’ can be answered affirmatively inasmuch as the official and operational goals of the KOC are clearly noted with more emphasis being placed on elite sport.

The final measure of effectiveness depends on the answer to the question: ‘in what degree
are those official and operational goals achieved?’ Given that the results achieved in major international events are highly publicised, the attainments of elite sportspeople are conspicuous internationally. In the case of the summer Olympic Games, according to *the Report on the 28th Athens Olympic Games* (The KOC, 2004: 325), the Republic of Korea reached 9th place in the medal table by winning a total of 30 medals including nine gold, twelve silver and nine bronze medals. *The Report on the 29th Beijing Olympic Games* (The KOC, 2008: 343) lists Korea in 7th place in the overall medal table, having obtained 31 medals including thirteen gold, ten silver and eight bronze medals. Korea thereby achieved the status of second most powerful nation in Asia for sport, following China, whose total of gold medals obtained was 51. In the winter Olympic Games, the Republic of Korea was also highly ranked in the medal table. The 21st Vancouver Olympic Games saw the Korean team recording its highest-ever position in the medal table with six gold, six silver and two bronze medals, as stated in *the Results from major international games* (KOC, n.d.). In terms, therefore, of its achievements in elite sport, Korea’s effectiveness can be rated highly. By contrast, sport for all and school sport in Korea do not receive comparable attention and their participants’ achievements are seldom highlighted.

The analysis of the official and operational goals can be explained in relation to an investigation of organisational values, the aim of which is to determine whether KOC staff members share similar or different values and beliefs. Indeed, one of the operationalisations of organisational values asks ‘whether staff members clearly know and share the organisation’s official and operational goals’. In analysing the interviewees’ responses regarding the official goals of the KOC it becomes apparent that most interviewees concentrated on two themes, namely ‘developing sports in Korea’ and ‘elite sport development’. While the theme of ‘elite sport development’ has a bearing solely on elite sport, the theme ‘developing sports in Korea’ can also be interpreted as covering the subject of sport for all. With respect to the KOC’s official goals as seen from the KOC staff members’ perspective, the following group of respondents answered by saying that ‘elite sport development’ was the main official goal of the KOC. One interviewee answered directly by saying ‘the enhancement of elite sport’ whereas the other three interviewees responded in indirect ways by affirming the importance of, e.g. ‘participation in international sports events’.

Enhancing elite sport

(a junior KOC staff member)
The KOC is responsible for organising our teams to attend mega events such as the Olympic Games, Asian Games and the Universidad

(an incumbent KOC Executive Committee member)

As a NOC, we should participate in world sporting events

(a junior KOC staff member)

We are the NOC which represents the Republic of Korea internationally and participates in international sports activities.

(a junior KSC staff member)

On the other hand, two other interviewees who agreed with these four respondents about the importance of elite sport promotion also admitted that the KOC had a significant role to play in ‘developing sports in Korea’.

As long as the IOC exists, the KOC exists too. At the same time, the KOC should represent and support our national sporting organisations at home. So our official aim is to develop sports at the national level.

(a former senior KSC staff member)

Fundamentally, developing and promoting elite sport but at the same time sport for all.

(a junior KOC staff member)

The two informants below claimed that the KOC should play an important role in ‘developing sport for all’ across Korea:

Developing and promoting sports across Korea

(a former KOC Executive Committee member)

Promoting and developing sports nation-wide… well, the KOC provides the basis or foundation for continuing to realise this goal

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

The three interviewees’ answers below are not directly related to ‘elite sports development’
but more related to the effects of ‘elite sport development’, which are ‘the unification of the Korean people’ and ‘making athlete's dreams come true’:

We train national team players and their good performance enables the Korean people to be one.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

Through elite sport we unify the Korean people

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

I think we should play a role in making athletes’ dreams come true.

(a former KOC Executive Committee member)

As demonstrated above, the KOC staff members mainly understand the official goals of the KOC as being the enhancement of ‘sport for all’ and ‘elite sport’, as indicated in The Statutes of KOC. In spite of the mention given to school sport in this official written document, no-one raised the issue of school sport except one KSC staff member who claimed that the KOC should defend its autonomy as a decision-making sporting organisation within Korea.

At a domestic level, the KOC should make decisions about overall sports policy, for example, sport for all, school sport… although our influence is slight.

(a junior KSC staff member)

The comment of this interviewee is likely to be a reflection of the KOC’s lack of authority as an independent organisation in sports policy making within the Korean context. Nevertheless, this informant at least considered ‘school sport’ to be worthy of inclusion as a potential beneficiary of sports policy for the KOC to take into consideration. The next interviewee also supported the junior KSC staff member above.

In any country, there has to be a sporting organisation which synthesises the whole area of sport. The government cannot handle it directly so it needs a public organisation to deal with the government’s policy on sport

(a senior KSC staff member)

This interviewee also shared the view that as a public sporting organisation the KOC is
directed by the government to deal with sports policy. This implies that the government’s strongly elite-sport-centred policy also affects the main direction of KOC policy.

The other element of the KOC’s perceived organisational aims is concerned with its operational goals. As before, the interviewees’ main answers may be divided into two categories: the promotion of a nation-wide policy of sports development, or sport for all and elite sport. Nevertheless, school sports were mentioned by respondents more frequently in this case. The first group of responses concerns the promotion of sport for all at the domestic level:

Our task is to promote and develop sports domestically.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

A nation-wide policy of sports promotion is the one to aim for. Developing sport policy draws Korean people’s interest in sport. Also a good result leads people to feel a sense of patriotism and pride

(a former senior KOC staff member)

Sport for all and school sport should be promoted for a healthy life.

(a former senior KSC official)

According to the Statutes, we should make a greater effort to promote school sport, and sport for all

(a senior KOC officer)

In connection with the interviewees’ replies above, the following interviewee also suggested that an enhanced programme of public relations should be used to raise people’s awareness of the KOC.

The KOC’s public relations should be reinforced. We should promote what we do. Our image to a lot of people is only as a sporting organisation that exists for the Olympic Games.

(a junior KSC staff member)

From this interviewee’s perspective, nevertheless, with its focus on elite sport and the KOC
has definitely played a significant role in representing the Republic of Korea as a NOC and, in turn, this role has strengthened the image of the KOC in the context of elite sport. The next response can be also seen as advocating the concept of sport for all:

It is important to set up and operate academic and rational programmes which Korean people can share.

(the former KSC & incumbent KOC Executive Committee member)

Although the next two interviewees also admitted that the KOC’s operational goals should be orientated more towards school sport and sport for all in order to live up to The Statutes of KOC official goals, they concluded that the KOC should focus on elite sport rather than sport for all or school sport in spite of those pronouncements:

As the Statutes state, we are supposed to focus on school sport and sport for all. However, there is the KOCOSA (Korea Council of Sport for All) [for promotion of sport for all] and we at the KOC put more emphasis on elite sport and training athletes

(a senior KOC officer)

Our goals are about the promotion of sport for all and national glory, aren’t they? Now, Olympism is our preference.

(a middle-ranking officer)

In association with the elite sport-focused operational goals, two interviewees below also mentioned that high performance sports could bring fame and a sense of unity to the people of Korea.

Through elite sport a good performance brings Korea fame.

(a KSC staff member)

The better performance of our national team makes our people feel unified

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

Apart from the issues raised over discrepancies between official and operational goals,
however, when the question ‘which one does the KOC place more emphasis on, elite or mass sport?’ was directly given to them, thirteen out of fifteen respondents admitted their preference for high performance sports. Only two informants insisted that both elite sport and sport for all should be treated as being equally important.

Elite sport and sport for all should both be considered important.

(a former senior KOC officer)

The KOC focuses on elite sport. However, according to our Statutes, our primary goals are developing elite sport, school sport, and sport for all. So, the KOC [should] put an emphasis on sport for all.

(a KOC Executive Committee member)

Accordingly, as the official and operational goals of the KOC cover elite sport, sport for all and school sport, the interviewees seem to acknowledge and share the same organisational values. Nevertheless, the de facto policy is likely to lean towards elite sport and the KOC staff members all share similar perspectives on the KOC’s ongoing policy. There is, however, a large difference between the KOC staff members’ perspectives what should constitute the organisation’s official and operational goals. The majority of interviewees put an emphasis on ‘elite sport’ as the official goal while ‘sport for all’ and ‘school sport’ were seen as being relatively minor operational goals. This can be seen as deriving from the fact that the KOC represents the Republic of Korea as a NOC internationally and should therefore focus on elite sport whereas the KOC is also the headquarters for sports in Korea, working domestically for the Korean people.

The next element to be discussed in relation to organisational values is possible existence within the KOC of any sub-culture, which is a significant factor in the attempt to understand whether organisational values are integrated or differentiated. A sub-culture may be discussed in terms of gender, age and position. Regardless of gender, most junior staff members admitted that there was a wide gap between the senior and junior staff members. The following interviewees listed several elements of difference in terms of the generation gap, varieties of educational background, foreign language ability and the length of exposure to living in foreign countries:

Of course, there is a sub-culture within the KOC. Most seniors were appointed
before and just after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and there was an interval of [about 18 years] till we were employed. There is a generation gap and young staff members can also utilise their English skills with the benefit of the experience of living abroad.

(a junior KOC staff member)

There is a big difference. (in what aspects?) most senior and some middle-ranking officers were employed pre- and post-Seoul Olympic Games and the number of these high- and middle-ranking officers is probably more than or similar to the number of junior staff members. The academic background of high-ranking officers is mainly related to public administration, which gives rise to a tendency to function as public servants, while junior and some middle-ranking staff members have experienced more time abroad and hold higher education qualifications.

(a junior KOC staff member)

The various differences claimed here are likely to result from the different backgrounds of senior and junior staff members. The testimony of other junior KSC and KOC staff members indicates that the organisation has tended to be quite conservative with a lack of opportunities for personal development, an organisational culture with which some junior staff members can cope only with difficulty.

To be honest, our organisation is quite conservative and senior officers enjoy drinking rather a lot, while junior staff members prefer spending time developing themselves. The young staff members are probably more competent. Accordingly the culture is quite different between the older and the younger staff.

(a junior KOC staff member)

There is a difference for sure. The overall organisational culture is quite conservative but the young junior staff members are not so conservative.

(a junior KSC staff member)

The informants’ views above are also supported by the senior and middle-ranking staff members below. The younger staff tend to join in sports club activities and, thus, the junior and senior groups usually socialise separately.

Yes, there is a club activity. The junior staff usually get together to enjoy sport club
activities.  

(a senior KOC officer)

I have no idea how to express it, but probably yes, the senior and the junior staff gather separately.  

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

The issue of gender is seen as an important element in identifying the organisational culture in connection with socialising. Nevertheless, many staff members alluded to the willingness of staff to gather without being hindered by concerns of gender.

Gathering has nothing to do with the gender issue.  

(the former KSC & incumbent KOC Board member)

Men and women all get together. In the case of the Department of International Affairs, the number of female employees is higher.  

(a junior KOC staff member)

Apart from the official gatherings, we usually get together irrespective of gender.  

(a junior KOC staff member)

We don't care about gender.  

(a junior KOC staff member)

The aspect of gender doesn’t affect that.  

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

It has nothing to do with gender  

(a junior KSC staff member)

I think that young staff members get together without caring about gender. In my case, I do meet female staff for work but don’t meet them in person.  

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

Yes, I do get along with female staff, but I think the female staff’s participation is a bit
The comments of interviewees quoted above can be explained in association with the issues of gender equity discussed earlier. As the junior staff members demonstrated in their responses previously, the problem over gender equity has been settled at the non-managerial level and most junior staff members and some middle-ranking officers share the same perspective, namely that harmonious relationships exist between male and female staff members. Nevertheless, male and female staff members tend to prefer different types of social activity. Male staff members usually join in sports activities more commonly while female staff members have organised the Women’s Society.

The Women’s Society is open to female staff members.

Yes, there is a Women's Society.

We have a women's gathering, which is called the ‘Women’s Society’. This is not official but it is still recognised by the KOC.

There is a sports club activity. As I play basketball, most of my fellow members are men.

The operation of a gender-specific Women’s Society is unlikely to be interpreted as being symptomatic of gender inequity in the KOC. This activity is more likely to be recognised as having the features of a club association, like a sports club.

The KOC interviewees may all, therefore, be said to share the same organisational values, which indicates that the official and operational organisational goals are well communicated within the organisation. In fact, the KOC actually places more emphasis on elite sport than its Statutes would imply and this is also well recognised by the staff members. Sub-cultures seem to differentiate senior from junior staff members within the organisation. The divisions
among them in this context do not seem to affect their ability to subscribe to the organisation’s official and operational goals; rather, they concern the ways in which staff members tend to socialise and interact due to the differences in their backgrounds.

Along with the sharing of organisational values, the other element of organisational culture that should be evaluated is the leadership. The main focus here is on how the senior and junior staff members communicate and perform their tasks, which allows the style of leadership to be characterised as tending more towards transformational or transactional leadership. Three operationalisations are stated: ‘does a leader elicit respect from his/her subordinates and stimulate their sense of pride?’, ‘does a leader carry out effective two-way and horizontal communications and interactions with his/her subordinates?’ and ‘does a leader clearly communicate organisational values, purpose and mission?’ Six interviewees responded by saying that by encouraging their subordinates to contribute to decision-making senior staff members increased their feeling of motivation. A stronger sense of motivation may result from improved two-way communications and more lively interactions between seniors and juniors.

There is a system by which we staff members can suggest our opinions to the Secretary General and the President. As a General Director, I also held meetings to hear the subordinate staff members’ ideas or opinions.

(a former senior KOC staff member)

Our internal communication system may affect our working environment. I think it is not too bad. I usually speak to my team leader often. Of course, it can be up to the team leader in a department and my team leader is willing to listen to us.

(a junior KOC staff member)

In the case of our department [of International Affairs], no matter what position we hold, each staff member should be responsible for each mega event. So because everyone cares for one event from the beginning to the end, there is an opportunity for me to offer my opinion

(a junior KOC staff member)

These days, our team leaders are quite young and our decision-making is quite
open to all staff members, so this leads to the participation of young staff members. Also, there is a newly established system by which all staff members can contribute their opinions.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

There is a system by which staff members can suggest their opinions.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

I can handle the task that I’m in charge with. When there is a different opinion, I should justify my own view. We are quite free to discuss our different ideas.

(a senior KSC officer)

As the KSC and the KOC have merged into one sporting organisation under the name of KOC, the evaluation of corporate governance of the KOC is analysed with reference to the organisation’s current title of ‘KOC’. However, in order to understand the organisational culture, the KSC and the KOC diverged from one another in several ways. According to the interviewees above, the KOC staff members seemed to enjoy a more flexible environment in which they were encouraged to express their opinions, since each KOC staff member was expected to deal with each international event individually. By contrast, the KSC staff members worked in a more fixed and conservative environment as their tasks were more related to administration and finance and were thus more likely to be related to the tasks that the KSC shared with the government.

Nevertheless, two interviewees quoted below claimed that it was hard to see that there was room in either the KSC or the KOC for effective mutual communications:

We don’t have such a system for sure. For several years the KOC has tried to be open and flexible in terms of its decision-making, but recently I haven’t been able to see any improvement.

(a junior KOC staff member)

If we suggest our opinions, the team leaders do not really listen to us. They do not actively listen to us.

(a middle-ranking KSC officer)

In terms of a reward system, three KOC/KSC interviewees testified that such a system of
incentives did not seem to be an influential element in the KOC’s performance because it did not give it any priority.

I would say that our system is quite open to everyone to contribute through the reward system

(a former senior KOC staff member)

Those who have achieved their tasks will be rewarded each year. But it doesn’t affect much because it is not a big deal.

(a former senior KSC official)

It seems that the members of KOC staff do not benefit from a reward system. In fact, there is no system of rewards at the organisational level, although the government operates a reward system as we are a public organisation.

(a middle-ranking KOC officer)

To judge by these comments, the reward system is not very actively developed, which implies that the leadership does not consider a system of financial incentives to be effective. One of the principal characteristics of the KOC’s work, before the merger, was that its staff were more engaged in organising international events. Consequently, the senior officers within the KOC, which was formerly known as the Department of International Affairs, have tended to interact with their subordinates more than their counterparts in the KSC used to do. Thus, with respect to the style of leadership at the KOC when it was the as Department of International Affairs, there was more of a tendency towards transformational leadership than was the case with the KSC.

Overall, the effective organisational culture may be defined as one in which there is ‘clear homogeneity of organisational values’ and one where ‘highly transformational leaders create a make strong positive organisational culture’. This is ‘more effective’ because the staff members all share the same values in terms of the official and the operational goals which the KOC has to pursue. In these circumstances an integration of organisational values takes place. However, the staff members also indicated that sub-cultures existed within the KOC in terms of a working differentiation of organisational values. Thus, organisational values within the KOC appear to be integrated in some aspects and differentiated in others. With regard to leadership, the Department of International Affairs, a title which defined the role of the KOC
before the merger, enjoyed better two-way communications among senior and junior staff members than those in the KSC and the senior officers encouraged their subordinates to contribute their opinions more and influence their decision-making. Thus, the leadership of the KOC was more likely to be of a transformational nature while that at the KSC tended toward the transactional style.

7.8 Efficiency

The definition of efficiency is ‘the amount of resources or funds (the input) to be used to improve or produce the desired output’ and the operationalisation is ‘how are the budget allocations decided?’

Table 7-12 Definitions/Interpretations and operationalisations of efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitions/Interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The amount of resources or funds (the input) to be used to improve or produce the desired output.</td>
<td>-How are the budget allocations decided?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Historic budgeting</em>: budgeting on the basis of the previous financial year’s allocation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Zero-based budgeting</em>: no budget lines should be carried forward from one period to the next</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Priority-based budgeting</em>: budgeting on the basis of priorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Performance-based budgeting</em>: budgeting on the basis of performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fixed budgeting</em>: budgeting on the basis of the level of activity and service provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The budget allocation to the NFs is made by carefully considering what a ‘fair allocation of resources’ should be in terms of equity and efficiency, as mentioned earlier (see equity in Chapter 7). The allocation of resources is more likely to be recognised as having been ‘fair’ if the resource distribution is equitable, while an ‘efficient’ allocation may be identified where the input of resources is efficiently distributed in relation to the desired output. The KOC is responsible for distributing resources to the NFs and the Local Branches. In *the Statutes of KOC* (n.d., 2009: 2) Article 5, which is concerned with ‘Member Organisations and Local Branches’, states the following:
(1) Sports organisations may become affiliated members of the KOC. The KOC’s organisational membership is categorised as Full Member, Associate Member, and Recognised Member.

(2) The definition of each organisational member category is as follows:

A. “Full Member” classifies a member organisation which fully complies with the rights and obligations of KOC membership and is accepted by a majority vote of the General Assembly following an assessment of the Executive Board.

B. “Associate Member” classifies a member organisation which is accepted as a KOC member by a majority vote of the Executive Board and has limited rights.

C. “Recognised Member” classifies a member organisation which has no rights and obligations as a KOC member, and its affiliation as a sports organisation is recognised by the KOC only for a limited time.

As of December, 2012, the National Federations comprise 58 sporting organisations in Korea that are affiliated members of the KOC (The KOC, n.d.). There are three types of membership: full member, associate member and recognised member. The representatives of the NFs constitute the highest decision making group in the KOC, namely the General Assembly of Representatives. These member organisations should comply with the Statutes of the KOC. According to the Statutes of KOC (n.d., 2009: 2) Article 5, concerning Member Organisations and Local Branches:

(1) In order to accomplish its mission, the KOC may have local divisional offices in Seoul, metropolitan cities/provinces, and in Special Self-governing Provinces (termed as “Local Branches”). (2009: 2)

Local branches are administered from 16 offices nation-wide under the auspices of the KOC and they deal with local sporting matters. Local branches should also comply with the Statutes of KOC and its detailed requirements and procedures, as stated in the regulations. According to the Report on Business Activities (KOC, 2009: 9), the criteria by which funding is provided to the 56 NFs and 16 Local Branches are set out below in Tables 7-13 and 7-14:

Table 7-13 Criteria for the supply of funds to the 56 National Federations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of performance</td>
<td>12,046</td>
<td>5-level differences in support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees’ salaries</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>1 Director and 2 employees at each NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>1,400,000 for each NF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the case of funds for the administration and for employees’ salaries, all NFs are allocated the same undifferentiated amount of funding, as Table 7-13 shows. However, none of the reports directly states what criteria should be applied to distinguish the five level differences in terms of funding. Another similar example is seen in the funding for Local Branches. As Table 7-14 illustrates, whereas funding for administration is allocated in the same amount for each Branch, different levels are applied for training.

Table 7-14 Criteria for the supply of funds to the 16 Local Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1,728</td>
<td>Different level application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Same amount application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of the Local Branches, the KOC usually allocates funds to them across Korea on the basis of performance and participation, i.e. “depending on the performance and participation results from the previous year’s National Sports Competitions” (KOC Business Report, 2008: 41). A high-ranking KSC staff member explained how the resources are allocated in the following response:

In terms of the improvement of performance, the NFs are divided into levels such as A, B, C…for example, A means the sports for the Olympic Games, B means the sports for the Asian Games… the main priorities should be attached to the sports for both the Olympic and Asian Games. It also depends on the number of medals obtained in international events, for instance, the Gold, Silver and Bronze medals.

(a high-ranking KSC officer)

According to this informant and the two Tables 7-13 and 7-14 above, the resources are allocated on the basis of the importance of international events and the athletes’ performance in previous sports events. This illustrates the KOC’s adherence to a performance-based system of budgeting with the aim of improving performance and training.
On the other hand, fixed budgeting is applied to the NFs and the Local Branches for the purpose of supporting their administration. This can also be seen as an example of historic budgeting as the budget is allocated on the basis of the previous year’s allocation. Overall, the KOC applied three different budgeting principles to the NFs and the Local Branches, namely historic, performance-based and fixed budgeting. It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of output and input in each of the NFs and Local Branches since the document does not share the information in detail.

7.9 Governance practices in a cultural aspect

As discussed in Chapter Four, this section deals with three important sources of organisational culture suggested by Brown (1998), being national culture; the vision and leadership; and the nature of business environment. The analysis of the four major events that took place in the KOC (see Chapter 6) and the analysis of the corporate governance of the KOC (see Chapter 7) enabled the identification of a cultural aspect of South Korea. In addition, the typology of organisational culture developed by Harrison (1972) and modified by Handy (1978, 1985) is applied to the case of the KOC to picture South Korean distinctive cultural aspects.

7.9.1 The vision and leadership

Of the three sources, the vision and leadership have been identified in the section of effectiveness above. The official and operational goals of the KOC are clearly noted with more emphasis being placed on elite sport. In terms of official goals, it becomes apparent that the KOC concentrated on two themes, namely ‘developing sports in Korea’ and ‘elite sport development’. While the theme of ‘elite sport development’ has a bearing solely on elite sport, the theme ‘developing sports in Korea’ can also be interpreted as covering the subject of sport for all. School sport was merely mentioned by the KOC interviewees, however, it was appeared at the Statutes of the KOC. Thus, the KOC interviewees seem to acknowledge and share the same organisational values.

Nevertheless, the de facto policy is likely to lean towards elite sport and the KOC staff members all share similar perspectives on the KOC’s ongoing policy. As mentioned earlier, the Korean government has placed elite sport as the most important section within the sport policy. The KOC also shared the view that as a public sporting organisation the KOC is directed by the government to deal with sports policy. This implies that the government’s strongly elite-sport-centred policy also affects the main direction of KOC policy. Therefore,
the KOC has set forth its goals of national glory by means of obtaining medals in international events. This appears to be consistent within the KOC as most interviewees of the KOC also agreed with that.

With respect to the type of leadership, a close-aide of the Korean government is usually selected as the KOC President and, thus, the KOC President is likely to deliver the policy of the government without enough explanations and gathering opinions of the KOC staff members. Also, the KOC President becomes a single influential individual, in particular, the incumbent President occupies a powerful economic position. Such economic powers, Chaebols, or conglomerates have contributed to the country’s economic development and have also been one of the most influential centres of power throughout Korean sporting history. The KOC/KSC incumbent President could exert his economic power to push ahead and persuade the government and political groups which formerly had a great chance to influencing the second KOC/KSC merger that took place in 2009.

In each department within the KOC, the interviewees agreed that power was highly concentrated to a handful of high-ranking officials and it caused more or less transactional leadership within the KOC. However, there was more of a tendency towards transformational leadership in the Department of International Affairs, of which tasks was highly closed to the IOC. Thus, this Department enjoyed better two-way communications among senior and junior staff members than those in the other Departments and the senior officers encouraged their subordinates to contribute their opinions more to influence decision-making. However, overall, transactional leadership was more prevailed throughout the KOC.

7.9.2 The nature of business environment

In relation with the vision and leadership of the KOC, the nature of business environment has been revealed throughout the analysis. As the KOC is a Korean Governmental umbrella body, it is more likely to evolve in a relatively slow-changing environment, which is unlikely to be highly competitive, changeable and innovative. The reliance on government funding prevented the KOC/KSC from becoming an independent policy-making organisation. The government’s influence was exercised more like a direct control, which means that the government was deeply involved in the policy making of the KSC/KOC. The organisation’s heavy financial dependence on the government resulted in governmental bodies such as the KSPO and the MSCT having long enjoyed superior positions to the KOC/KSC in sports policy decision-making by virtue of their ability to deliver financial resources to the KOC.
Therefore, the KOC-related governmental bodies are the most powerful stakeholders in sport policy in Korea. The study clarifies that position of the MCST as the most influential and powerful stakeholder. Also, public's opinions have focused on the national glory by means of obtaining medals in international events and this has affected the Korean Government's elite-centred sport policy. Consequently, the public's opinions are also strongly reflected to the policy of the KOC.

7.9.3 National culture
The last of the three sources of organisational culture deals with national culture, comprising the five elements of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, individualism/collectivism and long-term/short-term orientation (Confucian dynamism). This section employs the Korean governance practices in a cultural aspect in association with Hofstede's (1997) survey data drawn from IBM worldwide.

Power distance
This element discusses not only power distance between internal stakeholders within the KOC but also that of external stakeholders of the KOC. The study identifies that government bodies are the most powerful stakeholders to the KOC. The State President, the MCST, the KSPO all take higher power than the KOC in the decision-making over sports policy. The NFs are positioned as the lower stakeholders than the KOC President as the KOC President is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives and this may limit the extent to which the representatives of the NFs may be involved in decision-making. Therefore, power distance between major stakeholders of the KOC is in this order: The governmental bodies exercise direct power to the KOC while the KOC does the same way to the NFs and this shows that power distance between those major stakeholders is quite high.

Within the KOC, the similar set of views on the distribution of de facto power within the Executive Committee appears throughout the analysis. Two members who came from the governmental body and the KSPO exert power. The Executive Committee provides long-term strategic guidance for the organisation. As the Government push ahead to develop elite sport, the KOC is also following the government’s elite-sport-driven policy. In fact, the Statutes of KOC also legally admit that the governmental body is the higher decision-making body. The government’s strongly elite-sport-centred policy also affects the main direction of KOC policy.
The government has deeply involved in the election of the KOC President. The election of the KOC President is more likely to be affected by the power of the Korean government. The presidential election, has, in fact been conducted as a ‘token’ exercise with the result that an aide of the State President is usually selected as the KOC President. Although the KOC provides criteria on the electoral system for the KOC Presidency, in the actual election it is more likely that the Korean government will be deeply involved and this can be explained as a consequence of the system of governance that emerges from the basis of the analysis of the election of the KOC president.

Regarding power distance among internal stakeholders, the KOC President or the Secretary General holds the ultimate power in decision-making, which implies the existence of a centralised decision-making structure. The KOC President holds the power to appoint most major high-ranking officers, including the Secretary General and Executive Committee members. Also, the President has the power to accept or rejects departmental decision-making to some extent. If decision-making at the departmental level is only referred to the President or the Secretary General for their information, this can be seen as evidence of a more decentralised structure. On the other hand, in the case where the President or Secretary General is deeply involved in decision-making, this is more likely to come close to centralisation. The Department of International Affairs (the former KOC) staff members seemed to enjoy a more flexible environment in which they were encouraged to express their opinions, since each KOC staff member was expected to deal with each international event individually. By contrast, the former KSC staff members worked in a more fixed and conservative environment as their tasks were more related to administration and finance and were thus more likely to be related to the tasks that the KSC shared with the government. The president had the right to make the final decision in any case.

In addition, the process of selecting the Chef de Mission is not monitored and it is only open those who attend the presidential breakfast meeting. The decision-making is made by the KOC President without any objections from those high-ranking officials who attend the meeting. Directors of each department who interviewed all agreed that the meeting was a ritual formality for the selection of Chef de Mission and that their involvement in decision-making was almost none. Everything was done ‘according to the scenario’. The KOC President existed as the main actor in decision-making of CDM.
Internally, the KOC President is the most powerful stakeholder in decision-making and even senior staff members are expected to accept the KOC President’s decisions or opinions. Senior or middle-ranking officials in management positions along with expect junior staff members or subordinates are more likely to follow without questions. It features hierarchical structures which empower the top individual with limited participation for subordinates in decision making and, thus, staff members are unlikely to be equal across different power levels. Therefore, the high power distance is explicit in a Korean context.

**Uncertainty avoidance**

Uncertainty avoidance is very closely related with power distance. Most senior and junior staff members shared the opinion that junior officers usually had to obey their seniors’ instruction and orders in a Korean context. This is a big characteristic of high uncertainty avoidance that staff follows a strict structure with rules and expertise. As Brown (1998: 47) says, “Korean bosses are highly directive and make little attempt to explain their decisions to their employees”. This is also related to the leadership aspect within the KOC. The senior officials in a management level follow high transactional leadership. Additionally, as a public organisation, the KOC follows the government’s sport policy by resisting innovation of its own. Accordingly, the KOC shows high uncertainty avoidance.

**Feminism/Masculinity**

As the government has begun to put an emphasis on gender equity following the changes in our society that have raised people’s consciousness of the need to improve women’s rights around late 1980s. Against this backdrop, it was approximately in the early and/or mid-1990s when the tendency regarding recruitment inside the KOC/KSC became more favourable toward the employment of women. This is likely to reflect the linked phenomena of a more favourable attitude developing in society towards women’s active participation in society and of a change in the political conditions that led to the establishment of a governmental body for dealing with women’s affairs.

However the study revealed the prevalence of a male-dominated organisational culture in the KOC. This has resulted in the phenomenon of a low level of female participation at the managerial level. Women in general quit their jobs after marriage in the context of traditional Korean accepted social practice and that the approach to gender equity issues at the KOC/KSC was unlikely to have become sufficiently mature for women employees to be able to continue working after marriage. Such a male-dominated organisational culture justified the description of the KOC/KSC as being ‘conservative’. However social practice was
involved shows that it is to be a very common aspect of Korean society rather than just limited to the KOC.

More female workers are categorised as filling ‘clerical and technical support posts’, which conveys a situation of gender inequity with respect to administrative-level employment. Also, the salary differences between ‘administrative’ and ‘clerical and technical support’ posts and shows that employees in these categories are not treated the same in terms of their salaries. Only the staff serving in administrative posts are responsible for carrying out projects within the KOC, while the holders of clerical and technical support posts are only responsible for fulfilling subsidiary helpers’ roles. In terms of access to the higher position, staff in clerical and technical support posts remain at the lowest level. Nevertheless, gender equity is more likely to be achieved among the administrative posts at the non-managerial level, since female staff are appointed to such positions more frequently and thereby benefit from the same treatment and salaries as their male colleagues. Apparently, masculinity has strongly appeared in the Korean cultural context.

**Collectivism/individualism**

The organisation has tended to be quite conservative with a lack of opportunities for personal development and with a strong tendency of obeisance. This phenomenon brought an organisational culture with which some junior staff members have difficulty in coping. The divisions among them in this context do not seem to affect their ability to subscribe to the organisation’s official and operational goals; rather, they concern the ways in which staff members tend to socialise and interact due to the differences in their backgrounds. Most junior staff members admitted that there was a wide gap between the senior and junior staff members and listed several elements of difference in terms of the generation gap, varieties of educational background, foreign language ability and the length of exposure to living in foreign countries. Junior staff members are more likely to be exposed to the western individualistic culture as they have been educated by strong language-oriented studies, which gave more chances to live abroad. Thus, the younger individuals have a tendency of not disclosing details of their personal life rather than sharing it with others.

The senior staff admitted that collectivism used to be much stronger. As the conservative organisational culture encourages junior staff members to follow the senior officers to move together, the senior naturally accepted such an organisational culture. The relationships and connections between people had been strongly important and this was extended into their
social life. Thus, it emphasised the tight connections between staff members. This leads to
the existence of a sub-culture within the KOC. The junior and senior groups usually socialise
separately, the younger staff tend to join in sports club activities. Nevertheless, many staff
members alluded to the willingness of staff to gather without being hindered by concerns of
gender. Thus, sub-cultures seem to differentiate senior from junior staff members within the
organisation. However, collectivism has been still much stronger than individualism within
the KOC. The conservative environment encouraged the junior officials to make a
commitment to follow the tradition of the organisation, which collectivism is highly valued.

Long-term/short-term orientation (Confucian dynamism)
As identified in the section of collectivism/individualism, the KOC has encouraged new
comers to adapt of traditions of collectivism with persistence despite their personal
backgrounds and characteristics. Also, individual status is quite important in their
relationships as senior staff holds higher status in the relationships with their subordinates
within the KOC and also in their social life. Such relationships are very important. These are
major features of long-term orientation and thus, the KOC shows a long termist according to
its governance practices.

7.9.4 Typology of organisational culture
Overall, the KOC’s power and organisational structure is more likely to be close to power
culture in terms of typologies of organisational cultures: power, task, role and person culture
(see Figure 4-2). The characteristics of power culture are to “have a single source of power
from which rays of influence spread throughout the organisation…thus, to be pictured as a
web” (Brown: 1998: 66). Within the KOC, it is obvious that the sole power is located with the
KOC President and/or the Secretary General, as the KOC President and/or the Secretary
General is placed at the final stage of decision making. The selection of Chef de Mission is a
good example of power culture within the KOC. Although those high-ranking officers are able
to attend the meeting of selection of CDM, their opinions are not reflected to the final
decision. Rather, they are expected to agree with the decision of the KOC President without
questions.

The next groups of power are the Executive Committee and a handful of high-ranking
officers (directors) in the managerial level in each department. Under the power of the
President, the Executive Committee also holds strong power in overall decision making.
Under the system that the KOC President can nominate the members of the Executive
Committee, the KOC President holds stronger power than the Executive Committee.
Nevertheless, some individuals who belong to the Korean government in the Executive Committee are likely to hold similar power to the KOC President. In fact, power in practice is exerted by a limited member of individuals. However, in general, the KOC President holds higher status than the members in the Executive Committee.

The directors have the largest power in decision making in working-level position within each department. Nevertheless, they are obliged to inform the KOC President of their decisions and thus, the final decision-making is done by the President by accepting or rejecting departmental decision-making. Although the final decision-maker in the organisation is the KOC President, in some cases, the Secretary General also plays a role in deciding overall policy.

The power culture is also appeared at the national level since the power concentration prevailed through the national governance practice in the Korean context. The Korean government is the top power including the relevant governmental bodies. As the State President has the sole power in decision making in sport policy, the KOC should follow what the Korean government requests and orders. Especially, the MCST and the KSPO are both powerful governmental bodies, influencing the KOC due to its receipt of governmental funds. Furthermore, the KOC has more powerful status as a headquarters of the sport in Korea than the National Federations which all belong to the KOC. Given that the President of the KOC is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives which is the highest level decision-making body in the KOC, he has been able to exercise his decision-making authority over the representatives of each National Federation.

Therefore, at both the KOC and national levels, power concentration is apparent and this implies the existence of a centralised decision-making structure. Thus, this structure can be seen as the power culture and illustrated as a web-type of power distribution.

7.10 Conclusion

The aim of this section was to examine the ways in which the key principles of corporate governance in the Olympic Movement, which were constructed in a western context, are applied at the KOC and to identify the similarities and differences in the ways in which they are interpreted in the Korean context. Some principles are interpreted as similar as their notions of the IOC's without fulfilling their practices in reality, for instance, accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy, while some principles are well-established in the
concepts and well-interpreted in the practices as the IOC’s recommendations indicate, for example, effectiveness and efficiency. However, effectiveness and efficiency are more likely to the evaluating system rather than if the KOC is ethically right.

The auditing system, which is accountability, is not well-practiced within the KOC and a limited number of stakeholder hold power in terms of balancing power, which does not follow responsibility. The process of Chef de Mission is not transparent as it is only open to those who attend the presidential breakfast meeting. In fact, the Chef de Mission is selected by the KOC President and the election of the KOC President is more likely to be affected by the invisible power of the Korean government, which show that the KOC is against the notion of democracy in its practices. The KOC acknowledges well that a clear homogeneity of organisational values and highly transformational leaders can produce positive organisational culture, which is effective. The practice shows a homogeneity of organisational values with a sub-culture though and gradually towards transformational leadership. The resource allocation is on the basis of a performance-based and fixed system of budgeting. The notions of gender and disability equity are not clearly demonstrated by the IOC and are not clearly practiced in the Korean context either. However, IOC has focused on rather equality and the KOC has tried to meet up the expectations of the IOC by means of living up to higher percentage of female involvement.

Although the KOC appears to try to live up to the IOC’s recommendations, it is located in different political, economic, social and historical contexts which gives rise to a peculiarly Korean way of interpreting and applying the principles of corporate governance. As the KOC is the government-umbrella organisation with appropriated funding, the Korean government is the most influential stakeholder in decision-making. Nevertheless, The KOC’s power structure and organisational culture is likely to be concentrated to the KOC President within the organisation. In general, power centralisation is apparent throughout the Korean cultural context. Thus, the corporate governance practices of the KOC are also largely affected by the power centralisation within the Korean society.

With respect to national culture, the KOC features hierarchical structure which empowers the top individual and provides limited participation to subordinates in decision making and, thus, staff members are unlikely to be equally empowered across different levels. A high power distance is explicit in Korean context. Most senior and junior staff members shared the opinion that junior officers usually had to obey what their seniors’ instruction and orders in a
Korean context. This shows high uncertainty avoidance. As the conservative organisational culture led that junior staff members are encouraged to follow the senior officers to move together, the junior naturally accepted such an organisational culture. The conservative environment makes the junior officials to make a commitment to follow the tradition of the organisation, in which collectivism is highly valued. The KOC has encouraged new comers to adapt of traditions of collectivism with persistence despite their personal backgrounds and characteristics. Also, individual status is quite important in their relationships as senior staff holds higher status in the relationships with their subordinates within the KOC and also in their social life. Such relationships are very important. These are major features of long-term orientation. In addition, the study reveals the prevalence of a male-dominated organisational culture in the KOC. This has resulted in the phenomenon of a low level of female participation at the managerial level. More female workers are categorised as filling ‘clerical and technical support posts’, which conveys a situation of gender inequity with respect to administrative-level employment. Apparently, masculinity has strongly appeared in the Korean cultural context.

Interestingly, the KOC manifests similar interpretations of the key principles to those of the IOC without putting them into practice in the interests of good governance to the same extent. In such circumstances, nevertheless, where the KOC is making an effort to align its practices with the IOC’s recommendations as much as possible, the indication is that the KOC is on course to accomplish the IOC’s governance practices.
8 Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This study mainly deals with the key ethical principles of corporate governance, which have been developed in the business and the sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement in a western framework, and discusses the ways in which they have been adapted and interpreted in the non-western cultural context of the Korean NOC. It, therefore, seeks to address the following questions and objectives:

- What characterises good/corporate governance in the literature and how have the principles of good governance been adapted to the specialist sporting context?
- What principles of good governance (if any) are advocated by the IOC in relation to the governance of Olympic organisations? And how are these interpreted by the IOC body?
- How is the KOC governed? Does it reflect/respect principles of good/corporate governance in general, and specifically those aspects recommended by the IOC? And how are these interpreted in the KOC context?
- To what extent are practices of good/corporate governance developed in a western context applicable in a non-western context?

8.2 Key principles in business and sports sectors and the Olympic Movement

Following Chapter 2, which deals with the key ethical principles in the business sector where those principles originated and Chapter 4, which focuses on their application in the Olympic Movement, certain principles have been seen to emerge pre-eminently. Four ethical principles, namely accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy, are the subjects of most discussion in the literature pertaining to corporate governance in both business and sports sectors. On the other hand, equity, effectiveness and efficiency figure less prominently than those four principles. Nevertheless, Chapter 3 which focuses on corporate governance in the sports sector shows that relevant journal articles devote much attention to equity and effectiveness. In specific, equity covers mainly a gender issue and a small number of articles deal with equity in relation to ethnicity (race) and disability. Effectiveness in sports organisations is found by means of identifying its leadership and/or organisational culture. Those articles found in Chapter 3 tend just to touch upon the principles of accountability, responsibility and financial dependence.
Conceptualisation in a Western frame of reference

The three sections of literature review cover corporate/good governance in the business and sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement. The Cadbury Report (1992), which is the first report on corporate governance is the main source in the business sector. All the articles regarding corporate governance in the sport sector have been authored in western countries and operationalisations are developed based on the documents on corporate governance in the Olympic Movement. This demonstrates, therefore, that the notions of corporate governance are conceptualised in a western framework. It is important to identify the ways in which NOCs in non-western contexts interpret and practise ethical principles that are constructed in a western-context. The following analysis shows how governance practices have been interpreted in one particular national and culture context: that of the Republic of Korea.

Features of key principles in the Olympic Movement

The documents from the IOC highlight accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy as being the most important ethical principles to be considered in sporting organisations affiliated to the Olympic Movement. Whereas equity and/or equality and effectiveness have been studied in depth in the literature in relation to sporting organisations, the IOC’s recommendations make only limited reference to them and pay still less attention to efficiency. However, several articles in the Copenhagen Congress Contributions give relatively more attention to the issues of equity, effectiveness and efficiency that have had such a low profile in the Olympic Movement. Furthermore, the Copenhagen Congress Contributions also give consideration to the specificity of the cultural and historical aspects of each NOC. It argues that the IOC should understand and admit that each nation in which a sporting organisation is situated has its own historical, political, economic and cultural background, and the relations between a sporting organisation and its government should thus be considered in a different way depending on the relevant national context.

The importance of viewing NOCs from this perspective is especially evident when the governance practices of NOCs in non-western contexts are being examined as those governance practices can be interpreted differently in different political, cultural, social, and economic contexts. As discussed earlier, while the underlying concepts of corporate governance have been developed in a western context, individual NOCs’ different understandings of the fundamental ethical principles should be considered to some extent.
The concept of ‘autonomy’ in the Olympic Movement

Since the term ‘autonomy’ has often been used in IOC documents, Chapter 4 discusses the principles that can be related to making or achieving ‘autonomy’. The Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 12) states that “a definition of autonomy of sport reflecting the principles of respect, responsibility and reliability should be adopted by all within the Olympic Movement”. The NOCs should guard their autonomy by observing clearly delineated rights and duties in compliance with the IOC’s recommendations. Their autonomy should be respected by their governments within the framework of a positive relationship. NOCs should comply with the rules and regulations of the Olympic Movement in order to establish their autonomy, therein, acknowledging the Movement’s autonomy.

The interpretation of ‘autonomy’ given in The Olympic Movement in Society (2009: 12) is also relevant to the issue of democracy, as it emphasises the autonomy of sporting organisations in relation to any intergovernmental organisations and governments. It also states that “equality and fairness” are essential to the autonomy of the Olympic Movement. In addition, although NOCs should cooperate with their governments and/or governmental bodies, they should take a firm stance in that partnership, while the government should respect the autonomy of sport. This can be directly related to the call for democracy on the part of the NOC which ‘should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of high officials’. The clause of the Olympic Charter (2010: 62) stating that “the NOCs must preserve their autonomy” can be interpreted as a summons to NOCs to safeguard their independence and resist all external pressures by instituting their own independent decision-making procedures. Thus, if the principles of good governance are not respected, then autonomy may be under threat. Summoning an organisation to exercise its autonomy does not necessarily imply the introduction of democratic, transparent, accountable etc. ways of working, so autonomy does not automatically lead to good governance, but governance failures might lead bodies such as national governments to reduce or threaten the autonomy of sporting bodies.

8.3 Autonomy in association with institutional isomorphism

In order to study autonomy, which was briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, in greater depth, this section examines the recognition given to the concept of autonomy in sport by (1) sports organisations and (2) public authorities. It also refers to a series of case studies concerning sports organisations’ autonomy. In the case of the IOC, “under Rule 25 of the charter of 1949, being ‘independent and autonomous’ became a requirement for recognition of the NOCs”
(Chappelet, 2010: 11). Since 1949 when the term ‘autonomy’ with regard to the NOCs was first used in the Olympic Movement, NOCs have been encouraged to safeguard their complete independence and autonomy from political, religious or commercial influences. The IOC also recognised the International Federations’ (IFs’) autonomy from it in Rule 26 of the 2007 charter, but “the IOC exercises greater scrutiny over the autonomy of the NOCs than over that of the IFs” (Chappelet, 2010: 14). In terms of public authorities’ recognition of the autonomy of their national sports bodies, European intergovernmental organisations began referring to it in the late 1980s, notably the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Development of Sport (CDDS), 1992; the European Commission’s Report on Sport, 1999; the Nice Declaration of the European Commission, 2000; the European Commission’s White Paper on Sport, 2007; and the European Parliament White Paper, 2008 (Chappelet, 2010: 16-7).

With respect to a series of examples concerning sports organisations’ autonomy, several cases are introduced in which governmental interference has occurred in national sports organisations and (inter)governmental interference has affected the operations of international sports organisations. As a result of government interference in elections to their respective NOCs or NFs, or with the composition of the list of candidates, “the IOC suspended Iraq’s NOC in 2008 and Panama’s in 2007, and refused to recognise the election of new leaders of the Albanian NOC in 2009... and the IOC threatened to suspend the Kuwait’s NOC in August 2009” (Chappelet, 2010: 21). Other cases have occurred with relation to FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), i.e., the suspension of the national football federations of Albania and Madagascar, the threat to suspend the Spanish federation in 2008 and the brief suspension of Greece’s football federation in 2006 (Chappelet, 2010: 21).

Several instances of intergovernmental interference in international sports organisations have been highlighted. “The United Nations resolutions on apartheid (the last of them in 1985) caused international sports organisations gradually to suspend their relations with South Africa (until 1992) and Rhodesia (until 1980)” (Chappelet, 2010: 22). When a trade embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN in 1992, the Barcelona Olympics hosted by Spain in 1992 also applied this embargo but athletes from the former Yugoslavia were allowed to participate as “independent athletes” (Chappelet, 2010: 22).
In relation to the autonomy of sports organisations, the concept of institutional isomorphism is likely to be highly relevant (see Chapter 3 & 4). Augestad, Bergsgard and Hansen (2006: 296) explain that “theorists of the neo-institutional school concentrate on how and to what degree organisations adapt to both formal and informal expectations in the institutional environment.” The question at issue is “the extent to which an organisation should be able to adapt to the institutional environment”. Isomorphism is defined as the process by which organisations base their legitimacy on the norms and values of the environment to which they are exposed. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Leiter (2005) refer to this as “institutional isomorphism”, and Leiter (2005) states, in particular, that it is a characteristic of non-profit organisations.

Three types of isomorphism are proposed. Coercive isomorphism implies that ‘those who are the key suppliers of financial resources force organisations to adapt to their structures and regulations in the area’. In this study, the key suppliers comprise a broader range of entities than those which act simply as sources of finance. Secondly, according to mimetic isomorphism, ‘organisations tend to imitate other organisations which appear to have been the most successful and/or legitimate when confronting various changes and uncertainties. Lastly, based on the increasing professionalisation of management, normative isomorphism suggests that ‘a member of an organisation is likely to recruit people with the same understanding of how an organisation ought to be managed, or professionally trained managers, and/or to obtain expert advice.’ This study poses the question as to whether or not there is any evidence of the presence of isomorphism within sporting organisations.

In compliance with its summons to the NOCs to protect their autonomy, the IOC has also allowed them to generate their own funds so as to be better able to safeguard their full independence against possible pressures from the government. In 1989 the provision (“bye-law”) concerning Rule 24 recommended that NOCs should “raise funds to enable them to maintain their full independence, in particular from the government of their country or from any other organisation that controls sport in the country” (cited in Chappelet, 2010: 12). This was revised in the 2010 Charter as a Bye-law to Rules 28 and 29, 3.4 so as to state that “it is recommended that NOCs seek sources of financing in a manner compatible with the fundamental principles of Olympism” (2010: 67). In this way, the NOCs may avoid the adverse consequences of coercive isomorphism. Since the KOC has had to rely heavily on financial resources provided by the Korean government, the government has been able to interfere to a great extent in most aspects of sports policy. This is in spite of that fact that the
KOC is recognised as the headquarters of sport in Korea and can, therefore, fairly claim its entitlement to be independent in its decision making. The interviewees from the KOC have indeed borne witness to the KOC’s inability to be truly autonomous due to its financial dependency on the government. Thus, the government’s power to regulate the organisation’s financial resources has been an effective means for it to manipulate the KOC/KSC in ways that are favourable to its own ends. Accordingly, since the KOC/KSC lacks any real financial independence, the respondents assert that it is not able to defend its autonomy in decision-making.

In terms of organisational similarity, mimetic isomorphism indicates that ‘organisations tend to imitate the organisations which have seemed to be the most successful and/or legitimate when they are faced with various factors of changes and uncertainties’. Following the examples set by the more advanced NOCs, decision makers should take contingent factors, such as policies and programs that already exist nationally and internationally, into account in accordance with Institutional isomorphism. According to the Report on a sporting organisation’s structure modification released by the KOC in 2007, the KOC conducted research on advanced sporting organisations in other countries in 2003, for which the chosen models were provided by New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Italy, France, Germany and Switzerland. Apart from Japan, the NOCs in these countries are combined with their respective Sport Councils, for example, the German and French Olympic Committees. As discussed in relation to the KOC/KSC merger, the staff members from both the KSC and the KOC believed that merging the two organisations would improve efficiency. According to the senior KOC officer quoted below, another international mimetic isomorphism concerns the number of Executive Committee members and the number of Commissions:

In the case of the US, there were the US Olympic Committee and the US Sports Council separately until 1978 when the USOC became the leading sporting organisation in combination with the US Sports Council. In 2006, the number of Executive Committee members was reduced from approximately 125 to 11 in total. Those eleven members all have decision-making powers. The number of Commissions was also reduced from 24 to 4. It was a very dramatic reform and we also went through the same process.

(a senior KOC officer)
In conformity with international trends, the KOC and the KSC believe that such reductions improve the efficiency of the organisation. The newly-merged KOC achieved the aim of reducing the number of Executive Committee members from 125 members in both organisations to “fifteen or more but twenty or less for the number of Executive Committee members with no more than five Vice-Presidents included” (the Statutes of KOC, 2009: 7). Also, the number of Commissions was reduced from 23 to 11 (the Statutes of KOC, 2009: 10-1). With respect to the issue of how the Chef de Mission should be selected, a former senior KOC officer conveyed his view that the KOC should adopt the advanced system used in France, expressing the view that this could improve the national team’s performance:

The best model is France. The Chef de Mission for the coming Olympic Games is usually appointed when the President is elected. He or she can train and organise the national team till the Olympic Games. This can help to improve the national team’s performance.

(a former senior KOC staff member)

Three examples of mimetic isomorphism may thus be adduced in connection with the KOC’s efforts to improve its autonomy: the merger of the Sports Council and the NOC; the reduction in the number of Executive Committee members; and a reduced number of Commissions.

The last isomorphism, normative isomorphism, suggests that ‘a member of an organisation is likely to recruit people with the same understanding of how an organisation ought to be managed and/or professionally trained managers and/or to obtain expert advice’. An interviewee from the KOC explains that most new staff members who were employed 5 or 6 years ago could not continue their work and even decided to quit the KOC as they had not come from a sporting background. On account of that experience, the KOC established a policy that only those who were from a sports background should be employed because they were more likely to share the same understanding of the KOC’s values and goals and could therefore be assimilated into the organisation:

There were many cases of newly appointed employees quitting after three to six months. This made us rethink the criteria for recruitment and, thus, we tried to find people who could be assimilated into our organisation, which resulted in a tendency to recruit new employees who had received a degree in sports. Before the 2000s
most employees were selected in terms of their language skills but recently in most cases it has depended both on the degree and the language skills. We believe that there is a duty to give a higher allocation of posts to those who received a degree in sports.

(a KSC staff member)

In keeping with the interpretation/definition given earlier of institutional isomorphism as “how and to what degree organisations adapt to both formal and informal expectations in the institutional environment”, the application of the concept of isomorphism to sporting organisations world-wide is appropriate because it pertains to a common characteristic. The analysis of three cases of isomorphism concludes that the KOC as a NOC has obviously adapted its institutional environment to the Korean context. In summary, thus, isomorphism may be said to characterise the relationship between universalism of the IOC and the government and the particularism of the NOC.

8.4 Methodological reflections

This study adopted critical realist assumptions, following a retroductive strategy that hypothesises the regularities of the Korean society and its unobservable social structures, which impact the corporate governance of the KOC. As critical realism accepts an interpretivist epistemological assumption, it also used critical discourse analysis following an abductive strategy to understand how knowledge is socially structured through the members of the KOC staff’s language. In order to identify the power relations among the KOC’s stakeholders and to find similarities or differences between the IOC in its western context and the KOC in the Korean context in the ways in which they conceive of, and put into practice the principles of corporate governance, the review of discursive events includes interviews and documentary analysis with the purpose of identifying ‘regularities’ which represent social practices. The analysis, which mainly discusses social practices in relation to four events or processes in order to discover patterns of explanation or description, permitted ‘hypothesise’ on the real structures and mechanisms underlying or embedded in organisations. This entails the need to consider the (organisational) cultural elements of structures and the power structures bound up in the organisational structures ‘per se’ and thereby to identify the ways in which corporate governance is undertaken differently (or similarly) in Korea.
On the basis of the literature review covering corporate governance in the business and sport sectors and in the Olympic Movement, this study identifies the definitions/interpretations and operationalisations of the key principles, following a top-down approach. A bottom-up approach was also adopted, whereby an interviewee-led discussion enabled the question to be raised as to how certain policy actions came about. Thus, not only did this twofold approach allow aspects of the interviewees’ understanding of corporate governance to be identified but it also clarified the situation regarding the interviewees’ perspectives on western norms including the IOC’s norms as recommendations for governance, and whether their views were similar or different.

**Validity and Reliability**

Establishing the internal validity and demonstrating the credibility of the findings obtained by discourse analysis is regarded largely as a matter of coherence, or ‘warrantability’, in terms of which “an analysis is warrantable to the extent that it is both trustworthy and sound” (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 167). This study identifies certain discourses on behaviours of governance practices and formal/informal practices related to governance, which reveals the nature of social practices involving social structure and power relations. In terms of the external validity, the case study approach adopted is one which is driven by the theoretical generalisation which was being tested, namely the claim that although (a) governance principles are generally derived from a western perspective, (b) those principles are culturally relative. In effect, the case study of the KOC/KSC is one of ‘pattern matching’. In other words the research question relates to whether or not the governance principles advocated in the discourse of the KOC/KSC match the pattern of governance principles prescribed in western accounts, constituted by the universal principles of governance for international sporting bodies prescribed by the IOC. The CDA enables identification of different perspectives in governance practices and the example cited above of the ‘discourse of ignorance’ allows drawing up of warrantable conclusions about a principle of governance. Thus, there is interest in both the interviewees’ perspectives and in the real structures or processes.

The KOC/KSC was chosen as a single case as this sporting organisation fully meets the conditions for “the critical test” of “a well-formulated theory”, which is that governance practices are western-constructed and culturally relative (Yin, 1994: 38). The KOC/KSC represents a sporting organisation that functions in a non-western context where the cultural background is expected to differ from that of sporting organisations in the west, which thus
allows us to make generalisations about ways in which governance practices are exercised. Concerning reliability in discourse analysis, the concepts or meanings of key principles of governance developed and used by the IOC, which have been constructed in a western society, may be interpreted differently in a particular social context, for example, the non-western social milieu of the KOC. Therefore, the meaning given to the principles of governance in the context of the KOC is always likely to be in some respects similar to that of the IOC (it is part of the wider milieu of sport) and in some respects different, i.e. in ways specific to the Korean context. In addition, the concepts of governance can be newly interpreted over time, as the Korean context is always changing.

8.5 Research study contribution

This section reviews the contribution to knowledge made by this thesis and macro- and meso-level theoretical insights developed here in the light of its analysis of the KOC's governance practices as illustrations of the Korean historical, political, economic and social contexts. In Chapter 6, four major events that took place in the KOC were discussed, including the merger of the KOC/KSC, its budget planning, the recruitment of new staff and the processes by which the KOC President and Chef de Mission were selected. Against this background and taking into consideration the Korean context, the governance practices employed by the KOC can be evaluated.

8.5.1 Macro-level theoretical insight

The KOC case study identified the decision-making processes that reflected the power relations between the major stakeholders. From the theories of state perspective, Marxism, elitism and neo-corporatism are all accommodated. The first KOC/KSC merger was accomplished on the orders of the State President, Park Jung Hee, who was one of the most powerful presidents in Korean political history. This shows that Korean society used to have a Marxist tendency because, without any protest from the masses, the ruling class alone, here the government, was involved in decision-making and the majority of people, in particular, those who were engaged in the sporting field, accepted the state President’s decision-making without question. This relationship between the state and the people in the sporting field reflects in influence of Marxism.

The second KOC/KSC merger that took place in June, 2009 shows the aspect of elitism in Korean society. The KOC President Park Yong Sung, who is at the pinnacle of the business elite in the Korean context, has contributed to the KOC/KSC merger. He also possesses
considerable social status in sport as a former IOC member. When Park Yong Sung was designated as the KOC/KSC President, he secured his stance in the process of decision-making over the KOC/KSC merger and the government also accepted it despite its history of opposition to that development. His influence reflects the power of the elite in Korean society. He uses his economic, social and political resources to overcome government resistance, in particular, in the sporting field. Such an elite-driven practice may be seen to represent a significant difference from a western conceptualisation relating to good governance practice, since Park’s political position (reflected in government support) and his economic and social position appear to have been conclusive in allowing him to achieve his ends.

In connection with the budgetary process, this may be viewed as evidence of the existence of a neo-corporatist structure in which the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way with the involvement of a limited number of actors in order to integrate liberal parliamentary democracy, the market economy and a number of organised groups. The decision-making about the allocation of a budget to the KOC/KSC is mainly dependent on the MCST and not the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the National Assembly still plays a minor ‘rubber stamping’ role in inspecting the government bodies. The KSPO is also involved in the decision-making of the KOC/KSC as a supplier of funds but the organisation itself is also supervised by the MCST as one of the governmental sporting organisations that falls beneath its umbrella. The Korean government, thus, plays a central role through the involvement of the National Assembly and the KSPO. Accordingly, the KOC has a low degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the State government.

8.5.2 Meso-level theoretical insight

In connection with the theories of states discussed in macro-level theoretical analysis, the aspect of clientelism is exhibited in the context of the KOC since the government habitually appoints its political aides to be the heads of various sporting organisations such as the KOC/KSC and the KSPO. In the case of the KSPO, it is observable that the chairman of the KSPO is directly appointed by the State President. However, the KOC/KSC holds a meeting of the General Assembly of Representatives to elect a president and, thus, it seems that the government’s power does not affect the presidential election. Nevertheless, according to the staff members of the KOC/KSC interviewed, the government does in fact impact on the decision-making of the Representatives of NFs and, as a result, the candidate who has been patronised by the government has regularly been elected president. This shows that the government’s manipulation of the KOC/KSC election is conducted behind the scenes, in an
indirect and largely ‘unobservable’ way.

Concerning political governance, from the discussion of the KOC/KSC budgetary planning it becomes obvious that the government has direct control over KOC/KSC policy. This ‘direct control’ contrasts markedly with political governance in the ‘western’ sense, as rehearsed by Henry and Lee (2004), by which governments seek to ‘steer’ policy. The government seeks to exercise its direct control by supplying major resources and, in turn, it has become a main stakeholder in sports policy making. In connection with the KOC/KSC merger, for example, while the KSC and the KOC were pursuing their merger unsuccessfully for a decade, the government acted as the main obstacle in the process.

As a major financial supplier, the government has exerted its power over discourse, with the result that the KOC/KSC is almost excluded from the decision-making about the size of the budget. Governmental bodies such as the MCST and sporting organisations under the control of governmental bodies like the KSPO have long enjoyed superior positions to the KOC/KSC in sports policy decision-making by virtue of their ability to deliver financial resources to the KOC. The result for the organisation has been its huge financial dependence on the government and, in turn, the KOC’s lack of power. Accordingly, since the KOC/KSC lacks any financial independence, the interviewees assert that it is not able to defend its autonomy in decision-making. In addition, the government has exercised its power over sporting organisations by placing a close aide of the State President in the organisations’ presidency.

Budgetary planning is also influenced by the internal power relations that existed between the KSC and the KOC before their integration. Before their merger, an examination of the internal power relations between the KSC and the KOC shows that the KSC used to exercise wider powers than the KOC in that the budgetary planning was solely managed by the budget team which belonged to the KSC. This resulted from the fact that the KSC rather than the KOC had pre-eminent power and more privileged access to decision-making over sports policy. The KSC was established during the Japanese occupation under “the spiritual power of the entire nation” (KOC in Fifty Years, 1997: 32) and people regarded the KSC as the real centre of all sports organisations in Korea which, in turn, established the legitimacy of the KSC’s dominance at home.
Another external power relation appears between the KOC/KSC and the NFs. Given that the President of the KOC/KSC is the Chairman of the General Assembly of Representatives, he has been able to exercise his decision-making authority over the representatives of each National Federation, although the General Assembly of Representatives which was the highest-level decision-making body in the KSC, is the body which approves the final report and settlement. This is also a good illustration of the opportunities afforded by the possession of power over discourse in that the KOC/KSC President has more chance to influence decision-making than the Representatives of the NFs because he can exclude their preferred items from the agenda. Likewise, the process of selection of the Chef de Mission is a good illustration of power over discourse in that the KOC President has been the main actor in the decision-making over the choice of the CDM. Even though the Director Generals are invited to the meeting, they are excluded from the actual decision-making. The Director Generals also obviously share the belief that the selection of the CDM is a president’s absolute prerogative and these high-ranking officers do not present any opposition on that point.

Moreover, there is evidence of the effect of power over discourse in the way in which the concept of gender equity (here, the term equality is more suitable) is discursively constructed by KOC/KSC by promoting a target of 30 per cent female recruitment for the achievement of gender equity. This reflects the opinion of the dominant male decision-making group that such a level of female employment could be said to imply that gender equity had been realised, an opinion that the middle-ranking officer subscribed to without questioning.

With reference to Lukes (1974)’ second dimensional power can be explained in the context of the non-decision making roles of women and the disabled. In the KOC/KSC men constituted the power group and women could not access this higher administrative posts due to the social phenomenon in Korea whereby women were expected to leave their jobs after marriage. Also, the claim that the KOC/KSC deals with physical activity and thus that the disabled would not be able to work effectively in such organisations seems irrational since the tasks required of administrators do not involve participation in sports per se. The decision not to consider people with disabilities for such posts may be considered as an example of Lukes’ second dimensional power too.

In terms of systemic governance, the relations among the domestic stakeholders of the KOC are more likely to follow a hierarchical type of governance. As in the case of the KOC/KSC
merger, the hierarchical nature of the organisation’s systemic governance serves to explain the relations among domestic stakeholders. As the government has adopted the highest position in relation to the national sports organisations, it can exercise power in such a way as to control the KOC directly. As it regulate the supply of financial resources, the government’s higher position enables it to be deeply involved in decision-making, to such an extent that the KOC/KSC is virtually obliged to follow its orders. The NFs, in their turn, are under the ‘control’ of the KOC/KSC, so they can exert less power. Their subordinate position is evidence of the hierarchical systemic governance.

In relation to the KOC/KSC merger that took place in 2009, the KOC/KSC’s incumbent President was able to exert his economic power to push ahead and persuade the government and those political groups, which had formerly had a greater chance of influencing the KOC/KSC merger. The KOC/KSC decided to revise its Statutes in order to avoid entering into a conflict with the government that had continuously insisted on the separation of the KOC/KSC. This gambit was successful since the new President Park Yong Sung could take advantage of his economic power. This implies that the possession of economic power is an essential feature shared by powerful decision makers in sports policy in Korea. Therefore, KOC President Park was the most influential stakeholder in the KOC/KSC merger.

The analysis of the KOC’s practices shows examples of the power of discourse, evidence of which is given by the use of the word ‘merger’ to characterise the strategic policy devised by the incumbent KOC/KSC President in the process of restructuring the KOC/KSC. In spite of the fact that the President pursued a KOC-centred policy, agencies at all levels, for instance, the government, the KOC/KSC and other related sporting organisations in Korea, all expressed the view that ‘merger’ was the appropriate term, although the organisational structure was still obviously KSC-centred. The term ‘absorption’, therefore, suited the situation more accurately. The power of discourse influences individual and collective consciousness to such an extent that people’s actions are constructed by discourses that transfer knowledge, and in turn, discourses inform the creation of reality at the individual and/or collective levels.

There is a widely held belief among male staff members of the KOC/KSC that women are not capable of working as well as men, with the implication that women should quit their jobs after marriage, which is a factor that contributes to male dominance in the managerial
positions. The persistent and widespread nature of this kind of discourse (with a strong assertion of its accuracy, notwithstanding the lack of supporting evidence) demonstrates the power of the discourse of hegemonic masculinity. A further consequence is that clerical and technical support posts are mainly allocated to women with limited prospects of promotion. Moreover, salary differences in the public sector are disadvantageous to female employees although the recent policy change on gender equity has brought about greater participation by female staff members at the non-managerial level. Nevertheless, women are seriously under-represented at the managerial and Executive Committee levels, which can be seen as limiting their ability to influence decision making.

The power of discourse is also apparent in respect of the organisation’s policy regarding the employment of people with impairments. A ‘discourse of incapability’ and of horizontal segregation is manifest in the way in which the employment of people with disabilities is treated by some respondents as being primarily or solely the responsibility of organisations dealing with disability sport. With regard to the achievement of equitable employment opportunities for people with impairments, most members of KOC/KSC staff interviewed presume that people with disabilities are employed in sufficient numbers for the organisation to be in compliance with the regulations set by the government (though they were unable to say what the proportion required by the government was).

8.6 Organisational culture of the KOC in association with National culture

This study adopted Hofstede’s approach to determining the relationship between organisational values and culture and, furthermore, national culture as being of relevance to the analysis of the KOC’s governance practices.

The KOC

As the Korean interviewees illustrate Korean attributes my concern has been to engage with the Korean national culture.

Table 8-1 National culture of the Republic of Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five dimensions</th>
<th>Score of Korea</th>
<th>Features of dimensions of Korea</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
<td>PDI 60</td>
<td>- Hierarchy in organisations reflects the existential inequality between higher-ups and lower-downs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Subordinates expect to be told what to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Centralisation is popular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism/Collectivism</td>
<td>IDI 18</td>
<td>- Management is management of groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- The relationship of employer-employee is perceived in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
moral terms, like a family link.
- Hiring and promotion decisions take employees’ ingroup into account.

| Masculinity/ Femininity | MAS 39 (likely to be closer to femininity) | - A relatively small number of women in elected political positions (masculinity); a relatively large number of women in elected political positions (femininity)  
- Women’s liberation means that women will be admitted to positions hitherto only occupied by men (masculinity); women’s liberation means that men and women should take equal shares both at home and at work (femininity) |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Uncertainty avoidance   | UAI 85                                    | - Emotional need to be busy; inner urge to work hard  
- Motivation by security and esteem or belongingness  
- Suppression of deviant ideas and behaviour; resistance to innovation |
| Confucian dynamism (Long-term orientation) | LTO 75                                  | - Adaptation of traditions to a modern context  
- Respect for social and status obligations within limits |

Source: Hofstede (1997)

According to Brown’s (1998: 47) assessment of the chaebol, they “are liable to co-ordination by state agencies and political alliances”, and this case study of the KOC does indeed reveal the existence of such an alliance between the chaebol and state agencies and politicians. The incumbent KOC President, who is one of the leading member of the chaebol, exercised his economic, political and social power to merge the KSC and the KOC.

In connection with the results of this study, the KOC’s governance practices, which are integral to its organisational culture, can be seen to typify the broader national culture with respect to Hofstede’s five dimensions. In terms of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, a hierarchical principle has been seen to prevail in the KOC, accompanied by a centralising tendency. The situation of a lack of communication between senior and junior staff members within the organisation is one consequence of this as well as the barriers set up by the organisation’s hierarchical structure of which the junior staff members were conscious. In this connection, Brown (1998: 47) comments that “Korean bosses are highly directive and make little attempt to explain their decisions to their employees”. Similarly, Korea recorded a high level of uncertainty avoidance in Hofstede’s study (1997) and the KOC’s organisational culture is seen to conform to that same pattern. Although a few senior staff members responded by saying that they listened to the junior staff members’ suggestion, most senior and junior staff members shared the opinion that junior officers usually have to obey what their seniors’ instruction and orders.
Some interesting points arose from the research in terms of Individualism/collectivism and Confucian dynamism, showing differences in the views of the organisation held by the senior and junior interviewees in the KOC. The research told us that collectivism also seemed to feature strongly within the KOC which is consistent with Hofstede’s (1997) findings in that most KOC interviewees said they socialised often as a group within the organisation. However, junior staff members confessed that sub-cultures existed in this regard, as the senior and the junior staff shared sometimes different views on the matter of socialising with their colleagues. This aspect may also be interpreted in terms of Confucian dynamism. Whereas the senior staff tended to put an emphasis on the adaptation of the organisation’s traditions to a modern context, the junior staff members expressed their curiosity about their seniors’ attitude rather than following it without question. Thus, some interesting points emerged in terms of collectivism and Confucian dynamism. The KOC’s senior staff members were more likely to express their affinity with collectivism and were more comfortable with a long-termist perspective while the junior staff members were evidently less comfortable with collectivism and may have been less influenced by long-termism.

Although Hofstede concluded that Korea was situated more or less in a midway position on the scale of masculinity/femininity, this study has found that Korean society was likely to have been closer to the ‘masculinity’ end of the scale when Hofstede’s research was conducted about 40 years ago. Since 1990, though, Korean society has changed with respect to the advancement of women’s liberation as promoted by the Korean government, so the concepts of equity or equality have spread out within Korean society, with the result that a higher number of female staff members have been appointed. However, the case study of KOC shows that female employees still enjoy fewer chances to be involved at the decision-making level within the Korean context.

8.7 Limitations

As the concept of applying seven ethical principles to the evaluation of corporate governance was first developed in a western context, when those principles are applied in a non-western context such as that of Korea, there is a language barrier, as some terms are unfamiliar to those from a non-English-speaking background. In particular, the use of a bottom-up approach should lead the interviewees freely to express their own ideas on the seven principles. The core concepts of the key principles need to translated but it was found that there were no exactly equivalent terms in Korean. In order to enable the interviewees to understand these terms fully, it is sometimes necessary to provide explanations that may
more readily elicit their responses. For instance, the term ‘accountability’ is an especially difficult term to translate into Korean and it has to be well explained. However, it is possible for ‘accountability’ and ‘responsibility’ to be translated using the same Korean term. When they were asked about accountability, the respondents’ answers were biased towards the sense borne by the English word ‘responsibility’. In addition, ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ are also translated by using the same word in the Korean language. When the definition of the English term was explained to the participants, there was the risk that the explanation itself would lead them to fix their ideas about the principle concerned. In this case, while I had to explain the English words to the interviewees in the hope that they would understand well enough to answer my question. I feared that this might have biased them towards giving a particular answer.

In the course of the interviews, an issue arose over the definitions of the terms ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ (see Chapter Two). On analysing the interviewees’ responses, they were all found to have used a Korean word which incorporates the meanings of both ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ as defined above, that is ‘평등’, or ‘Pyung Deung’ in the Korean language. Accordingly, when the respondents argued about gender equity in terms of the percentage of females in employment, the sense of this Korean word is rather close to that of the English term ‘equality’. On the other hand, some interviewees raised the issue of whether different posts could be created which would only be available to women, which covers the meaning of ‘equity’. In fact, the Korean government also used the term ‘Pyung Deung’ in the sense of ‘equality’ in relation to this matter in designating the Ministry established for this purpose as the ‘Ministry of Gender Equality’.

With respect to aspects of the four events at the KOC that were examined in interviews, some events could only be well explained by a certain level of staff. The selection of Chef de Mission, especially, could only be described by high level members of the KOC/KSC staff who were actually involved in the meeting or the selection process. The budget planning is a similar case. Only those interviewees who were actually involved in the budgetary team or decision-making could account for the actual process or give their opinion on this matter.

8.8 Implications to Future Research

As this study is devoted to one case study, that of the KOC, it would be interesting to develop comparative research focussing on the KOC and some other NOCs in a non-western context. In particular, NOCs could be chosen from similar geo-political areas, and
with similar sizes and/or levels of sporting power. In this way evidence could be produced of the extent to which each different NOC interprets the IOC’s notions of corporate governance and the similarities and/or differences between them could be assessed.
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Appendix 1 Questions for interviews

First section: personal background.
Please provide your personal information:

1. How long have you worked for the KOC or the KSC?
2. Would you please tell me your position and the history of your position so far?
3. For what lengths of time did you hold each position?
4. Have you ever been a member of any other sports-related organisations?
   4-1. If so, for what lengths of time and what position have you served on that organisation?
5. Do you mind telling me how old you were when you completed your last education?
   Field of education (what is the highest level of education?) what kind of high education?
6. Are you a volunteer or a paid-staff?

Second section: decision-making.

1. Would you please list the most influential stakeholder(s) in decision making in sport policy in Korea? (in general)
2. Would you please identify the most influential person(s) in decision making inside KOC? (in general)
3. Would you please identify the most influential person(s) in decision making inside KSC? (in general)

● I’d like to consider policy decision-making in five specific cases:
   1. The KOC/KSC merger.
   2. Budgetary planning
   3. Recruitment of new staff
   4. Selection of Chef de Mission & the KOC President

4. Would you please identify the most influential internal and external stakeholder in decision-making?
5. Does any stakeholder seek your advice or assistance on each issues mentioned above?
   5-1. If so, what kinds of issues do they raise?
6. Were you involved in policy decision?
7. Who did you consult when you were involved?
8. Whose interest is predominated?
9. Was there any group which is not considered?
10. How would you personally evaluate the relative importance of each of these policies?

Additional questions for budgetary planning:

1. Can you tell me how and who the overall size of budget was decided? and who?
2. What was the process gone through in allocating budget internally?

Additional questions for Chef de Mission:

1. Would you please tell me how to choose the Chef de Mission in each games?
2. What is the process gone through of choosing the Chef de Mission?
3. Whose view were thought or not thought in terms of choosing the team manager?
Third Section: main principles

1. To whom are you accountable when you make a decision?
2. What do you think is the most important activity of committee?
3. What do you think is the most important activity of the Executive Committees of both the KSC & the KOC?
4. Do you think each member of committee or board share equal power and authority?
5. Are all relevant documents opened to be accountable to stakeholders?
6. Is each department free to organise their own policy?
7. In broad terms, what do you personally feel the KOC should be doing to combat the causes and consequences of?
   1) Inequity of male/female employment, participation in sport, leadership (management position in sport), activity of the KOC itself
   2) Lack of employment of disability
8. What does the KOC promote equity in decision making role in Korean sports?
9. What is the reason of the KOC existence? (official goals)
10. What is the primary task of the KOC? (operational goals)

Fourth section: other elements which affect key principles of corporate governance

1. Did you have induction when you were just joined the KOC or the KSC?
2. Are you socialised with other members of the KOC regardless of position?
3. Are you socialised with other members of the KOC regardless of sex?
4. Is there any special culture of female employees? Or male employees?
5. Do you have sub-culture in your org?
6. To what extent that you have been encouraged to develop your career or academic background since you entered the KOC or the KSC?
7. What are the most important features of your role?
8. Are you encouraged to contribute to decision making?
9. If so, is there a system which each member of the KOC is able to contribute his/her opinion?
10. Does the KOC put an emphasis on elite or mass sport?
11. In which areas of the KOC work would you say are the sharpest differences in opinion between high officials and members in department? (value)
12. Do you concentrate your own efforts as a KOC staff member on a limited amount of work or do you try to spread your time equally across all aspects of work? If you do specialise what do you specialise in and why?
### Appendix 2 List of Included Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Database</th>
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**Index:**

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<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Journal/Website</th>
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<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Whisenant, W. A. (2003). How women have fared as interscholastic athletic administrators since the passage of Title IX. Sex Roles, 49(3-4), 179-184.</td>
<td>PsycINFO (peer-reviewed)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3 Definitions and Operationalisations of key ethical principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Definitions/interpretations</th>
<th>Operationalisations</th>
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</table>
| **Accountability** | A member of the Executive Committee should comply with rules and regulations as well as its stakeholders’ needs | - To whom is the NOC accountable?  
- To what extent are stakeholders included in the decision-making?  
- Does the NOC indicate rules and regulations that an Executive Committee member should comply with?  
- How often is the General Assembly meeting held?  
- Is an annual report open to scrutiny by the General Assembly?  
- Is the election of officers & members undertaken by the General Assembly? |
|             | A group of auditors should be independent and scrutinise the behaviour of the Executive Committee | - Is there an independent audit? & how often is an audit held?  
- Does the NOC have an effective programme for managing the auditing? |
<p>|             | An organisation should provide accurate financial statements to audit.                      | - Does the NOC produce and provide enough references which encompass all of the financial statements? |
| <strong>Responsibility</strong>  | The Executive Committee members should also balance diverging interests, power and authority. | - Does the organisation justify its behaviours/actions by reference to ensuring an appropriate balance of power? |
|             | The Executive Committee should provide the strategic guidance of the organisation to ensure the long-term viability of the organisation. | - Does the Executive Committee clearly provide the vision and overall goals in the context of the long term viability of the organisation? |
|             | The Executive Committee should provide the effective monitoring of management.                | - Does it establish and evaluate the execution of clear, adequate rules and regulations by which management should conduct its activities? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Transparency</strong></th>
<th><strong>Democracy</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisations should develop and provide written policies and procedures that promote the timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern them.</strong></td>
<td><strong>It should be maintaining checks and balances by means of elections of high officials.</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| - Does it monitor a code of conduct and finance within the organisation? | - What kind of system exists for elections to the Executive Committee and the Presidency?  
  (If not, who nominates candidates for the Presidency and the Executive Committee?) - Does NOC provide clear criteria on the electoral system? - Are high officials in NOCs independent from internal/external interests? |
| - Is an organisational progress report annually released?  
  (If not, how often is it released?) - Are there clear rules and procedures on how to get ‘material matters’ which are of concern on to the organisation’s agenda? - Is any information including all regulations required open to the public/stakeholders? - Is a financial report open to the public/stakeholders? | - Is the process of decision making open or monitored?  
  (If so, by whom and for what purposes?) |
<p>| Organisations should open the process of decision making to all stakeholder | No matter what structure the NOC follows, either centralisation or decentralisation, it should be actually decentralised in decision making. | - Is power in decision-making decentralised or centralised at a managerial level, i.e. an Executive Committee? - To what extent are all members of each department able to be involved in decision-making process? - Are all departments independent in decision-making? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equity</th>
<th>In general</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meanings</strong> are produced in the ways in which dominant groups produce common understandings through the processes and patterns of interactions.</td>
<td>- Is there any evidence in the ‘meanings’ showing how, in particular, high officials make sense of equity?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Practices</strong> are understood through obtaining insight into the ways in which members of dominant and subordinate groups negotiate meanings when a member of the subordinate group attempts to enter the dominant group.</td>
<td>- Is there any evidence of the ‘practices’?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sports organisations should establish a channel of policy implementation to deal with complaints about discrimination and harassment.</td>
<td>- Is there a written policy (laws and rules) on gender, disability, ethnicity, and resource allocations? (in general)</td>
<td>- Is there a team or a monitoring system handling such matters?</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
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<tr>
<td>Female involvement in decision making should reach a minimum of 20 per cent at both the managerial.</td>
<td>- What percentage of women is involved in decision making?</td>
<td>- What is the ratio of females at the non-managerial level?</td>
<td>- May male and female staff members benefit from the same treatment, salaries and access to the higher positions?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Disability</th>
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<td>People with impairments should also be involved in decision making</td>
<td>- What percentage of people with disabilities take part as members of the decision-making bodies and in the non-decision making positions?</td>
<td>- Does the NOC provide relevant rules and legislation on disability and disability sport?</td>
<td>- Does the NOC provide a better working environment for disability staff members?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Equity (continued)</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-What percentage of people in different ethnic groups participates at both managerial and non-managerial levels?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Irrespective of the ethnicity, anyone capable should be involved at the working and managerial levels</td>
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<td>Fair allocation of resources</td>
<td>Fair allocation of resources, programs and decision making in terms of gender, disability, the size of the organisation, and high- or low-profile athletes or NFs’</td>
<td>-How are resources to NFs and athletes distributed?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The achievement of official goals and operational goals.</td>
<td>-What are the official goals of the NOC?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-What are its operational goals? (objectives whose attainment is desired)</td>
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<td>-Does the organisation clearly set forth the organisation’s goals?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-In what degree are the official and operational goals achieved?</td>
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<td>Organisational Culture: clear homogeneity of organisational values and highly transformational leaders are conducive to the formation of a strong, positive organisational culture, which is more effective.</td>
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<td>Organisational Values</td>
<td>Integration: with a strong alignment between words and deeds, an organisation-wide consensus and consistency between organisational values and employee behaviour may be achieved.</td>
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<td>Differentiation: when there is a contradiction between words and deeds, inconsistencies and subcultures may arise due to unbalanced power relations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fragmentation: if uncertainty and temporality exist between words and deeds, ambiguity and complexity are the consequences.</td>
<td>-Do staff members clearly understand and share the organisation’s official and operational goals?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Are organisational values shared by all members?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Is there a sub-culture within the NOC?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Are organisational values differentiated along these lines: individual roles; age and gender; volunteer and professional paid staff?</td>
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<td>-Is there an activity like an induction, or a social engagement to help staff to identify with the organisation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness (continued)</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Transactional leadership</em>: subordinates perform within a clearly outlined framework as tasked by their leaders in exchange for commensurate material or psychological compensation</td>
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<td><em>Transformational leadership</em>: leaders emphasise task-related values and a strong commitment to a mission, and inspire their subordinates to reach higher levels of performance in their commitment and contribution</td>
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<td>Leaders should be professional, interactional and communicative in their conduct, and/or capable of dealing with a contingency</td>
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<td>- Does a leader elicit respect and from his/her subordinates and stimulate their sense of pride?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Does a leader carry out effective two-way and horizontal communications and interactions with his/her subordinates?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Does a leader clearly communicate organisational values, purpose and mission?</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The amount of resources or funds (the input) to be used to improve or produce the desired output.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Historic budgeting</em>: on the basis of the previous financial year's allocation</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Zero-based budgeting</em>: no budget lines should be carried forward from one period to the next</td>
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<td><em>Priority-based budgeting</em>: on the basis of priorities</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Performance-based budgeting</em>: on the basis of performance</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Fixed budgeting</em>: on the basis of the level of activity and service provision.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- How is the budget decided to be allocated?</td>
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