An analysis on the development of elite sports policy in Taiwan: an institutional and Advocacy Coalition Framework perspective

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An Analysis on the Development of Elite Sports Policy in Taiwan: an Institutional and Advocacy Coalition Framework Perspective

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Ph.D.

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An Analysis on the Development of Elite Sports Policy in Taiwan: an Institutional and Advocacy Coalition Framework Perspective

By

Sheng-Hsiang Chen

A Doctoral Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

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For my parents
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Abstract

Drawing upon a series of interviews with politicians, sports administrators, coaches, journalists and academics and with analysis based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), this thesis examines elite sports development policy in Taiwan within a political context. It investigates the issues of whether or not sports development and policy-making reflect institutional features, and how sports policy has changed over time in Taiwan. It further explores the development systems of baseball, taekwondo and tennis, with a particular focus on similarities and differences between them at the elite level.

Empirical data gathered from semi-structured interviews and documentary materials is analysed using an institutional approach together the ACF. The main findings suggest that, in essence, sports development and policy-making in Taiwan comply with institutional features and, during different periods from 1949 to the present day, have consistently been influenced by the political needs of the time. The analysis of the development systems of the three selected sports identified some major similarities. The government promotes them using a top-down approach and each sport relies heavily on the public funding. There sports have no national level facilities. Talent identification and development mainly occur in schools and are conducted through the competition systems. There is government financial support for elite athletes to participate in international events or for the governing bodies to host international events. The development systems for coaches share the same mechanisms. Finally, national athletes in each sport can enjoy sports science support from the government during squad training and international events. However, the case studies also reveal considerable differences. The governing bodies of taekwondo and tennis play a more dominant in elite development than that of baseball. Parents play a more significant role in the identification and development of tennis players than for the other sports. Only taekwondo national competitors train relatively frequently at the national training centre. The facilities for elite baseball players are more adequate than for the other sports. Elite baseball players enjoy the most
international competition opportunities and taekwondo competitors the least. The existence of a professional baseball league and a highly professionalised international competition system for tennis serve to highlight the difference between the three sports in terms of the emergence of full-time athletes. In sum, this demonstrates quite clearly that there exists in Taiwan a single spine of sports development in general, but with variations.

**Keywords:** Taiwan; elite sports policy; institutional approach; the Advocacy Coalition Framework; baseball; taekwondo; tennis.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

Taiwan is not particularly well known in the world of international sport with the exception, that is, of baseball. However, the relationship between sport and politics in Taiwan is unusual, if not unique. Successive governments have recognised the potential of international sporting success for enhancing the country’s global image not least because other such avenues are partially closed as a consequence of the troubled diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As an athlete growing up and subsequently as a student who graduated from a PE department and was then awarded a Master’s degree in sports management, I have had a long-standing interest in sport in general and specifically in sports development. It was this that prompted me to embark on into elite sports policy development in Taiwan.

It is above all the political value attached to sporting success that makes elite sports development strategies in Taiwan of considerable interest. Drawing upon a series of interviews with politicians, sports administrators, coaches, journalists and academics and with analysis based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), this thesis examines elite sports development policy in Taiwan within a political context. In addition to providing a general overview of elite sports policy, the study also addresses three case studies in order to discern similarities and differences in policy-making in specific sports with very different historical trajectories in Taiwan. This study examines elite sports policy, using the ACF, within the general context of Taiwan’s welfare regime and institutional features in order to ask whether this approach, which has previously mainly been applied in the North American and European contexts, can aid our understanding of sport policy development in an Asian society with its own specific history.

Beyond this introduction, the thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2 examines the general relationship between sport and politics and considers how modern sports
can both generate a more civilised society and increase social segmentation. The chapter also addresses the use of sports for multiple political reasons. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the political context of Taiwan and to the specific relationship between sport and politics in Taiwan. Through a comprehensive review of sports policy literature, Chapter 3 firstly discusses the attitude of governments towards elite sport and the development of elite sports systems. Having established a broad understanding of these issues, Bergsgard et al.’s (2007) approach to explain elite sports policy is introduced and its analytical dimensions, with particular reference to Taiwan and to its implications for understanding Taiwan sports policy, are addressed. The chapter proceeds to introduce the ACF and outline reasons for adopting it as a tool with which to analyse the elite sports policy process. Chapter 4 discusses research methodologies and methods and indicates the ontological and epistemological perspectives and research methods adopted in the thesis. The chapter ends by describing the interview process. This includes not only a discussion of the general idea of the interview but also, more specifically, an outline of the procedures adopted to prepare for the interviews, the conduct of the interviews themselves, problems encountered during the interviews phase of the research project, and some of the more unusual interviewees. Chapter 5 examines the relevance of the welfare regime and its accompanying institutional features to sports policy in Taiwan and explores the issue of whether Taiwan’s sports policy reflects the welfare regime and those institutional features. Chapter 6 presents an overview of sports policy development in Taiwan within its historical, socio-economic and socio-political context. In order to ensure greater clarity, this chapter is divided into five main periods of sports development in Taiwan with the evolution of sports policy over time being discussed on the basis of the ACF. Chapters 7 to 9 are case studies of three purposely selected sports - baseball, taekwondo and tennis. Each chapter begins with an introduction to the relevant National Governing Body with an emphasis on its responsibilities and its relationship with four other significant organisations – the Sports Affairs Council (SAC), the Department of Physical Education (DPE), the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) and Republic of China Sports Federation (ROCSF). With reference to the ACF, each chapter then focuses on five key areas of elite sports policy – (1) the development of elite level facilities, (2) the identification of sporting talent, (3) the provision of domestic and international
competition opportunities for elite athletes, (4) the development system for coaches, the provision of coaches and of sports science support, and (5) the emergence of full-time athletes. Chapters 5 to 9 draw extensively on document analysis and on interview data. The thesis concludes by restating the main aim of the study, making key points relevant to the content, acknowledging limitations of the study, and providing recommendations for future research.
Chapter 2 Review of Literature

2.1 Sport and Politics

2.1.1 Introduction

The belief that sport and politics do not mix or overlap is well-known to many people, and is held on to by idealists. They think not only that sport should be used to improve human well-being and to maximise the greatest human physical and spiritual potential, but also that sport arenas are not appropriate places to make political statements, not least because the involvement of politics in sport blurs the true purposes of sporting competition. However, more and more people have gradually realised that this separation of sport and politics is impossible based on historical experience. As Coakley (1998: 433) concludes:

Sports do not exist in cultural vacuums. They are integral parts of the social world. As part of that world, they are influenced by social, political, and economic forces. Sports do not exist apart from the people who create, organise, and play them. The lives of these people and their relationships with one another are connected at least partially to issues of power and control. Therefore, politics becomes a part of sports just because sport is part of people’s lives. It is unavoidable.

It seems that the invention and global spread of modern sport, especially since the establishment of international sporting events (e.g. the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup), have led to an era of utilising sport for political purposes. Furthermore, thanks to the development of mass media and transportation, people can reach sporting events more easily, which means that there are more sport spectators and
audiences globally. Therefore, sport events, in particular international sport events, provide an opportunity for sportspeople to compete and become famous as well as for politicians and others to deliver certain political messages to both the domestic population and the world. As Nelson Mandela noted, ‘Sport is probably the most effective means of communication in the modern world, bypassing both verbal and written communication and reaching directly out to billions of people worldwide’ (quoted in Beck, 2004: 77).

This is not to say that there was no political element involved in sport in the ancient world. Statesmen often used the (ancient) Olympic festival as a forum to deliver an oration to their citizens and to obtain the admiration of the assembled crowds (Swaddling, 2004). Nevertheless, nowadays, although some people, even politicians, still assert the autonomy of sport rhetorically, sport and politics always go together. Sport is not merely sport. It has served as a multi-functional mechanism for dealing with wide-ranging social and political issues.

2.1.2 Sport, Civilisation and Social Segmentation

Arguably, since the invention of modern sport, the inherent characteristics of sport have served as a mechanism of civilisation as well as of social segmentation. Almost all modern sports are well codified and institutionalised, which means that people play sport in a given manner in formal competition. The implication of this is that people are more civilised than before because they know the rules and obey them. They can compete fairly and play with each other and with other groups outside their own community. Sport, however, also acts naturally as a source of social differentiation. First, innate physical and mental capabilities are different between people. Second, sport competitions are a zero-sum game: winner or loser; and the rankings also imply who is stronger or weaker. Third, sportspeople and spectators are different. One group play the games and the other watches them.
Early on in the expansion of British imperialism, modern sports spread from the UK to the colonies. In this period, colonial sports developed and local sports were marginalised (Jarvie and Reid, 1999). For example, in South Africa and many other colonies, white sports, especially cricket, were used to civilise the blacks; they were also used by the English-speaking whites to segregate themselves from other races, as they were an elite group. Cricket, as Nauright (1997: 26) describes, ‘…was an imperial game, the epitome of British culture, morality, manner and racism, which served to alienate Afrikaners as well as most of blacks’. In addition, sport has a social function that can potentially transmit values to the participants (Jarvie and Maguire, 1994). White sports were integrated into the PE curriculum in English white schools in South Africa in order to ‘instil values of British elite culture’ (Nauright, 1997: 25). Moreover, the integration of white sports and PE ‘further served as a mechanism of social differentiation’ as only a small number of black school-age children were enrolled in school programmes (Jarvie and Reid, 1999: 237).

The above is a general comment about the development of the political use of sport in relation to civilisation and segmentation. In addition, however, sport is frequently utilised directly by nation-states to deal with a variety of political issues, such as national integration, image enhancement, international goodwill and sporting boycott.

2.1.3 Use of Sport by Nation-States

**Sport and National Integration**

It is widely accepted that sport can improve national integration. In countries that face a problem of ethnic or cultural diversity and/or separatism, sport has been seen by governments as an approach to achieve collective belonging and promote national identity. In some nation-states, governments tend to host national games and ethnic
games. One of the political purposes of this is to bring people together and increase their solidification. Furthermore, bidding for international sporting events located in different regions of the country also symbolises national unity for governments, such as the 1992 Barcelona (Catalonia area) Olympics in Spain. Externally, success in international sporting events can arguably strengthen national identity. ‘We’ versus ‘they’, ‘our’ versus ‘their’ and ‘us’ versus ‘them’, are terms that are very often used by people to show where they belong when they are watching or discussing sporting competitions. Extended to international competitions between countries, the use of these terms implies people’s national identities, even though they may not even notice this.

In the 20th century the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the largest country in the world. It stretched across 11 time zones and comprised 15 Union Republics and approximately 293 million people (in 1991), all of whom had their own ethnic affiliation. It was not easy for the government to manage such a diverse situation. Sport, therefore, served the purpose of promoting national integration. As Rodionov (1975) argued, ‘The integrative functions of sport are immense. This has great importance for our multinational state. Sports contests, festivals, spartakiads and other forms of sports competition have played a key role in cementing the friendship of Soviet peoples’ (cited in Riordan, 1999: 50-51).

In Canada there has been a large amount of discussion surrounding ‘the cultural and politics of national identity’, at least since the 1960s (Bairner, 2001: 115). In the province of Québec, the majority of the population consists of Francophones (over 80%) and the separatist movement of Québec has been a long-standing issue for the Canadian federal government. Sport, in particular international sporting success, has been adopted by the Canadian government as a means of moderating the separatist movement. According to Bergsgard et al. (2007: 49), Pierre Trudeau (Prime Minister of Canada from 1968 to 1979 and again from 1980 to 1984), ‘recognised sport as a potentially valuable vehicle in defining and enhancing a sense of Canadian identity and, more specifically, helping to undermine the separatist movement in Québec’.
Canadian international sporting success, however, has been described at times as Québec’s own success when winning athletes have come from Quebec and been used to reinforce the separatist case. For example, in the 1984 Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games, Francophone athletes from Québec won two gold medals, the only two won by the Canadian national team, which was translated by the province’s premier, René Lévesque, into ‘Québec 2 Canada 0’ (Macintosh et al., 1988: 173). In addition, the high proportion of Francophone athletes from Québec in Canadian Olympics national teams (Green and Houlihan, 2005) seemed to give the separatists a fundamental reason to proclaim that the success belonged to Québec. Distinct perspectives between the federalists and separatists in terms of sport could also be seen in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. The Games served as a mechanism for promoting national identity for the federalists, but were considered to be Québec’s Games by the separatists (Bairner, 2001).

**Sport and Image Enhancement**

Another important political use of sport by governments is as a means of seeking image enhancement, both domestically and internationally. Ways to approach this include having a seat on international sporting associations (e.g. the International Olympic Committee and the Federation Internationale de Football Association), bidding for international sporting events, hosting events in a propagandist manner and, most importantly, achieving success in international sporting events. Indeed, over the last few decades, governments have increasingly become aware of the symbolic meaning of international sporting success in both international relations and at home. Sporting success seems to them to be a quick, effective and irrefutable way of enhancing the nation’s pride, demonstrating superiority and then obtaining image enhancement. However, tensions between two countries’ people can arise when countries pursue international sporting success, especially when a media element is involved. For instance, the media coverage of England versus Germany in their Euro 96 football match extended the rivalry between the two football teams to embrace the
peoples of the two countries (Maguire et al., 1999). It should be noted that for some politicians, image enhancement is more about promoting their own political image, which can be achieved through connecting themselves with sport and sporting success.

As for international image enhancement, this involves two concepts – recognition and prestige. As Allison and Monnington (2005: 6) suggest, ‘the “image enhancement” effect can be a question of success or merely of acceptance’. When recognised countries utilise sport as an image enhancement tool it is more about prestige. However, for others, such as Taiwan, Korea and Germany (between 1949 and 1990), which are or have been divided or are not accepted by most other governments as sovereign states, international recognition could be a more important issue than international prestige in the first instance.

Nevertheless, before 1939, the main political use of sport by governments for international relations was as a source of goodwill (Allison and Monnington, 2005). If there were any exception, it would be the case of Nazi Germany. After the Olympic Games were awarded to Berlin in 1932 and then the Nazis came to power, the Hitler government made numerous efforts to develop elite sport (Kruger, 1999) as well as successfully hosting the Games, although Hitler had claimed in previous years that the Olympics ‘was an invention of Jews and Freemasons’ and ‘could not possibly be put on in a Reich ruled by National Socialists’ (cited in Walters, 2006: 14). In spite of international pressure to withdraw the 1936 Olympic Games from Berlin, the IOC still insisted on its original decision. The spectacular style in which the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin were hosted, Hitler’s appearances at the opening ceremony and during the Games, and the excellent performance of Germany’s national team – which was placed first on the medal table – were presented as showing the power of a re-built Germany, of Nazism and of racial superiority and the brilliance of Hitler’s leadership not only to the world, but also to the German nation. As Kruger describes (1999:15), ‘the 1936 Olympics were termed a gigantic Nazi propaganda’. After seventy-two years, the Games hosted in Beijing shared considerable similarities with the Nazi Olympics (Liu, 2008).
The use of sport as a tool for image enhancement was not exclusive to Nazi Germany. It has been adopted by many countries over decades, including both communist and capitalist countries. Since it participated in the Summer Olympic Games in 1952 and the Winter Olympic Games in 1956, the supremacy of the USSR at almost every Olympic Games from 1952 to 1988 was hardly challenged by any other country, except during the 1968 Mexico City Summer and Grenoble Winter Olympic Games, the 1980 Lake Winter Olympic Games, the 1984 Los Angeles Summer and the Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games. Indeed, several communist states that had been tied to the USSR also achieved success at international sporting events after World War Two, especially in the Olympic Games (Riordan, 1999). According to Allison and Monnington (2005), the real drive behind this seemed to be to advertise the superior way of life of communism over capitalism. As a Soviet sports official asserted, ‘The increasing number of successes achieved by Soviet athletes… is a victory for the Soviet form of society and the socialist sports system; it provides irrefutable proof of the superiority of socialist culture over the moribund culture of capitalism’ (cited in Riordan, 1999: 57).

Another noteworthy example is that of the German Democratic Republic (the GDR). In 1949, four years after the end of World War Two, Germany was divided by the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), the French and the Soviet Union into West Germany (the FRG) built in ‘the western zones’ and East Germany (the GDR) in the ‘Soviet zone’. However, less fortunate than the FRG, the communist GDR faced the problem of achieving recognition from international society – except for communist countries – as an independent country (Riordan, 1993). In order for the GDR to break out of its diplomatic predicament, (elite) sport was utilised politically. As Riordan (1993: 42) describes, ‘Success in sport was seen by East German leaders as one means, perhaps the most popular and accessible, of gaining the regime acceptance and enhancing its image at home and abroad while other channels were closed’. Its remarkable performances in international sporting events, especially in the Olympic Games, were inevitably noticed by other countries and by international sport organisations, and this played a significant role in helping the GDR to obtain international status. In 1965, the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) recognised the National Olympic Committee of East Germany and allowed the GDR to participate separately from the FRG in the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games. Moreover, the Basic Treaty of the FRG passed in 1972 admitted the GDR as a recognised state, allowing both Germanys to enter the United Nations family.

With regard to capitalist countries, the USA during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) is a good example. It should be noted that the focus on image enhancement through sport in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Reagan’s USA differed. By using sport, the Nazis concentrated on advertising Hitler’s greatness, racial superiority and Nazism in general whereas the Soviet Union concentrated more on ideological superiority. In the USA, however, Reagan linked sport with his personal political achievement (Coakley, 1998) rather than capitalism’s superiority. This could perhaps be explained by two co-existing elements. First, the USA could not beat the Soviet Union into second place on the Olympics medal tables from 1952 to 1988, except at the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, from which the Soviet Union was absent, even though the USA dominated in other areas, such as economics. Second, because the USA was a democratic country, one of the most important tasks for Reagan was to enhance his political curriculum vitae and win the next election. Sport was an available and useful source for the Reagan government especially when Los Angeles hosted the 1984 Olympics and the American team achieved unprecedented success. As Monnington (1993: 134) comments, ‘The victories of the US athletes were used by the Reagan administration to reinforce the success story of Reagan’s first term’.

In addition to connecting the 1984 Games with his political achievement, Reagan drew political benefit from sport in various other ways. According to Coakley (1998), as was the case during the leadership of preceding US presidents, sport championship winning teams were invited to the White House by Reagan for the purpose of media consumption. Furthermore, in order for him to avoid interrupting the Super Bowl TV broadcast in 1985, he even abridged his inauguration speech and then arranged an appearance at the game, enjoying it and consuming it politically. Indeed, some
subsequent US presidents, such as Bill Clinton, have also taken advantage of sport for their own political careers and ‘when taken together, these examples provide strong support for the idea that governments and government officials use sport to promote themselves’ (Coakley, 1998: 411).

Furthermore, it seems that to some host countries/cities, assuring foreign sportspeople and visitors of a successful sporting event is crucially important to enhancing their image. However, some host countries/cities have faced the problem of internal political turbulence prior to events, which has had the potential to affect the events. Paradoxically, in order for these countries/cities to present a good image to foreigners by preventing the games from being interfered with by demonstrations, governments have often adopted a harsh approach to their treatment of demonstrators. In Mexico City there were student demonstrations, at which the demonstrators demanded change and opposed the Olympics of 1968. Indeed, the Mexican government had invested around 150 million dollars in its preparations for the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, and ‘many of its citizens believed that it was wasteful and misguided to outlay such a large amount of money in the name of sport, rather than spending such resources on housing or welfare’ (Toohey and Veal, 2007: 88). Just ten days before the Olympics, on 2 October, ten thousand demonstrators gathered in the Square of the Three Cultures and this soon led to violence. The response from the government was brutal. Troops opened fire on the crowd without cause or warning (Arbena, 1996). Eventually, at least 260 protesters were killed and over 1200 were wounded (Toohey and Veal, 2007). This brutal action meant that the Games would not be interrupted by further demonstrations and could open on schedule.

Another example is the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games in South Korea. In the 1980s, South Korea witnessed pro-democracy demonstrations involving large numbers of students, intellectuals and workers (Lee, 2010). According to Lee (2010), although the ruling party had pledged to hold a democratic presidential election at the end of 1987, demonstrations went on continually in Seoul and other major cities in South Korea. Some demonstrators even protested against the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul,
arguing that the Games ‘would simply justify the existence of the military dictatorship; …would solidify the division between North and South Korea; [and] … would only benefit a dominate class at the expense of the people’s interest’ (Lee, 2010: 120). Some of these protests were dispersed due to their attempts to obstruct the route of the torch relay and some of the demonstrators were arrested for distributing leaflets opposing the Olympic Games (Kim, 1994). The action of the South Korean government was far less coercive than in Mexico, but it can be seen that the two governments considered image enhancement as hugely important through providing a successful Games free of internal political factors.

**Sport and International Goodwill**

Sport is also utilised as an approach to improve international relations between countries. As Allison and Monnington (2005: 9) describe, ‘sporting encounters naturally engendered friendship and good will between nations’. A famous example is ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’. When the PRC was established in 1949, the USA adopted an isolationist policy towards the communist ‘new China’. There was no official or private interaction between the countries before the early 1970s. In the late 1960s, however, the USA was striving to escape the mire of the Vietnam War and to balance power with the Soviet Union, and the PRC was seeking interaction with western countries. Therefore, there was an urgent need to create better Sino-American relations (Hong, 2008). After six years absence from the international sporting stage (1965 to 1971), a Chinese table-tennis team attended the 31st World Table-Tennis Championship, which was held in Japan in 1971. During the game, the Chinese players implemented their diplomatic tactics – friendship first and competition second. Their friendly attitude linked with their sporting skill impressed both foreigners and the media. Soon after the Championship ended, the Chinese government invited the USA and five other western countries’ table-tennis teams to visit China. On 14 April 1971, China’s Premier, Zhou En-Lai, welcomed American players at the People’s Hall with a warm smile, welcoming attitude and conversation: ‘By this visiting, you
have opened the friendly door between the two countries’ (quoted in Zheng, 2009). After that, the interaction between the two sides increased. In February 1972, Richard Nixon became the first US President to visit China and two months later, China’s Chairman, Mao Zedong, visited the USA as the head of a Chinese table-tennis delegation. Through ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’, China was gradually recognised by the USA and then by the international family. Undoubtedly, sport played a significant role in the improvement in Sino-American relations.

**Sporting Boycott and Isolation**

Sporting boycott and isolation refers to countries, international sporting associations and sportspeople that refuse to have any connection or interaction with a particular country and/or exclude that country from international sporting affairs. It can be achieved, for example, through refusing to participate in international sporting events hosted in the isolated country, withdrawing membership from international sporting associations and suspending or divesting the right to participate in international sporting events. Such isolation or boycott serves as a form of protest or punishment.

As mentioned earlier, as early as the 1930s, the IOC faced international pressure for a boycott of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games after the Nazis came to power in Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. The reason for the protests, in the USA and the UK, was ‘to avoid bending Olympic rules to go along with the Nazis’ (Kruger, 1999: 14). The request for a boycott of the Berlin Games failed, but this opened a new chapter in the political use of sport to protest against other countries through the Olympics.

In the 1980s, two large scale but short term boycotts led by the USA (1980) and the USSR (1984) occurred. Due to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan at the end
of 1979 and the impossibility of the USA government taking direct military action during the Cold War period, the president of the USA, Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), decided to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games in protest against the Soviet action. Led by the USA, sixty-four countries joined the boycott. This relatively ‘soft’ anti-Soviet action by the USA government resulted in some criticism of political interference in sport from sportspeople. By contrast, politicians in the UK failed to change the decision of the British Olympic Association (BOA) on the American-led boycott. Despite Prime Minister Thatcher’s government urging British sportspeople and the BOA to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics, the responses from the BOA and most of the British sport federations were frosty (Allison and Monnington, 2005). The British team attended the Games.

No matter whether they managed to stop their national teams from going to Moscow or not, it seemed to western governments that there was a certain degree of political and diplomatic meaning in the boycott that would put pressure on the immoral Soviet Union. However, according to Monnington (1993: 147), ‘the real diplomatic value of the American boycott in influencing the government of the USSR was minimal’. Not surprisingly, four years later, in order for the USSR to avenge the American-led boycott in 1980, its government launched a further boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, although the number of countries that took part was much less. Only the USSR and thirteen other countries boycotted the Games and these included mainly Eastern Bloc states. Yet, not all communist countries, for example Romania, took the same line as the USSR in this instance.

More recently, the Chinese government also faced the possibility of a boycott after winning the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. According to Allison and Monnington (2005), the recommendation that the British government should oppose the allocation of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing emerged in a British parliamentary committee in 2000 partially because of China’s unacceptable policy in Tibet. The political use of sport is not only about governments. It also often involves other people, such as sportspeople, spectators and terrorists, who try to protest against
their own or other governments. The next section is related to uses of sport by non-
government organisations/people. However, before dealing with this, it is worth
discussing the case of the international sporting boycott of South Africa during the
apartheid period (1948-1993), which reveals the involvement of both governments
and non-governmental organisations/people.

Perhaps the most noticeable and the longest sporting isolation in the second half of
the 20th century was that of South Africa. After the implementation of the apartheid
policy in 1948, South Africa attracted international criticism. Sport, as an
international activity that allows countries to interact, had been amongst the victims of
racism in South Africa. During this period, a series of attempts to isolate South Africa
were made by many other countries and international sporting associations, and three
of which were extremely significant. First, South Africa was suspended from some
international sporting associations from the 1960s to the end of apartheid in 1993.
These included, for example, the FIFA, the IOC and the International Association of
Athletics Federation (IAAF). Both FIFA and the IOC also banned South Africa from
the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games respectively for a period of time.
Moreover, the disqualification of South Africa by the IAAF led to the record in the
women’s 5000 metres, set in South Africa in 1984 by South Africa born Zola Budd,
not being ratified by the IAAF as an official world record (Bale, 2004).

Second, South Africa was denied the right to take part in many other international
sporting events. In addition to the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games, South
Africa was also refused admission to the Commonwealth Games from 1959 to 1993,
the Davis Cup in 1970 and the Rugby World Cup in both 1987 and 1991. Although
South Africa remained a member of some international sporting associations, many
governments prevented South African teams from touring their countries. For
example, the Greek government banned South Africa from the 1979 Golf World Cup,
which was held in Athens.
Third, the boycott spread to other countries that appeared ‘friendly’ to South Africa. For example, led by Tanzania, many Third World national teams refused to take part in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal to express their resentful feelings towards the New Zealand government, which had permitted one of its rugby teams to tour South Africa (Hill, 1993).

It should be noted that although abandonment of the apartheid policy in South Africa in 1993 almost coincided with the end of its long-term international sporting isolation, it is inappropriate to overestimate the boycott’s influence. According to Guelke (1993: 152-153), there are four points of view that can help us to reassess the impact of sporting isolation on the apartheid policy:

Firstly, the country’s [sporting] isolation was never total; secondly, the intensity of the county’s isolation often bore little relationship either to the degree of apartheid practised in the sport in question or to the general level of social segregation in South Africa; thirdly, South Africa’s readmission to international competition has only been weakly related to the conditions prevailing in individual sporting codes; and fourthly, the transformation in the international position of South Africa sport is the result of complex political manoeuvring by the main political factions in the country and is a far cry from the depoliticisation of sport.

Nevertheless, sport was used as a means for governments and other non-government sporting organisations to put pressure on South Africa during the period of the apartheid.
2.1.4 Use of Sport by Others

Sport and Symbolic Protest

Symbolic political protest through sport is mainly led by sportspeople or spectators. By making particular gestures or acting in certain ways, they express their disapproval of existing situations created by their own or other countries. At the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games, two African American 200 metre sprinters, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who were placed first and second respectively in the finals, raised their clenched hands in a salute on the victory stand to complain against racial discrimination in the USA. Such a ‘figurative protest’ was cheered by many African Americans (Harris, 1999).

With regard to spectators, there are those whose country’s sovereignty is suppressed by another country. An example is Taiwan. The independence issue between Taiwan and China has existed since 1949, when the ruling party of Mainland China, the Kuomintang (KMT), was defeated by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and retreated to Taiwan. Although the CPC failed to conquer Taiwan further, the communist government considers it to be part of Mainland China and advocates a ‘one-China policy’, whereas the KMT considers the one-China policy differently. In order for the PRC to achieve its policy, the Republic of China (ROC) has been suppressed by the PRC in many ways. For example, China denies international space to Taiwan by preventing it from participating in international affairs and displaying its national flag internationally. However, at international sporting events, some patriotic Taiwanese spectators unfurl and wave their national flag, especially when the cameras are on them, even if the flag has usually been grasped by Chinese spectators. By doing this, they are not only expressing their nationalism, but also challenging China’s suppression.
However, although the major part of Taiwanese (elite) sports policy is associated with its independent issue, there is more to it than that. Before going deeply into Taiwanese (elite) sports policy, it is important to outline the political context of Taiwan and to discuss the relationship between sport and politics in Taiwan.

2.2 The Political Context of Taiwan

2.2.1 Before the Qing Dynasty

Prior to 1626, Taiwan (or Formosa) was separately governed by a number of different tribes consisting of people of Austronesian descent. Indeed, these indigenous people are recognised today as Taiwan's aborigines. During the 17th century, the Netherlands (1624-1662) and Spain (1626-1642) sought to colonise the island. However, the emergence of the Zheng family Dynasty (1661-1683) witnessed the establishment of a Han Chinese regime in Taiwan. During this period, Taiwan gradually developed towards becoming civilised society and increasing numbers of Han Chinese people emigrated to the island.

2.2.2 Before the Republic of China (1683-1945)

Taiwan became a part of Mainland China and was ruled by the Qing Dynasty from 1683 to 1985. During this period, Taiwan rapidly developed economically. Socially, large numbers of Han Chinese people emigrated to Taiwan, replacing the aboriginals as the main ethnic group on the island (the Government Information Office, 2004).
In 1895, the Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in accordance with *The Treaty of Shimonoseki* after their defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. However, it was subsequently restored to the ROC, governed by the KMT, which overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911, at the end of the World War II and the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945. After that, Taiwan became a province of the ROC.

However, Taiwan remained heavily influenced by Japan. From 1936, Japan began its so-called ‘Practice of Emperor People Movement’ in order to Japanise the Taiwanese in several dimensions, including their language, education, habitus, culture and institutions. In addition, Japan developed a colonial economy, which meant that natural and human resources in Taiwan were used for Japan’s benefit. During the Japanese colonial period, according to the Government Information Office (2004), on the one hand the Taiwanese experienced unfair treatment with regard to education as well as racism, but on the other hand Taiwan was modernised to a certain degree with regard to culture, politics, economy, agriculture and education.

2.2.3 The Chinese Civil War Period (1946-1949)

Despite the ending of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Mainland China was not at peace for long. In 1946, the Chinese Civil War between the CPC and the KMT began again, having started in 1927 with respite during the Second Sino-Japanese War. From 1945 to 1949, however, Taiwan was relatively free of the consequences of the War, although it suffered from serious hyperinflation caused by the impact of World War II, the influence of inflation in Mainland China and the flow of resources to Mainland China (Liu and Tsai, 1989; Yu, 2006). In order to stabilise its economy, the KMT government decided to reform the currency in Taiwan, replacing the old Taiwan dollar with the new Taiwan dollar (NTD) with a ratio of 40,000:1.
In addition, Taiwan experienced internal turbulence, beginning with the 228 Incident. It should be noted that the background to the Incident was an era of complaints by Taiwan’s inhabitants about the policies and behaviour of the new government – the ROC, which had existed since 1945. On 27 February 1947, Tobacco Monopoly Bureau agents confiscated contraband cigarettes from a woman and pistol-whipped her because of her resistance. This led to witnesses gathering and surrounding the agents. As a result, a bystander was killed by a warning shot fired by one of the agents. Although the agents were protected by government policy, this behaviour infuriated the crowd and many other people who heard about the incident. On 28 February, a petition calling for the agents to be punished was instigated in Taipei. The government, however, did not respond to this petition, preferring to send in troops to suppress the opposition. The crackdown became bloody when the troops started to fire on unarmed demonstrators. After that, the conflict between the government and the Taiwanese inhabitants became more serious. In the following days, the government proceeded to implement a ‘country sweeping campaign across Taiwan, arresting and killing people suspected of being members of the anti-government movement. Most of them were local elites and leaders. The 228 Incident initiated political conflict and racial estrangement, which were to have a profound effect on the political and social-cultural development of Taiwan (the Government Information Office, 2004; Lee, 2004).

Following a series of setbacks during the Chinese Civil War, in January 1949 Taiwan was selected by the KMT as the final base to fight against the CPC. In preparation for this, the KMT proclaimed martial law in Taiwan on 20 May 1949, to ensure that it was a stable and safe place, in particular after the 228 Incident. The impact of martial law on Taiwan became immediately apparent after the establishment of the ROC central government in Taipei.
2.2.4 The Arrival of the ROC Central Government – the Chiang Kai-Sheik Period (1949-1975)

From 1948, the KMT gradually lost superiority in the Chinese Civil War and was eventually defeated by the CPC, which resulted in its retreat from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. Once in control of Mainland China, the CPC established the PRC and between 1949 and 1978 attempted to conquer Taiwan by using armed forces for the purpose of unification. This situation was more serious in the first decade of the period. For instance, in addition to the PRC sending troops in 1949 to invade Kinmen – one of Taiwan’s islands located in an area of strategic importance – there were large scale artillery attacks on Kinmen, such as the 93 Artillery Bombardment in 1954 and the 823 Artillery Bombardment in 1958.

In the context of the Cold War, however, the ROC/Taiwan benefited from the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which increased the US government’s awareness of political and military strategies for preventing the spread of Communism in East Asia. Subsequently, The Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954, which included not only a mutual military aid relationship, but also political and economic cooperation. According to the Government Information Office (2004), the ROC/Taiwan received around one hundred billion US$ aid from the USA every year between 1950 and 1968. The reasons for America’s assistance were first, to enable Taiwan to facilitate America’s military activity; second, to assist Taiwan in its economic stabilisation; and third, to boost Taiwan’s self-sufficiency (Hsu, 1997). In reality, however, the impact of World War II on the economy, including hyperinflation and economic depression, continued during the post-Chinese Civil War period in Taiwan. For that reason, the aid from the USA was important for the KMT in assisting it to implement or continue a series of economic revival policies, for example, currency reform, land reforms and development of the manufacturing industry.
In addition to reviving the economy, in 1950 the KMT announced *The Practice Principles of Local Self-government* in Taiwan, which divided the administration area of the province into sixteen counties and five cities. The following year, magistrate and parliamentary elections were held to establish the local self-government. However, the Taiwan province governor was still assigned by the central government, thereby limiting local autonomy.

After retreating to Taiwan, the KMT governed Taiwan as an authoritarian regime using martial law and the articles of *The Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion*, which were announced in 1947 and prioritised over the Constitution of the ROC. This authoritarian system was generally close to, although not the same as, the Communist system, due to its controlling economics and politics to a lesser degree (the Government Information Office, 2004). Underlying the operation of the system was a racial structure. That is, relatively fewer but more powerful external-province people (*waisheng rens*) who had immigrated to Taiwan after the end of the World War II in 1945 governed relatively more but powerless original-province people (*bensheng rens*) who were rooted in Taiwan before 1945.

Under the authoritarian conditions, according to the Government Information Office (2004), there were four features in Taiwan. First, military force became the foundation for maintaining the reins of the government, leading to a heavy militarised atmosphere. Expressions of opinion on public affairs, assemblies, parades and basic human rights were also restricted.

Second, politics was totally controlled by a single party – the KMT. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that the president could unlimitedly renew his tenure by being reelected by National Assembly representatives; the term in office of National Assembly representatives (similar to legislators nowadays) became permanent; opposition parties were marginalised, and it was prohibited to organise a new party;
and, most public servants were external-province people. All of this resulted in original-province people considering the ROC to be a ‘regime from outside’.

Third, government control of the economy followed the ideas enshrined in *The principle of Min-sheng* in *The Three Principles of the People*. Large-scale or important enterprises were managed by the KMT. Private businesses could only be small scale. As a result, some academics term this party-state capitalism.

Fourth, popular thought and behaviour, to a certain degree, were controlled and influenced by the KMT, resulting in the ‘white terror’ atmosphere. For instance, *The Three Principles of the People* developed by San Yat-Sen, the first leader of the KMT, included an obligatory course in senior high school and university. Moreover, the media were directly and/or indirectly controlled by the KMT. Furthermore, special agents and informers permeated the society.

With respect to international relations, although the ROC retreated to Taiwan, it was still recognised as the sole legitimate authority of China by most of the international community. This is evident in its representation at the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations and in the fact that it had diplomatic relations with many countries. In effect, the ROC was one of the founding members of the UN and a permanent member of the Security Council from its establishment in 1945. From the 1960s onwards, however, the situation changed dramatically, when some nations that were friendly with the PRC attempted to expel the representatives of the ROC from the UN. In addition, the diplomatic relationship between the PRC and the United States improved after Richard Nixon’s inauguration as President of the USA in 1969 (Hsu, 1997). To a certain degree, this was attributed to ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’\(^1\). As a

\(^1\) Ping-Pong Diplomacy refers to the exchange of table tennis players between the USA and the PRC in the early 1970s. The event marked a thaw in USA-China relations that paved the way to a visit to Beijing by President Richard Nixon.
result, The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, which recognised the PRC as the only legitimate representatives of China to the UN and expelled the representatives of Chiang Kai-Sheik (ROC) from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the UN and in all the organisations related to it, was passed on 25 October 1971. From the mid-1970s, the resolution further ensured that most nations chose to follow the UN’s position with regard to the issue of the lawful authority of China between the PRC and the ROC (Yu, 2007) and terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC. Since then, the ROC has faced serious diplomatic difficulties within the international community.

2.2.5 The Yen Chia-Kan Period (1975-1978)

In 1975, Chiang Kai-Sheik passed away. Yen Chia-Kan, Vice President of the ROC between 1966 and 1975, succeeded to Chiang’s presidency, according to the Constitution of the ROC. During his presidency, the government proceeded with The Ten Major Construction Projects (1974-1979), and the economy flourished. There were no significant changes in politics or in diplomatic relationships. Furthermore, although Yen Chia-Kan was president, the military, the KMT and the political authority all centred on Chiang Kai-Sheik’s son, Chiang Ching-Kuo. Yen Chia-Kan, therefore, can be viewed as a transitional president before Chiang Chiang-Kuo’s election in 1978 (Chen, 2003).

2.2.6 The Chiang Ching-Kuo Period (1978-1988)

In January 1979, official relations between the ROC and the USA were severed when the USA established diplomatic relations with the PRC and abolished The Sino-
American Mutual Defense Treaty (1954-1979). This also meant that the ROC was no longer recognised by the US government. This news was a further setback for Taiwan, which was excluded by the UN in 1971. The United States Congress, however, passed The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to replace The Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in the same year. According to the TRA (1979), it was intended ‘to help maintain peace, security and stability in the West Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorising the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes’. Even so, the TRA did not indicate that the USA recognised the sovereignty of the ROC.

In order to prevent international isolation after being excluded from the UN and as a result of its much altered relationship with the USA, the ROC government changed its foreign policy in the form of providing economic or resources assistance for other countries in order to establish ties, and then official diplomatic relations. Such an approach has been termed an investment plan for the co-prosperity of Taiwan and its allies since the 1990s and this still applies nowadays. Moreover, at present the only acceptable name for the ROC, for most countries and international organisations, is Chinese Taipei, which was first adopted by the IOC.

In addition to its difficulties in building diplomatic relations with other countries, the KMT faced increasing domestic pressure to terminate the restriction on people’s opinions on public affairs, to permit organising new parties and to introduce democracy. These demands also implied a challenge to the martial law system. However, the government simply adopted coercion to suppress this movement. This was evident, for example, when a pro-democracy demonstration in Kaohsiung on Human Rights Day 1979 was repressed by the army and police sent by the KMT, resulting in the protestors’ arrest and imprisonment. This is known as the Formosa Incident or the Meilidao Incident. Furthermore, Henry Liu (often known by his pen name; Chiang Nan) who wrote an unauthorised biography of Chiang Ching-Kuo, was assassinated by the ROC’s military intelligence agent(s) on 15 October 1984 in the
USA (Shu, 2007). There were other cases of government suppression of the movement, but it is not the intention of this study to discuss this further. All of these incidents aroused the concerns of the international community, in particular the US government, with regard to the issues of democracy and human rights in Taiwan. Faced with increasing internal and external pressures, the KMT’s authoritarian system began to change from the mid-1980s. For instance, the KMT tacitly approved the creation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986; coercive suppression was replaced with ‘soft’ policing; and the KMT attempted to localise (or Taiwanese) its regime through assigning original-province people to some public positions. The most significant of these was internal-province person Lee Teng-Hui’s election by the National Assembly to Vice President. Eventually, in 1987, the KMT lifted martial law. The abolition of this system indicated that Taiwan was moving towards democracy, which was to have a profoundly positive impact on the development of politics and economics in the future (Hsueh, 2008).

2.2.7 The Lee Teng-Hui Period (1988-2000)

The end of the ‘Chiang Dynasty’ (1945-1988) in Taiwan and in the KMT followed Chiang Ching-Kuo’s death and Lee Ten-Hui’s succeeded as President of the ROC and leader of the KMT in 1988. In order to continually accelerate democratisation, Lee Teng-Hui’s government proclaimed the termination of The Period of Mobilization for the suppression of Communist Rebellion and the abolition of its related articles in 1991. This also meant that the President would be directly elected by general election, rather than selected by the National Assembly. Work also began on lifting the party and newspaper bans. However, ‘owing to the structure of the market and ownership patterns, the KMT government maintained a powerful influence over television and major newspapers’ (Rawnsley, 1998: 106). Nevertheless, the Taiwanese gradually began to enjoy democracy and a more liberal social environment. It is worth noting that during this period, the DPP’s political importance was enhanced through it achieving good results in elections. For example, it obtained around 41 percent of the
votes in the county and city magistrates’ elections in 1993 and it won around 30% of the seats in the Legislative Yaun between 1995 and 2000.

As mentioned previously, the governor of Taiwan province was assigned by the central government. Following democratisation, however, the post of governor was also opened up to election. In 1994, Soong Chu-Yu became the first governor of Taiwan province to be elected by qualified nationals. However, having considered that there was an overlap between the Taiwan provincial government and the ROC central government with regard to government organisations, human resources and functions, the ROC government decided in 1998 to annul the administrative authority of the Taiwan provincial government and to combine it with the Central Taiwan Office of the Executive Yuan.

Turning now to international relations, not only did the Lee government strengthen the ‘investment plan for the co-prosperity of Taiwan and its allies’, it also encouraged private enterprises to make investments in South-East Asian countries. Moreover, appreciating that an increased profile on the international stage might help Taiwan to resolve its diplomatic predicament, Lee began to visit other countries, including both diplomatic and non-diplomatic allies. During this period, although through these policies Taiwan successfully allied with some countries and returned to some international organisations, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the name of Chinese Taipei, it was difficult to make further progress in international relationships under the conditions of PRC control.

It is also important to mention that from the end of the 1980s, the government attempted to improve its relationship with the PRC (or so-called ‘cross-strait’ relations), which was exemplified by rescinding the ban on visiting relatives in Mainland China and by allowing private trade, cultural and social exchanges. Since then, interactions between the two sides have gradually grown, leading to a need for a unique agency to handle the numerous resultant problems. Thus, in 1991, the
government established an official agency – the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) under the Executive Yuan – which is responsible for the ‘overall planning and handling of Mainland affairs’ (the MAC, no date: http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=94003&ctNode=7108&mp=3) and authorised a non-official organisation – the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) – to serve as a communication channel with the PRC. In response to these initiatives, the PRC created a similar organisation – the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).

Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the two governments held several meetings and established dialogue through the SEF-ARATS channel, indicating the establishment of a mechanism of institutionalised negotiations between the two sides for resolving issues related to cross-strait exchanges. However, such a mechanism was unilaterally broken off by the PRC in 1995 after President Lee’s visit to his alma mater (Cornell University) in the USA. Moreover, the general election of the President held in 1996, under the shadow of the PRC’s missile threats, caused the cross-strait relations to deteriorate further. Although the channel of communication resumed in 1998, the PRC severed it again in 1999 when Lee announced ‘Special State-to-State Relations’ between Taiwan and Mainland China.

2.2.8 The Chen Shui-Bian Period (2000-2008)

In the political context of the enhancement of the DPP’s standing, Chen Shui-Bian, the DPP candidate, was elected as President in 2000, meaning that Taiwan experienced the first political party rotation for over five decades, and that democracy had become more mature in Taiwan. However, Chen’s presidency witnessed the slow and/or regressive development of Taiwan in several dimensions.
First, there was inconsistency in executive-legislature relations. Since the 1990s, internal disunity had meant that some politicians, who had separated from the KMT, had established the New Party (NP) in 1993, the People First Party (PFP) in 2000 and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2001. Nevertheless, the KMT tended to ally itself with the NP and PFP when facing political issues, in particular cross-strait relations, and this led to the term ‘Pan-Blue Coalition’. Generally, in contrast to the so-called ‘Pan-Green Coalition’ consisting of the DDP, the TSU and the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), whose aim was Taiwan’s independence with regard to cross-strait relations, Pan-Blue Coalition favours Chinese unification and/or maintenance of the status quo. From 2001 to early 2008, while the DPP became the largest party in the Legislature Yuan, the Pan-Blue Coalition won over half the seats (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). President Chen, however, decided to organise a minority government during his presidency, resulting in discordant executive-legislature relations. Such relations further affected policy formulation and implementation.

Second, economic development was slow. It should be noted that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 seriously damaged Taiwan’s economy. The DPP government, however, did not have efficient economic policies to handle the aftermath of the crisis, which led, amongst other things, to the fall of the average economic growth rate from 6.5% (before 2001) to 4.6% (2001-2007), a rise in the inflation rate and the devaluation of the NTD. In addition, Taiwanese businesses gradually lost their competitiveness because of Chen’s ‘locking in’ policy, which referred to restrictions on investment from Taiwanese businesses in Mainland China.

Third, cross-strait relations were frozen. This was evident in a lack of interactions between the two sides, even through the SEF-ARATS channel. In 2000, Chen referred to ‘Four Noes and One Without’ policy in his inaugural speech, in order to express the DPP government’s intention to maintain the status quo of the cross-strait relations provided that the PRC did not attack Taiwan. Although such a statement did not conform to the PRC’s ultimate aim for cross-strait relations – unification, maintaining
the status quo seemed to be an acceptable option at the time, in particular as Taiwan was protected from war by the TRA. Chen’s administration, however, retained its preference for Taiwan’s independence. For example, Chen espoused the perspective of ‘One Country on Each Side’ with reference to the political status of Taiwan and the DPP government abolished the National Unification Council and the National Unification guidelines in 2006. As a result, throughout these eight years (2000-2008), crises affecting cross-strait relations broke out several times and the interactions between the two sides decreased.

Table 2.1 The Result of the 2001 Legislature Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalitions</th>
<th>Pan-Blue Coalition</th>
<th>Pan-Green Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>PFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the Central Election Commission (2001)

Table 2.2 The Result of the 2004 Legislature Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalitions</th>
<th>Pan-Blue Coalition</th>
<th>Pan-Green Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>PFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the Central Election Commission (2004)

Finally, there was less possibility of building diplomatic relations with other countries for Taiwan, and Taiwan-USA relations gradually deteriorated. In general, Chen’s administration followed Lee Teng-Hui’s foreign policies. However, in the context of
the possibility that cross-strait war might break out if Taiwan declared dependence, the DPP’s preference for Taiwan’s independence and its related actions indirectly defied the principles of the TRA: maintaining peace, the stability of cross-strait relations and the status quo. This inevitably had a negative impact on Taiwan-USA relations and resulted in more serious diplomatic suppression by the PRC.

2.2.9 The Ma Ying-Jeou Period (2008-present)

Taiwan went through a second party rotation when the KMT’s candidate – Ma Ying-Jeou – achieved a landslide election victory (58.45% of the total votes) to become the President of the ROC in 2008. Indeed, earlier the same year, the KMT won more than 70% and the Pan-Blue Coalition 75% of the total seats in the Legislative election, respectively. After becoming President, Ma decided to organise a majority government. Not only did all of this reflect the fact that most nationals distrusted the governing abilities of the DPP, it also indicated that the executive-legislature relations should become consistent.

The first and most important task for the Ma administration was to end the economic recession, which was a ‘legacy’ left by the DPP. Initially, the performance of the Ma administration did not conform to voters’ expectations, in particular when Taiwan was affected by the American financial crisis in 2009. For example, the average annual economic growth rate decreased from 0.73% in 2008 to -1.93% in 2009 (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 2011). However, the economy has gradually improved since 2010. The average annual economic growth rate increased to 10.88 in 2010 and was forecasted as 5.01 in 2011 (the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 2011).
In addition, tensions with regard to cross-strait relations were alleviated due to the KMT government favouring maintaining the status quo and creating greater economic links with Mainland China. Since 2008, the SEF-ARATS channel has resumed and economic interactions and cultural exchanges have increased. On 29 June 2010, through the SEF-ARATS negotiation mechanism, the Ma administration signed The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in order to further improve the economic interaction between the two sides. Following the stabilisation of the relationship, the total amount of foreign investment in Taiwan has also increased. Furthermore, since adopting pro-China policy and establishing positive relations with the PRC, the Ma administration has enjoyed more flexibility in developing its foreign policies. In effect, all of this is identified as so-called ‘Workable Diplomacy’, which has helped to provide Taiwan with more space in the international community. However, Ma government’s pro-China policy also invokes the DPP’s criticism.

2.2.10 Summary

In economics, education, culture and society, Taiwan was heavily influenced by Japan during the colonial period (1985-1945). From 1945 to the present, Taiwan’s politics have evolved from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. In addition, although the ROC has become an international pariah since it was expelled from the UN and lost recognition from the USA, the country has gradually been more accepted by the international community, albeit with the name ‘Chinese Taipei’. Furthermore, the cross-strait relations have changed from military conflict to peaceful coexistence, which means that politics, economics and society more generally have a more stable environment in which to develop.
2.3 Sport and Politics in Taiwan

2.3.1 Introduction

As mentioned earlier, it seems to be impossible to separate sport from politics according to historical experience. This is undeniably true in Taiwan where the relationship involves two main issues: (i) sport and the one-China issue, and (ii) baseball and politics. The former refers to the legitimate status of the ROC in the Olympic Movement and disputes between the PRC and the ROC in the international sporting arena. The latter relates to baseball development in both the Japanese colonial period and the KMT government period (1945-2000), with the two governments utilising the sport to deliver their political aims.

2.2.2 Sport and the One China/Two Chinas Issue

As early as 1922, the IOC recognised the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) that was founded in Mainland China, which was ruled at the time by the KMT government. After losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949, however, the KMT moved its whole regime, including the COC, from Mainland China to Taiwan. Since then, the one-China dispute between the PRC (Mainland China) and the ROC (Taiwan) has become an international political issue. Although the PRC contended that Taiwan was a part of its territory and that the ROC was no longer sovereign, the government of Taiwan held a different perspective. The one-China issue was also extended into the international sporting arena because the right to participate in international sporting affairs involved state recognition. In other words, international sporting organisations, such as the IOC, had to face the issue. As a result, in early 1952, the IOC passed a resolution to permit both the PRC and the ROC to participate in the 1952 Olympics as separate countries. However, the two were dissatisfied with the resolution and
protested that the other should not be recognised as a legitimate country, and could not be included in the Olympic Movement. This led to the PRC’s absence from the 1956 Olympic Games and its withdrawal from the Olympic family in 1958.

In 1959, at the IOC’s annual meeting, the Soviet Union and some other eastern European IOC countries proposed that the COC, which was located in Taipei, Taiwan, and represented the ROC, should not be recognised and should be excluded from the list of IOC members due to the fact that it was unable to control and manage the development of physical education and sport in Mainland China. As a result, the COC was voted out of the IOC. Obviously, sport became one of the PRC’s and its communist allies’ political tools to suppress the ROC’s international space. On the other hand, this event also raised the KMT’s awareness of the importance of international sporting relations with other countries (Tan, 2008). Soon after the event, the COC successfully reapplied in 1960 with its new title – the Republic of China Olympic Committee (ROCOC), but the ROC’s national teams had to use ‘Taiwan’ as their name during the Olympic Games. The ROC, thus, participated in the 1960 Rome, 1964 Tokyo and 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games under the name of Taiwan. In order to prevent its international status from being further degraded, the ROC government appealed to the IOC to alter the name of its national teams to ROC. The appeal was passed but not until the IOC’s annual meeting in October 1968.

From the above, it seems that the PRC was unable to efficiently suppress the ROC through sport during the 1950s and 1960s because the ROC still enjoyed basic ‘international sporting rights’, such as being able to join international sporting organisations as a country and using the national flag and anthem during international sporting events. To a certain degree, most international sporting organisations maintained a neutral attitude when faced with the one-China issue. It should be noted that during this period, the ROC was also a member of the UN and was recognised by many countries. This meant that the ROC was not in an inferior position with regard to the one-China issue. In this respect, the ROC’s international sporting rights benefited from the political situation.
As discussed previously, however, the ROC’s status in the international community was dramatically degraded in the 1970s after the PRC’s ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’ and the improvement in the relationship between the PRC and the USA. The ROC was expelled from the UN and became an international pariah. The PRC’s dominance in relation to the one-China issue strengthened its capacity to block every kind of channel that might allow the ROC to develop its links with other countries, including sport. Therefore, the international sporting rights of the ROC were gradually removed from the 1970s onwards.

The first major shock came in 1973 when the Asian Games Federation (AGF) rescinded the ROC’s membership in order to allow the PRC to represent China at the Asian Games. This led to Taiwan’s absence from the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth Asian Games (1974-1986). In addition, although in 1975 the IOC rejected the PRC’s request to exclude the ROC from IOC membership as a condition of PRC’s re-joining the IOC, it was difficult to avoid other governments’ interference in the ROC’s international sporting rights through the manipulation of their own diplomatic policies. In 1976, the Canadian government, which had established diplomatic relations with the PRC, refused the ROC delegation’s entry to participate in the Montreal Olympics in the name of the ROC, which was now unrecognised. After negotiating with the government, the IOC announced that the ROC must use ‘Taiwan’ as the name of its delegation during the Games. The ROC, however, refused to do this and quit the Games. Again, the ROC’s international sporting rights had been damaged by politics.

In 1979, a representative of the PRC declared during the 81st plenary session of the IOC that Taiwan was China’s territory and that sport organisations in Taiwan could remain in the Olympic Movement only in the name of the Chinese Olympic Committee, Taiwan. Later the same year, the ROC’s sport suffered a further setback when the IOC, which was eager to integrate the PRC into the Olympic movement, unilaterally forbade Taiwan from using the name of the ROC and its national flag and anthem at any affairs held/hosted by any branch of the IOC. This prohibition received the ROC’s criticism of IOC’s political intervention in sport. The ROC and the IOC
member from Taiwan sued the IOC for its decision, which contravened the Olympic Charter. During the litigation in the Lausanne district court, the IOC even decided to terminate the ROC’s right to participate in the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Soon after losing the lawsuit, the IOC amended its Chapter to legalise the decision, and then negotiated with Taiwan’s Olympic Committee in relation to the name, flag and song to be used in the future. The ROC, therefore, had to accept the IOC’s request if it wanted to stay in the Olympic family. When faced with such a diplomatic predicament, sport was one of the few channels through which the ROC could partake in international affairs. As a result, on 23 March 1981, the ROC signed An Agreement between the International Olympic Committee, Lausanne and Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. The agreement confirmed that Taiwan could be included in the Olympic Movement in the name of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) and that it could use the Chinese Taipei Olympic flag and the national flag song. In addition, the IOC would assist Taiwan’s NGOs in rejoining international sport federations. All of this benefited Taiwan’s diplomatic situation and the development of sport in Taiwan.

On the other hand, due to Chinese Taipei being only the name of Taiwan’s capital city as well as the fact that the Chinese Taipei Olympic flag and the song accepted by the IOC are not its national flag and anthem (most countries use/are allowed to use their own national names, flags and anthems as their profiles in the Olympic affairs), this seemed to mean that the status of the ROC had been downgraded. Nevertheless, Taiwan has conformed to the Agreement and it returned to the Olympic Games in 1984. Since then, this ‘Olympic formula’ has extended to almost all international sporting affairs and even most non-sporting international relationships.

Signing the Agreement did not mean the end of the political dispute between the two sides in the international sporting arena. It only indicates that there is a formula to follow when the one-China problem arises. In fact, due to the gap between the two Olympic committees (China and Taiwan) existing for such a long time, and the different political systems and values, it is not easy for either side to cease playing political games in international sporting affairs in order to secure certain political advantages from each other (Tan, 2008). There are three main types of political trick. First, the term Chinese Taipei is translated into Chinese differently in the PRC and
Taiwan, resulting in quarrels, in particular when sporting events are hosted in Chinese speaking countries. The PRC interprets it as ‘Zhongguo Taipei’ (China Taipei), connoting that Taipei is one of cities of the PRC, and therefore, Taiwan is part of its territory. Such a translation apparently degrades Taiwan’s status. In contrast, Taiwan translates it as ‘Zhonghua Taipei’ (Chinese Taipei), implying that differences exist between Zhongguo (China) and Taiwan. In order to solve this problem, in 1989 the two sides signed a pact that unified the translation as Zhonghua Taipei. However, although the PRC has observed the pact since then on most stipulated occasions, the term Zhongguo Taipei is often adopted by the PRC’s media.

The second type of artifice relates to the order of the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) delegations’ parade at the opening ceremonies of international sporting events recognised by the IOC, such as the Olympic Games and the Asian Games. According to Olympic Protocol, the parade can be arranged in alphabetical order according to the host nation’s language. Otherwise, there is a given list of country codes (in English) to be referred to by non-English speaking countries. The CTOC’s country code is TPE, which was designed in order to distinguish it from the COC’s CHN and to avoid protest from Taiwan. Traditionally, most host nations adopt the list and catalogue the CTOC’s delegation in the ‘T’ group at the parade. At the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the order of the parade was based on the number of strokes in the first Chinese character, which led to the CTOC’s delegation being arranged in the same group as Hong Kong, China. As Bairner and Hwang (2010) mentioned, this arrangement seemed to deliver a message to the world that Taiwan was part of China. However, following the improvement in cross-strait relations in recent years, the PRC has begun to use the IOC’s country code, for example, at the 2010 Guangzhou (China) Asian Games.

Third, there is the problem of the ROC’s national flag appearing at international sporting events. As mentioned previously, the regulations in the Agreement, which have been adopted by most international sporting organisations, provide that the CTOC’s flag is the only one recognised for Taiwan. However, due to the fact that the
ROC’s national flag has a symbolic meaning of the ROC’s independence, it has been raised by organisers at some international sporting events hosted in Taiwan (e.g. the 1982 Women’s Softball World Cup and the Sunrise LPGA Taiwan Championship in 2011), which has often invoked Chinese protest. In addition, some Taiwanese athletes and patriotic spectators show or wave the flag during international sporting events. This behaviour has led to conflicts, which at times have been violent, between Chinese and Taiwanese athletes and spectators.

Although a number of political artifices are still utilised by China and Taiwan in relation to sport, this study will not discuss this issue further. However, in addition to the one-China issue in international sporting affairs, baseball in Taiwan is another important political issue.

### 2.2.3 Baseball and Politics in Taiwan

In 1985, Japan took over Taiwan from the Qing Dynasty and started its colonial regime in Taiwan. During the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945), baseball was introduced. In the early stage of occupancy, however, only the Japanese played the game. According to Yu (2007), there were two main reasons for this. First, on the one hand, the colonists, who were arrogant about their national sport and racist towards the Taiwanese, considered that playing the game would potentially raise the awareness of the Taiwanese youth and lead to a problem of control. Second, Taiwanese parents discouraged their children from playing and/or watching baseball because not only did they think that it was a meaningless game that would jeopardise their children’s academic work, but they were also afraid of their children being hurt. Moreover, due to cultural differences and the Taiwanese misunderstanding of modern sports, swinging bats and running to catch balls was regarded by the locals as crazy and purposeless and it often led to sneers and despised judgments. Nevertheless, many Japanese schools, public sector employees and corporations zealously organised
their own baseball teams, and inter-school as well as inter-amateur team competitions flourished. This also led to a gradual change in the locals’ attitude towards baseball. As Xie and Xie (2003) note, after around 1916, baseball became a well-known sport in Taiwan, and many Taiwanese were curious about it and had an interest in watching baseball games.

Following Japan’s political liberation after World War I, it changed its colonial policy to assimilation, viewing Taiwan as an extension of the homeland and seeking to integrate the locals into Japanese culture. In order to achieve this, many measures were taken, such as the termination of the dual education systems (two carefully designed different types of education systems for Japanese and Taiwanese children), official recognition of Japanese-Taiwanese inter-marriage and encouragement to learn Japanese. In addition, sport, in particular baseball, served as an important tool to assimilate the Taiwanese. As Yu (2007) mentions, although ‘some Japanese feared that including Taiwanese in baseball competitions would raise their national awareness, … the trend of Taiwanese participation was unstoppable, and baseball continued to play a significant role in the assimilation policy, which demanded that both peoples play together and be treated as equals’. Furthermore, it can be argued that the symbolic meaning of the Japanese and Taiwanese playing the game together was the elimination of estrangement and a closer relationship between the two peoples (Xie and Xie, 2003).

Through the systematic introduction of baseball into the educational system (e.g. primary, junior, senior high school and university) and the inclusion of more and more Taiwanese in amateur baseball teams, the colonists successfully popularised the sport in Taiwan and integrated it into Taiwanese everyday life. Playing baseball was no longer the prerogative of the Japanese. Every racial group in Taiwan, such as the Hans and aboriginals, could play it. According to Xie and Xie (2003), after the mid-Japanese colonial period Taiwan’s amateur baseball teams mainly consisted of Taiwanese players. In addition, having both Japanese and Taiwanese in school baseball teams was not uncommon. For example, between the 1920s and 1930s, some
of Taiwan’s school teams, which comprised the Hans, Japanese and aboriginals, were even invited to participate in the National High School Baseball Invitational Tournament, although there was a political implication of this assimilation policy with regard to the creation of a harmonious empire. In the golden years of baseball spreading in Taiwan (1919-1945), a number of outstanding Taiwanese baseball players emerged and the interest in playing and watching baseball grew. Arguably, all of this established a foundation in Taiwan for the development of baseball in the years to come. It is also worth mentioning that a large number of outstanding Taiwanese players were aboriginals and they played an important role in the development of baseball in Taiwan. This could be attributed to their growth patterns and superior physical constitution, and the work of some people, such as Gui-Xing Lin, who dedicated himself to baseball development in Taitung in the east of Taiwan where a large number of aboriginals lived.

In 1945, Japan lost the Second Sino-Japanese War and returned Taiwan to the ROC under the KMT regime. In order to de-Japanise the island after the bloody eight-year war with Japan, the KMT implemented policies in an attempt to rid Taiwan of everything related to Japan (Yu, 2007). However, baseball, which had such deep roots in Japanese culture, experienced only a short-term decline. As Yu (2007: 25) observed, although ‘after the bloody 2/28 Incident school principals from the mainland may have initially discouraged baseball on campuses because of its Japanese link, … objections to baseball were short-lived’. Moreover, amateur baseball was relatively uninfluenced by the de-Japanisation policy, which was evident in the fact that bosses of public corporations from the mainland permitted their institutions to organise baseball teams. According to Yu (2007), there are two main reasons why baseball was not seriously suppressed. First, because the KMT still planned to retake the mainland at that time, any form of physical exercise, including baseball, which could strengthen the nation’s physical constitution for military preparedness, was allowed. Second, there was no strong reason to ban baseball if the players or spectators were not involved in any Communist movement.
Nevertheless, compared with Japanese government, the KMT ignored the development of baseball in favour of two other sports – basketball and football. On the one hand, it may have been emotionally difficult for the KMT government to develop part of the Japanese legacy, and furthermore the mainlanders (external-province people) in Taiwan, who were relatively fewer in number but much more powerful in politics, preferred basketball and football to baseball. In addition, basketball and football possessed more political value for the government, even though baseball was utilised as a means to consolidate the connection between anti-Communist relationships with South Korea and the Philippines as well as to enhance relations between Taiwan and the USA. However, Taiwan achieved a number of victories in both basketball and football on the international stage from the late-1940s to the mid-1970s. Therefore, Yu (2007: 29) argues that

these basketball victories, along with those in soccer, were good propaganda for the KMT as they solicited the aid and approval of overseas Chinese and proclaimed the KMT’s legitimate status as the government of China. Baseball, on the other hand, was not an official Olympic event until 1992, and the KMT considered the game to lack the international prestige of basketball and soccer. So although baseball was not discouraged, it was not encouraged….

Arguably, however, the first two decades of the KMT regime can be considered a prosperous period for baseball, even though there was no, or very limited, support from the government. This was partially because baseball had been localised through allowing the Taiwanese to play it, and it had become part of Taiwanese everyday life. This meant that Taiwan’s passion for the sport continued during the Japanese occupation. Meanwhile, a large number of domestic baseball competitions caused the sport to flourish further between the 1950s and the 1960s in Taiwan (Xie and Xie, 2003). In addition, some banks and corporations that had their own baseball teams provided outstanding players with stable jobs, which was important for encouraging young Taiwanese people to involve themselves in baseball. Furthermore, the dedication of Xie Guo-Cheng (the former president of the ROC Baseball Committee
and so-called Father of Taiwanese baseball) along with help from others (e.g. Xiao De-Zong, Zhang Zhao-Gui, Zhuang Jia-En and Xue Yong-Shun) played a crucial role in developing the sport, in particular youth baseball, during the period when there was a shortage of aid from the government (Gao, 1994). During these years, grassroots baseball in Taiwan remained robust.

Although baseball flourished in Taiwan, competitions were mainly played on a domestic basis (Xie and Xie, 2003). In 1968, Xie Guo-Cheng invited a Japanese all-star team from an elementary school in the Kansai region, which had nurtured the 1967 Little League Baseball World Series champions, to play five baseball games against selected Taiwanese elementary school teams. In these competitions, ‘Hongye’, the most famous team, which had won the Children’s Baseball Cup in 1968, beat the Japanese team, leading to nation-wide excitement and strengthening of the national identity. The ‘Hongye legend’ increased the KMT government’s awareness of the potential of baseball in the ROC for achieving success at the international level and the political value of that success, which resulted in a change in the government’s attitude towards baseball development (Yu, 2007).

As mentioned earlier, during the 1970s, the ROC encountered major diplomatic difficulties and was gradually excluded from almost every international organisation. In order to improve the situation, baseball, in particular youth baseball, was exploited politically by the KMT government. First, participating in international baseball competitions and achieving success was important because of the potential to extend the ROC’s international visibility and enhance its international prestige (Xie and Xie, 2003). Thus, the government increasingly subsidised national youth teams’ trips to international baseball competitions, trained the squads professionally and ignored the LLB’s regulations by organising a national team. For example, the LLB required a national team to be formed on a community basis (e.g. a regional all-star team), but KMT officials organised national all-star teams.
Second, the success of baseball teams (e.g. Jinlong, Qihu, Juren, Lide, Meihe and Huaxing) was reinforced and disseminated by the mass media, which was controlled by the KMT, to promote national identity and a sense of pride (Xie and Xie, 2003). The same purposes were also served through symbolism. According to Yu (2007), this was evident both in the uniform of the national teams (both youth and adult) which was designed in the same colour as the KMT’s party flag (blue, white or a mix of two) and in the fact that government officials would distribute symbols (e.g. the ROC’s national flag) to ROC spectators to support the players and to exhibit at LLB competitions. In addition, the ROC’s national youth baseball teams were scheduled by the government before and/or after LLB competitions to have meetings with some of the main organisations of (Chinese) overseas compatriots in the USA, with the aim of consoling them, gaining their support and preventing them from veering towards to the PRC’s side (Xie and Xie, 2003).

Third, the baseball diamond in South Williamsport (Pennsylvania) where the LLB World Series was hosted was transformed into a political arena for fighting for different perspectives on national identity between the KMT government and supporters of Taiwan’s independence. It should be remembered that the KMT had implemented authoritarian rule and from the 1950s to the mid-1980s it still planned to retake Mainland China. Therefore, supporting Taiwan to be an independent country, which emerged from the mid-1940s, was not allowed by the government as it would undermine the foundations of the KMT’s political power as well as having a negative impact on its longer term plans. Considering that the LLB World Series was broadcast to Taiwan and had a large Taiwanese audience, independence supporters utilised the games to propagandise their ideology. In 1971, for example, a small plane hired by independence supporters, towing a banner with the slogan – Long Live Taiwanese Independence, GO GO TAIWAN – flew across the LLB baseball diamond while Juren (Taiwan) played against West U.S. (Yu, 2007). In order to prevent the growth of this movement through such a platform, the KMT government asked the staff of U.S. TV companies to keep their cameras away from the independence movement supporters and mobilised overseas Chinese, students and marines who were training in the United States to counteract the movement at the games.
In addition to the benefits mentioned above, baseball offered the value of ethnic integration to the government. After the 228 Incident, the gap between original-province people and external province people had widened in Taiwan, but baseball success on the international stage brought the two peoples together. As Gao (1994) observed, the success of the Juren youth baseball team in the LLB World Series played a historically significant role in Taiwan’s ethnic integration. It enabled all of the Chinese living on the island to forget their grudges.

Arguably, baseball has been viewed as an important sport by the government since the emergence of these political benefits in the 1970s. As a result of the Taiwanese passion for baseball and their continued success at international level, it has become the national sport of Taiwan. More recently, to obtain a higher profile on the international stage and more opportunities to participate in international affairs, the government has made efforts to bid to host international baseball games (e.g. see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 International Level Baseball Games Hosted in Taiwan since the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Titles of baseball games</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia Series</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseball World Cup</td>
<td>2001 and 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercontinental Cup</td>
<td>2006 and 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18U Baseball World Championship</td>
<td>1999 and 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16U Baseball World Championship</td>
<td>1997, 2003 and 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12U Baseball World Championship</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Wikipedia
2.3.4 Conclusion

The one-China dispute in international sporting affairs and baseball’s historical development are the two main issues affecting sport and politics in Taiwan. Since the ROC retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, the definition of one-China has been an international political issue. Although it seemed that the ROC predominated in relation to the issue in the first two decades (1950-1970), being excluded from the UN and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the USA witnessed a dramatic change in the ROC’s legitimate status in the 1970s. This situation was also reflected in sport. Beginning from the 1970s, the ROC’s international sporting rights were gradually removed. As a result, the ROC was forbidden from using its name, anthem and national flag in international sporting affairs by the IOC and then by most other international sporting organisations. In order to avoid being further degraded and faced with international sporting isolation, the ROC government challenged the decision by suing the IOC. This led, in 1981, to the two sides signing *An Agreement between the International Olympic Committee, Lausanne and Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee*. Since then, Taiwan has returned to the Olympic Movement and re-joined international sporting federations in the name of Chinese Taipei. Even so, the ROC’s status has been diminished. In addition, the PRC and ROC still play political games in international sporting affairs within the limitations of the Agreement in order to take certain political advantages from each other, such as using different translations of the name Chinese Taipei, changing the ordering of the NOCs delegations’ parade at the opening ceremonies of international sporting events, and showing the ROC’s national flag at international sporting events with Taiwanese organisers, athletes or spectators.

With regard to baseball, only the Japanese played it in the early years of their occupation in Taiwan. Following Japan’s political liberation in 1919, in order to assimilate the Taiwanese into Japanese culture, baseball was opened up to the locals. Between 1919 and 1945, the sport was gradually popularised in Taiwan through its systematic introduction into the educational system and the inclusion of more and
more Taiwanese in amateur baseball teams. This thereby established a foundation in Taiwan for the development of baseball in the years to come. After Taiwan was returned to the ROC in 1945, however, the KMT government purposely ignored the development of baseball because it had deep Japanese roots and lacked political value in the eyes of the rulers. In 1968 the creation of the ‘Hongye legend’ raised the KMT government’s awareness of the political benefits of baseball success at the international level. While the ROC encountered diplomatic difficulties in the 1970s, baseball was exploited by the government. This was done in several ways, for example, using its international baseball success to extend Taiwan's international visibility and to enhance its international prestige, reinforcing and disseminating the success through the party-controlled mass media to promote national identity and a sense of pride, and utilising Taiwanese spectators at the LLB World Series to counteract the Taiwan independence movement. In addition, baseball also played an important role in ethnic integration (between original-province people and external province people) for the government. More recently, bidding for international baseball games became one of means for the government to obtain an even higher profile on the international stage and more chances to participate in international affairs.

The development of (or desire to develop) baseball is probably secure for the political reasons identified above. Sports development more generally is influenced by the one-China issue and the need to maintain an international profile.
Chapter 3 Theoretical Approaches - Sports Policy Analysis

3.1 The Recent Attitude of Governments towards Elite Sport

Over the last few decades, there has been an increasing interest from governments in the development of an elite sport system. In Australia, before the 1980s, the development of elite sport was not a primary concern for the government (Green and Houlihan, 2005). However, after the country’s poor performances at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games (five medals), the establishment of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) in 1981 and the Australian Sport Commission (ASC) in 1985 confirmed that the government’s priorities had shifted towards elite sport and ‘signalled federal government (financial) support that would continue and further strengthen into the 1990s’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005: 27). From that time onwards, especially after the Olympics were awarded to Sydney in 1993, many government sport initiatives showed the country’s determination to develop sport excellence. These included greatly increased funding for elite sport, talent identification and development, centralised coordination at the elite level and the provision of a robust platform for elite success.

In Canada, the government has been involved in sport since the formulation of Bill C-131 – An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport, which was passed in 1961. This was prompted by the perception of a decline in Canadian physical fitness and by the poor performances of the national teams who won only one silver medal at the 1960 Rome Olympic Games and were defeated by the Soviet Union in international ice hockey (Macintosh and Whitson, 1990). In the 1960s, the federal government started to exhibit an interest in constructing its elite sport system, with the creation of a National Sports and Recreation Centre, which provided a central location for its national sporting organisations (NSOs), and the establishment of a new division within the Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate – Sport Canada, which is responsible for developing high performance sport. From the 1970s to the 1980s, on
the one hand, the government gradually put its sports policy emphasis on elite sports development. For example, the first Minister of State for sport, Iona Campagnolo, stated in 1976 that elite sport was the priority (Green and Houlihan, 2005). On the other hand, the federal government increased its involvement in elite sports development. As Macintosh et al. (1988) note, elite sports development was under the control of the federal government in the 1980s. After the 1980s, the Ben Johnson drug affair led to the Dubin Inquiry (1990), which recommended that the federal government focus less on elite sport. Indeed, the government’s focus on elite sports development was mitigated as a result of Dubin’s criticism, which was reflected in a Task Force Report on Federal Sport Policy, Sport: The Way Ahead (known as the Best Report), published in 1992. During this period, not only was elite sports development downgraded, but also federal funding for elite sport was reduced. However, in the new set of objectives for Sport Canada, revised in 1994, elite sport was reemphasised by the government. As Houlihan (1997: 83) observed, the government ‘largely ignored the thrust of the Best Report and its argument for a broader and less elitist approach to sport, and confirmed the priority of elitist success by making it clear that federal funding would be used primarily to fund elite athletes’.

In Japan, the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games was the most important catalyst for the Japanese government to develop and define its national sports policy (Seki, 1997). However, this Olympics did not stimulate a long-term commitment by the government to elite sports development, whereas, in the period from the 1970s to the early 1980s, the primary policy concern of the government was Sports for All (Yamamoto, 2008). Following the successive decline in elite sport performance at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games and the 1986 Seoul Asian Games, however, the priority of the government with regard to sports policy gradually changed towards elite sport. The Basic Plan published in 2000 expresses the intention to restore Japanese performance in international sporting events and indicates the emergence of systematic approaches to the development of elite sport (Yamamoto, 2008).
In the UK, government intervention in elite sports development was limited before the 1990s because of the so-called ‘arm’s length relationship’ of non-intervention (Oakley and Green, 2001a), as exemplified by the 1982 Great Britain (GB) Sport Council’s strategy, Sport in the Community: The Next Ten Years, in which it is stated that:

The council will continue to emphasise excellence and to encourage it in numerous ways, but sees its role mainly in the better use of proven approaches rather than seeking any major new action. Some nations invest vast public funds in special facilities, training programmes and financial and status rewards for elite athletes… It is neither tradition, nor policy to treat top level sport in this way in Britain.

The major change in the government’s attitude towards elite sports development occurred in the 1990s. First, the status of sport was raised to Cabinet level after the establishment in 1992 of the Department of National Heritage (renamed the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in 1997), which meant ‘further centralised control of funding allocations to sport’ (Green and Houlihan, 2005: 55). Second, the National Lottery was introduced in 1994 and sport was listed as one of five ‘good causes’ to benefit from National Lottery funding. Following the poor performance of the Great Britain team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics (one gold and only fifteen medals overall), the World Class Performance Plan (WCPP) was introduced in 1997 (using National Lottery profits) to give substantial financial support to elite sport. Third, in the government’s statement, Sport: Raising the Game (1995), mass sport was downgraded and elite sports development was given greater emphasis.

In China, although government initiatives of the 1950s, such as the establishment of the State Physical Education and Sport Commission (SPESC) and sport schools, the organisation of the National Games and the official recognition of 43 sports as competitive sports, indicated the beginning of the government’s attempts to develop
an elite sport system, mass sport was of equal importance (Hong, 2008). From the 1960s, the government changed its direction with regard to sports policy and began to give elite sport greater emphasis than mass sport. However, such a policy was attacked during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the elite sport system came to an end. As Hong (2008) observed, ‘the training system broke down, sport schools closed, sport competitions vanished, and Chinese teams stopped touring abroad’. The important turning point was the successful use of ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’ to improve Sino-American relations in 1971. Therefore, elite sport became increasing significant in China and the structure of sports development was restored. A particularly important government initiative in the 1980s and the 1990s was the establishment of an Olympic strategy, which ‘aimed to use the nation’s limited sports resources to develop elite sport to ensure that China would become a leading power by the end of twentieth century’ (Hong, 2008: 33). More recently, the regular element in official statements, ‘whole country support for the elite sport system’, seems to demonstrate a high degree of interest on the part of government in elite sports development.

One of the main reasons for the increasing interest of governments in the development of elite sport is an increased enthusiasm for international sporting success. Such an enthusiasm has two catalysts. The first is the symbolic significance of international sporting success (or failure), which relates to the perspective of the ‘war-like’ character of international sporting events. As one observer commented, ‘The Olympic Games are a war, a real war… The Olympic idea of the modern era has given us a symbol of world war, which does show its military character very openly, but – for those who can read sports statistics – it gives enough insight into world rankings’ (quoted in Krüger, 1998: 79). In this respect, international sporting events provides an opportunity for countries to compete with each other with very few, if any, casualties. Therefore, what follows is, as Oakley and Green (2001a, 2001b) notes, a ‘global sporting arms race’.

The second catalyst consists of the benefits of international sporting success. In the early stages, for Eastern Bloc Countries, especially the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), international sporting success could demonstrate the superiority of Communism over Capitalism (Hoberman, 1993; Riodan, 1993). In succeeding years, such sporting success has been valued in varying degrees by other countries. The diverse range of benefits includes:

(1) the enhancement of national pride (Green and Houlihan, 2008; De Bosscher et al., 2008). For example, the Olympic gold medal plays a role in building national self-respect for Norwegians (Hoberman, 1993);

(2) the exhibition of the government’s achievement. For example, success in international sporting events was used by Reagan’s government to reinforce its success in America (Monnington, 1993);

(3) the development of international prestige and recognition (Monnington, 1993; De Bosscher et al., 2008; Green and Houlihan, 2005). For example, for most Eastern European countries, international sporting success can draw considerable attention and admiration (Riodan, 1993); international sporting success can express China’s superpower status in the world (Tan and Green, 2008);

(4) the promotion of national identity (Houlihan, 1997). For example, the new countries arising from the collapse of the former USSR and Yugoslavia used international sporting success as a means to establish their national identity;

(5) the positive effect of role models on children and developing athletes (SportScotland, 2002; De Bosscher et al., 2008). For example, outstanding performance in winter sports can inspire children to ski and skate (Hoberman, 1993).

Although international sporting success has become more valuable and important to governments, it is still determined by a large range of factors. According to De Bosscher et al. (2008: 187), the factors leading to international sporting success can be classified at three levels: (1) ‘macro-level’, such as economic status and population size; (2) ‘meso-level’, such as sports policy (system) and politics; and (3) ‘micro-
level’, such as genetic qualities. However, the macro and micro level factors are not easy for governments to control. Therefore, governments tend to develop elite sport policies/systems (meso-level) to produce athletes who have medal-winning ability. As Green and Houlihan (2005: 2) note, ‘…these traditional sports powers have increasingly sought to maintain their relative advantage by adopting more systematic, professional and science-based approaches to elite athlete development’.

3.2 The Convergence of Elite Sports Systems towards a Similar Model

Within the context of increasing interest from governments in the development of elite sport, the competition in international sporting events has become intensified. Arguably, the former GDR and USSR were the pioneers in developing elite sport systems. As Hoberman (1993: 18) observed, ‘in the Soviet Union, the official promotion of competitive sport began in the 1930s’. According to Merkel (1999) and Green and Houlihan (2005), the components of the elite sport systems in the GDR and the USSR were: (i) a planned approach to identifying and developing talented athletes, for example, a multi-stage approach to filtering young athletes; (ii) central government funding; (iii) efforts in a small number of sports; (iv) the best possible sports facilities for coaching and training; (v) well-qualified coaches; (vi) sports science support; and (vii) sports schools. From the 1950s to the 1980s, although they were not successful in international or club football competitions, the remarkable achievements of the GDR and the USSR in other international sporting events, especially in the Olympic Games (see Table 3.1), aroused the awareness of other countries and acted as a catalyst for them to learn about the components of elite sport systems (Green and Houlihan, 2005). For example, Houlihan (1997: 6) notes that ‘Australia, and to a lesser extent Canada, have both adopted policies of elite squad development which are very close to the Soviet model in a number of key respects…’.
Therefore, one might wonder whether or not elite sport systems converge towards a similar model.

Table 3.1 The Achievements of the GDR and the USSR at the Summer Olympic Games (1952-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The summer Olympic Games</th>
<th>Position in medal table</th>
<th>Total medal won</th>
<th>Total medal numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 Helsinki</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Melbourne</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Rome</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 Tokyo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Mexico City</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 Munich</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 Montreal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Moscow</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Wikipedia

In this respect, Green and Oakley (2001) analysed the elite sport systems in Australia, Canada, France, Spain, the UK and the United States. They discovered ten common components of these elite sport systems and suggest that ‘there is a growing trend towards a homogeneous model of elite sports development’ (Green and Oakley, 2001: 249). The components are:

1. A clear understanding about the role of the different agencies involved and an effective communication network that maintains the system;
2. Simplicity of administration through common sporting and political boundaries;

3. An effective system for the statistical identification and monitoring of the progress of talented and elite athletes;

4. Provision of sports services to create an excellence culture in which all members of the team (athletes, coaches, managers, and scientists) can interact with one another in a formal and informal way;

5. Well-structured competitive programmes with ongoing international exposure;

6. Well-developed and specific facilities with priority access for elite athletes;

7. The targeting of resources to a relatively small number of sports through identifying those that have a real chance of success at world level;

8. Comprehensive planning for each sport’s needs;

9. Recognition that developing excellence has costs, and therefore providing appropriate funding for both the infrastructure and people;

10. Lifestyle support and preparation for life after sport.

In addition, in a case study on China, Tan and Green (2008) adopted these ten components as a framework and noted that the components found in western countries are also embedded in the Chinese elite sport system.

Digel (2002) compared the elite sport systems in Australia, China, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Russia and the United States of America, which were the most successful countries at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. He also identified that these elite sports systems shares many similarities and referred to seventeen items in this respect: (i) ideological preconditions; (ii) the setting of priorities (strongly promoting Olympic sports); (iii) Olympic tradition (a strong tradition of participation); (iv) the organisation of the athletes (hierarchical structure); (v) the staff structure (a tendency towards professionalism) (vi) the management of sports facilities (elite sports facilities tend to be specialized and centralised); (vii) financial structure (mixed-
financial income structure); (viii) methods of talent identification and sport promotion; (ix) the structure of the competition system (extensive regional and national competition programmes); (x) the structure of the training environment (using centralised control); (xi) the organisational structure; (xii) the reward systems; (xiii) anti-doping controls; (xiv) the planned goals; (xv) the current trends (every systems seeks greater efficiency and there is a close examination of existing resources); (xvi) the support systems (year round support located at a high performance centre); and (xvii) athlete privileges (privileged access to high-performance training centres).

These seventeen items refer more to the details of elite sport systems compared with the components identified by Green and Oakley (2001). However, there is substantial overlap between them. For example, items 2 and 17 are similar to the targeting of resources to a relatively small number of sports through identifying those in which there is a real chance of success at world level (component 7) and well-developed and specific facilities with priority access for elite athletes (component 6), respectively.

Through a comprehensive literature review, De Bosscher et al. (2006) identified nine sports policy factors (pillars) that lead to international sport success: (i) financial support; (ii) an integrated approach to policy development; (iii) participation in sport; (iv) a talent identification and development system; (v) athletic and post career support; (vi) training facilities; (vii) coaching provision and coach development; (viii) (inter)national competition; and (ix) scientific research. Differing from the work of Green and Oakley (2001) by focusing on searching for similarities and differences in elite sport systems, De Bosscher et al.’s work uncovers the prerequisites for a successful elite sport system at the policy level. However, comparing these nine pillars with the common components identified by Green and Oakley (2001), there are several similarities. For example, the concept of pillar 2, an integrated approach to policy development, contains elements of components 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9. The nine pillars were used by De Bosscher et al. (2008) to explore the elite sport systems in Canada, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. Although the main purpose of De Bosscher et al.’s (2008) work was to evaluate the elite sport systems through the nine pillars, these countries’ elite sport systems also exhibit the convergence.
So far, the tendency for elite sport systems to converge towards a similar model appears to be confirmed (at least in those countries that have been analysed). However, these authors (Green and Oakley, 2001; Digel, 2002; De Bosscher et al., 2008; Tan, 2008) also note the existence of several variations between different countries (for example, see Table 3.2). In short, therefore, the development of elite sport systems converges towards a similar model but with local variations.

Table 3.2 The Variations in Elite Sport Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variations</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports talent identification</td>
<td>Talent identification cannot be conducted at an early age in Norway – it is more cautious than in the UK, Canada and Germany (Bergsgard et al., 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward system</td>
<td>Australia has specific rewards for coaches; these only exist in a few countries (Digel, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of control by government</td>
<td>There is greater intervention by the government in elite sports development in China (Tan and Green, 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of work</td>
<td>In the UK and Norway, UK Sport and Olympiatoppen are only responsible for high performance at the national level, whereas, in Canada, the Netherlands and Italy, Sport Canada, NOC*NSF and CONI are responsible for both elite sport and general sports development (De Bosscher et al, 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doping control</td>
<td>In Australia and France, doping control is done on the basis of a special state law, whereas, doping control is not wanted in Germany (Degel, 2002).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See the table content

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3.3 Approaches to Explaining Elite Sports Policy

Among the mostly institutional approaches to explaining sport policies, Bergsgard et al. (2007) adopt the perspectives of welfare regimes and their institutional features. They assume that the differences in sports policy reflect the different features of the welfare regimes and institutions. Although the fact that the elite sport systems and policies reveal substantial similarities, their work provides insights that help to explain the relationship between the sport policies and general institutional differences between countries. Therefore, this study proposes to adopt their analytical perspectives to explain sports policy in Taiwan.

With respect to welfare regimes, Bergsgard et al. (2007) draw upon Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), the degree of decommodification and the mode of social stratification provide a theoretical structure through which to classify three types of welfare regimes: liberal, conservative and social democratic. First, decommodification means removing the dependence of people on the market by political force (Chan, 2008). This ‘occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 22). Second, social stratification refers to the way in which welfare provision affects people’s social status. For example, in conservative states, welfare provision is based on the types of occupation, so the social stratification is clear.

In liberal welfare states, there is a minimum political commitment for the state to protect individuals and promote market solutions. Only those people who are identified as at ‘serious risk’ can receive limited welfare provision from the government (e.g. the poor). Therefore, the lowest degree of decommodification is embedded in this welfare regime. An example is the USA.
In conservative welfare states, such as Germany, an important feature is the ‘blend of status segmentation and familialism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 82). Social right is based on social status (e.g. occupation). Furthermore, on the one hand, governments hope to minimise the impact of market forces through official welfare provision, and on the other hand, they expect families to share the burden of welfare provision. Therefore, the market plays a marginal role in welfare provision, resulting in a high degree of decommercialisation.

Finally, social democratic welfare states, such as Norway, feature ‘comprehensive risk coverage, generous benefit levels and egalitarianism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 78). These governments assume the main responsibilities of welfare provision with the market and families playing minimal roles. That is, the market is marginal in welfare provision. Moreover, the role of family in welfare provision is not significant.

Following these identified characteristics, Bergsgard et al. (2007) present the implications for sports policy of each type of welfare regime. In liberal states, governments play a limited role in sports policy and leave sport to the market. In other words, sport is more commercialised. In conservative states, voluntary sport associations play the most important role in sports policy and sport is less commercialised. In social democratic states, governments play an active role in sports policy and sport is less commercialised.

With regard to the institutional features, there are four analytical dimensions to Bergsgards et al.’s (2007) work: (1) state structure; (2) executive-legislative relations, (3) the relationship between organisations and government; and (4) the generalisation of interest. First, state structures are classified into four categories using the concepts of unitary or federal and centralised or decentralised. Although it is not clear how to differentiate between the decentralised unitary and the centralised federal state, ‘we would expect the differences to have an impact on the allocation of responsibilities between the national/state level, the sub-national/province/county level, and the
local/municipal level of government’ (Bergsgard et al., 2007: 26ff). Second, executive-legislative relations here refer to who controls policy formulation. Two indicators can be used to identify this aspect: the percentage of government time in office for minimal winning cabinets and single party cabinets (Bergsgard et al., 2007).

In addition, Bergsgard et al. also note that it is appropriate to estimate the strength of the opposition parties in the legislative, rather than the strength of the legislative itself, because the legislative branch of a governing party will support the government’s proposals. Third, corporatism and pluralism are the terms used to describe the relationship between interest groups and the government. In corporatist states, there is a highly integrated and institutionalised relationship between the government and interest groups. Governments cooperate with a small number of interest groups. In contrast, in pluralist states, there is a less integrated and institutionalised relationship between the government and interest groups. Numerous interest groups emerge and compete to translate their beliefs into public policies. Finally, Bergsgard et al. (2007) divide the generalisation of interest into two opposing categories: (1) less competitive, Sports for All and community oriented; and (2) more competitive, elite and commercially-oriented. The implications of each analytical dimension for sports policy are summarised in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 The Implications of Each Analytical Dimension for Sports Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical dimensions</th>
<th>The implications for sports policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State structure</td>
<td>Centralised unitary: minimised role for municipality, city or country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centralised federalism: strong role for sub-national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decentralised unitary: substantial local policy discretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decentralised federalism: strong role for sub-national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive-legislative relations</td>
<td>Executive dominance: sports policy shaped by executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger role for the legislative: sports policy shaped by the legislative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73
Table 3.3 The Implications of Each Analytical Dimension for Sports Policy
(continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical dimensions</th>
<th>The implications for sports policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between organisations and government</td>
<td>Pluralist: loose policy networks for sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporatist: closed policy network for sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalisation of interest</td>
<td>Less competitive, Sports for All and community oriented: appealing to public good in terms of health, fitness and community development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More competitive, elite and commercial oriented: appealing to public good in terms of business opportunities, job creation, national prestige and profit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Bergsgard et al. (2007: 36)

3.4 Welfare Regime and its Institutional Features in Taiwan and Potential Implications for Sports Policy

3.4.1 Welfare Regime

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work is innovative and important for the comparative analysis of welfare/social policy. However, when considering the case study of Taiwan, one could question whether Taiwan can be classified according to these three welfare regimes. Indeed, some researchers (e.g. Holliday, 2001; Lee and Ku, 2007) have argued that the capitalist East Asian countries, such as Hong-Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, cannot wholly fit into the Esping-Andersen’s typology (Holliday, 2000). As Goodman and Peng (1997:193) suggest:
Although historically Japan, South Korea and Taiwan may have actively adopted various aspects of Western social welfare, and reassembled and reconstituted them into their own systems according to their respective culture, political and social backgrounds, it would be difficult to demonstrate that these social welfare regimes have copied or even followed any particular Western pattern; instead, social welfare regimes in these countries need to be examined in their own particular contexts.

According to Lee and Ku (2007), the East Asian welfare regime can be identified as developmental/productivist. This includes features such as: (i) low and limited welfare provision by the government but strong intervention by the government in the field of development; (ii) a core value of economic development; (iii) limited role of markets in welfare provision; (iv) an important role of family in welfare provision; and (v) primary welfare provision to civil servants, teachers and military servicemen. Based on these characteristics, in developmental welfare states, one would expect that (i) governments play a strong role in sports policy, but provide limited funding for sports development; and (ii) sport is less commercialised.

3.4.2 State Structure

Although the Constitution gives the provincial and county/city governments legislative powers, the rules and regulations of regional and local governments that are in conflict with the national laws are considered null and void, suggesting that Taiwan (ROC) is a unitary state. In addition, according to the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC), Chapter X, there is a list (Article 107-110) that classifies the distribution of matters between the central and local governments. Any matter not enumerated in the list falls within the jurisdiction of the central government if it is national in nature, or of the province if it is provincial in nature, or of the city or county if it concerns the city or county. Disputes are settled by the Legislative Yuan.
All of this means that the regional and local governments have policy discretion in some domains and that the Constitution contains the spirit of ‘Balance of Power between Central and Local Government’. However, Taiwan entered the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (1948-1991) and the KMT government instigated martial law (1949-1987). Therefore, before 1992, the regional and local governments’ range of power and organisational systems operated mainly in accordance with *The Outline for the Implementation of Local Self-Government in every City and County in Taiwan Province*, which was the central government’s administrative decree and could be modified only by its preference, rather than on a legal basis. In 1994, following a Constitutional revision, *The Self-Governance Act for Provinces and Counties* and *The Self-Governance Act for Special Municipalities* were passed by the legislature, establishing a legal foundation for regional and local self-government. However, Kao (2012) argues that the autonomy of the regional and local governments did not significantly change thereafter because the two Acts were similar to the Outline. This led to the spirit of regional and local self-government not working in practice, and thus, Taiwan remained a unitary centralised state.

Not until 1999 when the government announced the Local Government Act has the central-local government system visibly changed. The most important features of this Act are that local legislatures can formulate local regulations and local governments can make local rules. This does not mean that Taiwan has become a federal system. In fact, Taiwan is still a unitary state because the law also states that if local regulations conflict with central government laws or regulations, they become null and void. In addition, the distribution of certain matters between central and local governments is blurred. Therefore, while the Act is a law that in theory values decentralisation, many academics (Chao, 2003; Cheng, 2005; Chou & Hsieh, 2009) have argued that Taiwan is still close to being a centralised system.

Nevertheless, whilst it can be argued that Taiwan is currently a unitary centralised state, it possesses some characteristics of decentralisation. It would be expected that
sports development is mainly dominated by the central government. However, local governments share the burden and have the power to make regulations and policy related to sports development at the local level, on the condition that these are not contrary to the central government’s regulations and laws.

3.4.3 Executive-Legislative Relations

As mentioned earlier, from 1949 to the late 1980s, Taiwan was an authoritarian single-party state. This resulted in the fact that the Legislative Yuan, which consisted mainly of KMT members, seemed to be merely a ‘department’ of the Executive Yuan. Following the democratisation process of the late 1980s, the KMT government allowed the emergence of different parties and the role of legislator was opened up to democratic election. In the 1990s, the largest opposition party, the DPP, gradually increased its importance in the Legislative Yuan. However, this only slightly changed a very unbalanced if harmonious executive-legislative relation because the KMT still controlled the executive and was dominant in the Legislative Yuan (the KMT won over half of the total seats).

In 2000, Taiwan experienced the first party rotation and the DPP became the ruling party from 2000 until 2008. During this period, the executive-legislative relationship changed significantly and the strength of the Legislative Yuan largely increased. This was caused by the formation of a minority and divided government, which meant that the DPP controlled the executive and the opposition parties’ coalition, the Pan Blue, dominated the legislative. According to Sun (2006), the system of divided government led to long-term and serious conflict between the two Yuans in terms of policy because the DPP and the Pan Blue coalition had very different political outlooks.
The Pan Blue coalition continued its domination of the Legislative Yuan after the 2008 and the 2012 legislator elections. Along with the KMT’s victories in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, the divided government became a unified government again. Although the Legislative Yuan is involved in the formation of policy issues, planning policy, the legitimation of policy, the execution of policy and the evaluation of policy results, it rarely challenges the executive’s dominance in these matters. In other words, the Legislative Yuan is more like an arena for examining the government’s budget and discussing its policy and proposed bills rather than for making policy. Arguably, therefore, the executive now plays a stronger role than the legislature in the policy-making process. However, this does not mean that policy is always dominated by the executive. While the KMT/Pan Blue Coalition legislators generally support the Executive Yuan’s policy, they experience pressure from different interest groups and/or public opinions. In fact, with regard to the formation of important policies that attract a certain degree of public attention and/or social antipathy, such as the Forth Nuclear Power Plant policy, the Legislative Yuan becomes more powerful than normal. In Taiwan, sport is hardly considered to be as important as other policy areas that can attract huge public attention. Therefore, it is to be expected that the executive dominates sports policy.

3.4.4 Relationship between Sporting Organisations and Government

Pluralism and corporatism are terms that are frequently used to depict government-interest group relations. The characteristics of pluralism are: (i) interest groups are formed voluntarily and freely by people who have mutual interests; (ii) there are many different interest groups that compete equally with each other in order to exert their influence on government and thus influence policy-making; (iii) although the government plays a major role in decision-making, it also collects opinions from every interest group; and (iv) the policy-making process consists of a bargaining-like approach. To cope with criticisms of pluralism, some academics, such as Lindblom (1977), have proposed neo-pluralism, which takes into account the fact that
government treats interest groups unequally, in so far as some of them are granted more privileges by government than others.

Corporatism indicates a very different system from pluralism. ‘Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports’ (Schmitter, 1974: 93-94). Corporatism emphasizes close cooperation and negotiation between the government and the private sector. The core feature of corporatism is elitism. Although the number of interest groups is limited because they need to be integrated, legitimacy and/or privileges with regard to being involved in the policy-making process through institutionalised channels are granted by the government. However, they must obey government regulations and control their members. Generally, therefore, they can be treated as quasi-government organisations. Schmitter (1979) further categorised this system into social corporatism and state corporatism and noted several differences between them (See Table 3.4).

Taiwan was governed by an authoritarian regime for a long period of time (1949 to the late 1980s). During this period, the KMT adopted state corporatism to manage government-interest group relations. Arguably, the relationship between them was very close because the interest groups could be considered as the extension of the government’s control – its branch in the private sector. Until the mid-1980s, economic development and democratisation drove political and social pluralisation and increased the strength of private sector/interest groups. Although some characteristics of corporatism remain, it can be argued that Taiwan has gradually moved towards neo-pluralism. Therefore, the relationship between the government and NGBs is expected to constitute loose policy networks.
3.4.5 Generalisation of Interest and Coalition Building

In terms of whether the culture of Taiwan is more or less competitive, there is a lack of hard evidence. However, there are two facts that show that Taiwan is more competitive. First, there is the belief that academic pursuit is regarded more highly than pursuits of other sorts, which has led to the fact that the education system in Taiwan is oriented towards examination success. Generally, parents encourage their children to compete with others and strive for good grades in order to enter higher and/or better education stages, such as junior and senior high schools and universities. More or less, therefore, adults who have been trained in this competition-oriented education system have competitive attitudes.

Table 3.4 The Differences between Social Corporatism and State Corporatism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social corporatism</th>
<th>State corporatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited number of interest</td>
<td>Inter-associational agreement and arrangement</td>
<td>Government restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups/associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singular representative interest</td>
<td>Spontaneous cooptation or competitive elimination is by surviving associations</td>
<td>State-imposed eradication of multiple or parallel associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups/associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory qualification of</td>
<td>Contractual negotiation and agreement</td>
<td>Officially decreed and/or exclusively conceded authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representative interest groups/associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-competitive phenomena</td>
<td>Product of internal oligarchic tendencies or external, treaty-like, voluntary agreements among associations</td>
<td>Product of the continuous interposition of state mediation, arbitration and repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchically ordered tendency</td>
<td>The outcome of intrinsic processes of bureaucratic extension and/or consolidation</td>
<td>The outcome of state-decreed centralisation and administrative dependence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4 The Differences between Social Corporatism and State Corporatism (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social corporatism</th>
<th>State corporatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional differences</td>
<td>Voluntaristic agreements</td>
<td>State-established framing of occupational categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between associations</td>
<td>between associations on respective domains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition by state</td>
<td>Recognition is granted as a matter of political necessity imposed from below upon public officials</td>
<td>Recognition is granted from above by the state as a condition for association formation and continuous operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representational monopoly</td>
<td>Dependently conceded</td>
<td>Independently conquered by the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls on leadership selection and interest articulation</td>
<td>The product of a reciprocal consensus on procedure and/or goals</td>
<td>The product of an asymmetric imposition by the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Schmitter (1979: p103-104)

Second, since the late 1980s, Taiwan has gradually become a democratic state which has resulted in the emergence of many political parties and more competitive politics. Moreover, society has become more pluralistic and various interest groups have emerged. This means that they have to compete with other interest groups in their domain or sometimes in other domains in order to obtain rights or deliver their ideas to the government. In sum, broadly speaking, this study would expect that the generalisation of interests is more competitive. In line with this, sports in Taiwan are expected to be less commercialised but more competitive and elite-oriented.
3.5 Understanding the Sports Policy-Making Process – the Advocacy Coalition Framework

Within the context of welfare regimes and their political systems, a valuable approach to explaining the sports policy-making process is through the ACF. As Sabatier (1999: 10) suggests, the focus of the ACF is on ‘explaining policy change within a given political system or set of institutional arrangements (including efforts to change those arrangements)’. Although theoretical frameworks such as the stages heuristic, the institutional rational choice, the multiple-streams framework and the punctuated-equilibrium framework are also popular in analysing policy process (see Table 3.5), this study adopts the ACF as a framework to explain the sports policy-making process in Taiwan. There are two considerations here: (1) increasing numbers of American and European researchers are interested in the application of the ACF for policy analysis, but relatively few researchers apply it in Asia (Sabatier and Weible, 2007); and (2) there is increasing scope for its application in the area of policy, but as Green and Houlihan (2005: 13) observed, ‘the ACF has not been applied to any significant degree to the area of sports policy’, except by a small number of researchers. Therefore, it is interesting to see that to what extent, the ACF can be applied in an Asian society (Taiwan) and specifically in the area of sport policy development.

Table 3.5 A Brief Introduction to Approaches of Analysing Policy Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical frameworks of policy process</th>
<th>Brief descriptions</th>
<th>More details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The stage heuristic</td>
<td>‘It divided policy process into a series of stages – usually agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation and implementation, and evaluation – and discussed some of the factors affecting the process within each stage’.</td>
<td>See Ingram et al, (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Institutional rational choice</td>
<td>It ‘is a family of framework focusing on how institutional rules alter the behavior of intendedly rational individuals motivated by material self-interest’</td>
<td>See Ostrom, (2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5 A Brief Introduction to Approaches of Analysing Policy Process (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical frameworks of policy process</th>
<th>Brief descriptions</th>
<th>More details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The multiple-streams framework</td>
<td>‘It views the policy process as composed of three streams of actors and process: a problem stream consisting of data about various problems and proponents of various problem definitions; a policy stream involving the proponents of solutions to policy problems; and a politics stream consisting of elections and elected officials’.</td>
<td>See Zahariadis, (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The punctuated-equilibrium framework</td>
<td>It ‘argues that policymaking in the United States is characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated by brief periods of major policy change. The latter comes about when opponents manage to fashion new ‘policy image’ and exploit the multiple policy venues characteristic of the United States’.</td>
<td>See True, et al. (2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Sabatier P. A. (2007): The Need for Better Theories. In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (pp. 3-17)

Since the ACF was proposed by Sabatier in the late 1980s, it has undergone a number of revisions (for more detail, see Sabatier, 1999; 2007). It arose out of a search for an alternative to the stages approach, a desire to combine the main features of top-down and bottom-up approaches, and a commitment to giving technical information a more important role in the policy-making process (Sabatier, 1999). As Sabatier (1998: 98) noted, the ACF can ‘provide a coherent understanding of the major factors and processes affecting the overall policy process – including problem definition, policy formulation, implementation, and revision in a specific policy domain – over periods of a decade or more’. The requirement of a time period comes directly from the important perspective of the ‘enlightenment function’ in policy research, which refers to the fact that ‘as new concepts and data emerge, their gradual cumulative effect can be to change the conventions policymakers abide by and to reorder the goals and priorities of the political policy world’ (Weiss, 1977: 44).
According to the ACF, policy change over time is triggered by a function of four sets of processes (see figure 3.1). The first set is the interaction of advocacy coalitions within a subsystem. A policy subsystem ‘consists of those actors from a variety of public and private organisations who are activity concerned with a policy problem or issue, such as air pollution control, and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: p119). Indeed, the ACF argues that in addition to traditional political iron triangles (government agencies, congressional committee and interest groups), actors within a subsystem should also include people who (1) play an important role in the generation, dissemination and evaluation of policy ideas, such as journalists, researchers and policy analysts; and (2) are found to be active at all levels of government in policy formulation and implementation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Such actors in the policy subsystem tend to ally themselves with others who have similar belief systems and if they also ‘engage in a nontrivial degree of working coordination, they form an advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 196). Normally, one to four advocacy coalitions will emerge within a subsystem. In relation to the area of sports policy, elite /high performance, Sports for All/mass sport and physical education (PE)/school sport could be possible advocacy coalitions within a sports policy subsystem. Moreover, the members of each coalition in a sports policy subsystem may be (and/or from):

(a) Elite sport/high performance – National Olympic Committee, national governing bodies of sport (NGBs), sports federations (or similar organisations), sports administrations at national level (e.g. DCSM and UKSI), quasi-governmental organisations (e.g. Sport England), sub-national sports administrations (e.g. country council) journalists, researchers, athletics and legislators.

(b) Sports for All/mass sport – national governing bodies of sport (NGBs), sport federations (or similar organisations), sport clubs, sports administrations at national and sub-national level, journalists, researchers and legislators.
Furthermore, from the ACF’s perspective, conflicts between opposing advocacy coalitions that hold different belief systems will occur and require mediation by a ‘policy broker’. Therefore, the function of a policy broker within a subsystem is to find certain reasonable compromises that can reduce intense conflict.

As for the policy belief system of each coalition, it has a hierarchical tripartite structure: ‘deep core’, ‘policy core’ and ‘secondary aspects’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 133). Deep core beliefs include ‘fundamental normative and ontological axioms that define a vision of the individual, society and the world’ (Kübler, 2001: 624), such as the relative priority given to various ultimate values, for example, individual freedom versus social security. The next level of the belief system, policy core beliefs, refers to ‘fundamental value priorities and the identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern’ (Green & Houlihan, 2005: 16), for example, the priority of sports policy given to Sports for All relative to elite sport. At the final level of belief systems, the secondary aspects comprise ‘instrumental consideration on how to implement the policy core’ (Kübler, 2001: 624), for example, in regard to the seriousness of the problem and the relative importance of various causal factors in specific settings, policy preferences concerning desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, and the design of specific institutions. In addition, the ACF assumes that the structure of policy beliefs entails a descending order of resistance to change, with deep core beliefs exhibiting the most and the second aspect the least (Kübler, 2001).

According to the ACF, changes in the belief system and policy can occur as a result of ‘policy-oriented learning’ (Sabatier, 1998:104). Policy-oriented learning is defined as ‘relatively enduring alternations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). Therefore, advocacy coalitions are particularly resistant to receiving new information that would
conflict with their deep core and policy core beliefs. In contrast, the secondary aspects are easier to change through policy-oriented learning over time.

In addition to policy beliefs, advocacy coalitions also have policy-related resources that can be used to draw up their own strategies and, in turn, influence public policy. Six different types of resources have been identified by Sabatier and Weible (2007: 201ff): formal legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources and skilful leadership.

The second set of processes has relatively stable parameters that are exogenous to the subsystem. These parameters are extremely difficult to change within a period of a decade or more and will provide constraints and resources to the actors within the subsystem. They include ‘basic attributes of the problem area’ (e.g. the differences between elite sport and mass sport), ‘basic distribution of natural resources’, ‘fundamental socio-cultural values and cultural structural’ (e.g. Sports for All or elite sport oriented) and ‘basic constitutional structure’ (Sabatier, 1988: 132).

The third set of processes, long term coalition opportunity structures, consists of the ‘relatively enduring features of a polity that affect the resources and constraints of subsystem actors’ and includes a ‘degree of consensus need for major policy change’ and ‘openness of political system’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007:200). Indeed, this set of processes is a new category that has been added since the late 1990s in order to deal with doubts about the applicability of the ACF to non-pluralist political systems, such as corporatist and non/quasi-democratic political systems. Doubts emerged because the ACF’s potential assumptions seemed more appropriate to polities that feature well-organised interest groups, mission-oriented agencies, weak political parties, multiple decision-making venues and a need for super-majorities, rather than for example, corporatist political systems.
The fourth set of processes contains external (system) events that are also exogenous to the subsystem, but are more likely to change over a decade or so. They refer to changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, systematic governing coalition and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). These factors are important prerequisites but are ‘not sufficient condition for major policy change’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 153). Indeed, one of the ACF’s fundamental premises is that ‘although policy-oriented learning often alters aspects of a coalition’s belief system, changes in the policy core aspects of a governmental programme require a perturbation in non-cognitive factors external to the sub-system’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:123). Moreover, external events also affect the constraints on and resources of, actors within the policy subsystem. An example in relation to sports policy for each factor is developed below:

(a) Changes in socio-economic conditions – an economic recession may result in sport funding being reallocated to due to governments tending to put public funding into other areas that can reduce an economic recession.

(b) Changes in public opinion – as Sabatier and Jenkins argue, ‘it can certainly alter general spending priorities and the perceived seriousness of various problems’ (1993: 223). Public opinion with regard to sport funding may alter the priority from elite sport to mass sport because the public may perceive that mass sport can benefit more citizens than elite sport.

(c) Changes in systemic governing coalition – different ruling parties may have different attitudes and approaches to sport (mass sport, elite sport and/or school sport).

(d) Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems – diplomatic policy subsystem may decide to utilise international sporting success as an important tool to promote the country’s international prestige. Therefore, there is a positive impact for the elite sport advocacy coalition within the sports policy subsystem.
In addition to ‘policy-oriented learning’ and ‘external perturbations or shock’ (the fourth set of processes), the new revision of the ACF provides another two ‘paths to major policy change’: ‘internal shocks’ and ‘negotiated agreement’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 204ff). First, the internal shocks can be understood through a focus on events that happen within a policy subsystem and that may ‘redistribute critical political resources’ and ‘confirm policy core beliefs in the minority advocacy coalition(s) and increase doubt within the dominant coalition’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 204ff). For example, in relation to the area of sports policy in Canada, the Ben Johnson drug affair at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games led to the Dubin Inquiry, which criticized the Canadian anti-doping policy and the government’s over-emphasis on elite sport. Second, negotiated agreements represent a substantial change to the status quo when there has been a stalemate between coalitions. In countries with collaborative institutions and a corporatist regime, ‘it must be modified to identify the conditions under which – in the absence of a major external or internal perturbation – arrangements involving policy core changes are crafted among previously warring coalitions’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 205).
Figure 3.1 Structure of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 202)
Chapter 4 Methodologies and Methods

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the research strategy and details the methods employed in the present study. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first of these concentrates on different ontological and epistemological assumptions and identifies those that underpin this study. This is important because such assumptions shape how researchers do their work and their claims with regard to the conclusions they reach. The second section briefly considers the positioning of the researcher in relation to Taiwan. The third section involves a brief introduction to qualitative research, of which this study is an example. It identifies the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research and the relevant issues regarding evaluating qualitative research. Fourth, the two main research methods – document analysis and semi-structured interviews – are outlined and discussed. Fifth, consideration is given to the rationale for selecting the three sports (baseball, taekwondo and tennis) for this study, and the particular interest of each sport as well as the general principles for choosing the three is explained. This chapter ends with a brief summary of the study’s research strategy and methods and also with interview process.

4.2 Ontological and Epistemological Considerations

It cannot be denied that ontological and epistemological positions are significant to a social scientist. This is because, first, ‘the existence of an array of divergent approaches and strategies for social enquiry poses the problem of choice for social research’ (Blaikie, 1993: 201); and second, as Furlong and Marsh (2010: 184) suggest, ‘each social scientist’s orientation to his or her subject is shaped by his/her
ontological and epistemological position… they shape the approach to theory and the methods which the social scientist uses’. Furthermore, Mason (2002) mentions that ‘in formulating your own intellectual puzzle, you must ensure that you have thought through what these are, and be confident that they are consistent – that is, that your puzzle is ontologically meaningful, and epistemologically explainable or workable’ (Mason, 2002: 18).

An ontology is literally a theory of being (Furlong and Marsh, 201). It refers to what is perceived to be the very nature of social reality (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). According to Bryman (2008: 18), its central question involves ‘whether social entities can and should be considered objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or whether they can and should be considered social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors’.

In general, there are two broad and opposing ontological positions within social science, namely foundationalism/objectivism and anti-foundationalism/constructivism. A foundationalist researcher believes that social phenomena or reality consist of observable facts that are independent of observers and social actors. In other words, there is a real world that cannot be affected by people. In contrast, an anti-foundationalist researcher perceives that the world does not exist independently of people’s knowledge of it. For Bryman (2008), social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. Thus, there may be multiple realities because of the local and specific differences between people’s interpretations.

In relation to ontology, epistemology is literally a theory of knowledge (Mason, 2002; Furlong and Marsh, 2010). Epistemological assumptions are related to ‘what kinds of knowledge are possible – how we can know these things – and with criteria for deciding when knowledge is both adequate and legitimate’ (Blackie, 2010: 18). With regard to the issue of epistemological positions, Furlong and Marsh (2010: 191) mention that ‘there are different ways of classifying them and even less agreement as to the best way of doing so’. In general, however, there are also two broad
epistemological positions – positivism and interpretivism. Based upon a foundationalist ontology, positivist researchers assert that the world exists independently of people’s knowledge and interpretation of it (objective truth) and that through a systematic and objective approach and direct observation, it is possible to test theories, to make causal statements and to search for law-like patterns. Only phenomena confirmed by the senses can be treated as knowledge (Bryman, 2008).

Different from positivism, interpretivism (underpinned by constructivism) affirms that there is no objective truth and that social phenomena or reality are socially constructed by an individual’s behaviour and people’s interactions. Social phenomena should not be understood independently of social actors’ interpretations (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). Therefore, ‘social scientists must use qualitative research to understand the reality constructed by the group studied, rather than claiming to discover the truth about a group’ (Cruickshank, 2003: 1). Moreover, as Bryman (2008: 16) suggests, ‘a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action’.

Obviously, these two broad epistemological positions stand for opposite perspectives. However, a third position – realism, and more specifically, critical realism – seems to find an intermediate place between them. While to a certain degree critical realism shares an ontological position with positivism – ‘social phenomena/structures do have causal power’ and reality is ‘out there’ – it argues that ‘not all social phenomena, and the relationships between them, are directly observable’ (Furlong and Marsh, 2010: 204). Observable superficial phenomena can provide only one fallible theory to identify deep structures and their effects (Bhaskar, 1989; Cruickshank, 2003). Furthermore, for critical realists, although ‘social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation of them, our interpretation/understanding of them affects outcomes. So, structures do not determine, rather they constrain and facilitate’ (Furlong and Marsh, 2010: 205). As such, both quantitative and qualitative data are useful for explaining social phenomena/realities (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). The present study is premised on critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions.
4.3 The Position of the Researcher in Relation to the Research Topic

As a person who is born and reared in Taiwan, I grew up with the two Chinas issue and the belief that sport can help to enhance the image of Taiwan on the global stage. Thus, it is inevitable that I have particular views about Taiwan’s sports development, which would differ from those of researchers from other countries. My familiarity with the country and its sports culture has obvious advantages in terms of prior knowledge, contacts and access, not least because of my ability to speak both of Taiwan’s main languages fluently. However, my Taiwanese background might also create problems in terms of a lack of detachment. Subjectivity and possibly influence the research findings. Nevertheless, I have tried to use my critical realist approach to minimise, if not to eliminate, these problems as far as possible.

4.4 Qualitative Research

Qualitative research is not a new approach in the social sciences and since the 1960s it has increasingly interested social scientists (Bryman, 1998). Indeed, it is recognised as an alternative approach to quantitative research to explain and understand the world. Moreover, according to Gubrium and Holstein (1997), four traditions of qualitative research are naturalism, ethnomethodology, emotionalism and postmodernism.

At first glance, unlike quantitative research, which concentrates on ‘numbers’ and statistics, qualitative research is more concerned with the meaning of ‘words’. However, as Bryman (2008: 367) notes, although qualitative research seems to imply a way of collecting or generating data that is contrary to quantitative research, ‘the distinctiveness of qualitative research does not reside solely in the absence of numbers’. The differences between quantitative and qualitative research are also
presented in the form of ontological and epistemological assumptions. In general, quantitative research is linked to objectivist ontology and positivist epistemology, and qualitative research is related to a constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. However, it should be noted that ‘although there has been a proliferation of writing on qualitative research since the 1970s, stipulating what it is and is not as a distinct research strategy is by no means straightforward’ (Bryman, 2008: 366).

Based on critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions, the current study draws largely on qualitative research. However, quantitative data directly related to the research will also be used, for example, governmental sports publication and sports statistics.

4.5 Evaluation of Qualitative Research

It can be argued that reliability, validity and objectivity are important in evaluating quantitative research. However, whether the criteria applied to quantitative research are suitable for evaluating qualitative research is a contested issue. As Bryman (2008: 34) mentions, ‘some writers have sought to apply the concepts of reliability and validity to the practice of qualitative research (e.g. LeCompte and Goetz 1982; Kirk and Miller 1986; Perakyla 1997), but others argue that the grounding of these ideas in quantitative research renders them inapplicable to or inappropriate for qualitative research’. In response to this, Guba and Lincoln (1994) propose trustworthiness and authenticity as alternative criteria to evaluate qualitative research. Trustworthiness consists of four elements: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Drawing on their work, Bryman (2008) provides a more detailed account. First, credibility parallels internal validity in quantitative research. In order to establish the credibility of research findings, it is necessary to ensure ‘that research is carried out according to the canons of good practice and [to] submit… research findings to the
members of the social world who were studied for confirmation that the investigator
has correctly understood that social world’ (Bryman, 2008: 377). Furthermore,
credibility can also be achieved by applying a triangulation technique, which means
‘using more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena’
(Bryman, 2008: 397).

Second, transferability parallels external validity in quantitative research. The
findings of qualitative research are difficult to generalise across or transfer to,
different contexts, due to the fact that they usually focus on a small group of people, a
certain culture and/or a period of time. Nevertheless, qualitative research is
encouraged to produce ‘rich accounts of the details of a culture’, which are able to
‘provide others with what they refer to as a database for making judgments about the
possible transferability of finding to other milieux’ (Bryman, 2008: 378).

Third, dependability is largely equivalent to reliability in quantitative research. By
applying an ‘auditing approach’ – peers judge well-filed research documents (e.g.
records, notes and transcripts), research procedures and findings, and so on – it is
possible to enhance dependability (Bryman, 2008: 378)

Finally, confirmability resembles objectivity in quantitative research. While a
qualitative researcher will not be able to remain wholly objective about his or her own
research, ‘it should be apparent that he or she has not overtly allowed personal values
or theoretical inclinations manifestly to sway the conduct of the research and findings
deriving from it’ (Bryman, 2008: 379).

Authenticity contains four elements that ‘raise a wider set of issues concerning the
wider political impact of research’ (Bryman, 2008: 379). Considering that the present
study is related to policy analysis, it is worth introducing these elements.
(1) Fairness. Does the research fairly represent different viewpoints among members of the social setting? (2) Ontological authenticity. Does the research help members to arrive at a better understanding of their social milieu? (3) Educative authenticity. Does the research help members to appreciate better the perspectives of other members of their social setting? (4) Catalytic authenticity. Has the research acted as an impetus to members to engage in action to change their circumstances? (Bryman, 2008)

4.6 Research Methods

As mentioned above, the selection of research methods is closely associated with the chosen epistemological position. The current study employs document analysis and semi-structured interviews as the main research methods. These will now be introduced in turn.

4.6.1 Document Analysis

Many political scientists utilise documents or text based techniques as one of their research methods (Vromen, 2010). According to Altheide (1996: 2) ‘documents are studied to understand culture – or the process and the array of objects, symbols, and meanings that make up social reality shared by members of a society’. The analysis of documents may involve both qualitative and quantitative forms. As Ericson et al. (1991: 50) suggest, quantitative content analysis ‘seeks to show patterns of regularities in content through repetition, and qualitative content analysis... emphasizes the fluidity of the text and content in the interpretive understanding of culture’. In this study, documents related to sports policy were analysed in a
qualitative manner in order to ‘make meaning from them by using them to tell the story or recreate a historical sequencing of events’ (Vromen, 2010: 262).

As stated previously, the main aim of the study is to explore and explain the development of elite sports policy in Taiwan. In this regard, analysing documents is useful. As May (1997: 157-158) argues:

Documents, as the sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make on a daily and long-term basis; they also constitute particular readings of social events. They tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the period to which they refer and describe places and social relations at a time when we may not have been born, or simply not presented.

Based on this, there are four key reasons for using document analysis in the current study. First, in order to obtain a profile of Taiwanese elite sports policy in the past and present and then to assemble the semi-structured interview questions, the research begins with a review of the related documents. As Caulley (1983) suggests, analysing the related documents before carrying out interviews helps the interviewer to acquire some retrospective data and to create appropriate questions that can reveal relevant information. Second, conducting document analysis allows researchers to identify the different discourses that structure the actors’ activities and how these are generated, how they function and how they are changed (Green and Houlihan, 2005). Third, because ‘document analysis may reveal information that could not be obtained through interviewing’ (Caulley, 1983: 20), the results can also be used to supplement the data gained from interviews. Fourth, information gained from document analysis can be triangulated with data from interviews. As mentioned earlier, triangulation – the use of more than one method and/or sources of data in the study of social phenomena – can enhance the credibility of qualitative research.
4.6.2 Sources of Documents

According to Altheide (1996: 2), ‘a document can be defined as any symbolic representation that can be recorded or retrieved for analysis’. Here, however, there is no intention to give an in-depth exposition on every kind of documentary source. Rather, the aim is to outline the most relevant types of documentation and provide the criteria for approaching and utilising a document. In this study two main sources of documents are used: primary sources and secondary sources. The primary sources of a study are considered to be documents that reflect a position of an actor and do not have analysis in them’ (Vromen, 2010: 262). These include laws, declarations, statutes, policy addresses, government and NGO/NGB statistics and annual reports, and also publications from the public sector and national level sports organisations. Secondary sources can be identified as ‘people’s accounts of incidents or periods in which they were involved’ (May, 1997: 159). These include, for example, scholarly journal articles, special columns in newspapers and textbooks. It should be noted that although the existence of a document is independent of the researcher, its ‘meaning and significance for the research act will depend on the researcher’s focus – that is, the document will not be transferred into ‘data’ without the researcher’s eye and question’ (Altheide, 1996: 2).

With regard to the issue of approaching a document, as mentioned, the term ‘document’ covers a wide variety of sources in social research. Therefore, it is important for researchers to be aware of the source of the documents that may be utilised (May, 1997). In relation to this, four criteria are suggested by Scott (1990) for evaluating the quality of documentary sources: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. A document’s authenticity refers to the genuineness and the reliability of its origins, which underpin document-based methods. According to Platt (1981: 34), six guidelines can be applied when assessing the authenticity of documents:
(i) Does the document make sense (is it consistent in its representation) or does it contain obvious errors?

(ii) Are there different versions of the same document?

(iii) Are there internal inconsistencies in terms of style, content, handwriting, etc.?

(iv) Has the document been passed through the hands of several copies?

(v) Has the document been in the hands of a person or persons with a vested interest in a particular reading of the text?

(vi) Does the version derive from an unreliable secondary source?

These criteria, then, are utilised in evaluating the authenticity of the relevant policy documents in the current study.

Having established the authenticity of a document, researchers also need to address its credibility. This means considering whether the evidence is free from artificial distortion. In other words, to what degree are the observations and records free of pretense and deceit? Therefore, researchers should ask who produced the documents, why, when, in what context and for whom. May (1997: 170) further suggests that to achieve this criterion, researchers ‘may employ other sources on the life and political sympathies of the author’.

The representativeness of a document relates to the extent to which it is typical. This involves establishing whether the documents collected represent the totality of relevant documents on the topic. Although it is important in all document research, typicality should relate to the specific research aims (May, 1997). The last criterion is a document’s meaning, which refers to whether the evidence is clear and comprehensible. With regard to this there are at least two levels of evaluation. One is the literal value of a document, which only gives its surface meaning to the analyst. The other is the deep value of a document, which demands ‘interpretive understanding’. This requires the researcher to relate ‘the literal meaning to the contexts in which the documents were produced in order to assess the meaning of the
text as a whole’ (Mogalakwe, 2006: 227). The documents in this study were therefore examined in relation to their social context.

**4.6.3 Semi-Structured Interviews – Qualitative Interviews**

As discussed previously, the ontological and epistemological positions of this study are critical realism based on the belief that social phenomena are independent of people’s knowledge of them, but that not all social phenomena are directly observable and that social actors’ interpretations affect outcomes. This means that generating data from social actors’ subjective knowledge, beliefs, experiences and perceptions through ‘conversation’ is important in order to understand unobservable phenomena and outcomes. For this reason, therefore, the interview is an essential research method for the present study. As Patton (1990: 278) claims, ‘the purpose of interviewing is to find out what is in and on a person’s mind… to access the perspective of the person being interviewed… to find out from them things that we cannot directly observe’. Vromen (2010: 258) further suggests that qualitative interviewing focuses on:

the distinctive features of situations and events, and upon beliefs and personal experiences of individuals. Interviews provide information on understandings, opinions, what people remember doing, attitudes, feelings and the like.

In terms of types of interview, unstructured, semi-structured and structured, the current study adopts the semi-structured approach. This type of interview possesses the following characteristics:

(i) The interviewer has an interview guide consisting of a list of open-ended questions or fairly specific issues that are to be explored (Bryman, 2008);
(ii) The questions may not be asked in order; rather the sequence will depend on the natural flow of the conversation (Gibson and Brown, 2009).

(iii) A semi-structured interview involves a less formal conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee(s). Thus, it enables the interviewer to probe beyond the answers for more information and allows the interviewee(s) to talk freely on a given issue and to provide their own experiences, evaluations and interpretations of events (Gibson and Brown, 2009; May, 1997).

In short, through conducting semi-structured interviews in this study, it is hoped to obtain more information, to probe the interviewees’ belief systems underpinning their perspectives and to identify the distinction between the ‘rhetorical data’ gained from the document analysis and the ‘reality’ of particular issues provided by the interviewees. All of this will contribute to understanding and explaining the historical development of elite sports policy in Taiwan.

4.6.4 Selecting Interviewees

The selection of interviewees for the current study involves purposive sampling and is based on the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). As discussed in the previous chapters, the change of policy over time is heavily dependent on the dynamics of the policy subsystem. Thus, capturing subjective perspectives and interpretations of events from the actors in a policy subsystem helps to understand and explain the development of sports policy. In this instance, the ACF provides a useful framework for selecting interviewees. According to the logic of the ACF, the potential actors in a policy sub-system belong to five different domains. With specific relevance to this study, the interviewees are selected from:
(i) Governmental agencies: the Sport Affairs Council (SAC) – the leading elite sport agency in Taiwan and its departments, which are responsible for elite sports development, such as the Development of Competitive Athletics and the National Sports Training Centre, which is a quasi-government agency.

In this domain, people who are or have been in crucial positions in relation to sports policy planning, formulation and implementation are the prospective interviewees as they are likely to have relatively comprehensive perspectives on the development of sports policy. They would exert more influence on sports policy outcomes and possess a clear viewpoint on the nature of the relationships between the NGOs/NGBs and the SAC.

(ii) Congressional committee: The Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China.

Legislators who apparently have more interest in the development of sports policy are the prospective interviewees as they are likely to have more knowledge of sports policy formulation, implementation and change over time. There are two criteria for identifying these legislators in this study. First, have they ever connected their backgrounds and/or political views to sport? Second, are they active in the formulation of sports policy?

(iii) Interest groups: the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC), the Republic of China Sports Federation (RCSF), the three selected sports’ national governing bodies (baseball, tennis and taekwondo).

Although the CTOC and the RCSF are not government agencies, they play an important role in the implementation of sports policy in Taiwan. Thus, chairs and senior staff members of the CTOC and the RCSF are the prospective interviewees as they are likely to have more experience of sports policy implementation and insights into sports policy change over time. Moreover, in order to derive data on the development of the three sports at elite level, it is essential to interview those people who have/had been involved in strategic planning and decision-making, if possible, over a number of years.
(iv) People who play an important role in the generation, dissemination and evaluation of policy ideas: journalists, researchers and policy analysts who specialize in the area of sports policy.

(v) Judicial officials who regularly intervene in the policy subsystem.

In the case of this study, no prospective interviewees from this domain are identified in the pre-established interviewing list because it is difficult to identify any judicial official who regularly intervenes in the sports policy subsystem. However, it is decided to select interviewees in this domain through ‘snowball sampling’ during the phase of conducting the interviews.

In order to maintain anonymity, this study refers to the interviewees as interviewee A, B, C… etc.

4.6.5 Recording the Interviews

In this study, the interview data was mainly recorded through a voice recorder, which allowed the interviewer to concentrate on the conversation. The data collection device was a Sony IC RECORDER ICD-UX70. The device features a digital voice recorder that is able to transfer digital files to a computer, making it easier to classify and transcribe each interview. In addition, in order to collect non-verbal data, notes were taken during the interviewing process.
4.6.6 Rationale for Selecting Three Sports – Baseball, Taekwondo and Tennis

There are four principle reasons for the selection of the three sports in the study. First, they are both Asian Games sports and Olympic sports. Although baseball was voted out of the 2012 London Olympic Games, it may return in the future.

Second, apart from being played at the Asian Games and the Olympics, these sports have robust international competition systems, such as world tournaments or championships. For baseball, the World Baseball Classic, the Baseball World Cup, the International Cup and the Asian Championship are major international competitions. For tennis, there are the four Grand Slam tennis tournaments: the Australian Open, the French Open, Wimbledon and the US Open as well as many other important annual events. With respect to Taekwondo, there are the World Taekwondo Championships, the World Cup Team Taekwondo Championships, the Asian Taekwondo Championships and the Korea Open International Taekwondo Championships.

Third, these are viewed as significant sports by the Taiwanese government and thus they compete for resources. According to the SAC (2011a), these are focussed sports upon which resources should be concentrated because they have medal-winning potential in international sporting events.

Fourth, NGOs/NGBs of the sports are responsible for a number of activities. The main responsibilities of the three sports are to select, train and assist national athletes, to develop referees and coaches, to bid for and host national and international sporting events, to assist at different regional levels, to formulate and explain the rules, and to examine sports equipment and facilities.
In addition to the general principles described above, there are also more specific reasons for selecting the sports for this study. These will now be explained.

**Baseball**

Originating in North America, baseball has become a global sport in as much as it is played around the world and involves sport labour migration. For example, not only are there baseball associations in countries throughout the five Continents (Africa: 24, Americas: 27, Asia: 24, Europe: 41 and Oceania: 15), but also professional baseball leagues (e.g. the Major League Baseball in the USA and Nippon Professional Baseball in Japan) recruit players from abroad. It should also been noted, however, that although it is a global sport, baseball is more popular in some countries or areas, such as North America and East Asia, than in others. Baseball was introduced into Taiwan in the early 20th century by Japanese colonisers. As we have seen, the development of the sport in Taiwan was influenced heavily by Japan. In recent years, the recruitment of Taiwanese baseball players by Major League Baseball (MLB) has also gradually impacted on the sport’s development. In addition, as well as being seen by the government as a significant sport, baseball can also be viewed as the national sport of Taiwan because of its popularity and as a consequence of outstanding achievements on the international stage. For all of these reasons, therefore, it is interesting to analyse the development of the baseball in Taiwan within the context of the policy change over time.

**Taekwondo**

Taekwondo is a sport that originated in Korea. It has been accepted as part of the sports programme of the Asian Games and the Olympics since 1986 and 2000,
respectively. Although taekwondo is played and practised in western countries, many of the sport’s successes are still achieved by Asian countries, in particular Korean taekwondo competitors. This has ensured a strong sense of taekwondo being a Korean or Asian sport. Indeed, the achievements of the Taiwanese taekwondo teams in international events are remarkable. In particular, the first Olympic gold medal for Taiwan, won by a female Taekwondo competitor (Chen Shih-Hsin) in 2004, can be viewed as a milestone in the sport’s development in Taiwan. This alone makes it worth analysing the development of Taekwondo in Taiwan.

Tennis

Originating in England in the 19th century, modern tennis is also played globally, but it is arguably still regarded as a Western sport. There are two reasons for this. First, the major tennis tournaments – the Grand Slams – are played in four western countries (Australia, France, the UK and the USA). Second, although tennis is mainly dominated by western players, recently, some non-western players have achieved outstanding performances, as can be seen in the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) rankings. In addition, for the Taiwanese government tennis is a relatively new potential medal-winning sport. In the past, the achievements of Taiwanese tennis players were not significant on the international stage. Since 2006, however, the achievements of Taiwanese tennis players at the Asian Games and in the ATP world rankings have gradually improved. Thus, it is valuable to study the development of tennis in Taiwan.

4.7 Conclusion

The ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning this study are based on critical realism, which posits that not all social phenomena are directly observable
and that social actors’ interpretations affect outcomes. This study first involves document analysis in order to establish the interview questions before the semi-structured interviews take place. The documents include both primary and secondary sources. Four important issues are involved in approaching a document – authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. After the document analysis, semi-structured interviews are adopted as the other main research method. Through semi-structured interviews, it is possible to capture the subjective perspectives and interpretations of issues or events from social actors, which, in this case, helps to explain and understand the changes in sports policy over time in Taiwan. The selection of the interviewees is based on the ACF, which contains five domains. All of the interviewees are or have been in crucial positions in a specific domain and possess experience of sports policy planning, formulation and implementation and/or the generation, dissemination and evaluation of sports policy ideas. In addition to providing a basis for selecting the questions for the interviews, document analysis is subsequently used to triangulate and complete the data gained from the interviewees. Finally, the selection of baseball, taekwondo and tennis in this study is based on four general principles and also a specific criterion for each sport. These four principles can be summarised thus: (i) are they Asian Games and Olympic sports? (ii) do they have a robust international competition system? (iii) are they valued as important, priority sports by the government? and (iv) are the NGOs/NGBs of the three sports responsible for a number of sub-disciplines? In addition, a specific reason for selecting each sport is that they represent different sport forms (global, western and Asian).

In sum, the present study, which is underpinned by critical realism, is qualitative in character. By using document analysis and semi-structured interviews, an accurate appraisal of the development of overall sports policy in Taiwan and of policy change over time in the three selected sports can be achieved.
4.8 The Interview Process

4.8.1 Profile of the Interview

The interviews were conducted between 25 March 2012 and 28 May 2012. There were twenty-eight interviewees in total and they were all male.

4.8.2 Pre-Procedure of Interviewing

Based on the ACF, the aim was to select the interviewees from five different domains. The reason why the study selected these prospective organisations and the positions was outlined earlier. Most of the preferred interviewees had been decided upon. However, a backup list of interviewees was prepared in case some of the prospective interviewees were unavailable.

After that, however, the problem of contacting each interviewee and obtaining permission to interview them soon emerged. This was because most of them are/were in important positions, and in Chinese hierarchical culture these people are not easy to reach, in particular as I was just a PhD research student and I had no direct connection with them. Therefore, the only solution to this problem was to build an indirect connection. There were two main steps in building such a link with the interviewees. First, I had to find a key person who was well connected to most of these people to act as my guarantor. Then, I could contact the interviewees directly to arrange an interview with each of them after my gatekeeper had notified them and obtained their consent.
Fortunately, my Master degree supervisor, Professor James Wang, is a retired staff member of the SAC, and he has good direct connections with most of the interviewees and indirect links with the others. Before going back to Taiwan to conduct the interviews, I asked him for his help and he was very enthusiastic. At that time, I also sent him my interview guide and asked him to modify my first draft list of interviewees because I was not sure whether my prospective interviewees were appropriate to answer my questions and also I was not sure whether they would be talkative. Also, I only had indistinct ideas about whom I should interview in terms of journalists and judicial officials who regularly intervene in the policy subsystem. After that, some interviewees were changed and two journalists were added to the second draft list of interviewees, but there were still no judicial officials. Nevertheless, it was considered to use snowball sampling to make my interviewee list more complete. The second draft list of interviewees contained twenty-three names.

In addition, it is worth mentioning that initially I outlined my interview guide in English, but I had to translate it into Chinese as I was going to interview Chinese speaking interviewees. In order to avoid misinterpretation and to increase the expert validity of the interview guide in Chinese, I asked another senior Taiwanese PhD. research student at Loughborough University, Jiang Ren-Shiang, who speaks English well and studies in the sports policy field, and also Professor Wang, who is interested in sports policy analysis, to review and modify it.

In addition to solving the potential problems of reaching the interviewees and translating the interview guide, the issue of how much time it would take to conduct twenty-three interviews had to be considered. However, the main concern in this respect was that the time of conducting the interviews was around five months before the 2012 London Olympics. This meant that some of the interviewees, who were involved in the preparations for the Chinese Taipei 2012 Olympic national team, such as the staff of the SAC, had limited available time and it was not easy to arrange to interview them. Before going back to Taiwan, therefore, I decided to extend the time I spent doing the fieldwork by a month in order to ensure that I finished the interviews.
during the course of my stay. As a result, the estimated duration of the fieldwork was around three and half months – 25 February 2012 to 6 June 2012.

4.8.3 Conducting Interviews

During my first three weeks in Taiwan, no interviewees were contacted by Professor James Wang – my gatekeeper – due to the fact that he was busy training a Taiwanese rower to obtain an Olympic qualification. This caused a delay in the interviewing process and some trepidation on my part. However, he promised that he would begin to contact the interviewees after that and the schedule would then be arranged. It was quite dramatic when the first interviewee asked me to conduct an interview just three hours after I contacted him, which made me aware that the fieldwork had begun and also made me more positive about it, in particular after three weeks of doing nothing in Taiwan. Thereafter, although there were still some ‘blank weeks’, two to three interviews were usually conducted per week and sometimes I conducted two interviews in one day. In the following weeks, the progress of the interviews quickened. As a result, the fieldwork was finished on 28 May 2012.

In terms of the places in which the interviews were conducted, most of the interviewees chose their own office as the venue. This made the interviewing and subsequent transcription easier because of the quiet environment and high voice recording quality. However, some of the interviews proceeded in noisy places, such as lunchrooms, lobbies and training courts (coach), which led to huge difficulties in transcribing them, due to background noise on the voice recordings. However, there was no possibility of me asking the interviewees to change the place in which they felt comfortable. Nevertheless, the voice recordings made in such places normally took two to three times longer to transcribe than the high quality ones. In addition to this, several other points are worth mentioning in relation to the period of conducting the interviews.
First, some of the interviewees would respond to the questions in Taiwanese, rather than Mandarin. Therefore, I also had to ask the questions in Taiwanese in order to make them feel that ‘I was standing on the same side as them’, which might enable them to become more talkative and then allow me to have a better chance of exploring the issues. In addition, Taiwanese – the most prevalent local language in Taiwan – could be considered by many Taiwanese speakers as a language in which it is easier to directly and precisely express one’s thoughts than Mandarin. This is because the expression of Taiwanese is stronger and some expressions in Taiwanese cannot be so directly translated into Mandarin. On the other hand, however, there is no written language for Taiwanese, which caused a certain degree of difficulty when I was transcribing the voice recordings due to spending some time finding appropriate expressions to translate and transcribe them in Mandarin.

Second, as mentioned earlier, snowball sampling was done initially to form the second draft list of interviewees before doing the fieldwork. However, the interviewees were also asked at the end of the interviews whether they knew any judicial officials who regularly intervened in the sports policy subsystem and others who would also be knowledgeable about these topics. The answer they gave to the first question was that they had no idea about this and that although they knew some judicial officials, they were only involved in things like international or domestic sporting lawsuits rather than sports policy. In terms of their responses to the second question, some of them had no idea and the others asked to see the list of interviewees; they then said that these people were knowledgeable enough about this topic. There were two exceptions: the Vice President of the Republic of China Sports Federation, Chen Guang-Fu, and a legislator, Tsai Huang-Lang. Chen’s personality seemed to me to be quite straightforward and enthusiastic, in particular because I was his good friend’s (Professor James Wang) student and I spoke Taiwanese to him (he was one of interviewees who spoke Taiwanese throughout the interviews). During his interview, when we proceeded to certain topics, he not only actively told me who had more comprehensive knowledge about these topics in addition to the interviewees on the list, but he also phoned them immediately to arrange interviews for me. This was real snowball sampling. As a result, four new interviewees were added to the list. Furthermore, after finishing the interview, he also asked me if anyone else on the list
had not yet been contacted by Professor James Wang and he then called some of them directly. All of this was very helpful for completing the interviewee list and advancing the fieldwork. With regard to legislator Tsai’s help, he also asked me if I wanted or needed to interview the director of the Sports for All Department, Wu Lung-Shan. In fact, Wu was on the list, but Professor James Wang had had difficulty gaining his permission for an interview. Therefore, Tsai’s generosity further benefited the study.

Third, there were three interviewees who responded to the interview questions in an extraordinary style. One was Wu Lung-Shan, director of Sports for All. He asked to see the interview guide first when I started to interview him, and then went out his office to print some slides that were relevant to the sports development in Taiwan. After coming back to be interviewed, he totally ignored the interview guide and the topics I wanted to ask about. He then started to explicitly teach me about everything on the slides step by step. It was like a one-to-one lecture. After finishing the ‘interview’, he explained that the reason why he had ignored the interview guide and taught me these things was because he wanted the data I collected from him to make my dissertation more comprehensive. Indeed, although he did not follow the interview guide, he actually referred to some topics in the interview guide during the ‘lecture’ and introduced some points of view that I had not been aware of previously. In addition to the slides and the interview voice recording, he provided me with other useful documents that would not have been easy for me to find. In fact, I was provided with additional documentary data by three other interviewees as well, which were helpful for my documentary collection.

Another interviewee who responded in an extraordinary style was legislator, Hsu Yao-Chang, who is the Secretary-General of the governing party (Kuomintang). In fact, although Hsu had initially promised to be interviewed face-to-face, in the end he was unavailable because he unexpectedly became very busy. It should be noted that Taiwan experienced political turbulence during the period of the fieldwork. This was caused by a lack of consensus on the US beef (import) issue and the regulation of capital gains tax between the ruling party and the opposition. As an important person
in the Kuomintang, it was understandable that Hsu had no time to be interviewed. However, in order to keep his promise, Hsu responded to almost every question on the detailed version of the interview guide in the form of a Q&A questionnaire, and then e-mailed it back to me. As such, it was similar to a structured interview.

The other slightly different interview was that conducted with Professor James Wang, who was not only my gatekeeper, but also one of my interviewees. Wang was also too busy to be interviewed face-to-face during that period because he was involved in the preparations of the Chinese Taipei 2012 Olympic national team. Therefore, he decided to answer my questions in a Q&A questionnaire form. However, the difference between Hsu and Wang was that the latter allowed me to ask him further questions relevant to the interview guide through Skype even when I had returned to the UK. Hsu’s and Wang’s cases were an expedient way of obtaining interview data from interviewees who were unexpectedly unavailable to be interviewed.

Fourth, Professor James Wang and I failed to arrange an interview with the current Minister of the SAC, Tai Hsia-Ling, who was on the list of interviewees. In fact, Wang contacted Tai’s secretary several times and told her/him about my request for an interview. The secretary always said that the Minister was busy and that she/he would pass the message on to her, but there was no response from her/him. As a result, I was not able to interview her. There might be two potential reasons for this. First, this was during the period of the Chinese Taipei 2012 Olympic national team preparations. As the Minister, she must have been busy and concentrating on the preparations. Second, she is the incumbent Minister and such a status might constrain her ability to express her opinions on some topics and/or to make criticisms. Although the current Minister’s ideas and opinions were important to the study, the timing and/or her status made an interview impossible. Therefore, in order to identify her viewpoints on the topics I am studying, the collection of related documents and documentary analysis will be important. It was interesting that Tai was the only female on the list. Therefore all of the interviewees were male.
4.8.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the interviews proceeded in Taiwan from 25 February 2012 to 28 May 2012. There were twenty-three interviewees initially. After snowball sampling, twenty-eight interviews (all male interviewees) were conducted. The problems of having no direct relationship with the interviewees and not having status to obtain permission to interview them were solved through finding a ‘gatekeeper’ to build indirect relationships. Moreover, in order to prevent mistranslation of the English interview guide into Chinese, two appropriate people helped to modify it. Furthermore, considering that the time of conducting the fieldwork was during the period of the Chinese Taipei 2012 Olympic national team preparations and some of the interviewees were busy in these matters, the duration of the fieldwork was extended to three and half months. Although the progress of the fieldwork was delayed for three weeks at beginning, it caught up when Wang had time to contact the interviewees. Most the interviewees chose their own offices as the interview venue that were quiet, but some did not. The noisy interview places led to the problem of spending more time on the transcripts. Four additional things are worthy of mention with regard to the interviews. First, some of the interviewees answered the questions in Taiwanese. Speaking Taiwanese might have made it easier for them to express their points of view, but I had to spend more time on the transcripts in order to find appropriate expressions to translate them into Mandarin. Second, the help from two interviewees, Chen and Tsai, benefited the snowball sampling and the progress of the fieldwork. Third, three of the interviewees responded to the interview questions in an extraordinary style, but the data collected from them were still useful. One ignored the interview guide and used his own slides to teach me. Another was not interviewed face-to-face, but answered the questions in the form of Q&A questionnaire. The other’s style was similar, but he allowed me to ask further questions relevant to the interview guide through Skype. Finally, I failed to interview the current Minister of the SAC, which might be because she was too busy with the Chinese Taipei 2012 Olympic national team preparation and/or because her status (as the incumbent Minister) constrained her ability to be interviewed. Therefore, making more effort to collect documents and documentary analysis became important in order to gauge her opinions.
5.1 Sports Policy and the Welfare Regime

Taiwan is a developmental/productivist welfare regime, which is a hybrid version of different types of western welfare regimes. Based on the key characteristics of a welfare regime, sports development in Taiwan is expected to be such that (i) the government plays an important role but provides limited funding; (ii) sport is less commercialised; and (iii) there is an important role for the family in sport provision.

In Taiwan, a long-term authoritarian regime (from 1949 to the mid-1990s) has left a strong impression on the citizens that intervention by the government in public policies, including sport, is normal. As an NGB senior member of staff (Interviewee M) noted, ‘There is a historical context. … We are between capitalism and socialism. Therefore, our government has to play a dominant role in the development of sports’. More specific evidence of this, as mentioned earlier, is that the government not only dominates the initiation and delivery of sports policy, but also utilises the power of budget allocation to control NGBs. Even then, however, the government only provides a limited budget for sport. Thus, one legislator, who is also a retired SAC vice minister (Interviewee S), commented,

I am very disappointed with the government in terms of sports development. Although developing sport and strengthening our sporting competitiveness involves many elements, the budget is the most fundamental and important one. … To date…the sport budget is very small.
It can be argued that sport in Taiwan is only rarely relevant to economic development in the eyes of the government, although its relevance in this respect is sometimes mentioned in the context of hosting sport events and promoting professional sport. In this regard, limited public funding for sports development complies with the core emphasis of the developmental regime – economic development.

Within a context of strong government involvement but limited public funding, the education system, family and the private sector make major contributions to the provision of sport. Arguably, schools are the most important source of sport provision for young people. As the director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) noted, ‘The promotion and provision of sport for young people in Taiwan are almost wholly through school sport’. In primary, junior and senior high schools, there are compulsory PE classes every week for students. As for higher education, although each university has the discretion to decide on the question of whether a PE curriculum is compulsory or not based on the new University Law (1994), in general, most still require first and second year students to follow the curriculum. Moreover, according to the Regulations for the Implementation of Physical Education at Universities, Colleges and Schools at All Levels, primary and junior high school students have to do some simple exercises at least three times per week during recesses, lunch breaks and at the flag salute ceremony in the morning. Furthermore, schools at every level have to host school games at least once a year and sports competitions three times a year. However, it should be mentioned that, although there is a rhetorical emphasis on the balanced development of the five educational pillars (moral, intellectual, physical, social, and aesthetic), the intellectual normally receives more attention and the education system is oriented towards examination success. This has created a situation in which the physical education timetable slots in primary, junior and senior high schools are sometimes ‘borrowed’ by non-PE teachers to teach other subjects, particularly before exams.

After school, a student can also join sports teams/clubs depending on their own, if not, their parents’ willingness. These teams are more competition-orientated. Thus, despite the fact that they are generally accessible, students who do not have good physical fitness probably have little, if any, interest in participation, due to a desire to avoid
feelings of exclusion, and are unlikely to be encouraged by teachers/coaches to join the teams. In addition, in Chinese culture, parents tend to urge their children to take additional lessons in learning centres and/or talent schools, rather than to take part in sports teams because of a common belief in the need to value letters and belittle arms (i.e. including sport). All of this leads to the phenomenon that sports teams do not appear to be popular enough amongst most students with only a small number participating. In universities, there are many different sports teams. However, as in schools, generally speaking, only a few students are interested in and/or can participate in them because these teams are high performance-orientated. In addition to these, however, student sports clubs organised on a departmental basis are easier for students to access. Moreover, university students are arguably less influenced by the pressure to attain further academic success when they choose to join the teams/clubs. It is noteworthy that schools, and in particular universities, increasingly play an important role in the provision of sports facilities, not only for students, teachers and staff, but also for the surrounding communities. This is because recently, since a large number of sport facilities are located in schools, the Ministry of Education has continually encouraged schools at every level to make their sport facilities available to the public access after school time and on the condition that this does not affect students’ activities.

With regard to high performance sports, from the fifth year of primary school to junior high school, some schools have established ‘sport classes’ exclusively for developing elite athletes. Some senior high schools that do not have sport classes do provide specific admission offers for potential elite athletes. After senior high school, there are also admission offers available to them in sport universities, PE departments in the universities of education, and some other universities. All of these sport classes and the senior high schools and universities are, as the director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) added, ‘Most important to the provision of sport and a channel to a higher degree for developing elite athletes and very fundamental to the overall elite sports development’.
Compared with schools, family is less important for the provision of sport for young people. This is because the traditional emphasis of Chinese culture differs in relation to academic study and sport, as mentioned earlier, resulting in the fact that the latter is rarely considered by parents as beneficial to their children’s development. This does not mean that parents are not concerned about their children’s health. However, as one senior coach, who is also an NGB member of staff (Interviewee R), commented,

Many parents make a mistake. That is, despite the fact that they know sport is good for health, they still unconsciously connect sport for health to sport for being an athlete which is not good for children’s future in Taiwan. …In addition, some parents think that some sports are dangerous. In most situations, therefore, they neither discourage nor encourage children to do sports and do not actively provide sport opportunities to their children.

Some families do still encourage their children to do sport. However, when it comes to high performance sports, the degree of importance for the family of (developing) elite athletes in terms of the provision of access to sport and/or financial support can differ markedly. The family plays a significant role if the intention is deliberately to cultivate children to become (elite) athletes after recognising their talent for sport. In this situation, the family actively provides sport opportunities or financial support to children or other family members. On the other hand, it plays a less important role if parents have no choice but to encourage their children, who do not like study, to devote themselves to competitive sports. Here, their main aim is to make sure that their children gain discipline through sports. Generally, families of this sort will not actively offer and/or will have a limited ability to offer sport opportunities and/or financial support to their children. Indeed, as a senior sports journalist (Interviewee E) noted, ‘As we can see, many grass-roots children who are engaged in competitive sports are disadvantaged, reared by grandparents, aboriginals or come from single parent or low-income families. …Relatively, the families can only provide limited resources for them to become elite athletes’.
The private sector is the other important vehicle for the delivery of sport. In the current study, this refers to voluntary sporting organisations at the national (NGB) and local levels, voluntary sports clubs and private sports centre/clubs that charge membership and/or tuition fees. Generally, NGBs put more emphasis on the provision of sport resources, by generating funds, providing domestic and international competition opportunities, and by providing coaching and administrative assistance for elite athletes and/or the development of elite sports. This is because, as a senior member of staff suggested, ‘The SAC values results. … Athletes’ performance in international sporting events this year is the SAC’s main criterion to decide on the allocation of funds to us for next year. We rely on their funds…and in order to obtain more funds, we have to decide where we should direct our efforts’. However, NGBs also sometimes host or cooperate with the government in hosting sporting events/activities for the masses. It is worth noting that since 2000, the confederation of most NGBs – the Republic of China Sports Federation – has become more relevant to the provision of resources to the masses, rather than to elite athletes, due to its functions of identifying and training athletes as well as organising sports competitions having been taken over by the SAC. The difference between sport provision for the masses and (developing) elite athletes can also been seen within voluntary sporting organisations at the local level. Voluntary sport clubs, such as folk dance clubs, sword-play clubs and Yuan Ji dance clubs, present a very different scenario with a greater focus on the delivery of sport to the masses, in particular to the middle aged and elderly, due to their main purpose being to promote individual or community health. Normally, they are small-scale, informal and community based. They consist of low-cost sports and are not dependent on government funding. With regard to private sports centres/clubs, these can be characterised as the commercialised sport sector. There are two main types: multi-sports fitness centres and individual sport clubs. Multi-sports fitness centres are run by private enterprises, such as World Gym and Begin Sport. Their scale is greater. They are mainly recreational and offer a fitness-enhancement orientation for those who can afford the membership fees. Since 2000, however, the government has gradually established public multi-sports fitness centres for general access, in particular in Taipei City and New Taipei City, and authorised the private sector to manage these through build-operate-transfer (BOT) and/or operate-transfer (OT) approaches. One retired SAC minister (Interviewee H) commented that
The creation of the public sport centres caused some suspicion about government competing for profit with the private sector by controlling policy. Some private fitness centres went bankrupt or had management difficulties because we [public fitness centres] charge much less for entrance and people preferred to come to the public sport centres to do sports. However, this policy made more people exercise. … This was good a thing.

In this respect, the provision of sport is less commercialised and thereby conforms to the developmental welfare regime of Taiwan. Compared with multi-sports fitness centres, individual sport clubs are more commercialised. Nevertheless, these clubs are only popular in certain sports, such as taekwondo and aerobic dancing.

To conclude, the Taiwan government plays a dominant role in the field of sports development, but only provides limited funding for it. Within this context, the education system is very important to young people in terms of the provision of sports. However, compulsory PE timetable slots are sometimes utilised to teach other subjects before exams. Moreover, after school, due to the traditional values of Chinese societies – to value letters and belittle arms – parents tend to encourage their children to take additional lessons in learning centres and/or talent schools, rather than to join sports teams. In terms of the provision of sports opportunities for sporting talent, sport classes (from the fifth year of primary school to senior high school) play a significant role. Compared with schools, families are less influential in relation to the provision of sport for young people, as they are also influenced by traditional thinking. The private sector is the other important vehicle for the delivery of sport. Although voluntary sporting organisations at the national (NGB) and local levels cooperate with the government to deliver sports to the masses, their main responsibility is centred on elite sports development. In addition, voluntary sport clubs, which are characterised as small-scale, informal, and community-based, promote low-cost sports, do not depend on government funding and are focused more on the delivery of sport to the masses, in particular the middle aged and elderly. Furthermore, with regard to private sport centres/clubs that charge membership and/or tuition fees, government involvement has led to multi-sports fitness centres
experiencing difficulties in staying in business. The other type of private sport centres/clubs – individual sport clubs – are more commercialised but they are only popular for certain sports.

5.2 Sports Policy and the State

As mentioned in Chapter 4, although it possesses some characteristics of decentralisation, Taiwan is close to being a unitary centralised state. Therefore, sports development and policy are likely to be dominated by the central government. However, because there are features of decentralisation, it can be expected that local governments (counties, cities and special municipalities) share some of the burden and have the power to make regulations and policy related to sports development at the local level on the condition that this is not contrary to the central government’s regulations and laws.

The KMT government invoked martial law between 1949 and 1987 and *The Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion* (1948-1991). In addition, there was no law to enact local self-government. Therefore, although the Constitution of the ROC contains the spirit of a ‘Balance of Power between Central and Local Government’, a unitary and centralised government structure has long been rooted in Taiwan. This has led to the fact that substantial power to develop sports and make sports policy has been located at the central level. Governmental sport agencies at the regional and local levels were simply responsible for implementing central government policy at that time.

From 1949 to 1953, there was no specific governmental agency for sport. Instead, the responsibility for sports development lay with the Department of Social Education
and the Bureau of International Cultural and Educational Relations in the Ministry of Education. After a short period, however, in 1954, the KMT reinstated the National Physical Education Committee (NPEC) of the Ministry of Education (established in 1932 and terminated in 1948). This consisted of only one Director and one secretary. Its operation relied upon collaboration with other agencies. In 1958, in order to reduce administration, the central government closed the Committee and its affairs were relocated to other agencies. Recognising the importance of sports development and the increased volume of business, the Ministry of Education restored the NPEC in 1961, and at the same time, increased its personnel and allocated it a larger budget. In the period from 1949 to 1972, the role of the governmental agency for sport at the national level experienced fluctuations, appearing to show only some signs of centralisation. However, it can be argued that whether the central government had a national level sport agency or not did not particularly influence the centralisation of sports development because between the late 1949s and the 1980s, the political system in Taiwan was authoritarian, allowing it to exercise authority over policy and development in every domain. Moreover, the ROCSF, which was a quasi-governmental sporting organisation directly controlled by the central government, assumed major responsibility for sports development until 2000. Nevertheless, in 1973, the central government again terminated the NPEC and instead established the Department of Physical Education (DPE) within the Ministry of Education as the supreme governmental sports agency to be responsible for the overall development of sports policy. This was the first time that Taiwan had experienced a specialized governmental agency at ‘Departmental’ level, indicating that central government’s control of sports development was now more visible.

It is noteworthy that after the central government retreated to Taiwan, over 95% of the territory of the ROC overlapped with that of Taiwan province. Between 1949 and 1998, the central government coexisted with the provincial government (regional level) in Taiwan, implying that the range of the provincial government’s authority covered the whole of the ROC, with the exception of special municipalities and two counties. Before it began to be downsized in the late 1990s, the Physical Education Division of the provincial government’s Department of Education was responsible for many sport policies for Taiwan. In this respect, one could argue that the sports policy
system was now more decentralised. However, it should be borne in mind that Taiwan was still subject to authoritarianism, whereby the provincial Governor was directly assigned by the central government until 1994, meaning that the provincial government was, in effect, the central government’s ‘shadow’. Moreover, the central government did not allow the provincial government to have any real policy discretion, in particular with respect to its policy coverage. Therefore, the direction of the Division’s sports policy was ultimately controlled by the central government. Indeed, the provincial government was downsized in 1998 and is now part of the central government.

Taiwan gradually became a democratic country following the abolition of martial law and The Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion in 1987 and 1991, respectively. As with other policy areas, however, sports development remained centralised. This was because, although The Self-Governance Act for Provinces and Counties and The Self-Governance Act for Special Municipalities, which were passed in 1994, established a legal foundation for regional and local self-government, these two laws did not give regional and local government sufficient policy discretion. In 1998, however, the central government created the Sports Affairs Council as a leading sporting agency and upgraded it to ministerial level. Except for school sports development, the other responsibilities of the DPE with regard to sports development were transferred to the SAC. (Although the SAC and DPE merged in 2013 as Sports Administration, because the current study is concerned with sports policy and development between 1949 and 2012, the newly established SA is not included in this study). At the local level, the city/county/special municipality government funds the Physical and Health (and Sanitary) Division and the Department of Sports in the Department of Education. The former’s responsibility is mainly restricted to the development of school sports and the latter is responsible for the development of mass sports and elite sports. It should be noted that the names of these local sport agencies vary from city/county/special municipality to city/county/special municipality and, the Department of Sport in some local governments, such as Taipei City, is independent of the Department of Education. Table 5.1 shows the distribution of government responsibilities at different levels in relation to sport in Taiwan before 2013.
Table 5.1 Levels of Government, Location of Sports Policy and Main Tasks in Taiwan before 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of government</th>
<th>Location of sports policy</th>
<th>Main tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National level</td>
<td>The SAC</td>
<td>Planning overall sports policy guidelines and producing strategic plans for sport policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Managing national sports affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assisting and supervising local governments in terms of commissioned matters.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improving national sport facilities and environment.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Sports for All.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conserving and promoting traditional, aboriginal and special sports.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing sport performances in international sporting events.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultivating coaches and referees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Managing and assisting NGBs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Responsible for sport interactions with other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Encouraging corporations to invest in sports development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Integrating public and private resources for sports development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning and developing sport industry.</td>
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<tr>
<td>National level</td>
<td>The DPE</td>
<td>Transacting the development of elite sports in sport universities, and senior and junior high schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning course outlines in sport senior high schools.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transacting inspection visits to sport classes in schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assisting and cooperating with the SAC to deliver sport policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.1 Levels of Government, Location of Sports Policy and Main Tasks in Taiwan before 2013 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of government</th>
<th>Location of sports policy</th>
<th>Main tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local level (city/county/special municipality)</td>
<td>Department of Sport in the Education Bureau</td>
<td>Planning overall sports policy at local level, mainly elite and mass sports.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting sport interactions with other countries’ cities/counties/special municipalities.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Managing and assisting city/county athletics associations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Developing elite and mass sports at local level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Delivering SAC’s and DPE’s sports policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Managing and improving local sport facilities and environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division of Physical Health Care Education in the Education Bureau</td>
<td>Planning and developing physical education and sanitary in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Developing physical education features of each school.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Delivering the SAC’s and DPE’s sports policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Executing athletes’ training courses in student athlete training centres, establishing sport bases in schools, assisting outstanding student athletes and carrying out sharing of coaching experiences.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transacting international sport interactions (between schools).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assisting Department of Sport in social, recreational and mass sports.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improving sport facilities, equipment and environment in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transacting affairs in relation to sport classes in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transacting the affairs in relation to professional coaches in schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(The main tasks might be different from city/county/special municipality to city/county/special municipality)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from the SAC’s, the DPE’s and cities’/counties’/special municipalities’ websites.
In 1999, the proclamation of *The Local Government Act* (LGA) was a milestone in terms of increasing city/county governments’ discretion to develop sport at the local level. Basically, local governments’ tasks/affairs can be classified into two categories in Taiwan: self-government affairs and commissioned matters (from the central government). The main difference between the two categories is the degree of involvement of the central government. In terms of self-government affairs, the central government has the power to oversee these, but it has little or no power to instruct local governments. On the other hand, the central government has the power to supervise and to instruct local governments with regard to commissioned matters. According to the LGA, the development of sports activities in the city/county is identified as a self-government affair and, there is no further or clear explanation of the development of sports activities. In other words, the range of developmental responsibilities can cover mass sports, elite sports and school sports. However, this does not mean that the central government has no capacity to influence local governments’ sport policies. In fact, one retired SAC member of staff (Interviewee Y) noted that

> The SAC and the DPE will intervene in certain local sport policies for which local governments apply for funds from central government to develop. Despite the fact that the local governments have policy discretion, they normally tend to comply with the SAC’s and DPE’s supervision.

The reason for this is explained by a senior sports journalists (Interviewee D), who notes that local governments’ budgets are limited and, in order to obtain funding from central government, they have to cooperate with the SAC’s and DPE’s sport policies. In terms of commissioned matters, another nationwide Act – *The National Sports Act* – also gives the sporting agencies at the central level (SAC and DPE) the power to be involved in sports development. This means that the SAC and DPE can safely entrust matters regarding sports development to local governments. Although local governments can formulate sub-regulations when implementing commissioned matters according to the LGA, these regulations cannot be contrary to the superior laws/regulations. From the above, it can be argued that sports development and policy
are largely centralised. However, it should be noted that such centralisation is
different from that in the past when local governments simply received and
implemented the sports policy initiated by central government. Arguably, the present
centralisation does allow local sport agencies to have more freedom than before
whilst delivering the SAC’s or DPE’s sports policies. In addition, commissioned
matters relating to sports development issued by the SAC and DPE are generally
nationwide in scope and refer to all local governments. Sometimes, however,
nationwide commissioned matters do only concern individual or a small number of
local government(s), such as hosting international sporting events or using local
government property to build national training centres. When this kind of situation
occurs, ‘the Ministry of the Interior shall jointly formulate implementation guidelines
in consultation with the relevant agencies, and submit such implementation guidelines
to the Executive Yuan for approval’ (the LGA, Article 22, 2010). In this respect,
therefore, the central-local government relationship is not always top-down with
regard to sports policy because some commissioned sport matters essentially involve
both nationwide and local development.

To conclude, before 1999, although there existed the spirit of a ‘Balance of Power
between Central and Local Government’ in the Constitution of the ROC, sports policy
and development were centralised. This was because there was no robust law for local
self-government and because of the execution of martial law and The Temporary
Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of
the Communist Rebellion. In addition, during this period, the provincial government
could only be regarded as central government’s shadow in terms of sports
development, even though the former was responsible for many sport policies. After
the establishment of the SAC in 1997 and the downsizing of the provincial
government in 1998, apart from the development of school sport, sport affairs at the
central level are the SAC’s responsibility. At the local level, the Physical and Health
(and Sanitary) Division in the Department of Education is responsible for the
development of school sports and the Department of Sports is responsible for the
development of mass sports and elite sports. Since 1999, the LGA has given policy
discretion to local governments in relation to sports development at the local level.
However, in reality, with regard to self-government affairs relating to sports
development, as a result of their dependence on central government funding, local governments have to accept the SAC’s and DPE’s policy supervision. Moreover, the SAC and DPE have the power to commission local governments to deliver their sport policies. That said, although sports development and policy remain centralised, the present centralisation is different from that in the past because local governments now have more freedom when implementing SAC and DPE sports policy. Furthermore, the local-central government relationship is not always top-down, particularly when the sport matters at issue involve both nationwide and local needs.

5.3 Sports Policy and Executive-Legislative Relations

As pointed out in Chapter 4, the policy-making power of the executive relative to that of the legislature is strong in Taiwan. The Legislative Yuan is more like an arena for scrutinising the government’s budget and debating its policies and proposed bills rather than for shaping policy.

In the Legislative Yuan, there is no particular standing committee for sport. While the Education and Culture Committee takes some initiatives in relation to sports development, by examining the sport budget and bills, supervising policy implementation, and giving suggestions about sport policies, it rarely challenges the SAC’s dominance in the formation of sports policy. Even in the divided government era, when the legislature greatly increased its strength in the policy-making process, sport policies were still mainly shaped by the executive. According to a retired SAC senior official (Interviewee P), ‘Basically, the Legislative Yuan’s concern would not extend to the formation of the sports policy. ……Sports policy is a professional area and there are a few legislators who know sport’. However, this does not mean that the SAC ignored recommendations from the legislature. Indeed, these would be taken into account by the SAC. As one SAC senior official (Interviewee N) mentioned,
‘Legislators’ suggestions on sports policy are important to the SAC because the legislature has the power to cut and/or freeze the sport budget’.

Nevertheless, it is believed that the Legislative Yuan’s suggestions are likely to cause only a few rather than many modifications to the regulation of sports policy. As one legislator (Interviewee S) noted,

In Taiwan the SAC, which represents the executive, acts as the sports policy maker and executor. The legislator is simply a sports policy actor who can only inspect the SAC’s policy and budget, and then offer some suggestions… There is a very limited range of things that the legislator can do for sports development.

Therefore, it is fair to conclude that, as in most other policy areas, the executive plays the dominant role in the sports policy-making process.

5.4 The Relationship between Sporting Organisations and Government

Between 1949 and 2000, the relationship between the KMT government and national sport organisations (NSOs/NGBs) reflected the state corporatism of Taiwan. At the national level, the DPE (known as the National Physical Education Council before 1973) was the governmental sport agency, and the government officially assigned the legitimacy and privilege to be involved in the elite and mass sports policy-making processes to a private umbrella organisation for sports – the ROCSF (known as the China National Amateur Athletic Federation before 1989). Moreover, the ROCSF
was identified as a quasi-governmental organisation for managing the NGBs and Tsouying Training Centre (renamed in 2000 as the National Sports Training Centre - NSTC) and promoting overall sports development, in particular at the elite level. Furthermore, it received public funding and controlled the allocation of funding to the NGBs. This led to a situation in which the ROCSF seemed to have autonomy in relation to elite and mass sports development and the NGBs had more interaction with it than with the DPE. One senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) pointed out that ‘Although the ROCSF was a private organisation, its function in the past was very similar to that of the current SAC’. In addition, a senior NGB member of staff (Interviewee J) added that ‘It [ROCSF] was powerful and dominated elite athletes’ selection, training and competition, and all governmental sport meetings could see its influence… We had to defer to it’. However, there was strong governmental involvement in its operation, which was exemplified by the fact that the presidents and general secretaries of the ROCSF were selected by the government. Furthermore, the backgrounds of ROCSF presidents were either as KMT politicians and/or military officers. Therefore, it is inappropriate to treat the ROCSF as a purely private organisation that was simply given certain privileges. It was more like a governmental agency that existed in a private form and broadly served the state interests. Arguably, despite the fact that discordant opinions and negotiations sometimes occurred between the government and the ROCSF, such as the issue of the DPE’s involvement in the NSTC and the need to establish a sport agency at the ministerial level, in practice these could be seen as disagreements between KMT elites. It should also be noted that many of the presidents of the NGBs also had influential military or civil service backgrounds (Yang, 1996). Therefore, this ensured further strong control on the part of the government. In sum, there was an extraordinarily close relationship between the government and the sport private sector during this period.

Since 1997, following the end of the authoritarian regime and with increasing democratisation, the ROCSF’s presidents have not come from the government or the military. The ROCSF has relatively more autonomy than before. However, in 2000, the SAC (established in 1997 as the leading governmental agency) assumed the ROCSF’s power to dominate elite athletes’ selection, training and competition, and the operation of the Tsouying Training Centre, which caused serious conflict
(including a lawsuit) between the two bodies. Since then, the ROCSF has been much less important in and relevant to the sports policy-making process and the development of elite sports. As a senior ROCSF member of staff mentioned (Interviewee I),

Nowadays, our [ROCSF’s] route changes to a more mass sports or leisure sports orientation. In fact, we are like their [SAC’s] downstream company… Our main functions are only to host some events, which the PR company can host, such as festivals, and to examine the qualifications and promotion of professional coaches and referees… This is very different from the past when we were in partnership with the DPE’.

In addition, the ROCSF has also become a titular confederation of the NGBs. One senior sports journalist (Interviewee D) observed that,

After its responsibility for affairs of elite sports was taken away, it has been on equal terms with the NGBs. In the past, it could act as the leading sport organisation for the NGBs because it held an authorised public budget for training and had the power to allocate funds to NGBs… Nowadays, the NGBs respect it, but there is just respect.

As with the ROCSF, no presidents of the NGBs are today chosen by the government. In addition, the ROCSF’s lack of any function in the development of (elite) sports indicates that the governmental sports agency has much more direct interaction with the NGBs. One legislator, who is also the president of a city/county athletics association (Interviewee W), stated that

The involvement of the private organisations plays a significant role in policy promotion. The government funds the domestic NGBs for the long-
term and gives them specific responsibilities. The SAC and the NGBs cooperatively promote sports affairs, thus forming a cooperative partnership. Combining public and private resources doubles the efficiency of promoting and improving Taiwan’s sporting competitiveness.

Similar statements are often made in publications written by officials to describe the importance of NGBs and city/county athletics associations in delivering sport policies and the close relationship between the SAC and NGBs at the national level and between local governments and city/county athletics associations at the local level. Arguably, however, the prerequisite of this partnership is that the NGBs should operate in a way that the SAC wants them to and/or can accept. This is because most NGBs lack the ability to raise funds by themselves and in order to obtain public funds, they must comply with certain regulations set out by the SAC, such as The Regulations on National Civil Sports Groups Subsidy and The Regulations on Subsidy, Counseling and Evaluation Method for Sports Federations Competing in Asian or Olympic Games. In addition, whilst the NGBs have the discretion to set their own internal regulations, annual plans and policies, these are examined, approved and supervised by the SAC. The reason for this involvement was explained by a retired SAC minister (Interviewee H), who said that, ‘They [NGBs] receive public funding… Therefore, we [the SAC] have a responsibility to supervise them and manage their performances’.

The NGBs’ dependency on the SAC for funding generates a top-down structure within the relationship. As a retired minister of the SAC (Interviewee G) mentioned,

The SAC controls the allocation of budgets. It is a top-down relationship… Nothing else. If they [the NGBs] did not agree with our [SAC’s] policies, they only felt unhappy and complained privately. They still had to follow the policies.
This strong argument acknowledges the SAC’s dominance in the relationship. However, this does not mean that the NGBs are unable to influence sports policy. In fact, the SAC includes individual NGBs in the policy-making process when it plans a policy for a particular sport, such as *The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan*. Moreover, there are arguments between the SAC and the NGBs, mainly about the amount of funding, but also with regard to regulations and policies. Generally, these arguments do not result in a stalemate. On the one hand, despite the fact that there is a top-down structure, the SAC will consider that some NGBs have political connections and serious conflicts with them could cause difficulties in policy delivery. On the other hand, the NGBs also worry that intense debates with the SAC might lead to worse results, such as less public funding and/or less administrative assistance. Therefore, the SAC and the NGBs tend to communicate, negotiate and compromise when arguments occur. One retired vice-minister (Interviewee A) concluded that ‘Revoking or cutting public funding for the NGBs to deal with the arguments is the last resort and should not happen. Interaction with the NGBs is not Zero-Sum Game. … We [the SAC] would not challenge their [the NGBs’] bottom line, and vice versa’.

In terms of the relationship between the DPE (the other governmental sports agency for school sports development) and the NGBs, there is limited interaction due to the former’s responsibility being more concentrated on the development of school sports since 1997. They only interact when national athletes are students as the DPE can then give administration assistance to the NGBs. In addition, the Chinese Taipei Student Baseball Federation (CTSBF), the Chinese Taipei University Sports Federation (CTUSF) and the Chinese Taipei School Sport Federation (CTSSF) heavily depend on DPE funding, which results in a top-down relationship. As the director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) noted,

The DPE supervises and assists an independent non-profit corporation – CTSBF. Although it exists in a corporate form, almost all of its budget comes from the DPE. This is around sixty million NTD per year for holding student league matches, and cultivating baseball coaches and players and international interactions. The DPE also directly subsidises the
CTUSF and CTSSF to the sum of approximately fifty or sixty million NTD per year. They are very cooperative with the DPE’s guidance.

The relationship between the government and the NOC in Taiwan is interesting. As mentioned above, from the 1960s to the 1980s, Taiwan faced serious diplomatic difficulties. For Taiwan (ROC) or the KMT, the NOC’s name and operation involved complex (international) political and diplomatic issues. Therefore, it can be argued that the direct involvement of the state in its operation and close governmental-NOC relations were considered necessary by the government. In fact, the NOC had the same personnel as the ROCSF. Although it had been separate from the ROCSF since 1974, its chairmen were still also the ROCSF’s (being assigned by the government) until 1998. Currently, however, the SAC and Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) have different ideas about their relationship. On the one hand, from the standpoint of the SAC, as one retired minister of the SAC (Interviewee G) commented,

A large ratio of CTOC’s budget is funded by the government, meaning that everything is controlled by the SAC. [Therefore] they cannot refuse to take the SAC into account. In fact, they just say that they do not care for the SAC, but they have to follow in the SAC’s steps. Moreover, even though they [the CTOC] think that they are an independent organisation, they probably do not dare to say so.

On the other hand, from the perspective of the CTOC, as one of its senior staff members (Interviewee K) noted,

According to the Olympic Charter, although the CTOC should cooperate and have a harmonious relationship with the government, it should maintain its independence. Therefore, it is necessary for the CTOC to let the government understand this concept. Otherwise, the government would
consider that the CTOC has to comply with its thoughts because of the funding and resources provider.

Arguably, the CTOC’s lack of ability to raise funds leads to the predicament that it can hardly react against the SAC’s involvement, even though it does complain about this. In addition, however, with regard to issues that are less relevant to (international) politics, the CTOC sometimes has to argue with the SAC, for example regarding the amount of public funding it receives and the administrative personnel arrangements in the national teams. However, these issues can be resolved through negotiation.

To conclude, the relations between governmental and sporting organisations in Taiwan from the late 1940s to 1990s can be described as state corporatist. The officially privileged umbrella sporting organisation – the ROCSF – was an extension of the executive branch due to the intense involvement of the government in its operations. This also led to a top-down relationship between the ROCSF and the NGBs and to very close government-ROCSF relations. From the 2000s onwards, the ROCSF has lost its privileges and become a nominal confederation of the NGBs. However, although the government does not directly control sporting organisations, there is still a top-down relationship between the SAC and the NGBs because of the latters’ heavy dependence on public funding. Nevertheless, they prefer to negotiate, and then to compromise, in order to avoid arguments resulting in a stalemate or more serious conflict. Moreover, this scenario has also occurred in the relationship between the DPE and some of the NGBs, although it is not apparent with regard to most NGBs due to the DPE concentrating mainly on the development of school sports and thereby lessening the amount of interaction. In terms of government-NOC relations, the SAC and the CTOC have different viewpoints. Basically, there is also a top-down structure that is the result of the direct government control in the past and that is perpetuated today by virtue of the CTOC’s dependence on the SAC’s funding.
5.5 Sports Policy, the Generalisation of Interests and Coalition Building

In the early stages of the KMT government’s retreat to Taiwan (from around the 1950s to the late 1960s), every policy was aimed at recapturing Mainland China and/or defending the island from an invasion by the PRC. Arguably, therefore, the priority of sports policy was the improvement of the nationals’ military physical fitness through the education system. As one retired SAC vice-minister (Interviewee A) noted,

Government emphasis on sports development has a historical context. In the past, the government valued most the development of physical education for national defence, such as grenade-throwing, pole-climbing and running with heavy equipment.

However, in 1968, the government passed a plan for the development of Sports for All and the cultivation of outstanding athletes, which witnessed the concept of dual objectives in sports policy, although the KMT government put more emphasis on the latter due to the fact that sport was one of few available means for Taiwan to address its diplomatic difficulties. One sports policy academic (Interviewee Y) mentioned that ‘After being excluded from the UN [in 1971], the government tended to put more effort into elite sports and utilised these to obtain international space, prestige and recognition’. This viewpoint is supported by the significant difference between the average for the central government’s budget allocation to the development of Sports for All (6.14%) and its allocation to elite sports (49.05%) between 1968 and 1987.

It can be argued, however, that between 1988 and 2000, the government valued Sports for All more than before. First, the public budget for mass sports development was greatly increased; second, there were new schemes in relation to the development
of Sports for All in *The Six-Year National Development Plan* (1991-1996); third, soon after the establishment of the SAC in 1997, the minister clearly declared that the future policy direction was ‘two axles’ – the development of Sports for All and elite sports; and fourth, the development of Sports for All was included in the first sport White Paper, which outlined future plans and strategies for development. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the government had totally changed its preference of elite sports development. In fact, the development of elite sports development still received more attention from the government than did Sports for All. In sum, as one sports policy academic (Interviewee U) observed,

> When Li Teng-Hui succeeded to the Presidency [1988-2000], he still preferred the development of competitive sports because he not only wanted to end diplomatic difficulties, but also hoped to present Taiwan’s identity through sports. Meanwhile, however, he also took the development of Sports for All into account and did not have so much bias in favour of developing competitive sports.

In the DPP government era (2000-2008), the SAC’s dual objectives were continually pursued. However, the priorities for sports policy differed from one SAC minister to another. For example, on the one hand, one retired SAC minister (Interviewee H) explained,

> When I was in tenure [2000-2002], I sustained an emphasis on the importance of health and introduced a slogan for letting Taiwan become a healthy power. It was unnecessary to spend so much money on competitive sports development. Not that the development of competitive sports was unimportant, but I adjusted the ratio of sports policy preference. I preferred Sports for All development more.
One the other hand, another retired SAC minister (Interviewee G) between 2004 and 2007, confessed that

I put emphasis on elite sports development. I had a personal slogan of generating sports stars. I thought that superstars could generate positive power to drive Sports for All and make teenagers like doing sports. The main responsibility for the development of Sports for All should be located in the private sector. Therefore, the government’s limited energy and human resources should be concentrated on the promotion of elite sports.

The difference in rhetoric between these ministers creates difficulty in terms of identifying the sports policy priority of the SAC. Nevertheless, the SAC’s levels of investment in elite sports and Sports for All seem to show that the former were given more weight. Between 2000 and 2008, the average public budget allocation to elite sports and Sports for All were 21.38% and 8.09%, respectively, which represents a significant difference. Moreover, although the budget for Sports for All was already limited and smaller, some elite sports affairs were also insidiously inserted into Sports for All affairs from 2006 to 2008 (Tseng, 2007). Furthermore, from a realistic perspective, as a senior sport scientist (Interviewee F) at the NSTC noted,

There is no specific scale or approach to evaluate whether the development of Sports for All is successful or not. However, if Taiwan’s national team does not win any medals at the Olympics, it is difficult to explain to nationals and the government will be interrogated by the legislators and thus, it places more emphasis on elite sports development.

In addition, it is noteworthy that due to President Chen’s desire to highlight Taiwan’s identity, the government made more active efforts to bid for international sporting events. Therefore, the budget for improving the overall sports environment was further increased.
Since 2008, the sports policy profile of the SAC has been similar to before. For example, the budget allocation for elite sports remains unbalanced. The SAC continually and actively encourages and subsidises local government to bid for international sporting events and a large amount of the budget is allocated for the improvement of the overall sport environment. However, it can be argued that the Ma government (2008 to the present) has had a more active attitude towards the development of Sports for All. This is not because the budget or policies for Sports for All are greater than they were during the DPP government, but President Ma seems more eager to demonstrate to the public his willingness and/or attempts to value the development of Sports for All. Furthermore, a retired SAC vice-minister (interviewee A) noted that ‘Sports for All has received the most emphasis from the government comparatively over the last five or six decades’. Nevertheless, whether the Ma government can gradually make efforts to balance the differences between mass and elite sports developments is debatable. The reason for this is that, as a senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee V) mentioned,

Although the Executive Yuan initially planned to invest 1.2 billion NTD in three years…400 million NTD per year from 2010…in the Sports Island Establishment Project, which is the most major policy for Sports for All, it extended the Project to six years with the same budget and only allocated 378 million NTD in the first year, 137.8 million NTD in the second year and 0 NTD in the third year.

To conclude, in the early stages of the retreat to Taiwan, the priority for sports policy was the development of physical education for national defence due to the realistic possibility of war with the PRC. Until 1968, dual sports policy objectives emerged with the government developing a Sports for All plan and also cultivating outstanding athletes. However, the government tended to put more emphasis on elite sports development and on using sports to address its serious diplomatic difficulties. Although elite sports were still given more attention than Sports for All, between 1988 and 2000, the government valued the latter more than previously. In the DPP government era (2000-2008), the ‘two axles’ policy direction was continually pursued.
Although different SAC ministers have had their own priorities, the evidence shows that the SAC generally continued to emphasise the development of elite sports. Meanwhile, the government made more efforts to bid for international sporting events, which led to the fact that the budget for the improvement of the overall sport environment was greatly increased. More recently (from 2008 onwards), the Ma government has gradually maintained a similar sports policy scenario to that of the DPP government. However, the Ma government seems to have adopted a more active attitude towards the development of Sports for All, despite the fact that there are problems in relation to budget allocation in its most important mass sports policy initiatives.
Chapter 6 Sports Policy Development in Taiwan – An Overview

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of sports policy development, in particular at the elite level, within the historical, socio-economic and socio-political context that existed in Taiwan between 1949 and 2012. The development of sports policy is divided into five periods (1949-1955, 1956-1972, 1973-1986, 1987-2000, 2000-2008, and 2009-2012) to ensure greater clarity, and is discussed with reference to the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to explain how sports policy changed over time. Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to address one issue in order to prevent confusion later on. Over 95% of the territory of the ROC overlapped with that of Taiwan province and the Provincial Governor was directly assigned by the central government. Thus, it is reasonable to consider that the essentials of the provincial government’s measures or policies for sports development for Taiwan province were almost nationwide in their scope and, to a considerable degree, these initiatives reflected the central government’s views. As Roy (2003: 80) described,

The provincial government had jurisdiction over all residents of the main island. Its departments duplicated the functions of the ROC central government in all areas except defense, foreign policy, and Taiwan-China relations. The extra layer of administration obviously helped substantiate the notion that the ROC government was temporarily sheltering on Taiwan and planned to resume governing Mainland China in the near future.

In this respect, the efforts made by the provincial government with regard to sports development before it was downsized should be taken into account.
From the time that the ROC government retreated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, it imposed an authoritarian regime. As a result, the degree of government control in every policy area, including sports policy, was substantial. In 1950, President Chiang Chieh-Shih announced that preventing the PRC from invading Taiwan and recapturing Mainland China were the main objectives of its overall policy, meaning that a large amount of the national budget was allocated to military development and all other policies were influenced by the same objectives in the following years. Before 1956, it can be argued, therefore, that sports policy was fairly ad hoc and limited to concern about the development of physical education for national defence and the improvement of the military fitness of the population. The government utilised two state-controlled ‘private’ organisations – the General Association of the Scouts of China and the China Youth Corps, which were established in 1926 and 1952 respectively – to promote PE activities after school and military training activities in schools and counties/cities for young people. Except for the improvement in the nation’s military preparedness, the intervention of the government in sports development was very limited. One sports policy academic (Interviewee U) explained the reason for this,

Basically, the government almost did not have the mood, energy and money to develop mass and elite sports in that period…because military development was given the first priority…. However, PE was emphasized and militarised because the government could and, needed to, recruit new soldiers who had had enough military fitness to enter the battlefield.

Indeed, there was no specific governmental agency for sports development between 1949 and 1953. Although the government established the National Physical Education Committee (NPEC) in the Ministry of Education (ME) in 1954, it had only two officials and a lack of resources, which led to the fact that it was functionless in the
promotion of sports. Outside the government system, the ROCSF/CTOC, which played a significant role in the selection, training and competition of elite athletes before 1949, faced certain difficulties in delivering its functions because of its relocation to Taiwan in 1951 and its initial lack of resources. Furthermore, no specific sports policy was developed. Indeed, holding the Provincial Games (from 1946) and Junior High Schools and Above Games (from 1952) every year, and thereby providing domestic competition opportunities for elite and/or developing elite athletes, can be considered as the only direct government initiative in the development of elite sports during this period.

Nevertheless, some government measures were indirectly linked to elite sports development. First, in 1951, the Ministry of National Defense created the Armed Forces Association for the Advancement of Sports (AFAAS) and sports bureaux in the Political Warfare Department, the Navy Air Force and the Combined Service Force Command Headquarters, to strengthen physical education and sport training in the military. The AFAAS and the sports bureaux regularly held sporting events and promoted sport activities, which increased the competitive sporting atmosphere in the military and, in turn, benefited elite sports development. Moreover, compared with non-military sectors, the military not only possessed resources (budget and sport facilities), but also had a much more complete organisational system for sports development with the establishment of the AFAAS and the sports bureaux, allowing the latter to more easily deliver their measures for sports development. Furthermore, the military created several sport teams, such as in basketball, baseball, boxing, football, shooting, track and field, table tennis and tennis, all of which constituted the main pool of talent for the selection of national athletes. Arguably, therefore, the military was an important influence on elite sports development and the cradle of elite athletes during this period. Second, from the early 1950s, the government utilised strengthening sporting interactions with its important anti-PRC ally – the Philippines – as a means of consolidating its position. Despite the fact that the government’s initial consideration was more about international politics, such actions at least provided international competition opportunities for elite athletes.
In the first decade of the ROC government’s retreat to Taiwan, it showed very little interest in mass sports development. It should be noted that it is difficult to distinguish the differences between the development of mass sports and the improvement in the nation’s military fitness. However, as one retired minister of the SAC (Interviewee H) mentioned, ‘The term or even the concept of Sports for All did not exist or was very immature in Taiwan in the early stages of the KMT government’s relocation. … It gradually emerged after the late 1960s’. Nevertheless, in 1953, President Chiang Chieh-Shih wrote *The Two Additional Statements of the People’s Livelihood: Education and Entertainment*, which showed the government’s embryonic idea of developing mass sport.

### 6.3 1956-1972

In 1956, the government assigned General Chou Chih-Jou to be the president of the ROCSF/CTOC (the voluntary sport organisation). This policy indicated not only the combination of the military’s resources with the ROCSF/CTOC, but also an increasing level of government intervention in sports development. The government’s involvement in sports development was further highlighted in 1961 with the restoration of the NPEC and the increase in its personnel and budget. In addition, although there was no government statement or specific policy that clearly declared the government’s preference, elite sports development was in practice given more emphasis than mass sports development. Between 1961 and 1972, the budget allocated to the development of elite sports was much greater than that allocated to the development of mass sports (Liu and Chou, 2008). Furthermore, most sport policies were apparently elite-orientated, which further manifested the government’s focus on the elite level. For example, in 1957, the ROCSF/CTOC published *The Three Year Plan for the Sports Development of China*, which aimed at achieving good performances in international sporting events. In 1964, it added *The Four Year Plan for Sports Development*, which aimed to complete the system of elite sports development. This plan included: (i) continuing to assist sport organisations to
establish NGBs; (ii) requesting NGBs to hold sporting events twice every year; (iii) strengthening the development of elite athletes and international sporting interactions; (iv) increasing and improving sports facilities and equipment; (v) cultivating sport coaches and PE teachers; and (vi) improving cooperation between the military and related organisations in society. Furthermore, in 1968, the government introduced The Implementation Plan for the Development of Physical Education for All and the Cultivation of Outstanding Athletes. This was the first time that the central government had developed a more specific and complete plan for both mass and elite sports development. However, although the development of mass sports was included in the plan, it would be inappropriate to think that the government treated mass and elite sports development as equal because very few resources were devoted to the former. Nevertheless, this policy at least implied the emergence of dual objectives in sports development. Last but not least, from the early 1960s, the government began to pay attention to the cultivation of developing athletes. First, in 1961, the Taiwan provincial government established the Taiwan Provincial College of Physical Education (CPE), the main function of which was not only to develop community PE workers and teachers, but also to cultivate elite athletes. In addition to the CPE, PE departments were gradually established by the central and Taiwan provincial governments in the Normal University, the National Teachers’ Colleges and in some private universities. Second, in 1966, the Ministry of Education promulgated The Regulations for Facilitating Admission to Higher Education for Students with Outstanding Sports Performance at High School Level and Above. This was a highly important policy document for developing sporting talent because it provided a channel for student athletes who were at the elite level to continue their sporting careers. Third, in 1971, the provincial government announced The Plan for the Establishment of Sport Classes in Provincial Public and Private Junior and Senior High Schools for sports talent and/or outstanding student athletes.

From the early 1950s, the conflict between the ROC and the PRC about the recognition of their legitimacy by other countries, which was almost as important as the issue of national defence, was extended to the sports arena and gradually became more significant. In order to exclude and/or avoid being excluded by the PRC from international sports activities, having national teams to participate was a basic
prerequisite. With reference to the ACF, a series of conflicts over the legitimacy issue related to the international sports stage can be considered as a constituting internal shock that strongly affected the belief system of sports policy actors and, in this case, acted as an important catalyst for increasing government involvement in sports development and an emphasis on the elite level. In the 1960s, another two internal shocks – the poor performance at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and a series of outstanding performances by Taiwanese youth baseball teams on the international stage from 1968 – strengthened the importance of the elite sport coalition.

In 1971, the ROC was excluded from the UN, meaning that the ROC’s legitimacy was no longer recognised by most countries and it was left isolated. Arguably, sports became one of few available vehicles for the ROC to enjoy continued international interaction. For the sports policy subsystem, therefore, the exclusion of the ROC from the UN was an external perturbation/shock that ‘attract the attention of key decision-making sovereigns’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007:199). This external event also further confirmed the core policy belief of an elite sport coalition. We should remember, however, that the ROC was governed by an authoritarian regime. According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), openness of the political system and the degree of consensus needed for major policy change are low in authoritarian regimes. Thus, the actors within the sports policy subsystem were restricted to a small number of KMT political elites.

Of particular interest is the fact that although there was a government sport organisation – the NPEC – some sports policy actors still advocated establishing a Department of Physical Education. In 1964, the minister of the ME – Huang Chi-Lu – proposed establishing a specific sport agency to strengthen the sport administration system (SAC, 2011a). In the following years, succeeding ME ministers continued to express their intention to create such an agency. In 1966, for example, at the First Meeting of the Taiwan Provincial Physical Education Committee, Yen Chen-Hsing (the ME Minister between 1965 and 1969) asserted that there was a need to establish a Department of Physical Education within the ME to be responsible for sports policy-making, policy-implementation and policy-access (SAC, 2011b).
6.4 1973-1986

In 1973, recognising the fact that the organisation and personnel of the National Physical Education Committee were unable to cope with the increased number of sport affairs, the government terminated the NPEC and established the Department of Physical Education (DPE) within the ME as the leading sport governmental agency. This was the first time that the government had created a specific sport agency and was arguably not only a defining moment for sports development in Taiwan, but also an indication that the government was now even more directly involved in sports development.

In 1976, the DPE published *The Sports for All Promotion Programme*, which had been planned since its foundation. In the programme, there were three implementation foci, consisting of community sports, labour sports/recreations, and public arena guidance and assistance in mass sports. The programme was actively promoted throughout the whole country and treated as establishing the main direction for mass sports development in the following years. Arguably, the formation and promotion of this specific, complete and extensive programme for the development of Sports for All reflected the government’s increased focus on mass sports development. However, it did not mean that the government’s preference had shifted from elite sports development to mass sport. In fact, the development of elite sports was still given priority by the government as was evident in the differences between the budget allocations to elite and mass sports – 48.84%:8.61% (see Liu and Chou, 2008).

In addition to *The Sports for All Promotion Programme*, there were four other major sport policies during this period (1973-1986). First, the government enacted a series of measures for the cultivation of outstanding developing/elite athletes. In 1976, the DPE introduced *The Regulations for Developing One Chosen Sport in Each Selected Junior and Senior High School* after an informal discussion about the specific long-term regulations with regard to cultivating outstanding athletes in schools. Based on
these regulations, in 1979, the DPE further announced *The Long-Term Implementing Essentials for Cultivating Sport Talents in Selected Junior and Senior High Schools*, which increased the number of chosen sports and schools. According to the SAC (2011b), this regulation built a robust foundation for the cultivation of elite athletes in the future because most athletes in national teams would come from these selected schools. In 1982, in order to connect the education of these developing sport talents, the DPE extended the regulations to colleges and universities by creating *The Long-Term Implementation Essentials for Cultivating Outstanding Sport Talents in Selected Five Year Colleges*. In addition to these strategies, the DPE drafted *The Plan for the Establishment of Local Training Centres* and *The Implementation Plan for Experimental Sport Classes in Primary and Junior High Schools* in 1982 and 1984 respectively, to strengthen the system of developing grass-roots sporting talent. Of particular importance was the 1984 plan because it provided a channel for sport-talented children to receive more professional training opportunities while at schools, indicating the government’s wish to develop these children at a very young age. Moreover, there was two-year mandatory military service in Taiwan. Therefore, in order to prevent outstanding developing/elite athletes from having their training halted by service, in 1974 the DPE cooperated with the Ministry of National Defense to produce *The Long-Term Implementation Regulations for Cultivating Sports Talents*, which selected fifteen target sports to develop and in which to establish military sport teams that provided a significant opportunity for male athletes to continue their training during mandatory military service.

At the higher competitive or elite level, in 1976, the DPE assisted the ROCSF to carry out *The in Prosperity Caution and in Adversity Patience Sport Training Plan*, which selected track and field, swimming, shooting, archery, gymnastics and judo as target sports because they were considered as most suitable for development. It should be noted that the ROSF/CTOC were divided into two separate organisations in 1974. Although the government had created the DPE, the ROCSF still played an important role in sports development, in particular at the elite level. However, in 1978, the DPE helped the ROCSF to publish *The Extended Implementation Plan for in Prosperity Caution and in Adversity Patience Sport Training*, which increased the number of target sports from six to twenty-eight.
Second, the government made efforts to develop sport facilities especially for elite athletes. In 1976, the DPE borrowed the Zuoying military camps from the military and transformed them into the Zuoying Sports Training Centre (ZSTC). Meanwhile, the ROCSF was funded and authorised by the DPE to train not only national players, but also outstanding developing athletes in the ZSTC. Moreover, in 1984, the Chung-Cheng Sports Park (called the Chieh-Shou Sports Park before 1975) was reformed as the Lin-Kou Chung-Cheng Sports Park Area and became home to the National Lin-Kou Physical Education College (renamed as the National Taiwan Sport University in 2009). Three years later, in recognition of the fact that the ZSTC was insufficient to cope with the increasing number of elite/developing elite athletes, the government proposed the establishment of the Northern Sports Training Centre (NSTC) in the Sports Park Area, which would utilise existing sports facilities to share the burden of the ZSTC. The sports facilities in the NSTC, which were of a professional standard, were corporately funded and built by both the private and public sectors from around the mid-1970s. The aims behind building these facilities were: (i) to act as the most professional sports training base for outstanding athletes; (ii) to provide places for training elite athletes in different sports during the summer/winter vacations and also the national teams, for testing and training outstanding developing (junior and senior high school) student athletes who had the potential to become elite athletes and for hosting international sporting events; (iii) to offer public access to inspire the masses to participate in sports and places for private and public organisations to hold meetings; and (iv) to address the development of Chinese martial arts and create a sports science research centre (SAC, 2011b). The establishment of the ZSTC and the attempt to create the NSTC were clear indications of a more systematic approach to elite sports development.

Third, due to the fact that many PE teachers were also sports coaches, in 1985 the government introduced *The Plan for Full-Time Sports Coaches in Schools*, not only to lighten the burden on PE teachers, but also to cultivate developing athletes. Coaches who were interested in the plan had to pass certain tests and were trained and then assigned to the selected schools mentioned above. In the following years, the government gradually released more places for full-time sports coaches in schools.
Fourth, the government started to take the welfare of developing elite/elite athletes into account, including their education, employment, mandatory military service and rewards. In Taiwan, many national players were student athletes. However, before international sporting events, especially the Asian and Olympic Games, there was always squad training at the ZSTC, which meant that student athletes who were national players faced difficulties. Therefore, in 1981, to solve this problem, the DPE announced *The Selection and Training Plan for the ROC’s Preparation of the Olympics*, which regulated student athletes so that they could make training their first concern and treat studying as secondary during squad training periods. It also helped them to catch up on their studies after the events. Moreover, this plan also took the national players’ future career paths into account. For example, the government would assist players who reached quarter-finals to find jobs or, it would maintain their positions and salaries during squad training and events if they already had jobs. Moreover, in 1981, the Executive Yuan passed *The Regulations for the Mandatory Military Service for National Players During Squad Training and the Olympic Games*. These regulations allowed national players to postpone their mandatory military service and shorten their period of service if they had achieved outstanding performances in international sporting events. Furthermore, in order to encourage elite athletes to achieve better performances, in 1981, the president of the Executive Yuan asked the ME to establish *The Essentials of the Ministry of Education Chung-Cheng Sports Decoration and Reward*, which rewarded elite athletes who had broken Olympic, Asian Games and national records in track and field, swimming, shooting, archery, cycling and weight-lifting. Arguably, this can be seen as the first indication of the emergence of a reward system for elite athletes in Taiwan. A year later, the ME further announced *The Essentials of the Ministry of Education National Glory Decoration*, which was also used to inspire elite athletes. Subsequently, in 1986, the two essentials were combined into *The Essentials of the Ministry of Education Chung-Cheng and National Glory Sports Decoration*.

From the above, with the exception of *The Sports for All Promotion Programme*, the major sport policies were elite-oriented, which further confirmed the government’s continued emphasis on elite sports development. From the time of the exclusion of the ROC from the UN in 1971, the ROC’s diplomatic situation had been deteriorating as
is exemplified by the fact that more and more countries terminated diplomatic relations with it. Moreover, in 1979, the USA severed diplomatic relations with the ROC and, meanwhile, annulled *The Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty*. According to the logic of the ACF, a series of diplomatic setbacks such as these can be characterised as external shocks, which in this instance not only strengthened the elite sports policy coalition’s core beliefs – focusing on the development of elite sports – but also provided it with the resources to deliver the core beliefs to government because, as has been mentioned, utilising sport as a tool was one of the few options available to the ROC in relation to international affairs. In addition, following these diplomatic setbacks, the ROC gradually lost its predominance in terms of its legitimacy within the Olympic family during the 1970s and the early 1980s, which was evident in the number of conflicts in relation to its name and its status in the Olympics with regard to hosting countries, the IOC, the Olympic Council of Asia (AOCA) and the PRC. Of particular importance was the Canadian government’s refusal to allow the ROC national team to enter its country and participate in the 1976 Montreal Olympics (Bairner and Hwang, 2010). This event, along with other smaller conflicts, can best be described as an internal shock for the sports policy subsystem and acted as a catalyst for the government to further emphasize the importance of elite sports development. Later the same year, the minister of the ME successfully proposed a large increase in the annual budget of the DPE from 1,800,000 NTD to 3,700,000 NTD. According to the SAC (2011c), most of the budget was used for international sports affairs and for the improvement of sports facilities in the ZSTC.

In addition to these, another two external events should be mentioned here. First, although preventing the PRC from invading Taiwan and recapturing Mainland China remained the overall government policy objectives, it can be argued that resources were not as concentrated on military development as before because the prospect of military conflict between the ROC and PRC lessened in the 1970s-1980s compared with the 1950s-1960s and recapturing Mainland China seemed to be an impossibility for the ROC government with its exclusion from the UN. Second, between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, the government launched *The Ten Major Infrastructure Projects*, which improved the economic conditions for the government.
Notwithstanding the fact that these two external events seemed to be less significant catalysts for the continued government emphasis on elite sports development than the previously discussed external and internal shocks, they provided an opportunity and indeed a necessary condition for the elite sports policy coalition to convince the government to dedicate more funds to elite sports development. However, decreased military expense and an improved government economic situation were also to be used by mass sports policy advocates to deliver their belief system to the government. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the launch of *The Ten Major Infrastructure Projects* also gradually changed Taiwan from an agricultural society to an industrial society and increased its gross domestic product (GDP) from 369 USD in 1970 to 3,045 USD in 1985. The subsequent transformation of lifestyle and higher incomes provided further resources for the mass sports policy coalition.

6.5 1987-1999

In 1987, the KMT government repealed martial law, which was a defining moment for the emergence of a more liberal society and open political environment because it symbolised the end of the authoritarian regime and a huge step towards democracy. It should be noted that the end of authoritarianism and the advent of democratisation was a transitional process that could not be wholly represented by a single event or distinguished by a particular moment in time. In fact, from the mid-1980s, many government initiatives could be identified as part of the transition. These included the government conniving in the creation of the DPP (1986), the lifting of newspaper bans (1986), the annulment of *The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization to Suppress the Communist Rebellion* (1991), and the first general election (1996). In addition, during this period, the GDP rapidly increased from 4,947 USD in 1987 to 12,279 USD in 1999. Arguably, a more liberal society and a better economic situation led to the fact that the population now had greater possibilities to pursue sporting opportunities.
Within this context, in 1989, the Executive Yuan ratified and asked the DPE to implement *The National Sports Construction Mid-term Plan*. However, most of objectives in the plan were markedly more related to elite sports development than to mass participation. According to the SAC (2011b), it was a four-year plan (1989-1993) that included eight main implementation elements: establishing a sports league-match system, the long-term cultivation and rewarding of elite athletes, raising the level of coaches and referees, cultivating sports development professionals, enhancing sports science and academic research, improving sports facilities, strengthening international sport interactions, and exalting and promoting traditional folk games. The total budget for the plan was 18,500 million NTD.

Nevertheless, in 1991, the government did introduce *The Six-year National Development Plan* (1991-1996), which included sports development in its culture and education section, with the aim of achieving the goal of building general access swimming pools and sports parks in every township and a baseball stadium in every county and city. It can be argued that the expectations with regard to sports development in the plan were more relevant to mass sports development. In 1997, the government established the SAC as the national leading sport agency. This was the first specific sport agency at ministerial level, suggesting that sports development was valued by the government more than ever before. Soon after the establishment of the SAC, it announced ‘the two axles and four wheels drive’ principle as its main policy direction. The two axles (dual objectives) were: (i) popularising the climate of Sports for All and improving the physical fitness of the population (the development of Sports for All); and (ii) strengthening competitive sports performance and enhancing sport competitiveness (the development of elite sports). The four wheels were: (i) constructing and managing sport facilities; (ii) erecting institutions and systems, making laws and regulations and planning programmes and activities; (iii) cultivating and certificating professional sport staff and volunteers; and (iv) propagating the concept of doing sports and developing sports science. In the same year, the SAC announced *The Sunshine Fitness Plan*, which was specifically aimed at the development of Sports for All. Through this plan, the SAC not only entrusted and funded voluntary organisations, NGBs, schools and communities to organise sport activities, but also subsidised local governments to build sport arenas, swimming
pools, convenient sport facilities, night-lighting equipment and convenient fitness-testing facilities. In 1999, the SAC then published *The Sports White Paper of the ROC*, which specifically and comprehensively outlined the prospects for sports development over the following ten years. In the White Paper, the dual objectives (elite and mass sports development) were further emphasized. From the above, it seems that the government had a more active attitude towards the development of mass sports between the early and late 1990s. This analysis is further confirmed by the increased public budget allocation (1990-1999) to mass sports development. According to Liu and Chou (2008), the budget allocation to the development of Sports for All (27.57%) even exceeded that provided for the development of elite sports (16.61%). However, it should also be noted that, according to Liu and Chou’s (2008) statistics, the government budget for sports development consisted of six categories (administrative support, Sports for All development, elite sports development, international sport affairs, the improvement of the sport environment, and school sports development). Some of these were more elite-focused, such as administrative assistance (11.62%), international sport affairs (7.85%) and school sports development (13.63%). The only category for which it is difficult to identify whether it was for elite or mass sports development is the improvement of the sport environment (22.73%). In other words, therefore, notwithstanding the government’s rhetorical emphasis on the dual objectives (elite and mass sports) as its policy direction, it still allocated more funding to elite sports development.

Some of the elite sport policies/measures that were implemented during this period are worthy of mention. First, in 1989, in order to pursue *The National Sports Construction Mid-term Plan*, the DPE assisted the ROCSF in revising *The Extended Implementation Plan for in Prosperity Caution and in Adversity Patience Sport Training*. The amended plan classified training targets (athletes) into two types, covering Asian and Olympic Games athletes who did not reach the standard to receive long term training and non-Asian and non-Olympic Games national players.

Second, in 1989, the DPE included *The System for the Establishment and Promotion of Professional Coaches in Schools* in its urgent working agenda. According to the
SAC (2011b), 630 seats for professional coaches in schools would be released during the following four years. It is noteworthy that this was also a sub-programme of *The National Sports Construction Mid-term Plan*, aimed at helping retired elite athletes to acquire jobs and to cultivate developing athletes for future generations.

Third, in 1991, the DPE amended *The Essentials of the Ministry of Education Chung-Cheng Sports Decoration and Reward*, to include those coaches who cultivated medallists into the reward system. This measure was initiated mainly because the DPE was attempting to respond to the increasing appeals to improve the welfare of hard-working coaches. It was argued that the coaches’ reward system could inspire them to devote themselves more to the cultivation of developing/elite athletes. However, this policy also led to some negative effects. As one senior sports journalist described (Interviewee E),

> Some athletes and coaches who only focused on rewards frequently would scramble for the prizes, leading to conflicts between them. These conflicts sometimes even became lawsuits. Moreover, in order to obtain or share the rewards, some secretaries of NGBs occupied the positions of coaches. Furthermore, this measure led to factional struggles in the sport community because some coaches treated potential medallists or talented developing athletes as their own property and did not allow these athletes to be trained by other coaches who had better training knowledge and methods. All of this obstructed the development of competitive sports in Taiwan.

As a result, the SAC subsequently excluded coaches from *The Essentials of the Ministry of Education Chung-Cheng Sports Decoration and Reward* in 2002.

Third, in 1999, the SAC established four levels within the developing elite athletes system: grass roots athletes (fourth level), outstanding athletes who were cultivated by
the NGBs (third level), outstanding athletes who were developed by professional
sport colleges, universities and physical education departments and who took part in
military service and in military sport teams (second level), and national
representatives (first level). In addition, there were some supplementary measures in
this policy.

Fourth, in Asian and Olympic Games years, the DPE authorised the ROCSF to make
selection and training plans for elite athletes. However, after 1997, the SAC took over
this responsibility. In 1998, the SAC assisted the NGBs in drafting *The Golden Plan
for the 1998 Asian Games and 2000 Olympics*. In addition, it targeted ten Asian
Games sports and also introduced *The Supplementary Plan for the Asian Games* for
the ten respective NGBs. According to the SAC (2011b), there were important
supplementary measures in this plan, including: (i) the establishment of a sports
science group (sport physiology, psychology, biomechanics, nutrition and medicine
and doping); (ii) the improvement of coaches’ and athletes’ treatment, living
environment and training facilities (in the ZSTC); (iii) the recruitment of foreign
coaches to assist with training; (iv) the implementation of domestic and overseas
training to increase national players’ practical experience; and (v) the inspection of
sport facilities for the 1988 Asian Games to provide coaches and national players with
more relevant information. Arguably, the plan witnessed the SAC’s active
engagement in adopting a fairly comprehensive and systematic approach to preparing
for the 1998 Asian Games. This was perhaps because the SAC was under pressure to
secure a major achievement following its creation in 1997.

Fifth, in 1997, military sport teams, which consisted mainly of elite athletes who were
fulfilling their military service, faced disbandment, when the Ministry of National
Defense (MND) implemented *The Military Downsizing Case* and, in order to prevent
elite athletes from being temporarily impeded from training due to military service, in
1999 the SAC communicated and negotiated with the MND to introduce and promote
*The Regulation for Squad Training for Military Sport Teams*. 
Sixth, three years after the government proposed the creation of the Northern Sports Training Centre, to share the burden of the ZSTC by utilising the existing sports facilities in the Lin-Kou Chung-Cheng Sports Park Area, it was officially established in 1990. However, the Northern Sports Training Centre was closed in 1996 when the National Lin-Kou Physical Education College decided, during a university meeting, to refuse to accommodate it in the College.

As mentioned earlier, during this period, society became more liberal and democratic and economic conditions improved, leading to greater opportunities for the people of Taiwan to play sports. In the 1990s, the government paid more attention to mass sports development than ever before, and listed it as one of the dual objectives of sports policy direction, which seemed to respond to the growing need. However, whilst this period witnessed a change in sports policy from giving priority to elite sports development to emphasising the dual objectives (mass and elite sports development), a large part of the budget for sports development was still allocated to the development of elite sports. According to the ACF, the change in socio-economic conditions was identified as an external (system) event that was ‘very important in establishing the resources and constraints within which subsystem actors must operate ….. [and] a necessary condition for major policy change’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). In the case of Taiwan, socio-economic change continued to provide the mass sport coalition within the sports policy subsystem with resources to deliver their belief system to the government. In addition, there were two other notable factors. First, during the transition between the regimes (from authoritarianism to democracy), the NGBs did have an impact on government control, insofar as the presidents of the NGBs were elected by their own internal mechanisms, rather than assigned by government. Although the government could still influence the NGBs as their funding provider, the NGBs now had more discretion and autonomy than ever before. Second, in terms of analysis, it can be argued that a more open political environment after the end of the authoritarian regime made the ACF approach more applicable in Taiwan.
In 2000, the ROC experienced the first party rotation in its history after the DPP’s victory in the general election. This was a defining moment for the democratic transition. From the perspective of the ACF, party rotation can be identified as an example of change in systemic governing coalitions (an external system event), which provides resources and/or constraints for actors within the sports policy subsystem and is a necessary condition for major policy change. However, it can be argued that there was no significant difference between the sport policies of the DPP and KMT. There remained dual objectives – elite and mass sports development – during the DPP era (2000-2008) as, was frequently evidenced in SAC publications. One senior member of the CTOC (Interviewee K) commented, ‘The main differences between the two parties are political points of views, rather than how to develop sports’. In addition, a retired minister of the SAC (Interviewee H) said,

No matter which party is in power, sports policy has its continuity and stability. Although there is still a possibility of policy change, the core value [dual objectives] would not alter. This is because the policy is about ideology, which will not experience huge change. However, some strategies and measures to realise the ideology could be different.

Nevertheless, the DPP which has a preference for Taiwan independence, seemed to be more active in bidding for international sporting events in order to increase Taiwan’s international profile and strengthen the Taiwanese national identity. In 2003 and 2004, Taiwan successfully won the bid to host the 2009 Summer Deaflympics and the 2009 World Games. As one legislator (Interviewee Z), who is interested in sports development and was once an elite athlete, noted,

After the DPP was in power, they started to actively bid for international sporting events. When they successfully won the events, they had to
improve the quality and quantity of sports facilities in Taiwan. Therefore, they spent a lot of money on the construction of new sports facilities and the improvement of existing sports facilities.

Between 2000 and 2008, there were also some important elite sport policies. First, the government made efforts to cultivate developing athletes and train elite athletes. In 2000, the SAC announced *The Sports Affairs Council Principles for Subsidies to Develop Special Sports in Colleges and Universities* and *The Sports Affairs Council Principles for Subsidies to Improve the Sports Training Environment in Professional Sports Colleges and Universities*. These principles included sport senior high schools and the universities that had PE departments or had first division university athletes in non-PE departments. In 2007, the SAC merged the two sets of principles and established *The Principles for Subsidising the Development of Special Sports and Improving Sports Training Environments in Post-Secondary Schools*. According to this principle, special sports were divided into five categories: (i) distinctive focused sports; (ii) Olympic Games focused sports; (iii) Asian Games focused sports; (iv) focused group sports; and (v) other sports. Arguably, the emergence of these principles enshrined government efforts to cultivate college and university student athletes. The main reason why the government paid so much attention to the cultivation of student athletes was that many elite athletes were students, in particular at university level. As the director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) commented,

In Taiwan, it is not difficult to find that most elite athletes and national players, especially Olympic national players, are undergraduates or postgraduates. They will retire or not concentrate so much on training after graduation because they have to look for a more stable job rather than being an athlete. Thus, the government has to value the cultivation of these elite athletes in the universities.

Moreover, in order to establish a more robust cultivation and training system and institutionalise a fundamental training system, in 2003, the SAC also enacted *The
Sports Affairs Council Application Principles for Funds for the Establishment of Grass-roots Athletic Training Bases and the Development of Special Sports by Senior High and Vocational Schools. Under the heading of training bases, there were substations that were mainly created in public or private primary, junior high and senior high schools or at public stadia, and these were guided and overseen by local governments. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the SAC had made selection and training plans for elite athletes/national players in every Olympic and Asian Games year. From 2000, these plans became more comprehensive and included more scientific elements, such as the introduction of ‘management by walking around’ and the establishment of a special working group, sports science assistant group, sports information group, selection and training group, and a medical network. It is noteworthy that among these initiatives, the Challenge 2008 Gold Plan could be considered as the most complete, detailed and long-term strategy for the development of elite athletes, demonstrating the government’s active attitude. This was a four-year plan, which was allocated 800 million NTD (200 million NTD per year) and was assigned seven main tasks: (i) a special project for the cultivation of (elite and developing) athletes; (ii) summer and winter vacation training camps for outstanding athletes (the employment of foreign coaches and overseas training); (iii) a golf training centre; (iv) a baseball research centre; (v) a sports science research centre; (vi) an improvement in altitude and seaside training centres; and (vii) holding archery competitions. In addition, there were designated sports that were classified into three categories: mainstream sports (track and field, swimming and gymnastics), medal winning sports (taekwondo, weightlifting, archery, shooting, table tennis, badminton and judo) and sports to market Taiwan (golf, baseball and tennis). One retired SAC minister (Interviewee G) who was involved in drafting the plan, stated the origins of the plan that

After coming back from Athens, we had won the first gold medals in history. On my way [from Athens] back to Taiwan, I wrote the 2008 Beijing Olympics Golden Plan...I wrote it on the plane. A journalist interpreted it as the Golden Plan. At that time, I reported this plan to President Chen, asking him to allocate 1 billion to me [the SAC] and telling him that I would make Taiwan achieve better at the Beijing
Olympic Games. He agreed and allocated 200 million per year to me to do this.

According to the logic of the ACF, winning the first two Olympic gold medals in the 2004 Athens Olympic Games can be identified as an internal event that further aroused the government’s awareness of the importance of elite sport success for strengthening the Taiwanese national identity and enhancing Taiwan’s international profile and in turn, that gave the elite sport coalition greater opportunity to deliver their ideas to government.

Second, there was a policy to improve sports facilities that were mainly reserved for elite athletes and potential elite athletes. After the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the National Sports Training Centre (NSTC) was officially established. It should be kept in mind that although the NSTC was actually the Zuoying Sports Training Centre (ZSTC), it was managed by the ROCSF. Therefore, in order to strengthen and consolidate elite athletes’ selection, training, competition and assistance, the SAC took over the ZSTC from the ROCSF and changed its name to the National Sports Training Centre in 2000. This could be considered as an example of increased government involvement in elite sports development. In 2005, the SAC attempted to make the NSTC a corporatized administration by carrying out The Regulations of Establishment of Administrative Corporatization of the National Sports Training Centre. The director of the NSTC (Interviewee C) commented that

There are some benefits of the administrative corporatization of the NSTC. … The most important one is that, for example, although we [the NSTC] have to raise part of the budget ourselves, we will have more discretion to use the budget and arrange personnel. Then, we can employ better coaches and sport scientists to assist elite athletes in the NSTC.
However, the NSTC was not a corporatized administration or an official executive agency in law because the regulation was not passed by the Legislative Yuan.

Third, elite athletes, in particular those who were national players and trained at the NSTC, received more attention from the government in relation to their studies and employment. As mentioned earlier, many elite athletes were students. Therefore, in order to establish a more complete system for national players’ studies, the SAC carried out *The Essentials for the National Sports Training Centre to Assist National Players’ Study during the Squad Training*. The Essentials were ratified and renamed as *The Sports Affairs Council Essentials for Implementing Outstanding Athletes’ Study Assistance during the Squad Training*. Moreover, the government institutionalised the employment of sports coaches in schools by gradually amending relevant regulations from 2003 to 2007. The institutionalisation of the employment of sports coaches in schools was important for elite athletes who had retired or who were looking for coaching jobs in schools during non-training periods. Furthermore, in 2001 and 2002, the SAC introduced *The Regulations Governing Supplementary Service for Military Personnel on National Sports Delegations* and *The Administrative Guidelines for Alternative Servicemen through Sports Training*, which aimed at solving the problem of elite athletes’ military service after *The Military Downsizing Case*.

Fourth, although the coach reward system was terminated in 2002 because of the exclusion of coaches from *The Essentials of the Ministry of Education Chung-Cheng Sports Decoration and Reward*, the SAC restored it in 2006 by making *The Sports Affairs Council Reward Regulation for Outstanding Coaches*, in order to increase the coaches’ motivation to put more effort into training elite athletes before the 2006 Asian Games. This regulation was amended in 2008 to become *The Reward Regulation for Outstanding Coaches*, which limited reward targets and largely reduced prizes. In 2010, the SAC imposed further restrictions with a regulation, which stated that if coaches were rewarded they must have ROC nationality. In other words, this excluded foreign coaches from the reward system.
In terms of Sports for All development, in 2000, the SAC introduced *The Health and Fitness Promotion Plan* to build on the completion of *The Sunshine Fitness Plan*. Moreover, there was *The Grassroots Plan* to construct a sport and recreational network by building general-access sport facilities/centres. In 2002, however, the former was aborted before it could be implemented and the latter was terminated because of a change of SAC minister (SAC, 2011b). Nevertheless, in the same year, the Executive Yuan announced *The Challenge 2008 Six-Year National Development Plan* and, in order to correspond with the plan, the SAC made *The Sports Population Doubling Plan* to replace *The Health and Fitness Promotion Plan*. This was a comprehensive six-year plan for mass sports development (2002-2007), which aimed to greatly increase the sporting population to reach the level of developed countries. In addition to the plan, recognising the geographic position of Taiwan (an island), the SAC also introduced *The Ocean Sports Development Plan* (2002-2007) to promote ocean sports, such as diving, surfing, sailing, ocean swimming and motor power yachting and increase the ocean sports population. Given these government initiatives, it cannot be denied that the DPP government valued mass sports development, in particular after 2002. Arguably, in addition to the fact that the SAC listed the development of Sports for All as one of its dual objectives, the implementation of the two-days-off per week policy after 2001 made a major contribution to attracting more government attention to mass sports development. As one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee V) mentioned,

People have more spare time since the two-days-off per week policy. Therefore, it is reasonable that they have more need for doing sports or recreation. This forces us [the SAC] to value mass sports development and make relevant policies to cater for such an increasing needs.

From an ACF perspective, the two-days-off per week policy can be considered as a policy decision and impact from other subsystem (an external system event), which produced short-term constraints for the elite sport coalition and resources for mass sport coalitions.
In addition to the sport policies mentioned above, the introduction of the sport lottery was another important initiative of the SAC during the DPP government era. In fact, as early as 1999, the SAC started to plan to introduce a sports lottery, which was evident in the fact that this was listed in the first *Sports White Paper* and treated as a major sports policy for the future. Following efforts over several years, the sport lottery was created in 2008 and 90% of its profits were used specifically for sports development. It is arguable that although there is a lack of hard evidence, the emergence of the sports lottery can be regarded as an elite sports policy because the profits from it have been used mainly for the cultivation of developing elite athletes and the improvement/construction of the NSTC and the National Shooting Centre (NSC).

6.7 2008- Present (The KMT era)

In 2008, the second party rotation occurred with the KMT’s victory. Again, the dual objectives remained the main sports policy direction. However, the development of Sports for All seems to have been valued more than ever before by the current KMT government. First, it was included in Ma Ying-Chiu’s (KMT candidate for President) election platform. Then, in order to realise this manifesto after the 2008 general election, in 2009 the SAC enacted and then started to implement in 2010 *The Improvement of National Sports Environment and Sports Island Establishment Plan* by referring to other countries’ mass sport policies. These included Australia, China, Germany, Korea, Japan and the United States of America. The total budget allocation to this for four years (2010-2013) was 13,206 million NTD (11,660 million NTD for *The Improvement of National Sports Environment* and 1,600 million NTD for *The Establishment of Sports Island*). Within this plan, there were also many sub-projects. This plan was the largest-scale mass sports policy between 2010 and 2013 and it received a larger budget allocation than ever before, in an attempt to achieve the expectation that everyone should want to do sports and could do so at all times and everywhere. Nevertheless, the real public fund for the Sports Island Establishment
part of the plan was insufficient. It gradually decreased from 2010 to 2012 and the duration for implementing the project was extended to six years (2010-2016). In addition to the overall plan, there was The Let’s Swim Plan (three phases) between 2010 and 2022, which not only aimed to improve the quality and quantity of swimming pools, but also to popularise swimming, in order to enhance the nation’s swimming abilities and prevent citizens, in particular school children, from drowning.

With regard to elite sports development, in 2009, the SAC started to implement The Mid and Long-term Plan of Sports Talents Development to institutionalise and legalise the system of cultivating developing and elite athletes. This was an eight-year plan (2009-2016) that was separated into two phases (2009-2012 and 2013-2016). The goals of the first phase were to win at least fifteen and four medals at the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games and the 2012 London Olympic Games, respectively. The budget allocated to it was 1,900 million NTD. Arguably, the plan was fairly comprehensive and robust for elite sports development because there were eight sub-plans that consisted of seventeen working foci. According to the SAC (2011b), the plan was introduced in 2008 after the poor performance of the Chinese Taipei national team at the 2008 Olympic Games (four bronze medals), which can be described as an internal event/shock with reference to the ACF. One sports policy academic (Interviewee U) made the following comment:

Poor or outstanding international sporting performances could be considered as focus events that provided the media with opportunities to sensationalise. The sensationalised events generated positive and critical pressures for the government who was expected to have responses to these. When the focus events were powerful enough to draw the legislators’ attention and allow them to interrogate the administration during a parliament session, it would have impact on the government.

Later in 2009, The Mid and Long-term Plan of Sports Talents Development was merged with The National Sports Park Establishment Plan to become The National
Sports Park Establishment and Sports Talent Development Plan. The duration of the plan was eight years and it was divided into two phases that were the same as in the original plan. In terms of the establishment of national parks, the SAC planned to improve the NSTC and the NSC in the first phase of the plan. Arguably, these two constructions and the improvement of sport facilities were beneficial specifically for elite sports development. It should be mentioned that The National Sports Park Establishment Plan began to be developed in early 2008, i.e. during the DPP government era.

In addition, between 2010 and 2013, there was The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan, which aimed to ‘rescue’ baseball in Taiwan after its continual poor performances on the international stage, in particular its defeat by the PRC in both 2008 and 2009, and the match fixing problems in professional baseball in 2008. In total, the central government committed to investing 2,025 million in the plan (1 billion NTD for the DPE and 1,025 million NTD for the SAC), (SAC, 2011a). It should be noted that, although The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan was specifically for baseball development, it was also a major elite sports policy on the part of the SAC.

Furthermore, in 2011, the SAC announced The Regulations for Sport Industry Development. Although there was no clear statement saying that the regulation had been made specifically either for elite sports development or mass sports development, most of its sub-regulations are beneficial to the former. For example, the sport industries can obtain public supplements if they provide job opportunities for elite athletes or cultivate outstanding athletes.

In 2010, an important sports policy was developed by the central government, which was specific to neither elite sports development nor mass sport. It stated that from 2013 the SAC was to be merged with the DPE as the Sports Administration (SA) in the ME because the government had decided to reform the organisations of the Executive Yuan. Although the level of the SAC would be downgraded (the SAC used to be on the same level as the ME), there would still be specific departments for elite
and mass sports development in the SA. Therefore, as one sport academic (Interviewee Y) mentioned, ‘The degradation of the SAC will not cause significant differences between now and the future in terms of implementing general sport affairs and even elite and mass sport affairs’. However, whether such a combination will be positive or negative in relation to elite sports development is uncertain. On the one hand, as one senior NGB member of staff (Interviewee T) anticipated,

Most elite athletes are in the universities, and therefore, the merger will be better for elite sports development. … It allows student athletes to have more resources and convenience. … Also, one specific sport agency may be positive to the chain of command for sports development.

On the other hand, as a senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) noted,

Due to the fact that the SAC will be degraded after the merger, when a sports policy is made, it will have to be agreed by one more government organisational level – the ME. If the minister of the ME does not value or is not knowledgeable about sports development, there will be some difficulties in producing and implementing sport policies. In addition, such a merger will cause a decrease in the budget for sports development. In fact, the budget allocation to the SA next year (2013) had been decided and it was reduced.

6.8 Conclusion

From the beginning of the ROC government’s relocation to Taiwan in 1949, it imposed an authoritarian regime, leading to the fact that there was substantial
government control in every policy area, including sports policy. Between 1949 and 1955, the development of physical education for national defence and the improvement in the military fitness of the population were the main concerns of sports policymakers because military conflicts between the PRC and ROC remained. However, the specific governmental sport agency was temporarily terminated (1949-1953) and it remained functionless even after it was restored in 1954. Conversely, the organisational system of the military in relation to sports development was relatively robust and possessed many resources. As a consequence, the development of sport depended heavily on the military during that period.

The defining moment in combining the military’s resources with an important voluntary sport organisation – the ROCSF/CTOC – and an increasing level of government intervention in sports development came in 1956 when the government assigned General Chou Chih-Jou to be its president. Between 1956 and 1972, it can be argued that elite sports development received more emphasis than mass sport. This is evident in the fact that not only was a much larger budget allocated to the development of elite sports, but also that most sport policies were elite-oriented. Nevertheless, the introduction of The Implementation Plan for the Development of Physical Education for All and the Cultivation of Outstanding Athletes in 1968 witnessed the emergence of dual objectives (mass sport and elite sports development). During this period, from an ACF perspective, there were three internal shocks which not only affected the belief systems of sports policy actors, but also acted as important catalysts for increasing government involvement in sports development with an emphasis on the elite level. These were: (i) the extension of conflict from the 1950s between the PRC and the ROC over their right to legitimacy within the sports arena; (ii) the ROC national team’s poor performance at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics; and (iii) a series of outstanding performances by Taiwanese youth baseball teams on the international stage from 1968. In addition, the exclusion of the ROC from the UN in 1971, which was can be described as an external shock, further confirmed the core policy belief system in an elite sport coalition because sport was now one of the few available vehicles for the ROC to maintain its international interactions.
In 1973, the establishment of the DPE within the ME implied that the government was now even more directly involved in sports development. In 1976, the DPE enacted a specific, complete and extensive plan for mass sports development – *The Sports for All Promotion Programme* – which enshrined the government’s increased attention on the development of Sports for All. However, due to the fact that a greater amount of the budget was still allocated to elite sports development and the other major sport policies were elite-related, it is unreasonable to think that the government changed its priority from elite sports development to mass sports development from 1973 to 1986. According to the logic of the ACF, the continued governmental emphasis on the elite level was caused mainly by an external shock – the worsening diplomatic situation after the exclusion of the ROC from the UN in 1971 – and a series of internal shocks – particularly a number of disputes concerning the ROC’s name and status in the Olympics. However, the decrease in the number of military conflicts between the PRC and the ROC from the 1970s onwards and the introduction of *The Major Infrastructure Plan* in the mid-1980s (both external events), which led respectively to less public funding for the military and better economic conditions in general, seemed to be less significant catalysts for the continued government focus on elite sports development. Nevertheless, these factors did allow the elite sport coalition to convince the government to dedicate more funds to elite sports development although it should be noted that these two external events could also have been used by the mass participation sport coalition to deliver their belief system to the government.

In 1987, the annulment of martial law subsequently led to a more liberal society and an open political environment. In addition, economic conditions rapidly improved between 1987 and 1999. All of this resulted in the fact that people had greater possibilities to pursue more sporting opportunities. Although more actual funds were allocated to elite sports development and most major sport policies were still at the elite level, it could be argued that in the 1990s, the government’s attention to mass and elite sports development was more balanced than ever before. This was because (i) the budget for mass sports development was increased; (ii) sports development in *The Six-year National Development Plan* (1991-1996) was more relevant to mass sports development; (iii) mass sports development was listed in the SAC’s dual main
objectives after it was established in 1997; and (iv) a specific policy for mass sports development – *The Sunshine Fitness Plan* – was announced in 1997. In respect of the ACF and in the case of Taiwan, socio-economic change further provided the mass sport coalition with resources to transfer its belief system to the government.

In 2000, Taiwan experienced the first party rotation in its history. Although the party rotation is identified as a change in the systemic governing coalition (an external event) that produces resources or constraints for actors and is a necessary condition for major policy change, dual objectives remained the main sports policy direction. Nevertheless, the DPP government seemed to be more active in bidding for international sporting events to increase Taiwan’s international profile and the Taiwanese national identity. In addition, the main elite sport policies of the DPP government centred on the cultivation of developing athletes and training elite athletes, the improvement of sport facilities, taking more care of elite athletes’ employment and studies if they were students and training at the NSTC, and making the coach reward system more complete. In 2004, Taiwan won its first two Olympic gold medals at the Athens Olympics. According to the logic of the ACF, this can be considered as an internal event that benefited the elite sport coalition. In terms of mass sports development, the SAC announced two major policies – *The Sports Population Doubling Plan* (2002-2007) and *The Ocean Sports Development Plan* (2002-2007). These two plans highlighted the fact that the DPP government valued the development of Sports for All. Arguably, the two-days-off per week policy enacted in 2001 also made a major contribution to attracting more government attention to mass sports development and acted as an external system event (policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems) with reference to the ACF. Furthermore, in 2008, there was another important policy of the SAC – the introduction of the sport lottery. However, this policy should really be treated as an elite sports policy because the profits of the lottery have been mainly invested in elite sports development.

After 2008, the dual objectives were still emphasized even with the second party rotation resulting in the KMT’s victory. That said, mass sports development seems to
receive more interest from the KMT government. Nevertheless, two internal events – the poor performances of both the national team in the Beijing Olympics and the national baseball teams in 2008 and 2009 led to the introduction of *The National Sports Park Establishment* and *The Mid and Long-term Plan of Sports Talents Development* as well as *The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan*, which were the most important major elite sport policies after 2008. In addition, there was *The Regulation for Sport Industry Development*, which has been beneficial to elite sports development since 2011.

From 2013, the SAC will be merged with the DPE as the SA within the ME. This change is not specific to mass or elite sports development. In general, there will be no significant differences in the implementation of general sport, mass sport and elite sport affairs and the development of mass and elite sports. However, whether such a merger will be positive or negative for elite sports development remains uncertain.

After an overview of sports policy development in Taiwan, we can now proceed to three case studies – the systems of elite sports development in baseball, taekwondo and tennis – in order to provide an even deeper understanding of elite sports development in Taiwan.
Chapter 7 Case Study 1: Baseball

7.1 The Chinese Taipei Baseball Association

In 1949, the Taiwan Provincial Baseball Committee (TPBC) was formed and subordinated to the Taiwan Sports Federation (TSF). In 1967, due to the fact that Taipei City was upgraded to the status of a direct-controlled municipality, the central government decided to differentiate between the affairs of the provincial and central governments. In the process of differentiation, therefore, the TPBC became an affiliated organisation of the Chinese National Amateur Athletic Federation (renamed the Republic of China Amateur Athletic Federation in 1973 and the Republic of China Sports Federation in 1989). Meanwhile, the TPBC was renamed the Chinese National Baseball Committee (CNBC). In 1973, the name of the CNBC was changed again to the Chinese Taipei Baseball Association (CTBA). According to the CTBA (2014), its main aims are to develop baseball, hold domestic and international baseball competitions, improve the health of the population, and promote sportsmanship. The organisational structure of the CTBA is presented in Figure 7.1.

As mentioned previously, baseball was introduced to Taiwan during the Japanese occupation and many Taiwanese, in particular internal province people, have a historic enthusiasm for baseball. The importance of baseball to the Taiwanese was further confirmed around 2000 when President Chen declared it the national sport. Moreover, there have been many outstanding performances by Taiwanese baseball teams on the international stage since the late 1960s. This is evident in the fact that the men’s and women’s baseball world rankings for Taiwan in recent years have been 4th and 6th respectively. Arguably, therefore, the CTBA in Taiwan is not only one of the country’s most important NGBs, but also one of the most remarkable in relation to elite success. In addition, it can be argued that the CTBA is relatively more internationalised than most other NGBs. As the president of the CTBA (Interviewee J) observed,
Figure 7.1 The organisational structure of the CTBA

Source: Adapted from Sports Affairs Council (2011c: p74)
We [the CTBA] have held the most international baseball competitions in the world... [and] have very good relationships with the International Baseball Federation [IBAF] and its president. .... Furthermore, Peng Cheng-Hao [the president of the CTBA between 1998 and 2006 and the deputy president of the CTBA from 2011] used to be the acting president of the IBAF and is now the 2nd vice president of the IBAF. He [Peng] is going to run for president of the Baseball Federation of Asia [BAF] and has a great chance of getting the position^1.

It should be noted, however, that although the CTBA is the prime baseball NGB, its responsibilities are mainly for amateur baseball development, holding domestic and international baseball events, and organising the affairs of national baseball teams at every level, including selection, training and helping them to participate in international baseball competitions. The responsibility for school (primary, junior high and senior high), university and professional baseball development belong respectively to the Chinese Taipei Student Baseball Federation (CTSBF), the Baseball Committee of the Chinese Taipei University Sports Federation (CTUSF) and the Chinese Professional Baseball League (CPBL). Despite the fact that there seems to be a division of labour, however, the CTBA’s and these three other organisations’ affairs do sometimes overlap and no specific regulation exists to clearly differentiate their responsibilities. This has resulted in some conflicts between the CTBA and the others, in particular the CPBL. For example, the CTBA faces some difficulties in recruiting players from the CPBL when organising national teams if professional baseball teams refuse to allow this. In addition, the issue of which organisation (the CTBA or the CPBL) should be mainly responsible for national baseball teams emerges if some national baseball players are recruited from professional baseball teams. This issue can occur frequently and/or become more serious when more professional players are included in national teams and/or when international baseball events are professional in nature, such as the Asia Series.

^1 Peng was elected as the president of the BAF in 2013.
In terms of the relationship between the CTBA and the SAC, this seems to be top-down because the latter is the former’s central competent authority that has the responsibility and the power to supervise. Moreover, the SAC is also the main funding provider – around 50% of the CTBA’s budget comes from the SAC. However, the CTBA has been included in the SAC’s meetings to provide suggestions about baseball development and policies. Moreover, the president of the CTBA (Interviewee J) suggested that

Whilst the SAC care about our results/international baseball achievements, they do not get involved in our internal administration and affairs and we have discretion. Meanwhile, they do not use their power of budget allocation to control us because we are fairly internationalised. We [the SAC and the CTBA] are more like a partnership. It [the SAC] provides funding for us and we [the CTBA] help them to promote baseball. As our funding provider, they of course have a responsibility to supervise us when we are implementing their policies. … Perhaps supervision is an inappropriate term. It should be communication or advice. In addition, we have been included in the SAC’s meetings to discuss and provide suggestions about baseball development and policies.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the CTBA always holds the same views as the SAC on baseball policies. For example, the CTBA’s president (Interviewee J) added that,

The last time we had different opinions from the SAC was in relation to the baseball team in the NSTC. President Ma wanted to help professional baseball teams to establish farms. Therefore, the SAC introduced a policy to send baseball players who were serving substitute military service and training in the NSTC to the farms and to subsidise the teams. We did not agree with this policy. It was fine if they [the professional baseball teams] trained these players well. However, the problem was that they [the
professional baseball teams] did not, and they just treated them as bench warmers. This was because these baseball players had to join the CPBL draft and could not be directly recruited by their original teams when finishing their substitute military service. Although the policy was eventually terminated, it had been in place for four years.

In relation to the ACF, the CTBA can be identified as a policy actor as it attempts to influence baseball policies at SAC meetings. Other policy actors, such as academics, representatives of the DPE, the CTSBF, the CPBL, the CPBL trade union and the CPBL fans’ union were also usually invited to the meetings. Among these policy actors, however, the CTBA is the most influential because, as the CTBA president (interviewee J) emphasized, ‘The SAC valued our opinions the most in the meetings’. In addition to this approach to influence baseball policies, the CTBA president (Interviewee J) confessed that ‘We sent our secretary general to communicate and/or negotiate with the director of competitive sports department, in particular on issues or policies relevant to funding’.

In addition to the SAC, it is worth outlining the relationships between the CTBA and another three organisations – the DPE, the CTOC and the ROCSF. First, there are only a few interactions between the CTBA and the DPE. This is because the DPE is responsible for school sports development and chiefly authorises the CTSBF to develop baseball in schools. In any case, the CTBA president explained that ‘We hardly have additional time to involve in baseball development in schools and the CTSBF’s affairs’. Second, the CTBA is a member of the ROCSF, which is an umbrella organisation for most sports associations. However, its relationship with these associations is nominal and there have been few interactions since the ROCSF’s function was downsized in 2000. Third, although baseball has been excluded from the Olympics since 2005, the CTBA remains the CTOC’s approved sports association. Furthermore, the CTBA rarely interacts or conflicts with the CTOC. As the CTBA president (Interviewee J) noted,
The CTOC is functionless for us [CTBA] because they are not influential and we [the CTBA] are mightier than the CTOC on the international stage. Therefore, we [the CTBA and the CTOC] do not have conflicts.

It is also interesting to note that, among the NGBs, the CTBA receives the largest amount of funding from the SAC, which has led to some NGBs making veiled criticisms of it. As one senior NGB member of staff (Interviewee T) commented,

Their [the CTBA’s] ‘basic expenses’ are very big because baseball is a team sport – a baseball team’s overseas training costs are more than that of a non-team sport. Baseball equipment is expensive and in addition baseball is the national sport. Therefore, it is reasonable to give the CTBA more public funding than other NGBs, including us. However, if the money invested in baseball to win one medal was given to other sports, two or more medals might be produced. What confuses us is who decides this return on investment and by what standard.

7.2 The Development of Elite Level Facilities

In Taiwan, there is no baseball stadium at national level because, as one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) noted, ‘We [the SAC] do not possess much land to build national level facilities’. However, every local government owns at least one city/county baseball stadium. Therefore, the number of baseball stadia seems to be sufficient, particularly as Taiwan is a relatively small country (land size: around 36000 kilometres square; population: around 23 million). As the president of the CTBA (Interviewee J) suggested, ‘We [Taiwan] are a small country and the density of baseball stadia is perhaps the highest in the world’.
In general, local government provides land and requests central government to share a certain ratio of funding to construct the stadia. Although these stadia are at the local level, it can be argued that some of them are high quality (see Table 7.1). This is evident in the fact that Taiwan has held many international baseball events at these baseball stadia. However, one senior sports journalist (Interviewee D) noted that,

The fact that Taiwan could host so many international baseball events is mainly because we [the CTBA] are powerful in the IBAF and have good relations with it, rather than the quality of our baseball stadia. …Despite the fact that our [Taiwan’s] baseball stadia are of good enough quality to host international baseball events, they are not good enough compared with Japan’s, Korea’s or the USA’s.

In addition, it should be borne in mind that baseball is the national sport in Taiwan. Therefore, better stadium quality should be expected. Nevertheless, most of these high quality baseball stadia are home to and managed by professional baseball teams, and according to *The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan* introduced in 2010 by the SAC, the government is improving the quality of these professional team-resided stadia. It should be noted that unlike those in Major League Baseball, Taiwan’s professional baseball teams do not own these stadia. They are permitted by local governments to use them as their home game stadia. Moreover, the high quality stadia also act as training sites for national and elite baseball players. One sports policy academic (Interviewee U) suggested that

The professional baseball teams’ stadia that are better can be temporarily borrowed to train national baseball players through negotiating with the teams. I do not think there would be any possibility of there being no places for national players to train.
### Table 7.1 The list of High Quality Baseball Facilities in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Capability (seats)</th>
<th>Specification (feet)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taipei Tianmu Baseball Stadium</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>L: 325; C: 400; R: 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei Arena</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>L: 310; C: 360; R: 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinzhuang Baseball Stadium (New Taipei City)</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>L: 325; C: 400; R: 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taoyuan International Baseball Stadium</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>L: 330; C: 400; R: 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung Baseball Field</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>L: 325; C: 400; R: 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung Intercontinental Baseball Stadium</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>L: 325; C: 400; R: 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douliu Baseball Stadium (Yunlin County)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>L: 330; C: 400; R: 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainan Municipal Baseball Stadium</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>L: 339; C: 400; R: 339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengcing Lake Baseball Stadium (Kaohsiung County)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>L: 328; C: 400; R: 328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the Sports Affairs Council (2011c: p77-79); L: left field, C: central field, R: right field

Although there is a baseball training field in the NSTC, national baseball teams rarely train there before international baseball competitions. There are two main reasons for this. First, the nature of baseball squad training is different from that of other sports. For example, the deputy director of the SAC’s sports facility department (Interviewee O) explained that
We [Taiwan] have many CPBL and overseas players in national baseball teams, which results in the fact that baseball squad training is short-term. In general, they are trained at city/county baseball stadia for a couple of days. They are then trained through having some matches with our professional baseball teams in these stadia. After that, they perhaps have some overseas training and friendly matches with other participating teams. Therefore, they are unlikely to be trained at the NSTC.

Second, the quality of the NSTC’s baseball field is relatively poor. As one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) commented,

There are a lot of city/county baseball stadia in Taiwan. When compared with the city/county baseball stadia, such as these that are home to professional baseball teams, the NSTC’s baseball field is not good.

However, elite baseball players who are serving substitute military service are trained at the NSTC’s baseball field. Moreover, the NSTC is reconstructing its sports facilities, including the baseball field. In the near future, therefore, the NSTC’s baseball field will be able to provide the national teams with another option to train.

It is also worth mentioning the baseball facilities for developing players, in particular student players, even though the main focus of this section is on the elite level facilities. In Taiwan, schools are the main baseball facility provider for developing players due to the fact that there is a lack of private after school baseball clubs. However, the insufficient quantity and quality of baseball fields in schools was indicated in *The Enhancing Excellent Baseball Environment Plan*, which is a sub-plan of *The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan* made by the DPE. Therefore, the DPE included improving the quantity and quality of school baseball fields at different educational
phases (from primary school through to university) into the plan, aiming to build twenty new basic baseball fields in schools and to improve eighty school baseball fields between 2010 and 2013. Nevertheless, only three kinds of schools can apply for the DPE’s subsidies to build or improve their baseball facilities: (i) schools that have had established baseball teams for at least five years; (ii) schools that participate in DPE-organised student baseball league championships and have advanced to the quarter-finals in the previous three years; and (iii) schools that were selected by the Chinese Taipei Student Baseball Federation (CTSBF) and the Chinese Taipei Baseball Association (CTBA) to participate in international baseball events.

According to *The Enhancing Excellent Baseball Environment Plan*, the government cannot subsidise every school to build or improve baseball fields because the government budget is limited and a baseball field requires a large area, which is not easy to secure for some schools. In sum, however, although the government sets conditions on applying the public funding, it remains apparent that it values the development of baseball facilities for developing players.

### 7.3 The Identification of Sporting Talent and the Development System

At different educational phases (from primary schools to universities), there are some schools that traditionally develop baseball effectively in Taiwan. One senior national baseball coach (Interviewee B) mentioned that ‘A very high percentage… maybe over 90 percent… of elite baseball players come from these schools’. Arguably, therefore, schools are the most important cradle for identifying baseball talent. However, the former Eastern European bloc countries’ approach to recruiting potential sport talent outside the participation base is not used for the identification of elite baseball players in Taiwan. One senior sports scientist (Interviewee F) explained that
Neither the social value nor the parents in Taiwan are happy to accept the concept of sports talent identification through scientific tests outside of current participants…including baseball…. This has caused many difficulties for the development of talent identification.

According to the perspective of the ACF, the fundamental socio-cultural value of opposition to talent identification beyond the current participants can be treated as a ‘relatively stable parameter’ that increases the degree of consensus needed for major changes and results in constraints/resources for subsystem actors.

Indeed, as one legislator (Interviewee Z), who has dedicated himself to sports policy development, observed,

Talent identification outside the participation base of sport involves many issues, such as laws and regulations. This has led to the fact that talent identification policy is fragmented and not easy to introduce and implement.

A lack of baseball talent recruitment from outside the existing participants does not mean that there is no development of baseball identification from within. In fact, young baseball players are identified through their competition and training performances. Moreover, in The Enhancing Excellent Baseball Environment Plan, the government sought to establish a database of baseball players at different educational levels, which reflects the government’s attempt to systematise baseball talent identification. Although identifying baseball talent based on players’ performances and the establishment of the database is different from using scientific tests to filter talented players, they are perhaps more suitable for baseball talent identification. As one senior national baseball coach (Interviewee B) suggested,
Because baseball is a ball game, players’ abilities, such as ball sense and skills, are not easy to directly reflect on or be explained by physical tests…or scientific tests. …Recently, therefore, the identification of talented players has tended to utilise information technology…statistics relating to on-field performances.

Nevertheless, it is also worth mentioning that there is a major sports policy – *The Mid and Long-term Plan of Sports Talents Development* – which includes the establishment of talent identification as its main task. In order to achieve this, the government plans to create standard scientific criteria for every sport, including baseball, for coaches, schools and grass-roots training bases to use as a reference for identifying talented athletes.

In terms of the development system for baseball players, as for other sports, there are four levels – primary and junior schools (fourth level), senior high schools (third level), university and college class A teams/military service training teams/national training teams/amateur teams or social class A teams (second level), and national teams (first level). At the fourth and third levels, most of the schools that develop baseball effectively have sport classes for players to continue not only with their training, but also with their studies. Arguably, schools play an important role in the cultivation of baseball players. Their importance is further confirmed because the baseball club system outside of the schools is weak. As the director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) commented,

Unlike western systems that value private sport clubs outside schools, we [Taiwan] develop young athletes mainly through the school system. For example, there are no sport classes in most western countries, but we [Taiwan] have our [Taiwan’s] school system to cultivate them [young athletes] and it is fairly robust…no matter whether it is baseball or….
Moreover, the baseball associations at city and county level and the CTBA at national level seem to be less significant in the development of young players. Arguably, assisting in holding inter-schools baseball events at the local and national level is perhaps the most relevant effort of local associations and the CTBA in developing young athletes. As the president of the CTBA (Interviewee J) noted, ‘The local level associations and we [the CTBA] rarely involve ourselves in that [the cultivation of young players]…[and] the government and schools take the main responsibility for it’.

Due to the importance of schools in the system of developing young baseball players, some specific measures has been adopted in *The Enhancing Excellent Baseball Environment Plan* to strengthen and improve the function of schools in the development of student players. First, there is an ongoing attempt to establish regional systems for cultivating student baseball players. In order to achieve this, the government plans to subsidise schools at different educational stages, such as junior high and senior high schools, to build cooperative partnerships in training, to reward universities and senior high schools that provide admission for local senior high and junior high schools student players respectively, to organise joint baseball training camps for schools, to fund scientific research to assist student players and coaches, and to establish regulations in relation to regional training systems for student players and cooperative partnerships between schools. Second, the DPE subsidises the local governments in Hualien and Taitung to create baseball priority areas. This is because the DPE is aware that in Hualien and Taitung counties, the increasing outflow of outstanding student players, in particular at senior high school stage, and coaches, to other major cities/counties and the lack of funding for cultivating student players have caused some difficulties for retaining talented players, for the development of players and/or for preventing a gap in baseball talent. Third, the DPE is also concerned not only with student players’ studies, but also with their moral education by introducing *The Training Guidelines for Sports Classes and Sports Teams at Senior High Level and Below*. One could argue that these concerns are necessarily relevant to a training system for developing student baseball players. However, they are important for the cultivation of players especially when one recognises that some school baseball teams and sports classes spend too much time on training and ignore their studies, and that there have been a series of fixed matches in professional baseball, which have given
the young generation of players negative role models. As the director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) mentioned,

Training time and studying time is unbalanced…training is too much in some cases…they [student players] are students essentially…this situation should not happen…we have to normalise their training and studying time. …There were some bad examples – fixed matches – for young generation players…we [the government] have the responsibility to teach players the right things when they are student players. Normal education is very important for cultivating a student player…perhaps it is as important as…or more important than training.

For second level players who are in compulsory military service, there is the army baseball team. In general, they serve alternative military service and are assigned to the NSTC to receive baseball training.

7.4 The Provision of Domestic and International Competition Opportunities for Elite Athletes

As mentioned above, Taiwan has a professional baseball league – the Chinese Professional Baseball League (CPBL) – in which most domestic elite players play. Arguably, therefore, the provision of domestic competition opportunities for elite baseball players is not an issue because the CPBL regularly provides competition opportunities during the baseball season. However, this does not mean that the government does not make any effort to provide competition opportunities for professional elite players. Because the limited spectator market causes some difficulties for professional teams with regard to maintaining reasonable profits, the government helps the professional baseball league by funding the teams. As such,
government subsidies to the professional baseball league could be treated as a different form of providing competition opportunities for professional elite players. As one senior sports journalist (Interviewee D) noted, ‘I do not really agree that the government helps professional baseball stay alive…because it is a professional sport… but we cannot deny that the government’s help does assist them [professional players] to continue to have competition opportunities’. Outside the CPBL competition system, there are the National Games that are held every two years. However, these Games are available not only for professional players, but also for the players at the second level (university and college class A teams/military service training teams/national training teams/amateur teams or social class A teams).

The government has also played an active role in the provision of international baseball events for elite players. At the elite level, for example, Taiwan held the 2001 and 2007 Baseball World Cup, the 2006 and 2010 Intercontinental Cup, the 2011 and 2013 Asia Series and the Asian Baseball Championship (1962, 1969, 1997, 2001, 2007 and 2012). In addition, the Premier 12 Elite Baseball World Championship will be staged for the first time in Taiwan in 2015. Therefore, it can easily be seen that baseball is one of the sports that is valued most by the government in terms of providing international competition opportunities for athletes. However, The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan indicated the problem that no clear rating system of importance for international baseball events had been created, resulting in the fact that some elite players were overworked in competitions and were injured. Therefore, the SAC has established a three class rating system of importance for international baseball events in the plan according to the attributes of the events. It is as follows: (i) first class: the Olympics, Asian Games and World Baseball Classic; (ii) second class: the Baseball World Cup, the Intercontinental Cup and the Asian Baseball Championship (if these events are held in Taiwan, they are upgraded to first class events); and (iii) third class: invitational tournaments that are not organised by the International Baseball Federation or the Baseball Federation of Asia, but are formally organised by other baseball federations. According to the plan, the national teams for first class events should rely mainly on professional players and be supplemented by amateur players; for second class events they should rely mainly on amateur players and be
supplemented by professional players; and for third class events, they should consist mainly of up-and-coming players.

However, the government’s active towards the provision of international events for players is not simply attributed to the aim to develop baseball. The diplomatic, political and economic benefits, including the enhancement of Taiwan’s international profile, the promotion of national pride and the creation of profits and increased numbers of professional baseball spectators after international events, are other important factors. This is evident from the fact that the benefits of hosting international baseball events are frequently mentioned in government documents and publications. Nevertheless, one sports policy academic (Interviewee Y) argued that

I support hosting international baseball events in Taiwan because this benefits players and baseball development, but there are too many. In the case of Taiwan, making profits from this [hosting international events] is difficult and the increase in professional baseball spectators is short-term. If the same amount of money spent on hosting these events were invested in other areas, such as the cultivation of developing players, it would be better for overall baseball development. However, it is quite impossible [to host fewer international baseball events and invest this money in other areas]. Politics and diplomacy are always their [the government’s] main concern.

From the perspective of the ACF, the basic attribute of the problem area (relatively stable parameters) in the case of Taiwan is that hosting international baseball events can generate the benefits mentioned above, and the fundamental social-cultural values support baseball development because baseball is identified as the national sport. Therefore, the degree of consensus needed for major policy change in relation to hosting fewer international baseball events is high. Moreover, political and diplomatic considerations with regard to hosting international baseball events can be treated as policy decisions and impacts from other subsystem (external system event). These
provide short-term resources for policy actors who support holding international baseball events in Taiwan. It is also interesting to recognise that other external events – changes in socio-economic conditions and changes in systemic governing coalitions – seem to result in fewer resources/constraints for the actors. As one senior sports journalist (Interviewee E) observed,

The government is/was still actively bidding for or hosting international baseball events even when our economic situation is/was not good. …Party rotations do/did not influence the government’s active attitude [towards bidding or hosting international baseball events] either. …The governments [the DPP and KMT] all need to utilise this [hosting international baseball events] to improve the diplomatic situation, to promote nationalism and to increase prestige.

Although this discussion intends to concentrate on the elite level, it is worth outlining the provision of competition opportunities for developing young players in order to have a more complete understanding. As mentioned in the previous section, there is a four-level development system for baseball players. First level players are classified as elite players. For the fourth level (primary and junior high schools) and the third level (senior high school) players, the National Elementary School Baseball Tournament, the Junior High School Tournament and the High School Baseball Taiwan are respectively the three main domestic baseball events and these are held every years. These three tournaments have a four-layer competition system: local league (township and city), city and county league, regional league and national league. Moreover, there are some important 12U, 15U and 18U national baseball championships (see table 7.2), and each of them exists for the purpose of qualifying to participating in different international 12U, 15U and 18U baseball events. In addition to these, some city/county governments and baseball associations host baseball events on a local basis and/or nationwide invitational baseball tournaments at both levels, particularly at the fourth. Furthermore, in 2013 a new major baseball event was introduced for third level players – the Black Panther Flag National Senior High School Baseball Tournament – which is claimed to be ‘Taiwan’s National High
School Baseball Championships of Japan (Summer Koshien). Thus, the provision of competition opportunities for developing players at the fourth and third levels is clearly sufficient.

Table 7.2 Examples of Important National 12U, 15U and 18U Baseball Championships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of development system</th>
<th>Educational phases</th>
<th>Name of national championships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forth level</td>
<td>Elementary school (12U)</td>
<td>The TOTO Cup 12U National Baseball Championships; The Herbalife Cup 12U National Championships; The Hsieh Kuo-Cheng Cup 12U National Championships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior high school (15U)</td>
<td>The Brett Cup 15U National Championships, The Hua Nan Financial Holding Cup National Championships and The Hsieh Kuo-Cheng Cup 15U National Championships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third level</td>
<td>Senior high school (18U)</td>
<td>The E.Sun Cup 18U National Tournament; The Wang Chen-Chih Cup 18U National Championships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resources: Adjusted from the CTBA – Domestic 12U, 15U and 18U championships


There are three important points here. First, the National Elementary School Baseball Tournament, the Junior High School Tournament and the High School Baseball Taiwan are held by the Chinese Taipei Student Baseball Federation (CTSBF) whose
main financial supporter is the DPE. The important 12U, 15U and 18U national baseball championships are organised by the CTBA, more than half of whose annual budget comes from the SAC. Arguably, the government plays a significant role in the provision of competition opportunities for developing players at the fourth and third levels. Second, the problem of having too many competition opportunities for developing players at the fourth and third levels has been pointed out in some sports policy reports. Indeed, the director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) also suggested that

There are too many baseball events [for players at the fourth and third levels]. In addition to student tournaments [the National Elementary School Baseball Tournament, the Junior High School Tournament and the High School Baseball Taiwan], there are baseball events at the local level. We [the DPE] have noticed that many student players [at the fourth and third levels] spend over half a year participating in competitions. This situation heavily influences their study. Therefore, we [the DPE] made a regulation that limits them to being out of school to participate in competitions for no more than thirty days per year.

Third, the national league for elementary schools has been suspended for two years since 2014, in the hope that 12U baseball development will not be overly competitively-orientated. The director of the DPE (Interviewee Q) explained that

Achievements in baseball events are important to coaches and valued by them because we [the government] have an assessment mechanism for them [coaches]. Therefore, they train players hard…sometimes over training. This can result in the fact that players have sports injuries and/or no longer want to be involved in baseball, in particular when they enter university, and then the brain drain occurs.
The provision of domestic competition opportunities for players at the second level (university and college class A teams/military service training teams/national training teams/amateur teams or social class A teams) is more complex than those for players at the fourth and third levels because it involves university and amateur players. In other words, there are two different competition systems at this level. For the university and college class A teams, both the university and the amateur competition systems are available. The University Baseball League, which is organised by the Chinese Taipei University Sports Federation (CTUSF), is one of the two main domestic competitions for universities and colleges every year. The league is divided into three levels – first open class, second open class, and general class. The other main event is the Plum Blossom Flag University Baseball Championships, which is held annually by the CTBA. The other competition system – the amateur or adult baseball league – also provides an important domestic competition opportunity for university and college players. The National Adult Class A Spring League and the Association Cup Championship are major baseball events that are held every year. In addition to these, there are numerous other baseball events and championships, such as the Semi-Professional Baseball Summer and Winter City Tours, the Transglobe National Adult Baseball Cup and the Popcorn League. Indeed, the number of amateur baseball events increased after the introduction of The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan in 2009. In addition, the National Games, which are held every two years, also include baseball for professional and amateur players. However, not all leagues and championships provide competition opportunities for university/college players. Moreover, although some university/college teams that participate in amateur baseball leagues or championships use the names of their universities/colleges, others adopt the names of their sponsors, e.g. the Fubon Bulls (the National Taiwan University of Physical Education and Sport), the Taian Insurance (the Fu Jen Catholic University), and Mei Fu Giants (the Chinese Culture University).

In terms of the provision of international competition opportunities for players at the fourth, third and second levels, the government is also supportive. This is evident from three facts. First, many international baseball events for 12U, 15U, 18U and 21U players have been hosted in Taiwan or have been successfully bid for by the CTBA, which receives support and funding from the government. Second, either the
government or the CTBA fully or partially subsidise the 12U, 15U, 18U and 21U national teams to participate in international baseball events that are staged abroad if they qualify. In addition, it should be remembered that second level players can also participate in international baseball events that are rated second class. To conclude, the provision of international competition opportunities for developing players is also sufficient.

7.5 The Development System for Coaches, the Provision of Coaches, and of Sports Science Support

The origins of the development system for coaches in Taiwan can be traced back to 1973, when the China National Volleyball Association (renamed the Chinese Taipei Volleyball Association) planned its own coaching system. In 1982, the China National Sports Association (renamed the Republic of China Sports Federation) announced *The Implementing Principles for Every National Sports Association to Establish a Coaching System*. In the following years, every sports association, including baseball, gradually established its coaching system.

As for other sports, there are three different levels of training camps and certifications for baseball coaches – class A (national level), class B (regional/special municipality level) and class C (city/county level). Some conditions are applied for lower class coaches when they attempt to attend higher level training camps and upgrade their current classes. In general, the CTBA takes the main responsibility for organising baseball coach training camps and issuing baseball coach certifications for each of these three levels. Except for class A baseball coaches, however, special municipality and city/county baseball associations can organise class B/C and C baseball coach training camps respectively and issue coach certification for participation. Three things are noteworthy here. First, the ROCSF is authorised by the SAC to manage the overall sports coach development system. Therefore, affairs in relation to coach
development, such as organising baseball coach training camps and issuing baseball coach certification, have to be examined and approved by the ROCSF and/or the SAC. Second, the budget for cultivating baseball coaches comes from the government. There are two kinds of public funding for the cultivation of baseball coaches – the general budget and profits from the sports lottery. One legislator, who was also interested in the development of sports policy, (Interviewee W) observed that

In the past, the resources for cultivating sports coaches only came from the government’s public budget. Due to the limitation of the budget, therefore, the government put an emphasis on increasing the quantity of coaches, rather than on the cultivation of elite coaches... Currently, however, the injection of the Sports Lottery Fund into the development of the coaches has gradually improved the situation.

In this respect, the government’s attitude towards the development of coaches is positive, at least in terms of public funding.

Third, according to the CTBA’s *The Implementing Regulations of Coaching System*, sports sciences are included in one of the basic programmes in baseball training camps at every level. This means that coaches have opportunities to improve their knowledge of sports sciences and are able to include them in their training.

Although there is a lack of statistical evidence, it can be argued that the number of baseball coaches is sufficient. As the president of the CTBA (Interviewee J) suggested, ‘Basically, the quantity of baseball coaches and the provision of coaching for baseball players are not an issue’. However, in terms of the quality of baseball coaches, he also added that, ‘Generally speaking, the quality of baseball coaches is still insufficient’. This problem is more serious at grass-roots level because as has been indicated in *The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan*. In order to enhance the quality of grass-roots coaches, a programme to encourage school baseball coaches to participate in training camps
has been included in *The Enhancing Excellent Baseball Environment Plan*. Moreover, although the government has not introduced an individual plan for cultivating elite baseball coaches, the CTBA offers some places for class A coaches to attend baseball training camps organised by baseball powers, such as Japan and the USA, in order for them to absorb new training techniques and improve themselves. Furthermore, *The Bole\(^1\) Plan-the Cultivation of Excellent Sports Coaches*, which is a general plan for every sports coach and aims to cultivate elite coaches by training them abroad also provides another channel for outstanding baseball coaches to advance further.

In terms of the provision of coaches for elite players (most of them are professional), professional teams take the main responsibility for this during the baseball season due to the existence of the CPBL. The government’s efforts in this respect are demonstrated by the fact that it subsidises the CPBL. Before and during international baseball events, the CTBA will use government funding to employ coaches for national teams. These national team coaches are not always domestic coaches. However, one issue in this regard was mentioned by a senior sports journalist (Interviewee E)

> Not only baseball, but also other sports…the public subsidy of employing foreign coaches has a salary cap. The foreign top coaches’ wages are expensive, and the NGBs would have to pay the extras if these were over the cap.

For developing and/or student baseball players, schools that have baseball teams and/or develop baseball well employ qualified baseball coaches. According to *The School Employment Regulations for Full-Time Athletic Coaches*, these school coaches are not PE teachers. They are employed specifically for the purpose of training school sports teams and supervising competitions. In addition, their wages are subsidised by

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\(^1\) Bole, the Chinese ancient, was an expert in identifying good horses and bad horses. Here it is used to describe good coaches.
the SAC. It is also worth mentioning that *The Enhancing Excellent Baseball Environment Plan* pointed out the problem that the provision of baseball coaches in remote areas, such as Hualien and Taitung Counties, is insufficient. In order to address this problem, the government has introduced a reward system for coaches who are willing to dedicate themselves to these areas. From the above, it can be argued that the government plays an active role in the development of the coaching system and the provision of coaches both for elite and developing baseball players.

In terms of sports science support, indeed, the government began to have a more active attitude towards this after the 1998 Bangkok Asian Games. During the squad training for the 1998 Asian Games, Professor Chen Chuan-Shou was assigned to organise a sports science group to support the national team. Although there was sports science support for national teams before 1998, it can be argued that the approach was fragmented. As a senior sports journalist (Interviewee D) observed,

In the past, the concept of sports science almost did not exist. Since the 1998 Bangkok Asian Games, however, the concept has gradually been established.

As for baseball, there is no particular sports science support programme or plan. Nevertheless, in general, the professional teams take the main responsibility for this during the baseball season. When national players are in squad training, according to *The Baseball Reinvigoration Plan*, the government will provide sports science support, including psychological consultation and anti-doping education, and arrange sports trainers who are in alternative military service for the professional teams that include national players and require this service. In addition, sports science support also includes analyse information provided by other teams and analysis. Arguably, sports information acquisition and analysis is an important element of sports science support for elite players and/or national baseball teams. One senior national baseball coach (Interviewee B) suggested that
Information acquisition and analysis before and/or during international baseball events are very significant for national teams. This sports science support…no problem…the government will provide us [national teams and coaches] with it.

7.6 The Emergence of Full-Time Athletes

As early as the Japanese colonial period, amateur adult baseball had emerged in Taiwan. After the end of the Japanese colonisation in 1945 and the KMT government’s relocation to Taiwan in 1949, amateur adult baseball continued to develop, even though the KMT government seemed to generally ignore baseball development in order to de-Japanise Taiwan. Many banks and public corporations, such as the Taipower, the Cooperative Bank, the China Oil Company, the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Board, and so on, gradually established their own baseball teams. Some private enterprises also founded baseball teams and competed with bank and public corporation teams in various annual competitions. Although these teams initially consisted of company employees who had an interest in baseball, baseball competitions between the teams were soon upgraded to a higher skill level, as more and more elite players were employed by these companies. However, these elite players were not full-time athletes because although most of them were initially employed for the purpose of enhancing the baseball teams’ strength, they were literally employees of the companies and were paid to work rather than to play baseball.

In addition to social amateur adult baseball, there was also amateur baseball inside the military. Since the KMT government imposed compulsory military service in Taiwan in late 1949, all men of the right age had to serve in the military for two years with a few exceptions, such as people with disabilities and students. Due to the fact that a large percentage of draftees were internal province people who liked and played...
baseball, the sport was inevitably introduced into the military. From 1950, therefore, the navy, the army and the air force established their own baseball teams to compete in the Military Games. These military baseball teams were strong because outstanding players in military service were recruited to play for the teams, which led to the fact that the military teams competed intensively with each other internally and with social amateur adult teams externally. However, the navy players were transferred to the air force team after 1973 and the air force team was eventually merged with the army team after 1990. Although in principle the military baseball teams were amateur, the players spent more time training and were more like full-time players than those in social amateur adult teams. This was because officers would ask, or permit, the players to replace some military training programmes with baseball training, which could be treated as part of their military training. In other words, officers were able to give consideration to both sides (military training and increasing the possibility of the teams performing better in competitions). As one retired volleyball player, who used to be in the military volleyball team (Interviewee AA), recalled,

"We [military volleyball players] had privileges. We did not need to join every military training programme because officers asked us to have volleyball training. This happened frequently, in particular before competitions. Our performances were important to their personal reputation/prestige. I think other sports were in a very similar situation to volleyball.

Generally, elite baseball players in essence remained amateur until the creation of the Chinese Professional Baseball (CPBL) in 1989. However, two phenomena seemed to deform baseball amateurism. First, poaching baseball players from other city/county teams to participate in the Provincial Games occurred. The media argued that professionalisation was equal to losing the sporting spirit (Hsieh and Hsieh, 2003). Second, elite baseball players played too many competitions after the Chinese Baseball Association (CBA; renamed as the CTBA) reformed the competition system for amateur adult baseball in 1978. As Yu (2007: 80) describes, ‘Though called
amateurs, they played nearly the whole year in order to take part in international games and minor tournaments’.

An argument to professionalise baseball in Taiwan had already existed since the early 1970s. Indeed, according to Yu (2007: 93), the period from 1977 to the early 1980s would have been the most opportune moment for baseball professionalisation because ‘veteran players had yet to retire while new players cultivated after Hongye were beginning to come through the pipeline’. However, this argument was ignored by the government and/or the public. There were two main reasons for this. First, the creation of professional baseball would have damaged the results of the national teams on the international stage because professional players were not allowed to participate in international baseball events until 1996. It must be kept in mind that success in international baseball events was valued by the government and/or fans because it was politically instrumental and/or expected. Second, long-term martial law led to a conservative society that was not willing to accept new concepts or idea about entertainment, such as sports professionalisation. This was exemplified by the fact that sports professionalisation was criticised by the media as representing the collapse of the sporting spirit. In addition to the proposition to create professional baseball, two presidents of the CTBA – Hsieh Kuo-Cheng and Yen Hsiao-Chang – attempted to introduce semi-professional baseball between the 1970s and the mid-1980s, but they too failed (Yu, 2007).

Beginning in the 1960s and increasingly between the 1970s and the 1980s, more and more companies withdrew from amateur baseball by disbanding their baseball teams. Moreover, some companies lessened their support for amateur baseball by providing fewer job vacancies for elite players. Furthermore, although the players in public corporation teams could enjoy good welfare provision and stable jobs, their salaries were not high in that era (around 500 USD/month in the Taipower and the Cooperative Bank, for example), and for most players, promotion to better positions would have been difficult because this involved examinations. All of this led to many elite players going abroad and signing contracts with foreign professional teams, in particular during the 1980s. In order to prevent the outflow of elite players,
developing professional baseball now became a matter of some urgency. However, the problem of creating professional baseball – damaging national teams’ results in international events – remained and South Korea’s experience – facing the difficulty of achieving good international results after the establishment of the professional baseball league in 1982 – caused even more concern. Nevertheless, in 1986, the IOC’s decision to accept professional athletes to compete in the Olympics seemed to imply that professional baseball players would be allowed by the IBAF to participate in international baseball events in the near future. This gave those who wanted to develop professional baseball greater confidence and an opportunity to persuade their opponents. Eventually, the CPBL was established in 1989 and the inaugural game was held in 1990. In the period between the creation of the CPBL and before the IBAF agreed to allow professional players to participate in international baseball events in 1996, the CTBA subsidised some important players in national baseball teams on a monthly basis for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and appealed to them to maintain their amateur status.

The issue of the emergence of full-time players has become axiomatic since the establishment of the CPBL. One could argue that the establishment and operation of the CPBL might not be considered the result of the government’s efforts or attempts to create full-time baseball players. However, due to the fact that the chairman of the promotion committee of professional baseball – Tang Pan-Pan – had a strong KMT government background, it is not difficult to imagine the involvement of governmental support, which was important in that era, in the creation of the CPBL. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the government’s subsidies and assistance do help the CPBL to continue to operate. This can be thought of as indirect public funding to elite baseball players, and arguably, all of this can be considered as a government initiative to create full-time players.

There are two important points that should be mentioned here. First, despite the fact that the existence of the CPBL clearly explains the presence of full-time players, there is a problem with the CPBL’s salary system. As the president of the CTBA (Interviewee J) noted,
There is professional baseball in Taiwan, but its salary system is immature. This has led to the brain drain to, for example, South Korea, Japan and the USA.

Second, the CPBL has painstakingly kept operating since 1997 when the fan market reduced dramatically. This was mainly caused by the ‘two leagues events’ – professional baseball being overloaded with two leagues (eleven teams at its highest) in Taiwan and the vicious poaching of players from other leagues – which occurred between 1996 and 2003 and the match-fixing scandals in 1997 and 2008. These two issues are responsible for underlying apprehensions about the CPBL, and the issue of full-time players.

7.7 Conclusion

Having discussed the development of baseball at the elite level in Taiwan, it is important to revisit some points that are relevant to the ACF approach. First, due to the fact that the CTBA, academics, representatives of the DPE, the CTSBF, the CPBL, the CPBL trade union and the CPBL fans’ union are usually invited to the SAC’s meetings to discuss baseball policies or plans, they can be identified as policy actors who attempt to influence baseball policies. Second, among these policy actors, the CTBA is the most influential because the SAC values its opinions the most. Third, in addition to delivering its belief system to the government in the SAC’s meetings, the CTBA also adopts another strategy – sending its secretary general to communicate or negotiate with the director of competitive sports development – which occurs particularly when there are issues or policies relevant to public funding. Fourth, there is a ‘relatively stable parameter’ – the fundamental socio-cultural value of opposition to talent identification outside of the current participants. On the topic of baseball talent identification, therefore, this increases the degree of consensus needed for major policy changes and results in constraints/resources for subsystem actors. Fifth,
the fact that hosting international baseball events can generate diplomatic, political and economic benefits (basic attribute of the problem area) and that baseball is the national sport (fundamental socio-cultural value) are relatively stable parameters, which leads to the fact that a high degree of consensus is needed for major policy change relevant to hosting fewer international baseball events in Taiwan. Moreover, political and diplomatic considerations with regard to hosting international baseball events are policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems (external system event), which offer short-term resources for policy actors who support holding international baseball events in Taiwan. Furthermore, other external system events, such as changes in socio-economic conditions and in the systemic governing coalition, cause fewer resources or constraints for baseball policy actors. Sixth, the restriction on professional players participating in international baseball events before 1996 and the IOC’s permitting, in 1996, professional athletes to compete in the Olympics, are policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems (external events) for the baseball policy subsystem. They respectively resulted in some constraints and resources for policy actors who support establishing a professional baseball league in Taiwan.

The fact that baseball is the national sport confirms its important status in Taiwan’s sports policy and development. Although taekwondo does not have as many historical connections with Taiwan as baseball, it originated from Asia (South Korea) and has developed effectively in Taiwan. Therefore, it is now worth exploring the development of taekwondo at the elite level in Taiwan.
Chapter 8 Case Study 2: Taekwondo

Given the complexity of the multiple schools of international taekwondo development, some points should be clarified here in order to prevent confusion later. First, there are two major styles of taekwondo, which respectively follow the rules of the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) and the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF). Second, the ITF was created in 1966 and the WTF in 1973. Although the ITF was established before the WTF, the WTF was recognised in 1975 and 1980 by the SportAccords (called the General Assembly of International Sports Federations before 1976 and the General Association of International Sports Federations between 1976 and 2009) and the IOC, respectively. Nowadays, the WTF style of taekwondo is widely accepted for international multi-sports events that include taekwondo, such as the Asian Games, South East Asian Games, the Olympics and the Universiade. Third, mainstream taekwondo development in Taiwan has followed the WTF style since the 1980s. For these reasons, the subsequent sections mainly focus on WTF style taekwondo development.

8.1 The Chinese Taipei Taekwondo Association

Taekwondo was first introduced to Taiwan in 1967 after former Minister of National Defense – Chiang Ching-Kuo – visited South Korea and witnessed in 1966 the benefits of the promotion of taekwondo in the military (Yang, 2010). Indeed, initially, taekwondo was only developed in Taiwan in the military. However, this sport was gradually extended to society after one of the Kaohsiung Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps held a taekwondo class in 1969. Moreover, some retired soldiers who had learned and/or practised taekwondo in the military founded their own private taekwondo dojangs and/or clubs from 1970 onwards. In 1973, the Republic of China Amateur Taekwondo Association (ROCATA) was established as the main taekwondo NGB at the national level. Its official name in English was
changed to the Chinese Taipei Taekwondo Association (CTTA) after the signing of *An Agreement between the International Olympic Committee and Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee* in 1981. Between 1973 and 1994, although there is a lack of hard evidence, it can be argued that the CTTA should be treated as a quasi-governmental organisation, as it was created by a General and its presidents were Generals or Director-Generals of the National Police Agency.

Unlike some national sports associations, such as the CTBA, which were reformed and/or renamed from their provincial sports committees, the CTTA was a newly established sports association at the national level. This was because the introduction of taekwondo to Taiwan took place in the same year as the central government differentiated between various affairs, including sports affairs, of the provincial and central governments. In fact, there was a Taiwan Provincial Taekwondo Association before the downsizing of the Taiwan provincial government in 1998. However, this was created after the establishment of the CTTA and was a CTTA affiliated organisation that helped to manage city/county taekwondo associations. The organisational structure of the CTTA is presented in Figure 8.1. According to the Taekwondo Handbooks of the Republic of China (CTTA, 1990), the CTTA’s main aims are to promote the development of taekwondo in Taiwan, hold domestic nationwide and international taekwondo events, develop Sports for All and strengthen the nationals’ physiques. It should be mentioned that, although no clear statement to this effect has been made, it can be argued that the CTTA primarily concentrates on the development of WTF style taekwondo, rather than that of ITF. This is evident from the fact that both the International Taekwondo Federation Taiwan and the Chinese-Taipei Taekwon-Do Federation are recognised and authorised by the ITF to promote ITF style taekwondo in Taiwan.

Compared with most other countries, taekwondo developed early in Taiwan. In addition, because the first president of the CTTA was a General who had good relations with the business sector and the CTTA was a quasi-governmental organisation, taekwondo could be promoted quickly in society through a top-down approach (Yeh, 2000). All of this resulted in a robust foundation for the development
Figure 8.1 The organisational structure of the CTTA

Tae kwondo’s capacity for winning medals has also increased the importance of the CTTA in the eyes of government. As one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) commented,

Our [Taiwan’s] national tae kwondo competitors can win medals consistently in most international sports or tae kwondo events. Our government values that [international sporting success]. Therefore, it is a focussed sport for our [Taiwan’s] government. …We [the CTTA] are important for them because they [the government] need us to deliver international sporting success.

Despite the fact that the CTTA is the prime NGB for national tae kwondo development, another three NGBs – the Chinese Taipei School Sport Federation (CTSSF), the Chinese Taipei Student Tae kwondo Federation (CTSTF) and the CTUSF – share the burden of tae kwondo development in the school system. In general, their responsibilities for the promotion of tae kwondo in schools do not overlap. As a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) described, ‘I think we [the CTTA and the three NGBs] have an unwritten/informal pattern of cooperation and common consensus on the division of labour’. However, there appears to be some disagreement between the CTTA and the CTUSF. For example, the senior CTTA member of staff added, ‘We [the CTTA] have a different viewpoint on the current tae kwondo competition system of the National High School Games, which was originally proposed by the CTUSF and approved by the SAC’. In addition, a senior SAC member of staff mentioned (Interviewee N) that, ‘If we had meetings in relation to tae kwondo development, these four NGBs [the CTTA, the CTSSF, the CTSTF and the CTSUF] would frequently be invited to our meetings to express their opinions’.

of tae kwondo in Taiwan. Over the last four decades, as a result, Taiwan’s tae kwondo participants have achieved outstanding performances on the international stage as is evident from the fact that national tae kwondo competitors win medals consistently at most international multi-sports and tae kwondo events. In this respect, the CTTA can be identified as one of the most successful NGBs in relation to elite performance. Taekwondo’s capacity for winning medals has also increased the importance of the CTTA in the eyes of government. As one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) commented,
In this respect, the four NGBs can be treated as specific policy actors within the taekwondo policy subsystem.

CTTA-SAC relations are generally top-down and the SAC has the power to supervise the CTTA because, as for most other NGBs, the SAC is the CTTA’s central competent authority and main funding supporter. However, the relationship between them is not always top-down. For example, one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) described a bottom-up relationship, recalling that

> In the CTTA’s general assembly, many grass-roots taekwondo coaches reflected their hope of modifying downwards the age limit for obtaining the qualification of a taekwondo coach, allowing more taekwondo competitors who have just graduated from universities but who do not achieve age limit to become involved in the promotion of taekwondo. The CTTA then expressed this opinion to the SAC. As a result, the SAC this year (2012) revised the age limit downwards.

Moreover, another senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) noted that:

> Although some members of the [SAC] training and counselling committee have their personal perspective on taekwondo development, they [the SAC] hardly use their budget allocation power to direct the CTTA. …They [also] rarely…or ever become involved in the CTTA’s internal administrative affairs, how it develops and how it should train national competitors.

Nevertheless, the SAC does involve itself in some affairs and disagreements between the SAC and CTTA can occur. As the senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) noted,
The SAC tends to give suggestions to the CTTA on certain affairs, such as what competition system should be adopted, when national competitors should be chosen, the number of national competitors who can have overseas training or the duration of overseas training. Inevitably, some disagreement between the SA and CTTA on these affairs happens.

In addition to these issues, the senior national taekwondo coach added that ‘The amount of public budget allocated to the CTTA and the question of who should be the head coaches of the national taekwondo teams are two other sources of discord between them’.

Normally, the CTTA president will directly negotiate with senior officials or ministers of the SAC when the CTTA has differing points of view on the SAC’s taekwondo policies. In addition, expressing its thoughts to the SAC through legislators and the media and, as one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) mentioned, ‘Utilising its international performance as a counter to bargain with the SAC’ can also be adopted by the CTTA. From the logic of the ACF, all of these are strategies used by the CTTA to influence the SAC’s decision-making or policies. Moreover, the CTBA, media, and legislators can be identified as policy actors because they also attempt to influence taekwondo policy.

It should be noted that although there are some disagreements between the CTTA and SAC, this does not mean that they have a bad relationship. Rather, a senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) suggested that

Currently, the CTTA maintains very good interactions and relationships with the SAC. … Our president [the CTTA president] is actively working on this. This is different from some of our previous presidents who paid most attention to the CTTA’s internal administration and management.
This observation was further confirmed by a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) who said that ‘We [the CTTA] have a close relationship with the SAC’s taekwondo specialists, such as directors and section chiefs, and sometimes have social intercourse with them’. From the perspective of the ACF, the efforts of the CTTA president to maintain a good relationship with the SAC is one kind of resource for the CTTA (skilful leadership). The officials who have social intercourse with the CTTA can also be treated as CTTA resources (having formal legal authority to make policy decisions) because they are potential members of the advocacy coalition.

It is also important to explore the relationships between the CTTA and another three organisations – the DPE, CTOC and ROCSF – in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of its status. First, as mentioned previously, the DPE is mainly responsible for school sports development, including taekwondo, and the CTTA receives funding and supervision from the SAC, resulting in only a few interactions between the CTTA and DPE. However, due to the fact that many national coaches and almost all developing and elite taekwondo competitors are in the education system, as one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) noted, ‘The DPE provides us [the CTTA] with some administrative assistance when student competitors or school coaches are selected by national teams and join squad training at the NSTC’. Second, although the CTTA is a member of the ROCSF and, like most other Olympic NGBs, a CTOC approved association, interactions between them are limited. Currently, the CTTA only interacts with the ROCSF with regard to the cultivation of taekwondo coaches and referees and with the CTOC to request foreign language translators and apply to participate in some international taekwondo events.

8.2 The Development of Elite Level Facilities

In general, elite taekwondo competitors who are selected as trainees in national teams
or as members of national teams are trained at the NSTC. Two places are utilised there as taekwondo training courts. The first is permanent and exclusive to taekwondo training. However, it is a long and narrow space that was rebuilt from an old barracks. One senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee C) noted that ‘The taekwondo dojang in the NSTC is too small’. The second facility is a temporary court in the gymnasium that is also used for other sports, such as basketball and volleyball, meaning that it is not exclusive to taekwondo. From the above, it seems that the sports facilities at the NSTC are poor. One senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) observed that

I just came back from France’s exclusive taekwondo dojang in their national training centre. Although they have developed taekwondo for many years and have not won any Olympic taekwondo gold medals, they support it very much. We [Taiwan] have won two [Olympic] gold medals…but our taekwondo courts in the NSTC are vastly different from theirs. Ours suggest just casually looking for a place that can simply shelter competitors from the wind and rain, providing some taekwondo mats and then being ready for training. I sighed about the difference in the quality of the taekwondo courts in the national training centres between us [Taiwan and France].

However, there are two different perspectives on the issue of whether the quality of the taekwondo courts at the NTSC is sufficient for training elite competitors. On the one hand, a senior member of staff (Interviewee, O) in the Sports Facility Department of the SAC asked:

Does the quality of taekwondo courts for training need to reach the standard of formal competitions? This concept should be made clear first. I thought that training does not need to reach that standard and that the quality [of the taekwondo courts] is sufficient for training.

1 The NTSC used to be a military base and has been utilised as a national training centre since 1975.
One the other hand, one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) argued that

The quality of the taekwondo courts at the NTSC is insufficient because they are not in accordance with the exclusive needs of taekwondo training. In addition, at the elite level, not always, but sometimes, taekwondo competitors do need to be trained on a court that is similar to formal courts in international competitions, such as one with a high platform. This is because they [the competitors] need an international competition ambience when they are trained. Otherwise, they will not be used to formal courts at international events and they will feel uncomfortable. We do not have a high platform for taekwondo training at the NSTC.

These two viewpoints also highlight the differences between officials and taekwondo coaches in relation to the quality of taekwondo facilities for elite competitors. Nevertheless, in 2009, the SAC introduced The Formation of the National Sports Parks and Talent Development Plan, a sub-plan of which – The Reconstruction of the National Sports Training Centre\(^1\)-the First Term – includes the objective to build a new martial arts stadium\(^2\) with an exclusive and professional training court for elite competitors from 2015 onwards. In fact, although there is a lack of hard evidence to claim that it had a direct influence on the SAC’s plan, the taekwondo community had appealed to the government to build an exclusive and professional taekwondo training dojang or courts for many years. A senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) recalled that

The taekwondo community asked the government to construct an exclusive and professional taekwondo court or stadium for taekwondo after winning gold medals at the 2004 Athens Olympics. Also, I and other national taekwondo coaches had a chance to meet president Ma after the

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1 The sub-plan is divided into four terms and the first term is between 2011 and the end of 2014.
2 The martial arts stadium will be built for boxing, fencing, gymnastics, judo, karate, taekwondo, wrestling, weightlifting and wushu.
2009 Taipei Summer Deaflympics. We wrote a letter to him. In the letter, we reviewed our [taekwondo’s] performances at the 2004 Athens Olympics and the 2009 Taipei Summer Deaflympics and expressed our hopes for exclusive and professional taekwondo courts.

According to the perspective of the ACF, outstanding taekwondo performances on the international stage can be considered as focus events that provided taekwondo policy actors with an opportunity to deliver their belief system to the government. In addition, the coaches, as actors in the taekwondo policy subsystem, attempted to deliver their thoughts to government.

Outside the NSTC, there is no public exclusive and professional taekwondo court or stadium at the national or local levels. However, taekwondo focussed universities, such as the Chinese Culture University, Fujen Catholic University, National Taiwan Normal University, National Taiwan Sport University, National Taiwan University of Sport and the National Taipei University of Education, have exclusive taekwondo courts. It should also be noted that, as mentioned previously, almost all elite taekwondo competitors are in the education system. Arguably, therefore, these universities play a significant role in the provision of sports facilities for elite competitors when they are not in squad training at the NSTC. Thus, in terms of the quality of the taekwondo courts, a senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) observed that:

Generally speaking, the courts in these taekwondo focussed universities are not big and are similar to a taekwondo training room that has some simple equipment. …[However] there are some exceptions. For example, the taekwondo court at the National Taiwan Sport University is around one hundred pings [330.57 square metres] and is amongst the best in the world.
Other sports facility providers for elite competitors are private taekwondo dojangs/clubs. One legislator (Interviewee Z), who used to be an elite taekwondo competitor and is interested in the development of sports policy, mentioned that ‘In addition to their [elite competitors’] own universities, they train in their own dojangs when they are not involved in squad training with national teams’. Moreover, some private dojangs are high quality. As one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) commented, ‘Some owners have spent a lot of money on their dojangs…over ten million NTD…, [and]…these dojangs are big, beautiful and good quality’. However, it is reasonable to believe that providing places for elite competitors to train is not the main purpose of private dojang owners, resulting in the fact that the dojangs are less important in the provision of sports facilities at the elite level than taekwondo focussed universities. This was confirmed by a senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) who asserted that, ‘Apart from the NSTC, in our [Taiwan’s] overall taekwondo training environment at the elite level, we mainly depend on these universities to provide facilities’. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the significance of private dojangs in the provision of sports facilities for grass-roots or developing competitors, which is evident in the fact that there are around three thousand taekwondo dojangs in Taiwan (Yang, 2010). Also, one senior DPE member of staff (Interviewee Q) noted that

For grass-roots or developing taekwondo competitors, both schools and private dojangs play a very important role. This is because some of them [student competitors] might join private dojangs to further strengthen themselves in after-school taekwondo clubs or teams. Students who are interested in taekwondo can also participate at private dojangs if their schools do not have clubs and some students enrol themselves as members of private dojangs even though their schools have clubs. This model is similar to that of some western countries.

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1 ‘Their own dojang’ here refers to the dojangs where the elite competitors used to train when they were developing competitors.
It is worthy of mention that due to the virtual absence of exclusive public professional taekwondo courts or stadiums, one might wonder how Taiwan can host international taekwondo events. One senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) explained that

We [Taiwan or the CTTA] can temporarily establish a professional taekwondo court in a stadium, such as the Taipei Arena, to host international [taekwondo] events and tear it down after that. It is not a big issue as long as we have a large enough place and professional equipment, such as officially recognised mats.

8.3 The Identification of Sporting Talent and the Development System

In Taiwan, there is a twelve-year compulsory education system, leading to the fact that most potential taekwondo talent is in schools. Moreover, as mentioned previously, there are around three thousand private taekwondo dojangs. Arguably, therefore, schools and private dojangs are two important bases for the identification of taekwondo talent. In 2002, the SAC’s authorised research established a ‘sport-related physical fitness quotient’, which can help coaches to identify potential sporting talent. This quotient consists of the results of certain tests, such as response, balancing, agility, speed, and stability. In the case of taekwondo, the tests have been adopted in some schools’ taekwondo clubs and private dojangs. However, one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) explained that ‘The tests are used only after students or children have joined the clubs or dojangs’. This means that there is no identification of taekwondo talent beyond the current participants. Moreover, the results are not the main criteria for identifying taekwondo talent. Instead,
performances in training or competition are valued. As another senior national coach (Interviewee R) suggested

Some schools’ taekwondo clubs and private dojangs have simple tests for students, the scores for which are just a rough reference. Some potential talents perhaps do not achieve good scores in these tests. In Taiwan, the most important thing for identifying taekwondo talent is performances in training and competition. Performance can better reflect their potential.

More recently, there has been a government attempt to systemise the identification of taekwondo talent by subsidising and authorising an academic unit to establish a database of taekwondo talent. Moreover, in 2012 the SAC introduced a major policy – The Six-Year Plan for the Cultivation of Sports Talent in Schools for the 2017 Universiade – for Universiade sports (including taekwondo), which aims to utilise the database to identify sports talent. Nevertheless, the database simply provides developing competitors’ competition results, which further confirms the tradition of identifying taekwondo talent through competitors’ performances.

It is also worth mentioning that generally there is no biological test, either within or outside the existing participants, to identify taekwondo talent. One legislator, who used to be a national taekwondo competitor and is interested in sports policy development (Interviewee Z), explained that

Scientific approaches, such as biochemical or genetic tests, to identify potential taekwondo talent within and, in particular, beyond current taekwondo participants, are not accepted by most parents. We [Taiwan] are a democratic country and you [coaches or the government] cannot force them to accept what they do not want to accept. Also, there is no regulation to allow schools’ or dojangs’ coaches to do this.
From the viewpoint of the ACF, parents’ negative attitude towards scientific tests and the fact that Taiwan is democratic and that no related regulation exists are respectively fundamental socio-cultural values and basic constitutional matters. These two relatively stable parameters could influence the degree of consensus needed for major policy change and cause short-term constraints and limited resources for subsystem actors.

However, The Plan for the Cultivation of Remarkable Aboriginal Sports Talent is perhaps the only exception because it filters sporting talent by their genes and simply focuses on developing indigenous sports talent. Nevertheless, this plan operates on a yearly basis, meaning that taekwondo is not always included in the plan. Also, there is no evidence to show whether or not selected aboriginal taekwondo talent has participated in this sport before.

In terms of the development system for taekwondo competitors, as for other sports, there is a four-level cultivation system. Some primary, junior high (fourth level) and senior high schools (third level) that have sports classes and universities (second level), in particular sports universities and those that have sports departments, provide places for outstanding competitors to continue their studies and training. In the case of taekwondo, it can be argued that these schools play a more important role in the development system of competitors than in other sports because, as one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) noted,

Most elite competitors are students and very few of them will continue their taekwondo careers after graduating from school. Even if they continue to be competitors, their performances will regress, such as those of Yang Shu-Chun and Su Li-Wen [two top elite female taekwondo competitors who were selected for national teams several times].
The main reason for this phenomenon, as one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) explained, is that

Unlike baseball and basketball, there are no professional, semi-professional or amateur taekwondo teams or leagues. …In Iran, they have a professional taekwondo league. Therefore, competitors have to seek jobs after graduating to make money and maintain themselves. It is impossible to take into consideration both training and work, resulting in the fact that their performances will regress and/or they will retire from taekwondo.

This does not mean that student taekwondo competitors do not need to pay attention to their studies. Relatively, however, they have more opportunities to train if they are in sports classes or sports universities/departments because they have additional taekwondo training sessions during and after school time. Nevertheless, taekwondo alternative military service for elite male competitors is an exception in relation to the high ratio of elite competitors’ retirement after graduating from school.

There are three noteworthy points here. First, given the prosperity of private taekwondo dojangs in Taiwan, it can be expected that these also play an important role in the cultivation system for taekwondo competitors. In fact, there is some cooperation between school taekwondo clubs and private taekwondo dojangs. One senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) noted that

At the very beginning, students who were interested in taekwondo would join school taekwondo clubs. Some coaches would suggest to students who had better performances in taekwondo training or competitions to join private dojangs to further strengthen themselves. … Some coaches even have their own private dojangs or have part-time jobs in dojangs…. 
Second, a gap has emerged in taekwondo talent since the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This is evident from the fact that comparing the 2004 Athens and 2008 Beijing Olympics, which four (full representation) Chinese Taipei (TPE) taekwondo competitors attended, only three TPE competitors obtained the qualification to compete at the 2012 London Olympics. In fact, the problem of a gap in taekwondo talent has existed for several years. As one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) mentioned

We [the taekwondo community] have recognised this phenomenon since 2004, but it was not very obvious because, for example, competitors who were at a lighter level could change their weight a little to participate at lower or higher levels. Currently, however, this phenomenon is gradually getting worse.

A reason for this gap in talent was suggested by another national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R), who claimed that

In 2001, the SAC abolished *The Reward Regulation for Outstanding Coaches*. Therefore, many coaches altered their emphasis from the cultivation of elite competitors to simply encouraging more children to engage in taekwondo because they did not have the motivation to dedicate themselves to the elite level. This then resulted in the problem of a gap in taekwondo talent gradually emerging.

In order to address this gap, the government has adopted three main measures. First, it helps elite competitors to prolong their taekwondo careers by encouraging some universities, in particular sports universities and those that have sports departments, to provide elite taekwondo competitors recommended admission opportunities to study postgraduate degrees. However, this measure seems to simply be treating the symptoms and not the root causes. As one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee
N) commented, ‘Although the mechanism of extending elite taekwondo competitors’ careers by helping them to remain in schools does postpone the emergence of a gap in taekwondo talent, this problem is getting worse because there is no fresh water’. On the other hand, therefore, the government is strengthening the cultivation system for developing taekwondo talent. This initiative is being advanced mainly through two measures – subsidising additional CTTA funding from the sports lottery funds to establish more sub-bases of existing taekwondo training bases for grass-roots and developing competitors, and introducing The Six-Year Plan for the Cultivation of Sports Talent in Schools for the 2017 Universiade to consolidate and improve the current cultivation system. According to a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X), ‘In addition to the SAC’s annual subsidy to us – 11 million NTD – they allocated another 6 million to us to cultivate young competitors’. Finally, in 2006, the SAC restored and amended The Reward Regulation for Outstanding Coaches. Although this amended regulation clearly excludes initial coaches from the reward system and only includes coaches who are really involved in training elite competitors, this policy at least reinstates national coaches’ enthusiasm for training elite competitors. Arguably, the emergence of the above three measures demonstrates the government’s desire to address the problem of a gap in taekwondo talent.

8.4 The Provision of Domestic and International Competition Opportunities for Elite Athletes

Unlike baseball, there is neither a professional league nor an amateur enterprise league for elite taekwondo competitors. In general, domestically, the important and high-level taekwondo competition opportunities available to them are the Asian Games Taekwondo Master Challenge, the National Games, the Olympic Taekwondo Master Challenge, the President’s Cup Taekwondo Championships and the University and College Games (first division). However, except for the President’s Cup Taekwondo Championships and the University and College Games, which are held annually, the Asian and Olympic Taekwondo Master Challenges and the National
Games are staged only every four and two years, respectively. Moreover, the National Games and the University and College Games are multi-sports events, meaning that they are not specifically for taekwondo. Furthermore, the main aim of the Asian and Olympic Taekwondo Master Challenges is to decide who can obtain Asian and Olympic Games representation, rather than to provide competition opportunities. As one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) commented, ‘They are just a means of selecting national competitors’. It should be noted that the University and College Games (first division) are listed as high-level taekwondo competitions because, as mentioned previously, so many elite taekwondo competitors are university or college students.

From the above, it seems obvious that the provision of competition opportunities for elite competitors is insufficient. Indeed, although this problem is rarely acknowledged in government reports or publications, the interviewees, including two senior SAC members of staff (Interviewees C and N), a senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R), a legislator who used to be a elite competitor (Interviewee Z), a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X), a senior sports journalist (Interviewee D) and a sports policy academic (Interviewee U), all mentioned this. Nevertheless, the legislator (Interviewee Z) also suggested that

Despite the fact that the domestic competition opportunities are insufficient, this is not a big issue. Taekwondo is special because every competitor has his/her own competing style. There are only a small number of elite competitors in Taiwan and they are familiar with each other’ competing style, leading to the fact that the strength of domestic [taekwondo] competitions is finite. For example, you can win ten titles in domestic competitions, but perhaps you cannot win any in international events or championships. This means that the effects of many domestic competition experiences on their performance in international events are limited. Relatively, having more experience of international competitions is the most important issue.
In fact, compared with elite competitors, grass-roots or developing competitors have more domestic competition opportunities. In the school system, in addition to taekwondo events in the National High School Games, which are staged every year, there are many city/county level taekwondo events between schools. Outside of the education system, the CTTA holds the National Junior Taekwondo Championships and the National Cadet Taekwondo Championships annually. Moreover, some private taekwondo dojangs also host their own taekwondo events at the local level. Nevertheless, one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) commented on a problem with the domestic competition system:

In general, our domestic competition system for developing competitors tends to be based in the education system, such as primary school taekwondo events, junior high school taekwondo events…. However, the international taekwondo competition system divides contestants by their ages, for example, O-17 group championships, junior championships [ages between 15 and 17] and cadet championships [ages between 12 and 14]. Therefore, we have to hold other taekwondo events that are based on contestants’ ages outside the education system, such as the National Junior Taekwondo Championships. Otherwise, our system cannot link with the international system.

In terms of the provision of international taekwondo competitions for elite competitors, Taiwan previously held the 1980 and 1990 Asian Taekwondo Championships and the 2000 World University Taekwondo Championships. Moreover, a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) recalled that ‘Around twenty or thirty years ago, there were the Provincial Governor’s Cup Taekwondo Championships that involved international exchanges’. Furthermore, Taiwan will host the 2017 Universiade. However, the latter is a multi-sports event. Therefore, although it includes taekwondo, it would be inappropriate to think that staging it is simply aimed at providing elite taekwondo competitors with international competition opportunities. All of the above shows that Taiwan is barren of international
taekwondo events currently because it has not staged such an event for 14 years. One senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) criticised this situation, stating that

We [he and the competitors] attended the Dutch Open Taekwondo Championships and the Spanish Open Taekwondo Championships this year. Some other European countries also have these kinds of taekwondo events, which have lasted for several years. It is good thing…good not only for establishing a brand image for the country, but also for providing an international competition opportunity for elite as well as developing competitors in their own country. It is perhaps difficult to successfully bid for major taekwondo championships, but you [the government] can host your own taekwondo events and then, invite foreign competitors. The government always says they value taekwondo development, but there is not this kind of event in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, a lack of international taekwondo events does not mean that there is no government effort in terms of providing international taekwondo competition opportunities at the elite level. In fact, a senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) mentioned that

The government always encourages NGBs, including taekwondo… to bid for international events and/or host international level events. We [the SAC] would give them both administrative assistance and funding in these areas if they applied. They actually have many resources to do this, in particular since the injection of sports lottery funds into sports development.

Moreover, the SAC will subsidise elite competitors to participate in international taekwondo events, although SAC subsidies are for whole taekwondo teams, rather than individual elite competitors. Generally speaking, the CTTA plans an annual
international competition calendar for elite competitors and provides this to the SAC in order to apply for funding. The SAC’s training and counselling committee then examines it and decides how many international competitions can be subsidised and how much should be allocated. According to one legislator (Interviewee Z), ‘Opportunities for elite competitors, in particular those who are national competitors for Asian Games, Olympic or some major [international] taekwondo championships, to attend international taekwondo events should be enough…[and] funding for these should be sufficient as well’.

It is also noteworthy that the importance of having more international competition experiences for outstanding developing competitors is no less than that for elite competitors. One senior national coach (Interviewee R) observed that,

There was a real example. Our competitors felt scared of black competitors when they participated for the first time in international junior taekwondo events… the whole body is black with white teeth… because they had never met such people. This resulted in the fact that although our competitors were skilful, they could not perform normally. This situation happened a lot. Therefore, they need more international competition opportunities that can help them to compete normally with different races in the future.

However, the provision of international competition opportunities for outstanding developing competitors seems to be insufficient. As a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) described, ‘The most insufficient part is junior and senior high school competitors’ international competition opportunities’. Moreover, he added that ‘Although we [the CTTA] often ask the SAC to allocate more funding for us to do this, the budget remains inadequate, leading to the fact that families, coaches and local governments sometimes have to share the burden…. Instead, they [the SAC] put emphasis on their [remarkable developing competitors’] training’. Nevertheless, the SAC’s passive attitude is understandable because developing taekwondo competitors
in schools is the DPE’s responsibility. This is evident in the fact that the DPE caters for subsiding certain outstanding athletes, including taekwondo competitors, to train and compete abroad. It should be borne in mind that, as mentioned earlier, the SAC and DPE emerged as the Sports Administration (the SA) in 2013. Therefore, a more active attitude from the SA towards the provision of international competition opportunities for developing taekwondo competitors can be expected.

8.5 The Development System for Coaches, the Provision of Coaches and of Sports Science Support

As mentioned in the previous chapter, all NGBs, including taekwondo, gradually established development systems for coaches from the 1980s. Currently, the overall operation mechanism of the taekwondo coach development system is similar to those of most other sports. As a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) suggested, ‘Coach development systems of all sports are the same in Taiwan, and we are no exception’. Therefore, the mechanism for taekwondo is as follows: (i) there is a three-layer taekwondo coach development system – class A (national level), class B (regional/special municipality level) and class C (city/county level); (ii) a lower status taekwondo coach can upgrade to a higher level if they conform to certain conditions, attend taekwondo coach training camps and successfully pass the training camp’s tests; (iii) programmes for coach training camps include sports sciences; (iv) the CTTA is responsible for organising and issuing all levels of taekwondo coaches training camps and taekwondo coach certifications, but special municipalities and cities/counties can respectively share the burden of cultivating classes B/C and class C taekwondo coaches; (v) the organisation of taekwondo coach training camps and the issuing of taekwondo certificates have to be examined and approved by the ROCSF and/or the SAC; (vi) there is a general plan – The Bole Plan – for the cultivation of elite coaches, to provide outstanding taekwondo coaches with an opportunity to train abroad and improve themselves further; and (vii) in addition to
the general budget, there are sports lottery funds for the cultivation of taekwondo coaches.

In the case of taekwondo, however, there are three noteworthy points to be made. First, the CTTA seems to have a more active attitude towards the cultivation of taekwondo coaches. For example, according to a senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N),

There is a special project to subsidise some outstanding coaches to train abroad. This is for every sport. The funding for it mainly comes from sports lottery funds. Last year [2011], among these three sports [baseball, taekwondo and tennis], only the CTTA applied to us to subsidise elite coaches to train abroad.

The CTTA’s active attitude was further confirmed by a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X), who noted

We [the CTTA] submitted our proposal to request the SAC funding for sending outstanding taekwondo coaches to train abroad. During the audit meeting for our application, the minister [of the SAC] examined it in person. We bargained with her in the meeting about the quota of coaches who could receive subsidies to train abroad. Eventually, she agreed to fund six outstanding coaches.

From the perspective of the ACF, the CTTA is a group of taekwondo policy actors who attempt to deliver their belief system to the government. Moreover, it can be argued that the reaching of an agreement between the CTTA and the SAC minister on the issue of how many remarkable coaches could be subsidised to train abroad was relatively easy. This is because the issue (budgetary applications within a specific
programme) belongs to secondary beliefs. According to Sabatier and Weible (2007: 196), ‘secondary beliefs are narrower in scope than policy core beliefs, changing them requires less evidence and fewer agreements among subsystem actors and thus should be less difficult’.

Second, the CTTA is not the only channel for elite coaches to advance themselves abroad. In fact, a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) pointed out that

Universities have many resources. Some universities have international exchange programmes. If the programmes involve taekwondo, universities’ taekwondo coaches will have opportunities to train abroad.

Third, as mentioned previously, a successful bottom-up case was made in relation to grass-roots taekwondo coaches’ requests to amend downwards the age limit for obtaining taekwondo certification. Currently, more taekwondo competitors who have recently graduated from universities are able to attend taekwondo coach training camps and gain coaching qualifications.

In terms of the provision of coaching for elite taekwondo competitors, this is not an issue if they were trained at the NSTC because there is a group of coaches for them. The mechanism for providing taekwondo coaches for national competitors consists of five elements: (i) the CTTA selects a head coach; (ii) the head coach then recruits other coaches and organises a coaching team; (iii) the CTTA sometimes employs foreign taekwondo coaches; (iv) the above three procedures are supervised by the SAC; and (v) the coaches’ salaries are paid by the SAC. Beyond the NSTC, taekwondo focussed universities are the main coaching providers for elite competitors as most of them are university students. In general, the quality of taekwondo coaches for elite competitors at the NSTC or at these universities is sufficient. As one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) suggested,
I used to be a head coach of national teams. Although there are few exceptions, most head coaches recruit coaches who (i) are full-time school coaches; (ii) are elite competitors’ coaches in their universities; (iii) used to be elite competitors and had outstanding performances on the international stage; or (iv) have reached class A level and have had remarkable coaching experiences for years. Sometimes foreign coaches join us. …Normally, there are good taekwondo coaches in universities that have elite competitors. In fact, many university taekwondo coaches are also national taekwondo coaches. Therefore, overall the quality of coaches for elite competitors should be no problem.

For taekwondo competitors at the grass-roots and/or developing levels, the provision of taekwondo coaches is also sufficient at least in terms of quantity. However, a senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) mentioned that ‘The quality of taekwondo coaches for them is uneven’. Nevertheless, the occurrence of this situation seems to be limited to taekwondo coaches outside the formal school system, such as private taekwondo dojangs, and amongst part-time school coaches. This is because there is The School Employment Regulations for Full-time Athletic Coaches, which was introduced in 2005 and amended in 2013 by the SAC. The qualification of taekwondo coaches who want to be full-time coaches in schools has to conform to the requirements of this regulation, such as being involved in coaching for a certain number of years and having good performances in coaching. This means that, as a senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) noted, ‘Through the mechanism of The School Employment Regulations for Full-time Athletic Coaches, the SAC carefully checks full-time school taekwondo coaches’ quality before they enter the school system’.

With regard to sports science support, although again there is a lack of hard evidence, one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) mentioned that ‘The involvement of sports sciences in national competitors’ training existed before 2000 and has obviously increased since the SAC directly took over the NSTC [in 2001]. Indeed, currently, elite competitors who are trained at the NSTC receive a wide-range of sport
science support, including, for example, nutrition, sports biomechanics, biological tests, psychological counselling, sports training, anti-doping education and so on. In addition, The SAC subsidises national coaching teams for information acquisition. When elite competitors who are university students are not in squad training at the NSTC, their own universities take the main responsibility for the provision of sports science support. However, the support in the universities hardly reaches the same level as that at the NSTC.

There are two important points that should be mentioned here. First, although the NSTC provides sports science support for national competitors, whether they can benefit from it or not depends heavily on their coaches’ opinions. As one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) noted,

I personally emphasize the involvement of sports sciences and most coaches are similar to me. However, there are still a few national taekwondo coaches who are reluctant to accept the involvement of sports science because they do not think that it helps their coaching much.

In addition, another senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) highlighted a more specific reason for a few national coaches’ reluctance to accept the involvement of sports sciences,

A few taekwondo coaches…they reject the involvement of sports sciences because…to be honest…some sports scientists do not concentrate on providing sports science support. Many part-time sports scientists in the NSTC are [full-time] university professors. Some of them come here [the NSTC] mainly for their own experiments or to conduct studies for the Ministry of Science and Technology, rather than out of concern for competitors. More seriously, few of them…very few…do not provide or explain the results of tests to coaches.
Second, the provision of sports science support for national junior taekwondo competitors is similar to that for O-17 national competitors. However, some scientific tests have to be agreed not only by their coaches but also by their parents. Beyond the NSTC, the provision of sports science support is insufficient. One senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) explained that ‘Generally speaking, junior and senior high schools and private dojangs do not have the equipment to do sports scientific tests’. Nevertheless, in *The Six-Year Plan for the Cultivation of Sports Talent in Schools for the 2017 Universiade*, the government plans to establish six regional service centres for sports sciences in six universities, which will provide sports science support not only for elite athletes, but also for developing athletes. Although this is a general plan for all sports, its introduction reflects the government’s efforts to improve the provision of sports science support for developing athletes, and junior taekwondo competitors will almost certainly benefit from it.

8.6 The Emergence of Full-Time Athletes

The concept of full-time athletes in the case of taekwondo might not be as easy to make sense of as in baseball in Taiwan because not only is there no professional taekwondo league, but furthermore most elite competitors are students. However, this does not mean that the development of taekwondo maintains pure amateurism or that there is no evidence of full-time taekwondo competitors. In fact, this is manifested in four phenomena. First, elite student taekwondo competitors at the NSTC train on a full-time basis. As one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) suggested,

Taekwondo competitors at the NSTC should be considered as full-time athletes because their main task/job is training. Although they are students, they do not actually go to the school during periods of squad training. In addition, the SAC arranges academic classes at night inside the NSTC for these competitors. However, I do not think they can easily concentrate on
classes after training all day…many of them sleep in the classes…generally speaking, the effects of these classes on their study are limited. Maybe…the purpose of arranging these academic classes is to prevent the SAC from being criticised for not taking care of student competitors’ studies.

Second, the SAC subsidises taekwondo competitors who train at the NSTC for the Asian and Olympic Games. According to *The Subsidy Guidelines for Training of Olympic and Asian Games Athletes* (2013), subsidies include ‘pocket money’, transportation costs and additional subsidies for unemployed (school) graduates or retired servicemen (mandatory military service) and/or furloughs who receive the same salaries as for their original positions. Although one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee R) mentioned that, ‘Nutrition fees [pocket money] and transportation subsidies are not large’, the fact that the government subsidises NSTC taekwondo competitors demonstrates a departure from amateurism. It is also important to note that notwithstanding the fact that subsidies began to be formalised in 2009 when the SAC first introduced new regulations, they did exist before that. As one legislator (Interviewee Z) recalled,

I do not remember the exact time…but the existence of government subsidies for elite competitors during squad training [in the NSTC for the Asian and Olympic Games] has a long history…but the subsidies were less before.

Nevertheless, it should be reemphasized that the above two phenomena only occur if and when the taekwondo competitors train at the NSTC. In this respect, these competitors are temporarily full-time athletes.

Third, there is a reward system – *The Regulations Governing the Issuance of Guo Guang Athletic Medals and Scholarships* – for elite athletes, including taekwondo
competitors, who have achieved outstanding performances on the international stage. Despite the fact that there is a lack of hard evidence, the reward system, as one senior CTTA member of staff (Interviewee X) estimated, ‘…could be the second most generous around the world’. Moreover, according to the regulation, there are two ways in which Olympic medallists can receive their prizes: by drawing the entire prize at once (12 million, 7 million and 5 million NTD for gold, silver and bronze medallists respectively) or in the form of a life-time pension (75,000, 38,000 and 24,000 NTD per month for gold, silver and bronze medallists respectively). This generous reward system and life-time pension seem to demonstrate the demise of amateurism and the emergence of full-time taekwondo competitors. It is also worth mentioning that in 2013 the SAC proposed an amended draft of the regulations to increase the prizes for Olympic gold medallists. In the near future, an Olympic gold medallist will be awarded 20 million NTD as a one-off withdrawal or 125,000 NTD per month as a life-time pension.

Fourth, a few elite taekwondo competitors are temporarily sponsored by private enterprises. For example, one senior national taekwondo coach (Interviewee L) recalled that ‘Before the 2004 Athens Olympics, Brands sponsored Chu Mu-Yen [an elite taekwondo competitor who won the second Olympic gold medal for Taiwan] monthly’. However, he also added that ‘Enterprise sponsorship for taekwondo simply focused on one or two elite competitors and they sponsored him [Chu Mu-Yen] because he had a greater possibility of winning an Olympic gold medal’.

There is an important point to be made here. Although the WTF is trying to professionalise taekwondo internationally through the introduction of grand prix taekwondo championships, this is a newly established system. Arguably, therefore, the idea of the international professionalisation of taekwondo remains immature or uncertain among taekwondo competitors.

From the above, it can be argued that the government plays a significant role in the emergence of full-time taekwondo competitors. Moreover, pure amateurism does not
exist in the development of taekwondo, despite the fact that there are no real full-time taekwondo competitors.

8.7 Conclusion

Having explained the development of taekwondo at the elite level in Taiwan, some concepts relevant to the ACF approach are worth revisiting. First, the CTTA consists of policy actors who attempt to influence taekwondo policies. Normally, the CTTA adopts three strategies to impact the SAC’s decision-making processes: (i) direct negotiation with the SAC through the CTTA president; (ii) expressions of the CTTA’s thinking through the media and/or legislators; (iii) using outstanding international performances in taekwondo as a counter with which to bargain with the SAC; and (iv) maintaining good relations with the SAC. Other potential (groups of) taekwondo policy actors include the CTSSF, the CTSTF, the CTUSF, the media and legislators. Second, at present, although there are some disagreements between the CTTA and the SAC, the former maintains a good relationship with the latter, which can be considered as one of its resources (skilful leadership). Another CTTA resources comprise taekwondo specialists who have good relations with the CTTA (the formal legal authority for making policy decision). Third, in general, there is no scientific approach, such as using biological or genetic tests amongst or beyond the current participants, to identify taekwondo talent because of parents’ negative attitudes towards this and the absence of legalised permission to pursue it. These two factors can be described respectively as ‘fundamental social-cultural values’ and ‘basic constitutional structures’ in the ACF’s understanding of ‘relatively stable parameters’ that influence the degree of consensus needed for major policy change and they form short-term constraints as well as resources for different policy actors in the taekwondo policy subsystem. Finally, there is the SAC’s special plan to subsidise outstanding coaches to improve themselves abroad and the issue of the number of taekwondo coaches who can be funded. It has been relatively easy for the CTTA and the SAC to reach an agreement in regard to this issue because it can be classified as a
secondary belief (budgetary applications within a specific programme), changing which is less difficult.

The next case study examines tennis, a sport that originated in England. In addition, tennis is dominated mainly by western players and there are fewer outstanding international performers than in baseball and taekwondo in Taiwan. However, it is a new potential medal-winning sport for Taiwan and has gradually attracted the attention of government. Therefore, it is well worth exploring how this western sport has and is developed in Taiwan.
Chapter 9 Case Study 3: Tennis

At the end of the 19th century, soft tennis developed in Japan from tennis. During the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945), soft tennis was introduced to Taiwan and actively promoted by the Japanese. This was evident in the fact that the Taiwan Physical Education Association, which was established in 1920, included soft tennis as one of its five focused sports in its regulations in 1922 and regularly held All Taiwan soft tennis events. According to the SAC (2011d), many students and the general public were fond of soft tennis at that time. This does not mean that tennis did not follow the introduction of soft tennis to Taiwan, but no Taiwanese, or at least very few, played tennis, and the differences between tennis and soft tennis were unclear or blurred amongst the Taiwanese. In fact, there were only two courts for tennis, and these were privileged for the colonisers’ own use (Li, 2006). Until 1946 – one year after the end of Japanese colonisation – in order to de-Japaneseise Taiwan, the government only included tennis as one of the sports at the first Taiwan Provincial Games, which meant that soft tennis players had to play tennis. However, soft tennis remained more popular than tennis. There were three main reasons for this: (i) the economic conditions of Taiwan were difficult after World War II and tennis equipment was more expensive than that used for soft tennis; (ii) tennis courts were lacking; and (iii) the development of soft tennis during the Japanese colonial period meant that the Taiwanese were more used to playing that version. Nevertheless, two factors gradually increased the popularity of tennis: (i) many KMT party members, military officers, successful businessmen and entrepreneurs in Mainland China liked playing tennis, and after the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, they actively promoted tennis, for example by teaching children and teenagers tennis at their own private tennis courts and through the introduction of tennis to society via the military.

1 The main differences between soft tennis and tennis are the material of the balls and skills required to play. Their rules and courts are also slightly different.
2 The five focused sports were baseball, sumo, swimming, soft tennis and track and field.
3 Soft tennis was a demonstration sport in the 7th Taiwan Provincial Games and became an official sport in the 8th Taiwan Provincial Games.
4 Many party members, military officers, successful businessmen and enterprisers built their own private tennis courts at that time.
and schools; and (ii) some overseas Chinese and students who had learned tennis dedicated themselves to popularising the sport after they came back to Taiwan.

From the above, it can be argued that the foundation of tennis development in Taiwan was soft tennis, i.e. from the Japanese colonial influence. In this respect, it can be argued the development of tennis had a similar historical context to that of baseball.

9.1 The Chinese Taipei Tennis Association

In 1948, the Taiwan Provincial Tennis Association (TPTA) was established and became responsible for the promotion of both tennis and soft tennis. However, there was no tennis association at the national level, which resulted in the fact that in 1956 the International Tennis Federation (ITF) refused to allow Taiwan to participate in the Davis Cup. In order that it could join international tennis events, the Chinese National Tennis Committee (CNTC) was established in 1967. Eventually, in 1970, the ITF agreed that the CNTC could be a member of the ITF using the name the Republic of China Tennis Association (ROCTA). It should be noted, however, that the CNTC did not change its name in Chinese. Until 1973, due to the fact that the government was reforming every NGB, the CNTC was terminated and the ROCTA was officially founded as the primary tennis NGB at the national level. Like other NGBs, the name of the ROCTA was altered to the Chinese Taipei Tennis Association (ROCTA)1 after the signing of An Agreement between the International Olympic Committee and Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee in 1981. Before 1989, the CTNNA can be regarded as having been a quasi-government organisation because the issue of who should be president was determined by the KMT government.

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1 In order to prevent confusion with the Chinese Taipei Taekwondo Association (CTTA), the abbreviation for the Chinese Taipei Tennis Association in this study has been changed to the CTTA.
According to the CTTNA’s articles of association, the main aims behind the establishment of the CTTNA are to promote the game of tennis and enhance the level of tennis performance. Its tasks include developing domestic tennis, hosting national and international tennis events, selecting and organising national tennis teams to participate in international tennis events, examining the qualification of domestic tennis teams that participate in international tennis events, and recommending domestic tennis teams to participate in international events. In addition to these, it is also: (i) invites and arranges for foreign tennis teams to visit Taiwan; (ii) organises tennis umpires’ and coaches’ registration and management and organises tennis umpires’ and coaches’ training camps; (iii) examines the qualification of Taiwanese tennis umpires and coaches who want to be international tennis umpires and coaches and recommends Taiwanese tennis umpires and coaches to be international tennis umpires and coaches; (iv) updates domestic tennis rules and explains tennis rules; (v) examines tennis facilities and equipment; (vi) publishes tennis research, books and documentary material; and (vii) copes with affairs relevant to all of these tasks and the CTTNA’s general aims. The organisational structure of the CTTNA is presented as figure 9.1.

As mentioned above, tennis was introduced to Taiwan in the form of soft tennis in the late 1900s. However, the development of ‘real’ tennis in Taiwan came relatively late compared to some western countries. Between the late 1940s and the mid-1990s, there were only a few outstanding international tennis performances by Taiwan. In recent decades, however, international tennis performances by Taiwanese players have improved. This is evident in the fact that according to the WTA (Women’s Tennis Association) official website’s (2014) description of Taiwan, ‘Chinese Taipei is not a traditional tennis heartland, but it is fast becoming a force to be reckoned with’. This leads to the possibility that tennis is a new potential medal-winning sport for the government, in particular at the Asian Games. Arguably, therefore, the CTTNA can be regarded as one of the country’s most remarkable NGBs in relation to elite success.
Although the CTTNA is responsible for national tennis development, the DPE directly assumes the main responsibility for the promotion of tennis in the education system. Indeed, the DPE’s direct involvement in developing school tennis is significant because, unlike baseball and taekwondo, there is no student tennis federation.

Figure 9.1 The organisational structure of the CTTNA

Source: Adapted from the CTTNA’s website – About the CTTNA. Accessed on 10/11/2014: http://www.tennis.org.tw/tennis/about.asp.
Other NGBs, such as the CTSSF and CTSUF, also share the burden of school tennis development. However, this does not mean that there is no involvement of the CTTNA in the development of school tennis. Indeed, one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) observed that

Our [the CTTNA] primary responsibility is not for school [tennis development]…that is the DPE’s, CTSSF’s or CTSUF’s. However, we hold some tennis events for youth players …they are all students … or assist them [the DPE, CTSSF and CTSUF] in organising school tennis events.

In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the current CTTNA, it is important to note the power relations within the tennis community in the past. Before 1989, although there was strong government involvement in the CTTNA’s presidential elections, presidents of the CTTNA all came from one of these four organisations: the CTTNA, the Kaohsiung City Tennis Association (KCTA), the Taipei City Tennis Association (TCTA) and the TPTA. Moreover, representatives of these bodies were most influential at CTTNA general meetings. Furthermore, each of these bodies had its own resources and social networks. Arguably, therefore, they could be identified as the four most significant power bases in the tennis community. After the CTTNA acquired discretion to manage its own presidential elections from 1990, however, this situation caused serious disputes between the different bodies during elections and meetings. As a result, the Minister of the Interior [MOI] decided in 1998 to disband the CTTNA and require it to reform. Later the same year, the CTTNA reorganised and elected a new president. Nowadays, there are fewer quarrels in the tennis community and within the CTTNA. As one senior member of the CTTNA (Interviewee BB) noted,

The TPTA almost does not exist since the downsizing of the provincial government… Currently, although we dominated national tennis development, I think we rarely have disputes with the KCTA and the
TCTA. We [CTTNA, KCTA and TCTA] get along well and cooperate together to promote tennis.

From the perspective of the ACF, the disbandment of the CTTNA can be treated as an internal shock with the ‘potential to draw in new – or redistribute – critical resources…. This shift in resources may tip the power structure of the policy subsystem from one dominant advocacy coalition and one or more minority coalitions to two or more competitive advocacy coalitions or, in a complete reversal, to a different dominant advocacy coalition with more than one different minority advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 204-205). This change in the power structure of the tennis policy subsystem reduced the number of dominant advocacy coalitions1 from many to one.

In terms of the relationship between the CTTNA and the SAC, the former is the latter’s central competent authority and funding supporter. In this respect, there exists a top-down relationship. Indeed, as one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) described,

One [the CTTNA] is in the private sector and the other [the SAC] is an authority. In addition, we receive funding from them. Therefore, it has powers and responsibilities to supervise us, leading to top-down relationships between us.

However, this interviewee also emphasized that, ‘The top-down relationships are not very obvious...because it [the SAC] will sometimes invite us to its meetings to

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1 In fact, the CTTNA, KCTC, TCTA and TPTA were described by a senior sports journalist – Su Chia-Hsiang – in 1993 as the ‘big four’ in the tennis community, meaning that it was difficult to judge which association was more powerful or dominant than the others. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they were all dominant coalitions.
discuss sports policies in relation to tennis development or how to host tennis events… although to discuss more on the latter issue than the former’.

There are three noteworthy points here. First, in addition to the CTTNA, as a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee BB) noted, ‘Academics and experts will be included in some of the SAC meetings’. Second, the CTTNA mainly adopts three approaches to delivering its views to the SAC when disagreement occurs between them. As a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) suggested, these are: (i) ‘Some senior members of the SAC come to negotiate with us and we can reflect on our thoughts with them’; (ii) ‘We also request legislators and/or the media to help us to express our opinions’; and (iii) ‘Sometimes, our president or General Secretary will directly negotiate with the SAC’. From the above, the CTTNA, academics and experts, legislators and the media can be identified as policy actors from the perspective of the ACF, due to the fact that they attempt to influence tennis policies or deliver their belief systems to the government. In fact, in the case of tennis, some tennis players and their parents can also be treated as policy actors within the tennis policy subsystem because, as one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) noted, ‘Some tennis players and their family members… their parents in general… will try to influence our distribution of subsidies to them or make complaints about some of our measures through the media or legislators’.

Third, the SAC is involved to a certain extent in the CTTNA’s affairs because, as one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) mentioned paradoxically, ‘It [the SAC] would not get involved in our affairs, but it would show its consideration or offer some suggestions about our internal elections and national teams’ selection, training and competition’. However, another senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee BB) clarified, explaining that

In fact, compared with most other [sports] associations, our degree of discretion is relatively high and situations in which the SAC use subsidies to control us rarely occurs. This is because more than half… a little more
than half of our annual budget is raised by ourselves. Nevertheless, the SAC is still a big sponsor… whoever suckles me [the CTTNA] is my mother. Generally, therefore, we would negotiate and/or cooperate with the SAC if it gave us some suggestions about our affairs.

The above information highlights the fact that a smaller percentage of public funding in an NGB’s annual budget can allow the NGB to have a higher degree of discretion. In this case, however, although the SAC’s subsidy accounts for a smaller percentage of the CTTNA’s annual budget, the SAC still acts as a significant sponsor for the CTTNA, leading to the fact that the CTTNA cannot be truly free of government control.

It is also important to reflect on the relationships between the CTTNA and another two organisations – the ROCSF and CTOC – in order to obtain a more complete profile of the CTTNA’s external relations. First, as mentioned in the other two case studies, despite the fact that the ROCSF remains an umbrella organisation for most NGBs, including the CTTNA, the importance of the ROCSF to NGBs largely decreased after the SAC took over the NSTC. Moreover, currently, the interactions between the CTTNA and the ROCSF are few in number and limited to tennis coach and umpire training. Second, there are only a few interactions between the CTTNA and the CTOC. This was explained by a senior CTOC member of staff (Interviewee K), who observed that:

Tennis is a highly and internationally professionalised sport…they have their own system…they rarely need our assistance. Normally, we would have some interactions when they were going to participate in IOC-related sports events or if the SAC required us to help them to seek more sponsorship for tennis… but it rarely happened.
9.2 The Development of Elite Level Facilities

At the NSTC, there are some tennis courts for the exclusive use of elite tennis players. However, one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee C) mentioned that ‘The NSTC’s tennis courts can be used for training, but their quality is perhaps not good enough’. Outside the NSTC, there is no tennis training centre or courts at the national level. Although some cities/counties, schools/universities and private tennis clubs possess tennis courts or centres, they are generally accessible either to students or staff members or to club memberships/people who pay. In addition, it seems that most of these courts cannot be identified as elite level tennis facilities in terms of quality. As one senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) suggested,

The city/county public tennis courts and tennis courts in schools, universities and private tennis clubs were not built for the purpose of elite players’ usage or hosting international tennis events. They do not need to be built for so-called elite level tennis …such as consisting of several tennis courts of high quality and with professional facilities. You cannot say their quality is poor… because there is no problem for training or playing… but they are just not elite level tennis courts.

From the above, it can be argued that the development of elite level tennis facilities is insufficient in Taiwan. One might wonder then how Taiwan can host international tennis events1. In fact, there are still a few city/county level tennis centres whose quality remains sufficient to host international tennis events, such as Yang-Ming Tennis Centre in Kaohsiung. In addition, professional tennis courts can be placed temporarily in some stadia (indoor carpet courts), such as the Taipei Arena. Nevertheless, at least as early as the 1990s, the tennis community stressed the problem of insufficient tennis facilities at the elite level and began to appeal to the

1 Taiwan used to host some international tennis events, such as the Davis Cup, the Fed Cup, the OEC Kaohsiung ATP Challenger and the OEC Taipei WTA Challenger.
government to improve the overall tennis environment by constructing a national tennis centre. As one senior sports journalist (Interviewee E) recalled, ‘From the very beginning of my sports journalist career… around 1993, there has been a voice asking the government to build a national tennis centre’. Before 2010, however, the government seemed to have a passive attitude towards that argument because, as the sports journalist added, ‘Although the government promised to build a national tennis centre, there was no sign of any government attempt to realise this promise until recently’. Nevertheless, in 2010, the SAC decided to provide the Taichung City with half of the total budget to build a national tennis centre. In 2014, the Taichung National Tennis Centre began to be built and is expected to be completely finished within five years. The change in the government’s attitude towards the construction of an elite level tennis centre can be attributed to two main internal factors: (i) the tennis community’s continual efforts to appeal to the government to build an elite level tennis centre; and (ii) the outstanding tennis performances on the international stage. As one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) mentioned,

The tennis community has been asking the SAC to construct a professional national tennis centre for many years. It is about time that the government should at least give some response. Of course, the consistently remarkable international performances by tennis players in recent years also allowed the tennis community to have more counters with which to persuade the government, and increase its willingness.

There are also two main external factors: the injection of sports lottery funds into sports development and the Taichung City government’s attempt to make Taichung City an international city. As one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) noted,

The injection of sports lottery funds into sports development does help us a lot to have more allowance for the improvement of the sports environment for elite athletes…. In the case of tennis, we used the sports lottery funds to subsidise the Taichung City government to build a national tennis centre.
It is also important to have the Taichung City government’s cooperation, such as in providing land and sharing the burden of the construction costs… in fact, they are willing to cooperate because… I think Mayor Hu… he wants to reform Taichung City as an international city through hosting more different international events, including tennis events and…. The prerequisite for that is having professional tennis facilities….

According to the ACF, people who appeal to the SAC to construct a national tennis centre can be identified as policy actors within the tennis policy subsystem. Moreover, outstanding international tennis performances can be treated as one of the advocacy coalition’s resources to deliver their belief system to the government. Furthermore, the Taichung City government’s urban planning for the tennis subsystem is an external system event – policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems – which generates short-term resources for policy actors in the tennis policy subsystem.

There will also be another elite level tennis facility – the Taipei Tennis Centre – in the near future, due to the fact that Taipei City will host the 2017 Summer Universiade. However, this does not mean that either the government or the Taipei City government has an active attitude towards constructing an elite level tennis centre in Taipei City. As one senior sports journalist (Interviewee D) commented,

To date, in Taipei City, there is no tennis facility that is good enough to host an international tennis event. Recently, the government and the Taipei City government have had no choice but to build a professional tennis centre because of the 2017 Taipei Universiade. Otherwise, I do not think they had any plan to do this.

There are two additional noteworthy points. First, Taiwanese elite tennis players rarely use domestic tennis facilities to train. The lack of professional tennis facilities
could be one reason for this. However, a senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) provided another important explanation:

Tennis is very different from other sports. Real elite tennis players have to compete around the world because tennis is a highly internationalized professional sport and there are plenty of international tennis tournaments. Moreover, if they [tennis players] want to obtain direct admission to the Olympic Games, they have to participate in more professional tournaments and win more professional matches. In fact, they do not really stay in Taiwan for long, which means that they rarely use domestic tennis facilities. Instead, they use training courts at tournaments to train more…. But I do not mean that there is no need to have an elite level tennis centre in Taiwan.

In addition, a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) added that ‘Although domestic tennis courts perhaps are not good enough, professional tennis players generally utilise the tennis courts at their universities or previous schools/universities or their own preferred tennis courts, to train when they are in Taiwan… Each of them is different’.

Second, schools, public tennis courts and private tennis clubs/courts are three main providers of tennis facilities for grass-roots players. However, the popularity of tennis courts in schools seems to be less than baseball fields and taekwondo courts. A senior DPE member of staff (Interviewee Q) explained that

There are many schools that have simple baseball fields because we subsidise them in order to promote baseball in schools. …The construction of taekwondo courts is easier and cheaper than that of tennis courts for

1 Some Taiwanese professional tennis players are university students.
schools…They [schools] only need an indoor place and some mats…of course these should be sufficient to protect students from injury. Generally, therefore, of these three sports, tennis courts are less popular in schools.

In addition, although there is a lack of statistical evidence, private tennis clubs may not be as popular as private taekwondo clubs/dojangs. As one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee BB) suggested, ‘The popularity of private tennis clubs is unlikely to compare with that of private taekwondo dojangs because the tennis market is smaller than that of taekwondo… there are not as many children playing tennis as taekwondo’.

9.3 The Identification of Sporting Talent and the Development System

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in Taiwan there is a twelve-year compulsory education system for children from six years old. Moreover, one senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) suggested that ‘Tennis players should not start their tennis training later than eight or nine years old because a better age for them to turn pro is around eighteen and a tennis player’s development generally requires at least seven to eight years’. As for most other sports, therefore, the school is an important site for identifying tennis talent. In schools, however, there is a lack of any identification of tennis talent outside of the current participants. As one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee BB) asserted,

Our [Taiwan’s] identification of tennis talent does not adopt the approach of selecting tennis talent from a group of school children who have never played tennis before. Identifying talent beyond the pool of current participants is more like the approach that some communist countries
would adopt. We [Taiwan] cannot because we are a democratic country. ...[Moreover] If you [coaches or the government] identified children outside the current participants, you would give parents an impression that you [coaches or the government] intend to guide their children to be athletes. Although parents are relatively more open-minded nowadays than in the past, the traditional concept of valuing letters [academic studies] and belittling arms [sports] remains. Therefore, they would not normally be happy with their children being athletes. This situation might be even worse in the case of tennis because it is an expensive sport, meaning that cultivating one child to be a tennis player means investing a fortune... not to mention that they may not be good enough to turn pro in the future. In fact, most families cannot easily afford this.

From the logic of the ACF, most parents’ traditional understanding (fundamental social cultural values) and the democratic political system (basic constitutional structure) are relatively stable parameters.

Nevertheless, there might be one exception outside the school system. One sports policy academic (Interviewee Y) noted that, ‘In the case of tennis, a few Taiwanese parents/families that are interested in tennis and/or have a tennis background have already decided to pilot their children/families’ children towards becoming tennis players before they really engage in this sport’. In this respect, the identification of tennis talent extends beyond the current participants. However, it is reasonable to believe that there is no, or at least very little, involvement of scientific factors in this exception. It should also be noted that although this situation might be seen in other sports, it might happen more often in the case of tennis. This is evident in the fact that, as this sports policy academic further commented, ‘Compared with most sports, there are more tennis players, in particular elite tennis players, whose initial coaches are their parents or family members’.
Amongst the current participants, the identification of tennis talent is mainly through the competition system. As with taekwondo, however, there has been a government attempt to systemise this approach by establishing a database of tennis talent that records competition results. More recently, according to *The Six-Year Plan for the Cultivation of Sports Talent in Schools for the 2017 Universiade*, the government proposed to utilise the database to filter tennis talent.

In terms of the development system for tennis players, there are some similarities between tennis and other sports. First, there is a four-level cultivation system. Second, the fourth, third and second levels of the development system are connected to the education system – some primary, junior high (fourth level) and senior high schools (third level) that have sports classes and universities (second level), in particular sports universities and those that have sports departments, offer places for outstanding players, allowing them to continue not only their studies, but also their tennis training. In the case of tennis, however, fewer schools with sports classes at the fourth and third levels provide places for tennis players and, these schools tend to be concentrated in certain cities and/or counties. The main reason for this was explained by a senior DPE member of staff (Interviewee Q), who stated that

There are limitations in the provision of tennis courts and/or coaches in schools...I mean not many schools have tennis courts and coaches. Moreover, only some cities/counties are active in developing tennis in schools, such as Tainan City. Therefore, there are fewer primary, junior high and senior high schools that offer places for tennis players and, these are limited to certain cities/counties.

Moreover, it seems that schools and universities, in particular the latter, play a less important role in the development system of tennis players than for most other sports, which can be attributed to three factors. First, there is greater involvement of parents/family, including financial and/or coaching support, in tennis players’ development. As one sports policy academic (Interviewee Y) noted,
In the case of tennis... many individual sports have a similar situation. As you can see, parents/families are the most important supporters for most tennis players during the early stages of their development.

Second, a potential elite player will normally have another coach or other coaches and be trained outside of his/her school/university. Third, outstanding developing players or elite players are not able to spend much time in schools/universities. As one senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) mentioned:

A real potential player should start to play internationally…enter the international tennis ranking system from fifteen years old…or a little earlier… if he/she wants to have a more successful tennis career.

It is worth mentioning that there are two general plans in relation to the development system of athletes respectively for every sport and for some sports, including tennis. The first is The Mid and Long-term Plan for Sports Talent Development, which involves providing additional funding to NGBs to improve the development system of athletes. According to a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee BB),

In the case of tennis, this additional funding is not used to promote tennis or improve the development system at the grass-roots level because tennis is not a ‘Sports for All’ sport… it is a more elite sport. Therefore, we mainly use it for subsidising elite or outstanding developing players to participate in international competitions. Nevertheless, this is also part of the development system for players.

The second plan is The Six-Year Plan for the Cultivation of Sports Talent in Schools for the 2017 Universiade – which is solely for Universiade sports (including taekwondo). With this plan, the government intends to strengthen
the development of Universiade sports talent in the education system. However, due to the fact that the importance of schools is less in the case of tennis, this plan is unlikely to benefit tennis very much.

9.4 The Provision of Domestic and International Competition Opportunities for Elite Athletes

In the case of tennis, a highly international professionalised competition system leads to the fact that elite players rarely participate in domestic tennis events. Therefore, it seems that whether or not the provision of domestic competition opportunities is sufficient for elite tennis players is not an important issue. As one senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) suggested,

In fact, domestic events are mainly for developing players. Domestic tennis events are not the elite players’ stage. International tennis tournaments are their just stage. If they needed to compete in domestic tennis events, they would not be considered elite players. In this respect, there are really no ‘domestic tennis events for elite players’…. although they can participate in any of these events. In any case, exploring the issue of whether there are sufficient domestic tennis events for elite players is meaningless.

In fact, wild card qualifying competitions for international professional tennis events hosted in Taiwan might be the only domestic tennis events in which some elite tennis players who do not have direct admission participate. That said, in order to have a more complete understanding of the issue of the provision of domestic events, there are some other domestic tennis events at a relatively high level. For example, there are tennis events in the National Games and National University Games and the
National High School Games and domestic ranking tournaments, held by the CTTNA.

The issue of the provision of international tennis events in Taiwan for elite players must be discussed from two perspectives. First, there is the provision of international tennis events in Taiwan. Currently, there are the OEC Kaohsiung ATP Challenger (ATP Challenger Tour; 125000 USD), the OEC Taipei WTA Challenger (WTA125K series), the Santaizi ATP Challenger (ATP Challenger Tour; 75000 USD), the Santaizi Cup ITF Women's Circuit (10000 USD), the Formosa Cup ITF Futures Kaohsiung (15000 USD) and the Caesar and Imperial Cup ITF Women’s Circuit (50000 USD). In addition to these international professional tournaments, Taiwan has also hosted some Davis Cup matches (Asia/Oceania Zone) and Fed Cup matches (Asia/Oceania Zone). As a small country, it seems that Taiwan provides an appropriate number of international competition opportunities for elite players. However, these events are at the second (ATP or WTA Challengers) and third (ITF Circuits) tiers of international professional competition. A possible reason why there are no higher level international professional tournaments in Taiwan was suggested by one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M), who commented that ‘At the moment, the ITF or ATP would not agree to us having higher level tournaments because the quality of our tennis facilities is not good and our pro players’ average strength is not sufficient’.

Nevertheless, although they are not first level competitions, having professional events in Taiwan remains important because Taiwanese players, in particular those who are lower ranked or up-and-coming, can enjoy wild card qualification and other

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1 A pro player’s ATP/WTA points can be directly transformed to domestic ranking points if his world ranking is top 500 or hers is top 300. One ATP point is equal to thirty domestic ranking points and one WTA point is equal to twenty.
2 It should be mentioned that the above information is mainly based on the year 2014 and the names and prizes/levels of some events might be different in the past and in the future.
3 The Davis Cup and Fed Cup are not international professional tournaments. However, world professional ranking points are awarded to participants at the World Group and the World Group playoff ties stages. The ranking points are not awarded to any Fed Cup participants. Davis and Fed Cups players represent their countries, rather than themselves.
home game advantages. Moreover, considering that Taiwanese players’ average world rankings are not high, with the exception of women’s doubles, it can be argued that the point distribution of the Challengers and ITF circuits are important for Taiwanese players to upgrade their rankings. This is evident in the fact that many top Taiwanese players and lower ranked/up-and-coming players participate respectively in the Challengers and ITF circuits.

It is important to mention one point here. Although the ATP/WTA Challenger and ITF Circuit are professional tennis events, the SAC still provides public funding for the CTTNA to organise them because, as one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) noted,

Hosting these professional tennis events can help our players to earn more professional points and improve their world rankings. If their rankings are high enough, they can receive direct acceptance into the Olympics and the Asian Games or have better draws in the Asian Games and Olympics. Moreover, these events are international events that can only increase the international profile of Taiwan.

However, one senior CTTNA member of staff mentioned (Interviewee BB) that, ‘The SAC’s subsidies only account for less than half of the organising costs of a professional tournament… So we have to seek the rest of the costs by seeking corporate sponsorships’. In this respect, the CTTNA and corporate sponsorships play an important role in the provision of international events in Taiwan. Nevertheless, according to The Sports Industry Development Acts, profits from ticket sales for sports events are free from income tax and corporations can enjoy tax reductions if they sponsor sports events. In fact, this government initiative can be considered as an additional and indirect form of public sponsorship for the CTTNA to host events.
The second dimension is the provision of subsidies for elite players to participate in international tennis events in other countries. As mentioned above, pro players’ world rankings directly influence their qualification and draw in the Olympics and Asian Games. However, they are professional and represent themselves, rather than the nation in professional tournaments. Arguably, all of this might cause the government’s confused emotions in relation to the issue of whether it should fund pro players. As one retired SAC minister (Interviewee P) mentioned,

Theoretically, the government should not fund professional players because first, they can earn prize money for themselves and will not return it back to us; and second, when they become famous… that is their personal achievement. This might cause some criticism of using the public budget to benefit private individuals. However, their rankings are relevant to the Olympics and the Asian Games and people will know where they are from when they become famous. Therefore, we have no choice but to subsidise them.

Nevertheless, although the government does give financial support to pro players to participate in professional tournaments, the subsidies are limited. In addition, due to the fact that there are so many professional tournaments, as a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee BB) stated, ‘Their family have to share the burden of the costs to participate professional tournaments and/or they have to seek some sponsorships or raise money for themselves before they can afford it’.

Although this section intends to focus on the elite level, in order to have a more comprehensive understanding, it is worth listing some important points that are relevant to the provision of domestic and international competition opportunities for outstanding developing players. First, it should be reemphasised that because elite players concentrate on international tournaments, almost all domestic tennis events are of primary importance for developing players. Second, in addition to tennis events within the education system, there are national ranking tournaments, national junior
ranking tournaments and some local level tennis events. Third, tennis events within the education system are dominated by the DPE, CTUSF and CTSSF, but the CTTNA and city/county tennis associations play a supportive role. Fourth, the CTTNA and the city/county tennis associations are responsible for tennis events outside of the education system. Fifth, a senior DPE member of staff (Interviewee Q) admitted that ‘Although there are tennis events in the National University Games and National High School Games, the provision of competition opportunities in the education system for developing players is insufficient because of a lack of tennis facilities in schools’. Sixth, there are some ITF Junior Circuits in Taiwan, such as the Mian-Chang Cup International Junior Championships, the GreenMax Cup International Junior Championships, the Nan-Ying Cup International Junior Championships and the Chief Minister Cup International Junior Championships, which are organised by the CTTNA. Seventh, although the government subsidises remarkable developing players to participate in international junior championships hosted in other countries, their families also have to share the burden of the costs. As one senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) noted, ‘Our government rarely fully funds developing players to compete abroad… it is the same for other sports’.

9.5 The Development System for Coaches, the Provision of Coaches and of Sports Science Support

As for most other sports, the development system for tennis coaches was established by the CTTNA in the 1980s and, as a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) mentioned, ‘I also used to be a tennis coach…I think there is no significant difference between our development system of tennis coaches and those of other sports nowadays’. In this respect, it can be argued that the mechanism of the tennis coach development system generally shares seven similarities with those of other sports, as listed in the corresponding section of the case study on taekwondo.
In the case of tennis, however, four additional points are worth mentioning. First, although there is a lack of statistical evidence, one senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) noted that

Many tennis coaches are produced through our coach development system. However, the quantity of tennis coaches remains difficult to compare with that of some other sports, such as baseball and taekwondo in your study or basketball, swimming… because there are fewer people who have tennis backgrounds or experience.

Second, the coach development system in tennis seems to place more emphasis on coaches’ English ability than it does in baseball and taekwondo because learning English tennis terminology is included as one of the compulsory programmes in tennis coach training camps. One senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) explained that

In order to allow players to concentrate more on training and competition, there should be someone to help them to communicate, negotiate or even argue with hosts… of course in English on most occasions. However, you [pro players] are in no position to request the government to arrange a regular translator for you because you are a pro player and participate in professional tournaments, which means that your coach has to do this for their players. Therefore, decent English ability and knowing tennis terms in English are basic prerequisites for a tennis coach.

Third, the CTTNA has begun to deliver anti-doping knowledge to coaches by posting tennis anti-doping information on the coaching section of its website. This could be mainly because of the more active attitude on the part of the ITF towards the anti-doping issue in recent years. Fourth, although, unlike taekwondo, the CTTNA did not apply in 2011 to the SAC to subsidise outstanding coaches to train abroad, this does
not mean that it plays a passive role in the cultivation of elite tennis coaches. In fact, the CTTNA actively cultivates elite coaches through various approaches as follows: (i) by regularly organising elite coach training camps that are different from class C, B and A coach training camps for outstanding coaches and by inviting famous foreign coaches, such as Juan Manuel Esparcia Clemente and Zahalka Christian, to the camps to impart their training experiences, knowledge and technics; (ii) by sometimes subsidising outstanding coaches to attend tennis coach training camps in other countries, the ITF Worldwide Coaches Conferences and the ITF Regional Coaches Conferences; and (iii) by holding tennis coach forums and arranging for Taiwanese coaches who have come back from foreign tennis training camps or ITF coaches conferences to deliver their acquired training knowledge or techniques.

In addition, the CTTNA’s subsidies for organising these additional elite coach training camps and provide outstanding coaches to improve abroad mainly come from the government, which thereby plays an indirect, but important, role in the cultivation of elite tennis coaches.

In terms of the provision of coaches for elite tennis players, a general mechanism is that the SAC provides public funding through the CTTNA for elite players to seek coaches themselves, which is different from the mechanism in baseball and taekwondo. Arguably, such a mechanism can be attributed to one major factor, which was suggested by a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee BB) that

Each tennis player’s demands with regard to their coach, in particular when he/she reaches elite level, are very subjective and individualised. On the one hand, we do not have sufficient time to arrange that for each of them, and on the other, players would not be satisfied with coaches arranged by us. Therefore, the best or most efficient way to proceed is that we give them funding, which comes from the SAC, and they seek their own coaches.
However, there is a salary cap on the public funding available for elite players to employ coaches. This means that players and/or their families have to share the burden of their coaches’ salaries if they want to employ coaches whose salaries exceed the cap. One sports policy academic (Interviewee Y) commented on this situation,

Although players’ world rankings are connected to their qualification and draw in the Olympics and the Asian Games, they are still pro players. Moreover, they can win prizes. Therefore, it is perhaps kind of unreasonable to request the government to fully fund players to employ expensive coaches.

Two points arise here. First, in Taiwan, the role of the family in the provision of coaches for elite players is not simply limited to that of an indirect funding supporter. In fact, this sometimes directly involves providing coaches for players, which is evident in the fact that, as one senior sports journalist (Interviewee D) mentioned, ‘Many elite Taiwanese players’ parents or family members are their coaches’. Second, the CTTNA and/or the SAC do select and provide national coaches\(^1\) for elite players when they participate in the Olympics, Asian Games, East Asian Games and Davis/Fed Cups. With the exception of national coaches who are also national players’ parents/family members\(^2\), however, most other national coaches are not full-time, meaning that they do not accompany players when they participate in international tennis tournaments. This leads to the fact that, as one senior SAC member of staff (Interviewee N) noted, ‘Problems of interactions and communications between them [national coaches who are not national players’ parents/family members and players] might occur’.

\(^1\) Generally, there are one head coach, one coach for the men’s team and one for the women’s team.
\(^2\) In the case of Taiwan, national tennis players’ coaches who are their parents/family members are sometimes selected into national coaching teams.
At the grass-roots and/or developing levels, the CTTNA, families, the school system and private tennis clubs play an important role in the provision of coaches. First, the CTTNA sometimes organises tennis training camps for junior players and invites foreign coaches, such as Clemente, to coach. Second, as already recognised, parents or family members are some players’ initial coaches. Third, notwithstanding that tennis is relatively less popular in schools because fewer schools have tennis courts, those schools that have tennis courts and actively develop tennis provide tennis coaches for student tennis players. Fourth, most private tennis clubs offer coaches outside of the school system for student players who have club membership, including grass-roots level players.

With regard to sports science support, one senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) noted that ‘There is a lack of sport science support from the government and elite players or their coaches have to take the main responsibility for it’. Indeed, due to the fact that national/elite tennis players do not train at the NSTC, they hardly have opportunities to enjoy the sports science support provided by the NSTC. Moreover, although some sports universities might offer sports science support for student elite tennis players, as a senior CTTNA member of staff (Interviewee M) commented, ‘These are fragmented’. Furthermore, no particular sports science support programme or plan has been enacted by the government for elite tennis players. The only chance for them to have sports science support that is offered by the government is during international multi-sports events (e.g. the Olympic Games, the Asian Games and the East Asian Games) and the Davis/Fed Cups. However, it should be mentioned that the sports science support at international multi-sports events is for every national athlete, rather than for national tennis players specifically.

Compared with elite players, however, it seems that developing players in certain cities or counties have more opportunity to receive sports science support. For example, according to *The Cultivation System of Regional Sports Talents Plan (Kaohsiung City) – Tennis*, in 2011, some schools, ranging from primary to senior high schools, in Kaohsiung City, combined the sports science resources of the NSTC to provide sports science support for developing players.
9.6 The Emergence of Full-Time Athletes

As mentioned previously, tennis has a highly international professionalised competition system. Moreover, one senior national tennis coach (Interviewee T) suggested that

If he/she [a tennis player] has turned pro, he/she will already be an elite player; if not, he/she will not be identified as an elite player.

Arguably, therefore, the issue of the emergence of full-time athletes in the case of tennis is straightforward. In the case of Taiwan, however, three important points should be mentioned. First, although there are domestic ranking tournaments, the players’ domestic rankings are mainly used for the selection of national players. Second, the establishment of an international professionalised competition system is clearly irrelevant to the government of Taiwan, although this does not mean that there is no government contribution to the generation of full-time Taiwanese tennis players. In fact, public funding for elite players can be considered as a governmental initiative in relation to the emergence of full time players. Third, due to the fact that there are some pro players who are also full-time students, one might ask how they can manage their professional careers and their studies. A retired SAC minister (Interviewee G) admitted that ‘They all play internationally in professional tournaments almost all year…they are just nominal students in their universities’. Nevertheless, one senior DPE member of staff also noted that

In the case of tennis, if pro players participate in international tournaments, the universities normally allow them to have official leave. They only need to join the intensive curriculum when they come back to Taiwan… their universities will arrange many teachers for them.
9.7 Conclusion

Having explored tennis development at the elite level in Taiwan, some concepts relevant to the ACF approach should be reviewed. First, the disbandment of the CTTNA by the MOI in 1998 was an internal shock within the tennis policy subsystem, which changed its power structure from many dominate coalitions to one. Second, the CTTNA, academics and experts, tennis players and their parents, legislators and the media can be identified as policy actors within the subsystem and together they attempt to influence the government’s tennis policy. Third, in the case of the development of elite level facilities, those who appealed to the SAC to build a national tennis centre should also be treated as policy actors. Moreover, the outstanding performances in recent years are one of the advocacy coalition’s resources that are utilised to deliver their belief system – such as having a national tennis centre – to the government. Furthermore, for the tennis policy subsystem, the Taichung City government’s urban plan is an external event, providing policy actors with short-term resources. Fourth, on the topic of the identification of tennis talent, most parents’ traditional values (fundamental socio-cultural values) and the democratic political system (basic constitutional structure) are two important and relatively stable parameters according to the ACF perspective.
Chapter 10 Conclusion

10.1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to explain elite sports policy within the general context of Taiwan’s welfare regime and institutional features using the Advocacy Coalition Framework. History tells us that sport, and in particular elite sporting success, have been widely used by governments and/or people for various non-sporting purposes. Taiwan’s difficult diplomatic situation – with its legitimacy unrecognised by a majority of other countries – has been instrumental in encouraging politicians to appreciate the value of sport and international sporting success. Indeed, even at the very beginning of the ROC government’s relocation in Taiwan, sport was used politically to strengthen the nation’s physical constitution for military preparedness in order to retake the Mainland China, to consolidate anti-Communist relationships with South Korea and the Philippines, to enhance relations between Taiwan and the USA, and to proclaim the KMT’s legitimate status as the ruling party of China. Increased government awareness of the value of international sporting success was further stimulated in the late 1960s by a series of outstanding performances on the international stage by Taiwan’s youth baseball players. Their achievements served to increase the country’s profile and prestige, to enhance national pride and consolidate national identity, to garner support from Chinese compatriots in the USA, and to improve relations between internal province people, external province people and indigenous people. In recent years, in addition to continuing to strive for baseball triumphs on the world stage, bidding for international sporting events has become one of the main strategies for the government to involve itself in international affairs and/or obtain even more international recognition.

Through a comprehensive literature review of sports policy analysis research, it emerges that more and more governments have demonstrated growing interest in the development of elite sport policies during the past few decades. Arguably, the
recognition of the value of elite sporting success has been a major influence in this respect. However, this inevitably results in the fact that competition in international sporting events has become intensified. Within this context, much of the literature suggests that elite sport systems of certain countries, in particular the major sporting powers, are converging towards a similar model with some local variations. Taiwan is a small country and can hardly be considered as a sporting power. Nevertheless, the political value of sporting success makes elite sport policies and development in Taiwan of considerable interest.

10.2 Summary of the Findings

At the first level of analysis of Taiwan’s sports policy, an institutional approach provides insights into the issue of whether sports policy and policy-making can reflect Taiwan’s welfare regime and four other institutional features. The main finding from this approach is that sports development and policy-making in Taiwan basically comply with broader institutional features. First, the government plays a dominant role in sports development but provides limited funding. Second, sport is less commercialised than in many countries. Third, there is an important role for the family in the provision of sport. Fourth, although sports development and policy-making are mainly dominated by the central government, local governments share the burden and have the power to enact regulations and make policy relating to sports development at the local level on condition that this is not contrary to the central government’s regulations and laws. Fifth, the executive dominates in terms of shaping sports policy. Sixth, the relationship between the government and NGBs follows neoplaralist lines, but there are some elements of corporatism, such as the close cooperation and negotiation between government and the private sector. Seventh, sports policy and development are more competitive and elite oriented than focused on mass participation.
At the second level, the ACF was adopted to analyse the evolution of sports policy over time. Indeed, one of the main values of the ACF is that it helps us to explain policy change within a given political system and set of institutional arrangements over periods of a decade or more. Moreover, the inclusion of two sets of external factors in the ACF allows researchers to develop a more comprehensive policy analysis by taking into account the issues of which factors impose constraints or provide resources for policy actors and how they do so, and in turn, how this affects the overall policy process. Furthermore, in addition to the traditional iron triangle (of agency officers, legislators and interest groups), the ACF includes two further categories of policy actor in the policy subsystem where the majority of policy-making occurs. This innovation is valuable for developing a more complete understanding of the policy-making process because these newly added policy actors, such as journalists, researchers and those who are at different level of government and responsible for policy formulation and implementation, also play an important role in the policy-making process.

The main findings based on the ACF are presented as follows. First, between 1949 and 1987, the level of consensus and the openness of the political system needed for major sports policy change – were low in Taiwan as a consequence of authoritarian government. This also meant that sports development was determined by a small number of political elites. Since 1987 and the end of the authoritarian regime, however, the level of consensus and the openness of political system needed for major sports policy change has been raised with Taiwan moving towards an increasingly liberal and democratic system of governance.

Second, during the period of 1949 to 1955, sports policy focused on the development of physical education for national defence, and there was limited government intervention in sports development. Elite sports development was left mainly in the hands of the military and mass sports development received very little attention at all from the government. The sports policy subsystem and, thus, sports development itself were heavily influenced by a factor external to that subsystem – namely,
government’s decision to largely emphasise military preparedness (a policy decision with impact from another subsystem).

Third, the appointment in 1956 of a military general to be president of ROCSF/CTOC and also the restoration of the NPEC and the increase in 1961 in its personnel and budget were indicative of increasing government involvement in sports development. In addition, between 1956 and 1972, elite sports development was given greater emphasis than before and more than mass sports development. There were three internal shocks and one external event which not only generated resources for the elite sports advocacy coalition to deliver their thoughts to the government, but also confirmed their policy core beliefs. The three internal shocks were (1) the disputes between ROC and PRC over the one China issue which extended into the international sports arena in the early 1950s and became more serious from the second half of the 1950s; (2) the poor performance by Taiwan at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics; and (3) a series of outstanding performances by Taiwanese youth baseball teams on the international stage from 1968. The crucial external factor was that the ROC was excluded from the UN in the 1971 and sport became one of few available channels for the government to maintain its international interactions.

Fourth, the introduction of The Sports for All Promotion Programme in 1976 highlighted the government’s increased attention on mass sports development. Arguably, after launching The Ten Major Infrastructure Projects, the subsequent transformation of lifestyle and higher incomes can be considered external factors with changes in the socio-economic conditions providing resources for the mass sports policy coalition. However, elite sports development was still given priority by the government during the period from 1973 to 1986. A series of diplomatic setbacks including exclusion from the UN followed by the Canadian government’s refusal to allow the ROC national team to enter its country and participate in the 1976 Montreal Olympics were an external and an internal shock respectively for the elite sports coalition, which strengthened the elite sports policy actors’ belief system and provided them with resources to persuade government to continue to put an emphasis on elite sports development.
Fifth, from the 1990s onwards, the government paid more attention to mass sports development than ever before although its main emphasis continued to be on elite sports development. Three facts provide evidence of this – the introduction of a set of mass sports policies, more balanced budget allocation between mass and elite sports development, and a declaration of the government’s preferred direction of sports development – i.e. having dual objectives (mass and elite sports development). Three external factors affecting the sports policy sub-system can identified between the 1990s and the early 2010s: (i) intensified rapid economic growth between the late the 1980s and late the 1990s and the construction of a more liberal society (resulting, in part, from changes in socio-economic conditions); (ii) governing party rotation on two occasions (i.e. a change in the systemic governing coalition); (iii) a policy of two-days-off per week; and (iv) a continued need to utilise international sporting success to increase Taiwan’s international profile in order to increase national pride and strengthen national identity (i.e. policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems). In addition, the winning of Taiwan’s first two Olympic gold medals at the 2004 Athens Olympic Games and a poor performance at the 2008 Beijing Olympics were both significant internal shocks for the elite sports coalition.

The general overview of elite sports policy in Taiwan was followed by three case studies – baseball, taekwondo and tennis. Although each of them has different historical trajectories in Taiwan, they operate in the same political context in which elite achievement matters. In addition, these three case studies are important and valuable because they provide a more detailed account of elite sports development in Taiwan. By analysing the three sports, we can discern some major similarities and differences between them in terms of policy-making, the role of their NGBs and the five elements of the development system at elite level. First, the CTBA, the CTTA and the CTTNA were all established in the 1973 as primary NGBs for their own disciplines at the national level when the government reformed all sports NGBs. Moreover, the three NGBs are remarkable in relation to elite success, thereby establishing that they are important to government. However, the CTBA can be identified as the most internationalised NGB, for example in terms of its capacity to build close personal connections with international federations. However, it seems that the CTTA and CTTNA are more dominant in the development of taekwondo and
trends at elite level respectively than the CTBA in relation to baseball because of the existence of a professional baseball league – the CPBL. Ultimately, the relationships between the SAC and the three NGBs are top-down because the former is the NGBs’ central competent authority and main funding supporter. Indeed, the three NGBs’ heavy dependence on SAC subsidies means that their affairs are unlikely to be free from government supervision and control as they are unable to refuse to cooperate with the SAC’s policies. However, they can offer suggestions about baseball, taekwondo and tennis development or policies respectively when they are included in SAC meetings. In addition to this, certain strategies adopted by them to influence SAC decision-making or budget allocation have been identified: (i) seeking help from legislators to negotiate with the SAC; (ii) sending their presidents or general secretaries to communicate with the SAC; (iii) expressing their thoughts through the media; and (iv) utilising outstanding international sporting performances as counters with which to bargain with the SAC. The similarity between the three NGBs can also be seen in their limited interactions with three other important organisations – the DPE, the CTOC and the ROCSF.

Second, in terms of the development of elite level sports facilities, although the NSTC provides sports facilities for the exclusive use of elite athletes from the three sports, the quality of this provision is inadequate. Away from the NSTC, there are no baseball stadia, taekwondo stadia or tennis training centres exclusive to baseball, taekwondo and tennis elite athletes at the national level. However, it can be argued that elite level sports facilities for baseball are more sufficient than the others because some baseball facilities at city/county level reach professional standard. Indeed, this has led to schools/universities and private sports clubs playing a role in the provision of sports facilities for elite taekwondo and tennis athletes. Nevertheless, both taekwondo and tennis communities have for many years appealed to the government to construct dedicated facilities at the national level, using their remarkable international performances as counters. Although the government did eventually agree to construct professional taekwondo courts at the NSTC and to build a national tennis centre in Taichung, these initiatives were not solely the result of the taekwondo and tennis communities’ efforts. For example, in the case of tennis, the injection of sports lottery funds and the city plan of Taichung City were two important additional
factors. It is important to note that of these three sports, only national taekwondo competitors train at the NSTC. Better baseball stadia exist outside the NSTC and short-term squad training for international baseball events is the main concern for national baseball teams. Not only do tennis players not train at the NSTC, they also rarely use domestic tennis facilities outside the NSTC to train. The main reasons for this are the poor quality of tennis courts in Taiwan in general and the fact that elite players have to spend a considerable amount of time competing around the world in order to obtain direct admission to or better draws in the Olympics.

Third, the three sports share several similarities with regards to the identification of sports talent: (i) schools are important sites for sports talent identification; (ii) there is almost no talent identification beyond the pool of existing participants because of the absence of necessary legislation; (iii) there are no biological or gene tests involved in talent identification either within or beyond the pool of existing participants partly as a consequence of traditional socio-cultural values in Taiwan; (iv) the identification of sports talent is mainly conducted through the competition system; (v) there are government attempts to systemise sports talent identification by establishing databases of competitive results. The main differences between them in this regard are that (i) private taekwondo clubs play an significant role in taekwondo talent identification; and (ii) for tennis, in addition to private tennis clubs, parents are important in relation to tennis talent identification. In a number of respects, the sports talent development systems of the three sports have much in common, such as a four-level cultivation system, sports classes in primary, junior high and senior high schools, universities’ making unconditional offers to outstanding athletes which helps talented athletes to combine training and study, alternative military service for elite athletes to maintain their training regimes, and government initiatives to improve the development system of sports talent and address the gap in sports talent. However, some differences between the three sports can be identified with more detailed exploration.

Firstly, fewer schools with sports classes provide places for tennis talent, which can be attributed to a lack of tennis facilities and coaches in schools. Secondly, most elite
taekwondo competitors are students and only a few of them continue their sporting careers after leaving the education system; this is very different from baseball and tennis players. The main reason for this is that there are no domestic professional taekwondo leagues or robust international professional championships. Thirdly, schools and universities play a less important role in the development system of tennis players than in those of the other sports. The greater involvement of tennis players’ parents and families in tennis players’ development, having other coach(s) outside schools and universities, and elite players’ short time in schools and universities, due to a large amount of international competition opportunities, are the three main factors. Fourthly, because of the prosperity of private taekwondo clubs, they are important to the development system of taekwondo competitors. Fifthly, the government shows particular concern to develop baseball players’ moral education in the development system due to the fact there have been a series of fixed matches in professional baseball.

Fourth, the provision of domestic and international competition opportunities is different for baseball, taekwondo and tennis. In terms of domestic competition opportunities at elite level, baseball has its professional league in which most elite players regularly compete. Specific domestic competition opportunities for elite taekwondo competitors consist of only two yearly events, one the biennial Asian Games Master Challenge and one the quadrennial Olympic Games Challenge. Furthermore, the latter two events are not intended to provide competitive opportunities for elite performers. This problem of a lack of domestic taekwondo competition opportunities at elite level was pointed out by many interviewees. Tennis, on the other hand, presents a very different scenario from both baseball and taekwondo. Due to the existence of a highly professionalised international competition system, genuine elite players almost never participate in domestic tennis events, with the exception of wild card qualifying competitions for international professional tennis events hosted in Taiwan. In this regard, therefore, there is no actual domestic tennis for elite tennis players.
Despite these differences, as regards the provision of international competition opportunities, one major similarity between the three sports is that there is government financial support for the respective NGBs to bid for and host international events and also for the elite athletes in the three sports to participate in international events. However, subsidising the NGBs to bid for and host international events is not intended solely to provide elite athletes with international competition opportunities. There is also a political consideration – increasing Taiwan’s international profile – that influences these subsidies.

In addition, two further apparent differences can be discerned. Firstly, elite baseball players enjoy the most extensive international competition opportunities in Taiwan and the elite taekwondo competitors the least. Secondly, although the government is quite reluctant to fund elite tennis players to participate in international championships because these players are professional, it has no choice but to subsidise them because their world ranking also influences their direct admission qualifications and draws in the Olympic and Asian Games.

Fifth, the development systems for coaches in these three sports are very similar. This is evident from the fact the three sports share the same mechanisms for the development of sports’ coaches and coaches can further improve themselves abroad through certain governmental projects. An additional emphasis on tennis coaches’ English language ability in coach training camps is perhaps the only variation identified in this study. In terms of the provision of coaches for elite athletes, the situation in baseball and taekwondo is similar during national teams’ squad training since the CTBA and the CTTA, which receive subsidies from the government, and are responsible for providing coaches for national athletes in their respective sports. Beyond squad training, however, professional baseball teams assume the main responsibility for coach provision because most elite players are in the professional baseball league. For taekwondo, specialist universities, which most elite competitors attend, are the main coaching providers. Tennis is a different case with the SAC offering public funding through the CTTNA for elite tennis players to seek coaches for themselves. Such a mechanism can be explained by the fact that each elite tennis
player’s demands for coaches are individual and subjective. One similarity between the three sports, however, is that the SAC’s funding for employing coaches includes a salary cap. For grass-roots or developing athletes, the school system is important to the provision of coaches. However, private clubs also play a significant role in the provision of coaches for taekwondo competitors. Moreover, in the case of tennis, in addition to private tennis clubs, the importance of parents and families in relation to coaching provision should not be ignored.

With regard to sports science support, the government offers this to national athletes during squad training sessions and international sporting events. Among these three sports, baseball and taekwondo national athletes have more opportunities to enjoy this support during their squad training than national tennis players as the latter seldom join group training. Beyond squad training sessions and international events, professional baseball teams and universities provide the support for baseball and taekwondo athletes respectively. Elite tennis players and their coaches take responsibility for most of their sports science supports.

Sixth, the issue of the progression to full-time athlete status is axiomatic in the cases of baseball and tennis due to the fact that there is a professional baseball league and a highly professionalised international competition system for tennis. Although the situation is very different in the case of taekwondo, it can be argued that the sport does not maintain a commitment to pure amateurism. Indeed, four factors undermine taekwondo formal amateur status: (i) elite competitors train at the NSTC on a full-time basis; (ii) they receive subsidies during squad training sessions; (iii) there is a generous reward system for medallists; and (iv) some elite competitors are temporarily sponsored by enterprises.

This analysis of Taiwan’s sports policy, using institutional approaches and the ACF together with three case studies, also drew heavily on interview data. The selection of interviewees in the study was informed by the assumptions of the ACF which extends the range of potentially important policy actors. This is different from most previous
studies of Taiwan’s sports policy which have mainly concentrated only on officials’ and interest groups’ opinions. Therefore, the interview data are more comprehensive. In addition, the SAC and DPE officials as well as the three NGBs’, the CTOC’s and the ROCSF’s members of staff who were interviewed are/were all senior and/or in important positions. The coaches and sports journalists who were interviewed are also senior, and the legislators have demonstrated a concern for or interest in sports policy and development for many years. Thus, the interviewees have considerable knowledge and experience of and/or insights into sports policy and development which contributed significantly to the quality of the interview data.

10.3 Limitations of the Research

Due to the fact that the study primarily relies on twenty-eight interviewees’ subjective opinions and partially on documentary analysis, it is impossible to make a grandiose claim that we have obtained a perfect understanding of Taiwan’s sports policy and development. That said, given that the thesis is premised on critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions, the aim of the study was never to provide some absolute truth. Instead, what has been achieved is a better understanding of Taiwan’s elite sports policy and development than offered by previous studies.

There are three other limitations to the study. First, it proved impossible to garner the views of the current SAC minister – Tai Hsia-Ling – whose understanding of sports policy and development is clearly important. The minister was busy with the preparation of the Chinese Taipei 2012 Olympic national team during the period in which interviews were conducted. In any case, because Tai is the incumbent minister, she may well have been sensitive about being interviewed and expressing her opinions on certain topics. Second, although the ACF assumes that two to five advocacy coalitions exist in the policy sub-system where most policy-making occurs, it is difficult to clearly identify effective coalitions in the case of Taiwan’s sports
policy subsystem. This is perhaps because some policy actors, such as the NGBs, rely heavily on public funding. Therefore, the study is only able to offer limited analysis of the dynamics that operate within sports policy sub-system and to focus primarily on the question of how external or internal factors influence sports policy actors and the sports policy process.

10.4 Suggestions for Future Research

Given that the three case studies reflect different examples of sports development albeit with several similarities, it is suggested that in order to have a more complete understanding of Taiwan’s sports development, analysis of more sports is necessary for future research. Moreover, Taiwan is rarely included in international comparative studies of sports policy, perhaps because Taiwan is a small country and is hardly considered as a sporting power. In fact, however, in addition to baseball, Taiwanese performers in a number of sports, including golf, handball, taekwondo, tennis, archery and weight-lifting, have achieved remarkable performances on the international stage. Therefore, it would also be worth developing comparative studies of the sports development of Taiwan with that of other countries which have similar institutional features, historical trajectories, and levels of international sporting performances in the future. Finally, with reference to the analytical approach adopted for this study, it might well be worth consider if other frameworks might add further to our understanding of elite sports policy in Taiwan itself.

10.5 Conclusion

Based on critical realistic ontological and epistemological assumptions and through
analysing interview data and relevant documents in accordance with specific theoretical frameworks – institutional approaches and the ACF, this study provides a better understanding of and insight into (i) the general interplay between sport and politics, (ii) the issue of whether sports policy and policy-making reflect broader institutional features, (iii) Taiwan’s sports policy, sports development and sports policy change over time, and (iv) the development systems of baseball, taekwondo and tennis, with a particular emphasis on similarities and differences between them at the elite level. It is important to note that the ACF has not previously been fully applied to sports policy analysis in Taiwan. As a consequence, the study might persuade other researchers to adopt the ACF to explore sport-related topics or some specific major sports policies. In sum, sports development in Taiwan during different periods from 1949 to the present consistently reflects the political needs of the time. That said, at the very beginning of the ROC government’s retreat to Taiwan, the government mainly concentrated on physical education for military preparedness in anticipation of war with the PRC. Elite sports development was mainly promoted in and through the military and was used to consolidate connections with anti-Communist allies. After the PRC’s continuing suppression of Taiwan’s international space and a series of outstanding performances in youth baseball between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s, the government gradually shifted its priority to elite sports development in order to obtain recognition from other countries and increase Taiwan’s international profile. However, the development of Sports for All received more government attention from the late 1990s than before with a further emphasis from the late 2000s because of the improvement of the country’s socio-economic conditions and its relationship with PRC. Even so, the government continues to value the development of elite sports more than that of Sports for All because of the perceived continued need to enhance Taiwan’s international profile. Moreover, despite the fact that sports policy and policy-making basically comply with many of the institutional features of Taiwan, a more detailed account of how sports policy changes over time has been necessary to understand more fully the different interactions between the sports policy subsystem and external subsystem events. Similarities and differences between the development systems of the three selected sports demonstrate quite clearly that there exists in Taiwan a single spine of sports development in general, but with variations.
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Appendices

Appendix 1

Semi-Structured Interview Guide

1. The role of government plays in sports development (baseball, taekwondo and tennis)
   (a) Why should the government support sports development?
   (b) What role does the government play in elite sports development overall?
   (c) What role does the government play in the development of baseball (taekwondo, tennis) at the elite level?
   (d) Has this role changed over time (in relation to elite sports development in general and the development of the three sports)?
   (e) Are there any differences between the parties’ goals in terms of sports policy during three main periods? (e.g. the KMT, DPP and KMT)

2. The preference of the government with regard to sports policy
   (a) What is the government’s preference as regards sports policy (e.g. elite sport vis-à-vis Sports for All)?
   (b) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past?
   (c) Why/why not?
   (d) Has the government targeted certain sports?
   (e) Which sports? Why? How?
(f) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past with regard to plans for targeting certain sports?

3. External and internal events/shocks which influenced sports policy

(a) Are there any long-standing elements (e.g. socio-cultural values and social structure, natural resources and constitutional structures) which benefit/restrict elite sports development in Taiwan?

(b) Are there any particular external events which might influence/restrict or might have influenced/restricted sports policy-making (e.g. economic recession, public opinion, the relationship between Taiwan and China)?

(c) How?

(d) Are there any particular internal events which might influence/restrict or might have influenced/restricted sports policy-making (e.g. poor/good performances, new leaders of the SAC)?

(e) Are there constraints/resources for the development of the three sports at the elite level?

4. The relationships between the voluntary sectors (e.g. the NGBs, the CTOC and the ROCSF) and the public sporting agencies (SAC and DPE)?

(a) What kind of relationship exists between the NGBs (baseball, taekwondo and tennis) and the SAC and DPE?

(b) What kind of relationship exists between CTOC and the NGBs (baseball, taekwondo and tennis)?

(c) What kind of relationship exists between the NGBs and the ROCSF?

(d) What kind of relationship exists between the CTOC and the SAC/DPE?

(e) What kind of relationship exists between the COC and the ROCSF?
(f) What kind of relationship exists between the ROCSF and the SAC/DPE?

5. The actors in sports policy-making process

(a) Which groups/actors have attempted to influence sports policy-making?

(b) Which are the most influential groups/actors in the sports policy-making process?

(c) What kind of resources and strategies do they (you) often use?

(d) (for politicians) Are there any actions that you took in relation to elite sports development in general and with reference to the three sports in particular?

6. The development of elite level facilities

(a) Are there elite level facilities provided for elite athletes to train?

(b) Are those sufficient and appropriate? Why/why not?

(c) Explain government funding and also additional funding from the sport lottery and sponsorship.

(d) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past as regards the development of elite level facilities? Why? What elements have caused the change?

7. The identification of sporting talents (baseball, taekwondo and tennis)

(a) What is the model of filtering talented athletes (in baseball, taekwondo and tennis) in Taiwan?

(b) Are the models effective? Why?

(c) Explain government funding and also additional funding from the sport lottery and sponsorship
(d) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past as regards the identification of sports talents? Why? What elements have caused the change?

8. The provision of domestic and international competition opportunities for elite athletes (baseball, taekwondo and tennis)

(a) Are the current domestic competition opportunities sufficient for elite athletes (in baseball, taekwondo and tennis)?

(b) Is there any support from government to help elite athletes to participate in international level competitions? Explain this support.

(c) Do you think this support is adequate for elite athletes to participate in international level competitions?

(d) Explain government funding and also additional funding from the sport lottery and sponsorship.

(e) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past as regards the provision of domestic and international competition opportunities for elite athletes?

9. The development system for coaches, the provision of coaches and the provision of sports science (baseball, taekwondo and tennis)

(a) Are there any coaching programmes provided for elite athletes?

(b) Describe these.

(c) Is the quality of coaching sufficient?

(d) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past as regards the provision of coaching?

(e) Is there any sports science support for the elite athletes?
(f) Describe this.

(g) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past as regards the development of sports science?

(h) Explain government funding and also additional funding from the sport lottery and sponsorship.

(i) Are there any development systems for coaches? What are they? Are there differences between sports?

10. The emergence of the full-time athlete (in baseball, taekwondo and tennis)

(a) Can elite athletes train on a full-time basis (discuss financial and study problems)?

(b) What support/plan is offered by the governments (or NGBs) to elite athletes to allow them to train on the full-time basis?

(c) Explain government funding and also additional funding from the sport lottery and sponsorship.

(d) Are there any differences between the contemporary era and the past as regards the emergence of full-time athletes?

11. Will there be any impact on sports/elite sports development after the SAC merges with the DPE?

An extra questions for retired SAC ministers

12. What was your priority with regard to sports development (elite or mass participation)? Were there any sports policies of which you feel proud? Why? What was the impact of these policies on sports development? Did successive ministers continue them?
## Appendix 2

### Record of Interviews Conducted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>12/3/12</td>
<td>4pm</td>
<td>The interviewee’s office in the University of Taipei (Taipei City)</td>
<td>1 hour 11 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>13/3/12</td>
<td>2pm</td>
<td>The interviewee’s office in the National Taiwan University of Sport (Taichung City)</td>
<td>58 minutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>15/3/12</td>
<td>9am</td>
<td>The interviewee’s office in the National Sports Training Centre (Kaohsiung City)</td>
<td>52 minutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>15/3/12</td>
<td>4pm</td>
<td>The SAC Administrative Building – lounge area (Taipei City)</td>
<td>1 hour 4 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>16/3/12</td>
<td>11am</td>
<td>The SAC Administrative Building – media office (Taipei City)</td>
<td>1 hour 18 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>25/3/12</td>
<td>4pm</td>
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<td>45 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
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<td>1 hour 7 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>30/3/12</td>
<td>10am</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology building – lounge area (Taipei City)</td>
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<td>I</td>
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<td>1 hour 17 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>2/4/12</td>
<td>2pm</td>
<td>Sanlunche Restaurant (New Taipei City)</td>
<td>1 hour 54 minutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>K</td>
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<td>6pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>L</td>
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<td>The interviewee’s office in taekwondo training room in Fu Jen Catholic University (New Taipei City)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>4pm</td>
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<td>Interviewee</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>P</td>
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<td>8pm</td>
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<td>1 hour 34 minutes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Received</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>2/5/12</td>
<td>3pm</td>
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<td>1 hour 12 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Received</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
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<td>11am</td>
<td>The interviewee’s office in The Legislative Yuan (Taipei City)</td>
<td>1 hour 10 minutes</td>
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<td>2.30pm</td>
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<td>4pm</td>
<td>The CTTNA’s office in the SAC Administrative Building (Taipei City)</td>
<td>56 minutes</td>
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</table>
Appendix 3

Sample Interviewee Transcript

Interviewee G

Chen: Minister, the main aim of my research is to evaluate and to analyse the historical development of elite sports policy in Taiwan. In particular, I shall focus on three sports, baseball, tennis and taekwondo. There are 10 to 12 issues that I am going to ask you about. The first concerns the role that government plays in sports development in Taiwan. Why should the Taiwan government support sports development, including the elite sports development and the sports for all development?

Interviewee G: Why should government support sports, including the elite sports and sports for all? That is the role of government play in sports development, is it not?

Chen: Yes.

Interviewee G: No matter what political regime it is, almost every government develops sports around the world. Sports is like one kind of culture...that is one kind of symbol of cultured society. Every government should play some kind of role in developing elite sports and sports for all. In fact, many sports in Taiwan were deeply influenced by the 50 years of Japanese colonisation. What you can see is that the situation of Taiwan’s love of baseball and tennis was significantly linked to Japanese colonisation. taekwondo came later...mainly being introduced from Korea to Taiwan...was one kind of martial art...that is military sports. At the beginning, taekwondo was introduced into the military in Taiwan. Therefore, the main purpose of practicing the sport in the military was just to improve combat and fighting skills. Later on, taekwondo became a competitive sport and gradually spread to the Asian
Games, Olympic Games and the world. So, taekwondo was introduced from Korea to Taiwan, and initially all taekwondo drillmasters in the Taiwan’s military were Korean. In the early period of taekwondo’s development in Taiwan, the background of all Taiwanese taekwondo instructors were military. This means that the development of taekwondo in Taiwan was spread from military to the general public. There are two important core values of the Taiwan’s government policy with regard to sports development...I believe that every government’s values are the same..., one is to achieve so-called remarkable performance in competitive sports, and the other is to promote the nation’s health. These are two main reasons that Taiwan’s government develops sports for all and competitive sports. One is in the hope of Taiwan achieving outstanding performance in competitive sports, and then to have ability to compete on the international stage...to put it simply, that is to honor the nation (Taiwan). The other is for the purpose of the nation’s health and helping people to acquire a regular sporting habit, to have militarism, and then every nation’s fitness and physique can improve. These are the two main core reasons why the government develops competitive sports and sports for all.

Chen: What role does the government play in sports development? Does it play an active role or a passive role?

Interviewee G: The role of the Taiwan’s government plays...is very active. Due to the unsuccessful development of professional sports and a lack of interest of enterprises in (sponsoring) sports development, most sports in Taiwan are promoted by the government and through the educational system. In fact, however, there are many groups in the general public which voluntarily promote Sports for All. These groups are everywhere in Taiwan and were created very early by the general public, such as line dance groups, hip hop dance groups, aerobic dance groups and Taiji-sword groups. My father managed a self-run Budokan at home after Taiwan’s restoration (from Japan to ROC). So, this climate has existed from the very early period. The government develops sports almost through the educational system. Therefore, the role of the government plays should be very active.
Chen: But our government does not invest much funding in developing sports, how can it be...very active?

Interviewee G: This is because the government actively wanted to achieve the two goals, so-called outstanding competitive sports and a healthy population in the early periods. This also can be seen in the establishment of the Sport Affairs Council. The level of this unit is equal to a Ministry and many countries do not have such an independent unit or they are auxiliary to the educational system; for example, physical education and competitive sports affiliates with Ministry of Education or somewhere else. Although the Sport Affairs Council will be abrogated and merged with the Ministry of Education next year, Taiwan has such an independent organisation, which shows that the government gives some weight to sports development. Recently, the total annual budget of the government was stable at around 1 trillion and 6 or 7 thousand million (NTD). In the early years, the annual budget for sports development was only 26 hundred million. This accounted for only a very low percentage of the total annual budget. It was lower than 0.01%. Assuming that the annual budget is 1 trillion and 6 thousand million, 26 hundred million is a very small amount of that. So the government (the DPP)...when I was the Minister of the Sports Affairs Council...aimed to raise an annual budget for sports development to 1% of the total annual budget, that is 160 hundred million. 160 hundred million and 26 hundred million annual budgets are very different. Nowadays, the budget for sports development is increased. There are also sports lottery funding and others. Comparing with the previous budget, it has increased significantly. The total amount of the budget for sports development today is around 7 or 8 billion.

Chen: Do you mean that the government has become more and more active?

Interviewee G: Yes.

Chen: There are three different periods of governance in Taiwan, the KMT (before 2000), the DPP (2000-2008) and the KMT (2008 to date). In your personal opinion, are there any differences between these three ruling parties’ goals in the development of sports?
Interviewee G: The SAC was established during the (earlier) KMT era and this was instructed by Lien, Chan when he was Vice President (1996-2000). In fact, at that time the KMT very actively promoted sports in the military. For example, there are physical education units in military. Sports in the military were very well funded, such as basketball, rugby and football. However, many military sports teams had been abolished. The reason for that we are not so clear. During a non-war era, the military should train their bodies through sports...competitive sports. Until now, we still do not know the reason for abolishing teams. Therefore, the (present) KMT government does not perceive how important sport is in a modern country. It is not only for wars. Inevitably, every country will pursue these things, such as sports participation, when its economy reaches a certain level.

Chen: When were these teams abolished?

Interviewee G: They did it step by step, and until now, all of them (military sports teams) have been abolished. So, I am not so sure when it started. I was possibly the first DPP member who was assigned as the Minister of the Sports Affairs Council. Because I majored in sports, I classified sports into three main types when I was the Minister. The first type are sports which can honor Taiwan and equip potential gold medal winning in the Asian Games and the Olympic Games. These include...I set up some sports...taekwondo, Archery and Weightlifting.

Chen: How about tennis?

Interviewee G: No. Only three sports, taekwondo, archery and weightlifting.

Chen: There was no baseball?

Interviewee G: No. The second type were the sports which could help Taiwan to extend its international profile and could market Taiwan to the world. This type also contained three sports, golf, baseball and tennis. The third type was the so-called mother of all sports which is also called for sports for all. These were, for example,
Swimming, Athletics, Basketball and Volleyball. It is very clear that there were three types of sports. One was the sports which could market Taiwan, another was the sports whose major aim was just to win gold medals in the Olympics...no matter whether they had sports values or not, or were mainstream sports or not, and the other was so-called basic sports, the mother of all sports, such as Swimming, Athletics, Basketball and Volleyball and Football and so on. We (the government) developed sports through this classification. Therefore, the funding allocated to each sport was different. On the basis of the classification, we invested a great amount of funding in the sports which had potential for medal winning. With regards to the sports which could market Taiwan, we also allocated them a huge budget. For example, Yani Tseng trained at the Sunrise Golf & Country Club which was established as the national golf course when I was the Minister. She developed from there. The first time she came to Sunrise Golf & Country Club, she was still a young girl. And afterwards, she stayed and was trained there for many years, about 5 or 6 years. We hired an Australian coach and Taiwanese coaches, Kao Bo-Tsung and Li Hsu-Chin to train her and teach her English. Of course her family is rich, but we trained her at the Sunrise Golf & Country Club whose course is very difficult and a high level one. In addition, the owner of the Club was also very enthusiastic. Therefore we met him and asked him to make the Club the national golf training course... I hosted the opening ceremony. Then, they were trained there. At that time, we trained a number of golfers, both male and female, around 20 people in total. By doing this, at least we created Yani Tseng, the world’s top golfer. During the same period, we also made a lot of effort to develop baseball. Therefore, we won the first baseball gold medal in the Asian Games... when I was the Minister. We beat Japan at the finals in Qatar (the 2006 Asian Games). We also funded some tennis players very much to win ATP points and to fight for their rankings around the world, such as Lu Yan-Hsun and Chan Yung-Jan...etc.. This is because that if they have good rankings, they will be placed as seeds in the Olympics, which could allow them to have some advantages. In fact, these three sports which could market Taiwan have achieved some good results. Moreover, we have already taken two gold medals (in the Olympics) in the sports which were identified in terms of gold medal winning. This was the first time we had won gold medals during 72 years...as early as the 1932, Liu Chang-Chun was the first Chinese who represented China (the R.O.C) to participate in the Olympics...Until 2004...72 whole years, we only have two gold medals. We also won two silver medals
(in the 2004 Athens Olympics) in Archery which is one of the most objective sports. Furthermore, we expected a weightlifter, namely Wang Hsin-Yuan – a small giant, to win a gold medal at that time (the 2004 Athens Olympics), but there were many unexpected events. As a result, he could not take the medal. Actually, however, he really had the ability to win the medal. This sportsman...I paid special attention to him. Although there were many reasons why he did not win the medal, these were secret and were not tested scientifically. Generally speaking, the type of sports we promoted just to win gold medals in the Asian Games and the Olympic Games all developed well.

Chen: Did the government have any plan for targeting certain sports before you (2004-2007)? Did the previous KMT make such a classification?

Interviewee G: No, they did not. After coming back from Athens, we had won gold medals. On my way (from Athens) back to Taiwan, I wrote the 2008 Beijing Olympics Golden Plan...I wrote it on the plane. A journalist interpreted it as the Golden Plan. At that time, I reported this plan to President Chen, asking him to allocate 1 billion to me (the SAC) and telling him that I would make Taiwan have better achievement at the Beijing Olympic Games. He agreed and allocated 20 million per year to me to do this. However, he asked me to win 7 gold medals. We (I) could not say that it was impossible if the President said so. After that, many journalists blamed me saying you are an expert in sport, how can you brag? In fact, I did not. The President asked me how many gold medals we (Taiwan) could win and I told him that we could probably take around 4 gold medals (at the 2008 Beijing Olympics). I said such a number of gold medals because I analysed for him that the medals won in sports like Archery, taekwondo and Weightlifting at the 2004 Athens Olympics might double (in 2008 Beijing Olympics). However, he told me that four (in Taiwanese, the homonymic of ‘four’ means death) was not good, how about seven...lucky seven. If the President said so, you could not say that you could not. Therefore, journalists blamed me. However, when the President said so, the only thing you could do was nod your head and say ok, I would try hard. In the past, if you responded that I could not do anything when Chiang Chieh-Shih said something related to counterattacking against Mainland China, you would be caught and executed by shooting. Anyway,
many people blamed me. In the 2007, I left the Executive Yuan (the SAC) and the Golden Plan was only half completed by me. As a result...of course, we did not win any gold medal at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.

Chen: What is the government’s preference for sports policy?

Interviewee G: They put their emphasis on elections.

Chen: Sorry, I meant do they prefer elite sports or sports for all or...?

Interviewee G: I cannot figure out what their preference is.

Chen: The next issue is related to events or shocks which influenced sports policy. Are there any long existing elements which benefit or restrict sports policy-making in Taiwan? For example, socio-cultural values, like some parents would probably think that their children’s prospects may not be good if they choose to study something about sports or to develop as sportsmen and will not allow their children to go this way.

Interviewee G: To value letters and belittle arms (sports) is a common situation and concept in Chinese culture, saying that studying sports will not have prospects. China (the People’s Republic of China) experienced a period of being blocked by many countries. Finally, they broke out of such a predicament by utilising ‘Ping-Pong Diplomacy’. After that, they gradually realised that like themselves, the sick man of East Asia and a weak country, the best tool to gain respect from other countries was sports, not war. Therefore, they developed sports by using the whole country’s resources, although they would state that their sportsmen are amateur from the standpoint of the Olympic Games and Asian Games, they are actually professional sportsmen. What I said is the pyramid type...one lash...developing up from grassroots. During the period of Japanese colonisation, Taiwan (the Japanese government) had very much valued sports. What you can see is that Taiwanese liked playing baseball. In addition, after 1945, the end of the World War Two, the Taiwanese team was the
When it comes to the question of whether the traditional concept of valuing letters and belittling arms will be broken, it depends on and relates to overall changes in social values. Wang Chien-Min can earn so much money per month; Kuo Tai-Yuan (Taiwanese) who played baseball in Japan, he could earn around 70 or 80 million per year when he was at his best. However, someone who is good at studying chooses to be a teacher or doctor, he/she may not earn so much money during his/her lifetime. Some parents, therefore, would probably think that encouraging their children to choose this way (sports) is not so bad if the children have talent for sport. Like Lin Shu-Hao, he is good at both studying and sport. He could probably earn large amounts of money when he signs a contract with whatever teams. It is very unfortunate that professional sports in Taiwan do not develop very successfully. The organised systems of both baseball and basketball are not robust and made worse by gambling. The so-called parental concepts would completely change if professional sports in Taiwan could develop successfully because encouraging their children to study is for the final purpose of earning money, a good life and his/her social status. If Taiwanese sportsmen were rich, famous and respected by others, parents absolutely would.... Nowadays, many parents invest a lot of money in developing their children as golfers or tennis players.

Chen: Do you mean that the parents’ concepts are gradually changing?

Interviewee G: They are changing. Because of the emergence of Taiwanese super stars (sports super stars) who are rich, famous and respected by people, the traditional concept lasting thousands of years, to value letters and belittle arms (sports), will change. However, the effect of the super stars will not be conspicuous very soon but it may be very significant after 8 or 10 years.

Chen: Currently, there is a trend of low-birth rate in Taiwan. Would this influence elite sports development in Taiwan?
Interviewee G: The parents of course think that doing sports is dangerous because they only have one child. More or less, this situation will happen. Foreign (western) parents would be onlookers even when their children take part in activities which seem to be dangerous. In fact, they attempt to develop their children’s adventure and to make them more independent. In Taiwan, however, parents always take care of their children, let alone during a trend of low-birth rate. These two cultures are different. Of course, over-protection is not good for children. Nevertheless, many young Taiwanese parents probably will not follow such a way of bringing up their children, and their concepts are changing.

Chen: Are there any particular external factors which would influence sports policy-making? For example, would the government lessen its budget for sports development during economic recession in Taiwan?

Interviewee G: I think that diplomacy would influence everything. Probably, the most serious restriction on sports development for us comes from China because many international sporting events and other things always meet the problem of ‘name’...for this and for that. If we want to bid to host international sporting events, such as the East Asian Games, the Asian Games and even the Olympic Games, we would be suppressed by China. If Taiwan could host the Asian Games in 6 or 7 years for example, the sporting hardware, software and even the entire society would be promoted by hosting the Games. Taiwan, however, does not have such an opportunity. The biggest international sporting event Taiwan has hosted was the 2009 Kaohsiung World Games. The other, the 2009 Taipei Summer Deaflympics, was special. But in fact, it was not competitive. That is a type of games for medical, health purposes, but Taiwan made it competitive and spent a lot on money on hosting it. The well-presented and successfully hosted event was the 2009 Kaohsiung World Games. All sportsmen were the best around the world, but this was the Games which included non-Olympic and non-Asian Games’ sports. We bid for the Games when I was the Minister and it was more successful. After that, we were unsuccessful in bidding for other Games because of suppression from China. I believe that this external influence is the most important, rather than economic recession.
Chen: Did you mean that the government budget for sports development would not decrease during an economic recession in Taiwan?

Interviewee G: Yes, they would not. Instead, many people might think that sport is more important during an economic recession.

Chen: How about public opinion? Would this influence the government’s sports policy-making process? For example, if some people think that the government should value elite sports development, would the government be influenced?

Interviewee G: The pressure from public opinion would not endure for long in Taiwan. Public opinions are temporary. If public opinion does not form a systemic power to supervise the government, it would be powerless. Of course this does not mean that temporary public opinions are useless. More or less, they would have some effects. For example, Yani Tseng asked the President Ma to arrange a LPGA Championship in Taiwan and Ma responded that I could utilise the money invested to host a LPGA Championship to host several jogging events. At that time, much public opinion criticised this. Maybe due to the critiques, as a result, we hosted the Sunrise LPGA Taiwan Championship 2012 at the Sunrise Golf & Country Club. Public opinions have power like this.

Chen: Are there any particular internal events which might influence the sports policy-making of the government? For example, Taiwanese national teams sometimes perform well or poorly. For example, we won two gold medals when you were the Minister, would this influence the government’s policy-making with regards to sports development?

Interviewee G: They (subsequent Ministers) do not completely understand the reasons. For example, I used to say that we would take four gold medals at 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, although the President wanted Taiwan to have seven. If I had continued to be the Minister, I would definitely have explored the causes of why we did not win four gold medals, like why did we spend such a long process and so much money and take no medal? If they (subsequent Ministers) clearly found out the
reasons for poor performance at the Beijing Olympics, sports policy of course would change. However, I did not see them to explore any...and nothing. Probably, they just said that they did not achieve that goal.

Chen: Do you mean that they did not find out the reason why they achieved no gold medals in Beijing which might cause sports policy to change.

Interviewee G: Yes, they did not. If they could not find out the reason, they would not have any countermeasures.

Chen: When a new Minister of the SAC takes up the official post, does this influence sports policy-making?

Interviewee G: More or less. When I was the Minister, I clearly stated that I classified competitive sports into three types and I let everyone knew that I would fund them differently as different types of sports. This type would get more than that. During this process, I needed to ask for agreement and common consensus because I had to convince many sports organisations and competitive sports organisations. If they did not agree, some powerful people would come to me and ask for money. However, if someone who is in a powerful post or a legislator, for example, asked you to allocate money to certain sports, the investment in these would be ineffective.

Chen: Did the government learn from policies in other countries with regards to the development of elite sports? Like their policies and systems.

Interviewee G: In particular the KMT government did policy-learning and cited examples the most. In this respect, it could frequently be heard that we learned from China in terms of competitive sports development.

Chen: Did we transplant their policies or systems to Taiwan’s elite sports development?
Interviewee G: We hired many of their (China) coaches to Taiwan, such as in Table Tennis, Fencing and Weightlifting.

Chen: Did we only learn from China?

Interviewee G: We also learned from the USA and Japan. We would mainly learn from these three countries, China, Japan and the USA.

Chen: The next issue is the relationships between the Sports Affairs Council and the associations of these three sports (the NGBs), baseball, tennis and taekwondo. Are there any conflicts or incompatible situations between them?

Interviewee G: No, there are not. The SAC controls the allocation of budgets.

Chen: So, is it a top-down relationship with them?

Interviewee G: Yes, it is top-down. Nothing else.

Chen: Is it possible that these voluntary bodies would argue with the SAC when they do not agree with some policies?

Interviewee G: If they did not agree with our policies, they only feel unhappy and complain privately.

Chen: Do they still have to follow the policies?

Interviewee G: Yes, they still have to follow the policies.

Chen: Is this because the SAC acts in the role of the funding provider?

Interviewee G: Yes.
Chen: Would they come to argue with the SAC if they were only allocated a small amount of money?

Interviewee G: Yes, they would do that through many pressure groups.

Chen: What is the relationship between the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and these three NGBs?

Interviewee G: Theoretically, they should not have any conflict. The funding of the CTOC also comes from the SAC. This means that everything is controlled by the SAC.

Chen: Do you mean that the CTOC is independent publicly, but is controlled by the SAC privately?

Interviewee G: In fact, before retiring (as Minister), I (the SAC) spent some money to invite a Japanese research group to map out how to market the CTOC. For example, they could raise 80% of their budget through marketing themselves, selling the CTOC’s own brand products and asking enterprises to sponsor them. However, they refused that and continued to receive money from the SAC.

Chen: As I know, it seems that the CTOC does not care for the SAC?

Interviewee G: They cannot refuse to take the SAC into account. In fact, they just said that, but they have to follow in the SAC’s steps. Theoretically, there are three important international events. The smallest is the East Asian Games which only nine countries attend. The next is the Asian Games in which around fifty counties participate. The final one is the Olympic Games which around two hundred countries join. These are the multi-sports events whose competing units are on the basis of nations. Others champions or cups are not as important as these three events. Of course the scale of the FIFA World Cup is almost bigger than the Olympics. Anyway, if Taiwan wants to attend these three events, the national team’s registration must be approved by the President of the CTOC, and then sent to the IOC. In fact, they
(CTOC) possess a trump card. However, because they receive funding from the
government, they cannot refuse to register and then let Taiwan be disqualified. I am
conversant with these people (from the CTOC), and they just complain but without
any actions. The President of the CTOC, Tsai Chen-Wei, and I are good friends. He
often complains about the SAC and sometimes he even says that it does not matter if
the government does not give us money because I have money. However, they still do
not dare to react against the SAC.

Chen: So, more or less, they would...

Interviewee G: They would follow the SAC’s guidance.

Chen: Are there any conflicts or incompatible situations between them (the SAC and
the CTOC)?

Interviewee G: There are no conflicts. They only have a ‘money’ relationship.

Chen: Could they have different ideas?

Interviewee G: Having different ideas would be impossible because they cannot
violate the Olympic model – using the name of Chinese Taipei to attend international
sporting events. During the period of the DPP government, they were very grouchy
about the name, but the KMT government is very happy to use it. However, you could
do nothing because the IOC had already made this decision. The IOC included China
(the PRC) and excluded the Republic of China from its family. After that, the ROC is
no longer called Taiwan. It is now named Chinese Taipei. The only thing which
would cause conflict between them (the SAC and the CTOC) is the ‘name’ of Taiwan.
Now, there is no way to change it, therefore, we have to accept this name, Chinese
Taipei.
Chen: The SAC wants to dominate the CTOC’s affairs, but the CTOC theoretically is an independent organisation. Could this cause conflicts?

Interviewee G: Even though they (the CTOC) think that they are an independent organisation, they probably do not dare to say this.

Chen: In the past (before the establishment of the SAC), the Republic of China Sports Federation (ROCSF) was powerful because they held the power to allocate budgets, ...

Interviewee G: In fact, the SAC gave money to the ROCSF and then it allocated money to each sports association at that time (1997 – the establishment of the SAC – to 2000 when most of the ROCSF’s affairs were taken over by the SAC), but the ROCSF still must submit reports to the SAC to apply for funding.

Chen: I mean earlier, before the establishment of the SAC. The power of the ROCSF could be...

Interviewee G: Their money would come from the Ministry of Education at that time.

Chen: At that time, were there any conflicts between the ROCSF and the sports associations (NGBs)?

Interviewee G: At that time, the ROCSF was more powerful because they held the power to allocate budgets. To a certain degree, therefore, they acted in the same role as the current SAC.

Chen: Minister, you just said that there are some pressure groups and actors within the sports policy-making process. Now, I am going to ask you some questions which relate to this. Are there any actors or groups who/which have attempted to influence sports policy-making in Taiwan?

Interviewee G: Of course the legislators.
Chen: How about academics?

Interviewee G: The voices from academics are very rare. Sometimes, however, they would publish some articles to express their ideas and directions, such as asking that the government should spend money and time on the development of sports for all, rather than the development of elite sports. Some even ask for the development of folk sports, and another would ask for emphasis to be put on leisure sports which could be combined with medical treatment. We have these voices, but in fact they do not influence sports policy.

Chen: When you were the Minister, during the sports policy-making process, was there a group which consisted of some academics and experts from everywhere...

Interviewee G: The SAC is a committee system which consisted of more than ten members. They are, for example, the presidents of each sports university, the vice ministers of each ministry, media practitioners, academics and experts. The SAC would hold several meetings with them every year, and some sports policies would be discussed in these meetings. In fact, I think that all sports policies would be made by the Minister himself/herself, but probably he/she would discuss these with others. I was like this...I think that 80% or 90% sports policies were made by one person (the Minister). However, he/she does not make policies without foundation. I am a sports expert, so I participated in this for several decades. In fact, I would still ask many people, such as asking others how to develop this, how to develop that and what is the key point of that? I would still ask, but a ‘blue picture’ (a clear picture) was already in my mind.

Chen: Who is the most powerful one among these actors?

Interviewee G: Do you mean the think tank?

Chen: During the sports policy-making process.
Interviewee G: Probably the legislators. They would challenge you through examining and freezing your budgets. For example, if you (the SAC) did not develop this particular sport or if you did not build this sports arena, they will not give you money. Then, this would lead to policy change.

Interviewee G: So, do they mainly utilise the power of examining and freezing the budgets to...

Interviewee G: Yes, this is because they have no ideas about sports development and they cannot win over others (us) by speaking.

Chen: The next issue is related to the development of competitive sports facilities, and I will also discuss these three sports, baseball, tennis and taekwondo. Are there any elite level facilities which are reserved for elite sportsmen to train in Taiwan?

Interviewee G: Currently, the National Sports Training Centre in Zuoying is the only one. Other sports facilities are located in each university.

Chen: Is there a particular martial art stadium for taekwondo only?

Interviewee G: No. There are many private taekwondo schools in Taiwan, but their equipment is limited.

Chen: How about tennis?

Interviewee G: They say this for many years...say that National Tennis Training Centre will be built, but we still do not have one. Although we have one in Huatan, Changhua, it seems that it is not fully utilised because it is located in a remote area.

Chen: How is its quality? I mean is the quality good enough for elite tennis players to train?
Interviewee G: Yes.

Chen: Are our baseball facilities more adequate because we have professional baseball and there are baseball diamonds in various counties and cities?

Interviewee G: There are baseball diamonds in various counties and cities, such as Taichung, Taipei and Kaohsiung. Also, quite a good baseball training field is located at the National Sports Training Centre. Therefore, the quantity and quality of baseball diamonds in Taiwan are OK.

Chen: Is the construction of sports facilities all paid for by the government?

Interviewee G: It is 100% financed by the government.

Chen: How about the private sector?

Interviewee G: There is no private sector involved in this (construction of sports facilities). In terms of sports hardware in Taiwan, we (the government) hoped that there would be a national tennis training centre, national golf training centre and national swimming training centre. The scales of these can be good enough for training as well as for hosting international sporting events. I founded the Alishan High Altitude Training Base on the Ali Mountain when I was the Minister, but it was closed after I retired. I established the Base because I thought the weather in Taiwan in the summer time was terrible – high-temperatures and high humidity. Such weather was not good for training because high-temperatures lead to sportsmen feeling tiredness more. The average temperature of the Ali Mountain on summer is 10 degrees centigrade. Moreover, plenty of trees allow sportsmen to do forest bathing and to breathe fresh air. However, they closed the Base. In fact, it is very regrettable from my point of view. Anyway, we still do not have national training centres for tennis, golf and swimming.
Chen: Are there any differences between the past and nowadays with regards to sports facilities in Taiwan?

Interviewee G: They have become more and more sufficient.

Chen: Do you mean that the government is more active in developing sports facilities than before?

Interviewee G: Yes. Like the current KMT government, they are developing general access sports centres. For example, there are some in Taipei.

Chen: But are these general access sports centres more for developing sports for all?

Interviewee G: These allow the private sector to operate and are BOT. No matter these are for sports for all or for something else, children can go there to do sports. For example, if someone is scared to be in the water, he/she will find it impossible to be a swimmer.

Chen: The next issue is the identification and training of sports talent in Taiwan. I will again concentrate on these three sports. What is the model for identifying sports talent in Taiwan?

Interviewee G: In the early stage, when I was not the president (of National Taiwan University of Physical Education and Sport) or the Minister (of the SAC), the Republic of China Sports Federation founded a group for sports talent identification at that time. Hu Shu-Yuan was the head of this group and I was a member. We did sports talent identification once, from the north to the south of Taiwan, and chose some sports for talent identification. At that time, we did not focus on these three sports. We did general talent identification. I did research into sports talent identification for the National Science Council for many years. Also, my main examples were aboriginals from Hualien and Taidung, and I mainly concentrated on two sports, athletics and baseball. After doing that, I found out that the social system and ideas of parenting in Taiwan would not allow us to establish the system of sports
talents identification such as existed in the past in China and East European countries, forcing talented sports people to train in sports schools. In fact, theoretically a very effective method for sports talent identification has not yet been created, such as a method that could identify sports talent now, and after ten years he/she will definitely become a world champion. To a certain degree, we did that before. To date, however, Chi Cheng, Yang Chuan-Kuang, Lin Shu-Hao and Tseng Ya-Ni were not selected through talent identification. For example, because her parents liked playing golf, we had their permission to send Tseng Ya-Ni to train in the Sunrise Golf & Country Club. There are many theories about sports talent identification and Taiwan has tried many different methods, but we were not successful. The identification system in Taiwan is based on competitions at different levels, and then sports talents are filtered through these.

Chen: So, there are no any other tests or maybe some tests like the muscle test etc.?  
Interviewee G: No. These might not be effective. There are thousands of indexes for sports talent identification, including red muscle test, white muscle test, nerve reaction ability test and so on.

Chen: So, the tests you did were more scientific?  
Interviewee G: Yes.

Chen: Blood tests?  
Interviewee G: No. I did red and white muscles tests in Japan. These tests would probably cause damage.

Chen: In your opinion, is the current system of sports talent identification in Taiwan effective?
Interviewee G: No, it is ineffective, totally ineffective. There is no one who dares to promise that they can identify a child as a sports talent and train him/her, and after ten years, he/she will break a world record or reach the level of sporting achievement of Lin Shu-Hao and Tseng Ya-Ni. Any parent would worry about that, no one dares to make such a promise and the government would not dare to give their word on this. Only if the parents are very poor and cannot feed their children, then they would say: ok, you can take my children to train.

Chen: Currently, there is a Mid and Long-term Plan of Talent Development. What influence on sports talent identification does this generate?

Interviewee G: It might be because the focus of government is on the 2017 World University Games. After five years...so the targets of implementing the Plan are the current junior and senior high school students This Plan probably is just for the Games. But I am not sure of that.

Chen: Is there any change between now and the past with regards to the system of sports talent identification in Taiwan?

Interviewee G: No.

Chen: There has been no change since the KMT government retreated to Taiwan?

Interviewee G: No, all of them were developed up naturally. Yang Chuan-Kuang was trained in the USA after he became a little famous.

Chen: So all the same?

Interviewee G: They are filtered through competitions. So did Chi Cheng. She won the high jump gold medal at the National High School Athletic Games (including junior and senior high school students) when she was in junior high school. At that time, the U.S. Department of State sent someone to Taiwan. They saw Chi Cheng and
then took her back to the USA. Until today, we still do not have any sportsman who emerged through sports talent identification.

Chen: The next issue is related to the provision of domestic and international competition opportunities for elite athletes. In terms of these three sports, are the current domestic competition opportunities sufficient for elite athletes?

Interviewee G: For elite athletes...of course there are some competitions, but in fact if they want to strengthen themselves, they still have to play on the international stage. Domestically, there are of course probably some competitions for athletes in the same period to compete when it is at the final stage (of selecting national team). If they want to improve...all the same...they have to go abroad. Like baseball, they sometimes play internationally for one or two month.

Chen: How about taekwondo?

Interviewee G: The same.

Chen: How about tennis?

Interviewee G: They all play internationally in professional tournaments for the whole year. They are all nominal students of the universities, but they actually play abroad.

Chen: So, currently domestic competitions...

Interviewee G: These are not important for them because of the weakness of their competitors.

Chen: Does the government give money to them when they go abroad to compete or train themselves through competitions?

Interviewee G: Yes.
Chen: How about when tennis players play the ATP tours? Would the government give money to them for that?

Interviewee G: Theoretically, the government cannot fund professional athletes. In fact, however, we funded them before they became famous. Because professional athletes can earn prizes, it is similar to business. However, would you (athletes) give money to the government? In fact, therefore, the government would not dare to budget a sum of money to fund these professional athletes because there would be a problem of giving and accepting in private.

Chen: People would denounce that?

Interviewee G: Yes. Professional athletes would not give money to the government when they won prizes. In this respect, every business man could ask for money from the government.

Chen: Earn and not compensate?

Interviewee G: Yes. They cannot act like this. The issue of sports talent identification we just talked also has the same problem. If you (parent) do not mind, I (government) give you five million to buy your child and train him/her. I (government) would give the money back to you (parent) if he/she was unsuccessful. If we (government) could do this, we could implement sports talent identification. Anyone who is interested in this could bet on it. Like Tseng Yani, she spent only a short time to win all the money back. In the future, if we have this kind of system...like Brazil, they have football schools. Every child in this school is bought...all of them are commodities. They train them until they grow up, and then they sell them. You see, if they can play very well, they could earn a lot of money. Sports talent identification...the development of sports is closely connected to money in many respects and to the development of professional sports.
Chen: Is the funding from government for elite athletes sufficient to allow them to compete internationally? Would the government fund them at a different level?

Interviewee G: Yes (the answer of the second question). They would fund large amounts of money before important Games or on athletes who have the potential to win gold medals. There is a system for this (allocating funding).

Chen: From your point of view, is the funding sufficient?

Interviewee G: It helps more or less. It is impossible to say that the funding is totally sufficient. It should be...their (coaches and athletes) consideration is that if the government gives more money to them, they can train themselves through competition longer and have a better quality of diet or accommodation; if the government funds them less, they would have to reduce/downgrade these (time, quality of diet and accommodation).

Chen: Is all this funded by the government?

Interviewee G: The government.

Chen: Would the NGBs seek sponsorship by themselves to supplement insufficient parts?

Interviewee G: They would do that...in private.

Chen: Are enterprises enthusiastic about sponsoring?

Interviewee G: It depends on their relationships...they are not very enthusiastic about this. Each association...like baseball, it is easier to find some sponsorship from business.
Chen: Did the government funded athletes to compete internationally in the past?

Interviewee G: Yes, There has been a system of funding, like how much should it fund, what sporting events should it fund and for how long should it fund.

A: Is the funding more than the past?

B: I am not sure of the current situation. Such a system had existed since the past. If they (coaches, athlete or NGBs) asked the SAC for funding, they would get it. There has been (or was) a principle of award and subsidy.

Chen: The next issue is related to the provision of coaching with regards to these three sports. Are there any coaching programmes provided for the elite athletes?

Interviewee G: Yes, all of these three have them.

Chen: Does the government provide coaches to them?

Interviewee G: Baseball maybe less. In recent years, the (baseball) head coaches are people on the side of Lin Hua-Wei and Yeh Chih-Hsien. Many taekwondo coaches are from Iran and Korea.

Chen: How about Taiwanese coaches?

Interviewee G: We also have Taiwanese coaches.

Chen: How about tennis?

Interviewee G: Some of them (players) have their own personal foreign coaches. Some parents are coaches.
Chen: How about the quality of coaches at the national level in terms of these three sports?

Interviewee G: Should be ok.

Chen: Is the quality of Taiwanese tennis coaches a little bit weaker?

Interviewee G: There are only a few in Taiwan. Basically, the top coaches are all foreigners.

Chen: How about taekwondo?

Interviewee G: There are many Taiwanese taekwondo coaches.

Chen: How about their quality?

Interviewee G: It should be ok.

Chen: Does the government fund this (providing coaches)?

Interviewee G: Yes, they employ coaches for athletes. There is a catalogue of the salaries for foreign coaches who have developed Olympic gold medal athletes.

Chen: The next issue I am going to ask you about is in relation to sports science support and assistance in Taiwan. I again concentrate on these three sports. Does the government provide any sports science support and assistance for elite athletes?

Interviewee G: The support of sport science was most emphasised during my tenure. I implemented it most seriously. This was the reason why we won 19 gold medals in the Bangkok Asian Games in 1998. It was the first time that Taiwan had a team of sport scientists. The team of sport scientists was created in 1996. I was the team leader, and the team consisted of five groups. The team started to practice in 1997,
and the government provided 10 million for me to do this. Therefore we made the record of winning the most gold medals to date.

Chen: Before 1996, did the government provide sports science support?

Interviewee G: No. they mentioned it occasionally.

Chen: They did not really work on it?

Interviewee G: I do not know if they did it or not. Even if they did, they just recruited occasionally some doctor to do some tests for tiredness. The first sports science team ever was launched in 1998. That is the reason why the government published a book, which was called ‘Chen Chuan-Shou – the Father of Sports Science in Taiwan’. It has been published recently.

Chen: Did the funding come from the government, for example research funding for sports science and funding for sports scientists?

Interviewee G: The government provided it all.

Chen: How about sponsorship?

Interviewee G: No, there was no sponsorship. The government provided it all. Currently Chou His-Wei takes responsibility for it. The National Science Council gave him NTD$ 20 million.

Chen: From the National Science Council, not from the SAC?

Interviewee G: It did not come from the SAC but the NSC. Chou His-Wei, Lin Hui-Hsiung and Lin Cheng-Chang were responsible for this.
Chen: I would also like to discuss with you the issue of full-time athletes.

Interviewee G: Full-time athletes?

Chen: That is, people who take sport as their profession.

Interviewee G: That is baseball...Taiwan...domestic.

Chen: How about tennis?

Interviewee G: Probably, there are also some golfers who are full-time. Pool is an example of sport professionalisation as well.

Chen: So is it impossible for taekwondo to become a profession sport?

Interviewee G: I think that it is impossible.

Chen: When athletes train at the National Sports Training Centre, was the subsidy from the government for each athlete on a par with salaries of the general public?

Interviewee G: I think it is not as good as a normal job. Also athletes could only receive the subsidies during the period of training.

Chen: In terms of the subsidy, did all of it come from the SAC?

Interviewee G: The environment of the National Sports Training Centre was very good including food and nutrition. All the funding for the NSTC and the subsidies for athletes came from the SAC.

Chen: Was there any sponsorship for it?
Interviewee G: Not at all. All the funding came from the SAC.

Chen: Has the government provided subsidies for training athletes since the earlier period?

Interviewee G: Yes, even when over a hundred people camped and were trained at the National Sports Training Centre, all the subsidies were provided by the SAC.

Chen: I think the subsidies were not that much? Were they?

Interviewee G: The food was good, and the living environment was no problem of course. Although there were some critics about the living environment, it was acceptable actually.

Chen: Next, I would like to ask you about the programmes to achieve the goal of winning Olympic/Asian games gold medals. Did the programmes to achieve the goal of winning Olympic/Asian games gold medals have any impact on the development of competitive sport in Taiwan in terms of funding, system and results?

Interviewee G: There were two aspects for the funding, including human resources and material resources. In terms of human resources, the first priority was to find the right people to help us, including coaches, administrators or sport scientists who we just talked about and so on. With respect to hardware, we should consider certain questions. These are ‘is the hardware enough?’ and ‘is there any problem for the funding?’. There is not completely nothing at the moment. However, for example, a highland training base, a winter seaside training base and a seaside training base, we do not have yet. In effect, those were all linked to ‘winning gold medals’.

Chen: In the future, the SAC will be merged into the Ministry of Education (MOE). In your opinion, are there any possible implications for the development of competitive sport in Taiwan?
Interviewee G: I think that it is going to be better than the current situation. It is better to merge the SAC into the MOE unless the SAC could be upgraded into a single department, and it could operate independently and have a bigger budget. The MOE has a NTD$ 100 or 200 billion annual budget, and it can push the sports development through school system.

Chen: So the funding should increase in the future?

Interviewee G: Yes. Comparing with the SAC which has no official affiliated organisations for policy delivery, the MOE has over one hundred and fifty or sixty universities.

Chen: In the future, athletes could use the sporting facilities of the MOE?

Interviewee G: Yes, the facilities of schools, the coaches and specialist coaches could operate together. This will be a positive situation and the budget should also increase.

Chen: The last question is...we realised that the every Minister has had his/her own ambitions for the development of sports policy. Could you please tell us which policy was the most satisfying during your tenure? No matter whether it is a policy for competitive sport or grassroots development.

Interviewee G: During my tenure, I accomplished the policy of winning Olympic gold medals as we had been looking forwards to an Olympic gold medal for a long time. Moreover, I reached the goal of hosting an international sporting event in Taiwan. During my tenure, we host [sic] (won the bid for) World Games in Kaohsiung and Deaflympics in Taipei. I had another policy, which was to turn unused spaces into green spaces in Taiwan, including landscaping them and making them into multi-functional sport parks. People could do jogging, picnic and BBQ in those parks. We did not want to build white elephants anymore. In addition, I attempted to build specialised bicycle paths and walking paths in Taiwan. I hoped that there would be 1000 km specialised bicycle paths and 10000 km walking paths in total. So we could
combine multi-functional parks, bicycle paths and walking paths together. People then would love sports and could do sport everywhere in Taiwan. Taiwan thus becomes a green sport island. This was my clear vision at that time, and included the plan for winning gold medals in Olympics, the idea for Sports for All as well as hosting international sporting events.

Chen: We all understand that the policy should be continuous. In terms of the policies which you were satisfied were with, do you think that the next Minister continued and implemented these policies? Also what impacts did these have?

Interviewee G: I have no idea about whether they do implement these policies or not currently. There was a plan to win seven medals in the Beijing Olympic, but there was no gold medal at all. Do you think that the policy was well delivered? In addition, their ideas and mine are different, which is exemplified in that I was going to build bicycle paths, walking paths and multi-functional parks, but they have a policy for building swimming pools and general access sports centres. We are different. They have their own ideas. My idea was to make the natural environment green, which was both eco-friendly and less expensive. They did not totally continue my policy.