Introduction: psychology and history – themes, debates, overlaps and borrowings [Psychology and History: interdisciplinary explorations]

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Introduction

Psychology and history: themes, debates, overlaps, and borrowings

Cristian Tileagă and Jovan Byford

The main concern of this book is with the possibilities for an interdisciplinary dialogue between psychology and history. At first sight it might seem obvious that psychology and history, as scholarly disciplines, have a lot in common. For one thing the two traditions of enquiry share, and are continuously brought into contact by their concern with the human condition: with individual and collective beliefs, mentalities, human behaviour and motivation, memory, personality, emotions and feelings. And yet the dialogue between the two disciplines has been, for the most part, sporadic and fraught with both theoretical and epistemological tensions.

Traditionally, both historians and psychologists have been aware of the need for a conversation with each other. Many historians have appealed for greater engagement with psychological literature. As the French historian Jean Chesneaux wrote, ‘social psychology and psychoanalysis add substantially to the historian's intellectual equipment and enable him [sic] to cope more effectively with problems of collective consciousness and mass mentality’.1 Historians of genocide and social conflict have similarly appealed for greater engagement with psychological literature, especially when researching topics such as memory, obedience, conformity or intergroup conflict.2 Meanwhile, the pioneers of the fields of psychohistory and psychobiography (which gradually developed throughout the 20th Century, mainly in the United States), sought to apply the tools of psychoanalysis and depth psychology to the study of historical figures, past events and collective behaviours.3 Equally, to many prominent psychologists, the engagement with history (and other humanities and social sciences) promised a way of undermining the rigid positivism that reigns within traditional academic psychology. Michael Billig, Kenneth Gergen and Serge Moscovici have all argued that psychology ought to be more attentive to the historical contingency of psychological phenomena and pay closer attention to the issue of how historical conditions, ideologies and cultural traditions produce and sustain particular forms of individual and collective thought and action.4

In spite of the increasing awareness that ‘history is far too important a matter to be left to the historians’ - and the same can be said to apply to psychology and psychologists - the conversation between the two disciplines has been anything but fluent.5 As Kenneth Gergen once observed ‘psychologists and historians have not

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1 J. Chesneaux, Past and Futures or What is History For (Thames and Hudson, 1978), p. 130.
5 Chesneaux, Past and Futures, p. 9.
always been congenial companions’. Mainstream academic psychology treats history with ‘little more than tolerant civility.’ Psychologists may ‘scan accounts of earlier times’, but only in the quest for ‘interesting hypotheses and anecdotes’, or for confirmation that the results of systematic and controlled empirical research have a wider currency and the much coveted ‘ecological validity’. But, history and psychology are seldom seen as being truly complementary. For many psychologists history is an incomplete enquiry, because of the evasive ‘messiness’ of history and social life. As Michael Billig explains:

Historians lack complete records of the past. They cannot run experiments to test hypotheses. A historian might claim that Protestantism was vital to the development of capitalism in the early modern period. Supporting evidence might be assembled. A plausible story might be told. But the thesis can never be ‘proved’ to the rigorous standards demanded by an experimental scientist, such as a chemist or physicist. No controlled experiment could be conducted on past events. One cannot re-run the processes of European history, this time controlling for factors such as Henry VIII’s divorce, the doctrines of Martin Luther and the failure of the Catholic Church to stop the selling of pardons, in order to assess what precise weightings these ‘variables’ would have on the rise of capitalism.

The attitude of ‘tolerant civility’ found among psychologists is reciprocated by historians who have been sceptical of historical enquiry based on psychological theories and empirical findings. In his 1957 presidential address delivered at the American Historical Association’s annual dinner, the Harvard historian William D. Langer stated that ‘classical or academic psychology […] so far as I can detect, has little bearing on historical problems’. Curiously enough Langer was more favourably inclined towards the potential of psychoanalysis and ‘depth psychology’. Other historians, however, have been less forthcoming. In Britain, the renowned historian of the 20th Century A.J.P. Taylor once wondered how anyone can take Freud seriously, a sentiment shared by other historians who see psychological reductionism as inherently ahistorical. One critic of psychohistory, Lawrence Stone, went as far as to accuse this approach of developing ‘along dogmatically ahistorical lines’, in that it emphasised causal factors ‘independent of the influence of historically based cultural conditioning’ and ignored ‘the critical importance of changing context – religious, moral, cultural, economic, social, and political.’ Even within the genre of biography, where the link between psychoanalytically informed psychology and history might seem most apparent, the cooperation between the two disciplines has been at best

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8 Billig, Hidden Roots, p. 10.
‘uneasy’. Psychobiography has always been largely confined to the peripheries of mainstream academia.¹²

One important cause of the tensions that exists between psychology and history lies is their dissimilar approaches to evidence and ‘data’. As Christopher Browning, one of today’s foremost Holocaust historians acknowledges, different historians reading the same historiographic sources ‘would not produce or agree upon an identical set of “facts” – beyond an elementary minimum – out of which a narrative of events…could be created’. In other words, the same material - official documents, eyewitness reports, memoirs, etc. - can produce multiple interpretations and explanations. There is no ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ means of adjudicating between competing interpretations, except through scholarly debate and argumentation. ¹³ This is not something that can be easily reconciled with academic psychology’s empiricist credentials, obsession with method and more often than not, quantification. Also, as Lawrence Stone points out, psychologists exhibit a tendency to adopt ‘an almost consciously antiliterary style’ sacrificing narrative coherence and clarity, so important in historical writing, in favour of a language that is ‘obscure, turgid, repetitive, flatulent, studded either with meaningless jargon and neologisms, or with oversophisticated algebraic formulae and impenetrable statistical tables’.¹⁴

Also, academic psychology often has a problem with historiographic sources. Because psychology focuses mainly on human behaviour in the present (from which it draws often unwarranted universalist, ‘ahistorical’ conclusions), psychologists can claim to have a direct and unmediated access to their object of study. Put differently, in the context of experimental research in particular, psychologists are involved in the design and creation of the data they analyse. Historians, on the other hand, do not have that luxury: they deal with ‘data’ that, because its locus is in the past, is always imperfect, incomplete, contingent on interpretation, mediated through sources.¹⁵

The present collection of essays hopes to help psychology and history move from their current state of sporadic engagement, towards genuine and authentic interdisciplinary dialogue. The thirteen chapters, authored by internationally renowned psychologists and historians, span a broad range of topics of mutual interest to the two disciplines, such as social memory, prejudice, stereotyping, affect and emotion, cognition, personality, gender and the self. Contributions explore these topics drawing on examples from different historical periods and cultural contexts - from 18th Century Britain, through apartheid South Africa to conflict-torn Yugoslavia - and cover diverse issues such as political decision making, Darwinian theory of emotion, and sexuality. Also, chapters consider the various issues that arise from conducting research across the boundaries between the humanities and the social or psychological sciences. These include the nature and limitations of psychological and historical enquiries, the different epistemologies within and across the two disciplines, the tensions between the universal and the particular, the relationship between the individual and the social. The main aim of this collection of essays is to rekindle the dialogue between psychology and history and encourage students and researchers

¹² See Elms, Uncovering Lives.
¹⁴ Stone, The Past and the Present Revisited, p. 8; see also M. Billig, Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
working in the two disciplines to engage in this dialogue more directly and self-
reflectively.

Conceptions and meanings of interdisciplinarity

Before we present the outline of the book it is perhaps worth dwelling on the
elusive notion of ‘interdisciplinarity’. As Ludmilla Jordanova points out, there is a
‘certain ambiguity surrounding what is meant by “interdisciplinary” – is it about
exchanges between fields that remain distinct or a rather more intimate blending
of domains with already blurred edges?’\(^{16}\)

One notable form of interdisciplinary engagement between psychology and
history involves what might be referred to as merger or appropriation. The sub-
disciplines of ‘psychohistory’ and ‘psychobiography’ are relevant examples.
Historians who embraced psychoanalysis turned it into a critical instrument for
uncovering hidden motives, desires, life trajectories, and so on, of both individuals
and collectives.\(^{17}\)

Another common form of engagement is transfer or borrowing. This is where
specific insights, ideas, or vocabulary from one discipline are used to shed light on a
specific problem regarding human motivation, behaviour, and so on. The historian
engaged in borrowing often takes on the role of the ‘seeker’ who looks for a particular
idea, ‘poking about’ in the quest for ‘some formula, some hypothesis, some model,
some method which has immediate relevance to one’s own work, and which seems to
help one to understand one’s data better and to arrange and interpret them in a more
meaningful way’.\(^{18}\) An example of this approach might include Christopher
Browning’s work on the conduct of the members of 101\(^{st}\) Police Battalion in Poland
in 1942, which drew on the findings of Stanley Milgram’s classic social psychological
study of obedience.\(^{19}\) On the other hand, when psychologists engage in borrowing,
they look to history for accounts of real life events, which they then examine through
the prism of psychological research and theory. One example is the study by Steve
Reicher and colleagues which looked at the rescue of Bulgaria’s Jews during the
Holocaust as an example of bystander intervention and the mobilisation of prosocial
behaviour.\(^{20}\)

The determining feature of borrowing is that it is selective, and focuses on
solving a particular problem or issue: how does one account for the survival of
Bulgaria’s Jews? What explains the behaviour of reserve 101\(^{st}\) Police Battalion?
Importantly, when historians or psychologists turn to each other, they do so for
suggestions rather than prescriptions. What is to be borrowed and how much is
usually determined by the perceived usefulness, applicability and relevance. As
Jordanova argues, ‘if conducted correctly, with due acknowledgement’ borrowing can
be seen, by both sides, as ‘a productive transaction’.\(^{21}\)

\(^{16}\) Jordanova, *History in Practice*, p. 80.
\(^{17}\) P. Loewenberg, *Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach* (New Brunswick:
Transaction, 1996).
\(^{18}\) Stone, *The Past and the Present Revisited*, p. 20
\(^{19}\) C. R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in
analysis of social identity and the mobilisation of social solidarity’, *European Journal of
Occasionally transfer or borrowing can lead to the creation of new vocabulary, and novel ways of thinking about psychological or historical phenomena. One example of this process of **translation** is the new ‘history of emotions’ whose vocabulary and academic thesaurus is a transformation and re-interpretation of concepts from disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary science, etc. Translation usually involves topics and concerns that are taken for granted by some researchers, but are seen as ‘lost’ and then ‘found’ by others. These ‘recuperation’ projects involve some degree of (more or less complex) transformation or translation.22 In the case of the ‘history of emotions’ the cross-disciplinary process of translation at the same time enriches historical practice, and revitalises the psychological exploration of emotions, by placing them ‘within an economy that depends on, and answers to, cultural expectations and social needs’23.

Translation is usually intimately linked to a process of **historicisation** of the object of study. For historians, this usually involves recasting individual-level type phenomena (fear, emotion, etc.) and situating them within a cultural-historical framework.24 For example, Bourke’s cultural history of fear asks ‘how can we understand the way people in the past experienced emotions such as fear’ given that, from an historical vantage point, ‘subjective feelings are invisible’? 25 One cannot just expect to contemplate historical ‘traces’ and understand how individuals ‘really felt’. ‘Knowing’ this requires squaring historical scholarship with insights from psychology and cognate domains.26

In any project of translation lurks the danger of **reduction** and oversimplification. In broadest terms, reduction can be defined as ‘recasting the type and level of phenomena from one that is complex to another that is less so: by implication, one too basic to be satisfying’27. A classic example of reduction in history is psychohistory. The majority of critiques leveled at the psychohistorical project have dealt in some way or another with its reductionism, its tendency to reduce complex historical phenomena, or individual biographies, to an (unsatisfactory) basic level, grounded in psychodynamic interpretations. However, as Elovitz argues in his contribution to this volume, psychohistory should be seen as more varied and less reductionist than its critics would allow. Another example that can be given is the new approach of ‘neurohistory’, with its emphasis on the brain as the material and historical basis of experience28. According to Burman (this volume), neurohistory suggests a narrative about past events that takes into account the biological underpinnings of experience, which, in any given context, are seen to cause the feeling of ‘what it was like’. One of the crucial suggestions of neurohistory is that

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23 Frevert, Emotions in History, p. 212.
26 Importantly, historicisation is not in itself a guarantee against reductionism. Quite the contrary, the impetus to account for a certain socio-psychological phenomenon culturally and historically (in a full and comprehensive fashion) can lead someone to disregard particular or deviant cases.
27 Jordanova, History in Practice, p.68.
historians need to take into account the ‘deep’ (evolutionary, physiological) structures, traditionally investigated by neurologists, neuropsychologists, and cognitive psychologists. It is assumed that one can delve deeper into the history of the humankind by exploring the neural structures that make possible feelings, emotions, culture, social organization, and so on. Historians’ turn to the brain is akin to psychologists’ turn towards evolution and neurosciences: some psychologists increasingly see evolutionary, physiological and cortical correlates of behaviour as the sole answer to the various puzzles posed by human action, values and motivations. These are not considered particular to individuals but rather as universal aspects that can offer the ultimate story of human existence and experience.

One of the problems with this approach is that the diversity of human actions is reduced to the brain, which is seen as determining the forms that cultural life and cultural experience take. In both cases, what Kenneth Gergen has called the ‘expanding romance with cortical explanations of human action’ ignores the diversity of experiences, plurality of values and beliefs, issues of cross-cultural variation, and so on. More importantly, what makes this approach reductionist is that it glosses over the idea that ‘the brain does not determine the contours of cultural life; cultural life determines what we take to be the nature and importance of brain functioning’. 

Appropriation, borrowing, translation and reduction, as forms of interdisciplinary engagement, are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive. In fact, when looking at specific studies, it is not always possible to determine where borrowing turns into translation or where translation might acquire the properties of a merger. Instead what can be discerned are elective affinities between the two disciplines which imply the notion of a discretionary, flexible choice. This choice is guided by diverse factors including, but not limited to, the prevailing academic conventions in the two disciplines, hierarchies of specialization and expertise, the implicit or explicit models of the mind and human behaviour, assumptions about possible areas of overlap and dialogue, and so on. Most importantly, as the contributions to this volume testify, the key driver of interdisciplinary dialogue has been the need to solve puzzles and answer questions related to the human condition. Sometimes these puzzles are defined by the conventions of the discipline and previously acquired knowledge; sometimes by real world concerns, and sometimes by the interaction between the two. Also, whether the dialogue between psychology and history involves a one-way or two-way flow is less important than the fact that researchers from two seemingly different traditions of enquiry can, and actually do find common ground, and use insights from the other discipline creatively, as a guide to their endeavor. The dialogue between two fields of knowledge and the continuing exchange, transaction, etc. should strive to broaden the scope of both of them and make more meaningful the examination of the variety of assumptions and preconceptions about the human condition. This dialogue should not be mainly about how psychology and history ought to relate to each, but about actual ways in which psychologists and historians infuse their enquiries with each other’s insights.

The recognition of this plurality of ways of doing interdisciplinarity is central to the present volume. Forthcoming chapters do not offer an ‘instructional manual’ on how to do interdisciplinarity, nor do they lay out a fully developed, singular interdisciplinary approach. Instead, as the title suggests, what follows is a collection of diverse and engaging interdisciplinary explorations, which track the intersection

30 Ibid., 19.
between psychology and history and consider different ways in which each discipline can enhance the understanding of the other. It is hoped that these explorations will raise awareness among researchers from both disciplines about the need to question their unspoken, often taken-for-granted assumptions, to scrutinize their concepts and methods more carefully, to innovate on existing research strategies, to generate new research questions, and to offer, where relevant, theoretical and contextual appui to other disciplines.

Outline of the book

The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with central aspects of the theoretical dialogue between psychologists and historians. The emphasis is on the distinctive theoretical relevance of interdisciplinary engagement for understanding human behaviour. The opening chapter, by Geoffrey Cubbitt, uses the example of social memory - a field of interest for both history and psychology - to examine the manner in which the boundaries between the two disciplines may be kept open or critically interrogated. Joan Wallach Scott discusses the possibility/impossibility of a productive dialogue between history and psychology, with particular reference to psychoanalysis. Scott argues that although history and psychoanalysis work with very different conceptions of time and causality, it is important for historians to recognise the latter’s potential when examining the historical relevance of unconscious motivation and fantasy. Scott charts part of the history of the ‘compatibility’ between the two disciplines and the contexts that fostered or hindered their interaction. Jeremy Burman critically appraises some of the recent engagement between history and neuroscience. Burman explores the promises and limitations of ‘neurohistory’ as an emerging approach that seeks to do ‘history from within’ and interrogates some of its psychological assumptions. The fourth chapter in this section, by Paul Elovitz, uses the example of psychohistory and psychobiography to consider the successes and failures of some of the previous attempts to bring closer together psychology and history. Elovitz identifies crucial tensions that strained the relationship between historians and psychologists in the past, and suggests remedies for a productive and mutually beneficial interdisciplinary engagement. The concluding chapter of Part I, by Ivana Marková, looks specifically at micro-history and single-case studies, and contrasts method and explanation in history and social psychology.

Parts II and III include examples of research in which psychologists and historians have borrowed from, developed, or explored each other’s ideas. Part II focuses on cognition, affect and the self. Carolyn Dean writes about selfhood and sexuality in historical writing. Dean follows the historical trace of conceptions of selfhood and gender identity in debates and historical works, and generally considers the historical and culturally contingency of psychological notions. Rob Boddice critically appraises the ‘affective turn’ in history by considering how emotions are treated in historical writing. Using the history of evolutionary psychology as a case study, he engages with the question about how to ‘do’ the history of emotions. Mark E. Blum looks at ‘cognitive orientation’ as a factor in the decision-making processes of politicians, and argues that cognition offers a useful tool for the historian trying to understand the psychological underpinnings of political decision-making and action. The chapter by George Turner, Susan Condor and Alan Collins explores the history of the concept of self-esteem, and shows that, contrary to popular belief, there existed a psychology of self-esteem in the writings of phrenologists, well before William James used the term in Principles of Psychology.
Part III offers further examples of the dialogue between psychology and history by considering issues around prejudice, ideology, stereotypes and national character. By charting the two ‘histories’ of the concept of prejudice in social psychology, Kevin Durrheim argues that one cannot understand the social psychology of racism in apartheid South Africa outside of its historical context. Through the analysis of a largely forgotten early social psychological exploration of antisemitism, Michael Billig writes about the need for a more historically conscious social psychology, while Mark Knights focuses on the understanding of stereotypes as both psychological and historical constructions, and comments on history’s and social psychology’s shared interest in the public sphere, the arts of persuasion and the formation of attitudes. The final chapter, by Cathie Carmichael examines the ways in which psychological and psychoanalytic language and interpretation of national character were mobilised for propaganda purposes in the former Yugoslavia in late 1980s and 1990s.

The contributions by historians included in this volume show how taking psychology seriously can help construct a more comprehensive stance towards historical phenomena, events, chronologies, etc. and disentangle the intricate web of human motivation, individual and social memory, values, attitudes, beliefs, social identifications, social representations, stereotypes, etc. Equally, the contributions by psychologists demonstrate how taking history and historical context seriously can help avoid the tendency towards unwarranted generalisation, and develop a more reflective stance towards the historical contingency of psychological vocabulary and phenomena, such as values, attitudes, collective mentalities, etc. Crucially, the volume does not privilege any specific school of thought within either psychology or history. On the contrary, it covers a whole range of theoretical, epistemological and methodological approaches, and considers the myriad issues that arise from conducting research across the boundaries between the humanities and the social or psychological sciences.

We have asked our contributors to not simply try to bring into contact or relate two seemingly separate domains of knowledge and practice, but to position themselves epistemologically and theoretically in order to generate and explore distinctive kinds of research questions, quandaries and problems. We hope that these explorations can foster the creation of a platform for emancipative and socially relevant forms of self-awareness and critical reflection across both disciplines. We also hope that they raise crucial issues regarding the cultural function of historical and psychological description and explanation, and the status of the knowledge that is generated by interdisciplinary endeavors. We will return turn to these issues in the Conclusion.

In this volume, one will find an engagement with the notion of interdisciplinarity, but without an overt consensus about how it can be achieved. There are hints and intimations at the possibilities for a dialogue between psychology and history which go beyond conventional assumptions and epistemological positions within each discipline. The contributions seek to open new ways of dialogue, drawing on different positions and voices within the two disciplines. The reactions to interdisciplinarity are different. Some of our contributors experiment with more direct ways, others approach the issue more tentatively. There is no common recipe, or a unified message as the essays collected in this volume reflect the inherent complexity and diversity of interdisciplinary scholarship.