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Love in Sociological Thought: A Conceptual Genealogy

By

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A Doctoral Thesis

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Abstract

This thesis conducts a conceptual genealogy of love in sociological thought. It traces the passage of a positive logic of love: a disappearing logic conceived in Goethe's art, cultivated from the social science of Comte and Marx to classical non/Marxist sociology, and finally extinguished by late/modern reflexive sociology. Recovering the lineage of Comte, Durkheim and Parsons, it defends an economic politics of love in the positivist tradition against the political culture of classical sociology and the bio-politics of current sociology. After the demise of Marxist political economy, it examines a new order of love transversal to the socialist and capitalist organizations.

The tripartite thesis argues that the sociological tradition has been tarrying with a social order of love evolved from Goethe's ethic of death and renunciation. This order expresses a disorganizing phenomenology of fate as the modern world traverses from the fated causes to fatal consequences of love. In the causal loop, the fated-fatal order of love encounters the act, freedom and risk in a multiple unfolding of reality with minimal difference. Part I explores how a religious-political belief of fetishism practiced by Comte and Marx comes across its fate in the historical act. Part II explicates why a cultural-political calling for fraternity theorized by classical non/Marxist sociologists runs up against its fate in sexual freedom. Part III reveals that a bio-political interest in reflexivity methodized by late/modern sociologists tumbles upon its fate in social risk. In conclusion, however, the thesis suggests that an event of posthumous life after the liberation of humanity continues to occur in a state of emergency because the passion for fate escalating from social science to sociology is driven by an unrequited love of Humanity.

Keywords: order, fate, love, act, sex, risk, fetishism, fraternity, reflexivity, humanity
Contents

Introduction 1

Part I
From Goethe's Art of Love to The Social Science of Comte and Marx

1. Why Goethe? 22
   1.1 Reason, revolution and love
   1.2 Goethe's love-life, death and renunciation
2. The Dual Relation of Comte and Marx 63
   2.1 Comte's love of fate
   2.2 Marx's question of fetishism
3. Social Science after Badiou 89

Part II
Goethe's Culture of Sociology Embodied

4. Rose's Archaeology of the Subject in Law and Love 105
5. The Spirit of Society in a Loving Subject of Law 125
   5.1 Weber
   5.2 Durkheim
   5.3 Simmel
   5.4 The Marxist question of fraternity
6. Durkheim Reconsidered 158
   6.1 Žižek's philosophy for Durkheimians
   6.2 Durkheim's social philosophy
   6.3 Durkheim's sociology
   6.4 Durkheim contra Bergson
Part III

The Romantic Enlightenment of Sociology

7. Reflexive Discourses of Love
   7.1 Bauman
   7.2 Giddens
   7.3 Beck
   7.4 Luhmann

8. Autopoietic Societies of Love
   8.1 Luhmann’s irony
   8.2 From Parsons to Foucault
   8.3 Foucault’s paradox
   8.4 Love after life

Conclusion

Bibliography
Introduction

Love in Sociological Thought: A General Outline of the Thesis

There are three principal aims of the thesis

(i) This thesis proposes that love in sociological thought has ceased to be an abstract idea celebrated in literary odes, religious hymns and philosophical treatises. No longer a magical solution to original sins and monstrous evils, love has acquired a self-questioning thought of its own. This means a history of rationality progressing from social science to sociology and beyond makes no sense without the problematization of love. At the dawn of modernity in the early 19th century, social scientists thought a reconstruction of national societies might be grounded in love. At the dusk of modernity from the late 20th century onwards, sociologists have reconsidered if love could deliver a transformation of our world society. We will present a close rereading of orthodoxy from Comte through Durkheim to Parsons starting from Goethe’s ethical matrix (ch. 1, 2, 6, 8). We will find unanticipated encounters with Marx’s theory, non/Marxist sociologies and psychoanalysis, late/modern sociology and post-psychoanalytic-Marxist social theory. In these encounters, we have separated a heterodox complex from a transdox series. The heterodox complex will receive mostly critical commentaries, particularly for Weber, Marxists, Gillian Rose and Luhmann (ch. 4, 5, 7). Standing out from the heterodox complex, we will highlight a “transdox” series from Badiou through Žižek to Baudrillard as a counterpart to the orthodox line (ch. 3, 6, 9).

We are unfolding a conceptual genealogy of love in sociological thought, not a systematic history of sociology or social thought, much less of philosophy, in Hegel’s sense. In sum, the first aim of the thesis seeks to prove that there is a hidden agenda of love in the sociological tradition requiring reconsideration by heterodox and transdox discourses.

The thesis is divided into three parts with each part consisting of three chapters. While unfolding the genealogical network, a chronological order from part I to part III is largely retained. Within each part, the genealogical
network spreads out from the chapter level down to the level of a specific point of argument. For example, in part II where classical non-Marxist sociology is concerned, we rather begin with an overview of post-structuralism and post-modernism through the eyes of Rose's history of contemporary philosophy (ch. 4) and end in a rereading of Durkheim through the lens of Žižek's history of modern philosophy (ch. 6).

Part I introduces Goethe's art as the forerunner of social science before the latter takes on the forms of Comtean religion and Marxian politics. In chapter 1, we will show that Goethe's art of love-life lies beyond the German philosophical journey of reason and revolution passing from Kant to Hegel. Moreover, his ethic of renunciation in death is irreducible to the cultural-historical imaginations of classicism, the Enlightenment and romanticism. In chapter 2, we will argue that Comte's scientific religion and Marx's scientific politics act out Goethe's art, insofar as both attempt to square the circle of knowledge and love in the hope of constructing a new society. Specifically, they result in a convergence on the question of fetishism in the historical process of r/evolution. In chapter 3, we will suggest that the social scientific conception of love can be understood as a dream of socialism unrequited in the current neo-liberal democracy. To elucidate this point, we bring Goethe, Comte and Marx back in the counter/late-modern philosophical contexts from Hegel through Nietzsche to Plato. These contexts are brought to the fore by contemporary philosophy from Karl Lowith's hermeneutics to Alan Badiou's post-Marxism. On this horizon, we conclude with a heuristic notion of love called the fatal act.

Part II examines further how Goethe's ethic of renunciation is embodied in the culture of classical sociology. In chapter 4, we will provide Rose's overview of the contemporary post-structural subject in law and postmodern subject in love against the modern philosophical baseline between Kant and Hegel. Reading Rose's work, we recognize the fates of sociology, Marxism, poststructuralism and postmodernism on the one hand and the chances of Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity on the other. However, Rose's total archaeology of the subject misreads Comte and Marx, obscures Goethe, and,
as a result, robs classical non-Marxist sociology of the chance to present a case for a loving spirit of society. In chapter 5, we will reread classical sociologists in light of Rose against Rose. Weber, Durkheim and Simmel are serialized according to her philosophical logic of the end, middle, and beginning to help us realize that classical sociologists do presuppose but only suspend a subject of love in their preoccupation with the law. By a common misconception of Goethe's ethic of renunciation, furthermore, sociology and Marxism end up with a coincidence of insight on the question of fraternity. In chapter 6, we will reconsider Durkheim's oft-criticized organicism in an alternative history of modern philosophy offered by Žižek, discovering an organism of love between the sexes in his sociology. We insist that Durkheim is immune from the German ideology because of his fidelity to Comte's positivism. In fact, he overcomes Comte's problems in the science of altruism and Religion of Humanity by introducing a symbolic method of sociological-anthropology, a genetic method inherited by later Parsons. This minimal difference marks the internal horizon of his sociology limited by the conceptual relation of life-time and free will. In this sense, Durkheim brings Comte's science back to Goethe's art of love.

Part III traces the end of sociological thought brought about by late/modern, reflexive sociology. In chapter 7, we will survey several reflexive discourses of love developed by late/modern sociologists, including Bauman, Giddens, Beck and Luhmann, distinguishing their new method of social analysis from the critical discourses of love presented in the conventional frameworks of social psychology, liberal Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis. Our reading will lead readers to acknowledge the impasse of the reflexive approach in a mystic cult of cynicism, as it abuses the knowledge of the Enlightenment and the power of the French Revolution by a fantasy of the romantic Enlightenment. In chapter 8, we will situate the intellectual growth of late/modern sociology in a rite of passage out of Parsonian modern sociology. Furthermore, we will explain the social genesis of reflexive sociology in a historical-institutional context. This means the institutionalization of sociology makes it a reflexive discipline in the service of the needs of everyday life in late-modernity. As a result, with recourse to Foucault's study of bio-politics, we
learn to tell that the late/modern(ist) discourses of self-government target sexualized individuals, not couples in love. In chapter 9, from the demise of Durkheimianism, Marxism and Freudianism, we conclude there is an evental order of love foreign to the body politics' will to risk.

(ii)
With the above genealogical network, we hope to achieve the second aim of the thesis, which is to reconstruct a conceptual event of love. Beginning with a consideration of Goethe’s art, the tripartite thesis argues that the sociological tradition of love has been pursuing an order of life in accord with the ethic of fate, that is, a social ethic of death and renunciation driven by the situational duality of love in fated and fatal events. Love’s three degrees of causality are found in a threefold encounter of fate with the act, freedom and risk. Part I may be read as the initiation of a temporal causality of love. Temporally, love finds its fate in the historical act, a true act in the structure of a fiction, just like Comte’s religious cult and Marx’s political praxis. Part II may be read as the intervention of a material causality of love. Materialistically, love finds its fate in the organic freedom of the sexes behind the scene of sexual antagonism, as we see from classical non/Marxist sociologists’ common search for fraternity. Part III may be read as the determination of a spatial causality of love. Spatially, love finds its fate in the risk society, where fatal consequences of risk are governed by the code of everyday security, as we see in the reflexive condition of life in late/modern sociology.

Moreover, our conceptual genealogy of love traces the original causes to the very end of the evolutionary chain. That is to say, while the three causalities of love seem to progress from the history through reality to hyper-real politics of life, we think against the grain. Bluntly put, we do not believe in a communicative model of love in the current society/sociology, insofar as this model “deconstructs” the concept of love reflexively into sensational pillow talk across multi-cultural spaces, inter-textual discourses and transsexual bodies. We hold that reflexive deconstruction profits from a cultural reduction of language, ranging from Greek, Germanic, Italic to Balto-Slavic languages. By contextualizing the linguistic structure, making language an open system of
signs, it falls prey to the code of Western culture, rendering other cultural phenomena transparent but its own fundamental rules opaque. As a result, the multicultural respect it pays to foreign cultures is merely rhetoric. It disregards the linguistic fact that the fabric of Western logos is not constituted by speech, but by the grammatical rules of gender and tense. Following these suggestions, we trace the conceptual causes of love back to sex in time. We suggest that love, after being subtracted from communicative space, can recollect its original relationships with sexuality and historical community. In other words, only by traversing the obscene and fantastic terrain of economic intercourse could one rethink a politics of love.

(iii)
Our final aim is implied in a discussion of the social world of love since the disorganized world of love constitutes the limit and horizon of the thesis. There are already many representations of love in the world from bestselling pocket books to statistic psychological models. But we find that love's logic of disappearance forbids us to grasp it in this manner, that love's genealogical network allows us to see only its quivering silhouette, and that love's conceptual event is available only through counterfactuals. Nonetheless, we present a list of contemporary studies of love (consisting of philosophical, historical and sociological works) in the following with a constant reminder that one easily loses sight of love's truth.

Philosophical works on love can be roughly divided into humanist and anti-humanist camps (cf. ch. 8). On the one hand, Irving Singer is doubtlessly a productive humanist philosopher of love. His major works include *The Nature of Love* (3 vols, 1984-1987), *The Meaning of Life* (3 vols, 1994-1996), and *Explorations in Sex and Love* (2001). John Armstrong's *Conditions of Love: The Philosophy of Intimacy* (2003), Alain de Botton's *Essays in Love* (2006), and Christopher Philips' *Socrates in Love: Philosophy for a Passionate Heart* (2007) are for popular tastes, since they discuss love in practical contexts from daily life to current affairs. This approach sticks to secular humanism against the religious view by putting more trust in the power of imagination to reevaluate reality. On the other hand, feminist philosophers write about love in
addition to female sexuality. Julia Kristeva's *In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith* (1987) and *Tales of Love* (1987) are textbooks in this area. Most of Luce Irigaray's works ponder on the link of sexual difference to love in opening up a new space for democracy. Her more recent works are *Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History* (1993[1990]), *To be Two* (2001[1997]), and *The Way of Love* (2002). Hélène Cixous' latest writings on love are *L'Amour du Loup et Autres Remords* (2003) and *L'Amour Même Dans la Boîte aux Lettres* (2005). This approach is more interested in a meditation on the moral-religious condition of politics based on a marriage of psychoanalysis, deconstruction and mysticism.

Historical works related to love are rich in empirical material, and yet susceptible to ideological representations due to a lack of philosophical and/or social scientific logic. First, in the history of emotion, one should mention Theodore Zeldin's *A History of French Passions* (5 vols, 1973-1977) and *An Intimate History of Humanity* (1994) which is much more concise. Peter Gay's *The Bourgeois Experience* (5 vols, 1984-1998) and Schnitzler's *Century* (2002) are critically acclaimed as usual. This approach is interested in psychoanalysis of everyday life in Western Europe. Second, in the history of private life, the first choice must be Philip Ariès' *The Century of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (1962) and *History of Private Life* (5 vols, co-ed. with Georges Duby, 1987-1991). Ariès is a good start because of his theoretical reference to Foucault's history of sexuality. Third, in the literary history of love, one cannot miss C.S. Lewis' *The Allegory of Love: The Study of Medieval Tradition* (1936) and *The Four Loves* (1960). Denis de Rougemont's *Love in the Western World* (1939, rev. 1972) and *Myths of Love* (1963[1961]) among others are often compared to Lewis' works. Apart from the problematic identification of culture with literature, this approach reflected a calling of love in the religious-political contexts of Protestantism, Europeanism and Nationalism (especially Frenchness and/or Englishness) in the early 20th century. But in a late/modern condition, Simmelian Octavio Paz' mystic view of love in *The Double Flame: Essays on Love and Eroticism* (1996) turns out to be more well received by the current sociology (cf. ch. 5, 7).
Probably the only sociologist who claims to have a theory of love available for empirical study is Francesco Alberoni. His fecund writings on love are built on his early political notion of the nascent state. Against French eroticism, especially Bataille, Bréton and others, Alberoni has been approaching a general theory of love-life by extensive researches on love-related emotions in different social settings, such as friendship, first love, cultural celebrity and political charisma. It remains to be discussed if his life trans<forming idea of love is a variant of neo-vitalism or neo-humanism. To say the least, one can find his Italian style of exposition in any of his works, such as Falling in Love and Loving (1979), I Love You: A Theory of Love (1996), Sex and Love (2005). Alberoni also founded the Falling in Love Center with his wife Rosa Giannetta Alberoni in the 1980s. In the U.S., by contrast, The Institute for Research on Unlimited Love was founded by John Templeton Foundation in 2001. The current president Stephen G. Post directs a group of scholars from medicine, psychiatry, theology, religious study, social science and sociology to publish interdisciplinary studies on altruistic love. The center is reminiscent of and more ambitious than Pitrim Sorokin’s sociological studies conducted in his Research Center of Creative Altruism founded at Harvard in 1943 (cf. ch. 8).

Apart from the above projects aiming to produce a general sociology of love, more focused studies rest content to make sense of intimacy. In the cultural sociology of intimacy, Eva Illouz’s Consuming Romantic Utopia: Love and The Cultural Contradiction of Capitalism (1997) and Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (2007) keep to the cultural Marxist approach. Finally, Viviana A. Zelizer’s development from the classic The Social Meaning of Money: Pay Checks, Pin Money, Poor Relief and other Currencies (1994) to The Purchase of Intimacy (2007) makes her an exemplar in the economic sociology of intimacy. In our view, this line harbours great potential for the empirical research of love.

The disappearance of a love-event: theoretical and methodological orientations of the thesis
Following the outline above, we propose to conduct a conceptual genealogy of love in sociological thought. The thesis as a whole argues that Goethe's art-life inaugurated a new world order grounded in true love. Goethe's order of love subject to the ethic of death and renunciation once helped the birth of social science and the growth of classical sociology, but his legacy has now passed into oblivion with the advent of late-modern, reflexive sociology. Against the current sociological opinion that reflexive modernity recurs through individual agency, we bring Goethe's subject of fate back in the sociological tradition to reform the site of a singular modernity. Above all, we assume that contemporary social theories are driven by the question of modernity and its discontents. Accordingly, a counter-modern current, a theoretical spectrum composed of the discourses of post-modernity (e.g. Lyotard and Bauman), late-modernity (e.g. Beck and Giddens), non-modernity (e.g. Foucault and Latour), and hyper-modernity (e.g. Deleuze and Baudrillard), may be largely seen as a dissatisfaction with the general view(s) of modernity (e.g. Habermas and Luhmann). A common presupposition across the spectrum considers that the contemporary world has progressed beyond the duality of the subject and the object not only in its content but also in its form. This premise is often led to a conclusion that the dual form of modernity could be superseded by fragmented dualism (i.e. nothing exists but a formless figure in the real, a preponderance of the Subject or the Object) or by simulated monism (i.e. nothing exists but a system of signs in the virtual, since there is neither the Subject nor the Object). In contrast, by recollecting the subject of fate, we hope to recover the dignity of the object at the same time.

Simply put, we adopt an ontology of the subject in covariance with the object to maintain a singular form of modernity. We challenge, undermine and even disavow the existence of the Other and the Self as the first and last metaphysical reasons of the world, only to recognize a social scientific non/relation between the subject form and the object form in parallel universes. While embracing the failure of modernity in its institutional content, we preserve the form of duality embedded in the (true) mendacity of modernity. That is to say, by keeping subjective fidelity to the "sublime object"
of ideology, an "immaterial corporeality of the 'body within the body'", we aim to formalize the vacuity inside the official, hypocritical words of community, which span from freedom and equality to justice and true love, to the letter (cf. Žižek, 1989: 18). Adopting such a "fatal strategy" suggests that our ontological point of departure rests on an event of the dice throw, a central theme of Mallarmé and Nietzsche elevated but unresolved in the discourse of hypermodernity (Deleuze, 1983: 25-34; Badiou, 2000a: 67-78; Brassier, 2000). The image of the dice throw, exemplified by gambling, evokes the ethical problem of choice and decision under the ambivalent condition of modernity, that is, the ontological coincidence of chance and fate (Baudrillard, 2001: 58-66, 80-89; Badiou, 2005a: 46-56). In this situation, the theoretical problem does not reside in the ontological structure of chance or fate as an ambivalent structure of being, but rather in how to think the world in an original way, that is, in a way beyond the proto-mystical meditation upon being-in-the-world heralded by Heidegger. Conversely, it is against the ontological confusion of being and the world that our research question is posed: how do we conceive a new world order grounded in true love? As such, we presume that a new order cannot be thought without an evental conception of true love. This means before introducing the universal truth procedure of love, the subject matter guiding the intention and purpose of the thesis, we should explicate our approach to the world with resort to Badiou's philosophy of the event.

Although we retrace the theoretical legacy of fate to Goethe, we are unconvinced by the philosophical method of being and becoming in hypermodernism. An ontology of being-in-the-world which structures presentation in terms of appearing and appearing alone requires an existential phenomenology of metamorphosis to express it (Deleuze, 1989; 1994; Baudrillard, 2001: 79). A major consequence of this worldview of uninterrupted emergence is the emancipation of human history, upholding the temporal heterogeneity of modernity with a multiplicity of time by means of continuity, duration and flow. Answering Heidegger's call for the end of philosophy, Deleuzian being is hence appropriated as an event, insofar as life as such is affirmed by "a sort of unwavering love for the world" (Badiou, 2000a: 43). In effect, hypermodernism imagines a certain non-mediated, sometimes even
immediate, becoming of being in the world at the expense of a subjective difference between being and the event.

And here Baudrillard is more aware than Deleuze of the non-identity of being and the event (Baudrillard, 1990a: 144-46). From the outset, one should abstain from a systematic misreading of Baudrillard’s “passion for rules” and “siding with the object” since Seduction (1990a[1979]: 131-53) and Fatal Strategies (1990b[1983]: 111-28) as a radical shift from his symbolic standpoint toward a compromise, if not total confounding, with the sign in the orders of simulacra (Kellner, 1989: 180-81; Kroker, 1992: 60-62; Levin, 1996: 128; Butler, 1999: 98-99, 120-21; Merrin, 2005: 38-41). On the contrary, Baudrillard’s early critique of the object system and later praise of the object can be read as his consistent effort to develop a fatal, literal analysis of the event, so that being may be discriminated from the world (Baudrillard, 2001: 133-36; 2003; 2004; 2005: 133-36). For this analysis to function, Baudrillard reserves an evental site foreign to ontological embroilment, a place of art where the disappearance of the subject could be captured “objectively” on a photographic image (Baudrillard, 1993b: 103-05; 1997: 28-34).

In fact, Baudrillard’s unwavering view of the symbolic order originates in For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1981[1972]), in which he argues that “sign must burn” by first demystifying use value before exchange value and then exterminating value (of the signified-referent) through more, not less, exchange (of the signifier) (Baudrillard, 1981: 63-87, 130-63, 211-12). This counter-anthropological logic of fetishization shows that the symbolic is inhumanly opposed to “the social” understood as a human organism in gentrifying the spirit of community. This is why the primary lesson after his analysis of “semiological reduction” is to acknowledge that fetishism of the body and beauty is an integral part of the ideology of the sign produced by the social system (Baudrillard, 1981: 88-101). This is also why, after his logic of the sense-event presented in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a[1976]), Baudrillard must supplement it with a logic of the disorganizing world, elaborating on the arts of seduction and fate, a “semiotics” of organs and affects, to counter the semiology of the sexual body (cf. Kristeva, 1987: 4-9).
For him, symbolic "relation and distance" mediated by the gift may localize "this void, the locus of relationship", and so proves counterfactually the insistence of subjective desire in a society where "love and aggression", or "love and death", coincide (Baudrillard, 1981: 65, 97; 1996[1968]: 199-202). It is this unrepresentable social void which prompts Baudrillard to portray a parallel universe of an "impossible exchange" with life after the "symbolic exchange" with death (formed in an object of the gift exchange) (Baudrillard, 1993a: 131; 2001: 123). Relativizing the value of life as well as death, he reiterates the thesis that a society is immanently traumatized by the symbolic order, an order existing for those who "prefer to pay and owe nothing to anyone" (Baudrillard, 1981: 211). Standing by the paradoxical point of society, on which a gift is anything but free and love is other than grace, Baudrillard demystifies the perverse omnipotence of God, a symbol of the Other persisting in the Self-identity of a secularized society (cf. Žižek, 2000: 157-58; 2003).

Without losing Baudrillard's focus on the art of disappearance, Badiou universalizes the singularity of the event into four generic truth procedures, science, art, politics and love. For Badiou (2003c: 87), "the void is the destiny of any event, since the being of an event is a disappearing." Moreover, if the event follows the logic of disappearance as such, then "death is not, and can never be, an event" (Badiou, 1999: 77; cf. Baudrillard, 1993b: 103-05). Being and the world never form a total circle without a break or a swerve toward the disappearance of truth events, on the site of which love constitutes one procedure. Postponing idealism indefinitely, Badiou has assumed that phenomenological, existentialist and structuralist approaches all fail to maintain the ontological difference of being from the world in the last instance due to the exclusion of the event in their thought, thereby inviting tyranny of the unthought. Conversely, the presentation of being in the world must not be levelled down to the appearance of the world with a post/phenomenological becoming of consciousness at one with things. Thus, Badiou comes around to reconsider an ideological subject without subjectivity in the light of Althusser's "subjectivity without a subject" (Badiou, 2006: 58-66; Žižek, 1999: 128). In other words, what is missing in Althusser is a rethinking of the subject of
"interpellation without identification", "an uncanny subject that precedes the gesture of subjectivization", in a savage world (or rather worldless situation) excommunicated by the cultured lifeworld of phenomenology and structuralism (Žižek, 1994: 60-61). In this respect, Badiou differs from Baudrillard in that the disappearance of truth-event invokes a subject to force nomination of the real at the risk of blowing truths into transparent evil, whereas the disappearance of art-event continues symbolic exchange to worship the object at the risk of reducing truths to obscurant simulacra (cf. Badiou, 2001: 58-89). The return of the truth and the good opens the question of the im/possibility of a subjective theory of the signifier.

A subjective theory of the signifier is apparently possible for Badiou. An "undecidable event" occurs to "someone" in a real life situation as s/he becomes an "indiscernible subject" by keeping fidelity to a "generic truth" of the situation, nominating the situational void without forcing upon the "unnamable" multiplicity of the real (Badiou, 2003c: 61, 165-68). Naming the ontological void of a situation by a subjective truth-event largely sums up Badiou's solution to the problem of the dice throw in modernity. Effectively, he seeks to "discover a thinking of choice and of the decision that would go from the void to truth without passing through the figure of the master, that is, without either invoking or sacrificing the master" (Badiou, 2005a: 54). Suspending the master-signifier within a subjective nomination of the truth-event, Badiou (2006: 26-57) brings Sylvain Lazarus' "anthropology of the name" in the real back to philosophical thought. Situated in the evental site like other truth procedures, "love is a thought" irreducible to the plenitude of being and the world, since the ontological structure of modernity has acquired an intelligence of its own (Badiou, 2003b: 55). Consequently, the being-thought of love cannot be thought through with recourse to the body and language as they have been revived from phenomenology to structuralism and beyond. Thinking love beyond rational consciousness does not mean that one should retreat to some oceanic feelings claimed by a lived experience (erlebnis) of the unthought. Quite the contrary, one could break into consciousness itself by embarking on a perilous, near-death experience (erfahrung) of the unconscious, a "mechanical memory" or compelled thinking

We will not go on to survey Badiou's views of love in the context of sociological thought until chapter 3, since his philosophical edifice sketched so far is sufficient to provide the building blocks of the thesis. Granted that love is a thought of the truth-event, the task of sociology in the wake of Badiou's philosophy would then consist in how to capture the disappearance of this love-event which resists a total expression of being in the world. But how do we analyze the ontological structure of modernity from the vantage point of a love-event? What would a new order of the world look like under the subjective fidelity of an amorous event? What is this amorous logic which conceals as well as reveals the truth of being in the world?

In view of Badiou's philosophical concepts of the event, subject, being and the world, we might tentatively reconstruct the analytic sites of philosophy and sociology as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophy</th>
<th>Event-subject/truth</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Art</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Love</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>Being-world/meaning</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Sex/uality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First and foremost, we agree with Badiou's fundamental claim of the "essential opposition" between "the classical ideal of truth and the modern polyvalence of meaning", insofar as truth is devoid of positive meanings after subtraction (Badiou, 2003c: 34). Accordingly, philosophy is predisposed to subjectivize the four truth procedures (from science to love) at the level of the event, whilst relegating corresponding objective apparatuses (from religion to sexuality) to the level of being in the world. The two levels are intransitive to each other, which means, for example, there is no relation between politics and economy, including a relation of antinomy requiring balance (from naïve other-exclusion to critical self-delimitation) or dialectics requiring sublation (from relative contradiction to absolute identity) (Badiou, 2001: 102-06; 2006: 124-40; Žižek, 1999: 347-59; 2004a: 73). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rule of
intransitivity. Badiou (2001: 140) philosophises culture subjectively as a "singular interconnected configuration of truth procedures." In a similar vein, Žižek (1999: 144) holds instead that religious ideology "gives body" to Badiou's generic truth. Their difference aside, exceptions of religion and culture have shown that there is still ambiguity concerning how to tell being from the world in the light of subjective truth-events. Hence, there is much room for sociology to reconfigure these sites, as long as sociologists do not rest content with making sense of love by a theodicy of being and becoming of the world, which we will see from Weber's cultural-economic sociology of world religions in chapter 5.

**A separation of love from the world: intention and purpose of the thesis**

In a sociological sense, one is bound to ask: what is love's evental relation with being in the world? Dignifying dance as a metaphor for thought, Badiou (2005a: 65) analyzes that "dance retains only a pure form from sexuation, desire and love: the form that organizes the triptych of the encounter, the entanglement, and the separation. In dance, these three terms are technically coded." Figuring love *qua* separation preserves the event from intermixing with Paz's post-modernist eroticism of "the double flame" and Latour's non-modernist networkism of the "factish", because love, as a thought subtracted from feelings, is much more singular than an "explicitating" desire for attachments and imbroglios (Paz, 1996; Latour, 1999; 2007a; 2007b). If the singular being of an event cannot but disappear from the multiple presentation of being in the real, then a love-event must occur to the world in a manner of separation, marking its place in but not of the world. By separation, love shies away from the obscenity of earthly desires.

As a reader of Badiou, Žižek (2001: 68-78, 142-51) evokes this tragic world of separation by love through a gesture of feminine renunciation of the beloved Other. In counter to the hysterical sacrifice of oneself for the Other, "someone" can reclaim a subjective desire by sacrificing the Other, given that "the Other's decision in me" is blinded, whether naively or cynically, by the desire of the Other. After subtracting one's subjective desire from the Other, an evental site of decision is then opened for a new order of love to be produced. If this is the
case, one errs to criticize the amorous truth procedure in positivist terms, such as familial chauvinism or political Fascism, since the subtractive aim of love is to revolutionize the libidinal economy of the subject in the real. And this aim is supposed to be achieved by the means of separation, the primary issue of which pertains to a dialectical overcoming of Women posited culturally-politically as the master-signifier in a post-patriarchal society (Žižek, 1994: 87-166).

Examined closely, Žižek’s critical analyses of culture and politics are sustained in a religious ideology of love. It appears that he defends a militant politics of love originated in Christianity against messianic mysticism celebrated in (postmodern) Judaism and New Age obscurantism supported by (Western) Buddhism (Žižek, 2000; 2001; 2003). But he is far from calling for a struggle of cultural hegemony in an age of globalization. On the contrary, Žižek’s wage lies in preserving a counter-cultural drive of modernity by releasing a savage form of Western culture from its multicultural positivizations. To subtract the violent drive of love in modernity, Žižek dialecticizes its double religious paradoxes, that is, between Protestantism and Catholicism on one front, and between Christianity and inhumanist atheism on the other front (Žižek, 1994: 41-43; 2001: 127-37; 2003: 122-43; 2008a: 109-18). Žižek works through his dialect of Christianity and modernity by a Hegelian syllogism of Christianity. This dehistoricized syllogism results in his complex strategy to rebuild a passage from faith (salvation and despair, act of love) to belief (ritual, work of love) in the face of impotent knowledge (doctrine, law of death) (Žižek, 1994: 34-41; 2001: 109-13).

It is this religious ideology of love which makes Žižek return from Badiou to Deleuze eventually. In reading Badiou’s Being and Event (2005b[1988]), Žižek retracts the Christian root of Marxism, as he reads Badiou first as an Althusserian, then as a post-Marxist reader of Saint Paul, and finally as an implicit Kantian, only not Kantian enough. Meanwhile, Žižek reconstructs the trunk of German idealism in Marxism, as he reads Badiou first as an anti-psychoanalyst, then as a pre-Kantian metaphysician, and finally as the last
French dogmatist who not only relies on the master's discourse against the discourse of university, but also sometimes regresses into the mystic's non-discourse (Žižek, 1998; 1999: 127-70). Based on the religious root, Žižek (1999: 145-58) plays Saint Paul against Badiou (and then Lacan against Saint Paul and Badiou), protesting that Badiou discounts the negative power of death in life and of betrayal in fidelity. Developing along the philosophical trunk, Žižek ascribes Hegel's notion of concrete university to Saint Paul's teaching, proposing that religion is the "arch-model of ideology", the "symptomnal torsion" of Badiou's four truth procedures (Žižek, 1998). Reading Badiou against Badiou, in short, Žižek tries to embody Badiou's philosophy of the truth-event in a Christian religion of love.

For Badiou, however, the question of ir/religion no longer constitutes a distinct line of social division in the 20th century as it was in the 19th century. Žižek is therefore mistaken by adding Pauline religion to his list of science, art, politics and love. Rather, "[t]he comparison is between philosophy and Paul; that is, between my conception of truth and the Pauline conception of truth" (Badiou in Badiou and Miller, 2005: 40-41). Taking this view, he understands Christian religion in the context of Hebrew culture as opposed to Greek culture. This suggests that a theological worldview remains at the margin of philosophy not because it believes in a sacred God, but because it builds a secular body of Christ as the symbolic support of the Church, State and Society. At bottom, the point of contention between Badiou and Žižek lies in a disembodied, philosophical notion of truth versus an embodied, psychoanalytical notion of truth. The problem of the body begs the Deleuzian question of how a body can be thought as an event, which bears an undecidable relation with ontology and the subject. In this regard, Badiou (2003c: 87) sums up well: "philosophy localizes the void as the condition of truth on the side of being qua being, whereas psychoanalysis localizes the void in the Subject, for the Subject is what disappears in the gap between two signifiers." This means Badiou's subject is situated between being and the event, leaving the world at arm's length, whereas Žižek's subject is equivalent to that very void event between being and the world.
As a consequence, from Badiou's viewpoint, Žižek has no Christian politics of love despite his acute concern for political emergency. On the other hand, in a recent reading of Badiou's *Logic of the Worlds* (2008[2006]), Žižek (2008b: 381-419) openly challenges his philosophical “master” for not being able to deal with being, event and the world on the same theoretical level, and also not being able to practically “give the dictatorship of the proletariat a chance”, provided that Badiou has settled for a pragmatic politics to work *with* the state “at a distance”. Betraying Badiou, Žižek finally takes a stand on Deleuze’s Bartleby life politics, a “saintly” politics of resistance to pseudo-activity such as non-voting as long as it “affects the big Other” (Deleuze, 1998: 68-90; Žižek, 2006: 375-85; 2008a: 151-73; 2008b: 410). He ventures so far as to insist that, facing a “non-subtractive” class divide, even true love (exemplified by Romeo and Juliet) must be sacrificed (Žižek; 2008b: 411). But Žižek’s problem is that there is only a virtual line demarcating life politics from biopolitics in Deleuze’s thought (Žižek, 2008a: 168; 2008b: 412). This means he stakes his philosophy on discriminating Deleuze’s philosophy of science and art from its cultural-political consequences (Žižek, 2004a). This contentious venture of Žižek will be discussed at length in chapter 6 to shed some new light on Durkheim’s work.

By comparison, Badiou remains more sensitive to the actual situation of politics because of his scientific vantage point indifferent to religion. Accordingly, he takes a lucid view toward the knot of love and politics. “Love begins where politics ends” due to their contrary numerical procedures: love is counted from one to infinity via sexuated duality, whereas politics is counted from infinity to one via free distancing (Badiou, 2006: 151). Badiou's politics is infinitely “unbounded” by positive predicates such as the family, race and nation-states, since he fully admits that “everyone on the ground is essentially alone in the immediate solution of problems, and their meetings, or proceedings, have as their natural content protocols of delegation and inquest whose discussion is no more convivial or superegoistical than that of two scientists involved in debating a very complex question” (Badiou, 2006: 76). Implicitly privileging science to art, Badiou's “axiomatic politics” is dismissive of modernist-regulative and postmodernist-aporetic moralities of ought and
perhaps. In effect, "either the egalitarian axiom is present in political statements, or it is not. Consequently, either we are in justice, or we are not" (Badiou, 2006: 99). Badiou's axiomatic politics of eternal presence brings a full circle back to our point of departure, only to rest on the other side of the mobius band, with Baudrillard's aesthetic politics, because Baudrillard, as a post-Maoist like Badiou, remarks similarly that an utopian revolt occurs at "radical presentness...even in its death throes", regarding "every man and society as already totally there, at each moment, in its symbolic exigency" (Baudrillard, 1975: 165).

Following the multiple methodological, theoretical and practical threads intertwined in the works of Baudrillard, Badiou and Žižek, we run up against an issue recurring in every truth-event procedure and life-world apparatus. This is the question of the master-signifer, or sovereignty, which is about how one can understand and change the world anew without “passing through the figure of the master, that is, without either invoking or sacrificing the master” (Badiou, 2005a: 54). Today, it is facile to accept that the world can function smoothly without the need to invoke a master (say, global capitalism or virtual reality), but is is difficult to resist the temptation of sacrificing the master. We have seen how Žižek, in his Deleuzian moment, touches upon the thin red line between life politics and bio-politics. Playing with fire like this, we are only a step away from Latour’s sacrifice of the master for the “love” of the factish provided that we are “well bounded” (Latour, 1999: 22, 29). Outbidding Žižek’s Pauline subject of faith with a reified turn to Frankenstein’s mimicry of Jesus on the cross, Latour invents the end retroactively by technological means, settling with a cosmic morality of care, a political ecology of design (Latour, 2002; 2007b: 10-12; 2008). Latour’s desire of the thing shows how easy the ethical dilemma of a presupposition and yet suspension of the master-signifer can be ignored. After all, it is extremely delicate a matter to maintain subjective fidelity to truth-events at a distance from being in the world. In this strict sense, we suggest love in the figure of separation is the arch-event in which one might still experience such a predicament of life by the hours.

In light of the preceding discussions, one might better understand the
intention and purpose of the thesis constituting the first aim claimed at the start of this introduction. Simply put, our intention is to uncover a conceptual genealogy of true love hidden in the sociological tradition from social science to classical sociology, while our purpose is to discern true love from its simulacra in the discourses of reflexive sociology. Through our genealogical research, we hope to achieve the second aim of the thesis, reconfiguring a conceptual event of love in a form different from the rigid analytic sites of philosophy and sociology diagrammed earlier. But we will not present a diagram of the conceptual event of love until our research journey reaches an end in the conclusion. Instead, here we provide a sketchy theoretical model more in accord with the contents of the thesis. Since our genealogical point of departure is the conception of social science by Comte and Marx inherited from Goethe, our theoretical model of love follows the assumption of fate, only to find parallel views of the act, freedom and risk with minimal difference in reality. In the meantime, this theoretical model organizes the tripartite structure of the thesis, as we review three phases in sociological thought, that is, social science, classical sociology and reflexive sociology. Their objective difference is minimal because social reality, according to the disappearance of love-event, is part and parcel of subjective thought. Therefore, subjective differences in these amorous discourses remain muddled up unless we can develop an evental approach to tell one from another. From Badiou's vantage point of the science-event, the three phases of sociological thought on love largely correspond to the three philosophical orientations toward art, including Aristotole's encyclopedic approach to the love-object in social science, Plato's axiomatic approach to the love-subject in classical sociology, and Parmenides' mystic approach to the love-thing in reflexive sociology (cf. Badiou, 2003c: 69-82). With these theoretical tendencies in mind, we may briefly explain our choice of reading.

The thesis is developed within a modest scope. First, we restrict ourselves to a discontinuous history of sociological reflections on love. As if to present a "pure" sociological genealogy, we feature our reading of Comte and Marx in part I, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel in part II, and Bauman, Giddens, Beck, Luhmann, Parsons and Foucault in part III. However, we engage more with
Comte, Durkheim, and Luhmann, and less with Marx, Weber and Parsons. Meanwhile, we feature several thinkers beyond the sociological curriculum, for example, Badiou, Lowith and Bhaskar in part I, Rose, Žižek and Goethean Marxists (Lukács, Bakhtin and Benjamin) in part II, and social psychologists/psychoanalysts (Riesman, Sennett and Lasch), liberal Marxists (Fromm, Marcuse and Arendt), and Baudrillard in part III. Yet, we deal more with Badiou, Rose and Žižek, and less with Bhaskar, Marxism, social psychology/psychoanalysis and Baudrillard.

Specific reasons for our choice and arrangement are too many to be enumerated in detail, so we indicate only two general lines of concern. Above all, the list is by no means meant to be exhaustive. We suppose that few would deny that a tradition is invented and reinvented retroactively. Moreover, after canonization, contemporaneous currents of thought never form a system without inner contradictions. For example, no one has convinced us why Durkheim and Weber can be read together as sociological fathers rather than failed philosophers or historians. Likewise, no one has explained why Foucault, who never held a post of sociology in his life, should be revered in contemporary sociology, whilst Baudrillard, once a sociological teacher, is largely dismissed except in the circles of literary and art criticism. In view of this, the material is meant to be theoretically consistent with our context of discovery of the love-event. The principle of choice is designed to test the pulse of love in the heart of sociological reason without being dogmatic or eclectic about the so-called sociological tradition. We simply wish to provoke a novel way of thinking between orthodox, heterodox, and transdox sociologists as well as anti-sociologists, reminding all parties concerned that, once upon a time, or twice in fact, there were conceptual seizures of a new world order of love occurred to serious thinkers of social science and classical sociology.

Second, we have excluded a wide range of philosophical (consisting of humanist and feminist) and cultural (consisting of literary and historical) and empirical sociological (consisting of social-political and political-economic) explorations of love from consideration, except to provide a supplementary reading list, which ranges from Singer and Kristeva, through Ariès and Lewis,
to Alberoni and Illouz. We find that they often reproduce stock ideologies of love, failing to think the subject matter creatively enough to meet the intention and purpose of the thesis, probably due to a common lack of an evental dimension in their works. We can also argue that we will examine critically similar methodological assumptions behind these excluded views of love in, say, Weber’s cultural sociology. Besides, a particular meditation on love developed by Bréton and Bataille in the interwar period will not be examined directly, except being critically referred to through their postmodern and poststructural forms of misrepresentation. Contemporaneous with heterodox Marxist sociology from Lukács to Benjamin, post-Durkheimian sociology undoubtedly also has something original to say about love. But we can also argue that we have dealt positively with similar theoretical consequences derived from this intensive view of love, say, in Baudrillard’s sociology of symbolic exchange.

In sum, we believe a restricted recollection of what has been thought about love by canonic sociological theories in the past will guide us to think again supposedly original thought of love in contemporary social theories with a sense of genealogical maturity. Thus, the thesis attempts to seize an event of true love as a long standing concept in the sociological, or rather social scientific, tradition, thereby discerning the love-event from ideological perversions of love mirrored in reflexive sociological discourses due to their collusion with the world. All in all, we have transposed Badiou’s axiomatic politics of justice to our subject matter: there is true love, or there is not.
Part I
From Goethe's Art of Love to
The Social Science of Comte and Marx

Chapter 1 Why Goethe?

After the death of art and philosophy declared by Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger, postmodernist and poststructuralist sophists have grown accustomed to announce the second death of sociology and Marxism. These discourses attempt to mend broken ties with philosophy and theology in our post-communist, multicultural global village. Paradoxically, as indistinct doxas, common senses and tribal consciences are revalued, no discipline is dead since a virtual whole is created in the epistemic series from theology and philosophy to sociology and Marxism. What is really disappearing is a social science of love implied in the projects of Comte and Marx. In this chapter, we will examine the social scientific condition of love prior to the formation and transformation of sociology and Marxism. We will argue that if the thoughts of Comte and Marx are read within the horizons of Saint-Simonianism and Hegelianism, a social science of love produced by positivism and communism will be lost to the dialectic of reason and revolution. Moreover, this common import of love can be put into perspective by introducing Goethe’s legacy of love at the turn of the 19th century. Goethe theorized a civilization of love-life, in which a savage duality of the sexes underlying the Greco-Roman culture was re-cognized so that the ethical kernel of death and renunciation could be extracted out of the dialectic shell of quantity and quality, growth and transit, and/or evolution and revolution. As such, if anything new came out of the thoughts of Comte and Marx, it was a social science of love.

1.1 Reason, revolution and love
At the acme of his systemization of natural sciences, Auguste Comte coined the word “sociology” to mediate his positive philosophy (the historical law of three states) and positive polity (the religion of Humanity), or simply, positivism and altruism. Overseeing the five natural sciences (after
mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology), sociology emerged
to be the sixth science. Undercutting the five cultural religions (after fetishism,
polytheism, monotheism, pantheism and deism/atheism), sociology prepared
for the sixth religion, religion of Humanity. By systematizing not only theories
of knowledge but also practices of love, sociology actually gave birth to the
seventh science called morals. Coincidentally, when Comte set out to change
his focus from a rational organization of knowledge to an emotional
congregation of love in 1844-48, Marx turned his attention away from an
impassioned critique of the ideology of money to a dispassionate analysis of
the power of capitalism. Reduced to modernist stereotypes, stereotypes to be
refuted later, it is as if the cultures of the Enlightenment and romanticism
exchanged their representatives in the parallel "transitions" of Comte's and
Marx's thoughts in the same period. Indeed, the wane and wax of Saint-
Simonianism and Comteanism overlapped with the decline and rise of
Hegelianism and Marxism. The period lasted half a century from the late
1820s to the early 1860s with the turbulent 1848 marking the time of inversion
and vertigo.

Marxism promoted a revolutionary progression from speculative to practical
philosophy (theology→ anthropology→ Marxism) in preparation for an
egalitarian "state" of Communism. Positivism, on the other hand, celebrated
an evolutionary progress from negative to positive philosophy (theology→
metaphysics→ positivism) in establishing an altruistic "church" of Humanity.
Manifestly, just as Marx strove to produce a scientific politics capable of
striking a blow to all state politics, so Comte sought to build a scientific religion
qualified to put an end to all theocratic religions. In the two modes of thought,
the all-embracing question, the question of method, theory and practice knot
together, concerned the conception of a social science (if the term sociology is
limited to Comte), in which science was expected to bring a radical
regeneration of society by way of a religious or political economy. Writing in
the aftermath of the French and English (industrial) revolutions, both Comte
and Marx wondered whether a new order of love was rising in the post-
revolutionary society. Their common insight opened up a transitional ontology
of im/possibility: can love do justice to the eternal return of revolution? Or,
must love occur with a Cultural Revolution of the world?

How could one read Comte and Marx today? First, it's tempting to subsume Comte's and Marx's thoughts under the "Saint-Simonian matrix" (Gane, 2003). The utopian socialist hypothesis has been suggested by Durkheim's study of socialism (Durkheim, 1958: 105-08, 219-21). But Durkheim also declared Montesquieu and Rousseau as the forerunners of sociology (Durkheim, 1960c). Moreover, the image of Durkheim as a positivist turned idealist was the invention of early Parsons' functionalism, which by no means reflects the whole picture of Durkheim's sociology, much less Comte's social science. We will come to Durkheim and Parsons later in the thesis. The point here is to see that reading Comte and Marx from the Saint-Simonian matrix does not lead us back to the source as hoped, but rather exposes our institutionalized idea of sociology in a series of difference and deference from Durkheim to Parsons. Thus, tracing a conceptual genealogy of love from the history of sociological thought must begin by breaking the mirroring relation between modernity and sociology. Specifically, one must renounce the very exceptional view of modernity, identifying sociology with an exclusive host country or region, such as American, English, German and/or French history and society. With regard to the matter of love, in particular, there is no host of origin, only disseminating hospitality of an origin.

Marx at least found an English connection to French socialism. Deriding Bruno's "absolute critical criticism" in The Holy Family (1845), Marx (in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 4: 124-34) argued that the early 19th century socialism comes from French materialism of the 18th century in order to overturn the metaphysical outlook of philosophy in the 17th century (Descartes' metaphysics, Spinoza, Leibniz and Malebranche). Furthermore, French materialism originates not only in French physicalism (Descartes' physics, Le Roy, La Mettrie and Bayle) but also English empiricism (Duns Scotus' nominalism, Bacon, Hobbes and Locke). In effect, French materialism is but a disavowed Spinozian pantheism promoting the popular belief of thinking matter. In this strict sense, French Enlightenment could be understood as a philosophy of commonsense binding deism with pantheist materialism. As a
continuation to his doctoral thesis on Epicurean materialism, Marx intended to overcome French materialism, inventing a German materialism based on the history of contradictory production. But it was Engels in Anti-Dühring (1878) who canonized Marx's materialism into a post-Hegelian dialectical philosophy inspired by a Spencerian history of science. As a result, Marx's materialism is distinguished from French materialism not only because French utopian socialism has a metaphysical root in English empiricism, but also because Marx's socialism is based on a scientific basis, whether it agrees with Engel's version of "scientific socialism" or not.

In light of Marx's analysis, Comte's positivism cannot be mistaken for French socialism since it seeks to transcend metaphysics as such. Indeed, it is along the lineage of French materialism derived from English empiricism and French rationalism that one would misread Comte. This accounts for the early excitement and later disappointment of eminent British positivists, such as Mill, Lewes and Spencer, about Comte's positive philosophy and polity. Confronted by French socialism, in fact, Comte broke off from Saint Simon's utopian activism in 1824 to develop his positive philosophy of sciences since 1826 (Coser, 1977: 16). His positive polity of religion elaborated since 1846 also differed sharply from Prosper Enfantin and Claire Bazard's sexual revolution for la femme libre in the 1830s (Gane, 1993: 114-19), since the female messianic "rehabilitation of the flesh" rebuilt only a masculine projection of feminine holism to help release the sexual fantasy of men. Alienated from feminists (Saint-Simonians, George Sand, Charles Fourier, Flora Tristan), women's rights activists (Jeanne Deroin and Désirée Gay) as well as antifeminists (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Jules Michelet) of his contemporaries, Comte "defended the family" and "celebrated the so-called feminine qualities of nurturing, love and empathy...to the construction of a new, more compassionate and harmonious society" (Pickering, 1996: 16, 20-21). Logically, Comte's "universal order" of love adopted an impossible position of overcoming the sexual division of faculties as well as gendered division of spheres by fatally embracing them.

A similar provocation could be heard from Marx's and Engels' ironic remarks
about Edgar's "tranquility of knowledge" in The Holy Family (1845). Edgar had argued against writers like Tristan, Béraud and Proudhon on the issues of production, prostitution and property. While dismantling Edgar's "faded, widowed Hegelian philosophy", Marx and Engels, however, did not simply side with Edgar's interlocutors. In the section on love written by Marx (Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 4: 21-22), he introduced his notion of "uncritical" love: "Herr Edgar changes love into a 'goddess', a 'cruel goddess' at that, by changing man who loves, the love of man, into a man of love; by making 'love' a being apart, separate from man and as such independent...the beloved is a sensuous object, and if Critical Criticism is to condescend to recognition of an object, it demands at the very least a senseless object. But love is an un-Critical, un-Christian materialist...Critical love 'is careful above all not to forget the cause behind the personality, for that cause is none other than the cause of humanity.' Un-Critical love does not separate humanity from the personal, individual man."

Given the above, Comte and Marx could not be assimilated into the matrix of Saint-Simonian socialism. Unlike Comte, moreover, Marx was a foreigner and outsider to Saint-Simon's circle. Hence, both imitated the act of Jesus Christ insofar as socialism could be regarded as a modern repetition of the early Christian community. That is, the subjective positions of Comte and Marx would become closer if we see them as loving traitors, as opposed to blind lovers, of Saint-Simon's utopian socialism. For the true love of socialism, they dared to betray their master to come up with a scientific religion and politics of love. Conversely, dismissing the religious and political implications of love in the writings of Comte and Marx would risk reducing them to either madness or platitude. This means identifying Comte's and Marx's thoughts with their historical personalities as chauvinists, misogynists and/or authoritarians would miss the mark. Committed to change their contemporary social order in practice, Comte's and Marx's theories could no longer be identified with idealism-realism or essentialism-constructivism. Akin to dramatic art, their science initiates one to an objective order of belief before the abyss of subjectivity.
Second, it's equally tempting to explain Comte and Marx with reference to Hegel (Marcuse, 1955). This represents a Western Marxist hypothesis of revolution. It describes the downfall of Hegelianism (and Hegelian Marxism by extension) and the rise of positive social theory represented by Comte, Friedrich J. Stahl and Lorenz von Stein. However, Comte's work attracted only belated and negative attention (except Nietzsche) in Germany (Heilbron, 1995: 260-62; Gane, 2006: 50). Hence, it looks strikingly odd to introduce Comte into modern German philosophy from Hegel to Marx, as if Comte interrupted the flow of revolutionary reason. But Marcuse (1955: 357) maintains that "the positivist program of social reform foreshadows liberalism's turn into authoritarianism". This judgment is produced less by the modernization of the West towards liberal capitalism than by the nationalization of Germany from the Weimar Republic to National Socialism. For an outspoken liberal democrat, in fact, the identification of Comte as an authoritarian in the spectrum of French politics from 1848 to 1851 is correlated to the development of fascism in Germany from 1920 to 1933 (Aron, 1968: 303-04). Accordingly, it is more reasonable to regard the crisis analysis of Hegelian Marxism as a reflection of the downfall of Comteanism and the rise of German sociology shaped by Weberians and the Frankfurt school. It is this political-intellectual context which allows Marcuse (1955: 343, 360) to assert that Comte theorizes from "the fundamental conviction of idealism" and only comes up with "the idea of humanity to make amends for the oppressive atmosphere". In short, Marcuse's Western Marxist hypothesis is motivated by his historicist conviction to democratic politics in the guise of historical objectivity.

A closer look at the intellectual contexts between 1830 and 1850 shows a parallel but zigzag development of positive philosophy in France and Germany. About one year after the death of his mentor Saint-Simon and his marriage with Caroline Massin, Comte's began his personal lectures on the philosophy of positive sciences in March 1826, but they came to an abrupt close due to his mental breakdown. Since the resumption of his work in 1829, Comte completed his entire lectures across the 1830s and meanwhile published *Cours de Philosophie Positive* in six volumes between 1830 and
1842. This decade saw the crisis of the Saint-Simonians, so it's not hard to see that Comte's scientific socialism competed against Saint-Simon's religious socialist disciples.

In Germany, on the other hand, the 1830s marked the rise of young Hegelians after the death of Hegel (in 1831). Later on, as Friedrich William IV came in power in 1840, his Minister of Culture invited Schelling over to Berlin from München to "destroy the dragon seed" of Hegelianism. Along with Kierkegaard and Bakunin in the packed audience, Engels (in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 2: 181) reported in 1841 Schelling's "dominion over German public opinion in politics and religion" from the latter's lecture hall. In the development of German idealism, Schelling's Naturphilosophie (up to his Jena years between 1803 and 1806) has been logically understood as objective idealism, marking the transitional phase between Fichte's subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism. Historically, however, Schelling's objective idealism of nature returned with a new face of "positive" philosophy of existence to dethrone Hegel's "negative" philosophy of reason. It remains a controversy as to whether Schelling has a systematic philosophy to integrate his romanticism, mysticism and positivism, but these gaps capture exactly Schelling's anti-Hegelian stance.

Indeed, Schelling had to revolt like a romantic against Hegel's theological rationalism; meanwhile, Comte had to argue like a rationalist against Saint-Simon's new religious romanticism. In this regard, the historical terms of rationalism and romanticism have reached their limitation in understanding the import of positive philosophy, much less any political judgment in terms of authoritarianism and liberalism.¹ Hence the difference between the two

¹ Marcuse (1955: 324) does notice from the outset the contributions to positive philosophy by Schelling as well as Comte on the ground that both sought "to counter the sway of apriorism and to restore the authority of experience". Nonetheless, he fails to draw further implications from this, but rather turns to introduce Stahl's theory of the state as the political version of Schelling's positive philosophy. The reason is that Marcuse is confused by the disagreement between Comte's focus on factual law and Schelling's interest in experiential freedom. He doesn't even entertain the possibility of a coincidence of opposites from a Hegelian view. However, he has no qualm to subsume Comte's rationalism and Stahl's anti-rationalism under the same banner of positive social theory. Marcuse's self-contradiction is a result of his social democratic bias, as if any positive social theory could be demonized as the authoritarian
versions of positive philosophy is the result of a particular social-historical situation.

Besides Schelling, the arch young Hegelian Feuerbach came up with a self-contradictory view of philosophy. Two years after *The Essence of Christianity* in which the first anthropological interpretation of religion was risked, Feuerbach published *Principle of the Philosophy of the Future* in 1843 to depart from the criticism of Hegelian theology in arriving at a quasi-positive statement of the new philosophy. "The new philosophy rests on the truth of love and feeling. In love and in feeling generally, every man confesses the truth of the new philosophy. The new philosophy itself is basically nothing other than the essence of feeling elevated to consciousness; it only affirms in reason and with reason what every man – the real man – professes in his heart. It is the heart made into mind. The heart does not want abstract, metaphysical, or theological objects; it wants real and sensuous objects and beings" (Feuerbach, 1966: 53-54, sec. 34).

Feuerbach’s new philosophy is formulated through the application of art to religion: first “art ‘depicts the truth in sensation’”, and then “just as in art, so it is in religion. Sensuous perception, and not the imagination, is the essence of the Christian religion; it is the form and organ of the highest and divine being” (Feuerbach, 1966: 56-57, sec. 39-40). In a reflexive move, the object of philosophy turns into the sensuous subject, Man: “not only ‘external’ things are objects of the senses. Man is given to himself only through the senses; he is an object of himself only as an object of the senses. The identity of subject and object, which in self-consciousness is only an abstract idea, is truth and reality only in man’s sensuous perception of man” (Feuerbach, 1966: 58, sec. 41). Hence the division of nature and man, anthropology and physiology in the new philosophy: “[t]he new philosophy makes man – with the inclusion of nature as the foundation of man – the unique, universal and highest object of philosophy. It thus makes anthropology, with the inclusion of physiology, the universal science” (Feuerbach, 1966: 70, sec. 54).
Feuerbach's new philosophy can only be pseudo-positive since the essence of his sensuous Christian philosophy is retained in the love of Man, stopping short before Comtean Humanity. Stated otherwise, Feuerbach performs an imaginary leap from the theological to the positive state, conflates essence with existence, and eventually gets himself trapped in the metaphysical replacement of God by Man. In light of this, a fine distinction should be kept between Feuerbach's metaphysical humanism and the scientific humanism of Comte and Marx.

It was after their Paris meeting in 1844 that Marx and Engels launched their polemic against Saint-Simonians and young Hegelians in writings like *The Holy Family* (1845) and *The Germany Ideology* (1845). Their life-long collaboration often makes readers overlook some underlying differences in relation to positive and negative philosophies. In his "business to follow the course of his [Schelling's] thinking and to shield the great man's [Hegel's] grave from abuse", Engels considered Schelling "the new enemy" early on in 1841 (Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 2: 187). He expressed his hostility in two pamphlets *Schelling and Revelation* and *Schelling, Philosopher in Christ* first published anonymously in early 1842 (Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 2: 607-08). Marx had no involvement in this debate.

A strong opinion against positive philosophy, furthermore, leaned toward young Hegelianism (Strauss, Bauer, Stirner, Ruge, etc) which culminated in Feuerbach's inconsistent philosophy. With no open critique of positive philosophy, Marx (in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 5: 3-5) held a radical view of Feuerbach in *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845). His idea of praxis is based on a vision of social humanity: the 11th thesis ("The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") is the logical result of the 10th thesis ("The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity."). Further, this is derived from Marx's difference from Feuerbach in the 6th thesis: "Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the
ensemble of the social relations."

Consistent with his early polemic against positive philosophy, on the other hand, Engels became entangled with Feuerbach’s philosophy after Marx’s death. This can be seen in the two independent pieces of work, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886). In *Ludwig Feuerbach* (1886), Engels suggested that it was Feuerbach rather than Marx who brought an end to German idealism, ironically due to the philosophy of sensuous love. "But love! – yes, in Feuerbach love is everywhere and at all times the miracle-working god called on to help surmount all difficulties of practical life...Love one another – fall into each other's arms regardless of distinction as to sex or estate – a universal orgy of reconciliation!" (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 26: 381) However, in *The Origin of the Family* (1884), Engels himself introduced an egalitarian sexual politics called "individual sex love" to the communist movement. Modern socialist feminism hasn’t been able to fully appreciate this work since it is read as a historical anthropological study to abolish the family, private property and the state. As such, Engels advanced very little from what had been noted by (Marx's study of) Morgan's *Ancient Society*. Rather, his original point was to propose "individual sex love", thereby superseding the structural contradiction of monogamous family which determines class contradiction in the bourgeois society in the last instance (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 26: 170-90). His concept of sex love "differs essentially from the simple sexual desire, the eros, of the ancients" in three aspects: first, "the woman stands on a par with the man"; second, "to possess each other, they confront great hazards, even risking life itself" with "a degree of intensity and permanency"; third, "whether it arose from mutual love or not" (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 26: 184). As a neo-tribal sign for the arrival of communism, the idea of individual sex love was reconfirmed to Engels in "a recently discovered case of group marriage" in 1892 (Engels, 1985: 195-222; Engels in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 27: 348-51). All in all, he intended to align the revolutionary practice of individual sex love to the working class.
It has been argued that Engel's ennoblement of individual sex love represents a radicalization, if not direct reversal, of his early position on gender relations in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1845) as a result of his relationship with Mary Burns. Meanwhile, it represents an implicit indictment of the gap between Marx's theory and practice due to his marriage with Jenny von Westphalen (Gane, 1993: 83-104, 141-55). Unlike Marx's duplicity, Engels generalized his personal relationship with Mary Burns into a theoretical statement, expecting that a transgression of class difference via reciprocal intimacy would be conducive to the withering away of the family, private property and the state. He had every right on a personal level to protest against the Marx couple for mistreating Burns; on the theoretical level, however, he went too far and too soon in putting egalitarian politics before revolutionary politics. Acting out his authorial sincerity, Engels committed a romantic fallacy in the same way as Feuerbach did.

In the final analysis, the issue comes back to where Marx and Engels stood with regard to Hegel's negative philosophy. This could be clarified from Engels' other two independent pieces of work written a few years before Marx's death, *Anti-Dühring* (1878) and *Dialectic of Nature* (1883). Clearly, the metaphysical question of nature which had preoccupied early Schelling returned to haunt Engels as he sought to identify social with natural change in his dialectical materialism. Engels' new methodology was laid out earlier in *Herr Dühring's Revolution in Science* (1878). An extended version of its general statement was later published in French in 1880 and then translated into English in 1892 as a separate pamphlet authorized by Engels himself. In the pamphlet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels argued a distinction of utopian and scientific socialism according to his naturalistic dialectic. But Marx's short introduction to the French edition complicates the authorship of dialectical materialism, as if Marx endorsed Engels' naturalized Hegelianism through Spencer. In light of the above, there is room for doubt. At least with regard to positive philosophy, Marx is brought closer to Comte's love of Humanity than to Engels' individual sex love.

All in all, reading the works of Comte and Marx within the intellectual contexts
of Saint-Simonianism and Hegelianism generally prioritizes reason (science and industry) and revolution (politics and culture) at the expense of love. For both Durkheimians and Western Marxists, the observation of modernity presupposes a dependent relationship of Britain, France and Germany in the following scenario. After changing into a relatively liberal bourgeois state since 1640 (the Royal revolution), Britain led a scientific revolution in the late 17th century and the industrial revolution in the early 19th century with the mediation of the British (English and Scottish) Enlightenment (from empiricist philosophy to political economy) in the 18th century. As an absolutist state, France politicized the British experience to create the French Enlightenment (the philosophes) in the 18th century by overturning its 17th century metaphysics, which culminated in the French revolution. Playing a leading role of Reformation in the 16th century made the progress of Germanic states religiously and culturally forward on the one hand and yet scientifically, economically and politically backward on the other. Hence, as the British and the French revolutionized economic and political realities, the German conducted a revolution of the mind from Kant to Hegel. In this world-historic grand narrative, the production, reproduction and consumption of knowledge always circle around the social use and abuse of reason and revolution.

Rejecting the Eurocentric grand narrative won’t release the thoughts of Comte and Marx from the grip of grandeur. In fact, Marx and Comte are themselves the first grand narrators or architects to dare dreaming the future of society. Following the grand narrative, instead, we might consider Comte and Marx as singular minds with respect to their national characters by way of excess rather than exception. Simply put, Marx is more German than Hegel whilst Comte is more French than Saint-Simon. First, Comte subjects Saint-Simonian religion to a philosophical scrutiny whilst Marx subjects Hegelian philosophy to a political critique. Then, both apply their new found approach to a cognitive remapping of industrial capitalism, responding to the economic malaise of modern society with a scientific reconstruction of religion or politics beyond theology and philosophy. Encountering at the gap between theory and practice, they both grow larger than their national characters, speaking for the love of humanity as citizens of the world. With this tacit alliance, they meet
1.2 Goethe's love-life, death and renunciation

To appreciate the cogenesis of sociology and Marxism in a social scientific condition of love, one must return to the poet Goethe and his age. It is our hypothesis that Goethe wrote for the future, prefiguring Comtean positivist religion and Marxian communist politics to come. Simply put, Goethe created a legacy of love based on a futuristic vision of modernity. We can argue the case as follows. First, we challenge the cultural conception of modernity as it draws on opposing historical hypotheses of the Enlightenment and romanticism to explain the revolutionary event around 1789. The cultural-historical causation of modernity is liable to overlook Goethe's legacy of love, and so undervalue the roles of sociology and Marxism in reconfiguring modernity. Second, we examine the reductive interpretations of Goethe as a romantic, a classicist and a Kantian. Third, we conduct a selective analysis of Goethe's literary work to recognize the ethic of death and renunciation as his legacy of love.

It is a common practice to dichotomize the Enlightenment and romanticism, regarding them as cultural-historical antecedents of modernity. Gay's (1967; 1969) interpretation gives a sweeping formula of the Enlightenment. He argues that the Enlightenment begins with an ideological weakening of the Catholic belief by pagan philosophy, natural science and art, and results in an institutional emulation of the European absolutist states with the Roman Church. Gay's portrayal of the Enlightenment, spanning across the latter half of the 17th century and the entire 18th century, goes beyond the Augustan or classical humanist tradition of Erasmus and Bacon to identify a neo-pagan origin of modernity. This is represented by the social criticism and philosophy of Diderot, Voltaire, Hume and Kant on the one hand, and the science and literature of Newton, Lessing and Rousseau on the other. "The Enlightenment was a volatile mixture of classicism, impiety, and science; the philosophes, in a phrase, were modern pagans" (Gay, 1967: 8). Resisting the autocracy of kings, aristocrats and priests, these savants, especially the French philosophes, claimed their own authority by unleashing the social force of
knowledge drawn from natural reason. In this sense, Gay's interpretation is
tendentiously idealistic since the agents of social change are primarily the
philosophes, empirical scientists, and neoclassic artists, leaving out the
believing mass population. Accordingly, the pagan nature of knowledge is
 overstated insofar as the deistic rationale of the philosophes themselves is
dismissed in an overly intellectualist account. In result, the historical impact of
the Reformation upon the Enlightenment is turned into a break of the modern
pagan mode of thought from the ancient humanist-neo-Stoicism (Gay, 1967:

But even when one takes structural explanans into account, such as the end
of the War of Religion (1562-1598), the rise of imperial wars between state
powers since the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the steady increase of
population, the emergence of towns and cities, the expansion of plantation
economy (particularly tobacco) and so on, the Enlightenment still looks like a
civilizing process of the European social system insulated from the rest of the
world. It's hence worth noting that the 18th century began with thirty golden
years of piracy (1700-1730) which led to a legalized government of the
overseas trade (of goods and slaves) by the European states, particularly
after the Netherlands, France and England took over the Portuguese and
Spanish monopoly of the world market.

Placing the Enlightenment in the wider context of colonization, Clarke (1997)
provides us with an alternative view of the Oriental Enlightenment progressing
from the age of the Enlightenment to that of romanticism. Indeed, apart from
the philosophes, scientists and artists, the social carriers of the Enlightenment
should also include other lesser-known cultural messengers, such as civil
servants, entrepreneurs and adventurers, at the frontier of the West: The
apparent outcome is the introduction and assimilation of Chinese and Indian
thoughts and artifacts (if not yet practices adopted until the 1960s) in the
West, and vice versa. Focusing on ideas, Clarke (1997: 60) argues that "just
as philosophes projected onto Confucian China their concept of polity
governed by wise and philosophically educated rulers, so the Romantics
projected onto India their idea of a more realized human existence and a
more holistic and spiritually driven culture." In other words, "just as
Confucianism had offered the philosophes a model for a rationalist, deist
philosophy, so the Hinduism of the Upanishads offered an exalted
metaphysical system which resonated with their own idealistic assumptions,
and which provided a counterblast to the materialistic and mechanistic
philosophy that had come to dominate the Enlightenment period" (Clarke,
1997: 61).

Nonetheless, Clarke's thesis of the Oriental Enlightenment, inspired by Said's
problematic theory of Orientalism, has assumed the projection of the Western
gaze onto the East as "romanticization" (Clarke, 1999: 19). Whilst gaining a
critical perspective to anatomize the colonial power/knowledge, this approach
not only undermines the truth value of the Enlightenment, but also threatens
the validity of the Oriental Enlightenment itself, for nothing could be learnt
from the East and everything recoils to a cultural-psychological projection of
power. As one's historical standpoint is turned from the truthful Enlightenment
to fantastic romanticization, the question returns to the change of
consciousness from rationality to madness within the European social
systems.

In this regard, Berlin's (1999[1965]: 1) lectures on the roots of romanticism
presents a provocative argument to account for "the greatest single shift in the
consciousness of the West" between 1760 and 1830. Berlin (1999: 14-20)
guards against all analytical definitions of romanticism due to their tendency
toward incoherence (such as Lovejoy's difficulty in accounting for the
coexistence of primitivism and dandyism), and yet he calls for a historical
conception of romanticism as a revolution "against everything" instead of
revolution with a cause. Firstly, romanticism induces a change in the
fundamental rules of judgment from a belief of truth to a faith in character, or
from a compromise with errors to a display of martyrdom for incompatible
worldviews (Berlin, 1999: 9-13). Secondly, romanticism emerges from "the first
attack on Enlightenment" by rationalism and empiricism (Montesquieu and
Hume) themselves before it is challenged by Johann Georg Hamann's
German Pietism (Berlin, 1999: ch. 2). Thirdly, Berlin (1999: ch. 3-4) identifies
several “true fathers of romanticism” (Hamann, Herder, Kant and Rousseau as a borderline case) and recognizes some “restrained romantics” (Kant, Schiller and Fichte). Fourthly, an “unbridled” romantic movement heralded by August Wilhelm Schlegel explores the inexhaustible depth of the self merging with a mystified world of nostalgia, paranoia and irony (Berlin, 1999: ch. 5). Fifthly, Berlin (1999: ch. 6) reflects on “the lasting effects” of romanticism, stressing the shift of ethical judgment from consequence to motive (i.e. sincerity) as a cause of the swing between Fascist violence and liberal tolerance in contemporary politics. In the final analysis, Berlin (1999: 119) renders his historical view of romanticism: the romantic individual’s “indomitable will” self/creates an infinite “flow of the universe” out of nothing since “no structure of things” is presumed in the first place.

Berlin’s view might be regarded as a romantic definition of romanticism due to its holistic and self-referential character. Discarding analytical understanding altogether, Berlin is unable to recognize romanticism without generalizing the other side of romanticism. If romanticism is understood as the construction of abyssal mystery, the other side is relegated to a pre-romantic “jigsaw puzzle” of the truth of things soluble by “virtuous knowledge,” thereby rendered historically indistinguishable by itself. The underlying presumption of a dualism of order and chaos undermines Berlin’s claim about the radical impact of romanticism upon modernity because all post-romantic attempts at a reconstruction of social order, from positivism to Marxism and beyond, would be dismissed as either pre-romantic authoritarianism or trans-romantic Fascist liberalism. Given the case, Berlin reduces the reality of irony to a psychological projection, undervaluing its social effects in our technological modernity. As social systems are increasingly ruled by digital and genetic engineering, an irony may no longer be subject to relativist and/or nihilist perspectives, but is embodied in the order of things themselves. Not exclusive to romanticism, in short, an irony can be “objective” as much as it is subjective. Thus understood, the problem boils down to his failure to admit that romanticism maintains an umbilical cord with the negative reason of the Enlightenment: romanticism is a revolt against the Enlightenment. Without accepting this objective irony, no modern love can be approached social
scientifically untainted by romantic mystification.

The Occidental tradition of love was initially shaped by the Greek public eros, the Christian universal agape and the French's provincial courtly amour. By contrast, a modern conception of love is subordinate to cultural-historical mentalities of the Enlightenment and romanticism. From the modern standpoint, love, in its European identity, originates in romanticism, preferring passion to reason. However, this opinion risks reducing modern love to what we call the romantic fallacy, the assumption that passion, for its spontaneity and sincerity, could reclaim truth from the dominion of rational calculation. But passion is no less affected than reason; essentially, they might not even oppose to each other, for mysterious passion merely deepens the profoundness of the truthful reason. In this sense, romanticism could be better seen as the historical embodiment of irony by its "natural" revolt against the Enlightenment's negative reason. In a word, romanticism exemplifies Hegel's negation of negation. The French Enlightenment is "idealistically" believed to be the consequence of scientific revolution and the cause of political revolution. Developed largely in England and Germany, however, romanticism bore "historical" proximity to the political and economic revolutions which rocked European modernity out of the imaginary into a real order. This real order is reflected in the convoluted form of romanticism caught by a love-hate complex towards aspects of tradition and modernity, such as belief and reason, or religion and art. In terms of idea, if love's heart were romantic by default, it would invoke an "innocent reason" in excess of the knowledge of reason, as we learn from Pascal's revision of Cartesianism. In historical terms, however, the French Enlightenment did not exist until the overthrow of the ancien régime in 1789, for if France had been an enlightened state (that is to say, if France had not had an absolutist king to resist the economic independence of the bourgeoisie in a populated city of Paris), the Revolution would not have happened. Therefore, it was romanticism which released the critical force of the Enlightenment reason to the point of perversion after the event.

As a literary movement, the golden age of romanticism spans the years from
1770 to 1830 across Europe, especially in England. For, it was English romanticism which got collectivized into a bourgeois experience in the late romantic, Victorian society since 1837 (or the reform Act of 1832). In light of this, one could distinguish four analytic dimensions of romanticism. The first dimension stresses on folklore or popular art in general, the antecedent of nationalism. This proto-historical character is derived from fairy tales collected by the Grimm brothers, von Herder’s study of folk songs, and the study of old ballads by Joseph Addison and Richard Steele. Prominent examples are the timeless Shakespeare and von Goethe. The second dimension revolves around emotion, nature and exotic cultures. This proto-social character comes from romantic poems by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth, Percy Bysshe Shelley and John Keats. Representative figures include the transnational Rousseau, Lord Byron and von Goethe. The third dimension extends to the neo-Gothic representation of medievalism. It is rooted in the folk tales of Robin Hood and King Arthur, as well as Horace Walpole’s Castle of Otranto. This historically regressive feature may be seen in the novels of Walter Scott, Mary Shelly and the Bronte sisters. The fourth dimension turns toward the Victorian cult of social individuals. They are inspired by individual geniuses, such as Napoleon Bonaparte’s saga, Lord Byron’s poetry and Beethoven’s music. This socially progressive feature may be further seen from everyday heroes in Heine’s poems and even Dickens’ novels. In these four dimensions, specific meanings and examples may contradict to each other, but self-contradiction is exactly what characterizes romanticism. Nonetheless, they reveal a logical development of romanticism from eternal nature to historical society in a paradox of continuous rupture. In other words, why did the “Great Chain of Being” (Lovejoy) break up? How did willful passion arise from lawful nature? When did human society emerge out of natural reason in a historical turn? These are puzzling questions not just about evolution but about the genesis of evolution. The evolutionary meaning of genesis has changed from theological creationism through historical genealogy to the biological genetics of individuals in society.

If romanticism was the prodigal son of the Enlightenment, and romanticism, especially in the English case, had a social existence more in the wake of its
literary imagination, then the actual revolutionary sentiment and act between 1770 and 1830 couldn't be represented *contemporaneously* by the French Enlightenment (before 1770) or English romanticism (after 1830), and hence should be captured, we suggest, by the transfiguration of German cultural revolution in itself. Moreover, even such a cultural revolution is often unduly referred to as German romanticism, since Goethe, however representative he might be to his age, presents a highly questionable case to romanticism. Here, the word "revolution" should be recovered to its original sense of over/turning, which is manifested in the very *passage* of incompatible systems of thought, such as classicism, enlightenment and romanticism, providentialism, scientism and mysticism, and/or transcendence, transcendententalism and idealism, finally making up a structural reference to the dynamic of the modern world in its aspects of modernism, formalism and hyperrealism. It is in this sense that Goethe in Weimar of Prussia produced his drama of love.

To "understand" Goethe, it is crucial to acknowledge an irony of truth in the gap between life and art: while the last whole man Goethe left every single detail of his life in diaries, correspondences and autobiographies, a definitive account of his life to do justice on both literary and biographical levels becomes unattainable. This irony is largely responsible for the inconsistent images of Goethe as a Kantian poet, a romantic biologist and a neo-classic humanist (Boyle, 2000; Richards, 2002; Armstrong, 2007), and the confusion could be clarified by looking for a legacy of love Goethe has bequeathed to the world behind the curtains of German philosophy, politics, science and art. Forsaking the practice of law, he grew into a poet, a scientist, and a lover. Goethe the poet, the novelist and the dramatist composed sophisticated masterpieces, including *The Sorrows of Young Werther*, *Wilhelm Meister*, *Elective Affinity* and *Faust*, amongst others. Goethe the scientist was involved with many pioneering projects, ranging from the study of minerals and animal anatomy to the study of plants, animal electricity and colours. Goethe the lover matched his science and art with numerous covert and overt erotic relationships with family and friends, regardless of class, sex and age, to synthesize the Enlightenment concept of nature with the Romantic concept of
life. Goethe's legacy of love, in short, exemplifies a way of natural life. But his natural life has to be distinguished from Rousseau's Emile (innocent savagery) as well as Voltaire's Candide (skeptical civilization) in that life, for Goethe, follows a rule of love in learning an act of renunciation from the experience of death. The resulting new order of love, we will argue, does not revolve around the dialectic of reason and revolution, but an experience of death and renunciation.

At the center of Weimar's courtly politics, Goethe was intellectually and/or personally familiar with all great minds emerging from the odd coupling of Kantian philosophy and French revolution, including Schiller, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Hölderlin, Hegel, Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, Schopenhauer, and so on. Heavily influenced by philosophical ideas and yet without becoming a philosopher, Goethe conducted a search for truth through his work of art. Meanwhile, because of a quasi-autobiographical lining to his work, Goethe's art and life were entwined in a web of love adventures, a love-life as we call it. So, how should one approach his love-life? Goethe is well known for his love to his family (his wife Christiane, son August, and the Frauenplan house) as well as romantic attachments, infatuations, and affairs. To the contemporary eyes, such ambivalence is symptomatic of an ennobled middle-class patriarch. Far from it, this shows his love did not fall prey to an imaginary romanticization of extramarital relationships as opposed to the family and society. Contrary to ambivalence, Goethe's love was larger than romantic passion since he had poeticized all of his personal relationships in an erotic ambiance. By Goethe's impossible demand to love all, everyone and everything, love turns into an unrequited, foreclosed tragedy. This is why his life and art are entwined together in love stories, transfiguring fractured love within the conflicted social structures into a hope of love-life. To elucidate

2 A round portrayal of love must defy social classification, and this is also true in Goethe's case. His loyalty with male friends such as Karl August and Schiller amongst others and his interest in homosexuality during his Italian trip can always provoke curious lines of analysis, if beyond the boundary of academic chastity. His love for children, exemplified in Werther's personality, appears beyond doubt, especially for his son August. His romantic liaisons with females go beyond class, social-marital and age divides to include Gretchen (his professed first love), Friederike Brion, Charlotte Buff, Lili Schönemann, Charlotte von Stein, Christiane Vulpia, Minna Herzlieb, Ulrike Levetzow, and many more flirtatious or casual relationships with actresses, widows, ladies and models.
Goethe’s love-life, therefore, one should drop the distinction between literary fiction and biographical reality to examine his literary artwork directly as an esthetic of appearance. On the basis of appearance, moreover, Goethe’s love-life needs to find an objective nature to complete, not impair, his art of truth. His interest in natural science, that is to say, helped to redefine a close encounter between nature and life.

By taking romantic biology “as a species of the wider genus of German nature philosophy”, Goethe is understood as an archetypical romantic biologist to prefigure Darwin’s romantic concept of life which highlights the “aesthetic and the moral dimensions of the science of biology” (Richards, 2002: 8, 512). The philosophical premise is that “Spinoza would set him [i.e. Goethe] on the path that would lead to Kant and then to the Romantics” (Richards, 2002: 396). Such a genealogy of romanticism levels out Kant’s three Critiques to marry post-Kantian idealism with Spinozist pantheism because from the moral-aesthetic judgment (a preference for the third Critique shared by idealists from Schiller to Hegel), the Self can be reunited with God through the mediation of Nature. Hence, highlighting Goethe’s trip to Italy (1786-88) as the romantic breakpoint, Richards (2002: ch. 10-11) presents the poet’s early art around “the eroticization of nature” in the female form, and his late science around “a morphological science of life” which is the forerunner of evolutionary biology beyond his early interest in animal anatomy (Goethe’s alleged discovery of the intermaxillary bone in humans in 1784). This dramatic narrative, however, reduces Goethe’s art to post-Kantian morality, idealizing the progression from nature to art on essential and historical grounds (i.e. from essential nature/historical art to historical nature/essential art) (Richards, 2002: 392-94). In effect, there is no real life concern for nature and art in Goethe’s work. This inattention to real life is reflected paradoxically in Richards’ (2002: 382-83) valorization of revolution as a romantic self-discovery or rebirth. Ironically, Goethe’s legacy of love regarding death and renunciation is buried since the romantic concept of love has been subjected to an infinite concept of life.

Armstrong’s recent thematic storytelling applies Goethe’s life and work to a neoclassic ethic of being “happy in an imperfect world”. Armstrong reads
Goethe from a humanist view of life to imagine the renunciation of death and immature love. His method of reading is straightforward: "[i]t is how you respond to the problem itself (being confronted by the impossible choice between two loves) rather than how you get into it that is interesting" (Armstrong, 2007: 90). Hence, suicidal love in Werther and triangular love in Stella are negative points of reference: "Werther is on the road to ruin, not because of the faults of the world, but because of some flaw in his inner condition." "Within the worlds of these works, there is no adequate response to such problems – there is only a fantasy solution (let's all love one another) or death" (Armstrong, 2007: 62, 90-91). Given as such, Armstrong (2007: 65) reads Goethe subsequent work like Wilhelm Meister and Faust as "epics of personal growth" in response to the early problem of sentimentality. Above all, Wilhelm Meister is read alongside Goethe's friendship with Schiller on the agreement of an classical art of politics "to ennoble us, to make us whole and balanced...to promote a kind of lucid inner stillness and equilibrium...centred and calm, vital but poised like an ideal Greek athlete...to spread energetic sanity" (Armstrong, 2007: 255-56). In this context, Wilhelm Meister tells us "we have to learn by experience", and a key "political creed" behind this humanist idea of education is about "human contentment. We are envious of more than we can use...And hence we don't rest content with the good things we have" (Armstrong, 2007: 276). Furthermore, the self-reproductive meaning of life can be read into Goethe's scientific study of plants and colours. His science constitutes the knowledge of holistic experience in accordance with Spinoza's ethic of renunciation to lead a life of "light-minded" thinking (Armstrong, 2007: 310-12). Thus, Goethe's science of life is opposed to both romantics and philistines, but it remains contestable to affirm "Goethe's acknowledgement of the conservative, material basis of happiness" as the wisdom of contemporary life (Armstrong, 2007: 330-31). Nonetheless, Faust is read as a drama of conflicting human values: worldly happiness is attained only by rejecting Mephistopheles' darkness to be led by God's light. The Manichean view of humanity exemplifies the hatred and love of earthly life by the metaphors of Mephistopheles and God, while Faustian humanity is understood as striving for the good work of creation (Armstrong, 2007: 392, 411, 417, 421).
From the humanist view of a happy life, Armstrong prioritizes the ethic of renunciation of death and immature love. Albeit therapeutic, this neo-classic world order is more individualistic than communitarian, let alone universalistic. In this sense, it amounts to a New Age rendition of Goethe's classicism: Armstrong's neoclassic Goethe would be most appreciated by a postmodern consumer/reader in search of inner peace, most probably with middle-class affluence and intellectual restlessness. However, he “misunderstands” Goethe as soon as Werther is excluded from Goethe's work of “mature love”. In short, Armstrong fails to reincorporate Werther's sorrowful, death-seeking love into a building block of Goethe's irony in art and life. Biased toward hedonistic humanism, Armstrong condemns the death wish to a sentimental emotion without objective reality. But suicide, once completed, might induce real consequences to social life. In light of this, the ethic of renunciation as Armstrong describes it amounts to a denial of death. This is why he cannot fully account for the idea of fate in a tragic sense of renunciation, a theme which predominates in Wilhelm Meister and Elective Affinity, except to assert the value of individual choice against Goethe's text (Armstrong, 2007: 264-65, 362-65).

Boyle probably comes closest to Goethe's poetic legacy of love irreducible to both social morality and individual ethic. In a close reading of the poem Euphrosyne (1798), especially in the passage where the poet fails to speak, Boyle (2000: 673-74) argues that Goethe's “poetry is rather a form of love which values even the most intangible moments and the shortest lives, in spite of Fate”. This poetic form of love may be specified as the poetry, or rather anti-poetry, of renunciation in response to the death of high art (Boyle, 2000: 781-784). Since Schiller, post-Kantian idealists had great expectation for Art to reconstruct the society, against which Goethe held a complex view of romanticism, swinging from reprehension, sympathy to qualified reconciliation (Richards, 2002: 458-59; Armstrong, 2007: 330). However, Goethe's renunciation embraced the historical fate of French Revolution without succumbing to it, which means he renounced its romantic-idealist consequences represented by “the secret German Revolution" in
reestablishing "the Kingdom of God" and "the invisible Church" (Boyle, 2000: 73). "The ideal, at once Greek, Kantian, and - after purification and reinterpretation - Christian, was a, perhaps the, characteristic of German response to the great political challenge of the time" (Boyle, 2000: 69). As a result, Boyle suggests that Goethe's "post-Christian" poetry of renunciation conveyed a subtle but sharp message by the end of the 1790s. The poet accepted neither Greek Classicism (cosmic harmony) nor Christian Romanticism (Protestant love), and nor atheist Enlightenment (French progress), but rather grasped Kant's limited reason (or the limit of reason as post-Christian love-poetry) to affirm the critical gap between idealism and realism, "acknowledging the existence of a power beyond poetry" (Boyle, 2000: 55, 793). Goethean renunciation, Boyle (2000: 794) sums up, "is the act of those who believe that their happiness is dependent on a power beyond their control... [and] the silence that acknowledges the absence from reality of the Ideal...Conversely, poems, being all of them occasioned poems, and expressing delight in a glimpse of beauty recovered, thanks to favourable circumstances, are emblem or 'talisman', of a 'counter-magic' which works against the hostility of fate."

We have argued that neither romanticism nor classicism can describe Goethe accurately. Nonetheless, for Goethe to become a Kantian poet without lapsing to both pre-Kantian Greek classicism and post-Kantian Christian romanticism is an impossible task. The reason is Kant himself is not up to the task if he is known (or perhaps confused) as the philosopher of the Enlightenment celebrating freedom and knowledge, not a poet of love and fate. In this sense, Goethe's anti/poetry is in conflict with Kant's "necessity of thought" modeled on Newton's mathematics. Although capturing Goethe's poetic renunciation as the spirit of his age, Boyle's critical Kantian interpretation still sometimes falls short of the mark.

At bottom, the problem of understanding Goethe is rooted in the problem of interpreting Kant because Kant himself is an elusive thinker who could belong to the tradition of French Enlightenment, German romanticism, and Prussian Enlightenment. First, Boyle's judgment of Goethe as a Kantian poet is
Premised on Kant as a progenitor of the Prussian Enlightenment, which is a cultural-historically specific view that we will adopt. Second, neo-Kantian Cassirer (1970[1945]: 20-21) links Rousseau’s penchant for primitive nature to Kant’s practical reason, making Kant an heir of the French Enlightenment. Moreover, he interprets Goethe in the light of Kantian philosophy, emphasizing their common rejection of Wolffian philistine theology and common defense of a critical philosophy of nature through the case of Goethe’s theory of morphology (Cassirer, 1970: 65-67, 77-78, 91-92). Gay (in Cassirer 1970[1963]: xiv-xv) goes on further to suggest the affinity between Goethe and Rousseau along the Enlightenment’s rational construction of nature. Third, from a parallel view (of romantic liberalism), Berlin (1999[1965]: 69-78) sees Kant as a restrained romantic (which is not unlike Richards’ genealogy of romanticism), but (contrary to Richards’ thesis) sees Goethe as a decided anti-romantic. However, Berlin (1999: 111-13) fails to identify Goethe between classicism (as in Armstrong) and the Enlightenment (as in Boyle, Cassirer and Gay), except to say “there is a solution” for Goethe, thereby relegating him to the pre-romantic world of “order, self-restraint, discipline.” This self-referential exclusion of Goethe from romanticism altogether is a logical result of Berlin’s romantic definition of romanticism. In sum, from pro-Enlightenment to anti-romanticism, a surprisingly consistent view of Goethe emerges on the basis of inconsistent, even contradictory, views of Kant. As a whole, it is Kant’s thorny ties with the cultural-historical mentality of the Enlightenment and romanticism which prevent Goethe from being understood in his own right. For this reason, Goethe the poet cannot be read along with Kant the philosopher too closely.

The above reflections mean to show that if Goethe is neither a classicist nor a romantic, then he is equally neither pro-Enlightenment nor anti-romanticism. In other words, conventional cultural-historical classification only obscures Goethe’s legacy of love. Instead, we argue that Goethe exceeded his times to foresee a post-idealistic fate of modernity since his legacy of love qua poetic renunciation couldn’t be learnt without coming up against the sexual power of death. That is to say, Woman, in place of God, turned into the “fate” of Man in the double sense of destined-condemned death and predestined-redeemed life. In the process, femininity became separated from nature while nature was
internally differentiated into a divided whole of matter and life at the turn of the 19th century. In response, Goethe fictionalized the Kantian Thing-in-itself and then idolized (in no naïve way) a post-Christian beauty called Humanity. The feminine body of Humanity conceived "society" miraculously in the subsequent ideas of Comte and Marx.

The development of Goethe's poeticization can be seen from his contributions to science and literature under the Prussian political condition. Independent from the old Empire, Prussia sought for a solution to similar problems (of social reproduction, mainly) comparable to France at the end of the 18th century, but a bloody revolution did not occur in Prussia as in France for necessary sociological reasons. In terms of social structure, Prussia lacked a mature bourgeois agent in an industrialized urban environment (Boyle, 2000: 23-25). In terms of historical culture, Prussia had "its own traditions of Lutheranism, rather than Catholicism, and Enlightened, rather than arbitrary rule" (Boyle, 2000: 51). In fact, a group of Prussian officials had begun a proper political "revolution" for at least a couple of decades before the French terrorist "accident", which resulted in a compromised course led by Kant's revolution of the mind in 1780 (Critique of Pure Reason) and Wilhelm von Humboldt's law reform in 1792 (Ideas towards Essaying a Determination of the limits of State Action) (Boyle, 2000: 26f, 36f). Therefore, the resulting Prussian norm was a "compromise" of the Prussian officials (like Kant and von Humboldt) with the monarchical social system and its Leibnizian metaphysics: "[b]y a Copernican revolution, the role of the Leibnizian 'as if' in establishing harmony between substances and appearances, is reversed. It is no longer the phenomenal world that functions 'as if' it possessed causality, but the monadic world behind it. But the connection remains obscure between visible, material, life and the noumenal realm to which the higher causality of politically independent beings who determine their own fate and legislate for themselves is confined" (Boyle, 2000: 52-53). The compromise of critical epistemology with dogmatic ontology marked the impossible transition from the individual monad to the universal subject. In other words, the Prussian Enlightenment was qualified with a sense of humility in which a break with the past would never be clean. As a Kantian poet, especially, Goethe knew better
that his critical idealism (or, rational empiricism) built a transitional wonderland between the past and the future, for the fate of the Enlightenment was to be an unfinished project between magic and science.

In the first decade in Weimer (1775-85), Goethe focused his scientific studies on mineralogy (the mineral "goethite" is named after him) and animal anatomy (he claimed the discovery of the intermaxillary bone in humans). From the Italian trip (1786-88) onwards, his interests expanded to botany, animal chemistry and zoology, commencing with the famous essay *The Metamorphosis of Plants* published in 1790. All these scientific explorations culminated in Goethe's creation of morphology, which has been widely conceived as the forerunner of modern evolutionary thinking. In this context, it is understandable that Goethe's morphology is regarded as the first romantic biology. As implied above, this is Richards' (2002: ch. 11) over-interpretation when he stresses the impact of post-Kantian idealists from Schiller to Schelling on Goethe's morphological notions of *Urpflanze* (primal plant) and *Urtypus* (archetype), as if the romantic doctrines of idealism have been accepted unreservedly. In fact, Richards' (2002: ch. 10) autobiographical reading of Goethe's literary art under the heading of "erotic authority of nature" has disclosed a fundamental principle behind the romantic concept of life, the principle that matter and mind belong to a positive force at One with Nature-God. In the Whole, the distinction between death and life becomes irrelevant since they have entered into a continuous natural process which is potentially, if not consciously, alive. In this sense, the romantic science of life is based on a furtive belief in the magical power of love which we might call the Snow White complex: romantic love can bring death to life in an instant of a kiss. This romantic magic of love in corollary to the romantic science of life may be found in romantic literature, such as *Frankenstein* (1818) written by Mary Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft's daughter. Understood as such, Goethe did not go as far as subscribing to romantic occultism apart from an open-minded sympathy which did not breach the consensus of Prussian Enlightenment, for his idea of natural science did not presume an essence of things-in-itself as in romantic life-love, but was rather confined in studying the manifest phenomena of nature by empirical observation.
Before musing on its anatomical implication, a morphological reading of Goethe’s *The Metamorphosis of Plants* should not focus on the idea of plants, but its apparent metamorphosis qua *Buildung*. It is not difficult to see that Goethe’s essay bridged the scientific and cultural-political meanings of *Buildung*, that is, *Buildung* as “formation” originated in 1789 by J. F. Blumenbach, and *Buildung* as “education” (or cultivated growth) applied in 1792 by Wilhelm von Humboldt. However, the ambiguity of choosing between a Leibnizian monad and the Kantian subject, especially in von Humboldt’s applied sense, remained unresolved since a biological conception of the whole as an organism apart from the inorganic was yet to be developed (Boyle, 2000: 30-31). To be sure, Goethe did not coin the term “morphology” until September 1796 in his diary, roughly two years after his conversation with Schiller about *Urpfänze*, a talk which indeed led to their romantic friendship until Schiller’s death in 1805, but a talk which by no means reached any consensus about *Urpfänze* being an essential idea of beauty beyond experience. Conversely, Goethe’s original theory of morphology was “the first outlines of a new science of appearances, a universal phenomenology” (Boyle, 2000: 460). In his own words, “everything that is must also manifest and show itself...to our outer and inner sense. Form is something mobile, that comes into being and passes away. The science of form is the science of transformation. The doctrine of metamorphosis is the key to all Nature’s signs” (Goethe cited in Boyle, 2000: 459). It is true that Goethe at the first stage believed in Nature as a romantic Whole which included organic and inorganic realms, but he also meant it in Kant’s critical sense that morphology presents Nature “as a subjective whole...the world of the eye, exhaustively comprised by form and colour” (Goethe cited in Boyle, 2000: 460).

From March 1797, Goethe got into close contact with the promising physiologist Alexander von Humboldt, Wilhelm’s brother. The younger von Humboldt introduced Goethe to the science of animal electro-chemistry dominated by the debate between Galvin and Volta over the existence of “the galvanic fluid” in animals. This refers to a controversial experiment about the vivification of a frog’s leg when brought into contact with metal plates arranged
like a modern battery (Boyle, 2000: 483; Richards, 2002: 317-20). The controversy induced a possible distinction between the inorganic and organic. Inspired by Kant’s metaphysical division of matter and life at the time, Goethe came up with a modified theory of morphology more in common with Alexander von Humboldt than with Schelling’s romantic force of life since the result was “a pragmatic science, with an Idealist basis but aware of its limits and collectively undertaken” (Boyle, 2000: 486). For von Humboldt (cited in Richards, 2002: 316), elements of matter “are combined according to the laws of chemical affinity”, whereas an organism’s body has the tenacity to “dissolve the bonds of chemical affinity and prevent elements of bodies from freely uniting.” Hence, matter is “inactive, brute and inanimate” not because it remains in hypostasis but because it displays malleable deformation (such as water). On the other hand, life is “vital, animated and organic” not because it strives for infinite transformation but because it expresses the strength to sustain the appearance of a form in the course of metamorphosis. In short, life can be distinguished from matter by observing its irritability or excitability to stimulation: the ability to go "mad" is a sure sign of life. Given as such, Goethe’s modified morphology allowed a certain degree of differentiation in Nature, severing ties from “the inorganic sciences, particularly mineralogy and parts of optics” due to their reversible course of change (Boyle, 2000: 483-84). Furthermore, he reworked drafts of comparative anatomy in the same period to put forward “a science of general metamorphosis” in which the Kantian distinction of the organic and the inorganic was maintained but only in a limited sense in order to reserve for the inorganic elements some “faint share...in Nature’s universal breath of life” (Goethe cited in Boyle, 2000: 484). It is hence true that Goethe at the second stage clung to the belief in Nature, but its partial organic differentiation was no longer a romantic Whole. Eventually, he settled for an awkward concept of “simultaneous metamorphosis” devoid of “the secession of time”, “the kind of metamorphosis preeminently found in the higher animals...to explain both the interrelation of the differentiated but

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<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, Richards (2002: 321) argues that Alexander von Humboldt’s science of life “appealed to” early Schelling’s nature philosophy. However, Richards’ (2002: 518-21) romantic introduction of von Humboldt misses the fact that he was amongst the first audience in Auguste Comte’s courses of positive philosophy opened in April 1826. The adoption of Comte’s terminology “celestial physics” in his work attests to von Humboldt’s non-romantic, if not positivist, orientation to science.
identical parts of a whole animal (by transformation of the basic bone) and the relation to the common type of the differently modified species (by transformation of the entire skeleton)” (Boyle, 2000: 485). In the final analysis, Goethe’s modified morphology of nature departed from both Spinozist Nature-God and post-Kantian Ideal-Whole; he arrived at a comparative anatomy of the partially organic whole in order to keep a harmonious, material hierarchy of life and yet to reject the monadic notion of the individual. In this latter sense, Goethe’s reflective natural whole exceeded both Leibnizian and Kantian systems to create a middle ground. Taking advantage of the loss of the end, he gave a poetic origin to the modern evolutionary conception of the natural whole (cf. Boyle, 2000: 485-86 for a critical Kantian view; Cassirer, 1970: 61-98 for an neo-Kantian view).

By August 1798, Goethe put forward a revised theory of morphology based on the principle of reproduction as opposed to individuation. Initially, he synthesized the empirical and the scientific methods of “looking” into an “active vision” of “the ‘appearance’ of the object” called Urphenomenon (pure phenomenon) in order to distance himself from the dogmatic residue of Naturphilosophie, for early Schelling’s “ways of seeing things” granted monadic perspectives of nature and nature remained mystified in a lively thing-in-itself (Boyle, 2000: 597-99). Subsequently, “the subject-matter of the sciences is repeatedly described not as things but as ‘phenomena’, the appearance of things to an observer; and of so fundamental a phenomenon as the capacity for reproduction, which distinguishes the organic from the inorganic world, it is said not to be possible to give any further analysis. It is an ultimate among phenomena, which others exemplify, but which itself exemplifies nothing” (Boyle, 2000: 599). Standing by reproduction, Goethe has taken a decisive step back from the romantic concept of life as unbridled productivity. More in line with Alexander von Humboldt, reproductive life should be understood as the maintenance of a form against the tendency to regress into formless matter. Goethe’s morphological world of appearance is then a paradoxical world of simulation: an artful way to attain life is to simulate the stillness of death, whilst matter simulates the activity of life. In short, to live is to learn the art of death. It is based on this scientific understanding of life.
that Goethe's love qua poetic renunciation could be seen as the experience of death.

To elucidate the poetic relations between love, death and renunciation, it is probably best to return to Goethe's literary art. Hence, we choose The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774), Elective Affinity (1809) and Faust (1772-1832) to exemplify his early, late and definitive works of love. Albeit covering a wide range of literary genres from epistolary confession and formalist novella (long-story) to poetical drama, this sample of work belongs to fiction instead of reflexive writings like Italian Journey or Poetry and Truth. It is assumed that a work of fiction has a poetic dimension foreign to what can be found from a contextual method of reading, including psychoanalysis, biography, history and sociology. To appreciate Goethe's literature, one should never deviate, but on the contrary follow rigorously his rule of fictionalizing love-life: "[a]nd so began that path, from which I have not been able to stray away during my whole life, namely, that inclination to turn whatever delighted, tortured, or otherwise occupied me into an image, a poem, and thereby to come to terms with myself so that I might as much justify my conception of external things as well as calm my inner self about them" (Goethe cited in Richards, 2002: 338).

In light of this, it is not enough to read the suicidal love in The Sorrows of Young Werther as a symptomatic malaise of his individual existence and/or social condition. Notwithstanding internal contradictions, both readings have commonly assumed that Werther's unrequited love bears a sentimental relation to nature and/or society, eventually leading up to his suicide. These interpretations argue how Werther's sentimentality is represented by his imaginary projection onto nature and/or by his critical distance from society. Hence the emphases are laid upon his naïve closeness to children and common folk, inconsistent images of nature from vitality to inactivity, and rejection by the social circle. Furthermore, Werther's constant call for understanding may be regarded as a narcissistic outcry, and his object of love, Charlotte, deemed as an instrument of his egoistic character. In result, the story tells us that if Werther had developed a mature kind of love, he would not have committed suicide; he could have either settled for a happy
life or fought for a just society. Given as such, these views do not grant Werther being read as a story of true love.

By contrast, if one takes Goethe's rule of fiction into account, then Werther must commit suicide, not only for the sake of saving Goethe's love-life (i.e. his relations with Charlotte Buff and Christian Kestner) but also to reveal the poetic truth that only an act of suicide can prove Werther's love for Lotte is real in this situation. Why must it be love or death? From Werther's standpoint in a type of unrequited love (i.e. A loves B who loves C), he must commit suicide in this subjectively totalitarian condition where every possible ex/change is closed. Suppose Werther throws himself a life line, from adaptation to struggle, his love would be either self-deluded in the first place or compromised at the end of the day. Thus, only by committing suicide can he demonstrate that his love for Lotte has objectivity. From Charlotte's standpoint, she could prevent the tragedy by practicing hetaerism, were she a man. But she is a woman, so Werther must die.

If Charlotte becomes a man, we then have a type of triangular love (i.e. B loves A and C who both love B). Even so, the problem is not resolved by gender equality (i.e. the evolution from monogamy and hetaerism to polygamy and promiscuous partnership) since gender strategies play a feeble role in Goethe's work of love. This is why we see from Elective Affinity when the type of triangular love presents us a deadlock of fate beyond strategy. In Werther, "the fate of Man" both "ordained" and "forsaken" by God has preoccupied Werther's mind from the start to the end (before the narrative passes on to the third person's viewpoint introducing an "analysis" of Werther's suicide).

4 Sexuality is not an issue here, so it does not matter whether Werther and Albert change their sex or not. In addition, Goethe is as disinterested in the melodramatic type of triangular love (i.e. A loves B who loves C who loves A) as he is bothered about the fairy tale type of reciprocal love (i.e. A and B love each other and live happily ever after). Moreover, the circular form in the melodramatic type of triangular love may be romanticized or rather mystified to infinity. This orgiastic love is represented by Schnitzler's ceremonial dramas in the making of Victorian middle-class, sexual culture (cf. Gay, 2002). For example, one of his best-known plays Der Reigen (1900, Hands Around, which was not performed on stage until 1920 and made into a film called La Ronde by Max Ophuls in 1950) constructs ten dialogues between characters before and after coitus. Beginning with the seduction of a Soldier by a Prostitute, each subsequent dialogue is related to its predecessors to form a cycle, until the tenth character, the Count, makes love to the Prostitute, and closes the cycle.
In parallel, Charlotte has cast Werther's fate in a double sense of death and salvation. For Charlotte, she is the direct cause of his suicide since she hands her husband's gun over to Werther's servant. For Werther, "I shall live for you" since "the darkness and madness of my soul are dispelled, and I breathe more freely again" only by your "divine breath" and "sacred music" (Goethe, 1989: 49, 53).

Moreover, in *Elective Affinity*, an unexpected event of fate could interrupt the strategic trade of elective affinity, reclaiming the identity of death and love in the type of triangular love. "Elective affinity" was a new concept borrowed from chemistry in Goethe's time ("de attractionibus electivis" named by the Swedish chemist Torbern Olof Bergmann in 1775, and then translated into German "wahlverwandtschaft" by Heinrich Tabor in 1785), which caused a moral controversy over his novella. But one should heed any simple opposition of elective affinity to fate in a metaphysical-political sense of freedom and necessity. As Hollingdale notes (in Goethe, 1971: 12-13), any naturalistic reading of a novella is a mistake since this genre features "the absence of names, the strict economy of means, the unnaturalistic action, and...elements not susceptible to rational explanation [but] proceeds in a more orderly and symmetrical way”. In short, the novella allows Goethe to create an objective form of irony, “[making] possible mystery and ambiguity underlying the action...without committing the author himself to an ironic view of that action.” In light of this, it seems better to regard elective affinity as a scientific solution to the problem of triangular love. This view is in fact summed up by the Captain himself in the story: “imagine an A intimately united with a B, so that no force is able to sunder them; imagine a C likewise related to a D; now bring the two couples into contact: A will throw itself at D; C at B, without our being able to say which first deserted its partner, which first embraced the other's partner” (Goethe, 1971: 56). This formula follows after another central character Eduard's argument that elective affinity introduces a fourth term to the triad “so that no one will go empty away” (Goethe, 1971: 55).

Therefore, elective affinity is an explanation of the tragedy of triangular love.
ending in divorce. In fact, this notion is introduced through the conversation between Eduard, Charlotte and the Captain about the duality of love and divorce. In the beginning, dealing with substantial compounds instead of elements, chemical affinity does not produce a spontaneous combustion like the making of water \((2H + O \rightarrow H2O)\), but depends on a third compound to aid unification, such as the combination of oil and water with the mediation of alkaline salt. Eduard reasons a compound “will not relinquish this unified state except through the action or force of some other agent. If this is removed, they [i.e. the elements] immediately come together again” (Goethe, 1971: 51). Eduard goes on to compare this third agent to “laws and customs”, and Charlotte ventures further to apply affinity to “affinity of mind and soul” (Goethe, 1971: 52-53). If chemical affinity romanticizes the social cohesion of love, then elective affinity introduces a real complexity about love and divorce, “for the most complicated cases are in fact the most interesting...the affinities become interesting only when they bring about divorces” (Goethe, 1971: 53).

Simply put, once there is a free unity with the new, there is a forced separation from the old, and the abandoned party in this duality cannot be saved without a fourth party is thrown in to create a swap. In the frame of scientific discussion, the erotic game of elective affinity begins when Charlotte’s young niece Ottilie is brought into the trio.

However, this ideal condition does not end in a happy ending but a fatal outcome. Before long after the two couples allow elective affinity to take its course, Charlotte’s child Otto, suspiciously resembling the Major and described by Eduard as being “begotten in twofold adultery”, dies of drowning in the nearby lake under Ottilie’s guardian (Goethe, 1971: 259-62). This fatal incident, first of all, forestalls the win-win scheme developed “so firmly complete in Eduard’s mind” by inviting the Major back to the swap to prevent his divorced wife Charlotte from “going empty away” (Goethe, 1971: 258). Second, Charlotte and the Major resign to fate in the same way as they adapted to elective affinity. They make no objection to whatever may come and offer no answers to life’s misfortunes (Goethe, 1971: 266-67). Ottilie initially counted on Charlotte to “decide our fate” upon the proposal of Eduard, but later she says “I have decided...I shall never be Eduard’s!” since “God has
opened my eyes in a terrible way to the crime I am committing...[and] the moment I learn you have agreed to a divorce I shall atone for my crime and transgression in that same lake" (Goethe, 1971: 260, 269). Because of Ottilie's act of renunciation, everyone is forced in the end to restore to a period of self-deceptive "pure togetherness" until Ottilie dies of resolution and Eduard dies of accident after her (Goethe, 1971: 286-87, 292-93, 299). No matter how much Eduard believes that "man is capable of willing and choosing", he half-realizes before his unpredictable death that "how fortunate I am that all my endeavours have ever been no more than imitation, a counterfeit!" (Goethe, 1971: 285, 299) Now it is plausible to argue, as commentators do, that the death of a child is a reflection of Goethe's worry about his only survived son August, and then symbolizes his conservative defense of social reproduction by marriage against free love. But this argument is based on a liberal ideology to affirm elective affinity and reject fate in the name of personal choice.

In fact, the logic behind Goethe's defense of social reproduction lies in something more binding than marriage. According to Alexander's von Humboldt's concept of life, elective affinity may stand for a lack of strength to maintain a form. In contemporary terms, elective affinity may be applied to plastic sexuality, signifying the triumph of the pleasure principle in society. For the party who does the choosing, in fact, a unity with the new is forced, whereas separation is free: saying yes to seduction takes no human effort whereas it requires the courage of love to say no. Given as such, the fatal incident provides a test of death to the existence of love in elective affinity. However unnatural it seems to human nature, renunciation by the rejection of social intercourse becomes the most natural human response available when a cruel event of fate happens to us. In parallel to Werther's suicide, Ottilie's renunciation is a logical result and the proof of true love behind the eroticism of elective affinity.

5 From 1786 to 1788, he made a tour to Italy by himself, and upon returning he started to live with Christiane Vulpius whom he did not marry until after Napoleon's siege of Weimer in 1806. Three years later, Elective Affinity (1809) was published, reflecting Goethe's inner conflict with an extramarital desire for Minna Herzlieb.
At bottom, this counterfactual but objective irony of love within elective affinity echoes the foreshadowing clue of the trio’s erotic conversation in the manner of scientific discussion. Their discussion is provoked by the situation in which Eduard complains about Charlotte’s reading over his shoulder when he tries to read aloud to Charlotte and the Captain. As Eduard explains, “if I read aloud to someone, is it not as if I were speaking to him and telling him something? What has been written down and printed takes the place of my own mind and my own heart; and would I ever take the trouble to speak at all if a window were constructed in my forehead or in my chest, so that he to whom I want to expound my thoughts one by one, or convey my feelings one by one, could always know long in advance what I was getting at? Whenever anyone reads over my shoulder if is as if I were being torn in two” (Goethe, 1971: 49). Apparently, Eduard is expressing a serious concern about the changing nature of humanity by technology in which love is put at risk. What can this love possibly mean?

During the conversation, Charlotte repeatedly confirms to Eduard that she is learning not only the science of elective affinity but also the art of listening with patience. In view of this foreshadowing, the art of listening is the art of love, and the art of love is the art of responding to the fate of death with renunciation. Eventually, Eduard’s complaint ironically blows back to his face as he becomes “driven by uncontrollable impatience” to hasten the swap (Goethe, 1971: 259); in fact, because he thinks without reflection, prompted only by “longing” and “desire”, Eduard chases Ottilie to the inn where she stays overnight in order to flee, and asks her to come back. Cornered as such, Ottilie returns to live with the trio, but maintains her fidelity to the promise of renunciation by keeping her silence and starvation onto death. Her uncompromising demand to others exclaims “leave my soul to me!” (Goethe, 1971: 278-93) In this sense, Ottilie’s silent suicide appears more unnatural than Werther’s pronounced suicide, for Ottilie dies of the renunciation of a false fate (Eduard), whilst Werther dies of a true one (Charlotte).

All in all, from unrequited love to triangular love, Goethe shows us that there is something binding in love beyond the law and its transgression (i.e. marriage
and extramarital affairs). Encountering a love event could challenge a potential lover’s character, a challenge so strong that his/her personal life is put at stake. In Faust, the ethic of renunciation in love is also achieved through an experience of death. From the start, it is equally tempting to read Faust as a classical “drama of reconciliation”, a romantic tale of female beauty, and a modern/enlightened fable of “incommensurable worlds” (Berlin, 1999: 112; Richards, 2002: 398; Boyle, 2000: 768). However, these historical readings are bounded too much by contextual concerns (such as analyzing versions composed in different stages of Goethe’s life) to account for the drama as an organic whole. As Goethe’s definitive work of love, Faust is unfolded in a real or virtual reality, a poetic fiction par excellence. Composed in 60 years of Goethe’s life, it includes a prelude, a prologue and two parts. Moreover, the first part has a single act and the second part five acts. First of all, the prelude “on the stage” juxtaposes the conflicted concerns of the director, the author and the actor in the production of a dramatic work. The director stresses on action to win the crowd, the author cares about language to express artistic imagination, and the actor is interested in experience to convey meaning to the audience (Goethe, 2002: 31-33). Then, the prologue “in heaven” introduces the ambiguous “pact” between God and Mephistopheles, modeling on the Book of Job. Strictly speaking, there is no pact being made not only because the two deities are in no direct disagreement with each other but also because God has predestined Faust’s soul to be saved. This is why after Mephistopheles laments “[t]he torments of Mankind move even me/ to pity, not to plague Humanity”, God comments “[h]e serves me now uncomprehendingly./ But I shall lead him soon toward the light.” At bottom, Mephistopheles is but a tool since God aims to show that “[m]en make mistakes, till they learn not to strive” (Goethe, 2002: 35-36). Thus, Mephistopheles is surprised at being “fooled” in the end (Goethe, 2002: 216). In effect, the foreshadowing in heaven orients this drama toward a love story of grace, not law: there is no question of fairness in love, since it is measured by neither classical action nor romantic imagination, and yet nor

6 Spanning across 60 years, he finally finished the dramatic poem Faust in 1831, but was reluctant to publish the second part before his death in 1832. Goethe started to compose Faust as early as 1772, after which parts and versions were published in 1790 (a fragment), 1808 (the first part), 1827 (an interlude), 1832 (the second part) and 1887 (Urfaust).
enlightened experience, but by their renunciation.

The first part is opened with the pact between Faust and Mephistopheles, and then turns to focus on the love tragedy between Faust and Gretchen. Although a knowledgeable academic, Faust's character bears much resemblance to Werther's suicidal passion for nature, life and poetry. In this sense, one might consider Faust a poet-scientist. In fact, the Devil intervenes to make a pact with him just when Faust prepares to end his life. This pact is to keep Faust unquenched and hence craves for more life experiences until he marvels, "this moment is so beautiful—let it stay!", where upon his soul should be snatched away by the Devil (Goethe, 2002: 61). Ironically, the pact is a statement of the identity of love and death since "let it stay" means to "be content to die" (Goethe, 2002: 60). To preempt the plot, this is why Faust must be saved instantly after condemnation in the second part, for the angels who carry off Faust's soul explain "[a]ll things at variance/ must be rejected:/ inward discordance,/ do not accept it./ If it prove violent,/ we must prove valiant;/ only the loving/ are raised up by Love" (Goethe, 2002: 214). By contrast, one would expect Faust's soul being taken away in the first part when Faust falls in love with Gretchen. But this is not the case since Faust merely falls for lust in the crucial scene of "forest and cavern": "I stumble from desire to consummation,/ in consummation pining for desire" (Goethe, 2002: 89). Instead, what happens is Gretchen being seduced and betrayed, as well as sinning (having sex with Faust) before killing her son and mother. In the famous "prison" scene, she renounces being rescued by Faust and chooses to pay for her own sin through real death. As such, she is immediately atoned upon judgment, leaving Faust to keep on striving (Goethe, 2002: 113). Homologous to the situation in Ottilie and Eduard, Gretchen is the true lover here who goes through subjective destitution and renunciation in the relationship, whereas Faust stays a desiring subject who cannot die (a living dead) and would not be saved (were he to die then).

The second part of Faust generates a world-historic vision of love in a mythological sense of universality. Although this part is often read as centring on Faust's quest for Helen of Troy, this affair is subordinated to the grand
vision. Accordingly, it is erroneous to forge a parallel link between Gretchen and Helen as a passage of female beauty from romantic particularity to classical generality, or the other way around. On the other hand, Faust's immortal soul redeemed in the “burial” scene is the central issue to provoke the holy eulogies of love in the final scene “mountain gorges, forest, cliffs, wildness”; therefore, it would be untruthful to argue that Faust, as a man of the Enlightenment, cares about his life rather than his soul, living in an incommensurable world from that of God and Mephistopheles. Even if Faust is a play of modernity, there is no sufficient reason to rule theology and religion out of modernity. At all events, we argue the five acts in this part can be read as Goethe’s proto-sociological theory of love. From a thematic point of view, act one reflects on the futility of empire and illusory economy (gold and magic; nature and reason); act two of science and uncontrollable eros (homunculus and god of metamorphosis Proteus; philosophies of water and fire); act three of art and transient beauty (Helen and her son Euphorion; female and youth); act four of war and corrupt powers (emperor and archbishop; politics and religion) (Goethe, 2002: 117-98). Taking part in all four stages, the insatiable Faust has reached old age in act five where the impossible hope of love finally reemerges. By this time, Faust has become rich. He seeks to claim more land from the sea, creating “new living space for Man” to build a second nature. To enforce the “master-plan”, he turns cruel to the traditional common folks who refuse to be relocated (which costs their life during the protest), remains impervious to the persuasion of Care, and so is blinded by her curse (Goethe, 2002: 199-208). At the height of complacency, Goethe utters the fatal words regarding the new man: “I see a race grow, fearless, self-reliant,/ living their lives out here, proud and defiant./ Such a race of men I long to see,/ standing upon free soil, a people also free./ Then to the fleeting moment I could say:/ ‘You are so beautiful —can you not stay?’/ Through all of Time, the achievement of my day upon this earth will never pass away./ I sense foreknowledge of such happiness,/ and now enjoy my highest moment— this” (Goethe, 2002: 211). He is then snatched away by zombies and soon redeemed by angels, or rather by the grace of love.

Furthermore, from a narrative point of view, the entire second part shows that
modernity is not only retrospective of all past historical cultures but also prospective of a future vision of love. This is why the Christian mentality dominating in the first part is traversed by the succession of modern, classical, medieval and back to modern scenes in the second part (from act one to four); meanwhile, the famous fifth act concludes Faust's fall and redemption in a feminine future of love: "[a]ll that shall pass away/ is but reflection./ All insufficiency/ here finds perfection./ All that's mysterious/ here finds the day./ Woman in all of us/ shows us our way" (Goethe, 2002: 223). It is worth noting that the image of woman is already separated from the Devil as Mephistopheles curses with disgust the female sex as "thrift" (Goethe, 2002: 128-29). One could also stress that the final scene with the multifarious eulogy of love is performed by "holy authorities" made of deities, angels, chorus of women and boys, and particularly Gretchen "the penitent" (Goethe, 2002: 222). The definitive historical beauty Helen of Troy is not a part of it. Given as such, one could summarize the meaning of love for Faust. If there are two colliding worlds symbolized by Mephistopheles and Faust, they are the worlds of production and consumption. After serial conquests, Faust gets tempted by Mephistopheles to change his masculine nature from suicidal consumption (indulging and forsaking by drive) to murderous production (striving and possessing by desire). However, the future fate of modernity is consumption in the feminine mode, and Faust's original character shares an elective affinity with this "Woman in all of us." Thus we have the paradoxical fate of Faust's love: he must reach something more radical than self-critically changing his masculine nature from consumption to production. Prone to produce nothing, by contrast, he could have pushed his suicidal character to the fatal extreme, and so reverse the very sexual premise of renunciation from the masculine to the feminine mode in the new world.

From a selective analysis of Goethe's literature, we have seen that modern love is realized through an experience of death. For Goethe, the life of love has nothing to do with adaptive happiness, reasonable knowledge or sacrificial mystery, but requires a suicidal simulation of death, humbly admitting the futility of knowledge and receiving redemption by feminine grace. In view of this, Goethe's love-life is not a project carried out by
knowledgeable, risk-assessing choices of reason, but a destiny recognized retroactively by adventurous, fate-guided acts of renunciation. This presumes that an act of love could be manifested in authentic as well as inauthentic modes. That is to say, to love is to die before living in the future mode of time, experiencing poetically the fiction of the present without realism and embracing soberly the arrival of the future without utopianism. The mode of time one experiences in Goethean love is neither classical eternity, nor enlightened immortality, and nor romantic infinity, but an unbearably positive piece of the future sticking out from the present, that inevitable future flying in my face ceaselessly. Renouncing the nostalgic past and the compromised present, only a true lover dares to enjoy the fictional, make-believing future abiding in the present; only a true lover has the courage to dream, demanding the illusion (of the future) to “stay!” Dreaming in the future, only a true lover can achieve renunciation in death. In love, indeed, who frets about the lapse of time, the end of history? In this strict sense, Comte and Marx are fatal lovers after Goethe.
Chapter 2 The Dual Relation of Comte and Marx

We have argued that Goethe bequeathed a legacy of love to modernity, a legacy obscured in the modernist philosophy of reason and revolution. The Goethean tradition of love makes a universal exception to the Kantian system of freedom and knowledge by situating the latter in the practical order of love-life. Exceeding the Enlightenment, this singular order is likewise irreducible to classicism and romanticism. In concrete terms, there are three points worth noting in Goethe's order of love-life. First, it is expressed in an act of renunciation or radical self-questioning as love-life relies on the suicidal restoration of the subject. Second, it is driven by an experience of death, a limit experience beyond human bodies and discourses. Third, it is oriented toward a fatal vision of the future at once in counter to the Art of idealism and the Life of utilitarianism. Precisely, Goethe's art of love called for a science fictional order of life in a time characterized by the failure of Art and the triumph of Life as the organizing principle of society. This fatal order of love adumbrated the conception of social science.

In the following, we will argue that Comte and Marx acted out Goethe's science fictional order of love-life via the objective forms of religion and politics. We suppose that an uncanny twinship of religion and politics underlies the dual relation of positivism and Marxism in the making of a post-idealistic social science since the very antagonism reveals their kindred spirit. Given as such, we oppose resolutely to the theses of two Comtes and two Marxes. In fact, such a symptomatic reading dictated by the rationalistic need for identity is responsible for most partial praises as well as criticisms, depending on where one comes from, of Marxism and positivism by undeserved notions such as classicism, enlightenment and romanticism, or traditionalism, rationalism and idealism. Particularly, interpreting a body of thought by means of epistemological breaks functions as an easy cop out, often resulting in a superficial rivalry between Marxism and positivism on the levels of method, theory and social reality.
On the level of method, one errs to contrast the positivist method with dialectics in terms of the object-subject divide. Besides, there is a further danger of vulgarizing positivism as well as Marxism by fusing the subject-object dualism into a mystic whole. Simply put, both modernist and postmodernist/medievalist readings have distorted the two modes of thought from the outset. As a matter of fact, dialectic and positive methods preserved the subject-object divide in every instantaneous state of the hierarchal series which makes up a social evolutionary process toward the objectification of subjectivity, or rather a totalization of the subject-object duality. Anticipating Heidegger's ontological difference, both modes of thought sought to maintain a dualistic tie with the sciences of existence on the one hand and the philosophy of Being on the other. But contra Heidegger, especially his mystical turn from Dasein to Sein, religious and political sciences of love envisaged by Comte and Marx respectively could overcome their ontic status to reconstitute a social ontology. In this self-positing move, the scientific reference to reality would be ontologized post facto and hence fictionalized. As such, positivism and Marxism together coined the idea of social science based on a religious-political ontology of love.

On the level of theory, one errs to contrast positivism with Marxism in terms of the order-revolution divide. Moreover, it amounts to a categorical mistake to regard positivism as a theory of science and Marxism a political practice. In short, dualisms like order versus revolution or theory versus practice are empty metaphysical constructs. For, the religion of Humanity presented in itself a revolutionary order while the politics of communism required an order of revolution for itself (i.e. dictatorship of the proletariat). To be exact, they both demanded a post-revolutionary order, an order of love-life. Along similar lines; the Comtean religion was the direct outcome of his theoretical science while the Marxian science was the necessary condition of his practical politics. In light of this, we are dealing in both cases with an original style of social analysis as a forerunner to the genre of science fiction since Comte and Marx wrote for the future reconstruction of society with a posthumous structure of feeling. In this sense, they were more like apostles, priests and media from the future rather than messiahs, prophets and utopians of the present since
they conveyed a non-representational order of love which emerged from but was not yet recognized by their contemporary age.

However, the social reconstructive function of social science has been carried out by reflexive sociology since the late 20th century as the capital of knowledge/power is theorized with no consequences in “changing the world”. From natural sciences to humanities, it is no longer the contents of the subject matter (i.e. facts, values and situations), but rather the social construction of knowledge in layered contexts (i.e. individual, cultural, economic, political, etc.) which constitutes the focus of study. This reflexive plague is stripping the practical idea of social science from itself. Betraying the reflexive social politics which conjoins us to “act otherwise,” one fails to “think otherwise” in the first place as s/he is convinced to take the stand of a second-degree observer to “participate” the nominal society. The rampant liberation of reflexivity produces in result the reification of society in which everyone is complacent with self-preserving critique without self-endangering change. Indeed, current sociology has reached to a point of saturation where reflexive deconstruction is practically not enough: what we need is fictional reconstitution. Relocated in the universal social ontology of love, we may reverse the methodological order governing the constructionist sociology and social psychology of knowledge. Since we have assessed Goethe’s legacy of love in a cultural-historical light, we will go on to examine Comte and Marx in the light of Goethe. This secondary order of exposition runs counter to reflexive readings, from literary criticism to sociological analysis, in the sense that Comte’s and Marx’s social theories will be fictionalized by Goethe’s absent presence. Although contextual factors will still be considered, we will begin from the genealogical hypothesis that Goethe’s legacy of love shaped by a science fictional view of art can account for the theories and societies of Comte and Marx.

On the level of social reality, accordingly, one can never fully explain a social theory by its empirical contexts in social-individual and/or cultural-historical modes because there is no simple causal relation between theory and society apart from covariance. In particular, the theories of Comte and Marx met not
only scientific validity but also social effectivity as their theories “mirrored” reality in a non-representational way. In other words, their theories were an integral part of the social dynamic they invoked, which was in but not of social reality since they captured the outliers of reality instead of the average mean. Simply put, their theories helped to produce the future strains of social reality in the sense that theorization was practiced without a historicist bias to justify the status quo. This radical theorization of society added an event of thought to social reality as if words could become literally flesh by notation, statement or declaration as ways of objectifying subjective existences. In the following two sub-sections, we will focus instead on depicting the science fictional order of love proposed by Comte’s positivist religion and Marx’s communist politics. One will see in what sense they lived on Goethe’s fatal vision of love-life, especially with regard to an interest in the fetishization of humanity as the primordial form of love.

2.1 Comte's love of fate
As a social program, Comte’s positivist order of love is built on the virtual totalization of subject-object duality and ontic-ontological difference by idolizing human altruistic feelings into the Great Being. In the context of his work, this order evolved from the ties sociology established with the positive sciences up until 1838, with art since 1844 and with religion since 1848. As if to reframe his law of the three states in a reversed order, the triune configuration of science-art-religion reflects the three forms of sociology and its condition, love, could take. In a prospective sense, this might signify either a logical evolution or an illogical devolution of his thought, depending on one’s position of enunciation in the three states. However, such ambivalence would eventually lead to metaphysical uncertainty, ending in a division of Comte’s positivist thought into two halves. Hence, we adopt a retrospective reading, arguing that Comte’s positivist order could be read as a mathematical solution to a set of practical-theoretical problems of love in a bid to consummate a science fictional ontologization of love after the facts.

First and foremost, although Comte followed the lead of his mentor Saint-Simon to relocate “spiritual power” in industrial society as early as 1820 in the
essay "Summary Appraisal of the General Character of Modern History," it was not until A General View of Positivism published in 1848 that he proposed his own "introduction to sociology a religious mode" (Gane, 2006: 31, 117, Comte, 1998: 5-46). The Comtean religion represents anything but a providential kind because identifying his positivist religion with providentialism is equivalent to accusing him of political authoritarianism, which only betrays one's own preference for liberal democracy (Aron, 1968: 94-95). Furthermore, Comte's religious movement, while different from the political movement of communism, should be properly understood as one of many historical responses to the revolution of 1848 (Pickering, 1999; Gane, 2006: 87-89).

From 1848, Comte's religious form of sociology was conditioned by a complex of love based on physiological, ideological and biographical foundations. Physiologically, the complex of love refers to a positive theory of the soul demonstrated by phrenology, a quasi-scientific branch of biology in his time. It originated in his conception of human nature composed of three parts, intellect (thought or head), affect (feeling, heart or love) and action (activity, practice or character). The parts of intellect and affect had been introduced in the section on the individual aspect of social statics in the Courses of Positive Philosophy before the part of action functioned to modify the fatalistic order as one of the progressive aims of positivism in A General View of Positivism (Comte, 1968[1851-54], Vol. I: 6-45; 1974a[1830-42]: 498-502). The positive relation between these three parts may be summarized in the maxim, "act from affection, think to act," in Comte's "systematic view of the soul" or "positive classification of the eighteen internal functions of the brain." As a logical order, social individuals are encouraged "to love, to think, to act" in an Aristotelian, that is, categorical manner that love is considered the principle, thought the means, and action the result (Comte, 1968, Vol. I: 594f; 1891a[1852]: 294f, table 3). In the classification of eighteen cerebral functions, specifically, these three parts are further divided into multiple series of "affective motors" which coordinate "intellectual functions" to generate "practical qualities". In the field of action, courage, prudence and perseverance compose three qualities of execution. In the field of intellect, synthesis, analysis, generalization, systemization and communication
compose five functions of counsel. In the field of affection, there are ten motors of impulsion within a personal-social duality. On the personal side, which occupies seven out of ten motors, there are five interests (i.e. nutritive, sexual, material, military and industrial instincts) and two ambitions (i.e. pride and vanity). On the social side, they consist of the remaining three motors, including attachment, veneration and benevolence, with benevolence strictly known as sympathy or universal love. The cerebral mapping of this affective field illustrates the “decrease of energy, increase of dignity, from the back of the head to the front, from the lower part to the higher, from the sides to the middle.” In sum, Comte valued the submissive character of action insofar as it is subordinated to intellect whilst the head has been harmonized by love evolving from the egoistic to altruistic area of the brain.

Ideologically, Comtean love was legitimated by the institution of monogamous, conjugal family as the analytic unit of sociology. Indeed, primary relations within the family provide the empirical context for Comte’s phrenology of the soul (cf. Wernick, 2001: 116-52). From Course of Positive Philosophy, the family was analyzed along the relations of “subordination” of age and sex (Comte, 1974a: 502-06). Yet it’s far from an arbitrary, absolute subordination of women to men, but rather a reversible, relative one based on “natural distinction” (Comte, 1968, Vol. I: 170). To be exact, women were first given a religious political role in A General View of Positivism. Bridging the social and the moral, Comte introduced a practical theory of class to build a religious polity of positivism. In accord with the submissive notion of practice guided by intellect and affect, women become the moral companions for positive scientists in order to convert the working classes from the communist camp into the religious constitution of a positive polity. In this practical phase, a certain post-revolutionary dictatorship of the popular origin, resembling Jacobins’ government of the Convention, is a “provisional necessity” prior to the autonomy of the spiritual power (Comte, 1968, Vol. I: 92-95, 160-63). Until the System of Positive Polity, a “positive theory of the family” was elaborated with moral and political aspects. In the moral aspect, filial, sibling and conjugal relations provide the natural habitats for the cultivation of the three social affections, veneration, attachment and sympathetic love (Comte, 1968, Vol. II:
The political aspect of the family is illustrated by the division of the spiritual power of women from the temporal power of men (Comte, 1968, Vol. II: 163). In the positive polity, as a result, love overcomes masculine Eros-God and sexless Reason-Life to be complemented with a feminine sex at the hearth. With the spiritual influences of motherhood, wifehood and sisterhood, women enjoy the social power to promote sympathetic morality beyond a private economy.

Biographically, an idealized image of Clotilde de Vaux played no doubt a crucial role in Comte’s complex of love. But this is a chauvinist view which cannot be taken seriously without acknowledging de Vaux’s female gender strategy in reality. As Pickering (2000) has shown, the actual relationship between the two proceeded more like a struggle over gender power, at least on de Vaux’s part, as social morality imposed an impossible demand of antinomy on women in the mid 19th century France, expecting them to satisfy both private and public virtues by achieving a contradictory self-identity of the passive mother-lover and the active partner-thinker. Avoiding this dilemma, Comte assigned a passive identity to women in his positive polity as he endowed the religious images of angels versus demons to the emotionally virtuous and intellectually overbearing types of women, according to his impressions of Caroline Massin and Clotilde de Vaux, respectively (Pickering, 1996). If we followed this critical view, then Comte’s resort to the ideal of motherly love would represent nothing but the disappearing reality of the conjugal family. In fact, this view itself presupposes that there is a social paradox of women’s independence to be solved in reality: if all women look for public recognition in intellectual professions, then marriage becomes highly dissoluble for various practical reasons (from child rearing to loving company), and an altruistic society of families will be replaced by a society of individuals. Nonetheless, this feminist case cannot be overstated either because if de Vaux was not naively passive, then nor was Comte simply

Ironically, we now have a twist to the critical feminist view of Comte’s perfect society since, in our over-productive consumer society, more and more well-educated women might wish to stay or return home being docile and glamorous housewives so much as the crazy female scientist who masterminds her robot husband to rebuild a harmonious, male-dominating society in the film *The Stepford Wives* (2004). We argue, however, Comte’s positivist order relies on a fatal potential of women, which is much more radical than feminism and its irony.
idealistic. As a result, one might argue a case of the third gender’s view, which better captures the ironic sting in Comte’s solution to the post-revolutionary dilemma of sexual politics. In this case, one has to drop the idea of historical individuals, which presents de Vaux and Comte as an alpha female and an alpha male vying for power and self-identity in place of love and care of the other. If one insists that Comte’s biographical situations must be accounted for, then it’s worth noting that the power struggle in fact lay elsewhere insofar as Comte was always involved in a triadic rather than a dyadic psycho-social relation: first to love the alleged prostitute turned wife Massin, he had to rival her patron Antoine Cerclet; then to love the widow turned writer de Vaux, he needed to compete with her editor Armand Marrast (Gane, 1993: 122; Pickering, 1993: 315-26, 373-74, 491; 2000: 144, 149). At bottom, the sexual-social logics of power and love are not mutually reducible. Hence, in the third gender’s view, we come to understand the literal sense of Comte’s proposal: his religious polity aimed at moral feminization of men by socially subjecting women to men. In this realm of public-private or social-moral duality, the preoccupation of seizing public, social power which dominates the designs of both chauvinist dualism and feminist monism could always be overwritten by the moral power of love as feminine grace in the hearth. This sexual-social logic in Comte’s religious positive polity antedated the psychoanalytic conception of castration more than half a century. Politically, he proposed a sociological form of Catholicism, which overcame not only religious Catholicism but also Hobbes’ anti-Catholic, political model of society since the ground of submission was brought from the political state’s authority back to a spiritual power.

Secondly, after crowning sociology as the apex of his philosophy of positive sciences, Comte tried to synthesize the scientific form of sociology with the form of art in A Discourse on the Positive Spirit in 1844. He insisted that science as law discovery and art as work making share “a close spontaneous connection” in sociology (Comte, 1903[1844]: 47). As an introduction to his lectures on Popular Astronomy, this text summarizes positivism in its intellectual and social aspects. Nonetheless, “the universal preponderance of Morals” is noted in passing to stress the consolidation and stimulation of “the
sentiment of Duty" by "the positive spirit of Generality" (Comte, 1903: 112). In short, only by bridging the theoretical science to an art of practice can the heart become the objective of the intellect. Subsequently, a positive theory of art was elaborated in A General View of Positivism (1848). In this text, Goethe's poetry, along with Byron's, is considered as the work of "destruction" for its "idealization of Doubt" on the Protestant soil (Comte, 1968, Vol. I: 239, 274). Comte then goes on to argue the identification of aesthetic and scientific geniuses, in respect of which Goethe is adduced again as a negative example, for he is better conceived as a metaphysical philosopher than a positivist poet (Comte, 1968, Vol. I: 249). Nonetheless, selected works of Goethe and Byron are included in Comte's positivist library, except Byron's Don Juan, to acknowledge a borderline positive spirit of the poet (Comte, 1968, Vol. IV: 484). In fact, already in 1829 while being informed of Hegel's lecture to prove the existence of God, Goethe commented "[t]he period of doubt...is past; men now doubt as little the existence of a God as their own...A French philosopher of the most recent times begins his chapter confidently thus: 'it is acknowledged that man consists of two parts, body and soul; so we will begin with the body, and then speak of the soul'" (Eckermann, 1998: 331). Radicalizing the Cartesian tradition, Comte's positive theory of the soul developed exactly this new French philosophy.

In short, Comte's positivist order of love, before it took a feminine religious form in 1848, had been prepared in 1844 by his intimation of sociology as a synthetic form of art and science. Apart from the argument of compatibility, however, there are no corresponding ideological and physiological complexes of love to condition the artistic form of sociology in the same way as in the religious form. Accordingly, Comte has no physiological and ideological theories of art (to deal with issues pressing to us, such as the institutions of art functioning in galleries, museums and academies, the industries of art constituted by art collectors, art dealers, art critics, art viewers, and mass media, and the behavioural and brain sciences of artists in comparison to geniuses, criminals, clairvoyants, mental diseases, brain damage, etc.). Biographically, furthermore, one errs to overgeneralize the impact of his affair with de Vaux on shaping a complex of love prior to the religious form of
positivism because the 1844 text was published a couple of months before he met de Vaux. Therefore, it seems more reasonable that the on-and-off relation with Massin, which ended in divorce in 1842, prompted Comte's conversion from the intellect to the heart and science to art. Massin was by no means less important than de Vaux in Comte's emotional life. In fact, as early as 1828 when Comte reviewed Broussais' physiology, he raised the issue of the "extreme negligence" of moral care in psychotherapy against the pretext of his wife's "love care" after his release from Esquirol's clinic in 1826 (Heilbron, 1995: 233; Comte, 1998: 240). Here to look for a historical individual Massin is as unhelpful as in the case of de Vaux since it would imply more or less that Comte's record of mental illness can discredit his late thought to personal delusion, let alone its social-historical impact. On the other hand, explaining Comte's artistic reform of positivism in terms of his historical-individual imagination about women is equally self-defeating since this feminist view could not escape from the grip of patriarchal ideology. What matters here is the actual Massin and de Vaux who contributed to the making of Comte's artistic and religious forms of positivism, respectively. This dimension pertains to his actual disappointment and expectation as a result of his intimate interactions with the two women throughout his adult life. In short, as Comte's disappointment toward Massin shaped his expectation of de Vaux, so the artistic formation of love was led to a religious transformation.

Thirdly, the fact that Comte initiated the seventh science of moral altruism to condition or supplement the queen of positive sciences, sociology, implies that there was a logical problem in the scientific form of positivism itself. Sociology needed to be extended to a new science of morality because, apart from the semi-scientific phrenology, there was no theory of love accountable even by the most advanced branches of positive sciences, such as biology and sociology (when narrowly defined without morals). Given as such, the question arises as to whether this seventh "science" implies a passage to a "philosophy" redefined? If so, what is this new philosophy's converse relation

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8 There is a biographical error here as Comte did not meet de Vaux first in October 1844 (Aron, 1968: 126; Gane, 1993: 123). Rather, he first met her in April 1844 and did not write her until April 1845, whereas A Discourse of the Positive Spirit had been published in February 1844 (Gane, 2006: 89; Pickering, 2000: 140).
to the positive sciences? Logically, the answer pertains to the mediating status of sociology insofar as it connects the positive sciences to philosophy. Therefore, one might examine the scientific character of sociology by comparison to the other positive sciences in order to find its implication for a philosophical notion of love before the artistic and religious forms of positivism took shape.

The question of a new science or new philosophy emerged as early as 1838 during Comte's second mental crisis and third marriage separation, leading him to an "aesthetic revolution" in a thirst for poetry and music. Meanwhile, this crisis caused him to stop reading practically all contemporary publications for the sake of his "cerebral hygiene" (Pickering, 1993: 477-86). In view of the six volumes of *Courses of Positive Philosophy* published between 1830 and 1842, 1838 was the year of the publication of volume III on chemistry and biology (lectures 35 to 45), and the year of his writings on social physics/sociology, which would be published later in three volumes in 1839, 1841 and 1842. Given these contexts, one might ask a fundamental question: what is sociology as a science and philosophy of love in Comte's positivist order? First, it is a myth that Comte's positivist sociology is analogous to organic biology. The organicism of sociology and its "bio-politics" are usually identified with positivism, but this was not the case until Spencer's social Darwinism altered Comtean sociology (cf. Fuller, 2006: 61).

Second, the place of chemistry has a strategic significance in Comte's order of positive sciences, for chemistry, derived from a break with the ancient alchemic order, could have upset the hierarchy as it appeared between astronomy and physics historically, but between cosmology and biology theoretically (Comte, 1891a: 149-50). Comte inserted chemistry between physics and biology against the historical sequence to create a theoretical distinction between the inorganic and organic sciences based on the degree of phenomenal complexity (Comte, 1974a: 256-57). Although chemistry brought the first method of observation to a new height by adding the senses of taste and smell to sight (in astronomy) and touch (in physics), it fell short of the methods of experiment, comparison and history (Comte, 1974a: 253-54;
Logically, chemistry should have had surpassed physics with an advanced method of experimentation, but it didn’t. Actually, its close relation with “the greater complexity of the phenomena in physiology” impeded the pure experimental environment (Comte, 1974b: 105-07). This physiological or bodily complication in chemistry also made its method of comparison imperfect and that of history wanting. This means chemistry in Comte’s time couldn’t deal with the question of life properly and that of memory at all. In effect, as an imperfect analytical science of composition and decomposition, chemistry had to improve its synthetic skill of recomposing the organic body (Comte, 1974a: 255-56; 1974b: 108-09). But this is far from saying that Comte envisaged a romantic biology, for his consideration of a positive state of chemistry was closer to modern physical chemistry characterized by its mathematical exactitude than to biochemistry. Conversely, Goethe’s approach to discover the scientific laws of nature might be misunderstood by Comte as a romantic-metaphysical conception of life resurrected from death. That’s why his expressed radical doubts over the metaphysical rule of affinity behind electro-chemistry, a reservation which settled down to a blanket rejection of “organic chemistry” (Comte, 1974a: 285-300). At the end of the day, he left no remarks about Goethe’s “morphology.” We have seen how morphology constituted the scientific basis of Goethe’s legacy of love. Recall that Goethe coined the term of morphology as a result of his initial study of the metamorphosis of plants in accordance with Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory of the state, and his subsequent interest in animal electro-chemistry in the company of Alexander von Humboldt. Morphology later developed into a general and then comparative metamorphosis. By contrast, Comte granted “the theory of plants [to become] the normal basis of biology,” but “this is the only part of biology which could be absolutely separated from sociology.” Eventually, he excluded “a sounder knowledge of man” from the hierarchy of all species based on parallel laws of animality and vegetality (Comte, 1891a: 154-57). At the outset of Courses of Positive Philosophy, in fact, he had professed to treat only physiology, but not botany and zoology, and chemistry, but not mineralogy. His reason was that in the two classes of natural sciences, which means fundamental and derived ones, he only dealt with “the abstract or general,” not “the concrete, particular or
descriptive" (Comte, 1974a: 41). At all events, Comte's concern was not that biology was a higher and more favoured science than chemistry, but that the distinction of organic biology and inorganic chemistry had to be held as a positivist order of sciences.

Henceforth, third, it becomes meaningful for his sociology to be modeled on the only hard science of his time, physics. Accordingly, sociology named originally as social physics was a matter of convenience. Nonetheless, his positive philosophy in pursuit of "invariable natural Laws" did look up constantly to Newtonian physics "in the case of the doctrine of Gravitation" (Comte, 1974a: 28). Hence, sociology construed as social physics implies that Comte biased toward the inanimate notion of love before the rise of Darwinian biology as a respectable science. Finally belonging to Goethe's legacy of love as we understood it, Comte's philosophy of love posited the renunciation of biological vitality by the simulation of physical death. Moreover, this scientific form of love was manifestly applied all the way to the religious form, preferring the sympathetic affect, the synthetic intellect and the submissive action.

All in all, Comte implemented his science-art of sociology by instituting a positivist religion after 1848. The religious form of positivism was elaborated in the four volumes of *System of Positive Polity* published between 1851 and 1854. In the meantime, he began to write in a circumspective manner, that is, not only in the form of a catechism to educate revolutionaries, women and workers, in 1852, but also in the form of an appeal to advise conservatives, kings and patricians, in 1855. To the mass audience, he offered questions and answers about the positivist worship, doctrine and regime, instructing the members of positive religion a way to "live openly", that is to "become more apt to think, to act and even to love." To the elite readers, he provided a philosophy of conservative politics to defend the rise of a "progressive dictatorship" in "the necessary connection between republican monocracy and sociocratic heredity" (Comte, 1889[1855]: 232, 254; 1891a: 189-90). In view of this, Comte's religious positivism replaced the realistic-idealistic dualism with a real-virtual duality. Goethe had commented at the end of 1826 that "French have good brains; but with them everything must be positive, and if it is not so
they make it so" (Eckermann, 1998: 139). Read in context, he managed to concur with a French science of nature (on the subject of colour) to have moved beyond "the load of mathematics" (Eckermann, 1998: 140). Nonetheless, the positive spirit of the French method "stick[s] too much to the real, and cannot get ideal into their heads," for "[u]nderstanding will be in the way of the French; they will not consider that imagination has its own laws, to which the understanding cannot and should not penetrate" (Eckermann, 1998: 212, 215). However in Comte's case, Goethe's largely accurate view of the French mind is somehow rendered ironic: although the positive state in Comte's law of the three states is acclaimed as the realistic one, his religious practice is often derided as idealistic. This irony reveals the inapplicability of realistic-idealistic dualism in Comte's thought taken as a whole. Rather akin to Marx's revolutionary praxis, Comte sought to advance his real, positive state by instituting "a universal order" of love (cf. Wernick, 2001: 165-66). Beyond pre-idealistic imagination and idealistic symbolization, Comte's rational idea must converge with the real affectively, or affectively post-idealistic. His ethical perfectionism to carry out religious positivism short-circuited the metaphysical desires of anthropologization, humanization and individualization in the Western civilization since the Greco-Roman times. This explains why his worship of the Great Being was "formed much more by the dead in the first place, then by those to be born, than by the living" (Comte, 1891a: 63). Hence, Comte's altruistic love of Humanity defined as "the whole of human beings, past, present and future..., but those only who are really assimilable, in virtue of a real cooperation toward the common existence" was post-humanistic and anti-humanitarian by anticipation (Comte, 1891a: 53). Within Western history, such "inhuman" love of the Great Being might be traced to the Egyptian worship of the dead. In practice, it points to astrology in Egypt or Chaldaea as it could be understood as the condition of im/possibility to the birth of positive sciences by Greek philosophers, from whom previsional observation broke out of oracular imagination to establish an astronomic view of the future for the first time (cf. Comte, 1974a: 135; 1974b: 81). Growing to maturity in the hands of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo, astronomy became the "chief motor" of history (Comte, 1903: 171-72). Beyond history, furthermore, the cult of astrology in Comte's positive religion refers to Chinese
culture on a logical ground, which will be discussed below (cf. Gane, 2006: 126-27; Comte, 1891b[1856]: 19). The point of comparison between Comte’s religious positivism and the Egyptian-Chinese cultures of fetishism lies in what might be called “the sex appeal of the inorganic” in modernity due to the objectification of human subjectivity and the reification of organic bodies (cf. Perniola, 2004[2000]). Given Comte’s difficult material and emotional life, it was not hard for him to savour a cruel taste of love in disjointedness and separation. The point here is that his positivist order of love callous to individual subjectivities and their rights (of whatever kind) demonstrates its “experimental” blood of science rather than the “dogmatic” spirits of religion and philosophy. Overall, Comte’s positivist sociology erected a religion redefined scientifically in a reversed hierarchy of positive sciences from biology back to astronomy.

Finally, we could appreciate the significance of the recent interest in Comte’s positive inclusion of “systematic fetishism” in his religion of Humanity by putting it back to the scientific form of positivism (Preus, 1987: 107-130; Gane, 1993: 124, 199; 2006: 99, 110, 122; Wernick, 2001: 177-86). In the end, Comte’s positivist sociology supplemented by moral altruism and then generalized to a religious love of the Great Being had to be synthesized by a mathematical logic of the subjective. To be exact, Comte’s final writing project, Subjective Synthesis, intended to create a Positive System to synthesize his Positive Philosophy and Positive Polity. In accord with the superiority of moral unity over intellectual and practical ones, and religion over philosophy and politics, he planned to write four volumes, including one entitled System of Positive Logic on theoretical synthesis, two entitled System of Positive Morals on moral synthesis, and one entitled System of Positive Industry on practical synthesis (Comte, 1891b: v, 1-2). Unfortunately, this third writing career was cut short by his death in 1857, leaving us only the treatise on positive logic. Here one can no longer argue that Comte regressed to pre-positivist imagination due to the “regeneration of mathematics,” although an aberration of scholastic neologism was led by his disciple Emile Littré in the 1870s (Comte, 1891b: viii; Gane, 2003: 37-43). Far from scholastic mysticism, Comte realized that “theoreticians are as much the object of suspicion when
they proclaim the necessity of a new spiritual power as are the rich when they insist on the value of material property." Accordingly, "it is for practicians alone to proclaim the value of priesthood...Its foundation could not but be the work of a philosopher; but it rests with patricians, proletariats, and women exclusively to secure its due ascendancy" (Comte, 1891b: xvii). Being consistently progressive, he sought to give a mathematical account for the religious form of positivism, particularly regarding the reintroduction of fetishism to the systemic closure of science and philosophy. Specifically, he aimed at clarifying the logic behind theologism and positivism in terms of the two pre-positive forms of mathematics, geometry and calculus (evolved from algebra, the theory of numbers).9 Restoring all seven positive sciences in the series between mathematics (qua mechanics) and morals to the fetishist form of mathematics, Comte pushed his positivism to the limit of geometrical imagination (Comte, 1891b: xiv-xvi). In theory, he argued for "an adequate incorporation of fetishism with positivism, so completing the reign of Law by that of Will" (Comte, 1891b: 6). Methodologically, moreover, he claimed a posthumous position of enunciation (of 1927) to relate "the fundamental science and the final science" or connect "mathematical speculations" with "moral meditations" (Comte, 1891b: vii, 3-4). As Comte's young disciple rightly admitted, Comte "did not invent the positive philosophy" which is "nothing else but the systematization of the sum of the forces which have concurred in the evolution of man...[but] not the work of a single man" (Charles Jundzill in Comte, 1891b: xxv).10 In the same sense, his logical explication of the positive religion should be seen as an integral part of a collective work of truth and love without an historical-individual author. In the context of Comte's œuvre, the positivist order of love (constituted in the scientific-artistic-religious forms of sociology) was eventually provided with an ontology of a science fictional

9 See Gane (2006: 123) for a fatal reading of Comte's dualistic form of theologism and positivism behind his law of three states.

10 Comte included in the appendix to the preface not only a letter of dedication to his first mathematical teacher but also the letters of his admirer and sponsor (Comte, 1891b: xxiii-xxxix). His acknowledgement to nobodies, which appeared repeatedly in many other publications, legitimizes his cult of heroes and savants in the positive calendar. In other words, Comte realized that the truth and power of his positive religion are intrinsic to what he called "spiritual sonship" by devoting to and so ennobling the lowest social carriers like a circle of love. In light of this, the sanctification of de Vaux and Comte himself should be understood in his two-tiered (elitist and mass) theory of religion.
and hence ultra-positivist status. Through the subjective synthesis of mathematical fetishism, the religion of Humanity was “sutured” (A. Badiou) to a science fictional ontologization of love after the fact.

If the science fictional character of positivism is revealed in the problematic of fetishism and positivism as two forms of subjective synthesis distinguished from the objective synthesis of theogonism, then the resulting order of love must exceed the social worship of Humanity based on the moral law of altruism (Comte, 1891b: 5). The logical question of synthesizing positivism and fetishism concerns the paradox between laws and wills in various derived terms, including theory and practice, intellectual generality and bodily complexity, or social relativity and personal absoluteness (Comte, 1891b: 5-6). As a solution, the cultic object of love, the Great Being (Humanity: the over-Man) has to be re-embedded in the non-objectified, universal realms of the Great Fetish (World: the Earth) and the Great Medium (Space: the Chinese idea of Heaven plus the Western idea of Ether) to form a positivist trinity (Comte, 1891b: 18-20). Manifestly, this model is inclusive of but irreducible to the geometric schema. In Comte’s definition, logic means “the normal concert of feelings, images and signs to inspire us with the conceptions which meet our moral, intellectual, and physical wants” (Comte, 1891b: 23). In the general positive logic, the Great Medium, the Great Fetish and the Great Being are connected to sign, image and feeling (by harmonious logic), deduction, induction and construction (by intellectual instruments), and Logic, Physics and Morals (by scientific knowledge) (Comte, 1891b: 46). In the universal positive logic, the positivist trinity is constituted by the correspondence of “Calculus with Space, Geometry with the Earth and Mechanics with Humanity” (Comte, 1891b: 69). In sum, the final Comte’s subjective synthesis bridges the logic of positive sciences to the mathematical logic through the maxim, ‘to complete laws we need wills’ (Comte, 1891b: 21). But how do these logics work out as such?

In practice, the fetishist-positivist synthesis boils down to the question of “voluntary obedience,” which means how to “consolidate synergy by developing sympathy” without falling back on the Protestant (spiritualist) God
and the materialist Nature (Comte, 1891b: ix, xi, 10, 14). With this concern, Comte introduces the key elements of fiction and fate to the love of Humanity. He holds that in “the subjective conception of the external order,” “the positivist differs from fetishist spirit only in refusing matter an intelligence which at first too much confounded with feeling” (Comte, 1891b: 6, 8). As objects of worship, in other words, the Great Being is differentiated from the Great Fetish in having an autonomous intelligence (defined as “modifying its conduct to adapt it to its situations”), while it is assisted by positivists (“Her true servants and their free auxiliaries”, intellect, feeling and action) to “gradually modify fate” (Comte, 1891b: 7). In this disjointed condition, the problem of sympathy arises during the positivist worship. Comte solves this emotional detachment from any constructed object by narrating a cosmological fiction of the stars’ evolution (similar to the Big Bang) in order to argue in utter frankness that “we neither need, nor have we the power, to conceive an absolute creation...On the other hand, it is desirable to imagine such changes anterior to the existing order, if such hypotheses can perfect our unity, whether by enabling poetical fictions to complete our philosophical conceptions, or better still, by developing our sympathies” (Comte, 1891b: 8-9). With the fictionalization of the external order, one is then initiated to the dominion of destiny. The “dominion of the unchangeable destinies,” which comprises the World, the Great Being and Man, eludes the abstract, metaphysical system. Passing to the real, positive system, “supreme destiny” resides in the two groups of laws about natural sciences and morals (Comte, 1891b: 11). Nonetheless, these fictionalized laws of positivism are not binding enough without the love of “supreme fate” which “has no peculiar sphere,” an “adoration [that] seems fated to remain for ever without an object. When aided by the supreme fate, universal love can secure as a habitual result that personality submit to sociability” (Comte, 1891b: 12-13). Conversely, if we “remove the yoke” of destiny and fate, “the human problem would remain insoluble, because altruism could never sufficiently overcome egoism” (Comte, 1891b: 13). In this context, the Great Milieu or Medium “with a fictitious nature of an unequivocal kind” is introduced in a historical fiction (about the replacement of Western God by Feminine Humanity originated in the Chinese Heaven and Earth) to account for this non-objectified fate
Only as a result of positivism, Comte concludes, the value of willful submission can be redeemed, substituting "the social for the personal point of view" to transform involuntary obedience into a happily voluntary one (Comte, 1891b: 13-14, 21-22). In short, the subjective synthesis of wills and laws cannot succeed without recourse to fiction and fate as the preconditions of science and morality. If this is the case, to whom are these practical logics suggested, and for what?

Building on the problematic of The Catechism of Positivism and Appeal to Conservatives, Comte’s unfinished project Subjective Synthesis marks a ripe deliberation on a universal positivism in the wake of the general view. It is to be read by “synthetic teachers” and “medical men” (Comte, 1891b: vi, ix). In Comte’s positive polity, this intellectual class is supposed to have harmonized scientific and moral laws, provided that they are supported by women, the affective class. Since the central problem of subjective synthesis concerns the willful obedience to laws, it cannot be achieved without the recognition of fiction and fate. The will is a “peculiar feature” in the collective human life, and its social carrier refers to patricians as the fourth class (Comte, 1968, Vol. IV: 68-69). It can also be seen as a minor part of the practical class largely composed of workers. This minor class of practice refers to the social strata of administration, mainly consisting of agriculturalists, industrialists and especially bankers (Comte, 1891a: 236-40; 1968, Vol. IV: 57, 71). In light of this, Comte’s subjective synthesis provides a spiritual (as opposed to spiritualist) guide to the arbitrary government by the practical class, advising the patricians to submit their fetishist, capricious wills to Heavenly Fate beyond the positivist laws of Destiny (World-Humanity-Man). As a result, Comte’s positive polity is grounded in its two sources, moral science and religion, to suggest a religious politics of love, insofar as the virtualized God in his spiritual philosophy escapes the two traps of spiritualism, monotheism and mysticism. Historically, this religious politics looks down on power politics evolved from Machiavelli through Hobbes to Rousseau in order to reclaim Aristotle’s moral politics. Bounded by categorical thinking, however, even the Aristotelian science has lost the spiritual truth in Plato. Henceforth, as a cultural response reversal to Hegel’s philosophy of history, this religious
politics looks up to the Chinese feudal courts, in which the patricians, following their common emperor's lead, were constantly exhorted by their literati to govern the Destined World-Humanity-Man by the Heaven's Way. In result, Comtean love is far from conservative since the governing class is doubly governed by moral-scientific laws and spiritual powers. Writing from the future's point of view, Comte believed the governmental mentality could be revolutionized from within by the universal love of fate.

Comte would be surprised had he lived to hear that we read him under Goethe's legacy of love, even though he did have indirect reports from Gustave d'Eichthal about the German philosophies of Herder, Kant and Hegel as early as 1824, and later came to familiarize himself with Goethe's poetry in particular during his 1838 aesthetic turn (Pickering, 1993: 275-303, 483). It might have brought more astonishment to Goethe had he lived to see how Comte's philosophy of the positive sciences began with an evolutionary series from mathematics or astronomy to biology and ended in a sociological polity, a moral polity further founded on a religious ontology of love synthesized with a mathematical logic of the subjective. However, given the key elements of death, woman, fiction and fate in the formation of positivist thought, we maintain that Comte acted out Goethe's legacy of love in a genealogical rather than cultural-historical or social-individual sense. In short, Comte reincorporated the sympathizing function of fetishism in the positive logic through the emerging mediator of fatalism. Representing the three states inside the positive state, the (imaginary) real objects of laws (World-Humanity-Man) and the (symbolic) real matheme of wills (the subject) are synthesized in an encounter with the (really) real thing called Fate.

¹¹ The Chinese literati practiced morality as well as astrology, defying Weber's ideal typical analysis in The Religion of China, which will be discussed in chapter 4. Practicing the Human's Way by the Heaven's Way is not just an ideal of Chinese religious politics, but rather constitutes the real of Chinese social organization, contradicting thereby Weber's judgment of Asia as traditionalism due to the lack of a Protestant spirit of modernity. The same can be said about Marx's "Asiatic mode of production" in a world dialectical series of liberation from China to Europe, which is an application of Hegel's philosophy of history. This Way or Tao implies the notion of Nature composed of an outer Nature and an inner nature, from which Taoist and Confucian cultures are deduced. In the Chinese figurative language, Nature/nature (Tzu-ran) means the affirmation of the self by restraint since it conveys an image of one saying yes, alright or enough (ran) by pointing a finger at oneself (tzu).
Without grasping the inner differentiation/systemization of the positive logic, in contradistinction to its phenomenology, one would normally criticize Comte's history of science and religion as a failure to think "at the end" of techno-science in modernity, and follow instead the neo-romantic doctrine of late Heidegger to redeem the saving grace of poetry from the grave danger of technology (Scharff, 2003). But the post-historical reading itself fails to appreciate that in the final analysis, Comte's narrative of the real is a *narrative logic* of historical laws as such, meditating on the im/possibility of time before the beginning of history. In this strict sense, one could refute the rationale of his English admirers and later detractors, such as Mill and Spencer, by arguing that Comte's contribution to sociology would not be practically positive without taking his second career (including the incomplete third) into account. Reflexively, the social belief in scientific knowledge in Comte's France guaranteed the efficacy of his thought, so much so that scientists like him could take the unique chance to design and launch his social engineering. Counter-reflexively, however, the logical synthesis of Comte's positivism makes one realize why his sociological science-art-religion was a "real" thing in a society of love which disregarded the distinction between science fiction and cultural history, fatal thought and convicted action. To say the least, if we think he was "mad" to bother himself instituting a positivist order of love, then the society we live in has probably been trapped in a loop of mental sanity.

2.2 Marx's question of fetishism

If Comte's theory of society is built on his religious economy, then Marx's is based on his political economy. If any 'Marx's philosophy' is worth saving from post/Marxist philosophies, then the evolution of his writing style from critique to analysis must be totally respected in order to break through the 'epistemological break' of Marx's anti-humanism. For Althusser, Marx broke away from his early humanist philosophy of praxis since 1845 by introducing the contradictory realities of social production, state-market ideology and dialectical history into the self-identical thinking of philosophy (Balibar, 1995[1993]: 6, 40-41, 78-79, 96). In view of this, the object of Marx's philosophy is neither political economy nor political economy (cf. Žižek, 1999: 347-59), but political economy. More than traditional political economy, his
philosophy becomes a model of social science as soon as it recognizes, from the horizon of economic politics, real contradictions in a politico-economic form of society. Economizing political forces, Marx's thought is thus not trapped in 'the mirror of production' which only reflects the identity of socialist revolution and capitalist rationality (cf. Baudrillard, 1975[1973]: 141-59), but rather opens a window to see through the contradiction of capitalist and socialist instances in one and the same social formation.

Marx's early writings are widely conceived as falling prey to the romantic ideology, given that Goethe's art was a distinctive allusion in his love poems to Jenny and remarks on literature (cf. Gane, 1993: 85-92; Marx and Engels, 2006). But he does have a humanist concept of love from very early on. As we have seen, he called for "uncritical love" with the vision of "social humanity" in 1845, assuming a theory of society based on the needs of human dignity as well as individual survival.

Already in 1844, Marx concluded his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts with the universal power of money. After discussing human feelings as 'ontological affirmations of being (of nature)' and private property as 'objects of enjoyment and objects of activity', he concluded with a sublime meditation on the dialectical consequences of money as human society is turned into a topsy-turvy, inhuman society. Firstly, expounding Goethe’s Faust, money is “the procurer between man’s need and the object”, and so “[f]or me it is the other person,” “the supreme good” that makes its possessor (that is me) all good. Secondly, expounding Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens, money is “the bond of all bonds” and “universal agent of separation”, “the visible divinity” and “the common whore”, and so “the alienated ability of mankind.” Thirdly, money is “the truly creative power”, “the external, universal medium and faculty [sic] for turning an image into a reality and reality into a mere image”, and so the general distorting of individualities.” Fourthly, money is “the general confounding and confusing of all things” (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 3: 322-26). Then, with a neo-classical turn, he came down to earth, revaluing human relationships as a “specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life,” as if "you exchange love only for love,
trust for trust, etc." Finally, he hoped for a reciprocal idea of love to counter the inalienable and alienating power of money: "[i]f you love without evoking love in return – that is, if your loving as loving does not produce reciprocal love; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you do not make yourself a beloved one, then your love is impotent – a misfortune" (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 3: 326).

At first sight, this is a sound humanist argument. Once we think again, however, he is begging the question of the beloved power of money or the fetishist power of love: are the four universal qualities of money not the universal characters of love? Did Marx not soon discover that the unreciprocated irony of love, love as a universal exception to all the other individual values in life, demanded him to complete the Hegelian synthesis? In other words, does the first volume of The Capital (1867) not stand for Marx's forced reply to love's inhuman demand as his opening analysis of commodity fetishism attests to the passive seduction of love swerving from the active production of love? Is this not why the 'incessant struggle' of capital and labour aims beyond relative gains of the surplus value between profits and wages to seize the valueless power of the beloved, when the wage system is abolished in the absolute antagonism between capital and labour (Marx in Marx and Engels, 1975, Vol. 20: 149)? Does The Communist Manifesto (1848) not represent Marx and Engel's inhuman cry for the international organization of workers into a political cult of fraternity as beloved as money?

Nevertheless, Comte and Marx failed to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of each other's projects. This missed encounter might be explained historically and logically. Historically speaking, while Comte tried to convert communists to his positivism in 1848, Marx rejected "shitty positivism" in 1866 (Gane, 2006: 50). The changing socio-historical climate propitious

12 From his July 1866 letter to Engels in London, one sees that Marx in Manchester read Comte's positivism through the English lens. In that letter, Comte was mentioned in the prior context that Marx intended to solve the problem of "organization of labour" in his revolutionary theory, a problem to which Comte had offered a solution, albeit unsatisfying to Marx. So the contextual implication is Marx encouraged Engels to pursue the problem so that Comte's "shitty positivism" could be surpassed (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 42: 291-32). This implication becomes manifest in another letter dated October 1867. There Marx tried to get
for the advancement of the new religious and/or workers' movements must have affected the divergent theoretical-practical strategies Comte and Marx took. After all, neither of them was an armchair theoretician, enclosing social reality in an abstract scientific analysis. Furthermore, with respect to the theoretical logic itself, for Marx, intellectuals criticize the governing class in which they form a part for the economic progress of the governed as an exceptional organ in the society. For Comte, intellectuals exhort the governing class to speak for the moral progress of society as a virtual body composed of class divisions. Different roles the intellectual class adopt in relation to the state result in different ways of changing the society by way of religious economy or political economy. Nevertheless, in both cases the intellectuals take a self-alienating stance within the system, hence reflecting an immanent condition of contradiction to catalyze the transformation of industrial capitalism into scientific socialism. From this standpoint, socialism and capitalism are no longer alternative rational projects to be chosen, but two life situations appearing and disappearing in the formal duality of society. And yet, due to historical and logical discrepancies, Comte's and Marx's mutual exclusion sealed their common fate of disappearance as positivism and communism were displaced.

Comte died in 1857, two years before Darwin's On The Origin of Species (1859) was published. Within the Comtean circle, both orthodoxy (Pierre Lafitte) and heterodoxy (Emile Littré) lost their intellectual momentum. Around the Comtean circle, Mill and Spencer lost their interest in Comte's religious turn within the real, positive polity. After The Principle of Psychology in 1860, Spencer gave his Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte (1864). One year on, Mill also voiced his disappointment with Comte in Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865). In fact, as early as 1832 in the famous London & Westminster review, Mill had expressed his view that Bentham's utilitarianism and Coleridge's conservatism were the spirits of the age. This Engels infiltrating English positivism by writing a critique for The Fortnightly Review, of which G. H. Lewes "the Goethe man, and unfortunately semi-Comteist, too" was the co-proprietor (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 42: 455). In a sense, Engels did succeed in converting English positivism to Marxism by replacing Comte's system for Spencer's as the reference of his positive Marxism in Dialectic of Nature, thereby paving the road to Russian Marxism. Marx's question of organization was ironically solved.
generalization implies that Comte’s universalistic concept of society based on a discriminative and sympathetic religion of love was discredited by Mill’s particularistic idea of society in an egalitarian and liberal morality of love. Mill’s frankness hence betrays his psychologist utilitarianism, or his subjectivization of social-moral reality, instead of an objective account of historical relativism. In this self-referential sense, Coleridge only turns conservative after the emergence of Mill’s liberal psychology, just as traditionalism acquires its traditional character only from the subjectivist standpoint of modernism.

Marx died in 1883, one year before Engels’ *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884). We have seen how Engels, at the center of the Marxian circle, fell into romantic fallacy by confusing public with private relations. If class and gender difference are equated and equalized in individual sex love, socialist feminism will differ very little from liberal feminism represented by Mill (cf. Gane, 1993: 128-40). A communist politics of emancipation foreclosed by social-cultural equalitarianism foreshadows the contemporary perversion of politics towards the convergence of post-socialist and late-capitalist economy, totalitarian and neo-liberal politics. Around the Marxian circle, neo-Kantian ethics from the Baden school (Rickert and Windelband) to the Marburg school (Cohen, Cassirer and Scheler), Dilthey’s historical hermeneutics, Heidegger’s existential ontology, as well as Friedrich von Wieser’s economics of marginal utility all contributed in/directly to a certain domestication and dispersion of the collective force of praxis in transcendental, psychological individuals.

From the social science of Comte and Marx to its romantic biological-psychological displacements by Spencer, Mill and Engels among others, the organizing logic of society shifts from objective love to subjective sexuality. In other words, a post-Comtean-Marxian paradigm of subjective love remains unclear, which, as we will present in the remaining parts of the thesis, appears to be the common bid of classical and late/modern sociology, Marxism and psychoanalysis. Indeed, the peaceful cult of women receded as liberal-socialist feminism advanced, leaving the feminine salvation of love to be subjectively appropriated by the becoming-woman of men. In a materialist
move, the perfectionist-revolutionary science of love turned literally homosexual as if Eve's ethos regresses into Adam's rib. As class struggle confused itself with gender struggle, the war of sexuality soon arose to stipulate a new social rule of hysteria expressed via aggression, homicide and suicide. Morally, the case seems ambivalent since it is unclear whether the rise of sexualized subjectivity signifies social progress: is it civilization or barbarism? These notions simply fail to describe a real society of subjects since this world of perpetual misunderstanding and self-misunderstanding belongs to Werther's manic-depressive impersonators. They are in capable of recognizing Goethe's poetic-scientific love in the kindred spirits of the young Werther and the old Faust. In sum, Goethe's life by death and renunciation recoils to a Gothic society of individuals surviving in solitude as long as they agree to the utilitarian morals of surveillance. Politically, however, the situation seems more straightforward since the struggle of subjective sexuality in the late 19th century adumbrated the warring state of the future. We are living in the future, a story embroiled in the self-fulfilling prophesy.
Chapter 3  Social Science after Badiou

In the previous chapter, we arranged a re-encounter of Comte and Marx in light of Goethe's art of love to find a dual relation, a coincidence of insight on fetishism, between them. Conversely, Comte and Marx missed their initial encounter because a "religious politics" of love, the blind spot, the eye which made possible the scientific visions of religious economy and political economy, was lacking. After all, positivist and dialectical modes of thought do stand on the same ground with regards to love, science, and religious politics, regardless of crucial derivative differences. For the theory of love, both champion a universal order of society based on a superhuman love extending from or breaking with the family kinship. For the method of science, both develop a science of history, ending up with a religious or political approach to social-moral economy. For the practice of religious politics, both defend a merciless style of government or rule. In result, both push the idealist philosophy to a certain materialistic opening, bringing being back to thinking. And yet, it is in this historical philosophy of being that a primary distinction emerges: Comte transforms (the medieval) tradition, whilst Marx transcends it. In general terms, they seem to disagree on the social ontology of time, that is, whether or not there is a continuous process toward the future. For positivist philosophy, a representation of the medieval order is possible in the future, but for dialectical philosophy, it is impossible.

However, the distinction is already a modernist one because it presupposes a historicized ontology confined to the im/possibility of retraditionalization. There is no reason why it couldn't be understood futuristically. In fact, from a rigorous post-traditional standpoint, contrary ontological procedures become the case since dialectical philosophy now draws on the possibility of preserving (the modern) traditions, composed of the enlightenment and romanticism, to achieve the overcoming, whereas positivist philosophy is able to surpass them (the law of three states). In result, the social dynamics of the future evolved from the positivist possibility and dialectical impossibility of the (absent) past may reverse their ontological premises when they are referred
to the positivist impossibility and dialectical possibility of the (historical) present. With the social-historical ontology of possibility and impossibility trading hands, the modernist distinction (between past and future, with reference to one, inherited tradition) can effortlessly turn into late-modern and de-constructive difference or even post-modern and post-structural ambivalence (between present and future, with reference to modernity qua multiple, invented traditions). In result, the distinction of a social ontology of the future between Comte and Marx is a spurious one since, continuous or not, both witness a predestined course of history, a fated history from a science fictional view of the future, rather than from the past or the present, and therefore distinguish themselves from objectivism and voluntarism, or scientism and historicism. Conversely, only from this untimely alienation from the world can one properly read Comte’s and Marx’s analyses of the past and present worlds as a futuristic and worldless work of love.

In this chapter, we will explicate the unrequited love of a social science in the context of contemporary philosophy. In a logical as well as historical sense, contemporary philosophy is expected to “represent”, however impossible, the post-modern and/or anti-modern condition which is unbounded by the system of modern philosophy. Stated otherwise, the question of modernity is reposed in a new mode of thinking. Accordingly, by dreaming on Comte-Marx’s social science of love after exemplary philosophers from Karl Löwith to Alain Badiou and beyond, we might ask to what extent love is a modern event subtracted from cultural-historical meanings. In pre-modern philosophy (from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to Plotinus, Augustine and Aquina), an onto-theology of being referred to the love of Wisdom and God via dialogue, monologue, mystic light, confession, knowledge, etc. In modern philosophy (from Descartes and Hume to Kant and Hegel), the love-being became reason and history to express Man and the Spirit via intuition, questioning, critique, reflection, etc. In consequence, what Comte and Marx have discovered is a Great Being. Other than divine and human beings, the Great Being demonstrates an objective intelligence, exercising its unconditional freedom to the brink of self-contradictory caprice. In the exceptional state of being, that is to say, the Great Being may contradict without reconciliation the identity of the
subject in the conventional religious-political sense. Hence we visited Goethe, not Hegel, to bring out the artistic-natural intelligence in Comte's and Marx's ideas, saving them from evolutionist and historicist progressivisms.

In Lowith's account, modern German philosophy from Hegel to Nietzsche ends in a strange return to Goethe's eternal love of nature distinct from Hegel's processive idea of history, whilst its manifest dis/course progresses toward a "bourgeois-Christian world" shown in the writings of young Hegelians (Lowith, 1991[1941]: 3-29, 175-231). As a result, men in Nietzschean modernity forge an "inconsistent compound", becoming "neither ancient ancients nor ancient Christians". Sharing the visions of Marx and Kierkegaard albeit having no acquaintance with them, Nietzsche witnesses the dying moment of the bourgeois culture and the inception of its posthumous simulation (Lowith, 1949: 19; 1991: 176). Lowith's interpretation of this "inconsistent compound" of fatality, providence and free will in modernity focuses on how the modern meaning of history represented in the antithetic figures of Hegel (deism/statism) and Proudhon (atheism/anarchism) is laden with the Christian telos of the future on top of the Greek logos of the cosmos. Henceforth, this eschatological future predominates over all modernist writers, from Comte and Tocqueville, through Marx and Burckhardt, to Spengler and Toynbee, beneath their historical science of facts (Lowith, 1949: 3-91). Given the case, however, modernity itself becomes unexplainable in Lowith's account since his theological interpretation of history has biased toward the Christian worldview, making the return to a Goethean modernity in the name of Nietzsche look implausible, if not impossible. The problem is Lowith bases his history of philosophy on a historicized philosophy of religion, overstressing the antinomy between antiquity and Christianity (in its Protestant type retroactively ascribed to the New Testament idea of the Church theorized by St. Paul and practiced by St. Augustine) at the price of obscuring the irreducible types of Judaism and Catholicism in configuring modernity, and further undervaluing the current of Eastern mysticism underlying all Western civilizations in disfiguring modernity.

Since civilizations are regarded as meaning-seeking cultures in history,
Lowith's interpretation inevitably "predicates" upon a regressive dualism of Christianity and paganism, falling short of his fine discrimination of Goethe's innocent paganism from Nietzsche's anti-Christian paganism (1991: 179). This shows that his philosophical method of "Schopenhauer's determined distancing" is unable to step into the affirmative love arising in either Goethe's or Nietzsche's modernity (Gadamer in Lowith, 1991: xi). Qualifying his thesis, Lowith does doubt the very notion of a Christian philosophy of history, calling it an "artificial compound" derived from the "Hebrew-Christian tradition". This tradition is unwilling to "work out' a working God" since there is a contradiction between Jewish particularity and Christian universality, that is, between a nationalistic "religious politics" per se and an inter-nationalistic profane politics as such (Lowith, 1949: 194-97). Nevertheless, Judaism and Catholicism never amount to overarching explanans of modernity except in the represented ideologies of progress in Marx's "transparent messianism" and Comte's "shallow theology" (Lowith, 1949: 44, 90). That's why "the impossibility of elaborating a progressive system of secular history on the religious basis of faith has its counterpart in the impossibility of establishing a meaningful plan of history by reason" (Lowith, 1949: 198). The two impossibilities deconstruct his backward-looking interpretation of history which "explains" nothing about modernity, but merely reflects an anti-historical common-sense: "this [i.e. the two impossibilities] is corroborated by common-sense; for who would dare to pronounce a definite statement on the purpose and meaning of contemporary events?...What we cannot see and foresee are the potentialities of...the apparent contingency of historical events...[which] are not solid facts but realized potentialities, and as such they are liable to become undone again" (Lowith, 1949: 198).

Overwhelmed by chaotic contingencies, Lowith (1949: 199) wonders if "history, instead of being governed by reason and providence, seems to be governed by chance and by fate." Yet again, Lowith (1949: 199), by following Augustine, reintegrates the religious views of pagan fate (based on astrology and a supreme power) with Christian providence (based on the supreme power only) to check against the irreligiously modern view of progress. Eventually, the mystery of history qua chance and fate is suppressed by a
Weberian interpretation of modernity as a progressive secularization: "Christian by derivation and anti-Christian by consequence," a "radical atheism...within a Christian tradition," and "the fruit [of evils] of too much good will and of a mistaken Christianity" (Lowith, 1949: 200-03). What remains is nothing but the problem of the futuristic horizon of modernity turned into a cage from the religious perspective of hope, regretting the nightmare of progress and disillusionment insofar as it is dreamt by a rebellious child of reason and faith who is lost in confusion (Lowith, 1949: 204-07). As such, Lowith "interprets" nothing positive from the meaning of history but a pessimistic critique of nihilism in modernity.

At bottom, Lowith, the Jewish liberal pupil of Heidegger, suffers from the problem of his historical method because the hermeneutical approach can hardly "understand" the post-historical necessity of Goethe's art. If Goethe's universe guards the eternal present against biases towards the past and the future, then Nietzsche is no doubt Goethe's philosophical heir, as Lowith implies in From Hegel to Nietzsche.13 Yet again, Goethe is primarily a poet. So if Goethe's world can be reread as fictionalizing a piece of illusion of the future abiding in the eternal present, then the materialist analyses of history conducted by Comte and Marx may be regarded as live narrations of the Great Being, partaking Goethe's artistic love of nature on the "six thousand feet beyond man and time" (Zarathustra), leaving utopianism (Saint-Simonians) and futurism (young Hegelians) way behind.

The discovery of the Great Being guides the trajectory of contemporary philosophy drawn by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Althusser, Derrida, Deleuze, Badiou and others. Losing the privilege to ponder on a happy life as Epicurean and Stoic philosophers did, life for contemporary philosophers becomes a self-undermining art, literally a tragic life. For, the Great Being compels one to think through the outside, the frontiers of good

13 This doesn't exclude Nietzsche from striking a science fictional cord after his literary masterpiece Zarathustra in the same manner as Comte's posthumous self-regard. Nietzsche wrote in a letter in 1884: "my work has time, I do not want to be misjudged as though I were concerned with the particular task of the present time. Fifty years hence a few men will probably realize what I have done" (cited in Lowith, 1949: 214).
living like misery (the poor), madness (the monstrous) and death (the remains if not spectres), as the exceptional state of existence. In short, the fundamental question of the Great Being revolves around the endogenous otherness of its intelligence. There are at least three phases of probing the intelligent Great Being. Phase one reflects on its (post-Hegelian) historicity: does it intimate an indomitable will to recur eternally, which amounts to nothing (Nietzsche)? Or, does it refer to a technological en-framing or destiny of the subject qua being-there (Heidegger)? Phase two deliberates about its (post-Kantian) transcendence: can it be dialecticized by a total political subject qua nothingness (Sartre)? Or, can it be supplemented by an infinite ethical subject qua the face (Levinas)? (Derrida then applies Levinas to undermine Althusser's theory of totality.) Phase three thinks over its (post-Comtean-Marxian) immanence: since ontologizaton (phase one) and deontologization (phase two) both suffer from idealist vestiges (i.e. failures to cross the endpoint of philosophy, giving [up] enough thinking to [begin] being), intelligent otherness might be reconsidered as sheer happening in the name of an event, thereby resituating the subject qua the constituted void between being and the event. Given the case, do being and the event count as a univocal One, or the antagonistic Two? Simply, does the multiplicity of being itself deserve the name of the event? And, exactly, what situations (of disjunction) do both figurations create to shape and mobilize the subjects (of the void)? (Deleuze and Badiou radicalize Althusser's Spinozism.) At bottom, the question of the Great Being provoked by its objective intelligence concerns the duality of a Thinking-Being while growing out of the classical problematic about the dis/unity of thinking and being.

This is not the place to discuss ramifying philosophical questions from the above typology. Our brief contextualization is to show that any presentation of the Thinking-Being must renounce both an orderly law of thinking and a promiscuous love of being, and confront instead the knots of thinking and being, law and love, on a Comtean-Marxian basis indifferent to Kantian antinomy and Hegelian dialectics. This is why the final Comte's problematic of the "subjective synthesis" of law and will remains acutely pertinent to the developmental problem of humanity, especially in light of Badiou's account of
the 20th century through a documentary analysis of poems, plays, manifestoes and treatises. Refuting the dubious name of totalitarianism-liberalism, Badiou renames the century (strictly from 1917 to 1976 for him) as the Russian century of revolutions complicated by wars, and then argues that it displays an irruption of "passion for the real" from the volcanic encounter of a "non-dialectical two" without synthesis, or a "disjunctive synthesis" between destiny and will, destruction and foundation, the end and the beginning of a new world in "a figure of inhuman beginning" (Badiou, 2007: 31-39, 171-78). Therefore, double images, such as history and life, wandering and command, submission and transgression, fraternity and we, resignation and rebellion, reappear in these documents (Badiou, 2007[2005]: 14, 91, 125, 129, 142-43).

Whilst reminiscent of Comte's question to which he answered with a mathematical love of fate, another spectre called Marx lurks behind Badiou's account. More than a spectre, in fact, Badiou unearths Marx's remains in the Russian century. Hence he argues carefully that since "the reverse of cowardice is not will, but abandonment to what happens," this courage to abandon oneself runs a greater risk of fusing with the bourgeois tolerance of differences, accepting the human condition in ecstasy, before being able to confront the abyssal act (Badiou, 2007: 125-27). It turns out that from the fatal to the act is a non-dialectical descent into a deep, deep valley. On this journey marks a sudden encounter of two strangers who become an "item". The formation of a fatal act is an event of love, disregarding consequences, staying with its conversion and making its own future in the eternal present. This means no dialectics, positive and negative, can now bridge the two states of existence since real life can no longer be processed by a master-slave relation of power originated in mechanics. In fact, dialectics worked out by the rational mind is susceptible to a denial of real life, papering over its

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14 Badiou shares with Deleuze the non-dialectical method, but then he disputes with Deleuze about its formal procedure, defending a symbolist deduction (Mallarmé against the vitalist production (Bergson) (Badiou, 2000a[1997]: 31-40, 75-77; 2007: 31-32). The politicization of Mallarmé's aesthetics allows Badiou to distinguish the uses and misuses of both Nietzsche and Marx according to specific situations, such as the relation between theatre and politics in the case of Brecht (Badiou, 2007: 39-47), without lumping them together as critical thinkers in general to pervert the revolutionary subject.

15 Badiou's documents include Mandelstram's The Age, Saint-John Perse's Anabasis, Fernando Pessoa's Maritime Ode, Brecht's The Decision, and Breton's Arcanum 17.
disjointed situation. Further, it might even be abused by nihilists who trans-value truths and simulacra infinitely as a gaming strategy, until “a dialectic disease would find a wholesome remedy in the study of nature” (Goethe in Eckermann: 1998: 244). Facing such an impossibility, Badiou turns around to embrace the non-presentable gap between the two by means of “formalization,” which is a mathematical procedure of subtraction combined with literary symbolism (i.e. a poetic image composed of few words to include the excluded margins of the paper as a part of the poem) in order to discern “a minimal difference between place and taking-place” (Badiou, 2007: 56).

Renouncing what Gillian Rose (1984) calls the “dialectic of nihilism” (between the Kantian law and its discontents), Badiou's non-dialectical formalism reserves a non-geometric place so that evental truths can be seduced by acts of fate unvalued in the semiotic space. I would call this recovered commitment which is at once forced and forcing “the fatal act of love” because, apart from resurrecting Marx, Badiou rehearses, however unwittingly, Comte's positivist method as he overcomes military strategies to become militant.16 Following or shadowing Badiou's method if not his polemic call for a “fusion of Germany and France”, I propose to rethink the philosophy of social sciences in the site of its truth procedures by formalizing the possibility of art and love immanent to Comte's scientific religion and Marx's scientific politics. I suggest this “desuturation” within the Comtean-Marxian “historic network of sutures” is a prerequisite to contest the Heideggerian-Levinasian cult of the Poets and Woman in the global culture of “syrupy love” (Badiou, 1999[1992]: 56, 61-67).

Here lies the methodology of our science fictional genealogy of the sociological reason. Badiou (1999: 70-71) sees the “rivalry of the poet and the philosopher” as a result of Nietzsche's overturning of Plato because

16 Except for Macherey who wrote a monograph on Comte after his dissertation on Spinoza, other Althusser-inspired Marxists from Balibar to Badiou dismiss Comte as a transitional figure who looks back to either the Enlightened Progress (Condorcet before Marx) or the Romantic God-Man (Hegel before Nietzsche) (Balibar, 1995: 84; Badiou, 2007: 168). Both fail to clear the unpaid debt of Althusser's structuralism to Comte's positivism (Gane, 2003: 179-80). This denial is unfortunate when one reads Althusser crediting Comte as “the only mind worthy of interest” in “the pitiful history of French philosophy in the 130 years following the Revolution of 1789.” (Althusser, 1969[1965]: 25)
"Descartes, Leibniz, Kant or Hegel might have been mathematicians, historians, or physicists; if there is one thing they were not, it was poets. But since Nietzsche, all philosophers claim to be poets, they all envy poets." What is meant by "the Age of Poets" was "completed" by Hölderlin, Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Trakl, Pessoa, Mandelstam and Celan, but is revived misleadingly by post-Heideggerian philosophy (Badiou, 1999: 71, 86). Nonetheless, Badiou (1999: 93) rereads these poets to defend "a locus of thinking which would maintain the category of the subject, but would grant the poets the destitution of the object." Accordingly, he raises three questions regarding "the unbeing of contemporary philosophy" to reform Platonism: the two, the objectless subject, and the indiscernible or generic multiple (Badiou, 1999: 89-96). Ironically, Badiou's subject reinvokes Comte's "supreme fate [sic] without an object" in his subjective synthesis. They share a mathematical fetishism (evolved from numbers to sets) which introduces an empty sign in the omnipotence of language and the body by exterminating language and dismembering the body. Notwithstanding this absent ontology, it is ontically inconceivable to situate a subjective "encounter" (which defines the two) with truth events "without a vis-à-vis", unless Badiou's definition of philosophy as an ethical history of "a desubstantializaton of Truth" can be applied in contemporary settings to an economic politics of digital and/or genetic fetishism (Badiou, 1999: 93, 144). Hence, the problem is that, preoccupied with the primary contradiction between Hegel's philosophy and Nietzsche's poetry, Badiou neglects our philosopher-poet Goethe, whose art of love anticipates Comte's and Marx's social sciences. But Badiou has dismissed them as suturing only to science and politics. Consequently, one must reconsider Badiou's "fiction of art" in a double sense since the age of Hölderlin and Goethe, a twofold fictionalization of art composed not only of fictional poetry through "dis-objectivation" but also of a fictional theater through re-objectivation. This means "the metaphorical movement of a destitution of the subject-object couple" must be complemented by a metamorphic movement of a constitution of the subject-object couple (Badiou, 1999: 76). That is, the mathematical ascent to the truth of the subject requires a sociological descent to the knowledge of the world at the same time since subjective fidelity to the truth of an undecidable event subtracted from being has presupposed the
being of the event subtracted from situational knowledge. Only in this double movement circling around the object, which splits into singularly presented being and universally represented knowledge, can Badiou's truth be conceived in the generic production of a situation from "any part whatsoever of it, that it says nothing in particular about the situation, except precisely its multiple-being as such, its fundamental inconsistency" (Badiou, 1999: 107). Stated otherwise, only when the split object qua symbolic being and imaginary world is doubly subtracted by the split subject qua nothing, objectless and real, can a situation be named as a generic truth event. Thus, we argue that a religious politics of love qua the fatal act, once redelivered from the missed encounter of Comte and Marx, becomes a reflection of the subjective disjunction in the Great Being as much as it is a response to it.

Apart from methodological reorientation, the theoretical position developed in this thesis could also be expounded with reference to Badiou's philosophy of being and event. Badiou's work can be read as formalizing a void between system and anti-system. In the main, he conducts a fourfold philosophical suture, suturing to science via Canto and Cohen, to art via Hölderlin and Mallarmé, to politics via Marx and Mao, and to love via St. Paul and Lacan (cf. Barker, 2002; Hallward, 2003; Badiou, 2003a[1997]; 2005b[1988]). Ultimately, he seeks to redeem Platonic philosophy by embracing its fiercest enemies, avant-gardes to seize the conceptual power of the prose within poetry (Mallarmé to Pessoa) and theatre (Brecht to Beckett) (Badiou, 2005a[1998]: 36-56, 89-121; 2007: 39-47). Leaving philosophical issues aside, this thesis revisits Badiou's four generic truth procedures or conditions of philosophy, which are science, art, politics and love, by means of the sociological method stated above. And yet, we take Badiou's caveat seriously, minding not to confound these procedures whilst supplementing his method of subjective reality with our method of objective fiction. This amounts to an organization of Badiou's philosophical conditions, a genealogy of sociological history, an effective historical sociology of sociology. That is to say, objective fictions of religion and culture will be woven into subjective realities of science, art and politics to constitute a site of true love in a subject-object duality. This site may then provide the conceptual coordinates to review social science, classical
sociology and Marxism, offering further a yardstick to revalue current sociology and social theory.

Given this organization, the site of true love includes Badiou's subjective reality. As a truth procedure, love is "the treatment of a paradox", a paradox between the two and the one, that is, between sexuated knowledge and truth of humanity (Badiou, 2000b[1996]: 269ff). Being sexuated, the truth of humanity can only be "seized" by inhumanity, that is, by the supremacy of feminine love over four generic procedures, thereby coinciding topologically with humanity (Badiou, 2000b: 280). In other words, love of humanity cannot attain concrete universality until it is punctured by feminine inhumanity, insofar as women are what Hegel says "the eternal irony of community". In poetic terms, true love follows the path of a labyrinth leading to the heart of a woman. In the labyrinth, love manifests a scene of Two, a scene of "an immanent construction of an indeterminate disjunction" "on the order of hard labour" (Badiou, 2003b[2000]: 52, 55). This labour is characterized by "the limping march of the double function of an indeterminacy," which involves "the included indeterminacy which is the object, and the exterior indeterminacy which is such-and-such unpredictable fragment of the scene of Two" (Badiou, 2003b: 52, 54). In sum, it is not enough to choose from objects of love (the order of being), for a loving subject, in the full sense of that term, must already be led to love by an unexpected scene (the order of event).

Moreover, the site of true love is not confined to love's subjective reality, but must reach out to work on the objective fictions of religion and culture. In Badiou's own terms, we posit that love is the most subordinate of all objective situations and the predominant subjective truths. This unique duality explains why love is theorized in the least among his four truth conditions of philosophy, whilst having been formalized to the fullest out of the feminine substance of humanity (Hallward, 2003: 185; Badiou, 2000b: 280; Badiou in Badiou and Miller, 2005: 40). As the social scientific conception of religion has been reviewed, this thesis is unfolding the whole process of organization. But prior to cultural objectification, one must see how love connects to other subjective generic procedures. For Badiou, while philosophy is sutured to
these conditions, philosophy itself produces nothing. On the contrary, these conditions produce truths, the "intra-philosophical effects" of which are "seized" by philosophy. That is to say, these conditions cannot be posited as objects by philosophical reflection in a conventional division of study, such as epistemology, aesthetics, political and moral philosophies. In Badiou's neologism, therefore, science produces an intra-philosophical effect in transitional ontology, art in inaesthetics, politics in meta-politics, and love in an ethic of fidelity (cf. Badiou, 2001[1993]; 2003c; 2005a; 2006[1998]). In these intermediary zones, love is first of all mediated to science via transitional ontology in an impersonal way, as Badiou himself deduces mathematically the indeterminate object wandering in the scene of love, which we summarized above. Second, love is mediated to art via inaesthetics in a poetic, productive way, as Bréton issues "the patently 'surrealist' Manifesto of an uncertain act" which says "I love you forever", the act of love fated to disappear "as encounter and thought, as an asymmetrical and egalitarian becoming, as the invention of oneself" (Badiou, 2007: 139, 145). For, inaesthetics renews itself from the schemata of didacticism, romanticism and classicism to introduce "the only education [which] is education by truths", insofar as poetry could resist the triple temptations of ecstasy (of identifying with the place), of plenitude (of choosing a simulacrum), and of the sacred (naming that cancels the singularity of the event), falling once again "under the registers of amorous desire and poetic production" (Badiou, 2005a: 5, 14, 140-41). Third, love is mediated to politics via metapolitics in a militant way, like Engels' new man "against the family, property and the nation-state", or "Gide's cry 'Families, I hate you'" (Badiou, 2007: 66). For, metapolitics offers "the least bound place of all" in a true egalitarian politics which "undermines [sic] the illusion of the bond, whether it be trade unionist, parliamentary, professional or carnival", provided that democracy could be deregulated from all nominations by "communitarian predicates, or predicates of subsets" (Badiou, 2006: 76-77, 94). Fourth, love is mediated to itself via a spiritual ethic of fidelity in a non-religious way, like Saint Paul's universal declaration that "circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing", or Lacan's subjective analysis that "there is no sexual relation" (Badiou, 2003a: 86-106; 2007: 68-80, 139). For, "the ethic of a truth is absolutely opposed to opinion, and to ethics in general", 100
as long as one could "love what you will never believe twice" by keeping faithful to one's encounter with a truth event as "something that happens to you" (Badiou, 2001: 51-52). In sum, these intermediations of love form a proto-objective, or subjective network of the infinite.

But there is a key provisio. Badiou (2007: 148-64) reckons the "romantic infinite" and "contemporary infinite" must be carefully distinguished in order to capture the real passion driving the progression of poetic politics from surrealists through situationists to the Tel Quel group. He sees those alliances of art and politics as reflecting a conflicted image of the century which "strives to have done with the romanticism of the Ideal: to abide in the abruptness of the effectively-real, but to do so with subjective means [sic] that remain irreparably romantic" (Badiou, 2007: 153). That's why they swing between "the perpetuation of a romantic subjectivity" and "the integral sacrifice of the infinite", or "a programmatic forcing" and "a nihilistic iconoclasm" (Badiou, 2007: 155). On a positive note, they do help to open the question of "the trace" between romanticism of the work and anti-romanticism of the act (Badiou, 2007: 158-59). The lesson is "to extricate itself from romanticism. It is the ideal of materialist formalization. According to this ideal, the infinite proceeds directly from the finite" (Badiou, 2007: 156). Badiou hence concludes that "it is because of a post-romantic conception of the infinite – qualitative as well as vanishing – that the art of the century inscribed itself paradigmatically between dance and cinema." He asks himself "what a non-religious art could be...an art in which the infinite is drawn from nothing besides the effects of the act ...an art of formalization rather than work" (Badiou, 2007: 160; cf. 2005a: 57-71, 78-88).

Now as a concept, we have argued that unrequited love of a social science renders significant a religious politics of love qua the fatal act. At the level of history, this means there has never been a real order of love founded on the fatal act in any state socialism, market capitalism or world capitalism. Rendered positively, we argue that the real order of love delivered from the reencounter of Comte and Marx opens up a really non-existing socialism, which is to be conceived against the ongoing struggle between Marxist and
non-Marxist sociologies, our subject matter in part II. In a sense, the struggle is imaginary since it continues decades after the breakdown of the wall between socialism and capitalism. In fact, we argue that the actual struggle never takes place between socialism and capitalism, or between Marxism and non-Marxism, but within Marxism. It is a familial quarrel over the crisis of Marxism. What we have is a “cold war” mentality of two Marxisms. The watershed of this familial strife lies in the entry of “culture” as the concept has been revalued by Western Marxists to substitute the notion of superstructure with far-reaching consequences. Returning to the fountain of the Enlightenment, the autonomy of culture was expected to redress Marx's economic determinism of the working class motorizing the law of history, as well as Eastern Marxists' political dictatorship of the party mobilizing the will of the nation-state. Ironically, the narrative of neo-Marxist cultural study derived from the inner split of political and economic aspects of society is now supporting the mythical reality of a recursive cultural economy (e.g. economies of tourism, higher education and mass media) on the one hand, and a reflexive cultural politics (e.g. politics of race, gender, age and sexuality) on the other. These parallel worlds render the ghost of two Marxisms inexorable, but this internal ideological breakup, we further argue, hides the real war between socialism and neo/liberalism.

Indeed, there is a growing enthusiasm of postmodern Marxism (Jameson), poststructural Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe) and critical realist Marxism (Archer) as they claim to apply postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical realist philosophies (Lyotard, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault and Bhaskar) to social analysis (Sim, 1998; Munch, 2000: 138-52; Joseph, 2006: 128-41). Along this eclectic line, eco-socialist Löwy (1993; 2001: 11f, 58ff) goes furthermost to promote “critical irrealism” as he argues to save some anti-modern, anti-capitalist passion from a typology of about ten romantic orientations, so that the revolutionary and/or utopian project of Marxism could be rejuvenated. Turning into a high priest of romantic Marxism, Löwy (2001: ch. 3-5) even invents its theoretical traditions (young Marx, Lukács and Luxemburg) and historical traditions (from young Coleridge and Ruskin in the 19th century to Charles Péguy, Ernest Bloch and Christa Wolf in the 20th
century). His generalization extends further to contemporary times as romantic variants of Marxism can be found in surrealism, May '68, new social movements and new religious movements (Löwy, 2001: ch. 6). Due to Löwy's sweeping account, one must find some of his contemporary examples overlapping with Badiou's models of love in his generic truth procedure, namely surrealism and May '68. Yet this is exactly where Badiou's hair-splitting distinction of romantic infinity and contemporary infinity becomes essential. As a sober post-Marxist in our post-romantic times, Badiou rightly preempts romantic Marxism as the primary simulacrum of Marxism, demanding it to be curbed from within. As an insider to Marxism, his caution agrees with the master hypothesis we have been arguing. That is, Comte and Marx were pioneering social scientists thinking from outside of the cultural-historical boxes of the Enlightenment and romanticism.

From this integral view, critical realism sticks out to be our final negative reference. To be exact, critical realism doesn't belong to post-Marxism if, as I argued just now, post-Marxism is plagued by the same romantic passion as non-Marxism is. Rather, critical realist philosophy is better understood as a reflexive open system which has assimilated post-positivism and post-Marxism by surmounting their nihilistic aberrations, especially their antirealist theory of knowledge and relativist theory of truth (Brown et al, 2002: 1-22; Groff, 2004: 1-24). Accordingly, Bhaskar's critical realism appears to come around to developing a unified spirit of Comte and Marx from an alpha point, supporting, along with Archer's sociology of "analytical dualism", a "social realism" of continuity and change, structure and agency, reality and critique in an endless elaboration of emergences (Cruickshank, 2002: 95-121). But dualism silences rather than answer the question about the historical relation of nature and society by introducing an analytical distinction of epistemological relativism on the transitive side and ontological realism on the intransitive side. Developing this paradox positively, critical realism grows from an abstractive objectivism since The Possibility of Naturalism (1979), develops into a dialectical realism by Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom (1993), and reaches at a transcendental hyperrealism in From East to West: Odyssey of A Soul (2000). From the first volume of his multivolume project Meta-Reality
(2002) onwards, a multicultural doctrine of spirituality, which combines Zen, Tao, Yoga and Gnosis, is coined to humanize as well as sanctify some critical realist wisdom to creative truth and emancipating freedom. The “Tao of love” plays a key role in initiating one into an affective and intuitive ambiance beyond the duality of subject and object, or knowledge and being (Bhaskar, 2002: 167-232). In sum, Bhaskar’s philosophical journey has a naturalistic beginning, a dialectic turn, a transcendental end, and finally an antiphilosophical exit to saintly spirituality. Contrary to appearance, however, his multicultural Enlightenment remains on the horizon of Kantianism, only to probe the mystic potential of Kant’s personal God e/merging at the alpha point of Comte’s and Marx’s theoretical logics. In other words, critical realism accomplishes a triumphant metaphysic of the post-scientific age, blinking totally the duality of nature and society, real duality as such. Only by doing so is it able to systemize everything in an “open” world by reflexive wisdom, everything but a reencounter of Comte and Marx from a futuristic, omega point. For, a religious politics of love qua the fatal act must be situated in an awkward encounter, and encountering always eventuates in a site of duality.
Part II
Goethe's Culture of Sociology Embodied

Chapter 4  Rose's Archaeology of the Subject in Law and Love

Based on the conclusion of the previous chapter, we are tempted to claim that since Spencer's and Engels' social evolutionist displacement of Comte's and Marx's ideas, a formal subject ruled by law and love has become the calling of sociology and Marxism. But discontinuing the history of sociological thought, in this chapter, we will introduce instead an overview of contemporary social thought. The message is similar but more general. We will argue the cultural-archaeological importance of law and love in the subjects of post-structuralism and postmodernism. We will examine the discord of subjects by drawing on Gillian Rose's problematization of law and love in the history of social thought. Since the baseline of her analysis is drawn between Kant and Hegel, Rose can rise above the divide between Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies.

Gillian Rose's profound critique of the subjects of law and love in the history of social thought undermines their transcendental and transcedent grounds, including the consequences of organic morality and social science on the one hand, and holy ethics and state politics on the other. First, Kant's question of law is reposed by the neo-Kantian philosophies of validity and value in Marburg and Heidelberg schools, insofar as they continue Rudolf H. Lotze's metaphysical reading of Kant's transcendentalism (schematized in triadic terms, subjectivity, objectivity, and thing-in-itself) through Plato's "logic of validity" (Geltungslogik). Furthermore, neo-Kantianism dominates the recurrent problem with the laws of necessity and freedom, or nature and humanity, in the two sociologies (Durkheim and Weber), two Marxisms (Lukács and Althusser) and two social theories, structuralism (Saussure and Lévi-Strauss) and post-structuralism (Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault) (Rose, 1984; 1995[1981]). Second, Kant's question of law is replaced by the question
of love in the post-Hegelian philosophies of anxiety and violence, including existentialism (Kierkegaard and Kafka), psychoanalysis (Freud and Lacan), and postmodern ethics (Girard, Arendt, Levinas, etc.) (Rose, 1992). Radical existentialism and psychoanalysis still recognize Hegel’s ethic of the middle in the actualization of social life from the subject-object relation. Ironically, the consequential religious-political ethic of postmodernism stretches the middle ground unconditionally, so the transcendental law is transfigured with transcendent love in a mystical union with God beyond essence, unknowable Otherness. Third, at the heart of neo-Kantianism and post-Hegelianism, it was Hegel (and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra) who first thought through the problem with the Kantian subject of law without invoking a dialecticized subject of love, insofar as ‘absolute’ idealism could be read, beyond partisan ideologies of the left and the right, as reflecting the ‘real’ contradiction of private property in a bourgeois society. But the strength coincides with the weakness of Hegel’s ‘speculative’ thought. Since the absolutely real tarries with any constitutive-regulative prejudgment of ethical life which turns actuality into reality, it supposes an ethic of renunciation, consigning post-Hegelian ideas to a perpetual theoretical-practical reflection in the Kantian-Fichtean manner. Anticipated but unresolved by Hegel (and Nietzsche), the fate of non-Marxist and Marxist social thought, including Marx himself, is determined by the arrested transition from Kant to Hegel (Rose, 1984: 87-90, 109-110; 1995: 201-11). After clearing the ground of transcendental laws and transcendent love, Rose calls for preserving Hegel’s ethic of the broken middle. Specifically, she looks into the fractured abyss to uncover a fated subject of love who has and loses nothing, thereby embracing the wisdom of the Russian orthodox monk Staretz Silouan: “keep your mind in hell and despair not.” In result, Rose believes “love’s work” is neither conditional nor unconditional, but lies “around the bounds”, that is, “bound to continue to get love wrong, all the time, but not to cease wooing” (Rose, 1997[1995]: 97-99).

It is plausible to trace Rose’s approach back to her early study of Adorno, in which she examines the melancholia of his negative dialectic in light of Hegel’s speculative philosophy (Rose, 1993: 53-63). However, we would rather describe her work as a total archaeology of the subject, because she
challenges the cultural foundations of the West in modernity, including Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity, relentlessly. Confronting her own past, Rose refuses to indulge in the post-Holocaust romanticization of Judaism as the messianic Other of modernity or its saving Grace; instead, she understands the contradiction between philosophy and anti-philosophy, or Greco-Roman politics and Hebrew ethics, in the Self-reflection of modernity. Renouncing the "divergences and convergences" of philosophy and Judaism, law and ethics, rights and power, Rose (1993: 23-24) introduces "a new discomfort" to the post/modern culture: "[i]s there a Jewish philosophy? I hope that by now you no longer know the answer to this question." Distinguished from current intellectuals who are skilled in indoctrinating personal religious, political or scientific faith with the rhetoric of critique, paradox or irony, Rose shows rare courage in carrying out the cultural cleansing, discriminating the surface value of modernity from its underlying traditions. By digging a hole in the dialectic of disappearance (modernity) and loss (traditions), she works through the dialectic of nihilism. In this sense, Rose's "method", had she cared to claim one, comes close to Badiou's subtraction of generic truths from singular being (one, formal modernity) and universal knowledge (many, particular traditions). Conversely, if a method must be subscribed to her writings, then she adopts Hegel's phenomenology which makes "the methodological statement that there can be no method" by applying "the equally self-canceling phrases" of Hegel's "absolute method" and Nietzsche's "conscience of method", "for an 'immoralist' could have no conscience, while no 'method' could be absolute." (Rose, 1993: 56; 1995: 149) But before pondering on Rose's fated subject of love, it's worth rehearsing her critiques of the post/modern subjects of law and love.

In the case of Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies, Kant's question of law is radicalized by the intermediary factor of neo-Kantianism. As the fourth generation of critics of Kant (1870-1914), the neo-Kantians of Marburg and Heidelberg schools (e.g. Cohen and Rickert) were inspired by critics of the third generation (1830-1870), especially by Lotze's ontologization of Kant's
epistemology into a Platonic "logic of validity". This logic gave primacy to the (Platonic) proposition of objectification prior to empirical phenomena which are objective experiences apperceived by the (Kantian) subjective synthesis of concept and intuition. "Lotze's notions of 'validity' and 'value' became the foundation of the Marburg and Heidelberg schools of neo-Kantianism and of their sociological offspring" (Rose, 1995: 6). With direct associations with neo-Kantians, moreover, non-Marxist sociology brings Kant back into account, transcendentizing again neo-Kantian ontology into a socially or culturally a priori: "Durkheim and Weber turn a Kantian argument against neo-Kantianism. For when it is argued that it is society or culture which confers objective validity on social facts or values, then the argument acquires a metacritical or 'quasi-transcendental' structure" (Rose, 1995: 14). Because of this double take, the neo-Kantian division of validity and value is redoubled in Durkheim and Weber at the levels of method and theory: "[a] paradoxical result of Durkheim's granting priority to validity over values, and of Weber's granting priority to values over validity, is that Durkheim produced an 'empirical' sociology of values (moral facts) and Weber produced an 'empirical' sociology of validities (legitimate orders)" (Rose, 1995: 21). Nonetheless, "it is the logic which grants priority to values, which is known, strictly speaking, as 'sociology'. This tradition draws on Simmel's 'forms of sociation', Weber's ideal types, von Wiese's theory of interrelations, and Parsons' general theory of action" (Rose, 1995: 21-22). By contrast, metacritical "new ontologies" which span from Dilthey, Mannheim, Husserl, Heidegger to Gadamer all "turn[s] the neo-Kantian critique of the philosophy of consciousness against neo-Kantianism itself: it exposes the formation and deformation of both transcendental and methodological reason." In other words, the metacritical analysis stands closer to the Marburgian stress on validity like Durkheim, insofar as "the analysis revolves within a hermeneutic or transcendental circle" (Rose, 1995: 23). On the other hand, Marxist sociologists ranging from Lukács, Adorno, Habermas and even Althusser all reproduce, consciously or

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17 The first generation of critics (1780-1790) "concentrated on the status of the thing-in-itself" while the second generation (1790-1830) "tried to resolve these Kantian aporias by giving primacy to Kant's practical philosophy or to the Critique of Judgment." Highlighting Hegel's actual ethical life elusive to and yet determinant of theory and practice, Rose seeks to distinguish a radically absolute Hegel from this second generation, including "Fichte, Schelling, Hölderlin, the early Romantics and Hegel" (Rose, 1995: 6).
not, the neo-Kantian paradigm as a result of the attempt to square Simmel's *Philosophy of Money* with the Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of reification and personalization (Rose, 1995: 25-39). Therefore, "Marxist sociology meets non-Marxist sociology at the Fichtean station between Kant and Hegel." (Rose, 1995: 36) In effect, both types of sociology thrive on the ambiguous distinction between "theory" and "method", wavering in the mutual conditioning of morality and legality (Rose, 1995: 39-41). The problematization of legal-moral "judgment" shows the limit of sociological reason within Kant's critical philosophy, failing to understand correctly Hegel's philosophy of the absolute designed to integrate theoretical and practical reasons. At bottom, the question concerns an actual theory of subjectivity which Rose believes only Hegel could deliver, whereas the fates of sociology, Marxism, and even Marx are all sealed in the Kant-Fichtean "victory of reflection" forewarned by Hegel (Rose, 1995: 201-03, 209-18). As the intellectual distinction between Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies is seen as spurious, eventually, the corresponding "political economies" of "capitalism" and "Marxism" are recognized as two "cultures" of law (Rose, 1995: 219-20). On the same course of fate, class struggle is indefinitely differed from within as well as without.

In the case of post-structuralism, the neo-Kantian problem with law is far from resolved as one might expect, but turns obvious and transparent devoid of any "conscience of method" as it once had for Hegel, Nietzsche and neo-Kantian sociologies (Rose, 1984: 210-11). Post-structuralism is derived from Heidegger's philosophy of the historical event, "the *Ereignis* of the *histor*, the judgment in which all judge and all are judged", which provides the solution to a problem originated in neo-Kantians' (Lask and Cohen) dispute over time and history before the judgmental court of the social (Rose, 1984: 48-63, 67). Moreover, post-structuralism is over-determined by the vitalism of Comte and Bergson, the phenomenology of Hegel and Husserl, and the structuralism of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss. This results in the dominance of poststructuralist philosophy represented by Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault. First, inventing a new vitalism evolved from Comte to Bergson, Deleuze revives Duns Scotus' God of "divine and arbitrary will", alluring us to his cult of "univocal being" which is "'at the same time nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy'" since
"everything is equally subjected to this inequality." (Rose, 1984: 105-07) Second, Derrida "legislates" forcibly "a new law table" of the *grapheme* distinguished from the *logos* to make the medium of "writing on the coin become coin as writing" insofar as "'[f]etishism' is made by Derrida into the unaddressable absolute in Marx and Nietzsche when it is the point of address in their work" (Rose, 1984: 166-70).

Unlike Deleuze's iconoclasm, Derrida de-constructs by re-constructing his intellectual distinctions from Hegel's and Husserl's phenomenology as well as Saussure's and Lévi-Strauss' structuralism, literally stealing the logics of "history" revealed by phenomenology and "law" erected by structuralism to "prescribe" his doctrine of *différance*. In other words, the terms and conditions stipulated in "the old law table" are far from terminated but rather reactivated by Derrida's signature in absentee. On the one hand, the terms of linguistic and anthropological structuralism involve a romantic rewriting (after Hamman, Herder and W. von Humboldt) of Kant's transcendentalism in a hyper-arbitrary legal-rational "stipulation" of "a system of pure values" and "reciprocal communication" to precondition as a "form of exchange" the arbitrary exchange of signification and circulation. As such, language and kinship are linked to legal economy to formalize the paradox of time in the theory of social contract, assimilating the living force of "imagination", the social force of "free consent" and the universal historical law of "spurious intelligibility" in the "memory" of "social fact" and "mathematical and mythical metaphysics of history" (Rose, 1984: 112-30). On the other hand, the conditions of idealistic and intentional phenomenology historicize the sovereignty of social contract to search further for the genesis of "historical self-consciousness" and "historical factuality" in the differentiation of geometrical culture and absolute economy. With his "exorbitant choice of text", however, Derrida "changes the signs" of all writings under examination, making, for example, Rousseau a utopian ignorant of the antinomy of law, Lévi-Strauss an anarchist unaware of the liberating power of writing, and Hegel a conservative complacent in historical eschatology. By his distracting play, the productive values already existing in these writings can then be usurped by Derrida's terminology, such as *différance*, *trace* and the *middle voice*. Perhaps, he recognizes only Husserl's
genetic historicity, Nietzsche's idea of force, and Bataille's general economy. Nonetheless, due to the unjust reversal of all textual signs, Derrida's prejudgment disguised as a deconstructive play invites counter-judgment, as Rose finds that Derrida's borrowed notions, such as Nietzsche's and Bataille's, defy their contexts of use, whereas, amongst his purloined letters, Hegel's speculative logic of the middle is particularly abused to the effect of encouraging a bad infinity seen in Levina's Otherness beyond history, a prescriptive value which Derrida claims to have avoided. At bottom, Derrida enforces a law of differance which glorifies non-knowledge by sacrificing historical self-consciousness (Rose, 1984: 131-65).

Finally, vacillating around the terms of vitalism, phenomenology and structuralism, post-structuralism is most destined by Heidegger's "self-perficient nihilism" to the concerns of "fate" (Moira), "justice" (Dike) and "light" (die Lichung) of Being as "historical time, the historical present, the Event...the 'Thing'" (Rose, 1984: 72-76). Ironically, the fate of Being only ends up with Deleuze's inventive life under the "ontological injustice" of Being and Foucault's discursive power via "theological and military" strategies and tactics at the "original night of the body" (Rose, 1984: 108, 174, 206). The Heideggerian Event turns into a pendulum ad infinitum between "post-metaphysical" science and metaphysics, reducing Kant's transcendental science of law to a fusion of a "legalism without law" and a natural "law without legalism" (Rose, 1984: 7, 83, 99, 193). All in all, Rose lays bare a series of civilization and naturalization of the Roman law (of private property) from Kant through Cohen/Heidegger to post-structuralists as long as Kant's "critical court [sic] founded and undermined by the usurpatory concept of freedom" is first unfounded by Heidegger's Event of appropriation and then undermined "by the post-structuralist revelation of the usurpation of Being" (Rose, 1984: 109). Simply put, this Fichtean perversion of freedom is construed as poststructuralists' over-identification of its thought with the fetishization of the subject at the epochal coincidence of civilization and barbarism. In consequence, Kant's critical court of consciousness, as a method of replacing metaphysics of the divine will with jurisprudence of scientific laws to settle the dispute over private ownership along the
transcendental poles of subject and object, person and thing, dignity and price, ends in a savage kingdom without ends, a no-man’s kingdom in which “[t]he thing or owning becomes the object, the thing owned, and disowned in the inclusive sense”, a senseless kingdom of fetishes qua “the medium which encompasses all discrete entities”, erasing objects and things (Rose, 1984: 11-19, 64-65).

While unimpressed by the sociological, Marxist and post-structuralist reformation and deformation of Kant’s transcendental law into civil, formal and natural laws, Rose is also disappointed by the danger of supernatural transcendence of love in the post-Hegelian philosophies of irrationalism. On a positive note, far from dialectical nihilism, for Rose, it is this non-dialectical irrationalism which rightly captures Hegel’s radical system, opening up the middle between subject-object relations. As a negative note, however, irrational thinking is susceptible to unconditionalize the science of transcendental law into an ethical politics of transcendent love, ideally taking the responsibility of, but actually abetting personal, face-to-face responses to the infinite demand of postmodernity. The trade-off is created by the paradox of advancing Hegel’s logic between the end and the beginning towards the post-Hegelian logic “between” the middle and the beginning. The derivative “between” here has become a simulated sign, an abstraction of abstraction since the middle is hypostatized. In other words, by usurping the consciousness of the end with that of the middle, Hegel’s determination and act of actuality in the (real) middle loses out again to the Kant-Fichean possibility and impossibility of thought in the (ideal) beginning. Henceforth, existentialism and psychoanalysis which write “from the middle in the beginning” give in fatefully to the religious-political ethics from Girard, Arendt to Levinas who speak “from the beginning in the middle”.

For Rose (1992: xi-xv), all social and political thoughts of modernity must work through the “diremption of spirit” since Kant’s antinomy of law. Therefore, if the diremption of law and science (of logic) is re-cognized by Hegel contra sociology and Marxism, and if the diremption of law and will (of power) is annihilated by Nietzsche contra post-structuralism, then the diremption of law
and ethics (of love) is repeated by Kierkegaard contra post-modernism. As the true heir of Hegel and Nietzsche, it comes to Kierkegaard who rallies existentialism and psychoanalysis to preserve “the equivocation of the middle” while admitting “the anxiety of beginning”. First, against textual interpretations derived from hermeneutics, dialectics and Judaic philosophy (Gadamer, Adorno and Fackenheim), Rose (1992: 3-17) argues that Kierkegaard’s fragment is not contrary to Hegel’s system, for neither does one begin from a philosophy of existence, and nor does the other end in a philosophy of essence. Following Blanchot’s literary reading to heed the confusion of authorship with authority, Rose (1992: 24-50) suggests that both play with an “illusion of thought” as long as one notices how Kierkegaard repeats what Hegel has recognized with “unscientific” pseudonyms called Johannes Climacus and anti-Climacus. “Every beginning so far encountered, whether contra or pro the System, appears as a mask...Just as this play of personae is the key to Hegel’s authorship without authority, so systematic illusion is the key to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity.” In specific terms, just as Hegel tells “the story of how natural consciousness acquired ‘personality’ — legal, aesthetic, moral”, so Kierkegaard enacts the drama of how “eternal consciousness” received impersonality — aesthetic, ethical and religious (Rose, 1992: 10). Disguised in the ironic and anxious voice of a self-negating woman, or rather “actress”, “[t]he aim of both ‘authorships’ — that of Kierkegaard and that of Hegel — what makes ‘authorship’ as such problematic to them and to their work, is how, contra Kant, to bring Revelation into philosophy” (Rose, 1992: 10, 18-23).

Second, Rose (1992: 51-54) argues against contextual explanations susceptible to biography, theology and psychology (Brod, Buber and Blanchot) because they concede Kafka’s debt to Kierkegaard regarding the anxiety of beginning, but consider Kafka to be more equivocal than Kierkegaard about the ethical law. For Rose (1992: 148), however, Kierkegaard’s “suspension of the ethical” guarantees no success in religious faith, for “[t]o posit that the ethical is ‘suspended’ is to acknowledge that it is always already presupposed.” Insofar as “both address the relation between not marrying, authorship, authority, actor/actress and truth,” “this is to remain
both with the anxiety of beginning and with the equivocation of the middle, manifested in the manifold failing towards form” (Rose, 1992: 55-56). Looking backward, this failing is caused by the “unhappy recollection” of love qua sins: “[f]rom the confessional face, the ambivalent erotic countenance predominates: ‘I cannot marry Regina/Felice because I/my father am too sinful’; from this paradox: ‘Regina/Felice and I do not marry because of the forgiveness of sins’” (Rose, 1992: 59). Looking forward, the failing might lead to a “happy repetition” of love qua humour if a man could impersonate a woman’s pathos: “woman provides the expression at every stage – coming into sight as the initial or aesthetic pathos of ‘myth’, coming into judgment as the ethical pathos of ‘conscience’, and leading off stage at the decisive border with the pathos of humour; momentary, eternal and transtemporal, respectively” (Rose, 1992: 83). In effect, the ethical ends “[w]ith this humorous revocation which returns us to the equivocation of the middle” (Rose, 1992: 84).

Third, Rose (1992: 85-86) argues that Freud psychoanalyzes Kierkegaard’s “look into beginning – anxiety of beginning and beginning of anxiety” via Pauline preaching, “without law, no sin: without sin, no grace.” Above all, “[t]he Kierkegaard authorship is ethical because of its premise that law is always already given. Anxiety, therefore, has an origin, a beginning: ‘being given’; and it is always already there or posited: ‘law’” (Rose, 1992: 87). This law of anxiety does not refer to the commandment in a confusion of pre-biblical paganism and post-biblical Rabbinic Judaism, but to the biblical Hebrew-Christian covenant (Rose, 1992: 99-101). Yet if the law begins with a pact of words, then the beginning must presume a speculative spirit. Accordingly, “[t]he thinking of Kierkegaard and of Freud, ‘anxiety’ is a Janus-faced concept which looks back to the aetiology of guilt and forwards to freedom. Pseudonymously, anxiety creates sin: sin does not create anxiety; psychoanalytically, anxiety creates repression: repression does not create anxiety. Anxiety is the pivot of movement backwards and movement forwards, of recollection and repetition, of loss and possibility, because it holds the middle – the ‘third’ or spirit of commandment to body and soul” (Rose, 1992: 101-02). Unfortunately, early Lacan’s “small circuit of the symbolic order”
"anthropologizes" the concept of anxiety by delimiting ethical eternity between life and death to the death instinct, and assimilating (hence, misrepresenting) Kierkegaard's "repetition" and Freud's "compulsion to repeat" in backwards only (Rose, 1992: 102-10). Therefore, the formation from the "natural body" to the "spiritual body" is thwarted as "the cycle - anxiety to sin, sin to despair; despair to grace -" is broken. As a result, the ethical "tone of facetiousness" preserved by Kierkegaard and Freud is muted since "ethical life has been ruined" by the disjunction "between the 'deepest misery' of the individual and the ethical 'everyday' of the age" as a symptomatic disjunction of Greek, Judaic and Christian cultures in modernity (Rose, 1992: 110-12).

More than singing another refrain to Hegel's logic and Nietzsche's power, Kierkegaard's diremption of law and love strikes deeply to the heart of modernity. This heart is made up of the _aporia_ of "love and the state" with the aporetic "and" implying "violence-in-love" (Rose, 1992: 240). However, in the making of postmodern ethics, the violence which characterizes the broken middle is first "sequestered", then "culturalized", and finally "sacralized" in "the holy middle". The first stage, of sequestration, is achieved by Mann and Girard. Aiming to get around severe Fascism, they rethink the place of myth by reading Goethe and The Genesis (i.e. the stories of Abraham, Issac, Jacob and Joseph) to suggest a facetious style of politics (Rose, 1992: ch. 4). Ironically, they overplay mythical facetiousness, ending up authorizing a Gnostic politics of love. In other words, "the feast is spoiled: Mann's repetition in the feast of a new, difficult humanism; Girard's re-affirmation of agape, the original love-feast, love without violence...This comparison of Mann's masked Gnostic authorship with Girard's unmasked Gnostic authorship brings out the politics of anxiety and the anxiety of politics in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous and signed Christian authorship" (Rose, 1992: 147).

The second stage, of culturalization, is advocated by Varnhagen, Luxemburg and Arendt. Seeking to deepen the critique of Enlightenment, they rethink "the right of women" by engaging with reformative (Goethe for Varnhagen), revolutionary (Bernstein, Lenin and Lukács for Luxemburg) and socialist (Augustine, Kant, Lessing, Varnhagen, and Luxemburg for Arendt) ideas
cumulatively, and expecting a gendered civil society governed by the state (Rose, 1992: ch. 5). Ironically, they undermine feminine sexuality, resulting in legitimizing an Agnostic society of love. In concrete terms, "[t]he impotence of 'the beautiful soul', the 'hypocrisy of judgment', and the 'omnipotence' of 'pure culture', represent three temptations whose precondition is the triple diremption — not 'twin contradiction' — which, unresolved, recurs in the three crises of bureaucratic reform, social democratic defeat, rise and fall of Fascism, and whose structural prevalence is especially exposed in the wake of 1989" (Rose, 1992: 236). Furthermore, "[a]ll three were less equivocal later in life and authorship - Rachel Varnhagen more 'beautiful' in her Second Salon; Rosa Luxemburg more judgmental in ways she herself anticipated in her last writings on the Russian Revolution; Hannah Arendt, who first knew the equivocalities of emancipation and twin contradictions, who knew truth in its equivocation, cultures judgment, and then, in a subsequent retreat, turns the culture of judgment back into a mental capacity in the lecture sketches for the final volume of the Life of the Mind: 'Judging'" (Rose, 1992: 238). A similar irony may be found in sociology as there is a surreptitious return of functionalism represented in Habermas' operational society of communication and Giddens' administrative society of surveillance (Rose, 1992: 245-46). Secularizing the state in the service of the needs of civil society, all is tied to one system of maintenance, and yet none seems content with 'the social' devoid of sacred bonds.

The third stage, of transcendence, is completed by Levinas and Rosenzweig. Trying to move beyond the holocaust and liberation politics, they retrace the origin of ethics to the Judaic law, halacha, by reading the Talmud against Hegel's philosophy and so intimating a Messianic ethic beyond knowledge and being, history and ontology (Rose, 1992: ch. 6). Ironically, the reduction of the Roman law and Christian ethics to the Hebrew law (sustained by the Rabbinic institution) leads up to an eschatological ethic of love. This means 'within halachic Judaism, as within philosophical presentation of Judaism from Rosenzweig to Levinas, there is no comprehension to complement commandment: no recognition of freedom and unfreedom' (Rose, 1992: 277). This full-fledged 'new political a/theology' is adopted by postmodern theology.
and sociology alike to celebrate an ethic of 'the holy middle' between the 'misrepresented' Judaism and 'the end of' the end of philosophy. Rose's examples are 'Theology and Sociology of the Disaster' authorized by Metz, Fackenheim and Bauman as they sacralize the dead and moralize the person to remake humanity in a 'New Jerusalem' (Rose, 1992: 277-96). In conclusion, the diremption of law and ethics is lost by way of redoubling, or 'dirempting it yet again', in all three stages. As such, the equivocation of the middle is mended and the anxiety of beginning resolved, while violence-in-love is forced to reconcile with the law, proposing a politics, a society and a/theological ethic of love without violence. In the name of postmodern agape, which is pacifist, humanitarian and cosmopolitan, any territorial violence is subject to public censure in a claustrophobic, ironically not absolutely open, manner.

Unconvinced by any antinomy or dialectic of the law, Rose rejects both finite dualism and infinite holism to embrace the mundane work of love through and through. Albeit appreciating Hegel's radicalism and its offspring in existentialism and psychoanalysis, she refrains herself from offering any theory or method of love, except for an impractical, useless but cathartic autobiographical fiction at the end of her short life. She records her personal observations, experiences and understandings about illness, old age and death, gender and the body, friendship and love with minimal reference to religious and philosophical ideas. Questioning the genre of autobiography, moreover, the heroine here is not Rose's ego and her reflection, but rather her significant others of nebulous identity, such as her disloyal boyfriend, unhappy mother, unknown artist friend, her cancerous body and so on. As such, she shows how anonymous intimate relations could have determined her sociological writings in a form of fiction (Rose, 1997). However, the odd allusion to Silouen about not abandoning oneself to despair in hell might be read as taking refuge in Byzantine mysticism. Still, Rose insists "[t]his is the source of my excessive spirituality, my screwtape obsession with disembodied truth" (Rose, 1997: 42). Masking herself in the demonic character of Screwtape from C. S. Lewis' fiction, Rose's "spirituality" is far from mystic. Her speculative flight 'out of ancient society' (founded on the three cultural pillars
of Europe, Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity) never flees from modernity to Eastern mysticism. On the contrary, her flight lands firmly on the mundane world of the multiple which is as generic as it is universal, that is, on Hegel's 'concrete universal'. For Rose, a true lover is no longer a post-Protestant who is destined to labour on earth while secretly believing in predestined salvation and damnation: the dubious a/theist is trapped in the ego and its ideal. A true lover is 'modern' in an ethereal sense, dwelling in an earthly hell without heaven, with a hope against hope in the world of means. Conversely, the 'worldly' kernel extracted from the triune traditional shell of modernity may also be understood as an earthly heaven without hell. In either case, Rose's generic subject of love inhabits in a world of transfinite contiguity, embracing the fate of human frailty.

Fundamentally, Rose might be read as an "absolute" Hegelian beyond left and right. In her reading, Hegel's absolute idealism is differentiated into a tripartite whole to organize the structure of *Hegel contra Sociology*. These three parts include the identity and non-identity of politics and religion, of art and life, and of reason and science. On this plane, Rose recapitulates Hegel's philosophy evolving from the pre-phenomenological writings of politics, religion and history through his phenomenology and aesthetics to the post-phenomenological logic. As such, Hegel's system is unfolded in a methodological more than a chronological order, as he goes from the absolute through the objective to the subjective logic to criticize the Kantian-Fichtean thought of morality from the speculative thought of actuality. 18 This differentiated totality allows Rose to argue a "return to Hegel" by way of feminine seduction, which is to explain how Hegel's logic itself has blocked a

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18 A retroactive understanding of the system could be seen from Hegel's speculative reading of Kant in the *Science of Logic* (1812). For the logical Hegel, Kant's formal distinction of "boundary" and "limit" assumes a moral judgment, the ought (Sollen). Antinomies such as finitude versus infinity, quality versus quantity, space versus numbers, physics versus mathematics, and knowledge of the other versus self are derived from it (Rose 1995: 185-92). Hegel's actual determination and contingency of thought could then overcome, which some would say "deconstruct", Kant's moral possibility and impossibility of thought. Thus, Kant's injunction that "you must because you can" (morality as a boundary possibility) is susceptible to its reversed form: "you can because you must" (morality as a delimiting impossibility). Beyond Kant's formalist morality, Hegel's speculative idea proposes "you can because it can be" (actuality as a determining fate), which is tantamount to saying "you can because you can" (actuality as a contingent act).
proper return after him (and has also anticipated this blockage), or how Kant's question of law is fated to recur in the post/neo-Kantian twists and turns of sociology, Marxism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism. The repetition is mainly due to a misunderstanding of Hegel from Kant's critical project, "hypostatizing" Hegel's absolute reason reckoning the "speculative" unity and contradiction between the subjective and the objective into Kantian-Fichtean reasons of theory and practice conditioned by the "propositions" of subjectivity and objectivity. Henceforth, just as sociology and Marxism conscientiously employ the last Hegelian couple of reason and science by progressing to the post-Kantian problem of validity and value, so post-structuralism and postmodernism impertinently exploit the first Hegelian couple of religion and politics by regressing to the pre-Kantian problem of metaphysics and law/love. In other words, whilst sociological and Marxist laws fall prey to transcendental methodologism and moralism by hypostatizing absolute reason to rigorous science, poststructuralist law and postmodernist love fall victim to transcendent occultism and messianism by hypostatizing ethical politics to mystic religion. In light of this, Rose herself could be said to rely on the middle couple of art and life, by which she gains the leverage to show the "prejudgments" of Hegel from both left and right in their objectivist and subjectivist "justifications" of reason with science, politics with religion.

For Rose, Hegel's speculative thought moves between the ideas of the end and the beginning, bestowing the end with a double meaning of finis and telos. The first and last telos of Hegel's philosophical system refers to "ethical life" in the middle of or elusive to the ideal subject and the real object. Its "actuality" hence takes on a relative, indeterminate abstraction, and yet an absolute substance of determination. The "apparent inconsistency", however, is methodologically consistent insofar as "the Hegelian system" follows a phenomenology which acknowledges that "[t]he abstract rejection of abstraction is the only way to induce abstract consciousness to begin to think non-abstractly" (Rose, 1995: 151). As a philosophy of life, Hegel's phenomenology adopts the non/method of "self-perficient, self-completing skepticism" which is a "path of despair" more radical than "the path of self-enlightening doubt". It is "not a teleological development toward the
reconciliation of all oppositions between consciousness and its objects, to the
abolition of 'natural' consciousness as such, but a speculative presentation of
the perpetual deformation of natural consciousness", "the experience not of
alienation, but of the inversions of substance into the various forms of
misrepresentation." (Rose, 1995: 150-53) "The Phenomenology is not a
success, it is a gamble. For the perpetual occurrence of inversion and
misrepresentation can only be undermined, or 'brought to fluidity', by allusion
to the law of their determination, to the causality of fate" (Rose, 1995: 159). 19
As a philosophy of art, on the other hand, Hegel's aesthetics adopts the (non­
)method of the severe style "to give a true representation of its object and
makes little concession to the spectator. It is designed solely to do justice to
the integrity of the object" (Rose, 1995: 51). The two procedures are
reversible because although life suspects the object whereas art respects it,
both seek to uncover some substance from the object, which is the substance
of a free subject. Accordingly, subjective freedom is truly "free" out of
necessity, only if produced by the necessity of ethical life to "substantiate" the
reflective ego or will from the outside.

Based on the two-tailed approach to life and art, the three speculative couples
are interlinked by the end and beginning of an ethical life with absolute
actuality. In the last couple of reason and science, science has finished in the
"infinite task" of intellectual-cultural "re-formation", but reason might begin
from the absolute logic, albeit threatened by an end in the egocentric
reflection (Rose, 1995: ch. 6-7). In the first couple of politics and religion,
religion has finished in the "ideological formation and deformation of modern
culture", but politics might begin from the ethical life, albeit threatened by an
end in "the severe style" of an unjust state (Rose, 1995: ch. 2-3). In the middle

19 The causality of fate refers to a multi-causality of Greek life, Roman law and Christian love
manifested in the manifold conceptual contradiction between the individual and the subject,
freedom and necessity, deed and word, lack of life and denial of life (Rose, 1995: 112-17,
155-57). "This fate means first, destiny, what happened historically to fate as ethical life;
secondly, determination, how the first fate, ethical life, changed into the second fate which
denied life and hence changed itself as life; thirdly, representation, how the denied concrete
existence is misrepresented as ideal, non-worldly love" (Rose, 1995: 157). In short, fate begs
the thought of the absolute to traverse its multi-causality, insofar as one recognizes fate as
the determination of the ethical substance of modern life as a result of the contradiction
between life, law and love.
couple of art and life, art has finished in "severe, ideal and pleasing styles" (and yet in a symbolic form), but life might begin from "the grave" of unhappy consciousness, albeit threatened by an end in cultural barbarism and moral conscience (Rose, 1995: ch. 4-5). On the balance sheet, Rose's Hegel combines life with art to speculate on the beginning of an ethical political reason at a time when religion and science have come to an end beyond rescue. The hidden and "weakest" link hinges on the condition of symbolic culture to play out its severe style, transforming the dual form of politics and art (dual because one with and the other without regard to spectators) (Rose, 1995: 142). Hence, "Hegel was not wrong to distinguish the end of art from the end of religion", but "Hegel underestimated the power of art in bourgeois society to renew itself at least as a culture, to re-form itself as different modes of re-presenting the contradiction between meaning and configuration" (Rose, 1995: 219-20). Hence also, if we recall, Rose can de-classify antithetical sociologies into egocentric cultures complicit to each other, and yet avoid invoking a "totalitarian" Hegel. After all, she has radicalized Hegel's "thought of the absolute" by way of an artful life, that is, by giving life's ethical actuality a "social import", a speculative art of letting contradictory experiences comes to pass without prejudgment (Rose, 1995: 92, 204). With a double vision of actual life and fictional art, Rose strives to re-cognize love as a work of renunciation of both conditionality and unconditionality, so that a generic gap between the real content and the symbolic form could be kept. This broken middle anticipates Rose's generic site of love.

Given her excavation of the generic site of love from Hegel's philosophy of life and art, one wonders why Rose couldn't appreciate Goethe's art of love-life in shaping Comte's and Marx's sciences in general and their views on fetishism in particular (as presented in Part I of this thesis). Rose is largely critical of Comte and Marx. First of all, after recognizing Comte's radicalism in resituating "the argument for natural law" in the positive age to counter natural right, she criticizes Comte's weak conception of metaphysics whilst explaining away Bergson's "attack" on Comte's positive philosophy as metaphysics by the mediation of Kant: "Comte is using metaphysics in the pre-critical sense, while Bergson is using metaphysics in the post-critical sense." The conclusion
is that “Comte and Bergson both share the same ultimate ambition: to demonstrate that moral experience is continuous with natural experience” (Rose, 1984: 93-94). This is a misleading analysis because Rose first reads Bergson through his admiration of Spencer as if the latter were a Comtean, and then reads “Comtean” Bergson through Mill: “Bergson produced a sentimental physics for his generation as Mill said Comte did for his” (Rose, 1984: 94, 98). As a result, Comte is seen as the forerunner of Deleuze's poststructural philosophy and Jenck's postmodern architecture, presiding over a “triumphant eccesiology” of “forced reconciliation” (Rose, 1992: xii-xiii; 1993: 233). The consequence of Rose's misreading is unfortunate, considering that Hegel's philosophical journey, which starts from the absolute through the objective to the subjective and back again, bears a striking homology to Comte's, insofar as one could manage not to read two (objective and subjective) Comtes abstractly out of Kant's morality of thought, but rather heeds his absolute concern for the actual “reconstruction of society” from the beginning to the end of his career.

In this regard, Rose shows an explicit inconsistency in Marx's case. She remarks that “the theory of commodity fetishism is the most speculative moment in Marx's exposition of capital” since his theory of fetishism conveys the categorical imperative of “how necessary illusion arises out of productive activity” (Rose, 1995: 217). What is unsettling here regards how Marx's “most speculative moment”, which is supposedly a Hegelian one for Rose, ends up regressing to the “necessary illusion” of Kant's morality rather than Hegel's truth. Nonetheless, Rose's comment is based on the premise that “Marx's failure to understand Hegel's actuality meant that he did not develop any theory of subjectivity” (Rose, 1995: 216). However this premise overstates her own general point, arguing that Marx, when he seeks to distinguish himself from Feuerbach's “'passive' materialism” and Hegel's actuality of the absolute at the same time, falls prey to “Kantian or Fichtean opposition of theory and practice” and heralds the fate of non-Marxist and Marxist sociologies by indulging in the “victory of reflection” (Rose, 1995: 203, 215-16). In fact, Marx did have a theory of subjectivity, even if it seems to agree with a fetishized subject, and even if it seems to be opposed to Hegelian subjectivity.
enveloped in actual life and symbolic art. Moreover, Marx's non-fetishist (i.e. neither pro- nor anti-) theory of subjectivity has defused the regression to a Kantian or Fichtean subject, as Rose reads it, if it could be read radically as witnessing a fictional subject of love. Ironically, it is this backward reading which feeds those false questions to reappear in the history of Marxism, wondering whether Marx is guilty of determinism or voluntarism, evolutionism or historicism, legalism or moralism, enlightenment or romanticism.

In the final analysis, Rose's reluctance to apply her radical reading of Hegel to Comte and Marx might be ascribed to her exceptional identification with Hegel's speculative thought of actuality at the expense of Goethe's art of love-life. Her understanding of Goethe is mediated by the Goethe studies of Mann and Varnhagen, which draw excluded "knowledge" of modernity from the "erotic irony" and salon hostess' friendly "listening" to overcome the problems of "sexual beauty" and "beautiful soul" of a woman as the problem of "modern subjectivity - sovereign and subordinated" (Rose, 1992: 122-25, 185-98). The literary-political stake involves taking on an extra position of the "witness" by the artful device of a pseudonym to remain vigilant to the aporia of authorship and authority, and so renouncing the twin temptations of becoming the perpetrator and the victim with the help of "this always already knowing yet being willing to stake oneself again" (Rose, 1992: 147-52). Given as such, Rose does acknowledge Goethe's playful art of love between eros and philia to a certain degree, albeit her authorship/authority comes from Hegel to Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, Rose's final analysis turns critical when Mann is connected to Girard, and Varnhagen to Luxemburg and Arendt. To reiterate, Rose criticizes this sociality of authorships for eventually abolishing the anxiety of beginning and the equivocation of the middle by isolating violence from "violence-in-love", by assimilating the "diremption of civil society and the state", and by taming the "facetious love and the state" into a "severe" style of politics or society of love without violence (Rose, 1992: 151-52, 238-46). Preoccupied with the consequences of Goethe's cult in politics and society, however, Rose obscures Goethe's main legacy of bequeathing an art of love-life, which could relativize Rose's Hegel from an exception to a case since Hegel's speculative thought of actuality cannot be absolutely identified without
itself being read speculatively. Given the case, although the poststructuralist injustice of law and the postmodern violence of love succumb to Kantian transcendentalism and pre-Kantian transcendence, sociology and Marxism still hold the chance to retrieve a mundane subject of love if one could question harder the very conscience of method they share with Hegel, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and dig deeper into the neo-Kantian ground of Platonism to subtract the generic multiple which is more actual than any lifeless theory or artless method (of validity and values). For classical sociologists, this means the writings of Weber, Durkheim and Simmel could be reread to trace an amorous subject within the legal one.
Chapter 5 The Spirit of Society in a Loving Subject of Law

Bearing in mind Rose's archaeology of the subject, we will examine the scientific formation of a loving subject in classical sociology in this chapter. From Weber, Durkheim to Simmel, the loving subject is unified behind a legal one. But classical sociology by no means represents a self-identical canon of neo/Kantianism, as Rose argues. Rather, the three forms of sociology approach idealism serially from Kant to Hegel and beyond, depending on their various degrees of openness to the sexual difference in Goethe's ethic of renunciation. Specifically, not only does the methodological difference between Weber and Durkheim require a reemphasis, but also Simmel takes a special note of Goethe's art of love in a cultural form, thereby linking sociology to the Marxist aesthetic. In result, Goethe's culture of love is embodied in a collective Subject of law. Manifested in historical entities, the collective Subject of law is the symbolic Other, be that a moral Society or a forceful State, to which individuals renounce their masculine egos in a fraternal celebration of the duties of charity and justice.

5.1 Weber

Indeed, love is not buried, but grows as a forbidden fruit in the garden of classical sociology, a garden guarded by the two incommensurable laws of culture and society, along with respective "scientific" conceptions of religion, morality, economy, politics, etc. In the Intermediate Reflection on the Economic Ethics of the World Religions, Weber enumerates the "directions of religious rejection of the world" diversified into five life orders governed by economic, political, erotic, aesthetic and intellectual values. Not only are these modern values at war with one another, but they all emerge in a tension with the core value of brotherhood. In particular, "the religious ethic of brotherliness in salvation religions has stood in a relation of high tension with the greatest irrational power of life, sexual love" (Weber, 2004[1915]: 232). As such, Weber's sociological "pluralism" is subject to a particular universal theodicy. Specifically, the economic, erotic and aesthetic orders are supposed to be subordinated to the political and intellectual orders which stand for the secular
derivatives of religious rationality.

This implicit hierarchy of values may explain why, firstly, Weber, a drafter of the Weimer constitution, championed formally the legal-rational rule of law in a Rechtsstaat turned Gesetze staat (rule by law), and substantially the charismatic rule of a hero in a Gerechten Staat (just state). His complex position is to be distinguished from both autocratic and bureaucratic modes of government in liberal democratic as well as totalitarian states. For Weber (2004[1921]: 144-45), such an ideal combination is possible because, ultimately, "the same process" goes with "the principle of charismatic legitimacy that in its primary sense is authoritarian can be changed into an anti-authoritarian principle", and with "the charismatic legal principle" as long as "the free acknowledgment from the side of the ruled is the premise and foundation of legitimacy." From the side of the ruler, however, "the distinction between an elected leader and an elected official" arises since one is responsible to his individual will ("his own discretion"), whereas the other is responsible to the collective will of law ("will of the voters"). Nevertheless, Weber's position holds logically since "political responsibility" is implied in this ideal state, guaranteeing words to become the letter by codifying two wills in the same law, as if the ruler and the ruled have become one thing.

Secondly, his public lectures on science and politics do not advocate two vocations of fact and value, as one is led to believe, by taking up the criterion of "side-taking" out of context, a criterion which is highly questionable in itself, as if science had been taking no sides. Rather, the spirits of fact and value represent two professional ethics of one vocation (beruf) exclusive to Protestantism. Indeed, a political "hero" who is able to combine "passion, a sense of responsibility, and a sense of proportion" bears a resemblance to an intellectual. First, an intellectual cannot be without "this particular frenzy, which is ridiculed by every outsider...this passion, this conviction" and "calculation...intellectualization as such" in order to master infinite ideas of "inspiration" that "come at its own time, not when we want". Moreover, adding up to the same character as a political leader, a responsible intellectual also "give[s] us 'no' answer", unlike a prophet or a saviour; nevertheless, he
“presupposes that the world must have a meaning” and proceeds “to interpret that meaning” by “work and enthusiasm”, so that he “act[s] differently...finds and obeys the demon which holds the threads of his life” (Weber, 2004[1919]: 257-87).

Thirdly, Weber’s claim to value freedom in the construction of ideal types by a relevant selection of values may then be seen as a practice of intellectual-political asceticism vis-à-vis moral anarchy. Specifically, when the light of Goethe’s Faust is lit at the end of his analysis, Weber argues to square the “ultimate evaluative values” with “the value of the individual facts” lost in “unreflective” and “uncertain” viewpoints through “the ‘objectivity’ of knowledge” (Weber, 2004[1904]: 403-04). Biographically, Weber’s unwavering asceticism at least from 1904 until 1920 is corroborated by experience since he witnessed Otto Gross’ erotic lifestyle on the Mountain of Truth in Ascona over the Easters of 1913 and 1914 via his personal relations with the von Richthofen sisters (Gane, 1993: 156-72; Whimster, 1998; Whimster and Heuer, 1998).

However, one errs to think that Weber upholds rationality against irrationality absolutely, and naively relegates passion to an irrational behaviour. In fact, he is well aware of the element of relativity built into his typology of social action, thereby emphasizing the non-reciprocal subjective meaning in a given social relationship: “‘friendship’, ‘love’, ‘loyalty’, ‘fidelity to contracts’, ‘patriotism’, on one side, may well be faced with an entirely different attitude on the other.” Analytically, although affectual as well as traditional behaviours lie “on the borderline of meaningfully oriented action,” the value-rational type shares with the affectual type “a common element” in that both actions are carried out “for its own sake” rather than for achieving “a result ulterior to it”. Moreover, the instrumental rational type is rational not just because, essentially, “the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed”, but also because, relationally, “value-rationality is always irrational” from the “point of view” of an instrumentally rational action (Weber, 1978[1921]: 25-27).
In this sense, a modern ascetic is ideally one who is able to maintain a productive psychological tension with erotic passion in society. Conversely, an "irrational" society, in addition to one of excessive love, includes the other frozen in a "passionless" bureaucracy. Moreover, this bureaucracy is an ironic outcome of ascetic rationality. Thus, Weber's sociology of economy interprets modern capitalism as an ambivalent product of Protestant asceticism, casing, rather than caging, rational individuals in an ultra-rationalistic society of "specialists without spirit and sensualists without heart." For Weber, the ascetic work ethic evolving from German Calvinists through English Puritans to the American entrepreneur Benjamin Franklin attests to the fateful bureaucratization of Goethe-Faust's ethic of renunciation. Historically, the cunning of reason rules that "[The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so]" (Weber, 2003[1904-05]: 180-82). Socially, the unintended consequence of ascetic action tends to embody the liberal democratic spirit of capitalism in a structure of professional specialization. If this is the case, then Weber restricts Goethe's ethic of renunciation to a virile renunciation of contemplative thought in favour of a constant human striving, modernizing Nietzsche's heroic "will to power" into a Kantian ascetic "will to act" (Kent, 1983; Sahni, 2001). Interpreting Goethe's ethic within a neo-classicist agon of dämon and deed, or conviction and responsibility, Weber's reading of Goethe's fiction fails to appreciate characters of feminine renunciation. These feminine, not necessarily female, characters from Werther and Faust to Ottilie and Gretchen express the movement of thought, thinking or intelligence, with a much more "restricted action". As such, Weber has sacrificed the subjective cause of conviction and responsibility to the social objective maintenance of a civic life.

By an image of the casing, or literally rendered as housing (gehäuse), rationality is seen as an existential tragedy of self-legitimation with a poetic kind of justice manifested in the fate of a self-accountable subject. Moreover, playing out the tension between Nietzsche's Hellenic fate and Kant's Protestant subject, the course of modernity is generalized into a cross-cultural narrative, which accounts for the birth of historical individuals only in the West. Simply put, modernity is set exceptionally in the European history of
disenchantment, in which Asiatic types of traditionalism are superseded by ascetic modernism, however fleetingly (Schroeder, 1992). These Asiatic types are considered traditional not because they have no rationality, but because they have no passion (for God and His body) to be rationalized in a certain spirit.

For example, in the Chinese feudal society administered by the prebendal state bureaucracy and mercantilist guild and coin economy, its religious beliefs present a system of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, including Confucianism and Taoism-Buddhism. Firstly in heterodoxy, Taoism appeals to the elite religiosity, aspiring for “apathetic ecstasy” through anchoretic mysticism. Popular Buddhism, having “relatively little bearing” on Chinese economic mentality, converges with popular Taoism to cater for folk religiosity, pursuing “orgiastic” or “emotional ecstasy” through astrological magic (Weber, 1964 [1915]: 177, 181, 206-07). As a whole, folk practices in Taoism and Buddhism are derivations of the Taoist hierocratic practice and macrobiotic theory (Weber, 1964: 177, 191-95). But this sub-typology lacks the fourth possibility of an elitist Chinese Buddhism “since Buddhism in its imported form was no longer the redemptory religion of early Indian Buddhism.” (Weber, 1964: 225) Besides, “European scientists usually agree that nowadays no correct Chinese could understand with complete empathy Lao-tzu’s (or his interpreter’s) views in their original, inwardly experienced context” (Weber, 1964: 186). The upshot is Taoist-Buddhist heterodoxy tends to create an “organization of magicians” or a “monastic organization” with the same “ritualistic” traditionalism (Weber, 1964: 173-78, 224-25). Weber (1964: 225) takes heed of “the occasional communities” formed by “the Buddhist festivities” and “the enduring communities” built in “the heterodox sects, often pursuing political ends and hence politically persecuted”, but they still lack “our cure of souls”.

Secondly in orthodoxy, both apathetic and orgiastic ecstasies are eliminated, which makes Confucians, “like the Roman nobility of office”, come close to Puritans (Weber, 1964: 181). “Both [sic] were ‘sober men’. But the rational sobriety of the Puritan was founded in a mighty enthusiasm which the
Confucian lacked completely" (Weber, 1964: 248). "The absence of hysteria-producing asceticist religious practices and the rather thorough elimination of toxic cults" are demonstrated by the Chinese rejection of alcohol "except for rudimentary use at sacrifice." Even the "effects" of opium consumption, "imported only in modern times" by Western powers, "lie in the direction of apathetic ecstasy, a straight continuation of the line of 'wu wei'”, which has more in common with "the rationalist Roman office" than with "heroic frenzy or the unchaining of active passion" originated in the Hellenic-Platonic sophrosyne (Weber, 1964: 232-33). In sum, only in light of a dispassionate rationalism could one rightly understand the “doctrinal” traditionalism of Confucianism characterized by its scientific absence of formal logics to develop natural law and natural sciences, its economic rejection of the professional expert, and its cultural loyalty to the ideals of propriety, piety, gentility and classics.

On the other hand, in the Indian caste society where independent politics and economy barely exist, the religious system is composed of Hinduism and Jainism-Buddhism. Firstly, on a scale more extreme than Taoism and Chinese Buddhism, the Indian heterodoxy parallels to its Chinese counterpart as Jainism is more royal than ancient Buddhism. But "with the support of the city nobles and, above all, the bourgeois patricians", Jainism and Buddhism have both accommodated to "the interest of the laity" via formation and transformation (Weber, 1958[1916]: 234). Internally, the Jains renounce the world of the gift cycle, sanctifying homelessness and nothingness via absolute fasting and poverty. A monk “yearns neither for life nor for death. Both desires would be lust capable of awakening karma.” With "correct knowledge", "correct insight" and "right practice", "love must be eliminated for it awakens a desire and the processes of karma." In short, "the heart of Jainism is empty" (Weber, 1958: 195-96, 198-201). However, this radically "active asceticism" must be qualified with an external formation of "the strong organization and ties between the lay parish and the monks" so that the monk’s "duty to wander" could be reversed by "the rule for the laity against travel" (Weber, 1958: 197, 201-02). Originally, ancient Buddhism does not seek salvation in ascetic knowledge, thereby making it contrary to Jainism and "the polar
opposite of Confucianism as well as Islam" (Weber, 1958: 206). But ancient Buddhism parallels to early Christianity as both seek salvation in an act of love, only along different lines of death and life. For Buddhist salvation, "man's ultimate fate depends entirely on one's own free behaviour...the meaning and value of the single act." Paradoxically, it refers to an act of "illumination" which seeks the "tranquility" of, or "satiety" with death. Accordingly, it implies an acosmic love free from "passion", a passion of the early Christian love of God and life. Without the passion of Christ, acosmic love is unknown to the doctrine of brotherhood taught by the ideas of (cosmic) love and hatred, neighbours and enemies. Without the passion of the "struggle for existence" or "fight without prospects of success", acosmic love has no personality (constitutive of an active man of knowledge and Goethe's "contemplative" man of conscience), no individuality (composed of the will and soul/ego), and no feminine sexuality (in favour of "edifying self-humiliation of emotional love of man") (Weber, 1958: 206-13). Due to the parallel notions of the love-act, the early Christian ethic of passion can be rationalized for its modern development, whereas "there is no true reconciliation between the worldly and monastic ethic" in popular Buddhism, which determines its asocial character. "The later soteriology, fashioned for the laity, therefore, could not follow the course of an inner-worldly puritanical asceticism, but only that of a sacramental, hagiolatrous, idolatrous, or logolatrous, ritualistic religion" (Weber, 1958: 218). Externally, Hinduism and Islamism pressurize Buddhist monks to launch missionary works in East Asia, developing northern Mahayana and southern Hinayana types and transforming Buddhism into a world religion (Weber, 1958: part III).

Secondly, Indian orthodoxy parallels to its Chinese counterpart as "both Brahaman and Mandarin rejected all types of orgiasticism", but "in neither case (Chinese or Indian) could the implied program be consummated" within similar but different social structures (Weber, 1958: 139). Hence, unlike Confucianism (but like Taoism), Hinduism is more ritualistic and less doctrinal due to the status of the priest over the king, the church-sect over the state. This unique caste structure allows Brahmical religiosity to develop a "magical asceticism" by pursuing mystic knowledge in a religious theocracy
instead of philistine technology in a political bureaucracy (Weber, 1958: 141-50). Sharing the same form of fate as Confucian rationalism, Hindu rationality is also not consummated, but rather consumed by the holy technique of Yoga, which is a “rationally systemized form of methodical emotional asceticism...superior to that of meditation”, seeking “feeling, not knowledge” (Weber, 1958: 165). “In the end, classical Brahmanical teaching could never completely reject as heterodox the virtuoso-like self-mortification of world-fleeing anchorites, because they too upheld the magical character of the gnosis” (Weber, 1958: 166). Based on the salvation doctrines of karma (ethical compensation) and sansara (migration of souls), the Hindu rejects the “transitory nature” of the body and its rebirth in order to merge with the “cosmic order”. They all strive for a state of “Nirvana or similar states of bliss” via “complete dematerialization” or “unconditional physical detachment” (Weber, 1958: 167-80). In result, everything is woven into “unreal and passing beauty...against the sole reality of divine being” when “reality and magic, action, reasoning and mood, dreamy gnosis and sharp conscious feelings are found with and within one another” (Weber, 1958: 191). In short, only in the context of an ultra-passionate supra-rationalism could one rightly understand the ritualistic traditionalism of Hinduism characterized by its invention of rational sciences (especially mathematics and grammar) and its absence of the concept of natural law.

Weber’s ideal typical analysis of the Chinese and Indian religions elaborates a holistic social order based on a cultural dichotomy of orthodoxy and heterodoxy and a social stratification of the rulers and the ruled. That is, Asian societies are stratified into the nobility (Chinese emperors and vassals; Indian kings and princes), intellectual priests (Chinese Confucians; Indian Brahmans), practical strategists (Chinese knights and eunuchs; Indian Kshatriyas) and the masses (Chinese peasants, artisans, merchants, pedlars and serfs in villages and cities; Indian Vaishyas and Shudras). Correlatively, the cultural tendency shows orthodox religions are practiced by the upper part of the social ladder, and heterodox religions, after being transformed, are worshiped by the lower part. The differential political powers of these tribal-occupational groups rely on multiple sources of authority, such as heredity,
status, class and so on. Internally viewed, neither Indian nor Chinese societies gain a relative advantage over the other since Weber portrays an India with more religious and scientific openness, and yet a China with more cultural and technological suppleness. Externally viewed, however, he insists that Asiatic economy results in a stable and closed system due to the traditional type of rule by the vying power elites. If so, he neglects a variety of relations the intellectuals could establish with their noble superiors, ranging from flattering support and strained advice to open criticism and utter seclusion, and the subsequent moral impacts on the masses via whispers and legends. Above all, his description assumes too much from the standpoint of government. A corresponding difference could then be seen from the perspective of the governed. Reading Weber as a conservative Durkheim, one is tempted to follow Lockwood (1992) who argues that there is an "ethical fatalism" believed by the Asian masses in view of their voluntary servitude to the social-cultural order. However, Lockwood's theory of two integrations contradicts Weber's critical depiction of the masses. In fact, the mass religiosity in Asia is considered by Weber as an unethical fatalism, like a mirror-image to the ethical fatalism of Asian intellectuals. In this sense, magical economy is a projection of utilitarian morality, rendering those infrastructural elements in the analysis, such as money and the city, to be "imaginary institutions". Idealizing human relations, Weber still lacks a materialist theory of society to extract Asian modernity within the traditionalist order. Thus, there is no reason why his negative interpretation of the masses couldn't be reversed into a positive hypothesis: the intelligent indifference of the mass. One could argue more plausibly that Asian masses disclose an aesthetic fatalism, binding counterfactually with their ethical literati at the heart of utilitarian, magical economy. This suggests a crude economic intelligence of the Asian laity could amount to an indifferent form of the mass to pre-de/form, however passively, the social-cultural space. To support this suggestion, we move to a higher logical step, arguing that Weber's view of Asian holism agrees with neither cultural history nor social history, at least in the case of China.

Weber presents the cultural-social divide in China by first explaining the
Confucian culture of the literati in the context of a religious economy (part I and II), and then interpreting the Taoist-Buddhist society of the a-literate and anti-literate believers in the context of a religious morality (part II and III). In this way, a highly supple contextual effect is produced: when the intellectual's standpoint of knowledge is examined, orthodoxy stands out without excluding the elitist appropriation of heterodoxy, and when the mass' standpoint of ecstasy is examined, heterodoxy stands out without excluding the popular reception of orthodoxy. But upon concluding the Confucian life orientation, Weber reveals his historical view of Confucianism by reading Ssu-ma Ch'ien after asserting that "the victory of Confucianism was decided only about the eighth century of the Christian era" (Weber, 1964: 165). Ssu-ma Chien is portrayed as a "non-classical" Confucian tinged with Taoism (Weber, 1964: 167). These final sections lay a transitional basis to compare and contrast Confucian orthodoxy and Taoist heterodoxy elaborated in part III of *The Religion of China*. So, "the pacifist character of Confucianism" is summarized ambivalently as a "rationalism of order" due to the "fear of the spirits", lest the "vengeance of the spirits" for the "victim of oppression" would lead to "mass hysteria with its danger of suicide" (Weber, 1964: 169-70).

Presented as such, Weber commits a grave error of historiography. In fact, Confucianism was ordained the state religion in 134 B.C. by Emperor Wudi of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.). Later, Taoism and Buddhism together or separately were also supported by many Emperors. Particularly notable cases occurred in the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) when Taoism became official in 632/8 A.D. under Emperor Taizong, and Buddhism in 690 A.D. under Empress Wu Zetian. In practice, there was a certain confluence of Taoism and Buddhism whether under Taizong's liberal rule or Wu Zetian's ruthless rule. Generally, Chinese Buddhism prospered in the Sui Dynasty (581-618 A.D.), the Tang Dynasty and the Song Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.). Apart from four major persecutions of which one occurred in the above golden ages, Buddhism was largely tolerated, if not supported, until the final stage of Imperial China, the Quing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.). Emperor Kan Hi's prohibition of Buddhist teaching was at most a "secret" one, and the ban was not "certainly so since Kan Hi's Holy Edict" (Weber, 1958: 268). For, being a

134
Confucian-Taoist, Kan Hi still left many inscriptions on the renovated Buddhist temples under his rule. In particular, the missing fourth possibility of an elitist Chinese Buddhism equivalent to Indian Buddhism did prosper in the Tang Dynasty. Indeed, Zen Buddhism was inspired by the Indian patriarch Bodhidharma when he resettled to the Chinese soil in the early 6th century. Then, it culminated in seven major cults in China, mainly following the fifth and sixth patriarchs, Shen-xiu and Hui-neng, in the 7th-9th centuries before disappearing in the 10th-13th centuries. In turn, it was exported to Korea (by Chinul) and Japan (by Myōan Eisai) as late as the 12th century.

But the Chinese root is erased in Weber’s account of Zen Buddhism since he jumps from the Indian seed to the Japanese flower, overlooking the gulf of language and culture (Weber, 1958: 277-80). Weber does acknowledge the Chinese missionary activities in shaping Korean and Japanese cultures, but he prioritizes the influence of original Confucianism to that of transformed Buddhism (Weber, 1958: 270-71). Focusing on Japan where Zen Buddhism reaches to its finest, Weber does also capture the religious feeling of “the middle class under feudal control” rightly as a feeling “more conducive to ‘moods’ than to ‘sentiment’ or ‘emotionality’ as we understand it” since “it did not accept the orgiastic-ecstatic and magical turn of the old Hindu and popular piety, nor did it accept the strong emotional ardour of later Hindu piety or of European pietism” (Weber, 1958: 279). Back in China, Zen Buddhism is excluded from the five out of eight Chinese Mahayana Buddhist sects that Weber mentions. Instead, “the oldest school, the Tschan sung” (phonetically rendered as “Zen sect”) is said to “have a strong Hinayanistic character” (Weber, 1958: 267). This is a serious misplacement. At bottom, Weber has to argue “Buddhism never won a controlling influence over conduct” in China, so that Buddhism can be fitted into the ideal types of Confucianism and Taoism.

20 The five sects Weber enumerates are “Hsien-schon-tsung”, “Tsi-jen-tsung”, “Tien-tai-tsung”, “Lutsung-sect” and “Tsching-tu-tsang” The three missing ones are Wha-yen-tsung, Mi-tsung and finally Tschan-tsung, the one he misplaces. But he takes note of “the acosmic love of the bodhisattva” in the second sect, which is “the champion of the specific Buddhist charity in China”, and yet fails to follow through its practical consequences, as he does in the Protestant sects. From the sect origin, this charity is now a universal cause of the Chinese Buddhist voluntary sectors.
No wonder that Chinese Buddhism is deemed as a "book religion" "established through its increasingly plebian nature" "in part of irrational asceticism, in part of irrational meditation" since it is always already "deviated" by the "Chinese folk-ethic" of magic bound to its customs of ritual, ceremony and Fung Shui (Weber, 1958: 265-69).

Weber's ideal typical analysis results in a spurious abstraction of China in all aspects. First, the Chinese social stratification interpreted from its religious morality shows at best a passive performance of the self by the Chinese mass public contrary to the Chinese social practice. Since the Period of the Warring Kingdoms (475-221 B.C.) before the very first Qin Emperor united China, the Chinese intellectuals have never ceased to be an organ of the masses. Ssu-ma Ch'ien's case is fairly typical here because, serving Han Wudi when Confucianism turned official, the Prefect of the Grand Scribes (Taishì) wrote Annals (Shiji) not only with "the absolute equanimity of tone" but also with moral and astrological sentiments backed by practice. Moreover, the eunuch Ssu-ma Ch'ien who treated his friend in a "cold didactic manner" is even archetypical, not just because "this cool temperature of inter-human relationships is truly Confucian", but rather because this reflects Ssu-ma Ch'ien's holistic attitude towards Confucianism and Taoism, a position of religious indifference which has been, not "was not acceptable without reservation" (Weber, 1964: 168).

Second, the Chinese cultural dichotomy explained by its religious economy proves at bottom an active expression of the person by the Western individual public foreign to the Chinese cultural history. Rather, the transcendental nature of this divide is revealed in certain "superstitious elements as is the case with all enlightenment" as the "eternal problem of theodicy": fortune and misfortune, justice and providence, destiny and fate (Weber, 1964: 206). Weber (1964: 207) discloses here a "specific concept of predestination, for example, in the sense of the Hellenic moira, an irrational, impersonal, and fateful power determining the great peripeteia of individual life. This conception is specific to all purely human heroism which has always proudly refused to believe in a benevolent providence." Writing this passage, Weber
has in mind the Protestant particularization of Hellenic predestination, so that “both elements”, the fatalist individual and the heroic subject, could be synthesized to create a third, universal element — the historical individual subject — rather than merely “existed side by side”. In short, it is according to the ideal type of the historical individual subject that the division of Confucianism and Taoism is established and evaluated. Generally speaking, each exemplifies one element without the other, and so cannot but expresses the worst of that element for want of the third. Specifically, the Taoist-Buddhist “folk belief” in astrology makes “the stars to rule[d] over the individual’s fate” without a subject, resulting in “the harmony and the eventual destiny of the social collectivity per se.” On the other hand, from Confucius’ “providentially ordered” mission is “found the belief in irrational moïra, with a characteristic twist. Only the ‘superior man’, it is said, knows of fate...Common man, without fate or the fearsome of fate, pursues happiness and goods; or he faces the change of fortune with resignation as fatum – not as kismet.” In other words, the Confucian represents a subject of “Stoic heroism” without an individual, “which alone is accessible to the intellectual literati, namely, a ‘preparedness’ approximating to Montaigne’s attitude” (Weber, 1964: 207). Yet finally, this division is erasable since Confucianism and Taoism are both empirical equivalents to Catholicism, which betrays the transcendental judgment of the Protestant spirit (Weber, 1964: 181, 233).

Given the case, one might resort to the Chinese religious-political history summarized above. Indeed, it is more reasonable to argue a simple separation of religious and political powers between Buddhist Taoism/Taoist Buddhism and Confucianism around the 8th century China. That is, at the pride of the Tang Dynasty, “the victory of Confucianism” was gained at the price of ceding its religious crown to Taoism and Buddhism practiced in society, not by a tolerant state assuming its triumphant “role of a ‘religious police’” (Weber, 1958: 264). However, the Chinese “magical garden” filled with wicked spirits has been denied access to any separation of the sacred and profane powers (in Durkheim’s sense) as a precondition to the social-individual production. To be precise, for Weber, “the opposition of the sacred and the secular” did appear in Asia at large, but in a way between the
orgiastic ecstasy of the masses and apathetic ecstasy of the intellectuals, not in the way "between an ethical God and the power of 'sin', the radical evil which can be overcome through active life conduct", "describable in the usual manner as 'ethical personality'" (Weber, 1958: 336-37).

As a result, Weber's overall account (of the absence of disenchantment in China) starts from an irrelevant misunderstanding and ends in creating plausible cross-cultural interpretations and explanations. The blind spot lies in his religious morality rather than religious economy, since he confuses religion with morality, prejudging enchantment by disenchantment in the forever unfinished project of "secularization". Weber's secular individual is anyone but Nietzsche's madman, for his metaphysical confusion is like a double-edged blade, pitting European against non-European economic histories with the universality of a personal God that never dies. Conversely, what Nietzsche's madman declares is the death of God, not the death of the sacred force and soul, gods and spirits. Thus, for the madman, 'everything is possible' not because of the coming of the secular Man, but rather because of his going, the disappearance of God-Man. After all, Weber's metaphysics of history produces a mise-en-scène of the world history seen from the particular universal eyes of a European subject, a hero of fate devolved to ordinary individuals by deifying their personalities.

Fundamentally, Weber maintains that Asian religions produce the silent masses and their rulers in contradistinction to reflective individual persons. The equalitarian nature of the latter qualifies them as the spiritual agents or carriers (träger) of capitalism. This is supplemented by his thesis of Asian traditionalism, which does not argue the lack of a rational mind, but the lack of a rational heart. Inside Asia, China and India, the two ideal types of Oriental rationality, are comparable to "France in the modern Occident" on one side, and antique Hellenism plus Christianity on the other. Herein implies the referential frame of French Catholicism and German Protestantism, the two ideal types of Occidental rationality. Across Asia, "the free competition of religions" resembles cultural "tolerance' somewhat in the sense of late antiquity" (Weber, 1958: 329). Henceforth, "the general character of Asiatic
religions" is founded on "a philosophical knowledge of the 'significance' of the world and life" in the form of "a flight from the world" or "world-indifferent behaviour". Correlatively, Asiatic charismatic economy expresses a fractured soul of "mysticism" and "magical spell" without being mediated by the spiritual "miracle" of science (Weber, 1958: 330-35). In other words, "Asia's partly purely mystical, partly inner-worldly aesthetic goal of self-discipline could take no other form than an emptying of experience of the real forces of experience. As a consequence of the fact that this lay remote from the interests and practical behaviour of the "masses", they were left in undisturbed magical bondage" (Weber, 1958: 342).

All is in accord with the critical idealism of the Protestant thesis, which does not "exclude" the possibility of Asiatic modernization in developing a rational form of capitalism, Quite the contrary, the possibility is included as Weber (1964: 248) concludes his study of China by stressing that his question is anything but "deeming Chinese 'naturally ungifted' for the demands of capitalism" because "[t]he Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism..." Accordingly, bulky Asian studies have missed Weber's point when they look for the fairly developed money economy in the city and technological inventions of printing and measurement by the Chinese civilization very early on in history. Weber's critical point intends to "preclude" an Asian modernity with a spirit to match the ascetic ethic of passion. Therefore, Asiatic modernization would be evaluated as either empty stability or blind progress, had Weber foreseen the "progress" of contemporary Asia. Given the case, one might question if he misses some political intelligence of the masses at the cold heart of "traditional" economy, secondly if he misconstrues "modern" bureaucratic economy as an ascetic engine of "possessive individuals" running out of its hot fuel of passion, and thirdly if he misapprehends, in a direct contradiction to the second if, "postmodern" libidinal economy as an eroticized melting pot of "possessed individuals" reaching to a boiling point. Nevertheless, for Weber, what makes asceticism modern at the critical threshold is that, at the risk of bureaucratization, the Protestant ethic has a unique charismatic authority to hold a rationality of passion without slipping
into dispassionate and impassioned authorities that eventually amount to an unreflective coincidence of opposites in autocratic and bureaucratic rules contingent on traditional and postmodern conditions. Eventually, the Occidental charisma is authorized by the “metaphysically indeterminable” logos, or discursive reason, since “significance” is added onto “beauty” by an androgyny’s loquacity: “before the cosmos of nature we think: it must still – be it to the analyzing thinker, be it to the observer contemplating its total picture and beauty – have some sort of ‘last word’ as to its ‘significance’....the belief that whoever, because of taste, remains silent has, indeed, much to be silent about” (Weber, 1958: 340). As a result, love is prone to be interpreted by Weber’s ever-refining “forms of brotherly love”, covering up not only its sense of male passion but also its nonsense of sexual difference (cf. Symonds and Pudsy, 2006). In conclusion, Weber’s law of culture posits a definitive moral economy demanded by a secular politics of love which presupposes the sovereignty of an individual subject.

5.2 Durkheim
To deliver law from Kant’s moral end, Durkheim suggests a morality of science around the limit of a science of morality alone by observing legal codes and practices and religious beliefs and rites. Rejecting the notions of purpose/aim and effect/result, Durkheim (1984[1893]: 11-16) confines himself to explaining the function/role of division of labour in society as “a source of organic solidarity”, insofar as it may be scientifically indexed in the evolution of legal function from punishment to restitution (i.e. from punitive laws to civil laws of property, domestic affairs, commerce and administration). His elaborate accounts of the causes (i.e. increases of physical volume, moral density and species-existential struggle), conditions (i.e. decreases of common consciousness and physiological heredity) and consequences (i.e. emergences of individual freedom, social change and spiritual human life for itself) in Book II of The Division of Labour in Society demonstrate the “need” of society, “in an entirely speculative fashion”, that is, without any superfluous desire to surmise a first cause “beforehand of the effects that the division of labour produces”, or “improvise” a last judgment “in the silence of the study” (Durkheim, 1984: 6, 179, 340). The point is to show that “civilization [which]
has no intrinsic and absolute value" nevertheless needs society since "the role of society cannot be reduced to a passive one of seeing that contracts are carried out...There are rules of justice that social justice must prevent being violated, even if a clause has been agreed by the parties concerned" (Durkheim, 1984: 15, 162-63). Simply put, there is something excessive in the division of labour than mere biological differentiation, just as there is something in-exchangeable in contractual relations than mere economic exchange (Durkheim, 1984: 162, 291, 308 n. 1). This something excessive or rather vacuous at the margins of nature refers to solidarity in a specialized society solidified by altruism "at the very dawn of humanity", thereby making a moral society embedded "in a network of obligations" (Durkheim, 1984: 145, 173).

At the natural boundary of morality, Durkheim hence takes pains to distinguish the normal division of labour from three abnormal forms, anomic (regulation but lacking integration), forced (integration but lacking spontaneity), and uncoordinated (spontaneity but lacking social "constraint"). In this complex Book III, which is often accepted or rejected on absolute im/moral grounds, Durkheim is dealing carefully with a substantial set of biological-economic problematic without moralism. To be exact, he tries to work out the fair rules of social competition in "a finely articulated organization" on the prior understanding that "specialization is not the sole possible solution of struggle for existence: there are also integration, colonization, resignation to a precarious and more contested existence and, finally, the complete elimination of the weakest through suicide or other means" (Durkheim, 1984: 228, 313). At bottom, these unnatural forms implicating one with another originates in the anomic form which begs the "positive control" of a just government in society: "the diversity of functions is both useful and necessary. But as unity, which is no less indispensable, does not arise from it spontaneously, the task of realizing and maintaining it will have to constitute a special function of the social organism, represented by an independent organ. That organ is the state or the government" (Durkheim, 1984: 154, 295).

Although the function of specialization demonstrates the moral in/significance
of society, it still doesn't justify a mastering organ of government without having brought about a subsisting organism of social life representing organic solidarity \textit{sui generis} (Durkheim, 1984: 297). Hence the organization of professional groups suggested at the conclusion of \textit{Suicide} is introduced to put \textit{The Division of Labour} in perspective, adding "something extra" to the regulation and the institution (i.e. integration) of law by "creating the body needed for the creation of the new law" without stipulating legal codes beforehand (Durkheim, 1984[1902]: lvii). Supplementing the functions of the kinship and the state, professional groups are entrusted to bind social individuals together with new ethics and morals. Lecturing on professional ethics and civic morals in detail, Durkheim (1957[1898-1900]: 218-19) ends up serializing "two very different varieties of duty", justice and charity, after justice is divided by "distributive" and "commutative" laws of dealing with material and symbolic inequality in society. Charity is further defined as "the feeling of human sympathy that we see becoming clear even of these last remaining traces of inequality...[by setting] moral equality over physical inequality which in fact is inherent in things" (Durkheim, 1957: 220).

From the vantage point of charitable solidarity as "the very acme of justice" (Durkheim, 1957: 220), legal sentiment and religious representation manifest the dual aspects of the collective consciousness. For Durkheim (1984: 120), religion symbolizes "the representative element in the common consciousness" in addition to "the affective element" codified in law. Accordingly, a private religion is as much of a contradiction-in-terms as a private law. Conversely, customary vendetta without justice is equivalent to magical exchange without a church, characterizing a band of utilitarian individuals, not a moral society. In line with his original position, Durkheim eventually establishes the homologous forms of religious and social life by theorizing religion via the clan totemism of Australian, Melanesian and Northern American tribes against the theories of animism and naturism. It is worth bearing in mind that whether or not totemism in Book I of \textit{The Elementary Forms of Religious Life} is a plausible theory based on sufficient ethnographic data is a question of natural scientific validity, which Durkheim never endorses naively. In fact, he refutes theories of animism and naturism
on the very ground that both presume "the great [religious] divide between the sacred and the profane must be sought in nature – in the nature of man or nature of universe," thereby de-naturalizing religious phenomena into "the product of delirious interpretation" (Durkheim, 2001[1912]: 76). "Since neither man nor nature is inherently sacred, this quality of sacredness must come from another source", which is a source of that "reality in which the kind of delirium that characterize all religions, in a sense, takes on meaning and objective value." (Durkheim, 2001: 76) Fully admitting the reality of fantasy, Durkheim (2001: 77) could turn around to include animism and naturism as "derivative forms or particular aspects" of totemism.

Given this is the case, Durkheim's theoretical problem lies in a distinction of totemism and fetishism since both are now supposed to be real. The reality of fetishism is internal to his definition of religion, the demarcation of the sacred from the profane things. This radically relative definition refutes the thesis of "the hierarchy of beings", leading Durkheim (2001: 37-38) to argue the "mutual dependence" of god(s) and man by adducing a positive case of fetishism when man uses and abuses his gods for protection. Nonetheless, he insists that the relation of fetishism and totemism is equivalent to that of species and genus, making fetishism an "individual religion", "a simple aspect of that public religion", just as "the individual totem represents one part or one particular aspect of the collective totem", namely a "subtotem" (Durkheim, 2001: 134). After the tradition of biological philosophy from Aristotle to Spencer, the classification of the individual and society is based on Durkheim's double propositions that "individualism and free thinking are of no recent date", and that individual totemism is not "all the more developed and all the more evident in more primitive societies" (Durkheim, 1984: 121; 2001: 133). In short, the neither-modern-nor-primitive origin of the individual constitutes the vanishing endpoint of society insofar as egoism and altruism emerge together "at the dawn of humanity". In view of the speculative nature of the social individual, Durkheim's position cannot be validated simply by a general distinction of totemism and fetishism, but needs a specific account of the social re/production and representation of the individual.
Hence from Book II of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* onwards, Durkheim specifies totemism according to various objects of belief, conducts of ritual and schemas of knowledge. First, objects of belief evolve from totems of name, emblem, animal, man and genus to totems of the individual and sex, which are further personalized into post-totemic notions of the soul, spirits and gods. Second, practices of ritual are classified by negatively ascetic cults and positively sacrificial cults which are further distinguished from mimetic, representative and commemorative rites, functioning as the religious preconditions of the scientific principles of causality, representation and reproduction. Finally, schemas of knowledge determine the socially relative experiences of time, space and so on against transcendental reason. Given as such, it would be fruitless to debate over the determining factor in the constitution of these elementary forms, considering different Durkheimian schools often bias towards different aspects of his theory into a specious thesis prioritizing the symbolic belief of religion, imaginary knowledge of nature or practical ritual of society. In justifying his order of presentation, Durkheim (2001: 36) argues that just as "the rite can be defined only after defining the belief", since "ways of acting" can only be addressed after "the special nature of their object". Likewise, ways of knowing can be defined only after acting. This order appears to endorse the predominance of belief, lending credence to Durkheim's idealism. However, this is far from the case, and nor is the opposite case true to prioritize ritual practices. In fact, his pre-animist view of religion has upset any linear evolution from theological ontology through metaphysical epistemology to pragmatic science (Durkheim, 2001: 150). Rather, the whole effort is to show that particular re/production of social-individual life amounts to nothing if the three apparatuses do not function together in concentrating a spiritual mana to mediate the triune realms of the real, the natural and the social, and consolidating a continuous force in the coevolution of religion, nature and society.

The idea of force and the totemic principle of mana are introduced as "the origins" of totemic beliefs, symbolizing the ultimate reality in the determination of mental representations. The two terms are used interchangeably in Durkheim's discussion, virtually describing the same reality, and yet could be
distinguished by its two sources, religion and society, or in slightly different terms, nature and morality. Firstly, the idea of force is objectlessly natural and impersonally real. Force is impersonally real because it fulfills cosmic-physical and moral functions, not only effecting "a shock that can be compared to an electric charge" and "sickness and death" that can be "conceived as fluids" leaving or entering a body, but also causing obedience "like a kind of imperative, that he is doing his duty" and confidence "to face the world". Also, force is objectlessly natural because this "impersonal god" found in every totemic object of belief "though identical with none" is "without a name, without a history, immanent in the world, diffused throughout a multitude of things." Thus, the natural-real idea of force is the totemic, religious origin of later metaphysical and scientific formulations of force (Durkheim, 2001: 140-142, 151-52). Moreover, the principle of mana is relatively social and positively moral. Mana is a socially relative principle because it "is located in an extended but none the less limited circle of beings and things of different kinds". The multiple names of mana (e.g. American Sioux's waken, Iroquois' orenda and Melanesians' mana) are "imposed" by "the nature of the social setting" as particular totemic clans "stand side by side but do not intermingle" to compose one "tribal Church" of independent denominations. Also, mana is a morally positive principle because it is "incapable of complete individualization" as it creates individualized deities without being "entirely resolved in a specific number of discrete and self-enclosed beings", but negatively it could "glide above the social organization, its division and subdivisions", "absorbing clan cults" into "a harmful mana" in "a tribal and even intertribal institution" of magic. Hence, the principle of mana is the social-moral origin of the post-totemic religious belief of deities (Durkheim, 2001: 143-50).

But the speculative non/identity of natural religion and moral society remains to be accounted for: "if the totem is both the symbol of god and of society, are these not one and the same?" To be exact, this is not a rhetorical question as many tend to believe. For, instead of giving a straightforward yes, Durkheim turns to ask "how was this apotheosis possible and how did it come about in this way?" (Durkheim, 2001: 154) Here the phenomenon of collective
effervescence is introduced, by which the "genesis" of the totemic principle of
mana is explained systematically from the pole of belief to that of ritual within
the comparative contexts of primitive tribes and modern societies. In
particular, the National Assembly in the French revolution is adduced as the
typical case to show the extraordinary power of effervescence (Durkheim,
2001: 157-82, 280-88). However, one should note that effervescence is
primarily described as the real genesis of a binding force "present, living and
unchanged" applied "to any society and so to any religion" before it is
concentrated on totemic belief objects and positive ritual rites (Durkheim,
2001: 140, 161). Specifically, effervescence displays a threefold character:
first, it is a "social action" effecting upon an "involuntary duty" outside us and
"genuine respect" inside us. This action "excludes any idea of deliberation and
calculation" since it originates from "echoes in the others", namely "prevailing
opinion". Second, it is a "moral authority" measured by the "intensity" of
"mental energy" with "psychic properties". This authority is not only aroused in
"exceptional circumstances" of ceremonies, festivals and assemblies when
things, crowds and heroes are endowed with that special mana, but also in
"various demonstrations of sympathy, esteem and affection" and "various
benefits of civilization", such as "fixed" language, tools, rights and "a treasure
trove of knowledge". Third, it is a religious reality overflowing the physical
reality of things as "the sacred character...is added to them...superimposed"
by social action working "in circuitous and obscure ways", leading man "to
imagine them in alien forms and transfigure them through thought." The
perspective of social action is gained only after a "scientific analysis comes to
enlighten him", but the authority of scientific objectivism still depends on the
"daughter of opinion" (Durkheim, 2001: 154-61, 174). In sum, the social action
of effervescence remains a cognitive view limited to a natural scientific
subjectivity before effervescence is objectified into a religious reality sui
generis for social action to be re-presented and re-cognized in a roundabout
way. As a positive implication, the duality of action and reality (or structure, if
structuralism can be applied in advance) can only be virtually admitted in case
they enter into an interminable exchange, leading up to a total confusion of
religion and society. On the contrary, it is not until the suspension of reflexive
duality that sociology can claim a social scientific consciousness for-itself. As
a negative result, transforming mundane things into sacred things by "religious imagination" cannot but actually admit the contradictory objectification-subjectification of society in "society's capacity to set itself up as a god or to create gods" (Durkheim, 2001: 160-61).

With this admission, Durkheim surmounts the trap of a vulgar sociology of knowledge, linking the knowledge of society to its being by subjecting the imaginary view (of the actual contradiction of religion and society, nature and morality) to the symbolic view (of their speculative non/identity). In other words, Durkheim synthesizes the parallax view with the "hypostatization" of society, ambiguously, as he concludes his study with "the ambiguity of the notion of the sacred". It is firstly a "scientific" ambiguity since hypostatization is conceived neutrally as a substantial and fictitious thing beyond reification and fetishization (cf. Pickering, 1984: 231-35). Furthermore, it is a "symbolic" ambiguity insofar as Comte's "second theory of religion", a "functional" review of religion as "intellectually obsolete and socially necessary", is elaborated by Durkheim (Preus, 1987: 109, 128). Along this line of thought, he resolves the contradiction of letter and theory, that is, of believers' theological approach and enlighteners' metaphysical approach (since Hume's anthropomorphism) to religion, with the methodological rigor of a symbolic literalism (cf. Preus, 1987: 157-77).

As long as one is immersed in the collective effervescence, one experiences the binding force of mana. But, there is a price to be paid for the symbolic grounding of the imaginary contradiction of social existence. The true "abyss of freedom" beneath the speculative non/identity of religion and society might have been sealed by an emerging, real ground of fate. Insofar as the "spirit" of "human brotherhood" guides his sociology (cf. Durkheim, 1984: 337), social reality is foreclosed by a real ground of fate too "fair" to touch the kernel of love with neither charitable beauty nor justified goodness, truly devoid of all senses. Durkheim's notion of love, as a duty of charity, is the gift of organic solidarity beyond biological struggle and economic utility. Love, as spiritual food, symbolizes a functional substitution of something for nothing, or precisely nothing but an empty signifier, the nothing-ness of love.
Finally, if Durkheim's science of morality renews the method of the symbolic form, this is because his morality of science inherits from the old doctrine of Trinity within Christian philosophy. After demonstrating the being of society akin to the "moral proof of the existence of God" (cf. Durkheim, 2004: 303ff), he is bound to be embroiled with some existential questions of society, such as relations of life and death, body and spirit, perception and consciousness, rationality and affect, which are inexplicable by the biological discourses of his time. We have seen that a moral society is coextensive with religion, law and love, just as the collective, the social and the individual are multiple types of species evolution "with no breaks in continuity" (Durkheim, 1984: xxix, 83, 172-74; 2001: 154, 337). In fact, society moves towards a spiritualized body of "average happiness" due to the paradoxical "abstraction", not realization, of "Quetelet's average man". This means the spiritual body rests on a specialized organism which rejects heredity, optimizing social life instead of maximizing the pleasures and pains of utilitarian individuals in an all-too-human historical process (Durkheim, 1984: 193, 266). Thus understood, the domains of social morphology, physiology and pathology can be circumscribed within a set of rules, studying social facts "as social things" characterized by an "inmateriality sui generis" (Durkheim, 1982[1895]: 162). Durkheim's sociological rules are a methodological formulation of his discovery of a social "organism that takes on 'spiritual' shape" which "cannot take root in the organism", or "a new life sui generis...added on to that of the body", due to the progressive "effect of increasing detaching the function from the organ – without separating it entirely, however – and life from matter, consequently 'spiritualizing' it" (Durkheim, 1984: 275, 284). As secular morality, this social spirit which Durkheim (1984: 338) characterizes as "charitable and just" is diversified from but irreplaceable by the old spirits of religion and law. As sacred morality, Durkheim's law of society speculates a definite moral economy contingent on a religion of love which proposes the sovereignty of a human subject.

5.3 Simmel

For Simmel, love neither ends in a moral culture nor functions in the middle of
a legal society, but rather seduces at the beginning of sexual division devoid of the sovereignty of individual and human subjects. After the publication of *The Philosophy of Money* in 1900, he stopped asking the ethical question of time in a frame of social differentiation and philosophy of history. Instead, he focused on a concrete analysis of culture in the monetary system by developing a life philosophy and a formal sociology. His writings on the cultural representation of female psychology prepared for and continued to build upon his philosophy of money “which also included a discussion of the monetary valuation of women, marriage and prostitution” (Oakes in Simmel, 1984: vii-viii). Female culture concerns a sociological representation of the feminine form. Simmel (1984[1911-23]: 65-101) argues that the objective form of culture represents the principle of "significance" in the male psyche, whereas "beauty" in the female psyche is unable to express this form. Hence, female culture comes close to a contradiction-in-terms if culture is defined as an objective form disengaged from its subjective contents. In effect, one should separate the absolute from the relative problems of the sexes since they are asymmetrical to each other. This is to say, since the male sex is prone to create an objective culture of differentiation discharged from a significant centre, the female sex is consigned to a relative problem of representation when the male culture predominates. By contrast, since the female sex tends to create a subjective culture of unity conserved in the beautiful whole with no centre, the female sex is elevated to an absolute crisis of representation when female culture starts to emerge (Simmel, 1984[1911-23]: 102-32).

Simmel's analysis of sexual division in modern cultural history can be found in his writings on *The Adventurer* and *Flirtation*. For the male sex, a man's conquest in a love affair is a case of an adventure, as everyday life is uprooted by indeterminable fate (Simmel, 1977[1911-23]: 195-96). This "super-life" experience requires a heroic attitude of fatalism to believe in the impossible, a triumphant confidence in the "unknown and unknowable element" of life. The adventurous lifestyles of Casanova, the gambler and the philosopher are thus intertwined by the love of fate itself (Simmel, 1977: 190-94). For the female sex, the formal sociality of flirtation is exemplified by the
charming "reserve" of "this semi-concealment of woman" embodied in their clothing or bodily ornament (Simmel, 1984[1911-23]: 136, 148). Expressing "an intermediate state between having and not-having", "interplay between consent and refusal" or "surrender and withdrawal of the self", this "precarious dualism" implies a formal unity in the "undifferentiated being of woman". In this sense, flirtation discloses "the more profound sense of the interpretation of love" than the Platonic "desire for possession" (Simmel, 1984: 133-36, 147-49, 151). Summed up in a word called "perhaps", flirtatious indecision shows an inner strength exactly when she abandons herself to the instrumental service of her lover, which is qualitatively different from anxious uncertainty which is a character of weakness to "gain time for the decision". Such "tentative turning" formalizes the "allusive charm" when a woman lures a man to risk an adventurous encounter with fate inaccessible to his decision (Simmel, 1984: 136, 141-44, 151). Accordingly, flirtation is a "play" with reality more than a disinterested form of "art". The immanent transcendence of "life" occurs as the tragedy of human separation and loneliness is metamorphosed into a play form of sociality unbounded by morality and beauty (Simmel, 1984: 144-47, 149-52).

Simmel's life philosophy may be largely read as an endorsement of Goethe's love and Nietzsche's fate against Kant's intellect and Schopenhauer's will. Without detailing his monographs on these four thinkers, one might recapitulate this philosophy of fatal love-life by reviewing two of his posthumous essays, Eros: Plato and Modern and On Love (a fragment). Summed up in a cultural thesis, the philosophical history of Eros (from Plato to Nietzsche) shows that the Apollonian rational thought has been unsettled by the Dionysian joyous life (Simmel, 1977[1921-22]: 235-48). Ancient and modern meanings of Eros can be revealed in a series of contrasts, such as unified cosmos/substance of being versus creative flux/movement of the soul, male body versus female face, inclusive supra-individuality versus exclusive individuality, self-sufficient possession versus unattainable relationship, and so on. A crucial transition occurred between Petrarch's and Michelangelo's Renaissance and Goethe's Romanticism or Weimer classicism when the idea of beauty was integrated to individuality. In effect, "the ultimate mystery of love
resides in the fact that there is no single attribute which is responsible for it—as Meister Eckhart said with respect to God, we should not love him because he possesses these and those attributes, but simply because he just is...Individuality—this unanalyzable unity, which is not to be derived from anything else, not subsumable under any higher concept, set within a world otherwise infinitely analyzable, calculable, and governed by general laws—this individuality stands for us the actual focal point of love" (Simmel, 1977: 244). Eventually, the trans-vital life of love breaks through moral and religious forms when a subject's psyche acquires "a formative quality" to individuate love's objects (Simmel, 1984[1921-22]: 153-92). Accordingly, love is neither impulsive behaviour, nor religious charity and sacrifice, nor sexual sentiment, nor emotional experience, nor subjective enjoyment, nor objective value judgment, nor desire or esteem for the object, and nor magical mode of being. In positive terms, love is "an ungrounded and primary category...As one who loves, I am a different person than I was before...the beloved as such is also a different being...There is an absolute connection, not a mere association...thoroughly integral and not compounded from different and otherwise existing elements" (Simmel, 1984: 161). As a cultural transfiguration from the ideas of God, soul and salvation, modern love is related to but not exhausted by Christian love, philanthropy and Kantian ethics. From the "genuine love" for the "Eternal Feminine" in Faust to the "absolute love" for an "irreplaceable personality" in Elective Affinities, Goethe's work exemplifies modern love in its full complexity. Following Goethe's lead, in sum, Simmelian love turns life into a work of art, a heroic tragedy of "a More-than-Life" predestined by the fate of "incomparable individuality" (Simmel, 1984: 167, 173-77, 180-90).21

5.4 The Marxist question of fraternity
As a triune canon, classical sociology does agree with Marxism on the suppression of sexual-erotic love with a legal-rational form in modernity, as far

21 A self-professed Simmelian, Octavio Paz misreads the super-human individuality of love into a humanist personality of love. Conflating Simmel's analysis of bourgeois culture with his authorship, Paz over-identifies the bourgeois ideal of the person to develop an embodied notion of human souls via a comparative but incoherent analysis of world religions. The result is a mystic doctrine of the double flame, sexualization and eroticization, of love (Paz, 1996: 156-60, 186-87, 189-206; Capetillo-Ponze, 2005).
as Weber’s ideal type, Durkheim’s elementary form, and Simmel’s form of sociation are concerned. This is where Rose gains the leverage to warn against Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies trapped in the Kant-Fichtean reflection ofmethodologism and theoreticism.

Yet exceptionally, Simmel’s sociologization of Goethe’s art of love to a sexual-cultural analysis of modernity is also appropriated by Marxism politically. We are referring to a neo-enlightenment scholarship of Goethe developed by Gyögy Lukács, Mikhail Bakhtin, Walter Benjamin, etc. inssofar as they move away from the neo-romanticist scholarship of Goethe by the influential works of Dilthey, Gundolf and Simmel (Tihanov, 2000: 216-17, 228-29; Ferris, 2002). On the first approach, these theories of novels struggle with the transition of fiction genres from Goethe’s historical realism to Dostoevsky’s psychological realism, pursuing a Marxist aesthetic in response to the rise of aesthetic modernism. On the second approach, the “apolitical” writings of these Marxists preempt, on a “meta-political” level, modernists’ “anti-political” total aesthetic with regards to the non/dialectical relations of politics and art on the one hand and history and time-space on the other. On the third approach, Marxists under the regimes of Stalinism and Nazism often had to disavow their past or face exile and even death (cf. Sim, 1994; Arendt, 1999[1955]). Accordingly, it is unwise to engage in an ideological analysis of the shifting positions of these Marxist aestheticians, let alone a comparative study of different religious politics between them, since the truth lies in their literary critiques. As a rule, from Lukács through Bakhtin to Benjamin, the more one is sympathetic to aesthetic modernism, the more one is prepared to admit the failure of Goethe’s realist literature in capturing and/or seizing the historical force of revolution (Tihanov, 2000: 216-45; Weigel, 2002). Hence, the fundamental issue concerns the question: does Goethe’s ethic of renunciation still “survive” in our historical culture to inspire a Marxist politics of fraternity?

Given the common wager put on Goethe by Simmel and Marxists, one should think twice about the destiny of the two sociological cultures sealed by Rose. We suggest a distinction of the logic from the thought of the world. In this regard, Rose is right to subdivide classical sociologists, since it is not just law
but its moral imperative claimed by Weber and Parsons which restricts sociology to a limited sense after Durkheim and Simmel. Meanwhile, she reminds us that Marx's question of commodity fetishism is changed to a problem of reification from Hegelian Marxism onwards only after further thoughts on Simmel's philosophy of money. In effect, the future of this fate is not totally foreseen, but fraught with a primary discord of Platonism and Kantianism inside neo-Kantians prior to the secondary division of Marburg and Heidelberg schools. Under the imaginary split between is and ought of thought, which Rose (1995: 1) dismisses hastily, one discerns a real split within the triune canon, which opposes the logic to the thought of the world in the schism of Durkheim, Simmel and neo-Marxists on the one hand, and Weber, Parsons and neo-Parsonians on the other.

Theoretically, the split tells us Durkheim and Simmel are more open-minded towards the object of study than Weber is, for they sociologize the letter before judging the spirit of the law. If Weberian love is derived ambivalently from the antinomy of morality and legality to necessitate the thought of the world, then Durkheimian and/or Simmelian love is deduced speculatively from the non/identity of morality and legality to symbolize the logic of the world. In this strict sense, Rose stands on a ground too high to make a sociological distinction between the post/Hegelian form of society and the pre/Kantian form of culture based on their vanishing reference point, nature. For, Weber's sociology anticipates a postmodern moral culture which dominates and replaces nature, whereas Durkheim's sociology anticipates a poststructural amoral society which simulates and displaces nature. Given the case, a further proximity between Simmel and Durkheim might be found in an early disagreement regarding Durkheim's critique of Simmel for sacrificing the contents of social life to its forms (Durkheim, 1960a). In view of Simmel's later writings of life philosophy, however, the disagreement turns out to reflect a prior agreement on capturing actual social life instead of stipulating an abstract morality.

Approaching the world via its logic or its thought signifies two incommensurable social dynamics based on love or freedom. It is apparent
that progressive social thinkers since Comte and Marx have searched and researched for a "scientific" way to "help" human societies achieve the equality of beings in a state of universality. However, Durkheim and Simmel think in terms of a two-tailed double bind with freedom and equality tied to a real life of counter-Protestant fraternity, whereas Weber thinks in terms of a two-tailed double bind with equality and fraternity tied to an ideal form of Protestant freedom. For the former, it needs an amorous society to be moral, really moral; for the latter, it desires a free society to be moral, ideally moral. Hence, for Durkheim (1984: 321), "what constitutes liberty is the subordination of external to social forces, for it is only on this condition that the latter can develop freely." "But where human sympathy is concerned, even these inequalities [of merits] cannot be justified. For it is man as a human being that we love or should love and regard, not man as a scholar of genius or as an able man of business, and so on..." (Durkheim, 1957: 219). For Simmel, "it was only through the voluntary act of renunciation as expressed in this concept [i.e. fraternité] that it would be possible to prevent liberté from being accompanied by the total opposite of égalité" (Simmel, 1971: 222). Due to the same priority of fraternity, one can see why Simmel's approach to the world's amoral logic antecedent to its moral thought in the frame of Goethe's ethic of renunciation poses a political challenge for Marxists.

Historically, the "loving" patience of these three classical sociologists could be seen as formalizing the failed work of love by Comte and Marx in legal terms and spirit insofar as they cultivate the fruit of love in the garden of law. While allowing varying degrees of excess to inform their theory of society, they expect, at bottom, fraternal love bounded by the paternal law to substantiate a cultured or civilized government in modernity. Reduced to a formula, sociology professionalized from social science might be seen as a canonic shift from love to law to guide the reformation of modern social life. In terms of practical social carriers, the vicissitudes of social science and sociology represent a changing mentality of the governing class, since they enlist different professionals from medical doctors to lawyers as social engineers. Yet, as long as both professional groups intend to rein the plebian pursuit of a better life in a moral track on the basis of an adamant doubt about excessive
economic rationality, both risk throwing the baby away with the bathwater. Conversely speaking, self/bounded moralities of love and law are fearful of traversing the materialistic feeling naturally arising from the marketplace, eventually missing the chance of founding a new and rigorous inhuman order of the social. Upon closer reflection, the pre-1880 social science of love and the post-1880 sociology of law had written the consequences of modernity since the Industrial and French revolutions, swinging from aestheticism to asceticism as two ways of conceiving the post-revolutionary social order. Given the trajectory from 1848 to 1870, this swing of historical feelings demonstrates how social science lived through a post-revolutionary symbolic enchantment, whereas sociology suffered from its disenchantment.

However, the thesis of enchantment and disenchantment is liable to over-interpretation if one “infers” that sociology represents a “realistic” awakening from the “utopian” dream of social science. For, this inference is a prejudgment issued retroactively from the “realism” of sociology to “irrealize” social science. As an act of patricide, the prejudgment is self-contradictory in that the “realness” of the symbolic is simultaneously admitted and denied. By contrast, a fair, if never full, significance of the canonic transition might come into view if one adopts a standpoint in the wake of the historical determination of sociology. Seen from a post-1920 standpoint, therefore, the same transition shows that the social scientific enchantment had “fictionalized” the symbolic before the sociological disenchantment “imagined” the symbolic: symbolic tradition in both instances is recognized as a lost object. By the thesis of fictionalization and imagination, we have adopted a real view of the symbolic, which brings us again to “the passion for the real”, as Badiou (2007) claims, in the 20th century. Previously, we argued Badiou’s analysis can be read across the theoretical divide of Marxism and non-Marxism. Now following Badiou’s meta-politics, we argue the real view can hold true in both Marxist and anti-Marxist periodizations to present a historically consistent standpoint. In concrete terms, the real intimates a dissatisfaction of symbolic fictionalization if referring to the political real from 1917 through 1945 to 1976; meanwhile, it implies a dissatisfaction of symbolic imagination if referring to the cultural real from 1917 through 1968 to 1989. From the real standpoint of the symbolic,
these post-1920 political-cultural events manifest a double dissatisfaction with the post-revolutionary social orders put forward by social science and sociology. Thus, the canonic transition may be reconsidered to signify that the symbolic fiction of love must be realized in the actual history of the real to complete rather than abolish the symbolic image of law.

Nonetheless, political and cultural symbolizations of the real history do stand in irreconcilable positions. This antagonism cannot be dismissed lightly, for it does contribute to a disarray of historical interpretation of the 20th century, not to mention a hermeneutic meltdown over the meaning of terrorism in the 21st century. Specifically, the opposition of political versus cultural histories refers to the sorry conflation of really existing socialism (after 1917) and fascism (before 1945) on a first approach, and the false distinction of totalitarian dictatorship (before 1989) and libertarian or neo-liberal democracy (after 1989) on the second. At bottom, the watershed lies in the event of 1968: does it herald a legitimate conquest of anti-Marxist culture from 1989 onwards or a willful implementation of Marxist politics since 1917? But these views are trapped in a one-sided suture to a real beginning and a real end of history, respectively. Given Rose's ethical equivocation of the middle, it's more exact to argue that the revolt of 1968 emerged at the point of reversal from politics to culture because one could trace the social force of youth in the event '68 to the decade of Cultural Revolution in Mao's China from 1965 to 1976. In light of this, one might further contextualize the de-politicized, particular culture of

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22 In fact, one could trace the source of modern student movements against imperialism to the 4 May Movement of 1919. It was not only a patriotic movement launched by students to oppose the unfair treaty put forward in the Paris Peace Conference, but also a continuation of the new cultural movement initiated by intellectuals in 1915 to abolish the residual feudalism in modern China. According to Mao's epistemology of dialectic materialism in On Practice (2007[1937]: 58), the 4 May Movement exemplifies a practice of “rational knowledge” on a higher dialectic stage than the practice of “perceptual knowledge” such as The Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (The Taiping Rebellion, 1850-64) and The Yi Ho Tuan Movement (The Boxer Rebellion, 1899-1901). But Mao suggested in a private letter of 1951 that the example of The Taiping Rebellion should be deleted from later publications because he suspected that it already went beyond a simple pre-rational, xenophobic movement (cf. http://www.marxists.org/chinese/17/marxist.org-chinese-mao-193707.htm, note 5). In line with this historical view, it is only natural to find Weber (1964[1915]: 219-24) had already argued a similar distinction, since, according to his sociology of modernity, The Taiping Rebellion revolutionized the Christian-Confucian mixture in China to create a chiliastic-ascetic ethic, whereas the Boxer Rebellion merely evolved toward a military-martial ethic from the contemplative-ecstatic norm in the Taoist-Buddhist soteriology.
1968 as the obverse consequence of the de-culturalized, universal politics when interwar intellectuals sought to “socialize” by force Goethe’s art of love-life in Lenin’s and Stalin’s Russia. The real view I expound here builds upon Badiou’s analysis of the Cultural Revolution at the heart of his theory of the subject before and after he coins his philosophy of being and event. In his Maoist period, Badiou (2005c[1975]; 2005d[1975; 1977]; 2005e[1979]; 2005f [1980]) argued that the history of French Revolution and post-revolutionary Restoration repeats itself in Mao’s Cultural Revolution and Deng’s economic revisionism, and thus reaffirmed the “right to revolt”. Recently, Badiou (2005g[2002]) ponders if Cultural Revolution stands for the Last Revolution. This is so because the organization of the revolutionary subject came to a point of “saturation”, whereby the Russian state-party form excreted a Chinese mass form. In light of this, any reflexive sociology of an autopetic “world” culture and politics would be bereft of its historical yardstick if Lenin, Stalin, and Mao have been precluded as the triune nemesis of “Western” freedom, equality and fraternal love.
Chapter 6  Durkheim Reconsidered

The entire case made in the previous chapter rests on a common interest between Simmel and Marxists in collectivizing Goethe’s art of love into political culture and/or cultural politics. They read Goethe’s ethic of renunciation from neo-romantic and neo-enlightenment views, unaware that opposing perspectives might have presumed the same sexual formulation of the ethic. In this regard, Weber lags behind them since his neo-classicist view of Goethe allows him to exploit different cultural representations of passion within the bounds of a putatively neuter reason. On the other hand, through Simmel, the door separating Durkheim from Marxists is further opened. Both Marxist and non-Marxist sociologies promote symbolic love behind legal forms of the state and society by initiating them into a spiritual ring of fraternity circling from justice to charity and back. But this is only half of the story. Here I argue there is an added complexity of love to be found in Durkheim’s oft-criticized organicism. It is important not to dismiss Durkheim’s organicism as a naïve positivistic analogy since his sociological logic can detach itself from the philosophical thought of humanity originated in German idealism because of his critical readings of Comte and Spencer.

In the section on Durkheim of the previous chapter, we applied our reading of Rose against Rose to suggest how Durkheim formalizes a speculative morality of science closer to Hegel’s logic rather than neo/Kantian thought by means of a science of morality in the middle of social being and knowledge (or, ontology and epistemology). As a twist to German idealism, we concluded that Durkheim, in fact elaborating on later Comte’s logic, coins a symbolic literalism to solve the imaginary contradiction of religion and society. During the process, his heuristic concept of organic solidarity, as an intellectual need to mediate his sociology of law, morality and religion, posits the double ethics of duty, justice and charity, in a serial spirit. Such an ontogenetic logic, a post-Kantian formal logic accounting for the twin births of society and individuals by the birth of a transcendental subject, works as if he gambles on justice as the
reason of duty, then he must at the same time raise the stake to call in charity as the love of duty in modern society. In consequence, we questioned if, having spiritualized the speculative non/identity of natural religion and moral society, Durkheim seals the abyss of freedom, the true kernel of love with neither charity nor justice, to the ground of fate.

In fact, the question we posed to Durkheim concerns how can the charitable spirit of love be upheld as an indeconstructable exception in the beginning? Or, why not deconstruct the indeconstructable ground of de/construction (of subjectivity), which is fraternal love? Furthermore, what is this real ground of fate that actualizes the existence of love, and what lies beneath the very act of actualization in its dual sense of truth and fiction? To answer these phylogenetic questions, questions of truth/fiction regarding a literal conception of the real before the birth of the symbolic subject, one needs to reconsider the organism of love qua respect in Durkheim’s work. We will stress in this chapter that he does provide a full explanation in this regard, and one would be surprised to see the complexity of his account. Afterwards, we will know why Goethe’s ethic of renunciation, the Ariadne’s thread of our genealogy of love from social sciences to classical (non/ Marxist) sociologies, could have been read otherwise. If one concedes that we are living in a post-symbolic world of normativity, a world which has transgressed Durkheim’s society of normality and pathology, then a new order of love beyond laws has to work through differential ethical formulations of Goethe’s love-life between masculine renunciation and feminine renunciation.

In the first instance, charity seems a remedy of social maladies, given the examples of caring for others, giving of alms, and even risking one’s life. Durkheim the philosopher holds onto this post/Kantian ideal of treating human personality as an end from his Sens lectures onwards (Durkheim, 1957: 218-220; 1984: 77, 338; 2004: 270-71). But it has no absolute value in his sociology. On the contrary, charity as a moral practice turns out to be a symptom. In his lectures on moral education, he admits, “[c]harity, in the popular sense of the word, the charity of person to person has no moral values in itself.” Moreover, it is “a symptom of a moral state” at worst, and
“symptomatic medicine” at best. For, “social evils require social treatment. The lone individual can do nothing against them. The only effective remedy lies in the collective organization of welfare.” (Durkheim, 1961: 82-84) Accordingly, once the precept of duty is actualized in the perpect of respect, we will find that Durkheim’s feeling of social reality is too rich and complex to be measured by idealism, or spiritualism in the sense Bouglé imputes to his teacher (Durkheim, 1974: xli).

6.1 Žižek’s philosophy for Durkheimians

Before rediscovering Durkheim's phylogenetic arrangement of ideas, we must first caution against two excessive methods of reading existing in divergent interpretations. We consider most contemporary studies of Durkheim too "sociological" and too "philosophical" at the same time. As such, they tend to violate Durkheim's brand of sociology and philosophy by overstretching them. To over/understand Durkheim, specifically, they draw on too many con-texts (of comparative societies, from L' Année Sociologique to Le Collège de Sociologie, from La Sorbonne to Le Collège de France, from Action Française to la troisième République) induced from a "Durkheimian sociology" of knowledge, and too many inter-texts (of comparative individuals, from Descartes to Kant, Kant to Comte, Kant to Hegel, Comte to Schopenhauer, Hegel to Marx, Bergson to Bataille, etc.) deduced from a "Durkheimian philosophy" of ideas. On the surface, contextual and intertextual excesses stand for mutually opposed methods of reading. One watershed lies in the so-called Parsons-Comte complex, from which a "sociological" method (of contextualizing, applying or projecting Durkheim to a sociological theory of society) and a "philosophical" method (of intertextualizing, dis-applying or reflecting Durkheim in a philosophical history of modernity) declare to part ways. At bottom, however, commentaries amount to multiple representations of Durkheim, converging on the charting of a "sociological-philosophical" map of his identity in place of the landscapes of his sociology and philosophy. The merging identity of contextuality and intertextuality shows that, after multiple interpretations, there has been only one method of reading Durkheim. We might call it the method of forensic science, eager to catch a "truer" Durkheim by seeking trace evidences, that is, more mediated societies and individuals,
schools and ideas, up close and personal to the historical Durkheim (such as Hamelin, Renouvier, Janet, etc.). When the mediated dis/appear along with the immediate, excrescent "philosophical-sociological" multiplicities no longer respect Durkheim's scientific methods of sociology and philosophy, since their distinct objects of study are lost in mutual approximation.

We are not saying that everything understood about Durkheim so far is wrong. On the contrary, we are saying every idiosyncratic trace of Durkheim's sociology being discovered is too right to "represent" the truth of his thought. The problem is that a labyrinthine search of contextual and/or intertextual evidences is inclined to ignore simple textual evidences in Durkheim's oeuvre. This is also the typical blindness of lovers, which is not revealed to them until they break up: intimate understandings turn into misunderstandings, their very causes. Headless of the blind spot, one would fall into a symbolic trap, loving Durkheim too much in the forensic tracing of his law, his crime, in founding sociology. This blindness betrays one's relative and limited knowledge of Durkheim's sociology dependent on his love of societies and individuals in an ontogenesis of love of duty at the expense of his love of humanity and organism in a phylogenesis of love of respect. To reverse the imbalance, we argue a textual sacrifice of intertextuality, ripping and reshuffling contexts to maintain a structural distinction and relation between sociology and philosophy. For this purpose, we turn to Žižek.

There are two main reasons for the choice of Žižek. First, his history of modern philosophy, especially German idealism, is led by a dynamic view of truth, and so superior to "philosophical" Durkheimians who tend to compel Durkheim to endorse the knowledge system(s) of a certain (group of) individual(s). Second, his theory of post-psychoanalytic Marxism is followed by a radical view of ideology, and so elusive to "sociological" Durkheimians who like to force Durkheim to adopt the ideological position(s) of a certain political, religious and/or intellectual society. As a whole, we read Žižek, in the same way as we read Durkheim, textually, against over-contextualizing or stereotyping him with a philosophical person (e.g. Žižek the Lacanian-Leninist-Hegelian) and/or a sociological thing (e.g. Žižek the political dissident
from Slovenia, the theoretical psychoanalyst from the University of Paris VIII).

Appreciating the friendship of enemies, Žižek would know best how (not) to love Durkheim (too much). We suggest that one can find everything Durkheimians might want to know about Žižek, and thus recognize the immoral challenge of Durkheims sociology poses to us today, in the controversial book Organs without Bodies (Žižek, 2004a). In conjunction with Badiou’s (2000a) logical critique of Deleuze, this book is firstly a philosophical reading of Deleuze, and secondly a sociological reading of the practical consequences of Deleuzianism in the domains of cognitive science, cinematic art and counter-cultural politics.23 Deleuzians simply do not love this book, criticizing Žižek, in the stereotypical way he is always criticized, for downloading the systems of Hegel and Lacan to Deleuze. According to his central argument, they are right. But this intellectual indignation discloses their emotional puzzlement about Žižek’s view of love, from which Žižek presents the book as a justified reading of Deleuze. Deleuzians might reasonably wonder why, apart from an introductory section on Deleuze’s aversion to debate and a philosophical section on Spinoza’s affirmation of Being, in which a certain conception of love is implied, a sustained discussion of love is missing in the sociological part, a part clearly designed to apply Badiou’s four conditions of philosophy (recall that we noted the same under-theorized site by Badiou in chapter 3).

If we could forget about all the personalities from Hegel and Lacan to Deleuze and even Žižek in our mind, a simple answer would strike to us that the whole treatise is produced by a drive to write a philosophy and a proto-sociology (in science, art and politics) of love in the guise of Deleuze’s philosophy and its sociological consequences. Leaving sociological consequences aside, we focus on introducing his history of philosophy. Since philosophical personalities are a secondary concern, we do not distinguish other conceptual

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23 Badiou discusses how Deleuze, in the wake of Heidegger’s phenomenology and ontology (from Dasein to Mit/Sein), turns to Bergson’s method of intuition in developing a virtual ontology, in which univocal Being (One-All) predicates nominal existence (anarchistic multiplicity) via the concept of the virtual as the organizing ground, of time as absolute memory, of the eternal return as chance, and of the subject as the fold.
authorships from Žižek's, but rather relate them historically in a conceptual network. Without exception, even when we credit most conceptual authorships to Žižek, this name should be read as a sign and put into brackets.

As a result, the only way to begin must be Truth. Truth "only occurs in the very passage from one to another perspective", and as such lies in neither transcendence nor immanence, and nor the gap between transcendence and immanence, but in "a fetishized misperception-effect of the gap within immanence" (Žižek, 2004a: 62). Without being opposed to Illusion, Truth is a "play[ing] with appearances" in "the structure of a fiction" (Žižek, 2004a: 167). In discovering Truth, therefore, one adopts "the strategy of tracking down, not the specific difference, but the minimal difference... that differentiates an element... from itself, from its own place of inscription...", namely "the 'pure difference' between enunciated and enunciation" (Žižek, 2004a: 64, 69). Žižek knows he is no producer of the truth, but the truth's mouthpiece, a psycho-philosophical analytic who contains himself in the subjective position of an object. As Žižek effaces his self-identity, Deleuze's contemporary philosophy might then be correlated with modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel through a retrospective view of post-philosophy from Hegel to Lacan.

First, contemporary philosophy since Deleuze claims to invent a style of thinking in a movement of difference and repetition. Yet by a violent act of discrimination against Anti-Oedipus, Žižek (2004a: 32) sides with the "apolitical" Deleuze of Logic of Sense who asks the philosophical-scientific question of causality, a question repetitive with but different from the question of origin puzzled by theology and positive sciences alike. So Deleuze turns the concept of the cause into a "quasi-cause" embedded in the immanent plane of consequences, meditating on how "the excess of the effect over its (corporeal) causes" posits a "sense-event" of affecting and affected bodies to generate its own causes retroactively (Žižek, 2004a: 27). However, the bodily and affective nature of the sense-event discloses Deleuze's ambiguity of materialism and idealism, supplementing a "formal genesis" with a "real genesis". Deleuze is indecisive about the ontological priority of Being or
Becoming expressed in the flow of virtualization/spiritualization (the passage from Being to Becoming) or actualization/embodiment (the passage from Becoming to Being). Žižek rejects the very pseudo-choice of materialism and idealism due to its presumed dualistic essentialism, including their contemporary coincidence of opposites in "vulgar materialism" and "gnostic spiritualist obscurantism" (Žižek, 2004a: 21-26). Rather, he "problematizes the very basic duality of Deleuze's thought, that of Becoming versus Being", arguing that this problem points to the limit of Life on Deleuze's vitalist conception of Event (Žižek, 2004a: 28). As a result, Žižek (2004a: 30) differentiates two sites of the virtual in Deleuze's work, biasing the repressed "site of the sterile Sense-Event" where "organs without body" is discovered against the liberated "site of productive Becoming" where the "body without organs" is found.25

Here, Žižek is taking a further step toward the deconstruction of the affective body, given that its sense-event gives Deleuze a ground of non-sense to make the mental structure of subjectivity an im/possibility. He corresponds the concept of the fold with that of autopoiesis in evolutionary cognitivism (as if Deleuze meets Maturana and Varela), arguing that it is not radical enough to rest on a self-enclosing loop of virtual organism, since it would take the duality of idealism and materialism to the worst (morals of ambiguity) (Žižek, 2004a: 111-17). Moreover, Žižek (2004a: 118-23) takes care to understand rightly the

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24 On the first approach, Žižek follows Badiou's philosophy of Being and Event beyond Deleuze's philosophy of Being and Becoming. In the second approach, however, Žižek (2004a: 103-07) criticizes Badiou for relapsing to the Kantian taboo of the Thing. In his discussion here, Žižek does rightly understand the problematic concerning a proper formalization of the "passion for the real" at the interface of post/ Marxist theory and practice. Nonetheless, it is Žižek himself who commits a Kantian misreading of Badiou's The Century. We have shown in chapter 3, contrary to Žižek's claim, Badiou (2007: 56, 148-64) does fully acknowledge the ethic of substraction (via the real object) in contradistinction to the ethic of purification (via the real Thing) in his discussion of the relations between art and politics.

25 The repressed site of organs without body can be found in Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaux, where he anticipates the conservatism of the psychoanalytic approach, and underestimates its progressive potential: "it is not at all a question of a fragmented, splintered body, of organs without the body (OwB). The BwO is exactly the opposite...The error of psychoanalysis was to understand BwO phenomena as regressions, projections, phantasies, in terms of an image of the body. As a result, it only grasps the flipside of the BwO and immediately substitutes family photos, childhood memories, and part-objects for a worldwide intensity map. It understands nothing about the egg nor about indefinite articles nor about the contemporaneosness of a continually self-constructing milieu" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 164).
problematic as a complex passage from “Life to (Self)Consciousness”, not a simple passage from matter to life. He shares with them the question of emergence, but does not explain it with the real-formal genesis alone; rather, he seeks to explain it with the passage from the real-formal genesis to the real-evental genesis. This passage leads him to ask “the properly materialist problem” of “how does subjectivity emerge in this reproductive cycle of genes.”

His position of genetic, mimetic fetishism, as we might call it, is guided by an effort to work through two philosophical traditions of the body, as one wishes to “become the body” whilst the other “possess the body”. But this means Žižek has presupposed a unique history of modern philosophy, which could have anticipated Deleuze’s contemporary philosophy irrespective of its ac/claimed novelty.

Second, since Descartes created the absent and “ticklish subject”, modern philosophy is destined to work through the duality of materialism and idealism into Žižek’s “dialectic materialism” which assumes “there is only void” (Žižek, 1999: 1-5; 2004a: 25, 88-89, 117). Premised on duality instead of dualism, the standard unified history of philosophy is then reread as a schizophrenic one, insofar as “the conceptual deployment/presentation (logos) fails, touches its limit, a narrative (mythos) has to intervene” (Žižek, 2004a: 74). Along the logocentric line, “the triad of paganism-Judaism-Christianity repeats itself twice, first as Spinoza-Kant-Hegel, then as Deleuze-Derrida-Lacan” (Žižek, 2004a: 33). In the mythocentric line, “[t]he triangle Spinoza-Hegel-Schelling is thus not as unambiguous as it may appear.” This means although “Spinoza rejoins Hegel” on issues of the “feminine assemblage” of reason and the conceptual truth of religion, “Spinoza is closer to Schelling” in their naïve belief in “true anti/fetishism” due to the ignorance of “the level of form” and the possibility of an Event (Žižek, 2004a: 54, 74-77).

Juxtaposing the two series, two things could be deduced. First, Žižek is well aware of the conditions of excessive logos or obscene superego manifested in contemporary Spinozism and Hegelianism. If Spinozism supplies the “ideology of late capitalism”, reducing consumers to un-reflexive marionettes, then Hegelianism provides the ideology of late nationalism, reducing
politicians to reflexive fools (Žižek, 1993: 216-19; 2004a: 34-41, 77-80). Moreover, Spinoza and Hegel cease to be logocentric and turn ambiguous because of the intervention of Schelling. Recall that, as we pointed out above, Schelling's true fetishism, the coincidental opposite of Spinoza's true anti-fetishism, has also been acknowledged, and its ideological manifestation is a "fetishist disavowal", arguably the critical notion of Žižek, subsisting the obscenity of extortionate rationality. In fact, a full view of the mythocentric series may be read from Žižek's reading of Schelling's drafts of Ages of the World. Here he re-serializes the trio (as Hegel-Spinoza-Schelling) to represent "three levels of freedom" within Schelling's meditations on the relations of God/choice, fate/decision and the act/will-of-nothing (Žižek, 1996: 68-70; 1997: 34-36). As a result, it is based on the passage from Kant's logocentrism to Schelling's mythocentrism that Žižek could reread the history of modern philosophy since "true philosophy begins" from them, which is a philosophy of the subjective truth, a truth of the subject implicated in substance (Kant's Thing and Schelling's Fate) (Žižek, 2004a: 45, 75). The effect is a restored continuity between modern and contemporary philosophies. And yet, this continuity is possible because it has posited the ultimate notion of truth as the passage of two incompatible perspectives or "the parallax view" (cf. Žižek, 2006). Now, where does this view come from?

Third, the restored continuity of modern and contemporary philosophies, including the continuity of two series within modern philosophy, is finally revealed as a retroactive causation (in place of their actual discontinuity) because of the post-philosophical turn made by Hegel and Lacan. This time, they herald a new philosophy of the subjective truth, a truth of the embodied subject separated from substance because of sexual difference. Žižek's theoretical challenge here is to analyze the passage of sexed consciousness from in-itself to for-itself in a syllogism, effectively, a retroactive movement of difference and repetition from the subject to substance and back with a piece of substance within the subject, or in terms of authorship, from Hegel/Lacan to Kant/Schelling and back (cf. Žižek, 1993; 2004a: 61-63). From this logical analysis, Deleuze may then be reread as an self-unaware Hegelian who misunderstands Hegel since their concepts miss and yet meet each other in
the coupling sites of morality and ethical politics, being and knowledge, and becoming and event (Žižek, 2004a: 45-75). Likewise, Deleuze may also be reread as a self-unaware Lacanian who misunderstands Lacan in the coupling sites of power and sexuality, body and language, and virtual reality and fantasy (Žižek, 2004a: 80-101). Hence, facing the charge that žižek himself misunderstands Deleuze, he would gladly admit that if so then he is a self-unaware Deleuzian.

In consequence, we stress the self-analytical nature of Žižek's analysis on behalf of him. It is apparent that his analysis comes from the fourth discourse of the analyst suggested by Hegel/Lacan. But he can no longer be deemed as a Hegelian or Lacanian in any doctrinal sense, since the Hegel/Lacan couple has fallen into the content of his syllogism, thereby only functioning to point toward a new philosophy of the subject. Thus, his analysis lies at the fourth order which is identical and yet not identical to the passage (in the three orders) of his analysis. And yet, calling the fourth discourse Žižekian still falls short of the mark, as if the reproduction of analytical subjects, which is already happening in our knowledge society, were a sign to the politics of Truth. Far from it, Žižek's work is to conduct a self-analysis of the analytical subject as nothing but a vessel of Truth. For him, analysts are true subjects because they are fearless and loving subjects constantly at odds with themselves in Truth, not because they are know-all prophets ahead of their times. As a result, the things Žižek deduces from Hegel/Lacan do not come from their all-embracing thought systems, but from the social-historical gaps reflected in their theoretical inconsistency, things which they know not they have done.

In this sense, Žižek (2004a: 102) summarizes the “three phases in the relationship of Lacan toward the tension between Kant and Hegel” combined with their political imaginations. 26 The first totalitarian phase follows the

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26 One should note that Žižek's interpretation of Lacan is heavily indebted to Jacques-Alain Miller. In fact, there are six “paradigms of jouissance” in Lacan's teachings. They evolve from the jouissance of imagination, signification, and impossibility to norm, discourse and non-rapport, each of which takes a standpoint with regard to whether and how a psychoanalytic subject comes into play with the Other (Miller, 2000a). The overall development leads to "the experience of the real," in which the speaking subject receives jouissance from the breakdown of the symbolic order in its dual senses of signification and embodiment. For later
Symbolic law supported by "the universal-Hegelian self-mediation". The second democratic phase pursues the Real desire posited by "the Kantian notion of the transcendental Thing". The third post-democratic phase passes to the Fictional drive through Schelling's vanishing mediation but finally because of Lacan's "additional twist, [as] he transposes the gap that separates all signifying traces from the Otherness into the immanence itself, as its inherent cut." As a whole, Žižek shows history after modern philosophy is much more complex than a quantitative-qualitative transition from Kant to Hegel as doctrinal Hegelians conceive it. His ideology critiques of contemporary cultural politics further demonstrate the far-reaching impact of a logical, as opposed to pre/phenomenological, retracing of the historical movement of ideas on post/Marxist philosophy and politics.

Fourth, after the non-linear history of modern philosophy is reconfigured, Žižek can then analyze empirical phenomena by operating on four orders of social-psychological coordination simultaneously, which, we suggest, sums up his post-psychoanalytic-Marxist philosophy. The zero degree of coordination refers to the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real coordinates in their projective non-relation in a "flat" juxtaposition, thereby posing the question of a scientific explanation of the Imaginary (individual egos in a world society). On the first degree (RIS), Žižek conducts a causal-logical analysis of the couple of the Symbolic and the Real from the Fictional view. For, "[m]uch more difficult than to denounce/unmask (what appears to us) reality as fiction is to recognize in 'real' reality the part of fiction" (Žižek, 2004a: 171). On the second degree (RIS x RIS with 6 possibilities), Žižek conducts a variable-perceptual analysis of the subset in the Real (consisting of objects, mathemes and the Thing) as opposed to the subset in the non-Real (consisting of images, symbols and Language) from the view of the subset in the Fictional (Žižek, 2004a: 103). The subset in the Fictional produces a minimal difference within the subset in the Real, which is manifested in the passage "from subjectivation to subjective destitution". Subjectivization refers to the

Lacan, the subject's "lack-of-being" is closer to Sartre's notion of "lack-in-being" than Lévi-Strauss' notion of structure. In other words, the subject is split from within, transcending its ego-consciousness in "the nihilation of classical subjectivity" (Miller, 2000b).
matheme of desire (in Lacanese: subject-Other, “desire is the desire of the Other”), whilst subjective destitution refers to the matheme of drive (in Lacanese: $-a$, the subject is nothing but a hole in “the object-cause of desire”). Accordingly, the minimal difference regards a “loop of enjoyment” based on sexual difference, that is, a loop between a masculine subject enjoying the Thing in the guise of the object and a feminine subject enjoying the object in place of the Thing (Žižek, 1993: 165-99; 1996: 92-98). Here it is crucial not to understand, like most critics do, Žižek’s notion of sexual difference in terms of bi/sexual dualism or dialectics, as if the question at stake were a moral crisis of masculinity or femininity, including their discontents, since his conception is derived from Lacan’s “formula of sexuation” (cf. Žižek, 1993: 45-80). Rather, Žižek’s problematic concerns, we suggest, the minimal difference between masculine renunciation and feminine renunciation in response to the question of sexuality as such. Therefore, on the third degree (which is the fourth order), Žižek conducts an ideological-conceptual analysis of two incompatible actualizations of love, one from desire and the other from drive (Žižek, 1997: 76-87). One might say that the sociological subject ended in law and love is complemented with a

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27 This is inherent in Lacan’s comic view of love as a missed encounter. A missed encounter of love occurs when one gives something which she doesn’t have to the other who doesn’t want it (Žižek, 2004b; cf. Baudrillard, 1990b[1983]: 134). In this sense, the two parties involved are not lovers to each other as individual human beings, but lovers with regard to the third element, an elusive something circulating in the scene of two,” as Badiou would say. The superfluous and yet indispensable something is schematized as objet petit a in Lacan’s formula of sexuation (Lacan, 1998[1972-73]: 78ff). On the first approach, this something stands in for something else. It refers ambiguously to the names of the father and the mother, the phallus and the thing, or the cause of desire and the consequence of drive. On the second approach, this something stands out as nothing. It formalizes the inexpressive void of the real at the momentary failure of representation.

28 Theoretically, the difference stems from Lacan’s reversal of Freud’s psychoanalysis of love to “the other side of psychoanalysis” in his later teachings from seminar XI to XX, given between 1964 and 1973 (Miller, 2003). In Freudian psychoanalysis, love refers to the transference of sexuality. Transference love posits that one's serial objects of love stand for sexual displacement of the lack of love from his/her parent(s). In this sense, love is an ideology, a mirror reflection to sexuality within the causal chain of automatism and conditioning, or contingency and determination (Miller, 1994: 7-11). However, Lacan turns love into a labyrinth in which the dissymmetrical positions of love (i.e. loving and being loved) are expressions of sexual difference (i.e. castration and the phallus) and similitude (i.e. castrated and castrating). This means “the love life of the woman” appears if “she constitutes a man as a phallus, all the while secretly castrating him” (Miller, 1994: 12). Therefore, love is not determined by vulgar materialism (i.e. the repression of sexuality and its discontents) but is over-determined by a threefold psychic economy of the drive, desire and demand (Miller, 1994: 13). In sum, Freud explains love away by his science and technology of sexuality, whereas Lacan reconsiders love as a matter of subjective faith and superstition (Miller, 2004).
psychological subject caused by desire and drive. If so, what matters in his social-psychological analysis is not an essentialist question of choice between the four states of the subject in the causal link, but an existential question of reconfiguring these subjective preconditions of actualization, shifting between their fundamental passageways. Simply put, the two passages, from Real desire to Virtual love on the one hand and from Fictional drive to True love on the other, symbolize two Orders of love via the necessary expression of two Forms of law.

But what do the above four things we learn from Žižek have anything to do with Durkheim? Intellectual kinships (from Kant to Deleuze) aside, Durkheimians should have noticed the corresponding points of relevance. Are they not basic Durkheimian questions in the making process of sociology, which are questions of causality (in a sense-organism), history (in a mythical logic), truth (in a sexed subject) and society (in an order of love)? We formalize these four points since they make up a hole, an inherent limit between Durkheim's philosophy and sociology often obscured by Durkheimians' over-contextualization.

6.2 Durkheim's social philosophy
Durkheim's proposal of a loving organism of society exceeded the modernist philosophy of law and love before him. As a matter of fact, the phenomenological-historical reading of German idealism from Kant to Hegel was the overbearing philosophical system from which Weber and Simmel spun off their forms of sociology. Even Marx wasn't immune from the German ideology when he praised Hegel against Comte. Having shown that Comte was not less "great", as Marx (in Marx & Engels, 1975, vol. 42: 292) claimed, than Hegel, we maintain that Durkheim learned his social philosophy from Comte.

Due to the wane of theoretical sociology in general and functionalist sociology in particular, the aforementioned reflexive condition has probably predominated over sociology instead of society in the past few decades. Within Durkheimian studies, in particular, the philosophical reading of
Durkheim receives a wider interest than the sociological reading. Precisely, this philosophical-sociological method is popular outside of American sociology where the Parsonian frame of social analysis has never lost ground (Alexander & Smith, 2005: 1-31; cf. Alexander, 1978; 1988; Camic, 1987; 1996). Most of these philosophical interpretations dismiss the Comtean tradition of Durkheim, placing him back to German idealism and its kinship, including materialism, realism and hyperrealism.

First, Durkheim could be read as a Kantian and/or a French Kantian by identifying idealism in the moral action of persons. By the instruction of Emile Boutroux, Durkheim's sociological project “from is to ought” shares with Kant the general concerns of developing a spirit of laws from the moral science, an organic self from the division of labour, a kingdom of ends from the republic of persons, and ethics of duty, good and autonomy from the religious cult of man (cf. Miller, 1996). If not a Kantian, Durkheim is at least a French Kantian for his debts to Renouvier’s neo-criticism are profound. Charles Renouvier’s political republicanism and scientific liberalism, it is argued, had an indelible influence on Durkheim’s beliefs in collective conscience and causal freedom (Stedman Jones, 2001: 87, 153). However, it’s more accurate to argue that Durkheim’s “Kantianism” had swerved from transcendentalism in crucial epistemological aspects since the reception of Kantian philosophy in France was channelled by eclectic spiritualism from Victor Cousin to Paul Janet (cf. Schmaus, 2004). In sum, these mutually-conflicting Kantian interpretations are symptomatic of a basic fact that Durkheim does not have a Kantian project to be carried out from is to ought (or, from meta/physics to morals), but rather, as we see below, a post-Kantian problematic to be worked through from the knowledge of being to an ethic of existence in a religious political sense.

Second, Durkheim could be read as a Hegelian and/or a French Hegelian by recognizing idealism in the ethical life of individuals. Durkheim shares with Hegel various universal themes, including objective reason, history, law, morality and politics, etc. (Knapp, 1985: 5; 1986: 596) Agreeing with Hegel’s concern for ethical life, in particular, his idea of organic solidarity reconciles
the dual logic of individual and society, body and mind, in a normatively bounded and yet historically open flow of becoming (Gangas, 2007). If not a Hegelian, Durkheim is at least a French Hegelian for his close friendship with Octave Hamelin (Strenski, 1989). Some question the link biographically and intellectually, but the intellectual points of contrast, such as reason versus reality, morality versus society, truth versus history, etc., reduce Durkheim to an anti-Cartesian empiricist, siding with the "evil genius" (Némedi in Némedi et al., 1995: 111). Hence, it remains plausible to read Durkheim and Hamelin together in a philosophical tradition of representationalism culminating at the end of the 19th century (Meštrović, 1988: 47-48). In fact, Durkheim has passed the classical dualism of empiricism and idealism, criticizing instead the "radical empiricism" of pragmatism by Hamelin's "radical idealism" (Durkheim, 1983: 34-35; however, see Némedi, 1995: 123-24, n. 8).

Third, Durkheim could be read as a Marxian, post-Marxian and/or anti-Marxian through a difficult crossover from idealism to political materialism. Coinciding with Marx, Durkheim has a radical socialist vision behind his political economic critique of the statist law and forced labour as an order of fatalism as well as anomie (cf. Pearce, 1989). Moreover, Durkheim leaves a lasting reminder to Marxism on the question of creating a "socialist morality" by disciplining, or rather self-controlling, the "passions and desires" of "human subjectivity and effectiveness, even for the revolutionary" (Pearce: 1989: 198, 205). The post/ Marxist appreciation of the potentials of Durkheim's thought is echoed in the Hegelian assessment: "what a Hegelian argument would look like immediately after Marx can be found in Marx's ethical sociology." (Gangas, 2007: 333, n. 12) In consequence, Durkheim's "collective subjectivism" produces a social ontology of the body and soul on the one hand and social epistemology of truth and ideology on the other. His sociology amounts to a position of "contradiction, ambiguity and aporia," shifting between pre-structuralism (social being) and post-structuralism (social knowledge) as a condition, and structuralism (social order) and critical structuralism (social change) as a result (cf. Lehmann, 1995).

Fourth, Durkheim could be read along with Mauss' symbolist anthropology,
radicalizing idealism into social realism between words and things. On the one hand, if a homological structure could be transposed on Saussure’s linguistic order (of la langue), Durkheim-Mauss’ social order (of primitive classification), and Mauss’ symbolic order (of the gift), then Durkheim’s notion of the social fact might be conceived as social discourses, the “sacred effect of language” (Gane, 1992: 61-84). Believing an order of words on top of things reveals a Christian approach to realism (based on grace), according to which social realities, from complex and violent to tacit and charitable characters, are predicated on a holistic human being (cf. Mellor, 2004). On the other hand, if heterogeneous cultures could be collected from the comparative religious studies of Sylvain Lévi, Mauss’ “second uncle” and Durkheim’s “alter ego”, then the Durkheimian notion of religion might be perceived as material, spatial and temporal existences, the “embodied sacred things” (Strenski, 1997: 116-48). Obeying a state of things at the bottom of words betrays a Judaic approach to realism (based on legalism), according to which social realities are “structured” in a metamorphic web of societies composed by singular objects. Contrary to appearance, however, the cultural successors to this legalist realism are not to be found in the seriousness of Cartesian reason and Kantian thing-in-itself, but in the festiveness of Rabelaisian playground of things and Wundtian “l’ école des choses” greatly admired by Durkheim (Alun Jones, 1999: 58-68, 172-231).

Fifth, Durkheim could be read along with Bergson’s vitalist philosophy, inverting idealism into psychological hyperrealism between selves and the other. It is argued that the works of Durkheim and Bergson are twin modern sources of postmodernism in anticipating the writings of Deleuze, Foucault, Baudrillard and Derrida. Both generations of theorists transfer their anxiety about the contested situation of the intellectual to the thinking of (the disappearance of) the sacred in society (Riley, 2002). First, Durkheim and Bergson are reconciled because of Durkheim’s compromised idea of “the left or impure sacred” developed alongside the anthropological studies of Mauss, Hubert and Hertz. Then, the modern sacred and the postmodern sacred are correlated through “the transference of these essentially Durkheimian ideas of the sacred to some of the students of Mauss during the 1930s, most
particularly to Bataille, Caillois and Leiris and other members of le Collège de Sociologie and other groups of the literary and artistic avant-guard of the interwar years" (Riley, 2002: 251, 258). However, before the conceptual confusions between religion, magic and mysticism are clarified theoretically and empirically, this plausible lineage should be regarded as an institutional-ideological transference rather than intellectual-philosophical confluence. At bottom, Durkheim's symbolist thought belongs to "a variant on the religious reformist trends of his time", which is neither "a species of avant-guard thinking mirrored in the radical artistic and literary movements such as the symbolist movement", nor "an anticipation of the religious social radicalism of self-appointed successors of Durkheim such as le College de Sociologie" (Strenksi, 1997: 153).

Virtually all interpretations above distance Comte from Durkheim's social philosophy. On the first approach, they appear quite fair to point out the mythmaker Parsons whilst refuting the myth of a positivist Durkheim. But early Parsons' (1937) reading of Durkheim as a positivist turned idealist is not a mistake; his mistake lies in not being positivist enough with regard to his analytic realism. He fails to acknowledge that Durkheim's positivism is neither confined to his early work nor confined to Comte's early work. As for commentators in the shadow of German idealism, they simply risk throwing the baby out of the bathwater, missing a real Comtean legacy purified by Durkheim. On the second approach, they are truly unfair to Parsons since he consistently seeks to apply or translate Durkheim's theory, or any other theory, to an analysis of modern society. Without respecting his sociological method of reading, one cannot appreciate later Parsons' "evolutionary" reinterpretation of Durkheim's *Elementary Forms* in the human condition rather than social system (Parsons, 1937: 640-96; 1973: 156-80).

Acknowledging Bellah's classic essay on Durkheim, later Parsons had outlined his evolutionary theory of general human action by 1970, jointly guiding the value orientation of American sociology to study modern society as a cybernetic system of moral individualism and civic religion (Bellah, 1959; Parsons, 1970). At this stage, one might recall the real myth of Parsons
behind the whole demythologization of the positivist Durkheim. We are referring to Dennis Wrong's 1961 sloppy criticism of Parsons for presenting an 'over-socialized image of man'. We suggest a source of confusion lies in an inadequate differential understanding of American sociology represented by Parsons and Bellah. In fact, Bellah (1959: 451-52) confuses Durkheim's 'genetic method' for a 'historical method', albeit his loose idea of history has excluded historicism. In this context, Durkheim's proposal of 'comparative sociology' is intended to provide a methodological precondition of anthropology rather than history. It is a structural method in place of Comte's historical method insofar as genetic comparisons can be generalized from 'several societies of the same species' to 'several distinct social species' (Durkheim, 1982[1895]: 156-58). This explains why Durkheim argues against the materialist concept of history, insisting on religion as the base of economy, and also why he argues against the empiricist concept of history, describing causal relationships as universal laws 'regardless of time and place' (Durkheim, 1982[1897]: 173; 1982[1908]: 215). In sum, while Bellah is pulled by a pre/Comtean-Durkheimian method of historical evolution, Parsons is pushed to a post/Comtean-Durkheimian method of genetic evolution (ironically through his affirmative reading of Bellah's essay).29

For Parsons (1973: 167-71), Durkheim's study of religion explores, besides cognitive and normative symbolizations, the "expressive" component of human action "as a generalized medium of interchange anchored primarily in social system but specifically mediating primary interchanges with both personality and cultural systems". This affective category is expressed in the contexts of sense (of appetite), faith (in a community of effervescence) and ritual (by symbols of blood and eating). Moreover, Durkheim's study of religion is not just social-cultural but rather scientific, since it proves that religion is a "general system of action" constitutive of the code within behaviour organisms, a science comparable to contemporary genetic biology unforeseen by evolutionary biology in Durkheim's time (Parsons, 1973: 160-

29 More ironically, Bellah-Durkheim's evolutionary thesis of moral individualism is inherited by the contemporary arch anti-Parsonian, Giddens, whose interpretation of Durkheim favours the lectures of morality, education and politics in Durkheim's Bordeaux years (Giddens, 1978: 16-19, 49-50, 63-64, 80-82).
In sum, Parsons (1973: 161-62) eventually seizes the perverse core in Comte-Durkheim's positivism (that is fetishism) at the revelation that free will lies in the genes. Foreign to post-idealist rationality (excluding the path from Fichte to Schelling), the conundrum of legalism and voluntarism does not find its solution in the external bound of legalism, but in an internal limit of voluntarism itself.  

All post/idealist interpretations of Durkheim, albeit contextually or reflexively reasonable in their own right, cannot invalidate Parsons' self-evident thesis that Durkheim's notion of conscience collective completes the evolution of French subjectivism from Descartes through Rousseau to Comte (Parsons, 1968: 313-14). This suggests that a quasi-essentialist dimension survives in Durkheim's social philosophy between Descartes and Kant. Indeed, it could be found in Spinoza's eternal conception (sub specie aeternitatis) if one 'examine[s] the doctrine of categories and the problem of totality in the works of Aristotle, Bacon, Spinoza, Kant and Renouvier.' (Neilsen, 1999: 19, 33) In the long run, 'despite Durkheim's attachment to Aristotle, Renouvier and others, the most systematic comparison is with the work of Spinoza.' (Neilsen, 1999: 242) Representing 'political liberalism of their respective eras,' 'Durkheim and Spinoza forge monistically oriented philosophies within the contexts of civilizational encounter, philosophies which retain their dual commitments to both tradition and modernity.' (Neilsen, 1999: 242-43) If such is the case, then Schelling's Spinozist idealism follows closely behind (cf. Durkheim, 2004: 33, 38).

Disturbed by "pure" philosophical comparisons, philosophical-sociologists might still wonder about the immediate context of Durkheim's social philosophy. By 1851, a scientific model of French philosophy had been

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30 This is where Meštrović (1988) errs in placing Durkheim in the legacy of Schopenhauer, since essentialist voluntarism falls in complicity with constructive legalism. In fact, Durkheim does not accept a bleak world of representation dictated by wanton will. At the level of the will, he rejects Schopenhauer's theoretical claim, "pleasure is simply the absence of pain", on three accounts: there is a) a non-violent need of pleasure, b) a continuous act of pleasure, and c) a needless cause of pleasure (Durkheim, 2004: 61). At the representational level, he refutes "empirical monism" in addition to "idealistic monism", which regards man as "the creator of his own suffering" (Durkheim, 1960b: 330-31).
established by Main de Biran's psychology and Comte's biology as they betrayed from Cousin's eclectic circle and Saint-Simon's socialist circle, respectively. Since then, the model was elaborated by the subsequent philosophical generation, culminating in Bergson's psychological philosophy and Durkheim's social philosophy. French Kantians and Hegelians were subjected to this general trend rather than subjugating it when they imported German ideas (cf. Gunn, 1922). For Durkheim, therefore, the object of philosophy is individual consciousness, psychological states of time-space, whereas the object of sociology is collective representation, social facts as things. Both philosophy and sociology are regarded as a science, since each study rests on a set of facts no less factual than positive sciences. Simply put, they open up two extra orders of "objectivity" (Durkheim, 1974: 1-34; 1982: 50-59; 2004: 33-35). In light of this, Durkheim's social philosophy could be regarded as the weakest link between psychology which he opposes and sociology which he supports.

More systematic than his philosophical essays on representations, judgments and human nature, the elementary forms of Durkheim's social philosophy can be generalized from his Sens lectures delivered in 1883-84 and pragmatism lectures delivered in 1913-14 (Durkheim, 1983; 2004). Meanwhile, these texts "should be understood in the context of his religious politics," considering that a constant battle of secular rationalities of the state and the church was fought within Durkheim's academic community (Gross, 1997: 142, italics mine). In the light of this, Durkheim's social philosophy could be regarded as the weakest link between psychology which he opposes and sociology which he supports.

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31 Durkheim's students, biographers and commentators cannot give us any consistent picture about the exact philosophical relation between Bergson and Durkheim. Both men had similar racial, religious, family and educational backgrounds, allowing one to conduct a comparative psycho- or cultural analysis (cf. Greenberg, 1976; Strenski, 1997). Larger contextual examinations even show that their intellectual projects and impacts entwine in a more complex manner than both men were willing to admit at the time (cf. Lalande, 1925; Bouglé in Durkheim, 1974; Peyre, 1980: 14; Lukes, 1973: 52, 495, 505; Pearce, 1997: 24-26; Gross, 1997; Riley, 2002).

32 In addition to phylogenetic and ontogenetic contexts of analysis which we have seen in the previous footnote, a sociogenetic analysis prefer to draw a sharp contrast between Bergson and Durkheim in the context of institutional facts sui generis, including clusters, personalities, colleges and faculties (cf. Clark, 1973; Greenberg, 1981; Welsz, 1983; Grogin, 1988). These analysts are Durkheimians who "love" Durkheim too much (arguably the most) to acknowledge Durkheim's religious politics in his original texts (let alone Bergson's).
again and again some perennial dualities in theology and philosophy, such as God and world, body and soul, consciousness and perception, truth and reality, reality and thought, thought and action, etc. Accordingly, if his statement of human nature is said to finalize "a modulated dualism set within an implicit monism" (Neilsen, 1999: 223), then one must add that his social philosophy reinstates a modulated monism set within an implicit duality. For, the material, spatial and temporal causalities of fate and freedom, law and will, representation and consciousness, or science and conscience in Durkheim's social philosophy can no longer be determined by logocentrism or mythocentrism alone. After all, it is in the spirit of Comte's narrative logic that Durkheim advances a mythical logic of history, a genetic evolution of history caused by the sense-event: "consciousness is therefore not a function with the role of directing the movements of the body, but the organism knowing itself, and solely by virtue of the fact that organism knows itself, we can say that something new occurs" (Durkheim, 1982: 82-83).

6.3 Durkheim's sociology
Durkheim's sociology is qualified for the crown of science because it traverses a passage of truth from logocentrism to mythocentrism and back. Differentiated from his social philosophy, the sociological figures which carry this passage of truth ask the question of education. Against post/idealist understandings, we shall argue that Durkheim does not support education by morals and/or opinions, but education by a truth subtracted from them. One is educated by the truth of love rather like heroes and heroines in Goethe's Buildungsroman. Moreover, Durkheim does not conceive love as an effect of human values and/or discourses, but love as a sense-event organized materially, spatially and temporally. Durkheim never promises us a sociology of love, not even a comparative-cultural one (as Weber does), but love in Durkheim's sociology can be scientifically symbolized through three degrees of causality. First, a temporal causality is expressed in the mediated, generational relation between children and adults. Second, a spatial causality is situated in the immediate, mimetic relation between nature and society. Third, a material causality is embedded in the de/mediated, ritualistic relation between women and men. At every degree, a question of the social organism
recurs in different perspectives from a neuter body through sexual organs to
the de/sexed bodily fluid, blood. The question is not supposed to be
interpreted contextually as an "analogy" of any empirical society in modernity
from a critical or ambivalent standpoint, but is to be read textually as a literal
truth in the structure of a fiction. In short, Durkheim symbolizes society in an
organism of love by a mythical logic.

Before entering the three degrees of causality of love in education, we should
understand Durkheim's general theory of education in his Sorbonne lectures
delivered in 1902-03. He lays out a moral theory with relevant educational
practices, explicating how a child can be socialized by imparting a feeling of
duty in the mind, the good in the heart, and autonomy in the will. In theory, he
outlines three elements of morality, including the spirit of discipline by rules,
attachment to social groups, and self-determination of the self (Durkheim,
1961: part I). In practice, he canvases three aspects of education, which
consist of reasoning against corporeal punishment and rewards, developing
altruism in the school environment and cultivating judgment by discrimination
between scientific and non-scientific knowledge (Durkheim, 1961: part II). We
focus on his moral theory.

On the one hand, Durkheim rejects the liberal-Marxist idea of discipline based
on control, that is, discipline understood as "a violation of a man's natural
constitution" by "impeding his unrestricted development". On the contrary, a
limitless self is "a sign of disease", a "view of the infinite" bound to go from
aspiration to anguish like "Goethe's Faust". His reason is a "reserve of vital
energy" applies "for all forms of human conduct and, even more generally, for
all kinds of biological behaviour," including survival ("amount of nourishment"),
activity (walking and repose), "general sentiments" ("love of animals, even
love of others") and "intellectual life" ("quantity of knowledge") (Durkheim,
1961: 38-40). Nevertheless, discipline could be checked by "criticism or
reflection, the agents par excellence of all change", since "conformity must not
be pushed to the point where it completely captures intelligence" (Durkheim,
1961: 52). As such, revolutionary heroes like Christ and Socrates are not anti-
disciplinary rebels, for "we must take care not to confuse two very different
feelings: the need to substitute a new regulation for an old one; and the impatience with all rules, the abhorrence of all discipline" (Durkheim, 1961: 53). In result, a distinction between normality and pathology is transversal to all conditions since all discipline "regularizes" its means and "constrains" its goals (Durkheim, 1961: 47).

On the other hand, Durkheim refutes the liberal-Marxist idea of attachment based on self-interest, since self-interest does not equal to self-worth: "if each individual taken separately has no moral worth, the sum total of individuals can scarcely have more. The sum of zeros is, and can only be, equal to zero." Accordingly, interest of the self and sacrifice to the other are both sides of the same coin, since “the practice of philanthropy is a virtue for some. Morality on the other hand, must by definition be common and accessible to all. Thus, one can scarcely see in sacrifice or in the devotion of person to person the kind of act we call moral” (Durkheim, 1961: 58-59). In result, “above and beyond me as a conscious being, above and beyond those sentient beings who are other individual human beings, there is nothing else save that sentient being that is society. By this I mean anything that is a human group, the family as well as the nation, and humanity” (Durkheim 1961: 59).

These groups are called “permanent and organized crowds” in a physiological-psychological sense, insofar as “[t]he organism itself is something other than a sum of its cells, so is society a psychic being that has its own particular way of thought, feeling, and action...” (Durkheim, 1961: 62, 65). Yet there is a “quite unintelligible” question about “renunciation of the self” (Durkheim, 1961: 66). Durkheim (1961: 67) wishes to explain “why we must regard society as desirable in and of itself and not only to the extent that it is useful to the individual.” His general reply refutes “the hoary habits of thinking” social-individual dualism as “a deceptive appearance”. Examples of suicide, language and religion are discussed to explicate the interpenetration of society and individuals in production of an actual person who “is not only a being who disciplines himself” but “also a system of ideas, of feelings, of habits and tendencies, a consciousness that has a content” (Durkheim, 1961: 67-73).
His specific reply begins from the social fact of familism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, these groups can never replace one another since "each has its function", and yet they can be stratified in "different phases of our social and moral evolution, stages that prepare for, and build upon, one another" (Durkheim, 1961: 74). On the other hand, the political society has a primacy over the other groups, and yet nationalism is "the limiting case" which "most closely approximates the society of mankind", if and only if "the inflated and jealous state knows no rules other than those directed toward its own interest" (Durkheim, 1961: 81). Here Durkheim over-identifies "the internal improvement of society" with "the general interest of humanity" according to a "centrifugal" rule of morality, capable of ruling "the state [to] commit itself as its main goal not to expanding, in a material sense, to the detriment of its neighbours" (Durkheim, 1961: 77). Given the case, his normative typology of nations, which distinguishes the "scientific, artistic, and pacific" from the "aggressive, military", obscures some realistic conflicts between national morality and its interest in an international division of labour. But Durkheim is no idealist since he is fully aware of the problem revolved around the distinct bodies of human groups in the making of a world society. The nation-state is given primacy over humanity because "there is no constituted society...a social organism" in mankind, whereas "the state is actually the most highly organized form of human organization in existence" (Durkheim, 1961: 76). One might argue that Durkheim's evolutionary image of society is torn between the present body of nation-states and the future spirit of humanity, whilst assuming the familial past. Nonetheless, his moral spirit of humanity is determined by the social body more than historical time because the fundamental rule of his argument posits that a body once born (family and nation-state) doesn't truly die, and a body yet to be born (humanity) doesn't have a real life.

In sum, discipline and attachment are two moral aspects in society, whose authority doesn't come from extra/ordinary individuals, but from "superhuman beings" embodied in the collective conscience of beliefs and sentiments. One can observe these beings by the "organization of society", since even when
the "silent functioning of the internal organs" may "escape us", "the effects get through to us" (Durkheim, 1961: 86-93). Therefore, virtues of duty and good turn into "a pair of abstractions" since "they altogether lack that which is needed to touch the heart and mind – above all, the minds and hearts of children." These "fuzzy concepts" are insubstantial "moving forces of conduct" composed of "emotional language", which "must be put in contact with the concrete and living realities" (Durkheim 1961: 94). Durkheim (1961: 98) does not confound the ideas of duty and good for "a single unity", but regards them as "the one or the other view of society", so that "we act out of respect for duty or through a desire of the good." Irrespective of conceptual integration, they "are still different things", designating two types of people (Durkheim, 1961: 99). One is the Kantian man characterized "by self-control and a tendency to withdraw", whereas the other is "the loving hearts, the ardent and generous souls...these passionate men" characterized "by a love of spending themselves, by an outward expansiveness...by active and creative energy" (Durkheim, 1961: 100). Furthermore, the two types of moral individuals can be generalized into collective sentiments. Durkheim (1961: 101) argues that in times of stasis and integration, "such as that of Louis XIV or that of Augustus", "the preference for rule and order is naturally preponderant". By contrast, "in times of flux and change," "the spirit of sacrifice and devotion" becomes the salient morality. As a whole, discipline and attachment form the duality of law and desire, not love, since the rule of duty and good will are pushed and pulled by the Other. They are not sufficient to make up a social being in love: the third element is required, self-determination of the will.

The introduction of the third "element sui generis of morality" is far from an anthropomorphosis of the Other into the Self. Durkheim never goes so far as to count on ethical individuals as the basis of a society of lifestyles, for it would be a nominal rather than a real society. In fact, he proposes "only a provisional approximation of moral reality" by giving "some feeling for this richness and complexity." "Morality is a preeminently human thing" which "embraces apparent contradictions" to appear idealistic and realistic at once (Durkheim, 1961: 122-26). He feels the urgency to "develop a spirit" matching with "the establishment of appropriate institutions", social bodies prompted by
"[n]ew ideas of justice and solidarity" (Durkheim, 1961: 102-03). Precisely, he asks how the body and the spirit could be related to resolve the duality of law and desire, finally knowing the social being of morality rationally and scientifically.

Durkheim's rational morality seeks to be scientific in later Comte's sense of a subjective synthesis of theology and metaphysics within positivism. On the first approach, he translates Judaic-Christian theology positively by identifying the "religious symbolism" of God, save God's essence, with the collective society, society understood as an object of both being and becoming, exteriority and interiority. This moral argument of society, as we call it, echoes his moral argument of the existence of God (Durkheim, 1961: 103-07; 2004: 302-08). In explicit terms, "[a]ll that we needed was to substitute for the conception of a supernatural being the empirical idea of a directly observable being, which is society - provided that we do not view society as an arithmetic sum of individuals, but as a new personality distinct from individual personalities" (Durkheim, 1961: 104). As a result of his positive theology, "[a] society remains, in some measure, the same throughout all the course of its existence. Throughout the changing conditions to which it is subject, there is a basic character that is always the same" (Durkheim, 1961: 106).

On the second approach, Durkheim (1961: 108) translates Kant's metaphysical morals positively by embodying the "double necessity" of constraint and autonomy in the dualism of human nature. With this explicit move back to Descartes and Pascal, he puts forward a scientific argument of morality, claiming to "resolve" the "contradiction between the good and the obligatory, between the individual and group" by "the dualism of our nature: autonomy is the product of reasoned will, heteronomy is the product of the senses" (Durkheim, 1961: 109-111; cf. 1960b). Suggesting a positive dualism of human nature as an answer to the abstract duality of society, he brings the philosophical question of the will's autonomy down to a sociological question of "effective autonomy", "progressive autonomy", or "enlightened allegiance" (voluntary conformity) (Durkheim, 1961: 114-15). In a metaphysical world with nobody involved, Kant can safely argue "the will is autonomous", to which
Durkheim questions "by themselves, moral laws are not necessarily imperative" (Durkheim, 1961: 109, 113). But if we live in a human society with bodies of groups and individuals, then "science is the wellspring of our autonomy", "thought is the liberator of will", and "we must have knowledge, as clear and complete an awareness as possible of the reasons of our conduct" (Durkheim, 1961: 116, 119-20).

On the third approach, Durkheim's "science of morality" is neither a rationalist science (boasting "man's reason as the legislator"), nor a humanist morality (imagining "morality is a personal artifact"), but a moral science consisted of "a system of symbolic representations" to "adequately express" nature and society, "just like the mathematician can determine the relationships between magnitudes through a simple mental calculation and without having to observe the actual relationships of such magnitudes they obtain outside of him" (Durkheim, 1961: 114-15, 119). By the symbiosis of natural objects with subjects on the pole of science, and social beings with things on the pole of humanity, the third element of morality turns out to be more than just achieving autonomy, but rather acquiring "intelligence". In an implicit move to Spinoza, morality can be enriched from "a function of the act", intentional or not, to a function of knowledge, achieving a deeper awareness "into the nature of things – the symbolic explanation of the rule itself, its causes and reasons for being" (Durkheim, 1961: 120). In sum, moral education leads one to a revelation of some total "knowledge of nature", "an ideal limit that we approach asymptotically" (Durkheim, 1961: 116). As if to preempt Bergson's creative evolution with revelatory evolution, however paradoxical it might sound, Durkheim holds a human society can will against its free but blind will through a production of the self in order to love only intelligible laws.desires of the Other.

Now one could read Durkheim's remaining discussions of the three aspects of education as a tutor's manual advising practical issues deduced from his moral theory. Specifically, children learn to know and love his morality after they are initiated to a set of proper relations between pupils and their tutors, pupils and other pupils, and pupils and kinds of knowledge under instruction.
However, it is far from a functional enforcement of a theory of socialization by teachers who are agents of socialization. Between theory and practice, in fact, there is a chapter considering basic observations of children's behaviours and temperaments before advices to the above practical circumstances are given.\footnote{The detour to discover some facts about children's nature protects his scientific application from the ideological concerns of his time. Due to further complications caused by this detour, we will not go on to provide a systematic analysis. Nonetheless, one can see the apparent problem of education here regards a mediated relation between children and adults, expressing a temporal causality of love. In this regard, a more concise account could be drawn from his notes on "childhood" published in 1911, and lecture outlines entitled "Rousseau on educational theory" published posthumously in 1919.}

Durkheim (1979: 149-53) defines childhood as a period of growth, in which a child expresses his/her physical, mental and moral fragility as well as potentials. At once weak and strong, a child is equivalent to a capricious "force for change" in a "constant process of renewal", and yet the "free movement and unhindered development" remains "the victim of circumstances". Accordingly, capricious change includes rather than excludes constancy. This means the political instability of a child induces him to appear "a sort of anarchist, ignorant of all rules, restraints and consequences", and "also a little traditionalist, even a stick-in-the-mud." By contrast, only an individual who has "self-control, the power to contain, regulate and overcome oneself" is considered to undergo a "veritable metamorphosis". Lacking a veritable order to make a change, a child's love-fear complex for novelty and change is destined to a movement of repetition, "a force of action" with "nothing to counterbalance it". "For this reason, it is very easy to make the child acquire habits" (Durkheim, 1979: 153-54). In result, a child's "formation of character and will" requires "a taste of regularity" which "is not yet respect for rule and duty", but "manic routine" or "mechanic order". Paradoxically, "nature does in fact place in our hands the means necessary for transcending it" (Durkheim, 1979: 154).

Furthermore, Durkheim reads Rousseau's Emile to the purpose. In fact, Durkheim's approach to education is closer to Rousseau than Kant whose philosophy is said to agree more with Spencer's on the primacy of self-interest.
Discarding the German lens of Rousseau who idealizes either romantic *nature* (anti-Kantian) or enlightened *culture* (Kantian), Durkheim rightly applies Rousseau's theory of savage education in human *civilization* to his theory of moral education. We could divide Durkheim's outlines of Rousseau's educational theory in three parts.

First, education has a "positive value", which isn't based on socialization in a critical or reflexive sense, such as class reproduction, state control, and value indoctrination, but on socialization in a paradoxical sense of denaturing and naturalization, or simply a social simulation of nature. Inasmuch as "the essential elements of man" can be ultimately found in "the nature of things", there is "nothing to study" but to "look for the child in the child" (Durkheim, 1979: 164-70).

Second, education has a "negative morality", which is "to educate man by things" where "the sentiment of absolute necessity stems from". Man's "superfluous powers" can be curbed when he is "surrounded by things", so that he personally experiences "the feeling of necessity" and "the feeling of resistance". The natural learning with "no restriction of movement" is analogous to natural healing with "no doctor" (Durkheim, 1979: 171-73, 176). The "action of things" "pre-forms" "a positive effect" distinguished from the commands of others' opinion and will (Durkheim, 1979: 183, 185). On the one hand, "opinion does not express things as they are. lt denatures them. It is an artificial thing" (Durkheim, 1979: 175). On the other hand, "human will must be disregarded" because it "superimposes on the real world a world of fiction and imagination" (Durkheim, 1979: 183). In sum, finite things "act from necessity, impersonality", stopping us from doing otherwise and making us obey "inflexible laws" with "no choice" (Durkheim, 1979: 177-78). The injunction of things says "let the curb be the force, not authority" (Durkheim, 1979: 178). Rejecting the commands of obstinate opinion and arbitrary will, man knows "true freedom" by "doing what one can" in "the feeling of the impossible" (Durkheim, 1979: 173-174).

Third, education has a "negative relation", which requires no obedience, no
punishment, no lessons, and no action of the child involving the tutor, for the tutor always remains aloof (Durkheim 1979: 177). Tutor and pupil are not involved in a contiguously interpersonal relationship of authority, but rather a natural-social relation intermitted by the action of things. Yet, this is not to say there is no personal master or action; rather, there is "no direct action. But not all action is forbidden. Tutor is the master of things; is behind them...the tutor must speak as things." In short, a pupil "must live surrounded by things", not by people (Durkheim, 1979: 179, 181). To sum up, Durkheim's moral theory practices "negative education", which seeks to produce a "positive value" of nature in society by developing a "negative morality" of "beings limited by things", "invincible and legitimate things", in a "negative relation" of "no fusion" between human beings (Durkheim, 1979: 186-94).

However, a temporal causality of love expressed in the mediated, generational relation between children and adults assumes that society reproduces itself in a neuter body independent from natural history. As such, the first degree of causality begs the question about the social organization of time by the natural force of things. In the pervious analysis, we have seen that his repetitive effort is to present a valid proof of this force, only manifested differently in his scientific theory of law and symbolic theory of religion. We stressed that the notion of force in his theory of religion posits a speculative non/identity of natural religion and moral society. But we haven't studied the relation of nature and society directly from the scientific view of law. Thus, it is worth consulting Durkheim's Latin thesis on Montesquieu finished in 1893, the same year as his main doctoral thesis The Division of Labour in Society, and his Bordeaux lectures on Rousseau delivered before 1901 and first appeared posthumously in 1918. Here post/idealistic interpretations interested in speculating Durkheim's political position from his academic- and religious-political contexts ironically fall back on a pre- or anti-Durkheimian ground, for they tend to dis/miss the scientific lessons Durkheim draw from Montesquieu's and Rousseau's explicitly political writings.

By and large, Durkheim seeks to reduce an original model of social science mainly from Montesquieu's Spirit of Law and Rousseau's Social Contract. He
argues carefully the potentials and limitations of their ideas, developing, above all, a scientific re-conception of "law" and "nature" to subsist a typological study of societies as real things. From Montesquieiu's case, Durkheim explores the conditions (of social things, types, laws, and descriptions), fields (of laws and ethics), societal classification (by sovereign powers) and methods (of deduction, experiment, comparison, induction and history) a social science is supposed to have. In Rousseau's case, the state of nature and origin of societies, the body politic and general sovereignty, and finally general and particular laws are further examined. According to Durkheim's oblique logocentric series from Descartes to Comte, Montesquieiu and Rousseau are two key figures of transition in the making of a true social science, insofar as they swerve from the circular deadlock of utilitarian interests and humanist values in Hobbes' and Kant's political philosophy.

For Durkheim, Montesquieiu surmounts the twin traditions in the philosophy of natural laws based on "deliberate will of human beings" and "general notion of man". Montesquieiu "declares not only the general laws, but also the whole system of laws, past and present, to be 'natural'. However, he derives the laws from the 'nature' not of man but of the social organism" (Durkheim, 1960c: 20-21). Specifically, "he does not separate law from morality, trade, religion, etc...Widely as they may differ, all these phenomena express the life of a given society. They are elements or organs of the social organism" (Durkheim, 1960c: 56). Nonetheless, he has problems justifying a division of law and ethics on the one hand and a mixture of law and rule (given by a lawgiver) on the other. These problems suggest Montesquieiu still compromises with the traditional views due to his failure to extend the field of natural laws to "the whole of social existence" (Durkheim, 1960c: 22-23, 48-49). Since "he also applies the word laws to relations between ideas rather than between things", Montesquieiu lacks Comte's progressive method of history (Durkheim, 1960c: 59, 63).

In a concrete analysis, Montesquieiu commits a confusion of double standards in his classification of societies which are republic (city-states of antiquity and the Middle Ages), monarchy (modern European nations) and despotism.
(Oriental empires). After rejecting Aristotle's criterion of classification based on number of rulers, Montesquieu's criterion still wavers between "the number, arrangement, and cohesion of their component parts" and "the nature of the sovereign authority", or "forms of government" (Durkheim, 1960c: 26, 32-33). Against the latter criterion, Durkheim gives an extended analysis of these societies based on the former. In terms of social sentiment, a republic is based on virtue; monarchy on honor (or self-love); despotism on fear. In terms of social structure, a republic is based on the unity of an undifferentiated body; monarchy on the division of labour in which "the classes — or, to use a contemporary term, the organs — of the social body limit not only to the authority of the prince but each other as well"; despotism on "the aspect of a monster, in which only the head is alive, having absorbed all the energies of the organism". In terms of social power, a republic is based on individual equality with no "antagonistic parties", monarchy asks for collective "political freedom", and despotism is sustained by people being "equal in the state of servitude" except the ruler (Durkheim, 1960c: 27-32). Yet, it's crucial to note that Durkheim refuses to endorse any form of society, let alone any form of government in this typology. In fact, this is exactly his point of criticism, insofar as Montesquieu biases against despotism, unable to respect that "each type has its own perfect form." Besides, he explicitly warns us not to mistake Montesquieu's republican society for "present-day France" (Durkheim, 1960c: 25, 62). Thus it is more apt to say that Durkheim's theory of society assimilates the symbolic force of his contemporary society without conforming to any secular powers of that society. Meanwhile, this means Montesquieu's scientific re-conception of law is not sufficient to observe societal types. Durkheim has also to re-conceive the relation between nature and society by recourse to Rousseau's miraculous account.

For Durkheim (1960c: 73), Rousseau's state of nature "definitely continued to reject Hobbes' pessimism about the presocietal man." On the other side, Rousseau's sovereign power also surpasses Kant's moral law by making itself no exception from limits: when the sovereign power infringes upon the rights of the citizens, it must be committed "by individuals who have taken its place and usurped its authority. Hence there is no obligation to obey (compare with
Kant)" (Durkheim, 1960c: 115). In result, "society is nothing if not a single
definite body distinct from its parts", an organicist view superior to Spencer's
"superficial relationships" of self-interest in a vague connection with sympathy
(Durkheim, 1960c: 83-84). However, Durkheim has to maintain Rousseau's
dual principles of individualist reflection and socialist compassion without
falling into self-contradictions committed by Rousseau (Durkheim, 1960c: 73,
85). Hence he questions "if, as assumed by Rousseau, Montesquieu, and
nearly all thinkers up to Comte (and even Spencer relapses in to the
traditional confusion), nature ends with the individual, then everything that
goes beyond the individual is bound to be artificial." (Durkheim, 1960c: 66)
Through defending Rousseau against Rousseau, Durkheim intends to prove
that nature ends with the social.

Durkheim (1960c: 137) proposes a logical re-description against the common
historical interpretation of Rousseau, while concluding that "just as he fails to
explain how social life, even in its imperfect historical forms, could come into
being, he has great difficulty in showing how it can possibly cast off its
imperfections and establish itself on a logical basis." In fact, his logical reading
of Rousseau's account of the origin of societies from the state of nature bears
a striking resemblance to Schelling's account of the genesis of time from
eternity. "It is as though, in metaphysics, after assuming the subject to be self-
sufficient, we should attempt to deduce the object from it" (Durkheim, 1960c:
80). "Rousseau's solution is fraught with contradictions. But this is far from
specious" (Durkheim, 1960c: 80). "One reason for not imputing to Rousseau
the radical pessimism that has been attributed to him is the germ of social
existence is inherent in the state of nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 90).

Deconstructing Rousseau's text closely, Durkheim (1960c: 67) argues "the
state of nature should be taken not as historical truths but as hypothetical,
conditional speculations." Natural man's "desires are satisfied. He cannot
covert what he does not have...At that state of his development, he was not
unsocial but asocial...he is happy" (Durkheim, 1960c: 73-74). "Men come to
need each other more and more and become increasingly interdependent.
Thus they emerge naturally from the state of nature...Thus, in order for
society to arise, external circumstances must increase man's needs and consequently modify his nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 81). "Something must have upset the existing balance, or if it was never really stable, certain factors must have marred it from the very beginning" (Durkheim, 1960c: 75). "[A] first association must have unleashed their passions, broadened their intelligence, in short, upset the original balance" (Durkheim, 1960c: 79). "Once the balance is upset, it cannot be restored. One disorder follows from another. Once the natural limit is crossed, there is no turning back. Passions beget passions and stimulate the intelligence, which offers them new objectives that rouse them to a fever pitch" (Durkheim, 1960c: 80-81). "Rousseau certainly prefers the state of nature to the civil state he sees about him...But there is no ground for supposing that he regarded this state of perfection as the only possible state of perfection" (Durkheim, 1960c: 89). "But then, if there is some way of correcting these imperfections or making them impossible, the grandeur alone will remain, and perhaps this new perfection will be superior to that of the original state" (Durkheim, 1960c: 91).

Yet, Durkheim's question is more complex and original than providing a logical basis of history for Rousseau, which is, after all, already there in Rousseau's subtexts. The bite of his criticism comes in the second part of the conclusion: "[s]o unstable is its foundation in the nature of things that it cannot but appear to us as a tottering structure whose delicate balance can be established and maintained only by an almost miraculous conjunction of circumstances" (Durkheim, 1960c: 137-38). Bluntly put, the properly Durkheimian question of "the nature of things" frames his analysis of Rousseau's views on politics and laws.

On the first approach, Rousseau specifies the body politic and sovereign force in accordance with the law of nature. "This new life must therefore be organized without doing violence to the law of nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 93). "Thus nature and society cannot be reconciled by outward juxtaposition. Nature must be recast...The state of nature must be transformed and, at the same time, maintained...they must assume a new form without ceasing to be" (Durkheim, 1960c: 93). "Thus they would depend, not upon each other, but
upon a force which by its impersonality would be identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with the force of nature" (Durkheim, 1960c: 94). "But *natural* is here synonymous with *rational*" (Durkheim, 1960c: 95). In this context, Durkheim rejects Grotius' doctrine of "the right of the stronger" and Janet's doctrine of the "exchange of the personality of others", reaffirming that a "society is an organized body", since "the moral order...must be introduced. However, it requires a foundation in some being...the social body" (Durkheim, 1960c: 97, 99, 103). Furthermore, Rousseau's notion of sovereignty is regarded as a "new type of personality" or "simply the collective force...in the service of the general will" (Durkheim, 1960c: 105, 110). In the authorship of Rousseau, Durkheim summarizes four characters of sovereignty, which are inalienable, indivisible, supreme, and restricted. The former two characters describe the sovereign power as a "collective being [sic] sui generis" and "a homogeneous force" that is "not organic", effectively, a "vitalist and substantialist conception of life and society" comparable to "a living body...animated by a single indivisible soul" (Durkheim, 1960c: 110-12). The latter two characters describe the sovereign power as having "no check" but "taking cognizance only of the body of the nation...an agreement...between the body and its parts, in short between the body and itself" (Durkheim, 1960c: 112-15).

On the second approach, Rousseau specifies the positions of general lawmakers and specific law governors in his political society. Rousseau's lawmaker, in a view more scientific than Montesquieu's lawgiver, has no power. "He can have no effective force for implementing his idea, for if he had, he would replace the sovereign power...He can only propose. The people decide...[Yet] how can he win obedience...In all likelihood, he will not be understood...In actual history legislators have been able to get around these difficulties by taking on a religious character" (Durkheim, 1960c: 118-19). "By some happy, unpredictable accident, a lawmaker must emerge to guide the people...such individuals are few and far between, and when they do appear, it is as if by miracle." Here Rousseau inevitably falls back on "historical pessimism. Though not necessarily contrary to nature, society does not arise from it naturally" (Durkheim, 1960c: 121). Furthermore, Rousseau's law governors, in a view more scientific than Montesquieu's classification,
"depend on the size of the society...Each kind of government may, of course, be best for a particular mode of existence." This is so even when Rousseau personally prefers aristocratic democracy in a society where "bonds between individuals should be reduced to a minimum" (Durkheim, 1960c: 124-27). And yet, Rousseau's "entire theory of government is based on a contradiction...Either, without any change in the general conditions of the state, the government becomes more concentrated and so acquires a power that is not in keeping with the size of the society, or else the government as a body usurps the sovereign power or the executives as individuals usurp the power that they should exercise only as a body" (Durkheim, 1960c: 128-29).

In conclusion, Durkheim stops to wonder if Rousseau is wrong to eliminate "the illogical and antisocial separation between spiritual and temporal power", inventing instead a "state religion...reduced to the few principles needed to strength the authority of the ethical power" (Durkheim, 1960c: 133-34).

This is not to say that Durkheim wishes to repeat "the illogical and antisocial separation" of two powers, at least not naïvely. Rather, he pushes the properly Comtean plan for the reconstruction of society to its logical extreme. Durkheim's "natural religious politics", as we call it, should be understood in a strict sense of his symbolic science. This is shown in his renunciation of formulating any messianic religious politics which is destined to be assimilated by another temporal power. Moreover, his critical analysis of Rousseau's views on politics and laws has a reflexive significance for his theory of society set in a division of labour. For Durkheim, a society is not just a body of vital forces, but rather a living organism based on a sexual division, the division of all divisions. Rather than imagining a Simmelian female culture, Durkheim fully admits sexual difference embedded in a society. This is why he develops "the method of determining this function", specialization, from a philosophical discussion of friendship, marital relationship and sexual evolution, which is a philosophy of dissimilarity, not "feelings of empathy that spring from similarity" or "general[ly] love [that] presumes a certain harmony of thought and feeling" (Durkheim, 1984: 17, 22). From the outset, Durkheim's notion of solidarity has ruled out the "union" or "fusion" of "two representations" or "images". Instead, "in the case of division of labour, they remain outside each other and are
linked only because they are distinct. The feelings that arise cannot therefore be the same in both cases, nor can the social relationships that derive from them" (Durkheim, 1984: 22-23). Here one would fall back on commonsense in the guise of Kant's spirit by remarking that "love is not love if it cannot cope with our hurts and disputes" (Miller, 1996: 104). In fact, foreshowing an intermediary form of society in the notion of "sexual totemism," Durkheim conceives sexual antagonism as a real symbol of love suspended within the social organism to augment individual diversity (cf. Durkheim, 2001: 124-25).

Nevertheless, a spatial causality of love expressed in the immediate, memetic relation between nature and society assumes that society produces itself in a sexed organism independent from primitive kinship. As such, the second degree of causality begs the question about the formal organization of space by the real force of objects. For, a natural-social space cannot be conceived as a form awaiting organization before some cryptogenic objects are placed in it. At this stage, Durkheim's logocentrism meets mythocentrism. We are referring to his studies of incest and suicide, both of which were published in 1897, the same year of his essay 'Concerning the definition of religious phenomena', and two years after the putative "transition" from science to religion usually inferred from his "revelation" by the work of Robertson Smith self-reported in a letter dated 1907 (Durkheim in Pickering, 1984: 61). We have refuted the epistemological break imputed to him, arguing instead that his studies of law and religion are integral to his symbolic notion of science, a science framed by a unique sociological series of logocentrism. Nonetheless, Durkheim needed to provide a methodological ground for the symbolic view itself, that is, a "reversed" mythocentric method of anthropology established in 1897 to supplement his logocentric method of sociology formulated in 1895.34 This means a mythical core of Durkheim's logical science could be released from his narratives of incest and suicide. In short, we hold that the two works, one of anthropology and the other of sociology presented to their best,

34 Durkheim's question of method between 1895 and 1897 has been shown clearly by Gane's research. In fact, Gane problematizes Durkheim's question on several levels, including a) a textual complexity in the sociological method, b) a contextual reversal between the sociological method and the theory of suicide, and c) a broken link between a social modeling and an individual "scenography of suicide" in the theory of suicide (Gane, 1988; 1994; 2000a; 2005).
disclose the internal limit and horizon of Durkheim’s thought.

Durkheim reveals the nature and origins of the incest taboo by a method of anthropology. The method states “in order to understand a practice or an institution, a judicial or moral rule, it is necessary to trace it as nearly as possible to its origin” on the following ground: “although the manner in which they must develop is not fatally predetermined by the properties which characterize them at their birth, these properties do not cease to have a profound influence on the entire course of their history” (Durkheim, 1963: 13). Defined as such, his method is firstly not an anthropological method commonly understood in terms of “structure” versus history. Nor is it, secondly, an archaeological method normally conceived as digging out hard evidences on the “original” site of a certain history. Rather, Durkheim’s method of anthropology is closer to the genealogical method in Nietzsche’s sense of the term.\(^{35}\) Precisely, it is the counterpart of his genetic method of evolution at the basis of comparative sociology to go beyond Comte’s historical method (Durkheim, 1982: 156-58).

Durkheim (1963: 15-16) starts from an observation of the law of exogamy widely practiced by aboriginal clans, a clan defined as “a domestic society...founded exclusively on the community of the totem, and not on a definite bond of consanguinity.” For example, “among the tribes of Victoria, the slightest suggestion of love-play among the people of the same clan was the object of repressive measures” (Durkheim, 1963: 18). Hence he concludes “exogamy is the binding force of the clan” (Durkheim, 1963: 25). Moreover, exogamy is the “very form that the incest prohibition appeared for the first time in history...For all repression of incest presupposes familial relations

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\(^{35}\) The structural relativism in anthropology (i.e. respect foreign cultures) could adopt a surface observation or a “deep description”, but the anthropological method is an offspring of phenomenology in the final analysis. The primitive absolutism in archaeology could hunt a lived fact (e.g. a bone, a tissue), an artifact (e.g. a clay, a mural) or a natural fact (e.g. a meteor, a fault), and yet the archaeological method is a derivative of empirical positivism. In contrast, Durkheim’s method of anthropology works on the logic of proof to trace the descent of an origin, a birth in history (Nietzsche). This method is re-appropriated in many ways from a genetic mutation of the body (Bergson, Deleuze), through a discursive history of the present (Foucault, Derrida), to a meta-political art of disappearance (Baudrillard, Badiou).
recognized and organized by society" (Durkheim, 1963: 27). "However", he adds quickly, "we cannot rest content with those exclusively dialectic considerations" (Durkheim, 1963: 28).

Tracing the social "origins" of incest, Durkheim (1963: 54, 68) refutes three hypotheses: a) the hypothesis of violence due to "specific peculiarities of lower societies, b) the hypothesis of heredity due to "constitutional peculiarities of human nature in general", and c) the hypothesis of instinct due to "a horror of blood". The first hypothesis, supported by McLennan, Lubbock and Spencer, explains the taboo by factors such as infanticide, collective marriage, war and pillage (Durkheim, 1963: 54-56). For Durkheim (1963: 57, 59), these exterior factors make an "unfortunate confusion between the tribe and the clan" because clans "in the majority of Australian and even Indian tribes...were born of two primitive roots by way of spontaneous generation. They were therefore not due to a sudden introduction of foreign and already differentiated elements." Morgan provides the second hypothesis, explaining the taboo by the harmful diseases a consanguineous marriage would cause to the individual organism. However, this is a derivative reason not only because "the aristocrats, the elite, cannot be formed in any other manner" but also because "there is a striking disproportion between the real inconvenience of consanguinity and the terrible sanctions imposed without exception on all those who transgress the law of exogamy" (Durkheim, 1963: 64-65). Finally refuting the hypothesis of instinct, Durkheim (1963: 68) argues "blood, it has often been said, has a horror of blood. But such an explanation is a refusal of explanation."

Nevertheless, he totally accepts the horror of blood as an objective social phenomenon, which is the most subjective type of ideology, a pure commonsense compared to the hypotheses of violence and heredity, only to re-cognize it by a social scientific explanation, the hypothesis of rituals. "Since", Durkheim (1963: 69) reasons "the totem is a god and totemism a cult, is it not rather in the religious beliefs of lower societies that one must go to look for the cause of exogamy?" His initial explanation says the horror of blood expresses the term called taboo in "a collection of ritualistic prohibitions
which have their objective to avert the dangerous effects of a magical contagion by preventing all contact between a thing or a category of things." One is forbidden to "touch" it, for "the nature of things is capable of diffusing and extending to the infinite by way of contagion." To accommodate something which "comes from the divine," "[a]ll that is needed is some chosen receptacle to contain such energy", an "object", a "container" strong enough to resist being "destroyed by its contents" (Durkheim, 1963: 70-71). This "feeling of horror" which causes a mutual avoidance of the sacred and the profane "demonstrates how deepseated is the separation of the two sexes...Does this hostility", he asks rhetorically, "not symbolize the type of antagonism that exists between the two sexes" (Durkheim, 1963: 71-72, 78)?

Explicating sexual prohibitions by ritualistic prohibitions, furthermore, Durkheim adduces the anthropological studies of James Frazer and Ernest Crawley precedent to Robertson Smith. We should note in passing that Robertson Smith is a primary reference in support of Freud's thesis developed from Totem and Taboo to Moses and Monotheism, so that he could found a psychoanalysis of sacrifice (i.e. the infamous "historical truth" of the Oedipus myth in an act of killing one's father) in a further reversed form to Durkheim's sociology of sacrifice evolved from Incest to The Elementary Forms (cf. Preus, 1987: 187-90). For Durkheim (1963: 85, italics mine), the origins of exogamy are revealed in the following scientified myth, "blood is taboo in a general way. It taboos all that enters into contact with it. It repulses any contact and creates a vacuum...Thus the woman, in a rather chronic manner, is the theater of these bloody demonstrations." On the first approach (as a result of his reading of Frazer and Crawley), blood is a de-mediated, material cause of the restraint and concealment of sexual organs, for "the veil is often a means of intercepting a magical action" (Durkheim, 1963: 85-86). On the second approach (as a result of his reading of Robertson Smith), blood is a mediating, quasi-cause of the communal body in which "a single flesh", "a single blood" and "a single soul" share their "consubstantiality" in the "mythical being" of a "blood-covenant" (Durkheim, 1963: 88). It is the quasi-cause for two reasons. First, "the magical properties attributed to the blood...come from" the "totemic being", a being who is "an individual" separated conceptually from the literal
totemic substance, "the animal or the vegetable species", but still "contain[s] within itself, in power, the species and the entire clan." In result, if the blood is empowered by an individual being, then the "sympathetic magic" of the savage, a superstitious belief that fragments or severed body parts live on without an organism, can be explained (not explained away) by a totemic religion of the body (Durkheim 1963: 86-87). Second, it is through the blood that "the totemic being [sic] immanent to the clan [sic] is incarnate in each individual." In result, "there is god in each individual organism" (Durkheim, 1963: 89).

In his synthetic view, Durkheim (1963: 92) comes around to "guard against literally accepting the popular explanations" as they condemn the woman as "a seat of impurity" by relating her menstrual blood "to evil powers rather than protective divinities." However, it is also incorrect to say that Durkheim guards for the sacred woman for her purity. Rather, he fully understands that women in the popular imagination can be interpreted as "either a dangerous magician or a born priestess" (Durkheim, 1963: 92). These two irreconcilable views together express "the extreme ambiguity" in "the notion of the divine" (Durkheim, 1963: 96). Hence, his precise scientific point is that "it is not so much as a deliberated being that the woman is taboo, but because she is the source of a magical action" (Durkheim, 1963: 93). Given the case, it is naïve to fall back on the first, temporal causality of love: one could argue in a constructivist criticism that Durkheim "identifies" with patriarchal men who subject women to a contradictory object of hate, hate of and hate by women, given that they are excluded as strangers in a social reality virtually perceived as neo-liberalism (Lehmann, 1994). It is not even satisfying to stay at the second, spatial causality of love: one could also argue in a deconstructive ambivalence that Durkheim "projects" women as a borderline object of fear, fear of and fear for women, given that they are alienated as sacred insiders and profane outsiders in a social reality formally conceived as some other scene within neo-liberalism (Tiryakian, 1981; Gane, 1992: 85-132; 1993: 21-58). For him, "[t]he fact is that fear is an integral part of respect", and "whatever difference there was with regard to the consciousness of these two emotions, disgust and veneration, they translated themselves into the same
external signs" (Durkheim, 1963: 95). Durkheim harbours neither hate nor fear to go down to the material causality of love. He accepts those ambiguous popular feelings, hate and fear of blood as a mythical symbol, in order to transform them into a social feeling of respect.

But what exactly is the "social nature" of incest? In fact, Durkheim has cleared the ground to answer the question in part II of Incest, which means before the real cause of the taboo in the blood is tracked down. There he makes sure a clan society is irreducible to a temporal-spatial social system represented by Cunow's "ethnography of the system of classes", according to which "each class would be a group of individuals of approximately the same age" (Durkheim, 1963: 28-32). Cunow's theory presupposes a society has a "double organization" rested on a unity of totemic groups and "the common habitat", which is a confusion of "totemic associations" with "territorial associations" (Durkheim, 1963: 25). This is confusing because, once the custom of women leaving home to live with their husbands is taken into consideration, "a weakening of the strictly totemic group takes place. For portions of various clans, which are thus reunited in a single place, live one life together and as a result form a society of a new type" (Durkheim, 1963: 42). Eventually, the system theory runs into a logical contradiction: "the duality of the totemic group and of the territorial group disappears, whether the two become one, or whether the former ceases to exist. It was this duality that produced the alternating combination to which the system of classes corresponds" (Durkheim, 1963: 43-44). Durkheim (1963: 40) clarifies that a totem is not "only a word, a verbal sign; it is the symbol of an entire ensemble of traditions, of beliefs, of religions and other practices. But when the different parts of the same clan no longer live one life together, the totem no longer has its original significance, although it retains its prestige for a long time because of habit." Introducing his genetic view of evolution by habit, Durkheim (1963: 45-46, 97-98) escapes Bachofen and Morgan's matriarchal view of society without giving in to the system theory which is eventually a patriarchal view of society. For him, "what tends to reverse the principle of uterine lineage is the law of exogamy combined with custom according to which the woman must live on the locale of her husband, for it is these two rules that determine that
the child is immediately placed far from his mother’s clan” (Durkheim, 1963: 48, italics mine). As such, Durkheim (1963: 49) rejects Cunow’s thesis holding “the Kurnai are more primitive than the other Australian tribes.” Far from the elementary form, the Kurnai’s “fusion of clans” is closer to his/our contemporary society since it is “made up of groups whose members look upon themselves as related, but who do not have a common insignia. Furthermore, no where are the instances of prohibition of so multiplied... Far from the incest horror among them being at a minimum, it is nowhere so fully developed; one can even say that it reaches a point of abnormal development” (Durkheim, 1963: 53).

In view of this, the social nature of incest symbolizes two sentiments of love, one situated in the “domestic”, sexual order of society whilst the other in the “conjugal”, sexed order of society (Durkheim, 1963: 106). In kinship relations, “love is not simply a spontaneous movement of personal sensitivity; it is, in part, a duty...This is why the home has always had, today and in former times, a religious character” (Durkheim, 1963: 100-01). “Elsewhere, there are sexual relations...[T]he society that they form depends exclusively, at least in principle, on their voluntary affinity...Love in this instance, can exist only on condition that it is spontaneous” (Durkheim, 1963: 101). The problem is “marriage seeks in vain to be the most moral form of sexual society” because “as long as they are not yet legally and morally linked, they are in the same situation as lovers” (Durkheim, 1963: 102). The duality of “the good and the pleasant, duty and passion, [and] sacred and profane” in the sexual order of society is so radical that “a man cannot make a wife of his sister without her ceasing to be his sister. This is what makes us disapprove so strongly of incest” (Durkheim, 1963: 103). Given “the opinion of mankind”, “there must have been some cause, foreign to their structural attributes, that determined this manner of seeing things” (Durkheim, 1963: 105, italics mine). Why? The foreign cause “must have existed first” not because incest is impossible, but, on the contrary, because incest is always possible: “the sexes should differentiate themselves and form some sort of two societies within one society; for nothing, either in the constitution of one or the other, would make such a separation necessary” (Durkheim, 1963: 108, 114, italics mine).
In conclusion, Durkheim (1963: 108, 114-15) stresses repeatedly that just as “the prejudices relating to blood” tell us “there is nothing in the properties of blood necessarily predestined it to acquire this religious character”, nothing but a real, quasi-cause, so the conjugal, sexed order of society foreign to the domestic, sexual order of society is not to be seen as “a progressive realization of certain fundamental ideas”. Passing the necessity of “human dialectic”, the sexual order must “have been imposed” by the sexed order as a “powerful force,” a force authorized by the “obligatory nature” of truth (Durkheim, 1963: 108, 115; 1983: 98).

No doubt, the eternal antithesis between passion and duty would have always found a means of demonstrating itself; but it would have taken on another form. It is not in the heart of sexual life that passion would have established, so to speak, its centre of action. Passion and love between the sexes would not have become synonymous (Durkheim, 1963: 112).

6.4 Durkheim contra Bergson
In view of the foregoing discussions, we may now explore the internal limit and horizon of Durkheim’s sociology. We have seen his theory of society is revolved around dual orders, namely a domestic order and a conjugal order. Adopting these conventional terms, however, Durkheim leaves a wrong impression to careless readers that a clan defined as a domestic society refers to the domestic order. Even as his clan society is rightly understood as the conjugal order, one runs into a further risk of regarding him as an ideologue of the patriarchal family. In fact, the latter case has been established by critical constructivists and ambivalent deconstructionists alike. Their case is based on ample textual evidences found in Durkheim’s defense of the indissolubility of marriage for the benefit of men, as he declared his practical stands in an essay ‘Divorce by mutual consent’ published nearly a decade after his statistic-sociological analysis of “conjugal anomic” in On Suicide (Durkheim, 1978[1906]; 2006[1897]: 284-305, 422-31; cf. Tiryakian, 1988: 1030-32; Gane, 1993: 117-19; Lehmann, 1994: 64-81).
These interpretations put Durkheim's thought into a gender frame of mind, which is, we suggest, the ideology of our contemporary world. Gendered readings miss their target of criticism and reflection for having confused Durkheim's idea of (sexual) passion with sex on the one hand and (familial) duty with love on the other. According to his usage, "domestic society" and "conjugal order" are purely contradictions in terms for defining and describing a clan. We might even say that his clan conception of society aims at an unremitting deconstruction of the family, as if Durkheim is working out how Comte's altruistic love could evolve from familial types of affection, which are, to recall, veneration, attachment and sympathetic love in the filial, sibling and conjugal relations. This is why he takes great pains to develop the genetic method of anthropology from sociology in *Incest*, arguing for the original survival of totemism at the end of the evolutionary chain against patriarchal and matriarchal models of society (represented by Cunow and Morgan). In other words, he traces the existence of an original cause in the elementary form of society, de-territorialized and de-historicized society, via a passage from the symbolic thing of totem in the clan, through the real object of blood in the incest prohibition, to the original truth of love between the sexes. This passage presents a moral proof of love, like his moral proof of God, not a mere evidence of it. In sum, the incest taboo proves that conjugal love is but is not just a mythical coupling of affinity by attraction and repulsion: love has also been preformed by a scientific order, an order *sui generis*, in society.

To clarify Durkheim's semantic obscurity, we have renamed his dual orders of society in terms of a sexual order and a sexed order. The sexual order is based on a phenomenological duality of sexuality/family (or, passion/duty), whereas the sexed order on a logical duality of sex/love. Marriage is an institutional site linking and breaking the dual orders, but these two emotional-conceptual couples do not represent social phenomena in the same breath. As a result, there is an insoluble sexual difference built in his sociological analysis.

Durkheim presents a clear picture of the sexual order, which may be found in
his theoretical refutation of the hypothesis of infinite pleasure and suffering (based on his anti-utilitarian view of happiness and progress) and anomic division of labour in *The Division of Labour*, in his statistical analysis of familial egoism and economic anomie in *On Suicide*, and in his practical ‘Discussion on sex education,’ where he points a way out of the impasses of moral-religious mystification and scientific-political demystification of sexual matters imparted to children (Durkheim, 1979[1911]: 140-47; 1984: 179-99, 291-309; 2006: 179-217, 262-84). In this regard, Durkheim argues consistently for a moral-scientific integration and regulation of myths created by the popular imagination. This is why, we recall, Durkheim (1961: 38ff, 66ff) expounds the duality of discipline and attachment in *Moral Education* by correlating an ethical lesson of “reserve of vital energy” learnt from Goethe’s *Faust* with a social fact of “renunciation of the self” embedded in the structure of world politics. At this stage, we understand that his idea of education advocates an ethic of masculine renunciation. On the first approach, his sexual ethic has advanced to a neuter standpoint akin to Weber’s neo-classicist reading of Goethe. On the second approach, his sexual ethic remains in a masculine standpoint shared by all non-Marxist sociologists we have discussed so far, regardless of their nuanced images of Goethe from the perspectives of neo-classicism, neo-romanticism and neo-Enlightenment. On the third approach, beyond any secular political arithmetic (of conservatism, liberalism and radicalism), his sexual ethic eludes the masculine standpoint again for a foreign cause.

For Durkheim, the cause for masculine renunciation comes from elsewhere. From the vantage point of the sexed order, the sexual order will unleash a masculine force of sex-love once bereft of moral-scientific discipline. This is the force of mysticism, a contemporary doctrine of which may be found in Bergson’s late work *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. First, Bergson over-identities morality with religion in a single instinctive force of Life, from which intelligence and intuition evolve as the two sources of power (of pressure and aspiration) to distinguish between closed and open moralities, static and dynamic religions, and mechanic and mystical societies of love (Bergson, 1935[1932]: 97-101, 266-68). In this sense, the speculative
non/identity of society and religion is dissolved in a biological metaphysic of life, according to which society is religion and vice versa. Second, taboo and totem are the functional products of static religion in dual perspectives, individual organism and human species (Bergson, 1935: 120-34). By contrast, Bergson's dynamic religion adopts the third perspective, the view of vital impetus. Third, a mystical society of love is correlated to open morality and dynamic religion. Morally, mystic "sensibility" as a "faculty or power of the soul" is masculine since "woman is as intelligent as man, but [sic] she is less capable of emotion" (Bergson, 1935: 44). Religiously, mysticism may be traced back to Greek and Indian philosophies, but "the complete mysticism is that of the great Christian mystics" (Bergson, 1935: 227). Socially, "[t]he mystic love of humanity is a very different thing" from the natural kinds of loving one's family and country (Bergson, 1935: 234).

Strictly speaking, Durkheim's critique of mysticism targets at William James rather than Bergson in his lectures on pragmatism. This is why he defines pragmatism in "the Anglo-Saxon milieu", and carefully distinguishes James' self-identification with Bergson's criticism of "classic rationalism" from the non-identity of "the positive conclusions at which the two men arrive" (Durkheim, 1983: 5-7, 32). Setting the French academic politics aside, Durkheim has acknowledged the similar spirit between his sociology and Bergson's philosophy in their common invocation to a vital force. Nonetheless, he pledges loyalty to a unique lineage of life philosophy, in which he associates without confusion Nietzsche's doctrine of truth "beneath appearances and fiction" and German romanticist "sense of complexity, richness and variety" with Comte's sociological feeling "which would be richer, more complex and less formalistic" and yet rationalistic "in the highest degree" (Durkheim, 1983: 2-5). Thus it is more correct to say that Durkheim's sociological question, distinguished from a psychological one, is less concerned with the

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36 From the view of individual organism, "religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence": this is taboo. From the view of human species, "religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the representation, by intelligence, of the inevitability of death": this is totemism (Bergson, 1935: 122, 131).

37 From the vital impulse arise new religious representations which are "defensive reactions of nature against the representation, by the intelligence, of a depressing margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired" (Bergson, 1935: 140).
intensification of psychic force than with the organization of social life.

In light of this, a horizon limited in the conceptual relation of life-time and free will could be drawn by contrasting Bergson's psychological philosophy with Durkheim's social philosophy. On the one hand, a single life-time has a supreme value for Bergson, whereas Durkheim appreciates better the meaning of deaths in life, lapses of time. Solving Zeno's paradox, Bergson vivifies a mechanical series of actions into a mystical act of duration. Hence, he often discusses the case of the relation of vision to the eye or the relation of the hand to the iron filings that limit its motion, recovering mysterious acts in the flow of everyday life (Bergson, 1911[1907]: 87-97; 1935: 207). However, cutting mystical "contact" with the Bergsonian body of functions, Durkheim's organicism, as we understand it, expresses something foreign to structuralism and functionalism alike. For Durkheim (1983: 95, 97), "continuity and communication exists in the mind, as they do in things," and yet "the need for distinction and separation [sic] lies in things themselves." In this sense, if "a state of anomie is impossible wherever organs solidly linked to one another are [sic] in sufficiently lengthy contact", it doesn't mean live contact with persons, but quasi-live contact with persons through things in a society of specialization (cf. Durkheim, 1984: 304-08).

On the other hand, Bergson gives an unconditional plea for free will, whereas Durkheim appreciates better the role of fate imposed on the will to make it free. Note that this is far from an epistemological or deontological disagreement, but rather an ontological difference. Bergson's philosophy of creative evolution begins from reclaiming the notion of reality by evolutionary means and ends in rejecting the notion of noting as fictitious (Bergson, 1911: ix-xv, 272-97; 1935: 260-62). But Durkheim's sociology accepts the fictitious nothing in social reality. Passing metaphysics, Durkheim's sexed order of society realizes that the ontological difference is a difference between the sexes. This is the lesson of feminine sex-love in *On Suicide*. Durkheim's problem is *not* that he cannot account for the question of women, but rather that he cannot miss to account for them as *nothing*. He could have easily adopted a straight chauvinist, neuter or feminist position to explain the
extremely private act of suicide, for all these positions are subjectivist. But excluding the sexed order, it wouldn't be a sociological analysis of suicide in the first place. So he knowingly presupposes and yet suspends the question of the other sex throughout the thesis, isolating the conjugal element from the other factors at every stage of the analysis. After all the non-social factors (i.e. psychic illness, racial heredity, cosmic season and imitating media) are rejected and all the social factors (i.e. religion and science, family and politics, military and economy) are explained, a quasi-social type of “conjugal anomie” (analyzed from the statistical correlation between marriage and suicide) is finally distilled, demanding a reply.

On the first approach, it is true that Durkheim (2006: 298-99) argues marriage life is to be favoured for the benefit of men, literally for the sake of protecting masculine sexuality from running wild. On the second approach, it is also true that he asks women to “make the sacrifice,” which may sound anti-feminist to contemporary readers, but is nonetheless an honest female viewpoint (Durkheim, 2006: 305). On the third approach, in his description, women’s paradoxical relation to men is strikingly homologous to nature’s relation to society, as we have seen in Durkheim’s lectures on Rousseau. “The woman is a more instinctive creature than the man, she has only to follow her instincts to find peace and quiet.” Hence, marriage is “not necessary” and “a strict obligation” for women because they are “already limited by nature” (Durkheim, 2006: 301). As a result, “their interests are opposed, one needing constraints and the other freedom” (Durkheim, 2006: 303). On the fourth approach, sexual antagonism amounts to be the last straw which could make or break his solution of the social problem of suicide by means of professional groups. He suggests to “make marriage more indissoluble” on the one hand, and allow both sexes to “be equally socialized but in different ways” on the other (Durkheim, 2006: 429-31).

In view of this, we might ask if Durkheim is forbidden to take a fatal leap from feminine sacrifice to feminine renunciation. His organism of love is neither asexual nor sexed but de/sexed in that women sacrifice their natural freedom to make a real object of desire for the constitution of society. Conversely
speaking, he knows a society is not yet free with men's discipline, but only free with women's sacrifice. Meanwhile, he also knows that the woman is a quasi-cause of society since the woman is nothing, who wants nothing but pure freedom without a form. So he needs to contain women's "magical action" as much as he needs to constrain men's mystic feeling. As a result, for Durkheim, a free society is grounded in the fate of the sexes. What he could have sacrificed is the very ground of fate for the woman to decide if she might renounce her magical action freely to help create a new form of society.

From the social science of Comte and Marx to non/Marxist sociologies, we have travelled a full circle back to Goethe's ethic of renunciation. In part I, we argued that Goethe's art of love-life anticipated the social science of Comte and Marx in the sense that his ethic of renunciation stood ahead of the cultural-historical imaginations of classicism, the Enlightenment and romanticism. In part II, we visited classical sociologists from Weber and Durkheim to Simmel and Marxists only to find that their renditions of Goethe's ethic relapsed to neo-classicism, neo-romanticism and neo-Enlightenment. Then, we reconsidered Durkheim's sociology to discover a sexual difference of renunciation in his theory of society, society as a de/sexed organism of love. From the de/sexed standpoint, we recognize Durkheim as the true heir of Comte, for he traces the education of love back to its original source in Goethe's art.

*In this sense, the fatalistic type of suicide, consisted of the cases of slaves, "young" married men and "childless" married women, is a particular by-product of conjugal anomie, not anomie as such (Durkheim, 2006: 305).*
Part III
The Romantic Enlightenment of Sociology

Chapter 7 Reflexive Discourses of Love

Pre-1980 para-sociological approach to the question of love often criticized the social phenomenon of intimacy in modernity. One critical voice comes from liberal Marxism. Classical examples include Hannah Arendt’s philosophical portrait, in *The Human Condition*, of the birth of “the social” in sustaining a labouring society (1958: 38-39), and Richard Sennett’s historical account, in *The Fall of Public Man*, of the cult of narcissistic “personality”, the “ideology and tyranny of intimacy”, in a “destructive *gemeinshaft*” (1977[1974]: 219ff, 333-40). Both pieces of work have a strong utopian sentiment, admonishing one against the breaking of democratic politics from the ideals of Greco-Roman cultures (for Arendt) and the Enlightenment (for Sennett). Accordingly, this line of research spatializes social morality by the contradictory trends of egoism and altruism, ascribing the culprit of “privatization” to the rise of intimacy.

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Arendt’s political and ethical philosophy, which spans from her Marxist analysis of totalitarianism to her Kantian analysis of the mindless evil and the willing mind may be read as a life-long commitment to the question of Augustinian love, the subject of her doctoral thesis produced in 1929. The textual and contextual importance of this theological exercise to Arendt’s later philosophy in particular and existential philosophy of her time in general has been carefully analyzed by her two posthumous editors, Scott and Stark, who reconstruct a coherent text from Arendt’s three versions of manuscript revisions between 1958-65 (Arendt, 1996: vii-xvii, 115-211). In Arendt’s analysis, Augustine’s theology of love is to be read in the context of Greek philosophy from Plato to Plotinus. Hence she argues that love in Augustine concerns the constitution of an ethical-political community or earthly city (*civitas terrena*) of neighbourly or brotherly love. It is characterized by a collective faith of fellowship (*societas*) not “in Christ [which] is secondary”, but in a “new companionship of fate”, which is originated in the common danger or menace of death, sustained by the imitation, as opposed to generation, of mutual love (*diligere invicem*), and completed by the transformation of grace to the choice and obligations of a “community-in-sinfulness” (Arendt, 1996; part III). In practice, Christ’s redemption of the whole world (*mundas*) instead of mere individuals is made possible by the subjective recollection of a past order and measure of love (*dilectionis ordo et mensura*) via a libidinal economy of the future. According to Arendt’s Augustinian economy of the subject, an anti-dialectic of time (moving in backwards) and desire/craving (*appetitus*, moving in forwards) corners one to clear a spacing of thinking and willing “between past and future” (*nunc stans*), thereby converting the very course, along with the object, of one’s love to soar in upwards from the love of worldly beings (*cupiditas*) to a love of God the eternal Being, translated as neighbourly love (*charitas*) (Arendt, 1996: part I & II).
The other voice of criticizing private morality comes from social psychology and neo-Marxist psychoanalysis. Both genres of study object to the domination of superego over the rational ego and/or the passionate id. Two influential studies of social psychology are David Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd* (1977[1950]) and Christopher Lasch’s *The Culture of Narcissism* (1991[1979]). It is self-defeating to engage in the polemic over the general nature of the American character (i.e. whether it is other-directed or narcissistic), given the risk of an infinite relativism of the sociology of knowledge (cf. Lasch, 1991: 64-66). Rather, opposing conceptions together compose a pair of mirror images of society: while Riesman reports a society of moral interaction, Lasch adds a psychological dimension to it. Examined closely, the two pieces of work share the same analytical method as both examine the impact of culture upon personality, the same empirical thesis as both argue the socialization of authority through surrogate agencies, and the same theoretical view as both imply the end of moral altruism.

For Marxist-Freudians, in addition, Herbert Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization* (1969[1955]) and Eric Fromm’s *The Art of Loving* (1957) explore how the human subject suppressed by industrial capitalism can regain autonomy by

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40 Specifically, it is worth noting a distinction between the methods of cultural history and social psychology. Social psychology, due to its logic of internalization, has set one foot in the reflexive school. This leads to nuanced conceptions of narcissism between Sennett and Lasch. Lasch borrows Sennett’s notion of narcissism, but overturns his thesis of privatization. After admitting Sennett’s diagnosis of narcissistic psychology as self-hate instead of self-love, Lasch adds a reflexive twist, arguing that narcissism reveals the problem lies in the private realm itself rather than privatization of the public sphere (Sennett, 1977: 333-36; Lasch, 1991: 27-30). In his words, “the cult of intimacy originates not in the assertion of personality but in its collapse...our society, far from fostering private life at the expense of public life, has made deep relationships, love affairs and marriages increasingly difficult to achieve” (Lasch, 1991: 30).

41 Nevertheless, compared to Riesman, Lasch (1991: 243-49) has a sharper critical edge in developing a psycho-generic theory of “the minimal self”. The notion of “primary narcissism” allows him to guard against secondary narcissism, opting instead for a self-delimiting ego capable of recognizing alter egos. Riesman (1977: xxvii-xxxix), on the other hand, takes pains to refute the confusion of the notion of other-direction with that of conformity or impression management. In fact, he fully recognizes the positive nature of other-direction, which is described as “a greater resonance with others...in a wider interpersonal circle”, a character heralding the coming of the “plastic man”. It is easy to assess, according to the sociology of knowledge, that this relative difference is a result of the intellectual politics of their times (early 50s versus late 70s). Nonetheless, we maintain that both accounts, as empirical generalizations, capture the same urban mass society, in which every self has become acutely aware of his/her social environs in his/her own eyes.
unleashing the force of *erōs* and practicing the art of love. In short, this line of research is forever dissatisfied with the social-economic order since it is predisposed to personalize love in an active against the passive mode of human relations (i.e. loving is superior to being loved).

The logical link connecting a critical with a reflexive approach to love, or probably to every subject of social study, might be reduced to this formula: criticism to problematization is reflexivity to deproblematization. From the critical perspective, the ascent of intimacy, often characterized as a phenomenon of privatization, alienation and mystification, signifies a conservative reaction to the historical reason of the Enlightenment, a regression of modernity to the dark times. From a reflexive standpoint, by contrast, it is the utopian reason itself that harbours a moral bias to the course of modernity. Henceforth, objections to privatization, alienation and mystification can be regarded inversely as projections of a privatized historicity, an alienated theory and a mystified politics. Compared to the critical approach, that is, a reflexive approach is happy to start from a clean conscience, claiming that there is nothing privatized, mystified and alienated in modern intimacy. They agree that the genesis and evolution of the private life had been coeval with modernity from the 17th to the 19th century. In consequence, "late-modern" intimacy since the late 20th century signifies a subjective understanding of modernity, which is correlated to a blanket transvaluation of the word "privacy". Given as such, the metaphysical Enlightenment of love in public cedes its discursive power to the sociological Enlightenment of intimacy in private.

Post-1980 accounts of intimacy by the reflexive sociological approach began with Niklas Luhmann's *Love as Passion* (1986[1982]), and was then variously revised by Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim's *The Normal Chaos of Love* (1995[1990]), Anthony Giddens' *The Transformation of Intimacy* (1992) and Zygmunt Bauman's *Liquid Love* (2003). Commonly inspired by Luhmann’s logic of the autopoietic systems, they admit that the symbiosis of intimacy and modernity stands for a modern code of love to make possible
reflexive communications between individual persons. The reflexive coding of love thus lays stress on cognitive and/or moral aspects of intimacy at the price of over-representing its expressive aspect under a shade of emotionality, from sexuality, eroticism to affection. In consequence, inside the code, all discourses of love are allowed, appearing plausible, but, outside the code, nothing is.

It is fruitless to compare between these similar discourses in anticipation of a whole reality and meaning of love to appear. We have surpassed the challenges of positivism and hermeneutics in the question at stake. But this is not to say totality doesn’t exist. Far from it, with the reflexive turn, we are given a totality of reality and meaning within a discourse of love: we have a multiplicity of totalities. Here, readers are deprived of all critical standpoints or “prejudices” to assess particular statements, since each discourse of love has become an integral part of each theoretical project. In result, the condition of knowledge turns into a mirror reflection of the condition of love described by these discourses. If this is the case, is sociology writing love or is love writing sociology? We will not answer this meta-theoretical question until the following chapter.

For now, the sense of vertigo takes us back to the Baroque scene, making us wonder whether the real and further true nature of love in contemporary society has been captured by sociological reflexivity at all. One might even argue that, after the metaphysical Enlightenment, a sociological enlightenment is caught in what Augustine once described as “the kingdom of darkness”. However, one should note that the present “kingdom” is only semantically continuous with the medieval world, but structurally differentiated from it. After all, the current “darkness” is no longer a result of ignorance and superstition, but of reason and knowledge. Indeed, if one can see nothing in complete darkness, then one is also blind in full light. Accordingly, if critical knowledge is relatively blinded by disfiguring truth (for, a critic is biased), then reflexive knowledge is absolutely blind to sign on a death certificate of truth. On account of this, a sketch of these four reflexive accounts of love, however untruthful to the “original”, is necessary. Our textual examination shall lead us
to acknowledge the impasse of the reflexive approach, while we trace a
mystic cult of cynicism behind the "romantic enlightenment" of sociology.\textsuperscript{42}
The journey begins from the moral hostage in Bauman's case and political
womanhood in Giddens' to cultural spirituality in Beck's and scientific ecstasy
in Luhmann's.

7.1 Bauman

For Bauman, "liquid love" refers to the "connection" or "network" of "virtual
relation-seekers" in "liquid modernity". Befitting to this subject matter, groups
of short essays are collaged like a cognitive mapping of human relationships
from micro to macro societies, as the fluid idea of love ties individuals loosely
to their social environs, from families, neighbours and nations to the whole
humanity (Bauman, 2003a). Bauman's idea of love in liquid modernity is a
result of an incompatibility between his modernist-liberalist ethic and
postmodernist-communitarian morality. On the one hand, the power ethic of
modernity prefers order-building, which further leads to ethical ambivalence
for a monad. The ambivalence of love can be found factually in privatized and
socialized surrogates of love, such as the experts and money (Bauman, 1991:
201-08). On the other hand, the moral politics of postmodernity favours the
aporetic "moral party of two", which is finally rooted in moral uncertainty for a
couple. Thus, the uncertainty of love can be found counterfactually in
individual strategies of escape such as fixing (possessive love) and flowing
(noncommittal love), with flowing on the wax side (Bauman: 1993: 82-109).
But what really happens is that flowing being the last im/possible stand to a
postmodern morality of commitment is often moralized into the commitment of
religious fundamentalism. This means an actual paradox of \textit{the ethical
ambivalence of moral uncertainty itself} is obscured by Bauman's call for a
postmodern morality (after Levinas and Løgstrup). As a result, Bauman (2001:
171) is cornered to the pragmatic claim that "love needs a reason", but a
reason "as an instrument, not as an excuse, justification or hide-out."

\textsuperscript{42}Lindholm (1998) concludes "the future of love" as the end of romanticism by mis/reading
Giddens along with Weber. Any facile post-romanticist sociology of love unwittingly assumes
an innocent view of the Enlightenment, missing all together the reflexive turn of sociology. We
repeat our point made in chapter 1 that romanticism is the perverse core of the
Enlightenment. Hence, the second enlightenment of sociology is in fact a romantic
enlightenment.
So there is no consistent theory of love in Bauman's writings, not even in *Liquid Love*. Precisely so, however, his life work can be read as an endless work of love. Since understanding modernity in terms of Holocaust's "rationality of evil", Bauman abstains from any epistemology of truth to envisage a *morality of ambivalence*. An ambivalent morality is expected to cast an impossible look at the opposing terms of difference (modernity) and indifference (postmodernity) at once. So the image of knots is his typical analogy; "Gordian knots are notorious for the impossibility for untying them. Gordian knots can be only cut" (Bauman, 2002b: 299). Because the dialectical method has ceded to inconsistency, social criticism traditionally conceived (as rigorous science and politics) should then be suspended by a moral emphasis on sociological enlightenment (Nijff, 1998; Bauman, 2000b). Bauman's notion of morality is deeply seated in the life situation of a person. He confesses "it's very difficult: not to live in ambivalent conditions, but to live in ambivalent conditions and being aware that they are ambivalent. That's awfully difficult. But I fear that is the only answer I can give" (Bauman in Welzer, 2002: 108).

However, we shall see how Bauman's moral ambivalence profits from private life situations to reach a utopia of strangerhood as the fate of humanity, thereby recognizing love only in the hostage.

In hierarchical societies, the stranger referred to a distinct (under-)privileged group, constituting a sociological form as Simmel (1971: 143-49) describes it. In differentiated societies, a certain "decomposition of the Other" occurs when strangers turn "either invisible or omnipresent" (Stichweh, 1997: 9). However, it does not mean that the Other is definitively dead in modernity, but that strangers, as personages of the Other, are politically constructed and mass media represented (Bauman, 1995; Beck, 1996; Rundall, 2004). In short, the political construction of strangers thus marks their social disappearance. The disappearance of strangers means an indifference to its sociological form, since "individualization and categorization of the Other become

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43 The problem concerns whether the stranger remains a useful analytic tool, and in relation to this, whether moral ambivalence should be included as a part of social criticism, or distinguished as a reflexive method of its own right. See debates between Tabonni (1995), Stichweh (1997), Diken (1998), and Marotta (2000; 2002).
interdependent”, which “makes room for more flexible schemata for distinguishing” (Stichweh, 1997: 10). Meticulous distinguishing is evidenced in what Bauman calls “the privatization of ambivalence”, designating a violence of discrimination in liquid modernity when “private morality” guards itself from harm in an “immoral world” (Bauman, 2001a: 175-219). Private morality has many faces, ranging from communitarian and fundamentalist enthusiasm to interpersonal affections (sexuality, love and friendship) (Bauman, 2001b; 2003a). But it is a morality of collective privation.

Bauman holds the axial trajectory of modernity dashes toward time-space liquidation, by which social strangers are all excluded by way of inclusion in physical proximity, meeting without talking, living for the moment in emic places (e.g. monumental squares), phagic places (e.g. department stores), empty places (e.g. hotel rooms) and non-places (e.g. deserted areas, blank spots in mental maps) (Bauman, 2000a: 91-129). Liquid modernity is situated in an efficient individualized society, where everyone is provided with quick services, small products, light food and carefree encounters (Bauman, 2000b). The global alliance of liquidization and individualization encourages “universal strangerhood” like “conceptual Jews” (Clarke, 2002).44 “The stranger sits on the barricade, he is neither here nor there, he belongs neither inside nor outside”: this is the so-called “new anti-Semitism” (Bauman in Bielefeld, 2002: 116).

Being a Polish Jew living in Russia, Poland, and England, Bauman does view the homeless world from the eyes of a stranger (Smith, 1998). He is concerned with how the noble culture of immortality has abandoned historical actions, perverting itself into a post-historical savagery of the undead: “[e]ternity, unless it is served up for instant experience, does not matter...Infinity has been reduced to a series of ‘here and nows’; immortality, to endless recycling of births and deaths” (Bauman, 1992; 2001a: 250). In

44 Clarke (2002) suggests how psychoanalysis (via Melanie Klein) can enhance the explanatory force of sociology of the stranger, particularly in relation to the notion of conceptual Jews. In this regard, see also Kristeva (1991) for a historical psychoanalysis of xenophobia and nationalism, and Diken (1998) for attempting an integration of Kristeva and Bauman into an ambivalent social theory.
such an unlivable situation, moderation can only be regained through extremity since extreme thought counterbalances extreme reality. This is to say, since modernity has built a liquid paradise on earth, it can only be challenged by "ethereal, intangible, individualized utopias in life and death" (Morawski, 1998: 35-38; Tester, 2002: 61; Jacobsen, 2004: 68, 83). In short, Bauman’s utopia receives a fateful turn to u-topia, a non-place of the Other forever elusive to me. This is how the demise of modern politics, in its breakdown of the territory/nation/state alliance, implies a deliverance of civil societies to a “post-Trinitarian fate of humanity” (Bauman, 2002b).

In short, the condition of modernity has grown ripe enough for people to pursue intimacy with universal strangerhood as the fate of humanity. This fate is conceived simultaneously as a historical fact of the past and a moral thing to come. Bauman’s utopian formula is more concretely expressed in his near aphorisms of love and identity. With regard to love, we read, “[y]ou would hold onto the partner of your choice and to the clan that has been chosen for you by fate”; “choice, unlike the fate of kinship, is a two-way street” (Bauman, 2003a: 26, 29). And yet, the very nature of love is “giving hostages to fate” (Bauman, 2003b: 6; 2004: 63); likewise, “[n]o one says making people into your partner-in-fate is easy; but there is no other way but to try, and try, and try again” (Bauman, 2003a: 25). With regard to identity, we read again, “[t]o identify yourself with...’ means to give hostage to an unknown fate which one cannot influence, let alone control” (Bauman, 2004: 30). And yet, “[i]dentity’ is a simultaneous struggle against dissolution and fragmentation; an intention to devour and at the same time a stout refusal to be eaten” (Bauman, 2004: 77). Due to these all-too-human contradictions, Bauman could depict modernity in terms of a moral ambivalence between fate and choice only from his u-topian standpoint.

What we call the “fateful” concept of utopia is suggested by the three commentators in the reference. This fateful discourse is originated in revisionist Marxism distinguished from Leninism. This central European line of humanism stems from the Warsaw school (e.g. Leszek Kolakowski) and the Budapest school (e.g. Agnes Heller) by reading Antonio Gramsci and Gyögy Lukács. For its history, see Michal Kopecek’s ‘Socialist democracy or revolutionary consciousness? The prospects and limits of "revised" Marxism in central Europe in the 1950s and 1960s’ at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~oaces/conference/papers/Michal_Kopecek.pdf, accessed on 20 January 2005.
Nevertheless, in a time of "rampant individualization", giving hostage to fate is giving hostage to uncertainty. Bauman conceives the hostage situation in a sense of sublime urgency beyond the secular crisis of biography in "fateful moments" (cf. Giddens, 1991: 110-13). As such, Bauman assumes the possibility of moral recollection and intervention in a hostage situation. It functions like a test of moral aptitude to see if the situation could be resolved by either the victim's revolt or the kidnapper's conscience. Therefore, Bauman has ruled out state mechanisms of the police and related outside agencies to terminate the situation by force. Moreover, he has also precluded a social psychology of the Stockholm syndrome (when victim falls for the kidnapper) in an actual hostage crisis, an immanent but objective reversal of the situation to entangle matters to the worse (cf. Baudrillard, 1990b[1983]; Bauman, 1988). Finally, a hopeful future is rested on moral actions, the last solid stand in our liquid life: "in these conditions [ie. individualized modernity], like it or not, act we will, bearing the consequences of our actions or our failure to act" (Bauman, 2002a: xix). This suggests Bauman's postmodern morality of ambivalence must have colluded with the modern ethic of voluntarism.

7.2 Giddens
For Giddens, love preordained by an impersonal fate has been replaced by interpersonal intimacy which structures and is structured by neo-liberal democracy. It is the idea of romantic love which not only undermines the values of patriarchal family, especially raising women's social status, but also enhances each individual's ability to conduct reflexive conversations (Giddens, 1992: ch. 3). Just as romantic love of the 19th century untied the knot of family from generational reproduction from outside of the kinship, so technological advancement of the 20th century, such as contraception and in vitro fertilization, achieves the "socialization of reproduction", releasing the pleasure of sexuality further from biological procreation within the family (Giddens, 1992: ch. 4). However, romantic love remains tied to the sexual division of labour. Therefore, Giddens (1992: ch. 7) looks into social psychology for the direct impacts of the relation between the sexes upon sexuality. Adopting the object relations school of psychoanalysis, Giddens
argues that intimate relations are psychologically determined by the parent-child relation, a psychology socially strengthened by maternal love, alongside romantic love, in the 19th century. In light of this, although men and women might display differential interests in sex and love, they share the same social psychological constitution in the pursuit of maternal love. With this paradigm, Giddens seeks to explain the late-modern obsession with sexuality in a post-Freudian view. Criticizing Foucault for entrapping himself in the 19th century, Giddens explains genital sexuality through the role of woman/mother in our society of sexual pluralism (Giddens, 1992: ch. 2). Combining the idea of romantic love with the maternal culture and reproductive technologies, as a result, sexual power is freed from the family institution, emerging as an independent force to propel interpersonal intimacy toward a future of plastic sexuality, confluent love and pure relationships. Finally by the projection of utopian realism, intimacy is hoped to facilitate neo-liberal democracy since it allows people to learn autonomy and contract, negotiate right and obligation, and develop respect and trust (Giddens, 1992: ch. 10).

Giddens (in Bryant and Jary, 2001: 234-37) himself admits that his theoretical transition around 1990 owes to the “different” research of intimacy as a result of his personal therapy experience lasting three and a half years to “disentangle some threads of my emotional life”. This means his social theory which ends in the thesis of the “democratization of personal life” is only a step away from his Third Way political theory. Given as such, the case of intimacy is a crucial empirical study to understand to what extent Giddens’ theory of late-modernity is a logical extension of his structuration theory (cf. Giddens, 1984; 1990).

The whole thesis of intimacy revolves around the intermeshing of the public and private spheres on the one hand and utopia and reality on the other. Its general point assumes the possibility of a female culture in the transformation of societal norms, which is seen as a path towards a more equal and democratic society. Giddens endeavors to explain the modern obsession with sexuality through the role of the woman/mother in our society of sexual pluralism, emphasizing the importance of maternal love as a foundation for social and psychological constitution.

46 It is naïve to criticize Giddens for dismissing the downsides of intimacy for empirical and/or historical reasons (cf. Jamieson, 1998; Tester, 1995: 116-22). For, he does distinguish sexual from intimate relations conceptually through the discussion of obsession and codependence. He also seeks to resolve the problem of the “cult of the penis” with Klein’s post-Freudian theory of maternal love (Giddens, 1992: ch. 5-8).
of social life, since, as extended analyses of romantic and maternal love unambiguously show, the vitalization of sexual power in society mostly relies on female agents. But female culture is liable to become a male representation of womanhood. This is why, we recall, Simmel puzzles over the impossibility of a female culture due to the tragic clash between a male form of significance and a female content of beauty. This is also why accounts of women’s place in a post/modern culture often run into a theoretical problem of mediation or linkage, insofar as they begin from the premise of the public sphere idealized by the historical imagination of Greco-Roman antiquity and/or the German Enlightenment (cf. Habermas, 1992; Bauman, 1987). By contrast, Giddens’ late-modernism immediately represents a female culture by the case of intimacy. The culture of intimacy could be represented in an immediate structure, or a duality of structure, because the “knowledgeability” of intimacy characterized by sexualized love and purified relationships is mainly a product of practical consciousness and the unconscious, not theoretical consciousness. Love is no longer a thought for him. Perhaps this is why he can publicly disavow the thematization of culture from his structuration theory when saying, “I don’t recognize any specific cultural turn in social theory” (Giddens in Bryant and Jary, 2001: 248).

If one regards female culture as an empirical case of the structuration process, then the culture of romantic and maternal love might be conceived as the duality of structure, structure defined by rules and resources, medium and outcome, constraint and enablement of (female) agency which is power (Giddens, 1984: ch. 4, 174). Conversely, agency refers to the reproductive practices, structuring in a structured society at every instance. Moreover, structuration is sustained by a pseudo-deconstructive notion of agency, insofar as agency “instanciates” structural principles like virtual traces in social institutions. The notion of agency is pseudo-deconstructive since it follows a politics of social change by means of interpersonal demonstration under risk control, by definition free from danger. Giddens’ secret politics of risk, long before he agrees with Beck and others, may be inferred from his sociology of suicide threats and attempts in counter to Durkheim’s sociology of completed suicides. His sociological theory of the suicidal act, as we might call it, began
in the early 1960s with recourses to views and data from anthropology, social psychology and psychoanalysis, and finally ended by 1971 (Giddens, 1964; 1965a; 1965b; 1965c; 1971: 36-51, 97-120; 1977: 297-332). By 1980, the suicidal act was conceptualized as a mediator between agency and power, as long as there was an "intimate tie between agency and suicide. Self-destruction is a (virtually) always open option, the ultimate refusal that finally and absolutely cancels the oppressive power of others; hence suicidal acts themselves can be understood as concerned with the exercise of power" (Giddens, 1979: 149). After 1980, the mediator of suicide, as a sociological theme, vanished from Giddens' major publications, especially in his statement of structuration, in which agency, power, time-space and structure seem to evenly make up a recursive constitution of society.47 But Giddens' theory of late modernity marks a return of his early repressed thought, for the pseudo-deconstructive, reflexive power of agency is finally "suicidal agency" as we call it.48 Suicidal agency ambivalently displays the authenticity of its "act" in late-modernity. As a symptom, it is expressed in the search for intimacy when reflexive couples cope with co-dependence in the vicious cycle of addictive letting-go and compulsive tightening-up (Giddens, 1992: 49-110). As a therapy, it is manifested in the pursuit of self-identity when reflexive agents play with contingencies of their "fateful moments", striving to maintain and reverse adverse circumstances (Giddens, 1990: 109-43; cf. Thompson et al., 2002).

In short, structuration of a female culture by romantic and maternal love could be reconsidered as female agents adopting the male cunning of reason reflexively in the suicidal act. Due to her political strategy of suicide, female

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47 This is where Archer (1982; 1995: 82-87) criticizes Giddens' notion of duality for making the ontological error of "central conflation", unable to elaborate the interplay of agency and structure on the one hand and culture and structure on the other. She couldn't understand why the duality of structure and agency does not conform to a symmetrically layered form of realism. But Giddens is partly to blame for her misreading since the "intimate tie between agency and suicide" is hidden from his structuration theory.

48 This is where Schilling (1993: 200-02) and Layder (1994: 138-42) criticize Giddens for making a surreptitious shift of perspective from recursive structure/agency to reflexive system/practice. They couldn't understand the logical consistency from the constitution of society to the deconstruction of society. But what happens is not a transition between two methods or theories, but a reemergence of their vanishing mediator, suicidal agency, adumbrated in Giddens' early work.
agency is content to achieve gender equality on the male's term. In structural terms, the wax of the female power is dependent upon the wane of patriarchal structures, aiming to gain more access to rules and resources in a neo-liberal democracy. In this sense, the very form of male culture is kept intact, only its inherent sexual antagonism is intensified. This suggests that Giddens' late-modern politics of intimacy expressed in sexualized love and purified relationships must have posited the cultural representation of womanhood, forcing a mis/representation of the unrepresentable.

7.3 Beck
For Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995), the "normal chaos of love" captures best a society of individuals structurally differentiated from the society of families. They are not asserting absurdly the disappearance of the family; rather, they assess the cultural consequences in the changing structure of the family. Social structural change in the private realm produces an individualized culture of love "more impossible and more important". Specific descriptions and quasi-general explanations of empirical data are Janus-faced with no logical conclusion.\(^{49}\) Although the argument mainly revolves around the conundrum between freedom and love, an actual intervening factor lies in gender equality. This means the individualized culture of love is a direct outcome of the empowerment of women, which could further deliver the society as a whole in shaking the "feudal foundation of industrial society", namely the residual sexual division of labour within industrial capitalism. The rise of women's social status is aided by institutional factors, such as education, economy and technology, amongst others (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: ch. 1). As such, gender inequality appears the determining structure to be subverted in the social-historical contradiction of modernity.

Consequently, three proximal close relations, within couples, between mothers and children and among individuals, receive far-reaching impacts. New social problems come into view, turning around to destabilize the modern

\(^{49}\) As a thesis, specific arguments are repetitive and inconclusive to the brink of incoherence. An ironic reason is that this is a work of collaboration by the married couple writing about the normal chaos of love.
family structure. They include changing relationships, serial divorce, men's forced freedom, attention to children, personal security and crisis, and so on (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: ch. 2-5). As a result, ethical paradoxes diversify from action, authenticity to truth. In other words, love is a chaotic interpersonal experience unclassifiable by rigid political, social and/or philosophical concepts. This is why love could be defined variously as "revolution for two", "communism within capitalism", "democracy for two", "dogmatism for two", "act of confession" against "a heartless society", "pop song romance" derived from novels reading of the previous century... At last, a quasi-definition of love turns out to have a religious nature: love is a "religion without churches and without priests", a privatized "secular religion", in which lovers themselves are "subjective law-givers" who are eager to "become themselves" (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: ch. 6). The religious culture of love hence expresses what individualization is about in Beck's theory of reflexive modernization.

Beck's theory of reflexive modernization evolves via two lines of research. He works on the thesis of risk society by himself, while coauthoring with his wife Beck-Gernsheim on the thesis of institutional individualization. The thesis of risk society has expanded its explanatory scope from the (inter-)national society to world society (Beck, 1992; 1999). The thesis of individualization has grown from a structural analysis to a cultural politics of individualism (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995; 2001). Politically speaking, taking on environmental and feminist issues does have an advantage of de-territorializing political economic approaches, such as globalization theory and international politics, advancing to a kind of manifesto of cosmopolitan culture (Beck, 2000). Philosophically, Beck's radical cosmopolitanism can be read as deriving from a long tradition of human rights originated in Kant's criticism of Hobbes. To avoid being entangled by his ideological polemics, it's better to trace cosmopolitanism back to its religious nature by taking a detoured look at his evolving logic of risk.

Beck's original theory of risk society argues a modest case rooted in the German interpretive sociology (from Weber to Habermas): the politicization of
science. He refutes scientific accounts of nature, such as “immiseration of civilization” and “the end of latency”, arguing instead that the capitalist society has been caught by a knowledge economy in the sense that knowledge determines being in a self-referential “ecological communication” (Beck, 1992: 51ff, cf. Luhmann, 1989). Therefore, scientific rationality only ends in a risk consciousness of “second-hand non-experience” such as statistic probability, promoting a catastrophic society (Beck, 1992: 71ff). In counter to this, scientific rationality has to be politicized by bring in social rationalities, such as actual concerns in the local communities. At the level of international society, one can still recognize certain social roots, such as collective interests, in Beck’s politics of risk. However, the paradigm of risk gradually breaks away from reflexive modernization to a higher vantage point of world society. Beck lately differentiates his conception of reflexivity from Giddens’ structural and Lash’s cultural versions. He argues that reflexivity should be conceived as an open attitude to the future courses of things based on reflexive unawareness instead of reflective knowledge (Beck, 1999: 109-32; cf. Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). To be fair, this move can be anticipated from his mistrust in scientific discourses from the outset. Nevertheless, the problem is that unawareness assumes the world to be knowable, infinitely (Beck, 1999: 122ff). Given the assumption, what is the nature of this rationality involved in formulating a reflexive unawareness to risk? Whose rationality does it belong to? How do these unobservable, virtual risks cross the social threshold from the knowable unknown to the communicable? These questions can no longer be explained by classical sociology since a rationality of unawareness is foreign to the social production of knowledge (by experts, politicians, journalists, etc.) in the first place. They can only be known by esoteric means in an individualized world society. In this sense, Beck’s world risk society is no longer satisfied with a political integration of science and society as in risk society, but pursues a gnostic experience of the world.

In light of this, one understands better why the analogy of privatized religion to individualized love finds no point of reference to any classical sociology of religion we have discussed. It is applicable to neither Durkheim’s ritualism nor Weber’s asceticism, and most definitely not Marxist atheism. It seems
comparable to the Calvinist faith, but only to a certain extent, since this faith no longer results in an institutional certitude as Weber's account of bureaucratization has shown. Rather, the "Calvinist" faith of love refers to an uninhibited display of psychological uncertainty, describing the normal chaos of knowledge and action in an individualized society (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 174-75). But the interpretive problem is, we recall, the same psychological uncertainty in the Calvinist faith has been pointed out by Sennett (1977: 333-40) as an anxiety of self-denial, responsible for the ideology of narcissism and the tyranny of intimacy. This suggests Beck's individualized culture of love pines for neither sacred nor secular religion, but rather supra-rational spirituality, which is, at bottom, an ultra-passionate spirit of science akin to Weber's account of love in Hinduism.

7.4 Luhmann

For Luhmann, love breeds its own improbability as a generalized symbolic medium. From the social semantic of novels, he outlines an evolution of the codes of love, passing from the medieval courtly love through passionate love in the late 17th century to romantic love in the early 19th century. Note that historical data here are subjected to an evolutionary frame. So these codes can be differentiated from one another because of parallel evolutions of form, proof, morality and anthropology (Luhmann, 1986: 41-47). And yet historically, it was passionate love which unfolded a social differentiation of emotion in the 17th century. Passion synthesizes rationality and sexuality in a passive manner, thereby encouraging moral ambiguity about the tension between love and friendship. Its social consequence leads to a "relaxation of the overall social morality", enhancing one's "capacity of being a person" (Luhmann, 1986: 46-47).

In an empirical context, passionate love gives birth to personal freedom because of a moral independence of extramarital affairs from family relations.  

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50 By form, the three codes correspond to idealization, paradoxicalization and functionalization. By proof, they correspond to knowledge of the object, subjective imagination, and symbolic questioning of facts. By morality, they correspond to the problematization of "the vulgar" in extramarital affairs, of sexuality as a matter of balancing rationality and sensuality, and of love itself. By anthropology, they correspond to rationality over passion, passion over rationality, and codification over incommunicability.
In these affairs, potential lovers experience mounting pressures to take an action against the odds of mutual uncertainty about the loved one’s true intentions. But this apparent deadlock creates a “double contingency”. This condition of im/possibility does not occur until a woman gains the ability to choose freely her object of love. The historical evidence could be found in the French literature of the 17th century when “precious” courtesans moved away from the medieval mannerism of a lady’s “unattainability”, learning to play the game of ambiguity with their suitors. The paradox is that “rhetoric of excess” fosters an “experience of instability” to subsist a rational “art of seduction”. As a result, passionate love transgresses social conventions and logical demonstrations (Luhmann, 1986: ch. 6).

Passionate love gave rise to a series of differences in the 18th century. The primary difference separates plaisir from amour. Pleasure stands for a subjective experience of reality inaccessible to others, whereas love refers to the social play around secondary differences regarding truth and falsity of the information perceived during interactions. Then, the controversy over passion and reason (e.g. “does s/he love me or not?”) turns into a problem of the social systems (Luhmann, 1986: ch. 8-9). From the perspective of the primary difference, however, the 18th century remained a transitional phase in modernity. Modernity proper refers more specifically to the process of individualization initiated by romantic love in the 19th century (Luhmann, 1986: ch. 10). Nevertheless, the 18th century signified a transitional discovery of “incommunicability” induced by radical differentiations between and within primary and secondary differences. Passionate love is not a code equipped enough to shape individuality since individuality requires a simpler codification than incommunicability. Thus, sincerity emerges as a new code to stand in for

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51 It is important to note that, except for the subjective feeling of excess which got an evolutionary advantage, passionate love bounded in a rational art of seduction did adapt to conventional morality in the late 17th century. That is why, parallel to passionate love, the half-rationality of friendship between passion and marriage could replace the rigid morality of gallantry. Comparatively, friendship in the early 18th century then turned into a regression toward the medieval morality of gallantry (Luhmann, 1986: ch. 7). Hence Luhmann’s account of friendship stands in a sharp contrast to Habermas’ account of the public sphere.

52 Conceptually, the primary difference is, in Bateson’s words, “the difference that makes a difference”. In the current context, it refers to the distinction between visible and invisible modes of communication, that is, the differentiation of human beings as an individual body and mind from social systems.
incommunicability. Since passionate love prefers emotion to rational judgment, making pleasure, the question of happiness, the only criterion of reality, sincerity, the question of truthfulness, is added to overcome the incommunicable passion. As a consequence, modern intimacy regards the systemization of individuality, consisting of romantic love, unconscious incorporation of sexuality, socialization of the reproductive function of the family, amongst other factors. Luhmann (1986: 127-128) insists that the romantic love complex is a historically relative code, codifying the im/possibility of communication by way of self-organization. Since each individual's bodily and psychic experiences has become opaque like black boxes, romantic love functions as a transparent code for people to communicate through secondary differences along the signifying chain. Far from a linear evolution toward either personality or anonymity, the self-referential evolution of love bears a witness to the differentiation between personal and impersonal systems, including their mutual mis/references (Luhmann, 1986: 12-17, 170-71).

Luhmann’s Love as Passion published in 1982 might be read as a transitional case study before the presentation of his systems theory in 1984 which provided a platform for his observations of different subsystems, including the environment, economy, science, politics, social movements, mass media, etc. Meanwhile, this work might also be read as a natural outcome of Luhmann’s early writings on religion and morality which applied his (less systemic) theory of differentiation in the 1970s. Structurally speaking, love takes over the social functions of religion and morality, opening an evolutionary course of modernity based on the logic of the social systems. Semantically, systems theory itself originates in a theory of love. In Luhmann’s theory of love, moral ambiguity is cultivated in the interpersonal realm. The codification of intimacy from courtly to romantic love is initiated by the middle code of passion in an evolutionary sense, since a passion for pleasure creates the primary difference in a subject experiencing an inner excess.

A systemic consequence of excess is interpenetration. Luhmann’s concept of interpenetration has an important role to play in the systems theory.
Interpenetration refers to a mutual construction of complexity between two systems. In fact, there are two separated modes of interpenetration: "intersystem interpenetration" operates between a social and a human system, whilst "interhuman interpenetration" operates between two human systems. In interhuman interpenetration, complexity emerges when both human systems (think they) have gained an access to each other's experiences and actions. Actions and experiences are conceived in a concatenation of events, which are "ways of relating" or "connectivity" without assuming any meta/physical existence and change of elements (Luhmann, 1995a: 215). Accordingly, communication means an "interpenetration of complexity" since an inter-human systemic relation is equivalent to an inter-environmental relation. But interpenetration does not apply to the visual image of a partial overlapping of two circles since the complexity of another human system can often penetrate deep into the center of a human system, fundamentally changing its operation (Luhmann, 1995a: 217-19). Therefore, interpenetration presupposes autopoiesis. Autopoiesis refers to an operative closure of a system, while it opens up to the complexity of the environment. By means of interpenetration, autopoiesis and complexity, two boundary-opening systems are constructed at once like two virtual identities. In this sense, interhuman interpenetration describes the formal process of communication in modern intimacy.

Second, interhuman interpenetration is evolved from intersystem interpenetration (Luhmann, 1995a: 210-12, 223-24). The two modes of interpenetration share the same operating mechanisms, but the intersystem mode is operated between personal and impersonal systems, namely human beings and social institutions. Luhmann's modernity means primarily a differentiation of human systems from the social systems, or when human systems gradually become an environment to the social systems. He fully acknowledges that the human body/mind subsystems have been penetrated

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53 The term "human" is chosen carefully to bypass the humanist notion of personality. It refers to "the social identification of a complex of expectations directed toward an individual human being" (Luhmann, 1995a: 210). In addition, a human system is different from a social system in that the former is composed of subsystems of the body/mind, commonly known as human beings.
by the social systems via politics, economy and sexuality into a "symbiotic mechanism". Nevertheless, Luhmann insists that this intersystem "integration", or "colonization" in Habermas' term, is not possible without having posited the opacity of human body and mind. In this sense, it is more naïve than critical to say that the "binary schematization" of modern love (e.g. either/or) has assimilated to the semiotic strategy of intersystem interpenetration. Rather, the opacity of human body and mind is the immediate condition of possibility for interhuman interpenetration independent from the mediated condition of intersystem interpenetration.

Finally, the two modes of interpenetration are distinguished by emotion. Human systems cannot operate without emotions, but social systems can. Emotion in this context has transcended the mind-body dualism since human body and language can be penetrated by the social systems (Luhmann, 1995a: 228). For example, social subsystems such as mass media and medical welfare have penetrated the interhuman means of verbal conversation and bodily care. In sum, although both modes of interpenetration presume incommunicability, and both penetrate language and the body by means of binary schematization and symbiotic mechanisms, interhuman interpenetration has an extra emotional capacity. Therefore, the evolutionary contribution of intimacy is reconfirmed. Passionate pleasure, the excessive experience of the human systems, is the precondition of interhuman interpenetration and intersystem interpenetration, the emotional motor of modernity.

Too intimate and yet too strange, passion is ultimately opaque to the solitary thinking subject, not to mention inter-subjective speaking subjects. This is why Luhmann objects to classical humanism. But such an overwhelming pleasure

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54 Luhmann (1995: 229-251) gives several examples to explicate how interpenetration overcomes incommunicability by means of binary schematization and symbiotic mechanisms of language and the body. Binary schematization always adopts a moral interpretation of norms to produce a moral crisis. One can counteract such crises by socialization, such as moral education. Cases of symbiotic mechanisms can be found in the two modes of interpenetration. On the one hand, symbiosis occurs in the intersystem government of the body by the state, market and sexuality. On the other hand, symbiosis involves in the interhuman development of the bodily potentials in the name of "youth", including dance, music, play and sport.
reveals a collective experience of ecstasy in the mystic cult. What lovers enjoy in love is not the transcendent, impersonal God, but a personal god, or rather two personal gods, which are at one with each by means of the other. This suggests that Luhmann's scientific codification of love is the flipside of a mystical experience of ecstasy.

From Bauman's postmodern morality to Luhmann's modern science, we might conclude that the reflexive approach has alchemized a scientific morality of love. This reflexive morality rationalizes love as a sign coded in the system of communication. In the virtual name of love, individual selves are bound to experience personal enjoyment through the physical proximity of others. Sustained by a collective fantasy, the reflexive rationality celebrates a cynical morality of public masturbation (since a cynic can only enjoy himself through the gaze of the other), which is neither private nor public intercourse, and yet nor private masturbation.
Chapter 8  Autopoietic Societies of Love

In the previous chapter, we serialized four reflexive accounts of love from Bauman to Luhmann, only to find a scientific morality supported by a mystic cult of cynicism. But setting Bauman and Luhmann aside, one could at least speak for Giddens and Beck that they do propose a radical cultural politics which has reformed the force of criticism through reflexivity. Nevertheless, this defense denies that the fundamental principle of reflexivity concerns the de-problematization of critical problems. Specifically, cultural politics (the personal is the politicized) is not a simple subversion of economic politics (the personal is the privatized). Rather, a reflexive subversion is a ceaseless operation of inclusive exclusion. In this sense, reflexive rationality stands for the simulation of critical reason, a pseudo-criticism.

Such a sociological pseudo-criticism appears more unsettling in actual social settings. If “the most dangerous characteristic” of modernity is “the disappearance of taboos”, its prevailing outcome is moral neutralization (Kolakowski, 1990: 12). In a world of moral neutralization, everyone is judging and being judged. But if all social values could be subjected to mindless and lawless questioning by a reflexive spin, then what we have is a society of secrets and scandals, accusations and counter-accusations, a melodramatic society much more sinister than the society of the spectacle. Not even neotribalism can be immune from the social logic of witchcraft and sorcery practiced in tribalism. With a certain evil intelligence superior to the sociology of reflexivity, the contemporary reflexive society has been living in a real nightmare, whilst reflexive sociologists rest content with a utopian realism.

So to the subjective question of the author in the writing of love and sociology (is sociology writing love, or is love writing sociology?), we can respond by objectifying love as a mirror between sociology and society. We hold that only by fully submitting oneself to the excessive love of reflexivity in current sociology and society could one encounter the limit of its validity. Following
the methodological rule, in this chapter, we posit a structural homology
between current sociology and society, and then proceed to explicate it in a
historical-institutional situation with recourse to Foucault's study of bio-politics.
We will argue Foucault rightly points out that late/modern governmentality
targets sexualized individuals, not couples in love. Henceforth, an
in/communicative irony in the reflexive discourses of love reverts back to a
paradox performed by the solitary thinking subject. But before our contextual
exposition begins, a closer look at the irony of communication in Luhmann's
social systems would be helpful.

8.1 Luhmann's irony
In the section on Luhmann of the previous chapter, we concluded his science
endorses a morality of public masturbation on the pretext that his theory of
love reveals nothing but a collective experience of ecstasy. No longer able to
imagine each others' subjective experiences, lovers end up communicating
the incommunicable by codes. Furthermore, if Luhmann's coding theory of
love does play a crucial role in the development of his systems theory, as we
have suggested, then his social systems must operate at a reflexive level of
communication beyond human imagination. Now, without losing ourselves in
more elaborate operations of the subsystems, such as economy and mass
media, we can reestablish Luhmann's theoretical making of social systems
from his basic concepts of society, communication, rationality and religion.

Derived from his early rejection of neo-empiricism, Luhmann's systems theory
practices an epistemology “between semi-determinism and methodological
decisionism.” Admitting the objectivity of value judgments, his sociology of
“functional equivalences” captures selective meanings through the reduction
of complexity (Zolo, 1986). By this method, his theory of society claims to
reunite divided objects of analysis, action and system, in two sociologies. He
finds that functional, critical and empirical sociologies all commit the paradox
of relating a surface case to an underlying cause. The emergence of a
paradox is tied to the demise of an objective observer. But the loss of a two-
valued, objective subject may be overcome in his theory by re-describing
modern society as a self-describing, self-observing and finally self-referential
system. In effect, nothing lies behind a case. Meanwhile, everything could be raised to a "cause" according to the rule of a multi-valued distinction, positing that the second observer can see what the first observer fails to see (Luhmann, 1994; 1995b). Historically, the coming of a systems society signified the passing of a political society (societas civilis) since the French Revolution. It marked a crisis of "societal" legitimacy, participation and representation. In response, legal despotism was created but failed as a political tool of reunification since parliamentary representation ended up representing particular interests bereft of the whole. As a result, the representation of society operates within a systems society of functional differentiation as opposed to stratified hierarchy (Luhmann, 1987). Arriving at a formal and unified concept, Luhmann (1991) then insists society could no longer be understood as human beings or territories to suggest a self-referential subject. Quite the contrary, it should be treated as "a self-describing object", "an operatively closed autopoietic system". By his definition, a systems society is re-produced via communication, operating recursive distinctions between information, utterance and mis/understanding. Human relationship is an environment to social systems. "Society is the comprehensive system of all communications." (Luhmann, 1991: 73) In other words, society refers to an insubstantial dimension of communicative operations, organizing people and things across time-space.

From very early on, Luhmann (1982) had appreciated the unity of Parsons' action-system theory from an advanced view of self-reference and complexity. Self-reference, also known as "reentry of indication", is "a structural feature of objective systems", by which time-space paradoxes can be resolved to build a functional hierarchy and regain a unity of difference. Complexity, on the other hand, is the cause and consequence of rationality toward selectivity and order, by which an analytical theory and action can wed with value-orientation. In effect, Parsons' early concept of action as an actor's situational relation to the object (i.e. the unit act) is transcended, and his late concept of action as a limited emergence of the system (i.e. AGIL-grid) is radicalized. Meanwhile, Parsons' concepts of interpenetration and media of interchange, "the kernel of his theory", are developed to describe the "consequences of differentiation". 
Examined closely, however, Luhmann went through a theoretical transition from the vantage point of action to that of communication around 1980 (Stichweh, 2000). Up until the late 1970s, he had affirmed action as the elemental form of society, rejecting the thesis of two sociologies. In 1979, he started to consider action in time as an event. By 1984, communication took the place of action as the ground of Luhmann's sociological/social systems. Relevant intellectual contexts include studies done in the late 1940-60s, such as information and communication theories, pragmatics and analytic philosophy, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Relevant theoretical problems involve the distinctions between psychological and social systems, experience and action, observation and operation, and finally autopoiesis and communication. On the new basis of communication, the explanatory scope of sociology thus expands from industrial society to information society on the one hand, and from human society to world society on the other. In general terms, communication is an operation of endless distinctions (between information, utterance and mis/understanding) by a risky preference. Hence, objective values are always implied but never realized. Denied any access to thought, communication is a property of social systems independent from the psychological system, so "only communication communicates". Nonetheless, communication might be upset by consciousness when scripts of contiguous words and images are perceived as "inverted system-reference" (Luhmann, 2002: 155-68). This means "the mind has the privileged position of being able to disturb, stimulate and irritate communication. The mind cannot instruct communication, because communication instructs itself." In sum, two different systems, the human mind and non-human communication, interpenetrate autopoietically without identification (Luhmann, 2002: 176-77, 182-84). Between the "structural coupling" of public language and private language, or social order and individual freedom, communication produces a differential form of rationality (Luhmann, 1991: 74-79).

Placing Luhmann's society of communication systems back in Western historical culture, one can then appreciate his challenge to the Old European rationality, as he often calls it. The Old European rationality supposed the
continuity of thought and being, as well as action and nature. The disappearance of a universal observer began from the late Middle Ages (skeptical nominalism) through the Enlightenment (critical rationalism) to Hegelianism (dialectic idealism). Since then, the West has been living in the epistemological consequences of paradox and distinction. The appearance of global communication contributed by the invention of printing, the discovery of America, the establishment of modern disciplines, and the cultivation of the critical public (via novels reading) sets a new historical scene for the Western experience. In this context, Luhmann rejects any reactionary rationality comparable to Far Eastern mysticism, such as Zen Buddhism, since they still believe one could reach at the level of an “unobservable observer” by cultivating oneself to become an extramundane, transcendental, immediate and pluralistic subject. By contrast, Luhmann, while admitting the loss of the classical subject, takes a step back to stand by an “observable observer” in a second-order observation. As such, paradox and distinction can be reunified in the “distinction of distinction” drawn from Spencer-Brown’s form of reentry, promising the differentiation of functional systems (Luhmann, 1998a: 22-42).

In an empirical sense, Luhmann’s modernity features individualized technologies without alienation, self-describing economies without reification, and contingent futures redrawn from the unmarked space of the present as a “border value” (Luhmann, 1998a: 1-21). He would encourage a contingent morality, advising us to take the risk of decision by endless trials against the ecological views of opaque fate and transparent knowledge (Luhmann, 1998a: 70ff; 108ff). Thus, Luhmann is not a romanticist in the conventional sense of opposing to the Enlightenment. By challenging the Old Europe, he regards himself as a New European rationalist, we argue, based on a mystical redescription of Christianity.

The secret of Luhmann’s theory is disclosed in an elective affinity between religion and social systems (Luhmann, 1998a: 43; 1998b: 68-69). Given that

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55 One cannot afford to miss the fact that religion has a privileged place in Luhmann’s theoretical edifice from the beginning to the end. We are referring to his very early work on The Function of Religion (1977[1972]) and other essays (1988b), and his very last writings published posthumously as The Religion of Society (2004[2002]). Known as a contemporary grand theorist in German scholarship, Luhmann’s systems theory has a striking resemblance
he has modernized the Old European rationality to a second-order observation whilst rejecting Eastern mysticism as a reactionary rationality not unlike the Old Europe, we might wonder if there is any religious significance left for a modern observer. In the first approach, because religion and social systems both seek to "de-paradoxize" life, "it seems as if the concept of God has only provided a dress rehearsal for society, with the unexpected side effect of semantically preparing society's entry into the modern world" (Luhmann, 1998a: 55, 1998b: 183-224). However, "the theological prototype of the observer of the system in the system is the Devil!" (Luhmann, 1991: 69) If the very moral distinction of good and evil sustains evil, then by playing the tragic role of observing the universal observer God, the Devil shows himself to be a fundamental monotheist (that is, monogamist), the keenest lover (that is, of God) (Luhmann, 1998b: 235-37). In this de-paradoxical viewpoint, sociologists, anthropologists and even theologians are irreconcilable with lay believers since they are doomed to a sinful life of knowledge with no innocent sense of belief (Luhmann, 1998b: 66, 243). On the other hand, even laymen's beliefs in hell, ghosts and witches as an integral part of a theodicy of fate to explain human sufferings are considered to have dwindled in the modernization of religion (Luhmann, 1998b: 64, 199). Thus, the overall religious sentiment in a modern society turns closer to the mystical faith of Nicholaus Cusanus, for whom God exists in an Other side of distinction, as well as of distinction and in-distinction (Luhmann, 1998b: 238). As such, the paradox of God and the Devil is reunited in a form of reentry by drawing a further distinction. The mystic unity with God ends up in an ecstasy of universal differences. While insisting that even caprice has a determinative structure underneath it, Luhmann states "God's command is a form of freedom" favourable to relativism, whereas the fear of relativism is Devil's moral trickery (Luhmann, 1988b: 245). In result, a modern observer of the system within the system turns out to be a mystic virtuoso speaking a scientific dialect.
Identifying the second-order observer with a scientific-mystic virtuoso explains why Luhmann's social semantics prefers differentiated social structures since they produce only "legitimate" knowledge from "stable and repeatable" communication. At bottom, systems theory recognizes only regularized social semantics after it "seriously exercises" other inter-systemic, semi-meaningful discourses in popular cultures (Staheli, 1997). In this sense, the co-evolution of cultural semantics and structural differentiation marks a nonconsensual consensus between a religious dogmatic and a social evolutionist, as the in/communication between theology and sociology reconciles with the liberal modern world (cf. Luhmann, 1988b: 71-182). In effect, Luhmann's *Religion of Society* reaffirms every modernist thesis one is already familiar with, such as differentiation and secularization, except that it is written in a coded language like a minute of communications by social systems themselves (Luhmann, 2004).

Luhmann's making of his systems theory from the remaking of the concepts of society, communication, rationality and religion looks immaculate. In the beginning, things appeared how they had been full of paradoxes beneath certainty. There was no history. But a new rationality based on objectified judgments of value came to resolve these paradoxes with formalization, differentiation and functionalization. Hence, these paradoxes have not been worked through, but rather diverted by drawing a meaningful distinction. Decomposing into insignificant differences, things become how they will be full of contingencies beyond paradox. The future will not happen. To communicate in the unity of differences (not opposites), social systems practice a technological mysticism. Due to the indifferent mystery of being, distinctions are obligatory even though they merely trans/forms life paradoxes into a virtual evolution of society. The evolved differences do not lead the world to get a glimpse of heaven or hell, but constantly reenter the world to trim and enrich it, unmarking it as a non-place beyond recognition and remarking it as an event beyond imagination. For Luhmann, communication of social systems is an allegory of love since paradoxical passion has turned into a distinctive code insensitive to subjective thought (e.g. "Mate, do you have a girlfriend or not?"; "Honey, do you love me or not?"). Yet, an ironic
consequence of such love is that social communication eventually goes on without lovers' personalities involved (e.g. "Listen, they are together..."; "Look, we are an item!"). Hence, we may conclude the irony of social systems by asking — has human communication ever begun?

8.2 From Parsons to Foucault

We have deliberated upon Luhmann's irony of social systems, the scientific horizon of all reflexive discourses of love. Now we turn around to examine the institutional condition of these discourses via the historical contextualization of modern sociology. We expect that few Western intellectuals would contest the thesis that humanity has been reaping the bittersweet fruit of modernity from 1789 through 1968 up to now. However, the epochal view glosses over a difficult rite of passage in the 1970s when social systems grew mature from an antagonistic to an adaptable state of discontentment. If modern society in the postwar period might be described by material and symbolic excesses, late/modern sociology represented its surplus values as it wavered between criticism and analysis. In result, we should examine the modernization of sociology itself from a vocation to a profession.

The impetus of late/modern sociology since 1970 was derived from a supposed incommensurability between the bourgeois revolution of 1789 and the student movement of 1968. The social-historical logic of change, albeit remaining collective, appeared to have altered its mode of organization. Within sociology, we could discern two phases of intellectual shift. At the first phase, late/modern sociology was disenchanted with the crisis consciousness of European classical sociologists between 1880 and 1920, whose morality entwined individuals and society in a tragic fate. At the second phase,

56 We restrict our genealogy to the confines of modern sociology. But the paradigm shift was not enclosed to sociology. On a larger background of modern philosophy, arguably, there were already four cognitive revolutions taking effects around the 1960s. The early 20th century went through an intellectual change of climate from Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology since the 1920-30s, through Sartre's and de Beauvoir's existentialism since the 1940-50s, to Lévi-Strauss' and Piaget's structuralism since the 1950-60s (above all anticipated by de Saussure and Mauss besides other literary and artistic movements). Meanwhile, revolutionary developments from the cognitive sciences included a) analytic philosophy of everyday language by Wittgenstein and Austin; b) phenomenology of everyday life by Schutz and Luckman; c) cognitive psychology by Simon and Bateson; d) second-order system theory by Maturana and Varela.
late/modern sociology was dissatisfied with the naïve consciousness of American Parsonians and liberal Marxists between 1920 and 1960, whose morality promoted individual action and collective praxis. In the process, the boundary between social analysis and social criticism turned increasingly blurred. Particularly since Lockwood's (1976[1964]) thesis of two integrations (system/parts versus social/people), a late/modern theory of society was elaborated, in which Parsons' and Marx's spirits roamed. In place of classical dualism, a late/modern theory of structure and agency was expected to open the unknown future by revaluing creative individuals' practices in everyday life.

In this sense, the Parsonian "tradition" became irreplaceable for its transitional character. Parsons (1937; 1970) established an analytical framework of action and system to analyze modern society, a paradigm unrivalled by other conflict theorists (e.g. Coser, Rex and Darendorf). Theoretical reconfigurations settled down by the late 1980s. On the one hand, Munch, Luhmann and Alexander insisted on radicalizing Parsons' sociology in functional and systemic terms (Munch, 1981; 1982; Luhmann, 1982; Alexander, 1984; Alexander and Colomy, 1985; Mouzelis, 1999). Mainly due to abstractive theoretical language, the reception of post-Parsonian systems theories remains limited. On the other Habermas, Mouzelis, Giddens and Archer formulated the sociology of structure and agency against their bête noire Parsons. Meanwhile, since Parsons' theoretical position had been counterbalanced by Lockwood's introduction of a Marxist standpoint, the question of structure and agency developed into a variety of theses, including Habermas' first-degree perspectivism (1987), Mouzelis' second-degree perspectivism (1974; 1997), Giddens' duality (1993[1976]: 169; 1979: 49-95), and Archer's dualism (1982; 1996b). The methodological debates occurred within as well as between a new social epistemology (Habermas vs. Mouzelis) and a new social ontology (Giddens vs. Archer).

57 The subtle assimilation of criticism within analysis in Lockwood's account provokes the problematic of structure/agency in late/modern sociology. Therefore, his analysis is not to be confused with similar theses, such as two sociologies or two Parsons (Dawe, 1973; Menzies, 1976).
But a Parsonian form of analysis (characterized by the unit act, pattern variables of value orientation, generalized symbolic media of interchange, and the AGIL-schema) was explicitly targeted and implicitly preserved by the sociology of structure and agency, as if it was a middle ranged theory of society in bridging the disjointed levels of action and system (Habermas, 1981; Giddens, 1984; Mouzelis, 1995; Archer, 1995). Accordingly, we have a theory of communicative action, a theory of power hierarchy, a theory of structuration, and a theory of morphogenesis. Collectively, these discourses of structure and agency have completed a Marxian translation of Parsons' paradigm, ending up neither Parsonian nor Marxian, but more neo-Weberian, or philosophically neo-Kantian. Given the current common interest in multiple degrees of perspective and types of agency, we wouldn't be too surprised at witnessing a critical Marxist converting to a reflexive Weberian. The only question is whether this conversion stands for a "relapse" of will-to-power in asserting social revolution, or an "advance" of will-to-love in supporting the evolution of social systems.

From this theoretical constellation, three observations can be made. First, a cognitive map of late/modernity has been drawn up by a differentiated model of society composed of concepts like system, structure, agency and inter/action. In the model, one expects a radicalization of antagonism between autopoetic system and interactive action as soon as the rules of structure and agency are set up in between. With these rules at hand, one averts the danger of falling back on Parson's theoretical edifice. But the price to be paid is that these rules are supposed to explicate specific mechanisms of system and inter/action in an empirical setting. In consequence, a social theory of structure/agency accedes to that of system/action. We have seen in the previous chapter that the development of Giddens' writings is a vivid example of this irony. In short, as soon as structuration theory is applied to an institutional analysis of late-modernity, "abstract system" runs away from the

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58 A representative case of such a conversion can be found in later Lockwood's work *Solidarity and Schism*. As a leading British sociologist of the conflict school, Lockwood (1992) inverts Parsons' question of order into a questioning. His thesis manages to integrate Durkheimian and Marxian sociologies (social anomie and economic contradiction) from a Weberian frame of analysis (cultural rationalization versus fatalism) (cf. Mouzelis, 1993: 578; Turner, 1995: 167).
reflexive control of agency. Sooner or later, the controversy over the relative autonomy of system and (inter-)action returns, which has occurred in post-Parsonian functional and systems theories.\textsuperscript{59}

Second, one possible response to the above controversy is to develop a layered theory of agency. The explanatory scope of agency causation is then enlarged to include means only loosely linked to social institutions, means borrowed from natural and human sciences (e.g. biology, psychology, history philosophy, etc). Again, we have seen that Giddens' writings from the very outset are fraught with psychological and philosophical meditations. These elements take actual effects in his later analysis of self-identity and intimacy as notions like ontological security, biographical zoning, anxiety, trust and risk build up a vague concept of agency. After all, once the duality of structure has been accepted, there is little reason to reject the duality of agency based on autopoietic subjectivities homologous to Luhmann's autopoietic social systems. In consequence, reflexive sociology of structure and agency turns into a general theory of agency \textit{sui generis} reminiscent of later Parsons' general system of action, which has also occurred since the 1990s.\textsuperscript{60}

Third, abandoning the vocation of evolution as well as revolution, late/modern sociology finds its professional task in bettering people's welfare in everyday life. The independence of the life-world is recognized as a late/modern condition, irrespective of Habermas' critique of colonization (Habermas, 1987: 156ff). Beyond criticism, late/modern sociology has accomplished a reflexive adaptation to the maintenance of everyday practices. No wonder Giddens endorses an unbroken chain of theory and "practice" \textit{qua} application. His

\textsuperscript{59}The case could be found in several rounds of debate caused by Goffman's notion of "interaction order" (Goffman, 1983; Rawls, 1987; 1988; 1989; Fuchs, 1988; 1989; Levine, 1989; Mouzelis, 1992). In the process, relevant ideas of Simmel, Parsons and Luhmann are drawn into the debate. The central point of contention lies in whether face-to-face interaction has an order \textit{sui generis} distinguished from social systems in modernity. Doubtlessly, they are dealing with a case of "the end of society".

sociology promises a user-friendly toolkit, joining in the service industry of knowledge. It is a matter of fact that late/modern sociology is no longer sustainable without feeding empirical analyses and predictions useful to the interests of the life-world prior to the system. Indeed, the sign value of a social scientific research is now determined by its empirical relevance and policy implications. More service than practice, professional sociology survives in the modern world through the revitalization of everyday life.

Given as such, we are tempted to argue that late/modern sociology "reflects" an economic society since the 17th century when scientific revolution prepared the material condition for the emergence of private life. The bourgeois right to privacy is "the social" in Arendt's (1958) sense, a domain of household consumption accumulating to the common wealth of a nation. The birth of the social sustains her tragic view of privatization since the public virtue of excellence (arête) in leading a life of thinking and action (vita contemplativa and vita activa) has lost to a thoughtless process of labour. However, this economic negativism cannot account for an affluent society.

We are also tempted to argue that modern sociology "projects" a political society from the 18th century onwards. The medieval way of life was a "natural artifice". The question of "how is society possible" only started to make sense in the era of "critique and crisis" (Tester, 1992: 6; Koselleck, 1988). In result, the transition from Tradition (asymmetrical reciprocity based on divine providence) to the Enlightenment (symmetrical reciprocity based on society) marks an imaginative construction of society in response to the crisis of religious life (Tester, 1992: 15ff). An imagined society has been operating by the authority of love since the 19th century. Paternalism creates an "authority of false love" (e.g. employers), while autonomy expresses an "authority without love" (e.g. experts) (Sennett, 1993: ch. 2-3).61 Both illegitimate forms provoke psychological negation, thereby standing for the "fear of authority"

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61 Sennett (1993: 52-54) lays out an evolutionary typology of authority: patriarchy, patrimonialism and paternalism. Ancient patriarchy originated in oeconomy or family economy distributes property and power according to kinship. Medieval patrimonialism derived from manorial societies keeps a contractual relationship with the seigneurs. Modern paternalism results from the separation of work from the family during industrialization. In paternalism, employers present themselves as patriarchs, "fathers" in a symbolic sense of the contract.
But if one follows Hegel's dialectic of recognition, authority could be transformed since it is after all the work of imagination (Sennett, 1993: ch. 1, 4). Neither a thing nor an illusion, authority might be reshaped by applying a private ethic of discussion to the public domain in a metaphoric way (Sennett, 1993: 190-97). The political imagination of society echoes the sociological thesis of detraditionalization defined as "the internalization of authority" (Heelas, 1996: 2). As a matter of "relative degree", detraditionalization prefers radical individualization to the coexistence with tradition (Heelas, 1996: 3-11). However, this political positivism cannot explain a mass society.

An affluent mass society, especially in the West, is a comfortable and learned society, a society of material and symbolic excesses. The crisis of the welfare state, the ideology of a decentralized government, the popularization of higher education, global network capitalism, visualized consumption, and virtualized technology all contribute to the multiplication and excrescence of social reality. Surviving by the surplus values of society, late/modern sociology has become an integral part of the social condition it tries to represent. In this symbiosis, there is no longer any need for a "great refusal" as Marcuse once believed; meanwhile, Beck's vision of a reflexive "new beginning" seems even less likely. On the contrary, a compromise with and a flight from paradoxes of life might describe better the adult character of reflexive sociology: structuration and differentiation are their proper professional names.

We argue that the co-evolution of late/modern sociology and everyday life "embodies" the social, dissolving the split of private economy and public politics. In a response to the crisis of families in the post-1848 France, a hybrid system of "flotation" prefigured the invention of the social (Deleuze in Donzelot, 1980: xvi). Preoccupied with "social problems" ranging from delinquency through sexual disorder to personal hygiene, the social was made up of a complex alliance of "tutelary" agencies, such as judicial courts, social work, psychiatry, pedagogy and medicine. It functioned as if there were a real life/time of the social in need of maintenance by these organs, preventing the social body from growing old and ill. Death, moreover, became
an omnipresent object of anxiety for the social. Rift by “antinomies inherent in the political foundation of the sovereignty of all”, which are justice and freedom above all, the Third Republic invented the social as a political strategy of diversion. The social heralded the arrival of modern welfare states (État-providence) to overcome at once traditionalism and liberalism at the turn of the 20th century. Political responsibility ceded to the ideology of “social progress”. The socialization of risk was programmed by the “homogeneous language of statistics” to secure the “organic solidarity” of (social) right (Donzelot, 1992). Surpassing the metaphysics of political sovereignty, social solidarity created a “consensus society” to promote the social and the individual, security and freedom at the same time (Donzelot, 1991: 174). According to this historical narrative, the subsequent crisis of providential states after the 1960s can no longer be seen as a sign of the revival of liberalism or communism in any neo-forms. Rather, the crisis of welfare states marks the failure of politics and the success of the social as the state and society drift further apart to make “the simultaneous enlargement freedom and security” the only way to social democracy. This “middle way” sums up the ideological debate between neo-liberalism and neo-social democracy, since both agree that a society must progress through dynamic social bonds instead of static social structures. Therefore, the cry over the crisis of the social signifies “the crisis in the growth of the social, since the debate is only about alternative modalities of the social bond, not about that opposition between differing ideals of the social order which the social-democratic strategy had undertaken to exorcise” (Donzelot, 1991: 177-78). Constructing love as a malleable social bond in everyday life, late/modern sociology has un/wittingly identified itself with the consummative agent of the social.

8.3 Foucault’s paradox
For Foucault, the social exercise of bio-politics is an exercise of governmentality. He provides us with a short history of governmentality. From Machiavelli’s advices to the prince to Rousseau’s invention of sovereignty, a process toward the “governmentalization of the state” occurred between the 16th and the 18th century. The historical transition started from the medieval state of justice, though the state of management around the 15th and the 16th
centuries, to the state of government after the 16th century. Based on the protocol of security, the modern state exercises its governing power by collecting pieces of knowledge about its population and territory (Foucault, 1991[1978]: 87-104). Moreover, the changing rationale of governmentality is not only expressed in social ideas, but also in imaginary narratives, common practices and disciplinary discourses (Foucault, 1988[1981]: 154-60). In practice, governmentality refers to political techniques of surveillance applied to individuals, which induces "the police" (polizei). Policing is different from the Christian and princely surveillance traditions due to the deployment of raison d'etat. In other words, the state looks for an immanent source of objectivity apart from God and the prince by recourse to political knowledge. Policing technologies result in several historical effects, such as consolidating empirical power, historicizing inter-state competition, and marginalizing individuals (Foucault, 1988: 146-52). The overall impact leads to individualization and totalization at once, insofar as the individual is given a value of the particular and the universal at the same time in the statistical pool of population (Foucault, 1988: 162). In short, governmentality is formed by an alliance of the police technologies and empirical rationality.

Furthermore, the subject of bio-political governmentality refers to sexualized individuals, not couples in love. In this sense, the incommunicative irony in the reflexive discourses of love is paradoxically confirmed in the guise of a solitary thinking subject. This is why Foucault stresses that adolescent masturbation was a key social problem in the 19th century (Foucault, 1980[1976]: 104, 120-21). His essay ‘Sexuality and solitude’ sums up further the Western history of subjectivity (cf. also Foucault, 1985[1982]; 1986). In the essay, Foucault (1997[1981]: 175-83) argues that modern sexuality deploys “technologies of the self” quite distinct from Habermas’ tripartite interests of knowledge, production, communication and domination. The Christian technique of confession should be valued in itself with regards to truth and sexuality. Genealogically, asceticism was not an invention of medieval Christianity, but could be dated further back to Stoicism in late antiquity. Nonetheless, the transition of sexual problematic from penetration to masturbation didn’t gain an institutional form only since Christianity to help develop a dimension of
subjectivity from relation to non-relation, action to thinking, or intimacy to solitude. This could be exemplified by the contrast between a pagan text and a Christian one in the Roman imperial period: Artemidorus' *The Interpretation of Dreams* and Augustine's *City of God*. In Artemidorus' text, sexual dreams were often expressed via the scene of penetration (as an act). Sexual positions in these dreams had no Freudian implications of a family romance, but were related to the male dreamer's social position (cf. also Foucault, 1986: 4-36). By contrast, Augustine's depiction of the sexual act emphasized emotional and bodily spasm, clearly a masturbating individual out of self-control. Adam was supposed to have sex only for procreation in Heaven. In view of this, Adam's self-concealment with a fig leaf before God signified less a response of psychological shame than biological punishment, namely involuntary erection. As Eve was punished for her labour, so Adam was punished for his sexuality. Since Augustine, confession means a confession of the libido: a subject's will to truth amounts to a will to sexuality. To deal with the problem of masturbation, a subjective truth must be constructed by sexualized thinking.

In order to master sexuality, one has to purify thought by a constant self-analysis. Besides Augustine, a parallel example can be found in the ethic of "chastity" established by Cassian's analysis of "cardinal vices" in 415 A.D. Fornication had a key place in the causal chain of vices. First, fornication and greed composed vices of the flesh, which were the first two causes of degeneration. Second, distinguished from greed, fornication was also the last of eight vices, the consequence of pride. Thus, a vicious circle was completed by connecting the spirit (pride) back to the flesh (fornication). Lastly, different from greed again, fornication was a biological need which requires complete eradication. Therefore, for an ascetic, the most severe battle occurred inside the self (Foucault, 1985: 14-17). Moreover, Cassian broadened the sense of fornication by adding two notions, *immunditia* and *libido*. The former referred to uncleanness when sexuality occurs without sexual contacts (e.g. caressing). The latter was even more subjective, describing how sexuality emerges from thoughts in the mind (Foucault, 1985: 17). Expanding the semantics of a word as such, Cassian could then separate fornication from
adultery which was an institutional violation, opening up a subjective domain of sexuality without sexual acts and relations, *immunditia* and *libido*, as the ultimate battle for chastity (Foucault, 1985: 18-19). In practice, there was even a technical design to help ascetics sleep without having sexual dreams. This technology of the self produced a separation of the will from thought (Foucault, 1985: 20-21). In short, the ascetic technique is a vigilant mental self-analysis to eliminate pollution and achieve virginity. The historical consequence of asceticism is less relevant to sexual restriction, and more to the expansion of a subjective reality in thought. For Foucault, subjectivation means opening up the immanent plane of thought to play with knowledge and truth. A thinking subject is an invention of ethical practices in Near Eastern monasteries and subsequently institutionalized in the moral actions of Western Christian churches (Foucault, 1985: 23-25).62

Christian confession is radically different from the Buddhist meditation in this respect. On the one hand, meditation has no subjective truth since subjectivity is the fundamental illusion – all we have is now. On the other hand, the counterfactual consequence of confession ends up reproducing a symptomatic subjectivity instead of clearing away evil demons, as expected by the psychoanalytic talking cure (Foucault, 1997: 178). The automation of thinking makes history possible in a reflexive movement uncontrollable by human imagination. This is why ethics should be conceived as “a genealogy of problems, which is not to say that all things are bad, but that all things are dangerous” (Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 231).

Following Nietzsche, Foucault’s genealogy of ethics reconstructs problematic

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62 Here the social-historical background is related to “the cult of the saints” in late antiquity, marking a tortuous passage to Christianization. The social craze in worshiping saints should be neither degraded as a matter of popular religion nor upgraded as an elite one, but rather signifies a collective turn to solitary deliberation (Brown, 1981). Situating “the problem of Christianization” in late antiquity, Brown (1995) argues that holy men such as Augustine acquired their social authority by fulfilling the function of pragmatic facilitation more than consecrated protection, insofar as they were often required to deal with pagan practices similar to sorcerers. We may infer, in contemporary settings, the “religious” cult of the saints and idols is still a common practice in Southern European and Southern American societies, which is homologous to the cult of the gurus and fetishes in Far Eastern societies. The “cultural” cult of the saints re-embodied in media celebrities and pop idols, we might add, can also be found in neo-liberal capitalist societies and/or metropolis around the world.
values by a socio-historical analysis of descent (Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung) without origin (Ursprung) (Foucault, 1977: 139-64). Indeed, ethical problematization defines the methodological bearing of his history of sexuality: "far from being the still incomplete and blurred image of an Idea that eternally retains our answers in some upper region, the problem lies in the idea itself, or rather, the Idea exists only in the form of a problem: a distinctive plurality whose obscurity is nevertheless insistent and in which the question ceaselessly stirs. What is the answer of the question? The problem. How is the problem resolved? By displacing the question." (Foucault, 1977: 185) Similarly, Foucault's genealogical method might also be described as "the ways in which human beings understand themselves and act upon themselves and others do not fit into such a linear narrative, nor do they emerge as a consequence of 'more fundamental' changes elsewhere—in the conditions of production, in family forms, in 'culture'. Subjectivity has its own history, and it is a history that is more heterogeneous, more practical and more technical than these accounts suggest." (Rose, 1996: 295) Summing up later Foucault's method, Deleuze (1988: 101, 104) argues "a dimension of subjectivity [is] derived from power and knowledge without being dependent on 'them' because "recuperated by power-relations and relations of knowledge, the relation to oneself is continually reborn, elsewhere and otherwise." All in all, we arrive at a reflexive definition of the Enlightenment from Foucault's genealogy of sexuality, thinking and history. As themes in Foucault's life work develop from the rational confinement of madness, through the epistemic discipline of crime and illness, to the bio-political government of subjectivity, Kant's idea of criticism, generated in a self-educational process to individual maturation via knowledge and freedom, degenerates into a conceptual "exit" and historical "way out" (Foucault, 1997: 305). In other words, Foucault's "project" of modernity is always interrupted by discursive narratives more or less than modernity: modernity has been deprogrammed by the circulation of fantasies around the ideology of the Enlightenment without ever touching its sublime object.

In light of this, Foucault's final recourse to a Greco-Roman ethic of the body might be read as a response to the metamorphosis of the Self in
late/modernity (Foucault, 1986; 1992[1985]). Historically speaking, there was a change of ethos from the Greek act of arête to the Roman “pathologization” of subjects (Foucault, 1986: 54-58, 141-42). Foucault indicates a problematic domain at the kernel of the Greek ethic of self-mastery besides the mutual limitation of the private house and the public agora. The inherent limit of the Greek ethic was situated in an ambivalent school/playground of eroticism where the “subject” and “object” of pleasure battled most fiercely in the case of “antinomy of the boy”, that is, when a man in the same-sex relationship wavered between a struggle of his activity and a respect for his boy’s honor due to the boy’s potential right to citizenship. There was no such ethical ambivalence between reciprocity and asymmetry in the case of two boys, where an inter-objective struggle for activity reigned supreme since both were not yet free subjects (Foucault, 1992: 193-225). Foucault exercises the deconstruction of Greek dual spheres unreservedly, which is shown in his recognition of the case of erotic relationships between two adult men, and yet subsequent exclusion of the outer limiting case from “the domain of active and intense problematization” (Foucault, 1992: 194-95). The educational problem of the boy was supposed to be solved by Plato’s ontological distinction of love and eros in the example of Socrates. In Plato’s narrative, Socrates reversed the condition of the erotic chase (that is, making boys chase him) by turning his eyes away from the embodied knowledge toward the disembodied truth and ultimately ending the erotic play (so that all chase after the truth) (Foucault, 1992: 229-46). But Socrates-Plato’s beautiful idea of love didn’t take roots according to Foucault’s history of subjectivity. What followed effectively was a birth of the Stoic subject in the Roman Empire.

Foucault (1986: 81-86) argues that the Roman’s “care of the self” shouldn’t be explained away as an individual withdrawal to the hearth and soul, as if it was a structural effect of the victory of the Empire over the city-state. Instead, multiple social networks of the self and others were produced. First, local relations of the polis were not destroyed, but appropriated by the Empire in a network of social space. Second, ethical reflection did not die away with aristocratic citizens, but changed its form of expression due to an emergence of managerial, service aristocracy. This intermediary class, consisted of
councilmen and knights, was caught in a contradictory social position between the governing princes and the governed civilians. In short, power relations in the Roman Empire became more complex than in the Greek city-state. Third, in parallel to the new “political game,” “matrimonial association” turned paradoxical. On the one hand, the economic function of marriage was taken over by the Empire, turning marriage into a public institution. On the other hand, the marriage relation was tightened up between reciprocal couples (Foucault, 1986: 77-80). As a result, relativized political activities had to enter in complex relations with the moral agent on the one hand and personal destiny on the other (Foucault, 1986: 87-94). But, there has never been a critical form of the subject, let alone any phenomenological inter-subjectivity. Quite the contrary, during the Roman imperial period, the subject was “born” in a docile state, a pathological state of mind which required constant solicitude by the technologies of the self. This is carefully suggested by Foucault’s choice of chapter titles from Dietetics, Economics and Erotics in The Use of Pleasure to The Body, The Wife and Boys in The Care of the Self. His implicit statement is that the heroic domains of the act were succeeded by the bio-technological relations between subjects, exactly precarious subjectivity from the very outset of its history.

In Foucault’s history of subjectivity, the biological question of sex prevalent in the 19th century has been deconstructed to a semiotic question of sexuality, allowing late/modern men to re/construct ad libitum a sexual-cultural politics of lifestyles in counter to bio-politics. This is how he actually liberates Freud’s repressive hypothesis in the guise of criticism (Foucault, 1980: 15-49).63 As a logical consequence, the question of the second sex, women, is relegated to the historical background. For him, the moral question of women was only a superficial and transitory one in the Middle Ages since the underlying question

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63 We are tempted to argue that Foucault took serious notes of Baudrillard’s (1987[1977]) criticism of his productivism in the first volume of The History of Sexuality from the standpoint of seduction, and so tried to break through the ideological impasse in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. We can see how the bio-political approach was pushed to the limit in the thematic parallels between Foucault’s analysis of Greek eroticism and Roman asceticism and Baudrillard’s analysis of seduction and fatal strategies (Baudrillard, 1990a[1979]; 1990b[1983]). In fact, Deleuze’s (1988) interpretation of Foucault’s concept of subjectivity by the “fold” of “the force of the outside” presupposes also his last twist after the first volume of The History of Sexuality.
from the late antiquity to modern times has always been an *ethical* question of
the body. This is why he reposes the question of chastity divested of female
morality (Foucault, 1985). Moreover, the ethic of the body was derived from
the genetic code of the boy in the erotic domain of the antiquity. By taking the
primordial question of the boy into accounts, we are *not* simply arguing that
his theory of society adopts a libertarian ethic of sexuality in place of sex. This
kind of criticism deserves to be retorted by Foucaultians as regressing to a
heterosexual ideology in a chauvinist as well as feminist sense. Rather, we
are analyzing in a scientific sense that Foucault's theory of society posits an
erotic education subsisted by a generational body of knowledge instead of a
sexed organism of love. Given the case, we could come back to the crude
fact, an original problem subtly displaced by Foucault's semiotic formalism.
Foucault (1992: 200) argues that a Greek citizen's ethical conflict between
reciprocity and asymmetry was *really caused* by his boy's "juvenile body"
juxtaposed with "signs and guarantees of a developing virility." So the boy's
body should be perceived as a sign of "feminine ambiguity" distinguished from
"feminine beauty." But hasn't his distinction presumed that the object of desire
was *originally caused* by a simulation of feminine beauty, a quasi-feminine
body? Reduced to this genetic evolutionary sense, Foucault's erotic politics
of the body turns out to be in the shadow of what Durkheim (1960c: 138) has
said about Rousseau's body politic, that is "a tottering structure established
and maintained only by an almost miraculous conjunction of circumstances."

While eroticizing the ethic of self-mastery, Foucault (1990: 7) refuses to be a
Hellenist like Nietzsche. The Roman Empire inherited the "strengthening of
austerity themes" from classical Greece, while Latin Christianization further
gave the ethical model "a legal framework and an institutional support"
(Foucault, 1986: 235). Methodologically, Foucault plays out the paradox of
Christianity and the Enlightenment in Western modernity by recourse to
Eastern Stoicism. But far from looking for a route of flight from the fantasy of
the Enlightenment, Foucault traverses the fantasy back in the Christian
matrix, looking for a minimal difference in the repetitive movement from the
Stoic ethic, the suppressed Christian antecedent, to Christian morality.
Theoretically, Foucault plays out the paradox of sex and love by recourse to
the history of sexuality or subjectivity. Thinking through the late/modern irony of intimacy and solitude, or communication and ecstasy in Baudrillard's terms (1988[1987]), Foucault brings to light a performative paradox between speech and thought, which is the paradox of masculinity (from a boy to man). Foucault's erotic education tells us that a social discourse is produced by a sexual body instead of rational language, a case to which a sociological discourse is of no exception. Given so, one can learn to tell the easy word of love from love itself, no matter how heavy the burden of proof may be. But shaking off the burden for the service of bio-politics, late/modern sociology has ended in social reality, confusing sexuality with love. Politically, as a result, the paradox between the sexes is too antagonistic to be reflexive. No post/Rousseauan body politic is able to govern both sexes in/differently as it governs individuals, for a society of sexed organism eludes every strategy of difference and indifference. This means even Foucault's sexual history of truth is immersed in the gay scene of transgression too much to bear the drab thought of a sexed politics of truth – once again (cf. Miller, 1993; Halperin, 1995).

8.4 Love after life
Late/modern sociology in Europe has grown from a critical to a reflexive state of mind. This is the mind of an individual subject who says "I am not the ego", given that the duality of modernity formulated in a subject's critique of its own rationalization has produced new social movements in a reflexive world without society (Touraine, 1989; 1995; 1998). Meanwhile, we cannot avoid the performance of the late/modern sociological self in everyday life, insofar as it has sacrificed modern sociology in America through a difficult rite of passage. After all, it was Parsons' sociology which first overturned classical holism by discovering the value of individualism. Europeans might argue that a contemporary individual has overcome Parsons' actor of faith in order and conflict, control and struggle, becoming an agent of risk for an uncertain future. Still, they have buried a modern sociological tradition of love in America suggested by later Sorokin's research project of "creative altruism" in the 1950s and later Parsons' thesis of "expressive revolution" in the 1970s.
By an act of passage, that tradition is forgotten in the dustbin of history. Since reflexive discourses of love present themselves in a fresh portfolio, let us take it at face value.

Reflexive discourses of love acknowledge individualization as the primary condition of late/modernity. Luhmann's science observes individualization as a structural factor in the social systems; Beck and Giddens aim further to politicize its cultural potentials. However, since Bauman thinks from a moral standpoint of individuation, expecting a u-topian future of humanity, he is acutely ambivalent toward any cosmopolitan or life politics of individualization (Bauman, 2001a; 2002a; 2002b; Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1991: 209ff). Nonetheless, we have shown how Luhmann's reflexive science has opened an ironic horizon, purging the last residue of humanism in a reflexive morality. In sum, the individual and the human person are in conflict with each other within the reflexive paradigm of love.

In fact, conceptual and cultural configurations of the person and the individual have never been very close in history. The person turns on the idea of a mask

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64 Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968), the founding chair of the sociology department at Harvard, was an opponent of Talcott Parsons' individualist sociology. Imprisoned by the Czarist regime and sent to exile by the Bolshevik regime, Sorokin was a Menshevik, as he continuously sought to draw a balance between socialism and individualism in the social-cultural context of Russia and America. Early Sorokin's work *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (4 vols, 1937-41) analyzed cultural mentalities of society cycling between ideational, sensate and idealistic types, a thesis summarized later in *The Crisis of Our Age* (1957). Directing his *Research Center of Creative Altruism* since 1943, later Sorokin published a series of empirical studies on altruistic love in the 1950s, in which the Christian-Catholic legacy of saints and neighbours were analyzed statistically, sociologically and psychologically to look for an idealistic-socialist answer to the crisis of our age, materialistic individualism. Presenting elaborate scientific and spiritual techniques to achieve altruistic love, these pioneering studies could beat any New Age self-help books we read today. By contrast, later Parsons' writings on religion and expressive revolution in the 1970s pushed the social diagnosis further to a realistic-individualist model of human action extended from Protestant love. Specifically, Parsons connects the Protestant idea of affection in terms of "gold" and "money" to a Christian order of "extended ecumenism" and "church" by recourse to his generalized view of the system, human system. Theoretically, an inner social-cultural tension between Catholicism and Protestantism shows that this American sociology of love and religion follows the Comtean-Durkheimian nexus in the shadow of a Kantian-Weberian nexus (cf. Turner, 2005).

65 Meanwhile, Bauman's social analysis relies heavily on a post/Kantian view of morality (in the authorship of Levinas), targeting at a postmodern "deconstruction" of any post/Marxist politics. An unreserved sociological exercise of Levinas' philosophy could be found in Bauman's study of death and culture (Bauman, 1992). As a matter of fact, since the wane of Hegel's phenomenological dialectics (of civil society and the state), the Kantian turn of neo/Marxism had taken place a long time ago in Habermas' analysis of human knowledge based on different types of interest.
split from things, whereas the individual focuses on the idea of indivisibility as a thing itself (e.g. an atom) (Williams, 1983: 163, 232). On the one hand, the person originates in the Latin word persona. In the Indian tribes from North-Western Americans to Australians, the person was a rigid function of a role or part in the clan or family (Mauss, 1979: 63-74). Although the person as a ritual mask had existed in Hindu and Chinese civilizations since the final two centuries B.C. (Brahmanism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism), later Oriental interpretations of the mask generally held a radical view of reconstruction as an illusion. In consequence, personal interactions based on faces and names contributed to the dissolution of the person in collective social structures (Mauss, 1979: 75-77). By contrast, a fully-fledged concept of the person is a long historical product of the Roman law (i.e. the right of a personae), Stoic morality (i.e. the conscience of a character), Christian metaphysics (i.e. the substance of man or soul as such), sectarian politics and post/empiricist psychologies (i.e. consciousnesses of the self) (Mauss, 1979: 78-89). Closely related the notion of character, in sum, personality designates "the quality of being a person" in contradistinction to a thing. In conceptual history, the modern meaning of the person is the outcome of a semantic change from an outward sign to an internalized possession between the 14th and the early 19th century (Williams, 1983: 233-35).

On the other hand, the individual in the sense of indivisibility can be dated back to medieval theology of the Trinity, physics of the 17th century, and empiricist logics and biology of the 18th century. In a classical sense, the individual was part of the group it belonged to. It was not until modern economics, politics and biology of the late 18th century that the individual acquired an independence from group reference (Williams, 1983: 162-63). Furthermore, individuality has a longer conceptual history than individualism. From the Renaissance to Reformation, individuality represented a revolt of Protestantism and the Enlightenment against feudalism, whereas individualism was an ideological product of liberalism based on political-economic structures of the 19th century (Williams, 1983: 164-65). In conceptual terms, the classical individual valued a harmony between freedom and equality. Individual rights were measured by "man in general" and "nature"
as a whole. This “individualism of equality” lasted until the late 18th century, culminating in the cosmopolitan idea of human rights demanded by French revolutionaries. By contrast, “individualism of inequality” was marked by a tension between freedom and equality in the post-Revolutionary period. Severed from natural laws, the individual became a construction of culture and history. In historical terms, the quantitative “singleness” of an individual calculated by the political economists in England and France ceded to a belief in the qualitative “uniqueness” of an individual by the German romanticists. Generally, the question of distinction in the Renaissance was replaced by the question of competition in the Enlightenment, and then ended up with the question of specialization in Romanticism (Simmel, 1971: 217-25, 269-76). In result, the modern individual enjoys full sovereignty as an indivisible thing.

But there remains the confusion of the person with the individual. Bauman’s individuated humanism remains incompatible with Luhmann’s individualized antihumanism. However, the problem is displaced to another level between humanism and anti-humanism. After the polemic against French antihumanism (dubbed as “la pensée 68” by Alan Renaut and Luc Ferry), Renaut (1997) argues further that the problem with anti-humanism is its dangerous assessment of modernity, which celebrates “independent” individuals at the price of “autonomous” human beings. The latter (humanist) tradition is derived from Descartes’ philosophy of subjectivity, going through Kant’s criticism and arriving at the postmodern question of “immanent transcendence” asked by phenomenology from Husserl to Levinas. The former (individualist) tradition originates in Leibniz’s philosophy of monadology, going through Berkeley’s empiricism and culminating in a tragic view of the subject from Hegel, Nietzsche to Heidegger. In this context, Renaut reviews Heidegger’s and Dumont’s “readings of modernity” from the opposing perspectives of the subject and the individual, arguing that modernity should not be reduced to a monadological worldview.

From an anti-individualistic standpoint of humanism, Renaut (1997: 203) is opposed to “the individualistic forms of antihumanism” in the post-68 social thoughts. Frankly, it is only plausible to argue that French antihumanism
identifies with individualism, since after the human form is overcome, it would be hard to maintain an idea of the sovereign individual. In fact, the contrary appears to be the case in French social thoughts, considering that we are often challenged intellectually by their neologism as they try to alienate an indivisible being with a ghostly existence, such as supplementary traces, ryzomatic lines, and viral simulacra. We might venture to say that French antihumanism is post-individualistic.

Nevertheless, Renaut's distinction of the human from the individual remains a fruitful analysis to us for two reasons. On the one hand, Renaut's analysis, in a style more rigorous than Bauman's essays, provides us with a critical view to lay bare Beck's and Giddens' illogical and antisocial project of a second modernity, insofar as they advocate a cultural politics of humanity on the basis of an individualized society. On the other hand, if Alexander Nehamas (in Renaut, 1997: xviii) is right to conclude that Renaut's liberal humanism represents a regression to traditionalism, then Bauman's utopian future of humanity is in fact a recollection of the past. We must fully admit the present irreality of humanity. Accordingly, reflexive modernity proposes a counterfeit humanism on the premise of sovereign individuals: human rights are individual rights, privileged individual rights. Thus Renaut barks at the wrong tree. The spirit of humanity is caught in a state of bankruptcy due to an idolatry revival of humanism, not because of antihumanism.

The historical logic from social science to sociology is very much like a mythical encounter of Oedipus with Sphinx. Since Comte's suture of Humanity to Fate, the riddle in Rousseau's Social Contract has been answered: "man is forced to be free." The forced freedom of humanity is the only dream of a modern social life whether one follows the logic from Comte to Durkheimianism or from Marx to Marxism. However, in the myth, as the riddle of man is solved by Oedipus, Sphinx plunges itself into the abyss, mortified but not dead. Similarly, after modernity, a deeper enigma lies beneath the fatal ground. Once the dream has become a reality, who cares about the forced condition of freedom, except freedom itself? Except fate, is there any other condition(s) of freedom on which humanity can rest itself? Or is there none? If
there is only abyss, is it still human freedom? In short, what is life like after the forced freedom of humanity?

We have seen how late/modern sociology devotes itself to the daily care of the self, enjoining individuals to carry out biographical projects by evaluating and managing risks inherent in the social systems. Due to the assimilation of sociological knowledge to social being, life after the forced freedom of humanity has become a nomadic life of individuals who are willing to submit themselves to the social body. They intensify and appropriate its vital force for inter/personal concerns, leaving unintended consequences to further reflexive control. Simply put, a late/modern individual voluntarily serves the body social's will to risk in exchange for his/her will to live in a state of security. Thus managing the risky business of life, has s/he not purchased an insurance policy?

Giddens (1999) promotes the policy forcefully to the general public. He argues that soon after the manufactured risk takes over the external risk, bringing an end to traditional and natural societies of “fate,” a second-degree observation of “new riskiness to risk” should be brought to consciousness in our runaway world. His pseudo-deconstructive move from fate to risk follows three interrelated steps. The first is a commonsense view from the present. The “great power” of fate (mouria), “the bringer of doom and death [sic] more ancient than the oldest gods,” is considered as “preordained determinism” in opposition to “openness of future events.” Meanwhile, the “moral” aspect of fate called “destiny” is dismissed for its “cosmic meaning,” irrespective of its sociological implication about collective responsibility (Giddens, 1991: 109-10). The second is an anthropomorphic view of history. The Greek god of fate is succeeded by the Roman goddess of fortuna. Moreover, a Christianized form of fortuna is secularized in the Machiavellianism of society. Although Christian “Divine Providence” bears a resemblance to Greek fate, the overall historical rationality has plunged into the project of modernity (Giddens, 1991: 110-111). The third is an individualist view by the self. Fortuna secularized in a political rationality is eventually personalized in “fateful moments,” crowning every individual a Machiavellian prince in his/her kingdom of the self.
Has the late/modern world/view replaced fate with risk with success? Or, has it not mistaken security for risk which had been synonymous with fate? Moreover, has the risk-ridden society/sociology not been caught in a trap of fatal strategy? In a post-Marxist view, Baudrillard (2001[1999]: 49-50) captures with lucidity the twist and turn of a reflexive state of mind: "the chosen forms of modification of the will and derivation of desire are merely parodies of fate. A fatal strategy, then, but a derisory one. In the absence of transcendent powers watching over us, and in the perpetual effort to produce proof of our existence, we are forced to become 'fatal' to ourselves...All risk-situations, which were once man's natural lot, are today re-created artificially in a form of nostalgia for extremes, survival and death. A technical simulation of pain and sacrifice...the individual reinvents for himself a form of trompe-l'oeil destiny as the technical hallucination unfolds—a form of artificial danger through which each person defies himself to exist. Like those ascetics and anchorites of old who subjected themselves to all kinds of ordeals in the hope that God would respond to their bodily torments."

In psychoanalytic terms, the fact that risk-seeking and security-binding individuals affirm everything but fate betrays their defensive psychology in the face of plethoric social realities (cf. Groarke, 2002: 574, n.7). Theorists of risk society "leave intact the subject's fundamental mode of subjectivity: their subject remains the modern subject, able to reason and reflect freely, to decide on and select his/her set of norms and so on" (Žižek, 1999: 342). Moreover, "[t]he answer of psychoanalysis to the risk society topos of the global reflexivization of our lives is not that there is none the less some prerelative substance called the Unconscious which resists reflexive mediation; the answer is to emphasize another mode of reflexivity that is neglected by theorists of risk society, the reflexivity at the very core of the Freudian subject" (Žižek, 1999: 345). In a post-psychoanalytic view, Žižek (1999: 345-46) adduces "numerous variations on this reflexivity in psychoanalysis": first, reflexive hysteria exhibits "the desire of non-satisfaction"; second, obsessional neurosis displays "the desire for regulation"
in a "masochistic' reflexive turn"; third, psychoanalysis itself is perverted by the "global reflexivization of interpretation" to end up with "the impotence of interpretation," since "the analyst's interpretation loses its performative 'symbolic efficiency' and leaves the symptom intact in its idiotic jouissance."

In this sense, a political "theory" of the third-way (including radical democracy) is an ideology since it theorizes nothing but merely reflects and incites the popular feeling that "there is no society." We are far from saying that social feelings are ideologies because, however much infused with the popular imagination of myths and magic, they stand for a natural state of affairs in need of respect in the first instance. Rather, our point is that a "sociological" theory gives itself up to the ideological apparatus when it falls for commonsense feelings and makes a professional gain by packaging and promoting them in a cultural field of distinction. This position, often obscured and stigmatized by the current pseudo-sociology, characterizes Durkheim's sociology as a "positive science" since it insists on the intellectual's nonidentity with social feelings in the final analysis. In a similar but reversed vein, Žižek (2000: 62-63) poses a "naïve" question to those reflexive intellectuals, as if grumbling on behalf of the over-identified masses when their lives do not work out as expected: "is not the true message of the notion of the Third Way therefore simply that there is no second way, no actual alternative to global capitalism, so that, in a kind of mocking pseudo-Hegelian negation of negation, this much-praised 'Third Way' brings us back to the first and only way—the Third Way is simply global capitalism with a human face, that is, an attempt to minimize the human costs of the global capitalist machinery, whose functioning is left undisturbed." Indeed, do we not often hear similar "irresponsible" complaints made by the same people acting as reflexive individuals in their daily lives? And yet, who has fled from responsibility, the party of representation or the over-represented, the caring ideologue or the spoiled individual?

If classical sociology was responsive to a national society of the late 19th century, then late/modern sociology is adaptive to a world society of the late 20th century, a world of global capitalism, neoliberal democracy and
multiculturalism. The process of sociological adaptation might be summed up in a series of disillusionment. From the communitarian dream up to 1945, through the revolutionary hope up to 1968, to the communist promise up to 1989, late/modern sociology come to accept the rule of the survival of the fittest by giving service to the only social agendas in town, which are world risk economy, human right politics and cosmopolitan culture. In this context, the reflexive discourses of love make a romanticist overdraft of the Enlightenment reason by enjoining us to enjoy sexuality in the name of love. As such, they stand for the cunning ideology of bio-politics. Un/fortunately, if only 9/11 had not upset the autopoetic system of late/modern society/sociology, we would not have bore witness again to the inhuman fate of love. If Badiou is right to say that the sexed truth of humanity can be seized only by inhumanity, then Comte's women are released from the object of Humanity subdued by Fate, turning into fatal subjects splitting the object from within.

When social systems have been producing the code of love, one's appeal to sensual love in everyday life cannot create anything new, for the human body has become part of the problem in the problem of language. As Barthes (1990[1977]: 231) has shown, after lovers' discourse, body and image, an "oblique truth" of love might be redeemed from Kao Tsu's response to a monk's question: "All things are said to be reducible to the One; but to what is the One reducible?" And Kao Tsu replied: "When I was in the Ching district, I had a robe made for myself which weighed seven kin." In Barthes' Zen-like logic, the virtual oneness of love is deconstructed to the discursive multiplicity of everyday life. But why not challenge the real multiplicity of love itself by the actual duality of love? When we encounter an object of true love, isn't the hyper/real appearance of everyday life fictionalized once again, so much so that love is re-experienced as an earth-shattering thought of the two split up from the one?
Chapter 9  Conclusion

In this thesis, we have genealogized the concept of love in a discontinuous history of sociological thought which traverses from social science through classical sociology to reflexive sociology. Before conducting our genealogical research, a methodological view was carefully formulated from the theoretical views of Deleuze, Baudrillard, Badiou and Žižek. Accordingly, we adopted an evental method to subtract a subject of love who endeavors to name the truth of a void situation without passing through the figure of the master or sovereignty. This method philosophised love as an arch truth-event which occurs to a real life situation. In the situation, an axiomatic subject of love could only seize the disappearance of its evental being in the world by capturing a singular moment of separation from the beloved other/Other. In short, this approach has admitted that love in the world no longer has, if not never has had, an uncontested totality or harmonious nature. Therefore, an ideal social ontology of love, understood in a real sense, is and is able to be revolutionized eternally through an axiomatic reposing of its presupposition, the subjective truth-event of love.

Based on this subtractive ontology, we suggest that our genealogical research has achieved the three aims stated in the introduction. For the first aim, we hope we have demonstrated that the concept of true love is a hidden agenda evolving within social science and classical sociology. Then, we achieved the goal of discriminating true love from love's simulacra reflected in reflexive sociological discourses. On this first level of content, we drew upon Goethe's model of fate to read the conceptual implications of love in sociological thought. The fate of love was problematized as a failed historical act in Comte's religion of Humanity and in Marx's politics of Communism. The fate of love was then problematized as formalized sexual freedom in Durkheim's inclusion of magical action within religious reality, in Weber's attribution of passion to rationality, and in Simmel's splitting of adventure and seduction. The fate of love was finally problematized as social risk by varying reflexive sociologies of modernity (Luhmann), postmodernity (Bauman), late-modernity
(Giddens, Beck) and non-modernity (Foucault). We suggested that they confused love with sexuality and mixed life politics with bio-politics since reflexive agency was reproduced by the code of communicative rationality, and so a society of reflexive practice promoted only pseudo-activity. Defending love's truth against its reflexive ideology, we thus delineated an orthodox series of sociology passing from Comte through Durkheim to Parsons, a series which recognized the belief of fetishism in building a social order (i.e. social production) prior to its maintenance (i.e. social reproduction). Understood in an evental sense, the recognition of a pre-ontological cause of society would imply that an order of true love must be generated in a life situation of fetishization. If this situation makes subjective fetishism an undecidable exception of the positive social order, then a reversible procedure of thought between Comtean religious sociology and Marxian political anti-sociology might be established. However, the dream of a new order of love based on a possible alliance of the two social scientific cannons was suspended as soon as we found a calling of fraternity believed by a group of heterodox non/ Marxist sociologists consisting of Weber, Simmel and Goethean Marxists. We suggested that, once settling for a fraternal morality, the truth-event of love was ontologized, if not further positivized, in a familial body of the State, Nation and/or Society.

For the second aim, we hope we have reconfigured the conceptual event of love from the rigid analytic sites of philosophy and sociology diagrammed in the introduction. The reconfiguration can be shown in the following diagram:
We assumed that sociology sets its fundamental task to think life socially, a task involving a fresh look at the social and life from an evental horizon of true love. Accordingly, we argued that Goethe's art and life science induced the conception of a social science of love. Then, we examined the logical consistency of science and religion in Comte's thought before indicating briefly a parallel couple of science and politics in Marx's thought, only to realize that their failed historical acts implied the im/possibility of a religious politics of love. Furthermore, apart from an introductory note, we suspended a systematic analysis of Deleuze-Žižek's take on a religion of love and Baudrillard-Badiou's stance of a science of politics. Instead, we asked how classical non/Marxist sociologists turned to theorize culture and economy directly, thereby creating an ontologized (e.g. Weber's spirit of capitalism) or positivized (e.g. Durkheim's spirit of society) concept of love. Against the official perception of sociology, we interposed Badiou's philosophy of love after Comte and Marx and Rose-Žižek's philosophy of love before Durkheim in order to argue a genealogical proximity between sociology and anti-sociological philosophy. We found that they shared a complex picture of the history of philosophy irreducible to the rationalistic view of modernity, a view which acknowledged only the maximalization of action and reality through
objective processes of secularization and humanization. As a result, they converged, with varying degrees of awareness, on the question of how the body-event can become a quasi-cause of the subjective order of love in the world.

On this second level of form, we argued that Comte and Marx, insofar as they inherited Goethe’s art, followed Goethe’s ethic of renunciation to organize a social life of love. Since we read the theoretical logic of social science eventually, renunciation in this original context might be brought forward to a vital renunciation of Life and a feminine renunciation of Woman. This was why our progressive presentation of Goethe was foreign to the circulation of cultural-historical schemata of classicism, the enlightenment and romanticism in the Goethe scholarship. On the other hand, we found these stock images of Goethe recurring in a heterodox series of non/Marxist sociology. It would have been possible to examine the mis/recognitions of Goethe’s ethic within German-Russian sociology, spanning from Weber’s ascetic action and Simmel’s seduced adventure to Lukács’ praxis of fate, Bakhtin’s predetermined chronotope and Benjamin’s star of hope. However, our critical reading privileged Weber to the others, since this historical sociologist reduced Goethe’s ethic of renunciation in the subtlest manner to a forced choice of action versus contemplation. It was this seemingly uncontestable presupposition which led to subsequent philosophical-theological meditations on fate and hope. Against the cultural-historical moralization of renunciation in classical sociology, we have understood Goethe’s ethic originally as a social science of love. That is to say, an experience of renunciation conceived as the end of time and sex occurs at a point of subjective destitution, thereby preserving a restricted action of thinking on an evental plane immanent but irreducible to the objective world of empirical action and theoretical contemplation. Contrary to intuitive expectations, we found Durkheim’s sociology, after the social science of Comte and Marx, preserved the evental logic of Goethe’s ethic outside the German-Russian scene through a close reading of his sociology. Specifically, we explored Durkheim’s conceptions of duty and respect in his sociology of law and morality on the one hand and his sociology of religion and magic on the other to uncover a subversive force.
kept hidden in his organicist theory of society. We suggested that Durkheim's society presupposed Goethe's renunciation as we understood it, since it could be constructed only by an analytic breakdown of the limits of life-time and sex-body. In this strict genealogical sense, we maintained that Goethe's ethic of renunciation could have been reconsidered as a universal experience of love driving the historical reason of social science and sociology.

The foregoing summation has explained why we proposed to reintroduce Goethe's legacy into the sociological tradition. We venture to say that his ethic of renunciation invites us to think again the nature of an act of true love in the world. In the introduction, we argued that love being a truth-event can only dis/appear in the world by way of separation. Now, placing the notion of separation in our research context of Goethe's ethic of renunciation, we stand sharply opposed to the very idea of sociality which constitutes the sacred heart of sociological mentality as such. From an evental view of love, we are apathetic about any moral revival of sociology, including cultural sociology in general and sociology of personal relationships in particular. These emotional intellectual reactions to cognitive rationalism held by structural sociology in general and sociology of impersonal organizations in particular say more about the moral panic of sociological theory than of social reality when both are disoriented by the dissolution of the spirit of modernity. At bottom, idealizing a particular type of sociality, which might span from the couple, the family, friendly communities and virtual networks to the neighbourhood, political alliances, commercial relations and cosmic humanity, never questions the conventional form of proximity or togetherness, since these sociological "types" of sociality are content with mirroring practices of the world.

Henceforth, the key point in our separatist concept of love is that, instead of chasing after yet another ideal type, one can always subtract from existing positive types of sociality to formalize a disappearing trace of true love in the real gap between the ideal and reality. Rendered quantitatively, all "scales" of human relationship, insofar as they can be reduced to the idea of social bond, are supposed to be intimate in the last instance. Conversely speaking, intimate socialities can never be morally distinguished from estranged
socialities, not just because authentic privacy socially colludes with pretentious publicity, but also because the sociological idea of sociality itself is meant to be based on the intimate in the first place.

By contrast, true love does not care for intimacy, but situates itself in a quasi-religious extremacy (figured by Lacan’s objet petit à, the object cause of desire), a target of analysis which Žižek would claim. Upon eventualizing itself in the world, true love subtracts a formal point of separation from positive types of sociality to produce a quasi-scientific politics of unbinding (figured by Althusser’s subjectivity without subject beyond ideology and science), an aim of analysis which Badiou might agree. Defined as such, true love in this thesis conceptualizes a theoretical knot of love and politics deduced from a corresponding methodological knot of religion and science.

Nonetheless, with regard to keeping the truth procedure or process of analysis, that is, never giving up one’s analytical desire, we cannot forget Baudrillard. If we adopt his symbolic view of art, then true love can problematize the logical paradox of gift exchange in society through a disjunctive synthesis of relation and non-relation. There are three anti-dialectical instances of paradox in the social exchange of gifts. The first instance reveals the ontological plenitude of social relations through the contingency of exchange, considering that people give and receive gifts as a voluntary, free choice. These people practice a subjective construction of true love in the world, because the actual web of gifts and counter-gifts stands as a positive proof of loving relationships in society. For them, there is a world of true love. The second instance reveals the ontological destitution of social relations through the necessity of exchange, given that people receive and give gifts as a determined, forced choice. These people practice a subjective destruction of true love in the world, since the virtual web of gifts and counter-gifts stands in for a negative sign of loving relationships in society. For them, there is no world of true love. The third instance reveals the ontological axiomatization of social relations through the impossibility of exchange, supposing that people give and receive gifts as an undecidable choice of fate. These people practice a subjective subtraction of true love from the world, for
the real web of gifts and counter-gifts stands for an unnamable signifier of loving-and-hating relationships in society. For them, there is no world of true love, but true love does occur to the world through an act of renunciation.

At this point, renunciation makes a subjective appearance not by a rejection of the gift exchange, but rather by an annulment of the social-relational function of the gift through exchange. In the first instance, true love is manifested by the self's gift exchange with the other, constantly keeping contact with the other albeit in a subjective distance from taking part in changing the other's plight in a situation. Thus enjoying oneself through (the desire of) the other, as if to keep them on a leash by the code of togetherness, this world of true love produces nothing but the loving falsity of the world. In the last instance, however, true love is expressed through an axiomatic subject's courage to let go of the beloved other in the name of truth. During the truth process, the subject must pay the full price in each and every bound of gift exchange. And yet/so, the subject can stand truly within the other's life difficulties with patience until the disjunctive couple have delivered themselves into a new situation, where both are able to leave each other with no anxiety to prove their subjectively positive social relation with any objective gift, except for an eternal trace of memory impressed by their common fidelity to true love.

For the third aim, we hope we have shed some new light on other ideological discourses of love which were not included or discussed sufficiently in this thesis. After applying an evental method to rethink a new world order of love, we have attained the third level of name with the master-signifier. By refraining from invoking and yet not sacrificing the sovereign name of the Other, we have learned that the production of a universal subject rests on nothing but the seductive efficacy of a name, insofar as this name can be recollected by thinking again the arch event of truth called love.
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