The media and democratic legitimacy in EU foreign policy. The role of transnational, British and Romanian media in the EU’s approach to climate change and its policy towards Russia

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Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/14034

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The media and democratic legitimacy in EU foreign policy. The role of transnational, British and Romanian media in the EU’s approach to climate change and its policy towards Russia

by

Cristian Nitoiu

Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

16 September 2013
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ABSTRACT

The issue of democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy has been at the forefront of the development of the European project in the last twenty years. However, little attention has been directed towards analysing the way in which democratic legitimacy underlines the construction of the EU’s foreign policy. This thesis draws on a broad understanding of democratic legitimacy which is seen to encompass various aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. It shows that the media had a positive effect (although in contrasting degrees) on the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy in two issue areas, highlighting the ways in which it achieved this. Drawing on insights from political theory, it argues that the European public sphere has the potential to foster the four characteristics highlighted above through the ability of the media to politicise foreign policy issues, which are commonly closed off from democratic scrutiny. Three types of interaction effects between the media and policymakers within the European public sphere are identified: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Firstly, indexing captures the ability of policymakers to influence and shape media discourse in order to aid their interests and goals by communicating in a favourable manner their policies to the general public. Secondly, through bounding the media can have a constraining or limiting effect on the range of policies – and their effectiveness – that policymakers can pursue, even if the latter are not aware of or willing to engage with the frames constructed by journalists. Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to purposively influence decision-making processes through its discourse. Empirically two distinct areas of EU foreign policy are explored: the EU’s approach to global climate change and its policy towards Russia. Hence, the study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of EU foreign policy and to its international actorness. Secondly, it extends in a comprehensive manner the debate regarding the crisis of legitimacy and democratic deficit in the EU to the realm of foreign policy. Finally, it also contributes to the literature on Foreign Policy Analysis which engages with the issue of democratic legitimacy.

Keywords: European Union, foreign policy, European public sphere, media, Russia, climate change.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Mike Smith. Throughout the last three years he has provided constant support and encouragement, valuable advice, meticulous guidance and intellectual input. It goes without saying that the project could not have been completed without his gentle yet throughout questioning of my ideas, approaches and (sometimes unsubstantiated) claims. Thanks go also to my second supervisor, Professor Lee Miles who provided very encouraging, but also thought provoking advice which helped advance my thesis.

The empirical part of the thesis would not have been possible without the help and cooperation of various EU and national policymakers, together with journalists working for national or transnational publications. I would also like to thank Olivia Dragușin and Alexandra Rențea for their wonderful hospitality and friendship during my numerous visits to Brussels. I am also grateful to my long-lasting friend Alina for hosting and encouraging me during my visits back home to Romania and to Bucharest.

I would also like to thank the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University for funding my PhD research. I express my gratitude to Dr. Alexander Christoyannopoulos, Professor Mark Weber and Dr. Ian Fraser who have offered their feedback on various occasions. Thanks go also to Dr. Jeremy Leaman, Dr. Robert Knight, Professor Dave Allen, Professor Helen Drake, Pauline Dainty, Audrey Pridmore, Francis Seller, Luisa Sutcliffe, Elise Bodet and Dr. Martin Farrell for all their help. During the last two years of my PhD I also had the opportunity to work as a desk supervisor in the Learning Resources Centre in the department. I am grateful to Val Boyle for giving me the chance to work in Centre, and continuously advising and encouraging me. At the centre, I had the opportunity to meet many interesting people and engage in various activities which made me see my PhD through different lenses.

During my PhD, I served on the UACES and BISA postgraduate committees. The time spent there put me in contact with fellow PhD students and more senior academics who shared their
experience, helping me to have a better grasp of how to manage my PhD. Special thanks go to my friends and colleagues that worked besides me in UACES and BISA.

My time in Loughborough was made more enjoyable by my friends and fellow PhD students in the department who provided both intellectual and personal support. Thanks in particular to Nikola Tomic, Simon Smith, Cristian Şurubaru, Dorina Baltag, Maximilian Drephal, Mika Obara, Lorenzo Cladi and Raimund Bauer.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, my parents, Camelia and Iulian, and my grandmother, Maria for their constant love and support during the past three years. Thanks go also to my other friends and colleagues whom I have not mentioned here, and especially to my girlfriend, Miho who made the last year of my PhD (without a doubt) more enjoyable and eye-opening.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Brazil, South Africa, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPS</td>
<td>European public sphere</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EV</td>
<td>European Voice</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>Financial Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of the Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Introduction

During the last two decades enthusiasts of the European project have been accused of taking for granted the Union’s commitments to democracy and overlooking the fact that its decision-making processes often make people feel disengaged with politics. The dissolution of the permissive consensus which provided thrust to European integration in the first decades of the European Union (EU) is commonly thought to have prompted disaffection with the European project and intense debate around the EU’s democratic deficit (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2000; Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Bovens, Curtin, and Hart, 2010). Hence, since the adoption of the Maastricht treaty which opened the path for the European Parliament (EP) to gain more and more competences, the need to connect political decisions with EU citizens has been a prime concern for both policymakers and scholars. Mitigating the democratic deficit – the discrepancy between the Union’s commitment to democracy and its political practices – has legitimised countless campaigns meant to bring the EU closer to its citizens and raise its profile. Simultaneously, the politicisation of European issues and the polarisation of European political debates by political parties across member states have raised significant question marks regarding the EU’s commitment to democratic values and have opened decision-making processes to democratic scrutiny.

In the recent period, constraining dissensus – where political issues within the EU are increasingly being debated, contested and negotiated – has replaced the former permissive consensus, putting a break on European integration, while also making it more legitimate (Hooghe and Marks, 2008; de Wilde, 2011; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012). Coupled with this, institutions such as the EP or the Ombudsman, thought to represent the interests of individuals within the EU have strengthened their institutional power. Policy areas with direct impact on EU citizens’ welfare – dealing with economic, migration, or mostly domestic policies – have been the target of measures directed at mitigating the Union’s democratic deficit (Diez, 1999;
Flockhart, 2010; Larsen, 1997; Moravcsik, 1997). On the other hand, the area of foreign policy\(^1\) seems to have been insulated both from the erosion of the permissive consensus and to a large extent from the debate surrounding the Union’s democratic deficit. Consequently, this thesis enquires into the broader question of whether the EU’s foreign policy enjoys democratic legitimacy. It offers a contrasting understanding of democratic legitimacy to the approaches currently found in the literature. Most of these approaches link democratic legitimacy to the notion of democratic representation and the way in which the legal and institutional framework of the EU allow citizens to have their interests represented in the making of the Union’s foreign policy. This thesis seeks to complement these approaches by introducing a notion of democratic legitimacy which encompasses multiple aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. An increase in any of these aspects is considered to be synonymous with enhancing the notion of democratic legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002; Rothstein, 2009; Forst and Schmalz-Bruns, 2011). The thesis achieves this goal by analysing the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted through the activity of the media\(^2\) and its interactions with policymakers within the European public sphere (EPS). Hence two research questions are at the centre of the enquiry presented in this thesis:

1. *Can the EU enjoy democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy through the activity of the media?*

2. *In what ways does the activity of the media endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy?*

In answering these two research questions, the thesis proposes and employs a model which maps out three types of interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) between the media’s discourse – the policy definitions it frames – and policymakers. These interaction effects are seen to have different implications for the enactment of democratic legitimacy in foreign policy decision-making. The argument is explored through two cases – the EU’s approach to global climate change and its policy towards Russia – which represent two distinct areas of EU

\(^1\) Foreign policy is understood in this thesis as a set of goals, approaches and initiatives formulated by a nation state or another type of international actor (e.g. international organization), and directed towards other actors in the international arena, and involving issues whose effects go beyond its sovereignty.

\(^2\) In this thesis the term ‘media’ is used mostly as a singular noun to express the aggregate of journalists and publications – together with the underlying communities and institutions they create. ‘Media’ is also rarely used throughout the text as a plural noun to refer to the plurality of publications within a certain landscape.
foreign policy, in this way painting a reliable, though not comprehensive, snapshot in time of the presence of democratic legitimacy in decision-making in the EU’s foreign policy. The two research questions will be explored by focusing on a sample which includes two member states with very diverse political cultures and media systems (the United Kingdom and Romania) and the transnational level. Drawing on the empirical findings the thesis will show that the EU’s foreign policy enjoyed (in contrasting degrees) democratic legitimacy, enacted and maintained through the activity of the media within the European public sphere. The next two sections will explore the notion of democratic legitimacy, followed by an overview of the way in which the literature on the EU’s foreign policy has engaged with the issue of democratic legitimacy. Following on from that, the last two sections of this introductory chapter will provide a note on the theoretical framework and methods applied, together with an outline of the thesis.

Defining democratic legitimacy: legitimacy and democracy
In the broader literature on EU policymaking, legitimacy has been conceptualised along the lines of two continuums: internal/external sources and input/output/throughput legitimacy. In relation to the first continuum, internally, the issue of democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy has been at the forefront of the development of the European project in the last 20 years. Traditionally, it was framed as the detachment of citizens from EU politics and studied through rigid research frameworks which focused on the state of public opinion or the way the principle of democratic representation is granted by constitutions (Boyce, 1993; Featherstone, 1994; Crombez, 2003; de Swaan, 2007). Besides the disenfranchisement of the EU citizens at the supranational level, it is fair to argue that the EU also suffers from a deficit of external sources of legitimacy. Externally, legitimacy is best described by the fact that ‘people [or generally addressed body of audience] have beliefs about a political order that motivate them to support that order in some way, to accept obligations towards it’ (Peters, 2006, p. 89). Legitimacy beyond national borders is seen in this literature to rely on the beliefs or consent of the addressed population as well as non-

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3 A more comprehensive approach would entail analysing a multitude of other issue areas such as international development, international trade, conflict resolution, the fight against terrorism, etc. Chapter 4 will highlight that the case studies chosen cover a wide spectrum of the EU’s behaviour in the international arena, which can be viewed as representative for other issue areas in the EU’s foreign policy.
EU(ropean) normative yardsticks\(^4\) (Lucarelli, 2006; Johansson-Nogués, 2007; Laidi, 2008; De Zutter, 2010; Bickerton, 2011a).

The second distinction finds that \textit{input legitimacy} tends to remain constant throughout time and is based on widespread ontological public support shared within a political community. Formally, it is linked to the spread and enactment of such principles such as transparency and accountability which lie at the base of a democratic political system (Moravcsik, 2002; Ramos, 2008; Gaus, 2010; Levrat, 2010; Weiler, 2012). On the other hand, various utilitarian calculations on the part of individuals coupled with their assessment of the effectiveness of policy outcomes can grant \textit{output legitimacy} to a political system (Scharpf, 1999; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Lucarelli, Cerutti, and Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt, 2010a, 2010b). The literature tends to agree that there is no trade-off between input and output legitimacies and both provide and maintain the public authority of an actor (Scharpf, 1999; Bogdanor, 2007; Bellamy, 2010). Moreover, Schmidt argues that \textit{throughput legitimacy} ‘focuses on the quality of the governance processes of the EU as contributing to a different kind of normative legitimacy from both the performance-oriented legitimacy of output and the participation-oriented legitimacy of input’ (Schmidt, 2013, p.5). This thesis explores the concept of democratic legitimacy – discussed in this section – which can be seen to resemble the category of internal legitimacy and encompass all the different types of legitimacy covered by the input/output/throughput continuum.

While many definitions of what a democratic system entails have been developed in the literature, they all seem to converge to the minimal idea that democracy means a government \textit{of the people and for the people} (Held, 1991; Abromeit, 1998; Archibugi, 2004; Lord, 2006; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). All democracies in this respect have to be based on a sense of collective identity which is constructed, rather than an ontological characteristic of the state (Lijphart, 1999). Democracy thus stems from the recognition within an already formed state – and a national political setting – of the collective identity on which it was built (Eriksen, 2007). Only after this occurs can more formal principles of democracy be institutionalised within a state: ranging from rule of law, to free elections or respect for human rights. What is disputed

\(^4\) Eriksen skilfully portrays this idea: ‘I suggest as a criterion of a legitimate foreign policy that the EU does not aspire to become a world organization– a world state– but subscribes to the principles of human rights, democracy, rule of law also for dealing with international affairs, hence underscoring the cosmopolitan law of the people’ (Eriksen, 2006, p. 10).
within the EU is the capacity of individuals to have their voices heard and shape politics (Habermas, 1992). Conversely, the issue of democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy has been at the forefront of the development of the European project in the last twenty years. However, one should note that the notion of democracy has been highly debated throughout literature and history, having a myriad of understandings (Habermas, 1986; Dahl, 1989; Held, 1991; Beetham and Lord, 1998; Lijphart, 1999; Terchek, 2000; Cunningham, 2002; Archibugi, 2004; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2009; Isakhanand Stockwell, 2012).

Two broad types of justifications have been developed by supporters of democracy: intrinsic and consequentialist. The former argue that individuals should have a degree of control over polities and decision-making processes, democracy effectively assuring such levels of control. On the other hand, consequentialist arguments claim that democracy can have positive externalities, whilst through policy outcomes it can foster values such as peace, prosperity or welfare. A deep commitment to democracy based on both types of arguments is considered to be at the heart of the EU, as its fundamental treaties highlight that:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Article 2, Lisbon treaty).

On the other hand, Lord argues that democracy should be predicated upon the idea of ‘political control over political equality’ (Lord, 2012, p.41), in this way favouring responsible government over responsive government. He adds that ‘democracy is a right to join together with others as equals to exercise public control over a polity before it is a system of rule likely to produce particular kinds of policy outputs’ (Lord, 2012, p.40). This perspective on democracy which mirrors preeminent views in the literature on the EU implies that because institutions such as the EP or the Council contain directly elected members or put forward by national governments—which have gained support through popular vote —, formally the benchmarks for democratic legitimacy are fulfilled (Hooghe, 2003; Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; Bogdanor, 2007; Holzhacker, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2008).
Due to the EU’s institutional complexity – relative to the nation state – it is argued in the thesis that a more nuanced understanding of democratic legitimacy is needed in order to complement the dichotomous understanding based on normative and consequentialist justifications, which translates into a focus on the principle of democratic representation. One source for the lack of democratic legitimacy within the EU might reside in the fact that the transfer of sovereignty that gave birth to the Union was not accompanied by an increase in transparency and accountability (Fuchs and Schneider, 2011). A contrasting view – on which this thesis draws – holds that the EU’s democratic deficit has its roots beyond the principle of representation or the increasing power of transnational bureaucracies unchecked by public scrutiny and control. Eriksen and Fossum (2012a, p.16) warn that, ‘under modern conditions, democratic legitimacy cannot be based on direct participation of all citizens in the making of the laws they are subjected to, because the people are never present to make the choices’. Justification of policy outcomes to those affected by them creates a certain type of legitimacy built on accountability and autonomy. The latter requires that those affected by policies are able to contribute to their development through transparent decision-making processes. Simultaneously, legitimacy also encompasses a set of rules and procedures that policymakers have to comply with and ‘serves to ensure that a polity is fit to make binding decisions on behalf of a demos’ (Eriksen and Fossum, 2012a, p.18).

Complementary to the need to assure political control over political equality through the principle of representation, democratic legitimacy is viewed in this thesis to be dependent on the extent to which decision-making processes are accountable, transparent, open to public scrutiny and participation, and infused with responsiveness – in this way fostering the autonomy of individuals. An increase in any of these aspects is synonymous to enhancing the concept of democratic legitimacy. Firstly, making public actions justifiable on the grounds of common and universal democratic values captures the notion of accountability. According to Olsen (2013, p.1), accountability is a central democratic value as it provides citizens the ability to control decision-making processes, and provides avenues for policies to gain wide consent and foster democratic legitimacy. Moreover, it means that citizens and those affected by policies have instruments which compel representatives and bureaucrats to justify their decisions and actions to the general public, and face sanctions if their performances are unsatisfactory, or in the case of power abuses (Borowiak, 2011). Secondly, transparency is considered to be a prerequisite for assuring democratic legitimacy, and broadly refers to the access that members of the general
public have to information about policymaking and political decisions or laws (Schmidt, 2013, p.6). It also can be considered to capture the ‘composition of the space in question where (political issues) can be seen and understood’ (Curtin 2007, p. 246).

Thirdly, responsiveness means that national or transnational polities and institutions are open to creating points of access in an indiscriminate manner for the public, which allows them to hold policymakers accountable (Goodhart, 2011). In the case of the EU, it grants citizens the opportunity to safeguard their interests and rights through mechanisms different from those available at the domestic level, in this way enhancing the ability of citizens to debate, contest or influence matters related to multi-level governance (Goodhart and Taninchev, 2011, p.1063). In the case of responsiveness, policymakers are open to the views and interests of the public expressed either through participatory formal institutional processes and debate within the public sphere, or through the input of elected representatives. Finally, openness to public debate entails the expectation that policymakers engage regularly through either formal or informal mechanisms in justifying and explaining their decisions to individuals in the public sphere, whilst also trying to materialise their promises and commitments (Bovens, Curtin and Hart, 2010a).

The EU’s foreign policy and democratic legitimacy: How can this be?
The issue of democratic legitimacy is becoming more and more debated in the literature enquiring into the EU’s foreign policy (Bickerton, 2011a, 2011c; Laidi, 2008; Sjursen, 2006b, 2006a). Policymakers have sought to draw on public support for their foreign policy decisions, but have eschewed from making them accountable (Bickerton, 2011c; Kandyla and de Vreese, 2011; Wisnievski, 2011). In the same vein, most of the mainstream literature has functioned on the assumption that the elite character of the EU’s foreign policy makes it immune to and closed off from democratic scrutiny (Bull, 1982; Hill, 2003; Howorth, 2001; White, 1999). Such a tendency is also endemic within parts of the broader tradition of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Here scholars hold polarised views regarding the role of democratic legitimacy in shaping foreign policy. Some claim that foreign policy is and should be placed beyond any form of democratic control (Rosenau, 1961, 1967; Key, 1968; Waltz, 1979; Kennan, 1985; Ginsberg,
1988; Weaver, 1993). Others view democratic legitimacy as an ontological characteristic of Western political systems reinforced by the causal links between public opinion or the discourse of the media and foreign policy decisions identified by the analyst (Brody, 1992; Cohen, 1993; Page, 1996; Robinson, 2011). Nonetheless, some foreign policy analysts engage in studying the notion of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or by proposing other complementary understandings of democratic legitimacy – as this thesis seeks to achieve (Iyengar and Reeves, 1997; Miller, 2007; Entman, 2008).

During the last few years scholars have increasingly been arguing that because foreign policy, similarly to domestic politics, needs to comply with democratic requirements, research should enquire into what a democratic EU foreign policy would look like. According to Sjursen, such an endeavour is reinforced by the erosion of intergovernmentalism which has been marked, for example, by the increase in the EP’s powers in the realm of foreign policy. The EP is a key actor in setting the budget for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and recently has had a central role in the discussion that preceded the creation of the EEAS (Sjursen, 2012, p.153). The majority of the literature that has followed this advice has assessed the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy by adopting a formal and intergovernmental understanding of democracy based on the primacy of the principle of representation. Studies have focused here on a minimum understanding of EU democracy where the Union’s power is limited to controlling and backing up representative democracy at the national level. The EU’s scope is to set up a system to resolve issues that member states cannot settle on their own (Held, 2003; Archibugi, 2004; Moravcsik, 2004; Crum, 2005; Lord, 2006; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). In terms of foreign policy, this conception of democracy is based on veto rights and intergovernmental logics similar to diplomatic behaviour; legitimacy is granted through national elected representatives. Peter Hain, the British representative at the European Convention skilfully captures this approach positing that, ‘if foreign policy is to enjoy legitimacy, there must be accountability through elected governments to national parliaments’ (quoted in Sjursen, 2012, p.147).

This thesis aims to enquire into the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the foreign policy of the EU through the activity of the media and its interactions with policymakers. The concept of the (European) public sphere is brought into the conceptual framework in order to better highlight the ability of the media to enhance all the aspects of democratic legitimacy:
transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate\textsuperscript{5}. In this way, it offers a complementary understanding to the way in which democratic legitimacy is infused in foreign policy decision-making within the EU by focusing on the democratic norms and values fostered by the public sphere. Most democratic theorists also hold that the public sphere contains empirical sources for the existence of democratic legitimacy within a certain political system and the precondition for democratic legitimacy to accrue through the activity of the media (Habermas, 1986; Calhoun, 1993; Curran, 1993; Fraser, 2007; Koçan, 2008).

Conceptually, the public sphere – or the European public sphere (EPS) in the case of the EU – is considered to be the space where individuals can interact with politics through the media and its discourse, and where democratic legitimacy is created and enacted. Discourse surrounding transnational European issues together with communication fluxes enacted through the EPS that link non-national actors to individuals within the EU are also thought to increase democratic legitimacy (Liebert, 2012, p.123). Hence, the EPS links individuals to decision-making processes through the communicative fluxes created by the media, which is seen here as a crucial actor in creating the EPS (Koopmansand Statham, 2010d; Medrano and Gray, 2010; Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner, 2010; Trenz, 2010a; Statham and Trenz, 2012b) – an idea developed throughout the second chapter. Access to information transmitted by the media opens up decision-making processes to democratic scrutiny and contributes to their transparency and accountability. The media have the ability to publicise and politicise European issues within the public sphere, informing people what to think about, but also how to perceive such issues (Cohen, 1993; Larsson, 2002; Statham, 2008; Maurer, 2011; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Fossum, 2012). At the same time, policymakers seem to be prone to perceive the media as the purveyor of public opinion – even equating the views expressed by journalists with those of the general public (Everts, 2000; Holsti, 2000; Kull and Ramsay, 2000; Sinnott, 2000; McLaren, 2002; Brewer and Gross, 2005; Aldrich et al., 2006; Knecht and Weatherford, 2006; de Wilde, 2011). Thus, the interaction between the media and policymakers is paramount for answering the puzzle set out in this thesis. This thesis proposes and employs an interaction model (between the media and policymakers) consisting of three types of effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting). The

\textsuperscript{5} Conversely, a focus on the European public sphere and the way in which EU foreign policy is politicised through the media provides a deeper understanding of the role of democratic legitimacy, than a focus solely on the erosion of intergovernmentalism and the principle of democratic representation would.
next section outlines the theoretical framework together with the research methods applied, followed by a summary of the structure of the thesis in the final section of the chapter.

**Case studies, theoretical framework, methods, and sample**

The thesis focuses on two case studies resembling two very different issue areas of EU foreign policy, which are discussed in more detail in chapter 4: the EU’s climate change policy and its policy towards Russia. Generally, case study frameworks are frequently employed by social scientists who seek to enquire into various social and political phenomena (Gerring, 2004; Bennett and Elman, 2006, 2007). Even though case study research has been under intense scrutiny related to its reliability and degree of rigour involved, it is considered to be the most appropriate tool for studying organisation settings coupled with their dynamics, such as in the case of foreign policy (Odell, 2001; Brecher and Harvey, 2002; Thomas, 2011). By comparing two very different case studies this thesis seeks to address questions of reliability and rigour, employing a comparative case study approach which can help paint a coherent and relevant picture of the two issue areas of foreign policy analysed. Moreover, Yin points out that ‘in general, case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events and when this focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context’ (Yin, 1994, p.1). In each case (i.e. the EU’s climate change policy and its policy towards Russia) the empirical analysis focuses on two high level events seen as defining moments for the EU’s foreign policy: the 2009 Copenhagen summit and the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. It is expected that the broad trends highlighted by the thesis relating to the nature of the interactions between policymakers interact with the media – and their implications for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted – would be relevant and apply to the EU’s foreign policy more generally. Hence, the thesis provides a robust and reliable framework for understanding the effects of the media’s activity (within the public sphere) and its interactions with policymakers on democratic legitimacy. This framework can be applied to various areas of the EU foreign policy, but also to nation state foreign policies, or multi-level and transnational governance.
The thesis presents in chapter 3 and employs a theoretical model based on three types of interactions effects between the media and policymakers: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Interaction effects can help understand the way in which the activity of the media within the public sphere endows decision-making\(^6\) with democratic legitimacy. Firstly, indexing refers to instances where the media enjoys low degrees of autonomy and independence, being employed by policymakers as a tool for publicising or gathering support for their policy approaches. Bounding implies that media discourse can affect decision-making – acting as an external constraint – in situations where policymakers are not willing to interact with its discourse or are simply unaware of it. Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to influence decision-making purposely through interactions with policymakers who are open to its discourse. Furthermore, the interaction effects between the media and policymakers are predicated upon the way the former frames policy definitions through its discourse. Policy definitions are understood here to be modalities of perceiving social and political reality by the media, which can focus on and frame various policy problems, solutions or expectations.

Chapter 4 highlights that empirically policy definitions are identified and distinguished through the method of frame analysis which broadly entails dissecting the way in which discourses are constructed and their effect on social and political contexts. In analysing interaction effects and their implication for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy, the findings of the frame analysis are correlated with data from interviews, questionnaires and various primary or secondary sources. Triangulating the analysis in this way allows for greater reliability and validity in the findings and the overall conclusions presented in the thesis.

Two member states (the United Kingdom and Romania) together with the transnational level (the EU’s institutions together with transnational publications) were chosen for the analysis due to their different roles and contribution to the EU’s foreign policy, or their contrasting political systems and media landscapes. A more practical reason resided in nature of the media sources whose language was accessible to the author. Nonetheless, an even more reliable study would have aimed to include more member states; however, such an endeavour would have probably required the concerted efforts of an entire research group. The frame analysis was conducted on

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\(^6\) Policymaking and decision-making are used interchangeably throughout the thesis to describe processes in the EU’s foreign policy.
two quality newspapers from each member state and three transnational publications. The choice for quality media is justified by the fact that they can portray a valid picture of their respective media landscapes, and are the most likely avenues for public debate and for the discussion of European issues. Media sources are complemented by data from interviews and questionnaires which targeted specific policymakers and journalists who were either involved in decision-making or were writing on the two issues within the timeframe analysed. The annexes (A, B, C, D, E and F) at the end of the thesis describe the sample for both media sources and interviews and questioners, whilst highlighting the difficulties encountered, together with the biases and shortcomings of the sample.

**Structure of the thesis**
The thesis begins by establishing in chapter 1 the way in which the issue of democratic legitimacy has been analysed within the literatures on the EU’s foreign policy and the tradition of FPA. In particular, it underscores that the scholarship focused on the EU’s foreign policy can be broadly understood along the lines of three debates centred on the EU and the nation state, the role of the EU’s institutions or the EU’s ontology. The chapter highlights that in the literature the notion of democratic legitimacy has been to a large extent researched by focusing on the legal and constitutional arrangements which are meant to ensure the principle of representation. Following on from that, the chapter highlights that some foreign policy analysts have viewed foreign policy as a policy area detached from the general public or have taken for granted the existence of democratic legitimacy in democratic systems. Others have enquired into the notion of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or by using other complementary approaches.

Drawing on the analysis of the two literatures, chapter 2 advocates for an approach based on the activity of the media, which is seen to have the potential to endow decision-making with democratic legitimacy. The concept of the European public sphere (EPS) is introduced here in order to highlight the potential of the media to enhance the multiple aspects of democratic legitimacy – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The EPS is understood to be the space where individuals come into contact with policymakers and
decision-making through the discourse constructed by the media. The chapter then highlights that the media is the central actor in the EPS, and that its interactions with policymakers are key to understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. One part of the chapter is also devoted to the structure of the EPS, which is seen to be the result of the overlapping between various Europeanised national public spheres.

Chapter 3 provides a theoretical discussion of the interaction effects model (between the media and policymakers) proposed and employed in the thesis. It presents three types of interaction effects – indexing, bounding and agenda setting – and underscores their implications for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted within the public sphere. The policy definitions (articulating policy problems, solutions and expectations) framed by the media are central to identifying and distinguishing interactions effects between the media and policymakers. In chapter 4, the methodology employed in order to empirically evaluate the three interactions effects and their meaning for the enactment of democratic legitimacy is presented. However, the first part of the chapter provides a detailed background to the two case studies explored in this thesis. The second part highlights that frame analysis is used in order to identify the most relevant and salient policy definitions constructed by the media. Data from interviews and questionnaires (with policymakers and journalists), together with various primary and secondary sources complement the frame analysis, and provide more reliability and validity to the findings of the thesis.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 involve empirically analysing the interaction effects within the transnational level and the two member states, in order to answer the two research questions. Each substantive chapter first provides an overview of the context within which the media and policymakers interact in foreign policy (the media/foreign policy nexus), followed by an analysis of the policy definitions framed by the media and the subsequent interaction effects in the two case studies. The final part of the chapters discusses the implication of the interaction effects for the way democratic legitimacy was enacted in the two issue areas of EU foreign policy.

The thesis then turns to the conclusions which discuss the theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis together with the strengths and shortcomings of the framework employed. The final part of the chapter reflects on the avenues for further research prompted by the findings of the thesis.
Chapter 1– Democratic legitimacy and EU foreign policy: Is such a link conceivable?

1.1 Introduction
Even though the lack of democratic legitimacy that the EU is widely perceived to suffer from has concerned scholars, students and practitioners, attention has been only recently directed towards the area of foreign policy. The thesis aims to fill this gap (and to answer to the two research questions presented in the previous chapter) by enquiring into the way in which the media through its activity and interactions with policymakers in the European public sphere has the potential to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. In focusing on the media and its role within the public sphere, this thesis provides a robust understanding of democratic legitimacy, complementing approaches constructed around the principle of representation. The emphasis on democratic representation has characterised the few studies that have enquired into the link between the EU’s foreign policy and democracy. The notion of democratic legitimacy is seen to encompass multiple aspects – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the current debates on the foreign policy of the EU and the way they deal with the issue of democratic legitimacy. Three broad debates are identified, centred on the idea of the national state and the EU, the role of the Union’s institutions, and finally the role of the ontology on which the EU is predicated. In doing so, the first section positions the argument developed within the debates regarding the EU foreign policy and defines its key concepts. The second section surveys the way foreign policy analysts have aimed to account for the relationship between democratic legitimacy and foreign policy.
1.2 Debating the nature of the EU’s foreign policy
By enquiring into the way in which the EU’s foreign policy is endowed with democratic legitimacy through the activity of the media within the European public sphere, this thesis is also implicitly challenging the wide consensus that the foreign policy of the EU is an elite driven domain where only states, institutions and national or supranational identities matter. Rather than asking how any of these three aspects construct the foreign policy of the Union and influence its effectiveness, it looks at the way the EU’s ontological commitment to democracy is translated into practice in this policy area. The need for such an endeavour is justified by the pervasiveness of democratic values within the make-up of the European project: being present in the EU’s treaties and, at least theoretically, informing its policy practice (Wimmel, 2009; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2011b; Eriksen and Fossum, 2012b). Throughout this thesis, EU foreign policy is understood to be the result of the fusion between member states and the EU institutions’ actions and interest, and their interactions within the dynamic and multi-level setting of the Union. This choice is also justified by the myriad approaches found throughout the literature and the consensus regarding the complexity that characterises EU foreign policy. This section provides a review of the literature on EU foreign policy and positions the argument of the thesis within it. Although not exhaustive, a list of three main areas of focus can be identified within this scholarship: a focus on the nation state which involves either comparing it to the EU or analysing the role the member states, an interest for internal processes – mainly institutional realities –, and a focus on ontology and the way identities, polities and narratives are constructed and employed. At the same time, the theme of effectiveness or whether the foreign policy of the EU actually works is present throughout all three perspectives. The last part of the section explores the way in which scholars have recently enquired into the impact of the decline of intergovernmentalism on the relationship between democracy and the EU’s foreign policy.

1.2.1 The EU and the state
The broader focus on the nation state has spawned two types of debates in the EU foreign policy literature: the first aims to account for the nature of the foreign policy of the EU in relation to the nation state, while the second analyses the way the national interests of member states influence
the foreign policy of the Union. Despite the recent focus on processes\(^7\), scholars of European Studies have always tried to figure out the ‘nature of the beast’ (Risse-Kappen, 1996). Questions enquiring into the nature of the EU have been posed in relation to all of its policy areas: from justice or foreign policy to migration and agriculture. In this sense, during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s the challenge for many was to evaluate whether developments in foreign policy analysis can be used in order to analyse the Union’s foreign policy (Allen and Smith, 1990; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, 2004; Hill, 1993; White, 2001). The question whether the EU’s foreign policy resembled that of the nation state was crucial here. The literature became divided between the idea that the EU is a new kind of international actor and the perspective that it is similar to or should be analysed in way same as the nation state. In support of the latter argument, Hazel Smith contends that the EU needs a foreign policy ‘much the same as that of the nation-state’ (Smith, 2002, p.7). She goes on to propose that scholars should spend more time conceptualising the ways in which the EU can become as effective as the nation state and not on the nature of the Union as an international actor.

In his review of the arguments put forward in the literature, White (1999, p.46) stresses that the foreign policy of the EU differs from that of the nation state in a number of important aspects: it is not a fully sovereign entity, its actors are more complex than within the state spanning from institutions, to interest groups and the member states themselves; and, as a result of the diverse mixture of actors involved in foreign policy, its processes differ, having a direct impact on the way in which the international agenda of the EU is constructed. The Union also lacks a coherent military capacity and has only recently started developing a diplomatic body (the EEAS), making its available instruments more limited than those of the nation state – which has a more coherent diplomatic system and is traditionally equipped with instruments of both soft and hard power. Thus, the instruments that are in the hands of the Union seem to be not as effective as those of the nation state (White, 1999, p.48). Moreover, many scholars have highlighted the gap that exists between the EU’s own expectations of its role in the international arena and its capabilities or instruments (Hill, 1993; Ginsberg, 1999; Howorth, 2001; Hyde-Price, 2006; Rynning, 2011; Smith, 2011). The issue of effectiveness has been also linked with the coherence of the coordinative processes between the EU’s institutions and the member states, with an emphasis on

\(^7\) Bickerton (2011a, p.26) contends that the analysis of EU policies ‘has moved from the ontological (what is the nature of the EU beast?) to the pragmatic and descriptive (what does the EU do and with what effects?)’. 
the nation state’s superior ability (Balducci, 2007; Biscop and Andersson, 2007; Howorth, 2004). Consequently, a discussion of the differences between the EU and the nation state (from a *sui generis* perspective or not) finds the Union searching for a more effective foreign policy that could provide concrete policy outcomes and successes.

The comparison with the foreign policy of the Westphalian nation state has proven to be very fruitful at an intellectual level, giving birth to ideas spanning from views which posit that the complexity of the EU makes it have a *sui generis* foreign policy, to the perspective that its foreign policy is similar to that of nation states – only weaker –, or that the Union should strive to have a more Westphalian type of foreign policy. However, this negative identification with the nation state has mostly overlooked the way the EU has shifted the boundaries and links between state, society and politics, transnationalising its foreign policy and opening it up to a transformed type of engagement with democratic legitimacy. Hence, the question of the presence of democratic legitimacy and the way it is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy is ignored here altogether.

The second strand of arguments which focuses on the foreign policies of the member states also sidelines the issue of democratic legitimacy, as most contributions draw their assumption from the realist tradition in international relations (IR) theory. Democratic legitimacy is largely irrelevant here, as domestic factors more broadly are generally considered to be less salient for the construction of the EU’s foreign policy. Member states and the way they pursue their national foreign policy strategies have also been a focus in scholarship. Disagreements regarding the policy towards Russia or about the degree of Atlanticism that the EU should convey have been frequent among the member states (Biscop and Andersson, 2007). Traditionally it has been considered that foreign policy is a domain of high politics where cooperation still remains intergovernmental (Bull, 1982; Moravcsik, 1997). As conflicts tend to be pervasive, little agreement can be forged on foreign policy issues within the EU which becomes the result of the ‘lowest common denominator’ between the national interests of the member states (Nuttall, 2000).

Moreover, Hyde-Price (2006, 2007) contends that the EU is a ‘calculator, not a crusader’ in that it behaves like a normal interest maximiser in the international arena and almost never shows signs of being altruistic. This happens because the member states are still very keen to protect
their sovereignty and wish to pursue their individual interests. As such, from Hyde-Price’s view, the foreign policy of the EU is prone to remain intergovernmental. Moreover, big member states such as France or Germany engage in developing and accept EU foreign policy only when it promotes their interests or it does not endanger them – in instances when second order interests and issues are involved, such as human rights or humanitarian aid. While the variety of diverging national interests has made it almost impossible for these member states to settle on important foreign policy issues, they have been quite successful in developing – at least rhetorically – common normative goals in marginal issue areas. These have included the promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law, environmental protection, or tackling climate change and poverty (Hyde-Price, 2008). Drawing on the realist tradition in IR theory, Hyde-Price’s view legitimates the idea that only the three big EU member states – France, Germany and Great Britain – have the capacity of developing the EU into a strong international actor. They can achieve this only if they work together to pool all their influence in order to successfully shape the international agenda on pressing issues like Iran or North Korea (Hyde-Price, 2007). What this ultimately suggests is that member states are considered to have a central role in forging the foreign policy of the EU. This thesis acknowledges the salience of member states and includes two sample states which vary regarding the level of commitment, power and influence in shaping EU foreign policy, but also other characteristics – which are detailed in chapter 3 – such as the political system or the media culture: the United Kingdom and Romania.

1.2.2 Institutional approaches
Recent years have shifted the focus more towards processes and assessing the institutional realities that contribute to the creation of the EU’s foreign policy. The foreign policy of the EU is viewed in this literature as epiphenomenal to the institutional processes internal to the Union, being one of its by-products (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011; Menon, 2011; Balfour, Bailes and Kenna, 2012). Within this scholarship, sociological institutionalist approaches which have become increasingly popular during the last two decades are based on the social constructivist theories of institutional building and learning developed in IR scholarship for the study of international organisations (Guzzini and Leander, 2006; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1994, 1999). These perspectives advocate a greater focus on the decentralised nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where decisions and expertise are shared among various institutions,
committees and policy groups. This approach also gives a higher degree of attention to the way in which member states contribute to the institutional processes behind foreign policy either as entrepreneurs, implementers, drives or barriers (Smith, 2004; Aggestam, 2011, 2008; Birchfield, 2007; Flockhart, 2010). Accordingly, foreign policy in the EU is not always the result of the lowest common denominator, but tends to balance towards a consensus from which decisions can derive. EU foreign policy is seen as being characterised by ‘a constant rule-govermed process of negotiation between actors which produces policy positions and international outcomes’ (Smith, 2005, p.55).

While advocating a more inward perspective that looks at the internal processes of the EU’s foreign policy, the institutionalist scholarship tends to equate issues of democratic legitimacy with the way in which decisions are adopted. But, as Hill and Wallace have pointed out, foreign policy encompasses more than formal processes. According to them, an ‘effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of nation states’ place in the world, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations’ (Hill and Wallace, 1996, p.8). In the case of the Union, where national identity is itself contested, the idea of effectiveness framed in this way becomes misleading. The key question here is whether the lack of a coherent identity that could sustain an effective foreign policy validates the recent focus on institutional processes in the literature. A closer look at the Union points to the fact that one cannot separate ontology from praxis in its foreign policy (Bickerton, 2011a, p.118). An institutional approach looks only at one side, at a technical and very complex area of EU foreign policy, overshadowing and taking for granted other components of the EU’s ontological constitution, such as the need for democratic legitimacy.

Although only marginal at this point, more critical institutionalist approaches share an emphasis on discourse in shaping the foreign policy of the EU. Drawing on Bourdieu’s sociology (1990, 1992, 1998a, 1998b), discourse refers here not only to the structure, the text or the ideas that are put forward, but also to the agents that create them. In its broader scope, this literature seeks to understand the relationships between ideas and policy, and the way ideas bring about change in institutions. The focus is on agents rather than on structure, as ‘ideas provide us with interpretive frameworks that make us see some facts as important and others as less so’ (Beland and Cox, 2010, p.3). Hence, ideas provide individuals, through communication, with a shared
understanding of what represents legitimate political action within institutions. The link between ideas and policy is researched by looking at the ideas that construct or deconstruct political institutions and the way they are interpreted and enacted. According to Schmidt’s (2001, 2008b, 2010a) conceptualization of discursive institutionalism, ideas are always the result of discursive processes which take place within discursive contexts. Discourse shapes the behaviour of actors within their field, but ultimately their existence and reification is linked to their intentionality. Schmidt (2008b) differentiates between coordinative discourses which describe practices that take place within institutions far from the public eye, and communicative discourses through which elites and institutions communicate political ideas to the general public. She goes on to argue that the more structural coordinative discourses are central to the construction of the EU’s foreign policy. This happens because complex polities need to spend a significant degree of time and resources on internal coordination, in this way putting more emphasis on coordinative discourses and less on trying to build popular support and legitimacy. Conversely, in simple polities where political activity is usually concentrated around a single authority (such as in Britain), the communicative strategies of institutions towards the general public tend to be more elaborate than those devised in order to coordinate policy actors.

In order to account for the influence of the ideas that both types of discourse create, most discursive institutionalist studies focus on the framing power and practices of policy actors. From this angle, agents frame their ideas in certain ways with a view to promote their interests. However, this is a rather narrow understanding of framing processes, which to a large extent departs from its common use in media studies or foreign policy analysis (detailed in chapters 3 and 4). Not only policy actors possess frame abilities, but also the media which in more complex polities (to follow Schmidt’s argument) takes the lead in presenting policy ideas and definitions to the general public, sending its feedback to policymakers. Although the media’s actions might not always be deliberate or intentional, its communicative abilities can be seen as a source for articulating policy problems and for providing policy solutions (Mehta, 2010, p.33) – this approach will be developed in chapter 3. Nonetheless, this thesis does not seek to explain how democratic legitimacy as a policy problem has come to influence the evolution of the EU’s institutional make-up dealing with foreign policy, nor that of European media institutions. It aims to explore the way the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy is fostered within the public sphere through the ability of the media to frame policy definitions and its interactions
with policymakers. However, this thesis does take into account the role of institutions and their developments or dynamics in shaping the foreign policy of the EU, chapter 5 exploring the way in which democratic legitimacy is perceived and enacted by EU policymakers within its institutions.

1.2.3 The focus on ontology
The EU’s search for meaning has driven scholars to enquire into the way the ontology of the Union predisposes it to behave in certain ways in the international arena. This has prompted a debate regarding the way in which the EU’s foreign policy is endowed with democratic legitimacy stemming from its internal make-up and citizens (Sjursen, 2007, 2011, 2013; Bruno and Vrailas, 2008; Thym, 2008; Manners, 2010c; Bickerton, 2011b; Stewart, 2011). However, a focus on democratic legitimacy has been only marginal, and at times ignored in favour of the view that the EU is inherently democratic – due to the deep commitment to principles of democracy inscribed in its treaties – which constrains it to behave normatively and altruistically in the international arena. The idea that the EU is a postmodern power which acts normatively in its international relations has become very popular during the last ten years. Manners (2002) first introduced the idea in his 2002 seminal article which has been developed and criticised by a whole array of scholars. When asked to state his opinion about the idea that the EU acts as a normative power in the international arena, the current president of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso argued that ‘the EU might be one of the most important normative powers in the world because of its ability to establish normative principles and apply them to different realities’ (quoted in Manners, 2008a, p.60). Barroso agrees here with Manners’ idea that the EU projects its power in the international system by shaping various principles and norms, and persuading different actors to adopt them. By endowing its norms with universality and imposing them on others, the EU is spreading a culture that transcends the state-centric approach which is commonly believed to characterise international politics (Manners, 2008b, p.55).

According to Manners, the Union erects new prescriptions of normality against which the behaviour of other states should be judged. Nonetheless, simply by acting in such a manner does not mean that the EU is a normative power, because it does not imply that the adoption of the Union’s norms would aid the life of individuals around the world. In this sense, Manners stresses
that it would be incorrect to take for granted the idea that the EU ‘has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics’ (Manners, 2008b, p.45), without analysing the normative constitution of the EU. He identifies two main aspects that have historically influenced the conception and development of the EU: namely a hybrid-polity which has its critical goal in transcending the political boundaries imposed by the nation state and a political-legal constitution that formalises the norms and values inherent to both the hybrid polity and the peoples of Europe into law (Manners, 2002, p.240). The former aspect of the constitution of the EU acknowledges that the Union’s normative stance in its international relations might be the sole creation of a group of scholars and politicians committed to the idea of a United Europe (Beland, 2009). By creating various narratives about the EU – and consequently about us – they have positioned the Union as an altruistic promoter of norms and values (Diez and Pace, 2011; Forsberg, 2011; Whitman, 2011).

Terms such as force for good or Normative Power Europe have been advanced in order to create this self-image of the EU (Eriksen, 2006; Flockhart, 2010; Forsberg, 2011; Selden, 2010; Wagnsson, 2010). During the Cold War, as Manners (2010b) claims, the hybrid-polity was still searching for a different foreign policy avenue through which it could establish the EU as a strong international actor. During that period, the hybrid-polity opted at times either for the development of a civilian power, or for that of a military power – a political and conceptual dance that was regulated by the relations between the two superpowers of the time, the US and the Soviet Union. As such, in times of tension the development of a military force was favoured, while during the détente, relying on civilian power was seen as a much better option (Manners, 2010b). Manners goes on to argue that after the Cold War these two views lost ground to the idea of the EU behaving in a normative way in the international arena. The hybrid-polity tried to achieve this by constructing different narrative norms aimed at shaping perceptions within the international arena of different states and regimes. They portrayed different states as evil or threatening, but never gambled with the option of intervening with military forces in order make them more secure (Sjursen, 2006a; Selden, 2010; Rogers, 2009). Manners (2002, 2008a, 2008b) unfolds this argument in order to show that the fact that the EU acts in a normative way does not stem from the nature of the hybrid polity that governs it, but from its politico-legal constitution that constrains its policies and actions.
Through a politico-legal constitution, Manners is referring to the formalisation within the EU’s treaties of various norms and values that are considered to be universal. He identifies nine principles that both constitute and are promoted by the EU: democracy, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, freedom, equality, good governance, social solidarity and sustainable peace (Manners, 2008b, p.46). These principles are also present within the United Nations Charter and are widely held within international law, pointing to the idea that the EU has the duty of promoting them externally. As such, although the EU might consider using military force to mediate different conflicts, the principles that lie at its foundation do not permit it to take the right to life of any individual. A big contradiction is thus uncovered here between the goal to develop military capabilities, potentially employing them for conciliating different conflicts and the EU’s inherent higher commitment to the right to live of individuals (Diez, 2005; Diez and Pace, 2011; de Zutter, 2010).

Criticising the EU’s normative self-image, de Zutter (2010, p.1117) points to the a priori recognition from other actors that this narrative entails. In positing that the Union behaves as a normative, *sui generis* actor in the international arena there is an inherit assumption that other actors endorse its international stance. Normative recognition stems here from the quality of the norms that the EU diffuses. Scholars following Manners’ take on normative power tend to consider the norms that form the base of the EU’s identity as being intrinsically universal (Lucarelli, 2006; Johansson-Nogués, 2007; Birchfield, 2007; Aggestam, 2008; Forsberg, 2011). Others have acknowledged that these norms are not in themselves universal; it is the inherent recognition by other actors in the international arena that provides them that quality. More recently, norms have been considered to be “universable” only when the relevant community for moral action is (constructed as) humanity at large’ (de Zutter, 2010, p.1117). Even if they might have been formally included in various international treaties, it is the performative aspect behind norms that attaches universability to them. The assessment of a norms’ practical impact on a certain moral community is crucial for establishing claims for universability (Aggestam, 2008; Laidi, 2008; Youngs, 2010). In its classical form, the Normative Power Europe narrative evades this issue by arguing that the EU is and always will be a normative power regardless of where its foreign policy practices might lead (Manners, 2002). Finally, Tonra (2011, p.1194) contends that

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8 Norms become universal once they are integrated into international law.
the EU’s norms stem from a multitude of narratives constructed (nationally) within the member states which highlight the contestation processes underpinning the relationship between identity (society) and foreign policy. Conversely, a single European narrative of foreign policy and exceptionalism is yet to appear and transfer legitimacy to the EU, as national narratives resonate with powerful images of national identity: ‘French puissance; Finnish ‘peacekeeping superpower’; German zivilmacht’ (Tonra, 2011, p.1198).

Following the argument presented above, legitimacy in the international arena – which should be distinguished from democratic legitimacy – can be granted only by the acceptance of a large moral community of states and peoples (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006; Hurrelmann, Schneider, and Steffek, 2007b; Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2009b). It must also be based on the way that the respective community comes to create and incorporate universal norms. Internally, in the case of democratic legitimacy, this would mean that norms need to be validated by democratic processes of will formation and ‘therefore transformed into norms willed by the political community of the EU as those they choose to pursue in international politics’ (Bickerton, 2011a, p.98). Thus, the interests and preferences of the public affected need to be reflected in the norms that the EU seeks to promote in its international relations. Only then can the EU promote its norms in the larger moral community of states and peoples and attach universality to them.

Laidi (2008) has applied this line of argumentation to the issue of democratic legitimacy, enquiring into the way the ontology of the EU democratically validates its foreign policy aims and norms. He points out that the Union has the potential of constructing a more democratic foreign policy than the nation state due to three of its characteristics. Firstly, the European Commission’s power is continuously contested, forcing it to always try to find new ways of enhancing its democratic legitimacy in all policy areas, including foreign policy. It achieves this through various communication campaigns and initiatives, negotiations with stakeholders and consultations with members of the civil society. Secondly, the EP which is the first directly elected transnational parliament in the world has considerably broadened its field of competence in foreign policy during the last years (Thym, 2008; Woolcock, 2010; Caballero-Bourdot, 2011; Herranz-Surrallés, 2011; Wisnievski, 2011). Finally, the EU’s foreign policy is built upon its ability to create norms that bind both domestic and global actors in order to provide public goods beyond the nation state (Manners, 2011). Within this process citizens are not viewed as voters,
but as organised interest groups that can shape both the agenda and the outcomes of EU foreign policy. While Laidi is right to highlight the role of democratic legitimacy in the construction of the Union’s foreign policy, he does not present a model that describes how this might be achieved or the mechanisms behind it. He takes for granted the role of formal institutions in advancing democratic legitimacy and considers processes of social preference aggregation to be working in foreign policy similarly to domestic policies, where citizens form and are represented by interest groups far more often. On the other hand, this thesis builds on the idea that the activity of the media within the European public sphere can play a crucial role in linking individuals to policymaking, boosting accountability or transparency and encouraging policymakers to be responsive to public debate – in this way endowing the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy.

1.2.4 The decline of intergovernmentalism as an avenue enhancing democratic legitimacy

Recently the five year project RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe) funded by the European Commission has explored the democratic norms and standards under which the EU operates. The central research puzzle of the RECON project (in its foreign policy section) enquired into the sources that can endow the EU with democratic legitimacy in the context of a departure in understanding decision-making processes in the Union’s foreign policy through a purely intergovernmental logic (Sjursen, 2011, p.1079). In the case of intergovernmentalism, democratic legitimacy is derived indirectly from the domestic political systems of the member states, entailing ‘consensus decision-making, veto rights, respect for national sovereignty and policy-making through a system of complex interstate bargaining’ (Tonra, 2011, p.1190). Most of the analyses undertaken within this project focused on the role of national parliaments and the EP in infusing the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy (Kantner and Liberatore, 2006; Koenig-Archibugi, 2002; Stie, 2010). For example, Wisnievski (2011, p.4) finds that the EP has managed to attain a much better position to negotiate with the other EU institutions on foreign policy issues than the Lisbon treaty afforded it. Such an influence has often gone well beyond the budgetary prerogatives of the EP, although it has not challenged the primacy of the member states or of the Commission on substantive foreign policy issues. The EP could contribute to enhancing the accountability of decision-making processes in the EU’s foreign policy by exerting some type of enhanced control over the EEAS and the High Representative on
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Bátora, 2010, p.2). On the other hand, Lord (2011, p.1142) puts forward two reasons for why national parliaments cannot hold adequately accountable the Union’s decisions in foreign policy. Firstly, developing specialised groups within national parliaments that can effectively exert democratic control over the institutions of the Union bears high costs. Secondly, national parliaments have control only over individual member states, but not over other members of the Council as a whole.

More normatively oriented scholars – who view democracy and democratic legitimacy as having an added value for the development of the EU and its citizens – find that endowing the Union’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy is hampered by the nature of foreign policy itself. Firstly, Eriksen (2011) questions whether the complexity of the bureaucratic system behind the construction of foreign policy can act as an instrument against democracy. Because foreign policy is still very much a domain of high politics, basing decision-making processes mostly on the work of experts and functionaries in the EU’s institutions has the effect of completely closing off this policy area from public deliberation, participation and scrutiny. Secondly, some NGOs and Think-tanks working on specific security and foreign policy issues are found to have been considerably involved in decision-making processes (Joachim and Dembinski, 2011, pp.1164–65). However, most of these organisations are based only around a certain number of issues (e.g. arms trade or defence), while others that deal with more popular debates (e.g. human rights or climate change) rarely get the opportunity to influence policy. Hence, Joachim and Dembinski raise a deep concern whether the activity of these organisations can be seen as contributing to the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy. They argue that it is questionable to what extent NGOs and Think-tanks are representative of, or can speak for those either negatively affected by or opposed to the foreign policy of the Union (Joachim and Dembinski, 2011, pp.1164–65).

Studies here draw on a limited conception of democracy based on the principle of representation, where democratic legitimacy is dependent on the ability of representative institutions such as the EP to strengthen their influence and control over decision-making processes in foreign policy. In this way, they ignore deeper levels of democratic legitimacy which imply the existence of a link between decision-making processes and the general public together with its preferences. This thesis argues that the EPS has the potential to link citizens to decision-making processes through
the media’s activity and its interactions with policymakers. The media is seen here to be able to boost the accountability and transparency of the EU’s foreign policy, whilst opening it up to democratic scrutiny and public debate – chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of these aspects. Chapter 2 will focus on the ability of the media to enhance democratic legitimacy by incorporating and exploring the concept of public sphere – and the EPS. The next section of this chapter takes the argument forward, surveying the way in which the study of foreign policy has accounted for democratic legitimacy.

1.3 Democratic legitimacy: An absent or hidden variable in Foreign Policy Analysis

1.3.1 Public opinion and foreign policy
The lack of attention towards democratic legitimacy in the literature on the EU’s foreign policy is contingent upon the broader tradition of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) which to a large extent overlooks democratic legitimacy completely or takes for granted its presence in democratic systems. However, some analysts have enquired into the notion of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or have used other complementary approaches – a goal also shared by this thesis. Traditionally, foreign policy analysts have acknowledged that foreign policy is a domain of high politics, where issues regarding democratic legitimacy do not and should not concern policymakers. Most of this literature has tended to equate democratic legitimacy with integrating the statistically constructed notion of the public opinion into decision-making processes. Almond (1950) and Lippmann (1955, 1997) underscored that political elites should keep decision-making processes in their sphere, as the views of the public in relation to international events are unstable and irrational. Consequently, the public can have very damaging effects on the foreign policy of a state, due to its capricious and unstructured views which are formed only after a certain event has happened. However, the context of the Cold War could be considered to have influenced the appearance of such views. The need for the US to maintain a high degree of secrecy, speed and flexibility in

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9 Nevertheless, Shapiro and Jacob (2000, pp.243–244) argue that if there is no link between the media, public opinion and foreign policy, we can easily conclude that ‘the level of democracy at work does not extend beyond the existence of procedural democracy’.
tackling the challenge of communism was at the base of these perspectives. Hence, most scholars engaging at the time with foreign policy issues tended to side with realist arguments about IR, emphasising the ultimate duty of politicians to safeguard through rational methods the national interest of the state. Lippmann (1955) underlined that the public tends to emotionally judge international events, showing more forgiveness towards cooperative actors or calling for extreme policies in situations of conflict with other actors. Rosenau (1961, p.95) also contended that the public cannot be trusted as their ‘response to foreign policy matters is less one of intellect and more one of emotion’. Political elites should thus be wary of engaging with public opinion in foreign policy issues, for citizens do not have the interest in issues and access to information, and are prone to make irrational and hasty judgments. The lack of strategic thinking on the part of the public is also mentioned as a reason for not listening to its opinion, as in the words of Morgenthau (1967, p.558) citizens ‘would sacrifice tomorrow’s real benefit for today’s apparent advantage’.

Not all segments of the public are thought by classical foreign policy analysts to have such a malign effect. Writing at the beginning of the Cold War, Gabriel Almond (1950) distinguished three groups within the public: the general public, the attentive public and the elites. He recognised the general public as the most numerous category of individuals which share a large disinterest for foreign policy issues, acting only in response to high profile international events. Contrary to them and in a significantly smaller number, the members of the attentive public are concerned with policy matters and try to stay informed, but have few pathways to put forward their opinions. Elites are a very influential and informed ‘stratum of the population which gives structure to the public, and which provides the effective means of access to the various groupings’ (Almond, 1950, p.138). Elites are the group that form the selection base for policymakers, and go back and forth from public to political life. According to Almond, they are the gateway for public opinion to reach policymakers working in foreign policy. The latter group (of elites) seems to functionally resemble Deutsch (1969) and Hass’ (1958) concept of epistemic communities. According to more recent work, the concept encompasses ‘network[s] of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, p.3). Similarly, Habermas mentions the existence of the ‘quasi-public domain which consists of ‘opinions that circulate in a relatively narrow circle … skipping the mass population’ (Habermas,
Opinions formed within this narrow communicative space can spread to the general public and infiltrate public opinion.

The Almond-Lippman consensus – as it has come to be known in literature (Aldrich et al., 2006; Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Baum and Potter, 2008; Bennett, 2008; Brody, 1992; Graber, 2009) – was first challenged by revisionists lead by Page and Shapiro (1992), who argued that not only do the views of the public about foreign policy tend to remain stable, but these opinions are based on informed judgments. According to them, the public starts with a lack of information and gradually gathers enough in order to construct rational and stable foreign policy preferences. The revisionist insight that citizens tend to be well informed and construct stable opinions about foreign policy has a blurring effect on Almond’s distinction between different types of public. Thus, the classical category of the attentive public is expanded to include all individuals and groups of individuals within a state and fuses into the concept of the general public. This notion of the general public will also be employed throughout the thesis. Moreover, the media is considered to have an important role in blurring the distinction between different groups as it addresses the public as a whole (Lewis, 2004; Aldrich et al., 2006; Schoen, 2007). Further on it will be pointed out that foreign policy analysis have sought to integrate the media as the link between foreign policy and public opinion, but only giving it only a small degree of agency and overlooking the dynamics between it, the general public and the political sphere.

A third group of foreign policy analysts considers that public opinion has the role of constraining policymakers. Rosenau (1961) first proposed the idea that very often public opinion acts similarly to a sleeping giant, allowing policymakers to make decisions on their own. However, when policymakers steer out of the limits imposed by the public, they can incur considerable costs. Acting like a ‘system of dikes’, Key (1968) claimed that public opinion channels the direction of foreign policy, making policymakers avoid decisions that would collide with the views and interests of the general public. Public opinion becomes ‘activated’ only when decisions have unpopular outcomes or challenge basic norms and values prevalent within the public sphere. According to Vengroff and his colleagues (2000), six factors mediate the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion: the nature of the problem and of the solutions proposed, the effectiveness of the communication process within and among elites, elites’ awareness and interpretation of public opinion, the perceived level of public support, and
the nature of decision-making processes. Shiraev has also identified an intervening variable, the policy climate, which can be seen as a ‘prevailing sentiment among policymakers and other individuals capable of influencing the direction of foreign policy through their roles as security and defence executives, analysts, problem definers, gatekeepers, watchdogs, and experts and commentators’ (Shiraev, 2000, p.298). The policy climate encompasses the range of views prescribing how a country should deal with international issues and its behaviour in the international arena.

These new insights into the role of public opinion in foreign policy have led researchers to enquire into other avenues such as social and cognitive psychology. Studies here highlight the fact that the social impact of the images of war casualties has made people more sensible to international conflicts (Brueggemann and Wessler, 2009; Bulkow, Urban and Schweiger, 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Nowak, 2012; Wolfe, Jones and Baumgartner, 2013). The idea that members of the general public rather than those of the elite would have a higher chance of becoming casualties, coupled with transformations in weapons technology which place greater uncertainty on human life are considered to have driven the general public towards being even more informed and rational in relation to international affairs (Jon Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Kuypers, 1997; Manheim, 1994). Cognitive psychology has been also applied by revisionists to show that individuals tend to make judgments with minimal cognitive effort. Mental schemas are employed by individuals in order to make adequate decisions without having access to all possible information (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Rahn, 1993; Zaller, 1992). A consequence of this that has been presented in the literature is that members of the general public that choose the right heuristic(s) – what people seem to do most of the time (Brody, 1994) –, on average construct similar foreign policy preferences as they would do if they were fully informed (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998).

This finding attaches more importance to the sources that provide even limited information to the public. Additionally, Zaller (1992, p.48), has shown that individuals tend to utilise and base their actions, behaviours and ideas more on the information that they have recently acquired, that is on top of their heads, and do not apply a complex cognitive model of evaluating past and present information. On an aggregate level, random opinions are cancelled out, revealing a stable and rational whole. The media is here the obvious source of information about foreign policy for
members of the general public (Maher, 2003; Norris, Kern, and Just, 2003b; Sheafer and Gabay, 2009). This thesis takes into account the findings from cognitive psychology and posits that the media not only informs the individuals what to think about, but it also suggest to them how to think and evaluate a certain piece of information, because individuals are prone to choose the most readily available cognitive mechanism for constructing opinions about foreign policy. The next section explores the way in which foreign policy analysts have sought to explore the influence of the media on decision-making processes and its interactions with policymakers in foreign policy.

1.3.2 Media and foreign policy
Foreign policy analysts with a focus on political communication have been keen in stressing that the media can behave as a strategic actor that shapes both the views of policymakers and public opinion (Kuypers, 1997; Strobel, 1997; Robinson, 1999, 2002; Gilboa, 2005; Baum and Potter, 2008; Graber, 2009, 2010). Consequently, Baum and Potter (2008, p.40) conceive the media as a silent independent actor that has the possibility at times to shape foreign policy decisions. The CNN effect\(^{10}\) seems to confirm this view, as studies have shown that politicians are influenced by widespread news and communication in the media (Brody, 1992, 1994; Hammond and Herman, 2000; Olsen, Carstensen and Høyen, 2003; Gilboa, 2005; Rid, 2007; Drezner, 2008; Akor, 2011). The influence of non-stop 24 hours news reporting on foreign policy decisions (commonly known as the CNN effect) has been associated with television and only in a small degree with the print media. Most research on the CNN effect has enquired into case studies regarding the influence of the media on the US or British governments’ decision to intervene militarily in situations where human rights have been seriously breached (Brody, 1992, 1994; Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Holsti, 2004; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990; Isernia, Juhasz and Rattinger, 2002).

\(^{10}\) The CNN effect captures the extent to which continuous 24 hour news broadcasting has any influence on foreign policy (Natsios, 1996; Livingston, 1997; Mermin, 1997). Drawing largely on lessons from the US political system, it is built on the assumption that news media have the ability to influence public opinion and electoral battles or debates. According to Gilboa (2005), due to the CNN effect, policymakers have no choice other than to direct their attention to issues which have been extensively covered by the news media. Consequently, the CNN effect points ‘to the ability of the first truly global television network to inform the public instantly and continuously of news from anywhere in the world and thereby force national policymakers to deal with the reported problems and issues quickly – often without sufficient time to deliberate’ (Nacos, Shapiro and Isernia, 2000, p.2).
In his 20 year review of the scholarship on the CNN effect, Robinson (2011) underscores that most studies would agree that the influence of the media is dependent on the degree of policy uncertainty – the existence of disagreement within the executive on a certain policy. The success of the media hinges upon the occurrence of strong policy uncertainties which allow it to side with one party, thus increasing its chances of influencing foreign policy. Otherwise, in situations of consensus and agreement within the government, the media has only the option of either supporting official policies or criticising them without hoping to shift political decisions. While intuitively and logically sound, Robinson’s (2001, 2007, 2011) theoretical model is narrow in scope and considers the interactions between media and policymakers as inherently fixed and mechanical. The complex relationships between journalists and policymakers, that differ from one issue area to another, are overlooked in favour of a framework that seeks to account for any policy development. Secondly, multi-level decision-making – as in the case of the EU – makes it very hard to trace the appearance and evolution of policy uncertainties. This points to the conclusion that a more complex and nuanced model must be employed in order to account for the interactions between the media and policymakers, and its influence on foreign policy within the EU. Due to the various institutions and the national interests that interact within the foreign policy of the EU, disagreements that lead to policy uncertainty are far more present than within the nation state. Thus, pinpointing the way in which media reporting converges with policy uncertainty would imply limiting the analysis only to a certain set of institutions or actors in EU foreign policy and overlooking others. As will be shown later on, and detailed in chapter 3, this thesis presents and employs an interaction effects model which captures the interactions between the media (and its discourse) and policymakers. The three interaction effects – indexing, bounding and agenda setting – are explored in order to shed light on the way in which the media through its discourse and interactions with policymakers has the ability to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy.

Most of the research on the CNN effect has been focused on developments in US politics, making its findings and methods not directly applicable to other cases, as very few media systems are alike or similar\(^\text{11}\). During the last ten years the media/foreign policy nexus – the

\(^{11}\) According to Isernia and his colleagues (2002, p.204), three main differences pose significant difficulties for exporting the findings drawn from US scholarship to the European context: the superpower status of the US relative to Europe’s rather emerging status, the contrast between the US presidential system and the multitude of
context within which the media and policymakers interact – has been analysed in the European context as well, primarily in what Hallin and Mancini (2004) consider as liberal and democratic systems (the UK, France and Northern Europe). What unites these countries’ media systems is a commitment to three basic journalistic principles – independence from any political party, balance between the views presented and objectivity. Nonetheless, this only represents an ideal descriptive model as commercial, managerial or political influences very often interfere in the processes of media reporting (Curtin, 2007; Boomgaard et al., 2010; Bondebjerg and Madsen, 2009). This categorisation has served as a background for most studies that engage in surveying the dichotomous attitude of the media – either consenting to (or supporting) the approach of the government or opposing it. Media systems from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) seem to depart from this dialectical model due to their recent establishment and limited experience of interacting with policymakers in more or less democratic arenas (Olausson, 2010). For example, in her analysis of the way in which the Bulgarian media framed NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, Balabanova found that the event was extensively covered by the media, which maintained on most occasions a neutral approach to reporting. At times, it criticised the government’s position to firmly back NATO’s policy in the region by presenting with empathy the ‘refugees’ fate and the devastation of the war’ (Balabanova, 2007, p.104). She finds that the overwhelming presence of neutral perspectives can be explained by the fact that the relationship between the media and the political sphere in post-communist countries is characterised by a high degree of consensus. While Western media systems are accustomed to criticising the policies of governments and always seek transparency, most journalists in former communist countries see themselves as being merely objective news reporters which have to avoid supporting any political argument. Another hypothesis raised by her study highlights concerns regarding the fact that the Bulgarian media might also be less willing to invest resources in lost causes, avoiding to publish approaches that depart from mainstream views found within the political arena and society.\(^{12}\) (Balabanova, 2007, p.110).

Baum and Potter (2008, p.40) have proposed a more complex and dynamic model than the CNN effect for accounting for the media’s interactions with policymakers and its potential to affect

\(^{12}\) This hypothesis can also be applied to Romania.
foreign policy. They argue that rather than studying bilateral relationships between the media, the general public and policymakers, a synthesis that fits all three actors into a coherent set of interdependent links would be required. These complex interrelationships are considered to be similar to those of supply and demand, and between consumers and producers in classical economic theories. In the same way as in the economic marketplace, the foreign policy marketplace tends to reach a point of equilibrium where the media supplies enough information to individuals to allow them to construct viable opinions, but below the point in which leaders have to base most of their foreign policy decisions on public opinion. Information here is the most important commodity exchanged between the three actors. In situations where the media delivers information below the equilibrium point – e.g. the beginning of international events –, policymakers have an advantage. By providing a more and more complete flow of information, the media brings the foreign policy market to the equilibrium point. Over time, the effects of the media turn the balance in favour of the general public, providing it levels of information that resemble those available to policymakers. Baum and Potter (2008, p.45) go on to argue that the media will again step up and limit the level of information it diffuses so as to rebalance the market. Although this approach advances the scholarly field significantly in comparison to older more static views of the media’s role in foreign policy, it strikes by its simplicity. Baum and Potter’s model incorporates an implicit view found throughout the literature that the media blindly conveys the message of policymakers to the public and receives its feedback (Entman, 2004), in this way taking for granted the presence of democratic legitimacy. Portraying all actors involved in the foreign policy marketplace as rational consumers and producers of information paints a very structural and deterministic view, where media coverage of international events is the main driving force behind foreign policy.

Others have proposed that influential and powerful groups control both the media and governments, in this way having the ability to gain public support through the media for policy initiatives and approaches supported by governments (Iyengar and Simon, 1993; Mermin, 1999; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Shapiro and Jacobs, 2000; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010). The ‘manufacturing consent’ model as it has come to be known also implies that actors (either journalists or policymakers) who oppose the overarching control imposed by powerful groups are marginalised within the system, most being forced to adopt a propaganda style of discourse. Moreover, Chomsky and Herman (2002) have famously argued that consent is also reified by the
structure of discourse which constrains actors not even to start exploring opposing points of view. Such an understanding of the media/foreign policy nexus positions the media as an agent of propaganda that cannot foster public debate by providing free and unconstrained access to news and information. The media is downgraded here from its democratic legitimacy enhancing ability to a mere ‘supportive arm of the state and dominant elites, focusing heavily on themes serviceable to them, and debating and exposing within accepted frames of reference’ (Herman, 1993, p.25).

Nonetheless, the manufacturing consent theory should not be discarded altogether as policymakers are the most reliable, and sometimes the only sources for journalists that focus on foreign policy. In this sense, Zaller and Chiu (2000, p.81) highlight that even if most journalists writing on foreign policy have degrees in IR, politics is empirical, based on reality; hence, journalists have to rely heavily on their sources in order to interpret it. Media are to a large extent dependent on governments, and when the latter decide to take a course of action or to initiate a certain policy, journalists are compelled to report on it (Strobel, 1997). On the other hand, policymakers seem to be aware of the power of the media, often regarding it, more or less implicitly as ‘an expression of public opinion’ (Balabanova, 2007, p.18). According to Cohen (cited in Strobel, 1997: 60−65), the media may ‘not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’. One could go further and argue that the relationship between the media and policymakers in foreign policy obscures any objective notion of the general public or public opinion, only the image created by the former and perceived by the latter having salience. Therefore, the general public becomes ‘an empty signifier of democratic discourse that functions as long as nobody notices that it cannot be given any substance’ (Góra, Mach and Trenz, 2012, p.165).

This understanding of the role of public opinion in foreign policy seems to be similar at first sight to the permissive consensus that allowed the European project to develop for more than four decades. The permissive consensus has managed to co-exists alongside deep Eurosceptic debates and views expressed throughout the media within the European public sphere due to the positive policy outcomes derived from a neo-functionalist approach to European integration. Hooghe and Marks have recently signalled the move towards a constraining dissensus in most policy areas, where the basic democratic and jurisdictional legitimacy of the EU is contested
Increasing politicisation of European issues is thought to have contributed to the erosion of the permissive consensus (Koenig-Archipugi, 2002; Mayer and Vogt, 2006; Wagner, 2007; Meyer, 2009; Kandyla and de Vreese, 2011). However, EU foreign policy has been built on a rather different type of permissive consensus, one in which support for more European integration has rarely been challenged in the EPS or by the images of the public opinion constructed by the media. The complexity and low salience, coupled with low levels of coverage of foreign policy have left this policy area unaffected by the emergence of a constraining dissensus. At times, it has determined both policymakers and the media to argue that democratic legitimacy and responsiveness may not be desirable in the face of an under informed public.\(^3\) (Entman, 2000, p.26).

This thesis brings in the concept of the public sphere in order to highlight the ability of the media through its discourse and interactions with policymakers to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy – discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Chapter 3 then presents three types of interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) which can be explored in order to analytically account for the way in which the media endows democratic legitimacy to policymaking. The three interaction effects focus on the way in which the media frames policy definitions, coupled with its interactions with policymakers. Chapter 2 will advance the discussion by emphasising the way in which the EPS through the activity of media feeds into decision-making process in EU foreign policy, boosting their democratic legitimacy.

### 1.5 Conclusions

This chapter has argued that the study of EU foreign policy has tended to overlook the role of democratic legitimacy, considering this policy area highly detached from society. This is surprising, as a focus on the democratic deficit of the EU has been central to the debate regarding the future development of the Union in other policy areas. Linked to this, scholars have also explored the way in which the shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus has impacted most EU policy areas, with a limited focus on foreign policy. The literature review thus

\(^3\) Entman also contends that debate regarding the existence of a permissive consensus in foreign policy might not be useful as ‘elites do not fully understand manifestations of public opinion any better than they do world politics’ (Entman, 2000, p.22)
links directly with the two research questions about whether and in what ways the media endows the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. Chapter 2 will show that the concept of the European public sphere is incorporated into the argument in order to highlight the ability of the media to enhance all the aspects of democratic legitimacy: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The EPS is to a large extent created by the communicative activities of the media, which fosters transnational communication flows by publicising and politicising European issues. Unlike scholarly analysis focusing on the nation state, the EU’s institutional make-up or its ontology, this thesis does not claim that its analytical emphasis – democratic legitimacy – lies at the heart of the Union’s foreign policy. Rather, it proposes that due to the fact that the EU transcends the limits of the national sovereignty, being built and conceived as a project that sustains peace and development through upholding the principles of democracy, the role of democratic legitimacy in all the Union’s policy areas should not be ignored.

On the other hand, some foreign policy analysts have ignored the role of democratic legitimacy altogether or have reified it, taking its existence for granted in democratic systems. Others have enquired into the notion of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or by employing other complementary approaches. The concept of the public sphere is thus central to the construction of democratic legitimacy, providing the space where politics meets society and norms are debated and perpetuated. In this way, it has the ability through the activity of the media to boost the accountability and transparency of decision-making processes and open them up to public debate. Two case studies (detailed in chapter 4) have been chosen in order to reflect two very distinctive areas of EU foreign policy: global climate change policy and the policy towards Russia. Chapter 3 presents the interaction effects model employed in this thesis for analytically identifying the ability of the media to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. Instances of the three types of interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) are empirically distinguished by using frame analysis coupled with data from interviews, questionnaires and various primary and secondary sources – detailed in chapter 4. Chapters 5-7 will then explore empirically the two case studies in order to answer the two research questions.
Chapter 2 – The European Public Sphere and democratic legitimacy

2.1 Introduction

While the idea that the EU’s foreign policy should be built on democratic legitimacy\(^{14}\) has only recently surfaced in the literature, the argument that the Union spreads democratic norms around the world through its external relations has become part of the official discourse and of the EU’s self-image. The previous chapter advocated the need to inquire into the way the EU draws on internal sources of democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy. The purpose of this chapter is to develop the idea of the public sphere and the way in which the actions of the media (within the public sphere) have the potential of endowing foreign policy decision-making with democratic legitimacy. By introducing the notion of the European public sphere (EPS) this chapter highlights the ability of the media through its interactions with policymakers to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy – and builds towards answering the two research questions in the empirical chapters. Through the EPS decision-making processes are opened up to public debate and scrutiny, boosting in this way their accountability and transparency. The EPS should not be understood as a singular space, but as the result of multiple overlapping Europeanised national public spheres. Unlike public spheres circumscribed to nation states, the EPS is to a larger degree created by the activity of the media and the transnational communicative processes it fosters. One might go as far as to argue that the EPS is what the media makes of it (Risse, 2010). Hence, a focus on the EPS provides a link between how democratic legitimacy is enacted through the activity of the media coupled with its interactions with policymakers.

As stated in the introduction to the thesis, interactions between the media and policymakers are crucial for understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is endowed to the EU’s

\(^{14}\) It was highlighted before that democratic legitimacy is a concept composed of multiple aspects: transparency and accountability to openness to public debate or responsiveness. Conversely, increases in any of these aspects are synonymous with enhancing the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes.
foreign policy. In chapter 3 the interactions between the media and policymakers will be mapped out by presenting a model of interaction effects (and their implications for the way democratic legitimacy is endowed to the EU’s foreign policy). The model will be employed empirically in chapters 5, 6 and 7 in order to answer the two research questions and explore the two issue areas of EU foreign policy: climate change policy and the policy towards Russia. The first two sections of this chapter provide an outline of the theories of the public sphere and the way they can be applied to the European setting. This will be followed in the second part of the chapter by an overview of the potential effects of the activity of the media within the EPS on the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy.

2.2 Conceptualising the public sphere
At the basis of theories of the public sphere stands the idea that individuals through participation, communication, and deliberation construct their social world. Society is created, perpetuated and altered by the actions of individuals within the public sphere (Bell, 2007, p.1). Thus, the public sphere is the space in which individuals meet politics and more or less intentionally shape the power of the nation state. Manifestations of intentionality imply here ‘organizing in interest groups and mobilizing the body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a counterweight to the state’ (Fraser, 2007, p.25). Eriksen (2007, p.25) highlights that a level of direct participation can only be achieved if the public sphere encompasses three basic characteristics: it is non-coercive, rational and secular. Conceptually the public sphere is founded on open rational debate which is devoid of any incursion from the nation state and where individuals express their ideas in a free and open manner, exercising their civil and political liberties. Democracy and secularity are considered to be paramount for the existence of such a public sphere, which through discursive action maintains a reflexive society, continuously mirroring it. Nonetheless, the public sphere conceptualised in these terms paints only an idealised picture of the way in which it unfolds into material reality. In day to day social practice, different layers of intentionality intersect, segmenting the public sphere and rendering it less rational and more coercive than the ideal type. As this thesis is interested in the reality – the here and now – of the EU’s foreign policy, trying to uncover the way in which it is endowed with democratic legitimacy, the analysis will depart from the ideal model of the public sphere.
The above discussion underlines the contested character of the notion of the public sphere which is derived from the discrepancies between material practices and the ideal type. Simultaneously, the normative role that the public sphere has to play in society seems also to be contested. On the one hand, the public sphere reflects a historically constructed relation between the political and the social, where the social practices of individuals become institutionalised in language, law or other traditions. This is a rather static and descriptive notion of the public sphere, which focuses more on its historically constructed ontology and overlooks any questions of political or social change that derives from individuals. On the other hand, a normative view conceptualises the public sphere as the space where public scrutiny maintains democracy, and where the liberties and freedoms of individuals are safeguarded by the ever-present need of legitimating policies. To be more explicit, the latter view of the public sphere draws on the former and departs from it in that it highlights the active role of the public sphere in shaping and legitimising politics within a certain community.

While acknowledging the need for understating the historical forces at work in the evolution of the public sphere, this thesis focuses more on its present transformative character. Two main arguments justify this preference. Firstly, a historical analysis of the public sphere will show that foreign policy has been traditionally a domain outside of public scrutiny. Moreover, Habermas (1998, 2000, 2001, 2006) and Taylor (2004) highlight that it was not until recently, with the overarching spread of democracy that the public sphere could be opened to debates about foreign policy. Secondly, many scholars have pointed to the fact that the EU – as with many other aspects – has a different type of public sphere than the nation state, one which is more dynamic, complex and constructed at many national and regional levels, making it more difficult to be captured solely by a historical approach (Boomgaarden et al., 2010; de Beus, 2010; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; Eriksen, 2007; Meyer, 2009; Trenz, 2004, 2007; Van de Steeg, 2010; Risse, 2010). The section on the EPS will detail these differences, but for the moment it is worth presenting how the relation between the public sphere, democracy and legitimacy has been conceptualised and researched in the literature.

The contested character of the notion of the public sphere is found throughout Habermas’ (1989, 1998, 2000) work on the concept. While he traditionally views the public sphere as a common space that both emanates from and shapes society in an inclusive manner, in the revised versions
of his theory he adds the idea that it is built on different categories and layers – be they social, geographical, historical or political. For example, on the societal level, class, race, age or gender seem to make a difference when informing the way individuals engage with each other in the public sphere. Through their interactions such divisions tend to coagulate – gaining democratic strength and legitimacy – and ‘wash’ into political decisions. Fraser offers a more stylised version of the argument positing that the internal divisions within the public sphere manage the tension between ‘normative legitimacy and political efficacy’ of social action (Fraser, 2007, p.7).

Consequently, only decisions that are bottom-up – in that they derive from public communicative discourse –, and yield practical democratic results are considered to be legitimate within the public sphere, and thus, binding for society.

By seeking public legitimacy for political decisions, the public sphere alters power relations significantly (Dahl, 1989; Calhoun, 1993; Goode, 2005; Bell, 2007; Splichal, 2011). Policymakers become more constrained to enter the public arena and open their judgments to the scrutiny of individuals. This puts more and more emphasis on the need to foster open public debate which has norm-giving power bestowed on it by a certain moral community of the willing. To be more precise, the emphasis on public debate is built on the idea that everyone is entitled to take part in it, the rationale of the more the better applying in this case. Democracy seems to be intrinsically linked to the imperative of open debate within the public sphere (Eriksen, 2007, p.30). The more a political regime shifts towards authoritarianism, the less political decisions reflect the debates within the public sphere, culminating with situations where such debates are silenced. However, the public sphere should not be understood as an intentional political actor which shapes the political agenda. It is both the context in which society meets politics and part of the process through which public debate shapes political decisions. In a stronger conceptualisation, Risse posits that the role of the public sphere is to inform citizens, monitor and critically evaluate the government (Risse, 2010, p.108).

Nonetheless, an inherent tension arises when one tries to analyse democracy outside the nation state. The level of ‘embeddedness of democratization in a nation state’ (Eder, 2007, p.48) cannot be overestimated in its influence on the way ideas of democracy are put into practice. The particular restriction imposed by the nation state on its democracy can be accounted for by looking at the pervasiveness of the public sphere. By channelling the flows of communicative
power in all corners of society, the public sphere becomes the space through which the periphery can gain the same discursive position as the centre. Where this transfer has been institutionalised into national or regional parliaments we can talk about the existence of a strong public whose preferences are – at least in theory – incorporated into political decisions. By the same token, a weak public only has the power of deliberating outside the political system. However, in the case of the EU this distinction seems to be misplaced as the widespread presence of parliaments – at various levels, local, regional, national, supranational – points to the a priori existence of a strong European demos (Koopmans, 2010). This issue will be developed when analysing the nature of the EPS, but for the moment it is worth noting that the aggregation of parliaments at various levels seems to yield a mix of strong and weak publics which shift and interact through time and in relation to different policy areas and events. As the institutionalisation of participatory practices and open debate is much weaker at the EU level than in the nation state (but embodies a broader set of democratic ideals), the European demos’ strength fluctuates in accordance with the level of politicisation within the public sphere (Statham and Trenz, 2012).

On the other hand, according to Vivien Schmidt (2008b), the more political issues become salient in the media the more legitimacy is granted to parliaments to deal on behalf of their citizens. This happens because for most people, politics does not exist outside the area defined by the media (Sheafer and Gabay, 2009; Bulkow, Urban and Schweiger, 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Nowak, 2012; Wolfe, Jones and Baumgartner, 2013). Paraphrasing Alexander Wendt’s famous phrase, one can argue that the ‘public sphere is what the media make of it’ (Risse, 2010, p.116). The argument referring to strong publics should be limited only to the existence of parliaments, as democratic legitimacy should be built on the existence within all institutions of the state of democratic procedures which provide the framework for individuals to shape politics through the public sphere in a normative sense. In this thesis democratic legitimacy is conceptualised to encapsulate multiple aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The media opens up all institutions to politicisation and public contestation through its democracy enhancing role. At the same time, the media can downplay events within the political sphere and shift public attention to more trivial aspects having, as Trenz (2009)
points out a *dumbing down* effect. Nonetheless instances of such discourse from the media reflect public disengagement with politics because\(^\text{15}\):

communication through the media constitute second-order observations that enable participants as well as audiences to not only observe themselves and their contributions but also the observations of others and their construction of reality. By mirroring and communicating social conflicts, the media contribute to social order in given society (Risse, 2010, p.117).

2.3 The European Public Sphere

2.3.1 Defining the EPS

The discussion about the public sphere started having significant relevance within European Studies only in the late 1990s when a growing degree of attention was directed towards European integration and the role of national and transnational media in providing thrust for it (Meyer, 2009, p.1047). Studies have shown that media reports about the acceding countries have had remarkable impact on public attitudes in the older member states in regard to future enlargement (Maier and Rittberger, 2008, p.262). This has led scholars engaged in conceptualising the EPS to argue that different national media in the member states have actually constructed over the years various conceptions of what the EU is and stands for (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007). In this sense, the Europeanisation of national public spheres has long been advocated for in the literature as a way of creating an EPS. However, research on the way in which the media through the EPS can endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy is yet to have been attempted in a coherent fashion. The studies that have engaged with this issue have only described and assessed the views of the general public on various issues in the EU’s foreign policy by evaluating opinion polls and surveys (Kentmen, 2010). The activity of the media and the EPS have not been linked to foreign policy decision-making processes within the EU in order to account for democratic legitimacy\(^\text{16}\).

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\(^{15}\) This is one of the reasons why this thesis analyses only quality media which is expected to have a *democracy enhancing* role.

\(^{16}\) Nonetheless, a few media analyses (Meyer, 2010; de Vreese, 2001; Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011; Risse, 2010a) have scratched the surface of the EU’s foreign policy, without any implication for its democratic legitimacy.
The relevance of the public sphere has been linked in the literature with the way in which the EU is conceptualised (Gripsrud and Weibull, 2010; Fuchs, 2010; Eriksen, 2007; Eder, 2010, 2007; Medrano and Gray, 2010; Statham, 2010b; Trenz, 2005). If the Union is thought of as a regulatory force which derives its legitimacy from its performance and not from the deliberative or representative character of its decision-making processes, only national public spheres have the duty to mediate the views and preferences of individuals. Legitimation at the European level is thus predicated upon the credibility of national governments. The EPS is conceptualised in this case as a disorganised structure of overlapping spaces that is driven by the interplay of national interests and the bargaining process that arise from it. Others have conceptualised the EPS as the result of a ‘multidimensional and gradual process that in one way or another extends public discourse beyond national spaces’ (Sifft et al., 2007, p.130). This perspective is linked to an understanding of the EU as both a regulatory force and as a post-modern *sui-generis* entity that strives not only for performance, but also for the promotion and deepening of the democratic norms and values that are its core.

The EPS is inherently linked to the broadening of news coverage of EU issues (Meyer, 2005; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Studies have argued that the EU is not adequately covered in national press, its visibility only increasing when high level events take place. Boomgaarden and his colleagues (2010, p.510) have shown that the EU is significantly more visible in newspapers than on television, with a special focus on the quality media. The limited amount of coverage around EU affairs has the potential of damaging the power of the media to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy. However, policymakers seem keen to react to media reports that claim legitimacy by drawing inferences from public opinion (Schwaiger, 2003). Moreover, policymakers tend to be sensitive to the way the media presents in the EPS the views of the general public towards their policies (Gavin, 2009, p.770). This model of the public sphere assumes that public opinion formation takes place outside the political

For example, in his study of the way German and British newspapers frame the foreign policy of the EU, Meyer (2010, p.182) concludes that both national public spheres increasingly tend to view the EU as having an important presence in the international arena. However, these findings should not be taken at face value, as the study only explores four issue areas, where member states are, to a large extent, willing to act through the common framework of the EU, in this way promoting globally a multilateral approach: trade and aid, human rights, crisis management, terrorism and non-proliferation.
system. Through the media, within the EPS, policymakers come to know the views of the general public (Statham and Koopmans, 2009).

The EPS is seen in this thesis as the result of the overlapping of national public spheres. As such, the EPS can be thought of as the result of two complementary processes: collective identification and discursive exchange (Eriksen, 2007). Both these processes are dynamic in nature and have to be assessed according to their historicity. In relation to the former mechanism, collective identification, it is worth noting that the EPS based on a common identity must be seen as indispensable for the normative development of the Union, and thus for the assurance that multi-level governance within its institutions takes into account the views of the general public. However, in terms of foreign policy, many scholars have underlined the absence of a common identity that would transcend the narrowness of national interests (Bickerton, 2011a; Hill, 2003; Hyde-Price, 2007). Moreover, a political will that could forge such a collective identity is thought to be no more than rhetorical (Mitzen, 2006; Pace, 2007; Eriksen, 2011; Bicchi, 2011; Howorth, 2004). Member states are seen in these studies as being rational egoists who only support common EU foreign policy approaches when they do not collide with their national interests. These arguments cast doubt over the possibility of a functional EPS that could have significant influence on the EU’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, through the Europeanisation of national public spheres (discussed below) the media (national and transnational) can have the potential to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy – allowing this thesis to enquire into the two research questions presented in the introductory chapter.

2.3.2 The Europeanisation of national public spheres
During the last ten years most of the literature has pointed to the idea that the EPS is not a single coherent space, but is formed by the overlapping of various national public spheres (Bee, 2010; Koopmans and Statham, 2010; Risse, 2010; Statham, 2010d; Van de Steeg, 2010; Selmeczi and Sata, 2011; Dobrescu and Palada, 2012; Sicakkan, 2012). Even more, there is little evidence that the EPS resembles in any way that of the nation state, due to the peculiarities of multi-level governance characterised by the continuous power negotiations between member states and the supranational level. As highlighted earlier, the lack of unity within the EPS has been correlated

17 Together with the one created by the activity of the transnational media.
with the absence of a *European demos* or a European identity (Schlesinger, 1999; Eriksen, 2007; Schlesinger and Kevin, 2002; Trenz, 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaard, 2006). De Beus (2010, p.32) suggests that trying to identify an EPS at the transnational level will be futile because a *European demos* is more likely to appear within national borders where social and political life is infused with and transformed by European issues. An EPS viewed in these terms would not result in the dissolution of national borders or of different cleavages present within societies, but would encourage a dialogue, where various traditions, languages or cultures are given equal say. According to Lauristin (2007, p.397), the new CEE member states have been showing more readiness towards the development of a public sphere defined in these terms because they perceive it as a chance to take part in the European discursive space as equals, where their cultural and national specificities are cherished and encouraged. The spread of the same European issues and frames through different national public spheres has been considered to be evidence of the existence of such an EPS. Both theoretically and empirically, it is commonly accounted for through the process of Europeanisation which is discussed in what follows.

The concept of Europeanisation captures the extent to which European discourse has extended from the supranational arena to the national public spheres in the member states and beyond them. To be clearer, it traces and assesses the way in which European issues are discussed within national discursive spaces, and through transnational communication flows come to travel from one domestic public debate to another. Furthermore, Koopmans and Statham (2010, p.43) maintain that national public spheres become Europeanised if discourses within these spaces evade the boundaries of certain national debates and assume transnational, European points of view. The minimal requirement for the presence of Europeanisation is that the general public already is or becomes aware of the European dimension of the discourses created and circulated by the media within national public spheres. On the other hand, the optimal requirement or the rule of thumb for an Europeanised public debate involves participating in a shared debate on European issues which are discussed using roughly the same criteria as in other national public spheres.

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18 The concept of Europeanisation should be distinguished from its mainstream understanding in the literature on European integration. Scholars more generally refer to Europeanisation as a process related to changes in policies, laws or identities (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). According to Radealli (2000, p.4), it includes ‘… processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’. Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) also view Europeanisation as a two way process between the EU and the domestic levels which are governed by both bottom-up and top-down constraints.
spheres (Bee and Bozzini, 2010). Sifft et al. (2007, p.147) in their study of the way newspapers frame European governance in five member states, found that most national public spheres are situated somewhere between the minimal and the optimal requirement of Europeanisation. In their opinion, national public spheres in the EU are not yet connected to a coherent European discourse which could be recognised by all participants. However, their study observed a high degree of openness in mediated domestic public debates towards European issues.

In the context of overlapping public spheres, the creation of the EPS related to foreign policy issues is considered to be captured by two processes: vertical and horizontal – in the literature they have been commonly considered separately (Brüggemann and Kleinen-von Konigslow, 2009; Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer, 2010). Vertical Europeanisation processes – highlighted in figure 2.1 – deal with the privileging within national public spheres of European approaches promoted by the EU’s institutions. Communicative processes could be here either top-down where EU actors intervene in national debates or most commonly bottom-up in which European issues are adopted by national actors. The top-down variant need not be mediated, as institutions have the ability to distribute their own information to citizens and manage their interactions with the general public (Michailidou, 2007, p.49). On the other hand, horizontal Europeanisation considers the communication flows between different national public spheres. Koopmans and Statham (2010, p.38) argue that a stronger variant of horizontal Europeanisation takes place when issues from another European state are reported, and European actors or policies are clearly identified. Instances of diplomatic rows between two member states or between one and an institution of the Union are examples of the two processes of Europeanisation intersecting. Van Noije (2010, p.266) has empirically shown that such cases have received considerable attention from the media over the last two decades and have triggered considerable public debate. Conversely, instances of weak horizontal Europeanisation occur only when issues regarding developments in other member states are merely reported in a certain national public sphere.
This thesis views the EPS as the result of the overlapping of Europeanised national public spheres in the member states, without paying specific interest to the process of Europeanisation – which would be a worthwhile and lengthy topic in itself. Rather, it takes for granted the idea that national public spheres have become increasingly Europeanised, and analyses the discourse of the media and its ability to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy through its interactions with policymakers in two member states within two very different political systems and media landscapes: the United Kingdom and Romania. To build an even more reliable picture it also analyses the transnational public sphere created by the activity of European transnational publications (Financial Times, European Voice and EUObserver). Transnational publications play an important role due to their extensive focus on the EU and their close connections to policymakers working within the EU’s institutions – which hold in high esteem the activity of transnational publications. This public sphere is much more limited in terms of the range of individuals from the general public involved than the British and Romanian ones. Moreover, it can provide valuable insight into the way in which EU policymakers interact with the discourse of the media and, as a consequence, the way democratic legitimacy – and its multiple aspects – is endowed to EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, national media frequently draw on or even translate analyses from transnational media, which makes the latter’s activity even more salient within the
Chapter 4 will present an overview of the media landscapes and political systems for each public sphere, while the following three empirical chapters will start by presenting the context (media/foreign policy nexus) within which the media interact with policymakers in the public sphere.

2.3.2 The EPS and EU foreign policy
It has become a commonplace in the media studies literature to argue that ‘the more the EU does, the more likely it is to get on the news agenda’ (Boomgaarden et al., 2010, p.519). Analyses of media coverage of the EU have highlighted that crucial and large institutional events influence positively the Union’s visibility in the media20 (Curtin, 2007; Gripsrud, 2009; Lauristin, 2007; Koopmans and Zimmermann, 2010; Maier and Rittberger, 2008; Schlesinger and Kevin, 2002; Smith, 2007; Trenz, 2010b). Consequently, it is expected that when a country holds the presidency of the Union or chairs a summit of the European Council, more news about the EU will be generated in its national public sphere. Similarly, in relation to the two case studies chosen here – climate change policy and the policy towards Russia – it is expected that the EU’s response and engagement with to the 2008 Georgian-Russian war or the 2009 Copenhagen Summit have presented a high degree of press coverage. According to de Beus (2010), such increases in the quantity of news have the potential of constructing increased awareness over the debates around the EU, and thus build public support or opposition for various policies. A focus on foreign policy evades the common problem of the lack of issue convergence between national public spheres that characterises most reporting on the EU. Policy areas such as transport or agriculture are thought to cause very different patterns of issue coverage within the national public spheres of the member states (Craglia and Annoni, 2009; Curtin, 2007; Bondebjerg and Madsen, 2009; Boomgaarden et al., 2010; Michailidou, 2007; Meyer, 2005; Maier and Rittberger, 2008; Stevenson, 2009; Preston and Metykova, 2009). The topics of media reports about the foreign policy of the EU offer a higher degree of transnational convergence due to their low level of technical language, and consequently their easy accessibility to the general public.

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19 This can be seen as part of vertical Europeanisation processes within the EPS.
20 On the other hand, Trenz (2004, p.312) has suggested that most European news receive minimal representation in the media to the extent that they are presented in a way which tends to the readership’s needs.
Nonetheless, national media perspectives on EU foreign policy are expected to differ in the standpoint they assume when presenting similar issues.

Koopmans and his colleagues (2010, p.64) have underscored that the views of EU and national policymakers are more visible depending on their influence in a particular area of foreign policy. In the case of climate change policy, which has an important supranational component, the views and the policies of the European Commission have been identified to be the most present in media reporting (Olausson, 2010). On the other hand, claims and discourses in relation to the EU’s approach to Russia made by national policymakers are more pervasive in the media than those constructed at the supranational level (Chifu, Nantoi, and Sushko, 2010; Kandyla and de Vreese, 2011; Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011). The preference for reporting on the European Commission’s activities in relations to climate change is also influenced by the fact that NGOs, environmental groups, interest groups and other civil society actors seem to view the supranational institutions of the EU as the main actor that could integrate their interests and goals (Smith, 2007; Trenz, 2004; Walter et al., 2009).

Koopmans and his colleagues (Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer, 2010, p.67) have found that even though France, Germany and the United Kingdom make up less than a third of the Union’s population, their national media accounts for more than half of the claims about the EU. As such, they argue that media debates in Europe are not nationally biased in as much as they are influenced by the debates on the EU within these three core countries. Out of them, France seems to present the highest rate of attention to the policy views developed at the European level, while the British media tends to focus more on how the EU’s approach convergences or diverges with the UK’s national interest (Eder, 2007). The extent to which a country identifies itself with the European project is important for understanding such media differences between France and Britain – support for European integration triggers a higher degree of positive visibility of the EU’s institutions in media reports. Furthermore, Risse’s (2010, p.138) empirical analyses point to the conclusion that the media in various national public spheres seems to be reporting European issues at the same time through roughly the same frames. Risse outlines the findings of the analysis of the Häider debate, where European newspapers presented the issue not only as one of concern to Austria and its democracy, but also to the whole of Europe. The debate on enlargement presents the same characteristics as that on Häider, with regard to the creation at the
same time of ‘general frames of reference and meaning structures’ across Europe (Risse, 2010, p.150). However, in all empirical examples examined in his book, *A Community of Europeans?*, Risse (2010) finds that usually when European issues are discussed, they are on the lips of European or EU policymakers.

A recent survey of the media coverage of the EU’s attitude towards the Orange revolution in Ukraine reinforces the idea that support for the Union’s leadership generates more positive coverage in national media (Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011, p.408). Accordingly, the French media was the most supportive in providing common aid to the democratic forces in Ukraine, highlighting the policies of the EU – the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). On the other hand, while still supporting a common EU position, the British media focused more on the rhetoric adopted by the New Labour government. Kratochví and his associates also found that a special interest in bilateral relations with Ukraine did not have any significant influence on the coverage of the coloured revolution by the media. Secondly, they showed that the Orange Revolution did not lead to a bilateralisation of relations with Ukraine, but to a high issue convergence in the EPS. Finally, they argue that technical policies such as the ENP – that the Commission wanted to publicise – did not receive too much media attention due to their low accessibility to the general public. The Union’s approach to Ukraine was presented in the European media with a larger focus on rhetoric than on concrete policies (Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011, p.408).

In terms of a collective EU identity there are numerous reasons and evidence to argue that in the realm of foreign policy the Union could not coagulate a coherent transnational public sphere as the economic policy of the Union has done (Meyer 2002, 2005; Schmidt 2001; Van de Steeg 2002). Nonetheless, the discursive exchange or the creation of common discursive practices has the power of fostering such a common European communicative sphere. Following Van Dik, discourse is understood here as ‘both as a specific form of language use, and as a specific form of social interaction, interpreted as a complete communicative event in a social situation’ (1990, p. 164). In this sense, Karl Deutsch’s classical work on *Nationalism and Social Communication* becomes relevant. From his point of view, the defining characteristic of a political community – as the EU strives to be – is predicated on the existence of sustainable communicative practices, more specifically on its members’ ability ‘to communicate more effectively and over a wider
range of subjects with members of one large group than with outsiders’ (Deutsch 1953: 97). Here, citizens have the ability to follow and contribute to debates around various political issues. This in turn grants legitimacy to the political sphere because it promotes social cohesion and political accountability (Meyer, 2005, p. 123). Sifft et al. (2007) have shown that in highly developed democratic political communities – such as the EU’s member states – public debates focus more on issues that affect the direct well-being of the individual or relate to the core functions of the nation state. Foreign policy with its functions of safeguarding a state’s citizens from external threats is thus bound to stir up public debate. Both case studies that are analysed here – i.e. the EU’s policy towards Russia and its approach to climate change – involve foreign policy issues that over the years have been labelled by the general public, media, and polities within the EU as posing great exogenous threats (differing in nature and degree) to the member states and to the EU itself.

It was outlined before that this thesis conceptualises the European public sphere as an ensemble of overlapping national and transnational public spheres. Drawing on Kentmen (2010), this thesis argues that in relation to foreign policy the absence of a coherent common public sphere is predicated on the both practical and discursive imbalance between the transfer of power from the nation state to the EU, and the skewed national orientation of political discourse within member states. For example, the UK converges with EU foreign policy approaches only when they are in line with its own national interest, but otherwise distances itself from the Union’s external actions and does not try to significantly alter them (Gillespie and O’Loughlin 2009). Simultaneously, in relation to the EU’s foreign policy, national media tend to favour domestically constrained views on foreign policy and not those developed at the supranational level (Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg, 2009). For such a reason – as recent Eurobarometer surveys (European Commission, 2007, 2010g, 2010e, 2010f, 2011) show – EU citizens seem to have low amounts of information about decision-making processes in the EU’s institutions (in foreign policy, and more general). The next section delves into the crux of the argument related to the ability of the media through its discourse and interactions with policymaking within the EPS to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy – which allows us to explore the two research questions.
2.4 The European Public Sphere and democratic legitimacy

Whatever view they may hold regarding the nature and the form of the EPS, most scholars argue that such a transnational space has added benefit for the furthering of European integration. It embodies the democratic ideals and values on which the EU was predicated, and harbours the potential of internally legitimising the EU’s policy. It grants legitimacy to the EU’s efforts to promote universal principles around the world such as peace, prosperity, or respect for human rights. Moreover, the EPS through the activity of the media could help in mitigating the EU’s deep democratic deficit – which justifies the focus on the media in the first research question explored in this thesis. Koopmans and Statham (2010) maintain that the EPS has the potential of fostering democracy in the EU, although presently it might not have the same degree of coherence as a national public sphere. However, de Beus (2010, p.29) rightly warns that scholars should be very careful in the way they advocate a EPS, as it would need ‘to develop and stabilise in both a top-down and bottom-up way’. Elites should be willing to inform and educate the general public, while at the same time grass roots transnational networks would have to drive forward European public debates on various issues.

The activity of the media within the EPS has the ability to spur the creation of processes and mechanisms that can endow the EU with democratic legitimacy. Moreover, it can enhance all the aspects which are considered in this thesis to compose the concept of democratic legitimacy – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. Firstly, the EPS acts as a space where individuals have the opportunity to engage in public debates regarding the EU’s affairs, thus allowing them to have direct contact through the media’s discourse with the European transnational environment. However, the interactions within this space are limited by the language barriers which also add more diversity to European debates. Schlesinger (2007, p.34) equates the formation of an EPS with that of a space which is intrinsically Anglophone due to the widespread presence of the language in discourses regarding the EU. Secondly, the activity of the media within the EPS increases peoples’ familiarity with the EU and their ‘sense that the political institutions of the community, along with decisions emanating from it, conforming to acceptable standards’ (Schmidt 2010, p.17). Simultaneously, this could lead to a transfer of legitimacy through the construction of narratives from the supranational level to the national level and back (Stevenson, 2009). Lastly, the media within the EPS can contribute to the degree of appreciation that individuals share towards the EU. Since legitimacy is dependent upon the
accessibility to, accountability, transparency and effectiveness of public debates and decision-making processes, more discourse regarding the Union in national public spheres might prompt individuals to increase their trust in the EU (Góra, Mach and Trenz, 2012). Furthermore, EU governance presented to, debated and understood by European citizens can provide a voice to individuals that are normally marginalised at the national level (Bee and Bozzini, 2010).

Within the EPS, communication cannot be separated from the social, political or cultural backgrounds in which it resides. Consequently, communicative processes entail not only the transfer of discourses, but also the creation of meaning structures be they social, political or cultural. Transnational communication, on the other hand, gives way to the production of discourses and meanings which evade the constraints imposed by centres of power located within nation states. Through this, it promotes several mechanisms which drive forward democratisation. In theory, forms of transnational communication within Europe provide the avenues where different national or regional actors can meet and become entangled in democratic processes of contestation or consensus formation. On the other hand, in Habermas’ (1989) classic theory, communication needs to be institutionalised in order to foster a democratic public sphere, where citizens could freely and equally interact with politics.

Two main forms of institutionalised communication are considered to coexist in reality: mediated communication (Gripsrud, 2009, p.210) and regulative communication (Koçan, 2008, p.24). In the case of the EPS, mediated communication is seen to be the primary form of communication. Nevertheless, regulative communication is related to creating a culture open to consensus achieved through free and equal access to public debates. In this sense, Trenz (2010b, p.26) argues that the EPS is a space ‘in which particular information is distributed, issues and policies made transparent, positions and claims are staked and old and new divisions are demarcated’. It is an environment that through its own nature calls on actors and encourages them to accept transformations that are suitable to all the affected groups. The EU’s institutions can produce regulative communication which affects the nature of the EPS. For example, the inner workings of the EP seem to reflect the regulative potential of European communication, where consensus rather than political compromise and conflict are the modus vivendi in which MEPs act.
Mediated communication within the EPS requires the construction of various patterns of circulation through which discourses can overcome traditional national borders. While within the nation state the public sphere can play a significant role through its agenda setting powers, the EPS tends to lie equally at the periphery of each of the member states. At least in theory, this positioning of the media within the EPS facilitates the proliferation of processes of public legitimation because transnational discourses created here are in a larger degree protected from the interference of political interests. In weak and young democracies, as those of the new CEE member states, the majority of the media systems have been used as tools for political propaganda by the political parties in power, decreasing the public legitimacy granting role of the media’s discourse within the public sphere (Balabanova, 2011).

The media can enhance the standards of democracy within the EPS. Through mediatisation, European issues come to be present in various national debates, fostering and creating new platforms of negotiations for ideas and different standpoints which are key to a democratic system (Krzyżanowski, Wodak and Triandafyllidou, 2009, p.5). As will be highlighted in the next chapter, the media frames policy definitions which influence the way in which individuals in the member states view the EU’s foreign policy. Policy definitions are understood to be particular modes of understanding social and political reality. Policy definitions together with coverage by the media also provide citizens with the necessary information that would allow them to construct reflexive opinions regarding the European views of politicians and evaluate them. As individuals in the EU have few chances to get in contact with policymakers at the supranational level, news reports and articles supplied by the media fill this knowledge gap, mediating the interactions between society and politics (Nieminen, 2009, p.73). EU policymakers may benefit from the media’s policy definitions and coverage by monitoring and evaluating the impact of their policies in the settings of member states (Koopmans, 2010). Moreover, mediatisation facilitates EU policymakers and administrators to initiate policies and open them to public debate (similarly to indexing effect detailed in the next chapter). The media can at times assume a more active role in setting the agenda or legitimising different patterns of behaviour and rules within the political sphere (Trenz, 2009, p.53).

It is quite straightforward to argue that most individuals within the EU do not have any direct interactions with politics – be it domestic or foreign policy –, thus relying on the media to obtain
information. In this sense, the media within the public sphere has the ability to shape the views and preferences of individuals. The policy definitions framed by the media not only inform individuals what to think about, but also suggest to them how to think about and evaluate information. The foreign policy of the EU is commonly considered to be a policy area over which individuals or different groups of individuals do not have influence due to the fact that information is withheld from them. Only the public which is well informed about the international agenda has the right and the duty to decide in foreign policy matters. This apparently closed nature of decision-making in EU foreign policy makes the role of media more important than in other policy areas. The general public gets its information about the foreign policy of the EU only from the policy definitions framed media, and more importantly it is only through the activity of the media within the EPS that individuals can make their voices count in the heads of the policymakers.

Hence, the media has here the ability to link individuals to EU foreign policy decision-making within the EPS. News about the EU’s foreign policy is scarce or almost nonexistent from other sources besides the media, making the EPS both the representative of individuals’ views and the force that shapes them. The relationship between the general public and the EPS, positions the media as both an opinion entrepreneur that seeks to mould the views of individuals, and as an actor – an entity similar to the Greek mythical hero Prometheus – that invades the traditional privacy of foreign policy decision-making, bringing it to bear the accountability of the general public. Through this, the media has the potential to encourage processes of public contestation and different forms of participative democracy within the EPS (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi, 2011; Splichal, 2011; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Dobrescu and Palada, 2012; Zografova, Bakalova and Mizova, 2012). The empirical chapters will endeavour to show whether the EU’s foreign policy can enjoy democratic legitimacy beyond the principle of democratic representation; i.e. through the activity of the media within the EPS – thus answering the two research questions.

Despite its ability to shape the political agenda by being legitimated through the portrayal of public opinion, the media within the public sphere should not be viewed as a political actor in its own right. Nonetheless, at times it can become part of the political process. Its role in relation to political decisions is seen here to be ‘closely coupled with the political sphere through constant
co-operative as well as conflictual exchanges aimed at attracting audience attention’ (Meyer 2009: 1049). The ability of the media to become part of the political process is predicated upon its agenda setting power, one of the three interaction effects between the media and policymakers explored in this thesis together with indexing and bounding. The next chapter will detail each interaction effect, highlighting their implication for the way democratic legitimacy is enacted within the (European) public sphere.

2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has argued that the media through its activity and interactions with policymakers within the European public sphere has the ability to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. Thus, it justifies the focus on the media in the first research question: *can the EU enjoy democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy through the activity of the media?* It also provides an avenue into answering the second: *in what ways does the activity of the media endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy?* Within the public sphere, the media plays a central role as it informs individuals regarding foreign policy issues, and provides policymakers with feedback from the general public. As such, the public sphere is constructed in a significant degree by the activity of the media, meaning that the more issues get publicised, the more decisions pertaining from them get endowed with democratic legitimacy. This chapter has also highlighted that the EPS can enhance all the aspects which are seen here to compose the concept of democratic legitimacy: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. Nonetheless, the absence of a coherent *European demos* or an overarching EU identity emphasises the differences between the EPS and that of nation states. Consequently, this thesis considers the EPS as a result of the overlapping of the Europeanised public spheres. Although this thesis is not interested in the Europeanisation of national public spheres *per se*, it takes it for granted and empirically analyses the activity of the media and its interactions with policymakers in two member states (the UK and Romania) and the transnational level – which is defined to refer to European transnational publications and the EU’s institutions. Moreover, as individuals have virtually no direct access to information and insight about the EU’s foreign policy, interactions between the media and policymakers are paramount for understating the way decision-making processes are made democratically legitimate. The next chapter will present the
model of interaction effects – between the media, together with the policy definitions it frames, and policymakers. This model will be then employed in the empirical part of the thesis in order to explore the way in which the EU’s foreign policy was endowed with democratic legitimacy in the two case studies – and to answer the two research questions. Chapter 4 will present the methodological framework used for identifying instances of the three interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) which entails using frame analysis and correlating its findings with data from interviews and questionnaires (with journalists and policymakers), and other primary or secondary sources.
Chapter 3 – Theoretical framework: Mapping interaction effects within the media/foreign policy nexus

3.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have argued that although there has been intense academic debate for the past twenty years over the EU’s democratic deficit and the lack of democratic legitimacy which hinders its decision-making in most policy areas, little attention has been directed to the Union’s foreign policy. To a large extent scholars have focused on the relationship between the decline of intergovernmentalism within the EU and its prospects of extending the control of representative bodies such as the EP over the Union’s foreign policy. As detailed throughout chapter 1, this strand of research emphasises institutional developments, perceiving democratic legitimacy as a result of or even epiphenomenon to the expansion of the powers of the EP and the broadening of the control of directly elected representatives over the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy – i.e. the EEAS. Chapter 1 also argued that the issue of democratic legitimacy has been treated in an incoherent manner by the broader tradition of foreign policy analysis. Legitimacy is rarely touched upon in the literature, most studies building on the assumption that media influence is equal to legitimacy (Kent, 2005, p.210).

In this thesis, democratic legitimacy is defined as a concept composed of multiple aspects pertaining to decision-making processes: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The previous chapter made a case for the exploring the existence of democratic legitimacy in EU foreign policy through the prism of the European public sphere21 which is commonly viewed to be able to enhance the aspects encompassed by the concept of democratic legitimacy. The media has a central role within the EPS due to its ability to construct

21 The EPS is commonly considered to be the space where individuals can interact with politics through the media and the Internet, and where democratic legitimacy is created and enacted. The EPS links individuals to decision-making processes through the media (Trenz, 2005; Baisnée, 2007; Koopmans and Statham, 2010).
transnational communicative flows, publicise and politicise European issues, in this way linking citizens to the decision-making processes. The way the media frames EU foreign policy and its interaction with policymakers are thus crucial for understating the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in this policy area.

However, merely conceiving a causal link between the media and decision-making processes in EU foreign policy – in researching the existence and nature of democratic legitimacy – would prove to be very dangerous, as this area of policy is subject to a considerably larger number of constraining factors: ranging from the nature of the international system, its norms, to for example, the inner workings of the EU’s institutions. In his review of the literature on the CNN effect and the media’s influence on foreign policy, Piers Robinson (2011) highlighted that although such a causal link cannot be implied from empirical research, the media is to be seen as a necessary constraint on foreign policy decisions. This thesis argues that within the nexus (the media/foreign policy nexus) created by the interactions between media and policymakers in EU foreign policy three types of interaction effects can be identified: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Indexing, bounding and agenda setting as interaction effects underlying the media/foreign policy nexus hinge upon the way in which policymakers interact with and perceive the media (and the policy definitions that it frames). Policy definitions are researched here through frame analysis which will be detailed in the next chapter dealing with the methodology employed in this thesis. Framing is broadly considered to capture the way individuals, groups or entities represent reality focusing on some aspects while downplaying others. The media generally frame three types of policy definitions expressing problems, solutions or expectations. This distinction among the three types of policy definitions framed by the media allows us to empirically identify (and evaluate) instances of the three interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) and their implication for the way democratic legitimacy is enacted.

The core value of the interaction effects model resides in the fact that the three types of effects can shed light on the way democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy decision-making processes – and thus facilitate answering the two research questions. Firstly, indexing captures the ability of policymakers to influence and shape media discourse in the public sphere in order to aid their interests and goals by communicating in a favourable manner their policies to the
general public. Indexing can be thought to boost democratic legitimacy in cases where the media acts as an educator, empowering and informing individuals how to view and participate in debates and political processes when policymakers decide to open various issues to public scrutiny. On the other hand, through indexing policymakers can use the media as a tool for rallying support for their policies or even try to manipulate the general public in accepting policies which stray from democratic values. Secondly, through bounding the media can have a constraining or limiting effect on the range of policies – and their effectiveness – that policymakers can pursue, even if the latter are not aware of or willing to engage with the policy definitions constructed by journalists. Bounding positions journalists as watchdogs of democracy, where their policy definitions can constrain the rhetoric and actions of policymakers, even if the latter are unaware or choose not to engage with the media’s discourse. Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to purposively influence decision-making processes through its discourse. Through agenda setting journalists have the ability to link individuals with the political arena by presenting the views of the general public to policymakers. In what follows the chapter will present the framework of analysis employed in the thesis by expanding first on the types of policy definitions that the media is able to frame through its discourse. The second part then continues by describing each interaction effect, detailing their implications for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy – and for the way in which the two research questions are explored in this thesis.

3.2 Modelling interaction effects between the media and policymakers

In chapter 2 it was argued that the media has a central role within the EPS in linking individuals to decision-making. In this way policies are made more transparent, accountable and open to public scrutiny and debate, boosting their democratic legitimacy. Hence, a focus on the way in which policymakers interact with and perceive the framing strategies of the media can paint a reliable picture of the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. Three types of interaction effects are identified which capture the interactions between policymakers and media (and its discourse): indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Indexing defines instances where media discourse is more or less directly influenced by official rhetoric or the deliberate actions of policymakers. Bounding captures the ability of the media to constrain
political action and rhetoric without policymakers being aware of or engaging with its discourse. Agenda setting captures processes where policy definitions constructed by the media influence decision-making processes through the deliberate actions of journalists. Unlike bounding, in the case of agenda setting policymakers are aware of and choose to engage with the media. At times, indexing, bounding and agenda setting can overlap. However, exploring the likelihood of policy definitions framed by the media to influence official rhetoric and policy facilitates distinguishing between interaction effects. Moreover, the analysis of the policy definitions framed by the media coupled with data from interviews (with policymakers and journalists) and other primary and secondary sources allows us to pinpoint the significance that each interaction effect has on the way democratic legitimacy is enacted. Before presenting in more detail the interaction effects model presented in this thesis it is worth exploring the way in which other scholars have attempted to chart interactions within the media/foreign policy nexus. It will be argued that most of the analytical distinctions developed in the literature are not useful for enquiring into the way democratic legitimacy comes to be enacted in decision-making processes in foreign policy.

3.2.1 Other attempts to map interaction effects between the media and policymakers
In his insightful analysis of the CNN effect Livingstone (1997, p.2) has identified three types of interaction effects in the case of international interventions. Firstly, the media can act as an accelerant, limiting decision-making response times, and putting pressure on policymakers to act quickly. This particular ability of the media falls into the agenda setting effect emphasised in this thesis, as policymakers would be affected by the media’s policy definitions and coverage only if they were aware and willing to interact with them. However, in this role, the media might be deliberately used by policymakers in their efforts to rapidly gain public support for their policy approaches – which points to instances of indexing. Secondly, Livingstone argues that the media creates policy impediments, in that it either undermines the moral or ethical bases behind official policies, or compromises operational security, especially in the case of military intervention. The impediment effect is often linked to the body-bag effect or the Vietnam syndrome which argues

22 Most frameworks are not generally able to encapsulate ‘the reality that media can be integral to democratic processes that place limits on state power while at a different juncture effectively operating as part of the apparatus of the state suggests a spectrum of state-supporting and opposing, activity on which different media operate’ (Kent, 2005, p.205).
that – starting with the Vietnam war – public support for foreign policy and international intervention decreases as images and news of causalities are presented by the media. Defined in this way, the media as an impediment resembles instances of bounding, although Livingstone does not specify whether policymakers are aware of the policy definitions framed by the media. Finally, agenda setting for Livingstone refers to the way in which the emotional coverage of atrocities by the media compels policymakers to address the respective issue. While Livingstone’s framework provides a look into the spectrum of interaction effects found in the media/foreign policy nexus, it focuses too much on international intervention, and remains analytically underspecified – making it quite hard to strike a distinction empirically. Moreover, his framework paints a simplified picture which implies that policymakers would be always responsive to media coverage and its policy definitions if they are constructed and deployed at the right moment (in the event of international conflicts).

A more underspecified and broad interaction effect – which was already discussed in chapter 1 – is the CNN effect. According to Robinson, the CNN effect is aimed at establishing ‘the degree of media influence on policymakers when they are deliberating over whether to intervene during a humanitarian crisis’ (Robinson, 2002, p.16). He further notes that the CNN effect implies that advocates of policy changes are aided by critical media which in conditions of policy uncertainty provides them with increased bargaining power. Secondly, media coverage is considered to compel policymakers to be responsive towards the image of the perceived public opinion painted by the media. However, claims according to which the CNN effect has dramatically changed the way in which foreign policy is conducted should not be equated with the idea that media is a crucial factor in determining policy. It rather shrinks decision-making times to respond to various events, ideas and debates in foreign policy, whilst opening them up to democratic scrutiny. In the literature, the CNN effect has been identified in two forms: strong and weak. The strong CNN effect is considered to have taken place in situations where the media has had a significant influence on decision-making processes, operating ‘as either a necessary or even sufficient factor in producing a particular policy outcome’ (Robinson, 2002, p.37). Defined in this way, the strong

23 Most studies of the CNN effect have been focused around the issue of humanitarian intervention, which can hardly build a comprehensive picture of the whole spectrum of foreign policy. By employing two case studies which resemble two very distinct issues areas in EU foreign policy, this thesis aims to overcome the shortcoming highlighted above – nonetheless, analysing a larger number of issue areas in foreign policy would paint an even more complete and valid picture.
CNN effect resembles the agenda setting powers of the media, one of the three interaction effects presented in this thesis. On the other hand, a weak CNN effect encompasses instances ranging from situations in which the media acts as an accelerant (Livingston, 1997) to when it enables (Hallin, 1989) various policies to be adopted and put into practice. The weak version of the CNN effect is in itself a very ambiguous concept and largely ineffective as it includes instances of agenda setting, bounding and indexing (or manufacturing consent for that matter) without creating an analytical distinction among them.

Touri presents another example which entails a three stage model in which the media influences decision-making processes in foreign policy. The first stage involves the way in which the commercial and strategic interests of the media impact its discourse. In the second stage, news frames target the general public; while, in the third stage, media discourse prompts perceptions and interpretation from the general public which constrain policymakers, as they are thought to be aware of the media’s discourse and the attitude of the public. Policymakers would act here in order to avoid domestic costs imposed by the media’s discourse and the perception of public opinion presented by journalists (Touri, 2006, p.88). O’Hefferman (1991) presents a contending model where the media is perceived to be an insider within decision-making processes. In this model, the media affects institutions and policymakers through five mechanisms: it sets the pace for foreign policy or constrains it, it defines standards and normal behaviour for policymakers within institutions, and it informs policymakers and directs or reinforces their attention. Mcquail (2006) has also distinguished between a number of interactions found within the media/foreign policy nexus. Firstly, he notes that the media can cause changes to policies – in any form – which can be differentiated according to the degree of intentionality involved, or the magnitude of the policy shift they determine. Secondly, in his model the media has the ability to reinforce changes pursued by executives or present official policies and approaches, whilst also having the power to prevent policy change. Mcquail’s model represents without a doubt a step forward in mapping interaction effects within the media/foreign policy nexus, but his effects are too underspecified and very difficult to analytically differentiate, or research empirically. At the same time, he takes a one-sided approach, merely analysing interaction effects from the point of view of the media. Conversely, he ignores the issue regarding policymakers’ willingness to interact with and their awareness of the policy definitions framed by the media.
The next sub-section explores the way in which the media frame policy definitions which are seen to be key to understanding the three types of interaction effects. The remainder of the chapter will then describe each interaction effect in turn – indexing, bounding and agenda setting – pinpointing the source of policy definitions, the factors which influence the likelihood of the three types of policy definitions to be incorporated in official policies and rhetoric, whilst providing an account of their impact for the presence of democratic legitimacy.

3.2.2 Media policy definitions
The three interaction effects are shaped by the way in which the media, through its discourse in the public sphere, constructs various policy definitions. Policy definitions are understood as particular modes of understanding social and political reality. The literature on public policy has a long tradition of surveying and analysing the way in which the media frame policy definitions and their influence on policymaking (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994; Birkland, 1997; Kingdon, 1997; Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Mehta, 2010). Through its discourse the media defines policy problems, solutions and expectations which can ‘represent events in a policy relevant way, as expecting, deserving, even requiring a governmental response’ (Kent, 2005, p.186). Empirically policy definitions are explored through frame analysis which is detailed in the next methodological chapter. Most scholars contend that the media’s policy definitions draw on or even mimic those constructed by other actors in the public and political spheres, and are defined only in relation to events, issues, debates or actors (Reese, 2003; Johnson-Cartee, 2004; Camaj, 2010). For example, de Vreese (2012, p.367) argues that journalists are almost never primary originators of policy problems, solutions, and expectations, and act more as advocates. For the purpose of this thesis, policy problems, solutions and expectations created and promoted by the media are considered to stem either from policymakers, the ‘social psyche’ of the public (or the perceived views that individuals hold towards an issue), journalists, or the environment which underwrites interactions between journalists and policymakers.

However, as highlighted by Wood and Peake, ‘foreign policy does not readily fit the theoretical mold most scholars associate with domestic issues’ (Wood and Peake, 1998, p.173). Hence, the way in which the media frames policy definitions will have its own peculiarities in the realm of foreign policy. In the case of foreign policy, the media’s policy definitions have a central role in
providing information to the general public – which they would not get through personal experience – and policymakers. The heavy reliance of individuals in the public sphere on the media for information and news about foreign policy is also recognised by Brewer and his associates (2003). Due to this dependency they argue that the media plays a central role through its policy definitions in shaping public perceptions of an actor in the international arena. On the other hand, the power of the policy definitions framed by the media to shape public opinion hinges upon the accessibility of the stories and the language journalists employ, coupled with the level of media exposure. This argument assumes that sustained media coverage over a certain period makes information more accessible, whilst also increasing the chance of influencing individuals’ judgments (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, 1997). Additionally, Brewer and Gross (2005) insightfully have shown that individuals are almost never subject to a single policy definition or set of related policy definitions constructed around a certain issue or event. They argue that on the contrary individuals are usually subject to competing policy definitions, which are selected according to citizens’ own values.

The way in which policy problems are defined can have important implications for the range of policy solutions that are proposed and seem viable. According to Hall, policy problems have a central role within decision-making processes, as they function as paradigms which underscore ‘not only the goals of policy . . . but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall, 1961, p.279). At the same time, the way in which media define policy problems can have a significant impact on the institution and venue where they are discussed, and the range of instruments used to address them. Policy problems defined by journalists are not always the result of conscious and intentional actions, as they can favor one definition over another due to their commitment to the principle of objectivity. The most pervasive policy problems defined (such as human rights violations, armed conflicts or terrorist attacks) by the media usually require swift response and tend to assume centre stage on the political agenda. Consequently, in such salient situations the policy problems framed by the media can shape official approaches and drive forward new policies by exposing policymakers to the pressure of public opinion, even if the general public tends to be generally uninterested in foreign policy (Rosenau, 1967; Iyengar and Simon, 1993; Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2008).
Rosenau contends that policy problems can be categorised according to the territory affected, saliency, the extent to which resources are needed in order to implement solutions, and the viability of finding solutions and putting them into practice (Rosenau, 1961). Metha (2010, pp.35–36) has identified three factors which can influence the likelihood of policy problems defined by the media to influence official policy and rhetoric. Firstly, the fit between the definition and the political environment implies that where a definition is line with those expressed by policymakers it is likely to become adopted. Secondly, the ownership of the problem and the range of those affected can limit or enhance the scope of a definition. Finally, the current political context – domestic or international – can influence the likelihood of policy definitions to be incorporated in official rhetoric and policy. On the other hand, Kent views culture, beliefs and myths as important filters for distinguishing between policy problems, together with various institutional practices and procedures (Kent, 2005, p.185). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) also point to the fact that the avoidance of policy commitments make for salient policy problems in general.

Secondly, besides constructing policy problems, the media has the ability to act as a policy entrepreneur and push for policy solutions (Kingdon, 1997). In his seminal work on ideas and public policy, Hall (1961) has pointed to three factors that can lead to the successful adoption and implementation of a policy solution: policy viability, administrative viability, and political viability. Policy viability refers to the extent to which a certain policy solution reflects the policy context in which it is proposed, and the degree of change required in order to accommodate it. On the other hand, the concept of administrative viability reflects the ability of current institutional and bureaucratic structures to implement the proposed policy solution. The level of political willingness and commitment required in order to adopt a policy solution captures the notion of political viability. Those solutions which score higher on these three factors have a better chance of being incorporated into official policy discourse and, subsequently practice.

Finally, the media expresses policy expectations which are very often prompted by a predefined political philosophy or identity which prescribes the appropriate role of the government given certain assumptions about the market and society – but also by the cultural, political or social discourse which is dominant at one time. Moreover, Mehta asserts that there are situations in ‘which after a certain number of issues that are prominent in the media are inconsistent with the
leading public philosophy, the public philosophy itself gradually changes or is replaced by another’ (Mehta, 2010, p.44). Journalists usually construct policy expectations which are based on ‘the deepest and most unquestioned cultural values, myths and ideologies’ (Kent, 2005, p.343). Once entrenched in the public sphere some policy expectations ‘will remain long term fixtures of the policymaking landscape; other definitions may undergo constant revision or be replaced altogether by competing formulations’ (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994b, p.4). The next three sub-sections present the three interaction effects which characterise the media/foreign policy nexus by underscoring the way in which each hinges upon the policy definition strategies of the media.

3.2.3 Indexing
Indexing (detailed in table 3.1) captures instances where policymakers are widely considered to have the ability to influence media discourse and the policy definitions constructed by journalists. According to Berry (1990, p.xiii), ‘to a far greater extent than with domestic politics, the press is at one with the foreign policy establishment’. Tiffin points that in instances of indexing the major impact of the media resides in portraying to policymakers the benefits and costs of pursuing different lines of action (Tiffin, 2000, p.201). However, in general most scholars would agree that policymakers are more successful in conveying their message through the media in situations where their policies are clearly formulated and insulated from conflict (Brody, 1992; Herman, 1993; Berkowitz, 1994; Kuypers, 1997; Mermin, 1999; Sobel, 2000; Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Robinson, 2011). For example, in the case of the US policy towards the Nicaraguan Sandista regime, Bennett (1990) found that public opposition to the official approach was not covered by the media. In this type of situations, indexing suggests that journalists are prone to adapt their views to those expressed by policymakers. On the one hand, this implies that journalists might suffer from a lack of independence relative to policymakers, because powerful interest groups control both the media and governments, ‘and consequently are able to use the media to mobilise public support for governmental policies’ (Gilboa, 2005, p.32). The media are seen here not to act ‘independently of what other institutions and groups in society are saying and doing, although there is considerable discretion for the media to give more or less emphasis to certain agenda items’ (McCombs, Einsiedel and Weaver, 1991, p.101). On the other hand, indexing should not be viewed at face value, as Archetti (2010, p.32) warns that it is
almost impossible for scholars to evaluate whether journalists are not critical enough of policymakers or are simply doing their job. She adds that merely analysing the way in which policymakers and the media frame their discourse, whilst searching for a fit between them does not paint a clear and reliable picture of the causal links involved. This can be overcome by focusing on the three types of policy definitions discussed previously: problems, solutions, and expectations.

Policymakers themselves are prime sources for indexing due to their ability to disseminate their message with the aid of the media through different techniques and channels: speeches, planting stories, releasing negative stories which might overshadow other bigger news items, feeding articles to the media, or providing them with cues24. Policymakers also view the media as a tool for surveying the general public and its opinions regarding official policies and discourse (Shaw, 2000, p.30). Through regular leaks to the media, policymakers sometimes aim to prime the public in order to prepare the ground for the acceptance of a certain policy approach, or to build up public support (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005, p.95). According to Harriman, states’ indexing abilities are enabled by the network of contacts that policymakers have with journalists. By providing the latter with inside information, policymakers attain the ability to manipulate the way in which topics are covered and presented by the media – in this way they can test the water or circulate different stories (Harriman, 1987, p.207). Cohen (1993, p.29) also found that some journalists take pride in collaborating with the government and being part of decision-making processes. Journalists also tend to view policymakers as their main sources, seeking to build sustainable contacts with political elites who are in powerful positions and have the ability to deliver them scoops (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). The salience of policymakers as sources in their attempt to influence the media is skilfully highlighted by Berkowitz who suggests that:

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24 Nonetheless, while policymakers might serve as the primary sources for journalists, the latter have the final say in what gets published (Touri, 2006, p.42).
Table 3.1 Indexing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic legitimacy</th>
<th>Source of frames</th>
<th>Policy problems</th>
<th>Policy Solutions</th>
<th>Policy Expectations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low levels of democratic legitimacy.</td>
<td>The media as a tool at the disposal of policymakers.</td>
<td>Policymakers can survey, manipulate and influence public opinion through the media.</td>
<td>More successful when they share broader ownership and affect large groups, nations, regions or even have global impact.</td>
<td>High policy and administrative viability mirrored by consensus among policymakers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media as educators of foreign policy and democracy.</td>
<td>The media can promote public debate when policymakers choose to open various policies to public scrutiny.</td>
<td>Perceived public opinion (by policymakers).</td>
<td>Fit with definitions promoted by other influences actors in the international arena such as the UN.</td>
<td>Political viability – spiral of opportunity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media can socialise new policymakers into democratic institutional cultures.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
when policymakers attempt to influence public opinion, they often see the media as a convenient channel for transmitting their messages. Sometimes, they intentionally attempt to place stories, while other times, they position themselves as useful news sources whom journalists can depend on (Berkowitz, 1994, p.89).

The well-known manufacturing consent theory – discussed in chapter 1 – holds that when policymakers choose to define a policy problem or to propose a solution, the media are compelled to report on it (Livingston and Eachus, 1996; Miller and Parnell Riechert, 2001; Herman and Chomsky, 2002). In contrast to the CNN effect, the manufacturing consent theory argues that executives are rarely influenced by the media. In the literature, two versions of the manufacturing consent theory have been differentiated: elite and executive. The former contends that all political elites (whether they are in the legislative, executive or any other positions that bear power and authority in the political sphere) have the ability to influence media agendas (and its policy definitions), whilst the executive version implies that only policymakers in power can affect media content. In both versions, Hallin (1984) argues that the media takes cues from policymakers, and journalists can rarely afford to diverge from official approaches. Here, journalists are thought to have a low to non-existent degree of independence in relation to policymakers, and almost never try to act as advocates. Scholars also claim that journalists are generally ill equipped due to their lack of training in international affairs and low number of contacts with policymakers within the policy circle to actually influence foreign policy in a significant manner. Moreover, in times of crisis, journalists are thought to be prone to side with the government in order to defend national interests, as they do not wish to see the country fail (Kuypers, 1997; Seaver, 1998; Taylor, 1998). Nonetheless, the manufacturing consent approach is criticised for the fact that it tends to validate itself by identifying instances of passive media which is highly reliant on sources originating from the political sphere (Edwards and Wood, 1999). According to Harriman, ‘journalists who stray far from [the state’s] assumptions know they are unlikely to see their work published’ (Harriman, 1987, p.186). Moreover, editors have the ultimate power in selecting news; for example, Kent found that in the case of the war in
Bosnia editors were unwilling to publish pieces which strayed away from the principle of objectivity and drew on non-elite sources (Kent, 2005, p.346).

In the case of indexing, policy problems favoured by policymakers are more likely to be defined by the media in situations where they are framed to affect large groups, nations, regions or even have global impact. Consequently, problems that are perceived to originate in the minds of policymakers and have only a narrow effect on their interests are more likely to be challenged by the media (Garber, McQuail and Norris, 1998). Policy problems defined by external actors (such as other states, transnational groups, and international organisations) can also influence indexing effects by either providing more thrust to certain definitions or downplaying and overshadowing others. For example, identifying by the UN of situations such as those in Burma or in Tibet as major human rights violations can provide a benchmark for assessing policy problems defined by policymakers in the EU. As indexing argues that policymakers are more successful in shaping the agenda of the media in situations where there is internal agreement and policies are clearly formulated, it is straightforward that a fit between the policy definition and political environment is a precondition for the appearance of indexing effects. Similarly, policy and administrative viability of policy solutions are inherent to instances where policies are transmitted clearly through the media by policymakers. According to Miller and Parnell Riechert (2001), political viability only matters when policymakers are caught-up in a so-called spiral of opportunity where they need to constantly rearticulate their message through the media or even withdraw a certain solution if public opinion seems to be largely disaffected by it. Finally, policymakers usually have direct contributions through op-ed pieces in newspapers where they try to add legitimacy to their policies and define how a successful foreign policy should look like. Significant shifts from current and past policy approaches together with expectations that fall outside the certain social, cultural, religious or economic context they are subscribed to, are less likely to be adopted by the media. One might argue that policymakers in their efforts to influence the media find it very difficult to escape the effects of their past discourse, being subject to rhetorical entrapment even when current political developments might urgently call for different policies (Bennett, 2008). Additionally, reporting on polls might also reify a preferred understanding by policymakers of reality which may limit the amount of dissent that individuals choose to engage in (Noelle-Neumann, 1984).
Indexing suggests that journalists act as conveyors of discourses about official policies to the general public and to a certain extent as its educators concerning foreign policy. In this area the media reinforces policymakers’ perception of public opinion, their role within foreign policy decision-making and the overall scope of foreign policy (Key, 1968; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Kennamer, 1994). The media can provide policymakers an effective avenue for gaining a deeper understanding of the views and interests of the general public ‘as they reflect the understanding of politics in the public sphere’ (Hodess, 1997, p.4). Policymakers use the media in order to test the reactions of individuals and set the ground for new policies; the media being considered a much faster and efficient way of probing the public than polls (Cohen, 1993, p.202). The media is thus a useful tool at the disposal of policymakers who can use it in order to divert attention from sensitive or unwanted problems, whilst also maintaining a virtual monopoly on the way in which journalists frame desired issues (Herman and Chomsky, 2002). In international negotiations the media might be used by policymakers in order to assess the willingness of other governments to cooperate (Touri, 2006, p.23).

While at first glance indexing seems to point to a lack of democratic legitimacy, it should not be viewed entirely as malign manipulation. For example, journalists can build support for policies in the public sphere by educating people how to contribute to the public debates surrounding them. Secondly, the media can aid democratic regimes and sustain democratic legitimacy by creating and promoting expectations informed by democratic values (Entman, 1989; Bajomi-Lázár and Hegedűs, 2001; Bellamy, 2010). In instances of indexing the media have the potential to grant legitimacy to political systems by conferring their own authority and legitimacy to institutions and policymakers (Hodess, 1997, p.2). Additionally, the media contributes to the preservation of institutional cultures in foreign policy which socialise new actors to democratic norms (Rid, 2007; Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2008; Soroka, 2012). However, these latter qualities that the media may exhibit are only marginal to the reality that according to indexing journalists are simple purveyors of official discourse. In most instances of indexing, their actions, more or less consciously, do not question in the public sphere the transparency and accountability of decision-making processes in foreign policy.
3.2.4 Bounding

The actions of the media can also have a constraining effect on decision-making processes in foreign policy without deliberately influencing political agendas or being taken into account by policymakers. Through the policy definitions it frames and the information it brings to light, the media can compromise certain policy approaches promoted by governments (Gilboa, 2005), limit the range of issues that can be successfully defined as problems (Strobel, 1997), undermine the effectiveness of policy solutions (Jackson, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010), create powerful images of how a government should behave in foreign policy (Wood and Peake, 1998), or more broadly damage the reputation of foreign policy actors, states or international organisations both domestically and internationally (Mercer, 2008). For example, Kent found that in the case of the war in Bosnia the activity of the British media had an incremental effect on policymaking by creating coverage and forcing minimal intervention from the state, even though British policymakers were largely unwilling to respond directly to the media’s discourse (Kent, 2005, p.222). Through bounding (detailed in table 3.2), journalists can exert a silent and unintentional control over decision-making processes, setting themselves the boundaries within which policymakers can operate. Governments and policymakers can suffer important damage to their reputation through the communicative acts and framing strategies of the media, in this way undermining the trust that the general public holds towards them and also that of more global actors. Damage to a government is determined here by both the simple act of covering a sensitive issue and by the known broader effects of the policy definitions employed by the media and its discourse (Miller, 2007, p.131). Bounding is able to damage reputations here due to the ability of the media to shape public opinion that can then, once perceived by policymakers, exert pressure on them. Powlick found in his study based on interviews with foreign policy officials that they tend to avoid policies and approaches that are perceived to encounter opposition from the general public because ‘there is a surprisingly widespread view among foreign policy officials that public input into, and even to some extent influence on, the foreign policy process is both necessary and desirable’ (Powlick, 1991, p.634). Thus, the second type of interaction effect (bounding) is a negative one, where policymakers are constrained by the discourse of the media even if they are not aware or willing to engage with it.
Table 3.2 Bounding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic legitimacy</th>
<th>Source of frames</th>
<th>Policy problems</th>
<th>Policy Solutions</th>
<th>Policy Expectations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The media has the ability to foster democratic legitimacy by boosting the accountability and transparency of decision-making processes in foreign policy.</td>
<td>Journalists.</td>
<td>More successful when they share broader ownership and affect large groups, nations, regions or even have global impact.</td>
<td>By highlighting internal conflict or a lack of dialogue the media can undermine policies.</td>
<td>The media is thought to reinforce the broader social and political context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media are the watchdog of democracy.</td>
<td>Perceived public opinion (by both policymakers and journalists).</td>
<td>Fit with definitions promoted by other influential actors in the international arena such as the UN.</td>
<td>The media can constrain policy solutions and their implementation and effectiveness by highlighting their low policy and administrative viability.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The media encourages and gives thrust to processes of democratic contestation within the public sphere.</td>
<td>Actors outside foreign policy circles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>However, journalists can have their own personal agendas or promote the interests of various groups.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Journalists lack knowledge about foreign policy and are easy to dismiss policies that fall outside accepted boundaries.</td>
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In the case of bounding, the power of the media to constrain decision-making processes derives from its ability to deliver information framed in various modalities to the general public and to actors outside the foreign policy community (Zaller, 1992, 1994). Firstly, coverage by the media of sensitive issues can lead to protests or even revolutions. Members of the civil society or even of the general public can act as sources or be even drivers for such information to be conveyed by the media. Secondly, the media might augment and reinforce public opinion, contributing to the formation of strong coalitions within society. Actors outside foreign policy circles with different interests also tend to supply the media with information and points of view that can damage the reputation of policymakers, policies, institutions or even states. Finally, the nature of the structure which mediates the relationship between policymakers and journalists can, in situations where the former refuse dialogue, promote a sort of overtly critical or even vindictive attitude from the media (Cohen, 1993). Bounding is also influenced by the fact that between politicians and journalists there tends to be mainly an adversarial relationship due to the different objectives and interests they pursue (Touri, 2006, p.14).

Bounding is more successful in instances where journalists highlight internal contradictions that underlie policy solutions. For example, supplying information regarding the low or limited policy and administrative viability of policy solutions can decrease the level of support from actors outside foreign policy circles and contribute to the erosion of broader coalitions. Additionally, by highlighting internal conflict or a lack of dialogue that a policy solution arouses among policymakers in foreign policy, the media can undermine its implementation and trigger a complete revision. The ownership of a policy problem again can enhance the ability of the media to constrain decision-making processes, whereby journalists investigate and bring to light the reasons behind the definition of an issue as a policy problem which affects only a narrow group of individuals close to those holding political power. Finally, constructing ambitious expectations regarding the goals and the outcomes of foreign policy puts significant pressure on policymakers to deliver concrete results. Otherwise, when policymakers fail to live up to their commitments, journalists are prone to cover their lack of success and damage their reputation. Nonetheless, in the case of high level international issues, the media are more likely to act as the guardian of national interests and public interest (Touri, 2006, p.171). More generally though, the media is thought to reify and act as a self-fulfilling prophesy in reinforcing the broader social
and political structure according to which it frames the actions and rhetoric of policymakers (Fairclough, 1995; Thompson, 1995; Hesmondhalgh and Toynbee, 2008). Furthermore, Berkowitz suggests that the setting and context of interactions can have significant effects on the nature of relationships between policymakers and journalists, namely directing it more towards adversity or cooperation (Berkowitz, 1994).

Bounding relates to the media’s very often assumed role of watchdog of democracy (Soroka, 2012). Journalists keep policymakers in check by highlighting the interests, contradictions and mechanisms through which policies are decided upon in foreign policy. Hence, they provide the necessary information to the general public that allows individuals to judge the activity of policymakers, in this way opening up political debates and boosting the transparency and accountability of decision-making processes. Media coverage and its framing strategies also encourage and give thrust to processes of democratic contestation in the public sphere. Individual concerns become endemic and spread throughout the general public, as individuals are provided with a chance to voice their views regarding foreign policy within the public sphere. Moreover, in democratic systems it is expected that mainstream media have a discourse that reinforces democratic values and is not inherently anti-establishment (Boyd-Barrettand Rantanen, 1998; Livingston and Bennett, 2003; Allem and Blach-Ørsten, 2011). On the other hand, journalists can have their own personal agendas or promote the interests of various groups, which can hamper their commitment to keeping policymakers under democratic scrutiny.

According to Bennett (2004), in their quest to enlarge and satisfy their readerships, the media are prone to favour conflict and failure over success and consensus, most times lacking the patience to wait for policies to yield practical results. Moreover, policymakers complain that journalists lack knowledge about IR and foreign policy, and are quick to dismiss policies which fall outside accepted boundaries or stereotypes (Cohen, 1993; Miller, 2007; Potter and Baum, 2010). One explanation might reside in the uncertainty which characterises journalists’ activity due to the lack of access to information about international events (Touri, 2006, p.1). Accordingly, the media ‘upholds the legitimacy of holders of formal authority as long as they abide by the relevant enduring values, both in the public and private realms’ (Gans, 2004, p.61). What this all suggests is that bounding has the ability to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes, although journalists’ behaviour might be fuelled by other tendencies or
interests – each of the following three chapters will flesh out instances of bounding and their impact on democratic legitimacy for each case study.

3.2.5 Agenda Setting
Agenda setting (detailed in table 3.3) is understood to be the conscious effort on the part of journalists to influence policy, whilst, unlike instances of bounding, policymakers are aware and open to the discourse created by the media. Nevertheless, a word of caution should be expressed, as Miller (2007, p.16) amongst other scholars has raised important doubts whether an analyst can empirically observe the direct influence of media policy definitions and coverage on policymakers. On the one the hand, proponents of the CNN effect argue that 24 hour live coverage of international events increases pressure on policymakers to act in a certain way. Scholars have shown that the CNN effect is most salient in situations related to humanitarian intervention or aid, where emotional images presented around the world define policy problems and push politicians to come up with solutions (Entman, 2004; Balabanova, 2007; Chong and Druckman, 2007a; Bennett, 2008; Hamelink, 2008; Robinson, 2011). Hence, the media is more apt in defining problems and criticising governments for not addressing various salient issues, rather than taking a gamble and proposing various solutions. Berry (1990, p.xiv) also finds that ‘when foreign policy officials are divided or uncertain, the press will focus on the struggle to define the foreign policy assumptions that guide specific policies’.

Most studies enquiring into the influence of the media over decision-making processes have to a large extent looked at how discourse affects individual policymakers, with little light being shed on the role of the media on aggregate policymaking. Taking into account the environment of policymaking together with the media/foreign policy nexus allows this thesis to better grasp the way in which through its discourse the media has the ability to pursue or focus on certain policy problems, solutions and expectations while downplaying others. According to Wolfe and his colleagues (2013), the agenda setting powers of the media are enhanced by so-called ‘windows of opportunity’ which appear around high level events and give the opportunity to journalists to
Table 3.3 Agenda setting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic legitimacy</th>
<th>Source of frames</th>
<th>Policy problems</th>
<th>Policy Solutions</th>
<th>Policy Expectations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agenda setting</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The media can significantly enhance democratic legitimacy in foreign policy decision-making.</td>
<td></td>
<td>More successful when they share broader ownership and affect large groups, nations, regions or even have global impact.</td>
<td>The media have a largely negative effect on policy solutions and their implementation.</td>
<td>Media are the gatekeeper of policymakers’ commitments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists become part of the political process.</td>
<td>Journalists.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists have the ability to link individuals to decision-making processes by conveying the views of the general public to policymakers.</td>
<td>Relationships between journalists and policymakers.</td>
<td>Events and trends in the domestic and international arenas.</td>
<td>Deliberate media efforts can be very successful when little to any amount of policy and administrative accommodation is required, or if it is favoured by lower ranking officials and the foreign policy bureaucracy as a whole.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists might behave as activists and contribute to forms of participative democracy.</td>
<td>Perceived public opinion (by both policymakers and journalists).</td>
<td>Fit with definitions promoted by other actors in the international arena such as the UN.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Journalists behave like activists and follow certain values and goals taken up from sources other than official ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists are in continuous dialogue with policymakers who choose to engage with them.</td>
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act as advocates who seek to change or initiate policy. Other studies focus on the timing within the policy process where the agenda setting powers of the media are more apparent and effective. For example, Akor (2011, p.98) argues that in the policy initiation stage, policymakers are more open to public debate allowing greater times for deliberation – in this way enhancing the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes in foreign policy. Nonetheless, a focus on the three types of media policy definitions creates a more coherent picture of the way in which the media influences political agendas in foreign policy.

The concept of agenda setting should be distinguished from the way in which communication scholars usually employ it to capture the extent to which media discourse influences views held by individuals, and subsequently public opinion (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Benton and Frazier, 1976; Weaver, 1993; Dearing and Rogers, 1996; Wood and Peake, 1998; Maher, 2003; McCombs and Ghanem, 2003; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006; Besova and Cooley, 2009). The common approach towards agenda setting found in the literature views the concept as the process by which media transmit their policy definitions and the salience of different issues to individuals – either the general public or policymakers. The media is considered in this literature as an integral part of decision-making processes due to its paramount role in gathering and transmitting information. On the other hand, Soroka (2012) contends that because personal day to day experiences are very unlikely to provide individuals with useful information about foreign policy, the media plays a crucial role in informing citizens. Nonetheless, the media has important effects on public opinion, suggesting to individuals what to think about and how to think about various issues (Cohen, 1993).

Policymakers also seem to equate the actions and the views of the media with public opinion, providing journalists with a monopoly on perceiving and transmitting to policymakers the views of individuals (Corner and Robinson, 2006; Hamelink, 2008; Brueggemann and Wessler, 2009). Media influence also manifests itself here through the use of polling data and public opinion (Kent, 2005, p.200), where journalists ‘legitimate the notion that responses of representative samples to polls comprise a more valid expression of public opinion than do public actions by individuals or groups (...) and this legitimation undercuts the influence of leaders and pressure groups who dissent’ (Margolis and Mauser, 1989, p.368). Touri holds that in order to identify instances of direct influence of media on policymaking (agenda setting) one should focus on ‘the
perception of policymakers about the public and most importantly their perception of the media’s potential in shaping the public’s views of foreign policy issues’ (Touri, 2006, p.54).

Relations between journalists and policymakers can have an important impact on the agenda setting power of the media. Firstly, due to the complexity of the field of foreign policy, professionals tend to shift roles either working for the government in different positions – very frequently as spokespersons – or working in the media. Secondly, relationships between journalists and policymakers tend to be more powerful and long-lasting in foreign policy than in other policy areas, due to the sometimes secret nature of diplomatic information. In his seminal study of media influence on foreign policy conducted during the 1960s, Cohen (1993) showed that policymakers admitted to regularly surveying journalists for new policy solutions or ideas when they seemed to be clueless or undecided on how to deal with a certain policy problem. The same study showed that journalists have generally a positive attitude towards influencing foreign policy. The media enters the foreign policy stage through the personal relationships policymakers forge with journalists: ‘informal interplay, where it does occur, is valued by both sides – by the reporter who must establish good contacts to do his job well; and by the official who wants to see the press do a good job in presenting the issues’ (Cohen, 1993, p.145).

However, Touri claims that most studies argue that the media has a limited impact on foreign policy as journalists are highly dependent on policymakers for sources (Touri, 2006, p.20). According to Miller (2007), the agenda setting powers of the media are even more pervasive when one analyses certain morally and emotionally charged episodes, when journalists ‘make or break’ political coalitions. Hence, ‘under the right conditions, the news media nonetheless can have a powerful effect on process’ (Strobel, 1997, p.5).

What should be noted from this discussion is that the media is in a better position to influence the range of problems that policymakers have to tackle and the way they are defined, rather than propose various policy solutions. Gilboa (2005) argues that the media can force policymakers to address certain issues even when they would prefer to ignore them. Thus, sustained media coverage has the potential to promote problem definitions even if they do not fit with the overall

25 Moreover, Berry argues that, in contrast to domestic policy, the role of the media in foreign policy is to provide information to the general public, which makes it unable to coherently influence decisions in the policy initiation stage, when journalists are more eager to get the story published for the public. Conversely, in the policy outcome stage, the media can afford to adopt a more critical approach and highlight the failure or success of a certain policy (Berry, 1990).
political environment. One reason for this resides in the extent of the groups affected by the problem defined within the media. For example, scholars suggest that policymakers are prone to respond to policy definitions which highlight mass starvation, genocide, war, child labour, all events and developments to which the general public can easily relate to and feel empathy (Hallin, 1984; Rachlin, 1988; Livingston, 1997; Gitlin, 2003; Robinson, 2007). Media definitions of policy problems which are abstract and remote to the general public are less likely to be salient and influence the agenda of policymakers. Developments in the international arena and the broader global context can limit the range of problems that the media can define. At the same time, policy problems which focus on other competing issues are rapidly sidelined or are not thoroughly articulated by the media (Page, 1996; Edwards and Wood, 1999; Brueggemann and Wessler, 2009). Miller (2007) has argued that the ability of the media to successfully propose and influence policy solutions and their implementation is limited26, in all but one case when journalists express their criticism towards a range of solutions while supporting others. Thus, the media can be thought to have rather negative effects towards the proposal, adoption and implementation of policy solutions. A more nuanced interpretation suggests that, in the rare situations when policy solutions are being put forward by journalists, they can be very successful when little to no amount of policy and administrative accommodation is needed in order to put them into practice. Balabanova (2010) argues that policy or administrative viability can trump political interests and ambitions, if solutions are favoured by lower ranking officials and the foreign policy bureaucracy as a whole.

The agenda setting powers of the media also dwell on its ability to express policy expectations. The media can be considered to influence decision-making processes through defining expectations and acceptable behaviour, and focusing on the context and pace of policymaking (Touri, 2006, p.21). The degree to which such expectations differ from those held by policymakers themselves or institutions is to a great extent questionable (Shapiro and Jacobs, 2000). Nonetheless, Page (1996, 2000) underscores that media are the gatekeeper of policymakers’ commitments and never shy away from criticising them for not living up to the goals expressed in the past. Expectations are reified and reinforced by journalists, who seem to

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26 One reason for this might reside in the internal conflict which arouses between journalists’ realisation of the fact that their activity might have a transformative effect on others and their commitment to objective reporting. (Carruthers, 1999, p.273)
never forget policymakers’ discourse and be wary of each significant change in policy rhetoric or practice (Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2008). In some cases though, journalists behave like activists and follow certain values and goals taken up from sources other than official ones, such as NGOs, artists, epistemic communities, or various transnational groups (Brueggemann and Wessler, 2009). Media perceptions of the structure and nature of IR can create powerful expectations which can influence policymakers because ‘the press’ definition of the structure of international affairs may become the prevailing definition among officials indirectly, because it is the one so many people accept’ (Cohen, 1993, p.211). Carruthers contends that policy definitions framed by journalists might have a more salient and long-lasting influence on policymaking as ‘mass media do less to mirror the world as it is than to shape a world as it should not be: a world where war too readily appears an inevitable outgrowth of ‘human nature’ and still, after a long century of conflict, an appropriate form of dispute resolution’ (Carruthers, 1999, p.273).

Through agenda setting, under the right circumstances – when journalists or media institutions’ own agenda does not diverge from democratic values –, the media can significantly enhance democratic legitimacy in foreign policy decision-making processes. Firstly, by setting the agenda, journalists become part of the political process27. In this position they have the ability to link individuals to decision-making processes within the public sphere by conveying the views (perceived or real28) of the general public to policymakers. Issues that affect large areas of the general public and wouldn’t normally be known to policymakers get publicised and politicised, prompting policymakers to address them through various policies. Journalists might also behave as activists, backing up certain causes related to foreign policy which translate into a higher degree of support from the media for forms of participative democracy in the public sphere set up in order to engage with that specific issue. Finally, even more than in instances of bounding, journalists, through the policy definitions they construct and due to their continuous dialogue with policymakers, have a better position to boost the accountability and transparency of decision-making processes in foreign policy, or foster responsiveness (Valkenburg, Semetko

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27 O’Heffernan contends that while the media becomes part the policy process, the government can also be seen as part of the media process (O’Heffernan, 1991, p.82)

28 Unlike politicians, the media is considered to be more sensitive to the wishes of the general public and shapes its discourse accordingly (Key, 1968; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Kennamer, 1994; Zaller, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Eichenberg, 2000; Everts, 2000; Sinnott, 2000).
and de Vreese, 1999; Norris, Kern, and Just, 2003; Sheafer and Gabay, 2009). The next chapter focuses on operationalising these concepts and presenting the methodology applied throughout the following three empirical chapters.

3.3 Conclusions
The link between foreign policy and democratic legitimacy is yet to have captured the interest of foreign policy analysts in a substantial manner. Most studies argue that foreign policy (still) is an area of high politics closed off from the better part of society. Public opinion or the media have been treated only as intervening variables which at best can catalyse foreign policy approaches and initiatives which are already accepted by policymakers. Nonetheless, recent research has highlighted the agenda setting powers of the media. Drawing on insights from political theory and political communication scholarship, the previous chapter argued that the public sphere – defined as the space where individuals are granted the opportunity to interact with politics – has the ability to endow decision-making processes in foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. Within the public sphere the media has a central role as it provides information to individuals and conveys their (perceived) views to policymakers. This chapter has shown that in order to evaluate the way in which democratic legitimacy is endowed by the activity of the media and its interactions with policymakers, a theoretical model which surveys the interaction effects that characterise the media/foreign policy nexus is applied. Moreover, the interaction effects model is used in this thesis to shed light on the two research questions set out in the introductory chapter. Three types of interaction effects are identified: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Firstly, indexing captures the ability of policymakers to influence and shape media discourse in order to aid their interests and goals by communicating in a favourable manner their policies to the general public. Secondly, through bounding the media can have a constraining or limiting effect on the range of policies – and their effectiveness – that policymakers can pursue, even if the latter are not aware of or willing to engage with the policy definitions constructed by journalists. Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to purposively influence decision-making processes through its discourse.

Together with the analysis of the media/foreign policy nexus, policy definitions facilitate assessing the implication of interaction effects for the way in which democracy is infused in
foreign policy. Policy definitions are empirically analysed through frame analysis which is presented in the next chapter on methodology. Framing is thought generally to capture the way individuals, groups or other actors represent reality by focusing on some aspects while downplaying others. Policy definitions are divided in three categories: policy problems, solutions and expectations. Each category can stem from a myriad of sources ranging from policymakers, journalists, to the political and journalistic cultures found within a certain political system and their interaction, or the way public opinion is perceived by the media and policymakers. The likelihood that a problem definition framed by the media will be adopted in official discourse and implemented in policy practice is influenced by a number of factors: the fit between the definition and the policy environment, the ownership of the problem and the range of those affected by it, and the broader domestic or international political context. On the other hand, viability on three levels –policy, administrative and political – determines the potential of solutions framed by journalists to be incorporated in foreign policy rhetoric and practice. Finally, expectations are considered to capture the political philosophy of a political system and the subsequent broader cultural, social and economic context. The next chapter operationalises these concepts and presents the methodology employed for identifying and studying media effects, and their implications for exploring the presence of democratic legitimacy in the EU’s foreign policy.
Chapter 4 – Methodology

4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the methods used in order to analyse the interaction effects between policymakers and the media, and their meaning for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. This thesis employs frame analysis and correlates it with data from interviews, questionnaires, official documents and other relevant findings drawn from scholarship29. Frame analysis can paint a representative picture of indexing effects coupled with the agenda setting and bounding powers of the media and the way it views and presents a certain phenomenon. Hence, the analysis of the framing activities of the media concentrates on the way in which journalists organise their discourse around a series of central ideas, themes and interpretations, in this way ignoring or downplaying other facets of reality (Baum and Potter, 2008). This is supported by the use of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires with policymakers and journalists, which are examined in order to explore the links between the media and the political sphere. Insights from interviews, questionnaires and the wider literature are used in order to portray and evaluate the political and journalistic cultures which underpin the media/foreign policy nexus. Moreover, interviews and questionnaires explore personal contacts, the nature of interactions between journalists and policymakers, mutual perceptions of their roles and the perception of the role of democratic legitimacy within decision-making processes in foreign policy. Through mixing these methods, a narrative can be constructed for both case studies of how policymakers interacted with the media. At the same time, this allows answering the two research questions and evaluating the implications of the three types of interaction effects for the way in which democratic legitimacy was enacted throughout the two case studies – which will be detailed in the first part of this chapter.

29 These methods help overcoming one of the major problems that plague research on the link between the media and policymaking in foreign policy which refers to the fact that coverage and content analysis are poorly linked with policy processes or outcomes (Kent, 2005, p.192).
Foreign policy analysts have been keen to recognise a major difficulty in the fact that it is hard to find or locate linkages between media activity and policymaking (Badsey, 1994; Gitlin, 2003; Gilboa, 2005). In this thesis, findings are based on congruencies and inferences between data gathered from various sources and analysed with multiple methods – pointing towards methodological pluralism. On the other hand, research enquiring into the influence of the media over foreign policy which employs data from interviews is plagued by two shortcomings. Firstly, it is hard to determine the actual importance that policymakers allocate to the influence of the media or the role of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, policymakers may find it difficult to measure the precise impact that the media had on their decisions. More generally, policymakers tend to over or underestimate the impact of the media in relation to particular events, in this way providing a distorted view (Robinson, 2002, p.18).

Within this thesis, interviews and questionnaires are used in order to provide background information and describe the context within which the media and policymakers interact (the media/foreign policy nexus). While data from actual policy meetings and committees is to a large extent still unavailable, this shortcoming can be overcome by using official documents, press releases, press statements, official declarations or press conferences. Hence, inferences about the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy are made only on the basis of cross-referencing and consistencies between all the methods and sources employed.

Before presenting the methods used in this thesis, the first part of the chapter offers a background to the two case studies which are concentrated around two very distinct issue areas in the EU’s foreign policy: the EU’s climate change policy, and its policy towards Russia. The second part of the chapter expands on the method of frame analysis, the range of media sources, together with data from interviews and questionnaires used throughout the next three chapters. The third part of the chapter provides a detailed presentation of the sample employed in the thesis consisting of two member states (the United Kingdom and Romania) and the transnational level.

30 According to Akor, ‘it is reasonable to expect policy makers' perspectives on issues and their recall of details of those issues to change with time (…) it is also reasonable to expect officials' to be dependent on the personality and style of the interviewer’ (Akor, 2011, p.123).
4.2 Case study selection: Two very distinct issue areas in EU foreign policy

4.2.1 The Union’s global climate change policy
The roots of the EU’s engagement with climate change policy can be found in the 1980s when environmental issues began appearing in domestic politics in states such as Germany, France or Belgium. The domestic electoral dynamics in these countries caused the expansion of European environmental standards, a trend which was accelerated in the 1990s with the accession of a series of new states where green parties were highly regarded (Kelemen and Vogel, 2009, p.442). Simultaneously, in the US the influence of environmental groups decreased after the drive spurred on by the seminal UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 died out (Vogler, 2005, p.837). Green parties in Europe had gained at the time the sympathy of the media which, throughout the 1980s publicised environmental calamities such as the discovery of a hole in the Ozone layer or the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Kelemen, 2010, p.340). In practical terms, the development of the common market in the 1970s made it possible for the European Commission to create environmental regulatory standards and harmonise them in accordance with most the stringent adopted previously, unilaterally, by various member states (Costa, 2008). The adoption of the Maastricht treaty, by transforming the decision-making rule for environmental measures from unanimity to qualified majority voting gave new thrust to the Union’s environment policy, as member states that were unwilling to incur domestic environment costs found it more difficult to oppose new regulations (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997).

The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol is considered to be the first major expression of the EU’s leadership in global climate change policy, although its efforts did not materialise in no more than a washed out compromise (Kelemen and Vogel, 2009, p.448). During the negotiations for the Protocol, the EU opposed US efforts to make developing countries subject to equal emission targets. Through this, it tried to persuade third world and developing countries of its commitment to norms such as differentiated responsibility and international equity (Scruggs, 2003; Veenman and Liefferink, 2005; Paterson, 2009; Camia, 2010; Parker and Karlsson, 2010). Thus, on a first reading, Kyoto forced the Union to commit itself to take far more costly actions than it would have desired, losing in this way international competiveness in relation to other developed states that did not agree to the ambitious emissions targets (Harris, 2007b, p.361). On the other hand,
Vogler (2011, p.33) has underlined that within this evaluation there is a not so evident degree of hypocrisy, as the EU managed to negotiate favourable terms for most of its important industries. Post-Kyoto the attitude of the EU shifted towards accepting the compromise with other developed states. This can explained by the difficulty that some member states had in matching international commitments, the slow pace of negotiations after 1997 or the tendency of some member states to act unilaterally due to their close relationships with the US (Costa, 2008, p.537). Nonetheless, these shortcomings did not sidetrack the EU from assuming leadership in global climate change policy, while other states were still not taking the problem seriously (Kilian and Elgström, 2010, p.265).

With the coming to power of the Bush administration in 2001, the US pulled out of the treaty stating that Kyoto was dead (Falkner, 2007; Paterson, 2009; Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007). In this context, the EU took on its shoulders the duty of seeing the treaty ratified. In the end, it was a compromise on the part of the EU which made this goal possible, namely supporting Russia’s bid for membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that paved the way for the Kyoto treaty to enter into force (Vogler, 2011, p.29; Parker and Karlsson, 2010, p.929). Since the ratification of the Kyoto treaty, the EU has made long term commitments in climate change policy. Firstly, it has introduced more aggressive climate and energy plans that would help build a more sustainable low-carbon economy. Secondly, ‘it has agreed to raise the share of renewable energy in its overall energy consumption from the current 8.5% to 20% and to raise the percentage of its automotive fuel use comprised of bio fuels to 10% until 2020’(Schmidt, 2008a, p.84).

The Copenhagen summit which took place in December 2009 was widely seen as an opportunity for the EU to draw on its global leadership and drive forward a progressive agreement. Although the EU displayed leadership in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit, by promising funding to developing states (Parker and Karlsson, 2010; Oberthüir and Dupont, 2011; Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2011), the events during the summit point to the idea that the Union lost its position as global leader in climate change policy. The US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) drafted the final version of the Copenhagen Accord constraining the EU to accept the deal. Curtin (2010, p.25) highlights that at the time, among developing, third world states and media in Europe and across the world, ‘there was a recognition that the EU had been
upstaged at best and humiliated at worst’. The Union’s multilateral approach had been replaced by a more bottom-up unilateral approach supported by the US and China. Even the European media argued that ‘the truth about Copenhagen is that (...) the EU completely failed to show leadership on environmental matters’ (Kilian and Elgström, 2010, p.258)

According to Egenhofer and Georgiev (2010), Europe’s failure at the Copenhagen summit must not come as a shock, for the EU was at the time a minor power in global emissions and only developing countries can matter in the end in delivering any sustainable solutions. Moreover, at the time, China and the US were highly constrained by their domestic institutions and circumstances to search for unilateral solutions. In the US, president Obama could not support new international climate deals unless he managed to win a majority of 67 votes in the Senate, which was highly unlikely (Christoff, 2010, p.650). For the Chinese, sovereignty and national interest seemed to weigh more than global issues (Christoff, 2010, p.644). Nonetheless, following the Copenhagen summit, the European Commission argued that its efforts were a success because member states (which were also committed to ambitious emission reduction targets and to the use of environmental friendly technology) managed to act unitedly and provide a worthy example to small and island states. This was an example on which the EU drew during the following summits on climate change in Cancun, Durban and Doha, where it managed to form a broad coalition with small and island states.

4.2.2 The EU’s policy towards Russia
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations between Russia and the EU have been thought to be characterised by the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation (Krok-Paszkowska and Zielonka, 2005; Lukyanov, 2008; Averre, 2009; Nichol, 2009; Haukkala, 2010). Periods of cooperation have succeeded or overlapped with subsequent periods of conflict, increasing in this way the complex character of EU-Russia relations and making the analyst’s effort of understanding them even more difficult, but also worthwhile. With the last enlargement towards CEE, the EU and Russia have become increasingly interdependent and in a continuous struggle for more influence in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Most scholars would contend that the eastwards advance of the EU has brought about an intense conflictual period in its relations with Moscow (Leonard and Popescu, 2008; Hopf, 2008; Haukkala, 2008; Light, 2008; Popescu and
Wilson, 2009; Tardieu, 2009; Pardo Sierra, 2011; Larsen, 2012). Not only the competition for more influence in the Eastern Neighbourhood, but also Europe’s dependency on Russian gas are considered to be the main factors contributing to the increasing conflictual nature of EU-Russia relations. Together with these, a clash of identities and interpretations of sovereignty has been a fertile ground for the appearance of various misunderstandings which have deepened the conflict. While the EU can be seen as a postmodern actor which has elevated itself from the constraints of sovereignty and nationalism, Russia has questioned the possibility of convergence with the Union on these terms (Berryman, 2012; Ziegler, 2012; Sakwa, 2013). On the other hand, Russia has been perceived as possessing a pre-modern identity which predisposes it to a positive and objective interpretation of international law and state sovereignty (Vasilyan, 2010, 89). Nonetheless, both Russia and the EU are in a process of defining their international actorness and foreign policy identities (DeBardeleben, 2012).

Cooperation, when it has occurred, has been related only to broad or marginal issues in the international agenda which were seen by both Russia and the EU as not affecting their vital interests. According to Kaczmarski (2011, 160), Russia and the EU tend not to differ when it comes to second order or distant international concerns. For example, both the EU and Russia on many occasions have rejected the use of military force for the resolution of international crises. The Georgian-Russia war of 2008 provided Moscow with the opportunity to have its voice clearly heard in Europe and strike a new partnership with the EU, built on the economic and security interests they share. Such a partnership, although still very abstract in practice, has been a long-lasting concern on President Putin’s agenda (in both his past and current terms). As early as 2005, Putin was sending a clear message to the EU in an article published in Le Figaro:

The Russian nation has always felt part of the large European family, and has shared common cultural, moral and spiritual values. On our historical path – sometimes falling behind our partners, other times overtaking them – we have been through the same stages of establishing democratic, legal and civil institutions. Therefore, the Russian nation’s democratic and European choice is entirely logical. This is a sovereign choice of a European nation that defeated Nazism and knows the price of freedom (Putin quoted in Headley, 2012, 243).
In the literature, the EU has been presented as a postmodern actor that in opposition to Russia does not rely on hard power in its international relations (Emerson, 2006; Haukkala, 2007; Ganzle, 2007; Light, 2008; Christou, 2010; Weaver, 2010; Tonra, 2010; Manners, 2010a). Such behaviour has created a degree of conflict in relation to the types of governance promoted in the Eastern Neighbourhood. However, Russia also prefers a weak hard power EU that does not have the capabilities to intervene in security issues: ‘Russia is stronger and faster… In every conflict situation, it comes out better’ (Popescu and Wilson, 2009, p.39). Each time the Union has seemed to be flexing its muscles and envisaged sending CSDP missions in the Eastern Neighbourhood, Russia has overtly expressed its criticism (Biscop, 2010; Delcour, 2010; Haukkala, 2010). Consequently, Russia uneasily accepts the Union’s sui generis identity as long as it gives it a free hand to exert its hard power (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012; Feklyunina, 2012; Milevschi, 2012; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Sakwa, 2012).

Most member states have sought to develop enhanced bilateral relations with Russia, who on its part has endorsed this kind of behaviour in different official documents (Sammut, 2010, p.79; Haukkala, 2008, 2009; Delcour, 2010; Cichocki, 2010). Germany and France offer the best example of developing this type of links with Moscow. Both have seen Russia as a main economic and security partner outside of the EU (Rahr, 2005, 2007; Lukyanov, 2008; Light, 2008). According to Weaver (2010, p.67), the Union as a whole has suffered in consistency and coherence, as most member states have developed their bilateral relations without consulting or having in mind their partners in the EU. Individual member states are thus more prone to seek their own agenda in their ties with Russia, leaving EU institutions crippled and unable to put into practice any of their more ambitious policies in the Eastern Neighbourhood that would conflict with Moscow’s interests. The Commission or the EP are only left with the power of responding rhetorically towards Russia. Even though they have found in some occasions support for their initiatives from states such as Sweden, – in the case of inserting a membership perspective within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – Germany and France decisively opposed them. One explanation for this would be that Western member states feel more unease at the prospect of immigration from the post-Soviet states than Sweden (Agh, 2010). Nonetheless, member states’ inclination to forge enhanced bilateral relations bypassing the Union’s institutions points to the fact that research on EU-Russia relations should have a primary focus on individual member states and then on the EU’s institutional dynamics in foreign policy. The policy over Russia case study
differs in this respect from the one on climate change policy, where the high degree of coordination between member states makes the Commission the main locus for decision-making.

The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 had its roots in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the South Ossetian war which ensued shortly after between ethnic Georgian and Ossetians, and left half of the region under the *de facto* control of the Russian joint peacekeeping force. During the spring and summer months of 2008 tensions escalated in the region, and on August 5 going through to August 7 Georgian forces launched a military offensive in an attempt to bring back the territory under Georgian control. Georgia’s intervention produced casualties among Russian peacekeepers which prompted a large scale intervention from the Russian army. Moscow justified it on humanitarian bases and in order to enforce the previous peace settled at the beginning of the 1990s. After five days of heavy fighting and raids on various Georgian strategic facilities and cities, the Georgian forces retreated. On August 12 a preliminary ceasefire was brokered by the French Presidency of the EU, which was signed by the two parties to the conflict in the following days.

The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 represents a crucial moment in the logic of EU-Moscow relations and is analysed in this thesis as a defining moment for the EU’s policy towards Russia (Rynning and Jensen, 2010, p.142; Agh, 2010; Baun and Marek, 2010; Christou, 2010; Biscop, 2010; Cichocki, 2010; Haukkala, 2010, 2009; Najšlová, 2010; Sammut, 2010; Wolczuk, 2010; Weaver, 2010; Vasilyan, 2010). Firstly, it relinquished all doubts regarding Russia’s desires to become a hegemon in the post-Soviet space. It showed that in times of crisis it was willing to deal a swift and deadly blow with its military power in order to protect its interests. The presence of Russians in all of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood has made their safety a national interest for Moscow. Although the 2008 August war was a public display of Russian hard power, Moscow was also engaged in a more *silent attack* in the background. Since 2004, many non-Russian nationals from ENP countries have been awarded Russian passports, giving Moscow the legitimate right to protect them – it is estimated that at the time of the war around 170.000 people in Georgia held Russian passports (Popescu and Wilson, 2009, p.42). Nonetheless, Russia gave the West an important signal and managed to put its bid for leadership in the region across to the EU (Sammut, 2010, p.84).
Secondly, with the Russia-Georgian war, the EU realised that frozen conflicts in the Caucasus could not be contained anymore without any clear involvement. Its duty of pacifying the conflict was reinforced by the fact that NATO – with even talks of membership – and the US sided too early with Georgia, compromising any potential agreement (Biscop, 2010, p.83). Before the war, bureaucrats in Brussels were very reluctant to involve the EU in frozen conflicts, as they considered that this would damage not only its relations with Russia, but also the success of the ENP (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012; Ivan, 2012b; Milevski, 2012; Nitoiu, 2012; Tudoroiu, 2012). Since the end of the war, Commission officials have stressed that the EU’s mission consisting of 200 field specialists sent in to oversee the peace agreement in Georgia has been a success, and therefore the Union has proven that it possesses the instruments to manage, contain and end conflicts (Weaver, 2010, p.74).

Thirdly, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 redefined relations between Brussels and Moscow as the conflict culminated with the symbolic request from president Putin that all major figures in the foreign policy of the EU sign the ceasefire treaty over the conflict with Georgia. Russia felt that all the major leaders in the EU (the president of the European Commission, the High Representative on Security and Foreign Policy, and the president of that time of the Council) had to be present in order to legitimate the important decision that was to come for the EU (Matsaberidze, 2008). In comparison to the Copenhagen summit, the ceasefire agreement brokered by the French presidency of the EU was seen and framed by the EU as a major achievement and a mark of the fact that the Union was a major actor in the international arena (Cornell and Starr, 2009; Nichol, 2009; Tardieu, 2009; Barroso, 2010; Larsen, 2012).

This section has highlighted that this thesis explores two very distinctive areas of EU foreign policy: the EU’s approach to global climate change and its policy towards Russia. Empirically the focus is on two high level events which are viewed as defining moments in relation to each of the two issue areas. Table 4.1 outlines the differences among the case studies which were detailed in this section. The following two parts of the chapter present the methodology and the sample employed in the thesis.
Table 4.1 Comparative overview of the two case studies

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<th>Climate change</th>
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<td>b) The EU’s approach</td>
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<td>c) Coordination between EU member states</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) Support for the role of the EU as an international actor</td>
<td>The EU as an important player in world politics that could influence the international agenda in issues as Afghanistan or North Korea. The EU as democratising its Eastern Neighbourhood</td>
<td>The EU constructed as a normative power which behaves as a force for good in the benefit of all the peoples of the world and the future of generations to come.</td>
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<tr>
<td>g) Economic incentives</td>
<td>Developing strong economical ties with Russia. Energy security</td>
<td>EU a leader in environmental friendly technology</td>
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4.3 Methods

4.3.1 Frame analysis

The framing activity of the media is crucial in understanding and identifying the three interaction effects underlying the media/foreign policy nexus – indexing, bounding, and agenda setting. Through framing the media articulates its policy definitions and gets them across to the general public, and more importantly to policymakers. A focus on frame analysis allows for the identification of the way in which the discourse of the media is categorised around a series of central opinions and ideas, in this way constructing policy definitions. Frame analysis underscores the connections made by the journalists between different events, policies or phenomena and their possible interpretations (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005). Journalists frame policy definitions around real-world issues and events, in this way directing readers’ attention on certain interpretations and structures of meaning. According to Entman (1993, p.152), framing means ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’. Other scholars have
conceived framing as being less dynamic and portraying rather fixed meanings which journalists can select in order to present and comment on various political issues, making them clear to the general public (Mermin, 1999; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1993; Robinson, 2001, 2011). Readers are usually unaware of the range of the framing strategies employed by the media, and thus susceptible to adopting their views (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005, p.85). However, research in social psychology has shown that individuals integrate frames received from the media within their broader view of reality and existing interpretations or stereotypes developed incrementally through personal experience and interactions with various discourses (Edwards and Wood, 1999). As a consequence, the study of media framing also has to take into account the social, political and cultural context in which it operates.

One common distinction found throughout the literature differentiates between framing and priming, whereby the latter refers ‘to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations’ (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010, p.63). De Vreese and his associates (2001) have identified two types of framing: issue specific and generic framing. The former are related to social and political structures, while issue specific framing refers to specific topics and salient events in the public sphere. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) have identified two other types of generic framing. Firstly, human interest framing focuses emotionally on the individuals and groups of individuals affected by certain issues, whilst conflict framing focuses on the conflicting nature of issues in foreign policy which can lead to polarisation. Another distinction can be made between distance and support framing. The former aims to create a certain sense of detachment between the general public and a particular issue, so as not prompt an official response from the executive. Support framing, on the other hand, implies overt support for official policy approaches (Robinson, 2002, p.35). While this differentiation can be useful when studying the influence of the media over international conflict and intervention, it provides little insight for an enquiry into the presence of democratic legitimacy in foreign policy, as both types of framing create instances of indexing. Finally, in their extensive review of the literature

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31 For example, Giltin (2003, p.7) contends that ‘media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organise discourse whether verbal or visual’.

32 Hence, for the purpose of enquiring into interaction effects, a differentiation based on the way in which the media frames policy problems, solutions and expectations provides a more detailed and reliable picture.
Chong and Druckman (2007b, p.116) find that the media’s framing strategies (and the resulting policy definitions) are considered strong if they emerge from intense public debate.

Framing can also be seen ‘as an indicator of media power and autonomy in the sense that through its process journalists exercise the freedom and the power to be selective in the events they cover and consequently to represent the world in ways that reflect their own motivations’ (Touri, 2006, pp.39–40). At the same time, the media has the power to frame in a negative way and downplay events within the public sphere and shift public attention to more trivial aspects of social life – having, as Trenz (2009) points out, a *dumbing down* effect. The media tends to select materials that have an inherent ‘newsworthiness’ in that they mirror issues of human interest – such as proximity, avenues for personalisation and dramatisation, or the status and notoriety of the actors involved – which hold high commercial value (Gavin, 2009, p.771). For example, in relation to the EU, even though most studies have shown that the British media tends to adopt an Eurosceptic discourse, ‘bad news’ can have an upward effect on the amount of knowledge that citizens have about the EU (Boomgaarden et al., 2010, p.518).

Consequently, in constructing the three interaction effects, the framing of policy definitions is also complemented by media coverage which is widely considered to provide citizens with the necessary information that would allow them to construct reflexive opinions regarding European issues (Camia, 2010; Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Carvalho, 2007; Gavin, 2009, 2010; Gavin, Leonard-Milsom and Montgomery, 2011; Gavin and Marshall, 2011; Olausson, 2009, 2010). As individuals in the EU have few chances to get in contact with foreign policy decision-makers, news reports and articles supplied by the media fill this knowledge gap, mediating the interactions between society and politics (Nieminen 2009, 73). Policymakers may benefit from media coverage by monitoring and evaluating the impact of their policies in the settings of the member states. Moreover, mediatisation facilitates EU policymakers and administrators to initiate policies and open them to public debate, although the media can at times assume a more active role through framing in setting the agenda or legitimising different patterns of behaviour and rules within the political sphere (Trenz 2009, 53). Analytically, Robinson (2002, p.38) suggests that media influence and pressure on policymakers to act should be measured by the

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33 In this thesis, coverage as an indicator for the amount of interest that is afforded by the media to the two case studies is conceptualised in terms of the total number of articles.
number of front page news stories published. Such levels of coverage have to be sustained for a period of four to five days in order to attract the attention of policymakers. However, adopting this approach would paint a skewed picture of media influence as it suggests that policymakers will always be willing to interact with the policy definitions framed by the media (if they have sustained coverage), even in situations when they choose to ignore points of view which oppose their own approaches. This thesis aims to overcome this difficulty by analysing primary and secondary data from interviews, questionnaires, statements or press releases and correlating them with analysis of media framing and coverage.

In his analysis of the CNN effect in the case of international interventions (Iraq 1991, Somalia and Bosnia) Robinson (2002, p.137) has applied a framework which implies identifying media frames according to a certain number of predictive keywords. This method is thought to increase the reliability and validity of the analysis, making it easier to replicate and test by other researchers. Another method aimed at insuring validity and reliability usually applied within larger studies by research groups involves using two or more researchers in order to code media reports separately, and test the findings through inter-coder reliability. This method makes findings harder to replicate by outside observers, and is impractical in the case of a PhD thesis. In this thesis articles were selected and coded on the basis of three separate readings. The methodology used for the selection of articles is presented in annex A. Section three of this chapter describes the publications included in the sample, while an overview of the articles analysed in each case is presented briefly in table A.1 in annex A (page 301) and in more detail in annexes C, D and E.

In each of the three following chapters, frame analysis is used in order to identify the most pervasive policy definitions found throughout the selected articles during the three readings. The frame analysis focused on the strategies employed by the media in order to select and emphasise certain aspects of reality, events, ideas or perceptions, whilst downplaying others. In the first instance, in each case study – throughout the sample member states and the transnational level – a quantitative descriptive analysis of the policy definitions framed by the media was operated. More specifically, for each policy definition, the number of articles containing it was

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34 In the third stage (the third reading) articles were read thoroughly in order to reinforce the validity and reliability of the analysis.
weighed against the total number of selected articles. The same process was then broken down and repeated for each publication, thus providing greater comparative depth to the study. At this stage, media coverage was also correlated with the policy definitions framed by the media as a means of uncovering their temporal relevance.

The second stage implied a qualitative analysis which divided policy definitions framed by the media into the three types – problems, solutions and expectations – according to their message and aim. The significance and relevance of each type of policy definition was then judged both in relation to their frequency – explored in the first part of the analysis – and the different aspects that shape their potential to influence official rhetoric and policy. In the case of policy problems such aspects included: the range of ownership and of those affected by a problem definition, its fit with definitions promoted by other influential international actors such as the UN, or its ability to synchronise with and capture various flows and events in the international arena. Policy, administrative or political viability were the factors explored when considering the policy solutions framed by the media. The political philosophy which underpins the range of actions deemed appropriate for a government within a democratic system coupled with the ability of the media to express the current social, cultural and economic context were considered in the case of policy expectations. Drawing on the frame analysis, each empirical chapter correlates its findings with data from interviews and questionnaires, official documents and insights from scholarship in order to uncover the implications of the three interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) for the way in which democratic legitimacy was enacted – and answer the two research questions. However, before detailing the methodology used during the interviews and questionnaires, coupled with their overall rationale the remainder of the section makes a case for the use of media sources in exploring political processes, with a focus on quality media.

4.3.2 Newspapers as sources

The choice for quality publications has often been argued for in scholarship drawing on their salience in their respective media landscapes and their nationwide distribution\textsuperscript{35} (Boomgaarden et al., 2010; Brüggemann and Kleinen-von Konigslow, 2009; Curtin, 2007; de Swaan, 2007; Trenz, 35\textsuperscript{35} Trenz (2004, p.313) has warned that although quality newspapers might have the biggest national coverage, they do not seek to address a national public or demos, but their narrow readerships. However, their target publics are dynamic and shift according to their interests in the issues presented.\textsuperscript{35}
2004; Stevenson, 2009; Statham, 2010c). Quality publications are the main public vehicle for both political and social discourse. Consequently, it is considered more likely to find articles about the EU in quality national newspapers than in local papers or tabloids (Meyer, 2005, 2009; Olausson, 2010; de Swaan, 2007; de Vreese and Boomgaard, 2006). Simultaneously, the quality media has been considered to provide the primary stimulus behind gathering popular support for more European integration (Risse, 2010). Additionally, the print media is also thought to allow space for more elaboration than television (Koopmans and Statham, 2010), thus granting journalists an increased potential to act as agenda setters – as it facilitates ‘autonomous opinion and will-formation processes of the public’ (Trenz, 2007, p.89). Quality publications have the potential to communicate the views of individuals to policymakers, thus shaping official rhetoric and policies (Trenz, 2004, 2007; D’Haenens, 2005). Nevertheless, even within the quality media there is an underlying danger of dumbing-down discourse and public debate. The personalisation of European topics, the search for the sensational or the overwhelming presence of advertisements might derail debates unto avenues that depart from rational and well-argued debate (Bennett, 2008). However, personalisation, dramatisation and fragmentation have a less severe impact on reporting in print media than on television and radio, allowing journalists working for newspapers to construct a more detailed and comprehensive discourse about foreign policy. Cohen (1993) has also argued that in comparison to other forms of media, newspaper reporting is more long-lasting and includes deeper analyses of events in the international arena.

The media is considered to have the primary role of selecting, processing and distributing information and points of view about the Union to individuals. Besides the obvious focus on news reports for their role of informing about the EU’s policies, commentaries and editorials were at the centre of the frame analysis due to their power of constructing and shaping various ideologies36. They possess the ability to turn individual and collective opinion into public opinion which can influence policymakers (Pfetsch, 2005). Making allusions to the public and legitimising one’s views from public opinion is one common way in which editorial judgments are constructed. Moreover, commentaries do not offer objective reporting that takes into account all views. Most give priority to more or less normative or prescriptive opinions about what the EU is and should be (Kriesi, Tresch and Joachum, 2010; Koopmans and Zimmermann, 2010;

36 Commentaries and editorials have been highly neglected both in media studies and political science as sources for empirical study (Pfetsch, 2005; Preston and Metykova, 2009; Trenz, 2004; Vliegenthart et al., 2008).
Meyer, 2005; Medrano and Gray, 2010; Schlesinger, 2007). Often debates might surface into editorials and commentaries in which journalists directly address other journalists or politicians that share opposite views. Nonetheless, Trenz (2007, p.91) has concluded that the central function of commentaries on the EU consists in allowing for the imagining of a ‘European society’ as a ‘collectivity of political self-determination’. These characteristics make the evaluation of commentaries and editorials very important for the assessment of the media’s role in shaping both public opinion and feeding the views of the general public to policymakers.

Nonetheless, using media sources as a base for analysing social and political action has received a considerable amount of criticism from political scientists. They contend that the media does not represent an objective source of information due to its internal selection biases and its framing power (de Beus, 2010; Craglia and Annoni, 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010; Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011; Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer, 2010; Koopmans and Zimmermann, 2010). Besides the various arguments that have been put forward in the literature in favour of the idea that media research does not deviate from the norms of validity and reliability37, these criticisms actually highlight the goal of the present study (de Swaan, 2007; de Beus, 2010; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010; Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner, 2010; Statham, 2010a, 2010b, 2010d; Trenz, 2007, 2004; Schlesinger, 2007; Preston and Metykova, 2009). It is because the media possesses such biases that one can assume that it has the ability to endow decision-making with democratic legitimacy and trace its normative role within the EPS. Moreover, Koopmans and Statham (2010, p.58) have stressed that the use of multiple sources can overcome the various limitations related to reliability and validity. The next section focuses on the use of interviews and questionnaires in order to complement frame analysis and their overall rationale.

4.3.3 Using interviews and questionnaires with journalists and policymakers

Open-ended interviews and closed-ended questionnaires (which also feature some open-ended questions) with journalists and policymakers were used in order to provide a better understanding of the interactions between policymakers and the media (and its policy

37 While a coherent discussion of the arguments in support of the reliability and validity standards falls out of the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that media studies scholars tend to agree that the print media is a useful source in both quantitative and quantitative analysis (Trenz, 2009; Statham, 2010d; Stráth and Wodak, 2009; Van de Steeg, 2002).
definitions). Correlated with frame analysis they allowed distinctions to be made among instances of indexing, bounding and agenda setting – as described in the first part of this chapter. Policymakers were selected in relation to their involvement in decision-making processes in the two issue areas of foreign policy explored in this thesis. The sample explained in annex B took into account the fact that in both issue areas individuals tend to move from working in national institutions to the transnational level\textsuperscript{38}. The sample included both journalists working for the selected publications and freelancers. This choice was made because of the fact that both transnational and national publications rely on the activity of freelancers based in Brussels, who due to their increased technical knowledge of the EU are able to provide detailed and informed analyses. Swapping stories and personnel between transnational and national publications is a practice frequently employed (Siaepera, 2004; Raeymaekers and Cosjin, 2006; Lecheler, 2008; Lecheler and Hinrichsen, 2010; Gross and Kopper, 2011). Hence, sometimes Brussels based correspondents of national newspapers are asked to write from their point of view in transnational publications. In the same vein, national newspapers on some occasions publish translated articles from transitional publications based on commercial agreements (Harrison and Wessels, 2009). Most correspondents based in Brussels and national journalists writing on the EU often contact or rely on the material produced by transnational publications (Lecheler, 2008). This happens because all three transnational publication analysed – which are presented in the next section – have a good reputation in Europe due to their high quality reporting on the EU (Meyer, 2009). Articles from transnational publications are frequently quoted by national newspapers and are seen as reliable sources, and thus avenues for legitimising media discourse (Preston and Metykova, 2009).

Respondents were selected according to their involvement in the two issue areas examined, aiming for an equal spread between them (and between Britain, Romanian and the transnational level). The goal of the questions used was to probe into the dynamics of the media/foreign policy nexus in general, highlight the way in which policymakers interact with the media, and the way democratic legitimacy is enacted and understood in foreign policy. Annex F presents a sample of

\textsuperscript{38} This cross section should be considered representative for those taking part in the two issues areas analysed here, and not for the wider group of individuals acting in the EU’s foreign policy. However, the results of the interviews can be perceived to paint a relevant picture of the media/foreign policy nexus and the subsequent interactions between policymakers and journalists in the EU’s foreign policy.
the general questions used in the interviews and questionnaires. More specific questions focused on the interactions between policymakers and journalists during the two key events analysed: the 2009 Copenhagen summit and the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. The interviews and questionnaires with journalists covered topics related to the internal and external factors that influence the way policy definitions are constructed by the media, in this way taking into the account the complex nature of the relationship between journalists and policymakers (Statham, 2010c, 2010d; Preston and Metykova, 2009; Van Noije, 2010; Medrano and Gray, 2010; Koopmans and Zimmermann, 2010; Koopmans, 2010). The internal factors included issues concerning: perceptions of readers’ demand, resources made available by various actors, quality of information from the EU as a source; while the external touched upon topics related to: framing and commenting strategies, targeting strategies or reporting strategies.

The interviews with policymakers were focused around four substantive issues. The first set of issues explored their interactions with and their perception of the role of the media in the practice of EU foreign policy. Secondly, the interviews enquired into whether policymakers share a concern for democratic legitimacy and its multiple levels – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The third set of issues was aimed at tracing the internal processes that take place within institutions which deal with foreign policy, and more specifically the processes through which decisions and policy approaches are publicised. The contacts between policymakers and journalists were the subject of the final set of substantive issues.

In analysing the interviews with journalist and policymakers in order to paint a reliable picture of the media/foreign policy nexus three aspects were taken into account. Firstly, there is a strong tradition in media studies of regarding the relationship between journalists and policymakers as paramount for the functioning of democratic systems: ‘a healthy symbiosis between politics and journalism is essential and life sustaining not only for them both but also for a third entity: democracy (...) when the symbiotic relationship falls ill, so does democracy’ (Merritt, 1997, p.52). In practice the symbiosis between the two spheres always falls short of the ideal, as both journalists and policymakers share different expectations and perceptions regarding their relationship and each other’s role in performing democracy. Journalists tend to praise themselves for being primarily objective mirrors to reality (Entman, 1989, p.8; Lewis, Williams and
Franklin, 2008, p.1). However, such a norm does not always apply to the way journalists choose the topics and stories that warrant coverage (Hesmondhalgh and Toynbee, 2008). Secondly, the main incentive for journalists seems to focus on whether an issue is interesting or not. Interesting within the journalistic culture possesses a strong symbolic meaning, as Niven (2012, p.263) points out: ‘in the academic world, calling work “interesting” might be seen as an insult, akin to calling it trivial (...) to a reporter, however, interesting is the currency of the realm’. A political issue (foreign policy included) is considered to be even more interesting when it questions with evidence the actions of elites, in this way making them more accountable to the general public. On the other hand, policymakers perceive ‘interesting’ or ‘good’ stories only those that highlight in a positive way issues where they would desire more visibility (Larsson, 2002, p.24).

Thirdly, several studies have highlighted the significant differences in the way policymakers and journalists perceive the influence of media over politics in democratic societies (Bennett, 2004; Anderson, 2008; Kepplinger, 2002; Kappinen, 2008; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008; Meyer, 2002; Newton, 2006; Larsson, 2002; Schudson, 2002, 1996; Ruusunoksa, 2006; Van Aelst et al., 2008; Strömbäck, 2011, 2008). Maurer (2011) has found that journalists see the media as having a weaker influence on decision-making processes than the estimates of policymakers. This happens because policymakers tend to be threatened by journalists that have their own political agenda which infuses their writing, pointing to the conclusion that the media is seen to have more power in relation to ‘political careers than as to the policy agenda’ (Maurer, 2011, p.33). An alternative account finds journalists less willing to admit that they possess any sort of power to influence policymakers or use their discourse in an intentional way, due to the prospect of losing crucial informal ties with the political sphere (Van Aelst et al., 2008, p.499; Entman, 1989, pp.19–20). On the other hand, Larsson (2002, p.25) in his study of the Swedish media/policy nexus has shown that policymakers are willing to discuss their influence on media agendas through informal ties with journalists, because they see public relations as a central part of their role39. He goes on to argue that in their interactions, policymakers and journalists require a manoeuvring space which allows each group to secure its goals without significantly damaging the other’s interests. The relationship can be even curtailed in situations when one actor (usually journalists) exceeds its manoeuvring space by using informal contacts in a way that is deemed

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39 According to Maurer (2011, p.34), policymakers might also use their informal contacts with journalists in order to get across their message more clearly to the general public and without too much interference from the media.
illegitimate. On the other hand, journalists who develop close ties with politicians can easily be labelled as avenues for propaganda. In the case of the EU’s foreign policy, reporting on EU affairs has been a preferred activity for individuals who often have tended to drift from the public sphere to the political one. In the realm of foreign policy this trend has been even more evident as information in this area tends to be limited to a small number of officials and journalists (Krahmann, 2003).

4.4 Sample
Due to the complex and multilevel nature of the EU’s foreign policy the empirical analysis focused on two EU member states and the transnational level: Great Britain, Romania and transnational level (the EU’s institutions). Firstly, the choice for the for the two member states is justified by their differing roles, willingness and levels of commitment in acting in foreign policy through the framework of the EU. British support for the EU’s foreign policy has been often limited only to an abstract goal and its possible consequences, but almost never expressed in relation to the methods that could materialise such an aspiration (Aggestam, 2011). Since its accession in 2007, Romania is considered to have had among the member states – both old and new – one of the most pro-European attitudes towards the development of a common European foreign policy (Chifu, 2010; Ivan, 2012b). However, Romanian support has hardly been translated into willingness and commitment to act in practice towards achieving more European integration in foreign policy (Nitoiu, 2011; Ivan, 2012a, 2012b). Finally, the focus on the transnational level is justified by the role and salience of the EU’s institutions in constructing its foreign policy.

In distinguishing media systems Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.11) assess them according to four major directions: the development of media markets, the development of journalistic professionalism, the type and degree of state intervention in the media system, and the link between political parties and media institutions (political parallelism). The media agenda is generally strongly impacted by the high level of parallelism, reporting and coverage focusing to a large extent on political life (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.73). In practice, the strong links between media and politics translate into high levels of politicisation, with policymakers frequently shaping the agenda of the media: ‘ties between journalists and political actors are
close, the state intervenes actively in the media sector, and newspapers emphasise sophisticated commentary directed at a readership of political activists’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.298). Within the Liberal or North Atlantic model (where the British media and the transnational publications are included) commercial publications dominate, leading to a high degree of professionalisation in journalism and a low level of parallelism. Due to the competitive and commercial nature of British media, Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.222) argue that the gatekeeping and public service role of the media is weaker than in other countries – which is also the case of the Romanian media landscape (Coman, 2009). Moreover, ethical regulations in the case of British and Romanian journalists are often overlooked in favor of market pressures (Morgan, 1995; Balaban et al., 2010). On the other hand, Henningham and Delano’s (1998, p.153) study shows that for British journalists it is paramount that their reporting presents to the general public interpretations and assessments of complex issues.

Two newspapers from each media landscape have been selected: The Guardian and The Times (UK), Adevărul and Jurnalul Național (Romania) and the Financial Times, the European Voice and the online publication the EUObserver.com (transnational level). They were investigated for a period of one year, two consecutive periods of six months before and after the two events analysed – the Georgian – Russian war of 2008 and the Copenhagen Summit of 2009. The selection of newspapers takes into account the characteristics of media systems and press cultures, namely the key political cleavages, the types of readerships, range of distribution, ability to influence public opinion and the journalistic style. Moreover, the publications have been chosen in order to mirror the split in political affiliations: centre-left vs. centre-right (Balčytienė and Vincūnienė, 2010; Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007; Eriksen, 2007; Liebert, 2007; Medrano and Gray, 2010; Meyer, 2005). Countries have different media systems and political cultures which reflect the societal and cultural cleavages within subsequent general public. The publications selected for empirical analysis address these various national specificities – which are detailed in the following three subsections.

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40 The sample for the transnational level also includes the online publication EUObserver.com.
41 In examining the two issue areas of foreign policy, articles were identified using the Lexis-Nexis database and, in some cases, the online databases of the newspapers within a period stretching six months before and after each key event.
4.4.1 The transnational level

At the transnational level, journalists share a cosmopolitan ideology underpinned by deep Euro-optimism, which also compels them to maintain high professional standards. Transnational media have been held at bay from state regulation and government intervention due to the complex nature of the EU, in this way enjoying a larger degree of freedom than national media. The analysis included here two newspapers (their average circulation is presented in table 4.2) and one online publication: the Financial Times (FT)\(^\text{42}\), the European Voice (EV)\(^\text{43}\) and the EUObserver.com – which has a similar readership and coverage to the other two publications. None of these publications can be considered to be truly a ‘European newspaper’ because they do not aim to direct their discourse towards the general public living in the member states. In a 2004 EUROPUB report on the way transnational European media report on EU topics, Firmstone (2004, p.8) found that transnational journalists believe that their European message cannot get across to individuals in the member states due to the national media which report mainly through domestic perspectives. However, these publications can be thought of as ‘European wide’ or transnational media because their discourse usually transcends the boundaries of nation states and is almost never solely concerned with covering domestic politics within a single member state. Transnational publications frequently employ freelancers and their articles are quoted or even translated by British and Romanian (and generally national media) publications, as they are seen to contain expert and in depth analysis of EU issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper/Publication</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Daily Circulation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008 (August)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Voice</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>18.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>118.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUObserver.com</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>25.000 visitors per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Financial Times (FT) is widely considered to be the most important transnational newspaper (Baisnée, 2002, 2003, 2007; Raeymaeckers and Cosijn, 2006; Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and Deprez, \(^\text{42}\) The FT refers here to its European edition which should be distinguished from the British edition. It is mostly similar to the UK version, but has a larger emphasis on European issues. \(^\text{43}\) Owned by the Economist Group.

Raeymaekers and his colleagues (2007, p.115) found that the FT has a privileged position within the ‘Brussels bubble’. It enjoys a considerable amount of prestige, often being considered by policymakers in Brussels the only true European newspaper. Its status is built on greater access to resources than other transnational media and a commitment to thorough and critical reporting, providing a prime example of quality journalism. The FT has the largest press bureau based in Brussels which reports both on the day to day activities of European institutions, and also on political and economic developments in the member states and other countries in Europe. However, articles tend to be tailored for a European business oriented readership, the newspaper affording the majority of its space to issues concerning stocks and shares, financial markets, or companies in Europe. The FT shapes its discourse in order to cater for the interests of ‘national governments, EU institutions and European political parties as well as its readership’ (Firmstone, 2004, p.34).

European Voice (EV) focuses on presenting information and analyses about the EU and its institutions on a weekly basis catering for ‘everyone involved in European Union policy making, those who seek to influence the decision-making process from outside, and those whose work is directly affected by decisions taken in Brussels’ (Firmstone, 2004, p.2). It reports on the day to day activity of the EU’s institutions, portraying an overt optimism towards furthering the European project which matches the views of its readership. However, due to its weekly publication cycle it does not cover day to day events, but provides in depth analyses of events that have happened throughout the previous week. Firmstone (2004, p.7) has found that journalists from EV most times pitch their articles in order to influence EU policymakers and decision-making processes. Finally, EUObserver.com is an online publication which aims ‘to support the debate on – and development of European affairs’. It publishes daily analyses and news reports which focus on the day to day activity of the EU. With four to five stories published

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45 Simultaneously, it tries to be a ‘paper of record’, following closely and mapping the activity of the EU’s institutions.
online each day written in a similar manner to newspaper articles, it is comparable in terms of space and coverage to both the FT and EV\textsuperscript{48}. Similarly to EV, it practices a type of cosmopolitan journalism, highly optimistic regarding the European project. The readership of EUObserver tends to have considerable knowledge of and interest in EU affairs, nonetheless due to its online open-source character, articles and points of view published by EUObserver are more often quoted in national media.

### 4.4.2 United Kingdom

It was noted earlier that the British media belongs to the North Atlantic or Liberal model outlined by Hallin and Mancini, being characterised by strong market orientation, deep professionalisation and noninstitutionalised self-regulation. On the other hand, more ‘pugnacious, critical and populist as ever’ (Gavin, 2009, p.777) the British media follows suit in portraying and perpetuating Eurosceptic views, a strategy adopted in order to mirror the views of the general public. Moreover, in their study of the way the British press framed the 1997 general Election and during the British EU presidency of 1998, Anderson and Weymouth (1999) have shown that Euroscepticism is widespread in British newspapers. The constitutional debate and the monetary union have also been framed through the prism of Euroscepticism by the British media, matching the disaffection of citizens with the EU (Davis, 2000; Dougal, 2003; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; Packham, 2007; Anderson and Price, 2008; Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Gavin (2001) also contends that the EU receives mostly negative coverage by British journalists who deem newsworthy only stories that contrast the actions of the Union with those of British citizens.

**Table 4.3 Daily circulation for selected British publications**\textsuperscript{49}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper/Publication</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>2008 (August)</th>
<th>2009 (December)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>332.587</td>
<td>300.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>612.779</td>
<td>521.535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{48} The similarity in coverage between the three publications adds validity to the comparative approach employed here. However, journalists writing for the EUObserver benefit from less stringent space restrictions – due to the nature of online media – which allow them to develop more detailed analyses. Articles published in EV very often also contain complex analyses because of its weekly publication.

\textsuperscript{49} Data was extracted from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/abcs; www.thetimes.co.uk/. Accessed on 15/09/2013.
Two British newspapers have been selected for analysis: the Times and the Guardian – their average circulation is presented in table 4.3. The Times is considered to be committed to conservative values and the centrality of traditional national institutions, while the Guardian tends to adopt left-of-centre views. The Times has two permanent correspondents in Brussels who report on all issues related to the EU and frequently travel within the continent and write about political developments in European countries. Very often, articles about the EU’s foreign policy are co-authored with London based journalists such as the diplomatic, foreign or political editors depending on the subject and its relevance for British domestic politics. At times, during the last ten years, it has had correspondents based in Moscow, but news relating to Russia has been mainly supplied by a wealth of foreign correspondents which travel throughout the world. Articles on climate change and the EU’s approach are usually written by London based editors such as those responsible for environment or energy, in collaboration or with background information from Brussels correspondents. The newspaper has a section on World Affairs (with a subsection on Europe, broadly defined) where most foreign policy topics and those related to the EU tend to be included – sometimes high level international events are discussed in the front pages, or through editorials and op-eds. Articles about global climate change policy appear mainly in the World Affairs section, but also in the Environment section. In terms of its approach to the EU, Carvalho (2007, p.239) finds that the Times has been very vocal in criticising the UK government or the EU’s ‘measures to combat greenhouse emissions and legitimate the existing economic and social order’. Moreover, in their study of British media attitudes towards European integration, Carey and Burton (2004) show that the discourse of Eurosceptic newspapers (such as the Sun, the Mail, Express, the Times and the Telegraph) is aimed at influencing their readers regarding the negative effects that ‘more Europe’ can have on their daily lives.

On the other hand, the Guardian focuses more on the global impact of politics, with an emphasis on the need to safeguard the security of future generations and foster the development of universal norms of responsibility and fairness (Forster, 2002). However, even the Guardian

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50 The analysis of the British media in both case studies was extended to six other British mid range newspapers and tabloids – Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, the Independent, the Mirror and the Sun – in another publication currently under review (Nitoiu, 2014). The distribution of the sample used for the article is in line with the overarching assumption found throughout the literature that quality national newspapers are more likely to cover topics related to the EU. The findings highlight that the Guardian and the Times contained an average of around 65% of the total number of articles selected for analysis. Moreover, the analysis shows that the other six newspapers constructed the same frames in both case studies as the Guardian and the Times.
which is widely seen as one of the pro-European British newspapers tends to take a critical view of integration in a number of policy areas – such as the adoption of the Euro (Werder, 2002). Similarly to the Times, articles about foreign policy and the EU are on most occasions a result of the collaboration between Brussels based correspondents and London based editors such as the political or international ones. However, in contrast to the Times, it employs just one permanent correspondent in Brussels who focuses his or her work only on the EU. From time to time, the Guardian publishes stories from freelance journalists, or due to its rather open approach to journalism, stories from the general public which are thoroughly fact checked. Unlike the Times, it tends to have correspondents in most major European capitals including Moscow, rather than foreign correspondents that travel around. Without a doubt, the newspaper presents high quality and detailed analyses on topics related to climate change and the environment (Gavin, 2009). This is a consequence of the importance that the newspaper attaches to these topics, with the Environment section taking up a substantial proportion of the newspaper, whilst stories related to this issue are featured regularly in the front pages. Moreover, the Guardian’s commitment to issues related to climate change is also reinforced by the number of staff and resources it devotes to these issues. For example, in the build up to the Copenhagen summit it increased its staff working on environmental issues from four to eight (Boykoff, 2012, p.253). Articles about foreign policy and the EU are featured in the International pages and, as in the case of the Times, when the topic is of high relevance for British domestic politics they are featured in the front pages.

4.4.3 Romania

Two main aspects have characterised the Romanian media since the country’s accession to the EU (Bocancea, 2011, p.107). Firstly, owners have had an overt influence on media reporting and the overall editorial direction of newspapers. Secondly, media discourse has become increasingly politicised mirroring the deep polarisation present in the Romanian political system. This confirms Gross’ (2008b, p.141) expectation that in the context of Romania’s membership to the EU, in the short and medium term ‘no major alterations to the media system and its function will occur until the culture of the political elites, media owners, and the citizenry evolves in a more liberal, democratic direction’. Freedom of expression has been a widely debated topic in the Romanian media landscape since the end of communism. On the one hand, journalists have been
deterred by the owners of their publication or by political elites through the use of the justice system from pursuing certain topics and expressing their opinions accordingly (Gross, 2008b). Nonetheless, political pressures have dwindled during the last ten years as a result of the privatisation of the media and their increasing economic self-reliance (Coman, 2004, p.589). Conversely, journalists themselves have often employed a rhetoric centred on the freedom of expression in order to cover-up blatant mistakes or unethical behaviour and interests (Coman, 2009, p.190). In contrast to the British media, the Romanian media has an enthusiastic and supportive attitude towards European integration, Euroscepticism hardly ever surfacing in its reporting on the EU (Coman, 2004; Lazăr, 2006; Lazăr and Paun, 2006).

**Table 4.4 Daily circulation for selected Romanian publications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper/Publication</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>2008 (August)</th>
<th>2009 (December)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adevărul</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>45,707</td>
<td>156,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurnalul Național</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>96,325</td>
<td>91,457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Romanian newspapers have been selected for analysis: Adevărul and Jurnalul Național – their average circulation is presented in table 4.4. Adevărul is the most important newspaper in Romania being the heir of the formerly state controlled Scânteia (Frumusani, 1999). It thus inherited and relies on the resources, expertise and personnel of the former publication which on many occasions implies support for the party in power (Bocancea, 2011, p.100). The newspaper is considered to have the most accurate and extensive coverage of foreign policy and international events. Since 2007, it has established a Brussels bureau hosting three correspondents who report on EU issues, including the Union’s foreign policy. The published version of the newspaper also includes a daily section (about four pages) where European topics are discussed. Additionally, the newspaper contains about ten pages with brief analyses featured in the Romanian edition of the Foreign Policy magazine. The chief editor of the newspaper’s Brussels bureau is also the chief editor of the Foreign Policy magazine, meaning that news and analyses centered on the EU’s foreign policy are frequently presented. The newspaper is owned by a prominent business man and member of the main right wing party which provides a subtle ideological orientation to its reporting. Commentaries, op-eds or even lead articles by

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policymakers or analysts are often featured, together with letters from the general public which are meant encourage public debate on foreign policy topics. Unlike most Romanian publications, which merely copy paste or translate news about foreign policy from news agencies, Adevărul is committed to creating its content in an original manner as much as possible by accessing sources directly (Schifirneț, 2010). Unfortunately, since late 2012 the Brussels bureau has been reduced significantly, with only one correspondent covering EU issues due to the numerous trials in which its owner has been involved – although by the spring of 2011 the Brussels bureau opened a surrogate TV station which broadcasted major EU events and interviews with high level policymakers.

Jurnalul Național has the highest circulation in Romania and is considered to be the second most salient and influential newspaper after Adevărul (Ulmanu, 2002; Radu and Stefanita, 2012). Its influence is based on its large resources and its ability to draw expertise and information from the large media conglomerate which contains it – besides the newspapers it also has five TV stations with regional affiliates plus a dozen radio stations. The owner of the newspaper is a prominent entrepreneur and former chairman of the second most important left wing party in Romania. This has translated in a continuous torrent of criticism and disapproval, sometimes with clear evidence and well constructed arguments for the actions of the right wing government. Moreover, the majority of the publishing space within the newspaper is afforded to issues of domestic politics which are used in order to criticise the government. Foreign policy surfaces only in the case of major international events or in order to highlight Romania’s approach in international relations. Romanian journalists often identify it to be the most responsive newspaper to the needs of the public, whilst correctly reflecting their interests (Ilaş, 2011). However, the low amount of resources directed towards reporting on foreign policy issues means that analyses and commentaries from experts outside the newspaper are almost never presented. More often than not, news is copied from international news agencies, journalists playing a crucial role though in selecting and adapting it for the Romanian public.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has presented the methodology employed throughout the thesis which entails a
detailed frame analysis correlated with interviews and questionnaires with journalists and
political actors, and other primary and secondary sources. Two case studies have been chosen in
order to reflect two very distinctive areas of EU foreign policy: global climate change policy and
the policy towards Russia. Research has been conducted on two countries (Romania and the UK)
and the transnational level which have been chosen in accordance to their varying levels of
public debate and accountability, in this way reflecting the heterogeneous character of the EPS,
but also their approach to contributing to the EU’s foreign policy. Frame analysis is used in order
to identify the most pervasive policy definitions found throughout the selected articles. Together
with the analysis of the media/foreign policy nexus, frame analysis facilitates the assessment of
the implications of interaction effects for the way in which democratic legitimacy is infused in
foreign policy.

The analysis of quality publications is often preferred in scholarship due to their nationwide
distribution and their potential to paint a reliable picture of national media landscapes. Moreover,
they represent the main public vehicle for both political and social discourse where it is more
likely for debates about EU foreign policy to surface. The next three chapters will each provide a
detailed assessment of the interactions between the media and policymakers, whilst aiming to
provide empirical evidence in order to answer the two research questions explored in this thesis.
They will first present a general overview of the respective media/foreign policy nexus, drawing
on data from interviews and questionnaires coupled with findings from the literature. The second
part of each chapter employs frame analysis in order to identify the way in which the media
articulated its policy definitions, whilst analysing instances of indexing, bounding and agenda
setting and their impact on the role of democratic legitimacy within the two case studies – the
EU’s approach to global climate change and the EU’s policy towards Russia.
Chapter 5 – The transnational level

This chapter first provides an overview of the media/foreign policy nexus at the transnational level. The following section of the chapter analyses the way in which the media constructed its policy definitions and their subsequent interactions effects – according to the model described in chapter 3. In doing so, it builds on the frame analysis of the selected media for the two case studies correlated with background information drawn from interviews and questionnaires with professionals working in the transnational media and EU policymakers. Three publications were selected as representative for the transnational media: EUObserver.com, the European Voice and the Financial Times. The distribution of the articles within the three publications is presented in table A.1 in annex A (page 301), while the coverage of the two case studies is highlighted in figures A.1 and A.2 in the same annex. Annex C shows that in the case of climate change the period surveyed was 1 June 2009 – 1 June 2010, with 160 articles selected. On the other hand, in the case of the policy towards Russia the period examined stretched six months before and after the conflict (8 March 2008 – 5 March 2009), with 227 articles selected. The final section discusses the implications of the interaction effects for the way in which the transnational media endowed the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy – in this way exploring the two research questions.

5.1 The media/foreign policy nexus
The EU is widely considered to be very successful in shaping the agenda of transnational media (AIM Research Consortium, 2006; Lazăr, 2006; de Vreese, 2007; Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and

52 ‘EU policymakers’ refer in this chapter to professionals who are or have been involved in policymaking in the EU’s institutions in climate change and the policy towards Russia – interviews and questionnaires with ten EU policymakers have been conducted. On the other hand, ‘transnational journalists’ refer in this chapter to journalists working for the transnational publications analysed (EUObserver.com, the European Voice and the Financial Times) and focus their writing on the two issue areas of foreign policy – interviews and questionnaires with six transnational journalists have been conducted.
Deprez, 2007; Lecheler, 2008). This happens even though most journalists working for transnational publications believe that the EU is continuously trying to sell its policies, overlooking any notion of objectivity, and ‘making it very difficult to distinguish between advertising and objective facts’53. Savin’s (2011) analysis of the framing strategy of the EU also shows that the Commission is very successful in providing information to the media and sometimes as the main or only source, in this way setting the agenda in terms of the European topics that the transnational media report on. This builds on the activity of EU spokespersons who regularly consult with their staff and DG COMM in order to plan medium term communication strategies for their policy areas. Such strategies take into account the range of possible future legislative proposals, policy initiatives, and high level events. Spokespersons meet every day at 10 in the morning in order to discuss the midday briefing and the topics that would be covered (Bijsmans and Altides, 2007). Here, they also plan short term communication strategies, debate which policies and issues might be considered by journalists as interesting news, and brainstorm how to answer difficult questions at the midday briefing. The daily midday briefing presents journalists with an overview of the policies and initiatives pursued by the Commission (Machill, Beiler and Fischer, 2006). It serves as an opportunity for the media to ask for background information both from spokespersons and more specialised bureaucrats, in this way also forging important informal ties.

Transnational journalists point to the fact that the ability of the media to successfully define policy problems, propose solutions or present expectations is hampered by a number of hurdles that they face when reporting about the EU. Firstly, similarly to other research projects (Neveu, 1998; Baisnée, 2002; Kepplinger, 2002; Toynbee, 2008; Gross and Kopper, 2011), the interviews underscored that journalists are constrained to focus on the need to attract the attention of their readers, whilst presenting European issues in a clear and comprehensive way54. This is a challenge because transnational publications aim to reach various audiences ranging from national ones to those based in Brussels and even others in non-European states. Secondly, the complex bureaucratic nature of decision-making processes within the EU’s foreign policy and the highly technical language they produce often require journalists to acquire specific knowledge (Bicchi, 2011). Moreover, journalists from transnational media consider that their

53 Transnational journalist 2.
54 Transnational journalists 1-5.
readers possess a considerable amount of knowledge and interest in European issues, though they argue that the EU is ‘not supplying the most important information’. Transnational journalists tend to perceive that the interest of individuals in European issues is continuously growing due to the increasing role of the Union in tackling the financial crisis, global climate change, or its overall status in the international arena. Consequently, most transnational journalists admitted during the interviews that they feel compelled to take a more proactive role towards this issue in defining problems and scrutinising the activity of policymakers in EU foreign policy.

Transnational journalists tend to justify their policy definitions by arguing that they reflect public opinion and the attitudes of the general public (Negrea, Bargaoanu and Dascalu, 2010). The framing strategies of the transnational media draw on four main sources: policymakers, journalists, perceptions of public opinion and the web of interactions between journalists and policymakers. Most transnational journalists argued that they sometimes back up their views by using constructions such as ‘the people believe’, or drawing on opinion polls – although some argue that polls must be analysed before being presented. People’s opinions are more frequently used by the media as a way of drawing the attention of EU policymakers, but also in a conscious attempt to impose a sense of democratic scrutiny on them. As part of an overarching commitment to the principle of objectivity, transnational journalists employ these strategies claiming that they adhere to the goal of portraying as many views as possible in order to paint a relevant image. Spokespersons working for the Commission and the Council reinforce the view that the media have the ability to provide feedback on what people think about the EU and how it should behave in the international arena. Due to this, EU policymakers argue that the Union is sufficiently open, providing equal information to all media regardless of their bias. On the other hand, transnational journalists claim that the range of policy definitions they choose to frame is highly influenced by the way they perceive the specific views of their readership (Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005). As a consequence, it cannot be overstated that the needs and preferences of their readers have to be always taken into account. Transnational publications aim more for the

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55 Transnational journalist 3.
56 Transnational journalists 1-5.
57 For example, one journalist admitted to feeling compelled to act ‘creatively in problem-solving’ (Transnational journalist 3).
58 Transnational journalists 1-5.
59 Transnational journalist 2.
informed public who know the ‘value the power of information’\textsuperscript{60}, mostly based in Brussels, and try almost always to address the EU’s institutions.

The networks of interactions and relationships that journalists build with policymakers have an important impact on media frames. Firstly, policymakers tend to have more contacts with journalists that reside in Brussels and especially those who represent transnational media. Moreover, policymakers favour the Financial Times (FT) because it has the largest and the most professional press bureau (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981; Neveu, 1998; Baisnée, 2002; Larsson, 2002; Lazăr, 2006; Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and Deprez, 2007; Anderson, 2008; Negrea, Bargooanu and Dascalu, 2010). Secondly, both transnational journalists and EU policymakers agree that in time relationships based on deep levels of trust can develop between them (Larsson, 2002; Heikkilä and Kunelius, 2006). However, as Larsson contends (2002, p.25), even long-lasting ties can be curtailed as ‘journalists appreciate the accessibility of sources, their openness and media-logical adjustments’, whilst policymakers ‘appreciate mainly what they perceive as being treated correctly in the media’. Data from the interviews conducted for this thesis correlates with the findings of EUROPUB project, in that according to transnational journalists, spokespersons working for the Commission do have not sufficient expertise in their area, and behave merely as PR staff or even salesmen of the benefits of European integration (Firmstone, 2004, p.24). The EP is considered to have very active press departments, which mostly tender for the national media, in order to reach as many voters as possible. Hence, they are not very interested in constructing a European discourse similar to that found in transnational media, but a multitude of discourses adapted to the characteristics of audiences from each member state (Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and Deprez, 2007, p.111).

According to Baisnée (2002), journalists – who have spent only a short period in Brussels and have not built trust relationships with policymakers – have a less positively biased attitude towards the EU. Moreover, they are prone to adopt a more scrutinising type of journalism which focuses on defining problems and shortcomings, rather than acknowledging policy successes. However, EU policymakers stress that policy problems defined by the media are more likely to be adopted when they reinforce their views and fit with the overall international context and that of the decision-making in EU foreign policy. Hence, in judging the quality of the media’s

\textsuperscript{60} Transnational journalist 1.
discourse, EU policymakers search for ‘quality of information, accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information and analysis’\(^61\). The ownership of the policy definitions framed by the media together with their convergence with those framed by high profile third party actors in the international arena (such as the UN) are considered to have an important impact on the success of the adoption of policy definitions framed by the media. Moreover, transnational journalists argue that their own standpoint and conceptions of IR (and the role of the EU) influences the way they report, pointing to a highly biased approach to reporting about the Union. Transnational journalists view the EU as the most complex administrative system in the world, that has the potential of being more open to public debate than the nation state – especially in terms of foreign policy (Lecheler and Hinrichsen, 2010). They contend that the EU has the potential, and widely expect it to behave as a normative actor and live up to its commitments and ambitious rhetoric\(^62\).

Moreover, EU policymakers perceive transnational journalists as mediators and multipliers for the EU’s discourse and its policies, whilst ‘journalists contact spokespersons usually when a need for supplementary background or technical informal arises’\(^63\). Hence, in its communication policy, the EU tends to work through multipliers as it does not have the staff and the resources to reach all of its corners. EU staff regularly attend both academic and policy oriented conferences expecting the other participants to spread the Union’s message. There is a continuous process of feeding news to journalists, because policymakers are always under the watch of the media and need to tailor their actions and discourse according to it (Statham, 2010c). Nevertheless, sources of indexing are to be found primarily in the network of informal ties and interactions between policymakers and journalists. According to the latter, even though the Union tries to deliver a lot of information about its policies, it doesn’t provide the most important or relevant for the media. Transnational journalists also argue that the Commission does not always give the correct information, very ‘often trying to project a positive spin’\(^64\). Information is usually acquired through informal means, which, in time, build a deep sense of trust between transnational journalists and EU policymakers. This leads to the fact that sometimes transnational journalists

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\(^{61}\) EU policymaker 6.

\(^{62}\) Transnational journalists 1-6.

\(^{63}\) EU policymaker 7.

\(^{64}\) Transnational journalist 2.
publish articles that are fed by the EU’s institutions and support various policies (Statham, 2007b).

EU policymakers tend to engage with journalists representing media with a broader coverage, although most would argue that they do not favour or discriminate in establishing contacts with journalists. Simultaneously, some EU policymakers admit the existence of a hierarchy which privileges the more quality publications, favouring the FT which ‘seems to be the most professional and fair’\(^{65}\). Hence, in deciding the quality of newspapers, individuals working within the EU’s institutions dealing with foreign policy look at a number of factors with an emphasis on objective reporting and the ability to project informed, original or well-reasoned opinions. Publications that have a high number of staff working in Brussels are thought to provide quality information or accuracy and comprehensiveness in their analyses\(^{66}\). They share broader coverage, larger readerships and employ journalists that have the ability to understand highly technical issues in a professional manner. On the other hand, the lower quality media tend to be very biased in the sense that they reflect only the point of view of the authors and do not present other ‘voices’ in order to paint a clear picture of reality (Firmstone, 2008; de Vreese, 2007; AIM Research Consortium, 2006).

The most pervasive role that transnational journalists assume is that of educators or mediators within the public sphere. This provides them with the power to fill the knowledge gaps of individuals surrounding the EU and to teach them how to view the Union. Indexing suggests that most times this could lead journalists to politically biased reporting and a greater access to scoops through leaks from policymakers. Heikkilä and Kunelius’ study (2006, p.73) reinforces the finding that generally the EU is very successful in indexing the discourse of the media. They point to the overarching power of the ‘Brussels bubble’ to entrench a certain sphere of values in the writing styles of transnational journalists. In their extensive report on the habits and culture of journalists based in Brussels, they find that individuals working for transnational media tend to approach European issues from a cosmopolitan perspective. More specifically, this involves refraining from vigorously criticising the EU and not publishing articles that contain negative stereotypes or references to the Union. Indexing is also reinforced by the very close

\(^{65}\) EU policymaker 1.
\(^{66}\) EU policymakers 1-10.
relationships that journalists develop with their contacts working within the EU’s institutions. Transnational journalists have a tendency ‘to develop a reaction of protecting the institution, a kind of self-censorship which they justify by their belief that the Commission is acting for the public good’ (Baisnée, 2002, p.120). Moreover, according to the interviews, transnational journalists take cues from spokespersons and accept planted questions during press conferences or even publish stories requested by their contacts.

According to most studies, EU policymakers tend to consider that the media can have negative effects on policy solutions and their outcomes or effectiveness even in situations when they are not aware of it or willing to interact with it (Siapera, 2004; Brüggemann, 2005; Kappinen, 2008). From their point of view, this happens because all too often the media is subjective and tries to manipulate public opinion, as ‘journalists do not take a policy perspective, but they usually have a very well defined perspective of their own’.

Secondly, EU policymakers argue that regardless of the quality of the publication they write for, journalists tend to search for the bigger perspective, but also for the sensational and conflicts, most times overlooking other aspects and focusing only on the issues and countries their readerships have an interest in. Simultaneously, journalism is viewed to be hypercritical, because the media does not really understand political processes from inside: ‘the media like to write more about failure in the EU’s policies, than about its successes’. Hence, the media is more prone to emphasise failure rather than success when covering the Union. EU policymakers argue that the media can hamper their activity by interpreting their policies in a narrow or even totally incorrect manner. For example, although the EEAS employs several layers of communication and uses a wide range of tools in order to address different audiences, public communication tends to remain technical and at times sticks to diplomatic language which implies that journalists need to have the ability read between the lines (Bicchi, 2011). On their part, transnational journalists who do not have strong ties with EU policymakers argue that they feel a sense of discontent towards the tendency of the EU to speak with one voice, almost never admitting the shortcomings that plague its approaches (Heikkilä and Kunelius, 2006). They consider that it is not their duty to mitigate the democratic deficit of

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67 Transnational journalists 1-4.  
68 EU policymaker 4.  
69 EU policymaker 3.
the Union, in as much as it is the EU’s duty to reform itself (Baisnée, 2002, 2003, 2007; Lazâr, 2006; Raeymaeckers and Cosjin, 2006; Schlesinger, 2007; Toynbee, 2008).

Journalists working for transnational publications that have been based for a considerable time in Brussels have largely pro-EU attitudes and are in a better position to influence the foreign policy agenda (Baisnée, 2002, 2003, 2007). They have had the opportunity to build close ties with EU policymakers making them responsive to their (i.e. transnational journalists) policy definitions. Their ability is in stark contrast to that of ‘newcomers’ and especially correspondents for national media who do not keep their posts for more than a few years and are more prone to be constrained by the scrutinising needs of the editorial offices back home and by their lack of access to policymakers. On the other hand, journalists working for transnational media either see themselves as trying to enact the highest journalistic standards or trying to campaign for a certain point of view and policy initiative, almost never portraying any sense of Euroscepticism.70 Through their campaigning efforts they usually try to find support in order ‘to reinforce [their] own opinions among those who are politically close’ within the EU’s institutions (Mancini, 1993, p.49). Moreover, Maurer (2011, p.31) finds that the transnational ‘media’s agenda-setting power resembles the power of a referee who decides which issues enter the political playground’. She goes on to argue that EU policymakers would not take into account the framing activity of the media if they did not perceive it to capture and represent debates within the public sphere. This can be affected by the links between policymakers and the media, as through the regular and informal contacts with policymakers, which can develop into relationships of trust. The second part of the chapter empirically analyses the way transnational journalists defined policy problems, solutions and expectations, evaluating and discussing the impact of indexing, bounding and agenda setting on the way in which democratic legitimacy was enacted in each case study.

70 Transnational journalists 1-6.
5.2 Interaction effects

5.2.1 Climate Change

*Indexing*

The most salient policy definition identified in the sample referred to the long term risks associated with climate change and framed it as a top policy problem due to its broad and indiscriminate effects on peoples around the world. About 98 percent of the total articles (see table 5.1) included this policy problem, advising but also praising EU policymakers for considering climate change as a policy priority, because it possessed the potential to harm the livelihood of future generations. This policy problem also converged with policymakers’ own approaches, as the Union’s rhetoric highlighted the major challenge that climate change brought to global governance and to the security and economic development of the member states. Transnational journalists took cues here and drew on EU policymakers’ discourse in order to make their readers conscious of the medium to long term consequences of climate change. Both before and after the Copenhagen summit, the Union overtly stated its commitment to a low carbon society – by increasing its reduction targets from 20% to 30% (European Commission, 2010a; European Commissioner for Climate Action, 2010a) – which was thought to ‘create new jobs and industries and will contribute to a more energy secure future’ (Council of the European Union, 2009). The three publications provided detailed scientific evaluations and reports from transnational NGOs which highlighted the malign effects that climate change could have on a global scale. In doing so, transnational journalists acted here as educators. Media discourse in this case (i.e. indexing) was also a tool for entrenching EU policymakers into the recognition of the threat posed by climate change and in the need to tackle it71.

Defining climate change as a major risk also resonated with views from other influential international actors such as the UN, or transnational environmental NGOs, which made the policy definition even more salient within the public sphere – together with the fact that it was perceived to affect populations globally. Keeping to its deep commitment to objective reporting and being used by EU policymakers as a way of giving thrust to public debate, the transnational media presented statements and points of view from actors outside foreign policy circles. These statements were featured in order to highlight the weaknesses of defining climate change as a

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71 EU policymakers 1-2.
major problem that the EU should tackle. Consequently, although most articles framed climate change as an important threat to the wellbeing of future generations, not all articles considered that the need to tackle the effects of climate change had to be backed up by substantive financial commitments. EUObserver (11 November 2009) noted that finances could be better spent on creating jobs. On the other hand, the FT highlighted that by committing itself to progressive measures to tackle climate change, the EU might be placed in a disadvantaged position, running the risk of driving ‘industry out of the region if it continues to push for deeper cuts in carbon dioxide emissions than other economies’ (Financial Times, 7 July 2009).

Table 5.1 Indexing – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change –medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>97.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is the only actor that can forge a global agreement on climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>63.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>59.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming other states</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>55.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal climate change deal</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>38.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

In another instance of indexing, the transnational media found itself in agreement with the Union’s institutions (drawing on their rhetoric), all of which advocated an agreement where both developed and developing countries would ‘contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (European Commissioner for Climate Action, 2010b). The EU was praised for proposing that rich countries should step up and commit up to 50 billion Euros each year until 2020\(^\text{72}\). However, failing to convince states such as the US, China, Australia or Japan to aid developing and poor countries, made the Union back down from its ambitious stance committing to offer in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit only around 7 billion Euros over the following three years. This downgrade was severely criticised by the transnational media (EUObserver, 11 December 2009; European Voice, 3 December 2009). The three transnational publications viewed equality, burden-sharing and solidarity to be integral to any solution meant to tackle the effects of global climate change. The construction of this policy solution involved acknowledging that the larger part of the emissions which have caused changes in climate were produced during the 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) centuries by Western developed countries –

\(^{72}\) The EU was supposed to contribute with around 15 billion each year (Financial Times, 3 November 2009).
contributing to their development and increasing the welfare of their citizens. Hence, rich countries were seen as having the duty to compensate developing countries for the cost that adopting progressive climate change policies would entail: ‘the world's poorest countries who are already struggling to survive in a changing climate, need action, not more hollow promises’ (EUObserver, 6 November 2009). Not only did this policy solution as defined by the media converge with the UN’s approach, but was also seen as a policy priority by EU policymakers.

Putting the blame on other states for hampering the EU’s efforts to drive forward a progressive agreement was a strategy employed by EU policymakers in order to pressure states such as China or the US, and build internal consensus (and confidence) within the EU (Boykoff, 2011; Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2011; Van Schaik and Schunz, 2012). Policymakers used here the media – as described in the interaction effects model in chapter 3 – in order to publicise and gather support for a policy solution which involved trying to convince smaller and less influential states to support the Union’s efforts. They perceived that this would have prompted the US or China to revise their position. Furthermore, the transnational media was seen as an avenue for rallying support from the member states in putting the blame on the US or China, whilst also persuading and reassuring European businesses of the EU’s ability to lead in global climate change policy despite other states’ unwillingness to cooperate. Numerous statements from EU policymakers were featured in order to give weight to this solution: for example, according to Connie Hedegaard, Commissioner for Climate Action, ‘climate change can be controlled only if all major emitters take action (...) the most convincing leadership Europe can show is to take tangible and determined action to become the most climate friendly region in the world’ (European Commission, 2010b). The majority of criticism focused on the US and the inability of president Obama to convince the US Congress to commit to clear emission targets and aid poor countries. Contrasting with the discourse of the other two transnational publications, the FT maintained a balanced discourse, arguing that pre-emptive and continuous blaming of the US was not the best strategy to convince it to engage with the effects of climate change (Financial Times, 17 November 2009). Unlike the US, China received lighter criticism for its unwillingness

73 EU policymakers 1-4.
74 EU policymaker 3.
75 For example, EUObserver wrote, quoting an official from the Commission, that the ‘EU warns of climate stalemate, blames Washington As for the third world, "Advanced developing countries need to make a meaningful commitment” ’ (EUObserver, 13 October 2009).
to commit to tackling the effects of climate change. One solution proposed by the transnational media for getting China on board involved enhancing the EU’s strategic partnership with China. EV strongly advocated the idea that the Union ‘must help Beijing’s low-carbon revolution succeed’ (European Voice, 26 November 2009). Due to its position as the world’s largest emitter, China had the opportunity to provide an example to other developing states and convince the US.

High expectations were associated by the transnational media with the EU’s potential to draw on its global leadership and drive forward a fair and progressive agreement on climate change. In this instance of indexing the Commission was a prime source for such expectations, as it had to show ‘leadership by taking tangible action to become the most climate friendly region of the world’ (European Commission, 2010b). Before the summit, the Union was praised for its key role in supporting the Kyoto Protocol and its ability to arrive at a common stance between member states, in this way serving as a model for other countries. The media were again used by EU policymakers in order to publicise and gather support for the EU’s leadership in global climate change policy, whilst educating their readers regarding EU’s potential and ability to lead. Furthermore, media discourse was an avenue through which EU institutions put pressure on the member states to commit themselves to further emissions reductions or adaptation policies. Accordingly, this would have strengthened the EU’s efforts to convince other states. For example, the FT frequently covered disagreements between member states, which were framed as a major hurdle that could have damaged the EU’s capacity to act as a leader by example. It argued that the EU’s approach could have attained credibility and legitimacy globally only if the member states managed to work together and synchronise with the efforts of the Commission. Among the member states, the media underscored that Britain was at the forefront of the EU’s efforts, proposing deeper commitments than any other member state.

Throughout the six month period before the summit, the wavering position of the member states – which continuously moved from supporting a 30 percent cut in emissions to only 20 percent and back – was seen by the three publications as a sign of weakness that could have endangered the Union’s negotiating power and credibility in Copenhagen. Poland and Estonia were among

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76 EU policymakers 1, 2.
77 The FT quoted David Miliband: ‘we’re asserting that the EU should stand ready to fulfil its commitment to moving from 20 to 30 percent in the context of a global deal’ (Financial Times, 8 December 2009).
the most vocal opponents of committing the EU to ambitious emissions reductions. They went as far as challenging in court the proposals of the European Commission, in order to develop burden-sharing agreements that involved the new member states from CEE being compensated for their emissions (EUObserver, 30 October 2009). Therefore, in such situations when the possibility of forging a common European position was bleak, being overrun by discussions of downgrading the EU’s commitments, the three transnational publications were keen to argue that the Union had the duty to set and promote ambitious goals in global climate change policy. Here the policy expectation expressed by the media seemed to find a fit with the political context of the EU, where interviews with policymakers showed that most member states wished to state their frustration with Poland. Not being able to do this on the record they turned to the media and leaked news regarding the negotiations between member states prior to the summit.

Although a large number of articles considered that Europe’s achievements at the Copenhagen summit fell short of its ambitious goals, in the six month period that followed the summit journalists emphasised that the EU had the potential to regain its leadership position, or had not even lost it in the first place. The EU’s official rhetoric argued that the Copenhagen summit represented a success for the Union and a crucial step forward in tackling global climate change. The Copenhagen accord was supported by 109 states, whilst small and island states took account and seemed to be convinced by the Union’s global approach as it showed the ‘determination of most countries to act on climate change now’ (European Commission 2010b). This policy expectation was forged around a rather biased interpretation of the outcomes of the summit promoted by the European Commission (2010a). Here, the Union’s capacity to cooperate with small and island states or poor countries against the US or China was perceived to be a major breakthrough that could have led in the near future to a binding global agreement. Indexing again implied that the media was used in order to publicise and gather support among individuals in the public sphere for the idea that the EU had the potential to bounce back after the summit and lead in global climate change policy.

A move which the Observer thought ‘could threaten the European Union's flagship mechanism for combating climate change’ (EUObserver, 23 September 2009)

EU policymakers 1-4.

For example, EV argued that the outcomes of the summit did not downgrade in any way the Union’s own commitments to tackle climate change: ‘But the EU was embarrassingly passed by when it came to the end-game politics that led to the Copenhagen Accord. Has this damaged the credibility of the delivery mechanisms, or changed the logic for implementing them as planned? Not much. Europe still needs to prepare for a low-carbon future, and will be able to reap benefits from moving ahead with its domestic agenda’ (European Voice, 4 March 2009).
The EP deviated somewhat from the official discourse of the EU, admitting that the summit was a huge disappointment. However, former EP President Jerzy Buzek argued that the Union had to build on its experience and commitment and not give up on its global leadership: ‘we must learn the lessons of how to improve the negotiating process (...) there are some positive elements to the agreement, but the EU should continue to put pressure on the rest of the world to reach a more ambitious agreement at a later stage’ (European Parliament 2009d). On the other hand, especially EUObserver drawing on the support of public opinion, highlighted Europe’s duty and potential to lead in global climate change policy, because the environment, as a whole, was ‘one of the few areas where the EU has consistently won respect and recognition from its citizens’ (European Voice, 19 October 2009). Moreover with the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, the three publications were optimistic about the prospect of the Commission having a better position in coagulating a common EU approach, which would have increased its power and role in global climate change negotiations.

**Bounding**

Bounding was present in the way the transnational media defined three policy problems. It implied here that EU policymakers were largely unresponsive to the discourse constructed by transnational journalists perceiving them as being too critical or influenced by their tendency to highlight sensational news and failure, rather than the EU’s achievements (as specified in interaction effects model presented in chapter 3). The outcome of the summit was largely framed by the transnational media as a failure, where the EU drafted ambitious plans which were not matched by policy successes. Consequently, the media defined the disappointing result of the Copenhagen summit as a problem which had to be urgently tackled in the near future (table 5.2). Moreover, the outcome of the Copenhagen summit prompted the media to argue that because the EU had not materialised its ambitious goals it had effectively lost its leadership in global climate change policy. For example, according to an environmental analysis featured in the FT, the summit represented a ‘climate Waterloo for the EU’ where ‘there was the motivation to be the clear driver in the negotiations, but they were more or less kicked out at the end’ (Financial Times, 22 December 2009). The EU was criticised for not being able to take lead of the

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81 EU policymakers 1-4.
negotiations and not striking a deal ‘directly with China, India, South Africa and Ethiopia’ (European Voice, 14 January 2010). Nevertheless, EV maintained its supportive tone, highlighting that the most important achievement for the Union at the summit was captured by its ability to harmonise the attitude of the 27 member states before Copenhagen.

Articles also warned about a stalemate at Copenhagen even in the run-up and during the summit, arguing that the EU didn’t manage to build a successful negotiating position\textsuperscript{82} that would have allowed it to discuss on equal footing with China and the US (EUObserver, 18 December 2009). Both policy problems were constructed by the transnational media featuring views from academia and the global NGO community which criticised the EU for not having a stronger position that could have made the agreement more transparent. Even though EU policymakers were unresponsive to these two policy problems, the media acted as a gatekeeper of democracy putting exogenous pressure on them to live up to previous commitments and promises\textsuperscript{83}. However, the transnational media linked both policy problems to division between member states which resonated with the views of the Commission (but not with that of the Council). Here, the three transnational publications anticipated the breakdown of the negotiations, underscoring the Union’s isolation and the tendency of a small number of the member states to promote different agendas during the summit (EUObserver, 3 May 2010). Interviews with policymakers working for the Commission highlighted the fact that the transnational media reflected their frustration with the new member states from CEE (especially Poland) which were unwilling to support the EU’s internal emission reduction approach\textsuperscript{84}.

### Table 5.2 Bounding – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>80.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>68.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is happening now</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>63.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own data*

The media was also perceived by EU policymakers to be too critical in defining climate change as a policy problem which had to be tackled with urgency. A considerably lower number of articles (than those which framed climate change as a medium to long term threat) suggested that

\textsuperscript{82} For example a few days before the summit, FT headlined: ‘High hopes and grim predictions’ (8 December 2009).

\textsuperscript{83} EU policymakers 1-4; Transnational journalists 3-6.

\textsuperscript{84} EU policymakers 1-4.
climate change was a present emergency that had to be addressed urgently. According to the FT (7 July 2009), the world had no excuse for denying the short term-risks associated with climate change. World leaders were advised to add urgency to the negotiations on climate change in order to achieve a progressive agreement (EUObserver, 6 October 2009), and draw lessons from countries such as Norway. Transnational journalists constructed this policy problem by frequently featuring detailed scientific reports and analyses, together with official assessments from the UN and various transnational environmental NGOs. In this way, the transnational media provided individuals with information that would allow them to form coherent opinions and participate in public debates.

The views of the general public were at times portrayed by the three transnational publications through letters and comments from their readers. EU policymakers were largely unresponsive to this policy problem due to the lack of consensus among the member states for recognising the urgency with which climate change had to be tackled (Christoff, 2010). For example, the Commission felt that pushing for the recognition of this policy problem might have discouraged some member states from implementing their current commitments – which were highly negotiated and contested (European Commission, 2009b). Although it was largely ignored by EU policymakers, this policy problem resonated with the EP’s call to take into account scientific evidence and urgently adopt measures in order to achieve and sustain ‘stabilisation levels and temperature targets that provide strong probability of avoiding dangerous climate change’ (European Parliament, 2009e).

*Agenda setting*

Table 5.3 shows that central to the way in which the media reported during the period analysed was the idea that the Copenhagen summit represented a crucial moment – which is also highlighted by the spike in coverage in the period around the summit seen in figure A.1 (page 301). There the EU was expected to lead the adoption of a binding agreement that could tackle the effects of climate change. Multiple articles drew on scientific reports or academic assessments in order to capture the magnitude of the summit which was seen as the ‘biggest

85 According to Michele Sabban, head of the Assembly of European Regions, ‘national governments must recognise and take advantage of the crucial role the regions play in tackling climate change and energy challenges’ (EUObserver, 30 November 2009).
show on Earth, and, for scientists at least, the most important meeting the world has ever known’ (EUObserver, 7 December 2009), where more than 15,000 delegates from 192 countries met. More cultural initiatives also reflected (according to transnational media) the importance of the international gathering, such as the climate change scholarship programme initiated by the Danish government months before the summit (EUObserver, 21 September 2009). Through this, journalists acted both as educators and activists, popularising the summit and aiming to educate individuals regarding the policy expectations associated with it. At the same time, the three transnational publications often published reports which contained views from the general public or from various environmental groups and NGOs, together with public opinion polls (which emphasised the high level of public expectations associated with the summit).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen – a crucial moment</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>97.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>57.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own data*

The importance of the summit was an idea promoted by the EU from as early as 2008, the EP\(^{86}\) even claiming in a resolution that it was the most important international meeting of the last decade (European Parliament, 2009b). Through their contacts with EU policymakers, transnational journalists managed to convey to them the views of the general public – having the potential to link individuals to decision-making processes –, putting pressure on the EU to achieve a progressive and fair global climate change agreement\(^{87}\). Moreover, both the three transnational publications and EU policymakers associated high hopes with the prospect of national leaders for the first time having the opportunity of negotiating a climate change agreement face to face, as Connie Hedegaard stressed: ‘the negotiators have been sitting opposite each other for years arguing from the same positions (...) that is why it is so crucial that the leaders say forging an agreement in Copenhagen is what they want to do. That will let [the negotiators] depart from here’ (Financial Times, 7 July 2009).

\(^{86}\) Hence, the EP expected an ‘ambitious and legally binding agreement that will require emission reduction targets for developed and developing countries as well as funding commitments and sanctions for non-compliance’ (European Parliament, 2009c)

\(^{87}\) EU policymakers 1-3; Transnational journalists 3-5.
The agenda setting power of the transnational media also manifested itself in the way it defined a policy expectation which argued that the EU should commit even more resources in order to tackle climate change globally. Journalists acted here as activists drawing on the EU’s own ambitions of leading in global climate change policy, together with the pleas coming from various environmental groups for immediate action. In this way, they exerted pressure on EU policymakers to adopt even more ambitious goals and implement them. As described in the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3, agenda setting in this case was facilitated by the web of informal interactions that transnational journalists have with EU policymakers which allowed the former to provide policy input. Trust relations were enhanced by the fact that some EU policymakers dealing with climate also had experience of working within the media\textsuperscript{88}. Moreover, transnational journalists’ tendency to argue that the EU should engage even more in tackling climate change was fuelled by their belief in the ability of the Union to act in the international arena for the well-being of other peoples\textsuperscript{89}. What this points to, is that agenda setting meant here that the media became part of the political process pushing the EU to make deeper commitments. This effect was the most visible in the build up to the Copenhagen summit when intense media coverage from transnational publications elicited more ambitious commitments from the EU\textsuperscript{90}– at least rhetorically (European Commission, 2008a, 2010c; Council of the European Union, 2009; European Parliament, 2009c, 2009a).

\subsection*{5.2.2 The policy towards Russia}

\textit{Indexing}

The first phases of the Georgian-Russian war elicited a strong response from the EU which criticised Russia for its intervention in a country which shared aspirations for European integration. Moreover, the Council argued that Russia’s ‘decision (was) unacceptable and the European Union (called) on other States not to recognise this proclaimed independence and asks the Commission to examine the practical consequences to be drawn’ (Council of the European Union, 2008a). Indexing implied here that the media took cues from and drew on EU policymakers’ discourse in order to define Russia’s aggression against Georgia as a policy

\textsuperscript{88} EU policymakers 2, 3; Transnational journalists 2, 4-6.
\textsuperscript{89} Transnational journalists 1-6.
\textsuperscript{90} EU policymaker 4.
problem – highlighted in table 5.4. Through this, it aimed to publicise and gather support within the public sphere for the EU’s initial critical stance towards Moscow in the weeks that followed its intervention. Furthermore, by providing detailed coverage (marked also by the increase in coverage during the conflict portrayed in figure A.2 – page 302) of Russia’s intervention, coupled with eye witness reports, transnational journalists sought to inform the general public regarding the horrors of the conflict. During the war, taglines such as ‘Russia is asking for trouble in Georgia’ (Financial Times, 9 August 2008) were frequently featured in order to define Moscow as the aggressor, and the sole actor responsible for the war. EV had the most critical discourse towards Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia, at times calling for the West (especially the EU) to step up, thus promoting an expectation that the EU should vigorously engage with Moscow. Conversely, it praised the French presidency of the EU for its swift response to the crisis and the way it managed, in the end, to coagulate a common European position in spite of the underlying division among the member states (European Voice, 16 August 2008). Less critical of the Russian intervention, EUObserver noted that the EU itself might have fuelled Moscow’s sense of insecurity due to the recognition of Kosovo earlier that year, and the fact that the Union had been unwilling to reconsider its partnership with Russia in order to take into account the latter’s interests and aspirations. Russia’s ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, was featured expressing this concern two months before the war: ‘with the Lisbon treaty in force and a clearer picture of how the EU is organised, it would have been easier to negotiate the pact’ (EUObserver, 24 June 2008).

Indexing was also evident in the way in which the three transnational publications framed Russia as a threat to Europe’s energy security. The media drew here on the views of the EP (European Commission, 2008b; European Parliament, 2008) and the Commission (European Commission, 2008c, 2008d) which were claiming – whilst highlighting the principle of solidarity – that the member states should work towards devising a common stance in negotiating a broad EU energy deal with Russia. On the other hand, in order not to antagonise with the big member states such as France or Germany, the Commission was also arguing that in regard to energy relations, that Moscow was far more vulnerable, as the member states represented the larger part of its market91. Hence, through their discourse, transnational journalists publicised the EU’s somewhat

91 EU policymakers 8-10.
mixed and ambiguous approach, opening it up to debate within the public sphere\textsuperscript{92}. Interest for the issue among the general public was meant to be aroused by the way in which the media framed this policy problem as affecting most member states. While acknowledging the Union’s need to diversify its gas suppliers and routes\textsuperscript{93}, in this way short-circuiting Russia’s energy hegemony, the transnational media did not consider Moscow to be a major threat for the EU’s energy security. Exporting 60 percent of its gas to the EU, which covered only a quarter of the latter’s needs, Russia was seen being highly sensitive to a shift in the energy acquisition policy of the member states. Nonetheless, the Union’s efforts to diversify its gas supply routes were thought to be hampered by a lack of political will and commitment, and the special relationships that some member states tended to develop with Russia.

Table 5.4 Indexing – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should be the main actor in dealing with Russia</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>77.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war seen as a Russian aggression</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>50.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should cooperate with Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>38.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>26.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>23.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

Even though most articles recognised that the war was caused by Russia, or that Moscow was an important threat to Europe’s security, they also stressed that the EU had to recognise Moscow’s new status and try to enhance its partnership with it accordingly. This policy solution was built on the EU’s official approach of forging a strategic partnership with Russia which was based on consensus both among the member states (Simão, 2012; Ziegler, 2012; Sakwa, 2013) and within the EU’s institutions (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012; DeBardeleben, 2012; Lomagin, 2012). Such a new relationship was seen as a credible policy solution which had to be based on a common approach that would be accepted by most member states, departing from the tendency of the old member states – such as Germany or France – to deal bilaterally with Moscow. This view converged with that of the Council – and with the overall approach of the EU aimed at building a strategic partnership with Russia – which adopted a rather moderate discourse towards

\textsuperscript{92} Transnational journalists 3-4.

\textsuperscript{93} According to the European Commission president, Barroso, ‘gas coming from Russia is not secure; gas coming through Ukraine is not secure, this is an objective fact’ (EUObserver, 1 September 2008).
Russia, avoiding to name the party responsible for the war: ‘the Council recalls that the Union had expressed its grave concern at recent developments in Georgia, and the open conflict that has broken out between Russia and Georgia (...) military action of this kind is not a solution’ (Council of the European Union, 2008d). According to EV, there was ‘no reason to do business as usual with Russia’ (European Voice, 9 October 2008), because the EU could not have a chance to ‘project “soft power” in the post-Soviet zone’ (EUObserver, 5 January 2009) or engage Russia on a modernisation path without developing a common stance that would strike a balance between the EU’s norms and values, and individual economic and energy interests. Again, the transnational media aimed to educate its readers regarding the EU’s approach in a bid to gain public support for the idea of building a strategic partnership with Russia. Transnational journalists also opened the EU’s approach to public debate\textsuperscript{94}, as EU policymakers felt that it required further public justification and legitimation\textsuperscript{95} – as specified in the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3.

One main argument that was at the base of the EU’s reasoning behind striking a strategic partnership was that Russia was part of Europe and thus desired to be integrated in it. As such, Russia was presented by around a quarter of the total number of articles examined to share European values and a common historical heritage. Russian representatives and political elites were afforded a fair amount of space in all the three publications, where they explained Moscow’s intervention and why it did not represent a threat to European and global security. The FT featured interviews with Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov who argued that the Western media presented the war through Cold War stereotypes which predisposed it to view Moscow as the aggressor (Financial Times, 13 August 2008, 16 January 2009). Moreover, the Kremlin considered that its motivation for the war involved safeguarding the livelihood of Russian citizens in south Ossetia, which was well within the rationale and the remits of international law. The Russian ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, reassured the Union on many occasions that it was better to have Russia as friend than enemy (EUObserver, 18 August 2008), and that Moscow was keen to enhance its partnership with the EU (European Voice, 28 August 2008). The construction of this policy solution involved urging the members states to renounce their one sided strategy in dealing with Russia and try to understand the latter’s needs.

\textsuperscript{94} Transnational journalists 1, 4.
\textsuperscript{95} EU policymakers 6, 7.
and concerns, in this way also striving to include ‘Russia's voice in the European debate’ (EUObserver, 24 November 2008). In doing so, the FT featured a statement from an overtly Euro-optimistic Russian elite:

We've always aspired to improve our relations with the European Union . . . because we consider ourselves a part of Europe, and moreover, we consider ourselves the geographic centre of Europe. From the first days of my presidency . . . we have clearly agreed that our foreign policy has to be multi-vectoral [ie open to the west, Russia and other countries] . . . We consume only 25-30 percent of what we produce, and we sell the rest . . . So we cannot be a closed country . . . We are only asking one thing: let us live our lives . . . don't block us, help us communicate and trade freely, exclusively on the basis of market principles and free competition (Financial Times, 18 November 2008).

The main policy expectation constructed by the transnational media argued that the EU had the duty and ability to engage as the main actor with Russia. This policy definition converged with and was based on the Union’s own perception of its role in pacifying the conflict, and with the overall ambitions expressed officially by EU policymakers. Transnational journalists aimed to educate individuals regarding the Union’s capabilities and intentions, in a strategy meant to enhance public support for the idea that the EU had the potential to deal with Russia and should act accordingly. During the twelve months covered by the frame analysis, the EU assumed a leading role in settling the conflict, urging both Russia and Georgia to cooperate (European Commission, 2010b), deal with moderation (Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008a) and try to achieve a peaceful settlement (Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008b). Following the ceasefire, EU leaders also boasted about the Union’s commitment to securing the region through the independent observer mission it sent to Georgia (Council of the European Union, 2008b). Over eight in ten articles from both EUObserver and EV supported the EU’s efforts in pacifying the conflict and trying to engage Russia in a constructive partnership. Hence, the EU had to be concerned about Moscow’s intervention in Georgia, and, more broadly, its influence in other countries from the Eastern Neighbourhood (European Voice, 2008).

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96 However, the FT was more doubtful and pessimistic regarding the EU’s capacity, due to the ongoing disagreements between member states and its lack of military and hard power that could back up its claims.

97 Transnational journalists 5, 6.
9 September 2008). The French presidency of the EU headed by President Sarkozy assumed centre stage in devising a ceasefire agreement that was fair for both Georgia and Russia, calling for an emergency EU response and a summit with Moscow in the initial phases of the war. Consequently, Sarkozy was praised for his approach which argued that the ‘that EU would welcome a real partnership with Russia, which is in the interest of everyone, but it takes two to tango’ (Financial Times, 2 September 2008).

**Bounding**

Division among the member states was defined as one of the main policy problems that plagued the Union’s approach towards Russia (table 5.5). Germany was presented as the main culprit, due to its appeasing attitude towards Russia: ‘whatever Russia does, Germany is generally unwilling to criticise it; this makes it hard for the EU to forge effective policies on Russia’ (Financial Times, 5 December 2008). Complex economic and energy
terdependencies together with the close personal relationships between Russian and German political elites (Financial Times, 9 January 2009) were perceived to be the main influences on German policy towards Moscow. On the other hand, Poland and other new member states from CEE were criticised for promoting unnecessary tough stances towards Russia based solely on historical resentment. For example, during the war, Poland pushed for the suspension of the EU-Russia partnership, former Polish President Lech Kaczynski arguing that a broad group of member states from CEE was supporting this decision. The transnational media linked the frame of division to the idea that the EU was not able to live up to the principle of solidarity which is inscribed in its founding treaties. Informally, the EP and the Commission banked on the criticism expressed by the media calling for the member states to act in concert in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict and have a moderate attitude towards Russia. However, officially, only the EP sporadically criticised the member states for their tendency to forge bilateral solutions with Moscow. In turn, EU policymakers working within the Commission publicly argued that the discourse of the transnational media was narrow and highly

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98 EV skilfully highlighted that ‘German Trojan horses are dangerously increasing the EU’s dependence on Russian energy’ (European Voice, 28 August 2008).
99 EU policymaker 8.
100 EU policymakers 6, 7.
influenced by the fact that journalists do not have coherent knowledge regarding the complexity and constraints which characterise the EU’s relations with Russia^{101}.

Table 5.5 Bounding – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – seen in a negative light</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>35.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach towards Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>27.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia is responsible for the war</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

In another and much more evident instance of bounding, the media argued that Georgia might have been responsible for the conflict as it resorted to rash actions, not taking into account Russia’s warnings and interests. This policy problem implied that the EU or the US might have been responsible for encouraging president Saakashvili to antagonise Russia. EU policymakers were unresponsive to this frame as the EU stood firmly by Georgia, supporting its ambitions for European integration. Transnational journalists featured here detailed information regarding Georgia’s actions, providing the general public with a narrative that contrasted with the mainstream one which put all the blame on Russia.

Supporting the efforts of NATO or the US in order to bring an end to the conflict was framed as a credible policy solution only in around a quarter of the articles, as journalists perceived that the US did not have the interest or the capacity to bring an end to the conflict^{102}. Nonetheless, before the war, Georgia and Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership in the spring of 2008 was presented as a having the potential to unsettle the balance of power in the region and put Russia in a structural position of insecurity. Drawing on these arguments, the FT (3 June 2008) predicted that Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations were bound to stir up animosities with Moscow, which in the near future could have led to the rekindling of frozen conflicts – i.e. the conflict in South Ossetia. While NATO’s eastwards expansion was viewed by the three publications as one of the main reasons that ignited the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, only the FT in a significant degree supported the idea that the US or NATO should be the main global actors that had the duty and power to settle the conflict and keep Moscow in check. Otherwise, the

^{101} EU policymakers 8-10.  
^{102} Transnational journalists 2-4.
other two publications advocated a secondary role for both NATO and the US, either supplementing or aiding the efforts of the EU. This view did not mirror the attitude of most policymakers interviewed\textsuperscript{103}, who argued that the EU needs to develop its own relationship with Russia independently from other international actors\textsuperscript{104}. Similarly to the model detailed in chapter 3, EU policymakers were largely unresponsive to the policy solution defined by the transnational media as they believed that such discourse could damage the EU’s credibility and legitimacy in dealing with Russia and Eastern Neighbourhood\textsuperscript{105}.

\textit{Agenda setting}

Around 70 percent of the articles (highlighted in table 5.6) in the sample linked Russia’s intervention in Georgia with a strategy of hinting to Europe that it sought to regain its former superpower status and ‘establish a new status quo’ (Financial Times, 13 August 2008). In defining this policy problem the transnational media put forward compelling arguments derived from the current international context. The media’s discourse emphasised that Moscow aimed to achieve this – to regain its former superpower status – by recovering its hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space and using its energy supplies in order to condition political outcomes. Russia’s malign intentions were also presented as affecting the whole of the EU, which provided more weight to the problem definition. Such ideas were reflected in a similar degree throughout the three publications, all suggesting that Russia’s new status should be understood to be synonymous with the emergence of a new Cold War. The FT even argued that the Russian intervention in Georgia was a direct result of and a response to Europe and the West’s eastern advance in the 1990 and early 2000s (Financial Times, 4 September 2008). On the other hand, in a small number of articles, EV argued that Russia was far less powerful than the Soviet Union, raising questions regarding the actual intentions of the leaders in the Kremlin: ‘behind Russia's return to traditional imperialism is a glaring lack of self-confidence’ (European Voice, 28 August 2008).

\textsuperscript{103} However, the EP in a resolution called for the EU to act together with NATO ‘to persuade the Russian Government to abide by international law’ (European Parliament, 2008).
\textsuperscript{104} EU policymakers 6, 9.
\textsuperscript{105} EU policymakers 6-10.
Transnational journalists linked to this idea another policy problem which framed Russia as a threat to the security of the EU. Both policy problems were defined as to affect large populations within the EU, making them even more salient within the public sphere, and thus putting pressure on policymakers to take them into account. The agenda setting power of the media was predicated in both cases on journalists’ network of informal ties and trust relationships built in time with EU policymakers, which allowed them to provide policy input\textsuperscript{106}. At the same time, transnational journalists created the discursive context in which individuals could be linked to decision-making by presenting their perceptions of the interests of the general public to EU policymakers, who in turn believed that the image painted by the media of public opinion was a relevant one\textsuperscript{107}. In relation to both policy problems, transnational journalists became part of the political process. However, agenda setting manifested itself here (in the case of policy problem which defined Russia as a threat to Europe’s security)\textsuperscript{108} only in the first phases of the conflict, when EU policymakers were taken by surprise and instinctively reacted against Moscow’s intervention\textsuperscript{109}.

In another instance of agenda setting, the transnational media also acted as the gatekeeper of EU policymakers’ commitments and promises, criticising the Union for not living up to the commitments and ambitions set up in the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The EaP was understood to be characterised in its initial phases by failure and the Union’s inability to promote democratic reforms that could keep its eastern neighbours at bay from Russian intrusion. EUObserver (5 March 2009) noted that the EU’s Russia first approach (Berryman, 2012; Kanet, 2012; Sakwa, 2013) hampered positive developments in the region, as the Union continuously shied away from practically engaging in areas that were seen to potentially damage Moscow’s interests.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Agenda Setting – frames}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Frame} & \textbf{Type of policy definition} & \textbf{Rate of occurrence (\%)} \\
\hline
Russia is regaining its great power status & Policy problem & 68.70 \\
Russia is a security threat & Policy problem & 64.30 \\
The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood & Policy expectation & 43.20 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Source:} Author’s own data

\textsuperscript{106} Transnational journalists 2-6.
\textsuperscript{107} EU policymakers 6-10.
\textsuperscript{108} Unlike the other policy problem which was incorporated and put pressure on official EU rhetoric throughout the timeframe analysed.
\textsuperscript{109} EU policymakers 6-10.
(EUObserver, 21 August 2008). Split between Russia’s interests and its own aspiration of spreading its norms globally, the EU was urged not to cave in to dictators from the Eastern Neighbourhood. These states were perceived to adopt opportunistic strategies, in that they tried to get as many benefits as possible (from both the EU and Russia) without giving too much in return (European Voice, 2 October 2008). The transnational media put here pressure on EU policymakers to make more ambitious commitments towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. Again, the efforts of transnational journalists were facilitated by the informal relations they built in time with policymakers\(^{110}\), allowing them to become part of the political process – as detailed in the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3. Spurred on by the transnational media’s support for a stronger European presence in the Eastern Neighbourhood, former EU High Representative Javier Solana also stressed the Union’s commitment to aiding the countries in the region, and Georgia more specifically: ‘for the EU, to be in Georgia is a great responsibility and it is a great honour. We will work with the people of Georgia and this will bring us closer (...) the EU is here in Georgia to work for the stability of the country. Our engagement is serious’ (EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2008).

5.3 Discussion

5.3.1 Climate Change
Due to the effects of the ‘Brussels bubble’, journalists often felt compelled to promote the EU’s policy on climate change, presenting points of view gathered both through formal means and deep relationships of trust built in time with policymakers. What this all points to, is that to a large extent the transnational media acted similarly to a third arm of the EU, communicating and backing up its policies. Moreover, the support of public opinion perceived by both transnational journalists and EU policymakers resulted in the fact that the transnational media reinforced in the minds of the latter the idea that their policies on climate change fully enjoyed democratic legitimacy\(^{111}\). Indexing was the primary interaction effect identified pointing to the idea that journalists acted as an extension of the EU’s decision-making processes, communicating its policies in relation to climate change and educating the general public (highlighted in table 5.7).

\(^{110}\) Transnational journalists 1-6, EU policymakers 1-4.
\(^{111}\) Transnational journalists 1-5, EU policymakers 1-4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Interaction effect</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
<th>EUObserver (%)*</th>
<th>European Voice (%)*</th>
<th>Financial Times (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>97.50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>93.00</td>
<td>97.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>38**</td>
<td>80.90**</td>
<td>85.70***</td>
<td>70.60***</td>
<td>88.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen – a crucial moment</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>76.90</td>
<td>86.30</td>
<td>58.10</td>
<td>78.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>32**</td>
<td>68.10**</td>
<td>71.40***</td>
<td>58.80***</td>
<td>77.80***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is happening now</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>63.80</td>
<td>66.30</td>
<td>58.10</td>
<td>64.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is the only actor that can forge a global agreement on climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>63.10</td>
<td>68.80</td>
<td>65.10</td>
<td>48.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>28**</td>
<td>59.60**</td>
<td>76.20***</td>
<td>41.20***</td>
<td>55.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda Setting</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>57.50</td>
<td>57.50</td>
<td>67.40</td>
<td>45.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming other states</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>55.60</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>30.20</td>
<td>70.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal climate change deal</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38.80</td>
<td>46.30</td>
<td>37.20</td>
<td>24.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.
**Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit (N=47).
***Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit: EUObserver (N=21); European Voice (N=17); FT (N=9).
Source: Actor’s own calculations: (N=160) / EUObserver (N=80); European Voice (N=43); FT (N=37).
The pervasiveness of this interaction effect was sustained by the perception that tackling the effects of global climate change shared wide support from citizens across the member states. The transnational media also acted as a gatekeeper of policymakers’ commitments criticising the EU’s downgrade in the aid it envisaged to send to developing countries in the eve of the summit – following the breakdown of the negotiations.

Agenda setting was present only in two situations, putting pressure on EU policymaker to make even more ambitious commitments in tackling climate change. Great policy expectations were put by the transnational media before the summit on the ability of the EU to strike a progressive deal. On the other hand, this high degree of publicity and the fact that the approach of the Union for the summit was made public well in advance, weakened the EU’s leverage in relation to other states such as China or the US – because, despite them, it did not have what to negotiate for in the intergovernmental setting. Bounding appeared in situations where the media was perceived by EU policymakers to be too critical due to its proneness to search for sensational news – similarly to the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3. For example, the failure of the Copenhagen summit was seen as a huge disappointment within the transnational media, a view which resonated with that of the EP, but to a lesser extent with those of the Commission and the Council, which perceived the accord as a crucial step forward in tackling global climate change.

In the six month period that followed the summit, the transnational media underscored that the EU still had the potential to lead in global climate change policy. In this way transnational journalists fuelled and legitimised a new approach from the Commission based on convincing small and island states, rather than major actors – a strategy which proved successful during the subsequent summits in Cancun and Durban (Boykoff, 2011; Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2011; Van Schaik and Schunz, 2012).

The prime policy expectation put forward by the media involved the EU’s ability to drive forward negotiations on a progressive agreement at the Copenhagen summit – highlighted in table 5.7. Accordingly, the transnational media underscored the magnitude of the international event and its overall importance and meaning for the future of peoples around the world. By presenting numerous statements from EU policymakers who expressed high hopes regarding the potential outcome of the summit, the media reinforced and unpacked EU official discourse for the understanding of the general public. Linked to this, media frames expressed an expectation
that if the EU was to lead in global climate change it would need to act unitedly. Thus, Poland and other reluctant member states from CEE were highly criticised based on information, often leaked through informal means from EU policymakers, which could not have been made public through official channels. According to one high level official in Commissioner Hedegaard’s team, the media aided their effort by highlighting that ‘Poland and the Czech Republic were unwilling to accept the 30 percent target’\textsuperscript{112}. In the aftermath of the summit, a large number of articles backed–up official discourse by claiming that even though the EU had a weak position in Copenhagen, it still had the potential to lead in global climate change policy. Indexing in the case of climate change implied that most transnational journalists felt compelled to support the EU’s ambitious agenda, as it matched the views of the general public, and it was related to a problem which had global effects. At the same time, transnational journalists perceived themselves as educators who had the duty to inform individuals regarding the EU’s approach which was infused with principles and values related to justice, human rights and equality. Transnational journalists also encouraged public debate – on issues where EU policymakers were open to public scrutiny – within the public sphere by providing individuals with detailed scientific accounts regarding the effects of climate change.

Through bounding the transnational media constrained the EU’s approach to climate only in a limited number of situations. Drawing mostly on points of view from actors outside the official EU foreign policy circle – such as academia, the NGO community or activists –, journalists put significant pressure on EU policymakers through the way in which they defined three policy problems (summarised below). This happened even though EU policymakers chose not to engage with such policy definitions because they diverged significantly from official approaches. At the same time, transnational journalists provided detailed information to the general public, encouraging debate within the public sphere. The three transnational publications claimed that the Union failed miserably and lost its leadership at the Copenhagen summit, being shunned by China and the US, in this way damaging the Union’s reputation. The failure of the Copenhagen summit was defined as a policy problem by the media, which urged the EU to take visible steps in order to convince other states to bind themselves to a progressive agreement – in contrast to the policy definition focusing on the loss of leadership. Due to the high level of publicity and

\textsuperscript{112} EU policymaker 4.
coverage that the summit received, its failure was seen to affect indiscriminately European citizens and peoples around the world. At the same time, the media’s policy definition also found a fit with the overall ambitions of the Commission, which was keen to put the process back on track after the failure of the summit (European Commission, 2010d).

Moreover, the media criticised the EU’s ambiguous attitude towards China, where European businesses were pleased to deal with Beijing, while the official rhetoric criticised China for not adopting a more progressive European agenda. Hence, a number of articles proposed that the EU should have a more coherent approach towards China, a view which did not resonate with that of EU policymakers (European Commissioner for Climate Action, 2010b). This happened because the EU was keen to present itself as a supporter of transparent and fair multilateralism, as one interviewee argued that ‘the greatest strength of the EU is its desire to deal internationally through multilateralism, it’s in its DNA’. Finally, although EU policymakers supported the idea of an equal agreement that would be fair to developing countries, they felt that some journalists were too subjective and highlighted only the sensational, arguing that only developed states should bear the weight of emissions reductions. Moreover, policymakers agreed that this type of framing discredited journalists who were presented to be over critical, since ‘media reporting that is overtly critical doesn’t have a clue (and is not interested) of the political constraints in which EU leaders operate’.

By presenting views from actors outside foreign policy circles, the transnational media encouraged debate and painted a balanced argument, which highlighted a more inclusive picture. Moreover, transnational journalists supported the efforts of environmental NGOs critical of the EU by highlighting the inconsistencies that characterised the Union’s approach to China or the US, and its inability to negotiate with them. However, EU policymakers felt that the high degree of transparency that the EU creates in its approach to climate change by making expectations clear – to the media, the general public and other states – can have a damaging effect on its ability to negotiate with China or the US. Due to the activity of the media which publicises and multiplies the Union’s ambitions in climate change, EU policymakers felt deprived of any leverage in their intergovernmental negotiations with other states, which were aware of the EU’s

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113 EU policymaker 1.
114 EU policymaker 2.
position and could disregard it. According to one EU policymaker, ‘the US does not want media attention, because it would be blamed domestically for binding the country to international agreements and externally for not being ambitious’¹¹⁵. The reverse argument claims that enhanced publicity for the EU’s approach to climate change can gather support from less influential states, which feel disaffected by the US and China’s attitude (Kelemen, 2010; Oberthür and Dupont, 2011; Vogler, 2011).

The agenda setting power of the transnational media in the case of climate change was internally legitimised by the conviction that individuals across the member states supported a progressive and strong stance from the EU. Transnational journalists’ networks of informal ties with EU policymakers allowed them to convey their perceived image of public opinion, which facilitated linking individuals to EU decision-making. Moreover, these relationships gave the opportunity to transnational journalists to put pressure on EU policymakers through their efforts to define two pervasive policy expectations: around the crucial moment that Copenhagen represented in development of global climate change policy and the fact that the EU should make even more ambitious commitments. At times, journalists working for the three publications also acted as activists pushing for a stronger EU presence in global climate change policy, because, as one article in EV put it, climate change was ‘one of the few areas where the EU has consistently won respect and recognition from its citizens’ (European Voice, 19 October 2009).

Agenda setting also stemmed from the way in which the media constructed the two policy expectations, regularly featuring commentaries from individuals throughout Europe, and points of view from various NGOs; in this way, initiating and fostering debate within the public sphere. Even before official rhetoric surfaced, the lack of solidarity among the member states in sharing the burden of tackling climate change was also severely criticised. This attitude was widely shared by most EU policymakers who felt their ideas reinforced by the reporting activities of the media. Through its reporting, the transnational media reinforced EU policymakers own belief that the EU was justified in trying to secure a global deal on climate, in this way boosting its democratic legitimacy. To that extent, by providing thrust to policymakers own views which were also mirrored by the general public, journalists became part of policy processes. Hence, this case confirms the potential of the EU’s foreign policy to enjoy democratic legitimacy through the

¹¹⁵ EU policymaker 4.
activity of the transnational media – which is in the scope of the first research question explored in thesis.

5.3.2 The policy towards Russia
In the second case study, the prevalence of instances of indexing – highlighted in table 5.8 – meant that, at most times, the transnational media provided biased information to the general public and did not spur on public debate. It only reinforced and legitimised at times official current EU policies – having a limited impact on democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, the transnational media criticised the member states for seeking bilateral ties with Russia, rather than achieving a common approach, which left weaker member states vulnerable to Moscow’s political use of energy prices. A stronger EU involvement in the Eastern Neighbourhood was also a pervasive theme throughout the articles analysed. The transnational media presented a more disengaged view on Russia than on climate change, pointing to the idea that it considered it as an area of foreign policy somewhat distant from the general public, and part of high politics. Nevertheless, the war prompted vigorous calls from transnational journalists for the EU to intervene in order to settle the conflict and promote security and stability in the region. This provided EU policymakers with an opportunity and a carte blanche to prove that the Union was truly an important international actor which had the ability to stabilise a conflict on its doorstep. The moderate message that the EU ended up conveying was also mirrored by the transnational media, which argued that the Union needed to act with caution in its relations with Russia and try to develop a strategic partnership with it.

Unlike the case study on climate change policy where indexing processes dominated the media/foreign policy nexus, here the media had a more balanced approach, instances of indexing being outnumbered by those in which journalists sought to influence the foreign policy agenda, together with those of bounding. Nonetheless, due to the fact that Russia was seen as a topic slightly detached from the interests of European citizens, coupled with the perception that dealing with Russia was still the remit of the member states, the transnational media here had only a limited effect in infusing the EU’s approach with democratic legitimacy. The transnational media was more successful in acting as an educator and sometimes a supporter of the Union’s ambitions in the international arena widely shared by EU policymakers. Furthermore, it had the
Table 5.8 Frames present in the transnational media – the policy towards Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Interaction effect</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
<th>EUObserver (%)*</th>
<th>European Voice (%)*</th>
<th>Financial Times (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should be the main actor in dealing with Russia</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>77.10</td>
<td>83.80</td>
<td>87.50</td>
<td>60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is regaining its great power status</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>68.70</td>
<td>61.30</td>
<td>73.60</td>
<td>72.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a security threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>64.30</td>
<td>61.30</td>
<td>61.10</td>
<td>70.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war seen as a Russian aggression</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>50.70</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>59.70</td>
<td>53.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>43.20</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>38.80</td>
<td>45.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should cooperate with Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>38.90</td>
<td>41.30</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>34.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – seen in a negative light</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>35.70</td>
<td>38.80</td>
<td>43.10</td>
<td>25.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach towards Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27.30</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>23.60</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>26.90</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>19.40</td>
<td>33.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>23.80</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>21.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia is responsible for the war</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.
Source: Author’s own calculations (N=227) / EUObserver (N=80); European Voice (N=72); FT (N=75).
potential, in some situations, to link individuals to policymaking through its agenda setting power (by supplying an image of public opinion to EU policymakers).

In this case, indexing effects implied that the media acted as a tool at the disposal of policymakers – which points to low levels of democratic legitimacy. This allowed EU policymakers to gain support for either having a tougher approach towards Russia or advocating the development of a strategic partnership. Journalists acted here as educators of the general public, providing individuals with detailed accounts of the EU’s policies and its approaches. In this way, they aimed to initiate debate within the public sphere on an issue where EU policymakers felt needed more legitimation and justification in front of citizens. The three transnational publications frequently featured articles which contained a policy expectation that the EU should take on the responsibility of dealing with Russia on equal terms and assuring peace and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The transnational media followed official rhetoric in defining the war in Georgia as a threat to the stability of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. Russia was seen as the main aggressor, the media praising the French presidency of the EU for taking a tough stance against Moscow in the initial phases of the conflict.

The transnational media also advocated the need for the EU to reshape its relationship with Russia and build a strategic partnership which would keep the European continent and its near abroad at bay from instability. Transnational journalists achieved this by highlighting the common values and historical heritage that Moscow shared with Europe, which as a policy solution meant that the EU should treat Russia as an equal and take into account its interests. The EU policymakers interviewed for this thesis were keen to argue that the prospect of a strategic partnership originated from within the Commission and that this has been often picked up and reinforced by journalists. According to one official from the EEAS the ‘strategic partnership with Russia involves foreign policy cooperation, climate change, multilateral engagement, development aid, self recognition’. Simultaneously, journalists working for transnational publications argued that they felt favourable towards the prospect of building a stronger

\[116\] Finally, the media transmitted the policy expectation held and articulated mostly by Commission officials (European Commission, 2008c; Barroso, 2010; EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2010) and MEPs (European Parliament, 2008) that, while taking into account Russia’s interests, the EU should strive to support its eastern neighbours in their path to democratisation and development.

\[117\] EU policymaker 9.
partnership with Russia\textsuperscript{118}, and hence compelled to report on and inform the public general regarding this initiative. This policy solution was facilitated by the fact that it was based on broad consensus among the member states. Although, generally, the EU’s policy towards Russia was perceived by the three transnational media not to affect large populations within Europe, transnational journalists defined the EU’s vulnerability to Russia’s political use of energy prices as a policy problem to which large populations within the Union were sensitive.

Instances of bounding were present in situations where the media identified divisions among the member states as one of the most salient policy problems, hampering the EU’s approach towards Russia and its efforts to stabilise the conflict. On the one hand, the three transnational publications criticised big member states such as Germany or France for their appeasing attitude towards Russia. On the other, Poland or other new member states from CEE were presented as taking an unnecessary tough stance against Russia. While the Commission or the EP informally sided with both types of arguments\textsuperscript{119}, the member states in question and their representatives in the Council were unwilling to engage with the problems defined by the media (Council of the European Union, 2008c). However, media discourse mirrored here voices from the Commission, which were seen as being too critical of the member states to be stated through official channels. The three transnational publications also sought to maintain a balanced position towards Russia throughout the period analysed. Voices from Russian political elites and representatives were often featured, and reinforced the view that Moscow should be seen as part of Europe, and that its intervention in Georgia was justified by the need to help its citizens. In only a limited number of articles, the three transnational publications identified a policy problem in the fact that the war might have been caused by Georgia’s rash actions.

Although most articles expressed the policy expectation that the EU should take the lead in promoting democracy and modernisation in Russia in order to achieve stability in the Eastern neighbourhood, a number of arguments were put forward especially in the FT in order to highlight the fact that the EU did not and could not possess the political willingness and military capabilities in order to back up such an ambitious goal. This was linked to a policy solution which argued that the US would be better equipped to deal with Russia and ensure peace and

\textsuperscript{118} Transnational journalist 2.

\textsuperscript{119} EU policymakers 7, 9.
stability in the region. The transnational media provided here information and criticism departing from the mainstream and official rhetoric, outlining a balanced and objective picture. Bounding also implied that transnational journalists presented information to individuals within the public sphere which otherwise would have been inaccessible to them, encouraging in this way public debate. Moreover, transnational journalists were perceived here to focus on conflict and sensational news, rather than on policy successes, due to their lack of knowledge about the constraints and the complexity which characterises decision-making in foreign policy. Because the policy towards Russian was widely viewed by both journalists and policymakers as a domain of high politics, this policy definition was not successful in influencing the foreign policy agenda. However, it managed to constrain the actions of EU policymakers only in the first instances of the conflict, due to high levels of coverage.

The most salient policy problem defined by the transnational media referred to Russia regaining its superpower stratus due to its intervention in Georgia. Discourse throughout the three publications signalled a shift in Russia’s reputation and stance, which now desired and proved it had the means to recover its hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space. This policy problem was backed up with arguments derived from recent developments in the international arena, where Russia was increasingly using energy prices in order to condition political outcomes. Policymakers were urged to take into account Russia’s new status and felt compelled to revise their policy. According to one EEAS official, Russia wanted ‘also to be an equal partner of the EU and US mostly due to its past status’120. Across the three transnational publications the idea that the Union should step-up and be the main actor in pacifying the conflict which was on its doorstep became prevalent. Through this, transnational journalists provided thrust to EU policymakers’ own understanding that the Union should develop its own relationship with Russia. The transnational media also acted as a gatekeeper of the EU’s commitment to aiding the democratising processes of the countries in its Eastern Neighbourhood. At times, it reminded policymakers that promoting a Russia first policy was detrimental to the development of its Eastern neighbours. In the way it was framed, this policy expectation reinforced the widespread desire to build a stronger EU foreign policy held by both journalists and policymakers (Matlary, 2006; Gariup, 2008; Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011). At the same time, it damaged its own

120 EU policymaker 8.
foundations by emphasising the EU’s lack of capacity and instruments to act in the international arena relative to other world powers.

EU policymakers especially from the Commission banked on the support of the media\textsuperscript{121} and often reaffirmed the EU’s commitment and willingness to aid the states in the region (European Commission, 2008b, 2009a; EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2010). Although the transnational media through its policy definitions gave drive to certain EU approaches in its relations with Russia, its ability did not stem from the activism of journalists or the general public’s (low) interest in the issue. Similarly to the case of climate change, the agenda setting powers of the transnational media were predicated upon journalists’ informal ties and trust relationships built in time with EU policymakers. Transnational journalists seemed to take pride in influencing the EU’s policy towards Russia. This happened because they perceive it as an area of high politics to which they take pride in being part of, as according to one journalist enhancing its diplomacy should be a prime concern for the EU, to which journalists could also contribute\textsuperscript{122}. Furthermore, agenda setting relied on the view held by EU policymakers that the media can paint a sufficiently reliable picture of public opinion, which endowed transnational journalists with the ability to link individuals to decision-making by providing their feedback to EU policymakers\textsuperscript{123}.

\subsection*{5.4 Conclusions}

The analysis of interaction effects in this chapter has highlighted that transnational journalists, deeply immersed in the ‘Brussels bubble’, rarely go out of their way to criticise the EU. They get most of their information regarding the EU’s foreign policy either through informal means based on trust relationships, or through the official communication channels of the Union. Moreover, the ‘Brussels bubble’ infuses journalists with a sense of optimism regarding European integration and the EU’s ability and duty to shape events in the international arena, which translated into the prevalence of instances of indexing. On most occasions, the transnational media acted as a third arm of the EU, publicising and gathering support for its policies, whilst also fostering debate

\textsuperscript{121} EU policymakers 5-7.
\textsuperscript{122} Transnational journalist 1.
\textsuperscript{123} EU policymakers 7-10.
within the public sphere. This attitude was mainly influenced by two factors. Firstly, it was influenced by the belief shared by EU policymakers that even though on the surface the EU’s foreign policy might seem detached from citizens, the various aspects of democratic legitimacy and a concern for mitigating the EU’s democratic deficit form an integral part of decision-making in this policy area. Transnational journalists argue that the EU is sufficiently transparent and willing to debate policy initiatives and proposals within the European public sphere – although this is not always evident in policy outcomes. Moreover, they agree with EU policymakers in arguing that is in the EU’s DNA to be open to public debate, as its institutions are very transparent and regularly consult with stakeholders and civil society.

Secondly, openness and transparency characterises EU policymakers’ engagement with journalists which they view to be key to the interaction with the general public, as the media has the ability to portray the policy preferences of individuals within the EU. Transparency is paramount in every institution’s day to day activities, but more so in the Commission (Curtin, 2007). EU policymakers argue that there is a high degree of openness towards public debate, where impact assessments are open to the public and to all other institutions in the EU (Góra, Mach and Trenz, 2012). Moreover, in general, scholars and practitioners argue that at the transnational level democracy works in practice through overarching consultations with all strata of society (Abromeit, 1998; Eriksen, 2007; DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann, 2007). At a deeper level, openness, transparency and accountability to each and every citizen are seen as crucial for upholding the EU’s commitment to democratic values and principles. EU policymakers indicate the existence of different aspects of accountability, but ultimately argue that they feel they are accountable to the public, while some felt accountable to the ‘rules and values of the EU’.

Nevertheless, the three transnational publications due to their commitment to the principle of objectivity and their high levels of professionalism framed contrasting (and sometimes conflicting) policy definitions, in this way providing individuals in the public sphere information which would have otherwise inaccessible. In both case studies, instances of bounding were evident in situations where the media featured mostly severe criticism which was directed

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124 EU policymakers 1, 3 7, 9.  
125 Transnational journalists 1-6.  
126 Transnational journalists 1-6.  
127 EU policymakers 1, 3, 5, 8.  
128 EU policymaker 1.
towards the Union’s inability to live up to its ambitious goals, or the tendency of some member states to act individually, while disregarding the common values shared by the Union. In the realm of foreign policy, Eurosceptic journalism seems to be almost non-existent. Moreover, in instances of agenda setting the transnational media highlighted that the EU should do more in the international arena. This in turn, allowed policymakers often to legitimise their normative discourse by alluding to the need to address the criticism expressed in the media that the EU should do more in foreign policy. Contrary to other policy areas, where Hooghe and Marks (2009) recently argued that through politicisation of European issues and increased public debate, the permissive consensus which provided thrust to European integration has transformed into constraining dissensus, foreign policy – at the transnational level – is still reinforced by a deep perception perpetuated by the media that individuals support a stronger European presence in the international arena. The pervasiveness of the EU in the policy definitions framed by the three transnational publications also points to the intense Europeanisation of their discourse – having the Union as a central theme.
Chapter 6 – The United Kingdom

As with the case of other empirical chapters, this chapter will first provide a description of the context within which journalists and policymakers interact, followed by an analysis of interaction effects in the two cases studies and a discussion of their meaning for the role of democratic legitimacy\textsuperscript{129} – in this way exploring the two research questions. Two newspapers were selected as representative for the British media: the Guardian, and the Times. The distribution of the articles within the two newspapers is presented in annex A in table A.1 (page 301), and the coverage of the two case studies in figures A.1, respectively A.2. Annex D highlights that in the case of climate change, the period surveyed was 1 June 2009 – 1 June 2010, with 136 articles selected. On other hand, in the case of the policy towards Russia the period examined stretched six months before and after the conflict (8 March 2008 – 5 March 2009), with 181 articles selected.

6.1 The media/foreign policy nexus

With the late 90s, equating the UK’s national interest to the development of a strong European foreign policy became a recurrent theme for British leaderships (Cameron 1999). For example, former Foreign Secretary David Miliband stressed on many occasions Britain’s need to contribute to the foreign policy of the EU and embrace it: ‘to be frightened of European foreign policy is blinkered, fatalistic and wrong (...) Britain should embrace it, shape it and lead European foreign policy’ (The Guardian, 26 October 2009). Nonetheless, British support for the EU’s foreign policy has been often limited only to an abstract goal and its possible consequences, but almost never expressed in relation to the methods that could turn such an

\textsuperscript{129} ‘British policymakers’ refer in this chapter to British professionals who are or have been involved in policymaking in the UK in climate change and the policy towards Russia – interviews and questionnaires with three British policymakers have been conducted. On the other hand, ‘British journalists’ refer in this chapter to journalists working for the British newspapers analysed (the Guardian and the Times) and focus their writing on the two issue areas of foreign policy – interviews and questionnaires with four British journalists have been conducted.
aspiration into reality. Criticism towards the EEAS is indicative of British distrust for modes of further integration in foreign policy and diplomacy devised at the supranational level (Burke, 2012). Public opinion surveys highlight the same tendency for the British general public, who is more willing to accept ‘more Europe’ (German Marshall Fund 2010) in foreign policy than in other policy areas (European Commission 2006; YouGov-Cambridge 2012), and even consider an individual approach from Britain less desirable than a unified European policy.

Both the Russian-Georgian war and the Copenhagen summit attracted the direct involvement of Prime Minister Brown and members of his cabinet, who offered myriad interviews to the media, whilst writing editorials which explained Britain and the EU’s positions. Britain’s approach to climate change differs significantly from that of other member states (Harris, 2007a, p. 23). It has made the most important contribution towards emission reductions, thus reinforcing the EU’s burden sharing approach. Together with Germany, it has pushed for tougher climate change regulations within the EU (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, p.25). Furthermore, during the last decade (i.e. between 1999 and 2009) the British government has invested a lot of resources in tackling climate change, together with hiring a large number of personnel. Ed Miliband acted as Climate Change Secretary and spearheaded the UK, and the Union’s efforts during the Copenhagen summit. On the other hand, Britain’s lack of dependence on Russian energy and its geographical remoteness have made it less interested than other member states in dealing with Moscow on bilateral terms, and more in favour of a European multilateral framework (Lynch, 2005; Christou, 2010). During the Russian-Georgian war, David Miliband as foreign secretary led the opposition towards Russia’s aggression by visiting Georgia and reassuring its leadership of Western support. Nonetheless, the limited peace agreement brokered by France and Germany which saw Russia as the de facto winner in the region was duly accepted by the British government (Cornell and Starr, 2009; Asmus, 2010; David, 2011).

To a larger extent than in the case of the European or Romanian parliaments, the British parliament is able to exercise effective oversight on Britain’s foreign policy and its activity in the EU through its select committees (Bulley, 2011). For example, during the war between Russia and Georgia (and in its aftermath) the Select Committee on EU Affairs held numerous hearings with members from the cabinet and issued reports on how the EU should deal with the conflict, whilst also assessing its activity after the ceasefire (House of Commons, 2008; House of Lords,
The Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change acted similarly, issuing numerous reports on the EU’s approach to global climate change, or holding hearings with scientists, NGOs and members of the cabinet (House of Lords, 2009c, 2009b, 2009d, 2010). Effective parliamentary oversight is part of a larger pattern, where decision-making processes in the UK in relation to the two case studies are made transparent through the well updated websites of institutions and the various public information campaigns they organise. Transparency, on the other hand seems to be much lower in quality than at the transnational level, very often specific information about policies and policymakers being hidden or even absent altogether\(^{130}\). British policymakers have mixed feelings about the relationship between democratic legitimacy and foreign policy, however they are keen to emphasise that accountability and transparency are paramount in their daily activity (Burke, 2012). According to one interviewee, democracy ‘decreases the effectiveness of policies as bureaucrats have to listen to electoral pressures from their ministers which most times, when confronted with technical issues constrain them not to take the most appropriate course of action’\(^{131}\). However, British policymakers contend that the media can reflect the views shared by the general public, and more importantly can be used as a way of interacting with citizens, surveying their opinions and receiving feedback on policies. As interest among citizens and availability of information regarding the EU (in most of its aspects) is quite scarce in the UK, the media is thought to have a central role in influencing the democratic legitimacy of the Union in Britain (Morgan, 1995; Hurrelmann, 2008). This makes the enquiry (in the case of the UK) into the two research questions explored in this thesis even more relevant.

In chapter 4 it was stressed that the British media system is characterised by non-institutionalised self-regulation, strong commercial and market orientation, and high levels of professionalism. In judging the level of professionalism of publications in reporting about foreign policy issues and the EU, British policymakers argue that it is proportional to the number of foreign correspondents, resources, the political orientation and the ability to capture and portray polarised views within the political arena and the public sphere\(^{132}\). There is a widely shared view that quality media tends to have a balanced approach, albeit subjective and infused with political

\(^{130}\) British policymakers 1-3.
\(^{131}\) British policymaker 2.
\(^{132}\) British policymakers 1-3.
considerations. In practice this assessment translates into the fact that British policymakers are attentive and exclusive in terms of the journalists they choose to interact with and provide background information, making informal ties and personal relationships very important (Henningham and Delano, 1998; Mannin, 2010; Hug, 2011). Trust relationships build in time and are maintained by continuous feedback loops between policymakers and journalists. Institutions also maintain blacklists which contain journalists that have misused quotes or background information.\textsuperscript{133}

British journalists believe that while their readers are generally interested in foreign policy – including global climate and the policy towards Russia –, they do not possess the necessary knowledge in order to understand the complexity of decision-making in foreign policy (even more in the case of the EU).\textsuperscript{134} On the other hand, scholars and practitioners contend that within the British media there is a tendency to treat issues related to the EU as external topics related to foreign policy (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Kent, 2005; Statham, 2007a). British journalists argue that they are simply reporters, while some put emphasis on their role as educators of the general public or political partisans.\textsuperscript{135} Capturing their readerships’ attention, access to policymakers and the availability of news space are thought to have significant influence on their reporting decisions. Commercial or editorial pressures, journalists’ own knowledge of the topic or access to expert knowledge are generally not considered to have a great impact on the way in which British journalists choose to report. The EU is considered to provide specialist knowledge and to be very accessible, as well as the UK national representation in Brussels. British journalists contact the EU’s institutions for information only occasionally.\textsuperscript{136} Very often, journalists target both national and transnational publics, and sometimes other journalists, academia or civil society. To a greater extent than in the case of journalists working for transnational publications or the Romanian media, British journalists do not have too much time because they need to write every day a blog piece, a news piece for the printed version, contribute to the website of the publication, whilst also responding to comments online.\textsuperscript{137}  

\textsuperscript{133}British policymakers 1, 2.  
\textsuperscript{134}British journalists 2, 3.  
\textsuperscript{135}British journalists 1-4.  
\textsuperscript{136}British journalists 1-3.  
\textsuperscript{137}British journalists 1-3.
British policymakers are frequently interviewed by the media as they view it as an effective avenue for giving voice to their policies in order to gain public support. They contend that a two-way process characterises their interactions with journalists. The media needs policymakers for sources, and policymakers use the media in order to publicise their policies, legitimise their actions or boost their reputation. Furthermore, the media is employed in order to encourage and foster public debate in relation to issues that British policymakers feel require public legitimation (Bond, 2003; Berkel, 2006). This belief is predicated upon the idea that the media can reflect a reliable image of the state of public opinion. Moreover, British policymakers argue that the media can provide feedback from individuals on their policies, which allows them to adjust the way in which policies are officially framed and presented to the general public.

British journalists also pride themselves in the fact that they sometimes act as educators, providing crucial information about foreign policy or the EU to citizens which otherwise would have been inaccessible. Accordingly, indexing (as well as bounding and agenda setting) is more successful in instances where policy definitions are framed in a way in which they affect large groups of individuals both within Britain and globally. Policy problems are also more pervasive when they converge with definitions articulated by the UN or the US – due to the traditionally strong transatlantic relations. Policy solutions and expectations are successfully indexed when they resemble high political administrative viability based on consensus in the political sphere, or respectively draw on the broader British social, cultural or political context.

British journalists engage in investigative reporting, and due to their commitment to the principle of objectivity aim to present polarised views from all the actors affected by the topic they report on (Henningham and Delano, 1998; Gavin, 2001). The bipolar structure of the British political landscape means journalists also draw their sources from the opposition, or from other actors outside foreign policy circles. Bounding is more evident in situations where decision-making processes lack transparency and British policymakers shy away from the limelight, avoiding public scrutiny or being held accountable. The media acts here as a watchdog of democracy, encouraging public debate and contestation within the public sphere, whilst putting British policymakers and their policies in the spotlight. On the other hand, British policymakers justify

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138 British policymakers 1, 2.
139 British policymaker 2.
140 British journalists 2, 3.
their decision not to take into account the discourse of the media and its perceived view of public opinion because journalists are thought to be prone to focus on conflict and sensational news (Kent, 2005). Newspapers are also considered to have their own agenda in reporting about foreign policy and the EU, sometimes being prone to search for sensational news. Coupled with the lack of detailed technical knowledge that journalists have about decision-making, it decreases the influence of the media. British policymakers argue that in such instances, the media fails in delivering a clear picture of their policies to the general public, and misleads citizens into rejecting them. Hence, journalists are seen as tending to dismiss policies which fall outside accepted boundaries due to the fact that they often lack specialist knowledge about foreign policy which would allow them to grasp the constraints and the complexity of decision-making in this policy area\textsuperscript{141}. Secondly, there is a perception that media owners and British journalists’ own activism can have malign effects on the way in which policies are received by the general public. This leads British policymakers to the idea that through its discourse, the British media is able to produce significant damage to the reputation of politicians and even states or international organisations (Morgan, 1995; Hurrelmann, 2008; Gavin, 2010).

Agenda setting relies on the network of interactions and dialogue that journalists maintain with policymakers. British journalists are here able to both put pressure on policymakers and convince them to adapt their policies, and through their partisanship very often become part of the political process. Journalists are able to frequently link individuals to policymaking by providing information to citizens regarding decision-making or the way policies are implemented, and then convey their feedback to policymakers. In relation to policy solutions, agenda setting is more successful when little policy and administrative accommodation is needed, and there is wide consensus among political parties. The agenda setting power of the media also manifests itself when British journalists act as activists and diligently pursue various issues which they perceive to have wide social and economic implications, and where political action is urgently needed. They achieve this through investigative journalism or by giving voice to various groups within the public or NGOs. Similarly, both the Guardian and the Times often feature public information campaigns and debates which run sometimes for weeks. Moreover, journalists’ diligence allows them to follow-up on policymakers’ promises and commitments, acting as their gatekeeper. In

\textsuperscript{141} British policymakers 1, 2.
the context of the structure of the British media/foreign policy nexus described in this section, the next sections will analyse interaction effects between the media and policymakers in the two cases and discuss their implications for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy – aiming to explore the two research questions set out in the introductory chapter.

6.2 Interaction effects

6.2.1 Climate Change

Indexing

Indexing in the case of climate change was present in the way in which the media drew on British policymakers’ rhetoric in order to define one policy problem, two solutions and an expectation. Firstly, climate change was extensively presented as a threat to global security in the medium and long term, with around 95% of the articles (highlighted in table 6.1) warning about the risks associated with it. This policy problem drew on the approach of both the British government and the parliament, which argued that in the medium and long term climate change can have negative consequences on the security and wellbeing of peoples around the world – which could also affect the UK and the EU (Miliband, 2009a). More specifically, climate change was charged with increasing the vulnerability of states to prolonged droughts and severe floods, and with encouraging desertification, the degradation of ecosystems, or with leading to reduced agricultural productivity (Miliband, 2010b). For example, in a report on ‘Adapting to climate change: EU agriculture and forestry’, British MPs acknowledged that ‘climate change will have major consequences for food production, water availability, ecosystems and human health, migration pressures, and regional instability’ (House of Lords, 2010, p.8). Moreover, Prime Minister Brown, in the build up to the summit, vigorously combated the idea that climate change was not a long term danger due to the absence of clear and trustable scientific evidence, noting that ‘those people who have become climate change deniers are against the grain of all the evidence that has been assembled that global warming and climate change are indeed challenges that the world must meet and that can only be met together’ (Press Association, 2010). As inferred in the model described in chapter 3, the two British newspapers publicised here the official approach of the government, which identified climate change as a threat in the medium
and long term, in this way gathering public support, but also opening the issue for public debate. In the way defined by the British media, this policy problem became legitimate due to its large and indiscriminate effects on peoples globally and its convergence with policy definitions constructed by the UN. Through regularly presenting detailed scientific evidence and analyses, British journalists also acted as educators providing citizens a wealth of information about the threat posed by climate change in the medium and long term.

Table 6.1 Indexing – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>94.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>68.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal climate change deal</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>37.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming other states</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>36.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>31.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

Within the EU, Britain was pushing for an agreement which would have been fair for developing countries, and entailed aid from rich countries to poor countries. This approach was justified by the fact that ‘some countries and regions are already vulnerable to climate variability and change, but in the coming decades all countries will be affected, regardless of their affluence or individual emissions’ (House of Lords, 2010, p.8). The British media also afforded considerable publishing space to issues of global justice and equality in climate change policy, a policy solution which was seen as enjoying high political and administrative viability stemming from the consensus in the British political sphere. Hence, the need for a deal that would ‘have at its heart equity and social justice between north and south’ (The Guardian, 30 September 2009) was a pervasive policy solution proposed by the two newspapers. Accordingly, the EU was seen as responsible for securing an agreement at Copenhagen that would be fair for developing countries. Even though the Union was committed to aiding poor countries with several tens of billions of Euro, the media still criticised the fact that most of the member states were not doing enough to convince tax payers about the need to tackle climate change. Here again, British journalists assumed the role of educators, providing information to the general public within the public sphere. They achieved this through a series of articles in both newspapers which concentrated on how developed countries have profited throughout history in the detriment of

142 Aid would have increased from 10 billion dollars in the first year to 100 billion in 2020 (Miliband, 2009b).
poorer countries from the south which are now the main victims of climate change (The Times, 20, 23, 27 October 2009; The Guardian, 25 September 2009, 10, 15 November 2009). At the same time, in defining an equal agreement as a viable policy solution, the media chose to create publicity for an initiative that the British government was ardently supporting within the EU.

Another policy solution – which sought to justify the Union’s inability to negotiate a progressive deal – constructed by British policymakers and taken up the media, involved putting the blame on other states on like China or the US for refusing to comply within international emissions reduction standards. In contrast to these states, Britain through the EU was willing to safeguard the environmental security of future generations and act as a leader by example in climate change policy. The EU’s unique position as a normative leader in climate change was constructed negatively against the US and China. Putting the blame on other states for not doing enough or not living up to their commitments was a method present almost in 40 percent of the articles in the sample. Titles like ‘Your emission cuts are not enough, EU tells Obama’ (The Times, 8 December 2009) worked to build up the Union’s moral stature, from which, it was hoped, it could usher in a more progressive and fair agreement at the Copenhagen summit. Despite traditionally strong transatlantic relations, British policymakers framed the leadership of the EU in climate change in opposition to the actions of the US. The British media incorporated the official rhetoric about the US in its discourse, claiming on many occasions that the US adopted a rather detached attitude towards climate change, which could have on the long run harmful effects for all the peoples around the world. Thus, in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit there was an overarching feeling that if an ambitious agreement would fail, the US would be responsible: as its ‘ignorance about the risks and reality of global warming could sink hopes of a new global deal to control greenhouse gas emissions at December's climate talks in Copenhagen’ (The Guardian, 29 September 2009).

Although recognised as the biggest polluter in the world, China received less harsh reviews from the British media in relation to its approach to climate change. Media discourse was in line here with the views of the British government which on many occasions encouraged China to bind itself to a progressive agreement (Gray, 2009; House of Lords, 2009d; Richardson, 2009; Miliband, 2010a; Press Association, 2010). For example, after the summit, the British foreign secretory David Miliband visited China arguing that it had received unnecessary bad PR: ‘it still
baffles me why some people continue to make an issue about China’ (Pomfret, 2010). Similarly, Ed Miliband before the summit pointed to the high possibility of a failure: ‘there is a wider question, too, about the structures and nature of the negotiations (…) we cannot again allow negotiations on real points of substance to be hijacked in this way’ (Miliband, 2009b). Indexing implied here that the media drew on the discourse of both British and EU policymakers which underscored the US or China as scapegoats in order to justify the Union’s weak influence and policy outcomes. While on the one hand, the two British newspapers publicised the government’s approach, building public support, on the other, they sent a clear message to non-EU states regarding the Union’s normative intentions which mounted significant international pressure on the US or China.

Even though the media was largely disappointed with the outcomes of the Copenhagen summit and the EU’s inability to convince other states to commit to effectively tackling the effects of climate change through a global accord, around 30 percent of the articles still claimed the Union had the potential bounce back. As such, both newspapers were still highly supportive and constructed a policy expectation that the Union should try to reassert itself as leader in climate change. The Times (18 February 2010) went as far as to publish an opinion piece from various British and European leaders which had the role of reassuring readers that: ‘the EU must reaffirm its role as a leader within a multipolar world, setting itself out as a secure reference point for democracy, human rights and social progress for the world’ (The Guardian, 3 January 2010). This policy expectation was linked to a broader expectation frequently expressed by the British government throughout the timeframe explored. According to it, even though the EU was committed to and engaged in tackling the effects of climate change, some member states were still unwilling to fully comply. This hindered the Union’s success in the international arena and its ability to act as model for other states (Miliband, 2009a; Richardson, 2009; House of Lords, 2010). Indexing implied in this case that the media was used by British policymakers in order to voice, publicise and justify their ambitions that the EU should engage even more, and their conviction that in the light of the outcome of the Copenhagen summit, the Union had not lost its global leadership.\footnote{\textsuperscript{143} British policymakers 1, 2.}
Bounding

Bounding was evident (shown in table 6.2) in the way the two British newspapers presented the summit through two policy problems. Firstly, the days of the summit determined a shift in the way the EU was seen and presented to the general public as a leader in climate change policy. During the summit it became apparent for the British media that the EU would not be able to assume leadership and broker an agreement on climate change that would commit the US or China, and help poor countries – which spelled a disappointing outcome for the summit. In the run-up the summit, the British media warned that due to American pressures, the EU was ready to accept a watered down version of the agreement, replacing its commitment to ‘30% cuts by 2020 with 30% by 2025’ (The Guardian, 18 December 2009). Britain’s Prime Minister Brown, in a series of interviews published in both the Guardian and the Times also admitted that failure at the summit was a real possibility (The Guardian, 19 December 2009; The Times, 19 December 2009). There was uncertainty about the prospects for an agreement – ‘as more than 115 world leaders descend on Copenhagen to make the crucial decisions, what can we expect? Nobody really knows’ (The Guardian, 17 December 2009). The Times (18 December 2009) went as far as to set up an online poll and debate where people could express their opinion about the possible outcome of the summit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>41.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>23.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK should lead by example independently</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

Secondly, the two newspapers identified a policy problem in the fact that the EU had not backed up its ambitious and normative rhetoric, and had lost its global leadership: ‘we now need to see more from Brussels, both in terms of emissions cuts and climate financing’ (The Guardian, 17 December 2009). The limited agreement that the EU achieved at Copenhagen and its exclusion from the negotiations between China and the US was presented in the British media as a significant failure for both the UK and the Union. A lack of political leadership on the part of the EU was framed as the main cause of the failure in Copenhagen ‘which has put the whole world more at risk’ (The Guardian, 13 March 2010). For the next three months, the Copenhagen summit became a point of reference, against which the British media would compare policy
initiatives that did not live up to their goals: ‘like the Copenhagen summit, it has been a largely miserable event, exposing the limits of environmental co-operation’ (The Guardian, 23 March 2010). Simultaneously, the British media noted that the outcome of the summit had the potential of raising electricity bills throughout Britain, as European industries would find it more and more difficult to cope with competition from other firms that are not subject to such ambitious reduction commitments.

In the aftermath of the summit, the British media also presented a series of opinions from researchers and think tanks that were disappointed with the EU’s failure to secure an ambitious agreement. The Union was considered to have an inferior power to China and the US: ‘the message that Copenhagen sent is that Europe is not at the table (...) the fact of the matter is that Europe’s leaders were taking a coffee and (Barack) Obama visited them at the coffee break. But he negotiated with others’, according to a senior EU independent advisor (The Guardian, 9 February 2010). Conversely, British journalists presented points of view from actors outside policy circles in order to highlight the failure of the EU at the summit and inform the general public regarding the reasons that led to it. As detailed in the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3, through this, the British media contributed to encouraging debate within the public sphere on the issue of climate change. However, the media was perceived not to have access to all the details of the negotiations that took place behind closed doors at Copenhagen, and thus to be prone to dismiss any outcome that diverged from the ambitious expectations that were previously associated with the summit. According to one British policymaker, the British media was oblivious or ignorant of the fact that there was ‘considerable pressure on the EU to do more which made it cave (...) the transparent nature of the EU’s internal negotiation outcome and its stance at the Copenhagen gave away its leverages in negotiations with the US and China’ 144.

Bounding was present here because, after the summit, British policymakers admitted that Copenhagen had been an obvious failure due to the fact that it did not establish a clear timetable for a legal and globally binding treaty, but continued to stress their commitment to tackling global climate change (Miliband, 2010a, 2010c). According to Ed Miliband, the UK and the EU had to reflect on the outcome of the summit and devise new approaches in order to secure an inclusive global agreement: ‘we have to begin by understanding the lessons of what went wrong

144 British policymaker 2.
but also recognise the achievements that it secured (…) this was a chaotic process dogged by procedural games’ (Miliband, 2009b). In various official documents (House of Lords, 2009c, 2009b, 2009d; Miliband, 2009a, 2010a) both the British government and the parliament presented the outcome of the summit in a positive light, claiming that even though on the surface the summit might have seemed like a failure, it actually progressed in a substantial manner the negotiation process, highlighting the EU’s ability to effectively lead in global climate change policy. These documents argued that it was for the first time that an agreement was signed by 49 states which produced 80% of global emissions. At the same time, the agreement endorsed ‘the limit of two degrees warming as the benchmark for global progress on climate change’ (Miliband, 2010c) and made significant commitments for rich countries to aid third world and developing states.

Agenda setting
Agenda setting was present in the way the British media constructed three salient frames which are highlighted in table 6.3. A significantly lower number of media reports\textsuperscript{145} – than those framing climate change as a medium to long term threat – considered that climate change was also a present threat and urgent policy problem. At times, official rhetoric also emphasised the urgency that tackling climate change presupposed, but argued that in order to be effective any measure had to be carefully thought through and implemented according to local circumstances (Gray, 2009; Richardson, 2009; The Telegraph, 2009). Ed Miliband agreed with the views expressed by the British media and in an interview for the Guardian (26 June 2009) highlighted the fact that: ‘people believe climate change is happening in the UK, most people do not think it is a plot or something made up, but most people do not seem to think it will happen in their area’. By framing climate change as an urgent issue which had to be mitigated at the Copenhagen summit, the British media acted as an agenda setter telling people how to view climate change and pushing policymakers for more commitment.

The success of the media’s policy definition was facilitated by the indiscriminate effects that climate change was perceived to have on peoples globally. Furthermore, this policy problem converged with and drew on definitions framed by the UN, by British policymakers (whose

\textsuperscript{145} Than those framing climate change as a medium to long term threat.
views were only marginal before the summit and became prevalent during it\(^\text{146}\) and the perceived state of public opinion in Britain and the EU – which was understood to favour immediate action. Through its agenda setting power, the British media had the potential to link individuals to decision-making processes, by conveying their views to policymakers and encouraging debate within the public sphere. Journalists achieved this by frequently featuring views from the general public such as opinion polls, op-eds and letters to the editor, all of which criticised and urged British policymakers to do more in order to tackle climate change. Environmental campaigners were also presented in a positive light in the two newspapers. Reports showed in detail how over 10000 protesters were arrested in Copenhagen, having their rights infringed. The Guardian showed more initiative, starting a campaign (10:10) that urged people to set an example by helping Britain to cut greenhouse gases by 10% by 2010 (The Guardian, 2 September 2009). The campaign had two main goals: the first was to inform world leaders about popular commitment to tackling global climate change. Secondly, in the context in which states like US or China opposed an ambitious international agreement, the campaign strived to make people conscious of their power to make positive changes to the environment – even if global leaders avoided tackling such changes in the climate with urgency:

in other words, our elected leaders are giving us – at best – a coin-flip chance of avoiding catastrophe. It is hard to imagine a more total failing of our political system. Imagine if they were standing at a plane door: "Come on citizens, get on this plane – 50/50 chance of a safe landing . . ." All of which means that we non-politician human beings who depend on the climate remaining habitable had best jump into action (The Guardian, 3 September 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen – a crucial moment</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>78.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is happening now</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>55.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is the only actor that can forge a global agreement on climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>45.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

\(^{146}\) British policymaker 2; British journalists 1, 2.
The coverage of climate change during the selected timeframe – which is highlighted in figure A.1 (page 301) – in the two British newspapers shows that the main policy expectation expressed by the media framed the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit as a crucial moment in the global fight against climate change. A ‘truly momentous event’, the Times (24 October 2009) underlined, where 20000 people from 198 countries converged to discuss the fate of climate change policy; an underlying idea that was identified in a significant number of articles. On their part, British policymakers argued that the summit was a critical moment, where the EU could have effectively taken charge of the negotiations and driven forward a progressive accord. However, officially the use of both formal and informal channels was seen as paramount for the success of the conference: ‘if we want to do a deal we will need to create greater momentum and make active efforts to find solutions (...) we need more progress before the leaders arrive’ (House of Lords, 2010). Similarly to the model specified in chapter 3, the agenda setting power of the media implied here that British policymakers were responsive to journalists’ discourse and felt compelled to add more salience to the way in which they perceived the Copenhagen summit and the EU’s role in tackling climate change. Through this, British journalists not only encouraged and fostered debate by providing citizens detailed information about the summit and the global challenges posed by climate change, but through their dialogue with policymakers became part of the political process. Furthermore, British journalists covered the summit extensively, sometimes their reporting being infused with activism and overt support for the need to forge an accord at the summit that would immediately and effectively tackle the effects of climate change.

Before the summit, the Union was presented as the most important actor that could forge an agreement on climate change. In another instance of agenda setting, the British media featured the expectation that the EU would live up to its commitments and lead the Copenhagen summit towards a progressive global accord. Journalists put pressure on British policymakers to act through the framework of the EU and also try to convince other member states to commit to more ambitious measures. Continuous dialogue and interactions between British policymakers and journalists enhanced the agenda setting power of the media, whereby journalists also became part of the political process. Thus, the British media associated the summit with a strong policy expectation – becoming gatekeeper of policymakers’ commitments –, whereby Copenhagen was

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147 British policymakers 1-3.
148 British journalists 1-4.
an opportunity for the EU to do more and pursue its global leadership. It had the potential to address the shortcomings of the emissions trading regime by committing all of its member states to clear policies. Such a display would serve as a model for other countries and would endow the global leadership of the EU with legitimacy in the international arena. At the same time, the British media claimed that the EU should do more in order to forge a progressive global agreement on climate change because it was the only international actor that had the potential to do so. The British official rhetoric stressed the ability of the EU to act as leader in climate change and to drive forward a global agreement, whilst warning that in order to do this the member states would have to live up to their commitments. A further incentive recognised by the government for the EU to assume a leading role in tackling climate change involved linkages between financial assistance and migration towards the Union, whereby funding the adaptation of developing countries might have limited immigration to the EU (Miliband, 2009a, 2009b).

6.2.2 The policy towards Russia

Indexing
The main interaction effect identified in the case of the policy towards Russia was undoubtedly indexing. During the initial phases of the conflict, Russia was presented as the aggressor by around three quarters of the articles (highlighted in table 6.4), defining a policy problem to which Britain and the EU had to respond swiftly. During the first days of the Georgian-Russian war, the British media featured articles which supported the EU’s policy of condemning Moscow for its aggression. Moreover, it praised Prime Minister Brown’s tough initial stance against Russia’s intervention, who argued shortly after the start of the conflict that: ‘in light of Russia’s actions ... we should suspend negotiations on a successor to the partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia’ (The Sun, 2008). Although the war was perceived as remote, the media drew on the rhetoric of the British government, promoting and publicising the issue in the public sphere. Through this, it informed the general public, aiming to educate individuals regarding the politics of the region and the conflict. Moscow’s intervention was widely viewed as an attack against a country in the process of democratisation, which shared aspirations of integrating into Europe. After the conflict, Russia was presented both as a threat to global security and as a state which was showing signs of adapting to the rules of the international community – and desiring peace and stability. In the House of Lords, voices were claiming that
Russia’s intervention marked the start of a new Cold War, the pinnacle of a period of negative transition (House of Lords, 2008a). On the other hand, former foreign secretary David Miliband’s surprise visit to and support for Georgia was fiercely criticised by the opposition (The Guardian, 18 August 2008) who considered that Britain should be more cautious when dealing with Russia. The Times also revealed that the British government had known in advance, but had not tried to calm down leaders in Tbilisi (The Times, 13 August 2008). Moreover, in a report, the Parliament emphasised that Russia was responsible for the conflict, even though Georgia might have taken a series of rash decisions:

Russia’s actions in Georgia have been rightly condemned as disproportionate. The scale of Russian militarisation on the Georgian border always belied Russia’s claim that it was only reacting to a Georgian attack, and mobile phone intercept evidence presented by Georgia now supports the assertion that, despite Georgia’s misjudgements, Russia was the aggressor (House of Lords, 2008a).

Table 6.4 Indexing – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The war seen as a Russian aggression</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>72.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>44.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>towards Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is the main actor in dealing with Russia</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>43.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>43.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should cooperate with Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>35.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>16.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

The weak ceasefire agreement brokered by the Union which left ‘Moscow calling the shots in the energy-rich Black Sea littoral and Caspian basin’ (The Guardian, 18 August 2008) was contested by the British media – which called for a tougher European stance. The Guardian even went so far as to call for the suspension of the trade agreement between the Union and Russia, whilst arguing that Europe’s condemnation of Russia was more symbolic and not wholeheartedly shared by its member states (The Guardian, 2 September 2008). Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, coupled with Moscow’s political and preferential use of gas prices fuelled a problem policy which highlighted the fact that Russia was an ‘energy bully’ (The Times, 1
January 2009) and a threat to regional security. Prime Minister Brown in the weeks that followed the conflict the crisis presented this idea, criticising Russia more or less openly. For example, in one of his statements soon after the ceasefire which made headline news throughout Europe, he stated, pointing an obvious finger at Russia that ‘no nation can be allowed to exert an energy stranglehold over Europe’ (RIA Novosti, 2008). Russia was seen by the UK government as a key supplier for Europe’s energy needs, making a fair and reliable deal with Moscow paramount for assuring the energy security of the EU (Cabinet Office, 2008, p.19; Miliband, 2008b). The British media also sided with the government’s view regarding Britain and Europe’s energy dependence on Moscow publishing headlines such as: ‘beware the bear trap: Britain, like most of Europe, is at risk of being the target of Russia's energy export weaponry’ (The Guardian, 30 August 2008). Europe’s energy dependency and vulnerability to Russia, as in the case of the previous policy problem related to Russia’s aggression, was publicised through the efforts of the British media. British journalists drew on official rhetoric in order to warn about the threat that Russia’s strong grip posed to the EU’s energy security. Here again, the British media informed the public about Moscow’s malign intentions and practices, drawing on the common view within the public sphere unfavourable to Russia.

As a solution to this policy problem, these articles argued that the Union could not afford not to sign a partnership agreement, as Moscow seemed to have the upper hand in terms of energy security (The Times, 2 September 2008; The Times, 2 January 2009). At the same time, the British media voiced concerns regarding the possible re-emergence of a new Cold War: ‘a new Cold War? We're yet to adjust to the old one ending: Bad-tempered relations between Russia and the EU cannot be allowed to stymie a new partnership deal: both sides need it’ (The Guardian, 23 May 2008). While maintaining a critical approach towards Russia, the British government and the parliament recognised the need for the EU to build and maintain a partnership with Moscow (House of Commons, 2008; House of Lords, 2008a). Increasing trade and economic relations, together with Europe’s energy dependence were listed among the main reasons why the ‘the EU should resist any attempts to isolate Russia’ (House of Lords, 2008a). Even if officially, British policymakers in the weeks that followed Russia’s intervention in Georgia adopted a tough stance, before the conflict and after the ceasefire, both the government and parliament strongly supported the EU’s initiative of developing and strengthening a strategic partnership with Russia. Indexing implied here that the British media was used in order to justify this approach in the
light of Moscow’s hegemonic behaviour in the Eastern Neighbourhood and its actions which threatened European security more broadly. Hence, according to the interaction effects model described in chapter 3, the relevance of this policy solution was enhanced by the high political viability of the EU’s approach to building a partnership with Russia and Britain’s adherence to it.\footnote{British journalists 1, 2.}

In constructing the policy definition related to building and maintaining an effective partnership with Russia, the two newspapers defined helping Russia to integrate with the West and the peaceful resolution of its conflicts as a policy solution. This was achieved by highlighting Moscow’s shared European identity, heritage and history. Nonetheless, the Guardian (18 August 2008) stressed that the Russians would ‘become willing to play with the west by western rules only if or when they no longer perceive those rules as disadvantageous’. The Times (29 January 2009) signalled that Moscow didn’t desire direct confrontation with the West and that it wanted to forge a new partnership with Europe based on more equal terms. Russian leaders were also keen to stress that they did not approve of using energy prices for political purposes, and Gazprom’s trade with countries like Ukraine should not damage its overall image as a trustworthy supplier to Europe. Points of view from Russian officials were often featured in the two newspapers. Most views expressed by them related to Moscow’s desire to cooperate with the West (The Guardian, 18 August 2008), its peaceful intentions (The Guardian, 27 August 2008), and blaming the Georgian leadership for intentionally sparking the fuse for the war (The Times, 13 September 2008). This mirrored the British government’s mixed approach which was, on the one hand, criticising more or less openly Russia for its intervention in Georgia or its political use of energy prices. On the other hand, British policymakers were encouraging Russia to integrate into the international community, as otherwise it stood to lose because it was ‘too enmeshed in the world economy’ (Miliband, 2008b).

During the conflict, the British government pointed to the ability and duty of the EU to assure stability in the region and to place Russia on a path to modernisation in the international arena (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2008, p.12, 2009, p.14). This commitment was best captured in Prime Minister Brown’s words: ‘the EU’s prime aim has been that the continent must never again be bloodied by wars of aggression (…) is time to recall that high ideal and send
Russia a clear, united message that its aggression will not be rewarded’ (Hinsliff, 2008). At the same time, British policymakers argued that the EU had to enhance its presence in the Eastern Neighbourhood, a policy expectation which was also taken up by the British media. Hence, media discourse drew yet again on British policymakers’ own rhetoric and promoted it in the public sphere, informing citizens about the EU’s ability and constructing an expectation that the Union should engage sustainably in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Throughout most articles in the sample, the British media expressed a policy expectation which framed the EU as the main actor in dealing with Russia. This policy definition did not refer to the Union’s institutions, but to the EU leaders or to a common European approach, which was more or less characterised by internal division. Three expressions marked the UK media’s interpretation of the EU here: ‘The EU heads of government’ (The Guardian, 14 November 2008), ‘EU leaders’ (The Times, 1 September 2008), ‘European leaders’ (The Guardian, 8 August 2008).

Unlike other member states, the British government – although officially preferring to deal with Russia through the EU – advocated an approach towards Moscow (with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict) which involved interacting and negotiating with it within multiple multilateral arenas such as the G8, the NATO-Russia council, the UN Security Council or the OSCE (Freeman and Williams, 2008; House of Commons, 2008; House of Lords, 2009a). Due to the UK’s close ties with its transatlantic partner, the British government envisaged the US to play an important role in assuring peace and stability in the region, as it had the ability and capabilities to hold Moscow at bay, and also to orient it towards a path of adaption and transformation in the international arena (Cabinet Office, 2008, p.3). France and other member states managed in the end to bring together a common voice for the Union. The Commission’s aid for the reconstruction of the regions affected by the conflict, and the 200 EU observers sent to Georgia were hailed as a huge achievement by both the Times and the Guardian. Despite this, only a third of the articles published during the war presented the EU as the main actor that should engage in the peaceful resolution of the conflict, while almost half of the references were to the duty of the international community (Europe together with the US through NATO – and/or the UN) to stabilise the region\(^\text{150}\). Thanks to the fact that strong transatlantic ties were also widely

\(^{150}\) Nonetheless, the majority of statements and positions featured within the sample were from European leaders. France, which held the presidency of EU at the time, was extremely active in articulating the Union’s response to the conflict between Russia and Georgia. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner and President Nicolas Sarkozy
shared within the British national public sphere, the media could incorporate in its discourse more easily, facilitating indexing effects.

**Bounding**

Three policy problems defined by the British media resembled three instances of bounding. Firstly, within two weeks of the start of the conflict, the British government adopted a less vocal and critical attitude towards Moscow, pointing to Russia’s need to balance: ‘between short term military victories and longer term economic prosperity’ (Miliband, 2008b), if it was to salvage its ‘international reputation and its relations with countries across the globe’ (Sparrow, 2008). The two British newspapers criticised the EU and Britain for giving in to Russia’s demands and not recognising the significant threat that Russia posed to Europe’s security (table 6.5). This policy problem – Russia seen as a security threat – was constructed mainly through the use of emotions, empathy and fear. By employing and portraying the realities of the conflict, the media sought to address the emotions of the general public, making individuals feel part of the war (Balabanova, 2007; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Brody, 1994; Gilboa, 2005; Rid, 2007). The British media recalled disturbing eye witness accounts from the war; for instance one villager remembered his neighbour: ‘he looked out of his window and they killed him’ (The Guardian, 20 August 2008). An article published by the Guardian evoked the ‘stories of survival and destruction from residents of the Georgian town hit by Russian jets that missed their target’ (The Guardian, 28 August 2008), a mother sharing her story of how she got her children out of the house just moments before the bombs fell. Moscow was portrayed in apocalyptic terms which identified it as a major threat for global peace, a number of articles emphasising one of president Medvedev’s daring statements at the beginning of the war: ‘attack our citizens and Russia will shatter you’ (The Times, 19 August 2008). Finally, the British media sought to arouse empathy for Georgia by vividly portraying the abuses, rapes, orgies and looting that the Russian army was accused of. As specified in the model presented in chapter 3, British policymakers were largely unresponsive to the policy problem framed by the media, due to their perception that journalists are prone to spearheaded the Union’s attempt to pacify the region and manage the cease-fire and post-war agreement (The Guardian, 14 August 2008; The Guardian, 19 September 2008; The Guardian, 27 August 2008; The Guardian, 14 November 2008; The Times, 17 November 2008). The overwhelming preference of statements from leaders of the member states, rather than those from the institutions of the EU, reinforces the finding that the UK media viewed the policy towards Russia and expected it to be a dealt as a topic of high politics, where mostly the interests of the nation states mattered.

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cover and focus on sensational news (Blair, 2008; Brown, 2008; Freeman and Williams, 2008; Miliband, 2008a). Furthermore, they perceived that British journalists lacked knowledge about foreign policy which made them unable to understand the complex network of constrains which characterises decision-making in this policy area\textsuperscript{151}. Nonetheless, presenting the war and Moscow’s intentions and actions in this manner put considerable indirect pressure on British policymakers, due to the sensitivity of the general public towards this type of framing.

**Table 6.5 Bounding – frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a security threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>61.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia is responsible for the war</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>21.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – seen in a negative light</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>14.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own data*

However, the discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric and its practical actions echoed throughout the pages of the two newspapers – with reports observing that European leaders were not as united as they would have liked to show – defined a policy problem in the EU’s inability to forge a common position towards Russia. This was considered to hamper its ability to engage more substantially in stabilising the Eastern Neighbourhood and the development of the states in the region. For example, just a few days after the EU’s vigorous response against Russia’s aggression, the Guardian was keen to note that: ‘already the European appetite for sanctions appears to be fading, with the French and the Germans signalling an unwillingness to punish Moscow (...) but the EU needs to be clear about what is happening’ (The Guardian, 1 September 2008). Hence, the two newspapers identified a policy problem in the lack of unity between member states in drafting a common response to Russia’s aggression. Poland and the Baltic countries were considered to be responsible for the derailing of the peace negotiations between Union and Russia. Divisions among the member states in devising a common strategy towards Russian were framed as the most important hurdle that impeded the Union from constructively engaging in the conflict and its resolution. Simultaneously, the EU was criticised for its inefficacy in providing support for the countries in its Eastern Neighbourhood (The Guardian, 1 September 2008). The ‘newer arrivals’ from CEE (The Times, 17 December 2008) were denounced for being particularly worried about Moscow and pushing for a tougher stance.

\textsuperscript{151} British policymakers 1-3.
Nonetheless, their points of view were ‘heavily outnumbered by those such as Germany that prize[d] their relations with Russia, seemingly, above all else’ (The Times, 9 August 2008).

In a weak instance of bounding, the British media presented here information regarding the unilateral interests and actions of various member states in their relations with Russia. Due to Russia’s remoteness to the British general public, this policy expectation did not encourage public debate within the public sphere. The government was largely unresponsive to the British media’s discourse, presenting an optimistic view regarding the EU’s ability to act unitedly against Russia and ensure stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Simultaneously, the British parliament claimed in an official document that the EU’s member states should work more on devising a common stance towards Russia, in whose absence the Union was found to be unable to support the development of the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood and back up its promises with real commitments (House of Commons, 2008). On the other hand, France’s ability to construct a common EU position and to drive forward the ceasefire agreement was presented by Prime Minister Brown as an important achievement: ‘the 27 members of the EU are totally united in condemning the aggression of the Russian Government’ (Waterfield, 2008). Individual and somewhat isolated voices from the opposition within the House of Lords were even more poignant in arguing in relation to the EU’s approach that: ‘the reality is that the European Union has proved most enthusiastic at generating words and lengthy statements, but the practical effects on the ground are most disappointing, and even negligible’ (House of Lords, 2008a).

Finally, bounding was present in the way in which the British media framed the fact that Georgia might have caused the war by forcing Russia to intervene due to its rash actions. Articles that contained this policy problem argued that Georgia’s lack of caution in dealing with Moscow had the potential to drag Europe into an undesirable and unintended conflict. On the other hand, Ed Miliband’s visit to Georgia, together with his repeated reassurances that the EU and the UK would stand by its aspiration to integrate into Europe were expressive of the government’s conviction that Russia acted as an aggressor. This made it unresponsive to the policy problem defined by the British media. The campaign driven by British policymakers to put the blame on Russia was so successful that even the Guardian (14 November 2008) emphasised that Moscow might have won the conflict on the ground, but lost the PR war against Georgia. In the pages of the two newspapers frequently featured stories regarding Georgia’s president Saakashvili’s
tendency to make rash decisions without considering their consequences or consulting the country’s western supporters. Although interest for this policy problem within the public sphere was low, it was present in about a fifth of the articles pointing to the fact that journalists – due to their commitment to the principle of objectivity – chose to portray the conflict from the standpoint of both actors involved. The general public was thus offered information that would allow them to form coherent opinion and challenge the decision of the British government to blame Russia for the war. Debate also ensued in the pages of the two newspapers about the state responsible for starting the war, with letters and commentaries from the general public making a case for either Russia or Georgia.

Agenda setting
The agenda setting power of the British media manifested in a policy problem which stressed Russia’s re-emergence as an important global power – seen in table 6.6. In the six months period leading to the conflict, the British media warned about the possibility of a war breaking in the frozen conflict areas of the South Caucasus (The Times, 2 January 2009). Nonetheless, the increase in the number of articles caused by the war did not result only in reports related to the conflict. Commentaries and analyses regarding Russia’s role in Europe and in the world, its threat to regional security or Europe’s energy security were frequently featured during the war and its aftermath. Such reports continued to be represented at a steady rate in the British media in the following six months, emphasising Russia’s increasing importance as a global power after the war (Blair, 2008). More than 80 percent of the reports contained a reference to Russia’s new status, almost always linking it with the need for the West (Europe and the US) to acknowledge and adapt to these new developments. By employing echoes of the Cold War, British journalists managed, at the same time, to arouse public interest for the issue and foster debate within the public sphere. Furthermore, in the weeks following the war, the two British newspapers warned policymakers regarding Russia’s new status, advising them to take account and adapt their policies. Through this, the British media became part of the political process, which is line with the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3. Thus, Russia’s re-emergence was also a key topic for the government, Miliband capturing the eye-opening effect of the conflict: ‘the Georgia crisis has provided a rude awakening (…) the sight of Russian tanks in a neighbouring country
on the 40th anniversary of the crushing of the Prague Spring has shown that the temptations of power politics remain’ (Blair, 2008). Drawing on the discourse of the media, Russia was seen by British policymakers (Brown, 2008; Miliband, 2008b; House of Lords, 2009a) to be regaining its economic and military power, which left it more isolated, less trusted and less respected than before the conflict\textsuperscript{152}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia is regaining its great power status</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>84.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

6.3 Discussion

6.3.1 Climate Change

British policymakers were convinced that climate change was an important issue which had global effects and posed a threat in the medium and long term. Moreover, they were committed to tackling climate change through the framework of the Union and convincing other states to adapt their policies accordingly. On the other hand, the policy definitions framed by the British media were salient both within the public sphere and among British policymakers due to the fact that, very often, they converged to those articulated by the UN (or other international organisations) or NGOs who were viewed as legitimate – together with the salient effects that climate change was perceived to have on peoples globally. Sometimes, British journalists took up ideas and causes related to climate change found within the public sphere and started personal crusades in trying to push for them on the political agenda, thus acting as activists. Instances of agenda setting and bounding – seen in table 6.7 –, where the media put pressure on policymakers to make more ambitious commitments (whilst acting through the EU) and follow them through, point to the ability of journalists to enhance the Union’s democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the instances of indexing in which the British media publicised and supported the British government's (through the EU) commitment to tackling climate change were also based on journalists' perception of public opinion (i.e. in favour of tackling climate change). This again,

\textsuperscript{152} British policymaker 1.
Table 6.7 Frames present in the British media – climate change policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Interaction effect</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
<th>The Guardian (%)*</th>
<th>The Times (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>94.90</td>
<td>96.50</td>
<td>92.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen – a crucial moment</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>78.70</td>
<td>78.80</td>
<td>78.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>68.40</td>
<td>65.80</td>
<td>72.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is happening now</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55.20</td>
<td>58.80</td>
<td>49.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is the only actor that can forge a global agreement on climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>45.60</td>
<td>43.50</td>
<td>49.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>21**</td>
<td>41.20**</td>
<td>45.50***</td>
<td>30.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal climate change deal</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37.60</td>
<td>37.60</td>
<td>37.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming other states</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36.80</td>
<td>36.50</td>
<td>37.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>16**</td>
<td>31.40**</td>
<td>33.30***</td>
<td>27.80***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>12**</td>
<td>23.50**</td>
<td>24.20***</td>
<td>22.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK should lead by example independently</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.
** Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit (N=51).
*** Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit: The Guardian (N=33); The Times (N=18).
Source: Actor’s own calculations: (N=136) / The Guardian (N=85); The Times (N=51).
contributes to outlining a more complete answer for the first research question, namely whether
the EU’s foreign policy can enjoy democratic legitimacy through the activity of the media. The
media achieved this by extensively covering the summit and providing information based on
scientific reports and assessments to the general public regarding the disastrous effects of climate
change.

Similarly to what the model presented in chapter 3 specified, individuals were thus offered
information which had the potential to make decision-making processes more transparent and
accountable, whilst also encouraging public debate within the public sphere. Various campaigns
and debates were initiated in the pages of the two newspapers which engaged their readers in
participative forms of democracy. Due to the high level of responsiveness from policymakers –
and their perception that the media could portray a relevant image of public opinion –, the media
had the potential to link individuals to decision-making processes by conveying their views to
policymakers. On the other hand, in two instances of indexing, the media gathered support and
publicised two policy solutions advocated by the British policymakers – where they felt they
needed backing up from the general public. Bounding effects appeared when the media was
considered to be too critical, or journalists were perceived to be lacking expert knowledge about
climate change policy, international negotiations or foreign policy which made them prone to
dismiss any result short of policymakers’ previous promises. Euroscepticism also was infused
into the two newspapers’ critique of the EU’s poor record at the Copenhagen summit.

Within the EU, Britain was aiming to lead in climate change policy, together with Germany
intensively trying to convince reluctant member states of the need to act unitedly and commit to
ambitious adaptation policies. Domestically, against the background of profound Euroscepticism
– which characterises British public opinion in relation to most of the EU’s activity – the British
media played a crucial role in gathering support for and justifying the government’s approach of
acting through the framework of the EU. However, drawing on British Euroscepticism, the
government, whilst supporting the Union’s efforts wholeheartedly, frequently criticised it for
agreeing on and setting too low emission reductions targets, or for the failure of some member
states to implement their policy commitments. Indexing was present as an interaction effect in
the case of climate change due to the fact that the British government fully embraced the need to
tackle the consequences of climate change. The British media publicised and supported the
approach of the government defining a policy problem in almost all articles in the sample, which framed climate change as a threat in the medium or long term. In constructing this problem, the media featured scientific debates and information regarding the current global effects of climate change or about the various policies that Britain through the EU was supporting and implementing. The convergence with definitions from the UN and the indiscriminate effects that climate change can have on peoples globally granted even more salience to the policy problem within the public sphere. Additionally, the British media presented negatively points of view prevalent within the scientific and policy communities which denied the malign global effects of climate change. Here journalists acted as educators providing information to citizens – about scientific evidence and policies – in this way encouraging public debate on an issue where policymakers were open to public input and scrutiny.\textsuperscript{153}

The British media also drew on official rhetoric and took cues from British policymakers in defining two policy solutions. Firstly, forging a global agreement that would be fair to developing states was a pervasive policy definition which was presented by British journalists as a policy priority. Journalists achieved this by featuring extensive reports on how implementing adaptation policies could have dramatic consequences on the economic welfare of citizens in developing countries, if not compensated by developed states. This policy solution was based on consensus among British policymakers, who used the media in order to educate the general public and generate debate within the public sphere (Christoff, 2010). Although not in the same degree as in the case of transnational publications, British journalists in about one fifth of the articles presented the claim that Britain and the EU’s efforts were hampered by China or America’s unwillingness to acknowledge the negative effects that climate change was having.\textsuperscript{154}

On the other hand, official British rhetoric frequently highlighted the fact that the US or China should be blamed for the lack of progress in tackling global climate change. One reason for the fact that this policy solution was not fully internalised by the two newspapers might reside in the strong transnational transatlantic relations which characterised British media reporting (Egenhofer and Georgiev, 2010; Rynning and Jensen, 2010); hindering, at times, British policymakers’ efforts to justify their failure by using the media to portray the US or China as scapegoats.

\textsuperscript{153} British policymaker 2; British journalists 1, 2.
\textsuperscript{154} Together with their unwillingness to commit to and take action accordingly.
Bounding effects appeared due to the media’s critical assessment of the outcome of the Copenhagen summit and the EU’s inability to drive forward a progressive global agreement. Although, at times, British policymakers hinted at the failure of the summit, they were optimistic regarding the EU’s ability to bounce back. They were also convinced of the fact that the agreement signed at the Copenhagen summit represented a step forward (although not as impressive as it had been hoped). Furthermore, they argued that media discourse was prone to dismiss any result short of the ambitions and goals expressed before the summit. This happened because of journalists’ tendency to focus on sensational news, fuelled by their lack of expert knowledge or insight into the pressures or constraints which characterise policymaking and international negotiations. Journalists featured stories including testimonies from scientists, NGOs, bureaucrats or political actors outside foreign policy circles, which described the negotiations behind closed during the summit (which left the EU isolated). Simultaneously, the British media featured commentaries and letters from the general public which expressed deep disappointment regarding the outcome of the summit. British policymakers also ignored the policy expectation (which was marginal within the British media) that the UK should act unilaterally in tackling global climate change, because they believed that acting through the EU would be a more effective avenue for pursuing their goals (House of Lords, 2009c; Miliband, 2009a, 2010b).

The agenda setting power of the British media was most evident in the way it defined the Copenhagen summit as a crucial moment. The EU was expected to lead a progressive global agreement that would set up a sustainable strategy for tackling the effects of global climate change. In doing so, British journalists informed the general public through extensive analyses and reports regarding the magnitude of the summit, and the significant moment it represented in the development of global climate change policy. Views from British, European and international political elites, coupled with scientific reports, or statements from transnational or grassroots NGOs frequently added weight to the policy expectation that was associated with the summit. Agenda setting meant here that the British media was able to put pressure on the government to recognise and commit itself to achieving an ambitious international agreement at Copenhagen. This happened through both its reporting and journalists’ continuous dialogue with

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155 British policymakers 1, 2.
policymakers. Associated with extensively covering the summit and emphasising its magnitude, the two newspapers expressed another policy expectation which argued that Britain would be in a better position to follow through its commitments if it supported and acted through the common framework of the EU. This drew on British policymakers’ own views, but amplified them, prompting journalists to act as gatekeepers of official commitments. Thus, British journalists became part of the political process, assessing the way in which policymakers implemented their policy promises and pressuring them to commit to even greater targets. These two policy expectations were also built on the idea that climate change represented a present policy problem which had to be tackled with urgency. Detailed scientific reports and assessments featured regularly in the two newspapers together with public campaigns which were aimed at making both the general public and British policymakers aware of the need to tackle the effects of climate change presently – not in a distant future, as in the case of the policy problem which framed climate change as a threat in the medium and long term. In all three instances described above, the global effects of climate change coupled with the convergence with international actors’ (international organisations such as the UN, or transnational NGOs such as Green Peace) own policy definitions enhanced the media’s agenda setting power. Moreover, agenda setting implied here that by providing individuals with detailed reports and often publishing voices and opinions from the general public within their pages, the two newspapers encouraged and fostered debate within the public sphere, and had the potential to link citizens to policymaking.

6.3.2 The policy towards Russia
The Georgian-Russia war of 2008 brought about echoes from the Cold War period, which reminded both British policymakers and the general public of the tensions and the Russian threat which characterised it (Asmus, 2010). Such memories influenced the way in which the British media reported throughout the period analysed, and the subsequent interaction effects with policymakers. Similarly, the traditionally strong transatlantic relations with the US shaped the way in which the British media presented the EU’s potential to deal with Russia and the Eastern Neighbourhood. This point was evident in the confusion which characterised official rhetoric – and media discourse which drew on it and was indexed –, which presented US involvement as a viable policy solution, whilst only arguing that the EU had the potential to act (and was expected
However, the Union was not seen to be able to back up its commitments and promises due to the member states’ tendency to deal bilaterally with Russia. The British media’s deep Euroscepticism – which is characteristic for most of the Union’s activity (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Usherwood, 2011; White, 2012) – also shaped the way in which journalists criticised the EU for not doing enough in tackling Russia’s malign and hegemonic interests. Policymakers used the media in order to publicise their approaches, gather support for them, or at times initiate public debate in relation to issues they believed required more justification and legitimacy. At the same time, journalists sometimes acted as educators of the public, featuring detailed stories regarding EU and British policies. As specified in the interaction effects model detailed in chapter 3, close informal relationships between policymakers and journals facilitated the former’s ability to index the media’s discourse.

Indexing was the most prevalent interaction effect identified in the case of the policy towards Russia, which points to the fact that the British media had only a marginal ability to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes within the EU. One reason for this resides in the low levels of interest that the general public shared for the issue, only Russia’s aggression raising its profile within the British national public sphere. There was also a mixed message in official rhetoric which was fed to the British media, and involved in the first days of the conflict a tough stance against Russia. This was influenced mainly by Prime Minister Brown and former Foreign Secretary David Miliband's ambitions to portray themselves as strong and decisive leaders, whilst before the war and in the months that followed the ceasefire, promoting the idea that the EU should develop a strategic partnership with Russia. On the other hand, in instances of bounding the media was considered to be too critical and focus too much on the sensational through its use of emotions, in order to shape public opinion and put pressure on policymakers. Agenda setting was present in one instance in which the British media defined a policy problem related to Russia’s re-emergence as an important international actor. The British media here put pressure on policymakers to recognise Russia’s new status and adapt their policies according.

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156 British policymakers 1, 2; British journalists 1, 2.
### Table 6.8 Frames present in the British media – the policy towards Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Interaction effect</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
<th>The Guardian (%)*</th>
<th>The Times (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia is regaining its great power status</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>84.50</td>
<td>84.00</td>
<td>85.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war seen as a Russian aggression</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>72.40</td>
<td>79.00</td>
<td>64.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a security threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>61.90</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>58.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach towards Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>44.70</td>
<td>37.00</td>
<td>54.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should be the main actor in dealing with Russia</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>46.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>42.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should cooperate with Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35.90</td>
<td>34.00</td>
<td>38.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia is responsible for the war</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.50</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>17.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>17.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – seen in a negative light</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>12.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>13.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.

*Source:* Author’s own calculations (N=181) / The Guardian (N=100); The Times (N=81).
Table 6.8 highlights that both the Guardian and the Times presented Russia as the aggressor in the war drawing on the official rhetoric of the British government and taking cues from policymakers. Indexing implied here, that British policymakers employed the media in order to publicise their critical stance against Russia’s intervention in Georgia in the first days of the conflict, and build public support for the need to tackle this policy problem. Echoes from the Cold War reminding of tensions and the constant fear of a potential Russian intervention in the West made this policy problem salient within the public sphere. This happened although most commentaries and letters from the general public featured in the media recognised that Russia was not able to pose the same threat to Europe as during the Cold War. Less appealing within the public sphere due to Britain’s energy independence, journalists, in another instance of indexing, stressed the threat that Russia posed to Europe’s energy security. Here again, British policymakers employed the media in order to signal a clear message which advocated solidarity among the member states. The British media also claimed with a hint of Euroscepticism that the EU was not able to convince states such as France or Germany not to strike bilateral energy deals with Moscow. Their individual approach was seen to leave a large number of the member states dependent on Russia for gas highly sensitive to Moscow’s use of energy prices.

On the other hand, before the conflict and in the months that followed the ceasefire, the two British newspapers reflected the views of the government, which advocated the idea that the EU should develop a strategic partnership with Russia in order to place it on a path to modernisation, and assure peace and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Furthermore, Euroscepticism influenced the way in which media discourse – drawing on official rhetoric – framed as a policy expectation the EU’s ability to act in the region and deal with Russia. The EU was considered to have the potential, but not to be able at the time to provide a viable policy solution to the conflict. British journalists linked this idea to the expectation that in order to be effective, the EU would have to live up to its commitments, whilst the member states should be more willing to act unitedly and support the Union’s initiatives. As interest within the public sphere regarding Russia or the EU’s approach towards Moscow was meagre at best, the British media played a crucial role in providing information to individuals, which otherwise would have not been available. In doing so, the British media aided policymakers’ efforts to initiate public debate in relation to issues where they felt policy needed to be better justified and made legitimate to the general public.
Bounding was present in the way in which the British media framed Russia as a security threat due to its hegemonic intentions and aggression against Georgia, a policy problem which was perceived to be far too critical of Russia by British policymakers\textsuperscript{157}. In constructing this policy problem, the British media employed emotional frames featuring shocking eye witness accounts together with graphic descriptions of Russia’s interventions. In doing so, journalists aimed to make the general public aware and responsive to the idea that Russia posed a major security threat, whilst putting pressure on policymakers to act accordingly. However, bounding (where policymakers seem to be unresponsive to the media’s discourse) might be seen here as a strategy on the part of British policymakers to send indirectly a message to Russia, which they felt was too critical to be made public through official channels. The British media also framed the lack of unity among the member states as a policy problem which undermined the EU’s ability to engage in the Eastern Neighbourhood or deal with Russia on equal terms. Again, journalists expressed views which were held by some policymakers, but were generally seen to be largely rooted in the British media’s deep Euroscepticism\textsuperscript{158}. While both policy problems were not framed in such a way as to affect British citizens or large populations globally, Russia’s threats to European security echoed with remnants from the Cold War and spawned debate reflected in the numerous commentaries and letters from the general public published by two newspapers. British policymakers’ tendency to ignore and be unresponsive towards the media’s discourse in these instances of bounding was also predicated upon their belief that journalists are prone to exaggerate news and focus on the sensational. This was seen to be caused by journalists' lack of expert knowledge and understanding of the pressures or mechanisms through which foreign policy functions. Finally, due to its commitment to objective reporting, the British media presented voices from Russian leaders and actors outside British foreign policy circles who claimed that Georgia might have been responsible for starting the war.

The agenda setting power of the British media was evident in relation to one policy problem which framed the re-emergence of Russia as a major actor in the international arena. Even though the policy problem was not defined to affect indiscriminately British citizens or peoples globally, it became popular within the public sphere as it reminded of echoes from the Cold War era. In defining this policy problem, the British media presented a wealth of commentaries,

\textsuperscript{157} British policymakers 1-3.
\textsuperscript{158} British journalist 2.
letters and op-eds from members of the general public. These contributions alarmingly highlighted the fact that Britain and the EU should not ignore Russia’s new status or ambitious, and adapt their policies accordingly. At the same time, journalists drew here on views from throughout the British political spectrum, including political actors from the opposition or outside foreign policy circles, coupled with policymakers in power who viewed responsiveness to media discourse in this case as having salient implications for their public reputation. Through their continuous dialogue with policymakers – and news spinning on the latter’s part – British journalists pushed them to adapt their rhetoric and policies according to Russia’s new perceived status in the international arena, becoming part of the political process. This policy problem, in the way defined by the British media, was the most pervasive frame identified, having the potential to foster debate within the public sphere. However, the presence of only one instance of agenda setting points to the fact that the British media was largely uninterested in influencing the UK or the EU’s policy towards Russia. This contrasts with the regular behaviour of the British media, which is generally considered to be able and willing to engage in agenda setting (Morgan, 1995; Davis, 2000; Akor, 2011).

6.4 Conclusions
The chapter has shown that in the case of climate change, the ability of the British media to enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy was much more evident than in the case of the policy towards Russia – where the media had only a limited effect on democratic legitimacy. The British government was already convinced that climate change was a threat in the middle or long term – and that the EU should lead globally in tackling this issue. The British media also put British policymakers under tremendous pressure to recognise the present threat that climate changes posed, coupled with the need to forge a progressive global agreement at Copenhagen – or the EU’s failure at the summit. Journalists achieved this by presenting alarming reports and points of view from scientists, or transnational environmental NGOs, together with letters and commentaries from the general public. Their ability was also facilitated by the fact that climate change was widely perceived to affect large groups of individuals, which made British policymakers even more sensitive to the media’s portrayal of public opinion. On the other hand,

159 British journalist 2, 3.
in the case of the policy towards Russia, the British media was much less willing to engage in agenda setting and mostly followed governmental rhetoric, publishing and supporting it. According to British journalists, the main reason for this resided in the overt lack of interest found for the issue within the British national public sphere. Only Russia’s intervention in Georgia brought back echoes and memories from the Cold War, which prompted the two newspapers to put pressure on the British policymakers to recognise Moscow’s new status and its ability to pose a threat to European security. Similarly to the case of climate change, the British media presented commentaries, op-eds or letters from the general public which warned that Russia could direct its guns towards Europe. However, the ability of the British media to link individuals to decision-making or foster debate within the public sphere was less visible than in the case of climate change.

What is important though in both case studies, is the fact that in the context of profound Euroscepticism, the policy definitions framed by journalists almost always contained a reference to the EU. Both in tackling climate change or keeping Russia in check, acting through the framework of the Union was seen as more beneficial for the UK than acting on an individual basis – journalists, at times, criticising the EU for not living up to its promises or not choosing to engage even more. On the other hand, Britain’s tradition of strong transatlantic ties with the US influenced the way in which the EU was perceived and presented by both journalists and policymakers in relation to its potential to lead in climate change, but more importantly in dealing with Russia and the conflicts in the Eastern Neighbourhood. As the chapter on the transnational level highlighted, criticism towards the US’ unwillingness to bind itself to a progressive global treaty that would have tackled climate change was much lower in the case of Britain, whilst support for the idea that the US could provide an effective solution to the war in dealing with Russia was much higher. Nonetheless, the central position that was allocated to the EU in the two case studies – in a different manner than the case of the transnational level, a contrast discussed in the final chapter – point to the fact that the EU was seen as a legitimate and appropriate avenue for the UK to act. Moreover, even though the British media had only a limited effect on democratic legitimacy in the case of the policy towards Russia, the case of climate change showed that it had the potential to enhance democratic legitimacy.

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160 Which characterises the attitude of the majority of British journalists towards most of the EU’s policy areas (White, 2012; Gifford, 2010; Packham, 2007).
Similarly to the case of the UK and the transnational level, the ability of the media to endow decision-making processes with democratic legitimacy through its discourse and the nature of its interaction effects with policymakers within the public sphere is considered to be influenced by characteristics of Romania’s political system and its media landscape\textsuperscript{161}. Following an overview of the media/foreign policy nexus in Romania, the chapter will delve into the analysis of interactions effects in the two case studies. It will achieve this by drawing on the types of policy definitions (problems, solutions and expectations) framed by the media. Two newspapers were selected as representative for the Romania media: Adevărul and Jurnalul Naţional. Table A.1 in annex A (page 301) presents the distribution of articles within the two newspapers, while figures A.1 and A.2 (in the same annex) highlight the coverage of the two case studies in the Romanian media. Annex E shows that the case of climate change in the period surveyed was 1 June 2009 – 1 June 2010, with 103 identified. On the other hand, in the case of the policy towards Russia the period examined stretched six months before and after the conflict (8 March 2008 – 5 March 2009), with 125 articles selected. Finally, in the last section, the chapter provides a detailed discussion of the findings and their implication for the way in which the Romanian media within the EPS endows the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy.

7.1 The media/foreign policy nexus
Chapter 4 highlighted that Romania is a semi-Presidential republic, where the President with the government share executive duties in foreign policy. The Romanian parliament has virtually no

\textsuperscript{161} ‘Romanian policymakers’ refers in this chapter to Romanian professionals who are or have been involved in policymaking in Romania in climate change and the policy towards Russia – interviews and questionnaires with five Romanian policymakers have been conducted. On the other hand, ‘Romanian journalists’ refers in this chapter to journalists working for the Romanian newspapers analysed (Adevărul and Jurnalul Naţional) who focus their writing on the two issue areas of foreign policy – interviews and questionnaires with two Romanian journalists have been conducted.
ability to provide input, although it has formal avenues in order to exercise oversight over foreign policy. In both issue areas – climate change and relations with Russia – the President and the government are able to act largely without encountering any opposition and debate within the parliament. During the period analysed, most of Romania’s foreign policy was spearheaded by its President, supported by the governing centre right coalition which had a significant majority within the parliament. As a consequence, the Prime Minister was largely absent in dealing with foreign policy, while the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs informally became subordinated to the presidency. The President’s direct involvement was more evident in the case of the policy towards Russia – which he saw as having prime security implications for Romania and the EU –, than that of climate change where decision-making was left to the government and its agencies which were committed to acting through the common framework of the EU (Băsescu, 2008a; Boc, 2009; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b). The President supported these policy approaches in the period around the summit, when tackling climate change gained increasing publicity both in Romania and globally. Otherwise, both the President and the government perceived climate change as a salient issue, but not one that should be included on Romania or the EU’s political agendas as a top policy priority.

Moreover, the parliament was often left outside the loop, the governing coalition choosing not to open foreign policy issues to the parliament’s oversight. When it occurred, it proved to be no more than an exercise in listening to symbolic speeches from the President. Formal representative processes that could ensure democratic legitimacy to decision-making processes were here clearly side-stepped, making the activity of the Romanian media even more salient (Chifu, 2010; Ivan, 2012b). However, the policymakers interviewed argued that the meagre oversight that the parliament has on foreign policy is accountable and transparent. For example, one MP, member of the foreign policy committee claimed that ‘all session of the foreign policy committee are public and can be viewed on the official site of the institution (...) also these decisions are disputed in the chamber of deputies’. In theory, Romanian policymakers also claimed that, not in the same degree as domestic politics, foreign policy can be made

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162 Romanian policymakers 1-4.
163 Romanian policymakers 1, 4.
164 Romanian policymaker 2.
The media is considered to be a central player in constructing a link between citizens and decision-making processes, which is very often built and maintained through the network of interactions and dialogue that journalists share with policymakers.  

Informal interactions are very effective, and provide journalists with background information, scoops and the ability to feed back into decision-making. On the other hand, more formal means of interaction have to be, according one Romanian policymaker, framed as clearly as possible, in order to allow policies to be covered coherently by journalists and then to gather public support: ‘a press release is a way, for you to highlight your activities and it also allows you to communicate your message (...) the most important thing is to write the statement in a clear way so everybody will understand the message you are trying to send out to the public.’

Chapter 4 presented an overview of the Romanian media landscape – focusing on the two selected newspapers – which highlighted the existence of significant levels of polarisation, the influence of politically active or engaged owners, coupled with low journalistic professionalism. According to the interviews and questionnaires with Romanian policymakers – which correlates with findings from the limited literature (Stefanita, 2011; Dobrescu and Bargaoanu, 2012) –, it appears that the level of professionalism is dependent upon Romanian newspapers’ resources, number of staff, their ability to present polarised views (whilst also focusing on issues of public interest) and journalists’ ability to maintain a fairly objective discourse. Political orientation and ideology are found to be synonymous with low levels of professionalism, although the ability of journalists to educate the public in understanding foreign policy (and the approaches of Romania and the EU) is highly valued by policymakers. In comparison to Western media, they argue that the Romanian media ranks very low on most of the above aspects, leading to an overt search for sensational news and conflict. Moreover, Romanian policymakers argue that the media reflects the views and preferences of the general public only in a limited manner. One reason for this, identified by Romanian policymakers, resides in the media’s tendency to have their own agenda, due to intense pressure from politically engaged owners. They identify another reason in journalists’ unilateral efforts to further their careers through...
strictly promoting the views that they see as matching the views of their publication’s owners (Gross, 2008a, 2008b; Coman, 2009). However, Romanian policymakers view the media as a powerful and useful tool for interacting with citizens and gathering support for their policies. Translated into practice, this means that very often Romanian policymakers, when it suits their interests, choose to take for granted the assumption that the media portrays a relevant picture of public opinion\textsuperscript{171}.

One main difficulty that hampers the activity of the media resides in the lack of transparency which engulfs decision-making within Romania – ranging from domestic issues to foreign policy. Even more than in the case of the transnational level or the UK, Romanian journalists have to rely on informal contacts in order to get access to information. The lack of transparency is also evident in the way institutions in Romania open their decision-making processes to public scrutiny. Here, information about various policies or provisions on how to contact policymakers or institutions is seldom present – this has hampered also this thesis, as lower ranking policymakers were on most occasions inaccessible. Both Romanian policymakers and journalists believe that foreign policy, in general – but, especially the policy towards Russia –, is a sensitive policy which should be kept insulated from the public\textsuperscript{172}. Secondly, Romanian journalists claim that most policymakers, although tend to be responsive, approach only subjects that are favourable to them or enhance their reputation. On the other hand, Romanian policymakers claim that media discourse has the potential sometimes to damage the reputation not only of individuals, but also of institutions, and jeopardise the development and implementation of crucial policies\textsuperscript{173}. Hence, international organisations such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE are generally held in high esteem, their points of view being used both by the media and policymakers as legitimising tools and sources for the definition of policy problems. At the same time, legitimacy is added to a definition by the dimensions of the groups of individuals affected by the respective issue.

In the case of indexing, Romanian journalists draw their sources from policymakers (from whom they take regularly cues) or their own perception of public opinion (Lepadatu et al., 2010). Policy solutions which are based on wide consensus within the political sphere – such as most foreign

\textsuperscript{171} Romanian policymakers 1-3.
\textsuperscript{172} Romanian journalists 1, 2; Romanian policymakers 1-4.
\textsuperscript{173} Romanian journalists 1, 2; Romanian policymakers 1-4.
policy issues – benefit from extensive positive coverage from the Romanian media. Similarly, journalists draw on and present policy expectations constructed by Romanian policymakers, which are in line with notions of national interest. Indexing is based here on the fact that policymakers are often interviewed by journalists and are willing to be featured in the pages of newspapers in order to get publicity. On the other hand, lower ranking bureaucrats are often reluctant to interact with the media and usually have their agendas overcrowded – and lack time. Ministers and high ranking officials seem to be always happy to be in the spotlight and to respond to the queries of the media. Romanian journalists sometimes feel that they need to educate the public regarding most aspects related to the EU. Issues related to the EU are to a large extent framed through contradictory lenses (not to the same extent as in the UK), either as topics of foreign policy or as ones of domestic politics (Lazăr, 2006; Coman, 2010).

 Romanian journalists argue that citizens do not regularly have access to information about foreign policy. On the other hand, Romanian policymakers frequently employ the media in order to survey and influence public opinion in order to gather support for their policies. Due to journalists’ belief that the media should educate the public regarding issues related to foreign policy and the Union, there is a perception that the media should aid the government in upholding national interest. The partisan media landscape also contributes to this view, as owners are more or less directly linked to political parties and the government. The newspapers analysed reflect the bipartisan landscape of the Romanian media, where Adevărul’s owner was considered to have strong economic links with the President and the governing coalition (Chifu, 2010; Popescu, 2010). On the other hand, the owner of Jurnalul Naţional was a central figure in the opposition and a fervent critique of the President and the government (Ulmanu, 2002; Dobrescu and Bargaoanu, 2012).

 In general, bounding is present when the Romanian media features criticism of foreign policy, policymakers dismissing it as upholding the corrupt interests of their owners, or those of various interest groups. At the same time, both journalists and policymakers admit that the former do not possess detailed knowledge about foreign policy and often search for conflict and disagreement.
within the governing coalition or sensational news\textsuperscript{178}. The Romanian media is thus perceived to be prone to cover policy failure and try to damage the reputation of elites in order to appeal to the demands for sensational news from their readerships (Ghinea and Avǎdani, 2011). In instances of bounding, lacking background knowledge and access to policymakers, Romanian journalists rely on commonly held views within the public sphere, which can make them prone to dismiss policies or official rhetoric that fall outside accepted boundaries. Bounding is related to the media’s ability to act as watchdogs of democracy. Even though its discourse is largely disregarded by Romanian policymakers, through investigative journalism, information about decision-making processes is made available within the public sphere, enhancing their transparency and making them more accountable. The definition of policy problems, solutions and expectations in the case of bounding usually draws its sources from journalists’ investigative endeavours, political actors outside foreign policy circles whose views diverge from the official rhetoric, or from international actors whose approaches are most often taken for granted and deemed legitimate. Investigative journalism often allows the Romania media to highlight various acts of corruption or lack of professionalism from policymakers, in this way undermining the implementation of policy solutions\textsuperscript{179}.

Romanian journalists pride themselves in contributing to decision-making and providing their input through either formal or informal means to policymakers\textsuperscript{180}. Their agenda setting power is predicated on the networks of dialogue and interactions they have policymakers, which sometimes are based on or transform into strong personal ties. At the same time, journalists move back and forth from working in the media to within the government. This provides them a better understanding of decision-making processes and the way in which to influence them. On the other hand, once in government, they are in a better position to index the media and use it in order to promote different policies. Hence, although transparency is low within institutions dealing with foreign policy and EU issues, the Romanian media can get insight into policy circles, extensive policy background information and highlight various policy problems, solutions and expectations. This allows journalists also to act as gatekeepers of policymakers’ commitments. As in the case of indexing, where policymakers choose to employ the media

\textsuperscript{178} Romanian journalists 1, 2; Romanian policymakers 1-4.
\textsuperscript{179} Romanian journalist 1.
\textsuperscript{180} Romanian journalists 1, 2.
because they perceive it as resembling public opinion, the agenda setting powers of the Romanian media also rely on its ability to shape and convey the view of the general public to policymakers. Here, the agenda setting power of the media dwells in its ability to portray the views of individuals within the public sphere through featuring comments, op-eds, or interviews with members of the general public. In doing so, the media links individuals to decision-making processes and fosters debate within the public sphere. Due to their proneness to act as activists, Romanian journalists sometimes define policy expectations and solutions which are far too ambitious and require a high degree of political and administrative accommodation. Hence, agenda setting is more successful in cases where the levels of required accommodation are low.\textsuperscript{181} Policy solutions that are proposed by the Romanian media also stem from lower ranking bureaucrats who informally express concerns widely shared within their institution regarding official approaches or propose solutions which have been ignored by the government.\textsuperscript{182} Drawing on these insights regarding the media/foreign policy nexus within which policymakers and the media interact, the chapter next analyses interaction effects within the two case studies.

7.2 Interaction effects

7.2.1 Climate Change

Indexing

Indexing was present in the case of climate change in the way the Romanian media constructed three frames which defined one policy problem and two solutions (highlighted in table 7.1). Nearly all the articles presented climate change as a threat to global security in the medium and long term. Voices and points of view from both Romanian and EU policymakers were presented in order to define this policy problem which was perceived to affect populations globally. It also fitted within the overall discourse regarding climate change articulated at the European transnational level, and with the views of Romanian policymakers which stressed the need to tackle the global and indiscriminate effects of climate change (Băsescu, 2009b; Boc, 2009; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b). Moreover, President Băsescu (2009b) argued that ‘the degradation of the environment and climate change are the most important threats to

\textsuperscript{181} Romanian policymakers 1, 2.

\textsuperscript{182} Romanian policymaker 1.
economic and social stability and to the development of our countries, affecting especially the poor'. Defined in this way, climate change affected large areas of population, having salient impact both at regional and local levels. In defining this policy problem, the Romanian media took cues not only from national or EU policymakers, but also from other influential international organisations such the UN, the World Bank or the World Food Organisation, whose assessments and reports were frequently quoted. Indexing implied that the Romanian media internalised official discourse and built support for coherent action against the effects of climate change. Scientific reports that warned about the long term impact of changes in the climate were often cited by the two newspapers, with an emphasis on the need for politicians around the world to take concrete actions in order to tackle this issue. Besides building support for the need to tackle the effects of climate change (as specified in the framework described in chapter 3), Romanian journalists also acted as educators, encouraging the general public to become aware of the dangers that climate change posed. The Romanian media also provided individuals with scientific evidence supporting climate change and the need to adapt their way of life to a more sustainable existence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>99.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming other states</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>48.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal climate change deal</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>22.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

Romanian policymakers viewed an equal climate change deal as integral to any solution that would address the effects of climate change. This view was justified by the fact that developing countries were perceived to be the most affected both by changes in the climate and the emission reductions which stifled their economic development (Băsescu, 2009d). In its official rhetoric, the Romanian government advocated an approach based on consensus throughout all political parties: ‘the need to implement measures aimed at financing the adaption costs incurred by developing and less developed economies (...) we hope that these resources will be channelled towards new technologies and the assurance of energy efficiency, which is an important economic resource’ (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).
Similarly to the previous policy problem, the Romanian media drew on the official discourse of both national and EU policymakers in order to focus attention on and justify in front of the general public an agreement based on equality. Moreover, the Romanian media contributed to opening up public debate on the issue, which was seen in positive terms by policymakers\textsuperscript{183}. The EU’s decision to aid third world and developing states in support of their commitment to implement climate change policy was hailed by the Romanian media as a viable policy solution. Through a contribution of 100 billion dollars spread between 2013 and 2020, the Union sought to encourage developing and third world states to commit to a progressive agreement at the Copenhagen summit. According to the two Romanian newspapers, these states were demanding for a long time that the West would take the responsibility for the majority of carbon emissions. However, in contrast to the EU, sacrificing the continuous growth of their economy in order to reduce their emissions was not an option that countries like Russia, India or Brazil sympathised with.

Blaming the US or China for the breakdown and the failure of the climate change negotiations was a strategy employed by the Romanian government. This policy solution highlighted that the EU’s efforts were hampered by the negotiations behind closed doors between countries unwilling to respond in a progressive manner to the challenges to global security posed by climate change (Băsescu, 2010a). In the Romanian media, the US and China were also presented as the main culprits that opposed the climate change deal proposed by the EU. Here too, the media took cues from Romanian and EU policymakers, and through its discourse provided an explanation for the EU’s failure at the Copenhagen summit. At the same time, the two newspapers argued that any effective solution that would lead to a progressive accord had to persuade China and the US to comply. Although, the newly installed Obama administration showed signs of trying to engage with the issue of climate change from a new perspective, the Congress didn’t share such an opinion. President Obama’s commitment to reduce emissions with 4% by 2010 (Adevărul, 11 December 2009) and his participation at the Copenhagen summit were undermined by the limited mandate he received from the US Congress. In justifying this policy solution, Adevărul (8 December 2009) even featured an article where Fidel Castro criticised President Obama for being too weak in the face of the ‘blind and irresponsible oligarchy’ which seemed to be

\textsuperscript{183} Romanian policymaker 4.
opposing any sort of measure against climate change. China was also criticised for its stubborn attitude towards climate change: ‘Do you know any Chinese man or woman that wishes to pay for Copenhagen?’ (Adevărul, 4 December 2009).

Bounding
The Romanian media also constructed policy definitions which were considered by Romanian policymakers to be too critical and damaging of the EU’s reputations and approach to global climate change. Hence, bounding was present in the way in which the Romanian media defined the failure of the EU during the Copenhagen summit as a policy problem, and a policy expectation which argued that the EU should increase significantly its internal efforts. One in ten articles – highlighted in table 7.2 – framed the agreement brokered at Copenhagen as disappointing and a policy problem which remained unresolved. Although most countries committed themselves to limiting the rise in global temperatures to maximum two degrees, both newspapers highlighted that the mechanisms proposed in order to achieve this goal were at best very vague. Disagreements between the US, China and the EU were perceived to have been the main cause for the failure of the summit. Even though it was proposing a progressive agreement that could tackle global climate change, the EU was sidelined and isolated by US, China and the other major emerging powers – i.e. Brazil, India or Russia. A lack of transparency in drafting the documents of the summit was also emphasised, surprisingly, by China’s representative, Su Wei: ‘this process is not transparent (...) text made out of thin air cannot be simply agreed upon’ (Jurnalul Național, 12 December 2009).

The two Romanian newspapers posited that the EU’s stance at the summit was undermined by accusations of illegal transactions regarding carbon emissions presented by Europol. The sense of disappointment expressed by the Romanian media was largely overlooked by the official rhetoric. The Romanian government argued that while the summit could have been viewed as a disappointing moment, there were a number of positive things that could be noted, such as the EU’s commitment to a fair deal. In this sense, the Romanian government stressed that more time and reflection was required in order to draw on the lessons learnt in Copenhagen and try to build the Union’s influence in the international arena through boosting its ability to convince small states – and act as a model (Boc, 2009; Băsescu, 2010b). Less concerned about climate change
after the Copenhagen summit, the Romanian government afforded little if any attention to the issue in the following six months. Although, Romanian policymakers largely turned a blind eye to the disappointing outcome of the summit, the critique constructed by the two newspapers became pervasive within the public sphere, due to the broad global and regional effects of climate change. By presenting views, commentaries and letters from the general public around the issue, Romanian journalists encouraged debate within the public sphere.

Table 7.2 Bounding – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>64.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>23.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>22.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

The EU was also charged for not doing enough in order to promote a progressive climate change agreement in its position of global leader. More than a fifth of the total articles contained an expectation related to the need for the EU to increase its global efforts in order to convince other states to commit themselves to ambitious emissions reduction targets. Before the Copenhagen summit, several statements from European leaders calling for more focus and decisiveness in the Union’s approach were featured in the two newspapers. For example, the President of the European Commission, Barroso (Adevărul, 3 November 2009) argued that the member states should present ‘concrete numbers’ in order to aid the developing countries. British Prime Minister Brown stressed that the member states should translate their ambitious discourse into practice: ‘our states should be as ambitious as they argue; it is not sufficient to say merely I can do, I would do, or I will do’ (Adevărul, 8 December 2009). Here, the Romanian media focused on the failure of the EU and its loss of reputation in order to appeal to readers’ perceived preference for sensational news. Due to its tough stance and policymakers’ perception that journalists are prone to cover policy failure, the official rhetoric of the Romanian government was largely unresponsive to the policy expectation expressed by the media. Rather, while acknowledging partly the EU’s failure to influence the outcome of the Copenhagen summit, the Romanian government underlined that:

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184 Romanian policymakers 1, 4.
the EU and its member states have made strong unilateral commitments towards reducing emissions and implementing new technologies (...) we can be very proud of this, but we cannot stop here (...) in the light of the negotiations (at Copenhagen) we need to carefully evaluate what we need to do in order to in order to reach our goal of limiting the rise in temperature to two degrees (Adevărul, 28 September 2009).

Agenda setting
Agenda setting was the most pervasive interaction effect identified, being highlighted by the way in which the Romanian media defined a series of policy problems, solutions and expectations. Not all the articles that framed climate change as a threat in the medium and long term focused on the need to tackle it urgently. In only about half of the articles, readers were informed and warned that global changes in the climate were happening right before their eyes. The rise of global temperatures was considered to have the potential to cause extreme meteorological phenomena and wipe out entire species of animals and plants. Moreover, climate change was no more a ‘virtual threat, but a reality responsible already responsible for the death of 300.000 people a year, nearly equivalent to the effects of the 2004 tsunami’ (Jurnalul Național, 2 July 2009). The sense of urgency was also constructed by portraying the protests and activity of various and global NGOs and members of the general public. Supporters and members of Greenpeace were featured due to their civic actions all around Europe: UK (Jurnalul Național, 12 October 2009), Italy (Adevărul, 4 December 2009) or the Netherlands (Adevărul, 11 October 2009). Voices from the general public were also featured in order to highlight the present threat posed by climate change through various social and cultural programs or demonstrations (Jurnalul Național, 12 December 2009). The actions of the general public were also presented in connection to the policy definition which claimed that climate change was a current threat.

Besides focusing on the actions of demonstrators around Europe, Adevărul (7 December 2009) featured a glimpse into the attitudes of citizens in other member states towards climate change. By taking the side of demonstrators and pushing for governmental response, Romanian

185 It presented a survey made by Le Monde according to which around 80 percent of Europeans agreed that they had to make a change in their life in order to reduce the effects of climate change.
journalists acted here as activists, contributing to new forms of participative democracy. At the same time, by conveying a perceived image of public opinion to policymakers, the Romanian media created the discursive context for individuals to be linked to policymaking. Romanian policymakers also underlined the urgency with which the effects and causes of global climate change needed to be addressed: ‘the circumstances which led to the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol a decade ago have significantly worsened’ (Băsescu, 2009a, 2009d). This policy definition was based on the discourse of EU policymakers and Western media, which Romanian journalists found to be highly legitimate. Climate change defined as urgency became a hot topic in the Romanian media, prompting also responsiveness from Romanian policymakers. On their part, Romanian journalists perceived that by reporting on the need to tackle urgently the effects of climate change, they were safeguarding the interests of citizens in Romania and those of peoples around the world. This was in line with the views shared by the general public – perceived by the media and policymakers.

Table 7.3 Agenda Setting – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen – a crucial moment</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>81.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is happening now</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>59.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is the only actor that can forge a global agreement on climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>33.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>11.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

The Romanian media also focussed on the long term impact that climate change might have on Romania, its policies and its involvement within the European Union, whilst proposing practical policies for mitigating effects of climate change. Most of its proposals either expressed views pertaining to the private sector, or the NGO and academic communities. Some solutions sided with policy approaches which had been already discussed as viable options by Romanian policymakers, but had not been agreed on. For example, according to the Romanian Centre for European Politics, Romania had to make investments in order to ‘cleanse’ its energy production sector and try to convince the private sector about the importance of climate change policy.

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186 Romanian journalists 1, 2.
187 Romanian journalist 1.
188 Romanian policymakers 3, 4.
(Adevărul, 6 December 2009). On the other hand, the media argued that within the EU, Romania had to comply with the ambitious emissions reductions agreed on by the member states, mirroring the official commitment of the government which stated that ‘Romania together with other EU member states is determined to act firmly towards reducing emissions and implementing significant measures for reduction and adaption’ (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). One such measure, highly publicised in the two newspapers, involved a policy of renewing the national car pool which implied trading old, highly polluting cars for a discount on new ones, which received praise from the two newspapers (Jurnalul Național, 4 August 2009).

The solutions defined by the media in order to be implemented were already being considered by Romanian policymakers, and were supported by lower ranking bureaucrats within the government. Hence, the Romania media became here part of the political process by proposing and supporting policy solutions to which policymakers were responsive. This resulted also from the fact that Romanian journalists found themselves in a continuous dialogue on the topic with policymakers who frequently offered them interviews or background information.

The Copenhagen summit was perceived in the Romanian media as a paramount gathering of the time, where effective and sustainable plans for tackling the effects of climate had to be drafted and agreed upon. As table 7.3 shows, about four in five articles constructed this policy expectation related to importance of the summit. Moreover, the coverage of climate change in the period analysed confirms the finding that the Copenhagen summit was perceived by the Romanian media as a crucial moment, where an ambitious agreement had the potential to be forged. Figure A.1 (page 301) shows a spike in the months before and during the summit, signalling a rise in the interest of the two Romanian newspapers in issues regarding global climate change policy. The magnitude of the summit was captured in news reports by portraying the impressive ‘numbers’ in play at the meeting: 192 states, 5000 journalists and 12 days (Adevărul, 7 December 2009). Adevărul (21 November 2009) sided with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs in highlighting the importance of the Copenhagen Summit, where the credibility and legitimacy of the EU’s approach to climate change was at stake: ‘we cannot afford missing the crucial opportunity we will have at the UN conference in Copenhagen’. Representatives of the civil society and the general public were also featured in order to portray the overarching

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189 Romanian policymaker 1, 2.
190 Romanian journalists 1, 2.
interest for the summit (and climate change in general) found throughout the public sphere. Besides drawing on the views of NGOs or members of the scientific community, the Romanian media also presented statements from EU and UN policymakers who were considered to possess high levels of credibility. Hence, journalists acted here as activists, pushing for an issue considered to be legitimate and salient for the future security and welfare of peoples globally. The view that the Copenhagen summit was a crucial juncture in global climate change policy was shared by the Romanian government which hoped for the signing of a ‘fair and progressive agreement – that would continue the progress achieved under the Kyoto Protocol’ (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009c). Through its ties and dialogue with policymakers, Romanian journalists could push even more for the issue to be placed high on the political agenda of the Romanian government\(^\text{191}\).

Within the timeframe explored, the EU was presented as a global leader in tackling the effects of climate change. This contained the policy expectation that the EU had to forge a global climate change agreement at the Copenhagen summit. Due to its member states’ own commitments to reduce carbon emissions and the Commission’s goal of providing aid to developing and third world states, the Union was considered to act as a leader by example: according to a French MEP, Europe could have played a ‘driving role at the climate change conference in Copenhagen’ (Jurnalul Naţional, 9 December 2009). Among the member states, Romania was praised by both its national media and the Commission for its contribution and commitment to the EU’s common approach (Jurnalul Naţional, 6 December 2009). The expectation that the EU should act as a leader in global climate change constructed by policymakers from the EU’s institutions, MEPs or political leaders from the member states also featured in the two newspapers. For example, in the build up to the Copenhagen summit, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini was keen to note that: ‘our commitment is to stop global warming and reduce emissions by 20 percent, and we are ready, in the event that our partners will support us, to reduce them even to 30 percent’ (Adevărul, 21 November 2009). Similarly, Romanian policymakers praised the Union’s leadership in global climate change policy due to its ability to act as an example for developing countries, and in this way catalyse the international negotiations for a new treaty (Băsescu, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, 2010).

\(^{191}\) Romanian journalists 1, 2.

205
case, agenda setting manifested itself through the ability of the Romanian media to emphasise the EU’s own expectations and aspirations, putting pressure on Romanian policymakers to comply to a greater degree with them. Romanian journalists achieved this through their dialogue and interactions with policymakers who were already supporting the EU’s leadership. Promoting and building support for a policy expectation again implied that the media acted as a gatekeeper of official policy commitments (as specified in the interactions effects model detailed in chapter 3). However, its criticism of the failure of the EU during the summit did not prompt the same level of responsiveness from policymakers – pointing to instances of bounding, as was highlighted earlier.

7.2.2 The policy towards Russia

Indexing
In their framing of the policy towards Russia, the two Romanian newspapers mostly took cues from policymakers and tried to publicise and build up support for their policies. One of the prime policy problems defined by the Romanian media focused on division and disagreements between member states. Germany and France were considered the main culprits that had constructed profitable economic relations with Russia in the past, disregarding the interests of other member states (Jurnalul Naţional, 8 January 2009). In a special issue, Adevărul (24 October 2008) asked high profile national and European policymakers why the EU had a divided approach to Russia and had been unwilling (unable) to speak with a single voice in relation to energy security issues. Romanian policymakers equated the EU’s weak policy towards Moscow with the big member states’ purely self interested ties with Russia, which disregard the interests of the new member states from CEE. Germany was framed as a defiant state which ignored the EP’s recommendation to forego its involvement in the North Stream project (Adevărul, 29 May 2008).

In this instance of indexing, the media Romanian took cues and was used by policymakers in order to convey a message which diverged from official EU approaches and could not have been stated directly. Moreover, by reporting on the deep divisions which plagued the EU’s ability to forge a common stance towards Russia, the two newspapers helped policymakers open up the issue to public debate. A clash with the more balanced approach of member states such as

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192 Romanian policymakers 3, 4.
Germany surfaced in 2011, when Wikileaks published a telegram from the US ambassador in Romania to the US state department in which President Băsescu was presented mentioning to an influential US senator the possibly of Romania being involved in a war against Russia, if the big EU players didn’t adopt a tougher, common position against Moscow (Popescu, 2011). On the other hand, Bulgaria and Romania were urged by a series of MEPs to resist Moscow’s offers to participate in the South Stream pipeline project which would have short-circuited the EU supported Nabucco pipeline (European Parliament, 2009d). Before and during the war, both newspapers overtly criticised the EU’s lack of unity, commitment and decisiveness in responding to Russia’s discursive and practical aggressions toward the physical or energy security of the states in CEE and those of the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Table 7.4 Indexing – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should be main actor in dealing with Russia</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>36.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional stability – Black Sea region</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>23.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should cooperate with Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – seen in a negative light</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>13.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

The main policy solution proposed by the Romanian media involved the development within the EU of a strategic partnership with Russia (highlighted in table 7.4). The Romanian government promoted the idea of constructing a strategic partnership with Russia which would assure stability and security in the region: ‘it is important to define the EU and NATO’s partnership with Russia on the basis of a coherent and transparent dialogue (...) our common objective is to consolidate European and international security’ (Băsescu, 2008d). While this view did not mirror a widely shared consensus among Romanian policymakers – some of which still shared deeply antagonistic feelings towards Moscow – it fitted into to the overall approach of the EU, which the Romanian government was officially committed to. Chapter 3 highlighted that indexing implies that policymakers rely on the media in order to give voice to their policies. Here too, the media was used by the Romanian government in order to portray a message towards Russia in line with the EU’s aspiration to build an effective strategic partnership. One in five articles examined argued that the EU should try to cooperate with Moscow, due to the important economic and historical ties they shared. A few weeks after the Union’s strong
response to Russia’s intervention in Georgia, the Romanian media urged the EU to be more lenient towards Moscow, as the latter seemed to have understood the *message of peace and stability*. This view was also predicated upon the idea that Russia desired to cooperate with the international community and promote peace and stability – a view which became prevalent in the pages of the newspapers after the ceasefire agreement. Former President Medvedev was featured in the two newspapers supporting a multipolar world, where peace and stability could be ‘maintained if only one state is deterred from acting on its own’ (*Jurnalul Naţional*, 6 October 2008). Consequently, in the build up to the 2008 US elections he was hopeful that the next American administration would favour strong relations with Russia. Moscow was also offering support for NATO actions in Afghanistan, a sign of a shift in Russia’s attitude towards the West.

Indexing in this case is also supported by the fact that, Russia as foreign policy issue was treated as a topic concerning only high politics, where Romania had to try to negotiate and conform to the policy agreed on within the EU. For Romanian policymakers there was also a contention that Russia should be dealt as an issue of high politics which was remote from the general public. In the pages of the two newspapers, there was almost complete absence of positions and arguments constructed within the public sphere by members of the civil society or the general public. This was also highlighted by the analysis of the coverage of the Romanian media of Russia as a topic of foreign policy. Although the Georgian-Russian war caused a sudden spike in the number of media reports relating to Russia as a foreign policy issue, it did not seem to have any long term effects on the coverage of the issue in the two newspapers. As seen in figure A.2 (page 302), after the conflict, media coverage returned to the same steady pace registered before the war, with an average of 7 articles per month. The war and the ceasefire produced almost five times more reports than this average, reinforcing the assumption that the conflict was an important issue in the Romanian public sphere. While Russia’s intervention had an upward effect on its reputation as a powerful international actor in the Romanian media, it did not produce the same results in terms of coverage. This could be accounted for by the fact since the fall of Communism in 1989, Russia, due to its past behaviour, has always been an important topic in the Romanian public sphere.

Optimism towards the EU’s abilities was shared by Romanian policymakers, who highlighted repeatedly the need to deploy a permanent EU mission in Georgia, and if possible in the frozen
conflict areas in the Eastern Neighbourhood (Băsescu, 2008f, 2008e, 2009c). The Romanian media also supported the expectation that the EU could assure peace and stability in its Eastern Neighbourhood, by focusing on its capabilities, and educating the general public regarding its policies and achievements. The Union was presented in almost half of the articles as the main actor that could provide peace and stability in the region (its Eastern Neighbourhood). Romania and Bulgaria’s accession brought the EU closer and made it more sensitive to the conflicts in the Black Sea region, constraining it to assume a coherent strategy towards the states in the area. However, the two newspapers stressed that a stronger involvement from Romania and Bulgaria – which were sidelined from contributing to the EU’s approach towards the region – would provide more legitimacy for the EU, due to the new member states’ close ties with the states in the region (Jurnalul Naţional, 21 October 2008). The EU’s policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood was based on convincing leaders in the region of the benefits of adapting to its economic conditionality (Adevărul, 26 May 2008). During the war, the EU was hailed by the Romanian media for being the first to act, before the US or other international actors.

Linked to the previous policy expectation, ‘more Europe’ or a stronger European attitude towards Russia’s interference in the democratisation processes of the countries in the Black Sea region (and its aggression towards Georgia) was also a salient policy expectation constructed by the Romanian media. The Romanian government called on repeated occasions for the EU to work together with NATO in order to ensure an enhanced European presence in the region: ‘the events in Georgia have demonstrated that regional actors do not have the ability to manage a conflict situations (...) this is why it is up to the international community, especially the EU and NATO to step up and get involved to a greater extent in ensuring the peace and stability of the region’ (Băsescu, 2009c). According to the Romanian media, the EU had to overcome its economic interests in the region and shelter states such as Georgia or Moldova from the negative influence of Moscow. Georgia was presented as a victim of the lack of willingness from Europeans to act in order to defend a country which shared aspirations for European integration. Editorials in both newspapers called for a more protective approach from the EU towards young democracies such as Ukraine or Georgia, which were highly vulnerable to Moscow’s malign interests (Adevărul, 26 August 2008). This expectation was in line with the common views held by the general public that Russia’s power had to be counterbalanced in order to assure the stability and developed of the region (especially that of the Republic of Moldova).
discourse, the Romanian media reified the expectation that the EU could neutralise Russia’s hegemonic interests in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In the months before the conflict, the Romanian media constructed a similar policy expectation, and through its agenda setting power managed to have a rather limited impact on official rhetoric. On the other hand, during the first two weeks that followed Russia’s intervention in Georgia, Romanian policymakers (who were before somewhat ignorant of this expectation) incorporated it into their discourse, radicalising it and feeding it back to the media (in an instance of indexing).

Bounding
Bounding was present in situations where the Romanian media defined policy problems and solutions which implied a tougher stance towards Russia than the Romanian government was prepared to adopt – highlighted in table 7.5. The main effect of the Russian-Georgian war on the Romanian media was undoubtedly the emergence of the idea that Moscow had regained its former great power status – which was defined as a salient policy problem. Over 60 percent of the articles in the sample argued that the EU and the rest of the international community should not disregard Russia, because such an attitude could have led to a new Cold War. According to Adevărul (28 September 2008), Europe could not afford to fight an economic war with Russia and should be very careful in managing its relations with Moscow. Russia’s investments in the military industry and naval presence in the war games organised by Venezuela were perceived as a testimony of Moscow’s growing power. Most articles warned that Russia was becoming again a powerful international actor which could pose an important security threat to Europe. Adevărul observed that with the start of the Georgian crisis: ‘the spectrum of the Cold War (was) more and more evoked’ (Adevărul, 8 September 2008), while the small conflict in the Caucasus turned into a ‘fight for democracy’ (Adevărul, 12 August 2008).

Media discourse here can be viewed as integral to the common views shared within the Romanian national public sphere about Russia’s malign interests and its potential to endanger global and regional security. Romanian journalists here adopted an active stance in promoting a critical view towards Russian which was rooted in the historical antagonism shared by a large part of the general public. In contrast, the Romanian government – after the first confusing moments which followed Russia’s intervention – presented a more nuanced view on Russia,
which both tried to appease it and to highlight the idea that Moscow needed to change its approaches to regional and global security: ‘Russia clearly has to play a major role in the peace and stability of the region Eastern Neighbourhood, (...) but it is not very clear whether it can supply in an impartial manner troops in the region’ (Băsescu, 2008f). Hence, Romanian policymakers perceived that the media’s discourse was too much influenced by journalists’ interests rooted in a traditional and unreflective fear towards Russia.

Table 7.5 Bounding – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia is regaining its great power status</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>64.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a security threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>63.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war seen as a Russian aggression</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>52.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>48.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>towards Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia is responsible for the war</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

Even months before the August war, the Romania media observed the increasing tensions in South Ossetia, where Moscow had strengthened its military presence. A move which Adevărul considered could have triggered a ‘conflict in the Caucasus with global implications’ (Adevărul, 6 May 2008). Thus, there is no surprise that one of the most important policy definitions constructed by the Romanian media presented Russia as the aggressor. More than half of the articles showed how Russian forces invaded Georgia’s sovereignty, disregarding the principles of international law. In the aftermath of the conflict, the Romania media asked whether the war was caused by the Russian secret services (Adevărul, 14 August 2008) as part of a broader plan to create a new ‘Union for Eastern Europe’ (Adevărul, 18 August 2008), which would allow it to manage the geopolitics of the region. Simultaneously, Russia was criticised by the Romanian media for not respecting the ceasefire agreement brokered by France, whilst President Băsescu made a case for a new type of engagement with the frozen conflicts in the region: ‘I have observed the inefficiency of current peace keeping mechanisms in South Ossetia, Transnistria, Abkhazia, etc. (...) maintaining current mechanisms would increase the risk of exacerbating the frozen conflicts’ (Adevărul, 14 August 2008).

\(^{193}\) Romanian policymakers 1, 2.
Georgia was also seen as responsible for the conflict due to its hasty decision to attack the separatist forces. News reports that constructed this frame argued that President Saakasvili acted impulsively, ignoring the advice of the West. Integrating the ‘irresponsible’ Georgia (Jurnalul Naţional, 1 December 2008) in NATO was seen to present a high risk to the security and stability of the Black Sea region, and more broadly Europe. Within the same perspective, Romania was also criticised for supplying arms to Tbilisi, while the Western media was charged with manipulating public opinion in blaming Russia for the starting the conflict. On the other hand, journalists’ own agendas influenced by the need to focus on the sensational and the deeply ingrained fear towards Russia, coupled with the perception that they lack knowledge about foreign policy, made Romanian policymakers unresponsive to the policy problem defined by the media which presented Russia as the main aggressor. Romanian, journalists were seen here to push for extreme approaches and dismiss without rational justification policies that tried to appease Russia. Hence, the official Romanian rhetoric presented a balanced attitude, on the one hand, arguing for the territorial integrity of Georgia, and on the other, for the need for Tbilisi to start negotiations with Russia:

we are endorsing without reservations Georgia’s territorial integrity (...) we are convinced that it is in the interest of all the states in the region –, be it Russia, Georgia or Romania – to ensure stability in the area and make sure that the Russian-Georgian conflict is settled as soon as possible, (...) to this end, we think that Georgia needs to find solutions in order to start negotiations with Russia (Băsescu, 2008b).

The official governmental rhetoric advocated an European solution – for the conflict and in dealing with Russia and the Eastern Neighborhood – where either the EU in cooperation with NATO or by itself would have to assume leadership in order to settle the frozen conflicts in the region. During the war and shortly after the ceasefire, President Băsescu repeatedly argued for enhancing the current peacekeeping international mission in the region with the presence of the EU: ‘if international mechanisms such as those of the UN and OSCE are not able to manage the situation appropriately, it is the moment for other international or regional organisations to get

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194 Romanian journalists 1, 2.
195 Romanian policymakers 1, 2.
involved, as is the case of the European Union’ (Băsescu, 2008f). In the Romanian media, the US was framed as another important international actor in the region, who could militarily oppose Russia and provide a viable policy solution – while the EU only had diplomatic instruments. Both newspapers hailed the arrival of a series of American warships in the Black Sea, underscoring Romania’s strong transatlanticism. US State Rice (Jurnalul Naţional, 15 August 2008), and Senator Lugar (Adevărul, 29 August 2008) the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee congratulated Romania for its contribution to the stability of the region. Nonetheless, the US was also criticised for losing its position in Europe and for not managing divisions within NATO. As half a year before the conflict, Georgia was denied NATO membership, the organisation was often referred to in the articles in the sample. The war threatened the eastern border of NATO, where the West ‘was fighting for every point on the map’ (Jurnalul Naţional, 19 August 2008). In highlighting the various drawbacks that the EU and NATO faced in dealing with threats to security in the Eastern Neighbourhood, together with the former’s lack of capabilities and political will, the Romanian media enhanced the transparency of the EU within the public sphere.

Agenda setting
The agenda setting powers of the media were largely limited in the case of the policy towards Russia. However, two policy definitions (one problem and one expectation) had a mild effect on official approaches and rhetoric (presented in table 7.6). Reducing Europe’s high energy dependency on Russia was a policy problem defined by almost a third of the articles examined. Moscow’s political use of energy prices, coupled with its policy of interrupting supply to commercial partners were the basic arguments that fuelled the idea that Russia posed an energy threat for Romania and the EU. The media also criticised Romania’s proposed participation in the South Stream pipeline project, which could have derailed the EU’s efforts of reducing its energy dependency towards Russia through the Nabucco pipeline. Romania’s energy security seemed for Romanian policymakers to be more important than maintaining the EU’s common approach: ‘if invited, Romania will participate (in the South Stream project) in any form in order to strengthen its energy security’ (Jurnalul Naţional, 14 March 2008), as Varujan Vosganian Minister for Finance and Economy stressed. As energy prices affected the wellbeing of a large number of Romanian citizens – and others within the EU – the problem identified by the media
became an important theme within the public sphere. Some articles pointed to corrupt politicians both in Romania and in other member states who were willing to sacrifice the interests of their citizens in order to get personal financial gains. The Romanian leadership also expressed recurrent concerns towards Moscow’s political use of gas and energy prices which had destabilising effects for the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood and to small EU member states – that were entirely dependent on Moscow for energy supplies (Băsescu, 2008d, 2008e, 2008c). Romanian journalists acted here as activists often through detailed investigations pursuing the reasons behind Russia’s preferential use of energy prices, and Romanian or EU political elites’ subsequent collaboration and acceptance. In this way, they strived to provide information to individuals within the public sphere, having the potential to encourage public debate. Moreover, the media pressured the Romanian government to adopt a critical approach against Russia’s energy policy, by legitimising its policy definitions through the perceived state of public opinion.

Table 7.6 Agenda Setting – frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>31.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>29.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a threat to Moldova’s security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>24.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data

In another instance of agenda setting, the Romanian media defined an expectation that the EU would actively engage in assuring stability in the Eastern Neighborhood and the Black Sea region – where stability was equated with tackling Russia’s negative actions. In this sense, the media encouraged and prompted the Romanian government on the one hand, to respond vigorously to Russia’s aggression towards Georgia in the first days of the conflict, and on the other, to contribute to and try to deal with the Eastern Neighborhood through the common framework of the Union. The success of this policy expectation was ensured by the high level of responsiveness from Romanian policymakers who maintained an open dialogue and enhanced network of interaction with journalists. The main reason for this was found in the high level of publicity and concern that was associated in the public sphere with Russia’s malign intrusion in Moldova’s domestic affairs – which the two newspapers presented as representative for the

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196 Romanian journalists 1, 2.
whole region. Letters, commentaries and points of view from the general public were frequently featured in the two publications, contributing to the intense public debate which followed Russia’s intervention. Additionally, Romanian policymakers became aware of the views prevalent within the public sphere regarding Russia’s policy in the Eastern Neighborhood and the EU’s capacities and aspirations.¹⁹⁷

Before the August war, according to Adevărul (29 July 2008), the Black Sea was no more a ‘Russian lake’ as President Traian Băsescu characterised it in 2005, but a space where all the important actors in the region had to collaborate, and where Moscow was supposed to acknowledge the interests of other states. At the 2008 NATO Summit, President Băsescu invited Russia to concentrate less on the issues that divided the states in the Black Sea region and focus more on essential common problems such as drugs, arms and people trafficking (Jurnalul Naţional, 5 April 2008). However, Russia’s aggression towards Georgia caused a harsher attitude from the Romanian media and the political sphere, which called for a large European military presence in the Black Sea region to tackle the Russian threat. President Băsescu travelled throughout the countries in the region and reassured them of the EU and NATO’s support without consulting the other EU member states.

Romania’s close cultural and historical ties with the Republic of Moldova prompted a significant number of articles that condemned Russia’s policy towards the latter, and urged Bucharest to act towards the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. According to both newspapers, Romania had to act through the common framework of the Union in order to produce a common policy towards Moldova which would aid the country’s path to democracy. In the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war a high number of reports warned of Russia’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Transnistria following the South-Ossetia example. Simultaneously, such perspectives were dispelled by EU officials who reassured that ‘Transnistria will not follow in Ossetia’s footsteps’ (Adevărul, 8 September 2008). Similarly, Romanian policymakers adopted a pessimistic approach, expressing deep concerns that Russia might use similar arguments to those deployed in the case of South Ossetia in order to support the independence of Transnistria and hence precipitate a potential conflict in the Republic of Moldova and the Black Sea region (Băsescu, 2008e, 2008c, 2009c).

¹⁹⁷ Romanian policymaker 1.
7.3 Discussion

7.3.1 Climate Change
The ability of the Romanian media to enhance democratic legitimacy was far more evident in the case of climate change policy than in that of the policy towards Russia. Table 7.7 highlights that instances of agenda setting and bounding were more pervasive than those of indexing. The issue of climate change was salient both within the media (in the public sphere) and in the discourse of Romanian policymakers. One reason for this is found in the indiscriminate effects that climate change was thought to have on peoples globally. Hence, in its reporting, the Romanian media acted on the assumption that public opinion was greatly concerned with the issue of climate change and the need to engage with its consequences. At the same time, the need to tackle climate change and the crucial moment that Copenhagen represented was a pervasive theme within the more global discourse of the UN, which enjoyed high levels of legitimacy and esteem in the two Romanian newspapers. Hence, in defining and pushing for political action, the Romanian media relied mostly on policy definitions already articulated at various times either by the EU, the UN, transnational NGOs or the wider scientific community.

The analysis of the policy definitions framed by the media together with their interaction effects with Romanian policymakers highlights that instances of bounding and agenda setting outweighed those of indexing both in terms of number and in terms of quality. Agenda setting implied that Romanian journalists became part of the political process, maintaining a continuous dialogue and with policymakers. Moreover, through agenda setting the Romanian media put pressure both before and after the summit on Romanian policymakers to support the EU’s approach to climate change and its global leadership. At the same time, by publicising the importance of the Copenhagen summit and its place in global climate change policy, the Romanian media strived to offer information to individuals, which had the potential to encourage public debate. Bounding was synonymous in this case to enhancing the accountability and transparency of decision-making processes, where the media became a watchdog of democracy. Bounding effects were present in situations where the Romanian media was perceived to have a discourse which was too critical, stemming from journalists’ tendency to focus on failure. Finally, in instances of indexing, the two newspapers gathered support for official policy approaches that they perceived to be in line with the interests of the general public.

Which also put considerable exogenous pressure on Romanian policymakers.
### Table 7.7 Frames present in the Romanian media – climate change policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Interaction effect</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
<th>Adevărul (%)*</th>
<th>Jurnalul National (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>99.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>96.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen – a crucial moment</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81.60</td>
<td>94.40</td>
<td>51.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>11**</td>
<td>64.70**</td>
<td>71.40***</td>
<td>60.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is happening now</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59.20</td>
<td>59.20</td>
<td>58.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming other states</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48.50</td>
<td>53.50</td>
<td>38.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is the only actor that can forge a global agreement on climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>36.60</td>
<td>22.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>4**</td>
<td>23.50**</td>
<td>42.90***</td>
<td>10.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>23.90</td>
<td>19.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal climate change deal</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>23.40</td>
<td>16.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>2**</td>
<td>11.80**</td>
<td>14.30***</td>
<td>10.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>99.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>96.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.
  **Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit (N=17).
  ***Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit: Adevărul (N=7); Jurnalul National (N=10).

Source: Actor’s own calculations (N=102)/ Adevărul (N=71); Jurnalul National (N=31)
Instances of indexing implied that the media acted as a tool at the disposal of policymakers, which allowed them to publicise their policies and gather public support. At the same time, indexing meant that journalists aimed at educating the general public regarding the dangers posed by climate change. Romanian journalists acted in this way due to their belief that citizens were concerned with tackling climate change, which elevated this issue into a matter of national interest. The Romanian media also highlighted the need to devise and implement coherent policies that would tackle both the causes and the consequences of climate change. In doing so, the Romanian media took cues from national policymakers, but also relied on discourse from EU policymakers which was often presented in order to justify the policy definitions constructed. The most pervasive policy problem defined by Romanian media (which viewed climate change as a threat in the medium and long term) drew to a large extent on policymakers’ own discourse and fitted with definitions from other influential international organisations such as the UN. Together with two other instances of indexing (the need to forge an equal deal and putting the blame on China or the US) this policy problem helped promote public debate in areas where policymakers were open and responsive. In putting the blame on other states, journalists relied on points of view from both Romanian and EU policymakers, and aimed to justify publicly the EU’s leadership in climate change. On the other hand, the other policy solution framed by the media related to the need to forge an equal deal converged with the approach of the UN, which was made even more legitimate in the public sphere.

Bounding effects appeared due to the criticism of the EU’s poor track record at the Copenhagen summit and its subsequent disappointing outcome that the Romanian media highlighted. Although partly admitting failure, Romanian policymakers found this criticism too harsh and at most times disregarded it completely. In constructing this policy problem, the Romanian media provided individuals with detailed accounts of the negotiations that took place behind closed doors at Copenhagen, leaving the EU isolated. Through this, Romanian journalists enhanced the EU’s democratic legitimacy by making its approaches more transparent. Moreover, by covering protests which took place throughout the country, the Romanian media had the potential to encourage processes of contestation in the public sphere. Linked to the disappointment of the Copenhagen summit, the Romanian media framed the EU’s subsequent failure as a policy

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199 Romanian journalists 1, 2.
problem. Additionally, the Romanian media continuously presented the expectation that the Union should do even more. This view conflicted with the official stance of the Romanian government which portrayed a rather satisfied and proud attitude regarding the Union’s efforts. Both definitions, while not being taken into account by Romanian policymakers, provided valuable information to the general public. In doing so, journalists acted as watchdogs of democracy and empowered individuals to hold policymakers more accountable. Bounding also implied, in the case of climate change that policymakers were unresponsive, due to their belief that journalists are prone to focus on sensational news and failure, rather than success.

While Romanian policymakers viewed climate change merely as a threat in the medium and long term, the media also highlighted the urgency with which the issue should be tackled. In constructing this policy problem, the two newspapers reported extensively on the various protests and demonstrations that were taking place throughout Romania. The media achieved this by featuring commentaries, letters from NGOs, scientists and members of the general public. Through this, the Romanian media had the potential to link individuals to policymaking processes by conveying their views directly to policymakers who were willing to interact with the content produced by the two newspapers. Here, the agenda setting power of the media managed to add a sense of urgency to the discourse of the Romanian government and the President in the build up to the Copenhagen summit. Agenda setting in the case of climate change also saw the media proposing a number of practical policies which would serve as solutions for mitigating the effects of climate change. These proposals originated from the NGO and academic communities, and some were even being discussed in various policy circles. Hence, in this instance, the Romanian media became part of the political process due to journalists’ dialogue and informal interactions with policymakers, but also their proneness to act as supporters or activists for different solutions. Romanian journalists’ activism also influenced their reporting of the Copenhagen summit which was framed as a crucial moment in development of global climate change policy. The policy expectation defined by the media, elevated the success of the Copenhagen summit into a top policy priority for the Romanian government. Additionally, the media acted as a gatekeeper of Romanian policymakers’ commitments, constraining them to adjust to the ambitious discourse of the EU and support its

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200 Romanian policymakers 1, 2.
approaches to global climate change policy. After the summit, the Romanian media also advocated for and put pressure on Romanian policymakers to continue to support the EU’s leadership in global climate change policy.

7.3.2 The policy towards Russia
In contrast to the case of climate change, the policy towards Russia was not perceived to have global effects, but rather local and regional implications, to which, nonetheless, Romanian citizens were highly sensitive. The case of the policy towards Russia also differs in regard to the nature of the political action envisaged. Tackling climate change was perceived by the Romanian media to be more effective when approached at a multilateral level through the framework of the EU – which would take into account the interests of peoples around the world. Romanian journalists argued that Romanian policymakers should try to negotiate a position within the EU – which was a better avenue for engaging Russia than bilaterally – that would safeguard the country’s interests towards Russia and the Eastern Neighbourhood. However, Romania’s rhetoric towards Russia, during the one year period analysed, was at best mixed and ambiguous. While it is not within the scope of this study to evaluate the reasons that led to confusion and sudden shifts in Romania’s rhetoric, one reason might reside in President Băsescu’s personal ambition of engaging Russia’s singlehandedly. He achieved this by hijacking completely from the government leadership in foreign policy. Secondly, trade with Moscow and foreign investment coming from Russia have intensified since Romania’s accession to the EU (Nitoiu, 2011), making it increasingly difficult for the Romanian government to maintain a tough stance against Russia in the period before the war and after the ceasefire. Ambiguity and confusion was present also in the Romanian media’s discourse, which, on most occasions, took cues from policymakers, supporting and publicising their approaches. At other times, it adopted a discourse which was viewed as too critical, and thus ignored by the Romanian governing elite. Hence, the difference between bounding and indexing resides here in the fact that the media was criticised for going too far. Moreover, bounding shifted to indexing in the first moments of the crisis, which left Romanian policymakers somewhat perplexed.

 Statements and points of view from the government regarding Russia were all but absent, and when present highly drew on the President’s rhetoric.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Type of policy definition</th>
<th>Interaction effect</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>Rate of occurrence (%)</th>
<th>Adevărul (%)*</th>
<th>Jurnalul National (%)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia is regaining its great power status</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>64.80</td>
<td>68.30</td>
<td>61.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a security threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>63.20</td>
<td>68.30</td>
<td>58.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war seen as a Russian aggression</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>58.30</td>
<td>46.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach towards Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48.80</td>
<td>41.70</td>
<td>55.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should be main actor in dealing with Russia</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36.80</td>
<td>43.30</td>
<td>30.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31.20</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>23.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda Setting</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29.60</td>
<td>31.70</td>
<td>27.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a threat for Moldova’s security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24.80</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>32.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional stability – Black Sea region</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23.20</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>23.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should cooperate with Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>23.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia is responsible for the war</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>21.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – seen in a negative light</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>13.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>12.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.

Source: Author’s own calculations (N=125)/ Adevărul (N=60); Jurnalul National (N=65).
Instances of indexing and bounding outweighed those of agenda setting, pointing to low levels of democratic legitimacy – seen in table 7.8. They also highlight the fact that both the Romanian media and Romanian policymakers viewed the policy over Russia as a topic of high politics, where decisions can be detached from the general public. The media acted, on most occasions, as a tool which Romanian policymakers could employ in order to publicise their approach to Russia and gather support for it. It also allowed policymakers to survey public opinion and ignite public debate on issues where they felt public support was necessary. At the same time, through the discourse of the Romanian media, policymakers were able to indirectly make public positions which they could not afford to state openly through official channels. The Romanian media portrayed a critical discourse – which surpassed that of the Romanian government – of Russia’s actions and intentions before the war and in the months that followed the ceasefire agreement, making policymakers unresponsive. Nonetheless, by providing information about Russia’s intentions and actions, the two newspapers provided a better position to citizens to hold policymakers accountable and claim more transparency. In defining Russia’s political use of energy prices as a policy problem before the war, the Romanian media offered policymakers an avenue through which they could adopt a more decisive discourse. Hence, interactions between Romanian journalists and policymakers moved from agenda setting or indexing to bounding, in situations where media discourse became much more critical than the official rhetoric.

In the case of the policy towards Russia, indexing effects implied that the media was used by Romanian policymakers in order to gather support for their policies and send an indirect message to both Moscow and to other member states – as specified in the framework describing interactions detailed in chapter 3. For example, in defining divisions among the member states as one of the most important hurdles that were hampering the EU’s ability to achieve a common approach towards Russia, the Romanian media took cues from policymakers, presenting a rhetoric which the government felt it could have not stated publicly. The Romanian media provided to individuals in the public sphere access to information regarding the different interests that were fuelling each member state’s approach towards Russia, encouraging debate within the public sphere. Indexing effects characterised the media’s decision to report on the need for the EU to develop a strategic partnership with Russia. The Romanian media aimed to gather support and educate the general public regarding the benefits of such a partnership, even though most Romanian citizens shared a deeply engrained hatred towards Russia.
The mixed and ambiguous messages that were being sent by the Romanian government through official channels were mirrored by the media. While supporting the development of a partnership with Russia, the Romanian media also claimed that the EU had the capacity and should do more in order to stabilise the Eastern Neighbourhood and keep the countries in the region at bay from Russia’s malign influence. Linked to this policy solution, the media presented myriad views from Russian leaders and Romanian policymakers who claimed that Moscow wanted to strike a deal with the EU, which would have assured peace and stability in Eastern Neighbourhood. In the case of indexing, the media’s policy definitions drew on the common view held by the general public and Romanian policymakers regarding Russia’s hegemonic intentions and the EU’s potential to keep them in check. Drawing on official rhetoric, the Romanian media framed two policy expectations which had the EU at their core. Firstly, journalists argued that the EU had both the potential and the capacity to engage with Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood successfully. Secondly, due to the proximity of the Black Sea – unlike the British and the transnational media – the Romanian media advocated that the EU should assure stability in the Black Sea region. Indexing again here meant that the Romanian media aimed to gather support for the government’s approach.

The Romanian media defined four policy problems which were largely ignored by Romanian policymakers due to their highly critical stance in the aftermath of the conflict (although accepted during the first days of the war). Firstly, articles pointed to the fact that Moscow had intentionally started the war and invaded a sovereign country. However, a smaller number of articles also argued that Georgia was responsible for the conflict. In this way, the Romanian media provided information from both sides of the conflict, painting a less biased picture. The Romanian media also warned policymakers that the Georgian conflict confirmed Russia’s power, status and hegemonic intentions in the international arena. Journalists linked to this policy problem the threat to Romania and Europe’s security posed by Moscow. The Romanian media drew here on the common view shared by the general public regarding Russia’s hegemonic intentions. Nonetheless, the media was seen by policymakers to be overtly critical and searching too much for the sensational. Bounding here can be seen only at the level of formal discourse and interactions, as policymakers also shared partly the critical stance of the Romanian media, but felt that such a rhetoric could be very damaging and publicly disapproved of the two
newspapers’ one-sided reporting\textsuperscript{202}. Bounding was more evident in relation to the media’s proposal which envisaged the US and various international actors (other than the EU) to have a significant contribution in engaging with Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Romanian policymakers were, on the other hand, highly committed to a purely European solution to the conflict which involved a strong presence and response from the EU. Through this, the two newspapers provided information about the willingness and capacity of the US and other international actors to involve in the conflict and assure stability in the region.

Romania and Europe’s high energy dependency on Russia was a policy problem that the two newspapers articulated, adopting most times a very critical stance. Affecting the welfare and the economic security of a large part of the general public both in Romania and throughout other member states, the issue became a popular stereotype when thinking about Russia within the public sphere. Simultaneously, it fitted with the discourse of the Commission which had been working for a number of years to try to build solidarity among the member states, and discourage them from negotiating preferential energy deals with Russia at the expense of others. Through their discourse, Romanian journalists acted as activists and provided information to the general public regarding Moscow’s political use of energy prices, and Germany or France’s bilateral deals with Russia. The Romanian media fostered public debate on the issue and put pressure on Romanian policymakers to adopt a decisive approach in tackling Russia’s threats to Europe’s energy security, in this way becoming part of the political process.

During the one year period analysed, the Romanian media constructed a policy expectation that the EU had the capacity and should involve itself in the Eastern Neighbourhood in order to foster the economic development of the countries in the region (and peace and stability). Agenda setting was evident in this case before and during the war, when the two newspapers often featured commentaries, op-eds and letters from the general public, which urged the Romanian government to support the EU’s position towards the region. During the war, Romanian policymakers’ rhetoric adopted the positions expressed by the media earlier, and even went further, claiming that the EU should do more in the region (in an instance of indexing, as was shown earlier). Again, the Romanian media became an integral part of the political process completing a full circle, first constructing a policy expectation based on their perception of

\textsuperscript{202} Romanian policymakers 1-3.
public opinion, feeding it to and putting pressure on policymakers, and after the latter adopted it and somewhat radicalised it, acting as a tool for gathering support.

Finally, unlike the transnational media or the British media, the two Romanian newspapers – due to Moldova’s proximity and the historical ties with the country – framed a policy expectation related to Romanian policymakers’ duty to argue within the EU for a stronger and more favourable attitude towards the Republic of Moldova. This policy expectation was seen by Romanian journalists to reflect the overwhelming support that most citizens shared for Moldova’s ambitions for European integration. The two newspapers featured voices from the general public together with commentaries which had the potential to encourage public debate on the issue, putting pressure on Romanian policymakers.

7.4 Conclusions
This chapter shows that within Romania’s national public sphere, the EU’s climate change policy was endowed with higher levels of democratic legitimacy through the activity of the media, than the policy towards Russia. The Romanian media’s agenda setting powers and its abilities to constrain decision-making through bounding, even in situations where policymakers lacked responsiveness, is indicative of the media’s ability to enhance democratic legitimacy in the case of climate change policy. Oppositely, the pervasiveness of instances of indexing points to low levels of legitimacy in the second case study, which can be partly attributed to the widespread view among Romanian policymakers and journalists that Russia should be treated as a topic of high politics where decision-making can be remote from the general public. Nonetheless, the analysis showed that in both case studies, the Romanian media not only viewed the EU as the main global and regional player (and the primary avenue through which Romania should act), but also criticised it for not doing enough or not living up to its goals. Hence, through its discourse, the Romania media raised awareness about the EU’s abilities and potential in the international arena, in this way encouraging public debate – also enhancing the transparency of the EU’s decision-making processes. Romanian policymakers were at times persuaded and constrained to act and contribute to the EU’s global or regional efforts. At other times, they were

203 Romanian journalists 1, 2.
aided by the Romanian media in publicising their approaches which converged with those of the Union. National policymakers’ approach to Romania’s activity within the EU was made more accountable within the public sphere. Furthermore, most of the policy definitions framed by the Romanian media (be they problems, solutions or expectations) envisaged a central role for the EU, which points to the Europeanisation of media discourse within the Romanian national public sphere. In turn, this gives weight to idea that the EPS – described in chapter 2 as the result of the overlapping between Europeanised national public spheres – through the activity and discourse of national media had the ability to enhance (in varying degrees) the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s decision-making processes in foreign policy.
Conclusions

Introduction
This thesis has highlighted that the media can indeed enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy. It has done so by posing two research questions: a) Can the EU enjoy democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy through the activity of the media?, and b) In what ways does the activity of the media endow the EU’s foreign policy democratic legitimacy? The argument developed in the thesis drew on insights from political theory and introduced the concept of the European public sphere, in order to highlight the ability of the media to enhance the multiple aspects of democratic legitimacy – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. As citizens do not commonly have access to information about the EU’s foreign policy, the media becomes their primary avenue for getting in contact or being actually linked to decision-making in this policy area. At the same time, it has presented and employed a model consisting of three interaction effects (between the media and policymakers) – indexing, bounding and agenda setting – which can shed light on the ability of the media to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-making in the area of foreign policy. In this regard the empirical cases have provided mixed results. The case study on the Union’s approach to climate change emphasised more clearly the fact that indeed the media has the ability to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy, and that it has acted accordingly.

The empirical chapters have highlighted that identifying and distinguishing between instances of the three interactions effects has shown that the media almost never can enhance simultaneously on all the aspects of democratic legitimacy. Rather, the way it frames its policy definitions, together with the nature of its interactions with policymakers can boost certain aspects (such as transparency and accountability) even when decision-making lacks for example, responsiveness.
Moreover, the findings presented in three empirical chapters should not be generalised to every aspect of the EU’s foreign policy, as the two case studies paint merely a snapshot of two very different issue areas of the EU’s foreign policy. What they do highlight is the fact that the interactions between the media (and its discourse) and policymakers affect the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. At the same time, they show that this thesis provides a robust framework which can be applied in order to assess any issue on the Union’s foreign policy agenda. After briefly revisiting the content of the previous chapters, this concluding chapter outlines the insights from the empirical chapters. The following sections then reflect on the theoretical and methodological approaches employed in the thesis, together with their strengths and limitations. The last section provides a discussion of the potential avenues for future research stemming from the findings, and the contribution to the literature of the thesis.

The introductory chapter outlined the aims of the thesis and positioned the argument within the literature. The chapter advocated that a broader understanding of democratic legitimacy should be employed. Rather than solely focusing on the principle of representation, and empirically evaluating the way in which it is inscribed into the legal and institutional make-up of the EU’s foreign policy, this thesis viewed democratic legitimacy as being composed of various aspects. These aspects are transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. An increase in any of these aspects is considered to have a positive effect on the way democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy decision-making. The introduction to the thesis also included a brief note which summarised the theoretical framework and the methods employed, which were presented in more detail in chapters 3 and 4.

Chapter 1 highlighted the way in which the literatures on the EU’s foreign policy and foreign policy analysis have engaged with the issue of democratic legitimacy. The study of the EU’s foreign policy was seen to be dominated by three broad debates which have either ignored issues of democratic legitimacy, or, in very few cases, have equated democratic legitimacy with the principle of democratic representation. Firstly, scholars have focused on the nation state, enquiring into the role of the member states in the constructing of the EU’s foreign policy, or have compared the EU to the nation state in order to account for the nature of its foreign policy. Drawing on insights from the realist tradition in IR, contributions to this debate have ignored the issue of democratic legitimacy, treating it as a domestic variable which does not have significant
effects on foreign policy. Secondly, scholars have focused on the institutional make-up of the EU and the internal processes that characterise it, equating democratic legitimacy with the principle of representation and its salience in the context of the perceived decline of intergovernmentalism. The third debate focuses on the way in which the EU’s ontology influences its behaviour in the international arena. Contributions here are centred on the assumption that because the EU is deeply committed to fostering the principles of democracy laid out in its founding treaties, its policies enjoy democratic legitimacy. The tendency to sideline the salience of democratic legitimacy in the literature on the EU’s foreign policy was found to reflect the lack of attention that foreign policy analysts afford to the issue. Some ignore its role altogether or take for granted its existence in democratic systems when a correlation between the media or public opinion and foreign policy decisions can be established. Others have enquired into the notion of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or by proposing other complementary approaches.

The concept of the (European) public sphere was introduced in chapter 2 in order to highlight the ability of the media to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes in the EU’s foreign policy – and aim to answer the first research question. The public sphere is generally seen as the space where people come into contact with politics through the information supplied by the media and the public debate it fosters. In this way, the media has, within the public sphere, the ability to positively affect all the aspects of democratic legitimacy: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The media play a crucial role, to the extent that the EPS is what the media make of it (Risse, 2010). As a consequence, the media’s interactions with policymakers were viewed in the thesis to be crucial for understanding the way in democratic legitimacy is enacted in EU foreign policy decision-making. The EPS was seen to have a complex structure resulting from the overlapping of various Europeanised national public spheres.

Analytically, an interaction effects model was presented and employed in this thesis in order to account for the ability of the media to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. Chapter 3 presented three types of interaction effects between the media and policymakers: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Indexing captures instances where the media lacks independence and supports the activity of policymakers, whilst being employed by
them as a tool for publicising and gathering support for policies. Bounding implies that the media has the ability to affect decision-making even though policymakers are unaware of or unwilling to interact with its discourse. The ability of the media purposively to influence decision-making aided by journalists’ ties with policymakers is encapsulated by instances of agenda setting. The chapter also highlighted that the modes through which the media frames its policy definitions – focusing on problems, solutions and expectations – are crucial for identifying and distinguishing instances of the three types of interaction effects.

Frame analysis was employed in the thesis in order to identify the way in which the media constructs its policy definitions. Chapter 4 highlights that framing captures the efforts of the media to unpack reality and present it to its readership. The frame analysis was complemented with data from interviews and questionnaires, coupled with various primary and secondary sources. Interviews and questionnaires were targeted on specific policymakers and journalists involved in the two issue areas analysed. The first part of the chapter outlined the two case studies analysed in the thesis, highlighting the fact that they resemble two distinctive areas of the EU’s foreign policy, which exhibit multiple contrasting characteristics. The empirical analysis focused on two member states (the United Kingdom and Romania) and the transnational level – chapters 5, 6 and 7 presented the findings from each of the three. This chapter now moves to highlighting the findings from the empirical chapters. The following sections reflect on the theoretical and methodological approach employed in the thesis, together with its strengths and limitations.

**Answering the research questions: the insights from the three empirical chapters**

This section presents the findings from the empirical chapters, highlighting the way in which they address the two research questions explored in the thesis. It first provides an overview of the media/foreign policy nexuses at the transnational level, and in the British and Romanian cases. The following two subsections focus on the two case studies, highlighting the way in which the empirical evidence addresses the two research questions. They show that the media had the ability to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy and the subsequent ways through which it achieved this – together with the variations in the extent to which it was
achieved. Additionally, in each case study, analyses between and across the three media/foreign policy nexuses are made, with an overview being presented in tables 8.1 and 8.2.

The three media/foreign policy nexuses

*The transnational level*

Chapter 5 highlighted that there is a widespread belief among transnational journalists that the EU is committed to upholding democratic values and principles. It also stressed that EU policymakers feel they need to be accountable and transparent to citizens, even more than national policymakers. They believe that the media has the potential to influence public opinion and to present a relevant picture of it. This is why the EU uses the media in order to multiply its message and get it across to citizens. On the other hand, transnational journalists contend that the EU’s decision-making is sufficiently transparent, providing relatively easy access to information. Nonetheless, they add that the information supplied by the EU’s institutions is most times very technical requiring significant specific knowledge, or that the EU is trying to sell its policies through the media to citizens. Due to the ‘Brussels bubble’, transnational journalists have a cosmopolitan and enthusiastic perspective on the European project, which leads them very often to refrain from criticising the EU. Linked to this, chapter 5 showed that the most pervasive role that transnational journalists assume is that of educators of the general public in relation to the politics of the EU. This sheds light on both research questions, as in their role as educators of the general public, transnational journalists are able to encourage debate within the EPS.

Euro scepticism almost never surfaces in the policy definitions framed by transnational publications. Moreover, transnational journalists argue that citizens’ interest towards the global role of the EU has been increasing during the last ten years. Journalists that have been based for a long time in Brussels – and are deeply immersed in the ‘Brussels bubble’ – develop strong ties with EU policymakers based on trust which give them a better position to engage in agenda setting. Indexing occurs very often, journalists taking cues or drawing on the discourse of EU policymakers in order to paint a supportive picture of the EU’s efforts in the international arena. Nonetheless, regardless of their support for the Union and their types of interactions with EU

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204 Transnational publications aim to reach various audiences ranging from national to transnational, aiming more for the informed publics.
policymakers, transnational journalists think that they can enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy – which builds towards a positive answer to the first research question. Nonetheless, they argue that it is ultimately the duty of policymakers to solve the Union’s democratic deficit.

The United Kingdom
In chapter 6 it was highlighted that British policymakers argue that the EU is a better avenue through which to achieve the country’s foreign policy goals than acting unilaterally. Hence, during the 2008 Copenhagen summit, Britain aimed to spearhead the EU’s climate change policy – having Ed Miliband as Climate Change Secretary. The policy towards Russia was seen as a remote issue, British policymakers being in favour of a common European stance, unlike most of the member states which tended to deal bilaterally with Moscow. At the same time, the UK parliament, through the detailed work of its committees, enjoyed more power and better oversight over foreign policy and European issues than the Romanian or the European parliaments. Transparency\(^{205}\) in foreign policy decision-making was assured through regular public campaigns. British policymakers believe that the media can be used as a tool for surveying and influencing public opinion, but also as a crucial avenue for educating citizens. British policymakers frequently employ the media in order to initiate public debate on issues they feel need more legitimation and justification in the public sphere. Hence, responsiveness to media discourse is high due to the informal ties that journalists maintain with policymakers. However, media professionalism is a very important aspect for British policymakers in constructing their interactions with journalists. This is why they are very careful in building relationships based on trust with journalists. Moreover, institutions maintain blacklists for journalists who break the informal rules of engagement.

The British media tends to treat EU related news as foreign news. This can be seen as a consequence of the fact that the policy definitions framed by the media are more salient in the public sphere when they are articulated to affect primarily British citizens, or have global impact. The habits of the British media paint a clear picture of how it enhances democratic legitimacy, in this way addressing the second research question. For example, the more quality British media frequently initiate public campaigns where individuals are encouraged to advocate various issues

\(^{205}\) Transparency is believed by both British journalists and policymakers to be a crucial aspect of decision-making.
and make them clear to policymakers – which can make the latter more accountable and responsive. On the other hand, British journalists often put policymakers in the spotlight for their lack of transparency. They achieve this by frequently engaging in investigative journalism, through which they present information that is usually placed outside of public scrutiny by policymakers. Nonetheless, British policymakers argue that sometimes the media misleads the general public more or less willingly. In some cases, it is also thought to have the power to inflict significant reputational damage to British policymakers and institutions.

Romania
Chapter 7 has shown that the nature of Romania’s political system and its media landscape should be seen as salient variables in assessing the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy decision-making. Romania is a semi-Presidential system where the President shares executive duties in foreign policy with the government. The Romanian parliament’s ability to set the agenda and provide input in foreign policy is low, but it can exercise oversight. Usually, foreign policy decisions in Romania enjoy consensus among political parties. During the period analysed, President Băsescu spearheaded the country’s foreign policy, side-lining the government and the parliament. Presidential involvement was more evident in the case of the policy towards Russia, which was seen to have more direct implications for Romania’s national interest. On the other hand, climate change was perceived to be a salient issue by Romanian policymakers and journalists, but not a policy priority. Hence, in relation to climate change, decision-making was left to the government and its agencies. As the parliament was ignored and side-lined during the period analysed, the principle of democratic representation had no positive effect, making the activity of the media crucial for enhancing democratic legitimacy in the two case studies. This also made enquiring into the two research questions even more timely and relevant. During the same timeframe, transparency was not a prime concern for Romanian policymakers. Responsiveness was also low, informal ties being the preferred mode through which journalists got access to information about foreign policy. Lower ranking bureaucrats lacked the time and the will to interact with journalists (an aspect which also hindered the empirical research presented in this thesis).

Chapter 7 also highlighted that there is a widely shared view among Romanian policymakers and
journalists that foreign policy is a policy area insulated from public scrutiny. It is linked with the view that the media should help the government to uphold the country's national interest in its foreign policy\textsuperscript{206}. In practice, this translates into the fact that Romanian journalists have a rather confused understanding of the EU; European issues being presented either as domestic or as foreign topics, or simultaneously as both. On the other hand, Romanian policymakers believe that the media can portray a coherent and relevant image of public opinion, and can be used in order to survey and influence it. At the same time, the Romanian media are perceived by policymakers to have their own agenda stemming from their politically active owners and their lack of professionalism. The media is also seen to be interested in sensational news and conflict, always searching for ways in which to damage the reputation of political elites or institutions. Through investigative journalism, the media often highlights cases of corruption which undermine the authority and status of policymakers.

**Climate Change**

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have highlighted that the national and the transnational media viewed the EU’s approach to climate change and the 2009 Copenhagen summit through similar frames. These findings point to the Europeanisation of the British and Romanian public spheres, and confirm the multilayered structure of the EPS. In the case of climate change, the activity of the media and its interactions with policymakers positively affected all aspects of democratic legitimacy: transparency, accountability, openness to public debate and responsiveness. Hence, the case of climate change offers a positive answer to the first research question, with table 8.1\textsuperscript{207} providing a comparative overview of the interaction effects in the three media/foreign policy nexuses. As the empirical chapters showed, the ability of the media to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy was not uniform, and varied according to each arena (i.e. the transnational level, the UK and Romania). In what follows, the discussion highlights these variations and the subsequent ways the way in which the media endowed the EU’s approach to climate change with democratic legitimacy, thus addressing the second research question.

\textsuperscript{206} Romanian journalists feel a sense of pride in being part of political processes and contributing to safeguarding the country’s national interest.

\textsuperscript{207} The bold text in table 8.1 emphasises the areas where similar frames prompted different interaction effects in each media/foreign policy nexus, pointing to variations in the media's ability to affect democratic legitimacy.
Table 8.1 Climate Change – Overview of the media’s policy definitions and the subsequent interaction effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>The transnational level</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type of policy definition</td>
<td>Interaction effect</td>
<td>Type of policy definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – medium to long term threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen – a crucial moment</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is happening now</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU the only actor that can forge a global agreement on climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate change</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming other states</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal climate change deal</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Both EU and national policymakers were convinced that climate change was a medium to long term threat. British and Romanian policymakers supported the EU’s global leadership and were pressured by their national media to make even more ambitions commitments. British policymakers were also aiming to take the lead within the EU in global climate change policy, proposing more ambitious commitments than other member states. The same policy definition – referring to the EU’s ability to act as global leader in climate change policy – was synonymous with instances of indexing at the transnational level. The transnational media was employed by EU policymakers in order to gather support for the Union’s approach to global climate change. Both national and transnational journalists perceived the general public as supporting the EU’s leadership in global climate change. There was also a high level of responsiveness on the part of EU and British policymakers. In the case of Romania, informal ties allowed Romanian journalists to get important insight into the country’s approach within the EU on climate change. This allowed journalists to convey to policymakers their perceived feedback from the general public, which had the potential to link individuals to decision-making.

In the discourse of the all the media analysed indexing primarily implied that journalists supported and publicised the EU’s commitment to tackle climate change. One reason for this resided in the fact that the issue of climate change was seen as a threat in the medium and long term. It was also perceived to affect peoples globally and to converge with definitions articulated by the UN. Nonetheless, indexing in the case of climate change should not be viewed as having solely malign effects on the aspects of democratic legitimacy. Both the national and the transnational media aimed to educate the general public by providing detailed reports and assessments from scientists or the NGO community, which allowed individuals to form coherent opinions, in this way encouraging public debate. At the same time, Romanian journalists aimed to gather support for policies when they perceived them to be in line with the country’s national interest. At the transnational level, indexing was the primary interaction effect identified which found expression in the transnational media communicating the EU’s policies in a positive light. Moreover, due to the ‘Brussels bubble’, transnational journalists felt compelled to support the EU’s approach to climate change, whilst educating the general public regarding the EU’s effort. The three transnational publications indirectly aided the efforts of the Commission to single out

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208 Moreover, Romanian journalists also relied on definitions from EU policymakers and transnational publications, which put even more direct pressure on Romanian policymakers to commit to the Union’s policy and support it.
member states that were unwilling to commit themselves (i.e. Poland or the Czech Republic).

After the EU’s failure at the summit, indexing was present in the way the British and the transnational media sought to gather support for the idea that the EU had the potential to bounce back. On the other hand, due to the fact that Romanian policymakers were largely uninterested in the issue of climate change after the summit, the Romanian media was able to set the agenda and put pressure on them to commit to supporting the EU’s efforts to regain its global leadership. Table 8.1 also shows that both EU and national policymakers were successful in using the media in order to publicise two policy solutions related to putting the blame on the US or China, and the need to forge an equal global agreement at the Copenhagen summit. In contrast to the Romanian or the transnational media, British journalists did not portray the same level of criticism towards the US or China, being influenced by the traditionally strong transatlantic relations.

By providing detailed accounts of the negotiations that took place during the summit (and left the EU isolated) whilst drawing on voices from actors outside foreign policy circles, the national and the transnational media enhanced the transparency of the Union’s approach. The analysis of instances of bounding can shed light on the second research question. More specifically, bounding implied that the media (national or transnational) encouraged public debate and processes of contestation within the EPS by reporting on various protests or social movements, and regularly featuring commentaries or letters from the general public. Bounding was generally present in situations where both national and transnational media were viewed to construct policy definitions which were too critical, due to journalists’ lack of knowledge about foreign policy, coupled with their tendency to focus on failure, rather than success. Moreover, policymakers argued that journalists lack specific knowledge about the mechanisms and constraints that characterise foreign policy decision-making, which make them reject policies that fall outside accepted boundaries or stereotypes. Bounding was also evident in situations where the media presented the negotiations behind closed doors. This made national and EU policymakers impervious to the media’s discourse, due to their perception that the media’s policy definitions had a damaging effect on the EU’s global leadership. At the transnational level, unresponsiveness on the part of the EU policymakers was predicated upon their belief that the Union should not be criticised, as it was a global champion of multilateralism. Although it made
their activity more transparent and accountable, EU policymakers also argued that the significant amount of coverage around the Copenhagen summit and the EU’s approach weakened its leverage in international climate change negotiations. This perception points to a research question related to the relationship between effectiveness in foreign policy and democratic legitimacy, which will be expanded in the last section of this chapter as an avenue for future research.

Agenda setting was predicated on the belief held by journalists that citizens in the EU were deeply concerned with the issue of climate change. Journalists, through their policy definitions, encouraged public debate by providing in the EPS detailed information about the present consequences of climate change and the crucial moment that the Copenhagen summit represented in the development of global climate change policy. The salience of the summit is also confirmed by the spike in coverage it received in all the publications in the sample, which is highlighted in figure A.1 in annex A (page 301). In this case, due to high levels of responsiveness, journalists from all publications in the sample were able to feed their perception of public opinion to policymakers. In this way, they encouraged debate in the EPS by frequently featuring comments and letters from the general public, and also had the potential to link individuals to decision-making. Through its agenda setting power, the transnational and the national media put pressure on policymakers to make more ambitious commitments in tackling global climate change – and live up to them. Agenda setting also occurred in situations where journalists acted as activists, taking up issues promoted by civil society groups or various social movements, and publicising them in the public sphere. Moreover, the informal ties between journalists and policymakers, but also the way in which the latter viewed the former’s ability to portray and influence public opinion, enhanced the agenda setting powers of the media.

**The policy towards Russia**

In contrast to the case of climate change, the transnational and the national media’s activity and interactions with EU policymakers had here (i.e. the policy towards Russia) only a limited effect on democratic legitimacy. The main reasons for this were the perception that the policy towards Russia was not of interest for the general public (with the exception of Romania), and the view that it was an area of high politics. Although not as evident and strong as in the previous case, it
also highlights that the media can in fact (in varying degrees) endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. The bold text in table 8.2 highlights the areas where similar frames prompted similar interaction effects in each media/foreign policy nexus. The low level of convergence between interactions effects shows that the media had a rather limited effect on democratic legitimacy, and its effects varied significantly across the three arenas (the transnational level, the UK and Romania). Nonetheless, the EU was at the centre of the framing strategies of both the national and the transnational media in relation to Moscow and the Russia-Georgia war – pointing to the Europeanisation of national public spheres. Figure A.2 (page 302) emphasises that the conflict was seen as a salient moment in EU-Russia relations by both the national and transnational media, due to the spike in coverage in all three media landscapes. Due to the informal ties between transnational journalists and EU policymakers based on trust developed in time, the latter were generally responsive to the policy definitions framed by the media. The transnational media was also seen to paint a sufficiently reliable picture of public opinion. In the case of the UK, transatlantic relations together with Eurosceptic tendencies influenced the way in which the British media perceived the Union’s role in dealing with Russia and assuring peace and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. At the same time, the policy definitions framed by the British media were made salient through featuring points of view reminding of the Russian threat from during the Cold War. On the other hand, Romania was expected by its national media to take the lead within the EU in dealing with the conflict and Russia. This to a large extent stemmed from President Băsescu’s ambitions of establishing Romania as a key geopolitical player in the region. In comparison to the transnational and the British media, Romanian journalists also constructed two frames centred on the Republic of Moldova’s and the Black Sea region’s security.

An analysis of the three interaction effects in the empirical chapters highlighted the way the media endowed the EU’s policy towards Russia with democratic legitimacy, thus addressing the second research question – table 8.2 providing a comparative picture of the interaction effects in the three media/foreign policy nexuses. Firstly, indexing was the most important interaction effect identified in the case of Britain and Romania, having equal incidence to instances of bounding and agenda setting in the case of the transnational level. It implied that policymakers were given a carte blanche for pursuing the EU’s policy towards Russia, whilst trying to avoid public scrutiny. Moreover, this meant that the media acted mainly as a tool
Table 8.2 The policy towards Russia – Overview of the media’s policy definitions and the subsequent interaction effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>The transnational level</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type of policy definition</td>
<td>Interaction effect</td>
<td>Type of policy definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should be the main actor in dealing with Russia</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is regaining its great power status</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia is a security threat</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war seen as a Russian aggression</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Policy expectation</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU should cooperate with Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – seen in a negative light</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach towards Russia</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia an immediate threat for Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Indexing</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia is responsible for the war</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>Policy problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia threat for Moldova’s security</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional stability – Black Sea</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
at the disposal of EU and national policymakers for publicising and gathering support for their policies in the public sphere. Through indexing policymakers also surveyed and initiated public debate on issues where they felt more justification to the general public was required. Moreover, Romanian policymakers employed the media in order indirectly to articulate messages which they felt could not have been made public through more official channels.

Indexing was also present in the way in which the Romanian and the British media mirrored the mixed message constructed by national policymakers, who advocated the construction of a strategic partnership before and after the conflict, whilst also exhibiting an overtly critical stance towards Moscow during the war. At the transnational level, indexing implied that the transnational media followed EU official rhetoric and portrayed a moderate message towards Russia’s aggression, whilst arguing the need to develop a strategic partnership with Moscow. This was a result of the fact that, due to the ‘Brussels bubble’, the transnational media acted as an enthusiastic supporter and educator of the general public regarding the EU’s ambitions in the international arena. The war and the policy towards Russia were not seen by the national and the transnational media to have broad global ownership, rather they were perceived to have regional or local effects. Hence, journalists drew on official discourse advocating policy solutions which focused on getting the EU involved in the Eastern Neighbourhood and also in the Black Sea region (in the case of the Romanian media). Both the national and the transnational media provided detailed accounts of the war and information about the EU’s policy towards Russia. Journalists acted here as educators, providing individuals information that would allow them to form coherent opinions and with a better position to hold policymakers accountable.

Secondly, bounding was present in situations where the transnational and the British media criticised the EU for not achieving a common stance. This policy definition mirrored the views of the Commission and the EP, but was seen by policymakers in these institutions as too critical to be stated through official channels. Similarly, British policymakers were strongly against the tendency of some of the member states to act individually in relation to Russia, but felt that such a message could not have been stated through official channels due to its critical nature. On the other hand, as table 8.2 highlights, Romanian policymakers openly criticised other member states for dealing bilaterally with Russia, a message which was also diligently conveyed by the Romanian media. Bounding was also predicated on the balanced approach to reporting that the
transnational and national media exhibited by portraying points of view from myriad sources. This in turn, led journalists to argue that the war might have been caused by Georgia’s rash actions.

On the other hand, bounding effects also appeared in situations where journalists were perceived by both EU and national policymakers to focus too much on sensational news, coupled with the use of emotional framing in reporting on the conflict in order to put pressure on policymakers or influence public opinion. Emotional framing consisted in this case of images of the war and graphic or disturbing eye-witness testimonies. The media’s policy definitions which framed the US as willing and able to provide a viable solution to the conflict and assure stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood were synonymous to instances of bounding in the case of Romania and the transnational level. This happened because EU and Romanian policymakers were committed to fully supporting the Union’s ambitions in the international arena. In contrast, due to the strong transatlantic relationship, the British media followed official discourses in advocating a salient role for the US in keeping Russian check in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Consequently, while British journalists were arguing that the EU should be involved in the region, they also believed that Union would not be able to draw on the same capabilities as the US.

Thirdly, agenda setting was present only in a handful of situations, pointing to a lack of willingness on the part of the media to directly influence policymaking in this issue area. The discourse of the transnational media represented an exception, as transnational journalists were keen to push for the EU to have a stronger global presence. Through its agenda setting power, the Romanian and the transnational media put pressure on policymakers to involve the EU more in the Eastern Neighbourhood and in supporting the democratisation and development of the countries in the region. On the other hand, the same policy expectation defined by the British media was synonymous to an instance of indexing, due to the low interest of the British general public in the politics of the Eastern Neighbourhood, coupled with British policymakers’ commitment to supporting the EU’s international ambitions. Both the British and to a lesser extent the transnational media featured commentaries from the general public, which pointed to the tensions that characterised the Cold War, in order to define a threat in Russia’s re-emergence as an important international actor. Agenda setting meant that journalists put pressure on EU and British policymakers to acknowledge this new situation and act accordingly. This policy problem
was also salient in the Romanian national public sphere, but it led to bounding, as it was seen by Romanian policymakers as too critical to be stated publicly – due to their strategy of forging strong economic and energy ties with Russia. Agenda setting was also present in the way in which Romanian journalists framed Russia’s threat to Europe’s energy security as a policy problem. On other hand, Europe’s energy security was seen by both transnational journalists and EU policymakers as not being seriously threatened by Russia’s actions. Nonetheless, through agenda setting, transnational journalists provided thrust to EU policymakers own understanding and views. For example, in the few examples of agenda setting, EU policymakers from the Commission frequently banked on the support from the media in order to put forward their initiatives.

Reflections on theoretical approaches
Drawing on the summary of the empirical findings of the thesis presented in the previous section, this section reflects on the theoretical approaches employed. Firstly, this thesis has provided a relevant though incomplete picture of the EU’s foreign policy, by exploring a snapshot of two of its issue areas. The highly contrasting characteristics of the way the EU engages with global climate change and constructs its policy towards Russia were presented in chapter 4 to cover a whole array of structural, institutional or agency related aspects which also describe other policy areas in EU foreign policy. What the analysis has shown is that in order to assess the concept democratic legitimacy, a focus on individual policy areas is needed, rather than on the EU’s foreign policy as a whole (Rosenau, 1967; White, 1999, 2001; Carlsnaes, 2004; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, 2004). Furthermore, the thesis points to the fact that, to a large extent, member states are in charge of delivering concrete policy outcomes in the EU’s foreign policy – an idea which has been revisited in the literature during the last two decades (Hill, 1983, 2003; Aggestam and Hill, 2008; Gegout, 2010; Tiersky, 2010; Aggestam, 2011; Rynning, 2011; Jørgensen, 2013; Rieker, 2013). The 2008 Russian-Georgian war provides a good example, where France, whilst holding the presidency of the Council, spearheaded the ceasefire agreement, partly due to former President Sarkozy’s own ambitions (Asmus, 2010). Personal ambitions seemed also to inform the British and Romanian leaderships’ unilateral involvement in the conflict, who openly supported Georgia, whilst claiming that they spoke on behalf of the EU
(Halbach, 2008; Cornell and Starr, 2009; Nichol, 2009). Hence, besides focusing on various issue areas, research enquiring into the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted should also concentrate on individual member states, besides the EU’s institutions. The thesis provided a positive answer to the first research question, highlighting that the media had the potential and willingness to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. The media had positive effects in varying degrees on its multiple aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. Consequently, the media (within the EPS) can be thought to have had this ability in other issue areas in the EU’s foreign policy.

Secondly, the focus on the activity of the media within the public sphere provides a robust framework for understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy decision-making – and a relevant avenue for exploring the second research question. The interaction effects model offers an overview of the way in which the media and policymakers interact, making it readily applicable to the foreign policies of nation states. Moreover, the interaction effects model does not have to be employed in order to account only for democratic legitimacy, as it can be adapted to focus on other aspects of decision-making. Nonetheless, a focus on democratic legitimacy using the interaction effects model might not prove to be practical outside democratic systems. On the other hand, while citizens have different avenues through which to come into contact with and influence policymaking on domestic issues (e.g. through civil society, social movements, or various stakeholders), foreign policy is generally characterised by greater degrees of secrecy, and is thought to be detached from society (Rosenau, 1967; Potter, 1980; Bynander and Guzzini, 2013; Risse, 2013; Wight, 2013). Hence, the media has a central role in supplying information about foreign policy in the public sphere to the general public, feeding their views to policymakers – in this way linking individuals to decision-making. The focus on the media allows this thesis to go beyond the principle of democratic representation. It also presents a framework which can overcome the way in which mainstream FPA literature commonly ignores or takes for granted the issue of democratic legitimacy.

The interaction effects model presented in chapter 3 is built on the assumption that the media tell individuals in the public sphere not only what issues are salient, but also how to interpret them. While this assumption is widely debated by media studies or political communication scholars, this thesis has highlighted and confirmed that an examination of the interactions between the
media and policymakers can provide a reliable assessment of democratic legitimacy. As a consequence, journalists’ and policymakers’ perceptions of public opinion are more salient than enquiring into the actual state of public opinion. In advocating an enquiry centred on the activity of the media, the thesis introduced the concept of the European public sphere. It is broadly considered to be a normative space, where individuals freely and openly discursively interact with decision-making through the activities of the media. Moreover, structurally, the EPS was seen to be the result of the overlapping between multiple Europeanised nation public spheres. In the empirical chapters, such Europeanisation was highlighted by the pervasiveness of the EU in the way in which the media constructed its discourse, and also in the presence of similar policy definitions throughout the publications in the sample. Processes of vertical Europeanisation were also highlighted by the fact that EU policymakers, together with articles from the transnational media, were frequently quoted in national media – which at times also translated articles from the three transnational publications.

Thirdly, this thesis has highlighted that, in foreign policy, the issue of democratic legitimacy cannot be studied solely as an objective category. Approaches that focus on the principle of democratic representation and the way it is instantiated by legal documents and political institutions view democratic legitimacy as an objective category. They fail to provide a reliable picture, due to the fact that in foreign policy, unlike domestic policy, citizens are detached from decision-making and their representatives rarely have significant agenda setting power. Even more, individuals feel disaffected with their representatives both at the national level, and in transnational institutions within the EU (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2000; Koenig-Archibugi, 2002; Wagner, 2007). Hence, this study has advocated an understanding of democratic legitimacy associated with a subjective assessment of its multiple aspects – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. An increase in any of these aspects is understood to be synonymous with a positive effect on democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, complementarity between approaches based and on the principle of democratic representation and a broader take on democratic legitimacy can provide a more comprehensive picture of the EU’s foreign policy, and a more detailed answer to the second research question.
Strengths and limitation of the thesis
This section highlights the strengths of the thesis, and looks at the way in which it deals with the inherent limitations of the methods and theoretical approaches employed. Firstly, the concept of democratic legitimacy was defined in this thesis to encompass various aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. Such an understanding of democratic legitimacy complements more rigid frameworks which focus solely on the principle of democratic representation and the way institutions enact it. The limited ability of representative institutions to influence the agenda of the EU’s foreign policy, coupled with citizens’ detachment and disaffection with them justifies a focus on a composite definition of democratic legitimacy such as the one applied in this thesis. Nonetheless, viewing this perspective on democratic legitimacy to resemble an objective category can prove to be very dangerous, as it refers here only to a rather subjective assessment of decision-making – which is very much dependent on the range of issues explored, the methods used, together with the focus on the activity of media within the public sphere.

Secondly, the thesis drew on the existence of the European public sphere as the result of the overlapping between various Europeanised national public spheres. While the study of Europeanisation was not the focus of the study, it is worth noting that the data presented offers great potential for exploring processes of vertical Europeanisation, which seem to have been prevalent. Moreover, chapter 2 highlighted the debates around the nature and the existence of the EPS, rather downplaying scholarly arguments that share a pessimistic view. Although during the late 1990s scholarly debate around the existence or the possibility of an EPS was fierce, recent years have underscored a consensus towards the idea that the EPS should be considered to be a multilayered structure, which is different from public spheres pertaining to nation states (Venturelli, 1993; Jakubowicz, 1995; Schlesinger, 1997; Statham, 2008; Wessler, 2008; Schifirneț, 2010). Most scholars tend to agree that, even if it does not already exist, the EPS could have positive effects on the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Linklater, 2007; Koçan, 2008; Gripsrud and Weibull, 2010; Splichal, 2011; Habermas, 2012). This in turn justifies the structure of the EPS applied here.

The multilayered structure of the EPS points to the fact that the media is able to grant legitimacy both to national and EU policymaking. By focusing on policymaking at the national level (and
the subsequent national public spheres) in the UK and Romania, the empirical chapters showed that the EU was covered extensively by the media and featured in virtually all of the policy definitions it constructed in relation to the two case studies. Even more, the analysis emphasised that both journalists and policymakers (with some exceptions) viewed acting through the framework of the EU more beneficial than acting unilaterally in the two issue areas. This points to the fact that the EU’s legitimacy in its foreign policy is to be found simultaneously at the level of national policymaking (in its member states) and at the transnational level.

The lack of empirical focus on Europeanisation is predicated on the assumption that the interactions between the media (and its policy definitions) and policymakers are crucial for understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is conferred on decision-making in the EU’s foreign policy. This raises two sets of concerns. On the one hand, the media is perceived to be the primary actor within the EPS, overlooking in this way other actors such as NGO’s, social movements or various other stakeholders. Nonetheless, the focus on the media is justified by the fact that it is best equipped actor within the EPS to provide the discursive avenues through which citizens can acquire information about the EU’s foreign policy and come to interact with its decision-making. On the other hand, there is an underlying assumption that through its discourse, the media shapes the opinions of individuals, telling them what to think about, but also how to think about a certain issue. In media studies and political communication there are intense debates regarding the extent to which the media influence the views of the general public (Everts, 2000; Holsti, 2000, 2004; McLaren, 2002; Aldrich et al., 2006; Potter and Baum, 2010). Nonetheless, there is also a consensus claiming that both journalists and policymakers work or interact on the basis that the media can both portray a coherent picture of public opinion and ultimately shape it (Cohen, 1986, 1993; Powlick and Katz, 1998). This in turn, makes the interactions between the media and policymakers within the public sphere the obvious locus for assessing democratic legitimacy – adding strength and increasing the relevance of the interaction effects model.

Thirdly, in the way it was presented in chapter 3, the interaction model makes it sometimes difficult to analytically distinguish between the three types of interaction effects. This problem of overlapping is overcome by triangulating the findings of the frame analysis with those from interviews, questionnaires, and various primary or secondary sources. The empirical chapters
highlighted that, on some occasions, the media framed policy definitions which were supported by policymakers, but were perceived to be too critical to be expressed through official avenues, pointing to overlap between interaction effects. Another limitation of the way in which the study distinguished between interactions resides in the fact that it associated each policy definition to an interaction effect. The empirical analyses showed and specified that some policy definitions might have prompted two contrasting interaction effects. Consequently, the model could be strengthened in the future by understanding (and integrating) the way in which different policy definitions are constructed in relation to each other, and the potential overlap between them (and between subsequent interaction effects).

Fourthly, the sample focuses on quality media which do not have the highest circulation rates in their respective media landscapes. Nonetheless, quality publications are widely viewed to be the main avenues for analysis, discourses and debate about the EU, due to their focus on quality and objective reporting (D’Haenens, 2005; Meyer, 2005; Trenz, 2007). Integrating social media (for example blogs) within the analysis could have added more breadth. Nonetheless, it would have also raised important practical and methodological concerns regarding the complementarity between traditional and social media (Wallsten, 2007; Domingo et al., 2008; Hermida and Thurman, 2008). A focus on more publications would have undoubtedly granted more validity and reliability to the analysis. However, such an effort would have been more suitable for the concerted work of an entire research group. Similar effects would be achieved through exploring more member states with contrasting political systems and media landscapes. Integrating the online publication EUObserver.com into the sample also raises important questions regarding the comparability between print and online media. Nonetheless, chapter 4 emphasised that its journalistic style and culture is similar to that of the Financial Times and the European Voice, having also comparable daily coverage rates and readerships. More attention could have been directed towards the various differences between the publications analysed, together with the way in which they framed their policy definitions. However, such an endeavour, while worthwhile, would have not advanced the enquiry focused on democratic legitimacy.

Finally, the use of data from interviews and questionnaires adds strength to analysis, but also raises issues of reliability and validity. The main difficulty resided in the inability to access through interviews all the policymakers identified to be relevant for the study (detailed in annex
B). As a consequence, the empirical chapters display an imbalance in their use of interview data, where the analysis of the transnational level benefits from more interviews and questionnaires – in cases where subjects were willing to participate in an interview, but lacked the time, an online questionnaire was sent. This raises questions regarding integrating data from questionnaires and interviews, which were addressed here by supplying similar interview questions, which were also tailored according to each respondent’s background, role and experience (see annex F for an overview of the general questions used in the interviews and questionnaires). On the other hand, questioning individuals about their role in various social and political processes is widely thought to incur considerable difficulties regarding replicability, validity and reliability (Robinson, 2002; Touri, 2006; Akor, 2011). However, this thesis employed data from interviews and questionnaires, to a large extent, in order to describe the context in which the media and policymakers interact (the media/foreign policy nexus) – with the exception of the transnational level where the response level detailed in annex B was greater than in the case of Britain and Romania. The strength of this thesis is based on the fact that inferences about the three interaction effects were made only on the basis of data triangulated from various sources: frame analysis, interviews, questionnaires, or primary and secondary sources.

Implications for the study of EU foreign policy and future research
In the background of the EU’s evermore present focus on mitigating its democratic deficit, this thesis has enquired into the influence of the media on the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy. This enquiry is justified by the lack of focus on the concept of democratic legitimacy in the literatures on the EU’s foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. In this sense, the thesis has sought to address the question of whether the media can endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy, confirming this ability through the empirical analysis of the two case studies: the EU’s policy towards climate change, and its policy towards Russia. The thesis also has important implications for the three types of debates around the foreign policy of the EU discussed in chapter 1. In relation to the first debate which focuses on the nature of the EU in comparison to the nation state, it reinforces the view that member states still are the primary actors responsible for the formulation and implementation of the Union’s foreign policy – which was more visible in the case of the policy towards Russia. On the other hand, the
findings of the thesis highlight that both the national media and the transnational media, while leaning towards this view, advocated foreign policy action through the common framework of the EU. This assertion is supported by the pervasiveness of similar policy definitions throughout all the publications analysed. From the perspective of foreign policy analysis, the thesis empirically showed that the interactions between the media and policymakers found at the transnational level are similar to those present within the two member states. This can be viewed as a mark of the EU’s aspiration to develop a foreign policy which would match in effectiveness and coordination that of the nation state.

In both issue areas, the empirical chapters showed that at times the media became part of the political process either through its abilities to consciously influence decision-making (in instances of agenda setting), or by being used by policymakers in order to publicise and gather support for their policies (in instances of indexing). In doing so, the media fed into the institutional processes behind the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy both at the transnational level and within the two member states. The thesis highlights that while the media might not be a central actor in the EU’s foreign policy, institutional perspectives should not ignore its role. Through their interactions with policymakers, journalists were shown to build trust relationships with policymakers, which in some cases became institutionalised at an informal level. This allowed the media to enhance the various aspects of democratic legitimacy – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate.

Finally, chapter 1 described how the third debate set in motion by the EU’s search for meaning and its ontology is built on the underlying idea that Union is inherently democratic and has a normative foreign policy due to its commitment inscribed in the founding treaties to the principles of democracy. Chapter 1 also argued that this claim should not be taken for granted and requires empirical evidence. Hence, the empirical chapters showed that, in the case of climate change, where the EU is considered to have a more normative approach, the media was in a better position to endow the Union’s approach with democratic legitimacy. It achieved this, to a large extent, through journalists’ belief that they represented within the EPS the views and values held by the general public, and policymakers’ perception that the media can paint a coherent picture of public opinion. What this points to, is the fact that claims that the EU is
acting normatively in its foreign policy should be predicated on the way it is made democratically legitimate, a process in which the media within the EPS plays a salient role.

The findings and the framework applied in this thesis also point to a number of avenues for future research. Firstly, the findings of the frame analysis of the transnational media can be used in order to qualitatively and quantitatively assess in more detail the level of Europeanisation of national public spheres. They can also highlight the quality and direction of transnational communication flows within Europe. However, any further research project that would aim to achieve this goal should also include in the analysis media from other member states (at least five to seven) which have different media landscapes and political systems. Secondly, the focus on the European public sphere can be enhanced by broadening the analysis to (and integrating) other less influential actors such as civil society groups, or social movements, other than the media. Moreover, the data from interviews and questionnaires, if supplemented, can be used in order to explore in depth the discursive communities and structures within which policymakers and journalists interact, and their influence on decision-making in foreign policy.

Thirdly, the framework presented in the thesis should be applied and extended to other issue areas (in the EU’s foreign policy) and to more member states. The interaction effects model can also be used in order to analyse the domestic constrains on foreign policy within the nation state. Global or transnational governance systems can also be explored through this model. A more comprehensive comparative analysis would account for the differences in the way in which the policy definitions of the transnational and national media create different interactions effects. These contrasts were highlighted in this chapter in the section detailing the findings from the empirical chapters. However, they were discussed only in relation to the ability of the media to endow decision-making with democratic legitimacy. Drawing on the analysis of the three interaction effects, broader comparative conclusions can be drawn about decision-making in foreign policy in the member states.

Fourthly, the focus on the media might be merged with that on the principle of democratic representation in enacting democratic legitimacy. In practice, this would mean exploring the way national legislatures in the EU interact with the media in order to put more pressure on executives, expanding their ability to influence the agenda of foreign policy. More specifically, it could feed into an exploration of the conditions and mechanisms under which the European
Parliament has expanded its competences in the realm of foreign policy since the adoption of the Lisbon treaty.

Finally, an inherent next step in the analysis would be to enquire into the way in which endowing the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy impacts its effectiveness. Chapter 1 highlighted that more than half a century ago, scholars following Almond (1950), Lippmann (1955) and Kennan (1985) were keen to argue that, foreign policy, in order to deliver the desired policy outcomes, should be kept insulated from the scrutiny and input of the irrational or emotional public. While such views on the role of the public (and implicitly of democracy) that inform both political practice and scholarship have become less influential, the literature is yet to have explored in a coherent manner the link between democratic legitimacy and foreign policy effectiveness in the case of the EU, but also more generally in the case of the nation state. The findings of the thesis could form the basis of an enquiry which correlates the effects of media on democratic legitimacy in the two issue areas with notions of effectiveness and performance in foreign policy. Nonetheless, in an increasingly multipolar world, where more established and rising powers seem to be uninterested in issues relating to democratic legitimacy in constructing their foreign policies, the EU might find its effectiveness and ability to negotiate in the international arena short-circuited by its increased attention to the activity of the media and the perception of public opinion painted by it.
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Annex A: Article selection methodology

In this thesis, after being selected on the basis of a simple keyword search on Lexis-Nexis or on the online database of the publications, articles underwent three separate and detailed readings in order to identify the relevant policy definitions framed by the media – providing an in depth analysis. The first reading excluded the articles that did not present climate change or Russia as political issues, while the second reading identified and coded the predominant policy definitions framed by the media. The third reading focused on the accuracy of the coding process. Narrowing the sample in this way allowed for a greater focus in the analysis, by removing all articles that viewed climate change as merely general news, which had no political effects. Coding such media reports would have skewed the analysis, as most of them framed climate change only in relation to the domestic society/popular culture, which is highly detached from national or European politics. On the other hand, articles, commentaries, news reports, etc. that presented Russia as a foreign policy issue – either for the UK, Romania, the European Union or other states and international organisations – were selected. This narrowed the total number, excluding the articles that treated solely internal developments in Russia, or other reports concerning Russian economy, culture, society and lifestyle. Secondly, the articles that focused on the probability of war in the South Caucasus – before August 2008 –, the war itself, its aftermath (the ceasefire) and the post-conflict management by international actors were also included in the analysis after the first reading. Table A.1 presents the distribution of the articles in the all the selected publications according to each case study. The coverage of the two case studies is featured in figures A.1, respectively A.2. An overview of the articles selected for each arena is presented in the following three annexes: C, D, and E.
Table A.1: Coverage by publication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Climate change</th>
<th>Policy Over Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of articles</td>
<td>Percentage of the Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUObserver.com</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Voice</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>62.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adevărul</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurnalul National</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own data.
*Refers to the total number of articles from each arena.
**Refers to the total number of articles from all publications covered in the sample (transnational, British and Romanian).

Figure A.1: Media coverage of climate change: 1 July 2009 – 1 July 2010 (number of articles/month).

Source: Author’s own data
Figure A.2: Media coverage of Russia as a foreign policy issue: 8 March 2008 – 5 March 2009 (number of articles/month).

Source: Author's own data
Annex B: Sampling, interview and questionnaire methodology

Sample

Field research was conducted between March-April 2011, March-April and August-September 2012 and March-April 2013. Subjects for interviews and questionnaires were not chosen at random. Interviews and questionnaires were conducted with policymakers who were involved in policymaking at the time of the Copenhagen summit and the Georgian-Russia war; and journalists who covered climate change policy and the policy towards Russia in the same timeframe. In general, three or four relevant policymakers were identified for each issue area in Britain or Romania, and between five and seven in the case of the EU’s institutions. Some policymakers moved from working for member states to working in the EU’s institutions in this period, whilst others moved from one institution to another within the EU. Finally, a small number of policymakers were involved in decision-making in both issue areas and thus able to provide rich data for both case studies. At times, policymakers who had key roles in decision-making in the two issues areas were inaccessible or unwilling to be interviewed, forwarding my repeated enquires to their institutions’ press officers or spokespersons – who very often sent me a formal message which stated that their institution is committed to upholding democratic principles. This lack of responsiveness manifested itself especially in the case of Romanian and British policymakers, which is reflected in the low number of interviews and questionnaires. At the transnational level, within the EU’s institutions the policymakers’ response rate was much higher which allowed for a more in-depth analysis in chapter 5.

Contacting journalists also represented a challenge as they lacked time due to the demands and pressures imposed on them by their media institutions. For example, regardless of the publication they worked for, journalists are usually expected to write daily one or two articles for the daily issue, a blog piece, a certain number of news pieces, update the website of the publications, while also constantly responding to comments on online platforms (Allern and Blach-Ørsten,
2011; Dahlgren, 2012; Lecheler and de Vreese, 2012; Matthes, 2012; Schejter and Tirosh, 2012). Since around two journalists from each publication in the sample covered the two issue areas (or foreign policy in general in the case of the Romanian newspapers), this cross-section paints a slightly more reliable picture than in the case of policymakers. The response rate for journalists (out of all the individuals approached and considered to be relevant for this thesis) was over 70 percent, and around 60 percent in the case of policymakers. A sample of the questions used in the interviews and questionnaires is presented in annex F. Nonetheless, all the interviews and questionnaires – with both policymaker and journalists – triangulated with data from scholarship and official documents provided valuable insights. This allowed mapping broadly the media/foreign policy nexus and exploring the way in which democratic legitimacy was understood and enacted in foreign policy in general. Tables B.1 and B.2 detail the sample:

Table B.1 Sample: policymakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The transnational level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both areas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Sixteen policymakers were interviewed in total, but two Romanian and British policymakers moved from working for national governments to the European Commission during the timeframe analysed and could thus offer insight into their experiences.

Table B.2 Sample: journalists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The transnational level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both areas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Eight journalists were interviewed in total, but four Romanian and British journalists published in both national and transnational publication, and were able to provide insight from both points of view.
List of interviews and questionnaires

Policymakers

EU policymaker 1, European Commission, DG Clima, interview, Brussels, 21/06/2013.
EU policymaker 2, European Commission, DG Clima, interview, Brussels, 27/03/2012.
EU policymaker 3, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 10/04/2012.
EU policymaker 4, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 30/03/2012.
EU policymaker 5, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 29/03/2012.
EU policymaker 6, EEAS, interview, Brussels, 02/04/2012.
EU policymaker 7, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 28/03/2012.
EU policymaker 8, European Parliament, interview, Brussels, 21/06/2013.
EU policymaker 9, EEAS, interview, Brussels, 03/04/2012.
EU policymaker 10, European Commission, questionnaire, 26/03/2013.
British Policymaker 1, Foreign Office, interview, Brussels, 23/03/2013.
British Policymaker 2, Foreign Office, questionnaire, 27/03/2013.
British Policymaker 3 (EU policymaker 1), British Parliament, interview, Brussels, 21/06/2013.
Romanian policymaker 1, Office of the Romanian President, interview, Bucharest, 21/01/2013.
Romanian policymaker 2, Romanian Parliament, questionnaire, 28/03/2013.
Romanian policymaker 3, Romanian Parliament, questionnaire, 30/03/2013.
Romanian policymaker 4, Romanian Parliament, questionnaire, 09/04/2013.

For reasons of confidentiality, neither the names nor the respective positions are mentioned.
Romanian policymaker 5 (EU policymaker 5), Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview, Brussels, 29/03/2012.

**Journalists**

Transnational journalist 1, freelancer and Adevarul, interview, Brussels, 08/04/2011.

Transnational journalist 2, freelancer, interview, Brussels, 12/04/2011.


Transnational journalist 4, freelancer, questionnaire, 26/03/2013.

Transnational journalist 5, freelancer, questionnaire, 27/03/2013.

Transnational journalist 6, European Voice, questionnaire, 26/03/2013.

British journalist 1, The Guardian, questionnaire, 26/03/2013.

British journalist 2, The Times, questionnaire, 29/03/2013.


Romanian journalist 1 (Transnational journalist 1), freelancer and Adevarul, interview, Brussels, 08/04/2011.

Romanian journalist 2 (Transnational journalist 2), freelancer, interview, Brussels, 12/04/2011.
Interviews and questionnaires

The interviews averaged around an hour, although they lasted between 30 minutes and 120 minutes. They were conducted mostly in the respondent’s office, but also in staff cafeterias within their institution’s building. The interviews were not taped, but recorded shortly afterwards through note taking by the author and further reconstruction of the responses. All the interview questions were open-ended allowing for clarifying and follow-up questions to be asked when necessary. The author was guided by a list of questions presented in the style of a questionnaire – a sample is presented in annex F. Although the interviews followed a standard set of questions, new ones were asked if the respondent strayed away from the focus of the interview. Similarly, the order of the questions was changed if the interviewee turned to a logical path different from the aims of the interview. There was considerable variance among the interviews based on the experience, role, and background of each respondent. This was a conscious decision on the part of the author, aimed to keep the level of interest of the respondent high, overcome the formal nature of the situation and get more quality information from the interviewees. This type of interviewing can lead to errors related to the comparability of data from different interviews, but, at the same time, can provide valuable insight and greater amounts of information than more rigid interview frameworks (Hermann, 1980; Rasler, Thompson and Chester, 1980; Powlick, 1991, 1995; Powlick and Katz, 1998). Questionnaires were used in situations where journalists and policymakers agreed to an interview, but stated that they did not have enough time for a meeting. Questionnaires were developed online on the ‘Bristol Online Surveys’ platform and were sent by email to each individual targeted. Similarly to the case of interviews, questions were tailored according to the role and experiences of each individual, and varied from closed-ended, to others which allowed for more elaboration.
Annex C: Transnational publications – selected articles

EUObserver.com

Climate change


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The policy towards Russia

Goldirova, R. ‘EU-Russia partnership talks expected to last a year’, EUObserver.com, 21/05/2008, http://EUObserver.com/9/26210

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**European Voice**

**Climate change**
Rankin, J. 'It's not easy being green', European Voice, 05-11/07/2009
Rankin, J. 'Paying the price for climate change', European Voice, 19-25/07/2009
Taylor, S. 'Energy policy is a political priority', European Voice, 26/07-01/08/2009
Rankin, J. 'Breaking butterflies upon a wheel of indifference?', European Voice, 30/08-05/09/2009
Leggewie, C. 'From carbon insolvency to climate dividends', European Voice, 06-12/09/2009
Crosbie, J. 'New government set to strengthen EU ties', European Voice, 06-12/09/2009
Emergency bid to find common climate position

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Foreign ministers to review EU relations with Russia', European Voice, 22-28/03/2008
Igra, D. and T. Vogel 'EU could play 'decisive' role in Georgian crisis', European Voice, 22-28/03/2008
Vogel, T. ‘Member states agree position on Russia partnership talks’, European Voice, 26/04-02/05/2008
Haukkala, H. ‘A stronger Union would carry more weight with the Russians’, European Voice, 26/04-02/05/2008
Kononenko, V. ‘The EU’s badly made Russian cheesecake’, European Voice, 03-09/05/2008
Igra, D. ‘Medvedev's Russia’, European Voice, 10-16/05/2008
Gardner, A. ‘Lithuania lifts veto on EU-Russia deal’, European Voice, 17-23/05/2008

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Vogel, T. ‘Ukrainian-Russian legal dispute looms over pipeline’, European Voice, 17-23/05/2008
Vogel, T. ‘Why Georgia should be on EU minds’, European Voice, 17-23/05/2008
'Not everyone buys into engagement with Russia', European Voice, 17-23/05/2008
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Brunsden, J. ‘French mull suspension of EU-Russia partnership talks', European Voice, 30/08-05/09/2008
'EU postpones partnership talks with Russia', European Voice, 06-12/09/2008
Jozwiak, R. 'Russia expects no delay to EU talks', European Voice, 06-12/09/2008
Pieklo, J. 'As the smoke clears in Georgia, it drifts over the Crimea', European Voice, 06-12/09/2008
Jozwiak, R. ‘Russia agrees on troop pullout’, European Voice, 13-19/09/2008
‘What to call the new stand-off between Russia and the West?’, European Voice, 13-19/09/2008
Jozwiak, R. 'Georgia believes Russia could relent', European Voice, 20-26/09/2008
Vogel, T. ‘The EU still has the hard work left to do in Georgia’, European Voice, 20-26/09/2008
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Jozwiak, R. 'EU to discuss Ukraine-Russia gas dispute', European Voice, 10-16/01/2009
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Jurnalul Naţional, 10/09/2008
Cristoiu, I. ‘Spre un nou război mondial încă nedefinit? (IV)’ (Towards a war yet to be defined), Jurnalul
Naţional, 11/09/2008
Constantinou, M. ‘Georgia şi-a cam tăiat craca NATO’ (Georgia has blown its chance with NATO),
Jurnalul Naţional, 18/09/2008
Severin, A. ‘Strategia compensaţiei şi strategia autoînşelării’ (The strategy of compensation and of self-
deceiving), Jurnalul Naţional, 23/09/2008
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territory), Jurnalul Naţional, 24/09/2008
Gaze mai ieftine contra unui sistem comun antirachetă’ (Cheaper gas against a common anti-missile
system), Jurnalul Naţional, 06/10/2008
‘Info’ (Info), Jurnalul Naţional, 09/10/2008
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Tiraspolul vrea ca SUA şi UE să dispară de la masa de negocieri’ (Tiraspol wants the
US and the EU to disappear from the negotiations table), Jurnalul Naţional, 09/10/2008
Severin, A. ‘Evoluţii şi dileme la Marea Neagră’ (Evolutions and dilemmas at the Black Sea), Jurnalul
Naţional, 21/10/2008
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Moldovenii nu au învăţat nimic din politică. Partidul lui Voronin rămâne favorit în ochii
electoratului’ (Moldovans don’t have anything to learn from politics. Voronin’s party will remain
favorite in the eyes of the electorate), Jurnalul Naţional, 29/10/2008
Ciutescu, O. ‘Alegerea lui Obama produce opinii diferite în Rusia’ (Obama’s election arouses different opinions in Russia), Jurnalul Național, 05/11/2008
Ciutescu, O. ‘SUA trimite încă un distrugător în Marea Neagră. Rusii au luat foc!’ (The US is sending another war vessel in the Black Sea. The Russian’s are mad), Jurnalul Național, 19/11/2008
Ciutescu, O. ‘Rusia vrea să rezolve problema Transnistriei pe șine rusești’ (Russia wants to resolve the Transnistrian through Russian ways), Jurnalul Național, 27/11/2008
Constantinou, M. “Adio NATO!” Semnează: Georgia și Ucraina’ (‘Goodbye NATO’. Georgia and Ukraine are signing), Jurnalul Național, 01/12/2008
Ciutescu, O. ‘SUA estimează un posibil conflict militar în Marea Neagră’ (The US predicts a possible military conflict in the Black Sea), Jurnalul Național, 12/12/2008
‘Tbilisi acuză Moscova că ascunde “crime de război”’ (Tbilisi acusses Moscow of keeping hidden ‘war crimes’), Jurnalul Național, 23/12/2008
‘141 miliarde de dolari pentru înarmarea Rusiei’ (141 billion dollars for Russia rearming), Jurnalul Național, 23/12/2008
Ciutescu, O. ‘Gazul nu trebuie să devină instrument politic’ (Gas should not become a political instrument), Jurnalul Național, 07/01/2009
Tudor, R. ‘Vladimir Vladimirovici Gazprom’ (Vladimir Vladimirovici Gazprom), Jurnalul Național, 08/01/2009
Mătăchiţă, M. ‘Criza gazului aduce gerul Bobotezei în Europa’ (The gas crisis brings frost to Europe), Jurnalul Național, 08/01/2009
Ciutescu, O. ‘Leonid Kravciuk: Putin şi Medvedev tratează Ucraina ca pe o regiune a Rusiei’ (Leonid Kravciuk: Putin and Medvedev are treating Ukraine as a region of Russia), Jurnalul Național, 13/01/2009
‘”Comedia gazelor”: Posibil complot al Moscovei şi Kieveului’ (‘The gas comedy’: Potential plot between Moscow and Kiev), Jurnalul Național, 14/01/2009
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Moldova ajutată de Ucraina, dar solidară cu Moscova’ (Moldova helped by Ukraine, but siding with Moscow), Jurnalul Național, 16/01/2009
Ciutescu, O. ‘Serghei Lavrov: Sper ca relaţia SUA - Rusia să se schimbe’ (Serghei Lavrov: I hope that the US-Russia relationship will change), Jurnalul Național, 19/01/2009
‘Petiţii româneşti către Europa’ (Romanian petitions to Europe), Jurnalul Național, 27/01/2009
‘Răzbunarea Mării Negre’ (The Black Sea’s revenge), Jurnalul Național, 05/02/2009
‘Comănescu, avizat’ (Comănescu, cleared), Jurnalul Național, 04/03/2009
‘Ştiri pe scurt’ (Brief news), Jurnalul Național, 05/03/2009
Annex F: Sample questions used in interviews and questionnaires

The role of democratic legitimacy in shaping global climate change policy

Perceiving the role of the media

1. How often do you read the press?
   - Daily
   - Four times a week
   - Three times a week
   - Two times a week
   - Every week
   - Every two weeks
   - Monthly
   - Never

2. Which of the following characteristics influence the degree of professionalism which publications exhibit in reporting European and climate change issues?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Significantly</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Resources</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Number of staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Number of correspondents</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Commitment to objective reporting</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Political orientation</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Focus on polarized views</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Breadth of analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Acting as educators of the public</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Ability to campaign for issues of public interest</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. To what extent do you think the following publications present climate change issues in a professional and informed manner?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Professionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
4. Do you think those newspapers have their own agenda in reporting about global climate change policy?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don’t know

  [Optional comments]

5. Do you see the media as reflecting wider views shared by the general public?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don’t know

  [Optional comments]

6. Do you see the media as reflecting wider views shared by society?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don’t know

  [Optional comments]

7. Can the media be a useful tool or avenue for interacting with citizens?
8. Do you think of the media as a crucial aspect for building the EU's reputation in global climate change policy?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don't know

Comments (Optional)

______________________________
9. For how long have you been involved in policymaking in global climate change policy?
   - up to a year
   - 2-3 years
   - 3-5 years
   - 5-10 years
   - over 10 years

10. In your opinion, does global climate change policy mix well with democracy?
    - Greatly
    - Significantly
    - Little
    - Not at all
    - Don't know
    ____________________________
    Comments (Optional)
    ____________________________

11. To what extent are you concerned with issues of democracy in your practice?
    - Greatly
    - Significantly
    - Little
    - Not at all
    - Don't know
    ____________________________
    Comments (Optional)
    ____________________________

12. How would you rate the level of openness to the public that your daily activity entails?
    - Greatly
    - Significantly
    - Little
    - Not at all
    - Don't know
    ____________________________
    Comments (Optional)
    ____________________________

13. In what ways do you think the practice and policies of your institution are made transparent and accountable? (Optional)

14. Do you think that the EU's global climate change policy is enjoying popular legitimacy?
    - Greatly
    - Significantly
    - Little
15. In what ways has your institution acted in order to enhance the EU’s legitimacy? (Optional)
The role of democratic legitimacy in shaping global climate change policy

Contacts with media and journalists

16. Have you ever worked in the media?
   ◦ Yes
   ◦ No
   If yes, can you please describe your role and indicate the number of years spent working in the media? (Optional)

17. Do you usually interact with directly journalists?
   ◦ Yes
   ◦ No
   If yes, can you provide the nature of the information you provide them? (Optional)

18. Do you have blacklists for journalists?
   ◦ Yes
   ◦ No
   How does one get on such a list? (Optional)

19. Can you describe the process of preparing press statements? Do you have any role?

20. Have you ever supplied stories to the media in order to promote a certain policy?
   ◦ Yes
   ◦ No
   If yes, can you please describe the context and mechanisms through which such stories were supplied to the media? (Optional)

21. Please provide your name for identification purposes. The survey results will be anonymised on publication.

Continue >
Survey testing only
The role of democratic legitimacy in shaping the policy towards Russia

Perceiving the role of the media

1. How often do you read the press?

- Daily
- Four times a week
- Three times a week
- Two times a week
- Every week
- Every two weeks
- Monthly
- Never

2. Which of the following characteristics influence the degree of professionalism which publications exhibit in reporting European issues and those related to the policy towards Russia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Significantly</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Resources</td>
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<td>d. Commitment to objective reporting</td>
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<td>g. Breadth of analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Acting as educators of the public</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Ability to campaign for issues of public interest</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. To what extent do you think the following publications present Russia and foreign policy issues in a professional and informed manner?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Professionalism</th>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Significantly</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. European Voice</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. EUObserver.com</td>
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<td>c. Financial Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. The Guardian</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. The Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Le Monde</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Le Figaro</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4. Do you think those newspapers have their own agenda in reporting about EU foreign policy? *(Optional)*

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don’t know

Comments *(Optional)*

5. Do you think those newspapers have their own agenda in reporting about the policy towards Russia?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don’t know

Comments *(Optional)*

6. Do you see the media as reflecting wider views shared by the general public?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don’t know

Comments *(Optional)*

7. Do you see the media as reflecting wider views shared by society?
8. Can the media be a useful tool or avenue for interacting with citizens?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don't know

Comments (Optional)


9. Do you think of the media as a crucial aspect for building the EU’s reputation as a foreign policy actor?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don't know

Comments (Optional)


Continue >

Survey testing only
Check Answers & Continue >
The role of democratic legitimacy in shaping the policy towards Russia

Democracy and Policymaking

10. For how long have you been involved in policymaking in foreign policy towards Russia?
   - up to a year
   - 2-3 years
   - 3-5 years
   - 5-10 years
   - over 10 years

11. In your opinion, does foreign policy mix well with democracy?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

12. To what extent are you concerned with issues of democracy in your practice?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

13. How would you rate the level of openness to the public that your daily activity entails?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

14. In what ways do you think the practice and policies of your institution are made transparent and accountable? (Optional)

15. Do you think that the EU's foreign policy is enjoying popular legitimacy?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
16. In what ways has your institution acted in order to enhance the EU's legitimacy? (Optional)
The role of democratic legitimacy in shaping the policy towards Russia

Contacts with media and journalists

17. Have you ever worked in the media?
   ◦ Yes
   ◦ No
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   ◦ Yes
   ◦ No
   How does one get on such a list? (Optional)

20. Can you describe the process of preparing press statements? Do you have any role?

21. Have you ever supplied stories to the media in order to promote a certain policy?
   ◦ Yes
   ◦ No
   If yes, can you please describe the context and mechanisms through which such stories were supplied to the media? (Optional)

22. Please provide your name for identification purposes. The survey results will be anonymised on publication.

Continue >

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The influence of media in global climate change policy

Perceptions of Readerships' Demand

1. How interested do you think your readership is in climate change policy?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

2. How interested do you think your readership is in European politics?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

3. How interested do you think your readership is in European Union's approach to global climate change?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

4. To what extent do you think your readership understands how European politics works?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
5. To what extent do you think your readership understands how EU’s foreign policy works?

- Greatly
- Significantly
- Little
- Not at all
- Don’t know

Comments (Optional)______________________________

Continue >
The influence of media in global climate change policy

Reporting decisions

6. Comment on how these factors influence your decisions to report on a certain issue related to climate change policy in broad terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Significantly</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Availability of news space</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Necessity to capture audience attention</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Access to important public figures</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Availability of resources for research or investigation</td>
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<td>e. Pressure of deadlines</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Lack of expert knowledge on topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Access to official documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Lack of clear cues and positions from politicians</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Own lack of understanding of topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>j. Pressure from senior editors or</td>
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<tr>
<td>journalists</td>
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<tr>
<td>k. Pressure from management or organizational pressure</td>
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The influence of media in global climate change policy

Resources made available by various actors and quality of information

7. Could you describe the frequency with which you contact national institutions when reporting on climate change policy?

- Always or very often
- Regularly
- From time to time
- Never
- Don't know

Comments (Optional)

8. Could you describe the frequency with which you contact the institutions of the Union when reporting on climate change policy?

- Always or very often
- Regularly
- From time to time
- Never
- Don't know

Comments (Optional)

9. Do you think that the EU regarding its approach to climate change is providing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always or very often</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>From time to time</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Specialist knowledge or expertise?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Material that is accurate?</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Material that is usable for news copy?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
d. Overall professional standards?

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

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The influence of media in global climate change policy

Framing and commenting decisions

10. Do you think in your position you act as?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Significantly</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Educator</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Partisan</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Ideologue</td>
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<td>d. Simply as a reporter</td>
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# The influence of media in global climate change policy

## Targeting strategies

11. Who do you target through your reporting and commentaries on climate change policy?
Public Sphere

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Always or very often</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>From time to time</th>
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<th>Don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Publication's readership</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. National public</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Transnational public</td>
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<td>d. Informed public</td>
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<td>e. Academia</td>
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<td>f. NGO's</td>
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<td>g. Other journalists</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

12. Who do you target through your reporting and commentaries on climate change policy?
Political Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Always or very often</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>From time to time</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Council</td>
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<td>c. European Parliament</td>
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<td>d. National government(s)</td>
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<td>e. Other international institutions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

13. Who do you target through your reporting and commentaries on climate change policy?
Social movements
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Always or very often</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>From time to time</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. European</td>
<td>©</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Regional</td>
<td>©</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. National</td>
<td>©</td>
<td>©</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. International</td>
<td>©</td>
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</table>

14. Please provide your name for identification purposes. The survey results will be anonymised on publication.

[Continue >]

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The influence of media on the policy towards Russia

Perceptions of Readerships’ Demand

1. How interested do you think your readership is in foreign policy?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don’t know
   [Comments (Optional)]

2. How interested do you think your readership is in topics related to Russia?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don’t know

3. How interested do you think your readership is in European politics?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don’t know
   [Comments (Optional)]

4. How interested do you think your readership is in European Union’s policy towards Russia?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don’t know
   [Comments (Optional)]
5. To what extent do you think your readership understands how European politics works?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

6. To what extent do you think your readership understands how EU's policy towards Russia works?
   - Greatly
   - Significantly
   - Little
   - Not at all
   - Don't know
   Comments (Optional)

Survey testing only
Check Answers & Continue >
7. Comment on how these factors influence your decisions to report on a certain issue in the policy towards Russia in broad terms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Significantly</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Availability of news space</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Necessity to capture audience attention</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Access to important public figures</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Availability of resources for research or investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Pressure of deadlines</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Lack of expert knowledge on topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Access to official documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Lack of clear cues and positions from politicians</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Own lack of understanding of topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>j. Pressure from senior editors or</td>
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<td>journalists</td>
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<tr>
<td>k. Pressure from management or organizational pressure</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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The influence of media on the policy towards Russia

Resources made available by various actors and quality of information

8. Could you describe the frequency with which you contact national institutions when reporting on Russia?
   - Always or very often
   - Regularly
   - From time to time
   - Never
   - Don't know

   Comments (Optional)

9. Could you describe the frequency with which you contact the institutions of the Union when reporting on Russia?
   - Always or very often
   - Regularly
   - From time to time
   - Never
   - Don't know

   Comments (Optional)

10. Do you think that the EU regarding its policy towards Russia is providing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Always or very often</th>
<th>Regularly</th>
<th>From time to time</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Specialist knowledge or expertise?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Material that is accurate?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Material that is usable for news copy?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
d. Overall professional standards?  

Continue >

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The influence of media on the policy towards Russia

Framing and commenting decisions

11. Do you think in your position you act as?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greatly</th>
<th>Significantly</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Educator</td>
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<td>b. Partisan</td>
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<td>c. Ideologue</td>
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<td>d. Simply as a reporter</td>
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## Targeting strategies

### 12. Who do you target through your reporting and commentaries on the policy towards Russia? Public Sphere

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<td>b. National public</td>
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<td>c. Transnational public</td>
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<td>d. Informed public</td>
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<td>e. Academia</td>
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### 13. Who do you target through your reporting and commentaries on the policy towards Russia? Political Actors

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<td>b. Council</td>
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### 14. Who do you target through your reporting and commentaries on the policy towards Russia? Social movements
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<td>b. Regional</td>
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<td>d. International</td>
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