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Applying Budd’s model to partnership

Over the last decade, the notions of workplace partnership and labour-management co-operation have resulted in distinctive and vociferous debates regarding forms of employee voice in the UK. It is proposed that there is a need to reconsider how we actually evaluate both the process and outcomes of partnership. Detailed case studies were conducted in three diverse banking organisations in order to understand more about the process and outcomes of partnership. The study then applies the ‘efficiency, equity, voice’ framework developed by Budd which has not been widely employed in industrial relations research. Accordingly, the paper examines if and how partnership contributes to the balancing of efficiency, equity and voice. Judged in this light, the case studies demonstrate various degrees of success in terms of the extent to which partnership facilitated voice and promoted more considered decision making, for both management and employees. The paper also demonstrates the usefulness of the Budd framework as a device in explaining employment relations processes and outcomes.
Applying Budd's model to partnership

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Over the last decade, the notion of workplace partnership has resulted in distinctive and vociferous debates regarding employee representation in the UK, attracting great attention from both policymakers and researchers alike (Acas, 2003; DTI, 1998, IPA, 1997, TUC, 1999). Research has focused upon both the potential of partnership as a union revitalisation strategy (Haynes and Allen, 2001; Heery, 2002; Wills, 2004), and the extent to which mutual gains are actually realisable (Guest and Peccei, 2001; Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Roche and Geary, 2002; Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004; Terry and Smith, 2003).

Many of the early empirical studies revealed mixed results, with the more positive studies revealing a range of benefits including stronger workplace organisation, union legitimacy and improved consultation. (Haynes and Allen, 2001; Wills, 2004). Critical studies, on the other hand, suggested work intensification, job insecurity and limited union effectiveness (Kelly, 2004, Tailby et.al, 2004). More recent research reveals how partnership depends upon various contextual factors including underlying management and union strategies, rationale for partnership, and the way in which it has been implemented (Heery, 2002; Heery et.al, 2004; Roche and Geary 2002; Samuel, 2007; Wills, 2004). Different types of partnership have also been identified including formal/ informal, union/non-union, private/public sector
arrangements, and typologies of partnerships have been developed (Kelly, 2004; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Wray, 2004).

While a steady stream of partnership studies has continued to emerge over the last five years (e.g. Danford et.al, 2008; Jenkins, 2007, 2008; Samuel, 2007), several significant issues of interest remain. Firstly, there is a need to be clear about the meaning and purpose of partnership arrangements. In evaluating the ‘outcomes’ or ‘gains’, we must reconsider what partnership actually means, and what such arrangements are expected to achieve. There is also a need to understand more about partnership as a process, and what it means in terms of relationships and decision making between actors. A further issue of interest concerns the dynamics of the different ‘types’ of partnership arrangements which exist. Addressing these issues is the purpose of this article.

Meaning of partnership

The meaning of partnership remains a matter for debate (Ackers et.al, 2004; Ackers and Payne, 1998; Dietz, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004). Academic definitions have focused upon identifying the principles, practices, processes, values and outcomes associated with partnership working (Marchington, 1998; Guest and Peccei, 1998, 2001). Dietz suggests a useful definition “should describe a set of organisational characteristics and practices that, firstly, do justice to the idea of managing employment relations in a ‘partnership’ manner and secondly, are readily observable in order to verify a genuine example in practice”
(Dietz, 2004, 4; see also Guest and Peccei, 2001). More practical definitions are offered by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) centred around partnership ‘building blocks’ such as organisational success, mutual legitimacy, consultation, and balancing employment security and flexibility (IPA, 1998, TUC, 1999). However, both include outcomes as part of their definition of partnership, and it is proposed here that it is important not to conflate partnership processes with employment relations outcomes. Employment relations outcomes (such as employment security or adding value) are better thought of as aspirations which can be explored empirically, but do not constitute an integral component of the partnership process per se. Partnership may concern an attempt to achieve these outcomes, irrespective of whether or not they are achieved.

It is proposed that a more useful definition would identify the practices and processes associated with partnership. In terms of practices, employee voice is central to all definitions and this may involve a mix of direct participation, representative participation and financial involvement (Guest and Peccei, 2001). However, most policy and organisational definitions associate partnership with representative participation (IPA, 1998, TUC, 1999), normally (but not always) involving trade unions. This is also implicit in most academic research (Tailby and Winchester, 2005). The process of partnership concerns issues including decision making and actor relationships. Partnership decision making is typically described as a ‘joint problem solving approach’ (Dietz, 2004; Haynes and Allen, 2001),
characterised by a genuine process of early consultation and affording some influence over decision making. This does not necessarily mean joint decision making (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Terry, 2003). Actor relationships are said to require trust, openness, mutual legitimacy and a commitment to business success, and as such the values and behaviour of organisational actors are crucial (Dietz, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005). Inevitably, there is likely to be some variety within this general framework, but it is suggested that these are the practices and processes which underpin a prima facie case of partnership and are likely to be mutually reinforcing.

**Processes and outcomes**

Perhaps the greatest limitation of the literature is the focus on raw quantitative outcomes, and the tendency to overlook the more subtle processes and qualitative outcomes of partnership. This is odd not least because partnership outcomes are notoriously difficult to quantify (Roper, 2000), but especially because partnership is about much more than just examining quantitative labour/business outcomes. Rather, partnership can be viewed more broadly as an attempt to reconfigure employment relations in light of the demise of old style joint regulation (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004; Terry, 2003). The narrow focus on measuring outcomes is also criticised by Dietz, who suggests that it not just the outcome which is important but also more subtle issues such as the way issues have been handled. For example in relation to job losses:
One need not express surprise when large scale redundancies take place under partnership. The issue is how they are agreed upon and handled. Training to enhance staff employability also plays a part" (Dietz, 2004, 9)

Thus partnership is also about subtle changes in attitudes and behaviours, which may not always be apparent if a narrow outcome focus is taken, requiring more attention to "internal behaviour transformations and attitudinal improvements" (Dietz, 2004, 7; c.f. Walton and McKersie, 1965). Such factors would inevitably be missed by studies such as Kelly (2004) where selected labour outcomes such as pay levels or job losses are used to ‘measure’ the success of partnership. More attention needs to be paid to both the process-oriented dynamics of partnership, and in particular the nature of more intangible qualitative outcomes, such as the overall quality of actor relationships and the climate of employment relations.

There are also issues with the way the outcomes of partnership have been evaluated and judged, as well as a lack of agreement regarding what partnership is expected to achieve, and the measurements for success. Consequently, outcomes are too easily offset against unrealistic announcements and agreements (e.g. increasing transparency, enhancing training and development, creating a better quality of working life), or other equally ambitious aims such as the renaissance of the union movement, exceeding the expectations of even optimists like Ackers and Payne (1998). In addition, few UK studies have considered the implications of partnership from the perspective of managers; research has focused somewhat narrowly on the labour outcomes. A notable exception is the work of Guest
and Peccei (2001), who examined the ‘balance of advantage’. Interestingly, their results, which conclude that the balance of advantage may be slightly tipped in favour of management, has often been selectively quoted by other researchers as evidence of the ‘failure’ of partnership. This is despite the overall conclusions of Guest and Peccei that, in certain circumstances, “partnership can lead to potential benefits for all the partners (2001, 233).

Again, much depends on how ‘successful’ partnership is defined, and what it is expected to achieve, but it seems unrealistic to expect that that long-term partnerships will lead to harmonious, consensual and conflict-free IR (Terry and Smith, 2003). It also seems unrealistic to even suggest that partnership will lead to ‘mutual gains’ in the purest sense of the term, with gains flowing equally and harmoniously to all parties; indeed it is difficult to imagine what such a situation would look like. Finally, studies need to be sensitive to the different types of arrangements which exist under the partnership umbrella, and distinctions can be made in terms of various factors including union recognition, formality, and rationale for the agreement (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004; Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005).

ACHIEVING EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND VOICE?

In order to move beyond the current impasse in the British partnership debate, and reconsider how we actually evaluate the process and outcomes of partnership, a useful normative framework is provided by Budd (Budd, 2004).
He suggests that we should return to considerations regarding the fundamental objectives of the employment relationship. Building upon the traditional economic view of the employment relationship, in which business wants to increase profits and workers want higher wages, he argues that equity and voice are equally important objectives. The narrow economic focus, he suggests, must be balanced with employees entitlement to fair treatment (equity) and the opportunity to have meaningful input into decisions (voice). He argues that extreme positions of either dimension are both undesirable and untenable and that the aim is to strike a balance between efficiency, equity and voice (see Figure 1).

Writing from an American IR perspective, Budd (2004) opens up an old British IR debate about political process and economic outcomes. Thus the Webb’s Industrial Democracy (1897) stressed the instrumental, economic role of trade unions and collective bargaining as a means of controlling excessive labour market competition and securing good wages and conditions. Industrial relations pluralists, such as Clegg (1960) and Flanders (1975) responded by emphasising instead the political benefits of ‘joint regulation’. Later radicals, notably Fox (1974) and Hyman (1975), in their critique of pluralism, returned to the Webbs' largely economic criteria. In their view, at that time, stable joint regulation did not deliver enough benefits to workers in terms of wages and conditions. The paradox here is that both neo-classical economists and Marxists tend to stress quantitative outcomes,
while pluralists wish to emphasise the qualitative process - while supporting equitable wage comparisons and the efficient use of labour and ordered wage setting as a basis for national economic growth.

Budd's work is a response to the dominant emphasis of US HRM on narrow business performance or 'efficiency. However, Hyman (2005) criticises him for endowing the employment relationship with goals, rather than concentrating on the largely economic implications for employees. In our view, the value of Budd's framework is that it explicitly sets out the three dimension that have run through this long IR debate. First, efficiency matters because it creates stable employment at the company level and growth at national level, for the benefit of shareholders, employees and society. Second, equity matters because employees and society care about the distribution of benefits. Third, voice matters because in a democratic society employees should have some say over how decisions are made.

Budd’s call for ‘balance’ has probably caused most controversy, as it could be perceived as suggesting the achievement of some kind of stable equilibrium, and raises concerns as to whether this is actually achievable (Adams, 2005; Estreicher, 2005). Adams (2005, 115) proposes a slightly modified objective, “optimality within minimally accepted bounds…societies should attempt to optimise efficiency, equity and voice – but the result might not be an equal weighting of all three objectives”. In other words, the aim should be to achieve sufficient levels of voice and equity compatible with high levels of efficiency. Budd (2005) acknowledges such criticisms, and
suggests that ‘balance’ need not necessarily be thought of as an equal weighting between the three dimensions, but rather as “the search for arrangements that enhance one or more dimensions without undue sacrifices in other dimensions” (p.196). He suggests that they can usefully be viewed more as a ‘regulative ideal’ even if they are never realised or cannot be easily measured. As Clegg (1975) argued, it is impossible to talk of an equal balance of power between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’, just as it pointless to try and neatly fix the exact balance efficiency, equity and voice. The point is that IR in a socially regulated, liberal democratic, capitalist society should modify the goal of efficiency by equity and voice.

The Budd framework has not yet been used in employment relations research, while Budd also suggests that efficiency, equity and voice “provide the dimensions for evaluating social partnerships” (Budd, 2004, 120), and therefore this study offers an ideal opportunity to test of the utility of the framework, and to examine partnership under a different analytical lens. Accordingly, this paper examines if and how partnership may contribute to the balancing of efficiency, equity and voice.

METHODS AND RESEARCH CONTEXT

Case studies were conducted in three banking organisations, referred to by the pseudonyms ‘NatBank’, ‘BuSoc’ and ‘WebBank’. Conducting case studies allowed rich contextual data to be obtained, and focusing on one
sector means many variables are similar, for example product and labour markets and the general competitive environment. By focusing upon one area of banking firms, namely administration centres and call centres, the labour process and employee profiles of each organisation are also similar. Following the ‘firm-in-sector’ method, it is suggested that it is useful to place organisational developments within the wider context in which they operate (Smith et al, 1990).

In order to establish whether the companies qualified as prima facie partnership organisations, following preliminary discussions with key employment relations actors, a detailed analysis of policy documents was undertaken and these were compared with the policy definitions offered by the TUC and IPA. The NatBank and WebBank structures were explicitly modelled upon the TUC and IPA definitions respectively, and clear similarities could be seen between employment relations policy documents and these definitions. While at BuSoc there was no written partnership document, analysis of other internal policy documents confirmed explicit commitments to most of the principles normally associated with partnership arrangements. These included commitments to business success, consultation, legitimacy of representation, information sharing, and efforts to balance flexibility and employment security (see Table 1).

[Table 1 about here]

The specific partnership infrastructure in each case, however, varied across several dimensions including route to partnership, corporate governance,
union recognition, and formality (see Table 1). In particular, the cases represent prima facie cases of partnership with an external union, partnership with an internal (staff) union, and partnership with an in-house non-union representative body. The financial service sector also represents a key component of the UK private sector and of the economy as a whole, and this is underlined by recent global economic events. Financial services also provides a point of contrast to much industrial relations research which remains firmly rooted in traditional manufacturing and public sector contexts. It is also distinctive in the private service sector in that there is a long tradition of various forms of both union and non-union employee representation (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2008).

It is also a sector which has experienced massive change from stable oligopolistic ‘traditional banking’ in the post-war era to a turbulent and highly competitive global ‘new banking’. This has led to organisational attempts in the 1990s to change organisational culture, pay, staffing and work organisation. In the same period relationships between employers and unions became increasingly adversarial with a significant rise in disputes and calls for industrial action in what was previously regarded to be a very stable, paternalistic component of the economy in employment relations terms (Storey et.al,1997, 2000). The numerous partnership agreements in the sector have also been found to have been relatively enduring (Bacon and Samuel, 2009). This context provides an excellent leading edge test of partnership i.e. to what extent can partnership regulate the competing equity and efficiency forces, in an industry where such forces had generally been
balanced in the post war era? A summary of the main characteristics of each organisation is provided in Table 1 (below).

[Table 2 about here]

Given the particular aims of this study to understand more about the processes of partnership such as the more subtle systems of decision making, a qualitative approach was deemed essential. The bulk of the data was obtained through interviews. A total of 50 interviews were conducted, consisting of a range of managers, union/employee representatives, and employee focus groups from each organisation in the period 2004/5. These were recorded and transcribed verbatim. A danger with research into experiences of partnership is that the researcher may expect to find three basic attitudes (positive, negative, agnostic), and such attitudes may be clouded by recent events, such as a recent pay rise or announcement of job losses. In other words, respondents supposed attitudes to partnership may just reflect the extent to which there is a ‘feel good factor’ within the organisation at the time.

Inspired by ‘critical incident technique’ (CIT) a particular aim of the interviews was to “capture the thought processes, the frame of reference, and the feelings about an incident...which have meaning for the respondent” (Chell, 1999, 56). This mitigates the risks of obtaining data which reflects vague underlying feeling regarding recent organisational events, as opposed
to attitudes to partnership per se. CIT interviews, on the other hand, involve the discussion of significant occurrences (incidents, events) identified by the respondent, the way they were managed and the perceived outcomes and effects. In practice, this method required interviewees to identify some of the main organisational issues/incidents which have been prominent in the last five years (or since they joined the organisation if less than five years). This allowed context-rich examples which illustrated the ‘lived realities’ of the partnership process to be obtained. This was supplemented by a detailed review of documentation including annual reports, media reports, company magazines, and various internal reports, presentations, meeting minutes and memos.

THREE CASES OF PARTNERSHIP

This section outlines the empirical evidence from the three case studies, by exploring in detail actor perceptions of important decisions in each organisation.

*NatBank: union partnership as a ‘solution’*

NatBank is one of the ‘Big Four’ British banks. The organisation signed a formal partnership agreement with its recognised trade union following an extended period of fractious industrial relations throughout the 1990s. The partnership agreement was based upon an adaptation of the six principles of
partnership espoused by the TUC. There was an extensive partnership machinery at both a national and local level, consisting of senior and middle managers, local union representatives and national union officials. Much of the emphasis was upon encouraging local dialogue and decision making, especially around discipline and grievance and issues of organisational change. Negotiations around pay and conditions, however, still occurred primarily at a national level.

As a large city institution, senior management made clear that efficiency was the primary objective, and that ultimately the business was owned by shareholders expecting a return on their investment. Indeed, during the 1990s industrial relations unrest was compounded by a loss of City confidence in the organisation and intense global competition. However, since the partnership agreement in 2000, there was evidence to suggest that the business efficiency objectives were, to some extent, being regulated by the partnership mechanism. For example, like many organisations in the late 1990s, the bank began outsourcing to India to save costs and increase efficiency. However, it was suggested that with the partnership arrangement the offshoring process was more equitable than it could have been.

Since partnership an agreed union-management consultative framework has been devised. Known as a ‘Globalisation Agreement’, the document explicitly outlines both employer and union commitments regarding a fair and transparent process for the management of offshoring. The union described it as representing a number of “hoops the organisation has to
jump through”. Specific commitments included policies regarding the avoidance of compulsory redundancies, voluntary redundancy packages, redeployment, retraining, career support and extensive notice periods. The union National Officer suggested that although the agreement does not stop efficiency-driven offshoring policies, it does ensure that NatBank engage in early union consultation, and prevents management from making only minimal or cursory attempts to consult staff (voice), by committing them to a process which far exceeds statutory minimum requirements (equity). This contrasts with the period prior to partnership, where a previous restructuring exercise was said by representatives to have been “presented as a fait accompli completely out of the blue”, with employees reporting “a major hoo-haa” with “everyone extremely worried”.

NatBank management also proposed that all call centre staff should be encouraged to sell on calls, taking the efficiency view that call centres should be proactively generating new leads and additional revenue, rather than reactively servicing the customer. Prior to the relocation of several back office functions to India, many long-serving staff had little experience of customer facing telephone work. The additional pressure associated with a blanket policy for employees to try and sell on all calls (efficiency), proved to be too stressful for many, and ultimately resulted in high employee turnover. Following protracted discussions with the union (voice), management agreed to re-introduce a customer service-only role, even though this modified their initial aim to maximise efficiency by having all call agents trying to sell on every single call. The Employee Relations Manager
suggested that the corporate-level sales strategy represented a “pure technical model” which neglected the realities and dynamics of the call centre. As he explained:

“For a long time, we resisted the union calls for splitting sales and service. And then lo and behold – we thought oh, wouldn’t it be good to split sales and service? And the union said we told you so. It’s a good example of where we’ve worked together with partnership” (Employee Relations Manager).

Equally, union representatives cited this as an example of successful joint working, especially for experienced employees who found the pressure to sell was simply too much, but excelled as customer service advisers. This illustrates how a management policy to improve efficiency was perceived to be deeply inequitable, and this in turn had a negative impact on efficiency as employee attrition rapidly increased, suggesting a business case for equity also exists.

The efficiency and equity tensions were also evident from a business idea to harmonise contracts from traditional 9-5 to staggered 8am-midnight pattern. Again, since the offshoring of most non-customer facing roles, the administration centre was now a primarily a call centre, and customers expected to be able to contact the bank at any time of the day or night. However, many long-serving staff members only worked normal office hours, resulting in shortages of evening staff which management viewed as inefficient. Acutely concerned regarding the possibility of long serving staff
being compelled to sign new flexible contracts, the union successfully persuaded the Bank through extensive dialogue (voice), to leave long-serving staff on the old working hours should they so wish, by highlighting the potential damage to morale and associated industrial relations upheaval if this controversial change was simply imposed (equity).

Management acknowledged that the negative impact of employee perceptions of inequity may negate or even outweigh the proposed administrative efficiencies of contract harmonisation. This required management and the union to return to the main issue: how could they staff telephones in the evening to meet customer demand? It was decided that a compromise was to recruit a pool of new staff working flexible hours set to match business demand. This was not the ideal situation for the business, which would prefer all employees to work on a flexible pattern (efficiency), and neither was it the ideal situation for the union, which would have preferred to avoid what it believed to represent a ‘two-tier’ system (equity). Nevertheless, the union took the pragmatic view that their primary responsibility is to defend the interests of existing fee-paying members. As the Employee Relations Manager reflected:

“If we hadn’t had the ongoing dialogue with the union, there is no doubt we would have imposed something from on high, would have pissed a lot of people off, would have moved our attrition rates up, and it would have cost us more in the long term...We let people stay on those contracts, kept them happy and working, and didn’t make radical changes we didn’t need to” (Employee Relations Manager).
A union representative was also pleased a compromise had been reached explaining how:

“Although it’s not ideal for us, and it isn’t benefiting the business as much as they would like, it made everyone happy. Management knew the score” (Union representative).

Within NatBank, voice was a prominent issue. In a workplace which had experienced significant organisational change, the local union representatives were active and enthusiastic, employees knew who their union representatives were, and support for the union was strong. There was evidence, therefore, that at NatBank the voice afforded through the partnership mechanism was moderating decision-making and mitigating the worst effects of organisational change on employees (equity). In several cases, the union was able to promote equity as a countervailing pressure against pure business decisions based on a narrow financial efficiency logic. There was also evidence of a business case for equity, given that decisions which were perceived to be inequitable, were often recognised by management to be ultimately counterproductive due to the negative impact on morale, and the increase in attrition (efficiency). Positive assessments regarding the improved dialogue partnership afforded was evident among managers, union representatives and employees alike:

“With partnership, the union are a great mechanism. They make you stop and think. Are we being fair? Is it even legal? We go through this whole process, and by the time we make the final decision we are absolutely convinced it’s the right thing to do” (Call Centre Manager)
“We know about a lot of the issues, be it restructuring, job losses or even knocking down walls, a long time before it happens. Now they run virtually everything past us and ask for our feedback” (Union representative).

“The Bank don’t seem to go as far as they could with decisions sometimes. They do seem to have respect for their employees” (Customer Adviser).

**BuSoc: union partnership as an ‘evolution’**

The triad can also be used to evaluate partnership at BuSoc. Though there was no written union-management partnership agreement in this case, a history of co-operative employment relations, and joint commitments to business success, employment security, union legitimacy, and information and consultation, reflected the TUC principles and appeared indicative of a prima facie case of partnership. The main forum was the national level Joint Consultation and Negotiation Committee, chaired by the HR Director, and attended by the most senior union officials including the General Secretary who also acts as Chief Negotiator. In practice, it was believed that most issues were advanced through more informal meetings and ‘corridor conversations’. Issues discussed typically included pay and working conditions, discipline and grievance, and organisational change. Much of the dialogue occurred at a national level, between senior management and senior union officials, while day-to-day issues were channelled through local employee involvement schemes which appeared to operate in parallel.

Management and union respondents agreed the notion of partnership best described the style of management-union relations, although the term
‘partnership’ was not officially used. As a mutual building society owned by members, BuSoc did not have the same commercial pressures to satisfy the stock exchange. BuSoc have used their historical image as an ethically guided mutual institution to its advantage both in terms of consumer marketing, as well as their espoused approach to employment relations. Accordingly, compulsory redundancies at BuSoc were almost unknown, the business had committed not to offshore any functions abroad, and is well known in the sector for various pioneering schemes concerning work-life balance, domestic violence, home working, and equal opportunities. Both the HR Director and Union President were keen to stress that most of their employment policies significantly exceeded the UK statutory minimum arrangements (equity).

Yet some managers suggested that the general culture of organisation was ‘perhaps too risk-averse’, at the expense of efficiency. In employment relations terms, an example would be that the business would almost always settle tribunals claims out of court even if they believed they had a strong case, to avoid any potential damage to the ‘ethical’ brand image. Similarly, it was suggested that the business seldom dismissed notoriously underperforming members of staff, and this related to what was described as a very ‘welfarist’ and ‘benevolent’ culture. This led to the perception by some managers that too much focus on ‘equity’ may actually be inefficient for the organisation. As a Call Centre Manager explained:

“If you want to get rid of someone who is no good, you need to get into a process with many steps, and a hearing between managers, the employee
and the union. It can be very frustrating, you have someone who is sick every Monday, their results aren’t good. They don’t give a damn about working here, let their team down, and there’s not much you can do about it”. (Call Centre Manager).

Though it was suggested that major conflicts between the union and management were relatively rare, the last major dispute concerned the end of the final salary pension scheme for new employees despite vehement union opposition. In this case, the efficiency aim was clearly greater than the equity concerns. Union officials opined that despite their opposition there was little they could do as the decision was ‘not unlawful’, and was simply presented to them as a fait accompli (minimal voice). This occurred under the leadership of the previous Chief Executive who the Union General Secretary suggested was “strongly efficiency focused”, but suggested that the current Chief Executive appeared to be more interested in “his people as well profits”. In this case, the attitudes of the personalities involved appeared to be central to the process, although the suggestion that major decisions such as pension arrangements can depend on the whim of the Chief Executive and the relationship he has with union officials, appears incompatible with the notion of a strong partnership.

Some examples were cited where the union and management had worked together but this was mostly on a minority of relatively uncontroversial issues. For example they jointly devised a new performance management framework which they thought was fairer for employees (equity) but clearly
driven by a desire to improve employee and business performance (efficiency). Moreover, the union was proud of its track record in negotiating pay deals which they believed were often the envy of many in the industry.

Union officials stated that on balance BuSoc was a ‘good employer’, at least compared to competitors in the same sector, and this makes it difficult to assess the extent to which the union is actually making a difference, versus the extent to which this is a result of employer paternalism. On the other hand, managers suggested that the staff union was an effective medium suggesting that since most officials are former employees, they could take a more ‘balanced view’ of situations:

“I’m always very impressed with the level of knowledge the union people have around what goes on in BuSoc, it makes it more transparent, and you know you can’t pull the wool over each other’s eyes. You both understand what you are dealing with” (Director of Personnel)

“I’ve always seen the union as a bit of a regulator on us, making sure we do the right thing. It doesn’t mean that they should stop the business making the right decisions for the business, because both parties have a vested interested in business success for customers and employees. I think there have been several examples where the business has wanted to do something, and the union have come back and said, have you thought about X and Y. And then we sit back and think, hmm, brainstorming is all very well but perhaps that wasn’t a particularly good idea after all” (Employee Relations Manager).
In general terms, the equity drivers were more prominent at BuSoc than in the other case organisations, and this may have meant there was less need for the union to adopt a proactive stance than at NatBank. Moreover, within this context the grassroots interest in voice was lower. Employees were apathetic and this appeared to stem from satisfaction as opposed to disillusionment. Staff attitude surveys were normally very positive, and focus group discussions confirmed that most employees viewed BuSoc as a very good employer overall. Where dissatisfaction did occur, this was attributed to problems of implementation of local decision-making and errant line managers, rather than dissatisfaction with corporate policy itself.

Union representatives were often inactive, and many had been nominated by default. Most of the negotiation and consultation occurred at a very senior level between Executives and one or two senior union officials. Perhaps this is partly the case because senior union officials are the few people not employed by the Society, and it is possibly more difficult for seconded officials who are due to return to work after their union position ends to voice their true concerns. Employees suggested that they would probably take more interest in employment relations matters had there been more controversial incidents as in other organisations. Union officials also speculated that while the Executive Board are committed to mutuality for the foreseeable future, they wondered what impact de-mutualisation would have, and how the employment relations climate may change, and whether the need to deliver results to stock exchange could have a negative impact on the employment relations culture.
In sum, while the equity emphasis appeared to be much stronger than at NatBank, there was little evidence to confirm that this was because of a partnership relationship between the union and management, and highlights the significant possibility that BuSoc may still be a ‘good’ paternalistic employer irrespective of the union. For example, there was still evidence to suggest that when external forces resulted in an efficiency ‘crisis’, such as the problems funding the final salary pension scheme, the efficiency force prevailed over equity with minimum voice afforded to employees or the union.

**WebBank: non-union partnership as ‘an alternative’**

WebBank was set up in the 1990s with the aim of being ‘different’ and ‘radical’ in the conservative UK banking market, offering competitive products aimed at young, educated and affluent consumers. The company does not recognise a trade union, and in this context partnership concerned an in-house representative body affiliated to the Involvement and Participation Association known as the WebBank People Forum. The Forum was the primary component of the WebBank partnership structure, and evolved from a team of three part time employee representatives, to three full-time and twelve part-time representatives. The Employee Chair was involved in an array of meetings including a monthly meeting with the Chief Executive and Director of Customer Service. Any employee with more than six months services is allowed to stand for election as a representative. To date, the scope has mainly been around issues of organisational change
and discipline and grievance, although there was increasing evidence of some involvement around issues of pay and reward.

Management suggested that since the company was listed on the stock exchange two years after launch, the pressure to deliver to shareholders has had a significant impact on day-to-day operations (efficiency). Despite a high degree of UK success, WebBank was a loss-making business due to a combination of high start up costs and the failure of an overseas expansion project, breaking into profit for the first time in 2005. In terms of voice, WebBank decided to set up an internal Employee Forum in preference to recognising an external trade union. It was suggested that management perceived unions to be “too adversarial” and “at odds with the culture of a new organisation”. Only five years old, the non-union Forum was still evolving but appeared to be run very much on terms set by management, and representatives and management were both clear of the fact that it is not a negotiating body. Most of the representatives did not seem to have a problem with this role, although one did express some doubts regarding the ability of the Forum to challenge in the face of severe adversity.

However, the existence or role of the Forum was not a priority for most employees, and many had limited knowledge or interest in the Forum. At most, it was considered to be a ‘counselling service’, offering advice in the event of discipline and grievance cases. However, as was the case with NatBank, there was some evidence of the Forum providing a useful voice channel, and acting to some extent as an efficiency-equity arbiter. For
example, the Forum had challenged the selection procedures being used to
decide new posts following an IT restructure which they believed were
arbitrary and political. It was believed that the final selection process was
much fairer as a result (equity). Moreover, there was a feeling that
managers can devise pure process models in their search for efficiency, and
that this is where it was suggested the dialogue added value (voice and
equity). As a representative explained:

“With restructures sometimes managers have a nice clockwork process
flow, and just assume the people will be OK. But they forget the human
side, and even HR can forget that. HR needs to check that things are
legally watertight. But they can get wrapped up in that, and forget the
human side. That’s where we come in” (Employee Representative).

The Forum was also active in ensuring that disciplinary and grievance
procedures were followed in a fair way and that due process was followed
(equity). A team manager recounted an incident involving a top performing
employee who suddenly developed a poor attendance record. It was
suggested that after several warnings an efficiency-oriented decision would
need to be made to dismiss the employee. The team manager admitted that
he was slightly bewildered and disappointed by this, as the employee
concerned was a consistently high performing member of staff, and
therefore decided to ask a Web Bank employee representative to help. It
transpired that the employee had a poor relationship with her line manager,
and believed that she had been the victim of bullying. After investigation,
the team manager transferred the employee to another team, and the
employee’s attendance record improved significantly. The team manager believed that had there been no opportunity for forum intervention a high performing employee would probably have been dismissed, as without the voice process the root of the problem may never have been identified. In other words, management may have dismissed the employee following several warnings, on the grounds that it was the most efficient decision. However, it was believed it was better to invest some time to ascertain the underlying cause and to try and resolve the situation. This resulted in a decision which was both efficient for the organisation as a high performing employee was retained, but it was also more equitable for the worker, as she was able to air her grievance and did not lose her job as a result of a relationship breakdown. Indeed, the ostensibly efficient decision may actually have been inefficient given that an experienced and popular employee may have been dismissed.

Prior to the establishment of the forum, the culture was said to be much more ‘hire and fire’, but it was believed the current dialogue (voice) facilitated better efficiency and equity outcomes:

“We try to take a balanced attitude...we know what challenges you are up against Mr Manager, but we think this guy could be treated better than he has been” (Employee Representative).

“Most employees at a disciplinary are blind to the problem at hand, or they don’t see why it’s such a problem. So for them it’s not fair. The forum is interesting because they’ve got both parties interests at hand. They are there for me as well (Team Manager – Call Centre).
“We just want to make sure due process has been followed. You can’t go from Step 1 to Step 5 in one move, you just can’t do that. Legality is the start of how we should work, not the end of how should work” (Employee Representative).

Overall though, WebBank management appeared much more interested in promoting efficiency rather than equity, and it was very much involvement on terms strictly defined and controlled by management. Even where decisions were ostensibly made in relation to equity, this was often underpinned by sound business rationale, although again this reinforces the notion that the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. As an employee representative explained, they were expected to bring solutions to the table in respect of issues they raise, and not to solely highlight problems:

“We can’t say no, you can’t do that, and leave it at that. If we say no, they’ll say, why not? Managers don’t want to hear no. But we’ve got the ability to do research, and to develop ideas, solutions and workarounds” (Employee Representative).

Nevertheless managerial respondents still acknowledged the value to the business of the structure (efficiency and voice):

“Because the representatives are at the front line, we don’t go down the line of designing something wholly inappropriate. We get valuable input from the people with a different perspective, which stops us wasting money and doing things that won’t work anyway. They’ve got a different perspective to ours so it adds value” (Senior Technology Manager).
“We consult the representatives, but we aren’t necessarily reaching an agreement with them, but there would be no point consulting them if what they said didn’t influence us. We want to be doing things that they support, and it frustrates me that sometimes the representatives are not involved as I believe we get a better result when they are” (HR Director).

Representatives were also generally positive about the relationship they had with managers and the effectiveness of the process:

“We have a very good relationship with senior managers. We have access directly to the top. The Chief Executive says hello to you. We put a big emphasis on building relationships because we felt at an early stage that having a good relationship would be better than a lets-play-poker approach” (Employee Representative).

“All we can do is make sure we get fair decisions. We are there to make sure people get a fair deal. I think we actually get to know more than a union would be told. It is recognised by the top management, they value the input, and we are given the time and resources we need for the good of the people” (Employee Representative).

DISCUSSION

By employing the analytical framework proposed by Budd (2004) and using Critical Incident Technique (CIT), there was evidence to suggest that as a result of the voice and dialogue afforded through partnership, union/employee representatives were often able to moderate decisions to mitigate the worst effects for employees at NatBank and WebBank. At NatBank for
example, the union and management team worked together to reach an agreement regarding what would constitute a ‘fair’ redundancy policy. This includes firstly discussing alternatives to job losses such as redeployment/relocation, minimising the number of losses, generous voluntary payments, career counselling and the provision of an extensive notice period. Prior to partnership the approach was described as “much more cloak and dagger”. The research revealed that moderation and mitigation by both management and employee representatives appeared to be an important characteristic of decision-making under partnership. While the ideal decision for the union may have been no job losses, partnership enabled a compromise to be struck.

The framework can also be used to illustrate the dynamics of discipline and grievance at WebBank. High turnover and discipline cases were highlighted by senior managers at WebBank to be a significant problem especially in the call centre environment. A key area of involvement for the Forum was acting as an intermediary in disputes between employees and line managers, and it was believed that the forum representative provided a useful additional perspective when disputes and grievances occurred.

The same regulatory effect could not be readily identified in the case of BuSoc. It was suggested that in the previous five years employment relations had generally been good, with few major controversies. The main recent incident was identified as the end of the final salary pension scheme to new entrants. This has become a significant issue among mutual
organisations as well as public limited companies, as spiralling pensions costs are seen to be eating into their ability to compete with their banking rivals. Increasing subsidies for the funds is controversial as often the main beneficiaries are executives. In 2001, the society took the decision to close the fund to new employees. A more drastic but efficient decision may have been to close the scheme to all staff, although to date few employers in the sector have taken such steps. A more equitable but less efficient approach may have been for the employer to increase their contributions and lump sum payments to help maintain the fund. Importantly, there was little evidence of the decision being regulated by the union, and the decision was said to have been imposed without consultation. So while the decision may have been to end the final salary scheme to new members only, which was the course of action taken by other banks and building societies at a similar time, and not perhaps the more drastic closure of the scheme, there was little evidence of this being a result of union involvement. In common with many other organisations, the future of the pension fund remains uncertain and is still a significant concern for the union.

In other words, two of the cases demonstrated evidence of ‘partial success’ as in many instances the voice and consultation process appearing to ‘moderate’ decisions in terms of ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’. The same could not be said in the case of BuSoc, with the most important decision in recent years being made without consultation, and limited evidence to suggest that more positive decisions were actually the direct result of union engagement. Thus despite a common commitment to the notion of partnership, the
practice of partnership varied between cases. At NatBank the degree of involvement was high and covered a wide scope of operational and strategic issues, and there was an emphasis upon local decision making. At WebBank the degree of influence was lower, with the structure focused mainly on operational issues, but the forum remit has been widening over time.

BuSoc was the most problematic case of partnership. The structure was highly centralised around a few key senior players, and the scope was focused around high level HR issues and dealing with local discipline and grievance cases. While consultation processes at NatBank and WebBank resonated with many aspects of a more integrative problem-solving style, at BuSoc the core of union activity still revolved around distributive issues, with information and consultation often occurring between a few key actors. Nevertheless, the quality of employment relations at BuSoc was judged by management, union and employee actors as being good, underlining the complex relationship between process and outcomes.

The Budd framework is therefore useful in illustrating how – and whether – partnership balances efficiency, equity and voice. This study, however, prefers the use of the terms ‘accommodation’ or ‘moderation’. It is believed that these are the most compatible with the pluralist view of the employment relationship, without implying that there ought to be an equal weighting which new pluralism cannot offer, and arguably old pluralism never offered
either. In short, partnership is perhaps better viewed as an attempt to make the employment relationship ‘less imbalanced’, rather than ‘balanced’.

Clearly, the framework cannot necessarily help us identify complex issues of cause and effect. It remains probable that businesses may achieve positive business/labour outcomes without partnership, and even a strong partnership need not automatically lead to guaranteed positive outcomes. This reflects the long standing complexity identified in the wider employee involvement and HRM literatures (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005). Despite this important caveat, the Budd framework remains a useful heuristic device when exploring the more subtle processes, and the qualitative and quantitative outcomes of partnership from within the pluralist tradition. Importantly, it encourages researchers to engage in a more holistic assessment of outcomes beyond narrow institutional union interests or raw labour or business outcomes, as well as underlining the need to consider processes.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, there is a need to re-think exactly what partnership means and exactly what it is expected to achieve and assess accordingly. The paper has also demonstrated the value of exploring decision making processes under partnership arrangements, as well the outcomes. It is proposed that the concepts of efficiency, equity and voice suggested by Budd (2004) provide a very useful intellectual framework for doing this. There is also a
need to compare the actual outcomes in real contexts of decision making shaped by partnership, and to compare outcomes not just with the ‘ideal’ outcome, but with the other possible alternatives. The partnership debate could also benefit from a more rounded assessment of outcomes: partnership is not just about outcomes for the labour movement but also employees and society more generally. The cost to the public recent developments in the global financial sector illustrates how efficiency matters to a wide range of stakeholders.

As these cases demonstrate, several decisions were better than they could otherwise have been for staff, and the dialogue afforded through the partnership approach had resulted in several compromises to the benefit of employees by mitigating the impact of decisions (equity). There was evidence to suggest that without the voice afforded through the early consultation and mutual legitimacy afforded by partnership dialogue, management decisions may have been more focused on short-term efficiency, with scant regard for the equity outcomes. Interestingly management acknowledged that decisions based solely on ‘profit-maximising’ and ‘efficiency’ are often inefficient in the long-term because they are met with staff resistance and union opposition, whereas compromises which may appear to be less efficient in the short-term, are actually more efficient in the long-term because of the greater legitimacy and acceptability. In other words, managers at NatBank and WebBank acknowledged that often there was a sound business case for equity and that the concepts are not mutually exclusive. Partnership may be unable to
neatly ‘balance’ the objectives of the employment relationship. However, the process often led to outcomes which were more balanced than they otherwise would have been, and this is a central component of the pluralist ethic, where the aim is one of levelling the playing field (Clegg, 1975).

Thus a strong, genuine partnership may encourage management to think more strategically and long-term in relation to their business strategies, and related HRM and employment policies. To varying extents, partnership facilitated dialogue and voice, which promoted more considered decision making, the moderation of business decisions, and the moderation of the worst effects for employees. When evaluated in this light, the cases of NatBank, BuSoc and WebBank demonstrate various degrees of success, although of course significant challenges remain if partnership is to become an enduring model of employment relations regulation in the UK.
### Table 1: Formal definitions of partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership element</th>
<th>NatBank</th>
<th>BuSoc</th>
<th>WebBank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint commitment to organisational success (IPA)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to the success of the enterprise (IPA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ Joint commitment to success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual recognition of the legitimate role and interests of all parties (IPA)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognising legitimate interests (TUC)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment and effort to sustain trust (IPA)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means for sharing information (IPA)</td>
<td>✓ Openness</td>
<td>✓ Information exchange</td>
<td>✓ Transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation, joint problem-solving, employee involvement (IPA)</td>
<td>✓ Problem-solving</td>
<td>✓ Consultation</td>
<td>✓ Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies to balance flexibility with employment security (IPA)</td>
<td>✓ Employability Flexibility</td>
<td>✓ Business flexibility Employee protection</td>
<td>✓ Flexibility Internal movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on quality of working life</td>
<td>✓ Equality Diversity Fair treatment</td>
<td>✓ Fair treatment Equality and diversity Training and development</td>
<td>✓ Equal opportunities Training and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Win-win (TUC)</td>
<td>✓ Promoting interests of all stakeholders</td>
<td>✓ Managing business in interests of company, employees and customers</td>
<td>✓ Act for good of bank and its people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing organisational success (IPA)</td>
<td>✓ Rewarding exceptional performance</td>
<td>✓ Prosperity for customers and employees</td>
<td>✓ Sharing success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from IPA (1997), TUC (1999), internal company documentation

### Table 2: Three cases of partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route to partnership</th>
<th>NatBank</th>
<th>BuSoc</th>
<th>WebBank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
<td>Proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>External union</td>
<td>Internal (staff) union</td>
<td>Non-union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate governance</td>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Mutual</td>
<td>PLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures and formality</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
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References


Parallels can be drawn with the work of Walton and McKersie (1965), and in particular their concepts of integrative versus distributive bargaining, and related notion of ‘attitudinal structuring’. 