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The Influence of Non-domestic Factors on Elite Sport Development and Anti-Doping Policy: the cases of Japan and the UK/England

by Mayumi Ya-Ya Yamamoto

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

July, 2009

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which selected aspects of sport policy in Japan and also UK/England are influenced by international forces. The objectives which underpin the research aim are to analyse the characteristics of the domestic policy areas and identify the varying degree of impact of external influences on domestic sport policy. The thesis examines the interactions between domestic and international factors that shape elite sport policy and anti-doping policy and seeks to identify how domestic institutional values and ideas have been shaped by global influences. Importantly, by analysing the nature and mechanisms of global influence that are manifest at the domestic level, it is intended to identify varying degree of impact external to national policy.

To achieve the above objectives, a qualitative methodology and related documentary research methods are adopted in the empirical investigations. Policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews are employed. The cases of UK (or England where appropriate) are introduced in order to generate a deeper understanding of the development of Japanese elite sport and anti-doping policy. The thesis draws on a range of theoretical frameworks, including international relations theory, international regime theory and globalisation, to analyse the empirical data. By adopting these theoretical frameworks, it is aimed to identify the possible characteristics of international policy regimes in the policy areas of elite sport and anti-doping.

With regard to the development of elite sport policy, the general observation is that a myriad of intermingling pressures have been stimulated by processes of globalisation. The empirical study shows that the realist notion of international relations has the potential to illustrate the capacity of states over the development of elite sport policy. The recent development of global anti-doping provisions and the internationally-agreed principles and values in 'play fair' have influenced domestic policy through a complex series of interactions between global and domestic forces. A policy regime is discernible in anti-doping policy whose effectiveness is based on the regulation of the policy area of anti-doping. However, it is evident that the outcome of interactions between the domestic and the global illustrates the differences between Japan and the UK. It is possible to identify an element of 'coercion' in the current global anti-doping arrangements where sanctions and monitoring are undertaken by the World Anti-Doping Agency. There is a different degree of 'calculated' national interest in benefits and costs associated with global policy principles, norms and compliance. As for the case of elite sport policy development, interactions between domestic and non-domestic factors can be explained better with the application of globalisation concepts. Despite the
states retaining substantial capacity and autonomy over many aspects of elite sport policy acting out of their self-interests, the capacity of globalisation to 'reach in' to the domestic policy process becomes apparent with different degrees of the 'enabling' impacts of globalisation between Japan and British contexts.

This thesis demonstrates the advantages of using a broad international relations framework to demonstrate the applicability of theoretical frameworks of international relations, international policy regimes and globalisation to the analysis of the interaction between global and national/local sport policies. With the objective to fill the gaps in knowledge, the thesis highlights the substantial contributions, in particular, to understanding the development of sport policy in Japan and the processes of global pressure manifest at domestic level as constraining and enabling factors, while future research will possibly be required to refine theoretical applications to the field of sport policy and advance the area of comparative study.

**Keywords:** elite sport development, anti-doping policy, international policy regime, globalisation, policy analysis Japan, UK/England
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Sharing time with my fellow friends at the ISLP/COS&R was more than precious: in such a multi-national and inter-cultural environment, I have learned the significance of how we can, and should, perceive ‘a truth’ and ‘the truth’. Special thanks to now-doctor Shane Collins and Una Hong for their positive attitudes towards our endeavour and life.

This thesis would not materialise without the very initial financial support from the Rotary International Club. I would also like to extend my thanks to all interviewees in Japan and the UK for taking time to contribute to this study. Meeting such enthusiastic interviewees motivated me to learn more about the field.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to: my great grandmother, Toyoko, with whom, to my regret, I could not share the joy of completing this task; my grandmother, Misako, who always encourages me to take challenges in order to see the bright side of life; my parents, Kazuo and Shiomi, and my beloved brother, Kazushi, who have all supported me throughout my time in the UK.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Aim and Objectives

The aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which selected aspects of sport policy in Japan and also UK/England\(^1\) are influenced by factors external to the domestic policy environment. Underpinning this aim are the following research objectives:

- to examine theories which seek to explain the influence of non-domestic factors on the policy process, including theories of international policy regimes, and consider their utility in relation to the analysis of elite sport development and anti-doping policy in Japan, and UK/England;
- to identify and analyse the domestic structures of sport and the processes of policy-making related to elite sports development and anti-doping policy; and
- to examine the interactions between domestic and international factors shaping policy in the two selected areas in Japan and UK/England.

At the heart of the second and the third objectives are the analysis of the robustness of the domestic policy arena and specifying, as precisely as possible, the way domestic policy has been affected by external international forces. As such, the central focuses of this study are, first, to examine how national policies are formed, shaped and directed; second, to identify the way in which domestic institutions, values and cultural beliefs mediate and constrain international influences; and, third and most importantly, to analyse how the mechanisms of global influence are manifest at the domestic level and varying degrees of impact of non-domestic influences on policy choice in Japan and UK/England and between the selected national sport policy areas within the countries.

While there are varieties of forms of explanations with different conceptual frameworks to examine the nature of international forces, this study utilises international relations theory, and more specifically the theory of international policy regimes and the concept of

\(^1\) Due to the growing impact of devolution in the UK it is increasingly difficult to treat UK sport policy-making as a single 'domestic' process. While anti-doping policy can still claim a UK scope, elite development is increasingly affected by the various processes of the four home countries. Consequently, this study is focused on UK policy processes except where there is a clear English remit.
globalisation to assess the international impact of domestic policy, to analyse complex processes of domestic response to external influence and interactions between domestic and international factors. Adopting these broad theoretical bases, the theory of international policy regimes will be used to examine the precise mechanisms of the intersections of domestic and international dimensions. More specifically, the analysis will focus, on the one hand, on the way in which the values and objectives of policy regimes are internalised and incorporated into patterns of policy-making and/or imposed upon a domestic organisational infrastructure and value system, and, on the other hand, the degree to which states maintain their capacity to respond to or resist international norms and principles in these two policy areas. The thesis will draw conclusions regarding the usefulness of these explanatory frameworks in understanding the mechanisms of influence external to the national sport policy processes.

Empirically, Japanese and UK/English elite sport policy and anti-doping policy will be explored through policy document analysis and the conduct of semi-structured interviews with senior government officials, officials of national sport bodies responsible for elite sport and anti-doping policy and academics specialised in the field as the primary source of data for the study. Although the study examines Japan and UK/England, the value of the UK/English case is as a point of reference to sensitise our understanding of the Japanese case in the historic development of sport policy, and importantly, to characterise the domestic responses to global influences and identify inter- and intra-state policy interactions and processes.

1.2 Research Background

The choice of Japan and UK/England and the analysis of the cases of elite sport development and anti-doping within the broad theoretical framework of international relations are prompted by the following four considerations: i) there is a relative absence of study of sport within international relations theory; ii) despite a growing volume of literature available in recent years on elite sport development and the notion of 'a sporting arms race', there is a lack of research in relation to the Japanese elite sport system; and iii) the impact of global organisations, principles and regulations concerned with drug-free sport on domestic policy-making and national sport bodies has not been analysed. These three considerations are further discussed below.
Fundamental to this study is a concern to help make good the relative neglect between the studies of international relations and sport. Not only have international relations theorists rarely examined sport from within their analytical framework but sport analysts have also seldom explored the usefulness of this theory as an analytical tool, although there are some exceptions, including Lowe, Kanin and Strenk (1978), Houlihan (1994b), Levermore and Budd (2004) and Riordan and Krüger (1999). Within the literature on international relations theory, sport has been a neglected field of study and little empirically and theoretically-driven research can be found. Noting the general, and surprising, marginalisation of sport policy analysis in general from utilising the major policy analysis framework, Houlihan examined and assessed the utility of four major meso-level analytic frameworks (the stages model, institutional analysis, multiple streams model and the advocacy coalition framework) to analyse sport policy and highlighted the value of a ‘modified’ advocacy coalition framework to examine the complexities in policy-making in sport as well as “the importance of an understanding of the social and recent historical context of policy decisions” (2005: 182).

Although the number of studies is still small there has been an increase in the number of academic studies utilising meso-level analytical frameworks in the study of sport policy, including the policy areas of elite sport, sport development and PE/school sport (for example, Green, 2003; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Houlihan, 1991).

However, the analysis of sport policy-making derived from a theoretical framework of international relations is still conspicuous by its absence. This has been explained by Nicholson (1998a) who argued that international relations as a discipline deals with the issues of war and peace, poverty and wealth as the fundamental problems. Taylor noted that “international relations scholars show little sign of seriously considering the place of sport in global human affairs” and argued that “international relations should take more account of sport” and criticised the rigid traditions of academic divisions (1986: 45). This relative lacunae in the study of international relations is more surprising when we consider the range of examples where sport has been used as a political tool to achieve various non-sport diplomatic objectives. Moreover, one would have expected that the recent interest among international relations theorists in moving beyond ‘hard power’ and analysing ‘soft power’ in the way the cultural sphere of international relations shapes the behaviour of governments would have resulted in greater attention being paid to sport (Keohan & Nye, 2000).

Allison and Monnington (2005) highlight the neglect of sport in the study of international relations and draw attention to two examples where states have used sport in foreign relations: first, “to sell themselves and enhance their image” either through success at international sporting competitions, hosting major international sport events or expressing the
status of a state or a nation at the Olympic Games; and second, in a coercive nature "to penalise international behaviour of which they disapprove" through sporting boycotts, which could appeal to governments "as strategic low-cost alternatives to other political methods" (Allison & Monnington, 2005: 5-6). Allison and Monnington argue, on the basis of these two examples, that "sport seems to claim some attention even according to a traditional definition of international relations" (ibid: 7). However, they claim that sport has been so thoroughly dismissed within international relations theory that its marginal status requires "further explanation and the most obvious hypothesis is that it does not fit into the established paradigms and debates of the discipline" (emphasis added, ibid, 7). Allison and Monnington argue that a government's concern for fostering international status or prestige through winning sporting competitions and for establishing international goodwill is derived from states' "innate tendencies to intervene in new fields when they are thwarted in old ones" (ibid, 25). The observation by Allison and Monnington is important and, based on their assumption of the classical dichotomy of theory of international relations, they utilise a state-centric view of realism for analysing the way states (in this case, Britain and mainly African states) are preoccupied with prestige and constrained by the international sport system. However, they only focus on the realism-idealism dichotomy in international relations theory and are confined in their analysis within the dominant realist state-centric assumption. No explanations are given in terms of the implications of these two paradigms, whether they are useful theoretical orientations, to understand the changing nature of sport. Allison and Monnington also fail to provide any alternative analytical framework to examine the way arguably 'autonomous' international non-governmental sport organisations (sport INGOs), the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in particular, and global issues in sport such as doping influence the domestic governmental sport policy agenda and how they are manifest at the national level.

As for Houlihan (1994b) who provides one of the few works that applies international relations theory to the complex relationship between sport and international politics, his analysis is grounded upon three strands of international relations (realism, pluralism and globalism). Houlihan recognises that the most significant level of sport-based interaction is among "formal non-governmental organisations and at the informal and personal levels", and that the tendency is for the basis of interactions to be "cultural/knowledge and people" (ibid: 31). Houlihan then seeks to provide an explanation for the relations between states and sport by relating sport to international relations theory. However, he argues that it is important to assess the applicability of international relations theory to sport through empirical research:

Placing the observable patterns within a variety of theoretical frameworks will
not only enable a sharper understanding of empirical data, but should also allow an evaluation of the adequacy of existing international relations theory to explore issues beyond its traditional preoccupations (Houlihan, 1994b: 31-34).

It is acknowledged that the field of international relations is interdisciplinary and intends to "make better sense of the institutions, events and processes which exist in the contemporary world" (Burchill, 2001a: 13). It might be expected that a conceptual and explanatory framework derived from international relations theory will lead to a broadened and deepened understanding of not only the role of states in international relations and sport, but also, and more importantly, of the interactions between international non-governmental and domestic governmental organisations in relation to sport. In particular, it is argued that it is essential to utilise the literature of international relations to understand the globalisation process in sport, the growing significance of transnational and multi-national actors, and also to explain how they create complex sporting relations which affect domestic policy processes. Recognising the increasing number of sport actors with different interests and financial, organisational and knowledge capabilities, it is the central interest of this study to examine the way these actors influence the behaviour of government and domestic policy-making processes.

Further, built onto the previous account of significance of applying international relations theory to sport, it is argued by Houlihan that given that the influence of globalisation/international forces on domestic policy is generally acknowledged, "there is very little analysis of how international forces are manifest at the domestic level – the process of influence is rarely explored" (emphasis added, 2007: 12). As such, this study introduces international regime theory to aid our understanding of policy decision-making and the role of government in sport, within which it will further focus on the mechanisms by which global dimensions influence domestic policy choice and the way states and national sport organisations intersect with international dimensions. It is also intended to examine the domestic responses to global pressures and the degree to which states or national sporting agencies feel compelled or obliged to conform to a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms and rules in the fields of elite sport development and anti-doping. For example, the concept of policy transfer will be explored in order to examine the reasons behind lesson-drawing and transferring policy from one country to another.

Secondly, there has been a clear growth in interest among governments in achieving international sporting success and in the design of elite sport systems. Both developments accordingly have attracted much academic attention over the last few years around claims of 'homogenisation' or 'convergence' of national elite sport development systems with the
majority of authors adopting a meso-level analysis (for example, Augustad et al, 2006; Green & Oakley, 2001; Oakley & Green, 2001; Sam & Jackson, 2004; De Bosscher et al, 2008). In addition, theoretically-informed comparative analysis of elite sport development has been expanding (for example, Bergsgard et al, 2007; Henry & ISLP, 2007; Houlihan & Green, 2008a) and Green and Houlihan (2005) identify common tensions between the allocation of resources between ‘sport for all’ or the development of sport clubs and community sport and the development of elite athletes across different sport systems (Australia, Canada and the UK). The systems that have been investigated include those fairly successful countries in elite sport, for example, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Soviet Union (Green & Oakley, 2001), and Australia, the UK, the United States and Canada (Houlihan, 1997) as well as Belgium (Flanders and Wallony), the Netherlands, Italy, Norway (De Bosscher et al, 2008; UK Sport/SPLISS, 2006). However, what is conspicuous is that the countries investigated are often selected from a narrow range with Japan, one of the top-finishing countries in international sport competitions, to a large degree excluded. Furthermore, many of the multi-country studies on sport are under-theorised (except for Houlihan & Green, 2008a). While this criticism should not lead to the dismissal of the contributions made by scholars examining the development of sport policy in Japan (for example, Seki, 1997; Uchiumi, 1993), they have a tendency towards being descriptive. Nakamura (2002) applies the analytical framework of policy networks to examine the development of sport policy in Japan. As for Yamamoto (2008), she primarily focuses on the Japanese development of elite sport structure within the framework of four variables developed by Green and Houlihan (2005; see also Houlihan & Green, 2008a), which is the framework that will be utilised in this study, while Henry and Uchiumi (2001) provide a useful comparative analysis of Japanese and British sport policy. In this way, this study thus contributes to filling the gap in knowledge in the area of Japanese sport policy development, specifically elite sport and anti-doping policy.

While it may be argued that the development and promotion of elite sport policy objectives has a close association with domestic policy, it can also be demonstrated, perhaps more persuasively, that the process of the development of elite sport policy should be understood as a reflection of the values and meanings attached to the Olympic Games by international sport organisations and other international actors. In this regard, the framework of elite sport policy will be considered with reference to questions that include why, when and how a state allocates funding to national specialist training facilities and other resources for elite athletes. The rationale behind the granting of support for ‘full-time’ athletes, the provision of wider sport competition opportunities, and the development of coaches and high performance specialists as well as the provision of highly specialist services to elite athletes will be
examined in relation to the interaction between domestic factors and international factors such as the principles and regulations of IOC, international sport federations (IFs) and World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). In light of the Oakley and Green's comments regarding the 'global sporting arm's race' (Oakley & Green, 2001) and an arguable convergence of elite sport organisational design and service programmes, the national engagement, if any, in learning and transferring the perceived good practice from one country to the other will be examined in order.

The third consideration that informs this research relates specifically to doping in sport. The issue of drugs in sport is primarily dealt with within the academic community primarily as an ethical problem that relates to the value/meaning of sport with much academic comment tending to be highly normative. The global anti-doping movement has become prominent due, in part, to the newly created WADA, and the publication of the World Anti-Doping Code (WAD Code) in 2003 (revised in November 2007) and the accompanying mandatory International Standards, the annually renewed Prohibited List, and the Models of Best Practice and Guidelines. However, the importance of WADA and the WAD Code has not yet been well researched. A particular gap is the analysis of WADA's relationship with governments and with international governmental and non-governmental sport organisations, and WADA's impact on the domestic policy-making (except for Houlihan, 2002a). Within the framework provided by international relations and international policy regime theories the analysis will focus on: the development of anti-doping policy in the UK and Japan; the relationship between domestic anti-doping organisations and WADA and the WAD Code; the changing relationship between IFs and national governing bodies of sport (NGBs) or national sport federations (NFs); and, most importantly, the way policy-makers perceive their obligations in relation to globally agreed anti-doping rules.

In summary, it is intended that this study will contribute to the development and refinement of concepts and theories of international relations, in particular, those concerning international policy regimes and globalisation. More specifically, the research should contribute to the continuing debate between neoliberal, institutionalist points of view within international relations theory and neo-realism. Neoliberalism endorses the theoretical framework of interdependent and transnational relationships among states, transnational and multinational organisations and non-governmental actors, as opposed to the realists' dominant focus on behaviour of states and distribution of power with the former conceptualised as being engaged in the maximisation of power and wealth. Constructivism could be a supplementary conceptual framework to neoliberalism for the analysis of state cooperation and their apparent willingness to subject their interests to international norms and regulations and to
international governing arrangements. The thesis will identify how these theoretical frameworks could be used to examine the way sport policy-making has been influenced by external factors and mediated by specific domestic historic and cultural elements. Finally, the study will contribute to the small body of literature that examines the development of elite sport policy and anti-doping policy in Japan and the UK/England by utilising theories of international relations, international policy regimes and globalisation.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

In Chapter 2, the theoretical basis of the study will be outlined. Theories of international relations, of international policy regimes, and of globalisation will be introduced and their utility in assessing international influence on domestic sport policy will be evaluated. Firstly, the dominant three schools of thought (realism, neoliberalism and constructivism) will be discussed to provide an insight into the ongoing paradigm debate within the discipline of international relations. The critical review of these schools of thought will clarify the key concepts and units of analysis within international relations which can provide us with an understanding of the roles of state, international governmental and non-governmental organisations and transnational and multinational corporations as well as the interplay between them. Secondly, the concept of the international policy regime will be explored and the implications of the above three schools of thought for the understanding of international policy regimes will be reviewed. Thirdly, the concept of globalisation will be examined with a particular focuses on three different assumptions (hyperglobalism, scepticism and transformationalism) regarding the trajectory of globalisation and its underpinning dynamics. Recognising it as one of the features of the globalisation phenomena, the concepts of lesson-drawing and policy transfer are introduced along with a range of other mechanisms of globalisation. The implications of policy transfer for the formation of international policy regimes will also be discussed with a particular reference to the significance of knowledge and ideas in policy, the assumption of which are shared with the 'cognitivist' or constructivist strand of international policy regimes. Finally, the impact of globalisation on sport will be extensively explored in relation to the dimensions of culture, economy, organisational infrastructure for sport and political elements. Overall, an overview of the characteristics and the strengths and shortcomings of each paradigm and concept will be imperative for us not only to explain how and why elite sport and anti-doping policies in Japan and UK/England were changed, but also to understand the views of policy change held by officials in decision-making positions.
Chapter 3 sets out the research strategy used for this thesis. A review of critical realism, the ontological and epistemological position adopted for the study, will be provided. It will become clearer that critical realism accepts the notion that the world exists (at least partially) independently of our knowledge of it, allowing us to reflect the interrelated nature of structure and agency. The structure-agency debate is crucial in the study to understand why, for example, the World Anti-Doping Code affects domestic policies and institutions and the preferences and values of actors within different countries to different degrees. Grounded upon a critical realist standpoint with an incorporated idea of structure-agency, the applicability of qualitative methodology will be explained. Central to our argument is the belief that a qualitative approach enables us to acquire a deeper understanding of social phenomena. Social action is thus meaningful to actors, their inner experiences and forms of social interactions. It has been well-documented in recent years that the role of states is being extended with regard to funding elite athletes and specialist sport facilities for achieving international sporting success. In contrast, domestic anti-doping policy has an even shorter history and attempts to coordinate international policy.

The conceptual and language issues will be carefully considered for the explanations surrounding the social construction of meaning, and elements or aspects of cultural specificity that may be embedded in government protocols, which may be assumed to influence the orientation of national policy. It can be assumed that the specific institutional context would mediate and channel the effects of non-domestic influence when we acknowledge the recursive relationship between agency and structure. Finally, the research methods adopted (policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews) will be discussed. Primary documentary sources, policy documents issued by the government and domestic sport organisations will be utilised to examine the development of sport policy in order to identify changes in policy rhetoric and substance, which may reflect the socially constructed reality in the documents. The utility of this method will be provided to allow triangulation with the semi-structured interviews conducted for the study. Semi-structured interviews with decision-makers from government office and national sport organisations will be used in the study in order to gain in-depth information about their values and experiences that shape their perception of policy issues and other institutional policy actors. It will be explained that a much larger number of interviews will be carried out for the case of Japan where the number of policy documents and available previous research is more limited.

The subsequent chapters will present the analysis of the four empirical sport policy cases, in which the anti-doping policy and elite sport policy structure will follow nearly the same
structure in both the UK/English and the Japanese cases. The analysis of the development of anti-doping policy will be presented in Chapters 4 and 5. The historic engagement in the fight against doping in sport undertaken in the UK and Japan will be examined at the beginning of each chapter. This will enable us to sensitise our understanding of the general attitudes of each government towards anti-doping policy. The second part of each chapter will provide an overview of the structural arrangements for coordinating national anti-doping programmes and will discuss the network interaction of domestic and global anti-doping stakeholders. The budgetary allocations and the extent of doping controls undertaken by each country will then be highlighted in an attempt not only to describe the change in patterns in finance and doping tests over time, but also, more importantly, to examine the impact of domestic and global policy actors on this pattern. Finally, the empirical evidence will demonstrate the intersection between national and global policy development, in the UK case, which will be discussed in relation to the debate regarding the creation of an independent NADO. Similarly, the global pressure on Japan will be analysed in relation to the significance of the development of WADA and the subsequent development of global agreement in anti-doping. As with the cases for elite sport structure, the questions asked in the empirical field research will primarily be theoretically-informed and will be reflected in the structure of these chapters.

Chapter 6 will begin by mapping the elite sport organisational setup in UK/England in order to explore the changes in roles and responsibilities of each of the agencies and potential and/or actual inter-agency tensions will be examined. The Japanese elite sport case in Chapter 7 will begin with a summary of the historic development of elite sport policy in order to provide a more in-depth understanding of the structural arrangement for elite sport policy that follows. The second part of both chapters will examine the way the ‘cost of excellence’ is embraced by demonstrating the trend in financial budgets to support elite athletes and coaches as well as the construction of specialist facilities.

The contributing elements of the research will be presented regarding the development of talent identification programmes both in the UK/England and Japan, of which policy provisions have rarely been explored. As for the UK/English case in Chapter 6, the new Long-Term Athlete Development (LTAD) model will be put into the wider context to explore why this model is emerging as the preferred generic framework to develop athletes. In this section, the nationally coordinated talent identification project (Sporting Giants) will also be examined to illustrate the intersection between a national priority of securing higher levels of performance and an ever increasing level of competitiveness in other countries. This will then be followed by domestic ideas to extend competitive opportunities through the
implementation of initiatives such as the UK School Games, which were promoted by the government. In Chapter 7, the process of talent identification in Japan will demonstrate a path different from that of the UK. It will present the domestic institutional values and norms that could conflict with the ideas promoted in 'elitist' talent identification models. These features are subsequently also identified in the management of domestic competitions. The detailed account of specialist elite sport support provision will then be provided in relation to the areas of coach development, sports science and medical support and the support of (post-) competition careers of high-performance athletes. These provisions correspond, in Japan, to a growing acceptance of the idea of 'holistic' support. As noted in the previous section, in order to organise the material and highlight the features of 'convergence' in elite sport support structures in UK/England and Japan, the framework of four variables developed by Green and Houlihan (2005) will be broadly employed in Chapters 6 and 7.

In the final chapter, Chapter 8, the empirical analyses of elite sport structure and anti-doping policy from Japan and UK/England will be brought together to map out the respective features of domestic policy-making processes in order to highlight the orientations of national policies and the way the selected cases are developed. Following a summary of each case, these empirical findings will be put into the theoretical framework to examine the mechanisms of external influences at the domestic level, and to identify the possible characteristics of policy regimes in elite sport and anti-doping policies. Thirdly, in light of the three considerations made in this opening chapter, the implications for the contributions of the thesis to the theoretical development and the possible areas for future research will be presented. In this respect, we will discuss the utility of the theoretical concepts and empirical findings in filling some of the gaps in research identified in this chapter. Some methodological issues will also be presented, particularly in relation to the methods adopted to the study. Throughout these discussions, we explore the utility of the research strategies and also whether the policy document analysis and semi-structured interview were appropriate methods to seek to answer the research questions presented in the beginning of this chapter.
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter provides an overview of three main bodies of literature and an analytical account of international relations theory, international regime theory and globalisation. The chapter is divided into three main sections. While it is beyond the scope of the objective here to undertake a very detailed review of the diverse theoretical perspectives and debates in international relations, the first section reviews three selected schools of thought in international relations theory which are essential for our understanding of the more detailed discussions of international regime theory which follows. The two most influential competing schools of thought within international relations – (neo-)realism and neoliberalism – will be examined followed by constructivism whose recent influence on the discipline of international relations, focusing on the political identity and national interests within international systems, cannot be dismissed. Secondly, the theoretical approach to international regimes will be discussed. Regime theory has been developed both from complex interdependencies and from international institutions developed by neoliberal accounts. It may be appropriate here to stress what Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger emphasise the significance of international regimes as follows: "the study of international regimes (or, more broadly, the study of international institutions) has matured and become a firmly established sub-field of International Relations" (2000: 4-5). Considering the emergence and development of international regimes as global phenomena, three main globalisation perspectives, namely, hyperglobalist, sceptical and transformationalist, will be examined in the third section of this chapter. It is worth stating at this stage that these three bodies of analytical literatures are intrinsically linked with each other due to their nature of interests in international relations, international systems and their influence and interactions between the domestic, regional, international, transnational and supranational levels of policy.

2.2 Overview of International Relations Theory

It is widely accepted that the origin and the development of the study of international relations lies in the aftermath of the First World War and the establishment of the League of
Nations as the forum for discussion to prevent war through which liberalism became the new doctrine among the European states (Burchill, 2001a; Hollis & Smith, 1990). It is claimed that E.H. Carr's classic work on *The Twenty Years Crisis* (2001, originally published in 1939) was critical of the European 'liberal-utopianism' which was contrasted with his 'realist' argument. Carr identified the discrepancies between the existence of 'haves' who have overseas colonies that could be materialistically and physically exploited and where a colonial rule of law could be enforced, and 'have-nots' who, obviously, do not have those resources and power. It was argued that the liberal idea of collective security failed and led to the catastrophe of the Second World War. In the aftermath of the Second World War, driven by the search for the causes of the two world wars, as opposed to the early liberal thought of 'the world as they wish to be' or 'ought to be', realists analysed the way 'the world really is' (Dunne, 2001: 169; see also Brown, 2001; Burchill, 2001a, 2001b; Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). It is argued that realism emerged as the dominant theory of international relations in the post WWII period and has largely remained so (Buzan, 1996).

However, it should be noted that the realist perspective has come under strong challenge from those who have drawn attention to the increased significance of international and transnational actors and phenomena other than relations between nation-states (Brown, 2001). Over the complex dynamism of international relations, according to Burchill, a relatively 'new' discipline of International Relations has been developed from the question of 'why is there no body of international theory' posed by Martin Wight in 1966 comprising "a range of alternative, overlapping and competing theories of world politics" which is less "politicised" than is currently the case within the discipline (Burchill, 2001a: 7-8, 12). A further challenge to the dominance of the realist paradigm came in the 1990s with the shift towards 'neo-utilitarianism' or more generally recognised as 'social constructivism' or 'constructivism' which has produced a rigorous analytical approach to international relations theorising (Ruggie, 1998b). Nevertheless, as Nicholson (1998a) claims, there is no agreement in international relations theory but various sets of conceptual tools do exist in order to make sense of international systems and international relations. Although a summary of the extensive bodies of literature in international relations would be beyond the scope of this section, three dominant theoretical perspectives (realism, neoliberalism and constructivism) will be examined in detail for explanations of different aspects of international relations.

2.2.1 Realism
As with other paradigms of international relations, it is far from easy to articulate and define realism in a single way, but it can be noted that realism "can fairly be called the dominant theory in the history of International Relations" (original emphasis, Hollis & Smith, 1990: 27). Represented by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, realists were the first to "offer a comprehensive account of the international system in practice" intending to develop generalisations about "patterns of behaviour in international relations, and to emphasise recurring phenomena rather than unique events" (Burchill, 2001c: 83-4). What is significant about realism is the primacy it given to states and the power politics among states for understanding anarchic international systems where insecurity, competition and conflict are the central issues. In this regard, it is seen that realism "is a pessimistic theoretical tradition" (ibid, 70). As later illustrated as neo-realism, although the core elements of realism remain intact leading it to its 'longevity', modifications, clarifications, additions and methodological advances have taken place within the perspective (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999: 82-88).

Katzenstein et al (1998) identified four main analytical elements of realism: i) states are the key actors in international politics; ii) states act on the basis of self-interest and, in this respect, states are seen as homogeneous; iii) states struggle for power and rationally act to pursue and maximise national interests; and iv) the international system is seen as anarchic leaving states in the status of conflict and possibility of coercion. The pessimistic realist account of international relations can be characterised by inter-state conflicts, suspicion and competition. For this reason, the balance of power is characterised as 'billiard balls' that collide with one another where "[t]he faster and larger balls (the major power) knocks the smaller balls (the lesser powers) out of the way, although their own paths may also deflected slightly by these collisions" (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999: 72). The condition of anarchic society means a lack of central sovereign world authority to regulate the behaviour of nation-states (Brown, 2001). As such, it is contended that, although Carr and Morgenthau did not discount the nation-state as "an indefinite fixture on the international landscape" of which position distinct from neo-realism, realism assumes international politics is characterised by inherent repetition and the recurrence of these interactions and collisions, rather than the reform or structural change in international systems (Burchill, 2001c: 81).

**Neo-realism**

Although neo-realism reasserted the realist logic of power politics on the foundation of an anarchic structure, the structural account of neo-realism, represented by Kenneth Waltz, identified the organising principle of intentional relations as systemic. The bipolar world system was seen as a more stable than assumed by the realists. The four key points of neo-
realism accepted many aspects of the realist standpoint but also advanced beyond realism, which provides the reference point for critics and criticisms (Keohane, 1996; Linklater, 1995). First, the primary analytical focus of neo-realism is the ‘structure’ of the international system that analyses states as a unit. In common with realists the international operative system is seen as anarchic, rather than possessing a hierarchy of organising principles found in most domestic political systems (Linklater, 1995: 244). The anarchic, or ‘self-help’, international system leaves states caught in the security dilemma, regardless of their domestic circumstances, which leads states to prioritise military security for their survival. As such, it is questioned by Waltz why the states behave in the same way despite the differences in political systems and contrasting ideologies. It is argued, as the second characteristic of neo-realism, that the structural constraints inherent in anarchy, rather than states’ internal composition, force them to be functionally alike. Identifying the international systems separately which conditions all states’ behaviour, the anarchic international realm “imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states” (Burchill, 2001c: 90). It is then assumed that the ‘regularities’ and ‘repetitions’ result in the anarchical system being reproduced and that because states are significantly concerned with their survival, all states are presumed to converge in their functions and domestic structural configurations (Hobson, 2001: 402; Linklater, 1995). The international system thus relies on the principle of ‘self-help’, which leads onto the third point.

It is acknowledged that states are obliged to protect their own interest and maintain, increase and accumulate power; “Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order” (Waltz, 1979: 111). Thus, states are seen as self-interested ‘rational egoists’ who are more concerned about their self-preservation and military power rather than, for example, expansion of the global economy (Burchill, 2001b: 95-7). In other words, in realist terms, interstate cooperation is seen as pessimistic insofar as each state seeks relative gains and is tentative towards others who it is thought may cheat and make greater gains from any cooperation. This explains the preoccupation of nation-states with power and security leaving the potential for conflict and competition. Within these organising principles of international relations, lastly, the bipolar system was seen as maintaining the stable balance of power more effectively than a multi-polar system. Whereas the multi-polar world is more confusing and allows the miscalculation of military power and the militaries of other countries, both super-powers were unlikely to defect and were more likely to seek the preservation of the central strategic balance (Linklater, 1995: 246-7). Waltz noted that superpowers “can be expected to act to maintain the system”, thereby conflicts between them were more avoidable (1979: 204).
International Political Economy

As a sub-field of study International Political Economy (IPE) was developed in the face of the increasingly interdependent nature of economic and political change and the rising importance of non-state actors in the 1970s. Robert Gilpin (1987) is one of the eminent scholars who responded to the neoliberal's challenge to analyse the transnational relations within the context of interstate politics and the regulation of the flow of international economy. Strange (1995) claims that the emergence of IPE coincided with the response to 'economic events' rather than 'ideas', while Krasner argues that the increased attention to issues of the political determinants of international economic relations was reinforced by the absence of academic analysis of "increasingly troublesome global economic developments" (1996: 109).

Gilpin and other IPE scholars within the realist perspectives identify 'structural power' which refers to the capacity to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy. It is argued that the distribution of power and hegemonic power in particular are residual within international economic exchanges where hegemons, not necessarily states, could dominate politics, economics and knowledge in a specific area.

Gilpin (1987) provided empirical research that suggested that the United States had created a substantive political framework with Europe and Japan within the economic realm. Consistent with realist premises, Gilpin argued that the possibility of international economic cooperation and global political stability can only be achieved when there is a single dominant power in international systems. It is conceived that hegemonic stability, then, can be achieved through the influence of a dominant power in order to deal with such issues as the exchange of money, trade, finance, health and communications (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999: 78-9). By applying his analysis to multinational corporations and trade, Gilpin analysed the distribution of power by the hegemon as the maximisation of self-interest through international economic behaviour designed to bring stability. As such, although there is a contribution to marrying the analysis of international politics to economics in the face of the influence of multinational corporations and transitional relations, it is noted as inevitable and customary that governments interfere with economic affairs and, according to Kazenstein et al (1998: 16-7), the issue of the role of states and market in the international political economy is enhanced by Gilpin's conceptualisation. What should be emphasised in relation to the primary concern of this study is that the analytical framework of IPE stimulated the academic discussion of international regimes and the conceptualisation of the potential influence of international institutions on the behaviour of nation-states (see Section 2.3).
2.2.2 A critique of realism and neo-realism

Keohane acknowledged that the key differences between realism and neo-realism were that the latter has a much narrower focus on the distribution of power and security which determines outcomes than classical realism (Keohane, 1993b: 271). Nonetheless, the core elements of the realist analysis are the focus on states (as the dominant actors) whose motive is to seek security and the assumption of the absence of overriding world government or an international order in the anarchic condition of international politics (Nicholson, 1998b). This general realist theorisation of international relations has, however, been affected by the rapid development of macro-level economic interdependencies, globalisation and implications of the demise of the Soviet Union. Due to its (over-)emphasis on the behaviour of states and structural continuity and repetition, realism could not explain the changing nature of international relations, world political economy and, in particular, the influence of international institutions on domestic political structures. Although the neoliberal critique triggered a reaction by neo-realists to re-analyse governance and the bipolarity elements in international politics and transnational economic actors, Sørensen claimed a 'poverty of imagination' in realism that "any thinking about alternative futures remains stuck in a forced choice between sovereign statehood and anarchy or the (unlikely) abolition of sovereign statehood and the creation of some world government" (1998: 86).

Furthermore, importantly, realism always downplays the significance of a transnational relationship and a normatively regulated international system because it principally focuses on the strategic behaviour of nation-states and is dubious regarding the ability of international institutions to help states cooperate (Keohane, 1993b). The neoliberal critique is largely based on the limitations of realism as an explanatory theory especially in relation to international regime change. Neoliberalism acknowledges the significance of inter-state relationships, the complex of interdependent relations among the various state and non-state actors and the multiple issues dealt with by international institutions. As regards the understanding of cultural change and the meaning and significance of sovereignty of nation-states, the realist approach was criticised as positivistic, ahistorical and foundational in terms of epistemology and an approach which sought to establish universal truth and underestimated the capacity of states to transform the international system (Sørensen, 1998, Smith, 1996). The post-realists also argued that neo-realism failed to consider not only the changing nature of state structures, but also the potential or desirable reformation and reconstruction of any international community where some interests are systematically excluded (Linklater, 1995: 254-8).
Despite these criticisms, Keohane acknowledged that the contribution of realism is its analysis of world politics and state action through its insights into power, interests and rationality (1999: 154). With specific reference to neo-realism, Linklater recognised that it has helped to give "greater sophistication to a field" surpassing realism in terms of its account of persistent systemic constraints of international politics under bipolarity which states' behaviours become similar (1995: 258; Burchill, 2001c: 89-92). It can be noted that the major contribution of realism and neo-realism is their emphasis on the anarchic society and hierarchical concerns of states, that is, their security concern and fears, and the consequent analysis of the concept of the balance of power. It is vital to acknowledge that the critique of the realist account of states and their power and interests does not diminish its significance in the analysis of world politics insofar as states are still dominant actors in international systems who retain coercive power over most international and global issues, despite the existence of significant non-state actors.

2.2.3 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism developed as a consequence of the strong realist critique in the post-1945 theoretical approach of International Relations and it challenged the conventional assumption and orthodoxy of realism due to the rapid socio-economic changes during the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly when Western Europe went through the process of regional economic integration, the neoliberal analysis of international interdependence, cooperation and integration was enhanced. As stated before, neoliberals look beyond the traditional boundaries of states and their competitive interactions to explore the complex process of international politics that is now increasingly 'domesticated'.

As Little (1996) implies neoliberalism can be better understood in relation to its interaction with realism where the pluralist account provided by liberal analysts paints the following distinctive picture of international relations in contrast to the state-centric and power-politics approach based on the pessimistic model of realism: i) identifying non-state actors, including international organisations, multinational corporations and civil groups, such as those concerned with human rights, as the important entities in world politics; ii) states are thus not unitary actors but composed of individuals, interest groups and bureaucrats; iii) states are no longer recognised as 'rational' as realists assume; and iv) acknowledging an extensive agenda in international politics which extends beyond 'high politics', such as military, security
and coercion, to include 'low politics', such as economics, welfare and social affairs (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999: 200; Keohane & Nye, 1977: 23). Grieco argues that although there are differences between the competing paradigms, one of the most distinct features of neoliberalism, or sometimes interchangeably referred to as the 'new liberal institutionalism', is its acceptance of a number of core realist notions of states and liberalists' account of cooperation (1993a: 117).

**Complex interdependence and absolute gain**

The work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1972; 2000) is seen as the outstanding contribution to the development of neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism. They laid out their analysis of the impact of changing economic and technological forces on politics in the 1970s and analysed the 'internationalisation' of the economy. Keohane and Nye first identified the growth of transnational relations among the Western states (including Japan) and examined not only the interdependencies between states, but also the transnational transactions and interactions among various business corporations. The state-centric paradigm of 'inter-state' interactions along with the conventional diplomatic activities was distinguished from 'transnational' interactions that would involve both governmental and non-governmental actors – individuals or organisations. Keohane and Nye then acknowledged the increasing impact of international institutions on world politics and the visibility of "transnational relations" – contracts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by central foreign policy organs of governments" (1972: xi). It was perceived that there were multiple interdependencies in world politics in which states are bound together in a complex web of overlapping interactions (Keohane & Nye, 2000; Keohane, 1989). Neoliberals, in the early days, questioned the realist notion of states as 'autonomous units' and were drawn to the notion of 'complex interdependence' which embraced two main features in international systems, namely, "the growing relevance of the global 'commons' and the rapidly increasing interconnectedness between states" (Little, 1996: 76; see also Jackson & Sørensen, 2007; Keohane & Nye, 2000). According to the pluralist account of neoliberalism, a growing web of interdependencies and a range of collective goods identified in 'global commons', such as environment protection, cannot be fully explained by the realists. As such, it can be characterised that the neoliberal institutionalist analysis contributes to the marginalisation of states in international relations and to enhancing the significance of international regimes and institutions.

However, as represented in the work After Hegemony by Keohane (2005; originally published in 1984), neoliberalism is further developed as institutionalist theory in order to
stress ‘conditionality’ which assumes states as the crucial actors but at the same time recognises multi-centric actors of international institutions helping to advance cooperation between states within an anarchic arena. On this account, Keohane states that institutional thinking “borrowed as much from realism as from liberalism” (1993b: 272; see also Keohane, 2005; see also Crawford, 1996: 72). As with the realist assumptions, states are conceived as ‘rational egoists’ but it is conceived that they would seek their ‘self-interest’ through cooperation within international institutions or through forming international regimes. As opposed to the realist account of power which privileges military capabilities, it is suggested that Keohane and Nye intend to develop different forms of “effective cooperation of power” (Little, 1996: 81), which enables states to pursue their interests through cooperation within the rules of international institutions.

The important element to emphasise as the point of critical disagreement between neoliberalism and neo-realism can be found in the way states conceive their interests and the way they seek gain from cooperation (Burchill, 2001b). As discussed, neoliberals claim that anarchy “remains a constant” (Axelrod & Keohane, 1993: 86) thus embracing the realist view insofar as international systems lack a common government which enforces rules in world politics (Keohane, 2005; 1993b). However, it is also argued that “where common interests exist, realism is too pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation and the role of institutions” (original emphasis, Keohane, 1993b: 277). Keohane claims that realists should have anticipated the decline or collapse of international institutions after the Cold War and the subsequent demise of a bipolar system. On the contrary, it is argued that there has been an increase in the number of and complexities in international organisations and regulations where an absence of common government would not necessarily prevent cooperation (ibid, 285-7). It is thus stressed that when common interests exist, states’ self-interest brings them together and establishes the international institutions through which leaders intend to “maximize subjective expected utility” and “facilitate self-interested cooperation by reducing uncertainty, thus stabilizing expectations” (original emphasis, ibid, 288; Keohane, 1989: 3).

However, the above assumption of neoliberalism was criticised by realists. Grieco, for instance, argued that it fails to capture “a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy” and that realists rigorously acknowledge the inherent problems of international cooperation (Grieco, 1993a: 117). Realists claim that while states focus on both their absolute and relative gains from cooperation, their concerns persist about the fear of ‘cheating’ in order to gain advantage, despite having international agreements. It is further argued that a consequence of the threat
of armed conflict results in states being more concerned with relative gains (who will gain more?) than absolute gains (what will gain me the most?) (ibid, 118; Burchill, 2001b).

In contrast, neoliberals argue that relative gains are 'highly conditional' and that empirical evidence of motivations for relative gains is difficult to provide because of the tendency for the realist argument to be based on the 'probability' of states' behaviour (Little, 1996). It is further argued by neoliberal institutionalists that the fear of being cheated, or of disproportionate gains due to the existence of uneven distribution and density of information, can be reduced by non-state institutions. It is noted that states construct international institutions, or international regimes, in order to overcome these obstructions to cooperation. In this regard, a commonly cited example is the European Union, a highly institutionalised organisation, Keohane also suggests that aspirations for greater international cooperation can be adaptable within existing regimes and it is possible to facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation rather than creating a brand new framework independent of a hegemonic state (Keohane, 2005: 219). The willingness of states to cooperate seems to be related to the volume and type of information available, although this remained an empirical question in relation to specific issues. However, Little notes that uncertainty is reduced in 'information-rich' environments of international institutions and states become more willing to cooperate, which subsequently leads to the formation of regimes (1996: 82). In the same regard, Hobson is hopeful of the way states play the role in enhancing the density of information and claims that states "can learn to trust each other and shift from behaviour that is dominated by short-term relative gains preferences (that is, defection) to cooperative behaviour that is based on maximizing long-term absolute gains", and thus, states "voluntarily set up international institutions" (Hobson, 2001: 406). Avoiding the risk of overstating the autonomy of institutions in relation to states, Hobson concludes that "[r]egimes do not limit state behaviour per se; they merely limit sub-optimal short-term defection, thereby enabling states to enhance their long-run gains" and that the establishment of regimes can be understood in relation to power interests of states (original emphasis, ibid: 407). As such, the scepticism of neo-realists notwithstanding, neoliberals argue that cooperation can maximise the long-term interests of states within a new world order based on the rules of law and open diplomacy and by the establishment of international institutions or regimes.

**Neoliberalism and the end of Cold War**

The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism seems to have boosted the relevance of the liberal account of international relations. Such prominent authors as Francis Fukuyama (1992) have described the 'triumph' of liberal democracy and Western capitalism after the
end of the ideological struggle and conflicts. Fukuyama was sufficiently optimistic to argue that we are witnessing the 'universalisation' of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government identifying it as the spread of legitimate domestic political order which would "eventually bring an end to international conflict" (Burchill, 2001b: 31). Since liberal democracy has been proclaimed as a 'triumph', the liberal-democratic principle itself has been questioned on the grounds of whether it is a Western principle and whether it brings peace (Huntington, 1993).

Attention has been subsequently drawn towards emergent global issues, such as environmental protection and human rights, which have shaped new international institutions and new theoretical explanations of international relations. It is suggested by institutionalists that "the increased economic and ecological interdependence as secular trends" would lead to an increase in the "number and complexity of international institutions, and in the scope of their regulations" (Keohane, 1993b: 284-5). It has been suggested that the end of the Cold War, to some extent, undermined both neo-realist and neoliberal perspectives of international relations due to their inability to explain the transformation of global order or, more generally, systemic change and, as a result, this has created the opportunities to explore critical and alternative positions for analysing the dynamics of global politics (Reus-Smit, 2001: 216; Wendt, 1999: 4). In this regard, critical theories or post-positivism, including constructivism, have challenged the 'mainstream' approach of international relations taking different ontological approaches to comprehend social identities and values of individual states.

2.2.4 Constructivism

The constructivist perspective has been articulated as a critical international relations theory whose primary contribution is that "the social, historical, and normative have returned to the centre stage of debate" (Reus-Smit, 2001: 225). However, it is argued by Ruggie that "international relations constructivists have not as yet managed to formulate a fully fledged theory of their own" and that constructivism "remains more of a philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations" (1998b: 856). Nevertheless, developed as an alternative approach to the limitations of conventional theories through "discussion and research within the discipline rather than external influences" (Burchill, 2001a: 25), constructivism rests on an ideational view to generate insights into international relations from a sociological perspective, concerned with
the fundamental assumption of social inquiry (Wendt, 1999: 5). Wendt critically commented that constructivism moved beyond the agreed similarities between neo-realism and neoliberalism which identify states as atomic and which consider identity and interests as well as changes of behaviour and self-interest as 'exogenously given' (Wendt, 1992: 391; see also Wendt, 1999). In contrast to constructivism, neo-realism and neoliberalism are based on the "choice-theoretic assumptions of micro-economic theory" and, in particular, neo-realism is 'materialist' insofar as it is interested in explaining the distribution and balance of power, such as military capability, as well as behaviour of states (Reus-Smit, 2001: 213). Within the constructivist paradigm, society is seen as a "constitutive realm, the site that generates actors as knowledgeable social and political agents, the realm that makes them who they are" (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003: 109-111; see also Wendt, 1992; 1999). As such, it is suggested that rather relying on 'common sense' or the conventional (neo-realist) wisdom in international relations, constructivism aims to "understand the full array of roles that ideas play in world politics" (Ruggie, 1998b: 867) and to theorise state identities and interests which "through an act of interrelation 'constructs' the 'meaning' in its action" (Palan, 2000: 577, 582-3; see also Weber, 2001). In this regard, it is significant to note that constructivism takes an 'empirical approach' which focuses on 'intersubjective' ideas, thoughts or beliefs that define international relations (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003; 2007).

Constructivism identifies social interactions as consequences of identity formation or learnt through "communication, reflection on experience, and role enactment" (Reus-Smit, 2001: 219). Of particular interest is to analyse not only the effect of political and social practices and actions, but also how interests and identities of individuals or states are formed at domestic and international levels. For this, social interactions are seen as notable elements in the development of the 'social structure of international relations' where, as Clunan argues, social institutions, norms, values, rules and ideas constitute international life (2000: 90-3). The joint primary concerns of constructivism are with both levels of individual state and international policy. The former explores the identities and interests of states and how they have been constructed through social interactions and international necessities (Haas, 1997) whereas the latter examines the externally defined state as a collective identity or behaviour with particular reference to the status or role of international society as the key decision maker (Wendt, 1992; 1999).

State identities and institutions

Alexander Wendt claimed that self-help and power politics are neither structural nor essential features of anarchy and that international anarchy is the outcome of state practice, ideas and
interactions through their relationship with other actors (1992: 394-9; 1999: 92-3). Wendt, the prominent constructivist theorist, argued that “first, states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; second, the key structures in the state system are inter-subjective rather than material; and third, state identities and interests are an important part of these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics” (1994, 385). Where ‘relational’ interactions between states exist, it is emphasised that anarchy plays ‘only a permissive role’, namely, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992: 395-402).

Whereas a game-theoretic analysis of cooperation which focuses on regulations and rules of state behaviour is adopted in neo-realism and neoliberalism, a constructivist account instead examines the way expectations towards cooperation and principled beliefs influence identities and interests and how actors acquire identities through participating in collective meaning in order to define their structures. Focusing on processual and relational elements for the construction of identities and interests, it is argued that identities are the basis of interests and that an institution is a ‘structure’ of identities and interests (Wendt, 1994, 1992). It is understood that institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities into which actors are socialised and participate in collective knowledge and thus ‘institutionalisation’ is one of the processes of internalising new identities and interests (Wendt, 1992: 399). In this regard, it is the “distribution of knowledge” that determines the way states relate and act towards each other (Wendt, 1999: 140). According to Wendt, the possibility of social processes and social interactions influences the constitution of social institutions and brings constructional effects to bear on identities and interests through ‘complex’ learning (ibid, 327).

The work developed by Wendt is recognised as helping to “problematize the concepts of power and interest as it is used in IR” (Palan, 2000: 589). However, one problem with the constructivist perspective is a lack of clear definition such that it is seen as just a ‘label’ which emphasises the structure-agency debate within the paradigm because structure is acknowledged as the product of human agency and behaviour (Smith, 2001b). Closely associated with the concept of structuration developed by Giddens, constructivism identifies the relational nature of structures and agency or actors (including international organisations) for understanding the anarchy in which social identities of states are (re)formed by the normative and ideational structure of international society. Reus-Smit (2001) argues, however, that it is extremely difficult to identify and explain when the nature of international society or state identity have been fundamentally changed. In relation to issues of change and transformation, Wendt argues that neo-realism makes too light of its analysis of change explaining “the same damned things over and over again”, namely, anarchy, while
constructivists take the issue of change seriously and discuss it in relation to social interactions (Wendt, 1999: 17).

Yet Wendt’s conceptualisation of state’s collective identity formation is criticised for its over-emphasis on external influence and lack of analysis of domestic interactions between state leaders and the public and, as a consequence, the divisions between international and national societies. In response to these weaknesses, Clunan suggests that it is necessary for constructivists to unify the interrelated elements of internal (domestic) and external (international) social relations for their studies in identity formation, otherwise the division would prevent the development of a coherent research agenda for world politics (2000: 100-2). A much stronger emphasis on the domestic environment and its relationship to the transformation of identity and institutional practices can be found in the work of authors such as Katzenstein (1996) and is relevant to this study. He focuses the analysis on how domestic norms and identity shape and define the behaviour of states in international systems as well as how their interests and policy are influenced by international norms. Peter Haas (1993; 1999) introduced the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ in order to seek explanations of the impact of nationally, internationally and transnationally shared ideas and principles held by such communities on domestic policy as well as on the development of international institutions or regimes.

The contribution of constructivism is highlighted as followings: “how international norms evolve, how ideas and values come to shape political action, how argument and discourse conditions outcomes, and how identity constitutes agents and agency, all in ways that contradict the expectations of materialist and rationalist theories” (Reus-Smit, 2001: 227). The key strengths of constructivism are that it focuses attention on both institutional and regime change and the change of identities and interests of actors, exogenous to them. In rejection of the ‘logic’ of anarchy and in its emphasis on intersubjectivity, constructivism offers an explanation for the process of defining, redefining and refining of identity, ideas, values and interests of actors, be they individuals or states, which shape political behaviour and actions (Ruggie, 1975).

The significance of these accounts of relationally constructed identities should be recognised in connection with the examination of international regime formation — when and how regimes can be formed — as well as in connection with the role of states with mutual interests in international society (see Section 2.3.2). It is argued that liberal institutionalism cannot comprehend fully why states cooperate and subject their responsibilities to international norms and regulation and seek to govern arrangements internationally (Burchill, 2001b: 64-5).
Grounded upon the broad discussions of international relations theory, the next section specifically highlights the way the three main schools of thought developed the understanding of international regime formations, followed by an outline and discussion of the characteristics of regimes.

2.3 International Policy Regimes

International regime theory and the broader examination of international institutions have become more established sub-field of international relations in recent years (Hasenclever et al., 2000; Keohane, 2005, 1993a; Krasner, 1983a, 1983b; Levy et al., 1995; Rittberger, 1993). Crawford acknowledges the increasing significance of the theory of international regimes in the study of international relations as follows:

The issue is especially compelling when regimes are considered in light of the traditional realist-idealist axis of debate in international relations theory. This is because regime theory, in its dominant mode, is not constructed simply as a new area of debate between realists and idealists, but as a promising vehicle for reconciling these age-old differences. Thus, rather than merely re-directing attention to international institutions, and the manner in which norms and rules influence relations between states, regime theory also attempts to reconceptualize international relations theory *per se* (original emphasis, Crawford, 1996: 33).

As such, with its roots in the 1970s embarking on the research on the influence of international institutions (Keohane, 2005; Keohane & Nye, 1977), it is possible to state that this theory has maintained the potential to reorient broader international relations theory. It has been argued in the previous section that neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalists in particular have examined how and why cooperation between states, as well as the formation of international regime, are possible when states claim sovereignty and compete for power under a situation of anarchy (Keohane, 2005, 1993a; Hurrell, 1993). Little (2001) suggests that the theory of international regimes provide an understanding of the way international regimes would prevail, whether they are highly regulated with substantial organisations or not. For Mayer, Rittberger and Zürn, the significance of the theory is "to explain the possibility, conditions, and consequences of international governance beyond anarchy and short of supranational government in a given issue area" (1993: 392-3).
This section firstly provides definitions of international regimes and some conceptual clarifications followed by what Mayer, Rittberger and Zurn (1993) call as 'three main tasks of research on international regimes', which are to: i) explain regime formation, persistence, and demise: ii) explain regime characteristics and properties; and iii) determine regime consequences and effects. For the purpose of this study, the third element is particularly important, although Mayer et al argue that conceptualisation of the effects of international regimes remains underdeveloped (ibid, 392).

2.3.1 Defining international regimes

Theorists suggest that established and formal organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union are not the only forms of international collaboration. Non-state actors actively involved in telecommunications, monetary, trade, environment, human rights, international sporting competitions and global efforts on eradicating doping from sport also collaborate in terms of international regulations and rules (Haggard & Simmons, 1987; Houlihan, 1994b; Young & Osherenko, 1993). As previously noted, it was initially demonstrated by Keohane and Nye that states build cooperation for promoting mutually beneficial agreement and regimes are defined as "sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence" and "devices for enhancing the utility of actors" (1977: 19).

Although various authors have contributed to the conceptualisation of international regimes, Stephen Krasner provides the most widely accepted definition as follows:

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice (Krasner, 1983a: 2).

As such, regimes are complex social institutions and social structures, the operations of which fulfil certain functions and an accepted set of activities, and they may not necessarily be accompanied by explicit organisational arrangements but may be operative by cutting
across jurisdictions of nation-states (Young, 1983). Clarifying the analytical components, Krasner (1983a) follows on to state that changes in principles and norms are the changes of the regime itself and changes in rules and decision-making procedures are the changes within regimes and that regimes are weakened when their components become incoherent between regime and related behaviour. The persistence and change in regimes will be returned to later in this section.

There are other similar concepts to international regimes which use different terminologies such as 'global governance'. As briefly quoted earlier, Mayer, Rittberger and Zürn elaborate Krasner's definition by stressing the aspects of 'governance without government' which is effectively based on "non-hierarchical normative institutions involving a stabilized pattern of behaviour of a given number of actors in recurring situations" (1993: 393). They argue that when states and non-state actors perceive their obligations and feel compelled to accept a set of rules and underlying norms, their behaviour, expectations and activities are shaped to comply with rules. Mayer et al then specifically conceive that regime analysis involves a focus on "voluntarily agreed-upon, issue-area specific normative institutions created by states and other international actors" (original emphasis, ibid). The similarities in definitions between Krasner and Mayer et al are clear and both are equally valuable, though the latter may involve a slight danger in over-emphasising the extent to which the phenomena move 'beyond the nation-states'. Neoliberals stress the necessity of overcoming state-centric notions of realism focusing on norm- and rule-setting and acknowledging that "voluntary self-organization seems to be pervasive in a world of increased complexity, including the national and sub-national level" (Mayer et al, 1993: 398). Identifying the 'peculiarity' of the complex nature of international relations where various kinds of principles and partial orders coexist, Mayer et al assume that states are not the prerequisite central authority and discard the competitive image of international politics.

Haufler (1993) also emphasises the possibility of states having a more marginal role in some regimes with a more central role for private sector/non-state sectors which can contribute to developing, implementing and maintaining international regimes. Nonetheless, she argues that a private regime institutionalised with private actors aiming to implement norms and rules would face rejection from states with their legitimate force. Haufler then acknowledges that non-state actors could be 'used' by states for policy implementation but that non-state actors, at the same time, could have a large impact on aspects of global politics because they can 'use' states to develop and implement their aims and policies (1993: 94-111). The point highlighted by Haufler is quite significant in relation to the objectives of this study. To be more specific, the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as a hybrid global
institution and the subsequent adoption of the principle of a global anti-doping policy as embodied in the World Anti-Doping Code (WAD Code) have required both government and non-government support. This level of cooperation becomes clearer when the WAD Code, as the internationally-agreed 'private' rule, was complemented by preparation and adoption of UNESCO's International Convention against Doping in Sport. The latter was necessary in order to ensure endorsement of the WAD Code by governments at the national level (further discussion in a later section). What is at stake here is that the idea of 'governance without government' forwarded by Mayer et al (1993) seems to downplay the sustained roles that states play. It is important to take account of the possibility that states struggle in the role that they play in international politics and in the establishment, development and revision of international policy regimes as well as in their role in the effective monitoring and implementation of regime rules and norms at the domestic level.

Before examining further the theory of international regimes, it may be useful to examine some similar concepts, especially 'international cooperation', 'international organisations' and 'international institutions', for the sake of clarification. Haggard and Simmons identify regimes in general terms as "examples of cooperative behaviour, and [which] facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can take place in the absence of established regimes" (original emphasis, 1987: 495). For Keohane, international cooperation and agreements can be examined through international regime-formation that would emerge when states affirmatively recognise a set of formal agreements and rules which have been considered by more than one state and retain continuing validity (1993a: 28). In this sense, it can be recognised that the real effectiveness of regimes is to facilitate mutually beneficial agreements among governments. Despite the conceptual overlaps, regimes are distinct from 'cooperation' insofar as the former embody a coordinated and comprehensive agreed set of rules and principles for a specific issue area as a way of achieving international cooperation.

It is important to reflect on the above definitions of international regimes in order to differentiate them from international organisations and international institutions. One useful way of describing the differences is that international regimes are a 'subset' of international institutions and international organisations. Keohane identifies international institutions that "include formal intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international regimes, and conventions" (1993a: 28-9). Although both international organisations and regimes are seen as institutions, the latter broadly embody a set of issue-area specific norms and rules, but are not necessarily attached to 'purposive entities' such as organisations (Mayer et al, 1993: FN6). The same argument comes from Crawford (1996) who argues that the concept of international regime allows a visualisation and interpretation of institutional dynamics which
can be broader than the physically grounded international organisations, and thus, have
greater potential to respond to or challenge the growing number of global problems by
establishing supra-national institutional cooperation and coordination. Embracing more
complexities, Hasenclever et al suggest that the formation of transnational regimes could
take place as a result of the actions of non-state private actors who create and maintain rule-
based normative institutions or cooperation around the transboundary issues of insurance,
banking or shipping (2000:5). Although the theory of international regime and their empirical
study can help us understand the 'institutionalisation' of international or global issues by
regularising expectations or interests and serve as institutional frameworks to facilitate
agreed-upon rules and norms (Haggard & Simmons, 1987: 496), it should also be
acknowledged that there are methodological difficulties in explaining when and how
international regimes emerge and change.

2.3.2 The development and effectiveness of international regimes

It is plausible to suggest that even though there is a consensus and/or convergence of
expectations among actors, the formation of a regime would not be automatic but has to be
deliberately constructed by participants that have global, international or regional capacity.
This section is drawn from the accounts of the circumstances and processes of regime
formation, transformation and decline as well as analyses of the reasons for effectiveness
and persistence of regimes. The explanations of regime development and change are
fourfold: structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive\(^2\) (Haggard & Simmons, 1987). It
can be recalled that these explanations reflect different paradigms or theoretical traditions of
international relations which have been discussed in the previous section. This section
examines exogenous and endogenous 'variables' to provide an account of international
regime formation for which Table 2.1 is useful as a means of identifying the possibility and
process of regime formation (Krasner, 1983a; Mayer et al, 1993). It should be noted that
these variables would be manifest from the behaviour of individuals, particularly government
officials or bureaucrats, as well as states, international organisations and epistemic
communities.

\(^2\) Gale introduced international regime concept from neo-Gramscian perspective in order to identify "class-based, inequitable
and environmentally destructive nature of current international institutionalization project" (1998: 276). In more specific, neo-
Gramscian approach examines the way global capitalism, which is expressed by the World Bank and IMF, is reflected in the
formation of international regimes and the way certain interests, particularly of international and national capital, prioritised over
the interests of, for example, women or workers within the regime.
Table 2.1: Schools of thought regarding the formation of international regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th><strong>Cognitivism</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central variable</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metatheoretical</td>
<td>Rationalist</td>
<td>Rationalist</td>
<td>Sociological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural model</td>
<td>Relative gain seeker</td>
<td>Absolute gain maximiser</td>
<td>Role player</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Institutionalism</em></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors affecting</td>
<td>Availability of regime</td>
<td>Issue-density; situation-</td>
<td>Regime mechanisms and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>likelihood of creating</td>
<td>formula securing balanced</td>
<td>structure</td>
<td>patterns of human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regimes</td>
<td>gains; power structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>behaviour, values,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>under anarchy; hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td>beliefs and ideas of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td>likelihood of creating</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>power structure under</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>anarchy; hegemonic</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime features</td>
<td>Balanced gains: mechanisms</td>
<td>'Contract' with compliance</td>
<td>Intentional and negotiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>making gains more</td>
<td>mechanisms or 'convention'</td>
<td>but routine and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'equitable'; imposed</td>
<td></td>
<td>intersubjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regime with skewed</td>
<td></td>
<td>processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>distribution of gains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall likelihood of</td>
<td>Low; very low (in zero-sum</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High – low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime-building and</td>
<td>situations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stability</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Hasenclever et al (2000: 11; 16)  
**Institutionalism** is measured by the causal significance that attributes to international regime.  
**Hasenclever et al use the term 'cognitivism' largely in the same way as 'constructivism', although they separate 'strong' and 'weak' cognitivism, the former of which can be referred to constructivism.

First ‘structural explanations’ rest on the realist argument of the ‘power-based’ approach, which is divided between the objectives of promoting joint utility or common good and enhancing the utility of particular actors, that is, ‘maximising individual payoffs’. Related to the second notion, realism suggests, in line with hegemonic stability theory, that the existence of a dominant power allows for the establishment of regimes and the facilitation of cooperation for the purpose of advancing their own national values (Keohane, 2005). For realists, the general perspective is that the decline of hegemonic leadership and its capabilities in the distribution of power would lead to either the demise of agreed principles and norms or regime transformation. It is argued that if regime formation contradicts the ‘logic of anarchy’, and that such regimes become only ‘symbolic’, or so-called ‘paper regimes’, hence realists are sceptical of regime formation and identify the effectiveness of regimes as being significantly low (Arts, 2000: 518). Nevertheless, ‘imposed regimes’ can still be relevant when the more powerful actors compel and constrain the weaker ones to act in conformity with a particular set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Young, 1983). In this case, the dominant interests prevail and some voices or interests are marginalised or ignored. The importance of power in relation to relative gain is reiterated by Krasner (1993b) who argues that the success or decline of international institutions, for
example on human rights issues, is based on the willingness of the most powerful states to participate and enforce its principles and norms.

In contrast, the neoliberals, largely drawing on game-theoretic approaches, in which the formation and facilitation of international regimes is viewed much more optimistically, argue that the primary difference in the claims between neoliberalism and neo-realism concerns the nature of interstate power. It is highlighted that the development and effectiveness of international regimes depend on the extent to which self-interested actors (normally states) perceive an absolute gain through cooperation and the establishing of a network which will reduce the fear of others’ defection by increasing mutual transparency of behaviour. Gale (1998) and Keohane (1983) similarly suggest an ‘information rich’ situation and a facilitative role for international regimes. It is claimed that the degree of communication, transmission of information and facilitation of knowledge assists interstate negotiations, by adjusting policy for cooperation and reaching agreement which gives states or non-state actors a sense of obligation to conform to international norms which, as a consequence, aids regime formation and ensures its maintenance (see also Stein, 1983).

These processes can be related to the ‘three paths’ of international policy regime formation: i) spontaneous, in which regimes emerge from the converging expectations of many individual actions; ii) negotiated, in which regimes are formed by explicit agreements; and iii) imposed (illustrated in the power-based approach) (Young, 1983). The first two paths, according to Keohane (1983), can be achieved through reducing transaction costs and improving the quality and quantity of information available to states. It is often the case that states, which may, according to realists, lack a sense of obligation, would be more willing to preserve an existing regime because they fear the difficulties and risks in joining potential regimes because they have ‘sunk costs’ when putting an existing regime at risk (Hasenclever et al, 2000: 8; see also Keohane, 2005: 98-106). It is readily acknowledged that, on the one hand, once states or other actors enter into an international regime, the regime participants are expected to alter their calculation of interests by changing ‘incentives’ and ‘opportunities’ and, on the other hand, once regimes are established they facilitate a coordination mechanism and monitor compliance, which allow participants’ expectations to converge as well as permit dissemination and exchange of information and communication, hence contributing to the stability and persistence of the regime (Stein, 1983: 139; Keohane, 1983). However, this conceptualisation may not fully capture the capacity of regimes to be arenas for conflict, the exercise of power and the institutionalisation of inequalities (Haggard & Simmons, 1987: 509).
The constructivist or 'cognitivist' account adopts different ontological and epistemological assumptions where ideas matter in the policy process. Recalling the argument as presented by Alexander Wendt that international institutions are conceived as 'intermediate entities', which modify, constrain, condition and channel state actions, and that international policy regimes should be seen as 'intersubjective entities' in which state identities and interests are constructed by knowledgeable practice (see 2.2.4), it is stressed that anarchy itself is an institution rather than some form of 'natural' state of affairs. Arts argues that the above two rationalist approaches have failed to acknowledge the importance of knowledgeable and capable 'global non-state players' in regime formation and also the importance of the 'mutually constitutive' relationship between global players and the structural properties of international systems, including regimes and power structures (2000: 528-9; see also Haggard & Simmons, 1987). This approach then conceives regime formation and implementation as intentional and negotiated within routine and intersubjective processes. Hasenclever et al distinguish between two cognitivist approaches: weak cognitivism, concerned with the role of causal beliefs, the role of epistemic communities in policy-making processes and international policy coordination and 'mechanisms' of governmental learning; and strong cognitivism, stressing the social character of international relations focusing on actors' knowledge and ideas as well as on durable interactions of actors and international institutions and regimes (2000: 10-12). Closely linked to discussions within 'strong cognitivism', Young (1991) explores the roles of individuals exercising significant influence over processes of institutional bargaining and characterises four forms of behaviour of 'political leadership' (structural, entrepreneurial, intellectual and charismatic). Structural leadership, for example, refers to those individuals who represent states, intergovernmental organisations, or non-governmental organisations, and who are 'experts' in an issue-area seeking to translate power resources (material resources) into bargaining leverage (Young, 1991: 288-293). Echoing the realist emphasis on relative gain, it is argued that structural leadership is, in part, a matter of timing and the ability to “deploy threats or promises” and, in part, “forming effective coalitions and taking appropriate measures to prevent the emergence of blocking or counter coalitions” (ibid, 290-1). Despite subtle differences in cognitivist approaches, the principle focus here is to analyse regime dynamism (how regimes shape and constrain the conduct of actors) and patterns of human behaviour over time and across space by treating actors as 'reflective organs' (the way in which actors negotiate and shape regimes) (Haas, 1993: 170).

3 Hasenclever et al classifies 'constructivist' into 'strong' or 'maximalist' cognitivist to emphasise the social character of international relations (2000: 10).
Moreover, the concept of epistemic communities introduced by P.M. Haas (1993; 1999) should be particularly highlighted in the cognitivist strand. It is argued that these knowledge-based transnational networks of issue-experts possessing highly technical and scientific knowledge are influential in helping states identify their interests and shape their policy-making processes as well as in forming multi-lateral or bi-lateral governance structures which could systematically limit the role of states. It is noted that, in the civil society, epistemic communities can actively take part in discussions and criticisms of governmental action and inaction that would alter states' behaviour and their political agendas (Keohane et al, 1993: 20). In contrast, Young's notion of 'intellectual leadership' focuses more on individual behavioural influence. An individual is seen as a 'thinker' relying on the 'power of ideas' whose 'intellectual capital' is notable in the face of global concerns that could shape the perspectives and principles of participants in the process of institutional bargaining to reach agreement in international society (Young, 1991: 298-302). It can be summarised that the cognitivist perspective, whether strong or weak cognitivism, aims to explain the way actors in complex interdependent relations make decisions relying upon their conceptions of how to play their role in international politics and how actors change their beliefs and ideas depending on their interaction with other actors and with international systems (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999: 217).

Some authors acknowledge that identifying the most influential 'variables' in the development and effectiveness of international regimes is far from easy (see Haggard & Simmons, 1987; Mayer et al, 1993). Nonetheless, Hasenclever et al (1997, 2000) suggest that the conventionally divided accounts of realism and neoliberalism, both of which are based on the same premise of regimes responding to rational actors, should be 'synthesised' with 'weak' but not with 'strong' cognitivism due to its incompatibility in ontological and epistemological foundations. An empirical question for this study to analyse is the 'conditions' under which particular policy-relevant ideas impact on the choices of policymakers to determine their cooperative behaviour or the degree of states' compliance with the agreed rules and principles of international institutions (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Hurrell, 1993). As emphasised by Risse-Kappen (1994) it is quite significant to recognise how realist and neoliberal perspectives can be 'complemented' by analysing the interaction between international and domestic influences and the way ideas, values and/or knowledge intervene between structural conditions and actors' interests.
2.3.3 Characterising international policy regimes

As demonstrated different perspectives emphasise different variables in explaining international regime formation with the consequence that they identify different characteristics of ‘successful’ regimes. As a result, this study discusses three ways of characterising regimes: the first, suggested by Levy et al (1995), emphasises the degree of formality and expectations of formality expressed by participants; the second, suggested by E.B. Haas (1990), draws attention to organisational forms, such as the degree of autonomy of the secretariat; and the third, suggested by Keohane (1993a), places the stress on regime capabilities, in relation to geographical scope, size and forms of participation of members in the regime’s decision-making procedures.

Regime-types can be divided into four categories depending on the degree of formality, which are associated with regime maintenance (Levy et al, 1995). ‘Vertical’ dimensions illustrated in Table 2.2 indicate the degree of a regime’s formality, whereas ‘horizontal’ dimensions show the anticipated or expected degree of constraint on states’ behaviour by either explicit or implicit sets of agreement or rules, in other words the extent of convergence of expectations. It is plausible to suggest that without any formal agreement and no expected convergence of agreed rules or norms, no regime exists. Even in the absence of formal rules, if there are expectations for informal rules to be observed and maintained by convergence or consensus in objectives among participants, then tacit regimes exist. By contrast, in situations where formal rules exist but are not observed, a dead-letter regime is said to exist. Security regimes during the Cold War can be classified as this type because even though SALT 1 (1972) and SALT 2 (1979) were argued, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union did not cease. Full-blown regimes suggest the existence of a high expectation of cooperation, observable formal rules, a high level of political prominence, with maintenance functions often fulfilled by a permanent secretariat, councils or a series of meetings and conferences. There may be ‘control-oriented’ full-blown regimes, such as the Bretton Woods international monetary regime and the WTO trade regime, both of which focus on member’s obligations to regulate behaviour. Nevertheless, there is a risk, as Little demonstrates in relation to environmental regimes, that same putative regimes may degenerate into dead-letter regimes, rather than consolidate into full-blown regimes (2001: 305).
Table 2.2: A typology of international policy regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formality</th>
<th>Convergence of expectations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Tacit regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Full-blown regimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Levy et al (1995)

Particularly related to tacit regimes and full-blown regimes, the formality of regimes can be understood in relation to an organisational capacity as well as some ‘arena’ or ‘forum’ that allows regime interactions and maintenance (Haas, 1990: Ch.4), although the point made earlier, that international organisations and international regimes overlapped but are not synonymous should be born in mind. It may be suggested that successful regimes are based on: patterns of representation (even if some interests are valued more than others and some interests are marginalised or ignored); an autonomous secretariat; a revenue basis; a series of meetings or conventions; voting of participants; budgeting; the status of experts as the consultants; policy review and monitoring (or in some case enforcement) of compliance; and a bargaining or negotiation process which operates across issues. Haggard and Simmons acknowledge that not all regimes exhibit all these characteristics but maybe possess an arena, some mechanism for fulfilling maintenance functions with the minimal administrative apparatus for the purpose of dispute settlement, the collection and sharing of information, whether virtually or actually, and surveillance (1987: 497).

Lastly, Keohane (1993a) discusses regimes in terms of their geographical scope, their general principles and rules, strengths, differences in functions and institutional membership. In broad terms, he classifies ‘international institutions’ into three types. First are restricted institutions with limited membership and which are geographically and politically exclusive in nature, for example, multi-lateral or bi-lateral regimes, such as NATO, OPEC, OECD, EU, the Council of Europe and the International Anti-Doping Agreement (IADA). Second, conditionally open institutions, such as WTO and IMF, which are open to those states that accept the principles and commitments required to secure the benefits of participation. It is understood that this type of institution adopts procedures and protocols which exclude non-members from benefits and are designed to encourage collaboration but which often achieve cooperation through imposing regulations on members. Finally, open institutions are open to all sovereign states. While the United Nations was conditionally open excluding the non-allies after the World War II, it has become an open institution in which all members have a vote.
and provides a forum of exchanging opinions, information, although it frequently finds it difficult to enforce rules or to ensure mutuality in bargaining. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) would fall into this category as it acknowledges National Olympic Committees (NOCs) based on nation-state boundaries, which, in principle, represent the IOC's value and allows them to participate in the Olympic Games.

**2.3.4 Criticisms of international regime theory**

A number of authors have criticised the theory of international regimes or the concept of international policy regimes. Susan Strange (1983) is one of the most prominent theorists who criticises the concept as fundamentally flawed and dismisses the concept for five reasons: first, there is little long-term contribution to knowledge; second, the study of international regimes is doomed to failure due to the 'woolliness' of the definition which allows "people [to] mean different things when they use it" (p.343); third, the concept is 'value-loaded' and ideological in nature accepting and legitimatising current policies and regime entities; fourth, it provides a 'static' view of international structure overemphasising outcomes of regimes (i.e. rules or international arrangements) and treating outcomes as fixed; and fifth, it is too non state-centric. Although it is beyond the scope of this section to respond to all the criticisms which Strange has raised (see Gale, 1998), two criticisms are of particular importance with regard to this study.

First, it is observed by Strange that regime analysis is 'biased' as it prioritises sustainable regimes or the issue areas which are most likely to sustain regimes. For example, she argues that most research on international regimes focuses on issues of relatively high political salience and where tangible regimes are more likely to exist, or can be expected to develop, such as security, the preservation of the environment\(^4\), human rights\(^5\) or transnational economic and trade relations\(^6\). Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 1, there is a notable absence of empirical analysis in areas of 'soft' politics. With particular reference to the issue at hand in this study, even though the formation and influence of sporting non-governmental international and regional organisations, such as the IOC, WADA, International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF) or The Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), have become prominent in recent years, international regime theorists have

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not examined them in the same way as they have other globally and internationally acknowledged political issue areas. Due to the lack of research which examines the sport policy issues of anti-doping and elite sport utilising the capacity of international policy regimes, this study can distance itself from those criticism that theoretical development of international regimes is 'seduced' to embrace those policy area where a higher possibility of international cooperation is expected (see Crawford, 1996: 81-2).

The second criticism made by Strange concerns the failure of regime theory to capture the dynamic character of international structure. This criticism is acknowledged by Mayer, Rittberger and Zürn who find difficulties in assessing "the quantity and quality of international regime formation that has actually taken place in the last few decades" (1993: 403). Assuming that not only states, but also a wide range of actors, play important roles in the policy-making process and in formulating actors' behaviour in international society, it is important for this study to identify the dynamic nature of the bargaining processes between state and non-state actors by looking at policy change over the medium term. It is also suggested that the process of 'formalisation' of international regimes may contain a 'dynamic factor' focused on an examination of the interaction patterns around issues of compliance (Puchala & Hopkins, 1983).

2.3.5 Summary

Embracing the widely accepted definition of international policy regimes provided by Krasner (1983a), this study examines the impact of non-domestic factors on policy choice and processes in the selected domestic sport policy areas. It has been demonstrated that the three main schools of thought in international relations provide different perspectives regarding the formation of international policy regimes and the achievement of international cooperation based on different explanatory variables (distribution of power for realism; interests of various groups of actors for liberalism; social interactions and process' for constructivism) as well as causal relationships (power and coercion for realism; mutual agreement and contracting for liberalism; identity formation for constructivism) (Crawford, 1996; Katzenstein et al, 1998). Given the divergence in theorising and understanding of regimes, the most comfortable theoretical fit would appear to be between the notion of an international regime and neoliberal accounts. The former offers the prospect of empirical validation of the latter and, consequently, neoliberalism provides a better foundation for the analysis of interdependent and transnational relationships among states, transnational and
multinational organisations or corporations and non-governmental actors (Katzenstein et al, 1998). For the analysis of interstate interdependences, neoliberal offer explanations for the process of international systems formation and the governing arrangements for cooperation based on the rules and norms that affect the behaviour of states. As such, it may be understandable that international regime theory has been dominated by the neoliberal mode of analysis for it examines the way states cooperate to achieve their interests and how those interests are defined and refined, while realism takes state interests for granted (Crawford, 1996: 123). However, it is important to acknowledge the potential contributions of the realist perspective and its distinctive approach to the analysis of regimes. Focused upon the state-centred power politics, realists analyse how the balance of power between states influences the possibility of forming international regimes as well as their effectiveness and content.

As illustrated in Section 2.3.2, the realist theory of hegemonic stability examines the way a single dominant power in the international economic system leads to an open international system and Gilpin (1987) argues that the distribution of power by a dominant state makes multinational cooperation and the openness or closure of economic trade possible. It is worth noting that realism is more persuasive in crisis situations in world politics and when an international arrangement has broken down. In these situation, in the view of realists, states, in particular the dominant actor, may act in a negotiating or constraining role and use their power to intervene to solve a contested issue in order to maintain the effective functioning of an international regime or a set of international institutions. Within the framework of international policy regimes, it is suggested that states are defined and bound by their commitment to international principles and rules and that states play the central role in the implementation of regime regulations at the domestic level (Katzenstein et al, 1998). While the neoliberal explanation could be a satisfactory basis for international regime theory under an 'abnormal or non-routine condition', the realist explanation provides a more plausible basis for the analysis of states and their power relationships. It is reasonable to argue that the fundamental difference between these two paradigms is around the problem of explaining change in international systems and particularly the conceptualisation of voluntary acceptance of an institution rather than relying on coercion and power to determine the outcome (Katzenstein et al, 1998: 23).

Nevertheless, acknowledging Wendt's argument that constructivism "can and should join forces in contributing to a process-oriented international theory" with neoliberalism (Wendt, 1992: 425), this study also embraces the theoretical orientation of constructivism. The emphasis on the role of social identity and knowledge in international politics and social actions allows us to analyse the identity formation of states and non-state actors through
their interactions and cooperation. As such, it can be argued that although knowledge may create a basis for cooperation and may transcend ideological cleavages, empirical discussion should take place about the way different forms of leadership affects the development of consensual knowledge and also the way inter-state relationships impacts on the development of effective international institutions and international regimes.

International policy regime formation, their maintenance and influence on policy choice and policy processes at the national level, will be examined in three ways: i) the formality of regimes and the degree to which expectations are converging; ii) their geographical scope and institutional membership; and iii) in the case of high levels of convergence of expectations, the organisational forms and the stability in the pattern of relationship and interactions between participating actors (often states). The actors' expectations will be examined regarding the extent to which regimes boost concern among governments, facilitate the ability to make and keep agreement, and build or undermine national political administrative capacity (Levy et al, 1995). Through these exercises, the mechanisms by which international factors impact on the national policy areas of elite athlete development and anti-doping policy will be empirically considered.

2.4 The Concept of Globalisation

Any evaluation and utilisation of the theory of international regimes should take account of the important concept of globalisation which provides insights not only into the marginalising or residual policy-making capabilities of nation-states, but also into the potential of non-state actors to influence internal policy. The concept of globalisation has attracted considerable attention in the social sciences as a reference point for understanding the complex change in interactions within the international community. Held (2002) acknowledges that even though globalisation is not a recent phenomenon, the term ‘globalisation’ captures important elements of rapid change in the contemporary world. For Hirst and Thompson, it is recognised that globalisation has become “the new grand narrative of the social sciences” (1999: xiii). However, the concept is far from being unambiguous and Scholte (2005), for example, identifies six interchangeable usages of the term: internationalisation; universalisation; liberalisation; Westernisation or modernisation; commercialisation; and respatialisation. Although there is no single understanding of the concept of globalisation and there has been a contested debate about what ‘globalisation’ actually means, the majority of research whether focusing primarily on economics, politics, technologies,
telecommunications, migrations, culture or international terrorism, construct analytical frameworks designed not only to examine the significance of globalisation, but also to identify the evidence of 'reach' of the global. A major debate on globalisation concerns the changing nature and role of states with some arguing that globalisation has resulted in the marginalisation and 'retreat' of states in relation to domestic policy as the dominant feature of globalisation (Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Weiss, 1999). It should be noted that international relations theory has incorporated the globalisation concept, particularly the emphasis on the global scope of interdependences embracing multiple actors at national, regional, international, transnational and supra-national level. This section will provide an overview of the dimensions of globalisation from three different perspectives (hyperglobalists, sceptics and transformationalists) which will be followed by a discussion of the relationship of between sport globalisation and internationalisation.

2.4.1 Differences in perspectives

As implied, there are differences in argument and approach to the analysis of globalisation. A broad categorisation can be made between 'globalisation believers' and 'globalisation sceptics' as well as middle-ground 'transformationalists' (Cochrane & Pain, 2000; Gray, 1998; Held et al, 1999; Hirst, 1997; Hirst & Thompson, 1999). It is useful to identify the way each perspective conceptualises globalisation along with the different issues and dimensions, such as the scale, historical trajectory (old or new), causal dynamics, socio-economic consequences and implications for state power and governance that are given prominence (see Table 2.3; Cochrane & Pain, 2000: 22-4; Held et al, 1999: 3).

The first approach is globalists or hyperglobalisers who, as 'globalisation believers', identify globalisation as a tangible and inevitable path to development. This perspective is typically represented by the work of Ohmae (1990; 1995) who suggested that we are moving into a 'borderless world' where sovereign states are obsolete. It is argued that the economy, financial markets and investment in particular, are entangled with global forces and the ability of states to exercise control in these areas is now threatened in a fundamental way. Cochrane and Pain (2000) further divide globalists into positive and pessimistic globalists but both perspectives readily acknowledge the impact of globalisation on the domestic policy sphere and national identities.
The second strand is *traditionalists* or *sceptics* who claim that rapid interdependences between states through economic development should be illustrated as 'regionalisation' or 'internationalisation' instead of 'globalisation'. The sceptics express their reservations regarding the accuracy and adequacy of the utilisation and explanatory power of globalisation (Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Khor, 2001). The sceptics argue that nation-states remain as very significant actors in world politics and that their retention of sovereignty is deeply rooted in the balance of power, a perspective which is shared by realist theorists within international relations.

The final perspective is the middle-ground *transformationalists* who reject the polarity of the two previous approaches. In their view, globalisation is a historically unprecedented phenomenon but the depths of interconnectedness are globally complex, diverse and unpredictable. However, transformationalists also acknowledge that nation-states remain powerful, as stressed by traditionalists, in relation to military, economic and political issues but that the regional and intergovernmental institutions play important roles. The advocates of this approach, such as Giddens (1990) and Rosenau (1997), are cautious about the claim that globalisation is inevitable or that globalisation has a fixed end-point and rather see globalisation as an open-ended historical process which is resulting in qualitative change in the global system.

Adopting these three perspectives, this section sets out the major debates and features of globalisation. Of particular importance to highlight at this stage is that the three schools of thought share a common interest in the impact of globalisation on the role, scope and nature of states. This element is significant as a way of shaping our analysis not only of the development of sport policy but also of the non-domestic influence on the development of sport policy in the empirical chapters.

**2.4.2 Issues and Dimensions of Globalisation**

It has been acknowledged that various authors have developed different conceptions of globalisation and highlighted different elements of the process of globalisation. As will be clear in the subsequent discussion, there is a tendency for each perspective to prioritise some dimensions of globalisation over others. Nevertheless, utilising the five aspects of globalisation (geography, production, governance, identity and knowledge) examined by
Scholte (2005), this section analyses the way the three perspectives construct arguments in relation to economic, political, cultural and social dimensions of globalisation.

**Hyperglobalists**

Hyperglobalists argue that the development of capitalism and information and communication technology has accelerated economic globalisation which has enabled international agencies, transnational private corporations and private economic and financial players to exercise influence on domestic policies and policy-making practices. It is argued that the policies of liberalising financial flows, trade and investment have broken down national economic barriers which have led to denationalisation of economies with the consequential increase in power of transnational corporations and international financial institutions at the expense of governments (Khor, 2001). The marginalisation of states is obvious for hyperglobalists who identify, on the one hand, that national sovereignty has been eroded thus limiting the capacity of government in policy-making and, on the other hand, that activities of transnational corporations are intensified which move free or at minimal cost in order to maximise their profits. Ohmae, a radical globalist, argues that “in a borderless economy, the nation-focused maps we typically use to make sense of economic activity are woefully misleading...It has become no more than an illusion” (1995: 19-20). Bryan and Farrell also acknowledge that “millions of global investors, operating out of their own economic self-interest, are determining interest rates, exchange rates, and the allocation of capital, irrespective of the wishes or political objectives of national political leaders” (1996: 1). Hyperglobalists observe that multi-national corporations (MNCs) and transnational corporations set standards, produce codes of best practices, and undertake self-regulation and that capital is mobile without attachment to nation-states and the governance of state governments is being relocated to the sub-national or the supra-national levels (Barrett, 1996; Woods, 2002). As such, it is argued that, on the one hand, the authority and power of nation-states and national governments are being undermined and cannot provide the welfare or social protection for citizens and, on the other hand, that global corporate capital plays a fundamental role in integrating and reordering economic activities and in distributing power in global financial markets, resulting in Fukuyama (1992) declaring the putative 'global triumph' of capitalism and the associated principles of liberal and political economy (see also Little, 1998; Gill, 1995; Gray, 1998).

A recent globalist view from Hindle (2004) argued that we are in the ‘third age of globalisation’. He suggested that the first phase of globalisation typified manufacturing and business operations as domestically operated while sales were international and that the
second phase saw both sales and manufacturing shift to the global level, although the headquarters remained domestic. Although these two phases of economic globalisation have been characterised as being 'imperialist', the third phase, in Hindle’s account, is illustrated as MNCs have become ‘truly global’ and constitute a ‘harmonious post-imperial’ set of relations in which the headquarters may have been dispersed and key business is outsourced to the non-dominant peripheral states.

This type of argument reflects a neo-Marxist view which is exemplified by Immanuel Wallerstein who, in the 1970s, introduced the concept of a ‘world-system’ to note that capitalism was the driving force of globalisation. In consideration of the historical development of the capitalist systems as a whole, Wallerstein (1991) conceived a single world-system of capitalist economy which provided a single division of labour in the world and he developed a framework for the measurement of social inequalities and ‘exploitations’ that are observed as operating on three layers: the central areas, the semi-periphery and the peripheral countries and regions. In this way, Wallerstein attacked late capitalism, whereby the underdevelopment of the Third World was a consequence of the development and wealth of the industrialised West. However, Wallerstein also implied that the concept of multi-layered forms of economic globalisation is one in which inequalities can be expressed not only in the traditional North-South division, but also within these two societies themselves.

However, while hyperglobalists share Wallerstein’s view regarding the existence of an integrated global economic phenomenon they also emphasise the importance of information and communication technologies in driving globalisation. It is argued that economic globalisation brings prosperity and consumerist ideology to individuals, families and corporate companies which, according to neoliberal hyperglobalists, define a new sense of identity. The emergence of liberal political economy and ‘global civilisation’ are seen as the historical trajectory because influential global institutions and their governance, such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO and the multilateral agreements of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), directly or indirectly impact on transforming the life of people and on reordering the relationship between territory and socio-economic and political space (Held & McGrew, 2002b: 5-8; Gill, 1995; Youngs, 1999).

In relation to the governance issue, nation-states not only have to cope with the consequences of the increase in the mobility of global capital and labour, but also have to face such global issues associated with environment, human rights, terrorism or drugs. It is acknowledged that the emergence and development of international and transnational organisations and pressure groups, including internationally operated NGOs or epistemic
communities, have further challenged and eroded the political decision-making capacities of nation-states. Accordingly, Youngs notes that "[g]lobalization problematizes accepted notions of societies as divided or separated along national territorial lines" (original emphasis, 2003: 13). It is fair to assume that nation-states are under pressure both from 'above' in relation to cross-border activities in finance, economics or politics and from 'below' in relation to civic societies, individuals and local communities (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003).

Hyperglobalists identify a societal or cultural element of globalisation distinct from economic power relations which may be represented as the homogenisation of national culture with such shorthand keywords as 'Americanisation', 'McDonalisation' or 'Coca-colonisation'. These notions are normally linked to the spread of capitalism symbolising the uniformity in lifestyles and cultural symbols along with American popular culture or Western consumerism (Jameson, 1998). As for the strong notion of the 'cultural homogenisation theorists', globalisation is synchronised with a standardised consumer culture and the pattern of cultural experiences dominated by mass media. Castells argues that territoriality and spatiality are compressed and shaped by global processes through networks, knowledge and the information society (Castells, 2000). A critical notion of 'imposition' can be recalled under these processes and Tomlinson identifies the domination of capitalist culture grounded upon the advanced modernity which may "get conflated in the discourse of cultural imperialism" (1999: 89; see also Tomlinson, 1991). On this account, Scholte recognises that homogenisation theorists express different perspectives which could be "either progressive cosmopolitanism or oppressive imperialism" (2000: 23), the former of which is represented by Mann who argues that we live in a global society where "a single power network" is in operation (1993: 11). Finally, what cannot be dismissed is the argument around national identity and nationalism which are both seen as conceptually contingent, artificial and ideological inventions. It is perceived that knowledge transcends beyond national boundaries due to the flow of the transnational and global economy and that the development of global communication infrastructure influences local and national identifies in a fundamental way (Scholte, 2005).

**Sceptics**

The traditionalists or sceptics are poles apart from the hyperglobalists. In terms of history, it is claimed that globalisation or global economy is not new but has existed since the 1870s and expanded to construct complex phenomena in the pre-1914 liberal economic order. Weiss (1999) argues that it was international political cooperation under the Bretton Woods argument, as the liberal internationalist project, that promoted economic integration. She
emphasises that "the vision, the means, and the power sharing arrangements at international level all predate the boom in capital mobility and transborder flows that has so inspired new globalism" (ibid, 67). Some authors thus ask a fundamental question: "has globalization taken place" (original emphasis, Hirst, 1997: 209). The focal points of the argument are first, the continuous domination and capacity of nation-states in the majority of domestic and international policy areas and second, the adaptability of nation-states to globalisation processes in ways that ensure their enduring power (Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Weiss, 1999).

With particular reference to the economy, sceptics emphasise a long-term process of internationalisation, rather than globalisation, and stress that transnational trade and production only happens within and between states, which may lead to regionalisation of economic integrations and cooperation.

Hirst and Thompson (1999) are the most prominent theorists to challenge the globalists' thesis and they make a clear distinction between, on the one hand, a strictly 'globalised economy', which, as we observed, suggests that global forces are beyond the control of states and that transnational companies determine economic outcomes and, on the other hand, a highly 'inter-nationalised economy' in which nation-states and various forms of international regulation created and maintained by nation-states still retain a major role in providing governance structure for economy. Hirst and Thompson identify four distinctive forms of inter-national economy (ibid, 2-3, 8-9): first, where the principal entity of economic activities is the national economy, which is domestically located, and whose interests determine the extent and notion of international trade; second, where trade relations are also defined by domestic interests, especially the interests of labour; third, where states are continuously interdependent but maintain the relative separation between domestic and international policy-making framework; and finally, where 'footloose' or genuinely transnational companies are relatively rare. Although sceptics do not wholeheartedly deny the rise and maturity of MNCs and transnational financial trading services, they argue that they are still subject to a wide range of state regulations and maintain 'value-added' activities like research and development (R&D) and core manufacturing in major industrialised countries (Hirst, 1997: 212). Grounded upon that pluralist standpoint, Hirst and Thompson highlight the necessary role of nation-states as the 'monopoly lawmaker' in controlling the forms of international governance by conferring legitimacy on regulatory regimes, international agencies and common policies through treaties (1999: 275-280; see also Gilpin, 2002; Hirst, 1997; Krasner, 1993a; Weiss, 1999).

Gilpin (1987) emphasises the 'permissiveness' and 'openness' of states and their willingness to use their power and authority to expand world markets and he argues that hegemonic
power which promoted economic 'openness' was crucial to the development and success of
the global economy after the World War II. Some sceptics argue that the 'world economy' is
far from global and is characterised by 'triadisation', which is the dominance by the
industrialised triad of Europe, Japan and North America (Dicken, 1992; Boyer & Drache,
1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1999; 2002). Sassen (2001) identifies the 'global control and
coordination' of the world economy as located in three zones of world cities (see also King,
1990). A similar analysis emphasises 'regionalisation' of the global economy which highlights
enhanced regional cooperative agreements, such as North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), European Union, APEC and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
However, despite the sceptics' conceptualisation as, variously, internationalisation,
triadisation and regionalisation, all agree that the nation-state remains the dominant actor in
facilitating economic activities.

In terms of cultural aspects of globalisation, sceptics recognise neither a common global
history nor culture and argue that national identity and nationhood are deeply rooted and are
unlikely to be eroded by multinational and transnational forces. Anthony Smith provided a
strong claim that nationalism based on the collective memory "lies more with the persisting
frameworks and legacies of historical cultures and ethnic ties than with the consequences of
global interdependence" (1995: vii-viii). As with the case of traditional sport that may be
advocated by government, nationally-based cultural symbols and identity are recognised as
the "pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth" (Gellner,
1983: 48-9), and thereby the construction of nationality, nation-ness and national identity are
seen as "cultural artefacts of a particular kind" binding individuals to an 'imagined community'
of shared time and space (Anderson, 1991: 4-6). On this basis, Huntington predicted a 'clash
of civilization' which assumes different cultural entities, particularly "those along the fault lines
of civilizations", face conflicts (1993: 28). As such, sceptics argue it is more persuasive to
accept the process of internationalisation or regionalisation which is shaped by the residual
and reinforced power and authority of states, rather than globalisation or the globalised world
that assume marginalised role of states.

**Transformationalists**

Transformationalists place themselves somewhat between the previous two schools of
thought and their argument is constructed around the cultural sphere of globalisation. They
acknowledge that the unprecedented pattern of globalisation is the core driving force for the
social, political and economic transformations which shape modern societies and world order
(Giddens, 1990; Rosenau, 1990). Giddens perceives globalisation as a long-term historical
process and as a powerful transformative force in which distant localities would be shaped by the 'global spread of modernity' thereby 'local contextualities' are dismissed due to the "chronic mutability of local circumstances and local engagements" (Giddens, 1990: 20-1, 64; see also Castells, 2000).

Unlike the hyperglobalist account of 'global civil society', transformationalists explain that nation-states are entangled with complex transnational networks and issues and with re-engineered states' power, functions and authority. James Rosenau (1990) conceives a 'polycentric world politics' in which all those involved in decision-making processes now compete with each other to achieve their objectives. As such, transformationalists are interested in analysing the reordering of spatial definitions and socio-cultural interregional relations and the transformation of political community as a 'survival unit'. Saskia Sassen (1994; 2001) highlights the increased mobility of capital and labour, goods, raw materials and tourists at both national and transnational level and the dynamic transforming processes of geographic areas. Sassen demonstrates that all forms of economic development have embraced both dimensions: global dispersion and global integration of economic activities (1994: 4). Some political geographers also identify political complexities that entail holistic and dynamic geographies of production and consumption networks and circuits in which both global and local contexts of consumption operate (see Jackson, 2002).

As such, seemingly contradicting phenomena of dual processes — globalisation, capturing the integration, and fragmentation — are operative not only at the economic level but also within the socio-cultural terrain. Clark describes 'fragmentation' as "a dialectical response to globalization" although both forces are 'complementary' and 'integral' where both reciprocal effects can be found (the impact of state policy upon globalisation; globalisation's impact on state policy) (1997: 28-31). Robertson (1992; 1990) similarly developed the idea of 'glocalisation', which assumes global and local phenomena are not mutually exclusive but that global culture can be contested by the local context, in which the model of globalisation is a contingent and dialectical process that opposes the idea of global culture as static and single process. The concept of 'imagined communities', where local, national and regional identities are constructed, is challenged by transformationalists and it is assumed that disembedded cultural practices produce greater complexities of hybrid forms of culture and consciousness (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Critically commenting on 'glocalisation', Bauman (1998) notes that the world is polarised and re-stratified into the 'globalised rich' and the 'localised poor' depending on the redistribution of privileges and deprivations of wealth and poverty. In this way, transformationalists attempt to analyse the local resistance to globalisation forces for change and how local values, culture and customs are transformed or
promoted by the globalisation forces and resist the global contingent processes and multi-layered interactions.

Summary

Table 2.3 gives a summary of each perspective along with issues and dimensions of globalisation, which have been observed.

Table 2.3: Three perspectives in the globalisation debate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues / Dimensions</th>
<th>Hyperglobalist</th>
<th>Transformationalist</th>
<th>Sceptics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>On globalisation</strong></td>
<td>Thoroughly globalised</td>
<td>Moderate assessment – need to consider other social forces; unevenness - carefully measured, qualified</td>
<td>Myth, over-exaggeration, only a rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chronology/periodisation of trend</strong></td>
<td>Recent development – enormous intensification since 1960s; discontinuity</td>
<td>Continuity and discontinuity – historically unprecedented powerful but uncertain transformative force</td>
<td>Nothing new – since middle of 19th century; continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptions</strong></td>
<td>Americanisation, Westernisation, universalisation, liberalisation, deterritorialisation</td>
<td>Supraterritoriality; Reflective deterritorialisation; ‘Glocalisation’-fragmentation; global governance</td>
<td>Internationalisation; regionalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor(s)</strong></td>
<td>Multilateral institutions; trans-border firms</td>
<td>Sub-state/ supra-state agencies; NGOs, activists, individuals</td>
<td>Sovereign states, regional bodies (EU, NAFTA); international organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On state and governance</strong></td>
<td>Diminishing, dissolving, retreating- removing governmental restrictions/ effectiveness; erosion of autonomy</td>
<td>Reconstituted/ restructured in forms, functions, authority; multilayered governance- redefined ‘sovereignty’</td>
<td>Substantial capacity and enduring power in regulations on territoriality, economy, finance, nationality, military forces and legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geography</strong></td>
<td>Transnational relations- trans-border exchanges</td>
<td>Reconfigurations of space and time in our lives</td>
<td>International relations- cross-border exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Globalisation forces</strong></td>
<td>Market force; liberal economy, liberal democracy; communication technology</td>
<td>Unprecedented multidimensional dynamics; global economic, military, technological, ecological, migratory, political, cultural flows</td>
<td>Economic interdependencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distinctive features</strong></td>
<td>‘Borderless world’; ‘stateless corporation’- intensified economic interdependence/ competition; transworld production; global markets; global production; liberal democracy/ privatisation; ‘global civilisation’</td>
<td>A set of changes- social, cultural, political; global stratification A number of disjuncture Transformation of basic institutions – global civil society</td>
<td>Continuous expansion of international economy since the 19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On politics</strong></td>
<td>Transnational governance</td>
<td>Civil society/ global governance</td>
<td>State sovereignty, international relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On culture</strong></td>
<td>‘Cultural synchronisation’/ Homogenisation- leading to progressive cosmopolitanism or oppressive imperialism; Commodification</td>
<td>‘Glocalisation’ - local particularities; particularisms- reaction against globalisation; ‘fragmentation’- sub-state identity politics; ethno-nationalism and ethnic cultural identity; heterogenisation- civil society</td>
<td>Fragmented into civilisation blocs and cultural/ethnic enclaves- possibility of ‘clash of civilisation’; illusion of ‘global governance’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On economics</strong></td>
<td>Single global market, global management; global competitions-denationalisation of economies; polarisation between winners and losers</td>
<td>Growing deterritorialisation; reorganisation of national economy</td>
<td>Interactions between national economies; centrality of industry- ‘Trialisation’ of production; division of labour- leading to marginalise the ‘Third World’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IR position</strong></td>
<td>Neo-Marxists and radicals</td>
<td>Constructivists/ cosmopolitanism/ Neoliberalis</td>
<td>Realists/ neo-realists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from: Scholte, 2005; Grugel, 2003; Held et al, 1999
It can be claimed that while most research prioritises some dimensions of globalisation over others, the most common important aspect shared across these perspectives is their consideration of the ‘effect’ or ‘reach’ of globalisation phenomena and the mechanisms of influence externally exerted on states’ decision-making processes. The ‘responses’ or reactions of the recipient culture, state or nation, are examined much more by transformationalists and sceptics than by hyperglobalists.

In summary, it can be highlighted that whether assuming internationalisation or globalisation, or even ‘glocalisation’ or ‘multinationalisation’, the debate over globalisation remains contested. Although they give reference to globalisation directly or indirectly, it should come as no surprise that both international relations and international regime theorists maintain their theoretical formulations as ‘international’, rather than renaming them ‘globalise(d) relations’ theory. In this regard, it can be observed that the concept of globalisation is embedded into a broad theoretical orientation of international relations and the three schools of thought in international relations, overviewed in Section 2.2, are broadly underlined by the differences in globalisation perspectives which accordingly highlight different issues and dimensions of globalisation.

As with the case of international relations theory, globalisation concepts are also engaged in the debate over the salience of states as the primary reference point for globalisation. This is particularly the case for sceptics, whose theoretical orientation is close to that of realists within international relations theory. Rejecting the hyperglobalist’s idea of the ‘erosion’ of state’s authority and autonomy largely due to the expansion of global and transnational economic activity and networks, sceptics echo the realist conception to argue for an enduring state sovereignty and national policy preference. As neoliberal international relations theorists claim, transformationalists conceive a wide array of non-state actors which play a role in international politics and a web of international treaties, institutions and regimes and states, according to which the state transforms its approach to achieve national objectives through international cooperation and collaboration. Some may acknowledge that international policy regimes, which may resemble the notion of ‘global governance’, embrace the globalisation concept most fully insofar as its interest resides with internationally or globally accepted and shared principles and norms which may converge to a wide range of actors’ expectations in a particular issue area. In other words, it is possible to note that globalisation concept is developed through the growing maturity of international relations theory and that the rapid globalising processes have made it impossible for, not only
international relations theorist, but also many of social (political) scientists, without referring to ignore the phenomenon.

2.4.3 Policy transfer continuum and mechanisms

The salience of the concept of policy transfer to this study as an analytical framework is to help conceptualise the mechanisms of impact of globalisation on domestic policy-making. For Stone, the concept of policy transfer “problematises the division between the domestic and the international” (1999: 53). It can be noted that policy transfer has become a crucial element in the modern policy-making process largely due to the advancement of information technology which allows the frequent exchange of information (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 1996; Dolowitz et al., 1999; Rose, 2005). Dolowitz (2003) suggests that the British government encourages an ‘outward-looking’ attitude in order to interrogate foreign ideas and policies as part of the British policy-making process. Our concern with the ‘mechanisms’ of learning and policy transfer could be seen as complementary to the analysis of international policy regimes and this point will be discussed throughout this section.

In a broad sense, policy transfer is premised upon “the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 5). However, it is important to take account of definitional ambiguities in policy transfer, especially with regard to what constitutes ‘learning’ (May, 1992). Outlining different conceptions of learning and its effect on policy formulation (‘policy learning’, ‘government learning’, ‘policy-oriented learning’, ‘lesson drawing’, and ‘social learning’), Bennett and Howlett (1992) highlight the ambiguities inherent in those conceptions that are not interchangeable due to different assumptions recognising the agent of learning, objects of learning and effects of learning.

Policy learning is a generic term to illustrate the processes of learning about policy tools or interventions. May suggests that policy learning is “concerned with lessons about policy content – problems, goals, instruments, and implementation designs” (1992: 340). What would be reasonable to suggest is that the cognitive process of policy learning is complex and influences organisation’s decision-making processes, specific programmes and the instruments used to determine and implement policy and/or the policy goals and ends (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; May, 1992).
Rose distinguishes 'policy learning' from 'lesson drawing'. He suggests that "lesson-drawing is about whether programme can transfer from one place to another" (1991: 5) and that a 'lesson' is "the outcome of learning: it specifies a programme drawing on knowledge of programmes in other countries dealing with much the same problem" (Rose, 2005: 16). Rose notes that lesson drawing accepts 'the contingency of public policy' because "it specifies the conditions that must be met for a programme to be effective" and that the empirical evidence of programmes that work in a specific context of one country does not necessarily indicate that it will work in another (ibid, 23). Rose argues that in comparison to the concept of policy transfer, lesson-drawing "focuses attention on programmes that can or should be imported from abroad at the expense of giving attention to the obstacles to applying lessons at home" (ibid, 24). It is also argued that the change in the policy environment, priorities in policy and preferences of politicians would alter values and knowledge. Rose identifies that late 19th century Japan provides the best example of lesson-drawing when the Japanese government was extensively engaged in introducing specific political instruments related to the army, education and jurisdiction. He notes that it was governmentally sponsored lesson-drawing which balanced both the technical element of 'transferability' and the normative evaluations of 'political desirability' to modernise Japan (Rose, 1991: 26-7; see also Dolowitz et al, 1999; Westney, 1987).

However, what is imperative to highlight is that the concept of lesson-drawing does not capture the 'dimensions' of policy transfer that encompass both elements of 'coercion' in learning lessons and 'push factors' in transferring programmes in the borrowing jurisdictions or organisations. Stone claims that although there is "some danger in the causal interchangeability of 'lesson-drawing' and 'policy transfer'", the latter is "the broader concept encompassing ideas of diffusion and coercion as well as the voluntaristic activity of lesson-drawing" (1999: 52; see also Page, 2000; Stone, 2001). In this sense, given that there are overlaps between the two concepts, for example, in the explanations for purposes of learning or degree of learning, the pressure or compulsion behind learning lessons can be conceived in the concept of policy transfer.

**Policy transfer continuum**

Evans and Davies (1999) narrowly define policy transfer as 'action-oriented intentional learning' which may occur voluntary or coercively. Specifically referring to a foreign policy, Bennett identifies five reasons why elites are intentionally engaged in policy transfer, namely: to put an issue on an institutional agenda; to calm political pressure; to emulate the actions of
an exemplar; to optimise the search for the best policy; and to legitimise conclusions already reached (1991b: 33). Needless to say explaining engagement in policy transfer is an empirical question, but it is useful as a heuristic device to demonstrate the process of policy transfer as located on 'continuum' for our better understanding of the 'subtleties' of policy transfer processes, including the complexities and shifting of motivations of various engaged actors (see Diagram 2.1; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; 1996).

As illustrated in Diagram 2.1, a distinction can be made between 'voluntary' policy transfer, which can be demonstrated as lesson drawing, and 'coercive' policy transfer, which then can be divided into direct and indirect coercive transfer. The particular usefulness of this continuum is that it identifies the wide range of actors engaged in policy transfer and the degree of compulsion by those actors to force governments to adopt a certain policy. While it is assumed that the actors engaged in policy transfer act "under conditions of more or less rationality" (Dolowitz, 2003: 103), James and Lodge are not convinced that the conceptualisation of voluntary policy transfer would offer anything new from the 'conventional' rational accounts of policy-making, which recognise the processes of "searching for the means to pursue goals in a systematic and comprehensive manner" (2003: 181). Although it is far from easy to identify the degree of rationality of policy-makers, the notion of 'bounded-rationality', which assumes that actors possess limited information and are influenced by their perceptions, may provide a distinctive element to lesson drawing (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 14).

Diagram 2.1: A policy transfer continuum

Adapted from Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000: 13, 1996
Towards the 'coercive' end of the continuum, Dolowitz and Marsh argue that "governments, international organizations and transnational companies can push other governments into policy transfer" in both direct and indirect ways (1996: 344). Indirect coercion involves a mixture of pressure from the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, a government would be pushed by perceived policy failure and by feelings of insecurity and fear of falling behind its neighbours or rivals. It is noted that the 'perception' of policy failure is more important than the 'objective reality' of policy failure in fostering learning. Bennett argues that these concerns "generate a sense of inevitability and urgency. The more countries that can be cited as 'ahead of us' the more plausible is the argument that legislation is desirable" (1991b: 43-4). This way of establishing legitimacy to stimulate policy transfer is illustrated by DiMaggio and Powell as a 'mimetic' process of 'institutional isomorphism' regarding policy selection (quoted in Radaelli, 2000: 28). It has been generally agreed that policymakers are driven to look for examples of what has worked before because of their dissatisfaction with the current provision in their country and the urgent necessity to change the policy instrument. When independent international reports, from organisations such as the OECD, identify a country as 'being a laggard' in the international arena, a government is put under pressure to make a policy response in order to improve its image (Dolowitz, 2003). As for exogenous indirect pressures, international consensus and international agreements may increase the perceived need for a government to cooperate and thereby join the 'international community'. Dolowitz and Marsh argue that "when a common solution to that problem has been introduced in a number of nations, then nations not adopting this definition or solution will face increasing pressure to join the international 'community' by implementing similar programmes or policies" (1996: 349). Stone identifies that an indirect coercive policy transfer also occurs via 'transnational policy communities' when they share their expertise and information with government and non-government delegations at the international level and form common patterns of understanding, consensus and agreement regarding policy, which diffuse the knowledge and ideas (2000: 50; see also Stone, 1999, 2001). However, it could be the case that this way of policy transfer may be merely an aspiration for policy and may not be supported by committed resources.

Although it is rare to find a sovereign state directly imposing policy transfer on another, the 'obligated transfer' occurs when a government must conform to actions taken internationally and multinationally and is compelled to comply with international treaties, international rules and regulations and, importantly, international policy regimes. Bennett illustrates this as "policy convergence through penetration", most common forms of which can be found in the
interests of multi-national business that penetrate into a state to implement a certain regulatory framework (1991a: 220). Supra-national institutions such as the IMF or World Bank have also played crucial roles in introducing the Western monetary system to Third World countries and that trans-national corporations also directly impose certain policy on governments (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996: 348). As regards anti-doping, the fact that WADA made ratification of World Anti-Doping Code a precondition for participation in the Olympic Games could be seen as an example of the direct imposition of the harmonising principles on national and international sporting organisations. While it should be reiterated that the motivations for being involved in policy transfer shift along the 'continuum' depending on the mechanisms which will be illustrated in the next section, it can be identified that when the arrow move towards the coercive end, the locus of initiative and the likely lead actors in policy transfer and policy change shift from the domestic political system and national actors to much more internationally-initiated knowledge and institutions.

**Policy transfer mechanisms**

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000; 1996) emphasise the necessity of understanding the processes and mechanisms of policy transfer which demonstrate policy change, development and formulations and the following questions are posed to examine the processes: i) why are policy-makers engaged in policy transfer? (see above discussions); ii) who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?; iii) what is transferred?; iv) from where are lessons learnt?; v) what are the different degrees of transfer?; vi) what factors and mechanisms restrict or facilitate the transfer process?; and vii) how is the process of policy transfer related to policy 'success' or policy 'failure' (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996: 344; 2000: 7, 8; see also Bennett & Howlett, 1992). Table 2.4 illustrates the dimensions and mechanisms of policy transfer, which provides the basis of an analytical framework in order to examine the processes of policy transfer.

Different authors identify varying lists of actors initiating learning and transferring ideas, knowledge or policies but the lists often include public officials and elected officials, international and transnational organisations, knowledge-based specialist groups or epistemic communities as well as multinational think tanks. The degree of policy transfer and the sub-set of questions of 'transferability' should be empirically observed but Rose (2005) identifies five common effects and outcomes of drawing lessons, which can be shared with transferring policy: i) copying; ii) emulation, in which the evidence about a programme or programmes and experiences abroad are employed as an exemplar or model, and then adapted (for Bennett, emulation is seen as 'a convergence of policy goals, policy content or
policy instruments'); iii) hybridisation, where elements of two exemplar programmes are combined into a new programme; iv) synthesis, in which elements from a variety of programmes are combined together into a new one; and v) inspiration, in which programmes in one country are utilised to inspire and stimulate the development of a domestic programme (see Bennett, 1991a; Rose, 1999; Dolowitz, 2003; Bennett & Howlett, 1992).

Table 2.4: Dimensions of policy transfer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Conditions and mechanisms</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Why engage in policy transfer?</td>
<td>Need to address objective policy problem and dissatisfaction with status quo;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct imposition of policy transfer on one country by another;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perception that a country is falling behind its neighbours or rivals;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pressure to join the ‘international community’, i.e. emerged international consensus or definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main categories of policy actors</td>
<td>Elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs/experts/epistemic communities or ‘policy middlemen’, transnational corporations, think tank, supra-national governmental and nongovernmental institutions, consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is transferred?</td>
<td>Policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes, negative lessons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From where are lessons drawn?</td>
<td>International supra-national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Intra-governmental’ level – governments/agents transfer policies from one nation to another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local level – sub-national units draw lessons from other political sub-systems/units within their own country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of transfer/ types of effects</td>
<td>Copying – direct and complete transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emulation – transfer of the core idea or conception as a model but tailored to meet the requirements of the enacting jurisdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combinations – mixtures of several different policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspiration – expand ideas of what is possible and inspire a policy change but the final outcome is not drawn upon the original</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prerequisites for transfer/ Factors constraint policy transfer</td>
<td>Past policies constrains agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of the political, bureaucratic and economic resources to implement the policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological similarities or shared ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic size and efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy feasibility and political, cultural and institutional conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors affecting failure in policy transfer</td>
<td>Uninformed transfer – insufficient information about the policy/institution and how it operates in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incomplete transfer – transfer occurred and shape policy change but crucial elements of what made the policy or institutional structure a success in the originating country may not be transferred, hence failure in implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inappropriate transfer – insufficient attention to the differences between the economic, social, political and ideological contexts in the transferring and borrowing country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Dolowitz, 2003; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 1996; Evans & Davies, 1999; Rose, 1991

What we should bear in mind is that policy learning and policy transfer do not necessarily lead to change and success in policy, while it can be assumed that policymakers engaged in learning lessons attempt to transfer a policy or programme that could provide a solution to an existing problem. It is important to recognise that the effect and outcome of policy transfer would vary depending on who is involved and the changes in motivations of policy-makers and preferred policy instruments in a ‘borrowing’ country. Examining the frequent policy
transfer activities between the United States and the UK, Dolowitz et al identify four institutional factors that facilitated the process of policy transfer: the first is a common language, which is said to remove the problems of translations and allow smooth exchange of ideas; the second, equally importantly to the first point, is a shared committed ideology, namely, neoliberalism which is underpinned by a similar perception of policy solutions, such as introducing market mechanisms; the third, but less important, is personal relations; and the final point is the way think-tanks and policy entrepreneurs play a role in influencing policy ideas (1999: 727-8). While the analysis of ‘successful’ transfer by Dolowitz et al is based on the premises of shared language and commitment to neoliberalism, Dolowitz and Marsh focus much more on political, social and cultural differences and acknowledge three factors that can lead to ‘policy failure’: i) ‘uninformed transfer’, where a borrowing country or organisation has insufficient information about the policy, institution or programme and how it operates in a lending country or organisation; ii) ‘incomplete transfer’, where transfer has happened but crucial components of policy or institutional structure in the originating country or organisation are missed out; and iii) ‘inappropriate transfer’, where economic, social, political and ideological differences are neglected (2000: 17). Nevertheless, what matter most, according to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), is the ‘perceived’ success for the key policy-makers engaged in policy area, which may serve their objective of policy transfer activity.

In this regard, it should be emphasised that policy transfer processes should be examined through the relationship between structure and agency. Evans and Davies (1999) highlight the prerequisites for transfer, namely, pre-existing policies or bureaucratic size and efficiency, policy feasibility and political, cultural and institutional condition, which constrain the learning of lessons and affect the dimensions of policy transfer. Policy-makers would also be constrained by past policies or political factors in their ability to incorporate ideas or knowledge about policy. It is the discussion of policy feasibility and political, cultural and institutional conditions that are of interest in analysing the process of policy transfer. At the domestic level, even in a ‘coercive’ situation, key policy-makers may reject a transferred policy due to a lack of sufficient or unbiased information, the consequence of which is an ‘implementation failure’ (see Dolowitz, 2003; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Green, 2007a). This can remind us of our earlier discussion about critical realist ontology that analyses the complexity of the interrelated nature of structure and agency. Green convincingly acknowledges that it is necessary to “interrogate the interaction between surface levels of policy and the deep structure which determines within limits the range of variation of the surface level” (2007a: 436).

_Policy transfer and international policy regimes_
To summarise this section on policy transfer, it should be highlighted, most importantly, that the 'continuum' and mechanisms of policy transfer and the literature on lesson-drawing could be used as a complementary analytical framework to the broader concerns of international relations theory and the theory of international policy regimes. It has been suggested that the conception of policy transfer processes and mechanisms provides us with a better understanding of the way, and the degree to which, international policy regimes influence policy development and change at the domestic level. Recalling that international regimes are defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1983a), it can be observed that, concerning the case of indirect coercion, international regimes may serve as a 'harmonisation' tool to highlight a common global problem and to facilitate the convergence of the willingness and expectations of states and non-state actors around a certain policy issue. 'Required' transfer may happen when international regimes, which often possess the means to fulfil a set of highly institutionalised functions concerned with monitoring of compliance or sanctions, compel a government to implement a certain policy or policy instrument.

Consequently, it can be argued that the policy transfer literature can be informed by the literature on international policy regimes and, at the same time, that the international regime theory can be informed by the theoretically-oriented literature on domestic policy-making processes (Bennett, 1991a). The conceptual similarity between policy transfer and constructivism or neo-cognitivism in international relations is notable as both central sets of theory focus on the role of knowledge, ideas and values and on intersubjectivity which attempts to explain how these elements shape the understanding of policy actors and policy-making processes. By integrating these two bodies of theory it would be possible to examine how a government perceived an emerging international consensus then developed or adapted a particular policy or programme. As Stone discusses, the concept of policy transfer "may illuminate the circumstances in which ideas, knowledge and learning prevail over interests, resource constraints and real-politik in policy making" (original emphasis, 1999: 54).

In this regard, the realist concern over relative gain and the neoliberals claim of absolute gain within international relations could help us to understand states' involvement in policy transfer. Neoliberal accounts could be useful, for example, for the analysis of indirect coercive policy transfer to examine the way states perceive the degree of gain from cooperation with an international consensus or in negotiated cooperation.
However, for James and Lodge (2003), the dimensions of the policy transfer continuum 'collapses' the different dimensions of rationality and the degree of coercion, which have been identified in the Diagram 2.1. They claim the existing literature on institutional approaches and theories which have focused on the power of ideas can serve the objective that the concept of policy transfer aims to deliver. James and Lodge instead suggest the alternatives derived from the globalisation and internationalisation bodies of literature, which are drawn to "both ideas- and institution-based accounts to offer various explanations for how policy-makers are influenced by forces beyond the domestic context" (2003: 186). Focusing on the context of the relationship between structure and agency the dimensions of policy transfer, direct coercive policy transfer in particular, can capture the processes and the extent to which international policy regimes influence the actors involved in policy transfer. Whereas Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identify the conventional three levels (international, national and local levels) of governance within which policymakers could be involved, it is useful to suggest a 'multi-level policy transfer analysis' which incorporates global, transnational and international levels of structure with an understanding of the roles played by agent(s) and network of agents as a micro-level analysis which takes account of the structure of states that influences the 'political desirability' of policy transfer (see Evans & Davies, 1999). As has been argued throughout this Chapter, the growing number and impact of international governmental organisations, international and transnational non-governmental organisations as well as epistemic communities have shaped the global public policy agenda. Acknowledging the significance of these non-domestic factors, it is possible to explain how interactions of state, non-state, transnational and international actors force a state to engage with an international policy agenda and participate in an international policy regime.

2.4.4 Globalisation and sport

What would then be the implication of globalisation for sport? Sport is often categorised as part of the cultural sphere and the impact of global culture, as illustrated in 2.4.2, can be understood in relation to the concept of homogenisation, as expressed as 'progressive cosmopolitanism' and 'cultural imperialism', the repression of national, local and ethnic distinctiveness, heterogenisation and glocalisation. This section reviews different conceptualisations of globalisation along with the acknowledgement of sport as a cultural product, an area of economic activity or commercial sector, an organisational infrastructure for sport and sport as a political resource or political arena. In accordance with these four
elements, this section summarises with the debate over the 'reach' of globalisation and the 'response' of local communities.

**The impact of globalisation on sport**

### a. Cultural dimensions

As has been demonstrated, three different views of the 'global culture' of sport may be identified. The first view is that sport has become 'commodified' due to the influence of the media as well as sports goods and merchandises produced by multinational companies. The proliferation of media either through newspaper, radio, national and satellite television or internet has a crucial role in popularising sport within and beyond the border. It has become increasingly the case that the mega sport events like the Olympic Games and the Men's FIFA World Cup and some international sporting bodies generate vast revenue through sponsorship and television rights, resulting in a situation in which they are now inseparable from television and advertisement income (Sugden & Thomlinson, 1998a). The role of media in the development of sport has become incredibly significant in view of the expansion of "media-sport-cross-ownership" where around twenty top clubs in basketball, soccer, baseball and hockey are owned by the media corporations (Cashmore, 2000: 283; 314-5). Within the first perspective of cultural dimensions of sport, it is also conceived that the sport heroes are now 'commodities', one of the earlier prominent examples of which is NIKE's paying Michael Jordan £10m in order to sell its shoes in 1992.

The notion of 'cross-ownership' of media in sport should be highlighted in that it has influenced the rules, formats and scheduling of sport and prioritised quantity over quality (see Cashmore, 2000). As early as the 1970s, American Football had been criticised as a 'boring' game due to an absence of high scores, to which, NFL Rules Committee took a radical action to increase the rate of scoring by changing the rule to heighten the action for television audiences. The same claim is made with regard to boxing which reduced the number of rounds from 15 to 12 not because of consideration for boxers' health and safety, but because of the television requirement to fit the rounds into one-hour television slot (Cashmore, 2000). It is conceived that these examples of television-driven globalisation of sport is conceptualised as "sport/media complex" (Jhally, 1989) or "media-sports-culture complex" (Rowe, 1999), in which sport is commodified for the global marketing to suit the interests of the media. Rigauer argues that athletes themselves and their achievements are transformed
into commodities, sold and exchanged for equivalent money values, allowing a “dehumanized” quantification of athletes (1981: 68).

The second perspective on globalisation in sport can be termed as ‘cultural imperialism’ which is also based on a Marxist standpoint and relates to the first conception of commodification. It is perceived that the dissemination of capitalist culture is driven by economic factors and the international competitiveness in sport reflects the domination by capitalism of world economy. This is explicitly suggested by Guttman who argues that “a nation that exercises political or economic power often, although not always, intentionally and unintentionally, also exercise cultural power” (1994: 177). It is described that modern sport was diffused through the informal and formal British Empire (Mason, 1989) and it is further suggested that the international diffusion of sport is bound up with the development of international relations such that virtually “all major sports in the current world sporting system originate from countries that have been among the major world powers” (Van Bottenburg, 2001: 43). The American influence on Australia (McKay & Miller, 1991) and Canada (Kidd, 1991) has been researched as examples of global cultural flows. The domination of economically powerful countries in the international sporting competition can also be highlighted. It is interesting to suggest that the G8 countries, who provide 65% of world trade, accounted for just under a half of all gold medals and 44% of all medals at the Sydney Olympic Games and 42% at the Athens Games (Houlihan, 2003a; 2008a).

From an explicit Marxist position, John Hargreaves (1982a) stressed that exploitative economic relations have been promoted through the consumption of sporting products and services and in this sense the Olympic Games reinforces an ideology of physical, powerful masculinity intended to increase the productivity of workers. The migration of sport players and athletes is illustrative of the global ‘division of labour’ which highlights the structural centrality of Europe (Maguire & Stead, 1997). Magee and Sugden utilise Wallerstein’s capitalist economic model to illustrate the globalisation of soccer and the pattern of labour migration which consisted of: the core of Europe; the semi-periphery of South and Central America; periphery of Africa; and the external area of Asia and North America (2002: 428). This linear migration pattern can be criticised as an economic-deterministic model which assumes it corresponds with the liberalisation of world trade, the development of transnational capital and a deregulated media (Miller et al, 2001: Ch.2). Specifically referring to hosting of the major international competitions, Allison and Monnington argue that it has become “a mere dream of most countries rather than a realisable ambition” which, if it were to be realised would lead to the “inevitable need to turn to external funding agencies to support project”, which would “re-kindled images of neo-colonialism and economic
dependency” (2005: 22). However, in their examination of economic significance of the ‘Japanese baseball labour’, Takahashi and Horne (2006) analyse that the Japanese player migration has not only brought a mutual benefit for both the Major League Baseball (MLB) in the United States and the Nippon Professional Baseball in Japan, but also, most significantly, extended the opportunities of Japanese capital and baseball players into North America and East Asia, specifically South Korea, Taiwan and China, where the popularity in baseball has also increased due to the presence of Japanese players in MLB. In this regard, they stress “economics underpins the movements of workers, including the transnational sports migration” (ibid, 85).

In contrast, micro-level analysis of personal experiences of sport labour migration suggests the pattern of migration behaviour does not necessarily equate to economic dominance. McGovern (2002) argues that the migration patterns of players are socially embedded in a range of social ties and networks and that there is a tendency towards a ‘homosocial reproduction’ to employ those players with cultural similarities due to a lack of reliable information and uncertainty of players’ performances. While he acknowledges that soccer players are ‘commodified’ in terms of global trade between the employers, McGovern stresses that these patterns of migration are the process of socially exclusive internationalisation which is unlikely to be indicative of a truly global labour market since it is also regulated and governed by national or regional regulations and that the market behaviour is influenced by political, social and historical relations between societies. The labour migration of sport players and athletes could be interpreted as cultural imperialism by Europe and America but it is more persuasive to argue that labour mobility is based on the nation-states’ regulations as well as social criteria, which would be far from the hyperglobalists’ claim of the existence of a global labour market. What could be seen as a more appropriate claim for internationalisation is the various responses of local culture to globalisation, which could be highlighted as resistance, reinterpretation or adaptation of global culture. Klein (1998), for instance, examined the way baseball became the vehicle for the redefinition of the cultural product of baseball against the American cultural hegemony in the Dominican Republic, and James (1963) discussed the way in which cricket became the vehicle for the expression of colonial resistance in West Indies. The interaction of the global and local can also be illustrated by the extent to which, on the one hand, participation in global sport is undertaken while, on the other, culturally specific sports are maintained in the national context. The creation of Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) and the revival and support of Gaelic games, both of which could be seen as expressions of resistance against English rules, are good example of the ambivalence towards global sport when the Irish also
maintain the participation in those sports with English-origin as well as government's recent interest in high performance Olympic discipline sport (Bairner, 2001).

The third perspective on the cultural dimension in sport is about the changing nature and complexities of nationalism and national identity that are expressed in sport (see Dyreson, 2003). In this context two types of research can be found. It is argued that, on the one hand, national and local identity has been undermined by the globalisation process, and on the other, that the re-emphasis or (re-)invention of national and local identity has been strongly prompted as a response to globalisation. Miller et al provide an example of the former with reference to the way in which 'Canadianness' in ice hockey had lost its "mythical nation-building functions" and symbolism of national superiority following the first defeat against the USSR in 1972 and the rapid increase in the number of hockey players in Canada from the Czech Republic, Finland, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden and America (2001: 55-6; see also Gruneau & Whitson, 1993). Within the 'modernisation' literature, it is often claimed that sport is utilised as a political tool for re-emphasising national identity, enhancing national prestige, securing legitimacy of government, compensating for other aspects of life within their boundaries as well as pursuing international rivalries by 'peaceful' means (Hargreaves, 1992). Although Cronin may be being too deterministic in claiming an 'inevitable' link between sport and politics in general and nationalism in particular because "sport is political, and has a long history of political intervention and value judgement" (1999: 54), it would be appropriate to note the significance of 'sportive nationalism' which illustrates not a single generic phenomenon but a complicated socio-political response to both sportive and non-sportive challenges and events (Hoberman, 1993: 18). The complexity of analysing the relationship between sport and nationality and national identity is emphasised in the case of the United Kingdom which embraces four nations within the state and the Scottish, Welsh and Irish national identity and political attitudes can be expressed through sport, especially soccer and rugby (see McCrone, 1992; Jarvie & Walker, 1994; Bairner, 1994; Harvie, 1994). It should be noted that the 'reinvention' of national identity and nationalism would not necessarily be derived internally but may be defined and confirmed externally with socio-historic and cultural elements strongly linked to the expression of national identity in the foreign media.

Within the context of globalisation, international sporting events which are normally represented by states tend to reveal the complexities of cultural and political identities where no single identity but rather multiple identities can be found related to 'lower-levels of attachment' such as ethnicity, gender or age. Tomlinson claims that sports are "globalizing as well as globalized" and "embody dramatically the tensions of the global/local dualism, offering as they do forms of sub-global identity and affiliation within the globalized discourses
of international sporting contacts and exchanges" (1996: 589-90). It can be suggested that sport reflects a dual dimension of 'globalisation' both as a process and as a balancing factor in the 'global/local dualism'. Hogan (2003) examines the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games which indicate both local significance in the global sense and the tensions between tradition and change, which Yamashita (2005) specifically focuses on, in his analysis of the opening ceremony of the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympic Games and the dynamic interactions between 'supra-national Olympic ideal' and nationalism, national identity or 'Japaneseness' in the Japanese sporting context. On the sporting scene, it can be observed that both elements of localisation and globalisation appear, which could be seen as reflecting both fragmentation and integration. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that insofar as international major sporting events like the Olympic Games are organised on the basis of states and take place at a particular site, the significance of the state and state territoriality still remain as the reference points for the organisation of international sport, the identity of athletes and the support provided to athletes (Houlihan, 2003a).

b. Economic globalisation in sport

It has been implied that the cultural change is largely driven by a growing economic interests in sport. The dimension of economic effects in sport refers to the expansion of businesses in sport and the 'commercialisation' of sport. Sport can be a source of profit in its own right but it is also seen as a vehicle for the 'globalisation of consumerism' (McKay & Miller, 1991: 93). The sport industry constitutes sport delivery services, sport products and sport support services. Many multinational corporations in sport such as NIKE and Adidas take a 'multivocal' approach to extend their brand image by collaborating with national soccer heroes or capitalising the local market on the basis of global appeal. Silk and Andrews consider NIKE's approach as the "transnational reconstitution of the cultural experiences of football" and, at the same time, the representation of the "elements of particular localities" through commercially inspired representations of locality (2001: 198).

As such, three general trends in economic globalisation in sport can be observed. Firstly, there has been a rapid expansion in the global market for sport products. Gratton and Taylor note that "sport sponsorships is a $20 billion global industry, dominated by the USA, which accounts for a quarter of the total. It is estimated to be growing at an annual rate of 10 percent..." (2000: 177). As touched upon in the earlier discussion of the cultural impact of global sport products, it is increasingly the case that such global sport manufacturers are appealing to the world market and seek to dominate the market of sporting goods.
Nevertheless, it is also becoming difficult to identify the fixed places of manufacturing/production or creation of markets and the commodity chain has become more complex (Jackson, 2002).

Secondly, a large number of international sport organisations have become profit-making bodies which shape the process of commercialisation of sport. It can be suggested that the international governing bodies of sport ‘monopolise’ the membership of national bodies and can use their power over athletes and players to set the conditions of their participation in competitions, and to organise globally marketable mega events which ensure the involvement of the media and sponsors. For example, FIFA requires every soccer player to register with one national association and regulates the status of players and the provisions of their transfer and also promotes a comprehensive global marketing structure encapsulated in the slogan ‘Think Globally, Act Locally’, the same strategy adopted by many MNCs. The establishment of its own marketing division, FIFA Marketing & TV AG, in May 2001 (following the bankruptcy of its former marketing-partner ISL resulted in the launch of the FIFA Sponsorship Programme, 2007-2014, which was the catalyst to create its own official partners, official suppliers and licensing as well as official emblem for ensuring maximum visibility of FIFA products. It is noted that FIFA also obtains a large profit by selling the television rights for the World Cup and it is estimated that the 2006 World Cup in Germany reached a total number of 26.29 billion global audience with 376 channels broadcasting in 214 countries and territory, dedicating 73,000 hours of dedicated programme.

Table 2.5: Olympic Marketing Revenue of the past three quadrenniums*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td>1,251,000,000</td>
<td>1,845,000,000</td>
<td>2,230,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOP Programme</td>
<td>279,000,000</td>
<td>579,000,000</td>
<td>663,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Sponsorship</td>
<td>534,000,000</td>
<td>655,000,000</td>
<td>796,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticketing</td>
<td>451,000,000</td>
<td>625,000,000</td>
<td>411,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>115,000,000</td>
<td>66,000,000</td>
<td>87,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,630,000,000</td>
<td>$3,770,000,000</td>
<td>$4,187,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from IOC, 2006a: 16
Note: *All figures in the chart have been rounded to the nearest $1 million.

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7 FIFA announces that the television coverage was ‘the most extensive’ with the increase of 76.4% of total coverage hours over the 2002 event and there was a ‘vast increase’ in broadcasting channels (376 channels compared to 232 channels in 2002). See: http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/marketing/tv/factsfigures/tvdata.html (last accessed 18 January 2008).
An almost similar trend can be identified in relation to the IOC's increased revenue through its five major Olympic Marketing programmes, in which the TOP Programme and broadcasting are managed by the IOC while domestic sponsorship, licensing and ticketing are managed by the OCOGs. It is stated that one of the main objectives of marketing programmes is to "ensure the independent financial stability of the Olympic Movement, and thereby to assist in the worldwide promotion of Olympism" (IOC, 2006a: 15). Table 2.5 shows the Olympic Marketing revenue for the past three quadrenniums, which illustrates the considerable increase in revenue from broadcasting. Some broadcasting revenue is provided to the Olympic Solidarity who then allocates funding to National Olympic Committees. It is reported that the 2006 Turin Winter Olympic Games generated $83 million in broadcasting revenue and the total broadcast revenue of the 2004 Athens Summer Olympic Games was $1,476.9 million (IOC, 2005). Preuss categorises the characteristics of the IOC's strategy in marketing or commercial exercises to suggest that the 'fundamental change' had occurred in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games when the financial independence of the Olympic Movement was demonstrated, and which subsequently led to the IOC seeking to monopolise any commercial opportunities associated with the Olympic logos and image (2003: 253-7).

What could be seen as the crucial element of economic globalisation in sport is the proactive involvement of central government and local government in sport, in particular for the bidding and hosting of sporting mega events. Preuss highlights the multiple 'interest groups' engaged in hosting the Olympic Games, which include: IOC members, state politicians, politicians of the host city, the local construction industry, national sponsors, and TV networks (2003: 258-261). What this suggests is the myriad of short-term and long-term political and commercial concerns of interest groups, although the involvement of states can be characterised in five ways: i) creating additional job opportunities; ii) the 'ripple effect' in economy; iii) attracting business and visitors to the local business; iv) attracting the regional, local and international media, which raises the recognition of the host city; and v) psychological and sociological benefits for the citizen of being associated with a sports event and possibly a winning team (Lavoie, 2000: 165-6). These elements were notable in the Candidate File for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (London 2012 Candidate City, 2004). Notwithstanding that each city or country has its own values and objectives, it is extremely difficult to calculate the actual effect and impact of bidding and hosting of the major international sport competitions. It is also suggested by Preuss (2003) that the complexities of being a host country, which requires a huge public sector financial investment as well as the resources to manage the demands of investors as well as tourists, creates 'winners and losers'. The associated image of corruption or opaqueness of international sporting governing bodies like FIFA, whose "reputation has been tarnished", could potentially be a damaging effect on
attracting a wide range of commercial sponsors (Guardian, 03 May 2002). The negative image of gigantism of mega events could be a detrimental factor in relation to the increasing criticism over the urban transformation and the construction of new sport facilities (Essex & Chalkley, 1998; 1999). In summary, economic elements of globalisation in sport can be characterised as an intense process of commercialisation in which sport is seen as business or franchise opportunities and sport organisations and clubs themselves are commercially-oriented to seek various revenue sources.

c. Development of global organisational infrastructure for sport

Although theorists give differing emphasis to the various elements of ‘modern sport’, there seems to be a consensus that one of its significant features is the formation, development, maintenance and expansion of both governmental and non-governmental regional/continental and international sport governing bodies (see Guttmann, 1978; 1994). Since the end of the 19th century, there has been a significant increase in the number and activities of sport-related state and non-state actors, which can be classified as international governmental organisations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), although many operate “in a ‘grey area’” between state and civil society (Houlihan, 1994b: 56).

Table 2.6: Selected examples of Sport INGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Regional/sub-regional/interregional</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single sport</td>
<td>IAAF, FIFA, FIBA, UCI, ITF, International Ski Fed.</td>
<td>Each continental federations for sport (e.g. UEFA, Confederation of African Football)</td>
<td>Each national governing bodies of sport</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Houlihan, 1994b: 57

Especially from the 1970s, the following processes can be perceived to have resulted in the ‘organisational globalisation’ of sport: an increase in number, size and influence of INGOs; the increased number of national governing bodies participating in and interacting with IGOs and INGOs; and a growing number of issues and values (related to athletes/players as well
as to the non-sport global agenda) that INGOs and IGOs need to deal with or cooperate with states and governmental organisations. Before discussing various organisations involved in sport and their roles and responsibilities, it should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this section to describe all the functions and activities of INGOs and IGOs and to illustrate the wide variety of interactions between sport INGOs whether they are global, national, regional, sub-regional or interregional. To aid our understanding of the organisational complexity, Table 2.6 is provided to demonstrate the range of INGOs organised by purpose or specialism and the geographical spread.

It would be nonetheless useful to differentiate between sport INGOs and IGOs, along the lines of the Olympic Movement and the degree of states' involvement, and to identify their engagement in sport globalisation. The former are generally represented by the particular sport disciplines and areas or event-specific bodies which are recognised by the IOC and/or have affiliations by national governing bodies of sport involving different levels of sport actors, whereas the latter consist of governmental organisations to which states provide support and set a regulatory framework. Sport INGOs can be further divided into those sport bodies that are associated with the Olympic Movement and with international sports federations (IFs) (Houlihan, 1994b: 60). These sport INGOs (Olympic Movement and IFs) and IGOs will be accordingly overviewed below.

**Sport INGOs**

- **The Olympic Movement**

The structure of Olympic Movement is hierarchical in a sense that the International Olympic Committee (IOC), as a supreme body to promote the Olympism, requires compliance with the Olympic Charter and accepts/rejects the members of Olympic Movement. The Olympic Charter is defined as “the codification of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, Rules and Bye-Laws adopted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It governs the organisation, action and operation of the Olympic Movement and sets forth the conditions for the celebration of the Olympic Games” (IOC, 2007: 9). It is interesting to observe that the IOC requires all members of Olympic Movement to comply with the Olympic Charter, which specifies “the main reciprocal rights and obligations” of those constituents of the Olympic Movement. Diagram 2.2, though illustrated in simplistic terms, demonstrates the complex network of INGOs established around the IOC and the three clusters of organisations and groups in the Olympic Movement that can be identified. The first cluster is in principle those organisations closely related to the Olympic Games, which include: i) the Organising Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOG); ii) the National Olympic Committees (NOCs);
and iii) the International Federation (IFs, see below). The NOCs are represented at the world level through the Association of National Olympic Committee (ANOC; made up of 205 NOCs as of January 2008), which is divided into five continental Committees (Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa, ANOCA; Pan American Sports Organisation, PASO; Olympic Council of Asia, OCA; Oceania National Olympic Committees, ONOC, and the European Olympic Committees, EOC).

Diagram 2.2: Organisational structure for the Olympic Movement

The second cluster of the Olympic Movement consists of the specialised Commissions which seek to promote the ideals and values of Olympism. The Commissions contain not only sport-related personnel, including sport officials and athletes, but also those individuals who have technical and specialist knowledge and are engaged in a number of global issues such as the protection of environment, women and sport, human development; human rights and peace through the Olympic Truce. The final cluster contains independent ‘partner’ bodies which share ‘common interests’ with the Olympic Movement, including, the Council of Arbitration for Sport (CAS, founded in 1983); the International Committee for Fair Play (CIFP, founded in 1963); the International Paralympic Committee (IPC); the World Anti-Doping...
Agency (WADA, founded in 1999); and the World Olympians Association (WOA, founded in 1994).

The relationship between the IOC and WADA is interesting in relation to the global promotion of drug-free sport. As for the IOC, even though the IOC Medical Commission had been responsible for the fight against doping since its creation in 1967, its activity was seen as a 'failure' and 'ineffective' particularly in the face of the scandal of the 1998 Tour de France (Dimeo, 2007; Houlihan, 2002a). WADA is a 'hybrid' partnership organisation with even representation between the Olympic Movement and governments on the Foundation Board as the 'supreme decision-making body' (38 members) and the Executive Committee as the 'ultimate policy-making body' (12 members). Richard Pound, the first WADA President (resigned in January 2008), mentioned that the harmonised and collaborative representation "send[s] the powerful message that when government and sport coordinate efforts, the fight against doping gains efficiency" and it is "the fundamental rationale behind the World Anti-Doping Code (Code)" (WADA, 2006 Issue 3: 1). According to WADA it is "the international, independent monitoring watchdog of the global fight against doping in sport and [the] custodian of the World Anti-Doping Code (Code)" and regularly monitors the activities of sports and governments in relation to Code acceptance, implementation and compliance as well as being engaged in research, accreditation of anti-doping laboratories and the promotion of anti-doping outreach and education programmes (emphasis added, WADA 2006 Issue 3: 6). As a 'watchdog' and 'custodian', WADA coordinates and monitors compliance by governments and NOCs (WAD Code 2003, Article 23.5.1), as well as sending teams of 'Independent Observers' and for 'Athlete Outreach' to the Olympic and Paralympics Games and international championships. Importantly, when WADA's headquarters were moved to Montreal from Lausanne, WADA's Foundation Board agreed to establish Regional Anti-Doping Offices in four continents (Cape Town, Africa; Tokyo, Asia/Oceania; Montevideo, Latin America; and Lausanne, Europe). By sharing the core roles and responsibilities of WADA, it is expected that the five offices (including WADA Headquarter in Montreal for North American region) "best know and understand the needs of the continents in which they live and have great responsibility in ensuring that WADA's work is best tailored to suit these needs" (WADA, 2004 Issue 1: 2). The WADA Regional Anti-Doping Organizations (RADO) are intended to play a facilitative role in promoting anti-doping principles within each National Anti-Doping Agency (NADO).

As a global independent organisation and as a Swiss Private law Foundation, the principle responsibilities of WADA are to coordinate and monitor the implementation of World Anti-Doping Code which is intended to ensure the harmonisation of anti-doping policies across
public authorities and sports and to monitor the proceedings of adverse analytical findings. As such, the World Anti-Doping Programme encompasses three levels: the WAD Code ('Level 1', mandatory requirement) has formalised a set of principles, statutes, strategic plans, a governance and a finance system⁹; the accompanied four International Standards (known as 'Level 2') as the mandatory document sets the four standards (for the Prohibited List; Therapeutic Use Exemptions; Laboratories; and Testing); and the Models of Best Practice ('Level 3', not mandatory) which provide recommended practices to the Signatories. On the adoption of the Code, a hierarchical nature of organisational framework underpinning the principle of 'Play True' was established to clarify the roles and responsibilities of 'Signatories' or stakeholders. It is WADA's assigned responsibility under the WAD Code to undertake a series of regular reviews and consultations in relation to the WAD Code⁹ and the List of Prohibited Substances and Methods (updated every year) which is open to the stakeholders for comment that can also characterise the element of 'harmonisation' across different stakeholders. It can be assumed, on the one hand, that the financially dependent status of WADA both on the IOC and on the governments and other public authorities, including the Council of Europe, would constrain its activities and it may consequently be pressured to reflect the patrons' interests, and on the other hand, that its 'impartial' status could facilitate the achievement of the implementation of harmonised rule in all sport and all countries. It can be further identified that the status of WADA has been enhanced by the unanimously ratified International Convention Against Doping in Sport at the UNESCO General Conference in October 2005¹⁰, which allows governments, for the first time, to implement the Code in the national policy.

The formation of WADA and its subsequent development of governance structures may have undermined the 'supremacy' of IOC over the anti-doping issue. The Olympic Charter was amended in 2003 to state that the adoption of the Code is mandatory for all members of the Olympic Movement. Nevertheless, it is fair to argue that the IOC is still dominant among constituents of the Olympic Movement through establishing a set of binding rules under the Olympic Charter and the Olympic Movement Medical Code, which state that the IOC Code "complements and reinforces the World Anti-Doping Code" and should apply not only to the Olympic Games but also to international championships hosted by the IFs and all competitions to which the IOC "grants its patronage or support" or which are "practiced within the Olympic Movement" (IOC, 2006b: Preamble 3 and 4). Including the previous argument

⁹ The 2003 World Anti-Doping Code went through three consultation processes in order to enhance the anti-doping programmes. The Code Review Team was formed in February 2006 and called the feedback to all stakeholders. The Version 3.0 of revised Code was accepted in the WADA Foundation Board Meeting during the World Conference on Doping in Sport hosted in Madrid in November 2007.
about the roles of IOC, these elements of explicit expressions of institutional arrangements and the determined promotion of the principles of Olympism highlight some characteristics of the international policy regimes for doping, which may expect the convergence of expectations of those participants in the Olympic Movement.

- **International Sports Federations (IFs)**

As early as 1881, the first international federation was created for gymnastics, which was followed in 1892 by international federations for rowing and skating. As noted earlier, it is well documented how the international sports federations evolved to standardise the rules and to make it possible to cooperate and coordinate international competitions and fixtures under the uniform rules (c.f. Guttmann, 1978). All national federations or governing bodies of sport are affiliated with the respective IFs. However, very few Olympic IFs possess extensive resources, except for possibly FIFA, IAAF and International Tennis Federation (ITF), with the consequence that representative bodies of IFs developed to play a coordinating role for the IFs particularly in their negotiations with the IOC. It is recognised that the General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF), founded in 1967, has become "an established part of the cluster of key sports INGOs" (Houlihan, 1994b: 61) aiming to promote communication and cooperation across different disciplines. Both associations for Olympic IFs (Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, ASOIF consisted of 28 IFs; Association of the International Olympic Winter Sports Federations, AIOWF consisted of 7 IFs, as of 2008) are concerned to maximise their benefits from the Olympic sport, whereas the Association of the IOC Recognised International Sports Federations (ARISF), consisted of those sports like sumo, life saving and chess, which are seeking to enhance their global influence (see Diagram 2.2; Houlihan, 1994b).

It can be pointed out that the relationship between the IOC and some IFs could be conflicting. On one hand, the IOC defines the mission and role of IFs within the Olympic Movement, one of which is to "contribute to the achievement of the goals set out in the Olympic Charter, in particular by way of the spread of Olympism and Olympic education" (IOC, 2007: Chapter 27.1-1.3) and, on the other hand, some IFs may seek financial autonomy to protect their own initiatives and interests through organising international, continental and regional competitions on a regular basis and marketing and sponsorship activities. What could be seen as a primary concern of the Olympic IFs is the potential loss of autonomy to the IOC, hence the loss of control over the development of their sport (Houlihan, 1994b: 65). These fears could be understood as resulting from the IOC's growing financial contribution to Olympic IFs, in which $190 million was distributed to the summer Olympic IFs from the
marketing revenue of 2000 Sydney Games compared to $86.6 million in 1996 Atlanta Games (IOC, 2006a: 19). It would be only the major sport IFs (such as IAAF and FIFA) which are wealthy enough to have the potential to break away from the Olympic Movement and also sustain their global role in relation to ‘social responsibility’ and ‘humanitarian’ activities. While the disputes between FIFA and the IOC are widely acknowledged (such as Under-23 rule) (see Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998a), it can be suggested that most of the IFs operate with financial constraints that require them to stay within the Olympic Movement (Hill, 1992: 65-7).

It can be observed that the tensions or ambivalent relations between the IOC and the IFs may be illustrative of the previous discussions about economic aspects of globalisation in sport, where the extent of independence in decision-making is greatly shaped by the IOC. It can be summarised that while the wealth of an organisation and its discretion over policy decision is varied, it should not be assumed that because many sport INGOs struggle over financial independence they are in opposition to the principles and values of the Olympic Movement and especially its association with commercialisation and professionalisation of sport (Houlihan, 1994b: 79). Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that further consideration should be given, through empirical study, to the capacity of both national and international non-governmental bodies to maintain their independence from the influence and interests of government.

**Sport IGOs**

There has been a notable increase in the number of intergovernmental organisations concerned with sport. The long-established IGOs with a significant interest in or impact on sport can be divided into two: the first are organised around the United Nations (UN); and the others are established on a continental or regional level, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. Houlihan points out that these three IGOs are particularly interesting in relation to the impact of globalisation on sport due to “their capacity to shape sport policy at state level through the control of important resources” (1994b: 83).

- **United Nations**

The most recent growing proactive involvement of the UN in sport can be identified when the former Secretary General, Kofi Annan, acknowledged the ‘power of sport’ to serve the UN’s objectives for development and peace. A special adviser, Adolf Ogi, was subsequently appointed on this matter and the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for

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Development and Peace was published in 2004, which led to proclamation of the International Year for Sport and Physical Education in 2005. These developments have brought 10 UN specialised agencies, programmes and fund with varying degree into the projects concerning the aspects of sport, which include the International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Human Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNESCO. UNESCO, multidisciplinary body of education, science and culture, represents its engagement in the promotion of physical education and physical activities to all and the recent engagement in a programme called ‘International Development through Sport’ is prominent. The most significant contribution of UNESCO to sport in the recent years has been its preparation and promotion of the International Convention against Doping in Sport in October 2005 which required the states either to indicate their respective ratification, acceptance, approval or accession on or before 31st December 2006, and which successfully entered into force on the 1st February 2007. The role of UNESCO and its Convention in anti-doping is substantial insofar as it has not only given legitimacy to WADA and the WAD Code but it has also stressed the collective obligation of government to be engaged in the fight against doping in sport. UNDP is also engaged in the HIV/AIDS campaign through the African Cup of Nations tournaments while UNICEF published Sport, Recreation and Play in 2004 to support children’s right to play and physical play based on the Convention on the Rights of the Child12.

The European Union

Both European Union and the Council of Europe are particularly important intergovernmental regional organisations which identify sport as the area of policy interest and as a political tool. Henry (2008) identifies five general rationales to justify EU ‘intervention’ in sport: i) economic regulation of transnational movement and trade; ii) implementations of sport-related schemes to regenerate and redevelop national economies; iii) to combat social exclusion and promote social integration through sport; iv) an ideological tool to unite the EU and to promote the cultural identity of European citizens; and v) the promotion of international relations through sport. One of the most tangible interventionist examples of the EU’s endeavours can be found in the Bosman ruling which confirmed the application of the laws on freedom of movement of professional athletes and players between clubs (see Parrish, 2003; Parrish & McArdle, 2004).

Further developments of the EU's intervention in sport can be found in the Amsterdam Declaration (1997) and Nice Declaration on Sport (2001) and, more significantly, from the Draft Constitution for Europe (2004), which outlined the competence of the EU in sport, and from the European Year of Education through Sport of 2004 to use sport as a promotional means of education. The most crucial development in EU policy is the adoption of the White Paper on Sport which intends to "give strategic orientation on the role of sport in Europe" and to "enhance the visibility of sport in EU policy-making" in which three aspects of sport are highlighted, that is, a societal role to contribute to creating the cultural identity, economic dimension and sporting organisation in Europe (Commission of the European Community, 2007: 2-3). The Action Plan for the White Paper is more explicit about the role of the EU and sport which is defined as subject to the application of EU Law.

In relation to the on-going discussions about the impact of globalisation 'reach', the relationship between the EU and member states is seen as "both complementary and competitive" and as negotiations and a response to a complex global context (Henry, 2008: 528). Parrish (2003) argues that the commercialisation of European sport is so considerable that the EU's expanded agendas in sport would not be achievable. Nevertheless, much detailed examination is required to analyse whether the expanding centralisation of power of the EU and the growing interests of EU in sport would lead to undermining or diminishing national sport policy.

The activities of the Council of Europe (CoE) in sport, physical education and anti-doping have played an important role in providing the pan-European forum for sport, which shaped domestic policy. Created in 1949 by ten non-communist European states, 47 member countries with five observer countries, including Japan, the CoE is engaged in four main activity areas, one of which is in education, culture and heritage and youth and sport. The "European Sport for All Charter" adopted in 1975 laid a comprehensive framework for sport. This was then built into the "European Sport Charter", adopted in 1992 and revised in 2001, which provides a definition of sport and affirms a universal right to engage in sport and physical activities. The Committee for the Development of Sport (CDDS) comprising of representatives of member states and the sport movement was established in 1977 and became responsible for promoting CoE values (human rights, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law) in and through sport. According to the CoE, the significance of strategic documents, such as the European Convention on Spectator Violence, the Anti-Doping Convention, and the Code of Sports Ethics, "did not simply influence sport on a European
level, but set a global standard for the healthy development of sport" (CoE, 2006: 5). In May 2007, the Committee of Ministers adopted the resolution to establish the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS) as a pan-European cooperative platform on sport. The EPAS functions to develop policy strategies, monitor the progress of European Sport Charter and coordinate strategic areas such as anti-doping, ethics and spectator violence.

Of particular importance in CoE initiatives in intergovernmental cooperation is its proactive anti-doping campaign. In the face of slow and sporadic progress in policy development on anti-doping, particularly within the IOC, the CoE adopted a number of recommendations concerning the use of drugs in sport.

To strengthen the European Anti-Doping Charter for Sport, the Anti-Doping Convention was signed in November 1989, and by January 2008 have been ratified by 48 countries which set standards and objectives that were a catalyst for promoting national and intergovernmental cooperation in relation to testing arrangements and the harmonisation of measures against doping. The Working Group of the Anti-Doping Convention is created not only to monitor the progress of the provisions of the Convention through the maintenance of a database on national anti-doping policies, but also to exchange information and hold workshops with the IOC, UNESCO, European Non-governmental Sports Organisations and the EU. The contribution of CoE to growing importance of the anti-doping agenda is reflected in WADA's decision to allocate two seats to the CoE on its Foundation Board. The Ad Hoc Committee European Co-Ordination Forum of World Anti-Doping Agency (CAHAMA) was created to coordinate the relationship between WADA, CoE and its member states, to facilitate the dissemination of information on WADA issues and to put forward an European public authority candidate for the post of Vice-Chair of WADA. It can be argued that despite the commitment of CoE to anti-doping policy the capacity and impact of the CoE seems to have become more limited in recent years and its role has been adapted to one of supporting WADA. It is questionable whether the role of the CoE in promoting a certain set of values and norms among member states as well as international sporting communities was compatible with a coordinating role in global anti-doping policy. It may also be argued that the growing interest of the EU in sport policy drew attention to the duplication of the work by CoE and that of the EU, with the latter better resourced to exercise influence over the direction of sport policy among EU countries.

As has been outlined, it is apparent that a significant number of sports-related international governmental organisations and non-governmental actors are engaged in a range of

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activities and global agendas. The intergovernmental entity can be characterised as active in relation to both 'globalisation' and 'internationalisation'. The Olympic Movement driven by the IOC may be transnational in order to promote its humanitarian principles and the IOC's active engagement in commercial activities can also illustrate its active participation in globalisation. In contrast, the IOC, as a 'supreme' body in sport, operates within the conventional state boundaries by setting the conditions of accreditation for the Olympic Games and for the recognition of NOCs. It would thus seem more plausible that, to the extent that the sport INGOs are constrained by the political framework and by the domestic legal or administrative system and by the intergovernmental instruments, it is within the regulatory state system that the sport INGOs operate. It may be reasonable to suggest, according to Houlihan, that "the globalising pressures affecting sport are located within a pattern of international governance where the state and international governmental organisations play a central, if not defining, role" (2004b: 59). The point about 'international governance' can be highlighted in the process of creating the World Anti-Doping Agency which has, after all, endorsed the hybrid representatives of both the Olympic Movement and public authorities and in the ratification of UNESCO Convention on Anti-Doping in order to provide the legislative means for the domestic policy formulation. While non-governmental organisations are the fundamental basis of the infrastructure of sport for setting rules and regulations and for accepting and rejecting member affiliation, it is important to pay more attention to the growing capacity of IGOs in promoting and regulating sport at the domestic and intergovernmental level and, accordingly, to the extent to which the states shape their policy in line with international requirements.

d. Globalisation and politics and/in sport

There are many examples that can illustrate interconnections between sport and politics. It is needless to note that within the Westphalia system each nation-state has its own distinct institutions for policy-making and jurisdiction within their distinctive socio-cultural, political, historical and economic circumstances. As examined in the previous sections, sport INGOs have ideals and principles that have the potential to influence national sport policies and it has become increasingly difficult for states to ignore the commercial, political and cultural importance of international sporting success and international sport mega events (particularly the Olympic Games) which attract a myriad global audience. While it is widely acknowledged (and criticised) that sport has been utilised as a political 'tool' in a variety of ways (see Allison, 1993; Allison & Monnington, 2005; Hargreaves, 1986a, b; Hill, 1992; Riordan & Krüger, 1999), we should be aware of the distinction between 'politics and sport' and 'politics in sport'.
The former illustrates the role of sport and the relationship of politics with sport in the public sphere, whereas the latter examines the sporting organisations or individuals in sport (such as coaches and state officials) and how they exercises power to pursue their own political interests. This section in particular pays attention to the former element in which sport is used as a political tool and resource to achieve certain non-sport objectives in the global context.

As previously noted, Allison and Monnington identify two principal political purposes for which states have used sport: "to sell themselves to enhance their image and to penalise international behaviour of which they disapprove" (2005: 5-6). One tangible illustration of the first motivation of states involvement in sport is the symbolic value of sport to states in demonstrating national prowess and enhancing the national image of the state both internally and externally. It is well documented that governments are willing to utilise sporting opportunities to gain recognition and enhance their reputation on the world stage. For example, South Korea was successful in hosting the 1988 Olympic Games under democratic government after twenty years of dictatorship and as for the example of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, it was a Catalan 'nationhood' as opposed to Spanish nation-state which was represented most effectively (Hargreaves, 2000). The financial and political support of bidding, hosting and participating in major sport competitions is another aspect of government's engagement in sport. The total number of bids for the Olympic Games, for instance, has been expanding since the 1988 Seoul Games. There were 20 cities in total with six finalists bidding for the 1992 Games, 24 cities for 1996 Games and 34 cities for the 2000 Games. The number of bidding cities for 2004 was twice as many as those for 1992, but only four finalists were chosen out of 58 bidders. While the IOC provides a guideline that governmental support is the primary condition for a bid city, it seems clear that during the campaign for the 2012 Olympic Games the involvement of head of the state was crucial in the successful bid (Guardian, 06 July 2005).

In relation to the second point of Allison and Monnington, it can be argued that not only is the 'positive image' of states promoted, but also the 'negative image' of certain political ideologies are highlighted through the means of sport or by utilising the international sport platform to criticise the political regime. As regards the 'political boycott' of international competitions, one famous example was led by the United States in its boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics in protest at the Soviet's Communist regime as well as the public motive of protesting against the invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in a more recent case, the 'power' of sport has been recognised through the engagement of the UN and some developed countries (e.g. Canada and the UK) as various projects for international
development through sport. The growing salience of the state's policy for international sporting success is reflected in governments' concern to establish a positive image of their states both domestically and internationally.

The increasing number of countries investing in elite athletes and specialist sport facilities and support programmes is referred to by Oakley and Green (2001) as 'a global sporting arms race' but are the strategies are becoming increasingly 'homogenised' (see also De Bosscher, 2008; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Houlihan & Green, 2008a; UK Sport/SPLISS, 2006). However, the increasing similarity between elite sport systems should not detract from the variation that still exists in both motives and processes. For example, China, according to Hong et al, is concerned to "develop elite sport and make China a superpower in the world" since it made its international re-appearance at the Olympics in 1984 (2005: 511). It is noted that the motive of the Chinese government is primarily linked to the 'open economic policy' of the 1970s, which necessitated competing against the 'West'. While the example of China can be understood in relation to globalisation pressures, the concern over the failure of British athletes in the 1950s and the increased profile of sport on the government's agenda were also largely derived from re-establishing British international and national prestige and from bringing health benefits to the citizens (more examination on this point, see Chapter 6).

Examples show that sport has become an important political resource and an arena for political action in relation to national and international objectives (Houlihan, 1997). It should be emphasised that the pattern of government decision-making and policy implementation is a commingling processes of globalisation and internationalisation. Within the arguably increasing uniformity of national elite sport systems and strategies for the promotion of participation in sport, there are a wide range of responses to the global phenomenon in sport and to the changing character of sport INGOs. Notwithstanding this, it can be suggested that sport is not only simply a passive resource for non-sport interests but is also a policy area where sport interest groups and sport INGOs interact at the transnational level and influence sovereign states and their policy decision-making processes.

2.4.5 Summarising globalisation concept

The theme of this section has been the examination of theory related to the analysis of the extent of the impact of globalisation on sport and on the role and capacity of states in sport. The chapter has also sought to examine frameworks for the analysis of ways in which
international governmental and non-governmental organisations for sport are shaped by and shape globalisation processes. Identifying globalisation as an outcome and as a process, the patterns of globalisation can be conceptualised by employing the ideas of globalisation 'reach' in relation to cultural, economic, organisational and political dimensions and the 'response' of the recipient society or targeted group. Table 2.7 below attempts to illustrate three categories of 'reaction' (passive, participative or conflictual) and to highlight the depth of penetration of sport globalisation to local culture. Houlihan suggests a 'total' and 'partial' reach of globalisation and he later introduces the ideal typology of 'globalised sport', 'internationalised sport' and 'multinationalised sport' in order to illustrate the range of possible globalisation trajectories (Houlihan, 1994a; 1994b; 2003a; 2004a). A passive response to the impact of globalisation is defined as either due to "an enthusiasm for the external culture" or "an inability to challenge the global culture", while a participative response is suggested as "a process of negotiation, bargaining, and accommodation and implies a sufficient control over resources to provide recipient cultures with leverage" (Houlihan, 1994a: 370-1). A conflictual relationship is defined as "the possession of sufficient resources to enable resistance" and as "a set of values that leads to rejection or attempted rejection of the global culture". It is notable that these three trajectories of globalisation, and the concepts of reach and response developed by Houlihan, highlight similar, if not synonymous, conceptualisations to those of three schools of thought discussed in the Section 2.4.2 (see Table 2.3).

It might be argued that the passive form of reaction to globalisation may reflect the hyperglobalists' claim that sport is 'globalised' assuming the retreat of states and decaying of distinct national identity, whereas sceptics may observe 'conflictual' reactions to the globalising reach of sport as an 'internationalised' nature of sport to which states and sport INGOs and IGOs play the role to regulate sport. The assumption of the transformationalists seems close to the assumption of 'participative' reactions that suggest not only that the state or national culture is greatly influenced by the economic interests of multinational companies or global broadcasting corporations but also states that retain a significant capacity to shape and mediate global influences. Nevertheless, it is essential to acknowledge that the conception of globalisation and the patterns of response to globalisation, i.e. reach, exhibit uneven, dynamic and complex processes in which the globalisation phenomena are influenced by national history and institutional culture and variously overtly embraced, adapted or rejected (Henry & ISLP, 2007). It may be more convincing to suggest that the recent feature of sport as global phenomena is an integral part of the growth of capitalism, often characterised as commercialisation, and the expansion of the global network of MNCs. However, caution is required not to overemphasise the extent, intensity and impact of the
globalisation process, which tends to dismiss the persistence of states' primary role in shaping globalisation influences on the nature of sport (Houlihan, 2004a).

Although Table 2.7 is provided as an illustration of patterns of globalisation, the capacity of globalisation to reach into society should be empirically examined. Global organisational infrastructure for sport seems to be expanding its capacity, but a systematic analysis of its 'reach' in national sport organisations and states is necessary to ascertain the extent of their impact. The discussions of this thesis that follows explore and highlight the pattern of state's engagement in national and global sport and the degree of influence of sport INGOs and IGOs and international policy regimes on the anti-doping and sport development system in Japan and the UK.

Table 2.7: Patterns of response to globalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depth of penetration by the global culture of local culture</th>
<th>Response The reaction of recipient culture</th>
<th>Conflictual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>‘Multinationalised sport’ – lobbying IOC to include non-Western sport in Olympics; adaptation of Western sport; ‘naturalisation’ of foreign athletes to compose a national team (changing sporting nationality); hybrid/multiple loyalty in sport; participation of supra-national or sub-national teams; diversified competition opportunities</td>
<td>‘Internationalised sport’ – exclusions of foreigners from traditional sport; regulate number of foreign players in national league; provide privileges to traditional culture; reinvention of local culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative</td>
<td>‘Global consumerism’; business pattern of 'Think Globally, Act Locally'; Glocalisation; protecting domestic clubs/leagues but involved in global brand marketing and selling broadcasting rights</td>
<td>Anti-NIKE campaign; boycotting global brand; implement national framework of regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>Adoption of World Anti-Doping Code but at the same time seeking to secure the seat at the WADA Board; bid for major sporting competitions with the ideas of multiculturalism and urban regeneration; national athletes appeal to CAS</td>
<td>Withdrawing the national membership from IFs/IOC; organising regional body (eg. GANEFO); ignoring international regulations; state or NFs (legally) challenge the decisions of IFs/IOC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Houlihan, 2004a; 2003a; 1994a

Note: GANEFO is Games of the New Emerging Forces, organised to challenge the Western capitalist sport in the 1960s.
2.5 Conclusion

This Chapter has reviewed three main theoretical and analytical frameworks in relation to this study and discussed the relationship between them. One of the objectives of this study is to assess the utility of theory of international relations, theory of international policy regimes and globalisation concepts in relation to elite sport development and anti-doping policy in Japan and the UK. Firstly, the realist theory of international relations challenges us to acknowledge the degree of centrality of state and to conceptualise various non-state actors from different levels in the international realm in terms of their general subordination to state power. The realists' focus on sovereign states has been the dominant approach to the theorisation of international politics and the theory views the international system as 'anarchic' with states preoccupied with seeking to maximise their self-interest and the balance of power. It is acknowledged that conflict is always present and that the struggle for power and relative gain are primary determinants of the behaviour of states. It is argued that the basis of international participation is state sovereignty (with only a small number of exceptions). Realists further argue that states have considerable capacity and that governments are the central actors in the international sporting scene and who compete for international status, prestige and for international leadership in order to gain privileged access to, for example, hosting the major sport events and to sport knowledge and information. Central to the realist account is the use of sport as a tool of diplomacy and of managing and fostering intergovernmental relations as well as a domestic tool designed to achieve objectives, such as social inclusion, education, economic development, urban regeneration and nation-building. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, its preoccupation with military security notwithstanding, realist theory might be of value in examining the extent of states' preferences in expending resources on sport.

In contrast, neoliberals, arguing from a pluralist standpoint, question the assumptions of realism and the state-centric approach to understanding the increasing complexities of international politics, although neoliberals do not dismiss the significance of states. Rather, neoliberalism recognises that the world is composed of a multiplicity of actors and interests that exert influence on states and on the way that bargaining and negotiating processes affect international politics. Neoliberals, to a larger degree, highlight sub-national, supranational and transnational relations and their interdependencies, in which they examine the influences of international non-governmental organisations such as the IOC and IAAF, transnational organisations like WADA and civil society actors such as human rights or
environmental groups like Right To Play. The increasing number and complexities of international institutions and regulations in relation to sport can be examined by utilising a neoliberal account. Embracing the idea of sport-based international relations, neoliberals are also able to acknowledge the possibilities of cooperation and collaborations by reaching common sporting interests through negotiations.

Constructivists are driven by different epistemological questions from the previous two paradigms and this can be an essential supplementary paradigm to the previous two. Constructivists acknowledge the relationship between what actors do and what they are; emphasise the role and formation/ transformation of identity and interests through institutional norms, values and ideas that shape political action; and see society as constitutive realm, the site of which generates actors as knowledgeable social and political agents. The constructivist approach would be useful to examine the transformative influence of actors by asking questions concerning the motives of state officials to participate and invest resources in sport INGOs and how governments or NFs react towards the values or ideas of sport INGOs. For the purpose of the study, the neoliberal/international institutional approach of international relations supplemented by elements of constructivism with a focus on intersubjectivity might be of more persuasive than that of realism in order to comprehend the wide range of sport INGOs and their bargaining and negotiations with state actors and domestic sporting organisations.

Secondly, the theory of international policy regimes is introduced embracing its potential to reconceptualise international relations theory (Crawford, 1996). Although the competing theories of international relations (as of the ‘neo-neo’ debate) utilise international regimes differently, our preference is to conceptualise regimes as relatively independent actor whose actions help to generate rule-governed behaviour in the ‘anarchic’ international system. Consequently, world politics and many spheres of international relations and activities of states are seen as being regulated by regimes. Defining regimes as a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, Krasner conceptualises an international regime as a form of institutionalised international collaboration distinct from governments, treaties or international organisations. The four elements of international policy regimes could regulate and govern states’ behaviour in a specific issue area of international relations, while international organisations which can and/or should react to events. Hence, the essential point of emphasis for international policy regime theory is that it is not necessary for international regimes to possess a tangible existence of organisational form, but that issue-specific informal institutions, such as social movements or epistemic communities, are also evident in sporting sphere. Consequently, the theory of international
policy regimes is a valuable tool to investigate the robustness of internationally or globally agreed principles and norms and their impact on states and domestic sporting bodies. Considering the number and extent of sport IGOs and INGOs and their influence on the government and civil society, the implications of international policy regimes would be a point of considerable debate for understanding the government’s engagement in policy transfer.

Thirdly and related to international relations theory, it has been demonstrated that the concept of globalisation captures an important feature of the development and significance of international relations and international policy regimes. In other words, it would be reasonable to state that 'international policy regimes' are examples of the phenomenon of globalisation. It is notable that the globalisation debate has highlighted not only the changing capacity of sovereign states but also the impact of various international, transnational and multinational actors on decision-making on various issues and aspects of society. Whereas the realist sceptics’ account highlights the centrality of states, various features of commingling of interactions between global and local are illustrated by transformationalists. Recognising a growing role and influence of international institutions, including international principles related to drug-free sport and the emergence of civil society, where sport NOGs are influential, sport can be considered in the transformationalist position of globalisation debates in relation to the changing nature of the nation-state. However, the growing influence of MNCs on local sports markets and sport INGOs and the sale of national leagues to foreign owners could be illustrative of the hyperglobalists’ account of the globalised nature of sport. Nevertheless, insofar as the state is the central provider of public subsidy and resources for physical education, elite sport, the promotion of mass participation in sport and welfare policy, it could be reasonable to suggest that the state retains the essential and defining role for sport policy and that the state implements rules to regulate the activities of MNCs as well as sport INGOs, which can be located within the pattern of international sporting governance. These would be interesting observations for this study to examine the degree of global ‘reach’ and local ‘response’ and discuss the characteristics of ‘internationalised’, ‘globalised’ or even ‘multinationalised’ sport (see Table 2.7). Overall, the globalisation literature is important in sensitising our understanding of both the capacity of external/global culture to penetrate into local cultures and the capacity of local cultures to resist and refashion global cultural products to reflect and possibly reinforce local culture.

Finally, it could be concluded that, in the absence of applications of the theories of international relations and international policy regimes to sport, the conceptualisations of these two theories have potential to advance the discussion of the significance and roles of sport IGOs and INGOs in international relations and domestic policy-making. By adopting
international policy regimes and policy transfer frameworks, a fuller and more detailed analysis of the role of sport INGOs and shared norms and principles in sport can be achieved.
Chapter 3 Research Strategy

3.1 Introduction

Briefly to reiterate, the aim of this study was to evaluate the robustness of the international policy regime for sport through the examination of two examples of domestic sport policy. While it was tentatively hypothesised that an international policy regime for sport might be identified, its significance still has to be empirically established. As Blaikie (1993) implied the philosophical perspectives of ontology and epistemology influence the outcomes of social research and entail questions of how knowledge is produced. To sensitise our conceptualisation of how the socio-political and international spheres, or the objects of study, were embodied, articulating ontological and epistemological assumptions was critical factors in achieving overall coherence in the argument. As such, it is right to state in Sparkes' terms that these assumptions provided “particular sets of lenses for seeing the world and making sense of it in different ways” and leads the researcher to “go about investigating it in different ways and report their findings in different ways” (1992: 12, 15). What should also be noted as imperative was that the adoption of a particular paradigmatic orientation has methodological implications and thus influences or constrains the choice methods and explanations of the empirical data collected.

First, this Chapter provided an overview of the broad ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted in this study followed by an explanation of the key features of critical realism. Specifically referring to international relations theory, the research paradigms within this discipline was also sketched out and the complexity of the paradigm debates was explained. Based upon the adopted ontological and epistemological positions, consideration was given to methodological issues, including the value of comparative policy analysis. This led on to the third set of discussions which focused on the methods or empirical research techniques employed in this study and their respective strengths and limitations. This part of the discussion highlighted more practical issues in terms of the preparation for the undertaking of empirical work in Japan and the UK. A brief summary was given at the end of the chapter in order to revisit the researcher's 'lenses' for knowledge-formulation.

3.2 Research Paradigms
3.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology

The clarification of ontological and epistemological assumptions was an essential first step in the research process (Grix, 2002). Marsh and Furlong, for example, argued that "an ontological position and the related epistemological position are a skin not a sweater" (2002: Ch. 1; see also Blaikie, 1993, 2000; Grix, 2002; Sparkes, 1992). The adoption of a particular set of ontological and epistemological assumptions resulted in a distinctive view of the world, and thereby, led the researcher to gather what could be perceived as existing knowledge in different ways. Consequently, the considerations of philosophy of science was an important underpinning of this research and a discussion of issues associated with ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and sources, was essential prior to the commencement of the actual research.

Colin Hay summarised the interrelation between the elements of the research process as follows: "ontology relates to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to what we know about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring that knowledge" (2002a: 63). That is, ontological assumptions were concerned with the claims made about "what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other" (Blaikie, 2000: 8; see also Grix, 2002). Different ontological claims determined in turn the way to explore and examine a given phenomenon. In other words, according to Downward and Mearman, "because the logical structure of explanation is always implicitly or explicitly distilled from an ontological perspective, this suggests constraints upon the use of methods for particular purposes" (2007: 79). Epistemological assumptions consist of ideas about what and how we can know about what we know focusing on the knowledge-gathering process. For Blaikie, epistemology is "possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be" (2000: 8; see also Bryman, 2001; Grix, 2002; Sparkes, 1992; Stoker, 1995). In this way, these ontological and epistemological assumptions determined, and would be the indicators of, the methodological justification for the selected techniques of data collection, which were examined later in this chapter.

Blaikie (1993) and others simplify, and give broad understanding of, fundamental ontological debates as falling under one of two polarised paradigmatic approaches (see Table 3.1). On the one hand, a realist position that suggests there is a set of underlying structures and these exist independently of any given individual. This is often associated with a positivist epistemology which suggests that in order to be able to identify such structures we need to identify structural regularities which inductively allow us to posit the existence of underlying
structures. A quantitative approach is often adopted as the preferred method seeking to build
generalisation through value-free observations of essential elements or objective reality
(Downward & Mearman, 2007; Sparkes, 1992). In contrast to the positivist paradigm is a
constructivist ontological assumption. It is claimed that this constructivist ontology perceives
social reality as "the product of processes by which social actors together negotiate the
meaning for actions and situations" (Blaikie, 1993: 96). As such, according to Groff, this
position is a 'breakdown' from positivist epistemology and grounded upon the "repudiation of
the concept of truth as a universal norm, and a deep suspicion of ontological realism" (2004:
4). It is argued that constructivists are interested in "how knowledge arises, what concept of
knowledge is appropriate and what criteria can be invoked in the evaluation of knowledge"
(Flick, 2004: 89). This is often associated with interpretivist or postmodern approaches to
epistemology, where social phenomena exist merely as a construction or interpretation of an
observer, where any beliefs and knowledge claims are equally valid depending on one's
perspective (Groff, 2004; Sparkes, 1992). Blaikie (1993) asserted that social phenomena are
intrinsically meaningful and that social reality was produced and reproduced by actors who
deconstruct the meaning of social situation or activities. Consequently, it was argued that
reality and knowledge were constructed through social interaction and interchange
influenced by the context. A qualitative approach was the preferred method when a
constructivist ontology was adopted, one consequence of which is that it does not allow the
researcher to provide comparison because each case study is deemed to be unique
(Downward & Mearman, 2007; Blaikie, 1993).

Table 3.1: Summarising conceptual frameworks in social and political analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positivist</th>
<th>Critical realist</th>
<th>Constructivist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The world exists independently of our knowledge of it</td>
<td>The world exists independently of our knowledge of it</td>
<td>The world exists as an interpretation of an observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures cannot be observed merely inductively argued for</td>
<td>There are deep structures which cannot be directly observed</td>
<td>No 'real' social world beyond discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The social scientist can establish regular relationships between social phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested, and falsified, by direct observation</td>
<td>Objects/structures and agents' actions or inactions have causal powers, so causal statements are possible but discursive construction affects outcomes</td>
<td>The world is socially, or discursively, constructed; social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretations of them and it is this interpretation of them which affects outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumed that there is no dichotomy between appearance and reality; that the world is real and not mediated by our senses or socially constructed</td>
<td>Structures thus do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain and facilitate; social science involves the study of reflexive agents who are capable of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing structures</td>
<td>However, meaning can only be established and understood within discourses and thus objective analysis is not possible and knowledge is discursively laden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Marsh, 1999: 11-14; Sayer, 2000
However, a third position of accepting that there are 'real but constructed structures', was evident (see Table 3.1). This position is associated with a critical realist approach which looks to understand how social structures are constructed and how these structures constrain and enable actions (a position associated with structuration for example), implies both qualitative and quantitative (hermeneutic and descriptive) research (see Groff, 2004; Hostettler & Norrie, 2003; Sayer, 2000). It is stressed in critical realism that social reality is a composite of both observable actions and unobservable 'deep' social and political structures which consequently makes the relationship between structure and agency a crucial focus of research (see Hay, 2002a).

In this sense, an interpretive research approach would also contribute to an understanding of critical realist assumptions concerning structure and agency in empirical research (Cruickshank, 2003; Sayer, 2000). Critical realism can allow us to reflect on the interrelated nature of structure and agency and also the way social structures facilitate and constrain agency or human activities (see Lewis, 2000, 2002; Marsh & Furlong, 2002; Hay, 2002a; Hollis & Smith, 1990). In this regard, Sayer contends that the critical realist would argue that "the world is characterised by emergence, that is situations in which the conjunction of two or more features or aspects give rise to new phenomena" (Sayer, 2000: 12) and agents give meanings to actions, which crucially influence outcomes (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 26). Traditionally, the relationship between structure and agency had been understood, rather simplistically, as two opposite poles. Firstly, structuralism (sometimes functionalism) viewed structures as constraining and even determining agency. This was contested due to its simplistic account of social and political events, processes and outcomes from a mono-causal perspective (Lewis, 2000; 2002). The opposite pole was intentionalism, which conceived structures as the product of intentional action with the stress wholly on human agency and micro-practices of social and political interactions. It is necessary to avoid its voluntarist position due to its over-emphasis on actors' autonomy. Both structural and intentional positions represented extreme poles in which the former ignores the activity of individuals who are seen as 'passive dupes of structures' and the latter takes little notice of structural influences on motivations or intentions of actors and of unintended consequences of action (Hay, 1995: 193-6).

To overcome this dualism, critical realism offered the claim that structure and agency were internally related in social practices and all social generalisations and explanations are limited by time and space (Hay, 1995: 197-9; Blaikie, 1993: 204). In other words, it was agents "who interpret those structures and who attempt to reconstruct, change or, indeed, accommodate themselves to it" (Marsh et al, 1999: 219) and, at the same time, structures
mediated and influenced agency. It was also accepted in this study that the strategic choice of action taken by agents not only affects outcomes but also that actions and outcomes may alter structures (Lewis, 2002; Hay, 2002a). The recognition of the interrelated nature of structure and agency was perhaps one of the most crucial elements of critical realism along with the acknowledgement that structures can be observable or unobservable.

In relation to the objective of this study, the complex interaction of structure and agency should be taken into account in empirical study in the social sciences, in which one cannot expect stable or unproblematic descriptions across time and space (Sayer, 2000: 13). What was also important was to connect the above paradigm debate with international relations theory, the predominant approach of which has been in the terrain of positivistic logic of investigation (the realist paradigm in international relations). The debate on structure-agency was the key for understanding a broad set of ontological and epistemological assumptions.

3.2.2 International relations theory and competing paradigms

Within international relations theory, although a comprehensive overview will be developed in the next chapter, it was important for the discussion of methodology to identify the key competing paradigms that express contesting views of the nature of the social world by focusing upon different levels of, and interactions between, actors and socio-political and economic issues. The majority of international relations theorists are interested in not only the relations between or among states, but also non-state actors which would include international organisations and multinational organisations or corporations, including the International Olympic Committee or NIKE, international and domestic civil groups, such as the International Working Group for Women & Sport (IWG), and state and non-state hybrid organisations like the World Anti-Doping Agency. Despite this broadly common focus, international relations theorists are constantly in a contested debate. Clarifying what constitutes the object of the social world at the local, regional, national, international and trans-national levels and how we question the nature of knowing or knowledge, Smith, Booth and Zalewski (1996) noted the continued ontological dominance of positivist assumptions, which are constituted of realism, pluralism and globalism, within international relations theory.
### Table 3.2: Summarising the inter-paradigm debate in international relations theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigms in IR</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Liberalism/Pluralism</th>
<th>International Political Economy/ Marxism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontological Assumption</td>
<td>Positivist</td>
<td>Critical realist</td>
<td>Marxist</td>
<td>Constructivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of analysis</td>
<td>State-centric</td>
<td>Multi-centric</td>
<td>Global-centric</td>
<td>Human-centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic actors</td>
<td>States, nations</td>
<td>Numerous supra-states (eg. regimes), sub-state (eg. bureaucracies), trans-state, non-state actors; individuals</td>
<td>The capitalist world system/economy (or forces and relations of production), classes and social movement</td>
<td>Institutions, individual actors – norms, identities, meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Billiard ball model</td>
<td>Cobweb model</td>
<td>Octopus model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of the state</td>
<td>Unitary actor</td>
<td>Disaggregated into components</td>
<td>Representing class interests (more or less directly)</td>
<td>Problematise the identities and interests of states – socially constructed, ideational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural dynamics</td>
<td>State is rational actor seeking to maximise its own interest or national objectives in foreign policy</td>
<td>Foreign policy-making and trans-national processes involve conflicts, bargaining, coalition, and compromise – not necessarily resulting in optimal outcomes</td>
<td>Focus is on patterns of dominance within and among societies</td>
<td>If thoughts and ideas of international relations change, the system itself corresponded to change as well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main issues</td>
<td>National security is top</td>
<td>Multiple, not least welfare</td>
<td>Economic factors</td>
<td>Inter-subjective beliefs/ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity to ‘reality’</td>
<td>National interests exist objectively. The statesman has to ascertain these and to act them out. In some versions, the world of manipulation and intuition take on an independent life</td>
<td>Perceptions and roles often differ from reality. Academic analysis can help to find rational and optimal policy</td>
<td>Deep structures in the economy are very stable and consistent. Political actors are systematically misguided in their perceptions (ideologies)</td>
<td>No external reality, no independent existence of social world. The social world is a human consciousness, thoughts, beliefs and ideas and an inter-subjective domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetition/Change</td>
<td>Timeless laws, international relations is the realm of recurrence</td>
<td>Change and possibly progress</td>
<td>Stable and continuous pattern – until the break</td>
<td>Uncertain accordingly human beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict/Cooperation</td>
<td>Relations among states are basically conflictual/competitive – struggle for power; security dilemma</td>
<td>Relations among states are potentially cooperative, non-state actors often mitigate conflict, but make the image confusing</td>
<td>Who gets what matter – relations within and among states are conflictual, due to the remained class struggles</td>
<td>Conflict is always a conflict of minds and wills of the parties involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Static</td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Influx</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Waever, 1996: 153; Jackson & Serensen, 2007

As such, Robert Cox questioned what constitutes the ‘knowable reality’ of international relations and argued that the “ontological presuppositions” of international relations were principally limited to the interactions among states” (quoted in Burchill, 2001a: 17; see also
Smith, 1996). It is worth illustrating here that developments in international relations theory have been characterised by a so-called 'inter-paradigm debate', mainly between neo-realism and neoliberalism, often referred to as the 'neo-neo debate' or 'neo-neo synthesis debate' (for a detailed discussion see next chapter). Smith et al (1996) also identified the achievements of new and alternative theoretical accounts of international relations under the heading of 'post-positivism' that goes beyond the loose description of positivism, which include empirical historical sociology, post-structuralism, feminism, critical theory and constructivism.

Bearing in mind the earlier discussion of ontology and epistemology, what we should be alert to in this thesis was that the use of terms tends to be confusing. The terminologies for philosophical discussions and analytical strategies of contemporary political science, which have been broadly examined in the previous section, were sometimes different from those used in international relations though referring to similar concepts. The core theoretical debates within international relations theory and the different paradigms or schools of thought revolved in international relations are: realism; structural theory or neo-realism; neoliberalism or pluralism (which includes liberal institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, interdependence theory); international society or the English School; constructivism; and postmodernism (Hay, 2002a; Jackson and Søresen, 2007; Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). Though there are disagreements about the way to classify international relations paradigms, Wæver (1996) and Jackson and Søresen (2007) attempted to summarise the four main competing paradigms and ontological assumptions – realism, pluralism, Marxism and constructivism – essential features of which are illustrated in Table 3.2 (see also Baylis & Smith, 2001; Buzan, 1996; Hollis & Smith, 1990; Smith, 1995; Smith et al, 1996; Viotti & Kauppi, 1999).

Before turning to a more detailed account, it was necessary to acknowledge the epistemological ambiguities found in positivism as the traditionally dominant perspective within international relations. Smith (1996) argued that it was around the 1950s when the literature of international relations became detached from its broader philosophy of social science with positivist assumptions becoming deeply embedded in mainstream international theory. According to Smith within international relations, positivism "conflates and confuses very distinct philosophical concepts (so that positivism is sometimes used to refer to an epistemology and at others to refer to a methodology)" (1996: 34). Smith nonetheless acknowledged that positivism continues to dominate what counts as the subject matter of international relations (ibid, 38; see also Buzan, 1996). As noted, it was acknowledged that realism, neo-realism, pluralism (neoliberalism) and globalism (structuralism) were seen as all
grounded on positivist epistemological and methodological foundations, while behaviourists in international relations have generally examined states’ behaviour in the international system by employing statistical analysis. According to Buzan, these paradigms, illustrated in Table 3.2, were not necessarily mutually exclusive in any total way, while each respective position remains unsurprisingly distinct (1996: 56-7).

Although the basis of epistemological assumptions are broadly shared, realism and pluralism look differently at world phenomena exploring them from different positions, and thus, it is unlikely that both paradigms would be integrated into the same basis of arguments. In this sense, the unsettling inter-paradigm debate between realism and pluralism or neoliberalism was characterised as the ‘neo-neo’ debate. It is considered that “the discipline [itself] was the debate...disagreement, not a truth held by one of the positions” (Wæver, 1996: 155; Jackson & Sørensen, 2007). Nevertheless, as with other social science fields, some critically oriented perspectives, such as Critical Theory and postmodern international relations theory, have emerged. These perspectives largely questioned the traditional preoccupation with epistemological questions of positivism in international relations and its neglect of ontological ones and aimed to ‘restructure’ the discipline incorporating human (often the marginal and excluded) emancipation (Linklater, 1995; Neufeld, 1995). To Krasner, as a realist who also reflected the strongly normative orientation within international relations theory, postmodernism was considered as directly linked to a form of ‘nihilism’ that would not lead society to peace and justice (1996: 125). However, as explained in Chapter 2, it should be highlighted that, closely associated with the English School’s concept of international society, constructivism powerfully challenged the conventional rationalist and positivist ontological and epistemological assumptions of realism and liberalism in international relations theory (Reus-Smit, 2001; Ruggie, 1998a; Viotti & Kauppi, 1999).

**International policy regimes and ontological and epistemological issues**

As stated, international relations theory has been dominated by positivism in which realism and neo-realism were privileged with the consequence that the ‘conservative’ epistemological assumptions of international relations shaped the examination of the distribution of power and self-interest of state actions (see also in Chapter 2). Buzan illustrated the forms of realism as follows: there is a “continuity of the human condition, particularly at the international level” and the “debate about power in international relations is the core of what realism is about. Its emphasis on the state derives from the sense that the state is the dominant wielder of power in the international system” (original emphasis, 1996: 50-1). With specific reference, for instance, to the development of the elite sport system and
infrastructure of high performance sport, governmental interests in displaying the prowess of
states through international sporting glory can be understood in relation to states’ self-
interest.

Neoliberalism or pluralism, on the other hand, has rejected and gone beyond the notion of
the state being the only integrated entity in international relations. Neoliberalism/pluralism
endeavoured to capture the dynamism of international relations to explore the possibilities for
cooperation within the international system. Consequently, the emphasis was on human
agents and their capacity to achieve cooperation for mutual advantage by reducing
uncertainty. With the analysis focused on the complex interrelations between domestic and
international politics, neoliberal/pluralism allowed international institutions and organisations
(which could be the product of state action or could possess an independent identity and
display agency in their own right) to be its main focus. This position can also take account of
the concept of the international regime. The pluralist position explicitly recognised multiple
actors, both from governmental and non-governmental organisations, and neoliberalism was
concerned to examine for example the way international agreements have been developed
and strengthened and the way networks have been established through negotiation and
sharing knowledge between governments, inter-governmental and international non-
governmental organisations (further discussion in Chapter 2; Hay, 2002a: 17-22; Smith et al,
1996; Waever, 1996). What is imperative was that the pluralist position recognised less
formal forms of trans-national contact between states and between states and non-state
actors, and thus, the development of sporting organisational entities can be recognised as
introducing potentially significant actors into the international system through which the
interpenetration of sport and (international) politics is realised (see Houlihan, 1994b). In this
sense, it can be seen that the neoliberal/pluralist position sat comfortably with the ontological
and epistemological assumptions of critical realism that are illustrated in the previous section.

As stated, the main focus of this study was to utilise international relations theory to
determine the existence and character of the international regime for sport, and to provide an
evaluation of its significance in selected sport policy areas in Japan and the UK. Theory
fulfilled a fundamental purpose not only enabling us to see the world from a particular
perspective, but also conceptualising and contextualising both observable behaviour and
underlying structural relationships (see Cooper, 2001; Gilbert, 2001; Stoker, 1995; Hollis &
Smith, 1991; Marsh & Smith, 2001). It is noted that a theory which is made up of hypotheses
can ‘explain puzzling observations’, and a theory can be constructed as the means of
induction, identifying the common features of the specific instances investigated, and can be
applied to explain other features by means of the logic of deduction (Gilbert, 2001). As such,
the view adopted in this thesis was aptly summarised by Steve Smith: "Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons" (1996: 13).

While the previous chapter has outlined the nature of international policy regimes, it is necessary to point out the ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with international policy regimes which influence methodological positions. As Ruggie advocated and as already discussed in the previous section, adopting an interpretive rather than a positivist epistemological position is more appropriate for this study given the emphasis on the analysis of the role of ideas, norms and social institutions (Ruggie, 1998a: Ch. 3; see also Wæver, 1996). Ruggie suggested that in contrast to the positivist precepts and prescriptions, interpretive epistemologies, which were required to both describe and explain, should be utilised because international regimes are conceptual creations and intersubjective in nature, which constrain state behaviour either as independent or intervening variables (Ruggie, 1998a: 85-6). Within international regimes, it was also imperative to understand that the impact of norms on state and non-state actors was not a passive process and that principles and shared norms of which a regime comprises as well as its communicative dynamics should be seen as a robust feature of an international regime.

3.2.3 Summary

This study employed critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions, which influenced the methodology and methods which will be examined in the next section. As stressed in a critical realist position, some international regimes or social institutions/structures may be more tangible with such actual elements as the existence of a president or a secretariat and organisational resources with legitimate formal rule-making procedures (like the UN, WTO, IOC or WADA). However, not all elements of an international regime have directly observable elements and may take the form of groups operating informally, communicating, for example, through emails and newsletters. To achieve an adequate account, interpretive epistemological approaches were also significant in understanding underlying structures or principles, norms and rules and in providing a depth analysis of interests and the behaviour of agents. As such, it should be emphasised that social structure and agency were in a complex causal nexus and recursively related and dialectical (Ruggie, 1998a; Lewis, 2002, 2000; Marsh et al, 1999). Consequently, within the
critical realist assumption, it was not only observable or tangible social phenomena or elements of international regimes that were significant, but also the unobservable or intangible elements of international regimes where actors such as states, institutions, governmental or non-governmental organisations and individuals were involved in setting agendas, interpreting principles or rules, transferring ideas and knowledge and identifying problems. The exploration of the interaction between the structural elements of an international regime, and agency can be strengthened by the adoption of an appropriate methodology.

3.3 Methodological Considerations

Methodological issues should be addressed within the ontological and epistemological positions outlined in the previous sections. In order to explore the research questions in this study a broadly qualitative approach was adopted. This section, first, illustrated the general methodological questions and, second, examined the way the choice of a qualitative approach may influence the analysis of empirical findings and the discussions of robustness and, third, considered issues of the reliability of research methods.

There is a general tendency to equate methodology with methods. However, the latter refers to particular techniques of collecting and analysing data. Blakie clarified the meaning and role of methodology as follows:

Methodology...refers to discussions of how research is done, or should be done, and to the critical analysis of methods of research. Methodology also deals with logics of enquiry, of how new knowledge is generated and justified. This includes a consideration of how theories are generated and tested – what kinds of logic should be used, what a theory looks like, what criteria theory has to satisfy, how it relates to a particular research problem, and how it can be tested (original emphasis, Blaikie, 2000: 8).

Methodological issues were thus tied to a specific ontological and epistemological position that shaped the choice of methods and how each method was to be used to conduct social research (Flick, 2006; Bryman, 2001; Devine, 2002. In more simplistic terms, methodology was situated as a ‘two-way relationship’ between the discussions of philosophical considerations and methods (Schwandt, 2001: 161). In order to explore the study of social
phenomena and social relations, this study employed a qualitative approach rather than quantitative approach. Nevertheless, the choice of either of these methodological approaches did not entail true or false accounts but only those that were more useful or less useful for a research project (Silverman, 2000a: 79). Qualitative research was appropriate for collecting the type of data required for this study. While the detailed examinations of techniques of data collections were provided in the next section, this section focused upon the general appropriateness of the application of a qualitative methodology in this research.

As Cruickshank acknowledged, it can be noted that critical realism was "critical, as regards methodology" (2003: 3). Given the ontological and epistemological standpoints associated with critical realism linking structure and agency and informing the research questions that have already been described, a qualitative approach was selected in order to acquire a deeper understanding of the social action of actors and more specifically to better understand their inner experiences and forms of social interactions, which needed to be interpreted from their point of view (Silverman, 2000a; 1993). Denzin and Lincoln stressed that qualitative research attempts to "make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (2000b: 3). Qualitative research thus made it possible to give a contextual understanding of social experiences or behaviour and phenomena. In other words, the underlying meaning of actions for agents and unobservable relationships between social phenomena and agents can be examined more effectively through an interpretive position based on qualitative research.

Flick (2006) has noted that positivist empiricism which underpins quantitative methodologies assumes that facts substantially speak for themselves with the implications that interpretations of data are not required. Quantitative approaches incorporated the practices and norms of the natural scientific model in analysis, and consequently, embodied a view of social reality as an external objective reality (Bryman, 2001: 20; May, 2001: 9-11). This study did not treat quantitative and qualitative approaches as competing methods, nor did it follow 'between-method' triangulation (Denzin, 1989). While this study incorporated a limited amount of quantitative data in order to contribute to our understanding of how policy has changed and been formulated, a broadly qualitative approach was necessary in order to provide a richer understanding of the social world. It was also imperative to provide adequate qualitative explanations of quantitative data in order to elucidate the interaction of human agency and institutions. Much of the quantitative data in this study was needed to describe phenomena such as: the size of the state budget distributed to sport in general, to the development of elite athletes and to anti-doping activity; the size of delegations and the number of medals won at the Olympic Games and also at major international championships;
the number of doping tests conducted annually; and the number of elite athletes gaining public funding. In this sense, quantitative data can be used to enhance the credibility of qualitative interpretations (Flick, 2006; Silverman, 2000a). Underpinned by the coherent ontological and epistemological assumptions described, quantitative data was used to provide further evidence in relation to policy change in a particular social setting (for a detailed account of mixed-methods approach, see Downward & Mearman, 2007).

The above discussions were linked to the issue of the 'quality of qualitative research', which was related to the traditional questions of validity, reliability and objectivity. Although these terms were strongly associated with quantitative approaches for seeking generalisation and law-like explanations, Silverman stressed that a qualitative researcher should be reminded to "ensure that your methods were reliable and your conclusions valid" (2000a: 188). These issues should be centered around "whether findings are grounded in empirical material or whether the methods are appropriately selected and applied, as well as the relevance of findings and the reflexivity of proceedings" (Flick, 2006: 15). Rejecting the above three traditional terminologies (validity, reliability and objectivity), especially with that of 'validity', in relation to qualitative research, Steinke outlined the "core criteria for qualitative research", as a combination of several criteria, namely: i) inter-subject comprehensibility; ii) indication of the research process; iii) empirical foundation; iv) limitations; v) coherence; vi) relevance; and reflected subjectivity (Steinke, 2004: 186-190). As Steinke implies a researcher should implicitly or explicitly check these criteria throughout the research. A research protocol that incorporated the above criteria was outlined in a later section (see particularly the Section 3.6).

In the selection and design of methods, triangulation techniques of analysis have been employed. There were various triangulation techniques and the detailed account of triangulation procedures is to be discussed in the next section alongside the chosen methods (semi-structured interview and policy document analysis). This study attempted to conduct what Denzin referred to as 'data triangulation' where different data sources were triangulated through empirical studies (1989: 237-241). More specifically, interview data were triangulated with the relevant primary and secondary documents collected. Triangulation was intended to enhance the robustness of research methods, rather than seeking to combine qualitative and quantitative methods as defined by Flick (2006: 34-43). Triangulation of data through combining qualitative methods, what Glaser (1969) described as a 'constant comparative method', was also employed in this study, the details of which shall be turned to next. Further rigour in triangulation was employed to ensure quality research. While qualitative research did not, as previously discussed, seek generalisability or replication, 'investigator
triangulation’ was adopted insofar as the researcher in this study would be engaged in discussions with some experts in the field (particularly in the case of Japan) (Denzin, 1989; see 2.6).

We can summarise in brief that the study utilised the strengths of a qualitative approach underpinned by an interpretive epistemology. Such an approach enabled us to: i) explore the subjective experiences and meanings, beliefs, views, values, norms and culture of selected policy-makers attached to those experiences; ii) analyse values and beliefs that these actors construct; and iii) draw particular attention to the contextual issues that place an interviewee’s attitudes and behaviour within the context of wider social settings and institutional constraints (see Flick, 2006; Devine, 2002; 1995).

3.4 Research Methods

Grounded upon the general methodological considerations and the detailed account of comparative policy analysis, this section examined the specific issues regarding the research methods to be employed in this study. The empirical material was gathered by collecting policy documents and conducting semi-structured interviews. The balance between interviews and the analysis of primary documents was different in Japan and the UK due to the differential availability of documentary sources and appropriate interviewees. For example, the main source of information in Japan was interviews, largely because of the limited volume of, and access to, policy documents. Fewer interviews were conducted in the UK case due in part to the extensive availability of publicly available policy documents and secondary research.

3.4.1 Policy document analysis

The documents to be analysed included not only primary policy documents from governments and international and domestic sport organisations but also relevant secondary sources. The research process refined the researcher’s focus, and alerted us to the availability of further relevant documents and also identified central policy actors for selection as potential interviewees. As such, the examination and analysis of primary documents from a range of domestic and international bodies facilitated triangulation.
May essentially perceived documents in two ways: they represent either a reflection of reality or practical requirements; and the value of these documents can be either as a topic of social research or as a resource for social research (2001: 182-4). Acknowledging that documents were formed within a certain temporal and socio-cultural context, it was sufficient to state that documents cannot be independent of social reality. In this regard, as previously noted in the discussion of comparative policy analysis, the socio-political and cultural understandings and institutional constraints and meanings that were attached to these documents should be taken into consideration. As a critical realist the engagement with these policy documents required a concern with not only what was recorded and presented in the text, but also what had been left out. May further elaborated these points arguing that documents reflected and constructed social reality and versions of events in which ‘social power is expressed’ (ibid, 183). In many ways, the documents should be seen not as the mere reflection of reality or a neutral artefact but rather as situated within specific socio-cultural and historical contexts that may contain the expression of power relations. As opposed to the radical claim from some post-modernists that every structure was continuously re-constructed, we sought to identify the relationship between various understandings of policy issues reflected in the texts published or proposed by government, domestic sport organisations and international sporting bodies taking into account the social and historical contexts of their production. As such, the significance of documentary analysis was that it was a source of data which provided understandings and ‘explanations’ of events, processes and transformations in social relations, which can be triangulated with semi-structured interviews and would consequently enhance the analysis of the context and meanings of policy (Bryman, 2001; Flick, 2002). Policy documents relating to sport policy in general and elite sport and anti-doping policy in particular would be identified through the review of secondary academic literatures and available public documents as well as the recommendations of interviewees.

**Accessing policy documents: practical issues**

It is important to note that as a result of the limited research conducted into sport policy in Japan, the availability of documentary sources in this domain was limited. This situation was in marked contrast to the UK where a wide range of policy documents were available through the internet or obtainable as printed material. In Japan obtaining relevant sport policy documents not only published by the government or by sporting bodies (i.e. internal documents) were much more difficult to access. The practical problems of gaining access to documents and the reliability of documents identified was addressed in relation to the
The procedures for collection of documents discussed by Scott (1990) who identified four criteria for assessing the quality of documentary sources.

The first criterion that Scott suggested was 'authenticity' which required the researcher to consider whether the documents were genuine or originally produced without errors and inconsistencies. This should not be a significant problem in this study as material were drawn from official sources, such as government departments' web pages or official policy documents. Scott raised the issue of 'credibility' as the second criterion to be applied in deciding the accuracy and reliability of documents or, in the words of Scott, "undistorted and sincere, free from error and evasion" (1990: 7). Because all documents analysed in this study can be identifiable in terms of publisher, publication dates and authors, the issue of credibility would not be unduly problematic.

The third criterion was 'representativeness' which concerned the typicality of documents. The documents used in the study were a mixture of the unique (for example, the UK Sport National Anti-Doping National Strategy) and the sample (anti-doping policies of particular sports). In some cases it was relatively easy to determine whether a document was unique. In relation to the criterion for authenticity and credibility, it is noted that the documents represented "specific version of realities constructed for specific purposes" (Flick, 2006: 249). Consequently, we shall take into careful account in our analysis the way documents was accessed and how and for what purpose those documents were written and by whom.

As oppose to the relative availability for the UK case, the number of policy documents in the public domain for the case of Japan was rather limited. Consequently, the Japanese interviewees were asked to identify and recommend documents published by the Japanese national sporting organisations (e.g. JOC, JISS) and to permit access by the researcher to those documents. What is important to note is that it was assumed that a large number of policy documents were only circulated around the internal actors or stakeholders (e.g. NFs' performance directors, coaches and supporting staff) or archived at individuals' offices. In relation to the issue of representativeness, the documents that were collected and analysed can be seen as 'typical' because the frequency of policy reviews and policy recommendations published by the Japanese national sporting bodies can be identified. However, it should be noted that those documents may be seen as 'untypical' or unique in a sense that access was restricted even though they could provide insights into values and notions of policy direction at particular times.
The last criterion and closely related to the third point on representativeness was ‘meaning’. Posing a question on ‘internal meaning’ of the values and ideas incorporated in a document can be seen as an epistemological question (Scott, 1990). Nevertheless, it should be reiterated that the analysis of documents should be underpinned by a critical realist assumption that the identified documents may represent a specific discourse and reality constructed for a certain political purposes. To investigate beyond these descriptions and to explore the individual’s understanding of policy processes, semi-structured interviews were employed in the study.

3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews

This study utilised semi-structured or semi-standardised interviews primarily for gaining in-depth information about decision-makers and decision-making processes, although different styles of interview techniques are acknowledged (Fielding & Thomas, 2001; Flick, 2002). The semi-structured interview was guided by relatively specific questions but also allowed open-ended and spontaneous answers from interviewees, to which an interviewer can respond and discuss relevant issues raised by the interviewees. What is significant for this research was that the semi-structured interview made it possible for interviewees to answer on their own terms and thus provided an insight into their perceptions and views on policy processes (Devine, 2002; Fielding & Thomas, 2001). The questions were formulated as “open questions” as well as “theory-driven, hypotheses-directed questions”, while “confrontational questions” were put at margin (Flick, 2006: 156-7). To achieve the objective of this study, semi-structured interviews were adopted in order to: i) ensure an agent perception of the operation of institutions and policy processes; ii) allow investigation and triangulation of the expression of policy in official documents; and iii) provide an opportunity to identify viewpoints, values and experiences that shape perceptions held of the policy issues and of other institutional policy actors and to clarify other relevant sources of evidence.

The in-depth semi-structured interviews with current and former senior sport policy actors, including public and national sporting officials, and senior academics in the sport field were utilised more extensively in Japan than in the UK largely because of the notable shortage of primary policy documents publicly available in Japan. The semi-structured interviews were recorded and the transcribed interviews were made available to the respondents to enable a check for accuracy. It was stated that well-informed interviewees could provide a researcher “with a means of analysing the ways in which people consider events and relationships and
the reasons they offer for doing so”, and consequently, important insights into a situation or an event can lead a researcher to identify other relevant interviewees and sources of evidence (May, 2001: 144-5; see also Yin, 1994). To demonstrate the strength of interview data and to ensure the credibility of the findings of study, ‘seeking, locating and contacting’ potential interviewees was an important process (Lilleker, 2003). This research adopted both a purposive and a snowballing sampling technique for selecting interviewees. The former was the process of selecting interviewees in accordance with criteria derived from the research questions and snowball sampling was a process by which an expert in the field identifies potential interviewees and that the nominated interviewees in turn were asked to nominate further interviewees (Bryman, 2004; Fielding & Thomas, 2001). Snowball sampling was valuable in situation where the list of interviewees was considered inadequate or incomplete but this technique had both strengths and weaknesses. To be more specific, on the one hand, snowball sampling can identify “a network of contacts that can itself be studied”, and on the other hand, it “only includes those within a connected network of individuals”, which was likely to involve bias (Arber, 2001: 63).

Potential limitations and strengths in semi-structured interviews

Qualitative research that embraced a semi-structured interview approach as outlined in the previous section has been criticised for being journalistic, only exploratory or subjective. As opposed to the positivist research synthesis that can be represented as seeking generalisable, replicable and comparable data with a high degree of certainty, the qualitative approach was often viewed as “soft” and “unscientific” (Devine, 1995: 141). Most of the criticisms regarding the credibility of qualitative research findings were reflected in the following quote which identified criteria for assessing research and emphasises the importance of:

- **internal validity**, the degree to which findings correctly map the phenomenon in question; **external validity**, the degree to which findings can be generalized to other settings similar to the one in which the study occurred; **reliability**, the extent to which findings can be replicated, or reproduced, by another inquirer; and **objectivity**, the extent to which findings are free from bias (original emphasis, Denzin & Lincoln, 1994a: 100).

Acknowledging the above quote, the critique of semi-structured interview approach would be that it is: i) too subjective; ii) lacking of transparency of interpretation; and iii) raises problems
of generalisability (Bryman, 2001: 282-3). These points also apply to 'elite interviewing' (see Lilleker, 2003).

The first issue of 'subjectivity' concerned the problems that rose from the researcher's involvement in the conversation and thus the risk that they might affect the data by introducing bias. What should be stressed is that the interviewer should seek both "clarification and elaboration on the answers given" and "have more latitude to probe beyond the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee" (original emphasis, May, 2001: 123). In investigating the inner world of experiences, intentions, meanings and ideas that people possessed and acted upon through semi-structured interviews it was necessary to keep a balance between the interviewer's involvement in the interview process and their position as a researcher. Maintaining a degree of 'distance' from the interview can be achieved by checking the interview schedule with my supervisor and also discussing the interpretations of interview data also with my supervisor but also with peers through conference and workshop presentations.

Secondly, related to the potential limitation in the operations of semi-structured interviews, there was a difficulty in replicating findings due to poor recall and poor or inaccurate articulation (Yin, 1994: 85). This problem was especially acute where the researcher was the principal "instrument of data collection" (Bryman, 2001: 282) and data interpretation (Fielding & Thomas, 2001). There were various techniques to overcome such limitations and to enhance validity in interpretation. Flick, for example, proposed the concept of "communicative validation" according to which the researcher looks for further authenticity through a second meeting (1998: 226). Given that some interviewees could not spare the time due to their busy schedule, there was only a limited possibility that an interviewee agreed to a second interview. When the availability of policy documents was restricted, multiple interview opportunities were quite significant in order to ask follow-up questions and confirm the interpretations from the previous meeting. Furthermore, this study utilised extensive face-to-face discussion or email communication to gain up-to-date information and to clarify the interpretations of the researcher (see Devine, 2002; Fielding & Thomas, 2001).

One of the most effective ways of ensuring plausibility of interpretations was to maintain the internal consistency of an account. While the issue of 'validity' did not have the same implications for this study as it would if the research had been conducted within a positivist orientation, coherency was salient for our interpretive epistemological position (Sparkes, 1992). All interviewees were asked to give permission for quotes for the purpose of this study and the semi-structured interviews were transcribed and findings were anonymously...
presented with the quotes, when possible, and the commentary on the selected transcriptions (Devine, 1995: 144-5). In order to clarify interpretations, triangulation of findings with other methods of data collection, i.e. policy document analysis, was undertaken which was able to increase the external validity and enhance our knowledge in the field of research. Silverman indicated that by "having a cumulative view of data drawn from different contexts, we may ... be able to triangulate the 'true' state of affairs by examining where the different data intersect" (2000a: 98). While this study was sceptical of the concept of a 'true' account, it aimed to provide plausible and defensible explanations and analysis through cross-referencing between transcribed interviews and primary and secondary documentary materials in a rigorous way. We also examined identified themes and concepts by coding each interview, which then were compared and contrasted with the subsequent interviews as well as within the interview itself (Fielding & Thomas, 2001: 137-8).

The second alleged shortcoming led to the third criticism which was that the findings obtained through qualitative approaches could not be generalised to other settings or be deemed representative of the population. Qualitative research, it was argued, was made up of a specific context or case that was based on the analysis of particular social relations, conditions or processes, and, as a result, would not seek a basis for generalisation beyond the specific context (Flick, 1998: 233-4). It was also often a characteristics of semi-structured interview that some elite interviewees, who may be embedded in a particular policy network, "may count more than others in terms of their influence on the decision-making process" (Burnham et al, 2004: 205). However, although the semi-structured interviews were confined to a small number of people from specific settings, careful design of the research, a cautious integration of different cases, and a constant comparison of cases may gradually transfer findings from the cases of countries and specific policy areas to more general and abstract relations (Flick, 1998: 234-5; Devine, 2002). The careful utilisation of the comparative approach was useful to elicit differences or correspondence among the research themes.

3.5 Research Protocols and Data Collection

Mention has already been made of the 'core criteria' for qualitative research, specifically referring to 'inter-subject comprehensibility' (Steinke, 2004). This section provided the details of processes of data collection and the way the methods was implemented as related to particular stages of the empirical work. By doing so, the procedures of data collection were stated in this section and in consequence the criticism towards qualitative methodology was
addressed. The researcher adopted a semi-structured interview approach following four steps: i) decided who to see; ii) got access and arrange the interview; iii) conducted the interview; and iv) analysed the result (Burnham et al, 2004: 206). Because a greater number of interviews were carried out for the cases in Japan due to the nature of study, these steps were explicitly illustrated below. Nevertheless, both the British and the Japanese cases followed a broadly similar research strategy underpinned by the methodological considerations that have been discussed in the previous sections. The intention was to document the steps taken in the study and to discuss the way the case of Britain was introduced as a point of comparison to that of Japan. Some implications of interventions when conducting research were also discussed in relation to the 'quality of qualitative study'.

3.5.1 The Case of UK/England

Significant material were drawn from the earlier research conducted by academics in the field. However, the existing British material only concerned the policy up to the early part of the century. The significant contribution of this study was to analyse the way sport policy has been developed since the Olympic and Paralympic Games were awarded to London in July 2005. Since then, there has been a substantial growth in political interest in being a successful host country of the Games and media attention has focused more sharply on the issues of the development and support of elite athletes and in ensuring drug-free sport. The development of sport policy in the period following the award of the Games was examined drawing upon the substantial number of government and national sporting bodies' strategic plans, government reviews and the minutes of Parliamentary discussions. Guided by the research questions, the desk studies were intensively carried out to analyse the way sport policy has been formulated and to identify changing values and attitudes of government and national sport bodies to elite sport and anti-doping policy. The primary policy document analysis and the review of secondary academic literature helped identify the gaps in knowledge, particularly in the understanding of rapid policy and organisational change in the period following the award of the Games. Senior officials from government agencies (for example, UK Sport and the English Institute of Sport) and non-governmental national organisations such as the British Olympic Association and Youth Sport Trust who are engaged at the strategic level for elite sport and anti-doping policy were interviewed. Despite a smaller number of interviews conducted for the British cases, it was intended that the researcher's understanding were enhanced by gaining additional opportunities to attend meetings with senior officials from the above mentioned national sport bodies throughout the course of research. This allowed further access to a wider range of officials being involved in
a number of core elements of elite sport system and programmes that were later examined (see Appendix A).

3.5.2 The Case of Japan

Phase I: Desk studies were undertaken to identify key contextual documents. It was intended to critically review the general socio-political history of Japanese and locate within it the development of sport policy and the structure for sport. This step also helped us to refine our research focus and identify gaps in research as well as to prepare the researcher for making contact with potential interviewees. At this stage, primary documentary sources were collected and analysed, which included: policy documents by the government (including policy planning documents, White Paper, government commissioned reports, discussion papers, policy reviews and budgetary papers); minutes of the Diet (Parliament); and documents published by the key national sporting agencies (i.e. JOc, JASA, JADA and NFs) and by some non-profit organisations for sport (like Sports White Paper by Sasakawa Sport Foundation). Documents were accessed if downloadable through the world-wide-web (WWW) and the researcher took note of non-downloadable documents and academic papers in order to collect them during the field work in Phase III. Secondary academic literature published in Japan were also identified largely through such WWW sites as the National Diet Library\(^{15}\) (http://www.ndl.go.jp/) and NII Scholarly and Academic Information Navigator\(^{16}\) in order to identify the existing research and to analyse broadly the development of sport policy and physical education. The secondary sources written in English were further reviewed to identify the degree to which the knowledge has been accumulated in the field. Some newspaper articles and sport-related magazine articles that gave critical comments were also collected.

Phase II: Initial interviews were planned by identifying key government departments, sporting organisations and individual academic experts in the field. It has been suggested that semi-structured interviews constituted the appropriate method for this study to gain more informed understandings and insights into the development of sport policy relating to elite sport and drug-free sport and to identify the values, attitudes and beliefs of interviewees towards these policy areas. The interview questions were developed in line with the objective of the research. Two parallel selection procedures of potential interviewees were formulated. First,

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\(^{15}\) The National Diet Library is the only national library in Japan preserving database for all national legislations, laws and regulations and publications by the government. The National Diet Library serves not only for the public but also for the public servants, especially politicians or bureaucrats, in order to compose a new law or legislation.

\(^{16}\) NII Scholarly and Academic Information Navigator. see http://ci.nii.ac.jp/?TZ=20071210023059180
the researcher directly contacted the interviewees who have been identified throughout the initial desk study in Phase I. Second, in parallel, the researcher discussed the list of potential interviewees already identified with two sets of academics who were experts in the field. One set of discussions took place with academics in the field of sociology of sport and physical education and the other set composed academic researchers who have worked extensively for sporting organisations at a number of levels. Not only did these discussions help refine the list of interviewees but also did they fortunately, provide the researcher with an introduction to the potential interviewees.

Phase III: The researcher was in the field and the initial interviews were conducted between March and April 2005 (see Appendix B). A total of 20 interviews were conducted at this stage with 23 individuals who were: current or former senior government officials/bureaucrats (Competitive Sports Division of MEXT); senior officials from national sport organisations (from the JOC, JISS, NAASH, JASA, JADA and NFs); and academics (from sport or physical education-specialist universities or departments). This was the first interview phase covering a wide range of individuals from different organisations in order to understand general sport policy development and more specific issues about elite athlete development and anti-doping policy. In the meeting, the interviewees were asked to provide the relevant policy documents, if possible. However, it was accepted that not all relevant official reports were made available in the area of elite athlete development and anti-doping.

However, in order to obtain as much primary and secondary literature as possible, the researcher sought access to the National Diet Library. At the same time, the extensive documentary sources specifically related to sport and physical education available at Nippon Tailiku Daigaku (Nippon Sport Science University, Tokyo) were also accessed. This university's library was reputed to hold a wide range of databases for literature related to sport and physical education following the opening of its graduate school. Collections of newspaper articles and some academic literature were also obtained at Hitotsubashi University (in Tokyo) where its sport research group owned a small library specifically dedicated to sport. The documents obtained through the field visit to Japan and the transcribed interview data were subsequently analysed and key emergent themes and the gaps in information were identified. Where necessary and possible, data from interviewees were confirmed following transcription and unclear comments were clarified through email.

Phase IV: A further round of face-to-face semi-structured interviews was conducted during 2006. Following the initial interview stage, personal contact were fortunately maintained with interviewees, some of whom agreed to meet for a second interview whereas others were
asked to introduce the researcher to their colleagues and/or invite her to access the documents archived in their organisation. The salience of this second stage interview was that it allowed the researcher to further determine and refine the research focus and questions generated from the first phase interview.

**Phase V**: The analysis of empirical material from Phase IV was undertaken in line with the key themes that emerged in Phase III and triangulated with the policy documents that have been obtained throughout the earlier phases of research. The analysis here was guided by the theoretical framework established for the study. Throughout the examinations of data and until the analysis was completed, the researcher remained aware of recent developments and changes in the direction of sport policy. To ensure that the research was up to date, regular contact were kept with the interviewees from JISS and JOC, some of whom provided a chance to meet to discuss recent change in direction of sport policy up to 2007. Throughout the whole processes, it was also significant to note that the researcher intended to achieve 'inter-subjective comprehension' by revisiting and discussing her interpretations and analysis of data with some experts in the field, some of which were noted as 'Personal Communication' in the thesis.

**3.6 Conclusion**

It has been argued in this chapter that there is a complex set of choices for social enquiries and these assumptions influence methodology as well as specific methods. As Blaikie noted, it should be acknowledged that there was “no perfect solution for the researcher” and “no ideal way to gain knowledge of the social world” (1993: 215). However, the consideration of research strategy was imperative in order to adopt the most appropriate ‘sets of lenses’ for the study. This study was underpinned by critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions. The key elements of critical realism were to identify both observable and unobservable social reality that was constructed by the interactions between structure and agency. Consideration of ‘deep’ social and political structures and ‘open system’ within the realm of critical realism were particularly significant in this thesis when the theory of international relations was utilised to understand social reality and phenomena (see Chapter 2).

As discussed in this chapter, the close relationship between ontology, epistemology and methodology was “directional”, that is it led to a particular range of methods (Hay, 2002a:
63). The adoption of an interpretive epistemology was imperative particularly due to the centrality of the analysis of dynamic interactions, whether they were observable or not, between national, international, intra-national, trans- and multi-national actors as well as their interactions with structures. It was acknowledged that the concept of an international policy regime identifies both tangible and intangible forms of regimes.

Qualitative methodologies were chosen for this thesis in order to make sense of deep levels of social experiences and behaviour of agents and their interactions with structure. It has been discussed that ‘quality of qualitative research’ was to be achieved through triangulation techniques of methods in analysis. To achieve validity and reliability, although these terminologies were strongly associated with quantitative research, a comparative approach was adopted. By introducing the examination of UK (or English where appropriate) cases as the point of reference, it was aimed to sensitise our understanding of the development of Japanese elite sport and anti-doping policy. It aimed to identify the degree of international influence and dynamic interactions between national and international agents and structures, which could incorporate the analysis of ‘action’ or ‘inaction’ in policy and how and why the elite sport and anti-doping policies were formulated in a certain way. The responses from the interviews conducted with the individuals who are in policy-making positions for elite sport and anti-doping in Japan and the UK and the rhetoric found in policy documents can be further triangulated for our analysis.
Chapter 4 The Development of Anti-Doping Policy in the UK/England

4.1 Introduction

The recent developments in anti-doping policy in the UK have been a response to the changing global environment, particularly regarding the legitimacy of National Anti-doping Organization (NADO) in the UK. There had been a great deal of political interest and demand for the creation of a NADO, which was reinforced by the 2012 Games being awarded to London, and the growing awareness of, first, the need to avoid a "national humiliation" due to a doping scandal, and second, the "apparent complacency" found in UK Sport. These issues became politicised and led to a more intensified debate (Phil Wills, Chair of the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee: HCST, quoted in BBC News, 22 February 2007; HCST, 2007). Eventually, after six-months of consultations and reviews conducted by the DCMS and UK Sport, the decision was made to create a new NADO operating outside the domain of UK Sport in time for the London Olympic and Paralympic Games. The organisation would have powers that allowed close coordination with law enforcement agencies, as well as managing results and testing distributions.

Structure of Chapter 4

This chapter starts with a historical overview of policy changes to combat doping in the UK which is divided into three phases (mid-1960s-1979; 1980-mid-1990s; and mid-1990s to 2007). The three distinct phases are based on the development of anti-doping policy in the UK, and show the changes in the British government attitude towards anti-doping policy, i.e. from being ambivalent and passive with minimal involvement in drug issues in sport, to a much more rigorous engagement at the international level as a means of achieving domestic policy objectives, and finally to coordinating the domestic effort to harmonise with the emerging global framework for anti-doping.

The second part of the chapter sketches the organisational responsibility of the UK Sport Drug-Free Sport Directorate (DFSD) and its network of relationships with anti-doping stakeholders. The allocation of public funds to domestic and global anti-doping programmes
and the number of doping tests conducted in the last decade are also reviewed in order to understand the patterns and the intensity of systematic doping testing and the resources distributed in the UK. The third section is the central part of the chapter and is based on the examination of policy documents and an analysis of the values and concepts publicly expressed by key national anti-doping actors, including DCMS and NGBs. This third section identifies the debate around the constant push towards an independent UK NADO, by examining government enquiries in the last five years and the accounts of national sporting actors, including a view presented by a senior DFSD official. The extent of the government's commitment to an anti-doping policy, and the way global influences and pressures on the UK's national anti-doping programme have been expressed in the policy documents, will also be discussed.

4.2 Britain's Historical Engagement in the Fight against Doping in Sport

4.2.1 Ambivalent involvement in anti-doping initiatives, mid-1960s–1979

It is generally agreed that the growing concern over the misuse of drugs in sport appeared in the 1950s and 1960s. Todd and Todd (2001) remind us, in their comprehensive review of the history of drug testing, that anti-doping policies at international level were developed through the establishment of the IOC Medical Committee in 1961; the IOC's resolution against doping in 1962; the 63rd IOC Congress held in Tokyo in 1964 and the first compulsory drug testing at the 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympic Games (see Table 4.1; Table 5.1; and also Mottram, 1988, 2005). They describe how anti-doping policy at that time was based predominantly on a "law and order" approach that emphasised detection and punishment (BMA, 2002: 86). Although many countries were taking tentative steps towards policy development in anti-doping, the British Cycling Federation was one of the few British sporting bodies to introduce drug testing in the Tour of Britain in 1965. The death of the British cyclist, Tom Simpson from the use of amphetamines, televised during the 1967 Tour de France, should be seen as a national and international catastrophe that brought a change in international sport organisation and domestic arrangements in the UK. In the same year, the IOC formed the Medical Commission and published the first list of banned substances. After the formation of a working party on drug abuse in 1965, the role of the Great Britain Sports Council (GBSC) was enhanced and it took greater responsibility for developing anti-doping policy and refining
testing procedures, which steadily increased the pressure on the governing bodies of the various sports to adopt and incorporate the IOC list into their regulations (Houlihan, 1997: 204).

The Drug Control and Testing Centre at Chelsea College (currently King's College, London) was established in 1978 as one of only three IOC accredited doping control laboratories in the world. Funding of more than £500,000 from the GB Sports Council from 1979 (Sports Council, 1986) subsidised not only the equipment and testing conducted by the Doping Control and Testing Centre, but also its research and sample analysis. The establishment of the Drug Abuse Advisory Group also signalled the coordinated effort of the GBSC to progress anti-doping policy. During the early period of the development of national policy in the 1960s, France and Belgium introduced legislation against doping in sport. This was subsequently followed by Italy and Turkey in the early 1970s (Todd and Todd, 2001). According to Arthur Gold, the Chairman of the Sports Council's Drug Abuse Advisory Group, there was a sense among the UK's NGBs that the prevalence of drug abuse in sport was "largely a problem of North America, Europe and Oceania" (quoted in Sports Council, 1986: 3). In the absence of specific legislation to control the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport in the UK, the legislation to regulate the availability of medical substances listed by the IOC became generally controlled using the Medicines Act 1968 and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The responsibility for the former lay within the Department of Health and Social Security and for the latter with the Home Office and its Ministerial Group on the Misuse of Drugs chaired by a Home Office Minister. However, it was not until the 1980s that the general consensus and policy cooperation concerning the issue of the use of drugs in sport, along with the efforts of the then Minister for Sport, Colin Moynihan, moved the issue into a more prominent position on the government's agenda (Houlihan, 1991).

Table 4.1: Selected key policy development in the UK, mid-1960s-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key events</th>
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| 1965 | The IOC formed the Medical Commission and the Medical Code  
The GB Sports Council formed a working party on drug abuse |
| 1967 | Death of British cyclist, Tom Simpson, at Mont Ventoux |
| 1968 | The IOC introduced 1st compulsory drug testing at the Grenoble Winter Olympics |
| 1978 | Drug Control and Teaching Centre at Chelsea College becomes an IOC accredited lab |
| 1979 | GB Sports Council started funding Chelsea College for its research and testing programme |
4.2.2 Achieving domestic goals through inter-governmental agreement, 1980-mid-1990s

It is evident that a number of national decisions were made in the 1980s and the GB Sports Council played an essential role in introducing a more rigorous programme and policy development. The review of The Misuse of Drugs in Sport published by the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1987 was significant not only because it brought a policy shift in 1988, highlighting the elimination of athletes' drug use as an inter-ministerial issue, but also because it later became a point of reference for the UK's involvement in drug-free sport (DoE, 1987; UK Sport, 2005b). At the beginning of this report, Sebastian Coe, then Vice Chairman of GB Sports Council, and Colin Moynihan, then Minister for Sport, both of whom was Olympic athletes, jointly stated that:

The use of performance enhancing drugs is contrary to the spirit of fair competition and can confer unfair advantage on the user...The problem is no longer simply an ethical one for sport. There are broader considerations especially as regards youngsters keen to emulate their sporting heroes...it is patently wrong for the misuse of drugs in any context to be given the slightest measure of acceptability.

(Moynihan and Coe, quoted in DoE, 1987: 1)

This joint-review, with the list of prohibited drugs and testing procedures, was presented to the Ministerial Group, and proposed that testing should be “independent” and “more effective, rigorous and entirely random” as well as calling for “a new drug testing regime” (DoE, 1987: 8, 10). One of the reasons for this was because, according to the Chairman of the GB Sports Council, only 25 sports had conducted tests since 1979, even though the Sports Council was offering NGBs a 100% subsidy for covering the cost of testing as a financial incentive (R. Jeeps, quoted in Sports Council, 1986: 1; Houlihan, 1991: 216). Showing frustration over the reluctant involvement of some governing bodies, Jeeps stressed the rationale for intensifying the testing provision by introducing random out-of-competition testing (OOCT) in Britain, stating: “We do not want to win by blatant cheating; Great Britain must be against the production of chemical athletes” (Sports Council, 1986: 1). It was perceived that the policy of doping control moved significantly in 1984 when the Sports Council made it compulsory for all governing bodies to introduce drug tests, with the threat of the sanctions of withdrawal of grant and services being applied (NCF, 1985; Sports Council Doping Control, 1993). The proposal put forward by Moynihan and Coe in 1987 brought a
further policy change, which led the GBSC to create a ‘new system’ of doping control by introducing OOCT in 1988, the first example of which had been piloted by the British Amateur Athletics Board (BAAB) from 1985. In addition to this, the Council of the Doping Control Services was created which oversaw the doping control system in the UK.

However, in terms of its influence, this new system did not prompt all bodies to introduce OOCT. The FA, for instance, chose instead to set up a compulsory ‘post-match’ testing for professional players in 1989 (the FA had started ‘voluntary testing’ in 1978). What marked a significant policy change was the implementation of a centrally-administered testing programme in order to overcome the possibility of manipulation and the inconsistent number of tests among NGBs, thereby making it possible to achieve a consensus regarding “who to test, when to test, how often to test and how to administer tests” (Houlihan, 1997: 207). With the recognition of the characteristics and needs of individual sport bodies, the GB Sports Council transformed its approach to NGBs by increasing negotiation and discussion with a view to introducing a tailored testing regime (Houlihan, 1991: 217-8).

Table 4.2: Selected key policy development, 1980s to mid-1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>The GB Sports Council made it compulsory for all NGBs to introduce drug tests. Council of Europe passed the European Charter on Doping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>BAAB piloted OOCT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>OOCT was introduced by GB Sports Council. 4 GB athletes tested positive in Seoul Olympic Games. Coni Enquiry by the Amateur Athletic Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>European Charter on Doping became available for signature. Formulation of European Anti-Doping Convention by the Council of Europe as a legally binding document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Establishment of International Anti-Doping Arrangements, the UK is the inaugural member with Australia and Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>BOA decided to accompany lawyers to the GB squad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>GB Sports Council issues a policy statement on doping.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most importantly, Table 4.2 illustrates that the development of a domestic anti-doping policy in Britain up to the 1980s should be understood in parallel with the early progress towards an international agreement in Europe and the progress at international level. It should be highlighted that the British government intended to achieve its domestic policy goals through an inter-governmental platform because of “the reluctance felt, even among the most committed anti-doping campaigners, to institute an anti-doping policy which is significantly more rigorous than that in most other countries” (Houlihan, 1997: 206). In this regard, the
policy progress in Europe and inter-governmental cooperation should be taken into account. After the very early adoption of a definition of ‘doping’ in 1963, the Council of Europe made substantial progress in anti-doping policy with the passage of the European Charter on Doping in 1984. This European Charter became available for signature in 1989 and emphasised the need for harmonisation in the drive towards the elimination of performance-enhancing drugs. It is imperative to note that the British Government showed early support for the activities of the Council of Europe and that the contribution of Colin Moynihan was crucial in the formulation of the European Anti-Doping Convention of 1989, which came into effect in 1990 (CoE, 1989; Houlihan, 1991). Attention should be drawn to the leading role of the GB Sports Council, along with ministerial support, in reaching a European agreement prior to the agreement of the Council of Europe. To be more specific, Sir Arthur Gold, Chairman of the Sports Council’s Drug Abuse Advisory Group, was the Vice-Chairman of the Working Party for the Convention in Strasbourg, which was chaired by Prince de Merode of Belgium who also was the Chair of the IOC Medical Committee (CoE, 1989). It was stated that the significance of what Britain instigated, with its philosophy to eradicate drug abuse, not only exercised an influence over the other 22 member states of the Council of Europe, but also delivered the message via its direct link to Merode, and hence to the IOC, which had, according to Gold, “both the wealth and the influence to set up laboratories and impose total control all over the world” (Arthur Gold, quoted in Sports Council, 1986: 5). What is also interesting to note, in the context of this chapter, is that whilst stressing an inadequacy in its programme, the GB Sports Council sought to enhance the domestic anti-doping programme with the readiness to “learn” from such leading countries as Sweden, Norway and Denmark in order to become more proactive (Sports Council, 1986: 6).

Nevertheless, given that the 1989 Convention had “historically been the basis for UK policy and programme implementation” (UK Sport Memorandum for HCCMS, 2004) and despite the resilience of the Sports Council and some NGBs in combating drug abuse in sport, the anti-doping programme in the UK lacked a standardised testing scheme (e.g. frequency of testing and level of competition) and consistent penalties. This reflected the ambivalence of the IOC and IFs, who had not yet formulated a global anti-doping policy which would make possible harmonisation between government and national and international sporting bodies. Equally importantly, another example of progress in national anti-doping issues through the international platform can be identified in the establishment of the International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA) in 1990. The UK Government was the inaugural member for IADA along with Australia and Canada, and was later joined by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and New Zealand. The purpose of IADA was to achieve
cooperation in order to enhance rigorousness in anti-doping provision and, to this end in
1998, the International Standard for Doping Control (ISDC) was agreed.

It is generally agreed that it was the case of Ben Johnson, who, after testing positive for
anabolic steroids following his 100m victory in 1988, was stripped of his gold medal, which
defined the doping crisis in modern sport (e.g. Houlihan, 2002a; Waddington, 2000).
Established by the Canadian Government, the Commission of Inquiry Into the Use of Drugs
and Banned Substances Intended to Enhance Athletic Performances (known as the Dubin
Commission of Inquiry) highlighted the complexity of doping networks in terms of the
involvement of doctors, physicians and other non-sport staff, and the prevalence of abuse of
performance-enhancing drugs in the world of sport (see Houlihan, 2002a; Waddington, 2000;
MacAloon, 1990). As with the discovery by an Australian Government inquiry of systematic
drug use by Australian Institute elite athletes (Commonwealth of Australia, 1990), British
athletes were likewise brought to public attention and criticised for the use of performance-
enhancing substances. This can be seen in the setting up of the Commission of Enquiry
(known as the "Coni Enquiry"), set up by the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) in order to
investigate allegations of drug abuse within British athletics as reported in The Times (AAA,
1988). Unlike the investigations in Canada and Australia it was not acting in a quasi-judicial
legislative capacity and although the impact of Coni Enquiry was slight it did provide three
indicative findings which gave an understanding of the prevalence of drug use in sport and
was of value to those involved in this matter in the UK.

The Coni Enquiry pointed out, firstly, that performance-enhancing drugs had become
"common knowledge" by the late 1950s and that the "knowledge and experience grew and
spread, so the range of events in which athletes were turning to drugs to assist their
performance increased" by the mid-1960s (AAA, 1988: Paragraph B5, 6). Secondly, referring
to athletics officials and their earlier attitudes, the enquiry stated that: "Cassandra-like, their
voices were ignored until, by the early 1970s, the practice (of using drugs) was widespread
internationally at the top level" (Paragraph, B11). The Coni Enquiry confirmed that the
actions that had been taken in the UK were "too little" and "too late" (Paragraph, B14). The
involvement of athletes, coaches and doctors who prescribed banned drugs to athletes was
acknowledged as a complex network of relationships, which corresponded to those alleged
in the 1998 Tour de France (Paragraph, B21-24; see also Waddington, 2000). The extent of
the network was indicated as follows:

The information and advice relied upon by those British athletes who are
using banned drugs today is obtained not from coaches, but by word of mouth
— locker-room talk — from other athletes, both British and from abroad; and
from the readily available pamphlets which the sports drug culture has
generated.

(AAA, 1988: Paragraph, B23)

However, the report also noted that the extensive prevalence of the “sports drug culture”
ceased around 1983, since then, “the level of drug abuse in British athletics has reduced”
(Paragraph B16, 19). Two “very plain” reasons were given for this. The first was the
introduction of OOCT and the second was the disapproval of drug use among athletes due to
the risks to their health (Paragraph, B19). The reasons seem unconvincing and over-
exaggerated since there was a lack of strong evidence as only a small number of athletes,
coaches and officials were interviewed and it had only been a short period of time since
OOCT was introduced. Given that some evidence may be questionable, what is striking in
this report is that it captured the values and perceptions of athletes and coaches at that time
in terms of the nature of international sporting success and competitions. It showed a
growing awareness of the pervasive use of performance-enhancing drugs as well as the
reluctance of some athletics officials to educate athletes and prevent them from taking drugs

The precise depth and breadth of drug abuse in sport in Britain through the 1980s to 1990s is
unknown, but it is legitimate to argue that Britain international reputation was blemished by
the four British Olympic athletes who tested positive at the 1988 Games, one of whom was a
Judo bronze medallist, Kerrith Brown, who was found to have traces of frusemide in his
system. Interestingly, the other three athletes escaped sanctions. Linford Christie, who
became the 100 metres Olympic winner in the 1992 Barcelona Games, was cleared after
testing positive in 1988. However, he again tested positive (for nandrolone) in 1999 and
served a two-year ban (BBC News, 05 August 1999). These results prompted the British
Olympic Association (BOA) to provide the GB squad participating in the 1992 Olympics with
accompanying lawyers in order to offer some protection to the GB athletes against
accusations of drug use (Houlihan, 1991: 220). At the same time, the research findings from
the survey of athletes’ experiences and perceptions of doping control carried out by the GB
stated: “I am convinced that the problem is widespread not only in Canada but also around
the world...(and) that banned performance-enhancing substances and, in particular, anabolic
steroids are being used by athletes in almost every sport, most extensively in weightlifting
and track and field” (Dubin, 1990: 336). This was reflected in a GBSC survey of 1995 which
claimed that 48% of British athletes, 86% of whom were from track and field, perceived that a
problem existed in international sporting competition (Sports Council, 1996). A similar conclusion was drawn by the Scottish Sports Council which conducted a longitudinal survey of eight athletes from 1960 to 1990 and identified three influential factors in the taking of drugs: availability; the overwhelming desire to win; and suspicions of others benefiting from taking drugs (Scottish Sports Council, 1992).

Subsequently, the GB Sports Council issued a new policy statement in 1996, setting out the dual aims of protecting the health of athletes and eliminating a form of cheating in sport:

The Sports Council condemns the use of doping substances or doping methods to enhance artificially performance in sport. Doping can be dangerous; it puts the health of the competitor at risk. Doping is cheating and contrary to the spirit of fair competition.

(Sports Council, 1996: 7)

The GB Sports Council’s policy statement for anti-doping, which is very similar to the rationale in the later-to-be-adopted World Anti-Doping Code (WAD Code), reflected the dominant feature of the 1980s in the UK. It is clear that this period can be characterised, on the one hand, by the ‘resilience’ of the GBSC and some leading governing bodies like the BAAB and the proactive involvement of the then Minister for Sport in the campaign against the use of drugs in sport. On the other hand, in response to the strong anti-doping provision introduced by the GB Sports Council, there was antipathy in a number of NGBs over the introduction of stronger sanctions and consistent testing. Nevertheless, this period might reasonably be summed up as one of relative consistency by the GB Sports Council in engaging with the government over the issue of doping in sport. There was also a parallel international process which sought to ensure an inter-governmental agreement on the implementation of a harmonised anti-doping policy that was in step with the development of the anti-doping policy in the UK. This became particularly prominent in the next period.

4.2.3 The growing importance of global anti-doping policy and the development of national anti-doping policy in the UK, mid-1990s-2007

Between the late 1990s and early 2000s there was a further search for a coherent policy arrangement and a coordinated structural approach to keep in step with the development of global anti-doping policy provision. The responsibility for the national anti-doping programme
was transferred from the GBSC to the UK Sport Ethics and Anti-Doping Directorate in 1996 and subsequently to UK Sport’s Drug Free Sport Directorate (DFSD). During this period, the government’s engagement in drug-free sport can be seen, firstly, in the allocation of a budget for the anti-doping policy, and secondly, in supporting the establishment of the Sports Disputes Resolution Panel (SDRP) in 1999 to provide “a low-cost alternative to the courts” (BMA, 2002: 108). As well as the adoption of the global anti-doping framework, this period was also noted for the setting up of a range of governmental and quasi-governmental inquiries in relation to the appropriateness of the provisions of the domestic doping programmes. In addition, there were conflicts over legitimacy and demands for the transformation of administrative structures and education programmes (see further discussion in 4.4).

Following the sensational Ben Johnson saga in 1988, there were two events in the late 1990s that prompted an international effort in the fight against doping, and consequently, the British government’s engagement with the issue. Firstly, with the demise of the former Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and East Germany, the systematic involvement of doctors and coaches in administering performance-enhancing drugs became public knowledge. Hoberman noted that it was the "state-sponsored East German doping program ("State Plan 14.25") that established a scientific elite to boost athletic performance" (1993b: 277; see also Riordan, 1991; Spitzer, 2006a, 2006b). The second event was the 1998 Tour de France where, even though performance-enhancing drugs had previously been prevalent in professional cycling, the event was perceived to be producing a ‘culture of tolerance of doping’. According to Waddington, it was seen as the “greatest ever doping scandal in sport” and what became quickly evident was the institutionalised “doping network” with the involvement of team members, coaches and doctors in supplying or concealing doping substances in professional cycling (Waddington, 2000: 153-169). The most critical issue in this incident was not only the swift involvement of the French authorities, which marginalised the responsibility of the international governing body, i.e. the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), but also highlighted the ineffectual and inappropriate anti-doping policies existing at the time. One of the outcomes from this incident was the introduction of blood testing before racing (Waddington, 2000). International efforts in the fight against doping were further advanced following the IOC’s alleged bribery in connection with the selection of Salt Lake City as the host for the 2002 Winter Olympics. The IOC scandal undermined its pivotal involvement in establishing global anti-doping policy and overshadowed its role as a “moral guardian” regarding drug abuse in sport. The result was the World Conference on Doping in Sport held in Lausanne in 1999 (see Houlihan, 2002a, 2002c; Hoberman, 2001).
The IOC’s intention to deflect criticism over corruption, and its avoidance of admitting the ‘inadequacy’ of the anti-doping policy overseen by the IOC Medical Commission, became apparent. The IOC proposed the creation of an anti-doping agency based on a ‘pseudo-independent’ model headed by its President, Juan Samaranch (Hoberman, 1999). As a result, Tony Banks, the then UK Minister for Sport, bitterly criticised the IOC at the opening of the Lausanne World Conference calling for it to become more democratic and accountable, and advocating the creation of an international anti-doping agency, independent of the IOC. Banks stated that:

The British government expects the IOC to clean up their act, and they can start with doping in sport...The system operating at the moment does not have the confidence of the athletes...In Britain we operate a rigorous anti-doping regime. We are not prepared to lower our standards to a lowest common denominator that is soft on doping in sport...We support a totally transparent world anti-doping organisation, but the IOC should not be that agency.

(Tony Banks, quoted in The Guardian, 03 February 1999)

In response, Merode, Head of the IOC Medical Commission, who was described as "inept and ineffective" (Hoberman, 2004: 8), asked "Why should I trust politicians?" (Merode, quoted in The Guardian, 03 February 1999). Tony Banks sought and gained support from a number of influential political figures, including Barry McCaffrey, Director of the White House Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP, 1999), who was described as being "a central actor in discussions concerning the new agency" (Houlihan, 2001: 140). McCaffrey stated that "recent examples of alleged corruption, lack of accountability, and the failure of leadership have challenged the legitimacy of this institution (IOC)" and said that the IOC's credibility was "tarnished" (quoted in The New York Times, 03 February 1999). The World Anti-Doping Agency was subsequently created in 1999 as a hybrid global agency independent of the IOC with equal representation and subsidies from governments and other public authorities, such as the Council of Europe, and from sports organisations, including the IOC and IFs. The World Anti-Doping Code was adopted in 2003, and was the landmark for harmonising the domestic anti-doping provision with global anti-doping policy. This was followed by the ratification of the UNESCO International Anti-Doping Convention against Doping in Sport in October 2005 which was a legally-binding international agreement for the government.
It has become more apparent that in response to the implementation of a robust, global anti-doping framework, as embodied by UNESCO, the UK Sport DFSD has made substantial progress in developing more comprehensive doping provision and promoting awareness and knowledge of anti-doping rules and regulations. The UK Sport DFSD became a WAD Code signatory in August 2004 and subsequently issued a number of national policy documents reflecting the WAD Code, including the UK National Anti-Doping Policy and Model Anti-Doping Rules, both published in 2005 and requiring NGBs to submit updated anti-doping regulations. Significantly, an Anti-Doping Agreement between UK Sport and an NGB became a condition for eliciting funding. There were also statements concerning the use of dietary supplements and nutritional intake (i.e. Nandrolone Progress Report of 2003).

A further indication of rigorous engagement in anti-doping policy can be seen in the commissioning of a review of UK Sport DFSD by PMP Consulting to investigate the “optimum arrangements for the governance, structure and operations of the national anti-doping organisation in the UK” (PMP Consulting, 2004: 1). By obtaining data from a wide range of organisations and athletes, this ‘independent review’ concluded that, irrespective of the weaknesses identified, the responsibility for anti-doping should remain within UK Sport which was “an important policy-making body for sport in the UK, and as such should retain the lead for anti doping policies and programmes” (PMP Consulting, 2004: 58-9). Among all the recommendations, two core elements were highlighted for the re-organising of the domestic policy arrangements. These were: i) the incorporation of a new corporate management and governance structure and improvements in education programmes; and ii) effective communications in order to restore the trust and confidence of sporting bodies and athletes (ibid, 54-64; PMP Consulting, not dated; see more discussion in 4.4).

Stemming from the recommendations in the PMP report for strengthening management and corporate governance (PMP Consulting, not dated), it is possible to identify that 2005 was a watershed in terms of the structural re-arrangement of UK Sport DFSD as shown in four key policy developments.

The first and earliest indication of significant change was the departure of the long-serving Director of DFSD, Michele Verroken, in July 2004, who was seemingly impressed with the operation of an American-style independent drug agency and who publicly pressed for an independent, anti-doping agency separate from UK Sport (Daily Telegraph, 20 December 2003; see 4.4). The second policy development occurred with the formation of the Independent Scrutiny Panel (ISP) with “non-technical” nature” intended to bring “credibility” to the anti-doping provision (PMP Consulting, not dated). Headed by a former Police Chief
Constable, the objective of the ISP was to scrutinise DFSD’s performance and to identify potential and actual conflicts of interest (ISP, 2006; UK Sport News, 30 June 2005). Another re-structuring of organisational arrangements to achieve greater transparency was seen in the creation of the post of Head of the National Anti-Doping Programme and in the separation of reporting from the other responsibilities of UK Sport (Houlihan & Preece, 2007: 329). It is instructive to note that Andy van Neutegem, who was appointed as the Head of National Anti-Doping Programme in June 2005 but resigned in January 2006, stressed the fundamental value of conducting drug tests as a “deterrent” (UK Sport, 2005a: 35). Linked to ensuring effective drug tests, the third point of policy change was the implementation of a “Manifesto” to identify short- and long-term policy objectives each year. It is clear that conducting ‘intelligence-based’ random OOCT by identifying prioritised sports and athletes, had become a number one priority, since they accounted for 50% of all tests in 2005/6, increasing to 55% in 2006/7 (UK Sport, 2005d, 2006d; see more details in 4.3.4). The last policy development, followed the pattern of the 2004 Start Clean programme by targeting younger athletes, and substantial financial resources were invested to launch the Global Drug Information Database and 100% ME education programmes, in order to expand the availability of information and education campaigns. The idea of the 100% ME programme was explained by the Director of DFSD as being set up to “switch the attention to those who choose to compete drug-free, and celebrate the success they achieve as drug-free athletes through sheer hard work, dedication and belief” (John Scott, quoted in UK Sport, 2005a: 14). The UK Sport’s attempt to enhance the education material seems to have been endorsed by WADA with its Education and Information Manager, Allison Holloway, being selected for the WADA Education Committee (UK Sport News, 18 January 2007). The educational ideal identified above was also confirmed by a senior DFSD official who emphasized a “narrow”, focused approach to anti-doping, in which education “has to be the start of any programme” as a “preventive measure” through providing athletes with the information to make informed choices and become aware of their rights and responsibilities. Together with this, this senior DFSD official explained that a more rigorous intelligence-based testing programme could serve as a “fantastic deterrent” (DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007).

A number of recent high profile and sometimes controversial cases not only attracted media attention and became the source of embarrassment, but also, significantly, showed the doping problems in sport to be trans-national, which highlighted the necessity of educating athletes and achieving consistency across sport. The first example is the case of Dwain Chambers, the European 100m champion, who was suspended for two years for taking anabolic steroid tetrahydrogestrinone (THG) in November 2003. It was the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) who found that Chambers tested positive. This, it
was claimed, was the result of an unprecedented American federal investigation into the San Francisco-based Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO), which was producing a new designer drug (not the result of the British system) that unmasked the complex web of the doping network (The Guardian, 22 October 2003). The case of Greg Rusedski, Canadian-born (then) No.2 tennis player in Britain, is another case where the international body found a positive result, although he was cleared of committing a doping offence by the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) because there was substance to the claim that the source of nandrolone was handed out by the ATP trainers on the tour. The last example comprises a series of high profile athletes that missed three random OOCT over 18 months (known as a ‘missed test strike’). These cases highlighted not only the significance of athletes’ responsibility for providing information of their whereabouts for a minimum of one hour each day, five days a week, but also the variance in sanctions across different sports. There is a great deal of discussion over whether athletes’ ‘forgetfulness’ can stand as a reason to appeal against the imposed sanctions. Rio Ferdinand, Manchester United soccer player, though it was a one-off to supply a sample, had an eight-month ban imposed and a fine of £50,000 by the FA (The FA Disciplinary News, 14 March 2004). In September 2006 Christine Ohuruogu was banned for 12 months, in line with IAAF’s ruling, for missing three random OOCTs administered by UK Sport. After her ban was lifted she went on to win the 400m championship at the 2007 International Athletics in Osaka. The triathlete Tim Don was suspended for three months in October 2006, as was judoka Peter Cousins, and powerlifter Gillian Wright received a six months ban in July 2006 (The Independent, 14 October 2006). All these three cases were for missing three OOCTs.

It was acknowledged that these high-profile cases in 2006 had a ‘knock-on effect’, forcing athletes to start taking more seriously the provision of information regarding their whereabouts, which resulted in a 50% reduction in the number of missed tests (UK Sport News, 13 October 2006). Acknowledging the system in the UK to be “tough” but “the most athlete-friendly in the world”, maintaining the balance between the need for no-notice testing and the demands on the individual (quoted in UK Sport News, 18 February 2007), the Head of Operations for DFSD, Andy Parkinson, nonetheless expressed concerns about the flexibility and inconsistency of sanctions across sport allowed under the WAD Code. The Code, he said, “puts us in the situation of different competitors in different sports not being treated equally even though they have committed the same offence” (quoted in UK Sport News, 13 October 2006). The coherence required for managing whereabouts information and missed tests was proposed by UK Sport to WADA as part of the revision of the International Standard for Testing. With its aim to achieve harmonisation across all sports and countries, this may be one of the few cases where the UK’s domestic needs have
instigated a change in the global system (UK Sport Comment Draft Version 1.0, 18 May 2007; UK Sport News, 04 April 2007, 25 May 2007, 15 November 2007). Although it did not reach an agreement during the 4th World Conference on Doping in Sport, it may well be that regular policy review and monitoring of the system, which allows the participating countries to comment, will be seen as the key element in developing and maintaining the global anti-doping regime. Furthermore, it is quite apparent that UK Sport has sought to establish an international consensus in order to settle the lingering domestic disagreement with regard to the whereabouts system (UK Sport News, 28 February 2007). However, no agreement has been reached in the UK regarding a more ‘sensible’ approach to such an offence as missing OOC three times. After their appeal to the Sport Dispute Resolution Panel or the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the rigorous domestic approach was questioned when athletes in the above four cases were cleared of offences by a bye-law of the BOA, that in the event of a conviction, automatically imposes a life ban on competing in the Olympics (UK Sport News, 04 April 2007).

As with the second period of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the progress of domestic policy during the third period continued to be strongly linked to international developments. However, this period must be seen as distinct because of the emergence of a number of global anti-doping policies, specifically the implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 and the issuing of the UK National Anti-Doping Policy in 2005, which reflected the principles and values found in WAD Code. The British Government became the twelfth country to ratify the International Anti-Doping Convention against Doping in Sport, adopted in October 2005 at UNESCO, which, in principle, has become the international legal basis for setting the responsibilities of governments in the fight against doping in sport. Perhaps the most striking aspect is that there is ample evidence to suggest that the national anti-doping policy and programmes have been steered by the emerging global framework, and that there is growing awareness of international perceptions of Britain being inactive and taking inappropriate domestic measures. What is also important to note is that the catalyst in changing policy was the hosting of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Despite the fact that UK Sport had resisted pressure for a long time and had decided in 2005 to maintain a NADO inside its organisation and set up an Independent Scrutiny Panel to ensure accountability and transparency, the creation of an independent NADO outside the domain of UK Sport, in time for the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games was announced in December 2007. In the light of international policy development in anti-doping, the Minister for Sport, Gerry Sutcliffe, who was appointed after the long-serving Minister Richard Caborn, described this decision as “a natural evolution” (UK Sport/DCMS Press Release, 05 December 2007). Although we shall return to these points in Section 4.4, it can be observed that non-
compliance seems not to be an option for the anti-doping actors in the UK. Separating the high-performance function from drug-free sport has indicated that domestic and external pressure have shaped the preference of government. Nevertheless, it is worth noting at this point that there is a conspicuous imbalance in the government's interest and investment in high performance, yet drug-free sport.

4.3 Organisational Structures and the Robustness of Drug Tests in the UK

This section examines the current anti-doping arrangements, particularly focusing on the characteristics of UK Sport DFSD and its relationship with international anti-doping organisations, as well as outlining the government's responsibility for anti-doping policy. It identifies the way the domestic arrangements have been influenced by an emerging global infrastructure for anti-doping. It then reviews the changing availability of financial resources for anti-doping programmes and the number of doping tests carried out in the UK over the last decade. In this way, it is intended to examine how the global development in anti-doping policy has influenced the resources allocated to drug-free sport and the number of doping tests carried out in the UK.

4.3.1 UK national anti-doping organisation and anti-doping stakeholders

The UK Sport Drug-Free Sport Directorate was appointed by the government in 1997, and took over the role of the National Anti-Doping Organisation (NADO) for the UK and the full responsibilities of the GB Sports Council. Aiming for "World Class Standards" is one of three strategic priorities of UK Sport, and therefore, in order to promote the highest standard of sporting conduct, and also ethically fair, drug-free sport, both on and off the field, it issued the UK National Anti-Doping Policy (UK NADP) and the UK National Anti-Doping Model Rules. As a Signatory to the World Anti-Doping Code, the roles and responsibilities of UK Sport DFSD are: to implement the UK NADP, ensuring that British sporting bodies comply with the WAD Code and International Standards; to manage testing and analytical results for the UK; to manage the disciplinary/monitoring process; and to implement education programmes to increase awareness and understanding of, for instance, the health of athletes.

[17] The anti-doping organisations are reflected in the arrangements up to December 2007, before the announcement was made by DCUMS/UK Sport to establish an independent NADO.
and misuse of drugs in sport (UK Sport, 2005a; PMP Consulting, 2004). As previously mentioned in 4.2.3, UK Sport introduced the 100% ME Education programme in 2005 to promote, particularly among young athletes, an understanding of the anti-doping rules and regulations and the values and responsibilities which will ensure fairness in sport by athletes and support staff (UK Sport, 2006d: 42-3).

Information technology is also exploited to provide an online drug information service through the Drug Information Database, educational resources and an Outreach Programme, modelled on that of WADA at the Olympics. This service is designed to educate school-age competitors about drug-free sport and the values of fair competition. It should be highlighted that, since its launch in late 1999, the Sports Dispute Resolution Panel (SDRP) has become a crucial part of anti-doping organisational provision, and provides services for fair resolution of disputes, including an independent tribunal, arbitration, mediation and appeals. The effectiveness of the Panel can be judged by the way each sporting body has chosen the SDRP as its preferred tribunal service. It was noted that a hearing framework, with an "independent" status, only allows the SDRP a passive position which works "within the structure that is decided ultimately from a policy level" (Siddall, SDRP Director, HCCMS, 2004: Q171).

To participate in the Olympic and Paralympic Games, GB athletes must abide by the BOA's 'bye-law' on doping, implemented in 1992. It is stated that the bye-laws "impose a life ban from eligibility for selection for the Great Britain Olympic Team of any person who has been found guilty of a doping offence, irrespective of any other sanction imposed by a relevant body" and that this would send "the strongest possible message...to the youth of this country to play clean" (HCCMS, 2004: Ev119). Nevertheless, it was stated in the UK Sport commissioned report that the BOA, in practice, has "a limited role except for the Olympic Games where they have jurisdiction over all adverse findings for the GB Team" (PMP Consulting, 2004: 15). In many ways, conflicting relationships between UK Sport and the BOA and their struggle to control anti-doping issues seem to have been intensified, especially after the decision to select London as the host city for the Olympics in 2012. It should be noted in this regard that even though UK Sport continued to be financially and politically supported by the Government to lead the UK's anti-doping policy and manage test results and education programmes, there had been persistent political pressure questioning UK Sport's eligibility as the NADO. This issue is further discussed in Section 4.4.
4.3.2 The features of the UK Sport Drug Free Sport Directorate and influence of emerging global framework for anti-doping

There are both similarities and differences between the Performance Directorate and the DFSD within UK Sport (see Chapter 6). Firstly, and not surprisingly, there is a shared characteristic in their status as sections within a non-departmental public body, financially dependent on Grant-in-Aid for the operation of drug-free programmes and the requirement to set targets. UK Sport, as a distributor of both Exchequer and National Lottery public funds, has the discretion to suspend and withhold funding to NGBs in the case of a breach of the UK National Anti-Doping Policy (UK Sport, 2005a). More specifically, to ensure compliance among different levels of sporting bodies in the UK, NGBs are required to sign a ‘tripartite’ Anti-Doping Agreement between UK Sport and the relevant Home Country Sports Council (HCSC) to secure eligibility for funding. The HCSCs monitor compliance with the Agreement, ensuring their commitment to UK NADP (HCST, 2007: Ev 105). Certainly, national sporting bodies are constrained by, and liaise with, their respective IFs to ensure compliance (UK Sport, 2005b). This can be seen as a contractual tripartite-relationship with a rather hierarchical structure of accountability whereby UK Sport (through managing and controlling test programmes) is in a position to impose coherent sanctions on NGBs and their athletes.

Secondly, the UK Sport DFSD intends to maintain a clear line of domestic and international relationships and accountability to the Performance Directorate of UK Sport, and to enhance transparent governance and management. Diagram 4.1 illustrates that the DFSD is in a complex web of accountability and relationships. In particular, following the review by PMP Consulting, it was intended to introduce the ‘Chinese Walls’ policy, whereby the DFSD separates itself from the rest of UK Sport’s functions by establishing an Independent Scrutiny Panel (ISP) which has an “overarching responsibility for scrutinising the anti-doping function within UK Sport, in order to identify actual or potential conflicts of interest and to make recommendations” (ISP, 2006: 1). The UK Sport DFSD embraces accountability not only to the Board of UK Sport and the Government (DCMS), but also to stakeholders at both domestic level (HCSCs, NGBs, BOA, BPA and athletes) and global level (World Anti-Doping Agency, IOC, IFs, IADA and ANADO). In addition, the DFSD is intimately linked with numerous professions, both sporting and non-sporting, domestically and globally. These include coaches, trainers and athletes from grassroots to elite level, sport specialists (e.g. sport doctors, physiologists, and scientists), independent Doping Control Officers (DCOs; Chaperones), medical officers, legal advisors and arbitrators (e.g. SDRP). These elements of
national and international networks of accountability were summarised by Houlihan and Preece as being "multi-centric rather than straight line as the Directorate is accountable to different authorities, for different purposes, to different degrees and with a range of intended outcomes" (2007: 395).

It is interesting to read the account of a senior DFSD official who said that the centralised global framework that emerged with WADA is now accountable for the whole global anti-doping programme; UNESCO being responsible for governments; ANADO for NADOs; and the IOC and IPC for looking after sport (i.e. their two events). He sees no point in maintaining IADA, due to the overlapping roles of representatives from those bodies and organisations "cluttering up" the global anti-doping infrastructure (DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007). Moreover, acknowledging the constraints resulting from these international 'generic organisations', the above DFSD senior official illustrated the residual tension and a lack of collaboration and trust between IFs and NADOs as follows:

They'll (IFs) still test the British athletes because they don't necessarily trust [us]...Their rationale is they still want to be able to do that (test athletes) because [IFs think athletes are] their athletes, 'the international-level athletes, they are mine, and I am gonna test them'. But it's like what's the point?, you are just wasting tests. And I mean we waste so many tests internationally, it's crazy.

(Original emphasis, UK Sport DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007)

He criticised the fact that, even though UK NADO (UK Sport DFSD) provides a full report of its testing results to IFs (see more in 4.3.4), a longstanding lack of trust by IFs has undermined the robust measures taken in the UK, which still suggests a 'cluttered' relationship with international sporting organisations.
Thirdly, and closely related to the first point, it is the responsibility of UK Sport DFSD in ensuring British athletes are ‘drug-free’. Athletes on the World Class Pathway Programme, including podium and junior levels, and professional players from sports such as rugby union, rugby league and tennis, are obliged to make contractual agreements with their governing bodies in order to enjoy personal rewards. Those WCPP athletes who are found to be in violation of anti-doping rules are suspended from receiving all financial payments (UK Sport, 2005a). UK Sport relies on the relevant IFs to ensure suspended athletes repay any financial gains from events (DCMS, 2007b: 27-8). In addition, the DFSD provides educational and information programmes which deliver the messages about all prohibited lists, the Therapeutic Use of Exemption drugs, and the harm to health that can result from the use of drugs. The detailed preventive strategies for doping in sport were issued to make explicit that it is not only UK Sport’s but also all sport bodies’ “duty to provide effective information and education to all athletes competing under the rules of the World Anti-Doping Code” and “to ensure athletes can make informed and responsible choices about anti-doping” (UK Sport, 2007a: 1). However, it is essential to point out the relative absence of athletes as “primary stakeholders” in anti-doping, which can be illustrated by the fact that only one athlete sits on
Although the objectives and aspirations proclaimed in the 100% ME education programme have the potential to reach out to athletes at the grass-roots level where elite athletes take on ambassadorial roles, there still remains the problem of the marginalisation of athletes in anti-doping issues. It also seems that UK Sport has not comprehended the demands of athletes. Some areas of improvement were identified by the British Athlete Commission. These include, amongst others, the availability of better information for athletes on the foreign medications available to them in abroad (BAC Memorandum for HCCMS, 2004: Ev90). While further investment in education and information may show a gradual shift in focus towards deterrence and prevention, the provisions such as the conditions for eliciting public funding based on compliance with the UK NADP and sanctions still present the image of the Directorate as an ‘investigative’ body (PMP Consulting, 2004; see more discussion in 4.3.4).

4.3.3 The role of the Government in anti-doping policy

The UK government takes a minimal interventionist position on anti-doping, setting national policy, providing financial support and, to some degree, coordinating the activities and roles of the key sporting bodies, whilst leaving the delivery of the policy for drug-free sport to UK Sport (at least from 1997 to the end of December 2007). The concepts of ‘value for money’ and the ‘arms’ length’ relationship with drug-free sport, along with their administration of the funding of UK Sport, were stressed by DCMS as being “the most cost-effective way to deliver a national anti-doping programme” (DCMS Memorandum to HCCMS, 2004). The inter-governmental agenda, whether bi-lateral or multi-lateral, is nonetheless retained through the government being officially represented in international negotiations and agreements, particularly those involving the IOC, WADA and UNESCO. The Head of the Elite Sports Team in DCMS acknowledged that it is in the sphere of international relations where the governments “can do” things and play a role which would not be possible for a public agency like UK Sport (Matthew Reader, quoted in HCST, 2007: Q1).

As previously described in 4.2.2, one of the earliest examples of a leading international, or more specifically, European initiative to combat doping was the establishing of the European Anti-Doping Convention through the Council of Europe, which came into effect in 1990, and which is perceived to have been “the basis for UK policy and programme implementation” (UK Sport Memorandum to HCCMS, 2004: 1.7). As for the International Anti-Doping
Arrangement (IADA), both UK Sport and the Government are signatories, ensuring quality procedures in anti-doping (UK Sport, 2002a: 7-8). The recent international agreement was the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping signed in March 2003, followed by the World Anti-Doping Code, which the Government supported. An international role was played by Richard Caborn, the then Minister for Sports, who was on the WADA Foundation Board. The UNESCO Convention adopted in October 2005 came before Parliament on the 3rd February 2006, and the Instrument of Ratification with UNESCO was completed on the 25th April 2006. The UNESCO Convention is the international legal framework to complement the UK's national anti-doping policy and to clarify the responsibilities of government to ensure Britain's compliance with the WAD Code. The ratification of the UNESCO Convention therefore clearly demonstrated the government's "commitment to the principles of the World Anti-Doping Code" (Lords Hansard, WA153, 30 March 2006).

The UK does not currently have any specific legislation on doping in sport and the Government recommends that UK Sport and HCSCs should implement the UNESCO Convention through administrative means rather than legislation. It was said that anti-doping was an aspect of the "self-regulatory framework of sports governance" (PMP Consulting, 2004: 12). Asked if the government would criminalise doping by applying a specific law, Richard Caborn, dismissed this in the light of WADA's core principles by claiming that:

We are not in the business of policing society. We are in the business of rooting out cheats in sport. That is what WADA's core function is about. What we have here, both in terms of how we have framed our laws and how we operate through UK Sport, does that in a very effective way.

(Caborn, quoted in HCST, 2007: Q319)

A practitioner from UK Sport DFSD made a similar point, stressing that catching the "cheats" who have "their sophisticated support mechanisms" is the most significant principle in the WAD Code, rather than being a "social police" to catch athletes who use cocaine or cannabis for "social purposes" (DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007).

As mentioned previously, in the UK case, it is the Medicines Act 1968 and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 which are theoretically the principle laws and regulations that apply to the flow of illegal drugs and the taking of banned substances. Different governmental agencies are responsible for enforcing this legislation and DCMS concluded that "it is more appropriate that officials continue their work with the MHRA [Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency], Home Office and law enforcement agencies to investigate what more
can be achieved through augmenting enforcement under the current legislative framework" (DCMS, 2007b: 8). Except for control of the inflow of illegal substances, which is the responsibility of HM Revenue and Customs, the domestic arrangement for drugs in sport and misuse of doping is largely recognised as an area of cross-government activity. The above-quoted DFSD official noted that different ministerial protocols influenced the debate in a cross-ministerial meeting, where, although "nothing much happened", the meeting was judged to be quite "successful" and symbolic because different ministers gathered together in the same room discussing the issue of doping in preparation for the 2012 Games. The conclusions of these meetings were echoed in the decision to "modernise" UK NADO, advocating a current “policy-based approach” but also transferring the results management, the responsibility for which had been possessed by NGBs, to a new NADO, creating a robust, effective partnership with law enforcement agencies (UK Sport Announcement, December 2007; see more in 7.4). In summary, the policy protocols advocated by the current Labour Government (such as cross-government involvement in the current legislative framework affecting anti-doping) remain unconvincing with regard to new legislation to criminalise doping offences, despite increasing national and international pressure on the UK to demonstrate extensive commitment to drug-free sport as the host country for the 2012 Games.

4.3.4 Anti-doping resources and the UK’s contributions to WADA

There has been a gradual increase in the Government’s financial contributions to anti-doping programmes over recent years. The DFSD is a full recipient of government funding, and the government does not specify how this is spent, that is, there is no ‘ring-fenced’ set within the block grant. UK Sport, however, sets targets as well as Key Performance Indicators and, therefore, needs to meet the criteria of regular reviews and evaluations of allocated government resources. One could argue that the resources devoted to both the national and global effort against doping indicate the seriousness with which the Government views this agenda. Table 4.3 illustrates the constant growth of investment in the operation of Drug-Free programmes from the annual Grant-in-Aid (GIA) or Exchequer subsidies. In comparison to the investment (£1.38m) in 2000/01, before the creation of WADA, the level of investment more than doubled to £3m in 2006/07. Nonetheless, apart from the budget increase in 2002/03 for testing at the Manchester Commonwealth Games, the significant year was 2004/05, when the DCMS “recommended” giving an extra allocation to drug free sport, to be used, to increase the total number of tests and to introduce blood tests (PMP Consulting,
In comparison to the costs of sample analysis, which is claimed to be the most expensive in the world (about £300 per analysis) and uses around 50% of the total anti-doping budget, only 3% is spent on education and information services. British spending on education is relatively low compared with those countries which are "perceived to be the leading nations in the field of anti-doping" such as Norway, Sweden and Australia, which spend more than three or four times this percentage on education (PMP Consulting, 2004: 30, 36; Verroken in HCCMS, 2004). An additional £1m was made available during 2005/06 for the launch of two educational and information programmes, 'Stay Clean' for young athletes and '100% ME'. This can be seen as a significant change in policy emphasis and a reflection of some of the concern and demands for improving educational and information resources highlighted in the review conducted by PMP Consulting and commissioned by UK Sport.

Table 4.3: UK's Contribution to WADA and UK Sport's allocation to National Anti-Doping Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK's contribution to WADA*</td>
<td>504,978</td>
<td>595,589</td>
<td>504,978</td>
<td>633,088</td>
<td>647,531</td>
<td>661,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total allocation to Europe</td>
<td>4,037,500</td>
<td>4,209,224</td>
<td>4,805,813</td>
<td>5,154,938</td>
<td>5,309,586</td>
<td>5,468,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WADA's allocation to public authorities</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
<td>10,117,500</td>
<td>10,117,500</td>
<td>10,852,500</td>
<td>11,178,075</td>
<td>11,513,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of UK's contribution to WADA</td>
<td>5.94%</td>
<td>5.85%</td>
<td>4.83%</td>
<td>5.83%</td>
<td>5.79%</td>
<td>5.74%</td>
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<th>2002</th>
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<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National A-D operation cost**</td>
<td>3,917,201</td>
<td>3,110,057</td>
<td>3,988,720</td>
<td>5,801,217</td>
<td>6,130,818</td>
<td>6,513,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA support to sports services</td>
<td>1,917,000</td>
<td>1,522,000</td>
<td>1,952,000</td>
<td>2,839,000</td>
<td>3,000,300</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA support to NGBs</td>
<td>3,631,125</td>
<td>6,173,117</td>
<td>8,113,065</td>
<td>6,551,146</td>
<td>5,778,740</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA total</td>
<td>10,198,618</td>
<td>22,534,635</td>
<td>28,650,790</td>
<td>27,199,722</td>
<td>28,261,539</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GIA to A-D programme</td>
<td>12.35%</td>
<td>6.51%</td>
<td>8.45%</td>
<td>9.87%</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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Percentage of European's contribution to WADA is 49.50% of allocation to public authorities contribution

*Contribution to WADA is in effect on 1 January. The same amount of contribution as UK has been made with France, Germany, Italy and Russia

**UK Sport's budget account is between 1 April to 31 March.

However, it is absolutely necessary to show the allocation of GIA for the operation of UK DFSD in relation to the funds for high performance success in the UK. Table 4.3 highlights that, on the one hand, the proportion of the total allocation of public subsidies from the Exchequer to the support of NGBs' high performance programme showed an increase based on the Olympic-cycle, and on the other hand, that only around 9% is invested in the UK's
anti-doping programme. Of particular note is the announcement in March 2006 of additional government funding through to the 2012 London Games, thereby, making £53.1m available in 2005/06. During that year, 63.1% of Exchequer subsides in total were allocated to the preparation for the Olympics and Paralympics, while the proportion of the budget devoted to the Drug-Free programme was reduced. Although this highlighted a clear prioritisation by UK Sport, the allocation of funds to elite sport specialist services, such as sports science and medical support, and Drug-Free provision was more or less equally distributed. As for the contribution to WADA, the UK's share in Europe remains the same. At the 3rd meeting of the International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS, formed in November 1999) held in Cape Town, it was agreed that governments should fund 50% of the contributions to WADA from January 2002, 47.5% of which was allocated to the European Union (WADA HP: www.wadaama.org). Table 4.3 shows the UK's contribution in accordance with the agreed distribution formula based on GDP and population for the years of 2002-07. During this period the British share remained the same, being equal to that of France, Germany, Italy and Russia.

4.3.5 The UK drug testing programme, 1988-2007

4.3.5.1 Adequacy in testing results

Although Waddington acknowledged some methodological difficulties in arriving at "a precise estimate of the changing prevalence of drug use in British sport", which may indicate "a critical weakness of anti-doping policies in Britain", he stressed the necessity "to estimate, [drug usage] as accurately as we can" by triangulating several sources of information (1996: 119-120). Waddington was cautious of using only one set of drug testing data, including positive test results from UK Sport DFSD, because the data is "almost worthless as an indication of the prevalence of doping in sport" (ibid, 121). Nevertheless, for our purposes we do not need to provide an understanding of the extent of banned substance use or the actual prevalence of the drug issue in the UK, but to identify the pattern of engagement in doping tests in a longitudinal way as well as to examine the changing emphasis in the policy in response to the development of global anti-doping movement.

Graph 4.1 summarises the results of the annual testing samples analysed by both UK and by international sporting bodies, all of which were obtained by the UK Sport DFSD. The graph illustrates the changing pattern in the total number of out-of-competition tests (OOCT) and in-
competition tests (ICT) collected and analysed over the period April 1988 to March 2007. The sample analysis was coordinated by the WADA accredited laboratories, the Doping Control Centre at King’s College, London, and HFL, Newmarket, Cambridgeshire (accredited in July 2004 but accreditation revoked in September 2007). Both sets of data should have reflected the following criteria set by UK Sport to determine priorities: i) the international status of the UK in the sport; ii) the negative public impact of offences and the positive impact of clean sport; iii) availability of financial rewards to athletes; iv) traditionally large adverse findings; and v) the potential for drug misuse (HCCMS, 2004: 25). This does not exclude the possibility of inconsistency in the UK Sport’s reporting system which had been influenced by changes in UK Sport’s regulations, such as the introduction of no-advance notice OOCT programmes. Also, it is not possible to determine from Graph 4.1 the extent of blood tests, which were, for the first time, introduced at the World Half Marathon Championships in Bristol in October 2001 (114 blood screens in 2006/07). The distribution of athletes based on sex cannot be identified either. It was stated in the report by the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee that the information and data available on drug test results was “unsatisfactory”. This was in the light of the government’s serious determination to ensure “deterrent and preventative action through the testing regime”, and there is also a “data-vacuum”, for example, in the variable number of sportspeople eligible for testing in each sport and the inability to identify the data which came from overseas athletes tested in the UK (HCCMS, 2004: 24). Equally, it is not known how many individual British athletes training abroad were tested. The weakness in reporting data was recognised later by Michele Verroken, former Director for DFSD, who stated that the data was “incomplete”, and thus, improving “accuracy and adequacy of test data would give greater public assurance that sufficient testing programmes [sic] are being delivered” (quoted in HCST, 2007: Ev87).
Graph 4.1: Total number of testing programme samples collected in the UK, 1988-2007

Source: Houlihan, 1997: 208; UK Anti-Doping Programme Full Year Figures (respective years)

Note: the number of OOCT conducted in 1994/5 not known
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LKA</td>
<td>Athletics</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>76: 6: 4</td>
<td>0: 452</td>
<td>0: 605</td>
<td>0: 14</td>
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<td>0: 8</td>
<td>0: 503</td>
<td>0: 526</td>
<td>15: 483</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFU</td>
<td>Rugby Union (Eng)</td>
<td>H</td>
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<td>59: 0</td>
<td>150: 0</td>
<td>147: 0</td>
<td>321: 0</td>
<td>100: 0</td>
<td>275: 100: 0</td>
<td>276: 168: 0</td>
<td>10: 0</td>
<td>24: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>Cricket (Eng/Wales)</td>
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<td>305: 0</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
<td>214: 0</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
<td>201: 0</td>
<td>211: 0</td>
<td>172: 93</td>
<td>172: 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWLAP</td>
<td>Weightlifting</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>1: 0: 1: 0</td>
<td>0: 144</td>
<td>229: 0</td>
<td>0: 156</td>
<td>244: 1</td>
<td>166: 247</td>
<td>0: 116</td>
<td>163: 1: 59</td>
<td>121: 8: 155</td>
<td>233: 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>Rowing</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>36: 3: 57: 4</td>
<td>26: 0</td>
<td>42: 0</td>
<td>6: 0</td>
<td>27: 0</td>
<td>42: 0</td>
<td>6: 0</td>
<td>26: 0</td>
<td>89: 0</td>
<td>63: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RYA</td>
<td>Sailing</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>16: 5: 40: 5</td>
<td>2: 0</td>
<td>19: 0</td>
<td>6: 0</td>
<td>20: 0</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
<td>10: 0</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
<td>38: 0</td>
<td>66: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


***Annual Testing Total conducted for UK NGbs**


Source: UK Sport Anti-Doping Report from 2001/01 to 2006/07; NAO, 2005

Note: The year for the testing Programme runs from April to March in the following year.

Total number of tests includes both ICT and OOCY. OOCY Squad and OOCY-T are separated where the data is available.

*Sports are divided into risk priorities - high, medium and low - that determine the level of public interest (government funded) services available to sport (A-D Report, 2000/01)

**Number of athletes supported on World Class Performance Programme (currently WC Pathway) for the Athens Olympics (UKS funding guide, not dated)

***Testing programme for respective IFs are not included in the total number of tests and the "Annual Testing Total" includes only these tests conducted for UK Governing Bodies
4.3.5.2 Pattern of engagement in doping tests

Whilst, acknowledging the shortcomings in the available data on drug testing, it is intended to analyse the tests conducted in the UK as accurately as possible in Graph 4.1 and Table 4.4. Three generally indicative patterns in drug tests could be identified. Firstly, it can be demonstrated that there is a long-term upward trend, notwithstanding the fact that international sporting events occasionally influence the total number of tests conducted in the UK (e.g. Manchester Commonwealth Games and Indoor World Championships in Athletics in 2002/03). Secondly, Graph 4.1 shows that, although the total number of sports involved in the testing programme is not stable, there has been a constant engagement in the programme by the Olympic sports. Due to the ‘recommendation’ by a paymaster (DCMS) to use the extra budget allocation for the year 2004/05, the total number of drug tests jumped from 5,876 in the previous year to 7,968. This huge increase was sustained in 2006/07, driven by a number of Paralympic sports, such as wheelchair basketball and rugby and disability powerlifting (UK Sport, 2006/07). Thirdly, and most importantly, there was a policy shift towards prioritising OOCt, but not ICT, from the late 1990s. The annual sample target of DFSD increased from 5,100 in 1998/99 to 7,000 in 2006/07, which was in accordance with the increase in the proportion of OOCt in the annual target, from 20% in 1998/99 to 42% in 2002/03 and to 55% in 2006/07. The key change was in the year 2004/05, following a budget increase, when the number of OOCt samples collected (3,296 tests) exceeded ICT (3,224 tests) for the first time. This was followed by a sharper growth in OOCt (4,283 tests) in 2005/06. It may be that the reason for the development in 2004/05 was because of the extensive number of pre-Games tests conducted prior to the Athens Olympics and Paralympics (total of 1,016 tests: 771 Olympians; 245 Paralympians). Three-quarter of the pre-Games tests for the Athens Olympics and Paralympics were OOCt, in order to guarantee that only “drug-free athletes” would be sent to the Games (UK Sport, 2004a: 12-3). One should be aware, however, that the number of athletes tested may be less than the total number of tests, since some athletes were tested twice or more.

Table 4.4 gives a further illustration of the trend in tests conducted between 2000 and 2007. The table specifically focuses on those 11 NGBs which fall into one of the following categories: i) those Olympic and non-Olympic sports in the UK that had achieved the testing targets most years; ii) those that are among the ‘big 5 major spectator sports’ (football, rugby union, rugby league and cricket, with the exception of tennis); iii) those sports traditionally classified as ‘high risk’ by UK Sport (except for cricket, which was as a medium risk, and sailing as a low risk); iv) those Olympic NGBs that are successful and prioritised in the World
Class Podium Programme and have a large number of Lottery-funded athletes (cycling, rowing, athletics and sailing) and/or; v) those active sports that have made additional commitments to drug-free sport and are engaged in the OOCT Individuals Programme (OOCT-I) that provides contact information and training details of athletes, and in which, any athletes on the register pool could be subject to OOCT anytime, anywhere (c.f. UK Sport News, 03 October 2006; Anti-Doping Report from year 1997/8 to 2006/7).

Table 4.4 draws attention to four key points. First, these 11 sport bodies account for 70.5% of the total annual number of tests conducted for NGBs in the UK over the past six years, the biggest of which is the Football Association (the English FA,) comprising 26%, followed by UK Athletics with 9.6%. It was proclaimed by the FA that there was only one positive finding of a performance-enhancing drug out of the 8,000 tests carried out, but the problem predominantly rests in recreational or social drugs (Coward, quoted in HCCMS, 2004: Q298). However, the data presented to the House of Commons Select Committee does not rightly reflect this point. The adverse findings for the 6 years 1999-2004 was 0.01% of the total tests in English football, of which 52 out of 66 positives were recreational or social drugs. As for athletics, all 53 positive findings in those years were related to performance enhancement (HCCMS, 2004: 55). It is possible to argue that different ‘doping cultures’ have been inherited in athletics and football, with drug abuse for performance enhancement being strongly associated with athletics. Second, there is a distinct priority given to high-risk sports, in that they account for 65% of all doping tests and 78% of the total number of OOCT tests undertaken in the UK. Third, four ‘major spectator sports’ (football, rugby union, rugby league and cricket), which are also categorised as ‘professional sports’, were responsible for more than 40% of all drug tests and about half of all OOCT in the UK. By contrast, four prioritised Olympic sports (athletics, rowing, sailing and cycling) which were given a total of £27m, 55% of the entire WCPP funding for the Athens Olympic-cycle (see 6.3.2), accounted for only around 25% of the total number of drug tests. However, there is a sharp change in focus by those four Olympic sports, plus swimming, towards prioritising OOCT. Since 2004/05, both athletics and rowing have concentrated only on OOCT, whereas cycling is the slowest to respond to implementing OOCT. Finally, and related to the third point, the level of international success and the number of WCPP athletes in a sport do not necessarily guarantee that a robust doping programme is being implemented. This is shown particularly in Table 4.4 where two prioritised Olympic sports with the largest numbers of Lottery funded athletes on the WCPP (rowing and sailing) have conducted only a small number of drug tests. This is in contrast to the number of tests in weightlifting, which is traditionally seen as a high risk sport with a perceived prevalence of drug abuse but has a low-priority Olympic sport status, with only one podium athlete receiving financial support in the Beijing Olympic-cycle.
4.3.5.3 Interpreting the development of anti-doping policy through examining the extent and robustness of doping tests

From both Graph 4.1 and Table 4.4, we can identify a broadly consistent approach to the drug testing programme conducted for NGBs in the UK. It can be seen that, although there is a steady increase in the overall number of drug tests, there is a concentration of tests in high risk, professional, spectator sports which are driving the drug testing programme in the UK. From the time the WAD Code was adopted in 2003, it has had an influence on the overall number of doping tests in 2004/05. It is likely that testing will be continued with more no-notice targeted OOCT, particularly for the Olympic sports, because of the UK Sport’s concern to send ‘drug-free’ athletes to the Olympic Games and the major international championships. However, from these two sets of data, not only are there the shortcomings already highlighted, but also there is a difficulty in determining the frequency of tests per athlete. To be more precise, taking the actual number of elite athletes into consideration, it is possible that a footballer in England (where there are 92 professional clubs and 34 Academies of Football, plus 54 Centres of Excellence for youth players) and British elite track and field athletes would have a lower likelihood of being tested than, for instance, elite cyclists or sailors.

It is interesting to observe that there is an intensified focus on refining the level of sophistication through implementing an ‘intelligence-based system of testing’ in order to optimise effectiveness and deterrence, and on the number of annual targets set as the Key Performance Indicators in the UK Sport Business Plan based around the Olympic-cycle (UK Sport, 2005e: 34). It is clear that the policy emphasis was influenced by the "keenness" of WADA for NADOs to implement “smarter testing”, by utilising information directly derived from NGBs, such as athletes’ performances, injuries and competition schedules (UK Sport ISP Meeting Report, 30 September 2005). The DCMS clearly regards UK Sport intelligence-based testing model as “the most effective way to come to an understanding about ‘real incidences of doping”’ (DCMS, 2007b: 5). However, it seems that the total number of drug tests still remains a government concern. This is reflected in the budget increase in 2004/05 prior to the Athens Olympic Games, which specifically targeted a growth in the number of tests. Interestingly, there were concerns expressed in the UK Sport commissioned report published by PMP Consulting that the DFSD was "too preoccupied by statistics" (PMP Consulting, 2004: 21-2). This is also reflected in government complacency over the 1.5% of adverse findings from all tests conducted in the UK over 5 years (1999-2004) in light of the
world average of 2% (e.g. DCMS response to HCCMS, 2004). Nevertheless, acknowledging that a large number of tests conducted internationally had been "wasted", John Scott, the then Director of DFSD, stressed the paradigm change from "a numbers game" to "smarter systems" to catch the cheats and give clean athletes more confidence in "competing on a level playing field" (Scott, quoted in HCST, 2007: Q11; UK Sport News, 26 September 2007). The determination to extend intelligence-based testing was seen in WADA revoked the accreditation of HFL because it did not meet the minimum requirement for the number of samples (1,500 a year) stated in the International Standard for Laboratories. This left King's College as the only accredited lab in the UK (WADA News, 25 September 2007).

The need for effective testing has become much more important in the build up to the London Olympic Games in 2012. This is not only due to a concern that British athletes should be absolutely clean but also due to a practical concern, arising from the pressure to conduct OOCT effectively throughout the London Games from the opening of the Athlete's Village to the end of the Games. Knowing the expectation of Britain, as the host country, to expand OOCT, the BOA's Chief Medical Officer emphasised the significance of sending "a very strong message to the rest of the world" in cooperation with WADA, the IOC and other anti-doping agencies (Budgett, quoted in HCST, 2007: Q302). However, despite being constrained by the mounting pressure surrounding the hosting of 2012 Games, a senior DFSD official interestingly stated that "[w]hat we are trying to do is to get away from the Olympic and Paralympic cycle" and that preferred to avoiding the number of testing is determined by the Olympic-cycle" (original emphasis, DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007).

To summarise the above argument, the policy decision to adopt an 'intelligence-based' approach was aimed at maximising effectiveness in catching the 'cheats'. Although the approach of using information to target testing moves away from the traditional 'law-and-order' approach, the government still considers the 'numbers game' as important, as seen in requiring the DFSD to provide performance indicators in terms of achieving the target number of tests. With the added impetus of the London Olympic Games, what is of importance in the present context is UK Sport's interest in remaining at the 'forefront' of anti-doping policy through constant monitoring of progress in other countries and policy development in WADA. However, it is almost impossible to be sure whether a higher number of intelligence-based tests would have a significant deterrent effect and result in a reduction in anti-doping violations or in adverse findings, and a change in the attitudes and values of athletes and supporting staff. Furthermore, as implied above, a gradual shift in focus to 'anytime and anywhere' OOCT has occurred in parallel with WADA's recommended direction
of policy. The clearest example is the publication of the UK's National Anti-Doping Policy (which was initially adopted in 2000) and the accompanying Anti-Doping Model Rules for NGBs in 2005, which reflected the compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code. As for the implementation of the Model Rules, it specified an effective intelligence-based testing using "Target testing. Weighted and random selection methods" (*UK Model Rules*, Article 5.6.1: page 14) by ranked criteria based on "the potential risk of doping and possible doping pattern" (page iv). It is plausible that this policy shift was a result of complying with the specific WAD Code with reference to conducting "No Advance Notice Testing (as) a priority" and to "Conduct Target Testing" to ensure that appropriate athletes would be tested (*WADA*, 2003: Article 5.1; *UKS Memorandum for HCCMS*, 2004). Unsurprisingly, a number of anti-doping actors at national level recognised that the success of anti-doping programmes relies on no-notice OOTC (e.g. *UK Sport* and *UK Athletics* Memorandums for HCCMS, 2004) and on the obligations of athletes who are in the national and international registered testing pools¹⁸ were clarified to "preserve the ability to conduct No Advance Notice Testing" (*UK Model Rules*, Article 5.6.3, page 15).

It would seem that the domestic and international objectives of UK Sport are intertwined with regard to the development of drug-free policy. On the one hand, the efforts of UK Sport to facilitate and monitor adherence to the anti-doping policies set by sport bodies are working in parallel with its modernisation programme for NGBs (see Chapter 6). It was claimed that modernisation practices and structures and arrangements for governance were necessary to ensure adherence to the anti-doping policy and to guarantee the highest standard possible (*UK Sport Memorandum for HCCMS*, 2004; *DCMS*, 2004). Only SDRP amongst the recipients of grants from UK Sport is understandably not required to set and meet targets because it is not "simply being judged on the number of cases", although it is expected to be a "best practice organisation" (*Siddall*, quote in *HCCMS*, 2004: Q172). Nevertheless, as discussed above, it is extremely difficult to determine the value and effectiveness of an investment for achieving a robust anti-doping programme.

On the other hand, UK Sport's ability to impose financial sanctions (suspending, reducing or withdrawing funding in cases of athletes breaching anti-doping policy, and life-time bans on any coach receiving public funding) indicates its willingness to implement robust mechanisms in harmony with WAD Code, IF regulations and the UK's policy on drug-free sport (*UK Sport*, 2005a; *UK Sport Announcement*, 11 April 2006). The Director of DFSD stressed that though

¹⁸ UK Sport defines 'national level athletes' as follows: i) those who represent GB or the UK in sports where athletes compete as GB athletes (those funded at the UK level); and ii) those who represent their home country in sports where athletes compete for England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland (those funded by the HCSCs). International level athletes are nominated by respective International Federations. All British athletes in the registered 'national pools' are handled by UK Sport, which then provides information to the relevant IFs.
the Code compliance across different sport bodies should never be underestimated. NGBs should sign the National Governing Body Anti-Doping Agreement for the receipt of public funding via UK Sport. Funding would, however, be discontinued to athletes involved in doping offences (Scott, quoted in HCST, 2007: Q12, 14). Nevertheless, the issue of ‘compliance in penalties’ was considered by the House of Commons Select Committee and the former Director of DFSD argued that penalties on athletes caught with illegal substances are not severe enough and that a large percentage of their prize money ought to be returned (Verroken, Memorandum for HCST, 2007). While UK Sport does not require athletes to repay financial gains from events, DCMS noted that the mechanism of sanction is, by itself, significant because it can suspend financial payments and also “reserves the right to reclaim any of the financial instalments of the award made to the athletes” during their suspension from sport (DCMS, 2007b: 27). In this regard, it can be argued that the intensity and robustness of national policy or the government agenda seems to be shaped by world standards and that the accepted procedures seek ‘harmonisation’, which has been stated in the WAD Code. There is a sense that the domestic objective is to be achieved through the emerging global platform as well as through financial sanctions. It is, nonetheless, far from easy at this stage to examine how financial sanctions impact on the attitudes of athletes towards doping tests and the extent of engagement and intensity of NGBs in managing and conducting drug tests.

4.4 Searching for Global Anti-Doping Best Practice and ‘Fudging’ the Issue of an Independent NADO in the UK

It is worth reiterating that the bid for, and the award of, the Olympic and Paralympic Games to London in 2012 generated government interest in ensuring a robust British anti-doping policy, which led to pressure on UK Sport DFSD to refine its anti-doping programme. This was typified in the two inquiries by the House of Commons Select Committee. They produced an ongoing policy debate about whether the DFSD would be ‘fit for purpose’ had it remained in the same organisation which was responsible for delivering British elite success. However, ‘no tangible evidence’ could be found in a conflict of interests or unethical behaviour concerning efforts to maximise medals in major international sport and the search for a drug-free culture (PMP Consulting, 2004). The House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee’s investigation into the UK’s drug-free provision (where particular emphasis was placed on human enhancement technologies in sport) was clearly
conducted in the light of the forthcoming London Olympic Games in 2012 to ensure being “ahead of the game rather than reacting to the game” and to avoid “humiliation”, and concluded that UK Sport showed “apparent complacency” (Chairman, quoted in HCST, 2007: Q101). Richard Caborn, the then Minister for Sport and Tourism, stressed to the inquiry “how importantly we take this subject of anti-doping and the whole role of WADA” and identified it as the evidence that “Parliament itself takes this issue seriously” (quoted in HCST, 2007: Q316). This recurring debate was finally concluded with the joint-announcement of UK Sport and DCMS, after the review by both parties, of the separation of the function and operation of NADO from UK Sport. It was explained that there was an “urgency” in restructuring the UK NADO because of “the unique timetable presented by London 2012 and the need to have sufficient lead time for the pre-Games period”. More importantly, it is stated the need for improvement in the current system to meet the “changing global environment”, where growing ‘non-analytical’ violations have necessitated a much stronger partnership with law enforcement agencies. These, in turn, have outgrown the roles and responsibilities of a NADO under the WAD Code and the UNESCO Convention (UK Sport Announcement, December 2007).

Of greater significance to this section is the need to understand how and why demands for an independent NADO have been shaped and directed by national anti-doping stakeholders, international bodies and the global anti-doping framework. This leads to the identification of the values and attitudes of UK Sport DFSD, national sporting bodies and the government towards the global anti-doping policy. The PMP review in 2004, commissioned by UK Sport, summarised the argument both for and against independence and separation of the functions of the NADO from UK Sport. It concluded in favour of the continuation, with only minor structural changes, of DFSD’s position within UK Sport (PMP Consulting, 2004: 41-45). In Table 4.5, the arguments identified by national actors at House of Commons inquiries are used as grounds for introducing an independent NADO to the UK. Although one can identify almost similar arguments in the late 1980s that emphasised the need for a new, rigorous, consistent and effective anti-doping regime whilst maintaining “independence in all the arrangements for testing” (DoE, 1987: 8), the main contemporary argument focuses on the national and international context. The main argument for establishing an independent NADO was principally based on the ‘conflict of interests’ claim. As the ancillary arguments largely agreed with the current UK Sport DFSD situation, more practical and management issues were raised by the representatives of NGBs, who demanded amendments to disciplinary proceedings and results management. It should be emphasised that, while the explanations cannot be separated from one another, the domestic argument over the location of the anti-doping function was particularly steered by interests seeking perceived
international best practice and responding to the changing and growing requirements of
global anti-doping policy.

4.4.1 Calling for an ‘independent’ UK NADO

Influential national stakeholders in sport such as the BOA, British Swimming, UK Athletics
and the Lawn Tennis Association, as well as prominent individuals like Michele Verroken
(former DFSD Director), Kate Hoey and Lord Moynihan (former Ministers for Sport),
repeatedly called for an independent NADO. In the Independent Sports Review, Hoey and
Moynihan expressed the view that there is no system for anti-doping in the UK that is
independent of sport, the sport funding system and political or bureaucratic influence (ISR,
2005: 124). The BOA, currently headed by Moynihan, echoed this and supported the
creation of a new agency which would be independent from individual sports, the sports
funding agency and political influence (BOA Memorandum for HCST, 2007). As for the FA, it
proposed an ‘accreditation scheme’, as an alternative, which would operate through UK
Sport, using a number of agencies for collecting and testing samples (The FA Memorandum
for HCCMS, 2004). Despite this, the decision was made by the Sports Cabinet to retain
DFSD within UK Sport. It concluded that there was “no tangible evidence of unethical
behaviour at UK Sport” and recognised the conflict-of-interests issue as only a “perception”
of stakeholders (PMP Consulting, 2004; DCMS, 2004). The enhancement of anti-doping
programmes with an independent NADO remained therefore a contentious issue.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified main argument</th>
<th>Critical Issues</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
<th>Main actors/orgs/committees</th>
<th>Counter Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interests in ‘dual role’ of UK Sport</td>
<td>Direct conflict observed between the agency for funding/promoting elite sport and being able to police or enforce standards in sport (Verroken). Situation is ‘leapfrogging’, meaning, different interests between UK Sport and NGBs are reflected in anti-doping policy (Cowan). Not independent of sport, the sport funding system, political and bureaucratic influence (ISR, BOA). Ineffective and costly quangos to be redirected or abolished and replaced with a ‘one-stop shop’ organisation.</td>
<td>Establishment of a new independent NADO or UKADA (UK Anti-Doping Agency) with statutory independence (Verroken, Sparks, LTA, PRA, ISR). Creation of a ‘Sports Ombudsman’ to oversee ethics in sport and integrity of anti-doping (ISR). Establishment of an independent education programme (Budgett, BOA). Setting up accreditation scheme for agencies to collect and test samples (FA).</td>
<td>HCST, Verroken, BOA, LTA, ISR, Sparks (BS), Moorcroft (UKA), The FA, Cowan (King’s College)</td>
<td>UK Sports Cabinet endorsed that no absolute, tangible evidence in support of unethical behaviour and creating a new NADO. No evidence and conflict of interests is a ‘perceived problem’ (PMP, UKS, DCMS). Confidence/trust in operation and integrity of DFSD (some NGBs in PMP).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest of athletes and public</td>
<td>Unnecessary stress on athletes due to confusion between being counsellor, guide or prosecutor, detrimental to less financially able athletes (Moorcroft). NGBs trying to protect athletes in order to avoid embarrassment (Verroken). Loss of public faith in sport and integrity of sport with fair play value and sport players being role models (Bittel, PRA). Exacerbating confusion of the public due to a lack of transparency of process and athletes from different sports being treated inconsistently over adverse finding (Sparks).</td>
<td>Establishment of government-endorsed disciplinary process through ‘UK CAS’ or National Tribunal Service to achieve consistency and cost-effectiveness (Moorcroft, ISR). Government to require standards and make legislation or withhold benefits to sport (Bittel). NGBs should focus on supporting athletes (Sparks). Providing names and reasons for athletes found guilty (ISR).</td>
<td>Moorcroft, BAC, Bittel (LM CEO),</td>
<td>Transparency, accountability and value for money can be achieved at UK Sport (DCMS). The Code allows a distinct tribunal service or being dealt with by sport (Scott, UKS). Case management should remain with NGBs (HCMS). Each NGB must take the lead and ownership in drug testing and doping policy in own sport (The FA). Work within the decided structure at national policy level (Siddall, FA). Confidence in testing compared with abroad (Penfelly, BAC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGBs’ liabilities</td>
<td>Exposure of NGBs in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings; individuals may take NGBs to court (Moorcroft, HCMS)</td>
<td>Develop SDRP into a national tribunal service for managing A-D cases (HCMS)</td>
<td>Moorcroft, Sparks</td>
<td>SDRP in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of development in lead countries</td>
<td>Independent reviews conducted and new models created in leading nations (Australia, Canada, USA, Scandinavians) with a completely independent NADO (Verroken, Sparks, ISR, Scott UKS). Complacent attitude of UKS claiming one of the best (HCST). Necessity to re-establish best practice (Verroken, PRA).</td>
<td>Creating an independent Sports Ombudsman (ISR): A single framework for dispute as the Canadian-type (Siddall, SDRP). Conducting continuous review process, establishing mechanism to share knowledge/info (HCST)</td>
<td>Verroken, Sparks, ISR, HCST, PRA</td>
<td>Forefront of A-D standards – govt being signatory to IADA and International Standard for Doping Control (PMP); constant learning process (Coborn).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restoring international presence</td>
<td>As once a world leader, GB has fallen behind development of international anti-doping, losing British reputation (ISR). Too much emphasis on international activities at the expense of domestic matters (3.6 PMP).</td>
<td>Establishment of a new independent NADO (ISR).</td>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Constant engagement in ANADO, IADA, Science Committee within CoE and already established international network of laboratories (UKS).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pressure to achieve global harmonisation</td>
<td>A “key to win” the issue of anti-doping but no consistency and no harmonisation in the UK (UKA). Public policy in UK is shaped by international treaties (89 A-D Convention, UNESCO Convention) (ISR). The Code created responsibility in Britain (Moorcroft).</td>
<td>Signing and adoption in law of the UNESCO Convention (ISR). Acting firmly at national level, requiring a decisive, consistent, positive lead by govt/UK Sport (Moorcroft.)</td>
<td>Moorcroft ISR</td>
<td>Govt made condition of eligibility for public funding to NGBs acceptance of the uniform mechanism (the Code) (DCMS). Conscious of not achieving uniformity of outcome (HCMS). Anxiety over level of compliance in other countries and loopholes between individual and team sport (UKS).</td>
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Source: PMP Consulting, 2004; House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sport (2004); House of Commons, Science and Technology (2007), House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sport (2007).

Note: BAC (British Athlete Commission); BS (British Swimming); ISR (Independent Sports Review); LA (London Marathon); LTA (Lawn Tennis Association); PRA (Professional Rugby Players Association); SDRP (Sports Dispute Resolution Pannell); UKA (UK Athletics).
The Anti-Doping Commission was launched by the BOA in order to challenge, *inter alia*, the "complacency of UK Sport DFSD" (which had been identified by the Science and Technology Select Committee) and to strengthen the anti-doping controls (*BOA News*, 24 July 2007) by making doping a criminal offence. This move was perceived by UK Sport as "a hostile move" (*The Guardian*, 25 July 2007) and as a "fall out" between the BOA and UK Sport (*The Independent*, 25 July 2007). As illustrated in Chapter 6, this is a reminder of the residual tension between the BOA, as an independent national sporting body, and UK Sport, as a quasi-governmental, publicly funded body for funding elite athletes. The BOA Chairman stated that "[as] the host Olympic nation in 2012, collectively we, the Government and its agencies have a duty to be a world-leading country in the fight against doping" (Moynihan, quoted in *BOA News*, 24 July 2007). It comes as no surprise that Colin Moynihan, who had led Britain's early engagement and development in anti-doping policy by utilising the international platform during the 1980s, instigated the debate and maintained the internal lobbying pressure. Interestingly, and contrary to the claim that the influence of BOA is weak, the BOA intended to enhance the credibility of the Anti-Doping Commission by appointing the Chairman of the IOC Medical Commission, the outspoken critic of the robust responsibility of the UK government, Professor Arne Ljungqvist, as a senior advisor to the BOA's Anti-Doping Commission. However, this provoked a swift response from John Steele, UK Sport's Chief Executive, who issued a plan to establish an independent National Anti-Doping Panel the next day. Steel stressed that "we are no way complacent" and although it was necessary to "be wary of constant investigation and review", there should be no "distraction, confusion about roles and duplication of effort" leading up to the Beijing 2008 and London 2012 Games (*UK Sport News*, 24 July 2007). Echoing this point, a DFSD senior official mentioned the implications of this recurring theme of 'conflict of interests' as follows:

...we have the Scrutiny Panel that oversees the operations between both sides of the building, and I can safely say that the two operations (UK Sport Performance Team and DFSD) are so far apart that there is no conflict. There's the perceived conflict though and that hurts us, because that damages our credibility and wastes our time, because with just about everything that comes out, there's always the last paragraph, the last question [about an independent NADO]. That distracts from all the good works that we actually do and we are actually looking into the future.

(UK Sport DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007)

The senior official from the BOA largely agreed with the above quoted UK Sport official, stating that he had found some degree of loss of "confidence" in these two national bodies
because they appear to disagree on a number of significant matters like anti-doping. It is the
NGBs' performance directors who feel a "complete waste of energy and time and sometimes
money" when they are focusing on achieving high performance success (BOA Senior
Official, Interview 31 July 2007). Arguably, although the comment by the BOA senior official
implies no consensus had been achieved inside the BOA, it would seem that Moynihan, as
the BOA Chair, instigated political lobbying by creating the Anti-Doping Commission with a
view to achieving rigorous international compliance. The UK NADO operational body (DFSD)
reacted to this, stressing the priority of maintaining and raising its credibility, and
implementing a delivery programme which would be constantly reviewed.

A world 'best practice' in anti-doping

What is more interesting to observe is that all advocates of an independent NADO
legitimatised their claim by citing the progress made in the lead anti-doping countries, such
as Australia, Canada, the USA and Norway. The progress in these countries together with
New Zealand, Denmark and South Africa was also used by David Sparkes, CEO of British
Swimming, for the re-organisation of anti-doping provisions in the UK (HCCMS, 2004: Ev29-
31). More strikingly, on their visit to Australia, the members of the Science and Technology
Committee were seemingly impressed by the Australian Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) that
had completely removed perceived conflicts of interest, and therefore, the Committee
claimed that it was "unacceptable" that the benefits of creating an independent anti-doping
agency in the UK were automatically dismissed (HCST, 2007: 34). What is also interesting is
the Committee's view, in the light of the progress in Australia and the USA, that UK Sport
"arrogate(s) to itself a world-wide leading position" (ibid, 43, 55).

The other key factor in creating an independent NADO is the domestic interest in Great
Britain having an international presence and influence in the global effort to eliminate drugs
in sport. Hoey and Moynihan explained that, though Britain was "once considered a world
leader in anti-doping effort", its international credibility and reputation had fallen. Public
confidence in British anti-doping programmes needed to be restored by implementing the
world-best practice (ISR, 2005: 124). David Moorcroft, an advocate of an independent
NADO, stressed that the fundamental principle underpinning the WAD Code defined the
responsibility of Britain to succeed in winning anti-doping issues both at national and
international level (HCCMS, 2004). These views were shared in the PMP review, which
concluded that the UK "needs to get back into a position to lead and influence international
policy development" through directing more resources towards "both influencing international
policy and communicating national policy" (PMP Consulting, 2004: 59). A DFSD senior
official noted that the British are “pretty well-represented” and “well-respected” at global level, with John Scott being a Vice-President of ANADO, with Craig Reddie (former BOA Chairman) in the IOC and Philip Craven as the IPC President. However, he dismissed Britain’s claim to be a “world leader” by stating: “I do think sometimes we say we are world-leading, when we don’t know what ‘world-leading’ is and maybe we are not world-leading”, because “we are relying on a lot of other organisations internationally to give us the lead, I suppose, in how to address anti-doping and we are following” (original emphasis, DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007). The particular area in which this official feels the UK to be a ‘follower’ is in having authority over results/case management and in planning that the distribution of tests should remain with NGBs rather than within a NADO. He cited the Dwain Chamber case, who was suspended for THG, as being “nothing to do with the UK system” but was due to the American’s intensive BALCO investigation in cooperation with police. The above DFSD official acknowledged that the change from being a ‘follower’ to implementing a rigorous system like that of the United States will be “an extra step for us to get to, and it takes a bit more time”. Nonetheless, the need to re-establish Britain’s international presence and influence in global anti-doping policy remains, as does the conscious aspiration to be a world leader in the fight against doping and to be influential in international policy progress. This point was highlighted in Section 4.3.4 in relation to the introduction of rigorous whereabouts intelligence-testing.

However, Houlihan and Preece (2007) argue that the government’s broader domestic agenda around the time of the UK Sport’s commissioned review did not allow for the establishment of an independent NADO. The main agenda at the time was: i) the drive for ‘modernisation’ and ‘joined up government’ that did not welcome the possibility of another public body or quango; ii) the long-term debate about the cosy relationship between the government, the NGBs and other national sporting organizations and their roles in sport policy; and iii) the changes in the relationship between UK Sport and the NGBs (Houlihan & Preece, 2007: 392-5). On the first point, Richard Caborn repeatedly mentioned the need to provide “evidence” of the conflict of interests of DFSD and then he could “interrogate” it (quoted in HCST, 2007: Q317-8). Following the Labour Government’s evidence-based policy, Caborn continued to argue that, without clear evidence, creating a new body or changing the existing structure is neither in the Government’s nor sport’s interest. The BOA Chief Medical Officer, Richard Budgett, and Nic Coward, the Director of FA’s Corporate and Legal Affairs, were also in favour of the current structure and ‘professionalism’ shown by DFSD (Budgett, quoted in HCST, 2007: Q268-9; Coward, quoted in HCSMC, 2004: Q328). Coward stated that “[if] you have a great system that is actually serving your sport well, don’t change it unless you really do think it is going to make it even better” (quoted in HCSMC,
2004: Q328). This point appears to have been supported by the high percentage of athletes who showed their 'trust' in the testing process (64% of athletes/70% players\textsuperscript{18}), 90% of whom were positively satisfied with the way tests were carried out (UK Sport, 2006e: 27-9).

These relatively satisfactory ratings for the current arrangements and "a strong bias toward a central role" for UK Sport, together with a shortage of fundamental evidence, all served to strengthen the argument that having an independent NADO would potentially result in negative consequences (PMP Consulting, 2004: 41-5; Houlihan & Preece, 2007). The above analysis may also reflect the lack of strong international pressure for a change in policy by creating an independent UK NADO. There was even an acknowledgement of the international perception that the British system does not 'cheat' the others. A senior DFSD official, reflecting on his experience, explained that, despite the UK's anti-doping operation confusing international organisations, "we get away with it internationally, because we are British, and we have that nice British culture that people see us being reasonably, ethically, good people!" (Interview, 08 November 2007). With this perception in mind, what is more interesting in relation to the second and third points above, as examined by Houlihan and Preece, is the DFSD's tentative attitudes towards government and the NGBs, which are well illustrated in the comments by the aforementioned senior DFSD official. Although the centralised models from Canada, Australia, the USA and New Zealand were "analysed" and it was hoped that the DFSD would acquire further discretion for results management and "investigative powers", it was stated that:

...we need to be very clever about how we are positioning with the Government, how we are positioning with sports, and there's a bit of a tightrope to walk in the middle of it to get the best out of it...we are the ones exerting the pressure on government at the moment and we are doing it sensibly and intelligently,...we know we need to move quite quickly [to prepare for the 2012 Games] but you can't rush Whitehall...the wheels of politics is (sic) ...incredibly slow!

(UK Sport DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08 November 2007)

To summarise, on the one hand, there is a domestic recognition of global progress and an interest in retaining the British presence in the international sphere as a (perceived) 'world-leader' in the anti-doping programme. On the other hand, there is the competitive nature of the relationship between UK Sport and the Government as well as between UK Sport and

\textsuperscript{18} The UK Sport Drug-Free Sport Survey defined "Athletes" as Lottery-funded athletes throughout the UK and "Players" as professional players in football, cricket, rugby union, rugby league, tennis, ice hockey and basketball (UK Sport, 2006e: 8).
the BOA and also some NGBs, which has not only allowed the ‘conflict of interests’ debate to appear on the political agenda, but has also slowed down the development of policy.

4.4.2 A final ‘part of the jigsaw’ for a robust anti-doping programme

As already noted, UK Sport DFSD has not been responsible for results management, as this responsibility has been retained by NGBs. This situation has raised many issues in the debate about an ‘independent’ NADO. More specifically, there are variations between NGBs in result management, tribunal and disciplinary proceedings in cases of adverse findings and breaches of rules, and these are handled differently by each NGB. David Moorcroft, the then Chief Executive for UK Athletics (resigned in 2006), described the current situation as “a huge weakness within the British system”, saying that this is “the final part of the jigsaw” of the anti-doping programme, and should be managed by a government-backed disciplinary process within a centralised body such as a UK Court of Arbitration\(^{20}\) (quoted in HCCMS, 2004: Q201; Ev37). Interestingly, the related argument over the ‘conflict of interests’ in UK Sport DFSD became, in a practical sense, the conflict of interests within NGBs (see Table 7.4). Firstly, it was argued that the dual role of the NGB, being a counsellor or a guide for anti-doping as well as being a regulator and a prosecutor who conducts results management and disciplinary proceedings, causes stress and tensions between the governing bodies and the athletes. Bruce Hamilton, Chief Medical Officer of UK Athletics, commenting on the difficulty remarked that: “[our] anti-doping department will one day be the person who is ringing you up to make sure everything is okay and that you have filled out all the paper work and everything is good; the next day they will be shutting all the doors up and letting you know that you are under a sanction” (quoted in HCST, 2007: Q191). The difficulties in maintaining the roles to maximise international success with the anti-doping policy enforced were discussed by the review of the British Medical Association. It claimed that: “It is certainly questionable whether governing bodies can be both game-keeper and poacher with equal enthusiasm” (BMA, 2002: 110).

Furthermore, a range of disciplinary proceedings and penalties, which are handled differently by each NGB, a lack of transparency and a great degree of inconsistency in the various disciplinary processes have led to a loss of athletes’ confidence in the anti-doping

\(^{20}\) It was eventually decided that UK Sport set up the Sports Dispute Resolution Panel, being an independent National Anti-Doping Panel (NADP), to hear doping cases on behalf of NGBs. It was possible that NGBs would be offered the NADP’s services free of charge (UK Sport News, 16 October 2007). Moreover, UK Sport can now appeal against a decision about the period of ineligibility imposed by NGBs, which allows further harmonisation of rules with the WAD Code. These were two cases which successfully appealed against the decisions by Rugby League in February 2007 and the English Basketball Association in October 2007 (UK Sport News, 25 October 2007).
programme. It was considered that these differences not only caused confusion and
dissatisfaction among athletes but also damaged the public's faith in the value of the anti-
doping system, and consequently, in sport itself (e.g. Sparkes, Bittel and PRA, all in HCCMS,
2004). The Sport Dispute Resolution Panel recognised that the 'perceived inconsistencies'
resulted from "differences in size and resources of NGBs, leading to differences of approach
in managing doping cases", and thus outcomes become inconsistent (HCCMS, 2004: Ev19).
What is at issue here is how to achieve robust transparency with open and fair proceedings,
since NGBs may be, or are at least perceived to be, protecting their own athletes, which
would expose them to being accused of malpractice (Sparkes and Verroken, in HCCMS,
2004). As far as a DFSD practitioner is concerned, the current arrangement for results
management is seen as "crazy" since it is managed by people in NGBs who have "no
expertise and no skills". It has been suggested by this official that there is now "a great
catalyst called 2012", which exerts unprecedented external pressure from WADA, the IOC,
the IPC and the media on the British anti-doping programme and on the UK Sport structure
in particular. This can be seen as a "very nice bit of pressure", because it can "push aside
that conservative approach that Brits always have," and the "naïve" and "relaxed attitudes"
towards anti-doping prevailed in the UK, thereby, allowing a "more aggressive approach by
us, and as a result, changing the culture of the sports" (DFSD Senior Official, Interview 08
November 2007). Interestingly, despite the supreme external pressure on the activities of
DFSD, this senior official held that the London 2012 Games and the accompanied pressure
are the best opportunity to shape and direct government values and enhance the domestic
anti-doping policy.

Indeed, the eventual announcement at the very end of late 2007 to create a new UK NADO,
outside the mandate of UK Sport, has confirmed the above argument, and thereby, raised
the possibility of putting in place the final 'part of the jigsaw'. The announced new NADO is
planned to be the centralised body for exclusively managing results and the distribution of
tests across all sport and for operationalising intelligence-based testing. More importantly,
this body aims to establish a greater effective partnership with a number of law enforcement
agencies to control 'non-analytical' anti-doping rule regulations, i.e. to curb those who supply
and traffic banned substances to athletes. In respect of the argument over an independent
NADO and conflict-of-interest claim discussed in this section, this "major shake-up of the
nation's anti-doping system" (Daily Telegraph, 05 December 2007) demonstrates the
domestic policy change and a close harmonisation with the global framework for fight against
doping.
It is reasonable to suggest that the appointment of the new Minister for Sport may have altered the policy priority of the government and pushed forward the agenda of the government as well as that of UK Sport over the rigorous domestic anti-doping arrangement. As quoted previously, the former, the long-serving Minister for Sport, Richard Caborn, consistently opposed, in principle, the idea of creating an independent NADO that allowed coordination with police and other investigative agencies, because, along with the "WADA’s core function", he believed that "[w]e are not in the business of policing society. We are in the business of rooting out cheats in sport" (HCST, 2007: Q319). Although his successor Gerry Sutcliffe also emphasised catching the ‘cheats’ who “are constantly finding new ways to beat the system [and], we have to constantly look at what we do to catch them”, he is much more in favour of ‘policing’ those who are supplying and trafficking banned doping substances (DCMS/UK Sport Press Release, 151/07, 05 December 2007). The Minister’s interest in controlling ‘non-analytical’ doping offences was expressed during the Madrid World Conference on Doping in Sport in November 2007. During this conference, Sutcliffe announced the establishment of a Working Group to examine the way to control the possession and supply of prohibited substances, and acknowledged the complex network relationship in anti-doping (UK Sport News, 16 November 2007).

In light of the revised World Anti-Doping Code adopted during the 2007 Madrid World Conference, what is notable is that the minister’s preference in anti-doping policy was shaped by his growing awareness of the changing nature of international obligations, to which the government needs to conform in terms of law enforcement and regulations for the banned substances in sport, and in terms of the increasing role of NADOs. One can therefore conclude that the growing concern of WADA over the “changing global environment”, in which “the malign influence of ‘upstream’ doping offenders” prevails, has led to the recognition of UK’s pressing need to “fulfil its obligations under the World Anti-Doping Code and UNESCO Convention” (UK Sport Announcement, December 2007: 1, 3).

Furthermore, it can be suggested that the impetus to change policy direction is influenced by the higher expectations of WADA and international leading countries, although it is expressed as a ‘domestic’ decision, when faced with the London 2012 Games. The previous argument by Houlihan and Preece held that it was the broader domestic agenda of the government, i.e. ‘modernisation’, that prevented the creation of an independent NADO (Houlihan & Preece, 2007: 329-5). Instead, conversely, it is this ‘modernisation’ policy discourse that has been used as the domestic rationale for establishing a world-class new NADO with a much more robust capacity to maximise its impact by embracing the perceived global ‘best practice’ (UK Sport Announcement, December 2007). However, it should be
seen that there was mounting pressure from the "unique time table presented by London 2012 and the need to have sufficient lead in time to the pre-Games period" (ibid, December 2007: 1). The idea of the change being driven by a 'conflict of interest' was played down by Sue Campbell, who stated: "I don't think anyone doubts the quality of UK Sport's work to date in anti-doping, both in terms of testing and particularly education" (DCMS/UK Sport Press Release, 151/07, 05 December 2007). Instead, it was reported that the "main catalyst for the reforms" was the expected global exposure of UK's anti-doping activities after the Beijing Olympic Games (Daily Telegraph, 05 December 2007). We can reasonably suggest, therefore, that the IOC's expectations for the host Olympic state and the continuous pressure exerted by WADA and the leading anti-doping countries, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, which have successful crime-fighting operations implemented, have played the most significant role in the decisions of UK Sport and DCMS. It can be argued that it was only through reflecting international progress and through pressure by WADA and by those aforementioned leading countries that the creation of an independent NADO, which was once dismissed by the former Minister for Sport and UK Sport, was rationalised.

4.5 Conclusion

The early development of anti-doping policy in the UK passed through three phases. At first, from the late 1960s to the 1980s, the role of British Sports Council was important to advance the anti-doping policy in the UK. In the late 1980s, the national anti-doping policy was intensified primarily by the introduction of compulsory testing and OOCT. The Sports Council expressed the possibility of sanctioning NGBs, but their involvement in the anti-doping programme across different sporting bodies was inconsistent and far from rigorous. At the second stage, the British attempt to deal with the issue of doping in sport was explored through international platforms, one example of which was the International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA) signed in 1990 in order to enhance cooperation with Australia and Canada, and which maintained the momentum in policy development in the UK. Most tellingly, the government openly tackled the issue of doping in sport with the proactive involvement of the Council of Europe, who took a pivotal role in agreeing the European Charter on Doping and the formulation of the European Anti-Doping Convention. Nonetheless, it is plausible that this international engagement owed much to an enthusiastic Sport Minister, Colin Moynihan. It can be concluded that the domestic anti-doping policy, in the 1980s in particular, was developed in parallel with the international practices and was "a reflection of the reluctance felt, even among the most committed anti-doping campaigners, to
institute an anti-doping policy which is significantly more rigorous than that in force in most other countries" (Houlihan, 1997: 206).

At the third stage, and in support of the 'reluctance' generally felt among policy actors, it would seem that the rigor and intensity of anti-doping policy was not explored at government level in the UK to the same degree as the cases in the Australia and Canada. This was partly due to there being no drug test 'scandals' involving high-profile British athletes, which could have acted as a stimulus to government intervention and changes in policy. Of the four GB athletes who tested positive at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, three were cleared by their own governing bodies. The investigations into drug use in sport undertaken by the Amateur Athletics Association were closest to the inquiries, with judicial legislative power, conducted in Canada and Australia. The Coni Enquiry was important insofar as it provided some evidence about the relative prevalence of drug use in sport and the values of athletes in this matter in the UK. However, when Alain Baxter, the first British Olympic medallist in skiing at the 2002 Salt Lake City Games, was stripped of the bronze medal because he tested positive for stimulants, the government failed to have any forms of doping enquiry to make the doping issue a central feature in the debate over government policy. This may have given the impression of a 'naive' British attitude towards anti-doping policy in contrast to the growing political focus on elite sport success from around the late 1990s.

The UK's anti-doping policy in recent years has certainly been influenced by the emerging consensus in world anti-doping programmes as to doping offences, sanctions, international standards and models of best practice. With the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in 1999, the adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 should be seen as the defining moment for Britain, allowing it to (re-)shape its anti-doping structure and policy. The efforts to comply with the Code and harmonise it with the core national anti-doping elements have principally been expressed in four ways: i) the prioritisation of random OOCT based on the refined intelligence-based testing programme, which is recognised as the most effective method of combating the use of drugs in sport in the WAD Code as well as in the UNESCO Convention; ii) the implementation of UK National Anti-Doping Policy, including the possibility of financial sanctions for athletes (though not requiring the repayment of prize money), and Manifesto for Drug-Free Sport; iii) the establishment of an Independent Scrutiny Panel; and iv) the growing priority of education and information programmes. In comparison to the extensive financial and human resources support of the government for British elite success as examined in Chapter 6, the amount of Exchequer investment in drug-free programmes has remained largely unchanged, except for further investment in educational and information programmes, which can be seen as a reflection of the increasingly perceived
value of proactive deterrence rather than the reactive 'law and order' approach. Nevertheless, a contested debate on the incompatibility of both performance funding and drug-free functions and the legitimacy of the location of the DFSD within UK Sport have remained key issues in anti-doping policy.

It can be summarised, as illustrated in Diagram 4.2, that the change of UK's anti-doping policy is influenced by both domestic and global influences and pressures as well as learning the policy of best practice from other countries and taking the best opportunity to use the international progress in policy development. From the comments in government inquiries, the national anti-doping policy and the consideration for an independent NADO were steered by the emerging global anti-doping framework and the concepts of 'best practice'. In the light of hosting the Olympic Games in London in 2012, there have been growing concerns over international perception of Britain as being inactive and 'confusing' WADA, other NADOs, international sporting bodies, and importantly, athletes with the inappropriate domestic measures being taken. It would seem that international developments and the corresponding assurance of Britain's international prominence in global anti-doping policy can be seen as a critical rationale for an independent NADO. However, it also indicates that the issues of anti-doping programmes are entrenched within a set of complex relationships at domestic as well as multi-lateral and global levels (see Diagram 4.1).

Nevertheless, Diagram 4.2 illustrates that although institutional values were broadly shaped globally, a lack of evidence, the perceived cost and the government policy agenda (or specifically the modernisation agenda) were decisive in maintaining and strengthening DFSD within UK Sport. In the government reviews published, there was a degree of satisfaction with the UK Sport services and an evidence of an unethical behaviour was lacked. For the majority of the governing bodies, improvements in fair and transparent disciplinary proceedings were the pressing need. It would appear that one of the central concerns of the representatives of sporting bodies was to avoid their conflict of interests, which arose through their responsibility for both high performance success in their sport and the setting up of a disciplinary panel and hearings, rather than the considerations of UK Sport itself. The argument for transparency in disciplinary procedures reflected a growing maturity in the attitudes of domestic anti-doping actors towards a drug-free sport. It helped to ensure harmonisation across sport and the re-establishment of confidence in NGBs and sport by both athletes and the general public.

As shown in Diagram 4.2, although the core policy debate was framed and operated within the global sphere set by WADA, it was, as argued by Houlihan & Preece, that the associated
pressures from WADA and the leading anti-doping countries could be no more than a "mimetic isomorphism" (2007: 392). The core global framework and dynamism of compliance with the WAD Code can be identified, while the major factor constraining radical change was instigated when the Government decided to maintain an arm's length, centralised anti-doping system. However, most significantly, the dynamism of organisational relationship was further transformed when the government and UK Sport finally announced the creation of a new NADO independent of UK Sport. While the elements that shape the anti-doping programme in the UK shown in Diagram 4.2 remain almost the same, it is important to highlight that DCMS and UK Sport could not resist the (perceived) external pressure of meeting the expected global standard as a host country for the Olympic and Paralympics Games. At this point 'isomorphic' pressure may have become internalised. Nonetheless, as with the case in the mid-1990s, participating on the global platform and responding to external pressure was an opportunity to enhance the arrangement of the national anti-doping structure in the UK, and, in many ways, it was these pressures that steered government policy preferences.

Diagram 4.2: Elements shaping the anti-doping programme in the UK
Chapter 5 Development of Anti-Doping Policy in Japan

5.1 Introduction

Japan has had a lengthy involvement in anti-doping activity. As with the case in the policy development for high performance sport, the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games was the catalyst in acknowledging the issue of drugs in sport at national level. However, not only was it a limited number of enthusiasts who took the initiative in implementing some anti-doping programmes but also it was largely motivated by the perceived necessity of action if future international competitions were to be hosted in Japan. The implementation of the anti-doping policy was inconclusive, lacking in enthusiasm and reluctant. The international criticism in 1996 publicly made by Alexander de Merode, the Head of the IOC Medical Commission, regarding the small number of doping tests conducted in Japan, can be seen as one of the lowest points for the Japanese anti-doping actors. In practice, it was effectively only after the establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999 that the Japanese sport actors and the government became more rigorously engaged in policy cooperation, part of which is reflected in the creation of the Japan Anti-Doping Agency (JADA) in 2001. It is possible to argue that the intensified domestic commitment to anti-doping activities received a mixed response from the government in terms of their domestic and international objectives. To be more specific, on the one hand, the Japanese government and sports officials were concerned about maintaining their international reputation in sport (that is, Japanese athletes being free from allegations of drug cheating and the Japanese authorities acting against drug problems in sport) sensing Japan's obligation to contribute to the international and regional anti-doping platform. However, on the other hand, the government was still showing a reluctance to engage in what was emerging as a global consensus, especially in relation to the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport that requires legislative commitment of government.

Structure of Chapter 5

This chapter firstly explores the historical development and change of political salience in anti-doping policy in Japan, which is divided into three phases (mid-1960s-1984; 1985-1998; and 1999-2007). Of particular importance for fulfilling the objectives of subsequent sections is the most recent phase, the period in which a robust domestic anti-doping policy was
developed in relation to the emerging global platform for anti-doping. The current structural and organisational arrangements for the anti-doping programme in Japan are then described in order to identify a centralised anti-doping provision. Given a notable shortage of publicly available data, the level of public subsidies and the total number of doping tests is also provided. Most importantly, the attitudes and values of the Japanese government in relation to anti-doping policy are examined in the third section of this chapter. Analysis is primarily based on a range of policy documents and discussion papers that were obtained through empirical work, although primary and secondary documents from the early years are strikingly limited. In addition to policy document analysis, this section utilises a range of semi-structured interviews conducted with senior policy officials involved in the anti-doping programme in order to examine the extent of domestic exposure to the global anti-doping policy and the degree of exogenous influence on the Japanese involvement in anti-doping activities by exploring Japan's commitment to, and compliance with, the policy.

5.2 Japanese Historical Engagement in the Fight against Doping in Sport

5.2.1 From early involvement to the ‘Blank Period’, mid-1960s-1984

It can be identified that the Japanese involvement in anti-doping activities came as early as the 1960s, which coincided with the gradual international emergence of the doping issue (see Table 5.1 and also 4.2.1). The proactive engagement of Japan in anti-doping arose in the early preparations for hosting the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. The Games were domestically and internationally significant as the anti-doping issue became part of the international agenda for the first time at the 63rd IOC Congress held in Tokyo, the consequence of which had had an impact on the attitudes of some Japanese sport officials. Hosting the IOC Congress during the Tokyo Games, which was in many ways an international project, led to the creation of the IOC Medical Code, followed by the first compulsory drug testing at the 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympic Games. This was so enthusiastically welcomed that 1964 became a symbolic year, generally known as the 'first anti-doping initiatives in Japan' (JADA, 2008).

What should be emphasised is the pivotal role Dr. Kuroda Yoshio, who later became the President of Japan's Anti-Doping Agency (JADA), played in highlighting the significance of
the issue of doping in sport domestically and internationally. At national level Dr. Kuroda contributed to setting up the Doping Research Small Committee within the then Japan Amateur Sports Association (JASA) in 1966 for taking a coordinating role for anti-doping in Japan, while the Sports Science Research Institute, formed in the following year, undertook research projects on the doping issue, among many other 'medical and science' issues in sport. His engagement with the IOC – he became one of the initial members of the IOC Medical Commission (created in 1967) – was crucial. This point was described by a current senior JASA official, who is responsible for its anti-doping programme, as follows:

Dr. Kuroda stressed the necessity to implement doping control at the Tokyo Municipal Congress (which was responsible for hosting the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games) and ... thanks to his central position in the IOC Medical Commission; Japan could be at the front of [anti-doping activities] from the beginning and still is. This initial Japanese involvement led [concerning Japanese sport actors] to much pride and belief that Japanese athletes were clean [from doping].

(Interviewee B, 17 March 2005)

Whilst the Sports Science Research Institute conducted a small amount of research related to doping issues, it was not until the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympic Games that Japan became proactively engaged in advancing the anti-doping programme. Prior to the Sapporo Games, the Sports Science Research Institute of JASA published the first Doping Guidebook for Japanese athletes in order to raise awareness about doping. The significance of the Sapporo Olympics should be highlighted in the sense that drug testing was carried out for the first time in Japan. In 1978, JASA recognised its salience to provide subsidies to a private company, the then Mitsubishi Petrochemistry Medical Science, to establish a testing laboratory.

However, what should be recognised as detrimental to the implementation of further anti-doping policy initiatives and the general willingness to be involved in anti-doping after the Sapporo Games was the dissolution of the Doping Research Small Committee set up within JASA. This effectively left no coordinating agency for anti-doping, although, in principle, JASA continued taking responsibility for conducting doping tests leaving only 'research' function with Sports Science Research Institute. The first research on doping appeared in

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21 The name of the company was renamed as Mitsubishi Kagaku Bi- Clinical Laboratories (MBCL) in 1975, which merged with other two corporations to create the Mitsubishi Chemical Medisience Corporation (MAM) in January 2006, within one of the Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings Corporation’s operational branch.
1977 mainly on the methods and techniques of doping control tests, the same research concern of which can be identified up to 2000, while the areas of research conducted by this Institute were predominantly on sports medicine, physiology, biomechanics, health and injuries of athletes and the development high-performance system.

Table 5.1: Japanese Anti-Doping activities in relation to global developments, mid-1960s–1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issues in the World</th>
<th>Issues in Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>The Council of Europe establishes a commission of experts to fight against doping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>The IOC Congress was held in Tokyo and the IOC Medical Commission and Medical Code created</td>
<td>Marked as the ‘First Year of Anti-Doping in Japan’ due to the anti-doping issue being discussed at the IOC Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>The 1st Sports Science Research Center of JASA was established; its Director mentioned the necessity of dealing with the anti-doping issue (July) JASA set up the Doping Research Small Committee (Aug)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>FIFA and UCI introduced doping control</td>
<td>The Sports Science Research Centre was renamed as the Sports Science Research Institute within JASA and it launched the ‘Sports Medicine and Science Research Project’ with doping issues included as one of its research areas Dr. Yoshio Kuroda involved in the creation of the IOC Medical Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>IOC Medical Commission established and the 1st List of Prohibited Substances was published Death of British cyclist, Tommy Simpson, during the Tour de France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Drug tests were conducted for the first time at the Grenoble and Mexico OGs IAAF introduced In-Competition Testing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>IOC added anabolic steroids to its list of prohibited substances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Sapporo Winter OG</td>
<td>Doping Research Small Committee of JASA produced Doping Guidebook prior to OG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>First reliable test for anabolic steroids introduced</td>
<td>First international doing control test conducted in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1st UNESCO International Conference of Ministers and Senior Officials Responsible for Physical Education and Sport (MNEPS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>UNESCO Inter-governmental Committee for Physical Education and Sport (CIGEPS) was formed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Establishment of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within the IOC</td>
<td>JASA acknowledged Mitsubishi Petrochemistry Medical Science as a testing lab by providing subsidies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: JADA, 2008; Consultation on Anti-Doping Activity Report, 1998

In this regard, it is reasonable to argue that in the absence of holding large international competitions, like the Olympic Games, the impetus to strengthen anti-doping policy and to

22 The outline of research conducted by the Institute can be accessed from http://www.japan-sports.or.jp/publish/report.html (last accessed 04 December 2007)
introduce a robust testing programme was lost. It should therefore come as no surprise that this led to a lack of enthusiasm and inconsistencies in approach among NFs and sport officials. To summarise, Japan had a 'blank period' regarding the anti-doping issue between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s with the absence of a coordinating agency and scant national effort (Kono, 2003c). It was also noted that there was no incentive for proactive engagement in anti-drug matters due to a lack of perceived problems, which consequently was seen as "one of the reasons why the Japanese anti-doping activity had been delayed" (Consultation on Anti-Doping Activity Report, 1998: 23).

5.2.2 Moving from a reactive to a more proactive involvement as a result of international scandals, 1985-1998

For a decade, there was a relative silence in which no significant progress in anti-doping policy was made, although this did not preclude a small number of research activities on doping testing methods being undertaken in JASA. It may not come as a surprise that it was again the holding of an international sport competition in Japan, at which testing was required, that advanced the anti-doping programme. Most importantly, the development of anti-doping activity in the mid-1990s was driven by the perceived embarrassment of a Japanese athlete failing a drug test, and later, facing international criticism by an international figure. In this second phase, the media and public attention were attracted to the issue of doping in sport due to a large number of failures in doping tests by Chinese athletes at the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games that subsequently raised concerns for domestic athletes and the robustness of anti-doping provision in Japan.

Just prior to the Universiade held in Kobe in 1985, the Mitsubishi Petrochemistry Medical Science laboratory successfully became the thirteenth, and second privately-owned, IOC accredited laboratory. Holding the 1985 Kobe Universiade was significant in two ways in relation to the development of anti-doping policy in Japan. First, this first Asian accredited laboratory became fully operational during the Kobe Universiade and its level of sophistication to ensure the reliability of testing became the basis for updating the lab with the most advanced testing mechanisms.
Table 5.2: In-Competition Doping Tests conducted in Japan, 1986-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NFs</th>
<th>No. of competitions</th>
<th>No. of ICT</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Positive Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.35</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAAF</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAAF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAAF</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAAF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAAF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSF</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
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<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAAF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*JFA (J-League)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Power-lifting</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bodybuilding</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAAF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.35</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JSF</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*JFA (J-League)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Japan Football Association (JFA)

Second, it was from 1985, when JASA/JOC\(^{23}\) started conducting Out-of-Competition Testing (OOC) for Japanese national athletes prior to their participation in international competitions, that the standard for the number of OOC to be conducted was set. Table 5.2 suggests that the Power-lifting and Bodybuilding National Federations became the first sport governing bodies to introduce In-Competition Testing (ICT) programmes in 1986. The first Olympic discipline to adopt the ICT was the Japan Association for Athletic Federation (JAAF) in 1990 which was followed by the Japan Swimming Federation (JSF) in 1993. The introduction of ICT for the professional Japanese Soccer League (J-League), established in 1993, was also significant in that professional players became subject to drug testing, which

\(^{23}\) It is described as JASA/JOC because the JOC was then one of the committees inside JASA, although it was, in principle, the JOC who had the responsibility for identifying who should be tested.
consequently expanded the total number of ICTs conducted in Japan. However, it is evident in Table 5.2 that not only was the number of NFs conducting ICT very small but also the total number of ICTs conducted in Japan was equally limited, both of which were not comparable with the number found in the UK. For example, in 1996, there were only 153 tests in total (excluding ICT conducted in J-League) and only three Olympic NFs were engaged in ICT. In contrast, Table 5.3 indicates that a larger number of OOCT were conducted by JASA/JOC before the four major international competitions which can illustrate their increasing interest in sending 'drug-free' Japanese athletes to international competitions.

Table 5.3: Out-of-Competition Testing for the Japanese international-level athletes before international competitions, conducted by JASA/JOC and JOC*, 1985-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Olympic Games</th>
<th>Asian Games</th>
<th>Universiade</th>
<th>East Asian Games</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Winter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Kobe 165</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Seoul 451</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Zagreb n/a</td>
<td>Strbske Pleso n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul 296</td>
<td>Calgary 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Duisburg 49</td>
<td>Sofia n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Beijing 543</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Sheffield 178</td>
<td>Sapporo 87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona 285</td>
<td>Albertville 83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Buffalo 193</td>
<td>Zakopane 62</td>
<td>Shanghai 260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Lillehammer 99</td>
<td>Hiroshima 709</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Fukuoka 276</td>
<td>Haka 101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta 389</td>
<td>Halpin 114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Sicily 158</td>
<td>Muju 98</td>
<td>Bussan 285</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consultation on Anti-Doping Activity Report, 1998
Note: The sole responsibility of the JOC from 1990

It is generally agreed that the scandal of Ben Johnson being tested positive and stripped of his gold medal for the men's 100m in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was the catalyst for the adoption of the International Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport (see Houlihan, 2002a; Waddington, 2000). In response to the progress made by the IOC, JASA created the Anti-Doping Activity Group within its Sports Science Research Institute in 1988. It is nonetheless possible to identify that, although JASA/JOC may have assumed the central role in conducting OOCT for international-level athletes, they failed to ensure that national sport bodies introduced anti-doping programmes. It is important to recognise what caused a significant delay in having a coordinated approach in developing a national anti-doping programme was the departure of the JOC from JASA in 1990 (until then, the JOC was one of the committees within JASA). As a consequence, these two separate national agencies both became responsible for conducting anti-doping programmes. On the one hand, it is the JOC
who assumed the responsibility for testing international level athletes within its Anti-Doping Committee (created in 1995) and for ensuring NFs' testing programmes, and on the other hand, JASA still retained, to a considerable extent, the responsibility for coordinating anti-doping activity and research. While the JOC and JASA intended to collaborate by setting up a Joint Meeting for Anti-Doping in 1993, it was argued by a senior official of JASA that the persistence of JASA in maintaining its organisational influence on the overall direction of NFs undermined the JOC's initiative in the implementation of a coherent anti-doping policy in Japan (Interviewee B, 17 March 2005).

As highlighted in Section 4.2.2, the notorious Ben Johnson case in 1988 and the systematic drug abuse discovered at the Australian Institute in 1987 led to government inquiries in Canada and Australia respectively, and raised the international public and political profile of drugs in sport. Nevertheless, the impact of these scandals in Japan was not as extensive as, for example, in the UK where the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) carried out a national enquiry into athletics (see 4.2.2). However, it was the case where a large number of Chinese elite athletes, particularly in swimming, tested positive during the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games that was recognised as a much more staggering scandal in Japan.

In Hiroshima, eleven Chinese athletes won a total of 23 medals in swimming, athletics, canoeing and cycling but tested positive and were consequently stripped of their medals during the Asian Games. Houlihan noted that there had been no Olympic medal in swimming won by the Chinese until 1988 and because the dramatic improvement of the Chinese to the status of "a powerhouse in international swimming" was so sudden, there had been suspicions of a systematic doping regime (2002a: 52-5). It was also reported that there had been an "increased suspicion of institutionalised doping in China" which led to "broad scepticism about the credibility of China's emerging sports empire" (New York Times, 18 December 1994). In the FINA World Championships in Rome, only three weeks before the 1988 Asian Games, the Chinese swimmers had won twelve out of the sixteen competitions but seven swimmers, including three female world champions, were tested positive in Hiroshima. This confirmed the doubts in the media and by a number of leading national swimming federations (especially Australia, Canada and the USA) that doping had been structurally institutionalised in China.

The reaction by the Japanese media, sport officials and the public to the 1988 Hiroshima scandal was rather emotional, which can be categorised in three ways. Firstly, there was a great degree of relief and satisfaction in Japan when the ability to detect Dihydrotestosterone (DHT) became possible. The Mitsubishi Lab was recognised as world class in the media, at
least in Japan, for the level of sophistication regarding data-processing technology and machines. It was noted that "nobody had ever thought that the Tokyo lab could detect DHT" (Yomiuri News Paper, 25 December 1994; Asahi News Paper, 01 December 1994), because DHT was then perceived to be "the most advanced and latest substance" with "no standard for testing available" at that time (Yomiuri News Paper, 06 December 1994). It was claimed that the Mitsubishi BCL collaborated with Dr. Manfred Donike at the IOC laboratory in Cologne, which was then one of few IOC labs successfully testing for DHT on a regular basis, and that it was equipped with the highest international standard of testing methods available just three days before the Asian Games (Yomiuri News Paper, 06 December 1994). What is important to highlight is that the Japanese officials made sure that they had the most up to date laboratory equipment available for the Kobe Universiade, which suggests the value of Japanese officials in setting the standard for anti-doping provisions when the Japanese host international competitions. An example of this is illustrated by JASA and the JOC ensuring the spending of a large sum from their budget for purchasing the updated equipment for the Tokyo World Athletic Championships in 1991 and for the 1998 Nagano Olympic Games. Secondly, severe accusations and condemnations were made against the communist ideology and policy of the Chinese government, and, accordingly, the elite development system in China was criticised on ethical and moral grounds. It was claimed in two Japanese national newspapers, Mainichi and Asahi, that with the introduction of the 'open-door policy' in China in 1978, its government had a political objective to prove the superiority of the Chinese-model of a 'liberal market economy' through the success of Chinese athletes regardless of whatever it took to win (Mainichi News Paper, Asahi News Paper, both dated 30 November 1994). The closed nature of the IOC-accredited laboratory in China and its closeness to the government-funded Institute of Sports Medicine was also the source of criticism concerning the possibility of state involvement in systematic doping (Yomiuri News Paper, 23 December 1994). Thirdly and most importantly, while there was an initial sense of disappointment and surprise expressed by some Japanese sporting officials in relation to the unethical behaviour of their Asian compatriots, they expressed more concern about the impact of this doping scandal on the mentality and commitment of Japanese elite athletes to their training and performance. The then Director of High Performance at the JOC, Matsudaira, commented that: "if it was a systematic violation [by the Chinese] then it is very disappointing news considering they are our Asian competitors...However, what I am worried most is [that] this incident could influence the perception of Japanese athletes who may interpret it in a way that 'one does not need to aim for achieving gold medals', rather than "one should not aim for gold medals even by using drugs" (emphasis added, Asahi News Paper, 29 November 1994). This comment by Matsudaira illustrates the JOC's primary concern was not the strengthening of anti-doping
provision but primarily on the impact of doping by other countries as Japanese high-performance athletes and their attitude to achievement.

Some change in values and understandings in relation to the issue of doping in sport can be identified following the 1994 scandal involving top Chinese athletes during the Hiroshima Asian Games, one of which was the JOC's initiatives to raise anti-doping awareness of Japanese elite athletes for ensuring the athletes are 'clean', being free from performance-enhancing drugs. It should be seen as one of few proactive engagements of the JOC in implementing an education programme, to which ¥10m was allocated from the JOC's high-performance budget for distributing the anti-doping educational video, *Anti-Doping: Aiming for a Real Champion*, across 5,500 high schools. It was aimed to develop a wider understanding by junior athletes and junior/youth coaches about prohibited substances and their implications, especially the damage to the health of the athletes (*Yomiuri News Paper*, 02 December 1994). In contrast, whilst it was noted as a recurring demand to apply the same sanctions to all athletes from different disciplines, the Chinese scandal in Hiroshima did not directly stipulate an implementation of a coherent and robust anti-doping policy in Japan. To be more specific, in light of the accusation of Chinese officials and athletes concerning drug use in sport, the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of Japanese anti-doping arrangements was notably kept quiet (*Yomiuri News Paper*, 09 December 1994). What should also be highlighted is that during this time, Australia, Canada and subsequently the UK and the United States had pursued extensive inquiries into doping, whether they were governmental or voluntarily initiated by sport, whereas Japan did not institute any form of national review into the prevalence of doping in sport. In contrast, exogenous factors, such as the scandals in other countries or by positive tests by foreign athletes, seemingly instilled confidence in the sophistication and rigorousness of the testing procedures in Japan.

Up until 1995, the attitude of Japanese sport actors and the government towards the development of an anti-doping policy can be seen as lacking in self-reflection and enthusiasm. However, a significant change in policy and attitudes of Japanese sport officials to the doping issue came in 1996 due to the international exposure of a Japanese international-level athlete and the consequent embarrassment felt by the Japanese officials. A Japanese 100m track and field athlete, Ito Yoshitaka, who was at a training preparation camp for the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games in the USA, tested positive in an OOCT conducted by the IAAF.
Table 5.4: Japanese Anti-Doping Activities in relation to the global developments, 1985-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issues in the World</th>
<th>Issues in Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Universiade held in Kobe</td>
<td>Establishment of Asia's first IOC-accredited Doping Control Laboratory within Mitsubishi Petrochemistry Medical Science; JASA/JOC introduced testing for international-level athletes prior to any international competitions; JSF introduced doping test from 1st Pan-Pacific Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>IOC banned blood doping</td>
<td>Power-lifting and Body-building governing bodies respectively introduced doping test; JASA purchased testing equipment from Kobe Universiade Organizing Committee with ¥20m from the Exchequer budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Ben Johnson tested positive for steroids in the Seoul OG IOC adopted the International Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport 2nd UNESCO MINEPS in Moscow - praised and supported IOC Medical Code with regard to anti-doping</td>
<td>JASA established the Anti-Doping Activity Group and Doping Database Group - an emergence of structured anti-doping activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>IAAF introduced Out-Of-Competition Testing</td>
<td>JAAF and JSF introduced ICT to their Japanese National Competitions (Grand Prix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>IOC included Erythropoietin (EPO) in its list of prohibited substances but a reliable testing method was lacking</td>
<td>Separation of JOC from JASA; the JOC became responsible for Japanese international-level athletes to be tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>JOC set up the Medical Committee; Medical Science Project started within the Committee and anti-doping was included in this project. JASA bought updated testing equipment with ¥116.8m from Japan Cycling Promotion Fund</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Joint meeting on anti-doping between JOC and JASA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Independence of CAS from IOC Hiroshima Asian Games – 11 Chinese athletes tested positive</td>
<td>JOC produced and distributed anti-doping video to high school athletes/coaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Independence of CAS from IOC Hiroshima Asian Games – 11 Chinese athletes tested positive</td>
<td>Set up of JOC’s Anti-Doping Committee; Testing on top-athletes was moved to JOC’s A-D Committee from JASA. However, JASA continued to take a coordinating role domestically. Professional soccer league (J-League) introduced doping tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>An Olympic-level track-field athlete was tested positive and gained a 4-year ban by the IAAF; Alexander de Merode directly criticised Japan for its small number of doping tests. JOC-JASA Joint Meeting established the Consultation Committee on Anti-Doping System. MEXT allocated the budget for A-D for the first time</td>
<td>ACHPE Report argued the necessity to establish a public A-D coordinating agency; JAAF introduced ICT to Japan Junior Competition and Inter-College Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Tour de France Scandal – police raid discovers prohibited substances and highlights the need for greater anti-doping efforts by public and private organisations. 1998 Nagano Winter Olympic Games</td>
<td>The Consultation Committee on Anti-Doping System published a Proposal for Anti-Doping Activities in Japan; JOC purchased updated lab equipment for the Nagano Games with ¥135.45m, supported by Japan Cycling Promotion Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Consultation on Anti-Doping Activity Report, 1998
This positive case was seen as the most scandalous incident for the Japanese officials. An executive JAAF member, who is also a senior member of JADA Doping Control, recalled this event commenting that: "It was big news. It became the most significant issue among the Japanese sport actors!" and, as a consequence, JAAF decided to extend ICT, which then instigated the introduction of OOCT and an educational programme in 1997 (original emphasis, Interviewee P, 04 April 2005).

Furthermore, with the sensational incident of 1996, what should be highlighted as the most important aspect for recent anti-doping policy development was the internationally-made accusation by the Director of IOC Medical Commission, Alexander de Merode. Partly in response to the 1996 incident, Merode publicly criticised the Japanese reluctance in engaging in anti-doping and suggested that a lack of enthusiasm of Japanese officials in anti-doping was reflected in the "extremely small number of doping tests conducted in Japan" in comparison to the growing number of Japanese elite athletes participating in the Olympic Games (quoted in JADA, 2003; Consultation on Anti-Doping Activity Report, 1998). The criticism by Merode was recorded and described elsewhere in the documents available in Japanese and, equally importantly, this was questioned in the Education, Science and Culture Committee of the House of Councillors. An academic, who had been in a central position for elite sport development, was called to give a witness statement to answer the question raised in this government Committee as to why the international criticism was raised against the Japanese. In his statement, Dr. Asami claimed that the small number of doping tests conducted was due to "the extremely low level of recognition of the anti-doping issue among Japanese sport officials and athletes"24 (date, 12 February 1998).

The international exposure of Japan to this perceived failure should be seen as a catalyst in two ways for the developing anti-doping policy in Japan. First, the 'myth', which was shared among Japanese sport officials that Japanese athletes were 'clean', had collapsed (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005) and the public's ethical value, namely, that "doping is bad", was generated (Kondo, 2006: 297). Nevertheless, Kondo argues that despite the fact that Ito could not overturn the test result, his positive case in 1996 was seen as purely out of 'ignorance', which was one of the "only scattered cases of unintentional or inadvertent use"

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24 The Education, Science and Culture Committee of House of Councilor is one of the parliamentary discussion bodies for the issue around sport and some of its members are ex-athletes. See The Education, Science and Culture Committee of House of Councilor Minute, No. 5, Vol. 6, 142th Diet Session, 12 February 1998.
by the Japanese athletes\textsuperscript{25}, whereby, Kondo believes that the "Japanese athletes are generally considered to be relatively clean" with few case of violation (2006: 298). However, we cannot be certain about Kondo's claim, which is "the norm in Japan" being exerted from "external pressure of the (Japanese) public" has prevented Japanese athletes from taking banned substances (ibid, 310 in FN4), for it further requires careful considerations as to how 'the norm' was constituted. It might also be the case that small number of tests conducted in Japan could be part of the explanation for the few positive cases among Japanese athletes. We could note that in light of a relatively sporadic approach to anti-doping policy in the mid-1990s in Japan, it might have possibly been the case that this notion of 'moral' or 'societal' value embedded in Japan prevailed into sport, and consequently, no urgency was felt regarding anti-doping among Japanese sport athletes and officials. Second, the criticism by Merode highlighted the incompetence of Japanese anti-doping arrangements and led to the establishment of the JOC-JASA Joint Meeting which organised the Consultation Committee on the Anti-Doping System in 1996, in which the Japanese Professional Sports Association, along with other sporting bodies and academics also participated. In January 1998, the Consultation Committee published a Proposal for Anti-Doping Activities in Japan. It is interesting to highlight a significant absence of nationally coordinated anti-doping activities that as many as 41 sport bodies (57\%) did not have any anti-doping policy, half of which had never taken any anti-doping measures\textsuperscript{26}. It was suggested that this antipathy and a lack of understanding in the anti-doping issue among a number of NGBs, reflected their general reactive attitudes, and was derived from the following (ibid, 46, 54):

- Doping tests in Japan had been conducted only because it was an obligation for hosting international competitions and for sending national athletes to international competitions, and therefore, there was no proactive engagement in Japan in eradicating doping from sport;
- For some people who were actively involved, anti-doping was perceived to be the problem;
- Educational and promotional activities for anti-doping were inadequate;
- No appeal body to protect athletes and coaches existed;
- Not enough understanding among the national sport actors about anti-doping;
- Test results were not adequately managed; and
- No adequate domestic measures were taken to apply changes made in IFs' anti-doping rules.

\textsuperscript{25} Kondo (2006) reports the cases that the Japanese athletes violated doping rules, which are, two case of using cold medication in 1984 Los Angel Olympic Games by male volleyball player and a female alpine skier; and the use of methyltestosterone in the 1998 Asian Games by a male billiard player.

\textsuperscript{26} Of total of 72 bodies which returned the questionnaire out of 57 JOC/JASA affiliated bodies, 5 non-affiliated bodies and 16 professional sport organisations, Consultation on Anti-Doping Activity Report, 1998: 66-68
The above issues were highlighted in relation to the international development of anti-doping policy, but it is worth emphasising that the Consultation Committee expressed concerns about Japanese elite athletes losing their international credibility. In particular, there was a strong awareness of Japan’s ‘international obligation and responsibility’ for arranging a holistic anti-doping system when Japanese delegates are sent to international competitions and the Olympic Games. The report stressed that it has to be the “basic condition” to implement a robust testing programme if Japan was to become a “developed sporting nation” (Consultation on Anti-Doping Activity Report, 1998: 5, 54). This Consultation Committee also sent questionnaires to the 22 national anti-doping coordination agencies in other countries that respectively owned the IOC accredited laboratory (gained 12 responses). Furthermore, two representatives from the JOC and an official from the Competitive Sports Division of the Ministry of Education also paid a visit to the Australian Sports Drug Agency (ASDA) to learn the progress made internationally with a view to introduce “a potential model” of ASDA as a Japanese coordinating agency (ibid, 1998: 38-41).

The conclusion of the Consultation Committee stated that “without an independent national coordinating body which can harmonise with both professional and amateur domestic sport and with international bodies, it would not be possible to promote and develop sport in Japan” (ibid, 46). The significance of this proposal should be highlighted as the consolidated effort of enthusiasts and in light of international developments, the following four key recommendations were made: i) to specify the fundamental value of Japanese anti-doping activities; ii) to create a ‘Japan Anti-Doping Organization (ADO-Japan)’ as an independent, public, coordinating agency for anti-doping in time for the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games; iii) to coordinate an impartial and fair anti-doping testing programme in collaboration with domestic and international organisations; and iv) to establish an organisation to protect the human rights and dignity of athletes. This coordinated effort was reflected in the report to the government submitted by the Ministry of Education’s Advisory Council for Health and Physical Education (ACHPE), which reiterated the significance of establishing a public coordinating agency for anti-doping and which thus became the first government document to indicate anti-doping issue as its concern (ACHPE, 1997).

To summarise, the reaction of Japanese sport actors to the anti-doping issue during the second period can be characterised as *laissez-faire*, sporadic and categorically reactive. It is striking that the necessity to conduct doping tests in international competitions hosted in Japan still largely influenced the development of anti-doping arrangements. The catalyst for change in the direction of policy came from the perceived humiliation felt among Japanese
sport officials due to a Japanese elite athlete failing a drug test and the subsequent international criticism, specifically from the head of IOC Medical Commission, which resulted in the detailed recommendations for a domestic anti-doping arrangement. Nonetheless, it should be stated that, although the Consultation Committee's proposal had already been consolidated prior to the doping scandal in the 1998 Tour de France and the subsequent World Conference on Doping in Sport hosted by the IOC, the development of the anti-doping policy in practice came into being with the global anti-doping initiative in the very late 1990s (see next section).

5.2.3 The Japanese willingness to engage in global initiatives for anti-doping policy, 1999-2007

Following the proposal of the Consultation Committee and the ACHPE report, there was a growing awareness in the government of the necessity to establish an independent, coordinating anti-doping agency. However, even after the global anti-doping platform was created, the government seems to have still been reluctant to engage in the anti-doping programme, leaving it to the sport sector to deal with domestic sporting matters. This general attitude of the government was typified in the first World Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne, which was organised by the IOC in February 1999, and the first International Inter-Governmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (IICGADS) Summit held in November 1999 in Sydney. Although the majority of countries sent ministers or high-rank government officials to attend these international conferences, such as Tony Banks from the UK and Barry McCaffrey from the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, Japan only sent a lower-rank state official of MEXT (Okonogi Hachiro) and officials from the Competitive Sports Division accompanied by a JOC representative and anti-doping official from NFs. A number of interviewees in this research, who attended these intergovernmental and IOC conferences, bitterly criticised the initial slow response of the government in recognising and being sensitive not only to the international policy development in general but also to the significance of IICGADS in terms of international sport policy development, which was effectively the first global forum for ensuring the collective voice of public authorities to the IOC and dialogues between the government (Drugs in Sport HP; Houlihan, 2002a; see 5.4 for more discussions). However, an official from the MEXT Competitive Sports Division, who had attended these world conferences, acknowledged that the government's objective was effectively met by securing international status through the Senior Vice Minister of MEXT becoming a WADA Executive Committee and Foundation
Board Member in return to promise the Japan's financial contribution to WADA\(^{27}\) (Interviewee C, 18 March 2005). More specifically, this government’s enthusiasm for securing the international position and acting as a lead country in Asia for anti-doping matters can be identified in its willingness to make a financial contribution to WADA. It was agreed in the 3\(^{rd}\) IICGADS Summit held in Cape Town in 2001 that 20.46% of WADA’s budget was to be allocated to Asia\(^{28}\). In 2002, the Japanese government agreed to pay WADA $1,502,800 (¥180m, 17.68% of the contribution to WADA’s overall budget of $8,500,000) thus becoming the second biggest contributor after the USA, which has, undoubtedly, influenced WADA’s subsequent decision to establish its Asia/Oceania Regional Office in Tokyo (see Table 5.7 for financial contribution). The Japanese government called the 1\(^{st}\) Asian Regional Intergovernmental Meeting in Tokyo in April 2004 and proposed the formula for WADA’s allocated budget\(^{29}\). The overall formula for the Asian calculation to WADA was 15% based on the number of competitors who attended the Olympic Games and the balance based on the World Bank economic indicator.

The Basic Plan for the Promotion of Sport published by MEXT in 2000 confirmed the promotion of anti-doping activity only as a “related policy area” or as a supplemental area of policy in relation to the core sport policy objective of MEXT, namely, achieving 3.5% of all medals available in summer and winter Olympics. The role of government in anti-doping policy was also acknowledged as being “to organise the domestic anti-doping structure and to promote cooperation with international organisations” (MEXT, 2000). Nevertheless, to the disappointment of some anti-doping officers, the 1998 proposal by the Consultation Committee and the JOC-JASA’s joint statement highlighting the necessity for creating a Japanese NADO as a public entity were not reflected in the actual policy arrangement. The government authorised the establishment of the Japan Anti-Doping Agency (JADA) in September 2001 as an ‘incorporated public foundation body’ (a publicly recognised body without the high status and financial support by the government granted to a public body, although it is eligible to government funding\(^{30}\) and mainly subsidised by the toto revenue. Subsequently, the joint Anti-Doping Communication Meeting was established between JADA, JOC, JASA and MEXT in order to discuss the way to promote understanding in the anti-doping programme in Japan. The JOC, Japan Paralympic Committee and JADA jointly signed the World Anti-Doping Code (WAD Code) that was adopted at the Copenhagen 2\(^{nd}\)

\(^{27}\) Other representative countries from Asia in the initial WADA Foundation Board members were South Korea, China and Iran. See more detail in [http://www.wada-ama.org/teccontent/document/Asian Region Contributions Overview Japan 2004.pdf](http://www.wada-ama.org/teccontent/document/Asian Region Contributions Overview Japan 2004.pdf).


\(^{30}\) The definition of ‘incorporated public foundation’ is defined in the Civil Law. An organisation is given this status to serve public interests in a not-for-profit way. There are 14 different ministries in charge to authorise the establishment of an incorporated public foundation. The Competitive Sport Division of MEXT is the authorised body for the majority of NFs, the JOC, JASA and JADA.
World Conference on Doping in Sport in November 2003. Just before the Athens Olympic Games, JADA implemented the Japan Anti-Doping Code, which is modelled on the WAD Code, and required all JADA affiliated bodies to adopt it, otherwise it is claimed that any public financial support would be withdrawn (JADA, 2004c: Clause 12).

As for JASA, while its long-lasting role in anti-doping research and activities ended, in principle, with the creation of JADA, its responsibility for hosting the annual Kokutai ensured that it retained its function in overseeing doping tests and promoting educational programmes for anti-doping at prefectural level through the annual publication of, among others, *Doping Tests in Kokutai: for Kokutai Athletes* which simplify the Prohibited Lists of WADA (JASA, 2004b). JASA introduced a doping test in Kokutai from the summer event in 2003 by establishing an Anti-Doping Section within JASA’s Sport Medicine and Science Committee which widened the possibility of drug tests for athletes at national, prefectural and regional levels. However, given its decision to introduce doping test in this annual national event made significant impact on prefectural elite athletes who are now eligible to doping control, the responsibility of JASA in anti-doping seems to have been further weakened, especially when toto subsidies to JASA for coordinating the Kokutai doping programme was replaced to JADA in 2007 (JASA gained ¥870,000 from toto subsidy in 2006; see more discussion in 5.6), which consequently enhanced JADA’s discretion by gaining a coordinating role conducting doping tests at the Kokutai event.

The public awareness of drug issues in sport was significantly increased during the Athens Olympic Games when Murofushi Koji, a top Japanese hammer thrower, was upgraded to a gold medal after the Hungarian, Adrian Annus, who had initially won the event was reported to have provided someone else’s urine sample and refused to provide another sample when requested (Case 17, WADA, 2003). The majority of the newspaper coverage positively praised this incident as a ‘success’ of the Japanese approach to anti-doping policy, which reported Murofushi’s emotional belief with a quotation from the Greek lyric poet Pindarus, about “devotion to training and winning with truth in fairness” (*Yomiuri News Paper*, 30 August 2004). An internal JISS email newsletter circulated to national, regional and local sport officials (called J-net), praised the way investigations by the JOC and Tokyo-J Project, which had been formed within JISS to provide information support during the Olympic Games, were rigorous and had influenced the IOC Medical Commission to act further against Annus (*J-net*, 30 August 2004).

It is notable that the Murofushi/Annus case brought a sense of confidence to the Japanese anti-doping officials (Professor Kono Ichiro was a member of WADA’s Independent Observer
team at the Athletes Olympic Games) and encouraged them to be proactively engaged in the fast-moving global anti-doping programme. JADA promptly responded by introducing WADA's preferred, web-based, database management system – Anti-Doping Administration & Management System (ADAMS) – in 2005 and encouraged all athletes participating in the 2006 Doha Asian Games to use this system. As part of the promotion/education anti-doping programme, JADA produced a promotional DVD modelled on that of WADA's “Level the Playing Field” with some top Japanese athletes providing a soundtrack. It was distributed to all NFs and prefectural and regional PE/Sport Associations. It is interesting to observe at this point that few Japanese (ex-)athletes at international level became more proactively engaged and played a greater role in increasing public confidence in, and understanding of, the value of the anti-doping programme, indicating the gradual emergence of a structured and cross-organisational support system. For instance, two officers from JADA were sent to the 2006 Asian Games as a support team to advise and oversee Japanese athletes for the whole doping test process. The 11th World Athletics Championships held in Osaka in August 2007 saw 1,132 pre- and in-competition samples collected from a total of 976 individual athletes (82 athletes tested in OOCT during training camps in Japan). This was recognised as a catalyst for the Japanese officials to ensure all procedures for doping tests, including the equipment, was updated to meet international standards (Interviewee J, 22 May 2006). In preparation for the upcoming world championships, the Japan Association of Athletics Federations (JAAF) had conducted the very first blood-doping tests in Japan at the Osaka National Athletics Championships in June 2007.

Most importantly, 2006 was a significant year that saw a change of policy to a more rigorous involvement of government. First, the Competitive Sports Division of MEXT allocated its budget of ¥100m to JADA for the first time. Although it was a one-off budget, it was specifically aimed at increasing the total number of doping tests conducted by JADA. The government interest in securing a sufficient number of doping tests was reflected in the revised Basic Plan of 2006. In comparison with the extensive number of doping tests in "leading anti-doping countries in Europe and America", including the UK, it was perceived that those of Japan were extremely low that it had to reach "to a minimum international standard" (MEXT, 2006a: 33). Second, and more importantly, the government finally 'accepted' (as opposed to 'ratify' like the case of Britain) the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport in very late December 2006 becoming the 34th country to endorse, just before the final date for the UNESCO Convention in order for it to come into force in February 2007. Third, and equally important, was the implementation of the Anti-Doping Guidelines in Sport by MEXT in May 2007. The Guidelines was implemented in response to the UNESCO Convention, the significance of which should be highlighted in two
ways. Firstly, in the *Guideline*, MEXT not only publicly recognised JADA as the national anti-doping coordinating body highlighting the obligation of NFs to comply with the World Anti-Doping Code, but it also acknowledged its ministerial role (Competitive Sports Division specifically) having a national responsibility for anti-doping as the government body (Article 3). Secondly, the process of appeal and fair hearing was specified with the establishment of the Japan Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel (JADDP) which stated that athletes, supporting staff and NFs can appeal to the Japan Sports Arbitration Agency (JSAA, established in 2003). Most notably, financial sanctions were now to be applied to those athletes, coaches and sport governing bodies that violated doping rules and MEXT and the relevant funding bodies (i.e. NAASH) would stop all subsidies. Those NFs not complying with WAD Code would also be denied, either partially or fully, financial and any other relevant support (Article 4).

However, a striking deficiency of these *Guidelines* was that it did not achieve harmonisation across sport organisations in Japan due to the absence of professional sport leagues and bodies, such as J-League, the Japan Football Association (JFA) and Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB). Two high-profile doping cases from the J-League and NPB that occurred around the same time should be highlighted as a foreseeable challenge to the enhanced harmonisation and future development of anti-doping activities in Japan. In a post-competition testing, Rick Guttormson, the American professional baseball player belonging to Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks Baseball Club, tested positive for Finasteride, a substance which can be used as a masking agent. Although he claimed he was using it "to boost his hair growth" (*Sports Nippon News*, 11 August 2007), Guttormson was suspended for 20 days and his team was fined ¥7.5m. As a result, he became the first player to test positive for banned substances in Japanese professional baseball history and it was consequently the first doping case since the NPB's initial introduction of doping tests in the 2006 season. Guttormson was also the first American baseball player to have tested positive for steroids (*NBC Sports*, 10 August 2007).

As for the case in the J-League, which had not adopted the Japan Anti-Doping Code but separately applied its own regulations out of JFA's discretion (as of November 2007), a professional football player, Ganaha Kazuki, was suspended for six games in May 2007 for violation of the "J-League's Anti-Doping Code" for intravenous injection of nutritional supplement. His club team, Kawasaki Frontale, whose team doctor injected Ganaha, was also fined ¥10m (*Kyodo Press*, 01 May; 08 May 2007). Interestingly, although JADA responded that Ganaha's case was not a violation of doping according to the WAD Code and David Howman, the then WADA's Director General, also identified a failure in J-League
procedures, the professional league declined to overturn its decision (Kyodo Press, 11 August; 14 September 2007). Although Ganaha appealed against the decision to the Japan Sports Arbitration Agency, the J-League did not agree to arbitration, and thus, he appealed to the Court of Arbitration (CAS), only the second time that a Japanese athlete had taken a case to the CAS (MSN Sankei News, 13 December 2007). Consequently, although no J-League players have tested positive for doping so far, the JFA decided to implement an anti-doping policy from February 2008 that could supersede that of the J-League (Sports Hochi, 08 November 2007). It was reported that the Director of the J-League Anti-Doping Committee, Aoki Naoto, admitted the ICT facilitated by the J-League had been "a mere name" because the league provided the names of those who would be tested at least 60 minutes before the start of the match (quoted in Yomiuri News Paper, 12 December 2007).

Table 5.5: Japanese Anti-Doping Activities in relation to global developments, 1999-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issues in the World</th>
<th>Issues in Japan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1st World Conference on Doping in Sport – IOC invited governments and sports movements to attend. A key recommendation is to establish an independent anti-doping agency. Feb 4 – Adoption of Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport</td>
<td>• May – JOC/JASA Joint Meeting agreed on the establishment of Japanese Anti-Doping Agency as a public utility</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>Establishment of WADA – a private Swiss Foundation incorporated under Swiss Law with equal representation from the Olympic Movement and Public Authorities; adopted WADA Strategic Plan – 5 year strategic plan</td>
<td>• Dec – Japan became an Executive Member of WADA</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.14</td>
<td>The International Drugs in Sport Summit hosted by the Australian Minister for Sport and Tourism – adopted the Sydney Communiqué; Proposed the establishment of International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sports (IICGADS)</td>
<td>• The lower-rank MEXT official (State Official for MEXT) represented Japan on the IICGADS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1st IICGADS – Montreal Declaration: selection of WADA’s executive members from the government of each continent; 2nd IICGADS – Oslo Declaration: proposal that the government pay 50% of WADA’s annual budget; Working group for financial sustainability (Finland, South Africa, Australia, Japan and Canada). An EPO detection test, based on a combination of blood and urine analysis, and Out-of-Competition Testing was first implemented at the Sydney OG</td>
<td>• Sept – Basic Plan noted the significance of establishing an anti-doping coordinating agency and its activity stating that: - the agency will be a ‘public utility’, then government provides ‘necessity support’ - positive involvement in international educational and promotion A-D activities as an Executive Member in Asia • JOC-JASA Joint Meeting established a provisional Committee to prepare for setting up a Japanese NADO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2001 | 3rd IICGADS – Cape Town Declaration: decision over the government’s share of WADA’s budget depending on i) the ability to pay (mainly based on GDP); and ii) the number of delegates to the OG | • Discussion started to introducing A-D testing to Kokutai – financial, legal, human rights issues were considered • Sept 16 – JADA was established as a national coordinating agency to which government made an ‘acknowledgement’ • Dec – Anti-Doping Communication Meeting between MEXT, JOC, JASA and JADA created for sharing the ideas of Japanese anti-doping provisions • FINA Fukuoka World Championships – the
What is also interesting in Ganaha's disputed case is that the Competitive Sports Division intervened for the first time in an anti-doping case and requested the J-League to provide explanations about the case. The then Vice-Minister for MEXT, Endo Toshiaki, also publicly highlighted the uncoordinated arrangements in Japan and requested the professional leagues/tournaments to introduce doping tests. In response to this, Sumo and Golf swiftly acted to create an anti-doping commission to prepare for the implementation of tests. (Kyodo

**Source:** Kono, presentation slides, 2006; Houlihan, 2002a
As such, these two high profile cases, followed by another two positive cases in international sailing and chess, illustrate a lack of understanding and consistency across NFs, especially professional leagues, and that JADA's capacity in coordinating and harmonising the national bodies has been limited.

Irrespective of the particular problems identified, it can be summarised that the Japanese government's interest in the anti-doping issue grew in parallel with the emerging global anti-doping platform. In comparison with the very limited number of sport bodies and enthusiasts from sport organisations engaged in anti-doping until the end of 1990s, it should be stressed that the Japanese anti-doping programme, which is coordinated centrally at JADA, has just started to become consolidated. Both government and Japanese anti-doping policy actors seem to have sought proactive engagement in WADA, its Asia/Oceania Regional Office and international bodies, in order to pursue national policy objectives. However, what should be emphasised is that there are considerable differences in the values and approaches used against drugs in sport by different categories of policy actors. There are also different attitudes to tackling the anti-doping problem at domestic and international levels, which will be examined in Section 5.4.

5.3 Organisational Structure for Anti-Doping and Doping Tests

5.3.1 A Japanese-style coordination of anti-doping agency

Before the Japan Anti-Doping Agency (JADA) was created in September 2001, the dominant approach to domestic anti-doping arrangement was sporadic and, as noted in Section 5.2, although there was constant pressure by the Japanese national anti-doping policy enthusiasts which finally resulted in the establishment of JADA. According to a senior anti-doping official for a federation of one of the successful Olympic disciplines who also is a member of JADA, it was previously seen as a "fragmented system", where JASA, JOC or some national federations separately organised doping controls, which "could easily have allowed athletes and sport officials to cheat" (Interviewee Q, 05 April 2005). Nevertheless, although the Japanese had been passive and un-coordinated in organising doping tests up to the late 1990s, since which time, it is perceived that the level of involvement in anti-doping activities have been grown, according to a JADA Board member, principally being driven by the fear and pressure that Japanese athletes might be "expelled from participation in
international sport" due to extremely low number of doping controls undertaken in Japan (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005).

The Competitive Sports Division of MEXT is the principal state body responsible for the anti-doping issue and it created the Office for Anti-Doping Support formed within this division in 2001 along with the appointment of an Anti-Doping Specialist Officer, which was followed by another appointment of an Anti-Doping Promotion Officer. Given the government appointment was made within the Competitive Sports Division, one person holds dual roles and responsibilities in both elite sport success and drug free sport. JADA is overseen by the Competitive Sports Division of MEXT and as with any other national anti-doping organisation, it has become a centralised national anti-doping coordinating agency, responsible for ensuring compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code and achieving harmonisation across NFs and professional sport bodies in Japan. While independent in its operation, JADA is accountable to MEXT via the Competitive Sports Division by submitting an annual report which covers its expenditure, settlement of accounts and activities. Diagram 5.1 illustrates the domestic and international relationships as a complex web of accountability involving JADA and its affiliated national sport organisations (including the JOC, JASA, NFs, Japan Professional Sports Associations and other bodies), all of whom are obliged to comply with the Japan Anti-Doping Code (revised in July 2007). Due to its incorporated foundation status, JADA is not guaranteed a stable income from the Exchequer budget and is only funded through toto subsidies, the implication of which will be discussed in the next section. The areas of JADA’s responsibility and activity are six-fold: i) implementing anti-doping plans and programmes; ii) providing support and guidance to NFs about ICT and OCT; iii) training doping-control officers; iv) providing educational and promotional activities for anti-doping; v) collecting, managing and updating the information/database; and vi) conducting and promoting anti-doping research (JADA, 2008; 2007b). The Japan Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel and the Japan Sports Arbitration Agency are independent of JADA thereby ensuring a fair hearing and appeals process for athletes and support staff.

Quite importantly, the JADA Board members consist of multiple stakeholders from national sport bodies, such as NAASH, JOC, JISS, JASA, and the All Japan High School Athletic Federation (AJHAF), academics, ex-Olympians, and members of parliament (JADA, 2008). This can be highlighted as a characteristics of the Japanese anti-doping structure which, according to one JADA Board member, is a “reflection of individual enthusiasm”, since these individuals already had some kind of previous involvement on a volunteer-basis in anti-doping issues even before JADA was formed (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005). It is worth noting that there is a duality of representation by some Board members who also share their
role as senior members of national sport bodies (the JOC, JISS and NFs). This can suggest a blurred line of responsibility or the possibility of conflicts of interests between maximising high performance and ensuring drug-free sport, especially where some individuals are influential in the direction of both elite sport policy and anti-doping policy (see further discussion in 5.5).

Diagram 5.1: Japanese anti-doping: selected relationships and accountability

5.3.2 Anti-doping tests constrained by scarce resources

As just mentioned, JADA is not guaranteed a stable income and is therefore in a financially fragile position. A consequence of this situation is a limit to the number of doping tests. Three quarters of the total cost of any JADA project or programme can be supported by toto while requiring JADA to search for the remaining income on its own. The activities of JADA are also constrained by the requirement for government (Competitive Sports Division) approval for toto subsidies which can only be used to support the conduct of approved ‘projects’. JADA’s annual budget was about ¥125m, ¥70m of which was income from toto for doping
control (see Table 5.7). A severe decline in toto’s revenue, which until recently has been JADA’s single most substantial income, has constrained the capacity of JADA, the result of which can be highlighted in three ways. First, the human resources at JADA are restricted and thereby it must rely on volunteers or ‘enthusiasts’ to support anti-doping activities, as noted before. Second, in response to the decreased financial allocation from toto, the number of ICTs and OOCTs conducted by JADA was reduced accordingly and it is apparent that JADA relies on NFs to be proactive in the testing programme. Table 5.6 shows that JADA conducted only 60 OOCTs in 2004, while the JOC conducted 385 OOCTs on Japanese Olympic athletes prior to the Athens Games (1,926 in total). Nevertheless, as can be noted from Table 5.6, JADA’s limited financial resources are reflected in the absence of published data in the annual report of the total number of doping tests. The ‘data-vacuum’ is such that there might be a greater possibility of JADA losing further accountability to its stakeholders. A senior JADA official admitted that a lot of sporting bodies are aware of JADA’s limited capacity and that it is ironic that JADA has to rely on NFs to initiate doping tests and cannot demand or require NFs to conduct a minimum number of doping tests, although JADA is supposed to act as a supervisory body to NFs, ensuring the robustness of anti-doping programme as well as their compliance with the WAD Code (Interview J, 22 May 2006). A member of JADA Board who is also a director of the anti-doping programme in a national federation confirmed this point, saying that, because of JADA’s unavoidable dependence on NFs for conducting doping tests, there is a shared recognition among NFs of JADA’s inability to impose strict sanctions on NFs (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005). Another interviewee, who is responsible for anti-doping in one of biggest national governing bodies, further illustrated this point. He stated that, while JADA requires NFs to produce information on the whereabouts of all JOC World Class athletes every three months in order to allow JADA to conduct OOCT, the majority of NFs are dismissive of this obligation since they have recognised that JADA does not have sufficient (financial) means to conduct rigorous OOCT (Interviewee Q, 05 April 2005).

The limited capacity of the national coordinating agency can also be reflected in WADA’s accredited testing laboratory based at Mitsubishi Chemical Medscience Corporation in Tokyo. As a private company, this Tokyo Lab is entirely self-funded and it is only the anti-doping laboratory section that runs at a loss within this corporation. Against this background, the first Exchequer budgetary allocation in 2006 to the “Anti-Doping Support Programme” should be recognised as imperative, particularly because it had a specific objective to increase the total number of doping tests. The recovery of toto’s revenue for 2007 seems to

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31 The revenue for toto was exceeded for the first time in 2007 (¥22,498bn) with the introduction of various “toto games” (such as BIG, mini BIG, mini toto) (NAASH, News Release, 01 September 2007).
have also given some relief to JADA which expects to expand not only doping tests but also the educational and promotional activities which had been neglected due to the tight budget (Email Communication with Interviewee J, 18 October 2007). Lastly and quite controversially, in order to overcome the financial shortages and secure enough money to fund its anti-doping programme, JADA introduced a “JADA Official Sponsorship Programme”, which has become JADA’s biggest source of income. The sponsorship programme has two parts: one is that those who provide financial sponsorship to JADA are rewarded by being allowed to use JADA’s name and logo on their products (¥2m a year, 12 sponsors as of November 2007); and the other is to accredit ‘doping-free’ supplements and other products (such as energy drinks). In light of the Prohibited List issued annually by WADA, and allowing those products to achieve JADA ‘play true’ accreditation, one company pays ¥3m a year for its 20 products and additional ¥50,000 for another 10 products (11 companies with 231 products had agreed contracts as of November 2007). Not surprisingly, some anti-doping actors were alarmed at the generation of revenues from accrediting ‘safe’ supplements, which may unnecessarily encourage athletes to take supplements, rather than educating them to have a balanced nutritional diet (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005). The same interviewee quoted above was also concerned with the consequences of JADA’s sponsorship programme becoming known, especially by other NADOs, because it may alert them and WADA to a conflict of interests in, on one hand, imposing ‘strict liability’ on athletes and, on the other, approving supplement intake by athletes.

Table 5.6 A total number of testing programmes in Japan, 2001-2004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>JADA’s Affiliations and JADA</th>
<th>ICT</th>
<th>OOCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of affiliated bodies</td>
<td>Bodies conduct test</td>
<td>Bodies conducted ICT &amp; OOCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>***36</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JADA, 2002a, 2003a, 2004a, 2006a

Note: * The number of doping tests were reported in two different sources:
1) JADA Anti-Doping Guidebook, which is annually distributed to national athletes and coaches;
2) JADA’s Annual Report that officially reports its activities to the government.
Although there are slight differences between the number of ICT and OOCT reported, this table is drawn from the latter source.

**‘Average’ is total number of testing/JADA-affiliated bodies conducted doping tests.
***This number includes Japan Taekwondo Federation that was not affiliated body to JADA but conducted ICT.
5.4 Attitudes and Values of the Japanese Government in relation to Anti-Doping Policy

As described in 5.2.3, the government seems to have exhibited double standards in their domestic and international approach to the anti-doping issue. To examine the role of government in more depth, this section intends to describe the perceived government responsibility for anti-doping activities at domestic level. It will then be contrasted with government’s willingness to establish external relations through a rigorous contribution to the global anti-doping platform, which would reflect the broader concerns and interests of government. It is nonetheless possible to identify a steady and open criticism by national anti-doping actors of the government’s political stance on anti-doping activities.

5.4.1 Domestic rhetoric and ambivalence of government

It has been argued by one of the officials from the Competitive Sports Division that the creation of “specialist positions” for an Anti-Doping Specialist Officer appointed in 2001 and an Anti-Doping Promotion Officer in 2006 within the Division itself is “symbolic” to highlight the seriousness of government attitude towards domestic anti-doping policy (Personal communication with EE, 19 May 2005). The government’s position in relation to anti-doping policy was illustrated in the Basic Plan of 2000 and the revised Basic Plan published in 2006, in which the view of the use of drugs in sport is stated being “against the spirit of fair play”, “harmful to health” and “exacerbating juveniles’ drug abuse” (MEXT, 2000). The government’s ethical standpoint against the use of drugs in sport seems consistently based on the need to protect sportsmen and women and to uphold the fairness of sporting contests. An official of the Competitive Sport Division, who attended the 1st World Conference on Doping in Sport, stressed that:

The meaning of a doping-free world is to protect sport that gives dreams and hopes for children. Doping is against the principle of fair play and the health of athletes and it also brings harm to the society due to the addictive nature of drugs...Drugs devalue the meaning of sport, to which the government is strongly opposed believing that it should never happen.
Nevertheless, coinciding with the reform of public administrative structures implemented by Koizumi’s administration, which were based on his ‘neo-liberal’ beliefs and policies during the late 1990s and early 2000s, JADA was left outside the public mandate. It is emphasised by the government that the responsibility for doping tests, harmonisation with the WAD Code and anti-doping education programmes, should rest with JADA and sports bodies. Two senior officials from the Competitive Sports Division each dismissed a more proactive government involvement asserting that the arrangements with two designated officials and programmes currently in place were sufficient (Interviewee X, 18 August 2005; Interviewee AA, 18 August 2005). One of these officials, who was then overseeing the national anti-doping programme, further stressed that outlining the value of fair play in high school PE teacher’s guidebook for teaching (Theory for Physical Education) could act as an ample educational and promotion programme for drug-free sport and that toto subsidies allocated to producing and distributing 300,000 copies of the Athlete’s Handbook for Anti-Doping, developed by JASA, was more than enough (Interviewee AA, 18 August 2005).

However, the minimal involvement of government attracted a stream of criticism from national anti-doping non-governmental officials, which can be categorised in three ways that illustrate the values of central government, MEXT and the Competitive Sports Division in anti-doping activity. First, all interviewees from JASA, JADA, the JOC and several national federations agreed that the reluctance of government to provide more financial support is an indication of the government’s general attitude towards anti-doping policy. A JADA senior official, whose initial contribution to anti-doping policy in Japan started around the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, did not conceal his anger and was cynical about the government, stating as follows:

How many years have passed since 1964? How much has the government paid for WADA and how much have they paid JADA?...[We have] no financial support, just from the Sport Promotion Lottery (toto). With this level of financial contribution, no one could dare say that the government has recognised [anti-doping] as a national policy!

(original emphasis, Interviewee I, 23 March 2003)

Nevertheless, another JADA senior official critically stated that the reluctance of government to acknowledge anti-doping as an important area of policy is notable across sport policy in general, stating: “because it is seen that sport is considered as a matter for the private
sector...we are constantly pleading with the government for more active engagement in anti-doping issues" (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005). He went on to criticise the government’s willingness to pay for WADA “in the same way as ODA (Overseas Development Aid), throwing money about and supporting external policies, not providing domestic support at all, which is the typical way of ‘Japanese diplomacy’!

Criticism has become more acute from the key players in the anti-doping programme in addressing, as mentioned previously, a sharp decrease in available funding from toto for JADA’s anti-doping programme. It is worth emphasising the imbalance in government financial contributions to WADA and JADA, which is shown in Table 5.7. For instance, in 2003, the Japanese government contributed ¥183,342,000 ($1,502,800; 17.68% of WADA’s budgetary share) to WADA, maintaining the same level of contribution as in previous years, while the allocation to JADA via toto, the principal source of income, in the same year was only ¥18,764,000. Less than 5% of toto revenue became available to JADA, the consequence of which can be seen from the decline in the total number of doping tests conducted (see Table 5.6). It also restricted the JADA’s capacity to expand education and promotional programmes with the consequence that extremely little publicly accessible information and also no substantial educational materials or programmes can be found.

Table 5.7 Japanese Contribution to WADA and JADA budgets, 2002-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese contribution to WADA</th>
<th>Participating Asian countries</th>
<th>Total allocation to Asia</th>
<th>WADA’s allocation to public authorities</th>
<th>% of Japanese contribution to WADA</th>
<th>toto subsidies</th>
<th>JADA’s total annual budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,502,800</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,739,100</td>
<td>8,500,000</td>
<td>17.68%</td>
<td>6,881,000</td>
<td>112,397,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,502,800</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,070,037</td>
<td>10,117,500</td>
<td>14.85%</td>
<td>2,220,422</td>
<td>129,018,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,502,800</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,070,037</td>
<td>10,117,500</td>
<td>14.85%</td>
<td>2,220,422</td>
<td>120,966,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,502,800</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2,220,422</td>
<td>11,178,075</td>
<td>13.84%</td>
<td>2,220,422</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,502,800</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,287,034</td>
<td>11,178,075</td>
<td>13.44%</td>
<td>2,287,034</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,502,800</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,355,645</td>
<td>11,513,417</td>
<td>13.05%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: All are stated in US dollars and contribution to WADA ($1,502,800) in Yen is equal to ¥183,342,000. ‘toto subsidies’ and JADA budget are stated in Yen.
Percentage of Asian contribution to WADA is 20.46% of all public authorities contribution.
We cannot evaluate the relative decrease/increase if inflation was taken into consideration.
1 Initial distribution among Asian countries in 2002 were limited, only to China, S. Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia and Japan.
2 Singapore, Qatar and Iran joined in 2003 and 10 countries became the core contributors.
3 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen joined, each contributed the minimum $5,000 in 2004.
4 14 countries, plus those 8 countries contributed in 2004, were budgeted $5,000 in 2005 but 7 countries failed to pay.
5 Another 10 countries were budgeted $7,082 each but 18 countries failed to pay.
6 32 countries were budgeted $8,878 each but 19 countries failed to pay.
The second point, closely linked to the first point, is the inconsistent policy alignment between the close involvement of the Competitive Sports Division in elite athlete development and drug-free sport. The commitment of the government to anti-doping clearly remains secondary to international elite sporting success, the essential policy goal defined in the Basic Plan in 2000. This can be demonstrated from the substantial amount of investment in elite sport support infrastructure, the higher level of funding available for the development of elite athletes and the application of quantitative targets based on international sporting performances (see Chapter 7). There is a sense that anti-doping is a marginalised area of policy, which was well illustrated by a JADA official as follows:

Now we hear more of investment by the government for the creation of a National Training Center but we haven't heard if JADA would be supported to enable it to have more manpower or new schemes ... We have an extremely fragile structure in anti-doping. On the one hand, the government is investing more money into the development of athletes for obtaining more medals but, on the other hand, the number of doping tests is dropping.

(Interviewee J, 18 March 2005)

This official was fearful of being internationally accused, by the IOC and WADA in particular, for the significantly small and declining number of doping tests conducted in Japan, as opposed to the extending level of success produced by Japanese athletes. Thus, undoubtedly, the Exchequer budget (¥100m) allocated by the Competitive Sports Division in 2006 was welcomed with relief and a number of staff working for JADA was accordingly increased which allowed the expansion of the anti-doping programmes (Email Communication with Interviewee J, 18 October 2007). The last point of criticism should be seen as the resilience of MEXT against ministerial interests for agreeing national and international policy instruments. There are myriad political interests existing, for instance, in the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), which deals with the issue of drugs and health, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which represents all international negotiations and agreements at, for example, UNESCO. While MEXT is the committed ministry in charge of anti-doping, the struggles to maintain the political balance of power between different ministries in terms of the processes for implementing global agreements and standards of anti-doping were seen in MEXT's inability to reach a domestic consensus, the point of which will be discussed in more depth in the following section.
5.4.2 A ‘Janus-faced’ government at global coordination

As has been suggested, and as opposed to the degree of reluctance shown in domestic policy arrangements, the Japanese government has proactively responded to provide support for the global anti-doping movement with a high profile investment. It must be asked, however, whether the willingness of the government was a strategic, domestic decision or a result of the accumulation of problems and influences from outside of Japan. This section sets out to analyse the level of enthusiasm of the government for shaping the global anti-doping effort and the degree to which non-domestic policy actions have influenced the formulation of Japanese domestic anti-doping policy.

The Japanese government showed a quick response in supporting the establishment of WADA for the promotion and coordination of the global fight against doping in sport. As shown in Table 5.7, the government agreed to contribute 17.68% of WADA’s total budget, making it the second largest contributor (see Table 5.7), and subsequently, Japan became an Executive Committee Member of WADA’s Foundation Board in December 1999. The Japanese government also bid successfully for the WADA Asia/Oceania Regional Offices to be located in Tokyo. Upon its official inauguration in April 2004, WADA organised the 1st Asian Region Intergovernmental Meeting in the fight against doping chaired by the Japanese government and attended by representatives from 17 countries. They discussed the issue of each country’s share of WADA’s allocated financial burden (WADA, 2004b: 15), which was followed by meetings in Beijing (2005), Bangkok (2006) and Kuala Lumpur (2007).

In exploring the complex policy decision-making processes in the Japanese government, it is possible to argue that the government’s involvement in WADA was the outcome of the long-term efforts of major domestic anti-doping actors (see Section 5.2.3). The Japanese anti-doping actors, mainly medical sport doctors who worked for the JOC, JASA and/or NFs with a long history of being involved in international doping control, embraced the opportunity to react promptly to the renewed international efforts to tackle the problem of drug abuse around 1998 and 1999. Prior to the anti-doping incident at the 1998 Tour de France in July and August, the Japanese anti-doping actors had already organised a committee to publish a comprehensive and concrete proposal (Proposal for Anti-Doping Activities in Japan) in January 1998 which compared the international level of engagement with the national

competence on drug issues. The Tour de France incident and the scandal of the IOC’s selection of Salt Lake City for the Winter Olympic Games led the IOC to hold the anti-doping conference which agreed on the Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport in February 1999, and subsequently led the establishment of WADA in November 1999. There is no doubt that the development of WADA was the decisive moment for the Japanese government to take a much more constructive engagement in global anti-doping provision, while their sensitiveness towards international sporting politics was criticised by those anti-doping officials from the sporting circles. A further commitment to the then emerging global anti-doping structure was the bid for the Asia/Oceania Regional Office of WADA. The then Anti-Doping Support Specialist Officer at MEXT claimed that this had been for the following reasons:

The anti-doping activities in the Asian region are way behind the Europeans’ stronger engagement and we wanted to disseminate information from Japan to Asia...(and) we concluded that sending officials to IFs and having a permanent international office were very important.

(original emphasis, Interviewee C, 18 March 2005)

Although the process for selecting the location of the WADA Asia/Oceania Regional Office was uncertain, gaining a presence in WADA and taking a leadership position in Asia was highly valued by the Japanese government officials due to the acknowledgement that Asia is “one of the largest and most culturally diverse areas of the world...[which] presents unique challenges”.

However, the process of concluding the UNESCO Convention underlined not only the constrained and conflicting attitudes of the government towards WADA and UNESCO but also a mixture of inter-ministerial interests and the nature of international negotiations. A senior JADA Board member who attended the initial World Conference on Doping in Sport revealed his frustration with the ambiguous attitude of Japan in dealing with WADA and UNESCO:

On the one hand, people from WADA praised our effort, and on the other, when the same government officials went to UNESCO, he was constrained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the Ministry of Justice and had to make an effort to undermine the UNESCO Convention...against his will!

Various political interests within government ministries can help to account for the inconsistent attitude of government towards WADA and UNESCO. According to government protocol, it is only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) which can make the final decision on any external/international statements whilst the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) makes decisions on the judicial arrangements and negotiations. It was claimed by the same interviewee quoted above that although it was effectively the first time any MEXT 'official' had appeared at the international stages of intensive negotiations involving in bargaining process and the strong influence of MOFA prevented any dialogue regarding a strong international cooperation with UNESCO (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005). It is imperative to note that the acceptance and implementation of the UNESCO Convention, which would override national legislation underlying different ministerial protocols at the domestic level, is not a matter for MEXT but is dealt with by several ministries such as MOFA, MoJ and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), all of whom were influential in deciding whether the UNESCO Convention should be accepted. Another national anti-doping actor addressed his anger and disappointment towards the attitude of the Japanese government by referring to his observation at the UNESCO Conference, and critically noted "how actively the government officials were intending to undermine the Convention" negating a strong commitment towards the changing of some domestic legislation and regulations (original emphasis, Interviewee P, 04 April 2005).

Nonetheless, two senior officials from the Competitive Sports Division acknowledged that the adoption of the UNESCO Convention did influence its decision on the allocation of part of its 2006 annual budget (¥100m) to JADA (its total budget in 2006/7 was ¥17,154 billion). It was described that the intention of these officials was to explore the possibility of reaching a domestic consensus and the synthesis of anti-doping opinions at national level through the increase in the total number of doping tests (Interviewees W & X, 18 August 2005). While the attitude of the government department responsible for the eradication of doping in sport (Competitive Sports Division) has clearly become more committed than before, the inter-ministerial conflicts and political interests seem to act as the barrier to arriving at a national consensus, which may undermine the global effort. A senior JADA officer showed his concern about the difficulties in bargaining with certain ministries (especially MOFA, MHLW and MoJ) fearing this that may result in re-interpretations of existing domestic legislation, with the consequence that they are applied at a superficial level rather than in the manner in which originally intended, i.e. to ensure harmonised, coordinated and effective-anti-doping programme for the elimination of doping from sport (Interviewee R, 26 August 2005).
In summary, there was a conscious decision made by the Japanese government to pursue international recognition and provide significant financial contributions to WADA while avoiding or minimising national anti-doping obligations in relation to the UNESCO Convention. Despite this, there was so far a minimum commitment by the government to carrying out a small number of doping tests domestically to assist in ensuring the integrity of national athletes and the international reputation of Japan. The ambivalent attitude of the state towards domestic anti-doping initiatives is therefore contrasted with the determination of government to be proactive in WADA and the Asia/Oceania region.

5.5 Accepting a ‘Global Value’ for Anti-Doping Policy

Established as one of the earliest NADOs in the Asian region, JADA implemented the Japan Anti-Doping Code, which was closely modelled on the WAD Code, adhering to the WAD Code and WADA’s *International Standards* (WADA, 2003). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that there is a strong belief among national anti-doping actors that the global campaign for the elimination of drug abuse in sport was a European-led initiative, reflecting different levels of understanding, consensus and confidence in the international anti-doping regime as a common global issue. The rather lengthy quote that follows is indicative of the different primary concerns and motivations for participating in anti-doping activities between Japan and Europe/America:

...there are a myriad of understandings in terms of the doping crisis in the world, especially in Europe and America. There are two dimensions with regard to the anti-doping activity: [that is] for the benefit of prevention of the prevalence of drug abuse in society, particularly among young people, and the sound and ethical development of sport. In Japan, it is recognised that the excessive use of drugs as a whole is not as extensive social problem [as in Europe and America]. Thus, the Japanese international participation and contribution to anti-doping activities is derived from its perceived obligation to achieve international cooperation and to promote the Olympic Movement.

(Interviewee B, 17 March 2005)

As shown elsewhere (for example, Houlihan, 2002a; Waddington, 2000), there is an urgent necessity to deal with the prevalence of drugs in society and the fight against doping in sport
can be seen as one of the social policies in some countries in Europe and North America. However, the above observation identified the drug problem in Japan as a relatively less serious social issue. It is thus interesting to consider the current high profile involvement of Japan in global anti-doping policy in order to highlight that the motivations for this involvement are largely derived from a sense of international obligation to participate in the global policy platform. Nevertheless, a JADA senior official suggested the difficulties in reaching a deeper understanding of the meaning of "what is intrinsically valuable about sport", which is defined in WAD Code as the fundamental rationale to achieve universal harmonisation in anti-doping policies (WADA, 2003: 3), because the rationale was primarily articulated by the European and North American anti-doping community (Interviewee J, 23 March 2005). This official continued to argue that the traditional values in sport largely shared in Europe and North America were reflected on the principle of WAD Code, which is far from easy for the Japanese to share the feeling of disapproval of doping and commitment to an anti-doping policy. On this point, we can reasonably suggest that the domestic principle for anti-doping policy is being externally framed while the fundamental value of the 'spirit of sport' is domestically endorsed. The same JADA official goes on to argue that this incomprehension can only be overcome and negotiated by taking a much stronger instrumental role in promoting 'the idea of universal property for the global anti-doping movement' across Japan and the Asian region.

Given the noted lack of understanding of the full implications of the fundamental anti-doping rationale, it is evident that JADA intended to initiate the domestic policy goal through close collaboration with WADA's Asia/Oceania Regional Office, which covers the largest geographical area, ranging from the Middle East to a number of Oceania islands. One example of this can be identified from the WADA Symposium for Asian NADOs, co-hosted by JADA and the Asia/Oceania Regional Office in March 2005, which was attended by 17 Asia/Oceania representatives, including Anne Gripper, the then General Manager for Operations of the Australian Sports Drug Agency (ASDA), who was presented as the expert on the international standard testing (c.f. ASDA, 2005; ANADO News Letter, September 2006). The objective of this first international forum was explained by the JADA official quoted above. He claimed that in light of the "low level of understanding" of anti-doping issue across Japan, there was "a necessity to fulfil our responsibility" as the regional representative and promote strategic and technical issues across Asia and Oceania. It was stressed that:

... the problem exists more so in [countries like] South East Asia, West Asia and Middle Asia because they don't even coordinate any anti-doping activities. Mr. Hayashi (the Director of the Asia/Oceania Office) told me that he
had been trying to persuade and encourage the anti-doping officials in Asia to sign the Copenhagen Declaration, but their reactions had been very slow. Mr. Hayashi and I felt that those countries don't even know about [the meaning of anti-doping]...and thought we had to do something about it.

(Interviewee J, 23 March 2005)

The JADA/WADA joint-forum was welcomed by WADA as "the initiative to construct a community" in the Asian region for the eradication of doping in sport (cf. WADA, 2004a). While it is difficult to identify any direct evidence influencing the behaviour in Asia, the forum should be seen as significant in the sense that it could demonstrate the Japanese proactive effort for mediating Asian countries as well as implementing the expanded reach of domestic policy goals. Despite the continuous struggles to comprehend the global principles for anti-doping stated in the World Anti-Doping Code, it seems to be the case that the Japanese involvement in the global anti-doping system is due only to its interest in maintaining the regional influence and taking greater role in Asia/Oceania region but also to the positive acceptance of external pressures in order to advance the national anti-doping policy, particularly to influence the reluctant ministries. As such, we can highlight that, in some sense, the global pressure is embraced as the 'opportunity', rather than threat, especially for JADA, for achieving the domestic policy objectives and for steering the government protocol.

5.6 The Incorporation of the Global Anti-Doping Framework within Domestic Anti-doping Programmes

This section is centered around the examination of policy-decisions that illustrate external influences that resulted in the implementation of OOCT and other education and promotional programmes through three domestic cases, namely: i) the Japan Sport Association (JASA) at Kokutai; ii) the Japan Association of Athletics Federation (JAAF); and iii) the Japan Swimming Federation (JSF).

5.6.1 The introduction of anti-doping tests in Kokutai by JASA
It is possible to argue that through evidence accumulated and examined with JASA the progress in domestic and global anti-doping policy influenced JASA’s decision to introduce both In-Competition Testing (in 2003) and unannounced random Out-of-Competition Testing (in 2006) into Kokutai. This can be seen as highly symbolic as it represents the further incorporation of the policies of the global anti-doping movement. The following eight reasons were considered instrumental for the introduction of doping control at Kokutai: i) it is the biggest national multi-sport competition; ii) it should be seen to be meeting international standards; iii) education programmes on anti-doping are more effective for younger athletes; vi) providing support to NFs for doping control can be extended; v) more robust anti-doping activities at regional PE/Sport Association level can be sought; vi) sport doctors should be trained; vii) drug abuse by citizens can be prevented; and viii) the mission of being an Executive Member of WADA can be achieved (JASA: 2003b). In this regard, the JASA’s introduction of doping control tests needs to be understood in relation to two particular decision-making processes that occurred within JASA. First, as with the proposal presented by the Consultation Committee on Anti-Doping Activities in 1998, while there was a strong demand among national sport officials to introduce doping tests at Kokutai, the implementation of this proposal was delayed due to a lack of resources. Second, the establishment of WADA became catalyst for the introduction of doping tests in Kokutai following the expected financial support via toto. There has been a lengthy involvement by JASA in anti-doping-related projects, such as the three-year project on the protection of health of Kokutai athletes, which started in 1990, followed by the nine-year project from 1995 on the science/medical support of Kokutai athletes. When it was completed, a new project on “Anti-Doping Education and Promotion Project, mainly for Kokutai Athletes” started in 2004 indicating JASA’s interest in taking a proactive role in anti-doping mainly in consideration to Kokutai athletes’ health, although the financial availability prevented from introducing doping tests (JASA, 2003b). However, the global organisational entity and principles became the final push to form an Anti-Doping Section within the Sport Medicine and Science Commission of JASA (Nakajima, 2003: 850), the time of which was accorded with the internal necessity to reform the competition structure of Kokutai.

The Kokutai Doping Control Code was introduced in June 2003, which complied with the WAD Code, WADA’s International Standards and the Japan Anti-Doping Code (Kokutai Code, II.7; JASA, 2003b: 4). It is possible to argue that with a large number of prefectural athletes participating in 37 summer/autumn and 3 winter Kokutai events (plus one demonstration event), the multiple interests from prefectural and regional organisations as well as ‘sports doctors’ who are certified by JASA were reflected in the complexity of the
arrangements for *Kokutai* doping tests (see Diagram 7.1). In accordance with Article 5 of the World Anti-Doping Code, "Test and Test Distribution Planning" (WADC, 5.1), it was intended to achieve a "gradual increase in doping tests" and planned for 50 tests to be conducted in 2003, 100 in 2004, 200 in 2005 and 300 in 2006, where the proportion for testing was split into 20% for the Summer *Kokutai* event, Autumn (40%) and Winter (10%) (sic, Fukubayashi, 2003: 846). All *Kokutai* athletes, including high school and junior high school athletes, are subject to both ICT and OOCT, where the proportion was set as 3:2 (JASA: 2003b). Although this complied with international standards, the modified 'Kokutai-method' was adopted, where ICT was defined as being conducted "eight hours prior to- and post-competitions" and the OOCT was interpreted as either a day before or during *Kokutai*, depending on the discipline or event (JASA, 2003b). It should be highlighted that *Kokutai* testing was modified in consideration of 'equality' among sport events and the interests of all 47 different prefectures, in which Prefectural Performance Directors would be informed 48 hours prior to testing. In respect of the 'international standard', JASA amended the guideline for *Kokutai* OOCT in 2006 that specified that no-notice OOCT requiring *Kokutai* athletes to submit Whereabouts Information to JADA (Clauses 8 and 10; JASA, 2006). It was nonetheless a 'Kokutai-method' OOCT that was not fully compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code, for instance, its Article 5.1.2 definining "Make No Advance Notice Testing as a priority" (WADA, 2003). Although the revised guideline was implemented, it was far from a robust OOCT since, although in a strict sense it established the possibility of random testing, only a selected and limited number of athletes were subject to testing. The criteria for these tests were based on, first, those athletes who compete internationally and who are expected to be at senior international level and, second, a maximum of five athletes from each prefecture participating in *Kokutai* (Close IV-(4)-2; JASA, 2003b: 8).

Nevertheless, it is notable from Table 5.8 that the total samples collected in the 2006 *Kokutai* was doubled and it is reasonable to assume a further increase in doping controls in forthcoming *Kokutai*. However, in light of the overall athlete participation in *Kokutai*, as the total number of doping tests conducted is minimal, only about 0.005% of athletes would have the possibility to be tested. What could be seen as outstanding is that the implementation of drug control tests in *Kokutai* itself was a landmark for JASA, despite the process of agreeing the *Kokutai*-method and the actual number of drug tests. More specifically, the willingness of JASA to introduce doping tests modelled on international standards took place at the same time as the debate on the restructuring of *Kokutai*, which was the most significant item on the agenda within JASA (JASA, 2003a). The reform of *Kokutai* was principally to raise its once-
enjoyed popularity and high profile, as well as the level of performance, up to international standards (JASA, 2003a; JASA, 2007; see Chapter 7). It was suggested that conducting doping tests was perceived to be an 'international standard' for such an "elite multi-sport competition" as Kokutai where it is necessary to ensure "fair and equal competition" (Fukubayashi, 2003: 845). Nevertheless, while it would not be too wise to ignore an institutional strategy to redevelop Kokutai for understanding the policy process, it is equally important to note that an internal political "top-down decision", in which JASA's Director for Kokutai ordered the implementation of doping tests in Kokutai, was an overwhelmingly important influence (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005).

Table 5.8: Doping Control under "Kokutai-method" (from the 58th Summer/Autumn Kokutai to the 63rd Summer Games)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kokutai</th>
<th>&quot;Host&quot; prefecture</th>
<th>Total number of Kokutai participants***</th>
<th>ICT</th>
<th>Doping Tests</th>
<th>Total no. of samples</th>
<th>Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Autumn</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Summer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>58th</td>
<td>Shizuoka</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>6,867</td>
<td>19,991</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>59th</td>
<td>Aomori/Satama</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>6,014</td>
<td>20,010</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>60th</td>
<td>Yamanashi, Tokyo,</td>
<td>4,198</td>
<td>7,718</td>
<td>19,016</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Niigata, Osaka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
<td>61st</td>
<td>Hokkaido, Gunma,</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>25,884</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aomori, Aomori,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hokkaido, Tochigi,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gunma, Gunma, Hyogo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>62nd</td>
<td>Gunma, Gunma, Oita</td>
<td>4,026</td>
<td>25,711</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gunma, Gunma, Oita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>63rd</td>
<td>Nagano, Oita</td>
<td>3,589</td>
<td>22,275</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The first host prefectures named are the Winter event host. Mostly, more than one prefectures co-host the Winter event.
*The latter prefectural name is both Summer and Autumn events' host.
**Since 2006, Summer and Autumn Kokutai events are merged as part of Kokutai reformations leaving winter game separate.
***Athletes participated in "Demonstration Events" are excluded from the total number of participants.

Even though the total number of doping tests in Kokutai is extremely small and it is too early to draw a conclusion regarding their influence on the reform of Kokutai, it is worth emphasising at this stage their significance at domestic level, which can be highlighted in two ways. Firstly, the doping control in Kokutai coordinated by JASA directly influenced the prefectural and regional levels. More specifically, all of the 47 Kokutai-participating Prefectural Sport/PE Associations and prefectural boards of education or sport/PE, which oversee prefectural performances, now have to deal with the anti-doping issue if they wish to send their prefecturally selected-athletes to Kokutai. It should be pointed out that a series of implementation processes for anti-doping policy in Kokutai highlighted the residual responsibility of JASA for the prefectural level, where it organises lectures and holds seminars on the general doping issue in sport, banned substances, supplements and Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) and annually distributes the updated Athlete's Handbook.
for Doping Control Test in Kokutai (see JASA HP34). In a much more positive sense, it was acknowledged by a senior member of JASA that the anti-doping issue started being shared across prefectural athletes and coaches and, significantly, the line of communication between JASA and prefectural bodies was strengthened, which makes dissemination of information and understanding of anti-doping activity and the procedure for doping tests easier (Interviewee B, 17 March 2005). However, the same official noted that the attitudes of prefectural officials and athletes still remain reactive rather than proactive, since their primary concern is to avoid providing the very first positive case and bringing 'prefectural disgrace', rather than taking the initiative at the prefectural level. The domestic struggle to comply with the international standards and regulations is an interesting one. Although it was decided that JADA should assume the responsibility for Kokutai doping tests in 2007, the relationship between JADA and JASA seems conflicting over exercising influence at prefectural and regional level and there may be persistent duplication of effort surrounding doping tests and promotional programmes.

5.6.2 The Japan Association of Athletics Federations as the biggest advocate for anti-doping

The Japan Association of Athletics Federations (JAAF) has been the most proactive anti-doping national federation for sport in Japan with, overseen by its Medical Commission, one of the longest histories of doping tests. It can be however argued that JAAF's anti-doping activities are influenced by the positive and strict involvement of, and pressure from, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), which implemented ICT in 1968, the year in which the first ICT was conducted at the Grenoble Winter Olympic Games and the Mexico Summer Olympic Games. Reacting to the introduction of OOCT in 1989 by IAAF, the Japanese officials eventually decided to introduce ICT at the Japanese National Championships in 1990 (see Table 5.2). Since then, there has been a gradual increase in tests and currently around 300 ICT and OOCT35 are conducted at a number of domestic competitions, which include the Japan's National Championships in Athletics, six JAAF sponsored marathon events, and track and field inter-collegiate and inter-high school competitions. It became quickly clear that Japanese athletes would not be exempted from being subject to IAAF's out-of-competition testing, the first case of which came in 1993 when two international-level Japanese athletes were out-of-competition tested. The significant

34 For JASA's Kokutai information, see http://www.japan-sports.or.jp/doping/index.html (last accessed 29 March 2008).
35 JAAF conducted, in 2002, the total of 347 tests (177 ICTs; 170 OOCTs); 323 in total in 2003 (180 ICTs; 143 OOCTs); and 316 in total in 2004 (197 ICTs; 119 OOCTs). See JADA 2004a, 2005a, 2006a.
policy change was in 1997 when all athletic disciplines (track & field, marathon, road racing, relay and speed-walking) became subject to ICT, including at the Japan Junior Championships, at which OOCT was implemented in 1997 (Yamasawa, 2003: 151, 153). Testing junior athletes, in collaboration with JASA particularly for Kokutai testing (Sasaki, 2003: 887), is seen as significant for raising awareness among the teenage athletes in collaborating with JASA while JAAF intends to disseminate information as widely as possible through the annual publication of its guidebook, Aspiring to be Clean Athletes, which includes the list of ‘safe supplements’, describing what athletes can take, rather than not to. Despite having ten regional offices across Japan and an established network with JAAF in order to exchange information and personnel with the medical doctors from the national body which, along with anecdotal evidence, suggests that JAAF is the most proactive NF in Japan in terms of number of doping control, the availability of information remains limited, which also makes it difficult to determine its view on ICT and OOCT.

Nevertheless, the processes by which JAAF adopted the comprehensive anti-doping activities should be understood in the context of its ‘risk management’. As seen previously in Section 5.2, it was an international track and field elite Japanese athlete who was first tested positive from OOCT conducted by IAAF before the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. This was reported so sensationaly that not only did it appear on the front page of domestic newspapers but also raised questions in the Education, Science and Culture Committee of the House of Councillors for Japanese “ignorance” of doping tests (e.g. The Education, Science and Culture Committee of House of Councillors Minute, 20 February 1997). This incident was described by one of the Medical Committee members of JAAF as “out of blue”, indicating that it served as “wakeup call” for the majority of athletes and officials because, until then, “the drug issue in sport had been seen as the fire on the other side of the river” (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005). He continued by explaining how the 1996 event should be seen as catalytic, which was perceived as a national embarrassment and humiliation but eventually transformed the attitudes of both JAAF officials and domestic sport actors. It was illustrated as follows:

With their narrow mind, most of the JAAF officials were eager to hide this problem [that a Japanese athlete was tested positive] particularly from the media. However, Dr. Asano (then JAAF anti-doping officer in charge) insisted on complying with the international rules. It was the very first time that a Japanese athlete came to be in the international spotlight as a positive case. Before then, it was only a domestic matter and we could have manipulated a report to the IAAF. This 1996 incident was literally a ‘Kurofune’, that nobody
would have ever imagined happening...but it was actually burning at our back! There was no risk-management or whatsoever in JAAF at that time. Since then, understanding of anti-doping among the elite athletes became completely changed....and [JAAF is] currently a leading federation in Japan in terms of anti-doping.

(original emphasis, Interviewee P, 04 April 2005)

As the above quote indicates, in respect of policy development, it can be identified how international pressure led to the anti-doping issue receiving a higher policy priority within JAAF and changed the attitudes of both JAAF officials and athletes. Following the 1996 incident, this increased attention towards anti-doping policy was demonstrated when the JAAF Board agreed to allocate ¥15m to educational and promotional activities and the JAAF Medical Committee produced the doping handbook and web information page. Nonetheless, the above interviewee, who is currently at the centre of anti-doping activities in JAAF, stressed that "the most advanced form of education and promotion activities is to conduct doping tests", which serves as "a fundamental deterrence" leading to change in the attitudes and awareness of athletes, coaches and all support staff (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005).

In contrast, as also discussed in 5.2, the media represented the 'clean' image and 'sporting' figure of the Japanese hammer thrower who was awarded a gold medal (Murofushi Koji) during the 2004 Athens Games after a Hungarian hammer thrower tested positive in an ICT. Kenji Ogiwara, a member of House of Councillors and also a gold medallist in Nordic Skiing himself, claimed that this first 'positive' case of an upgraded gold medal had revealed that the "spirit of Olympism" prevailed in Japan, which "reflects the national interest" in a positive way (The Education, Science and Culture Committee of House of Councillors Minute, 28 July 2005). Achieving this gold medal was also labelled as a "successful" example of information gathering and intelligence activities led by JISS, the JOC and JAAF and their pressure and appeal to the IOC during the Athens Olympic Games (JISS, 2005a: 73). Nonetheless, while the number of doping tests conducted by JAAF is the largest and the most intensive among national sporting federations, it is worth emphasising that JAAF's activity is always negotiated and re-negotiated through its relationship with its superior international organisation (IAAF), which imposes much stricter international rules and sanctions and also exercises pressure on national bodies. Thus, accessing and obtaining insider knowledge of IAAF, as well as having represented at the Asian Athletic Federation (AAA), was highlighted as being the highest priority by a senior JAAF official, since it enabled the design of the national anti-doping provision and enhanced the Japanese presence in international
negotiations and consultations for agreeing international policy standards set by the IAAF (Interviewee P, 04 April 2005).

5.6.3 The Japan Swimming Federation, being showed the path for a rigorous anti-doping programme by a parental body

It should be reiterated that the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games where 7 swimmers, including a world record holder, tested positive prior to the Games, alarmed officials of the Japan Swimming Federation (JSF). The first international doping tests were conducted for Japanese swimming at the 3rd Pan-Pacific Swimming Championships, a biennial, four-country competition for Canada, Australia, the United States and Japan, held in Tokyo in 1989. It was just before the 1994 Pan-Pacific Championships in Kobe when the nationally coordinated ICT was introduced to the 1993 Japan Championships, which was later expanded to the levels of Inter-Collegiate Competition and the Inter-High School Competition in 1996. The JSF currently conducts ICT in all JSF recognised events, including the masters, youth and junior levels. Hosting the 9th FINA World Swimming Championships held in Fukuoka, in the north of Japan, in 2001 pushed the anti-doping issue up the agenda within JSF because of FINA’s request to implementing rigorous anti-doping activities (Suzuki, 2003). In response to FINA’s further request, JSF implemented its Anti-Doping Rules in 2005, which complied with the WAD Code, the Japan Anti-Doping Code as well as the FINA Rules.

The attitude of the Japanese in the early period of world swimming in the mid-1990s can be seen as being in the middle of sporting power conflict between the perceived leading swimming and anti-doping countries (Canada, Australia and United States in particular) and an emerging swimming nation (China). As noted earlier, the 1994 Hiroshima Asian Games, where eleven Chinese athletes, seven of them swimmers, tested positive for DHT, was seen as a shock in Japan. Nevertheless, what should be emphasised is the rigorous engagement of the Japanese medical doctor, Dr. Kuroda, in the whole process of conducting ICT during the 1994 Asian Games, including the report of the final disciplinary decision on those Chinese athletes to the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) (Yomiuri News Paper, 06 December 1994; 09 December 1994). There were severe criticisms issued by 18 Western swimming federations which, on the last day of the 1994 World Championships in Rome, had submitted a unified statement to FINA requesting an investigation of the Chinese swimmers. However, the Japanese kept quiet and preferred remaining 'neutral'. In the post-Hiroshima Games period, Canada and Australia, two of whom were participants in the Pan-Pacific
Championships, followed the USA's initial proposal to exclude all Chinese swimmers from the 1995 Pan-Pacific event in Atlanta in order to preserve 'fairness' in sport. However, again, the Japanese objected to this isolation plan for it would "not be fair to apply the same strict sanction to all Chinese swimmers" (Mainichi News Paper, 14 March 1995). What should be seen as controversial, in contrast to the orchestrated international criticism particularly from Australian and American national federations, was their incoherent approach when their respective national swimmers were tested positive for doping and these two federations toned down their request for the "most strict measures" demanded in the Chinese case to FINA and instead reduced the period of sanctions imposed on those swimmers (Yomiuri News Paper, 03 April 1996). Observing these historic developments and the influences exercised by the Pan-Pacific countries in FINA's anti-doping provision during "this unstable period", it was stressed by a senior JSF official that having a Japanese member in the FINA Medical Commission (Dr. Mutou) was so crucial not only in reflecting Japan's opinion in FINA and against those leading swimming national federations like Australia but also in providing an international perspective to remain "neutral", which enabled to "maintain international status" of Japanese and retain regional influence in Asia (Interviewee Q, 05 April 2005).

With regard to the depth and intensity of the national anti-doping policy, it is possible to observe two ways in which the JSF Medical Committee steers (or is being steered) and influences domestic and international policy. Firstly, there is a separation of responsibilities between FINA and its national federations, while JSF hugely relies on the activities of FINA. The total number of tests conducted by JSF is relatively low over the years (total of 146 tests in 2002; 49 tests in 2003; and 55 tests in 2004), while OOCT coordinated by JSF is almost none (only one OOCT conducted in 2004). A chief anti-doping officer at JSF acknowledged in an interview that, on the one hand, conducting ICT in all events organised by JSF is a fundamentally "instrumental reason" in order to prove that national championships are of "international standard" by having doping controls, and on the other, that conducting OOCT is largely left to FINA, which is so intensive and extensive that there is a general belief among JSF anti-doping officials that any "dopers would have no chance competing internationally" (Interviewee Q, 05 April 2005). Nevertheless, it is noted by one official that given that FINA demands each national body to produce its own domestic rules, such a requirement is a "complete waste of time and effort" because FINA Rules determines national arrangements, although FINA's "business-like" approach was not favoured because it contracts-out to the Swedish International Doping Tests & Management (IDTM) for conducting an extensive number of OOCTs on national swimmers who seem to be treated like "commodity" to provide sample. Secondly, it should be highlighted that there is a tentative attitude and lack of consensus regarding anti-doping policy between anti-doping
officials, the high performance team and the members of the Board within JSF, largely because there have been no case reported that Japanese swimmers tested positive so far. While JSF was the fourth Japanese national body to introduce doping tests (in 1993) and, since then, has maintained a high level of involvement in anti-doping activities relative to other national sporting federations, the organisational priority, especially at the Board level, has been undoubtedly the maximisation of the performance of Japanese swimmers and the number of medals, the consequence of which has raised tensions between the high-performance team, plus the Board members, and the Medical Committee of JSF. This medical team is composed mostly of medical doctors, like the above-quoted JSF senior anti-doping official himself, but they are perceived to be "no more than a tool" for conducting and reporting doping tests and "troublesome", being not appreciated by the Board members who assume that Japanese swimmers are 'drug free' because positive tests had never been reported, which, as a result, have made it difficult to request a larger budget to the Board which consequently increased tensions between the decision-makers and medical doctors (Interviewee Q, 05 April 2005). In this regard, the global progress in anti-doping policy was welcomed by member of the Medical Committee who saw it as an opportunity to follow the FINA's rigorous rule and to persuade the reluctant Board members to accept the global norms and values.

5.7 Conclusion

5.7.1 Conclusion for the development of anti-doping policy in Japan

The global institutional arrangement (WADA and the Code) that emerged has clearly had a huge impact on the Japanese sports administrators' and politicians' attitudes towards the effort to combat doping in sport. Since the establishment of WADA, Japan intends to be involved as much as possible in shaping the direction of anti-doping policy by maintaining a global and regional presence and continuing to comply with anti-doping policy. For example, the Japanese government is willing to continue to contributing to WADA and to securing its position at the WADA's Foundation Board and Executive Committee on the representative of Asia. While the Japanese government adopted the UNESCO Convention in late 2006, it is much more likely that the disparity in attitudes among the domestic policy makers would prevent the establishment of a robust national infrastructure and funding provision for anti-doping. However, it is crucial to note that domestic debate on anti-doping and state strategies has reacted to, will become more sensitive to, and be designed to respond to, the
development of global anti-doping policy debates and issues. With this point in mind, there are four themes highlighted in relation to the historical development and changing political importance of anti-doping policy in Japan.

First, although there has been a lengthy involvement in anti-doping activity in Japan, it was certainly the formation of WADA, the International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sport, and the accumulation of pressure from international sporting federations that eventually led to the formation of a domestic coordinating agency in Japan. Despite the efforts of JADA to facilitate the implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code, the depth and extent of its activity and effectiveness are limited. A JADA senior official stressed that JADA has established a strong and equal relationship with WADA which encourages all stakeholders by stating 'it’s your task' to eliminate doping from sport, hence the Code compliance, and that the national anti-doping programme has been shaped by the requirement of global anti-doping policy framework (Interviewee J, 22 May 2006). However, we have observed the persistent domestic problems regarding the structural arrangements for anti-doping policy which in Japan remain fragmented and far from cohesive insofar as there is a lack of an integrated and common voice for rigorous anti-doping policy, largely because of insufficient financial support and the weak of legislative status of JADA. Second, different levels of global and national commitment among government officials and ministries can be characterised as a ‘Janus-faced’ diplomacy. One of the paradoxes that can be identified is that while the government has demonstrated a passionate compliance with, and rigorous commitment to, the Code, they have proved to be much more reluctant to ratify the UNESCO Convention which would impose legally binding obligation on the government. The avoidance of statutory requirements and the fragility of the funding mechanisms for domestic anti-doping activities also demonstrate unwillingness by certain ministries to provide a lead on national anti-doping provision, thus questioning their commitment to the global agreement.

Given a certain degree of reluctance regarding domestic anti-doping policy implementation, Japan’s adoption of a leading position in the global fight against doping in sport, especially in the Asian region, can be explained by political motives. This third point is reflected in the positive attitude of the government towards agreeing to host the WADA Asia/Oceania Regional Office. What should be seen as significant is exercising regional influence through inter-governmental and inter-organisational negotiations and bargaining and exchanging information and knowledge, which was understood to be the opportunity for building relationships and networks with the leading anti-doping agencies and governmental bodies. At the same time, in this situation, it can be argued that the governmental and non-
governmental anti-doping policy actors in Japan are exposed to the pressure exerted from WADA of meeting the perceived expectations and requirement for hosting the WADA's Regional Office in Tokyo, which led to hold the regional seminar which was concerned to set standards in the Asia/Oceania region. Despite the Japanese calculations of gaining regional leadership and presence and global interests, there is a perceptible acceptance of global pressure in order to achieve these domestic objectives. Lastly, one can argue that the Japanese commitment to the anti-doping policy is strongly mediated by the perceived national interest in elite sport success. To be more specific, the implementation of anti-doping policy is linked to international medal success in an 'ethically clean' way. In contrast to the generally agreed rationale for the proactive engagement in anti-doping found in Europe and North America, where the anti-doping issue is strongly linked to the health campaigns and drug abuse prevalent in society, the underlying principle or motive in Japan for complying with the global anti-doping movement among the national anti-doping actors and agencies, including national coaches and athletes, is predominantly linked to the ethical context of sport ensuring the 'clean' image of Japanese athletes and protecting 'Japanese face' externally. The avoidance of national humiliation was reflected in the over-reaction of national sport actors, as well as national newspaper, to the 'scandals' of a Japanese athlete and international criticism. In this regard, the 'fear' expressed by a senior JADA official regarding potential international criticism of the in relatively small number of doping tests conducted in Japan would be understandable when contrasted with the growing investment in elite athletes as discussed in Chapter 7. It is clear that we cannot consider a more robust commitment to anti-doping policy in Japan without bearing in mind the greater significance of elite success.

Based on the shared values and interests that are defined as "to prove what is intrinsically valuable in sport" or "the spirit of sport" (WADA, 2009: 6), the internal lobbying groups for anti-doping, who have shaped, to some degree, the direction of domestic policy and might pressurise the government more strongly for greater and for more enthusiastic compliance, have been gradually growing in influence. This will be advanced when the national anti-doping policy community forms more robust relations and coalitions with the global policy community and agencies, including WADA, in order to exert pressure and lobby the ministries and ministerial governmental division in charge, with the aim of implementing national legislative regulations to control doping in sport. Nevertheless, the key issue for the advancement of national anti-doping policy may remain the way in which the government is steered by the internal lobbying groups and global pressure out of its calculation of national interests.
5.7.2 Preliminary conclusion regarding the development of anti-doping policy in Japan and the UK/England

At the end of the empirical case on the development of anti-doping policy in Japan and the UK/England, a brief preliminary conclusion is provided. It can be demonstrated that there is an emergence of international policy regime in anti-doping policy. There was an evidence that showed that a policy regime had facilitated the awareness of government and national sport actors of the issues related to anti-doping, (re-)shaped domestic policy and structure, initiated policy change, and influenced the domestic actors to conform to the World Anti-Doping Code. Moreover, the regime has a coercive nature operating through a globally recognized structure in which the sport movement and government equally participated and the behaviours of states and national actors are constrained by a set of principles and rules and also by the legally binding UNESCO Convention. We have observed that there was, among domestic policy actors, a sense of obligation to comply with the WAD Code and harmonise it with core national anti-doping policy both in Japan and the UK. It was further observed that, at the same time, the global anti-doping policy regime has raised awareness and sensitivity within the UK and Japan to the level of compliance of other states. The implementation of the Japan Anti-Doping Rule and the UK National Anti-Doping Policy, the adoption (or 'acceptance') of the UNESCO Convention, and the growing priority in education programmes are evidence of the impact of the regime on domestic policy.

However, there were different degrees of influence, and response to, the international policy regime at the domestic level. It has become clear that the Japanese felt stronger exogenous pressure, or coerciveness, than the British who have seen the globally agreed standardised anti-doping rules as an extension of existing practice. It can be suggested that different patterns of response between Japan and the UK to the global anti-doping policy regime are influenced by the prior policy choice and by the conditions of domestic values and interests. As noted, the international policy regime is shaping domestic policy and constraining the behaviour of states, but, importantly, the domestic response is participative (rather than passive or conflictual).

It was demonstrated that the Japanese felt under pressure to respond to the international progress and were fearful of international accusations of non-compliance and national embarrassment. As observed, the government was initially reluctant and was slow in its response to the international progress in anti-doping policy and the domestic structural...
arrangements were fragmented. However, the Japanese would not have been able to adopt current anti-doping without the development of global institutional arrangement. It was noted that the global pressure to comply with the agreed anti-doping principles, norms, rules and institutional arrangements initially instigated the development of domestic anti-doping policy that led to the establishment of the Japan Anti-Doping Agency and the facilitation of the WAD Code at the domestic level. International criticism was avoided and the government provided subsidies for doping tests and accepted the UNESCO Convention. However, there was also a gradual recognition of the political and diplomatic opportunities created by being (actively) engaged in the global anti-doping policy regime. Japan subsequently secured international and regional representation and prestige by the membership of WADA’s Foundation Board and Executive Committee and as the host of the WADA’s Asia/Oceania Regional Office in Tokyo which was seen as an opportunity to enhance the international credibility, status and prestige of Japan. In other words, there was increasing domestic momentum for stronger engagement in anti-doping policy in Japan where the national orientation of policy has been shaped and directed by the global framework and by the internal lobbying for anti-doping.

As for the development of UK’s anti-doping policy, the central tension was the ‘perceived conflict of interests’ within UK Sport. There were growing awareness and sensitivity to international progress, and the British government and UK Sport eventually decided to establish an independent NADO, despite their initial preference to maintain the UK Sport DFSD as an arm’s length agency due to a lack of evidence of any unethical behaviour. It has been examined that although the award of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 in London and the government’s concerns over the eventual successful organisation of the Games have pushed the government agenda, the UK’s anti-doping policy has been steered by the conscious acknowledgement, and the fear, of falling behind the internationally leading countries, like Australia, Canada and the United States. The decision to create an independent UK NADO for enhancing the domestic anti-doping provision was influenced not only by the avoidance of domestic and international criticism, but also by a concern to maintain the UK’s credibility as a ‘world leader’ in the policy area. In short, the domestic perception of regime expectations put additional pressure on the government to establish an independent NADO.

In summary, there was a strong evidence to suggest that an effective policy regime was operating in relation to anti-doping policy and that it was, to some degree, coercive in nature. Nevertheless, the pressure from the regime was factored into the calculation of domestic self-interest, or cost-benefit, that influenced the extent of active participation in global anti-doping policy. It became clear that the states are conscious that non-compliance is costly
and they are encouraged, and willing, to conform to the global platform. It can be suggested that although different patterns of response between Japan and the UK to the global anti-doping policy regime have been influenced by the prior policy choice and the conditions of domestic institutions, the behaviours of states and domestic sport actors will continuously be constrained by the global anti-doping policy regime.
Chapter 6 Developing Elite Athletes in the UK/England

6.1 Introduction

A notable change in sport policy, the sporting landscape and the availability of public funding was made after the mid-1990s. The then UK Conservative government placed a much greater emphasis on elite sport success than witnessed before following the poor international performance in Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996. Since this time, the New Labour government has largely followed the Conservatives and reinforced and legitimised the objective of medal success, which is seen as generating a 'feelgood' factor. At the same time, the Labour government has stressed the needs to 'modernise' the national sport organisations so as to produce effective returns on investment. Since July 2005, when London became the host city for the XXX Olympiad, government interest in, and political importance given to, British elite sport performance at the Olympics have been further entrenched in order to realise 60 medals, 18-20 of them gold, and finish 4th in medal table with a possible team size of 791 GB athletes (271 athletes in 2004 Athens Games).

This chapter will explore the development of the elite sport system in the UK (and England where appropriate). The structure of this chapter falls into four substantive sections. Firstly, the structure of elite sport development will be outlined, describing the organisational roles and responsibilities and the relationship between the national sporting bodies in order to identify the policy priorities of each organisation. This will be followed by more in-depth analysis of inter-organisational relationships in order to identify the values held by organisations as they move towards a 'One Stop Shop' structure and to discover if there are conflicting interests involved in the drive towards more 'streamlined' relationships. Secondly, the trend in the cost of excellence will be identified by examining the way high performance funding is influenced by the level of international performances and by the performance targets set by the respective Olympic-sport national organisations. The third section will provide consideration regarding the talent identification and development (TID) mechanisms, the generic framework of the Long-Term Athlete Development (LTAD) model and the way both TID and LTAD programmes have become prominent features of the elite sport system in the UK. It will then focus on the policy changes in the competition environment for talented young athletes. The final section will provide a much more detailed account of systematic and holistic support provision for elite athletes in the areas of elite coach development and coaching education as well as in sports science and medical support, including the
performance lifestyle, which illustrates a growing requirement to support athletes in the competitive environment. Throughout each section, the aim is to examine and characterise the depth and breadth of exogenous influences, especially those from other countries in relation to the growing level of international competitiveness in sport. In addition, we will examine the influence of externally defined issues/agendas, on the development of the elite sport system in the UK.

6.2 Mapping the Elite Sport Development Structure in the UK/England

It should be reiterated that the distinctive feature of the UK in international sport competition is its dual representation, as Great Britain for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, and as the four Home Countries for the Commonwealth Games and some major international competitions such as the Football and Cricket World Cups. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) does not have authoritative power over each Home Country, since sport is one of the devolved areas of policy. These complex political and sporting structures in the UK suggest the complexities in coordinating policy and allocating resources in the most effective way. It is not surprising that the consistent criticisms regarding the structure of sport in the UK are its fragmentation and duplication of work which have resulted in an urgent drive towards collaborative work across different levels of actors and organisations through a ‘One Stop Shop’ approach (c.f. Cunningham Review, 2001; Carter Report, 2005a/b; ISR, 2005). The decision to stage the 2012 Olympics in London can be seen as a catalyst for enhancing the commitment of the government to elite success and to streamlining and simplifying the roles and responsibilities of organisations, especially at national level.

To be more specific, there are possibly three identifiable national ‘policy platforms’ which are emerging and which can be divided into distinctive national policy areas, at least in England. These are: elite sport (UK Sport); community sport and participation in sport (Sport England); and PE/school sport (Youth Sport Trust). This can be seen as the progress towards the ‘most efficient and effective way’ of achieving the ‘single system for sport’ recommended in the DCMS commissioned Carter Report (2001). As will be argued in the subsequent section, it is remarkable that UK Sport has been equipped with the financial and structural means to steer the national target in terms of high performance success. Nonetheless, while a simplified administrative framework for sport is emerging, questions remain as to whether the national
policy platforms can provide the 'efficiency and effectiveness' in elite sport success, which the Labour government seeks across public sectors.

Diagram 6.1: Sport organisational structure with devolved nature in the UK (as of July 2008)

Diagram 6.1 illustrates the relatively centralised organisational structure with high-performance actors at different levels, the financial flows and the network or partnership relationships between actors. This section will consider how the organisations at national level, such as the BOA, Sport England, and YST, establish the partnership link with UK Sport and how conflicting, or potentially conflicting, relationships, especially in relation to the struggle for eliciting funding and developing athlete pathways, can be identified. Although the limited space precludes a detailed explanation, the relationship between UK Sport and the Home Country Sports Councils and the specialist networks of institutes and facilities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland need to be taken into consideration in order to understand how the support for athletes can be consistently delivered in the regionally-based network model. It is important to be reminded that the underlying aim is to identify the extent
to which the organisational restructuring of elite sport system has been influenced by exogenous factors.

6.2.1 Governmental level

Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)

The DCMS aims "to improve the quality of life for all through cultural and sporting activities, to support the pursuit of excellence, and to champion the tourism, creative and leisure industries" (DCMS, 2006). Its Sports Division aims to improve the quality and quantity of sporting opportunities from grass roots to elite level in England. Four areas of Public Service Agreements (PSA) were defined in 2004, two of which were jointly targeted with other departments (Department for Children, Schools and Families: DfCSF, previously DfES; Department of Health) that were closely involved in neighbouring policy areas. The DCMS also constructs 'arm's length' relationships with 66 public bodies, two of which are Sport England and UK Sport, through a mixture of funding, regulation and sponsorship (Capability Review Team, 2007). The DCMS puts in place the strategies for sport in England, some examples of which are TASS and TASS 2012 programmes; National School Sport Games; the development of sports facilities, including the rebuilding of Wembley Stadium; equality in sport; and the expansion of community sport. It funds Sport England, in relation to the objective of increasing participation, and UK Sport in the hope of making GB athletes successful on the international stage. The Department also supports equality in sport, community sport and professional sport.

Sport is a devolved area of policy where four different administrations in the UK are responsible for community, school/PE and elite development with respective national visions, strategies and institutes. The DCMS is the government body that decides the distribution of National Lottery funds for 'good causes', from which are awarded grants to the four National Sports Councils and UK Sport. In contrast to the devolved nature of sport policy, the

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36 The objective of Government PSA Target 1 is to enhance sporting opportunities for 5 to 16 year olds and increase the percentage of school children in England who spend a minimum of 2 hours each week in high-quality PE and school sport within and beyond the curriculum increased from 25% in 2002 to 75% by 2006 and to 85% by 2008, with at least 75% in each School and beyond the curriculum increases from 11% to 2010 as well as in the population as a whole. Target 3 focuses on the increase in active sport participation. See DCMS HP: http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/Sport/default.htm (last accessed 19 February 2008).

37 For instance, the Ministry for Tourism, Culture and Sport of the Scottish Executive has set its own long-term overarching goal to have 60% of the adult Scottish population taking part in sport at least once a week by 2020 with the dual objectives of increasing participation and improving performance. See the recent national strategy published by the Scottish Executive in 2003, Sport 21 2003-2007: Shaping Scotland's Future (2003) and subsequently update and developed in Reaching Higher: Building on the Success of Sport 21 (2007).

creation of the Sports Cabinet in 1998 was intended to organise and coordinate the work of the four home countries' Ministers for Sport and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport acts as a chair. As such, it can be noted that the DCMS maintains an authoritative power over lottery allocation, and the international representation and success of Britain at the Olympic and Paralympic Games and international sport competitions. In order to successfully host the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012, the Secretary of State sits on the Olympic Board and works with the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), the BOA and the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG).

6.2.2 Non-departmental public bodies for sport (Quangos)

United Kingdom Sports Council (UK Sport)

UK Sport is the leading UK public body responsible for securing international sporting success and supporting NGBs and athletes in order to achieve medals in the Summer and Winter Olympics and Paralympics. It was established by the Royal Charter in 1997 as a non-departmental public body and works within the governmental framework, being accountable to Parliament through the DCMS. Its Board members are appointed by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and UK Sport provides a four-year Olympics-cycle 'funding agreement' with the DCMS submitting 'performance against targets'. Under its three Strategic Priorities (World Class Success, Worldwide Impact, World Class Standards), UK Sport takes full responsibility for maximising the British (and, where appropriate, English) performances at the Olympics and Paralympics and international sport competitions and provides strategic delivery and support for the World Class Potential programme, TASS, TASS 2012, EIS and non-Olympic sports in England. It also attempts to build a close partnership with the three Home Country Sports Institutes in order to ensure the development of home country athletes to represent the UK (see Section 6.2.5 for further discussion). The current policy objective of UK Sport is the GB Summer Olympic team to be 4th and the Paralympic team to be 1st in the medal tally in the 2012 London Games.

UK Sport is funded by both Lottery and Exchequer subsidies and is responsible for managing and distributing nearly £60m a year for medal-winning performances with the funding-cycle being based on the four-year Olympic intervals. Its budget was topped up when the Chancellor announced the 2012 performance funding of £200m of public money plus another £100m being sought from commercial partners. The overall funding between 2006 and 2012
is about £660m which is the highest level of investment in high-performance sport in the UK. In contrast to the pre-additional budget announcement, UK Sport does not differentiate between Exchequer and Lottery funding for investing in NGBs, although some differentiation can be identified in respect of Lottery money going to the World Class Performance Pathway Programme (UK Sport, 2006a; BOA, 2007b).

Launched in 1996, the three-tier lottery funded (Performance, Potential and Start) World Class Performance Programme has invested about £25m a year in 320 Summer Olympic athletes from 18 sports and 135 Paralympic athletes. Responding to the Chancellor’s extra funds and aspiring to be in the top 4 medal winners in 2012, it was renamed as the World Class Performance Pathway Programme (WCPP) with three tiers: World Class Podium, Development and Talent that are aimed to identify talent at an early stage and connect the talent through to the top performance level (see Diagram 6.2 in later section). The restructured WCPP is underpinned by a ‘No Compromise’ strategy which is defined as being “ruthless about our podium potential in every event, studying every aspect – medals available, athletes, coaches, current performance, further potential, talent selection, cost and above all the opposition – and invest accordingly” (UK Sport, 2006b). NGBs are required to set agreed performance criteria against which UK Sport provides funding and supporting infrastructure and services to elite athletes. For the ‘effective’ and ‘transparent’ distribution of additional funding, UK Sport ‘triggers’ funding to NGBs on the condition that they meet the criteria of performance management and governance structure which were framed by UK Sport for the delivery of the ‘100 Day Plan’ (UK Sport, 2006b). The degree of ‘ruthlessness’ is illustrated by the newly defined role of UK Sport within its “Mission 2012”, a new monitoring and evaluating mechanism (UK Sport News, 08 May 2007).

It is notable that a greater emphasis on maximising the potential for elite performance came from putting EIS under the strategic direction of UK Sport after 2006. This has allowed further integration between UK Sport and EIS that “maximises impact and minimises duplication of effort and resources” (Sue Campbell, quoted in EIS, 2006: 3). Talent Identification programmes, which includes the “Talent Swap Shop” for transferring existing athletes from one event to another, can be highlighted as the core elements of collaborative work between the two high performance institutes for ensuring the quality of the British performance in 2012 (see further in 6.4). The Performance Lifestyle programme should be given particular attention as another element of collaborative work integrated by the WCPP to help athletes to maintain top sporting careers and their personal lifestyle (see further in 6.5). UK Sport also invests £6m a year to educate and develop 60 Elite Coaches through the World Class Coaching Strategy (see further in 6.5.1).
Other significant strategic areas of work delivered by UK Sport are the policies for ‘international relations and development’, which are expected to lead to greater possibilities of medals and the increase of British influence in the world of sport, and ‘anti-doping’. This objective remains strong in terms of securing the right to host international sport competitions in the UK, thus bringing a positive advantage to the British athletes. The effectiveness of British representations on international sporting bodies can be identified by the successful bid for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, but further commitment by UK Sport in this area can be seen in the International Leadership Programme (ILP) launched in 2006, the aim of which is to make international post holders well-equipped with the appropriate competencies and knowledge. In other words, this programme is intended to ensure the building of “a legacy of sports administrators with exceptional skills to offer” and ensure the strategic influence of international sporting members (UK Sport, 2006a: 46).

As Chapter 4 has already identified the anti-doping policy development, the responsibility for anti-doping programmes had been another area of UK Sport’s engagement that had existed since its creation, although in December 2007 the creation of an independent National Anti-Doping Organisation (NADO) outside its domain was announced. It should be stressed that UK Sport had strengthened its capacity through issuing the UK’s National Anti-Doping Policy in 2005, as well as by launching the ‘100% ME’ athlete education along with the Athlete Ambassadors role model programme. It should be highlighted here that UK Sport was self-proclaimed as one of the most proactive NADOs, with clear policies on ‘no-advance notice Out-of-Competition Testing’, based on the five times a week, 24 hours a day rule (UK Sport, 2006a). Nevertheless, being under pressure from a series of independent reports by the House of Commons and some leading NGBs, it has become apparent that the government was concerned to prevent any doubts about the role of NADO leading to the London Olympic and Paralympics Games in 2012 (DCMS Press Release, 151/07, 05 December 2007; see more in Chapter 4).

The English Institute of Sport (EIS)

The EIS was set up in 2002 at a cost of £120m to act as a network of elite centres across England, with 9 regional multi-sport hub-sites to be funded by UK Sport Lottery money. The UK Sports Institute (UKSI) was initially to be created as a centralised structure (c.f. DNH/Sports Council, 1995), but the government, guided by the experience in Australia, decided to create a decentralised, regional network of institutes (see Green, 2007a;
Another strong influence from Australia can be identified in the fact that Wilma Shakespeare, who was the founding Director of the Queensland Academy of Sport in Australia, was appointed as a National Director of EIS which makes strategic decisions and to whom the 9 regional managers report\(^{39}\) (see Green & Houlihan, 2005). The current evolution of a network of satellite centres along with regional hub sites is seen as providing "the quiet revolution that will change the face of sport in this country" (EIS, 2006: 18). A streamlined 'performance partnership' seems to have recently evolved between UK Sport and the EIS, which has become more focused on providing performance training environments and support in order to allow elite performers and up-and-coming talented young athletes to reach their potentials. Under the strategic direction of UK Sport, the EIS provides the holistic, multi-disciplinary, specialist support services to elite athletes. These include sports science and medicine, applied physiology, biomechanics, performance analysis, nutritional advice/support, medical checking/ consultation, physiotherapy, psychology, strength and conditioning coaching, sports massage, podiatry and performance lifestyle (more details in Section 6.5.2). Each hub has its specialist sport and the EIS works, in partnership with other Home Country Institutes, to deliver the World Class Pathway Programme by ensuring that "the right level of support reaches the right athletes at the right time" (UK Sport, 2006a: 24). UK Sport funds the Fast Track Practitioner Programme which gives a 12-month internship opportunity at the EIS, and aims to foster "world class back-up" of elite practitioners who enhance the "performance partnership" (EIS, 2006: 16). Another co-initiative between UK Sport and the EIS is the implementation of talent identification programmes in partnership with NGBs, which identify and develop talented athletes in a systematic manner (see more details in 6.4).

**Sport England**

As a non-departmental, public body sponsored by the DCMS operating under the Royal Charter, Sport England evolved out of the Great Britain Sports Council, which was established in 1972 and then, in 1997, separated into the English Sports Council and the UK Sports Council. When the National Lottery was introduced in 1994 to allocate funds for 'good causes', including sport, the English Sports Council became responsible for distributing lottery money to sport in England. Rebranded as Sport England in 1999, it has taken full responsibility for community sport in England and for those English governing bodies and athletes competing as Team England. It set a strategy called "Start, Stay and Succeed" in

\(^{39}\) Wilma Shakespeare has left EIS in the late November 2007.
The 'mission' of Sport England is to enable 2 million people to participate in sport by 2012 and to sustain sport participation through investing and promoting community sport. Sport England is at the heart of achieving the DCMS' PSA 3 target through monitoring the participation level in sport and active recreation, and at the same time contributes to the achievement of the DfCSF/DCMS' PSA 1 target for school sport. Despite losing its responsibility for elite sport, Sport England still promotes and invests in "sporting pathways which release potential" through community sports activities, sports clubs, coaches and officials, player pathways, volunteering and sports facilities (Sport England, 2007: 3). It also identifies 'sporting outcomes' against which Sport England's performances are evaluated in terms of the number of people (aged 5-16 and over 16) participating, volunteering and receiving coaching and the development of high quality clubs and sporting pathways (ibid, 6).

In relation to the London 2012 Games and its sustainable legacy, Sport England has been given a leading role in identifying the way to maximise participation at grass roots and community levels across the London area (see Sport England et al., 2006).

In the Independent Sports Review (ISR) undertaken by the two former ministers for sport it was argued that Sport England has been "a mouthpiece for the Government" and has lost independence as "a voice for sport" (ISR, 2005: 9). Government influence is clearly seen in that Sport England always had to accept the redirection or re-statement of its strategy or long-term objectives in accordance with the decisions made by the government. Nevertheless, what is significant in the transformation of Sport England in relation to elite sport development is the creation of a 'smooth' sporting pathway from participation in schools and clubs through to elite level, by its commitment to 'releasing potential' (Sport England, 2005; 2006). Sport England also invested in establishing five National Sports Centres for elite athletes with specialist training facilities and equipment, and 38 sports centres as a training base for English athletes and for widening participation at community level. Although Sport England set out a vision for 2012 of taking a "strategic leadership for sport" (Sport England, 2004), the transfer of its responsibilities for the World Class programme, the EIS and TASS to UK Sport in April 2006 prompted another review of its organisational strategy, and left it only with responsibility for community sport (see Section 6.2.4).

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40 PSA 3 objective is by 2008 to increase participation in sport and active recreation at least 12 times a year by 3% in the priority group and increase the number of people who engage in at least 30 minutes of moderate intensity sport at least 3 times a week by 3% by 2008.
2007; see more details later in this section). Such involvement in creating the pathways can be seen to a lesser extent in its 'Sporting Champions' scheme. This provides opportunities for young people in schools and local communities to interact with elite athletes who can inspire youngsters to become involved in sport and eventually aim at becoming high performance athletes. What is also interesting is that, in line with the government's policy for 'streamlining' the national sporting bodies, Sport England seems consciously being engaged as a central enabler in creating a framework at community level. It defines its role as establishing a 'supply chain' connecting organisations in a 'Delivery System for Sport', connecting organisation from the national (NGBs) level, regional (Regional Sports Boards; RSBs) and sub-regional (County Sports Partnerships; CSPs) to local levels (Community Sports Networks; CSPs, coaches, volunteers and clubs).

Other Home Country Sports Councils (HCSCs) and Elite Institutes

As mentioned above, each home country sets its own strategy for sport and support for elite athletes competing in some international competitions. It is only recently that each devolved Parliament/Assembly has identified the 'instrumental' role of sport in society (see Scottish Executive, 2003, 2007; Sports Council Wales, 2005a). The nationally established, high performance institutes are governed by their respective Home Country Sports Councils which invest in developing home-grown talented athletes. Each institute maintains a partnership relationship with UK Sport in order to achieve the British target in the Olympics and Paralympics (see Section 6.2.5 for relations between HCSCs and UK Sport).

In Scotland, in recognition of the "intrinsic value of sport" and "sport's instrumental role in society", Sport 21 was endorsed in 2003 by the Scottish Executive and Parliament as the "national strategy for sport" (updated in 2007; sportscotland, 2003a: 5). Sportscotland is a delivery body for achieving community sport and Scottish elite success, which are the two-tier national goals for sport in Scotland (sportscotland, 2007). It sets the investment strategy for distributing national lottery funds, under the influence of the UK Government and the Scottish Executive (Scottish Executive, 2007; sportscotland, 2003a, 2007). Its role is defined as working in partnership with a wide range of agencies, including Scottish governing bodies of sport (SGBs), to develop and implement the "Long-term Player Development" by providing "escalator" sporting pathways from grassroots to elite performance level (sportscotland, 2003a: 33-4). The investment category of 'Achieving Excellence' has attracted the most

funding (37.5%). Sportscotland has created an ‘Institute Network’ at an operating cost of £16.06m for the Scottish Institute of Sport (SIS, created in 1998) and £4m for the six associated Area Institutes of Sport, each institute is required to produce a four-year strategic plan as a condition of funding (see Diagram 6.1; Vaga Associates, 2006: 38). It also invests in SGBs for the purpose of employing national performance staff and implementing coaching frameworks (see more detail on excellence cost in Section 6.3; sportscotland, 2003a). Nevertheless, there is a noticeable similarity in the language of sport used by the UK Government and by the Scottish Executive, as well as sportscotland and SGBs. One of the examples of this is their aim to achieve ‘best value for investment’ in sport. This can also be notable in relation to the requirement for producing delivery plans and frameworks based on the concept of ‘partnership-working’ and the ‘governance’ model of sport bodies.

A similar pattern of policy initiatives and investment in sport can be identified in the Sports Council for Wales (SCW) and Sport Northern Ireland (SNI). Each home-grown elite athlete is also supported by the National Lottery fund. The SCW launched a sport and physical activity strategy (‘Climbing Higher’) in 2005, and, with Welsh elite success, the “Élite Cymru” scheme provides not only financial support through SPORTLOT, but, like its English counterpart, also provides sports science and medicine, strength and conditioning as well as career and education support, and free access to training facilities through the BOA’s passport scheme. The Welsh Institute of Sport (WIS, opened in 1972) provides the similar specialist support programmes as the EIS. The athletes nominated by the NGBs are also assessed against the agreed performance target and to achieve the SCW’s performance and excellence agenda, it has employed the “Sports Development Pyramid” model. This starts from ‘foundation’ for maintaining and widening the performance base, moving to ‘participation’ in school or community sport, ‘performance’ at regional and local level and, finally, to ‘excellence’ at Welsh and international competition level. Under the Performance Team of SNI, it is intended to develop the “Talent Athlete Development Model” to ensure the development of elite athletes, while the Sports Institute for Northern Ireland, based in the University of Ulster, provides similar specialist support for elite level athletes.

6.2.3 Non-governmental national sporting actors

42 See the SCW’s ‘Élite Cymru’ scheme at http://www.welsh-institute-sport.co.uk/content/public/content/default.asp?ID=4 (last accessed, 19 February 2008).
The British Olympic Association (BOA)

The British Olympic Association was established in 1905 as the British representative body on the IOC, with the aim of protecting and promoting the Olympic Movement across the UK. Together with the British Olympic Foundation (BOF), it is responsible for the dissemination of Olympic education and the promotion of the Olympic ideal. Working with 35 Olympic Governing Bodies, the BOA has never missed sending a Team GB to both the Summer and Winter Olympic Games and has been responsible for selection, preparation, management and performance of Team GB. Moreover, London was the host for the Olympic Games in 1908 and 1948 as well as being selected as the host in 2012. Interestingly, over 100 years, the BOA has maintained its independent voice for the British Olympic sport. It is stated that the BOA "has always safeguarded its independence from government and thereby retained its ability to represent its members, the Olympic Governing Bodies, free from political or governmental influence" (BOA, 2006a: 4). Completely relying on commercial sponsorship and licensing (£3.67m in 2005) and private donations (£2,663 in 2005; £1m in 2004), the BOA has fiercely resisted any government intervention, of particular example of which was to ignore Thatcher’s call for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. However, while the BOA preserves its identity by being autonomous and free from political interference and interests, as the pressure to become 4th in the medal table intensifies, Colin Moynihan, the Chairman of BOA, has expressed his concern over the increasing “ politicisation of sport” and the possible loss of an independent voice for the British Olympic sport. However, in relation to 2012, Moynihan accepts that there is a shared responsibility, whereby: “the Government (DCMS) builds the theatre, LOCOG puts on the show, we at the BOA deliver the actors and actresses word perfect and the Mayor inherits the legacy for Londoners the day the curtain falls”. Even though the head of both LOCOG and the BOA were on the same side of the political spectrum in contrast to the other two members of the Olympic Board who were from the Labour Party (until the election of new Conservative Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, in May 2008), the congruence of purpose for staging the Olympic Games should be highlighted. However, this might lead to the BOA being more integrated into, or affected by, the government policy. The BOA Chairman, therefore, expressed the need for sport organisations to be ‘fully equipped’ with management structures and governance procedures in order to make the sporting voice heard (see below on FTSE-BOA partnership and Section 6.2.4). Nevertheless, while it is not involved in funding allocation to NGBs, the BOA provides an ‘alternative’ insight to actual overall British performance as the “Relative Olympic Medal Table”, which reflects the results from a single event (a World Championship or equivalent).

Simon Clegg, Chief Executive of the BOA (resigned in December 2008), reiterated that, in all Olympic sport, there is more emphasis on delivering medals than ever before (BOA, 2006b).

The BOA also facilitates a number of services which support high performance and talented athletes, such as the Olympic Medical Institute (OMI) in partnership with the EIS, and the holding of Pre-Olympic Camps. It should be noted that the influential role of the BOA in supporting athletes remains significant in relation to such programmes as the Olympic Passport Scheme for NGB-nominated athletes and the Olympic and Paralympic Employment Network (OPEN) for the athletes whom UK Sport does not fully cover under its World Class Pathway Programme. Although the BOA’s coordinating work seems similar to that of UK Sport, its independent role makes it different from UK Sport, which is largely steered by the extent of the government budget allocation as well as by the political climate of the time. In addition, acknowledging the increasing commitment of UK Sport to elite achievement in the Summer Olympic sports in comparison with the Winter Games, it was started that the BOA “politically” intends to maintain a balance between the performance focus on the Summer and Winter Olympic sports (quoted in BOA, 2005: 4).

Youth Sport Trust (YST)

In the policy area of assuring quality PE and creating sporting opportunities for young people, the influence of Youth Sport Trust seems to be growing. In contrast to the other two national agencies (UK Sport and Sport England), the distinguishing feature of YST is that it is a registered charity, established in 1994 by businessman John Beckwith, with the objective of achieving the PSA government target (providing 85% of school children with 4 hours of PE and sport by 2012) and improving the whole school environment, while providing a transferable curriculum through PE/school sport. Placing itself at the heart of a network of schools, the principal areas of YST’s work are: i) to support the delivery of Specialist Sports Colleges and School Sport Partnerships (SSPs) through the PESSCL strategy; ii) to provide the structured schemes of TOP Programmes; iii) to deliver the Step into Sport programme and host the Top Link Festival for developing young leaders and volunteers; and vi) to support gifted and talented school children in PE and sport under the Gifted & Talented (G&T) initiative (YST, 2007).

The author has obtained the PowerPoint Presentation slide provided by a BOA senior officer, which illustrates the detailed descriptions of OPEN programme that is operated by Blue Arrow, recruitment agency.
In relation to elite sport, the G&T provision is largely related to the development of elite athletes. Nevertheless, it is imperative to understand that there is a broad aim in G&T, whereby 10% of school children who are not only physically able and also those children who have broad cognitive, leadership and management skills are to be identified, nurtured and developed\(^6\) (see more in Section 6.4). To do so, YST manages the “Talented Young Athlete Pathway” in order to ensure meeting the needs of gifted and talented young people using three strands: i) providing practitioners with the National Career Professional Development for ensuring high quality PE in schools; ii) establishing the ‘pathway’ through creating and enhancing the competition managers’ network, the UK School Games development networks and the Multi-Skills Academies; and iii) providing support for gifted & talented children through delivering the Junior Athlete Education (JAE), the National Talent Orientation Camps (NTOC) and the Beckwith Scholarship. The recent government appointment of the YST as the organisers and managers of the UK School Games and the Competition Managers can be seen as the evidence of its extended responsibility for structural engagement in enlarging competition opportunities and bridging the gaps between schools, clubs and NGBs (see more in Section 6.2.5).

National Governing Bodies of Sport (NGBs)

In the UK, three patterns of governing bodies of sport exist, namely the UK/British, devolved and overlapped sports which are indicated in Table 6.1. Due to the UK’s devolved structure of NGBs, there are dual high performance funding structures, one from UK Sport and the other from the Home Country Sports Councils (except for England). Game Plan reported that these elements represent a lack of either total centralisation or total devolution and called for more clarification of funding structures and closer coordination between the Home Country Sports Councils (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 130-3; see Section 6.2.5 for further discussion).

Nonetheless, NGBs, including the devolved bodies, can be defined as the “central point for sport and the main support mechanism for athletes in a particular sport” (HCST, 2007: 10). They provide all levels of support including recreation sport, local/regional clubs, the development of players and organising competition at senior level, as well as the development of policy and governance in the relevant organisation. It should also be stressed that NGBs are expected to be responsible for “representing their members’ interests

\(^6\) The Department for Children, Schools and Families provide the definitions of ‘gifted’ and ‘talented’. The former in England refers to those pupils who are callable of excelling in academic subjects, while the ‘talented’ pupils may excel in areas “requiring visio-spatial skills or practical abilities, such as in games and PE, drama, or art”. See http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/giftedandtalented/identification/gandt/ (last accessed 19 February 2008).
to their sport's international federation and for establishing the rules for the sport or sports in conjunction with them" (ibid, 10). The balance between developing elite athletes and supporting the club structure and participation may have increased the tension within NGBs and between UK Sport and NGBs. NGBs are required not only to modernise their organisational governance structure but also to produce planning documents and performance targets, by which the level of funding is decided (c.f. DCMS, 2000; see also Cunningham, 2001).

Table 6.1: Three patterns of representation of sport in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sports compete at both Devolved and UK level</th>
<th>Sport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Devolved Sports (e.g.)</td>
<td>Cricket, Soccer, Bowls, Karate, Lacrosse, Netball, Rugby Union, Squash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 23 Overlap Sports</td>
<td>Athletics, Badminton, Basketball, Boxing, Canoeing, Curling, Cycling, Equestrian, Gymnastics, Hockey, Ice Skating, Judo, Modern Pentathlon, Rowing, Sailing, Shooting, Swimming, Table Tennis, Triathlon, Volleyball, Water Skiing, Weightlifting, Wrestling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C UK/British Sports (e.g.)</td>
<td>Tennis, Bobsleigh, Canoeing, Fencing, Gliding, Handball, Ice Hockey, Ice Skating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from: DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 131

sports coach UK (SCUK)

The arguably belated development and implementation across the UK of coaching systems for every level, from the playground to the Olympic arena, has attracted a significant attention over a number of years. It is only recently, however, that the issue of the education and development of high-level coaches has been recognised as deserving of a national strategy with a clear budget support. A series of government documents, such as the Government’s Plan for Sport (DCMS, 2001) and the Cunningham Review (2001), recognised that the improvement in the status and professionalism of coaches, and high quality structures for coaching, were essential for putting athletes on the podium. The National Coaching Foundation (NCF) was originally established in 1983 as a sub-committee of the then GB Sports Council. It was externalised in 1989 to become an independent charitable body. It was then re-branded as sports coach UK (SCUK) in 2001 and is funded by Sport England (45%) and UK Sport (22%), with a lesser amount from the Football Association. Accordingly, the DCMS Coaching Task Force (CTF) has conducted a thorough review of the activities of SCUK and identified its weaknesses as well as positive elements of its ‘unique contribution’, such as its single focus on coaching and its commercial operations (DCMS, 2002).
recommendations put forward by CTF, to which the government granted £25m for three years, are catalysts in clarifying the overall strategic role of SCUK as the key national agency that has expanded its organisational capacity. Eventually, through a consultation process with partnership organisations, NGBs in particular, SCUK set a strategic direction for the development of coaching. This is set out in the *UK Action Plan for Coaching* (published in 2006, renamed *UK Coaching Framework: A 3-7-11 Action Plan* in 2007) wherein three distinctive phases up to 2016 are identified. It is intended to establish coaching as a paid profession and with this in view, the 'coach pathway' and the UK Coaching Certificate (UKCC) has been developed as a new structure for sport-specific coach education and qualification. The SCUK takes a central role in facilitating and monitoring the coaching and coach education system so as to improve the standard of coaching for athletes who are aspiring to be elite. As discussed in the CTF Final Report, the devolved issues were approached through creating a network of coaching centres in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England with the cost being covered by SCUK and Sport England, and in partnership with higher education agencies (DCMS, 2002; see Section 6.5.1 for more details).

6.2.4 Key actors at regional and local levels

School Sport Partnerships (SSPs) and County Sports Partnerships (CSPs)

The purpose of the School Sport Partnerships programme is to establish families of schools to deliver the Government’s PSA target and is managed by DCMS, DICSF (previously DfES), Sport England, YST and the New Opportunities Fund. All Specialist Sports Colleges are expected to play a central role in helping to implement the PESCCL strategy as the hub for SSPs sharing good practice and raising standards for PE and school sport in the partner secondary and primary schools (DCMS, 2000: 7; DfES, 2006). To achieve the policy objectives (2 hours per week high quality PE), the strategy of enhancing partnership-working and the development of networks was again stressed as a means of making a positive impact on school sport. The specialist sports colleges are also expected to play a role in creating competition opportunities for pupils and excellence in PE and community sport.

As for the County Sports Partnerships, the objective is to create a 'one voice' delivery system for community sport and to establish successful partnerships at a local level through enhancing the community sport networks. Though it leaves an interesting question as to the
effectiveness of cross-agency partnership networks, the CSP initiative is particularly noteworthy since it largely corresponds to the approach advocated by the government in relation to 'joined-up networks' and 'partnership-working' between Sport England regions, NGBs and CSPs, as well as the implementation of business plans (Whole Sport Plans/One Stop Plans of NGBs) in order to achieve joint long-term goals. One of the strategic areas intertwined with realising national objective for elite sport at a local level is the requirement for NGBs to establish a 'Player Pathway'. This is potentially based on a generally-agreed Long Term Athlete Development (LTAD) framework and the delivery of Multi-Skill and Fundamental activities and effective competition opportunities at the county level across different platforms (see more detail in Section 6.4; Sport England, 2005).

6.2.5 Relations between actors

The key national agencies for the development of sport and sporting success have been mentioned in the previous section. To recapitulate, DeMS is the government body with the ultimate responsibility for the achievement of Team GB and Britain's engagement in anti-doping policy, whereas UK Sport takes a role in delivering the policy objectives for elite sport. This section aims to describe the changing focus of key national bodies in a more relational manner and identify the reasons behind the increasing organisational tensions, collaborative links and changes of direction.

Developing the talent pathway as a 'relay race'?:
Youth Sport Trust – Sport England – UK Sport

As has already been indicated in Diagram 6.1, there was a catalytic change in April 2006 with the strong aspiration to clarify the responsibility for the development of elite athletes at national level. In its strategic document, Sport England is explicit about its role and the creation of a link with Youth Sport Trust and UK Sport for creating 'seamless pathways' stating that:

The way the three agencies work together is like a relay race. The Youth Sport Trust starts the race. It then passes the baton to Sport England who
in turn – for a very small number of highly talented individuals – hands it on to UK Sport (Sport England, 2007: 11).

A ‘baton relay’ transition between the three key phases is described as: first, improving the quality and quantity of school sport and participation of school children in sport (YST); second, sustaining and increasing participation in community sport (Sport England); and lastly, developing performance pathways and winning medals at world-class events (UK Sport). It was made clear by Tessa Jowell, the then State Secretary for Culture, Media and Sport, that this streamlined responsibility was favoured by the government with its intention to create a “foundation for future UK sporting success” (Jowell, quoted in UK Sport, 2006a: 18). It was also acknowledged that the integrated, high-performance support streams “have allowed us (UK Sport) to channel our expertise even more effectively to lead the drive for success” (John Steele, quoted in ibid). It would be reasonable to assume that the impetus to transfer the responsibilities for high-performance-related programmes from Sport England to UK Sport indicates a political desire to promote elite success by laying a pathway for the development of talent in schools and communities (c.f. Penney, 2000; Kirk, 2004).

However, the account provided by Sport England for developing ‘seamless pathways’ can be regarded as being too idealistic and rhetorical, especially since it is possible to identify discrepancies in the long-term objectives set by the respective agencies. Primarily focusing on supporting the education and development of young people through PE and school sport, the objective of the Youth Sport Trust is to achieve the government PSA target by implementing the PESCL strategy. As for Sport England, its target is to get two million more people active before 2012, whereas achieving 4th position in the medal table in the London Olympic Games in 2012 is the objective of UK Sport. It was stated by Sport England that: “Sport England needs to reach up and link with UK Sport. It does this by investing in NGBs to help them develop effective pathways that take talented athletes from club to UK Sport’s World Class Performance Programmes” (Sport England, 2007: 11). However, it can be said that the above statement is less convincing in that UK Sport has, for example, developed its own talent identification or ‘Fast Track’ talent development programme as well as a talent transfer programme that would marginalise the role of Sport England in bringing potential athletes through to the senior level. In practical terms there is little evidence so far to suggest that the ‘baton’ has ever been relayed.

In addition, it is possible that the role and political voice of Sport England may have been undermined by this change of organisational responsibilities. Sport England has not only lost its core objective of making a ‘successful sporting nation (England)’ and ended up becoming
a body solely responsible for community/grassroots sport, but has also become financially weakened due to a smaller allocation of Exchequer and Lottery money. With the additional budget announced by the Exchequer in March 2006, the total of £2.2bn of National Lottery money was diverted to cover the construction costs for the 2012 Games and Sport England is expected to lose £99.9m, which would be an 8% cut in its budget (The Guardian, 23 April 2007). As opposed to the reduced capacity of Sport England, UK Sport has extended its organisational capacity by securing additional funding of a total of £200m in public subsidies through to 2012.

It is plausible to suggest that the change in the significance of the two agencies can be attributed to the influence of the ‘policy entrepreneur’, the current UK Sport’s Chair Sue Campbell, who was the previous Chair and current advisor of YST. She seems to have successfully convinced the government leaders and officials to invest, this time, for winning medals at the world championships and Olympics (c.f. Campbell, quoted in UK Sport, 2004a: 24-5; Green & Houlihan, 2005). This is suggested by the claims of Richard Caborn, the then Minister for Sport, who stated that “UK Sport won the argument with the Treasury” (quoted in BBC Sport, 08 May 2007). In contrast to this, the Chairman of BOA dismissed the above claim, stressing it was the product of collaborative efforts where “sport speaks with one voice”, the result of which was the commitment by the Treasury of £600m over 6 years (Colin Moynihan, quoted in BOA, 2006b: 2). Nevertheless, it is important to realise that an individual influence cannot be isolated from structural constraints (which corresponds to the critical realist standpoint) and that the government’s interest and determination to strive for medal achievements in 2012 influenced the decision of additional funding. The observations of a regional manager from the English Institute of Sport are illustrative of this point. When asked about the way in which transferring management responsibility for performance partnership from Sport England to UK Sport changed the relationship between national sport organisations, she remarked that there is a good “personal relationship” on the ground but there are constraints caused by organisational interests and values as follows:

I think in sport, in any country you go to, you have politics, pressures and tensions ... and there is overlap. I think ... we need to do collectively [and] really make sure that [all] organisations know whose positions where [and that] where they can lead in their area or where they should be supporting in the area. I don’t feel we’ve quite got there yet.

(EIS Regional Manager, Interview 02 August 2007)
Green's analysis is useful in making us aware of the rationale behind the struggle for change at national level. He argues that because "the actions that people choose to undertake' are increasingly shaped by the requirements of elite sport and, specifically, the requirement to construct 'pathways to the podium', they "serve to subdue alternative voices within the sporting community" (Green, 2004: 386). Most tellingly, the above account by an EIS regional manager is a good illustration of the tensions between an impetus to retain an area of responsibility in an organisation and a sense of vital needs to establish a robust collaboration with partner organisations. What is of importance in the present context is that the divided role between community sport and high performance sport reflects the strengthened capacity of UK Sport for achieving 4th in the 2012 Olympics, and in order to do so, no alternative voices can be heard (Green & Houlihan, 2006; Green, 2004).

Nonetheless, 'alternative voices' or an 'alternative approach' can be seen in the way the Youth Sport Trust operates at school level. As noted, YST is a charity, and hence, its working relationship with schools and NGBs shows considerable differences from those of UK Sport and Sport England, both of which are non-departmental public bodies. This point was stressed by a senior YST official when she said that:

...there is a really interesting way in which we need to work with National Governing Bodies and schools because we are not the funder. So we need actually to be a partner, rather than a funding body, and therefore, the skills and requirements to be a partner or be a national lead are very different. So you don't have the carrot and the stick, you know. You are not having a big huge relationship where if you don't do Y, you won't get X. So you have to be more skilful and your relationship has to be one of need. That need is financial, that need is knowledge or that need is advice or that need is tools.

(original emphasis, YST Senior Official, Interview 14 August 2007)

While it can be suggested that the growing significance of YST coincides with the interest of government in PE and school sport with a view to achieving its wider social and education policy, the above quote is instructive for understanding the way YST has become influential in developing sport policy and forming policy about the place of sport in schools through putting into operation the PESSCL strategy (see Houlihan & Green, 2006). This different concept of the partnership relationship will be reiterated in later sections in the discussion about the role of schools in creating 'pathways' in school sports.
A potential conflict over high performance responsibilities:
UK Sport – BOA – NGBs

Since the introduction of Lottery funding, and especially after the 2012 host city announcement, the areas of duplication of work and conflicts of interest between UK Sport and the BOA have become more apparent. There are immense possibilities for disagreement between those two national sporting bodies over financial distribution and the support of NGBs and athletes and also the way to manage the organisational structure. There are two examples which highlight this point, and which help to increase our understanding of the BOA's changing role and interests in athletes development, especially the structural arrangements for high-performance athletes, and the potential for either conflicting or collaborative relationships between the BOA and UK Sport.

First, and most importantly, UK Sport's monopoly in managing and steering the British high-performance programme may be weakened by the BOA's appointment of Sir Clive Woodward, a former England Rugby Union national coach and the 2003 World Cup winner, as Director of Elite Performance in September 2006. He is responsible for all 35 Olympic sports and Olympic NGBs' performance directors are expected to report to him. This would suggest that the BOA has taken a more proactive role in elite performance and development systems, which may, as UK Sport Chief Executive indicated, bring confusion over responsibilities (John Steele, quoted in UK Sport News, 07 September 2006). It was stated that Sir Clive's intention was to act as a coordinator rather than as an enforcer and to encourage cross-organisational relationships, working from the top of the triangle, i.e. top athletes. Woodward's following comment reflects this position:

My job is to make sure the BOA deliver and give the athletes everything they require. I've never had any doubt it would work and that we could all pull together – UK Sport, the English Institute of Sport, funding agents, the coaches and the athletes themselves. As I say, the talent is there, we just have to make sure we work together and the pathway is possible.

(Woodward, quoted in The Independent, 29 May 2007)

The appointment of Woodward to the UK Sport's 'Mission 2012' performance panel can be seen as a strong indication of 'collaboration' between UK Sport and the BOA, with their collective determination to produce medals. Nevertheless, one might suggest the degree of BOA's discretion in monitoring and evaluating the performances of Olympic sport may
conflict with its ‘independent’ role of empowering the sporting bodies. This element will be linked to the next point.

Secondly, it can be seen that there might be duplications between UK Sport and the BOA in their respective responsibilities for transforming NGBs’ organisational structure into a transparent governance system. UK Sport not only has to meet a performance target agreement with the DCMS (c.f. NAO, 2004; UK Sport, 2005e), but is also authorised to oversee the modernisation of NGBs’ structural arrangements and to review their performances, a responsibility of which affects UK Sport’s public funding (c.f. Deloitte & Touche, 2003; UK Sport, 2005e; UK Sport Press Release, 08 May 2007). This was accepted as part of the UK Sport’s ‘modernisation’ agenda, which was documented both in *Investing in Change* (Deloitte & Touche, 2003a) and *NGB Success Criteria/ Model Framework* (Deloitte & Touche, 2003b). The ‘Modernisation Programme’ was defined as “improved ‘efficiency and effectiveness’... about using existing resources in a more productive manner, not least to generate more income” (Deloitte & Touche, 2003a: 35). Some external and internal barriers to maximum effectiveness and efficiency are identified and competence-based ‘success factors’ are also presented, alongside a number of recommendations. The processes of modernising the organisational structure were further stressed subsequent to the increased public funding leading up to the 2012 London Games, when UK Sport published the criteria to release funding along which NGBs should have “the capacity, competencies, internal controls and business systems” (UK Sport, 2006b).

However, with a similar objective, but in a rather different manner, the BOA also seems to have started taking initiatives regarding the management of Olympic NGBs through a drive towards developing business-based model organisations. More specifically, the announcement of “FTSE-BOA Partnership Initiative” is intended to provide partnerships, not sponsorship deals, between 33 FTSE100 business companies who transfer their skills, business expertise and best practices in order to develop the quality and structure of the 33 Olympic NGBs (BOA News, 14 February 2007). The subsequent publication of a document called *Guide to Working with National Governing Bodies of Olympic Sports* (BOA, 2007a) sketches a broad regulatory, legal and governance framework for NGB operations, in order to help business partners to understand the sport-specific context. Based on the different needs of NGBs and the specialist expertise of the FTSE companies, the partnership
relationship can be seen as exclusive to one partnership, while maintaining a ‘mutual’ interest for the long-term benefit shared by both parties in the partnership.47

The government strategic documents, *A Sporting Future for All* and *Game Plan*, made explicit about the requirement for NGBs to set agreed targets for their development through sport and performance indicators, and develop a Long-Term Athlete Development framework for nurturing young athletes (DCMS, 2000; DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002). According to Green, in broad terms, this has brought about bureaucratic control “through the use of planning dictates and auditing and evaluation” by government and government agencies (in this case UK Sport) (2004: 378). Green continues to argue that NGBs have become “embedded in the social and organisational structure of the paymasters (DCMS/UK Sport)” in order to receive their income and budget for high-performance development (ibid, 383). A senior official from the Youth Sport Trust, who closely works with NGBs, critically observed that if ‘paymasters’ change the rules, “then the National Governing Bodies have to jump through different hoops” because:

...it’s [a] master-servant relationship and they (NGBs) will do whatever they need to do to have money. So, basically, the premise of success must come down to quangos, UK Sport..., the responsibility they have is to ensure that there isn’t a lack of direction... [because] we don’t have very strong individual skills and competencies within our National Governing Body structures... and we are slightly handicapped by our skills and competencies with our workforces...

(YST Senior Official, Interview 14 August 2007)

Her observation about NGBs, which conform to the requirement set by UK Sport to provide strategic direction, was confirmed by a UK Sport official involved in the “Mission 2012” evaluation. She commented that due to that fact that some governing bodies are ‘weak’ and find it difficult to adjust to rapid changes and, indeed, they showed resistance to change even though a vast amount of public subsidy became available to them, UK Sport has to set the direction for NGBs and ensure that they work together to improve their organisational competencies (UK Sport Official, Personal Communication, 11 August 2007). Interestingly, this official from the Performance Team also acknowledged that even a successful governing body such as the Amateur Rowing Association, whose performances are consistent, was still

47 One example of ‘FTSE-BOA Partnership Initiative’ can be identified in the partnership between British Volleyball and Land Securities, UK’s real estate investment trust, where both showed a ‘mutual interest’ in reaching out to communities and at the same time aimed to develop the organisational structure of British Volleyball.

'amateur' in its organisational governance and necessitated 'guidance' to improve its organisational structure, although a number of other "weaker NGBs" required much stronger involvement by UK Sport. It is possible to identify a hierarchical form of imposition used to achieve the implementation of modern management in NGBs, which is almost the same as commercial management-style. The BOA identifies the relationship between UK Sport and NGBs as being 'stringent' and 'contractual'. It is worth noting that the latter are constrained by the steering role of UK Sport and that the government "is able to impose conditions on the NGBs for accountability and transparency as a governing body" (BOA, 2007a: 4). The engagement of the BOA in seeking to equip NGBs with appropriate, effective and efficient corporate governance and business structures seems to reflect its growing concern with the greater 'politicisation' of sport (BOA, 2007a; see also Green & Houlihan, 2006; Green, 2004).

It is worth illustrating that there is still a strong intention on the part of the BOA to maintain its position as a 'guardian' to protect the autonomy of sporting organisations against political intervention. To further comprehend the process of the BOA's involvement with NGBs in accordance with the criteria set in "Funding Triggers" for UK Sport, its unique position in the world of sport, with financial independence from the government, and its perceived responsibility to 'empower' NGBs, it is helpful to note the following quotation from the Chair of the BOA:

The best legacy we can leave our governing bodies to respond in this context is to empower them. The BOA must be 'fit for purpose' to deliver services of the very highest order to our membership, the sports governing bodies, and through them to the sportsmen and women we ultimately represent. If we as sporting organisations are fully equipped with good governance, transparency and in-house expertise, we will then be able to continue to resist the growing attempts at interference from politicians of all political complexions at whatever level and protect the freedom and autonomy of sport and the Olympic Movement.48

Colin Moynihan showed an increasing fear of 'political intervention' or 'greater politicisation of sport' due to the hosting of the 2012 Games in London. He stressed the need to protect the autonomy of sport and outlined the BOA's leading role in helping NGBs to be well-equipped. This concern to protect the autonomy of NGBs reflects the BOA's determination to remain

independent and maintain its own autonomy. However, it should be noted that the BOA seems to be moving towards convergence with the government objective which requires sporting bodies to be 'fit for purpose', in order to ensure that Team GB achieves 4th in the Olympic medal table in 2012 (BOA, 2006a). The following comment by the Chief Executive of the BOA may indicate one of the motives behind the proactive involvement of the BOA in changing organisational structure and knowledge-sharing with business partners through the introduction of such initiatives as FTSE-BOA.

The public's judgement of the success of the 2012 Olympic Games will not be by how efficient the Organising Committee (LOCOG) is, nor by how beautifully architecturally-designed the stadiums are, but by how many Team GB athletes stand on the podium with medals around their necks. Delivering Olympic success cannot be achieved cheaply or overnight, and sport was vocal in its insistence that greater support was required now if Team GB was to be hugely successful in 2012.

(Simon Clegg, quoted in BOA, 2006a: 7)

The above quote suggests that the BOA increasingly senses its 'ownership' of Olympic NGBs and responsibility for delivering the medal target. This may have stirred some disagreement between the BOA and UK Sport in the way they wish to approach the governing bodies of sport. However, it is imperative to note that speculation about the differences in opinion and approach between the two national bodies seems to have alerted NGBs and particularly caused concern for performance directors. One senior official from the BOA admitted that the problem was intensified after the award of the 2012 Games to London. He tentatively explained 'politics' as follows:

...as long as they (performance directors and head coaches) perceive that the BOA and the funding agency, UK Sport, and the Institutes all are saying the same thing and all working closely together...[and] if we were all, as we say, singing from the same hymn-sheet, there is no problem. Where the performance directors find there is a problem is if there is a disagreement between the BOA and UK Sport. And currently, very publicly, there are differences in approach.

(BOA Senior Official, Interview 31 July 2007)
With regard to the case of the disagreement over UK's anti-doping policy between the two organisations, this senior BOA official observed that the principal problem is a loss of faith by performance directors of the Olympic NGBs. He admitted that there are issues over the "confidence of the sport in the two organisations", which they perceive as "a complete waste of energy and time and sometimes money" when faced with the conflict between the two central agencies, the BOA and UK Sport (original emphasis, BOA Senior Official, Interview 31 July 2007).

The above quotes and the previous discussion illustrate the interesting relationships between UK Sport, the BOA and NGBs. On the one hand, it is plausible to argue that NGBs are increasingly shaped by the requirement of UK Sport to modernise their organisational management and to implement governance structures which adhere to the government objective, so as to elicit performance funding. On the other hand, the perceived discrepancies in opinion between the quasi-elite sport government agency and the politically independent Olympic body, which may have resulted in some loss of confidence from the NGBs, could influence the robustness and effectiveness of the high-performance structures and 'pathways to the podium' that are being created.

Increasing complexities and the 'cost' of the devolved elite sport system:
UK Sport– Home Nations’ Sports Councils– Specialist Sport Institutes

It is likely that the aspiration to establish a 'one-stop shop' model for the elite sport development system faces further barriers due to the advance of devolution and the establishment of Devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, where sport is a devolved area of policy. Clearly, there are inherent complexities in having four different national representations in some international competitions and four respective high performance strategies and specialist institutes. The governing bodies of sport exist at home country level as well as UK/British governing body level. While in Table 6.1, three patterns of sport representation in the UK have been identified, Table 6.2 indicates the way 23 'overlapping' governing bodies represent the UK or Home Countries and the way they are funded.

With regard to the crucial element of sustaining British international competitiveness, both HCSCs and UK Sport are conscious of the necessity of pooling enough young athletes and developing and implementing the framework for talent identification and development (see Section 6.4). Sportscotland has developed its Long-Term Player Development (LTPD) model...
to establish performance pathways and the Sports Councils of Wales and Northern Ireland have similarly addressed the need for a Long-Term Athlete Development (LTAD) model to be implemented to provide a wider opportunity for talented athletes (for the case of Northern Ireland, stated as “Talent Athlete Development Model”; see sportscotland, 2007; SCW, 2005a, 2006; SCNI, 2005).

Table 6.2: ‘Overlapping’ Governing Bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK vs. Devolved Representation:</th>
<th>Overlapping Sport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 ‘overlap’ sport which receive funding from UK Sport and HCSCs</td>
<td>Canoeing, Equestrian, Ice Skating, Modern Pentathlon, Rowing, Sailing, Water Skiing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 7 UK/British Sports which do not compete in major competitions at Home Country level (but receive funding below WCPP from HCSCs)</td>
<td>Athletics, Cycling, Gymnastics, Judo, Shooting, Swimming, Triathlon, Weightlifting, Wrestling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 9 UK/British Sports which occasionally compete at Home Country level (in Commonwealth Games)</td>
<td>Badminton, Basketball, Boxing, Hockey, Curling, Table Tennis, Volleyball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 7 Devolved Sports, which come together at UK/British level only for the Olympics</td>
<td>Adapted from DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While elite athletes from any of the home countries at the World Class Podium level are eligible to be funded by UK Sport, it is the responsibility of HCSCs and the devolved National Governing Bodies to make commitment to support athletes below the Podium level. Therefore, it is no surprise that there are inconsistencies in running the high-performance programme and that UK Sport faces difficulties in establishing an overarching structure for high performance and coherent standards across the UK, due, in part, to its weak capacity to influence the Home Country NGBs.

A further difficulty may stem from the fragility of sport funding and the different levels of funding that may affect the development of elite athletes and support provision. As noted in the National Audit Office report, the decreased income of the National Lottery has affected the level of resources available to athletes during the Athens-cycle (NAO, 2004), and the soaring cost of the London Olympics and Paralympics might influence future funding for elite sport. In the meantime, there is an anxiety over further discrepancies in funding streams, for instance, for the development of full-time professional coaches and implementation of the sport-specific five-level UK Coaching Certificate (UKCC) across the UK. It was acknowledged that in comparison to their English and Welsh counterparts, who have established funding streams to support volunteer coaches, and in light of the Scottish success at the Commonwealth Games and in achieving its goal in LPTD, the Scottish coaches may be at a disadvantage that may create “a source of potential embarrassment for SGBs and
sportscotland" due to lack of resources, which is likely "to jeopardise the UK nature of the coaching certificate" (Vaga Associate, 2006: 25). It is not unreasonable to assume that the devolved set-up and different capacities of HCSCs and sport governing bodies may undermine the development of a UK-wide sport policy and aspirations for the British success.

The regionalised set-up of Home Country Institutes also illustrates the aspiration to provide a coherent athlete-centred support. An EIS regional manager felt that, although initially there had been competition between institutes, it has now become crucial to establish a "good working relationship" with lead sports across different institutes to ensure that the level of specialist services and support is focused around the needs of athletes. She explained the institutional shift in value from a "competitive element to one of cooperation", based on an emerging "consistent partnership agreement", as follows:

...whatever the sport, there is a mechanism like trying to make sure [that there is] consistency, and not different regions trying to do different things with the sport; [with] nine different Regional Managers (of EIS) trying to speak to the performance directors at the same time...Regions have been recognizing that different regions have different strengths that [there is] expertise they haven't got. Naturally, sharing that expertise [and] being able to find solutions for each other, and just making the institute work nationally, is [a] better situation than being overtly competitive.

(EIS Regional Manager, Interview 02 August 2007)

It is important to note that cooperation between different regions with their respective lead sports and the idea of 'partnership-working' reflect the broad policy emphasis of the Labour government Nevertheless, a senior BOA official held that "one of the costs of spreading our institutes all around the country" is that it could "dilute the quality of support", because it is "impossible to deliver the very best support for all of your very best athletes" (BOA Senior Official, Interview 31 July 2007). It would seem, however, that as long as the support services currently provided by the regionalised institute structure are focused around individual athletes and achieving 'partnership', this model can be seen as quite rational.

6.2.6 Summary
It should be emphasised here that since the creation of UK Sport in 1997 and the EIS in 2002, the support provision for the enhancement of elite athletes’ performances has been shifting towards being much more scientifically and medically oriented, for which the sport institutes provide specialist support. As argued, the award of the Olympic and Paralympic Games may bring about conflicts and struggles among elite sport agencies at national and devolved levels over funding allocations and distributions and the extent of their influence over one another. However, it has certainly strengthened the monitoring and evaluation role of UK Sport regarding the performance of NGBs and has it also raised the interest of the BOA in promoting sporting ‘independence’ for NGBs. It is worth noting that the change in relationships between the national sporting bodies has been driven not only by 2012 but also by domestic requirements, such as modernisation and the concern to make effective use of public funding. Nonetheless, despite not being explicitly expressed, the underlying pressure to maximise the British performance based on a structured support system may have come from other countries’ success and technological and scientific developments (c.f. UK Sport/SPLISS, 2006). However, the way the inter-agency relationships develop in the course of preparation for the London Games remains to be seen.

6.3 Financing Excellence and the Targeting of Resources

In recent decades, an increasing proportion of high performance investment has been targeted at medal-potential athletes and NGBs in the UK. The delivery of high performance funding is bureaucratically operated and conditional on the production of World Class Performance Plans by NGBs and the success in meeting their performance target (see UK Sport, 2002b; Green, 2004a; Green, 2005). In their comparative research, the SPLISS project identified that the UK has the ‘greatest advantage’ in terms of the total national expenditure on sport (UK Sport/SPLISS, 2006; also de Bosscher, et al, 2008). It has been shown that, in addition to the Exchequer budget, a large sum of Lottery funding has been allocated to UK Sport, the EIS and other elements of elite support. Since the Secretary of State appointed UK Sport to be a distributor of Lottery funding in July 1999, this non-departmental public body has supported governing bodies of sport and individual athletes through managing and distributing ‘public’ investment. Mention has already been made of the fact that UK Sport took over the responsibility for world class success from the GB Sports Council in 1997 and that world-class performance support provision (World Class Plans) was transferred from Sport England in 2006, although Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish athletes
remain supported by their home countries until they reach the World Class Podium level. In line with the government's strategic objective, UK Sport has a 'contractual obligation', as the recipient of Grant-in-Aid (GIA), Exchequer and Lottery funding, to produce a three-year Funding Agreement with the DCMS for assuring the best use of public expenditure (c.f. UK Sport, 2005f). On top of existing government support, the award of the Olympic/Paralympic Games to London resulted in the additional government investment (£200m, plus £100m commercial income) to ensure British success on its home soil. What should be highlighted is that UK Sport calculates and assesses the level of performance by using a formula which takes a target-driven, 'no compromise' approach to maximise the medal winning performance successes.

The following section aims, firstly, to examine the trends in the amount of public money and Lottery funds distributed, particularly during the most recent Athens and Beijing Olympic-cycles, and to discover to which strategic working areas that funding was allocated with reference to the three-tier strategic policy areas. UK Sport's Reports and Accounts, along with its business plan and Annual Report, are the particular source of the data collected and analysed for this purpose. One should be cautious, however, in that it is sometimes difficult to track down the precise allocation of budget, mainly because of the inconsistent description or categorisation of resources/data for the total amount distributed. Given these shortcomings, this section aims to provide as accurate picture as possible of the amount of government subsidy and to identify those NGBs and athletes who are prioritised and the targeted areas of elite service. The second objective in this section is to consider whether the available Lottery money has allowed athletes and elite coaches to train full-time. The section then examines how the focus and values of UK Sport have changed as reflected in the decisions over the allocation of Exchequer funding.

6.3.1 Trends in public expenditure for elite sport performance

It should be noted that determining a precise amount invested by the Great Britain Sports Council (GBSC) for elite development prior to 1997 is not easy. It is also difficult to identify the expenditure on high performance allocated by Sport England and UK Sport before their responsibilities were streamlined. However, Graph 6.1 indicates a gradual increase in public subsidies directed into sport before 1997, when more than £200m has become available owing to the introduction of the National Lottery which gave a huge financial boost to developing elite and potential athletes in the UK.
Of 16.6% of National Lottery allocated to sport, UK Sport has become a distributor of 9.2% to support elite athletes. Graph 6.2 helps us to identify the additional resources from Lottery Funding invested in developing and supporting high performance athletes through the World Class Performance Programme. It shows that an average of £20m from the Grant-in-Aid (GIA) and the Lottery subsidies were invested each year during the Athens' Olympic cycle (2001-2005) and that, due to the decrease in Lottery revenue, there is a much stronger reliance on the Exchequer subsidies as a significant financial base for supporting elite sport provisions.

Graph 6.1: Grant-in-Aid and National Lottery Budget Allocation (1977-2006)


Note: The Great Britain Sports Council was funded until 1997 when UK Sport and Sport England came into existence due to the transition period. The National Lottery was introduced in 1996 and allocated the revenue to Sport England from 1997 and to UK Sport from 1999.
Graph 6.2: Exchequer Budget & National Lottery to UK Sport

Source: UK Sport GIA/National Lottery Report and Accounts, 1999-2005 (respective years); Sport England Annual Reports, 2000-2006 (respective years)
Note: These figures are based on net income. The duration of National Lottery availability in 1999/2000 was nine months.

In line with its strategic objectives, UK Sport largely classifies major funding streams in two ways depending on different programmes. It is notable that, as can be seen from Table 6.3, Lottery money is mainly distributed to support NGBs in providing elite-specific services and performance-related personnel, and to support elite athletes' living costs, personal training and necessary equipment costs through the WCPP. NGBs are also supported with Lottery grants in bidding for and staging international sport competitions (World Class Events Programme). The Exchequer GIA funding complements the Lottery fund and assists the functions of UK/GB National Governing Bodies to ensure that structures are in place for delivering the medals and investing in the areas of, inter alia, the development of performance programmes and governance structures (previously invested in modernisation.
programmes), the UK’s anti-doping programme and the activities of partner organisations such as sports coach UK and international sporting representation (see more detail in 6.5.1).

Table 6.3: Strategic Area and Funding Provisions of UK Sport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Priorities</th>
<th>Overall Objectives</th>
<th>Examples of Programmes</th>
<th>Funded through</th>
<th>Average fund yr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Class Performance</td>
<td>To support athletes to succeed on the world-stage</td>
<td>World Class Podium Programme World Class Development Programme World Class Talent Programme (World Class Performance Programme) Athlete Personal Awards - “Winning Athletes”</td>
<td>NL for athletes GIA for NGBs</td>
<td>£2.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To develop skilled people to support UK world-class athletes</td>
<td>Elite Coach Programme SS/SM Fast Track Practitioner Programme</td>
<td>GIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To drive the development of a world-class high performance system for the UK</td>
<td>EIS; TASS TASS 2012 Scholarships</td>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>10.5m 4m 1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide Impact</td>
<td>To establish the UK as an authoritative and leading player in world-class sport</td>
<td>An increase in British representation Supporting IFs in the UK Establish Memoranda of Understanding for international partnership</td>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>£400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To develop an international development assistance programme in through sport</td>
<td>International Development Assistance Programme</td>
<td>GIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To develop a sport-focused strategy for staging major international events across the UK</td>
<td>World Class Events Programme</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>£1.6m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Class Standards</td>
<td>To lead a world-class A-D programme for the UK</td>
<td>UK Sport NGB Agreement OOC T A-D Testing programme</td>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>£1.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To work with athletes and others for promoting the highest standards of sporting conduct</td>
<td>100%ME education programme 100%ME Tutor Ambassador Outreach Programme</td>
<td>GIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UK Sport, 2002c

6.3.2 ‘The most effective use of money, the highest return on investment’

The original idea for the World Class Performance Programme came from the GBSC and from the Lottery Strategy of Sport England. Since 1999, the World Class Lottery Fund has been enabling UK Sport to provide financial support to WCPP athletes and, in addition to the UK Sport programme, Sport England separately supported the World Class Potential and Start athletes in England through its World Class Plans up until March 2006. The Athlete Personal Awards (APAs) directly finance athletes on the WCPP. The Awards are means-tested and categorised in three ways for contributions to the sporting and living costs incurred (annual average of £764 in 2001/2; £17,800 in Athens cycle). As many as 339
athletes were supported through WCPP to prepare for the Athens Games, with athletics (52),
rowing and sailing (47 each) receiving the most investment (UK Sport, 2004a). Other Home
Country Sports Councils have their own allocation of Lottery funding for use, in respect of
performance and development programmes, for those athletes who have not as yet reached
the world-class performance level (Welsh Élite Cymru; Athlete Support Programme in
Scotland).

The significance of APAs should be highlighted because it has made it possible, for the first
time, for athletes training ‘full-time’ to be supported financially and to be provided with a
widened access to support provision. In the report presented by the British Athletes
Commission, 73% of the 2004 Athens Olympians considered themselves as ‘full-time’
athletes, an almost similar number to that from the Sydney Olympics (British Athletes
Commission, 2004:10). The APAs is complemented by the Athlete Medical Scheme run by
the BOA and the holistic Performance Lifestyle Programme (previously known as Athlete
Career and Education: ACE UK). The latter programme has become much more important in
managing the athletes' career transition and maintaining the balance between their sporting
careers and their normal life-style, including education. Its objective was stressed by the UK
Sport Head of Operations as being: “to provide guidance on how to maximise their focus on
their sporting programme, whilst still fulfilling other important commitments such as career,
family, social or financial” (Simon Le Fevre, quoted in UK Sport, 2006a: 33; see more in
6.5.2).

However, a senior BOA official questioned the ‘positive’ impact of public funds available to
elite athletes in comparison to his time as a ‘full-time’ high performance athlete with full-time
work stating that although “Lottery funding has enabled athletes to train more effectively with
better rest”, those athletes are “becoming slightly ‘pampered’,...looked after far too well and
expecting far too much” (Interview, 31 July 2007). Nonetheless, it should be recalled that
even after Lottery funding made it possible for athletes to train ‘full-time’, a large number still
remain reliant on personal income from corporate sponsorship, or even from parents, and
prioritise the commercial circuit rather than domestic competitions organised by NGBs in
order to maximise income through prize money (Green & Houlihan: 2005). The financial
pressures for elite athletes were also expressed in the Athens Athlete Report from the British
Athletes Commission (2004). Although 73% of Athens Olympians responded that they
considered themselves to be full-time athletes, 56% of this number were in employment
(34% part-time, 22% full-time), and 46% of the female and 35% of the male respondents to
the Athletes Commission were in debt due to their commitment to being an elite athlete (ibid,
10-11). Interestingly, it was reported that most of the athletes in debt have not had an
opportunity for gaining sponsorship (59.8%) or prize money (68.2% respectively) (ibid, 14). While the data for Olympians on WCPP tends to be inconclusive (see ISLP, 2005), the introduction of support provision like the "Get Sponsorship" web-site, collaboratively developed by UK Sport and the BOA, as well as the BOA’s OPEN (Olympic and Paralympics Employment Network) Programme, which provides flexible job opportunities for athletes, are the reflection of the domestic necessity for athletes to secure corporate financial support and to increase their income in order to continue as competitive athletes.

Lottery for ‘winning sport’

For the NGBs to elicit performance funding, they are required to submit to UK Sport a world-class performance plan together with targets for winning medals and improving their level in international rankings. In addition to considering the information about the number of podium athletes which is provided by each NGB, UK Sport assesses the medal potential to decide the level of WCPP funding. While some funding awards were made in the build up to the Sydney Games, it is difficult to identify the impact on performance because of the ‘short-term’ nature of the funding (see Cunningham, 2001). However, as stated before, it is clear that the introduction of WCPP has allowed the athletes to train and compete on a full-time basis with widened access to more competitions and training opportunities, and for performance directors and sport science/medicine specialists to be employed (UK Sport, 2001a). Table 6.4 indicates that, after the Games in Sydney and the securing of £25m annual funding from the government, the UK Sport investment mechanism prioritised 10 sports and investment was made accordingly.
### Table 6.4: UK Sport World Class Investment and Medals Won in Summer Games

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Athletics</strong></td>
<td>£20,378</td>
<td>£7,200</td>
<td>£6,300</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rowing</strong></td>
<td>£20,049</td>
<td>£8,640</td>
<td>£7,290</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cycling</strong></td>
<td>£17,494</td>
<td>£7,920</td>
<td>£6,800</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sailing</strong></td>
<td>£17,194</td>
<td>£7,380</td>
<td>£5,350</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Swimming</strong></td>
<td>£16,659</td>
<td>£6,120</td>
<td>£4,920</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canoeing</strong></td>
<td>£10,789</td>
<td>£3,600</td>
<td>£3,450</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equestrian</strong></td>
<td>£9,618</td>
<td>£4,320</td>
<td>£2,760</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gymnastics</strong></td>
<td>£7,253</td>
<td>£1,830</td>
<td>£3,630</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hockey</strong></td>
<td>£8,573</td>
<td>£2,880</td>
<td>£2,880</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Badminton</strong></td>
<td>£6,953</td>
<td>£480</td>
<td><strong>£629</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shooting</strong></td>
<td>£4,817</td>
<td>£1,080</td>
<td>£1,080</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Triathlon</strong></td>
<td>£3,897</td>
<td>£1,445</td>
<td>£1,845</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diving</strong></td>
<td>£4,586</td>
<td>£1,980</td>
<td>£920</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modern Pentathlon</strong></td>
<td>£4,658</td>
<td>£1,620</td>
<td>£155</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boxing</strong></td>
<td>£4,660</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td><strong>£0</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Volleyball</strong></td>
<td>£4,040</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basketball</strong></td>
<td>£3,990</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fencing</strong></td>
<td>£2,719</td>
<td>£720</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water Polo</strong></td>
<td>£3,133</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Handball</strong></td>
<td>£2,986</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tae kwondo</strong></td>
<td>£2,284</td>
<td>£720</td>
<td>£420</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Archery</strong></td>
<td>£2,371</td>
<td>£900</td>
<td>£168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table Tennis</strong></td>
<td>£2,219</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wrestling</strong></td>
<td>£1,992</td>
<td>£360</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Synchronised Swimming</strong></td>
<td>£1,617</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weightlifting</strong></td>
<td>£1,437</td>
<td>£180</td>
<td>£45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (£’000)</strong></td>
<td>£191,890</td>
<td>£58,155</td>
<td>£50,304</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>*16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**GB medal position** | 10 | 10 | 36 | 13 | 12

**Source:** UK Sport, 2004a; UK Sport World Class Performance Programme Summer Olympic Investment 2005–2009; IOC Medal Table (for respective years)

**Note:** Funding is described as £’000 (million);
The two most commercially successful sports (soccer and tennis) do not gain funding from UK Sport;
*This includes bronze medals for tennis;
**Hockey, badminton and boxing were mainly funded by Sport England;
# indicates those sports tailored to the support of individual athletes.
The medal potential, the evidence of a performance system to produce a number of talented athletes, a track record of achievement and value-for-money investment have all become key indicators used to identify the prioritised events (UK Sport, 2002b: 28). It was claimed that "the development of a World Class programme and priorities reflects a growing public awareness that...winning medals is just as important as getting people to take part in sport" (ibid, 8).

Table 6.4 shows that a total of £50.3m was invested in the Summer Olympic NGBs during the Athens four-year cycle (excluding the funding to individual athletes). The biggest sum (£8.3m) was granted to UK Athletics, plus overall funding to individual athletes of £3.1m. The above Table shows that four sports (athletics, cycling, rowing, and sailing) have consistently been the top priority sports, being awarded a total of £27m, 55% of total WCPP funding. In return, they produced 61% of the overall medals in Athens. Immediately after the Athens Olympics, the National Audit Office (NAO) scrutinised the overall cost of £83.5m, which includes funding to WCPP athletes (reported as 339 athletes), during the Athens cycle allocated by UK Sport. Although there were some inherent limitations, what could be seen as significant in the NAO report is that a medal-based performance indicator (£ per medal) was used to examine the effectiveness of investment, i.e. Olympic medals. It is concluded that an average cost of per medal was £2.4m, with eight sports not meeting their individual targets and six of them not delivering any medals. If all sports had met their targets, the average cost per medal would have been £1.7m (NAO, 2005).

In response to the NAO's recommendations to be "more focused" and to take "tough decisions based on performance", UK Sport developed a new 'performance investment model' to maximise its return on investment (NAO, 2005). Consequently, UK Sport operated with DCMS as well as NGBs increasingly on a contractual basis through funding agreements and performance measures (Green, 2004). Nevertheless, taking into consideration the limitations of target setting for medals and the absence of any challenge to UK Sport as the primary support for NGBs as highlighted in the NAO report (NAO, 2005: 33-6), it can be seen that the management of the high performance field was becoming increasingly contested between NGBs and technical. As expected, on the one hand, the three most successful sports in Athens (rowing, cycling, sailing) initially gained an extra £1m, and sports like equestrian and archery, which had exceeded the original target, secured more funding. On the other hand, athletics, which had the highest level of funding in Athens but failed to meet its agreed target of 5-7 medals, achieving only 4 medals, faced a cutback in funding.
Although anxieties about the uncertainty and instability of resource availability had previously been expressed by UK Sport, the Government confirmation of its financial commitment (£200m Exchequer subsidies) through to 2012 meant that, in the words of the then Sports Minister: “UK Sport won the argument with the Treasury, and the sports must respond now” (Richard Caborn, quoted in BBC News, 08 May 2007). After taking increased responsibility for establishing integrated performance pathways with £3m of Lottery money transferred from Sport England, the 2006 Chancellor’s Budget announcement hugely boosted the availability of public money to UK Sport and led to the investment formula of “No Compromise Investment Strategy” (UK Sport, 2006c). This now eliminated the ‘prioritised’ form of investment in NGBs under the UK Sport World Class Pathway model (see Diagram 6.2 in later section). The announcement of the “No Compromise” strategy in 2006 can be seen as UK Sport’s determination to be “ruthless about our podium potential in every event, studying every aspect...and invest accordingly”, and thus, “[we] must reinforce the best, support those developing and provoke change in the under-performing” (UK Sport, 2006a: 2). It was estimated that a minimum of £45,000 would be necessary to support each podium level athlete (UK Sport, 2005a). A World Class Pathway has accordingly been re-developed as a structure for funding with three key levels (World Class Podium, Development and Talent; see Diagram 6.2). It is somewhat surprising that an almost tripled budget has been allocated even to those under-performing sports like handball, volleyball and basketball that have never had a track record of success and whose organisational as well as domestic performance structures are still immature and evolving. Nevertheless, the performance-led business approach remained in the “Funding Release Triggers” issued with a “100 Day Plan” for specifying performance and governance criteria. Based on this, UK Sport would decide on the further release of funding to NGBs. Regardless of the level of performance and success, all Summer Olympic disciplines (apart from tennis and soccer) are, for the first time, allocated initial funding of £17m (2006/7 FY). It can be argued that this ‘no compromise’ approach is aimed at making UK Sport a robust authorising, reinforcing and monitoring body. It has been claimed that UK Sport is “committed to delivering against a transparent, responsible and performance driven process” and ensuring appropriate governance arrangements for NGBs (UK Sport, 2006c). Admitting that the distribution of funding to all Olympic sport is far from easy, but that the ‘no compromise’ approach taken is the ‘most equitable’ way, the Chair of UK Sport claimed that:

Public funding should never be a given – it must be earned. It is for the sports and athletes now to prove by their performances in the next three years that this investment is justified and indeed should be increased as they build up to
London 2012. And they must also demonstrate they are fit for purpose in handling public funds.

(Sue Campbell, quoted in UK Sport News, 11 April 2006)

The subsequent “Mission 2012” statement has further strengthened the role of UK Sport as a monitoring, auditing and evaluation body to NGBs, demanding that they conform in producing performance planning to develop successful athletes, establish performance systems and structures and to enhance corporate governance (UK Sport News, 08 May 2007; 23 May 2007).

The row between UK Sport, Sport England and the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) over freezing funding, followed by the governmentally-commissioned independent Mallin Review (2007) that investigated the governance structure and strategic direction of basketball, should be used as an illustration in this context. What is interesting here is the direct condemnation of FIBA by the way UK Sport and Sport England suspended £325,000 funding to England Basketball from 01 October 2006 while they waited for Mallin Review to be published (due to be published in November 2006 but delayed till July 2007). This independent review concluded that there was unsuitability of organisation with disparate governance and weak execution providing a lack of “performance culture”, and hence an “untenable organisation” (Mallin Review, 2007: 10). In retaliation, FIBA criticised UK Sport and Sport England for “unacceptable interference” and being “abusive”, by threatening all the English team with disqualification from participating in European Championships (The Guardian, 23 May 2007; England Basketball Newsletter, 24 May 2007). FIBA set the deadline for 15th June, but delayed it until 13th July 2007, to solve the domestic problems, otherwise all English teams would be threatened with being banned from all FIBA competitions49. In answer to FIBA’s criticism, UK Sport, as well as Sport England, maintained its legitimacy over its intervention and denied the claim of being an ‘untenable organisation’ for England Basketball in relation to establishing an effective pathway and to achieving maximum return on investment. This is highlighted in the following quote from UK Sport’s Chief Executive that:

...our approach is not solely based around accountability – it is fundamental to our drive to improve performance. That is our end game: sports that are well run, using their investment wisely and well across the performance pathway will perform better...the nation deserves a return of its investment and we will help sports deliver it.

It was again the British Olympic Association that criticised the move by UK Sport and endorsed the move by FIBA, by claiming the "autonomy of governing bodies" and that the role of the government "must be to empower governing bodies, not to micro-manage the process" (Colin Moyihan, quoted in BBC News, 22 May 2007). Even though there were strong criticisms and threats to ban the English players from playing internationally by FIBA, UK Sport resisted this coercion, maintaining its stance with regard to the domestic body, though it eventually released the funding on 16 July 2007, right after the FIBA deadline, and subsequently set up the British Performance Basketball (BPB), with the consent of DCMS and the Treasury, as a subsidiary 'performance company' whose function is directly overseen by UK Sport (Mallin Review, 2007).

In the light of the discussions regarding international policy regimes, it is important to acknowledge that the above conflicts illustrate the difference in values between the international sporting organisation, which is the international authoritative body for the national federations and for setting qualification standards, and the quasi-governmental organisation, which is accountable for public money as well as taking the steering role for the domestic governing bodies. It may be suggested that the priority of domestic policy was to improve the governance structure and ensure performance, while an international governing body of sport could exercise a suspension of national body if it was dissatisfied with the domestic body's organisational performance.

Of particular importance here on the issue of basketball is that there is considerable evidence to show target-setting and business-model funding, the criteria for which have been much tightened by UK Sport partly in response to the National Audit Office report, and organisational structural changes have been made in accordance with the values required by UK Sport (c.f. NAO, 2005; Deloitte & Touche, 2003a). Hence, it is reasonable to recognise that NGBs "have been/are 'compelled' to play by the rules" set by UK Sport (Green & Houlihan, 2004: 401; see also Green, 2004). Further attention should be drawn to the fact that the move towards a high-performance, target culture seems to have been shared by the BOA. A senior BOA official acknowledged that it is not just UK Sport, but also the BOA, which has "joined the game" by setting the target of becoming the 4th in the medal list for the 2012 Olympics. However, this official showed his concern over the BOA's drift towards over-emphasising performance achievement, stating as follows:
The BOA also makes lots and lots of statements about medal targets and medallists and we make much more fuss about medallists than perhaps we should...we have so much talk of targets, targets, and targets...[but] there's enough pressure in sports without having targets, [the] pressure as in competitive pressure!

(BOA Senior Official, Interview 31 July 2007)

According to this BOA official, the pressure for achieving targets has not allowed NGBs or coaches to work in a long-term but has constantly forced them into taking short-term views "because they have to achieve the next set of targets".

Moreover, the extent of enforcement and the feeling of urgency to deliver targets have become evident. Reviewing the Netherlands, Australia and Italy, the NAO report stressed international rivalries in the last part of the document, especially the "likely strength of Asian teams". Increasing standards of performance were seen as one of the central areas of anxiety, leaving no room for complacency in the development of an elite sport structure (NAO, 2005: 40). The conclusion from the SPLISS project is also instructive on this point. It argues that: "rules of the games are dictated by what rival nations are doing, not on the basis of what an individual nation is doing now compared with what it did in the past" (UK Sport/SPLISS, 2006: 16). This point is emphasised by the UK Sport Chief Executive, who said that "...we cannot stand still for a moment and we need a way to shine a light on progress...whilst facing up the harsh reality of international competition" (John Steele, quoted in UK Sport News, 08 May 2007). It is beyond doubt that calculations of athletes' capabilities for delivering medals are complex, since the performance progress in other countries has to be factored in. Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that the enduring theme of maximising the chances of winning medals is also related to the direction of international sport policy development and the adherence to, or compliance with, international requirements, e.g. anti-doping policy.

Exchequer budget for robust structure and international relations

The purpose of Exchequer funding is distinctively different from the one illustrated for Lottery money. It is allocated to establish a strong sporting infrastructure that is expected to complement the World Class Pathway Programme. The budget from the government is mainly distributed to subsidise the strategic administrative areas shown in Table 6.5, although it is strongly inter-connected to the objectives of the performance-focused Lottery money, in respect of ensuring the effective administrative system to be implemented, in order
to deliver the best support services for athletes. In addition, it is the Exchequer funding where a wider range of organisations is supported, including the partner organisations of UK Sport and non-Olympic bodies. It can be said that, with all the various objectives, the overall aim is to extend the domestic and international influence of UK Sport and Britain in general.

Table 6.5: UK Sport funding in its ‘Strategic Areas’ (£ m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic areas</th>
<th>Sports Bodies</th>
<th>Sport Services</th>
<th>International Representation</th>
<th>Drug-Free Sport</th>
<th>Strategic area in total</th>
<th>Total Grant-in-Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>£33,905</td>
<td>£2,828</td>
<td>£1,882</td>
<td>£3,003</td>
<td>£36,908</td>
<td>£53,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>£13,311</td>
<td>£3,206</td>
<td>£1,723</td>
<td>£2,839</td>
<td>£21,079</td>
<td>£28,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>£14,119</td>
<td>£4,264</td>
<td>£1,713</td>
<td>£1,952</td>
<td>£22,048</td>
<td>£23,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>£11,028</td>
<td>£3,021</td>
<td>£1,030</td>
<td>£1,522</td>
<td>£16,601</td>
<td>£23,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>£4,991</td>
<td>£1,777</td>
<td>£912</td>
<td>£1,917</td>
<td>£9,597</td>
<td>£15,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>£4,860</td>
<td>£1,127</td>
<td>£986</td>
<td>£1,507</td>
<td>£8,480</td>
<td>£16,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>£4,770</td>
<td>£1,135</td>
<td>£908</td>
<td>£1,380</td>
<td>£8,193</td>
<td>£12,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>£4,653</td>
<td>£1,080</td>
<td>£798</td>
<td>£1,468</td>
<td>£7,999</td>
<td>£12,327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UKSIA/G National Lottery Report and Accounts 1999-2006 (respective years)

To elaborate on this point, two elements are significant for understanding the extended steering role of UK Sport. Firstly, more than half of the Exchequer budget is dedicated to NGBs in order to establish and develop appropriate administrative and corporate governance systems and to appoint specialists for international sporting success. While the impact of modernisation programmes launched in 2001 will not be reiterated (see Green, 2004), the government is unequivocal about the ‘self-help’ of sport governing bodies, requiring modernisation and professionalisation, but, in return, they are given a “greater say over how those funds are spent” (DCMS, 2000: 19-20). Since 2001, with funding of £7m for a three-year modernisation project, UK Sport has provided support to NGBs to help them improve the quality of management and the competencies of their organisations and people, including the implementation of equity policies, with the ultimate aim of increasing participation and developing talent (UK Sport, 2001a: 8). The Chief Executive of the Royal Yachting Association acknowledged the significance of the role of UK Sport as a “neutral referee” or “neutral facilitator” which has helped to change its organisation, because it is “very hard to modernise on your own” (quoted in UK Sport, 2003a: 35).

In relation to the need for transformation of the sporting bodies and in response to the Cunningham Review of elite sport in 2001, one of the core recurrent themes is the development and support for high performance coaches (see more in detail in Section 6.5.1).
The engagement of UK Sport in coach development, elite coaches in particular, has been consistent since its inauguration. Among other partnership organisations, UK Sport has invested the largest amount of Exchequer money into sports coach UK, which is ultimately related to developing and implementing the UK Coaching Certificate system. In the immediate aftermath of the Coaching Task Force review in 2002, almost doubled amount of funding has been made available to SCUK for operationalising the UK-wide certificate system, as illustrated in Table 6.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Year</th>
<th>1997/98</th>
<th>1998/99</th>
<th>1999/00</th>
<th>2000/01</th>
<th>2001/02</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>£700,000</td>
<td>£700,000</td>
<td>£770,000</td>
<td>£745,000</td>
<td>£745,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td><strong>£1,590,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>£638,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>£1,201,209</strong></td>
<td><strong>£1,434,253</strong></td>
<td><strong>£425,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UK Sport Annual Reports for the figures between FY 1999/00-2002/3; SCUK Annual Reports for the figures FY 2003/4-2006/7.

Note: *Including the funding for both Main Award and the development of UK Coaching Certificate; **Including both Main Award and Research Grant; ***Based on predicted expenditure, including the Core Award only (UKS Annual Report, 2007: 8)

Although the subsidies to SCUK are related to a wide range of coach developments, it is only recently that UK Sport has started investing directly in nurturing and supporting high performance coaches. Responding to the Cunningham Review, UK Sport developed a World Class Coaching Strategy, which consists of enhancing professional development programmes and providing scholarship money for elite coaches and support specialists. The Strategy includes holding the annual World Class Coaching Conference, launched in 2001, and the three-year Elite Coach programme\(^\text{50}\). The latter programme was established just after the Athens Games in 2004 with £1m a year funding and aimed to have 60 elite coaches nurtured by UK Sport for the London Games in 2012 (UK Sport, 2007b: 22). As also seen in the recruitment of young people with expertise for UK Sport’s Fast-track Practitioner Programme (FPP) with £20,000 for each intern, it is significant that a growing amount of the budget is allocated to ensure holistic elite athletes’ support provisions.

While the second feature of the UK Sport investment can be seen as being of lesser significance compared to developing high performance programmes, the strategies with international perspectives should be seen as imperative, not only for maintaining the success

\(^{50}\) The initial intake of eight coaches were 'graduated' in November 2007 (UK Sport, 2007b: 22)
of British elite athletes, but also for influencing international sport politics. As shown in Table 6.5, with the doubled budget being available to this strategic area, a consistent logic can be found in terms of the increasing investment in promoting the UK’s representation in the ‘international corridors of sporting power’ (UK Sport, 1998). Since the early years, the significance of strengthening the British international presence and representation had been acknowledged and that being “at the heart of the decision-making process brings with it not only the ability to influence the development of sport internationally, but also the opportunity to secure more events for the UK – giving our athletes the competitive edge that home advantage brings” (UK Sport, 1998: 5). The International Representatives’ Grant Aid Programme annually invests about £400,000 for British representatives to attend meetings with the aim of bringing overall benefits to British athletes and sport. In this sense, the international representation within the international sporting bodies has become much valued for promoting domestic interests, not only by securing British representations on IFs and international non-governmental governing bodies of sport to influence the international development in sport, but also, ultimately, by securing competitive advantages for the British athletes (c.f. UK Sport, 2007b, 2006c).

Another systematic international involvement is the establishment of ‘global partnerships’ through international relations and promoting partnerships and agreements with other countries. As China and the UK are the next two host countries for the Summer Olympics, the British Prime Minister was engaged in making an inter-governmental agreement, particularly on business, with his Chinese counterpart, using sport as the diplomatic tool. These next two Olympic hosts agreed the sporting exchange of athletes and expertise, cooperating to achieve their respective national target. While the direct cost is not known, a number of Memoranda of Understandings has also been established with such countries as Saudi Arabia, Cuba and South Africa to exchange players and coaches and interact with young people in local areas, which is being founded on “a mutual love of sport” (UK Sport, 2005a: 41). In this case, sport is recognised as an instrument for building partnerships and harmonising relationships and for the sharing of information and personnel with other countries. It is hoped that this will not only influence international sporting administrative relations, but also create economic and political relations to benefit the UK. Furthermore, the value of sport for international relations is identified as a means of addressing and solving various issues such as health and education in developing countries or places left in need through conflict or disaster, and some £400,000 were invested in 13 countries through

51 The most recent example of using sport as a ‘diplomatic tool’ is the visit of Gordon Brown to China to meet Premier Wen Jiabao to negotiate the expansion of trade and investment. They watched the table tennis match and the Prime Minister Brown, who accompanied Kelly Holmes to China, mentioned to expand “a new programme of sports cooperation”, which “will build greater relationships and stronger bonds between our two great countries” (Gordon Brown, quoted in 10 Downing Street Transcript, 18 January 2008). See also Daily Telegraph, 19 January 2008.
international development projects in 2005 (UK Sport, 2006a: 7). Re-launching of the "International Development through Sport" programme may be the sign of re-engagement with collaborative relations with other countries through sport. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that the policy emphasis on “Learning from Overseas” cannot be found to the same extent in the early years of UK Sport, and the need for maintaining a strong presence and voice in the international sporting community has attracted much more policy importance since the successful lobbying which led to the London Games. It remains important to acknowledge that “gaining international influence by working with other nations to share experiences, knowledge and resources” plays a big part in elite sport policy strategy (see UK Sport, 1998: 5-7).

6.3.3 Summary of financing for excellence and targeting of resources

It is clear that the unprecedented availability of public funding for the cause of British excellence in sport has influenced the way NGBs perceive their performances as well as their organisational structure, and that UK Sport does not 'compromise' in its evaluation. The funding structure is centrally-driven, because on the four-year Olympic-cycle, and the recipients are increasingly influenced by the need for success against the agreed performance target, as well as the need for transformation to a modernised and professional management structure. Since gaining the right to distribute both Grant-in-Aid (in 1997) and Lottery funding (in 1999), UK Sport has tailored its distribution formula, to be principally based upon the level of success, as measured against the performance target. Although it is a relatively new phenomenon in the UK, the organisational (re)structuring should be seen in tandem with the NGBs' funding agreement.

It has been demonstrated that the usage of GIA and Lottery funding is differentiated depending on strategic areas of UK Sport, though it is sometimes not clear, and that in contrast to the decreased Lottery funding, public money from the Exchequer was increased by £5m in 2005/06, even before the decision of the 2012 Games. Even though the Athlete Personal Awards via the National Lottery has enabled a large number of international athletes to train ‘full-time’ and more than 70% of them consider themselves as ‘full-time’ athletes, it is interesting to note that half of funded athletes are engaged in some sort of employment, which is supported by UK Sport and the BOA. This may suggest an insufficient availability of funding to support all elite level athletes, or may indicate the high cost involved in maintaining the high performance athletes, even though specialist support is provided, by
EIS or other sports institutes in the devolved nations. It is also clear in Table 6.4 that performance determines the extent of WCPP funding from UK Sport and that the three most 'successful' sports have obtained the highest level of investment, with the highest return of medals. While the instability of public money and National Lottery funding has been a recurring theme (see UK Sport, 2002b; Cunningham Review, 2001), winning the additional guaranteed funding up to 2012 is seen as imperative. Nevertheless, the decision to initially allocate £17m equally to every Summer Olympic sport (except for soccer and tennis) poses interesting questions as to whether 'new' sports, which have neither a track record of international performance nor even a domestic performance structure, would transform the governance structure to produce 'credible performance' in 2012 (UK Sport, 2006a: 20). It can be observed that, on the one hand, there is a constant legitimisation of the funding mechanism through monitoring and evaluation by UK Sport, and on the other hand, there is an acceptance by NGBs of conforming to the values of their 'paymaster', including its 'modernisation' agenda and achieving performance targets, to elicit funding. Hence, this has led their dependence on resources. It should be reiterated that increasing investment in the 'complementary' strategic areas, in particular the programmes for international representation and development of coaches, may indicate a growing awareness of how to influence or lobby international sporting politics in favour of Britain, with consequent British performance advantages.

The GIA subsidies are also used for establishing Memorandam of Understanding and for training British representatives to IFs. This can also be seen as 'instrumental' means to achieve sporting as well as non-sporting objectives. However, the remaining key questions for potential consideration are whether the elite sport policy can maintain the equilibrium between investment for the high performance-edge and for grass-roots participation and development. There is some indication in this section that the largest ever investment in elite sport far outstrips funding for community sport. Based on the highly pragmatic inclination towards international success, as discussed, the next section gives a more detailed description and examination of the rationale behind the development of support provisions for elite athletes, focusing on the most recently discussed areas of talent identification and development.
6.4 Talent Identification and Development and Pathways to the Podium

In the previous section, it was claimed that producing development plans for elite athletes and effective investment strategies, that is, the highest return on investment (i.e. medals won in the Olympic Games), has become the core feature in the UK strategy for eliciting funding for NGBs. Supporting elite athletes, young potential and talented athletes has seemingly become a 'sophisticated science' and establishing an appropriate system to inspire young talented athletes to be nurtured and supported to their highest medal potential is increasingly accepted as the prerequisite of international sporting success (c.f. UK Sport, 2006a). As demonstrated before, the investment of National Lottery money in world-class athletes in Britain has indisputably enabled them to have more access to professional support services in order to have a better chance of success. However, even though a single performance framework has been formulated by UK Sport (see Diagram 6.2 in later section), it is still not clear how athletes can get into the part of a performance pipeline in each sport; how children are identified and selected, how they are nurtured and developed to a higher performance stage, and, most importantly, why and to what extent talent identification and development are perceived to be imperative by the national sporting governing bodies.

Given that different national, devolved, regional and local agencies have their respective responsibilities and approaches to identifying, selecting and developing talented performers (see Section 6.1), it is not surprising that the strategy for creating a 'one stop' talent development system and designing a system of identification of talented athletes is seen as extremely complex, and the questions of which, why, how, who, where, what and when excellence can be achieved should be given particular consideration (see Thomson, 1992). It is also fair to claim that, although the systematic talent identification, the multidisciplinary approach to identifying and developing athletes and the role of coaches throughout the development phases of athletes have attracted vast interest within the sporting as well as academic communities in the UK, there seem very few (successful) models, with the possible exceptions of the widely known “National Identification and Development (NTID)” programme in Australia and, though controversial and contested, the former Soviet Union and East Germany (see Hoare, 1998, 1996, 1995; Houlihan, 1997; Kozel, 1996; Sandner, 2004). It is reasonable to suggest that the validity or effectiveness of systematic talent identification, theorising and measurement for identifying and predicting talent has not reached a consensus, although its significance seems to have been endorsed (see Wolstencroft et al.,

32 The details of NTID can be found from: http://www.ais.org.au/talent/ (last accessed, 05 February 2008).
2002; IYS, 2001; Williams & Reilly, 2000; Reilly et al., 2000; Kozel, 1996). Academic and sporting interests and attempts at clarifying 'nature versus nurture' together with the interrelated concepts of 'gifted' and 'talented', has intensified the debate around the way to maximise their (sporting) potentials (see Tranckle & Cushion, 2006; Brown, 2001).

Introducing and aspiring to implement Long-Term Athlete Development (LTAD) in the UK (Long-term Player Development in the case of Scotland) as arguably one of the best models can be seen as an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of the fragmented and sporadic nature of developing talented young people. It is too early to assess the practical effectiveness of supporting young athletes from the stage where the focus is on 'fun' through to the 'excel' stage. However, this section intends to examine the way LTAD has been widely acknowledged as the best and most appropriate model in the UK, and the extent of the influence of LTAD on the values and concepts for identifying and developing talent and, accordingly, on the significance of developing high-quality coaches. The GB team's automatic qualification for the London Olympic Games in 2012 as the host country, and the ambitious target, entrenched the growing and urgent need for talented athletes to be effectively selected and supported up the talent ladder to the podium level (c.f. SCUK, Winter 2005). In the absence of a coherent framework, the creation of a national programme for the systematic identification and development of talented performers and for the improvements in the quality of coaching seems to have been the enduring theme for the sustainability of national elite sporting success in the UK.

Against this background, the objective of this section is, firstly, to give a brief overview of the change of focus in policy and the concept of talent identification and development from the late 1990s. Secondly, in acknowledging the policy dimension, it is intended to describe the absence of a systematic process to identify talented children and the growing awareness and interest in a systematic approach to seek out young people with talent and to develop these potential athletes. In particular, the sporadic problems inherited in this area in the UK will be highlighted. It is our contention that by briefly outlining LTAD's key elements, the intentions and the aspirations of some NGBs introduced in this model will become clear. Thirdly and more significantly, policy learning practices and policy transfer will be examined through recognition of existing 'effective' talent identification systems in other countries and it is intended to explore the content of these practices and the rationale behind the introduction of TID programmes. This leads to theoretical questions in relation to identifying the characteristics of policy transfer, whether learning and lesson drawing have voluntarily occurred or whether they have occurred by coercion in order to develop or change policy. The last objective in this section, and equally important, is to discuss the policy background
of the growing significance of improving the quality of coaches and coach education that are incorporated as the essential element of talent identification and development. Throughout the section, the extent to which the domestic arrangement of talent identification and development and coach education have been externally influenced and domestically internalised and adapted will be observed.

6.4.1 Increasing importance of the identification and development of sporting talent

A systematic approach to the identification and support of talent is a very recent phenomenon in the UK. Little evidence of systematic screening of talent based on specific tests was reported in the Sports Council's work in 1992 (Rowley, 1992). The identification of potential and subsequent capacity for success heavily relied upon parents' and children's own motivations (see Kay, 2000), and sports clubs and coaches played secondary roles. Without reliable sports science approaches, largely only competition results or coaches' 'gut-feeling' identified children with potential. Wolstencroft et al. also argue that a comparative absence of talent detection models, due to insufficient resources and expertise, led to a reliance on the current participation base and self-selection, although it is noted that there was increasing recognition by NGBs of the importance of systematic approaches in this matter (2002: 32). In addition, it has been acknowledged that the application of a scientific approach to identifying and selecting talented young people was neglected by sport in general, and more so with minor sports in the UK who suffered from an insufficient support structure for young people with the ability to achieve excellence (IYS, 2001: 5). A recurring concern can also be identified in relation to the intensive training and competition for children who specialised early in sport and, as a result, became psychologically and physically 'burned out' (Rowley, 1992).

Hence, the predominant characteristics of identifying and selecting talented young individuals in sport in the UK up to the late 1990s fall into two categories. Firstly, children were expected to participate in sport, trials or competitions and achieve a relatively high level, from which they would progress through as a selection by coach. Hence, social and environmental factors affected the degree and intensiveness of participation in sport and competitions that inevitably eliminated a certain group of children in society. Secondly, a detection or selection of young athletes relied upon the instincts and subjective judgement of coaches who had the inclination to focus on current performances and the biological age (physical maturation) of
young performers rather than measuring potential in a co-ordinated and systematic manner (e.g. Rowley, 1992; English Sports Council, 1998; IYS, 2001). The latter point was identified in the recent study as the 'relative age effect', which served as the key factor for the selection of a sports team, and it is certain that in some sports, like soccer, a large number of children were treated unfairly (Morris & Nevill, 2006). In Fisher and Borms' (1990) classification, it can be demonstrated that the UK adopted a 'person related' or unsystematic model on the assumption, rather naively, that talent would emerge on the basis of mass participation and junior competitions.

Needless to say, a number of elements influence the identification and development of young people. It is clear that talent identification and development in the UK had been unsystematic, largely based on a traditional pyramid model of a performance natural selection and progression approach, and sporadic attempts and investments made by NGBs and Sports Councils. Thomson, commissioned by the Scottish Sports Council in 1992, recognised four emerging approaches to the development of sporting talent, especially related to education sectors. These occurred at: i) private boarding schools; ii) certain universities and colleges, some offering scholarships; iii) certain NGBs (soccer and tennis specifically) through national sports centres or by offering special curricula to local secondary schools; and iv) commercially-operated tennis academies/centres (Thomson, 1992: 3). His analysis clearly indicated an absence of nationally recognised framework and identification programmes for sporting talent which corresponds to the above claim. It was left to sport/NGBs to work out the ways and means by which they were to engage in talent identification and development, with most opting for performance-oriented measures. The main issues concerning these independent initiatives in Britain were summarised by Wolstencroft et al. as follows:

...for most NGBs, talent detection and identification can often equate to selection of the young players who are able to perform the best at the time of testing as opposed to the selection of those with potential...physical maturity is indeed a determining factor in the selection of athletes...[there is] an inevitable bias because of selection policies at youth level that favour individuals that are more physically mature...As a further problem, the performance-oriented models widely employed by British NGBs, do not recognise the role of psychological factors in the development of sporting excellence (Wolstencroft et al., 2002: 32-3).

Abbott and Collins echo the above criticism of strong reliance on natural selection, stating that the current procedures for talent identification are based on a "limited range of variables
and base selection of the 'talented' on one-off proficiency measures" (2004: 396). In this regard, with the growing awareness that the development of young sporting talent is a multi-dimensional and continuous process, the recent studies have emphasised the incorporation of a holistic and dynamic dimension to identifying talent which considers psychological and cognitive capacities and game intelligence. There is also an emphasis on the avoidance of attaching too much importance to children with early physical maturity whose performances are largely based on their physique (e.g. Abbott & Collins, 2004; Williams & Reilly, 2000).

The relative laissez-faire approach of the development of sporting excellence relying on the voluntary involvement of children in sport and competitions was reviewed in Sport: Raising the Game (DNH, 1995) and was reflected in the subsequent proposal for the creation of a National Academy (DNH/Sports Council, 1995). Following the growing national policy interests in sport and the proposed distribution of National Lottery funds for talent identification and development and for sport scholarships, the National Coaching Foundation (currently sports coach UK) published a special issue on “Talent Identification and Development” in 1996, in which the international and domestic models were introduced (NCF, Spring 1996). The illustrations of the FA Programme for Excellence and the National School and Rugby League's professional recruitment and players' ladder system may have reflected the fragmented nature of the aspirations of each sport (Burns, 1996; Kear, 1996). In contrast, the examples from Australia, Germany and Canada were highlighted as successful TID systems which illustrated the utility of schools to test and pursue excellence in sport (NCF, Spring 1996). It can be demonstrated that a growing interest in talent identification was attributed to, on one hand, a decline in school sport and sports activities to the extent that they could no longer serve as the foundation for identifying talented young players/athletes, and, on the other hand, the increasing levels of performance, the intensification of international competitiveness and the increase of professionalisation, which require an early detection and nurturing of potential athletes.

As stated before, the creation of performance pathways from school playing fields to the Olympic medals has consistently featured in the arguments in recent national policy documents (see DNH, 1995; DCMS, 2000; DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002). The need for establishing a long-term performance pathway was recently well demonstrated in Sporting Future for All. As a primary objective for maintaining consistent future international sporting success, it was argued that:

Too often these (successful) individuals have thrived despite the system or relied on a chance encounter with an exceptional coach. We can no longer
rely on chance and goodwill. We need to learn the lessons of our competitor nations and have the most professional system for talent development and support of excellence...First, we need to widen the base of participation. Then we must ensure that those with ability are helped to develop their potential. The system must support talented young performers every step of the way. Good coaches are essential if we are to identify potential and develop talent (emphasis added; DCMS, 2000: 15).

From the above quote, four points signal the key elements for understanding the dominant problems inherent in the UK. First, and as discussed before, identifying talented performers had been un-structured and sporadic. Second, producing an integrated talent-development plan and expanding the availability of high quality coaches, competition opportunities and access to facilities and support services were identified as essential features if talent was to flourish. Such good practice would lead to the modernisation of NGBs if it were incorporated into the respective business plans (c.f. Cunningham Report, 2001). Third, despite widening sport participation and the strengthening of competition opportunities, the need for the multi-staged progression of children and talented athletes was stressed. At the same time, it was expected that the provision of Specialist Sports Colleges and coaches would play an essential role in bridging the gap between schools and clubs and in supporting talent through the (then) UKSI network centres, as well as appropriate support services. These were all stated as the core aspects for developing talent in the policy document (DCMS, 2001).

It is important, finally, to highlight that there is an acknowledgement that other countries have been engaged in identification and development of potential talent in a systematic manner. It is stated that "Successful sporting nations have created a clearly signposted pathway for talented young people and provided data to help identify those with the greatest potential to succeed" (DCMS, 2000: 15). It became apparent that there is a willingness to learn from other successful rival countries. While the policy document in 2000 did not specify which nations had implemented what kind of effective systems, the subsequent government policy document did identify Australia, the USA, Sweden and France as those countries that created the "well-established pathways" (DCMS, 2001: 39). Nevertheless, it was the Canadian Long-Term Athlete Development pathway model that was legitimised within the policy document, because this model had been "widely accepted abroad" (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 125). The appointment of Istvan Balyi as a consultant to sports coach UK may have indeed confirmed that it was not only a voluntary endorsement of the ideas of LTAD but also a transferring of expertise in order to implement the programme from Canada, and British Columbia in particular. It is also unreasonable to dismiss the influence of Australia on
the implementation of the development of talent identification programme in Britain (see more discussions below).

It can be argued that the most striking feature of *Game Plan* (2002) is that, for the first time, the proposal for the Long-Term Athlete Development was seen as a nationally-recognised concept for talent development. It was claimed that without a "shared conceptual framework for understanding the 'science' of talent development", and without a shared and co-ordinated approach, talent had been 'diluted' and efforts had been duplicated, with confusion over roles among governing bodies (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 124-5). The intention was to clarify the roles and responsibilities of each body at the different developmental stages, and this seems to have become a reference point in the UK. The LTAD model was incorporated into Sport England’s strategic paper (2004) in 'start, stay and succeed' in sport. As will be outlined in Table 6.7, a large number of NGBs have already developed and incorporated the principles of LTAD in their national strategic planning, with Sport England plays a large part. However, it is not surprising that the increasing need to create integrated and more systematic ways to approach the identification and development of talent strongly resembles the implementation of the World Class Pathway Programme operated by UK Sport. With its extended responsibility for the whole pathway process, UK Sport aims to create a more coherent system to produce ‘world class’ athletes and coaches (c.f. UK Sport, 2006f). The strategy for identifying “talent characteristics to reach the podium” was re-emphasised, with the implementation of a talent identification and development strategy being the condition of receiving the performance budget for 2012 (UK Sport, 2006b).

However, the extent to which UK Sport identifies LTAD as a significant model for establishing talent pathways is not clear due to the absence of the language of LTAD in its policy documents. Given that it has launched its own nationally-organized ‘fast-track’ talent identification programme, it is difficult to observe how UK Sport has incorporated the concept of LTAD into its strategic direction (see more in Section 6.4.2.4). It may be the case that the fundamental aim of UK Sport is focused on world-class sporting success and that it is acutely interested in the pathway to the very top. This may preclude LTAD’s emphasis on basic motor skills and early years’ experience of children as part of its strategy. Nevertheless, the creation of talent pathways or ‘windows of opportunity’, based around the principles of LTAD, have been recognised by a number of NGBs as one of the most important factors for sustaining elite sport performances and participation in sport. At the devolved nations level, due to the comprehensive review of talent identification and development programmes (Wolstencroft et al., 2002), sportscotland has introduced its Long-term Player Development as a co-ordinated approach and integrated pathway in Scotland by using similar language
and concepts to LTAD (sportscotland, 2005). While it is too early to assess whether athletes excelled to the international level because of this talent development system or framework, the above argument has made it possible to conclude that a large number of actors in sport have been made to realise the necessity for implementing some sort of systematic talent identification and development programme. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the principles of the LTAD model have been inspirational and shaped the policy discourse and the direction of development plans at the levels of devolved strategy, PE/school sport, NGBs and coach education.

6.4.2 Implementing the LTAD model and its impact

To recapitulate, there had been no theoretical and methodological consensus over talent identification, selection and development, though there is a growing awareness of the programmes in the countries of the UK. It seems conceivable that the concept of Long Term Athlete Development have corresponded well with the policy objective of the Labour Government, i.e. the twin-focus on participation and excellence, and the delivery in partnership. The distinguishing feature of the LTAD model is the aim to equip children with "physical literacy" by developing broad generic skills as the foundation for excellence, and to optimise the long-term development of young athletes (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 125-6). Accepting the anecdotal 'ten year or 10,000 hour rule', the entrepreneur of the LTAD model, Istvan Balyi, who works for Sport Canada and was appointed as a consultant to SCUK, stressed a player-centred approach to providing for the appropriate and specific needs of individuals, in order to realise their full potential within sport. By classifying early or late specialisation sports, Balyi stressed the role of coaches, teachers and parents with the emphasis on fundamental motor skills prior to specialising, which can be seen as one of the characteristics of LTAD (see Balyi, 2001; Balyi & Hailton, 1999). One of the reasons for selecting the LTAD model for sport development could be the need to overcome the persistent problem of over-competition/training of young children who then face 'burnout' or injuries even before they reach senior level (c.f. Rowley, 1992).

In its consultation paper, England Hockey (2005) recognised that the concept of the LTAD is "nothing new" and that its basis has already been widely accepted. However, the difference it makes, it is argued, is to bring "mass understanding and a mechanism for applying the theory to better integrate whole sports development systems i.e. coaching, training, playing, competition etc" (England Hockey, 2005: 2). As such, one of the core elements of the
proposed LTAD is the necessary partnership co-ordination and integration of key actors in order to provide stepping-stones from schools, clubs, local authorities, and the higher/further education sectors to the national sport agencies. In particular, as athletes progress higher up the development ladder (or 'Training to Compete/Win' stages of LTAD), it is stressed that the role of, and partnership between, NGBs and different levels of sport bodies is crucial. At different phases of development, different delivery partners play key roles that encourage sharing of "a common set of values and principles to enable partnership working" (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002: 126). Furthermore, the roles and responsibilities of high-quality coaches at different stages in LTAD have been highlighted, and the government has invested resources to improve the standard of coaches and coaching education initiated by sports coach UK.

6.4.2.1 Talent identification and development in schools

In the FUNdamental stage of LTAD, which recommends the provision of 'multi-sport camps' during school holiday time, the role of schools during the earlier stages of the progression from the 'playground' to the 'podium' is perceived to be the most crucial (Balyi, 2001). The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, emphasised the value of school sport as the first step on the performance ladder stating that it is the school where "children discover their talent and their potential... [and they] need clear pathways into taking part at club and national levels, with the right coaching and the right support at every stage" (Blair, quoted in DCMS, 2000: 2). Although the idea that PE and school sport plays a vital part in developing talent is far from new, the policy documents in the early 2000s illustrated the necessity of not only an improvement in standards of teaching PE and sport, but also more structured support provision and opportunities for competitions at several developmental stages in schools, thus providing talent pathways. One of the initiatives was the launch of PE and School Sport Club Links (PESSCL) in late 2002. This was to ensure 'high quality' experiences in PE, school sport and sport clubs (DfES/DCMS, 2003; 2004). This produced, in the words of Houlihan (2000), a 'crowded policy space' where schools are increasingly being expected to maximise the development of young sporting people through PE and school sport.

There seems willingness in the government to integrate the concept of LTAD and to establish talent development pathways into, among others, the Gifted & Talented (G&T) initiative targeting 12-16 year-olds. It is worth noting that, while the words 'gifted' and 'talented' are used interchangeably in government documents (e.g. DfES/YST, 2004), some attempt has been made to distinguish between them, with the 'raw material' being equated with gifts, and
the 'end product of formal learning' as talent (Trankle & Cushion, 2006; also see more discussions in Bailey & Morley, 2006; Neelans et al, 2005). It is suggested that G&T groups constitute the top 10% of young people (DfES/DCMS, 2003). Although searching for gifted and talented children is not exclusive to the realm of sport (see Neelans et al, 2005; Heller et al, 1993; DfEE, 1997), the understanding of pupils with 'high ability' in sport is defined widely to include not only those who have excelled in sporting performance, but also those who have demonstrated cognitive and creative abilities and/or good leadership or organisational skills (see Bailey & Morley, 2006; Talent Matters Home Page53).

It can be suggested that there was a considerable increase in YST's organisational influence in its role of supporting School Sport Partnerships for talent development in the PE curriculum and for supporting and developing talented young athletes, as well as creating talent pathways. Supported by YST, the School Sport Coordinators and Link Tutors are required to identify and support talented pupils in PE. The progress of talented young athletes is supported through the provisions of Specialist Sports Colleges, Multi-Skill Academies, Multi-Skill Clubs, the Junior Athlete Education (JAE) Programme and National Talent Orientation Camps (DfES/DCMS, 2003). A multi-agency engagement is expected, and holding school competitions can be seen as an area where 'inter-agency' cooperation is working. Although the significance of creating the National Competition Framework for talent development and expanding networks of Competition Managers in SSPs is discussed in a later section, it is worth stressing here that the development of 'competitive pathways' for talented performers should be linked to the LTAD guidelines for maximising talent development (Tan, 2005: 20-1). Notwithstanding the fact that the concepts of the roles and responsibilities for talent development have been classified, it remains to be seen if empirical observation can be found for the effectiveness of partnership relations between schools, sport clubs and NGBs in creating talent progression ladders and developing talented young people.

However, even more significantly, the adaptation of LTAD to the PESSCL strategy does not negate earlier claims that previous performances are the yardstick by which children are identified as talented by teachers and coaches. The selection relies on a performance-based assessment, owing to a lack of systematic screening in school (c.f. Rowley, 1992). Those pupils selected for a Multi-Skill Academy are expected to be already displaying high levels of psychomotor skills with an eagerness to learn. There is recurring theme and repeated question about how and why those children are selected, and the way those talented pupils progress up the talent ladder in clubs and in the provisions of NGBs. This leads to a further

question over residual tensions between the aim for 'physical education' and performance-based 'competitive sport'. Bailey, Morley and Holt argued that the G&T initiative in PE stands in a 'unique' position among other school subjects because it provides sporting participation for all through PE, as well as "a necessary foundation for further elite performance and international success" (2003: 5). Their argument indicates that, although such concepts as 'gifted and talented' and 'excellence' in schools have been widely integrated into the education policy of New Labour (DfEE, 1997), there always remain in PE the conflicting values of the general pedagogical and extrinsic benefits, such as health or pupils' attitudes and behaviour, and the pragmatic objectives of identifying talent through PE lessons or extra-curricular sport activities. Kirk critically examines the general direction of policy in school sport/PE and identifies "an obvious, palpable and certainly desirable connection between physical education and elite sport" (2004: 187). He continues to argue that the role of PE and school sport is increasingly becoming the stepping-stone for identifying and developing talented pupils through such provisions as Specialist Sports Colleges. The changing values of PE and the ongoing disagreement or tensions over the concepts in PE and school sport have been well documented, and hence will not be repeated here (see for example: Penney & Evans, 1999; Kirk, 1992). However, one can understand the dominant policy discourses and expectations underlying PE as having a 'duality' in their character, that is, on the one hand they promote the participation of all pupils in sport and physical activity for the development of 'physical literacy', and on the other hand they still remain as the focal point for promoting excellence in physical education.

6.4.2.2 Scholarship schemes for talented sporting youth

The launch of the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme (TASS) in 2003 with an initial £6m of government subsidies, expanded from 2004 into a £3m a year Exchequer-funded programme, can be seen as another attempt to ensure that a sufficient number of talented athletes follow an appropriate 'pathway' to succeed. Those potential athletes aged 16-25, who have not yet reached the level of World Class Funding, are eligible for TASS funds64. This is aimed at bridging the gap between the junior representative level and the world-class level, and retaining the athletes by balancing and combining their sport and academic life or employment so that they are able to fulfil their sporting potential. Subsequent to the award of the London Games, the government assured the expansion of the TASS scheme in August 2005 with another £1m per year, three-year funding, and a lowering of the age eligibility for TASS athletes are eligible to receive a scholarship of up to £3,000 worth of sporting services for 19-25 year olds, and £1,840 TASS Bursaries for 16-18 year olds.
TASS scholars. A further £0.5m was invested to support another 100 athletes through the TASS programme. The TASS 2012 scholarship was also newly launched as a £0.3m scheme to support 300 high-potential, 12-18 year-old athletes, and another additional £0.2m funding was announced for creating talent identification and talent pathways. These measures have demonstrated the government's acknowledgement of the significance of TASS.

At the launch of TASS, the then Secretary of State described how three quarters of talented young people aged between 17 and 21 have been 'lost' due to the disorganised and ad hoc nature of support for them, and hence, called for cooperative action for the new scheme, as follows:

In many cases, athletes succeed despite – not because of – the system... There is competition to 'own' talented athletes. This new scheme will only work if we become focused on the athlete and what they need to achieve their potential... No envy. No jealousy. No vying for the credit. Just the satisfaction of having played a key part in making the best better... Too many sporting geniuses are lost before they are ever found. This scheme is the start of allowing them to hone and perfect their skills, [to] beat the world and to thrill us all.

(Tessa Jowell, DCMS Minister’s Speech, 12 May 2003)

Tessa Jowell set out the need to exclude any possibility of 'wasting' athletes and the need to put athletes at the centre, enabling their potential and abilities to flourish. In her rhetoric, the determination to avoid 'waste' in talent and ineffectiveness in talent pathways is clear, particularly for the purpose of introducing the TASS 2012 scheme. The TASS 2012 scholars, nominated by NGBs, benefit from a £10,000 per annum award, which allows them access to EIS' specialist support services. Describing the aim to target “the very best young athletes”, Guy Taylor, TASS National Manager, stressed the need to 'fast-track' them into the sport's World Class Performance programme with the benefit of the “unrivalled menu of support services” from NGBs (Taylor, 2005: 15). There is a much stronger aspiration for a structured approach to provision for young athletes to allow them to develop through to a senior elite level, and the inter-agency partnership approach is again stressed as a means of influencing the development of talented athletes (Taylor, 2005). It has been reported that since 2004 around 140 individual athletes have been successful in migrating to the World Class Pathway.
(either Podium or Development level) out of 2,714 athletes who gained TASS funding, but a
detailed examination of the way potential young high-performance athletes are ‘fast-tracked’
and supported through the world-class performance ladder is needed. The most striking
element of TASS is that it is the government scheme to provide public money to ensure
enough support structure is in place for talented young athletes and to achieve equilibrium
between their sporting performances and education or employment. However, considering
that the award is made only to selected athletes who would be nominated by NGBs, it can be
concluded that the scheme is specifically targeted at filling and pushing the performance
pipeline rather than establishing a long-term pathway to the top.

6.4.2.3 Implementing LTAD in NGBs' long-term development plans

To achieve the strategic objective of helping people to ‘start, stay and succeed’ in sport at
every level, Sport England (2004) established a co-ordinated strategy for delivery and
investment in 20 prioritised sports. These prioritised sports were expected to develop ‘whole
sport plans’ with reference to the Long-Term Athlete Development model (Sport England,
2004). Though in 2006 Sport England lost its responsibility for high performance and support
for upcoming talented athletes in England, there is ample evidence to suggest that the LTAD
framework was reviewed and re-modelled by NGBs according to their specific needs. As
illustrated in Table 6.7, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Canadian model of LTAD
has been incorporated into Sport England’s priority sports, which have published
comprehensive models of athlete/participant pathways and adapted the original principles
into the progression stages of each sport.

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56 Those 20 priority sports are divided into ‘UK-wide priority sports’ (athletics, swimming, cycling, rowing, sailing, canoeing,
triathlon, judo, gymnastics, equestrian) and ‘England priority sports’ (soccer, tennis, cricket, rugby union, rugby league, golf,
hockey, badminton, squash, netball).
Table 6.7: Examples of sport specific pathways underpinned by LTAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Swimming</th>
<th>Synchronised Swimming</th>
<th>Diving</th>
<th>Badminton</th>
<th>Canoe</th>
<th>Gymnastics</th>
<th>Judo</th>
<th>Women's and Girls Football</th>
<th>Cricket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualisation through LTAD model</td>
<td>Achieve the correct training, competition and recovery throughout a young athlete's career; provide the appropriate opportunities for young people with particular reference to their growth and development</td>
<td>Establish a sustainable and viable model for developing sport with a clear and easily understandable swimmer pathway for everyone involved in the sport</td>
<td>Ensure vital windows of opportunity giving the best chance of success and increase lifelong participation in sport; encourage athletes to participate in team sports, ballet and gymnastics</td>
<td>Provide children with all skills needed to participate in physical activity throughout their life; give a consistent and systematic guide to develop junior talent and to give more people lifelong enjoyment in sport at all levels</td>
<td>Provide a base of paddlesport and movement skills to give the paddler the skills necessary to follow a performance-oriented pathway or to enjoy paddlesport recreationally</td>
<td>Apply to those choosing an elite pathway and to non-competitive gymnastic participants; provide a sound basis for preparation for a life of sport or physical activity</td>
<td>Give clear, logical guidance on the specific skills and levels of training and competition for all ages and stages; designed to maximise everyone's abilities</td>
<td>Map out clear development pathway and fill in development gaps in development pathway for talented female footballers; provide scientifically based planning tools for coaches, educationists and administrators</td>
<td>Provide everybody with the opportunity for realising their potential, create a positive, dynamic and rewarding cricket environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmes</td>
<td>5 stages: FUNdamentals; SwimSkills; Training to Train; Training to Compete; Training to Win</td>
<td>6 stages: FUNdamentals (5-8); Synchro Skills (9-11); Training to Train (11-14); Training to Compete (14-18); Training to Win (18+); Retainment (25+);</td>
<td>6 stages: Flip 'n Fun (8-9/5-8); Diving Skills (9-11); Rising Stars (11-15/10-14); Podium Potential (15-18/14-17); Podium Performers (18+/17+); Sport for Life</td>
<td>6 stages: FUNdamentals (3-8/09); Learning to Play (8/9-11/12); Training to Train (11/12-15/16); Training to Compete (15/16-17/18); Training to Win (17/18-22/23); Peak Performance (20/21+);</td>
<td>6 stages: FUNdamentals (5-10/6-9); Paddlesport Start and Development (8-14/7-13); Training to Train (11-17/10-15); Training to Compete (15/16-17/18); Training to Win (17/18-22/23); Peak Performance (20/21+);</td>
<td>6 stages: FUNdamentals (6-10); Pre-start (9-12/8-11); Start (12-16/11-15); Potential (16-25/15-23); Performance (20+); Retention</td>
<td>6 stages: FUNdamentals (6-10); Learning to Train (8-11); Training to Train (10-14); Training to Compete 1 (13-16/14); Training to Compete 2 (16-14+); Training to Win 1 (19-21+); Training to Win 2 (22+); Retention</td>
<td>6 stages: FUNdamentals (6-9/8-8); Learn to Train (9-12/8-11); Training to Train (12-16/11-15); Training to Compete (16-12/15-17); Training to Win (19-21/17+); Training to Win 2 (22+); Retention</td>
<td>6 stages: FUNdamentals (6-9/6-8); Learn to Train (9-12/8-11); Training to Train (12-16/11-15); Training to Compete (16-12/15-17); Training to Win (19-21/17+); Training to Win 2 (22+); Retention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The programmes’ age specification in brackets gives the age of male/female. There is no separation in between male and female in badminton. Although it does not exclude boys’ participation, it assumes the age to be for females in synchronised swimming. Gymnastics acknowledges the different age-ranges depending on discipline, not necessarily separate male/female.
The Amateur Swimming Association (ASA), with its four Olympic disciplines (swimming, synchronized swimming, water polo and diving), was one of the earliest examples, in the late 1990s, of a sport adapting the principle of LTAD to the training and competition regime. This was then introduced to three other swimming events in the early 2000s. The well-regarded GB National Performance Director, who came from Australia, acknowledged the problem facing the current system of British swimming as follows:

Right now we have too many clubs in Great Britain offering too little training time and in most cases too much competition. This leaves many athletes in a twilight zone of training less than 14 hours a week, hoping for international results and expecting overseas tours and camps and national level success...However, in most countries and in most clubs, the vast majority of athletes train between 8 and 14 hours per week...Changing this twilight zone should be [the] major focus of every club and national programme.

(Bill Sweetenham, quoted in A Short Guide to LTAD, ASA, not dated)

The primary element of LTAD is setting the appropriate balance between training, competition and recovery, and one of the driving forces behind the implementation of LTAD in swimming was the integration of competitions into the training programme (Age Group swimming), with an understanding of the growth and development of young people (ASA, 2004). The short-term training and over-emphasis on competition criticised by Sweetenham were expected to be replaced with a long-term approach and an age-group competition structure, with consideration being given to the appropriate frequency of competitions. The influence of the Australian performance director was reflected in ASA’s strategy to “enable the swimming community to pull in one direction towards achieving swimming’s goals and targets” (Gordon, quoted in A Short Guide to LTAD, ASA, not dated).

With recognition of problems similar to those found in swimming, regarding the existing imbalance between competitions and training time, as well as inconsistencies in the way young players were being trained and developed, England Hockey also demonstrated the usefulness of LTAD principles to address the weaknesses in its current system and structure. They seemingly served as a catalyst for the drive to create a single system, and it was intended to adapt the LTAD model to the specific nature of hockey (England Hockey, 2005).

As for cycling, one of the most successful and highly-invested sports in the UK, it was

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57 Bill Sweetenham from Queensland, Australia, was appointed as the GB National Performance Director after the Sydney Olympics in 2000 and resigned in September 2007.
acknowledged that the traditional narrow focus on organised competitions did not create wider opportunities for people to stay in cycling, although cycling is "ideally positioned to be the catalyst for change in cultural attitudes" towards achieving government targets for physical activity (British Cycling et al., 2005). Incorporating the principles of LTAD into the 'Cycling Sport Development Model', the promotion of children's cycling and non-competitive participation is emphasised in order provide the foundation of long-term engagement and to create a 'seamless pathway' and competition opportunity from school and community programmes to excellence.

6.4.2.4 'Fast-tracking' talent to the podium

In contrast to the aspiration for a 'long-term' development of athletes, UK Sport seems to have learnt the programme for talent identification and the development from other successful countries and applied to the local context. The value of implementing a national TID programme, piloted in mid-2006 and formally launched in February 2007 by UK Sport, is illustrated as "both an Art and Science involving a complex blend of scientific knowledge and assessment, alongside coaching art" (UK Sport TID Home Page). Of especial note is that the UK Sport and EIS joint-TID programmes, "Talent Swap Shop" (i.e. talent transfer) to 'recycle' talented athletes, and "Sporting Giants" to fast-track tall, young (age 16-25) athletes, demonstrate the precise targeting of a limited number of athletes who are likely to contribute to the success in London 2012.

As early as 1986, the "Training of Young Athletes (TOYA) Study" was launched by the Sports Council due to the growing concern, or 'impression', about the negative effects of intensive training and competitive pressure on children. Acknowledging that the "search for potential champions at an early age has become an increasing priority within sport", part of the TOYA Study in 1992 concluded that little evidence could be found of any form of systematic screening or search for talent based on specific (scientific) tests. As has been noted before, the selection heavily relied upon coaches' 'gut-feeling' or performances as the evidence of giftedness (Rowley, 1992). The National Coaching Foundation (currently sports coach UK) introduced the Australian Talent Search Programme, along with German and Canadian TID systems as well as domestic examples from soccer, gymnastics, squash, rugby league and cricket, to its quarterly magazine in 1996 (NCF, Spring 1996). At the inception of the UK Sports Council in 1997, the significance of talent identification was recognised and the

58 See the TID programme: http://www.uksport.gov.uk/pages/talent_id/ (last accessed 19 February 2008).
license for the computer software associated with the successful "Sports Search and Talent Search Programmes", was bought from the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) (UK Sport, 1998: 9). However, a senior consultant to UK Sport identified the fact that even though there was public money available to UK Sport to conduct a systematic talent identification from its inception, in practice TID was "not formalised" and "not coordinated". Hence it has only become "serious" since the launch of the joint TID programme by UK Sport and the EIS in 2007 (UK Sport Senior Consultant, Meeting, 20 September 2007).

It is generally agreed that a number of key aspects of the elite sport system were developed in the former Eastern bloc system, in particular East Germany and the Soviet Union, and were then adopted in Australia, and to a lesser degree in Canada (Houlihan, 1997: 6; Green & Houlihan, 2005). However, although Green agrees that on one level there are several similarities between the former Eastern bloc and Australia, Canada and now the UK, in terms of elite sport systems, he dismisses this claim by stating that "on another level, a deeper analysis reveals some stark discontinuities". One particular example of this is the Australian TID systems which bear "little resemblance to what many have claimed about the Soviet Union and GDR" (Green, 2007a: 433). Green then concludes, using supporting evidence from the empirical interviews, that it was rather a "club-based development and social systems of recruitment" that allowed Australian success in international sport.

On the contrary, what should be emphasised is that we cannot dismiss the influence of principles, and ideas of the intrinsic value of talent identification and development from the Eastern bloc on Australia and, consequently, on Britain. Indeed, the national TID programme in Australia, which formally began in late 1994 with the Federal subsidies following the award of the Sydney Olympic Games, has some stark similarities to the GDR system, in which schools played a large part in scouting for talent which was identified by full-time coaches with the help of PE teachers (Kozel, 1996; Sandner, 2004). Regardless of the notorious state-drug regime in the GDR, Dr. Hartmut Sandner described the "Unified Scouting and Selection System", which came into operation in 1973 as part of the GDR elite sport system to test all four different grades of all pupils in all schools, as one of the success factors for the GDR with its limited population. For screening athletes, the GDR TID system had determined the scientific measurement of a certain body physique, abilities and skills to meet a certain requirements for different sports (for example, gymnastics, swimming and diving for the 1st grade) (Sandner, 2004: 122-4). The Australian Talent Search Programme was developed along the same lines for the 2000 Games in Sydney to test all pupils aged 14-16 from all

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58 Dr. Hartmut Sandner worked for the Centre for Scientific Information Physical Culture and Sport in Leipzig, which played a significant role in the GDR elite sport system from the mid-1950s to the demise of GDR in 1991.
schools, based on eight measurements of physical and physiological testing, with PE teachers assisting the state/territory TID coordinators (Hoare, 1996).

The aforementioned senior UK Sport consultant explained her "interpretation of the very successful TID system" as the system developed by Eastern bloc, the GDR in particular, which was recognised and embraced by Australia and Britain because it had "the very clear understanding in what makes elite performers...with testing measurement introduced". Despite acknowledging the problem of state doping, she said that coaching and science were successfully incorporated to identify talent (UK Sport Senior Consultant, Meeting, 20 September 2007). The Sporting Giants programme sought tall, 'hidden sporting talent' or 'ready made' athletes and showed a noticeable resemblance in values and approach to the Australian TID programme, and therefore with its East German predecessor. Most remarkably in a practical sense, there is a considerable degree of similarity in the selection criteria adopted in the targeted sports (volleyball, handball and rowing) and targeted athletes in Britain with those in Australia. These are: a relative lack of participation; high-level performers/competitions with no requirement for past involvement in the TID sport, and looking for particular physical and physiological attributes together with relatively high sporting achievement in previous sports (Hoare & Warr, 2000; UK Sport Sporting Giants Campaign Press Release, 30 January 2008).

Rowing was, in 2001, one of the earlier examples of the TID programmes being implemented as a UK NGB and demonstrates a clear evidence of policy transfer from Australia. The Amateur Rowing Association (ARA; GB Rowing) pioneered a national talent identification and development programme, called the World Class Start (WCS) Talent scheme. An EIS TID Coordinator explained that it is understandable that a traditional sport such as rowing, which has a limited accessibility to river and rowing equipments and is participated in by a specific social class from certain schools and universities, has hugely benefited from introducing the systematic TID programme. She went on to describe how transferring the successful model and knowledge from Australian rowing has made substantial progress so far in identifying rowers in schools by measuring their specific physical (height), physiological (endurance) and mental components, all of which are required for succeeding as an elite rower (EIS TID Coordinator, Personal Communication 04 August 2007). Stressing the continuous success rowing has produced for Team GB, having never missed an Olympic medal since the 1976 Montreal Games, one of the GB Rowing WCS coaches explained that the inception of the WCS programme owes much to Peter Shakespeare, the successful

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50 ARA’s World Class Start Talent scheme was covered by Justin Rowiatt broadcast in the BBC News Night on 23 August 2006. Accessible from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/5278104.stm.
Australian Olympic medallist and previously a national rowing coach at the Australian Institute of Sport. Shakespeare had successfully implemented a TID programme in Australia and joined the ARA in 2001 as a Performance Development Manager (GB Rowing WCS Coach, Personal Communication 04 August 2007). It is also interesting to observe how a nationally-coordinated TID programme (Sporting Giants) has been embraced as an 'effective' way of identifying talent by this WCS coach. It is stated that WCS rowing coaches from different rowing centres had made appointments with thousands of local schools and PE teachers to conduct testing in schools. However, because it is the schools' responsibility to select pupils for testing, not only were they restricted in their access to pupils, but also they could only find, on average, one pupil fitting the profile of a potential rower out of 100 pupils tested. This WCS coach mentioned that he sometimes felt that time and effort were "so wasted" due to the poor communication with schools and PE teachers after testing thousands of pupils. Hence, he feels the nationally organised 'Sporting Giants' programme that pre-selects athletes with the right physical attributes and with some sort of competitive sport background is a much more effective and rational approach (GB Rowing WCS Coach, Personal Communication, 04 August 2007). The two senior officials from the EIS and the BOA also accepted that this is a "rational approach" and they should be "ruthless" about identifying and selecting "the right level of athletes and right mind-set and the right attributes" for gaining medals (EIS Regional Manager, Interview 02 August 2007; also BOA Senior Official, Interview 31 July 2007). There is therefore enough evidence to suggest that the TID system in the UK has been 'emulating' the Australian model as well as that of East Germany, and these seem to have reached some degree of consensus. It is also clear that a vast majority of testing components have been transferred from these earlier models to the UK.

Nevertheless, the rationale behind 'fast-tracking' athletes to podium level should be further examined in the context of the earlier discussions about the centralised steering role and responsibility of UK Sport and the implementation of principles of LTAD as the 'best' development model in the UK. In relation to the long-term performance pathways, what could be seen as paradoxical with the UK Sport TID programme is the potential incompatibility between meeting a relatively short-term demand with its pressure to producing 60 medals from 120 athletes in 2012, and creating a long-term elite performance environment based around the notion of LTAD. On one level, after acknowledging the responsibility of Sport England for high performance, it has become increasingly possible for UK Sport to establish an integrated performance pathway from the World Class Talent and Development phases to the Podium level. This may leave a legacy of sustainability in identifying potential performers and may (potentially) embrace the values of LTAD. The idea of creating "a performance environment" was embraced by John Steele, Chief Executive of UK Sport, saying that this.
result “in a true and lasting transformation of the high performance sporting landscape in this country” (Steele, quoted in UK Sport, 2006a: 21).

However, at the fundamental level, over-emphasis on identifying and producing Olympic athletes may be short-lived and would not be sustained beyond 2012. The above quoted senior consultant from UK Sport explained that the World Class Pathway model has been developed by UK Sport as a “Harry Potter’s Hat” model as illustrated in Diagram 6.2. This is based on the ‘mechanical’ way of calculation for filling the high performance ‘pipeline’ in which a total of 1,200 athletes are required and, depending on the number of medals available to each sport, NGBs would be assessed on the number of athletes pooled (UK Sport Senior Consultant, Meeting, 20 September 2007). It is worth noting that this model could indicate a ‘division of labour’, which goes back to the earlier question of whether the ‘baton’ would ever be relayed between different agencies; that is, between Sport England, whose responsible for community sport, YST, which is responsible for school sport and PE,
and on to UK Sport for high performance (see 6.2). The above UK Sport senior consultant announced that ensuring the provision of quality PE/school sport, club and coaching would be left to the efforts of Sport England and YST who, it is hoped, would provide a "fishing pool and pond as wide as possible", whereas UK Sport, as the gate keeper for the world class, would be exclusively focused on the current high performance sport, which she described as "a global sporting arms race" that has become "an industry to gain gold medals". She went on to describe the TID system as being "very aggressive for a very specific reason", i.e. finishing 4th in the medal table in the 2012 London Olympic Games (UK Sport Senior Consultant, Meeting, 20 September 2007). A further analysis would be necessary in order to analyse the extent and effectiveness of the nationally-organised TID programme and the way governing bodies are incorporating the idea of 'lasting transformation' of the performance environment into the short-term demand for producing medal-winning performers. It would be interesting to observe how sports like handball and volleyball, whose level of participation and competitiveness are low, but who intend to produce a 'credible' level (top 8) of performance in time to participate in hosting the Olympics (c.f. UK Sport, 2006g). Nonetheless, it is plausible to suggest that there has never been the option of not adopting the TID system considering the number of athletes required for Team GB's achievement in the 2012 Games, and that the TID system may have been pushed by UK Sport at the risk of pursuing short- and mid-term policy objectives at the expense of a long-term performance structure in the UK.

6.4.2.5 Summarising the impact of LTAD model

To summarise this sub-section, although it would require, according to LTAD, at least 8-12 years to measure its impact and effectiveness within sport and to identify talented young athletes going through the development pathways, the significance of applying LTAD models to sport/PE and performance plans across the UK cannot be underestimated. It would appear to provide a coherent conceptual framework and common language for sharing an understanding of developing athletes across different sporting disciplines. The significance can also be seen in the objectives of LTAD as illustrated in this section. To be more specific, it is likely that this model makes it possible to refine the understanding of athlete development among coaches, administrators and, in part, parents, and it may have been, for some NGBs, the catalyst for change in the design of their systems and structures. The attempt has been made to implement a systematic process to enable talented young people to be well-equipped for sport and to develop and optimise their potential. However, it still remains to be seen whether those athletes excel because of or in spite of the consistent
development model of LTAD. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the role of the government is increasingly important in infusing the financial and structural instruments needed for preserving talented athletes.

In contrast to the specific focus on placing athletes in the performance pipeline and the identification and development of medal-winning athletes, the evidence suggests that UK Sport has theorised and conceptualised its own talent identification programme for a specific objective within a limited timeframe. It is an understatement to say that there might be underlying themes of LTAD in the World Class Pathway Programme. However, the elite performance target for the London 2012 Games set by UK Sport as a "Harry Potter's Hat" model seems to have rather short- to medium-term performance objectives, in particular for sports with a low number of participants and international competitiveness. Nevertheless, the strategic involvement in continuous athlete development and 'fast-tracking' athletes to the podium can be identified as areas of policy transfer. It can be suggested that not only have the sporting officials felt anxiety over not displaying at least 'credible' performances at international level, but also they have imported the ideas and principles of TID and LTAD and also practitioners from other countries, notably Canada and Australia, to the UK.

6.4.3 Competition opportunities for talented young performers

One of the core elements of the LTAD framework is the integration of competitions into the long-term performance and development programme of athletes. It is problematic that coaches' high expectations for winning distract from a "long-term commitment to training" in the development of elite athletes (Balyi, 2002: 6). Nevertheless, Green and Houlihan (2005) argue that there had been a relative neglect in the issue of competition structures and opportunities, in contrast to the widespread emphasis on elite facilities and expert support provisions, for international sporting success.

In the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, strategic sport policy documents addressed the necessity to support young (talented) athletes in their progress up the talent development ladder by competitions. Although it was John Major who stressed the significance of competitions, policy documents published by the New Labour government also reviewed the effectiveness, appropriateness and intensity of competitions at different developmental stages and the balance between competitions and training (c.f. DCMS, 2001;
DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002). Kate Hoey, the then Minister for Sport, stressed the implementation of an effective competition system as follows:

...we must make sure it [is] easier for people to progress to higher level of competition. Talented players do not emerge automatically. If those with potential are to progress we must make sure they get the right coaching and support at every stage and are able to move on to higher levels of competition as they develop their skills.

(Kate Hoey, quoted in NCF, 2000 July: 13)

The increasing demand for a planned approach to talented athletes through competitions was further expressed in the predominant emphasis of ‘peaking by Friday’. Patrick Carter, the then Chair of Sport England, underscored this point in his comprehensive report commissioned by DCMS. He stated that there are persistent, “conflicting demands on potential young performers from schools and sport clubs” and that, as a result of fragmented development approaches and competing over the best young athletes, they face “over-competition, disjointed training programmes and early burn out” (Carter, 2005b: 35). The disjointed understanding of the balance between competition and training was further recognised by Bill Sweetenham, the GB swimming performance director, who claimed that: "[there is] too much volume to be fun and achieve the social and happy benefits of the participation level (8 hours and under) and not enough to achieve the competitive results or optimum performance that an athlete expects" (Sweetenham, quoted in A Short Guide to LTAD, ASA, not dated). These inherent problems became much more apparent when the LTAD framework was introduced and emphasised the need for maintaining a balance between training and competitions.

Patrick Carter also identified weakness in the existing competition structure and recognised the ineffective nature of talent development through competitions. He claimed that: “Weak NGB links between performance management programmes at club, county and regional levels have regularly held back talented performers and national performance squads and training programmes have seldom delivered sustained levels of success” (Carter, 2005b: 35). Although there was a considerable degree of recognition of the lack of understanding and coordination between different actors, an YST senior official emphasised that creating ‘competition pathways’ is essential, because they are “the single most effective talent identification programme” (YST Senior Official, Interview 14 August 2007). In this regard, the investment in the development of a National Competition Framework and the UK School Games could be seen as indications of government interest, not only in providing structured
competitions for young people, but also in allowing talented athletes to be exposed to pathway opportunities through competitions and the provision of appropriate support.

A National Competition Framework for Young People

The creation of national competition frameworks was initiated by the Labour government in 2004 when the National Schools Competition Framework was announced as part of PESSCL strategy (currently renamed the National Competition Framework for Young People). The additional funding of £519m for 2006 to 2008, jointly funded by DCSF (previously DfES) and DCMS as part of the PESSCL strategy, was allocated to the employment of Competition Managers as part of the network of School Sport Partnerships. It was described as being prompted by the "ambition" to develop "a high quality school sport national competition framework implemented locally with opportunities for all" by 2012 and to improve the quality of inter-school competition opportunities (DfES, Bulletin 3, December 2005).

This initiative raises two points worthy of note to illustrate the growing significance of integrating competitions into talent identification and development. First, there is an explicit emphasis on achieving consistency in competition structures across different sports. In comparison to the earlier version of the Schools Competition Developments Bulletin, there appears to be a stronger emphasis on engaging NGBs in creating a "single competition framework" and athlete/player pathway or "talent ladder" based on the principles of LTAD, which is to be linked to high quality competitions within school sport and clubs (DfES, Bulletin 3, December 2005). It is not surprising that the rationale behind this was the award of the 2012 London Games and the focus on international sporting success served as the catalyst for change in the competition structure. This was pointed out by Gordon Brown, the then Chancellor, in his public comment on the rationale for investment in this area that:

...it is vital we create the conditions to turn this young British potential into world class British talent. With the right investment and support, these teenagers can be reaching their peak when the Olympics come to Britain in 2012, and we will do whatever it takes to ensure that...we have...the best prepared sportsmen and women ready to compete and win for Britain.

(Gordon Brown, quoted in DCMS Press Release 115/05, 09 September 2005)

61 The first 20 Competition Managers (90 Managers expected to be in place by Autumn 2007) were employed in September 2005 working through a provision of County Sport Partnerships and SSPs, and are responsible for establishing new competitions between schools and coordinating sporting fixtures and inter-school competition across the UK (DfES, Bulletin 2: Appendix, July 2005).
The second point to highlight regarding the integrated competitive framework is the key role of Competition Managers in the coordination and management of inter-school and inter-district competitions. As noted earlier in Patrick Carter’s criticism of competing over the same potential talent and the disjointed nature of co-operation at different levels of athlete development, this initiative may be endeavouring to resolve the existing problems through specifying the responsibilities of Competition Managers. They are expected not only to work within the provision of School Sport Partnerships, but also to collaborate with County Sport Partnerships, county and regional NGBs and local School Sports Associations. It can be suggested that establishing effective partnerships across different levels of agencies is the key to success in implementing a single competition framework in the UK.

The UK School Games

The UK School Games was launched in 2005 with the potential to bridge a gap in competition between schools, county clubs and national sport bodies and to be effective in enabling talented, potential athletes to experience quality competition. It was launched with £1.5m of National Lottery funding, organised by the Youth Sport Trust, and is designed to replicate the themes of the multi-sport international events like the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Games and to provide young people with an opportunity to compete nationally. It was originally planned to be integrated into the government plan of “putting competitive sport back into schools, so that kids across the country, regardless of background, have the chance to go for gold on their own school sport stage” (Richard Caborn, quoted in DCMS Press Release, 043/06, 29 March 2006). However, it soon became clear that the objective of the UK School Games embodied a stronger orientation towards performance, rather than participation, targeting, in the words of then State Secretary, the “most talented school-age athletes” who are selected to compete by their sport’s governing body (Tessa Jowell, quoted in DCMS Press Release, 030/07, 07 March 2007).

The account provided by a YST senior official, who works to develop the UK School Games and a National Competition Framework, is instructive in two ways (Interview, 14 August 2007). Firstly, the role of the YST seems to have become more influential after the acknowledgment of its lead position in the competition framework. The YST official mentioned that the responsibility for developing competition strategy did not go to Sport England or the NGBs because it was a reflection of the government’s recognition of the work

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Another £6m Exchequer budget, plus £3.5m from the Big Lottery Fund, was allocated to the YST from 2007 to 2011 after the success in the first Games in Glasgow.
of YST, which has developed a successful and effective delivery system for the PESSCL strategy. Secondly, she indicated the significance of NGBs' engagement in selecting young, school-age athletes for the UK School Games because there is a dominant view among NGBs that schools are a "mystery" and "hard to navigate". The relationship between schools and NGBs could, therefore, be moderated by creating an integrated competition structure being coordinated by YST (YST Senior Official, Interview 14 August 2007). Although a wider impact of UK School Games and Competition Framework will require further investigation, it can be suggested that the LTAD development model is reflected in a growing awareness by government of improvements in competition quality and extending structured 'competition pathways', which are associated more with the talent identification programme.

6.5 Elite Athlete Support Provision

6.5.1 Development of elite coaches and coaching education

It is worth repeating that the recurring theme of creating a strategic competition structure, which reflected the idea of LTAD, is linked to the development of the quality of coaches. While in recent years the improvement in the quality of coaching has become essential for the identification of talented young people and the development of their potential and skills to higher levels, in comparison to the rapid development of specialist support services for elite athletes, the issue of coach development and raising the status of coaching as a profession has had a lower priority.

Despite the British Association of National Coaches (BANC) being formed in 1965, the initial evidence for the development of coaching education in a professional manner was the establishment of the National Coaching Foundation (NCF) in 1983, as a sub-committee of the GB Sports Council, along with the creation of a network of 14 National Coaching Centres across the UK. A 'think-tank' was formed as collaboration between the BANC and the NCF in late 1985, and appeared to be another indication of greater recognition of the need for good quality coaching. Acknowledging the gradual emergence of national coach training schemes, Frank Dick, then Chairman of BANC, observed that this owed much to the involvement of "honorary" voluntary coaches who were the "keystone for future development" of coaching and that the emergence of "professional coaches in private sector" could be seen as the "greatest single change in coaching" (quoted in NCF, 1986: 5).
The Coaching Review Panel was formed in 1989 and the GB Sports Council published the first strategy document, *Coaching Matters*, in 1991. This reviewed the issues of the direction of coaching and cooperation and partnership between different organisations. The Chairman of the Coaching Review Panel, Peter Radford, reflected the fragmented nature of organisations in coaching by stating: "so many administrative variants and such a complex regional and national framework ... [compete] in terms of efficiency and resourcing" (Peter Radford, quoted in Sports Council, 1991: 5). Radford then called for a "re-think" of the situation and also suggested that a review was necessary, due to the 'exogenous changes' in policy. By this he meant the introduction of the national curriculum, which brought "substantial" change in extra-curricular activities and, more significantly, "greater emphasis on performance and excellence" by the Sports Council and local authorities (ibid, 4).

Although the Chairman of the GB Sports Council considered that the above Coaching Review was "one of the most important initiatives ever taken by the Council" (Yarronton, quoted in NCF, 1990 Spring: 1), the Chief Executive of NCF stated that the development of coaches working with elite athletes "received scant attention" until another consultative document, *The Document of Coaching in the United Kingdom*, was published in 1999 (Stevens, in NCF, 2000 July: 18).

The publication of *The UK Vision for Coaching* by UK Sport in 2000 was seen as a decisive call to develop the UK-wide award schemes and common standards, which, in the words of the Chief Executive of NCF, "will provide consensus, direction and a framework for coordinated action by the many organisations involved" (Stevens, in NCF, 2000 July: 18). Despite the existence of the National Coaching Foundation (NCF, re-branded in 2001 as 'sports coach UK'; SCUK), which is supposed to take full responsibility for strategic leadership in coaching education, it is quite evident that in the UK this area of policy had been disorganised. The absence of an overall direction in coaching and quality assurance, and the *ad hoc* qualification system, finally gained political attention in government strategic documents in sport (DCMS, 2001; DCMS, 2002; DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002). Of particular significance was the Coaching Task Force (CTF) established by the government in its final report, published in July 2002 (DCMS, 2002).

Three important recommendations proposed by the CTF should be highlighted as showing government interest in the values of enlarging a "physically literate population" (ibid, 19) and developing a professional approach to elite athletes. Firstly, the organisation of coaching education became more defined when sports coach UK took a strategic lead in developing
The UK Coaching Framework: A 3-7-11 Action Plan for the implementation of the UK Coaching Certificate (UKCC, previously known as the National Coaching Certificate) across different sports. Secondly, it was intended to provide greater chances of employment and to expand the number of paid coaches through the employment of Community Sports Coaches (CSCs) and by creating a network of Coach Development Officers (CDOs). Lastly, and most importantly, the LTAD framework was applied to the UKCC and there is a clear parallel between the aspects of long-term athlete/player pathways and development and the long-term development of coaches (SCUK, 2007).

The last point should be further illustrated in relation to the growing organisational influence of SCUK. It is possible that, being publicly subsidised with £25m for three years, the SCUK has become an advocate of government objectives, not only through adherence to the CTF recommendations but also by endorsing and promoting the principles of the LTAD model for the development of coaches and the understanding of coaching. The significance of the LTAD framework being adapted to UKCC should be highlighted because it seems to have captured the imagination of various levels of coaches, who had previously shown tensions that were identified in a range of review documents. It also allowed the sharing of the same concept for the long-term development of both athletes and coaches from different NGBs (Campbell, 1995: 27-31; SCUK, 2007; DCMS, 2002; UK Sport, 1999). However, although the SCUK may have become the lead national agency for encouraging each of the national sports bodies to endorse sport-specific UKCC, one cannot dismiss the potential conflict between NGBs and SCUK. From her experience, a SCUK official mentioned difficulties in dealing with a sport body such as the Football Association (FA) whose strong financial and participation base had allowed it to develop its own coach education structure, operated separately from SCUK (SCUK Official, Interview 20 February 2007). On the other hand, a senior FA official argued that the national UKCC does not meet the demands of a wide range of football coaches and noted that the FA had been "successful" in implementing the system of coach education, particularly 'e-learning', which was first put in place in 1993 (The FA Senior Official, Interview 21 February 2007).

Nonetheless, the importance of the increase in the quality of coaches can be readily acknowledged, and also the growing importance of talent identification and development. Richard Caborn, the then Minister for Sport, stressed the “need for a concerted effort to improve the quality and quantity of coaches in all sports” (quoted in DCMS, 2002: 2). This necessity was further illustrated in the governmental document as follows: “Talented young performers are often ‘lost’ to sport because they are not identified effectively, are poorly
coached and are provided with few support services" (ibid, 49). Then it is concluded that without the government intervention and investment "through quality coaching many young people will not achieve their potential and standards at International level will decline" (ibid, 50). Talent development coaching programmes at the regional level for selected sport was proposed for the identification and development of talented young athletes and, most significantly, for achieving their potential and maintaining the standards at international level.

Interestingly, 'international benchmarking exercises' were undertaken through the CTF review, in order to ensure its work was not conducted in isolation from what was developing internationally and to learn from the successful good practices in four "leading countries in the world" (Australia, France, Germany and Sweden) (DCMS, 2002: 6-7; 26-44). This, paradoxically, illustrated the limited resources and ideas domestically available and the need to look to other countries for fear of being left behind and losing long-term international sporting competitiveness. It can be argued that it was this necessity that drove this area of policy forward.

**Strategy for developing 'home-grown' elite coaches**

Clearly, the development of elite coaches is one of the areas of the British high performance system which was slow to progress. It has been suggested that the absence of "national coaches" until 1947 meant that "in essence, no base of performance-related coaching in Britain" existed because of the dominant "middle-class values" in sport and that the poor performances of the British team in the Stockholm Olympics in 1912 was seen as the "catalyst" which made the BOA decide to set up a public fund to "employ national coaches in athletics, cycling and swimming" (McNab, quoted in NCF, 1999 Spring: 3). However, although it was the poor British performance which led to the reconsidering of the approach to the employment of coaches, it was only during the 1990s when a substantial amount of public funding became available for the development and support of performance coaches together with organisational development, a series of consultations and action plans. Since its creation in 1997, UK Sport has distributed Exchequer subsidies to sports coach UK and doubled the amount for the implementation and operation of UKCC (see Table 6.6). The NGBs are also the recipients of public funding from UK Sport for the development of their respective sport-specific coaching qualifications. It should also be recalled that the availability of National Lottery funding has paved the way to fund NGBs to employ full-time performance directors (Green & Houlihan, 2005).
However, while the significance of addressing the development of coaches working with high performance athletes had been noted in the vision of UK Sport on coaching (UK Sport, 1999), it was only in the post-Sydney Games period and in response to the Cunningham review of 2001 when UK Sport showed much proactive involvement in developing coaches at the elite level. It initiated investment in structures (World Class Coaching Programme) in order to foster and develop professional coaches working with world-class programme athletes. Two related strategies are of paramount importance: firstly, the introduction of the World Class Coaching Conference in 2001 which reflected the growing role of coaches and set up the forum for coaches to share knowledge and practice. The significance of this was articulated as creating "a culture of excellence for our coaches" (UK Sport, 2004a: 20-1).

Cross-disciplinary learning among high-performance coaches has become more valuable as a way of investing in 'home-grown', high-performance coaches and the second initiative which UK Sport introduced was the Elite Coach Programme. This was intended to challenge "the traditional approach to the identification, recruitment, development and retention of elite coaches" (Harrison, UK Sport Elite Coach Manager, quoted in UK Sport, 2005a: 24). Subsequent to the Athens Olympic Games, this programme was introduced as a £1m p.a. programme with the specific target of optimising consistent British performance success. It takes a maximum of 10 coaches each year in order to fast-track 60 home-grown elite coaches by 2012. This entails a wide-ranging development of professional skills, such as the integration of sports science/medicine to meet the specific needs of athletes and learning from other sporting disciplines, business and practices in other countries.

What is at issue here is the vital necessity for securing high-quality British coaches of elite performances to ensure a long-term British success. A consistent problem has been the number of coaches imported from abroad in order to increase the level of British performances and to renovate the approach to training and competitions. As has been implied, the influence of Australia on the British high-performance sporting structure is particularly conspicuous. Bill Sweetenham's successor as the national performance director for British Swimming, for example, was Michael Scott, who was the former director of the Australian and New South Wales Institutes of Sport, and Wilma Shakespear, the first EIS National Director, was the founding Director of the Queensland Academy of Sport in Australia (see Green 2007a; Green & Houlihan, 2005). Indeed, the rationale for appointing overseas coaches is explained by Green and Houlihan in that they "bring ideas, methods and experiences from Australia and other leading countries and have been very influential in shaping elite sport in the UK" (2005: 188). Nevertheless, this reliance on foreign proficiency raised some concerns in A Sporting Future for All as follows:
In search of the best possible coaches some sports have recruited and employed coaches from abroad. While it is right to draw on the best expertise from overseas, it is vitally important that we support 'home-grown' coaches. We need to see a greater investment in the identification and training of coaches from within this country who have the potential to work at this level (DCMS, 2000: 16).

The above points draw further attention to the lack of human resources capable not only of coaching at high level, but also possessing a wide range of ability to manage and coordinate "other coaches, sports scientists and medicine support personnel, deal with the media and provide consistent mentoring and support for their performances" (ibid, 16). It is imperative to highlight that there are growing concerns about the resources allocated to the employment of foreign experts and world-class coaches from abroad because, as it stands, it has proved costly but, more importantly, those experts do not necessarily stay within the UK and strengthen its foundations (UK Sport, 2004a: 28).

This indicates that a strategic approach to developing domestically nurtured high-performance coaches is finally evolving. Although Level 5 of UKCC is also targeted specifically at the very limited number of high level coaches, an apparent willingness of UK Sport to be engaged in developing elite coaches on its own, suggests its discrete involvement in coach education, development and deployment. The shift towards ensuring that British international level coaches have holistic knowledge and a range of capabilities could be seen as an indication of the increasing demands for the incorporation of sport science/medicine services into the training of elite athletes and into the effective identification and development of potential athletes to optimise their success. In this respect, advocating to build a forum for exchanging experiences and knowledge should be highlighted as the key indicator that coaches are expected to gain innovative ideas in order to enhance 'a culture of excellence' in coaching and to maximise international sporting success (c.f. UK Sport, 2004a). In the area of elite coach development, while there has been a domestic need to depend upon the 'migration' of foreign coaches or performance directors, particularly Australians, who bring innovative approaches and spread their ideas and philosophy to the high performance scene in the UK, it has become apparent that recent policy has placed the emphasis on 'home-grown' elite coaches, who are expected to gain holistic knowledge in high performance, and on providing a forum to create an elite coaches' community.
6.5.2 Increasing importance of sports science and medical support

The previous sections have suggested that it is increasingly important to incorporate specialist knowledge in sports science and medicine into coaching techniques in order to improve British performances. The value in exploiting sports science and medicine within an athlete-centred approach appears to have slowly been acknowledged in the UK, but, even after the government investment in this area, it is seen that its effects have been erratic and varied. Given the different requirements within sport for technical support and service, Green and Houlihan argue that, whereas the establishment of UK Sport Institute (UKSI) "to some degree at least, gives direction to sports science research and, more importantly, facilitate its dissemination, acceptance and application", the effective application of sport science and medicine to performance athletes is "clearly some way off" (2005: 177).

The growing requirement for accessing adequate medical and scientific support for elite performers was acknowledged in the late 1980s (Sports Council, 1988). In its strategic policy document, *Sport in the Nineties*, the Sports Council stated in 1992 that, in contrast to growing recognition of sports science as "a key ingredient in assisting those with talent, commitment and interest to reach their potential", sports medicine "has been less well developed, being bedevilled by [a] lack of focus, professional and organisational jealousies and a growth both limited and unstructured" (Sports Council, 1992: 40). To overcome this "traditionally muddled British approach" (Sports Council, 1988: 49), the National Sports Medicine Institute (NSMI) was established in 1992 with the objective, *inter alia*, of providing clinical services. This led to the establishment of the Olympic Medical Institute (OMI) attached to a residential rehabilitation centre. The BOA's Athlete Medical Scheme and Junior Athlete Medical Scheme, covering a range of athletes wider than those on the UK Sport World Class Pathway Programme, were also introduced.

As stated in Section 6.1, the idea of establishing the British Academy of Sport was suggested in *Sport: Raising the Game* (DNH, 1995) and the introduction of the National Lottery made it possible to fund the creation of an elite-specific support institution. The notable influence of the successful Australian model with its extended specialist sports science and medical provisions should be highlighted as the impetus for creating a regionally-based network of specialist institutes across the UK (Theodoraki, 1999). In this regard, Green provides an in-depth analysis showing that "UK Sport policymakers and bureaucrats engaged in some degree of intentional lesson drawing (for whatever political/policy reasons), at least with regard to the development of the UKSI during the 1990s" (2007a: 431). Given the issues and
conflicts surrounding the creation of UKSI, the application of sports science and medicine to the preparation of athletes for competitions has been accepted as a multi-disciplinary programme. With the increasing recognition that high-performance success has become a 'sophisticated science', sports science and medical support embrace such associated support services as nutrition, strength and conditioning, psychology, performance analysis and research in technology, all of which are believed to affect performance (c.f. EIS, 2006).

According to early research into the performance services athletes received, it has been shown that about a tenth of athletes had not received medical (11%) and sports science support (13%) (UK Sport, 2000). Although the post-Athens research also showed that athlete take-up of sports science service varied, it was noted that the development of professional expertise in sports science and its availability was indicated as the key benefits of the WCPP programme (NOA, 2004). Notwithstanding the fact that it is "a source of potential competitive advantage", particularly with the knowledge of sports science, and the tiny margin between success and failure as identified by NGBs, it was acknowledged that effectiveness in delivering the benefits of specialist services relied on abilities of UK Sport and NGBs to "sell" the available facilities and support services to athletes and coaches (NAO, 2004: 19). Interestingly, one EIS support manager confirmed this account by the National Audit Office claiming that, although there are aspirations and a large number of practical activities to provide services and support through cross-regional centre partnership, there is a strong sense of competition between nine EIS regional centres, and each centre, consciously or unconsciously, tries to "sell" its athlete-centred services, especially to coaches (EIS Performance Lifestyle Adviser, Interview 27 February 2007).

More significantly, the increasing application of sports science and medicine to high performance training should be understood in relation to the growing significance of global anti-doping policy. With the British adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code in August 2004 and the implementation of the new National Anti-Doping Policy in May 2005, there is an intensification of the responsibility of athletes to be knowledgeable about the Prohibited List and the need to submit their own Therapeutic Use Exemption for medication as well as the Athletes' Whereabouts Information. With the intention to "broaden the awareness and the horizons of our athletes", an extensive number of educational programmes have been implemented by UK Sport, making sure that as much information as possible gets through to a wide range of athletes. In addition, medical packs were provided for athletes during the Olympics and Paralympics (UK Sport, 2004a: 14-5). As a result, it can be suggested that the global anti-doping policy has intensified, at least to some degree, the awareness of athletes regarding sports science and medicine. This is evident in the intention of national bodies of
sport to give the message about the use of supplements to an optimum extent by illustrating the "athlete's personal risk and responsibility" for their intakes (UK Sport, BOA & BPA, 2007). It is notable that the athletes are endorsing not only the sports science and medical support in their training to gain the competitive edge, but also taking control of their own medicine and nutritional intake (see more discussions in Chapter 4).

Performance lifestyle support: developing athletes 'holistically'

One of the support programmes consistently given emphasis since the establishment of UK Sport seems to be the provision of 'holistic' support for athletes' lifestyle, in order to ensure equilibrium between their sporting career and private life. This area of support can be recognised as another example of voluntary transfer of a successful high performance service provision from Australia. The licence of Athlete Career and Education (ACE) programme was bought from the Australian Institute of Sport in 1999 by UK Sport and endorsed as ACE UK. In 2002 this developed into the Performance Lifestyle programme that requires advisers to complete nine-month, UK Sport accredited training course before providing services to athletes on WCPP (46 regionally-based advisors as of March 2007). A UK Sport manager, who oversees the programme, explained that the shortcomings and some elements of unsuitability of the Australian ACE for the UK context had gradually been acknowledged after several years of operation of ACE in the UK. Consequently, the ACE programme had to be developed beyond a mere focus on education and career to embrace the much wider value of 'lifestyle management', including advice on budgeting, finding sponsors and media training, all of which reflects the pressures and demands of being elite athletes (UK Sport Manager, Interview 28 February 2007). A Performance Lifestyle Adviser from EIS highlighted a range of benefits that this 'soft' service has brought to British athletes and coaches and the fact that not only all elite institutes of sport across the country, but also some professional sports like rugby union and rugby league, have employed the accredited performance lifestyle advisers, and are realising the value of balancing sporting career and daily lifestyles of athletes (EIS Performance Lifestyle Adviser, Interview 27 February 2007).

The prominent strengths of Performance Lifestyle were reflected in the review of then ACE UK undertaken in 2000, just before the Sydney Games. This review identified the necessary 'human' touch support to athletes, who expressed feeling under increasing physical and psychological pressure over performance with the introduction of WCPP. A number of athletes responded by saying that they were not being treated "as anything other than

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64 It should be noted that the BOA also introduced the OPEN (Olympic & Paralympic Education Network) Programme at the same time as ACE UK, although the OPEN specifically focuses on helping athletes find employment suited to their training schedule.
vehicles delivering sporting performances" by coaches or 'performance-related' staff (UK Sport, 2001b: 16). One athlete was quoted in the review as saying that they felt 'disposable' and that some coaches did not show any care about whether or when the athletes retire. This athlete also expressed his view that the Performance Lifestyle Advisers were "friendly" and were able to focus more on the wider needs of athletes, thereby bringing a "human" touch and "personalised relationships" into the high performance service (ibid, 84). In this regard, despite the initial implementation of the Australian model, it comes as little surprise that the policy for providing a 'soft-touch' service for elite athletes has been adapted and developed to meet most of the needs of British athletes and, to some extent, compensate for the 'inhuman' characteristics of high performance environments.

6.6 Conclusions

It would be reasonable to conclude that the most recent catalyst for the heightened policy emphasis on elite sport policy is the choice of London for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. This would certainly not preclude an evidently growing general interest of government in shaping the development of sport policy and implementing policy instruments for high performance sport since the middle of 1990s. These include the introduction of the National Lottery, the development of elite sport facilities and the corresponding development of high performance specialists and provisions. The significance of PE and school sport and the need for extending competition opportunities for young athletes had been identified by the Conservative Prime Minister John Major. This was further elaborated and structured by the New Labour government with the introduction of Specialist Sports Colleges along with the PESSCL strategy, although sport was introduced as the policy instrument to achieve general social policy objectives.

Nevertheless, it can be noted that it was the Olympic and Paralympic Games being awarded to London in 2005 that finally sharpened the focus of government and guaranteed a considerable amount of funding being invested in sporting excellence, which signified a reshaping of the character of the elite sport policy sector. Moreover, it is fair to claim that, at the very least, the government now has a very clear reason to invest in UK high performance success, as the host of the Games in 2012. One of the investment areas, among many others, is the additional financial support for potential young athletes (TASS and TASS 2012) and ensuring the competitive opportunities (UK School Games). The largest ever investment in supporting high performance athletes can be seen as another indication of the
determination of the government to ensure international success. This is reflected in the high performance investment formula developed by UK Sport, although it has been slightly changed with the inclusion of those sports with a poor performance history and a low level of participation.

Of special significance is the possible emergence of a centrally-controlled structure led by UK Sport for elite sport policy. It has been acknowledged that the streamlined responsibility for elite sport attached to UK Sport has indicated a marginalisation of, among others, Sport England from potential athlete development (in England). It has also strengthened the capacity and discretion of UK Sport in steering the agenda for elite sport and the direction of NGBs regarding the distribution of the high-performance budget, setting performance targets and implementing a modernised governance structure. This chapter has also demonstrated that the focus of UK Sport is to ‘fast-track’ talented athletes and practitioners through elite coaches and sports science and medical expertise programmes which are being manoeuvred in a ‘ruthless’ way to achieve relatively short- and mid-term medal success, which may influence the high performance structure in long-term.

However, the centralised monitoring and evaluation roles of UK Sport for the attainment of policy goals attracted the condemnation of the international governing body of basketball, which threatened to ban the English team from participating in the competitions. What is interesting is that while the suspension of funding to England Basketball was resolved by providing alternatives to reform its governance system, it was effectively a coercive ‘threat’ from FIBA which forced the change of attitude by both England Basketball and UK Sport. This could be seen as quite a rare example of intervention from the international sporting body to direct the policy of domestic sport organisation, but this row between the international sport governing body and UK Sport could be another illustration of the fact that NGBs are required to play to the rules set by UK Sport.

There is ample evidence for the practices of lesson drawing and policy transfer, whereby British elite sport provision has been strongly influenced by the Australian model and, to a lesser extent, by East German and Canadian models. Although it could have stopped at the level of finding out what worked best for identifying and developing talent in the former GDR, in fact, the British elite sport system opted to directly ‘import’ Australian services and expert personnel. As for the case of the Long-Term Athlete Development model, its principles and ideas were adopted from Canada and were expressly endorsed as the preferred policy by the New Labour government, being reflected particularly in Sport England documents and in some NGBs policy. Nevertheless, the shortage of ‘native’ experts as well as knowledge in
coaching and training, identifying and developing talent has been problematical. It can be assumed that the British elite sport system has matured through the voluntary implementation of models from Australia or Canada, which are willingly adapted and internalised to such an extent as to incorporate them into an 'original' British form. In particular, while the specialist support services for elite athletes through sports science, medicine and performance lifestyle initially had a huge input from Australian knowledge and practice, as well as human resources, the recent initiative seems to be much more one of 'self-help' in providing sufficient specialist services by fostering an elite support service provider.

As for the identification of talent and fast-tracking of potential world class athletes, while the sporadic nature of talent identification and development had been identified in the 1980s as a domestic structural and cultural problem, it was the decision regarding the hosting of the Olympic Games that urgently necessitated a quick solution and the implementation of a nationally-coordinated TID system. The successful Australian model was adopted, which called for athletes with specific physical components and also tested athletes based on scientific measurement. In summary, it can be argued that examples of exogenous influences on the development of the elite sport system in the UK can be found in the voluntary engagement for the transferring of policy and perceived good practice. The necessity for this may have been shaped and dictated by the sense that the British elite sport system is underdeveloped and that adapting and developing foreign models is necessary in order to have an edge over rival nations. In this regard, the British policy emphasis on gaining a leadership position and international representation within international sporting bodies can be understood as a bid to exercise influence in the 'international corridors of sporting power' and to bring competitive advantages home.

The rhetoric surrounding the idea of 'legacy' put forward by Sebastian Coe, Chairman of LOCOG, during his closing speech at the IOC Conference has been used by the government since 2005 to refer to anything from the decision on the distribution of public funds and the re-structuring of administrative responsibilities to the implementations of a new scholarship scheme for young potential talent and the UK School Games (see DCMS, 2007a). The 'legacy' discourse implicitly or explicitly embraces a long-term objective to become the 'best sporting nation in the world'; a vision which matches the values attached to the Long Term Athlete Development framework. While the implementation of LTAD as a structural framework from participation to excellence over an 8-12 year time-range is relatively new in the UK, the extent to which this model has influenced policy strategies is worthy of note. Observing the areas of possible conflict, the review of organisational responsibilities in
Section 6.2 has revealed the intention to create a 'seamless pathway' in national policy, which clearly set out the areas of responsibility at the national level (in England) for elite sport (UK Sport; EIS; NGBs), community sport (Sport England) and PE/school sport (Youth Sport Trust). It can be suggested that although there have been frequent argument in government strategic papers, consultation or reviews regarding the redundancy and inefficiency of the administrative structure, there are signs of streamlining and a 'one stop shop' administrative responsibility in certain areas of sport policy.

However, as implied in this chapter, it comes as little surprise to suggest this could be a rhetorical illustration for organisational responsibilities. As the pressure for succeeding at international sporting events has mounted, the divisions between the three national sport organisations seem to be much more evident than before. It has become evident that, when faced with achieving the national target, coming to 4th in the medal table in 2012, UK Sport directly intervened to implement the 'effective' talent identification and development system. This bypassed the involvement of Sport England and YST leaving to these two bodies the responsibilities for consolidating the participation base. It could be pointed out, on the one hand, that the area of policy discretion given to elite sport has become much more specific, and, on the other hand, that partnership and network relations between organisations have become more cohesive, especially in relation to the life-long participation in sport/physical activities and optimising the chance of achieving higher levels of performance through structured competition opportunities and providing performance talent ladders. Seen from this perspective, although it is at the very early stage, the influence of the LTAD model could be distinctive insofar as all the above agencies have embraced its framework and included it within their respective strategic policy/plan from a lesser (UK Sport) or greater (SCUK; Sport England) extent. Sports coach UK, which is supposed to introduce the ideas of LTAD across NGBs and different levels of coaches through the implementation of the UK Coaching Certificate, could be overarching the divided national policy areas and national bodies, even though it is expected to work closely with YST for the developments in coaching and coach education at county level and the provisions for County Sports Partnerships and School Sport Partnerships to deliver the PESSCL strategy. This may be the emergence of a sport organisational structure in the UK (England where applicable) established around the surrounding value of LTAD.
Chapter 7 Developing Elite Athletes in Japan

7.1 Introduction

It was in the 1990s when there was a move to provide much greater public funding to sport, although the call for further increase in government funding and support of elite sport still continued. The publication of the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Sport, 2000-2010 in 2000 was significant insofar as it was a master plan for sport with numerical targets based on a ten-year timeframe. Subsequently, a number of recent initiatives suggest a long-term commitment and increasing involvement of government is the provision of support for elite sport, which include the establishment of the Japan Institute of Sports Sciences (2001) and the National Training Center (partially opened in December 2007, fully-operationalised in January 2008). Most importantly, the latest submission of the report titled, The 'Developed Sport Nation', Nippon: National Strategy for Top Sports (or known as "Endo Report"; Sports Promotion Roundtable, 2007), by then MEXT Vice minister Toshiaki Endo in 2007, can be seen as indicative of a politician trying to influence the sport policy agenda along with a number of governmental and non-governmental elite sport officials. Bidding for the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2016 and the JOC's target to become 3rd in the IOC medal table also highlighted the ambition of Japanese national sport policy actors. In this regard, it can be suggested that the success in the 2004 Athens Olympic Games (5th in the IOC medal table) was a significant moment and provided impetus for the Japanese government and national elite sport policy actors insofar as it validated their investment in the development of infrastructure for specialist elite use and legitimated a continued structured approach to the development of elite athletes.

This chapter draws upon empirical data gathered from policy documents and from semi-structured interviews carried out mainly in 2005-7 with current or former senior government officials/bureaucrats (Competitive Sports Division of MEXT), senior officials from national sport organisations (from the JOC, JISS, NAASH, JASA and NFs) and academics. The structure of this chapter falls into five substantive sections largely following the same order as Chapter 6 for the case of UK/England. Nevertheless, for our better understanding, we begin in the first part of the chapter to examine the development of sport policy in Japan, which has a much more acute focus on how elite sport policy has been formulated in the post-war era than a broad historic overview discussed in Chapter 5. The second section
maps out the structure of elite sport development, along with an explanation of the responsibilities of each organisation and interrelationship between sport actors and which hopes to identify conflicts and collaborative networks. The availability of funding broadly for sport promotion and specifically for increasing Japanese high performance will be examined in the third part of the chapter, which is followed by a discussion of the much stronger emphasis recently given to structured talent identification and development in the fourth section wherein we will highlight how the significance of the structured approach has been accepted in the light of some reluctance felt among sport actors. Finally, the chapter moves on to examine much more substantive strategies for elite success in Japan wherein the emerging system for developing athletes, which include: the growing importance of ‘second career’ support programmes; expansion of competition opportunities for young athletes; specialist provision of coaching, sports science and medical support services, which follows the four dimensions identified by Green and Houlihan (2005; also Houlihan & Green, 2008a). As part of the specialist support provision, the last but most importantly, some distinctive characteristics the country possesses will be examined, namely, its strong awareness and active involvement in ‘intelligence activities’ and effective ways of gathering information from other successful elite sport countries. Therefore, the ample evidence of policy learning and policy transfer will be analysed in the fifth section of the chapter. Overall, the chapter intends to identify the changing policy emphasis on the development of elite athletes and the extent to which the Japanese approach to elite success has been influenced by exogenous factors and issues.

7.2 The Development of Elite Sport Policy in Japan: the increasing involvement of the Government

Japan gained its political independence in 1951 following the indirect occupation by the United States and from 1952 resumed its participation in the Olympic Games. Ever since, as Table 7.1 shows, the Japanese participation of not only athletes but also of officials in the Olympics has grown. The participation in the 1952 Helsinki Games was followed by the first international hosting event, 1958 Asian Games, in Tokyo. In 1959, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the 1964 summer Olympic Games to Tokyo, which provided the most significant catalyst for the development and definition of a national sport policy in Japan. The government subsequently enacted the Sports Promotion Law in 1961 which established an organisational and funding framework for sport and which gave responsibility to the minister of education to formulate a promotion plan for sport. While the Law was
significant in terms of defining the role of government in sport and that of sport organisations, it was also significant in establishing the balance between elite sport success and Sport for All. However, the Law must be seen in a wider political context of the overriding emphasis on economic growth and industrial development which limited expenditure not only on welfare services, but also on sport, thus delaying until the year 2000 the implementation of the plan for the promotion of sport.

Table 7.1: Japanese participation and achievement in the Summer Olympic Games, 1952-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Olympiad Year</th>
<th>Summer Olympic Game City</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Participant Countries/Regions</th>
<th>Number of Athletes</th>
<th>Japanese athletes (male, female)</th>
<th>Japanese officials</th>
<th>Japanese Table Position</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 1952</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>5,429</td>
<td>72 (61, 11)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 1956</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>3,178</td>
<td>117 (101, 16)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 1960</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6,313</td>
<td>157 (147, 20)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 1964</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>5,133</td>
<td>365 (264, 61)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 1968</td>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>5,498</td>
<td>183 (153, 30)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 1972</td>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>7,121</td>
<td>152 (144, 38)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 1976</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>6,043</td>
<td>213 (152, 61)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 1980</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>5,283</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 1984</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td>231 (179, 53)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 1988</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>8,473</td>
<td>259 (198, 71)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 1992</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>9,368</td>
<td>263 (181, 82)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 1996</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>10,352</td>
<td>310 (160, 150)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2000</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>11,116</td>
<td>268 (158, 110)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 2004</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>11,099</td>
<td>312 (141, 171)</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 2008</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>11,028</td>
<td>578 (170, 170)</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOC Official website, respective years; JOC official websites, respective years

Most importantly, what was significant about hosting the Games was that it was seen not just as a Tokyo project and a sport project, but clearly as a national and multi-purpose project. The government invested hugely not only to help rebuild the country’s devastated infrastructure, but also to help rebuild national morale after the World War II. By forming an Olympic Ministership and holding the Olympic-related Cabinet Meetings, the government recognised the powerful symbolic value both domestically and internationally of hosting a successful Olympic Games. In particular, the government saw the hoped-for success of Japanese elite athletes and the efficient hosting of the Games as opportunities to reinvigorate the Japanese name in the world and regain national pride for its citizens (Ikei, 1992). Consequently, pressure to host a successful Games was immense. In 1955, the government announced the first public investment specific to the development of elite athletes with ¥5,000,000 per year and across six fiscal-years (1960-65), the total public subsidies for the preparation of Japanese athletes for the host Olympics was ¥2,063,000,000 (JASA, 1986: 154). With this public funding, in 1960, the Japan Amateur Sports Association, the national sport body and also then acting Japanese Olympic Committee, created an ad-
hoc Tokyo Olympics Task Force for High-performance along with the JASA's Special Committee for ensuring enough support for the Japanese athletes. Fukuyama argues that it was only when the High-performance Task Force was created that "elite athlete development started being considered in a planned and structured way" in Japan (1986: 31).

Subsequently, the first strategiC five-year plan for development of high performance athletes was implemented by JASA, followed by the investment in, *inter alia*, creating the systems for coaches and Training Doctors, organising training camps for national sport federations (NFs) and international exchanges, including invitations to high-performance coaches. One of the most important structural developments after the Tokyo Games was the creation of a permanent Performance Improvement Committee in 1965, which initially had the objectives to develop elite athletes, to promote physical fitness of all and expand sport participation. This was followed in 1971 by the separation of the high-performance function by the establishment of a JOA High-Performance Committee inside JASA. In accordance with the restructuring of JASA, the Mass Sports Committee and the Performance Improvement Committee were separately created in 1976, the latter of which successfully secured annual Exchequer subsidy for the development and support of athletes in 1977. This was imperative insofar as the allocation of a budget has stabilised because the government budget had only been available when Japan then hosted the two Olympics (1964 Tokyo and 1972 Sapporo; JASA, 1986: 154-6). As for the government, one of the 'legacies' of 1964 Games was to make, as a legislation, the date of its Opening Ceremony a national holiday, namely, Health Sports Day (or Physical Education Day), and October became the nationally designated month for the promotion of public health and fitness. The Cabinet also agreed on the "Promotion of Public Health and Physical Fitness (Kokumin no Kenkou-Tairyoku no Zoukyou Taisaku)" to create a Public Congress for Physical Fitness Promotion with 13 ministries and agencies along with 233 private bodies promoting policy areas of welfare, diet (nutrition), physical education, sport and recreation. All of these government offices became eligible to hold the annual budget under the "Physical Fitness Promotion" (see more in 7.3.1).

However, while the government invested heavily before and during the 1964 Tokyo Games in the development of the infrastructure for sport in order, partly, to satisfy public concern to win medals, this investment did not stimulate a long-term commitment to the development of elite athletes and the pursuit of international success in sport. In contrast, during the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, despite the publication of *Fundamental Policies for the Promotion of Physical Education and Sport* (1972 Report) by the Ministry of Education’s Advisory Council of Health and Physical Education (ACHPE), which was the first policy document to promote leisure (sport) opportunities for all (ACHPE, 1972), overall government
enthusiasm for elite sport success remained relatively muted with priority being given to the policy of Sport for All. However, accordingly to Morikawa (1986), from the mid-1970s, and especially following the poor performance by Japan at the 1976 Montreal Olympics, there emerged a growing level of concern within the government and in the media with the country's declining elite performance. Reliance on the commercial sector to support elite athletes, which was increased when a large number of companies identified the commercial values of investing in high performance athletes and coaches, and the weakness in the process of talent identification and development were considered largely responsible. The problem became more acute when the Japanese business entered into a period of economic recession that began in the early 1990s thus reducing its support for elite athletes, coaches and teams. As such, it was around this time that an underlying tension between mass participation, an objective which the government was under increasing pressure to become involved with, and elite sporting success began to emerge.

The expressions of 'concern' in the mid-1970s developed into an expression of 'crisis' towards the late 1980s due to the relative decline in Japanese performance. The perception of crisis attracted the attention of governmental committee meetings and the prime minister himself. Although Japan had dominated sporting competition in the Asian region since the 1964 Games, there were consecutive poor performances in the 1982 New Delhi Asian Games, when Japan fell behind China for the first time, and in the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and 1988 Seoul Olympic Games when South Korea gained a total of 33 medals achieving 4th place in the medal table, as opposed to Japanese finishing in 14th place. Ever since, as illustrated in Diagram 7.1, the concern of Japanese officials was the rivalry with South Korea for regional domination. Japan's sharp decline in international sporting success was publicly recognised and criticised by the then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who established a personal consultation committee on elite sport success. However, it was only after the ACHPE produced a report on Strategies for the Promotion of Sports for the 21st Century in 1989 which endorsed most of the recommendations issued by Nakasone's committee that elite sporting success was established as a significant policy concern. Indeed, the public outcry of concern correspondingly started appearing in the official journal of Ministry of Education (Monbu Jihou) in the 1980s. Prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics, its March edition was dedicated to the issue of Japanese high-performance, in which, for example, Furuhashi Hironoshin, the world champion in swimming in the late 1940s and then influential figure being the director for swimming federation, suspected that no Olympic disciplines had potential to win medals in Seoul, and thus, the "Japanese sport circle is facing a huge challenge" (Furuhashi, 1988: 8).
In 1984, JASA, the then national responsible body for elite sport, also responded to the poor performance by publishing a mid- to long-term strategic performance plan, "Leaping for Sports 21" with five major plans: i) maintaining a balance between sport mass participation and elite sport; ii) extending the sporting opportunities based on an integrated training system; iii) increase the role of coaches and development of coaches; iv) development of a sports science and medicine centre; and v) expansion of core sport facilities from local to national to include the development of a sport information centre (JASA, 1984: 8-14). It was also reported that in response to the poor performance at the Seoul Asian Games, the JASA Performance Improvement Committee decided in 1987 to create a committee for the National Training Centre in the view to establish an Olympic High-Performance Athlete System with financial support to elite athletes and coaches (see more detail in 7.3; Kawasugi, 1988: 42-5). Furthermore, the PE Bureau of Ministry of Education decided to ease the contested regulation of junior high school athletes and allowed them to participate in the National Athletic Meet (Kokutai) from 1988 in support of development of pupils’ individuality and ability and improvement of competitiveness (initially only in swimming, athletics gymnastics and figure skating) (Ministry of Education, 1989).

Graph 7.1: Asian Games Medal Acquisition among Top Four Countries

The ACHPE report of 1989 was endorsed in a 1992 White Paper, with the MESSC noting not only the decline of Japanese achievements, but also highlighting the rapid improvement of
African and other Asian countries (MESSC, 1992). It was not until 1997 that government concern was translated into elite-focused policies, while policy action was sparked by another poor performance of the Japanese national team at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games (17th with 3 gold) and the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games (23rd with 3 gold), which was 1.7% of the total Olympic medals available, the lowest Japanese performance (MEXT, 2000: 14; see Table 7.1). These and other disappointing performances in international sport can be identified in Graph 7.1 that became the key reference point in the Basic Plan with its 10-year national objective to regain the highest level of success in the Olympic Games in the 1964 Tokyo Games (5th position with 16 gold and 29 medals in total).

Despite the government providing limited funding to elite sport, the Sports Promotion Fund, comprising a one-off sum of ¥25bn from the central government and ¥4.4bn from the private sector, was established in 1990 in order to give more autonomy to MEXT and enable it to use its budget to undertake longer-term strategic planning of the development of elite athletes. Furthermore, the passage of the Sports Promotion Lottery Law in 1998 (the soccer toto, sales started in 2001) was seen as a major achievement for national sport actors who had expected to secure revenue sources with the purpose of building a "lifelong sporting society" which included money for elite sport (MESSC, 1998). The annual decision over the distribution of subsidies from the Sports Promotion Fund and the Sports Promotion Lottery is managed by the quasi-governmental agency, the National Agency for the Advancement of Sports and Health (NAASH; see 7.4.2). However, both government and toto funding have been inadequate for the planned activities for the development of elite sport due to: the severe downturn of the Japanese economy; the persistence of low interest rates (0.5% in 2007) which affected the reserves of the Sports Promotion Fund; and the decline in the popularity of the professional soccer league (J-League) which led to a gradual decline in toto sales.

The publication of the Basic Plan in 2000 which provided political legitimacy for the introduction of toto was drawn up on the assumption that toto revenue would be substantial. As one of the three fundamental policy objectives stated in the Basic Plan, its implementation provided the defining moment in the development of a more systematic elite sport policy with four elements being of particular importance. Firstly, it was the first time that the government had announced a national target in elite sport, namely, securing 3.5% of all medals available at both the summer and winter Olympic Games. The numerical target became more visible in 2003 in the preparations for the Athens Olympic Games, when the Competitive Sports Division produced the “Nippon Revival Project”, which specifically allocated funding to high-potential medal-winning athletes and sport disciplines (see 7.4.3). Secondly and importantly,
the elite-targeted sports science and medical specialist institute, Japan Institute of Sports Sciences (JISS), was inaugurated in 2001 as a sub-division of NAASH and its activities were defined in the Basic Plan. Thirdly and equally importantly, the Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) published the Gold Plan based on, and reinforcing, the government medal target. The JOC indicated its practical responsibility for high-performance development, not only in accrediting national federations for sport (NFS) and sending delegates to the Olympic Games but also in devising a series of qualitative and quantitative performance indicators based on the results in world championships and the Olympic Games in order to determine the distribution to NFS of the funding that had been received from the Competitive Sports Division (JOC, 2001a). Finally, the construction of the National Training Center (NTC) was specified in the initial Basic Plan and more explicitly in the revised version of the Basic Plan published in 2006 following the then populist Prime Minister Koizumi's public expression of support for the opening of the NTC in time for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (MEXT, 2006c; Koizumi Cabinet Mail Magazine, No. 153, 02 September 2004).

It should be reiterated that the policy framework for developing medal-winning athletes only emerged as a systematic programme following the publication of the Basic Plan, some 39 years after the passage of the Sports Promotion Law in 1961. Prior to the publication of the Basic Plan, sports service expertise related to specialist support for elite athletes and coaches was dispersed across a large number of organisations and institutions, including sport-specialised universities, NFS' high performance centres and prefecturally/municipally owned training centres and sports science and medical institutes. With the subsequent publication of the JOC's Gold Plan and Gold Plan Stage II: Summer Version in 2006, which set the even more ambitious target of third in the medal table by hosting the summer Olympic Games in 2016 (JOC, 2006), the JOC's responsibility was specified as overseeing the achievement of international success and acting as a mediating and supporting agency for NFS. The role of the JOC has become that of evaluating the activities and performance of NFS and, on the basis of its assessments, distributing the annual government subsidy. The assessment criteria developed by the JOC emphasised the role of NFS in developing elite success and formed the basis of an implicit contract between the JOC and the NFS in relation to elite sport development (see 7.4.3 and also Table 7.9 in later section).

The JOC's concern with elite success is reinforced by its strong collaborative link with JISS which has focused on: designing a programme of TID; supporting elite athletes through sports science, medicine, and nutrition; and distributing information to athletes, coaches, support staff within NFS and prefectural/municipal sports agencies. What is significant is the establishment of an organisational and personal network which includes policy actors from
local, regional, and national levels that has been facilitated especially by JISS and the JOC leading to the gradual emergence of an elite sport policy community. Furthermore, the importance of constructing a policy community, which has some degree of international contacts especially with specialists, is reinforced by the activities of the Department of Sports Information in JISS and the Information Strategy Section of the JOC. Both agencies have been instrumental in using their international contacts to systematically gather ideas and information from successful elite sport countries (discussed more fully in 7.6.4). The concern to develop a domestic elite sport policy community was also reflected in the establishment of the Japan Top League (JTL) in 2005 authorised by the Competitive Sports Division and the appointment of former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro as president.

The first policy evaluation report commissioned by MEXT on the Improvement of International Competitiveness published in 2006 itself should be recognised as important, while it is broadly supportive of the current approach to elite sport development (MEXT, 2006b). Part of the reasons for publishing the report may have been to legitimise current government policy and underline the contribution of JISS to elite success in Athens (Japan finished 5th in medal table with 16 gold and 37 medals). The report lacked the critical review of policy that would have been provided by an independent third party but the review was conducted by 'internal' officials whose values and policy emphasis seem to have been reflected in the report.

Despite the recent burst of policy-making, the degree of consistency of emphasis on elite sport policy should not be exaggerated as sport remains relatively marginal both within the lead ministry, MEXT, and across other government ministries that have a more limited interest in sport. However, whether the generally marginal status of sport is a threat to investment in elite sport is debatable, for at the time that government is privatising public sector facilities managed by local authorities in order to ease the pressure on public expenditure, it is investing about ¥22 billion in the construction of the NTC (the total of ¥37.4 billion including the cost to purchase the land). It should be noted that policy for mass participation and elite sport are the responsibilities of different divisions of MEXT (the Sports for All Division and the Competitive Sports Division respectively) and that their budgets are not therefore in direct competition. However, the investment in elite sport is partly rationalised by arguing that international elite success boosts enthusiasm for sports participation across the nation (MEXT, 2006a; MEXT, 2000). Furthermore, and most importantly, the report submitted by the personal advisory committee of then Vice MEXT minister, Endo Toshiaki, on the 'Developed Sport Nation', Nippon: National Strategy for Top Sports (Endo Report) has noted the fundamental necessity to consider elite sport as a national strategy. The objective
of this report is to establish Japan as a "genuinely developed state" wherein the fundamental values in national elite sport policy are acknowledged as: i) to enhance the 'national power' and 'presence' in international society; ii) to contribute to the nation's security and world peace; iii) to provide the model for being 'Japanese' and to contribute to the health and welfare of people and the state; vi) to vitalise the domestic economy; and v) to develop the national mechanism of elite sport as is the case in other developed elite sport countries (Sports Promotion Roundtable, 2007). One of the committee members and also our prominent interviewees in this study reflected on the process of the formulation of Endo Report and explained that the values in elite sport was expressed in the report in such a way that each sport actor, from the members of the Diet, NF officials, sport-specialist university staff to prefectural and local officials in charge of sport, could influence their respective organisations to implement high-performance policy in sport (Personal Communication with H, 22 September 2007). A senior non-career official from the Competitive Sports Division also recalled that the impact of this report was so extensive that not only MEXT itself but also other ministries, especially the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (which oversees the central administrations), quickly reacted to question the legitimacy of Endo Report. However, the senior member of Competitive Sports Division escaped from these ministerial criticisms and controversies by emphasising that it was issued by a "private consultative committee of Vice Minister", not by his Division (Interviewee GG, 29 August 2007).

7.3 Mapping the Elite Sport Development System in Japan

As shown in Diagram 7.1, a domestic structure for elite sport policy is relatively centralised at the Competitive Sports Division which distributes the Exchequer subsides to specific projects and annual planned programmes. In practice, however, it is the JOC that develops and facilitates strategic programmes for identifying, nurturing and developing athletes and distributes the public funding to NFs, based on its quantitative and qualitative performance measures. The role of JISS is increasingly becoming more significant since its inauguration in 2001 and it has established a partnership with the JOC for planning and implementing elite sport policy and also for providing specialist support for athletes. The elite sport structure and organisational arrangements were, and still remain to some degree, fragmented following the establishment of JISS and the publication of JOC's Gold Plan in 2001 which defined its responsibility for being the core policy actor for international sporting success. Furthermore, the creation of NTC has become the defining moment for forming an 'elite triad central
structure' in Japan with the JOC being the elite sport policy formulator and being the evaluating agency for NFs, which closely work with JISS whose holistic sports science and medical support functions are imperative for realising the policy programmes and support provisions possible, along with the National Training Center where provide the foundation for training for young and senior athletes and for coaching development.

Diagram 7.1: Sport organisational structure and flow of funding in Japan

What is also notable in Diagram 7.1 is the dispersed and fragmented nature of the sport organisational structure and institutional relationships at sub-national level. There is a hierarchical relationship between the Japan Sports Association (JASA, previously known as Japan Amateur Sports Association) at national level and the Prefectural PE/School Sport Association (representing all 47 prefectures and municipal sports associations), some of which may be located alongside the Prefectural PE/School Sport Division within the prefectural government. It should be highlighted that the board of education in each
prefecture plays a crucial role in investing from the prefectural education budget in PE and school sport and also in identifying talent and developing potential elite athletes. Since the JOC would be unable to reach out to the prefectural and regional levels, which have their own athlete development plan and competition framework, the role of JISS has become more significant to establish a coherent approach for developing athletes. In addition, other national non-governmental bodies for sport such as the Nippon Junior High School Physical Culture Association (NJPA) and the All Japan High School Athletic Federation (AJHAF) also structure a hierarchical relationship with their sub-bodies at prefectural and municipal bodies and organise national, prefectural and municipal sports competitions at junior and high school levels in link with schools. With these points in mind, this section provides the overview of the roles of each actor followed by the description of the still fragmented administrative framework for sport and the emerging elite sport policy network.

7.3.1 Governmental level

Table 7.2 shows the current distribution of responsibilities for sport and leisure across the machinery of central government. Reducing from thirteen ministries and an agency with the administrative reform of 2001, eight ministries and one agency hold the budget for 'Physical Fitness Promotion'\(^65\) (see also Graph 7.3 in section below). The areas of responsibilities and budgetary allocation fall into four categories: facility management, including construction of facilities; leadership/instructor training, including coaches; organisational development, including the support of clubs; and promotion of specific programmes and projects. Each ministry has authoritative and supervisory roles to manage independent administrative agencies requiring them to produce organisational plans, based on which grants are provided.

\(^65\) The Social Insurance Agency came under the budget of Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in 2006 following its national postal service system became privatised, while the discretions remain separately between the agency and MHLW.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries/Agency</th>
<th>Name of ministries prior to administrative reformation</th>
<th>Main policy areas</th>
<th>Examples of project areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Facility management</td>
<td>Managing recreation, sport and welfare facilities; health support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC)</td>
<td>Management and Coordination Agency; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Post and Telecommunications</td>
<td>Facility management</td>
<td>Management of public school facilities; maintenance of PE/sport facilities; management of independent administrative agency under MEXT's authority and supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Development of instructor</td>
<td>Subsidise sport bodies; subsidise operations of Independent administrative agencies (e.g. NAASH, JISS, NTC)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational Development</td>
<td>Promotion of regional sport; promotion of Wide-area Sports Centre; promotion of 'Physical Fitness Activity' programme; management of public school PE-related facilities; promotion of 'Improvement of Children's Physical Fitness Campaign'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Welfare; Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>Facility management</td>
<td>Development of skills and abilities of youth labour leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Development of instructor</td>
<td>Subsidise 'general sound diet programme' and Union of Elderly People; promotion of 'Health Nippon 21' project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational Development</td>
<td>Promotion of specific projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Insurance Agency</td>
<td>Social Insurance Agency</td>
<td>Promotion of specific projects</td>
<td>Promotion of health management project in workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries</td>
<td>Facility management</td>
<td>Management of recreational facilities in forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of specific projects</td>
<td>Promotion of sound diet; facilitation and management of providing milk in school meal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)</td>
<td>Economic Planning Agency; Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
<td>Promotion of specific projects</td>
<td>Promoting sport/leisure industry and market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Land, Transportation and Tourism (MLIT)</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport; Ministry of Construction</td>
<td>Facility management</td>
<td>Management of tourism industry, park in urban and greenery places, marina, coast-line, cycle path and large-scale public park; management of walking and toilet facilities in public places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment (MOE)</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td>Facility management</td>
<td>Subsidise natural park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Development of instructor</td>
<td>Subsidise advisors/instructors for natural park; subsidise volunteer project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of specific projects</td>
<td>Subsidise learning environment in natural places and 'Children Park-ranger project'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gekkan Taiiku Shisetsu (2003-2008)
Note: *Other Independent Administrative Agencies under MEXT's supervision is the National Institution For Youth Education (Kokuritsu Seishonen Kyouiku Shinkou Kikou), which was merged with the Olympic Memorial Youth Centre and the National Youth Centre.
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is currently the lead administrative unit for the promotion and development of sport in Japan. It is in charge of planning, implementation and evaluation of policy and of distribution of governmental subsidies to sports agencies and specific projects. The distinctive features of governmental sport administration and policy-making for sport in Japan are: first, the stronger influence of bureaucrats by comparison with politicians, although those 'elite/career bureaucrats' who hold discretion over budgets and programmes in each division are frequently transferred (normally every two or three years) between/within the ministries, and consequently, leave a dependence on 'non-elite' or 'non-career' bureaucrats to draft and implement policy. Second, there is a broad consensus on sport policy among the political parties, reflected in the work of the Federation of Supra-party Diet Members for Sport.

Lastly and importantly, policy on 'sport' is dominated by a concern with 'PE' or 'social PE' which reflects the historic emphasis on the latter within the (social) education policy agenda. At the ministerial level, it was the establishment of a Physical Education Division in 1928 within the Ministry of Education, which took responsibility for the emerging government interest in sport coinciding with the increasing militarism and authoritarianism within the Japanese government. After Japan withdrew from hosting the Olympic Games scheduled for 1940 in Tokyo, the PE Division was restructured as the PE Bureau which took a central role in preparing young males for military services through physical fitness training at schools (Nakamura, 1992). The government had established a centralised system of sport administration within the Ministry of Education, elements of which are still strongly evident today. The PE Bureau was regarded as one of the major advocates of militarism within the government and was abolished at the start of the Allied occupation in 1945. However, this historic priority accorded to PE was challenged, if only modestly, by the creation of separate Divisions for Sport for All and Competitive Sports in 1988 that indicated the growing government interest in separating out the issue of improvement of international medal-winning success from the broader concern with life-long sporting participation. A senior JISS official who had previously worked at the then PE Bureau supported this separation stating that it was the very first time that the partition between PE and sport became clear in the government administration, while he also stressed there still remained residual confusion and tension between the objectives in PE and sport (Interviewee Z, 18 August 2005).

As Diagram 7.1 illustrates, the responsibility for elite sport policy is centralised within the Competitive Sports Division of the Sports and Youth Bureau within MEXT. This Division is
primarily a national policy actor for elite sport policy with the current policy objective to gain 3.5% of summer and winter Olympic medals available. It is from this Division that most of the high-performance-related public subsidies are distributed to three non-governmental sport bodies (JASA, JOC and Nippon Budo Kan) and to specific programmes and projects. The Exchequer's annual budget allocation is divided between the national sport organisations as direct subsidies and the research projects or programmes which the Division commissions normally from the JOC, JISS, other sport bodies or universities. It can be noted that the Competitive Sports Division is in direct competition for the allocation of MEXT budget with the other four divisions within the Sports and Youth Bureau or indirectly whole bureaus and divisions in MEXT. In this sense, insofar as gaining an appropriate Exchequer budget, the Competitive Sports Division can dedicate its budget to the elite sport policy, whilst not affecting other sport policy area, including PE/school sport and life-long participation. In relation to achieve policy goals, one of the recent initiatives taken by the Competitive Sports Division was the implementation of “Nippon Revival Project” in 2003 specifically targeted at the potential medal-winners in the Athens Olympics. This division is also responsible for organising and managing the annual Kokutai as a co-organiser with a host prefectural government and JASA. As a supervisory ministry, it monitors the Sports Promotion Fund and Sports Promotion Lottery operated by NAASH and also provides finances to NAASH which distributes budgets to JISS and National Training Center.

A continuing problem in the government is that the management of sport, leisure and recreational facilities is dispersed across a number of different ministries, which makes it difficult to have a coherent policy to expand the opportunities to access to sport (see Table 7.2). One of the distinctive features of the sport policy-making process is the consultative role of the Sports and Youth Division of the Central Council for Education (previously known as the Ministry of Education's Advisory Council of Health and Physical Education, ACHPE) which is influential in developing and overseeing the delivery of sport policy. Nevertheless, there have been a number of initiatives from the sport circle since around the time of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics to overcome the weak voice of the Ministry of Education (currently MEXT) throughout the cabinet and to raise the status of sport within the government. The most recent initiative can be found, as discussed before, in the Endo Report (Sports Promotion Roundtable, 2007) which recommends the creation of a 'Sport Ministry or Sport Agency' and a ‘Japan Sports Commission’ under a new sports promotion law. It is also notable that the appointment of Hase Hiroshi, the ex-professional wrestler, as the Vice minister for MEXT between November 2005 and September 2006 may have raised the profile of sport in government, the impact of which however requires further examination.
7.3.2 Quasi-governmental level

National Agency for the Advancement of Sports and Health (NAASH)

The National Agency for the Advancement of Sports and Health (NAASH) is a non-departmental public agency, which in 2001, was reorganised due to the public restructuring of governmental bodies/institutions. The principal objective of this agency is to promote sport and health of children and youth and NAASH is obliged to submit three to five year policy plans and objectives as well as a "Mid-term Plan" that is monitored and evaluated regularly by a committee comprising the supervisory minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications. The management responsibility of NAASH is to cover: i) the National Stadium, ii) the activities of JISS, and iii) disaster relief and promotion of school lunch (sic). It is also the distributing body for three major funding streams in relation to elite sport: a) the Sports Promotion Fund introduced in 1990 to which the government provided a one-off payment of ¥2.5 billion principally for the development of elite athletes; b) toto (the national lottery), which has been allocated for the development of Sport All since 2001; and c) the Support for the Development of Sport Project introduced in 2003 with the central aim of winning medals. The influence of MEXT, and its Sports and Youth Bureau, is exercised by means of its budgetary control and influence over the distribution of subsidies through NAASH that it closely monitors and evaluates.

Japan Institute of Sports Sciences (JISS)

An inadequacy of elite training facilities and support service provisions had already been acknowledged since the early 1960s and the necessity to establish a national training centre was stressed by prominent national sport actors like the then Performance Director of JASA/JOC. However, it finally materialised in 2001 as the Japan Institute of Sport Sciences (JISS), centralised in the capital, Tokyo, but in a partial form from the original plan. Its inauguration as one of the operational divisions of NAASH can be seen as a landmark insofar as it was the first centralised specialist elite-focused institute. JISS has since become the primary support service provider in sports science, medicine and technical information and it also operates a 'mini-national training center' located inside its facility. Its fundamental aim, as defined in the government document Basic Plan of 2000, is to play a substantive "supportive role" in relation to potential medal-winning athletes (MEXT, 2000). This quasi-government institution is dependent on public money not only for the development of its
training center facility, but also to meet the cost of human resources and its programmes and projects. JISS' scope for innovation in projects is tightly constrained by the framework of procedure and accountability of government: first, JISS is obliged to obtain explicit approval for projects/activities from its parent organisation, NAASH; second, it is regularly evaluated by MEXT; and third, despite being heavily dependent on government finance, it is nonetheless required to generate money due to its statutory status as an 'independent' administrative body (generating roughly ¥0.3bn annual income). One source of income is to charge NFs in order to use the JISS facilities, while this charge, according to a performance director of Olympic ball game, is seen as "unjustifiable" (Interviewee V, 12 April 2006). In addition, the effectiveness of specialist support provisions become undermined because of internal conflicts and lack of dialogue between different departments within JISS and one of its senior sport doctors suggested which led not only the isolation of each department but also to less internal-cohesiveness inside the institute (Personal Communication with FF, 22 May 2006).

National Training Center of the Japan

The impetus to establish the National Training Center (NTC, opened in December 2007) was the perceived national inadequacy of training facilities and the fact that "9 of the top 10 countries in the gold medal table at the Athens Olympics possess" some sort of domestic NTC (MEXT, 2006a: 26). Additional momentum was given by the support of the then Prime Minister following the success in the Athens Olympics in 2004 with Koizumi ordering the fast-forwarding of construction of NTC in order to aid in the preparation for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Policy actors within government (especially MEXT) and non-governmental actors (such as JOC) argued carefully for a government funded elite athlete-centred training facility which will allow "concentrated, consistent training activities" (MEXT, 2005b). The proposed NTC, it was argued, should operate in partnership with JISS and with the already-existing training bases for winter sport events, marine/waterside sports, and high-altitude training (National Training Center Expert Committee Meeting, 2004). While the facility itself is to be managed by NAASH, the JOC will be responsible for facilitating and actual delivery of the Elite Academy66, the national academy for the development of elite coaches and management directors (Elite Coaching Academy), together with the provision of athlete education and second career support (JOC Career Academy) (JOC, 2006). It is also expected to embrace a centralised function to establish an elite network to provide a much

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66 In the first year of operation of NTC, elite schools were inaugurated for junior-level athletes in wrestling (4 girls and 1 boy, between Year 5 primary and Year 1 junior high school) and table tennis (2 girls, junior high school Y1 and 4 boys Y6 in primary school). Those athletes in elite school go to schools in neighboring area. See MSN Sankei News, 14 March 2008.
higher quality training opportunities for athletes. However, despite the state-of-art facilities and long-waited elite school functions now being in operation, it does not provide free access to all Olympic-discipline sport where they are charged for the use of facilities, which as with the case for JISS is likely to become the source of disappointment and concern for a number of NFs whose ability to pay fees is limited.

7.3.3 Non-governmental national sporting actors

The Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC)

As any National Olympic Committee, the central objective of the Japanese Olympic Committee is supposed to promote the Olympic Movement. Its important roles practically are to send delegates to the Olympic Games, Asian Games, East Asian Games and Universiade and to improve the Japanese international sporting competitiveness. To examine the elite sport policy in Japan, the distinctive role of the JOC should be understood for its capacity in strategic planning for elite success. This responsibility may be the reflection of Japan's participation in the Olympic Games in the early 1900s. For the participation in the 1912 Stockholm Games, Dainippon Taiiku-kyokai (Great Japan Amateur Athletic Association: JAAA) took an initial role as being the NOC. During the World War II, the JAAA was restructured to support ultra-nationalist worship of the Emperor, but was 'dissolved' at the end of war. The post-war restructuring was intended to break the association with militarism and maintain autonomy from the government, although with the redevelopment of Kokutai, the dependency of the Japan Amateur Sports Association (JASA; currently Japan Sports Association) on government subsidies as well as its association with the Emperor still remained (Takahashi & Tokimoto, 1996). During this period, the JOC was renamed as one of the committees within JASA. However, political pressure, especially from the lead Liberal Democratic Party, to withdraw Japanese athletes from the 1980 Moscow Games was such that JASA followed the government decision which consequently led the JOC to become independent of JASA in August 1989. It is noted, however, that it was not only the intention to avoid the criticism at being excessively close to central government and to concentrate solely on developing elite athletes but also to obtain much financial autonomy of the JOC under the influence of its first president, Tsutsumi Yoshiaki (Seki, 1997). It is suggested that Tsutumi, who was the owner of Seibu Corporation and later arrested for corruption in 2005, invested in a number of corporate teams (like baseball, ice hockey) and leisure resort (such as ski-course, skating rinks, golf course), which was modelled on the 1970s national project,
'Reconstruction of the Japanese Archipelago', promoted by the then prime minister (Taniguchi, 2005). However, as noted, the JOC is heavily reliant on the Exchequer budget via Competitive Sports Division and is always seeking more income, which resulted in the introduction of marketing and sponsorship agreement with private corporations through managing directly the image of top elite athletes as well as gaining public funds through the 'Team! Gambare! Nippon' Programme (Kaneko, 2005).

The JOC published its strategic plan, Gold Plan, in 2001 (some revisions in terms of wording and project names were made immediately in 2002) wherein was redefined its responsibility to specify its objective along with the government policy goal (3.5% of Olympic medals) and set the process of developing athletes and pathway to the podium. Before then, a member of the JOC Board argued that the role and discretion of the JOC was weak, which was merely a representative body of NFs' interests, while with the Gold Plan implemented, the JOC has identified itself as the central high-performance agency to collaborate with NFs and JISS and to coordinate those programmes and activities (including development of coaches, information/technical support and sports science and medical support) which were dispersed across NFs and also unable to deal with NFs (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005). This official, who was also a member of the drafting team for the Gold Plan, explained that the most significant element was to develop a series of qualitative and quantitative performance measures for the distribution of funding effectively and for retaining a sharp focus on the outcome (medals). Another JOC senior official largely agreed with his colleague's account and claimed that the Gold Plan was cautiously planned in order to "keep JOC's supervisory body (MEXT) happy and feel respected" and thus it can attract more subsidies and accordingly expand the activity areas of JOC (Interviewee M, 01 April 2005). Following the highest medal achievement in the 2004 Athens Olympic Games since the 1964 Tokyo Games and on the revised Basic Plan published in 2006, the JOC reset the 'ambitious' target in the revised Gold Plan Stage II: Summer Version targeting the top three of overall medal acquisition by hosting the summer Olympic Games in 2016 thus gaining 'home advantage' (JOC, 2006). However, it is interesting to observe that even though the JOC gains public funding, its 'private' status does not attract much public accountability, because there has been no independent evaluation of JOC's activities and operations.

The Japan Sports Association and Prefectural and Local PE/Sports Associations

The Japan Sports Association (renamed in 2005 from the Japan Amateur Sports Association) is the primary non-governmental body for promoting Sport for All. JASA was
judicially classified as a 'special public interest agency for public welfare (sic)'. It co-hosts the annual sport competition (Kokutai) with the Competitive Sports Division and a host prefecture; organises the Japan Junior Sports Clubs and training courses; provides certificate programmes for coaches/trainers (including the categories of leader, teacher, programmer and manager); and implements the Comprehensive Community Sports Clubs in municipalities (city, ward, town and/or village). At prefectural level, each prefecture has its own PE (or Sports) Association (Ken Taiiku Kyōkai; PESA)\(^{67}\), which may be placed within the prefectural PE/School Sport/Lifelong Sport Division within the prefectural ministry of education board or sometimes set up as a separate entity from the board of education. In turn, PESAs affiliate to JASA for its membership for participation in Kokutai. We should stress here that a hierarchical relationship is formed between JASA and PESAs mainly because of the former body allocating the number of Kokutai delegates from each prefecture, which tend to be the crucial concern of PESA and also the board of education. Since 2003, JASA also became responsible for organising anti-doping tests at Kokutai as well as managing daily anti-doping activities, such as training doctors, and providing education programmes, until its function was overtaken by the Japan Anti-Doping Agency in 2007 (see more detail in Chapter 5). A large amount of JASA’s income comes from the government Exchequer budget via the Competitive Sports Division and toto funding is allocated through NAASH for, inter alia, the support of implementation of Comprehensive Community Sports Clubs.

With the JOC separated from JASA, the latter lost its role in developing athletes resulting in it focusing on the policy area for the promotion of Sport for All. However, a JISS senior official, who was a former member of JASA, was sceptical about the "ambiguous status and identity of JASA" that even after the JOC’s separation and subsequent loss of responsibility for high performance sport, JASA still retained its interest in maintaining organisational responsibility and influence in developing athletes (Interviewee Z, 19 August 2005). Although the official organisational name in Japanese can be translated as ‘Japan Amateur Physical Education Association’, it was suggested by this JISS official that dropping the word ‘amateur’ during translation into English, may have been in the organisational interest as it infers a closer association with ‘sport’, rather than ‘physical education’, and with it a ‘professional’, rather than ‘amateur’ body. However, this vagueness in the organisational objective can be identified from the JASA’s recent publication on The Search for New Kokutai: Reformation

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67 As noted before, there are ambiguities in the terminologies in Japanese. Although Taiiku can be translated as physical education, it includes the meaning of both sport and physical education. Taiiku has been used historically. Local, prefectural and municipal governmental organisations still use this term, even if they are responsible mainly for local sport, i.e. Sport for All. While Ken Taiiku-kyokai can be translated as the prefectoral physical education association, it will be referred as "Prefectural Physical Education Sport Association (PESA)" in this thesis.
Plan 2003 that indicates the way JASA struggled to come to a decision as to whether it solely focuses on Sport for All or both Sport for All and elite sport (JASA, 2003a). A senior official from JASA acknowledged that due to a decline in the level of competition in Kokutai, the reformation plan aimed not only to reinvigorate and streamline Kokutai (organised as summer, autumn and winter events) but also to incorporate within Kokutai's ideas of talent identification and talent pathway, through which elite athletes can emerge (Interviewee A, 17 March 2005; see more discussion in 7.5.5). Furthermore, the JASA has a strong association with the Ministry of Education (currently MEXT) illustrated by the role of influential politicians. For example, the former Prime Minister Mori Yoshio was appointed as the JASA President in late March 2005, while Mori also represented the Japanese Rugby Football Union and was appointed to the Board of JOC in the same year. This appointment not only illustrates the value of sport organisation such as JASA to political figures intending to achieve his political objectives, but also illustrates the intention of JASA and the JOC to restore their communication channel and collaborative relationship with the influential political figures and the government.

National Sports Federations (NFs)

Most NFs in Japan have dual affiliation to both JOC and JASA, even if they are not included as an Olympic discipline. The initial Basic Plan respectively required NFs to produce coherent/integrated talent identification and development plans until 2005, the progress of which could be monitored and evaluated by MEXT, NAASH and JOC (see 7.5.2). The JOC measures international performance and the world ranking of athletes based on which it decides the amount of annual budget distribution to each federation. NFs are encouraged to collaborate with the JOC and JISS for the development of talent and elite athletes and to provide support systems to athletes. National and international competitions or Grand Prix circuit are also organised by NFs. One of the distinctive characteristics of Japanese sport bodies is that a large number of committee members in the JOC, and more importantly, the performance directors within the JOC are representatives from NFs or internally-selected but working on a 'voluntary' part-time basis.

Japan Anti-Doping Agency (JADA)

While the responsibilities of JADA have been described in more detail in Chapter 5, it should be reminded here that the anti-doping activity coordinated by JADA is increasingly crucial aspect for the nurturing and development of elite athletes. JADA requires NFs to adopt the
Japan Anti-Doping Code and conducts both in-and-out-of competition testing including un-announced testing and oversees the domestic anti-doping programmes (see Chapter 5).

7.3.4 Non-governmental sub-national sporting actors

As noted, it is the Prefectural Ministry of Education and Prefectural PE (or Sports) Association (PESA) that operationalise policy at prefectural level and deliver services and programmes by: establishing Comprehensive Sports Clubs; developing elite athletes, including talent identification and talent development programmes; and having responsibility for school sport (PE and extra curricular activities). Some prefectures or PESAs have sports science and/or medical institutes and high performance centres, most of which re-use the facilities that were constructed for hosting Kokutai and domestic and international sporting competitions held in the prefecture. Until the establishment of JISS there was no inter-prefectural communication or dialogue. JISS has taken the initiative to create networks across prefectures and local regions for effective implementation of talent identification and development programmes with Fukuoka prefecture (south of Japan) creating the first structured TID programme in 2004 (see 7.5.2.3). The growing partnership in support of athletes between municipalities or prefectures and the JOC has become more evident with one example being allowing prefectural-level performance athletes to use public facilities and provide support services without charge.

7.3.5 Relations between actors

Following the description of the relevant national sport organisations, this section explores the changing organisational and structural links among those actors and intends to identify the way inter-agency cooperation and conflicts are emerging.

Struggles for steering influence: Competitive Sports Division– NAASH– JISS

While both NAASH, which is responsible for a broad promotion of sport, and JISS, the specialist agency for sports science and medicine, are supposedly ‘quasi-independent’ bodies, one cannot ignore the direct or indirect influence of MEXT and the Competitive Sports Division specifically, on these organisations. One example of direct influence is the appointment of officials to the management boards or committees in NAASH and JISS. For
example, one of the board members in NAASH was the former senior official of Competitive Sports Division as was the current Director of JISS in 2007. Whereas there is strong criticism when retired senior bureaucrats get jobs at NAASH or JISS, this kind of re-appointment of former senior government officials may have enhanced emerging policy advocates through attending governmental committee meetings and obtaining information and resources. The interdependent relation can also be identified when the Competitive Sports Division draft some detailed plans, such as “Nippon Revival Project” that required an immediate medal-winning outcome in the Athens Olympic Games. An official at the Competitive Sports Division argued that although the majority of key decisions had been made by the Division with specialist staff, the “know-how” of NAASH and JISS is always crucial and was utilised to design this kind of multi-yen project because “their inside expert knowledge and accumulated information are required” to identify the potential medal-winning athletes and national governing bodies of sport (Interviewee X, 16 August 2005).

The Government and sporting protocol in elite sport:
Competitive Sports Division—JOC—NFs

The Competitive Sports Division annually distributes Exchequer budget to the JOC, then to NFs, for the delivery of specific activities, such as organising training camps, sending delegations to international sporting competitions and implementing TID programmes. A junior officer at the Competitive Sports Division claimed that although it is theoretically an authoritative body of government for the JOC and NFs, it acts only as “supportive role entrusting the JOC to ensure the Japanese elite success” avoiding an ‘interventionist’ approach (Personal Communication with EE, 19 May 2006). Nevertheless, it is often a point of frustration that the JOC is only eligible to two-thirds of its budget that originates from MEXT, and that the use of the budget is restricted to the specific projects assigned by MEXT. To cover another one-third of its budget, the JOC is engaged in marketing, private sponsorship or commercial advertisement. Endorsing the government’s numerical target in its Gold Plan, the JOC has made a strategic decision to go along with the government policy, abandoning its previous ‘detached’ position. It is observed by a senior JISS official, who currently works closely with officials from the Competitive Sports Division and the JOC, that there had been no effective communication and “harmonious relationship” between MEXT and the JOC prior to the publication of Gold Plan, because the previously “favourable dominant view in the sport world in Japan was to distance itself from political influence so that it should be seen as ‘clean’ in terms of the operation of sport” (Interviewee H, 19 August 2005). Although there are various accounts as to a ‘strategic’ decision taken by the JOC, a
technical member of the JOC expressed that the historic 'detached' position of not only the JOC but also the sport field from politics did weaken the possibility of an influential voice in the government. This JOC senior official continued to argue for a growing awareness of the interdependent relations between "politics" and "policy" in sport as "politics is necessary to steer the sport policy" (Interviewee BB, 22 August 2006). It is acknowledged by this official that the JOC had to reposition itself against the distance from the government willingly endorsing the national target and accepting some implications of constrains by the government, which consequently made possible for the JOC to shape the ideas and values of Competitive Sports Division.

Emergence of 'elite sport community' or still fragmented?: cross-agency communication network

The JOC and JISS are the only two central sport bodies that are specifically concerned with medal-winning in Japan. They intend to support those areas which an individual NF cannot cover and establish collaborative links between national sporting actors (JOC, 2001a). The Department of Sports Information at JISS, formed in 2001, and its equivalent in the JOC, the Information Strategy Section of Information and Medical Science Special Committee, are said to work closely on a number of projects, particularly relating to the analysis of Japanese performance and the organisation of technical forums (JISS, 2004a: 68). These two specialist departments coordinate their work to strategically gather, analyse and disseminate information and exchange knowledge about high-performance sport, and most importantly, they intend to formulate a 'community' for high-performance across NFs, prefectural and municipal government, coaches and sport specialist academics. While the growing interests and values in creating an 'intelligence community' will be discussed in Section 7.6, it should be stressed here that their extensive engagement in 'intelligence gathering', that is, the analysis of strategic knowledge and information for identifying athletes, developing potential athletes and monitoring other rival and upcoming countries have become the most distinctive features of the Japanese elite sport system as it seeks to gain a competitive advantage. However, this collaboration with the effort to create an 'elite sport community' may be undermined at the sub-national level where the Prefectural PE/School Sport Division has an individual prefectural plan with a large annual budget allocated to the management of prefectural sport policy and to the development of prefectural athletes in order to compete at Kokutai. Despite structures being different between each prefecture, it is commonly understood that the prefectural board of education or PE/Sport section as well as the
Prefectural PE/Sports Associations set a high priority for winning prefectural athletes at Kokutai, which consequently causes a fragmentation of policy objective in sport. The Sports Information Department of JISS, however, endeavours to establish a relationship between the national and prefectural levels, which should be seen as significant insofar as it has opened wider possibilities of identifying and developing young athletes from an early stage, and thus, it is hoped to create a wider elite sport community. For connecting between the centre and prefectures, such projects as the "Local Network Project" was launched and one outcome was to create an email circulation system (called 'j-net') in 2003 (JISS, 2005a: 86-7). In this regard, the above quoted senior JISS official recognises that the creation of JISS was catalytic because the JOC has not had the capability to manage local sport bodies and officials, while "JISS is able to take a 'coordinator's role' at prefectural level...by sending desirable messages [through j-net] to prefectures and municipalities in order to send them expectations for their contributions to Japanese success at international level...because historically their interests were only prefectural athletes representing Kokutai, [and] no more than that" (Interviewee H, 19 August 2005). As will be examined in 7.5, one of the outcomes from local network projects, in collaboration with the JOC, was the implementation of structured TID programmes at some prefectural and local levels. Nevertheless, in contrast to JASA, JISS does not have an 'authoritative' power over prefecture, municipalities and their education boards, and therefore, seeks support from MEXT for achieving these national goals and disseminating information of good practice.

Establishing partnership or competing for leadership?: JOC– JASA

The fall-out between JASA and the JOC over the political pressure to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games is said to have caused a split between the two. As discussed, with 47 affiliated PESAs, JASA is in a better position to have a direct link with regions and thus reaching out to a wider population through such programmes as Junior Sports Clubs that are managed by PESAs and overseen by JASA. While the responsibility of the JOC and JASA were divided, a more collaborative relationship seems to have developed in recent years. One example is the decision to accept the President of JASA as a member of the JOC’s Board in 2005 and, in turn, the appointment of JOC’s President to the Board in JASA. Nevertheless, one senior member of JASA dismissed the claim of ‘divided responsibility’ that, on one hand, the development of elite athletes is managed only by the JOC, and on the other hand, JASA is responsible solely for promoting life-long sport (Interviewee A, 18 March 2005). This official emphasised the overarching role centrally taken by JASA in “laying foundation and basis [for the development of elite athletes]” and creating “the very first step
of performance ladder, from region, *Kokutai*, national and to international*. However, the JASA's role in high-performance development has become further diluted with the creation of the National Coaching Academy which the JOC delivers to foster international elite coaches, responsibility for which used to be held only by JASA. It can be summarised that, although there is an intention to integrate JASA and the JOC at the strategic level, there is growingly an apparent division of labour between the two national bodies in practice which may well be a source of friction in the future, particularly if JASA continues to feel excluded from the development of elite athletes.

7.4 Financing for Excellence and Targeting of Resources

In principle, there are three ways of allocating public finances for the area of elite sport, namely, the Exchequer budget (including the grant titled Development and Support for Athletes Programme, from 2003), the Sports Promotion Fund and the Sports Promotion Lottery (*toto*). With the publication of *Basic Plan* in 2000, the governmental and quasi-governmental funding streams seem to have become much more performance-orientated for effective and efficient use of limited public money. Most importantly, responding to the objective of government, it is evident that the JOC started applying a series of qualitative and quantitative performance indicators to evaluate the Olympic NFs. While targeting government subsidies to achieving excellence is slowly being recognised, other public resources were initially confusing. It was only in 2005 that the funding structure was clarified when the NAASH' Evaluation Committee was streamlined into two divisions; the first to allocate funds mainly to the improvement of elite sport (Sports Promotion Fund), and the other is largely to allocate funds to the area of promotion of participation in sport (*toto*). However, this streamlining the division of responsibility remains blurred. However, since the then Ministry of Education appointed NAASH to be the distributor of two public funding resources, it has only served merely as a 'distributor' with a loose contractual obligation with MEXT and not engaging in any form of monitoring or evaluation. Although the Evaluation Committee of NAASH currently seems being clear about the point-system, based on which prioritised athletes and NFs are categorised and funded, the grant recipients would not be assessed for best use of public money but only requested to submit project reports to NAASH. Nevertheless, this lack of accountability could be the reflection of the substantially unstable and low income generated both from the Fund reserves and *toto* sales, which only very
recently have increased with the introduction of new forms of toto lottery (such as toto Goal 3, BIG and mini BIG).

This section firstly provides a brief overview of historic trends in public expenditure for elite athlete development. In the second part of the section, two relatively new financial tools for the support of elite athletes and coaches will be explained where documents and committee meeting notes/minutes published by NAASH are the main source of data collected and analysed. A particular focus in the second section is to examine the accounts and values of national sport actors in relation to the policy process of forming these available public resources. Most importantly, the last part of the section brings into question the rationale behind the introduction of new fund, Development and Support for Athletes Programme, that originated from the Nippon Revival Project, and whether the greater availability of resources has allowed elite athletes and coaches to train full-time. One should be aware, however, that the primary data published by the government is not concise as it is lacking coherence, while the data provided here are cross-referenced with the official data and the secondary source from literature in order to provide as accurate account as possible and identify the policy emphasis on elite sport from the trend in funding.

7.4.1 Historical overview of financing international success

Government subsidy to elite sport was introduced as early as 1921 (¥1,000) when the Japanese delegation was sent to the 5th Far Eastern Games in Shanghai. Initially, there was no government financial support for the participation in the Stockholm Olympic Games, when Japan first participated, but ¥6,000 was provided for the Paris Olympic Games and the 7th Far Eastern Games, both held in 1924. Early evidence of government's growing interest in winning on the international stage can be identified from the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Games, where 190 athletes were given ¥10,000 by the government. As part of the Emperor's allowance, ¥30,000 was granted to 297 delegates participating in the 1936 Berlin Olympics (JASA, 1986).

The centralised system of sport administration within the Ministry of Education had been established before World War II, but it was after the Allied occupation in 1951 that the government re-invested in elite sport and international success. To prepare for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics as a host country, a total of around ¥2.06 billion was spent on the development of athletes between 1960 and 1965. It was recognised as a 'national project'
ensuring Japanese success, and avoiding failure, at a time Japan was recovering from the war and re-establishing and re-branding itself as a democratic sovereign state throughout 1950s and 1960s. However, more importantly, government interest in international sporting success waned after the Tokyo Games which resulted in falling investment in developing athletes and facilities. The Exchequer budget was only guaranteed in 1977, until then, the government funded elite athletes only when Japan hosted Olympic Games hence funding was sporadic. Quite significantly, Graph 7.2 shows that the Exchequer budget was modest and JASA had to rely on the revenues generated by publicly-organised sport races. However, the state grant jumped from ¥281,000 in 1975 to ¥1,143,700 in 1978, and ¥1,680,000 in 1981/2, after which overall public funds decreased. Accordingly, JASA's expenditure on both projects specifically related to the high-performance budget (elite athlete development and sending athletes to major international sporting events) reached to the highest amount (¥1,885,202) in 1982.

Then Director of Performance Improvement Committee of JASA/JOC argued that the consecutive poor performance of Japanese athletes in early and mid-1980s was due to limited resources available to Japanese elite athletes which is "nothing comparable to those athletes from Socialist countries and other sporting power in the world who enjoy state services" (quoted in Kawasugi, 1988: 43). Against this background, the "Olympic Performance Athlete System" was introduced in 1987 to prepare for the Seoul and Calgary Olympic Games, specifically targeting two categories of athletes: first, "performance athletes" who had potential to be selected for the national team; and second, "elite performance athletes" whose possibilities for medals is realistic (A-rank) and also who can finish in the top rank or possible medals (B-rank). This was the first time that JASAIJOC gave free access to specialist services for these athletes and provided financial aid for A-rank athletes with ¥300,000 a month and B-rank athletes with ¥100,000 a month, as well as for their high performance coaches with ¥200,000 (ibid, 44-5).

The Olympic Performance Athlete System still remains until today as the JOC "Athlete Programme" but is seen as insufficient. The most recent catalytic public funding for elite athlete development was initially a one-off high performance budget as part of the Nippon Revival Project, which specifically targeted the highest medal-potential disciplines/athletes in

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Graph 8.2 does not indicate the budget which was allocated to sports science research project, although we do not deny the fact that a large number of research projects looked into specialist support areas for high-performance athletes.
the 2004 Athens Olympic Games but remained as the "Development and Support for Athlete Programme Fund" distributed by NAASH.

Graph 7.2: Public grant to JASA and its expenditure on elite success, 1963-1985

Source: JASA, 1986. 527-8
Note: Described as ¥-.000.
'Public race subsidy' includes: Keirin (bicycle race), Kyōtei (motorboat race) and auto-race.

In relation to the three funding streams, a senior NAASH official in charge of the fund distributions argued that the introduction of the "new financial tools (Sports Promotion Fund, toto and Athlete Programme)…eventually specified where and in what ways those (resources) are distributed" and, accordingly, the flow of resources have clarified the role of each sport actor (JOC, NFs, NAASH, MEXT) (Interviewee Y, 16 August 2005).

7.4.2 Two new financial tools for supporting elite athletes

Sports Promotion Fund
The objective for the establishment of Sports Promotion Fund with an initial fund of ¥29.4 billion (comprising of a one-off payment of ¥25bn by central government and ¥4.4bn from the private sector) was to provide continuous financial support for the increase of Japanese international sporting competitiveness, and thereby, the ratio of Fund's distribution between elite sport and sport for all was confirmed as 3:1 (MESCC, 1991; NAASH Fund Committee Meeting Minute, May 2002; June 2003). The above cited senior NAASH official who was a former PE Bureau official recalled the urgency of the time for introducing the Fund saying: "the Fund was endorsed by the government because Japanese top-athletes couldn't win even in Asia and [there was a sense that] we had to do something about it!" (original emphasis, Interviewee Y, 16 August 2005). Moreover, it was explained by another retired official from PE Bureau that the introduction of the Fund was demanded by the Ministry of Education because "it was the only ministry which did not have any other financial resources for sport in comparison to other ministries" (Interviewee Z, 18 August 2005). Although the Fund was introduced to provide more financial autonomy to MEXT, which allows a much longer-term strategic plan particularly for the development of elite athletes and coaches and holding international sporting events in Japan, the confusion in the objective of allocation of funds remained which was pointed out in the NAASH Fund Committee Meeting stressing "the ultimate aim of the Fund should be specified as 'elite success', rather than 'promotion of life-long sport'" (NAASH Fund Committee Meeting Minute, May 2002).

The Fund distributes in four main streams, the first of which, funding for "Sports Activities of Athlete/Coaches", is the allocation for the development of elite athletes and coaches, which include: domestic and international training camps, sending national teams abroad for extended exposure to international environments, inviting international teams to Japan and the training of elite coaches. However, the severe shortage of funding is conspicuous that in contrast to ¥463 million made available in 1991 to 227 activities under this category, it was only ¥156.627m in 2004, which was further decreased to ¥86.456m allocated to only 61 activities in 2006 (NAASH, 2007). The above cited NAASH official observed that this immense shortfall in the Fund should be explained in relation to the Japanese economic downturn which affected not only a national low interest rate (0.5% in 2007), consequently, hitting its reserves (17.70% in 1991; 5.58% in 200669), but also the government's initial arrangement for the set up of the Fund (Interviewee Y, 16 August 2005). More specifically, this official recalled "a political game at the time" between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that although the government had initially planned to provide ¥50 billion to the Fund, it was reduced to half because they required the other half to establish the

* From NAASH Fund Committee Meeting, Material 4, dated 16 January 2008.
"Abe Fellowship Program\textsuperscript{70}, and that later the then minister of education "apologised to me (as the then chief official of the PE Bureau) for not securing sufficient financial aid". In many ways, even though the Fund for sport was created, the search for sufficient funding for sport continued thereby strengthening the policy preference to enact the legislation for the Sports Promotion Lottery.

**Sports Promotion Lottery (toto)**

The Law on Practices of Sports Promotion Lottery came into force in November 1998 and the actual sales of toto started in 2001 with the distribution of revenues following in April 2002. The introduction of toto largely relied on the popularity of soccer's professional league (J-League) launched in 1993. It was designed to provide financial support for a wide range of projects for increasing participation in sport which was recognised as "a new revenue source for the purpose of building a 'life-long sports society'...and for creating a rich sports environment" allowing Japanese elite success in sport (MESSC, 1998). Nakamura examined the process of the passage of the Sports Promotion Law and identified the resistance to “another form of ‘national gambling’” by such interest groups as the Parents Teacher Association (PTA) who intervened in the discussion (2002: 164-172). Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that the introduction of toto was legitimated and prompted by the ‘successful’ examples from other countries, including the UK, Italy, Spain, Holland, Germany, Switzerland and Argentina (see toto Letter, Summer, Autumn 2001).

The revenue from toto is allocated mainly to the area of promotion of Sport for All/life-long participation in sport including the support for regional facility development, in particular the Comprehensive Community Sports Clubs and development of instructors/coaches in local sport clubs (NAASH Sports Lottery Fund Committee, Minute, August 2001). As Table 7.3 shows, the area of international sporting success is also eligible for toto funding, which include the areas of talent identification and the development of potential junior-level athletes and anti-doping activities. However, what is notable is the decline in toto funding wherein the total of around ¥5.8 billion in 2002 was reduced to as little as ¥80 million in 2007. As for the

\textsuperscript{70} The Abe Fellowship Program was introduced and named after the late Mr. Abe Shintaro, father of former Prime Minister (Abe Shinzo) who, who proposed in 1990 to establish the Center for Global Partnership (CGP, currently Social Science Research Council, SSRC) when he was a minister for Foreign Affairs. It was described in the CGP web-site that “Shortly before Mr. Abe's death, the Japanese Diet agreed to create a new endowment within the Japan Foundation, thereby providing resources for the founding of CGP. The mandate of the CGP is to assist in achieving closer relations between Japan and the United States and to contribute to a better world through the cooperative efforts of both countries" (from http://www.ssrc.org/fellowships/abel/, accessed 01 January 2006).
area of sporting success, Table 7.3 suggests that the toto cut some funding areas reducing the allocation of ¥3.7 billion in 2002 to ¥39.5 million in 2007. One high-performance official from an Olympic NF who also sits at the NAASH Sports Funds Committee, noted that the funding area for TID survived the cuts in 2005 because of the agreement in the Committee that it is the essential programme for the Japanese future Olympic success (Interviewee V, 12 April 2005). However, he expressively showed his disappointment and anger in terms of a shortage of available funds as follows:

...How much could we fund for talent identification programme this year (in 2005)? We only had 46 million yen in order to allocate all TID programmes across Japan! How could we distribute [this money] to all national federations? ... It would cost one sport body at least 32 million yen [to run a TID programme]. At the end of the day, it is children who have to take the burden for gaining access to sport.

(Interviewee V, 12 April 2005)

The introduction of toto raised the expectations among national sports policy actors, while there are enough grounds to suspect that the shortage of toto funds may have undermined the credibility of government’s commitment to sport. Interestingly, the accumulation of debt in toto alerted the government which was included in part of the reformation plan of central administration.

Despite the initial plan to ‘abolish’ toto, the tone of the government was softened to only requesting NAASH to undertake a ‘fundamental rationalisation’ of operation of toto (Asahi, 17 December 2007). Although the sales of toto has steadily risen and its allocation to the area of elite success was expected to increase from a mere ¥22m in 2007 to ¥300m in 2008 (NAASH Sports Funds Committee, Meeting Material 4, 22 February 2008), it remains to be seen whether this fund raises enough resources to satisfy national sports actors.
Table 7.3: Allocation of toto funds, 2002-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sports Promotion Lottery Fund (¥,000)</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Maintenance of local sports facilities</td>
<td>843,407</td>
<td>551,200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Supporting Activities of Comprehensive Sports Clubs</td>
<td>492,549</td>
<td>565,891</td>
<td>381,784</td>
<td>169,419</td>
<td>82,571</td>
<td>57,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Supporting sport promotion activities by municipal government</td>
<td>538,999</td>
<td>140,251</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Identification and Development of Potential Athletes</td>
<td>85,739</td>
<td>232,292</td>
<td>89,300</td>
<td>46,945</td>
<td>18,264</td>
<td>17,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Support for Activities of Sports Organizations</td>
<td>3,593,006</td>
<td>880,717</td>
<td>170,938</td>
<td>74,331</td>
<td>28,276</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Promotion of sport activities</td>
<td>1,035,023</td>
<td>482,659</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Promotion of anti-doping activities</td>
<td>45,181</td>
<td>56,257</td>
<td>23,564</td>
<td>19,522</td>
<td>8,326</td>
<td>4,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Sports coaches/instructors overseas training</td>
<td>50,079</td>
<td>46,895</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>6,604</td>
<td>1,886</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Development of organizational foundation</td>
<td>28,111</td>
<td>33,153</td>
<td>15,074</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Hosting the International Sporting Competition</td>
<td>2,348,873</td>
<td>26,825</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total funding for Elite Sport-related from toto</td>
<td>3,678,745</td>
<td>1,113,645</td>
<td>260,238</td>
<td>121,276</td>
<td>46,540</td>
<td>39,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Funds from toto</td>
<td>5,779,650</td>
<td>2,434,791</td>
<td>552,722</td>
<td>243,750</td>
<td>110,847</td>
<td>79,969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NAASH Fund Committee Meeting Material No.2, date 16 January 2008
Note: 5·b includes: i) doping tests; and ii) educational and promotional activity
5·d includes: i) promotion of international exchange; and ii) development of management function
The allocation of funds are based on the financial account at the end of fiscal year, apart from 2007.
The amount in 2007 is the initial allocation at the beginning of financial year in April.

7.4.3 Public funding and the Nippon Revival Project: supporting ‘full-time’ athletes

The key policy indication of governmental bodies in Japan can be found in the annual “Estimate Budget Request”, normally requested at the end of August for the next financial year. Table 7.2 suggested that there are other ministries that invested in policy areas of sport, leisure and recreation including funding for sport facilities. Graph 7.3 illustrates the overall public funding to the sport-related area (so called “Physical Fitness Promotion” budget). The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism allocated the biggest subsidy with ¥100.870 billion for the management and maintenance of recreational facilities and public parks. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare had ¥28.2 billion to support its health promotion programmes in 2006/07. What is notable is the continuous decline of the Physical Fitness Promotion budget with the highest reduction of 10.1% in 2005/06. It is based on the then Prime Minister Koizumi’s neo-liberal policy (so called “Three In One”
policy) to cut public expenditure and seek the maximum impact of investment. In 2002/03, MEXT had a total budget of ¥61.534 billion for the policy area of Physical Fitness Promotion, while in 2006/05 it was reduced about half, to ¥39.727 billion. The main reason for the extent of the cuts in this budget is the elimination of subsidies for management and maintenance of high-school sport facilities and also the handover of public grants to municipality/local government for the management of other public school sport facilities. It is explained that this policy change was due to the Koizumi's policy for 'devolution' with the intention to reduce the budget of central government and more autonomy of local authorities (Gekkan Taiiku Shisetsu, 2006: 42-3). Out of ¥39.7 billion of MEXT’s total budget in 2006/07 for 'physical fitness', which include the finances for facility management and maintenance, ¥16.690 billion was specifically put towards the ‘sport’ area of which ¥3.8 billion (excluding the construction of NTC, i.e. ¥5.4bn) was allocated to the Competitive Sports Division (MEXT Budget Report, 2006). As briefly discussed before it can be reiterated that according to a senior official of Competitive Sports Division, they are constantly “in competition against other divisions” within the Sports & Youth Bureau over the tight budget because around 70% of the total ministerial budget is allocated to education and 12-13% goes to the promotion of science and technology, and thus, the rest of around 7-8% needs to be shared under a broad category of “life-long learning, culture and sport” (Interviewee X, 16 August 2005).

Furthermore, it is argued that the low policy priority of sport within the Cabinet became particularly evident if the Basic Plan for sport were compared with that of science and technology. This was explained by a former senior member of JISS, who was also a member government advisory committee (ACHPE) for the introduction of toto, that “in comparison with the government promise of hundreds of billions of yen invested for ten years stated in the Basic Plan for the promotion of science and technology..., the Basic Plan for sport did not guarantee government financial investment but only illustrated the usage of toto finance, which was the reflection of government reluctance in assuring public finance in sport” (Interviewee G, 23 March 2005).
In addition, government value in sport, which stated “sport brings dreams and passion to the life of citizens”, becomes quite rhetorical when we consider a general awareness and frustration felt among national sport actors, illustrated by the following account by a former officer of Competitive Sports Division, currently working for NAASH:

...there should be various means to provide public support for champion's sport. However, sport isn't something the government gets directly involved ...there is a general recognition that sport policy is the area of private sector, in contrast to the public policy areas like policing, fire services or drug issues, in which the public sector has a direct involvement and enforces legislations. Sport isn't, sport is separated from these types of administrative power, which is supposed to be autonomous...Taking part in sport and

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**Source:** Gekkan Taiiku Shisetsu, 2003-2007

**Key:**
- MAFF - Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
- MEXT - Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
- MHLW - Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
- MIC - Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
- MITI - Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
- MLIT - Ministry of Land, Transportation and Tourism
- MOE - Ministry of Environment
watching sport is a private matter...therefore, the public sector only needs to 'support' these private activities!

(original emphasis, Interviewee Y, 16 August 2005)

It is interesting to observe the notions of 'public' and 'private' when we consider explicit expressions of direct involvement of government in a structured and planned manner which was demonstrated in the Basic Plan based on the acknowledgement of "cultural values in sport" that was earlier recognised in the ACHPE document in 1989 (MEXT, 2000; ACHEP, 1989; see also Asami, 1998: 33).

Nevertheless, the above cited former official confirmed three ways of government financial support: first, the government provides a direct but partial financial support to the 'programmes' undertaken by the JOC, JASA and Nippon Budo Kan. While the JOC is the principal national sporting actor responsible for elite athlete development, it is only eligible to receive between 1/3 and 2/3's of the amount needed for the JOC's core activities, consequently the JOC is constantly engaged in generating funds from commercial, sponsorship and marketing activities (Kaneko, 2005). Second, the Competitive Sports Division provides funding for a range of 'hard support' (for development and management of public facilities, e.g. NTC) and 'soft support', such as to a programme for developing coaches/instructors facilitated by JASA; and third, it supports the implementation of certain programmes and research projects. In this sense, the introduction of the "Nippon Revival Project" in 2002 was unprecedented to provide additional government subsidy to the JOC with approximately ¥1 billion71 in 2003 followed by a new funding stream specifically targeted the high-potential medal athletes in the Olympic Games (see below). A total of ¥27.5 billion was invested for the construction of JISS and ¥37.4 billion for NTC (including the construction cost of ¥22bn), which was opened in late December 2007 ((National Training Center Expert Committee Meeting, 2004). The Competitive Sports Division further requested an allocation of another ¥562m in 2006 for creating a network of high-performance facilities, including winter sport and high-altitude training (MEXT, 2006c).

The Nippon Revival Project

What is striking most about the introduction of the Nippon Revival Project is the fact that government recognised the limitations of the aforementioned 'non-interventionist' approach and the weakness of the current sporting funding structure and performance environment for

71 The amount of subsidies from the Competitive Sports Division in 2002 was ¥1.594bn in 2002; in 2003 ¥1.929bn, ¥2.025bn in 2004 and ¥2.304bn in 2005.
elite athletes and coaches. As illustrated before, there are two main ways in which athletes and coaches can obtain funding for their activities which are: i) government subsidies centrally allocated to the JOC that are distributed to NFs, and then to athletes; and ii) the "Sports Activities of Athletes/Coaches" stream within the Sports Promotion Fund. The former is provided as the JOC’s ‘Athlete Programme’, introduced in 1987, by nominating athletes to provide financial aid under its high-performance categories of Elite A, Elite B, and Youth Elite and to the coaches of the designated athletes. The maximum amount provided for Elite A athletes is ¥200,000, Elite B ¥100,000, and Youth Elite ¥50,000 per month, which is barely sufficient for them to live on as full-time athletes even though all funded athletes also receive free access to specialist services such as massage and physiotherapy and some athletes gain further resources from their respective NFs. Consequently, elite/youth athletes still rely on additional income from sources such as private companies to which most of them either belong, in part-time employment and/or having commercial sponsorship deal where their image is used for their sponsors’ advertisement campaigns, public relations or sometimes increasing the welfare of staff (CSRC, 2005). It should therefore be noted that the early introduction of the Sports Promotion Fund did not make a dramatic difference to the income of elite level athletes.

The MEXT and its commissioned research team (Corporate Sport Research Committee, CSRC) have identified three weaknesses in the current high-performance environment for top athletes (MEXT, 2000; CSRC, 2005). The first was the dependence of athletes on corporate companies who owned sport clubs and teams and provided athletes with coaching, financial and technical services, and welfare support. The weakness arises from the fragility of the financial base of many company sport clubs, corporate sport teams in particular, due to financial problems of their parent companies with the result that some athletes have lost their income and some have been forced to give up their athletic career. Related to the previous point, the second weakness is, as a senior JOC official engaged in developing the ‘second-career’ project’ pointed out (see in Section 7.6.1), the experience of elite athletes is being “wasted” because the majority of athletes tend to be engaged in non-sporting careers/sectors after their athletic career as there are not enough opportunities to utilise their knowledge and competencies within sport, as coaches for example, and not enough social recognition for sport-related occupations (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005). Not enough protection when athletes are injured and especially if injury forces early retirement from their sporting career were pointed out in the Basic Plan (2000), which reflected the insufficient financial support available for international level athletes. In part, the under-funding of elite athletes is a consequence of the tradition in Japan of relying financially on business for the production and support of elite athletes. While there is a growing awareness of the necessity
and the demand to increase levels of government support in order to produce a supportive environment in which athletes can train, there are strong reservations, as expressed by a high-ranking NAASH official, regarding the provision of comprehensive financial support due to the association between state support and the system of "state amateurs" found in the communist and many ex-communist countries (Interviewee Y, 16 August 2005).

These reservations notwithstanding the Competitive Sports Division allocated the budget based on the newly introduced Nippon Revival Project in 2003 and 2004 to prioritised NFs based on performance criteria formulated by the JOC. The project was financed by the Competitive Sports Division as a direct subsidy to the JOC with an increased budget of ¥335 million in order to expand the opportunities for intensive training camps for elite athletes and for the enhancement of national team sport leagues in order to prepare for the Olympics and Asian Games. In the same year, the Competitive Sports Division also allocated about ¥420 million for the "Development of Prioritized Disciplines" and distributed additional funding via NAASH to selected Olympic-discipline NFs to maximise their chances of success in the Athens Olympic Games. In comparison to the unstable and declining funds from Sports Promotion and toto, Table 7.4 shows that this funding programme, which is backed by the Competitive Sports Division, has a stable budget to help potential medal-winners and their coaches to concentrate on their training and to widened opportunities to train abroad. In this regard, we might note that despite a degree of reluctance felt among some officials from the government, its direct intervention in supporting high-performance athletes and coaches seems to have been accepted.

The Nippon Revival Project, part of which is now incorporated as "Development and Support for Athlete Programme Funds" managed and distributed by NAASH, had another objective, that is, to revitalise and increase the level of national leagues of ball-game disciplines. As illustrated in CSRC report (2005) issued by the Sports and Youth Division of MEXT, closures or dissolutions of corporate sport teams were seen as a continuing problem which resulted not only in players losing their clubs but also in the decline of the leagues' popularity. The Japan Top League (JTL) was subsequently created in 2005 with eight sports of nine leagues\textsuperscript{72}, all of which are subject to the public financial support under the "Top-League Management" funding stream. The objective of establishing JTL is stated to "produce a solid foundation for achieving medals in team sport at the Olympic Games" and the former Prime Minister Mori Yoshihiro was appointed as its president with the first and last Minister of Public

\textsuperscript{72} These eight sports of nine leagues are: women's soccer (Japan Women's Football League, L-League or 'Nadeshiko League'); volleyball (V-League); basketball (Japan Basketball League, JBL; and Women's Japan Basketball League, WJBL); handball (JHL); rugby (Top League); ice hockey (Asian League Hockey, ALH); hockey (Hockey Japan League, HJL); and JSL (Japan Softball League, JSL).
Sports and Olympian, Aso Taro, became its vice president (JTL, 2006). It is also intended to establish a collaborative link across the 9 leagues to provide support with management of each others’ professional leagues. As such, attention is drawn to the fact that the JTL has political impetus having influential politicians so the form of inter-league cooperation is unprecedented as it has become possible to attract more financial resources from the government.

Table 7.4: Targeting funding for a ‘high return’ of investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development and Support for Athletes Programme Fund (¥, 000)</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of allocation</td>
<td>No of Funding</td>
<td>No of Funding</td>
<td>No of Funding</td>
<td>No of Funding</td>
<td>No of Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Development of Prioritized Disciplines</td>
<td>190 419,874</td>
<td>179 422,495</td>
<td>174 347,233</td>
<td>134 336,540</td>
<td>124 382,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Domestic training camp</td>
<td>76 95,314</td>
<td>69 83,594</td>
<td>90 116,817</td>
<td>55 67,827</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. International training camp</td>
<td>41 131,381</td>
<td>42 103,277</td>
<td>33 .86,040</td>
<td>24 60,398</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Sending teams to international competitions</td>
<td>47 126,199</td>
<td>61 172,612</td>
<td>50 142,450</td>
<td>55 208,315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Inviting teams from overseas</td>
<td>3 12,636</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>1 1,926</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Top-League Management by Sports Organizations</td>
<td>7 175,000</td>
<td>8 158,500</td>
<td>8 171,000</td>
<td>9 164,000</td>
<td>9 154,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>197 595,575</td>
<td>187 587,261</td>
<td>182 518,233</td>
<td>143 500,540</td>
<td>133 536,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NMSH Funding Committee Meeting Material 3, 21 February 2008; Material 6, 16 January 2008; NAASH, 2007
Note: the breakdown of 2007 accounts is not known

“Developing Prioritised Disciplines”: introducing targeted funding

The decision to allocate subsidies to athletes based on the identification of the disciplines/events with a ‘high potential for success’ was unprecedented. It was highlighted by an officer in the Competitive Sports Division that they intended to demand “an ‘immediate outcome’ by Athens, by Turin, and Beijing” (Interviewee X, 16 August 2005). To meet the expectations of ‘immediate outcomes’ stated in the Nippon Revival Project and the political objective of winning 3.5% of Olympic medals, the above cited interviewee explained that the concept of ‘Revival’ proved controversial. While there were those in government who interpreted ‘revival’ to mean the revival of sport in which Japan had previously excelled, such as gymnastics, the prevailing view was that the objective was “to revive the level of success achieved in the 1964 Tokyo Games” (Interviewee X, 18 August 2005). Notably, the criteria-based evaluation is undertaken by the JOC’s Information Strategy Section and was endorsed by the government. Category I is a quantified evaluation, which include: i) past-medal
achievement (Olympic Games, world championships); ii) most recent medal achievement (Olympic Games, world championships); iii) possibility of medals and top 8 finish in next Olympic Games; vi) facilitation of TID programme; and v) performance structure for elite athletes. Category II, which is a quantitative evaluation of those NFs that have fewer than 12 points but which are recognised by the JOC as having some emergent international quality athletes or having a strong youth/junior development system (NAASH Sports Fund Committee, Meeting Material, dated 29 March 2007).

It can be observed that NAASH has only a passive role and, as its senior member explains, it "listens and refers to the evaluation rankings provided by the JOC", although it intends "to maintain its impartiality because the funding committee tends to become the representation of 'organisational interests'...and thereby it (NAASH) appoints some 'neutral' personnel like university academics" (Interviewee Z, 16 August 2005). Nevertheless, despite that NAASH makes final decisions for the level of funding as a fund distributor, the JOC's discretion over the allocation of the performance budget and the identification of prioritised disciplines has strengthened in recent years. In this regard, the earlier claim of the JOC's specifying its organisational identity can be reiterated in which the JOC formulated the evaluation criteria that are consistent with the government's emphasis on the willingness of NFs to establish a long-term structured and planned TID system. A senior JOC official who had also been involved in formulating the evaluation criteria, suggested that the JOC has become like an "evaluative body...constantly monitoring the NFs' performances, activities and organisational structures, which consequently made it impossible for NFs to provide distorted information to the JOC as previously happened many times in order to obtain more high-performance money" (Interviewee M, 24 August 2005). It may also be notable that NFs are required to produce what was required by the government and the JOC that may have resulted them being pulled in two directions, one to establish a long-term strategic approach to TID and the other to deliver an 'immediate outcome', namely, medals.

It would also not be too exaggerated to suggest that the success in the Athens Olympic Games was a relief for the JOC officials who analysed the past, present and future performance potential of NFs and athletes and also for the Competitive Sports Division officials who assigned the JOC via NAASH to evaluate NFs based on its performance criteria and targeted an 'immediate success'. In 2004, there were 31 events from 19 disciplines, 90% of which gained medals with only cycling team-sprint, archery and sailing that had not been recognised as medal-potential prioritised sports in the JOC's evaluation. If we specifically refer to 16 gold medals, they all came from the events which the JOC categorised as 'Extra A' (swimming and judo) and 'A' (athletics, wrestling and gymnastics) (Fukuda, quoted in
What is important here is that, after the Athens Olympics, the first policy evaluation was conducted by MEXT on elite sport policy, which was formalised in a report titled *The Improvement of International Competitiveness* (MEXT, 2006b). It is part of the process of administrative reformation, which required government departments to publish policy evaluation reports from 2002. This report used the business 'logic model' of input, output and outcome examination to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of government investment in achieving elite success. This evaluation is significant insofar as the government now requires accountability of its financial usage and assessments of policy impact and effectiveness, of which elements are also addressed in the annual budget request document by the Competitive Sports Division. The report was generally supportive of the current approach to elite sport development undertaken by the government specialist division, the JOC and JISS and also identified a 'correlation' between 'input' and an ultimate 'outcome', that is, medals. However, it can be critically commented that it may have been to legitimise current government policy and underline the contribution of JISS to elite success in Athens because the report lacked the critical review of policy which could have been provided by an independent third party. In this regard, our doubts in the significance of this evaluation report can be attracted to the seriousness of MEXT in producing it, for they may have identified having the first policy evaluation on sport, rather than any other MEXT's public policy agenda, was publicly 'attractive'. It can also be suggested that the report might have been to indicate additional requiring resources because it concluded "much effective policy development is necessary to maintain a stable performance with around 3.5% medal acquisitions" (MEXT, 2006b: I-35).

In summary, it can be argued that the *Basic Plan* encouraged increased investment in elite success and the MEXT review of policy in 2006 provides evidence of an increasingly structured and long-term approach by the government to the preparation of elite athletes underpinned by a neo-liberal and 'value for money' approach to effectiveness as measured by high-performance achievement in the Olympics and major world championships. As discussed in this section, the funding structure and the organisational responsibilities for distribution of funding as well as the targeted strategic activities and evaluation criteria have all become much clearer only in recent years. While it appears that the funding structure seems to have become more generous, the Sports Promotion Fund and *toto* are constrained by the deficit in their budget. However, there is a growing awareness among government officials of the fast-increasing international performance standard which required the reconsideration of its long-standing 'non-interventionist' attitude (Interviewee X, 16 August 2005) and the need to become much actively involved in supporting high-performance athletes and coaches in order to ensure Japanese success in the Olympics and major...
championships (Interviewee GG, 29 August 2007). The launch of the Nippon Revival Project was symbolic insofar as the government supported the criteria-based evaluation, which is undertaken by the JOC, and consequently, NFs are much more under scrutiny of government for meeting both quantitative and qualitative high-performance elements. This has also given the ground for the Competitive Sports Division to further announce ¥200 million of 2008/09 Exchequer budget in order to provide the financial support, including the 'team' of eleven elite sport specialists, including coach, psychologist and physiologist, to 5 medal potential sports (judo, swimming, athletics, wrestling and gymnastics) in order to secure success in the 2012 London Games. A senior official from the Competitive Sports Division stressed the "direct investment" in five prioritised sports was invaluable in face of increasing international standards and, he believes, in light of other countries' similar approach this sports-centered specialist support programme could increase the chance of Japanese winning more medals (Interviewee GG, 29 August 2007).

7.5 Talent Identification and Development and Pathways to the Podium

7.5.1 Increasing importance of the identification and development of sporting talent

While the concept and importance of talent identification and development (TID) was recognised prior to the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964, and has been a constant theme during the latter half of the twentieth century, the operationalisation of a structured and nationally coordinated TID programme has only recently materialised in Japan. From as early as 1977, the Sports Science and Medicine Research Group of JASNJOC was directed by the government to conduct research on developing high-performance programmes for different sports. However, it was in the mid-1980s that we can observe a growing awareness in the significance of structured TID, which was undoubtedly influenced by the consecutive poor performances of Japanese athletes and the growing recognition that other successful countries in elite sport had implemented the TID systems. In 1984, JASA proposed to establish a 'long-term integrated performance plan' foreseeing the 21st century of Japanese high-performance in its published performance document (JASA, 1984). Moreover, two JASA research projects funded by the government symbolised the urgency felt among the national
sport actors. Based on the 1984 JASA long-term performance vision, the four-year project on "Development of Sports Curriculum for Improving Performances" was launched in 1988 in order to develop an effective training system/programme, which could allow athlete development from younger age, with five sport disciplines (athletics, swimming, gymnastics, soccer and speed skating) selected to formulate a high-performance training curriculum (JASA, 1988; 1989a). Due to the dominant school sport club culture in Japan, the chief researcher for this project identified the inherent problems in inconsistent training approaches from primary, junior high to high schools as well as the coaches' short-term concern of "winning national championships at each stage in school", resulting in "physical and mental burn-out" of young athletes (Asami, quoted in JASA, 1988: 1-2). In the following year, equally importantly, another three-year project was granted to "Sports Talent Identification Methods". With five specialist research groups, the research was conducted to identify social, psychological, physiological, growth and development components that can effectively help identify 'elite athletes' with initial six disciplines (wrestling, judo, weightlifting, female gymnastics, synchronised swimming, skiing) that have "potential for obtaining medals in the Olympics and international championships" (JASA, 1989b: 3-6). In recognition of the significance in cooperation with the Sports Curriculum project earlier started, Ishii Kihachi, the director for the TID research project team, reported that the JOC's independence from JASA "was catalytic for restructuring the Japanese sport system in 1989", which reshaped the research objective of this project having much specific high-performance orientation (ibid, 6). The project problematised the traditional "natural selection" of athletes in Japan, and thereby, concluded to take account of both scientific and social elements in a national TID programme that can be shared between national governing bodies (JASA, 1991b: 237-241).

Strikingly, the two research groups visited a number of 'advanced sporting countries' to learn about their TID programme and high-performance system. In the first year, the Sports Curriculum team visited Rumania, Hungary, West Germany, the UK and Soviet Union (only for gymnastics for three consecutive years) in 1988, followed by the United States and Canada accompanied by a researcher from the TID group in 1989. As for the TID project, the research group visited Bulgaria, West Germany, Canada and the United States, followed, in the next year, by visits to Sweden, Belgium, Italy and China (JASA, 1989b; 1990b). Fujita explained the choice of Bulgaria as one of the very first countries which the state invested in identifying "future potential (talent) in the areas of sport, art and music in the 1970s", around the time when there had been a gradual increase in international recognition of the lack of scientific research on identifying the components of past successful elite athletes (quoted in JASA, 1989b: 205). Interestingly, both research projects identified the necessity of combining both socialist (e.g. China) and liberal countries; countries of different sizes (from Belgium to
the United States); countries producing consistent success (Sweden for tennis); countries whose performance had fallen but currently managed the elite sport system as a national project, such as Canada; and an upcoming Olympic host state (Spain) anticipating some sort of TID programme in place (JASA, 1989a, b; 1990b). It was acknowledged that a number of ‘surface’ level of information can be obtained from international championships and desktop research, while the significance of conducting field work was recognised in obtaining the detailed information and to view actual training programmes and facilities, which provide more insights and better prospects of transferring the practice to Japan (JASA, 1988: 131-2; 1989a, 117-8; 1990a: 63-9).

However, despite the learning regarding ‘advanced’ TID models that had taken place in the late 1980s, the effective use of this accumulated knowledge and information was questionable, particularly because the government re-granted the JOC fully in 1998 for a similar five-year “Model Project for the Establishment of an Integrated Coaching System” in order to identify the effective high-performance programme, including TID, on the basis of value in coherent coaching approach. Even though the initial seven disciplines from nine sports were expanded to 27 disciplines from 16 sports in 2001 with another “Athlete Development Model Project”, a senior project member from the JOC stated that the first five years of the project was “a complete waste because some members of NFs spent the allocated budget on supporting elite athletes, not on formulating a high-performance programme” (Interviewee V, 12 April 2005). As a result of the reluctant attitude from a number of NFs, this official noted that federations from handball and soccer federations only took their own initiative to produce an integrated coaching system to develop a coherent high-performance programme.

Consequently, a nationally-coordinated approach to talent identification and a structured development programme for potential and senior high-performance athletes only emerged after the publication of Basic Plan. By 2005, it required NFs to create their own ‘integrated training system’, including effective TID with appropriate coaching principles, against which condition, NFs are eligible to obtain toto grant (MEXT, 2000). The acceptance of the need for a systematic approach to TID was the result of constant criticisms of a training and coaching system which was fragmented between schools, universities and corporate teams and identified as “one of the causes of the decline of Japanese international competitiveness in sport” (MEXT, 2000: 15; JOC, 2001). It is also reported that a total of 296 corporate teams were either dissolved or stopped operations between 1991 and 2005 (Sasakawa Sports Foundation, 2006: 101), which was also identified as a factor in the decline of Japanese performance. According to MEXT, the dominant pyramid-shaped model revealed limitations
not least because of the rapid decline in the birth-rate and the consequent overall decrease in the number of school sport clubs, participation in sport and decrease in children's physical fitness, which consequently lead to a decrease in "human resources at the national level" making it increasingly difficult to find talented young people who could be developed to elite level (MEXT, 2006a).

Overall, the Japanese approach to talent identification has been fragmented and inconsistent relying too heavily on schools and private corporations which tend to act independently of NFs to support potential elite athletes. Neither the corporations nor the schools are systematic with a long-term view or coordinated in what they do (Asami, 2001). Furthermore, while a substantial proportion of the annual budget for Kokutai has been allocated by municipal authorities to the development of young athletes, the sector remains unsystematic largely depending on school clubs and (voluntary) teachers, especially PE teachers, to take responsibility for coaching school teams and the identification of talented young athletes. PE teachers were criticised by the project leader responsible for establishing a model of talent development for their short term interest in "winning" (Gamo, quoted in JOC, 2003a: 14). A university academic who was a member of ACHPE also critically commented that the historic reliance on schools as the basis for developing athletes is no longer appropriate for increasing Japanese performance to meet fast-moving international standards (Interviewee U, 07 April 2005), while a senior JISS official mentioned that school clubs cannot provide children with multiple sport experiences because they are required to specialise in one club from early age (Interviewee H, 19 August 2005). Moreover, due to the nature of Kokutai as an inter-prefectural competition, achieving cooperation between prefectures was imperative for the establishment of a coherent TID system at the regional and national levels. In many ways, it can be observed that the necessity to implement a structured TID programme was derived not only from the recognition that sport organisations cannot sustain the sporadic 'pyramid-shaped' selection system but also from an acknowledgement of exogenous circumstances which include domestic demography and societal change in Japan as well as intensified pressure to compete against the international rivals.

Following the inception of JISS, the systematic approach to the identification of talented children became possible at prefectural and municipality level with the creation of the “JISS-JOC Information Strategy Project” and also the “Local Network Project” that played the core role in conceptualising associated values in TID and in designing a TID programme for Japan. In the 2004 International Sports Science Conference, annually held in JISS, an official from the JOC Information, Medicine and Science Committee defined a systematic TID as “identifying, nurturing and making use of talented human resources” (Katsuta, quoted in
Notably, presenting a 'global standard' is recognised as one of the central strategies to disseminate a message across prefectural and municipality officials and to reach consensus on a structured TID programme and also to provide the opportunity to legitimise the strategy of JISS and the JOC. On this point, a senior JISS official who is involved in TID programme stressed that "providing international value to prefectural and regional officials was crucial...particularly because they have a 'negative' image towards the notion of 'elitism', 'selection' and 'talent'...and the successful examples from aboard can provide added value to introducing a TID programme" (Interviewee H, 19 August 2005). Interestingly, the then Vice Director of the former GDR's Centre for Scientific Information Physical Culture and Sport in Leipzig (currently Institute for Applied Training Science Leipzig), Dr. Hartmut Sandner, was invited to present the GDR's "successful elite sport system" including its TID programme (JISS, 2004b). As such, creating an international network is also seen as one of the important elements for conceptualising and implementing TID programmes for which for example two talent identification coordinators from the Western Australian Institute of Sport and the Tasmanian Institute of Sport were invited to report on their experiences in TID and visit Fukuoka prefecture to support its TID programme (JISS, 2005a: 88-9).

**Fukuoka Sports Talent Scout Project**

The first 'generic' structured TID programme was introduced in Fukuoka prefecture (South of Japan) in 2004, although initially Toyama, Gifu and Aomori prefectures had also been attracted to the idea in 2002. The "Fukuoka Sports Talent Scout Project" started in the following year as the first example of the systematic selection of children from years 4 and 5 (age 9-11 as 'Fukuoka Kids') and year 6 (age 11-12 as 'Fukuoka Juniors') based on physical testing, scientific and genetic data. Fukuoka Action, the prefectural high-performance centre, manages the programme where the selected Fukuoka Kids and Juniors can experience multiple disciplines to develop basic physical skills and later be advised on the one or two "most suitable disciplines" for specialisation (Tanaka, 2005a). It can be identified that this project organised by prefecture with help from the central agencies for elite sport was unprecedented and thus catalytic for the Japanese sport system for three reasons: first, the initiative came from a prefectural government and may indicate a gradual change in the composition of the elite sport policy community. An earlier comment about inter-prefectural rivalry notwithstanding, it offers the prospect of cross-prefectural/institutional cooperation to complement the cooperation between JISS, the JOC and NFs at the national level. The above cited JISS official argued that because the TID programme requires the involvement of all levels of sporting actors, including the prefectural board of education, PE teachers,
parents and public sport and non-sport bodies (e.g. Prefectural Sport/PE Association), it has the potential to break the "sectionalism" between those actors because there was no effective communication before for sharing information or good practice (Interviewee H, 19 August 2005). This official stressed that a JISS' "coordinating role" was imperative to maintain the balance of interests and different values among actors, to establish cross-institutional collaborations, and, most importantly, to disseminate "success stories to other prefectures which stimulate them (officials in prefectural boards of education) to endeavour to produce Olympians from their home prefecture".

Second, the implementation of talent identification and selection programmes at the prefectural level have to be consistent with the broad policy objective of promoting lifelong participation in sport. As stated in the prefectural policy document, *Basic Plan for Fukuoka Sports Promotion (2003)*, a mass participation rationale was necessary. It is noted that this project has three rationales, that is, to give as wide opportunity as possible to all children; to maintain and improve the prefectural sporting competitiveness, which leads local citizens to have a greater interest in sport and promote life-long participation in sport; and consequently, to initiate changes in citizens' attitude towards sport (Tanaka, 2005b). As emphasised by a senior officer of Fukuoka Action, the TID programme needed a mass participation rationale. Similar to the earlier comment of a JISS senior official, this official from Fukuoka TID programme argued that terms like 'talent', 'selection', and 'elite' are controversial due particularly to the programme being operationalised by the quasi-governmental agency (Fukuoka Action) and funded by the board of education at the prefectural level, and thus, they needed to be legitimated by connecting with the promotion of citizens' sport participation, educational purposes, and the provisions of opportunities to every child (at first selection stage at least) (Interviewee DD, 10 May 2006). As such, the fundamental value of the TID programme was acknowledged as "providing dreams and a chance for *all children* to realise their potentials based on their own free will" (emphasis added, Waku, quoted in JISS: 2005b).

Finally, and elated to the second point, finally, this project is significant insofar as it is initiated to contribute to the firm foundation of high-performance system in Japan. A senior JISS official emphasised that the TID programme is to establish a "new performance pathway to national sport federations in Japan", hence, the "holistic development of young talented athletes would provide a solid basis for Japanese performance" (Interviewee H, 19 August 2005).
As Diagram 7.2 shows, the prefectural and regional TID is in parallel with the ‘traditional’ pyramid-shaped model, in which the majority of athletes specialise in early age. The regional TID model plans to develop not only the general physical abilities of selected children, but also their intellectual abilities and personal competencies, including logical thinking, knowledge of nutrition and communication skills. It considers the parents’ sporting history and physiques, social and environmental circumstances, and, interestingly, educating parents is also seen as one of the imperative support programmes. This reflects the extent to which the project is based on the development of young talented athletes ‘holistically’ with a long-term perspective taking precedence over the short-term, thus avoiding the elite athlete ‘trade-off’ between academic work and sporting training (Fukuoka Sports Science Information Centre, 2006).
Despite these implications, the project is still in its infancy. Its effectiveness in producing medal-winning athletes remains to be seen. However, two Fukuoka Junior athletes were already selected for the Asian junior championships in short-track event (j-net, 26 November 2007) and the accumulated knowledge in TID and these ‘successful’ examples have already been disseminated to impact on those ‘interested’ prefectural/municipality governments or education departments.

Table 7.5: Japanese Talent Identification Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TID programmes</th>
<th>TID for All</th>
<th>Talent Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Fukuoka Sports Talent Scout, 9-11</td>
<td>Bifuka Aerial Project, 7-18</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wakayama Golden Kids, 8-10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iwate Super Kids, 11-13</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yamagata Dream Kids, 9-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okayama Yume Athlete, 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Targeting all children</td>
<td>Targeting all children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifying children with high</td>
<td>Transfer from trampolining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>potential mentally and physically</td>
<td>to aerial free style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>School-based</td>
<td>School-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>3 phases of tryout</td>
<td>Fitness screening tests at school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Regular training at prefectural</td>
<td>Monthly training at the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>performance centre</td>
<td>training base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily training at local clubs</td>
<td>Daily training at local clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participating in training camps</td>
<td>Participating in summer</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>training camp and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>competition</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seasonal training in</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>winter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pathway</td>
<td>Participating in youth camp and</td>
<td>Direct link to National</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>competitions</td>
<td>squad or being</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structured training programmes</td>
<td>identified by NFs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tryout</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Although there are differences in objectives and delivery as Table 7.5 demonstrates, the rationale developed for the Fukuoka project appears to have influenced other prefectures such as Wakayama, Okayama, Iwate and Yamagata prefectures, and the district government of Bifuka in Hokkaido, all of which have decided to implement and operationalise a similar TID programme in order to produce ‘prefectural-born’ Olympic champions and to achieve educational and social policy objectives. The Wakayama’s “Golden Kids Search Project”, which targets year 3 and year 4 (age 8-10) children, for example, is aimed at succeeding its host Kokutai in 2015 and ultimately producing international athletes. As for Okayama’s “Yume (Dream) Athlete” programme launched in 2007 (targeting year 3), its Health and PE Division of Board of Education invested ¥1.6 million of the prefectural budget in developing international-level athletes and coaches (Okayama Prefecture, 2007).

7.5.2 Talent transfer and prioritising strategic events

Table 7.5 suggests that the case of Bifuka is the first to introduce a structured 'talent transfer' programme in Japan, transferring from trampolining to aerial free style. The idea of talent transfer is increasingly becoming more important along with the TID programme, largely because of a growing recognition that Japanese athletes have been "dead" and "wasted", and because young athletes are "over-subscribing to certain popular sports, like soccer and baseball, thereby, many are ended up with sitting on the bench" (Interviewee V, 12 April 2005). As such, some national elite sport actors are feeling pressured to find an 'effective' way of gaining medals by utilising or 'recycling' athletes. While the TID system has not been developed as a national programme but been implemented at the prefectural and regional level, an official from the Competitive Sports Division of MEXT identified the necessity to develop a "new perspective" in terms of having maximum impact from the existing athletes who should also be "an investment for the future", part of the idea of which was formulated as the Nippon Revival Project (Interviewee W, 16 August 2005). Along with this idea, the JOe submitted its plan to the Competitive Sports Division for formulating the 'qualitative' evaluation of the Olympic NFs under the Developing Prioritized Disciplines fund (see 7.4.3), which included the criterion of whether a discipline appears "suitable to the Japanese physique", like high flexibility, small physicality and sports requiring high concentration (JOe, dated 19 January 2004).

Furthermore, the concept of identifying 'easy medals', i.e. high potential of winning medals, has been recognised. A JOe senior official, who is part of the high-performance team, mentioned that not only do "we need to acknowledge which countries are emerging and threatening Japan" but also, more importantly, "we need to consider the way to double medals", which requires extensive intelligence analysis. This official continued to elaborate with his 'personal opinion' as he had previously suggested to some NFs' directors of high-performance that the way to secure more medals is to "target women and winter sports" because:

...women from the Islamic countries do not participate (in the Olympic Games) so there are fewer rivals (to the Japanese). Also, it is only those high-GDP countries which have participated in ball games. We haven't focused on the development of female athletes so far, therefore, we have a better chance. As for winter sports, those countries close to the equator do
not participate and China and Australia in particular only take part in events like aerial and short-track. As such, we need to combine winter events with summer events for the argument of ‘doubling medals’ because winter events have not been a focused so far by the JOC either...There are a huge potentials in winning medals in winter events because of the technology in Japan, which give us much advantage.

(Interviewee M, 24 August 2005)

It should be noted that the number of women exceeded that of men for the first time in the Athens Olympic Games (see Table 7.1), and thus, the consideration for finding a gap for women and winter disciplines is one of the indications that the processes of developing athletes have become more institutionalised based on the strategic approach to explore new emergent national federations.

7.5.3 Expanding NFs’ responsibilities for identifying and developing talent

In comparison to a ‘generic-type’ of TID programme identified in the previous section, the identification and development of potential and promising athletes of which the national sport federations take charge have a narrower target to those athletes who are in the performance pipeline. As discussed earlier, MEXT required NFs to produce their own “Athlete Development Programme” and specified their responsibility for fostering and developing their potential athletes. The framework for athlete development was conceptualised by the JOC in its Manual (JOC, 2003a) which stated that the “establishment of an integrated coaching system and formulation of a programme for potential athletes are most crucial” and urged a fundamental change in the notion related to TID into a much more focused, effective way of “talent selection/development and maximising athlete’s talent” (ibid, 2-3).

The significance of producing this Manual is two-fold: first, it allowed the creation of structured and collective national approach across NFs, which could lead to a “restructure of the organisational framework” (ibid, 45); second, as stressed by a JOC senior official who was involved in producing the Manual, it ensured the sharing of concepts between NFs, thereby, allowing a “flow of communication” and “sharing good examples so that the NFs’ officials would know what to do”. However, he also commented that the communication between NFs is “fragmented and sectionalism still remains strong” (Interviewee V, 12 April 2005). Nevertheless, while the federations of tennis, wrestling, athletics and handball are
presented as good models in the *Manual*, the "Japanese-model National Training Center System" introduced by the Japan Football Association (JFA) in 1976, which later launched a centralised elite school structure ("J-Village" from 2003), is illustrated as the 'principle' template (JOC, 2003a; see Diagram 8.2). With the 'pyramid-shaped' model, connecting from the local (grass-roots) foundation, prefectural and regional (county) training centre to the national, 47 prefectures are divided into nine regional training centres. The JFA also established flexible categories (Under-12, Under-14 and Under-17) based on age and particular skills stressing the importance of providing young players with the maximum opportunity to gain exposure to various skills (JFA, 1998: 11-8; JFA, 2000). The Japan Handball Association (JHA) later developed its National Training System (NTS), modelled on the JFA's system, the necessity of which was addressed because of the emerging five central Asian countries (including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), Arabic nations and South Korea (JHA, 2001: 2). However, despite these model developed by the JOC has stimulated further implementations of "Athlete Development Programme", for example, in table tennis (JTFA, 2003; Maehara, 2006), judo74, and volleyball which launched its national training centre in Kaizuka city, Osaka in 2003, there are some criticisms and reservations in providing such templates and models. Another senior member of JOC questioned the usefulness of the *Manual* stating that:

> I think we need to be careful of identifying a good high-performance system. Such localised and traditional sports like judo have a long history in operating their own talent identification and development systems largely with effective dōjyo structure which has established close relations from the local to national levels...It would not be ideal to force such well-established effective traditional system to change into a unified performance system just because other countries are also doing it!

(Interviewee M, 24 August 2005)

Nevertheless, because the eligibility for toto funding is restricted only to those NFs that operationalised an Athlete Development Programme, there may be an emerging conflict between allowing flexibility and maintaining a traditional system and autonomy of NFs for developing talent athletes on the one hand and the national expectations of creating an integrated training and coaching system for expanding medal potentials on the other.

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One of the most recent and important developments in terms of the integrated high-performance system is the creation of the nationally-coordinated National Training Center. As previously mentioned, wrestling and table tennis launched their National Elite Academy (NEA) programme in January 2008 and the selected academy athletes (around the age of 10-13) live inside the NTC, go to local schools and have access to specialist support services. The concept of a centralised academy is principally based on the long-term athlete training and coaching system, the necessity for which had already been acknowledged in the mid-1960s (see 7.5.1). Takiguchi (2005) argues that the Japanese sport has finally actualised an "elitist system", which has a strong association with the former east European countries and also plays the same function as the Physical Training School (the specialist sport school of the Japanese Self Defence Force), which has produced 14 Olympic medallists since the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. He suspects that the national academy system supported by the government contradicts the idea of creating a comprehensive training structure, which is supposed to connect the grass-roots to the podium level. Nevertheless, creating a centralised NTC has already influenced some prefectural and municipality governments to create a specialist sport school, the example of which can be found from the plan to create a “Top Athlete Elite School” proposed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Its advisory consultation committee recommended creating a unified schooling system from junior high school to high school, while we can identify its objective is linked to the successful bid of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2016. It is interesting to observe the instrumental ‘principles’ of creating a specialist school for sport that are not only creating a coherent training system for potential athletes, which supports the objective of government, but also nurturing "internationally-minded athletes" as well as "contributing to the performance standard in Asia" (Tokyo Elite Sport School Consultation Committee, 2007: 3). Given it is difficult to assess the effectiveness, whether NEA could contribute ‘effective’ production of medallists because it is still in its infancy, it is striking that the Japanese elite sport structure has become centralised being supported by more government funding in last few years.

7.5.4 Competition opportunities for talented young performers

There has been a long neglect of the structuring of competition opportunities, particularly ideas such as a framework for national competition, and it is only recently that issues of competitions have been discussed along with the development of structured high-performance system. However, the issue of providing a wide range of national, regional and
international competition opportunities to up-coming young athletes seems to have proved to be more problematic for the JOC. As part of the “Junior Development Programme”, the JOC Junior Olympic Cup is introduced as the “pinnacle of junior-level athletes” (JOC, 2003b: 4), and for further international exposure of young athletes, the JOC’s proposal at the East Asian Games Association Conference (EAGA) to reform the East Asian Games into the junior athlete competition with only Olympic disciplines was postponed (Jiji Press News, 21 June 2006). The domestic competition opportunities and structures for youth athletes are fragmented, mainly because the inter-school competitions organised at local, regional and national levels are managed by different national agencies (AJHAF; NJPA, see Diagram 7.1), which operate independently of the JOC. Most importantly, the scheduling of domestic competitions (Kokutai and inter-collegiate/school games and events) and international ones is seen as conflicting in terms of the different interests and values held by the various organisations and agencies. In particular, the policy priority of the prefectural governments and their PE/Sport Associations with regard to Kokutai is to produce the best set of results and is seen as an inter-prefectural competition rather than a national championship which is part of an elite development strategy. In the absence of a long-term vision of national athlete development, the primary concern within most prefectures was to use the budget to construct facilities and prepare athletes in order to do better than other prefectures.

The different perceptions of Kokutai are illustrated by the recurring conflict, from the late 1960s through to the 1980s, between the Ministry of Education and JASA on the one hand and the educational organisations and teachers on the other over the criteria for participation of junior high school children. Whereas the former bodies would have linked to lower the age limit in order to raise the level of international performances through Kokutai, which became flexible for some sports in late 1988 (see 7.2), the educationalists have proved to be unsympathetic due to their perception of participation in Kokutai as a distraction from “students’ normal schooling” (Morikawa, 1988: 27; see also Seki, 1997; Takahashi & Tokimoto, 1996). A senior member of the JOC identified the issue of ‘gypsy’ athletes who transferred from one prefecture to the other in order to help the host prefecture to win Kokutai as also undermining the contribution of Kokutai to national athlete development (Interviewee V, 12 April 2005).

The persistent problem in prefectoral rivalries in Kokutai is notwithstanding, the absence of a substantial number of elite athletes who prefer to train or take part in the international and national Grand Prix circuit, the decline in popularity of, and media attention given to, Kokutai all combined to prompt JASA to propose a reform plan of Kokutai (JASA, 2003a: 21-2; 2001: 17). The formal criticism towards ‘gigantism’ of Kokutai with the increased infrastructure
costs and large number of participants forwarded by seven mayors of forthcoming hosting prefectures also resulted in the reform. The reform plan is striking as it has a dominantly elite focus. It was proposed to make Kokutai “the highest domestic sport competition with higher level of competitors” (JASA, 2003a: 8). Despite the plan for the reduction by 15% in the number of athletes, the disciplines from the Olympics and Asian Games were prioritised and with lowering the age limit to include the final year of junior-high students (age 14-15), JASA identified the value of Kokutai in “identifying and developing athletes who should endeavour to achieve international success” (ibid, 8, 18). A senior JASA official explained that they created the criteria for reducing the number of athletes, which is based on the extent to which NFs collaborate with JASA’s strategy and encourage top-level athletes to participate in Kokutai and they identify Kokutai as part of their performance programme (Interviewee A, 17 March 2005). The most significant reform was to allow athletes already competing at international level to participate without preliminary competition and, most importantly, to reschedule the Kokutai calendar by integrating the summer and autumn games thereby enabling more athletes to participate in both international competitions and Kokutai. This has become much more explicit in the second reform plan for winter event issued in 2007, which aimed to “reschedule the extent to promote top-athletes participation” (currently held in late January-February) (JASA, 2007: 3). Moreover, the attempt to resolve the tension between the national and international competitions can be identified as crucial. From his experience, the above cited JOe member addressed that:

Most of the international competitions abroad take place around June, July and August, not so much in late-September because players normally go back to school. The Japanese cannot participate in international competitions because a lot of domestic competitions are held [around the same time of the year]...The biggest problem is Kokutai. Some coach and even athletes insisted on saying ‘because we have the regional preliminary tournament [for Kokutai], we cannot go the Asian Games’...It’s all about scheduling. It’s nonsense to chase the schedule...Japan needs to adjust its schedule to the international one.

(Interviewee V, 12 April 2005)

Overall, the competition structure of Kokutai is most likely to be reformed in line with the requirements for international sport success at the Olympic Games and major international championships. This emphasis illustrates JASA’s consistent organisational interest in elite sporting success and promoting youth-level athletes participating in Kokutai by lowering the
age restriction, despite the specified organisational objective of the promotion of life-long participation in sport and sport for all.

7.6 Elite Athlete Support Provisions

7.6.1 Lifestyle support and 'second career' programme

There is a growing awareness of the necessity to construct a holistic elite identification and nurturing system focused on a national elite academy as perceived to be evident in other countries that have enjoyed elite sport success. As more systematic and scientific approaches to the identification of talent have been promoted, the more the idea of the holistic development and support of athletes in society has become recognised. As previously noted, the Basic Plan acknowledged a lack of sufficiently supportive environment for injured and retired athletes and those athletes who had to give up their athletic career or lose income due to the financial difficulties of the corporate teams they belong to. Consequently, it suggested to "create a solid training environment" and "provide opportunities to athletes to undertake vocational training and to acquire skills to prepare their post-athletic career" (MEXT, 2000: 19-20). Moreover, the desire for the systematic development of talented athletes is challenged by growing criticism of the excessive hours of training that athletes of junior high and high school age face creating a 'trade-off' between study and training (Kono, 2003a; Saeki, 2006). Kono, a member of the Board and the Information and Medical Science Special Committee of the JOC and a sports doctor, stressed the necessity of establishing a programme to nurture and develop the character, intellectual and communication skills of athletes (including cross-cultural and presentation skills), and the ability to maintain emotional balance and independent control over their training (Kono, 2003a: 27; see also Katsuta, 2007). It is also noted that athletes have an extensive opportunity to hone their human skills and become a role model to society outside of sport (Katsuta, 2005: 44-5). As can be found in such innovative TID programmes in Fukuoka, the objective of the development of physical abilities from an early age is complemented by the holistic approach to young and elite athletes that emphasise the development of conceptual and intellectual skills, including athletes' 'coachability', creativity, logical thinking and public speaking skills, which have also incorporated into the National Elite Academy as "intellectual" and "humanistic" education (JOC, 2007a).
In relation to senior athletes, their career management and career development have become more focused in recent years. The JOC established a "Second Career Project" in 2004 as one of its Athlete Programmes designed to provide "an environment where athletes can devote themselves to training" (JOC, 2001a) and opened a designated website in November 2005 (Athlete Plus, http://www.joc-athlete.jp/index2.php). From 2005, the Competitive Sports Division of MEXT also provided a subsidy of ¥8 million for research to develop a comprehensive support programme for athletes, undertaken jointly by both JOC and Tsukuba University, which resulted in the Athlete Career Transition Programme delivered by a specialist recruitment agency. The research group commissioned by the government intended to: formulate athletes' life-style model to maximise the use of athletic knowledge and skills post-career; identify socio-cultural values of an athletic career; create a balanced demand and supply of an athletic career (Saeki, 2006: 3-4). While the term 'second career' implies that it is solely concerned with the post-retirement career of athletes, the project is not only focused on career transition, but is also concerned with re-evaluation of cultural values of athletes and with educational programmes for junior and top athletes. With the creation of the National Training Center, the "JOC Elite Career Academy" as one of its centralised Sports Academy Programmes was launched in April 2008 with the intention to provide assistance to athletes to create their life-plan and, after all, to "make human resources of being top-athletes available to the society" (JOC, 2007a: 60). Similar schemes in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States were researched in particular the Athlete Career Education Programme (ACE) of the Australian Institute of Sport which was seen as the model of good practices (Tanaka, 2004: 54-5). However, although the necessity to investigate the issue of post-athletic career and transition had been recognised, empirical research on athletes' experiences after their retirement remains absent. As Saeki rightly argues, by comparison to the growing salience of early year TID, "the development of second careers has been marginalised" and the extent to which a sport career is "socio-culturally valued" (2006: 1) remains to be seen.

7.6.2 Development of elite coaches and coaching education

The structured development of elite coaches has only materialised in the last few years, although the intention to develop coaches and sport (PE) instructors in an organised and

75 Caution is needed in relation to the term 'Shidousha' which in Japanese can cover 'instructors', 'trainers' and 'coaches'. The term 'coach' tends to be used in relation to 'elite/youth elite coaches' at local and national levels, while 'instructor (shidouin)' tends to be used for coaches in the community and 'teachers' are used for training instructors for local and commercial sport facilities. Furthermore, documents from JASA, ACHPE and Ministry of Education emphasise the development of "Shiyakai-Shidousha" (social instructor) that include 'instructors' from
systematic manner at the national level goes back to 1965, a year after the Tokyo Olympic Games (see Table 7.6). However, the progress in turning the 'intention' into practical development of high-performance coaches policy seems to have suffered due to the reduction of governmental subsidies to sport during the 1970s (JASA, 1986: 154-5). In 1986, the ACHPE set up by the Ministry of Education emphasised the need to increase the quality of coaches/instructors to meet the increasingly "diversified and sophisticated needs" of sports participation and also to "obtain social trust" by which was meant to increase the status and quality of coaches in the eyes of the general public (ACHPE, 1986). ACHPE then proposed the establishment of a nationally recognised certification system by setting criteria for competency and "guaranteeing the knowledge and technical skills of coaches" as well as a national "data bank for coaches" (ACHPE, 1986). Responding to the recommendations of ACHPE, JASA, in 1988, redesigned and implemented courses leading to government recognised certificates for the development of not only of coaches and sport instructors at the community level, but also of coaches concerned with the "development of international competitiveness" (JASA, 2004a). Because JASA had had a responsibility for the promotion of both community sport and elite level success (until the JOC's separation in 1990) its focus was directed to developing certified coaches/instructors across a broad range of levels of athletic ability.

The need for a sharper focus on elite coach development was highlighted in the 2000 Basic Plan. As a result, JASA was required to collaborate with NFs to redevelop the coaching programme so as to "allow coaches the effective acquisition of knowledge in the athlete development programme" (JASA, 2004a: 5-6) in order to meet the needs of elite athletes. Due to a period of administrative reorganisation within central government, the "Certified Sports Instructor System" developed by JASA was only given the status of a non-governmenteally recognised certificate in 2002. It could therefore be argued that the certificate had been downgraded which prompted JASA to start (re-)conceptualising the profile of the "desirable sport coach/instructor" to redesign the system yet again (JASA, 2001; 2004b).

However, despite the increasing emphasis on elite sport success within JASA, it continued to stress the goal of realising 'life-long participation in sport' and the consequent necessity of developing "a high quality instructor who can develop each individual's skill to enjoy sport culture" (JASA, 2004a: 10), namely, a coach with generic skills rather than the particular skills needed to support elite athletes. The credibility of JASA's certificate system could also be questionable when only 39 out of 117 coaches (33%) who accompanied the Japanese community, elite and commercial sector and imply the relationships to the society. We should note, however, that there seems no consensus for an appropriate English term. (see JASA, 2004a: 10)
national team to the Athens Olympic Games had some kind of JASA certificate (JASA, 2004a: 28).

Table 7.6: History of the development of coaches, 1965-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>JASA/ JOC Programme</th>
<th>Objectives/content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Development of “Sport Trainer Programme”</td>
<td>It was introduced to develop top level athletes in post-Tokyo Olympic Games, which introduced general principles of applied sport medicine and sciences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Development of “Sport Instructor”</td>
<td>For the development of instructors at the community level in reaction to the increasing interest in sport participation during the 1970s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Establishment of JASA Certified Sport Instructor System</td>
<td>Re-development of the former programme with three kinds of certification system: Sport Instructor; Coach/Upper-Coach; Trainer. Modules of common subjects and specialised subjects became programmatised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Development of “Sport Doctor System”</td>
<td>ACHPE raised the issues of developing coaches and instructors for community, elite and commercial sports and proposed to establish an accreditation system that contain modules for knowledge and technical skills for social physical educators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>ACHPE proposal on “Certification System for Social Physical Educator”</td>
<td>Ministry of Education issued &quot;the provision on evaluating the project in knowledge and technical skills of social physical educator&quot;. JASA's certification system met the national criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Revision of JASA Certified Sport Instructor System – nationally recognised system</td>
<td>Revisions of Certified Sport Instructors:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>’89 Sport Instructors: Level A, B, C</td>
<td>Sport instructors for community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>’89 Coaches: Level A, B, C</td>
<td>Focus on the coaches for the elite athletes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 to 1999</td>
<td>’90 Teachers: Level A, B, C</td>
<td>Development of instructors at the commercial sport facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>’92 Sports Programmer/ Fitness Trainer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>’92 Youth Sport Instructor/ Upper-Level Youth Sport Instructor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>’94 development of Athletic Trainer programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Starting the review of “Sport Instructor” system</td>
<td>As part of the administrative reformation, the organisations set up for serving ‘public interests’ do not gain privileged grants for their programme/project, thereby, the review took place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Research on National Coach Academy</td>
<td>MEXT provided subsidies to JOC to consolidate an idea for developing elite coaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Launching of National Coach Academy</td>
<td>With the creation of National Training Center, NCA was launched, obligating the performance coaches to attend the NCA sessions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from JASA, 2004a, b
The recent development by the MEXT and the JOC in order to develop specialised full-time coaches was to develop elite coaches separately from JASA's certificate system which is largely targeting volunteer instructors/coaches or its broad category of 'teachers'. The Competitive Sports Division recognised not only the unsuitability of the certificate system by JASA for the development of highly skilled coaches, but also the absence of a structure to systematically develop specialised elite coaches (MEXT, 2002b). While the Competitive Sports Division holds the annual Coaching Conferences (called "Coach Summit), its direct involvement in coach development becomes more apparent in 2001 when it invested in establishing a training system for nurturing and maintaining coaches with specific experience in working with high-performance athletes. Three policy objectives (2003-8) were set to: support two full-time national coach places in each Olympic NF with ¥394 million per year subsidies (46 coaches had been placed in 30 sport disciplines as of 2005/06); to develop 5,000 specialists (coach, sport doctor, athletic trainer); and to develop a nationally coordinated training programme for nurturing high-performance coaches. Investment was also made in 2001 in the "Model Project to Implement the Development of National Coaches", which planed to "create a training system for coaches by 2010". The JOC was commissioned by the Division to deliver the Project, which signalled the JOC's enhanced responsibility for the development of specialist coaches (JOC, 2007b). The objective of government for establishing a specialist training system for top-level coaches was to enable them to acquire the "advanced specialised skills" whereby the coaches can use within their own sports to "construct a strategy reflecting the international competition standard and organise training programmes by applying sports science and medical knowledge" (MEXT, 2002b). Nevertheless, the initiative of the government notwithstanding, a member of the JOC's national coaching project criticised its inflexibility stating that "we have to always wait for the answer from the government whenever we want to decide on formulating the project" (Personal Communication with CC, 08 December 2005).

The plan for creating a National Coaching Academy (NCA) located inside the NTC became imperative because the JOC not only requires high-performance elite coaches to complete its comprehensive coaching curriculum but also intends to develop sports administrators, technical staff and youth development staff, and provide the certification of "Director" status for all NCA graduates (JOC, 2007b). The development of 'sports administrators' is particularly interesting because it aims to nurture personnel who "should be world-standard...and can actively engage in international matters and debate with IFs and Asian
federations about the international sporting issues, such as changing rules" (Tajima, quoted in JOC, 2007b: 28). The importance of fostering elite coaches became considerably important in relation to a lack of their 'international exposure and experience' and the consequent absence of international influence of Japanese particularly on the process of changing rules and rule-formulation and also inability to appeal against unfair judgements to IFs, all of which have been recognised as "part of the essential components of overall international competitiveness" (JISS, 2003: 44-5; see more discussion below). The shortage of 'home grown' elite international level coaches was pointed out by one high-performance committee member in the JOC who noted that there are very few Japanese coaches who are "exported" and internationally recognised (Interviewee M, 24 August 2005). Subsequently, after the Athens 2004 Games at the JOC Coach Conference, this point was reiterated by Katsuta, a member of JOC Information, Medicine and Science Committee, who noted that the "Japanese international future performance needs to factor in not only the extent to which Japanese international-level performance coaches can bring strategic information to the world but also, in turn, how much they can obtain updated international information" such as the transformation of rules (quoted in JOC, 2004: 31). This point was illustrated by the comment from Imura Masayo, the ex-synchronised swimming national head coach whose team gained medals in all Olympic Games from 1984 and 2004. Knowing a number of Russian, Chinese or even Korean (synchronised swimming) coaches are being recruited abroad to disseminate their coaching methods and their ideas and knowledge to other countries, Imura revealed that one of the reasons for accepting the position of head coach to the Chinese national team in preparation for the Beijing Games was because that: "it would be the best chance to increase the international status of Japanese coaching" (Mainichi News Paper, 24 December 2006). Indeed, a clear secondary objective of the coach development strategy is to produce top-level international coaches who will then gain easier access to globally disseminated information and tactics and also be influential in the decision-making of the international sporting federations (JOC, 2002a; 2004).

7.6.3 Specialist services, sports science and medicine support

The significance of the application of science and medicine to high performance sport was discussed from the time of the preparatory period for the Tokyo Olympic Games (see Table 7.7). Following the decision to host the Olympics and the establishment of the Tokyo Olympics Performance Special Committee in 1960, the Sports Science Research Committee and the Training Doctor System were launched in JASA. The launch of the Sports Science
Research Committee was appreciated as "one of the most valuable assets" of the Tokyo Olympics (JASA, 1986: 154) and, consequently, JASA opened the permanent Sports Science Research Institute in 1967. Although its activities were rather 'small scale', some researchers were commissioned to investigate and explore the training methods and science applications from the Communist countries (Asami, 2005).

Following the review initiated by the President of JASA (Kono Kenzo) of the importance of sports science and medicine in 1975, he proposed a plan to construct a specialised centre for sports science and medicine at the national and regional level. The President's view was reinforced by one sports academic who noted that "there was confidence in sports science in Japan among scientists...recognising the standard as the same as that of European or American but there was no institution that could provide feedback from the most advanced research results of sports science" (Interviewee U, 07 April 2005). However, the proposal was not helped by a considerable scepticism towards sports science among athletes during the 1960s and 1970s, many of whom felt they were being used as "guinea pigs", while athletes appreciated more of sports medicine because of their perception of its direct impact on their performance (Asami, 2005).

The most likely explanations for the institutional shift from scepticism to a willingness to embrace the application of sports science and medicine was the success of South Korea in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games where the host nation's medal count exceeded that of Japan and there was an acknowledgement among Japanese national sport officials of Korea's structured engagement with scientific training (Interviewee Z, 18 August 2005). However, there seems to be a clear relationship between the increasing acceptance of the application of science/medicine to sport and a growing sense of crisis due to the failure of Japanese elite athletes. Although coaches at the elite level tend, as they did throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s, to rely on their experience and personal training methods, there was a gradual accumulation of trust and confidence in sports science among elite coaches. The greater willingness to acknowledge the potential of sports science was due to the evident success of the communist/socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, and the field research into those countries were conducted by the Japanese national sport officials, for example, by the gymnastics national coaches (JASA, 1988; 1989a; 1990a), who emphasised the value of a centralised approach to developing athletes and particularly a centralised specialist sport research institute.
### Table 7.7: Historical development of application of sports science and medicine in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>System</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Opening of Sports Medical Consultant Office</td>
<td>For the management of the health of athletes and their consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Launch of Sports Science Research Committee</td>
<td>It belongs to the High Performance Special Committee for the Tokyo 1964 Olympics: for the first time, science had been introduced into the development of athletes, the most valuable asset of the High Performance Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 Dec</td>
<td>Dissolution of Sports Science Research Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Re-launch of Sports Science Committee</td>
<td>Understanding of importance of science and medicine in the promotion of sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Establishment of Sports Science Group within the High Performance Committee for Sapporo Olympics</td>
<td>With the decision to host the 1972 Winter Olympics, the significance of the application of scientific training method was reviewed followed by the high altitude training for the 1968 Mexico Olympics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Opening of Sports Science Research Institute at JASA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Emphasis on proliferation and development of sports medicine and sciences</td>
<td>Kenzo Kono, the President of JASA, reviewed the significance of sports science/medicine and Dr. Kuroda, the Director of Institute, proposed the future plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Launch of Certified Sports Doctor System, JASA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Research Committee for the Preparation of the Establishment of National Sport Science Center was launched</td>
<td>PM Nakasone established his Private Committee on Sports Promotion after the decreasing medal count in the Seoul Olympic Games and it suggested establishing a national sport science center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The blueprint of the National Sport Science Center was completed</td>
<td>The actual land for the Center was decided but the construction work was postponed due to the financial constraint to construct facilities in prepare for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympic Games based on the decision in 1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The construction work for Japan Institute of Sport Sciences started</td>
<td>On the completion of all facilities for the Nagano Olympics, the budget was allocated to the construction work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Launch of Japan Institute of Sports Sciences (JISS)</td>
<td>JISS provides specialist medical, science and nutritional support and advice to top-level athletes with full-time staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Launch of National Training Centre</td>
<td>Centralised and holistic supporting system is in place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from JASA, 1986:174-9; Asami, 2005

The sense of crisis was deepened by the then Prime Minister’s overt interest in the government’s involvement in raising the standard of Japanese success in sport and after the period of failure in international sport between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. Central to the
improvement in standards was the establishment of the National Sports Science Center which was modelled on the example of countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States. However, the combined effect of the economic recession of the 1990s and the construction costs of the facilities for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics and the Football World Cup in 2002 drained the budget of the Competitive Sports Division, and led to the delay or, as Asami (2005) who was the first Director General of JISS claimed, the “hibernation” of the construction work on the National Sports Science Centre (original name, later renamed JISS) until 1997. This point can be highlighted in Table 7.8 which suggests that a larger amount of budget was made available in 1997, which was increased from ¥4 million in 1996 to ¥4.170 billion in 1997, and from 1997 to 2001, a 5-year project for the construction of JISS was undertaken because of the completion of construction of facilities for Nagano Olympic Games.

Table 7.8: Competitive Sports Division budget allocation regarding the preparation for the NTC, JISS, 1998 Nagano Games and 2002 World Cup (in ¥)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Allocated budget for the preparation of establishing a national sports science institute</th>
<th>Allocated budget for the preparation of the Nagano Winter Games</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>14,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Allocation to the development of a national sports centre</th>
<th>Allocation to the support for the international competitions: preparation for the Nagano Winter Games; preparation for the 2002 World Cup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4,170,000,000</td>
<td>24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6,679,619,000</td>
<td>22,390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3,142,683,000</td>
<td>31,443,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4,011,000,000</td>
<td>31,443,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,690,560,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Up to 1996 the proposal was to have a national sports service institute which would incorporate sports science research and elite training facilities. In 1996 it was decided to separate these functions and establish a National Sports Centre (later renamed JISS) and a National Sports Center (later renamed NTC).

However, it is ironic and indicative of the erratic commitment to elite sport that while the hosting of the Olympics in 1964 (Tokyo) and 1972 (Sapporo) led to increased investment in sports science/medicine and eventually to the establishment of a research centre at JASA (JASA, 1986), hosting the 1998 Nagano Games (despite their perceived success) resulted in priority being given to the construction of facilities over the establishment of a foundation for sports science/medicine. This may suggest that the most recent Games did not stimulate the same degree of government interest as the previous two and possibly explains why the final plan was to create a specialist sports science research institute which would only include a
small-scale 'mini-training centre' inside the institute, retreating from the earlier and much preferred comprehensive training centre with the sports science capability.

Despite the modest remit of JISS, its significance should be highlighted insofar as it has made available, for the first time, to elite athletes access to specialist support services on a daily basis and particularly free access to medical services (called Total Sports Clinic, TSC) and high-altitude training facility for the elite and youth elite athletes who are nominated by the JOC and NFs. JISS provided support for some 16 Olympic events out of the 30 in which the Japanese national team participated in the 2004 Games and the impact of JISS, as shown by the 'success' stories of athletes and coaches at the 2002 Busan Asian Games and the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, had already been acknowledged by a number of officials from JISS, JOC, and the NFs (c.f. JISS, 2004c, d; MEXT, 2006b). An academic who had previously been involved in consultation for the government regarding JISS observed that the impact of JISS would be to create "a rapid scientification of sport", which advances the interests of sport officials in "science" (Interviewee U, 07 April 2005). However, two high-ranking officers at the JOC and JISS were both reluctant to identify sports science/medicine as the sole cause of success in the 2004 Olympic Games partly because the achievement in Athens was also a function of the mini-training centre established inside JISS and partly because the achievement in high-performance sport had not yet been sustained over the long term (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005; Interviewee Z, 18 August 2005). Expanding the role of JISS in elite sport development is also hindered by the legislative constraints of a fixed budget and a fixed number of permanent researchers (15 permanent researcher and 36 researchers on contract as of March 2007; JISS, 2007) which was seen by some as limiting its long-term impact on the accumulation and utilisation of knowledge. The construction of a NTC, next to JISS, is an acknowledgment that the services and functions provided by JISS are insufficient and that athletes require a more comprehensive support programme. However, whether or not the institutionalised elite sports science/medicine support attached to the centralised NTC produces a long-term, stable and successful achievement of Japanese elite athletes remains to be seen.

7.6.4 Striving for excellence through intelligence activity

The establishment of an effective communication network across all levels of sport and the strategic utilisation of information have become the most distinctive features of the structure of Japanese system for developing elite athletes. The facilitation of sharing ideas,
information, and experience within Japan is organised by JISS and the JOC which are also both responsible for strategic gathering of information from other countries and its incorporation into debates on elite sport policy which consequently has a substantial degree of influence in shaping the direction of elite policy framework and emergence of policy advocates. One comment from a senior member of JOe illustrates the effectiveness of creating a communication network, which, he stated, "contributed most to the winning in Athens" (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005).

This official later recalled that a network-building started as a personal relationship, specifically among the technical staff from the different ball games to agree to collaborate with each other because there were growing awareness to use "complementary elements" in their respective ball games for enhancing performance (Interviewee R, 26 April 2005). This later became institutionalised as a project on the "Inter-sport Discipline Collaborations for Ball Games" launched in 1998 with the initial five ball sports (baseball, basketball, handball, rugby union and soccer; later extended to include water polo and tennis), which was then diffused to 'combat sports' (wrestling, judo and sumo) and to 'artistic sports' (synchronised swimming, gymnastics, rhythmic gymnastics and figure skating), both of which established their respective support projects before the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games (JOC, 2001b, 2003c). The project leader for artistic sport stated that institutional networks among artistic events became imperative mainly because the "dominant vertical relationship between NFs prevented each NF from embracing sufficient hardware, software and human-ware for high-performance development" (Kaneko, quoted in JOe, 2003c: 60). The network-building, the exchange of ideas, information and good practice, and the accumulation of knowledge became more institutionalised when JISS formed the Department of Sports Information in 2001, which was encouraged to work closely with the Information Strategy Section of the JOC's Information and Medical Science Special Committee. Working on the "JISS-JOC Network Project", these two specialist sections coordinate their work to deal with the technical and strategic aspects of elite sport policy, by analysing the status quo, planning policy, evaluating and monitoring performance and policy and providing support and scientific/medical information to NFs (Katsuta et al, 2005b: 60). The above cited JOC official who was a member in the project suggested that there is sufficient balance between the JOC and JISS, because the former can take a coordinating, monitoring and evaluation role having "information as its authoritative 'brand'", whereas JISS can maintain its "neutral position" between the national, regional and local sport actors (Interviewee R, 06 April 2005).

One of the most significant features of the work of these sections in JISS and the JOC is that they anchor the ambitious initiative to establish comprehensive information and strategic
networks from local, regional and national sport organisations, sport academic research institutes and international bodies, through the engagement of apparent 'action-oriented intentional learning' for increasing the potential of winning medals. Importantly, these two specialist sections are actively involved in a constant and systematic gathering of information from successful elite sport countries and 'rivals'. The data obtained from other countries are analysed by the Sports Information Department to provide not only the assessments of Japanese competitiveness, but also details of the different models of TID and high-performance structures delivered in other countries. The collected information and knowledge is then disseminated through a communication network, which relies on email circulations, personal contacts, occasional conferences, forums and seminars, and informal 'lounge' meetings. In this regard, this 'information strategy' is described as 'intelligence gathering' activity, which according to an interviewee in the JOC can be seen as similar to the services provided by a 'think-tank' or the work of intelligence agencies such as the CIA and KGB (Interviewee M, 01 April 2005; see also JISS, 2005a: 80).

To be more specific, there are broadly five functions for the extensive 'intelligence' activities which have close links to the development of elite athletes: first is to change values, attitudes and ideas of policy actors from all levels. As discussed in Section 7.5, the need for a systematic approach to TID was not least because of the rapid decline in the birth-rate and the increasing difficulty in finding elite talent but was also a result of the criticism of a training and coaching system which was fragmented between schools, universities and corporate teams and identified as "one of the causes of the decline of international competitiveness" (MEXT, 2000, 15; JOC, 2001a). Consequently, the effective systematic TID has gradually been recognised as the essential core policy for the long-term success of Japanese elite sport. However, an official form Fukuoka Talent Scout Project, for example, had to face strong "conservative attitudes against 'elitism'" particularly from the prefectural board of education and therefore presenting the examples of successful countries, such as Australia, and having a shared understanding about the examples from abroad became quite effective to shape their view (Interviewee DD, 10 May 2006).

Second and related to the first point, intelligence gathering is not simply to influence the values of policy-makers but also to help set the priorities in elite sport policy and to achieve policy consensus regarding the use of policy instruments which are utilised in other 'rival' countries. It is suggested that influencing policy decision-making, particularly at the state level, is imperative to produce advocates for elite sport programmes who were well informed (Waku, 2005). Identifying information as a 'tool' for international success, according to a senior JOC official, the priority and value of information can be diversified and "manipulated"
depending on the needs and objectives of policy actors and sport officials and thereby “it is important to improve international performance [and] that everybody [is working on] the same direction or having the same recognition” (Interviewee M, 01 April 2005).

The third element of the rationale intelligence gathering felt among the national sport actors is to evaluate the formulation of the precise and effective criteria for the evaluation of NFs in order to ensure the targeting of resources for their effective use and maximum return on investment. It can be reiterated that with the publication of Gold Plan, the JOC has repositioned itself to exercise more influence over NFs. It is clear today that the JOC intends to take a proactive and independent role in monitoring and assessing the daily activities of identification and development of talents and potential youth athletes according to the criteria shown in Table 7.9. Different from the criteria adopted in the Nippon Revival Project, the JOC introduced 30% ‘qualitative criteria’, although, according to a senior JOC official, there was a stronger argument to prioritise the traditional quantified element which is based on the actual performances (Interviewee R, 26 August 2005). It seems even more apparent that collecting and analysing information has given autonomy to JOC in terms of assessing the actual level of performances which used to be dependent on the information provided by NFs.

Table 7.9: JOC’s NF Evaluation Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-areas</th>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Sub-points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quantified (70 pt)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past performance</td>
<td>Basic point Past achievement in the Olympic Games Success level of Elite Performance Athletes</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International ranking</strong></td>
<td>Achievement from the most recent World Championship or World Ranking Achievement from the Asian Games or Asia Ranking</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Athlete Development System</strong></td>
<td>Whether the system is in place; the level of implementation of TID and athlete development system</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOC Evaluation Area (30 pt)</strong></td>
<td>Robustness of performance system Extent of utilising personnel who has experienced the JOC’s overseas training programme</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Power</strong></td>
<td>International representation at IFs/Asian Federations and by sending international referees Extent of involvement in anti-doping programme</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extent of cooperation with JOC</strong></td>
<td>Understanding of JOC’s objective and participation in JOC’s meetings</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from JOC, 2002a, XI-12
Interestingly, as can be observed from Table 7.9, effective information gathering and intelligence activities have become vital to influence the 'international corridors of sporting power' and to increase the Japanese international representation. This fourth point is acknowledged as the "battle outside the sport field", i.e. influencing the change of rules, interpretation and understanding of rules, and lobbying at IFs and the IOC, which is regarded as equally important as the "battle on the sport field" (JOC, 2002b: 15-8, 25-7; JISS, 2005a: 72-3).

A central concern is the global presence of Japanese personnel as indicated by the number of officials, referees/judges and technical staff as well as board members at IF and the IOC levels. This corresponds to the earlier claim of fostering international-level coaches, while a growing recognition can be found as to a low number of Japanese 'exported' or 'migrated' coaches and technical officials, which as a result does not allow a flow of knowledge and updated information back to Japan. Katsuta (2002a) argued that the Japanese were "too passive towards the change in international sporting rules" and were very poor at international lobbying activities and speaking effectively and persuasively on the international stage which resulted in such a limited international network and little international presence in the world of sport. Consequently, the significance of intelligence activity is stressed by a senior JOC member in his recognition of the problem in the language as follows:

...Basically, sport is dominated by Europe and the activities of Europe are significant, because the rule book is often written in English or French, sometimes in German. In order to gain actual information,...there is always someone in-between for interpreting the original language [to Japanese], which would have a possibility of manipulation of information, whether consciously or not. The meaning will be completely different depending on the interpretation and the way translated...With these in mind, the flow of world information should be coming from multiple channels [for effective analysis of information].

(Interviewee M, 01 April 2005)

This recognition of Japan being at the periphery of rule-making is interesting when we take into account Japan's enthusiasm in hosting international championships. Since the first international sport competition held in Japan (Asian Games in Tokyo, 1959), it hosted 11 multi-sport international and regional events between 1958 and 1998 (such as Asian Games) and a number of single sport championships were held particularly from 1990. Taking only 1995 as an example, there were 13 international competitions held across Japan, which
include the Universiad in Fukuoka and fourth World Sumo Championships, and the most recent examples are the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the 2007 IAAF World Championships in Athletics, yet there were consecutive failures in bidding for the Olympic Games (Nagoya for 1988; Osaka for 2008 Games). It is acknowledged that hosting international sporting competitions is the opportunity to promote the country and to overcome the geographical remoteness (Competitive Sports Division, 1995).

Nevertheless, the aforementioned linguistic barriers are perceived to be linked to the political 'isolation' of Japan from the core. In relation to the previous point, the final reason for engaging in intelligence activities can be highlighted in the following comment by the JISS senior official:

With regard to information, it is more or less borderless. However,...Japan is isolated [from Europe] and also from information. Yet, in the world sporting community, sharing information is taken for granted and from the shared information, [they] consider the next step for formulating policy. Japan had drifted away from this trend, I mean, Japan was way behind this trend.

(Interviewee H, 19 August 2005)

Most tellingly, there is a strong perception of development in the world of high-performance sport, where the geographical position of Japan is isolated from the dominant elite international sport communities located in Europe and North America. For the initial preparation of creating a specialist section for information both in the JOC and JISS, it is reported that some models were rigorously researched by visiting, among others, the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) and the Institute of Applied Training Science in Leipzig, Germany (JISS, 2002: 77-80). As such, seeking out and adapting good practices and also conducting benchmarking exercise have become the dominant features for effective intelligence activity. The JISS official quoted above stressed that "the rivals and sport developed countries, particularly Russia, Australia, Britain, the USA, Germany and France, are consistently monitored...[and] China especially as the next Olympic host is the key. Of course, smaller countries like New Zealand or Bulgaria need also to be researched" (Interviewee H, 23 March 2005). Adapting the practice of USOC which set up a "High Performance Centre & Information Technology" to provide multilateral support during the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics, the "Tokyo J-Project" was created during the 2002 Busan Asian Games (JISS, 2003) and the latest report for the Turin Winter Games suggests an expanded role for intelligence through the Tokyo J-Project which produced both daily
newsletters and strategic information on site for circulating useful performance information to
the Japanese athletes and officials in the Athlete Village (Kawai et al, 2006).

In this regard, the practices of those rival countries tend to be embraced as an 'international
standard' and maintaining international engagement through intelligence activities is
perceived to be crucial for keeping 'isolated Japan' at the forefront of information. Moreover,
while there is a clear intention to build an international network not only to identify good
practice and to adapt it to the Japanese context but also to disseminate selected information
from JISS to equivalent bodies in other countries (JISS, 2005a: 88-9). This significance of
putting 'information' at the core has resulted in, intentionally or unintentionally, stimulating the
emergence of an elite sport policy community which may imply exclusiveness of those non-
participants being remote from the support, renewed ideas and values and nationally-
oriented policy direction which may result in the potential to develop a view of the preferred
elite athlete development system in Japan. In consideration of the recent influential minister's
consultation report, the Endo Report (2007), which recommended creating a "Sport
Information Strategy Bureau", we can reasonably suggest that the significance of intelligence
activities has been endorsed due to its association with gaining competitive advantages and
thus further medals.

7.7 Conclusions

7.7.1 Conclusion for the development of elite sport policy in Japan

It can be concluded that the recent re-emergence of Japan as one of the leading sporting
nations is attributed to the refocusing of the government on elite sport success and the
strategic planning of national sport actors. After the seemingly enthusiastic involvement in
the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964, which was part of a national venture, the attitude of
government became ambiguous towards elite sport and sport for all was prioritised in order
to satisfy citizens' growing demand for sport participation. It is quite apparent that an
important incentive in the move towards the direction of a coordinated elite sport policy was
the poor performance of Japanese athletes and a sense of crisis in light of emerging Asian
rivals. Following disappointing results in the Olympics in 1992 and 1996, which acted as a
catalyst, change was slow but gradually and finally facilitated through the publication of the
Basic Sports Promotion Plan in 2000. However, while the policy priority accorded to elite
success in sport is evident, the increasing recent domestic concern over children and young
people's participation in sport and their level of physical fitness is steadily rising up the contemporary agenda of the ministry (MEXT) and is prompting some tension with elite sport objectives. The potential tension can be identified as most evident in, on the one hand, the growing significance of identifying talented and potential young athletes and the implementation of formal TID programmes for ensuring a long-term Japanese sporting success, and on the other hand, the requirements that TID programmes have to be presented as part of the overall promotion of children's participation interests in sport and as providing elite sport opportunities for all. It has also become much more likely that central policy actors find a stronger necessity to demonstrate the 'non-sport' reasons, such as promotion of 'international peace' and 'nation's sound development', in order to support elite sport policy (Sports Promotion Roundtable, 2007).

The chapter suggested that government maintains the dominant role in shaping and specifying the direction of elite sport policy, in part, through its control over the distribution of financial resources particularly for building elite sport specialist facilities. During the phase of budgetary cuts by central government and a sharp decline in finance to overall sport-related policy areas, the public comment by the then prime minister to advance the earlier construction of National Training Center was astonishingly unusual while this may have signified the legitimacy of creating the centralised elite training centre. The role and influence of national elite sport organisations (JISS, JOC and NFs) is substantially determined by government due to the fragility of their funding base, their high dependence on public resources, their lack of significant organisational autonomy, and their strict accountability to the state. However, there was general reluctance within the government to become directly involved in elite sport systems, partly due to the deficit for promoting sport, and also partly due to the historic suspicion of the sport circle towards government intervention in sport, all of which may have undermined the effective voice of government with sport bodies.

Notwithstanding the government's influence, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the discretion of the JOC in deciding elite sport provision has increasingly been strengthened with its relatively new capacity to determine the level of funding based on qualitative and quantitative performance criteria and accordingly to monitor the NFs' level of international success and their high-performance system. While the JOC's assessment criteria for funding largely relies on the conventional measurement (past achievement), such criteria as the extent of 'collaboration' with the JOC is indicative of its willingness to become an 'evaluation body' and not merely a funding 'distributor'. The JOC was also given operational responsibility for the National Coaching Academy and the National Elite Academy which require them to oversee the 'soft' side of support provisions. This indicates an evolving
centralised structure of elite sport system in Japan. In this respect, it can be noted what might strengthen the position of the JOC is the apparent endorsement of policy objectives of the government (the Competitive Sports Division in specific) while the JOC had maintained its 'independence' from the central administration, the explicit example of which was its separation from JASA in late 1980s.

In common with a number of other successful countries, it has become increasingly apparent that the elite sport development model, which was outlined by Green and Oakley (2001) and developed as four dimensions by Green and Houlihan (2005), constitute the supporting infrastructure for elite athletes in Japan. The specialist facility for the elite is almost fully established with the creations of JISS and the state-of-art NTC with the functions of the National Elite Academy and the National Coaching Academy along with the second career support. These facility developments have enabled sports science and medical support to be centrally provided by JISS. Prior to which, the availability of scientific knowledge was confined only to individual academic researchers leading to scepticisms among athletes towards scientists. However, some 'success stories' from the Athens Olympic Games seems to have enhanced acceptance among not only athletes but also coaches who used to rely on their knowledge and techniques from their own experience. In tandem with growing scientific and medical specialist support, the issue of 'second career' or career transition of retired athletes has become the central issue. Some contesting values, however, can be observable, which is, on the one hand, there is a growing recognition of accountability among sport officials to the elite athletes and their future occupation and life-style, and on the other hand, the social values in athletes are seen as imperative in order to contribute to society. The notion of 'holistic' development of young talented athletes, which can be identified both in regional TID programme and in integrated high-performance development systems instigated by NFs, may have been connected not only to taking a broad approach to young performers for securing Japanese elite achievements but also to the ideas of developing socially valuable assets. With the TID principle still contested, the investment in developing elite sport is thus rationalised with the arguments that international elite success promotes sports participation across the nation and 'enriches' people's lives and that the Japanese national athletes can be the 'model figure' of being Japanese.

However, several elements that can be identified as distinctive to the Japanese sport system are noteworthy. A long tradition of 'corporate athletes' has already been impacted by the socio-economic transformation of Japan, which concerned the government enough that it provided direct financial input, although at modest levels, and to facilitate an institution (JTL) to support high-performance athletes and top professional leagues. The demographic
change of Japanese society also prompted a sense of 'crisis' that precipitated moves to ensure there would be enough athletes in the performance pipeline, by promoting structured talent identification and create a new talent pathway. Finally, further distinctiveness is illustrative by the perceived international position of Japan. In face of the (perceived) growing pressure for high-performance success, it has become crucial to incorporate the policy-oriented learning and adapt good practice identified in successful and rival countries to the Japanese elite sport system. While the engagement in intelligence activity has been described as having multiple purposes, of notable significance is to steer policy objectives nationally and regionally in favour of planned national goals formulated by central elite sport actors and, more importantly, to enhance Japanese representation in the world of sport, and consequently, gaining high-performance advantages. Given the Japanese elite sport policy is still embryonic, it can be suggested that the continued structural approach to the development of elite athletes may be dependent on effective intelligence gathering and the adaptation of good practice to the Japanese context.

7.7.2 Preliminary conclusion regarding the development of elite sport policy in Japan and the UK/England

It can be concluded that the case of elite sport policy development does not suggest the existence of an international policy regime. Unlike the case of anti-doping policy development, there is no evidence of a coercive policy regime that shapes the domestic policy and mediates and constrains the behaviour of states or domestic actors. Furthermore, there is no centrally agreed principle or particular model in terms of the development of elite athletes although there is evidence of the emergence of an increasing similarity in domestic models of elite athlete development. However, what have become evident through the examination of development of elite sport policy in Japan and the UK/England is that states and national sport actors retain substantial capacity and autonomy in deciding their policy for elite sport success, although their policy-decisions and strategic planning are being influenced by their conscious (re-)focusing of policy with desire to become the leading and successful countries in sport. It can be suggested that the processes that influence domestic policy are more informal and subtle and relate to the awareness of global expectations and ideas about what is important and successful in achieving the international success in sport.

It has been observed that the 'reach' of globalisation is evident as both countries have shown their growing recognition of international standards in sport and a set of values for the
development of elite athletes. We have identified that both Japan and Britain have invested in similar elite athlete development systems with specialist support structure in place, including the state-of-art elite sport specialist facilities and the sports science, medicine and lifestyle support service provisions. Both have set up the funding structure to allow athletes, to certain degree, to train and compete full-time. They have, or at least intended to, adjusted the domestic competitions calendar, to support elite athletes' preparation for international competition. They also have taken initiatives to secure non-governmental or commercial income and identified the significance of bidding and hosting the international competition, the Olympic Games in particular, as elements in an effective elite development strategy.

We also identified the self-imposed international pressure and urgency felt among the government and non-governmental national sport actors to maintain competitive advantage. It has shown a common practice to 'reach-out for success' to realise sporting excellence. One of which mechanisms to maintain success can be seen in the process of policy learning and policy transfer as well as mimetic/imitative policy. Actors in both Japan and Britain have intentionally looked for, and identified, best practice abroad, especially in former Eastern European countries (especially the GDR), Canada, Australia and United States. One of the examples of which is that both Japan and the UK examined potential best practices of talent identification and development structure for ensuring their long-term sporting success. The UK adapted the Long-term Athlete Development model from Canada which the government endorsed as the model of best practice that embraces a structural framework from participation to excellence, while the Japanese, being conscious of a 'global standard', have incorporated the ideas and principles of LTAD and structured performance pathways.

The voluntary Japanese engagement in the systematic scanning for best practice and information gathering or 'intelligence' activities indicated their urgency and necessity to gain competitive advantage. On the one hand, some government officials and national sport actors showed their dissatisfaction towards the status of sport in Japan as indicated by the low level of state funding and the expressed concern that Japan had fallen behind their neighbouring rivals. We can possibly argue that it is a self-reinforcing pressure but the capacity to respond to these concerns and alter policy remains with the state.

Lastly, what is also important to highlight is that the global pressure and the consequent adaption of good practice are being impacted by the domestic sport structure and embedded culture and values. In other words, the globalisation 'reach' has been influenced and constrained by the domestic or local institutions which are embedded in historical, socio-cultural and organisational differences, thus producing different patterns of response.
Chapter 8 Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter, the previous chapters will be brought together in order to answer the questions raised in our introduction in light of the empirical analysis of elite development systems and anti-doping policy in Japan and also in the UK/England. In the first part of the chapter, our intention is to summarise the domestic structures of sport and the processes of policy-making related to elite sports development and anti-doping policy. In doing so, the extent to which domestic institutions, values and cultural beliefs which may constrain international influences will be analysed.

The second part of the chapter will provide a detailed examination of the variety of mechanisms of non-domestic influence at the domestic level, and will identify different impacts of international forces between countries and between the selected national sport policy sectors within Japan and the UK/England. While the preliminary conclusions have been provided at the end of each case (see 5.7.2 and 7.7.2), this section will examine, within the theoretical framework, the reach of global influence and the extent to which government determines sport policy. A response to the third objective of this thesis which is to examine the interactions between domestic and international factors shaping policy in the two selected areas in Japan and also the UK/England will be provided. In doing so, this chapter will also examine the nature and mechanisms of influence external to domestic factors within the theoretical framework adopted and the possible characteristics of international policy regimes with regard to elite sport and anti-doping will be explored.

Building on the previous two sections, as the third part of the conclusion, the implications of the findings for theory development and the utility of the conceptual frameworks adopted in the study will be assessed. In addition, the potential areas of contribution of this thesis especially to the existing international relations theory will be explained. It will then be discussed whether methodological insights discussed in Chapter 3 were useful in developing our understanding of empirical data. In particular, issues related to research instruments adopted for the actual investigations will be considered.
8.2 Change of Government Sport Policy in Japan and the UK/England

8.2.1 Development of elite athletes in Japan and the UK/England

The cultural significance of sport is well-established in Japan and the UK where the centralised organisational structure and funding streams for sport are developed and also quasi-governmental agencies are either fully or partially sponsored by the government being responsible for both the development of elite athletes and the delivery of specialist sport support services for elite athletes. Nevertheless, while both the Japanese and British governments were initially tentative in their involvement in sport policy, they both arrived at policy emphasis on elite sport partly because of a common exogenous factor, namely, the poor international performance of domestic elite athletes. In both cases, this interest in sport is bolstered by concerns of international prestige which is primarily reflected by performances at the Olympic Games. The defining Games which brought both governments’ sense of crisis to public and media attention were in Japan’s case, at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games where they finished 14th in the medal table behind China and South Korea for the first time. In Britain, this crisis occurred following the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, where the team registered its worst performance ever at the Games, finishing in 36th place in the medal table.

However, the primary catalyst of government involvement for each country came at different times and by very different routes. For Japan, hosting the 1964 Olympic Games was regarded as a national project in which the government was interested not only in having its athletes achieve podium finishes, but also in reintroducing the country back into international society. However, the dramatic Japanese post-war reform and national reflection on ultranationalism resulted in extensive suspicion and reservation among Japanese sport policy actors towards the government’s intervention in, and manipulation of, sport. Since the successful hosting of the 1964 Games, not only have these Game become a ‘collective memory’ for the Japanese and a reference point for the Japanese elite sport actors in many ways, but also the symbolic value of international representation at the Olympic Games and international championships has been endorsed as an important instrument for achieving non-sport objectives. However, the reluctance of the government to continuously invest in elite athletes was evident, largely because of the considerable pressure to respond to the demand of citizens for the provisions of sport, recreation and leisure in the 1970s and early
1980s. This public pressure and also the government's growing concern for welfare policy eventually resulted in a policy emphasis on sport for all. Within a context of a longstanding absence of funding in high performance sport, the consecutive poor performance of Japanese athletes in the 1980s attracted the attention of the then Prime Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, whose policy emphasis rested on the political and economical 'expansion' of Japan. However, external events of the 1990s undermined this emerging interest in sport due to the accumulated sense of crisis which surrounded the severe economic downturn, followed by the neo-liberal policy of cutting public expenditure and did not allow for the establishment of a sufficient funding stream for sport. The publication of the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Sport, 2000-2010 finally highlighted the government's triad approach towards sport. Following this three-pronged approach in the Basic Plan of 2000 and its revised plan of 2006, fostering children's physical fitness through PE and school sport, developing life-long participation and elite sport are the central foci of policy planning. In the UK, a structured approach to elite athlete development occurred earlier, despite a seemingly antagonistic view held in the 1980s by Margaret Thatcher towards sport, further fuelled by a prevailing notion of the amateur tradition. In contrast to his predecessor's reluctant attitude, John Major's 'romanticised' view of sport raised the policy concerns for sport to the state level and assured public money, largely from the National Lottery, being made available to sport. Thus, the dual sport policy approach to elite sport and PE/school sport evident in the UK and England became a substantive policy area particularly in relation to social and educational objectives. The awarding of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games to London was the most recent catalyst for sport policy development. With the government current presence on the Olympic Board and its promise of funding for elite athletes and their support services, the Games can be considered as a national project. Indeed, this is confirmed by a governmentally-backed emphasis on medal success on home soil as being integral to the successful hosting of the Games.

As such, both Japan and the UK/England were concerned about their international presence in the global sporting area. The rapid replacement of the Japanese Prime Minister and the Minister in charge for sport (MEXT) suggests not only the difficulties in attaining long-term governmental commitment to sport, but also the separation of decision-making power from the executive, resulting in strong influence of bureaucrats. Nevertheless, in contrast to the devolved nature of sport and the appointment of state secretary and ministries for sport in the UK/England, there is a principal Ministry with a specific division responsible for elite sport success and hosting international sporting competitions in Japan. This may have enhanced the bureaucrats' accumulation of knowledge and information within the Competitive Sports Division therefore having the ability to act as independent sources of policy authority. The
exceptional, but important, case in which a Prime Minister opted to rest policy initiative in elite sport was Nakasone in the late 1980s, who created a personal advisory council which ultimately recommended a structured approach to support the development of elite athletes. Consequently, this development became very influential in the subsequent policy formulation. Moreover, the reluctance of government to fully subsume elite sport under state policy is related to the historic association of sport with ‘physical education’ or ‘social physical education’, which are primarily linked to social, welfare and education policy. In spite of this ambivalence, as evidenced by the Endo Report released in 2007, there has been an attempt from politicians and national elite sport actors to establish ‘competitive sport’ as a discrete domain of state policy.

While the Japanese government forms a centralised political machinery, there is no tangible evidence that a central initiative has been taken to conduct a critical review of the fragmented sporting landscape involving the total number of sport bodies competing at national, prefectural and local levels. In addition, the government does not have the forceful means, particularly financial, to compel the sport sector to solve or even address its inherent structural problems. Indeed, the state’s intervention in sport which resulted in the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games eventually resulted in a streamlined responsibility for elite sport. However, this streamlining occurred not because the government identified the problem but it was because of the JOC’s dissatisfaction regarding the government’s increased political influence combined with its strong preference for having an autonomous voice to the government equal to its former parental body, JASA. The JOC repositioned itself within elite sport strategy by aligning itself with government objectives and has also taken a leading role in conceptualising, coordinating and shaping the direction of elite sport policy since the publication of its strategic plan in 2001. Given the then Prime Minister Koizumi’s neo-liberalist orientation which supported a policy related to devolution, two elite sport specialist bodies, the JOC and JISS, have identified the value in extending elite sport policy networks. In particular, they stress the importance of supporting winter, marine and high altitude sports while simultaneously coordinating organisations at both prefectural and local levels.

The political structure in the UK with the growing power of the devolved administrations suggests a greater degree of complexity in the facilitation of elite sport policy. The UK government has established an ‘arm’s length’ relationship with quasi-governmental organisations for elite sport, formulating a fairly centralised support structure for elite athletes and coaches supported by specialist networks of elite institutes and facilities. The influence of government in reorganising national policy platforms for sport is notably evident in its modernisation agenda intended to transform the governance structure of national sport
governing bodies in the UK. This governmental influence is also striking when considering the decision to favour and implement a ‘one stop shop’ approach in the relationship between UK Sport, Sport England and the Youth Sport Trust in the belief that in such a partnership, public funding would be used more effectively. The complexity of representation patterns in the UK sport system reveals a relatively fragmented elite sport structure which might lead to a lack of total centralisation or a total devolution of the system. The future structure of sport in the UK may be a much more fragmented version than the one documented throughout the course of this study.

To date, the Japanese government has also failed in issuing a critical review of policy for elite sport that could be conducted by an independent third party, despite substantial investment in supporting high-performance success especially when considering the construction of specialist infrastructure. By contrast, the British government has either commissioned a number of reviews or been audited by an independent body. The administrative arrangements in the Japanese elite sport development can be characterised as dependency relations where both JISS and the JOC largely rely on governmental resources, even though the government does not fully finance the high-performance provisions. Nonetheless, the Competitive Sports Division still takes an indirect approach to elite sport (and also anti-doping policy). The matter of sport is left to the ‘private’ sector (i.e. JOC), which is expected to conceptualise the approach to achieve excellence in sport and evaluate NFs’ achievement. An independent administrative agency (JISS) then takes a medium role in coordinating the relationship and linking other agencies to deliver systems at prefectural and local levels. A similar resource dependency can be identified in the UK, although the discretion of the quasi-government agency (UK Sport) is much more extensive in terms of requiring NGBs to produce performance targets and to implement governance structures based on the idea of ‘modernisation’. UK Sport also presents a model structure of high performance development, whereby NGBs are required to issue strategic planning documents based on business principles. Although a funding formula, which prioritises sports and on the basis of international success and athletes who are likely winners, has only recently emerged in Japan, the appropriateness of providing ‘grants’ seems to be accepted insofar as the policymakers and elite sport actors perceive that the Japanese are ‘revived’ at the Olympic Games. In contrast, a relatively sophisticated ‘no compromise’ approach in Britain suggests the state ‘invests’, in contrast to allocating ‘grants’, in the pursuit of elite sport success. By doing so, Britain attempts to assure transparent accountability of public resources and their effective use, with the extent of return on investment coming under the scrutiny of government.
Despite certain socio-economic and political differences between the two countries investigated, the Japanese and the British provide relatively similar elite sport support provision for their athletes. Both states provide financial resource as personal awards such as free access to specialist facilities and support programmes and provide training equipment. Both implement, or at least endeavour to take, a systematic approach to talent identification and development, and both provide specialist sports science and medical and 'holistic' support to athletes, including 'second career'/performance lifestyle' support. There is ample evidence to suggest that both Japanese and British elite sport actors are engaged in learning and drawing lessons from other countries and transferring good practice, through the rigorous application of strategy and support schemes for athletes and coaches. However, importantly, we can highlight different paths and approaches taken by each country, which are largely mediated and constrained by domestic institutions embedded in historical, socio-cultural and organisational differences. Yet, the motivation for implementing a structured approach to elite development in both countries can be traced to national disappointments relative to their rivals as much as by the desire to realise sporting excellence.

It is unlikely that the provision of a direct and full financial subsidy to elite athletes would be welcomed in Japan due to its historic association with the 'state amateurs' of the former communist countries. While public resources were available to nominated athletes and their coaches via JOC depending on an athlete's rank (Elite A, Elite B or Youth Elite), as full-time competitors, these sums are not sufficient enough to maintain minimum lifestyle standards. Overall, the majority of Japanese elite athletes and coaches rely on financial assistance from corporate companies through employment on corporate teams, or, by obtaining sponsorship deals. This arrangement can be regarded as one in which the athlete is considered as a 'corporate amateur'. However, the collapse of the Japanese economy resulted in a number of companies retreating from owning and managing top sports clubs, and ultimately forced the government to recognise the necessity of providing more generous support to high performance athletes. This led to both the introduction of the "Nippon Revival Project" and the current "Development of Prioritized Athlete" funding stream which is distributed by NAASH. In many ways, despite the various interpretations as to the meaning of 'revival', the underlying principles of revival from when and of what may have indicated the historical values attached to the impact of Japanese success in the 1964 Tokyo Games in shaping the elite sport actor's perception of acceptable targets. In a similar way, Major's 'conservative' value of sport and subsequent refocus on traditional competitive team sports highlights an instrumental view of elite success. Although the financial support for athletes has grown with the introduction of the National Lottery allowing them to carry on as 'full-time' athletes, as Green and Houlihan (2005) previously suggested, athletes are always, by necessity, looking
for external income. This can come in the form of sponsorship deals and commercial income – by attending Grand Prix circuits at the expense of NGBs’ events – and attendance at other organised events with commercial sponsors. Athletes are also frequently reliant upon parental support. Despite the financial difficulties still faced by a number of British athletes, the critical account of a senior British Olympic Association official was indicative of the belief that athletes currently enjoying some degree of support from the government have become “pampered”.

In Japan, it is not only the athletes themselves who are in need of financial support. Indeed, it is suggested that the entire Japanese elite sport system would also benefit from an increase in investment. Due to legislative constraints, the JOC and the quasi-governmental specialist agency for elite sport cannot obtain full subsidies from the government and are thus required to generate their ‘own’ money to sustain the system and their respective activities. In this regard, on one level, it can be concluded that the role of government has been reinforced because of the socio-economic change in Japan. But, on another level, it has maintained its detached position from a ‘private’ or civil society sector such as sport by not providing grant-in-aid and leaving or imposing financial ‘autonomy’ to the national sport bodies.

The development of formal talent identification schemes and criteria is also another elite sport support portfolio found in both Japan and the UK. These have been extensively discussed in relation to the common issues identified in both countries, like early burnout and dropout of potential athletes. It has become problematised in both countries that there are competitions from different sports over the same talented young players. Centrally organised TID schemes, as crucial elements of an elite sport system, are a very recent phenomenon both in Japan and the UK. The urgency of implementation of TID system is demonstrated, at the surface level at least, quite differently, but the Japanese and British elite sport actors ultimately aim to secure a solid foundation for foreseeable success in the Olympic Games. It has become apparent that the implementation of TID programmes had to be adapted to the local needs in Japan, where winning at the Kokutai still remains valued and a motivation to invest in sport by prefectural governments. Its value was framed in broad socio-educational needs in order to persuade, in particular, prefectural officials from the board of education whose dominant beliefs in ‘equality’ are competing with the notions of ‘selection’ and ‘elite’. More importantly, although the priority of performance at the Kokutai also prevents some high-performance junior and senior athletes from competing in international competitions, the recent decline in its popularity combined with a larger number of athletes participating in international Grand Prix circles have, in turn, forced JASA to reform this annual inter-prefectural competition in such a way that elite athletes can participate and utilise it as a
high-performance event and as a stage for developing talented young athletes. Rearranging the Kokutei competition calendar to suit the international sport calendar was also discussed as a necessity to allow top athletes to participate in international competitions. As for Britain, such ‘fast-track’ TID projects remained relatively uncontested because of the urgent requirement to secure ‘pre-made’, physically suitable athletes to ensure ‘credible’ and successful performances in new sports such as handball and volleyball at the Olympic Games in 2012. Nevertheless, it should be reiterated that the implications of UK Sport’s partial dismissal of the emerging generic development model (Long-Term Athlete Development), which could possibly be the shared values and ideals in development of athletes and approach in coaching among different UK stakeholders, may generate conflicting relations with other sport organisations. Widening competition opportunities for young athletes in the UK was entrenched by the government initiative. The multi-sport event like the UK School Games and the provisions of National Competition Framework for Young People have been instigated in part to create ‘competition pathways’ between schools and NGBs sets of organisations which are often mutually suspicious.

Despite the long history of sports science and medical support, the ‘distrust’ of Japanese athletes towards scientists, exacerbated by a lack of a coordinated approach, did not allow the easy exploitation of scientific knowledge within the Japanese sport system. Only recently has the potential of sports science, medicine, nutrition and psychology become more acceptable, due to the number of successful national and international examples which utilise this specialist support, often coordinated by a centralised supporting unit. The same scenario can be found in the UK, with the initial idea of the creation of the UK Sports Institute but the subsequent development of networked regional specialist institutes. The creation of these regional institutes reflects not only the ‘negative’ lessons learnt from Australia (where the centralised system was not workable because of the country’s geographical size), but also the other intention to optimise support by taking an athlete-centred approach. The development of a Performance Lifestyle programme showed an emulation of the Australian specialist programme, ACE, which was adapted to meet the particular needs of British athletes. For the launch of the JOC Career Academy, the programmes of other countries were followed as examples of good practice and the ‘social value’ of elite athletes was considered as important policy issue in order to continue investing in talented young athletes. This was largely reflected in the domestic situation in which a large number of Japanese athletes were employed by private corporations and had experienced a ‘trade-off’ between athletic career and education.
In summary, there is ample evidence to support the previous claim of ‘convergence’ of the national elite sport development system and service in both Japan and the UK/England. There is also some degree of government intervention in shaping the direction of elite sport policy in both cases. Green and Houlihan concluded in 2005 that the NGBs in the UK “have embarked on an extremely risky path” (2005: 181) in neglecting the development of grassroots sport. This may have become more apparent after the awarding of the Olympic and Paralympic Games to London, with an unprecedented amount of public subsidies already having been guaranteed to sporting excellence rather than mass participation. Nevertheless, the instrumental view of policy in sport is common to both Japan and the UK, where the governments have presented the value of elite sport success in relation to other policy objectives, particularly linked to socio-economic, education and foreign policy. In Japan, the departure from a ‘laissez-faire’ approach towards a more structured elite sport system is quite a recent phenomenon. There seems to be a growing willingness to accept more extensive and formalised support provisions, such as the National Elite Academy, National Coaching Academy and National Career Academy (undertaken at the National Training Center), all of which are believed to bring success for Japanese athletes. It is acknowledged that an integrated approach to the development of elite athletes, coupled with the aforementioned sports science and medical support provision are finally in place. Thus, if Japanese athletes do not produce good results at the forthcoming Olympics, the effectiveness of the training and coaching practices, as well as the appropriateness of support services will be questioned. However, it is too early to draw a conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the newly established integrated support system in Japan. For the UK, the awarding of 2012 Games to London seems to have become the most recent catalyst for the national elite sport actors to reconsider the support structure and reorganise its approach. The ‘scientific’ evaluation of level of performances and the resulting high-performance development model (World Class Pathway Model) is deemed necessary in order to ensure the podium success of British athletes. Overall, the policy for elite sporting success is strikingly similar between the two countries investigated here. But we are reminded that the delivery of the supporting strategy for domestic athletes appears embedded in domestic institutions and the support structure is constantly developing in accordance with continuous reference to (if not suspicion of) rival nations and the pace of the home nation’s innovations.

8.2.2 Development of Anti-Doping Policy in Japan and the UK/England
Not surprisingly, policy development in Japan and the UK to combating doping in sport has occurred in response to high-profile drug abuse cases, such as Ben Johnson, the perceived ‘disgrace’ of national elite athletes who were tested positive, and the global effort which established the global organisations of World Anti-Doping Agency and IICGAS. The acceptance of the World Anti-Doping Code, the development of bi- and multi-lateral agreements and most importantly, the ratification of the UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport which imposed formal legal obligation on governments were important developments for ensuring national compliance and harmonisation of anti-doping policy and practice across the globe. While the awareness of cases of drug use in sport has been documented both in Japan and the UK since the 1960s, a rigorous engagement in anti-doping policy and practice had not been sustained. Indeed, it can be noted that only a limited number of individuals, who were either politicians or national anti-doping and sport actors, showed their willingness to give consistent support to the doping programme. For the Japanese, framing the problem of doping as a national concern occurred only after hosting the IOC Congress during the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, at which time the introduction by the IOC of doping tests at the next Olympic Games was confirmed. For the British, the death of Tom Simpson, an elite cyclist, during the Tour de France in 1967 provided the impetus to introduce an anti-doping policy proposed by the Great Britain Sports Council and to implement more refined testing procedures.

A lack of coordination and ambivalence of government and GBSC towards anti-doping policy and procedures were apparent until the late 1980s. The catalyst to change in the UK was the joint-review conducted by the then Minister for Sport, Colin Moynihan, and by the then Vice Chairman of GBSC, Sebastian Coe, both of whom were Olympians. Together, they raised the profile of the issue of doping in sport and, subsequently, a new regime was introduced. The new regime revolved around a centrally-administered testing programme and included out-of-competition testing, for which NGBs were 100% subsidised. The Council of Europe was used as a platform to encourage regional bi- and multi-lateral agreements with other European states. Perhaps most significantly, a multilateral agreement signed with Australia and Canada, enabled the exchange of good practice in anti-doping and acted as an international lobby to wider sports and political organisations. Following the state inquiries in Canada and Australia, an inquiry was undertaken by the Amateur Athletic Association which indicated the prevalence of drug use in sport in the UK as well as the general value and attitudes of British athletes towards drug taking in sport and engaging in doping practices.

In contrast, subsequent to the Tokyo Games, Japanese involvement in anti-doping became inactive, displaying no particular commitment of resources remaining relatively reactive, only
introducing doping tests as a result of the requirements of hosting international sport competitions in the 1980s. For example, out-of-competition testing was introduced in preparation for the hosting of the Kobe Universiade in 1985 when the first Asian laboratory was accredited. In response to the progress made by the IOC after the doping scandal and the 1988 Games, the JASA/JOC became a coordinating agency to conduct doping tests on Japanese athletes, although the number was small and not comparable with the extent found in Britain. Even though a number of Chinese athletes tested positive in 1994 at the Hiroshima Asian Games, a national inquiry into doping in sport did not take place in Japan. Rather, the international exposure of a Japanese track and field athlete who was tested positive from an OOCT, which was perceived as the national ‘scandal’ causing consequent embarrassment in 1996, finally prompted further investigation. The subsequent criticism by the then Director of the IOC Medical Commission, Alexander de Merode, about Japanese complacency towards its high-performance athletes was brought to the attention of politicians and the government. This led to the formation of the Consultation Committee on the Anti-Doping System composed of a number of national sport bodies. As such, the Japanese were sporadic in terms of their involvement in anti-doping with little coordination, no proactive engagement in the region and very few government resources. By contrast, the British had a much longer multilateral involvement in anti-doping policy which included the exchange of information and good practice with other proactive countries.

The Japanese government’s acknowledgement of anti-doping issues, likely tied to the preservation of an ideal sporting image and the promotion and protection of public health, must also be considered within a changing global attitude and climate towards anti-doping policy. However, the initial Japanese endorsement of the global anti-doping issue was distinctively different from the British, whose international voice had already been strongly represented in previous multilateral and regional agreements. For example, the Japanese decided to send a low-rank official to the first World Anti-Doping Conference in Lausanne in 1999. Despite the Japanese insensitivity to the international policy development, securing a member on the WADA Executive Committee and Foundation Board was perceived to be of national interest for the Japanese government who promised the second biggest financial contribution to WADA. The British government’s contribution was subsequently mediated within the regional bloc of European Union. The subsequent domestic policy development on anti-doping is also quite interesting when considering the relatively different routes taken by the Japanese and the British. The contrasted features between the two countries are observable in relation to the stable income promised by government to the national anti-doping agency. This consequently influences the robustness of domestic anti-doping
structure, the values of national sport actors and public officials, and also the status of national anti-doping agencies.

In spite of expectations and recommendations by the national sport actors to create the Japan Anti-Doping Agency as a public body, disappointment was expressed when the government decided to create a national coordinating agency as a 'private' incorporated agency with a mere guarantee of toto subsidy. The scarce resources allowed only minimal doping tests to be conducted by JADA and also forced its reliance on a controversial sponsorship deal with pharmaceutical companies to accredit 'safe' supplements and nutritional snacks/drinks. Despite the then government's primary interest in reducing the size of state expenditure, this arrangement did not satisfy national anti-doping actors and some supporters showed their anger towards the government. In the case of Britain, UK Sport maintained its role as a national coordinating agency and was subject to full public funds and the consequent 'public accountability'. However, this became a source of domestic and international debate in terms of its 'independence' and 'conflict of interests'. Given the extensive criticisms of 'complacency' of UK Sport regarding its claim of being the most active anti-doping agency in the world, the total number of samples collected in the UK exceeds that of the Japanese, whose activities, in terms of doping control, were on a much smaller scale. While anti-doping agencies in Japan and the UK promoted and supported the importance of educational and promotional activities, the interests of the government, public, media and the NADO itself rested squarely in doping tests, with the bulk of resources being allocated to detection, deterrence and sanctions. However, the relative affluence of UK Sport allowed the production of educational tools designed to reach a wide audience, especially young athletes. This educational, pro-active work undertaken by UK Sport seems to be internationally recognised as good practice, evidenced by the appointment of its Education and Information Manager to WADA's Education Committee.

Despite varying interventionist positions taken by both governments in the domestic arrangement of anti-doping policy, both have a keen interest in being regarded as 'leading sporting countries' in light of the growing emphasis and significance of global anti-doping policy. In this context, the double standard of the Japanese government towards domestic and global anti-doping policy is outstanding, especially when considering imbalances between financial contributions to WADA and JADA. Japanese sports organisations placed pressure on the government to have closer cooperation with the World Anti-Doping Agency, which led to the initial engagement of the government with the Lausanne Declaration in 1999. However, through its initial involvement, the government soon realised the benefits of high-profile representation in a global anti-doping programme. Despite this, the government's
commitment to anti-doping remains secondary to its primary concern with elite international sporting success, an alignment which is also notable in Britain. The 'Janus-faced' position of the Japanese government became even more apparent during the ratification process of the UNESCO Convention, which was intended to endorse the World Anti-Doping Code and legally obligate countries to comply with the Code. In the interviews, all national anti-doping actors and a representative of MEXT to UNESCO, agreed that the mixture of inter-ministerial interests had an impact on the nature of international negotiations. Furthermore, it was felt that these negotiations were rigorously undermined by inter-governmental values and protocols in an attempt to avoid legal commitment to the Code by the Japanese government.

To some extent, the reduced sense of urgency in the Japanese response may be reflective of the low prevalence of drug abuse in Japanese society and the very few positive case of Japanese athletes when compared to many European and North American countries, where the associated health and crime problems are at issue. As a senior JADA official explained, the values entrenched in the creation of WADA and the WAD Code derived from European and North American sporting traditions. At a fundamental level, these beliefs and values are not wholly shared by Japanese culture and society, which can, in part, explain the relative ambivalence of the Japanese attitude towards the implementation of globally accepted anti-doping policies.

Such ambiguity is not so apparent in the UK. The prospect of hosting the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympics Games, coupled with a series of recent embarrassing high profile cases of British athletes, who either tested positive due to associations with the notorious BALCO laboratory, or who missed out-of-competition tests, has increased the government's interest in anti-doping issues. The investigations by the parliamentary committees were, in part, intended to eliminate the persistent domestic and international perceptions of British inactivity in efforts against doping in sport, which eventually resulted in changes to the national anti-doping organisation. The government was not alone in these actions. Large and influential domestic bodies of sport like UK Athletics and British Swimming opted to follow the general trend of other 'leading' anti-doping countries such as Australia and the United States to reduce the practical difficulties associated with disciplinary proceedings and the sanction of athletes.

In summary, the creation of WADA, the emergence of the World Anti-Doping Code, and the subsequent ratification of the UNESCO Convention for Anti-Doping, has undoubtedly had an observable effect on domestic anti-doping structures. Differences are noticeable with regards to the enhancement and coherence of domestic programmes, as well as increased expectations of sports organisations towards governments in Japan and the UK. It is worth
highlighting that, feeling greater pressure to engage in the anti-doping network, both governments, seem to have determined that non-compliance with WADA would be costly. The emerging global policy framework has also enabled the development of the respective national anti-doping policy and rules, further encouraging the advancement of harmonisation of national anti-doping rules. In particular, being the host nation of the next Olympic and Paralympic Games, it is evident that the British government could not resist global pressure to act proactively in rearranging the domestic structure which was perceived to have conflicting interests between 'drug-free' and 'high-performance success'. Some Japanese anti-doping actors feared international condemnation, as had occurred in 1996 from the head of IOC Medical Commission due to the government's continued hesitant involvement in national anti-doping policy. This was compounded by the growing investment in elite sporting success and a stagnant amount of capital allocated to anti-doping programming. Although policy development and preference in Japan is derived primarily from domestic interests, it is increasingly evident that policy actors are constrained from manoeuvring domestic policy by international factors and are encouraged to conform to the growing global platform on anti-doping.

8.3 Mechanisms of Global Influences on Elite Sport Policy and Anti-Doping Policy

Building on the preceding sections, the content of this section will question what the external forces for domestic sport policy are, and how and where the non-domestic and domestic elements intersect. The extent to which domestic institutions mediate or constrain the impact of international influences and the process of global pressures manifest at the domestic level and the varying degree of impact of non-domestic influences on policy choice in Japan and the UK/England will be assessed within three overlapping theoretical framework (international relations, international regime theory and globalisation, including lesson-drawing and policy transfer). We will analyse the constraining and enabling factors of domestic policy development and the interactions between international or transnational non-governmental and domestic government organisations from the empirical investigations conducted in the thesis. In this respect, these exercises lead us to evaluate the applicability and potential of these theories as tools of future research providing further understanding of sport policy, elite sport systems and anti-doping policy.
With regard to the development of elite sport policy, the general observation is that there are a myriad of intermingling pressures stemming from the processes of globalisation. Given the prevalent interest in gaining a competitive advantage and achieving international sporting excellence, the realist notion encapsulated within international relations theory has the potential to explain the significance of both the domestic policy arena and the capacity of states. When considering the development of anti-doping policy, interactions between global and domestic forces are apparent. The coercive nature of the emerging anti-doping regime has a significant impact on the policy preferences of domestic anti-doping actors.

8.3.1 Conforming to global pressures and the emerging global policy regime for anti-doping

Engagement by both Japanese and British policy makers in anti-doping policy was reaffirmed by the global shift in attitudes towards anti-doping. The subsequent emergence of the apparent global consensus concerning world anti-doping programmes related to doping offences, sanctions, international standards and the introduction of models of best practice only further heightened this sense of momentum. As demonstrated in the previous section, with the creation of World Anti-Doping Agency and the adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code, a number of policy provisions or changes were implemented in Japan and the UK. While the outcome of policy development illustrates diversity between the two countries, interactions between global and domestic forces can be identified. The facilitation of policy change occurs in the way these two dimensions interact, when policy preferences of states and domestic anti-doping actors are influenced. As such, the notion of globalisation 'reaching in' and participative responses are quite prominent in the case of anti-doping policy.

Stephen Krasner defined international policy regimes as: "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (1983a: 2). As the formation of regimes was characterised in Chapter 2, a high formality with a global institution and policy framework for anti-doping has emerged with the creation of WADA. This is accompanied by a permanent secretariat, sub-regional offices, regular meetings and conventions, voting, budgeting, monitoring of compliance and regular exchange of information and also by stated principles. The empirical evidence suggests that there are expected constraints on states' behaviours by a set of globally accepted rules and agreement in anti-doping, including the World Anti-Doping Code and importantly the UNESCO International Convention against
Doping. The convergence of states and domestic actors’ expectations is quite visible, as highlighted in Table 8.1. It is sufficient to highlight that, at one level, there were shared global expectations to combat the use of drugs in sport. This was witnessed in the Copenhagen Declaration of 1999 and in the quick ratification of the UNESCO Convention for anti-doping. At another level, there were explicit domestic responses to global pressures which compelled the government and national anti-doping officials to conform to a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms and rules which can be identified in the global anti-doping policy. Undoubtedly, the awareness and sensitivity of both the Japanese and British governments towards agreed principles and norms of global anti-doping policy and the progress in the leading anti-doping states became also discernible. Consequently, non-compliance and domestic ignorance in the advancement in rules, international standards and prohibited drugs framed by WADA became unacceptable domestically, but particularly internationally.

The dominant assumption of converged expectations and collaborative situations and also the consequent compliance are (indirect) ‘coercive’ situations which can be explained by the realist strand of international policy regime theory. Indeed, there are a number of forms of ‘coercion’ in the current global anti-doping arrangements where sanctions and monitoring are undertaken by WADA, the IOC and IFs who effectively have the discretion to impose sanctions on athletes, coaches as well as other domestic anti-doping agencies and to expel IFs and countries from international sporting competitions. Moreover, the realist assumption of the domination of stronger states in the policy sector may be evident, possibility sustaining the regime. The leading anti-doping nations are countries like Australia, Canada and the United States, all of which played pivotal roles in creating a new anti-doping global agency. However, although these lead countries’ representations remain strong and WADA has implemented the monitoring of national anti-doping coordinating agencies and has enforced sanctions to ensure overall compliance, an ‘obligated transfer’ or direct imposition of anti-doping policy is not evident. The two empirical cases suggest a more intriguing explanation that the Japanese and British governments had a sense of obligation to conform to the global principles and norms in anti-doping, although these were primarily fuelled by a ‘calculated’ national interest in gaining more advantage from others, regional rivals in particular. The calculated interests were derived from the self-interest of actors weighing the benefits and costs associated with being considered compliant with the global anti-doping policy rather than being considered deviant. Gaining regional status, obtaining updated information, increasing knowledge, gaining good practice, and achieving cooperation with other international organisations were also largely associated with obtaining performance advantages for national elite athletes and officials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-requisite of policy regimes</th>
<th>Degree of consensus and convergence of domestic actors' expectations in:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Principles: beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude</strong></td>
<td>Fully accepted through signing of WADC and 'acceptance' of UNESCO Convention; implementation of Japan Anti-Doping Code by JADA and Doping Guideline by MEXT</td>
<td>Fully accepted through signing of WADC and 'ratification' of UNESCO Convention; implementation of UK Anti-Doping Policy and UK National Anti-Doping Model Rules</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Norms: standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations</strong></td>
<td>Compelled to oblige to participate in a global forum; willingness to gain international presence and being perceived as the regional leader in Asia/Oceania</td>
<td>Compelled to oblige as the host nation for the Olympics; willingness to establish itself as a 'leading' anti-doping state in the world</td>
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<td><strong>Rules: specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action</strong></td>
<td>Promise on extensive contribution to WADA budget; reluctance in changing legislation and act at minimum</td>
<td>Increased expectation to create an independent NADO and to legislate against doping in sport due to 2012 Games</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-making procedures: prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice</strong></td>
<td>Still ambivalent: minimum engagement of government and politician but optimum influence of domestic anti-doping actors; slow</td>
<td>Growing interests of government and politicians whose decision impacted</td>
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The most significant illustration of the cost-benefit calculation was perhaps observed in the Japanese case where they have demonstrated a commitment to the importance of active participation in WADA. To them, the participation is perceived to provide a great deal of advantage to Japanese anti-doping actors and the government. It has become apparent that Japanese anti-doping actors, including MEXT officials, are particularly concerned with sustaining their reputation as a world-leader in the anti-doping campaign by establishing the image of Japan not only as being completely 'clean' of doping, but also as a leader in the Asia and Oceanic region. To maintain this status and prestige, the successful bid for WADA's Regional Office and securing an Executive seat have become key objectives for the government. In other words, the Japanese government's promise of 17.68% of WADA budgetary contribution typifies its strategic interest in securing international and regional representation, thereby enhancing its credibility related to anti-doping policy. It can also be stated that compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code and the states' decision to enter into international agreements (e.g. UNESCO Convention) have been engineered in a way that secures the benefits of cooperation, while minimising the 'costs' derived from the (perceived) fear of a global accusation of Japanese complacency and inactivity which could negatively impact on its current image and reputation of international prominence. In addition to calculating interests, the nature and orientation of national policy and institutions for anti-
doping have been shaped and directed largely by the global framework. For instance, the specific governmental position on anti-doping was created within the Competitive Sports Division of MEXT which, for the first time, allocated ¥100 million of its Exchequer budget to the doping testing programme. Additionally, a national policy 'guideline' was subsequently issued after the acceptance of the UNESCO Convention. The early implementation of the WADA-endorsed programme, ADAMS (Anti-Doping Administration & Management System), the introduction of doping tests at the biggest national multi-sport event (Kokutai), and JADA's application of financial sanctions to non-compliant NFs (although the evidence does not suggest it is effective) also demonstrate how the global anti-doping policy regime helped to influence and define the values of Japanese anti-doping actors. More interestingly, and as argued in the previous section, these actions cannot be viewed as having purely altruistic motives, but have rather been derived from cost-benefit calculations. The different attitudes of the Japanese government towards WADA and UNESCO is viewed as Janus-faced, where the domestic decision-making process of endorsing the UNESCO Convention, which legally binds the states, is seen as largely directed by domestic institutions, or specifically, by the ministerial interests and protocols. We can safely conclude that the Japanese policy debate is framed and directed within a global arena which is facilitated by WADA and further influenced by leading anti-doping countries.

As for the British case, the willingness of the British government and anti-doping officials was expressed in terms of their concern for maintaining its reputation of being at the front of the global anti-doping movement. Moreover, the eventual decision to create an independent NADO in the UK can perhaps be regarded as a typical case in which the capacity of the government and the national agency are constrained in manoeuvring the structural arrangement and direction of domestic policy. Announced in late 2007, the process of policy-decision to create an independent UK NADO illustrates the effect of globalisation shaping domestic policy protocols. The initial 'independent' review commissioned by UK Sport had concluded in favour of maintaining the Drug-Free Sport Directorate inside UK Sport with some minor structural change largely because of a lack of evidence of unethical behaviour and because the then government agenda was unsympathetic to having another quango body. However, another consultation undertaken by DCMS and UK Sport concluded that "change is both necessary and desirable" in order to "modernise the UK's approach to anti-doping" (UK Sport Announcement, December 2007: 3). With the growing associated external pressures, we can reasonably suggest that it was the response to a persistent domestic call for eliminating 'conflict of interests' within UK Sport. Additionally, global pressure to restructure the UK NADO by separating the stakeholders was exerted in relation to rigorous testing, achieving independence in investigation and disciplinary proceedings and the
implementation of anti-doping legislation. It can be argued that such a dynamic change of
global anti-doping policy highlights the commingling of global pressure with domestic
interests and values. Pressure external to the UK can largely be found in relation to the
enhanced anti-doping provisions which include the enactment and ratification of the
UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport, and the revision of World Anti-Doping Code.
In addition, the progress made towards wanting to 'lead' anti-doping countries such as
Australia, Canada and the United States, coupled with criticism from prominent international
anti-doping officials describing the 'complacency' of British attitudes, seem to have steered
policy decisions. The domestic policy focus on successfully hosting of the London 2012
Games and ensuring the world leading position of the British in anti-doping have became
catalytic for policy-decisions on a new UK NADO. However, as examined in Chapter 4, the
fact that the UK anti-doping programme has already developed a number of provisions,
including the intelligence-based testing and educational programmes for optimising
effectiveness and deterrence, illustrates that the British are ahead of many other countries,
including the Japanese. Here we note that a policy leap, as has occurred in Japan, cannot be
found to the same extent in the UK. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the account of
a senior anti-doping official stating that pressure to create a UK NADO, combined with
recurring criticism *did indeed* 'hurt' the credibility of not only British anti-doping policy, but
also the UK Sport Drug-Free Directorate.

Nevertheless, accurately evaluating the calculations of domestic interests and values is not
an easy task because of interdependencies between structure and agency. It is useful to
highlight from the neoliberalists' account the aforementioned changing behaviour of the
government which intends to pursue its interests through cooperation. The consequence of
which will influence the extent of regime formation and its persistence. We have examined
how the existence of recent global agreements on anti-doping constrained actors' choices
and control over anti-doping issues where the cost of being outside the global anti-doping
movement and the benefits they gained from being active participants enabled them to
shape the regime for their strategic policy objectives. It has nonetheless become apparent
that the capacity of government and domestic agency to facilitate national anti-doping policy
was restricted in the face of global pressure or globalisation 'reaching in', especially in light of
expectations and domestic concerns regarding being perceived as inactive and ineffective.
However, through intergovernmental and inter-agency communication or negotiations, the
situation has become much more 'information-rich' which has not only increased the
governments' sensitivity towards the global progress, but also transmitted information about
the activities of other countries and NADOs. As a result, the Japanese and British actors' interests and behaviour have been altered, especially when the governments identify
'incentives' and 'opportunities' in participating in the global anti-doping policy arena. Given that both the Japanese and British governments channelled the states' strategies to respond to the changes and expectations at the global level, we have enough evidence to suggest that different trajectories of policy reforms undertaken by these two countries were influenced by the prior policy choices and the conditions of domestic institutions. As the neoliberalist strand of international policy regime theorist suggests, once both governments are the participant in the policy regime under the global coordination and monitoring facilitated by WADA, cooperative behaviour emerged as a consequence of increasing communication with other NADOs in the region and disseminating and exchanging information to encourage them to be rigorously compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code.

In this regard, with neoliberal acceptance of an array of actors at various levels playing significant roles in international politics and its notion of interdependencies to achieve cooperation, the constructivists'/cognitivists' accounts of regime dynamisms emphasising 'ideas' and 'epistemic communities' can also help us comprehend the varying degree of constraining impact on policy-making processes and change of beliefs of policymakers at the domestic level. Considering that the majority of national anti-doping actors in Japan interviewed for this study were either medical doctors or sports scientists, and also had some degree of engagement with WADA, IFs or UNESCO, the significance of a knowledge-based network of professionals cannot be dismissed, especially when considering the possible emergence of a 'full-blown' regime in the anti-doping policy arena. It is highlighted that government protocols and the behaviour and values of government officials are shaped by the relatively independent individual experts. These knowledgeable groups of people seem to have enhanced the capacity of being internal lobbying group and framed the perceived best practices within the global anti-doping framework, which eventually enabled the Japanese policymakers to identify their interests. However, for the British case, the dependence of the state and the national anti-doping agency on expertise is quite weak because the capacities of these two actors to determine the anti-doping policy and the history of their representations at the global level have been stronger than their Japanese counterparts. In this sense, we can identify that the discussions associated with 'strong cognitivist' assumption of international policy regime, which was presented by Young (1991), may be relevant only to the case of Japan, where those individuals not only shaped the government's policy agenda by establishing a predisposition to cooperate with the WADA but also are closely associated with the government and sometimes represented to act for the benefits of state engaging the international bargaining.
To summarise, we can safely state that a policy regime can be found in anti-doping policy whose effectiveness is based on the dissemination of policy principles, norms, regulation and ideas and on the converged expectations of the advocates who embrace those regime principles. As such, it was observed that the domestic anti-doping policy framework is externally defined and that the choice of states is constrained. It was discussed that states felt compelled to comply either in fear of being expelled from international sporting competitions or in recognition of costs being outside of global anti-doping policy arena. However, the states' adaptability to the growing needs to cooperate with the global anti-doping framework is prominent in which cooperative behaviour and convergence of expectations in global anti-doping policy gradually emerged from the Japanese and British governments, through varying incentives. The role of state and the continuous commitment of government and non-governmental anti-doping actors remain imperative for the facilitation of compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code and eventually a more effective global anti-doping regime associated with the UNESCO Convention. It has been demonstrated that the neoliberal assumption helped to explain the choice of policymakers to determine the cooperative behaviour of the Japanese and British governments and, as opposed to hyperglobalist assumptions, the globalisation 'transformationalist' account increased our sensitivity in understanding the dialectical interactions between the global and the national/local contexts.

As for the elite sport system, it is much more difficult to observe the influence of an international policy regime on domestic policy-making to the same degree when considering the global pressure and resultant motivations which have shaped national anti-doping policies. In some sense the development of national elite sport structure is regulated by the IOC, IFs and WADA with regards to eligibility and rules of the games for international sport participation and cooperation with the policy agenda externally set, for example the protection of human rights of young athletes, is sometimes required. However, the stimulus for the development of elite national sporting systems in Japan and the UK is predominantly attributed to a desire to compete for Olympic medals and glory. The premises of international sporting success and the according elite sport support provision are increasingly becoming convergent (cf. de Bosscher, 2008; Oakley & Green, 2001), it is hard to speculate the emergence of an 'elite sport policy regime' in a vacuum of stable institutional entity and agreed principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.
Interactions between domestic and non-domestic factors shaping policy for elite athlete development can be explained by applying globalisation concepts. Chapter 2 identified globalisation as one of the mechanisms determining domestic policy. The capacity of states in the policy making process is influenced by the 'reach' of globalisation with its ability to both facilitate and mediate national policy. Literature surrounding the concept of lesson-drawing and policy transfer can highlight the 'participative' elements that states and domestic sport actors use to harness globalisation effects in order to achieve policy objectives. As discussed in Chapter 2 and as sometimes represented as the argument associated with 'cultural imperialism', the dominant notion of globalisation in a hyper-globalist view is that globalisation intrinsically constrains and reduces the capacity of states in domestic decision-making. Their ability to pursue policy objectives is then lessened or eroded causing a 'retreat' of the state, forced conformity to international agreements. In some instances, there may be some degree of similarity between the argument about the coercive nature of international policy regimes and the notion of conformity and restriction and dissolution of autonomy as discussed in the previous section.

The loss of control by Japanese and British governments over national elite sport policy is far from evident. Instead, states retain substantial capacity and autonomy over many aspects of elite sport policy, such as policy formulation, decisions surrounding public funding levels and the extent and nature of support of elite athletes, coaches, officials and specialists in providing services for high-performance athletes. Particularly in the UK's case, the state's capacity to manage its finance is apparent with the implicit association with the New Labour's policy value of 'modernisation' and the demand for effective and accountable use of public resources. This is in direct opposition to the suspicion towards state intervention in sport traditionally seen in Japan. However, this traditional penchant for suspicion is changing. With a recent increase in demand for much more proactive support provision by the Japanese national elite sport actors, the capacity of the state is gradually extending. For example, the JOC is now requested to formulate performance measurements to aid the prioritised allocation of funding.

Even though the erosion of the state's capacity is not obvious, three particular areas can be highlighted which demonstrate globalisation's capacity to 'reach in' to the domestic policy process. The first is a growing demand to adjust national competition schedules to coincide
with the international calendar in order to expand competitive opportunities for international level athletes. This element was extensively discussed in relation to the Kokutai scheduling in Japan. Also, the necessity of securing commercial income and other financial means for the elite sport system is the second area that is visible at two levels. Firstly, it is relevant in terms of the activities of state and national elite sport actors and, secondly, at the level of the athletes to assist in continuing their athletic careers. This financial need is discernible in the case of the JOC, and also, to a lesser extent, in UK Sport. Consequently, some effects of commercialisation can be identified. Finally, state interest in increasing the future potential to win the right to host major international sport championships is perceived to be one of the major structural constraints internationally set, which, for example, pressures public and elite sport officials to ensure that 'clean' national delegations are sent to international sport events.

Straddling domestic and international factors is the development of elite sport policy, which can be explained by the heuristic framework of lesson-drawing and policy transfer, an example of a 'participative' view of globalisation. Although the 'enabling' impacts of globalisation differ between Japanese and British contexts, two common grounds in relation to the perspective of national elite sport actors and state officials regarding the influence of globalisation, which ultimately enables the development of domestic policy, emerge. First, the growing exposure and greater mobility of national elite sport officials, elite athletes and coaches to international competitions, enhanced training practices, and more globally available information. With the hope of pursuing desired national objectives in high-performance sport, this has enhanced awareness of activities of other countries and intensified incentives to learn innovative practices and to adapt good practice found in other countries. The second is a growing recognition of increasing international standards in sport and sophistication in supporting structures. Winning medals has become much more difficult and the pressure to compete at an elite level is more acute. The 'intelligence gathering' activities of the Japanese illustrate a self-reinforcing pressure to catch up with successful countries by identifying and adapting good practice. As such, the perception that many other countries are ahead of Japan and its fear of falling behind its rivals and also dissatisfaction with current elite sport provision have fostered the impetus of Japanese elite sport officials to engage in strategic learning. The national practice of disseminating and generating globally-accepted knowledge has become prominent in order to raise good practice on the policy agenda, to shape the direction of policy and policy preference and ultimately to reach policy consensus. This in turn causes innovation in national elite sport structures, resulting in a gain in competitive advantage. Regular visits to a wide range of 'advanced' elite sport nations, including the 'perceived' rivals, by Japanese elite sport actors and the invitation to foreign
experts have become a common feature to draw lessons and transform the approach to elite sport support provision. The establishment of formal and informal inter-agency cooperation domestically and internationally appeared to be the common practice to exchange updated technical information. The impact of globalisation was not only expressed, but was perceived as an 'opportunity' to 'reach out' to dominant sporting nations in Europe and North America, in an attempt to overcome the marginalisation of Japan. The Japanese strategic learning practice is driven by the domestically perceived necessity, or even urgency, which can be characterised as 'indirect coercion' of policy transfer along its continuum developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). For the British, while such structured way of intelligence gathering cannot be identified, it is predominantly Australian, and to a lesser extent Canadian, models of elite sport structures which have been drawn upon as sources of inspiration. Recruitment of experts from these countries brings their specialist knowledge and values to British high-performance sport. Increasingly, international representation in sport has become a policy concern for both Japanese and British policy-makers because of the available opportunities to exchange ideas and to influence the direction of policy undertaken by international federations for sport. It is agreed that the participation in such decision-making processes in rule-formation can enhance performance advantage, and may increase prospects of hosting the Olympic Games, or other major international championships. In this regard, we can acknowledge that the influence of globalisation can be expected to sway actors' policy preferences and is accepted as generating positive domestic impacts.

An important point to highlight is that there are some incentives in undertaking learning lessons which may include the transferring of policy, and in bringing high-performance experts into the country. Despite the intensified international sporting competitions and growing pressure to enhance national competitiveness, these forms of learning from successful countries does not necessarily lead to a swift transferring of policy and may be ended up with a mere aspiration. In other words, the extent to which globalisation pressures and consequent adaptation of good practices found in other countries is largely impacted by domestic sport structure and embedded culture and values that largely determine whether examples from other countries are copied, emulated, hybridised or synthesised. As such, and in the face of mounting pressure to respond to the refinement of the global 'sporting arm's race', some strategic approaches for global competitions in sport have been adapted by the Japanese and the British in different ways. Organisational entities in the UK illustrate the diversified response to globalisation where, on one hand, each devolved nation has autonomy over the financing of sport and broad sport policy formation related to the development of talented children and young athletes. At the podium level, on the other hand, the implementation of structured high-performance development models within the elite sport
system structure have become increasingly centralised and depend considerably on public resources to ensure more medals at the Olympic Games.

The introduction of TID programmes in Japan highlights the institutional constraints at the domestic level, which have been highlighted in the policy transfer 'synthesis' in Rose's model (2005). The idea of structured talent identification and development originated in the 1960s and was followed by some policy experts conducting field work investigation in a number of 'leading' countries to accumulate knowledge in the late 1980s. However, the impact was limited to mere inspiration and substantive policy change was not stimulated. It was only after the recent formation of JISS that policy became actualised. However, and importantly, the choice of JISS as a central coordinator in policy formulation was constrained by organisational arrangements and values that were entrenched at the prefectural level, which made copying or even emulating TID programmes found in the lead countries not possible. As discussed, the Japanese sport structure is still fragmented and the board of education or related departments within the prefectural authorities and the preferectural PE/Sport Associations are dominant in shaping policy and in controlling finance for sport and prefectural elite athletes. Therefore, the project to introduce a structured TID had to be mediated to make it suitable for the preference and needs of prefectural governments as well as adhering to acceptable policy objectives and solutions, i.e. wide educational needs, the promotion of overall health and providing sport opportunities for citizens. Consequently, the first TID programme implemented in Fukuoka prefecture entails synthesised elements that take a variety of combined TID practices learnt from other countries. The institutional constraints were also evident from the fact that due to the JOC's lack of influence at the prefectural level, coupled with the absence of a policy network, the TID project was initiated by JISS. In the nature of the aforementioned fragmentation in the Japanese elite sport structure, JISS facilitated some institutional arrangements by creating dialogue and an information network across prefectures. This has not only allowed them to access updated information available nationally and internationally, but also has shaped awareness and policy preferences in elite sport, consequently, increasing the number of successful TID projects emerging in other prefectures. In contrast, the implementation of network-based elite sport institutes and the 'giant-aided' TID programme centrally facilitated by UK Sport were almost the emulation of Australian experiences. It was not only the urgency that these two countries were faced, i.e. securing the success in the hosting Olympic Games, but also the individuals who implemented the programme are Australian and, more importantly, those physiological components that the British TID programme selected were employed on the basis of Australian model. This can confirm the conception presented by Bennett (1991b)
and Rose (2005) that the emulation occurred as a convergence of policy goals and policy instruments for talent identification.

We have argued that despite the growing salience of international factors which constrain and enable the choice and decision of domestic actors, the impact of state and domestic institutions cannot be negated in the analysis of the development of elite sport systems. Instead, in the Japanese case, there was a countervailing push for the government to become involved more rigorously in what used to be seen as the 'private' sector, where there was a historical resistance to the state's intervention. As represented in the recent state initiative to create the "Nippon Revival Project", the role of government is evolving in the support of elite athletes. As for the British government, global and self-imposed pressure to become a successful Olympic host nation seems to have encouraged the government to intervene more in elite sport policy. The idea of meeting performance target presented by NGBs and UK Sport is almost obligatory in light of the need to demonstrate the effective use of public money resulting from the central domestic policy value, i.e. the modernisation agenda. The empirical chapters observed that both states offer political incentives to foster cutting-edge strategic support to athletes in order to achieve Olympic glory, whether for non-sporting objectives or, in a naïve sense, for a 'pure' sporting reason.

It is suggested that the dominant (neo-)realist paradigm within international relations theory may provide us with supporting arguments about the strength of states in shaping and transforming policy for elite athlete development. The question posed by the SPLISS consortium study group, "to what extent do you wish to be part of this game?" (UK Sport/SPLISS, 2006: 16), inherently indicates the conflicting and anarchic nature of global elite sport competitions. Within the paradigm of realism, as defined in Chapter 2, states are predominantly assumed to be the key actors in the international system and the relationship between states, and the potential for conflict between them, are main foci. Conflict is thought to be intrinsic to the behaviour of states existing in an anarchical international system. It can be conceived that the role of states has become increasingly dominant in international elite sport competitions, and that elite sport officials and athletes seek to maximise their medal potential in the Olympics. Therefore, the realist principal interest in how a state acts and reacts in the face of others is noted as a useful concept. Japanese intelligence gathering is an overt strategic activity based on its uncertainties over the performance advancement of other countries (especially historic and regional rivals). It is noted that states invest more resources into specialist facilities and experts and identify prioritised sports in order to exploit comparative advantages in international sport. On this point, an understanding of globalisation developed by Dale is instructive in its suggestion that: "States' individual
responses to changing global realities centre on making themselves more competitive" (1999: 4). Clearly, we can observe the apparent impact of globalisation on elite sport policy in the two countries investigated. Based on the idea of 'self-help', the Japanese in particular employ primarily domestic policy objectives to enhance competitiveness through the constant monitoring of rivals. Furthermore, the domestic elite sport structure is strengthened through the refinement and application of specialist and innovative approaches supporting elite athletes and coaches. Both Japanese and British elite sport actors seem to be embedded in an endless game to retain their relative gains.

Nevertheless, the realist assumption focusing mainly on the distributional conflict between states over competitive advantage would, in no way, jeopardise their 'national security'. It is also not the case that the international competitions in sport are anarchic but are rather conducted according to strict rules of the game. It was discussed in Chapter 2 that the unit of analysis demonstrated by realists does not sufficiently address the significance of non-governmental organisations and transnational agencies. As such, the realist analysis, which argues for the states as rational actors and for the dominance of structure over agency and which undermines the significance of multilateral actors, is much less adequate. The assumption that states make decisions for their own national policies, regardless of exogenous influence, offers little insight into the way in which states are constrained by the international organisations or externally defined values, norms and regulations. However, in the case of the prevalence of structured elite sport systems, states are openly engaged or are being supported and legitimated for its activity by quasi-governmental sport bodies for high-performance. This is achieved mainly through financial means or dependency relations in which they are also willing to promote alliances even with the 'rivals' in order to strengthen their capacity to obtain Olympic medals. For example, signing the Memorandum of Understanding between the British Government/UK Sport and the Chinese Government/Chinese General Administration of Sport can be assumed to be cooperative and there is an encouragement for exchanging specialists and information. This may not have been made possible had China and the UK not been impending hosts of Olympic Games. It might be possible to suggest that a close association with realism illustrates that these two countries seek a 'relative gain' on the basis of the domestic interest as the host countries through sharing their elite strategies. These agreements are limited only to the UK and China and involve the exchange of specialists and athletes more freely than may be seen in relationships with other countries. It is thought that such exclusivity help them to gain more advantages over others.
As such, the concept of realism does fit reasonably neatly with our understanding of the development of elite sport structures, where the constitutive actors are sovereign states and its intervening role in elite sport policy persevere. The intention of national elite sport actors to gain a competitive edge and their everlasting suspicion of others' gaining a significant competitive advantage could be seen as a consequence of the global realities in elite sport. However, both Japanese and British elite sport actors are participative and 'reaching out' to globally circulated ideas and knowledge, from which they harness global influences to attain policy objective, i.e. Olympic glory. The varying mechanisms of interactions between domestic and non-domestic influence can be well explored by the analytic concept of lesson-drawing and policy transfer, especially in consideration with the institutional constraints and the consequent complex and dynamic processes in transferring the perceived good practices. We can conclude that the policy transfer continuum enables an identification of the significance of these domestic and non-domestic forces manifest in the domestic elite sport policy structure.

8.4 Methodological Insights

How have methodological lenses helped us to explore the changes in elite sport policy and anti-doping policy in Japan and the UK and in identifying the nature of international influences on the development of national policy? The comments provided in this section will discuss the implications of the methodologies adopted in the study based on our extensive discussion of methodological considerations in Chapter 3.

This study utilised policy document analysis and semi-structured interview, both of which were then triangulated to enhance the level of confidence in the cases investigated. The utility of these two methods will be assessed in reflection of the initial thoughts discussed in Chapter 3.

Policy document analysis

The most distinctive contrasting feature between Japan and the UK/England was the availability and accessibility of primary and secondary document resources which initially influenced the construction of our research findings. The availability of documents in Japan was limited not only in relation to the 'primary' policy documents, which included government
policy publications (policy planning papers, policy reviews, official statistics, budgetary papers, accounts and audit documents) and the documents published by national sport bodies (i.e. NAASH, the JOC, JASA, JADA and NFs), but ‘secondary’ academic literature that provided critical and theoretically-informed analysis was also in short supply for the Japanese case. Since Horne’s (1998a) claim that literatures published in English about the development of Japanese leisure (and sport) lacked theoretical and critical analysis, the availability of literature in English and Japanese, with regard to the development of leisure and sport in Japan, has improved (for example, Maguire & Nakayama, 2006; Nakamura, 2002; Henry & Uchiimi, 2001). However, an absence of sport policy analysis which is theoretically-oriented is still evident, something which Houlihan (2005) suggests may be a reflection of the level of academic interest towards the analysis of public policy for sport, regardless of the increasing government interest in sport, of which claim is no exception to Japan.

As discussed in previous chapters, in spite of a climate of increased public scrutiny over government policy expenditure and its accountability, no policy evaluation or audit has been undertaken in Japan such as that can be found in, for instance, the National Audit Office report in the case of UK. In this regard, the processes observed in our data collection have suggested the deeper structures at play. The sporadic nature of policy documents may have been a reflection of the Japanese government’s general orientations and views towards its accountability in policy and decision-making processes. The institutional ‘ethos’ filters down to the level of national sport organisations, where the access to strategic policy documents, policy reviews and finances is also restricted. It was difficult for us to even ascertain the existence of documents, let alone access them. Because accessibility to documents was so limited, the researcher was required to ask the interviewees to provide the policy documents issued by the government and national sport bodies. In this regard, we confirm the Mulgan’s assertion that the ‘Japanese model’ of policy-making style where the un-elected bureaucrats can act as an “independent source of policy authority” (Mulgan 2003: 80), which have been effective regardless of the frequent change of Prime Minister or ministers. Their effectiveness in policy-making may be indicated by the ‘relative achievement’ of Japanese elite athletes over the years, while it might also have been the case that the Japanese performances were nothing to do with the central government’s policy. Nevertheless, one can note that these public officials who were engaged in policy-making may have not been subject to public accountability to the same extent as the elected politicians/ministers could have been. We can argue that the comparative analysis of available documents and publications has enabled us to claim that the Japanese government should have shown more sensitivity towards its policy documents and the implementation of policy, traits which seem to be
identifiable in the case of Britain where a larger volume of policy papers are available. It is further noted that reviews of secondary documents suggest a potential area of expansion for research into policy which is informed by theory and infused by critical assessments of the development of sport policy over recent decades. Such study could constructively advance not only sport policy research but also the policy for sport in Japan.

**Issues in undertaking semi-structured interviews**

An extensive number of interviews were conducted for the Japanese case study, with 33 individuals interviewed (outlined in Appendix B). The reliance on semi-structured interviews was appropriate particularly because the questions underpinned by theory were developed before the researcher was actually in the field. This enabled us to gain in-depth information about the decision-makers and the decision-making processes, something that would not have been possible purely through the analysis of the rather limited amount of published resources available in Japan. This interview style was welcomed by some participants because they felt they could speak freely about their experiences, values and ideas in the policy area investigated in this research. Others felt they had the opportunity to reflect on the ways in which they were developing elite athletes and how they dealt with anti-doping issues. In addition, the researcher’s presence in the field was important in terms of obtaining published materials on projects, discussion papers, the majority of which were found in participant’s offices. During this time, the researcher was also able to gather the reflective comments of high-performance directors. The adoption of snowballing samples also directed us to identify the gaps in research and provided us with an understanding of how network relations are formed.

Although general issues related to interviewing have been acknowledged in Chapter 3, there are two issues specifically related to research in the Japanese context which should be highlighted to further reveal characteristics of Japanese sport policy structure and decision-making processes. First, in a practical sense, it was a challenge for the researcher to identify appropriate individuals to contact and interview, given the relatively ‘ambiguous’ nature of Japanese sporting bodies. As a number of interviewees themselves acknowledged in their response to questions raised during the interview process (see Chapter 7), they are involved in formulating policy strategy and making decisions on a ‘volunteer’ basis and rarely work full-time at the national and sub-national levels of sport organisations. In particular, some individual’s names repeatedly came up in government consultation committees’ documents. These people were predominantly university academics with dual ‘voluntary’ responsibilities for decision-making within a number of sport bodies, including the JOC. The nature of a
The second point concerns the general socio-cultural context and organisational settings of the Japanese sport field(s) and the relationship between the researcher and the researched. In addition to the previous point, our critical realist account will help comprehend these observable and deep social structures, which are established or reconstructed by the interplay of human agency. A particular reference should be made to the dynamics generated through the interview processes, from the preparation for the interviews through to maintaining contact and dialogue. Irrespective of whether the researcher was initially introduced or made direct contact, it is possible to cast a light on three layers of interesting dynamics that are related to the attributes of the interviewer herself and the characteristics of sport fields which may have been embedded in the 'tradition' and 'culture' of Japan. It is striking to observe that all interviewees were male, apart from one who was a female physical education teacher at a junior high school and involved in the government review of the PE national curriculum (see Appendix B). This illustrates not only the distinctive nature of those involved in sport policy in Japan, but also raises the issue of power relationships in the sporting organisations with respect to genders. This experience contrasts greatly with the case in Britain, where we can find almost equal gender representations and, strikingly, there are substantial numbers of female officials who hold the high-ranked position in the sport bodies, some of whom were interviewed in this study. The second consideration should be given to the usage of language. It is necessary for the researcher to be conscious of the rigid
hierarchical or 'vertical' nature of Japanese society (cf. Nakane, 1967) when the Japanese language is used in the interview process. To elaborate on this point, there had to be a careful thought process to choose right vocabularies from a diverse range of informal/impolite and formal/polite words as well as distinctive male or female vocabularies in the email conversations and face-to-face interviews. Underpinning the critical realist ontological and epistemological position that assumes interrelationship between structure and agency, the "orthodox consensus" which sees language as a mere medium to describe phenomena should be rejected in favour of a recognition that language is the central medium of social life where social actors engage (Blaikie, 1993: 206). As argued in Chapter 3, it should be taken into account in our analysis that there are some conceptual ambiguities and incompatibilities both between, and within, languages which are embedded in a particular historical and political context, and embodied in political and sport systems.

A further dynamic is the attributes of interviewer herself, being Japanese and living in the UK and researching about both Japan and Britain. It is likely that this may have influenced interviewees' preconceptions about the interviewer, their degree of willingness to accept the interview, and their feeling free or (un)restrained in their responds to the questions raised. Burham et al suggest that being a researcher in a foreign country could have advantages in the sense that respondents may feel they will learn something from the interviewer about policy design and implementation in his/her own country (2004: 208-9). Their account can be supported from the reflections of actual interviews undertaken by the researcher in Japan. For example, for some cases, she was asked to give presentations on the UK elite sport system. In another case, she was requested to send research and policy documents on elite sport and anti-doping available in English, through which the researcher was able to maintain contact with the participant to gain further information needed to fill the gaps in knowledge and understanding. This sustained contact also led to opportunities to conduct the second round interviews which enhanced understanding of the research area. It is also interesting to note that once the researcher was acknowledged as being within the network circle of individuals who facilitate policy-making and implement policy practices, the door was opened up to start in-depth conversation about the policy-making processes in Japan. On several occasions, the researcher was also involved in seminars and workshops. It is suggested that dynamics generated between the researcher and the researched shaped the interview process, and that the data gathered provided a better understanding of the policy-making process. It has also been highlighted that the general socio-cultural context is arguably an important element when conducting the field-work research. For this research, it was necessary to understand the general political system, and the specific sport system, in Japan and the UK/England. It should therefore be concluded that it would not have been possible to
achieve a very detached position (positivist or critical rationalist), being fully engaged in
dialogue (critical theory) or being emancipated within the researcher’s paradigm (feminism).
Rather, a balance between a detached and involved manner, or ‘conscious partiality,’
seemed to have been feasible in this study (Blaikie, 1993).

8.5 The Utility of Theory and the Contributions to Knowledge

In Chapter 1, we set out to consider the three potential areas of contributions in order to fill
the gaps in knowledge. Namely, i) a relative absence of study of sport within international
relations theory; ii) a lack of research in relation to the Japanese elite sport system; and iii) a
lack of analysis of the global impact on domestic national policy concerned with the
transboundary issues of doping in sport (see 1.2). This section will address the contributions
of our study to the sport policy field and identify potential future development in research.

8.5.1 Contributions to existing international relations theory

Earlier sections have demonstrated the applicability of theoretical frameworks of international
relations, international policy regimes and globalisation to the analysis of how domestic elite
sport policy and anti-doping policy is shaped and directed by external forces. Our intention is
not to repeat the implications and benefits of the three concepts. However, the contributions
of this thesis to, and the advantages of using, a broad international relations framework will
be identified and the future possibilities of using sport as an empirical case within the field of
international relations, international policy regime theory in particular, need reiteration.

The relative lacunae of research identifying sport as a worthy area of study whilst applying
international relations theory drew our initial interest in using the theory when analysing
sport. Citing sport as a ‘low risk’ foreign policy tool, Allison and Monnington (2005) suggested
that the international relations theory could be utilised to analyse two particular research
areas (selling and enhancing the image of states and penalising international behaviour of
states through sporting boycott). They also argued the dichotomy between realism and
idealism/neoliberalism has prevented research on sport within the discipline of international
relations. However, this thesis has argued that this inter-paradigm debate of international
relations can highlight interesting future research possibilities. More specifically, this thesis
has contributed to highlighting the possibilities of incorporating the disagreement within the
theory of international relations into the analysis of sport policy development. In other words,
the debate between realism and neoliberalism over the way states conceive their own interests and the degree to which the change of states' behaviour is occurred or cooperation is achieved either because of states' concern for relative gains (realism) or absolute gains (neoliberalism) could be applied to the examination of the way sport policy is developed, particularly in relation to the analysis of the growing intensity of competition over Olympic podium positions.

It has been suggested that the dominant (neo-)realist paradigm within international relations theory can be utilised to explain the role and motives of states in shaping and transforming policy for elite athlete development. We have demonstrated the possibility in the future research that the (neo-)realist account help to analyse the way states act out of their self-interests in the international sphere of sport and how they could be grounded in anxieties or suspicion of others in order to gain a competitive advantage in sport. Empirically, these inherently conflicting actions, done in the pursuit of achieving Olympic success, can be examined to consider how inter-state cooperation is prevented (or enabled).

The thesis has also argued that the realist's rational actor model can be aided by the pluralist account of neoliberalism, which can embrace the significance of cooperative behaviour at a global level. In the case of sport, this occurs between elite sport specialist agencies and national, international and transnational institutions, within which 'information-rich' environment states can be ensured to operate. This in turn creates trust among states by reducing uncertainty (see Little, 1996). By taking neoliberalist accounts into consideration, the international relations theorists can examine the extent to which conditions encouraging cooperation among states exist, and how common interests are identified between states and national sport agencies. The future research can be considered in analysing how common interests are identified and how cooperation is emerged in the sport policy development arena. Within the framework of neoliberalism, it is possible to examine the monitoring compliance, sanctioning defectors, and the way policy transfer is facilitated through the exchange of expert knowledge and drawing lessons (see Keohane, 1989). In this sense, the third strand of international relations theory, constructivism, is also addressed its utility with regard to an analysis which takes into consideration the inter-subjective knowledge of individuals or epistemic communities. It has been illustrated that the constructivist approach can be specifically useful, for instance, in analysing the relationship between the emergence of an anti-doping regime and the values and knowledge obtained by individual experts forcing national sport bodies to show their compliance.
It can be concluded that the thesis has demonstrated the applicability of the international policy regime theory to examine the development of sport policy, in particular the development of domestic anti-doping policy, and that further possibilities of research can be identified. First, the World Anti-Doping Agency, as a hybrid global agency, presents a rare, if not unique organisational structure with a globally agreed set of principles, values and rules as encapsulated in the World Anti-Doping Code. It is possible to conduct specific research into the distinctive character of WADA, including the degree of formality, and the way decision-making has taken place, which may lead us to understand the process by which the expectations within domestic policy-sub-systems are influenced and converge (see 2.3.3).

Acknowledging that the different perspectives of international relations emphasise different variables in explaining international regime formation, this thesis demonstrates the extent to which both Japan and Britain came to regard non-compliance as out of question with the result that their policy decisions were shaped by the globally set of rules and requirements. It was demonstrated that the Japanese and the British governments have sought to cooperatively facilitate the implementation of anti-doping principles and policies in part driven by a concern to avoid becoming marginalised from the core of anti-doping policy processes.

Second and related to the first point, the way the institutional arrangements and the agreed principles have been altered and the way international and domestic actors engaged in the discussions or bargaining processes would be worthy of further research. It was demonstrated in the thesis how the Japanese government officials had different protocols to approach WADA in comparison to UNESCO which was partly explained by the perception that being an active participant in WADA was the best way to secure their national interests. The thesis provided examples of interactions between the states and how the government prioritised the absolute gain according to which they perceived that they would gain most from being active participants in WADA. As opposed to a realist perspective of international policy regimes which stresses that states with greater power would emerge at the expense of the weaker states, it was identified that the neoliberal assumption was more helpful in explaining the decisions by policymakers which led them to determine that cooperative behaviour and attitudes towards engagement in the bargaining process via WADA was in their national interest even if it meant conceding a degree of control over domestic anti-doping policy.

Lastly, but most importantly, further examinations of the depth and breadth of compliance of states, national anti-doping agencies or National Olympic Committees, and international sport federations with the World Anti-Doping Code would be an interesting area of research to understanding how a regime is treated as a collective good and how interactions between
the global and national/local context are made. As for the UK, domestic actors perceived a conflict of interests in UK Sport DFSD, which eventually resulted in the establishment of the independent national anti-doping agency. The resolution of this perceived conflict of interest was considered essential in order to demonstrate compliance. However, the WAD Code has been revised and the 2009 version requires further financial and legislative commitment from government and the responsible bodies thus posing further challenges regarding compliance. In this context, it has been argued in the thesis that international policy regime theory can be utilised to further analyse, for example: how the domestic actors perceive 'compliance' and 'harmonisation'; how the requirement to be compliant is reflected in the enforcement of rules at the domestic level; and how the depth and breadth of compliance is affected by the interests and institutional constraints of states or international sport federations.

8.5.2 Methodological considerations

Not surprisingly we still observe methodological weaknesses, which were discussed in Chapter 2. Allison and Monnington (2005) may have also been subjected to criticism for similar weaknesses. To be more specific, a researcher could be attracted to sport policy research in cases where s/he can readily identify likely regimes. Anti-doping and human rights issues surrounding children and young talented performance athletes represent only two of a number of domestic examples which may also be subject to such categorisation. Within the international political arena, inter-state conflicts like the boycott of international sporting events and restrictions surrounding the nationality of athletes are further examples. It is argued that this criticism is difficult to avoid at any level of sport policy analysis. Indeed, the majority of analysis conducted on the development of elite sport policy apply meso- or micro-level frameworks, including the four meso-level concepts examined by Houlihan (2005).-Given the current research focus on the intersections between the domestic and non-domestic factors shaping the domestic policy, the application of theories with a macro-level focus seemed obvious. Alternatively, the nature of the sport policy arena, where the majority of decisions are made at the domestic level, may suggest that adopting a meso-level framework might have provided more analytical descriptions to evaluate, for example, the way elite sport policy is developed and valued in the context of Japan. One may also claim that meso-level theory may help account for factors such as the network of key actors in the policy making process, changes in the role of government, or the relationships between key agencies in sport. However, aligned within a critical realist philosophical orientation, our research questions attempted to identify the mechanisms of non-domestic influences which are manifest at the domestic level, as well as the ability of domestic institutions to shape and
mediate external forces. Adopting the three theoretical lenses discussed in this thesis allowed us to examine elements which could also have been acknowledged had we adopted, for instance, a meso-level framework. Not only was it possible to confirm the usefulness of international relations theory (including international regime policy theory) when applied to the transnational issue of anti-doping in sport. Additionally, future implications of using this theory as a tool to conceptualise the development of elite sport policy have been discussed. These considerations will clearly assist others applying international relations theories when exploring new areas of (domestic) sport policy research. Thus, our initial premise, that realism and neoliberalism within international relations theory act as complementary paradigms can be confirmed, and it is suggested that the international relations theory may be able to investigate areas in sport policy where generating global principles, norms and values are unlikely.

When taking into account of the second considerations of this research, it is reasonable to suggest that this study has made substantial contributions to developing the understanding of sport policy in Japan. This is especially true with regard to the Japanese sport policy field, where sociology of sport, historic analysis of sport and sport management tend to embrace sport policy as their broad research interests. We have previously implied that having UK/English cases as points of reference increased our sensitivity towards Japan where sport policy research is somewhat absent. It was especially significant to enhance our refinement of the research approach and the analytical, or critical, view of the researcher's own country. Despite the claim by Heidenheimer et al that "everyday comparison on public policies" (1990: 1) could reflect policy-making practices, it was possible to guide our analysis in a way that identified the distinctiveness of things like institutional or administrative arrangements and patterns of interorganisational resource dependencies.

This research attempted to analyse the two different elite sport systems and anti-doping policies of Japan and the UK/England within the theoretical frameworks of international relations, international policy regimes and globalisation. Examining the intersections between global and national/local has been enabled us to explore 'enabling' and 'constraining' global and national factors in a precise manner. Future investigations will be required to refine theoretical applications to the field of sport policy with respect to the actual operationalisation and delivery of sport policy in Japan and the UK/England. It is anticipated that this work will inform policymakers and managers, particularly in Japan, to design a much more accountable sport structure.
8.6 Summary

It has been argued that the selected sport policy cases of elite sport and anti-doping in Japan and also the UK/England provide a substantial external influence on the development of national policy. Furthermore, the mechanisms by which domestic and non-domestic factors intersect show multi-layered complexities. Given the current increased value placed on winning medals at the Olympic Games, the multiplicity of actors found in domestic, international and global sporting domains, and the global disapproval of doping, the questions posited in the research were vital in examining how non-domestic forces impacted on the development of national sport policy. They were additionally useful in uncovering the mechanisms of intersections, as precisely as possible, between the national and non-domestic forces, particularly with regard to the concept of global 'reach in' and 'reach out'.

On a general level of conducting research, it has become clear that careful considerations of philosophical perspectives steering the outcomes of research is imperative, and that a particular set of lenses have permeated the research strategy employed in this study. The intensive data analysis, which was guided by theoretical frameworks, was constantly revisited through discussions with the supervisor and peers. The dynamic interactions between national and global agents and structures were identified, although the boundaries between them were, at times, somewhat blurred. The analysis of 'action' or 'inaction' in policy was compared specifically in relation to the way in which elite sport and anti-doping policies were formulated. The development of elite sport policy in Japan and the UK/England was also indicative in such a sense that the elite sport actors from these two countries felt the constant necessity for performance improvements and refinement of elite sport structures, which was mainly directed from outside of their countries. As such, 'inaction' was not an option for the policy cases selected for study. However, from the general observation in this research, it is noted that a determination of success or failure at the Olympic Games may depend upon how elite sport support is delivered rather than what composes an elite sport structure. Nevertheless, identifying and refining the crossroads between global and national/local are required not only for our investigations into the possibilities of applying international relations theory to the study of sport, but also for increasing our understanding of the robustness of domestic institutionalised practices and the facilitating and constraining factors external to the policy area. This in turn enables us to show more rigor and sensitivity when considering the global sport policy field.


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## Appendix A: Interviews in the UK/England

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Interviews – situations where interviews took place / Author’s impressions</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.02.2007</td>
<td>Sport Coach UK, Official</td>
<td>Implementing the national coaching certificate, Level 1 certificate, in particular</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>In the SCUK meeting room at Loughborough University, we both sat in a sofa and discussed why and how the national coaching certificate was introduced and the significance of this certification system for maintaining the minimum standard in coaching across sport. She talked about SCUK’s target for having each NGB implement sport-specific UK Coaching Certificate but the response was slow in some NGBs. On the contrary, such sport body as the Football Association, which had a strong financial backbone, operates its coaching system and she mentioned it is increasingly difficult to make a consistent certification programme.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.02.2007</td>
<td>The Football Association, Senior Official</td>
<td>Implementation of E-learning in the FA; organising the training for coaches</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The interview took place in the FA headquarter and this FA Senior Official was willing to talk about how successful its coaching certificate system is. He mentioned that due to the size of the FA and football-related personnel, ‘E-learning’ has become one of the most successful coaching programmes. This programme seems also attracted the coaches from outside of the UK. This interviewee was confident of the programme and showed the FA’s organisational strengths compared to Sport Coach UK which is fairly a new with little influencing all NGBs.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.02.2007</td>
<td>English Institute of Sport, Performance</td>
<td>Based at one of the nine EIS Regional Centres; providing Performance</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>At an EIS Regional office, the interviewee described that Performance Lifestyle is growing in its significance as the ‘athlete-centred’ programme. She mentioned that education and personal life was previously ‘compensated’ by training and performances, but it is no longer the case in the current context. As an Olympian herself, she referred to her experience being a high performance athlete and said that she tried to understand where the athletes stand and provided constructive advice to them.</td>
<td>1h34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lifestyle Adviser</td>
<td>Lifestyle programme to World Class Podium athletes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28.02.2007</td>
<td>UK Sport Manager</td>
<td>Implementation of Performance Lifestyle programme with EIS advisers; keeping track</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Sat in a meeting room of UK Sport, the interview took place face to face. As this UK Sport Manager was involved in the implementation of Performance Lifestyle programme, he described the benefits of its programme. It was interesting to compare his account with the Performance Lifestyle Advisor in the previous day because the practical implementation is left to each advisor at a regional institute, while the funding is provided by UK Sport constraining what and how advisors can deliver the programme.</td>
<td>56m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Profile</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Duration</td>
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<tr>
<td>31.07 .2007</td>
<td>British Olympic Association, Senior Official</td>
<td>Overseeing the Pre-Games training camp; sitting on a number of BOA committees</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The interview was conducted at a restaurant in London sitting outside over lunch. He was quite relaxed and referred to his experiences both being an athlete and an administrator. As one of the senior officials long serving for the BOA, he stressed how the establishment of UK Sport influenced the structure of elite sport. In particular, he described the perceived antagonisms between the BOA and UK Sport and admitted that there are many occasions where the two central sporting bodies do not get along each other. This BOA official was also quite critical of how high performance athletes have been influenced by the funding introduced to them.</td>
<td>1h33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.08 .2007</td>
<td>EIS, Regional Manager</td>
<td>Overseeing one of the nine EIS regions; previously worked in a different sport body</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The phone interview was conducted – she was initially unavailable more than thirty minutes but, in the end, she was able to spare additional ten minutes for the follow-up questions over the phone. As the EIS regional manager, she showed her frustrations being in-between UK Sport and EIS staff. She mentioned that with the London 2012 awarded, various reviews have been taken place and now that EIS needs to provide the document to illustrate the necessity of funding and human resources, she feels that despite its ‘rationality’, all NGBs, based in one particular EIS, should work closely with the regional manager and EIS staff. The phone interview was not easy because it was not possible to see the face expressions of the interviewee although it was possible to understand her feeling from the changing tone of voice.</td>
<td>1h03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.08 .2007</td>
<td>EIS, Talent Identification Coordinator</td>
<td>Implementing TID Programme in some NGBs; conducting TID events across the UK</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal communication undertaken during the ‘Sporting Giants’ test event in Bath University – she was newly recruited when the TID programme was first implemented with the view of developing athletes for ‘less popular’ sport for London 2012. Because the test event was to identify talent for rowing, she mainly talked about how and why TID was introduced to rowing and the way she discusses the significance of TID with other NGBs. She was quite open talking about the process and values behind the TID programme in relation to the success in the host Games in 2012.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.08 .2007</td>
<td>GB Rowing Amateur Rowing Association, World Class Start (WCS) Coach</td>
<td>A national coach for junior-level rowers based at one of the national centres for rowing; conducting TID event in cooperation with EIS</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal communication undertaken during the ‘Sporting Giants’ test event in Bath University – he was busy coordinating the event but happy to talk about why GB Rowing introduced the TID programme by referencing to the then Performance Development Manager, Peter Shakespeare. This WCS coach mentioned that the influence of Shakespeare and his successful example brought from Australia were huge to develop the performance system in rowing. As one of the most successful sports in the UK, he implied the pressure GB Rowing is under for maintaining the international success.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.08 .2007</td>
<td>Youth Sport Trust, Senior Official</td>
<td>Overseeing the Multi-skills academy of YST and the newly introduced Junior Athlete Education Programme and National Talent Orientation Camp</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The interview took place outside of café at Loughborough University over lunch. She was quite happy answering the questions raised during the interview. It was interesting to hear how the organisational relationships between different national sporting agencies constrain one another and, in particular, the way UK Sport puts pressure on NGBs to deliver their target. She emphasised the ‘independent’ position of Youth Sport Trust and its growing influence in the areas of school sport and junior development in sport. Nevertheless, there was a general impression that the idea of how a ‘seamless developmental path to the podium from the playground’ works is still under discussion.</td>
<td>1h35m</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.09.2007</td>
<td>UK Sport, Senior Consultant</td>
<td>Implementation of talent identification and talent transfer programme in the UK</td>
<td>The meeting took place at UK Sport office and her junior staffs were also present. She was fine with the questions asked in the meeting. The meeting was mainly about the talent identification programme, which was newly introduced for the success of London 2012. Because this UK Sport senior official was from outside of the UK, she was quite critical of the system and said “ineffectiveness in the sport system” exists in the UK. Although the ideas and values of talent identification and transfer are quite new, she acknowledged the importance of coordinated work between the sport organisations, including universities. She mentioned that ‘recycling’ athletes from one sport to less popular sport would be one of the most effective ways of utilising the human resources for the success in high performance.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.11.2007</td>
<td>UK Sport Drug-Free Sport Directorate, Senior Official</td>
<td>Overseeing the anti-doping programme across different NGBs in the UK</td>
<td>Sat in UK Sport office, he originally planned to spare half an hour but was happy extending his time up to one hour. Because the announcement had already been made to create a new independent national anti-doping agency in the UK, he explained the very initial enthusiasms of government to learn the anti-doping activities in sport. This interviewee was very open to talk about the ‘perceived conflict of interests’ at UK Sport and discussions he had with the government about the establishment of an independent anti-doping agency.</td>
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</table>
## Appendix B: Interviews in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Interviews – situations where interviews took place / Author’s impressions</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>17/03</td>
<td>JASA Senior official</td>
<td>General Secretary of JASA, responsible for the development and reformation of Kokutai</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Sat at one of the corners of sport science archives, door is open and you can see officers passing by. He initially started talking along the line of questions that had already been given to him beforehand. He was quite honest about ineffectiveness of Kokutai in recent years and emphasised the necessity to reform it in order to regain its credibility.</td>
<td>1h16.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>17/03</td>
<td>JASA, Senior official from the Sport Science Research Group</td>
<td>Senior JASA official in charge of anti-doping activities; overseeing JASA’s sport science research, information and anti-doping activities. Member of JADA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Sat at one of the corners of sport science archives, he was honest in his opinion about JASA’s slow response to, and involvement in, anti-doping activities. During the interview, he drew on his experiences from his attendance to WADA meeting and emphasised the significance of Kokutai Anti-Doping tests introduced in 2003.</td>
<td>2h44.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>18/03</td>
<td>Competitive Sport Division, Anti-doping Specialist Officer</td>
<td>Serving Competitive Sports Division for more than 10 yrs; appointed as A-D Specialist Officer, attended WADA meeting in the early years</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The interviewee was introduced as his Mater programme student by one of the academics from Tsukuba University with whom the author has a good contact. The interview was conducted in a quiet meeting room at MEXT office sitting on sofa. There were some interruptions in the middle of the interview. He passionately explained about the activities undertaken by MEXT and he was confident in his job.</td>
<td>1h12.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>20/03</td>
<td>PE teacher at primary school in Nagoya City, Advisory Council member for MEXT</td>
<td>Head teacher of a primary school in Nagoya City; appointed as one of the Advisory Council members for MEXT</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>In a quiet head-teacher’s room on Sunday sitting on sofa. On the school walls, there are full of pictures and charts, one of which showed pupils’ achievement in skipping ropes to which Interviewee D was proud of as the head teacher because &quot;pupils started encouraging each other to achieve higher objectives&quot;. Interviewee D, provided his account of the revision of PE National Curriculum. Interviewee E, the junior high school PE teacher, explained about the discussions from the MEXT meeting on the revision of PENC. The two interviewees’ focus was practical and their issues, agendas and concerns were expressed to consider pupils’ experiences in PE and sport in schools.</td>
<td>3h22.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>22/03</td>
<td>Japan Sport Arbitration Agency (JSAA), Senior member</td>
<td>A lawyer and university academic being one of the proactive members for JSAA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>At the top floor of his law firm in a quiet meeting room. The interview started in a very nervous way because the author was late for the meeting as she had waited for the interviewee at the Japan Sport Arbitration Agency office in Yoyogi (Tokyo), the wrong place. However, the interview went quite depth in terms of 'protection' of athletes.</td>
<td>56.30m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>23/03</td>
<td>JISS, (then) Senior official</td>
<td>Chair of various ACHPE and MEXT committees; one of the active members for introducing toto; influenced the establishment of JISS and NTC</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>In a quiet Director's room sitting on sofa, face-to-face. He was relaxed, smiling, telling what he knew about the history of Japanese sport. His memory was not so clear as he mixed up some years. However, with his long experiences in the past, his historical account on sport was important as he examined the issue both being an insider and outsider.</td>
<td>1h51.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>23/03</td>
<td>JISS, Senior research member of Information Strategy Dept</td>
<td>In charge of information strategy, working in close collaboration with the JOC and the Competitive Sports Division of MEXT</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Sat in a meeting room but we can hear voices from next door as the room was not completely separated by wall but the temporary wall partition divided the meeting room and office space. He had to rush off for a meeting in the middle of the interview but continued our conversation afterwards. He prepared the PowerPoint slide about what it means to understand 'intelligence' in sport or elite sport policy. During the interval between the interview, the Interviewee H made a presentation to one of the prefectural Physical Education Associations and there was an opportunity to observe the issues found in sport and organisational structure.</td>
<td>1h25.54 Plus 52.51m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>23/03</td>
<td>JADA, Senior official</td>
<td>Long-involvement in Anti-Doping activities</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Only Interviewee J initially attended the interview as the interview plan. However, Interviewee J thought it would be much better to have Interviewee I to join because of some historic account to be explained on anti-doping activities. Interview I sometimes showed his anger and frustrations towards the reluctance of the Japanese government in anti-doping policy, especially towards the allocation of budget. He left the meeting in the middle but the author carried on the interview with J.</td>
<td>2h15.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>23/03</td>
<td>JADA, Senior official</td>
<td>Inaugural member of JADA; working closely with Interviewee R and with Tokyo WADA Office</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Sat in the corner of JADA's office and he had to go and pick up phone during the interview. At the beginning, the author had an impression that the Interviewee J was not bothered to talk about his work and the values and attitudes of Japan towards global anti-doping policy but he gradually showed his passion when we had conversation about the values of sport and 'play fair' and the educational aspects of anti-doping.</td>
<td>2h15.08 Plus 25.24m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>24/03</td>
<td>ICSSPE, honorary member</td>
<td>Retired academic with a longstanding involvement in the research on the development of PE and sport in schools</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Interview took place in a café close to Interviewee K's home. It was so easy to hear clattering sound and chatting voice behind us, where we talked over coffee and cake. He seemed happy to be asked a lot of questions with regard to his involvement in ICSSPE and provided vast knowledge on the development of PENC.</td>
<td>2h42.09 Plus 20.37m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>29/03</td>
<td>Nippon Taiiku University, Academic researcher</td>
<td>Academics in sport policy and sociology of sport; senior member for the Japan Sport Sociology Association (JSSA) Senior</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A brief interview at JSSA's Conference in a staff meeting room. A depth conversation was not possible as he was busy with the Conference as a senior member. We had a brief talk with regard to the development of PENC and sport in Japan.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| M | 01/04 | JOC, Senior member | Senior member of the JOC Information Strategy on a ‘voluntary’ basis; involved in the development of JOC Gold Plan and evaluation criteria for NFs | M | In his office at the university, door opened, it was possible to hear the conversation from outside of the office. In a relaxed atmosphere, the Interviewee M mentioned the content of his work at the JOC in depth. In particular, the process of developing the JOC Gold Plan and the activities of information strategy at the JOC. He was happy providing all documents related to elite sport development and the report published by the JOC. There were some interruptions because the phone went ringing in the middle of the interview but overall the interview went interactive. | 2h34.17
Plus 35.53m |
<p>| N | 01/04 | JOC, Member | Member of Information Strategy and the development of universities-link at the JOC; conduct athletes-support programme | M | As the interview went on with Interviewee M, M called his colleague, Interviewee N, to join the interview on the topic of holistic network relations on sport. The interview was constructed around the points of how the sport-related agencies collaborate each other to have a comprehensive support system for elite athletes. As the Interviewee N has been involved in the motivational programme for the JOC, it was possible to discuss how sport system in Japan influences the development of athletes. | 1h05.18 |
| O | 02/04 | Tsukuba University, Member of Physical Education National Curriculum Committee for MEXT | Chair of PENC Committee of MEXT; heavily involved in the development of PENC | M | In his crowded office and the interview was face-to-face. However, unfortunately, in this compact office, the author could not stand for smoke as Interviewee O was smoking throughout the interview. He started being frustrated with my framework as I was asking all the historical account/development of PENC. He even suggested focusing only on some historic accounts of PENC, otherwise, he said “it would not be possible to explain about the changing significance of PENC”. He went on describing the development of PENC and how discourse changed because of changing significance of PE in education system. Due to the socio-economic development in Japan, he also described how the association of PE with military disappeared but ‘liberalist’ idea took over after the World War II. It was stressed that the content and ideas of PENC has been influenced by the United States in the early years but in more recent years, the influences were mixed learning from several other countries. | 2h06.07 |
| P | 04/04 | Japan Association of Athletics Federations (JAAF), Senior medical doctor | In charge of Anti-Doping in JAAF, JADA Doping Control Commission Vice-President | M | Met at his medical office. The Interviewee P was cheerful giving his understanding of anti-doping activities in Japan and showed his passion towards sport, especially ‘play fair’ sport. He was involved in the meeting for the Copenhagen Declaration and had holistic view of Japanese involvement in anti-doping as one of the biggest NFs in Japan. It has been stressed that Japanese athletes are ‘clean’ but ‘innocent’ so ‘cheating’ is not necessarily the problem for the sport in Japan. | 1h41.11 |
| Q | 05/04 | Japan Swimming Federation (JASF), Senior medical doctor | In charge of Anti-Doping in JASF, Member of JADA Doping Control Commission | M | The interview was conducted in a doctor’s shared office with some interruptions but it was mostly conducted in a quiet place. The Interviewee Q explained about the structures of JASF and FINA and how JASF is under the influence of FINA. He identified the significance of his predecessor involved in FINA and showed his frustration towards the reluctance in anti-doping activities found in the JASF Board members. He was willing to provide some photocopies of initial report and paper on anti-doping. | 2h23.59 |
| R | 06/04 | JOC &amp; JADA, Senior member sitting on the Board | A board member of the JOC, involved heavily in the development of the JOC Gold Plan and JISS; Board member of JADA and actively involved in WADA | Sat in a busy café and interviewed over lunch. There were many noise around us and interruptions were made as we sat in a café. In particular, when Interviewee S happened to sit next to us for lunch, the conversation did not go smoothly. At the beginning, the Interviewee R was not so interested in the interviewee content, but as the discussion heated up, he started talking about his idea of elite sport more openly. There was a general impression that because he is heavily involved in sport policy, or national programme for sport, in Japan, more time in a quiet place was required for the next round of interview. | 53.38m |
| S | 06/04 | Tsukuba University, Academic researcher in PENC | International contact in Japan for development of PENC | The interview was conducted in his office and the Interviewee S was very talkative of his subject area. He was quite natural in giving depth understanding of how PENC was developed in accordance with the development of education policy in Japan. His attitude was supportive towards the interviewer and helpful in providing the written materials. Even after dinner, we had discussions about how sport is conducted in both Japan and the UK. | 2h43.52 |
| T | 07/04 | Tsukuba University, Academic researcher | Senior researcher for MEXT Promotion of Health and Sport Science Research Programme at Tsukuba University | In his office, having coffee sitting on a sofa face-to-face. The Promotion of Health and Sport Science Research, one of MEXT's global programmes for 21st century called &quot;Centre of Excellence (COE)&quot;, was awarded to Tsukuba University and Interviewee T was one of the senior researchers for this project. He mentioned how academic field contributes to the development of health and sport activities into the 21st century. There were some interesting conversations as COE was new strategy set by MEXT but he was quite critical of the sectionalism found in the university which distract from giving attention to good research. | N/A |
| U | 07/04 | Tsukuba University, Academic researcher on the development of sport | Senior academic in the filed of sociology of sport; a member of Sports Promotion Fund at NAASH | Interviewee U sat in his office chair and the interviewer sat in the sofa where we had some distance each other. He started being very critical of the sport policy in Japan and gave an impression to the author that the 'sport policy' does not almost exist, especially due to a long-standing confusion between 'sport' and 'physical education'. At the same time, with his involvement in various governmental committees and meetings, he implied a fragmented organisational sport structure in Japan. | 1h16.04 |
| V | 12/04 | JOC, Senior member | Senior JOC member for the development of elite athletes; Director of talent identification programme for the JOC | We met in his office in a friendly atmosphere although there was some noise outside where students were passing by. Interviewee V showed his passion about talent identification and development because he believes that TID programme can provide the opportunity to flourish each child's abilities and potentials. On the contrary, he was critical of the limited funding from the government and restricted way of using government-related resources. He gave a very informative observation for how sport structure in Japan does not meet the international 'standard'. | 1h42.17 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16/08 10:30</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Chair of various ACHPE and MEXT committees; one of the active members for introducing toto; influenced the establishment of JISS and NTC</td>
<td>Met in a quiet meeting room at the 10th Floor of the Japan Football Association, face to face. There was a relaxed atmosphere and the answer provided by Interviewee G was much more constructive compared to the first time. It seemed that he was not as restricted in what he could say as before. Interviewee G reiterated and refined some answers that he made last time and gave critical views on elite sports and how it is organised in Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/08 13:00</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Competitive Sports Division, Senior official</td>
<td>Overseeing Competitive Sports Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/08 16:00</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Competitive Sports Division, Senior official</td>
<td>Senior official working under Interviewee W; in charge of overseeing the sport agencies’ activities and progress of elite sport development; involved in setting the evaluation criteria for distribution of funding to NFs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/08 10:00 &amp; 19/08</td>
<td>AA</td>
<td>JISS, Senior official; Executive Member of NAASH</td>
<td>A senior JISS official; previously worked for the then PE Bureau and JASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/08 16:00</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>NAASH, Board member</td>
<td>Ex-bureaucrat of Competitive Sports Division; currently responsible for NAASH funding, including toto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1h12.16</td>
<td>1h42.26</td>
<td>1h36.33</td>
<td>1h24.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>18/08 14:00</td>
<td>Competitive Sports Division, Specialist Anti-Doping Office</td>
<td>Supporting staff for anti-doping programme and working in close collaboration with JADA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>19/08 13:00</td>
<td>JISS, Senior research member of Information Strategy Dept</td>
<td>In charge of information strategy, working in close collaboration with the JOC and Competitive Sports Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>22/08</td>
<td>JOC, Senior member of JOC Information Strategy</td>
<td>Working on ‘volunteer’ base for the JOC Information Strategy; involved in a project on the collaborations between ‘similar-type sport’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| M | 24 & 25/08 | JOC, Senior member | Senior member of the JOC Information Strategy on a 'voluntary' basis; involved in the development of JOC Gold Plan and evaluation criteria of NFs | Because this was the second round interview, it was conducted in such a relaxed atmosphere. Firstly, we had lunch updating each other's work and came back to his office for the interview, although there were many interruptions with the students visiting him the office.

When he clarifies various points on sport and sport policy with the author, he gave a very instructive viewpoint of the JOC. During the interview, informal conversations over lunch became useful, especially about the changing arguments of elite sport after the 'successful' Athens Games. After Athens, the JOC has reviewed the JOC Gold Plan and he gave the very insight of what went on, why and how.

Interviewee M mentioned to the author that the focus of the interview was "much clearer" than the previous time. He kindly provided all materials from the JOC, most of which were not publically available. |
| R | 26/08 12:00 | JOC & JADA, Senior member sitting on the Board | A board member of the JOC, involved heavily in the development of the JOC Gold Plan; Board member of JADA and actively involved in WADA | Sat for interview over lunch in a restaurant close to his university where we can hear the conversation from the table next to us. In the middle of the interview, there was a phone call and Interviewee R had to stand up.

He was more relaxed than the previous time as it seems he was not so in a hurry. He answered questions one by one, but when questions were clarified by the interviewer, it seemed that the clarifications and explanations were not well enough and there was a general impression that he was not satisfied with the explanations. Yet, overall, he was polite and sincere to answering questions. It became clear that he has been at the center of the JOC's strategic planning and directly negotiates with MEXT. He also showed his interests in the sport policy and system in the UK and asked the author in turn to report. |
| DD | 08/12 | JOC, Member | Involved in the development of coaching system at the JOC on a 'voluntary' basis | On his visit to the UK, Interviewee DD was available for interview for less than half an hour. With his involvement in setting up a national coaching academy, he came to examine the system in the UK and how Japan can learn from the system the UK has implemented. He mentioned that the development of coaching system, or the development of coaches, is one of the areas in sport that Japan is behind, because coaches have their 'castles' to protect his/her coaching style. |

3rd Round Interview in 2006

| EE | 10/05 | Fukuoka Talent Identification Programme, Senior member of Fukuoka TID Programme at ACTION | Inaugural member of Fukuoka TID Programme and in charge of implementation and monitoring the Programme | Initially, there were information exchanges of the progress of TID programmes in the UK and Fukuoka as requested by the ACTION staff. Because Fukuoka is the very first prefecture in Japan to implement the TID programme, it was clear that the Interviewee EE looked around the 'successful' example in other countries in collaboration with JISS. It was interesting to gain the values in sport policy at the prefectural-level. |
| AA | 17/05 | JISS, Senior official; Executive Member of NAASH | A senior JISS official; previously worked for the then PE Bureau and JASA | Much relaxed atmosphere than the first interview and the interview was again conducted in his Director's office. He emphasised the significance of understanding of sport, mainly interpreted as 'Physical Education', rather than 'sport'. On this point, some fragmented organisational structure in sport was strongly criticised by Interviewee AA. | 1h33m |
| FF | 19/05 | Competitive Sports Division, Junior official | Junior staff of Competitive Sports Division working in a number of government projects, including the monitoring of the JOC's progress in TID programme | Sat for interview over lunch and talked through various schemes of government. As Interviewee FF is a junior staff who conducts daily work with the JOC and NFs, it was interesting to observe different standpoint from the senior officials, like Interviewees W and X. He was unsure of how talent identification will be developed in the future. | N/A |
| J  | 22/05 | JADA, Senior official at JADA | Inaugural member of JADA; working closely with Interviewee R and with Tokyo WADA Office | After attending the National Coaches Summit in the previous day, Interviewee J agreed to have an interview for the second time. He talked the fast-moving progress in anti-doping programme in Japan and started mentioning "what has changed from the last time we talked". In general, Interviewee J provided much more positive account than the last time in terms of the progress in anti-doping policy in Japan and the Japanese international contributions to WADA. It was sometimes difficult to listen to him due to the interview situation, undertaken at JISS dining room. | 35m23 plus 1h 04m |
| GG | 22/05 | JISS, Senior official at Sports Science and Medical Division | Coordinates the activities in JISS as a medical doctor; also act as a member of JADA | Personal communication – exchanged some information with regard to the elite sport structure in general and how anti-doping programme has been implemented in both Japan and the UK. The Interviewee GG explained about how ineffective JISS can be due to the internal politics should be subject to reform. | N/A |

4th Round Interview in 2007

| CC | 23/03 | JOC, Senior member of JOC Information Strategy | Working on 'volunteer' base for the JOC Information Strategy; involved in a project on the collaborations between 'similar-type sport' | There was a long discussion about how sport in Japan is organised and structured. In along with the questions raised, Interviewee CC was open about the criticisms raised inside the JOC, but he finds the inherent problem exists in the sporting structure in Japan. He was very relaxed, which made the semi-structured interview productive. | 1h08m |
| HH | 29/08 | Competitive Sports Division, Non-career senior official | Non-career senior official with a long involved in elite sport policy development and anti-doping | Sat in an open floor at the Competitive Sports Division, Interviewee HH talked about how the Japanese sport is structured and how elite sport programme has been funded by the Competitive Sports Division. With his long engagement in the Competitive Sports Division, he feels that Japan is 'behind' other developed sporting countries like the UK. He stressed the significance of the newly-introduced 'multi-support programme' from 2008 in order to prioritise some sports and provide specialist support and science and medical staff to those prioritised NFs. | N/A |
| H | 22/09 | JISS, Senior research member of Information Strategy Dept | In charge of information strategy, working in close collaboration with the JO and Competitive Sports Division | M | We met in his office and talked through the recent development of elite sport structure. It was possible to observe how the issues in elite sport have been changed and how the relationships between those agencies involved in elite sport (i.e. MEXT, JOC and JISS) have been changed after the establishment of JISS. It has been expressed that with more funding made available to elite sport system, those agencies needed to collaborate more. He was open to questions as before, but more analytical than before due to the successful development of TID Programme and how he thinks this would influence the elite sport system in Japan. | N/A |
Appendix C: An Example of the Interview Schedule in the UK/England

Interview questions for the EIS Regional Manager

1) Background & Responsibilities
   - Previous responsibility and the current responsibility – when started working for EIS

2) EIS – organisational relationship/ elite sport actors and organisations
   - How do you perceive the changing feature and the role and responsibilities of organisations in the UK?
     ➢ Complexity in relationships / “streamlined responsibility”? – UK Sport, EIS, BOA, Sport England, Youth Sport Trust etc? – Who has responsibility for what…?

3) Developing and supporting elite athletes
   - How would you observe the development of ‘elite sport policy’ over the last 20, 10 years or so?
   - How the existence of specialist sport institutes / UK Sport has impacted or changed the way athletes prepare themselves for the Olympic Games or major World Championships?
   - How do you perceive that elite sport development is becoming internationalised?
   - Any international pressure to provide better support, better success/ achievement?
     ➢ Is there any learning processes from abroad or information sharing undertaken?
     ➢ Is there any pressure to identify the cutting-edge approach, which would make difference from other rival countries?
   - Why and how the TID programme has become important in the recent years and what would you think of legitimacy over LTAD model?

4) Development of anti-doping policy
   - How rigorous do you think the UK’s national anti-doping programme/ policy is?
   - How do you think the establishment of WADA and World Anti-Doping Code has shaped the domestic policy, including the policy direction of UK Sport?
   - Do you find any pressure to comply with WADA/ Code through your work?
   - What do you think that athletes, coaches or officials feel pressured to follow in certain way and how you ensure athletes are in compliance?
   - How the government is involved in the educational activities on anti-doping?
Appendix D: An Example of the Interview Schedule in Japan

Development of elite sport policy in Japan: Interview for C

1) General overview for the development of elite sport policy in Japan
- How the development of elite sport policy occurred and what are the changes in policy over the last 20 years?
- What would be the evidence for such change – the extent of allocated budget or resources?
- How state supports the development of elite athletes? – by developing facilities, allocation of budget in a prioritised way, or the creation of competitive sport section?
- Why the significance of elite sport has become more important – is it due to: the accumulation of pressure outside; sense of crisis; effective lobbying from the national sport actors; or the influence of an influential politician or sport personnel?
- How and why the government has found the elite sport is important? – were there any lessons learnt from other countries or was it necessary to be a strong sporting nation as a host country for an international sport competition?

2) Process of the development of the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Sports (2000) and its impact
- What was the background of publishing the Basic Plan?
- Were there any model to draft the Basic Plan and any research was taken place abroad?
- Why it was drawn up around this time?
- How does MEXT perceive each pillar of the Basic Plan: life-long participation in sport, the increase of competitiveness at international level in sport and linkage between life-long participation, elite sport and school participation?

3) Developing and supporting elite athletes
- How would you observe the development of ‘elite sport policy’ over the last 20, 10 years or so?
- Is there any governmental funding available to elite athletes? If yes, what are the criteria and requirements for being funded; if not, are there any intentions to support elite athletes by providing funding?
- Why both toto and the Sport Promotion Fund were introduced?
  - Where did the idea come from; how does both funding function?
  - Are there any criteria for subsiding sport (i.e. life-long participation, elite sport and school sport)?
- Where did the ideas of establishing the JISS and the National Training Center come from – how MEXT funded the project and support the idea of centralised training system?
- How the existence of specialist sport institutes (JISS and National Training Center) has impacted or changed the way athletes prepare themselves for the Olympic Games or major World Championships?
- How do you perceive the changing feature/ nature of "elite sport community" and the role and responsibilities of organisations in Japan? What caused the change?
- Any international pressure to provide better support, better success/ achievement?
  - Is there any learning processes from abroad or information sharing undertaken?
  - Is there any pressure to identify the cutting-edge approach, which would make difference from other rival countries?
The Basic Plan made an obligation for NFs to create a scheme for a unified coaching system – what was the background of making it as an obligation?

Why and how the TID programme has become more important in the recent years and what would you think of legitimacy over LTAD model?

How do you perceive that elite sport development is becoming internationalised?

How does MEXT/government perceive the hosting international sporting competitions/conference?

4) Relations between school sport and elite sport development

How the significance of school sport (PE) has been changed in relation to the development of elite athletes?

What kind of influence is there on PE, PE National Curriculum and school sport (extra-curricular activities)?

Governmental involvement in the Anti-Doping Movement

How did the Anti-Doping issue become the domestic policy matter?

What stimulated the introduction of anti-doping policy/activities?

When did the debate for the introduction of anti-doping policy started?

What kind of discussions were there?

How important is the anti-doping matter at the governmental level?

How has it become more important?

Where did the pressure come from – were there any real push from the government as the high priority policy issue?

How rigorous do you think the Japanese national anti-doping programme/policy is?

How do you think the establishment of WADA and the World Anti-Doping Code has shaped the domestic policy, including the development of JADA?

How does MEXT perceive the introduction of the World Anti-Doping Code?

Do you find any pressure to comply with WADA/WAD Code through your work?

What kind of actions taken place after the introduction of the World Anti-Doping Code?

How is the government/MEXT involved in WADA and the global anti-doping movement?

What roles did MEXT take for signing the World Anti-Doping Code? What kind of initiatives Japan has taken for the global anti-doping movement and why?

How was the government involved in the establishment of the WADA Asia/Oceania Office – were there any bidding?

What are the financial contributions to WADA Asia/Oceania Office?

What kind of debate took place to the establishment of Asia/Oceania Office in Tokyo?

What is the relationship between JADA and MEXT?

What are the financial contributions to JADA; why the government invests in the anti-doping matter?

How JADA perceives the government's values in anti-doping?

What do you think that athletes, coaches or officials feel pressured to follow in certain way and how you ensure athletes are in compliance?

How the government is involved in the educational activities on anti-doping?
Appendix E: Examples of correspondence for a potential interviewee in the UK/England and Japan

FAX Front Page Template

Institute of Sport & Leisure Policy
School of Sport & Exercise Sciences
Loughborough University
Leicestershire
LE11 3TU
UK

Date

xxx 様

title

添付された FAX をご覧下さい。
Please kindly find the attached FAX letter.

Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy
FAX letter for setting up an interview

FAX

xxx 様
title
FAX number

Direct Line: +44 (0)1509 226362
Fax: +44 (0)1509 223935
E-mail: M.Y.Yamamoto@lboro.ac.uk
yamomotoyaya@yahoo.co.jp
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/isses/institutes/salp/index.html

Date

xxx 様

はじめまして。私はイギリスにあります Loughborough(ラフバラ)大学の Institute of Sport & Leisure Policy という研究所で、博士課程に所属しイギリスと日本のスポーツ政策を専攻しているものです。国際スポーツ機構と国内の機構との関わりについて研究テーマとして調べています。そこで、xxx(name and title) and areas of interview topics でアンチ・ドーピングへの取り組みについてお話を伺いできたらと思います、FAX を差し上げております。

調査のため、3月半ば(17日以降)から4月の半ばにかけて日本へ一時帰国する予定でいます。3月16・18・23・28・29日以外は現在のところ何も予定が入っていませんので(potential interview dates)、是非先生にお時間をお取り願えないでしょうか。

上記のメールアドレス、もしくは FAX 番号へ返送していただけると幸いです。内容について詳しいアウトラインが必要なようでしたら、お教えください。お忙しい中恐縮ですが、どうぞ宜しくお願い致します。

それでは FAX にて失礼します。

山本 真由美

Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy
Email letter sent to potential interviewees

Dear xxx,

My name is Yaya Yamamoto from the Institute of Sport & Leisure Policy of Loughborough University. Currently, I am undertaking the research on the development of elite sport policy in the UK.

I am wondering if I could possibly be able to ask for your time to interview you (30-40 min at most) for my research. The areas of the interview questions will mainly be about why and how the government invests in sport and why elite sport policy has become an interest of the government. In addition, there will be a specific focus on the relationship between the UK's elite sport development and the non-domestic factors.

The interview time/date will be suited to your availability.

Please kindly let me know if you need further information and I would be happy to send you the specific questions I would be asking you.

Thank you again for your kind cooperation for the research.

With kind regards,

Ya-ya Yamamoto

Institute of Sport & Leisure Policy
Loughborough University
01509 22 6362

xxx 様

はじめまして。私はイギリスにあります Loughborough(ラフバラ)大学の Institute of Sport & Leisure Policy という研究所で、博士課程に所属しイギリスと日本のスポーツ政策を専攻しているものです。国際スポーツ機構と国内の機構との関わりについて研究テーマとして調べています。そこで、xxx(name and title) and areas of interview topics アンチ・ドーピングへの取り組みについてお話をお伺いできたらと思い、Email を差し上げております。

調査のため、(potential interview dates)、是非先生にお時間をお取り願えないでしょうか。本メールアドレス、もしくは FAX 番号へ返送していただけると幸いです。内容について詳しいアウトラインが必要なようでしたら、お教えいただけますと幸甚です。大変のお忙しい中恐縮ですが、どうぞ宜しくお願い致します。

山本 真由美