Borderland memories. The remaking of the Russian-Estonian frontier

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Metadata Record: [https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/14541](https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/14541)

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‘Borderland Memories: The Remaking of the Russian-Estonian Frontier’

by

Alena Pfoser

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

December 2013

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Abstract

The border between Russia and Estonia has undergone significant changes in the past two and a half decades from a border between two Soviet republics to an international border and external EU border. In the public discourse and the scholarly literature, this border has been characterised as a battlefield shaped by divergent geopolitical visions and evaluations of the shared past. While Estonia has sought to distance itself from Russia and condemns the Soviet past as an occupation, Russia derives pride from its historical role in liberating Europe in World War II and continues to hold on to positive memories of the Soviet past and its role in the Baltic states. The thesis looks at how these official narratives have been negotiated locally in the once united border towns of Narva and Ivangorod in the Russian-Estonian borderland. Based on an extended fieldwork stay and the analysis of 58 life-story interviews with people living on both sides of the border, it examines how people living in the borderland position themselves in the context of shifting narrative and structural frameworks. How do they re-evaluate the relations to the other side and reconsider their memories of the shared past?

In examining these questions, the thesis seeks to make two general contributions to existing literature: it brings together the fields of border studies and memory studies to explore the reconfiguration of both temporal and spatial orderings in the making of a border. Secondly, it outlines a model for studying border change that focuses on the interrelations between the vernacular and the official level. The first part of the thesis looks at the politics of temporal orderings in the borderland and explores how people belonging to different ethnic groups and generations remember the past in the context of changing borders. It shows how people in part reproduce the polarised narratives mobilised at the official level but also how local experiences and generational change lead to a diversification of temporal orderings. The second part of the thesis explores the politics of spatial orderings in post-socialist memories. It looks at how by remembering the past people both reproduce and undermine borders; it demonstrates that it is not simply the memories of a shared past but also new inequalities following the establishment of the border that shape the ways in which people relate to their cross-border neighbours.
Overall, the thesis provides a complex and differentiated account of border change in which different temporalities and spatialities at the vernacular and official levels can interact, interrelate and stand in opposition to each other. It shows that although people living in the borderland experience constraints and even powerlessness in the face of changes in the border, they have an active role in negotiating the changes and develop multiple responses to official narratives. It demonstrates how by appropriating official narratives and relating them to their own purposes, people articulate local concerns and make claims for belonging, recognition and state care in the face of the changes.
Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been written without the support of a large number of people:

My biggest thanks go to all the men and women in Narva and Ivangorod who were willing to share their life-stories. Their narratives form the backbone of my thesis and I want to sincerely thank them for their openness and trust.

Furthermore, I wanted to thank those who facilitated my research locally and made me feel welcome: the librarians, local administrators, historians, professionals and volunteer guides who helped me in orienting myself in the field. In Narva, special thanks go to Juri and Irene Weiss-Wendt who were most generous in their support for my project even before they had met me in person. Juri and Irene helped me in establishing crucial contacts in the field and, equally importantly, provided space for reflection at their home; they reminded me of Estonia's painful past when I became too absorbed in positive memories of the socialist past. Olga Burdakova and the other staff at the Narva College provided support for the organisation of everyday life in Narva. Silvia Ilmenskaja at the Estonian Society was most helpful in putting me in touch with Narva's old inhabitants. In Ivangorod, Liubov Nikolaevna Dobzhenko and Zoia Pavlovna Pogodina agreed on short notice to host me. Svetlana Iurevna Shmakova and her daughters provided me with an additional home and organised excursions and interviews for me. Aleksei Alekseevich Rumiancev generously shared his historic photographs of the borderland. Vera Badalyan organised the transcription of the interviews in Saint Petersburg.

The first seeds for this project were laid when I was working as a research assistant in the oral history project on 'The Cold War in Communicative Memories and Public Spheres' at the Ludwig-Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres in 2008. Thomas Lindenberger encouraged me to follow my interest in Russia and in the study of borderlands and put me in contact with Sabina Mihelj at Loughborough University. The financial support of Loughborough University's Graduate School made it possible to put my research plans into practice.
I could not have hoped for better supervisors than Sabina Mihelj and Mike Pickering. Throughout the process of working on the thesis, Sabina and Mike have provided me with guidance and support, pointed out relevant literature and helped in refining and sharpening my arguments. Additionally, Emily Keightley helped me in better understanding the literature on memory.

My fellow PhD students at Loughborough's Department for Social Sciences were a great source of support and dialogue throughout the process: Dana Nassif, David Smith, Georgie Payne, Roxana Morosanu, Sarah Lewis and Emily Harmer provided me with a friendly working environment.

My friends in Austria, the UK and Russia have always supported and encouraged me. I particularly want to thank Ekaterina Chertkovskaya, Veronika Eberhart, Odin Kroeger, Ksenija Kuzmina, Pauline van Romondt-Vis, Traute Vogl and Alexandra Wachter. Tatiana Voronina helped me to interpret the first interviews when I was still living in Saint Petersburg. With Eva Engelbert, a visual artist, I started to work on a multi-media exhibition project on the Russian-Estonian border parallel to my PhD research. While not directly used in the thesis, the productive discussions with Eva while working on the exhibition helped me in better understanding the local dynamics in the borderland.

In Pawas Bisht I found a most supportive and inspiring companion during the process of writing the PhD, and I cannot thank him enough for his support and care.

Regardless of whether I was in the UK, Estonia, Russia or Austria, I could always count on my family. My parents Kristina and Alfred have always encouraged me in my studies. They were there in both the exciting and the difficult moments of the thesis writing and reminded me of the vital importance of having a rest. The thesis is dedicated to them.
Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Outline of the thesis ................................................................. 14

CHAPTER 2 THE RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN BORDERLAND: HISTORICAL CONTEXT
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 18
2.2 Between East and West: changing sovereignties, trade and industrialisation in the borderland ...................................................... 20
2.3 “The Friendship between the Estonian and the Russian Peoples”: Post-war reconstruction, Russification and integrated border space in the socialist past .................. 25
2.4 “Our border is the border of European values”: Rebordering Estonia, returning to the West after the fall of socialism ........................................ 33
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 42

CHAPTER 3 THE POLITICS OF TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL ORDERINGS: CONNECTING MEMORY STUDIES AND BORDER STUDIES
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 44
3.2 Linking border studies and memory studies: temporalizing borders, bordering memory ................................................................. 45
3.3 Politics of temporal orderings: the temporal dimensions of border making ............. 54
3.4 Politics of spatial orderings: the spatial dimensions of memory ................................ 61
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 66

CHAPTER 4 CONNECTING VERNACULAR AND OFFICIAL NARRATIVES
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 68
4.2 'Grounding' the study of borders and memory ........................................ 69
4.3 Consensus and contestation: Ways of relating vernacular and official narratives ...... 75
4.4 Vernacular narratives in social context: between structure and agency .......... 80
   4.4.1 Ethnicity ................................................................................. 84
   4.4.2 Generation ............................................................................... 86
   4.4.3 Locality .................................................................................... 88
4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 89

CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 91
5.2 Studying borderland narratives .................................................... 92
5.3 Conducting fieldwork: access to the field and research ethics ......................... 96
5.4 Data collection .......................................................................... 99
5.5 Data analysis ........................................................................... 105
5.6 Conclusion ............................................................................. 108
List of Figures

Figure 1.1 View of Narva Castle and Ivangorod Fortress.................................................. 9
Figure 2.1 Geographical location of the border region ....................................................... 19
Figure 2.2 Map of Narva and Ivangorod........................................................................... 19
Figure 2.3 The town hall of Old Narva ............................................................................. 22
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 View from Narva to Ivangorod. View from Ivangorod to Narva..32
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 New monuments in Narva and Ivangorod................................. 41
Figure 8.1 Street with typical houses on the Parusinka Peninsula, Ivangorod..................... 171
Figure 8.2 Shopping Centre ‘Astri’, Narva........................................................................ 177

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Rise in population in Narva ................................................................................ 28
Table 2.2 Ethnic composition of Narva in 2012 ................................................................. 29
Table 5.1 Interview sample in Narva and Ivangorod according to ethnicity and generation101
Chapter 1 Introduction

On the banks of the Narova river that marks the boundary between Estonia and Russia two great fortresses face each other. Narva Castle in the Estonian town of Narva to the West was founded in the 13th century when Northern Estonia was ruled by the Danes and was rebuilt and extended under German and Swedish rule. On the other side, Ivanгород Fortress on the eastern shore in Russian Ivanгород was erected in 1492 by Czar Ivan III to mark off Russia’s western border. Both have a distinct architectural style: the long Hermann tower and a system of fortifications in Narva stands in contrast to the lower fortress structure on the Russian side that stretches alongside the river bank. Only several meters away from each other, these two different fortresses have been used in Estonian public discourse as a symbol of ancient animosity between Russia and Estonia and sign of the civilizational fault line between East and West. As the Estonian sociologist Kirch writes and as it has been reiterated in public statements and tourist brochures:

If one supposes hesitatingly that the civilizational border between Estonia and Russia is anachronistic or negligible, one need only stand on the bridge over Narva river... and witness carefully the ‘overt civilizational confrontation’ of two cultures: on the Estonian side there is an historic fortress built by the Swedes, Danes and Germans in accordance with the cultural traditions of Western Europe; on the other [in Ivanгород] a primeval fortress as an exponent of Slavic-Orthodox cultural traditions. (Kirch 1994, 12).

In this quotation, assumptions about place, identity and memory become intertwined to give the border between Russia and Estonia historical depth and ground it in an ancient battle between East and West. The European cultural heritage – represented in the Danish, Swedish, and German architectural influences on the Narva castle – is seen as directly opposed to the cultural traditions of Russia. In the ‘civilisational’ battle between East and West, Estonia is both territorially and culturally firmly located on the western side – consciously disregarding the large Russian-speaking minority that lives in Estonia and particular around the Narova river.

The fortresses and the historical narratives embedded in them are part of a larger symbolic landscape through which the border got redefined and remade after the fall
of socialism. In Estonia as elsewhere in Europe's eastern peripheries the opening of
the Iron Curtain hardly signalled the demise of borders, but has given way to a whole
set of new divides and bordering processes that have, both through material
fortifications and the mobilisation of new symbolic narratives, radically altered the
continent's geographies. As former principles of organising space and time ceased to
hold, political and cultural elites have engaged in creating new symbols and
narratives that provide orientation and legitimise the social and political changes. In
some cases conflicting memories that have been used for legitimizing national
boundaries have led to inter-state tensions and become catalysts of conflicts
(Zhurzhenko 2011). The Russian-Estonian border is usually presented as a battlefield
of conflicting memories and conceptions of space. Particularly Estonia has mobilised
memories of its pre-war past and European historical legacies to detach itself from
the Soviet past and Russia. But also the Russian side has reinvented the border as
Russia’s western outpost in reaction to Estonia’s political reorientation and
integration in the ‘West’, while also continuing to hold on to positive memories of
the Soviet past and its imperial grandeur of the past.

Figure 1.1 View of Narva Castle and Ivangozd Fortress
This thesis explores the dynamic reconfiguration of both temporal and spatial orderings in the making of this border after the fall of socialism and the EU’s eastern enlargement. In the past 23 years the Russian-Estonian border has experienced dramatic changes shifting from being an internal border within the USSR that could easily be crossed to becoming an increasingly fortified international border between nation-states and the new EU external border (Berg and Ehin 2009; Kuus 2007; Lehti and Smith 2003). As the example above shows, memories play an important role in these processes: The making of state borders is accompanied by the creation (and contestation) of spatiotemporal landmarks, coordinates that provide orientation and serve to legitimise belonging and exclusion. While the literature on the region has usually adopted a top-down approach and focused on the elite-led, antagonistic processes of imagining space and remembering – articulated also in the image of the opposed fortresses – this thesis examines these processes from a different perspective. It starts from the assumption that the border and its narrative representation cannot be seen simply as results of an elite-led process imposed onto an empty landscape. Until recently, the border towns of Narva and Ivangoord, in which the two fortresses are situated and which are populated predominantly by Russian-speakers, used to form a shared social space where people could move freely between the sides, and where cultural narratives were dominated by the notion of the ‘friendship between the Russian and Estonian people’, promoted by the Soviet ideology. For the new, antagonistic visions of space and time to take root, this shared social space and the accompanying narratives had to be remoulded and erased – a process that, as this thesis shows, was full of contradictions, and generated a range of localised narratives that often departed from the black-and-white story told in tourist brochures and public statements.

To analyse this bottom-up dynamics of the remaking of the border and its relationship with established official narratives, I spent several months of fieldwork between 2010 and 2012 in the border towns of Narva and Ivangoord and conducted extensive life-story interviews with people living on both sides of the border and belonging to different social groups. By means of these interviews I was seeking to answer three key empirical questions: How do people living in the borderland position themselves in the context of shifting narrative and structural frameworks?
How do they re-evaluate the relations to the other side and reconsider their memories of the shared past? And how do vernacular narratives relate to official narratives that mark the border in time and space?

Through engaging with these research questions, my thesis sought to fulfil two more general aims:

Firstly, this thesis draws on the analysis of border-making and memory in the Estonian-Russian borderland to make a case for a specific way of conceiving of memory and borders, in which particular attention is paid to **vernacular narratives in relation to official narratives** circulated in the public sphere. Drawing upon literature in the fields of memory studies and border studies the thesis argues that to get a deeper understanding of the dynamics of temporal and spatial orderings, we have to consider how spatial and temporal orders at the level of (conflicting) official narratives are received, negotiated and challenged in personal meaning-making activities. Only by looking at the interrelations and tensions between the two vernacular and official narratives we can get more grounded insights into processes of remembering and bordering and enable a less teleological account of political and social change than studies focusing exclusively on top-down processes (Reeves 2009). The relations between bottom-up and top-down processes are often thought in terms of oppositions: ‘Popular memory’ is seen as subordinated and resistant to dominant official memory. And borderlanders are assumed to oppose the border that is established in top-down processes by political elites. By considering the level of personal narratives and putting it in relation to larger meaning frameworks, my study in contrast analyses a broader spectrum of responses to the border changes. Rather than contrasting top-down and bottom-up perspectives, this study suggests a more complex view on ordering time and space in the borderland as being mediated by official representations of the past and characterised by fragmentation and diversification within the borderland. The people living in the borderland are not a homogeneous community but are shaped by divergent individual and collective experiences and differ in their positions in social space and in the symbolic resources they have available for narrating their stories. Looking at the dynamics of bordering and remembering in the borderland, the thesis considers different sociostructural categories which structure their narratives. I discuss particularly the role of ethnicity
(chapters 4 and 7), generation (chapter 5) and locality (chapter 6) as three central categories in people’s narratives. These sociostructural categories constrain people’s access to symbolic resources and enable certain ways of making sense, including ways of acting on and ‘talking back’ to institutional arrangements and elite narratives, for example, by articulating claims about belonging, victimhood and social benefits.

Secondly, the thesis also seeks to use the case study of border-making and memory in the Estonian-Russian borderland as a springboard to develop a set of more general propositions about the relationship between borders and memory, and thereby to further an integration and cross-fertilization of the fields of border studies and memory studies. Border studies and memory studies have developed as two new fields in the past decades and while bringing together researchers from different disciplines, they have done so largely independently from each other. Despite the connections between borders and memories, the links between the two are often rather implicit than explicit. Past studies on nationalism and nation-building (Zhurzhenko 2011, Smith 1999, Paasi 1996) as well as studies in international relations (Langenbacher and Shain 2010, Berg and Ehin 2009), and ethnographic studies of borders (Ballinger 2003, Berdahl 1999) have shown interest thinking memory and border together. However, such attempts remain largely unsystematic.

The thesis makes the case for a stronger linkage between the studies of memories and borders. Drawing upon theoretical debates in both fields can result in mutual cross-fertilisation and sensitise us to the dynamics of both remaking space and time through the creation of borders. Bringing a memory studies perspective to border studies means raising attention to the temporal dimension of making borders, to the ways in which memory contributes to (re)ordering space and to creating links between people and place over time. Bordering then involves not only the construction of unity and difference in space but also in and over time – something that (as I will show in Chapter 2) particular newer research tends to oversee. Furthermore, a stronger linkage between the fields can also contribute to memory studies: bringing a border studies perspective to memory studies can help us to re-think the relationship between memory and place, regarding place not as stable but as something which is actively (re)constructed in processes of remembering.
The Russian-Estonian borderland provides a particular apposite case for bridging memory studies and border studies. It has been a site of a relatively recent reconfiguration of spatial and temporal orders and has been subject to multiple changing regulations since its delimitation in 1991. More than other post-socialist borderlands, it has been characterised as a battlefield shaped by polarised imaginations of political space and historical narratives on the macro-level. The complicated history of the borderland, among others the Swedish historical heritage, the period of Estonian independence between the World Wars and the Soviet past, have resulted in memory layers that overlap, diverge, compete and contest among themselves. Estonia is part of what Timothy Snyder has called the bloodlands – a region caught between Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union which experienced mass killings by both regimes. Memories of violence and past displacements have re-emerged since the restoration of Estonia's independence as well as memories of earlier nation- and state-formations, while at the same time more positive memories of the socialist period have been devalued and silenced – in contrast to the Russian side of the border where the socialist past and particularly the victory in World War II continues to have a positive meaning and to be a source of national pride. Due to their “paradoxical character” (Baud and van Schendel 1997, 216) as sites of difference and contact zones, borderlands are good sites to study the dynamics of making place and remembering. Borders have been conceptualised as a privileged site for the construction of inclusion and exclusion. They have played a crucial role in constructing and solidifying national identities and cultures and have been used as symbolical markers for forging people's affiliation to the state while at the same time being objects of renarration and contestations.

The Russian-Estonian border extends over 460 km and has been traditionally populated by culturally and ethnically diverse populations whose life-worlds used to extend beyond the border. To the south the border runs primarily through the rural areas of Setomaa – a trans-border region and homeland of the Seto people who share the Orthodox faith with Russians and cultural traditions with Estonians (Kaiser and Nikiforova 2006). Further up north, there is the Peipsi Lake (in Russian: Chudskoe Lake) as Europe’s largest transboundary lake; on its shores one can find fishing villages populated by Old Believers. For the present study the twin towns of Narva
and Ivangorod, which are located on the road between Tallinn and Saint-Petersburg and form the northernmost border-crossing point between Russia and Estonia, have been selected as fieldwork sites. Due to their spatial proximity and dense networks in the past, they present an ideal micro-cosmos for studying a borderland in the making – and to analyse the relation between nationalisation of the borderland and its resistances, change and continuity, inclusions and exclusions.

1.1 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided into three parts:

Part I sets the stage for the thesis by introducing the theoretical and methodological framework as well as the historical context in which the study is situated.

Chapter 2 discusses the development of the Russian-Estonian borderland over time and links local developments to wider political changes and international relations. It gives an overview of the changing political sovereignties – Danish, Livonian, Swedish, Russian, Soviet and Estonian – and population shifts that have shaped the borderland over the course of history and inscribed it with different meanings. Identifying these different time layers, the chapter particularly focuses on the more recent history of socialist and post-socialist rule that figure most prominently in local narratives of the past and the border.

Chapter 3 provides a literature review on border studies and memory studies and embeds my approach towards them. It argues that by combining the two fields can lead to cross-fertilisation – a stronger consideration of the temporal aspects of making borders and of the spatial aspects of memory. Furthermore, it introduces the concepts ‘politics of temporal orderings’ and ‘politics of spatial orderings’ as central elements of bordering processes. These two concepts allow us to think about border and memory as multiple and contested processes through which past and present are put into relation and the relations between inside and outside are defined. These two concepts will be employed in the two empirical parts of the thesis. The foregrounding of either the politics of temporal orderings (Part II) or the politics of spatial orderings (Part III) in the presentation of the results helps to organise the material but does not mean to treat them as separate from each other. Making the
case for a stronger integration of border studies and memory studies, the thesis will keep track of how temporal orderings contribute to ordering space and making the border, and how spatial orderings are informed by memories of the past.

Chapter 4 discusses the relation between micro and macro level within the politics of spatial and temporal orderings. It discusses how the two levels have been conceptualised in theoretical writings and literature on the region and makes a case for an approach that considers processes of ordering space and time on the individual level in relation to and interaction with the level of official narratives. Furthermore, it introduces the categories of ethnicity, generation and location that shape processes of remembering and bordering.

Chapter 5 introduces the methodological framework of the study. Building upon the theoretical considerations, the study adopts a narrative approach in which particular attention is drawn to the interrelations between vernacular and official narratives. The chapter draws upon recent sociological literature on narrative studies and life-story interviews that have informed the data collection and analysis. Furthermore, it gives insights into the organisation of the fieldwork in the borderland, research ethics and my position as a (foreign) researcher in the field.

The remaining two parts of the study present the empirical results in the context of the theoretical framework. While differing in their thematic focus, all the data chapters are concerned with the relation between personal meaning-making activities and elite-led narratives.

Part II of the thesis focuses on the role of memory in the making of the Russian-Estonian border and discusses the politics of temporal orderings in the borderland.

Chapter 6, “The Dynamics of Memory in a Multi-ethnic Borderland”, gives a close analysis of competing temporal orderings in the borderland. It focuses on how two ethnic groups in Narva – the pre-war population and the Russian-speaking Soviet-era settlers – order time and use memories to construct and negotiate belonging to territory. In the literature on Estonian-Russian relations, ethnicity has been discussed as a key category for structuring people’s memories. The chapter gives insights into diverging memory narratives and constructions of belongings for both groups that are informed by polarised narratives on the public level. Narva’s pre-war population and
their descendants, a small minority, use memory to construct authentic and exclusive belonging in the borderland, while Narva’s Russian-speakers try to defend their belonging against the background of their status loss in independent Estonia by drawing upon memories of the socialist past. While these strategies are based on conflicting modes of ordering time and contradictory constructions of belonging, the chapter at the same time raises attention to interactions and cross-references between groups and alternative memories rooted in the local level can be the basis for less exclusive identities in the borderland.

Chapter 7, “The Generational Dynamics of Memory at the Border”, discusses the role of generations and questions of continuity and discontinuity in temporal orderings. One of the key questions for the legitimisation of borders is the transmission of new historical narratives about the past to younger generations. Authors have argued that it is important to consider generational change when analysing the meanings of the border as “it is easier to communicate new ideas on the relations of states... to new generations” (Paasi 1996, 209). The chapter focuses particularly on the role of experiences for mnemonic change. It posits that while the older generations reconsider the past in relation to a changing present, the meaning-making processes of different generations diverge as generations draw upon different experiences in the past and are confronted with different ‘problems’ in the present. The chapter shows a partial shift happening between three generations of Russian-speakers (the socialist generation, the ‘Perestroika’ generation and the post-socialist generation), showing the sedimentation of new narratives of past and future over time and constructions of identity linked to them. The chapter adds to the previous one in that it shows that temporal orderings of ethnic groups are not homogeneous but that memories are generationally structured.

Part III of the thesis shifts the focus from processes of ordering time – and how this is linked to constructions of identity and belonging – to the spatial dimensions of border making. It discusses the politics of spatial orderings in narratives of post-socialist change.

Chapter 8, “Narrating Change, Redrawing the East-West border” focuses on the reconsideration of spatial orders in narratives of post-socialist change. The transition from socialism to socialism did not only lead to a reconsideration of the past but also
a redefinition of people’s geographical position and relation to the other side. The chapter looks at how Russian-speakers living in Narva and Ivangoord make sense of their locatedness on either side of the border. It discusses how people in their everyday lives adopt and appropriate categories like ‘Europe’, ‘West’ and ‘East’ and underlying hierarchical understandings in space in order to make sense of their division and diverging national trajectories. The chapter shows how memories of new spatial inequalities inform their perceptions of ‘here’ and ‘there’, self and the other and lead to the construction of symbolic borders between Narva and Ivangoord.

Chapter 9, “Narrating a Hardening Border Regime: Between Security and Mobility” focuses on the politics of spatial orderings in the discussion over mobility regulation. The changing geographies between Russia and Estonia have not only led to a reconsideration of symbolic boundaries between Europe, West and East but also had concrete effects regarding the possibilities for border-crossing. The chapter will analyse local debates over security and mobility in Narva and Ivangoord and link it to different ways of engaging with the state and different historical memories in the region. It picks up some of the threads of chapter 5 on memory and ethnicity as it discusses how these different ways of perceiving the border are shaped by diverging memories of ethnic groups. While some of Narva’s pre-war population defend the hardening border regime and invest positive emotions in the state as a locus of security and protection, others focus on experiences of (im)mobility; they see the present border regime as a disturbing fact.

Chapter 10 provides a concluding discussion. It summarises and synthesises the main strategies of ordering space and time that were identified in the empirical chapters and points out how the findings contribute to the existing literature on border studies and memory studies.
Chapter 2 The Russian-Estonian borderland: Historical context

2.1 Introduction

Travelling on the road that connects Estonia's capital city of Tallinn with Russia's northern metropolis St. Petersburg one encounters approximately half-way the twin towns of Narva and Ivangorod that now mark the international border between Estonia and Russia and the easternmost border of the European Union.

Narva is located on the western shore of the Narova river and with approximately 63,000 inhabitants is the third largest city of Estonia in the heavy industrialised northeast of the country. In contrast, Ivangorod on the Russian side of the border is much smaller – it has only 11,000 inhabitants; it is more provincial and poorer with its population earns about half the average income of Narva (statistics for 2010 provided by the Department for Economic Development (2011) in Ivangorod, and the Narva Department for Development and Economy (2011)). These two border towns that until recently used to form an integrated space are now part of Europe’s new periphery. The relations between them and their position within the political geographies of Europe and Russia have changed dramatically over time and – similar to other borderlands in Eastern Europe – have been shaped by shifting borders, wars between regional power holders and population displacements. Within the changing geographies, the break-up of the Soviet Union and Estonia’s accession to the EU have been only the most recent reconfiguration of space in the region.
Figure 2.1 Geographical location of the border region (Source: Google Maps)

Figure 2.2 Map of Narva and Ivangoord (Source: Google Maps)
This chapter presents the larger historical developments from the perspective of the borderland and introduces the events and developments that have shaped local life over the years and contributed to complex layers of memory. As the literature on borders demonstrates, borderlands are central sites for processes of nation- and state-building: political changes thus become particularly articulated in borderlands and borderlands are also the places in which the symbolic inscriptions of a place as ‘ours’ as opposed to ‘theirs’ are both reinforced and contested (Sahlins 1989, Donnan and Wilson 1999). In my discussion I particularly focus on the history of changing political sovereignties, population shifts and the meanings that have been inscribed in the borderland. The changing sovereignties have not only changed the relation between Narva and Ivangoord – between conflict and trade, integration and division – but also brought new people to the borderland and displaced others. New populations and state- and nation-formations invested new meanings into the borderland and significantly altered its material environment.

The chapter goes back to the early history of Narva and Ivangoord when they were founded in the Medieval Age. The more recent history of the borderland – from the incorporation of Narva and Ivangoord into the Soviet Union till the declaration of Estonia’s independence and the division of the two towns – will be discussed at greater length as this figures prominently in the memory narratives of the borderland’s present population. My focus on local history in relation to larger political changes is also reflected in the sources: the chapter draws upon general historical literature on European history and the Baltic States and combines it with articles on local history and insights from my fieldwork.

2.2 Between East and West: changing sovereignties, trade and industrialisation in the borderland

Today’s borderland between Russia and Estonia is situated at a point where the interests of many states have overlapped. In the past 400 years Narva and Ivangoord experienced changing sovereignties including Danish, Livonian (as part of the German Order), Swedish, Russian, Estonian, German, and Soviet rule. As a result of power struggles, political discontinuity became one of the most defining features in
the history of the Baltic region (Plakans 2011, xiv). The changing political rulers and wars between the competing regional powers have left their mark and have shaped the image of the borderland as a contested place between West and East, Protestantism and Orthodox faith, European and Russian influence – an image of a polarised borderland that is often mobilised in contemporary public and political discourse. Over the course of history Narva and Ivangorod however did not only constitute sites of war and power struggle but also served as places of contact and trade. Located on the Hanseatic League they could profit from trading connections between the West and Russia (Kivimae 2004 on medieval Narva).

Narva was founded in the 13th century by the Danes who used to rule over the northern part of Estonia, and was later sold to the Livonian Order, an independent branch of the Teutonic order. During its early history Narva formed the easternmost point of the province of Estonia, and already in the peace treaty of 1448 between the Livonian order and the cities of Novgorod and Pskov the border was fixed to the Narova river. Ivangorod on the eastern shore of the river was founded in 1492 and was named after Tsar Ivan III who ordered opposite to the Narva Castle the construction of the fortress of Ivangorod to mark the western border of Muscovy, the predecessor state for the Tsardom of Russia.

Already in the late 15th century, Muscovy had attacked Livonia seeking to extend its territory. In the Livonian Wars of the mid-16th century Narva was conquered by the Russians, but Russian rule did not last long. In 1581, Narva was taken over by the Swedes who, gaining control over the northern part of the Estonian territories, became the dominant power in Northern Europe (Plakans 2011, 77-124 on medieval history of the region and the Livonian Wars; Weiss-Wendt 1997a on changing sovereignties). While already during Russian rule Narva was turned into a thriving port (Narva Muuseum 2001, 15), it was the following 120 years of Swedish rule that are usually seen – according to present evaluations – as Narva's ‘Golden Age’. During Swedish rule Narva expanded as its merchant elites could profit from the integration into trade routes. The town centre with its distinct Northern Baroque was built following a fire in 1659 that had destroyed the old town. The uniform architectural style, its narrow lanes, churches and two-storey buildings with decorated portals constructed during the times of Swedish rule, became Narva’s
hallmark and formed a distinct identity for the Old town (documented in Sarap 1939) until its destruction in World War II. Till the present the memories of Old Narva’s material environment figure prominently in the narratives of Narva’s old population and mark a difference to the uniform housing that was built later during Soviet rule and continues to shape the cityscape.

Figure 2.3 The old town hall is one of the few remaining buildings of Old Narva

In 1700 and 1704 the borderland became the site of two great battles between the Swedish and Russian empires, between King Charles XII and Peter the Great as part of the Great Northern War over the rule of Northern and Eastern Europe. In the first battle the Swedes successfully defended Narva but lost it only four years later to Russian forces. The territories of Estonia and Livonia were incorporated into Tsarist Russia and became the western borderland of the empire.¹

¹ The following two centuries of Russian rule did not automatically mean a russification of Estonia – despite the changing sovereignties the Baltic Germans, landowners and urban patriciates with shifting
Despite the changing sovereignties, Narva and Ivangorod since the mid-16th century did not experience any division as they belonged to the same state first under Swedish, then under Russian rule. Already early in their history Narva and Ivangorod were thus not merely outposts of opposing military powers but were closely connected. This connection was strengthened when in 1648 smaller Ivangorod became an administrative part of Narva forming an integrated neighbourhood on the eastern shore of the Narova (Weiss-Wendt 1997a). It was only three and a half centuries later that the two towns effectively became separated by the new international border between Estonia and Russia.

Despite the integration in the structure of imperial Russian administration, the borderland did not become completely russified after Russia’s victory in the Great Northern War – Estland like the other provinces of Livland and Kurland in the Baltic region retained a certain autonomy during the Russian empire, and the Russian rulers confirmed the rights and privileges of the Baltic German nobility as had done the Swedes before them. While the Great Northern War had displaced a larger part of the local population and the borderland took some time to recover, Narva together with its neighbourhood Ivangorod also during the two centuries of Russian rule, formed a multi-ethnic and multi-religious place populated by a mixed population of Estonians, Russians, Germans and other nationalities like Swedes, Jews, Finns and Poles. Narva and its suburbs on the western shore of the river were traditionally populated by a larger number of Estonians, while the neighbourhood of Ivangorod was predominantly Russian. At the end of the 19th century, according to the official boundaries of the town, in Narva lived 16,599 people in 1897; among them were 7,313 Estonians, 7,297 Russians and 1,000 Germans (Weiss-Wendt 1997a). While the cultural influence of these groups changed with time – Russification policies in the Baltic Provinces during late Tsarist rule were meant to diminish German influence (cf. Raun 2001, Thaden et al 1981), the Baltic Germans who were dominant among the merchant class and factory owners remained a powerful local political loyalties for a long time were the immediate rulers of the Baltic lands. The European character of the Baltic provinces allowed Russian empire to position itself as a European Empire (Plakans 2011).
influence and continued to exercise local political hegemony till the establishment of an independent Estonia in the aftermath of WWI and the Russian revolution.

While Narva had first become known as a commercial town, in the mid-19th century it experienced a first wave of industrialisation making use of the water power and particularly the large waterfalls of the Narova river. In the mid-19th century several factories were erected on the shore of the river. The Krenholm cotton-spinning and weaving factory was founded by the 'Moscow cotton king' Ludwig Knoop, a German entrepreneur living in Moscow, and remained the largest employer in Narva during the Soviet period. On the eastern shore of the Narova river ('Parusinka'), a cloth factory and a flax mill were built, producing sailcloth and jute (Ivanen 2010, 39-41). At the end of the 19th century, Narva was Estonia’s main industrial centre: 41% of Estonia’s industrial workers, in comparison to 33% in Tallinn, lived in Narva. The industrialisation and creation of factories contributed to significant population growth (from 5,000 inhabitants in 1857 to 16,600 people in 1897 and if Narva's suburbs are included over 45,000 people lived there) (Zelnik 1995, 42-43; on industrialisation in Narva and Ivangoord, Zelnik 1995, 21-25; Ivanen 2010, 37-48). Particular Estonians living in the rural surroundings settled in the city and joined the workforce; others remained in the villages but profited from the commercial connections to Narva. In the memory of the old population, it was however less the industries than the old town as a site of trade and a rich multilingual cultural life that was prominent.

In 1917, both parts of the city voted in a referendum to join the newly autonomous province of Estland within the Russian Empire and were later, after a short period of Bolshevik control, incorporated into the independent Republic of Estonia (Weiss-Wendt 1997a). The outbreak of WWI and the collapse of tsarist Russia as well as the defeat of Imperial Germany provided the opportunity for Estonia to become independent. The Tartu Peace treaty, signed by Estonia and Bolshevik Russia in the aftermath of the Estonian war of independence, became the birth certificate of an independent Estonia and marked the border 10 km to the east of Narva in the north, reflecting the frontline at the time of the armistice (Raun 2001, 110). During the time of independence which lasted just two decades between 1920 and 1940, the Estonian character of Narva became more dominant as many of the rich German merchants
and aristocracy in the city left. In 1934, it was populated by 64.8% Estonians, 29.7% Russians and 2.1% Germans (Raun 1991, 131).

2.3 “The Friendship between the Estonian and the Russian Peoples”: Post-war reconstruction, Russification and integrated border space in the socialist past

World War II and the annexation of Estonia in the Soviet Union most significantly shaped the history of the borderland and created a disjunction between pre-war and post-war times: the old town with its Baroque architecture was turned into rubble and replaced with a new one built in the spirit of socialism; the multi-national and multi-lingual population was replaced by Russian-speaking settlers from the Soviet Union. Wartime destructions and population displacements had taken place all over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but the borderland between Russia and Estonia was so severely affected that according to a historian the only historical legacy that post-war Narva inherited from its predecessor was the old name (Brueggemann 2004, 84).

Since 1933 Estonia had been caught between two totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union in which its neutrality policy proved of little help.² With the aggressive eastwards expansion of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union increasingly saw the Baltic Lands as a buffer zone and sought to fortify its western border. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with its secret protocol, signed on 23 August 1939, allocated Estonia together with Finland, Latvia, most of Lithuania and eastern Poland to the Soviet Union, and on 16 June 1940 Estonia and its neighbour Latvia received an ultimatum. The forced surrender due to Soviet pressure was quickly followed by a first wave of arrests, executions and deportations among the local population (Snyder 2010, 119-154, on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; on Narva, cf. Vana-Narva Seltsi väljaane 2001). Between 1941-1944 Narva and Ivangoord were in the frontlines between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The German invasion of 1941 damaged Narva but was against the background of Soviet violence and repressions

² This does not mean that the Baltic people were simply victims of the great powers but as Brueggemann rightly remarks “without Nazism or Stalinism there could not have been any form of Baltic ‘collaborationism’” (Brueggemann 2009, 950).
welcomed by many (Weiss-Wendt 2009). Although the borderland experienced systematic bombardments between 1941 and 1944, it remained relatively intact till spring 1944 when Narva was reduced to rubble by Soviet bombardments (which were later blamed on the Germans). Also smaller Ivangorod, at that time still an integral neighbourhood of Narva, was not spared by the war: its fortress and some of the churches were destroyed by German detonations (Weiss-Wendt 1997b, 59-60).

On the place of old Narva, which was once famous for its baroque architecture, a new town was built that differed radically in its architectural appearance and the composition of its population (Brüggemann 2004). Only 8% of the pre-war living space was left and initial plans to rebuild them the ruins of the Old town were abandoned in the post-war years. Narva’s older population who had been evacuated by the Germans to the Western part of Estonia were for the most part not allowed to return. In the eyes of the Soviet rulers Narva had a strategic location and planned to build a uranium processing factory in the town which was the reason for the regulation of the post-war migration and the prohibition of the old Narvitiane to return to Narva (Vseviov cit in Brueggemann 2004, 83). The old population who had in many cases supported the Nazi regime against the background of experiences with the Soviet rulers were regarded suspiciously by the Soviet rulers. Sentiments against Narva’s older population were reflected in the local newspaper coverage of that time. As the newspaper Narva Worker declared:

> It is known that until 1940 in Narva alongside thousands of honourable workers lived a considerable number of white guardsmen, spies and exploiters that Soviet Narva does not want to see here. And (it does not want) to allocate the housing space and other benefits to the inhabitants of Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov and other honest Soviet patriots who carried all the burden of the war, all deprivations and hardships only after the appetite of the so-called ‘old’ Narvitiane has been satisfied (Narvskii Rabochii, 25 April 1950).

Moving back to Narva was thus difficult for Narva’s former population – and not seen by all as desirable: after the war their houses were destroyed and the town was dominated by Russian-speaking workers from all over the Soviet Union. Those who did manage to outwit the regime or simply waited long enough for the restrictions to
pass, moved back into a place that had ceased to resemble the place they had known it before in any significant detail.

Due to the displacement of the old population, the reconstruction of Narva and Ivango rood was mainly undertaken by newcomers from Russia and other parts of the Soviet Union (which will subsequently be summarised under the category of ‘Russian-speakers’). Furthermore, in the early post-war years prisoners of war amounted for large numbers of the work force (Mertelsmann 2004, 110). Like many other towns and cities throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the borderland around the Narova river resembled a huge construction site in the immediate post-war years. Together with 32 other cities, Narva was designated a town of ‘republican significance’ whose reconstruction had special priority after the war and was placed under the direct supervision of the ESSR Council of Ministers (Brueggemann 2004, 83). Particular significance was placed on the reconstruction of the industries. The Krenholm factory was first to be put on stream, and was followed by the construction of new factories and power stations in the borderland. Narva hydro station, which was finished in 1957, was the main driver of the reconstruction on the eastern shore of the Narova, in Ivango rood. In the 1960s and 70s two power stations were built in close proximity to the city alongside with other factories for furniture, construction materials and concrete.\(^3\)

The newly constructed towns were inscribed with new meanings reflecting the Soviet ideology: in their architectural style they were made to match the imagination of socialist cities; streets were renamed (for example from Vestervalli to Stalin and Kommunaari street from Hermann street to Leningrad shossee, Weiss-Wendt 1997b, 67), monuments to Lenin were erected, new holidays and parades introduced and history was rewritten to highlight the socialist history of people and place (cf. Kaiser and Nikiforova 2008 for a more detailed description). The earlier history – particularly the times of Estonian independence and Swedish rule – was silenced. In the first post-war years the reconstruction of Narva’s old town centre did not have any priority. The ruins of old Narva that effectively could have been restored were

\(^3\) Particularly the power stations brought male workers to the town whose previous employment structure was dominated by female sewers at the reconstructed and extended Krenholm manufacturing plant.
removed after long discussions over their fate in the late 1950s. Only few buildings like the Old town hall, a couple of houses alongside with the two fortresses remained as signs of earlier life in the borderland. The remnants of Old Narva had to make place for new buildings (Weiss-Wendt 1997b, Brueggemann 2004). \(^4\)

The borderland was rebuilt according to the imagination of a socialist city, sovgorod: uniform housing estates were erected and replaced the first provisional mass accommodations that were built for construction workers. However the first years of reconstruction were shaped by difficult, if not miserable conditions: there was a constant lack of housing for the workers who came to Narva. Even ten years after the war, every inhabitant only had 5.3 square meters at his or her disposal (Konchenovskii 1991, 227) and also later people often had to wait for several years until they received a flat on their own. Despite the problems that shaped life in the post-war borderland, the lack in living space, shortages in construction materials as well as a lack of hygiene and social problems like illnesses and alcoholism, Narva, and to a lesser degree its twin town Ivangorod, grew constantly.

\textit{Table 2.1 Rise in population in Narva (Narva Department for Development and Economy 2013, 7)}

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants (in thousands)</td>
<td>22,4</td>
<td>30,4</td>
<td>57,9</td>
<td>73,5</td>
<td>82,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After their annexation to the Soviet Union in 1944, the Baltic countries in general experienced a massive influx of migrants. In the first three years after its incorporation into the Soviet Union, about 180,000 immigrants arrived in Estonia (Kolstoe 1995).

\(^4\) Brueggemann names the high costs and different priorities of post-war reconstruction rather than ideology like the attempt to destroy the ‘bourgeois heritage’ as in other places as reasons (Brueggemann 2004).
The newcomers of the Soviet time were supposed to provide labour force for the industrialization and to replace the great losses in the native population resulting from the Stalinist terror and the waves of deportations. While the influx of Russian-speakers is often seen as a direct result of a Russification campaign by the Soviet state, newer research points out that there were regulations and quotas for migration to the Baltic region in place. As structural conditions like unattractive living and working conditions made the region unpopular among Estonians it was difficult to find enough local work force to reconstruct and strengthen the industrial development in Estonia’s north-eastern region in which also Narva was located (Mertelsmann 2004, 2006). The ethnic composition and culture of Estonia’s north-eastern borderland was thus shaped by the destruction of Old Narva in World War II, the settlement restrictions for the previous inhabitants as well as the difficult structural conditions in the early post-war years; these factors made Narva relatively homogeneous in comparison to other Estonian cities where the population was mixed. Even those few Russian settlers, who did learn some Estonian, usually forgot it quickly. Russian was not only the lingua franca between the nationalities, but also with some exceptions the only language that was – and still is – widely spoken.

During the Soviet period, like in the present, ethnic Estonians amounted to only 4-5% of Narva’s population.

Table 2.2 Ethnic composition of Narva in 2012 (Narva Department for Development and Economy 2013, 8-9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Estonians</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Belarusians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>82.45%</td>
<td>3.78%</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>2.08%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike in the Estonian cities of Tallinn and Tartu where ethnically segregated neighbourhoods for Estonians emerged, in Narva the Estonians due to their small numbers were in constant interaction with the Russian-speaking settlers: they were integrated in the town community in the workplace and in leisure spaces – however experiences of repressions and deportations, everyday discriminations as well as attacks on symbols of Estonianness (like the Estonian gymnasium and a monument
to the independence war) showed resentments and interethnic tensions that existed beyond the Soviet dictum of ‘internationalism’ and the ‘friendship between peoples’. Together with the memories of times of independence, such experiences divided the Estonians from the Russian-speaking settlers.

The Russian-speakers who settled in Narva in many regards represented typical Soviet men and women, workers that tended to identify with the Soviet state rather than with a distinct republic. Ethnic Russians living in Soviet republics enjoyed certain privileges like Russian-language schools, cultural facilities and access to desirable work-places without the need to learn the Estonian language. Although Russia was not identical with the Soviet Union, Russians were inclined to develop a strong affiliation to the state and saw no reason for the formation of an own ethnic identity. According to Vujacic, “in multinational contexts, ‘dominant nations’ have no reason to develop a particularist political nationalism of their own” (Vujacic 1996, 774) – thus, Russians could be considered to be more Soviet than any other nation (on the ambivalent role of Russians in the USSR, cf. Slezkine 1994). The Russian-speaking migration together with the borderland’s economic, political and symbolic integration in the USSR contributed to establishing Narva and Ivangoord as essentially Soviet places – a legacy that is widely felt today.

However to understand the position of the borderland within the political geography of that time it is important to consider that it was part of the Baltic region and within the Soviet Union was considered as particularly ‘western’ due to its high economic standards, literacy rates and German and Scandinavian cultural influences (on the Russian perception of Balts cf. Brueggemann and Woodworth 2012, Brueggemann 2007). Although for Estonians the period of Soviet rule was merely perceived as a Russification/Sovietification, Russian-speakers settling in the region felt its distinct character. Even in the 1950s when Narva still was considered to be the ‘least developed town’ in the Estonian SSR, the living standard was, in comparison to the destruction in other places of the Soviet Union, significantly better. Particularly in the subsequent years the supply situation improved and even people from Leningrad came to the borderland to buy special products. Also culturally many came to associate themselves with the Baltic region – even though this did not mean linguistic assimilation. According to David Laitin “the Russians in the Baltic states
made greater efforts to adapt to local culture than they made in other republics” (Laitin 1998, 71).

The differences between the westernised Baltic borderland and the rest of the Soviet Union were also reproduced and institutionalised within the borderland itself. After the war, the border between the Estonian SSR and the Russian SFSR was shifted by Stalin in favour of the Russian Federation back to the Narova river. Ivangoord was formally divided from Narva, integrated into the Leningrad region and the Russian SFSR. In the south the entire area beyond Petseri was attributed to Russia, reducing Estonian territory by 4.3% (Pettai 2007). The border shift that initially did not seem significant had important consequences in the future, for the new border between the two republics laid the foundation for what would become the future state border between Russia and Estonia – and led to a conflict over Estonia’s lost territories in the east that were guaranteed by the Tartu Peace Treaty. Unlike the Union’s external borders that functioned as ‘institutions of isolation’ (Chandler 1998), the internal borders of the USSR were soft and did not hinder mobility – they formed administrative boundaries between Soviet citizens whom the regime considered to be politically unified under socialism.

Despite initial local complaints about the division of Narva and Ivangoord, the border did not hinder the towns from effectively forming an integrated settlement – over the years the two towns developed a common labour market, public transport system, infrastructural facilities as well as a unified water supply and canalisation. The sense of a shared space was constitutive of everyday life – people lived on one side and worked on the other, visited friends and relatives across the border, attended

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5 Estonian SSR (ESSR) stands for Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic; Russian SFSR (RSFSR) stands for Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
6 In formal terms, the transfer took place on the basis of decrees “passed” by the Estonian and Russian Supreme Soviet Presidiums (Pettai 2007, 417).
7 There were however certain quotas for settlement and internal passports in place to regulate migration in the Soviet Union. In post-war Estonia quotas for the settlement of Russians were introduced although not always put into practice (cf. Mertelsmann 2006).
8 The local executive committee wrote several letters to higher ranking authorities arguing for the reuniting of the two cities arguing that the division was disturbing the reconstruction process. Narva Linnaarhiiv. Opis n 1. Protokol zasedanii ispolkoma, 19.4.1950.
cultural events and buried their loved ones on the other side. This integrated life across the border is reflected in photographs of that time showing the road between Narva and Ivangoord with people freely walking from one side to the other. For an outsider who has not experienced Narva and Ivangoord without a border, photographs of this time look unfamiliar: the same road is lined with fences and barriers block people’s free passage.

Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 To the left: view from Narva to Ivangoord. To the right: view from Ivangoord to Narva (with the Herman tower in the background). Photograph by Aleksei Alekseevich Rumiancev, date unknown.

Despite the practical integration, the border between the ESSR and the RSFSR running between Narva and Ivangoord was not meaningless on the local level. The understanding of Narva as an ‘Estonian’ and Ivangoord as a ‘Russian’ town was institutionalized at the administrative level and perpetuated in the official discourse, symbols and local newspapers. Although in comparison to other localities Estonian

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9 According to Rogers Brubaker (1994) two modes of institutionalising nationality existed in the Soviet Union: territorial institutionalisation of nationality on the sub-state level (on the top of the hierarchy were the Union Republics with their titular nations, i.e. the Estonian SSR) on one hand, and the ethnocultural classification of persons according to exclusive national groups (i.e. the Estonian
language and other symbols of Estonianness were of minor significance in Narva, the level of the republic did matter in administrative terms as well as on the level of cultural representations. Signs in Narva were bilingual regardless of the fact that post-war Narva had developed into a Russian-speaking town and almost nobody understood Estonian. In official accounts, framing Narva as an Estonian town could even turn the relations between Narva and neighbouring Ivangoord, both Russian-dominated, into a "true embodiment of the friendship of the Soviet peoples" (Kann 1979, 264). Furthermore, there were differences between Narva and Ivangoord at a symbolic level. It was considered to be more prestigious to live in Narva, which had always been bigger and had, unlike Ivangoord, enjoyed special attention in the process of post-war reconstruction. Within the shared space of the twin towns Ivangoord remained the smaller and less developed brother and these differences in size and range of activities were often interpreted as differences between republics or civilisations, reproducing symbolic boundaries that existed on a larger scale between the western edge of the Soviet Union and other republics at the local level.

2.4 “Our border is the border of European values”: Rebordering Estonia, returning to the West after the fall of socialism

On 20 August 1991 Estonia declared her independence, predated by a mass movement which has become known as the Singing Revolution. The movement for national independence that had gained momentum during the perestroika could seize the August coup in Moscow directed against Gorbachev’s reforms as an opportunity to establish the impossibility to negotiate with the Soviet Union and to declare Estonia independent. Initially Soviet troops made a modest show of force; they

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10 Tannberg, for example, states that after Stalin’s death, Soviet inspectors who came to Narva criticized that too little attention was paid to Estonian national specificities and that the local party committee did use Estonian language in their political work (Tannberg 2007).
closed the port and occupied the television and radio tower in Tallinn but left two days later. On 24 August 1991 Yeltsin’s Russia recognized Estonia’s independence after the failed coup and established diplomatic relations two months later (Raun 2001, 243-245). The Soviet Union formally dissolved in December, and Russia became independent. The restoration of Estonian independent statehood after more than five decades of Soviet rule marked a break in the history of the borderland and created new international borders between what had formerly been the largely unmarked borders of Soviet republics. It was accompanied by a nationalisation of the territory and the inscription of new meanings in the borderland but also resulted in conflicts between the states and internal divisions between ethnic groups – particularly the status of Russian-speakers who got stranded on the Estonian side of the border changed radically.

The first border controls between Narva and Ivangorod were introduced only six days after Estonia’s declaration of independence; controls of goods at the border had already been conducted earlier. In the following years, the border between the ESSR and the RSFRS on the Narova river that could easily been crossed in the past successively became a line of separation that marked distinct territories, and while it did not completely disrupt economic and social connections, over time they became much harder to sustain. The hardening of the border regime expressed itself in a number of changes: the construction and extension of border fortifications like barriers, fences with barbed wire and custom control buildings, and the establishment of technologies of surveillance and control. The materialisation of the border changed the public space – some houses were removed and streets blocked to make place for the customs control building; on the Russian side watchtowers were erected along the river, and the presence of border patrols became a common sight in the border space. Furthermore, the changing documentary regimes – from a simplified border crossing system for locals from 1992 to 2000 to a full visa system – significantly impacted the relations between Narva and Ivangorod and its people. In 1992 Estonia established a visa regime with Russia but first introduced a propusk system for locals with relatives on the other side to mitigate some of the negative consequences. This simplified regime was finally abolished because of Estonia’s approaching EU membership (on the local discussions and interpretations of the
mobility regulation cf. Chapter 9). While previously it had not mattered much on which side one lived, with the nationalisation of the borderland it thus became consequential whether one was registered in Narva or Ivangoord: commuting over the Narova river became more difficult; people had to give up their jobs and sell their dachas or resettle on the other side. For many people it was a painful process to be separated from friends and family members who lived on the other side of the river. The division also had consequences for shared infrastructure that had been developed for the two towns. The public transportation system and the telephone network ceased to exist, and the system of water supply and canalisation that was based in Narva became the object of a conflict in the late 1990s when Ivangoord was not able to pay the rising water bills from Estonia which were three times higher than in the Leningrad oblast and caused several disruptions in the water supply (cf. Jauhiainen and Pikner 2009).

This history of division and the different meanings that have been inscribed in the border space after Estonia's declaration of independence have to be understood in the context of Estonia's geopolitical reorientation since the 1990s and contentious relations between Russia and Estonia resulting from it. After the restoration of its independence, Estonia has marked a break with the Soviet past and stressed its difference to Russia presenting the border as a line between two civilizations – the East and the West. As Estonia’s late president Lennart Meri stated in a speech on Estonia’s Independence Day in February 1993: “It is precisely in the name of European values that Estonia needs a secure border… Our border is the border of European values” (quoted in G. Smith et al 1998, 102). The border with Russia should be made as firm as possible, at the same time the borders with other EU member states became more permeable.

The geopolitical ‘return to Europe’ and the Western world has also been expressed by a distancing from the communist past. While also other former Soviet republics and states of the Eastern chose to distance themselves from the socialist past and Russia, the break with the past and geopolitical reorientation has been particularly pronounced in the Baltic states where the 50 years of Soviet rule were declared as an ‘illegal occupation’. In contrast to other post-Soviet states, Estonia could look back at a history of independence that was presented in the living memory of many of its
population. Declaring its independence, the focus for Estonia lay on the \textit{restoration} of statehood and the return to the pre-war republic. Establishing continuity with the pre-war past should mitigate the negative influences of the Soviet period, protect and strengthen the Estonian nation and reintegrate Estonia into the West\footnote{According to Brubaker’s definition, in nationalizing states, the core nation conceives itself as different from national minorities and has a sense of ownership of the state, which it wants to protect from “alien” influences. To advance the development of the state, the core nation engages in a project of nationalization including the promotion of culture, bio-politics, and economic flourishing according to its own interests. The sense of ‘ownership’ of the Republic already emerged during Soviet time as a result of the Soviet nationality policies, which provided ethnocultural nations with their own political territories. However, because of constraints in the political right of self-determination and the domination of the party, the titulars actually lacked in power to govern the Republic on their own (Brubaker 1994, 55-59, Brubaker 1996).} (for an overview on the politics of nationalizing Estonia and ‘restorationism’ cf. Pettai 2007; Budryte 2005, 65-101; Smith et al 1998; for the implications for the Russian-speaking population cf. Laitin 1998, 83-104). Nationalisation had both internal and external dimensions: alongside with its geopolitical reorientation towards Europe, the status of the Russian-speaking population who were seen as part of the Soviet legacy, changed dramatically. In Estonia, the migration of Russian-speakers from other Soviet Republics, who by the late 1980s made up for almost one third of Estonia’s population caused a fear of denationalization and of losing one’s language. It was seen as threatening the stability if not territorial integrity of the nation-state (Smith 1998, 96). Although about 30% of them had expressed their support of Estonian independence, Russian-speaking settlers and their descendants were excluded from the national community. According to the citizenship laws adopted in Estonia, they were not granted automatic citizenship in the newly restored state but first had to undergo naturalisation by demonstrating language skills and knowledge of the constitution as well as proving residence in the country (first for 2, later for 5 years). The citizenship laws have later been amended under the pressure of the European Commission, but despite the legal changes in integration policies before Estonia joined the EU, they still promoted an Estonian cultural domain with the Estonian language as the tool to unite the society (Feldman 2006).
Russia in contrast followed a very different political route. Unlike Estonia, Russia could not detach itself from the Soviet past or the imperial history – it did not have a history of national independence and a national identity founded in a period other than the imperial past. Defining itself as a successor state of the SU, Russia saw itself as a guarantor of security and stability in the region. It wanted to protect its status as a geopolitical power, as well as the positive memory of the Soviet past and the victory in World War II. For Russia, Estonia’s nationalisation and Europeanisation created a feeling of offence. The dominant view in Russia is that Estonia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union was not an occupation but a legitimate expansion, and that Estonia actually had profited from Soviet post-war restoration and gained its better socioeconomic position within the USSR as a result of Soviet investments (Viktorova 2006). Furthermore, Estonia’s NATO accession and EU integration has contributed to a further polarisation between the two states as Russia feared both as intervening in its sphere of influence. According to a political scientist,

both public and political discourses in Russia indicate immense difficulties in coming to terms with the fact that a country of such insignificant size and standing as Estonia can even begin to formulate an independent foreign policy of its own that is divergent from, and sometimes in direct opposition to, Russia’s interests (Viktorova 2006, 7).

The antagonistic identities and the securitisation of the relations between Russia and Estonia have expressed themselves in a number of contentious political issues, for example, the removal of Russian troops from Estonian territory, Estonia’s membership in the EU and NATO, the treatment of the Russian-speaking minorities and the location of the border itself. Estonia had demanded the return of the lands lost under Soviet rule through Stalin’s border shift to Estonian territory, so re-establishing the territory according to the Tartu peace treaty. Although these lands weren’t actually populated by Estonians anymore, they were framed as lost Estonian territories. Such territorial claims were also expressed in post-independence maps that depicted the pre-war borders and only acknowledged the new reality by indicating the site of the effective border with a narrow line (Berg 2003, 110). Russia on the other hand argued that the previous borders were rendered absolute by

Although the conflict over the border agreement has been mainly negotiated between Tallinn and Moscow and has recently seen a new rapprochement, the bordering processes between Russia and Estonia have been also articulated in the inscription (and contestation) of new local meanings in the borderland. The local bordering processes reflected the diverging national trajectories characterised above but also encountered local resistances, particularly in Russian-speaking Narva.

For Narva and Ivangoord the fall of socialism meant a change in their geopolitical position from an industrial centre in the western borderland of the Soviet Union to isolation at the national peripheries. While in the past during the times of contact and trade, location used to be Narva’s and Ivangoord’s greatest assets, today it has been turned into an obstacle as both towns have difficulties in making use of their position at the EU’s external border. The peripheralisation was significantly shaped by the process of deindustrialisation: the large industrial enterprises that had been dependent on the Soviet market of supply and demand were sold and many of them closed creating high numbers of unemployment and feelings of uncertainty among the population. The closure of the state-sponsored factories dependent on Soviet supply and demand markets have made the North-Eastern region of Estonia the one with the worst socioeconomic indicators and resulted in high unemployment. Narva that once attracted migrants from different parts of the SU lost large parts of its population (from 82,000 inhabitants in 1990 to currently 64,000). The difficult situation that Narva found itself at the beginning of the 1990s was also due to the fact that the city which had formed as a predominantly Russian-speaking area felt the effects of the nationalisation policies particularly intensely.

12 The territorial claims were dropped already in the mid-1990s but it is mainly the tensions over the framing of the treaty and divergent interpretations of the past that have come into the way of a settlement. The 2005 negotiations saw a significant rapprochement but stopped when members of the Estonian parliament insisted to add a preamble with a reference to the Tartu peace treaty to the bill and Russia revoked its signature. Russia not only declines to cede any territory to Estonia but also refuses any reference to the Tartu Peace treaty in the border agreement – something crucial for Estonia – as it fears that it may become a precedent for territorial claims of other neighbouring states.
In the late 1980s, early 1990s Narva with its largely Soviet-minded population of industrial workers formed as one of the key sites of resistance to Estonian independence and defended Soviet power. While some of Narva's Russian-speaking population had supported the Estonian endeavours for independence together with the remaining members of old Narva, the majority were against it. Already in 1989, tensions between Tallinn and Narva started as Narva together with neighbouring towns and villages demanded an autonomous status for the region within Estonia that would bind it closer to Soviet Russia. The tensions culminated in the Narva referendum crisis in summer 1993 when the Narva city council, together with neighbouring Sillamäe, decided to hold a referendum about territorial autonomy and caused fears about an Estonian Transnistria, a separatist region of Moldova that until the present is under strong Russian influence including military presence (for a good overview of the ‘Narva Crisis’, cf. Smith 2002). Already before its start the referendum was declared illegal and only about half of the population participated in the vote – with 97 per cent voting in favour of the autonomy proposal. According to a more recent analysis, the referendum crisis was not so much a secessionist attempt but was to make use the political situation to put the Estonian government under pressure to amend its policies towards the Russian-speaking population (Smith 2002, 97).

Narva thus fits uneasily in the national project of Estonianisation. Due to the autonomist movement in the early 1990s and the fear that “local inhabitants might look eastwards towards Moscow rather than westwards towards Tallinn” (Burch and Smith 2007, 920), Narva is till the present day seen to embody, at least potentially, a security threat for the nation-state. In the eyes of most Estonians Narva is considered to be “not quite Estonian” and remains a symbol of the loss and destruction brought by the Soviet occupation. Within political debates the integration of Narva into Estonian and European space has been an explicit aim since independence. Since the early

13 Several autonomy proposals were made demanding: full autonomy in the spheres of taxation, culture, education, healthcare, social provision and electoral law; local authority ownership of social and productive infrastructure; a visa and tariff-free regime at the state border; special consultative voting rights in the Estonian parliament. As a basis for their demands, local leaders frequently invoked the spectre of possible inter-ethnic violence (Smith 2002, 95).

14 On a seminar on urban development in September 2011, for example, which took place on 7 Oct 2011, the Estonian minister of regional development Siim Valmar Kiisler repeated the need for Narva
1990s, Estonian cultural elites together with Narva's old population have initiated attempts at inscribing new meanings in the border space by erecting new monuments, organizing new commemorative activities and publishing historical literature with a focus on the memory of Old Narva and the pre-war history. Monuments to victims of repressions and old Narva have been erected as well as the 'Swedish Lion', commemorating the 1700 Battle of Narva; Narva’s monument to Lenin was relocated from the central square to a corner of the Narva fortress. Memory initiatives at the local level thus fit within the general national aim to re-establish continuity with the past and to stress 'return to Europe' and a European heritage. These memory politics have at least symbolically empowered the old Narvitiane in relation to the Russian-speaking populations and provided recognition of their memories of the Old town and the suffering that many of them had experienced under state socialism, although it of course has not changed the fact that the former remain a minority within Narva. The “Old Narva” is often idealised as the authentic Narva and the Soviet architecture and the Russian-speaking population dismissed as alien\(^{15}\) (on some of these monuments and activities cf. Kaiser and Nikiforova 2008, Burch and Smith 2007, Brednikova 2007).

While these attempts at nationalising Narva are only partly successful, the city in general significantly calmed down and a differentiation of the population and accommodation to the changes has taken place – not least because of the coming of age of a new generation who can make use of the opening borders to Europe. While the majority of Narva’s population were not granted automatic citizenship in the 1990s, the number of people who have passed the citizenship tests have significantly increased over the years: in 2012, 46.7% of Narva’s population had Estonian citizenship, 36.3% had a Russian passport, and 15.7% remained stateless (but had legal residency in Estonia) (cf. Narva Department for Development and Economy 2013, 9). Particularly among younger people the percentage of Estonian citizens is high. The

to become a ‘normal European town’ and to strengthen its integration into Estonia rather than looking eastwards towards Russia (fieldnotes 7 Sept 2011).

\(^{15}\) However, in comparison to other places with a multiply determined history, local politics of memory take place on a relatively small scale and have not really ‘heated up’. Actors who are seriously interested in local history are few, the exhibition on the city's history stops in early 1900 and unlike Tallinn and Tartu, Narva still misses a book on local history of Narva.
large number of Russian citizens and people with an undetermined citizenship status in comparison to nation-wide statistics is due to the fact that it allows people to cross the border easily without having to apply for a visa. Thus, pragmatic rather than ideological reasons often affect the choice of citizenship.

Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 New monuments in Narva and Ivangoord. To the left: the Swedish Lion (with the Narva Castle in the background), erected in 2000. To the right: the monument to the fallen soldiers in Ivangoord, erected in 2011.

Ivangoord was also turned into a periphery by the political changes happening since the 1990s. Unable to benefit from the proximity of larger Narva to the same extent as before, Ivangoord acquired a provincial status that was reinforced by the town’s integration in a 5 km border zone that was erected around Russia's new borders to protect the new edges of the state. While Narva is seen to negatively stand out within Estonia, Ivangoord has become a town like many others within Russia, shaped by problems that are characteristic of life in the Russian provinces – bad streets, lack of investments, and poor entertainment facilities. Particularly the loss of regional autonomy in 2007 when Ivangoord was put under the administration of the larger town of Kingisepp, meant a significant cut in the local budget. Although the means
for symbolic investments and city branding have been very limited, Ivangoord on the level of symbolic politics has been reinvented as a Russian outpost with an emphasis on military history. Iconically, Ivangoord fortress, Ivangoord's main tourist site, has been used to promote the image of a town safeguarding Russia’s western border and defending the state (Brednikova 2007, 61-63). Ivangoord’s role as a Russian outpost is also stressed in local initiatives like the 'Young Friends of the Border Guard' (described in Chapter 9) that should establish contacts between the border guards and young people and promote patriotism. During the time of my fieldwork in December 2011, the most recent monument was erected to commemorate the veterans of the Afghanistan war and other soldiers-‘internationalists’ fighting in Russia’s recent wars like the ones in Chechnya. Alongside this stress on war heroism, emphasised in the opening ceremony, local politics of memory have mobilised interpretations of the past that are opposed to the ones in Narva – reflecting the competing identity projects and historical memories on a national level. In contrast to Narva, where at the level of local memory politics positive accounts of the socialist past have been pushed back in favour of the European heritage and memory of repression, in Ivangoord World War II continues to be remembered as glorious victory and liberation of Europe by the Red Army. Recently a monument has been erected to commemorate the Estonians fighting on the side of the Red Army as well as to fallen Russian soldiers who fought against Sweden in the Battle of Narva.

2.5 Conclusion

The chapter has presented the influence of different regional powers in the borderland, the shifting position of Narva and Ivangoord within Europe’s political geography and their relation towards each other. These different historical periods are constitutive of different memory layers that continue to shape the borderland today and inform the claims of its inhabitants over belonging, Europeanness and Russianness, inclusion and exclusion. As borders have been redrawn and Estonia has been integrated into Europe, no consensus over the past has been reached. On the contrary, the recent past has been shaped by conflicts over memory in which different interpretations of the past are mobilised – as it is expressed in the monuments recently erected in the borderland.
Particularly World War II and the subsequent Sovietisation changed the physical outlook of Narva and ethnic composition of its population; it is the interpretation of this period that is most contested. From an Estonian perspective, this time marks the erasure of the Swedish heritage and multi-ethnic and German- and Estonian-influenced local culture, the illegal occupation and the Sovietisation of Estonia. From a Russian perspective the Soviet period was a legitimate extension and furthermore did not make the borderland completely Russian / Soviet. In Russian eyes, the Baltic region constitutes ‘our west’ (nash zapad), an integral though different part of its territory. In the empirical part of the thesis I will analyse in more detail how different groups living in the borderland remember and make place in the borderland, patterns of symbolic investments drawing upon differing pasts.
Chapter 3 The politics of temporal and spatial orderings: Connecting memory studies and border studies

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses theoretical developments in the relatively new fields of border studies and memory studies and introduces conceptual tools that can help us think about bordering processes in space and in and over time. How are borders created, sustained and how do they change? What role does memory play in these processes – does it undermine borders or, to the contrary, contribute to their creation? What is the relation between past and present, continuity and change in the making of a border? These questions guide the chapter and set the course for the presentation of the empirical material later on. One of the main aims of the thesis is to bring the study of memory and borders together. This chapter offers some suggestions of how this could be done.

The first section of the chapter will review existing literature in both fields. It argues that the relation between borders and memories has not received the necessary attention and that existing studies combining the two concepts often lack theoretical sophistication and demonstrate shortcomings that could be avoided when engaging more fully with the literature in both fields. Furthermore, it introduces the approach adopted in the thesis and discusses its benefits: considering memory and temporal (re)orderings as key dimensions of border-making allows us to take into account the historical depth of bordering processes and to achieve a more balanced conceptualisation of continuity and discontinuity in borders. Moreover, a combined perspective can contribute to the study of memory in that it allows us to better understand the making of place and borders through memory. It goes beyond widespread assumptions of either stability or fluidity in place memory by considering the (mnemonic) processes through which borders are made and unmade.

In the remaining two sections, I will look at the processes of ordering time and space in more detail and outline how they are conceptualised in the thesis. I will discuss some of the key concerns in border studies and memory studies that are particularly
relevant in this context and introduce the concepts of the politics of spatial and temporal orderings as key dimensions of border making which will be used to organise the empirical parts of the thesis. Speaking of the politics of temporal and spatial orderings allows us to think about memory and border-making as ongoing processes rather than as fixed objects, and to capture the dynamic nature of border change, processes of reconfiguring spatial and temporal orders as well as contestations over them. In the discussion of existing theoretical perspectives, the chapter focuses in particular on the relation between past and present and the question of the malleability of the past as part of temporal orderings as well as issues of inclusions and exclusions, mobilities and enclosures as part of spatial orderings. It shows how they can be used to reach a better understanding of the temporal orders of borders and the spatial orders of memory.

3.2 Linking border studies and memory studies: temporalizing borders, bordering memory

Border studies and memory studies have developed as two new research fields in the past three decades. They have brought together researchers from different disciplines such as sociology, geography, history and anthropology, and especially in recent years have seen first stages of institutionalisation developed, as for example in the establishment of research networks and centres as well as in the publication of special issues, academic journals and research companions aiming at creating a canon or giving an integrative overview of its latest stage (cf. for border studies, Wilson and Donnan 2012a, Wastl-Walter 2011, and for memory studies, Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy 2011, Erll, Nuennning and Young 2008). Although some of their interests overlap (as for example, in cultural identities, nationalism and globalisation), the two fields have developed their agendas largely separately from each other.

In the following pages I will discuss how the link between borders and memory has been addressed in existing work in the two fields and outline some of the shortcomings in previous studies. Secondly, I will show how my approach differs from them, by engaging to a greater extent with existing literature in the two fields.
Finally I will sketch out the benefits of a stronger linkage for the study of borders and memory and how it would contribute to the development of the fields.

Being interested in the construction of territorial borders, border studies have focused on discourses and practices which constitute difference in space. Earlier studies were concerned with geographical descriptions of state borders, their natural features and morphology, and typologies of borders were developed. In the 1980s and 1990s border studies have gone through a ‘cultural turn’ and have become interested in the construction of identity and difference, inclusion and exclusion in space – something that opened up the studies of borders to scholars in the social sciences (for discussions: Newman 2006, van Houtum, Zierhofer and Kramsch 2005). In the context of the fall of the Iron Curtain, discussions over globalisation and the rise of particularisms and security concerns in a world shaped by anxieties over terrorist attacks, immigration and the ongoing financial crisis, border studies developed as a heterogeneous field concerned with the changing nature of state territory, nations and belonging. Studies have closely examined the role of borders and border technologies in a globalised world and also have focused on the relation between social and spatial boundaries and pointed to multiple and conflicting spatialities which are not necessary limited to the nation-state (Wilson and Donnan 2012b, Baud and van Schendel 1997, Sahlins 1989).

The focus on space has however led to a lack of attention to the temporal dimensions of making borders. Particularly in newer social-constructivist studies of borders, the focus on the spatial and social dimensions of borders hasn't been matched with equal attention to their temporal aspects. Privileging space over time, studies often present us with a ‘flat’ picture of bordering processes without taking into account the role of the past in shaping the border and ‘rooting’ territory historically. This has been noted by several scholars in the field who have criticised border studies for their lack of historical reflexivity and for focusing on the processes of inclusion and exclusion “within a 'timeless time' emptied of historical specificity” (Kramsch 2003, 70; cf. O’Dowd 2010, Wilson 2012). O’Dowd in particular has argued in a recent article that studies of borders should engage more with historical processes. Reviewing newer writings on borders, he criticises the “incapacity to recognise the 'past in the present', as in the various historical deposits of state-formation processes” (O'Dowd
2012, 1032). He argues that studies that focus on borders in Europe tend to overestimate the newness of these assumedly ‘post-national’ borders rather than considering the different layers of historical meaning that continue to shape them. Similarly, Thomas Wilson argues in a recent article that

…the consideration of space and groups of people in border studies must be tempered with a consideration of their histories. History and space intersect the framing, construction and practices of power and the politics of identity and culture in borderland (Wilson 2012, 80).

These arguments draw attention to the historical making of borders and are guided by the assumption that an awareness of the past provides us with a deeper understanding of borders and the dynamics of border change in the present. While O’Dowd makes the case for combining border studies with historical sociology inspired by the longue durée studies of Michael Mann and Charles Tilley, this study adopts a different approach by using memory as a way of exploring the past in the present. Considering the central role of memories in bordering processes, the study combines a border studies perspective with the rich literature on memory studies that has emerged over the past years. Rather than looking primarily at the historical formation of statehood over time, the focus of the thesis lies on the relation between past and present and the role of memory in the making of borders in the present. It assumes that memories of the past – memories of population replacements, competing ideologies, and past spatial orders – play an important part in meaning-making processes and continue to inform ways of constructing identities and evaluating the present. Past events and developments are from this perspective relevant not as objective historical occurrences but as (reconstructed) accounts of the past that act in and on the present and serve to legitimise or undermine borders. This includes acts of actively using the past and interpreting it to fit present demands and future expectations, as for example in the reinterpretation of the Narova River and the two fortresses as a civilizational fault line, outlined in the introduction to this thesis.

Also Sarah Green’s ‘tidemark’ approach is sensitive to historical processes of border formation as it is interested in both the continuities and discontinuities of making borders. It argues that borders are “constantly being reworked, while there are also (more or less) predictable regularities from one event that creates a mark to the next.” (Green 2011, 15)
While the role of memory in the making of borders has been highlighted by several studies on nationalism as well as ethnographic studies on borders, this has been done largely in piecemeal fashion. In most cases, existing studies attempting to link memory- and border-making have failed to offer a fully elaborated and integrated approach to memory and borders, and are typically marred by a somewhat limited understanding of memory. Paasi (1996), for example, provides a very good introduction to the role of national literature, monuments, the media and other institutionalised forms of memory in the making of borders. They play a central role in what he calls ‘spatial socialisation’, namely

…the process through which individual actors and collectivities are socialized as members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities and through which they more or less actively internalize collective territorial identities and shared traditions (Paasi 1996, 8; for a more detailed discussion cf. Paasi 1996, 54-61).

While these are valid points, Paasi’s approach lacks a more elaborated understanding of the dynamics of memory and its relation to the past, and specifically of the relationship between vernacular and public processes of memory formation – an issue addressed in the following chapter. Due to this, his analysis shifts between top-down and bottom-up perspectives, the invention of the past and its persistence in traditions, without attempting to mediate between them. The lack of a thorough conceptualisation of memory can also be observed in Meinhof et al.’s extensive bottom-up study of several inner-European borders. Meinhof states the significance of “disturbing memories of past conflict and violence” (Meinhof 2003, 781; cf. Meinhof 2002) for the construction of identity and difference in the present, but lacks a theoretical conceptualisation of memory. In her account ‘memory' most of all works as deep-seated historical experiences that continue to matter in the present and potentially counteract the attempts at constructing a united Europe. Similar to Meinhof, Daphne Berdahl (1999) observes in her ethnography on the East Germany border village of Kella that the border between East and West did not simply dissolve in the process of German reunification. Berdahl, however, provides a different explanation for this process: In contrast to Meinhof’s study, Berdahl focuses not so much on the persistence of the past in present-day thinking but on the reinvention of the past and its spatial order as a reaction to the changes. Being confronted with the discrediting of the socialist past, the local population of the border village resisted the changes by expressing nostalgia.
for the GDR. According to Berdahl, this nostalgia, as a reinvention of the socialist past, is used to draw a boundary between themselves and their neighbours. These studies thus make the case for considering ‘memory’ for the construction of borders but operate with very different understandings of it: In the first case memory is seen as a relic of the past that persists in the present, while in the second one it is considered as an invention of the present to articulate present concerns. As I will show in the next section, these tensions can be mediated by engaging more deeply with discussions in the field of memory study and particularly the discussion on the malleability of the past.

While the field of border studies thus operates with a relatively limited understanding of border’s temporal dimensions, the following paragraphs will address how the relation between borders and memory has been conceptualised in memory studies.

Regarding memory as a process of making sense of time, memory studies have shown the diverse usages and meanings of the past in contemporary life (Misztal 2003, Olick and Robbins 1998, Halbwachs 1992). Like border studies, memory studies is not a homogeneous field of study but has been characterised by a multiplicity of themes and perspectives. There are studies on phenomena related to memory on the level of autobiographical memory (Fivush and Haden 2003, Skultans 1998, Neisser 1994, Passerini 1987), on remembering in groups (Welzer et al. 2002, Middleton and Edwards 1990), on cultural memory and memory politics (Bodnar 1992, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Such works have sensitised us to the multiple temporalities of social life that exist and interact on different social levels. But also the spatial dimension of memory has been actively explored by researchers working in the field. In contrast to border studies that have not paid sufficient attention to time, memory studies have analysed memory’s spatial dimensions starting from early Greek considerations of aide-memoires to more recent discussions of memorial spaces (Dwyer and Alderman 2008, Till 2003, Charlesworth 1994), cities (Hirsch and Spitzer 2010, Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009) and mnemonic landscapes (Ingold 1993, Schama 1995 for two different perspectives, for a recent discussion: Schramm 2011). While early scholarship has assumed that memory is linked to places and requires localisation, it was especially Pierre Nora’s seminal project on sites of French national memory, ‘Les lieux de memoire’, that has proved influential.
for the conceptualisation of place memory. Lieux de mémoire are sites “where memory crystallizes and secretes itself” (1989, 7). They are opposed to another form of spatialised memory, the 'milieux de memoire'. In line with modernisation theories but with a distinctly nostalgic tone, Nora assumes that the lived memory milieus of the past have been replaced by artificial memory sites which are deliberately created by intellectuals:

*Lieux de mémoire* originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organise celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no longer occur naturally (Nora 1989, 12).

Nora's inventory of 'national memory' forms the foundation for many studies of memorials and national sites of memory which have since then emerged as the dominant way of spatialising memory (for example, Hackmann 2008, Till 2005, Francois and Schulze 2001 – although some of these works operate with a modified understanding of Nora’s concept; for an overview over some of the works cf. Hoelscher and Alderman 2004, 349-350). Although not explicitly referring to Nora, Connerton's conceptualisation of place memory in modernity is also clearly inspired by the work of the French historian (cf. Connerton 2009, 7-39).

Despite being hugely influential for the conceptualisation of the spatial character of memory, Nora's approach has not remained without criticisms – among others for the division between lived and artificial memory, the selection of sites, and the nostalgic tone of the study (for a comprehensive critique, cf. Legg 2005). One of the main criticisms which has been recently raised is that Nora, and the studies that have followed him, operate with a static concept of space which is equated with the container space of the nation-state and in which the respective memory sites (memorial, monument, etc.) operate as one node – something that is also reflected in studies of national memory cultures. Astrid Erll, for example, writes that under the influence of Nora's work memory studies have been primarily concerned with “specific memories of (allegedly stable and clearly demarcated) cultures – the most popular social unit being the nation-state, which was then swiftly seen as isomorphic with national culture and a national cultural memory” (Erll 2011, 6). Also Julia Creet in her introduction to an edited volume on migration and memory criticises the
assumption of stability associated with spatialised memory when she writes that “contemporary theories of memory have mostly considered memory in situ, and place itself as a stable, unchanging environment” (Creet 2011, 3).

While Erll and Creet together with an increasing number of scholars working in the field of memory studies see the solution to this problem in focusing on travelling or 'transcultural' memory which is detached from place, I argue that we have to pay greater attention to the role of memory in the production of place and borders as static. It is certainly important, as Erll and Creet argue, to consider memories reaching beyond the nation-state order. Yet by privileging travelling memory we risk losing sight of how processes of remembering can contribute both to the making and undermining of existing spatial orders. Rather than jumping from a conception of memory that considers places as natural and given to a fluid one, we should pay more attention to which concrete spatial orders processes of remembering contribute to or undermine, including the processes of using memory for the making and legitimisation of national borders. A conceptualisation that takes memory’s role in border-making seriously has to account for both stability and fluidity in place memory.

Existing studies of spatial forms of memory already provide us with some insights into these processes. While there is little work done on memory in relation to borders and borderlands, authors working on monuments (Dwyer and Alderman 2008, Charlesworth 1994), cities (Diener and Hagen 2013, Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009, Young and Light 2001) and regions (Bialasiewicz 2003, Said 2000) provide us with a rich literature on the relation between place and memory. These studies analyse attempts at fixing authoritative meanings of the past in place and also shed some light on the construction of spatial orders through memory. Studies of the nationalisation of memory after the fall of socialism, for example, show how spatial orders are reconstructed and space is nationalised through the erection of monuments, the renaming of streets and other changes in the cityscape, while at the same time old spatial frames are consciously removed or forgotten (Verdery 1999, Young and Light 2001). Furthermore studies show that these constructions of place are accompanied by ambiguities and can be counter-acted and contested by different actors. Ochman, for example, analyses how the memory of World War II in
contemporary Poland is mediated by the municipal level that “can either contest or validate a nationalizing version of the past endorsed by the state” (2009, 414). In his introduction to a special issue on Baltic memory places, Hackmann (2008) argues for the need to take a closer look at the relations between national and transnational levels in mnemonic sites in Eastern Europe.

These studies are different from Nora in that they analyse different formations and levels of space and – some more explicitly than others – give us insights in the construction of space through memory. In doing so, they make clear that memory is not only situated in space but contributes to its production. Furthermore, studies address the contestedness and resistances to dominant interpretations and spatial scales. Memory sites can acquire multiple meanings and become sites for competing claims of belonging and the “cultural struggle over territory, which necessarily involves overlapping memories, narratives, and physical structures” (Said 2000, 182). From such a perspective there is no uniform way of imagining and remembering place but rather a multiplicity of “intersecting place-making projects” (Gille and Ó Riain 2002, 278)

While much of the existing studies on place and memory have concentrated on monuments and cityscapes as the most obvious forms of spatialised memory, little research has yet been done on less obvious forms of spatialised memory, as for example the spatial orders of mnemonic narratives. Furthermore, existing studies have often focused on the role of elites – local and national – and their symbolic struggles, without taking into account ordinary people and their sense of place (cf. Pfoser 2013). This is a niche that this thesis seeks to address. Two exemplary studies come closest to how borders and memory is conceptualised in the thesis and deal both with the intersection of shifting political orders and processes of personal remembering after the fall of socialism. Hirsch and Spitzer’s sensitive study on the ‘afterlife of Czernowitz in Jewish memory’ (2010) is based on a journey Hirsch and Spitzer undertake with Hirsch’s parents when they return for the first time to the place they were forced to leave. It shows the multiple layers of memory of this city, the Habsburg heritage, the creation of a Jewish Ghetto during Romania’s alliance with Nazi Germany and its annexation by the Soviets. The memory of Czernowitz provides a good example of how certain meanings and time layers have become
inscribed in space while others have been erased, and can interact and create tensions with the spatial orders of personal memories. Moreover, Pamela Ballinger’s study (2003) *History in Exile* provides a rich picture of memory narratives in the borderland between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia in the context of shifting political borders in the early 1990s. Ballinger looks at the memory of two groups – the *esuli*, who left the Julian March for Trieste after World War II and the *rimasti*, those who stayed behind in socialist Yugoslavia as an Italian minority. Also here memory is enmeshed with spatial orders, the constructions of territorial belonging founded in the past and constructions of hybridity and purity. The two groups produce different accounts which render place meaningful: those who left construct the region as a pure Italian place which was illegitimately taken by the Slavs; those who stayed construct it as an essentially hybrid place. Both studies add vernacular perspectives to the study of shifting political contexts and discourses embedded in them.

As the discussion of the existing literature indicates, there have been relatively few attempts to combine the study of borders and memory, and existing studies have shown several shortcomings in the ways they conceptualised memories of borders and the borders of memories. The approach suggested in the thesis will engage more fully with the literature on border studies and memory studies. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the two fields in the following ways. It enriches the study of borders in that it: firstly, enables a better understanding of the role of the past in the making of borders and takes into account the historical depth in constructions of spatial orders. The past plays a crucial role in arguments about the organisation of space by founding borders in time and legitimising them as, for example, territorial claims, border conflicts and changes are often founded by memories. Adding temporal depth to the making of borders and thus 'temporalising' them allows us to add an additional layer to the study of inclusion and exclusion at borders. Secondly, my approach draws attention to the concrete ways in which the past is used to stabilise or undermine borders by examining empirically which past events and emplotment structures are used and how, and which ones are excluded or marginalised. Thirdly, it provides a more balanced conceptualisation of continuity and discontinuity. As I have shown, those studies that consider the role of memory at the border, usually tend to focus either on the invention of the past in processes of remembering or on
mnemonic inertia. Using a refined conceptual apparatus from the field of memory studies (explained below in more detail), we can think about how these tendencies can work at the same time and thus better understand processes of border change.

A combined perspective also contributes to the field of memory studies. Firstly, it enables a better understanding of the role of space in memory, and a more all-encompassing appreciation of different forms of spatial memory, not only those linked to monuments and remembrance sites but also those inherent in the spatial orders of mnemonic narratives. Secondly, it draws attention to the concrete ways in which space is ordered and borders are drawn in processes of remembering, looking at the construction of spatial difference and connections, exclusion and inclusion. Thirdly, it provides a more balanced understanding of the relative role of stability and fluidity of space in memory. In its conception of space memory studies has tended to focus on either stability or fluidity, reproducing some of the earlier ways of thinking about borders. Drawing upon the literature on borders and bordering processes allows us to go beyond binary assumptions of borders as static or permeable per se and instead analyse bordering processes in practice. Rather than seeking to 'de-localise' and 'de-border' memory, we should consider memory's role in both making and unmaking them.

Finally, my approach to borders and memory takes into account the different levels at which spatial and temporal orderings are made, and the interactions and contestations that occur between them. It is therefore able to account for multiple and potentially conflicting ways of remembering and border-making. This issue will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter.

The following sections will provide a discussion of key concerns in border studies and memory studies and outline how they inform the suggested approach.

3.3 Politics of temporal orderings: the temporal dimensions of border making

Borders acquire their legitimacy through historical narratives, shared stories of origin that are told to establish links between people and soil. To understand the temporal dimensions of border making, we therefore have to take a closer look at the workings
of memory. Drawing on existing literature in the field of memory studies, I will
discuss two aspects of memory that are particularly relevant to the understanding of
the temporal dimensions of border making: first, the role of narratives in processes of
remembering and different modalities of relating past and present, and second, the
question of how malleable the past is. I will then use these points to develop the
concept of ‘the politics of temporal orderings’, which, along with the concepts of ‘the
politics of spatial orderings’, constitutes the theoretical backbone of my analysis.

Memory is the central faculty of being in time. It involves an active process of
meaning making. We make sense of the past by putting it into meaningful relations
to the present and future and constructing and navigating temporal narratives.
Narratives and their capacity to order time play a central role in the organisation of
memory. Narratives organise diverse and often contradictory experiences in a
temporal and thematic order. Not all past events become equally relevant in the
process of remembering. To play a role in the present, past events must be selected;
some are highlighted while others left out and forgotten, creating a sense of

The temporal narratives through which we make sense of the world are typically
structured through different ways of organising time. In his book ‘Time Maps’
Eviatar Zerubavel (2003) provides us with a comprehensive overview of different
patterns of narrating the past and transforming seemingly incoherent events into a
meaningful narrative. He undertakes a 'structuralist mapping' of the formal features
of remembering and systematically discusses different shapes and structures of
historical narratives: among others, progress and decline or zigzag narratives;
narrative density ('marked' and 'unmarked' time), the construction of continuity and
discontinuity. The past can be remembered in terms of continuity with the present, as
in narratives of descent or in terms of a break when the past is marked to indicate a
watershed and a ‘new beginning’. Such positive or negative ways of relating the past
to the present – either by means of emphasising continuity or rupture – play an
important part in legitimising or contesting of a present social order and the
construction of belonging. For example, marking a break with the communist past
and a return to the pre-communist times has been a crucial way of ordering time after
the fall of socialism and has helped to enforce new identities and to legitimise the new political order (Lagerspetz 1999, Verdery 1999).

Zerubavel is mainly interested in identifying different structural patterns for organising the past and the models that he discusses are necessarily schematic in their presentation, as he does not analyse how they are actually produced and negotiated in practice. The book nevertheless is indicative of the diverse ways of ordering time among individuals and collectives and shows us, like other publications in the field, that the past enters the present not as an exact reflection of what happened but as a reconstruction that is shaped by social frameworks and cultural conventions. The different shapes of narratives and ways of ordering time play a crucial role in the construction of collective and individual identities. Narratives provide groups not only with a story of origin (where do we come from?) but also help to construct an identity in the present. As Somers argues, locating oneself or being located in a narrative about the past is central to the construction and transformation of identities (Somers 1994). This has been particularly explored in relation to the construction of national identities (Mihelj 2009, Bell 2003, Smith 1999). The construction and evocation of links between past, present and future are central to nationalist story-telling, for example by telling a story that glorifies the nation and constructs belonging in soil. As Bell notes

to mould a national identity – a sense of unity with others belonging to the same nation – it is necessary to have an understanding of oneself as located in a temporally extended narrative, and in order to be able to locate one as such, nationalist discourse must be able to represent the unfolding of time in such a way that the nation assumes a privileged and valorised role (Bell 2003, 69).

Drawing upon these points, I argue that the temporal dimension of border making is best approached through the analysis of narratives, and through the examination of particular narrative structures and modalities as discussed here. What links are established between past, present and future? How is time ordered in order to claim territory and construct, legitimise or undermine borders? As these questions indicate, narratives not only order time but they have an active part in the construction of space and the drawing of borders. I will thus come back to narrative in my discussion of spatial orders.
The second aspect of memory that is relevant to understanding the temporal dimension of border making is memory's relation to the past. As argued above, the existing writings on borders’ temporal dimensions work with very different conceptions of memory. Some conceptualise the temporal orders embedded in borders as an invention of the present and a result of elite projects aimed at legitimising or undermining existing borders. Others see memories as a reflection of past experiences that continue to persist despite border change. These different positions reflect the dichotomous ways in which memory’s relation to the past is often conceptualised in memory studies. One of the key debates in memory studies in the past has been over the relation between the past and the present. Traditionally, the field has been characterised by two broad tendencies: ‘presentism’ or ‘historicism’, namely the tendencies to either overstate or understate the malleability of the past. While the first approach sees the past as a product of present-day interests, for the second one the past appears as independent from present consciousness (Cubitt 2007, 26ff.; for a good overview cf. Mihelj forthcoming). Authors working in the field of memory studies have drawn our attention to the need to find a balance between the two. Cubitt for example argues that bridging the gap between the two is a “central problem for any effort to appreciate the temporal dimension of human existence” (Cubitt 2007, 28). In my conceptualisation of temporal orderings I build upon these and other recent writings in the field which argue that is necessary to find a balance between 'historicism' and 'presentism'. In drawing upon this debate we can find a middle ground that can help us to better conceptualise the temporal dimension of borders and particularly to achieve a more balanced conceptualisation of continuity and discontinuity in a situation of border change.

Sociological research on collective memory has traditionally foregrounded the constructedness and selectivity of memories and focused on how present concerns and group memberships shape people’s images of the past. The past is not simply stored in people’s brains and capable of being recalled ‘as it was’. On the contrary, it needs to be interpreted and reconstructed from a present perspective: “we do not retrieve images of the past as they were originally perceived but rather as they fit into our present conceptions, which in turn are shaped by the social forces that act on us” (Misztal
From this perspective, past events are remembered because they appear to be functional for social integration, the sustaining of group identities or the legitimation of certain political projects.

In his theory of collective memory Maurice Halbwachs (1992) puts the emphasis on the process of remembering which takes place in the present. Halbwachs was first to develop a sociological model of memory which foregrounds the formation of memory at the level of social groups. According to Halbwachs’ central thesis, despite the assumption that memory takes place on the individual level, it is always shaped by the social world and without its sociality it wouldn’t exist: “No memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections” (Halbwachs 1992, 43). In interaction with others the individual experiences the world and acquires knowledge; he or she becomes part of a collective symbolic and cultural order. The social frames of remembering are specific to social groups which shape what is worth being remembered and how it should be remembered. In this functionalist conception of memory, which has been influenced by his teacher Emile Durkheim, processes of remembering are shaped by present day social needs and expectations. According to Halbwachs, memory doesn’t preserve the past as such but reconstructs an image of the past and re-organises it in regard to changing societal frames:

(...) the mind reconstructs its memories under the pressure of society (...)

Society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them a prestige that reality did not possess (Halbwachs 1992, 51).

In contrast to Halbwachs’ approach which foregrounds people’s group memberships in the reorganisation of the past, other scholars have focused on top-down processes of remoulding the past. This is especially so in studies of the creation of national memories (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) but is also found in studies of conflicting memories which emphasise how a viable past is made up (‘invented’) by political and cultural entrepreneurs to correspond to present-day interests. Despite appearing and claiming to be ancient, traditions are often a product of recent origin – like for example, the Scottish national dress – and should be seen as political constructions of
continuity to create social cohesion, to legitimise political rule, and to transmit certain values (Hobsbawm 1983, 9, Trevor-Roper 1983).

While the past certainly is used instrumentally and is shaped by people's social affiliations, it would be wrong to reduce processes of remembering to their ideological or functional role. People do not only refer to the past for purposes of political manipulation or mobilisation, or because their group membership requires this from them, but also because they try to understand who they are and what they have become through time (Ricoeur 1991, see also Olick and Robbins’ discussion of different forms of selectivity 1998). Furthermore, a number of scholars have stressed that while remembering processes certainly involve a reconstruction, there are limitations in the extent to which the past can be moulded according to present-day interests in the present. These authors have questioned the assumptions about the ‘malleability of the past’ and raised attention to various constraints in remaking it (Mihelj forthcoming, Schwartz 1991, Schudson 1992, 1997). As Michael Schudson argues:

The past is in some respects, and under some conditions, highly resistant to efforts to make it over. It cannot be made over at will which is not to say that people don't try. People and organizations and nations do make their own pasts, to paraphrase Karl Marx, but they do not do so in conditions of their own choosing, with materials of their own making, or even with their memories acting entirely under their own volition. (Schudson 2011, 287)

Interpretations of events or historical figures often endure rather than being constantly overrun by a changing present. In his study of Watergate in American memory, Schudson stresses the limitations in co-opting memory for our own purposes and stresses that the study of memory should go beyond such intentional memory projects. He identifies three key factors that constrain the deliberate construction of memory: personal experiences which shape people's identities and act as commitments, the institutionalisation of the past in laws, text books and monuments as well as such cultural factors as the transmission of the past through language and other symbolic system (Schudson 1997; for a longer Schudson 1992, 207-221). Similarly, Barry Schwartz shows in his study that despite the partial remaking of images of Lincoln and Washington, there has been much continuity in how they were perceived (Schwartz 1991). Although over time a different image of
Washington was superimposed on the earlier one, seeing him more critically in the face of new democratic realities, old beliefs about his aristocratic personality continued to shape the memories of the former president.

Drawing upon these considerations can help us draw attention to both continuity and discontinuity in temporal orderings. We have to conceptualise memory as a creative way of dealing with the past but which nonetheless operates with constraints. While the drawing of borders certainly involves the creative reconfiguration and re-narration of the past – an aspect that studies of post-socialist memories have often focused upon – we should be wary of assuming that this reconfiguration, marking a break from previous temporal orders, is absolute. Authors like Schudson teach us that although people reconsider the past in a situation of change, they are not able to remake it completely.

Drawing upon this debate, my examination of temporal orderings embedded in borders aims to find a balance between 'historicism' and 'presentism'. The answer to this problem lies partly in the analysis of the role of generations and generationally shaped experiences. Within the discussion on the malleability of the past, much of the literature on generation and memory (Mannheim 1998, Schuman and Scott 1989, Larson and Lizardo 2007) takes a conservative position by foregrounding the impact of experiences for remembering. Generations share a “common location in the social and historical process” (Mannheim 1998, 168) and are constituted by shared historical experiences. By considering generational change and the ways in which generations remember the past by drawing upon diverging experiences can help to explain continuity and change in temporal orders. I will come back to these questions in Chapter 7 where I discuss the change and continuity in temporal orderings in the borderland.

Before I will discuss the creation and erasure of spatial orders and how they have been conceptualised in border studies, I want to point to one issue that has not been sufficiently addressed yet in relation to the temporal dimensions of border-making: nostalgia. Nostalgia is a complex mnemonic phenomenon that can be particularly virulent in cases of border change. Nostalgia can have different forms; it can appear in form of commodified products and experiences and can be seen as part of an amnesiac culture. In the thesis, I do not discuss these commercialised forms but focus
on nostalgia as a mode of temporal ordering that appears in memory narratives and positively valorises the past and which involves feelings of loss, lack and longing (Keightley and Pickering 2012, 117). As it will become clear in the empirical chapters, nostalgia is a prominent form of temporal ordering in the Russian-Estonian borderland and is a way of making sense of decline in the present. However, it is not the only form of memory that is articulated as a reaction to border change, and my analysis of temporal orderings also aims to capture these other modes.

In the next section I will look more closely at the creation and erasure of spatial difference – to which temporal orderings can contribute to - and how this has been discussed in the literature on border studies.

3.4 Politics of spatial orderings: the spatial dimensions of memory

Borders are means of organising social space and of marking spatial difference. They establish relations and at the same time mark divisions, defining inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion. These simultaneous processes of connection and separation have been noted already by the German sociologist Georg Simmel, who compares borders to bridges which connect and doors which can be closed (Simmel 1994). But how borders have been conceptualised and which of these aspects predominate has differed within the literature – influenced by social developments and theoretical developments. How can we think of borders? Are they opening up or closing? What kind of relations do they establish and for whom?

This section will review some of the literature on borders and discuss three key questions that have animated debates in border studies and are relevant to my conceptualisation of the politics of spatial orders of memory. Firstly, are borders sites of enclosure, security and state sovereignty or sites of contact, exchange and cross-border mobility? Secondly, should borders be seen as fixed entities or as processes? And thirdly, what is the relationship between material and symbolic borders? After a period of focusing on the opening of borders and the unmaking of spatial orders, more recently the focus has been on how borders continue to be redrawn in the context of security threats and global migration circuits. Drawing upon this literature I will show that despite being reconfigured, borders continue to shape people's lives
and matter both symbolically and practically. More generally, the newer scholarship on borders helps us to think about them in terms of processes that are shaped by different levels and are negotiated between different actors. Rather than considering borders as fixed entities, we should look at processes of border-making. In particular, I will point to the role of narratives in bordering processes.

Borders are a key marker of state sovereignty. The modern nation-state has been based on the principle of territorial exclusivity and the control over who and what is allowed to enter (Andreas 2003). Furthermore, states have tried to homogenise their territory by turning regional and ethnic groups into co-nationals and strangers and thus forging a national identity (Sahlins 1989, Anderson 1996). Early studies on borders, which were conducted particularly in the fields of geography and history, were in the first instance occupied with the historical-geographical descriptions of state borders and the development of typologies on borders (for reviews: Newman 2006, Kolossov 2005, Paasi 2005). Natural features and the morphology of the border were analysed as well as the historical evolutions of borders and their effects on cross-boundary cooperation. In these studies, borders were usually understood as exclusive lines which demarcated the state container and its space of sovereignty. Such a conceptualisation of borders has however been difficult to uphold. While sovereignty was never complete and the controls of borders was always a relative accomplishment (Torpey 1999), it was particularly the complex political, social and economic changes in the late 20th century that have led to a reconsideration of the ways how to think about borders. The growing interconnectedness between states and globalisation processes means that state borders have been reconfigured and territoriality has become questioned (Sassen 1996). On one hand, scholars developed a new research agenda that focused on transnational migrations, and cultural and economic flows, and criticised mainstream work in the social sciences for confining themselves to the nation-state and thus implicitly reproducing nationalism. Research on mobilities called attention to the diverse ways in which people, ideas and goods are not limited to a bounded space of the nation-state but constitute parts of networks, 'transnational spaces' or deterritorialised 'scapes' that extend far beyond its confines. Appadurai, for example, called for a postnational geography that would allow us to better capture the world in motion in which the "isomorphism of people,
territory and legitimate sovereignty that constitutes the normative charter of the modern nation-state is under threat” (2003, 338). And Castells' work on the network society writes that the 'space of places' has been replaced by a 'space of flows' (1996).

The focus on mobilities and flows has also been reflected in a different set of writing, which has developed mainly within anthropology and focused on the implications these processes have had on people's identities. ‘Border theory’, as it is often referred to, uses borders and borderland to challenge conventional thinking about place, culture and identities (Rovisco 2010, Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Rosaldo 1989, Anzaldúa 1987). Influenced by post-structuralism and feminist studies, they focus on the transgression of established boundaries and the development of identities 'in-between'. The border/ borderland in this writing has a predominantly metaphorical character: it is used to designate a locus of transgression or hybridity. Rosaldo for example considers border zones “not as analytically empty transitional zones but as sites of creative cultural production” (Rosaldo 1989, 208) where hybrid cultures emerge. Similarly, the anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson suggest that the term 'borderland' has to be understood as an 'interstitial zone' and can be considered “the ‘normal’ locale of the postmodern subject” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 48). Also in this set of literature the focus is thus laid on the crossing and overcoming of divisions, rather than being focused on processes happening at the actual border.

Both sets of literature have come under increasing criticism in the past year. While they provide us with a non-state centred lens of thinking about social life, the problem with some of these writings is that due to their conceptual critique of borders and the assumption that they have lost importance, they have failed to explore the actual workings of borders and the processes that keep them in place. Celebrating mobility and fluidity, they further failed to put the study of movement into relation with experiences of immobility and entrapment that were happening at the same time. Although this has been moderated in more recent studies (see for example, Glick-Schiller and Salazar 2013 for a discussion of mobility studies), studies focusing on border crossings still tend to have difficulties in addressing the role of state power in regulating mobility as well as the importance of borders and
territory at the level of identifications, as people's continued identification with the nation-state.

Scholars working in the field of border studies and beyond have addressed these problems and provided a different perspective – both in their ways of evaluating current border change and in their conceptual apparatus for studying borders. In their writing they focus not so much on the dissolution of borders as their continued relevance (for a recent overview: Wilson and Donnan 2012b, Johnson et al. 2011). Although state borders may have changed their character over time (Andreas 2003) and do not appear the same for everyone (Rumford 2006, Cunningham and Heyman 2004, Balibar 2002), they do matter practically and symbolically. Particularly as a reaction to the globalisation of crime, terror and diseases as well as illegal immigration, borders have been securitised and turned into a selective mechanism of protection and mobility regulation (Turner 2007, Shamir 2005, van Houtum 2010, Cunningham and Heyman 2004). At the same time, more traditional agendas of border demarcation and nation-building have not lost their importance (Newman 2012, Feldman 2005, Smith et al 1998). These studies illustrate that despite the need to question the naturalness of borders and the nation-state, we thus should not at the same time forget the continuing grip of the state on people's lives and its appeal in shaping people's identities.

Using these arguments can help us better understand the politics of spatial orders of memory. As I have argued above, in their conception of space memory studies has tended to focus on either stability or fluidity, reproducing some of the earlier ways of thinking about borders. They have first tended to take the nation-state as a natural container of memory and then extended it to consider mobile memories of diaspora groups or universalistic tendencies of memory in the global age. What the above-mentioned studies indicate is that we should neither consider borders as static nor as open and permeable per se but analyse bordering processes in practice. Spatial orders and their borders are not a given but are actively constructed, among others through processes of remembering. The processual character of borders has been further developed in the literature on border studies. Authors working in the field have suggested a new vocabulary for thinking about borders, conceiving of them not as given lines between nation-states or other spatial units, but instead as socially
(re)produced and contested phenomena, which underlie changes and differ in their meanings. According to Paasi,

…boundaries are not merely physical, empirical lines or zones that can be frozen on maps and atlases as naturalized entities. Instead they are social, cultural and political constructs that are made meaningful and exploited by human beings as part of the institutionalization process of territories (Paasi 2001, 22).

Rather than the border itself, processes of making, remaking and unmaking of borders are at the centre of newer studies of borders – something that has been called ‘bordering’ (Newman 2006, Van Houtum, Zierhofer and Kramsch 2005, van Houtum and Naerssen 2002) or 'borderwork' (Rumford 2008). Van Houtum et al. for example argued that we need to focus on the “complex and varied patterns of both implicit and explicit bordering and ordering practices” (Van Houtum, Zierhofer and Kramsch 2005, 2). Balibar (2002) has stressed the multiplicity of meanings that a border can have: borders are heterogeneous, overdetermined and polysemic. They are reinforced or questioned by other boundaries in social space, the boundaries between ethnic and religious groups or members of a language community. Consequently, “borders never exist in the same way for individuals belonging to different social groups” (Balibar 2002, 79). The arguments for the processual nature of borders link well with the study of borders in mnemonic narratives. Narratives do not only order time but are also linked to certain imaginations and experiences of space through which inclusions and exclusions, and the boundaries between inside and outside, are constructed and legitimised.

A third debate in border studies has focused on the relation between symbolic and material borders. This can help us to develop a clearer understanding of how to think about borders as narratives. I will argue that we have to consider territorial borders as processes that happen both through the construction of identity and difference and the construction of mobility and enclosure. Some authors, particularly in sociology and anthropology, have focused on the symbolic dimensions of spatial orderings and the construction of identity and difference. Built upon works on the symbolic construction of ethnic groups and communities, studies are interested in processes of ‘bordering’ and ‘othering’ which divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘here’ and ‘there’,
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ in relation to territorial ideologies or as internal group-building processes (cf. Meinhof 2002, Barth 1969, Cohen 1985, for an overview of some of the sociological literature cf. Lamont and Molnar 2002). At the same time, the territorial border is not only a representation but also as something which is connected to a set of institutional practices, regulations and documentary regimes that shape local experiences and influence the ways in which people make sense of their lives at the border (for a critique of the 'bordering' concept cf. O’Dowd 2010, Megoran 2012). These aspects should however not be treated in isolation: If we look only at symbolic boundary drawings and the roles of symbols and representations in constructing borders, we risk underestimating the role of state power as an objective force that regulates mobility and shapes the everyday lives of its and other states' citizens. On the other hand, if we focus only on the practical production and policing of mobility and enclosure, we tend to miss how these processes are symbolically legitimised and build upon a discursively constructed understanding of territory.

What does this mean for the study of spatial orders through mnemonic narratives? Narrative studies of borders have been criticised for focusing only on the former level of representations and symbols by leaving aside the material side of borders and using a ‘text-based’ approach to borders (cf. Johnson et al. 2011). Using (mnemonic) narratives to study borders, however, does not mean reducing borders to the level of representations but can include experiences of borders as material and institutional sites of mobility and enclosure. As will become clear in the empirical chapters, people remake spatial orders after the fall of socialism by negotiating both imaginative and material dimensions of borders in their narratives. Narratives then are not just representational but are used here to gain access into the reconfiguration of temporal and spatial orders as part of practical processes of reorientation in the borderland.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the potentials of bringing memory studies and border studies into dialogue and have tried to address some of the key issues that are part of this endeavour. There are some studies that seek to combine the study of borders and memory on which we can draw in our attempts at an integrated approach. Yet the
existing literature has failed to fully engage with and make use of the discussions happening in both fields. As I have shown border studies engaging with memory do not have a fully elaborated approach to memory and tend either towards ‘presentism’, in seeing the past as an invention of the present, or ‘historicism’, in seeing memory as accumulated and unmediated experience. Furthermore, memory studies that look at borders and place tend to either overemphasise stability or fluidity in place. Other studies are usually limited to an examination of material heritage. Drawing upon concepts and debates in border studies and memory studies, the thesis adopts an approach that can help us to mediate some of these shortcomings. I have outlined key debates and issues in both fields and indicated how they inform my approach to memory and borders and my conceptualisation of the temporal orders of borders and the spatial orders of memory – discussions over the narrative shapes of memory and the malleability of the past as well as the construction of inclusion and exclusion as part of making borders and the symbolic and material dimensions of borders. In doing so, my approach contributes to a better understanding of temporal orders of borders and the spatial orders of memory through the study of narratives. These key issues will be examined in more detail in the empirical chapters and the conclusion of the thesis.
Chapter 4 Connecting vernacular and official narratives

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter was concerned with the relation between borders and memory and how the two concepts have been discussed in the literature. I have argued that the focus of research has shifted from treating borders and memory as unified objects to processes of bordering and remembering, and of ordering time and space, and have suggested that we should look at how these processes take place at one and the same time. They should be considered closely alongside each other. This chapter introduces different levels at which the processes of border making and remembering take place and particularly discusses the relation between vernacular and official narratives\textsuperscript{17}: How can we conceptualise these two levels and their relations? Are vernacular narratives a reflection of public discourses, are they formulated in terms of opposition and resistances to them or do we have to assume a more complex relation?

Especially in a situation of social change, there is a tendency among scholars of memory and borders to focus on the official level and see changes as a result of shifts in discourses, symbols and narratives at the elite level. Studies of geopolitical discourses and representations, the rewriting of histories and the creation of new symbols, narratives and monuments, provide powerful examples for how new temporal and spatial orientations are created. This perspective has been particularly important for studying Baltic-Russian relations and processes of conflicting state- and nation-building in the region. However, as I will make clear, a study that focuses

\textsuperscript{17} There are different ways of labelling these two: personal and public, vernacular and official, counter narratives and dominant narratives, individual and collective. For the present study, the pair 'vernacular' and 'official' responses was chosen as it captures best the analysed practices. While there are multiple public narratives within Estonia and Russia, among them more moderate voices and voices by minority groups (i.e. Russians participating in Estonian public debates) these clearly depart from the official position. Public narratives thus are in themselves heterogeneous and while studying the internal conflicts over geopolitics and memory politics within and between Estonian and Russian public narratives would make for an interesting study, this thesis foregrounds the relations between vernacular and official narratives as it is here where it identifies a major gap in the literature.
only on top-down processes is very limited in capturing the nature and dynamics involved in the (re)making of borders and memory. Building upon newer research, I will stress the importance of considering different levels and actors involved in them and particularly point out why the consideration of vernacular practices can give us important insights into remembering and border-making. Following these considerations, I will give an overview of how the relation between vernacular and official levels has been commonly conceptualised. Discussing different ways of thinking about this interrelation in both border studies and memory studies, I will introduce a sociologically informed model which looks at the interactions and tensions between the two levels and make a case for considering vernacular narratives in their social context. It is necessary to account for people’s narrative location in order to gain insights into how narratives are socially shaped, along with the resources and constraints that shape them. Finally, I will introduce different sociostructural categories like ethnicity, generation and geographical location that are particularly relevant for the present study.

4.2 'Grounding' the study of borders and memory

The relation between micro and macro dynamics, vernacular and official levels is one of the key questions in the study of both memory and borders. The processes of temporal and spatial orderings as they have been characterised in the previous chapter take place on multiple levels: ways of organising time and space can be found on the level of broad cultural frameworks that have emerged with the rise of modernity, on the level of social groups and institutions and on the level of personal orientation – the structuring of one's self-identity. Studies on borders and memories, however, very often focus on only one of these levels: due to established ways of thinking about borders as top-down constructions or due to disciplinary specialisation within both research fields – with, for example, political sciences focusing on macro-phenomena and social psychology on the micro-level. Drawing upon existing debates in both fields, I will argue for a ‘grounded approach’ that captures border-making and remembering at multiple levels and to consider the interrelations and tensions between them.
Borders are usually considered to be in the domain of states – conflicts over territory, delimitation and maintenance of borders are considered to be key question in state-building processes. One strand in the literature has focused on how spatial orders are constructed and maintained from a top-down perspective and are interested in the production of inclusion and exclusion and geographical knowledge from above. Studies especially on symbolic geographies (Anderson 1983, Lewis and Wigen 1997) and in the field of critical geopolitics (Ó Túathail, Dalby and Routledge 2006) have analysed discourses which constitute the nation-state as an ‘imagined’ geopolitical entity. This included the analysis of boundary narratives produced by politicians, scholars and intellectuals, which are usually associated with attempts to stabilise territory and naturalise relations between people, culture, and space (cf. Said 1978, Neumann 1999, Kuus 2007).

As I have argued in the previous chapters, in the past years studies of borders have shifted their attention to the multiple meanings of borders and ways of experiencing them. The refocusing of the research agenda on bordering processes also involves going beyond the state as the main actor in the making of borders. To understand this multiplicity of meanings, it is necessary to consider multiple scales and actors that shape the border (cf. Rumford 2007, Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007, Newman 2006, Balibar 2002, Donnan and Wilson 1999).

Scholars have pointed out that “bordering practices are less and less in the exclusive domain of the state and its agents” (Johnson et al 2011, 62) and that a disintegration of the state and the border has taken place. Supranational and subnational actors participate in making the border and in the case of the EU, they have an even greater importance in determining how borders should be regulated. Cross-border cooperation may potentially blur state borders but at the same time, borders can be reinforced through identity politics and securitisation (Rumford 2007). From the perspective of people living in the borderland, the main question is how they encounter, appropriate and contest the border. Works on identity, ethnicity and citizenship in the borderland have shifted the focus from the state and economic cooperation to the local level (Meinhof 2002, Berdahl 1999, Donnan and Wilson 1999 and 1998). They have analysed how the border as an institution and a discourse shapes identities and spatial practices in everyday life in borderland. Local actors
actively participate in making and negotiating the border (Baud and van Schendel 1997, Sahlins 1989) and can challenge the order of the nation-state by constructing alternative spatial orders and identities. Especially ethnographic and narrative studies of borders have shown interest in studying the border from below and in understanding borderlands and their population divided by a border (for some examples, cf. Pelkmans 2006, Meinhof 2002, Berdahl 1999, Donnan and Wilson 1999 and 1998). As Zartman summarises:

> Whereas previous studies in the social sciences tended to focus on communities within states, so as to hold one variable constant, or on comparisons of different communities in different states, so as to analyse the differences, the new field of inquiry concerned transborder communities affected by a political line imposed on them (Zartman 2010, 2).

Scholars have even argued for a ‘vernacularisation of border studies’ – of moving the field into a more societal direction away from considerations of state security (Perkins and Rumford 2013). While I believe that border studies need to attend closely to the power of the state, this downscaling of perspective provides us with arguments that official considerations and elite narratives cannot account for all experiences of the border and the practices of making them.

Also in the field of memory studies, authors have argued for paying more attention to practices of personal remembering and for linking 'cultural memory' back to people's memories and experiences (cf. Keightley and Pickering 2012, Cubitt 2007, Misztal 2003). The formation of memory studies as a field has led to the fragmentation of certain research foci. Memory in the contemporary scholarly discourse has been divided into subcategories like communicative memory, bodily memory, cultural memory, public memory etc. and many scholars tend to focus either on cultural objectifications of the past in monuments and films, the public staging of memories in ceremonies and political apologies or the social psychology of personal remembering (cf. Chapter 3). As Wertsch commented, there is a division of labour between psychology concentrating on individual dimensions and sociology, history and political sciences concentrating on collective memory (Wertsch 2002). Such a division can already be observed in Jan Assmann’s (1988) influential suggestion to replace 'collective memory', a concept that was introduced by Maurice Halbwachs,
with the concepts of 'communicative memory' and 'cultural memory', the lived memory of a community which has a relatively small scope on one hand, and the cultural objectifications of a society's past on the other. Such differentiations can be useful for a field in which individual and collective memory are sometimes treated with little conceptual clarity and tend to merge (cf. Halbwachs' definition of collective memory 1992, but also in newer works, for a critique Kansteiner 2002).

The major problem is that they leave out of focus how we can think more creatively about how these dimensions of memory relate to each other. Based on his study of ancient civilisations, Assmann himself conceives 'communicative memory' and 'cultural memory' as opposed modes of memory; cultural memory for example is considered to be distant from the everyday and temporally remote (Assmann assumes that the cultural memory replaces communicative memory after the latter has ceased to exist and no living eyewitnesses remain; cf. Assmann 1992, 56). Also many studies on memory tend to detach cultural memory from communicative memory rather than looking at the intersections and tensions between the levels. However, communicative memory and cultural memory do not exist in isolation from each other but interact and interpenetrate: communicative memory is always mediated by symbolic resources that go beyond the daily life of a social group. At the same time, the memory of historical events and periods is not purely 'cultural' as eye witnesses and other actors participate in shaping images of the past. We thus need to consider the interrelations between different mnemonic products and processes and the tensions between them. By focusing purely on the level of memory politics and objectifications of the past in cultural memory we risk operating with a truncated understanding of memory. As Susannah Radstone has argued:

> Without this dual focus, studies of memory will share with approaches grounded in identity politics a limited view of the processes, practices and institutions through which experience or memory make their mark and are made (Radstone 2005, 135).

It is crucial to consider the gaps and absences that official narratives produce; how images of the past are received or rejected in a society, or as Alon Confino has put it, how representations of the past “steer emotions, motivate people to act” and “become a socio-cultural mode of action” (Confino 1997, 1390).
Building upon the above-mentioned studies, I argue that to provide a fuller and more grounded account of social transformation, top-down processes of reconsidering the spatial and temporal order of the past have to be analysed in relation to vernacular narratives and meaning-making activities on the personal level. Studies focusing on the official level often make claims about the dominant character of discourses and narratives without providing much empirical evidence. The power of discourse over the individual acts of identification is taken for granted without studying if and how official narratives come to be shared among members of the society. I argue that we have to take into considerations how spatial and temporal orders at the level of official discourses are received, negotiated and challenged. Which resources are adopted and used in everyday life and which are ignored? How are they mediated by local experiences? We have to open up the study of border change to the local responses and to consider narratives which can depart from official accounts. Such a perspective allows us to achieve a more differentiated understanding of the dynamics of temporal and spatial orderings and to take into account agency, along with the reflective and habitual responses happening on the level of individual meaning-making activities.

The need for a grounded study of spatial and temporal orders becomes particularly apparent in regard to studies of recent border changes in Europe's Eastern periphery. Previous studies of the region have largely failed to study the interrelations between the levels. The majority of studies on the Russian-Estonian borderland (and similarly on other borders at Europe's Eastern peripheries) are concentrated on geopolitical dynamics and the changing symbolic geographies in the region (Malksöö 2009, Berg and Ehin 2009, Kuus 2004, Lehti and Smith 2003, Aalto 2000) focusing on top-down dynamics and the role of political and cultural elites in the making of borders and the creation of new temporal and spatial orders. Authors have drawn attention to the asymmetric and antagonistic relations between the Baltic States and their large Russian neighbour and have particularly stressed the politicized and polarized character of memories of World War II and the communist regimes. They have studied spectacular memory events in which such antagonistic memories crystallize – most notably the conflict around relocation of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn in 2007 (for example Kattago 2012, Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008; Lehti, Jutila and
Jokisipilä 2008). While some studies have stressed the role of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia as an important element in the relations between Russia and Estonia (Smith 2002, Berg 2001, Merritt 2000, Smith and Wilson 1997), they have usually regarded them as an object of identity politics and potential political mobilisation along (binary) ethnic categories.  

Exemplary for this tendency to focus on the official discourses and narratives are two edited volumes on identity politics and historical memory in the region which provide a good overview of recent research by some of the most influential scholars and experts working on the Baltic States: Berg and Ehin's *Identity and Foreign Policy. Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration* (2009) and Smith and Lehti's *Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences* (2003). The two volumes are different in evaluating the current situation – the edited volume published by Smith and Lehti has a more optimistic outlook than the book by Berg and Ehin which sees the conflicting national identity conceptions as frozen and unchangeable prepositions structuring the geopolitical reasoning and accounts of the past. The two volumes are however similar in that they focus on discursive and political dimensions of the geopolitical changes. They tend to conceive the border and memory as something that is made top-down – by state actors aimed at constructing national and regional identities or shaped by the EU's interest in consolidating the new Eastern borders. For example Smith and Lehti write in their introduction to a collected volume on geopolitical discourses in the Baltic region:

> in examining the organisation of territorial space for political purposes, the work views 'geography' not merely as a passive spatial setting in which human life occurs, but as a social construct that is produced and reproduced by means of discourses (Smith and Lehti 2003, 6).

While adopting a constructivist perspective – space is something that is actively constructed – the making of borders (and of memory) is in these studies something

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18 Assmuth’s ethnographic work on the Baltic borderlands offers an exemption (Assmuth 2012, 2006). Furthermore, there is a rich tradition of life-story writing in Estonia that focuses on processes of personal remembering – often focusing on case studies. For a current overviews and interesting examples cf. Joesalu and Koresaar 2013, Aarelaid-Tart and Bennich-Bjoerkman 2012, Kirss 2009, Koresaar 2004. I will be drawing upon some of these studies in the analysis of my empirical data.
which is in the hand of the power elites of statecraft and the result of (competing) geopolitical and nationalist discourses or the influences of Europeanisation processes. Overall, there is relatively little consideration of if, and how, these developments resonate in the population.

Adding vernacular narratives to the study of the Russian-Estonian border allows us to explore some of the complexities of border making and remembering. How do people respond to official narratives and the creative processes of reordering time and space? How do they deal with the changes? What are the tensions and connections between vernacular and official narratives? Only by looking at the interrelations and tensions between the two levels can we attain more grounded insights into processes of remembering and bordering and enable a less teleological account of change (cf. Reeves 2009). In the following section, I will discuss different ways of conceiving this relation in the literature on borders and memory before introducing a model that considers interrelations and appropriations as well as tensions between them.

4.3 Consensus and contestation: Ways of relating vernacular and official narratives

Schematically, we can distinguish between two broad tendencies in relating vernacular and official narratives: on the one hand, studies have focused on shared narratives and collective identities created through processes of bordering and remembering based on consensus. On the other hand, there are studies that stress that far from being consensual the making of borders and historical narratives are permeated by operations of power and shaped by political contestations.

As outlined above, some studies focus on the official level and ignore the level of vernacular narratives. In doing so, they run the risk of assuming a similarity between official discourse and reasoning on the level of everyday life or of considering the latter as irrelevant. For example, some of the studies focusing on the construction of borders in geopolitical discourses or memory at the national level work with the implicit assumption that these discourses, symbols and rituals tell us something about society as a whole. Despite the differentiation of memory studies into studies that
focus primarily on representations of the past on one hand and those that focus on remembering at the individual and small group levels, authors working on the former often make assumptions about the circulations of memories in society without providing much empirical evidence. The language of ‘collective memory’ is often used to presume that nations display forms of collective memory and that memories are shared by members of a pre-constituted national community. For example, in the work of Anthony Smith ‘myths and memories of the nation’ play a central role: “memory, almost by definition is integral to cultural identity, and the cultivation of shared memories is essential to the survival and destiny of such collective identities” (Smith 1999, 10). There is however little clarity about how these processes of ‘memory cultivation’ work and how memories are acquired and shared among members of a society. Kansteiner notes a “desire for cultural homogeneity, consistency, and predictability” in memory studies in which assumptions about processes of remembering are made that “conflate properties of the cultural system with sociocultural activities” (Kansteiner 2002, 193 and 196; cf. Bell’s critique of the literature on memory and the nation, Bell 2003).

On the other hand, the relations between bottom-up and top-down processes have often been thought in terms of contestations and oppositions. Vernacular memory is seen as subordinated and resistant to dominant official memory shaped by the interests of powerful groups. And borderlanders, migrants and other social groups are assumed to resist changes and subvert the border that is established in top-down processes by political elites. Research working with such an oppositional approach draws upon different theoretical traditions but is often influenced by neo-Marxist or post-structuralist thinking. Authors working with this approach employ concepts like ‘hegemony’ (Antonio Gramsci), ‘popular memory’ or ‘counter-memory’ (Michel Foucault) and ‘spatial tactics’ (Michel de Certeau) and seek to foreground challenges to the official order and do this often with a critical emphasis.

An important example for such a conceptualisation within the field of memory studies are the works of the Popular Memory Group (cf. Popular Memory Group 1982, for a discussion, Misztal 2003, 61-67) which was developed in the tradition of British cultural studies. The Popular Memory Group is interested in public representations of the past and private forms of remembering and the interrelations
between the two. Public memory is associated with representations of the past circulated by state institutions, business, public media, and voluntary associations; it is here that ‘dominant memory’ and powerful historical representations have become hegemonic within society. Yet, the Popular Memory Group does not conceive of the dominant political order as monolithic and total but as a site of contestation. “Dominant memory is produced in the course of … struggles and is always open to contestation” (Popular Memory Group 1982, 207). Different institutions do not convey a homogeneous image of history and there are oppositional forms of public memory as well as a “privatised sense of the past which is generated within a lived culture” (Popular Memory Group 1982, 211). Memories of marginal groups like women, working-class people and people of colour which are subordinated to dominant memory and silenced, are of particular interest for the authors of the Popular Memory Group. Their study of memory is linked to an explicitly political project of unveiling and generalising such marginalised experiences and facilitating the emergence of popular memory to challenge the hegemony of the ‘dominant memory’.

Although John Bodnar’s seminal work on American public memory does not follow the theoretical conceptions and political project of the Popular Memory Group, there are parallels between the two; also Bodnar analyses public memory in terms of “an argument about the interpretation of reality” (1992, 15) and an opposition between official and vernacular culture associated with the ‘consciousness of ordinary people’. Official concerns like the promotion of national unity and patriotism dominate over vernacular ones representing more diverse and localised interests. In doing so, however, he foregrounds different patterns of experiences rather than the competing visions of history and highlights the idea of transaction rather than open conflict.

Such perspectives have also prevailed in the studies of spatial orders and borderlands. Alongside the studies on borderland hybridity (that were discussed in the previous chapter), the French philosopher Michel de Certeau in particular has been a key focus for people interested in the construction of space and power relations. In his book *The Practice of Everyday Life* de Certeau focuses on popular culture and everyday practices such as walking in order to investigate the ways in
which people operate in everyday life. It is his presumption that the study of representations is limited if it does not look closer how they are 'used' by its readers. Discourses, as he argues, are marked by uses; they offer to analysis the imprints of acts of processes of enunciation (…), they thus indicate a social historicity in which systems of representations or processes of fabrication no longer appear only as normative frameworks but also as tools manipulated by users (de Certeau 1984, 21).

De Certeau is interested in small acts of resistance – acts of guerrilla tactics of ordinary people who act against the system and the strategies of the powerful (cf. Sharp et al 2000).

Borderlands have particularly inspired scholars to study the subversion of existing spatial orders. Much of the research on borderlands draws upon the assumption that borderlanders are different from mainlanders because of the proximity of the ‘other’ and the fact that border-crossings can be a part of everyday life. As Newman and Paasi write, “For people living in border areas, boundaries are an essential part of the activities and discourses of daily life, which are not necessarily translated into the collective and historical meanings that manifest themselves in the more general sociospatial consciousness” (Newman and Paasi 1998, 198). Scholars have focused on ‘border cultures’ with hybrid modes of identification and cultural codes existing across borderlines (Anzaldua 1987). On the level of everyday practices borderlanders can show playful ways of dealing with the border and mocking of border guards (for example, studies on smuggling as a ‘weapon of the weak’ cf. Bruns and Miggelbrink 2012).

The oppositional approach as I have outlined it above demonstrates that acts of remembering and bordering are shaped by asymmetrical social relations and power structures and challenges homogeneous views which see the constructions of spatial and temporal orders as harmonious and equally shared among members of a society. At the same time, however, this model risks the danger of seeing conflict as the natural state of society and therefore misses non-conflictual cases and more positive ways of relating to the official discourses and adopting them. While we can acknowledge the peculiarities of life in the borderland, this should not lead to seeing
subversion as the dominant way of life in the borderland and the borderland population as a homogeneous community subverting the national order.

Conceptualising the relation between vernacular and official narratives, we have to consider different possibilities for them to relate to each other. We have to take into account that official narratives that put time and space in an order are more than mere instruments of domination but can provide orientation and meaning to personal experiences. As Cubitt argues for the field of memory studies:

   Rather than regarding conflict and consensus as the terms that define two starkly opposing theories of social memory, it may be best to focus on the ways in which elements of the two are interwoven in the ways that the past is constructed and engaged with (Cubitt 2007, 230).

And, one may add, it is beneficial to look at how people can both oppose and adopt official narratives when making sense of their geopolitical positioning and constructing spatial difference. Official narratives from this perspective can work as resources for orientation oneself in a changed present. For example, in her study on Latvian memory Vieda Skultans found that narrators make use of historical and literary resources and other cultural representations to make sense of traumatic experiences. She observed that

   …although the actual narration was emotionally fraught both for the narrator and for me, the retelling of experience had a literary structure and tone. Such narratives make the distinction between natural and literary language difficult to uphold: they empower individuals to take up centre stage as the imaginative recreators of their world (Skultans 1998, 34).

Such a perspective can give us different insights into the workings of vernacular narratives. Vernacular narratives here do not appear predominantly as instruments of political actors trying to escape the grip of the state and challenging dominant forms of meaning. They are efforts after meaning; they are shaped by cultural and social influences but are distinct from the abstract level of the nation and official narratives constructed in rituals, monuments and official commemorations. Studying vernacular narratives means to attend to the process of localising the meaning of, and finding more proximate significance in, broader social events and historical developments. More concretely, the thesis will look at the temporal and spatial orders of vernacular
narratives, the narrative strategies in relation to time and the border, which can draw upon existing cultural resources circulated in official narratives and appropriate them by relating them to local contexts and experiences. The ‘intersubjectivist approach’ to memory as it has been outlined by Barbara Misztal comes close to this. Misztal writes that

memory is intersubjectively constituted (…) while it is an individual who remembers, his or her memory exists, and is shaped by, their relation with, what has been shared with others and (…) is, moreover, always memory of an intersubjective past, of a past time lived in relation to other people (Misztal 2003, 6).

Such a concept of memory draws upon the assumption that memory is both embodied and embedded – it is a reflexive and active process of creating meaning linked to a “unique set of past experiences and a unique history of interpreting and inscribing experiences” (Prager 1998, 110) while at the same time being shaped by social contexts and larger meaning frameworks. This point can be made not only in relation to memory but with all acts of meaning-making at the vernacular level. It also applied to people’s ways of engaging with the border. Paasi refers to this in his work on the Finnish-Russian border when he writes that: “interpretations of socio-spatial structures… are bound to the experiences of one's life-world and spatial life history” (Paasi 1996, 207).

4.4 Vernacular narratives in social context: between structure and agency

We should not stop at the assumption that there are different ways of relating to official narratives but instead analyse why certain people negotiate borders and interpret the past in certain distinct ways. We have to consider the social context in which people tell stories and interpret the world and think of their narratives as practices that are embedded in certain structural conditions which enable and constrain certain ways of meaning making. Despite the particularities of life in a borderland, borderlanders do not form a homogeneous community. They are shaped by divergent individual and collective experiences and are differently aligned with
power relations. To understand people’s narrative locations, I adopt a sociological approach to studying vernacular narratives.

My approach has been informed by practice theory as a meta-theoretical approach that considers the relation between structure and agency. Some of its basic understandings and concerns can help us to formulate a sociological way of thinking about processes of remembering and bordering as practices that are embedded in structural contexts. In my discussion I am largely drawing upon Karen O’Reilly’s work (2012) which seeks to use practice theory for the study of migration. O'Reilly provides a comprehensive introduction into the key insights of practice theory and discusses how its concerns over the relation between structure and agency, and the reproduction or change of social order, can be applied for in migration studies (for other useful overviews and discussions cf. Reckwitz 2002, Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and von Savigny 2001).

Practice theory is a broad theoretical perspective within sociological thinking that goes back to the work of a number of social theorists, most prominently Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens and is part of a larger cultural turn in social sciences. It has developed as a response to opposing tendencies in social theory in the past – on one hand a concern with social structures and institutions as reflected in functionalist and structuralist social theory, and an interpretive approach stressing the creative and dynamic aspects of social life as constituted by individual agents on the other hand. One of the main concerns of practice theory is go beyond these dichotomous ways of studying the social life and to understand social processes without privileging either ‘objectivism’ or ‘subjectivism’, i.e. the assumption of the primacy of either social structures existing outside of individuals or internal, subjective interpretations. Practice theory establishes linkages between individuals and the wider structures as enacted by people and draws attention to their interactions in everyday life. Rather than opposing structure and agency, it considers their mutual dependency and interrelations by studying practices. The key assumption is that neither agents nor institutions and structures are determinant but that structures are both constraining actions and are themselves the outcomes of action (O’Reilly 2012, 16-19).
Practices can be most broadly understood “arrays of human activity” that are embodied and mediated and organised around shared understandings (Schatzki 2001, 11). According to this definition, practices can include a wide range of activities, for example making things, relating to others, and engaging in performances. As Andreas Reckwitz writes, a practice is “a routinized way in which bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are treated, things are described and the world is understood” (Reckwitz 2002:250). Practices can be both discursive and non-discursive: also language – what people say – is a type of activity and hence can be considered a practice phenomenon (Schatzki 2001). In my study, I access people’s practices by studying narratives and look at what people do with ‘borders’ and ‘memory’ when telling stories about themselves. These stories as practices are not predetermined by social structures. How actors act and express themselves, how they remember and relate to the border is not just about following institutional rules and norms or for example, passively accepting the social structures in which they are situated or the identities they are assigned. Social structures are constantly perceived, understood and enacted by agents in the context of their social lives and therefore can also be modified and changed. Attending to practice means to attend to processes of bordering and remembering as something that is actively and creatively done by people and is evolving over time (cf. the processual understanding of borders outlined in the previous chapter).

But at the same time, while attending to agency and creativity in people’s narrative practices, we should not forget that they are part of wider cultural processes and socially situated. While being sensitive to people's experiences and perceptions, we have to take into account the constraints and opportunities in which people act and make sense of the world. “The concept of practice connotes doing, but not just doing in and of itself. It is doing in a historical and social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do” (Wegener 1998, 47 quoted in O'Reilly 2012, 30). Calhoun and Sennett make a similar point when they write that “to attend to practice is indeed to attend to the ways in which human action is embedded in social organisation.” (Calhoun and Sennett 2007, 8). Hence we cannot think about practices without considering their social situatedness. Practices are not abstract ways of ‘doing things’ but are mediated through social and cultural institutions, norms and resources that
people have available. The way how structures affect practices is not uniform but differs according to the position of the actor. For example, a study that analyses narratives in the Russian-Estonian borderland has to take account of the historical context – the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union, the repression of many Estonians and the settlement policies – as well as the cutting off of relations between Russia and Estonia after 1991, the nationalisation and Europeanisation policies in Estonia and the hardening of the border regime. These structural conditions have affected and still affect people in different ways – we can assume that they will be very differently experienced by, for example, different ethnic or generational groups. Taking this context into account, we have to consider how people’s narrative location, their position within social structure and their experiences they can draw upon, enables as well as constraints certain kinds of reasoning and story-telling, certain ways of ordering time and space. These structures are of course not just experienced as external impositions but in part made effective by the internalisation of social relationships through experience (one of the key themes in Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology). Routines, capabilities and learned cultural schemata can be seen as powerful internal structures that inform people’s practices.

In the following paragraphs I will discuss three sociostructural categories that shape the location from which people remember the past and engage with the border: ethnicity, generation and locality and discuss how they are relevant in the context that I am studying. The foregrounding of ethnicity, generation and locality over other structural categories that inform meaning-making processes is due to my focus on the relations between border and memory. Ethnicity and locality play a crucial role in the making of territorial borders; state-building processes build upon or can be undermined by ethnic divisions and transform localities by integrating them into the symbolic and institutional order of the state. Generation is crucial because it can capture the passing of time, continuity and change in border-making. The importance of these three categories for a study of borders and memory was supported by my fieldwork research when differences between ethnic groups, localities and

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19 While already some of the authors working with an the oppositional approach considered practices and agency (most explicitly, de Certeau 1984 and the Popular Memory Group 1982) and the power relations they are placed in, they had a limited account of them in focusing on resistances.
generations became apparent. These categories, of course, do not exist separate from each other but intersect and are criss-crossed by other categories like class, citizenship status, gender and political affiliations. In her ethnography of a post-socialist mining community, the anthropologist Eeva Kesküla (2012), for example, has pointed out that ethnicity and class tend to intersect in Estonia. Estonia's Russian-speaking minority largely consists of workers whose position has been weakened not only by the nationalisation processes but also the economic liberalisation adopted by the Estonian government. This also applies to the Russian-speakers of Narva, the majority of whom used to work at the large industrial enterprises owned by the Soviet state. Class thus becomes relevant in relation with ethnicity, although no clear class divisions could be observed between ethnic groups locally, both of whom are predominantly working-class. With regard to gender, the notable differences had to do with how the participants connected their life story with private and/or public events: women focused more often on events in their private life (getting married, giving birth), while men focussed more on public events – this trait has little to do with border memory as such but more with general gender differences.

Ethnicity, generation and locality should not be understood in terms of objectively constraining objects but are subjectively experienced and invested with meaning. While acknowledging the subjective dimension of these categories and the meanings associated with them, my study conceives of them as more or less malleable structural layers linked to certain experiences, norms and resources upon which people draw in their narratives (cf. O'Reilly's discussion of ethnicity 2012, 54-55). As structural layers they are not stable but historically situated and changing – they can be discursively emphasised and downplayed and they are linked to changing institutional settings.

4.4.1 Ethnicity

Ethnicity is usually seen as the main structuring category in Russian-Estonian relations: Russians and Estonians are thought as having different patterns of remembering and ways of ordering space due to different positionings in society. In my thesis I use a relational understanding of ethnicity that is defined by both processes of self-identification and external classifications. Most generally, ethnicity

84
refers to “aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive” (Eriksen 2002, 4). Rather than being a substance, defined by definite cultural characteristics of a group, ethnicity in this understanding is the result of the relationships of between collectivities and the organisation of cultural difference (cf. Barth 1969). While Frederik Barth’s famous definition of ethnicity focused on the processes of boundary-making through which ethnic groups are constructed and maintained and in which certain cultural characteristics are emphasised, other scholars have focused on the role of external constraints and the influence of wider structures in defining and shaping ethnicity. Jenkins stresses that ethnicity can also be a powerful external classification that is not chosen by individuals but that they are assigned by others (Jenkins 2008, 53). Furthermore, Jenkins draws explicit attention to the contexts of ethnic categorisation and argues to consider institutional processes in the definition of ethnicity.

In my thesis, I use ethnicity to characterise the relations between the old inhabitants of Narva and the Soviet-era settlers, the former encompasses mostly Estonians and the latter mostly Russians but not exclusively so. Pre-war Estonia had a significant Russian community and particularly the borderland was populated by a large number of ethnic, often multilingual Russians. Furthermore, the group of Soviet-era settlers consists of people from different Soviet republics, mainly Russia but also Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan and others and which speak Russian and often understand themselves as one group of Russian-speakers (similar to the British Asian, cf. Laitin’s discussions of Russian-speakers as a new identity category in the former Soviet republics (Laitin 1998)). Rather than a strict definition of 'ethnicity' (as, for example, defined by the mother tongue or assigned by the Soviet definition of nationality), it is this division between 'old population' and 'newcomers' that shapes people’s narrative locations and the experiences and resources they draw upon. These two groups were differently affected by Estonia’s involuntary incorporation into the Soviet Union: Narva’s old population saw their town destroyed in World War II. Most of them were displaced, fell victim to repressions and experienced the Sovietisation and Russification often as negative. Russian-speakers who moved to Estonia (who went through the period of Stalinist terror earlier) could profit from the higher living standards in the Baltic States and enjoy certain privileges (cf. Chapter 2
for a more detailed discussion of these diverging experiences). The positionings of these two groups, however, changed following Estonia’s independence from Soviet rule. The nationalisation policies empowered Estonians as the ethnic majority and disempowered Russians.

Estonia’s political elite adopted a policy of legal restorationism aiming at renationalising Estonia and restoring the pre-Soviet culture. Estonians and other members of the old population were immediately included in the political community, as they had lived in Estonia before 1940. The Russian-speaking settlers living in Estonia however were not granted automatic citizenship rights. Not only did they find themselves divided from Russia by the new national border but also their social (and legal) statuses were suddenly reversed. Without doubt, such diverging experiences (which will be analysed in more detail in the subsequent chapters) have left their mark in personal story-telling in the borderland, not only in the narrative content but also in the present structural position from which people tell their stories. Two empirical chapters address ethnicity as a structural layer that is shaped by institutionalised forms of politics and personal experiences: Chapter 6 looks at the processes of the construction of belonging and exclusion among Narva’s old population and the Russian-speaking settlers through processes of temporal orderings. Chapter 9 deals with processes of spatial orderings, and more specifically perceptions of mobility and immobility as being structured along ethnic lines.

4.4.2 Generation

Generation is a concept that has multiple meanings – from genealogical generations within families to historical generations, from arbitrarily defined age cohorts to self-conscious groups with a collective identity (for conceptual discussions, cf. Mannheim 1998, Corsten 1999, Kertzer 1983, Ryder 1965). In this thesis generations are defined in terms of generational cohorts, as groups of people who were born around the same time and who experienced historical events at the same biographical stage. In that the thesis follows Mannheim’s classic definition of generations as based on “common location in the social and historical process” (Mannheim 1998, 168) and constituted by shared historical experiences of an age cohort. While acknowledging biological factors – ageing and generational change – that shape the
role of generations, Mannheim’s concept draws upon the assumption that social and historical experiences are critical for the constitution of generations. He particularly mentions the role of formative experiences that have the potential to “coalesce into a natural view of the world” (Mannheim 1998, 168). Each generational cohort makes contact with the social heritage at a different point in time, shaping their experiences and structures of opportunity.

This conceptualisation is different from ‘age cohorts’ that divide people into groups according to their year of birth without linking it to the historical context. It is however also different from a stronger concept of generations as self-conscious and active groups that can become the engine of social change (what Mannheim called ‘generational unit’) (cf. Corsten 1999). While generational cohorts can become a source of identity – when people actively assign themselves to certain generations – the concept generation is used in the thesis in its weak form as a cohort of people that share a location within social structure. Generational cohorts differ in which events they have experienced and at which biographical stage they have experienced it and show – as illustrated in detail in Chapter 7 – different patterns of remembering and relationships to the social and political changes. Four generational groups were identified in the thesis: Generation 1945 (born between 1921 and 1944), the post-war generation (born between 1945-the mid-50s), the 'perestroika' generation (born between the late 1950s and 1979) and the post-socialist generation (born after 1980). The generation 1945 was born before World War II. Those who had lived in the borderland before the war had experienced the time of Estonian independence. In their formative years, members of the generation 1945 had experienced the war-time destruction and Stalin's regime. The post-war generation was born after the war and grew up under the Soviet regime. In the literature on Russia this generation is often called the optimistic ‘sixties’ generation (shestidesiatniki), who came of age during Khrushchev's thaw (Yurchak 2006, 31). In Chapter 7, which focuses on generational differences within the group of Russian-speakers, the first two generational cohorts were analysed together because of the similarities in how they remembered the past. Both generational cohorts (I call them the ‘socialist generations’) grew up and were socialised under the Soviet regime and shared similar experiences – they migrated to Narva after the war and experienced the reconstruction of the town and its industry;
they shared a belief in the Soviet system and experienced greater difficulties to reorient themselves after 1991. The generation of the ‘perestroika’, born between the late 1950s-1970s and came of age during the mid-1980s and experienced the social changes that led to the break-up of the Soviet Union in their formative years. Although like the previous generations they grew up in the Soviet Union and went through Soviet schooling, they were more sceptical, ironic and disbelieving in relation to the state ideology and found it easier to reorient themselves after the fall of socialism (Yurchak 2006, 31). Finally, the post-socialist generation came of age after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the border drawing. Despite the emergence of new uncertainties, they could make better use of new opportunity structures (on a comparative discussion of generations in relation to ethnic groups in Estonia cf. Vihalemm and Kalmus 2009). The age categories mentioned above are only approximate, and the boundaries of these generational cohorts are, of course, permeable. Again, as in the case of ethnic groups, generational groups should not be seen as homogeneous, as there are differences along the lines of class, educational level, political attitudes and biographical experiences, and boundaries drawn between them are not impregnable.

4.4.3 Locality

Another crucial factor shaping the narratives of people is locality, the geographical location where they live. Locality is not only perceived and interpreted in people’s sense of place but becomes relevant as geographic location linked to certain material forms and cultural, political and economic circumstances (cf. Gieryn 2000). I use it in the thesis to acknowledge the differences that exist between the border towns of Narva and Ivangorod, both on the local and nation-state scales and their position in relation to Europe that shape people’s narratives and experiences of the reconfiguring borderland. These two towns differ, among other factors, significantly in size and local infrastructure and are affected by differentiated national institutions and political trajectories. The central part of border-making is the inscription and reproduction of differences by the state. The establishment of diverging institutional (economic, political, administrative) structures and discourses – reflected in different currencies, systems of social care as well as regimes of citizenship – are part of
making the border top-down (cf. Reeves 2008, O’Dowd 2010 and Wilson and Donnan 2012). Locality, of course, should not be considered as an exclusive factor. It is one of the central characteristics of a borderland that people’s social spaces are not confined to their own locality and can make use of the different national trajectories. As van Schendel writes,

…a borderland is much more than the peripheral meeting point of two states and their institutions. Rather than considering a borderland as a transition zone, or even a crush zone between centres of sovereign territorial power, we should consider it in its own right (Van Schendel 2005, 366).

However, while acknowledging cross-border activities and the possibility of borderlanders to take advantage from multiple institutional systems and localities, we have to take into account how localities and the divergent state projects that are inscribed in them mediates trans-border activity and ways of ordering space. Locality constitutes a significant structural layer underpinning people’s practices, as the place they live in and are institutionally embedded in. It matters whether people live and spend most of their time in Narva and Ivango. Locality will be addressed in Chapter 8, which looks at the reordering of space and symbolic bordering processes between Narva and Ivango.

4.5 Conclusion

The study of vernacular narratives allows us not only to add a different set of empirical data to the study of the border region, but allows us to provide a conceptual model for studying the remaking of borders in general. In this chapter I have discussed the relation between vernacular and official narratives and how it has been conceptualised in this study in the context of previous work on borders and memory. Together with the previous chapter, it sets the framework for the empirical analysis of border-making and remembering in the Russian-Estonian borderland. I have argued for the importance of considering vernacular narratives alongside official ones. Despite calls for a ‘multidimensional’ study of borders and a focus of connections and tensions between levels of remembering that have been made by several scholars, there are still far too few studies that aim to take up this challenge. Discourses of political and cultural elites are certainly powerful in providing cultural
frameworks for ordering experiences and orientation but do not determine vernacular narratives and processes of meaning-making. As it should have become clear, the argument for a grounded study of borderland memories should not mean to replace the study of official discourses with vernacular perspectives but to analyse their interrelations, the tensions and mediations between the levels. Vernacular narratives do not exist in isolation and should not be detached from wider social developments and ways of framing them. Thus, whilst in my empirical material I will largely be drawing upon personal life-story narratives I will analyse their relations to larger narratives and place them in a social context. This enables us to consider agency in the study of borders and memory while at the same time being aware of the institutional and practical constraints that people encounter when narrating about their lives at the border. Before I will introduce the results in four substantive chapters, the next chapter discusses some of the methodological considerations that have driven this study.
Chapter 5 Methodology

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological framework of the thesis and the concrete methods that I chose to study the spatial and temporal reconfiguration of the borderland. How do people living in the borderland position themselves in the context of shifting narrative and structural frameworks? How do they re-evaluate their relations to the other side and reconsider their memories of the shared past? And how do their personal narratives relate to elite-led narratives that mark the border in time and space? I sought to answer these research questions and to employ my theoretical approach on borders and memory by using a qualitative approach combining narrative research with insights from my ethnographic fieldwork. During an extended fieldwork stay in the borderland I conducted 58 life-story interviews with people living on both sides of the border. These life-story narratives are a great source for accessing vernacular perspectives and examining temporal and spatial orderings and form the main empirical data on which the present study is based. The study is situated in the broad tradition of narrative inquiry. In line with my theoretical approach and methodological considerations in the literature, I adopt a sociological approach to narrative analysis in which narratives are not treated in isolation but are analysed in their social context and in relation to official narratives. For a better contextualisation of the interviews, the thesis draws upon additional data collected during the ethnographic fieldwork. This consists of archival documents, expert interviews, and the fieldwork diary based on my observations and encounters during the research stay.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly it introduces the methodological approach and positions it within debates on narrative inquiry. Secondly, it discusses my research stay as a border-crossing activity and gives insights into access to the field and my position within it. The remaining two sections outline the methods of data collection and analysis: life-story interviews as a method of interviewing aimed at facilitating story-telling, and the analysis of narrative strategies in relation to time and border. Throughout the sections the chapter addresses some of the challenges of
the empirical research: the conflict between depth and scope of the study, and my position as a foreigner in the field as well as the conflicting perspectives of the groups I interviewed.

5.2 Studying borderland narratives

As relatively new interdisciplinary research fields, border studies and memory studies have not yet had elaborate methodological discussions about how to best approach their research objects. Despite the calls for particular ways of studying borders – i.e. the need for ‘multiperspectival border studies’ as articulated by Rumford (2012) and Donnan and Wilson (2012), there haven’t been any explicit methodological guidelines about how to undertake such a study. Apart from Megoran’s call to integrate ethnography into political geography (Megoran 2006), there are few methodological reflexions in border studies. Also the field of memory studies has yet to fully engage in a discussion over methods. Keightley, for example, noticed a “generalised lack of systematic methodological attention devoted to the use of memory in empirical research” (Keightley 2010, 56; cf. Mihelj 2013).20

Despite this lack of debate over how to approach borders and memory empirically, there are a number of methods that are actually employed in the two fields – ranging from ethnography (Pelkmans 2006, Ballinger 2003, Berdahl 1999) to discourse analysis (Meinhof 2002, Tileaga 2008) and statistical methods (Schuman and Corning 2000, Schuman and Scott 1989), reflecting among other things the diversity of disciplines contributing to the fields. Also a study on memory and borders could use different methodological approaches: it could focus on geopolitical discourses and memory politics and use discourse analysis or content analysis for the interpretation of political statements and media representations. Or it could use survey methods to find out about public opinions on cross-border relations and evaluations of the socialist past. However, a study of the interactions between different levels that takes into account structure and agency in temporal and spatial

orderings requires a research perspective that is able to say something beyond the level of representations and aggregated statistical data. Two methodological approaches, ethnography and narrative research, correspond best to the theoretical framework outlined previously, as they both start from the local and personal level and situate it in wider frameworks. The methodological approach adopted in this study integrates some elements of both: it is based on ethnographic fieldwork in the borderland and is informed by observations, conversations and archival research collected during this time. The main focus is however on the narrative interviews that were conducted during this period and that are the main source upon which I will be drawing in my analysis. The benefit of studying narratives is that they can incorporate an awareness of time and history better than ethnography, which is often focused on social relations in the present. Conducting extensive biographical interviews in the borderland allowed me to gain insights into patterns of remembering that would have been less explicit and harder to access in an ethnographic study. While my study thus enriches the study of narratives with insights from ethnographic fieldwork – and thus goes beyond narrative studies that for example are interested in textual analysis alone – my methodological approach can be situated within the broader framework of narrative research.

Narrative research has developed at the intersection between the humanities and social sciences and can be seen as part of the re-emerging interest in qualitative inquiry since the 1970s. While its predecessors can be traced back to Thomas and Znaniecki’s *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* and the Chicago School of urban sociology in the 1920s and 1930s, it was particularly the turn to culture, language and meaning-making processes in the social sciences that created an interest in the study of narratives (Chase 2005). Narrative inquiry is not a clear methodological approach but involves different analytic lenses and disciplinary approaches (for an excellent overview, cf. Chase 2005, 2011). There are different understandings of narratives and traditions of working with them: in literary studies narratology has developed as a field of its own, focusing mainly on the technical components of literary texts. Other studies have been concerned with narratives in institutional and conversational contexts that focus more on the *how* of storytelling using ethnomethodology (Holstein and Gubrium 2000, Ezzy 2000, Poletta et al 2011)
and conversation analysis (Bamberg 2006). Often narrative here is defined as a short topical story about a particular event or a narrative about an aspect of one’s life such as an illness narrative told in a medical encounter. In line with my research focus, the methodological approach adopted in the thesis regards narratives as a practice of retrospective meaning-making. Narratives are a way through which people make sense of the world and their place in it. In contrast to text-based approaches in literary studies, the interest lies not primarily in the structural components of narratives, but in the ordering and shaping of past experiences in their social and historical context and the cultural and social resources that enable and constrain meaning-making. Individuals are regarded both as unique and as connected to social and cultural worlds and relationships that affect their life choices and life stories (for example, Lawler 2008, Maynes, Pierce and Laslett 2008, Andrews 2007, Skultans 1998, Ricoeur 1991).

Although my study builds mostly upon interview data, it was crucial for my study not just to record interviews with people but also to gain insights in the organisation of social life in past and present. As Maynes, Pierce and Laslett write:

> Individual life stories are very much embedded in social relationships and structures and they are expressed in culturally specific forms; read carefully, they provide unique insights into the connections between individual life trajectories and collective forces and institutions beyond the individual (Maynes, Pierce and Laslett 2008, 3).

This also echoes the concern of practice theory with the structures that frame practices (O’Reilly 2012). Although a detailed analysis of interviews can give us insights into the social context, we cannot rely on solely on the interview. As O’Reilly puts it,

> …practice often involves doing things without being aware of it, in the context of constraints and opportunities of which agents may not be conscious. It is important, therefore, to find ways of studying the practice of daily life and understanding it without relying solely on the views of agents (O’Reilly 2012, 159).

Following these insights, the thesis looks not only at what people say but also how their stories are embedded in and structured by social and political contexts and
official narratives that offer frames for interpretation. Furthermore, it is sensitive to historical context, for example by analysing generational experiences and how they have been shaped by certain historical constellations. Although the interviews were analysed first by themselves, their interpretation also draws upon the rich contextual information I gathered during my fieldwork in the borderland (see below for a more detailed discussion).

One of the main dilemmas in narrative research is the “trade-off between depth and scope” (Connell quoted in Maynes, Pierce and Laslett 2008, 134) – the size of the sample and the depth of insights about the particularities of narratives. I have opted for a mid-way solution. My approach is firmly qualitative and in contrast to survey studies allows for a detailed interpretative analysis of narratives. However, with a relatively large sample of 58 interviews, it is different from many studies based on narratives which work with small numbers of case-studies and focus on subjective experiences and self-construction in relation to the historical contexts. Studies based on biographical interviews are often based on the extensive analysis of one or a few cases and use them to make generalisations about experiences of, and ways of dealing with, social change (cf. Breckner, Kalekin-Fishman and Miethe 2000, Humphrey, Miller and Zdravomyslova 2003, Aarelaid-Tart and Bennich-Björkman 2012). These studies were an important inspiration for my thesis. In contrast to most of them, I chose to work with a larger number of interviews (overall 58 interviews) and focused on the main patterns in which narratives were structured rather than providing a detailed analysis and comparison of singular case studies. The decision to include a relatively large number of narratives and thus to extend the scope of the study at the expense of depth is due to my conviction that a broad perspective is required to capture the dynamics of temporal and spatial orderings in the borderland. Based on a larger sample, my methodological approach is able to give a better overview of the different patterns of making sense of the changes and ways of relating to official narratives than approaches that are more concerned with the in-depth analysis of internal structures of single cases. Furthermore, it allows me to work with different generations and ethnic groups and to capture different positionalities in the borderland, helping to counteract imagination of the borderland as a homogeneous place.
5.3 Conducting fieldwork: access to the field and research ethics

Most of the empirical data for the thesis were collected during a four-months-long fieldwork stay in the borderland between September 2011 and January 2012. Conducting interviews in both Narva and Ivangoerd, my fieldwork was in itself an exercise in border-crossing. To capture the dynamics of life in the borderland, it was crucial for me not to limit myself to one side but to see the connections and divisions between the two. Research on borders often focuses on a border community on one side of the border due to pragmatic reasons or difficulties of access. This practice, however, leads to the reproduction of the nation-state as a natural frame of social relations (Reeves 2008, Amelina et al. 2012). Rather than taking the border for granted reproducing the state's account, the interest in the border itself and the remaking of spatial and temporal orderings suggested a multi-sited research perspective that included both border towns. Furthermore, the analytical focus on ethnicity, generation and locality helped me to move away from a national perspective. To facilitate the organisation of interviews in both towns and to gain direct insights into the life in Narva and Ivangoerd, I moved half way through my fieldwork to Ivangoerd where I was living for a month before returning to Narva where I had rented a flat. Living in both towns and crossing the border on a regular basis I could not only better capture different positionalities and ways of experiencing the border, but also better generate insights into navigation of the border in everyday life: the usage of two currencies, Russian roubles and Euros, and two sim-cards depending on whether I called to Russia or Estonia; the need to take into account the two hour time difference between Russia and Estonia when organising interviews on the other side and a sensibility towards the differences between the two towns – as when my participants started comparing the streets, infrastructure and prices on both sides.

I became interested in doing research on the Russian-Estonian border in the context of a collaborative research project on memories of the Cold War in border towns alongside the Iron Curtain based at the Ludwig-Boltzmann Institute in Vienna, where I was working as a research assistant. While my role in the project was to analyse local newspaper articles on the erection and fall of the Iron Curtain between East and West Germany, the project sparked my interest in borders in general, and I became
interested in extending the research to Europe's new borders with Russia. I was born and grew up in Austria's capital Vienna but had been studying the Russian language since entering university and had spent several months as a student, researcher and tourist in the country. In contrast to the opening borders within Europe, territorial borders between Russia and its European neighbours have been reinforced, creating new experiences of divisions against the background of shared memories of socialism in Europe's East. In my view, these bordering dynamics had not been sufficiently explored in the scholarly literature. When I left Vienna for Saint Petersburg to enrol in a master's programme in Russian and Eurasian Studies, I started with the support of the Boltzmann-Institute to gather information on the Russian-Estonian border, particularly on the Estonian border town of Narva. Narva was easy to reach from Saint Petersburg, and I went there in November 2009 for the first time, and again for a three-week long period in January 2010 when I interviewed Narva’s Russian-speaking population who had been divided from Russia by the international border.

My first encounter with Narva was not particularly positive: I entered the field with few personal contacts and during a time when it was already getting cold and dark outside. In my first meetings – mainly facilitated by social organisations that I had contacted in advance – my position as an outsider became obvious: I was a foreigner and a student in her late twenties, wanting to interview people who were mostly twice my age or older and belonged to a different social background. Several people living in the border town perceived me as an official representative of a foreign country who needs to be told the ‘true story’ of the Russian-speaking community, and although they were happy to talk about the nationalisation of Estonia and the painful division between Narva and Ivangorod in general, it was more difficult to find people who agreed for a recorded interview about their personal experiences of it. My position as an outsider was however not always a disadvantage: many people perceived me with curiosity, saw in me an opportunity to be heard or simply wanted to help me. Particularly in Ivangorod, which in contrast to Narva was not

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21 Having spent more time in the field I started to see articulations of collective complaints among middle-aged and elderly Russian-speakers as an interesting result in itself and as part of their claim for recognition.
struggling with the negative consequences of nationalisation and citizenship laws, curiosity and interest were the most common reaction. In one of the first meetings I had arranged with the local Technical Institute to speak to and potentially interview some students, I found myself in a large hall with an audience of about thirty-five people including members of staff who not only wanted to hear about my research but also about my opinions about EU foreign policy towards Russia and recent political developments more generally. In general in Ivangoord it was much easier to find people who were ready to share their story with their ‘European surprise guest’ – not least this was due to the smaller size of the Russian town where everybody seemed to know everyone. But also Narva, with the help of an emerging network of contacts, became more accessible over time and changed from a site that I initially had found ‘difficult’ to access to a more diverse and even friendly place in which I was often invited to visit participants again to have tea with them, and where many were ready to help me to arrange interviews with their friends and family members.

Apart from the access to the field, another challenge of my fieldwork was that I wanted to conduct interviews with different ethnic groups, not only with the Russian-speakers who constituted the majority of people living in the borderland but also with Narva’s old population. Members of these two groups had very different stories to tell and articulated competing claims of belonging and victimhood (analysed in detail in Chapter 6). In her ethnography of the contested borderland between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, Pamela Ballinger describes that she felt conflicted interviewing people with different backgrounds and political associations; it was as if she was “betraying one or the other group by consorting with the ‘enemy’” (Ballinger 2003, 6). Although the situation in the Russian-Estonian borderland was less polarised and I was never questioned on the fact that I wanted to interview both Russian-speakers and Narva's old population22, I sometimes felt uncomfortable when being confronted with exclusive claims of belonging and generalisations on the other group. Some of the participants engaged in a virtual argument with members of the other group over

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22 This was not least due to the fact that Russian-speakers constituted the unquestionable majority in the borderland, so that the need to interview them was apparent. On the other hand, Narva's old minority was small and most Russian-speakers blamed not them but the Estonian state or the Estonian nation for their victimisation.
the character of the socialist past, and questions of territorial belonging and victimhood, trying to convince me of their ‘truth’. My strategy for dealing with this situation was to listen with attentiveness to what people were telling me and to try to understand the reasons and motivations behind their positions, while remaining sensitive to silences and exclusion. Josselson has pointed out that narrative research is based on an empathic and respectful relationship between the participant and the researcher and involves a responsibility during the whole encounter to the dignity, privacy and well-being of those who are studied (Josselson 2007). Developing a respectful and sensitive relationship with my participants and listening to what they had to say and why, was a crucial part of my fieldwork. My position as a foreigner was certainly helpful in that regard as I was not clearly associated with one or the other group and could position myself as somebody who in the first instance wanted to understand their story, rather than questioning them on what they had to say. Listening to their story, however, did not mean accepting everything that my participants said at face value. Particularly the fact that I spoke to different groups helped to put certain claims into perspective. For example, my interviews and conversations with the old Narvitiane, who had lived in the borderland before the Soviet annexation, made me aware of the omissions in the narratives of many Russian-speakers, and vice versa. However, most of the times life-story narratives were not only based on exclusions and stereotypes and in themselves included contradictions and relativisations.

Alongside with these more general concerns, the research followed formal ethical guidelines required by the university: I gained approval for my research strategies by Loughborough’s Ethical Advisory Committee, and handed out a participant information sheet and obtained informed consent from all my interviewees.

5.4 Data collection

Contact with my participants was established with the help of gatekeepers, through voluntary organisations like folklore clubs and veteran associations, educational institutions like the Narva College and the Technical Institute in Ivangoord, businesses, as well as personal contacts. I was lucky to have the support of a number of people in helping me to orient myself in Narva and Ivangoord and in establishing
contacts to potential interviewees. Most of the institutions I had contacted to find participants reacted positively to my inquiry and helped me to organise meetings with their members, to inform them about my research, and eventually to organise personal meetings for interviews. Several people offered me their help to find respondents among their circle of friends and relatives; some of them I had already interviewed earlier (‘snowball sampling’). The growing number of contacts that I established during my fieldwork enabled me not only to organise a relatively large number of interviews in a short time but also to get access to a wide range of participants of diverse ethnic and educational backgrounds. Some of these contacts extended across the border, so when I moved to Ivangoerd I could already draw upon a large number of people who were interested in an interview. To better oversee and control the sampling process, I had developed an ‘ideal sample structure’ in advance, which encompassed generational cohorts, gender and ethnic groups. This structure was used as an orientation and provided me with some guidance in the process of searching for participants. For example, in both towns it was easier to find women who were willing to participate in the research and to speak about their lives, so I directly asked my gatekeepers for male participants.

While a study based on narrative interviews cannot claim to be representative in a statistical sense, the number of interviews and their different backgrounds helped to identify the main patterns of narrating about the past and engaging with the border. Although every life-story was different and had its individual twists and turns, joys and sufferings, particularly at the end of the fieldwork stay, I felt a familiarity with many of the stories I was told. The complex situation in Narva (Ivangoerd was smaller and ethnically more homogeneous) had made me anxious that I had not collected enough data and was the main reason why I went beyond the intended sample size of 40 interviews. At the same time, I realised that the themes kept repeating themselves – a good indicator for theoretical saturation of the sample (cf. Rosenthal 2005, 87). Despite the relatively large number of interviews, the sample is still far from being representative in a statistical sense. This means that I cannot make conclusions on the distribution of certain ways of remembering and border-making among certain groups. The main strength of the qualitative analysis is to its interpretative approach, which allows to identify the broad patterns of how people
narrate about their lives as well as to get a close understanding of the meanings of these narratives.

Altogether I conducted 58 interviews in the borderland, 35 in Narva and 23 in Ivangorod. Among them were 37 women and 21 men, 57 Russian-speakers and 12 members of the old (largely Estonian) population; 15 born between 1922 and 1945 (Generation WWII), 16 born between 1946 and 1959 (post-war generation), 14 born between 1960 and 1980 (‘Perestroika’ Generation), 13 born after 1981 (post-socialist generation).

Table 5.1 Interview sample in Narva and Ivangorod according to ethnicity and generation

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<th>Narva</th>
<th>Ivangorod</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian-speaking population</td>
<td>Estonians / Old Narvitiane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation 1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-war generation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Perestroika’ Generation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist Generation</td>
<td>6</td>
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A detailed explanation of the interview structure including the year of birth and the profession can be found in the appendix. The interviews were between 45 and 210 minutes long and usually took place in the home of the participant. A few interviews were conducted in public places like coffee houses or the venue of their leisure club, according to the participants’ preferences.

All the interviews were conducted in the Russian language. I had learnt the Estonian language before my fieldwork stay in the borderland but although I was able to have simple conversations, conducting an interview about the complexities of life in the borderland went far beyond my basic language skills. I thus had to rely on my
participants’ knowledge of the Russian language, something that posed at least potentially a problem, since for many Estonians Russian was the language of the Soviet occupation. I tried to address the language issue directly in the encounters with my Estonians, showing my appreciation of their willingness to speak Russian. In contrast to other parts of the country, the problems emerging from my limited language knowledge were mitigated by the fact that Estonia’s North-Eastern borderland was largely Russophone. Estonians living in Narva were used to speaking Russian and used it in their everyday lives to communicate with their neighbours, in local shops and institutions. Furthermore, the fact that I was myself a non-Russian native contributed to a more positive perception.

The approach to narrative that I have outlined above suggests a particular perspective on the interview and its participants. Traditionally interviews in the social sciences have been regarded as passive instruments for obtaining information. From this perspective interviewers are concerned with the minimisation of distortion and seek to pose questions in a way to get a truthful answer from their interviewees. However, scholars have criticised the limitations of this perspective and have argued to see interviews as a site of interpretative work (cf. Holstein and Gubrium 2011, 1995). Rather than eliciting 'undistorted' and 'truthful' accounts, active meaning-making activities are a hallmark of all interviews. Interviews should thus be conducted in a way that is open and allows these processes of interpretation and meaning-making to take place.

For the thesis I used the biographical-narrative interview as a specific way of conducting interviews (Rosenthal 2005 and 1995, Schütze 1987 and 1983, Hollway and Jefferson 2000). Biographical interviews are based on extended accounts of lives that develop over the course of one or several interviews and give us access to ways of temporal and spatial orderings as part of the narration about past and present experiences. In contrast to more structured qualitative interviews, these interviews are based on a very open questioning technique, which aims to elicit stories and create space for people to structure their accounts. Hollway and Jefferson have summarised basic principles for conducting narrative interviews in the following way: the interviewer should ask open-ended questions and proceed in a way that elicits stories. Furthermore, he or she should follow up using informants' ordering
and phrasing, and to avoid ‘why’ questions as they lead to argumentations and disconnections from people's lives (Hollway and Jefferson 2000, 34-36). Moreover, I followed the suggestions of Rosenthal and Schütze to conduct the interviews in two phases: in the first phase, the interviews start with an open initial question, followed by a main narration, which is structured by the participant herself. Only in the second part of the interview does the interviewer ask the narrator about additional and more detailed information relating to her life-story or specific events (Schütze 1987, 1983, Rosenthal 1995). I usually had tea with my informants before we started with the interview and had already explained earlier that I was interested in life-stories of people living in Narva and Ivangorod and how they had experienced the transformation of the borderland. When we sat down for the recorded interview as a rule I repeated my research interest and asked them to ‘tell about yourself and your life in Narva/Ivangorod’. I would start posing questions only after they were finished. After the main narration, I followed up with questions of clarification (for example, ‘you’ve mentioned your move to Narva; can you tell me more about what brought you to Narva?’, ‘How do you remember the formation of the border?’). Additionally, I prepared more specific questions that I posed to all my participants about life in a border town and the changes it had undergone (‘Do you think life in a border town different from other places?’, ‘When was the best, when was the worst time to live here?’). I enquired into the meaning of the border in their lives and how often they crossed it. The advantage of this phase-model of interviewing (an open narration in the beginning, followed by questions of clarification and more specific questions) is that especially in the first part the informant can structure his/her account freely without much intervention, and is able to decide on the basis of her own relevances, which experiences and events are to be included in the narrative. The result was often long and detailed stories that allowed for a good analysis of the narrative emplotment (described in more detail below). While this specific interviewing technique worked well with some people, others had different expectations of the interviewer and relied more on questions. The method of the biographical interview was used in a pragmatic manner to adjust it to such situations. Although I sought to formulate my questions as openly as possible, in some interviews – particularly with younger informations – the main narration was very short and subsequently I took on a more active role in asking questions.
Along with the narrative interviews, the thesis draws upon a number of other sources to access the social and historical context and the official narratives. Most importantly the thesis uses secondary literature – historical, sociological and political studies on Estonia and Russia as well as more general literature on borders and memory – to contextualise the interviews and gain information on the official narratives circulating in Russia and Estonia, and on the sociohistorical context in which individuals are positioned. Additional contextual information was collected during the ethnographic fieldwork stay. Firstly, my experience of living in Narva and Ivangorod, observations and conversations during the four months period of my fieldwork stay, helped me to gain insights into the organisation of daily life. During this time I participated in local life, and among other things went to social gatherings and seminars, made friends, went for extensive walks, read the local newspaper, went shopping at the market and in the new shopping centres, crossed the border several times. Although this was not equivalent to putting myself in the situation of people who were living there permanently, these activities gave me valuable insights into the life in the borderland. I documented my experiences and observations during my stay in the borderland in an extensive fieldwork diary (approx. 70 pages) on which I will draw in the empirical chapters to add to the analysis of the interviews. Secondly, additional contextual data were collected by interviewing officials from the local administration, museums and tourism and border guards about their area of expertise: the political, economic and social situation in Narva, cross-border cooperation and the historical development of the control regime, and more generally the history of the borderland (cf. appendix for more information on the interviewed officials). These interviews provide insights into social structures and circumstances which enable and constrain story-telling; more particularly, I collected data on the local settings (information on local politics and problems and priorities for local development), changing border regulations, ethnicity and generation (statistical data and information on citizenship legislation in Estonia as well as interviews with the members of the Old Narva society on their minority status within Narva). Thirdly, I visited the library and archives and accessed books, historical documents and newspaper coverage on the borderland. The archival research focused particularly on the socialist past and the time of the border drawing between the late
1980s and mid-90s in order to gain insights into the history of connections and divisions of Narva and Ivangoord.

5.5 Data analysis

The data analysis focused in the first instance on the analysis of the narrative interviews and narrative strategies in relation to time and border, with the additional sources being used to contextualise them. Narrative inquiry involves a particular way of approaching data: it focuses not simply on the content which is represented, but also opens up to forms of telling about experience: why was a story told that way? (Riessman 2001, 697). Furthermore, it pays attention to the sequentiality of the interview – the order in which experiences are told. Narrative analysis thus signifies a move away from a theme-oriented method of data analysis based on codes and categories (in which the sequences are divided from its context) to a case-oriented approach that focuses on the narrative as a whole before making comparisons across cases (Chase 2005, Riessmann 2012, Rosenthal 2005, 71-74).

For the data analysis the interviews were first transcribed by Russian native-speakers to secure accuracy and anonymised, using Estonian names for my Estonian participants and Slavic names for the Russian-speaking participants. Narva and Ivangoord are relatively small towns and for insiders it is not hard to identify certain people according to their professional and leisure activities. Due to this fact, I sometimes slightly changed or left out biographical data in the characterisation of the participants without however changing key characteristics.

The interview transcripts were analysed in the following way: firstly, I read the transcript as a whole to familiarise myself with the case and noted down peculiarities. This was followed by a careful analysis of the main narration. A detailed plan of the structure of the account was compiled specifying themes and subthemes in the interview. This method is based on the assumption that a narrative does not consist of a number of unconnected parts but that the parts relate to each other to form one or sometimes several plots (for a detailed discussion and theoretical foundation cf. Rosenthal 1998). I analysed this structure using the following questions: How does the narrator structure the account and why – what
does he or she do when telling the story in this way? Which themes are mentioned and how are they connected? What alternative ways of narrating can be imagined? In analysing the structure of the main narration, particular attention was paid to modes of narrating time – the narration of continuity and discontinuity (turning points), the narrative shape and evaluation of certain periods (i.e. progress or decline) as well as to modes of spatial orderings in the narratives: the construction of inclusion and exclusion, the ways of relating inside and outside and evaluating the border (i.e. as protection or barrier, as legitimate or illegitimate). Furthermore, those narrative strategies of ordering time and space were analysed in relation to official discourses – how does the narrator relate to official discourses, what cultural resources does he or she use to structure her account?

In addition to the narrative analysis that focused on the structure of the narrative as a whole, I conducted a detailed analysis of sequences, particularly on the construction of inclusions and exclusions and ways of engaging with the border – something that was not always clear from the main narrative. In the analysis of selected thematic sequences I focused again on the narrative strategies mentioned above and particularly on the words that were chosen by the narrators. The analysis of the narrative structure and the analysis of selected thematic sequences were first conducted on a case-study basis. After a number of cases had been analysed, I made comparisons across the cases to identify main patterns of narrating and contextualised them using secondary literature and other data collected during my fieldwork: the fieldwork diary and expert interviews. These helped to situate the interviews historically and to place the narrators within the larger picture of a borderland in transformation.

Comparing patterns of remembering and border-making, I focused on similarities and differences on the basis of ethnicity, generation and locality. As mentioned earlier, these sociostructural categories were most important not only in relation to my theoretical interest in borders and memory but also significantly shaped my empirical material. Using them as a basis for my comparisons allowed me to keep the relatively large and diverse number of life-story interviews manageable. That said, not all of the chapters examine each of the sociostructural categories in equal depth. Rather, each chapter has a distinct empirical and theoretical focus, and addressed particular
research questions by drawing on sets of comparisons relevant to the question. The first two chapters focus on the role of ethnic and generational differences in shaping vernacular memories, and do so by focusing exclusively on interview materials from the Estonian town of Narva: Chapter 6 is based on the comparison along ethnic lines, the differences between Narva’s old population and the Russian-speaking newcomers. This division is crucial for understanding temporal orderings in the borderland and is characteristic for Narva where despite the small numbers of the old population, the memory of the old population has been locally promoted and regular social and commemorative events are held for them. In contrast, only very few members of the old population live in Ivangoord and their memory is not publicly celebrated. The population of Ivangoord is thus largely ethnically homogeneous, and in contrast to Narva, ethnicity does not play an equally prominent role in shaping the recollections of the past. This is not to say that the memories of participants from Ivangoord are devoid of links to ethnicity. My participants’ life stories were, of course, developed in dialogue with official national (Russian) narratives of the past. However, because of the additional complexities of ethnic composition in Narva this context provided an analytically richer setting. Chapter 7 focuses on generational differences among Russian-speakers living in Narva. This focus allowed me to address the internal differences within this group and to discuss issues of continuity and discontinuity in temporal orderings in a situation of when historical narratives change. Again, this was something that was more pronounced in Estonian Narva than in Ivangoord where there has been greater continuity in the historical narratives of the state, as well as comparatively greater continuity in vernacular memories, and hence the differences between generations and their memories were less pronounced. The subsequent two chapters are based on material from both border towns, as the patterns of spatial and temporal orderings relevant to my arguments become most clearly apparent when including narratives from both sides of the border. Chapter 8 compares patterns of spatial orderings between Narva and Ivangoord and looks at the reconfiguration of symbolic borders between Estonia and Russia, West and East. For this chapter, it was crucial to include perspectives from both sides of the border to analyse how locality – whether people live in Narva or Ivangoord – structures people's narratives about the changes. Likewise, Chapter 9 draws upon interviews from both Narva and Ivangoord but foregrounds differences in making sense of
mobility and enclosure along ethnic lines, picking up some of the concerns of Chapter 6. Again, as concerns over cross-mobility were articulated in relation to the other, it was important to include perspectives from both towns.

5.6 Conclusion

Building upon the theoretical framework, the methodological approach adopted in this thesis is concerned with the collection and analysis of narratives and is situated in the broad methodological perspective of narrative inquiry. While there are many ways of collecting and analysing narrative data, my approach focuses on narrative strategies as articulated in life-story interviews, analyses them in relation to official narratives circulating in the public sphere, and takes into account the narrative location from which people speak. Life-story narratives are reflective accounts of what people have lived through and are central sites of what Katherine Verdery has called the ‘reordering of meaningful worlds’ after the fall of socialism (Verdery 1999). Analysing them gives us insights into their ways of positioning themselves within changing spatial and temporal frameworks and the resources and constraints shaping the meaning-making activities. While the interviews already contain insights into the structural contexts in which they are situated, I combine them with additional material from my ethnographic fieldwork.
Chapter 6 The dynamics of memory in a multiethnic borderland

6.1 Introduction

A border comes to existence through the erection of fences, gates and controls. These hard facts are however not sufficient to fix it and make it appear legitimate. As ‘discursive landscapes of social power’ (Paasi 2011), borders rely on the power of symbolic narratives which invest them with meaning and turn them into seemingly natural divisions in space. Temporal orderings play a crucial role in this process; putting past, present and future into a narrative order, they provide territorial divisions with historical depth (cf. Chapter 3). Particularly when it comes to new borders, historical memories are mobilised to ‘prove’ that the establishment of statehood follows a ‘natural’ historical development and is the expression of an ancient will of its people for independence (Zhurzhenko 2011). Temporal orderings are then not a direct reflection of history ‘how it was’, but are politically constituted – they reflect a selective interpretation of the past and are related to a present-day imagining of a political community.

The post-Soviet states of Russia and Estonia have chosen very different ways of ‘reordering’ time after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the demise of the teleological temporal order connected to it (for an overview of different narrative strategies in Eastern Europe, cf. Troebst 2005). Similar to other countries in the region, Estonia has externalised the socialist past and has presented the period of Soviet rule as a ‘rupture’ in the history of the nation (Koresaar 2004). Bracketing off the socialist past, restorationist narratives have sought to re-establish continuity with the inter-war period of independent statehood positing the fall of socialism in terms of a national liberation and a return to a ‘European course of history’ (Lagerspetz 1999). Memory politics in Russia have in contrast encountered more difficulties in providing a meaningful national narrative and in defining the borders of its political community. Unable to externalise the socialist past, official Russian narratives are shaped by greater continuity with Soviet times. After a short period of seeking to establish distance vis-à-vis the socialist past, the victory over Nazi-Germany and the
liberation of Europe from fascism has become the centre piece of historical narratives of the Russian state seeking to sustain the image of national glory and heroism (Tumarkin 1994, Gabovich 2005). Stressing the victory in World War II has furthermore been used to establish Russia’s position as a European state and international geopolitical actor (Prozorov 2009).

Much of the literature on memory politics in the region has focused on these ‘incompatible’ historical narratives between states and ethnic groups which draw upon opposing interpretations of the past: what was occupation and loss of independence for Estonia is celebrated as victory and liberation from fascism in Russia (for example Kattago 2012; Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008; Lehti, Jutila and Jokisipilä 2008). This chapter focuses on vernacular narratives in the borderland to further explore the link between temporal orderings and ethnicity. It analyses the divergent temporal orderings of two ethnic groups living in Narva. One comprises the older, predominantly Estonian inhabitants who had lived in the border town of Narva and its surroundings before World War II; the other includes Soviet-era settlers, mostly from Russia but also from other Soviet republics who moved to Narva after the town’s destruction in the war and who now constitute a large majority (over 95%). The chapter focuses on the narrative strategies of these two groups in relation to the past, and shows how temporal orderings as processes of meaning-making are linked to different politics of space and contribute to remaking or questioning national borders.

At the same time, this chapter aims to examine more closely the relationship between official narratives and vernacular memories and shows that these temporal orderings found in vernacular narratives are not homogeneous and static. Studies on collective memory and ethnicity often put emphasis on consensus and the shared character of stories about the past. Anthony Smith, for example, writes that

…ethnicity is defined, first of all, by a collective belief in common origins and descent, however fictive, and thereafter by shared historical memories associated with a specific territory which they (the ethnic groups) regard as their ‘homeland’ (Smith 199, 208; my emphasis).

This focus on shared memories of ethnic groups is also wide-spread in studies on Russian and Estonian collective memories. Authors writing about ‘divided
memories’ between states and ethnic groups have often adopted a static and bounded conception of memory as they tend to take the oppositional narratives for granted and juxtapose them as stable positions regarding the past. Particularly when it comes to the memory of Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority, authors tend to equate official and vernacular forms of remembering. However, such an approach is too simple as it leaves out the ways in which Estonian national narratives might transform Russian-speakers' ways of making sense of the past. More significantly, the assumption of a divided memory cannot account for the plurality of memories on the socialist past which can be found within Estonian society, and also cannot account for the inconsistencies, dynamism and the multiplicity of temporal orderings embedded in everyday processes of remembering (for a critique of dominant assumptions regarding national temporalities, cf. Edensor 2006 and Bell 2003). A popular alternative would be to point to fissures in collective memory and to focus on the resistances and alternative temporalities of popular memory, as for example suggested by a Foucauldian approach or the Popular Memory group (Foucault 1977, Popular Memory Group 1982). As elaborated in Chapter 4, this thesis follows a different approach to memory and regards it as an ongoing negotiation between official narratives and vernacular memories. Rather than thinking of memory in terms of either consensus or conflict, it is more productive – and more accurate in terms of how personal narratives work – to look at how the two are interwoven and how dominant ways of ordering time are negotiated, adopted and contested in personal meaning making processes (cf. Misztal 2003; Cubitt 2007, 199-242). The chapter thus analyses how national narratives can work as resources for orienting oneself in and across time while at the same time acknowledging that these narratives cannot account for all experiences and necessarily produce exclusions (for example, Gallinat 2006). Furthermore, the analysis presented here also suggests that personal memories do not only engage with national narratives of the own ethnic group but that memory work takes place “in overlapping networks of relations that shift over time and space” (Somers 1994, 603). More specifically memory is not necessary congruent with ethnic boundaries and Russians can for instance adopt and make use of Estonian official narratives, and vice versa.
The chapter is divided into two large parts – one about the memories of the old population, the other about the settlers. In each part I will outline their characteristic emplotment structures of people’s life-story narratives and discuss how these ways of temporal ordering are part of bordering processes and linked to constructions of inclusions and exclusions. I will show that shaped by their divergent experiences and polarised official narratives, ethnic groups remember time in competing ways and found their belonging in different time periods. Estonians’ memory narratives present the socialist past in terms of suffering and displacement, and construct continuity to Estonia’s first period of independent statehood while excluding the Russian-speaking settlers. Russian-speakers on the contrary recall the socialist past in terms of progress and well-being and draw upon this past to insert themselves into the local and national collective. However, as I will outline for both the old Narvitiane and the Russian-speakers, alongside dominant models of temporal orderings, alternative temporalities and less exclusive ways of imagining belonging can be found in the memory narratives of both groups.

6.2 Memories of Old Narva, memories of loss: temporal orderings in the narratives of ‘Old Narvitiane’

The ‘Old Narvitiane’ I have interviewed form a distinct mnemonic community supported by social institutions and annual commemorative activities. Many of them are members of the Estonian society, the Eesti selts, which forms a meeting-point particularly for older Estonians living in Narva and organise regular folk dancing lessons, handicraft sessions and other gatherings as well as annual activities to celebrate national holidays, to take care of the cemeteries and to commemorate the victims of Stalinist repressions (fieldwork notes, 19.10.2011). Along with ethnic Estonians, other members of Narva’s old population, people from mixed marriages and Russians who had grown up in pre-war Estonia, participate in these activities. During my fieldwork I attended several meetings of the society, and I met several of my participants with their help. From these encounters and the interviews that I conducted with them, it became clear that the Old Narvitiane saw themselves as different from the majority of Narva’s population due to their memories of pre-war Narva and their experiences of violence related to the war and the Stalinist
repressions in the borderland. This sense of difference was already reflected in the name, the Old Narvitiane, which linked their identity back to the old town before its destruction in World War II. Furthermore, they had a peculiar position within Narva: they were empowered by the nationalisation of Estonia, gaining in contrast to the Russian-speaking settlers automatic citizenship rights and experiencing the promotion of their language locally. However, while belonging to the national majority, they remained marginalised within the town due to their small numbers locally.²³

When narrating their life-stories, many of the old Narvitiane adopted the tripartite temporal structure characteristic of the official historical narratives in Estonia: they narrated the inter-war period in terms of a ‘state of origin’ or ‘Golden Age’, followed by the period of Soviet occupation usually characterised in terms of ‘suffering’ and ‘displacement’ and as being finally was reversed with the restoration of independence in the post-Soviet period. Some of the interviewees diverged somewhat and included earlier experiences and events or the German occupation between 1941 and 1944 but in the overall structure of the accounts these events were of minor importance. Although the individual stories and the thematic foci of the interviews differed, this dominant narrative served as a reference point for organising personal experiences. These experiences of suffering during the Soviet rule were usually temporally extended to encompass not only the time of Stalinism but also the following decades of socialism (‘extended displacement’). The Soviet-era suffering was contrasted to the inter-war period characterised by cultural vibrancy and multicultural openness in contrast to the Russian monoculture and the cultural wasteland of the Soviet period.

Many of my participants and their family members had been victims of the Stalinist repressions. They had experienced displacement by the war and started their narrative with the violence they experienced in Narva in the 1940s: the arrival of the Soviets in 1940 and the subsequent deportations²⁴, the war and destruction of the

²³ For this reason, Narva is the only town in Estonia which has an Estonian society to promote Estonian culture.

²⁴ Violence during the occupation by the Germans was mentioned only by one interviewee. The narrators had experienced violence predominantly by the Red Army, in the war and under Soviet rule.
Laura opened her life-story narrative by mentioning her birth in pre-war Narva. Stating the place and date of birth was in her case not only a narrative convention but also historically significant as it is related to experiences of violence following the installation of Soviet rule in Estonia. Multiple events were closely related in the account and formed together a story of her family’s displacement from Narva: the first signs of the Soviet regime, the murder of her grandfather and father in 1940 and 1944, the war, the restrictions that Laura and her mother experienced when they wanted to move back to Narva. As she explained further in the interview, as an inhabitant of the ‘Old town’ she and her family were suspicious in the eyes of the Soviets, and it took Laura 15 years to move back to the borderland – an experience that she shared with several other people I interviewed. Laura went to school in Tallinn and received her education as a geography teacher in Armenia. After she had finished university, she registered with a friend who lived in Ivangorod and thus could work locally despite the restrictions put in place by the Soviet authorities. Only in 1970 she could obtain an official registration in Narva. In Laura’s narrative, the events starting with the arrest of her grandfather in 1940 are characterised in terms of a disruption of her family’s life and more generally, the previous life in Narva. While she managed to work as a teacher during the socialist past and positioned herself as
somebody who could look back at a successful professional career, these early experiences of violence and disruption shaped the way she evaluated Soviet rule. In a later part of the interview, when I asked her to tell more about her difficulties to register in Narva, Laura characterised the disruption of the old way of life in more general terms:

Alena: This means you are one of the few who could return…

Laura: One of those, yes. Now mostly newcomers from Russia live in Narva. They started rebuilding (the town). The hydro station was built. Many of those who participated in the construction received a flat and stayed here. When after the war the Krenholm factories were put into operation, they needed sewers. And they took on sewers who already knew their work. They came here and then they agitated others, their relatives to come. And that’s why now we have already the second and third generation of those living here who moved here after the war. Of course, you have old people. In our house, too, who moved here in the beginning of the 50s and who were working in the factories. They are pensioners and of course, that they were called occupants offended them. They came here because that was the politics of this time, to settle, so that there were fewer local people, who wanted to live like before the war. Before the war Estonia used to live well. But the intelligentsia was sent to Siberia and those who lived well in the villages. They were turned into kulaki and sent off (to Siberia). Those who could, fled abroad in 1944… the best left. Scientists, artists, writers. And those who came here were… well who moves to a construction site? Who moved here? Workers. And of course, the culture was not the same. Before the war, Narva had its theatre, many singers who were from Narva. Georg Ots was born in Narva, Gurev, Viktor Gurev, and Arthur Rinna, singers. All Narvitiane. Vera Neilus. Paul Keres, the chess player, also a Narvitian. (…) In Narva the culture was highly developed… before the war.

(Interview with Laura, b.1936, 23.10.2011)

In this statement, Laura described the general changes happening in Narva after the war as the town was reconstructed by Russian newcomers. While the first part of the account is relatively neutral, Laura identifies the settlement of the newcomers as part of the Soviet politics, displacing the previous population and their way of life. Laura used contrasting images of a time 'before' and 'afterwards' to set apart the time before and after the war: the pre-war high culture and its representatives (Russians and
Estonians) are opposed to workers at a construction site; 'the best' were deported or left and were replaced by the working class.

In all accounts of the Old Narvitiane that I spoke to during my fieldwork research, displacement and suffering were the characteristic frames for narrating about the war and the Stalinist period. More than for other Estonian towns, for Narva these years signified a break. As the Old town was almost totally destroyed during the war and resettlement restrictions impeded the pre-war inhabitants to move back after their evacuation, alongside with experiences of deportation war displacement was a common experience among pre-war inhabitants. If the Old Narvitiane managed to return to Narva after the war, they indeed encountered a place that differed radically from the one they had left.

Analysing narratives of displacement of Italians, who used to live in Istria, Pamela Ballinger identified a somewhat similar temporal ordering to the one found in the narratives of the Old Narvitiane; the Italian émigré’s stories were usually divided into three: a state of origin, displacement and (partial) integration (Ballinger 2003, 183). However, what was characteristic of the narratives of some of my informants is that the second stage was temporally extended: Putting emphasis on experiences of suffering, deprivation and hardships during the whole period of Soviet rule, they narrated the socialist past in terms of an extended displacement which continued after the years of war and Stalinist terror and was reversed only by the restoration of the state’s independence.

This was particularly explicit in the narrative of Sofia, an ethnic Estonian, whose family had returned to Narva almost immediately after the war when the Soviet restrictions were not yet in place. Sofia’s narrative focused on the dissolution of borders between her homeland Estonia and a negatively depicted Soviet Union, which threatened the status of the local population including herself. Her memories of the socialist period centred on the influx of Russian settlers, experiences of personal limitations and scarcity. The borderland in the post-war years resembled a construction site, and as becomes evident from archival sources, housing shortages were usual not only in the immediate aftermath of the war but also in later decades (cf. Konchenovskii 1991, 227). Sofia used her experiences of the Soviet distribution of living space – based on a waiting line system and privileges for certain groups of
people – as part of her narrative of extended displacement. Sofia used to live together with her husband and daughter at her mother’s place, and according to the Soviet housing programme she should have been entitled to receive her own flat:

If I think back when I was married, I had a child, a daughter. I was living with my mother. I wanted to receive a flat. And to receive a flat… here you could not simply buy a flat, but where you worked, you had to line up, and when it was your turn you could receive a flat. Specialists received a flat first, out of turn. Well and so many specialists arrived, and I used to be first in the waiting line and still didn’t receive a flat for years. I went to the Ispolkom [executive committee] and said ‘I need a flat.’ And he said: ‘You need a flat? You live with your mother, you have a roof over your head and you want a flat?! We have people who sleep at the railway station. On their suitcases. They have nowhere to live.’ And I said foolishly: ‘But why do they come here if they don’t have a place to stay?’ He got angry: ‘Leave my office’ and I received my flat when I was 45 years and had two children. (…) I was 45 when I received a flat although I was born in Narva and my mother was born in Narva. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946, 26.10.2011)

Sofia used this story to illustrate what she called the ‘Soviet order’, an order which limited her personal life-chances and which produced benefits for strangers while excluding her and other inhabitants of what had become ‘Old Narva’. The denied flat is a symbol of the denial of a place in her home town. As in other narratives, the Soviet state and its institutions are depicted as serving the Soviet settlers and acting against the local population not only through direct acts of terror but also in more mundane practices like the distribution of housing. In the life-story narratives these memories of suffering and displacement were often articulated in collective terms and related to national narratives. As Sofia argued at the end of her narration:

The Estonians went through a lot. Some people less, some people more. My relatives (…) weren’t sent to Siberia. But there were other forms of suffering. Every family was suffering in some way, no matter how, under this Soviet power. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946, 26.10.2011)

While suffering and hardships were recurrent themes in narrating about the socialist past, these memories were inextricably linked to the memory of the inter-war period as a better past, a state of origin before the disruption – as it has been articulated in
Laura’s quotation above (cf. Koresaar’s analysis of the Soviet past as a ‘filter’ through which earlier experiences are evaluated, Koresaar 2004). Most of my participants were too young to have detailed memories of the pre-war period or were born after the war and knew about the life in Old Narva only through the stories of their relatives. Through the lens of childhood memories, transmitted stories and images and influenced by later experiences of displacement, they depicted this period of the 1920s and 30s in idealised terms as a time of wealth, multiculturalism and high culture and contrasted it to what came afterwards. Laura, who was four at the time when she left Narva to escape the war and the terror, also relied on such collective images when she described life in pre-war Narva. The memory of the pre-war life provided a counter image to the imposed Russian culture in post-war Narva. Particularly the multi-cultural character of Old Narva was mentioned by many interviewees. In contrast to the Soviet policies of Russification, this Estonian multiculturalism – a hybrid of Estonian, Russian and German cultures – was characterised by multilingualism and mutual respect. It was considered to be ‘real multiculturalism’.

Such a characterisation can also be found in Raisa’s narrative, an ethnic Russian interviewee whose grandparents had been wealthy entrepreneurs in pre-war Narva and who positioned herself as part of the community of the old Narvitiane. Raisa’s narrative demonstrates that, as highlighted earlier, the temporal orders adopted by the interviewees did not always coincide neatly with ethnic divisions. Raisa started her account with the story of her grandfather who fought on the side of the tsarist army in the Russian civil war, escaped to Estonia and in the 1920s settled in Narva where he became a successful entrepreneur “until the war destroyed everything here, and we lost everything”. Although she was an ethnic Russian and born after the war, she strongly identified with Old Narva and stressed that her grandparents not only spoke Russian but also German and Estonian and followed Estonian traditions in celebrating Christmas. Again, her narrative shows contrasting images between the pre-war and the post-war period. The war not only lead to the loss of the estate but also threatened this distinct hybrid culture:

I was raised according to shared Russian and Estonian traditions – I think this was a wonderful lesson. You just have to love the soil and the group in which
you live and you will always have a positive attitude [to each other]. (...) My mother still used to speak German, Estonian and Russian. Estonian was commonly spoken, so she needed to know it. When after the war hardly any Estonians remained, we got a problem. My mum forgot German and forgot almost all her Estonian, and also my dad because they had nobody to speak Estonian to. This was a particular problem because many, many Russians moved here. They were told that they have to learn Estonian in a week, and I participated in forums, conferences and seminars and said that no matter what we have to start with our children starting with nursery school and school. I, for example, did everything for my daughters – they speak Estonian, Russian, French and English. (Interview with Raisa, b.1950, 02.11.2011)

As somebody who does not speak Estonian, it is particularly important for Raisa to include herself into the old Narvitiane – drawing upon shared cultural traditions and an interest in recovering the past. While there is a break between the pre-war and the post-war past and the arrival of Russians threatens the old traditions, in her eyes the independence provides an opportunity to reconnect with this lost past. A similar pattern occurs in other life stories; although the restoration of Estonian independence did not bring a return of the old town, it was seen as a prominent event that allowed the re-emergence of the submerged memories of Old Narva and provided some recognition of their suffering. Along with the introduction of Estonian language in schools, several of my respondents mentioned the erection of monuments to the victims of repression in their narratives, which provide recognition for their experiences of suffering and displacement.

### 6.3 Constructing ‘authentic belonging’: stabilising the borders of the nation

Works on Estonian collective memories have emphasised that memories, particularly those in the 1990s, worked as counter-memories and were directed against the ‘Soviet distortion of memory’ (Koresaar 2004, Kirss 2009, Wulf 2009). Soviet historical narratives had interpreted the beginning of the communist regime as the beginning of a better and just life, excluding Estonia’s previous history of independence, the secret protocol of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and
the repressions and mass deportations during Stalinism. Post-Soviet memory accounts were thus aimed at challenging the blind spots of history and at finally articulating in public “how it actually was” (Kirss and Kivimäe 2009, 14). The relative success of accounts of national suffering in vernacular narratives is due to the fact that they provided symbolic recognition for experiences of suffering and loss and furthermore enabled people to make sense of individualising and often traumatic experiences in collective terms. Supported by political and legal transformation since the 1990s, which has postulated the return of the Estonian nation as a political subject (Pettai 2007, Budryte 2005), these narratives of national suffering functioned as resources for narrating one’s life-story as part of a local and national fate. This does not mean that this model of temporal ordering was imposed or is mechanically used by narrators. While official representations of the past are influential in the sense that they offer interpretations of the past, they were adopted in life-story narratives “to convey the quality of their particular life experience” (Skultans 1998, 157) – as we could see, for example, in the excerpt from Sofia’s life-story in which she interprets her experiences of discrimination under Soviet rule as part of the collective suffering of the nation.

As this model for narrating the past continues to be meaningful in the present, it is important to note that the memory of victimhood and displacement not only works in terms of a counter-narrative to the Soviet interpretation of the past but is consequential for the present in that it is part of an ongoing negotiation of the symbolic boundaries of Estonian society. The temporal orderings found in the narratives of the Old Narvitiane are linked to specific ways of constructing inclusion and exclusion, of drawing the boundaries of the nation in the following ways: firstly, by bridging the present and an earlier past the Old Narvitiane constructed themselves as representatives of a primordial community with a distinct culture and constructed ‘authentic belonging’, while secondly by characterising the socialist past as a time of suffering and displacement, they constructed themselves as collective victims of the Soviet regime. These ways of temporal ordering excluded the Russian-speaking population by constructing them as part of the socialist past.

The temporal orderings were directly linked to claims of being the authentic inhabitants of the borderland. While the majority of the people I spoke to did not
make territorial claims on the basis of their temporal orderings – to the lands beyond
the present ‘control line’ which used to be part of Estonia during the inter-war period
– the Old Narvitiane used this model of temporal ordering to draw symbolic borders
between themselves and the Russian-speaking newcomers and their descendants.

One of the particular characteristics of the constructions of inclusion and exclusion
was the ostensible paradox of nationalist (exclusive) identity that is constructed as
open and multicultural (cf. Ballinger 2003 on a similar phenomenon in Istria
(‘authentic hybrids’)). As mentioned above, the old Narvitiane characterised old
Narva as a multicultural, multilingual and open place (as opposed to Russian
monoculture that replaced it) but at the same time had a very exclusive understanding
of who belonged to this community and thus who could be seen as an ‘authentic
inhabitant’ of Narva.

Although in the narrative accounts these Russian-speakers hardly appeared as direct
perpetrators, they were constructed as representatives of Soviet rule and a cultural
threat and were thus excluded from the community of local inhabitants (on notions of
security and threat informing conceptions of space cf. Chapter 9). This is particularly
explicit in the following quotation in which Erik, an ethnic Estonian, who recalled
life in the 1950s. Erik had moved to Ivangoord together with his parents to escape
the kolkhoz in his home village:

In Ivangoord there was a problem. Purely Ivangoordian children (chisto
ivangoorodskie deti) I would say were very normal, and they treated Estonians
normally because Ivangoord used to be connected to Narva, that is to say that
the parents educated them accordingly. But many, many people from Russia
came to Ivangoord to build the hydro power station. And the children were
absolutely different, there weren't Ivangoorodians, they had an absolutely
different education and many alien characteristics like fighting, like… Well
these newcomers’ children were very different from the children from Narva
and Ivangoord families… for them there was no difference between Germans,
Estonians, Tatars, Russians, they were very relaxed about it but the newcomers
stuck together (...) the most negative memories I have of the Russian
newcomers, they were very different. It's hard to say why exactly, they were
very different from local Russian children. (Interview with Erik, b.1949,
12.11.2011)
Erik constructs an opposition between the children of the old population and the newcomers – while the former share characteristics like ‘purity’, ‘multiculturality’ and ‘openness to others’, the latter were considered to be ‘different’ or ‘alien’, showing hostility and aggressive behaviour to others. As in Erik’s narrative, other participants commonly characterised the Russian-speaking settlers and their children as ‘newcomers’ (priezhlie or prishlie) despite the fact that most had been living there for several decades and many of them had even been born there. The label ‘newcomer’ was usually linked to assumptions about the Russian-speakers’ alienness, their low levels of education and culture as well as their lack of interest and care for Narva and its history.

They weren’t interested at all what they will see here, that this town has an ancient history, and that the other people who live here who let’s put it that way had to leave a large part of the population behind. (Interview with Raisa, b.1950, 02.11.2011)

Through the mobilisation of selective memories, the Old Narvitiane thus constructed a particularistic and exclusive belonging in place and re-drew the boundaries of the nation. By bracketing off the socialist past and characterising the Soviet-era settlers as an alien population, they framed Narva as an essentially ‘Estonian town’, despite the fact that they remained locally a minority. This was supported by official historical narratives in Estonia that were rooted in the restoration of the inter-war nation-state as well as national policies that denied Russian-speaking settlers automatic membership in the political community.

### 6.4 Living together in past and present: alternative memories of the Old Narvitiane

While it was important for the Old Narvitiane to tell their particular stories of loss and victimhood, not all experiences could be fitted into the teleological national narrative outlined in the preceding sections. Positive or ambivalent memories of the socialist past and negative experiences in the present, for example, did not fit into dominant narrative frames and are usually marginalised in the public discourse as
well as in scholarly literature. In my interviews I could identify three sets of tensions between official narratives and vernacular memories which point to alternative temporalities and less exclusive spatial orders in the borderland: a) the tension between narratives of suffering and positive memories of the Soviet times, b) the tension between constructions of exclusive belonging and experiences of living together and b) the tension between narratives of national restoration and realities of local decline. While these alternative ways of ordering time and space were more apparent in some life-story narratives than others, they could generally be found in all interviews.

When I asked Laura, whose life-story narrative was mentioned earlier, at the end of the interview about how she thinks the murder of her grandfather and father in 1940 and 1944 had affected her life she reflected:

We regularly meet in March and June together with those who were deported to Siberia at this monument and there are some people who still have this anger (zloba) in their souls and when they speak, they speak with this anger. I don’t have this, maybe because I wasn’t personally affected. I was subjected to many forms of discrimination but at the same time they accepted me at the institute anyway, they allowed me to complete a higher education, this means that I myself… the only thing was that I wasn’t allowed to register in Narva in the beginning but otherwise there were no repressions against me. I received a room like other specialists. Also at work there wasn’t anything like that I was treated differently. I didn’t feel that. (Interview with Laura, b.1936, 23.10.2011)

This quotation shows us how Laura negotiates between experiences of suffering and hardship on the one hand and everyday life under Soviet rule on the other – a tension which is characteristic of her life-story narrative as a whole. The memory of the repressions is of great personal importance to her, and in several episodes Laura positions herself as part of the community of victims of the Soviet repressions, who participates in the annual memorial activities. At the same time, Laura points to discrepancies between her own individual experiences and emotions and those she ascribes to the community. Although Laura experienced difficulties as the daughter

25 Only recently ‘alternative memories’ of the Soviet period have been subject to closer analysis (cf. Jõesalu and Koresaar 2013).
of an ‘enemy of the people’ not all experiences fit into the narrative of suffering and displacement. As evident from the above-quoted excerpt, Laura’s recollections of suffering were intertwined with recollections of experiences when she was treated equally by the state and its institutions, especially in the workplace (Laura had a successful career as a teacher).

Similar tensions between the dominant narrative and personal experiences and recollections are apparent also in Erik’s narrative, which offers a very good example of the difficulties involved in questioning the dominant narrative structure. While Erik adopted the dominant tripartite model in his life-story narrative, his narration about the socialist past focused on his adaptation to and integration into the system rather than on suffering (or resistance). When I asked him about his education, Erik remembered:

There was this pioneer squad which was new for me. In Estonian schools we didn’t have anything like that. Later when the Soviet power got stronger and kolkhozy were founded, then they introduced pioneers and komsomol. For us this was preposterous (diko) but then of course we became used to it (priobshili). As they say, when at Rome, do as the Romans do.²⁶ When I left to study in the technical institute, I used to meet regularly with the Ivangorodians, with my classmates. We went out dancing and just met very often. We always had a good relationship. After [finishing the studies at] the institute many went away, and we met less often. But anyway when we see each other, it is always nice to meet, to remember, to talk. There is nothing negative in this regard, this was probably Estonia’s fate to come under Russia’s influence for a second time. (Interview with Erik, b.1949, 12.11.2011)

In this quotation Erik positioned himself as somebody who adjusted to the Soviet system by becoming a member of youth organisations, making friends with Russians and engaging in usual Soviet leisure activities like going to the ‘tancy’ (dancing). What is interesting is that Erik felt a need to justify these alternative stories about the socialist past and evaluate these memories from a national perspective. He justified his adaptation and the friendships by referring to a common-sensical need to comply

²⁶ In Russian: You are under the regulations of the monastery you live in.
with the imposed order and the ‘national fate’. The official narrative here was adjusted to fit his personal experiences.

As Erik’s narrative indicate, not all identity constructions encountered in the borderland relied on essentialist distinctions between ‘natives’ and ‘newcomers’. Several participants remembered interethnic friendships and experiences of living and working together in past and present. Some of my participants made sense of these diverging identity constructions by differentiating between ‘Soviet-minded’ (sovetskie) and ‘Russian’ (russkie) people or between the oppressive Soviet state and innocent people. As Sofia remembered:

In my circle of friends there are pre-war Narvian and then these normal Russians who came here and they grasped how good it is here and they took over all the good things and live peacefully with the local population. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946, 26.10.2011)

While according to Sofia these ‘normal Russians’ became more Estonian, others conceived of these influences as mutual and spoke of how Russians had made them more extroverted. Erik used the example of his holiday trips to illustrate the influence Russians had on him:

If I spend a long time with a closed group of Estonians, then in the beginning I am thrilled. For example on my tourist excursions, I’ve travelled quite a bit and especially when I go on long bus trips, in the beginning I am thrilled to hear Estonians. I listen to them, the language is beautiful, really beautiful. But in the end, in the second week, I start to feel tired… because an Estonian never lets you get close to him, even on a table he sits in the corner, he is a terrible individualist. And because I’ve lived most of my life among Russians (…) I start to feel tired, I want back to a Russian sphere. This is a sign that I’ve become russified (Interview with Erik, b.1949, 12.11.2011)

Tensions between the official frames for narrating past and vernacular memories were particularly apparent when people came to speak about present-day life in the borderland. The abstract narrative of restoration and progress after the fall of socialism had mobilised hopes and fantasies of a better life which stood in contrast to the reality of peripheralisation occurring in the borderland. With the establishment of the border and the closing of the industries Narva had experienced a dramatic
economic decline that prompted many local inhabitants to leave the city and look for employment elsewhere. In some of my interviews, the narrative of national liberation was adopted and outweighed social and economic hardships (for example, in the interview with Sofia). Others, however, articulated their disappointments stressing the discrepancy between the narratives of national restoration and local realities of decline. Telling stories about the closing of the factories, about one’s own and other people’s experiences of unemployment and poverty, many participants adopted a local stance in relation to national developments, relativized narratives of progress and restoration and made claims for enjoying their share of benefits brought by Estonian national independence restoration. Several interviewees framed the transition to independent state in terms of hopes and disappointments.

Raisa, the ethnic Russian participant who considered herself as a member of the ‘old Narvitiane’ community, has been an active member of several groups engaged in restoring the old town since the mid-1990s. Throughout her narrative Raisa linked the memories of the pre-war past to a personal and collective project of restoration. She participated in the development of a detailed plan for the gradual re-erection of buildings and streets which were destroyed during the war and about which she had learned from her grandfather. Raisa remembered her optimism when Estonia became independent:

> I cried. I had been longing for this a lot. I had the impression that a new life will begin and that now everything will be good... I was patriotic like everybody else in Estonia. I expected that they will all start constructing together, restoring not only the town but also the culture and traditions. And the people who had moved here... of course there was no sense to drive them out of here. It would have been simply necessary to familiarize them with this culture in a very soft, delicate manner so that they could get inspired and wanted it themselves... But unfortunately, this didn’t happen. People said ‘We don’t need this. We will build a new and beautiful Tallinn.’ (Interview with Raisa, b.1950, 02.11.2011)

In Raisa's narrative the hopes for a better future and the recovery of the past are closely interlinked. In her account this recovery is both material and cultural and is perceived as something inclusive which encompasses all people living in Narva. Due to Narva's positioning at the margins of the restorative efforts however, the vision of a collective recovery could not have been put into practice. Her vision of restoration
is confronted with Narva’s status as a town of Russian-speakers, being literally and symbolically located at the margins of the state.

After several years I suddenly understood that the Estonians are engaging with this [the reconstruction] and we are not wanted here (my lishnie). (Interview with Raisa, b.1950, 02.11.2011)

While Raisa complained that Narva has been left out in the project of national reconstruction, Erik went further in his critique and stressed the destructive character of the transition. Erik had been actively involved in the Rahvarinne, the Popular Front of Estonia, which was a key force in the independence movement and described a sense of initial excitement similar to the one mentioned by Raisa. Retrospectively, however, he interpreted the transition in terms of (economic) destruction rather than restoration:

Life in Narva used to be very good because Krenholm was working, everybody had work. It became difficult to live here under Estonian rule because all the big enterprises were destroyed. (…) It wouldn’t have been necessary to pull down all the factories. It would have been necessary to do this gradually and in a different way. But all these young people said ‘let’s do it in three years’ and a lot has been destroyed. And this antagonized many people who left their active positions and retreated. (Interview with Erik, b.1949, 12.11.2011)

Positive memories of the socialist past and negative experiences of the present point to alternative temporal orderings which challenge the official narratives. Narrating about personal careers and friendships, participants showed that the socialist past was not limited to experiences of victimhood and defended it as a meaningful period of their lives. Furthermore, criticising the present developments they could make claims for having their share in the national restoration or imagine it in alternative, less polarising ways of imagining belonging. In contrast to the drastic imagination of inclusion and exclusion based on assumptions of authentic belonging, many participants argued for a slower or even different transition which would have been less dramatic in its local consequences. These ways of making sense of the communist past and the present are linked to alternative ways of remembering and expressing solidarity which cross the boundaries of ethnic groups on the basis of a shared local identity.
6.5 Reconstruction and decline: temporal orderings in Russian-speakers’ memory narratives

In comparison to the Old Narvitiane who founded their belonging to Narva in the pre-war time and remembered the socialist past predominantly in terms of suffering, Narva’s Russian-speaking population structured their accounts in significantly different ways, shaped by their different narrative location and experiences of the past. The Russian-speakers constituted the large majority in Narva since World War II; their families had come to Narva from different Soviet republics and many of them had benefitted from the Soviet politics of distributing work places and housing. Having moved to Narva after the war, this group remembered the socialist past not as destruction and displacement from their familiar environment but in terms of post-war reconstruction. More generally they recalled the Soviet past with nostalgia, and in contrast to the old Narvitiane, they experienced the restoration of Estonian independence in terms of status loss. They were not granted automatic citizenship status and in the public discourse were perceived as occupants.

Their accounts were usually divided into two parts: firstly, the period of the ‘good socialist past’ which was narrated as a time of progress and ‘good life’, and secondly, the post-socialist present, usually which was usually presented in terms of collective decline and hardship. In narratives of people who were born outside of Estonia, the socialist past was further divided into the time before and the time after their migration to Narva. Remembering the rise and decline of Narva and relating personal experiences to this meta-narrative, my participants not only adopted the elements of the Soviet/Russian narrative but directly engaged with Estonian official narratives. Like the old Narvitiane, who countered what they saw as the Russian/Soviet distortion of memory, also the Russian-speakers engaged with both the Russian and Estonian official narratives. Even if their responses were shaped by different social positionings and past and present experiences, the two groups shared the same discursive context.

When narrating about the socialist past, some of my Russophone respondents directly adopted the Soviet narrative of reconstruction and progress that continues to circulate in Russian official discourse. According to this narrative the Soviet state,
together with the Russian-speaking settlers, had rebuilt Estonia after the war. The local history of the erection of a new town with large industries was inscribed in a broader narrative of the expansion of the Soviet modernisation programme after the war (cf. Kann 1979). For Evgenii, who came to Narva in 1970 to work at the large cloth factory Krenholm, the history of Narva consisted of its rise with the Soviet post-war reconstruction efforts and its fall after the restoration of Estonia's independence.

After the war there was nothing here. The Soviet Union built everything, all the factories were built by the Soviet Union. The only thing that Estonia did, was to sell these factories.

Evgenii was born in Ukraine and had worked on construction sites in several Ukrainian towns before moving to Narva. He recalled his arrival in Narva:

When I came here Narva was a simple provincial town. But over time, when I started to work here … I grew to like this town more and more. I saw how it was built. When I arrived here the last house was on the Tallinn highway. (…) Further there used to be a hamlet. And all this was built. Rakvere used to be the last street; there wasn’t any Dauman or Geroi street. Nothing was there. And virtually before my sight everything was built. Everything grew, three micro-rayony were built in their entirety. (Interview with Evgenii, b. 1944, 08.11.2011)

Such stories about the ongoing construction and expansion of the town, where “houses were being built like mushrooms after the rain”, could be found in many narratives and put the emphasis on a sense of progress. Furthermore, many respondents perceived themselves not only as spectators of Narva’s transformation into a modern town but also as active participants in this process through their work at the construction sites and in factories. People's memories were not simple adoptions of the narrative of Soviet reconstruction. Similarly to the Old Narvitiane, official narratives were not adopted mechanically in interviews but appropriated to make sense of personal and localized experiences. In the case of the Russian-speakers, narratives of a ‘good life under socialism’ were often linked to the short durée of personal and everyday life. Although people living in socialism did not necessarily directly believe in the state’s teleological narrative, it provided a framework within which everyday life was planned and lived (Yurchak 2003, 484). Some respondents focused
their life-story narratives on their professional careers and the making of a home and family.

Svetlana, a 60-year old pensioner, centred her life-story narrative on her work at the Krenholm manufacturing plant, a large (and now bankrupt) textile factory. She had moved to Narva from a village in the Leningrad region. Like other respondents, she fondly remembered the work at the factory in terms of a specific form of sociality:

I was working for more than 30 years at Krenholm. I worked during the day shift. We were busy with machine maintenance because the machines required service. We worked in the spinning collective. At the enterprise, there was also the spinning collective, the weavers, and then there were the textile, the finishing and the clothing manufactures... We’ve grown up there, we’ve found friends there. It was a real family. We went to work in the morning. When there was something to celebrate, for example, a birthday, we brought sweets and a cake, during lunchtime. When somebody was mourning, somebody had died, we collected money and they let us go to the cemetery to stand by. When somebody had a problem, of course, we supported each other, we were a real family. Even if we don’t see each other so often now, when we meet, we hug each other and… start to remember, how we were working together, which efforts we made, and how hard it was. (Interview with Svetlana, b.1951, 17.01.2010)

Svetlana described her three decades of work at the factory as a stable experience in which the individual and the collective were closely interconnected. Working at the factory appeared as “a whole way of life”; the labour collective not only worked together but shared joys and grief equally. Comparisons of the labour collective with a family and a circle of friends demonstrate a strong identification with the factory and a sense of collectivity (Ashwin 2000, 10). They are also underpinned by a nostalgic yearning for the loss of this collective way of life in post-socialism. Alongside the sense of communality at the workplace, which she mobilised in her memories, Svetlana’s interview also showed pride in the work and a sense of importance of hard work – she remembered in great detail the technical aspects of her daily work routine and proudly presented some of her factory’s garments. In comparison to Svetlana, who did not have any professional education and worked as
a machine maintainer for 30 years, Tamara focused her story on self-realisation and professional recognition, starting with her moving from a Ukrainian village.

The allocation of specialists (raspredelenie) was throughout the whole Soviet Union, you could go to every Soviet republic and I went to Tallinn to the Ministry of Services (bytovogo obsluzhivania). There were two places: Riga or Tallinn. I had a look at the map, Tallinn was further. I wanted to go further away from home, because I didn’t want my parents to interfere in my life. I wanted to accomplish everything on my own. (Interview with Tamara, b.1955, 31.10.2011)

Narva in her account is a place that enables her professional self-realisation. Having arrived in Narva, Tamara recalled that she

…quickly got an advancement and was appointed the head of this branch [of a state combine]. When I started to work there, back then we had plans but the plan was not fulfilled. But two or three months afterwards, we started to fulfil the plan. And then there was the socialist competition (socrevnovanie), who works best. We won the first prize in the republic and then as long as we were working there, we did not hand over the first place to anybody else (Interview with Tamara, b.1955, 31.10.2011)

Tamara managed, as she said, to 'build up a reputation' during the socialist past, but her career however was interrupted by the fall of socialism. She lost her job and the status connected to it. Past frames of meaning-making – the fulfilment of the plan and the good performance of the factory – continue to be used as proof of one's personal achievements and recognition at a time in which they have been questioned. For both Tamara and Svetlana, the fall of socialism and more specifically the dismissals from their workplaces in the early 1990s were a turning point and connected to the loss of collectivity in the case of Svetlana, who started to engage in cross-border trade, and in the case of Tamara, who had been unsuccessful in her attempt to build her own business, the loss of recognition and dignity that she could achieve during socialism.

In most life-story narratives of Russian-speakers, positive memories of socialism were contrasted to individual and/ or collective experiences of decline in the post-socialist present. Narratives of decline centered on multiple themes – the
deindustrialization, unemployment, decline of living standard and loss of social security arrangements. These themes were characteristic of experiences of transition elsewhere (Shevchenko 2009, 67). My respondents criticized how the expanding industrial town in which they had lived transformed itself into a ‘dying town’ with ‘no future’. The experiences of decline however were different from other post-industrial towns that, for most of my Russian-speaking respondents, had an explicit ethnic dimension and were connected to the new order of a nationalizing state (Brubaker 1996) which put their presence in Estonia under question. Having lived and worked in Narva for many years, the Russian-speakers were suddenly confronted with the feeling of being no longer wanted in Estonia. In her narrative, Mariia, a retired engineer in her late 60s, who look for a job in the UK as an unskilled worker after she lost her job at one of the big factories, contrasted the decline in the present to the socialist past:

You know, during Soviet times not everything was as bad as it is presented now. There were many things which were much better. Because Estonia was always thought of as a foreign country even in Russia, it received large subsidies and therefore what was here couldn’t be found in Russia, even in regard to the supply situation… I can understand the national self-consciousness but... how did it turn out?! Everything was destroyed, and now? (Interview with Mariia, b. 1943, 19.11.2011)

In this statement, Mariia refers to the later development in Estonia in comparison to other Soviet republics and uses the past reflexively to criticize the present. While she does not question Estonian independence, she makes use of the past to criticize the form of nation-building which she perceives as being destructive. In contrast to the Old Narvitiane who characterised the socialist past in terms of a displacement and disruption of the previous spatiotemporal order, Russian-speakers focused on the post-war reconstruction and positive memories of socialism. Rather than being destructive, the socialist past here appears as a genuinely positive time that was integral to the place. The Russian-speakers’ ways of ordering time had an explicit political dimension. Recalling Narva’s socialist past as a time of progress and ‘good life’ and contrasting it to what came afterwards, my participants countered Estonian historical narratives and defended the socialist past as a period of personal and collective value.
6.6 Reclaiming belonging: countering Estonian narratives, reinscribing oneself in place

The ways the Russian-speakers constructed their identities through their temporal orderings mirrored some of the practices of the Old Narvitiane – like them, they perceived of themselves as locals and constructed their belonging in place. And like them, most of them thought of themselves as victims: in contrast to the Old Narvitiane, this victimhood was linked to their symbolic displacement from Estonia’s political community since the restoration of independence. Their ‘reactive victimhood’ can thus be seen as a counter-narrative to the Estonian narratives which focused on the suffering of their own ethnic group.

In their memory narratives Russian-speakers emphasised the years spent in Narva, the birth of their children and their efforts in reconstructing the town. They linked their identity to the rise of Narva after the war. While they considered Narva to be their home, their belonging was not ‘rooted’ in a primordial sense of community but had been acquired over time. During my fieldwork when I was looking for interviewees I told a group of pensioners who regularly met in the same building as the Estonian society that I was looking for participants who had moved to Narva during Soviet times and who would like to tell me about their lives. I tried to make sure whom I meant by adding that I was not looking for Old Narvitiane. A woman responded: “But that's who we are, old Narvitiane. We are Narvitiane and old. We have lived here most of our lives” (Fieldwork notes 03.11.11). This quotation exemplified very well people's sense of belonging to Narva. Despite references to the old populations as authentic, they regarded themselves (as I have outlined above) as locals who were ‘rooted’ in Narva. This belonging however was put in question since 1991 with the new Estonian citizenship policies, which created for many Russian-speakers a state of ‘ontological insecurity’ which continued up to the present. Unlike the Old Narvitiane, the Russian-speakers could not draw upon state resources to found their belonging. On the contrary, they had to prove their loyalty to the state and language skills before becoming citizens, and were labelled ‘occupants’ in the public
Regardless of their actual citizenship status, many of their life-story narratives were shaped by a justificatory discourse and showed the need to legitimise their belonging. This becomes apparent in another statement by Mariia, who expressed the effects of the Estonian national narrative on the Russian-speakers particularly well. When I asked her whether she would have preferred to stay in Narva rather than going to the UK as a temporary migrant worker, she stated: “Of course, this was a forced step that I had to take.” Mariia continued with a reflection on what home means to her:

Alena, do you understand, the Estonians… that means the government, thinks that they did not achieve independence in 92 but 80 years ago and that since then, they have…. But those years [under Soviet rule], you can't throw them away; you can't throw them out of your life, out of history, out of everything. The people who were born here, who have grown up here, this is their homeland (rodina), isn't it? There [in the UK], of course, when you go there, you feel like in a different country. But here we did feel like in our own country. And suddenly to stop feeling like this… I can’t feel here like I felt in the UK. Right? (Interview with Mariia, b. 1943, 19.11.2011)

Contradictory logics of making place become apparent in this context: the logics of national narratives of rupture and discontinuity which displace Russian-speakers on the one hand, and the embodied experiences of having lived in Narva for many years and the feeling of one's own place on the other. Mariia uses the past to construct belonging by arguing that living in a place for a long time rendered it into a homeland. While Mariia’s statement conveys a sense of the insecurity of belonging in the present; other respondents were using the interview to directly counter the Estonian narratives and to present themselves as victims of the regime. Sergei, who came to Estonia as a child, had been working in one of the big power plants until his forced early retirement:

I was working here for twenty-thirty years, I invested money in this republic, I developed it, the industries were developed, God forbid. That's how it was. … I have a flat, a garage, everything, all of my children are here. Why should I

27 My respondents differed in their strategies regarding their citizenship status. Some of them had passed the test and became Estonian citizens while others had opted for Russian citizenship or remained stateless.
leave? Let's calculate: How much money did I put in your republic and then return me the money. Then people start to get angry. I say: Wait, why are you like this? Which right do you have to tell me that I should leave? (Interview with Sergei, b.1939, 13.10.2011)

Sergei connects his individual life-story with the collective story of the post-war reconstruction and industrialization of Estonia. By emphasizing his contribution, he claims recognition of his work and constructs himself as a citizen who has an equal right to live in Estonia.

The Russian-speakers' temporal orderings thus countered the official narratives that excluded them and reinscribed themselves in place. In contrast to the exclusivist logics in the Old Narvitian's temporal orderings, the Russian-speakers however did not construct Estonians as alien. The Russian-speakers’ constructions of inclusion and exclusion were based on a different logic which in many regards echoed the Soviet ideology of multicultural coexistence between nationalities and the Russians as ‘bigger brothers’ of other nationalities (Brubaker 1994, Slezkine 1994). Russian-speakers put their emphasis on the peaceful living and working together of all ethnic groups in the past and stressed their (past) sympathies for Estonian neighbours and co-workers. In their eyes this positive relationship of the past had in their eyes been unilaterally suspended by the Estonians. As one respondent recalled:

I can remember one guy who said: and now I am at home here and you can get lost (umatyvat’). Although we drank tea together, celebrated together, he had lived all his life here. (...) He came to work and started to say such things although earlier everything used to be alright. Maybe it had an influence that the Estonians had a different truth. Maybe. But it was offensive (obidno) to be honest, offensive. Especially when you start to get used to people, you start to respect them or one could say even love them. And suddenly they tell you something like this. (Interview with Evgenii, b. 1944, 08.11.2011)

The Russian-speakers’ narratives of victimhood were thus conceived as a reaction to the Estonian ones. However, they produced their own exclusions and concealments in that they usually disregarded the preconditions under which their positive experiences of the past had taken shape. The Estonians’ ‘different truth’, to which Evgenii briefly refers, is omitted or trivialized in almost all narratives: the deportations, the settlement restrictions against the old inhabitants and everyday
hostilities which took place beneath the discourse of multicultural life were hardly
mentioned by any of my respondents. Although Russian-speakers did make
references to Old Narva, the memory of the old town was reduced to its physical
environment. Their regret over the loss of the architecture did not extend into
mourning over the loss of large parts of its population. Aiming to construct (and
defend) their belonging in the present, the Russians focused on memories of their
own victimhood.

6.7 Hardships and disillusionments: Russian-speakers’ alternative
temporal orderings

The narrative of reconstruction and decline was successful because it connected well
to individual experiences. Despite different intensities and points in time the changes
were experienced, and despite the different individual strategies in dealing with
them, the fall of socialism had been a collective experience which affected all of my
respondents who were adults during this time. Even those who managed to have a
stable income in the present had seen their status within Estonia questioned and most
of them had experienced economic insecurities in the recent past.

Despite the idealising lens of nostalgic memories through which the socialist past
was usually recalled, not all memories of this time were genuinely positive. As with
the Old Narvitian and their memories, discrepancies between the state ideology and
everyday experiences or negative experiences that could not be integrated into a
positive meaning framework offered a different evaluation of the time and could
potentially destabilise nostalgic images. A positive or ambivalent interpretation of
the post-socialist present which would challenge the dominant narrative of decline I
found only among members of younger generational cohorts of Russian-speakers,
particularly the post-Soviet generation for whom new possibilities had opened up
since the 1990s. In the next chapter on generational change in temporal orderings I
will discuss some of their ways of making sense of time. In the remaining paragraphs
I will instead focus on the tensions between vernacular and official narratives
encountered among the older generations of Russian-speakers, who had come of age
during socialism. Two major tensions could be observed in these narratives, both
connected to the evaluation of the socialist past: a) *the tension between positive memories of the socialist past and past experiences of hardship* and in a similar vein 
b) *the tension between positive memories of the socialist past and past hopes for a better future.*

My respondents for example recalled the bad ecology as a result of the industrialisation, mentioned the difficult working conditions which negatively affected their health as well as the lack of housing and inequalities within the Soviet system – something that had also been mentioned by the old Narvitiiane (cf. excerpt from Sofia’s life-story narrative quoted above). Maksim’s life story offers a good case in point. The episode of the socialist past, which he remembered most vividly, concerned what he called his “long and sad story about receiving a flat”. When he arrived to Narva, he first lived with his mother in a dormitory - “nine (square) metres for two, can you imagine?” Later he moved in with his wife and was living with her and their three children in one room in a shared flat. Driven by the state’s promise that every family would receive a flat, Maksim asked at his factory for his own flat:

> I went to the vice director for consumer affairs who distributed the flats and told him ‘I have been working at Baltiets already for 14 years. I have the right to receive at least a one-room flat, give it to me.’ And then I said ‘I have three kids now’, and this vice director impudently laughed at me and said: ‘even if it were ten… this is not my business.’ For many years I went and asked for a flat and was betrayed. In general there was always fraud, I don’t know why. There was always fraud. (Interview with Maksim, b.1947, 05.11.2011)

While Maxim believed in the Soviet ideology it was the bureaucratic system and the people that he held responsible for letting him wait for nearly two decades before obtaining decent living conditions. However, a couple of minutes after he had articulated his critique, Maksim stressed how lucky his family was: “now you don’t get anything for free anymore.” Despite its faults – the fraud and the inequalities that it generated – the socialist past was in his eyes better than the present. Other respondents similarly relativized negative experiences in the past in the face of present-day difficulties and thus kept up the dominant model of temporal ordering. As Mariia put it after a long consideration of the positive and negative sides of living under socialism: “Everywhere there were pluses and minuses, but at least it was
normal”. Although the socialist past had also for the Russian-speaking population its own hardships and inequalities, it still appeared as a relatively better time, a reliable and stable order they grew up with and got used to.

A similar pattern could be observed when some of my respondents recalled the restoration of independence. Although the majority of Russian-speakers in Narva favoured the persistence of the Soviet system (Smith 2002), a significant part of the local population did support national independence. When narrating about their experiences of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, participants articulated – similarly to the Old Narvitian – feelings of hope and expectations of a better future without Estonia’s dependence from Moscow (Interview with Maria, b. 1943, 19.11.2011, Anton, b.1965, 25.10.2011, Tat’iana, b.1963, 12.10.2011, Maksim, b.1947, 05.11.2011). Anton recalled that he was part of a collective of young people at the local komsomol and had arguments with representatives of the town council because they supported independence.

Although I was young I was part of it, I was in a niche of young and progressive people and everything that was happening in Narva, in Estonia and even a little bit in Moscow, I was part of it, I was aware of it. (Interview with Anton, b.1965, 25.10.2011)

Anton constructed his identity as a progressive person who wanted a better future under independent statehood which he linked to economic well-being, democratic rule and better personal life chances. This imagined future however did not take place:

There was 1991, 92, 93… and I say: Guys, we are in a train station at the platform but the train doesn’t stop; it goes past us, the train of history. It has closed doors. And you stand there and understand what is happening in the country, that if you don’t have any property, if you don’t have any power, if you don’t have any position, then you will be nobody. Do you understand that? The system is a democracy and everything is said to belong to everybody (obshenarodnoe)… but you understand that everything is happening differently. The train goes with closed doors and you can’t do anything. (Interview with Anton, b.1965, 25.10.2011)
In this quotation Anton characterised the early years of Estonian independence as a crucial moment in his and his friends’ life-stories. Following the metaphorical image of a train station, they were ready for departure and starting something new – ready to be part of/to join the historical development. Imagining the future, Anton had seen himself and his friends as part of the political community and of national time. However, the ‘train of history’ had closed doors and he himself was excluded and literally left ‘out of time’ – left out from the progress.

6.8 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore the dynamics of remembering in a multi-ethnic borderland and provide an analysis of the temporal orderings of two groups – the old Narvitiane and the Russian-speaking settlers – and of how these temporal orderings are linked to bordering processes. Particular attention was paid to the structuring role of ethnicity, and the ways in which different patterns of memories both coincided with as well as transcended inter-ethnic divisions in the border region. Analysing the intertwining of dominant as well as alternative ways of temporal orderings within personal narratives, the chapter opened up the field of inquiry into the complexities of remembering at the vernacular level and tried to account for multiple temporal orderings, or as Shapiro puts it, “the temporal junctures and disjunctures that every political collective encompasses” (Shapiro 2000, 82).

As the chapter showed, the narratives of two groups follow different emplotment structures in the narratives of the two groups. While old Narvitiane narrated the socialist past largely in terms of suffering and displacement and established continuity to the pre-war past, the Russian-speakers’ narratives brought forward a positive evaluation of the socialist past in contrast to present-day decline. These narrative structures are linked to different ways of constructing inclusion and exclusion: the old Narvitiane brought forward an exclusive conception of belonging in place based on memories of the old town and reproduced the borders of the nation. In the case of the Russian-speakers, these borders were questioned by narrating the socialist past as a positive and meaningful part of their life and by reclaiming belonging in place.
Narrating the past and using it to construct inclusion and exclusion the old Narvitiane and the Russian-speakers engaged with official historical narratives of both states. The old Narvitiane who had been empowered by the structural changes after the restoration of independence, could use the Estonian official narratives as a resource to construct 'authentic' belonging in the borderland. At the same time, they also related their memories to and against Soviet/Russian narratives which had silenced the suffering and repressions against their own group. Due to the fact that they locally remained a minority and their story was little acknowledged among the majority of Narva's inhabitants, it was important for them to continue to tell this particular story that provided recognition for past sufferings and constructed privileged belonging.

Likewise, Russian-speaking settlers not only drew upon official Russian/Soviet narratives that frame the socialist past in terms of a positive time but also, seeking to justify their belonging in Estonia, engaged with Estonian narratives. Russian-speakers living in Narva were confronted with the symbolic and structural exclusion from the Estonian political community, and in contrast to the old Narvitiane, their narratives were shaped by greater insecurity and a justificatory rhetoric. Russian-speakers countered the historical narratives that excluded them as well as rearticulated their memories of socialism within the new national frames, for example by stressing their contribution to the post-war reconstruction of Estonia.

The interviews thus show a whole range of different ways of engaging with official narratives from a vernacular perspective. Official narratives functioned as symbolic resources that were adopted not simply because of their normative power, but also because they could, at least to some extent, provide useful frames for making sense of the divided experiences in the past and could be used for constructing inclusion and exclusion in the present based on those experiences. However, as I have shown, the temporal orderings of the members of the two groups go beyond the official narratives and are actually more similar than assumptions about divided memories suggest. Experiences of conviviality and shared grievances, like the housing shortage during socialism as well as the peripheralisation of the borderland in recent years, can be found in interviews with participants from both groups. Such experiences point to a shared experience of locality or even a sense of local identity which exists
beyond the antagonisms embedded in official narratives. Local experiences in the borderland thus on the one hand reflect the contentious relations between Russia and Estonia and diverging interpretations of history resulting from them. On the other hand, they also point to a much larger spectrum of experiences and relations, and serve as a reminder of the selectivity of polarised national narratives. To acknowledge these shared experiences and the diversity of vernacular memories does not mean relativising experiences of suffering and repression, but rather engaging with the complexity and circumstantiality of vernacular memories. If listened to, they provide us with a different (and more localised) take on memory that can be fitted back and used to mitigate nationalising narratives, which all too often rely on simplistic drawing of boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ethnic groups, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ times.
Chapter 7 The generational dynamics of memory at the border

7.1 Introduction

As border changes go hand in hand with changes of historical narratives, one of the central questions is whether these national narratives are successful and become integrated into people's narratives of place and self. The previous chapter already addressed the relation between vernacular and official narratives and indicated that the consideration of vernacular memories in the borderland adds complexity and ambiguities to post-socialist nation-building and can partially put the space of the nation in question. This chapter further explores the relation between vernacular and official temporal orderings as part of border-making by focusing on questions of continuity and discontinuity in the borderland.

Literature on post-socialist memory has usually stressed discontinuity in relation to the socialist past and showed how new historical narratives have been invented to create orientation and to serve as a tool for social integration and the accommodation of geopolitical shifts (cf. Zhurzhenko 2011, Troebst 2005). Concentrating on elite-based and instrumentalist memory projects, much of the literature has focused on the erasure of the socialist past and the creation of new symbols and narratives, for example through the renaming of streets, the erection of new monuments and the removal of old ones after the fall of the Iron Curtain (Young and Light 2001, Verdery 1999). Based on my theoretical framework and considerations of the persistence of the past in the present, the chapter makes a case for a more balanced approach to memories, which links memory back to generationally shaped experiences. Generational cohorts can be conceptualised as an “anchor of continuity in memory formation” (Mihelj forthcoming). It often requires a new generational cohort for the reconsideration of the past and changes in mnemonic patterns. This is also critical for the formation of borders. The political geographer Anssi Paasi argued for example that it is important to consider generational change when analysing the meanings of the border as “it is easier to communicate new ideas on the relations of states... to new generations” (Paasi 1996,
Following these considerations, the chapter analyses how different generations of Russian-speakers living in the border town of Narva order time, and how this is related to their generational location, their diverging biographical experiences and their associated subject positions. Looking at the intersections of generation and ethnicity in temporal orderings, the chapter shows the diversification of vernacular narratives over time and makes a further contribution in correcting overly polarized and ethnicised accounts of remembering processes in the region.

The literature on memory and generation has usually focused on the role of formative experiences for generational cohorts (cf. Mannheim 1998). There are several studies based on surveys that analyse the generational stratification of memories and have come to the conclusion that people remember past events because they experienced them at a certain stage in their life, during early adulthood (Schuman and Scott 1989, Schuman and Corning 2000, Lee 2012). Drawing on these studies, this chapter considers experience as crucial to processes of remembering. However, in contrast to these existing survey-based studies it goes beyond an interest in memory content and in recollections of individual events, and instead considers how different generations actually order time as part of meaning-making activities. Generations are both communities of experience and communities of interpretation that are involved in active meaning-making activities in and over time (see Andrews 2002 for a discussion of the role of story-telling and narration in the making of generations). The primary focus then lies not on what people remember but on what people do with memory and how they negotiate the past in the present.

28 Schuman and Scott (1989) measured generational effects in the perception of historical events in the US and found that whether events were remembered or not depended on if they were experienced during an individual’s life-time and particularly during early adulthood. Events occurring afterwards were usually not considered to be memorable. The Vietnam War was remembered mostly by those Americans who were between 15 to 27 years old at the time the war began, while WWII was especially important for older people who were between 16 and 24 years old in 1941. Subsequent survey studies have confirmed these results, although the concept of ‘generational imprint’ has been modified: Larson and Lizardo, for example, showed that memories can be based on mediated experiences and reflect the significance of an event at a later time (Larson and Lizardo 2007). Furthermore, scholars argued that characteristics of the event matter for the age group remembering it (Lee 2012, Schuman and Corning 2000).
Furthermore, as part of this negotiation of the past in the present, people draw not only upon their own experiences – as some of the studies on generational memory indicate – but can integrate experiences which precede their own life-time and which are for example transmitted within families and the media in their life-stories. As Pickering and Keightley argue:

Generation as a subject position, a consciousness and a domain of social action is doubly relational as it involves a vertical relation through time with what came before us and what may come after, and a horizontal relation in time with others who share our historical location (Pickering and Keightley 2013, 117).

This aspect is most prominently articulated in Marianne Hirsch’s work on post-memory (1997) and Michael Rothberg’s concept of multidirectional memory (2009). Transference and empathy are, of course, not the only way of engaging with others’ past; conflicting images of the past and the rejection of older memories are also a means of generational positioning. Drawing upon these theoretical insights, the interest then lies in how people belonging to different generations engage in temporal orderings, and in whether and how younger generational cohorts take up other experiences and adopt or reject narrative frames of the socialist generations in their narratives.

The chapter provides a comparative analysis of the temporal orderings of the different generations of Russian-speakers, comparing the generation of the ‘perestroika’ (born between the late 1950s-1979) and the post-socialist generation (born between 1980 and 1990) with the older socialist generations, the generation 1945 and the post-war generation (born between 1921 and mid-1950s) (for a more detail explanation of these groups cf. Chapter 4 p.87-88). As the narratives of the socialist generations have been analysed in more detail in the previous chapter, this chapter will focus primarily on contrasting them with the narratives of the ‘perestroika’ generation and the post-socialist generation.

As I will show, these generational cohorts differ in their present positionings and past experiences and adopt relatively distinct patterns of remembering and different relationships to the social and political changes. The narratives of these generational groups differed in the periods, events and experiences they focused on and in the
amount of detail included in memories, as well as the meanings associated with remembered events and periods. The differences between generations also indicate a partial shift in how the socialist past is remembered among Russian-speakers. Russian-speakers belonging to the generation 1945 and the post-war generation usually remember the socialist past with nostalgia based on memories of recognition and personal satisfaction under socialism and in contrast to an alienating present. In comparison, the members of the ‘perestroika’ generation share many of the socialist generations’ sentiments about the socialist past. However, their memory patterns are more diverse, reflecting their experiences of late socialism and the perestroika as well as in some cases their successful reorientation after the 1990s. The post-socialist generation who has only limited personal memories of socialism is most inclined to subscribe to official narratives of ‘becoming European’ in Estonia, but can adopt elements of the socialist generations’ temporal orderings to make sense of insecurities in the present. The chapter is organised in three main sections that provide a detailed analysis of the temporal orderings of each generational cohort. The first section will also address the phenomenon of nostalgia in these memories.

7.2 Longing for the past, claiming recognition in the present: the temporal orderings of the socialist generations

Russian-speakers in Estonia are usually believed to be looking back at the socialist past with a sense of loss and longing and to be thinking of the demise of the Soviet Union as a tragedy or, as Putin put it in a much-quoted TV speech in 2005, the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (quoted in Oushakine 2009, 79). What is taken as ‘Russian memory’ however largely reflects the experiences of a specific generational cohort, who were in their 50s or older when the Soviet Union fell apart and many of whom belonged to the first generation of settlers and whose narratives have been analysed in more detail in the previous chapter. As I have argued, it was the Soviet system that had enabled them to build their careers in Narva's large industrial enterprises, to found families and make their home in a place that was in many cases more economically advanced than the – often rural – areas they came from. Memories of socialism occupied a large space in the memory narratives of members of this group. While these memories were generally multi-faceted and
encompassed a wide range of personal and collective experiences, the central mode of temporal ordering among members of the socialist generations was to contrast positive memories of socialism to present-day decline and feelings of alienation.

This narrative mode can be characterised as nostalgia, a sense of loss, lack and longing in relation to the past (Keightley and Pickering 2012, 117). Nostalgia is a multi-faceted mnemonic phenomenon and is often associated with negative characteristics and seen in terms of a distortion of the past, an idealisation and invention of a past in the present as opposed to ‘real memory’. As Charles Maier wrote “Nostalgia is to memory as kitsch is to art” (cited in Boym 2001, xiv). Rather than seeing their nostalgia for the past exclusively as a form of a mnemonic distortion shaped by the present, nostalgia here is analysed a way of temporal ordering, which actively engages with these past experiences and through which continuity and discontinuity are negotiated (Atia and Davis 2010, 182). As Fritze argues: “If nostalgia is taken not as blindness to the directionality of history and the necessity of the present but as a kind of sightfulness, then some rather interesting structures of temporality come into focus” (Fritzsche 2002, 64).

Being nostalgic for the socialist past was characteristic for post-socialist subjectivities which my respondents shared with many members of the same generational cohorts in other post-socialist countries (for an overview, Todorova and Gille 2010). In the border town of Narva insecurities in the present were particularly strong: the deindustrialisation, the privatisation and closing of many factories led to a collective sense of decline. In addition, the citizenship regulations that Estonia adopted in the early 1990s reinforced feelings of alienation in this town populated by Russian-speakers. In the nationalistic project of restoring the Estonian nation, the former Soviet citizens were turned into aliens (on the Soviet nationalities policies and politics of citizenship, cf. Brubaker 1994; for an ethnography of the early 1990s in Estonia, cf. Laitin 1998, 83-198). As I have shown in the previous chapter, their temporal orderings were linked to a struggle for recognition and claims of belonging in place. Being nostalgic meant for them participating in a discussion on citizenship regimes and their experiences of displacement and exclusion from the national community. In comparison to my Estonian informants who used the national narratives of liberation from a foreign occupation to symbolically legitimise the
changes and ease difficulties experienced in the present\textsuperscript{29}, Russian-speakers did not have a new narrative available. Particularly those who had more difficulties reorienting themselves in the new economic and political conditions because of their age and professional background, adopted defensive narratives. Unable to integrate their positive memories of socialism into the project of the (Estonian) nation, their temporal orderings formed a counter-memory to Estonian narratives of national liberation.

7.3 Nostalgia and ambivalences: the temporal orderings of the 'perestroika' generation

Similar to the generation of their parents and grandparents, the ‘perestroika’ generation had lived significant parts of their lives under socialism and used the bi-partite temporal structure, based on a distinction between the socialist past from the post-socialist present, to order time. However, their ways of making sense of socialism had their own generational specificities. In comparison to the positive evaluation of the socialist past and the depiction of a negative collective trajectory after the fall of socialism articulated in the memory narratives of the preceding generations, in this generational cohort we encounter a much more ambiguous set of temporal orderings – something that struck me in my first encounters during my fieldwork stay (fieldwork diary 16.09.2011). For the ‘perestroika’ generation the past became relevant in different ways – as a genuinely better time, as a reflection of and longing for certain dimensions of life which were lost, or even as a memory of a repressive system hindering the development of self-expression. While I have shown in the previous chapter that also among the socialist generations more critical ways of narrating the socialist past could be found, this was much more pronounced in the next generational cohort.

This wider range of engaging with the socialist past has to be analysed in the context of different experiences in past and present. Firstly, this generational cohort had distinct lived experiences of (late) socialism and experienced the shaping influence

\textsuperscript{29} Also Estonians in Narva (who constituted 5\% of the population) were concerned by closing of the factories and the increasing unemployment.
of the perestroika. Alongside the key themes of socialist sociality, professional identification and social security which indicate trans-generational patterns of meaning-making, their memories were also shaped by their coming of age at a certain time in Soviet history. They remembered the socialist past with an emphasis on leisure time and entertainment, which reflected a significantly improved socioeconomic context in the borderland in comparison to the post-war years (Brueggemann 2004) as well as the particular character of the period of late socialism (Yurchak 2006). In contrast to my interviewees belonging to the war and post-war generations, the participants belonging to the ‘perestroïka’ generation distanced themselves to a greater extent from the ideological underpinnings of the Soviet system.

Secondly, members of this generation were also different in the experiences they had after the fall of socialism, as at least some of them found it easier to reorient themselves after the 1990s and could make use of the new opportunities offered by the regime. Even though they had experienced exclusion by the Estonian citizenship regime, as their parents did, it was in comparison easier for them to adapt to the new circumstances after the fall of socialism. This does not mean that they did not mourn certain aspects of the past which were now lost but they did it in a more ambivalent manner and had diverging opinions based on different biographical experiences.

This was particularly apparent in the interview with Marina, a woman in her mid-forties. Marina grew up in Narva and after her education in Leningrad had first followed her parents’ career in the Krenholm manufacture. In the early 1990s, she left the factory voluntarily to take advantage of the new working opportunities and accepted a position at the border agency. One of her statements captured her evaluation of the socialist past in relation to the present particularly well:

Alena: For all the years that you have been living in Narva, how do you think the town has changed?

Marina: Hmm… it changed, together with its people. Yes. But I think this is not only about Narva. It seems there are fewer happy people. But I think this is purely because of the economic circumstances. A state of…

Alena: Unemployment?
Marina: Insecurity. Because I remember… I think that we were lucky because I knew: school, college (*institut*), work, pension. Very good [laughs]. Future perspectives, and that I knew that if I want I can go to college, and in any case I will get work (...) and I will always have employment, and afterwards I can retire and enjoy the life as a pensioner. But this absolute certainty is lost, especially for the young. (...) On the other side, I understand that young people now live within totally different frames and borders than us. We had narrow ones, within the boundaries of my so called homeland, my Soviet Union. But they have the whole world. During childhood I never thought that my friend will marry a German and will go and live there. That I will go to Australia (...) Young people have more opportunities, maybe they are lucky in that regard. I don't know. But generally I think that they are less happy. I noticed that now we sing less, we used to sing a lot when we came together. (Interview with Marina, b.1965, 11 Nov 2011)

Being asked about the changes in Narva, Marina was uncertain how to evaluate them. She associated different qualities with life before and after the fall of socialism, which had shaped generational cohorts. In the statement, the present is characterised as a time of insecurities and economic difficulties and contrasted to the happy and stable life under socialism. Alongside the opposition between insecurities and securities, she introduced a second opposition – between opportunities and limitations – which provides the cornerstone of her ambivalent stance with regard to the evaluation of the past and the present. Not only the post-socialist generation but also members of her generation could make use of the new life-chances. However, in the end it is the loss of certainty and of a distinct sociality of the past that predominates in her account. The activity of ‘joint singing’ stands here as a symbol of coming together and the experiences of collectivity which Marina regarded as typical of the whole period.

Marina’s accounts and those of other respondents of her generation shared many elements with the memories of the previous generations – like them, respondents of the ‘perestroika’ generation remembered socialism as a good and stable period, demonstrated identification with heavy labour (“we were yearning for our work”, interview with Mikhail, b.1971, 17.11.11) and used Soviet metaphors, for instance,
by likening the labour collective to a family. Tat’iana, for example, remembered her time at the Krenholm manufacture in the following way:

If one speaks about Krenholm… of course this was like a big family, there were many of these workers’ dynasties and… I worked at the finishing factory; this was too far to walk and we usually went by bus. We all knew each other, and there too was always the sense of a large collective. (Interview with Tat’iana, b.1963, 12.10.2011)

However, in comparison to the previous generations a stress on fun and entertainment was typical for some members of this generational cohort and showed, similar to what Alexei Yurchak had observed in his study on the ‘last Soviet generation’ in Russia, a “replacement of Soviet political and social concerns with a quite different set of concerns that allowed one to lead a creative and imaginative life” (Yurchak 2006, 132). The factory in Marina’s account appeared, for example, exclusively as a locus for the organisation of her social life. Mentioning holidays and festivities like the sports day, day of youth, travelling in the Soviet Union, Marina concluded:

There was this very good system during the Soviet time; every enterprise, especially the big ones, had its house of culture, its pioneer camp. There were sports instructors in every factory, when I started to work there were even saunas. One could get tourist vouchers to go somewhere for holidays. Then when we started to work at Krenholm, we were considered ‘young specialists’ and to integrate better into the collective there was this Community of Young Specialists where we met regularly. All in all… we had a lot of fun. (…) Of course, we didn’t construct communism, not even socialism. We actually just enjoyed ourselves [laughs]. (Interview with Marina, b.1965, 11 Nov 2011)

This statement can be seen as a way of distancing herself from the ideological framework of socialist labour. The memories of leisure and youth characterise the socialist past in terms of a ‘good life’ and present it as a time emptied of any ideology. The socialist past appears as a time in which she could make use of the state’s social arrangements and build personal contacts. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, although Marina’s account did show nostalgia and mourning for certain aspects of the past, she did not depict the past twenty years in terms of a collective
unilinear decline but focused on her personal adaptation process. She remembered the moment when she received Estonian citizenship:

It was interesting. I could finally go to Europe, in the other direction, to Europe. In the past... I love to travel and in the past I went around the whole Soviet Union (obezdila). And here with the blue [Estonian] passport I had the opportunity to go already to Europe, well and this was really interesting for me. I recall that my first visa was to Finland – that was something! ‘Oho!’ [she laughs]. And then Germany, and later Austria. And later without any visa at all. And the world somehow opened and... now many friends live in Europe because of different circumstances. And I can go and visit them. This somehow compensated... well I don’t regret it [that she took the Estonian passport]. The Estonian passport gave me the opportunity to work in state service, yes. Here at that time the industries started shutting down, and there were job cuts. It gave me the opportunity to find a different kind of work. (Interview with Marina, b.1965, 11 Nov 2011)

Marina described the break-up of the Soviet Union in terms of a simultaneous border-closing and border-opening. She appears relatively pragmatic in her reorientation; she is aware that she cannot choose the circumstances under which she lives and tells the story of a relatively successful professional, and geographical, reorientation, although she found it disturbing that she first had to prove her ‘loyalty to the state’ before being able to get Estonian citizenship.

In comparison to the previous generation, the members of the ‘perestroika’ generation had because of their age a greater need and greater opportunities to reorient themselves professionally. They had already achieved professional education and taken the first steps in their working lives, but being in their twenties, some of them could – like Marina, who started working for the border agency – make use of new opportunities more easily than their parents. Their different trajectories after the fall of socialism, their sense of agency (or lack of it) in independent Estonia also shaped their interpretation of the socialist past. Citizenship status, but particularly professional success and satisfaction, were crucial criteria for how they evaluated their own experiences under socialism and the socialist past in general.

The case of the couple Anton and Tat’iana, an entrepreneur and an arts teacher in their early 40s, shows how even within one family these experiences – and
accordingly also their memories of the past – could be very different. In both of their narratives, memories of socialism were connected to experiences of the perestroika, which had shaped their years of education and early professional life and which both of them had experienced as a time of change and excitement. The industrial town of Narva was far from being a centre of perestroika and glasnost; it was populated primarily by a technical and uneducated labour force from Russia and other Soviet Republics and in comparison to Leningrad, Moscow or Tallinn the atmosphere was reportedly conservative. However, also here, under the influence of the developments in the centres, some alternative milieus and circles emerged.\(^{30}\) Anton, for example, conceived of his identity as shaped by the spirit of perestroika.

Although I was young, I was up to standard, I was in my progressive youth niche and… generally I was well informed about everything that was going on in Narva, in Estonia and some things in Moscow. (…) We thought that this socialist system would modernise itself. And we of course also had our personal goals, building a career, securing material provisions (obespechenie) for oneself and one’s family. (Interview with Anton, b.1965, 25.10.2011)

Anton recalled (late) socialism primarily as a positive time of discoveries, opportunities and a promising future. He became a leading member of the komsomol, the communist youth club\(^{31}\), participated in many gatherings of young people and took advantage of the liberalisation, opened his own business. Anton presented the komsomol in the late 1980s as a progressive organisation that was relatively independent from the communist party. He sympathised with the progressive forces within the political system; but like many others, who were convinced that the regime needed reforms, he did not foresee the extent of the changes:

Under Gorbachev we all still had like rose-coloured glasses on. We thought everything is normal, there are some problems and we just have to try and change everything a little bit, so that it will be good and even better. But we

\(^{30}\) An example of that is the Noortele youth camp, which brought people from different countries together and took place nearby in the seaside resort of Narva-Joesuu.

Anton could not continue his early professional success. As a Russian, he found himself side-lined by the new developments and experienced difficulties in adapting to the rules of the nationalising state, finding business partners and continuing his political career. The perestroika as a historical watershed was overshadowed by the fall of socialism as a second turning point with negative consequences for him: “In the end all hopes were destroyed.” The disappointments over the unrealised past promises turned into a nostalgic longing for (late) socialism as an incomplete but better time.

His wife Tat’iana however did not experience the fall of socialism as a negative development. For her, the present – her career and personal development – appeared as a prolongation of the late 1980s. After finishing school, Tat’iana started to work at the Krenholm manufacturing plant as a designer but after a short period moved to Moscow to obtain professional education. She had fond memories of her childhood and youth in socialist Narva and recalled positive experiences of socialist collectivity (see the earlier excerpt on p.150) but in her narrative a different way of evaluating socialism predominated:

I was studying in Moscow, it was the time of perestroika, I arrived in 1985 and our eyes were open to everything. That is to say for a long time we were so Soviet, we had blinkers… Pioneers, komsomoley, there were slogans everywhere. Even pupils had notebooks where… they tried to be pressed into a five-year-plan as well (…) we wrote our duties in the notebook, which mark I shall get, what goals I shall reach. (…) Life afterwards showed us that all of this was nonsense. (Interview with Tat’iana, b.1963, 12.10.2011)

This statement shows the adaptation of narratives of liberation from the Soviet regime which were characteristic of Estonian national narratives. Socialism here has negative characteristics and is presented as a wrong and oppressive ideology, a distorted consciousness which was overcome through political transformation. For Tat’iana, perestroika led both to a political and professional reorientation, which induced a considerable reevaluation of the past:
When I returned to the production, this production setting weighed heavily on me. And maybe because of this I was attracted to the arts school [to teach there]. And when the dismissals started, I changed my profession, to me it was not a blow. On the contrary, it was something new and [created] more freedom of self-expression. But to the other designers who were dismissed it probably was a blow. (Interview with Tat’iana, b. 1963, 12.10.2011)

Instead of stressing the positive sides of collectivity, against the background of her own professional and personal development as an arts teacher (and artist), the industrial work is seen as confinement. The loss of her job in that way can be interpreted as a form of personal liberation. While her experience was not the most typical in Narva and many members of her generation did not have a positive framework within which to interpret their dismissals from and precarious conditions at the factories, Tat’iana’s case shows very well the emergence of different and more diverse temporal orderings and identities in this generation. Despite showing many similarities with the previous generations in how they remembered the socialist past, members of this generation also found different ways of interpreting the past in the light of present experiences.

7.4 Between ‘European time’ and an insecure present: the temporal orderings of the post-socialist generation

In comparison to the generations who came of age under socialism, young people I interviewed did not have many own memories of socialism. Born between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, my respondents had spent most of their lives in newly independent Estonia and knew about it primarily through stories, images and practices which they heard about from family members, school education or the media.

Most of my participants belonging to the post-socialist generation were students at the local college training to become teachers or social workers. In comparison to other generational cohorts they were mainly concerned with planning the future, finishing education and finding work. This was reflected in the narrative focus of the interviews on the present and future. In contrast to the socialist generations, whose
narratives were as a rule divided into the socialist past and the post-socialist present, the post-socialist generation focused on the latter period and told stories about growing up in Narva, their education and leisure activities and their expectations for the future. One of the most central questions they were confronted with was whether to stay or to leave. With relatively high rates of unemployment, lack of permanent, well-paid and specialist jobs, Narva did not provide many options and many of their friends had already left Narva to study or work somewhere else. Even more than the ‘perestroika’ generation whose reorientation after the fall of socialism had not always been successful, the narratives of the post-socialist generation were shaped by a sense of agency. Although some of them mentioned difficulties in finding a job and experiences of discrimination against Russian-speakers in Estonia, they did not experience the same insecurities as their grandparents and parents with regard to their citizenship status and did not have any difficulties in passing the citizenship test because of Estonian language training in school.

Being concerned with building their present and future, memories of the socialist past did not play an important role in their narratives and were usually not part of their main narration. When they were directly asked about their family history and Narva’s history, the stories they told of the socialist past were abstract and had little details. Members of the post-socialist generation however showed a relatively broad range of ways of engaging with the socialist past, ranging from disinterest and devaluation of the past to nostalgic yearnings for it. Some of them assessed the socialist past as outdated and negative and adopted the narrative of progress and movement towards European modernity in independent Estonia. Others characterised the socialist past as a ‘better time’ in comparison to the present and shared some of the nostalgic feelings of the generation 1945 and the post-war generation. The different modes of negotiating the socialist past reflected their different evaluations and experiences of the present and gave voice to their political sensibilities.

Elena, who was 22 years old at the time of the interview and a student at the local college, was most explicit in her negative evaluation of the socialist past. She grew up in a working-class family. Her parents as she said were living from salary to salary and could hardly support her. Having to rely on herself, Elena described herself as a very ambitious person who wanted to leave Narva and move abroad to
achieve something. Embracing a European life-style and aiming for a career in business, the socialist past seemed distant and not relevant for her:

Alena: What do you know about Narva during Soviet times?

Elena: I don't know anything. Mmm... I was born Soviet. And everything that concerns the Soviet period is ‘Sovok’. This is the former century, old, it makes me laugh. This is my opinion. (Interview with Elena, b.1989, 29.10.2011)

In her evaluation the socialist past appears as out-dated and old fashioned – it is ‘Sovok’, a derogatory term which is used for Soviet things and people and which she used to distance herself from the past. Her statement, ‘I don’t know anything’, indicates not only a lack of knowledge but a lack of interest in the past which is far removed from her present concerns. A couple of days before the interview Elena came to meet me at a jazz café where I had dinner with a friend. Elena was making fun of the café which in her eyes was a good example for ‘Sovok’. When I asked Elena in the interview to explain this, she said:

This is Soviet Union. A place which isn't even touched by young people. Even how the chairs stand there, how it is lit. Everything is very Soviet. Or maybe just Russian, very very Russian. Anyway, we are already... we are standing with one leg in Europe, we are catching up very well. The development has gone into this direction. To Europe. In regard to technologies, attitudes (mirovozrenie), innovations. We want to leave all this behind us. (Interview with Elena, b.1989, 29.10.2011)

The socialist past appears here as something old, a superseded aesthetics which is opposed to a dawning ‘European future’. In contrast to the nostalgia of the older generations who located socioeconomic success in the past, Elena valued (western) European modernity and saw it as the direction in which Narva and Estonia were developing. The narrative frame of the statement is a belief in progress which could also be found in official Estonian narratives and which she shared with many ethnic Estonians of her age. This expectation of a European future was also reflected in her personal plans and ambitions. In the interview Elena spoke about her year as an exchange student in Germany as well as her plans for moving back. While in these episodes her dream of a different and better life was an underlying theme, they also showed uncertainty about the present and the future. “I don’t know if anyone is
waiting for me there”, she said about her plans to move abroad. “But anyway, you have to try it.”

Navigating between the socialist past and European future, other participants belonging to the post-socialist generation also shared Elena’s evaluations of the socialist past as something negative and outdated. 22-year old Irina, for example, shared Elena's plans to leave Narva and move abroad. When I asked her what her parents' reactions are she replied:

Of course they understand. Here I just… even my dad sometimes jokes: ‘you are going to work at the power plant and continue our cause, right?’ [laughs]. They have been working there for all their lives and I should follow them, right? [jokingly]. But anyhow, neither they nor I myself see any concrete future for myself. I am still looking for it. (Interview with Irina, b.1989, 29.10.2011)

While her own future still seems uncertain, it is clear for Irina that the life-models of generational cohorts who came of age during the socialist past (as for example, the socialist model of workers' dynasties that was still relevant for the upbringing of the previous generation) are outdated, a reality of the past. “Continuing the parents' and grandparents' cause” is not more than the object of a joke. That the socialist past is perceived as distant also becomes apparent in the following statement:

Alena: When do you think was the best time and when the most difficult time? What do you think?

Irina: Now that I’ve grown up I would be interested to go back when there was a deficit. Deficit of everything, of goods. They received food with vouchers [laughs]. I can’t imagine how this happened. I would like to see it. But I think that … for my parents, for people who are in their forties, thirties to fifties, now they are… I think they can compare and they would say that the best time was when they removed these vouchers. That’s my impression. When goods appeared in the supermarkets and you could buy them and there was lots of work. This was exactly when Estonia became independent. (Interview with Irina, b.1989, 29.10.2011)

Irina associated the socialist past with a memory of deficit and contrasted it to a time of plenty following the restoration of Estonia’s independence. Although her account of the socialist past was presented through her parents’ eyes, it is clear that it tells us
more about her own way of making sense of the past. In interviews with older respondents the late 1980s and the early 1990s were characterised as one of the most difficult and insecure times during which many had lost their work places and had to rely on their vegetable gardens as a source of food supply. These evaluations of the socialist past indicate how quickly images of the past can change over one generation. Particularly in times of societal transformation when old frames of reference are devalued representations of the past can change quickly. These were also related to a way of constructing belonging: those members of the post-socialist generation, who adopted new narrative frames, usually presented themselves as having new hybrid (Estonian Russian) or cosmopolitan identities and detached themselves not only from the socialist past but also from Russia as a cultural space. The interpretations of the changes were different from Estonian official narratives in that they were emptied of political content and ignored the history of repressions and state violence in the past. Selectively appropriating some elements of the Estonian official narratives, the post-socialist generation’s evaluation of the socialist past was based on aesthetic and consumer preferences rather than on the condemnation of the Soviet regime’s terrorist practices. Also the new opportunities and promises of Europe which were at the core of their relatively optimistic evaluation of the post-socialist present were centred on consumerism, entertainment and European mobility.

For other participants belonging to the post-socialist generation, the socialist past could also become an object of nostalgic longings and appear as a better place where life was still easier. Against the background of their own difficulties in the present and uncertainties about the future, the opportunity structures and greater stability of the past were seen in a positive light. The Soviet system of raspredelenie that guaranteed a specialist work place for everybody who had graduated, along with a flat, appeared to provide an attractive alternative to the present situation in which neither employment nor the acquisition of an own living space could be taken for granted and required major efforts (conversation with Igor, fieldwork notes from 12.11.2011). Such a (selective) engagement with the socialist past was then linked to a critique of the present and reflected feelings of insecurities in the present and often a more politicised ethnic identity. This could be also observed in the case of the 19-
years old Eduard who remembered Narva’s development under socialist rule. When I asked him about the best and worst times in Narva’s history, Eduard said:

Good times for Narva were when… I don't think like many others that the Soviet Union was something thoroughly good, but anyway it also had its good sides. Like for example the reconstruction of Narva. Because many politicians in Russia were very interested in Narva. Many poets and writers from Russia came to Narva. Narva was a border town both Russians and Estonians were interested in. (…) There was interest in Narva because Russia invested money in Narva: therefore factories were constructed, a polyclinic and a hospital. Krenholm, Baltiets, the power plants, the hospital and polyclinic, a police station and a fire station. Everything was constructed during Soviet times. With Soviet money. (…) and people were moving here to live here. New houses were built, work places, people came to work here. (Interview with Eduard, b.1992, 19.10.2011)

While Eduard began his consideration of Narva’s socialist past with a relativisation (to which I will come back later), this quotation shows a generally positive evaluation of the past as a time of construction and centrality. This is reflected in the interest of politicians and attraction to writers as well as to workers and which stood in marked contrast to what Eduard characterised as the present status of a 'discriminated periphery'. When I asked him about his own family history, Eduard stated that his parents moved from Soviet Russia to Narva during the prosperous period of socialism:

(…) they came to Narva because back then there was work. And my family took roots here because there was work here. Now of course, I think if I put myself in that situation, for example, my parents they would have now met somewhere else in Tallinn or maybe even not in Estonia because firstly there is nothing to do in Narva, nobody comes to work here from abroad. Nobody at all. (…) Now only those people live here who manage to find work, but there is no work. Some of my classmates went to study in England. Some of my classmates went with their parents abroad. Many good students try to leave. (Interview with Eduard, b.1992, 19.10.2011)

The past here serves as a basis for a reflection about structural changes in the present, as a springboard for complaints about the limited opportunities in Narva and (later in
the interview) as a starting points for criticisms of Russian-speakers’ status in Estonia today. One of the themes of the socialist generations’ nostalgia can be retrieved in these statements: progress in the past, peripheralisation in the present. In this case, frames of interpretation are successfully transmitted from the previous generations to the next (cf. Pickering and Keightley 2013).

In comparison to the nostalgia of the generation 1945 and the post-war generation, such accounts were however more abstract and primarily used to articulate critique. Furthermore, they were shaped by a greater need to qualify and justify positive accounts of the past. While one has to be cautious in making generalisations on the basis of a small sample, I found it telling that their positive evaluations of the past never came without relativisations, expressed in opening phrases like Eduard’s ‘I don't think (…) that the Soviet Union was thoroughly good, but anyway…’. Similarly, in the case of another young person, the possibility that nostalgia for the past was a form of distorted memory was mentioned before engaging in nostalgic talk:

The old generation talks very much about this. (…) Therefore I have this information background but it’s hard for me to say if one lived better during Soviet times. (Interview with Igor, b.1983, 09.01.2012).

I think that such relativisations reflect an uncertainty about the meaning of the socialist past. Because the positive character of the socialist past had been questioned by Estonians' narratives of occupation and suffering, its critical potential in the present was dubious. In Eduard’s case his qualification that the socialist past was not thoroughly good was explicates later in the interview when he reflected about the Stalinist repressions against Estonians:

Why is there such a disagreement between Estonians and Russians? Because… the Russians were in favour of the Soviet Union in Estonia and the Estonians against, even now. Because back then more work places were created for Russians than for Estonians (…) Russians came here to work and Estonians were even shot and sent to Siberia during Stalinist years and to other fantastic places, therefore they have such a negative attitude towards Russians. (Interview with Eduard, b.1992, 19.10.2011)
Although the ‘Russian version’ of the past occupied a much more central place in his narrative as it was linked to his critique of Narva's status as a periphery and of Russian-speakers’ discrimination in Estonia today, he acknowledged Estonians' 'different truth'. Such statements made the socialist past appear in a more differentiated light. Again we can interpret this in relation to the position of Russian-speakers in Estonia: arguing for recognition and better life-chances may be more effective with reference to other values. In Eduard's narrative, for example, the principle of democracy and social welfare is much more important in his complaints than the socialist past.

Summing up, the memory narratives of the post-socialist generation show both shifts and (some) continuities in how the socialist past is remembered. Young Russian-speakers growing up in independent Estonia can make use of official narratives in Estonia for making sense of their lives under conditions which are very different from their parents, while at the same time the memory frames of previous generations have not been completely replaced and form a (at least from their perspective) workable if contested resource to articulate critique.

7.5 Conclusion

A generational perspective can offer a more grounded and differentiated image of continuity and discontinuity in remembering practices, which is able to account for changes while at the same time remaining sensitive to the limits of imposing a new memory regime. The chapter showed both emotional and political resistances to and appropriation of national narratives in Estonia by the Russian-speaking population. The interviews show that generation is an important category along which memories are structured. Born into different historical times, generations of Russian-speakers thus differ in their narrative foci, extent of knowledge about the socialist past and their ways of making sense of it. Interpretations of the past and evaluations of the present in relation to the past reflect different generational experiences and the particular biographical and historical locations from which stories are told. The memories of the socialist generations are shaped by experiences of the socialist past and frame Narva as a place of connections and socialist modernity and use these
memories as a counter-narrative to an exclusionary memory of the nation. In contrast to them, people belonging to the post-socialist generation tend to establish distance to the socialist past as a way of linking their own sense of self to the dominant Estonian (and European) narratives and the promise of a European modernity. Finally, the 'perestroika' generation shares diverse memory patterns, ranging from nostalgia for the spaces of the communist past and the acknowledgment of new opportunities. These different generational patterns demonstrate that what is commonly perceived as a result of ethnic differences can to a certain extent be seen as a matter of generational differences.

These different ways of narrating the past and the spatial orders that are embedded in them can be better understood by considering the role of embodied experiences in vernacular narratives. Schudson writes that memories are both commitments and promises (Schudson 1992, 207) – they shape our understanding of ourselves and our expectations, what to claim, what to expect from the future. People cannot simply choose the past they remember; it is linked to identity investments and a cumulative sense of the self. The 'commitment' to past experiences – and linked to it, the burden of the past – becomes particularly apparent in how the socialists generations remember the past. For them, the socialist past was experienced as a largely positive time of personal satisfaction, a sense of recognition and advancement – a past which was largely experienced as an enabling context in which people could build their lives and make their careers – which was contrasted to experiences of an alienating present. Particularly those who were at a later stage of their life and those who had difficulties in reorienting themselves mourned over the loss of socialism as a personally meaningful and ‘better’ period. Also the ‘perestroika’ generation shared some of the socialist generations’ positive memories of socialism, even if showing some variations in form and content. In contrast to the socialist generations, who defended the socialist past to claim belonging in the present, the ‘perestroika’ generation did not seem quite so threatened by the political changes. Their temporal orderings reflected the experiences of late socialism, its time-specific hopes and subsequent disillusionments. They were at least initially sympathetic to the new order ensured by perestroika and could make better use of the opportunities offered by it. Alongside with negative experiences of decline, some of them could interpret the
time after the redrawing of borders as linked to the opening of a new space of opportunities and therefore tended to be less defensive regarding the socialist past – even though they remained critical of the present order.

An even greater reconsideration of, and distance from, the socialist past could be observed in the temporal orderings of the post-socialist generation, for whom the socialist past was not part of their own life-story. In contrast to the previous generations' actually lived experiences, members of the post-socialist generation, who were born shortly before or after 1991, had an indirect relationship with the socialist past and had heard about it only in a mediated form from their parents, the media and the educational system. They did not make the same identity investment in the socialist past and thought of it as being relatively distant. Nonetheless the post-socialist generation engaged with the past to position themselves and understand the present – either in terms of a positive departure from the past or as a means of critique of the present. How they made sense of the past depended largely on experiences and interpretations of the present in terms of a time of opportunities and progress or limitations and insecurities. The post-socialist generation could adopt some of their parents’ and grandparents’ temporal orderings as they were linked to their own experiences of insecurity and precariousness.

In the existing literature, generations have usually been conceptualised as categories of discontinuity – following Mannheim's conception of generational consciousness shaped during early adulthood (Mannheim 1998). What we can observe here with regard to their memories of the socialist past is however not a complete replacement of older memories by new ones but a more complex picture of mnemonic change and continuities between the generations. Whether or not the older generations’ nostalgia is transmitted to and appropriated by the post-socialist generation to a large extent depends on whether it connects with present-day insecurities and feelings of exclusion.

The extent to with the generationally structured images of the past are a uniting or dividing factor between generations still needs further elaboration. Do the different spaces of experience between grandparents, parents and children lead to a division between family members, or are they bridged in familial narratives referring, for example, to present difficulties and to a cross-generational ‘Russian experience’?
Research on Eastern Germany for example shows that generational differences can be
masked by East-West differentiation, particularly in cases of families in which the
parents had difficulties in reorienting themselves after the fall of socialism (Karstein
2010). One possible way to explore these issues would be to use family interviews
alongside individual interviews. This would also help to account for the fact that
generations are not isolated groups and that the meanings of the past and its relations to
the present are often negotiated in the context of a particular mnemonic community.
Chapter 8 Narrating change, redrawing the East-West border

8.1 Introduction

The past two chapters have analysed the politics of temporal orderings in the Russian-Estonian borderland. Focusing on ethnicity and generations on the Estonian side of the border, they looked at different ways of ordering time and navigating historical narratives based on different experiences and positions in the present and analysed the ways in which they contribute to stabilising or undermining the borders of the nation. Incorporating perspectives from both Narva and Ivangoord, the following two chapters foreground spatial ordering, and examine the ways in which space is ordered in memory narratives.

This chapter looks at the construction and negotiation of spatial difference in Narva and Ivangoord and at how people use categories of ‘East’, ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ and related spatial hierarchies in their narratives of post-socialist change. It examines the conflicting ways in which Russian-speakers living in Narva and Ivangoord interpret spatial changes in relation to shared memories of the socialist past and position themselves within Europe’s shifting geographies.

In doing so, the chapter follows two aims: firstly, it aims to analyse the ways in which space is ordered and borders are made and unmade in processes of remembering. I assume that spatial categories and meanings associated with them are not neutral and descriptive but are part of bordering processes and reflect power relations (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 10-11, cf. Bourdieu 1991). In focusing on the making and unmaking of borders in memory narratives, the chapter draws attention to the multiple and dynamic ways in which borders are constituted. Green, for example, states that borders should be conceptualised in terms of a “lively sense of difference, one that is constantly being reworked, while there are also (more or less) predictable regularities from one event that creates a mark to the next” (Green 2011, 15; cf. Green 2009, Van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005). Such a conception allows us to capture particularly well the contested geographical mappings at Europe’s eastern frontier which have undergone dramatic changes since 1989.
Secondly, in line with the overall aims of the thesis, particular attention is drawn to the making and unmaking of borders in vernacular narratives in the negotiation of the East-West border, something that has been of relatively little concern in the writing of symbolic geographies. As argued in Chapter 4, much research on borders has either focused on elite discourses, boundary narratives by politicians, scholars and intellectuals, who are usually associated with attempts to stabilise territory and naturalise relations between people, culture, and space (cf. Said 1978, Neumann 1999, Kuus 2007) or has adopted an oppositional approach that focuses on lived senses of place and alternative spatialities that challenge the exclusive logics of the nation-state and its boundaries (going back to de Certeau 1984 and the literature on hybridity in borderlands, Anzaldua 1987 and Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Focusing on how people actively engage with geopolitical changes and invest them with meaning, this chapter sees them neither as passive objects of political changes nor as necessarily resistant to them. As I will show, making sense of their lives on Europe’s new margins, people living in both border towns participate in the making of borders and adopt and appropriate metageographical categories like ‘Europe’, ‘West’ and ‘East’ and the underlying hierarchical understandings of space in their vernacular narratives. Analysing how particular official narratives about borders are used by people living in the borderland, the chapter points to people’s creative responses in relation to borders and takes into consideration what people ’do' with borders, e.g. complaining, claiming benefits or making status claims. Although an acknowledgement of agency is present already in the approaches based on the oppositional framework, these approaches conceive of action in very narrow terms – the only two possibilities offered are acceptance and resistance (and perhaps a negotiated appropriation). In contrast, my approach demonstrates that such strategies of bordering and accompanying narratives can be used to perform a much wider range of actions.

In the following pages, I will firstly outline the shifts in Europe’s borders and how the Russian and Estonian states have commonly related to them. This will be followed by an examination of how Russian-speakers living on both sides of the border positioned themselves within these shifting symbolic and material landscapes and redefined the relations to their neighbours against the background of shared memories of the past. I
will introduce three narratives of place which can be found in the borderland. The narrative of becoming ‘peripheral’/ ‘eastern’ focuses on the shift from being the ‘West in the East’ to becoming eastern and backwards because of the geopolitical changes. The second narrative of becoming ‘European’ in comparison focuses on the emerging differences between both sides and adopts the East-West hierarchy to associate Narva with a superior identity. In the third narrative, the East-West hierarchy is contested by reversing its valences and associating the East with positive things. This narrative is largely a response to assumptions about Narva's and Estonia's superiority.

I will argue that the multiple ways of bordering in the Russian-Estonian borderland constitute a case of a ‘nested peripheralisation' at Europe's new margins, which reflects power relations and uneven local experiences of transformation. In an article published in 1995, Bakić-Hayden (1995) introduced the concept of ‘nesting orientalisms’ in relation to the example of former Yugoslavia to characterise the gradation of inferiority within the East. She showed that assumptions about superiority and inferiority between 'West' and 'East', 'Europe' and 'non-Europe' recur within the margins, and labelling the other as less developed can be used to veil one's sense inferiority. In place of ‘nesting orientalisms’ I use ‘nested peripheralisation’ to characterise the competing ways of ordering space to foreground the sense that all strategies of narrating spatial change should be seen in relation to the peripheralisation processes that have occurred since 1991.

On both sides of the border the status as a new periphery does not create unity across the border but results in parallel and competing projects of imagining space and constructing difference – making claims about one's superior status vis-à-vis the other or using assumptions about one's inferiority and Easternness to argue for symbolic recognition and financial benefits. It was especially locality – whether people lived in Narva or Ivangoorod – that shaped the way in which the East-West border was remade on the ground. Whether people lived in Russia or in newly enlarged Europe mattered symbolically as well as practically and structured people's narrative in interaction with personal experiences and their generational location.
8.2 Remaking the East-West border

The fall of the Iron Curtain has radically changed Europe’s symbolic geographies. The fading Cold War division has led to a reconsideration of geographical markers of ‘Europe’, ‘West’ and ‘East’ that have long been taken for granted. Some have concluded that the geopolitical changes transform Europe into a post-western place and that “the very terms east and west (…) are best abandoned in making sense of Europe” (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 36) because of the continent’s cosmopolitan outlook, its multiple historical heritages as well as its principles of cooperation and solidarity. Other authors however have drawn a less optimistic picture and focused on the emergence of new borders and the reconfiguration of hierarchies within Europe’s shifting symbolic geographies, particularly visible in the context of the Eastern enlargement and most recently, the financial crisis. Merje Kuus (2007), for example, states that despite the multiple transformations Eastern Europe has undergone since 1989, the East continues to be Europe’s negative ‘other’ which is selectively reproduced in geopolitical discourses and institutional practices (cf. Schwell 2011, Kuerti 1999). Eastern European states are often seen as lagging behind and are considered not to be fully European (yet), which mobilises deeply rooted assumptions of Eastern Europe’s otherness (Wolff 1994, Neumann 1999) that are expressed in dichotomies of modernity versus tradition, individualism versus collectivism, secularism versus religiosity, civic versus ethnic nationalism.

While these discourses express continuing power asymmetries between states and regions of Europe, they are however neither homogeneous nor unidirectional: especially since the fall of the Iron Curtain, 'Europe', rather than being a stable location, appears as a more flexible constellation – a kind of 'sliding scale of Europeanness and Eastness' (Kuus 2007, 32) which can be used to characterise certain groups and practices. Thus states can slide in and out of Europeanness depending on, for example, how they deal with the past, whether they follow political recommendations by European institutions and adopt certain economic and

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32 Wolff (1994) has traced its history reach back to the 18th century, showing that while connotations have been varying over time, Eastern Europe’s otherness has been used to express the West’s own superiority.
democratic principles. Furthermore, although assumptions about Eastern Europe’s otherness express power asymmetries on the continent, Eastern European countries are not passive recipients of external Western classifications. The rhetoric of Europeanness or Eastern inferiority recurs within the ‘East’ itself and is used locally to negotiate their position within the continent (cf. Malksoo 2010, Helms 2008, Kuus 2007, Mihelj 2005, Bakić-Hayden 1995). Eastern European states have been actively involved in the discourses on the borders of Europe and thus in reproducing and challenging symbolic geographies by, for example, inserting themselves into Europe and shifting its borders further eastward to distinguish themselves from the inhabitants of neighbouring states, or by turning Easternness into a positive national characteristic.

Sharing a position on the margins, Russia and Estonia have adopted different strategies within these discourses on Europeanness. In Estonian public discourses, the border to Russia has been framed as a deep-seated civilisational divide between the East and the West. Foregrounding its ‘European’ culture and historical heritage, Estonia has framed the fall of the Iron Curtain in terms of a ‘return to Europe’, thus pushing the border of the West further eastwards to include herself while making the border with Russia as firm as possible (Malksoo 2010, Kuus 2007, Brueggemann 2007, Lehti and Smith 2003). Although often considered ‘Europe's constitutive other’, Russia too has selectively appropriated 'Europeanness' in defining her geopolitical identity and has regularly depicted the Baltics as countries of lower civilisation. Russia's relationship to Europe however continues to be marked by ambivalence, shifting between attempts to achieve European recognition and a Russian Sonderweg stressing its cultural distinctiveness (cf. Prozorov 2009; on Russian symbolic politics cf. Neumann 1999, 161-182; Bassin 1991; Khalib, Knight and Todorova 2000).

Finally, the borderland divided by the EU external border is not only the object of reconsiderations of Europe's symbolic borders. As the following sections will show, negotiations of the East-West border are appropriated in more banal and localised

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33 Discussions on a Northern identity indicate a regionalisation in Estonia’s identity constructions, but this should be seen as secondary geopolitical project, with the integration into Europe being the primary goal.
ways in Narva and Ivangoen in order to make sense of local changes and emerging inequalities.

8.3 Becoming ‘peripheral’/ ‘eastern’

The division of the borderland was on both sides most commonly experienced in terms of a peripheralisation. The narrative of peripheralisation was based on assumptions about the reconfiguration of space from being the 'West of the East' in the past to becoming eastern and relatively backwards, adopting assumptions about an inferior East. Narratives of peripherality could be found both in Ivangoen and Narva, with mirroring assumptions of one’s own inferiority and related sentiments (nostalgia about the past, indignation or resignation about the present). On both sides of the border these narratives were particularly prominent among elderly people and those who had had difficulties in adapting to the changes. Becoming ‘peripheral’ or ‘eastern’ was however experienced differently on each side of the border and reflected locally specific ways of experiencing marginality that stemmed from the different trajectories of the towns after their division by an international border. Narratives of peripherality were therefore not linked to a mobilisation of cross-commonalities form an alternative imagination of space. Rather than overtly resisting and subverting the state, people on both sides used the border to articulate their concerns, claims and complaints. Through practices of complaining and claims-making, they reproduced and appropriated the border as they addressed their respective states.

Narratives of ‘becoming a periphery’ characterised the reconfiguration of sociospatial relations since the restoration of Estonian independence. While the nationalisation of the borderland had not eliminated all cross-border relations, narrating oneself as ‘peripheral’ meant the foregrounding of industrial decline, the cutting off of relations (expressed in the expression ‘we were simply cut into half’ (nas razrezali po-zhivomu) which I repeatedly heard during my fieldwork) and the construction of Narva or Ivangoen in terms of a ‘dying town’, ‘appendix’ or ‘remote, provincial place’ without a future.
In Ivango�rd, peripherality meant to be left out and forgotten by the political centre and was shared with other provincial places in Russia. Particularly the half-island of Parusinka – a 19th century industrial zone and nowadays a particularly abandoned part of Ivango�rd which was characterised by poorly maintained streets, lack of renovation and commercial infrastructure – was used as an example to illustrate Ivango�rd’s status. The Parusinka consisted of factory buildings and old workers’ houses that had largely survived WWII and were apart from the Ivango�rd Fortress, one of the most interesting places to visit. However, despite ambitious ideas to renovate this area (interview with Ol’ga Seliverstvova from the Department for Economic Development, 07.11.11), it remained one of the most abandoned places within the town with empty buildings, streets full of potholes and poor street lighting (cf. Figure 8.1). One of its inhabitants, Andrei, a pensioner who used to work as an engineer in Narva, reflected extensively on the town’s changing status and his own difficulties of making a living in the present since the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Looking out of the window from his kitchen where we conducted the interview, he commented on the changes in urban space:

How many destroyed houses do you see if you go for a walk on the Parusinka? There used to be a wonderful restaurant with an interesting interior design at the final bus station. On the other side there was a restaurant and a shop. In the factory a thousand people used to work and now maybe a hundred are left. Can you see the red house with the letter ‘P’? [Andrei pointed to a half-finished building.] A structure for a military institute was built there that should be moved from Krasnoe Selo to Ivango. But then this unfortunate time happened… they had planned a bridge and an enterprise on the other side of the canal. There were the first signs of a new military institute. I don’t have words for what is going on right now. (Interview with Andrei, b. 1939, 29 Nov 2011)

As in many narratives in the borderland, Andrei interprets the empty and demolished buildings and idle factories as spatial signs of a general decline. Similar to other post-socialist places, the deindustrialisation and movement of production sites elsewhere had left behind a transformed space. Alongside with the relocation of industrial work, local infrastructure, commerce and leisure activities had been closed down. Dereliction shaped the general impression of the quality of life in the borderland. Already in the past, Narva and Ivango were located at the relative periphery: on the Baltic margins of the Soviet empire. These margins however were characterised both at the level of Soviet discourse and of personal experiences by largely positive characteristics. Within the Soviet Union, the Baltic States were known for being economically and culturally more advanced than other republics due to their distinct historical heritage and their developed consumer culture and were furthermore embedded in dense social and economic networks with other Soviet Republics.34 This contributed to the feeling of advanced (Soviet) modernity which enabled people like Andrei to build their careers and shaped their sense of place in the past. Since the fall of socialism, the once lively social and economic space had been turned into an empty zone, in which buildings still reminded the observer of a better past and

34 In the Soviet literature, for example, Narva was presented as part of a larger system of production and supply: people from the ‘brotherly republics’ participated in the reconstruction; factories exported their goods around the Union; the power stations produced energy for the whole North-East region of the Soviet Union (Kann 1979).
unrealised future expectations. Andrei linked his observations on the transformation of urban space to a reflection on Ivangoard’s locatedness within Russia:

Putin and Medvedev are people with common sense but they can’t bring any order, you know. They care about stability in Russia, and therefore they have to be in power, and to be in power they have to feed the metropolis with millions of voters. Then they will have the majority in the Duma. But we, the province, a remote place (zakholust’e) we don’t see these changes. There, they move to new flats but here this house is the newest one. (Interview with Andrei, b. 1939, 29 Nov 2011)

While for Andrei the fall of socialism was the main reason for Ivangoord’s marginality, in his narrative it was interpreted not only in terms of relations between past and present but also in terms of spatial relations – as a result of the spatial inequalities between the centre (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and the periphery. Although in some cases ‘life in the provinces’ was valued because of its quietness, peacefulness and nature (Interview with Aleksandr, b.1965, 12 Dec 2011; interview with Igor, b. 1987, 17 Dec 2011), a sense of being marginal and left out of the relative progress happening in the centre was dominant in Ivangoord: “nobody needs us… it is as if we don’t exist”, as another informant put it (interview with Iuliia, b. 1956, 13 Dec 2011). Despite its relative geographical proximity to St. Petersburg, Ivangoord was perceived as a remote place due to the centralised nature of Russian geography with a concentration of capital, power and signs of a capitalist modernity in two big cities. The transformation that Russia’s metropolises had undergone in the past decade had not reached out to the provinces.

While Narva had been equally affected by deindustrialisation and shared many of these characteristics, in comparison to Ivangoord, Narva's peripheralisation additionally had an ethnic dimension (as mentioned in Chapter 6), reflecting the different national contexts of the transformation: becoming peripheral was interpreted as a result of an ethnic nationalisation directed against Russian-speakers. Being stranded in Estonia upon the break-up of the Soviet Union, many Russian-speakers in Narva felt doubly marginal, excluded as inhabitants of a peripheral place and because of their ethnic origin. This double marginality came together in the place of Narva as a Russian-speaking border town, which, in the eyes of many, was being
excluded from the rest of Estonia. Rather than 'escaping the east' and 'returning to Europe', a narrative mobilised by the Estonian state, many of Narva’s Russian-speakers saw themselves excluded from the changes and turned to 'easterners' by the logics of the nationalistic and capitalist transformation. Furthermore, narratives of peripherality in Narva reflected on Estonia’s positioning within the new geographies of Europe – which were expressed for example in everyday theories about the circulation of goods. One of my informants exemplified this in a story about a purchase in one of Narva's shopping centres:

I decided to buy myself a new cap. I went to different shops and found in one of them in the shopping centre Fama, a cap which was part of what was called 'the new collection'. I liked it and decided to buy it. In my car I had a look at the price tag – there was a sticker with the Estonian price. This was in 2009. 'The new collection'. But the price tag was half-transparent and I saw beneath it the price in Deutsche mark [the Euro was introduced in Germany in 2002]. This is how we live here. We have two opportunities: either we buy what the Europeans haven't bought ten or more years ago or we buy European second-hand which is brought here. (Interview with Anton, b.1965, 25 Oct 2011)

The story about the German cap is used to express a hierarchical imagination of space in which Estonia clearly is in a disadvantaged position. One of the most important promises after the fall of the Iron Curtain had been the access to Western goods of consumption. The availability of Western products and Estonia's integration into a European (commercial) space however does not erase differences and make Narva 'European' but reproduces the border between West and East. The story thus articulates a sense of disappointment over being a 'second class European' due to the geopolitical location on the continent's margins.

As evident from the interviews, despite shared imaginations of an inferior status, narratives of peripheralisation drew upon divergent experiences and positionalities in Narva and Ivangoord and hardly created an imagination of a common space transcending national borders. As a relational category 'peripherality' was bound to a centre – imagined as a nation-state or EU. It was used to define one's place within the new national and global geographies and was often connected to claims-making in relation to the (own) state. My interviewees used the narratives of peripherality to make claims for a better life and more state care. Looking from the margins inwards
(and rarely across the border) they used the border to articulate their local concerns and to demand care of the state, financial subsidies and recognition as well as the easing of the border regime.

This is evident in the story told by Iuliia, a retired factory worker living in Ivangorod, who had to work to supplement her small pension. She lived in a small flat in a multi-storey building and used the border to make claims for social benefits:

As far as I know in the whole world everybody who lives in a border town receives some subsidies. Additional work places are created so that people can live comfortably. Here they only take from us, everything is only getting worse and worse. Narva lives worse than Tallinn, and we live even worse than Kingisepp [the administrative centre of the district], not to speak of Saint Petersburg. (...) There are no positive incentives so that we could feel that we are representatives of Great Russia, that we live here and here is where Russia begins. But we don’t notice that. Here is where Russia ends; this is how it turns out. (Interview with Iuliia, b. 1956, 13 Dec 2011)

In nation-building processes borderlands are often considered to be crucial locations which are invested with ideological meaning, security concerns and showcase architecture. Iuliia refers to this imagination when she argues that Ivangorod should be a place where Russia begins, a representative face for the country. It is not important whether the invocation of a ‘Great Russia’ is meant with irony here; what we can see is that narratives of place and border directly engage with the state and mobilise imaginations of how a border town should be like. In sum, narratives of peripherality both reproduced assumptions about one’s inferiority and backwardness and at the same time expressed the desire to escape the East and transcend otherness.

8.4 ‘Becoming European’: negotiating local differences

People living in Narva and Ivangorod negotiated hierarchies in space not only against the background of their local development – memories of progress and good life under socialism as opposed to post-socialist decline (see also Chapter 6) – but also against their relative position in relation to the 'other'. While the nationalisation of the borderland contributed to peripheralisation on both sides, this peripheralisation was experienced unevenly. Past memories of shared progress and relative equality
between Narva and Ivangoord had been replaced by the emergence of local differences. Despite the deindustrialisation and economic decline, Narva has seen changes in urban space since the late 1990s: streets have been refurbished, several cafes were opened, shopping malls have been erected, including cafes and restaurants, a cinema and shops with Western brands. These changes created an image of urban renewal despite the difficult economic situation – something which was missing in Ivangoord. Drawing upon the emerging local differences between the sides, uneven national trajectories and older symbolic boundaries in the region, several respondents on both sides of the border interpreted the changes in Narva as westernisation, a spatiotemporal rapprochement with Europe. Despite positing Europeanisation as a gradual process, the narrative of 'becoming European' was based on essentialist assumptions about stable European and Russian characteristics, which is a strategy typical of metageographical thinking (Lewis and Wigen 1997). It adopted elements of the official narrative in Estonia – stressing Estonia's place in Europe and cultural and economic superiority vis-à-vis Russia – while at the same time appropriating it to serve different purposes. For people living in Narva, narrating Europeanness was a way of constructing belonging to a superior economic and geocultural space and marking a difference vis-à-vis Russia. In Ivangoord assumptions about the other's superiority were a means of expressing higher individual aspirations. On the collective level, these assumptions were linked to claims-making.
One example of narrating Narva as 'becoming European' could be found in the interview with Elena, a student at the local college. When I asked Elena about how Narva had changed over time, she said:

> Somehow our Krenholm manufacturing plant comes into my mind. Have you seen this building? Very impressive, yes. One of the few buildings of the past that is still intact. But now the factory has been closed. And then I remember when our first [shopping] centre was opened. It is called 'Astri'. This is already Europe. All the brands, trends and Ray Bans... Germany is everywhere! It is good that we are starting to find our way out (vyrulivat’). Maybe the salaries will be like in Germany sometime. (Interview with Elena, b. 1989, 29 Oct 2011)

This statement pointed to different places within Narva that belong to different historical times. The category ‘Europe’, used to characterise the shopping centre, has a positive connotation and is linked to a specific imagination of modernity and consumerism which coexists with other places and times – in her case, the Krenholm manufacturing plant that symbolises industrial work. Growing up in a working class family constantly lacking money, Elena embraced everything she considered European and was very conscious in her attempts to achieve what she called a
‘decent life’ – primarily reflected in her consumer desires. As Daphne Berdahl notes consumption is a “central organizing category and metaphor for the dynamics of East-West relations” (Berdahl 1999, 168, cf. Rausing 2004, 70-89) – something that was apparent in the life-story narratives of the post-Soviet generation. Elena liked to spend her leisure time in the shopping centre and dreamt about moving back to Germany where she had spent a year abroad as an exchange student.

As in the case of many other inhabitants of the borderland, Elena’s narrative was shaped by a hierarchical ordering of spaces in which an imagined ‘West’ served as a model and in which Tallinn ranked higher than Narva, and Germany higher than Estonia. Narva was not completely European but on the way to becoming it. These nesting place identities were particularly relevant to set Narva apart from Ivangorod and Russia. Elena recalled:

> When I went to Russia, I wasn’t ready for Russia. Here we do have criminality but not that much. The youth slang is somewhat – … and their fashion style lags behind. Here we buy ... of course, China produces many clothes for everywhere, but nevertheless we have cool things here. You can find RayBan here, but there, who would even care about RayBan?! (Interview with Elena, b. 1989, 29 Oct 2011)

Elena illustrated the differences in living-standards and aspirations between Estonia and Russia by referring to a recent visit at a friend's place in Russia:

> The living conditions were awful. There had been a fire in the communal flat, in the bathroom, the walls were all black. But no money at all to renovate. And they said: well, it burnt, what shall we do? It’s alright, anyway we have tap water. You should try to move my mother and father to a flat with burnt walls. Who would live there? I would go crazy. But they say it’s normal! Normal that they have a roof over their head. (Interview with Elena, b. 1989, 29 Oct 2011)

This quotation shows how Elena constructed relative difference and superiority in relation to Russia – these are articulated both in terms of particular socioeconomic realities and cultural differences. According to her, what set herself apart from people in Russia, was her different imaginations of a ‘normal life’ and consumer desires – or, to put it differently, the desire to ‘escape the east’. Such cultural differences that she evoked were regularly used in everyday conversations about different modes of behaviour among local Russian-speakers, which drew upon long-
established symbolic boundaries in the region. While socioeconomic differences between Narva and Ivangorod were primarily mentioned by members of younger generations and seen as welcome signs of Europeanisation\(^{35}\), the formation of cultural differences between Russians living in Russia and Estonia was noticed across generational divides. People who were born in Narva told stories about the distinct cultural environment in which they had grown up. And those who moved to Narva from other Soviet Republics often referred to an adaptation process through which they became more Estonian or European – speaking differently, becoming quieter and more ordered and generally more ‘cultured’. In contrast to the topos of a 'lost modernity' articulated in the narrative of peripheralisation, this narrative of becoming European was based on the assumption of a positive cultural development. In the case of younger informants this development was usually seen as a positive departure from the Soviet past, older generations typically established continuity with the past and presented this continuity as stemming from Estonia's Western character and rooted in experiences of the Soviet period. The latter strategy is evident in the story of Tamara, a former factory director who was now unemployed. Tamara focused her life-story on what she saw as her successful movement from Ukraine to Narva:

> For me Estonia became like a second home because my children were born here and then, I wouldn't even think about moving to another country. When I go to Ukraine, I already feel like a stranger there. Here is a different mentality, a different life-style. I am not used to that life anymore. When I go there, I can feel that very clearly, that I am different. And my classmates and relatives too, they see that I am different... Here people are calmer, less emotional, more reserved. There people are so emotional, I get tired of it. (Interview with Tamara, b.1955, 31 Oct 2011)

What one can observe here is an adoption of the East-West hierarchy and the marking of a difference to the 'East' – Russia or, in Tamara's case, Ukraine – to construct oneself and the place one lives in as (more) ‘European’ or ‘Estonian’ (cf. Bakić-Hayden 1995). While in Estonia’s geopolitical discourses Russia and Russian-
speakers are posited as the ‘other’ against which one’s own Europeanness is constructed, Russian-speakers living in Narva could appropriate the discourses of becoming European to mark their belonging to a higher economic and cultural space. In the case of one interviewee, who was born in Narva but who obtained her professional education in Soviet Russia, the asserted cultural differences were so significant that she argued for the hardening of the present border regime to prevent more Russians from visiting Estonia. Although she had experienced personal limitations and a decline in her living-standard since the restoration of Estonian independence, in comparison to those from Russia and other places of origin, she felt that she was in a better situation. While the narratives of the older population generally foregrounded decline (cf. Chapter 6), focusing on spatial differences and positive cultural differences in relation to Russia and Ivangoord was a way of feeling better about one’s own situation. Inferiorising places in the East, my participants reconstructed belonging within the shifting geographies and could achieve a “positive cultural association, even while living in a country where they may experience discrimination based on ethnic distinction” (Fein 2005, 343).

Narratives of ‘becoming European’ functioned not only as a self-description in Narva but were also used in Ivangoord to attribute a higher status to the other side and by implication accept an inferior, non-European status for oneself. Ivan, a young engineer, recalled that he was shocked when he went to Narva for the first time, almost 20 years after the erection of the passport controls: “You cross the river and there is a different town, a different country”. While in Ivangoord nothing had changed, “there is a cinema, branded shops… or rather the quantity of shops … there is some choice.” (Interview with Ivan, b.1983, 11 Dec 2011). Vera, who worked in the town administration and characterised herself as an active person who liked to travel, made a similar observation and stressed the sensual, legal, cultural and economic characteristics that made Narva distinct from Ivangoord:

> When I cross over to Narva and enter a building or something else, well I go and say that it even smells (differently). For me somehow it smells, I feel that for me this smell is not Russian. I already feel this. It seems to me that this is

36 Such an argument was clearly exceptional – most Russian-speakers stressed the importance of cross-border mobility (cf. Chapter 8).
already a part of what makes Narva different, and there are different rules, although in large parts Russians are living there, anyhow, you feel that this is already Europe. The way everything is organised, I don't know why but when you go and take a taxi you have to use the security belt, while here this is not necessary. Even at the back seats they tell you to use the security belt... well a certain strictness (strogość) has come up, and in regard to the shops there have been already such supermarkets opened and you go there and they are European, unlike ours. (Interview with Vera, b.1983, 26 Nov 2011)

Particularly for young people living in Ivangorod visiting Narva for leisure activities or shopping was attractive. In Ivangorod opportunities for spending leisure time were limited due to its smaller size and the closure of institutions like the cinema and the house of culture that had operated during the socialist past. Some of my respondents stressed that the access to a locally experienced Europe added to their place experience and made life in Ivangorod more interesting. Speaking about her sense of place, Vera stressed, alongside her kinship ties that connected her to the place, Ivangorod's border location that made it a good place to live – “here you are already at the border, you go and you are already in Europe. (...) Saint Petersburg and Tallinn which is also European are close; I really like the location” (Interview with Vera, b.1983, 26 Nov 2011). By acknowledging the Europeanness of Narva, Vera’s own peripheral situation became less of a burden and almost achieved a more elevated status because she was close to (European) Narva, and everything it offered.

Others however focused on differences and complained about the situation in Ivangorod. In comparison to the narrative of becoming peripheral, in this case the superiority of the other side was used to reinforce the argument about one's lack of opportunities and need for development. Ivan, for example, said that he was so frustrated with the situation in Ivangorod that he had taken steps to prepare his relocation to Narva – he attended an Estonian language course and registered himself in Narva – to increase his personal opportunities which he thought he could realise more easily in ‘Europe’ (Interview with Ivan, b.1983, 11 Dec 2011). Beyond such individual aspirations, many inhabitants of Ivangorod used the comparison with Narva to articulate their concerns for Ivangorod’s future and demands to collectively ‘escape the East’. This was most prominently articulated in a petition demanding to annex Ivangorod to Estonia that was initiated by the City Council Deputy Iurii
Gordeev and which was signed by about 650 inhabitants in 2010 (over 5% of Ivangorod's population). It followed an earlier petition, held in 1998, and was partly a response to the downsizing of the local budget in the course of administrative restructuring. In 2007, Ivangorod lost its former regional autonomy (from 1991-2007) and as a consequence lost 50 million roubles. According to the population and the local administration, this reinforced the local decline and dramatically affected possibilities for public investments. The petition declared that “the arbitrary rule of our bureaucrats as well as the absolute indifference of the regional powers regarding our problems forced out to take this step” (quoted in Kirilenko 2010). As was stated by the initiator himself in multiple interviews, rather than questioning the territorial integrity of the Russian state from within, these petitions should be interpreted as a deliberate provocation to raise awareness of the local situation.

Two of my respondents in Ivangorod who said that they had signed the petition mentioned similar concerns. One of them was Evgeniia, who was 45 years old at the time of the interview and was working as a real-estate agent in Ivangorod. In her narrative she remembered with fondness the shared past between Narva and Ivangorod when 'everything was the same':

> It was better when the [Soviet] Union still existed, back then everything was the same. Everything was clean and beautiful. Although Narva was of course a bit more ... Ivangorod was also [good]. There was one telephone set, everything was connected. You wouldn't think that these were separate towns, Narva and Ivangorod. (Interview with Evgeniia, b.1964, 01 Dec 2011)

Against this background of a shared past, Evgeniia criticised the decline in Ivangorod and argued:

> I would be for giving Ivangorod to Narva, so that we could at least have what they have there. If you come from Narva to Ivangorod you can feel the difference, right? You feel it. (...) Of course, Russia would never give up Ivangorod – this is all too clear, because it was built by Ivan the Third and some others. Although yes, of course, it used to be part of the Estonian Republic, the border was further away at Komarovka, but nobody will give it up. Okay, so

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37 Interview with Ol’ga Seliverstvova, Dept for Economic Development, 07.11.11; for more information on the petition: Gankin and Shaposhnikov 1998.
don’t give it up. But then at least put things straight in Ivango... You shouldn't treat a town like this! Take Narva ... not everything runs smoothly there because Virumaa [the province in which Narva is located] for Estonia is like a thorn in its side, there are only Russian-speakers, so that's clear. But they don't have the same chaos like here on our side. There isn't any money for anything. Last year there was the year of the Parusinka. What did they do on the Parusinka? Nothing. Nothing at all. (Interview with Evgeniiia, b.1964, 01 Dec 2011)

In this statement, Evgeniiia stressed the relative differences between Narva and Ivango... Although she acknowledges difficulties in Narva where “not everything runs smoothly”, according to her, it is obvious that Ivango... is even worse off due to the lack of state care and money. Her suggestion to redraw the border – supported by her reference to the inter-war period – was rhetorical: Evgeniiia knew that a border change between the states was unrealistic. By contrasting Ivango... to Narva and demanding a shift of the border eastwards to include oneself into a more privileged space, she underlined claims for state care while at the same time mobilising images of a socioeconomic border between Narva and Ivango...

8.5 Reversing the East-West hierarchy

Within the negotiations of the East-West border, Easternness is however not always a status associated with negative character traits. Negotiating the reinscription of otherness, ‘Easternness’ can be revalued and associated with positive characteristics. Klumbyte introduces the concept ‘politics of provinciality’ to argue that provinciality and Easternness can become a local asset for people who are marginalised within the European geographies and can create alternative national ideologies (Klumbyte 2011). On the example of Soviet sausages and the Euro-sceptical book “The Making of an Empire” in Lithuania, she shows how through intellectual discourses and consumption practices alternative Eastern-oriented geopolitical identities can emerge which complicate the image of Lithuania’s Europeanisation. Focusing on Russia, Prorozov (2009) has analysed recent national identity constructions among political parties and argued that while Russia has turned away from Europe, this is linked to a reassertion of her identity as a sovereign state. These accounts give way to a different
conceptualisation of identity in which the valences of the East-West hierarchy are reversed. While it is in some regard similar to the narrative of ‘becoming peripheral’ which was introduced above, ‘Easternness’ in this case becomes associated with positive things.

In the Russian-Estonian borderland, such alternative ways of making the East-West border were adopted primarily in Russian Ivangoord and could be seen as a response to the narrative of 'becoming European' and feelings of exclusion from Narva’s alleged superiority. Inhabitants of Ivangoord, for example, acknowledged Narva's more advanced socioeconomic and technological development but saw it as a negative change that destroyed neighbourliness. People criticised especially the commercialisation of the relations with Narva through which Narva's inhabitants were said to have turned from friends and neighbours into arrogant customers who just cross the border to buy cigarettes and then leave (fieldwork notes 28.11.2011).

The refusal of Western superiority presents a common way of questioning the East-West hierarchy. It is however similar to the previous narratives in that firstly it does not question the essentialist character traits associated with both geopolitical poles and secondly, shares the similar sets of characteristics assigned to East and West, e.g. development vs. backwardness, rationality vs. emotionality. Although the valences of these characteristics are reversed, there is, as Lewis and Wigen remark in their discussion on symbolic borders between East and West, “a remarkable congruence in the contours of their respective cultural stereotypes” (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 75).

Aleksandr, who was in his mid-forties at the time of the interview and owned a small shop in Ivangoord, described the emerging differences between Narva and Ivangoord against the background of earlier memories. Aleksandr’s family moved to Narva from Russia’s Far East shortly after his birth. He studied in Leningrad and was allocated a job and a flat in Ivangoord, not thinking that the border would divide him from Narva. His positive memories of childhood and youth, and the close connection he retained to Narva where he started playing in an orchestra, formed an important part of his narrative of the socialist past. In his life-story, he contrasted these positive memories of Narva and reflected on how Estonia changed since then:

The Soviet memories are much more sincere than now. When you go to Narva--this is why I asked you, whether you perceive Narva as European,
Europeanized. I don't experience something like this. I just walk through the backyards and notice how everything has changed, how even the walls are unfriendly. They reject you, you know. They've become strange. People in Narva, they point their fingers (zagnut' pal'cy): ‘We are Estonians.’ They, they are Russian people, who live in Narva. They tell us, the Ivangoord people, that they are... ‘Excuse me, we are Estonians’. Do you understand, I say: ‘You are Russian. How can you [say this] because of such a nonsense...?’ [he refers to the nationalisation] How is this possible? Why is there such a division, do you understand... That they are in Narva, they are in Estonia, they are in Europe. They think that ‘we are one step higher than you, and you are ... Who are you, at all? What are you saying?’ That means there is such a separation, probably a division in consciousness which has happened here. (Interview with Aleksandr, b.1965, 12 Dec 2011)

Aleksandr’s statement conveys the sense of a difference between Narva and Ivangoord. In this case this difference is however not positively evaluated but linked to a feeling of estrangement and exclusion that he contrasted to a shared past. Aleksandr criticised the changes which had occurred since the establishment of the new border: according to him, both materially and mentally Narva had turned away from Ivangoord and its inhabitants now thought of themselves as European, as superior to their eastern neighbours. The border according to him now appeared as a (unilateral) “division in consciousness”. Aleksandr himself rejected the use of the category of Europeanness for Narva because of the hierarchy between the sides that it implied. Aleksandr nostalgically remembered the times of past unity when both Narva and Ivangoord were part of an advanced Baltic region and mobilised a shared identity across borders. However, complaining about Narva’s (Western) arrogance and re-evaluating his relationship to Narva, he himself participated in bordering processes: he said that due to his negative encounters, he had stopped visiting Narva “I wouldn’t even take Narva as a gift” (Interview with Aleksandr, b.1965, 12 Dec 2011).

A similar pattern could be observed in many instances during my fieldwork in Ivangoord. Dealing with the emerging differences and felt exclusions, residents of Ivangoord reaffirmed the division by practices of self-exclusion. Refusing to visit Narva and/ or refusing the character traits associated with it, they excluded
themselves both practically and symbolically from 'Europe'. Negotiating their own location outside the European Union, some of my respondents for example positively valued the collectivism, disorder and solidarity associated with Russia, and contrasted them with the individualism, strictness and competition of Estonia/the West, for example when contrasting the cold consumerism of the other side to the good neighbourly relations in Ivangorod. When I asked Iuliia, whose husband lived in Narva, whether she would like to move there, she said:

Well I was born there, it is my home (moia rodina). But now, I don’t want [to go to Narva] anymore. I tell you why: I have an Estonian mobile phone connection and a phone with a Russian mobile phone connection. And then there is still the Ivangorod phone connection, when you have little money you call through the window. You make a phone call and then you lean through the window and shout. Also, I can still go to my neighbours and say: ‘Listen, I am very hungry, I don’t have anything at home, please feed me!’ well this is possible here, but not anymore in Narva, there is ‘Europe’. It hardly ever happens. But this is such a good thing! Or, for example, my neighbour visited me because she needed something, she ran out of yarn in a particular colour and came to ask me for it. And you can then say: ‘I don’t know how to make kissel [a fruit soup], please teach me.’ That’s how it is.” (Iuliia, b. 1956, 13 Dec 2011)

In this quotation, the local networks of support and exchange in Ivangorod characterised by neighbourliness and mutual help are contrasted to a ‘Europeanized’ Narva where people are presumably more individualistic and have more distanced relationships. Interestingly, the practices of support emerge out of a situation of need – experiencing financial shortage or lack of certain goods – but in this case have positive connotations as they are linked to constructions of community and solidarity which get lost with the rise of European modernity. In contrast to Aleksandr, Iuliia did not refuse the category of ‘Europe’ to characterise Narva but associated it with a negative valence. In her case reversing the East-West hierarchy was linked to a local identity, while other respondents extended the hierarchy to a broader collective and mobilised strong Russian identity. In all these cases, Easternness, articulated in terms of a different cultural identity, becomes a positive asset.

In Narva, such mappings in which the East-West hierarchy was reversed and the other side was associated with positive characteristics occurred very rarely. For most
of my interlocutors in Narva, Ivangorod was a provincial Russian town which was even worse off than themselves and which was associated with cheap shopping and a shared past. However, in some instances the spatial hierarchies were put in question. Ivan, for example, found work in Ivangorod after having been unemployed in Narva for several years. He stated that he was first afraid to go there to work. While in Narva, according to him, ‘everything had turned to the better’, Ivangoord was characterized by stagnation. When I asked him whether he thought that people in both towns were different, he answered:

Ivan: As long as I was not working here… and if I had not gone there every day as I do now, I probably would not have noticed… but as I was living here for three years, I have to say, they are different, yes, different.

Alena: In what sense?

Ivan: Well somehow I thought that in Ivangoord, ah, people from Narva are more civil, more civilised. But now my opinion is that people from Ivangoord are somehow more cordial (podushevnee). Today when I cycled to my work place, it was very windy and I was wearing a hat with a visor. My hat was blown away, it fell somewhere away from me. There was a man walking behind me and he ran to get me my hat. I know, in Narva if I had gone by, nobody would have stopped if they had walked by. That means people are more sincere there, they are not as much spoilt by civilisation. In my understanding as people they are slightly better than us. (Interview with Ivan, b. 1968, 28 Nov 2011)

What is telling in this quotation is again the assumption of cultural differences between the two towns; alleged European and Russian character traits are associated with the respective sides. Recalling his positive experiences in Ivangoord, Ivan however reversed the valences between poles: his initial association of Narva with positively defined ‘civilised’ characteristics is reconsidered, and Ivangoord appears as open-hearted, collectivist and, as one could add, ‘Russian’ as opposed to a Europeanized Narva ‘spoilt by civilisation’.

This statement then reproduces assumptions about Russia as less ‘civilised’ East, even if it therefore appears as a better place. Another example of a reversed East-West hierarchy I came across in the narratives of my participants was the case of Russian food which was considered to be more natural and of higher quality. Such
evaluations were usually linked to complaints about the high number of additives in Estonian food since the country’s integration into Western markets - captured for example in the assumption that Russian sugar was sweeter than the type sold in Estonian supermarkets.

Like in the previous narrative, the reversal of the East-West hierarchy in the borderland should be seen as a way of responding to uneven post-socialist change. While for Narva, it was used to articulate civilisational critique, in the case of Ivangorod it was a way of dealing with disappointments and feelings of inferiority. Rather than aiming to 'catch up' and become more similar, articulated by other interviewees, characteristics associated with the 'East' were embraced and used to mobilise a positive sense of local and national belonging.

### 8.6 Conclusion

The examples I have used provide some insights into the ways in which people living on Europe's new margins make sense of its shifting geographies and negotiate their positioning within them. The narratives make clear that the East-West hierarchy is not only defined in geopolitical discourses but is reproduced and negotiated locally in everyday narratives of place and border. The interviews clearly show a sense of difference which has emerged between the two towns that used to form an integrated and relatively homogeneous border space. Most of the borderlanders had initially perceived the border with its material manifestations and increasing regulations as something which was imposed from above; however, in making sense of their locatedness they participated in making it stick.

Within the multiple configurations of the east-west dyad, competing imaginings of modernity and civilizational progress were the lenses through which advantages of being 'western' or 'eastern' were discussed. The narrative of becoming peripheral focused on the experience of socioeconomic decline within the new geographies and used assumptions about one's backwardness and lost Soviet modernity for claims making. The latter two narratives – the ‘becoming European’ narrative and the narrative premised on the reversal of the East-West hierarchy – emphasised the local production of differences. Adopting the East-West hierarchy, Russian-speakers living
in Estonian Narva constructed themselves as more European than their Russian neighbours, thus marking (and reclaiming) belonging to a superior space in relation to the neighbours. Also people living in Ivango rod shared similar assumptions about Narva’s Europeanness to express their own backwardness and need for development. The counter-narrative to this Europeanisation and the exclusion it produced for Ivango rod was to reverse the East-West hierarchy and to associate one's side with positive connotations. In Narva, such a reversal of the East-West hierarchy was in comparison much rarer.

Rather than questioning the East-West divide and mobilising cross-border spatialities, all three narratives of place that I have discussed here reaffirm and reproduce spatial differences – although the valences and people's own position within this hierarchy diverge. Even the narrative of ‘becoming peripheral’, that could at least potentially appear as a shared cross-border narrative, was bound to an imagination of being divided from each other, positioned at the ‘edge’ of respective national (or in the case of Narva, also European) geographies. This does not mean that the borderland was devoid of alternative spatialities, familiar landscapes of cross-border friendships, work and leisure (cf. Chapter 9 for a discussion of (im)mobilities). However, what one could observe here is a reconfiguration of these relations: as people tried to make sense of the geopolitical changes and different national trajectories, they adopted the East-West distinction, invested it with local meanings and appropriated it for claims-making. From this perspective the border emerges as a field of multiple and competing place-making and bordering narratives in which diverse objects, practices and values (as for example, abandoned buildings, consumption practices and ideas about living together) were used as objects of spatial orderings.

This chapter has made a case for a situated understanding of the making of borders that takes the narratives and practices of ordinary people into account. Focusing on people's creative responses to the border, it puts an emphasis on people's strategies of narrating spatial change and using the border for particular goals. This does not mean endorsing an instrumentalist account of agency: people cannot use the border for anything they want as their actions, their complaints and claims are embedded in personal experiences and circumscribed by the local and national context in which
they articulate their concerns. The different ways of drawing the East-West border are part of different ways of negotiating one’s position at the margins and within a hierarchically structured system of spatial divisions.

Throughout the chapter, I have pointed to locality as a structural layer which shapes spatial orderings and adoptions of the East-West border. While both Narva and Ivangorod share a liminal position within European space, they differ in their symbolic and material status, and in this context only certain cultural resources are plausible and can be used effectively to make claims and frame one's experience of the shifting post-socialist geographies. For example, the narrative that posits Russia as part of 'Europe' is not used to characterise Ivangorod. While among political and cultural elites, this narrative may work (cf. Mälksoo 2009), in the provinces the critique of modernity and embracing of local collectivity and solidarity form a more plausible way to counter the felt exclusion from Europe.
Chapter 9 Narrating a hardening border regime: between security and mobility

9.1 Introduction

Since the erection of the first border post in 1991, the border between Russia and Estonia has been turned into an increasingly fortified and bureaucratic border regime. The fact that a formal border treaty between Russia and Estonia has not been signed yet and that even the location of the border was contested for a long time – the pre-war border ran 13 km further eastwards and claims to this territory were common among Estonian political and cultural elites till the mid-2000s – has not hindered the efforts of state agents to turn the ‘control line’ (kontrol’nata liinia) between Russia and Estonia into a fully materialised border: over the years, the area of border control has been extended from a simple barrier to a large fenced zone equipped with modern surveillance technology, customs control and separate entries for cars and pedestrians. Additionally the border crossing has become more bureaucratic; the older and more easily manageable system of document controls through a propusk system (system of local permits) was replaced by a far more cumbersome visa regime similar to the one other EU member states have with Russia. Custom relations have limited the range and amount of products one can carry across the border and smuggling has been actively fought, although it is still practiced by many on a small scale (cf. Golunov 2013, Viktorova 2006, Ehin and Berg 2004).

This chapter aims to analyse narratives and experiences of mobility and enclosure in the face of this hardening border regime. How do people remember and narrate the

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38 In 2000, the simplified border regime for locals was abolished following EU requirements as part of the implementation of the Schengen acquis. These changes were made earlier than necessary, showing the “complementarity of interests between the Estonian government and the EU” in making the border harder (Ehin and Berg 2004, 47). Some facilitations for obtaining a visa for locals with relatives on the other side are currently in place but serve only a limited number of people.

39 The borderland, particular Estonian Narva, has seen intense out-migration after Estonian independence and there is a story to tell about people’s connections to Europe and other places – as a way of finding new opportunities and escaping resignation in an area in decline. I will however focus
changes in the border regime since 1991 and how is this related to their belonging to an ethnic group or citizenship status? Bringing mobility and enclosure into the forefront of the discussion, the chapter adds a different angle to the debates on borders along Europe’s Eastern periphery, which often focus on the geopolitics of national identities and shifting symbolic geographies in the region (see however Jansen 2009, Follis 2012, Stoilkova 2013). In the previous chapter, I picked up the discussion on symbolic geographies, analysing the appropriations of categories of ‘East’ and ‘West’ in relation to people’s locatedness inside or outside the EU. This chapter complements these concerns with a focus on the changing mobility regime, its effects and interpretations, which are a central part of the bordering processes taking place between Russia and Estonia/ Europe. Together with Europe's symbolic borders, the possibilities for cross-border mobilities have changed drastically in the past twenty years and have had practical consequences for organising life between Russia and Estonia. Analysing people’s reaction to these changes, I will focus on different ways of engaging with the border and mobility regulations in the borderland. Rather than embracing either mobility or enclosure as definite characterisations of our age – a tendency noted in the writing on borders (cf. Chapter 3) – I discuss them together and analyse meanings related to them on an empirical level, as was suggested by Jansen and Loefving (Jansen and Loefving 2009, 5).

Focusing on people's personal narratives, the chapter will show that memories of the past play an important role in the interpretation of mobility regulation. Meanings of bordering processes are temporally situated and are linked to different memories of the socialist past. Smith et al. argue that “(...) boundary concepts as empire, state and nation are imbued and interpreted with deep identifiable and historical meanings by communities” (Smith et al. 1998, 9). These also become relevant in the discussions on mobility. As I will show, memories of Soviet debordering and military presence in Estonia on the one hand, and memories of free local and Union-wide cross-movement on the other, inform people's spatial orderings.

Furthermore, the analysis focuses particularly on people’s affective engagements with the state and mobility regulations. As in the previous chapter, I argue that rather
than thinking about bordering dynamics in terms of an opposition of the state vs. the people, dominance vs. resistance, it is more fruitful to consider a variety of ways of engaging with the state. Authors working on borders and nationalism have argued that scholars should not think of the state as external to people’s practices, and have stressed the continuing emotional significance of state territory (Reeves 2011, Berezin 2003, Donnan and Wilson 1999). I will show that people living in the borderland usually do not question the integrity of the state but wish to adopt it to fit it with their own interests. The main question for them is not if there is a border but how is the border – whether it runs counter to or corresponds with personal/ local/ national needs of security, mobility and economic well-being.

In the following sections I will introduce two thematic frames of narrating the border. The first one foregrounds mobility and cross-border spatialities based on kinship, social and economic connections that have been (to different degrees) altered by the hardening border. The second one frames the border in terms of sovereignty and security and conceives of it as a necessary element of the state which offers protection and demonstrates strength. Although this was a minority position in the borderland, the frame of security showed that on both sides the border could become associated with positive meanings. In Estonia and Russia, there are different ways of framing the border in these terms, reflecting different historically shaped conceptions of it. While for some of Narva's old inhabitants the border was perceived as a protection against a more or less determined Russian threat, Russians in Ivangorod defending the border were influenced by images of ‘normal statehood’ or a strong state. In the third section, I will focus more closely on how the state becomes an object of different emotional engagements and claims-making in these two narratives: while the first one is usually conceived as an articulation of opposition to the state, I show a more complex relation to the state. Narratives of (im)mobility give voice not only to a critique of bounded statehood and enclosure but also to an imagination of the state that enables local mobility and provides social care. The second narrative on the other hand invested the state with positive meanings and framed it as a source of security and comfort. Finally, I will compare the two frames, their different ways of conceptualising space and engaging with the state, and discuss normative arguments for 'opening borders' in this context.
9.2 Disruption of past cross-border spaces: narratives of (im)mobility in the borderland

As has been shown in several studies (for example, Megoran 2006, Navaro-Yashin 2003), enclosure and the hardening of border regulations usually have a negative connotation for people living in borderlands. They are perceived as a violent intrusion into people's lives and a disruption of previous social and economic cross-border relations. The dominant view I encountered on both sides of the border in regard to the mobility regulations was linked to such concerns over their cross-border networks which mattered much more than the protection of territory and sovereignty. Focusing on kinship and economic relations, people framed the border in terms of ‘(im)mobility’ and pointed to alternative past and present spatialities beyond the confines of state space. Memories of past mobilities and flows – between Narva and Ivangoord and the Estonian and Russian Soviet republics, the ESSR and the RSFSR – played an important role in this narrative. Mobility was not unregulated during Soviet times: the system of compulsory registration (propiska) regulated movement and particularly restricted entry to big cities; recent graduates had to take up obligatory placements, and the lack of a flexible housing market further limited opportunities to move elsewhere (on mobility and migration in the USSR, cf. Heliak 2008, White 2007, Buckley 1995). However, the administrative boundaries of the Soviet republics did not pose any restrictions for people’s mobility, and people travelled, obtained work, visited friends across them. Alongside with other positive memories of the socialist past (examined in more detail in Chapter 6), borderlanders remembered the mobilities between the border towns and other places of the Soviet Union and put crossing the borders of the Soviet republics in a positive light. They were seen as essential constituents of personal life, urban and economic development and in the present possessed for them higher relevance than the territory of the two states. In the following sections, I will discuss experiences and narratives of (im)mobility and their different intensities, before addressing how they were used to claim the right to mobility.

During my fieldwork stay in Narva and Ivangoord, I was regularly told the story of the once integrated border towns where it did not actually matter on what side one has lived and of a flourishing industrial region, nurtured by Soviet money and
workforce coming from different parts of the Union. The following excerpts, one
taken from the interview with Aleksandr, a cross-border worker living in Narva and
the other from the interview with Iuliia, a pensioner living in Ivangorod, provide
good cases in point:

Earlier we used to have one town, Narva and Ivangorod, that means there was a
common transport system, the buses went from Narva to Ivangorod, there was
no division, two towns like one. It used to be like that throughout the history.
Also during Soviet times, before Estonia’s separation, before 1992. People from
Narva were working in Ivangorod, Ivangorod people in Narva. It was one town.
Of course, now the picture is totally different. You cannot just cross over, you
have to have a visa. And there are problems with work. (Interview with
Aleksandr, b.1967, 18.11.2011)

The situation in the country in relation to the border? I can clearly say that we
see this all absolutely negatively. Earlier people went easily over the border –
they came to us, we went to them. Now there are these obstacles (prepriastvia),
to visit your son you have to line up in these queues. Sons, children and
grandchildren live there. Kinship ties were disrupted and you stand there in
these crazy queues that nobody wants to solve. (Interview with Iuliia, b. 1956,
13.12.2011)

In most of the everyday talk, the state border between Narva and Ivangorod was
associated with crossings and travels that have become increasingly difficult. On
both sides of the border this was commonly expressed by the phrase ‘nas razrezali
po-zhivomu’ – meaning ‘we were forced to break off our relations’, or literally ‘we
were cut up alive’, voicing the forced and violent character of the changes. The
collective story of division and disruption of social space was narrated by a wide
range of individuals I encountered in the borderland including people working in the
local administrations on both sides. Literally everybody knew somebody who got
stranded at the wrong side of the border, had a grave to look after on the other side or
lost her job as a consequence of the hardening border regime. Also some of my
respondents among the Old Narvitiane stressed the networks of cross-border
interaction and cultural connections to Russia and showed the importance of local
and practical concerns for life in the borderland beyond ethnic divisions.
At the personal level there were however great differences in the intensities of experiencing the border as an obstacle. The differentiated permeability of borders has been noted as one of their key characteristics (van Houtum 2010, Rumford 2006, Balibar 2002). Balibar illustrates this schematically, writing that

For a rich person from a rich country… the border has become an embarkation formality, a point of symbolic acknowledgement of his social status, to be passed at a jog-trot. For a poor person from a poor country, however, the border tends to be something quite different: not only is it an obstacle which is very difficult to surmount, but it is a place he runs up against repeatedly, passing and repassing through it as and when he is expelled or allowed to join his family, so that it becomes, in the end, a place where he resides (Balibar 2002, 83).

This differentiated permeability was clearly observable on the micro-level in Narva and Ivangorod. However, in comparison with other sites of the EU external border where scholars have diagnosed structural asymmetries between those inside and outside the European Union (for example, Jansen 2009 on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, Follis 2012 on the Polish-Ukrainian border), I encountered people on both sides of the Russian-Estonian border who found it either relatively easy or hard to cross. The crucial factors which structured experiences and perceptions of (im)mobility were people’s citizenship status and opportunity structures for obtaining a visa as well as their cross-border contacts and obligations (for example, those who had relatives and graves to look after on the other side). According to the citizenship legislation adopted in independent Estonia, the Russian-speaking minority could not automatically obtain Estonian citizenship but had to undergo naturalisation first and pass a test on Estonian language and constitution. Confronted with these criteria many inhabitants of Narva had opted for a Russian passport or remained stateless. These differing citizenship statuses in Narva – told apart by the colour of their passport: blue (Estonian), red (Russian) or grey (‘alien's passport’) – significantly structured people's mobility (on passports cf. Torpey 2000, Jansen 2009) and created a complex set of border-crossing abilities, further complicated by changing visa regulations for different groups of people.40

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40 People’s ability to cross the border also changed over time, further complicating the issue. For example, stateless citizens, who at the time of my fieldwork made up 16% of Narva's population.
One person who continued to live a cross-border family life was Iuliia, who was in her mid-fifties when I met her for an interview in her flat in Ivangoord. “The Berlin wall did not disappear, it was moved here between Narva and Ivangoord” was the first thing she told me. It indicated how intensely the border mattered for her:

I was born in Narva, but because it was difficult under Soviet rule to receive a flat were you lived, I received one here [in Ivangoord]. We were working together. Earlier this was one state. That's why a part of my family is in this country and one part in the other. I have a husband whom you won't see there because he comes to me with a visa and needs to go through all kinds of difficulties to get it. The border exchange [the simplified regime of border crossing] has been changed. (…) My husband is Estonian. He can't receive Russian citizenship, because he went to Estonian school, his nationality is Estonian and he lives in Estonia. Of course, he could give up his Estonian citizenship and somehow move here but he would leave his son behind. For my family to live together on one side of the border, dozens of people would have to move. This is practically impossible. And I can't move there because I have a grandson here and a daughter-in-law. We have a very big family. Earlier we used to come together for celebrations and sat together around a big table, for birthdays. Now we don't celebrate birthdays anymore. We stopped this. What sense does it make if I can't invite my relatives and not everybody can go there? This means we are totally split up. (Interview with Iuliia, b. 1956, 13.12.2011)

Iuliia had planned to move together with her second husband but before they managed to get a flat from the municipality, Estonia declared its independence. The Soviet state which had provided the foundations of their life across the Narova river had ceased to exist. Her family story reflected all the difficulties of organising one’s family life across a hardening border. In the first years after Estonian independence, they benefited – like other borderlanders – from the simplified border crossing regime for locals which mitigated the local effects of the bordering processes. Since the abolishment of the system of local border-crossing permits (propuski) in 2000, (Narva Department for Development and Economy 2012), were not allowed to enter Russia for several years, but since 2008 did not need a visa to enter Russia. The visa agreement between Russia and the EU in 2007 facilitated the visa procedures for entrepreneurs and people participating in cultural, scientific or educational programmes (interview with Aimar Köss, deputy head on Border Guard Affairs, East Prefecture of the Police and Border Guard Board, 11.01.12).
her husband and other relatives – all of them were Estonian citizens – had to undergo complicated bureaucratic procedures for obtaining a visa. Although visits were not impossible, sustaining connections required increasingly more work, time and money – for example, the need to provide documental proof of one’s relationship. The everyday relations of visiting each other and coming together were significantly disturbed if not disrupted. In her narrative Iuliia contrasted the memories of family celebrations in the past to the present, when it is already very difficult to organise the cross-border mobility for her husband, and organising a get-together for the whole family is virtually impossible. While she herself possessed a double citizenship and could regularly cross over to Estonia, she complained about the intrusion of the state into her private life:

It is insulting. This is my lawful husband, why should some power decide when I should sleep with him. When I will be old I will write my memoirs ‘in bed with the prime minister’. Mr Putin and Mr Ansip decided when I should sleep with my husband. This makes me very angry. (Interview with Iuliia, b. 1956, 13.12.2011)

Experiences of a hardening border were not only limited to the organisation of life on the local level. Others foregrounded the impediment to their mobility (and their ways of negotiating the border) over larger distances – people who had kinship networks stretching further across the border, particularly those who had moved to Narva during Soviet times and were now ‘stranded’ on the other side of the border. Against the background of memories of free movement and travel in the Soviet Union, the present was depicted in terms of limitations. Nadezhda, who was unemployed after her dismissal at the Krenholm manufacture, focused her life-story narrative on her present feelings of entrapment. When I asked her to tell me about her life Nadezhda replied:

Nadezhda: Well generally … it’s interesting. I was born in Belarus. Yes. Then I grew up in Karelia. Do you know where Karelia is?

Alena: Yes, of course.

Nadezhda: Karelia. After I had finished school in Karelia I moved to Estonia. When was this? These were the Soviet times. When there weren’t any restrictions like the demarcations now. It was not … well … difficult. I moved
because … because everybody probably wants to live a better life. My parents also wanted life to be better. During the Soviet times in the backwoods of Russia, it was very difficult to live there. And for me it wasn’t important where I would move. To Estonia, to Saint Petersburg, I could have moved there, too. Then somewhere in Karelia, Petrozavodsk and cities of this kind, where you could get a job, where you could work somewhere. (Interview with Nadezhda, b. 1966, 18.01.2010)

Nadezhda characterised her life by movements – from Belarus to Karelia as a child and then to Estonia. It is the Soviet Union that serves as the implicit space of reference and constitutes a space of opportunities in which she can choose her working place and escape the limitations of the Russian backwoods. The opportunities of the Soviet past (among others the right to mobility) were contrasted to the restrictions of the post-Soviet present that affected Nadezhda’s life-world and shaped her present perspective. Nadezhda was emotionally attached to her place of origin in Karelia, the Russian North where her parents and sister lived but travelling had become more difficult over time. Due to her citizenship status and her limited financial possibilities she experienced the visa regime as a practical obstacle. She had opted for Estonian citizenship in the early 1990s without foreseeing the consequences it would have on her mobility. In contrast to those who qualified for a free visa because they had close relatives or family graves in the borderland or could make use of cultural or educational exchange programmes, it was financially difficult for her to obtain access to Russia. The changes in the organisation of her private life expressed her sense of entrapment:

When I was young everything was interesting. I travelled a lot. In the Soviet Union. There are many places I’ve been to. In Belarus, Ukraine, in Petersburg, and I went to see my parents very often. (…) I travelled through the Union with a tourist voucher and just out of my personal interest. There was this possibility. Later, when everything began to turn around with the Perestroika, irregular work, of course, and the possibilities to go somewhere to see something ceased completely, yes. The routine: home – work, work – home. No other interests. Some handicraft. Knitting. Like this, everything got narrow (suzilos’), narrow, narrow, narrow, yes. That’s it. (Interview with Nadezhda, b. 1966, 18.01.2010)
This victim narrative should not obscure how many borderlanders were successful in negotiating the border and used it as a resource or adapted more pragmatically to the geopolitical changes. While some of my respondents in Narva were like Nadezhda, nostalgic about past connections to Leningrad/St Petersburg and the ability to travel easily in the Soviet Union, other had adapted more pragmatically to the changing border regime, feeling that the negative consequences of the border regulation had been compensated by the benefits of the opening of borders in Europe (Interview with Marina, b.1965, 11 Nov 2011). Dealing with the changed mobility regime between Russia and Estonia was generally easier for those who did not have any cross-border obligations. Laura, an ethnic Estonian, told me that earlier she and her husband, who were proud of possessing a car, went to Leningrad regularly and visited other places in the Soviet Union, but had only been four times to Russia since the border closing:

When they closed the border, I virtually… in this year I went twice to Piter [St Petersburg] with the Estonian society on 2 and 3 July, we went to the [Estonian] Jaani Kirik Church, we went there and of course visited Peterhof, Tsarskoe Selo [imperial palaces in the surroundings of St Petersburg] and the second time when we went in September, 10-11 we visited Pavlosk, Kronstadt and Leshavo, the cemetery of the repressed, Leshavo and on that occasion we performed in the Jaani Kirikus, a very beautiful church. (...) And last Thursday I went to Ivangorod with a friend to buy sugar [laughs]. The sugar is cheaper there, 50 cents per kilo in our currency. Apart from that I don’t go there, I don’t apply for a special visa, but now I was issued a visa for a year and I can make use of it. But I have acquaintances who go there regularly, Russian citizens who bring me medicine from the pharmacy; it helps me more than our medicine. Although Jaanika always says ‘Don’t dare to buy Russian medicine, it is not the same!’ I say: ‘You’re right, it is cheaper.’ (Interview with Laura, b.1936, 23.10.2011)

Laura described a geographical reorientation taking place with what she calls the ‘closing of the border’: the journeys she takes to Russia now happen far less frequently than in the past and occur in the organised setting of the association for Estonians in Narva. Laura would not have made the effort of organising a visa on her own but obtained one for free via the Estonian society as part of an agreement on cultural exchanges with Russia. This opens her way for more banal border-crossings.
to Ivangorod, which she otherwise would abstain from. Laura’s statement also pointed to new opportunities for using the border as a resource (cf. Rumford 2006, Bruns and Miggelbrink 2012). The different national trajectories and above all the different price regimes created differentiated structures of opportunities for people in the borderland. Most people in the borderland had excellent knowledge about the changing regulations for crossing and knew how to take advantage of them. During my fieldwork I was told multiple stories about smuggling goods to the other side, questioning the authority of the border guards or crossing over with somebody else’s document. These activities showed playful ways of dealing with the border and stressed the ability to manoeuvre and ‘work’ it to one’s benefit. While Natalia in the beginning of our interview had also told me about the difficult division between Narva and Ivangorod, she made clear that for her the border had offered her opportunities for making a living by engaging in grey trade. This happened in the times of financial difficulties she experienced as a single mother in the 1990s. She summarised her perception of the border in the following way:

I think that in the vicinity of a border, people can never die of hunger. No matter how. Crossing in one or the other direction, somehow, somewhere … You can always earn money. You don't have to smuggle, I mean, no immoral goods like weapons or drugs. I have always said that I shall use all possible means apart from weapons, drugs, robbery, murder and prostitution [laughs]. Everything else is fine. Clean toilets, sweep streets. This too is work. Never mind. Especially on the border…! So far, I have never passed the customs office empty-handed. Anything else would be an empty run. (Interview with Natal’ia, b. 1954, 29.11.2011)

Like other respondents however she said that smuggling and grey trade have become more difficult over time and the relative ease of working the border in the ‘tumultuous 90s’ (likhie devianostie) was gone (for an account of the changes, cf. Golunov 2013, 109-121). During the time of my fieldwork, contraband was reported to take place predominantly on a small scale – mostly fuel, alcohol and cigarettes that people affixed to their bodies in the hope that they would not get body-checked by the guards. Observing activities around the border and listening to stories of smuggling, often involving a sense of joy about outwitting the state authorities, it was clear that many people continued to use cross-border trade as a source of
income. However, this involved far more organisational work, time and risk than earlier. The border that in the 1990s still appeared for some as a ‘game’ (for example, interviews with Marina, b.1965, 11.11.2011 and Natalia, b.1963, 12.10.2011) had become a physical reality and was linked to a system of control that made it more difficult to use it. It is in this context of the hardening border regime that people articulated their concerns over mobility regulation and the role of the state.

9.3 Defending the border: sovereignty and security in the borderland

Arguments for the opening of the border against the background of memories of past mobility were however not the only way of engaging with the material border between Russia and Estonia. My analysis of the interviews revealed a different set of engagements with the border among borderlanders that was closely associated with the state perspective.

Borders are an expression of the territorial consolidation of states and markers of sovereignty and the control over territorial access has been a core state activity (Andreas 2003, Torpey 2000, Donnan and Wilson 1999, Anderson 1996). In post-Soviet states, the issues of state sovereignty and the protection of territory have been highly emotionally charged (Berg and Ehin 2009, Kuus 2007, Smith et al 1998). Rebordering Russia has been one of the key aims in Estonian foreign policy – expressed not only on the symbolic level but also through citizenship policies and the regulation of movement to Estonia, countering what was seen as the negative consequences of Soviet settlement policies. While some have argued that Estonia's integration in the European Union has mitigated some of the national security concerns, entering the Schengen space has in practical terms made the border to Russia, now the EU's external border, harder. As the Estonian political scientists Ehin and Berg wrote in 2004:

Perhaps more than other candidate countries, the Baltic States have strong incentives to join Fortress Europe. In fact, principles underlying the Schengen agreement are highly consistent with the general foreign policy orientation and security strategies pursued by the Estonian government over the past decade.

(Ehin and Berg 2004, 46-7).
Geopolitical arguments for a hard border were not only employed by politicians and intellectuals of statecraft but also used by a number of my respondents in the borderlands, particularly members of the Old Narvitiane (but also some members of the Russian-speaking minority) who associated themselves closely with the nation and the independence movement during the perestroika. The border for them was associated with sovereignty and security and they defended it in the light of what they considered as 'persistent threats' emanating from Russia. These threats were usually of diffuse character, merging cultural insecurities (Russia as ‘an unpredictable neighbour’, disorder, lack of democracy) with fears over an eventual military intervention.

Memories of the past played a crucial role in this construction of insecurity: as I have shown in Chapter 6, the old Narvitiane remembered socialism as a time of displacement and suffering caused by the Russian occupation. Furthermore, several of my interviewees remembered the fear of a Russian intervention in support of the Russian-speaking minority in the early 1990s. Considering these memories can explain why even though the likelihood of a Russian military invention was small and the Estonian public discourse has refocused on predominantly cultural insecurities after it joined the NATO and the EU (cf. Kuus 2007), the fear of Russia’s continuing imperial desires was pronounced in several encounters and even after the fall of socialism the image of ‘Russian tanks’ continued to cause anxiety for some of my Estonian interlocutors. Adopting geopolitical discourses over security and sovereignty, people constructed Russia as a threat, while at the same time constructing the border as a remedy against it.

The role memories of the past played in discussing security and territorial sovereignty became particularly visible in Sofia’s narrative, an ethnic Estonian whose relatives used to live in Narva before the war and who closely associated herself with the community of the Old Narvitiane. Sofia narrated her life-story as part of a larger story of debordering and rebordering Estonia. She foregrounded the destruction of Old Narva, the repressions and disadvantages of the Old Narvitiane and the influx of migrants from Russia and other Soviet Republics as part of threatening Estonian culture and identity by making it Russian (cf. Chapter 6). Against this background the remaking of the border in the early 1990s was
emotionally charged – it was a necessary step towards liberation and regaining national sovereignty after the Russian occupation.41

Alena: How was it for you when the border was formed in the beginning of the 90s, how did you experience this?

Sofia: I think this was good (normal’no), I remember the day when… I don’t remember the exact date but I remember the day… I was on the street and stood, where now you have the customs facilities, these fenced gates, and I… there is a square nearby. And I stood on this side on the square, when the last tanks left Estonia. This was the last day, the last troops… I was crying. Not because I felt sorry, although many could think that… It's not enough to say that I cried, the tears were just falling out, not because I was sorry that they are leaving but because I was happy. Yes, I don’t want the border to be open. Estonia is very small in comparison with other states in the world. And then you still have to bring many things in an order here, there is much disorder, Russia is such a huge thing (bolshaia makhina). I think that there you have even more of this disorder because Russia is so big. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946, 26.10.2011)

The establishment of the border – and the need to keep it closed – is put here in the context of the Russian military presence in Estonia and is connected to a diffuse threat which persists until today. Being asked about the formation of the border, Sofia did not recall the regaining of Estonia’s independence or the establishment of the first border post. She remembered the symbolic day when the last Russian troops left Estonia on 31 August 1994, and thus associated the bordering efforts with liberation from military domination and threat. Even after the restoration of independence, Russian troops continued to be based in Estonia and in the face of political controversies regarding Estonia’s treatment of the Russian-speaking minority, the troop withdrawal was consciously delayed and used to augment Russia’s pressure on Estonia. Only with the disappearance of Russia’s military power did Sofia consider the bordering as complete and experienced relief and happiness. For her, the rebordering of Estonia was a necessary measure against

41 Such arguments can also be found in political science texts: “After fifty years of Soviet occupation and uncontrolled Eastern immigration, control of the Eastern border has become virtually synonymous with independence, statehood, and ethno-national survival.” (Ehin and Berg 2004, 47).
Russia’s domination and negative influence on Estonia, she however continued to perceive a threat coming from the other side of the border, which is diffuse and related to territorial size and ‘disorder’. Estonia’s geopolitical location has prompted many comments and reflections among politician and intellectuals, and Estonia being ‘small and therefore vulnerable’ is a central motif in the discussion about national territorial sovereignty and about Estonia’s integration into EU and NATO (Lauristin 1997). Also Sofia evoked images of a small state which was confronted with Russia’s insecurity and disorder in Russia and used it to make an argument against those who want the border to be open. Russia's lack of democracy, grey trade ('dirty trade') and drug smuggling over the border were the central themes in the construction of threat. When I asked her what the border meant to her, Sofia answered:

To some degree it is scary. This is not a hostile country but a country from which you can always expect surprises. In Narva the head of the homeowner association (kvartynoe tovarishestvo) who also has a well-paid position at the power plant said: ‘One time, I will lie down on this bridge and shoot all Estonians with a machine-gun!’ Willy-nilly you start to think how many of these people we have in Narva. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946, 26.10.2011)

Again, Sofia did not construct Russia as a direct threat to Estonia’s security but rather as an ‘unpredictable neighbour’ who caused continuing insecurity and is ‘scary’ due its geographical proximity. In her example, a woman coming from inside of the local community threatens to go to the bridge and shoot the Estonians. Russia and local Russian-speakers are closely associated and are moulded together into a (nationalised) threat for Estonians. This fear was more than merely rhetorical: Sofia experienced a feeling of unease in living in a town of Russian-speakers on the Russian border and stressed that I should treat her statement on the border as confidential: “we are having a very frank conversation here.”

Studies have raised awareness about the role of security in Estonian society and have revealed the diffusion of the security discourse through which citizenship and culture have become objects of securitisation. Gregory Feldman, for example, has demonstrated how the Russian-speaking minority has been constructed as a cultural threat in Estonia (Feldman 2005) both by the national elite and by European actors.
Merje Kuus (2007, 2004) has documented a general shift in the security rhetoric from military threat to cultural issues in Estonia and Eastern Europe (Kuus 2007, 2004). She writes that

…security claims are increasingly based on more diffuse cultural categories, such as cultural spheres, frontiers, and homelands rather than on the territories of states. Geopolitics is decoupled from state territoriality and transferred into the realms of cultural difference and moral values (Kuus 2007, 118).

According to her, it is particularly the malleability of security discourse which has contributed to its continuing relevance in Eastern European states even after they joined the EU and NATO. This is certainly a valid argument and also my interviews like the one with Sofia show the diffuse qualities of a ‘Russian threat’. At the same time, state territoriality remains of crucial importance and continues to be an object of intense emotional investments among Narva’s old population.

While not all Estonians framed the border in terms of a threat and welcomed enclosure as a security measure, Russia’s aggressiveness and the possibility of violence emanating from Russia was raised in some discussions and conversations during my fieldwork stay. In several of my interviews and encounters with the old Narvitiane, Russia was characterised as potentially dangerous, ‘greedy’ and not willing to give in (for example, Interview with Boris, b.1928, 12.01.12, Interview with Anna, b.1953, 03.11.11). This threat emanating from Russia became particularly pronounced during a dinner with an Estonian-Jewish family in September 2011, where we came to speak about Narva’s recent history and what they saw as the persisting loyalty of the Russian-speakers to Russia (fieldwork notes from 22.09.2011). The couple recalled with horror the demonstrations of the separatist movement in the early 1990s when people openly showed anti-Estonian sentiments and were expecting Russian tanks to come to the town to defend them and their rights. While the Russian state has had an ambivalent and shifting relationship with the Russia-speakers in the ‘near abroad’, especially in the early 1990s military rhetoric was used by actors like Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Foreign Minister Andrei Kosyrev and nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovskii, which was welcomed and picked up by many Russian-speakers, who felt discriminated against by Estonian citizenship policies (cf. Laitin 1998, 102-104 on the Russian-speakers’
“Abandonment by Russia”). Even now, my host Mikhail said, they could never be sure if the Russian tanks would enter Estonian territory. The fact that Narva was populated by Russian-speakers, who would in his eyes even today support such an intervention, increased his feeling of insecurity. In his fear of Russian tanks different memory layers came together – the fears of the recent past, the separatist movement and the fear of Soviet intervention during the restoration of Estonian independence as well as older memories of repression under Soviet rule, experienced by his family and other co-nationals. “How can we forget?” Mikhail asked rhetorically. These memories of the past were of continuing relevance for him and other Estonians that I spoke to. They also resonated in Sofia’s narrative. My question about the recent border formation had brought her back in time to the repressions and insecurities experienced during Stalinism, of having to whisper in the evenings in fear that somebody might listen at the window. Having remembered these insecurities, Sofia brought her thoughts back to the border:

…that’s why I don’t want to open the border; (it is) too early. I don’t say that this should never happen but I think in the first thirty years it is early. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946, 26.10.2011)

The assumption of the need for enclosure was something that was shared even by ethnic Russians supporting Estonian independence, as this quotation from the interview with Tat’iana, an inhabitant of Narva and holder of an Estonian passport, suggests:

When the borders were closed, I didn’t feel that this is somehow a great tragedy. In the sense that yes we supported Estonia’s independence, this was 100%, all of my circle of friends (окружение). For the older generations, it was a tragedy because … they were bewildered or confused, we demonstrated them that this is how it should be, this is necessary and irreversible what Gorbachev did, this was a very important step towards the future, a good one, etc. Even if there was an inconvenience with the border-crossing – the most important thing is freedom. And then we indeed did live in a country of people who deserved, who had the right to be free. Without question we supported them. (…) these inconveniences with the border, I think that maybe today it is artificially kept up. But back then these borders were a necessity to divide two opposed
ideologies, because there was the fear of the (Soviet) Union, the fear of the empire. (Interview with Tat’iana, b.1963, 12.10.2011)

Tat’iana frames the border in terms of sovereignty and freedom and underlines her and her friends’ support and solidarity with the Estonian independence movement. What is interesting here is that physical bordering is interpreted as a necessary means ‘to divide two opposed ideologies’. The state space here is given priority over the local spatialities, and bordering acquires a positive symbolic function – it guarantees freedom and divides conflicting ideologies (and generations) rather than ethnic groups.

This narrative, based on memories of national and personal insecurity, normalises and defends the border regime and the integrity of the state territory as it constructs it as a necessary condition for national and personal security after a period of debordering and the insecurity derived from it. Russia (and in some cases also the Russian-speaking minority) is constructed as a potential aggressor or at least a strong and ‘unpredictable’ neighbour. In this context, the state and its borders become emotionally charged and appear as a locus of comfort and guarantor of safety against a stronger and ‘unpredictable’ neighbour.

However, as Tat’iana's statement shows, there were different assessments of the need for enclosure in the present. In contrast to Sofia, whose narrative combined memories of the past with newer threats, Tat’iana demonstrated the possibility of imagining the border and its way of regulating the relations between the states in a different way – in which the barriers for crossing were 'artificially kept up'.

While the rhetoric of security and territorial integrity was more pronounced among Estonians, it was present also on the Russian side, where the border was occasionally framed as a site of closure rather than of exchanges and opportunities. This was based less on memories of the past and relations to Estonia, than on everyday normative assumptions about statehood and one’s position of being an ‘outpost’ on the western border of the state. In public discourse, Ivango and has been framed as a Russian outpost and ‘defender of the fatherland’. As Brednikova writes in her analysis of museums and other memory sites in the borderland:

The production of locality in Ivango is not linked to the creation of uniqueness, but rather to the claim of a special status and a special mission for
the town whose history is inscribed in the common, unified history of Russia (Brednikova 2007, 62).

This claim of a special status and mission resonated in the narratives of some of the inhabitants in Ivangoord, and was articulated in contexts such as the local club 'Young Friends of the Border Guard', which was run by Ivangoord's School No 2 and aimed to use the proximity of the border and the military forces stationed there for the purpose of civic-patriotic education. The aim of the club was to use the contacts with border guards to create and strengthen a feeling of patriotism (Interview with school administrator, 8.12.2011). On a more banal level, ways of defending the border and the practices of control were mentioned in conversations about the border security zone. After the dissolution of the USSR, the border security zone which ran around the Soviet border had been moved to regulate Russia's new state borders, among others also Russia's border to Estonia. Living in the border zone included several regulations for locals – regarding fishing, access to the river, particularly entry and exit, many of which exceeded the control mechanisms on the Estonian side. For example, to visit Ivangoord a permit by the local branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB) was required that could be obtained through a formal procedure. Not only visitors but also local residents were examined and were required to present ID documents every time they returned to Ivangoord.

Being asked about life in this border zone, several of my respondents however normalised the controls arguing that “any border needs to be protected” and that it was the duty of the FSB to monitor who enters the border zone. One informant, for example, argued that for such a big country like Russia it was necessary to have a protected border zone. Although he felt disturbed by the controls and surveillance practices, he constructed the border as a sensitive place and imagined Ivangoord as a crucial site in its protection. Scholars working on Estonian-Russian relations have noted that the construction of the neighbouring state as a threat is not limited only to

42 A high proportion of children pursued a career in the army after finishing school.

43 The restricted access zone was first created in 1934 to control the Soviet border. Despite the continuities, there were however significant differences in the regulation of mobility between past and present (cf. Szmagalska Follis 2009, Chandler 1998).
Estonian geopolitical discourse, but has its counterpart in Russian geopolitical discourse, too:

The situation in Russia differs only in the sense that its growing self-confidence make explicit securitization of threats emanating from the Baltic states less likely – but they nevertheless occupy a core position in the consolidated ‘other’ which threatens Russia, inter alia, by trying to revise the results of the Second World War (Fofanova and Morozov 2009, 29).

The construction of insecurity and the defence of the border in the borderland was however less relational: it did not relate to the Baltic neighbour as a threat to Russia's security but evoked the general image of the border zone as a strategically important place within Russia.

9.4 Citizenship claims and visions of the state: the right to security, mobility and care

As evident from materials presented in previous sections, the hardening of the border and changing mobility regulations at the Russian-Estonian border were evaluated in different terms by different groups of people. These evaluations were often closely tied to different ways of relating to state authority, and, more specifically, different ways of engaging with and using the state in the narratives of security and (im)mobility. More than mainlanders, people living in the borderland feel the presence of state authority, for example through the presence of border guards and legal regulations for crossing the border. In their relation to the state people are not passive actors, but show different ways of negotiating it and engaging with it. Chris Rumford has raised our attention to the fact that “borderwork can (...) be associated with a range of claims-making activity, not only claims to national belonging or citizenship, but also demands for transnational mobility, assertions of human rights, and demonstrations of political actorhood, all of which can comprise acts of citizenship” (Rumford 2011, 68). The following paragraphs will analyse the kind of claims people in the Russian-Estonian borderland made in relation to the state.

The narrative, which foregrounds security and state sovereignty, invested the state with positive emotions – something that is usually forgotten when focusing on
resistance in the borderland. Gaining sovereignty for most of my Estonian informants meant to regain authority and ability to move securely within their own country – of feeling ‘free’ and ‘being the ruler in one's own country’. What we can see in this narrative is a close association between the state, the nation and personal identity in which state territory gets emotionally charged and becomes a site of comfort and security. Feelings of security provided by the state were in the interviews contrasted to feelings of insecurity in relation to the Russian state, expressed in terms of a lack of protection experienced in Russia or a more general national threat emanating from Russia. One informant for example expressed regret at having buried her relatives in Russian Ivangoord because neither the Soviet nor the Russian state was interested in their graves nor protected them from being purged (Conversation with Piret, ethnic Estonian, fieldwork diary 13.06.2012). And Sofia stated in her interview:

I think that Russia is an undemocratic country. Maybe they are more democratic than they used to be, but not in the sense how I understand democracy. If the Russians (rossiane) like it that way, they should wave their flag and carry on. But one should not open the border. (Interview with Sofia, b.1946, 26.10.2011)

Again, as in the reference to Estonia's small size quoted earlier, the argument for the need to have hard borders is articulated in relation to the protection of one's own democracy. Although their own democracy and sovereignty are still seen as endangered by Russia, the state and its borders were connected to a promise of both national and personal security and territory.

In comparison to the positive emotions invested in the state in the first narrative, many discussions of (im)mobility operated with an implicit or explicit opposition of the state and the people (for instance, when Iuliia complained about the intrusion of the state into her private life). With the bureaucratisation of the border regulations, visa regime and the customs regulations, the state was seen as having a negative and disruptive influence on local development and mobility – rather than having a protective function for its citizens. People who felt excluded from decision-making and frustrated about how the tense geopolitical relations affected local life, portrayed the state as a violent intruder, which disturbed their previous social and economic arrangements. This applied to the perception of both the Estonian and Russian states: while the complaints addressed different problems and were often directed to one’s
own government, people usually held both states responsible for the difficulties in crossing the border. In the light of past mobilities, present socioeconomic insecurities and increasing mobility elsewhere, many borderlanders adopted a local perspective and defended their right to mobility and smuggling. While usually not questioning the territorial integrity and sovereignty, this position privileged the local level and interests over national ones and thus raised attention to a different scale and personal needs which ran counter to a strictly policed border regime. Such critiques of the way the border was policed can be seen as acts of resistance against the current mobility regime. However, the dichotomy of people vs. the state only captures half of the picture as people articulating concerns over mobility gave voice to their expectations vis-à-vis the state and made significant emotional investments in the state. While the hardening of the border was regarded as a sign of ‘too much state presence’ in the borderland, complaints were also made over its absence in other fields, against what the participants saw as the lack of state care and social benefits to ease difficulties experienced in the border region. Iuliia, for example, who had earlier articulated her concerns over the intrusion of the state in her family life, argued:

Of course, every people has the right of self-determination. This is how it was written in the Soviet constitution. If the Estonians want to live separately, of course, they should have the right to do so but they should not… the border should not violate the rights of the people who live alongside it. They need help to adapt to this life. Once the border appears you need to give them some benefits, you need to help them, so that they don’t perceive the state in a negative way. But here we do perceive it negatively. Because of our personal problems. It seems that our personal problem is the state. (Interview with Iuliia, b. 1956, 13.12.2011)

While recognising Estonia’s independence, Iuliia argued from a local perspective: She again emphasised the experience of the border as an imposition from above and complained that the state is not paying sufficient attention to local life. Expressing these concerns she however articulated a different imagination of the state which does more than just regulating and limiting. Ultimately, it was not less state and the dissolution of the border that she desired but a state that cares and provides its citizens with benefits to counteract the disadvantages of life in a border town. Similar concerns were also raised by Anton, who worked as an entrepreneur in the media and
was particularly worried about the local economic consequences of the border drawing:

This border is not made for people. Borders are not made for people, they are made for states, right? These are economic or political borders. And spheres of influence. Now Estonia went from one sphere of influence to another, how I understand it, some powers in Europe or Washington. And we have to deal (otvechat’) with that, because the border here won’t be opened. I don’t believe that Russia will become part of Schengen. We have mercantile interests in Narva. Even now people from Petersburg come here for shopping. If there won’t be a border, it will be easier. Then we can make money from it. (Interview with Anton, b.1965, 25.10.2011)

Anton argues from a position of local interest, of being entitled to make use of the border. He characterises the border as something imposed from above as a result of geopolitical changes which represent the interests of the state or ‘some powers in Europe’ but not those of the people living in the borderland. People are described as victims of political circumstances and as he remarked later, ‘hostages of the conflict between Estonia and Russia’ who are located on the line of conflict. While he does not see any changes to the border in the near future, he claims that not only the state should benefit from the border, but one should also be able to take advantage of the border locally. In the present however local ways of making use of the border were according to him impeded:

When the economic crisis started, people lost their jobs… and at the same time, the prices for cigarettes went up. But people didn’t have any money, in the whole region. And people started to go from Narva to Ivangozorod, among others you could carry a whole block of cigarettes, well 10 packages and people carried even more. And to go to Ivangozorod, there was the problem that you had to stand in a line for half a day to go there and to return. Can you imagine? The line of people grew. And to solve the problem, they could have increased the salaries and create more working places so that people are not without work, one could have not increased the prices on cigarettes. No. They just decided to limit the amount of what you can take [across the border] and introduced more controls and punishments. That’s how they solved it. The people don’t live well? You have to limit them, and they will adjust somehow. Is this a country which loves its own people? (Interview with Anton, b.1965, 25.10.2011)
Anton’s story characterises cross-border trade as a way of coping with financial difficulties in the face of the economic crisis and risen prices. What is interesting here is that the limitations on the quantity and type of imported goods that can be brought from Ivangoord are interpreted as a sign of the state's 'hatred'. Expressing their frustration and disappointments with the practices of border control, Anton and other people articulated their imaginings of how a state should be, namely a state that does not restrict people, but instead provides support and care. People in the borderland did not primarily question the sovereignty but demanded to be able to make use of it.

What these quotations further indicate is that concerns about the right to mobility were not only articulated in the context of personal cross-border relations but also economically as a right to make use of the border. Abraham and van Schendel write that

> Many transnational movements of people, commodities, and ideas are illegal because they defy the norms and rules of formal political authority, but they are quite acceptable, 'licit', in the eyes of participants in these transactions and flows (Abraham and van Schendel 2005, 4).

Although some personally distanced themselves from cross-border trade and perceived it as something only the poor and unemployed do (interview with Tamara, b.1955, 31.10.2011), smuggling and grey trade were described by many as a legitimate income and coping strategy in times of financial difficulties⁴⁴. The border and customs regulation and trading barriers – like for example the restrictions on cigarettes, the planned fuel restrictions and the import ban on meat or dairy products to the EU since May 2004 as a reaction to the Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic – were criticised as unnecessary:

> When you go from Russia and you take something … at the customs control they can take it away from this little pensioner, a small piece of sausage. This is just a small piece for her. The person brings some curd cheese and butter and even this they take. From whom do you take this, this is a little pensioner? Our people, Russians (rossiiane)! They take from their own. I understand when the

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⁴⁴ The normalisation of contraband can also be seen in line with informal economic practices during the socialist past which were often tolerated despite being illegal.
Estonians take from us, then this does not offend us (*eto ne obidno*), this is not our state, no? But here are our Russians. (Ivana, Excerpt from a discussion at the veterans’ union, 01.12.2011)

Ivana considers the execution of this regulation not in terms of its legal status but as a way of being robbed by the state officials who should rather have demonstrated solidarity with their fellow citizens. As in the case of personal relations, here it is assumed that the state and its representatives should support the citizens rather than delimiting them. The illegal export of meat is seen as a legitimate activity, while the border guards are being unrightful. These acts of citizenship occur in a context where the state in the eyes of the borderlanders cannot provide sufficient care for the people. Particularly in the context of unemployment and the financial and economic crisis, people saw cross-border trade as a necessary and rightful means of dealing with the economic insecurities.

### 9.5 Conclusion

The tightening of the border between Russia and Estonia – a consequence of Estonia’s nation-building and integration into the EU and NATO – generated different reactions among the inhabitants of the borderland. It stirred up a discussion over the meanings and valences of mobility and enclosure and ultimately over different imaginings of the state.

As I have shown, memories of the past are a crucial factor in making sense of the hardening border regime. Framing the borders in terms of security or mobility concerns reflected the complex memory layers in the borderland and was influenced by people’s belonging to an ethnic group. Those focusing on security almost exclusively belonged to the group of old Narvitan and saw the border as a remedy against what they saw as negative effects of the Soviet debordering processes. However, also people thinking of themselves as old inhabitants of Narva would prioritise local spatial realities over the national ones showing that local experiences can provide an alternative and often more powerful spatial reality than the state space. Like the majority of the borderlanders they recalled past flows and mobilities in a positive light and contrasted them to present day enclosures. This result falls in line with my previous arguments (presented in Chapter 6 on memory and ethnicity).
that although ethnicity as a structural layer mediated processes of remembering, people's memories were not determined solely by it. Ethnicity was criss-crossed by local and personal experiences. Due to the shared history of living across the border that reached back many centuries and was also practiced during the socialist past, the division was painful and difficult for people across ethnic divides.

Furthermore, I could show that people's perceptions of the border mobilised different concerns and scales and were rooted in different visions of the state and its relation to its citizens: while in the first narrative borderlanders adopted the state’s concerns over security and sovereignty and privileged state space over other spatial realities, the second narrative brought forward a vision that foregrounded local concerns over state interests. In the latter case, rather than imagining a strong state and a sharp divide between Russia and Estonia, the state was seen as an instance that should be helping local inhabitants to adapt to new border realities.

At first sight, the widespread sense of entitlement to cross-border mobility seems to contradict the patterns identified in the previous chapter, which analysed the emergence of symbolic borders between Narva and Ivangorod. However, as the narratives reveal, the borderlanders found no contradiction between their claims to mobility on the one hand, and their own investment in erecting symbolic borders on the other hand. Although the relations between Narva and Ivangorod had been redefined after the erection of the territorial borders and people participated in the construction of spatial differences between the towns, most of them would have preferred to keep the border open.

The different positions in relation to mobility and security put emphasis on the need to think of borders as ongoing processes whose meanings are contested and are part of political, economic and cultural struggles (Cunningham and Heyman 2004, 293, Balibar 2002). These struggles do not only take place between the state and its citizens but also within the borderland where different positions can be adopted. The two frames did not fall into the usual division in which attempts at border closure are confronted with ways of resisting and undermining it. For the majority of people living in the borderland the border was seen to have a damaging effect on local life, personal cross-border relations and economic well-being. Yet, in other cases, the border was defended as a sharp dividing line necessary for national security and
sovereignty. Furthermore, even for those who opposed the restrictions on mobility, state care and social provisions were often of primary importance and were given priority over the easing of the border regulations.

These results have broader implications for debates over the role of national borders, 'fortress Europe' and cosmopolitanism. Despite arguments over the decreasing importance of borders in the face of globalisation and cosmopolitanisation of societies, the interviews show that borders of nation-states continue to be invested with meanings. While they may have been reconfigured and the grip of the state over people's lives may have loosened, the state for many people still is a source of protection and care or at least an entity to which they address expectations. The literature on migration and the EU’s external borders is often underpinned by a critique of the exclusionary character of the EU and by implicit normative assumptions over the need to open up Europe’s borders. Scholars working from a liberal perspective, who themselves are frequent border-crossers, often adopt positions favouring free mobility and a world without borders for everyone. Bounded spaces for them are a source of exclusion and therefore considered as generally politically regressive. While I agree with them that a critique of the tendencies to turn Europe into a ‘fortress’ is necessary, we need to consider local meanings and contexts in which statements about the need for opening borders become articulated, rather than simply positing mobility as universally desirable.

In his critique of cosmopolitanism, Craig Calhoun (2003) has warned that it can promote global capitalism and other ‘non-cosmopolitan dimensions of globalisation’ (Calhoun 2003, 90) – diminishing rather than increasing solidarity and democracy. His argument for taking 'place and perspective' into account is a valuable suggestion for considering the meaning of the border between Russia and Estonia. In recently established states, borders are usually of particular importance as part of state consolidation, the forging of identities and wishing for a secure future (Rabinowitz 2012). Particularly in a situation where Russia has shown sustained interest in regaining her former sphere of influence, and imperial fantasies continue to haunt post-Soviet space (cf. cyber terror attacks against Estonia in 2007), the Estonian position – which resonates in the experiences of some of the Old Narvitiane – reflects the wish for security. While it is important to uncover the logics of
securitisation and to develop scenarios for desecuritisation and the mitigation of local experiences of entrapment, it is important to take this local context into account before subscribing to a position that unconditionally celebrates mobility. One should be aware that arguments for a borderless world can be co-opted by different political forces, not all of them necessarily progressive.
Chapter 10 Conclusion

This thesis has looked at the reconfiguration of borders and memory, spatial and temporal orders in a border region undergoing drastic social change. The redrawing of national borders after the break-up of the Soviet Union and Estonia's integration into the European Union has significantly affected the symbolic and material landscapes in the borderland. This has been accompanied by a re-evaluation of the relations between Russia and Estonia and also by debates over how to deal with the past. The history of this contested borderland, shaped by military conflicts and state violence and competing projects of modernisation and state-building, continues to reverberate in the present. Questions of whether Soviet rule was a criminal and illegal regime or brought liberation from fascism and economic development to post-war Estonia, affect foreign relations between the two states and have recently also entered the European level in debates over the condemnation of crimes of communism.

How shall the contentious past be commemorated? What position do Estonia and Russia have in a reconfigured Europe? How shall the relations between two unequal neighbours be organised? Although these questions are often negotiated in geopolitical centres, at the level of political relations, in cultural magazines and historical commissions, they do not remain limited to the level of official politics. As the thesis demonstrates, they are part of how people make sense of political changes and reorient themselves in the present. Starting from the local level of the once united border towns of Narva and Ivangoed, which form the northernmost border-crossing point between Russia and Estonia, the thesis sought to empirically examine the following questions: How do people living in the borderland position themselves in the context of shifting narrative and structural frameworks? How do they re-evaluate the relations to the other side and reconsider their memories of the shared past? And how do vernacular narratives relate to official narratives that mark the border in time and space? Drawing upon an extended multi-sited fieldwork stay and 58 life-story interviews conducted in the borderland, the thesis engaged in in-depth analysis of these questions and linked them to broader concerns over the relation between borders and memory. In doing so, the thesis sought to make two key
contributions: firstly, to add to the study of borders and memory by bringing the two fields into a dialogue; and secondly, to analyse the interrelations between the level of vernacular meaning-making and official narratives circulated in the public sphere. The following discussion summarises how this was achieved in the thesis and how the insights generated add to the existing literature and can benefit future studies.

One of the main contributions of the thesis is to bring together the fields of memory studies and border studies, both through a discussion of the theoretical literature in both fields and through an empirical analysis showing how such linkages between borders and memories can be established. Rather than focusing on one dimension – space or time – the thesis has analysed the remaking of both temporal and spatial orders in the Russian-Estonian borderland along with the complex patterns of how people reorient themselves and negotiate political change. In the following discussion, I will first link the empirical findings to the literature on border studies and look at how these findings draw attention to the temporal dimension of border-making. Secondly, I will analyse the findings in relation to memory studies and look how they can contribute to ‘border’ memory studies. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the thesis for a conceptualisation of the relations between vernacular and official levels and for future studies on border change.

10.1 The politics of temporal orders in the borderland

Studies of borders have often addressed the issues of inclusion and exclusion, mobility and immobility in the present without considering their historical depth and rootedness in memory (O’Dowd 2010, Kramsch 2003). Memories of the past can reinforce and legitimise symbolic and material divisions in space but can also undermine them by contrasting a shared past to a divided present. When analysing the remaking of borders we have to take into account the role of memories of the past and the role they play in making sense of border changes. Drawing upon literature in the field of memory studies, the thesis has suggested a model for how to empirically study temporal orderings as part of border making. I have drawn attention to the different narrative structures people use to order time – the choice of past events and emplotment structures – and their relation to official historical narratives circulated in the public sphere.
Furthermore, the thesis puts forward an approach that is able to capture both continuity and discontinuity in memory. As argued in preceding chapters, studies examining the role of memory at the border usually tend to focus on the top-down construction of new historical narratives to legitimise new spatial orders or they stress mnemonic inertia and its potential to undermine new borders, for example when people remember the past without a border with feelings of nostalgia. In the thesis, I considered the question of continuity and discontinuity in relation to generationally shaped experiences, which allows us to develop a more differentiated picture of mnemonic change.

The first empirical chapter analysed the temporal orderings of different ethnic groups, Narva's old population and the Russian-speaking settlers. It examined whether the ethnic groups followed the polarised and antagonistic character of the temporal orderings found at the level of the official narratives. The literature on memory politics in the region has usually focused on memory conflicts between Russia and Estonia. The opposing evaluations of WWII and the period of Soviet rule – as either occupation or liberation, as time of displacement or reconstruction – have contributed to the contentious relations between Estonia as a newly independent state and Russia as the former imperial power. Providing a detailed analysis of how ethnic groups and generations engage in temporal orderings and relate their life-stories to official narratives, I was able to illustrate a broader and more differentiated picture on the local level. Members of these two groups structured their accounts of the past in significantly different ways. Narva's old population focused on the suffering and displacement under the Soviet regime against the background of memories of an idealised pre-war period. The Russian-speaking population in contrast narrated the socialist period as a period of reconstruction, progress and good life and opposes it to post-socialist decline. The empirical analysis showed that memories of the past – of the good inter-war period, of state violence and displacement and of post-war Soviet reconstruction and progress – significantly shaped imaginations of political communities and their borders. The chapter demonstrated that ethnicity acts as a significant structural layer for organising temporal orderings, and that temporal orderings at the vernacular level thus reflect and draw upon the structure and contentious character of the official narratives. However, I also pointed out the
complexities within and across vernacular narratives that do not coincide neatly with ethno-national divisions. Although temporal orderings were certainly contested and divisive, the analysis revealed the existence of localised memories crossing ethnic divides. Remembering in the borderland involved conflicts and contestations drawing upon the official narratives as well as localised memories based on a shared past and present. The chapter showed that although ethno-national borders were to a certain extent reproduced in the mnemonic patterns of the old Narvitiiane and the Russian-speakers, these borders were not as stable and clear-cut as it is usually assumed.

The second empirical chapter on remembering and generations gave insights into continuity and discontinuity across generational cohorts and provided further evidence of differentiation in patterns of temporal orderings. Comparing the narratives of three generational cohorts of Russian-speakers – the socialist generations, the 'Perestroika' generation and the post-socialist generation – the chapter traced different patterns of remembering that were linked to divergent generational experiences in past and present. The chapter showed a partial shift taking place in the memory narratives between the socialist generations, the 'perestroika' generation and the post-socialist generation. The older generations clung on to positive memories of the socialist past and defended them against their devaluation in the present; the subsequent generations were more ambiguous in their relation to the socialist past. Particularly the post-socialist generation distanced itself from the socialist past and used elements of the Estonian official narratives to frame the post-socialist present in terms of a positive departure. We can thus find at least a partial sedimentation of official Estonian temporal orderings among the post-socialist generation as a consequence of the political changes. Linking these temporal orderings back to different sets of social experiences, I demonstrate that official narratives are not simply imposed on people. Shifts in remembering do not happen because of the imposition of the new temporal orderings from the top; the narratives of Europeanisation connect better to the experiences of younger generations than those of older generations which feel a greater commitment to memories and experiences of the socialist past. These results allow us to draw some broader conclusions about continuity and discontinuity in memories in relation to border
change. Memories at the vernacular level are neither just inventions of the present nor are they a residuum of the past that persists even though social realities have changed. New memories and experiences certainly reorganise memories of the past, add new memory layers to the borderland and in part displace the old ones. At the same time, memories of socialism cannot be erased completely and particularly among those Russian-speakers who lived during socialism continue to be used as a positive reference point. To account for the temporal dimension of border-making, we thus have to look not only at change in historical narratives at the official level but to draw attention to multiple temporalities that can coexist at the same time at vernacular level.

10.2 The politics of spatial orderings in post-socialist memories

The thesis has also sought to contribute to memory studies by providing a close analysis of how space is ordered in memory narratives. Although as I have argued, the field of memory studies has a long tradition of looking at the spatialisation of memory, there is a tendency to overemphasise either stability or fluidity in memory. Studies have either taken the nation-state container as the natural spatial frame for studying memory (following Nora’s influential work on the sites of French national memory, Nora 1989) or have more recently stressed the transnational and ‘travelling’ character of memories across borders (Erll 2011, Creet 2011). The thesis has sought to find a middle way between these two tendencies by drawing attention to the construction of spatial differences and connections, exclusions and inclusions in memory narratives. Rather than examining the transcendence of national borders, the thesis looked at how memories contribute to stabilising or undermining the nation-state border. It has provided an analysis of the concrete ways in which space is ordered and borders are drawn in narratives in the borderland.

The two empirical chapters in the second part of the thesis showed the active role of people in negotiating the symbolic and material borders between Narva and Ivangoord, Estonia and Russia. The restoration of Estonian independence and the materialisation of an international border between Narva and Ivangoord significantly altered the relations between Russia and Estonia, changing political, social and economic relations at different levels. The chapters analysed the reconsiderations of
cross-border relationships and the remaking and undermining of borders in memory narratives. As in the previous part, the chapters showed differentiated patterns of engaging with the border and its local manifestations. Depending on whether they were resident in Narva and Ivangoord or whether they belonged to the old population or the Russian-speakers, people interpreted the changing spatial orders and cross-border relations in different ways.

The first chapter on spatial orderings analysed the remaking of symbolic borders between Estonia and Russia. Geopolitical discourses often construct the border between Russia and Estonia in civilisational terms, as a border between 'East' and 'West'. I was able to show that these categories are also used on the local level. Although Narva and Ivangoord shared a common past and experiences of decline since the establishment of the border, the inhabitants of both towns did not construct a shared cross-border space in their narratives. Memories of new inequalities and the uneven national trajectories were crucial for how the inhabitants of both border towns ordered space and positioned themselves within them. Although both border towns had been affected by peripheralisation, the inhabitants of Estonian Narva were usually regarded as better off. In their narratives people used indicators like differences in streets, consumer goods and cultural characteristics to evaluate the changes. Negotiating the local differences emerging between Narva and Ivangoord, their inhabitants redrew and reproduced the borders between Estonia and Russia, West and East in the borderland. Comparing themselves to their neighbours, people living in Narva posited themselves as more ‘European’ than Ivangoord. In comparison, inhabitants of Ivangoord felt that they had been, to a greater extent than their neighbours, disadvantaged by the changes brought about by the border drawing. Some of them complained about their inferior status and expressed the desire to escape the ‘East’; others reversed the spatial hierarchies by ascribing positive meaning to Eastern characteristics like collectivity and solidarity in opposition to the individualistic and competitive character of the European neighbour. I describe these changes in terms of a ‘nested peripheralisation’ to foreground how the status of the borderland as a new periphery resulted in competing projects of imagining space and constructing difference.
The second chapter on spatial orderings looked at how people discuss the relations between Narva and Ivangorod in relation to the hardening mobility regime and foregrounded differences along ethnic lines. It discussed how against the background of divergent memories of the past, ethnic groups make sense of mobility and enclosure at the border. Although the relations between Narva and Ivangorod have been redefined after the erection of the territorial borders and people participate in the construction of spatial differences between the towns, the majority of the inhabitants would have preferred to keep the border open. Particularly, the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Narva and Ivangorod stressed the need for cross-border mobility. They recalled past flows and mobilities to their neighbouring town and to other places in the Soviet Union in a positive light and contrasted them to the negative effects of present day enclosures. Particularly, the economic possibilities that cross-border mobility allowed for were at the forefront of their engagement with the hardening border regime. In contrast to the Russian-speakers, Narva’s old population framed the border in terms of security and defended the mobility regulation. The memory of past sufferings and displacement as well as the anxiety over Russia’s continuing imperial desires rooted in these memories informed their spatial orderings in the present. Against the background of memories of terror and displacement, the Russian neighbour was conceived as potentially threatening, as lurking behind the border. A hard border regime then could act as a remedy against the insecurity caused by Russia. Again, ethnic group membership did not match completely with the evaluations of the border; some members of the old Estonian population prioritised cross-border mobilities and local spatial realities over a nation-state space with hard borders, demonstrating that local experiences can offer an alternative and often more powerful spatial reality.

Taken together, the two chapters in the second part show how memories contribute to the remaking of spatial orders. On the basis of divergent memories of the past people order space in different ways and invest the borders of the nation-state with different feelings. Memories of past violence contribute to the construction of the border as a necessary remedy and protection and reproduce the space of a nation under threat. Memories of a shared space and past mobilities during the socialist past in contrast destabilise the border, point to alternative and subjectively 'better' ways of
ordering space and as such form the basis for mobility claims in the present. Beyond these differences in past experiences, more recent experiences of inequalities add a further layer to the making of borders in memory and shape the ordering of space. While economically and practically cross-border mobility continues to be important and desirable for many inhabitants of these two peripheral towns – not least as a means to secure one's livelihood – the division over 20 years has left its traces in the borderland and has contributed to the emergence of unequal relations. Comparing themselves with the 'other side', people reproduce the border running between Russia and Ivangorod. Claims for cross-border mobility thus go hand in hand with the articulation of difference and the making of borders.

Analysing how spaces are constructed in memory – and what kind of spaces these are – can be useful in relation to recent studies on memory wars in Eastern Europe and studies of transcultural memory and European memory formation. Especially in a situation where scholars have increasingly looked at transnational memory and post-national memory projects, it is important not to lose sight of the ways in which memory's spatial orders continue to be rooted in particular historical and social contexts. Before going too far in our aspirations for a united European or global memory space, we have to look at how memories work in practice, and acknowledge that they can work in contradictory ways – acting as divisive and reinforcing national borders, while also foregrounding alternative spatialities. Between the polarised and conflicting memory landscapes at the national level and the fluid memory spaces at transnational level, we find differentiated spatialities linked to local, regional and national concerns.

10.3 The relationship between official and vernacular narratives

On a more general level, the thesis has offered a model for how changing border and memory regimes can be studied. It has drawn attention to the multiplicity and contestedness of spatial and temporal orderings and the interrelations between official and vernacular levels. Spatial and temporal orders are not unified and all-encompassing but coexist, intersect and stand in opposition to each other. Past studies on borders and memories often show a limited understanding of the dynamics between individual and collective levels. Despite the calls for a multidimensional
study of borders (Wilson and Donnan 2012b), studies of their remaking all too often employ a macro-perspective and have a limited understanding of how geopolitical narratives resonate among the local population. The field of memory studies has tended to focus either on individual or collective processes of remembering and although scholars have pointed to the need to focus on connections and tensions between levels of remembering (Keightley and Pickering 2012, Cubitt 2007, Radstone 2005), there is only a limited number of empirical studies that take up this challenge.

The thesis demonstrated the benefits of an approach that considers these two levels in interrelation and maps the interactions and tensions between them. Analysing the relations between official and vernacular narratives, my analysis showed the impossibility of imposing a new order top-down. The making of spatial and temporal orders certainly involves power relations and top-down strategies of domination and exclusion. Official narratives and material manifestations of the border, however, do not determine temporal and spatial orderings at the vernacular level but are open to multiple responses and attempts at countering or adopting the official orderings and the exclusions they produce. Processes of remembering and engaging with the border, then, are not just reactive but creative ways of dealing with the reconfiguration of spatial and temporal orders. As shown in the thesis, people living in the Russian-Estonian borderland actively resisted official narratives or appropriated them for their own purposes. Although people experienced constraints and some of them even powerlessness in the face of the changes, they related their lives to official narratives in order to articulate their concerns and to make claims for belonging, recognition and dignity, for protection and care by the state. Their multi-vocal concerns show that in making sense of the changes the inhabitants of the borderland not only reflected on what had happened to them but also expressed their critiques of the present and their hopes for the future.

The thesis has furthermore demonstrated the need to consider different interactions between the vernacular and official levels. A homogenised conception of the vernacular as a site where official narratives are replicated or as a locus of opposition and resistance is not able to fully capture the differentiated ways in which people relate to official narratives. Based on a detailed empirical analysis, the thesis could
show a broad range of interactions between the levels, linked to people's position in the social structure. Considering the socio-structural categories of ethnicity, generation and locality enabled me to draw a differentiated picture of the borderland vernacular. The findings make it all the more important to systematically analyse the level of the vernacular in studies of borders and memory rather than making blanket assumptions about 'borderland memory' as such.
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245


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Appendix A  List of Recorded Interviews

Life-story interviews recorded in Narva

*Generation 1945 (9)*
Natal’ia, b.1925, Old Russian minority, 25.01.12
Boris, b.1928, Old Russian minority, retired worker, 12.01.12
Laura, b.1936, Estonian, retired teacher, 23.10.11
Riina, b.1936, Estonian, retired worker 27.10.11
Tiia, b.1937, Estonian, retired teacher 26.10.11
Ol’ga, b.1933, Russian, retired teacher, 09.11.11
Sergei, b.1939, Russian, retired engineer, part-time worker, 13.11.11
Larisa, b.1941, Russian, retired engineer, 09.11.11
Anastasiia, b.1943, Russian, retired engineer, 07.11.11

*Post-war generation (11)*
Sofia, b.1946, Estonian, administrator, 26.10.11
Erik, b.1949, Estonian, retired engineer, 12.11.11
Rein, b.1949, Estonian, retired businessman and cook, 15.01.10
Raisa, b.1950, Old Russian minority, retired, 02.11.11
Anna, b.1953, Estonian-Old Russian minority, journalist, 03.11.11
Ekaterina, b.1946, Russian, retired nursery-school teacher, 10.10.11
Maksim, b.1947, Russian, retired worker, 05.11.11
Evgenii b.1949, Belorussian, retired worker, artist, 08.11.11
Liliia, b.1949, Belorussian, retired varnisher, 22.01.10
Svetlana, b.1951, Russian, retired factory worker, 17.01.10 and 28.01.10
Tamara, b.1955, Ukrainian, unemployed, 31.10.11

*‘Perestroika’ Generation (8)*
Tat’iana, b. 1963, Russian, art teacher, Interview 12.10.11
Anton, b. 1965, Russian, entrepreneur, Interview 25.10.11
Marina, b.1965, Russian, civil servant, Interview 11.11.11
Vladimir, b.1965, Russian, skilled engineering worker, 13.11.11
Nadezhda, b. 1966, Russian, sewer, unemployed, 18.01.2010
Liudmila, b.1970, Russian, estate agent, 26.01.10
Mikhail, b.1971, Russian, engineer, 17.11.11
Nina, b.1972, Russian, sewer, unemployed, Interview 14.11.11

*Post-socialist Generation (7)*
Igor, b.1983, Russian, student, 09.01.12
Kirill, b.1983, Russian, civil servant, 16.10.11
Ekaterina, b.1987, Russian, student, 16.11.11
Aleksandr, b. 1989, Estonian, border guard, 10.11.11
Irina, b.1989, Russian, student, 29.10.11
Elena, b.1989, Russian, student, 29.10.11
Eduard, b.1992, Russian, student, 14.10.11 and 19.10.11
Life-story interviews recorded in Ivangoord

*Generation 1945 (6)*
Polina, b.1922, Russian, retired engineer, 13.01.12
Agata, b.1927, Russian, veteran society, 07.12.11
Svetlana, b.1931, Russian, retired teacher, 17.12.11
Nikolai, b.1931, Russian, retired factory worker, 17.12.11
Oksana, b.1932, Russian, retired teacher, 13.01.12
Andrei, b.1937, Russian, retired engineer, 29.11.11

*Post-war generation (11)*
Valerii, b.1949, Russian, engineer, 16.12.11
Polina, b.1950, Russian, retired engineer, 27.11.11
Liumila, b.1953, Russian, estate agent, 01.12,11
Natal’ia, b.1954, Russian, marketer, 29.11.11
Iuliia, b.1956, Russian, retired factory worker/ lift attendant, 13.12.11

*’Perestroika’ Generation (6)*
Valeriia, b.1961, Russian, engineer, 04.12.11
Grigorii, b.1961, Russian, entrepreneur, 14.01.12
Liubov’, b.1962, Russian, civil servant/ administrator, 26.11.11
Evgeniia, b.1964, Russian, estate agent, 01.12.11
Aleksandr, b.1965, Russian, retailer, 12.12.11
Roman, b.1979, Russian, factory worker, 03.12.11

*Post-socialist Generation (6)*
Vera, b.1983, Russian, civil servant, 26.11.11
Ivan, b.1983, Russian, engineer, 11.12.11
Petr, b.1984, Russian, teacher, 01.12.11
Igor, b.1987, Russian, firefighter, 14.12.11
Viktoriia, b.1990, Russian, student, 08.12.11
Dar’ia, b.1992, Russian, student, 28.11.11

*Additional data*
Recorded group discussion at the veterans’ union, Ivangoord, 01.12.2011

**Expert Interviews recorded in Narva**
Anne Veebo, Department for Development, 21.10.11
Viacheslav Konovalov, International Relations, 24.10.11
Olga Tseromuskina, Narva Visitor Center coordinator, 07.11.11
Aimar Köss, Deputy head on Border Guard Affairs, East Prefecture of the Police and Border Guard Board, 11.01.12

**Expert Interviews recorded in Ivangoord**
Ol’ga Seliverstvova, Dept for Economic Development, 07.11.11
Irina Nikolaevna Mironova, Museum director, 06.12.2011
Gennadii Aleksandrovich Popov, historian, 10.01.12
School no.2 Administrator, Club ‘Young Friends of the Border Guard’ (iunye druzia pogranichnika), 08.12.2011
Svetlana Fedorovna, Center for Sustainable Development and Tourist Information, 13.12.2011
Appendix B  Participant Information Sheet

Living on the new margins of Europe: Identity, Place, and Memory in the Russian-Estonian Borderland (Preliminary Thesis Title)

Participant Information Sheet

Alena Pfoser, PhD candidate
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What is the purpose of the study?
The main purpose of the study is to examine how people living in Narva and Ivangoord have experienced the transformation of the Estonian-Russian borderland – from Soviet times to the present – and how this is related to their self-understandings and their perception of the place they live.

Who is doing this research and why?
This study is being conducted by Alena Pfoser, as part of his PhD research at the department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University. The work is being supervised by Professor Michael Pickering (M.J.Pickering@lboro.ac.uk) and Dr. Sabina Mihelj (S.Mihelj@lboro.ac.uk).

Once I take part, can I change my mind?
Yes! After you have read this information and asked any questions you may have we will ask you to complete an Informed Consent Form, however if at any time, before, during or after the interview you wish to withdraw from the study please just contact the main investigator (Alena Pfoser, +372 56725727, A.Pfoser@lboro.ac.uk). You
can withdraw at any time, for any reason and you will not be asked to explain your reasons for withdrawing.

**How long will it take?**
The interviews will usually last one to three hours. You might be asked for a follow-up interview.

**Is there anything I need to do before the sessions?**
No. The interviews will be conducted in your home. In case you prefer a public place, please make sure to bring along any food or medication that you may need. If you wish you can ask a friend or family member to be present during the interview.

**What will I be asked to do?**
You will be asked to participate in an in-depth interview about life on the border. The interviews will usually involve two stages: in the first one, you will be asked to tell freely about your life in Narva/ Ivangoord and your personal life-story. In the second one, you will be asked questions about your perception of the border and the place you live, about everyday life, and continuity and change in the town.
The interview will be recorded using a voice recorder. You may be asked to discuss photos of important places in Narva and Ivangoord.

**What personal information will be required from me?**
The interview relies on your readiness to tell about yourself. In addition to the questions about your life in Narva/Ivangoord, you will be asked in the end of the interview to provide your age, gender and occupation.

**Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?**
Yes. The following measures will be taken to ensure confidentiality: All personal information and interview data will be stored as digital files on the external hard disc drives of the investigator in locked offices at Loughborough University. The data will only be accessible to the investigator and his research supervisors. Recordings and interview transcripts will be held for 10 years from the date of collection and will be destroyed after this time. Data will be stored in anonymised form, not under participants’ names.

**What will happen to the results of the study?**
They will be published in a PhD dissertation and also be disseminated in academic presentations and publications. All data used in publications will be anonymised including names and dates.

**What do I get for participating?**
There is no monetary or material compensation provided for participation in the study. As a participant you may request for an audio copy of your interview. This will be made available to you by the researcher for your personal record and use.

**I have some more questions who should I contact?**

For more information, please contact Alena Pfoser per phone (+372 56725727) or per email (A.Pfoser@lboro.ac.uk).

**What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted?**

If for any reason you are unhappy with the manner in which the research was conducted you may write about it to the researcher’s supervisor who will then forward your complaint to the relevant authorities. Please address any such grievance to Professor Michael Pickering at M.J.Pickering@lboro.ac.uk or to Dr. Sabina Mihelj at S.Mihelj@lboro.ac.uk.

The University has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle Blowing which is available online at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm.

*(The participant information sheet has been translated into Russian, the native language of most of the participants.)*
Appendix C  Interview guideline

Opening question

I am interested in the life-stories of people living in Narva and Ivangorod. Please tell me about yourself and your life in Narva/ Ivangorod. You can tell your story freely, I won’t interrupt you and will pose you some questions only after you are finished.

Questions of clarification

- Why did you come to Narva/ Ivangorod?
- How did your life turn out afterwards?
- Memories of the border formation
- EU accession
- Present life in Narva/ Ivangorod

Additional questions

What meaning does Narva/ Ivangorod have for you?
How is life in a border town different from other places?
When was the best, when was the worst time to live here?
What meaning does the border have for you?
How often do you cross it?
How do you evaluate the relations between Narva and Ivangorod?

Participant information sheet

Name, Date, Place and year of birth, gender, education (primary, secondary, tertiary), professional activity, native language, citizenship.