Western perspectives on ethnic politics

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Ethnic politics in the Cold War

Despite some federalist hopes and dreams, the post-war international order was rebuilt on the basis of nation states and their mistrust of minority rights.\(^1\) Ethnic ties and ethnic claims were viewed with particular suspicion because they seemed to threaten national sovereignty and cohesion. Ethnic homogeneity, as Inis Claude wrote in 1955, ‘frequently appeared as a value in itself’\(^2\). The founding fathers of the United Nations certainly had no interest in strengthening the ability of ethnic minorities to resist assimilation.\(^3\) Indifference or hostility towards collective minority rights – the obverse of the ‘strange triumph of Human Rights’\(^4\) – can also be seen in the peace settlement. In contrast to the treaties signed after World War I, Western governments followed what one British official called ‘the general policy to avoid laying down any minority rights in this peace settlement’\(^5\). There was no restoration of the (limited) possibilities of appeal which had been enjoyed under the League of Nations.\(^6\) The provisions for autonomy to the South Tyrol German-speaking population agreed in 1946 and incorporated into the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty were extensive on paper but there was little international interest in ensuring that Italy implemented them. Similarly, the protection for Austria’s Slovenes and Croats laid down in the 1955 Austrian State Treaty was not followed up with any energy by the four signatory powers.

This attitude is not hard to understand. Even in World War I treaties, Britain and France, as status quo powers, had seen minority rights as a dangerous Pandora’s box.\(^7\) The experience of Hitler hardened this view so that at the end of the war, in Claude’s words, ‘statesmen, generally backed by a public opinion which was deeply impressed by the perfidy of irredentist and disloyal minorities, were disposed to curtail rather than to expand, the rights of minorities’.\(^8\) The failure of appeasement and the Munich agreement were taken as conclusive proof that the only way to ‘deal with dictators’ was to stand up to them.\(^9\) This perspective, though understandable, was selective in that it focused exclusively on Chamberlain’s diplomatic miscalculations and its exploitation by the predatory Nazi ‘kin-state’. That obscured the underlying, ‘transferable’ element of the ‘Munich problem’ – the reconciliation of minority rights and state cohesion in an ethnically diverse society. Thanks to Hitler and the Sudeten German Party, most post-war claims to minority rights risked being dismissed as
pretexts for subverting the state: the perspective was summed up by the belief that ‘every protected minority will ultimately find its Henlein’

Of course, the turn against minority rights and ethnic claims went deeper than this shamefaced memory of Munich. The very idea of basing collective claims on a supposed community of descent was now indelibly marked by Nazi racism and genocide. Even if racism was hardly absent in post-war Europe, the overt use of the language of racial superiority and anti-Semitism was thoroughly discredited. That made any hint that ethnic categories were being rehabilitated deeply suspect. Even non-dominant minorities who made no claims to racial superiority were open to the accusation that they were reopening ‘the race question’. Proponents of ethnic group rights lost most of the influence and standing they had enjoyed before the war. Individuals rather than groups were seen as the prime bearers of rights. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) laid down Educational rights in Article 26 in relation to educational opportunities and parental choice. It had nothing to say about the possibility that education might help minorities redress structural disadvantages in the cultivation of its language or culture. On this point, the Soviet Union, for all its theoretical adherence to Leninist principles of national autonomy and its advocacy of collective ‘social rights’, did not seem to disagree.

The norm of the nation-state was also embedded in Western perceptions of communist take-overs in Eastern Europe. Soviet domination came to be seen as a dual-linked oppression; both the rights of national self-determination and democratic rights were being trampled underfoot. As this view solidified, the exclusionary implications of ethnic nationalism were downplayed. In the echoes of the nineteenth-century liberal views of the Ottoman and Tsarist empires, Eastern European nations were seen as captive nations awaiting their moment of liberation.

The marginalization of ethnic explanations can be seen in the aftermath of the Yalta conference (February 1945). The attacks on the agreements were portrayed as a gross act of national betrayal and, like Munich before it, the betrayed nation was assumed to be a nation-state. Admittedly, Poland’s pre-war ethnic plurality, which provided the rationale for the revision of its Eastern borders, was used by Churchill in his House of Commons defence of
Yalta on his return. But this kind of argument was soon displaced by the extinction of Polish democracy and the alleged connivance of Western leaders in it. The continuing violence among Poles, Ukrainian and Lithuanians on Poland’s eastern borders received little attention, while the expulsion of the German population was reinterpreted as an ideologically motivated act. When Churchill returned to the subject in his “Iron Curtain” speech of March 1946, he fitted it into his warning message of the Soviet menace. Unlike his comments a year before, he made no mention of German racial persecution of Jews and Slavs as the context for the expulsion of the Germans. Neither did he discuss his own ambiguous role in the West’s acceptance of the necessity of the expulsions. Instead, he accused ‘the Russian-dominated Polish Government’ of making ‘enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany’, and instigating mass expulsions ‘on a scale grievous and undreamed of’. The city of Stettin (Szczecin) was not a site of ethnic interaction but the end point of the perimeter which marked the extent of Soviet encroachment. Behind the line lay Eastern Europe’s nations, referred to by Churchill as ‘ancient states’ with ‘their famous capitals and the populations around them’. Trieste, at the other end of the curtain, was also reframed. Here too Churchill had himself been instrumental in the process when he had successfully urged the US government to draw a line against any further advance of Yugoslav troops the previous summer. As a result, the city became an early Cold War hot spot rather than just another ‘ethnic squabble’. In Pamela Ballinger’s words, the ‘Anglo-American interpretation of the Italo-Yugoslav border dispute as a thinly veiled act of communist expansion prevailed over…competing interpretations emphasizing a complex history of nationalist contestation’.

This ‘de-ethnicisation’ can also be seen in another classic text of the early Cold War, the ‘Truman doctrine’ (March 1947). Truman’s speech was of course a decisive step in the globalization of US policy towards Soviet policy, and contained suitably Manichean rhetoric. Less often noted is the way Truman’s simplification downplayed ethnic dimensions of the crisis. By implication, the Greek nation under threat was ethnically homogeneous. Greek territorial claims (against Albania and ‘Yugoslav Macedonia’) or Greek proposals ‘to rid themselves of disloyal Slavophone elements’ (estimated at half the population of 60,000) in exchange for around 20,000 Greeks (now in Bulgaria) were not mentioned and the ethnic grievances raised by the Yugoslav government were seen as mere
The State Department corrected its envoy (Mark Ethridge) in order to make ‘a clear-cut distinction between general conditions... which make possible or serve as pretexts for frontier violation and actual direct causes and responsibility for such violation’. Using internal conditions in one country to justify territorial violations would be ‘clearly contrary’ to the UN Charter. Officials were concerned that the ‘occurrence of a large number of typical Balkan border incidents should not be allowed to divert attention from the systematic aggressive policies’ of Greece’s three communist neighbours. Of course, in Greece, like in with Trieste, ethnic (and other) grievances were indeed being used by Yugoslavia. But the point here is that in the simple Cold War narrative, the exploitation was the main story, the grievances themselves were secondary issues.

This process also reinforced a straightforward ‘majoritarian’ understanding of democracy, in which a militant communist minority (supported by an international communist movement) was pitted against a unitary Greek nation. In this view, the party or parties with the most votes in election won the legitimate right to speak for the nation. If they proved fallible or became unpopular they could always be voted out of office. As Truman put it (conceding that ‘the Greek Government is not perfect’), one of the chief virtues of democracy was that ‘its defects are always visible and, under democratic processes, can be pointed out and corrected’. But this was precisely what was not possible in ethnically divided societies, where majority-minority relationship were structurally embedded so that ethnic competition became a ‘zero-sum conflict’.

Truman’s scenario of a world divided between despotism and democracy was sustained over the following decade by the prevailing totalitarianism model of communism. In the schematic presentation of the ‘syndrome’ presented by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the repression exercised by communist regimes was so overwhelming that it allowed almost no space for resistance. Not only that applied in the first case to the supposedly helpless and atomized individual but it also meant that the mobilization of collective identities, like nationalism or ethnicity, was also given little chance (although Friedrich and Brezinski did give consideration to the possibility of communist regimes using it to strengthen their hold on power). This lack of interest in nationalism even extended to Nazi Germany, the supposed comparator of the communist totalitarian state. The Nazi utopia of ‘the folk community’
was seen as the functional equivalent of the communist ‘world brotherhood of the proletariat’ both of them being means towards mass mobilization, but the actual target was on the left – ‘the classless society of the socialist tradition’.

On this analysis it was hard to see how communist rule might ever change, let alone collapse. So it is perhaps not surprising that little consideration was given to what a post-communist world might look like. Friedrich and Brzezinski gave merely a hint that they anticipated, on classical liberal lines, that liberated states would wish ‘to further understanding between nations’. This would mean the ‘possibility for peaceful coexistence of the nations peopling this world’.

Of course, neither the ethnic diversity of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Empire nor the resulting tensions were a secret, even if reliable information was not easy to get hold of. And the politics of the anti-communist refugees who had fled to the West suggested that showed that these tensions went too deep to be suppressed in the interests of anti-communist unity. In the case of the future of the territory to the east of the Oder–Neisse line, the ethnic conflict also involved the large Polish community in the United States, on the one hand, and the West German governments, on the other hand, which included the representatives of the expellee parties. US officials could hardly gloss over this difference although the unresolved legal status of the border meant they could allow German expellee politicians to believe that a restoration the 1937 borders was still possible. West German governments for their part practised what Pertti Ahonen has called a ‘juggling act’ between ‘the promotion of forward-looking, democratic values and structures’ on the one hand and ‘the pacification of compromised, discontented elements’ on the other. Other equally toxic ethnic difference continued to simmer in the diaspora: between Slovak separatists and Czechoslovak exile politicians over the future of Czechoslovakia; between Ukrainians and refugees from the Baltic states, who anticipated the ‘dismemberment’ of Russia, and former Vlassovite Russian nationalists on the other; last not least conflicts – sometimes violent – between Serb and Croat exile groups over the future existence of Yugoslavia or continuation of war time conflicts. US policymakers sought to defer any decisions on these differences until future liberation, in the meantime sticking to the notional return to Europe’s 1937 borders, and including Czechoslovakia, Russia and Yugoslavia in the list of captive nations.
The suppression of the Hungarian revolution made it clear any direct or military ‘liberation’ was highly unlikely. At the same time, after the death of Stalin, there was growing evidence that East European regimes were ready to diverge from Soviet instruction. Some Western observers began to wonder how much longer Soviet domination could last. In 1965, Ghita Ionescu argued that Stalin’s empire had already broken up since his successors were ‘incapable of imposing the kind of ideological uniformity and economic dominance he had’34. He also discussed nationalist grievances as ‘the most virulent motive of dissent’ against communist rule; there were two aspects to this: the resistance of a people which sees national sovereignty being curbed by ‘suzerain power’ and also the claims by ‘ethnic or regional groups...that the central administration oppresses or neglects them’35. Brzezinski, moving away from the schematism of the totalitarian interpretation, concluded that Eastern European states were moving from being satellites into the position of junior allies, while communist totalitarian rule was mutating into ‘domesticism’. He referred to Tito and Ceausescu, whose leadership was supported by a new generation of technocrats and managers, who were less ideologically purist than their predecessors. Brzezinski saw a danger in Western encouragement of anti-Soviet nationalist dictatorships unleashing xenophobia and ethnic conflict. For this reason he thought it would be shortsighted for the West to try to ‘ride the tiger’ of nationalism in the hope that it would threaten the Soviet-dominated world only.36 Other Western observers began to see the Soviet Union less as an implacable totalitarian enemy than as a manageable, if unpredictable competitor. One advantage of a Pax Sovietica was its ability to keep the tiger within bounds. Mark Kramer has referred to ‘the stabilizing effect of the Soviet military presence in Eastern and Central Europe [which] was widely taken for granted and even appreciated, at least tacitly’37.

[B] 2. The ‘ethnic revival’ in Western Europe

Downplaying ethnic claims and ethnic explanations was an (understandable) response to Nazi rule and reflected the polarizing logic of the Cold War. It was also in line with the prevailing theoretical assumptions of social sciences, which tended to see ethnicity as a vestigial phenomenon, or limited to traditional societies. To the ‘mandarins of the future’ its political importance in the Third World was as a potential obstacle in the ‘nation-building’, which was
meant both to strengthen resistance to communism and to create the basis for economic growth, perhaps even the ‘take-off’ envisaged in Walt Rostow’s well-known model of development. In some versions of modernization, ‘integration’ played a key role, acting as a glue which could achieve social cohesion in very different contexts. For advocates and students of European unity, integration involved the closer coordination of trade policy, the avoidance of any return to pre-war economic nationalism and, at the federalist end of the scale, the creation of supranational institutions or even a United States of Europe. Carl Friedrich, for example, wondered if those who were ‘unifying (and integrating) Europe’ could not be seen as ‘nation-builders’ no less than Nehru or those who try to weld tribes into nations. In the case of the influential political scientist Karl Deutsch, integration meant the process of ever intenser and denser communication, ultimately leading to a higher level of ‘community’. Deutsch’s scientific agenda had a political dimension, in which there was a progressivist teleology as well as a concern about the robustness of Western values in the face of the communist challenge. Though Deutsch certainly acknowledged the existence of inertial forces slowing down integration, he was generally confident that they would be overcome. The key question in relation to national-building was how nations ‘triumph over smaller units, such as tribes, castes, or local states, and more or less integrate them into the political body of the nation?’ At least before the revival of Gaullism in the 1960s, Deutsch considered the possibility that ‘a North Atlantic Community might develop between democracies on both sides of the Atlantic’. In this process there was in principle ‘no upper limit on the number of ethnic and linguistic groups that could be integrated’. Andre Markovits, a student of Deutsch, has aptly described him as an ‘eternal optimist’. That optimism has been viewed more critically by Michael Latham as the delusion that ‘the “traditional” world was plastic and malleable’, which led many social scientists ‘to overestimate their ability to redirect and channel nationalist forces’. 

In the course of the 1960s, modernizing confidence like this began to ebb and expectations were lowered. Outside Europe the unity of anti-colonial nationalist movements began to fracture after independence and, as in the case of Nigeria, state boundaries came under attack from secessionist movements. The view that ethnicity was only salient traditional societies was also undermined by its mobilization in industrial society, in combination with forms of unrest. In the United States, the reality and the desirability of the ‘melting pot’ was
questioned by African-Americans in the civil rights movement as well as immigrant groups resisting integration, at least on the terms that seemed to be on offer. The subject of ethnicity – and the word itself – spread throughout political and academic discourse. As it did, some of its students sought to decontaminate it, that is remove the taint of racism and right-wing extremism. For example, the sociologist Joshua Fishman argued that ‘while there is a racist potential in modern ethnicity that is not sufficient to dam the phenomenon’. In Western Europe the unequal treatment of post-war immigration led to social and ethnic (‘racial’) unrest among second-generation immigrants and undermined the prevailing complacent assumptions that racial conflict was a specific problem of the United States.

Perhaps most important here, there was an unexpected mobilization of ethnicity in Western Europe. The diversity of these ‘ethno-regionalist’ or ‘ethno-regionalist’ movements makes it hard to generalize about them. They included urban terrorists using Marxist slogans as well as neo-fascist groups; Basque militants opposed to Franco’s regime, Catholics demanding civil rights in Northern Ireland, Corsican protesters against French centralization and French-language separatists in the German-speaking Canton of Bern, to name only a few.

It is also difficult to locate these new movements in relation to the Cold War. On one interpretation they became possible because the East–West battle was becoming muted. Fear of communism as an ideology or of nuclear attack was declining within the post-war generation. Traditional party loyalties were being undermined by an unprecedented economic growth and the extension of welfare provision.

The emergence of ‘ethno-regionalist’ mobilization also directly contradicted Karl Deutsch’s observation that Western European nationalism had ‘settled down’. Critics of modernization theory like Walker Connor concluded that ‘ethnic consciousness, far from disappearing was “definitely on the ascendancy as a political force”’. He saw this as a refutation of the ‘American scholarship’ which had analyzed and dismissed ethnicity as a force in advanced industrial societies. On the contrary, it was an inevitable part of the processes of homogenization, urbanization and centralism. Increased communication had not destroyed ethnic difference but heightened consciousness of it and facilitated the mobilization against the unequal treatment of different ethnic groups.
The new ethnic mobilization also meant a challenge to Truman’s simple contrast between totalitarianism and democracy by claiming that the democracy which the West had been defending was far from perfect. To some critics this amounted to a rejection of liberal values and a covert attempt to reintroduce outlawed racialist categories into European politics. Samuel Salzborn has recently argued along these lines, claiming that ever since the end of the Third Reich a determined intellectual lobbying campaign had been waged by a determined network of activists, including several who had been complicit in National Socialism. Their aim was nothing less than the rehabilitation of an ethnicized political theory, which would eventually allow Europe to be reorganized along ‘organic’ ethnic lines. Ethnic groups rather than individuals would be the bearers of rights. By the 1960s, Salzborn argues, this lobbying activity had successfully permeated mainstream structures in Western Europe (in particular, the European federalist movement) and begun to undermine the civic, republican values which had underpinned Europe’s post-war territorial settlement.55

Though Salzborn is convincing in his exposé of the lineage of a part of the ethnic revival, he probably overstates its coherence and level of organization. But his identification of the post-war territorial and political territorial settlement as a target of the ‘ethnic revival’ points to the way ‘Yalta’ was now recoded, partly as an extension of de Gaulle’s (abortive) attempt to break through the supposed superpower Diktat and establish a ‘Europe of des patries’. One leading figure in the ethnic revival Guy Héraud looked forward to a Europe des ethnies. In this perspective Yalta symbolized not just Soviet imprisonment of nations (and western connivance in it) but the imprisonment of Europe’s diverse ethnic groups.56 Héraud, like Fishman thought it was time for ethnic movements to lose the stigma of Munich and the Sudeten Germans.

In elaborating this point others argued that the basic message of the new movements was emancipatory; their anti-statism was not an attempt to destabilize the post-war order but to supply the basic need for the warmth and Gemeinschaft, which had been ignored by centralization and homogeneity. For this reason, Fishman aligned them with the libertarian politics, which emerged from the ferment of the 1960s, including the hippies.57 Similarly, Anthony Smith sought to counter those who were ‘aghast at what appeared to be a revival of
“tribalism”...only ten or fifteen years after its apparent destruction in the bunker of Berlin.”\textsuperscript{58} He argued that the ethnic revival was part of a wider radical rejection of ‘the prevailing statist framework’ and a quest for more ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ forms of existence. He traced its pedigree back to the enlightenment and a ‘critical discourse, appealing to general principles like popular sovereignty, inalienable rights and cultural diversity’). Since the war many movements had undergone a ‘radical ideological metamorphosis’, which meant they were more likely to be on the left than on the right. In short, for Smith, this was a welcome grassroots revolt against the straightjacket imposed at Yalta.\textsuperscript{59}

Whether viewed critically or positively the ethnic mobilization of the 1970s had important implications for Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, especially if it was indeed a global phenomenon, as relevant for industrialized as for agrarian societies. But overall, most of its analysts stuck to Western Europe (apart from the occasional passing reference to the ‘Croatian Spring’). On the other hand, scholars of Eastern Europe or Soviet policy, although well aware of signs of disaffection or unrest, including some which would erupt 20 years later, were cautious about drawing wider conclusions, or seeing it as part of a systemic crisis. In fact, in the decade after the crushing of the Prague Spring, Soviet control of Eastern Europe stabilized and the cohesion of the Soviet Union was rarely questioned. Joseph Rothschild, who had a deep knowledge of Eastern Europe, saw a ‘historically ironic reversal’ of the inter-war situation, which meant that the challenge to state legitimacy in the West was now ‘potentially more serious than it was and at least as serious...as in the East European countries’ where (“with the possible exception of East Germany, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia”)...the other Communist states do not appear to be targets of domestic ethnopolitical repudiations and delegitimations as state entities.\textsuperscript{60} Several experts on Soviet society accepted the official estimate that, as Brezhnev proclaimed in 1972, the ‘nationality question’ had been ‘fully, definitively, and irreversibly resolved’.\textsuperscript{61} This perception was probably further reinforced by the dominant ‘neo-realist’ theories in International Relations, which privileged the international ‘system’ over the unit and saw the tendency towards an equilibrium between the two superpowers. In a notable hostage to fortune, its leading figure, Kenneth Waltz, made the production of ‘reliable and explanations or predictions’ a central criteria for the validity of a theory.\textsuperscript{62}
The Helsinki Final Act (1975) came close to the *de facto* recognition of the Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe, including the absorption of the Baltic States, even if it did not amount to the complete Western legitimation Soviet leaders were looking for. It kept open the possibility of peaceful reunification of Germany. In West Germany the Oder–Neisse border was now widely accepted as permanent and the increasing contacts between West Germany and Poland helped defused the issue. According to Levy and Dierkes, West German national identity gradually evolved from an ‘ethno-national idiom’ to an ‘economic identity’. Some even saw West Germany as the first ‘post-national’ society. The unexpected resurrection of human rights in the aftermath of Helsinki was driven by dissident groups in Eastern Europe rather than Western government. The Ford administration, in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, was not looking for reasons to intervene in Eastern Europe. In any case, Article VIII of Helsinki Final Act did not tread any new ground in terms of minority protection; it was conventional reiteration of the right of self-determination as well as the national sovereignty. The elision of human rights and minority rights came after the fall of communism, thanks to the interventionist policies of the OCSE and its High Commissioner on National Minorities.

A decade before the fall of the Berlin wall, minority protection, affirmative action, the right of secession, the validity and limits of liberalism and a host of other public policy and philosophical issues were being debated in the West. The academic study of nations and nationalism, which had been in the doldrums, moved up the academic agenda. Yet in the two most influential discussions, there was little indication of the developing crisis in central Europe. Benedict Anderson’s influential *Imagined Communities* (1983) took most of its contemporary examples from South America and South East Asia although there was a tangential reference to the difficulties facing Yugoslavia since Tito’s death (1980). Starting from a recognition of the greater durability and power of nationalism compared with Marxism, Anderson warned of the possibility of conflict in Eastern Europe between nationalistically minded Marxist regimes, giving Yugoslavia and Albania as examples. In contrast to Smith, Anderson also endorsed the stabilization achieved in Eastern Europe by the Red Army’s ‘overwhelming presence’, which had ‘ruled out armed conflict between the region’s Marxist regimes’. Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* (1985) was also only obliquely concerned with contemporary Central Europe even though one of his targets was
clearly a kind of national mythmaking, which was recognizably central European. His stress on the constructed or synthetic nature of nations, arising from the need of modern industrial organization for a codified homogeneous culture, was in principle equally relevant for civic nationalism as for ethnic: it could be achieved either by assimilation or by exclusion. But the debunking thrust of Gellner’s argument, for example, his dig at the peasant dress code of Budapest urban opera goers, was more relevant to ethnic-based claim to authenticity. Perhaps more striking is Gellner’s lack of concern about the destructive danger of nationalism. He refers dismissively to the ‘Dark Gods’ theory, which holds that nationalism is ‘the re-emergence of the atavistic forces of blood or territory’. Against this theory (the third of four ‘false theories’ of nationalism) he argues that

man of the age of nationalism is neither nicer nor nastier than men of other ages…His crimes…are more conspicuous only because, precisely, they have become more shocking, and because they are executed with more powerful technological means.

Five years later Gellner’s tone had changed. Addressing a (still) Soviet academic audience, he concluded that with the benefit of hindsight both Marxism and liberal social thought had ‘underestimated the political vigour of nationalism’. Whereas in 1985 Marxism had been one of his four false theories, now he explained that it shared the mistake of liberalism of assuming that ethnicity-like cultural differences ‘will go down the drain’ under the conditions of work in industrial society. Gellner concluded that contrary to both ‘Modern industrial High Culture is not colourless, it has an “ethnic” colouring, which is of its essence. Though Gellner was clearly greatly affected by the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe he was far from the rather apocalyptic interpretations offered by Michael Ignatieff.

Anthony Smith (Gellner’s former student) also recognized the relevance of the worsening situation for his stress on the primacy and historicity of ethnic identities. Initially he had greeted the Eastern European revolutions as the continuation of the emancipatory movement in western Europe. It meant that ‘the interventionist state’ had ‘rekindled among its ethnic minorities those aspirations for autonomy and even separation that had previously been
muted or repressed. Now he noted more sombrely that violence was the inevitable accompaniment of competing ethnic claims. He predicted that there could be ‘little escape from the many conflagrations that the unsatisfied yearnings of ethnic nationalism are likely to kindle.’


30 Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship*, 52, 68.


37 Kramer in Ther and Siljak, 7.


Deutsch, *Political Community*, 158.


60 Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, 17.


68 Stargardt, Gellner’s Nationalism, 176–7.


71 Gellner, *Encounters*, 37, 42.


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