Highly skilled migration and the promotion of entrepreneurship in the UK

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Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/17423

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A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of Doctor of Philosophy
Geography Department
Loughborough University

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May 2015
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Thalej Vasishta of Paragon Law Ltd. and my supervisors, Dr. Elizabeth Mavroudi and Dr. Adam Warren for their support throughout the PhD process.

My girlfriend Lucy and my family have been instrumental in this process; I would like to thank them for their patience and care.

I would like to thank Loughborough University for the resources and backing provided for the PhD, including valuable training and conference opportunities.

Finally, I would like to thank the participants of this study, who invested their time and shared personal and professional experiences; their insights are at the core of this thesis.
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Abstract

There is a dearth of research on migrant entrepreneurship in the context of contemporary UK policy. At the same time, there is evidence of burgeoning transnational socio cultural connectivity. This thesis evaluates the impact of these conditions on migrant entrepreneurship in a rapidly changing policy environment. Migrant entrepreneurship is viewed differently in academia, policy and public perception. This causes significant policy tensions and disjunctions that are manifest a migration policy system which fails to take into account the agency of migrant entrepreneurs. In a break from previous studies, the migrant entrepreneur’s negotiations of power and agency that stem from transnational connections in a contemporary UK context will be addressed. It is important to acknowledge structures of migration policy and economic landscape at national, regional and local scales. Three areas of the UK are addressed; London, focusing on Inner London East, Birmingham and the West Midlands and Cambridgeshire.
1. Introduction

Migration policy impacts upon entrepreneurship in the UK and structures highly skilled migrant entrepreneurs’ use of the UK as a base for economic activities. Somerville and Goodman (2010: 951) suggest that ‘…immigration policy is a comprehensive set of myriad and interlocking rules and regulations that encompass asylum and refugee migration, economic migration and family flows as well as integration requirements.’ However, interpretations vary, reflecting the challenges for government in managing migration through policy. Mulvey (2010: 437-438) posits that

‘…immigration policy is seen as impacting on immigration politics, a politics in which hostility towards all migrants, but particularly those considered least ‘wanted’, has been institutionalized in both the political and public debates.’ (see Lowi 1972).

There is expectation for migration policy to provide a set of socio cultural ‘ground rules’, encouraging diversity, tolerance and social inclusion (Geddes 2000; Guiraudon 2003). However, according to Mavroudi (2010: 225), these are ‘…often thinly disguised attempts to classify and categorise groups for easy recognition, ‘tick-boxing’ bureaucracy, and are often contradictory…’ The manifestations of migration policy vary based upon which scales they are represented at; this thesis will demonstrate this through an analysis of migration policy in sub national spaces and transnational places in the UK.

In migration studies migrant entrepreneurs have been relatively neglected as a mobile population, despite their importance for subnational and national economies that they run businesses in and through. This thesis will focus on UK migration and fiscal policies showing how they impact upon migrant entrepreneurs and prospective migrant entrepreneurs to the UK. In turn the transnational socio cultural connections that migrants foster often impact their economic and entrepreneurial activities; this will be highlighted. Changes to policy are frequent and legislative alteration is manifested in the everyday activities of migrant entrepreneurs in the UK. Every immigration system is a
composition of legally mandated programmes towards work, family and humanitarian flows which are negotiated over long periods of time. Somerville and Goodman (2010: 952) suggest that these ‘...separate policy areas have distinct interests and as a consequence a 'big picture' view of immigration policy can obfuscate differences...’

Boswell (2007a; see Haddad and Balz 2006) notices that recent literature on the theory of migration policy ‘...has tended to be dominated by two overlapping themes: the question of why migration policies fail and attempts to explain the inclusionary tendency of migration and integration policies.’ Here, problematic policy areas will be addressed, seeking to understand how the complex ‘Tier 1 High value migrants’ section of UK migration policy operates on the ground from the perspective of stakeholders within migration and entrepreneurial processes.

This thesis aims to contribute to the field of migrant entrepreneurship by investigating the promotion of entrepreneurship in the UK through policy and the subsequent effects that this has on entrepreneurs in the UK. In 2011 at the opening of Tech City in East London Prime Minister David Cameron first introduced the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa and spoke to prospective highly skilled economic migrants stating: ‘If you have a great business idea, and you receive serious investment from a leading investor, you are welcome to set up your business in our country… we want you, we will make it easy for you, we will put out the red carpet for you...’ (BBC 2011). Though this thesis aims to focus on migrant entrepreneurs in the UK, an exploration of this mobility contributes to a more complete understanding of the impacts of policy on the migration process and breaks ground in addressing how migrants interpret, negotiate and determine their migration pathways through the use of transnational socio cultural connections.

1.1 Context

Three dominant stages are noted in UK migration and policy through the twentieth and twenty first century, 1) dealing with the immigration obligations
of empire, 2) mediating the role of the EU and managing changes of responsibility of national government to oversee immigration policy, and 3) fundamental policy change in the implementation of the UK points based system. The following sections will provide a brief synopsis of migration policy in the UK based around important themes of migration policy. Smith (Smith 2008: 415) outlines the key problem in structuring this on a party political basis, in that despite the opinion that the ‘…Conservatives have been seen as tougher on immigration than Labour in the UK, there has been little difference in practice between the two parties’ policies in government.’

When in power, New Labour made substantial changes to immigration policy, and one change is the implementation of the points based system; this is often identified as one of the seminal changes in the structure and practice of UK immigration (Dobson et al. 2009). Balch (2009: 613) addresses the ‘…shift in UK labour migration policy since 2000 and demonstrates how policy was redesigned by networks of actors working between and within the worlds of think tanks and government, including the Prime Minister's Policy and Innovation Unit (PIU), the Treasury, the Home Office and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR).’ Somerville and Goodman (2010: 952) express this theme similarly, they conclude that ‘The ‘engine room’ of economic migration policy development between 1997 and 2007 was a network of departments, associations, employers, agencies, think tanks and interest groups which coalesced around a single agenda.’ However, this policy change does not tend to take into account the perspectives of migrants on the ground.

Among the most important new policies implemented at this time were those aimed at highly skilled immigrants, the expansion and redesign of the work-permit system and measures to attract international students (Flynn et al. 2010). The envelopment of migration policy within a wider vein of economic policy (Dobson et al. 2009) is perhaps efficient in describing the effect of points based system. This coincides with Somerville and Goodman’s study on ‘policy networks’ that existed between 1997 and 2007 in UK asylum, economic migration and immigrant integration policy. The analysis shows that
employers and businesses (together with other state and non-state actors) were part of a tightly organised, ideologically cohesive economic migration ‘policy community’. This policy community was ‘…crucial to the development of economic migration policy, in contrast to the development of asylum and integration policies.’ (Somerville and Goodman 2010: 952).

The points based system allows for the quantification of migrant labour around specific educational and economic attributes (see Figure 17). Castles (2006) cites the 2006 White Paper highlighting that points are awarded ‘…for attributes’ (such as educational qualifications, previous earnings, prospective earnings, and age) and ‘control factors’ (which are concerned with preventing over-staying and irregular employment through a sponsorship system).’ (Home Office 2006: 16). This revised system has allowed for the consolidation of over 80 different routes for entering the UK for non-EU nationals down to five (Clark and Drinkwater 2008). These are based around skill categories,

‘…Tier 1 is for highly skilled individuals; Tier 2 for skilled workers with a UK job offer; Tier 3 for “limited numbers of low skilled workers needed to fill specific temporary labour shortages”; Tier 4 for students; and Tier 5 for youth mobility and temporary workers “for a limited period of time to satisfy primarily non-economic objectives” (Home Office, 2006:2).’ (Castles 2006: 753-754).

Salt (2009) stipulates that the Points Based System was not only a measure to bolster the ailing industries lacking in skilled and highly skilled staff, but to strengthen the resident labour market test for Tier 2 skilled jobs so that employers must advertise jobs to resident workers through the national JobCentre Plus offices network of labour offices before they can bring in a worker from outside Europe, this measure was implemented from 1 April 2009.

The points based system focuses ‘…on bringing in migrants who are highly skilled or to do key jobs that cannot be filled from the domestic labour force or from the EU,’ (Home Office 2006: 1 see Castles 2006). According to Iredale
(2001: 20) this has been ‘A general solution for governments to facilitate the import of temporary professionals, usually on the basis of arguments that skills shortages are immediate and short term and that these workers are highly mobile and will not want to stay permanently.’. This is reflected in academic developments, as Pellegrino (2001: 112) explains ‘The debate on ‘brain drain’ has gradually been replaced by proposals for encouraging ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain exchange’.’

Since 2008 fundamental changes to the organisation and management of UK migration policy have been witnessed (Dobson et al. 2009; Facchini and Mayda 2011). As has been addressed, this new policy abandoned what Findlay and Stam (2006: 7) term ‘…the previous plethora of labour immigration channels…’ creating a ‘…points based immigration policy similar to that in place in Australia.’ In 2008 Tier 1 replaced the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP). Tier 1 is defined by the UKBA as for those that are ‘…exceptionally talented and highly skilled workers, investors and entrepreneurs wanting to work in the UK.’ (UKBA 2012 see Home Office 2011) This category is divided into five sub categories 1) exceptional talent, 2) entrepreneur, 3) investor, 4) general and 5) graduate entrepreneur.

Hopkins and Levy (2012: 37-38) suggest that ‘…many of the changes that the Coalition Government has brought in are sensible and evidenced based, such as the reform of the Tier 1 migrant visa. This is echoed by Papademetriou et al. (2008: 9) as they posit that ‘The UK needs to think more strategically about immigration flows in a recession, namely by increasing selectivity and preparing for the upswing.’. They continue to recommend that ‘In policy terms this means: Increase selectivity by adding to the points total for Tier 1…” (2008: 9). Somerville and Sumption (2009: 74) summarise the difficulty of highly skilled migration management through Tier 1 of the contemporary migration system. They suggest that in order to ‘…capitalise on talent in a competitive world, the UK needs to continue attracting students (and easing student–worker transitions) and selecting those most able to contribute to our economy (such as low-carbon experts and green engineers).’
The emergence and sustainability of world cities and world city regions is linked into the flows of migrants out of, into and through them. As Beaverstock (2012: 240) suggests ‘Highly skilled international migration is a preeminent process for world city growth, competitiveness and network building.’ Accordingly, the place of a world city in the ‘…global urban hierarchy, [is] sustained by transnational corporation inter-company transfers and ‘expatriation’ …’

According to Pissarides and McMaster (1990: 812), ‘…there is scope for an active regional policy…’ A decade since this statement was made, Somerville and Goodman show that it takes more than a solely governmental overview of migration policy and the regional economic and political landscape. Accordingly, they found that an intermeshed and networked state of policy governing some sub national spaces exists, whereby ‘…employers and businesses (together with other state and non-state actors) were part of a tightly organised, ideologically cohesive economic migration ‘policy community’. (2010: 951). This is echoed by Ambrosini (2012: 1), as he states that in relation to local policies for immigrants, in recent years it has become ‘…increasingly accepted that they are distinct units of analysis in the governance of migration, with significant degrees of autonomy with regard to national policies.’

This thesis will explore three UK spaces and the impact that national migration policy is having on migrant entrepreneurs in these areas. These are A) London, focusing on Inner London East, B) Birmingham and the West Midlands, and C) Cambridgeshire.

**Figure 1 Sub national areas - metrics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Resident population</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Businesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham (and the West Midlands)</td>
<td>1,092,300 (5,674,700)</td>
<td>522,000</td>
<td>34,285 (215,680)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>632,100</td>
<td>323,000</td>
<td>30,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner London (East)</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>48,500</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2.1 Inner London (East)

Figure 2 Map of the UK, with Inner London East highlighted
Today, London's Tech City is a high growth phenomena located in Inner East London. This locality can be seen as an inner-urban hotspot, which builds heavily on the assets of a global city. Consequently, the UK’s digital economy is largely clustered in London. The city has nearly 24% of British jobs in computer and related activities, and 22% of telecommunications jobs. For digital content, the figures are even higher. Centre for London research shows Inner East London’s digital firms are closely related to both financial and business services, and to London’s creative industries. Inner East London and other digital hotspots have emerged organically within London’s neighbourhood fabric, rather than being planned ‘innovation zones’. From a local perspective, Inner East London’s is one of several digital economy zones in the capital, probably the most dynamic, and the eastern end of a high-tech corridor running through the centre. In 2013, London’s Tech City topped the chart for new business generation in the UK, launching 15,720...
new businesses in the Silicon Roundabout area between March 2012 and March 2013.

Beaverstock and Smith (1996) postulate that as cities like London, New York and Tokyo strengthen their hold on global finance and banking, they increasingly become global marketplaces for skilled migrant workers (Beaverstock et al. 2001). This section will argue that this phenomenon has not occurred in recent years as a result of regional or city-regional migration policies but through what Amin and Thrift (1992) term, a neo-Marshallian node of industry clustering characterised by a high level of openness to and interaction with the global economy. This provides ‘...an essential source of knowledge, expertise and market opportunities.’ (Keeble and Nachum 2002: 27-28). This concept is being encouraged in the government backed local project: East London Tech City. Here, investment policy favouring information technology, social media and digital technology firms has deliberately created nodes of firm clustering. This government intervention in the locality originally termed Silicon Roundabout highlights a desire to re-imagine the Silicon Valley success story in London. This was articulated by David Cameron in November 2011, as he stated that East London Tech City ‘...wasn’t invented by government, it was happening here anyway. But we thought let’s get behind this, let’s help this, because Silicon Valley succeeded because it was building on something that was already there, Tech City is the same. Great hub of tech businesses, we can create something really brilliant and world beating here in East London.’ (Cameron 2011).

There is very sparse academic work on East London Tech City considering the high levels of capital and political investment from the Coalition government and private sources. A movement away from the reliance on financial services has been witnessed, with emphasis placed upon emerging information technology, social media and digital technology firms. These trends do not suggest the promotion of migrant entrepreneurship by proxy. Through dialogue with organisations and government funded groups such as Tech City Investment Organisation and the UK Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills, the levels of policy and support for migrant entrepreneurs on the ground will be evaluated.

1.2.2 Birmingham and the West Midlands

Figure 4 Map of the UK with Birmingham and the West Midlands highlighted
Birmingham and the West Midlands have a long history of inward migration which has been institutionalised through local and city regional government bodies. Brown et al. (2009a; 2009b) provide a concise summary of the role and position of local authorities and other city regional organizations in administering migration policy for Birmingham and the West Midlands. They point out that ‘Migration policy at the sub national level is the responsibility of the West Midlands Strategic Migration Partnership (WMSMP)...which is one of 11 such organisations across the UK,...funded by the UK Border and Immigration Authority (BIA) of the Home Office.’ (2009b: 41). The intermeshing of organisations at various scales is noted, as Brown et al. (2009b: 42) suggest that the WMSMP works at national, sub national and local levels, ‘At the national level through the principle strategic groups on migration established by government at the regional level through collaborative working with other regional organisations.’ Webster (2001: 34) suggests that Birmingham was the British centre of the car economy throughout the 1960s causing low unemployment in this era. He posits that
‘...the vigour of the employment situation in Birmingham had long stimulated migration to the city.’ More recently, ‘Finance, Law and Business Services together with R&D and Higher Education are important sectors in Birmingham’s economy.’ (Brown et al. 2009a: 12). These sectors have been part of the regeneration strategy pursued by the city, alongside flagship projects in architecture, education and arts.

The following tables (ONS 2015) show jobs by sector (Figure 4), and business count broken down by size of business (Figure 5) - indicating the industrial composition of Birmingham and the West Midlands.

**Figure 6 Jobs in Birmingham and the West Midlands by sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee jobs (2013)</th>
<th>Birmingham (Employee Jobs)</th>
<th>Birmingham (%)</th>
<th>West Midlands (%)</th>
<th>Great Britain (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Employee Jobs</td>
<td>476,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time</td>
<td>329,000</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Time</td>
<td>147,500</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employee Jobs By Industry</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Services (A-B: Agriculture And Mining)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy And Water (D-E)</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (C)</td>
<td>39,300</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction (F)</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (G-S)</td>
<td>416,900</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale And Retail, Including Motor Trades (G)</td>
<td>70,600</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Storage (H)</td>
<td>17,800</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accomodation And Food Services(I)</td>
<td>26,500</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information And Communication (J)</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial And Other Business Services(K-N)</td>
<td>109,700</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Admin, Education And Health (O-Q)</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services (K-S)</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONS business register and employment survey
* Data unavailable
Notes: % is a proportion of total employee jobs
Employee jobs excludes self-employed, government-supported trainees and HM Forces
Data excludes farm-based agriculture
Phillimore et al. (2007) suggest that barriers to highly skilled migrants within Birmingham and the West Midlands are caused by shortcomings in the infrastructure for skills recognition. Brown et al. 2009b: 46) build on this, claiming that Accreditation of Prior Learning (APL) is less well developed in the UK than in countries such as the Netherlands, France and Germany and improvements may well be of use here.' (On a city scale, Brown et al. (2009b: 41) see Birmingham city council as occupying a key role in migrant integration policy in urban area. These policies were developed in the council’s 2002 Integration Strategy, and ‘…implemented through a range of activities within the city council and in partnership with other public, private and community organisations, including the police and health services.’ The city level ‘Integration Strategy’ and work on this policy area is separated from the council’s wider social inclusion and equalities activity, but according to Jaffares et al. (2008) a number of links are now being made.
1.2.3 Cambridgeshire

Figure 8 Map of the UK with Cambridgeshire highlighted
Cambridgeshire is a UK subregion, renowned for a developed tech sector and anchor institutions including the University of Cambridge. In the May 2010 study commissioned by the East of England Development Agency (EEDA) on ‘the Cambridge Cluster at 50’, the role of migration policy is addressed in relation to the future of the Cambridge high technology subregion (SQW 2011). The study places impetus on central government for advancing ‘…a policy framework that allows Cambridge and other UK hubs to compete effectively in what is an intensely- and increasingly- competitive sphere.’ (SQW 2011: iv). The study calls for

‘…an effective migration policy that does not place restrictions on highly skilled or talented people from outside the European Economic
Area seeking to work or study within the Cambridge area.’ (SQW 2011: iv).

This is then developed to highlight the need for ‘effective operation in both national and global space.’ (SQW 2011: 21). The study suggests that ‘…restrictions on international migration are seen as seriously unhelpful.’ and ‘Current attempts to cap migration are not welcome and indeed, there was a strong sense that it needed to be made easier rather than more difficult through, for example, the issuing of visas…’ (SQW 2011: 21). Despite this assumption in the SQW (2011) paper, Faggian and McCann (2009: 320) suggest that ‘The evidence supporting the role played by the mobility of local human capital in promoting innovation is still quite tentative…’ Millard (2005: 343) addresses movement incentives in terms of career development in highly qualified and specialized areas, this is arguably ‘…a more important migration motivation factor than economic gain…’ . It is instead suggested that ‘The highly skilled are drawn to competitive and innovative places to better their career development.’ (Millard 2005: 343). Millard (2005: 344) addresses the theoretical foundations of this theme, postulating that although there has been ‘…considerable discussion about the close link between highly skilled migration and uneven regional development…the literature on highly skilled migration and that on clustering has developed separately.’.

The rapid growth since the 1960s of a cluster of technology based SMEs in the Cambridge subregion (defined broadly as covering settlements up to 15 miles around the city of Cambridge) has attracted international attention. Numbers of local high technology firms have mushroomed, from only 30 in 1960 and 100 in 1975, to 330 in 1985 and 798 in 1998, employing 27,318 employees (Keeble 1998). The cluster is historically focused on the University of Cambridge with its frameworks currently attracting research attention, and contains a diversity of technology based sectors rather than being specialized in one particular sector.

The modern Cambridge cluster began in 1960 with the foundation of Cambridge Consultants, which was formed to connect Cambridge University
academics and industry. While Cambridge was already home to several well-established engineering firms, such as the Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company, the Pye Group, and Marshall of Cambridge, it was still viewed by many as a small country town in the centre of a very large natural green belt. However, with the establishment of Cambridge Science Park by Trinity College in 1970, the cluster began to grow rapidly. 39 new companies were formed between 1960 and 1969. In the 1970s, 137 were formed. By 1990, company formations had reached an average of two per week. Today, Cambridge is one of Europe’s largest technology clusters. Around 54,000 people are employed by the more than 1,500 technology-based firms in the area, which have combined annual revenue of over £12 billion.

The following tables (ONS 2015) show jobs by sector (Figure 7), and business count broken down by size of business (Figure 8) - indicating the industrial composition of Cambridgeshire. Figure 9 denotes employment by occupation using SOC2010, this indicates role counts in the subregion and levels of seniority of the workforce.

**Figure 10 Jobs in Cambridgeshire by sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee Jobs By Industry</th>
<th>Cambridgeshire (Employee Jobs)</th>
<th>Cambridgeshire (%)</th>
<th>East (%)</th>
<th>Great Britain (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Employee Jobs</td>
<td>284,900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Time</td>
<td>94,900</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Primary Services (A-B: Agriculture And Mining)**: 900 employees (0.3%)
- **Energy And Water (D-E)**: 3,600 employees (1.2%)
- **Manufacturing (C)**: 30,200 employees (10.6%)
- **Construction (F)**: 10,000 employees (3.5%)
- **Services (G-S)**: 240,200 employees (84.3%)
- **Wholesale And Retail, Including Motor Trades (G)**: 40,200 employees (14.1%)
- **Transport Storage (H)**: 10,500 employees (3.7%)
- **Accommodation And Food Services(I)**: 15,900 employees (5.6%)
- **Information And Communication (J)**: 15,000 employees (5.3%)
- **Financial And Other Business Services(K-N)**: 62,900 employees (22.1%)
- **Public Admin, Education And Health (O-Q)**: 85,800 employees (30.1%)
- **Other Services (R-S)**: 9,000 employees (3.5%)
Universities are one of the Cambridgeshire’s most valuable institutions, and play a number of roles in helping the tech driven local economy – in providing skilled graduates and encouraging spinout firms (Swinney 2011). Research
suggests that the physical proximity of universities to firms is an important enabling factor (Abramovsky and Simpson 2011; D'Este and Lammarino 2010). The University of Cambridge is a major employer, technology provider, and a source of knowledge and skills in the region.

The University of Cambridge suggest that much of the cluster’s rapid growth in the 1970s can be attributed to the foundation of the Cambridge Science Park by Trinity College in 1970. In addition to the Science Park, the University and its Colleges have been integral to the infrastructure which enables the cluster to continue to grow, including St John’s Innovation Centre, Peterhouse Technology Park and the ideaSpace Enterprise Accelerator.

The University also contributes to the growth of the cluster by providing solutions to business problems through consultancy activity and through the licensing of discoveries to new and existing companies. More than 1,000 IP licensing, consultancy and equity contracts are currently under management by Cambridge Enterprise, the University’s commercialisation group.

1.2.4 Summary

Here, three case study areas have been outlined to develop a research context and develop a sense of place.

In the locality of East London has seen high levels of investment from private and public sources, including government. Comparisons have been made to Silicon Valley, with the Coalition government outlining plans to artificially elevate the area to a ‘world beating’ status. It has been questioned whether an entrepreneurial cluster can be created and provision for migrant entrepreneurs will be evaluated. In Birmingham, city regional and local government provides the driving force behind manifestations of city regional migration policy. Evaluation of Cambridgeshire shows local organisations acting in a subregional space. Government and industry coalesce around a policy framework that allows Cambridge to compete effectively in the global labour marketplace. Institutions such as the University of Cambridge act as catalysts for institutional thickness (Keeble et al. 1999), where a mixed public and private sector innovation landscape is promoted by university activities.
1.2 Rationale

UK government has made many penetrating changes to the regulatory environment both to encourage entrepreneurial non European Economic Area (non EEA) migrants to enter and remain in the UK and to manage non EEA migrant numbers. The impact of policy changes is undocumented, and migrant’s perspectives of changes are absent from academic literature on migrant entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the impact of Tier 1 Entrepreneur migration policy on the ground, for practitioners, professionals and migrants has not been investigated, spurring the conception of this study and gaining support from my industrial sponsor and government bodies.

This study will address migration policy as manifest at multiple scales; where it has previously been seen as an exclusively national issue. Here, sub national interpretations and affects will be addressed. The interplay between impacts at different scales is highlighted in Iredale’s (2001: 21) statement summarising conflicting interests of government and industry in contemporary political space, providing an arena for political debate (Keating 1997) and juxtaposing the spatial fixity of industry with flows of people and capital. He suggests that ‘…migration selection policies now need to be seen in a much wider context than in the past when most professional labour markets were national. This will require a substantial shift in policy thinking which many governments will have to face as they join the ‘war’ over skills.’ An intermeshing of interests, policy and places will be seen as scales overlay one another, providing an alternative way of looking at entrepreneurial migration and policy for the UK.

There is a dearth of research on the role of socio cultural connections, connection to place and family connections and informal social networks for high skilled entrepreneurial migrants. Researchers have explored transnational identity formation though this will not be the focus of discussion in this thesis. The economic, political, religious, and socio-cultural practices that propel migrant incorporation and transnational connection will be evaluated as drivers of change in the migration pathways that entrepreneurs carve out through space and time (Levitt et al. 2004). These concepts were
taken up in the context of Silicon Valley by the likes of AnnaLee Saxenian (2001; 2004; 2005) around ten to fifteen years ago, and will be readdressed in the context of the UK and contemporary migration policy.

This research contributes to a field of research that is emerging as significant in the UK, as the rhetoric of promotion of migrant entrepreneurship by government is juxtaposed by the realities on the ground of complex and often restrictive migration management policy. Though overall numbers of migrants entering the UK on the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa are relatively small, the economic contribution, and multiplier effects of innovative and growth stimulating enterprise are important at subnational and national scales.

1.3 

**Aim and objectives**

The aim of this research is:

‘To investigate policy impacts on the promotion of migrant entrepreneurship in the UK and the ways that migrant entrepreneurs interpret, negotiate and determine their migration pathways through the use of transnational socio cultural connections.’

To address this aim three objectives are explored in this thesis:

1. To explore how non-EEA high skilled entrepreneurial migration is incentivised in the UK and how this relates to place.

2. To determine how non-EEA high skilled migrants engage in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape.

3. To examine how non-EEA high skilled entrepreneurs are connected and embedded in transnational socio cultural networks in the UK and with their home country.
1.4 Thesis structure

This thesis is comprised of eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background to research in order to situate this study within the existing literature on highly skilled migration and mobility and then specifically addresses migrant entrepreneurship. Chapter 3 informs the methodological framework for the study and discusses research design, epistemology, data management and use, positionality, ethical considerations, policy relevance and dissemination of research. Chapter 4 is the first of four empirical chapters which explores the concept of entrepreneurship in the context of migration, unravelling key themes and contextualising the multiple standpoints on entrepreneurship that will inform subsequent discussion. Chapter 5 addresses the impact of migration policy on migrant entrepreneurs in their movement to the UK; analysing policy and problematising key aspects of Tier 1 PBS policy. Chapter 6 examines the impact of the UK’s economic landscape on migrant entrepreneurship, looking at fiscal and economic policy that is used to promote and manage migrant entrepreneurship alongside Home Office migration legislation. Chapter 7 discusses the role of transnational socio-cultural connections in the course of the migration process and settlement in the UK for migrant entrepreneurs; exploring the impact that transnational relations have on economic activity, and the everyday lives of migrant entrepreneurs. Finally, chapter 8 brings together the four empirical chapters to conclude and discuss the overall research findings. This chapter highlights the contribution that this research makes to existing knowledge and theory; discussing the impact of these findings and providing future direction for research in the field.
2. Highly skilled migration, migrant entrepreneurship and policy: examining relationships and impacts

2.1 Highly skilled migration

2.1.1 Defining highly skilled migration

Highly skilled migration is an ill-defined and hazy area of academic and policy literature, focusing on qualifications and experience as a gauge of skill level. Definitions have not been nuanced following on from John Salt’s seminal work (1997) on highly skilled migrants. Kofman and Raghuram (2009) state that there are no clear definitions of highly skilled migration at present and most researchers treat migrants with a tertiary education as skilled. They distinguish between those who are skilled such as nurses and teachers, and those who are highly skilled including ICT workers, scientists and doctors. In the author’s view, this outlook is an over simplified account of categories spurred by Kofman and Raghuram’s (2009) agenda to highlight gender bias in skilled and highly skilled occupations. In Figure 16, Mahroum (2000) deconstructs what ‘being’ a highly skilled migrant entails. This sees classification on the basis of highly skilled mobility, types of influencing factors and policies. For a working definition here, Salt (1997: 3) proposes that highly skilled migrants ‘…have a tertiary educational qualification or its equivalent, although the skills can also be acquired through experience.’ This is echoed by Akçapar (2006) as he cites the OECD position on highly skilled migrants, again as having a university degree or extensive experience in one field. These definitions tend to overlap heavily accounts of skilled migrants, as Vertovec (2002: 2) denotes, skilled migrants are ‘…those in possession of a tertiary degree or extensive specialized work experience…’ This includes

‘…scientists and researchers, international consultants, employees of international organisations, managers of multinational businesses, professionals, clergy, artists, actors, tourism operators, athletes,
specially qualified workers, military personnel, and university students.’ (Todisco et al. 2003: 13).

There is a sense of conflation when referring to political documents and migration legislation compared to academic definitions (Regets 2001; Guelloc and Cervantes 2002; Facchini and Mayda 2008). On the one hand the UK points based system (PBS) for example, allows for the quantification of migrant labour around specific educational and economic attributes (see Figure 6). Castles (2006) cites the 2006 White Paper (Home Office 2006: 16) highlighting that points are awarded ‘…for ‘attributes’ (such as educational qualifications, previous earnings, prospective earnings, and age) and ‘control factors’ (which are concerned with preventing over-staying and irregular employment through a sponsorship system).’ (Home Office 2006: 16). This corresponds with the rationale of the Australian PBS, as Miller (1999: 192-193) suggests ‘Skill migrants must satisfy a points test, have specific work skills, be nominated by particular employers, or otherwise have the potential to bring benefits to Australia.’ (see Robinson and Carey 2000; Antecol et al. 2001).

On the other hand, as Brown et al. (2009: 22) state, ‘The term 'highly skilled' can indicate a formal educational qualification, but ‘skill’ can also be defined as the ability to solve certain tasks regardless of whether those abilities were acquired vocationally or by more formal educational means.’ Brown et al.’s (2009) assumption does not acknowledge that policy structures do not tend to encompass this less rigorous gauge. Skills are often measured solely on the basis of qualifications, failing for highly skilled yet low qualified migrants, particularly relevant when looking at migrant entrepreneurs (Tseng 2000; Auriol and Sexton 2001; Barrett et al. 2001; Low 2003; Foreman-Peck and Zhou 2011). Iredale (2001 10)) suggests not only this but ‘…selection procedures and/ or employers assess Western qualifications more highly than others.’ This qualification is seen as ‘…ensuring not only technical skills but also of ‘other’ language competence, as well as increased awareness of the ‘political, economic and social context of the host nation.’ Unsurprisingly then,
a university degree gained in the migrant’s country of origin does not guarantee a skilled position after migration (Parreñas 2001; Parutis 2011).

The points-based system focuses ‘...primarily on bringing in migrants who are highly skilled or to do key jobs that cannot be filled from the domestic labour force or from the EU,’ (Home Office 2006: 1 see Castles 2006). According to Iredale (2001: 20) this has been ‘A general solution has been for governments to facilitate the import of temporary professionals, usually on the basis of arguments that skills shortages are immediate and short term and that these workers are highly mobile and will not want to stay permanently.’ This is reflected in academic developments, as Pellegrino (2002: 112) explains ‘The debate on ‘brain drain’ has gradually been replaced by proposals for encouraging ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain exchange’.’. Yet, to an extent, highly skilled migrants remain an elusive category for definition due to their invisibility (Findlay 1996). Hannerz suggests skilled international migrants remain ‘invisible’ because ‘...they can adapt easily to their new habitat as states recognise them as being an ‘acceptable’ (politically, socially and economically) segment of modern migration systems (Raghuram 2000).’ (c.f. Beaverstock 2005: 248). It is argued that this speculation must be taken in a relevant political and economic context (Mahroum 2000). The following section will address this in the context of corporate labour movements illustrated through empirical evidence. Mahroum (2000: 29) stipulates of policy that it ‘...should be tailored to suit the different organisational and cognitive structures of the various sectors and professions.’ It will be argued here that the same is true for both theoretical representation and in defining the nature of highly skilled business or entrepreneurial migrants (Benson-Rea and Rawlinson 2003), against the political lumping and homogenisation of a diverse ‘nomadic cadre’ (Beaverstock 2005: 249) of transnational workers.

In her study, Weiss (2005: 707) stipulates that in interviews quite a few highly skilled migrants claimed that they ‘...do not want to see themselves as ‘migrants’ 'This may be attributed to the negative connotation of the word’... or ‘It could also be seen as an attempt to defend their personal identity against common procedures that turn people into migrants.’ (2005: 707). Brown et al.
build upon this, citing the ambivalence and unclear connotations of what it is to be a migrant: ‘The status of migrant can also mean many things: it can be limited to certain forms of work permits for foreign employees; the status as a seconded employee within an international company; or simply mean any non-national.’ This ambivalence is manifest in the everyday activities of migrants, as well as in policy, where vagueness and hazy definitions provide a simultaneously bounded yet flexible environment.

Changes to migration policy over the last five years have has an impact on the numbers of highly skilled migrants to the UK, and the rationale for their migration. Figure 10 shows the changing number of visas issued per year since 2010. As aforementioned, the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa was introduced in 2010, impacting Tier 1 intake. Subsequent changes to policy that have had greatest impact on numbers of visas issued include 1) in Tier 4, the abolition of the Post Study Work visa in April 2012, 2) creation of the Tier 1 Graduate Entrepreneur visa in March 2012, 3) for Tier 2, changes to family migration and dependents (including minimum salary increase to £18,600 in July 2012, and 4) the closure of Tier 1 General category, with the window for extensions on the visa ending in April 2015.

**Figure 13 Visas granted in the UK by PBS Tier since 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tier 1 (High value)</th>
<th>Tier 2 (Skilled)</th>
<th>Tier 4 (Study)</th>
<th>Tier 5 (Youth mobility and temporary workers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>32,946</td>
<td>68,193</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>37,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>22,819</td>
<td>66,432</td>
<td>261,870</td>
<td>38,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18,010</td>
<td>68,108</td>
<td>209,804</td>
<td>40,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>11,604</td>
<td>79,982</td>
<td>218,625</td>
<td>41,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>9,866</td>
<td>90,725</td>
<td>220,116</td>
<td>44,011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1.2 The economic impact of highly skilled migration in the UK

Highly skilled migration may have positive and negative effects on the economies of either the sending or receiving country. Though again, it is not possible to identify the clear-cut costs or benefits, and economic theory has stressed the ambivalence of migration issues. Shachar (2006: 193) highlights that the ‘modern approach’ to immigration in the UK, is designed ‘…to ensure that visitors, businessmen, students and others whose activities benefit the UK feel encouraged to come.’ However, here and in the broader literature, little indication of what economic contribution highly skilled migrants make to the UK is provided. In 2000 George Borjas (2000: 11) asked ‘…what is the economic impact of international migration on the host country?’ This has not been evaluated or disaggregated for each category of migrant, therefore this section will aim to shed light on the economics of (highly skilled) migration and embed this in a European and UK context (see Coleman and Rowthorn 2004; Cerna 2010). Ouaked documents the 2002 ‘Transatlantic roundtable on high-skilled migration and sending countries issues’, outlining three motives, to 1) identify impacts of highly skilled migration on source countries, 2) identify policies to maximise benefits to source countries and negate impacts such as ‘brain drain’ and, 3) frame and evaluate international agreements regulating the movement of highly skilled workers in order to identify measures to promote economic prosperity. These objectives encapsulate the rationale of national government and supra national regional policies, here the economic basis for these political manifestations will be illustrated and conceptually disaggregated from a ‘politics of highly skilled migration’. In this light, Borjas (2000: 15; Borjas et al. 1997) suggests that ‘Because local labour market conditions may not provide valuable information about the economic impact of immigration, some studies have attempted to measure the impact at the level of the national market.

To contextualise the economic contribution of highly skilled migrants, overarching figures will be first examined. For Spain and Germany estimated economic benefit is suggested, in Gott and Johnson’s pre-Euro currency study, figures from the RWI Economic Institute show that the collective
migrant population in Germany is contributing about seven per cent (DM250 billion) to annual GDP. It is estimated that ‘...foreigners are paying DM100 billion in taxes and contributions and receiving approximately two-thirds of these payments (DM60 billion) in monetary transfers from the state and public goods.’ (2002: 12). According to Gott and Johnson’s (2002: 12) estimates, migrants in Germany are making a net fiscal contribution of DM40 billion, or £12.3 billion. Figures for Spain show that ‘...in 1998 migrants made a net fiscal contribution of 187 million pesetas (£0.7 million), contributing 335 million pesetas in taxes and receiving the equivalent of 148 million pesetas in government expenditure.’ These figures are out of date; however they are useful for comparison. Teruel and Segarra (2009: 114) update information for Spain, in terms of numbers of migrants, suggesting that ‘...available data point out the intensity of the arrival of immigrants to Spain in recent years. Immigrants were forming only 1.6% of Spanish population in 1998, but then their fraction increased to 7.0% in 2004 and rose to 11.3% in 2008.’

In the UK economic migrants comprise over a third (38%) of all migrant inflows with significant numbers coming to the UK for formal study (32%), family reunification (16%) and, since the 1990s, large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees have sought refuge in the UK. These figures differ significantly by country of origin in 2008, just 24% of non-EU migrants came for work reasons compared to 54% of EU migrants (ONS Annual Migration Report 2008; Hopkins and Levy 2012). The geographical inequalities on a regional scale within the UK in highly skilled migrant make up are of interest for this study. Miller and Reid point out that there are variations in migrant qualifications, for example, over 30% of migrants in London, the South East, the North East, Wales and Scotland have a degree or equivalent qualification while less than 20% do in the East and West Midlands (Miller and Reid 2011). The 2007 Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) report to Harvey Nash details estimated economic impact of highly skilled migrants to the UK between 2007 and 2012. The total economic benefit of skilled migrant workers is estimated to be £77 billion to the UK economy, equivalent to 4.7 per cent of the United Kingdom’s GVA in 2004 prices. Furthermore, the study takes into account impacts upon education, health and government services
sectors, highlighting expectation that these will benefit more than any other sector from highly skilled migrant economic activity; ‘Highly skilled migrants will boost output in this sector by just over £17.8 billion in 2004 prices.’ (CEBR 2007: 7).

Looking at the impact of highly skilled migrants at the level of the company, Hopkins and Levy (2012) suggest that the profitability is in some cases increased, particularly in high tech industries. Conducting an event analysis of the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA) of 1998, which nearly doubled the number of available skilled migrant visas in 1999, Lin (2011) found that employers and shareholders in the industries (high tech) that were more likely to use highly skilled migrants gained an average of over 20% in cumulative excess returns following the passage of the Act.

2.1.3 Government policy, ‘brain gain’ and talent attraction

According to the 2002 OECD (2002: 5). policy brief ‘The policy objectives regarding immigration of highly skilled workers in most OECD countries are threefold: i) to respond to market shortages; ii) to increase the stock of human capital; and iii) to encourage the circulation of the knowledge embodied in highly skilled workers and promote innovation.’ Developed countries have positively accepted foreign talent by increasing caps on the number of visas issued, or by relaxing the requirements for entry and work permits (McLaughlan and Salt 2002; OECD 2002). The UK launched a Highly Skilled Migrants Programme in January 2002 and in 2005 where

‘…over three-quarters were issued to four occupational categories – medical (largely trained doctors), financial, business and information technology (Salt 2006).’ (Kofman 2007: 130).

Murakami states other examples including the ‘…American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act (1998), the American Competitiveness in the

As Guellec and Cervantes (2001: 71) denote,

‘Developing centres of excellence for scientific research and framing the conditions for expanding technological innovation and entrepreneurship are important for making a country attractive to highly skilled workers…’

Rothgang and Schmidt (2003) notice the increasing competition among developed countries for highly skilled workers (Porter 1990; Mahroum 2000; Bauer and Kunze 2004; Shachar 2006). In the UK, the concept of developing centres of excellence has been documented by Morano-Foadi (2005: 150 see Mahroum 1999; Mahroum 2000; Meyer 2001; Peixoto 2001; Ackers 2005a; 2005b; Morano-Foadi 2005; Hercog and Siegel 2011).; she evaluates the UK as a key destination for mobile researchers from aboard. She states that ‘…migration appears concentrated on the most elite and the 2003 Higher Education White Paper aimed to encourage the continued mobility of the scientific elite into the United Kingdom.’ According to Kofman (2007) this trend has also been shown in European Commission orientation towards immigration policies to attract the highly skilled, however, the emphasis on the financial and managerial elites of knowledge based economy is arguably not adopted to the same extent as in the UK (European Parliament 2007; Frattini 2007). Morano-Foadi (2005: 151) suggests that figures show a ‘brain gain’ rather than a ‘brain drain’ in flows of scientists into and out of the country.’ However, this does not correlate with trends documented in The Guardian newspaper report on the Former Immigration Minister, Damian Green’s proposal to ‘…replace the "post-study work route" for graduates with a new more limited "graduate entrepreneur" specialist category.’ (The Guardian 2012). This seemingly regressive move, an eminent theme debated at the APPG (All Party Parliamentary Group) on Migration (2012), has been discussed informally as ‘…a possible graduate entrepreneur route.’ since mid-
2011, where minutes of the Migration Advisory Committee from 15 July mention the development (MAC 2011).

Hawthorne (2005: 670) stipulates the changing ethos of the Australian national government confronted with ‘...an age of ‘boundarylessness’...’ the Australian state ‘...had to redefine itself as ‘an agile global player which fosters international integration, [that] encourage[s] the flourishing diversity if its citizenry: multiple identities, multiple global connections and even multiple passports (Cope and Kalantzis 1997: 142)' Progressively, as Khoo et al. (2007: 176) describe, ‘Many industrialized countries now have temporary migration programmes that facilitate the entry of skilled foreign workers ...’ (Salt 1992; 1997; Iredale 1999; OECD 2002; Ruhs 2005). However, as Pichler (2011: 968) states, ‘...contemporary policies may predominantly focus on mechanisms rather than outcomes on labour markets...’ In the UK Millard (2005: 343) assesses the impact of clustering on scientific mobility, focusing particularly on a case study around Italian ‘researcher migrants’. It considers the ‘...location decisions of this group of researchers based on the clustering of R and D in Europe and in the UK.’ The results point to the importance of prestige and networks in determining location decisions and these factors give established research centres an important advantage over smaller, developing ones. This piece of research is fundamental for informing policy, as Ackers (2005b: 275) alludes to, stating the intention for ‘...engagement of these processes with policy and practice’ Understanding the dynamics of highly skilled mobility including what factors shape career and migration decisions, factors that attract highly skilled migrants to different locations, and the importance of mobility to career progression form the crux of this section. These aspects define where nationally and regionally specific policies become ‘useful’ and where they may impede movements and talent attraction (Ackers 2005b).

According to Brown et al. (2009) this government driven incentivisation has been fostered at the city regional level by the West Midlands Strategic Migration Partnership (WMSMP) It is suggested that attention should be paid to ‘...scale and nature of the work to be undertaken at a regional level,’
demanding action to be taken, including the communication of ‘…the overwhelmingly positive contribution made by migrant workers to the regions’ employers and the regional economy widely across all industry sectors and to the general public to maintain this equilibrium,’ (WMSMP 2008). Although generalised through a cross section of labour migrants, the facilitation of migration and highly skilled migrants begins with informing private and public sector stakeholders and national citizenry (Wickramasekera 2002; Azam 2005; Connell and Burgess 2009) a perspective echoed by Foster et al. as they observe ambivalence in perspectives of skilled migration, some

‘…see immigration as clearly beneficial to the host community, citing such apparent advantages as…its infusion of new skills, entrepreneurship and technology into local industry. Others argue as strongly against…adding disproportionately to budget costs through settlement and language programs and welfare payments.’ (1994: 445).

Facchini and Mayda (2008: 652) investigate ‘…the role played by economic channels in shaping public opinion.’ Looking at ‘…how attitudes translate into policy outcomes,’ They argue that ‘Public opinion is most likely the main political-economy force that reduces the current size of migration inflows.’ (Facchini and Mayda 2008: 695). Usefully, they hone in on the impact that public perception has on realities of migration experiences across the skills spectrum.

The role of government in facilitating highly skilled migration, as with business, is not exclusive. Migrant agency and decision making form an extensive body of literature in this field, as Beaverstock (2005: 247) broadly states, ‘Managerial elites have agency and power in globalisation,’ This ability to enforce preference in location decisions is assumed to be used to their advantage, whether economically, socio culturally or politically (Alarcón 1999; Bagchi 2001; Poros 2001; Raunio and Sotarauta 2005). On transnationalism in the city Smith (1999; 2001) emphasises the importance of the agency of transnational migrants, ‘…which is deciphered through networks, practices
and social relations, grounded in space.’ (Beaverstock 2005: 249). As Lin (2001: 19–20) puts it, ‘In the usual imperfect market situations, social ties located in certain strategic locations and/or hierarchical positions (and thus better informed on market needs and demands) can provide an individual with useful information about opportunities and choices otherwise not available.’ This adheres to arguments made by Harvey recognising ‘…that highly-skilled migrants rely on social networks to obtain new job opportunities.’ (2008: 454 see van Dalen and Henkens 2012).

### 2.1.4 Remittances and economic behaviour

Lowell and Findlay (2001: 11) postulated in 2001, that ‘Unfortunately, researchers have failed to study the remitting behaviour of just the highly skilled.’ Yet, as Lowell (2001: 2) also stipulates, there may be unique characteristics to the financial behaviour of highly skilled migrants, leading to the assumption that isolating these characteristics could enable framing of related trends. It is suggested that highly skilled migrants are ‘…more likely to be banked and, hence, they are more likely to save and are more able to access loans.’ This is supported by Bollard et al., as they posit that highly skilled migrants are ‘…likely to earn more, be repaying education loans, have more access to financial institutions,’ Furthermore, a ‘propensity to channel monies through the formal market also mean that highly skilled emigrants are more likely to invest in instruments like remittance backed bonds, to place their savings in foreign currency accounts, or invest directly in their home country.’ (Lowell 2001: 2). One of the best empirical examples of this is Saxenian’s (2002) study on entrepreneurship and investment by the highly skilled immigrants in America’s high-tech Silicon Valley. Saxenian’s (2002) survey finds that 73 percent of entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley report being likely to do business in their home country. In Lowell and Findlay’s (2001: 17) appraisal of this study, they point to the fact that half ‘…of the foreign-born entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley have business relations in their countries of origin, mostly concentrated in rapidly expanding urban centres.’ So far as investments are concerned, ‘18 percent of the surveyed foreign-born
professionals in Silicon Valley have invested or currently invest in start-ups or venture funds in their homeland, dominated by Indians (22 percent), followed by Taiwanese (17 percent) and then by mainland Chinese (10 percent)’ (Lowell and Findlay 2001: 17).

In addressing skill level and investment, Lowell and Gerova (2004: ii) suggest that ‘…solid data do not exist on the extent of diaspora business investment, much less on the propensity to invest according to expatriates’ skill level.’ (2004: ii). They use data from the US to exemplify notable variation in expressions of interest in investment with ‘…45 percent of the Armenians, 18 percent of Cubans, 22 percent of Palestinians, and 23 percent of Iranians expressed no interest in investing in their homeland.’ Johnson and Sedaca (2004: 73) postulate that the role of remittances should be downplayed, they suggest ‘…the mobilization of knowledge and skills of these expatriate professionals can play an even more effective role in facilitating economic development in their countries of origin…’ than individual or collective remittances (Lowell and Gerova 2004).

2.2 Migrant entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship is an under defined concept with a dearth of attention paid to process and individuals. Low and Isserman (2013: 2) suggest that the literature yields ‘…no generally accepted definition or measure of entrepreneurship (Malecki 1993; Casson 2003; Iversen, et al. 2008; Goetz et al. 2010) and measuring entrepreneurship at a sub-national level is particularly difficult (Gartner and Shane 1995; Luger and Koo 2005).’ Veeraraghavan (2009: 14) takes a conceptual look at the way that entrepreneurship is addressed and defined, citing the National Knowledge Commission (2008), to suggest that ‘…Entrepreneurship is defined as the professional application of knowledge, skills and competencies and / or of monetizing a new idea, by an individual or a set of people by launching an enterprise de novo or diversifying from an existing one (distinct from seeking self employment as in a profession or trade), thus to pursue growth while
generating wealth, employment and social good.’ Veeraraghavan (2009: 14) further posits that from a semantic position the ‘…term ‘entrepreneurship’ comes from the French verb ‘entreprendre’ and the German word ‘unternehmen’, both means to ‘undertake’.’ This vague definition is in stark contrast to definitions in policy, where entrepreneurship is conceptualised and legislated in an econocentric manner, tending to disregard social and cultural constructs that frame entrepreneurialism in the structures of economic reproduction.

Valenzuela (2001: 335) argues that ‘…the literature on entrepreneurship is vast, fragmented, and at times confusing due to the mixed use of terminology and the various disciplines that study the topic.’ Kalantaridis and Bika (2006: 110 see Cahn 2008) argue that over the past two decades, ‘…there has been a considerable shift in academic opinion away from the entrepreneur as an island of exchange towards entrepreneurship as a contextual process.’ This view supersedes restrictive econocentric concepts, arguing that only medium and large size firms comprise entrepreneurship (Kilby 1971; Wilken 1979). As Valenzuela claims, much of this earlier literature on entrepreneurship is primarily elitist, placing a large emphasis on firm size and location, innovation, proprietorship, and capital start-up. (2001: 335 see Light and Rosenstein 1995). From an interdisciplinary perspective Thornton (1999: 20) defines entrepreneurship as ‘…the creation of new organizations (Gartner 1988), which occurs as a context-dependent, social and economic process (Reynolds 1991; Low and Abrahamson 1997).’ Yet, the acquisition of business interests remains ‘entrepreneurial’ in definitions spanning many political and academic institutions and concepts (Wright and Coyne 1985; Shane 1996; Church 1993; UKBA 2012).

Migrant entrepreneurship is considered as different from traditional entrepreneurship by Achidi and Priem (2011) in the sense that immigrants have a particular configuration of their human and social capital and behaviour that influences in start-up activities in a different way, as compared to their counterparts who are born in a specific host country. Liargovas and Skandalis (2012: 637) suggest that there are four determinant factors of
migrant entrepreneurship, contextualised by their work in Greece, these are: ‘(1) family survival needs; (2) immigrant community ties; (3) personality features or traits; and (4) market infrastructure and general conditions.’ Entrepreneurship and migrant entrepreneurs are embedded in the structuration debate which runs parallel to theorisation of high skilled migration. Studies of entrepreneurship tend to be highly spatialised in contemporary academic theory, with prominent research focusing on entrepreneurship and innovation and ‘…their link with regional economic growth and establishing links between new firms and innovation.’ (Low and Isserman 2013: 2). Entrepreneurship is increasingly ‘…the domain of organizations and regions, not individuals,’ argue Thornton and Flynn (2003: 401). Moroz and Hindle (2011) question whether or not there is a growing disconnect between scholarly theory development and empirical theorizing from the study of the practice of entrepreneurship, suggesting that the role of academia may be misrepresenting entrepreneurial realities on the ground (Aldrich and Baker 1997; Davidsson 2000; Hoy 1997). Here, it will be suggested that the role of individuals remains important in the context of migrant entrepreneurship. This will draw on ideas of structure and agency, co-constituting entrepreneurs with their economic, political and socio cultural environment. Most studies rely on entrepreneurship proxies that ignore innovation (Low and Isserman 2013), yet the nature of migrant enterprise in the UK is often high tech, innovative production or research and development. The institutionalisation of entrepreneurship offers a proliferation of entrepreneurial opportunities and resources. Thornton and Flynn (2003: 401) posit that these resources have been increasing in numbers and in varieties, ‘…be they technology licensing offices, bands of angels, venture capital firms, corporate venturing programs, or incubator firms and regions.’

The need for a subnational measure of innovative entrepreneurship motivated Low and Isserman (2013: 3) to propose and develop a way to measure innovative entrepreneurship annually at the county level and, thereby, useful for studies of regions, states, and metropolitan areas as well. However, this approach is flawed, with gaping holes in their metric; failing to encompass transient migrants and enterprise investment in the US.
The naturalisation of risk in entrepreneurial behaviour is commented upon by Puri and Robinson (2013: 423), they suggest that entrepreneurs are ‘…more optimistic and enjoy the non-pecuniary benefits of work more than wage earners. They embrace risk, but perhaps less so than commonly believed, as their risk-bearing is tempered by longer planning horizons.’ Entrepreneurs were seen as risk takers by many participants, with the use of money as investment in business or ideas with potentially unfavourable economic circumstances. Rae (2009: 137) suggests that entrepreneurship is ‘…the pursuit of opportunity regardless of the consequences’, and a privileged instrument of liberal market economics worldwide. He contextualizes the entrepreneurial process, framing the argument of risk in the contemporary global economic crisis, postulating that ‘…the financial turmoil resulting from the credit crunch suggests that the social and economic effects of unregulated entrepreneurial behaviour in pursuit of short-term profit are severe and self-defeating, resulting in massive destruction of value for national economies, businesses and individuals.’ (Rae 2009: 137). This destructive perspective on entrepreneurship when left unchecked, was not mentioned by participants, instead responses to the question of entrepreneurship portrayed entrepreneurs as brave, informed and hungry for success.

Sandri (2009: 1) suggests that as new business opportunities open up, entrepreneurs increase their saving to finance the investment that produces growth. He posits that ‘…saving has to rise more than investment in order to allow also for the accumulation of precautionary assets.’ This falls in contrast to the assumptions of entrepreneurs as risk heavy and capital light ideas generators, and suggests that patterns of saving and investment are mediated by survival strategies of entrepreneurs. The willingness to risk everything as an entrepreneur is offset by factors such as family support and the ability to finance.

The type of industry that is engaged with can determine definition as an entrepreneur or as self employed. Puri and Robinson (2013: 423) study the attitudes of entrepreneurs,
‘…how they differ as a group from others in the economy, as well as
how they differ from one another according to the mode of entry into
entrepreneurship and whether or not the firm is a family business.’

They require a respondent to meet two criteria to be classified as an
entrepreneur: 1) ‘…the respondent must own some or all of at least one
privately owned business, and the respondent must consider themselves to
be self-employed.’ (2013: 426). They suggest that this definition excludes a
number of types of individuals who might justifiably be considered self-
employed. They argue that this definition facilitates a ‘…ready comparison to
the work of Heaton and Lucas (2000), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), and Gentry and Hubbard (2004), who focus on portfolio holdings of
private equity owners, as well to the work of Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) and
Hamilton (2000), who primarily focus on the self-employment decision.’ (Puri
and Robinson 2013: 426).

Marcotte (2013: 177) postulates that when entrepreneurship was defined by
various researchers, it was usually ‘…in relation to the dichotomy between the
Schumpeterian innovative entrepreneurs and the less innovative, opportunity-
alert Kiznerian ones.’ These approaches allow for the inclusion of less
constrained forms of individual entrepreneurship than would be possible using
a strict Schumpeterian definition (Marcotte 2013). Iyigun and Owen (1998:
454) suggest that ‘Entrepreneurs provide the economy with new ideas,
products, and ways of doing things’ Entrepreneurship as different to other
forms of economic activity is a discourse reproduced through academia as
well as in everyday life, with great value socio cultural placed on
entrepreneurship. Gartner (1985: 696; see Hornaday and Aboud 1971;
Brockhaus 1980a; 1980b; Carland et al. 1984) suggests that ‘The major thrust
of most entrepreneurship research has been to prove that entrepreneurs
aredifferent from non-entrepreneurs…’ (Addressing immigrant
trepreneurship, Rusinovic suggests that traditional academic literature
positions immigrant entrepreneurs as active in an ethnic or a middleman
market (Rusinovic 2008). Linked to this is the concept of ‘ethnic
trepreneurship’, though it is not the focus of this section. Chaganti and
Greene posit that the term ‘ethnic entrepreneur’ should be defined by the levels of personal involvement of the entrepreneur in the ethnic community instead of reported ethnic grouping. This can be transferred to other spheres of entrepreneurship, where the level to which the individual engages with the institutional and economic framework of a defined space may exacerbate significant differences in personal and business characteristics. Rusinovic (2008: 440) demonstrates in her study on immigrant entrepreneurs in different markets, that for ‘…second-generation immigrant entrepreneurs who were born and/or raised in the receiving society,’ the level of community and ‘ethnic’ embeddedness has a less significant impact of business activity. Differentiation between ethnic entrepreneurship and migrant entrepreneurship, or even conceptualisation of entrepreneurship, is sparse, with academic literature tending to use terms in proxy.

Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp (2009) state that the general picture of European migrant entrepreneurship is determined by 1) distinct push factors such as high unemployment rates and low participation rates or low status in the labour market and 2) mixed embeddedness. The concept of mixed embeddedness is essential when addressing migrant entrepreneurship, described as an interactionist approach to encompass both actors (the migrant entrepreneurs) and the opportunity structure in a more comprehensive analytical framework (Kloosterman et al. 1999; Kloosterman 2000; Engelen 2001; Kloosterman and Rath 2001; 2003; Rath 2001; Light 2005; Rusinovic 2006; Brandellero and Kloosterman 2009; Kloosterman 2010). In terms of explanation, Kloosterman and Rath suggest that in order to understand the socio-economic position of immigrant entrepreneurs one must take into account ‘…not only their rather concrete embeddedness in social networks of immigrants but also their more abstract embeddedness in the socio-economic and politico-institutional environment of the country of settlement (Kloosterman et al. 1999).’ (2001: 190). Furthermore, the inclusion of a point on ‘embeddedness in social networks’ (Kloosterman and Rath 2001: 190) reinforces Light et al.’s (1989: 2) position, that ‘…as migration network connections reach some threshold level; they amount to an autonomous social structure that supports immigration.’
Clydesdale (2008: 123) advocates that ‘In the 1990s, many nations pursued immigration policies aimed at attracting entrepreneurs who could invigorate their domestic economy.’ This is exemplified in Khosravi’s (1999: 496) study on Iranian migrant entrepreneurs in Sweden in the 1990s. The Swedish ‘…social democratic government, whose welfare system in the late 1990s seems to be more fragile than ever, finds no other way out than to push unemployed migrants toward entrepreneurship.’ The Swedish government endeavoured to facilitate the starting of businesses by non-European migrants by giving them training, and introduced grants and bank-loans. Khosravi (1999: 496) goes on to explain that the government initiatives were relatively successful, using national statistics, ‘…18 per cent of all newly-started enterprises in 1997 were started by migrants, of whom 29 per cent were women.’

Clydesdale (2008) questions whether government agencies can select and place individuals with entrepreneurial qualities into new environments and expect an increase in entrepreneurial activity. The UK Border Agency defines the entrepreneur category of the points-based system ‘…for people who want to set up or take over, and be actively involved in running, a business or businesses here.’ (UKBA 2012). This demands capital; £200,000 funding or a reduction to £50,000 ‘…where the funding was provided by a venture capitalist, a Government Department or a seed competition.’ (Home Office 2011). Ram and Jones (2008: 352) outline the numerical significance of migrant business in the UK, ‘…there are more than a quarter of a million in the UK, which contribute at least £15 billion to the UK economy per year In England alone, in 2004 these businesses made up 5.8% of small and medium-sized enterprises (Mascarenhas-Keyes 2006; Ghilardi 2007).

Economic policy such as tax policy and legislation around starting a business in the UK has an important role in the promotion of entrepreneurship. Tax policy impacts the location decisions of migrant entrepreneurs setting up a business or establishing a new wing of an existing business. Schemes such as R&D Tax credits, an HMRC policy providing research and development
(R&D) relief for corporation tax that may reduce a company or organization’s tax bill are useful for early stage companies where cash flow is often limited.

Finally, the conceptualisation of entrepreneurship as a hybridisation of culture and society will be examined. Staeyert and Katz (2004: 179) explore and reflect upon the implications of how to conceive entrepreneurship when considered as a societal rather than an economic phenomenon in their 2004 study on ‘Reclaiming the space of entrepreneurship in society,’ addressing geographical, discursive and social dimensions. They suggest that in order to ‘…conceive and reclaim the space in which entrepreneurship is seen at work in society,’ They point at the geographical, discursive and social dimensions of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial studies. They look at research agenda, the geopolitics of entrepreneurship and finally ‘…what spaces/discourses/stakeholders have we privileged in the study of entrepreneurship and what other spaces/discourses/stakeholders could we consider?’ (Staeyert and Katz 2004: 179). Here it is argued that the conceptualisation of entrepreneurship as a socio cultural phenomenon is grounded in the migration debate. Basu and Altinay address the interaction between culture and entrepreneurship in their study of London businesses. They compare the cultural attributes of different ethnic groups and how those affect their entrepreneurial behaviour. They find a diverse array of business entry motives and formulations of entrepreneurship among migrant communities in the city. They postulate that these may be explained by differences in family background, migration motives, religion, family links, business experience, educational attainment and other factors. The evidence suggests that the interaction between culture and entrepreneurship is stronger in the case of some ethnic groups than others.

Vertovec argues that analysis needs to go beyond the traditional focus upon ethnicity and nationality as the ultimate sources of diversity; Sepulveda et al. (2011: 472 see Vertovec 2006, 2007) examine his concept through the lens of entrepreneurship. They cite Vertovec, arguing that superdiversity is characterised by a dynamic interplay of variables including ‘…those related to country of origin (including nationality, ethnicity, language, religious tradition,
regional and local identities, cultural values and practise), migration channel (related to particular labour market niches and social networks), legal status (comprising a range of categories related to varied entitlements and restrictions of rights), social class, labour market experiences, gender and age profiles and spatially specific factors including local area responses by service providers and residents…’ This ties into Frederking’s (2004: 197). analysis of the interplay of structural factors, contributing to contrasting processes of immigrant entrepreneurship in host countries. She suggests that the multifaceted nature and ‘…structural context of immigration laws, housing and education policies affect the way in which groups organize in the respective neighbourhoods, and it is these patterns of organization that dictate the subsequent relevance of culture in entrepreneurship.’ The composition of culture and society is manifold and diverse, sculpting and subjected to moulding forces through agents in disparate and sometimes detached spaces of engagement. Nordqvist and Melin (2010) propose a three theme framework: actor, activity and attitude, here this will be applied to culture, society, country of origin and family with entrepreneurship, as it co-constitutes definitions and practice.

Points mentioned here will be dissected in the findings chapters, used to illustrate opportunities and barriers to migrant entrepreneurship. This draws from Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp’s (2009) recognition of a simple dichotomy in 1) opportunities for and 2) barriers to migrant entrepreneurship in their study evaluating critical success or performance conditions in Europe and the USA (van Delft et al. 2000; Chaganti and Greene 2002; Fairlie 2004). Clydesdale (2008:123) suggests that barriers to success include ‘…lack of ability to source information, ignorance of government regulations, poor understanding of local market forces and consumer behaviour, language barriers and poor business networks.’ Entrepreneurial opportunities arise from inefficiencies within existing markets such as information asymmetries, changes in social, political, demographic and economic forces, and new inventions and discoveries (Holcombe 2003; Cohen and Winn 2007).
2.3 International comparison: Canada and Australia

An influential report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2002) distinguishes between two models of skilled migration. The supply-driven model – often associated with Canada, Australia and New Zealand – uses points-tests to screen in favour of prospective migrants with desirable characteristics who put themselves forward for consideration. In contrast, the demand driven model – associated with the US – relies upon employers to identify skilled migrants who are likely to contribute positively to the receiving economy. Although this binary categorisation helped to cut through much of the complexity that characterises skilled migration policy in practice, it has become increasingly inadequate in context of contemporary policy reforms. Recent shifts in policy suggest that the US, Canada, and Australia are now all converging towards a “hybrid” model of skilled migration (e.g. Papademetriou et al., 2008). In the US, there is growing interest in the introduction of a points-based scheme, in response to evidence that the Australian and Canadian systems have successfully screened in favour of highly skilled migrants (e.g. Koslowski, 2013, p. 28).

An indication of migration rationale and admissions in 2001 is provided by Mahroum for a number of countries, including the UK, Canada and Australia in Figure 11, below.

**Figure 14 Reason for migration - UK, Canada and Australia (Adapted from Mahroum 2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reason for migration (% total immigration)</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Family Reunification</th>
<th>Asylum</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Canada

In Canada, greater emphasis is being placed on the short-term employment outcomes of migrants in response to growing evidence that many of its skilled migrants have struggled to find employment commensurate with their skills. In Australia, there has been a general shift away from ‘supply driven’ independent skilled migration towards ‘demand-driven’ outcomes, in the form of employer and government-sponsored skilled migration (Phillips and Spinks 2012). This shift is designed to better meet the short-term labour market needs of employers, including soft skills that are difficult to quantify.

In 2013, She and Wotherspoon outlined the immigration regimes of Canada, the US and the UK, in the context of temporary labour migration. They suggest that Canada offers international students a direct path to permanent residency, which demonstrating forward thinking to secure intake of high-qualified immigrants (Bond et al. 2007). As part of its strategy to cope with the skill challenge, Canada’s international student policy is consistent with its emphasis on skill based immigration, as is the case with the UK and Australia.

She and Wotherspoon (2013) suggest that the current shift of the selection of economic immigrants from the federal government to provincial administrations through the Provincial Nominee Programs, international students, especially those with a Master’s or PhD degree, can be expected to be more valued and integrated into Canada’s innovation strategies. This movement towards sub national devolution of migration policy echoes movements towards greater autonomy of city regional, sub regional and local government in the UK.

There has been a growing tendency towards a demand driven immigration selection regarding post-study retention signalled by the requirements of Canadian work experience or a current job offer. As a traditional immigration country, Canada’s skill-based immigration places strong emphasis on direct import of talent from abroad, rather than on those who transfer from existing
temporary categories, such as international students (She and Wotherspoon 2013).

Australia

Permanent immigration to Australia is primarily administered under the Migration Programme. There are two major streams to the Migration Programme: the Skill Stream is for people with skills that are likely to contribute to the Australian economy; and the Family Stream permits reunion of immediate family members. The only other pathway to permanent residence in Australia is through the Humanitarian Programme for refugees. Since the mid 1980’s, Australian immigration policy has placed an increasing emphasis on the suitability of prospective immigrants for the local labour market. Between 1985 and 2012, the share of all visa outcomes that were administered under the Skill Stream of the Migration Programme more than quadrupled, from 15 to 63 per cent. This increase was primarily at the expense of the Family Stream – traditionally the most prominent migratory pathway – which declined from 64 per cent of all visa outcomes in 1985 to 29 per cent in 2012. The substantive increase in the relative size of the Skill Stream between 1985 and 2012 was driven by both the economic cycle and policy reforms. Repeated Governments have stated that the primary objective of the recent expansion of Australia’s Migration Programme is to offset the economic pressures of population aging and below replacement fertility rates. The shift in favour of the Skill Stream is designed to support this objective, by promoting migrants with high level vocationally specific skills who can quickly find employment in their occupation (Birrel et al 2006).

The Skill Stream of the Migration Programme is predominantly comprised of two visa categories, which are distinguished by whether or not an applicant is sponsored by an Australian employer. Employer Sponsored visa applicants require an employer to commit to employ them full time for a minimum period, in a legitimate position that requires a skilled worker. Skilled individuals who do not benefit from employer sponsorship can apply to migrate independently to Australia through the General Skilled Migration (GSM) category. GSM visa
applicants are assessed on the basis of a points test that takes into account a range of characteristics, including the applicant’s age, education, skills, occupation, experience, and language ability (Ven et al. 2014).

Collins (2003) provides a perspective on how federal, state and local policies have impacted on migrant entrepreneurs in Australia, directly and indirectly, and at the policy initiatives that have been developed in Australia to respond to the migrant entrepreneurs. Australian research on immigrant entrepreneurship points to the need for a diverse and complex policy response to immigrant entrepreneurship (Lampugnani and Holton 1989; Kermond et al. 1991; Lever-Tracy et al. 1991; Stromback and Malhotra 1994). Collins suggests that there are three key areas of micro policy responses to immigrant entrepreneurship: ‘…the education and training needs of ethnic entrepreneurs; policies designed to encourage unemployed immigrants to become entrepreneurs; and policy related to government strategies to improve communication with ethnic entrepreneurs.’ (2003: 137).

Birrell et al. point to a number of schemes in Canada for the encouragement of the migration of highly skilled workers in strategic occupations, for example, the 1998 British Columbia Provincial Nominee Program, ‘…this was a quota-less program’ supported by business sponsors, as well as entrepreneurs assessed by ‘…net worth, minimum investment, and minimum number of jobs’ to be created.’ (2006: 130) Accordingly, this scheme ‘…mirrors a number of Australian regional initiatives.’ (Birrell et al. 2006: 130).

Collins states that the fine tuning of immigration programmes in Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Hiebert et al. 2003) to maximise the benefits of migrant labour by a relative reduction in refugee and family categories and a corresponding increase in the skilled and entrepreneurial categories, is simply oriented around increasingly globalised capital accumulation. Migrant entrepreneurship has become one of the driving forces for the growth of national and regional economies, particularly in the USA and in many European countries (Borjas 1986; 1990; Barrett et al. 1996; Cross 1992; Kloosterman et al. 1998; OECD 2006; Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp 2009).
This harks back to Rothgang and Schmidt’s (2003) statement of the increasing competition among developed countries for highly skilled workers (Porter 1990; Mahroum 2001; Bauer and Kunze 2004; Kuptsch and Pang 2006; Shachar 2006), with equal relevance. Yet, Collins contradictorily posits that ‘…there are few direct policy initiatives to promote immigrant entrepreneurship in Australia.’ (2003: 137).

2.4 Transnational connections

Transnationalism is a concept that has been used in geography and associated sub disciplines as a critical lens to view a multiplicity of phenomena occurring in and co-constituting the modern world system (Portes et al. 1999). The proliferation of studies of transnationalism has created a diverse mosaic of geographical research, spanning political connections, spatial transformation and of interest here, the movements of specific groups such as high skilled and entrepreneurial migrants. Portes et al. (1999: 218) suggest that the growing number of ties linking persons across countries and ‘…the fluidity and diversity of these exchanges has given rise to many contradicting claims.’ They posit that in some academic literature, ‘…the phenomenon of transnationalism is portrayed as novel and emergent, whereas in others it is said to be as old as labour immigration itself.’ (1999: 218). In the context of migrant entrepreneurship, they postulate that transnational entrepreneurs are depicted as a new and exceptional milieu of migrant, ‘…whereas in others all immigrants are said to be participants in the transnational community (Massey et al. 1994; Riccio 2001; Christiansen 2013).

Transnational activities can described as a reflection and natural accompaniment of the globalization of capital, though as will be illustrated, Glick Schiller et al. (1992) and other academic sources suggest that they are seen as a grass-roots reaction to this very process (Basch 1994; Guarnizo and Smith 1998). The pathways that migrants carve through space and time are manifest in complex transnational socio cultural relations; these relations have influence over every aspect of the migrant’s everyday life, through
mundane experiential activities as well exceptional life course events. The theorisation of transnationalism was borne out of a realisation that immigrants live their lives across borders and maintain their ties to home, even when their countries of origin and settlement are geographically distant. Glick Schiller et al. (1992: ix) suggest that transnationalism emphasises the emergence of a social process in which migrants establish social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. They suggest that immigrants are understood to be transmigrants ‘...when they develop and maintain multiple relations-familial, economic social, organisational, religious and political- that span borders.’ Furthermore, they postulate that transmigrants ‘...take actions, make decisions and feel concerns within a field of social relations that links together their country and their country, or countries of settlement.’ (1992: ix). Levitt et al. (2003: 565) recognise that ‘...some migrants maintain strong, enduring ties to their homelands even as they are incorporated into countries of resettlement,’ suggesting that this calls into question conventional assumptions about the direction and impacts of international migration. Levitt et al. (2003: 565) further postulate that critics of transnationalism theory, ‘...doubt that transnational practices are widespread or very influential.’ Rusinovic (2008: 431) suggests in her 2008 study on transnational embeddedness, in which she evaluates transnational activities and networks that not every entrepreneur is or can be transnationally active; ‘...transnational capital’, which not everyone automatically possesses, is needed to be able to do business with the country of origin.’ Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002: 766) offer similar conclusions in their analysis of socio cultural transnational linkages among Colombian, Dominican, and Salvadoran immigrants in the United States. They postulate that participation in any particular transnational activity is low, ‘...but participation over all the different forms of transnational practices is extended.’

Key to the transnationalism debate is the premise that immigrants redefine but do not break their ties to their country of origin. Language has a key role to play here in terms of communication and interactivity within and across state borders. This redefinition is a highly personal and positional experience, whereby migrants create a multiplicity of ties in different areas of social action
that transcend national barriers (Itzigsohn 2000; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999). Vertovec (1999:447) suggests in a review of literature on transnationalism across several disciplines not surprisingly finds a wide variety of descriptions surrounding meanings, processes, scales and methods concerning the notion of ‘transnationalism’. He suggests several themes to disentangle the term transnationalism, these include ‘...transnationalism as a social morphology, as a type of consciousness, as a mode of cultural reproduction, as an avenue of capital, as a site of political engagement, and as a reconstruction of ‘place’ or locality.’ Kivisto (2001: 549) suggests that over the past decade, transnationalism has ‘...entered the lexicon of migration scholars.’ He argues that the concept ‘...suffers from ambiguity’ (2001: 549) as a result of competing definitions ‘...that fail to specify the temporal and spatial parameters of the term and to adequately locate it vis-à-vis older concepts such as assimilation and cultural pluralism.’ (2001:549). Kivisto (2001: 549) concluded this study by suggesting an alternative assessment of transnationalism ‘...that locates it as one potential subset of assimilation theory, rather than as an alternative to it.’

Kivisto (2001: 571) states the importance of place, suggesting ‘First, place counts. Even in transnational social spaces, place continues to count. Contrary to the image of transnational immigrants living simultaneously in two worlds, in fact the vast majority is at any moment located primarily in one place.’ Dunn (2010: 1) suggests that adopting an ‘...embodied approach to the study of transnationalism is a powerful corrective to the dangers of exaggerating mobility and footloosedness.’ This echoes the importance of place and connection to the location of settlement as well as the ideological notion of a spatially distant home. Furthermore, Dunn posits that ‘When the scale of analysis is upon migrants rather than migration flows, and upon transnationals rather than upon transnationalism, a much more complicated and realistic picture emerges.’ (2010: 1) He concludes that transnational migrants are simultaneously mobile and emplaced (Werbner 2002; Dunn 2010).
Gielis (2009: 271) repeats this idea, postulating that contemporary transnational migrants have ‘...complex social lives in that they live in a number of different cross-border social networks at the same time.’ He suggests that most transmigration scholars try to grasp this social complexity of migrant transnationalism by using a network lens, in an attempt to develop an understanding of the external complexity and interrelations of these networks he suggests a ‘place lens’. Geilis draws on geographical and anthropological literature on open and relational understandings of place, showing that interrelating migrant networks are visible in place in two ways. Firstly, ‘...migrant places are meeting places of social networks...’ and secondly, ‘...they are sites (translocalities) where transmigrants can reach out to people in other places.’ (Gielis 2009: 271).

Portes (2003: 876) suggests that ‘Subsequent research has indicated that regular involvement in transnational activities characterizes only a minority of immigrants and that even occasional involvement is not a universal practice ...’ However, this is qualified by evaluation of the types of transnational activity. Portes (2003: 877) states that actions like ‘...sending an occasional remittance or visiting the home country undoubtedly qualify as part of what is labelled transnationalism,’ though this is not a new concept or academic term. These activities have been engaged in by migrants since ‘...time immemorial.’ (2003: 877). Portes (2003: 877) suggests that there is a paradox ‘...that transnationalism, as a new theoretical lens in the field of immigration, is grounded on the activities of only a minority of the members of this population.’ Levitt et al. (2003: 565). posit that what is meant what is meant by transnationalism and ‘...what should and should not be included under its rubric are not always clear.' This is an issue for researchers as findings from primarily case study based research on transnational migration are often exaggerated or skewed (Levitt et al. 2003).

Portes (2003: 876) suggests that the ‘anthropological set of studies’ that effectively launched transnationalism as a novel perspective stated that it was a pervasive phenomenon in contemporary immigrant communities. This led to terminological restructuring, labelling immigrants as transmigrants in the
sense that they had ‘…ceased to pursue the traditional course of assimilation
to engage wholesale in multi-stranded activities across national borders.’
Borders and barriers are transcended not only through the use of
technologies, but as instilled in the migrant’s sense of identity (Marcu 2011).
Vertovec (2001: 573) suggests that ‘…many peoples’ transnational networks
of exchange and participation are grounded upon some perception of
common identity; conversely, the identities of numerous individuals and
groups of people are negotiated within social worlds that span more than one
place.’ The construction, negotiation and reproduction of identities is of key
importance when addressing transnational spaces of flows, with the migrant
embedded in multiple places of settlement and belonging. Castles (2010:
1565) postulates that a conceptual framework for migration studies should
take social transformation as its central category, ‘…in order to facilitate
understanding of the complexity, interconnectedness, variability, contextuality
and multi-level mediations of migratory processes in the context of rapid
global change.’ He suggests that this would mean examining the connectivity
of social transformation and human mobility ‘…across a range of socio spatial
levels, while always seeking to understand how human agency can condition
responses to structural factors.’ (Castles 2010: 1565). This ties into the
structuration debate that has been embedded through arguments here as a
useful critical tool for unravelling complex processes on the ground, alongside
the policy landscape of the UK.

Transnational ties add new complexities to the continuous and dynamic
processes of identity formation. Ghosh and Wang focus specifically on social
and cultural linkages, they identified reasons that influenced their own cross-
border involvements, using their findings to present an ‘…emergent
conceptual framework that highlights interactive psychological, sociocultural
and economic processes that influence the formation of individual transnational identities.’ (Ghosh and Wang 2003: 269). Ghosh and Wang
(2003: 269) use the term transnationalism to refer to ‘…the various acts
migrants perform across territorial borders…’ contrary to more connection and
community oriented definitions previously cited (Basch et al. 1994; Portes et
illustrate that these transnational acts are often ‘...born out of an awareness of multilocality and a desire to maintain multiple identities...’ (Ghosh and Wang 2003: 269). It is argued here that there is a close relationship between transnationalism and identity, as manifest in performances of migration activity and through everyday life. Vertovec (2001: 577) suggests that a ‘...massive body of social and social psychological theory addresses the ways in which people conduct their everyday lives in terms of their identities.’ Identities are seen to be generated in, and constructed through, internal ‘... (self-attributed) and external (other-ascribed) dialectic conditioned within specific social worlds.’ (Vertovec 2001: 577). Cerulo (1997: 285) posits that 1990s academic literature constituted an antithesis to former work in sociology during the 1970s that focused primarily on ‘...the formation of the “me,” exploring the ways in which interpersonal interactions mold an individual’s sense of self.’ This forms the theoretical backbone for much work on identity in contemporary literature; this includes the conceptualisation of identity as a social construction and as malleable through space and time. We need to pay attention to individual and collective identities and how people’s identities and acts are enabled and hindered by structures, policy and society, taking into account how, when and where they are able to acts as agents. The identity debate has been refocused to place attention from the individual to the collective, with others prioritising discourse over the systematic scrutiny of behaviour. Cerulo (1997: 385) postulates that some researchers approach identity as ‘...a source of mobilization rather than a product of it and the analysis of virtual identities now competes with research on identities established in the copresent world.’ In critiquing the disaggregation personal and collective identities, Vertovec (2001: 577) suggests that they should be ‘...understood as always closely entangled with each other,’ This should be considered while recognising the ‘...serious theoretical problems debated around notions of self, personhood and collectivity...’

Ghosh and Wang (2003: 269) cite Portes (1998) in their argument that identity is manifested through the other, positing that ‘...identities influence acts, acts create identities and over time both identities and acts change and ramify...’ Ghosh and Wang suggest that they build on Vertovec’s (2003; 269)
suggestion of transnational consciousness. They believe that transnational consciousness is ‘...essentially individualistic, composed of an abstract awareness of one’s self, diaspora and multiple belonging.’ This falls out of kilter with many ideas presented previously suggesting the complexity and interconnectedness of personal and collective identity, the categorisation of which is imperfect, failing to acknowledge a host of co-constitutive factors such as gender/sexuality, race/ethnicity, and class forming what Appiah and Gates (1995: 1).term the ‘holy trinity’ of the discursive field.

Dunn (2010: 4-5) argues that constructivist approaches to identity have been wary that a focus on bodies will suggest essentialism. He posits that work on embodiment by geographers ‘...carefully negotiates binaries of mind/ body, constructivism/ essentialism, and structure/ agency...’ This ties into Ghosh and Wang’s (2003: 279) suggestion that the term ‘transnational consciousness’ can be used to describe what they state are ‘...intertwined conduits of the immigrant's pre-migration social identities, her/his individual, familial and societal value systems and ‘moralties’ (socioeconomic/political), psyche of departure, material circumstances and social connections in the migrant city and a sense of perceptions and expectations of the host and the home societies about her/him.’ Transnational consciousness is a tool with which ‘...an individual negotiates her/his ‘desire’ to engage in particular transnational activities and the ‘reality’ of the situation.’ (Ghosh and Wang 2003: 279). Suarez-Krabbe (2012: 335) approaches the question of selfhood, suggesting that it cannot be understood without considering the larger project of identity preservation. This ties into the debate on identity and transnationalism through links with scales and spaces of identity. She implies that identity can be conceptualised on two levels, ‘...a metaphysical level, and a social level.’

As has been stated, migration involves the physical movement of bodies in and out of place, suggesting the innate processes of transnationalism. O’Connor (2010: 75) suggests that in a world characterised by ‘...increased ease of travel and major advances in telecommunications, in the international arena, this movement has been argued to occur in the context of a borderless

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world.’ Ghosh and Wang comment on the role that technologies, particularly information and communication technology have to play in the realm of transnational engagement. They suggest that that the material circumstances of friends and family back home, particularly their access to means of communication such as the telephone and the Internet, play an important role (Ghosh and Wang 2003). Accordingly, Castells (2010: 2738) suggests that there is close interaction between the technological transformation of society and the evolution of its spatial forms (Scott 2001; Mattos et al. 2004; Graham 2005). Further to this, he states that in the age of information and communication technologies, ‘…in sharp contrast with the predictions of futurologists, we are not witnessing the end of cities or the annihilation of distance.’

In her evaluation of ‘the everyday’ and migration, Dyck (2005: 233) suggests that by looking at mundane activities researchers can capture the ‘…complexity of local–global relations in conceptualising an accelerated pace of the stretching of social relations over space.’ Butcher (2009: 1353) suggests that these relations are being disrupted by transnational migration, as well as being constituted by it, calling into question definitions of cultural identity and processes of cross-border mobility as an unsettling force for associations between people and place. She postulates that relationships, ‘…as one element of everyday cultural practice that circumscribes identity and belonging, are also affected by this mobility.’ However, identities are not isolated to, or inextricably bound up with place; rather, migrants carry their pre-migration social identities such as age, class, gender as well as individual, familial and societal value systems and moralities across borders (Ghosh and Wang; Dyck 2005). Bradatan et al. suggest that rigid definitions of transnational identity are proven to be empirically restrictive, and counter to recent academic trends documenting the embodiment of transnational identity. Bradatan et al. (2010:1350) see transnationalism as ‘…fitting well within the postmodern idea of fluid identity, where defining one’s self depends on the audiences without affecting the ‘true’ meaning of self.’ Addressing friendship, networks and transnationality in London through the experiences of young New Zealanders, Conradson and Latham (2005b: 1469) find
'…formulations of the self as creative project to be remarkably central to the mobility of this cohort.'

There is a dearth of research on the role of family connections and informal social networks for highly skilled entrepreneurial migrants. This evaluation will conceptualize family networks as a form of capital (Granovetter 1995; Portes 1998; Wong 2004; Drori et al. 2009) seeking to disaggregate confused interpretations of family connections and the impact of migrant entrepreneurs. Greve and Salaff (2003) acknowledge the movement towards discursive recognition that entrepreneurs embed their business decisions in social structures, suggesting that these structures are necessary for enterprise (Starr and MacMillan 1990; Reynolds 1991; Larson and Starr 1993; Borch 1994; Hansen 1995). Wong (2004: 120) contributes to this sparse field, in part looking at the case of transnational kinship groups including the family as ‘…the manifestation of the transnational ties and it is their demographic characteristics and their human and economic capital that facilitates their mobility between and among various nation states.’ This incorporates Light and Gold’s (2000) suggestion that family members produce transnational entrepreneurship by mixing formal and informal economic endeavours with loans, goods, business techniques, standards of consumption, and workers criss-crossing borders and taking advantage of economic, political, and cultural differences between nations. Wong draws on Faist’s (2000) conceptualisation of transnational space, categorising this in tripartite form, with transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits, and transnational communities where the typical cohesive resources are reciprocity exchange and solidarity respectively for each form. Wong (2004: 144) suggests that the findings from interviews with transnational Taiwanese immigrant entrepreneurs reveal the ‘…importance of transnational familial network capital and demonstrate the nature of their engagement in various types of transnational circuits.’ These transnational businesses were spatially interwoven through family networks of ‘ownership and management,’ among locations in Canada, Taiwan, and other parts of the world. Wong concludes that his findings of transnationalism among Taiwanese entrepreneurs parallel the research findings in Australia and the United States and harbour
significant policy implications (Yamanaka and Piper 2003; Zlotnik 2003). Of course, the importance of life course, career stage and other issues of temporarily remain fundamental to the conceptualisation of the role of family connections. Entrepreneurs build networks that systematically vary by the phase of entrepreneurship, analyzing number of their discussion partners, and the time spent networking (Greve and Salaff 2003).

Flores-Yeffal and Aysa-Lastra (2011: 481) suggest that there remains a need to consider how the place of origin affects ‘…the type of ties—family, friends, or paisanos (countrymen)—with those who provide support to migrants.’ This should be tied into how that varies over time and how migrant entrepreneurs negotiate transnational familial connections. The current literature in this field homogenises ideals, ‘families’ and social cultures, ‘placing the debate’ (Monk 1994; Malpas 2012) in the terms of migrant entrepreneurs and taking an in-depth look at their connections to place (which seem to have been substituted by placelessness). Further work is needed on how migrant entrepreneurs to the UK negotiate and manage their adjustment through familial support networks and informal social connections.

In summation, conceptualisations of socio cultural networks and relationships have been exhibited in relation to both migration and entrepreneurship, yet these bodies of literature do not intermesh leaving insufficient work on socio cultural networks and relationships of migrant entrepreneurs. Current efforts fail to incorporate the many changes made by government to the regulatory environment in order to encourage entrepreneurial non-EEA migrants to enter and remain in the UK, this includes investment in high tech clusters such as East London tech city. This therefore needs to be evaluated. There is a dearth of research on the role of socio cultural connections, connection to place and family connections and informal social networks for highly skilled entrepreneurial migrants. This gap will be approached from a multiscalar perspective drawing on national, subnational and local spaces of entrepreneurial engagement and opportunity to provide a unique view of the management of migration in national and sub national spatial contexts. This section has sought to firstly, question scale, political and economic space as
integrated in the migration debate. It then examined highly skilled migration, migrant entrepreneurship, and relationships with policy and business. The hazy definitions and disjunctions of this area of migration studies (ICMPD 2005: 2) are reflected in a body of theory that generally fails to incorporate the interactions and agency of highly skilled migrants, businesses and governments. Here, these aspects have been brought together to evaluate relationships and impacts.

2.5 Migration networks

Migrant networks and organisations have ‘…emerged as development agents. They interact with state institutions in flows of financial remittances, knowledge, and political ideas.’ (Faist 2008: 21). Williams suggests that evaluation of the ‘…role of social networks in mediating relationships between flows and spaces.’ (Williams 2007: 29), is an important area in the study of transnational socio cultural connections. Migration networks are described by Massey et al. (1993: 42-43) as ‘…sets of interpersonal relations that link migrants or returned migrants with relatives, friends or fellow countrymen at home. They convey information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation and give support in various forms.’ They posit that this networked structure reduces the costs and uncertainty of migration, and therefore facilitates mobility (Light 2000; McKenzie and Rapoport 2004). From a conceptual perspective, Light et al. (1989: 1) suggest that Migration network theory

‘…addresses the cumulative causation of migration as a result of reduced social, economic, and emotional costs of migration pursuant to the formation of migration networks.’

Furthermore, they postulate that networks promote the independence of migratory flows, ‘…once network connections reach some threshold level, they amount to a autonomous social structure that supports immigration.’ (Light et al. 1989: 1). As such, network supported migrants have assistance in
practicalities and information transferral processes, such as ‘…transportation, finding housing and jobs in their place of destination, and in effecting a satisfactory personal and emotional adjustment to what is often a difficult situation of cultural marginality.’ (Light et al. 1989: 1). Migration network theory introduces a sociological dimension, improving the mechanical and econometric ‘push and pull’ conception that prevailed earlier, including world systems theory, as discussed previously (Light et al. 1989).

Glückler (2007: 619) suggests that ‘…network theory can be used to analyse regional economic development, looking at the economy as interactions in networks.’ This is echoed by Granovetter (2005), in the position that there are manifold ways in which social networks affect economic outcomes. This links to Amin’s (2000) argument that economies need to be understood as flows and networks that transcend, and reconstitute, the meaning of, territoriality and borders. As such, there is a subnational dynamic to the debate around migration networks, with a tension between how regional economies are constituted through the intersection of spaces and flows, and this has a profound impact on territorial disparities (Brenner 2001: Yeung 2005). Williams et al. (2004: 27) suggest that international labour mobility ‘…constitutes one of the most significant of these flows, especially because of the implications of an increasingly homogenized European economic space.’ They posit that the circuits and flows of labour (Sassen 1990; Massey et al. 1993) require spaces in which their particular stages are performed. The transnational performance of connectivity stretches social relations, creating new forms of spaces, with meaning and identity remaining invested in place. They conclude by arguing that spaces, flows and circuits of international labour are both the medium and products of individual practices over varying time scales, based on human knowledge. Migrant networks are created by migration flows but, in turn, constitute socio-scapes which are ‘…interconnected nodes along which the flows can be relayed. Such scapes reconfigure the dimensions of time and space…’ (Urry 2000: 35). The relationship between spaces and flows is ‘…mediated by these scapes that, in addition to social networks, are also notably constituted of transport routes and social organizations.’ (Williams et al. 2004: 28).
Boyd (1989: 641) suggests that networks connect migrants across time and space. He posits that migration flows often become self-sustaining, ‘...reflecting the establishment of networks of information, assistance and obligations which develop between migrants in the host society and friends and relatives in the sending area.’ Meyer (2001: 93) suggests that besides facilitation, ‘...the impact of social networks on migration flows is also one of channelling...’ Meyer continues to posit that immigrants serve as bridgeheads for prospective and fellow immigrants in both the geographical as well as the professional areas in which they have settled (Gurak and Caces 1992; Meyer 2001). Importantly, Boyd (1989: 641) states that movements ‘...are not necessarily limited in time, unidirectional or permanent.’ Gordon (2001: 5). elucidates that while recognizing the importance of intra-regional linkages and collective learning processes, the analysis of innovation systems must ‘...incorporate the precise articulation of regional processes and external innovation relations, a configuration of linkages that takes varied forms in different localities and may change substantially within a single locality over time.’ Thus, the acknowledgement that migration is both impacted by and impacts upon spaces of transnational engagement over time suggest that the space of flows that traditionally capture network activity are rooted in space of places (Castells 1996). Portes and Bach (1995: 10) posit that migration itself ‘...can be conceptualized as a process of network building, which depends on and, in turn, reinforces social relationships across space.’ Thus, as Vertovec (2002: 3) suggests, ‘Migration is a process that both depends on, and creates, social networks.’ Furthermore, networks utilised by migrants ‘...vary considerably depending on local histories of migration, national conditions and communal socio-cultural traits.’ (Vertovec 2002: 3). Coe and Bunnell (2003: 443) suggest that a community ‘shared repertoire’

‘...that draws on stories, artefacts, discourses, historical events and discourses, and reflects a history of mutual engagement and dynamic coordination through technologies of communication.’

is important in maintaining relations and interconnectivity among members. This ties into Wenger’s (1998) conceptualisation of communities of practice.
Transnational connectivity takes shape ‘...through routines and repeated interaction, rather than being actively designed or implemented in a top–down sense.’ (Coe and Bunnell 2003: 443). As Gertler (2001: 18) argues, ‘...communities of practice are seen as the principal mechanism through which tacit knowledge relating to new practices is produced and spread.’ There is an occupational and socio economic perspective to the networked, organisational dissemination of transnational connectivity as a hub for knowledge transfer. Shah and Menon (1999) show that there is qualitative variation in types of networks used by different occupational classes. Vertovec (2001: 93)suggests that high occupational groups rely more on networks of colleagues or organizations and less on kin-based networks than unskilled workers. Accordingly, Meyer suggests that

‘The forms and characteristics of these networks may depend on their composition – friends, relatives, kin, acquaintances, professional colleagues, etc. ... but the result is similar: most positions are acquired via connections.’

Network approaches have been underused for the study of what is at the intersection of both international migration and technological innovation, namely the mobility of highly skilled persons, or knowledge workers in an increasingly entrepreneurship driven innovation lead economic landscape (Meyer 2001). Poros (2001: 245) suggests that social networks ‘...have long been identified as crucial to migration flows and the economic behaviour of immigrants.’ She posits that there are two strata of network; interpersonal ties and organisational ties. The first, interpersonal ties, are commonly cited in network and migration literatures, and include relationships to kin, friends, and community. In contrast, organizational ties exist when individuals are weakly embedded in organizations or institutions. However, these loci of connectivity are not mutually exclusive, as interpersonal ties of friendship and family do exist within organizations. On this note, organizational ties need to be distinguished because they refer to the mediating structure of the organization, where colleagues, co-workers, supervisors, and even friends, family, and acquaintances relate to one another. Configurations of social
networking are messy and often complex, with organizational and interpersonal ties forming composite webs that link local labour markets transnationally and channel immigrants to particular destinations and into particular occupations. Poros (2001: 245), in her study of Asian Indian migration to New York and London, attempts to ‘…clarify the role and meaning of networks as they affect different types of migration and the occupational outcomes of migrants.’ She posits in conclusion that the prominence of migration network mechanisms challenges the role that human capital plays in producing distinct outcomes for immigrants, rather seeing migrant groups as embodying a socio cultural tendency to pursue transnational connectivity. Williams et al. (2004: 27-28) suggest that there are a number of important aspects of labour mobility in the context of spaces and flows. Contextualising this, they postulate that migration has to be understood ‘…in terms of both structural relationships and social networks. Although economic and political conditions shape the broad outlines of migration flows, social networks (and human agency) determine how they are constituted.’ Here, migration networks and the process of networking by migrant entrepreneurs will be evaluated. This will focus on the organisational ties that Poros introduces, as an intermediary state between institutionalised connections and interpersonal ties.

3. Methodology

This section will highlight and intermesh conceptual trends and epistemological rationale with methods and techniques that have been used in fieldwork, as Burawoy (1991: 271) suggests, ‘…methodology provides the link between technique and theory.’ Here, the methods that have been used to answer research questions will be addressed and the nature of fieldwork with human participants will be discussed at length. In 1997 Steinar Kvale (1994: 147) suggested that

‘With the objections to qualitative interviews highly predictable, they may be taken into account when designing, reporting, and defending an interview study.’
It will be argued that this is no longer the case, with the advent of qualitative geography as the ‘new orthodoxy’ (Crang 2002) a set of more complex epistemological questions have been asked around impact points of research activity on both researched and researcher. This new wave of qualitative exploration has taken form through documentation of micro geographical and embodied experiences.

3.1 Epistemology and research methods

3.1.1 Interview

Semi structured interviews were used to elicit detailed responses from participants on tailored themes respective of their expertise and positionality. The critical reflexive examination of various aspects of the use of interviews has enhanced it as a research tool and led to a broadening of its role and significance in research and its impact in research findings (England 1994; Elwood and Martin 2000; Herzog 2005; Jupp Kina 2012). David Silverman (1997 248) suggests that the interview is not merely a technique for gathering data; ‘...rather, it should be examined as part of the structuring of an 'interview society,' ‘While Herzog (2005: 26) posits that interviews have become part of our everyday routine (Gubrium and Holstein 2002), engraining the process as constructive of individual subjectivity and as a method of deepening ‘...the concept of knowledge and its sources, incorporating the subjects' experiential truths into the process of the creation of knowledge...’ (see Atkinson and Silverman 1997). The interview has been conceptualised in a number of ways, as a ‘speech event,’ (Mishler 1986), an ‘act of communication’ (Herzog 1995; 2005); a ‘narrative practice’ (Abu-Lughod 1993; Lieblich and Josselson 1994; Behar and Gordon 1995; Hitchings 2012), a conversation between partners (Rubin and Rubin 1995) and as a performance (Pratt 2000). According to Warren (2002) the interview forms part of the concrete aspects of reality construction rooted in the social, structural, historical, cultural and circumstantial contexts in which the interview takes place (DeVault 1990; Warren 2002). Longhurst (2003: 118) observes that interviews and focus groups are both ‘...about talking with people ... in
ways that are self-conscious, orderly and partially structured.' This is interlinked with Herzog’s suggestion that the very existence of the interview, along with what takes place around and during it, or is generated by it, plays a role in the analysis of the findings and in the construction of the reality being studied. This highly temporal and spatial interpretation of the interview draws into it the debate on performativity (Thrift 2004a; 2004b), as Pratt (2000: 639) summarises, this ‘…enable us to imagine and experiment with a broader repertoire of research strategies, beyond the documentary and the confessional, and multiple research objectives: here, now, and then and there.’ The interview as a technique of ‘data collection’ was a constitutive component of the research and the people that are involved in this component are co-authors of this thesis. Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 30 see Herzog (2005) suggest that interviews are ‘…the procedural scaffolding of a broad, culturally productive enterprise…The interview’s ubiquity serves to produce communicatively and ramify the very culture it ostensibly only inquires about.’ (Byrne (2004: 182) asserts that the semi structured interview technique establishes rapport and is ‘…able to achieve a level of depth and complexity not available to other, particularly survey based approaches.’ The idea of a dialogue with participants and prompting from the interviewer rather than dominating conversation will be prevalent throughout the encounter.

Thrift and Dewsbury contentiously postulate that ‘What is remarkable in geography is the generally limited nature of the methods in use.’ (2000: 424). This seems paradoxically at odds with Hitchings’ (2011: 61) suggestion that ‘Human geographers researching everyday life seem increasingly hesitant about interviews.’ The debate around the depth and breadth of qualitative research methods draws from broader arguments against the perceived tyranny of ‘representation’ in the discipline (Thrift 2000). In defence of interviews as a form of information exchange Hitchings posits that researchers should not be confined to the opinion that it can ‘…only ever provide an unsatisfactorily washed out account of what previously took place.’ (2012: 61 see Thrift and Dewsbury 2000). The interview is clearly a technique with innate strengths and weaknesses, Yeung (1995: 313) argues
‘...that the qualitative personal interview method is a much better technique than other common techniques in international business research such as postal surveys and telephone interviews.’

Yet, tendency for bias is also extensively debated, van de Vijver and Tanzer (2004) look into types of questions asked in interview and demonstrate a tripartite analysis of bias based upon sample, administration, and instrument or technique. Much scepticism has been shown towards the use of transcribed, depersonalised data suggestions that this distorts meaning and ignores subtext and context have been made in contemporary critical literature which has called for the use of alternative methods such as video and photo diary keeping (Latham 2003; Bissell 2010; Macpherson 2010; Simpson 2011). Hitchings retorts that ‘...we [as researchers] should not discount interviews on routine practice because they superficially seem inappropriate. (Hitchings 2012: 66). Crang’s (2002) re-evaluation of semi-structured interviews summarises their methodological role in geography and touches on the problematic aspect of using interviews in fieldwork citing the complex nature of positional engagement and interaction with participants and the impact points that this causes in research.

3.1.2 Interview structure

Participants were informed about the nature of the research prior to interview. It was made known that the fieldwork that they took part in would contribute to this study on highly skilled migration and the promotion of entrepreneurship in the UK with special reference to the incentives and disincentives to migrant entrepreneurship. Participants were also notified that the research is co-sponsored by law firm Paragon Law Ltd. If they were requested, a set of questions were forwarded to the participant, however this was not offered in initial contact. This set of questions was used through the semi structured interview process to allow prompting of dialogue in preconceived directions. As Rubin and Rubin (1995) denote, both the person being interviewed and the interviewer may take control of the interview and change the subject, guide the tempo, or indicate the interviewer was asking the wrong questions.
Questions varied dependent on who was being interviewed, as has been discussed in the previous section. Interviews were themed around 1) the promotion of migrant entrepreneurship and relation to place, 2) questions of how highly skilled migrants engage in entrepreneurial activity in the UK and 3) the impact of socio cultural interactions and transnational connections. The interviewer had a paper based prompt and the interview was recorded in both partial written and audio formats (Cohen and Crabtree 2006; Sands and Krumer-Nevo 2006).

Skype and telephone interviews were used as interview methods alongside face to face encounters where it was not possible to arrange a convenient meeting time or where the participant was not in the UK. It has been suggested that these tools have become elemental in contemporary social sciences methods (Booth 2008; Kazmer and Xie 2008; Erickson 2010), tending to be used as a fall-back mechanism, negating the costs of long distance travel (Woo 2006). As Jane Gitschier (2010: 1) posits, ‘After I had to abort plans to visit Victor in Massachusetts, we eventually settled on a Skype interview, and I persuaded him to shoot his own photo on his computer’s photo booth … We had a grainy connection but a lot of fun.’ Skype arguably allows for low cost implementation of an interviewing strategy whilst maintaining personal interaction, which is often lacking in written or spoken communication alone (Saumure and Given 2010). Furthermore, Skype ties into an increasingly sensitizing ethical stance to interviewing, as is suggested by Bertrand and Bourdeau (2010: 70) who found that

‘…the research interview by Skype offers a real freedom space to the interviewed who has the power to quit the network session whenever he wants and require his collaboration to a higher degree.’

It was found that Skype interviewing allowed a richer data set to be compiled, with participants from across the globe able to offer perspectives on prospective entrepreneurial migration to the UK and alternative national, cultural and economic settings to the UK. Furthermore, as suggested, Skype allowed for scheduling of interviews around time frame that suited participants
and the interviewer. Some participants wished to use the telephone or Skype as they were wary of wasting time travelling, this enabled them to do so and remain in an interview environment that they could feel comfortable in (Deakin and Wakefield 2013). The importance of place and interview location was acknowledged in this study and interviewees were free to decide the location (bearing in mind ethical restrictions on the interviewer to conduct meetings in public spaces).

3.1.3 Sampling

This research process employed a snowball sampling technique, the use of which will be evaluated in the following section. Fifty seven participants were interviewed in total (see Appendix 3) attempts to access participants were concluded at the point of saturation – where a critical mass of perspectives were gained, and limited new relevant material could be added by conducting additional interview. Of the interviewees, it was identified that in London, Brazilian migrants are potentially over sampled. This ties into the caveat of snowball sampling in delivering connected interviewees which led to a densely networked group of entrepreneurs participating. In the sample, formal and informal investors are under represented, though the influence of investment in determining migration behaviours alongside other facets of the economic and socio cultural landscape are discussed at length. Participants were based in the three areas described, as well as national representatives of government, business membership organisations and other stakeholders, such as MPs and parliamentary officials. Snowball sampling involves the use of initial contacts to identify other potential participants (Henry 1990), according to Darker et al. (2007) this is often used in qualitative research (Coolican 1999; Brown 2005) and placed within a wider set of link-tracing methodologies which seek to take advantage of the social networks of identified respondents to provide a researcher with an ever-expanding set of potential contacts (Spreen 1992). The process is based on the assumption that a ‘bond’ or ‘link’ exists between the initial sample and others in the same target population, allowing a series of referrals to be made within a circle of
acquaintance (Berg 1988). This assumption, proves potentially problematic in a dynamic research process, as Howe and Dougherty (1993: 19) suggest, the process of data collection is ‘...ethically charged and unpredictable from the outset.’ As Gallacher and Gallagher (2008: 12 see Kiptot et al. 2006). highlight, ‘Research is inherently unpredictable: the best laid plans are liable to go awry. Methodological immaturity privileges open-ended process over predefined technique. It does not aim to discover or uncover a pre-existing world, offering instead experimentation, innovation and ‘making do’.’ A sense of assumption that participants would be willing to impart sensitive personal information regarding associates, friends or relatives in snowball sampling required the interviewer to engage and develop relationships founded on trust and developed over a period of time. In this study snowball sampling worked well, and highly networked groups offered contact information of suitable colleagues and suggested routes into alternative and unexplored themes around migrant entrepreneurship that have an impact on them or associates.

3.1.4 Identification of and access to participants

In this research methodology there were three stages of participant identification focusing on three main participant groups; 1) national policy makers, 2) subnational government and business organisations and 3) individual migrant entrepreneurs. At the national scale, policy makers from the UK Border Agency (UKBA), UK Trade and Investment and MPs, such as a senior member of the Business Innovation and Skills Select Committee were interviewed. Participants were identified from official documentation and online resources detailing responsibility and role within their respective organisation. Looking at subnational manifestations of national governmental activity, Ward and Jones (1999: 301) suggest there is a need to focus on local government and the relationship with ‘...quasi-public and quasi-private agencies ...’ This was addressed, with subnational bodies such as Marketing Birmingham within Birmingham City Council, the Chambers of Commerce within the study regions and locally representative organisations such as London and Partners, and the subregional Cambridgeshire County Council. Finally, at stage three individual migrants were interviewed. This group was
identified initially through publicly available documents and media sources, digital resources and the Internet and use of contacts (and word of mouth) (Walford 1994). This informal method of participant recruitment incurs significant caveat where the strategic recommendation of those believed by an existing participant to echo an agenda or political point (Mohan 1999; Brydon-Miller et al. 2003).

There were problems with access to some prospective participants, particularly those working for government departments and time poor entrepreneurs. Walford (1994: 1) argues that ‘…such research presents particular difficulties for the researcher in terms of: access to research sites and respondents; the interview techniques that are needed; the interpretation of the data generated; and ethical issues.’ As such, Barker and Weller (2003: 212) suggest that ‘Negotiating access is … a process requiring researchers to be prepared to address any issues that gatekeepers may raise.’ Gatekeepers tended to be those first contacted within the relevant organisation, who would refer the researcher to a colleague, or having been interviewed, suggest contacts that were suitable to contact. This aided the process of recruitment, owing to the networks of influence that many participants had in circles of migrant entrepreneurship and policy making in their area and on a national scale. Walford (1994) suggests that access is likely to be particularly difficult where a policy initiative is controversial and fiercely contested (Walford 1991; Whitty and Edwards 1994). This was found to be the case here, with migration a hot political topic, and many politicians and government officials seemingly wary of criticising government policy. However, the keen political interest in this policy area also aided the recruitment of some participants who wished to speak out and be heard on issues that impacted them, or their organisation (often in the case of membership group representatives). Curtis et al. take a pragmatic approach to the dilemmas of access in fieldwork, they suggest that ethical criteria concerning who should be chosen to have a voice in a research project, and how access to informants should be organized, can seem to conflict with a rigorous theoretical framework.
3.2 Data management and analysis

The data collected from interview was transcribed, and checked for accuracy (Aira et al. 2003). Poland (2002) discusses at length some of the issues that can interfere with the accuracy of transcribed data (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). As Nicholas and McDowall (2012: 340) posit, ‘The researchers’ active role in identifying, selecting and reporting the themes is acknowledged as inevitable to the process of this study.’ Data is presented in the form of quotations, based upon suggestions that they ‘…are not only the proof used in the analysis, but they also preserve the language of the respondents.’ (Mostyn 1985: 141). For Winchester (1996: 125) the key issue is a combination of representation, mediating and interpreting material through our own words, knowledge and experience and the reading of texts, usually transcriptions of the spoken word, she suggests that ‘…even letting the interviewees’ own words speak for themselves involves a choice on the part of the interviewer.’ Winchester’s (2007: 13) consideration will be acknowledged here, and ties into Silva’s suggestion that ‘What you see in research largely depends on a combination of what you want to see, what you ask to see, what you are allowed to see and how you frame the research.’

There is a burgeoning interdisciplinary literature on analysis of textual material collected by interview (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Feldman, 1995; Silverman, 1993). This is contrary to Attride-Stirling’s (2001: 386) suggestion that ‘…there is relatively little said on how to analyse the textual material that qualitative researchers are presented with at the end of the data gathering stage…’ Sofaer (2002: 334 see McDowell 1992; Crang 2002; Kwan 2002; Hewitt 2007). cites Hall (1997) in suggesting that analysing such formations means ‘…investigating how things are represented, studied and thought about and how knowledge produced by discourse exerts power by constructing identities and relations…’ Here, the construction and interpretation of meaning through data analysis will be addressed in relation to its impact on findings, in order to ‘…distinguish between our observations and our interpretations of those observations.’ (Sofaer 2002: 334). Data analysis and coding was
addressed conceptually and practically, as Basit (2003: 143) suggests ‘Data analysis is the most difficult and most crucial aspect of qualitative research.’

McLellan et al. (2003: 63) suggest that special attention should be given to how textual data, particularly transcripts of audio-taped materials, are prepared. They go on to stipulate that ‘...no universal transcription format is adequate for all types of qualitative data collection approaches, settings, or theoretical frameworks, there are some practical considerations that can help researchers systematically organize and analyze textual data.’ Lapadat and Lindsay (1999: 64) posit that methodological and theoretical issues ‘...associated with the transcription process have received scant attention in the research literature.’

Transcription was seen as an opportunity to ‘get to know’ the data that was provided in interview and an important process in analysis. For Halcomb et al. (2006: 38) transcription refers to the process of ‘...reproducing spoken words, such as those from an audiotaped interview, into written text.’ However, Bauder (2006: 61 see Woods 1998; Pain 2004) suggests that we as researchers must ‘...engage critically with processes of reproduction and create the spaces in which problematic professional practices can be challenged and transformed.’

MacLean et al. (2004) question the extent to which nonverbal cues such as silences and body language and emotional aspects such as crying, coughs, and sighs should be incorporated into transcribed text (Poland 1995; Wellard and McKenna 2001). It is argued here that the intricacies of the interview as an event cannot be represented thoroughly as a manuscript of actions and speech. Park and Zeneah (1999: 621) cite Bourdieu in suggesting that something as apparently simple as the placement of a comma, ‘...represents a translation or even an interpretation’ Interviews here will not be accompanied by detailed notation describing participant bodily actions or gesticulations (Poland and Pederson 1998; McLellan et al. 2003).
In monitoring the quality of transcription, Poland (1995: 290) acknowledges that ‘error’ is ‘...socially constructed and open to multiple interpretations.’ He suggests that an assessment of ‘...the trustworthiness of transcripts be routine practice in qualitative research.’ (1995: 290). Lapadat and Lindsay (1999: 64) conclude that transcription is theory laden and that ‘...the choices that researchers make about transcription enact the theories they hold and constrain the interpretations they can draw from their data.’

Coding is one of the significant steps taken during analysis to organise and make sense of textual data, it is a dynamic, intuitive and creative process of inductive reasoning, thinking and theorizing, developing codes from raw data (Brown and McIntyre 1993; Basit 2003). The basic coding process is to organize large quantities of text into much fewer content categories (Weber 1990; Coffey and Atkinson 1996), through ‘...the assigning of interpretive tags to text (or other materials) based on categories or themes that are relevant to the research.’ (Cope 2010: 440). Weston et al. (2001: 381 see Weston et al. 1997; McAlpine et al. 1999a; McAlpine et al. 1999b) posit that despite coding ‘...mountains of verbal data in the form of interview transcripts in various contexts over the last decade...', they have paid relatively little attention to ‘...what lies below the surface- the enormous task of developing coding systems and coding the transcripts that provide the very basis for reporting the results of our investigations.’

Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 27) suggest that ‘...codings link different segments or incidences in the data. We bring those fragments of data together to create categories of data that we define as having some common property or element.’ Here, coding of data was categorised initially by themes of 1) Policy 2) Economy 3) Entrepreneurship and 4) Transnational connections. It is acknowledged that there is significant overlap between these themes, and this is expressed in the empirical chapters. These themes were then sub categorised, in policy for example themes revolved around Tier 1 Entrepreneur, Tier 1 Graduate Entrepreneur, Sole Representative visa and Points Based System. These categories were given numerical values, allowing for easier totalling of frequency and in this sense resembles
summative content analysis where the approach seems quantitative in the early stages (Kondracki and Wellman 2002), but its goal is to explore the usage of the words/indicators in an inductive manner (Catanzaro 1988; Babbie 1992; Morse and Field 1995). Therefore, analytic work then lies in establishing and thinking about the linkages between data, not ‘…the mundane processes of coding.’ (Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 27).

Qualitative content analysis was chosen as the method of coding here, where coding categories are derived directly and inductively from the raw data (Cavanagh 1997; Yeh and Inman 2007). It is suggested that data analysis starts with ‘…reading all data repeatedly to achieve immersion and obtain a sense of the whole…’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1279; see Tesch 1990). This is assisted by the transcription process. Qualitative content analysis to an extent hybridised, though conceptually used in favour of other techniques such as directed content analysis and summative content analysis.

Thematic analysis was used in this study, providing a platform for the comparison of academic materials with the themes addressed by participants illustrating their opinions and experiences. Alternative text analysis methods include discourse analysis, narrative inquiry and grounded theory. Discourse analysis allows focus upon social constructionism grounded in geographical and psychological literature (Potter 1996; Phillips and Hardy 2002). Edwards (1997) cites that discourse analysis is key to an understanding of the role of ‘mundane realities’ (Billig 1995; Jones and Merriman 2009). This approaches aspects of normative study and intermeshes with concepts of positionality and reflexivity (see section 5) (Baxter 2003; Olson and Sayer 2009).

Thematic analysis, used here, is noted for its flexibility (King 2004), in a broadly critical realist framework (Willig 1999) in order to identify, analyse and report common themes within the data. As Braun and Clarke (2006: 82) posit, ‘A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data.’, a useful tool absent from methods such as discourse analysis (Baxter and Eyles 1997). Yet they caution that, ‘Thematic
analysis is a poorly demarcated, rarely-acknowledged, yet widely-used qualitative analytic method.’ (Braun and Clarke 2006: 2). Thematic analysis can be used in an inductive way with themes being data-driven and strongly linked to the transcripts (Boyatzis 1998; Nichols and McDowell 2012).

The researchers’ active role in identifying, selecting and reporting the themes is acknowledged as inevitable to the process of this study. Quotes will be used as a primary form of data in the empirical chapters. Quotes were selected to illustrate a range of views on key themes. They are representative of themes mentioned by the broader participant sample, but quotes are representative of the sentiment expressed about certain themes by individuals. However, there is caveat in data presentation of this sort, as Bazeley (2009: 9) suggests that there is a problem of representation with relying for evidence on one or two quotes that might have been drawn from hundreds of pages of text. She posits that ‘While one or two quotes might powerfully illustrate a theme, they do not convey how widely this theme might have applied, or for whom, or how it links to other themes.’ This issue is echoed throughout geographical literature on the presentation of qualitative data, though little is offered to overcome it (Antaki et al. 2003; Burnard et al. 2008; Bazeley 2009). Quotes are presented in context with questions asked by the interviewer and within minimal intervention or editing.

### 3.3 Positionality, reflexivity and ethical considerations

The documentation of intricate, yet fundamental details of interaction through qualitative methods is a topic that has received much attention over the past twenty years. However, more widely within human geography, the implementation of this concept and consideration of positionality, reflexivity and emotional, affectual and ethical issues is often at best sparse and at worst non-existent. This irresponsible absentness of position when taking into account humanity within fieldwork and writing may overlook personal aspects of place and thoughts through interviewing (Anthias 2002; Massey 2004; Hutchison and Bleiker 2008). As Mosselson (2010: 479) writes, it is useful to
understand ‘...how my own identity interacted with the identities of my participants,’ and England (1994: 249) posits that ‘The researcher cannot conveniently tuck away the personal behind the professional, because fieldwork is personal.’ In this vein, it is argued that such reflexivity challenges the more positivist paradigm, ‘...breaking down the power relations in dichotomous oppositions of researcher and researched, outsider and insider, known and unknown.’ (Lew 2011: 163). The positionality of the researcher and researched will be briefly discussed here on a practical and theoretical basis; acknowledging how certain events impacted the research process and had an effect on data collection.

3.3.1 Positionality

Over the past two decades there has been much focus across the social sciences and humanities on issues of positionality (Moser 2008). Rose (1997) argues that claims by authors that the problematic aspect of positionality in research has been resolved rests on ‘...mistaken understandings of the researcher as someone in the possession of perfect self knowledge.’ (Sidaway 2000: 261). This argument shall be extended here, drawing interdisciplinary and expanding body on research utilising and critically engaging with the often elusive concept of positionality. Robertson (2002: 788), in her ‘pithy polemic on positionality’ questions the robustness of ‘the clunky term’ positionality, she suggests that ‘...anthropologists today often begin a manuscript with the words, “writing as a [name the category].”’ The operative assumption is that “positionality” is a condition of and for reflexivity.’ (2002: 788). England postulates that we have ‘...different personal histories and lived experiences,’ as people and as researchers, constituting personality or one’s ‘personal inventory’ (Francese 2009). So in this sense, returning to the premise of positionality as a reflexive tool, England (1994: 248) proposes that: ‘The researcher cannot conveniently tuck away the personal behind the professional, because fieldwork is personal.’ Warren 1988: 7) echoes this suggestion as she writes, the researcher as ‘...any person, without gender,
personality, or historical location, who would objectively produce the same findings as any other person,’ is a mythical being.

Interviewing was a highly personal experience, with face to face meetings and questioning that pried into the everyday lives of migrant entrepreneurs and stakeholders. The role of the researcher determined how questions were received, in the simplest sense through the manner in which they were asked, and in greater depth; down to the minutiae of perceptions of the researcher. It was not found that interviewees asked questions about the life trajectory of the researcher; questions tended to be oriented around research findings and dissemination, impact and policy recommendations.

3.3.2 Critical self reflexivity

Critical self reflexivity is an important aspect of the research process that was considered throughout this investigation. Robertson (2002: 785) provides a summary of the practical expectations of reflexivity as a process when she states that, ‘Most basically, reflexivity describes the capacity of any system of signification, including a human being—an anthropologist—to turn back upon or to mirror itself.’ Chiseri Strater (1996: 115) suggests that to achieve a reflexive stance the researcher needs to ‘…bend back upon herself to make herself as well as the other an object of study…’ Myerhoff and Ruby (1982) describe this as subject and object fuse used to ‘…legitimize, validate, and question research practices and representations.’ (Pillow 2003: 175).

Research processes are outlined in this chapter and the questioning of interviewees, their positionality and the relation with the researcher were fundamental in sculpting interaction and therefore, impacting upon findings. For example, language and representation was key in the interview process. For many participants English was an additional language, and the way that questions were phrased was considered extensively and adapted based upon individual experience and through interviews. This was also a factor that played out through the transcription phase of data collection. Language and representation of thought differs per participant, and the way that spoken word
is documented was adapted to allow for greater transparency of thought process and feeling as conveyed personally and corporeally. For example, if a period of silence was recorded in interview, it was important to note whether this was owing to linguistic issues or thought about what to say, or a period of emotional or personal introspection.

Here, critical self reflexivity will be primarily used on a practical basis for evaluating research process and thinking in greater depth about the relationship between researcher and participant. For some researchers reflexivity denotes a technique for making research transparent, as England (1996) suggests it is important to be more open and honest about research and the limitations and partial nature of that research. However, this is flawed, with research transparency often shrouded by desire to provide concrete and impact laden findings, rather than admitting methodological or process based problems. Giddens (1986) argues that modern societies are increasingly characterised by personal reflexivity (Warde 2005), within this argument it is also intimated that routines are feasibly dragged into discursive consciousness (Hitchings 2012). Though this approach does not provide a practical method to move forward with high quality ethical and reflexive research. On the other hand, Mosselson (2010) demonstrates that the conduct of interview experiences and routines within this are essential for understanding data collected (see Figure 20). As Figure 20 suggests, research does not always proceed as the researcher plans, with non-premeditated processes running through data collection. Reflexivity involves self-awareness during the research process which aids in making visible the practice and construction of knowledge within research in order to produce more accurate analyses of our research (Pillow 2003).

3.3.3 Power relations

Power relations between researcher and participant sculpted the way in which interviews were conducted and changed the language and conversation culture. Elwood and Martin (2000: 650) suggest that ‘…it is crucial to recognise that, far from being removed from social and cultural contexts at
other scales, the interview site provides a material space for the enactment and constitution of power relations.' Participants in this study were invited to choose a location where the interview would take place, and as Herzog (2005) suggests the issue of who selects the location, and what setting is chosen, is not only a technical matter of convenience and comfort but should be examined within the social context of the study being conducted. The interviewer was flexible and willing to adapt himself to the preferences of the participant; however, there were time and commitment constraints on the interviewer that changed location, timing and duration of some interviews (Jenkins 1996; Herzog 2005; Scott et al. 2006). The interview process is co-constituted by both researcher and participant, and in this investigation the often high profile business or political standing of participants led to a greater willingness to intervene or alter the intended schedule or research. For example, some interviews were cancelled and rearranged up to four times before the meeting took place owing to inconvenience and change of plan on behalf of the participant.

The interviewer was a 23 year old, white, male student. Interviewees ranged in age from early twenties to late seventies, though they were predominantly middle-aged men. Many of these participants were successful businessmen. There was evidence that these participants may have been trying to impress a sense of success and weaving complex self-mythologies oriented around overcoming adversity and achieving high levels of financial, social and cultural capital in doing so. McAdams (1993: 11) suggests that the narrative of the self or the personal myth is told in order to provide a sense of coherence to scattered and often confusing experiences that occur over the life course and in our everyday lives. He posits that in order to live well, with unity and purpose, people ‘...compose a heroic narrative of the self that illustrates essential truths about ourselves.’ It is important to recognise that people tended not to draw attention to their own mistakes or misjudgements unless this resulted in overcoming adversity and achieving prosperity.

Adler and Adler (2002) argue that the subject of the interview should be the determining factor in terms of location. They tended to leave the decision as
to interview location in the hands of the interviewer. Interviews dealing with highly emotional, sensitive or private issues are best conducted in the home of the participant since such a setting offers a sense of intimacy and friendliness. This was not be possible due to ethical constraints, and did not impact on the research process as experiences and questions around emotive topics were minimal and participants did not express outwardly a sense of discomfort or high emotional feeling.

3.3.4 Ethical considerations

Le Heron (1992) presents a specification of the main areas of ethical concern that ought to be acknowledged in the relations with people studied. These are: informed consent, confidentiality, minimizing harm, cultural sensitivity, and providing feedback to participants (Hay 1998). Yet as Sultana (2007: 374) suggests, ‘There are critical disjunctures between aspects of everyday behaviour in the field and the University’s institutional frameworks that aim to guide/enforce good ethical practice, as the conduct of fieldwork is always contextual, relational, embodied, and politicized.’ The researcher is responsible for ethical standards of this study; Popke (2007) introduces the debate on research(er) responsibility, citing Doreen Massey (2004) as she highlights, from an ethical standpoint, a relationship of responsibility toward others who may be implicated in the heterogeneous links and connections that extend through the research process. Consideration of the ethics of spatially explicit data is taken through the anonymity of proper names (unless given verbal or written consent to name), consideration of the sensitivity of some information and a participant feedback mechanism (VanWey et al. 2005).

Ethical consent forms were supplemented by information documents to ensure that participants understood what they were committing to and had the information to look at after the interview event. Participant willingness to be involved in the study was confirmed through either a signature or verbal confirmation and again the planned management of data that they provided was outlined (Appendices 1 and 2). This process was primarily governed by
the university’s Ethical Advisory Committee and their code of practice, but also refers to the Data Protection Act (1998). During and after the interview participants were told that they could withdraw at any stage and care was taken to ensure that participants did not feel obliged to take part in the research. No interviewees chose to withdraw at any stage, though two interviewees asked that the researcher contacted them with intended use of their quotes and interview material prior to publication, which has been done.

Confidentiality and anonymity were important conditions that participants were protected by in the research process (Longhurst 2003; 2010). Dowling (2010) suggests that there are many ways that confidentiality of participants can be maintained, and many of these were used in this study. Participants are not named, but their role and organisation that they work for, or own is stated unless this compromises the identity of the individual, in which case a generic title is provided. Transcripts and electronic documents were stored in secure locations that only the researcher had access to and files were password protected. The research process did not put participants in a position where they might be at risk or harm as a result of their participation whilst at the same time ensuring that the researcher was not exposed to harm. Cultural sensitivity was key in addressing the needs of participants and was embedded in the research process. Cultural sensitivity implies an awareness of the influences of other isolated of multiple factors that can impact and shape the priorities and perspectives of individuals and groups (Dennis and Giangreco 1996). The multiple positionalities of participants were accounted for and requirements were embedded in the interview process.

3.4 Research questions

Research questions will represent gaps in literature, facets of changing context and themes addressed, allowing the researcher to structure data collection through a methodological framework. Using the methodology outlined this study will answer the following:
1. How is non-EEA highly skilled entrepreneurial migration incentivised in the UK?
   a. How does this relate to place?

2. How do non-EEA highly skilled migrants engage in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape?

3. How are non-EEA highly skilled entrepreneurial migrants connected and embedded in transnational socio cultural networks in the UK and their home country?

3.5 Policy relevance and academic research

There has been an increasing awareness of the relationship that academia has with policy over the past decade, inciting a complex and interdisciplinary debate in the fields of geography and social sciences (Massey 2001; 2002; Martin 2001; 2002; Castree 2002; Dorling and Shaw 2002; Lee 2002). Aspects of this debate will be addressed here, with suggestions for moving forward from what is widely considered a paradoxical rut of political agenda vis-à-vis pragmatic concerns of work within ‘the academy’ (Peck 1999; 2000; Banks and MacKian 2000; Pollard et al. 2000). Policy relevant academic work is not a proxy for policy changing. Accordingly, Ward suggests that policy relevant research, ‘...while it might appear a straight forward term...masks more than it reveals.’ (Ward 2005: 311). Literature around this concept within human geography has seen protagonists call for active policy relevance (Martin 2001; 2002; Dorling and Shaw 2002), this perspective tends to express a lack of ‘real terms impact’ in current research. Ward adapts this call and posits that geographers ‘...engage the wider audiences.’ (Ward 2005: 311). He goes on to highlight that ‘Our potential publics are multiple, ranging from media audiences to policy makers, from think tanks to NGOs, from silenced minorities to social movements.’ (Ward 2006: 498). To summarise, Dorling and Shaw ask the question, ‘How can you measure whether academic work influences policy?’ they answer this with ‘Not easily.’(2002: 636 quoted in Ward 2005: 310).
3.6 Dissemination of research

Research findings will be disseminated through a research findings event that will be held in London as well as through summary documents and face to face meetings with individuals. The event will be held in London, as it is the heart of UK policy and the site where most participants were based. As alluded to in the previous section, and as Salter and Martin (2001: 509) suggest that ‘…there is extensive evidence that basic research does lead to considerable economic benefits, both direct and indirect.’ The author supports Martin’s (2001: 190) suggestion for ‘…a commitment to generate and disseminate knowledge that both informs others of how those systems operate and how they might be changed.’ The role that academic research has to play is not confined to academic or political realms, and has impacts in business and industry. Salter and Martin continue to posit the important role of publically funded research, suggesting that ‘…basic research is crucial for the strategic position of industrialised nations in the world economy, and for remaining at the leading edge of technology.’ This premise rests on the strategic dissemination of research and will be briefly addressed in this section. Dewsbury and Naylor (2002: 258) suggest that dissemination activity ranges from ‘…instrumental acts in the field to the plethora of conversational performances thereafter over coffee, during conferences and in co-authored textual productions.’ Here, participants and organisations involved in the study will be offered access to the research. The research will contribute to articles that will be published in academic journals and other forms of media (Beaumont et al. 2005; Ward 2006).

3.7 Research limitations

This research was limited by a number of important factors that need to be considered and evaluated. The impact of snowball sampling has been addressed in chapter 3; this method of sampling has clear implications in terms of favouring connected individuals and groups with structures of communication and close knit social activities. Nonetheless, the range of
participants that were identified as relevant to the study was represented in the research sample.

The study focuses on Inner London East), Birmingham and the West Midlands, and Cambridgeshire. This means that findings may not be representative of the UK as a whole. When looking at national migration policy there was a focus on London due to the city as a hub of policy making in the UK. This may have impacted participant’s breadth of knowledge on non-London migrant entrepreneurship in the UK.

Migration and economic policy have changed rapidly and policy were amended and manipulated over the period in which research was conducted. Views that participants express on aspects of policy are highly temporal and reflect policy in a snapshot perspective. Furthermore, the policy landscape of the UK has dramatically changed over the writing of this thesis. This has been accounted for and changes acknowledged where possible. Limitation lies in the inability of documentation of policy to keep up with changes on the ground.

Despite limitations outlined here and throughout the thesis, the methods employed allowed the main research aim and objectives to be realised. Further investigation could iron out some of the issues encountered here, and it is acknowledged that when addressing policy timeliness is of great importance.
4. Unravelling entrepreneurship: the problems and opportunities of migrant entrepreneurship in the UK

This chapter works through contention in defining entrepreneurship, unravelling how entrepreneurship is presented in the context of migration in academia, and policy. This outlines entrepreneurship as socially and culturally reproduced, and imbued with value in contemporary economic landscapes. It addresses 1) how non-EEA highly skilled entrepreneurial migration is incentivised in the UK, and 2) how non-EEA highly skilled migrants engage in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape. This will be achieved empirically exploring the role of entrepreneurship in the UK with policy makers and migrants, and understanding what entrepreneurship means across academia, policy and in popular discourse. A definition that aggregates these diverse perspectives on entrepreneurship will then be posited and used throughout this thesis in order to contribute to policy making that engages with entrepreneurs on the ground and develops the impact and relevance of academic work in this field.

The key contribution here will be a definition of entrepreneurship that is relevant to highly skilled migrants in order to provide a conceptual platform to move forward debate in policy and academia.

4.1 Defining entrepreneurship

Definitions and theorisation of entrepreneurship in policy, academia and through traditional perceptions have been addressed. The ideology of entrepreneurial behaviour was discussed with participants, where diverse responses were recorded. This shows the variable and contextual nature of entrepreneurship, in this case, as structured by mobility and migration policy. Entrepreneurship is often defined by characteristics that entrepreneurs discursively represent or perform in the economic landscape. Fundamental to this assumption is the idea that entrepreneurs achieve funding and use it to reproduce value, often through innovative technologies. This does not define the essence of enterprise, but points towards the econometric centricity of
definitions and expectations that entrepreneurs are intended to fulfil. This is particularly poignant in migrant entrepreneurship, where high investment levels and pressurised success are necessitated by UKBA policy structures.

As a former UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) representative suggests, the entrepreneur tends to aim to create scalable and sustainable business:

“As soon as possible but equally it is key not to have, things always take longer in business and it is good to take time… so he hasn’t been over for a few years, but what you find with good savvy entrepreneurs, they find a way of doing it… in 2008/9 he was looking for investment to open a plant, and funny enough there wasn’t any, so he rewrote the plans and got together investment for a micro plant, now he has product, and he can go round with that, he could put four plants up next to the one that he has now… (I41, UKTI Global Entrepreneur Program former representative)”

The dependency on innovation is suggested by Veeraraghavan (2009), as entrepreneurship and innovation are inextricably linked. Kirzner (2002) suggests that the process of innovation is actually of spontaneous undeliberate learning (Veeraraghavan 2009). Accordingly, the necessary characteristic of the entrepreneur is alertness, with no intrinsic skills other than that of recognizing opportunities, being necessary. Leibenstein (1995) postulates that an entrepreneur must be

‘…dominant, and be gap-filler, i.e. have the ability to perceive where market fails and to develop new goods or processes that the market demands but which are not currently being supplied.’ (Veeraraghavan 2009: 17).

Veeraraghavan concludes that Innovation and entrepreneurship are two sides of a coin. He suggests that ‘While there is a need for the innovations to occur which should be facilitated and even encouraged deliberately by entrepreneurs, it is equally important for them to create opportunities and environment to realize those innovations.’ (2009: 19).
Eckhardt and Shane (2003: 333) posit that contemporary research has tended to move away from ‘…a focus on identifying those people in society who prefer to become entrepreneurs towards understanding the nexus of enterprising individuals and valuable opportunities.’ Dalziel (2008: 23) suggests that definitions of entrepreneurship consider ‘…personality traits and social networks’ as predictors of entrepreneurial success. Conversely, strategy considers firm resources and capabilities and membership in favourable industries as predictors of firm performance (Dalziel 2008). Eckhardt and Shane postulate that this new focus has required scholars to explain the role of opportunities in the entrepreneurial process.’ (2003: 333). This links with Short et al.’s (2010: 40) suggestion that ‘Without an opportunity, there is no entrepreneurship.’ They postulate that a potential entrepreneur can be immensely creative and hardworking, but ‘…without an opportunity to target with these characteristics, entrepreneurial activities cannot take place.’ (2010: 41 see Stevenson and Jarillo 1990). This ties into the suggestion from a senior member of the MIT Enterprise Forum in the UK that entrepreneurship is the strategic utilisation of ideas within an opportunity structure:

… entrepreneurship I would say is, really a venue for people that have ideas and want to create something, and follow through. And your standard entrepreneur is someone that probably doesn’t fit in with a normal company psychology, someone who cant work with other people, someone who likes to work on their own, and someone who thinks outside the box, and really most of them don’t understand how to work inside the box as they say.

GW So, would you be able to define migrant entrepreneurship and also look at what is an entrepreneur more broadly…?

I12 Well, I do think it is a type of person, are they different from those in the UK? Only in terms of personality, as you know Americans aren’t afraid of failure, they pick themselves up, and start back over again, whereas other people in other societies don’t have that … (I12, senior member MIT Enterprise Forum)
Entrepreneurship has been conceptualised as a state of mind, co-constituted of a series of interlocking and synergistic psychological tendencies (Davidsson 1989). Entrepreneurship was described as a state of mind by a senior member of Cambridgeshire County Council, reflecting the idea of innate difference and otherness of the entrepreneur:

…I think that entrepreneurship is something, a state of mind of an individual, being an entrepreneurship is not necessarily something you can learn, something you can be taught, it is something that you are. What I think that government can do and local authority do, is to get out the way … when they are a blockage. (I11, Senior member of Cambridgeshire County Council)

Krueger (2003: 105) suggests that ‘…understanding entrepreneurial cognition is imperative to understanding the essence of entrepreneurship, how it emerges and evolves…’ particularly for the conceptualisation over description of entrepreneurial activities. Baron (1998; 2008) argues that humanity shares the same basic cognitive processes but ‘…entrepreneurs appear to face unique role demands that are accompanied by differences in the cognitive processes those role demands require.’ (Krueger 2003: 106). Baum et al. (2007: 1) argue that entrepreneurship is fundamentally personal, and though entrepreneurship research has shown ‘…that there are multiple personal, organizational, and external causes of successful new venture creation, it takes human vision, intention, and work to conceive and convert business ideas to successful products and services.’ A member of Tech City Investment Organisation suggests that the entrepreneur will take further steps to ensure business success, with an emphasis on the new and ‘unthought-of’:

I think so. I mean, it is almost self selection because somebody who is an entrepreneur tends to be of a different style to somebody who is rolling out an existing business but just happens to be doing it in the UK. So an entrepreneur … is, by the very definition, launching a new business, something that hasn’t really been done before… […] and I think is more prepared to take the steps and go further to make the business successful. (I1, UKTI Tech City Investment Organisation representative)
Entrepreneurs tend to be young and unattached, according to Ley (2006: 748) ‘Some 30 countries run business immigration programmes, indicating the resolve of the state to play actively in the globalisation game and attract footloose skilled and entrepreneurial migrants who will prime economic development in a new land in return for citizenship rights.’ He suggests that Canada seen success with this scheme, arguably through liberal selection criteria (Ley 2006). The desirability of unattached entrepreneurs is mediated by the drive for movement to new markets, where mobility is a normalised and mundane component of global business activity. Ley (2006: 748 see Schoof 2006) suggests that between 1983 and 2001, ‘…over 310,000 immigrants landed in Canada through the BIP [Business Immigration Programme], while the Australian programme recruited 91,000 and the US programme, with steeper entry requirements, fewer than 6,000.’ The UK has tended to lag behind these arguably more progressive national migration policies, taking a neo conservative route to business migration, and therefore curtailing potential stocks of footloose entrepreneurial talent entering and being retained in the UK (Barrett et al. 2001). Bauder (2008: 109) suggests that implicit in Canada’s immigration policies is that ‘…some immigrants are endowed with a particular entrepreneurial spirit, and that this spirit relates to immigrants’ origin.’ This ties into the supposition that migrant entrepreneurs possess differing qualities to indigenous entrepreneurs, an idea that is expunged in Peter Li’s 2001 study on immigrant’s propensity to engage in self employment. Li (2001: 1107 see Waldinger et al. 1990; Light and Rosenstein 1995) suggests that migrants engage in self-employment and entrepreneurial activity as ‘…a means of self-preservation when faced with unfavourable competition in the open market, and that those who are culturally more endowed with certain cultural values and organizational capacities are more likely to succeed…’ This is illustrated on the ground, as a former representative of Tech City Investment Organisation outlines the characteristics of migrant entrepreneurs that tend to locate in East London:

*I think a lot of companies are characterised by entrepreneurs who are relatively young, or not particularly attached, so they may come without family...*
members or they may be coming over here to be with friends, so... (I1, representative of Tech City Investment Organisation)

Clark and Drinkwater (2006) suggest a possible explanation for the discourse that entrepreneurs are young and unattached to family, citing age structure. They posit that there are lower self-employment rates since the UK born members of ethnic minority groups will be younger on average and we expect self-employment rates to rise with age. This contradicts the supposition of youth, and perhaps ties into the restrictiveness of high capital requirement for visa application under the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa (discussed in section 2.1), this will be elaborated on in the following section on the Policy landscape of the UK. Dalziel (2008: 23) describes the success of two migrant entrepreneurs in the Canadian context, looking at

‘...Terry Matthews who immigrated to Canada from Wales at the age of 26 and went on to found leading communications systems firms such as Mitel and Newbridge Networks, and K.Y. Ho who immigrated to Canada from Hong Kong at the age of 34 and went on to found ATI, a leading semiconductor firm.’

The age of these individuals is tightly intertwined with a multivariate set of alternately influential dynamics, such as gender, socio economic background, education and personality.

Entrepreneurship is further seen to be natural and an organic phenomenon through the embeddedness of entrepreneurs in systemic restructuring of existing markets and the opening up of new or unexplored opportunities, linking into Eckhardt and Shane’s (2003) suggestion for mutual reliance on opportunity structure and entrepreneurial engagement. This argument resonates with the neo-liberalisation of markets, yet does not fit into the tight mobility restrictions on human capital:

*Of course there is an argument that entrepreneurship is a natural thing and ... therefore people will automatically identify things that they need to do and
The utilisation of networks is a characteristic that is described as being most prevalently used for economic growth by entrepreneurs. This strategy has been documented extensively in academic literature, theorised through the network success hypothesis (Witt 2004), where ‘…network activities can be measured and which indicators exist to quantify start-up success.’ (Witt 2004: 392). According to Witt there are large differences in the way that the dependent and the independent variables are defined in the academic literature around this concept. There are additional factors that influence the effectiveness and likelihood of entrepreneurs to embed themselves in networks, ‘…such as the networking expertise of the founders and the entrepreneurs’ level of existing know-how in the areas of co-operation and networking (‘absorptive capacity’).’ (Witt 2004: 392). The impact of networks on entrepreneurial activity are wide ranging, used by the entrepreneur to enable business progression and economic growth of the business, as well as facilitate socio cultural development and the proliferation of social capital. The conceptualisation of social capital has been used extensively to describe the phenomena associated with entrepreneurial and entrepreneur’s networking behaviours. However, these accounts often fail to recognise the complex interactivity of social agents manifest in an institutional and societal framework. Anderson and Jack (2002) explore the nature of social capital in entrepreneurial networks in their empirically underpinned study. They establish that social capital is a relational artefact that plays an important role in facilitating interaction. Anderson and Jack (2002: 193) posit that social capital has been taken to be structure (Coleman 1990), though also incorporates many aspects of social context, ‘…such as social interaction, social ties, trusting relationships and value systems that facilitate the actions of individuals located in a particular social context...’ They suggest that social capital both the origin and the expression of successful network interactions (Cooke and Wills 1999). The crux of Anderson and Jack’s (2002: 193) argument revolves around unravelling the paradox that ‘…social capital is described as both the glue that binds to create a network and also the
lubricant that eases and energizes network interaction.’ They (2002: 207) suggest in conclusion that a conceptual problem arose because ‘...the expression of social capital, as glue or lubricant, was attempting to define the phenomenon in terms of one another. In fact both dimensions are merely expressions of social capital, while social capital itself is a process.’

The regional impact of entrepreneurial activity is suggested by a representative of Tech City Investment Organisation, citing the influence and impact that entrepreneurship has on spaces. This is contrary to forthcoming arguments pitted around the structuration debate which tend to create a dualism with structure and agency, with structure proving the unfaltering backdrop to economic, social and political activity:

…but if you are talking about real entrepreneurship in the sense of the people who set up companies which are capable of growing fast and doing something different, that will shake up just about every region, and that is not a bad things, generally speaking it is a good idea. (I3, representative of Tech City Investment Organisation)

Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) provide empirical evidence to suggest that areas with higher levels of entrepreneurship exhibit stronger growth in labour productivity. They outline entrepreneurship as an important subnational mechanism facilitating the spill over of knowledge which in turn drives the activity of economic agents. In their 2004 study, Sternberg and Litzenberger (2004: 767) identify regions with industrial clusters in Germany and to analyse their entrepreneurial environment. They found, on the other side of the coin, that the ‘...existence of one or several industrial cluster(s) in a region has a positive impact on the number of start-ups and attitudes in the very same region.’ They suggest that the implications of their findings have significance with respect to regional policies encouraging industrial clusters. This ties into the politicisation and encouragement of initiatives such as East London Tech City, based upon the position of mutual economic environmental benefit from entrepreneurs and industrial clustering. This idea will be discussed at greater length in later sections, addressing the local impact of migration policy as well
as the economic ecosystems of the three UK subnational case studies, showing difference in spatial configuration, looked at in this thesis.

Entrepreneurs were described as able to make something out of nothing, as well as being efficient money multipliers from low level funding sources. This facet of entrepreneurial character is engrained in rhetoric around entrepreneurs as the ‘new alchemists’ (Handy 2004). Handy (2004: 11) suggests that these entrepreneurs are metaphorical, not literal alchemists, and ‘…unlike the alchemists of old, these new alchemists are not frauds, not is money usually their main motive.’ This debate around entrepreneurship ‘on a shoe string’ (Roberts and Woods 2005) contradicts the nature of migration policy capital requirements, as mentioned, but also highlights the quasi mythical sense of entrepreneurs as pioneers and revolutionary economic power houses. This is further engrained with use of language, terms such as venture, enterprise, spirit and Saxenian’s ‘New Argonauts’ (Saxenian 2006) entrench exceptionalism of entrepreneurs through banal linguistic practice (Billig 1995). Saxenian (2006: 99) suggests that the migrant entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley are like ‘…the Argonauts of Greek mythology who ventured with Jason centuries ago,’ She likens them to Greek mythology in terms of the nature of their ‘…embarking on risky foreign adventures in pursuit of wealth. Armed with their knowledge of technology markets and their global contact-books, the new Argonauts are in a strong position to mobilise the expertise and capital needed to start successful global ventures.’ (2006: 99). She suggests, as has been addressed briefly in this section, that the success of these entrepreneurs ‘…forces us to think afresh about how countries and regions grow.’ (Saxenian 2006: 99). A representation of Tech City Investment Organisation suggests that the entrepreneurs in East London Tech City seem to exist on air alone, reinforcing and institutionally developing this perception of entrepreneurs as exceptional:

*I think a lot of the guys here, whether they are migrants or not, are almost living off thin air, in a sense, that when they are in the head down high growth phase, they have got a tiny amount of money that they make last forever. (I3, representative of Tech City Investment Organisation)*
Bahrami and Evans (1995) described Silicon Valley as an ‘ecosystem’ consisting of various institutions, skill sets embodied in individuals and an entrepreneurial spirit (Kenney and Von Burg 1999: 71). The concept of entrepreneurial spirit tends to be one of ‘roughing it’ and surviving on the bare minimum of economic funds in order to provide the entrepreneurial venture the best chance of early stage growth, which is ‘turbo-charged’ according to Kenney and Von Burg for the cases of Route 128 in Massachusetts and Silicon Valley, California. Unlike these cases, a Cambridge, UK based US entrepreneur suggests that the entrepreneurial activity does not have to be high technology focused, it must simply embody and represent the creation of something out of nothing:

So entrepreneurship is, let me think… what is an entrepreneur? So, it is creating something out of nothing, I think that is a good start, and there is also a risk element, but I think that fundamentally I think it is about creating something out of nothing… and making some sort of business out of it… it doesn’t have to be a high tech venture, because honestly, if you have someone that is selling hotdogs on the street that is still entrepreneurship, … it’s just so iffy, because some people would define entrepreneurship as a profitable business, but that is like an aim, maybe it will be profitable, maybe it won’t be… there’s a risk that it won’t be, but they are still an entrepreneur… (I15, Cambridge, UK based entrepreneur)

This perspective is echoed by a Cambridge based member of a locally embedded technology club and business person, he suggests similarly that high tech ventures are not solely entrepreneurial ground, with low tech industries providing equal economic stimulation:

‘…it seems it doesn’t have to be technology based businesses that are the heart of all entrepreneurship in this part of the world. It is seen to be an entrepreneurial community and supportive of those people that want to give it a go.’ (I8, Cambridge Enterprise and Technology Club representative and business person based in Cambridge, UK)
Another, more realistic perspective on entrepreneurship, though no more valid, is the idea that an entrepreneur can multiply low level, or seed stage funding using an idea and an entrepreneurial skill set. Lerner (2002: 83) suggests that an extensive body of entrepreneurship research has ‘…highlighted the unpredictability of the entrepreneurial process.’ This falls in contrast to the confident and indestructible perspective of entrepreneurs that is often communicated in academic and publicly oriented discourse. Lerner (2002: 83) further postulates that

‘Very few entrepreneurs, whether in high- or low-technology settings, commercialise what they initially set to develop in their original time-frame. Rather, successful entrepreneurs gather signals from the marketplace in response to their initial efforts, and adjust their plans accordingly.’

The fallibility of entrepreneurs in venturing to develop business opportunities is a key issue that is under represented in much academic literature. Furthermore, reiterating the detachedness of Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa policy from the realities of the volatile economic landscape, the concept of acceptable failure is absent. Lerner (2002: 83) suggests that in the US context, ‘…many federal agencies, leery of being seen as ‘picking winners’, push entrepreneurs to devote funds to purely pre-commercial research.’ This is not the case in the UK, where UKTI and UKBA rhetoric revolves around the picking of winners, under the auspices of delivering effective migration policy, which contributes economically to the UK.

A former senior representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge, and an advisor on entrepreneurship suggests that entrepreneurs embody neo-liberal capital acquisition (Peet 2000; Harisalo 2009), with a head for making money at the expense of others, or to the disregard of others in the assumption of selfishness and greed:

So, what is an entrepreneur… so I define an entrepreneur as someone who is in effective control of a commercial undertaking…… so for example my wife
when on reception here said, ‘He is a typical entrepreneur, he only thinks of himself and doesn’t give a damn about anybody else’ … this attitude of entrepreneurs as greedy self-centred … so… there are different types of entrepreneur, there are social entrepreneurs, there are serial entrepreneurs, there are cooperative entrepreneurs … there’s lifestyle entrepreneurs. And I would argue that in the Cambridge context that is not quite the case, and I would draw a different analysis… there are people who are innovators, people who have ideas and want to see them developed commercially, so they are entrepreneurs to that extent. In term of funding…. they will get equity in, or they will get business angel finance in, and what you will find, certainly in Cambridge, is after two or three years they are no longer the CEO, but they have moved on, and if they have moved on they become allegedly serial entrepreneurs…. … (I9, former senior representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre Cambridge and entrepreneurship advisor)

Entrepreneurship is often used as a survival mechanism, with economic betterment reliant on the skills of the individual and knowledge of markets. This is particularly relevant when looking at migrant entrepreneurs to the UK during the mid to late twentieth century. An Indian born business person illustrates the mentality that he believes embodied the Indian migrant entrepreneur, and speaks about the experiences that his family, and father had in migrating to the UK:

*It depends on your definition of entrepreneur, I myself, don’t consider myself to be an entrepreneur, my Dad would have been an entrepreneur. An entrepreneur in my view would put their house on a hunch, and follow it through, and they are just sort of very very focused and sometimes even short sighted, they don’t see if it goes wrong, for them there is no failure and no consequence of failure, and if it does fail, they will get up and do it again. So I am not like that, but my father certainly was, he had to borrow a lot of money, money he didn’t have… he had to sell my Mum’s jewellery, which my Mum never let him forget, so… and on a chance to come here and make a success of it. So when he got here, I guess it was the cold light of the winter, there were twenty people living in one house, doing night shifts and so on, so the*
bed was always warm, you know...sort of thing, and share cooking and all of
that, so it was just go out, earn money, sleep, and then send it back to the
family back home, and it want until about 10 years later that the rest of the
family could come, so I was the first, with my Mum, but his job was purely
whatever was available, (I10, Indian born business person and entrepreneur)

Santarelli and Vivarelli (2006: 13-14) suggest that research on
entrepreneurship should take into account psychological attitudes such as
desire to be independent, fear of becoming unemployed, frustration in
previous job in order to understand the ‘...kind of attitude which can be
defined as a “try and see” bet...’ that entrepreneurs take when establishing
new ventures. They postulate that in this view, ‘...new founders – mainly
driven by a personal search for autonomy and job satisfaction - “visit” a
sectoral niche searching for business chances; later, they discover whether
their entry decision was right or wrong and may decide to exit.’ (Santarelli and
Vivarelli 2006: 13-14). The evaluation of the psychological characteristics that
define motives of some entrepreneurs ties into Hemingway’s 2005 study on
personal values as a catalyst for entrepreneurship. She suggests that values
may act as a driver for entrepreneur’s behaviour, paying particular attention to
the existing debate on moral agency contextualised within a field of corporate
social responsibility. Sonny Nwankwo (2005) addresses characterisation of
Black African entrepreneurship in the UK observing that many ‘...Black
Africans embarked on entrepreneurship more to escape ethnic penalties than
a strategic response to the structure of environmental opportunities.’ (2005:
120). Nwankwo (2005: 120) posits that ‘...this “escapist mindset” has meant
that inadequate initial preparations have tended to characterise the small
businesses they operate.’ Here, it is argued that the restrictive categorisation
of entrepreneurial tendencies, which has been proliferated through academic
literature has tended to offer blunt conclusions to definitions and actions of
migrant entrepreneurs. Nwankwo’s study attempts to disentangle this complex
field and disaggregate discourses perpetuated through public rhetoric and
academic generalisation.
4.2 Entrepreneurship as social and cultural capital

Building on what has been addressed in chapter 3, this section addresses entrepreneurship as a socio-cultural phenomenon rather than a solely individualised, embodied characteristic. Interviewees suggest that entrepreneurship can be fostered and incubated within certain social settings and drawn out through interplay of familial and individual traits that are often sculpted by cultural influences. A representative of a Midlands based Asian business group suggests that entrepreneurship and practice should be addressed in terms of the social, how populations from specific geographies are discursively predisposed to particular activity:

You also need to think about it in terms of social…if you look at family business, because they are more entrepreneurial, some of them could be for over generations, so of them are new…how they operate within India, you will find that there are certain societies that are more entrepreneurial…and you will find that the migrant population within Leicester, more Gujaratis, they come from Gujarat in Indian, which is more prone to being entrepreneurial. Punjab, so if you go back to Southall and Wembley and those sort of areas, you will find that they are more…they are again more entrepreneurial……. Even within the migrant population there is big thing about who has come and you look at Leicester population for example, more Gujaratis from the Western part of India. So it is more of survival initially, and the psyche that we are business lead, and another thing that happens within these communities in India or the UK, they work because they are all family businesses and they all work as a family business so the head of the family whoever that is….is the head of the business, and business decisions are not taken without consulting with the head of the family, …it kind of…you will find that there is a pattern there. (I19, representative of a Midlands based Asian business group)

The role of family is important to acknowledge within the field of entrepreneurship studies, with many migrant ventures either relying upon transnational connections with family for knowledge spill-over effects, or run alongside existing ventures in the entrepreneur’s country of origin,. Lumpkin
et al. (2010: 241) posit that some family businesses provide an environment that fosters entrepreneurial activities (Aldrich and Cliff 2003; Rogoff and Heck 2003), on the other hand, there is an argument that positions family businesses as risk averse, reluctant to innovate and slow to change (Kets de Vries 1993; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007; Naldi et al. 2007). Lumpkin et al. suggest that entrepreneurial behaviour has been associated with strong performance among firms in many contexts (Rauch et al. 2009), and there is great interest in whether family controlled businesses might benefit from being more entrepreneurial. In this context, a representative of Birmingham City Council suggests that a personal narrative of entrepreneurship can sculpt the migrant’s economic activity. This is particularly relevant in the West Midlands, with ‘…a long history of inward migration.’ (Brown et al. 2009: 47) and a generational thickness of migrant socio cultural composition:

…there are people with entrepreneurial skills and talent, and entrepreneurial families and entrepreneurial history who go round from one country to another to precisely, and this is what I found in my thesis, I found several things, one of which was the intention… where you found the motivation to go to a country to start up a business that was very strong evidence that these were entrepreneurial people and that means that they deliberately went into different countries for that purpose. Large majority of course went to improve their economic livelihood, which means working in the labour market, but there were others who possessed certain entrepreneurial qualities… (I4, representative of Birmingham City Council)

An Indian born business person and entrepreneur suggests that the culture of entrepreneurship differs across space, with Indians being innately entrepreneurial, due to survival and the necessity to conduct economic activities outside of traditional labour market scenarios:

I mean in India, pretty much everybody is an entrepreneur… everybody’s making money, got to find some way of making some money… some of the… lot of farmers there, cant make ends meet, get a college education and become a teacher, or open a shop, or whatever, very much go out and make
Basu and Altinay suggest that Asian migrant entrepreneurship in the UK is aggregated to the extent that cultural differences are ignored and this dearth of culturally, and spatially specific research is restricting the scope of geographers to understand the subtle processes associated with these phenomena. They suggest that until the 1990s, studies focused on overarching groups, or a single community like the Gujarati Patels (Lyon 1972). Basu and Altinay (2002: 5) posit that recent studies on non EEA migrants have compared the entrepreneurial activities of different groups in the UK (Modood 1992; Rafiq 1992; Metcalf et al. 1996; Basu 1998; Basu and Goswami 1999; Borooah and Hart 1999; Smallbone et al. 1999; Brown 2000). Modood (1992) asserts that Asian business success in Britain is really an Indian success story. Metcalf et al. (1996) support this suggestion, finding that ‘...Pakistanis are less successful than Indians in self-employment because of socio-economic and cultural factors, for example, the lack of formal skills, education, and savings, lack of family loans on favourable terms and the influence of religion, which prohibits the payment interest on (bank) loans.’

Migrant entrepreneurship was viewed by interviewees as transformative as seen in the quote below. It is often used as a proxy measure for the regeneration of previously neglected spaces (Sahin et al 2012; Ma and Wu 2012; McFarlane 2012). Anderson (2000) posits that in locations where capitalistic relations are less robust, such as depleted communities, the entrepreneurial process may adapt and manifest itself differently. Johnstone and Lionais (2004: 217) address the spaces of ‘depleted communities’, suggesting that ‘...they are a persistent feature of late capitalism.’ They (2004: 217) suggest that these depleted communities are ‘...areas that have lost much of their economic rationale as space, while retaining high attachments and social relations of place.’ Conditions in depleted communities can limit possibilities for traditional development, though entrepreneurial responses are not similarly constrained (Johnstone and Lionais 2004). Johnstone and Lionais (2004: 217) argue that depleted communities can act as hosts to a
unique form of enterprise that combines good business practices with community goals. They refer to this as ‘...community business entrepreneurship and argue that it is similar to, but distinct from, the traditional entrepreneurial process.’ Within the setting of the depleted community, the entrepreneurial process can be modified to pursue community goals, thereby creating new opportunities and making new forms of development possible (Johnstone and Lionais 2004). This idea of spatial transformation through migrant entrepreneurship is illustrated by a senior representative of the London Chambers of Commerce and Industry; he outlines the impact of Indian entrepreneurs to areas of North London and the East and West Midlands:

...they came with entrepreneurial skills and aptitude and as a result they used those skills to actually start up in business and often ... you know... sort of transforming certain areas that have been earmarked for demolition... (I4, senior representative of the London Chambers of Commerce and Industry)

Further to this, a representative of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s policy team suggests that the impacts that migrant entrepreneurs have on society and national business culture are positive and should be encouraged. As Interviewee 6 suggests, learning from other countries that have a greater sense of entrepreneurship is important for the future of UK competitiveness. This builds on the idea of a tripartite synthesis of the entrepreneurial mindset, with society, culture and the individual. The idea of entrepreneurship as social and cultural is enforced by the mutual constitution of spatially specific, though often hybridised entrepreneurial landscapes:

...there is an entrepreneurial culture that exists in this country but we have an awful lot to learn in terms of practices from other countries, so yes, also we have places like India, they are extremely entrepreneurial, what you want individuals across any level learn best from their peers and learn best by being pushed by them and the policy that actively discourages entrepreneurship is quite frankly stupid... in terms of engendering a culture of entrepreneurship, is A) Good, B) good for society and C) does bring
significant economic benefit in terms of you have a creator of wealth from one individual, they employ individuals, pay tax etcetera, employ other individuals, and it goes on. We want that culture that says we want world leading businesses and entrepreneurs to establish themselves here… anything that dissuades that culture from taking route is stupid… (I6, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

However, it was found, counter to the transformation argument, that the dynamics of exclusion have engendered a greater sense of entrepreneurial spirit in some communities, a representative of Birmingham City Council suggests that some entrepreneurs feel ‘othered’ in the UK and unable to participate in mainstream economic activities, thus pushing them into self employment:

…the dynamics of exclusion has actually engendered a greater entrepreneurial spirit in some of these communities and you can actually see specific patterns of concentration geographically as well as occupationally in different fields of enterprise and if we understand that then I think you could start looking at something that has happened before then, (I4, representative of Birmingham City Council)

A representative of an Asian business group based in the Midlands suggested that the idea of incremental innovation in India sculpts the entrepreneurial process of migrants. This is conceptually known as of ‘jugaad’ innovative practice (Jain and Singal 2010; Birchnell 2011; Radjou et al. 2012), a term applied to a creative or innovative idea providing a quick, alternative way of solving or fixing a problem, which has to be used because of lack of resources is key in understating contemporary incarnations of this sentiment. The idea of entrepreneurship for survival is reiterated by this interviewee, as well as findings around the engrained entrepreneurship in the Indian psyche, which is translated to the UK context in mobile populations:

From the India side of things, this word [name] came out with this thing called the bottom of the pyramid approach… …From a migrant population, that
Indian, that psyche, you are always trying to incrementally innovate, something... or find a solution, it doesn't matter what strand of society you are, that business side of things, how do I bargain, how do I find a deal, how do I ... ways to make more money I think that is engrained into the Indian psyche. So when you have a migrant population, two things, one is that they have that psyche, and the other is the survival... (I19, representative of an Asian business group based in the Midlands)

The cultural heritage of entrepreneurship stems from a number of socio economic conditions; this is transferred to the UK, and embodied in human capital as a source of spill-over knowledge. A representative of CBI India suggests that some Indian entrepreneurs are obliged to be entrepreneurial in the UK as a result of poor employment prospects, rather than the culture of entrepreneurship in the country of origin:

I think some Indians do, I think the Gujarati's came here, via East Africa are, they have finished with their own countries and generally come and take over... vast swathes of the economy... and they are probably the exception, so [muffled] or down South to the Tamils... certainly the [muffled]... I don't think that they are by nature more entrepreneurial than anyone else, they might be obliged to be entrepreneurial because there aren't proper jobs about... but that is different. And I say all of that because at that point you have to ask yourself the question, you know, if we are looking for entrepreneurs in this country, is the Indian the right person to come here and do it? I mean my prejudice is broadly yes... because they are looking for somewhere to go and they may as well come here as go to France or America or Australia, but it bears thinking about, why Indians are entrepreneurial and how genuinely good will they be here... (I50, CBI India)

A representative of the Black Country Asian Business Association and board member on the National Asian Business Association suggests that the cultural tendencies for entrepreneurship by first generation migrants become lesser through generational detachment (Andersson and Hammarstedt 2010). This may be as a result of cultural assimilation to the host country (Haller et al.
2011; Ndofor and Priem 2011; Portes and Rivas 2011), as well as knowledge acquisition around issues of employment and mainstream economic pathways:

Okay interestingly I would say that is now beginning to change and more ... I am talking about second, third British Asians now have a proclivity to go towards the professions, as well as being entrepreneurial, I think that earlier generations were forced through lack of job opportunities to be entrepreneurial, but that is changing. Migrants are important, as part of their DNA they have a very entrepreneurial streak, but I wouldn’t say that the third generation, is as ... as a priority they are moving into the professions. (I53, representative of the Black Country Asian Business Association and board member on the National Asian Business Association)

4.3 Summary

In summary, entrepreneurship has been presented as an under defined concept with a dearth of attention paid to process and individuals, yet there are multiple stand points on its conceptualisation. As Low and Isserman (2013: 2) suggest, the literature yields

‘...no generally accepted definition or measure of entrepreneurship (Malecki 1993; Casson 2003; Iversen, et al. 2008; Goetz et al. 2010) and measuring entrepreneurship at a sub-national level is particularly difficult...’

Here, a definition for entrepreneurship is proposed that encompasses both individual and cultural aspects of enterprising activity across space and time. Entrepreneurship in the context of highly skilled migration is an economic and socio cultural process conducted within and across borders by risk taking and opportunistic individuals (or groups) in order to achieve a desired aim which often involves, but is not limited to capital gains.
This definition is built from exploration of academic literature and analysis of empirical data. Entrepreneurs were seen as risk takers, in this sense Rae (2009: 137) suggests that entrepreneurship is ‘...the pursuit of opportunity regardless of the consequences', is a privileged instrument of liberal market economics worldwide. Entrepreneurship is seen as different to other forms of economic activity is a discourse reproduced through academia as well as in everyday life, with great value socio cultural placed on entrepreneurship. As Gartner (1985: 696; see Hornaday and Aboud 1971; Brockhaus 1980a; Carland et al. 1984) suggests that ‘The major thrust of most entrepreneurship research has been to prove that entrepreneurs are different from non-entrepreneurs...’ Entrepreneurs tend to be young and unattached, and facilitate natural and organic economic development. They tend to be catalysts for systemic restructuring of existing markets and the opening up of new or unexplored opportunities. This links into Eckhardt and Shane’s (2003) suggestion for necessary conditions of opportunity structure and entrepreneurial engagement for grass roots economic growth. Entrepreneurship is often used as a survival mechanism in the host country, taking into account psychological attitudes of migrant entrepreneurs such as desire to be independent, fear of becoming unemployed, frustration in previous job in order to understand the ‘...kind of attitude which can be defined as a “try and see” bet...’ (Santarelli and Vivarelli 2006: 13-14) that entrepreneurs take when establishing new ventures.

Finally, the conceptualisation of entrepreneurship as a hybridisation of culture and society was examined. Staeyert and Katz explore and reflect upon the implications of how to conceive entrepreneurship when considered as a societal rather than an economic phenomenon. This argument was expressed as ethnicity, culture and superdiversity, family, spaces of entrepreneurship, community transformation and exclusion dynamics were addressed in relation to empirical data on how entrepreneurship is comprised and defined. The suggestion that cultural tendencies for entrepreneurship by first generation migrants become lesser through generational detachment (Portes et al. 2009; Andersson and Hammarstedt 2010), outlines the temporal and cultural dynamics of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is a socially and culturally
embedded set of interlinking phenomena, which constitutes and in turn is impacted by spaces of engagement. The complexity of defining entrepreneurship and migrant entrepreneurship has been presented. In outlining key debates around the nature of entrepreneurship, arguments will be theoretically developed in proceeding sections and empirically grounded through data from participants engaged in entrepreneurial activity in the UK.
5. Policy, migration and enterprise

This chapter addresses how non-EEA highly skilled entrepreneurial migration is incentivised in the UK, how this relates to place and engagement of highly skilled migrants in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape. Looking at highly skilled migration through a policy lens, we see the barriers to the use of Tier 1 visas and the mixed experiences of highly skilled migrants’ in their temporary movements to the UK to participate in entrepreneurial activities. The chapter shows where more could be done to support highly skilled migration through the Tier 1 route, and highlights the four pillars of current Tier 1 policy – Legitimacy and Abuse, Funding and Investment, Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Measuring success. The Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa is relatively new in its life cycle, and more needs to be done to understand where there are problems and what can be done to make the visa work in a more effective way, for both promotion of entrepreneurship, management of highly skilled migration and understanding the role of migrant entrepreneurs in the UK.

The UK’s migration policy landscape for entrepreneurs will be evaluated, looking at policy routes that entrepreneurs are discursively channelled into for instance, the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa and alternative routes through the policy landscape such as the non-points based Sole Representative visa. The agency exercised by migrant entrepreneurs in negotiating structures of migration policy showed that the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa does not work in the best interests of all migrants, with policy makers and other stakeholders suggesting that the visa is not functioning as intended. Migration policy was found to control and manage entrepreneurial migration to the UK, without providing a direct incentive for entrepreneurs to do start or relocate business interests.

5.1 Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa

It was found that changes to Tier 1 policy have defined the highly skilled migration policy landscape over the past 6 years since the introduction of the points based system in 2008. With the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa launched in
2010, key issues have included closing down loopholes, development of satellite institutional structures and services (such as venture capital regulation, funding mechanisms and advisory networks within and outside of central government control), and management of validation (extension criteria and business concept, from January 2013). Mulvey (2010: 437) postulates: ‘...the way that policy is made plays an important role in how it is subsequently received.’ He suggests that not only the policies, but ‘...the symbols and rhetoric that accompanied policy-making...’ are important factors in influencing how policy impacts immigration trends and experiences. The political climate in central government, stemming from electoral and party political activity is reflected in the institutional culture of government departments such as UKBA, Home Office and UKTI (Hammar 2001; Epstein and Nitzan 2006). The ‘mood music’ (I27), as one participant suggested, played by governmental institutions is tantamount to determining the impact and context of policy reform (Freeman 1995).

5.1.1 Legitimacy and abuse

It was found that issues around legitimacy of participants and abuse of the migration policy system were problematic areas of Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa operations. Anderson 2009: 408; see Hardt and Negri 2009; Linebaugh and Rediker 2000) suggests that ‘...the control of movement, its channelling and endless categorisation, is in part a manifestation of state relations to both capital and labour...’ (High value migrants are viewed differently to other economic migrants, there is a discourse of exceptionalism, as Blinder (2013: 3) posits ‘...attitudes are more positive toward high-skilled immigrants in the US (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), and, in Britain, toward migrants in particular skilled occupations such as doctors and nurses, or those with the means to support themselves (Crawley 2005, German Marshall Fund 2011).’ Tannock (2009: 251) posits that Tier 1 workers are defined as the world’s best and brightest: ‘...they stand (allegedly) at the top of a global meritocracy, clearly superior to what can be found domestically in the native-born workforce.’ (2009: 251). He goes on to suggest that this is in keeping with ‘...meritocratic ideology,’ that these immigrants are granted extraordinary
rights and privileges by virtue of their superior talents and/or achievements (Tannock 2009; Gafner and Yale-Loehr 2010).

In the Entrepreneur route, the potential recycling of money by the applicant from a funding source in order to obtain the visa was, until recent changes, unaccounted for in policy documentation. This entails holding the required sum of money in a personal bank account for the required period of time for UKBA checks to be performed on its validity, then returning the money to the funding source when the application is approved. This loophole may have been utilised by applicants or prospective migrants who do not have sufficient funds, to borrow money from individuals or financial institutions, which may be returned after the visa is granted. One participant suggested that issues around transparency and monitoring money movement hinder the validation process, and may result in abuse:

…it would appear that, as in all routes there is some money recycling, so it would show in one person’s bank account for the purpose of the visa and then it would be transferred straight to someone else’s bank account to get their visa, as I say without a full investigation into each individual it is very hard to actually clarify what is happening… More often than not, it was money that they had either borrowed or was in their possession before they applied for the visa. (I13, representative of the UKBA Business and Investment Team)

UKBA ‘Attributes for extension’ of the Entrepreneur visa demand that migrants have invested, or had invested on their behalf, ‘…not less than £200,000 (or £50,000 if, in your last grant of leave, you were awarded points for funds of £50,000) directly into one or more businesses in the UK.’ (Home Office 2013: 13). It was suggested by the same participant, that extension procedures would be problematic should investment not be met, as many migrants employing the strategy of money recycling:

…at the end of the three years you would have trouble getting a different visa or getting an extension on the entrepreneur visa, you would then have to choose a different route, so if you are a genuine entrepreneur and you have
the money to succeed and you want to do that, either with £50,000 with a backer or £200,000 by yourself, and you want to make your life in the UK, the incentive is that you have got to meet the rules, so there is the incentive to be an entrepreneur. If your incentive is to milk the system, then you will find another way to get round, not meeting the rules. (I13, representative of the UKBA Business and Investment Team)

It was established by another participant that abuse may be endemic within the Entrepreneur visa policy system. At the time of interviewing, the sum of £200,000 did not have to be the same money invested over the three year period granted:

Well, UKBA I think are quite concerned about the fact that there may well be abuse… it is very difficult to track that speculation in that sort of position. I think there is general agreement, particularly between the Home Office and UKTI that the entrepreneur route is not working in the way that we would like. And UKBA are somewhat hamstrung by their lack of funds, they have had quite a reduction in their actual budget, but my view is that if you want to make that route secure, then you need to make sure that the 200K that is demonstrated as being available at the beginning of the process, is the same 200K that is being invested,… (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)

From 31 January 2013, changes to the Entrepreneur visa were put in place, UKBA state that where they have concerns, they ‘… may ask you [Entrepreneur visa applicant] to demonstrate that the funds you have used to apply remain available to you beyond the date of your application. The funds must continue to be available to you until they are spent by your business or businesses. ‘Available to you’ means that the funds must be: (1) in your own possession; or (2) in the financial accounts of a UK incorporated business of which you are the director; or (3) available from the third party or parties named in your application (if applicable).’ (Home Office 2013). Further to these financially directed changes of 31 January 2013, additional measures to validate business concept and ideas at application stage, accordingly UKBA suggest that they are in effect introducing ‘…a genuine entrepreneur test
which will give UK Border Agency caseworkers the ability to test the credibility of suspicious applicants…’ (Home Office 2013). UKBA suggest that these changes have been made ‘…in response to evidence that the route is being targeted by applicants seeking to abuse the Immigration Rules.’ (UKBA 2013).

On 30 January 2013 Mark Harper (Former Immigration Minister) made a statement about the rationale behind these policy alterations:

… the Entrepreneur route is now being targeted by applicants seeking to abuse the immigration rules. There is strong evidence that funds to prove eligibility are being re-cycled amongst different applicants and that artificial businesses are being created. We need to tighten the current rules to allow for a meaningful assessment of the credibility of an applicant for this route… I am therefore acting promptly to tackle this abuse, without damaging the legitimate applicants who are important to our economic growth… We are vigilant and will take swift action where we see evidence of abuse. At the same time, we will protect genuine entrepreneurs and continue to encourage them to invest in the UK where they will be made welcome. (Mark Harper 2013).

Though these changes were seen as positive for many participants (in findings from interviews conducted post January 2013), it was suggested that UKBA do not have the funding, or expertise to follow through on the validation aspects of enacted changes:

…the UKBA doesn’t have capability to assess whether a business idea is good or not, I make no judgement whether they should or they shouldn’t, but they openly admit that is not what they are good at… and they don’t have the time frankly, to wade through business plans to make a commercial decision on whether to let a person in, so they have a tick box protocol, have you got this much money, is it held in a regulated… have you forged the documents or not?... yes, yes, no, then you can come in and that is the way that they work… (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)
The positivist nature of the PBS is being denuded in the reintroduction of decision making processes, the grey area of migration policy. This is in stark contrast to the motivation behind the abolition of over 80 former routes, pre-PBS, as Brau (2011: 14) suggests ‘...the PBS replaced a previously complex and subjective system with a standardized process that would, in theory, be easier both for applicants as for the deciding government.’ She develops this, postulating that rationale behind the PBS is that migration, ‘...albeit managed migration that would also secure borders and prevent abuses to the system, [and] is beneficial to the UK both economically and culturally. The government has come to rely more substantively on outside stakeholders, a premise of the introduction of the PBS in 2008, as Dobson and Salt (2009: 127) state, ‘The processes by which the points based system is being made operational rely heavily on the active participation of diverse stakeholders. Employers who wish to sponsor workers under the PBS must first obtain a licence.’ The integration of outside stakeholders into the migration policy system, including migrant management was referred to by one participant, with comments around establishing a president for sponsorship within the Entrepreneur route:

There has been a suggestion that I think [name of company], they have like an entrepreneur route into their business, where the entrepreneur comes in for four months and they give them help and support and mentoring and help them grow their business, help them either to get investment, or not even need investment because they have generated that themselves. And at the end of that four month term, you have got a professional entrepreneur set up ready to go, and their was talk of bringing in companies like [name] who maybe would sponsor the entrepreneur for a period of time, so the prospective entrepreneur visa to be changed slightly to be, you can have a prospective entrepreneur visa if you go to one of these companies, and they act as not a sponsor issuing a COS, for working, but more of a, I vouch for this person... (I13, representative of the UKBA Business and Investment Team)
As suggested, increased business validation and the introduction of sponsorship dominates rhetoric around alleviating potentially high levels of abuse in the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa:

…well if you look at the routes that are deemed successful, involve sponsorship, so they have taken the responsibility away from the border agency staff, so it still sits with the border agency, but through an intermediary, a business or a university, someone is keeping tabs on someone else… and I am not saying that’s the answer but I am saying that this constant reference point for the migrant, enables the tracking and therefore cuts down on abuse, (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)

When questioned about the plausibility of this concept, businesses, such as the investment firm whose representative was interviewed stated that in theory, incubating entrepreneurs could work for them provided the ideas that the immigrant entrepreneur brings supplement existing business activity:

I21 … I think there would have to be a business reason to do, so if somebody said that I have a great idea about this new product, or evaluate the range of products that we have, come into the business and understand the business and then I will let you know what my idea is, or you know,… but there would have to be… I don’t think that we would say, yes, come in, we will house you for six months while you… if there was no value, why would you do it? I think it would need to be relevant, so if someone has an idea for a financial or asset management company then the business may see value in that… then potentially you use that six months for the individual to understand the business and understand it in that way, and use it for their proposal… … (I21, representative of multinational company)

The adaptation of the route for the purposes of validating legitimacy of applicants came up throughout interviews with national government representatives from UKBA, UKTI and members of Parliament. How the route is manipulated and the success of changes implemented from 31 January
2013 and their impact on the validation of migrant entrepreneurs is yet to be seen.

5.1.2 Funding and investment

The availability and access to sources of funding and investment was of importance to many of the entrepreneurs interviewed. As suggested, Tier 1 Entrepreneur policy demands high capital availability, to be validated on application. The levels of capital demanded may prove unfeasibly high for many immigrant entrepreneurs, taking into account macro-economic factors such as exchange rates and barriers to the transnational free movement of money. Koser and Salt (1997) suggest that many countries have actively opened up to inflow of foreign labour expertise due to the flows of foreign investment that often accompany skilled migrants. This has been particularly relevant to developing countries (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia and China) to adopt a more open position with regard to skilled labour immigration. In Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand, foreign firms are allowed relatively easy access to foreign skilled manpower (Pang 1993, Koser and Salt 1997). Hatton and Williamson suggests that we live in a world where ‘…trade policies are liberal and immigration policies are restrictive.’ (2006: 3). He suggests that a paradox is apparent in contemporary policy, this is based on the argument that immigration and import restriction should go together, and Hatton and Williamson (2006) posit that they never have. There are two levels of funding on the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa, the £200,000 route and the £50,000 route. A representative of UKTI suggested that these were industrially specific sub routes, this does not ties into UKBA policy lines, yet encompasses the tech focus:

And then there is the entrepreneur visa, you may know, there are two types, there is the standard entrepreneur visa, where you need £200,000 and then there's the tech, I don't know what the official name for it is, but it is basically the high tech entrepreneur for which you need £50,000… (I29, UKTI Brazil)
The first of the sub routes, the £200,000 investment option, requires available investment provided by the entrepreneur in a validated financial institution, as UKBA state on their website, the money may be evidenced as within or outside of the UK, preferentially treating UK held investments and the funds may be held over a number of accounts. The bodies of literature within geography addressing the transnational mobility of capital tends to focus on social and cultural capital movements, often ignoring the geographies of international financial flows. Tolciu (2011: 409) offers a perspective with which migrant entrepreneurs are viewed as first and foremost economic actors, ‘…who predominantly understand their ethnic social capital as a strategic, economic resource for action.’ This acknowledgement of the economic primacy behind entrepreneurs’ many decision making processes, supported by the information and backing from socio cultural connections is progressive, tying into arguments presented here. A representative of UKTI suggests that the £200,000 route is the simplest option, though citing the recycling of money as a viable option here:

… the quickest and easiest way to get a visa as an entrepreneur is to borrow £200,000, put it in the bank, apply for a visa and then give it back. And as long as you invest £200,000 over the three years, it doesn’t have to be the same £200,000, any £200,000… you get to keep your visa. (I18, UKTI)

For the second of the sub routes, the £50,000 investment option, the money must be provided by a venture capital firm, seed funding competition, UK government department or devolved government department only. UKBA require validation of funds, suggesting a recent letter from an accountant confirming the amount of money made available to the entrepreneur. The £50,000 route is more complex than the £200,000 option, with multiple pathways for seeking and managing funding and investment, as a UKTI representative explains, the route is not working as intended:

…It doesn’t work, and this is one of the issues, the 50K route is marred with just being a non-workable route, so … there are three options, you either have 50K from a UK government department, including now a devolved … from the
13th of December [2012], from the devolved administration. The circumstances under which any UK government department would pay a company that doesn’t currently exist in the UK any money at all, I’ve yet to see, so that I think we can pretty much safely assume, is a non-starter. Venture capitalists as a rule don’t give 50K to anybody, because it is not enough money. And of the UKTI endorsed seed funds, none currently provide £50,000 of funding, so it is almost impossible to establish a company under that route. There is one UKTI endorsed seed fund that has just come off, who will be offering £50,000… but … you can switch from Tier 4 student to 50K route, but from the 13th December you won’t be able to switch into the 200K route. You can switch from post study work into an entrepreneur route with your own £50,000 and it doesn’t have to come from one of those sources, (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)

The movement from Tier 4 and Post Study Work (PSW) routes into the Entrepreneur route suggests that the transition from student to entrepreneur or graduate worker to entrepreneur is being encouraged. The removal of transitory path from Tier 4 Student to entrepreneur may suggest another tightening of policy around the use and recycling of money for purposes of abuse and illegitimacy. It was suggested by Iredale in 2001 that changes to the Australian migration policy system to facilitate the transfer of temporary business and student visa holders to permanent entry visas were due to the risk of these skilled categories becoming a drain on the welfare state through unemployment. In the UK, the abolition of the PSW route has incited criticism (Warren et al. 2013). It There are concerns about the impact of specific regulatory changes,

‘…in particular, the closure of the Tier 1 Post Study Work (PSW) route, reduced entitlement of international students to work in the UK and more stringent Higher Education Institution (HEI) accreditation procedures (APPG Migration, 2012).’ (Warren et al. 2013:4).

Advice for entrepreneurs and companies on potential routes most suited to their specific needs is often provided by UKTI advisors, whether UK or
internationally based. Understanding the geographies of visa application is integral to understanding the mobility and migration trends of entrepreneurs. The transnational web of UKTI advice is often administered through the British Consulate, British Embassy or governmental services in the country of origin. Access to information on funding opportunities, rhetoric around most workable routes and experiences of those that are working or being processed through these hubs may impact the decisions that potential migrants make when applying. For example, in Brazil, it was suggested that the £50,000 route is inaccessible through UK funding sources:

…the problem is, to get that £50,000 entrepreneur visa, the £50,000 has to come from a number of named sources, it has to be a British Angel investor, or it has to come from the Technology Strategy Board, I can’t remember who else, Regional Growth Funds, all those kind of things and it is extremely difficult in practice for a foreign entrepreneur to get funding from any of those sources to be quite honest. To get £50,000 from one of those sources, at least from Brazil is a non-starter that said, the other one sounds more complicated than it is. (I29, UKTI Brazil representative)

A Mumbai based representative of London and Partners, the official promotional organisation for London concerned with attracting and delivering value to business, students and visitors (London and Partners 2013), suggested that they have a role in assessing and evaluating business plans, strategy and impact of business proposition in relation to doing business in London:

…we have two Indian offices, one on the east coast, one on the West coast, we have offices in China… so overseas, we talk to prospective companies identifying and understanding their business plan, what impact they are looking to have [muffled] and accordingly, London and Partners want to take a concentrated approach, so setting up in London is not something that every company is looking at, but every company wants to be associated with London, (I38, London and Partners, Mumbai)
The UKBA overseas network consists of 6 regions: Africa, Americas, Asia-Pacific, Euro-Med, South Asia, and Pakistan and the Gulf (UKBA 2013). It is suggested that following a restructure which began in 2007,

‘...the overseas network operates on a 'hub and spoke' model [within] each region there are a number of visa application centres ('spokes') where people can submit their visa applications, supported by fewer decision-making centres ('hubs') where we decide those visa applications.' (UKBA 2013).

Risse-Kappen (1999: 7) suggests that ‘Domestic structures and international institutions are likely to interact in determining the ability of transnational actors to bring about policy changes.’ This ties into what Keck and Sikkink term transnational advocacy networks, where ‘...these interactions and structured in networks, which are increasingly visible in international politics. Some involve economic actors and firms. Some are networks of scientists and experts whose professional ties and ideas underpin their efforts to influence policy.’ (1999: 89). Here, this concept will be adapted; the networked institutionalisation of migration policy on a global scale forms a backdrop for agency and negotiation by the prospective immigrants that co-constitute the policy system. This draws upon Giddens’ expression of the mutual dependency, rather than opposition, of human agency and social structure (Wright 1995: 771; Giddens 1976; 1977; 1979). Goss and Lindquist (1995) highlight the institutionalization of networks in their study of migration in the Philippines. Wolfel (2005: 2) suggests that their approach conceptualizes individual migrants as knowledgeable agents undertaking action within pre-established institutions with recognized rules, tying into the premise of structuration theorisation. Accordingly, the networks that they are embedded in provide information that helps potential migrants decide if ‘...migration would improve their utility function, or perceived opportunities that would be associated with the move.’

Advisors and potential immigrant entrepreneurs suggested that the levels of investment were too high to feasibly consider movement of business to the
UK; this was especially relevant for early stage and seed businesses. A US entrepreneur explained how he chose to locate his business in Spain due to the restrictive capital requirements of the Entrepreneur visa, after considering migrating to the UK:

*I considered going there, but as an American, you are aware that you need £200,000, which would potentially be do-able with friends and family, or investor money, but it is a lot to ask, and I wouldn't be comfortable doing that. So I am more or less going to try to do the equivalent in Spain which is an ‘autonomo’ it is an annually renewable, it is something that basically the Spanish government has some guidelines and you can go to one office and get one opinion, and go to another city and get another opinion, so it is kind of up in the air, and the lawyers say that you should put in kind of between thirty and sixty thousand Euros in a bank account and you can create the, well I guess you just ask for a visa, and it just depends who you get. Sometimes they allow you to get the work permit, basically the entrepreneurs’ visa as an American, sometimes you don’t, so you just hope you get the right person. For me I am looking at extending my student visa in Spain, for me that is the easiest way to continue working on the business whilst in Spain, I have everything ready to pull the trigger on the SL, which is the basic company structure in Spain, but I haven’t actually done that because I have been waiting on tax advice and the enforcement on loan enforcements, so everything is super complex. (I6, US finance entrepreneur in Spain)*

When asked if he had considered the £50,000 route, the interviewee stated that, though this was equally restrictive due to the low valuation of an early stage company and requisite high equity stake that a venture capital or seed investment firm would take for the funds:

*GW ...you could get £50,000 from a venture capital firm that can be substituted for the £200,000 personally, you have had experience on these venture capital firms, was that not something that you thought about doing?
That is a good point, venture funds though, basically I don’t want to give away equity when I don’t have to and at the moment I have contacts in those venture funds,… I don’t want to ask for investors to come in at this point, because the valuation is much lower than I think it could be post-proof on concept. I can, I think I can get through proof of concept with my own funds, rather than having to put up £200,000 to trial a business, which is a ridiculous sum of money to trial a business … (I7, US finance entrepreneur in Spain)

The management of investment and funding opportunities by entrepreneurs is key in the application process and their subsequent financial development (Bates 1997; Mason and Stark 2004). Hsu suggests that social ties with venture capital firms are fundamental in sculpting investment and funding opportunities: ‘Social ties with VCs have been identified as an important precursor to organizational resource attainment and performance, and so this study analyses the correlates of heterogeneous social links with VCs.’ (2007: 722). As Wang (2008: 2) suggests, this matters for entrepreneurs and seed companies where early stage firms are often endowed with ‘…little legitimacy and few of the resources needed to acquire the information, capital, and skills for survival and growth.’ The sense that the investment required is overly high is again echoed by the representative from UKTI Brazil:

So you need £200,000, which is a bit steep for many of the entrepreneurs that I deal with, taking into account the exchange rates, however, what isn’t very clear on any of the documentation UKBA produce, but what I was able to confirm, was that that £200,000 does not need to be in the UK, so if you have an entrepreneur that has a bank account for his company in Brazil and it has the equivalent of £200,000 in that account, he only has to show that he has access to that account, and that account is, it doesn’t even have to be exclusive, but that it is available for use for the opening of his UK company. He doesn’t need to move that money physically to the UK, so that option actually becomes quite attractive, because as long as he has an account somewhere, access to a bank account somewhere with that money in it, that is all he needs to get the visa. Of course there are checks and that sort of thing, UKBA will not allow you to go to a bank, borrow £200,000, open a bank
Outside factors such as exchange rate, banking structure and geographical location impacts upon the investment process and application advice. This was the case for Mumbai where small companies were ‘priced out’ of an entrepreneur visa in the UK, though it was suggested that they took alternative routes to conduct entrepreneurial activity in the UK, such as the Sole Representative visa:

For smaller companies the entrepreneur visa, I would say in the Indian context is not a favourable thing, because there is a huge funding requirement and you have got to show that I have this amount of funds, that I am going to invest in the UK, so for a small stage company, it becomes very difficult that option, so normally there are other options, you can go for a Tier 2 Sole Representative visa, one of the ... [muffled] you can migrate to the UK, ... entrepreneurship visa is not going to be of much interest in India... (I38, London and Partners, Mumbai)

The high capital requirements of the entrepreneur visa leads one UKTI representative to term the route ‘investor light’, drawing comparison to the Investor route for high-net-worth individuals who want to make a substantial financial investment in the UK. Applicants do not need a job offer to apply in this category. UKBA assess the application based on the ability to invest £1,000,000 in the UK (UKBA 2013). It is suggested by Interviewee 18 that an amended £50,000 route would be more suitable for the managing migrant entrepreneurs:

I think, to an extent UKBA are defining entrepreneurialism in the same way that I would in that, a wannabe start up kind of business and starting with an idea and building it into a business, so to that extent, if you look at the 50K
route, the prospective entrepreneur then leads onto the entrepreneur, and that makes a sensible route, apart from the fact that it can get ... if you allow different mechanism, ... from coming into the UK with a letter saying this person, or this team is coming into the UK with a view to establish a business and you are going to give them 6 months to do that... you then need a separate mechanism to help them fund that, that is a separate conversation around what needs to happen along that route. And that for me is what an entrepreneur typically might be, the 200K route, for me is an investor light, it is an entrepreneur, who is entrepreneurial in spirit, but the business has grown but doesn’t have a million quid, so they have a right to come in and invest 200K, but there is an assumption that they will become an integral part of the company that they invest in… so take on directorship, or a shareholding of some sort, and have influence, which I think is right. This issue is that … we are not incentivising that, at the moment it is come and buy a visa for 200 grand and then in three years’ time we will check to see if you did that, but there is no quality assurance, it is because UKBA can’t or won’t go out mid-way through that process and check that things are… (I18, UKTI Immigration Specialist)

The availability of sub national funding opportunities in the UK was a problematic issue raised by participants, suggestions revolved around low interconnectivity with national migration objectives around entrepreneurship outside of London. For instance, in Birmingham no funding opportunities for migrant entrepreneurs were available:

So migrant entrepreneurship as I said, we can certainly, and if you have got any ideas on Tier 1 visa and that’s legitimate i.e. That they can stay as long as they tick all the boxes, because it might mean that we have to change our mainstream programmes to accommodate them, because at the moment we can’t support them because any grants or assistance that we provide we would ask them are you a permanent resident in the UK, are you a UK citizen… (I4, Birmingham City Council representative)
The West Midlands Strategic Migration Partnership addresses migration issues revolving primarily around community cohesion, belonging and the impact of migrants in the region. They do not tend to address issues around migrant entrepreneurship as prevalently as some of the aforementioned London-based organisations. In Cambridgeshire, the business angel community is highly developed and networked, it is threaded through both the institutional (universities and business groups) and socio cultural fabric of the area. The knowledge embodied by these business angels incentivises many entrepreneurs to choose Cambridge as a destination to establish industrially specific and often niche industries, such as Biotech, Cleantech and wireless communications. In summary, the depth of business interconnectivity, small scale and innovative finance opportunities and knowledge from subregional business people and universities form an environment for effective migrant entrepreneurial incubation.

The spatialities of investment, including business suitability and validity of investment in certain business types, sizes and models were addressed by participants. It was posited that entrepreneurs, as investors, should be assessed not solely on their capital worth and investment prospects, but where they invest and the value that they add to the UK economy:

You could incentivise, you could pick winners, you could focus on sectors, but this goes for the investor route as well, if you want money in the country and that is if you are concerned about then you may as well make that money go somewhere useful… so, … if I came into the UK with £200,000 and invested it in HP, would I really be making a massive difference? But if I could identify that the company that I had chosen wouldn’t be able to take the next step in its evolution without my 200K, I could demonstrate that I am adding real value where others are not… and that is one way of offsetting the perception of a lack of loans to small businesses from the banking sector… (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)

The venture capital landscape in the UK is centred around London as a world leading financial hub and global city. It is suggested that there is a focus on
immigrant entrepreneurs and investors gravitating to London and the management of their movements. This is an overly simplistic perspective of competition theory, addressing the assets and relative strengths of other nations as a destination for business. Interviewee 18, a UKTI Immigration specialist, postulates that rhetoric around attracting migrant entrepreneurs needs to look further than the national boundaries and take into account areas where the UK could increase performance on continental and global scales:

*If you look at venture capital, I don’t believe there are only looking within the borders of England or the UK, and to be honest if there are people looking at supporting the entrepreneurial process, visa or no visa, they are looking across Europe… you don’t need visas, you can come in and set up a business, but that is still a market, so people that are looking for entrepreneurs, are going to look wherever there are the best entrepreneurs. And Israel as you mentioned earlier is a hot bed of innovation around certain technologies and the people that are in that area know that are they are saying no, no, no, come here… I am talking to a company at the moment who have developed a piece of software based on a mobile application, they established it outside the UK, came to London to set up an Head Quarters and have basically decided to onshore everything from outside of Europe, to the UK, it just works better for them… (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)*

In summary, the availability and access to sources of funding and investment was of great importance to many of the entrepreneurs interviewed. There are two investment options within the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa, demanding £200,000 and £50,000 depending on funding source and visa status. Bodies of literature within geography addressing the transnational mobility of capital tends to focus on social and cultural capital movements, often ignoring the geographies of international financial flows. Advisors and potential immigrant entrepreneurs suggested that the levels of investment were too high to feasibly consider movement of business to the UK; this was especially relevant for early stage and seed businesses where credit was often poor and capital resources minimal as prospective migrants. This section has evaluated
investment and funding options associated with the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa, addressing the negotiation of policy and financial application aspects.

5.1.3 Promotion of entrepreneurship

Migration policy, across Tier 1 is concerned with attracting ‘the right people’. Objectifying in terms of financial input to the UK economy is a key measure of the value of migrant entrepreneurs under the Entrepreneur route. The question of resource allocation in attracting these migrants is called into question in relation to incentivising through policy. The schizophrenic nature of the Entrepreneur route is manifest in the disjunction in UKBA and UKTI rhetoric around policy (Atkinson and Coleman 1989). From the perspective of a UKTI representative, policy should focus on attracting and retaining high tech entrepreneurs with limited government resources:

*If we are looking at entrepreneurs outside of the UK, if we have to focus resources, given that we have to focus resource, because we are limited in what we have, you have to focus on, in my view… you have to focus on the ones that bring most value, so you should seek to attract those that are seeking to develop a business that wouldn’t necessarily otherwise be developed by the population that are already here, whether they be migrants who are looking at entrepreneurial routes themselves or the indigenous population, but high value, high growth, employing people and developing technologies that add some value…* (I18, UKTI Immigration Specialist)

Putting the impetus on high technology and high growth firms to perform brings into question the premise of the Entrepreneur visa, and suggests that its creation was established by the need to not only boost the UK’s flagging economic output, but also to pioneer new and innovative technology. When asked whether the Entrepreneur visa as it currently works is appropriate for promoting what this sub set of entrepreneurial activity to be present in the UK, the UKTI representative postulated that more attention should be paid to where the £200,000 or £50,000 investment is made:
… I don’t think it [Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa] specifically excludes good, high quality, high value entrepreneurs… I’ve sat in a room with the case workers who are looking at the applications, and some of the stuff is brilliant and some of it is dross. There are businesses that you think why would we go out of our way to attract people to do that business here? And there is no problem with someone coming in to set up a café, or a shop, or an eBay reseller, or something like that. But that is not principally what an entrepreneurial route is for, and if you look at the 200K route in Tier 1, it is flimsy at best, but the… individual has to invest £200,000, but nobody really gives a stuff in what. Well, why not? (I18, UKTI Immigration Specialist)

The attraction of high technology firms is not unanimous or exclusive. Hart et al. (2009: 1) suggest that high tech companies ‘…drive job creation and aggregate growth in the U.S.’ they find that, while most previous studies have overstated this role, it is nonetheless very important (Hart et al. 2009). This ties into what one UKTI representative suggests:

…we do look at benchmarking and the Border Agency and Home Office do too, but we all look at it from different perspectives. Because it is one think saying, I see these things as being able to shape the entrepreneurs that come in, not shape the entrepreneurs, you know select the entrepreneurs that come in and add greater value, so if you have only got 1000 that are allowed in each year this is what we want…. But actually it is uncapped… so… it doesn’t matter, so it doesn’t matter if you get 100 tea shops in Worcester, as long as you are getting the Intellectual Property as well, and I don’t think that we should worry about that. We are not getting the high end stuff, but what we don’t want to do is unnecessarily narrow the route and make it look more prescriptive and put people off, (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)

Pressures from closure of other areas of migration policy were apparent in decisions to apply to the Entrepreneur visa. With the closure of the Post Study Work route, as previously mentioned, migrants tended to seek alternative routes to remain in the UK. When asked if migration policy serves to promote migrant entrepreneurship one UKBA representative suggested:
Currently - probably not. I think the vision, of what it is changing, I think that it absolutely will, I think we are heading on the right track, if we are working with UKTI that is a massive step. I don’t think that we make it difficult, but I don’t think that it is promoted as well as it could be, although there have been massive rises in the entrepreneur visa since Tier 1 General shut down and since Post Study Work shut down, so we have seen them switching from being anything they want to do as a worker, switching to the entrepreneur…

GW So it does squeeze people into the entrepreneur route…which is fine so long as they are using it for the purposes of being an entrepreneur…

I13 Absolutely, and we wont know that for three years, currently, the current thinking is that, if we are looking at them coming in and these companies being their sponsors then we give them a year… so they get their 6 month visa, their Prospective entrepreneur, they do their internship if you like with these companies and at the end of that six months they can apply for an entrepreneur, but it is only for a year. And after that they have to prove to us that what they were doing is getting better and then we might give them another year, just to make sure, and then give them a three year period, which I think is what the Graduate entrepreneur one does… (I13, representative of the UKBA Business and Investment Team)

The suggestion for greater integration between visa categories in Tier 1 and the Prospective Entrepreneur category signpost change in the administration of the visa, particularly in determining whether the migrant is adding financial value to the UK economy before the three year period. UKBA suggest that the Prospective Entrepreneur category of visitor is for people ‘…who are in discussions with venture capitalists or UK government departments to join, set up or take over - and be actively involved in the running of - a business in the UK. It enables them to enter the UK for a maximum of 6 months so that they can secure funding to meet the financial criteria for Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) of our points-based system.’ (UKBA 2013). Targeting sectors of migration policy where potential entrepreneurs are administered through alternative visas is an option for promoting innovation in high tech fields. One UKBA representative
posits that certain visa groups are more likely to transfer to the Entrepreneur visa than others:

*It is more likely that it is going to be people on Tier 4 or people new into the country that are going to use the entrepreneur visa, people already here and established in Tier 2 or Tier 1, the original highly skilled side, it is very unlikely that those sort of people will switch to the entrepreneur visa.* (I13, representative of the UKBA Business and Investment Team)

There is a disjunction between the motivations of UKTI and UKBA when it comes to promoting migrant entrepreneurship in the UK. UKBA have relatively little ammunition other than the relaxation of existing legislation to encourage a positive perception of policy. On the other hand, UKTI have a plethora of projects and programmes aimed at providing a stable and productive environment for migrant entrepreneurs. The Global Entrepreneur Programme will be addressed as an example of this. Interviewee 18, a UKTI Immigration specialist, suggests that the Global Entrepreneur Programme has become increasingly taken up as a result of changing government position on entrepreneurial migration:

*With the Autumn statement that came out recently, there is an additional incentive now for UKTI to actively promote entrepreneurs and activity, shall we say generally across Tier 1 of the visa system. So UKTI has a programme called Global Entrepreneur Programme where it actively supports a group of entrepreneurs as and when they come in on their radar. There is a proposal that will seek to attract additional entrepreneurs into the UK and my role specifically is supporting companies and entrepreneurs, but anyone on the investment side in accessing information about applying for and going through the visa process.* (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)

UKTI suggest that the aim of the Global Entrepreneur Programme (GEP) is to ‘...attract the world’s best sustainable, early-stage companies and entrepreneurs to set up their global business headquarters in the UK.’ (UKTI
2012). The programme is aimed at non EEA based entrepreneurs and early stage businesses that are considering relocating their business to the UK.

A Serial Entrepreneur and Angel Investor suggested that the UK’s dynamic ecosystem is an important location for global entrepreneurs. He postulated that he would ‘“would certainly recommend the significant help and support the Global Entrepreneur Programme’s team of experts are able to provide technology businesses looking to scale and grow internationally from a UK hub.”’ (UKTI 2012). An executive of Silicon Valley Bank supports this, suggesting that ‘Entrepreneurship has transformed from a local to a global phenomenon and the GEP has developed a highly innovative business model using their own entrepreneurs to help accelerate early-stage technology companies from a UK hub.’ (UKTI 2012). The multiscalar geographies of entrepreneurship are manifest in the cross cutting nature of the Global Entrepreneur Programme. Flint (2003: 627) addresses these phenomena in the context of a burgeoning neoliberalism, he suggests that ‘Political geography is playing a crucial role in investigating globalization as a particular scalar expression of neoliberalization.’ Theoretical engagement with geographical scale illustrates how the global has been constructed to facilitate the circulation of capital. There is also value in empirically elucidating the body of theory through analysis of policy, both in terms of rhetoric and speaking to those on the ground (Smith 2002; Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Furthermore, local initiatives, such as Tech City institutionally are institutionally embedded, in the case this initiative is the manifest territory of Tech City Investment Organisation. In the 2012 Tech City Investment Organisation impact report it is suggested that the government can help grow the Tech City cluster in two ways Firstly, ‘“by ensuring that national policy promotes enterprise and growth. The Entrepreneur Visa, Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme and opening up Government procurement are three examples of action central Government has taken in direct response to concerns expressed by Tech City companies about access to talent and finance.”’ (TCIO 2012). Secondly, Eric Van Der Kleij, Chief Executive of TCIO at the time suggested that ‘“Government can help by attracting inward investment, and supporting companies in the cluster who want to expand into
international markets.’ (Van Der Kleij 2012). Tech City Investment Organisation (TCIO) was set up in April 2011 as part of UK Trade and Investment in order to do so. Interviewee 18 suggests that the promotion of entrepreneurship through policy often boils down to this organisational and institutional backdrop to frame global policy rhetoric:

I guess it does come down to policy, so initiatives like Tech City… that demonstrate that we are focused on entrepreneurs, that we recognised high value and you don’t need to employ vast numbers, it is about the value add… (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)

For many participants the best way of promoting migrant entrepreneurship in the UK was to reduce government barriers. Over the past decade the rhetoric of closure for high skilled and more recently Tier 1 routes has been symptomatic of the wider migration policy landscape, concentrated on accepting the ‘good’, or ‘best and brightest’ immigrants, and rejecting applications from ‘bad’ immigrants. On the ground, categorisation of immigrants is becoming less definite, with systematically embeddedness of a sense of discretion and a reintroduction of grey area in UKBA decision making. This policy shift could be argued to be poorly synchronised with the founding objectivity of the points based system. Though as once participant suggests, this is a necessity when managing the complexities of the entrepreneur and other high value Tier 1 visas:

You could incentivise, you could pick winners, you could focus on sectors, but this goes for the investor route as well… The message is really, really key, and I think that the UK as an entity, the Border Agency, Home Office and UKTI need to not worry too much about people that complain about the visa system, if they are the people that we don’t want here, so if we are making, rightly or wrongly… I make not judgement, but if we are actively choosing to exclude some people from our country, then why are we worrying about them complaining how complex the visa process is, so lets focus on all those that are eligible to get the smoothest ride that they can and making sure that they have an easy ride into the UK… (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)
Tannock (2009) suggests that opening doors to the best and brightest has gone hand in hand with closing doors to other immigrants, as Flynn (2004: 2) postulates, ‘…a virtuous Dr Jekyll to the vicious Mr Hyde,’ of immigration policy.

Participants at national and subnational levels suggested that the removal of barriers was more important for the promotion of migrant entrepreneurship than the establishment of new initiatives:

*I can’t see this government doing anything of that nature, this government is all about removing barriers, it is not about creating new stuff, (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)*

*The other thing is people who wish to come here to do business and set up here, life is still not that easy, when it comes to obtaining visas and getting the transfers, you know getting all the documentation completed…so it is a hindrance. (I2, senior representative of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)*

*… I think government and local authorities and the public sector meddles in these areas at its peril, (I11, senior representative of Cambridgeshire Borough Council)*

Participants postulated that migration policy was a more difficult component of the entrepreneurial landscape to shift, citing changes in fiscal policy and the economic landscape as key measures for promotion of migrant entrepreneurship. In essence, suggesting that if the economic incentives for migrants to come to the UK outweigh the hardships of migration policy, this will act as a beacon to entrepreneurs.

5.1.4 Measuring success

Charloff and Lemaitre (2009: 4) suggest that the supply driven migration systems of Tier 1 have been ‘…showing their limits in recent decades, with
settlement countries finding it more difficult to select for success in the labour market.’ The selection of success and measurement for the purposes of determining leave to remain has been a stumbling block for UKBA in relation to the entrepreneur visa. Where this is particularly relevant is in success measurement prior to the elapsing of the migrant’s three year period to remain. UKBA conducted an internal evaluation of the success of the route, assessing management information and empirical evidence of company activities in the UK, as Interviewee 13 explains:

We took management information on… so a list of the people that had applied for the entrepreneur route overseas and in the UK and we looked at three years ago, so we could evaluate over the past three years how much they have actually contributed to the economy. Because after three years they come for a renewal, so if they applied overseas three years ago it would be about now that they would be applying for their renewal, it is only at the renewal stage that we can understand how many jobs they might have created, if they were successful, how they used their money. I went right through this, so the rules three years ago were similar, there may have been some tweaks to them… (I13, a representative of the UKBA Business and Investment team)

When evaluating success of a migrant entrepreneur their economic contribution to the UK economy is focused on. This ties into the criteria to remain in the UK, with two jobs to be created and the initial funding amount invested (UKBA 2013). Agencies such as the Migration Advisory Committee are advocates of this econometrically driven approach to determining the impact of entrepreneurial migration to the UK (Ruhs and Vargas-Silva 2008; Holt and Macpherson 2010). The rates of success were suggested to be lower than anticipated:

I had high expectations that weren’t met, but speaking to a couple of entrepreneurs when I was with UKTI the other week, their expectation is a lot lower, so they wouldn’t expect more than a 50% success rate. I would have thought that someone coming to the UK with £200,000 or with the minimum
investment but with backing would have been far more successful, because they would have done a lot more research and really understood the market that they were going into before they applied, so I was expecting 75% 80% success rate. The actual entrepreneurs we spoke to said that a 50% success rate would be a good success rate, in actual fact it was far lower than that. (I13, a representative of the UKBA Business and Investment team)

Marsh and McConnell (2010: 564) suggest that ‘Claims that a particular policy has been a ‘success’ are commonplace in political life. However, a few of these claims are justified in any systematic way.’ Here, the measures and definition of success was not clear, there were a number of factors that fed into the UKBA evaluation methodology. Marsh and McConnell (2010: 564) go on to posit that ‘Claims that policies are successful, or not, are implicit, if not explicit, in most discussions of policy.’ Accordingly, Boyne (2003: 212) posits that ‘Academic contributions to the definition of improvement are also, as yet, extremely limited’. Interviewee 13, a representative of the UKBA Business and Investment team, postulates that the information requested in the initial application is not conducive to analysing success (see Appendix 4), however with changes to business validation that were enacted on 31 January 2013 more data may become available in this area. When questioned around areas of success and industrial composition, it was suggested that in contrast to the high tech focus previously mentioned by UKTI representatives, a catering firm employed most people and established high turnover. However, the definition of entrepreneur is called into question (McQuaid 2000). Interviewee 13, a representative of the UKBA Business and Investment team, suggests that the business may not be exemplifying entrepreneurship:

…there are two that spring to memory that were particularly successful, one was a catering business, I think that it was West Indian cuisine, … and that had created about 12 jobs and had grown really well and the turnover was really great, I cant remember what the other one was. But that to me is a traditional entrepreneur, that’s a ‘I’ve come with nothing, I’ve built this business up from scratch and now I’m successful’. I don’t see having some money and taking on someone else’s business as being… I suppose it is
entrepreneurial, but it's not what I would think of if I think of as an entrepreneur. (13, a representative of the UKBA Business and Investment team)

The suggestion of a lower rate of success than anticipated (though anticipated success rates were not gauged systematically) overturns their supposition in this instance. Marsh and McConnell address the literature on this issue, suggesting that non-academic sources skate over the problem and ‘...even the academic literature, which we consider in more depth below, most of which is concerned with the evaluation and explanation of ‘public service improvement’, generally fails to outline and discuss criteria against which success/improvement could be judged.’ (2010: 565).

5.2 Sole Representative visa

The Sole Representative visa is used by migrant entrepreneurs as an alternative route into the UK to conduct economic activities; the details of this visa have been explained in the chapter 2. Negotiation of the migration policy system by migrant entrepreneurs, in picking and choosing visas for optimum return and minimum inhibition contradicts the UK political rhetoric of ‘picking winners’, in fact empirical data would suggest that it is the ‘savvy’ migrant entrepreneurs that embody liberalism and mobility (Freeman 2006). In the survey by Evans et al. (2007), 49.4 per cent of the respondents indicated that they came to the UK to study (with the idea of working) or (openly) to work and save money (Kubal et al. 2011). The agency of these migrants in conducting scoping visits to the UK in turn shapes policy responses to migration (Faist 2000). Interviewee 24, a Brazilian entrepreneur, explains his choices in the visa application process:

So, for my situation when I started studying the possibilities, I found out that there were two possibilities for me, the Entrepreneur visa and also the Sole Representative visa. Actually the Sole Representative visa, I almost ran into it by accident, I was very focused on understanding the entrepreneur visa,
because there were very straightforward conditions to apply, and to get the visa. (I24, Brazilian entrepreneur in London)

A representative of UKTI in Brazil suggests that more entrepreneurs utilise the Sole Representative visa than the Entrepreneur visa. The obligations to the entrepreneur are less demanding and do not impact upon eligibility to remain in the UK following evaluation proceeding the granted three year period. Koser and Salt (1997: 294) suggest that there seems to be ‘…a positive general correlation between skilled labour flows and investment flows…’ The Sole Representative visa encourages these active investment relations and the corporate sculpting of transnational economic ties (Castles and Miller 2005; de Haas 2005). Flexibility within high value and business oriented UK migration policy relies on transparency according to Lowell and Findlay (2001: 19), they postulate that ‘Transparent policy delivers clearly defined promises: migrants and employers must know their obligations and be held responsible, there should be no hidden costs or ways to game the system,’ When asked if ‘…the bulk of the people that you have spoken to on the Sole Representative visa?’ The UKTI Brazil representative stated:

Yes, at least in the initial stages, that is the easiest way for them to come into the UK is on a Sole Representative visa, but there are some things, you have to read the rules of the Sole Representative visa carefully also, because I think the person applying for the visa cannot own more than 90% of the company, so if it is a one man company, or a one man SME then it is very difficult for him to come over on that SR visa. If it is sort of the partner of the guy that owns the company, then that can be done, or the indicated employee of the company, and that remind me of another thing…there is the Global entrepreneur programme that UKTI is also running which is specifically aimed at attracting entrepreneurs, serial entrepreneurs from foreign markets to set up in the UK, the catch is with that, is they are serial entrepreneurs, they are already successful entrepreneurs, so the guy that is starting his first IT company and wants to do it here on the UK doesn’t usually get into the category for that programme which also assists with visas and that sort of things, but the problem that I have had with that programme is that the
successful entrepreneur, that already has one or two successful companies in Brazil is not interested in coming to the UK permanently, and the programme in order to qualify for the programme, you have to move lock stock and barrel, everything to the UK. And so the more successful entrepreneurs, because they are successful, they don’t want to do that. The smaller entrepreneurs, just starting out, they are not quite big enough fish to fit into the category, for the Global entrepreneur programme, and then the really big entrepreneurs in Brazil we have a few of they like a guy called [name] who owns the ... he owns a number of things, a big mining company MBX, there is no way that he would pack up everything and move to the UK. It might be that he sets up additional operations here but not the main one, and in Brazil that has always been a bit of a catch, I am sure that it is a good programme, but in Brazil, not so much because of the way that it has been set up, it doesn’t appeal to the Brazilian investors of that type. (I29, representative of UKTI in Sao Paulo, Brazil)

Interviewee 19, a representative of an Asian Business group in the Midlands, suggested that there is firm economic rationale behind the favoured uptake of the Sole Representative visa over the Entrepreneur visa for many existing businesses:

...nobody who is going to... for example from India, nobody from India is going to sit up one day and say, ‘I want to go to the UK and start a business’ that’s not going to happen. Okay, you have a business back in India that you want to expand, or you want to set up an office or an activity in the UK, or you will say for example, I want to buy up a company in the UK, when I have got enough money, or backing to do it… (I19, Midlands Asian Business Group)

This category, though arguably invoking more stringent business validation checks, is thought of by participants to be less demanding when achieved, whilst in the UK, for extension of leave, leave to remain and permanent residence:
So I was kind over going in that direction, but then one day I think, out of browsing the UK immigration site, I found this visa and the name… the name of kind of made sense to me, I said let’s look at this. And I just realised that it was the perfect visa for my situation because the company has existed for over ten years, established in Brazil, it is active and over the years it has built up a portfolio of clients, and all of a sudden, I thought this is it. It is more flexible than the Entrepreneur visa and it kind of fit our situation perfectly, so that is the one I went after. (I24, Brazilian entrepreneur in London)

The rhetoric of entrepreneurialism and innovation for growth, integrated throughout central government, and filtering through migration policy provides an implicit barrier to the uptake of the Sole Representative visa as uncategorised and non PBS policy. It has been suggested that the application documentation is overly complex, the regulations too severe and the subjectivity of non PBS routes will represent difficulty negotiation:

*It is interesting and I think it is worth mentioning, that some people discouraged me to pursue that visa just because they argued that it is more complex in terms of paperwork and documentation. And I think one of the arguments that I heard was … the person who would analyse it, that kind of visa was more subject to, you know, subjective aspects… and that made me think, but then when I went back to study the visa, I thought, this is exactly our situation, it is not like we are pushing it, it is what it is. So I felt let’s give it a try and if it doesn’t work, we can always come back to plan B. But I can tell you that in the end, even the process itself was… you know there is a lot of documents to out together, but nothing too hard to get, so all of the things that they required, we had, or had easy access to. (I24, Brazilian entrepreneur in London)*

However, Interviewee 29, a representative of UKTI in Brazil, suggests that the Sole Representative visa is simpler in terms of paperwork, yet prospective migrants tend to find temporal aspects of application problematic such as company establishment regulation:
Then we have the Sole Representative visa and the entrepreneur visa, that were the next two sort of options for the companies. The Sole Representative visa though, one has to be careful because it is only valid for companies that are not yet set up in the UK, so the person that would get that visa, would do that in order to come and set up a UK company, and the reason that I mention that is because some of my colleagues in other markets, they are dealing with very proactive guys, and they are waiting for their visa to be processed and they see how easy it is to set up a company in the UK, they can do it online, they go ahead, apply for and get permission to set up their UK company while they are still overseas and then their visa gets turned down, because they have just contravened the terms of their visa, so we always have to tell them if they are interested in the Sole Representative visa, they must not set up the company before they are in the UK, or they will not get the visa. And a number of people have applied to that one, it is the easiest one I think in terms of paperwork. (I29, a representative of UKTI in Sao Paulo, Brazil)

This disjunction in rhetoric and perception is highly geographically and institutionally specific, forms a spatialised politics of perception (MacLaughlin 1998; Rogers 2003). UKBA documentation suggests that officials should seek to establish that the parent company is a genuine commercial enterprise, judged in the round, taking into account the length of time that the company has been established, its turnover, profitability and number of employees, as discussed. Furthermore, UKBA documentation posits: ‘It must be the intention that the business remains centered abroad.’ (UKBA 2013). This is a potential stumbling block for entrepreneurs looking to spearhead corporate internationalisation (O’Farrell and Wood 1996; Westhead et al. 2001) whilst maintaining their commercial hub in their country of origin. UKBA qualify this, in line with the subjectivity of a non-points based approach, by suggesting that it does not mean that they ‘…must refuse an otherwise sound application because of evidence of an intention to make the branch here flourish so vigorously that it might, at some time in the longer term, overshadow its parent company.’ (UKBA 2013). The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) oriented approach that this policy advocates is clear (Acs et al. 2007; Djankov et al. 2008), if a company can contribute economically, and there is no evidence
that they are seeking to abuse the policy system, then they will be granted leave to remain. In addition to this, it is suggested that companies which have been trading for less than twelve months should be required to justify the need to establish an overseas branch in the UK. This statement does not reject the possibility of an early stage company entering the UK; this may be achievable with circumstantial validation based upon micro economic factors.

The application process for the Sole Representative visa proved formative for Interviewee 24, a Brazilian entrepreneur in London, in re-evaluating business direction and plans for internationalization:

That is what I heard initially, I mean, I know that even for the entrepreneur visa, you do have to show a detailed business plan, and what the company should look like and what you plan to do, so I don't even know if that is accurate. But I can tell you that, I guess, in terms of what we already had and what we had to create and what we had to elaborate more to get that visa, I would say that 90% is just getting things together... and then you know, what I realised was that the level of detail in terms of the business plan, versus what we had at that point, it needed some improvement, so we spent some time, which was actually very good for us, because we looked at some aspects more in depth, so it was positive. In the end I can tell you that... in a matter, of 7 to 10 days I was able to put together everything that we needed, so I cannot complain about it, it was very simple. (I24, Brazilian entrepreneur in London)

The positive experience that this entrepreneur had in application and establishment of a subsidiary, or branch of his existing Brazil-based business may have been influenced by additional cultural factors, easing both business decisions and personal upheaval as is often perceptible in global movements. Applicants must be able to demonstrate English language ability, as is the case with the majority of high value visa routes (Hawthorne 2005).

5.3 Summary

This chapter addressed two core questions in this thesis, on how non-EEA highly skilled entrepreneurial migration is incentivised in the UK, how this
relate to place and engagement of highly skilled migrants in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape. Looking at highly skilled migration through a policy lens, we see the barriers to use of Tier 1 visas and the realities on the ground for highly skilled migrants’ temporary movements to the UK to work by participating in entrepreneurial activities. The chapter shows where more could be done to support highly skilled migration through the Tier 1 route, and highlights the four pillars of current Tier 1 policy – Legitimacy and Abuse, Funding and Investment, Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Measuring success. The Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa is relatively new in its life cycle, and more needs to be done to understand where there are problems and what can be done to make the visa work in a more effective way, for both promotion of entrepreneurship, management of highly skilled migration and understanding the role of migrant entrepreneurs in the UK.

We see uniformity of migration policy, and heterogeneous places across the UK, and as such migrants’ entrepreneurial engagement with the place varies depending on facets of the sub national spaces that they are based, and the place-based dynamics of the areas they engage with.

It was found that the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa is not working as intended, where immigration from those that are not entrepreneurial, or not using the visa as intended (as laid out in chapter 6). Reform is being made to the system to take into account abuse and validate legitimate entrepreneurial ideas and applicants, but it is important that policymakers heed the evidence presented in this and other papers, like Nathan (2014) to acknowledge the positive role that migrants play through their entrepreneurial contributions to the economic, social and cultural life of UK Plc.

We have seen, in recent years, that the Points Based System is undergoing a subjective turn, moving away from its initial premise as an objective, black and white application process system. However, the broader rhetoric of closure of the UK migration policy system is pervasive, and is impacting prospective
migrant entrepreneur’s willingness to do business in the UK, alongside economic pressures and competition.
6. The UK’s economic landscape and its role in migrant entrepreneurship

This chapter will outline the significance and experience of the broader economic landscape in sculpting the migration decision for highly skilled entrepreneurs to the UK. There are many economic forces that shape highly skilled migration which play a fundamental role in mobility, but as we know, migrants are not exclusively rational actors and a number of forces play a role in structuring the processes of transnational migration. This chapter focuses on the role of institutions and economic policy in the UK to understand impact on migrant entrepreneurs – this answers how non-EEA highly skilled migrants engage in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape.

6.1 The Global Financial Crisis and impacts on migration

The global financial crisis had a profound impact on migrant entrepreneurship to the UK. In fact, Tilly (2011) suggests that the crisis that exploded in 2008 dramatically changed the context for international migration. This impact was felt so strongly, and with global resonance not only because of the ‘…global reach and severity of the crisis, but also because international migration is more integrated in the global economy than ever before.’ (Koser 2010: 13). The myriad repercussions of this financial crisis are complex and intermeshed, McKibbin and Stoeckel posit that governments have responded with an easing of monetary and fiscal policy that in turn have their own effects on activity and financial and trade flows. The downturn in economic activity is causing unemployment to rise sharply and, with it, a political response to protect domestic industries through various combinations of domestic subsidies and border protection, and there is potential for protectionism to rise further (McKibbin and Stoekel 2009). This ties into the political rhetoric of a period to which the concept of a liberal paradox (Hollifield 2004) can be applied. The strained nature of economic growth and employment prospects innately knocks onto migration dynamics and flow composition of labour in the UK. Beets and Willekens (2009) suggest that migration is affected less than predicted, with impact varying by reason for migration and by migrants’
employment status. Labour migration is affected most, in particular migration of low-skilled persons. This ties into Castles’ (2011: 311) suggestion that

‘The international mobilization of workers and their differentiation on criteria of gender, race, ethnicity, origins, and legal status are a crucial part of the global economic order.’

Crucially, he posits that ‘...neoliberal dream is dualistic: a cosmopolitan, mobile world for elites; a world of barriers, exploitation, and security controls for the rest. Political and environmental refugees, marriage migration and family reunion will not be much affected. Remittances are affected less than predicted. This argument tacks onto the idea that a period of recession or financial instability provides an opportunity for companies to enter new markets, which, due to the market turmoil, provide less competition and better chances for short term survival.

The financial crisis acts as an opportunity for many companies, particularly relevant to those from Brazil, who suggested that their relatively unknown brands and unfamiliarity with the UK market could be overcome in this period of weakness for UK based competition:

*And there is a crisis here, ... and that’s wonderful for us, because everything is cheaper, the government is dying for us to come here, if it wasn’t a crisis it would be much much harder for us to come here, of course that it would be easier to find business, but still for setting up it is easier now, (I25, Brazilian entrepreneur)*

Duncan and Waldorf (2010) suggest that formerly immigration-adverse, non-traditional immigration states are now opening their doors to this pool of highly skilled migrants. They posit that ‘...states attempt to sweeten their offers to global talent so the latter would come to their shores...’ and ‘Even more interestingly, notwithstanding the current global economic turmoil, states continue to invite and retain well-educated migrants, while low-skilled migrant labour is turned away.’ (2010: i). The sentiment of opportunity for high skilled
migrants and entrepreneurs, (at the expense perhaps of low skilled migrants,) was echoed by a senior representative of Cambridgeshire county council, who suggested that a ‘crisis environment’ provides conditions for an entrepreneur to succeed:

...we are helping to set the environment that makes it easier for an entrepreneur to succeed. Although I will say from my own experience ... actually being an entrepreneur during a recession is a great time, it is a fabulous time to start up, when the challenges are as bad as they could be that’s really when you can test yourself to see if its going to work or not, (I11, senior representative from Cambridgeshire County Council)

The idea of the UK as a springboard or soft landing into Europe was suggested by entrepreneurs, with many participants positing that they could overcome hurdles like language, time zone, access to services and availability of advice in the UK, allowing them to establish a European base for subsequent movement into continental Europe.

...the UK is a great springboard for Europe, so it is on the doorstep of Europe, but it is not within the Eurozone, so all of the crises have not directly impacted on the UK, it is seen as a safe haven in Europe, why would anyone want to go to Europe now? It is not because the market is that great at the moment, but they realise that the European crisis will pass at some point and it gives them a real opportunity to get into Europe at a time when the competition is weak ... for a Brazilian company to break into the European market at a normal time is might be pretty difficult, but now it gives them a chance to establish their brands, establish their offices, get good personnel, start delivering services and then when the economy recovers, benefit from that, and they see the UK as a good base for that... (I29, representative of UKTI in Sao Paolo, Brazil)

The ‘recession as the bearer of opportunity’ concept is developed empirically (Kelley et al. 2011), with participants suggesting that it gave them the impetus for migration to the UK, and developing their business:
Maybe there are other opportunities…maybe putting some of our products into mainland Europe, we don’t lack ideas here basically, tonnes and tonnes of ideas, not enough hours, you can do anything and turn it around and make it work… it is just you… if you have got that about you, you can sell anything really… you have got to have a belief in yourself don’t you? And that is it, it is just being positive, and there is a recession, businesses are suffering, but through the recession there are a lot of opportunities out there too… (I33, entrepreneur of Indian origin in the Midlands)

Castles (2011: 312) suggests that the global financial crisis and the world recession revealed ‘…both continuity and change…’ He posits that on the one hand, the inherent propensity of capitalism to economic crises, and on the other, citing Gills (2010), a new multidimensionality, ‘…in which simultaneous and overlapping crises of economy, society, politics, environment, and world order came together to create a profound civilizational crisis…’ Economists argued that the removal of restrictions on human mobility would lead to large increases in global income (Bhagwati 2003; Nayyar 2002), but politicians in labour-importing countries were aware of popular suspicion of immigration, and responded with a rhetoric of national interests and control (Castles 2011). The financial crisis can be seen to strain the politics of migration, and according to Castles (2010: 2) the migration-mobility debate can be located in a political discourse. He suggests that ‘For demographic, economic and social reasons, all highly-developed economies find themselves increasingly reliant on immigrant labour – at all skill levels …’ On top of this, ‘…migrants have developed forms of collective, individual, and community resistance that undermine top-down ‘migration management’.’ (Castles 2011: 311). This could have large scale impacts on future of international migration (Castles 2011).

One representative of a Portuguese based company working alongside Portuguese and UK government suggests that economic crisis draws out issues associated with identity, and citizenship, with migrants viewed suspiciously:
The problem of the crisis is that when you start to see a lot of unemployment, people don’t like to see the foreigners coming and having better conditions than the ones that they have… but foreign entrepreneurs, they don’t see it in the right… in the start up, seed stage there are not so many things being done… it is more for later stage… and if you come and you have… I think it is 1 million euro it is tax free and invest 200 it is something else, I can send you a presentation from our partner [name]… (I47, Portuguese entrepreneur and entrepreneurial advisor on European entrepreneurial migration)

The suggestion that the financial crisis is a spur towards migration for some entrepreneurs gained resonance, with failings in the country of origin and often flagging economies, entrepreneurs felt the need to break into new markets:

It was a coincidence I was on the [muffled] and I really liked the country and the people and it was a very good place and the economy was catching up and I was working in resources in London and it was an industry severely hit by the recession, I was very lucky because my own team wasn’t downsized at all, by a lot of my colleagues they had to leave the company and that was affecting my work in a way that I had to stay on for many hours and it was not very nice… so when I came back from Brazil, I started to look for opportunities elsewhere and it was a coincidence my company was actually looking at expending from Brazil and … I was very enthusiastic about it, and they said that I could do that and … so I became a recruiter in Brazil, they didn’t have any structure in Latin America, and the Brazilian recruitment market wasn’t very developed, … (I31, Brazilian entrepreneur based in London)

Subnational impacts of the financial crisis have been felt across the UK. The manner with which devolved authorities and institutions address economic issues in their region, or local area is varied in form. The financial crisis in the UK is contextualised by a series of factors:

i) Growth and success of the North premised upon public sector

ii) South is illustrative of private reflexive spheres
There is a prioritisation of London as financial service hub of the UK, Europe and arguably the world.

There are examples of intervention at a local scale, which will be addressed.

These points are suggested by a representative of Marketing Birmingham, within Birmingham City Council, he posits that the credit crunch has caused the emergence of stimulus to cut government spending which has impacted Birmingham and the West Midlands, and the city council through funding mechanisms and the ability to allocate project funding:

...because of the recession we’ve had the credit crunch and now the government wants to reduce the public sector because that has been expanding faster than the private sector, now they want to reduce that and increase the private sector, so we have got initiatives for example, like the Regional Growth Fund, round one, round two, and in the round three we have put two bids in and we will know next week hopefully if we have got ...we have heard the grapevine that we have actually got something, so that is 100 million pounds, two programmes, put a 75 million pound programme in called the Greenbridge and that is aimed at strengthening the SME supply chain and helping companies in their transition into the green economy and we support that through three specific interventions, capital investment, so when they bare buying equipment we will give you a sort of ground contribution so long as you buy a piece of equipment that is going to give you the highest energy efficiency, because it is good for business that when we have given you the grant hopefully that investment will start to repay you and make you more sustainable with the cost savings, skills development and product innovation, those three areas… (I4, a representative of Birmingham City Council)

The agenda of government spending cuts is intertwined with a broader green agenda, as is explained; this ties into the debates on energy and pollution, with emphasis on renewable energy and viability from a regional perspective and, carbon trading at local scales. Power at el. (2010: 3) illustrate in their book, ‘Phoenix Cities: The fall and rise of great industrial cities,’ examples of
'weak market cities', that have ‘…experienced acute loss of purpose over the last generation, going from urban industrial giants to shadows of their former glory and pre-eminence.’ However, as one participant suggests, Birmingham and the West Midlands is hailing an industrial resurgence, contextualised by specialist car part manufacturing:

… so the West Midlands Economic Forum [WMEF] basically started with a collaboration with a university, looking at a series of seminars on the credit crunch, and that expanded to about 6 or 7 different business schools in the WM, it is basically designed as a neutral forum to look at different aspects of the economy and put it in a global context… the thing for me is that the public sector has been filling in form for the past 20 years saying how underprivileged and poverty stricken the area is, but there is loads of anecdotal evidence that it is actually quite a dynamic and strong economy, (I43, representative from West Midlands Economic Forum)

The regional institutional framework of the UK has undergone dramatic transformations in the past five to 10 years, with the dissolution of Regional Development Agencies and the establishment of Local Enterprise Partnerships, as the next generation scalar, manifestation of national government infiltration at a sun national scale. It is suggested by a Cambridge based entrepreneurs and business angel, that as the regional development agencies shut down and government spending dropped, the impetus for business development and the promotion of entrepreneurship has been placed on private sector organisations, empirically, he refers to Cambridge:

…the dynamic of what has happened here, as the RDAs have shut down and the country is in a recession, the money for this sort of stuff is much less than it used to be… and … so in Cambridge there is a group called Future Business ‘.co.uk’, and they seem to have small amounts of resources to run a programme on business growth and that offers twelve hours of quotes free unquote consulting time to help you do this, and they are quite… similar to Cambridge Cleantech… (I40, Cambridge based entrepreneur and business angel)
The ideas that are presented in here are echoed by an entrepreneur and representative of CBI India, he suggests that entrepreneurship is innately private sector and should be encouraged privately. However, he suggests that Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) can play a role in governing this growth and promoting it from a public sector stance, feeding into central government, with potential to inform broader political and policy based debates:

…in terms of entrepreneurship, if the idea is that jobs are going to come from private sector growth and or people starting their own businesses against public sector spending their way out of the recession, therefore the context is as entrepreneurs being part of the private sector, creating their own jobs… for employing others, so in terms of local areas and encouraging entrepreneurship, it is at the heart of the LEPs agenda, however, each LEP has its own priorities, its own priority sectors, and they are all run differently, board members, different geographies, (I48, entrepreneur and representative of CBI India)

To link in and signpost a meta debate, Massey (2010: 6). suggested in 2010, referring to mapping the path to economic re-stabilisation, ‘Only by understanding that the economic agenda is part of a wider social and political settlement will we succeed in opening up the debate on the alternatives.’ Here, by drawing in migration to form a pivotal position in the debate on economic restructuring, it is argued that this should be addressed at subnational scales.

6.2 Funding and investment

This section will address the spatiality of economic provision, including policy that governs funding and investment, located in an institutional framework of lending bodies, often incentivised, if not overseen by government at local, regional, national and supra national scales. Chatterji et al. suggest that the various public policies that could influence entrepreneurship span tax, education, immigration, technology and standards, financial markets, intellectual property, and several other policy domains. Such foundations for
the conceptualisation of migrant entrepreneurship in the UK have not been thoroughly laid out in academia. Scale and space will again form a conceptual underpinning for the evaluation of economic policy, allowing for variation and the spaces of entrepreneurship to be evaluated. Entrepreneurship policies are often embedded in larger cluster promotion initiatives, Chatterji et al. (2013: 19) suggest that in the US context that these can ‘…emanate from federal, state, and local authorities.’

The nature of funding leads to competition within and between firms for optimum conditions in terms of company valuation, return on investment and growth potential. Cambridgeshire, London and Birmingham and the West Midlands provide useful case studies for the evaluation of funding across the UK in varied and spatially specific economic environments. In 1995 Martin and Minns (1995: 125) suggested that regional growth theory and regional policy traditionally focus on ‘…the process of industrial development.’ They add that ‘Relatively little is known about the flows of money and financial capital that shape that development.’ (Martin and Minns 1995: 125).

It is argued here that there remains a poor understanding of these complex financial processes, especially in the context of UK regional development. The glut of venture capital opportunities in London plays off against the highly networked web of business angel investment in Cambridgeshire and this against subnational government opportunities in Birmingham and the West Midlands, with competitive funding regimes defining seed investment structures for all subnational spaces. The role of venture capital in economic development is increasingly recognized as central to the development of an entrepreneurial economy. However, as Mason and Harrison (2002: 427) suggest, ‘…the supply of venture capital is not distributed evenly across the space economy. They go on to posit that in the UK there is a high concentration of venture capital provision in ‘…Greater London and the South East, reinforcing the existing patterns of regional concentration of economic activity.’

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Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000: xi) suggest that business angel financing is of utmost importance in the funding landscape, they postulate that these investors deliver ‘…more funding to entrepreneurs than any other source, business angels are some of the most important (though least understood) players in our entrepreneurial landscape today.’ Malecki (1994) looks at regional or local policies that attempt to alter regional or local conditions and to promote entrepreneurship and innovation whilst analysing networks of interaction, culture and local environments. Zerbinati and Souitaris (2005: 43) evaluate ten European local governments, five in the UK and five in Italy to explain the recent initiatives to compete for and utilize European Union structural funds. They propose five distinct types of entrepreneurial agents in the public sector: ‘…professional politician; spin-off creator; business entrepreneur in politics; career-driven public officer; and politically ambitious public officer.’ With an institutionalised perspective on regional development, Amin (1998: 2) approaches this theme in three parts, with the first section of this 1998 paper summarising ‘…the axioms of economic action and governance which emerge from a theorisation of the economy rooted in institutional economics and socioeconomics.’ The second section deals with contemporary institutionalist thought in regional development studies, and the third section draws out its policy implications. Venkataraman (2004: 153) asks ‘What does it take for a region to foster technological entrepreneurship?’ He suggests that most work on this topic emphasize the tangible infrastructure such as sound legal systems, transparent capital markets, and advanced telecommunications and transportation systems. Here, there will be a focus on the case of Birmingham on funding and competition, with a host of schemes to promote entrepreneurship through small scale funding emanating from institutions such as Birmingham City Council and Marketing Birmingham (based within the City Council).

Shane and Cable (2002) posit that economic explanations for venture finance are under socialized and incomplete as they do not consider how social ties influence the investment and funding process. Here, their call to investigate the socialisation of funding will be taken up, as an empirical undercurrent
through analyses of the aforementioned subnational dynamics to migrant entrepreneurial funding.

The case of UK migrant entrepreneurship provides a unique set of circumstances with reference to visa policy conditions and the need to have available considerable capital as a condition of entry to the UK (with £50,000 and £200,000 most common). As outlined, Chatterji et al. (2013: 19) have conducted work in this area in the US context, they aimed to

‘…provide a parsimonious but informative review of relevant policies, we focus our attention on initiatives targeted at supporting the founding and growth of start-ups in specific geographic regions.’

This evaluation will introduce aspects of the structuration debate into their already developed ideas of a subnational economic infrastructure, looking from the perspective of business groups, accelerator and innovation centres, and migrant entrepreneurs to provide an holistic picture of the funding and investment backdrop to non EEA businesses and individuals.

Internationally scoping business competitions and other competitive funding regimes attract talent to the UK for a pre-defined period of time, with the intention of retaining the most able entrepreneur or team within an accelerator or incubation program, perhaps with the provision of seed funding, or contacts to achieve necessary funding. One UKTI representative describes a forthcoming scheme that will aim to attract students and graduates to the UK to start up or continue in early stage company development, with a focus on high technology enterprise and innovation:

…essentially what we are trying to do is to set up a new initiative that will focus on student, or recently graduated individuals overseas who have an interest in setting up their own business, or who have an entrepreneurial interest, and essentially, what we will be launching is a business plan competition in the summer, we will be inviting applications from students and recent graduates that want to come to the UK, and what we will be providing
is financial support and some other support packages, to help student teams and early stage companies to come and set up their business. We envisage the winning teams to be staying here for at least a year, and clearly we would want to make that transition as simple and straightforward as possible, so we will be providing support on things like visas, accommodation and connecting these companies to the right partners in the UK and one of the significant parts, is that we will also be partnering with some of the accelerator programmes in the UK, so we will also be helping the companies to develop their business ideas to be in a position by the end of the first year to either have obtained funding from another source, or be well on their way to doing that. (I51, UKTI representative)

As suggested by this representative, the role that UKTI will play in the program is primarily that of an information broker and acclimatization tool for non EEA entrepreneurs. The provision of information and assistance in seed company stage is a valuable asset for a firm, as has been argued, the stumbling blocks to company creation often lie in the realities of negotiation of economic and political landscapes, unfamiliar in a cultural and social context, to the migrant entrepreneur. Here, the role of connections, networking and the interplay with funding and investment opportunities will be evaluated, focusing empirically on experiences that migrant entrepreneurs have had in achieving funding and questioning government representatives and business organisations on what opportunities are available for non EEA entrepreneurs.

Referring to East London Tech City, one Tech City Investment Organisation (TCIO) representative postulates that funding is a key driver of industrial change and economic growth in a region, comparing the position of Tech City to Silicon Valley in its successful attraction of entrepreneurial talent:

I don’t see any reason why it would stop, because, the only thing that I think would make it stop is if those entrepreneurs perceived that there were other better places to go, it is like, it is the same analogy of start up companies going to Silicon Valley, I don’t think that is going to stop overnight unless, there is no funding available in Silicon Valley, or there is no logic to go there, Tech City is different, but at the same time it is trying to make it to be one of
the attractive locations for start up companies and that was borne out by the Boston Research Group who classified London as number three after Silicon Valley and New York as the place to start up a company… (I1, TCIO)

The role of connections and networking for the achievement of funding is widely recognised as being of significant importance in determining the location of an entrepreneur and/or company. There is a dearth of geographical research addressing the question of funding and investment, and given that the allocation of economic resources is fundamental to sculpting processes in our social, cultural, economic and political landscapes, it is suggested that this area is given more academic attention. The use of pre-existing transnational networks such as the global presence of British embassies and Consulates, provide a web of spatially specific knowledge and on the ground experience of the market places in which they are situated.

Absolutely, for me, I mean out technology, it is access to markets really, I am off to East Africa next week, that is not though GEP that is a trade visit to East Africa, I have managed to get a bit of funding from the government for it, obviously Britain having an embassy in every country of the world, we are looking to do a lot of export work and all the countries and all the embassies have been nothing but helpful actually. (I52, UKTI representative)

Organisations, such as MIT Enterprise Forum UK provide former students with access to the global network of alumni and enable national and regional MIT alumni groups to act as spokes in the network of professionals and entrepreneurs from the university hub. As one representative of the organisation suggests, the business and social connections that they facilitate underpin the existence and philosophy of MIT:

Connections, we make connections… so basically for funding then we help them find the right person, [name] funded [name] for his business through a friend of his. And at my CEO forum at [name], I used to fund start ups through members of the group, by introducing them, so that is it, connections… (I12, representative of MIT enterprise forum and US entrepreneur)
This ties into the notion that the representative goes on to express suggesting that the business culture of the US is different to that of the UK. The US is argued to be less institutionalised, with funding through people, rather than from banks, venture capital firms, or government grants:

… Maybe they are not aware of them, maybe they are not interested, when you work in the states, it is mostly through individual connections, it is a different kind of system, you get most of your funding through people…

GW Okay, and do you thing that policy in the UK at regional level encourages a culture of entrepreneurship? So, perhaps looking at London and Cambridge…

I12 I do, I think that both cities do, you feel like you are back… you know when you are in Cambridge everyone you meet, everyone is running a start up or involved in some way, same in London … (I12 representative of MIT enterprise forum and US entrepreneur)

London and Cambridge are exceptions to this rule, with networks of business angels and a more socialised conception of funding opportunities.

We are at the moment trying to build better links with Tech City…But on the whole it hasn’t been an issue, because we are not ourselves building the companies, and generally speaking when people leave here they are reasonably grown up, they can make their own decisions, Where I think that London has been important to us in recent years, is being a source of incomes like funding. (I3, representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre Cambridge)

The internationalisation of funding and investment prospects is of key importance in understanding trends towards the global migration of entrepreneurs, the use of international sources of funding as a mechanism to prompt transnational expansion was cited as a strategy used by
entrepreneurs, particularly those with underdeveloped or poor investment infrastructure in their country of origin:

Most of the people who start these businesses … have links back to places of family or birth or whatever, the businesses are national or international, so they are not local market places and most of the market places are international which takes them outside the UK, and if they get funding, or equity funding that will take them outside the UK because it means they have to grow the business in order to exist, so the horizons are quite national or international … (I9, former representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre and advisor on entrepreneurship)

Business angel funding was found to be most prevalent in Cambridgeshire, over London and Birmingham and the West Midlands. The integrated nature of universities, public sector, innovation centres and accelerators and entrepreneurs in Cambridgeshire creates a networked business community and multilevel drive for regional development. Explaining the premise for a UKTI business competition to be rolled out in 2013, one representative referred to business angel funding as a core investment opportunity for seed stage companies, being able to offer capital as well as spatially relevant advice on business practice and regional market dynamics:

The follow up funding will be likely to come from Business Angels, the rationale for working with accelerators is that they are already very well connected to the business angels networks and the VCs interested in early stage, therefore we would look to place all of these teams into an accelerator programme. This will help them develop their pitches, to make them attractive to investors, but also it will help them with the visibility of the investment community in the UK, ultimately there may be some companies that don’t want to participate in the accelerator programmes, or it may be inappropriate, for example they may be MBA graduate who have already had a lot of time starting up their business already, in that case we would come to some kind of arrangement, and in that case there will be some other part of UKTI that may be able to help, so I am thinking here of the Global Entrepreneurs
programme, so that is a separate programme that is designed to look at slightly more mature entrepreneurs. So we will use whatever mechanisms are appropriate to help companies obtain follow up funding. (I51, UKTI representative)

The use of venture capital (VC) for seed stage funding was not common among entrepreneurs interviewed, it was suggested that early stage companies tend to receive poor valuation estimates and have to relinquish larger portions of their business for equity. Venture capital funding tended to be used as second or third round funding. Of the non EEA companies that moved to London, a significant proportion suggested that the developed funding ecosystem and presence of VC firms positively influenced their decision, looking to future funding applications and business growth. Chatterji et al. (2013: 9) suggest that venture capital funding has become so widespread and prevalent in the funding landscape, yet is under legislated for by government, they posit that

‘...even if the public sector supports VC in a more general way, with beneficial tax treatment for private VCs, for example, rather than engaging in direct lending itself, that support has costs and those costs may offset any benefits. If the government needs to raise sales taxes to offset the VC subsidies, this could easily do more harm than good.’

Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002: 175) summarise the state of entrepreneurial borrowing from venture capital firms, they suggest that

‘Entrepreneurs pursue a single high risk project each but have no own resources. Financiers provide funds, covering investment cost plus an upfront payment, in exchange for a share in the firm. The contract must include incentives to enlist full effort of entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists also assist with valuable business advice to enhance survival chances.’
This set of assumptions is adhered to by Hsu (2007), as he investigates the sourcing and valuation of venture capital (VC) funding among entrepreneurs with varied levels of prior start-up founding experience, academic training, and social capital. He suggests that social ties with VCs have been identified as an important precursor to organizational resource attainment and performance and he analyses the correlates of heterogeneous social links with VCs. The socialisation of VC funding mechanisms (Shane and Cable 2002) is examined, also looking at venture valuation, as it reflects enterprise quality and entrepreneurs’ cost of financial capital. This ties into the experience of one US entrepreneur based in Spain, previously referred to, this entrepreneur did not seek to migrate to the UK due to poor valuation of lack of capital provision outside of VCs:

I worked at a venture fund, you know a venture capital fund in New York, called [name] and they invest only in the US and I thought that was kind of limited, … and I then, that’s an impact investment fund, and I am focused on impact in many ways, it has been environmental, at the moment I am focusing on student loans from alumni lenders, …, and I guess, this is a business which has been working in the UK and France and one that works well in the US, and one which I feel no one is applying in Spain, and I have been looking at different structures, I have been looking at setting this company up in Spain, the UK and Ireland, … those are the main geographies that I consider setting it up in, all European, I guess the investor valuations in Spain are not very good, I guess the UK has some good tax breaks for entrepreneurs and seed investors coming in, and that is why in part that the valuations are much better for early stage businesses, and that is why I considered going there, but as an American, you are aware that you need £200,000, which that would potentially be do-able with friends and family, or investor money, but it is a lot to ask, and I wouldn’t be comfortable doing that. (I7, US entrepreneur in Spain)

There is heterogeneity among VC backed entrepreneurs, specific aspects of their background influence the ability to achieve VC funding and under what conditions they will receive it. Hsu (2007: 722) disaggregates this, addressing
key aspects of an entrepreneur’s socio cultural and personal narrative and the role that they play in sourcing funds. He suggests that prior business ‘…founding experience (especially financially successful experience) increases both the likelihood of VC funding via a direct tie and venture valuation.’ (Hsu 2007: 722). Furthermore, the founders’ ability to ‘…recruit executives via their own social network (as opposed to the VC’s network) is positively associated with venture valuation.’

Hsu (2007: 722) posits that at the time of conducting his research, with the emerging internet industry ‘…founding teams with a doctoral degree holder are more likely to be funded via a direct VC tie and receive higher valuations, suggesting a signalling effect.’ In summary, Hsu’s (2007: 722) research underscores some ‘…important dimensions of heterogeneity among VC-backed entrepreneurs.’ In the UK, the role of venture capital in economic development increasingly is recognized as central to the development of an entrepreneurial economy (Mason and Harrison 2002) Mason and Harrison examine the regional distribution of venture capital investments in the UK in the 1990s, a period of massive growth in venture capital investment activity. The Government’s regional venture capital funds are unlikely to be effective in closing this regional finance gap.

Florida and Kenney (1988: 301) address the role that venture capital plays in high technology entrepreneurship. They explain the ‘…differences among various venture capital complexes focusing on where venture capital is important to innovation and entrepreneurship and conversely where it is not.’ Broadly, government venture capital schemes are intended to capture public benefits in terms of increased innovation, growth and job creation. The contemporary form of regional venture capital funds in the UK is the Capital for Enterprise (CfEL) scheme. CfEL is the UK Government’s centre of knowledge, expertise and information on the design, implementation and management of finance measures to support Small and Medium Size enterprises (SMEs) across the UK. Capital for Enterprise (CfEL) is a fund management company which designs, delivers and manages venture capital and debt guarantee schemes on behalf of the public and private sectors. CfEL
(1996: 1) brings together deep knowledge, experience and expertise in investment management along with a detailed understanding of SME finance markets (debt, equity and hybrids), public policy objectives and the interaction between the two. CfEL is the largest single investor in UK venture capital, giving it a detailed overview of the UK venture market. Taken together, the debt and equity programmes mean that CfEL has over £1.8bn of assets, liabilities or commitments under its direct oversight. Lerner suggests that ‘...public programs to provide early-stage financing to firms, particularly high-technology companies, have become commonplace,’ Globally, programs’ precise structures have differed; the efforts have been predicated on two shared assumptions: ‘1) that the private sector provides insufficient capital to new firms, and 2) that the government can identify firms where investments will ultimately yield high social and/or private returns.’ Lerner (1996) identifies that at the time of publication, these claims have, however, received little scrutiny by economists.

There is a gulf in opportunities between achieving seed funding and second or third round funding. It is suggested by on Tech City Investment Organisation representative that seed funding is difficult to come across with the low levels of capital that are demanded by start up stage companies. These levels may be unsuitable for venture capital firms and diminished socio cultural capital in the UK as an unfamiliar economic landscape may lead entrepreneurs to seek alternative funding sources:

Well, its seed funding, £50,000, between 50 and 100 it’s sometimes quite difficult, its difficult areas, you hear from some people, it can be quite difficult areas to get funding. It’s more start out funding and it’s not impossible, but it’s not littered with people waiting to throw money at you, conversely, its rather odd, but once people have got some track record, and have something to show for what they have been doing and then go to a VC that’s usually quite a lot easier, but then they’re into the sort of millions, so it’s not the, it’s not the sort of … kind of population that we are looking at really,…

GW Okay, because they are not a start up at that point…
Regional and local government support in the UK was more concentrated in Birmingham and the West Midlands. Community level funding provided by City level government, in contrast to VC funding administered from a national scale, was directed at promoting entrepreneurship among ethnic minority communities and those that are unemployed. This funding did not have a specific remit of focusing on migrant entrepreneurs, and tended to look past this group of visa holding UK residents. One representative of UKTI based in the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce explains the ‘product’ range of funding options for companies in the region and the interaction outside of Birmingham and the West Midlands:

“Our advisors have a whole range of products that are at national and regional scales and are appropriate for each company… every now and again we get colleagues that are working on these products that will come up here and promote that… so we work with them as well… we connect with… they were based in the East Midlands, the name has gone out of my head, but they were trying to find funding for [muffled] they were working with companies that were investment ready, and we looked with them, so we have done a lot of that whether it is a national UKTI project or a regional one…we work with growth accelerators as well and their companies…” (I57, UKTI Birmingham)

The scope of regionally grounded programs often stretches beyond the geographically scalar boundaries that they were initially predicated on representing. The conceptual movement away from the administrative region as a containerised and exclusive is empirically evidenced by the inter-scalar activity between UKTI representative in a range of UK government regions as well as with the ‘hub’ of government policy in London. Montello (2003) suggests that regionalization, and the creation or identification of regions, is
concomitant with the identification of discrete sets of entities, physical or conceptual. A representative from Birmingham Science park, Aston suggests that their spatiality as a science park takes them beyond the boundaries of Birmingham city, and embeds the park, as an institution, in a framework that spans the West Midlands and across the UK:

…I think for us, we can reach beyond Birmingham, and I think the Midlands…

GW And that is what you see as your catchment?

I46 Yeah, West Midlands… I guess really… we do focus quite a lot on Birmingham, just because we don’t offer any funding, and that is the issue, people aren’t going to relocate to take part in this… they need to move… our catchment area is going to be limited… But then Oxygen, I don’t know if you have come across, or managed to get in touch with [name], so Oxygen, he, Oxygen, was started as a partnership between the science parka and Oxygen, and that has attracted people from all over the world… just because there is funding involved and it is a different offer, come here, we will give you money and you can concentrate on what you are doing for three months, it is like a Boot camp… you know… so that does attract people from wherever, but with E4F it is a far more regional initiative… (I46, Birmingham Science Park-Aston representative)

The idea of community funding is exemplified as one representative from Birmingham City Council suggests that provision of funding for the Afro Caribbean community in Birmingham and the West Midlands, he posits that this group has relied in the past on greater levels of state support:

…the Afro Caribbean community has relied on more state support, we saw the need and I have been instrumental in that, securing funding, section eleven Home Office funding, specifically set up Black Business Centres there were six set up and one was set up in Birmingham, and the idea was to try to encourage dynamism, but that was in the sort of ‘80s. Now what we are doing, is we try to customise the mainstream approaches much more (I4, Birmingham City Council)
The spatiality of communities, such as the presence of a vibrant China town in Birmingham city centre, suggests the manifestation of what Zhou terms ethnic entrepreneurship, in spatial enclaves in the cityscape. Although this concept will not be explored in granular detail, in the case of Birmingham it is useful to conceptualise the spaces of entrepreneurship in relation to ethnicity and temporality of migrations to the region. Fong and Shen (2011) suggest that decades of research have contributed to understanding the operation and implications of minority-concentrated industrial sectors, though often the reasons for concentration in some sectors but not others remain unclear:

…*the clothes community, that is worth exploring, it is one of the bigger China Towns, it is very insulated and very self-serving, in the sense that it is a community that looks after itself, and engages in traditional activities, such as travel, restaurants, bars and that sort of thing… we at the chamber struggle to engage the Chinese community, they are not interested in funding, have you read the my Brum reports? (I34, Birmingham Chamber of Commerce)*

The role of LEPs is again that of a locally embedded source of information and funding, LEPs are often in touch with local and regional crunch points around funding and business development, and this spatially specific knowledge allows for the administration of appropriate funds for small business. The levels of funding that are signposted or provided by LEPs are unclear with the recent overhaul of Regional Development Agencies and the rescaling of the work that they have historically shouldered in promoting regional economic growth (see Appendix 5).

In summary, three states empirically define the regional funding composition of London, Birmingham and the West Midlands and Cambridgeshire. The proliferation of business angel networks and funding in Cambridgeshire stems from a close knit business community that is interwoven into the universities and local government. In London, the status of global financial hub has led to the development of a complex and comprehensive venture capital infrastructure. Finally, in Birmingham and the West Midlands, the role of regional and local government has been highlighted, with the public sector
institutionalisation of funding opportunities, honed into the community level, and directed at spaces of community entrepreneurship, not necessarily by migrant entrepreneurs, but more often first, second and third generation settled communities who have carved out enclaves of business activity in the city.

6.3 Tax policy

Tax policy impacts the location decisions of migrant entrepreneurs setting up a business or establishing a new wing of an existing business. Bruce and Mohsin (2009: 1) suggest that this conclusion is not surprising, though they posit that the ‘… more normative question of whether tax policy should affect entrepreneurship is perhaps more puzzling.’ Those in favour of small business tax subsidies use the popular argument that entrepreneurial ventures fuel economic growth and create jobs (Garrett et al. 2006; Minniti 2008; Bruce and Mohsin 2009). Furthermore, Bruce and Mohsin (2009: 1) postulate that ‘…they provide positive externalities, or economic benefits that accrue at no additional cost to others in the economy.’ Kirzner (1997) suggests that through innovation, hard work, and a willingness to accept financial risk, the entrepreneur takes advantage of previously undiscovered opportunities for arbitrage and profit (Blanchflower 2004; Garrett and Wall 2006). The costs involved in tax from profits are significant for a start up, or seed stage business, as capital tends to be low in the business and profits are often reinvested in the business to aid growth. Devereux and Griffith (2003: 107) examine the impact of taxation ‘…when investors face a discrete choice between two or more mutually exclusive projects…’ they consider the location choice of multinationals. They suggest that such choices depend on an effective average tax rate. They propose a precise measure of this rate, which is shown to be ‘…equal to a weighted average of an effective marginal tax rate and an adjusted statutory tax rate, where the weights depend on the profitability of the investment.’ The exploration of these concepts for entrepreneurs looking to establish their business in the UK has not be comprehensively covered in geographic academic literature, and debates have focused on the question of international competitiveness (Summers
1988) and foreign direct investment (Haaparanta 1996; Morisset and Pirnia 2000). Here, the literature on tax policy, entrepreneurship and the promotion of entrepreneurship will be fused with the empirical experiences of migrant entrepreneurs to the UK and how they negotiated fiscal policy to give their newly formed businesses the best chance of success in the UK. Policies or institutional changes that encourage entrepreneurial activities lead to higher growth. King and Levine (1993) have argued that the higher the quality of financial intermediaries the more potential entrepreneurs with technology advancing projects will be financed, generating faster economic growth. Whilst on the other hand, Aghion et al. (2009) emphasise entrepreneurs’ ability to adopt frontier technologies in promoting economic growth, this links into disproportionate levels of high tech companies entering the UK market, as previously discussed. It was suggested by a representative of UKTI that the policies that matter for migrant entrepreneurs are fiscal; they are constantly changing and provide a backdrop for economic activity:

*The policies that do change are fiscal, so tax rates, corporation tax and so forth, various incentives around access to finance. But principally, it is always going to be about the market, so the UK as a competitive place, but also as a place to do business, (I18, UKTI Immigration specialist)*

Bruce and Mohsin (2003: 1) evaluate and extent the time series literature on tax policy and entrepreneurship by using more recent data from the US and modern econometric techniques to examine the importance of federal income, payroll, capital gains, corporate income, and estate taxes on self-employment rates. They show through regression results that ‘...some taxes, namely capital gains and corporate income taxes, have significant but very small effects on self-employment activity.’ There was a call among representative of government bodies looking to promote migrant entrepreneurship in the UK, as well as regional and local government levels to simplify taxation policy in the UK:

*Well I don’t think that it is particularly easy to raise early stage money, but then I don’t think that it should be because it is very risky stuff… I think my*
personal view is that the taxation arrangement that the government is putting in place, though on the face of it they look quite attractive they are just too complicated… and they keep changing so even someone that is quite knowledgeable like me, I think that you almost need to involve tax people and accountants to use them… and often I think it is self-serving, the civil servants like it, the accountants like it, but for the entrepreneurs I don’t think that it is so important, although some people do think that it is good to have all of these tax breaks… I would like the tax system to be much simpler, in terms of the accessibility of money, I think that it tends to come from angels, or family and friends, or the banks, I don’t think there is an institutionalised … (I44, UK based entrepreneur and business angel)

On the other hand, some entrepreneurs expressed the thought that the UK has a tax system that is less shrouded in red tape and easier to navigate than that of their home country. The Brazilian tax system is suggested by a Brazilian representative of UKTI to be far more complex and demands a greater level of negotiation than the UK equivalent:

…the Brazilian taxation system is extremely complex… and it is getting more and more expensive for companies to operate within the law and pay tax in Brazil, whereas the UK government has introduced extremely simple tax rules and the corporate tax rate is going down and it is becoming very competitive. And labour law as well, in Brazil, once you have hired an employee, it is kind of difficulty to get rid of that employee is things take a downturn, whereas the labour law in the UK is very flexible, which makes it easier for companies [muffled] their staff according to the financial situation that they are in, all of these factors make the UK a very attractive place particularly for companies in the IT sector… (I29, UKTI Brazil representative)

Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008) examine whether tax policies can be used to encourage entrepreneurial activity, in lieu of prior studies producing ambiguous results. They use a twelve-year panel of tax return data to examine the effects of tax rates on entrepreneurial entry. Their results offer convincing evidence that cuts in relative tax rates faced by entrepreneurs,
either in the form of higher rates for wage workers or lower rates for entrepreneurs, increase entry. The experience of a Confederation of British Industry (CBI) representative suggests that this concept has been applied in the Netherlands, for the purpose of encouraging high skilled migrants to move there over European competition:

*I met some people from the Netherlands equivalent of the CBI and they tell me that they have got a tax break for highly skilled migrants, and I said that it is as far away from our policy as you could begin to be… they were saying that we find it so hard to attract people and you have got all these advantages… so I think they are both important. (I30, CBI)*

The tax regimes of other European nations are of great importance to the UK as a source of potential competition for talent. Taking a regional approach, Porter (2000: 15) suggests that the ‘…prevalence of clusters reveals important insights about the microeconomics of competition and the role of location in competitive advantage.’ He goes on to posit that even as

‘…old reasons for clustering have diminished in importance with globalization, new influences of clusters on competition have taken on growing importance in an increasingly complex, knowledge-based, and dynamic economy.’ (Porter 2000: 15).

These new influences could include the liberalisation of taxation policy, incentivisation of R&D activities or provision of knowledge and information networks to entrepreneurs looking to locate their business in a specific locale. The presence of technopoles (Castells and Hall 1994) such as Tech City and Cambridge, and the support from national government that they are provided with suggests a movement towards the development and specialisation of the UK in high tech manufacturing and development. This specialisation is a necessary step in the maintenance of a globally resonant competitiveness according to a representative from the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry:
as an economy, from our perspective as an economy we are sort of at a point, and now... what we decided what we want to be at an economy, we can’t compete at the low skilled level, we can compete at the highly skilled end, and we have to do more on that front to compete with South Korea, Canada, a lot of the digital, very good at that stuff. Even countries like France, have tax breaks on some of that digital stuff that we don’t do, some states in the USA as well, and that’s where I see as an economy where we should be aiming to go to, and looking at that frame, we are looking at quite highly skilled people coming to the UK, and seeing it as a place to set up, digital or high tech manufacturing, things like that. (I28, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

An US entrepreneur suggested that tax is a key driver of his migration decisions, with specific locations taking global president due to their progressive and low tax regimes:

I know somebody that have moved to the UK and then moved away, they are hedge fund managers, and they do it for tax reasons, only. [muffled speech] ...They will have their residence in Jersey, or some lower income tax rate, and they will go back and forward, which to me seems like a waste of time, but to them it is important because they really care about the money. The only other places that I am really considering would be Ireland and Luxembourg, and it is mainly for the tax reasons and because of the tax reasons they have developed a kind of culture of having these special purpose vehicles that are easy to set up they have these employees that pick up the phone for you and the paper trail, so it looks like to are running it from … (I7, US entrepreneur)

There is a political juxtaposition between freeing up borders for migrant entrepreneurs and high skilled migrants and tightening legislation of unwanted migrants. A representative of Tech City Investment Organisation suggests that through the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa, and other financial incentives such as R&D tax credits, the UK is making itself attractive to migrant entrepreneurs:
But in terms of the government view of making it easier and more straightforward for entrepreneurs to come ...in through the entrepreneurs visas and other financial incentives which are more generally available, so things like R and D tax credits, I think all of that is in the right direction. (I1, Tech City Investment Organisation)

R&D Tax credits are an HMRC policy providing research and development (R&D) relief for corporation tax that may reduce a company or organization’s tax bill. A company or organization can only claim R&D Relief if it’s liable for Corporation Tax and HMRC define an SME as a company or organization with fewer than 500 employees and either an annual turnover not exceeding €100 million or a balance sheet not exceeding €86 million, this definition applies to spending on R&D from 1 August 2008. Furthermore, the company or organization ‘…can only claim for R&D Relief if an R&D project seeks to achieve an advance in overall knowledge or capability in a field of science or technology through the resolution of scientific or technological uncertainty - and not simply an advance in its own state of knowledge or capability.’ (HMRC 2013). From 1 April 2012, for SMEs, ‘...the tax relief on allowable R&D costs is 225 per cent - that is, for each £100 of qualifying costs, your company or organization could have the income on which Corporation Tax is paid reduced by an additional £125 on top of the £100 spent. It also includes a payable credit in some circumstances.’ (HMRC 2013). A representative from Tech City Investment Organization cites this policy as an attractive proposition for migrant entrepreneurs looking to set up in the UK:

There’s, for the very small start ups there’s the R&D tax credits, that I keep banging on about them, but they are great, 225% tax credit, you don’t get that anywhere else. That can really help you, played properly, can help you fund your business, for immediate cash strapped period, (I5, Tech City Investment Organisation)

The provision of tax breaks and favourable tax policy for entrepreneurs leads a US entrepreneur to believe that valuations are better for early stage
businesses in the UK. This links with Hall and Lerner’s (2009: 14) explanation of the tax relief phenomenon in relation to value of capital. They suggest that

‘…the tax treatment of R&D in most OECD economies is very different from that of other kinds of investment: because R&D is expensed as it is incurred, the effective tax rate on R&D assets is lower than that on either plant or equipment, with or without an R&D tax credit in place.’ (Hall and Lerner 2009: 14).

Therefore, this effectively means that the economic depreciation of R&D assets is considerably less than the depreciation allowed for tax a purpose - which is 100 percent -- so that the required rate of return for such investment would be lower (Hall and Lerner 2009). The tax relief that occurs in the UK as a result of R&D activities, involving the betterment of innovative practice and high technology enterprise is an efficient mechanism for increasing the stock of potential high growth companies through investing in tax policy:

I have been looking at setting this company up in Spain, the UK and Ireland, ... those are the main geographies that I consider setting it up in, all European, I guess the investor valuations in Spain are not very good, I guess the UK has some good tax breaks for entrepreneurs and seed investors coming in, and that is why in part that the valuations are much better for early stage businesses, (I7, US entrepreneur)

Policymakers at all levels of government, particularly at the state level, are also actively providing more direct assistance to start-up firms. Chatterji et al. (2013: 21) suggest that ‘Several states have created programs to provide R&D funds to local start-ups, sometimes in the form of loans or convertible debt.’ In the US context, when evaluating state level policy, they found that recipients in Michigan were 15-25% more likely to survive after three years relative to a set of comparable firms (Zhao and Ziedonis 2012), due to state specific policy development. They go on to question whether these programs also ‘...develop ventures that scale significantly in the local area,’ (Chatterji et al. 2013: 21) in the UK context this has been illustrated. Where migration
policy is not politically malleable in the contemporary state of border enforcement, emphasis is placed upon the fiscal environment, and promotion schemes, as a Tech City Investment Organization representative suggests:

*I mean the government’s policies around entrepreneurship are …I think trying to reduce the barrier to participation, so making it easier and more straightforward for entrepreneurs to come and set up here be that overseas ones or UK, and I think things like EIS… and related schemes are helpful because they make it easier for investors to invest in start up companies. So that, plus other tax breaks like R&D tax credits for instance which are really welcome here and others ideas like making it easier when you file patents, so things like Patent Box which is going to come in and … those are probably just the tip of the iceberg, over the longer term we will see more from this area, and it seems to me that the government is trying to be joined up and provide policy that will address all the key issues start up companies will have. (I1, Tech City Investment Organisation)*

At a regional scale, council tax and service provision are important aspects of creating a suitable environment for migrant entrepreneurship. A senior figure from Cambridgeshire County Council suggests that despite council tax rises to 2.95%, the region maintains relatively low tax rates:

*Because we are in territory we don’t know, and I don’t think that central government has the confidence it should have. So we see a lot of policy changes, and our plea to them is don’t do anything, just sit there and be quite, don’t do anything, because you actually get in the way. If we were to lose the election in May next year it would be very clear to see what we have done here, in policy, just doesn’t seem consistent, it doesn’t feel comfortable or feel confident, and sometimes you just have to do the right things, and they just keep getting in wrong. So there is a big issue between the concept of localism and then the need for central government to control things more locally, as you get nearer to the next general election that is the plot. How can you have localism on one hand, so that is the big story, but in the same breath not allowing the council to set its own taxation, which is enshrined in legislation,*
there is an issue where central government knows better than local
government how to spend its money. And that is decided at the ballot box, the
reality is we put council tax up to 2.95%, because we have very low tax here,
… [muffled speech] is this about political backtrack, or is this about providing
the services that people of Cambridge require, and are they prepared to pay
for it. This is the issue we had last year and there wasn't a murmur about the
council tax, nobody cared about the council tax whatsoever, but they are
terrified about losing their services, so that’s it. I feel that we are in tune with
the people that we serve in Cambridgeshire, but central government seems to
have a different view to that, and the political mantra about what percent of
councils are low tax, and that’s good, therefore MPs get re-elected, that is a
false premise in my view… (I11, Cambridgeshire County Council)

Tying in the regional and the nation with reference to tax policy is of prime
importance in order to create a cohesive and cognisant regime for the
promotion of entrepreneurship. A representative of a Portuguese company,
working with bodies such as UKTI to promote European interconnectivity and
entrepreneurship suggested that political articulation and regionalisation of
policy may lead to benefits for the host nation:

Okay… … one thing… that has been discussed here, a lot of time the policies
have to articulate very well between government and local government, the
municipalities, and what is the right geography scale, it is usually an issue,
Portugal is probably small enough to be considered as a whole… but maybe
UK not… and a lot of the countries, usually a national strategy might not
work… the other thing is that tax is very important, being around… this
attraction strategy, that everyone know, if you have a very good university, or
a very good company, that that attracts other good players and also liquidity
of money, the UK has a lot of advantage in having such a big financial
market… it is relevant to attract start ups to be invested in, usually they follow
the money… (I47, representative of Portuguese company focusing on the
promotion of entrepreneurship in Europe and working alongside UKTI)
A former representative of UKTI suggests a manifestation of the de-liberalisation debate and migration in a coupled argument for the clamping down on undesirable or ‘badly behaving’ entrepreneurs, and the loosening of tax legislation to make the UK a more attractive environment for those migrant entrepreneurs that are willing to ‘jump through the hoops’ (see Appendix 6).

Paying tax is seen as a migrant entrepreneur’s contribution to UK Plc., as well as the provision of jobs for UK nationals and investment in UK infrastructure. The use of UK taxpayer’s money to further non EEA migrant entrepreneurial activity is a contentious issue. In East London Tech City emphasis is placed on tax cuts and financial breaks as well as the provision of information, over hand outs and funding, as has been seen in Birmingham and the West Midlands. The institutionalisation of the cluster has gone hand in hand with government support for these measures in part, due to the proximity of Tech City to Whitehall and Downing Street, and also due to the desire to create a flagship high technology cluster in the capital:

_We have to otherwise, we cannot justify using tax payers money unless that is proper, but you know this is new to me and it might have implications for us and our programs…this year we have a target of 50 overseas companies setting up in Tech City… and we also have the remit of helping existing entrepreneurs who are already here, trying to listen to, although a lot of this goes through number 10, trying to listen to their … any issues they have which would impact of policy, such as R&D tax credits, entrepreneurs visa, that sort of thing… and in general in very many ways trying to help the cluster grow. (I5, Tech City Investment Organisation)_

There is an impetus to foster a culture of entrepreneurship, and arguably this works most effectively where migrant entrepreneurs do not have to overcome hurdles such as high tax rates. This is illustrated by a representative from the London Chamber of Commerce below, he suggests that the tax that entrepreneurs pay, the jobs that they create and investment in infrastructure underpin this mentality. As Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2009: 3) suggest, entrepreneurs are of particular interest to researchers and policy makers as
‘...they are thought to play a vital role in the economy, providing much of the energy behind job creation, technological advancement and overall economic growth.’

…there is an entrepreneurial culture that exists in this country but we have an awful lot to learn in terms of practices from other countries, so yes, also we have places like India, they are extremely entrepreneurial, what you want individuals across any level learn best from their peers and learn best by being pushed by them and the policy that actively discourages entrepreneurship is quite frankly stupid… in terms of engendering a culture of entrepreneurship, is A) Good, B) good for society and C) does bring significant economic benefit in terms of you have a creator of wealth from one individual, they employ individuals, pay tax etcetera, employ other individuals, and it goes on. We want that culture that says we want world leading businesses and entrepreneurs to establish themselves here… anything that dissuades that culture from taking route is stupid… (L6, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

The notion of tax policy as a facet of competitiveness for the UK attribute has been illustrated. Tax credits and breaks are important mechanisms for promoting entrepreneurship in fields of high tech development and innovation. As Chatterji et al. (2013: 3) posit if

‘...governments will benefit from taxes paid by a successful firm in the future, then it may make sense to aid the firm up front with public subsidy; tax breaks to million-dollar plants can be seen as an up-front payment compensating the plant for the future taxes that the local government will extract from them.’

They go on to suggest that these justifications are relevant for any kind of industrial policy, though with particular focus is on local policies towards innovation and entrepreneurship. This resonates with the examples that have been presented for each of the three regional case studies. In their study, Chatterji et al. (2013: 4) ignore national policies such as tariffs, immigration
policy, and patent policy, and focus on support for industry and entrepreneurship at the local level. Here, these aspects have also been integrated into the approach. The aid provided to companies ‘…can take the form of direct subsidies (including tax abatement), non-priced public infrastructure, and credit support (including both loan guarantees and direct lending).’ Clarke (2011: 9) suggests that the importance of favourable Capital Gains Tax (CGT) programs and personal tax rates should not be underestimated. He postulates that

‘Whilst some form of CGT is an important source of revenue, the current scheme currently provides a disincentive for entrepreneurs and investors alike, something that could be removed with some retuning of policy.’ (Clarke 2011: 9).

The second area of tax policy identified by Clarke (2011: 9) is the 50% personal tax rate. He posits that ‘This higher rate of individual tax creates disincentives to work, but more importantly makes Britain less attractive for entrepreneurs and investors and makes it harder to attract skilled employees.’ The problematic nature of these tax programs should not be ignored in the light of useful tax credit schemes.

The role of tax policy in making the UK an attractive nation for migrant entrepreneurs should not be understated. In their study focusing on tax and firm births, or numbers of businesses being started, Bacher and Brülhart (2010) evaluate tax reform proposals in the spirit of the ‘flat tax’ mode, which is a tax system with a constant marginal rate (Slemrod 1990; Lockwood and Manning 1993) which is usually applied to individual or corporate income. These tend to aim to ‘…reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. We explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births.’ (Bacher and Brülhart 2010: 1). In the same vein as they suggest that firm birth rate is proxy for entrepreneurship,’… which, following Schumpeter, has come to be regarded as a key driver of economic growth.’ (Bacher and Brülhart 2010: 1).
Garrett and Wall (2006) demonstrate that levels of entrepreneurship can be greatly affected by the general policy environment, though a representative from the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry suggests that UK government should not bend its policies beyond recognition to attempt to encourage migrant entrepreneurs to locate in the UK. He posits that the UK is a competitive location and that tax drives development of infrastructure and allows for the provision and support of hubs such as Tech City:

…the tax regulatory system is important, you know I wouldn’t necessarily encourage us to, I mean Britain has a lot of benefits, so I wouldn’t necessarily just race to the bottom, zero corporation tax, things like that. We need a tax system that allows local and regional government to invest in the infrastructure and the skills that we need obviously, but you know, that is why we need to look at our system better, to make sure that we are at a competitive level, and that doesn’t mean having the lowest out of all of them necessarily, but you know…it does need to be competitive. (I28, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

Taxation policy impacts the simplification of perceived complicated policy and the promotion of high tech migrant entrepreneurship through a competitive taxation regime with tax breaks for research and development leading to innovation and enterprising technological advancement. Empirically, the balancing act of taxation policy has been experienced by migrant entrepreneurs and enforced and utilised by national government bodies such as UKTI in order to present the UK as open for business. Regional specificities exist in the uptake of tax policies designed to encourage entrepreneurship, with greater concentration of companies using these schemes tending to be tied to the technopole sites of East London Tech City and Cambridge. In Birmingham and the West Midlands, there was less empirical evidence to suggest that these tax breaks and credits were being employed as a means of funding or capital release. Bodies such as the London Chamber of Commerce, CBI, Tech City Investment Organisation and UKTI see the UK as in competition with other European and non EEA nations for the attraction and retention of global talent. The creation and delivery of
tax credits and breaks for migrant entrepreneurs and non EEA companies fosters a sense of the promotion of entrepreneurship in both private and public sector organisations.

6.4 Starting a business in the UK

There are many stages to starting a business in the UK for migrant entrepreneurs, whether on the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa or the Sole Representative visa. Entrepreneurs suggested that although the process was often easier than in their country of origin, there were some key stumbling blocks to setting up a company and beginning to function as desired. Katila and Wahlbeck (2012: 295) suggest that in order to start up a business, entrepreneurs must have recourses such as ‘…information, capital, skills and labour.’ They posit that ‘new’ entrepreneurs seldom have all the resources they need, and therefore they are forced to seek support from their contacts to acquire them. Here, an evaluation of the areas in which support services assisted migrant entrepreneurs will be presented, with an in depth exploration of the role of transnational socio cultural connections and networks.

Registering the company in the UK is an essential, yet often overlooked aspect of starting a business. Although this process should be the most straightforward and often was for the migrant entrepreneurs that were interviewed, a number of support service representatives suggested that there were potential issues that arise from the transnational nature of migrant business development. A representative of UKTI in Brazil postulated that with the Sole Representative visa, there had been examples of entrepreneurs registering their prospective company with Company’s House in the UK on the Internet prior to moving to the UK. This contravened the terms of their visa and they were not allowed to enter the UK:

The Sole Representative visa though, one has to be careful because it is only valid for companies that are not yet set up in the UK, so the person that would get that visa, would do that in order to come and set up a UK company, and the reason that I mention that is because some of my colleagues in other
markets, they are dealing with very proactive guys, and they are waiting for their visa to be processed and they see how easy it is to set up a company in the UK, they can do it online, they go ahead, apply for and get permission to set up their UK company while they are still overseas and then their visa gets turned down, because they have just contravened the terms of their visa, so we always have to tell them if they are interested in the Sole Representative visa, they must not set up the company before they are in the UK, or they will not get the visa. (I29, UKTI Brazil)

Sepulveda et al. (2011: 469) argue that there has been the materialization of a changing context for migrant business within London, ‘…mapping the emergence of new forms and geographies of enterprise.’ As in their study, here the realities on the ground for migrant entrepreneurs in setting up and starting a business in the UK will be mapped out through an examination of ‘…processes of business start up and growth, and integration into institutional and regulatory frameworks, to demonstrate how elements of ethnicity, migratory status and a range of other variables interplay with wider economic and political contexts to shape diverse new migrant entrepreneurial activities.’ (Sepulveda et al. 2011: 469). The complexity of knitting business development and start up stages in the context of an unfamiliar business landscape can cause temporal setbacks in the establishment of migrant businesses in the UK. The main reason for these setbacks is often bureaucratic, and involves the processing of payments and paperwork. The system is illustrated by a former member of UKTI’s Global Entrepreneur Program (GEP):

… but actually do you know how to start a company?

GW No…

I41 Yeah, and most people wouldn’t… and it is actually a little bit complex and there are things you need to do, and opening your bank account is actually a little bit hard… people who don’t know that, about opening a bank account will struggle, that they need to do the prep and get their passport and do this and
the other… and so you can’t open a company without a bank account or identifying you… we just need to straighten it out, so people at the top saying this is how it is done and people at the bottom going okay, I understand, and I will follow instructions and stop being a bureaucrat, it is a waste of time… I suppose there is a transparency thing, we have an intolerance to corruption and that is something that we desperately need to hold onto… we do differently, … in other places there are some pretty rough practices that we need to push back on, and in the long run that will help us… so don’t water it down for the sake of some quick wins, that would be bad… (I41, UKTI GEP)

There are a number of scales of interaction with the UK both prior to migration and whilst in the early stages of business development for the migrant entrepreneur. The institutional framework to be traversed in the process of ratifying and ‘legislating the business into existence’ jumps between the city, the nation, the region and the locality in a spatial mosaic of containerised policy. Kloosterman (2010) suggests an approach to the evaluation of migrant entrepreneurship opportunities and resources from a mixed embeddedness perspective (Kloosterman and Rath 2001; Cain and Spoonley 2013). His approach combines the ‘…microlevel of the individual entrepreneur (with his or her resources), with the meso-level of the local opportunity structure and links the latter…to the macro-institutional framework.’ (Kloosterman 2010: 25).

An examination of the necessary resources of a prospective entrepreneur with views on opportunity structures can be combined (Kloosterman 2010). This approach will be broadly adhered to, with the scalar evaluation of institutionalised structures and spaces of entrepreneurial engagement. The limbo that entrepreneurs are left in when applying for visas and making decisions around location often results in the inability to work to lengthy schedules as many policy hurdles have to be cleared before visas, business arrangements and the micro-levels of business development can be finalised. A US entrepreneur explains the difficulty that she had in concreting her business plans due to combined policy and business restrictions:

Setting up a business, you have to deal with a lot of things, and you can’t even make a full plan I feel sometimes, because without knowing where I am
going to be, in the UK? I can’t plan… I would incorporate it and do everything to try to make it successful in the UK, but if you don’t know then its like, well maybe I should establish it in the US and then bring it over to the UK… if I were to set up a business in the US, I would be fine, or maybe China right? But it is like, because I want to set up in the UK, I am a little bit different …the UK wants to promote entrepreneurship and bring revolutionary ideas from outside of the UK and into the UK, it is going to be brought by immigrants and it is not going to happen if you do not have that flexibility… (I15, US entrepreneur and student, Cambridge)

Setting up a company bank account may take a long while for migrant entrepreneurs and cause disruption. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) suggested that in a recent study, migrant entrepreneurs that they had engaged with also had problematic experiences with opening a bank account. Heather Rolfe, a principal research fellow at the NIESR, suggested that ‘David Cameron promised a ‘red carpet to those whose hard work and investment will create new British jobs’ but many who participated in the research had encountered red tape rather than a red carpet. Particular problems were reported with banks, which individuals had approached to open current accounts and for loans such as mortgages. Many of those who took part in the research had experienced difficulties and delays in simply opening a bank account, leading them to question whether the UK is open for business.’ (NIESR 2013). This occurred for two Brazilian entrepreneurs who suggested that the delay in opening a bank account due to the paperwork, performing checks of Brazilian partners and Portuguese/English translation caused the company to be unable to pay their staff promptly and engendered systemic issues in the business:

I32 I think the setup is easier…it is easier and some things it is extremely difficult, like I would say our worst experience, it was not set up a company, it was open a bank account… because how can you do a business without having a bank account?

GW Was it difficulties with the bank and the paperwork?
I32 Most of the paperwork, because the partners are foreigners, and after a while we get all the papers we needed…

I31 …we needed who your clients are, and they are all Brazilian, proof of address stamped by lawyer, translated by a translator…

GW That is going to cost…

I31 Yeah, and a lot of time…

I32 Open a company rent a place, this is easy, you have the capital you can do it… but once you need to manage money, do investments, buy equipment, things that are very expensive, pay your employees, it becomes essential to have this bank account, and we couldn’t. So it affects everyone, because we couldn’t open a bank account, so we couldn’t have the pay roll going, had to put the pay roll back in to the months that we didn’t have, so it is a mess, very confusing… (I31, I32, Brazilian entrepreneurs)

Hiring employees for the newly started businesses was key in rapid enhancement of capacity as clients were secured. Some underlying rationales behind the migration of business to the UK emerged as it was suggested that in Brazil, despite a growing economy, a skills deficit and high wages had pushed IT companies to look to Europe:

…and then something else that is very important is the push factors, despite the fact that Brazil’s economy is growing and perhaps because of it there is already a skills shortage in certain areas becoming apparent, and in the IT industry that is becoming a big problem, it is very difficult to get skilled IT labour in Brazil for a reasonable cost these days, and even if you do there is the problem of retention, because every time you find a good guy they will be head hunting… so you get a lot of rotation of staff and the cost is going up to such a degree that in some cases it is cheaper to hire IT staff here in the UK, so as much as it will be a surprise to many in the UK, some Brazilian companies setting up an IT company here, and hiring staff is actually cheaper
than doing it in Brazil. Now, you get very highly skilled very professional staff at what they consider to be reasonable rates, and added to that, the Brazilian taxation system is extremely complex… and it is getting more and more expensive for companies to operate within the law and pay tax in Brazil, whereas the UK government has introduced extremely simple tax rules and the corporate tax rate is going down and it is becoming very competitive. And labour law as well, in Brazil, once you have hired an employee, it is kind of difficulty to get rid of that employee is things take a downturn, whereas the labour law in the UK is very flexible, which makes it easier for companies [muffled] their staff according to the financial situation that they are in, all of these factors make the UK a very attractive place particularly for companies in the IT sector… (I29, UKTI Brazil)

The effective attainment of talented employees to further business expansion in the UK was not straightforward for some of the migrant entrepreneurs interviewed. A Brazilian entrepreneur suggested that she had hired and then let go a member of staff that did not ‘fit in’ with the business culture, which may be as a result of differences in the national culture of doing business:

This is all very recent, so I have been hired to do that in September, so first of all I was two weeks in Brazil, we were negotiating for the whole month of August, in September I went there and spent two weeks with a team in Brazil, to get to know them and then I was here, completely on my own to start everything. So, I spent a lot of time with the little bits, looking for accountants, lawyers, a place for me to stay, it is a long process of translating everything, all the materials, like the website, the structure for us to actually be an international company, and this has taken me almost until today. We have hired other people, we have [name], she is over there, we have [name] she is the business developer, we have also hired a social media guy, but he wasn’t a very good fit for the team, so we let him go, and it is set up so the same two owners in Brazil are the same two owners here, and I am the director here, so I am responsible for everything. (I25, Brazilian entrepreneur, London)
The process of location and acquisition of company premises and office space was assisted by organisations such as London and Partners, the London Chamber of Commerce and Tech City Investment Organisation in London, with fewer similar service provisions in Birmingham and the West Midlands and Cambridgeshire. The Chambers of Commerce in these regions did however, have services to assist with property and premises. A Brazilian entrepreneur in software development suggested that almost all of the information that he needed to start a company in the UK was provided by UKTI and Tech City Investment Organisation:

_The first thing, they gave me all the information that I need in Brazil, before I book my tickets, when I arrive here they show me, they ask me what sort of business do you do, and what sort of customers so they show me the city, and Tech City around Shoreditch…it is another profile and I show them and they try to understand what I really needed, they show me TechHub, I spoke with the manager there, and they show me a place in Liverpool Street and they introduce me to the guys from London and Partners, then I was informed about the TouchDown programme, they offer you a free desk in Liverpool Street, in Devonshire Square, for me it was perfect, because my company, we are not a product based company, we provide services, we need a formal space to do meetings, so my company doesn’t fit that well in inside TechHub, it is not the profile of my company, and they realise that… and I managed to do the agreement and everything and then they give me information about an accountant, how to open a company, who can help me do that and in two weeks I had already my company established working, the office, the desk, everything, nearly all for free, perfect, perfect, it was quite easy no, in two weeks I was able to do everything… (I23, Brazilian IT entrepreneur, London)_

This was reinforced by a former representative of UKTI in Sao Paulo, Brazil who suggested that the provision of free and subsidised office space through London and Partners allowed companies to strengthen the business with relatively low start up costs for a period that suited them:
I guess that as well, the free office space that for the SMEs is great, so London and Partners for example offer the touchdown London programme which gives a new company in London a free place for 6 months, it is basically a work bay for a single person, but if you are an SME for example it is a great way to get them started, for a year they have very low operating expense for some of the tech companies there are similar offers from tech hubs around the country [name], where you don’t get free space but you get lab space that you can hire on a daily basis, on an hourly basis on a weekly basis as you like, with all the kit available, whereas if you had to go and buy equipment, it would cost you thousands of pounds, so it is a lot cheaper for them if they want to do small scale research on a small budget… (I29, UKTI Brazil)

As well as the utilisation of institutionalised support services through UKTI in central government or disaggregated and spatially specific services such as Tech City Investment Organisation, or London and Partners, migrant entrepreneurs also used their networks of social connections to mobilised help in setting up. This was illustrated by a US entrepreneur, who, through the aid of UKTI as well as her own contacts negotiated an unproblematic start to her UK business life:

…for me it was easy, I came over and this friend, [name], who was a big member in the UKTI, and as soon as I got to Cambridge he asked me to come over for the [muffled speech], and from there, I had some other connections through my CEO forum, and somebody asked me to join her private equity firm, she is a Harvard Business school graduate, and she is in the Valley now, and what I do with her, is I do capital introduction, I am a consultant for that, and everything I do is on the computer, so I am wherever I want to be, in the house, or wherever, I work in a virtual office… (I12, US entrepreneur and on the board of MIT Enterprise forum)

In Katila and Wahlbeck’s study on ‘The role of (transnational) social capital in the start-up processes of immigrant businesses’, they evaluated the start up
processes of Chinese and Turkish migrant entrepreneurs in Finland. They postulate that

‘…families starting up new Chinese restaurants have sufficient practical skills in cooking and service work after working for years in Chinese restaurants. However, they do not usually have sufficient cultural and financial resources for the task.’ (Katila and Wahlbeck 2011: 299).

To an extent this point can be translated to the UK context, where migrant entrepreneurs have specific industry knowledge, as well as socio cultural capital that enables constrictive relationship maintenance and building, but they lack the spatialised knowledge of business culture, the politics of unfamiliarity and client building in the UK.

As suggested, support services are offered for migrant entrepreneurs at a number of different levels and scales. Consideration of language, culture, and spatially specific business and financial practice is necessary in order to provide relevant information for starting a business. Nathan and Lee, suggest that the migrant entrepreneurs that tapped into service provision and researched ‘…the potential for their businesses before coming to the UK appeared to be making more progress than those who did not.’ (2013: v). Furthermore, they suggest that informal support networks played a more important role than formal support structures, though ‘Those who had received [formal] business support and advice found this valuable, with UKTI and Scottish Enterprise both highly praised.’ (Nathan et al. 2013: v). The Greater London Authority (GLA) (2010: 2.27) suggests that improvement in the dissemination of support services needs to occur with ‘…new migrants are often excluded from services because of limited opening hours or a lack of understanding of care entitlements.’

Much of the impetus for starting a business in the UK for migrant entrepreneurs was the access to new markets, and the drive often came from the success of friends, role models or other migrant entrepreneurs, who would
then be called upon to offer support and soften the landing into the UK (Fletcher 2006):

Absolutely and even setting up… the idea that I started a business, and two or three of my friends are starting businesses, once immigrants are seen to start businesses then other immigrants are able to start businesses, they can create jobs and maybe create space for other people to get in this, there is a chain effect somewhere, but I think it needs to be encouraged and I don’t think it is necessarily very well supported… (I49, Kenyan entrepreneur)

Above, a Kenyan entrepreneur in financial services felt that migrant entrepreneurship was not well supported by formal bodies such as UKTI, UKBA or BIS. The spatialities of support networks are called into question, with the potentially disparate allocation of global support from the likes of UKTI and British Consulate in certain nations. As will been illustrated, in Brazil, there is extensive information and service support offered to prospective entrepreneurs. A Brazilian entrepreneur states that he received practical advisory assistance for his working life as well as personal help in locating a property to live in and aid with acclimatisation to London from UKTI in Sao Paulo:

I have received a lot of assistance from the UK Trade Office in Sao Paulo, and through the trade office I have established a contact with London and Partners here in London, both were very helpful. Each on helped me with different practical aspects, but overall they complimented each other and kind of covered every single aspect that I needed. Even things that I didn’t anticipate, I would get assistance with, you know. So it is a very wide range of services that are offered to foreign companies. (I24, Brazilian entrepreneur)

On the support side, a former UKTI Brazil representative, also in Sao Paulo suggested that his role was one of support and facilitation of companies into the UK, from large multinationals to individual migrant entrepreneur at seed stage:
…well basically in Brazil my role was inward investment manager for UK Trade and Investment, I was based in the British Consulate general in Sao Paulo, and with my role together with a small team, one other and one intern, was to work with Brazilian companies from all sectors and of all sizes who were interested in setting up in the UK in order to qualify for assistance they had to be prepared to set up a formal company in the UK, register with companies house and employ at least one person, so these companies ranged from university spin outs and other start ups to SMEs to very large corporations, extremely large organisations, (I29, UKTI Brazil representative, Sao Paulo)

Scaling down the remit of support, a representative of UKTI spoke about the rolling out of a new business plan competition and the support services that would complement it. The target migrant entrepreneur is graduate, or student, requiring greater levels of assistance in securing accommodation and other personal facets of living in the UK for a semi-permanent period:

Yes, so when I was talking about the support package, we are still working on that but there are at least a dozen different items, so it is help with living arrangements, help with setting up a bank account, finding a location in a co-working space or an incubator, it is help with any other aspects that they need to set up the company, so registration, legal advice, accountants, and some of this will be provided free, but some of it will be subsidised, and some of it will be here is a referral and let the company get on with what they want to do, so again, we don’t want to be too prescriptive, but at the same time we want to make sure that the companies are not struggling with this, and they explained how they had struggled a little bit as they were not aware of UKTI and they had come and set up their first company here. And it is the same with a recent graduate from an engineering school in France so I asked him what he wanted access to prior to setting up his business, in other words we are trying to validate what young companies are going to need when they come and in the first year we will put the package together and if it doesn’t look as though it will provide everything that we need, we will re-evaluate… (I51, UKTI Brazil)
Location of office space and highly specific knowledge of the place that the migrant entrepreneur will be relocating to is essential for business as well as personal development. A Brazilian entrepreneur in business development and design thinking suggested that an English speaking location was key, with a choice from the US or the UK. London and Partners provided support to the business in contacts, accountants and lawyers, as well as other aspects of international business relocation:

*I think that they are thinking about strategic places, so the first place would have to be, an English speaking place, that is, it is easier for us because we speak English, it is sometimes broken, but...still it is the second language, so it would be an English speaking place, for me I think it makes more sense London than Chicago, because it is better connected, there is support from the government, ... so we have for example L&P they are supporting us with office space, they are giving us contacts, accountants, lawyers, anything we need, they are giving us support to, a year membership to London Chamber. So they are really supportive, so I think that if there is a ... part of the government that is thinking of opening an agency to help with business from foreign countries that is good news for us.* (I25, Brazilian entrepreneur)

At the micro scale of support service provision, a Chinese entrepreneur specialising in forging business and networking relationships between China and the UK suggested that in line with Chinese business culture, she had assisted companies in contact management and strategic introductions in the Cambridge area:

*Well we have not actually helped anyone set up per se... because it is so easy to set up a business here, and there is free government support, as you know, for example if you set up in London, there is one called London and Partners that provide lots of free support and I know them very well, in fact I work with them in that informal way... so... we, our help is more a lot of time, there was a company in Cambridge, one of our neighbours, but they just ... they have been here for 7/8 years and when they first set up they wanted to see the Managing Director of St. Johns’ Innovation Centre which introduced*
them to me and then they just knock on our door all the time, and they ask everything... you know everything, whatever you can think of... so we are just giving them free advice, we become friends, that is how a lot of Chinese companies, but later we had business dealings arranged senior level meetings and we use them as our resource to do things in China, we become more embedded, we are more like partners after a while. In fact... this company, their chairwoman invested in my company... so basically going back to your question, day to day... we typically hiring staff, VAT and visa all those matters. For example this company we introduce them to a law firm who specialise on work permit for Chinese companies, recruitment companies, we introduce them to the local government... those free service, but that is a service that we can offer to other companies, but as I say, we don't usually get involved in this setting up... it is all finding partners finding acquisition partners, investment partner because there is more value added, also Chinese companies are not to pay for small things, like an introduction for someone... (I56, Chinese entrepreneur, Cambridge)

The facilitation of contact with potential clients was seen as fundamental to the business development process. Operating in a global marketplace, with an emphasis on the UK and Europe, a Brazilian entrepreneur spoke about the significance of connections and the strategies that they are using to secure business. These contacts were established through networking, attending industry relevant events and finally, through hiring a member of staff to concentrate on client acquisition:

*It is the two of us and we have just recruited someone to work with us... in [muffled] he will be helping us with events and strategic introductions, that is the most critical thing to get introduced to serious companies and to talk with decision makers and budgets, and we come from an organisation that is a lot larger than the two of us...* (I31, Brazilian entrepreneur)

In summary, this section has outlined processes of registering the company, setting up a bank account, hiring employees, finding and securing premises and office space, personal aspects of international migration and the support
services at different scales that are used to facilitate these processes. In their 2013 report on ‘The Economic and Labour Market Impacts of Tier 1 entrepreneur and investor migrants’ for the Migration Advisory Committee, Nathan et al. (2013: 49) make a series of policy recommendations in relation the Tier 1 visa and for support to entrepreneurs and investors wishing to become established in the UK. Despite their suggestion that ‘…the active support of UKTI and business support agencies to Tier 1 entrants is welcomed.’ (Nathan et al. (2013: vi) state ‘The need for review of the difficulties experienced by migrant entrepreneurs with banks, both in opening personal accounts and in borrowing.’ (Nathan et al 2013: vi). This is reinforced by the call for greater levels of ‘Business support to entrepreneurs before and after application, through coordinated working by the UK Border Agency and BIS/UKTI.’ These recommendations are echoed here, along with the praise that many migrant entrepreneurs gave to formalised support structures that are often institutionalised through central government. The provision of support services to allow a smooth transition from country of origin to the UK is fundamental to the migrant entrepreneur in starting and developing their business.

6.5 The impact and influence of Higher Education Institutions

Higher education institutions play an important and co-constitutive role in the creation of the UK’s economic landscape and international student levels signpost national openness to non EEA migration. Mukerjee and Chanda (2013: 1) postulate as education has increasingly assumed the role of a tradable service, countries from all parts of the world have become active participants in the ongoing internationalization of higher education. They suggest that ‘One of the key outcomes of this process has been the phenomenal growth in international student mobility since 1998.’ UK Higher Education sector has generated considerable export earnings for the national economy. The total value accumulated annually from overseas students, including tuition fee income, finance from research grants procured overseas, and revenue from internationally-located spin-out companies, has been estimated at almost £8bn (BIS 2011). In their 2013 study on ‘International
student perceptions of post study opportunities in the UK’ Warren et al. (2013: 3) suggest that ‘…international students set particular importance on the high reputation of UK universities…’ when electing to study in the UK. World class universities are a lure for global talent, providing regional hubs for the attraction and retention of students, graduates and academics within a close knit community of knowledge production, and as will be discussed, enterprise. As Gertler and Vinodrai (2005: 1) suggest ‘…the university acts as an anchor for creative thinking and activity within the economy.’ The economic embeddedness of the HEI goes beyond higher education provision and signals the integration of a complex set of enterprise, innovation and public sector engagements. The university in particular is an infrastructural node in the economic landscape with a latent labour pool, skills capacity and capital source. A representative of Tech City Investment Organisation highlights the role of the University of the Arts in East London, signposting it as an integral aspect of the cityscape and driver for migration to the sub city region:

So for instance, if it is a company in financial services pointing out that the real high speed internet connections that we have here and the low latency would be a significant factor. If it is a creative company, it may be due to the presence of … a whole range of internationally recognised colleges of art and design. So, particularly featuring the University of the Arts. (I1, TCIO)

HEIs foster enterprise and innovation programs, with service provision built in to the formalised structures of education institutions through enterprise offices, spin out companies and research. Universities provide capital for companies looking to start up with a focus on high technology or ‘brain intensive’ industries. In Birmingham and the West Midlands this is highlighted through schemes such as Be Seen, Technology Strategy board regionally focused grants and Innovation vouchers. As a representative of Birmingham Science Park, Aston suggests, the financial assistance for creative and digital tech companies encourages the retention of talent in the region:

That was a scheme that I believe started at Aston University, but has been rolled out nationwide, where SMEs can access up to £5000 worth of support
from universities, so they can get someone’s time, or to do research, so that is really good. Something called innovation networks, run through Wolverhampton or Coventry and that is a grant of £10,000, so there are a few things going on… Be Seen, which is an incubator for recent graduates based in Birmingham, and they can access a grant… so I see part of my role as giving out that information and making sure that companies know it is available. So there is low level grants, I don’t know of any companies that have been successful at the bank… I don’t think that many companies even bother… they don’t see it as an option. We have a couple of reinvestment trust, where you can access loans at a slightly better rate of interest… and they are easier to get… I know a couple of people who have done that. Creative England is another organisation, it has its base in this building and provides grants and assistance for creative, digital… (I46, Birmingham Science Park, Aston)

A representative of Birmingham Chamber of Commerce suggests that there is not ‘a ‘…regular experience of entrepreneurs coming here [Birmingham and the West Midlands] and settling here today…’ (I34, Birmingham Chamber of Commerce). This phenomenon is being mediated by the presence of this fund availability, with attempts to foster a culture of university led spin out businesses:

…I don’t think there is that experience but if it is happening, I think that it is tending to be university lead, you would see it more in terms of spin outs, Birmingham science park probably have examples of that happening in a tech way that you could probably speak to … and maybe you could do that in terms of [name], but in terms of the common experience, what I think you do see more of now… is a sort of transient population that will split their time between here and particularly the Middle East and Abu Dhabi, there are a couple of people that, I know people that do that are there is something interesting going on there, but I couldn’t speak with any confidence in the continuing waves of entrepreneurs coming over and establishing their … in the last couple of years, if they are it is probably tech lead through the universities… (I34, Birmingham Chamber of Commerce)
Franklin et al. (2001) suggest that these ‘surrogate entrepreneurs’ form the backbone of contemporary of intellectual property commercialisation. They posit that the rapid increase in the commercialization of this intellectual capital can be ‘…viewed as a paradigm shift of comparable magnitude to the industrial revolution, or in terms of organizational structure, the introduction of limited liability...’ (Franklin et al. 2001: 2). Wong et al. (2007: 941) echo this perspectives, suggesting that in the context of Singapore, as in the UK, increasing prominence has been given to the role of universities in stimulating economic growth through ‘…industrially relevant research, technology commercialization, high-tech spin-offs, attracting foreign talent, and inculcating entrepreneurial mindsets.’ The manifestation of intellectual property commercialisation has also been noted in Cambridge, with Anglia Ruskin University providing funds to act as a ‘candle’ for enterprising graduates and academics:

…supported through Anglia Ruskin University… Anglia Ruskin got some money after the University of Warwick turned it down, somebody came up to them and said, I’ve got £50,000, use this to encourage entrepreneurship. So we use this as a prize for businesses, and use it as a candle, this year we had about 30 applicants for this fund, and they can be anybody from the Cambridge sub-region……The [name of Norwich based science park] are not doing what they should be doing… in fact they are encouraging people to be scientists and not entrepreneurs, and not being open minded and they bully people to stop them being entrepreneurial…[Highly skilled migrants] These are exactly the sort of people that we ought to be encouraging to come and live here and make us even more middle class than we are… (I9, St. John’s Innovation centre and advisor on entrepreneurship in Cambridge)

Lockett and Wright (2005: 1043) postulate that there needs to be a change in university structuring of technology transfer for the spin out company process from universities to occur effectively. They find that both the number of spin out companies

‘…created and the number of spin-out companies created with equity investment are significantly positively associated with expenditure on
intellectual property protection, [and] the business development capabilities of technology transfer offices and the royalty regime of the university."

Their results highlight the importance not just of resource stocks, but also of developing appropriate capabilities of technology transfer officers in ‘spinning out’ companies. Link and Scott (2005) find that in the US context university spin-off companies are a larger proportion of companies in parks that are geographically closer to their university and in parks that have a biotechnology focus. This ties into the funding impetus, with the desire to keep enterprise geographically proximal and create an ecosystem of innovation around the university. The proliferation of business plan competitions within universities in the UK, often driven by the commercialisation of STEM subject research again calls into question the role of the university and the interplay of student and enterprise. A former senior figure in St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge and advisor on entrepreneurship suggests that Anglia Ruskin University is thinking progressively about developing an integrated culture of entrepreneurship within its existing institutional framework:

*It has a competition every year for the best new business idea for example, which is open to students from any faculty, so they don’t have to be from the business school, or particularly one of the technology departments. It can be anything, they run this competition every year [muffled speech] as students’ progress they have to firm up their ideas and devise a business plan, imagine it is as something that they might take to a dragons den, and that is a very deliberate act on the part of the university to get people thinking at least in a slightly, if entrepreneurial is too grand a word for it. (I8, former St. John’s Innovation Centre senior figure and enterprise advisor)*

Pérez Pérez and Sánchez (2003: 823) suggest that an ‘...important contribution of entrepreneurship ‘hi-tech’ firms is their catalysing role to knowledge creation and transfer in innovation networks.’ The identification of entrepreneurs within innovation networks often occurs through funding competition and company development. A senior figure at the London
Chamber of Commerce and Industry calls into question how the identification of entrepreneurs in an HEI context should occur. He suggests that the role of universities is key, and cites examples of the effectiveness of intervention strategies in the promotion of entrepreneurship (see Appendix 7).

The role of universities as sponsors of students and graduates has increased over the last year with the introduction of the Graduate Entrepreneur visa, as previously discussed. Working alongside university’s enterprise and technology transfer offices graduates are encouraged to develop and incubate business concepts under the auspices of an HEI:

The university also has to monitor all of its Graduate entrepreneurs, there has to be at least quarterly meetings, the Graduate entrepreneur scheme works on a 1 year grant, possibly extended to a 2nd year, so we have to make an assessment of the progress and the extension year relies in the assessment of the entrepreneurs, got some likely plan for raising the £50,000 to switch into the main entrepreneur category by the end of the second year, so obviously there has to be some ongoing contact there, enterprise are ideally placed, they do that already with home and European students, it is just a question of extending it for students who can no longer get post study work visas who may have been able to do this prior to April [2013], (I20, university immigration specialist)

There is a contrast between universities in the involvement in enterprise schemes, this varies dependent on the age, subject emphasis and location of the HEI. However, Shane and Stuart (2002) argue that the overall resource environment of a university is important for the survival of start-ups, regardless of their location (Lerner 2005; Link and Scott 2005). Audretsch (2004: 2) tests the propositions that ‘…geographic proximity to the university is shaped by different spillover mechanisms, research and human capital, and by different types of knowledge spillover, natural sciences and social sciences.’ He posits that spillover effects are locally bounded with an emphasis on place. A Cambridge based entrepreneur illustrated the importance of space in a comparison of Imperial College, London and the
University of Cambridge, he suggests that proximity for company and entrepreneur is fundamental in determining business development through funding and access to university resources:

…in contrast with London, in particular in contrast with Imperial College and Cambridge the first thing to say is they are both stellar universities, the quality of innovation is great, so I am not making any point about that, 2) that Imperial College is in the heart of a world city, none of the guys that work on campus can afford to live close, whereas in Cambridge, I don’t know what the numbers are, but I bet you 75% of the entrepreneurs in Cambridge live in 10 miles and in London that is very very different, I think the community is a completely different thing. If you look at what Imperial innovations does, so Imperial innovations is the tech arm of Imperial College, and is analogous to Cambridge Enterprise here in Cambridge, it has a very similar aim, it has raised £100 million maybe more, so it has got a stunning advantage, it can start people up and have a more commercial agenda… than Cam Enterprise and it has real money to invest in companies. But what it doesn't have is the 150 savvy guys that you have got around Cambridge… and it buys into the fact that they are important and it reaches out… I think the mixture and dynamics of things in Imperial is very different to Cambridge… another factor that I don’t quite understand, in Cambridge, you have got the university of Cambridge and you have Anglia Ruskin… university, which is the former Cambridge college of arts and technology, I don’t want to be sniffy about that, but it is a different type of institution, but Cambridge I think dominates Anglia Ruskin, I am sure of that. In London you have got Imperial College, UCL and I don’t know how many others but you have probably got 4 or 5 competitors to Imperial, that you don’t have in Cambridge, London is a world city, it can take all of that… the dynamic of that is quite different and look at London, you might see some interesting differences there… (I40, Cambridge based entrepreneur)

It is argued by a Cambridge entrepreneur and senior figure at the Centre for Business Innovation that the University of Cambridge is a locus of the enterprise community in the region:
Well the university is right at the heart of what happens in Cambridge, but connections between the university and many companies in Cambridge are quite diverse and in some cases… quite complicated, […] Cambridge is a small place and in a particular aspect of that community, for example the telecoms, mobile area, everybody knows everybody else and there is someone in the university that can answer almost any technical question that you can come up with… providing you know who it is to ask… the profs in the universities have key role in this as mentors, as communications hubs… … so communications both within and outside the university is quite complex and made up of thousands of individual relationships… I suspect thinking back to what I said earlier, the consultancy companies plus the university, between them have been responsible for attracting a large number of the brightest people from outside the UK, and indeed outside Europe, and with the university, obviously Cambridge only takes the very top people, so again, you are filtering out the brightest people that there are around, and Cambridge is in competition with MIT and Harvard and maybe only a handful of other universities to get those top people… and once they are in Cambridge a proportion of them will stay here, or perhaps return later on… and I think that, I am not involved directly with what is happening in Tech City at all, but I think that will be quite a challenge for Tech City and London generally, because its universities are extremely good, (I45, Cambridge based entrepreneur and senior figure at the Centre for Business Innovation)

HEIs provide support and business advice to local businesses and spin out companies, acting as a networked hub for entrepreneurial talent in their proximity. Differentiating spin off companies and businesses embedded in the enterprise culture of the university, a former St. John’s Innovation Centre figure and enterprise advisor suggests that the university does not have to be directly involved in business activity to contribute to development and success:

The vast majority if businesses are here because the university is here to some extent but are not… in other words the university didn’t contribute to the IP, or doesn’t have a hold on the IP. The people doing business are university
students perhaps, and the environment encourages them and there are mechanisms to assist them should they wish to start a business and assist with commercialisation. And what we are trying to do at Anglia Ruskin is parallel that with the less scientific businesses so we get a more balanced enterprise society… so it is not just high tech enterprise society, but it is a total enterprise society…Most of the people who start these businesses …have links back to places of family or birth or whatever, the businesses are national or international, so they are not local market places and most of the market places are international which takes them outside the UK, and if they get funding, or equity funding that will take them outside the UK because it means they have to grow the business in order to exit, so the horizons are quite national or international. Cambridge is a world class university, so you see similar things that have happened in Oxford, though Oxford is a town that went through the industrial revolution, quite clearly and had a motor industry, whereas Cambridge didn’t really go through the industrial revolution, it is still a medieval town basically… (I9, former St. John’s Innovation Centre figure and enterprise advisor)

Wren and Storey (2002: 334) evaluate the provision of ‘…soft business support on the performance of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs)…’ Though they find that this has no impact on the survival of smaller SMEs, it is most effective in the mid-range SMEs, where it raises survival rates by about 4% over the longer run and growth rates in surviving firms by up to 10% per annum. Birmingham City University are involved in the support of local businesses in the Jewellery Quarter of the city, as a representative of Birmingham City Council explains:

So there are about 300 jewellery quarter firms there now and we have a specific programme, running with Birmingham City University that supports the jewellers, (I4, Birmingham City Council)

There is an emphasis as HEIs not only as business support hubs, but as centres for the attraction retention of knowledge and skills. Arguably in the UK, the debate over the role of universities as a source of new spin-out
companies was intensified after the publication of reports from the Bank of England and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in 1996 and 1997 respectively (Franklin et al. 2001) Franklin et al. (2001: 2) suggest that both reports ‘...highlight the issues associated with, and significance of, new technology-based firms to the future of the UK economy...’ Despite this relatively recent spin off culture associated with UK universities, ‘the global war for talent’ (Beechler and Woodward 2009: 273) has been waged for decades, intensifying recently with the proliferation of global migration pathways for international students. Manning and Massini (2008: 35) posit that the

‘...seemingly unlimited availability of science and engineering (S&E) talent in emerging economies and the increasing difficulties of finding such talent in advanced economies have given rise to a new trend: the global sourcing of S&E talent.’

The use of universities as a pool of talent and labour is illustrated in London, Cambridge and Birmingham and the West Midlands. In their study of multicultural economic development in Birmingham, McEwan et al. draw on critiques of global cities to conceptualise Birmingham as a global city by highlighting forms of economic globalisation that draw on the city’s residents, their histories and their social and cultural networks. The representation of Birmingham in this conceptual framework suggests a networked interdependence of city agents in co-creating a hub for economic development. Brown et al. (2009a: 131) posit that ‘Creative migrants broadly speaking come to Birmingham without a clear plan and on individual pathways. These migrant are attracted by the creative potential of Birmingham and are looking for quality of life and a creative environment in which to develop their talent and to interact with other talented creative professionals.’ The HEIs within and around Birmingham contribute to the perception of Birmingham as a creative hub in the UK. A representative of the West Midlands Economic Forum suggests that Birmingham and West Midlands HEIs are drivers of talent diversification and attraction:
I haven’t got any data for that, but yes, it is starting to attract further people in… this is why the university technical colleges are quite important to build up that skilled labour pool. [in Birmingham and the West Midlands] (I43, senior figure in West Midlands Economic Forum)

Viewing higher education as an export, Birmingham’s economy is significantly impacted by the migration of students into universities and HEIs. A representative from Birmingham Chamber of Commerce suggests that the development of skills for the city is key in ensuring economic, and socio cultural progress:

We did a big piece of work with the MAC to make a case for understanding by the points system they are not sufficiently skilled, but make a case that we aren’t providing that… that training and that facility, and that was recognised locally and I think that even an academy type thing was set up to try to provide the indigenous population with those sort of skills… it couldn’t attract enough people to make the source sustainable, there is a shortage in the city that is very unique to Birmingham… … The instinctive response that we have, we certainly would support kind of, there is a feeling that universities, when looking at student recruitment, Birmingham’s biggest export is its student population, higher education, we are normally [muffled] and have been crippled on government policy on student visas, and that knocks on, and concerns that I think that lots of business organisations have articulated in that we have the requirement for lots of workers to come into the country, as we have huge skill deficits that we are not currently able to do, and the economy is suffering as a consequence of that so… the chefs, academic staff and students, I believe that, speaking to the hippodrome, which is where Birmingham ballet is based, dancers as well were affected and eventually a route was introduced in Tier 1 there in the system… (I34, Birmingham Chamber of Commerce)

Similarly, in the Cambridgeshire context, a Cambridge based entrepreneur specialising in forging transnational connections between the UK and India
posits that feeding graduates into the regional economic system will percolate through institutions and lead to improvement in skills for the area:

…and what the university is doing, it is feeding into the system, and there are quite a lot of bright kids and if they like it here, they stay here, and if they stay here they are actually building the business… statistically it has the highest numbers of start ups in the UK, probably in the world, and they are quite successful as well. And therefore the environment is set up where you don’t have to go very far to find the skills that you need, so if you are starting up something there will be a lot of clever people around to help you start that business… (I10, Cambridge based entrepreneur)

As well as being interconnected with and arguably co-constituted by spin off companies, knowledge and skills networks and regional businesses, HEIs are interlinked with accelerators and innovation centres. The role of St. John’ Innovation Centre is pivotal in facilitating the commercialisation of research and the development of graduates and students into entrepreneurs in the region. A senior figure at the innovation centre positions it as a component of the regional ecosystem, providing office space, hot desking and a close knit community of entrepreneurs:

… there is an ecosystem around Cambridge, although we are owned by St. Johns we are open to all covers, you don’t even have to be a member if the university, you come here because being in Cambridge is somehow relevant to you, we did at our last annual survey find that around 25% of people that work in the building have got Cambridge degrees often at advanced level. When people come to us they may have come from completely outside, they may have come from the university’s pre incubator, that is a kind of hot desking arrangement in the university itself that is grooming those companies that are not quite ready to give up the day job so to speak. And when people leave us, they can either move into the science park across the road, the business park down the road or the centre of town or London. So what matters is that there are many different streams that can merge and indeed do merge… (I3, St. John’s Innovation Centre)
Incubators are increasingly being used as a tool for promoting entrepreneurship and startups, leading to new policy incentives and a changing economic landscape in the UK (Aernoudt 2004). Incubators rely on close links with funding networks, such as those that have been addressed in this section. Incubators are tools that could be important for migrant entrepreneurs in enabling a fast track understanding of business culture, as well as development of social capital when starting a business.

6.6 Summary

Migration policy in the UK is naturally not designed to promote migrant entrepreneurship but enable structuring and management of migrants. Economic incentives promote migrant entrepreneurship in the UK, these incentives include tax policy and credits, access to European markets, regionally specific funding and investment prospects, the ease of setting up a business and ease of access to free or subsidised support services.

The global financial crisis has affected migrant entrepreneurship in the UK and the rationale for migration to the UK to conduct entrepreneurial activity – despite evidence of numbers of highly skilled migrants under Tier 1 of the points based system dropping year on year (Figure 10), we may in fact be seeing a renaissance in movement to the UK, based on conditions caused by the Global Financial Crisis.
7. Transnational socio cultural connections

This chapter addresses the third research question - how are non-EEA highly skilled entrepreneurial migrants connected and embedded in transnational socio cultural networks in the UK and their home country? The section outlines the concept of connectivity, and empirically applies this to the three case study areas to offer original contribution to understandings of the transnational socio cultural connections in the UK, which can be applied to other national contexts within sub national spaces and places of migrant entrepreneurial engagement.

7.1 Connectivity

This study offers a unique approach to research on migrant entrepreneurship and transnational socio cultural connections through developing a greater understanding of the impact on sub national spaces in the UK. Scale is important, and a tool through which spatially significant phenomena can be investigated. Moving between scales in the analysis of entrepreneurship, policy and economic landscape has allowed aspects of space and place to be located in a resonant debate within migration studies and tying into the structuration debate, which is of key importance within the context of this study. Priemus and Zonneveld (2004: 283) suggest that it is useful to move between scales in the analysis of policy, ‘...from the European Union to national spatial policies ...between national policies and regional spatial policies and between regional and urban spatial policies.’ As mentioned, this underpins the variance in spatial and institutional configuration of sub national areas addressed. Accordingly, Clarke (2000: 360) posits that there are gaps in ‘...the ability of national governments to control global and transnational economic processes ... stemming from the logic of new competition and production processes at a global scale as well as limited national sovereignty-direct the attention and activities of political and economic interests to sub-national levels.’
Sub-national scales of transnational engagement are important spaces in the evaluation of migrant entrepreneurship and connectivity across borders that this entails. Storper (1997) suggests that conditions of interdependence, indivisibilities, and uncertainty lead to greater efforts to coordinate actors and to channel decisions at sub-national levels. Transnational entrepreneurs and associated communities provide a mechanism for the international diffusion of knowledge and the creation and upgrading of regional and local capabilities. With cross-regional technical communities having the potential to jump-start local entrepreneurship,

‘…they succeed over the long term to the extent that they build alliances with technical professionals, businesses, and policymakers in their home countries.’ (Saxenian 2005: 36).

In migration studies, the long-distance economic relations that migrants have with their homelands have been the subject of an extensive, albeit fragmented, multidisciplinary inquiry. However, Guarnizo (2003: 666) suggests that ‘Most existing studies have been primarily concerned with the north-south flow of monetary remittances that migrants send to their homelands.’

Framing the regional and to some extent, scalar debate in the UK is the overarching government objective of ‘rebalancing the economy across regions’ (Harris and Moffat 2013). As discussed, the impacts of the financial crisis in the UK included a loss of public sector jobs, focused in the North of England. As such Harris and Moffat (2013: 2) argue that the focus of ‘…central government policy is now on greater employment growth and diversification away from public sector employment, rather than improving productivity.’ This ties into the incentivisation of entrepreneurship, migrant entrepreneurship and self-employment as modes of economic diversification in austere times (Chaston 2013). Government regional policy has shifted, necessitating a reframing of the sub-national debate in the UK to encompass a movement from regional to local policy development. This restructuring of political and developmental organisations has been exemplified in the
abolition of Regional Development Agencies in favour of the establishment of Local Enterprise Partnerships in 2010. Despite this institutional reorganisation, networks of non-governmental bodies continue to operate in regional arenas, suggesting the embeddedness and effectiveness of this regional framework. This ties into Keating et al.’s (2009: 51) position, whereby ‘Devolution may leave existing systems of interest articulation unchanged, leaving ‘regions without regionalism’…’ Keating et al. (2009: 51) suggest that the territorialisation of these systems of interest articulation may cause bounding of some groups to spaces and places of engagement, ‘…while allowing others the freedom to choose’ between levels of government; or it might promote a general territorialization of interest representation and the emergence of territorial policy communities.’ A representative of Tech City Investment Organisation cites the role of Local Enterprise Networks and their predecessors, Regional Development Agencies, suggesting that their subnational focus falls in contrast to the contemporary tech cluster models offered by schemes such as East London Tech City:

... well... when the regional development organisations were in existence, yes, I guess there were similar things, now there is a different structure so in some areas there will be ... an organisation that focuses in a small area, a city or a region so there is in Manchester, there is in Greater Cambridge area, obviously in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, still, so there are similar organisations that try to help companies coming to an area. But I think that Tech City Investment Organisation breaks the mould a little bit, because it looks much more at the holistic picture, so it is not just about ... getting grants to take your company to the ext stage, or getting investment, it is more about, well if I am a start up company coming into East London, how can we help with everything that I need to get my company going? So be it investment, marketing, route to market all those things from a business side, but also, can you help me, at least point me in the direction of accommodation, language schools, transportation, all of those other things. So, we don’t get into a lot of detail with those other aspects, but we do work very closely with London and partners... who do. [...] I think that if there was one word that you would pick to describe what we do, it is trying to take a more holistic view of inward
investment and really put ourselves in the mindset of a start up company, and say, okay, what are your issues likely to be and help resolve those.

Echoing Guarnizo (2003: 667), it will be argued here that a migrant entrepreneur’s transnational engagement has ‘...significant influence and transforming effects not only on the development of their localities and countries of origin, but also on global macroeconomic processes, including international financial arrangements, international trade, and the production and consumption of culture.’ Furthermore, spanning this and subsequent sections is the call for acknowledgement of the role of everyday transnational practices. These practices and activities are not ‘...neatly compartmentalized, nor are their consequences...’ (Guarnizo 2003: 666). In order to examine the economic effects of transnational migration Guarnizo argues that researchers should not limit the inquiry solely to activities that are a priori tagged economic. He suggests that more holistic perspective should be positioned to capture ‘...economic implications, intended and otherwise, generated by migrants’ multifaceted transnational engagement – phenomena that can be described by the concept of transnational living.’ (Guarnizo 2003: 666). As such there are regional differences in transnational socio cultural connections and the ways in which they are manifest. This section will explore the three case study regions of London (focusing on East London Tech City), Birmingham and the West Midlands and Cambridgeshire and the connections that they harbour within spaces of transnational engagement and places that have been implanted with transnationally significant meaning for migrant entrepreneurs, policy makers, professionals and business groups.

7.1.1 Inner London (East)

In Inner London East the institutionalisation of transnational connections has occurred through government initiatives and organisations such as Tech City Investment Organisation (TCIO). Addressing institutionalisation according to Huntington’s definition, ‘...the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability,’ (Remmer 1997: 35). Levitt et al. (2003) suggest that transnational activities vary with regard to their formality. The
regularization of transnational allegiances has been expressed here within institutionalized structures, primarily UKTI programs and incentivisation to structure previously informal relations. The objective of institutionalisation is iterated by a TCIO representative, he suggests that the formalisation of connectivity with clusters outside of the UK and Europe provides channels of entrepreneurial opportunity:

So, I think in some instances I think that we are trying to develop more formal relationships with some of the clusters in … outside of the UK. And we would do that where it makes sense, so if there is… a means of helping companies in both locations, so in London and overseas to do exchange to come up and set up and say for a company that wants to do business in the US make it easier for them and vice versa, well …and for other regions in the UK we have had as I have said, we have had some discussions with the other clusters, but that’s… I think that is something that will happen naturally anyway and it can be on a company by company or sector by sector basis because… there is a very strong gaming cluster here and also in animation…but there are probably stronger clusters in those two areas in Brighton and Bristol respectively…so, we would expect that companies and networking groups involved in that sector area will be looking at companies and communicating with companies not only in Tech City but in Brighton and Manchester, wherever else … (I1, TCIO representative)

The use of business delegations and exchanges to facilitate transnational connections is documented by Liu in his 1999 and 2001 studies of Chinese institutionalisation of transnational connections. He suggests that academic literature tends to focus on the personal/ informal dimensions of Chinese transnational business networks, paying little attention to their historical precedents and formal institutionalization. Vertovec (2003: 655) cites the importance of collective practices ‘…including association meetings, the pooling of funds, visits by delegations, and community development projects…’ He cites Smith’s (1995) work on Mexican villagers in New York and Mexico and Levitt’s (2001) study of Dominican villagers in Boston and the Dominican Republic to illustrate mobilising structures in shaping transnational
practices. Saxenian (2002: 192) suggests that US educated Indian professionals institutionalized their social networks in the 1990s ‘...through the formation of two of Silicon Valley’s most vibrant associations—The Indus Entrepreneur (TiE) and the Silicon Valley Indian Professionals Association (SIPA)…’ though these bodies were arguably slow to build direct ties to India.

The government facilitation of inward investment in the UK through UKTI has taken the form of networked knowledge and information exchanges. Notably, a program with a series of Brazilian tech clusters, housed alongside university spin off centres, has proved fruitful in facilitating the migration of Brazilian entrepreneurs to East London. In Gordon’s study on ‘State, milieu, network: systems of innovation in Silicon Valley’ he suggests that that while recognizing the importance of intra-regional linkages and collective learning processes, the analysis of innovation systems must

‘...incorporate the precise articulation of regional processes and external innovation relations, a configuration of linkages that takes varied forms in different localities and may change substantially within a single locality over time.’ (Gordon 2001: 5).

The connections that East London has with the home places of the migrant entrepreneurs that have (re)located their businesses are conceptualised as flows in Castells’ (2000) ‘Network Society’ as they embody the cross-border circulation of knowledge, skills and intelligence that constitute the space of flows (Beaverstock 2005). Migrant entrepreneurs transfer their knowledge cross-border as they enter cities like London, within established cosmopolitan connections and networks, which are reproduced in both entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial space. The conceptualisation of migrant entrepreneurs as transnational elites entails their being embedded within transnational networks, which are both cross-border (Bailey 2001; Vertovec 2002) and highly spatialised in the transnational social spaces of the London as a city (Smith 1999; 2001; Beaverstock 2005).
Meyer (2001: 93) suggests that ‘Connections with earlier migrants provide potential migrants with many resources that they use to diminish the risks and costs of migration: information about procedures (technical as well as legal), financial support, job prospects, administrative assistance, physical attendance, emotional solidarity.’ The use of exchange schemes between East London Tech City and Brazilian cities is illustrated by a representative of TCIO:

I1 So… so our primary focus in UKTI is to do two things, one is to facilitate inward investment, so that is companies coming from overseas coming and setting up in Tech City in particular, it also helps in the trade side companies that are based in the UK to internationalise and do business overseas. Now, there’s a whole team of other people, not in the Tech City Investment Organisation, but within the investment team within UKTI that help companies move to other parts of the…UK, so for instance I work closely with a colleague who is in the digital media area and we went on a joint mission to Brazil, and to get the message out about one, the UK in general and two, about Tech City in particular. But as part of that dialogue we would also talk about other clusters, so if there was particular an expertise in Edinburgh or in the North West, or in Belfast for instance, we would mention that too. (I1, TCIO representative)

East London Tech City has seen the institutionalisation of transnational connections that have occurred through government initiatives and organisations such as Tech City Investment Organisation (TCIO). This institutionalisation defines the region, with a proliferation of formal links through government and non-government service provision. The use of business delegations and exchanges to facilitate transnational connections has been explored and will be built upon later in this chapter.

7.1.2 Birmingham and the West Midlands

The restructuring of sub national governance had an impact on the West Midlands as a city region. The carving up of former Regional Development
Agency administered territory has given rise to a series of Local Enterprise Partnerships, as mentioned previously. Accordingly, many government provisions, such as business support infrastructure in the West Midlands are extremely fragmented, changeable, and confusing with a large range of institutions and intermediaries purporting to provide business support (Ram et al. 2012). Ram et al. (2012: 516) suggest that

‘Many are small specialist entities working with ethnic minorities providing a range of variants of business support in terms of scale, outreach, and targeting.’

A representative of Birmingham City Council elaborates on these changes, suggesting a manifest reinterpretation of policy:

So region, we are Birmingham, now we were part of the West Midlands region, when the RDA, the Regional Development Agency disappeared, then basically we have been organised across a new geographical entity call LEPs, so we have one Greater Birmingham and Solihull LEP, but then you also have the Black Country LEP, the Coventry LEP, there are six LEPs to make up that whole region. Some of our programmes are much more strategic geographically so we cater for all the LEPs and some of our city focus… (I4, representative of Birmingham City Council)

Henry et al. (2002) argue that Birmingham is reinventing itself through a strategy of prestige city centre regeneration. Drawing on the theoretical lenses of transnationalism and postcolonialism, they suggest an alternative vision of Birmingham’s economic place in the world. Focusing on ethnic diversity, Henry et al. position Birmingham as a global city, utilising a politics of scale and empirically tapping into local residents’ personal narratives and histories. This ties into Smith’s (2001: 61-63) earlier argument for the need to ‘historicize the Global City’. He suggests that a historical perspective reveals ‘globalization’ not as a ‘…recent all-encompassing system of economic power but rather as a historically specific, variant, and contested set of economic and social practices…’ (Smith 2001: 63 see Held et al.1999).
In their study of ‘The ‘Global’ in the City Economy’ addressing issues of multicultural economic development in Birmingham, McEwan et al. (2005: 917) suggest that their intention is to signal alternative understanding of ‘global’ ‘…as it relates to economic advantage, transnationalism […] and ethnic diversity within cities…’ Birmingham City Council has recently recognized the need to revisit its strategic vision to focus on 'place making' as well as 'place marketing' in an attempt to link immigrant and poor neighbourhoods with the downtown economy (Sandercock 2003; McEwan et al. 2005). Here, notions of historical connectivity, migration network development and family will be evaluated as significant forces driving migrant relations with space and place in the region.

The city of Birmingham and the West Midlands region have a long history of inward migration. Brown et al. (2009b) outline the temporal patterns of immigration from non EEA countries in their study of Birmingham and the West Midlands region as a destination for the highly skilled from the perspective of transnational migrants. They suggest that the 1950s saw the start of substantial immigration from the New Commonwealth. Addressing Birmingham’s demography, Brown et al. provide a breakdown of migrant groups; they suggest that ‘By 1961, 1.4 per cent of Birmingham’s population were immigrants from the West Indies and 0.9 per cent from the Indian sub-continent.’ This trend developed through the 1960s, with over 40 per cent of the total migrant population being born in the Caribbean, Pakistan and India. However, contextualising the migrant population of Birmingham, Slater (1999) suggests that by 1971 New Commonwealth residents (including their dependants) remained at less than 5 per cent of total population. Following the Second World War there was inward migration to the West Midlands from Commonwealth countries, firstly from the Caribbean and later from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. A representative of Birmingham City Council echoes Brown et al.’s suggestion, stating that primary immigrant groups were composed of Indian and Caribbean people:

Okay, if I put Tier 1 on one side, and sort of talk about migrant labour, migrant entrepreneurs, migrant entrepreneurship, then we would probably look at …
immigrants, is the word that was used historically and that is people that came to UK for the purpose of work and this is now going back a long time, certainly the main watershed has to be just before the second world war… fifties but certainly sixties and seventies and eighties, […] so primarily the Indian sub continent and then of course the Caribbean, but of course you have had other communities since and I sure when you read the immigration history I think you will find a lot of the detail has been documented. (I4, Birmingham City Council representative)

Brown et al. (2009b: 47) suggest that the ‘…economic boom of the fifties, fuelled by the reconstruction effort, resulted in a shortage of labour, which attracted a flow of mostly young, single men who came to work in industries in and around Birmingham.’ They cite the process of chain migration as a stimulus for increasing immigration to the region. This led to the passage of increasingly restrictive legislation with the 1962 and 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Acts. Finally, in 1971, a third Act effectively stopped all primary immigration from New Commonwealth Countries. Ballard (2002) suggests that the rapid growth of Britain’s South Asian population during the second half of the twentieth century, such that it included nearly two million people by the turn of the millennium, is best understood as the most recent manifestation of a dynamic series of inter-connections between the British Isles and the Indian subcontinent. These connections first began to emerge as Britain set about an Imperial presence in South Asia, and which are now developing further in a post-Imperial context. Henry et al. (2002) suggest that this position is particularly relevant for Birmingham and the West Midlands. The location of Birmingham in specific transnational and diasporic networks, which they argue are products of British imperialisms and migratory paths, makes the city distinctive in terms of both its diversity and as an example of postcolonial economic processes. They suggest that they use the term postcolonial not just as a temporal marker, but as a theoretical tool for analysis of associated processes. Hall (1996) argues that post-colonialism traces imperial histories that appear everywhere ‘…in the naming of streets, the sugar in tea, public monuments in parks and squares and so on…’ (Henry et al. 2002: 120). Thus, the position of Birmingham in transnational imperial networks, as Henry et al
would suggest, provided the initial impetus for immigration of colonial and post-colonial Commonwealth migrants through the twentieth century.

Brown et al. (2009a: 36) suggest that in 2001,

‘...Birmingham had one of the most ethnically diverse populations in Britain, with 29.7 per cent of the city’s population coming from minority backgrounds, and was second only to inner areas of London in terms of ethnic diversity.’

Brown et al. suggest that the UK can expect to see the continuation of specific migration linkages that reflect not only the country’s historical position in international migration systems (for example, New Commonwealth migrants). (Brown et al. 2009b: 24). The impact of these historical connections is bound up with the role of family in establishing and maintaining transnational socio-cultural connections.

Family is a key node of transnational connection making for Birmingham and the West Midlands. Brown et al. (2009a) suggest that the reasons creative and knowledge workers and recent university graduates chose to locate in Birmingham were strongly connected with ‘personal trajectory’ factors associated with pre-existing personal social ties within the region citing quotes such as ‘family lives here’; ‘I was born here’; ‘I studied here’ and ‘proximity to friends’. (Brown et al. 2009b). In her study on Transnational family networks in the Somali diaspora in Egypt Al-Sharmani suggests that Somali migrants are increasingly leading a transnational life in which family members are sustained through networks of relations, obligations and resources that are located in different nation-states. She argues that these networks and relations ‘...enable diasporic Somalis to seek safety for themselves and their relatives, minimize risks and maximize family resources.’ (Al-Sharmani 2010: 499). Family is often conceptualised as an economic burden and a transnational project (Falicov 2005; Ryan et al. 2009; Bruine et al. 2013). This falls in stark contrast to conceptualisations of family here (Greve and Salaff 2003; Tilly 2007), where networks of knowledgeable agents work to inform
and develop transnational ties for the purposes of entrepreneurial and familial betterment (primarily in socio-economic terms). A Member of Parliament in the West Midlands outlines the understanding of family connections from his experience of migrant entrepreneurship:

*They brought, obviously close family ties and an ability to raise money from within their family and a commitment to work and progression, and education in the family which certainly, I would say is a feature of the indigenous white community, in my area, where there is a tradition of young people leaving school at 16 to go and work in the large metal bashing companies, semi-skilled occupations at best, and there was neither the self-confidence or the aspiration to start their own business, that is a sweeping statement, because obviously there are exceptions, but that would not be an unfair caricature of the local culture, so you have the indigenous white working class culture, and the largely Indian, but if not Asian migration there, who very often have started off from small businesses but expanded them, and if I look at business that I am invited to go along to, a huge proportion of them are owned by the Asian community, and that has been a result of … well a combination of ability to raise funds and a driving desire to better themselves a good education and an instructive desire to be traders and entrepreneurs. (I27, senior MP and West Midlands based politician)*

In summary, historical connections and family are interlinked through temporal associations to home and country of origin. In Birmingham and the West Midlands, a long history of immigration is noted, with a focus on those groups from South Asia. The impacts of colonialism and imperialism have been explored in relation to South Asian, and particularly Indian groups.

### 7.1.3 Cambridgeshire

Cambridgeshire relies heavily on the immigration of international students for global connectivity. Khadria (2001) suggests that the movement of students should be seen as an integral part of transnational migration systems, not least because the networks they forge often lay the tracks of future skilled
labour circulation. This theme, previously discussed, provided a useful lens through which the promotion of entrepreneurship can be addressed in the context of transnational socio cultural connections. The informal connectivity that Cambridgeshire incentivises through networking groups, friendship and kinship ties and the spatial clustering of entrepreneurial activities around nodes of university headed business form a cohesive regional and transnational web. The role of universities penetrates entrepreneurial spheres of Cambridge, as previously discussed, and the proliferation of business competitions, migrant entrepreneurial networks and academic led spin off companies has caused a significant contribution from institutions such as the University of Cambridge and Anglia Ruskin University this was mentioned by a Cambridge based business person and senior member of the Cambridge Enterprise and Technology Club:

Right, …it is important because we have no, very, apart from old established agriculture, Cambridge as a region does not have a reputation for large businesses, you would have to go to … near where you are, to the Leicester’s and Birmingham’s and London’s of this world to find very large organisations, there are lots of small organisations here, many of them feeding off the university of Cambridge and of course the other university here, the old polytechnic, Anglia Ruskin university, which takes a far more practical rather than academic role, so we are lucky having two universities here And people feed off of that intellectual capacity, have ideas and then start turning them into businesses, but they are very often small businesses not large organisations, and I wonder, although it can be frustrating in terms of growing businesses, I wonder whether that encourages entrepreneurial behaviour on the basis that people will perhaps be more entrepreneurial in smaller groups, rather than in larger hierarchical, bureaucratic organisations. (I8, Cambridge based business person and senior member of the Cambridge Enterprise and Technology Club)

Fresnoza- Flot and Pecoud (2007) suggest in their study of Filipino entrepreneurial migrants in Paris, that the migrant entrepreneurs use networks based on friendship to allow for the circulation of information within
the Filipino population. The role played by these networks in facilitating labour opportunity dissemination, information and various kinds of assistance to other migrants and migrant entrepreneurs characterises immigrant entrepreneurship (Light et al. 1993). Light et al. (1989: 2) suggest that ‘…whatever macro-societal political/economic conditions may initially have caused migration, the originating pushes and pulls, the expanding migratory process becomes “progressively independent” of the original causal conditions.’ In effect, migration processes supersede the conditions that caused them to begin (Light et al. 1989). Light et al suggest that network formation provides the rationale behind these interlinked phenomena. This ties into the suggestion of a senior representative from St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge who posits that a number of networking groups exist, revolving around the promotion of entrepreneurship and specific industry sectors, and providing information and advice:

Yes, yes, I think probably, the kind of top two or three that spring to mind for me. There is the Cambridge Angels, there are approximately fifty people, all very high net worth, all experienced at running businesses, there is the Cambridge Network, which is, if you like, the club of clubs and particularly people arriving new to Cambridge, getting membership at the Cambridge Network and going to their events is a fast track to meeting lots of other likeminded people, then there has been organisations that are sort of spin outs from that, the industry specialist groups, there’s for instance, Cambridge Wireless and Cambridge Cleantech…ad if you are in let’s say low carbon, joining Cambridge Cleantech is likely to be a way of meeting people you could recruit and people you could work with or people that might invest in you.[…] I think it would be fair to say they all have a visibility that is well beyond their physical size. I think that Cambridge Network has done a fair bit of work overseas over the years, and whenever there is a delegation going either way it’s likely that Cambridge Network will be involved…and Cambridge Wireless certainly has membership from outside the UK, I don’t know if it’s from outside Europe. They have companies like Nokia who are members. (I3, Senior representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge)
Light et al. (1989: 2) suggested in 1989 that existing treatments of migration networks overlooked the role of ‘…networks in expanding the immigrant economy at locations of destination.’ In contemporary geographical and sociological literature, it is recognised that social networks are crucial to migration flows and the economic behaviour of immigrants. Poros (2001: 243) postulates that much of the literature on international migration and economic sociology ‘…specifically focuses on the role of interpersonal ties in influencing migration and economic action, such as finding employment.’ Poros (2001: 243) focused on the impact of informal and social migrant networks on occupational attainment and employment, though network configurations include ‘…organizational, composite, and interpersonal ties that link local labour markets transnationally and channel immigrants to particular destinations.’ Kadirbeyoglu (2004: 45) suggests that networks are comprised of individuals or collective actors, and the relations that take place between them, it has an informal level of organisation and possesses no ‘…formal attributes such as membership lists or hierarchies.’ This may be the case for some transnationally active migrant networks, though in the case of migrant entrepreneurship in Cambridge, the propensity for membership and formalised network structures is much greater.

Rauch and Trindade (2002) suggest that in the context of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in international trade business and social networks have a considerable quantitative impact on international trade by helping to match buyers and sellers in characteristics space, in addition to their effect through enforcement of community sanctions that deter opportunistic behaviour. Light et al. (1993) suggest that the ethnic dimension to business and entrepreneurial networking groups may be an important factor. The migration network’s messages are credible because of the relationships of mutual trust that link members. Light et al posit that in many cases ‘…the migration network appeals to participants’ ethnic chauvinism. Chauvinism encourages participants to hoard useful information while concealing it from outsiders.’ (1993: 7). Kloosterman and Rath (2001: 2) suggest that this can be the case, though approaches the issue in a less objectivist light. They state that ‘Many researchers, highlighting the role of immigrant entrepreneurs, have focused
on the problematic of the supply side.’ Research has explored the differences in proclivity towards entrepreneurship between certain groups of immigrants, the way ethnicity impinges on the resources of immigrant entrepreneurs and especially their embeddedness in social networks (Rath 2000; Rath and Kloosterman 2000). Rauch and Trindade (2002: 116) suggest that ‘Among the many types of business and social networks that exist, co-ethnic networks have the advantage for empirical research that it is much easier to identify network members.’ They suggest that not only the overseas Chinese, but also many other ethnic groups living outside their countries of origin create formal or informal associations to which co-ethnic businesspeople from both the host countries and the mother country have access (Redding 1995; Rauch and Trindade 2002). A representative from St John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge illustrates the scalar movement from regional interconnectivity in the UK, to stemming out to China and the US as networking opportunities are expanded and production ability is increased:

*Within the UK I think it’s, that there are only a handful of places that are really dynamic, science based business clusters. And, often they are doing their own thing, and possibly because I know the incubator managers in places like Manchester, and Oxford and Bristol, we have good links. But generally speaking there is no particular interest for companies to go to Manchester, or come from Manchester. When people leave here it is likely to be either London or overseas, when they leave Cambridge they become international pretty quickly. […] A lot do end up with a US presence, sooner or later. And, increasingly, people are selling into China, but it is not developing as fast as you would expect, I think there is still a lot of …getting to know you type problems, and that is something where there are more and more intermediaries that can help, like UKTI, it is not something that’s going to change inside a year, doing business in the US is generally quite easy for people. (I3, senior representative from St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge)*

Vertovec (2001) suggests that these type of network are not just transnational, but trans-local, the resultant long-distance networks among
local and migrant entrepreneurs and professionals can provide highly important channels throughout which run flows of capital, skill, knowledge and information. Saxenian’s work on networks linking Silicon Valley with the Hsinchu region of Taiwan and Bangalore and Hyderabad in India provides a prominent example of this (Saxenian 1999). Building upon the assumption of the London region as capitalising on institutionalisation of networking and transnational socio cultural connections, by way of analogy Saxenian (2002: 117) suggests that ‘…China have aggressively promoted and facilitated the institutionalisation of these transnational networks, the more hands-off approach of Indian policy makers appears to contribute to India’s lower rates of return entrepreneurship.’ The nature of the regions is dramatically variable; with a greater personal interconnectivity exhibited in Cambridgeshire through networks of Business Angels and low level investors, and a larger presence of venture capital opportunities in London. The spatial specificities of each region are manifest in the networking opportunities that it houses are attaches to, with manifestation of networking embodied in the migrants, entrepreneurs and structures that lie both in situ and as spaces of flows.

Scale and distance are again brought up in relation to regional interconnectivity, within and across national borders. A representative of the Centre for Business Innovation and Cambridge based business person suggests that the embodiment of networks transcends distance, though returns to its importance in the context of Silicon Valley and the UK context:

GW You mentioned connections between Silicon Roundabout and Cambridge, could you elaborate slightly further as to how they came about and why?

I45 Well I think it is mostly down to individual people, clearly a lot of our entrepreneurs, they spend a lot of time going to London to talk to investor and talk to business associates and clients and customers… so there is quite a bit of that going on anyway…. a number of companies based in the Silicon Roundabout area has Cambridge investors putting money into them, so there are quite a lot of connections there, CW does do some joint events with
partners in London, there isn’t anything particularly formal there, it is down to individual people and their companies and what they are doing… and London and Cambridge, you could say are two sides of the same coin, you could be in London from Cambridge in 35 minutes, you could say why would you consider them as separate, if you were in Silicon Valley you probably wouldn’t consider them as separate, 30 miles between them, but in England things are slightly different, so they have a small amount of separation geographically… […] [laughs] … to be a cluster near Silicon Valley, it have probably got to be 200 miles away, but here in England everything is rather closer together … (I45, a representative of the Centre for Business Innovation and Cambridge based business person)

In summary, Cambridgeshire exemplifies transnational connectivity trends in the form of informal relationships and the movement of students, as an integral part of transnational migration systems, not least because the networks they forge often lay the tracks of future skilled labour circulation. Vertovec highlights an understanding of the multiple roles of transnational networks what Meyer (2001) calls a connectivist understanding.

7.2 Historical links and UK global connectivity

Historical linkages were identified as a significant facet of transnational socio cultural connectivity, and applied particularly to the context of Birmingham and the West Midlands. This follows Glick Schiller’s recommendation that:

We must locate our study of the simultaneity of contemporary interconnections within historical studies of what has gone before. In short, Transnational Studies needs to resituate our conceptualization of geography and history.’ (Glick Schiller 1994: 161).

In this section, broader implications of historical connections and further empirical data from the previous section will be applied in terms of UK global connectivity and the role that historically and politically poignant structures and institutions play in migrant entrepreneurship. Cambridgeshire and London
will be addressed as sites of historically significant transnational connectivity and aspects of these connections will be evaluated.

The connections that people have, that are transnational, personal and decisive, sculpt migration pathways and skew patterns of migration networks. Lacroix (2007: 401) suggests that transnational studies and diaspora studies share a common initial intent; ‘...the will to place migrants’ experience at the core of migration studies.’ This links into comments from a representative of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry who describes the ‘ethnic diaspora’ that exists in London, citing personal and collective influence over prospective immigrants to the UK:

*Why would they come to London? Well, I think a number of reasons, number one is clearly the ethnic diaspora in London is far more than elsewhere, so they can relate to people… they might have their own connectivity already in place, from that point of view. Of course … the Indian entrepreneurs they feel London’s a great easy place for them to come to do business because of the language being common, English there and also access to Indian food etc will play a role for them. African businesses also like to come here, also because of this connectivity, commonwealth connectivity. London is a great place in terms of the connectivity and the time zone as well, this is the only place in the world where we can, when the Japanese go to bed, we know what has happened in the Japanese economy and with the Americans wake up we know what is going on there. So I think we have a serious advantage from a time zone point of view which often does not get looked at, but it really helps.* (I2, senior representative of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

Many studies have focused upon East Punjab which is situated in north-west India and widely recognised (Ballard 2003; Singh and Tatla 2006) as a major outsource of South Asian migration to the UK over the past century. This area has witnessed dramatic and significant out-migration and subsequent intra-diasporic migration (Thandi 2010; 2014), across the world, for example, ‘...to Canada, the USA, New Zealand, Australia and East Africa...’ (Taylor 2013: 2).
In her 2012 study on the British Ugandan Asian diaspora Herbert maps the diverse allegiances and changing conceptions of home expressed by this group. Herbert (2012: 296) evaluates the different trajectories of belonging, challenging ‘…much of the current literature on the South Asian diaspora, which focuses on connections to India as the principal homeland.’ Herbert (2012) evaluates how Ugandan Asians constructed their sense of home in Uganda, and how their forced migration transformed this, causing complex responses to contested and multiple belongings. In his study on Punjabi communities in India and the UK, Taylor argues that transnational pursuit of home is significantly shaped by the dynamic social context of South Asia. He posits that returning Punjabi migrants attempt to

‘…distinguish themselves from the resident population through conspicuous consumption, and simultaneous attempts from Punjabi residents to exclude Non-Resident Indians from ‘real’ Indian status, lead to a continual reprocessing of home across different sites of mobility, as well as demonstrating the ‘never fully achieved’ nature of home.’ (Taylor 2013:1).

Contrary to this, Herbert (2012: 296) suggests that the Ugandan Asian respondents ‘…emphasis on their previous attachments to Uganda helps to challenge stereotypes about South Asians in Uganda and can partly be seen as an attempt to reclaim their place in Uganda’s history.’ A representative of Birmingham City Council suggests that the East African Asian community had a significant impact in Birmingham and the West Midlands through the trade links and commercial trends that they embodied (see Appendix 8).

Through the lens of Vertovec’s (1999) conceptualisation of transnationalism as a social morphology, type of consciousness, and mode of cultural reproduction, it can be seen that local transformation of space to replicate places of commerce in the migrant’s country of origin was performed in Birmingham and London as East African Asians immigrated. This ties into the transnational trade and commercial networks that were forged across borders, encompassing India, Africa and the UK, as loci of interconnectivity and places
of engagement, not only in commercial activity, but in identity reproducing practices of socio-cultural nature. Processes of transnationalism are reinventing the socio-cultural landscape of cities, particularly within countries that have actively sought new migrant streams (Vertovec 2004; Friesen et al. 2005). Friesen et al. (2005: 386) suggest that this is happening in New Zealand where the refashioning of social spaces ‘...is at once spectacular (resulting in new residential landscapes and built environments) and mundane.’ These phenomena are also exhibited in an Australian context, in Voight Graf’s (2005: 365) study of the construction of transnational spaces by Indian migrants she suggests that due to the '...historical depth and current diversity of Indian migration to Australia, it is possible to analyse continuities and discontinuities in transnational processes with past experiences and to compare different communities of Indian origin today.' A representative of a Midlands based Asian Business Association suggested that the import relationships are innately bound to community and transnational networks of migrants linked through family, kinship, friendship or other personal relations:

Well with some this will be the case... there is still the connections with India, they will be there, I mean most of the stuff that you are selling is either getting imported from India, or East Africa where they were initially, so the connections, the networks are there, and those are the things that make it work, when you talk about migrant community doing entrepreneurship, different regions will have different things, and I think it will be interesting for you to do a pattern, of they are a migrant community, what sort of business do they get into? And you will find that there is a pattern there… and that actually leads onto say, who is helping them, who is financing them, because if you are going to start a shop, you require equity from somewhere, does the bank provide equity, or do you get it from your informal networks? (I19, a representative from a Midlands based Asian Business Association)

Ballard (2002: 2) postulates that the rapid growth of Britain’s South Asian population during the second half of the twentieth century ‘...is best understood as the most recent manifestation of a dynamic series of inter-connections between the British Isles and the Indian subcontinent which were
first began to emerge as Britain set about an Imperial presence in South Asia,’ and which are now developing yet further in a post-Imperial context. Jones et al. (2012: 93) suggest that since the 1970s and ‘…throughout the famously entrepreneurial 1980s,’ migrant entrepreneurship had been growing even faster than that of the UK population at large. They (2012: 94) posit that South Asians were ‘….in the vanguard of this trend, winning a reputation as an exceptionally successful entrepreneurial population, all the more remarkable for their apparent ability to out-perform native white competitors in the face of racism and migrancy.’ Jones et al. (2012: 94) postulate the perceived ability for entrepreneurial success ‘…stemmed from the very high visual impact of their mainly urban-based retail and catering activities, with sedate monochrome shopping streets like Southall Broadway in West London now rendered in exotic technicolour.’ They continue to suggest that this was reinforced by the number and proportion of the Indian and Pakistani self-employed continuing to climb in relation to the indigenous UK population (Jones et al. 2012). Rath (2000: 3) suggests that ethnic minority owned enterprise is now deeply embedded in the European and North American urban economy, observing that ‘…the fate of advanced cities and that of immigrants have become closely intertwined.’ Many studies that focus on South Asian migration to the UK address ethnic entrepreneurship, which tends to entail ventures in catering and the restaurant industry, or low skilled commerce such as small scale retail. Here, many entrepreneurs originating from South Asia, or East African Asian migrants, suggested that from entrepreneurial foundations in these industries, higher value added enterprise was developed. This is exemplified in a description of his business trajectory from an Indian entrepreneur based in the Midlands (see Appendix 9).

Historical and cultural links with entrepreneurship co-constitute rhetoric around the naturalisation of enterprise among migrant groups, as discussed in section 1. Furthermore, the predisposition to embark upon low technology enterprise is suggested by many studies, either explicitly, or implicitly through empirical material and topics addressed. For example, Kloosterman et al. (1999) analyse opportunity structure, from a mixed embeddedness perspective for migrant entrepreneurs, he suggests that
‘Immigrants have set up shop almost anywhere in urban Europe. From Pakistani owned Indian restaurants in Trondheim to Chinese leather firms in Milan and from Turkish butcher shops in Berlin to Caribbean tobacconists in Liverpool: immigrant entrepreneurs have been trying to exploit opportunities for small businesses in many cities ...’ (Kloosterman et al. 1999: 25).

It may be a fundamentally rational assumption that with limited financial resources and often limited educational qualifications, migrant entrepreneurs should choose this low skilled route. Yet in contemporary migration policy landscape, this is not a plausible option for many, with high capital requirements and qualifications needed for the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa, as well as business validation tests which reduce the ability for prospective migrant entrepreneurs to ‘wing it’ in the UK (Clarke and Drinkwater 2000; Barrett et al. 2001). The dearth of technology based migrant entrepreneurship in the Midlands is illustrated by a representative of a Midlands based Asian Business Association:

...so most of the migrants that come, are coming for employment...once they are in the UK, then you have a very strange pattern, most of these people will try to generate some sort of enterprise, or their own business, because once they have a steady job at least from the Indian psyche, that is a pattern you will find. Many of these people will have generated, or registered companies...

... You can look at the past, when Indians, or Asians came out from Uganda and stuff and they landed up here, they did not land here because they had a lot of money, they had to flee, but once they had landed here that psyche kicked in that I have to survive and I have to do some business, and I can do that and I have networks back home. And the banks wouldn’t have given them money at that time, but they still managed to set up big businesses, and we see most of Leicestershire, they have set up on their own. Now you are in an era, where we are saying banks and other equity firms should be giving money to set up enterprises and the equity, if you look at it has been some extent influenced by technology. Not always IT, it could be sustainable technology anything to do with science and engineering... or science and
technology, and you will find that not very prevalent within the Midlands at the moment… (I19, a representative of a Midlands based business group)

This perceived lack of technological migrant entrepreneurship is changing not simply as a result of tighter policy shifts, as previously illustrated in Cambridgeshire and East London with the proliferation of IT, Biotech, Cleantech and communications companies run by migrant entrepreneurs. In Birmingham and the West Midlands, a transition may be occurring in light of Jones et al.’s (2012: 93) suggestion that the Indian community in the UK is exemplifying an ‘ethnic entrepreneurial transition’. They posit that educational credentials, an increasing presence in the professions along with diversification into new and emerging sectors are ‘…gradually changing the profile of Indian entrepreneurship.’ A representative of the Black Country Asian Business Association and Board member of the National Asian Business Association suggests that this trend is being pushed further, with second and third generation migrants tending to desert entrepreneurship in favour of professional employment:

Okay interestingly I would say that is now beginning to change and more … I am talking about second, third British Asians now have a proclivity to go towards the professions, as well as being entrepreneurial, I think that earlier generations were forced through lack of job opportunities to be entrepreneurial, but that is changing. Migrants are important, as part of their DNA they have a very entrepreneurial streak, but I wouldn’t say that the third generation, is as … as a priority they are moving into the professions. (I53, Black Country Asian Business Association and Board member of the National Asian Business Association)

Lacriox (2011) suggests that the ebbs and flows of Indian policy oriented towards transnational communities define the relationships that the UK has with India. He states that the vested interests of Indian authorities in these communities are a relatively recent phenomenon. Though Bhat and Narayan (2010: 13) suggest that contemporarily, ‘…we find transnational networking among the Indian diaspora based on multiple identities of religion, region and
also of caste,' there are perceived losses of connectivity running through academic and UK policy discourse. Explanations of connectivity losses may be partially justified by Lacroix's (2011: 24) position that after independence,

‘...the national authorities adopted a development strategy oriented toward self-sufficiency in order to cut off from its past as a colonised country. In this context, emigration was a reality which did not fit with the overall narrative of an independent nation-building process.’

Emigrants from India were widely perceived negatively, either in terms of deserters or of brain drain (Khadria 2008). Thus, Lacroix suggests that emigration was discouraged as passports were sparingly delivered. In 1998 Mahler called to disaggregate transnational communities to discern the differential access and participation in transnational social fields, the access to and connectivity with countries of origin for migrants is variegated and complex. Dhingra’s (2008) paper on Indian diasporic communities in the USA calls attention to the problem of defining ethnic boundaries for those born in the diaspora but unwilling, or unable, to relinquish their “primordial” identities. The study, based on interviews with second-generation Indian youth as well as Indian leaders, suggests that researcher should distinguish between adaptation and integration, and between the political and the socio cultural community. Dhingra focuses specifically on the attempt of diaspora Indians to integrate into the host land socially, economically and politically without abandoning Indian identity. In the UK, this phenomenon is seen to be mirrored, though in dramatically differing contexts. There was a desire to reconnect with countries of parents and grandparents origin, which in the West Midlands, have been severed through transnational disengagement and disentanglement:

Interestingly we are now forging links with India, where most of our entrepreneurs come from, and in October, in partnership with the Black Country LEP, UKTI and the local Chamber we are taking a trade mission to visit India.[...] We are taking a trade mission to five cities in India, and we are taking businesses there, both Asian and non-Asian, [...] nothing to do with
The role of language in the context of transnational socio cultural connections is important. The historical connections that are harboured with the UK and former colonies, commonwealth nations, and trading partners enables pathways of migration to be carved and migration networks between these nations to be forged. Saxenian (2002: 185) suggests that first-generation immigrants like the Chinese and Indian engineers of Silicon Valley, ‘...who have the language and cultural as well as the technical skills to function well in both the USA and foreign markets...’ are well positioned to play a central role in this transnational environment. The role of language therefore, cannot be underestimated as a historically significant and transnationally sculpting force that enables the continuation of connectivity across borders and facilitates cultural exchange. Language as a mediatory tool in transnational socio cultural relations is historically embedded, with reflections of technology impacting the nature of these spaces of flows and manifested linguistically in the ground. In their study addressing multilingual literacies in transnational digitally mediated contexts, Lam and Rosario-Ramos postulate that technology impact on the everyday lives of young migrants. They suggest that

‘...young people mobilise multiple languages to conduct inter-personal relationships and seek out media information in from various sources in their ‘home’ and ‘host’ societies within digital networks, and sometimes across a larger diaspora.’ (Lam and Rosario-Ramos 2009:171).

Lam and Rosario-Ramos cite Saxena’s (1994; 2000) research of the language and literacy practices of Punjabi speakers in West London in the late 1980s to mid-1990s positioning the work as one of the pioneering studies that examined issues of ‘...language attitude, choice and maintenance among immigrant families in relation to their migratory histories and transnational ties to their places of origin.’ (Lam and Rosario-Ramos 2009: 171). Literacy and language are approached as social activities which are embedded in
particular cultural contexts. Saxena (2001: 275) found that the ways in which Punjabi migrants positioned themselves in relation to different language choices and script choices for usage and teaching the next generation were ‘…strongly influenced by their cultural and religious roots in their place of origin, their diasporic connection and the religio-political conflicts that took place in India at different points in time.’ This research illustrates the role of what Basch et al. (1994) and Levitt and Schiller (2004) have called transnational social fields in ‘…shaping and fostering particular language and literacy practices and dispositions.’ (Lam and Rosario-Ramos 2009: 171).

Castells (2001: 253) suggests that ‘…the language issue may be playing a role, particularly for those recent immigrants with limited knowledge of English,’ In this light, Benitez (2006: 190). posits that transmigrants’ communicative practices based on phone conversations in public spaces might be considered as new forms of creating a ‘third space’ ‘…namely of co-presence visibility and the reterritorialization of collective identities…’ (Place-making enterprises, such as the mundane embodiment of language, are territorially bounded within transnational spaces, where language acts as both a facilitator and barrier to connectivity. As has been suggested, the identities of individuals and groups within specific diasporas are formed by complex historical, social, and cultural dynamics within the group and in its relationships with other groups (Karim 1998). Karim (1994: 286) posits that the ‘Retention of ancestral customs, language, and religion, the marriage patterns of its members, and particularly the ease of communication between various parts of the transnational group…’ determine transnational characteristics and sculpt the contemporary transnational relations that exist among and between spatially variegated groups. Dernersesian (1994: 286) suggests that ‘…identities will be encountered from particular social and historical locations, from situated knowledges, from ethnographic experiences of rupture and continuity, and from a complex web of political negotiations with which people inscribe their social and historical experiences and deliver their self-styled counter narratives.’
The language issue is prevalent in discourse around the attractiveness of the UK and London. With the English language as lingua franca of the modern world system (Seidlhofer et al. 2001; Meierkord 2002; Jenkins 2007), it is suggested by a representative of the Confederation of British Industry that London is a melting pot of opportunity and cultures (see Appendix 10). Informal relations that have been made and retained over the late 19th and 20th Centuries continue to hold significance in the 21st Century, with developments in trade and political connections, as well as the proliferation of migration networks, sculpted by policy, though spanning globally dispersed populations. In Birmingham and the West Midlands, it was suggested by a representative from the Birmingham Chambers of Commerce that informal relationships with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India are very strong and maintained through transnational connections as well as movement between the UK and these nations for culturally significant events and practices. These are reinforced by the institutionalisation of business networks and groups through the likes of the India Pakistan Trade Unit, housed within the Chambers. This and other locally embedded groups facilitate trade visits, allow contact acquisition and build upon solid historical foundations of migration and transnational connectivity that exists with South Asia, as well as other commonwealth nations that have been integrated into the group’s framework.

GW Okay, and looking at connections, country of origin and historic connections, how does Birmingham interact with other regions and countries outside of EEA... So, perhaps trade relations and informal relations?

l34 Informally I think they are very strong, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, very strong links culturally, so it is not ... so Sikh girls when they are getting married with go home, one of those intimate links to the economy, they will buy their wedding clothing and then come back over here. If you look at the ... one of the things that we are trying to do is set up a specialist clothing area, so instead of taking them back to India before they get married, come to Birmingham, it would be cheaper than having to travel as far, and you would get the same quality. That is one of the things that the city is really trying to
make work, the city has a really interesting age profile which shows Pakistani women tend not to go out to work and are economically isolated, the same is true of Bangladeshi women, if you look at the demographic, it is quite terrifying and we are trying to respond to that. So it definitely exists and it is quite normal in Birmingham to have [muffled] take four weeks holiday to visit Pakistan or wherever, and that is normal business practice to let that happen, where you can only get two weeks in one go and that will happen, so there are those sorts of cultural appreciation there... the IAB has some formal linkages, with various parts of Indian, they have various links and formal agreements, mayors and whatever else they may have, UKTI have a formal role and we are the lead chamber in the West Midlands, for Asia, so we lead there and also we do professional, financial and creative clusters, those geographies are our speciality as well, so we take responsibility for that as well… (I34, representative of Birmingham Chambers of Commerce)

Historical linkages have been identified as a significant facet of transnational socio cultural connectivity, and applied particularly to the context of Birmingham and the West Midlands, though are nonetheless significant for all three regions addressed. Here, this was illustrated through detailed empirical data excerpts from migrant entrepreneurs, policy makers, practitioners and business organisations. The role of language as a keystone of transnational identity and connections over time was addressed, and finally the cultural significance of transnationalism as an event-laden set of flows and phenomena occurring across and within national borders was presented. The role of historical connections is complex and multifaceted, with a multiplicity of terms relating to a plethora of activities on the ground, and performed through flows of communication and knowledge exchange.

7.3 Institutional connectivity

7.3.1 National institutional connections: UKTI and inward investment
Inward investment in the UK is institutionally spearheaded by UK Trade and Investment. This takes many forms, from large scale investment from transnational corporations to the entrepreneurial activities of migrants under the Tier 1 Entrepreneur route. The transnational infrastructure of UKTI is embedded in spaces of flows, but also spaces of places, with representation in British Consulates globally. The network of support, information, and incentivised promotion of the UK as open to business is at the heart of attracting inward investment. These activities fall under what Levitt et al. (2003) suggest are observable facets of transnational political and economic life, alongside participatory activities such as investing or voting, which can be easily measured and interpreted. Rose (2007: 22) posits that these foreign services are commonly regarded to promotes exports, with Ambassadors, commercial attachés and other members of the diplomatic corps playing ‘…a key role in developing and maintaining export markets.’ Lee (2004: 50) suggests that under the last Labour government (from 1997), the UK renovated its diplomatic system ‘…so that the planning of commercial diplomacy has been centralized, the commercial activities of diplomats have been extended, and business interests have been formally integrated within the diplomatic systems.’ These changes to the institutions and practice of UK diplomacy now under way have created a diplomatic practice in which the balance between the commercial and political elements of commercial work has swung very much in favour commercialisation and the promotion of national economic prerogatives (Lee 2004). London exhibits a greater proclivity towards harbouring national institutional connectivity. The importance of place as a nexus for institutional activity should not be underestimated, with proximity to central government in terms of both space and connectivity playing a key role. The span and scope of UKTI, as embedded in the global foreign services network, is illustrated by a UKTI Immigration Specialist, who suggests that funnelling investment to the UK is a key diplomatic issue, as Lee’s suggestion of blurring lines between politics and economics through embassies and consulates is realised:

*Both, so all my work comes from my colleagues, so… there are relationship managers around the world, UKTI has a presence in over 100 countries and*
of those 30 something specifically focused on inward investment. Individuals and companies looking to come to the UK will have contact with one or more of those posts and if they raise a question around visas or immigration then my phone will ring, or an email will appear, or have a conference call, I have had three conference call with China this week, talking about the difference between Investment, Entrepreneur, Sole rep., Tier 2… […] so it is sort of a funnel, and colleagues overseas are looking for the opportunity to get investment into the UK in a sense, so they will be looking at everything that a company needs to do to establish an entity in the UK and start employing people. There are a number of us that have an area of expertise and I cover skills, recruitment, employment regulation, visas and immigration, so any questions around accessing talent come to me and that goes for companies that are already in the UK, looking to expand, so a lot of my work is handling the enquiries for delaying sponsor license applications… (I18, UKTI Immigration Specialist)

Traditionally, in migration studies there has been an emphasis placed on the connectivity of individual agents and family groups, including kinship relations (Goss and Lindquist 1995). Portes and Zhou (2012: 192) suggest that this emphasis has overlooked organizations as an important actor. They posit that ‘Organizational initiatives of migrants themselves and their interface with home-country actors, including sending communities, regions, and states, bear directly on the migration–development relation.’ An MP based in the West Midlands suggested that the political underpinning of UKTI enables a fast-tracked connection building program to be rolled out on a transnational basis, this is illustrated through a series of institutional links with Brazil, often manifested in organisations and joint venture programs (see Appendix 11).

Saxenian documents the aggressive promotion strategies of Taiwanese and Chinese policy makers in promoting and facilitating the institutionalisation of migrant transnational networks. She suggests that these policies have seen considerable return on the entrepreneurial activity of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants and communities in these countries. The more hands-off approach of Indian policy makers, on the other hand, ‘…appears to contribute to India’s
lower rates of return entrepreneurship.’ (Saxenian 2002: 117). Zhou and Lee (2013) offer a conceptual framework for analyzing the relationship between transnationalism and community building by examining Chinese ethnic organizations in the United States. They suggest that immigrants often engage their ancestral homelands via organizations and that organizational transnationalism contributes to strengthening the infrastructure and symbolic systems of the migrant community and enhancing the community’s capacity to generate resources conducive to immigrant incorporation. This ties into Saxenian’s work on transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China. Saxenian contradicts Zhou and Lee’s (2005: 35) position, suggesting that the nature of individual embeddedness in transnational networks, in a process more akin to “brain circulation” than “brain drain,” is transferring ‘…technical and institutional know-how between distant regional economies faster and more flexibly than most large corporations.’ These engineers and entrepreneurs are aided by the lowered transaction costs associated with digitization and utilise technological knowledge networks to facilitate regional economic upgrading in their country of origin.

Through institutional capacity for connection building, manifest in politico economic incentivisation, individual entrepreneurs can tap into national bodies such as UKTI to further entrepreneurial concerns. The mutual benefit of involving migrant entrepreneurs in fostering transnational connections was flagged by a series of entrepreneurs, primarily from Brazil. Tech City Investment Organisation have worked extensively with Brazilian University Science and Technology parks, forming knowledge and information flows through transnational space and time, as well as the transfer of human capital, embodied in migrant entrepreneurs from Brazil and advisors, consulate officials and trade delegations from the UK. As one Brazilian IT entrepreneur suggests, the link with Tech City Investment Organisation from an institutional perspective, which is spatialised by the location of East London Tech City, is an important connection node with the UK. The UK government department interaction with a Brazilian non-governmental organisation illustrates the variegated and intra-scalar nature of transnational
connections, as well as governmental structure differences between Brazil and the UK:

Yeah, we are working with Tech City and UK Trade and Investment and … because our company in Brazil, when we started our company in an incubator, just to give you a little bit of background, it is quite different to the UK, because in Brazil … I would say 95% of the incubators in Brazil are inside universities, or are public institutions, so not like here where most are private and you have angels behind these to get new ideas… in Brazil it is something for universities, and our companies start inside the university, this park is like an IT park, so they have like 60 or 70 companies working inside this park, in the middle of the university, so they manage to give jobs to all of the students at this university and they have big companies, Microsoft, WalMart, Dell Computers, HP etcetera, and… in the last last… July we managed to sign an agreement between UKTI, Tech City and this IT park and create a programme to exchange companies, so the idea is that every 6 months they are going to send up to 6 companies from Brazil from the UK, and at the same time 6 companies from the UK are going to Brazil and they are going to receive our support there, it is quite interesting because it is the first time that you have this programme… UKTI an agreement with an IT park to try to promote business between the UK and Brazil… (I23, Brazilian IT entrepreneur)

The interactivity gap between UK and Brazilian government is expunged by the Brazilian entrepreneur, as Brazil's socio economic culture has been witnessed to shift at a rate that has not been followed by bureaucratic reform, or governmental openness to transnational socio economic relations with the UK:

I just wanted to emphasise as I am doing all the time, it was quite easy to get the support from UK trade and investment in Brazil, so they did an amazing job you know… the natural would be, if I wanted to export for example, the natural path would be to search for some assistance from the Brazilian government right? To increase my business and to export, but I couldn’t manage to get this from Brazil, […] And UKTI has put a lot of effort to try to…
to show to companies in Brazil that they can invest in UK, because before that, nobody used to think about the UK, if you were in Brazil, the normal way would be okay open an office in the South, now let’s move to Sao Paulo, the biggest city in South America, and then it was, let’s go to New York, or another city in the United States… they never thought about the UK, with the importance of Asia and China, they feel that if they go to UK they have access to here… and now we have a lot of things to build you know… in China our client is actually a group of investors from UK, the guys that have the money they are in UK, but they have their business in China, and this is something that you cannot see, not that easy in United States, … so I think London we still have connections with East and West, time zones as well… (I23, Brazilian IT entrepreneur)

In the context of institutionalised entrepreneurial promotion, Harrison et al. (2004: 1045) suggest that entrepreneurs are not local, but that they are ‘…attracted to technology clusters, or incipient clusters, by a range of magnet organisations (talent attractors).’ This ties into the role of Tech City Investment Organisation, as a magnet organisation, that uses positive facets of the economic and political landscape of the UK to present a ‘glocalised’ (Swyngedouw 1996; Brenner 1998) and attractive image of East London Tech City. The use of technology clusters to project government economic dynamism works on a transnational scale, forming bilateral and multilateral trade relations and fostering a sense of global entrepreneurial activity, as suggested by an MP based in the West Midlands:

I wouldn’t quote the sources, but senior companies, who the government tend to use as an opportunity to project itself, rather than the day to day engagement that it needs with those countries to do the preparatory work… and that is in no way to criticise UKTI, who on a say to day basis do a good job. I think you have got this contradiction in that… they genuinely want to back UKTI in developing these contacts and we have got the business ambassadors, you have got a whole range of schemes designed to help small companies, you have got road shows going round the country to encourage SMEs to export abroad, but at the same time you have got this negative
message coming out from migration policy that is a deterrent to develop a long term relationship that is necessary. All the evidence that my committee has gathered, when it has gone abroad to cover these issues, you don’t normally win contracts abroad through going to events, making a big splash and impressing them, you make … you get contracts by fostering relationships [muffled] they are over a long period of time and given the fact that a lot of the [muffled] are obviously anxious to encourage our economic development, we can only do that by working in partnership with [muffled]… that is evident in Brazil and in China in particular, and to do that you have got to have connections, parallel connections between business community here and the community in these countries… (I27, MP based in the West Midlands)

Government linked organisations such as London and Partners are important bodies for focusing migrant entrepreneurial development in localities in the UK. In his study on organized Chinese transnationalism and the institutionalization of business networks, Liu addresses the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI). He attempts to establish the ‘…historical linkages between organized Chinese transnationalism and the institutionalization of business networks.’ (1999: 391). Liu (1999: 391) suggests that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the personal and informal patterns of Chinese transnationalism, and posits that by ‘…delineating the complex mechanisms and agencies through which SCCCI was vitalized and connected to the institutionalizing, regionalizing-and, eventually, globalizing-processes of multi-dimensional Chinese social and business networks in Asia.’ The role that the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) plays in the city region mirrors that of the SCCCI as a ‘…well knitted and extensive organisational structure to function as an institutional nexus for ...business...’ (Liu 1999: 371). The LCCI furthermore, acts as a fundamental institutional support to the making, operating, and sustaining of business networks across the geographic boundaries. This includes migrant entrepreneurs that both the Chamber and other regional organisations recognise as key to the economic and innovative development of London’s economy. This is illustrated by statements from a Brazilian IT entrepreneur, who suggests that organisations such as London and Partners
in the UK, in addition and collusion with Brazilian governmental organisations promote transnational relations and foster entrepreneurial migration:

… so we have backing from both London and Partners and we also have backing from UKTI and there’s the Brazilian UKTI is called APEX, we have help from them, so we are actually selected by APEX, they are helping us with the process of internationalisation, but they are not very good. So, they are very slow and we are much faster than they are, so we have official support, but it is… [...] I think that they are thinking about strategic places, so the first place would have to be, an English speaking place, that is, it is easier for us because we speak English, it is sometimes broken, but…still it is the second language, so it would be an English speaking place, for me I think it makes more sense London than Chicago, because it is better connected, there is support from the government, … so we have for example L&P they are supporting us with office space, they are giving us contacts, accountants, lawyers, anything we need, they are giving us support to, a year membership to London Chamber. So they are really supportive, so I think that if there is a … part of the government that is thinking of opening an agency to help with business from foreign countries, that is good news for us. And there is a crisis here, … and that’s wonderful for us, because everything is cheaper, the government is dying for us to come here, if it wasn’t a crisis it would be much much harder for us to come here, of course that it would be easier to find business, but still for setting up it is easier now, and from here, half an hour I am in Paris, next week we have a meeting in Germany, we have another meeting in Spain, in Chicago, no, I think that you have very similar to Brazil, because it is so big it is hard to leave. So… what we are considering as next steps, we thought of somewhere in Asia, India would make more sense because again it is English and we also have some connections there, but… they really like China for some reason, I am not too sure about China, I would rather go to places like South Korea, I think that it makes more sense, and of course holiday! [Laughs] (I25, Brazilian IT entrepreneur)

The role that trade missions, trade delegations and commercial diplomacy have in contemporary transnational relation building should not be
underestimated. Nitsch (2007) suggests that the purpose of international trips by heads of state varies enormously. The aim of these visits is to develop and enhance bilateral relations with a focus on political issues, human rights, environmental protection, cultural contacts, and economic relations. Economic relations tend to feature frequently in the agenda of these visits, and topics discussed may range from ‘...global economic issues and closer economic cooperation to joint investment projects and trade disputes.’ (Nitsch 2007: 1797).

Sure, all of those that I mentioned have taken place this year I think…or at least Ghana is taking place early next year… there is one to India taking place in the next couple of months I think so Boris Johnson there, so they are all fairly high profile and subsidies for small business, and they will take businesses to areas of activity…[...] It is also inward investment as well and obviously the chamber has a greater role to play and the businesses that come with us that is why the mayor comes with us. [...] I mean generally speaking we respond to the membership, we are led by that and respond to market forces and so on…I think you have to look at, I mean CC, are a global entity, there is in every country, so there is a global network that we would like to, or aspire to use. So there is chambers of commerce in China, BCC that set up there are so on, in terms of us choosing our destinations for trade missions, we go by the market and so on… I mean, interesting example, actually, there is a number of companies [industry], so I went to see one of the companies that makes the components…… From the companies that we have been speaking about, they are often sitting in their silos and they don’t get the chance to speak to one another, so this [trade mission] is an opportunity for them to network and form relationships… (I6, senior representative from the London Chambers of Commerce and Industry)

Senior political figures are often accompanied by a high ranking delegation of business people and managers. (Nitsch 2007). This form of commercial diplomacy is defined by Naray (2008) as ‘...the activity conducted by state representatives with a diplomatic status in view of business promotion between the host and home country.’ (Busschers 2012: 1). Busschers (2012: 1) suggests that commercial diplomacy is ‘...an increasingly more important and powerful governmental measure to support SMEs in their
internationalization endeavour, by addressing information asymmetries and other market failures in today’s interconnected competitive market environment...’ The involvement of political celebrities and figureheads, such as London Mayor Boris Johnson is illustrated by a senior representative from the London Chambers of Commerce and Industry:

*It is great... we try to get Boris to go as much as we can and the politicians, we are trying to have some high profile politicians go over the next few years. Because obviously what they take with them is the publicity and the... you know create a bit more of a buzz around it, it is alright taking the LCCI out there, but get Boris out there, get our very high profile mayor, and it really does say that we are serious and going out to India for that to happen as well, the more influential these sort of trade missions would be... (I28, senior representative from the London Chambers of Commerce and Industry)*

In summary, inward investment in the UK is institutionally spearheaded by UK Trade and Investment. This takes many forms, from large scale investment from transnational corporations to the entrepreneurial activities of migrants under the Tier 1 Entrepreneur route. London has been shown to exhibit a greater proclivity towards harbouring national institutional connectivity, which has been empirically fleshed out by entrepreneurs and policy makers who are embedded in these institutionalised national networks. Portes and Zhou (2012) suggest that this emphasis has overlooked organizations as an important actor, with a favoured academic focus on individual agents and familial connections. As well as the national institutional connections that are fostered by the likes of UKTI in the interest of promoting inward investment, Government linked organisations such as London and Partners are important bodies for focusing migrant entrepreneurial development in localities in the UK. Trade delegations form an important component of transnational connection building for the purposes of inward investment, and again, rely upon the interconnectivity of political and business figureheads alongside coherent mutual economic benefits.
7.3.2 Regional institutional connectivity

Institutional connections are multi scalar in composition, with national, regional and local bodies interacting and operating within government, business organisations and formalised networking organisations. Perkmann (2002: 122) suggests that institutions tend to be conceptualised in two strands, the first acknowledging the ‘…action-shaping power of institutions in their juridico-formal capacity as sustained by economic institutionalists…’ and second that ‘…institutions constitute reality for social actors in the sense that they provide for intersubjectively valid and persistent modes of interpretation and ways of doing things.’ In the context of transnational socio cultural connections and migrant entrepreneurship, it is suggested that institutionalised bodies exhibit facets of both of these positions. The extent to which networks are institutionalised, and changed from personal and informal connections to formalised and centralised, will be brought into question in this and the following section. Birmingham and the West Midlands appear to have a greater density of these regional institutionalised networks than East London or Cambridgeshire. Aspects of regional institutional connectivity in Birmingham and the West Midlands will be evaluated.

Educational background and the role of universities as a node of regional transnational connection is explored by Saxenian in her 2002 study on transnational networks and Regional Development in Taiwan, China and India. She suggests that the alumni associations of ‘…elite Chinese secondary institutions such as Beijing University and Qinghua University have active Bay Area chapters that provide an additional direct link back to China.’ (Saxenian 2002: 136). In contrast to this, the Indian community institutionalised its social networks in the 1990s from a far more grass roots position, where Indian immigrant engineers successfully mobilised their professional networks within Silicon Valley. Friesen et al. (2005: 391) posit that in January 2003, ‘…at a conference on the Indian diaspora held in New Delhi, the Indian government announced the implementation of a system of dual citizenship for People of Indian Origin (PIO) in selected countries.’ Friesen suggests that this example of ‘…high level institutionalization…’ of
political transnationalism (Portes et al. 1999: 222). had been under consideration for several years, and is seen to be of mutual benefit to members of the Indian diaspora and to India itself (Friesen et al. 2005). The perception of elite universities as international institutions is reproduced in Cambridge. A representative of Cambridge Enterprise and Technology club and Cambridge based entrepreneur suggests that the institutional footprint of Cambridge in the regional and national economic and socio cultural landscape provides a unique environment for fostering transnational connections and entrepreneurship:

*I don’t, know I am just thinking out loud here, but I think that there might be two reasons, one is clearly the university of Cambridge has its own paw print over this, and it attracts people and ideas from all over the world. I think it would see itself as an international institution and I sure that it has done form many years. And another one, quite negative, I don’t think that Cambridge had much of an identity, 20-25 years ago, they said if you wanted to wind anyone up who lived in Cambridge and was proud of Cambridge, you would say, it is just a market town. And it is it is no bigger than that, and when the students aren’t here, it is really quite a small village, kind of place, and small for the networking. But then it has had no particular identity, no particular culture beyond the university, and so...when the whole, whatever you want to call it, the dot com era, or the internet age burst upon us ... all this appetite for entrepreneurial activity came and Cambridge was able to adopt it because it had no previous ... cultural philosophy, so it is not like trying to transform the industrial heartland of Midlands... ...The other interesting feature, on the migration point, is the large numbers of non UK people here in Cambridge, it is quite normal to find yourself going to seminars and events and find yourself talking to someone from overseas. Your reaction is not, there is a German or a Pole, or an African, you just think there is another chap, and you fall into conversation. Which not too many miles away from here is quite unusual, ... *(18, representative of Cambridge Enterprise and Technology club and Cambridge based entrepreneur)*
Huggins et al. (2011) explore the inter-organisational knowledge networks that universities in the UK engage in through their knowledge transfer activities. Accordingly, the institutionalisation of knowledge networks is associated with organisational and locational factors (Chesbrough 2003; Cooke et al. 2004; Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen 2006). Huggins et al. (2011) show that the nature and formation of inter-organisational knowledge networks is related principally to the organisational characteristics of network actors, and secondarily to their spatial location. The characteristics of a network actor, in this case a university, are likely to influence the type, diversity and location of other actors with which it networks (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Huggins et al. 2008; Clifton et al. 2010).

The establishment of specialist trade units, often within existing regional institutions, such as the chambers of commerce, illustrates sub national scale, organisational connectivity through transnational networks. The India Pakistan Trade Unit (IPTU), housed in the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce is an example of this regional institutional connectivity. Supported by the European Regional Development Fund, ‘…IPTU has been designed and created by the International Trade Team at Birmingham Chamber of Commerce…’ with the intention of creating ‘…a strong and authoritative West Midlands regional resource on international trade and investment with South Asia - while also providing day-to-day, incidental detail of news, weather and whatever catches the eye.’ (IPTU 2013).

Regional institutions act as nodes for transnational connectivity. Birmingham and the West Midlands has been shown to have a high density of regional institutionalised networks. Educational background and the role of universities as a node of regional transnational connection were explored, with an emphasis on the inter-organisational knowledge networks that universities in the UK engage in through their formalised and informal knowledge transfer activities. Finally, a case study of the India Pakistan Trade Unit, housed within the Birmingham Chambers of Commerce was evaluated in order to illustrate sub national scale, organisational connectivity through transnational networks.
7.3.3 Local nodes of transnational connectivity

In 1990 Leitner suggested that over the past two decades, issues of local economic growth have come to dominate urban politics and planning in Western cities, with local governments adopting increasingly ‘…entrepreneurial economic-development strategies.’ (Leitner 1990: 146) This trend continues to pervade local economic policy, and it particularly relevant for the UK where governmental structural change has paved the way for Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in favour of their Regional Development Agency (RDA) predecessors. Locality has become the contemporary socioscape (Albrow 2001) through which transnational connections can flow and be forged. As such, it is necessary to analyse how economic and political processes operating at different spatial scales interact to determine institutional connection formation and processes. Albrow’s suggestion of the increasing deterritorialisation of communities under globalisation, paves the way for his argument that ‘globalized locality exists’ (Albrow 1997: 51). Accordingly, the networks of individuals in a locality can extend as far as their resources and will to use the communications at their disposal and importantly, the resources and facilities of a locality may link it to globally institutionalised practices (Albrow 1997). The micro level institutional practices that are evident in Cambridgeshire highlight the multi-scalar nature of the institutionalisation of transnational connections. As previously illustrated, there is a deep network of Business Angel investors in the Cambridge region, with locally specific and embedded knowledge. Cambridge Angels is the framework within which these investors operate, allowing visibility and collectivity (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Tarrow 2001). A representative from Cambridge Enterprise and Technology Club and local entrepreneur suggests that the establishment of Cambridge Angels has provided a tight knit investment network for the locality, as well as a source of spatially specific entrepreneurial knowledge:

I suppose one thing that we haven’t touched on, which may be peripheral in terms of what you are looking at, but in terms of the promotion of entrepreneurship, there is a well-established local business angels
community, well the Cambridge Angels is one of them, and it is becoming increasingly less true as Britain changes, but there have been business angel groups here for the last 20 years, the last 15 to 20 years, or so. And that must help local business trying to raise money, so yes there is Cambridge Angels as you say, there is a group called the Great Eastern Investment Forum, so it would lay claim to be original… (I8, a representative from Cambridge Enterprise and Technology Club and local entrepreneur)

Williams (2007: 29) suggests that positioning international migration in relation to ‘…the literature on knowledge management opens up new perspectives on its role in the overall transfer of knowledge in the economy.’ He posits that by starting from the premise that all tacit knowledge transactions are socially situated, addressing scales of national and urban and presenting them as interfolded rather than as discrete sites of analysis (Williams 2007). Here, it is suggested that in place of Williams’ conceptualisation of the urban, the local is positioned as a site of analysis. Whilst migrant entrepreneurs are perceived to embody knowledge and skills lacking in the indigenous labour market (Coe et al. 2003; Audretsch et al. 2004; Williams and Balaz 2004), they use local human capital resources to bed into the new economic and socio cultural environment in which they have situated their business. A London based company from Brazil used the strategy of hiring local staff soon after establishment in the UK, so as to tap into the tacit knowledge and socio cultural networks of UK nationals:

I will be working on, as those connections grow and as the business grows … then we plan to … of course get more people involved. So we plan to have people from Brazil come very often, but we plan to have them in Brazil because there are other markets that we cover and local projects, and of course that might change but when I think of new staff and hiring, assistants and managers, the first idea is to take up local people, people who know about the local culture, people who know about the local culture and can add more to the company… (I24, Brazilian business management entrepreneur)
The role of local government is key in culturally specific business practices such as those of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs where meeting business and government figures forms an aspect of their local connectivity nexus (Zapalska and Edwards 2001). A Chinese entrepreneur based in Cambridge who provides assistance to migrant entrepreneurs and enables transnational business relations suggested that Chinese entrepreneurs expected free advice around figureheads in the locality and strategic introduction opportunities:

*I work with them in that informal way... so... we, our help is more a lot of time, there was a company in Cambridge, one of our neighbours, but they just... they have been here for 7/8 years and when they first set up they wanted to see the Managing Director of St. Johns' Innovation Centre which introduced them to me and then they just knock on our door all the time, and they ask everything... you know everything, whatever you can think of... so we are just giving them free advice, we become friends, that is how a lot of Chinese companies, but later we had business dealings arranged senior level meetings and we use them as our resource to do things in China, we become more embedded, we are more like partners after a while. In fact... this company, their chairwoman invested in my company... so basically going back to your question, day to day... we typically hiring staff, VAT and visa all those matters. For example this company we introduce them to a law firm who specialise on work permit for Chinese companies, recruitment companies, we introduce them to the local government... those free service, but that is a service that we can offer to other companies, but as I say, we don't usually get involved in this setting up... it is all finding partners finding acquisition partners, investment partner because there is more value added, also Chinese companies are not to pay for small things, like an introduction for someone... (I56, Chinese entrepreneur based in Cambridge)*

This transnational localism is conceptually represented through 'glocalism', with applications to migration studies tending to revolve around place and theories of home spaces (Swyngedouw 2004; Torkington 2012). The emergence of the Local Enterprise Partnerships across the UK is positioned
by the LEP Network as ‘…evolving from the bottom up - free from central
control and shaped according to local need: the LEP Network is based on
these principles too and is driven by the priorities of its members.’ (LEP
Network 2013). The institutionalised connectivity that this locally embedded
organisation embodies is rooted in local economic development and
undertaking activities to drive economic growth and the creation of local jobs.
A representative of the LEP Network suggests that LEPs are adhering to the
localism agenda, including the encouragement of entrepreneurship at a local
scale:

"I suppose, obviously I am representing the LEP network and we are based in
the British Chambers of Commerce, but separate and out role is to coordinate
and formulate best practice as well as lobby for Local Enterprise
Partnerships… and… in terms of entrepreneurship the LEPs were charged
with creating jobs and growth in their local area, and as part of the localism
agenda, so actually delegating down as far as possible, and therefore they
are able to make decisions with knowledge of the local area and in terms of
entrepreneurship, if the idea is that jobs are going to come from private sector
growth and or people starting their own businesses against public sector
spending their way out of the recession, therefore the context is as
entrepreneurs being part of the private sector, creating their own jobs… for
employing others, so in terms of local areas and encouraging
entrepreneurship, it is at the heart of the LEPs agenda, however, each LEP
has its own priorities, its own priority sectors, and they are all run differently,
board members, different geographies, (I48, LEP Network representative)

Issues surrounding the localism debate have emerged in the UK over the past
5 years with the abolition of Regional Development Agencies and the
establishment of Local Enterprise Partnerships. The localised
institutionalisation of transnational connections is rooted in the importance of
place and satellite organisational networks. Examples of this have been
exhibited, with the role of local investment groups, knowledge transfer agents,
local government and devolved government representation at a local scale.
The transnational connections that link Cambridgeshire with non-European
economies, cultures and societies as embodied in migrants, tended to be anchored locally, rather than nationally, or regional, compared to East London and Birmingham and the West Midlands.

7.4 Networking and the impact of migration networks

Transnational migrant networks project a sense of socio cultural identity, rooted in spaces of flows. Schrover and Vermulen (2005: 823) postulate that immigrants set up organisations ‘...to create, express and maintain a collective identity.’ However, as Mouffe (1993: 20) suggests, everyone is an inhabitant of a diversity of communities ‘...as many, really as the social relations in which we participate and the subject positions they define.’ Vertovec (1999: 35) postulates that this is an approach which points the way for the grounding of the kind of postmodernist political theory to which notions of multiple identities are often equated, ‘...a grounding in actual social relations, everyday institutions and interactional practices.’ As mentioned, Glick Schiller et al. (1992: 1-2) suggest that these immigrants ‘...who make decisions, take actions and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously are termed ‘transmigrants’...’ In the case of immigrant entrepreneurs, Portes et al. (2000) position that this group’s strategic use of contacts and associates in another country, primarily their country of origin, for their business, enables interpersonal and organisational transnational connectivity to span socio economic as well as socio cultural relations. A representative from the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry suggests that the provision of dynamic and robust networking opportunities as a membership function promotes the use of the organisation as well as fast tracking trade relations in the capital:

As an organisation, we recognise it [networking] is vitally important, we do have groups of members that we facilitate interaction with, on the basis that it is important to get those cultural ties, so our Chinese Business association and ABA [Asian Business Association], we had a thing for women in business, so networking opportunities for all those different individuals, it is important because it demonstrates the importance of culture in entrepreneurship and
trade generally, because clearly those people have links that they don’t necessarily have with other arms of the population, so that is important in itself. (I6, senior representative of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

This perspective is echoed by a representative of Tech City Investment Organisation. They suggest that migrant network facilitation is a core function of the organisation, suggesting that migrant networks are often institutionally embedded organised nodes, which have a socio economic agenda in the interest of sending or receiving country:

Okay, so several things, we, as the Tech City Investment Organisation we work very much with the community here, so making it easy for companies who are already here, or who have just moved here to connect and network with other people who would be relevant to them. So, investors or … other peer group companies. But also, we spend a lot of time overseas promoting the message around, come to the UK, come to London and specifically come to Tech City. I think the rest of the infrastructure that exists here, so, co working spaces … access to finance and all of those things are really important as well. (I1, representative of Tech City Investment Organisation)

Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004: 1177) suggest that migrants do not make their communities alone, but ‘…states and state politics shape the options for migrant and ethnic trans-state social action.’ Schrover and Vermeulen (2005: 823) argue that the characteristics of the immigrant community and the political opportunity structure are important in explaining immigrants’ organisational activity. As such, they posit that ‘Too much and too little competition (from governments and others) leads to reduced organisational activity. Too small and too large communities experience problems in maintaining organisations.’ Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2005: 1178) suggest that despite structural and opportunity based limitations, ‘…International migrants repeatedly engage in concerted action across state boundaries.’ In fact, they suggest that ‘…the use, form, and mobilization of the connections linking “here” and “there” are contingent outcomes subject to multiple political constraints.’ (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2005: 1177).
The influence of institutional connections has been addressed, here it is suggested that the connectivity building projects that are stimulated and enacted by national bodies such as UKTI allow organisational spin off groups to thrive in informally structured milieu. Ryan et al. (2008) challenge the assumption that migrants are able to access dense networks within close-knit local communities, suggesting that this perspective simplifies the experiences of newly arrived migrants, and underestimates difficulties that they may face in accessing support. They examine the different types and levels of support derived through social ties, arguing ‘...for a greater differentiation and specification of networks both vertically and horizontally, but also spatially and temporally.’ (Ryan et al. 2008: 672). This ties into Vertovec’s (1999: 34-35) suggestion that ‘...complex new social morphologies and organisational patterns are coming to challenge the hierarchical political structures of the past.’ As Healey et al. (1995: 274) observe, these political structures are ‘...being replaced by horizontal alliances and networks, cutting across divides between the political and the economic, the public and private’. These relations involve the identification of 'key nodes' in networks, as well as networking activity, forming place and project specific nodes of connectivity that are focused around a sense of collective agency. The construction of an organised networking community is witnessed through the activities of Tech City Investment Organisation in East London. The use of high profile international events such as the Start Up Games allowed the exploitation of existing networks and the proliferation of spin off groups that used opportunities to engage on business grounds to build transnational socio economic and socio cultural ties:

…the last event that we held, which was just a few weeks ago, was the Start Up Games and again a real mix of start ups from around the world. So, probably more, higher percentage from the UK on that occasion, but from all over the world. Again, spending time talking to each other networking, and doing … I guess competitive pitching, and with the option of on one of the days to pitch to external investors, as well. (11, representative of Tech City Investment Organisation)
As transnational transformative agents, migrants work within and co-constitute networked organisational structures. Saxenian (1999) provides examples of transnational entrepreneurial engagement based upon socio cultural and socio economic ties, in her study on Asian immigrant engineers and scientists in Silicon Valley. She views the transnational phenomenon of immigrant entrepreneurship through a social capital lens, suggesting that entrepreneurs exploit their social capital by building global, professional and business ties that connect them with Asia. They are ‘…uniquely positioned because their language skills and technical and cultural know-how allow them to function effectively in the business culture of their home countries as well as in Silicon Valley.’ (Saxenian 1999: ix). Saxenian posits that a transnational community of Chinese engineers has ‘…fostered two-way flows of capital, skill and information between California and the Hsinchu- Taipei region of Taiwan…’ (1999: ix). The use of innovation centres as hubs of economic activity has been suggested in previous sections. Here, this space, such as St. John’s Innovation Centre, will be viewed as a nexus of socio cultural connectivity. As a senior representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre suggests, networking and connectivity is a core function of the centre as a node Cambridgeshire’s broader networked landscape:

... I suppose the third function we [St. John’s Innovation Centre] do is an extension of that, it is partly to make sure that there is a very good ... networking environment around here and that we can plug not only our actual tenants on site, but our virtual tenants, the people who use us as an address if you like, can get to meet the people they need to meet[...] I think what really matters around here is the network of ...other experienced entrepreneurs and investors and the access to technical help through the tech office, that is what matters most. [...] Yes, yes, I think probably, the kind of top two or three that spring to mind for me. There is the Cambridge Angels, there are approximately fifty people, all very high net worth, all experienced at running businesses, there is the Cambridge Network, which is, if you like, the club of clubs and particularly people arriving new to Cambridge, getting membership at the Cambridge Network and going to their events is a fast track to meeting lots of other likeminded people, then there has been organisations that are
sort of spin outs from that, the industry specialist groups, there’s for instance, Cambridge Wireless and Cambridge Cleantech...ad if you are in let’s say low carbon, joining Cambridge Cleantech is likely to be a way of meeting people you could recruit and people you could work with or people that might invest in you. (I3, senior representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge)

Goodings et al. (2007: 463) suggest that there is ‘A dialectic between collectivity and place, resulting in the grounding of a shared sense of the past in a particular place, is at the base of all communities.’ They postulate that in this sense, community is, by its very definition, innately mediated. This ties into Wellman’s (2001) position that community is found in networks and not groups, people often view the world in terms of groups according to Freeman (1992), though they function in networks. In networked societies, Wellman (2001: 227) posits, ‘…boundaries are permeable, interactions are with diverse other, connections switch between multiple networks, and hierarchies can be flatter and recursive.’ Organisations form complex networks of alliance and exchange rather than cartels, and workers report to multiple peers and superiors. Furthermore, these networks are transnationally robust, with evidence of translocation of informal business and organisation patterns that are place specific. A representative of Birmingham City Council postulated that networks and spatialised trade dynamics in cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa were translated to the UK, in London and the West Midlands following forced migration from African nations:

‘..these people have come here lock stock and barrel and its almost as though they have transformed and transposed the sort of business network that was in Mombasa, Nairobi, almost, if you look at the dynamics of the situation of the way that the shops have actually been organised, you often find some of these same patterns have been replicated from the country of origin. (I4, representative of Birmingham City Council)

Networking is localised and personal with spatially engrained organisational structures exhibiting project based community activity. A literature defined by conflation is presented in debate around the meaning and use of the term
community (Hoggett 1997; Delanty 2003; Shaw 2008; Mavroudi 2010). To belong to a community is the archetypal small scale construct (Hunter 1953). Community is often seen as a given entity rather than how ‘...community formation and placemaking,’ takes place, from a normative standpoint (Mazumdar and Mazumdar 2009: 307). Tension within and between communities is a dominant theme in literature. Urry (1985) justifies community conflict exhibited in space with the observation that no two objects can occupy the same point in space. Urry (1985) concludes that ‘space is necessarily limited and there has to be competition and conflict over its organization and control.’ (Chidester and Linenthal 1995: 18). Here, the construction of a transnationally networked community is organised around shared status, as both migrant and entrepreneur. The interaction between place and individual, as an embodiment of experience, perception and agency, is illustrated in Newman and Paasi’s (1998) study addressing boundaries, with the institution of community and spatial impregnation with a sense of identity: ‘Even if they are always more or less arbitrary lines between territorial entities, they may also have deep symbolic, cultural, historical and religious, often contested, meanings for social communities.’ (Newman and Paasi 1998: 187; Luz 2008). Institutional hubs, such as offices and cafés, are imbued with a sense of networked centrality. This often overlaps with locations of informal organisational networks, as a Brazilian entrepreneur suggests, his networking strategy involved the strategic use of places for personal and business relationship building:

In terms of... we still have our link with LCC, and we also have some links with the Brazilian CC, in London, we have a lot of links with companies here, that join this chamber in order to understand the Brazilian market, to invest... so for me, it is a good place to be as well, ... I can help them, we can think about joint ventures to exploit the Brazilian market, because I know the market well, and at the same time, they know the market here... so for example, you can see that I am not a sales guy, even my English is not perfect, so I cannot sell my products here, but I have some partners here and they have their sales guys and these guys they manage to sell their services here, in the UK as well... and the same time, my sales guys in Brazil, they
manage to sell their services in Brazil as well...so we need to be in the two, the London and the Brazilian chambers, about Tech City, I don’t have any formal link but, have you been there TechHub, you know the café that they have in the basement… […] I used to spend some time there as I used to have some friends there, I used to spend at least, and have a coffee in there [muffled] and that is my link with Tech City now… (I23, Brazilian entrepreneur based in East London)

Networking uses technology and online social networking facilities for promoting transnational socio cultural connections. With the proliferation of newer, cheaper, and more efficient modes of communication and transportation migrants can maintain their home-based relationships and interests across national borders (Vertovec 2002). Vertovec (2002: 4) suggests that contemporary ‘…globally ‘stretched’ patterns of activity affect a variety of migrants’ social relations (including friendship, kinship and status hierarchies), modes of economic exchange, processes political mobilization, practices of cultural reproduction (including religious practices, institutions like marriage, images and symbols affecting group identity) forms of information transfer, and nature of professional association.’ Accordingly, Portes (2000: 258) posits that the rising class of transnational entrepreneurs ‘…could not exist without new technologies and the options and lower costs that they make possible.’ Transnational networks are used to build a locally based but far-reaching research and technico-industrial web (Meyer and Brown 1999). The resultant long-distance networks among local and foreign-based professionals, Vertovec (2002: 4) suggests, ‘...can provide highly important channels throughout which run flows of capital, skill, managerial know-how and information. Such networks are not just transnational, but are usually trans-local.’ The use of technologies, such as conference calling facilities, is suggested by a representative of Birmingham City Council as enabling and co-constitutive of transnational socio cultural connections at an organisational level:

And I was successful in securing a project through Interreg funding for a project called making knowledge work and since then we have got seven out
of eight international projects which involve working with seventy-nine partners, so if you look at those projects, they are very innovative, we have got a project called Science Park Without Walls so basically if you can imagine a science park without walls, how can that science park function in the world? Well basically we are using Cisco technology of at least four to six screens like that fitted out in a room, and actually it has already been demonstrated in the science park, where we can talk, have video conferencing around the world, five, six people at a time. So from this room, don’t have to go to San Francisco or anywhere, so a business can actually talk to a potential customer, or venture capital, so Science Park without walls. We’ve got Next Generation Science Park, how the next generation of Science Park is going to look. And then we have got Smart Spaces which is looking at the energy efficiency of public buildings, some of our buildings, you can’t even switch the heating off… (I4, representative of Birmingham City Council)

Social media sites and tools such as Skype and Facebook allow for the networked connectivity of individuals in virtual space, or placeless socio-spheres.

‘Yeah, very much so. Business is done on relationships to be fair, sometimes it doesn’t work like that but the majority of the time negotiating and costs all of that sort of thing are done on the basis of a relationship…[...] There is a trend towards alternative methods, Skype, the social media, LinkedIn and that sort of thing. But I would be surprised if 9.5/10 people that you speak to didn’t way you cannot beat meeting people personally and to that end, that is why we are still running 200 events each year…that do that, put people together in the same room… (I6, representative of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)

The use of blogs and social networking technologies is documented by Panagakos and Horst (2006: 112) in their 2006 paper on technology and the social worlds of transnational migrants. They suggest that while transnational migrants may adopt ‘…new ICTs to suit their communications and networking needs, the impact on social networks, daily life and community is largely
contested.’ They posit that it should not be automatically assumed that increased use of the Internet, mobile phones or other ICTs necessarily means that individuals feel more connected or are more community-minded (Panagakos and Horst 2006). Nevertheless, social media is a tool that is used extensively for creating and maintaining spatially dispersed connections. As an entrepreneur in Israel postulates, the multiplicity of blog sites, social media opportunities and more traditional networking tools enable relations to be formed across borders, and between prospective and settled migrants (see Appendix 12).

The use of technology as an enabling power in the proliferation of networks and networking opportunities is studied by Smith (1999), he suggests that an important aspect of transnational networking is translocalism. Beaverstock cites Smith, postulating that ‘…the ‘translocal’ is composed of ‘local to local’ relations, ties and networks that cross national boundaries, and where they intersect in the city are the ‘translocalities’ (i.e. the household, the firm, the community centre).’ (Beaverstock 2005: 248-249) Accordingly, sustainability of the translocal is positioned around ‘…social networks in migration and their attendant modes of social organization…’ (Smith 1999: 128) These networks span cross national boundaries ‘…by both physical movement and technology.’ (Beaverstock 2005: 249) Translocal connections are sustained by technological means, such as advanced transportation and communication, jet airplane, satellite dishes, courier services, telephone, faxes and email now available to facilitate the production of transnational social ties (Smith 1999). The use of Yammer, LinkedIn and other professional, social networking sites is suggested by a representative of Tech City Investment Organisation. The organisation of post event networks through these means allows spatially dispersed migrants and agents to continue communication:

So, yes. That was the whole point of the Start Up Games for instance. So in that we had UK entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs from all around the rest of the world, and part of the major deliverable for that event was networking, and now some days after the event, weeks after the event, there are still active
online networking groups for that whole communities for companies that were there... [...] We, we set it up as a networking tool, but we have kept it going and this is through Yammer, to, to leave it as something that companies can continue to use and benefit from... [...] I think to set up the network in the beginning, so if you are having a big event, or something like that, its very useful because it means that participants can find out who is going to be there are how to get in contact with them, ahead of the event itself, but then beyond that, things like LinkedIn, they are very important, I have had quite a few enquiries that have come via LinkedIn. (I1, representative of Tech City Investment Organisation)

In summary, transnational migrant networks project a sense of socio cultural identity, rooted in spaces of flows. Migrant network facilitation is a core function of the organisation, with migrant networks often constitute in institutionally embedded organised nodes, which have a socio economic agenda in the interest of sending or receiving country. As transnational transformative agents, migrants work within and co-constitute networked organisational structures. This networking is localised and personal with spatially engrained organisational structures exhibiting project based community activity. Networking uses technology and online social networking facilities for promoting transnational socio cultural connections. With the proliferation of newer, cheaper, and more efficient modes of communication and transportation migrants can maintain their home-based relationships and interests across national borders (Vertovec 2002). This section has addressed networking and migrant networks as organisational, transnational socio cultural connections. This scale of interaction, and form of collective agency falls between the institutionalised connections that were evaluated in the previous section, and interpersonal relations that will be discussed later in this chapter. Dolfin and Genicot suggest that despite a large literature on migration experience among an individual’s family and community networks, establishing that these networks tend to encourage migration, ‘...there is little research investigating the mechanism by which networks exert such effects.’ (2010: 343). The following section will address these issues, dealing with personal experience, connections, family and friends.
7.5 Personal experiences, connections, friends and family

7.5.1 Family

Mincer (1977: 2) suggested in 1977 that ‘...families tend to be less mobile than persons unencumbered by spouse and children.’ This remains a key assumption of geographical research on family migration and takes a restricted view of related familial relations and transnational connectivity that cross border family life entails. Empirical data in this section revolves around the perceived importance of family to high skilled entrepreneurs and migrants to the UK, with illustration of how these connections are used, maintained and created transnationally. Greve and Salaff (2003: 1) suggest that family connections are especially important for migrant entrepreneurs, these entrepreneurs ‘...access people in their networks to discuss aspects of establishing and running a business.’ They found that entrepreneurs build networks that systematically vary by the phase of entrepreneurship, analysing number of their discussion partners, and the time spent networking. Accordingly, ‘...entrepreneurs talk with more people during the planning than other phases.’ (Greve and Salaff 2003: 1). They conclude that family members are present in their networks in all phases, and provide a varying role in the entrepreneurial and migration life-courses of participants.

Alarcon (2012: 91) posits that despite growing evidence about the importance of family and gender for migration and development on a broader scale, there is a dearth of meaningful international discussion about how these four fields concretely interface with each other. He postulates that migration studies and policies ‘...traditionally have focused on individuals rather than on the family as a unit of analysis or recipient of migration services and benefits.’ In geographical work, the impact of familial relations on transnational migration is often restricted to caring, child rearing or dependant spouse roles (Baldassar and Merla 2013; Mazzucato and Schans 2011; Kraler et al. 2011). Where the impact of family is mentioned in relation to immigrant entrepreneurship, there is a conceptual tension between ethnic minority
business and mainstream economic participation. Essers et al. argue that families play an important role in the context of migrant entrepreneurship. Accordingly, Essers et al. (2013: 1646) suggest that work on migrant entrepreneurship emphasizes, ‘…that migrant entrepreneurs often rely on family networks to acquire resources and how these networks bring trust, despite negative reciprocity.’ Furthermore, the impact of family norms, attitudes and values also impact migrant entrepreneurs, their business, migration decisions and identity construction.

Migrant entrepreneurs use technology to keep in touch with family members on a transnational scale. As such, in her study on the Indian diaspora in a transnational context, addressing this migrant group’s social relations and cultural identities in the New York Cityscape, Bhattacharya (2008: 74) suggests that ‘…participants regularly contacted family in India by telephone, email, Internet, postal mail and gifts sent with others travelling back home.’ As has been established, migration channels are carved out in space and time, often with attached networked activity led by family and kin experience, this is illustrated in Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) find that having a father or brother that has migrated to the US increases the likelihood of migration for Mexican males. Here, in line with Bhattacharya’s (2008) depiction of transnational familial groups, the definition of family encompasses not only parents and biological siblings, but grandparents, cousins and other extended family members. Participants in her study described feelings of ‘…connection, trust and mutual concern as the primary strengths of their family relationships.’ (Bhattacharya 2008: 74). Parents provided in depth instructional and instrumental supports including recommendations for daily living practices (like eating nutritious food, cooking Indian meals or maintaining faith in God), which allowed a sense of home place projection in their migration setting.

A representative of Tech City Investment Organisation suggests that the presence of family members often signifies a greater potential to migrate and higher levels of cultural understanding among prospective entrepreneurs. The feeling of pre migration place based knowledge is fundamental to this understanding, as Faist (2000: 200) suggests:
‘...international migration is not a discrete event constituted by a permanent move from one nation-state to another. Rather, it is a multidimensional economic, political, cultural and demographic process that encapsulates various links between two or more settings and manifold ties of movers and stayers between them.’

As such and as previously discussed, transnational social spaces emerge which are temporally longitudinal and generationally embedded with ‘...ties and the unfolding transnational social spaces [extending] beyond the first generation phenomena such as diasporas have attested to this for centuries.’ (Faist 2000: 200). These statements from Faist describe the empirical essence of transnational connectivity. As Ryan (2011: 83) suggests the

‘...study of transnational families has been useful in challenging the assumed linearity of migration and illustrating the ongoing linkages between family members here and there, the concept of “transnationalism” implies more than simply regular contact with the home country.’

... people do talk about having family members here, so that is particularly strong, in places like India, Australia, Canada, US and then seeing peer group companies that have done something successful and have been inspired by that, feeling that they are moving to a community where there is already an existing community of people that are familiar to them. So, people from Brazil, fall into that category...so yes, there is...[...] There are some Brazilian start-ups and we have seen a great increase in the number of Brazilian companies that are showing an interest in the UK and particularly East London and that’s partly down to the fact that we did some activity earlier in the year. So, I visited Brazil and presented on Tech City, and, in six different cities, so .... (I1, a representative of Tech City Investment Organisation)

The importance of distance is denuded by technology, though familial closeness is not unanimously tied into spatial proximity. As Ryan (2010: 83) postulates in her study on Polish migrants in the UK, with a focus on
transnational familial relations, recent research has ‘...helped to complicate previous assumptions about the migrant family as a bounded geographical unit ...’ Ryan (2011) suggests that families involve complex webs of relationships across generations and across locations (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994) rather than simple conjugal or household units. Accordingly, Bryceson and Vuorela (2002: 28) postulate that ‘There has been a tendency to make the family synonymous with the household’ this ‘...fails to capture the composition and structure of transnational families’ The conceptual embeddedness of family in household places fails to appreciate dispersed family groups and networked spatially distant kin (Flores-Yeffal and Aysa-Lastra 2011) As Boyd (1989: 643) posits,

‘Families represent a social group geographically dispersed. They create kinship networks which exist across space and are the conduits for information and assistance which in turn influence migration decisions.’

Transnational mobility impacts families, and incentivises transnational socio cultural connectivity. These ties become extended through space and time as geographically dispersed relatives form part of ‘...multistranded social relations which link together migrants’ societies of origin and settlement.’ (Baldassar and Baldock 2000: 63). This is illustrated by an Indian entrepreneur based in Cambridge with personal experience of European migration:

*I10 Distances are not relevant at all...what is relevant is, distance in terms of kilometres or miles, but how close you are as a family, but if you are close it doesn’t matter, I think that modern India is built on [muffled] then the success of my village is based upon about a dozen people who have gone abroad and sent the money back. And despite their being in the early days... remittances... despite that they sent back the maximum they could, and now it is a lot more free in terms of the money that you can send. And I think that is similar to anywhere in India, when they come out they support families back at home... [...] It is always about the timing, he went back in mid 70s so I was*
still studying, he was 57, 58 when he went back, I am similar age now, he wanted to return and he ... wanted to spend the rest of his time where he grew up, where he was brought up, and a lot of Indians who are coming to retirement, I would say 90% of them are going back regularly over the winter months and at some point they may decide to stay, because the travelling is too much hassle and there isn't much more to come back for... their life now, their past, the rest of their life in comfort. They build a house over there, and build a family home, you can get the comforts there now, so flat screen TV, air conditioning when in the summer months it can get up to 45 degrees Celsius... (I10, Indian entrepreneur based in Cambridge)

Family acts as a background support mechanism for migrant entrepreneurs. This support may be manifest in advice on everyday living, help with decision making, or emotional and psychological support. Baldassar (2007a: 385) posits the importance and persistence of bonds of emotion across distance. In her 2007(a) study on transnational families and the provision of moral and emotional support, she finds the perseverance of bonds of emotion across distance which challenges ‘...arguments about the declining bonds within translocal families as a result of globalising processes.’ As previously discussed,

‘...the role that new communication technologies play in sustaining these bonds is offered as a possible explanation to account for the apparent increase in the frequency of transnational emotional interaction over time.’ (Baldassar 2007a: 385).

Skrbiš (2008: 233-234) suggests that ‘Theorising the ways in which migration, emotions and belonging are experienced and understood in the context of transnational family life is no small task because it involves several major, and closely interconnected, social scientific concepts _ the institution of the family, the processes of transnationalism and migration, emotions and the complex question of belonging.’ Through transnational family life, these intertwined phenomena are connected and co-dependent, with emotions representing ‘...the glue of this co-dependency.’ (As Baldassar (2007a: 387) postulates,
global circuits of power and capital, as well as political unrest, have ‘...increased the incidence of people on the move whether for career development and/or lifestyle change or sanctuary and economic security.’ These flows of people have resulted in transnational exchanges of support as homeland and migrant kin endeavour to care for each other across time and space (Baldassar 2007a). In a study on migration and aging Baldassar (2007b: 275) addresses ‘transnationalism from below’, suggesting it to be ‘...the more quotidian and domestic features of transmigrant experience, highlights the importance of considering the role of homeland kin and communities in discussions of migration.’

The minutiae of family activity in the micro spaces of home engagement are again expanded to encompass a complex series of transnational connections and multiple sites of connection. Baldassar suggests that ‘Transnational lives are thus shaped by the ‘economies of kinship’, which develop across changing state (‘macro’), community (‘meso’) and family migration (‘micro’) histories, including, in particular, culturally constructed notions of ‘ideal’ family relations and obligations, as well as notions of ‘successful’ migration and ‘licence to leave’. (Baldassar 2007b: 275). Skrbiš (2008: 231) states that the idea of transnational family ‘...implies dynamics, flux and change, yet it is also embedded in unyielding and stable structures that impact upon the experiences of family members.’ The extent to which family provide underlying stability in emotional and knowledge based support it illustrated by a Brazilian entrepreneur in London, she suggests that family act as a devil’s advocate in decision making time periods. These familial structures are reproduced by ‘...the institutions of the host society, the restrictions imposed by geography, international politics and law, technologies that enable communication and travel and the strength of ties with family members back home or in other places.’ (Skrbiš 2008: 231). The Brazilian entrepreneur then iterates the importance of non-family member network integration, and her personal goal to make new friends and associates within non Brazilian social groups. White and Ryan (2008: 1471) suggest that ‘The possibilities for making new friendships and relationships are part of the charm of the
adventure, especially for young people from small towns with limited social possibilities.'

I think I am kind of lucky because my family always say, ‘Are you sure you want to do this? Then just go’, so that’s…kind of like what … I don’t really know many Brazilian companies here, but this is just me, because since I come here at the beginning I try to avoid Brazilian people because I mean I knew English already but I didn’t want to just like speak Portuguese, so I try to avoid Brazilian people, so my whole idea was to experience life in the UK, so the different culture, everything, so I try to avoid this. And now that I am like OK, I have a lot of experience here so [name of company] is really good for me because it is a bridge back with Brazil, so when I go back I can do like,… it is not just like any companies in the UK and it is a Brazilian company, that people in Brazil know… (I26, Brazilian entrepreneur in London)

Family and kinship ties influence entrepreneurial activity on the ground through embedding socially networked connections in a setting of knowledge sharing. ‘In transnational family contexts, practical support largely involves the sharing of knowledge and expertise, which can happen across distance,’ (Baldassar 2007a: 390). This may include ‘…the exchange of advice and information on any number of topics including child rearing, real estate, loans, purchases, and recipes.’ (Baldassar 2007a: 390). This is highlighted by a representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge. He suggests that the existence of potentially invisible ties that bind families may not only result in support and knowledge sharing, but also development of transnational entrepreneurial opportunity through the transferral of expertise across space and time:

I3 I think it is something that, if you are from, whether it’s India or Poland, you do tend to retain very strong links with where you have come from. And they may not be terribly visible to outsiders, but that does not mean to say they are not important. […] I can think of … one example of a masters student, an MPhil, he joined a company here, and then, he was from India originally, he set up on his own… and he was collaborating remotely with his brother who
was a graduate of the Indian institutes of technology, brother then moved to California, they carried on collaborating remotely and they also then got some people in Poland involved, almost as though it was, sort of, different migrants, coming together. (I3, a senior representative of St. John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge)

This is furthered by a representative from Birmingham City Council, he suggests that without the transnational socio cultural connections, fostered through familial relations and networks, migrant entrepreneurship could not be facilitated in many cases. The role of these ties, in procuring products, knowledge and services is key to the economic success of the Indian and Central Asian migrants that are mentioned:

Yeah…I mean just to finish off the last point, I mean some families have global connections, and if you take for example the Digbeth Wholesale market I used to go there when I was a kid, thirty, forty years ago, over forty years ago, and these were people from Punjabi, Pakistani communities, and these are people that couldn’t have started a wholesale food and veg. business buying and selling Indian vegetables, which they could only do in India, they couldn’t have done that without the international contacts from the country of origin and what they have done is expanded that from India to here. So there are families, quite a few that do have those international connections, and in fact as a civil servant I recognise that, you know, yes you have chamber of commerce, you are interested in import/ exporting, however what the chamber of commerce weren’t doing, or certainly wasn’t seen to be doing was attracting those groups of people, whoever they are, ethnic, gender, age, whatever way you want to categorise them, they weren’t segmenting the market enough, and their view was equal opportunity, they were basically saying we are organising this mission, irrespective of their background can come. (I4, a representative of Birmingham City Council)

The relationship that migrants have with family and friends is place specific and enacted through mundane activities in everyday life. Conradson and McKay (2007: 168) postulate that ‘Many of the events and communities that
shape our senses of self are connected to particular places.’ They (2007: 168) suggest that work, friendship and family are important nodes of understanding in these spatialised terms, ‘...for each of these forms of sociality is typically associated with a series of identifiable locations.’ Place plays a major role in the ongoing constitution of identity (Pile and Thrift 1995; Conradson and McKay 2007; Yeoh and Huang 2011). Places represent relatively stable constellations of social, material and natural entities (Conradson and McKay 2007), therefore a persons’ movement between settings is also a significant influence upon subjectivity. For transnational migrants and especially migrant entrepreneurs, the relational effects of mobility may be particularly significant. An entrepreneur, for example, might choose to ‘...exchange a sense of community and reciprocity in a village setting for the economic opportunity yet relative anonymity of a major city.’ (Conradson and McKay 2007: 168). In associated processes of mobility and settlement, they will be shaped by new relations in the destination setting, this will stem from locally forged socio cultural relations as well as the transnational performance of previously local connections. In this light, Sheller and Urry (2000) suggest that mobility provides opportunities for new forms of subjectivity and emotion to emerge, whether broadly positive or negative (Conradson and McKay 2007).

As Hage (2005: 467) suggests, conceptualisations risk overemphasising the transnationalism of migrant collectives when local processes are not also considered as constitutive of the experiences of groups and individuals, as ‘...one cannot be understood separately from the other.’ As Levitt and Jaworsky (2007: 131) postulate,

‘...recent scholarship understands transnational migration as taking place within fluid social spaces that are constantly reworked through migrants’ simultaneous embeddedness in more than one society.’

Developing this, Tomiak and Patrick (2010) suggest that migrants are similarly rooted in more than one society. Conradson and McKay (2007: 168) suggest that ‘Geographical mobility inevitably changes the relations we have with emplaced configurations of people and events, while at the same time
As such, transnational socio cultural identity, and the mundane realities of transnational spatial engagement are co-constituted. McAdams (1997) conceptualizes these multiple identity construction as a reflexive project that people ‘work on’, as situated within time and context, and in dialogue with their relevant others (Essers et al. 2013). Smith (2001) recommends a renewed focus on transnational interconnectivity ‘...because it captured a sense of distanciated yet situated possibilities for constituting and reconstituting social relations. [This] underlines the socio-spatial processes by which social actors and their networks forge the translocal connections and create the translocalities that increasingly sustain new modes of being-in-the-world.’ (c.f. Conradson and Latham 2005: 228). The importance of place as a manifold component of transnational socio cultural connectivity is explained by a representative of London and Partners in Mumbai, India. He suggests that the demographic fragmentation and respective subjectivities of migrants within the sub-continent are manifest in representations of everyday life through family relations:

I38 It is very demographically fragmented, I would say that the northern India, ... people ... [muffled] they have more people in the UK than Southern India, the south of India is more of a knowledge economy... where you get more IT companies and [muffled] and that part of the country has taken off in the past 15 to 20 years, this part of India, the southern part of India has more connections with the USA... because that, early 90s, the first southern Indians abroad went to the United States, so the northern part, yes, from Punjab they are more in the UK, some of the immigration, ... and some in London... and Gujarat ... they are more likely to have connections with family and friends in the UK, the Southern Indians are less ... (I38, a representative of London and Partners based in Mumbai, India)

This section has addressed importance of family to high skilled entrepreneurs and migrants to the UK, with illustration of how these connections are used, maintained and created transnationally. Migrant entrepreneurs use technology to keep in touch with family members on a transnational scale, which has in
turn denuded the importance of distance. The importance of place persists, with the construction of migrant identity tightly tied into notions of home and a sense of situation. Family acts as a background support mechanism for migrant entrepreneurs. This support may be manifest in advice on everyday living, help with decision making, or emotional and psychological support. Family and kinship ties influence entrepreneurial activity on the ground through embedding socially networked connections in a setting of knowledge sharing. As Baldassar (2007a: 390) posits, ‘In transnational family contexts, practical support largely involves the sharing of knowledge and expertise, which can happen across distance,’ Finally, the relationship that migrants have with family and friends is place specific and enacted through mundane activities in everyday life. As such, Conradson and McKay (2007: 168) postulate that ‘Many of the events and communities that shape our senses of self are connected to particular places.’

7.5.2 Friends

Bunnell et al. (2012: 490) suggest that friendship is a means through which

‘…people across the world maintain intimate social relations both proximate and at a distance. Friendships, it seems to us, are an important part of what makes us, and our geographies of various kinds, human.’

Increasingly, people near emotionally may be geographically far away; yet as Larsen et al posit, ‘…they are only a journey, email or a phone call away.’ (2006: 262). Bunnell et al. (2012: 502) introduce the Geographies of Friendship, postulating that study of ‘Practices of friendships through/in mobile social life offer further possibilities for those interested in the everyday and microgeographies of transnationality.’ As such, practices of friendship are reconfigured through a range of transnational mobilities, ‘…producing particular (re)configurations of social geographies in destinations, places of transit and even in sites of origin.’ (Bunnell et al. 2012: 502) Conradson and Latham (2005: 287) find that ‘…formulations of the self as creative project to
be remarkably central to the mobility...’ of high skilled migrants. Friendship and interpersonal social networking is a key aspect of this project, and performed through a range of socio cultural connections spanning time and space. Bunnell et al. (2012: 491) argue that ‘Geography is important in the making, maintenance and dissolution of friendships, as well as in the types of friends that are important within particular space-time settings.’ The diverse geographies of transnational socio cultural relations and how that relates specifically to friends and interpersonal connectivity will be addressed here.

People can travel, relocate and migrate and yet still be connected with friends and family members ‘back home’ (Larsen et al. 2012). Distance is being equalised, if not denuded by spatially vague technologies that allow transnational (or even virtual) place-making to occur: ‘So, increasingly, people who are near emotionally may be geographically very far away; yet they are only a journey, email or a phone call away.’ (Larsen et al. 2006: 261). Not only are questions of ‘time-space compression’ brought to the fore, but issues surrounding ‘time-space distanciation’ or the spatial stretching of social networks will be evaluated here (Larsen et al. 2012). Larsen et al. (2006: 261) further suggest that

‘There is a shift from ‘little boxes’ of spatially dense and socially overlapping networks to networks where connections are spatially dispersed and membership of one network does not necessarily overlap with that of others ...’

This stretching of tight knit networked spaces ties into a statement from a Brazilian entrepreneur in London, who illustrates the temporal flux of relationships and oscillation of connectivity through space:

I26 Actually I knew [name] from Brazil, we studied together in Uni, in Rio, that’s why we knew. But when I arrived here, I didn’t know that she was here as well, so we lost contact, and then I was working already after my graduation from my masters, I was working from another company and there are some seminars and events all around this area, so I met her there and I was like, Oh my God, so after we worked together in another company here in
the UK. She left first and I left, and then she called me and said what are you doing, I have this company, we are looking for people, so I went. [...] I think it is really important, because before I was working with her I was doing freelance, so when you doing freelance networking is everything, because it is the way that you get jobs, not only with the people that I knew before, from Brazil, but when I arrived here, I didn't know anyone, so I had to start building my network up again, like 80% of the work. [...] all my family is in Brazil, my friends, everyone, I cam here by myself, during that period I stayed here, I just came back from Brazil now, for holidays, before this I think that I was away for more than one year. But now we have Skype we have internet all the time, we have all of these type of applications, it is easier to communicate. (I26, Brazilian entrepreneur in London)

Spatial dimensions of friendship are undergoing significant change as a result of increasing human mobility and long-distance connections. Bunnell et al. (2012: 502) suggest that ‘Existing practices of connection, community and intimacy that have been sustained primarily through geographies of (mostly) stasis, are thrown into flux under contemporary conditions of globalization.’ This has implications for a range of intimate social relations, though it is friendship that appears to be gaining prominence in recent research. In her study on the Indian Diaspora in a Transnational Context, Bhattacharya (2008: 74) analyses peer relations as a component of social relations and cultural identities of immigrants to New York City. The participants identified peer social relationships as ‘…the most influential force upon their coping responses during the adjustment process.’ As such, peer relations were primarily driven by needs for social support, survival in a new country, getting a job and aspirations for accomplishing prosperity in the USA (Bhattacharya 2008). Bhattacharya (2008: 74) states that migrant’s explanations of need-based issues ‘…allowed them to make friends who could guide them through the immigration process or who undergo the same experience at the same time.’ This ties into Wiles’ (2008: 119) work on New Zealanders in London, where she posits that ‘Several researchers have observed the close-knit, supportive role that friendship networks in this community have played in motivating young New Zealanders not only to travel but also to choose
London as a destination, and in shaping their experiences and social networks upon arrival …' The strong social bonds that social peer and interpersonal friendship relations provide may facilitate useful social support but at the same time can make it difficult for many to experience integration in indigenous social networks (Wiles 2008). Larsen et al. point out arguments that mobility produces a lack of connections, commitment and emotional nearness (Albrow 1997; Cresswell 2002). They cite Putnam (2000), postulating that mobility can be argued to undermine communities and ‘social capital’. In ‘…mobile times social networks are individualised,’ (Larsen et al. 2006: 262), so there is a proliferation of weak ties, while at the same time strong ties are increasingly few and short-lived because people are more mobile. Larsen et al. (2006) suggest that weak ties are more socially suited to mobile life styles as they represent routes while strong ties imply roots (Granovetter 1983).

The role of friendship networks is not only important for entrepreneurial activity, but also influences socio cultural activities that contribute to a person’s sense of well-being and performance in everyday life. White and Ryan (2008) suggest that emotional support in combating homesickness and loneliness may be provided by close relatives or a partner. They posit that transnational relationships may be intense, dense and durable, involving a good deal of trust and empathy (White and Ryan 2008). Additionally, support may be available from friends who live outside one’s immediate environment (Granovetter 1973) using telecommunications (Wellman 1988) and other mobile communications technologies. White and Ryan (2008: 1470) postulate, that in this way, ‘…transnational links with people ‘back home’ may continue to play an ongoing supportive role for migrants.’ Bhattacharya (2008: 74-75) cites her participants’ identification of ‘…reciprocity, emotional closeness and mutual concern for well-being, as essential to peer relationships.’ She suggests that these socio personal ties offered feelings of ‘togetherness’ and the expectation of mutual aid with the cultural adjustment process. However, knowledge and local informational support, ‘…such as how and where to register with a doctor, or which is the best school in the area,’ (White and Ryan 2008: 1470). may be sought from different sources such as work
colleagues or neighbours who are more familiar with the local environment. They build on this premise, suggesting that ‘...the existence of a circle of friends and relatives does not in itself mean that support is always available or forthcoming...’ (White and Ryan 2008: 1470). For example, friends may not have the resources to provide the kind of support that migrants require. Wierzbicki (2004) argues that migration researchers often take for granted that migrants arrive and simply slot into networks that provide them with jobs, housing and emotional support. The mobility of friendships further develops this argument. High skilled migrants are suggested to position mobility as periods of exploration, travel and new experiences, as well as opportunities to harness economically reproduction (Conradson and Latham 2005). Conradson and Latham (2005: 287) suggest that the mobility of friendships raises questions about how we think about contemporary international mobility, ‘...and the significance of friendship as opposed to kin or neighbourhood relations within it.’ A Brazilian entrepreneur suggests that he uses the experience and friendships that he has fostered in Brazil to develop his entrepreneurial and socially networked opportunities in the UK. The embodiment of socio cultural relations, as a capital resource allows migrant entrepreneurs to intermesh economic and socio cultural life spheres in a tangible way. However, another entrepreneur, and partner of I32 suggests that friendships are different and social relations are more difficult to obtain that socio economic connections, he tends to travel for business and involve seeing friends and family in this business trip:

More for business, but the plan is like, I need to travel back to Brazil at least twice a year to get papers and see what is happening... what has changed and kind of a training environment, of course to see my family, our operations are based in the same city as my family in Brazil so I can see them too. But I have some Brazilian friends here in the UK, they came to study and they stay friends, and I have some friends in Brazil to connect. It is a very very different cultural background, so it’s getting better but it is very difficult... it is a very different way of living, the city, friends, it is very different... [...] I think it does get lonely, and it takes time to build friendships and it is not like building a
business relationship, it is it's a lot more… (I31, I32, Brazilian entrepreneurs in London)

Social capital, as manifest in friendships and socio cultural relations, has been used by migrant entrepreneurs as a substitute for financial capital. As Adler and Kwon (2002: 22) suggest like other forms of capital, social capital can either be a substitute for or can complement other resources. ‘As a substitute, actors can sometimes compensate for a lack of financial or human capital by superior "connections." More often, however, social capital complements other forms of capital.’ (Adler and Kwon 2002: 22). As a senior representative of the London Chambers of Commerce and Industry illustrates, his father migrated to the UK with low capital, and employed transnational connections, as well as local friendship networks to enable economic success:

I2 Oh, I think it was the entrepreneurial flair, that made them look out for opportunities and of course they had there own fellow countrymen who might have seen… achieving some success and helped from each other. I mean, many of them started activities with very little capital. They didn’t have any capital in many cases, my own father, he started his business in motor trade, I remember in the first shop, we had empty boxes on the shelves, just to show that the shop was full of stock, so you had to do various things, the push that has done it. And it has lead to some rejuvenation of a number of very poor areas, if you go and look at Ealing Road, Wembley or Leicester… all these have revived from what were quite derelict areas to become quite successful. (I2, senior representative of the London Chambers of Commerce and Industry)

Friendship networks and socio cultural connections that are established through extra familial relations are used to negotiate unfamiliar societal and business settings. Lawrence (2001) argues that Australian international students use key socio-cultural competencies in order to constitute the means by which they can achieve socio cultural familiarity, facilitating their successful transition to university culture. Here, it is suggested that migrant entrepreneurs in the UK also use this negotiation strategy to enable familiarity
with the UK’s complex and culturally different business environment, as well as localised business discourses. As a Brazilian entrepreneur in London highlights, the use of UK nationals, as embedded within interpersonal and occupational networks, facilitates this cultural understanding. This strategy is echoed for another Brazilian entrepreneur, as she suggests an organisational/interpersonal scalar meshing to enable connection building for the purpose of social and economic development (see Appendix 13):

As the business grows and as we get, and again George one important thing, we believe that presence in London can help us in two different ways, it can help us because it makes our… value propositions stronger in Brazil, we can help Brazilian companies expand and we have our own presence beside partners, and that makes our position stronger at least and the other thing is… because… I will be full time here and because the company has a presence here we have a much better chance for applying companies interested in Brazil, so the idea is to develop those relationships, I will be working on, as those connections grow and as the business grows … then we plan to … of course get more people involved. So we plan to have people from Brazil come very often, but we plan to have them in Brazil because there are other markets that we cover and local projects, and of course that might change but when I think of new staff and hiring, assistants and managers, the first idea is to take up local people, people who know about the local culture, people who know about the local culture and can add more to the company… (I24, Brazilian business development entrepreneur in East London)

7.6 Summary

This section has addressed the impact of friends and interpersonal ties as a facet of transnational socio cultural connectivity. Initially, Bunnell et al. (2012: 502) introduce the Geographies of Friendship, postulating that study of ‘Practices of friendships through/in mobile social life offer further possibilities for those interested in the everyday and microgeographies of transnationality.’ As such, practices of friendship are reconfigured through a range of transnational mobilities, ‘…producing particular (re)configurations of social
geographies in destinations, places of transit and even in sites of origin.’ (Bunnell et al. 2012: 502). Spatial dimensions of friendship are undergoing significant change as a result of increasing human mobility and long-distance connections. The role of friendship networks is not only important for entrepreneurial activity, but also influences socio cultural activities that contribute to a person’s sense of well-being and performance in everyday life. Migrant entrepreneurs rely on support provided by friends in order to negotiate emotional, personal and interpersonal issues. Again, technology is becoming increasingly important as a medium through which migrants can maintain and create transnational socio cultural relations. As such, migrants use friendship networks and interpersonal groups to negotiate unfamiliar societal and business settings.

They key finding from this section is that migrants redefine but do not break ties to their country of origin. This confirms the transferability of aspects of the UK case, and echoes the likes of Faist et al. (2013), and Saxenian (1998; 2006) who looked at migration in very different national and sub national contexts.

This has significant repercussions for policy. Policymakers should therefore consider the ramifications of changing national migration policy not only on the UK as a whole, but evaluate the sub national impacts of policy reform, and the weight of empirical evidence presented here. Of course, transnational socio cultural connections have influence and transforming effects on the development of the migrant entrepreneur’s localities and country of origin. This policy impact also effects global macroeconomic processes, including international financial arrangements, international trade and the production and consumption of culture.
8. Conclusions

8.1 Thesis summary

The promotion of entrepreneurship in the UK has not previously been addressed in the context of highly skilled migration and recent policy reform. This study has contributed to theories of entrepreneurs as a subset of highly skilled migration, in order to provide insights into realities on the ground for migrants by taking into account the perspectives from stakeholders at national, regional and local scales. To do this, the impacts of national migration and economic policy were evaluated as manifest at sub national levels.

After introducing the research in chapter 1, chapter 2 discussed highly skilled migration, migrant entrepreneurship and policy in the context of relationships and impacts, identifying gaps in the literature around defining entrepreneurship, the impact of policy on individual migrants and the holistic impact of policy landscape in affecting change to migration decisions and realities on the ground for highly skilled entrepreneurs. Chapter 3 explored the methodology used in this research and explained why the methods used were most appropriate, discussing ethical implications and outlining a plan for strategic dissemination of research findings.

The aim of this study was to investigate policy impacts on the promotion of migrant entrepreneurship in the UK and the ways that migrant entrepreneurs interpret, negotiate and determine their migration pathways through the use of transnational socio cultural connections. This was addressed using three objectives that explored themes in existing literature and data collected. These were 1) to explore how non-EEA high skilled entrepreneurial migration incentivised in the UK and how this relates to place, 2) to determine how non-EEA high skilled migrants engage in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape, and 3) to examine how non-EEA high skilled entrepreneurs are connected and embedded in transnational socio cultural networks in the UK and with their home country.
Chapter 4 worked through contention in defining entrepreneurship, unravelling how entrepreneurship is presented in the context of migration in academia, policy and through traditional perceptions. This chapter outlines entrepreneurship as socially and culturally reproduced, and imbued with value in contemporary economic landscapes.

Chapter 5 responded to research objectives 1 and 2 in addressing policy, migration and enterprise. The UK’s migration policy landscape for entrepreneurs is evaluated, looking at policy routes that entrepreneurs are discursively expected to take i.e. Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa and alternative routes through the policy landscape such as the non-points based Sole Representative visa. The agency exercised by migrant entrepreneurs in negotiating structures of migration policy showed that the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa does not work in the best interests of all migrants, with policy makers and other stakeholders suggesting that the visa is not functioning as intended. Migration policy was found to control and manage entrepreneurial migration to the UK, without providing a direct incentive for entrepreneurs to do start or relocate business interests.

Chapter 6 looked at the economic landscape of the UK and responded to research objectives 1 and 2. Aspects of conducting business in the UK such as availability of funding and investment, tax policy, help with starting a business in the UK and the impact and influence of Higher Education Institutions were addressed. These were seen as incentives to conducting business and acted to promote the UK as a nation open to migrant entrepreneurship.

The third research objective was addressed in Chapter 7 which focused on the impact of transnational socio cultural connections on the migration process for entrepreneurs in the UK. These connections were scalar and place specific. Regional connectivity, historical links and institutional connectivity often helped migrants decide where to locate and how to do business in the UK prior to movement, whilst networking and migration networks and personal connections, such as family and friends were
embedded in the everyday lives of migrants and assisted with day to day problems. Furthermore, the importance of transnational socio cultural connections at all scales was found to be broad ranging and intensely personal and responsive to spaces of entrepreneurial engagement and place.

8.2 Aim and objectives

This thesis has investigated policy impacts on the promotion of migrant entrepreneurship in the UK and the ways that migrant entrepreneurs interpret, negotiate and determine their migration pathways through the use of transnational socio cultural connections. To address this aim three objectives were explored. This section will address how these objectives were fulfilled and key findings for each.

To explore how non-EEA high skilled entrepreneurial migration is incentivised in the UK and how this relates to place.

Chapter 4 addressed entrepreneurship in the UK by looking initially definitions and use in policy and academia. The key contribution here is development of a definition by which these intermeshed concepts are related explicitly to Tier 1 entrepreneurs whilst intermeshing facets of both academic and policy discourse.

It was found that entrepreneurship is an under defined concept with a dearth of attention paid to process and individuals. The vague definitions of entrepreneurship in academia and public perception are in stark contrast to definitions in policy, where entrepreneurship is conceptualised and legislated in an econocentric manner, tending to disregard social and cultural constructs that frame entrepreneurialism in the structures of economic reproduction.

It was identified that migrant entrepreneurship is different to other forms of entrepreneurship. There is a tendency for migrants to be viewed as more
entrepreneurial than indigenous business people due to social and cultural factors than enable or encourage risk taking and market exploration.

Empirically, this objective explored who the migrant entrepreneurs in the UK are, and found a pervasive discourse, that was notably manifest in Inner London East and Cambridge, that entrepreneurs tend to be young and unattached. Family and friends act as important support networks that impact migrant’s decisions on location, enterprise and everyday life.

The sub national case studies enabled evaluation of migrant’s relationship with place that incentives to entrepreneurship are rooted in. Entrepreneurship has a strong sub national dimension, with regional, sub regional and local spaces acting as key arenas for policy based promotion and engagement with place. As such a definition that offers flexibility to account for the variegated mosaic of national, regional and local policy, and academic study was proposed to move forward this field of research:

Entrepreneurship, in the context of highly skilled migration, is an economic and socio cultural process conducted within and across borders by risk taking and opportunistic individuals (or groups) in order to achieve a desired aim which often involves, but is not limited to capital gains.

This definition encompasses the role of sub national institutions, connectivity, and place, alongside established definitions of entrepreneurship which identify qualities such as risk taking, and opportunism. Integrating ‘entrepreneurship as a process’ with an ‘individualised sense of entrepreneurship’ aligns with the structuralist debate explored in this thesis. This underpins analysis - moving beyond conceptualisation of a dualistic relationship between structure and agency.

In Chapters 5 and 6 it was found that migration policy in the UK is naturally not designed to promote migrant entrepreneurship but enable structuring and management of migrants. Economic incentives promote migrant
entrepreneurship in the UK, these incentives include tax policy and credits, access to European markets, regionally specific funding and investment prospects, the ease of setting up a business and ease of access to free or subsidised support services.

The global financial crisis has affected migrant entrepreneurship in the UK and the rationale for migration to the UK to conduct entrepreneurial activity – despite evidence of numbers of highly skilled migrants under Tier 1 of the points based system dropping year on year (Figure 10), we may in fact be seeing a renaissance in movement to the UK, based on conditions caused by the Global Financial Crisis.

To determine how non-EEA high skilled migrants engage in entrepreneurship within the UK economic and political landscape.

We see uniformity of migration policy, and heterogeneous places across the UK, and as such migrants’ entrepreneurial engagement with the place varies depending on facets of the subnational spaces that they are based, and the place-based dynamics of the areas they engage with.

It was found that the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa is not working as intended, where immigration from those that are not entrepreneurial, or not using the visa as intended (as laid out in chapter 6). Reform is being made to the system to take into account abuse and validate legitimate entrepreneurial ideas and applicants, but it is important that policymakers heed the evidence presented in this and other papers, like Nathan (2014) to acknowledge the positive role that migrants play through their entrepreneurial contributions to the economic, social and cultural life of UK Plc.

With this in mind, it was also found empirically that some entrepreneurs with a desire to adhere to the structures governing migration in the UK, and contribute to the UK, as well as pursuing their own goals were unable to use the Tier 1 Entrepreneur route to facilitate their stay in the UK. The Sole Representative visa, a non PBS visa, was used by migrant entrepreneurs to
bypass the stringent application and capital requirements of the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa and negotiate entry to the UK to conduct entrepreneurial activity. This is clearly shows a challenge to policymakers, where wholesale reform, or at least some flexibility, and adaptability must be embedded into the system. This should be achieved by paying greater attention to the experiences of migrants, as has been the emphasis here.

We have seen this in recent years, with the Points Based System undergoing a subjective turn, moving away from its initial premise as an objective, black and white application process system. However, the broader rhetoric of closure of the UK migration policy system is pervasive, and is impacting prospective migrant entrepreneur’s willingness to do business in the UK, alongside economic pressures and competition.

**To examine how non-EEA high skilled entrepreneurs are connected and embedded in transnational socio cultural networks in the UK and with their home country.**

This thesis found that migrants redefine but do not break ties to their country of origin, this finding confirms the transferability of aspects of the UK case, and echoes the likes of Faist et al. (2013), and Saxenian (1998; 2006) who looked at migration in very different national and sub national contexts.

Sub-national regions play an important role as places of engagement for migrant entrepreneurs as they perform and live their transnational socio cultural connections across space and time. The types of connections that were fostered by migrants were different across the three areas studied. In Inner London East there is a greater propensity for institutional transnational connections, in Birmingham and the West Midlands the role of historical and familial connections plays a significant role in shaping the migrant entrepreneurial landscape while in Cambridge the connections that stem from organisations such as HEIs and friendship groups are paramount to global economic connectivity and cohesion.
Policymakers should therefore consider the ramifications of changing national migration policy not only on the UK as a whole, but evaluate the sub national impacts of policy reform, and the weight of empirical evidence presented here. Of course, transnational socio cultural connections have influence and transforming effects on the development of the migrant entrepreneur’s localities and country of origin. This policy impact also effects global macroeconomic processes, including international financial arrangements, international trade and the production and consumption of culture.

The empirical findings on transnational socio cultural connections are perhaps the most underused and undervalued tool that can be implemented by policymakers and academics alike. To build policy foundations to promote the evidenced economic benefits of entrepreneurial migration (Nathan 2014), and to develop the body of evidence to inform how these nationally driven objectives will impact sub national spaces.

The following section outlines the key contribution of this thesis to academia, then in evaluation of future work to be conducted in this field, some of the issues mentioned and gaps unfilled by this work will be developed.

**8.3 Contribution to geographies of migration**

With academic work on migration and mobility spanning ‘…studies of corporeal movement, transportation and communications infrastructures, capitalist spatial restructuring, migration and immigration, citizenship and transnationalism, and tourism and travel’ (Hannam et al. 2006: 9–10), this study contributes to an under-researched group of high value and high skilled migrants, who encompass key qualities and attributes that impact on the social, cultural and economic landscape of the UK (see Appendix 14). It has been reiterated that migration and society are co-constitutive, as Castles (2008:13) conceptualises ‘…migration not as merely as a result of social transformation, nor as one of its cause, but as an integral and essential part of social transformation processes.’ Here, findings have applied this to high
skilled migration and entrepreneurial migration to expand a field of research that has been covered almost exclusively by econocentric work on contribution.

As identified in existing academic literature, high skilled migrants make a significant contribution to the economies of receiving countries. Labour migration and skilled mobility has been given an entrepreneurial slant here, addressing processes and policy that has been little covered by geographers in the past. This is due to the time sensitivity of migration policy (Ghosh 2000; Storesletten 2000) and economic change, but also draws in questions of transnational socio cultural connections and the impact of family and kinship networks.

Koser and Salt (1997: 285) posited in 1997 that migration by the highly skilled had attracted little attention among international migration scholars. They found that international flows of highly skilled workers are essential elements in the global Economy, though most research had been

‘…directed towards immigration for permanent settlement and its consequences for integration and race relations; temporary labour migration, mainly by manual workers; and, latterly, asylum.’

They conclude that there is a multitude of specific issues about which we know little. This study contributes heavily towards the understanding of one of these issues, migrant entrepreneurship as a subset of highly skilled migration. Furthermore, Koser and Salt posit that one key research avenue is clarification of concepts; here this has been endeavoured, with notions of entrepreneurship evaluated in their guises within policy, academia and discursive perspectives. This will allow for more rigorous future qualitative and quantitative research to be conducted on this cohort in the UK, as defined by both migration status and visa type, but also through alternative negotiations of the policy system and in non-mainstream economic niches.
The impact of transnational socio cultural connections glues together these concepts, providing insights into the migration negotiation process and the impact that institutions, organisations, interpersonal connections and experiences have on location, business and everyday life for migrant entrepreneurs. In migration studies the importance of acknowledging these connections is recognised, and a significant body of work has picked through impacts on migrants on the ground (Saxenian 2005). Using this concept, and practice in this study, it has enabled a more intimate and often everyday look at the transnational performances of a relatively small, and under-studied subset of highly skilled migrants.

8.4 Further investigation

This exploratory research has highlighted key areas for further academic study. The complexity of policy has been examined, drawing out problematic issues around the workings of the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa and associations with the broader UK migration policy spectrum. There are four areas proposed here where further study is needed to explore the workings of what is a recently implemented and rapidly shifting policy landscape. These areas will be explained in the following section.

Firstly, the social and cultural impacts of Tier 1 policy change to UK migrants is under researched, with studies tending to take an econocentric perspective of migrant entrepreneurship. There is a dearth of research addressing the empirical repercussions and social and cultural dimensions of the migration process, as well as entrepreneurial activity when in the UK. These demand a more in depth evaluation of transnational socio cultural connections in the 21st Century, and analysis of the consumption of culture with emphasis on how this impacts international trade, financial interactions and the micro decision making processes of migration entrepreneurial businesses in the UK.

As suggested, there is little academic work on high skilled transitional migration from a policy perspective. This would build upon the movement of students and non-entrepreneurial migrants into alternative visas for the
purposes of conducting entrepreneurship in the UK as has been addressed here. Evaluation of the transition of International students to Tier 1 Entrepreneur and Tier 1 Investor visas in the UK, as well as into the recently formed Tier Graduate entrepreneur visa would provide a longitudinal perspective on talent and innovation stock as embodied by non EEA migrants. This ties into a broader rhetoric on retention of talented students, and moves away from the view that students are a temporary economic boost, before necessitating their movement through policy, back to their country of origin. The transnational socio cultural ties that migrants use to connect with people and places outside of their settled spatial proximity forge bonds with the places that they engage with and inhabit. As such, migration policy should be engineered to enable the transition of students to non-Tier 4 visa categories. This has not been addressed in the context of contemporary UK migration policy, and warrants further academic exploration.

Thirdly, it is acknowledged that the impact of changing political rhetoric on migration policy uptake is profound (Geddes 2003; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Brettell and Hollifield 2013), yet this has not been quantified, nor qualified in terms of the impacts on the ground for prospective and settled migrants to and in the UK. Work on the politics of migration currently tends to revolve around public perception and electoral politics; this involves management of conflict, xenophobia and the structures of receiving states (Spencer 2003; Louis et al. 2010; Samers 2013).

Finally, the UK is in competition with developed nations in the Northern and Southern hemispheres, for the attraction of talent and innovative capacity as embodied by high skilled and entrepreneurial migrants. Comparative study of EU and Canadian, US, Australian migration policy systems for entrepreneurial migrants would shed light on the array of policy landscape configurations and the competition for global talent that the UK faces. Studies have addressed migration policies for these nations individually (Mahroum 2000; 2001; Iredale 2001; Collins 2002), yet detailed analysis of the policies directed at entrepreneurial and high skilled migrants has not been conducted.
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Figure 15 Massey et al.'s (1993: 433-434) conclusions drawn from macro economic neoclassical theory

1. The international migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates between countries.
2. The elimination of wage differentials will end the movement of labor, and migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials.
3. International flows of human capital—that is, highly skilled workers—respond to differences in the rate of return to human capital, which may be different from the overall wage rate, yielding a distinct pattern of migration that may be opposite that of unskilled workers.
4. Labor markets are the primary mechanisms by which international flows of labor are induced; other kinds of markets do not have important effects on international migration.
5. The way for governments to control migration flows is to regulate or influence labor markets in sending and/or receiving countries.
Figure 16 Massey et al.'s (1993:435-436) conclusions drawn from micro economic neoclassical theory

1. International movement stems from international differentials in both earnings and employment rates, whose product determines expected earnings (the prior model, in contrast, assumed full employment).
2. Individual human capital characteristics that increase the likely rate of remuneration or the probability of employment in the destination relative to the sending country (e.g., education, experience, training, language skills) will increase the likelihood of international movement, other things being equal.
3. Individual characteristics, social conditions, or technologies that lower migration costs increase the net returns to migration and, hence, raise the probability of international movement.
4. Because of 2 and 3, individuals within the same country can display very different proclivities to migrate.
5. Aggregate migration flows between countries are simple sums of individual moves undertaken on the basis of individual cost-benefit calculations.
6. International movement does not occur in the absence of differences in earnings and/or employment rates between countries. Migration occurs until expected earnings (the product of earnings and employment rates) have been equalized internationally (net of the costs of movement), and movement does not stop until this product has been equalized.
7. The size of the differential in expected returns determines the size of the international flow of migrants between countries.
8. Migration decisions stem from disequilibria or discontinuities between labor markets; other markets do not directly influence the decision to migrate.
9. If conditions in receiving countries are psychologically attractive to prospective migrants, migration costs may be negative. In this case, a negative earnings differential may be necessary to halt migration between countries.

10. Governments control immigration primarily through policies that affect expected earnings in sending and/or receiving countries—for example, those that attempt to lower the likelihood of employment or raise the risk of underemployment in the destination area (through employer sanctions), those that seek to raise incomes at the origin (through long-term development programs), or those that aim to increase the costs (both psychological and material) of migration.
Figure 17 Hagen-Zanker’s (2008: 5) Theories of migration defined by level of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Micro-level</strong></th>
<th><strong>Meso-level</strong></th>
<th><strong>Macro-level</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration cause:</td>
<td>Migration cause/ perpetuation:</td>
<td>Migration cause/ perpetuation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual values/ desires/ expectancies</td>
<td>Collectives/ social networks</td>
<td>Macro-level opportunity structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. improving survival, wealth etc.</td>
<td>e.g. social ties</td>
<td>e.g. economic structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main theories:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main theories:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main theories:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lee’s push/pull factors</td>
<td>- Social capital theory</td>
<td>- Neoclassical macro-migration theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Neoclassical micro-migration theory</td>
<td>- Institutional theory</td>
<td>- Migration as a system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Behavioural models</td>
<td>- Network theory</td>
<td>- Dual labour market theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Theory of social systems</td>
<td>- Cumulative causation</td>
<td>- World systems theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- New Economics of Labour Migration</td>
<td>- Mobility Transition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Faist (2000) and own elaboration
Figure 18 Hagen-Zanker’s (2008: 6) Theories of migration defined by initiation or perpetuation of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation of migration</th>
<th>Perpetuation of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Neoclassical macro-migration theory</td>
<td>- Migration as a system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Migration as a system</td>
<td>- World systems theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Dual labour market theory</td>
<td>- Social capital theory</td>
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<td>- World systems theory</td>
<td>- Institutional theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mobility Transition</td>
<td>- Network theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lee’s push/pull factors</td>
<td>- Cumulative causation</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Neoclassical micro-migration theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Behavioural models</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Theory of Social systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- New Economics of Labour Migration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Massey et al. (1993) and own elaboration
Figure 19 Mahroum's classification of highly skilled mobility, types of influencing factors and policies (2000: 29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Type of Push &amp; Pull Factors</th>
<th>Type of Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers and executives</td>
<td>● Benefits and remuneration</td>
<td>● Business-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Economic factors (supply and demand mechanisms)</td>
<td>● Immigration legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● The state of the national economy</td>
<td>● Income tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers and technicians</td>
<td>● Bottom-up developments in science</td>
<td>● Inter-institutional and intergovernmental policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Nature and conditions of work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Institutional prestige</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics and scientists</td>
<td>● Governmental (visa, taxation, protection, etc.) policies</td>
<td>● Governmental and regional policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Financial facilities</td>
<td>● Immigration legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Bureaucratic efficiency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>● Recognition of a global workplace</td>
<td>● Intergovernmental, and inter-institutional policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Accessibility problems at home</td>
<td>● Immigration legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Inter-cultural experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.  A classification of highly skilled mobility, types of influencing factors and policies.
The current Tier 1 categories are:

- **Tier 1 (Exceptional talent)**

  This section describes the Tier 1 (Exceptional talent) category of the points-based system, for people who are recognised or have the potential to be recognised as leaders in the fields of science and the arts.

- **Tier 1 (Entrepreneur)**

  This section describes the Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) category of the points-based system, for people who want to set up or take over, and be actively involved in running, a business or businesses here.

- **Tier 1 (Investor)**

  This section describes the Tier 1 (Investor) category of the points-based system, for people who want make a substantial financial investment in the UK.

- **Tier 1 (General)**

  This section describes the Tier 1 (General) category of the points-based system, for highly skilled workers. This category is now closed to applicants outside the UK, and to migrants who are already here in most other immigration categories.

- **Tier 1 (Graduate entrepreneur)**

  This section explains how you can remain in the UK under the Tier 1 (Graduate Entrepreneur) category of the points-based system.
Table I. Male entrepreneurs* in Australia, by birthplace of the main countries of origin of Australia’s Chinese immigrants, 1991 national census (% of those in the labour force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Malaysia and Brunei</th>
<th>People’s Republic of China</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of entrepreneurs*</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Entrepreneurs determined by adding proportion in labour force that are self-employed to those that are employers

Source: Ho and Coughlan (1997, p. 151, Table 6.16)

Table II. Female entrepreneurs in Australia, by birthplace of the main countries of origin of Australia’s Chinese immigrants, 1991 national census (% of those in the labour force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Hong Kong</th>
<th>Malaysia and Brunei</th>
<th>People’s Republic of China</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of entrepreneurs</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ho and Coughlan (1997, p. 151, Table 6.16)
Table 2.6

1998 Sales and Employment of Silicon Valley High-Technology Firms Led by a Chinese or Indian CEO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of Firms</th>
<th>Total Sales ($ M)</th>
<th>Total Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>3,588</td>
<td>16,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>13,237</td>
<td>41,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>16,825</td>
<td>58,282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share of Silicon Valley high-technology firms, %

|                | 24 | 17 | 14 |


NOTE: Statistics are for firms started by Chinese or Indians between 1980 and 1998.
I was thankful for the amount of time I had been forced to spend thinking through my ethical practice: I could sit back, confident that she wouldn’t find any other names since, thanks to the guidance in procedural ethics of the institutional review board (IRB), no identifying notes were in my book. I was also relieved as I thought now she had crossed the line, she wouldn’t find what she wanted, and she would finally relax into the interview. She gave me back my book, but kept the interview guide and declared, ‘The boots are on my feet now. I’m in charge.’ I looked somewhat longingly out of the window, and in my momentary lapse of attention, she called a friend to the table. She said something to him I couldn’t hear, they laughed, and then the friend sat down. He was going to join us. I felt somewhat intimidated, and more determined than ever to get through this interview, chalk it up to experience, and never think about it again.’ (Mosselson, 2010: 479)
Appendices

Appendix 1 Informed consent form
Appendix 2 Participant information sheet
Appendix 3 Interviewee profiles
Appendix 4 Measuring success of the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa
Appendix 5 Local economic infrastructure and the role of the LEPs
Appendix 6 Badly behaving entrepreneurs and the promotion of entrepreneurship through tax policy
Appendix 7 HEIs and the promotion of entrepreneurship
Appendix 8 The impact of East African Asian communities on the entrepreneurial landscape in Birmingham and the West Midlands
Appendix 9 Personal and business trajectory of an Indian entrepreneur in the West Midlands
Appendix 10 London as socio cultural melting pot and impact on the promotion of entrepreneurship regionally and locally
Appendix 11 UKTI connection building and transnational institutional links with Brazil
Appendix 12 The promotion of entrepreneurship in Israel and lessons for the UK in the use of social media
Appendix 13 Connections, friendship and furthering entrepreneurial goals
Appendix 14 Key findings
Highly skilled migration and the promotion of entrepreneurship in the UK

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me. I understand that this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee.

I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form.

I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation.

I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study.

I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing.

I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless it is judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others.

I agree to participate in this study.

Your name
__________________________________________________________

Your signature
__________________________________________________________

Signature of investigator
__________________________________________________________

Date
__________________________________________________________
Highly skilled migration and the promotion of entrepreneurship in the UK

Participant Information Sheet

George Windsor
PhD Research Student
Department of Geography
Loughborough University
Leicestershire LE11 3TU
G.Windsor@lboro.ac.uk

What is the purpose of the study?
As a result of funding from Paragon Law Ltd. and Loughborough University I will be conducting research on migrant entrepreneurship and its impacts for sending and receiving countries.

Once I take part, can I change my mind?
Yes. After you have read this information and asked any questions you may have we will ask you to complete an Informed Consent Form, however if at any time, before, during or after the sessions you wish to withdraw from the study please just contact the investigators. You can withdraw at any time, for any reason and you will not be asked to explain your reasons for withdrawing.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
Your name will normally be kept anonymous unless indicated otherwise during the course of the interview. The data collected will be transcribed (if taped) and kept for a finite period of time for the purposes of data analysis and will not be publically accessible.

What will happen to the results of the study?
They will be used to write academic articles and policy-relevant documents.

I have some more questions who should I contact?
George Windsor (address at the top of this form).

What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted?
Please contact the investigator and/or consult the following website http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee number</th>
<th>Organisation/ role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Interview time period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TCIO advisor</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LCCI senior representative</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>St. John’s Innovation Centre Senior executive</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Birmingham City Council</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>TCIO advisor</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>LCCI</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>US finance entrepreneur</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Autumn 2012</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>Autumn 2012</td>
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<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>Autumn/Winter 2012</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Brazilian IT entrepreneur</td>
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<td>Autumn/Winter 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Brazilian business consultant entrepreneur</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Brazilian business consultant/ design thinking entrepreneur</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Spring 2013</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>MP and BIS Select Committee representative</td>
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<td>Spring 2013</td>
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<td>Indian wholesale foods entrepreneur</td>
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<td>South East Strategic Partnership for Migration</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Entrepreneur and former East of England Development agency</td>
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<td>Spring 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Former UKTI GEP advisor/ entrepreneurship advisor</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>London First</td>
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<td>Spring 2013</td>
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<td>WMEF</td>
<td>West Bromwich</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>UK entrepreneur and advisor</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
</tr>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Entrepreneur and IT Knowledge Transfer Network</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>BSP-A</td>
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<td>Portuguese entrepreneurship advisor/ UKTI</td>
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<td>LEP Network</td>
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<td>Kenyan finance entrepreneur</td>
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<td>CBI India Advisor, former British High Commission in India and entrepreneur</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>UKTI</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Indian IT entrepreneur</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>Indian music and production entrepreneur/ Black Country/ National Asian Business Association senior representative</td>
<td>West Bromwich</td>
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<td>UKTI Creative and Tech City</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>Chinese business consultant entrepreneur</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>Aston Business School and entrepreneurship and innovation advisor</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>Spring 2013</td>
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Appendix 4 Measuring success of the Tier 1 Entrepreneur visa

‘GW When you were looking at this, how did you define success and how did you determine whether they had been successful or not?

I13 It is very difficult, because in the initial application they are not asked to tell us what they are going to do and how they are going to do it. So, for very good reason because we don’t actually have any experts that can evaluate business proposals, but because we don’t know what they are going to do, it is quite difficult to understand whether they have been successful or not. The criteria that we use was, have they got an existing company, or were they involved in another company, have they created any jobs, which is part of the criteria for extension, 2 jobs within a year, I think it is for the lower, see I’m not terribly familiar with it, two jobs within the first year, I think I know that, but to find that information we don’t really ask that much at the extension stage either, so we resorted to going onto the internet, looking at different, like Companies House and different types of internet services that will tell us if a company has somebody working for them with that name and date of birth, to try and do a bit of research on the person, there were two particularly successful people out of a large number and I can’t remember off the top of my head what that was, hundreds rather than thousands, there were two of particular note, there were others that had just seemed to meet the criteria by the skin of their teeth and a lot of them were not seeking to renew their entrepreneur visa… but either had switched into being a student, or doing something else, or they were applying for 10 year long residence, so they had been a student in the UK for seven years, they decided that they were going to be an entrepreneur, and then at the end of their entrepreneur visa they have had 10 years in the UK and they can apply to stay indefinitely. The 10 year long residence visa doesn’t require checks on if they have become a successful entrepreneur…’ (I13, a representative of the UKBA Business and Investment team)
Appendix 5 Local economic infrastructure and the role of the LEPs

‘It is actually, so we engage with the department of Transport around, like pinch point funding and sort of infrastructure and local transport bodies, so BIS and DCLG sort of share the agenda, so enterprise zones that sits in DCLG, obviously they sit with the LEPs, LEPs are involved in enterprise zones, in some areas they are running the enterprise zones, they may be a sub group or part of a group, say run by the local authority, so BIS has got all the Business New agenda, in terms of press releases and the DCLG agenda, they very much work together on that… and then in terms of skills, skills funding in 2015, a portion of that is going to LEPs and Heseltine’s report is out and part of that is looking at the budget ion the 29 March, and within that LEPs are expected to get a very comprehensive role in terms of funding, in terms of engagement with departments, I would say it like this, the government’s number 1 priority is reducing the deficit, the second is the growth agenda, and that is across all departments… the delivery of the growth agenda is through LEPs, so when LEPs were initially set up they had no funding and they were knocking heads together and kind of facilitating and enabling, encouraging within local areas, things have moved on, they have core funding, they will probably be able to bid into that single pot and actually engage with [muffled] and UKTI, the trade and the investment side, and they are engaged pretty much in the city agenda, and skills plans… across government departments, … … in terms of transport, BIS and DCLG… infrastructure, skills, business support, if you think of those and sort of finance and that is all on the LEP agenda, so in terms of engagement, we engage quite a lot…” (I48, LEP Network)
Appendix 6 Badly behaving entrepreneurs and the promotion of entrepreneurship through tax policy

‘I would almost want to see a heavy crackdown on people that are behaving badly… people say the reason that they don’t want to loosen up the regulation is that there are bad people out there, and there are, so you need stronger policing… whatever, the executive, to stop people from misbehaving, but equally, the people that are behaving need to be given the freedom to crack on and do it… not necessarily just lower taxes, but it needs to be made easier for people to do business. So here are some radical ideas, this seed enterprise investment scheme, that is huge, and it is not talked about enough… so here is an example of what Cameron should have said a couple of months ago with that 50p tax thing… he was being crucified about dropping taxes and that sort of thing, he should have said, ‘I am really sorry, the 50p tax rate stays, and that is the way it is, everyone is in this together’ and get the political thing out the way, and then point out ‘However we have got this enterprise investment scheme, seed investment scheme, and I am not a tax advisor, I am merely your prime minister, but if anyone happens to be paying high level tax, if you were to invest in a friend’s business that is eligible for this, or invest in a small fund, or whatever mechanism and you use this tax wrapper, you will find that you are given every support possible to reduce your tax bill and that is good for the government, and that is because, you might say that I would rather have your tax pound, I waste a lot of it and then only spend 10p on the right things, whereas this tax rate makes sure that all of the money goes into the economy, and there is a multiplier effect that means that people then may taxes on it…it pays wages and it pays VAT, so I am not a tax advisor, but it will be a double win here’. So if you publicise what is really good about it, and it would also neutralise the carping about this, that and the other, politically I understand the implications of what you are doing… (I41, former representative of UKTI Global Entrepreneur Program)
Appendix 7 HEIs and the promotion of entrepreneurship

‘And I think what is lacking is ability to identify entrepreneurs, because you can see, you can see and feel one when you meet one, but to be able to identify one without having met the person, I am not sure yet what research capabilities we all have to do it. I mean, I met with someone from Southbank University the other day over dinner, and they have set up a business and entrepreneur unit at the university, hoping that students and amongst students there will be emerging entrepreneurs who would come up and I also not long ago, and I will probably be acting for this group but there about four engineers out of Imperial college, Imperial University they, they developed a solar lantern when they were at university and I helping them get success internationally with their product. There are…those kind of examples that are encouraging to see that at university level there is a thought process going on and you know, you could weed out the entrepreneurs from the non entrepreneurs by setting up a unit and giving a little bit of a push. Because, the fact that you are meeting me from Loughborough University, normally universities wouldn’t quite get round to doing such things, but it is good to see that universities are playing a bit more roll in this area. And I think it is a good source, but then you are only dealing with academic, and … sort of students who’ve joined the university, but there are a whole lot of entrepreneurs who are out there who are not going to be graduate and we have, I don’t know again, you might have relevant statistical data to show that, how many entrepreneurs in the country are graduate or non graduates, because there are quite a few who are not.’ (I2, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry)
Appendix 8 The impact of East African Asian communities on the entrepreneurial landscape in Birmingham and the West Midlands

‘...you can certainly find lots of examples within the Asian community, where certain groups have been known internationally, they are called ‘Trading diasporas,’ and these people are entrepreneurial in their own country but they have come here for that purpose and partly they have come here willingly, and partly through forced circumstances, particularly if you look at the East African Asians, for political reasons they were forced out and as a result obviously UK, received them, they welcomed them, and as a result almost on arrival you find at least two specific examples, are very observable, in Leicester and certainly in Wembley, Ealing Road, and these East African Asians have come from Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, and particularly Kenya, ‘69, '67, '71 and that’s the time scale. And these people have come almost penniless because their assets and everything were frozen, but they came with entrepreneurial skills and aptitude and as a result they used those skills to actually start up in business and often ... you know... sort of transforming certain areas that have been earmarked for demolition so for example, Melton Road, if you look at the history of it, was marked for huge demolition, significant scale and certainly along Ealing Road in Alperton, lots of abandoned shops and these people have come here lock stock and barrel and its almost as through they have transformed and transposed the sort of business network that was in Mombasa, Nairobi, almost, if you look at the dynamics of the situation of the way that the shops have actually been organised, you often find some of these same patterns have been replicated from the country of origin.’ (I4, representative of Birmingham City Council)
Appendix 9 Personal and business trajectory of an Indian entrepreneur in the West Midlands

‘... then I get married, young age, 21, my wife is from Nottingham... I live in Wolverhampton, my wife’s father had a small business in Nottingham in the Victoria centre he had a little stall there selling Indian, West Indian and Chinese food. And I enjoyed my engineering and everything, he said why don’t you come and join me in a business, I said no... I am very happy thank you very much, happy with what I do. He promised me this great vision of business world... blah blah blah... I have always worked, very entrepreneurial, I will do stuff and make stuff, make money from work, it doesn’t matter, you will do it... excited me the fact that I could do business, I said give me three months, if I like it I will do it, otherwise I will go back to Wolverhampton... so I moved to Nottingham, looked at it, saw it wasn’t working, went back to Wolverhampton, thought, waste of time... he is another guy, very entrepreneurial, wouldn’t give up, he saw something in me and said, come and join me, come and join me... I took a wage cut and everything, came back to Nottingham again, we had another go at the business, my Brother in law, my father in law and myself, we set up another stall in the Victoria centre, bought another little warehouse, then we sent on to focussing on oriental foods, the Chinese food market was growing at the time, there was a lot of the ... late 70s a lot of restaurants opening up, supplying Chinese restaurants and take aways, so come from India, to England, now selling Chinese food... [laughs]... but in Wolverhampton was tough, skin heads trying to beat the hell out of us, Enoch Powell, rivers of blood... so we had come here and my Grandfather fought for this country and we were called [offensive names] and if anything it toughens you up... [...] so then I came to Nottingham, started the business, the oriental food, and we grew that business from 1978 to about 1990, to about, I would say 7-8 million pounds worth of business there, which in the old days was a lot of money... to be honest we were very hungry we worked 7 days a week, 24/7, nothing was going to stop us... we just kept growing, then we went to... so we used to import our own Chinese food, distribute that to Chinese restaurants and take aways, then we started becoming wholesalers fro there, I think in the early
90s I could have actually retired, we had no more market out there, so me with a bright idea, said why don't we open a cash and carry you know... so we opened a cash and carry in the mid 90s so, when you are doing a cash and carry a lot of corner shops would come and shop with us... so tea, bacon god knows what... we were a one stop shop for everybody... the turnover jumped from say 9, 10 million to 40 million because corner shop people, we opened another cash and carry in West Bromwich which took the business to 100 million pounds then I did category management for large cash and carry like Booker, then were Caucasian they understand mainstream cash and carry they didn't understand Chinese food, Indian food, coming from India, and now advising people like Bookers, Indian is my heritage, so I know Indian food... English food, I understand the grocery business, advising people like Stuart Rose, Marks and Spencer's,... up to 120 million... you know that business continued to grow. I left that business 9 years ago, I left it at 120 million a year... and it was still a family business, [...] we are creating our own brands, two beer brands, selling to Germany, Scandinavia. In the UK I have got some retail ranges that I have developed here, going to the multiples... I have got a property business, the oriental foods here, I have got a security business in the US, [name], a company called [name] and set one up in the US, doing monitoring that sort of thing, and I do the community stuff here,' (I33, Indian entrepreneur based in the Midlands)
Appendix 10 London as socio cultural melting pot and impact on the promotion of entrepreneurship regionally and locally

'We think it is really important and that is one of the aspects that the UK has got along with others, it is the kind of, English language that can attract people to the UK, we have got strong cultural connections with other countries for instance, I met some people from the Netherlands equivalent of the CBI and they tell me that they have got a tax break for highly skilled migrants, and I said that it is as far away from our policy as you could begin to be… they were saying that we find it so hard to attract people and you have got all these advantages… so I think they are both important. We hear from our office in India, and recently we have been asking them a lot about perceptions and that is to do with people trying to get various visas but also just visitors and saying… do you still think the UK is welcoming to you? And their answer is, we think that we have got strong cultural ties, however you look as though you want to cut those now. And I have also had New Zealand, speaking to them a lot recently, they are saying that we have got a very strong connection, and they are saying, of course, it is a very cautious, where is it going, sort of thing. And certainly with students, it is a strong business message that we hear from all major businesses, saying that people who studied abroad, have got a strong link to these countries, can reach them on a social level and these are the people businesses want to employ……It is a huge difference and they are saying that a lot of British people are still coming to us, so it is almost about those reciprocal… highly skilled migrants particularly have the view, but surely this [policy changes] wasn’t meant to affect me, and that is in the broad cultural way, and they are saying, but my reason is a genuine one, and that is where the real challenge is as well… the overall communication piece…’ (I30, representative of the Confederation of British Industry)
Appendix 11 UKTI connection building and transnational institutional links with Brazil

‘With the political underpinning, and UKTI to ensure that they can make these connections. And again, I come back to… we went to Brazil last may, and Brazil is very anxious to increase the number of its students that can speak English… and Work without Frontiers, or something, they have a special scheme where the government subsidises students to go to English speaking countries to improve their English, and the visa restrictions actually restricted the number that we could take in this country so they are all going to the USA. And… that’s a slight exaggeration, but we were certainly under-recruiting on the potential that we had there, I know UKTI has been working on it there has been some improvements, one of them was the English language restriction, they were going there to improve their English, but they have got restrictions on entry for, shall we say those with poor English, so it is self defeating. So here we have the major economy in South America, very disposed to Britain, they always say… Portugal is England’s oldest ally, I hadn’t realised that when Napoleon invaded Portugal, it was the British navy that took the Portuguese monarch over to Brazil… and they set up there which is why Brazil is Portuguese speaking, and then took them back with Napoleon was defeated. And there are very genuine warm relations between us and that country and a great desire to develop relationships, but I don’t think that we capitalised on that… yet, and its obstructions like that that don’t help, certainly if you actually look at our trading statistics with Brazil, we are way behind France and Germany, despite the fact that we have far greater inherent advantages, and it is not just about the immigration rules, I mean undoubtedly, I don’t think that we are being outward looking… enough over thirty years there, I wouldn’t be sure, but… it is part and parcel of a culture that I don’t think has maximised the potential of this country and the government now has just got totally contradictory policy, on the one hand they recognise they [muffled]…’ (I27, MP based in the West Midlands)
Appendix 12 The promotion of entrepreneurship in Israel and lessons for the UK in the use of social media

‘117 Yeah, and also we are trying to actuate the networks of student bodies, that are out there and this is something we can do from afar, fraternities, and we can do a little with fraternities. So it will be social media and also we will have to come and do seminars there. [...] So we can of course advertise, we can use different things, we are first of all having partners at universities, and the relevant student bodies called [names] and [names] and we will activate them too, of course I am already a member of Facebook and LinkedIn groups there, so we will try to advertise for free, but we are also going to set up seminars which means that we can bring in some… some… some… what do you call it, prestigious, not prestigious but an interesting lecturer, and the seminar is going to be not on our programme, but how it is to be an entrepreneur in Israel and we will receive applications for a seminar and … then we are going to have like a one day seminar at the universities and we will bring in a great speaker as I have said. Who will be inspirational, and hopefully we can attract some interest there. And also we are going to use a PR which means that the focus on …have some specific PR groups, influential bloggers, that they already write about things like these, they are going to write in the same magazines, and will look for. This means Mashable and people outside, their own private blogs, that are read highly in the industry and what do you call it, really sets the standard in industry about what is going on in Tech-World. We will have to pay a little bit there, to find one or two bloggers that are very influential there. So that is how we are going to use social media. Yeah, globally create a lot of attractions, there is also something called the Jewish Agency which has a lot of representative in every state in the US, they work , they are nothing to do with us, but they will help us in informing people that there is a programme like this.’ (117, Tech Hub entrepreneur is Israel)
Appendix 13 Connections, friendship and furthering entrepreneurial goals

‘I25 The connections are very very very important, I think it was really important, it was really good that I was here a year before I was hired, because in my course in the Netherlands, we were taught that we had to work as much as possible, we have to be active, I am never a shy person, but then they told me how to interact with people, and then I got to this new country and I wasn’t very prepared to be here, it was very scary and I didn’t know anyone, I didn’t know any company, so I joined different organisations, so I started organising this thing called Global Service Jam, which is a Global event that happens simultaneously all across the world and it is organised locally, so I got in touch with the guys that were here and said hey can I help. There is an organisation called MakeSense, and they help social entrepreneurs, […] So I got in touch with them, I also started organising the Global Sustainability Jam, so… and I was, when I was working at [name], the only reason that I worked at [name], it was like a shitty job, but I felt that I needed a brand in my CV, I was working at a very good company in Brazil, nobody ever heard of, I did a very good course in the Netherlands, nobody ever heard of… so I needed a brand … I need something that is like catchy, so I went to [name] and while I was at [name] I went to lots of meetings and I was saying ‘Hey, I work at [name] would you like to have a coffee?’ and it worked, so … I thought this is where I sourced a lot of my network through things like that… I met a lot of people who wanted things from [name] but I couldn’t help them… so… I met a lot of people … so now, for the partnerships I was able to do all of the partnerships with my existing network, all of the companies that I visited, and this is very important, we are doing three projects with partners and two of them I think are really good, and I think they are very juicy… [laughs] and the fourth one trying to get clients directly, this is also where I am … … you know those people who are like hubs, people who know so many people, I am getting in touch with them and I am saying, this is what I am doing now, how can you help me? And they are pointing me to the right direction…’ (I25, Brazilian entrepreneur in London)
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<tr>
<th>Entrepreneurship</th>
<th>Policy, migration and enterprise</th>
<th>Economic landscape</th>
<th>Transnational socio-cultural connections</th>
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<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship is an unclear concept with a dearth of statistical paid to process and industry.</td>
<td>Changes in the UK migration policy system have been co-ordinated by a shifting rhetoric towards the promotion of entrepreneurship.</td>
<td>The global financial center has affected migrant entrepreneurship in the UK and the balance for migration.</td>
<td>Migrants indicate that do not break ties to their country of origin.</td>
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<td>The degree of entrepreneurship is academic and public perception is in dramatic contrast to definitions. Policy, where an entrepreneur is conceptualized as legitimate an economic success. Failing to disregard social and cultural trait that makes entrepreneurship the structure of economic reproduction.</td>
<td>Migration policy does not promote migrant entrepreneurship but enables structured and managed migrant employment.</td>
<td>Economic loci affect promote migrant entrepreneurship in the UK, these areas that include tax policy and credit, access to European market, regionally specific funding and issue the prospect, the ease of setting up a business and ease of access to free or established support services.</td>
<td>Sub-national regions play an important role as places of engagement for migrant entrepreneurs. They perform and like their transnational socio-cultural connections across space and time.</td>
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<td>Immigrant entrepreneurship is different from other forms of entrepreneurship. Migrants are more entrepreneurial than domestic entrepreneurs due to social and cultural factors. Availability or encourage risk taking and market exploration.</td>
<td>The Thr1 Entrepreneur is networking as intended and informal being made to the system to take into account status and utilize legitimate entrepreneurial ideas and applicants.</td>
<td>Collectors are manifest in differing guises across the regions studied. In London, there is a greater propensity for international transnational connections, in Birmingham and the West Midlands the role of historical and familial connections plays a significant role in shaping the migrant entrepreneurial landscape while in Cambridge, the connections that stem from organizations such as HPA and the hipster groups are paramount to global economic connectivity and cohesion.</td>
<td>Transnational socio-cultural collectors have influence and transforming effects on the development of the migrant entrepreneurs' localities and country of origin, as well as on global macroeconomic processes, including international financial management, international trade and investment and domestic economic activities.</td>
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<td>Although entrepreneurs tend to be young and established, family and friends are important support networks that impact migrant decisions on location, enterprises and everyday life.</td>
<td>Abuses, including the recycling of capital, have been used by some applicants to overcome application requirements.</td>
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<td>Entrepreneurship has a strong regional dimension, with sub-national spaces acting as key areas for policy based promotion and engagement in place.</td>
<td>Immigrants are to renew their Thr1 Entrepreneur idea successfully, but will need to hard time into the UK and employ of UK nationals.</td>
<td>Sources of public funding for the Thr1 Entrepreneur US are not readily available, and entrepreneurs tend to private financial sources to obtain the idea. This means that the collected data is being poorly and overly used.</td>
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<td>The politics based system is being made more effective, moving away from its initial premise as an objective, black and white application process system.</td>
<td>The broader rhetoric of obesity of the UK migration policy system is impacting prospective migrant entrepreneurs' willingness to do business in the UK, alongside economic pressures and competition.</td>
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