Immigration in UK newspapers during general election campaigns, 1918-2010

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Immigration in UK Newspapers during General Election Campaigns, 1918-2010

David Smith

A Doctoral Thesis
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Abstract

Issues concerning immigration and asylum have attracted considerable news media coverage in countries of the ‘Global North’ such as the United Kingdom during recent decades. The UK national press – famous for its longevity, mass appeal and partisanship – has been uniquely placed to report on and provide commentary about issues of social change such as these, especially as they have become more prominent in UK party politics.

This thesis therefore analyses the press coverage of immigration issues in seven national newspapers during the final week of general election campaigns between 1918 and 2010 in order to provide a historical context to these recent developments. Using content analysis and critical discourse analysis methods, the study assesses several aspects of the representational pattern of immigration coverage and offers a perspective which emphasises continuities and contrasts across time and across the press.

Over two empirical chapters, the content analysis provides a thorough profile of the coverage in terms of its volume, the news presence and access of social actors, the balance of supportive and critical voices in coverage, the lexicon used to describe immigrants and immigration processes and the themes of debate. The findings suggest that immigration has become a low-threshold political issue within recent campaigns, for which there is a core element of detailed discussion but an unprecedented expansion in superficial reference to such issues. The prominence, politicisation and problematisation of immigration have combined to frequently provide critical voices with a prominent platform. Meanwhile, supportive voices and those of immigrants were mostly marginalised. There was relatively little variation in the thematic dimension of coverage over time and to some extent across the press.

A third empirical chapter offers a critical discourse analysis of the headlines in three main areas of coverage: ‘precarious routes’ comprising forced and irregular migration, ‘numbers’ and immigrants as voters and candidates. These aspects of the debate are examined in terms of ‘our’ and ‘their’ rights and responsibilities to reveal how the press has constructed the ethics and politics of immigration qualitatively.

Keywords: Newspapers, Journalism, Elections, Migration, Asylum, Refugees.
# Table of Contents

**Immigration in UK Newspapers during General Election Campaigns, 1918-2010** ................................................. i

**Abstract** ...................................................................................................................................................... ii

**Table of Contents** ....................................................................................................................................... iii

**List of Tables and Figures** ........................................................................................................................... vi

**Acknowledgements** ...................................................................................................................................... viii

1: Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1

   Why study election campaigns? ................................................................................................................... 2
   Why study the press in the longue durée? ..................................................................................................... 5
   Why study the press coverage of immigration? ........................................................................................... 8
   Outline of thesis .......................................................................................................................................... 12

2: The Sociology of Journalism and the Reporting of Immigration ............................................................ 15

   Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 15
   The sociology of journalism ........................................................................................................................ 15
      Organisational issues .................................................................................................................................. 15
   The role of journalism .................................................................................................................................... 30
   A national press ............................................................................................................................................. 33
   The reporting of immigration ....................................................................................................................... 39
      The ‘imperial legacy’ ................................................................................................................................... 39
      The ‘New Racism’ ........................................................................................................................................ 41
   Previous studies of the news coverage of ‘race’ and immigration ............................................................... 46
   Summary ..................................................................................................................................................... 55

3: The Politics and History of Immigration: Legislation and Definitions ..................................................... 58

   Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 58
   The Politics of Immigration: The State and its Responsibilities .................................................................... 60
      A state-centric political issue ...................................................................................................................... 60
      From territorial exclusion to social exclusion .......................................................................................... 64
      Which political elites control policy? ........................................................................................................ 65
   The responsibilities of the receiving country ................................................................................................. 70
   Defining migration ....................................................................................................................................... 71
      Competing definitions ............................................................................................................................... 71
   A typology of immigration to the UK ........................................................................................................... 85
   Summary ..................................................................................................................................................... 89

4: The Politics and History of Immigration: Demography and Public Opinion .............................................. 91

Differences between actors .................................................................................................................. 188  
Differences between newspapers ........................................................................................................... 191  
Differences between newspapers across time ..................................................................................... 194  
The Lexicon of Coverage ....................................................................................................................... 196  
The Fullness of Coverage: Themes ....................................................................................................... 203  
The Thematic Dimensions of Coverage ................................................................................................ 204  
Summary ................................................................................................................................................... 217  

8: Negotiating Rights and Responsibilities: The Ethics and Politics of Immigration ................................. 220  
 ‘Precarious’ Routes: The Responsibilities of the Host? ............................................................................. 222  
 Forced migrants: asylum seekers and refugees ....................................................................................... 224  
 Irregular migrants .................................................................................................................................. 232  
 Convergence ......................................................................................................................................... 236  
 Numbers: The Rights of the Host .............................................................................................................. 238  
 The authority of facts and figures ........................................................................................................... 240  
 1992 and 2010 ...................................................................................................................................... 242  
 Moderate spokespersons .............................................................................................................................. 245  
 ‘The Migrant Vote’: Insiders or Outsiders? ............................................................................................... 247  
 The German and Austrian voters forgery, 1922 ................................................................................... 248  
 The migrant vote .................................................................................................................................. 249  

9: Conclusion: continuity and change? ................................................................................................ 256  
 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 256  
 Summary of findings and discussion ......................................................................................................... 258  
 Continuity and change .............................................................................................................................. 266  
 The ‘so what’ question ......................................................................................................................................... 268  

References .............................................................................................................................................. 275  

Appendix A: Major Statutory Immigration and Nationality Legislation prior to 2010 ................................... 313  

Appendix B: Coding Dates ....................................................................................................................... 316  

Appendix C: Content Analysis Variables ................................................................................................ 317
List of Tables and Figures

- Figure 3.1: Categories of legal status 82
- Figure 3.2: Richmond's matrix of international migrants 84
- Figure 4.1: Estimated average annual net migration in the UK (thousands), 1901-2010 95
- Figure 4.2: Immigration by reason 1991-2011 100
- Figure 4.3: Applications for asylum (excluding dependents) 1979-2010 101
- Figure 4.4: Initial Decisions of Asylum Applications 1984-2010 102
- Figure 4.5: Proportion of survey respondents claiming that there are ‘too many’ immigrants compared with grants of settlement for immigrants 108
- Figure 4.6: Immigration as an important issue by UK net migration, 1974-2013 109
- Figure 5.1: Sample sets 121
- Table 5.1: Inter-coder reliability results 127
- Figure 5.2: The Fairclough model of CDA 129
- Figure 6.1: Sum total of immigration items per campaign 135
- Table 6.1: Sum total and mean number of immigration items by newspaper 135
- Figure 6.2: Sum total of immigration items across press sectors by campaign 137
- Figure 6.3: Mean number of immigration items per edition across press sectors by campaign 137
- Figure 6.4: The focus of immigration items (raw counts) by campaign 140
- Figure 6.5: Mean distribution across press sectors of main focus immigration items over time 141
- Figure 6.6: Mean distribution across press sectors of secondary focus immigration items over time 141
- Table 6.2: Sum and mean number of ‘immigration items’ and ‘IAE’ items per campaign 143
- Table 6.3: The percentage of immigration items coded as IAE items per campaign 144
- Figure 6.7: The mean number of election items per edition compared with the mean number of IAE items per edition by campaign 146
- Figure 6.8: Percentage of election items counted as IAE items 147
- Table 6.4: Front page immigration and IAE items by campaign 150
- Table 6.5: Focus of immigration items by electoral orientation 151
- Figure 6.9: The focus of IAE items (raw counts) by campaign 151
- Table 6.6: Types of immigration stories over time 154
- Table 6.7: The news presence of actors 157
- Table 6.8: Five most prominent actors per campaign (raw count of appearances) 158
- Table 6.9: News presence of migrant actors versus non-migrant actors by campaign 161
- Table 6.10: The presence of ‘immigration pressure groups’ 163
- Figure 6.10: Sum number of directly quoted words per item in each campaign 165
- Figure 6.11: Sum direct quotation (words) per actor category 166
- Table 6.11: News Presence and News Access by campaign (percent) 167
- Table 6.12: News Presence and News Access by newspaper sector (percent) 170
- Table 6.13: News Presence and Access of migrant actors by newspaper title 171
Table 7.1: Direct quotation by actor tone 179
Table 7.2: Direct quotation by actor tone in IAE items 180
Table 7.3: The number of quoted actors by tone category in IAE items 181
Table 7.4: Direct quotation by actor tone in non-IAE items 181
Table 7.5: The number of quoted actors by tone category in non-IAE items 182
Figure 7.1: Comparing the directional balance of IAE coverage and non-IAE coverage 183
Figure 7.2: Total direct quotation in words by actor tone over time (IAE items) 184
Figure 7.3: Mean directly quoted words by actor tone per item over time (IAE items) 185
Figure 7.4: Total direct quotation in words by actor tone over time (non-IAE items) 187
Figure 7.5: Mean directly quoted words by actor tone per item over time (non-IAE items) 187
Figure 7.6: Sum quotation by tone of actors in all immigration coverage 189
Table 7.6: Sum quotation by tone of migrant actors 190
Figure 7.7: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers 191
Figure 7.8: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers in IAE coverage 192
Figure 7.9: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers in non-IAE coverage 193
Table 7.7: Mean direct quotation in words per item by tone across time in all coverage 195
Table 7.8: Raw count of top six terms used for migrant groups in each period 197
Figure 7.10: Fluctuations in usage of terms over time (sum frequency of usage per campaign) 198
Table 7.9: Raw count of top fifteen terms used to describe migrants’ movements in reports 201
Table 7.10: The themes of immigration coverage 204
Table 7.11: Themes of main focus coverage over time 207
Figure 7.11: The dominance of the five most frequent themes in main focus coverage 209
Table 7.12: Themes by newspaper in main focus immigration coverage 212
Table 7.13: The frequency of themes in immigration and IAE coverage 213
Table 7.14: Top ten groups the coverage was about by time period (raw counts) 215
Figure 8.1: The coverage of ‘precarious migration’ (i.e. ‘forced migration’ and ‘irregular migration’) over time 223
Table 8.1: The proportion of articles in which migrants were referred to by country of previous residence or nationality in main focus coverage 229
Figure 8.2: The coverage of numbers over time 239
Figure 8.3: The coverage of ‘the migrant vote’ and candidature over time 248
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1: Introduction

During the past two decades, issues relating to immigration and asylum have seemingly become established as an intertwined and ever-more integral part of public policy-making, a highly-charged area of the policy terrain between mainstream political parties and of growing importance for restriction-favouring voters left unquenched by recurrent legislative intervention. Immigration processes have become an increasingly substantial contributory factor to population growth, economic development, the size and age profile of the labour force as well as socio-cultural change. The mass media have been well-positioned to mediate the public debate concerning these issues, but it has been particularly within the pages of the national daily press, notorious for its partisanship and mass appeal, that debate has grown to become a consistent and prominent feature. Indeed, in certain sections of the press, immigration and asylum issues regularly make the front page\(^1\) or else are the subject of much editorial comment, and often colonise (or at least colour) discussion of political issues as diverse as healthcare, higher education, foreign policy, social security and so on. This has subsequently raised concerns in some quarters about the impact of such coverage on social cohesion, policy-making and the process and outcome of electoral politics. Being such apparently dominant and divisive issues in public life, this study therefore asks how immigration and asylum are represented in the national daily press at the critically-important time of general elections.

Moreover, as much of the above is assumed to be very recent in occurrence yet rarely empirically demonstrated as such, this study explores press coverage of immigration and asylum issues during election periods in the longue durée, spanning 25 campaigns over almost a century (1918-2010) and across seven newspaper titles (the Guardian, Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Mirror and Daily Herald/Sun) in order to provide a comprehensive view of continuity and change over time. This is achieved through the utilisation of both quantitative and qualitative methods (see Chapter 5). These methods provide an insight into how the press debate over immigration and asylum issues has developed in several different ways, notably with regards to the

\(^1\) For instance, in 2003 at the height of a so-called ‘asylum crisis’ the Daily Express ran 22 front-page stories about asylum seekers and refugees alone in a 31-day period (Greenslade 2005: 21).
amount of coverage there has been, which social actors and views are present in and have access to the debate, what the debate has been about thematically, how the language of the debate has altered and how the press has constructed the ethics of immigration and its consequences in regard to discussion of a few key themes.

This introductory chapter will discuss the justifications for a study of this kind and the organisation of the thesis.

**Why study election campaigns?**

The introduction of cheap, mass-circulation, national newspapers in the twentieth century came alongside both the enfranchisement of larger numbers of people\(^2\) and the development of national political campaigning at election times (Denver 2007: 125). Previously, campaigning had ‘largely consisted of canvassing, leafletting and meetings’ (Wring 1996: 95) in local, intimate environments. Politicians, however, began to recognise that the public reach of newspapers allowed for the dissemination of information regarding their campaign activities to people across the country. Over the years this has come to mean that ‘modern campaigns are, therefore, media campaigns; they are a form of spectator sport’ (Denver 2007: 131). Voters become aware of and essentially experience the campaign through the mass media (including newspapers, radio, television and the Internet) and, during the mandated three-to-four weeks of electoral campaigning, media coverage ‘reaches saturation point with the progress of the campaign being charted day by day’ (ibid.).

Although considerations for voting behaviour in relation to long-term effects are undoubtedly important, election campaigns are also of interest to news media researchers and critical periods of time in society for a number of other reasons. They represent a brief period of time in which governmental power is at stake, and during which ordinary political and media logics correspondingly alter (Walgrave and van Aelst 2006: 96-98). Ordinarily central actors in the news such as the staff of government departments make way to some extent for the vigorous and well-resourced activities of parties and candidates, the media ‘devote more attention to politics in campaign times,

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\(^2\) This was the case especially in 1918, when the electorate trebled in size to 21 million people – mostly due to the enfranchisement of women - as a result of the Representation of the People Act 1918 (Wring 1996: 94).
opening opportunity windows for political actors’ with regards to both ‘horse race’ as well as issue-oriented coverage (ibid.: 97) and the partisanship of newspapers themselves is at its most overt. Putatively ‘key’ issues of the day are fore-grounded on the news agenda, perhaps (but not necessarily) related to their longer-term sedimentary saliency, and are subject to strident debate, while a number of issues and sources deemed not germane to the election are relatively marginalised. The presence and coverage of social issues such as immigration and asylum during campaign periods, especially when viewed in their historical context, are therefore of great significance.

Certainly, then, news organisations and political professionals take election campaigns seriously. Further, even allowing for the possibly minor or secondary influence of short-term campaigns in electoral outcomes overall, there is still cause to believe that campaigns ‘at least have the potential to matter’ (Holbrook 1996: 12, my emphasis). Holbrook identifies several reasons for this, including that ‘there are a significant number of people who decide how to vote during the campaign’ whose votes could be decisive in a close poll, ‘party identification is less important to the electorate than it used to be’³, ‘there is significant fluctuation in candidate support during the campaign’ and ‘as elections become more media oriented they generate a lot of information that can be used by voters as they consider how to vote’ (ibid.).

The potentially critical importance of election campaigns can indeed be illustrated with reference to an immigration-related example. There is cause to speculate that a late swing for the Conservative party and therefore the result of the 1992 general election may have been in large-part owed to an orchestrated campaign of immigration ‘scare stories’ by the largely Tory-supporting popular press (e.g. the Sun, the Daily Express, the Daily Star) in the final days of the campaign (Billig and Golding 1992a, 1992b; Thomas

³ This has become known as ‘partisan de-alignment’. As Blumler and Kavanagh point out, in the first two decades after the Second World War, much of the electorate ‘related to politics through more or less firm and long-lasting party identifications’ and voters were therefore unlikely to ‘sift the arguments concerned, tending to vote instead on group-based loyalties’ (1999: 211-212). It is certainly true that the electorate’s loyalties lie less dominantly with the Labour Party and the Conservative Party now than in the past; in 1950, together they amassed 90 per cent of the vote and over 98 per cent of the seats, whereas in 2005 they obtained only 69 per cent of the vote and 88 per cent of the seats (Denver 2007: 2). This has therefore conceivably created opportunities whereby voters may be influenced by short-term factors such as perceptions of party competence (either in general or on specific policy issues of concern) or the quality of party leaders during election campaigns (ibid.: 85).
These stories warned (in the case of the Sun) of a ‘human tide’ of ‘bogus refugees’ in the event of a Labour win, based on their opposition to proposed asylum legislation. Billig and Golding (1992a: 163) postulate that, with a combined readership of approximately seventeen million people, these newspapers reached roughly half of the electorate, meaning that ‘even if only two in a hundred electors were swayed by the immigration scares in the Tory tabloids, the effects would have been profound: such a late swing would have been sufficient to give the Conservatives their overall majority’.

More recently, the 2010 election campaign saw the appearance of immigration in a number of ways. In terms of the electoral outcome, immigration may have played more of a role as a long-term issue rather than as something with a short-term impact while economic concerns were undoubtedly of greater importance for many voters (Flynn et al. 2010). Nonetheless, the media furore over Gordon Brown’s ‘bigot-gate’ gaffe, the appearance of immigration-related questions in each of the televised prime ministerial debates and David Cameron’s attempts to detoxify the Conservative Party’s ‘nasty party’ image underscored the importance and ordinariness of immigration as a political issue and demonstrated the fragility which marks its public discussion. The campaign was also a reminder of the way in which electoral debates can play a part in the development of the political initiatives and narratives which ensue (ibid.: 110), such as in the subsequent formulation of Coalition government policy on net migration and various retrospectives emanating from the Labour Party about their perceived lack of engagement with the public about the issue.

It is therefore important to study general election campaign coverage both for what campaigns reveal symbolically about the contemporary political concerns of each period and for the potentially significant role the press and the mass media may play in the electoral and political process.

Given this rationale, it is perhaps surprising that there have been few systematic historical comparisons of electoral coverage of particular social issues to chart changes in the way in which their politics have been represented in the news media at this critically important juncture over more than a handful of elections (but see Harmer 2012).
Why study the press in the longue durée?

It is hoped that this thesis will therefore help to remedy a general neglect in media and discourse studies to attend to media content in its historical context. This is consonant with the viewpoint advanced by James Curran in 1991 when he called history the ‘neglected grandparent of media studies’ (1991: 27 in Pickering 2014: 9), but the argument has been expressed recurrently since, suggesting that it is yet to be adequately addressed and that media studies retains its ‘frantically contemporary agenda’ (Corner 1999: 126 in Pickering 2014: 9). The ‘present-centredness’ which has marked much media studies research is characterised by the seizing on what seems emergent, ‘[hustling] it into greater prominence than it would deserve in the longer term; and [pronouncing] upon its epochal significance’ (Pickering 2014: 10). According to Pickering, this ‘obsession with the waves just breaking at our feet’ induces an ‘amnesia’ that ignores ‘how long those waves have travelled in their movement towards the present’ (ibid.).

Curran, in identifying the major problems which have beset the writing of media history, notes that ‘most media history is media-centric’ and therefore ‘tends not to illuminate the links between media development and wider trends in society’, while the ‘technological determinist version of media history’ has dominated the field4 (2002: 135), contributing to an impoverished understanding of media and their consumption which assumes that it is communications technology driving historical change rather than constituting one of its features (Pickering 2014).

Another issue has come in the traditional neglect of the diachronic study of the popular press on the part of historians, due to perceptions of the ‘predictable, trivial, unsophisticated’, conservative and sensationalist characteristics of this section of the press (Bingham 2012). This over time led to an emphasis on the study of elite newspapers and a general dismissal of the content of the popular press as ephemeral rather than an important source of public information – especially as circulation grew in the twentieth century. This also has to be seen in the context of a general neglect of newspapers as

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4 Curran also notes that ‘most [media] history is medium history’, i.e. ‘It takes the form of historical accounts of an individual medium’ and provides ‘fractured and incomplete understandings of the historical role of the media’ as a whole (2002: 135). Although this concern is noted, the justification for focussing solely on the national press is made in Chapter 5.
primary historical sources in part due to methodological barriers which are only now being ameliorated with the introduction of digitized newspaper archives (Bingham 2010).

Carvalho (2008) has pointed out that news discourse studies methodologically require proper consideration for the historical context of the texts produced on a given topic in order to produce an adequately explanatory analysis. More importantly, though, this is required because it is impossible to understand how public issues emerge, are constituted into political problems and provoke the formulation of answers and the adoption, implementation and evaluation of measures without providing a ‘biography’ of social and political issues in the media (ibid.: 164). Regrettably, most news discourse studies tend to provide ‘snapshot’ views of such issues which neglect their significantly longer ‘life’ or else focus on long-term change in terms of issues of style and genre ‘rather than to change in the meaning of issues in the media’ (ibid.: 163-164).

An approach which recognises these concerns is especially necessary in relation to press coverage of immigration issues, so that a comprehensive understanding of the formation of the debate can be attained. There are two factors involved in the justification for this. The first relates to evidence and perceptions concerning the recency of immigration’s ascent as a prominent and divisive political issue. It has been established that the past twenty years have seen immigration and asylum become increasingly salient as political issues in the media reporting of general election campaigns (Richardson 2008: 321), during which time polls have also charted the rise of immigration and asylum as issues of major importance for voters (see Chapter 4). The second relates to a general lack of longitudinal analysis establishing patterns and features of continuity and change in immigration coverage, which has been exacerbated by a more general neglect in research to examine how immigration appeared in the press prior to the second half of the twentieth century (see Chapter 2). Various examples can be found which have tentatively suggested that the migrant groups subject to hostile coverage in parts of the popular and conservative press historically have changed, but that the underlying attitudes towards the immigrants of each period are similar (e.g. Bingham 2005). But without a systematic and longitudinal research approach, it is difficult to assess how this is manifest in coverage or to explain whether recent patterns are a product of contemporary social
conditions or whether they are merely the recent materialization of historically-entrenched discourses.

An intervention such as this will also provide an experiment to test widely-propagated notions in public discourse such as those which claim that immigration is ‘off limits’ to public and political discussion. One example of this in particular came in the aftermath of the so-called ‘bigot-gate’ incident from the most recent election campaign\(^5\), wherein a *Daily Mail* front page headline read: **DEMONISED: THE GRANNY WHO DARED TO UTTER THE I-WORD** (29 April 2010). The invocation of ‘the I-word’ dramatised allusions to censorship which were spelled out explicitly in the standfirst: ‘Politicians’ censorship of any debate on mass immigration explodes as Brown brands 66-year-old care worker a bigot’. This kind of framing can be related theoretically to what Teun van Dijk has named the ‘pretence of censorship’ (1992: 105). More broadly, some coverage of the incident also questioned the extent to which the political classes (though particularly the Labour Party) had faithfully and sufficiently engaged public concern in the preceding years (e.g. Glover 2010; Chapman 2010; Kavanagh 2010); this too can be related to the persistent invocation of what Martin Barker called ‘the argument from genuine fears’ in his ‘new racism’ thesis in the 1980s (1981: 14-16). The invocation of both the ‘pretence of censorship’ and ‘the argument from genuine fears’ (whenever expressed as a disillusionment with political responses to immigration) have gone some way to suggest that immigration has never been properly discussed or legislated for by the allegedly elitist political or media classes as a whole over time. Meanwhile, Britain is claimed to be ‘post-racial’, an assumption which pre-emptively eliminates opportunities for the articulation of grievances on the part of immigrants and people of ethnic minorities regarding ongoing discriminatory treatment in everyday situations and at the hands of

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\(^5\) ‘Bigot-gate’ refers to an incident in which the incumbent Prime Minister Gordon Brown was overheard calling the floating (though traditionally Labour) voter, Gillian Duffy, ‘just a sort of bigoted woman’ to an aide on a Sky News lapel microphone in what he had thought was the privacy of his campaign car. Duffy had voiced, along with a number of other issues, her concerns about immigration from Eastern Europe to Brown (‘You can’t say anything about the immigrants because you’re saying that you’re... but all these Eastern Europeans what are coming in, where are they flocking from?’), and it was seemingly this aspect of the conversation to which Brown referred in his subsequent comment. Footage of the incident was played repeatedly on news broadcasts in the hours afterwards and thus, from what was intended to be a closely managed photo opportunity, the beleaguered Labour leader was forced to provide numerous *mea culpas* in public and private, and the incident was believed to end any hopes for a Labour victory (Lim and Moufahim 2011: 657).
the state (Alexander 2014: 1787). This thesis will help to assess whether assumptions such as these are sustainable.

**Why study the press coverage of immigration?**

Migration is an incredibly complex and multi-faceted phenomenon which presents a number of opportunities and challenges to migrants and non-migrants as well as to sending and receiving countries (Koser 2007: 1).

Historically, migration has been an inevitable result of the physical, vocational and social capacities of humans as a species and as such a fundamental and crucial feature of the human experience (De Genova 2013). Although ‘read as conquest, trade, war, kinship networks and so on’, human mobility in all its historic forms is a reminder that migratory processes are not a modern occurrence, and pre-date the existence of more contemporary notions such as globalization, capitalism, nation states and borders (Anderson 2013: 12). Legal obstacles, selective filters and physical barriers to human mobility, now endemic throughout the world but only relatively recent and reactive artefacts of these contemporary notions (except where such barriers are geological), are ultimately what constrain the intensification of migratory processes (De Genova 2013).

Nevertheless, such obstacles, filters and barriers are inexorably navigated or circumvented, and as such global international migration is numerically on the rise. This in itself is at the root of much dispute and debate about the ethics of migration, but it has also coincided with distinctive changes in the character and consequences of global migratory patterns (Castles and Miller 2009). Their impact upon social, cultural, political and economic development at global and local levels has had profound effects on societies around the world, and migration of course transforms the lives of migrants themselves. Correspondingly, migration has ascended to the top of the political agenda in a number of countries, with the public and political debate in each shaped by parochial concerns and solutions. For the countries of the ‘Global North’ which receive more migrants than they ‘send’, it is with regards to the consequences of inward migration that political solutions are most keenly-sought.

Britain has not been exempt from its own experiences of migration, either in the distant past or presently. Historians of immigration to Britain have frequently recognised the
centrality of immigration in the earliest formation of British society\textsuperscript{6}, contradicting widespread popular myths which ignore the historical importance of immigration in nation building (Castles and Miller 2009: 79) and which permit the promulgation of a perspective in which the British population is seen as a homogenous ‘island race’ only recently touched by outside influences (Runnymede Trust 2000: 18; Hayter 2004: 13).

In fact, a history of Britain during the past several hundred years would arguably be incomplete without taking into account its role in the establishment of major global migration patterns, which have usually been to the benefit of its Empire. The establishment of these migrations not only helped to compose the global demographic patterns of today but is also related to some extent to the formation of contemporary international migration routes. There have broadly been four key periods of mass migration around the world since the sixteenth century. The first was ‘the forced transportation of between 10 and 20 million people as slaves from Africa to America’ to provide forced labour for mines and plantations; the second comprised ‘indentured or bonded labour, or temporary slaves, from India and China’ to various places in Asia, South Africa and the Caribbean; and the third was of ‘Europeans to America and Australia, which began in the eighteenth century and reached its peak in the first decade of the twentieth century’ (Hayter 2004: 9-10). The fourth, beginning in the 1950s, constituted ‘a reverse flow from the South to the North’ (ibid., see also Castles and Miller 2009: 6, 81, 85, 98 for illustrative diagrams of these major global migrations), which in the case of the UK came most notably and problematically from the countries of the New Commonwealth (see Chapter 3). An important distinction between these migration patterns is that the first three were effected in large part by the colonial European powers, while in the fourth era the migrations unexpectedly (if perhaps inevitably) ‘came home’\textsuperscript{7}. The sequential transference of these processes from ‘elsewhere’ to ‘here’ was

\textsuperscript{6} For example, ‘the British are clearly among the most ethnically composite of the Europeans’ (Geipel 1969: 163-164 in Holmes 1988: 3), ‘it would be difficult to locate an epoch when some immigration [to the UK] did not take place’ (Holmes 1988: 3), immigration is ‘not only one of the biggest stories of British life; it is also one of the most resonant, and one of the oldest’ (Winder 2004: 2), ‘the history of Britain is a long story of immigration – the immigration of Angles, Saxons, Normans, Danes, Dutchmen, Belgians and many other people from different parts of the world’ (Foot 1965: 80) and ‘Britain has always been a country involved in migration’ (Layton-Henry 1992: 1).

\textsuperscript{7} Beyond economic, social and cultural factors (e.g. relative disparities in prosperity between the people of post-colonial and previously colonised countries, familial networks, common language, shared cultural traditions and the participation of colonised subjects in imperial warfare), this ‘reverse flow’ was
named Britain’s ‘imperial legacy’ by Zig Layton-Henry (1984: 1, 14-15) and was recognised aptly in a reputed slogan of the Asian Youth Movement in the 1970s: ‘We are here because you were there’ (Hayter 2004: 17). This historical trajectory of global migrations has led to proposals from some quarters (e.g. Smith 2014) that once-colonial (and now affluent) nations bear special obligations relating to entry and citizenship to (the descendents of) their former subjects. However, the formal rejection of such responsibilities and their concomitant removal from public debate essentially occurred in the UK by the passing of the immigration policy of the 1960s and 1970s.

Indeed, the sustained politicisation and problematisation of immigration effectively began in the UK at this point, while internal migration and emigration have not attracted nearly as much political attention for their no less critical if distinct size, ethics, consequences and experiential features. In fact, emigration from the UK was much larger than immigration to the UK during most of the twentieth century – though by its end the UK had become a country of sustained overall net immigration. This became even more apparent in the opening decade of the twenty-first century during which immigration reached unprecedented levels. Within this apparently simple narrative – from net emigration to net immigration – lie the fractious tensions at the heart of debates about inter alia the merits and methods of exclusion and inclusion, national and cultural identity, citizenship and representation, responsible governance, tolerance and post-colonial politics (see Hall 1978; Gilroy 1987, 2004).

These debates have crucially emerged, in notable part at least, in a national press which ‘flags the homeland daily’ (Billig 1995). The role of the press in mediating such a fundamental and increasingly influential element of social life in the nation as that of immigration, especially at significantly important points in time such as during election

unexpected and probably inevitable due to the concession of subjecthood which came with colonialism. This concession was predicated on ‘the expectation that the major movement would continue to be an outflow from Britain’ (Layton Henry 1984: 13, my emphasis), traditionally encouraged as a ‘conscious part of Britain’s imperial policy’ in order to ‘assist the economic development of Dominion territories, strengthen the ties with Britain and increase the power of the Empire’ (ibid.: 9). Even the authors of the British Nationality Act 1948, which ultimately affirmed the rights of Commonwealth subjects to migrate to the UK, had not imagined that these rights would be taken up in any substantial number (see Hansen 2000: 52-56).

8 A sense among some politicians of Britain’s duty as the ‘Mother Country’ of its Empire was, in fact, what in part delayed the introduction of legislation to curtail Commonwealth immigration until 1962 (see Foot 1965).
campaigns, is of vital concern in liberal democracies (Benson 2013: 18). According to liberal theorists of the media’s normative democratic role, there is an onus on the press to diligently and responsibly marshal a full and fair debate if citizens are to understand the features, causes and impacts (upon readers as much as upon other people and social processes) of immigration issues. Indeed, newspapers are not only ‘strategically placed’ (Golding and Middleton 1979: 5) to explain such phenomena but, as a culturally-dominant product, have the potential to project an inclusive vision of the cosmopolitan nation and provide space for the circulation of a wide range of views about Britain’s role in the world and its responsibilities to other people if we are to take their occasionally-voiced cosmopolitan credentials (see Law 2002) at face value. This thesis will shed light on how they have approached their task.

Moreover, as global migration continues to rise, the profile of migrants continues to change and the consequences of immigration become even more diffuse, it is an appropriate time to pause and consider how the press might help audiences to understand these patterns in future. Circulation figures for most national newspaper titles continue to dwindle, so it is pertinent to question how the press will continue to reach a national audience and influence the national debate and whether such a press will remain as relevant a force in an apparently increasingly ‘globalised’ world, in which prospective audiences might hold multi-faceted personal identities.
Outline of thesis

The thesis is organised into several further chapters.

Chapter 2 is devoted to a theoretical discussion about the sociology of journalism and specifically how this may be related to the press coverage of immigration. It begins by considering what impact ordinary news practices and organisational structures may have upon the journalistic representation of immigration. In the latter section of the chapter, the expected roles of journalism in covering immigration, how the national orientation of the press may affect the reporting of issues such as immigration, and the findings of prominent studies relating to the representation of immigration and 'race' in news media are explored in order to provide a contextual background to continuity and change in representational patterns over time.

Chapter 3 moves the discussion on to provide a historical background to the politics of immigration in the UK. It begins by developing a discussion about the political definitions concerning immigration, thus providing an insight into the linkages between official and popular discourses and the symbolic boundaries of national belonging which might be shaped and re-shaped in press coverage. This entails examining the role and power of the state in awarding or denying entry and citizenship to differing groups of migrants, an overview of the major categories and shifts in immigration and nationality law over time and a discussion of alternative perspectives used to define types of migrants. This subsequently leads to the presentation of a typology of migrants relevant to the purposes of the study, which both creates an analytical framework through which to see migrant categories and provides an opportunity to consider the distinct experiential and ethical features of different kinds of migration.

Chapter 4 focuses briefly on two other major aspects to the politics of immigration, both crucial to a deeper contextual understanding of the mediated migration debate. The first relates to demographic change in the UK over time, in order to provide a background to political debates centring on what is usually termed the 'numbers game'. The second relates to public attitudes towards immigration as represented in public opinion polls and their analysis. This provides an essential background into what citizens might demand of
immigration politics and how their knowledge and attitudes may interplay with the construction of immigration news.

**Chapter 5** explains the methodological design of the thesis. It details the main research questions of the study and the research design, including the sampling of data, the rationale for choosing both quantitative and qualitative methods, which methods were chosen and why.

**Chapter 6** is the first of two chapters which present the results of a systematic content analysis of the coverage of immigration in all seven sampled newspapers during election week. The first part of the chapter charts the volume of such coverage in terms of its quantity, frequency and depth while the second assesses the appearance of a range of social actors in terms of their news presence and news access. In doing so, the chapter highlights fluctuations in the appearance of immigration on the electoral news agenda and considers which social groups are able to define the mediated immigration debate.

**Chapter 7** elaborates on these findings to explore the attitudinal and thematic dimensions of coverage. The first part of the chapter continues to consider the role of social actors in debate, by providing a profile of the balance between ‘supportive’ and ‘critical’ attitudes expressed in coverage. This is followed by an analysis of the lexicon used to describe migrant groups and migration processes in coverage, in order to provide a snapshot of how the ‘terms’ of debate have developed over time. These aspects of the chapter help to determine the extent to which the debate is ‘fair’. The final part of the chapter examines which themes appear in newspaper coverage, in terms of their breadth and depth, in order to assess the extent to which coverage is ‘full’.

**Chapter 8** complements the findings of the content analysis of the previous two chapters with a critical discourse analysis of newspaper headlines which questions how issues surrounding the ethics of immigration are addressed in coverage. In studying the headlines and lead paragraphs of three major thematic areas of coverage, the analysis utilises a framework that considers the construction of ‘our’ rights and responsibilities and ‘their’ rights and responsibilities over time in coverage dealing with i) ‘numbers’, ii) ‘precarious routes’ and iii) ‘the migrant vote’ and migrant candidature.
The final chapter concludes the study by summarising the major findings revealed by the previous three analytical chapters, in terms of continuity and change. This leads on to a discussion of the major contributions of the thesis. In particular, the chapter considers what the findings of the study mean for the role of the press in immigration and electoral politics.
Introduction

This chapter provides two main functions through an exploration of key theoretical debates in news studies both generally and with specific regards to news media representations of immigration and immigrants. First, it will establish how the dynamics of news reporting may affect the press coverage of immigration. In order to do so, I will consider issues central to the sociology of journalism, such as news values and source practices, as well as those more particular to immigration reporting, such as ethnic minority representation in the newsroom and the role of relevant industry guidelines and regulation. Second, the chapter will also explore the role of journalism in mediating social issues such as that of immigration, the significance of the nationally-defined orientation of the national press in terms of the likely effects of this orientation on immigration coverage and the major findings of textualist accounts of the news media representation of immigration and ‘race’. This is supported by a discussion of theories relating to the contemporary history of racist discourse. Since the focus of this thesis is longitudinal, this chapter is intended to provide where appropriate a reflection on the continuities and changes which have been observed in these areas of research.

The sociology of journalism

Organisational issues

What ‘makes’ the news? Contrary to the view that the news is ‘random reactions to random events’ (in Negrine 1994: 123), decades of news analysis have contributed to the view that news is the result of a routine selection of all the possible (i.e. virtually infinite) events which take place around the world every day to produce a product fitting the available space of the newspaper (after advertising space has been accounted for) and which is intended to be sold in sufficient volume (in combination with the sale of advertising space) to return a profit (ibid.: 118-123). As newspaper organisations have finite space, time and material resources available for each published edition, the selection of events as ‘news’ must make the production of copy as efficient and inexpensive as possible, while at the same time providing an informative and entertaining ‘product’, in order to make the business which publishes the newspaper economically...
viable. These constraints, along with the need (or at least desire) to ‘maintain a political line’ (ibid.: 118), shape the news production process. Journalists must negotiate all of these constraints but, according to organisational approaches to news production, in order to do so effectively they tend to develop rituals and practices which ‘routinize the unexpected’ (Tuchman 1973). On the contrary, according to political economic approaches to news production, news output is circumscribed in service to powerful interests due to the economic orientation and reproductive social functions of news media (e.g. Herman and Chomsky 1988; Golding and Murdock 2000) – which are, after all, profit-oriented businesses. As will be shown, however, it is not necessary to discuss the political economy of the press at length – important though such factors may be at the general level (and which are to some extent implicit within the everyday routines of news production anyway) – in order to explain the specific logics which drive the construction of immigration news and account to a large extent for the representational patterns found in immigration coverage (see below). The main organisational issues which will be focussed upon therefore include news values, minority representation in the newsroom, guidelines and regulation, and the sourcing of news.

**News values**

One important practice in news selection and gathering is the adherence to a set of criteria which index what journalists perceive a news story to ‘look like’\(^9\), and which they think align with the ‘imagined’ preferences of the ‘expected audience’\(^{10}\) (Richardson 2007: 92). Such criteria are known as news values.

As Bell duly observes, news values are ‘values’ (1991: 156, my emphasis). They ‘reflect ideologies and priorities held in society’ and are therefore not neutral (ibid.). This helps to indicate that the news provides a construction rather than a ‘reflection’ of reality through the choices inevitably made in its gathering and arrangement. ‘Events’ ostensibly contain no intrinsic or ‘natural’ framework of meaning in themselves; the media’s active selecting, presenting, structuring and shaping of events produces meaning and assigns meaning to those events (Hall 1982: 64).

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\(^9\) Fowler stresses, however, that these criteria ‘are probably more or less unconscious in editorial practice’ (1991: 13).

\(^{10}\) This perhaps helps to account for some of the variation in thematic focus between the output of certain journalists and newspapers, whose audiences hold differing expectations of their newspapers.
Deacon suggests that ‘structural and cultural factors have a far more significant role in this construction process than deliberate political bias – that is, the tendency to privilege people, issues and perspectives because they fit more effectively into the cycles and demands of the news industries, because they have greater cultural significance and proximity and because they do not confound broadly accepted normative values’ (2008: 8). Hence, news values provide journalists with a routine and ‘common sense’ way of selecting events to construct meaning in news narratives without requiring laborious consideration of the potentially troubling implications of their choices.

Galtung and Ruge provided an influential typology of news values in their study of foreign news reporting in Norway. Their set of criteria included: frequency, threshold (including absolute intensity and intensity increase), unambiguity, meaningfulness (including cultural proximity and relevance), consonance (including predictability and demand), unexpectedness (including unpredictability and scarcity), continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, reference to persons and reference to something negative (1973, discussed in Fowler 1991: 13-17). These news values, it was suggested, would work in combination to provide news stories with their newsworthiness; the more news values satisfied by an event, the more likely the event is to become news.

This typology was criticised and adapted by Harcup and O’Neill (2001), who argued that it ignored the ‘day-to-day coverage of lesser, domestic and bread-and-butter news’ (ibid.: 276). Harcup and O’Neill therefore offered their own set of news values, namely: the power elite, celebrity, entertainment, surprise, bad news, good news, magnitude, relevance, follow-ups and the media agenda.

Another criticism of theirs was that journalists may, in fact, construct news to fit these criteria, rather than that the events contain such features in and of themselves (e.g. ‘most journalists are trained to write unambiguous angles to stories that may be ambiguous, complex or unclear’) (2001: 277; Fowler 1991: 19). Further, it must also be considered that news values are not universal over time, place or institution and are subject to interpretation. By way of example, Richardson notes the demise of the ‘Parliament page’ in the UK broadsheet press in the 1990s, to illustrate that the editorial
staff of these newspapers during this time changed in their opinion of what audiences wanted, concluding that it was not in-depth coverage of the goings-on in Westminster\textsuperscript{11} (2007: 93-94).

News values need not necessarily be interpreted in the same way across the press, either. For newspapers serving a local audience, for instance, not only will the focus of the newspaper change in accordance with local concerns, but it is possible that they may take a ‘responsible journalism’ approach with regard to immigration matters to avoid fuelling intra-community tensions and to commercially appeal to the diverse potential audience which has formed in some areas over the past several decades (Machin and Mayr 2007; Bagley 1973, but see Rasinger 2010; Finney and Robinson 2008; Chessum 1998). Likewise, for media outlets aimed at diaspora audiences, news values are interpreted in ways which help to ‘sensationalise struggles for racial equality rather than inflame racial tensions’ (Gordon and Rosenberg 1989: 62), providing a populist alternative to mainstream news narratives.

However, the audience in the case of the national press is in general a nationally-defined one. The importance of this is that, as Conboy remarks, ‘categories such as threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, reference to elite nations, and reference to elite individuals all function best within the news when they are linked to national narratives’ (2007a: 155).

This correspondingly has specific and potentially critical implications for the likely interpretation and application of news values to immigration issues in these newspapers. For example, in their pivotal study \textit{Racism and the Mass Media}, Hartmann and Husband found that, despite newspapers’ explicit condemnation of overt forms of racism and prejudice\textsuperscript{12}, the news content they found was augmented towards reporting events on the basis of the news values of ‘conflict’, ‘negativity’\textsuperscript{13}, ‘consonance’\textsuperscript{14} and

\textsuperscript{11} This accords with a roughly twenty-five percent decline in the number of parliamentary and political items in the Guardian and Daily Telegraph between 1986 and 1996 (Negrine 1999: 332).

\textsuperscript{12} Their overall results came despite the apparently earnest intentions of reflexive journalists (at least, of those contacted) to improve upon such practices (e.g. Hartmann and Husband 1974: 163-165), and news and editorial comment which ostensibly ‘condemned and deplored’ prejudice and discrimination as well as showing a concern for improvements in race relations (1974: 145).

\textsuperscript{13} This and the previous news value are very important for the impressions audiences may receive about immigrants. As Hartmann and Husband put it, ‘positive stories of harmonious race relations are less likely
‘unambiguity’\(^{15}\) (1974: 154-155), producing a perspective which emphasised social tension and amplified the perceived ‘problems’ of immigration and immigrants.

Just as economic imperatives may oblige the local and regional press to sometimes cultivate a ‘positive’ interpretation of news values, for the national press ‘within a predominantly white society and culture, economic forces can centre ‘middle ground’ white opinion and interests since this is where the largest market and profits are found, and thereby marginalize minority interests, voices and opinions’ (Cottle 2000a: 20). As Shibutani points out, the news is not just anything ‘new’; ‘it is information that is timely...This transient quality is the very essence of news, for an event ceases to be newsworthy as soon as the tension it has aroused has been dissipated’ (1966 in Hartmann and Husband 1974: 153). To news staff and the national newspaper audience concerned with preserving the privileges associated with their position in the social structure (and who perceive immigrants as a threat to this), this ‘tension’ is likely to lead to a partial immigration problematic which ignores the ‘everyday’ (Essed 1991) experiences of violence, discrimination, exploitation or hardship often suffered by recent immigrants themselves (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 153-154). In other words, events involving minorities become of interest and therefore ‘news’ when journalists believe they affect or are of interest to ‘us’ (Sonwalkar 2005: 271).

Further, news values which focus on ‘us’ have their own implications for the construction of people categorised as ‘them’. For instance, the news value of ‘threshold’ is commonly to be carried than stories of racial conflict, and the negative behaviour of minority groups becomes more newsworthy than their positive achievements’ (1974: 154).

\(^{14}\) ‘Subsequent events that conform to the expectation stand a better chance of making the news than those that do not, and new events may be interpreted in terms of existing images even if the existing image is not in fact the most appropriate’ (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 155). An example of such an inappropriate image from this period that Hartmann and Husband use is the image of ethnic conflict in America in the 1960s as the framework for the reporting of the British situation (ibid.). If journalists and news audiences come to expect (based on past news coverage) the issue of immigration to be characterised by conflict, negativity, etc. and concerned with only a limited range of topics then this news value may sediment this further to fit in with the prior narrative.

\(^{15}\) The problem inherent to this news value is that complex events are made to seem straightforward and events deemed too ‘ambiguous’ to be easily pared down into a convenient news narrative are more likely to be ignored. This presents a dual problem for immigration news. Firstly, unfamiliarity on the part of reporters with the complexities of the phenomena, law, etc. of immigration is likely to lead to simplistic or partial narratives (c.f. Hartmann and Husband 1974: 155). Secondly, this news value may facilitate the propagation of stereotypes. This is undoubtedly problematic for the representation of immigrants where such stereotypes contain negative connotations, but even ‘positive’ stereotypes may simply serve to provide essentialist portrayals of migrants (Cottle 2000a: 11).
implemented in ways which lead to ethnocentric or ‘homocentric’ (‘a preoccupation with countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself’) reporting (Fowler 1991: 16). This is due to its interpretation not just in terms of the ‘size’ or ‘importance’ of an event at some notionally universalist level, ‘but more specifically to the size or importance of an event to a particular audience within a national setting’ (Conboy 2007a: 155). Events abroad affecting scores of British ex-pats (ibid.), for instance, provides grounds for the selection of such events as news (with central events subordinate to the plight of the British people involved), dovetailing with the news value of ‘reference to elite nations’. One consequence of this approach can be summarised with reference to the succinct rule-of-thumb, commonly known as ‘McLurg’s Law’ and attributed variously to newsrooms throughout the modern history of journalism: ‘news is what happens to ‘one Englishman, 10 Germans, or 1000 Indians’’ (in Bell 1991: 204).

This imagines the world as a series of ‘concentric circles, each one taking us further away from our imagined kith and kin’ (Kundnani 2001: 53) and further towards indifference and a devaluation of other(ed) people’s ‘worth’. As Kundnani notes (ibid.: 54), with the decline in foreign news across the news media since the 1980s (and in keeping with selections based on other news values such as ‘consonance’ and ‘unambiguity’), it has become less likely that distant and complex events will be duly explained and more likely that impressions will be formed that ‘trouble is endemic to these places’. This can lead, for example, to audiences (glad for their distance from these remote problems) coming to consequently see the plight of refugees as something of little concern to them (ibid.). It would be unsurprising if newspaper readers were to share a strongly ‘partial’ (Gibney 2004) (or ‘particularist’ [Schuster 2003b]) view of desirable refugee (and immigration) policy (contra ‘impartial’ or ‘universalist’ view) given such consequences.

Even news values with no obvious ramifications for the coverage of immigration may play a role in diminishing the quality of journalism associated with its construction. Frequency (or ‘recency’), for example, is such a taken-for-granted influence in news production that ‘time is rarely specified in headlines, and often not in lead sentences’ (Bell 1995: 320). One associated aspect of this news value is the ‘desire to report a result rather than a process’ (ibid.: 321). In other words, ‘the murder is more newsworthy than the police investigation, the verdict more than the trial’ (ibid.). This kind of coverage is therefore
associated with an ‘episodic’ framing of events. The crux of this is, as Suro puts it, that immigration, as with many other areas of public policy (e.g. education and health care), ‘produces a narrative that may be punctuated by high-profile events but is defined by the cumulative impact of many small events that go unnoticed individually’ (2011: 8). Consequently, a focus on high-profile events which disappear as quickly as they arrive may ‘[condition] the public to think of immigration in the “problem/conflict/difficulty” framework’ (Gemi et al. 2011: 19). Further, in combination with a focus on ‘reference to persons’, the immediacy of this news value neglects to attend to the background influence of social, economic and political structures and institutions essential in making sense of people’s migration (c.f. Iyengar 1992 in Suro 2011: 7; Hartmann and Husband 1974: 157). The less dramatic, the processual and the historical dimensions of immigration patterns therefore remain under-reported; their explanation and context ignored.

Similarly, the news value of ‘unexpectedness’ or ‘surprise’ lends itself to a focus on the unusual rather than the routine. For instance, the theme of illegality with regard to immigration appears to dominate in American journalism as journalists strive to highlight the aberrant (civil) law-breaking of the few rather than the law-abiding activities of many more millions of ‘legal’ migrants (Suro 2011: 6). Indeed, in a recent study which utilised corpus linguistics methods to analyse UK press coverage from 2010 to 2012, the term ‘illegal immigrant’ was found to appear fairly regularly in each of the tabloid press (in 6.6% of immigration-related items), mid-market press (10% of items) and broadsheet press (5% of items) (Allen and Blinder 2013). In combination with the news value of ‘threshold’ or ‘magnitude’ (and the expectation of these news values on the part of audiences), the reporting of events unusual-but-minor, such as irregular migration, might lead to assumptions that such events are in fact commonplace and therefore worthy of concern.

**Minority representation in the newsroom**

Another contributory factor in the production of immigration news lies in the extent to which non-British – especially ethnic minority – journalists are employed in the newsrooms of the national press. At its most acute, under-representation in this regard can have ‘serious consequences for news production, writing style, source access and
[the] general perspective of news discourse’ (van Dijk 1996: 92). It may, of course, also undermine the frequent claim that the press is qualified to, and does, speak on behalf of British society as a whole (Bingham and Conboy 2015; Curran 2000; Hampton 2004).

It is difficult to assess the proportion of Black or Asian journalists in the staff of the British press because newspapers have not generally been at all forthcoming with such data (Richardson 2004: 39). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that despite an increase in the ethnic minority population in the UK (especially in London, where the national press is based), there have been disproportionately few ethnic minority journalists working in the British press, that progress has been slow and ‘piecemeal’ over time and that there have been few ethnic minority editorial staff (Ainley 1998; Law 2002; Francis 2003; Commission for Racial Equality 2005; Cole 2006; Markova and McKay 2013). Indeed, the first non-white editor-in-chief of a nationally-circulated daily British newspaper (Amol Rajan of the Independent) was appointed only in 2013 (Halliday 2013).

Despite statutory legislation relating to anti-discriminatory recruitment as well as the apparent presence of equality policies in media institutions (Markova and McKay 2013), the continuing under-representation of ethnic minority journalists can be accounted for in part by the ‘clique’ nature of employment in the press (Statham 2002: 414). In other words, applications are made and jobs are awarded on the basis of word-of-mouth and ‘who you know’, rather than through the formal advertising of vacancies. This tends to structurally preserve the existing composition of the national press’ staff ‘to the detriment of not just Black journalists but also working class and female journalists’ (Richardson 2004: 40).

Even for the few Black or Asian journalists present in the newsroom, it would be a mistake to automatically assume that their reporting interests would align with the interests of Black or Asian newspaper readers (ibid.), and certainly that their reporting interests would necessarily correspond with a positive approach to the reporting of immigration per se. Nevertheless, when journalists (regardless of ethnicity) have addressed such interests, this may confound the ordinary news policy set by those in the

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16 Even when journalists are ‘head-hunted’ from the local or regional press, the pool of available non-white journalists has been proportionately even lower than in the national press (15 out of 8000 journalists in 1998 according to Ainley [1998 in Richardson 2004: 40]).
predominantly white editorial structure, leading to ‘sanctions’, whether formally in the case of editing of copy and reprimand or informally in the case of the closure of career opportunities later on and loss of influence in the newsroom (Wilson and Gutiérrez 1985: 143-144, see also Philo et al. 2013, Richardson 2004: 40-42). This provides journalists with an uncomfortable dilemma between professional achievement and personal integrity (Richardson 2004: 42-43). Otherwise, ethnic minority journalists may be expected to cover only ‘ethnic topics’ but still be seen as ‘less competent, less credible, and partisan in the coverage of ethnic affairs’ (van Dijk 1993a: 244-245).

**Guidelines and regulation**

In order to counter the negative portrayal of minority groups, the National Union of Journalists created several guidelines in a code of conduct in 1975 for journalists reporting on issues of ‘race’, which called for more balance in news reports about black communities, the eradication of spurious reference to ethnic origin in crime reports and the avoidance of sensationalism in the reporting of issues which could have an impact on ‘race relations’ (Troyna 1981: 13), which were later accompanied by guidelines on the reporting of racist organisations. However, it initially proved difficult to address breaches of the code (Cohen 1982: 90), and journalists claim that they are more likely to rely on professional codes of ‘common sense’ and ‘objectivity’ in their approach to immigration and asylum issues than to scrupulously consult such guidelines (Statham 2002: 412).

Further, despite the establishment of self-regulatory industry bodies such as the Press Council (in 1953) and Press Complaints Commission (in 1991), neither were able or willing to tackle incidents which contravened their codes of practice in regard to discriminatory representation to any adequate effect whatsoever (Gordon and Rosenberg 1989: 66; Greenslade 2005; Petley 2006; Leveson 2012).

The failure to faithfully implement these codes of conduct despite honourable intentions and reflexive journalists (e.g. Hartmann and Husband 1974: 163-165; Philo et al. 2013; Bennett et al. 2013) demonstrates that such measures and attitudes are perhaps not enough to curtail discriminatory coverage and do not overshadow the overarching influence of the general structures, ideologies and practices of the press on immigration coverage. Meanwhile, statutory legislation contends only to deal with excessively
offensive content, rather than with the sedimentary effects of ‘less serious’ discriminatory discourse.

**The sourcing of news**

Sources are seen as so integral to the production of news content by some that, as Sigal puts it, news is not ‘what happens, but what someone says has happened or will happen’ (1988: 15). Dialogically, this means that the production of the news can be characterised as a form of ‘cultural argumentation’: ‘an unending battle between a multitude of differentially powerful parties over the definition of reality’ (Turow 1989: 206 in Deacon et al. 1999: 9). Amid recurrent concerns from some quarters that power imbalances may be reflected in news production and therefore news output, the study of sources helps to ‘investigate the extent to which the news is dominated by elite versions of contemporary events’ (Richardson 2006: 103).

Indeed, for critical analysts, the media ‘routinely privilege the voices of the powerful and marginalize those of the powerless – whether as a result of media ownership, control and instrumental design; prohibitive costs of market entry, advertising pressures and the commodification of news; or more diffuse cultural processes informing journalist socialization, news production and the ideological reproduction of consensus’ (Cottle 2000b: 427). In such accounts, elite perspectives ‘dominate and direct public discourses, until they become “common sense”’ (Jacomella 2010: 92). With regards to immigration news, for instance, van Dijk (1996: 93, see also 1991: 151-175, 1993a: 252-255) argues that media access relating to minority actors is characterised by several features which serve to undermine the representation of pro-minority perspectives in the news, including that: minority groups which represent migrants have traditionally been unable to find the resources and news attention for the arrangement of routine, organised media events such as press conferences; minority speakers are much less frequently quoted in the news; that when quoted, ‘then either moderate spokespersons will be quoted who share the opinions or perspective of the majority’¹⁷, or radicals or extremists will be quoted in order to facilitate ridicule or attack; ‘minorities are especially quoted on ‘soft’ and less ‘risky’ topics’ and, finally, ‘unlike majority group speakers, minorities are

¹⁷ Journalists tend also ‘to quote those speakers who voice the position of the newspaper’, with the claims of ‘ideological opponents’ undermined by ‘distance markers’ (e.g. scare quotes) (van Dijk 1991: 175).
seldom allowed to speak alone. Their accusations of the host society and its elites, when quoted at all, never go unchallenged’ (van Dijk 1996: 93, emphasis in original). However, it is difficult to assess on the basis of such accounts the extent to which these features have been sustained longitudinally. Indeed, there has been much debate over the nature of sourcing practices over time.

According to some accounts, the cultivation of ‘news beats’ (Fishman 1980) provides a way for journalists to ‘routinize the unexpected’ (Tuchman 1973) through attendance at events and places of likely ‘newsworthy’ events, which subsequently leads to problematic issues concerning imbalances in news access. It has been suggested that there are only a select range of institutions and events which journalists routinely attend, including: parliament, councils, police, other emergency services, courts (including inquests and tribunals), royalty, diary events (e.g. annual events such as Ascot), airports and other news media (Whitaker 1981: 31-32 in Fowler 1991: 21). Further, there are organisations whose public pronouncements are also likely to be regularly attended, including: government departments, local government, public services (e.g. transport authorities), corporations, trade unions, non-commercial organisations (e.g. pressure groups), political parties and the military (ibid.). Finally, prominent individuals and members of the public may also be accessed, but ordinary citizens are usually only accessed incidentally rather than through privilege (Fowler 1991: 22; Lewis and Wahl-Jorgensen 2005).18

Further, journalists often rely on each other (see Seymour Ure 1968, ch. 6 and 7; Tunstall 1970, ch. 7), on the output of other (particularly prestigious) news organisations in what has been called ‘inter-media agenda setting’ and on ‘wire’ services such as the Press Association (Atkinson et al. 2014: 358) in order to meet the pressures associated with producing regular and quality copy. It is suggested that these pressures have increased over recent decades, exacerbated by declines in newspaper circulation, increased

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18 According to Lewis and Wahl Jorgensen (2005: 101), public opinion tends to play a ‘minimal role in driving the news agenda...as such, politics on the news is usually about what politicians do, and not necessarily about what people want them to do’. Crucially, they argue that a common way in which public opinion features in the news comes through ‘impressionistic strategies’ (ibid.: 105), such as through anecdote, ‘statements that infer something about public opinion in general’ (ibid.: 102), or through vox pops, which are used in casual ways that suggest that they are representative of public opinion generally (ibid.: 103). The routine ways in which journalists attempt to invoke and address what the public is thinking may therefore actually tell us more about journalists’ impressions of the world than citizens’ impressions of the world (ibid.: 105) and do a disservice to producing a democratic and creative (rather than reactive) public dialogue.
pagination and the contraction of newsroom staff (Lewis et al. 2008a, 2008b). This has produced concerns that the press is increasingly reliant on plagiarising the claims of outside influences such as PR agencies without due fact-checking or the critical interrogation of sources, and therefore that there has been a decline in editorial independence (ibid.; Davies 2008).

Unlike in a number of other areas of news reporting, there is still mostly no specific immigration ‘beat’ to speak of in the UK per se; ‘issues relating to immigration and ethnic relations are subsumed into the general reporting practices and covered by Home Affairs, Crime and Law correspondents’ (Statham 2002: 404). This may result in a neglect both to source a range of other authorities on the nebulous and expansive issues that immigration touches on politically, in addition to the innumerable sites geographically across (and within) the borders of the nation at which immigration-related and potentially ‘newsworthy’ events may occur19 (Dummett 1973: 246-249). However, it also suggests that editorial staff presume immigration to handily fit within the rubric of policy and reportorial areas such as ‘crime’ (which may prefigure the framing of its coverage by correspondents more familiar with stories about criminals), and mean that non-expert journalists are assigned to stories for which their background knowledge is inadequate to source prominent organisations and spokespersons, ask constructive questions and critically evaluate what they are told (ibid.) This suggests a lack of consideration on the part of newsrooms to deal with immigration and asylum as a set (or two sets) of related issues in their own right. The immigration news beat is thus unlikely to operate substantially differently in effect from other beats on a newspaper’s political roster, except inasmuch as the quality of reporting associated with other such areas may be diminished.

The key to understanding the general routine rights of news access enjoyed by powerful institutions (particularly political organisations and individuals during election campaigns) lies in the reciprocity of the relationship between the media and their sources: ‘the media conventionally expect and receive the right of access to the statements of these

19 Even in the USA, where the ‘immigration beat’ is perhaps more established within national press newsrooms, it is claimed that ‘it’s like no other beat. There’s no City Hall, no cop shop, generally no press room, to mention a few typical news-gathering venues. The whole issue is a lot more dispersed and amorphous’ and ‘lacks the cache of more traditional beats’ (McDonnell 2011: 91).
individuals, because the individuals have roles in the public domain; and reciprocally these people receive access to the columns of the papers when they wish to air their views’ (Fowler 1991: 22). Not only do such sources have ‘roles in the public domain’ (and thus represent others), but they are ‘accredited’ by their institutional power or expertise (Hall et al. 1978: 58). In Hall et al.’s ‘primary definition’ model (ibid.), pressures both professional (e.g. objectivity) and commercial (i.e. ‘constantly working against the clock’) ‘combine to produce a systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Consequently, ‘these ‘spokesmen’ [sic] become what we call the primary definers of topics’, whose ‘initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic in question...sets the terms of reference within which all further coverage or debate takes place. Arguments against a primary interpretation are forced to insert themselves into its definition of ‘what is at issue’ (ibid., emphases in original). This, for the authors, has significant consequences, even within immigration debates: ‘once race relations in Britain have been defined as a 'problem of numbers'...then even liberal spokesmen, in proving that the figures for black immigrants have been exaggerated, are nevertheless obliged to subscribe, implicitly, to the view that the debate is 'essentially' about numbers’ (ibid.: 59, emphasis in original).

The power imbalance facilitated by the consequences of the primary definition model is seemingly exacerbated further by the astute ability of powerful institutions to adapt their message to the ‘media logic’ (Altheide and Snow 1979) of news organisations by, for example, creating ‘pseudo-events’ (such as press conferences and manifesto launches) that are planned and announced in advance (Boorstin 1962).

Since the 1990s, however, there has been a move towards approaches which have focused on source strategies themselves (Schlesinger 1989, 1990; Schlesinger and Tumber 1994) and which have thus helped to reconcile to some extent political economic approaches and organisational approaches to the sociology of journalism (Deacon et al. 1999: 8). Schlesinger’s call for less media-centrism in an approach to source strategies (i.e. recognising their own competitive activities) was accompanied by an influential critique of the primary definition model (1990). Schlesinger claimed that the primary
definition model did not take account of: ‘the contention between official sources’\(^{20}\); the behind the scenes manoeuvrings of sources, rendered methodologically invisible by culturalist readings of texts\(^{21}\); the competitive and shifting nature of key sources within privileged elites\(^{22}\); longer-term shifts in the structure of access; and for assuming a unidirectional flow of definitions from power centres to media’ (ibid.: 66–7 in Cottle 2000b: 436). In his view, news access therefore becomes an ‘achievement’ rather than an atemporal, axiomatic result of the shape of existing social structures (Deacon et al. 1999: 9), though he (along with his colleague Tumber) did not seek to deny the general tendency for authoritative views to be promoted in the news (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: 20).

Another approach which sought to explain this general tendency came with Bennett’s ‘indexing hypothesis’: ‘[m]ass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to “index” the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic’ (1990: 106). This hypothesis is therefore linked in some respects to Daniel Hallin’s (1986) concept of the spheres of debate (see below) not just in that it posits that news media output will generally reflect the dominant views of the powerful, but that it allows for the re-shaping of the news debate in times of elite dissensus\(^{23}\) (Bennett 1990).

As McNair puts it, ‘when the British establishment lacks unity and coherence, the British media reflect that disunity and become more open’ (McNair 2009: 66, see also Deacon and Golding 1994).

A final point to consider is that the particular and peculiar politics of immigration may in fact lead to apparent idiosyncrasies in the nature of sources and their expressed attitudes. This is due to the ‘strange bedfellows’ alliances of policy preferences towards immigration which mean that the usual cleavages characteristic of other areas of public

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\(^{20}\) ‘In cases of dispute, say amongst members of the same government over a key question of policy, who is the primary definer? Or—and it goes against the very logic of the concept–can there be more than one?’ (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: 18, emphasis in original).

\(^{21}\) This is the case most notably with ‘off-the-record briefings’ (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: 18).

\(^{22}\) ‘There is nothing in the formulation of primary defining that permits us to deal with...inequalities of access amongst the privileged themselves’ (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: 18).

\(^{23}\) Note, however, that Bennett claimed that the indexing hypothesis was ‘intended to apply more to news accounts of everyday events, crises, and policies than to “special coverage” of things like elections that may have a normative-ritual order of their own’ (1990: 107).
policy are less significant in immigration politics, ‘scrambling’ typical categories of left and right (Benson 2013: 7). Benson argues of the American context that the ‘pro-immigration side’ includes ‘left progressives’, ‘civil libertarians’ and ‘laissez-faire capitalists’, while the ‘anti-immigration side’ includes certain ‘labour unions and African American groups’, in addition to ‘various tribes of conservatives, sometimes (but not always) overlapping, concerned with balanced budgets...cultural unity...or law and order’ (ibid.). For example the op-ed pages of the New York Times are frequently in alignment with the views of left wing Democrats and agricultural interests in favouring increased immigration (Schuck 2011: 77), despite ideological differences in other areas. As for the UK context, it has also been observed that journalists tend to quote and treat more favourably sources in immigration news with which the newspaper’s editorial line accords (van Dijk 1991: 175; Balch and Balabanova 2011: 901). In recent years this has meant that broadly authoritarian, ‘anti-immigration’ newspapers have often turned to think-tanks such as MigrationWatch (which ‘sees immigration as a source of chaos’, imploring the government to ‘impose draconian measures’) for ‘expert’ opinion, while broadly cosmopolitan, ‘pro-immigration’ newspapers have instead tended to source ‘large employers’ for their views in the same debates, whose rationale for less restrictive immigration may not overlap with the newspaper’s but whose general desired ends do (Balch and Balabanova 2011: 901).

When it comes to the voluntary organisations involved in immigration politics, such as NGOs and charitable bodies, as well other such pressure groups some of which have developed a more media-centric and PR-oriented approach over time (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994, ch. 3), those which are most able to fund ‘information subsidies’ such as press releases and publicity events (Gandy 1982 in Deacon 1996: 191-192) are most likely to secure privileged media access (Deacon 1996: 191). Even without large economic resources pressure groups can ‘make use of their human resources and apply strategies that integrate well with journalistic routines’ and hence disrupt the ordinary victories of ‘official’ sources (Davis 2000: 55). However, organisations (e.g. trade unions) whose affiliations place them ‘in opposition to the dominant value system’ and/or which are ‘intrinsically controversial or unpopular’, as well as those seen as ‘advocates’ rather than
‘arbiters’, are likely to find that journalists source them less readily (Deacon 1996: 179, 192).

The role of journalism

The terms ‘representation’ and ‘mediation’ each contain more than one meaning. The news represents and mediates the issue of immigration and electoral politics in important ways in regards to both.

In the first sense of both terms – depiction – the news provides information to citizens about social phenomena beyond the experiences of their everyday lives (van Dijk 2012: 27, Hall et al. 1978: 56, Hartmann and Husband 1974). During election campaigns, news audiences (including those who govern) come to be informed about the various social and political facets of issues such as immigration – about the impact it may have on the lives of the citizenry as well as those of other people, including would-be immigrants – and as citizens (and governments) (re)act accordingly. This may be with regards to which aspects of immigration they think about (i.e. agenda setting), how they think about them (in terms of the ‘scripts’ and narratives that they understand ‘immigration’ by), or what they think about them (in terms of their attitudes towards immigration issues). According to liberal democratic conceptions of the role of the press, citizens require an adequate informational ‘diet’, comprising relevant details and scrutiny of their prospective representatives’ plans and record as well as recognition of a range of views and interests, in order to be able to make informed civic choices (Street 2001: 253). This entails the avoidance of bias which, though an elusive concept, for news content constitutes the avoidance of misrepresentation (e.g. of people’s views, values or cultural affiliations) and misinformation (e.g. about society or a set of political options), both of which present fundamental dangers to the functional participation and cognizant judgement of citizens (ibid.: 257).

The behaviours that the available ‘diet’ of information might influence are myriad. Crucially for some newspaper readers, however, such behaviours could include actions with respect to their vote at the ballot box on polling day or (importantly in the case of politicians) in their position on immigration policy. Meanwhile, politicians have an incentive to appeal to potential voters through the mass media in order to persuade the
electorate that they are fit to govern and to communicate their policies effectively. Hopeful of visibility and favourable coverage, the judicious politician might feel obliged to adapt the presentation of their message in order to fit the demands of news production.

If this perspective prescribes news organisations with a crucial democratic responsibility (in particular when approaching elections), in the second sense of their definitions these terms are a reminder of the related, social consequences of the press coverage of immigration.

The second sense of the term ‘representation’ means to ‘stand for’ or ‘speak for’ somebody else, such as governments claim to on behalf of the nation or people (Billig 1995: 98). Since the end of the nineteenth century and the developments characterised as the ‘New Journalism’, the British press has claimed a role in this sense as the ‘Fourth Estate’ and a champion of the people, defined by Mark Hampton as a ‘representative ideal’ (2004). Previously, the ‘educational ideal’, an ideal consonant with the notion of a public sphere, politics-by-public-discussion norm, had been the ascendant and enduring ‘idiom’ used to define the expected role of the press. From the establishment of the ‘representative ideal’, however, the expectation that the press should educate the masses and influence public opinion receded and was supplanted by one in which public opinion would be channelled through the press and conveyed to elites. This was driven, according to Hampton, by straightforward commercial imperatives more than a genuinely democratic awakening on the part of proprietors and editors. The expedience of this elision between the democratic representation of readers and the consumerist grounds upon which such representation is based should, therefore, be taken into consideration when assessing the authenticity of the press’ ability to speak for the public at large. Although the educational ideal has occasionally since been invoked (e.g. in the BBC’s mantra to ‘inform, educate and entertain’), the tabloid press in particular continue to claim representative status in the national political debate.

The news media have, however, also been associated with other normative roles. One such role assigns a ‘social responsibility’ function to journalists (Siebert et al. 1956), a theory most associated with the journalistic ideal of ‘objectivity’ and claims of fact, balance and neutrality (Benson 2008). Objectivity is a professional norm so powerful, in
fact, to common understandings of good journalism that many journalists claim to navigate certain procedures in a ‘strategic ritual’ which allow them to safeguard the appropriate objective values against accusations of wilful or inadvertent bias (Tuchman 1972).

Even if not strictly a normative ideal, the role of the media is often seen as crucial in cultivating positive (or negative) relations between ethnic groups, due in large part to their role (discussed above) in depicting immigration to audiences who do not necessarily have direct, routine experience of immigration or contact with immigrants. This brings us to the second sense of the term ‘mediating’. The news (can) provide an ‘important mechanism in constructing and mediating relations between host and immigrant minorities’ (Gemi et al. 2013: 271). Since the news is largely controlled by and oriented towards an in-group likely to be affected by the consequences of immigration in a particular way, this is a delicate responsibility; the fostering of social cohesion is at stake. This responsibility provides an intrinsic tension. On the one hand, the mass media are perhaps morally (and in some respects legally) responsible for the social consequences of what they publish, but on the other, if a ‘free’ press is considered desirable then the press must be guaranteed the licence to publish provocative opinion and debate.

Normative theories of journalism are various and often deployed in composite formulations, emphasising specific ideals more or less (Benson 2008: 2592). They are also in many respects artificial and interpretative constructs, rather than something journalists contemplate anew in every move they make (journalists being far more likely to routinize certain behaviours, as with the ‘strategic ritual of objectivity’, to satisfy expected norms). Nevertheless, normative theories have been invoked historically by media owners, journalists, politicians and commentators to describe not only an ideal of journalism, but on many occasions to describe the apparently existing journalism of the day (see Hampton 2004).

The press can therefore variously be seen to possess informational, representative and/or potentially mediating functions in how they cover immigration issues at election time. The outcomes which may follow from each of these functions are of integral importance if the basic tenets of liberal democracy are to be supported and ultimately
sustained. On this set of assumptions there is, therefore, an empirical case to answer about whether and how the national press has, in regards to immigration coverage, fulfilled the normative democratic functions associated with the status its advocates claim for it.

**A national press**

Newspapers not only transmit information, they also ‘bring readers together as part of a community’ (Williams 2010: 10, citing Carey 1989, ch. 1) through ‘rituals’ which highlight the things newspaper audiences have in common rather than those they don’t. With the decline of the Radical press in the 19th century and the growing influence of the London-based press (Williams 2010: 6-7; Conboy 2004: ch. 5), the national character of the press has increasingly corresponded with an orientation towards national concerns (Harris 1996: 51 in Conboy 2004: 1; Seymour-Ure 1991: 16-21). Despite the elitist and commercially expedient nature of this focus on the nation (constructed, increasingly, by ‘global communications conglomerates’ whose primary allegiances are to power and profit), it must be narrated in terms which find resonance with a popular audience (Conboy 2006, ch. 3).

Anderson has argued that the rise of ‘print capitalism’, which introduced mass-produced books and newspapers to the populace, played a large part in constructing the image of ‘the nation state’ in the minds of its inhabitants during its formative stages (1991/1983). With this, the national newspaper reader grew to know that ‘the ceremony he [sic] performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion’ (ibid.: 35). The reader knows this because he or she will see exact replicas of their own newspaper of choice in various places familiar to them and ‘is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life’ (ibid.: 35-36).

Readers need not look further than the contents of the newspaper itself in order to ‘imagine’ the nation, however. As Billig (1995: 118) notes, the separation of international news and ‘home’ news (a separation he calls ‘news apartheid’) helps to recurrently inscribe the centrality of the nation as something of major social importance through the structural organisation of the newspaper. This ‘banal’ form of nationalism, in contrast
with the more recognisable ‘hot’ nationalisms of separatists and fascists, elides the ideological contentiousness of the nation as a way to imagine and organise social communities politically (i.e. it makes ‘common sense’ of the nation).

Newspaper readers are even encouraged to ‘imagine’ the nation and accept its unique importance through the subtleties of the language and rhetoric of the news. As De Cillia et al. (1999: 165) suggest, metonymy, synecdoche and personification can be used to construct discursively unity or division, and thus to construct what it means to be a member of the nation. Examples include the ‘particularizing synecdoche’ (*pars pro toto*) such as with ‘the foreigner’ or ‘the Brit’ to generalise and essentialise characteristics to whole groups or the ‘generalizing synecdoche’ (*totum pro parte*) such as with ‘Britain’ to personify the nation and represent the actions of some individual(s) (e.g. elite politicians) as though they were the consensual actions of the nation’s inhabitants (ibid.). Focusing on deixis and pronouns, Billig reveals that not only are words such as ‘here’, ‘we’, ‘our’ (not to mention their opposites) regularly deployed across the British press (particularly in editorialised content) in ways which assume that ‘here’ will be interpreted as meaning ‘Britain’ and ‘we’ as ‘us Britons’ (1995: 114-115), but that the use of the definite article (as in ‘the Prime Minister’ or ‘the country’) presupposes that the subsequent noun could only be referring to the British version unless otherwise stated (ibid.: 116).

The implications of the nation-centric outlook of the news for immigration reporting are, I would argue, highly significant. As Pickering has suggested,

> ‘nationalism has profoundly shaped our sense of belonging and the symbolic boundaries constructed around it. Nations of course have literal boundaries, where we have to show our passports and maybe a visa if we want to cross over them...But these literal boundaries do not in themselves define our different identities for us; they only inform our different identities once they have become symbolically defined. Symbolic boundaries are ways of demarcating what is perceived to be different from ‘us’, in our relative sameness and so of heightening ‘our’ sense of this sameness by providing a place for ‘our’ identity’ (2001: 83).
Hence, while the ‘nation-building’ or ‘anthropological’ narrative of media history is one which suggests that a major consequence of the media’s output has been ‘greater social inclusion’ and the (eventual) recognition of Britain as a multi-ethnic community (see Curran 2002: 26-33), and while expressions of nationalism may have recently shifted from a strident ‘ethnic nationalism’ to a more cosmopolitan ‘civic nationalism’ (Billig et al. 2005), it cannot be denied that with inclusion (despite its expanding contours) comes exclusion. As Hall et al. (1978: 55-56) claim, news relies on the assumption (and forging) of consensus – whether because news audiences share the same language or, more problematically, when they are claimed to share the same interests and values (reconcilable, at least, in a ‘broader basic framework of agreement’) despite possessing fundamentally conflicting class or group interests.

Maintaining this consensus necessarily relies on the identification and marginalisation or condemnation of difference and deviance. According to Hallin (1986) in his study of television news coverage of the Vietnam War, there are three ‘spheres’ at work in news debates, which categorise the legitimacy of various perspectives. His model includes the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’, the ‘sphere of deviance’ and the ‘sphere of consensus’ (1986: 117), which he claimed could alter in size under conditions of elite political dissensus. Journalists, in employing the model to categorise some points of view as more legitimate than others, therefore claim different duties of ‘objectivity’ with regard to the ideas of each sphere. For example, he labelled the sphere of legitimate controversy the ‘province of objectivity’, being the ‘region of electoral contests and legislative debates’ (ibid.: 116) and other areas of contention for which journalists feel obliged to present a ‘balanced’ outline of the views of both or multiple ‘sides’. In contrast, the sphere of consensus is ‘the region of “motherhood and apple pie”’, containing views so uncontroversial to journalists that they are even compelled to advocate or celebrate them (ibid.: 116-117), while the sphere of deviance contains ‘views which journalists...reject as unworthy of being heard’ in which journalism ‘plays the role of exposing, condemning or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus’ (ibid.: 117). As the following two chapters will illustrate, elite and public opinion on immigration politics since the introduction of immigration control have essentially centred on a debate about the limits and effects of such control,
rather than their absolute legitimacy, which for many is a taken-for-granted assumption of national sovereignty. This (though by no means comprehensively) provides some idea of the perspectives available in the spheres of consensus and legitimate debate in immigration debates and their elasticity.

As for the remaining sphere, multiple deviants or deviant views have variously been the targets of press attention or marginalisation, which help to reinstate the boundaries of the other spheres as a result. For example, Hall et al. (1978) documented the complicity of the press in the construction of a moral panic around ‘mugging’ in the 1970s, which was overwhelmingly cast as the crime of young black men and which articulated the elite response to a ‘crisis of hegemony’ that had arisen in Britain since the 1950s. More recently, in the introduction to the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Stanley Cohen identifies refugees and asylum seekers as one of several ‘objects’ of contemporary British moral panics (2011: xxii-xxvi; see also Banks 2012; Philo et al. 2013; Bailey and Harindranath 2005; Buchanan et al. 2003; Mollard 2001; Matthews and Brown 2012; Kaye 1998, 2001). Two consequences of the representation of asylum seeking as a crisis came with the delegitimization of the notion of asylum and the augmenting of the term ‘asylum seeker’ to effectively become a ‘racist epithet’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Pickering 2001: 203, Schuster 2003a: 244), without necessarily affronting social norms regarding racist expression (Greenslade 2005: 8). Yet another contemporary example can be found in the coverage of Muslims and Islam in the press. Following the Gulf War and the events of 9/11, Islam has increasingly captured the attention of the press, while Muslims themselves have been treated as a homogenous group overwhelmingly associated with terrorism, political extremism, and religious or cultural difference and therefore as a ‘threat’ and a ‘problem’ (Moore, Mason and Lewis 2008; Richardson 2004, 2009; Poole 2006; Nickels et al. 2012; Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2013).

The key to the linguistic representation of deviancy and the demarcation of ‘us’ from ‘them’ may lie in a set of strategies identified by Teun van Dijk, which he has termed the ‘ideological square’. The ideological square comprises four main ‘moves’:

1. Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us.
2. Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them.
3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them.

4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us (van Dijk 1998: 267).

Van Dijk argues that these moves work at micro and macro dimensions of texts, from lexicon and syntactic structures to the pragmatic functions of a text (Richardson 2004: 55). Perhaps the most obvious examples come in terms of syntactic structures and transitivity; studies of news output using critical linguistics methods have suggested that members of out-groups are often constructed at the sentence level as active in ‘bad’ actions while members of in-groups are often constructed as active in ‘good’ actions or ‘de-agentialised’ where their actions could be construed as ‘bad’ (e.g. Fowler 1991: 70-79; Richardson 2007: 58-59). In maintaining a broad social consensus, therefore, the ideological square is an important device in constructing a Positive Self Presentation and a Negative Other Presentation (Richardson 2007: 51).

When deviancy is not met with condemnation (i.e. ‘hypervisibility’), it is likely to be met instead with marginalisation (i.e. ‘invisibility’). Some migrants are at a particular disadvantage in airing their opinions in the press, not only because they may lack social or economic capital in contrast with elite social actors (van Dijk 1996, 2000) and because journalists may see them as what Deacon and Golding refer to as ‘advocates’ rather than ‘arbiters’ (1994) but, for those from non-English-speaking countries, because of a lack of language skills (Gemi et al. 2013: 277). Migrants may therefore have to rely indirectly and impersonally on representatives to make their case for them, such as NGOs and advocacy organisations, lawyers and politicians (van Dijk 1991: 154). Condemnation and marginalisation may even fruitfully combine to give an overall picture in which migrants

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24 Consider, for instance, the examples provided by van Dijk (1988: 11): ‘Police kills demonstrator’ vs. ‘Demonstrator killed by police’ vs. ‘Demonstrator killed’. These syntactic constructions, according to van Dijk, assign different levels of responsibility to the police. In the final example, the role of the police in the action would be unrecoverable.

25 These terms are used in Moon and Rolison (1998: 129).

26 The logic driving this is that if translators are required to locate those best-placed to remark upon the experiential aspects of immigration, then the costs in time and money to facilitate this inevitably leads to journalists eschewing such input. It is also possible that migrants may fear prejudicing the outcome of an ongoing legal case, or be suspicious of the consequences of speaking to the media (Buchanan et al. 2003: 41), and therefore refrain from volunteering to speak to journalists for these reasons also.
are ‘mostly represented in the news as speechless actors involved in negative acts’ (ter Wal 2002: 428).

A national consensus must also be built on a hegemonic narrative of the national past and its political outlook. The construction of this national past (the ‘collective political history’ of the nation) relies on the propagation of ‘myths of genesis and origin, mythical figures, political triumphs, times of flourishing and prosperity, decline, defeat and crisis’ (De Cillia et al. 1999: 158). Conboy, for example, shows how the anniversaries of certain nationally-significant events (e.g. D-Day) offer opportunities for the press to draw upon a particular and partial history to form a narrative of national heritage (2006, 2007a: 170-172, 2007b). Nostalgia and myth-making therefore serve to confound the ordinarily ephemeral status of news to produce a populist history – to the marginalisation of counter-narratives. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, this narrative of the national past tends not to allow for acceptance of the historical role of immigration in the building of the nation (or of extant indigenous communities in the histories of settler nations) (Castles and Miller 2009: 79; Runnymede Trust 2000: 18). The cultural ‘amnesia’ (Hall 1978: 25) which forgets the history and character of Empire may even provide for the creation of a victimhood which ‘presents the British themselves as the ultimate tragic victims of their extraordinary imperial successes’ (Gilroy 2004: 103) without the necessary back-story.

Further, the national narrative is able to provide a link not only between the nation and issues of immigration, but also to ‘race’, in addition to other concerns of certain sections of the press. As Gilroy notes, the novelty of newer forms of racism ‘lies in the capacity to link discourses of patriotism, nationalism, xenophobia, Englishness, Britishness, militarism and gender difference into a complex system which gives ‘race’ its contemporary meaning’ (1987: 43). Specifically for (parts of) the press, this has emerged in the form of a ‘populist outrage’ which has sought to suggest that perceived progressive political endeavours (e.g. anti-racist initiatives and an allegedly ‘open door’ immigration policy) were welcomed by a metropolitan ‘liberal elite’ caring little about their supposedly oppressing and ‘self-destructive’ effects on the rest of the population (Kundnani 2001: 56; van Dijk 1992: 104; Hall et al. 1978: 164). The ‘imagined dangers’ associated with these developments included ‘political correctness’, Britain (especially England) as a ‘soft
touch’ (for example, in relation to asylum seekers or the judiciary), the erosion of ‘our way of life’ and Britain’s declining global influence (Kundnani 2001). Consonant with Gilroy’s observation, Kundnani argues that ‘these apparently disparate issues are stitched together into a single fabric of nationalist reaction’ that bears the legacy of Enoch Powell’s novel linkage of immigration, Unionism and European integration (for which he too blamed an elite minority government) (ibid.: 56). Much immigration coverage therefore (at least contemporarily) fits into a general ideological framework which is simultaneously coherent, complex, conspiratorial and combative. The focus and structure of this framework will differ between newspapers depending on the social, economic and cultural concerns of its assumed readership, but this nationalist reaction was common to much of the right-wing press during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (e.g. Murray 1986, van Dijk 1991, Searle 1989, Conboy 2007a: 153-154, Gordon and Rosenberg 1989).

The reporting of immigration

The ‘imperial legacy’

If the patterns and policies of immigration have been determined in large part by Britain’s colonial legacy (and the related political solutions that emerged with the relinquishing of Empire) (see Chapter 3), then the dominant, racist representational patterns of colonised people which helped to legitimise Empire27 have reflected this, providing their own legacy in resultant discourses. It is therefore worth pausing to briefly consider the influence of racist ideology in its various forms on the news reporting of immigration issues.

The contours and features of racism, as with many systems of thought, have evolved (and continue to evolve) over time, ‘resuming in news forms and configurations’ (Berkeley et al. 2005: 28) depending on political and social circumstances. For example, Hall claims that the ‘indigenous racism’ of the 1960s and 1970s was different in form and effect from the racism of the ‘high’ colonial period: ‘it is a racism at home, not abroad; it is the racism, not of a dominant but of a declining social formation’ (1978: 26). As the Guardian journalist Gary Younge (2014) recently and polemically observed, ‘racism is a hardy virus

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27 Pickering (2001: 30) insists that racist ideologies came as a justificatory result of colonial expansion, rather than the other way around (‘as a means of laying down a foundation of values and beliefs that could then be used as a basis for constructing the imperialist edifice’).
that mutates to adapt to the body politic in which it is embedded. You can't wipe it out with a single shot because by the time you've dealt with the last strain, a new one has developed resistant to previous remedies'. Past racisms are thus ‘remediated’ (Titley 2014), their ‘traces...still to be observed, reworked in many of the modern and up-dated images’ and built upon and facilitated by ‘a very ancient grammar’ (Hall 1990: 16, emphasis in original). This applies especially to the press: racist ideas live on in the ‘cultural repertoire of present-day Britain, and form part of the perspective through which we view contemporary events’ (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 29). Therefore, despite developments in the acceptability and form of racist expression over time (and since Hartmann and Husband formed their conclusions) (see below), overtly racist representations of immigrants and other minorities may sometimes surface and erupt in new configurations in the pages of national newspapers long after they have been deemed to have been consigned to the past.

For example, Gordon and Rosenberg (1989: 34-38) showed that the cartoons available in national newspapers when writing in the late 1980s ‘borrow freely from the racist imagery that was popularised in the heyday of the British Empire to justify its subjugation and exploitation of ‘natives’, and bring that imagery to bear on people’s perceptions of the issues affecting black people in Britain today’ (Gordon and Rosenberg 1989: 34-38). In news coverage from 1990, Brookes, in her analysis of coverage in the Guardian and Telegraph showed that, despite their editorial differences, they presented a ‘stereotypical, naturalized and dominant representation of Africa’ (Brookes 1995). The features of this discourse, such as a reliance on topics associated with chaos (e.g. civil war) and helplessness (e.g. Western loans described as ‘aid’) (Fair 1993), bear much in common with the prevailing assumptions of the pseudoscientific racism of the late 19th century, in which colonised people were claimed to be hopelessly reliant on European governance (the ‘white man’s burden’) (Curtis 1984: 66).

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28 See also Searle (1989), who came to similar conclusions based on the coverage (including cartoons) of events and people in and from Africa and Asia.
29 In a comparison of texts from both newspapers, each juxtaposed the ‘normal’ (‘suit, tie and celebration’) with the ‘paranormal or macabre’ (‘juju and the smell of rotting corpses’) (Brookes 1995: 484), while the most archetypical metaphoric constructions in a number of headlines depicted Africa as a place of ‘darkness’ (ibid.: 473-474).
30 See also Fair (1993) for an analysis of the American press which reached similar conclusions regarding the reductive framing of Africa and Africans in news coverage.
The ‘New Racism’

Despite evidence for the lingering influence of past forms of explicit racism, following the horrors of the Holocaust, the entry by Western colonial powers into their ‘post-colonial phase’, the Civil Rights Movement in America and ‘changes in white liberal thinking’ during the latter half of the twentieth century, the overt and blunt forms of racism which had largely been previously deemed unproblematic in Western societies began to become far more ‘suspect’ and intolerable (van Dijk 1993a: 162, Cottle 2000a: 5). Van Dijk argues that these were surface-level changes which did little to ‘fundamentally affect the basic relations of ethnically based power’ (1993a: 162) while Cottle believes that positive, ‘multiculturalist’ portrayals of ethnic minorities now often come instead through a superficial focus on cultural festivals, individual successes and cultural exotica which serve to reinforce stereotypes and ignore ongoing disadvantage and inequality (2000a: 11). Nevertheless, one important result of these changes came with the introduction of what has come to be termed the ‘norm against prejudice’ (Billig 1988: 95) – that is, a social norm against airing explicitly racist views.

Since prejudice has become associated with irrationality, it is ‘important to present one’s views as reasonable, rational and thoughtfully arrived at’ (Augoustinos and Every 2007: 127). The norm against prejudice therefore compels people (including journalists) who wish to make interpretably racist arguments to deny the possibility of racist meaning in their communication through a variety of strategies. Such strategies include (van Dijk 1992, 1993b, 2012; see also Lynn and Lea 2003; Goodman 2010; Goodman and Burke 2010; Augoustinos and Every 2007):

- introducing arguments with phrases such as ‘I’m not racist but...’ (plus disclaimers and ‘transfer’ moves which claim that somebody else, such as a news source, is the responsible party for the belief in question31);
- making counter-accusations about intolerant or exaggerated anti-racism (i.e. ‘the pretence of censorship’ [van Dijk 1992: 105]);

31 In news discourse, this strategy often finds voice in the ‘argument from genuine fears’ (a concept that can be related to the notion of the elite appeasing of an allegedly ‘racist public’), which must be appeased regardless of whether the object of ‘ordinary’ people’s fears is real, for their fears are genuine and therefore it is immaterial as to whether they have any basis in fact (Barker 1981: 14-16). It is therefore a specifically-advanced version of the argumentum ad populum argumentative fallacy.
• denying racist intention as an excuse;
• euphemising or defining racism in narrow terms (or similarly by using scare quotes around the word ‘racism’ and using speech verbs such as ‘claim’ or ‘allege’ to attach doubt to accusations of racism);
• redistributing (i.e. victim-blaming) or concealing agency for racist acts (e.g. through transitivity choices);
• justifying the propagation of arguments on the grounds that they are simply reporting ‘the truth’ (the defence of some newspapers which ‘repeatedly and prominently publish reports about minority crime’, for example [ibid.: 92]);
• and referring to moral and legal prohibitions on racist behaviour as signalling that racism as a ‘structural characteristic’ of society or the state no longer exists. Racism thereby becomes a ‘thing of the past’, the domain of the far-right or the socially deprived or something that happens ‘elsewhere’ (van Dijk 1992: 93, 1993b: 182-183; Crawford 2011), which helps to consolidate a positive self-presentation (van Dijk 1992: 103).

Significantly, another related development postulated to have developed alongside the ‘new racism’ has been termed ‘discursive deracialisation’ (Augoustinos and Every 2007: 133-134). Within this phenomenon, the ‘category of nation’ rather than ‘race’ might be used to ‘sanitize and deracialise racist discourses’ (ibid.), but otherwise speakers may draw on economic issues and other seemingly ‘reasonable’ grounds to make what amount to racially-motivated arguments by proxy (Goodman and Burke 2011). The expression of racist belief has therefore assumed subtle and covert qualities (Teo 2000: 8) in becoming reflexive and adaptable to contemporary social norms32.

Despite prohibitions on explicit expressions of racism, Stuart Hall’s notion of ‘inferential racism’ helps to explain how racist assumptions may persist subtly, implicitly and unconsciously in discourse, and may therefore mean that inferential racism is ‘in many ways more insidious because it is largely invisible even to those who formulate the world in its terms’ (Hall 1990: 13). In contrast with ‘overt racism’, which comes in the form of

32 Indeed, even people who espouse fascist ideas recognise such norms, adapting their messages to allay the private ‘hardcore’ coterie while simultaneously concealing their true beliefs from prospective supporters in the public sphere, in what Richardson has termed a ‘Janus-faced’ propaganda technique (2011, see also Billig 1978).
recognisably and openly racist arguments, inferential racism occurs through the ‘apparently naturalised representations of events and situations relating to race, whether ‘factual’ or ‘fictional’ which have racist premises and propositions inscribed in them as a set of unuestioned assumptions’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Hall provides as an exemplar a hypothetical television programme concerning a ‘problem’ in ‘race relations’ which, despite the probably honourable intentions of the programme makers and the maintenance of ‘scrupulous balance and neutrality’ in questioning people for the programme, is ‘impregnated with unconscious racism’ because it is ‘predicated on the unstated and unrecognized assumption’ that black people are ‘the source of the problem’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Recurrent recourse in the press to debate concerning immigration control, ‘numbers’, the collocation of immigration and crime, problems of reception, public resentment, illegal entry, etc. (c.f. van Dijk 2000: 38), contend to subtly provide a link between ‘their’ presence and ‘our’ problems in a ‘sanitized’ but inferentially racist framework (Bailey and Harindranath 2005: 280), even if migrants or pro-immigration groups are provided with right of reply. The concept of inferential racism therefore provides an explanation for how ordinary news routines (e.g. news values and the ‘strategic rituals’ of news objectivity [Tuchman 1972]) and apparent progress into a ‘post-racial’ phase may provide fertile conditions for the continued inscribing of negative associations with immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, even if this were not the intention of journalists.

However, the emergence of the ‘new racism’ is not solely based on its subtle adaptation to social norms and political circumstances; it is also rooted in providing a response to the de-legitimation of earlier, pseudoscientific (i.e. biological) ideas about ‘race’ and the (therefore necessary) supplanting of such ideas with a focus on essentialised cultural difference and unsubstantiated socio-biological notions of ‘human nature’ as the justification for disassociation (Barker 1981). In the ‘new racism’, a commitment to genetic hierarchy is ostensibly therefore not a necessary feature. For example, Barker makes reference to a televised interview between David Frost and Enoch Powell in 1969, in which Frost pressed Powell to admit a belief in racial hierarchies (1981: 40-41). Powell would not be drawn to do so; for him, immigration was supposedly a problem of ‘culture and assimilation’ rather than ‘race’, and (due apparently to reasons of fatalistic ‘human
nature’) ‘the people of England will not endure it’ (ibid.: 39). The ‘new racism’ is therefore strongly related to ‘differentialist’ or ‘ethnopluralist’ racism, which ‘tries to legitimise strict segregation and discrimination by claiming that multiculturalism threatens ‘cultural and ethnic purity’ and leads to ‘contamination’, ‘degeneration’, and ‘decline’’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 10). Despite the *prima facie* eschewing of hierarchy within these forms of racism, there is therefore an *implicit* ‘inferiorisation of the culture of the ‘others’’ (ibid.) intrinsic to concerns related to predictions of contamination, degeneration and decline, for these dramatic consequences would not logically follow if there were not.

A focus on essentialised ‘cultural difference’ also serves to naturalise social problems in a ‘common sense’ framework of ‘how things are’ and ought to be, and therefore eradicates a need to consider how exclusion, disadvantage and discrimination are rooted in social structures and issues of social justice (Alexander, 2014: 1787; Cottle 2000a: 11). Disadvantage thus become an issue of personal responsibility and explained through discussion of ‘choices, practices, ‘ways of life’ and identities’ (Alexander, 2014: 1787), rather than explained as a failure of collective social responsibility or the responsibility of the state.

The new racism thesis therefore helps to explain the subtleties of how immigrants and other ethnic minority groups may become stigmatised and othered in contemporary discourse in seemingly ‘acceptable’ ways. For instance, since exponents of the new racism/inferential racism avoid ‘explicitly racist labels’, ‘codewords’ which assign negative properties or actions to minority groups can be productively used to imply the problems associated with them (van Dijk 2000: 39).

Even more recently, there has been an acknowledgement of a form of racism directed at people who are ostensibly ‘white’, such as asylum seekers and economic migrants from

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33 For the same reason, contemporary concerns about the ‘imminent threat of Minority White Cities...associate a White majority with a superior value and a society that is more governable than a diverse one’, and therefore reveal their implicit racism (Finney and Simpson 2009: 143-146).

34 The use of ‘codewords’ can be related to what has been called ‘dog whistle politics’ or ‘dog whistle journalism’ (Ward 2002: 28 in Bailey and Harindranath 2005: 276), i.e. ‘the discussion of policy issues in an outwardly reasonable language, but one using words and phrases that are calculated to carry a different message to the target audience’. An example of this can be found in the Conservative Party’s use of slogans during the 2005 election campaign which asked ‘Are You Thinking What We’re Thinking?’ and insisted ‘It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’ thereby anticipating accusations of ‘playing the race card’ (Pitcher 2006) but inviting accusations of ‘dog whistle’ racism by their critics (Banks 2012: 297).
less wealthier nations (Fekete 2001). This was dubbed ‘xeno-racism’ by Ambalavaner Sivanandan, who described it as

‘a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at western Europe’s doors, the Europe that helped to displace them in the first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour-coded, directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is therefore passed off as xenophobia, a ‘natural’ fear of strangers. But in the way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism. It is racism in substance, but ‘xeno’ in form’ (quoted in Fekete 2001: 23-24, my emphasis).

Fox et al. (2012), in a study owing much to this concept, analysed the political and media response to Hungarian and Romanian migrants in the 2000s, concluding that such migrants were ‘racialized’ in the tabloids, driven by a ‘culturalist discourse as a basis of exclusion’ (ibid.: 685). From another angle, Bates (2010) identified the invocation of a ‘white working class’ category in mediated discussions of the immigration issue in the 2010 general election campaign, which helped to conflate ‘white’ with ‘British’ and ‘exclude other Europeans from the ideal of “white” national belonging’ (ibid.: 16).

However, it is not completely without historical precedent that white migrant groups have been subjected to prejudiced and ‘racialised’ representation. Pickering demonstrates the ways in which Irish stereotypes in the 19th century drew on extant, racist images of African people to disparage Irish people for their allegedly ‘disorderly, debased, backward, [and] inferior’ characteristics (in contrast with the opposite characteristics attributed to ‘Britishness’) particularly following the famine of the 1840s and the concomitant forced migration of large numbers of Irish immigrants to the UK.

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35 This was particularly prominent and negative in the case of Romanian migrants because, the authors argue, Romanians were already economically and socially marginalized (making it ‘easier to discursively marginalize them as well’) and because this fitted into an extant narrative about Romanian migrants which was originally shaped in the 1990s (Fox et al. 2012: 689-690).
In a similar vein, some criticism of the concept of the new racism has centred on a contention as to whether the new racism is truly new; earlier pseudoscientific racisms ‘always included a reference to the cultural or national ‘character’ and ‘uniqueness’’ (Rattansi 1994: 55 in Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 9).

**Previous studies of the news coverage of ‘race’ and immigration**

Given the above discussion, it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the work on the representation of immigration in the news media can be found as a constituent of studies concerning first and foremost racism and discriminatory representations of (usually non-white) people in the media, and in the press especially. The main reason for this can be related back to what was perceived and constructed as a crisis of ‘race’ in the mid-twentieth century (see Hall 1978) and the corresponding politicisation of migration from non-white countries, especially from the countries of the New Commonwealth. Prior to the gang-led and racism-fuelled attacks of 1958 in Nottingham and Notting Hill (often referred to as ‘race riots’), parts of the press (e.g. the *Daily Worker* and the *London Evening Standard*) had in fact welcomed the ‘Windrushers’ in 1948 and subsequently ostensibly entered a period of ‘self-imposed censorship’ on the basis that such migrants had played their part in the Second World War, that negative coverage would be ‘dangerous to racial harmony’ and in recognition of Britain’s labour demands (Ainley 1998: 3-5, see also Greenslade 2005: 17-18). Little systematic work was done previously on the press coverage of immigration, though Sharf’s (1964) retrospective account concerning the coverage in the British press of Jewish people under Nazi rule registered the hostility with which parts of the press greeted Jewish refugees in the late 1930s and the use of zero-sum arguments which suggest that ‘our’ tolerance requires the curtailment of ‘their’ immigration, later recycled to similar effect in discussions of Kenyan Asian migrants in the late 1960s (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 184-186).

The politicisation of migration during the first decades after the Second World War came as a result of non-white migrants becoming problematised on the basis of their number and – crucially (for numbers arguments alone ought logically to have provoked concern

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36 According to Ainley, only the Guardian sustained a balanced view after the 1958 riots, giving ‘space to black immigrants to articulate their views of life in Britain’ and presenting ‘both sides of the conflict so readers could make a more informed judgement of the situation’ (1998: 5).
also for the arrival of white immigrants) – their alleged difference. This led researchers to
consider the portrayal of immigrants and immigration through the lens of racism and
ethnicism rather than through the lens of the political categories of immigrants, refugees,
asylum seekers and irregular migrants or immigration as a social process (at least, until
more recently). The reason for the focus on racism rather than ‘race’ was outlined by
Hartmann and Husband, who asserted that the reason they chose to call their 1974 book
‘Racism and the Mass Media’ rather than ‘Race and the Mass Media’ was only partly due
to problems associated with the falsely reifying consequences of the concept of ‘race’.
Centrally, it was because, in their view of the then-contemporary situation, ‘racism not
race is the basis of the British ‘racial problem’’ (1974: 205, emphasis in original). The crux
of this was that ‘coloured people [sic] have not on the whole been portrayed as an
integral part of British society. Instead the press has continued to project an image of
Britain as a white society in which the coloured population is seen as some kind of
aberration, a problem, or just an oddity, rather than as ‘belonging’ to the society’ (ibid.:
145, emphasis in original).

The study from which Hartmann and Husband drew this overall conclusion featured a
content analysis of the Times, the Guardian, the Daily Express, and the Daily Mirror on
193 days (sampled systematically on every thirteenth day) between 1963 and 1970 to
analyse the volume and topics of ‘race-related material’ in the British press (1974: 127-
146 and 273-274; see also Hartmann, Husband and Clark 1974). Quantitatively, the four
newspapers overall regularly published ‘race-related material’ at an average of 4.6 items
per day in the British context (as opposed to the ‘overseas’ context, for which 5.8 items
per day were published). Two-thirds of this came in the Times and Guardian alone (1.3
items per day and 1.7 items per day on average respectively) (1974: 273). ‘Immigration’
and ‘Race Relations’ dominated the topics associated with this coverage (see ibid.: 274),
leading Hartmann and Husband to conclude that ‘[r]ace in Britain was portrayed as being
concerned mainly with immigration and the control of entry of coloured groups,
discrimination and hostility between groups, with legislation, and with the politician,
Enoch Powell’\(^{37}\) (ibid.: 144). Notably, they observed thematic similarities across the press,

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\(^{37}\) Hartmann and Husband note that, from 1968, Enoch Powell’s influence on the frames of reference in the
‘race-related’ debate meant that ‘the press found it difficult to mention the subject without bringing Powell
but only when press material was aggregated (Hartmann, Husband and Clark 1974: 164). In other words, there may have usually only been a partial overlap in the types of subject matter covered by the press on most days, but this partial overlap on a daily basis aggregated to a high degree of uniformity in the topics covered over time\(^\text{38}\). Therefore, despite the substantial differences in ‘tone, style, political orientation and apparent intention’ between newspapers such as the Guardian and the Daily Express, ‘they agree fairly closely about what the issues are and, apparently, about what kind of thing is newsworthy and what is not’ (ibid.: 164-165, Hartmann and Husband 1974: 132-133).

Further, despite also an overall similarity in the thematic focus of coverage over time (with a coefficient of concordance in overall press topics across the years sampled of 0.56 [Hartmann, Husband and Clark 1974: 134]), they did identify a general shift during the 1960s from a focus on ‘the relation of coloured people [sic] to the major social resources of housing, education and employment...towards the hostility itself and its manifestations, including the concern to keep coloured people out of the country and the concern to regulate hostility, by the various laws and machinery set up to these ends’\(^\text{39}\) (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 144). Thus, in their view, over the period sampled, ‘anything about race and colour that could be discussed in terms of immigration, of numbers, of the relations between white and black–particularly hostility between the groups–or of discrimination has increasingly come to be regarded as more newsworthy than material that requires a different frame of reference’ (Hartmann, Husband and Clark 1974: 138). Further, they observed an overall similarity between the topics present in the press and the subjects recalled by questionnaire respondents when asked what they could recall reading about ‘coloured people’ [sic] in the press (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 146). Their work was complemented over time by further studies which also came into it’ (1974: 145). Similarly, Seymour-Ure’s analysis found that Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech had a transformative – if temporary – influence on the news agenda and the coverage of immigration in 1968 (1974: 106-109).

\(^{38}\) Hartmann and Husband observed a coefficient of concordance of .86 in all (i.e. British and overseas) material and of .70 in the British material (1974: 132).

\(^{39}\) In a critical discourse analysis of a piece published in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1990, van Leeuwen observes that ‘reactions’ to immigration were attributed to Australians, the Australian government and people ‘concerned about’ or ‘resentful of’ immigrants in other countries; ‘[t]he reactions of immigrants, on the other hand, are not represented. Immigrants only provoke reactions’ (1995: 88). This seems to accord, much later and textually manifested, with the shift in focus in the press identified by Hartmann and Husband which began to dwell on the epiphenomenon of the responses of non-immigrants to immigration as the immigrant population in the UK increased.
to the conclusion that press coverage had, overall, constructed migration and immigrants themselves as a ‘problem’ and ‘threat’ (e.g. Hall et al. 1978; Troyna 1981; Gordon and Rosenberg 1989; Searle 1989).

One of the most influential contributors to the study of media representations of ‘race’ and immigration in more recent times is Teun van Dijk. In keeping with what the ‘ideological square’ would predict (as outlined above), van Dijk argues that ‘ethnic’ news in general focuses on ‘only a few main topics, which on the whole can be summarised as problem news’ and that, therefore, much of the potential debate is discarded\textsuperscript{40} (2012: 22-23, see also 1991). The main aspects of such news are identified as follows:

- the construction of non-European immigration as a ‘major problem [for the receiving society than for newcomers except in rare circumstances], if not as an invasion then as a threat’;
- problems of ‘reception, housing, employment, and integration’ [again, for ‘us’ rather than ‘them’];
- ‘crime and violence’ (including ‘illegal’ immigration).
- Finally, depending on certain political and social conditions, ‘the political debate on immigration’ including legislative measures and public statements from politicians\textsuperscript{41} (ibid.).

His content analysis and discourse analysis of news coverage over two periods in the 1980s found that, though immigration was more prominent in 1989 than 1985 (1991: 88), the headlines of ‘ethnic news’ generally were less negative in 1989 than 1985 (ibid.: 70). The sub-topics of immigration news in van Dijk’s analysis centred on ‘immigration policies, decisions of non-admission and expulsion, repatriation, family reunion, illegal entry and residence, and the treatment of immigrants’ (ibid.: 95). These topics, according

\textsuperscript{40} Topics absent from ‘ethnic’ news discourse, according to van Dijk, include: ‘the problem the Others have entering the country, finding housing and work, integration in a new social and cultural environment, or everyday experiences with more or less blatant racism, such as exclusion, marginalization, and problematization’ (2012: 24).

\textsuperscript{41} This largely concurs with Law (2010: 193 in Gemi et al. 2011), who distinguishes ‘four limited topics’, including ‘debates on numbers’ (including the ‘uncontrolled’ numbers of ‘illegal’ immigrants), ‘(racialised) crime’ such as drug offences and prostitution (‘which from an individual negative example, is usually generalised and attributed to entire ethnic groups’), ‘cultural difference’ (linked to ‘social problems’), and ‘ethnic relations’, which becomes ‘newsworthy’ only when it comes to ‘extreme forms of discrimination and racist violence’ (ibid.).
to van Dijk, are ‘largely set in a framework of negative associations, such as political rows, numbers, luxury immigrants, costs to the ‘ratepayer’, fraud, illegal residence, and ‘strange’ customs. As in earlier decades, the topics of immigration focus on problems, if not on threats against white Britons. It is not surprising that although forced repatriation is not advocated, it remains a legitimate option. It is not surprising either that the racist nature of many immigration restrictions and laws, as well as the treatment of new immigrants by the authorities, are seldom topicalized’ (1991: 97).

However, Statham (2002: 396) claims that accusations of the media’s inherent racism, causative role in the perpetuation of racist violence and promotion of popular racist beliefs upon which the ‘racist media thesis’ had become based overstate the case by focussing excessively on examples that demonstrated the depths but not the representativeness of racist coverage, and further that this perspective may have lost some validity over time. Instead, Statham argues that there have been modest improvements insofar as racist coverage is concerned overall. He claims that newspapers such as the Sun – highly criticised in previous analyses (e.g. Searle 1989) – had likely made improvements to its coverage over time given the convergence in its coverage with patterns found in much of the rest of the press (2002: 405), that the general election of 1997 and its coverage did not feature a particularly politicised discussion about ‘race’ (see Law 2002) and that news coverage in general often denounces overt expressions of racism (Law 2002: 75) and acknowledges the contribution of ethnic minority groups to society (Statham 2002: 406-407). However, such improvements have crucially not extended as far as to the coverage of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, especially in the tabloid and right-wing sections of the press (Statham 2002: 407-408). Minorities who were previously part of the ‘out-group’ (e.g. Black and Asian people) are therefore now to an extent ‘included in the ‘we’ who are defined in opposition to ‘them’ the foreigners’ (ibid.: 409).

Overall, particularly in the ‘liberal’ broadsheet press such as the Guardian, but occasionally in more conservative quality newspapers, such as the Times, immigration issues tend to be covered in more depth and with more ‘background’ information (van Dijk 1991: 247; Law 2002; Statham 2002: 401), reporting ‘more often about topics that are relevant for minorities’, quoting minority spokespersons more often, and occasionally
even publishing ‘non-establishment, anti-racist views’ (van Dijk 1991: 247). Statham, maintains that, at least more contemporarily, the press is split between the centre-left and broadsheet press, which ‘carry more pro- than anti- immigrant themes’ (such as the ‘civil society issues of combating racist acts in the public domain’) (Statham 2002: 403, 407-408), and the centre-right press, which focus heavily on immigration and asylum issues (in the case of the Daily Mail and Daily Express as a ‘campaigning’ issue) and ‘take up a strongly anti-immigrant stance’ (ibid.: 407). But, importantly, van Dijk provides the caveat that newspapers such as the Guardian may have limited reach beyond ‘liberal elites’ and are overshadowed in circulation by the tabloid press and other conservative quality newspapers. Further, he claims, even this ‘liberal’ end of the press merely ‘represents the more ‘tolerant’ wing of the ethnic consensus’ rather than being ‘mouthpieces of an explicitly anti-racist perspective’, that the major topics of press discourse across the spectrum remain similar and that ‘the views of white authorities and institutions dominate the news about ethnic affairs’ regardless of editorial policy towards immigration (1991: 247-248).

Law – writing over a decade later – argued that overall surface-level improvements go ‘hand in hand with a significant core group of news messages which foster racism, animosity and hatred’ (2002: 160). Coverage specifically concerning immigration was found to be ‘often characterised by sloppy journalism with little attention to the real costs and benefits of complex migration flows’ (ibid.: 161). Law concluded, therefore, that the ‘great anti-racist show’ characterising the changes since the 1980s ‘may also be seen as an outward, empty attempt of mere display masking continuing normative and progressive whiteness in news organisations, racial and ethnic inequalities of power and employment, and a collective failure to provide appropriate quality news services for black and minority ethnic communities and consumers’ (ibid.: 76).

Irrespective of the debate over the extent to which the media has become more positive or more negative, immigration patterns undoubtedly altered during this time (see Chapter 4) and with them, so did the focus of the press. As Berkeley et al. observe, media attention has generally shifted from ‘non-white’ Commonwealth immigration to ‘the anxiety over asylum seekers and migration from the new member states of the European Union and elsewhere’, though emphasis is still placed primarily upon a framework of
immigration control (2005: 25). In regards to this very recent period, the RASIM research group at Lancaster University have utilised corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis techniques in order to examine the discursive representation of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants (hence RASIM) in over 175,000 news articles in the British press\(^{42}\) (including over 100,000 articles in the broadsheet press, 50,000 in the tabloid press and 24,000 in the regional press) between 1996 and 2005 (Baker 2007; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Baker and McEnery 2005; KhosraviNik 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Their analyses tracked an incline of 62% in the volume of news coverage about ‘RASIM’ within the decade period of study (Baker 2007), with sharp spikes and falls in coverage. This incline gained particular momentum from 1999 onwards, including in March of that year when they recorded over 3000 articles across the press due to the NATO invasion of Kosovo and an ensuing refugee crisis (KhosraviNik 2009: 482), having previously counted less than 1200 in any single month from 1996. This figure was not surpassed again within the timeframe, but from 2001 onwards the number of articles per month ranged between 1300 and 2800. Some of the spikes during this period included September 2001 (‘the 9/11 attacks, issues of asylum seekers in Britain, the Australian ‘boat people’ case’), May 2002 (‘the second round of the French presidential election – LePen versus Chirac, the schooling of asylum seekers’ children, the assassination of Pim Fortyun’), March 2004 (‘the Madrid bombing, the asylum bill, East European immigration checks, the expansion of the EU’) and May 2005 (the UK general election) (ibid.). Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 20-21) found that the vast majority (86%) of words collocated with ‘RASIM’ words in their corpus fell under eight categories: provenance/destination/transit (e.g. Iran, Lebanon, UK, France), number (e.g. flooding), entry (e.g. arrive, come, enter), economic problem (e.g. benefits, jobs, working), residence (e.g. camp, housed, settled), return/repatriation (e.g. back, refused, return), legality (e.g. bogus, illegal, caught) and plight (e.g. fear, forced, escape). Further, the authors also found a frequent conflation between refugees/asylum seekers and (im)migrants in their collocate analysis (ibid.: 26, see also Philo et al. 2013: 57-62, 95-104).

In his own analysis, KhosraviNik identified several ‘topoi’ within negative portrayals of RASIM, including the topos of numbers, the topos of economic burden, the topos of

\(^{42}\) This included 19 titles, only two of which were regional newspapers.
threat, the topos of danger and the topos of law (2010b: 17). However, different newspapers featured these topoi in varying ways: the *Times* ‘seems to generally refrain from drawing on a common negative topoi directly and tries to incorporate a more ‘creative’ version of argumentation’, possibly only alluding to the existence of such arguments rather than exploring them fully, while the *Mail* ‘comfortably reproduces the existing...labels in society’ without such qualms (ibid.: 18). In this sense, ‘broadsheet negative representation of RASIM is productive’ whereas tabloid negative representation is ‘reproductive’ (ibid.). The ‘liberal’ newspapers (e.g. the *Guardian* and the *Observer*) utilise topoi of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘justice’, especially in cases of asylum seekers, but in consolidating an ‘us/them’ narrative, KhosraviNik argues that this shows them to be ‘best described as victimisation rather than positive representation’ (ibid.: 18-19). In his report of the research, Baker claims that ‘it became apparent that even the liberal press was slowly subscribing to more exclusionary rhetoric’ as the coverage increased (2007: 29).

Overall, then, although some progress may have been made in curtailing the most egregiously discriminatory forms of representation regarding ethnic minority groups and immigration, ‘many features of the earlier period remain stubbornly in place. Immigration is still discussed in terms of numbers and problems, ‘black’ families are still pathologised and ‘Asians’ in general only considered worthy of media interest if they can be shown to be ‘culturally backward’, if they are victims of racism or, less frequently, if they have made good as hard working immigrants’ (Alibhai-Brown 1998: 116 in Statham 2002: 397-398). As Gemi et al. (2013: 266) similarly suggest of European media discourses, ‘positive’ reporting ‘tends to be presented as the “exception to the rule” and reflects processes of cultural assimilation with migrant individuals portrayed as successful and socially integrated if their creativity and achievements can be framed within the dominant culture’.

Illustrating continuity in representational patterns, one feature key to shaping the narrative of immigration discourses which seems to have endured and which can be found in numerous contexts lies in the use of metaphors within coverage of immigration. Thus, numerous accounts have demonstrated that the movement of migrants and refugees are, in various temporal and national contexts and through various media and
political discourses, pejoratively related through metaphor usage to disease, military invasion and war, natural disasters (including the movement of water), pollution, animals/insects and the trade and transportation of goods (Baker and McEnery 2005; Charteris-Black 2006; Burke 2002; McLaughlin 1999; Buchanan et al. 2003; Mollard 2001; Santa Ana 1999; Cisneros 2008; Rasinger 2010; O’Brien 2003). Such metaphors, it is argued, serve to homogenise and dehumanise their target groups.

A full(er) typology of such metaphors is provided by Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 60), who list the major and most frequent stereotypical metaphors in German and Austrian discourses about migrants and ethnic minorities as follows:

- **natural disasters**: immigration/migrants as avalanches or flood disasters.
- **dragging/hauling**: illegal immigration as dragging or hauling.
- **water**: immigration/migrants as a water-course/current/flood that has to be ‘dammed’.
- **fire**: alleged effects of immigration/conflicts between ‘racialised’, ‘nationalised’ and ‘ethnicised’ groups as smouldering fire.
- **thermostatics**: effects of immigration as pressure within the pot and conflicts between ‘racialised’, ‘nationalised’ and ‘ethnicised’ groups’ as bubbling.
- **plants and fertile soil**: migration and effects of migration as transplantation/repotting, uprooting, or (alleged) causing of social conflicts as seeding.
- **genetic material**: cultural and social traditions and ‘heritage’ as genetic material.
- **growth/growing**: increasing immigration and increasing conflicts as growing.
- **pollution and impurity**: intergroup contacts, exchanges and relations as pollution and impurity.
- **melting**: intergroup contacts, relations, exchanges and assimilation as melting [e.g. the ‘melting pot’].
- **body**: racialised, nationalised, ethnicised groups are metaphorically ascribed ‘collective (racial, national, ethnicity) bodies’; outgroups are metaphorised as ‘foreign bodies’ or alien elements.
- **blood**: immigration as bleeding white or bloodletting of the imagined ‘collective bodies’; intergroup relations as blood impurity.
- **disease/infection**: immigration/migrants as an epidemic; intergroup contacts and relations as an infection.
- **animals/animal-owning**: immigrants/minorities as parasites, as ‘attracted like the moths to a flame’, as herded together.
- **war/fight/military**: immigration as military activity/invasion.
- **goods/commodities and exchange of goods**: migration as import and export of workers/workforce; migrants as ‘freight’. 
• **food**: ‘good/welcome immigrants/minorities’ versus ‘bad/unwelcome immigrants/minorities’ metaphorised as the wheat that has to be separated from the chaff.
• **vehicle/boat/ship**: effects of immigration as overcrowded boat.
• **house/building/door/gateway/bolt**: the ingroups’ (e.g. ‘national’) territory as a house or building; stopping immigration as bolting the door.

The usage of metaphors such as these cannot simply be regarded as trivial details which embroider the reporting of migration issues; they provide ‘a central part of the way that the story is composed and is intended for interpretation’ (Conboy 2006: 101). For example, in the case of water (or ‘fluidity’) metaphors, a narrative can be structured (whether over time or within a single text) in which migrants ‘first trickle in, then turn into streams and at last flood a peaceful country’ (Pohl and Wodak 2012: 206). They therefore offer a hyperbolic and vivid frame of reference by which audiences may be able to make sense of immigration processes (c.f. the ‘unambiguity’ news value) but, in doing so, evacuate the personal and individual experiences of immigrants and refugees from the framework. At their most polemic, such as with water-based imagery, they mean that ‘immigration restriction thus becomes a matter of life and death’; ‘we’ may drown if nothing is done (van Dijk 2012: 26). Likewise, ‘immigration as military activity/invasion’ metaphors also invoke a need for drastic measures, implicitly suggesting repatriation as a desirable political solution (CCCS 1982: 85) just as the residents of an occupied country might wish to violently reject invading militant forces.

**Summary**

This chapter has explored a number of issues pertinent to understanding the features of the press coverage of immigration and asylum coverage in the context of the journalistic structures, routines and ideologies which shape them. However, despite the undoubted contributions of decades of media analysis concerning continuities and developments in the coverage of ‘race’, racism and immigration – as identified in this chapter – they have neglected to provide a sufficiently long-term focus, either individually or aggregately. Individually, even the most ambitious studies usually analyse news coverage over periods of ten or fewer years, while, aggregately, very little is known about the news mediation of immigration prior to the second half of the twentieth century. Further, despite the general cross-temporal contrasts and comparisons which can be drawn from related
studies between the 1970s and 2010s, such studies seldom facilitate precise ‘like-for-like’ comparisons; invariably they differ in terms of their length of study, the news media under analysis, their criteria of inclusion, their methodological approach, the stage of the political cycle at which the research is undertaken, or in the aspects of the collated data focused upon. Moreover, the representations identified as bearing the influence of the ‘imperial legacy’ sit in an uneasy, though not irreconcilable, tension with the heralded changes of the ‘new racism’ (even acknowledging their apparently superficial functions). Therefore, as Ferguson noted in 1998 about this research area, ‘[w]hat has to be studied is the extent to which underlying media discourses have moved or changed over time’ (1998: 153). It was Ferguson’s contention, for example, that ‘we are indeed in a period of change, but that there is little evidence to suggest that it is more than a surface transition’ (ibid.). This study has been designed in a way which can help to contextualise and explore the validity of meta-narratives such as that implied by the ‘new racism’ thesis – along with the empirical results of relevant studies – in a much needed longer-term view. In addition, the methodological approach of the study has been adapted in recognition of the potential opacity and flexibility which have been theorised by neo-racism theses to have increasingly pervaded discussions of ‘race’ and immigration over time.

In light of the debates explored in this chapter, it is worth returning to consider comments made earlier on in the chapter regarding the role of journalism, both in regards to election campaigns and in regards to immigration news. By variously claiming for themselves functions of information and representation, with all that these entail for the relationships of the press with politics and society, newspapers contribute importantly to the electoral process. As was noted, newspapers both represent in the sense of depiction, and represent in the sense of claiming to speak for others. How the press has depicted immigration and immigrants, and publicised the views and interests of various social actors (including electors, candidates, immigrants and other interested parties) during general election campaigns are questions of vital and ongoing empirical concern. Despite scholarly reservations about how commercially expedient newspapers’ claims to represent the wider society are, such questions remain of integral value in
determining the available debate to the citizenry during critical junctures such as campaigns.

Questions such as these rely on understanding the definitions of reality promoted by social actors ordinarily privileged in news discourse in order to determine the extent to which they are reflected in press coverage. The next chapter attends to this in presenting a historical background of the political and social context of immigration to the UK over time.
3: The Politics and History of Immigration: Legislation and Definitions

Introduction

The previous chapter explored various and sustained criticisms of the press in their coverage of immigration, in addition to issues relating to the ‘homocentric’ and ‘ethnocentric’ application of news values and the consequences of the nation-centric outlook of the daily national press on its output. These issues invite consideration for how the press’s coverage of immigration may promote a set of definitions, values and symbolic boundaries in regards to who belongs in ‘our’ society. However, these definitions, values and boundaries are not constructed in a vacuum, nor will they have necessarily emerged solely within the press. Exploring their political manifestations is a valid exercise in itself, since it establishes the political and social context within which press coverage was published. But this also helps to understand the underlying factors which shape common sense constructions of ‘our’ rights and responsibilities towards various groups of migrants, because the construction of these obligations and duties is inextricable from the political context from which they emerge and which they help to re-shape.

The following two chapters will consider various aspects of the politics of immigration to the UK since the beginning of the twentieth century. This comes firstly in terms of the governance, legislative history and definitions of immigration to the UK in this chapter and secondly in terms of the demographic history and public attitudes towards immigration in the next. These chapters therefore provide the required context against which the role of the press as an important mediator and participant in the politics of immigration can be assessed. To be sure, although the focus of this chapter is the legislative climate and part of the next is concerned with the ‘public debate’, the news media’s role in driving and shaping these environments has also to be appreciated.

As Hay explains, the power of ‘media influence’ resides not in ‘direct ideological indoctrination’ but in the ability to ‘frame the discursive context within which political subjectivities are constituted, reinforced and reconstituted’ (1996: 261 in Lynn and Lea 2003: 429). The press therefore has its own part to play in ‘approving’ (Lynn and Lea...
the immigration of some categories of migrants over others and thus inherently of helping to establish the expectations which accompany migrants’ entry, membership and reception. Journalists thus wield considerable symbolic resources in re-shaping the political debate in their own terms, even if they tend to index the elite mainstream debate (Bennett 1990) and are led to an extent by their sources (Gans 1980). This has allowed journalists to demand political action while simultaneously claiming to champion their readers’ own wishes. The post-1997 governing Labour Party, for instance, was routinely led in its presentation (if not its formulation) of immigration and asylum policy by the demands of a highly active and adversarial conservative press (Carvalho et al. 2015; Dean 2012).

However, the question of whether in the case of immigration it is the news media which forces the political agenda versus whether it is the political agenda driving the media agenda43 may ultimately be beside the point. In the case of longer term cycles of spin, intrusion and cynicism, for example, Deacon points out that identifying cause and effect - and therefore original blame - fails to acknowledge that it is the competitive dynamics within as well as between media and political systems which fuel these processes (2004). In terms of immigration politics, for their part politicians recognise that they may in the short-term win 'points' for making bold promises in the press (Spencer 2011: 13), but the need within the Labour and Conservative Parties to usurp or fend off the prospects of their competitor's ownership of the immigration issue is undoubtedly a contributory trigger in their courtship of press attention. The news media, on the other hand, may well be led to sensationalise immigration politics if editors believe that this leads to increased or sustained circulation, above and beyond a serious and primary inclination to direct the substantive immigration policy debate. Overall, the situation may be better seen as one in which the immigration issue spirals in terms of attention and tone and in which the original responsibility of politicians or the media is difficult to extricate, rather than one in which we can assume that the 'political' or 'media' tap can be turned off to halt the flow of attention.

43 Jessika ter Wal (2002) concluded in an EU-wide survey of racism/cultural diversity in the media that the news agenda had up to that point followed the political agenda in regards to immigration in Britain. This dynamic has been observed in the influence of Powell on the media debate in the 1960s and 1970s (Seymour-Ure 1974, ch. 4), the transformation of the mediated asylum debate in the 1990s (see Kaye 1998, 2001) and general election coverage in 1997 (Law 2002).
In light of these observations, this chapter begins with a discussion of the role of various social actors and structures who and which materially affect immigration processes through their institutional power, reflecting issues discussed in the previous chapter concerning who is able to symbolically define events in the news media and to consider the responsibilities their status entails. Correspondingly, it is also necessary to outline how immigrants have historically and contemporarily been categorised in both a legal and scholarly sense, in order to provide the necessary ‘definitional’ background to immigration to the UK. From this, a typology of immigrants pertinent to the later analysis is provided, due to the important part that categories play in the politics of representation, and in order to help distinguish between the varying experiential features of immigration. This comes in recognition of the fact that migrants with varying degrees of freedom and who migrate for a variety of reasons ask different ethical duties of the receiving country.

The Politics of Immigration: The State and its Responsibilities

A state-centric political issue

Immigration control policy helps to determine immigration patterns which, in turn, have a significantly influential impact on the demography, culture, economy and politics of a state (Meyers 2000: 1245). The power to determine the entry and membership criteria of the nation is therefore both legally and symbolically powerful. As Pickering suggests (2001: 83), the ‘literal boundaries’ of nations ‘do not in themselves define our different identities for us; they only inform our different identities once they have become symbolically defined’. However, as he also points out, they determine if, where, and the terms upon which we have to account for our identity (by showing our passports, visas, work permits, etc) if we wish to gain entry to the national territory, since our rights to enter a country legitimately depend on entry criteria set by the powerful elites of the nation state. These criteria usually contain hierarchies of legal entitlements to enter borders (from automatic rights of entry based on native statehood to few or no rights based on a variety of exclusionary dimensions) as well as conditions on the entitlement to attain citizenship and exercise certain civic and social rights once resident within the nation.
Despite being a global and international phenomenon, migration is recognised as something that is administratively managed at the national level (in Clayton 2010: 39), rather than chiefly through international or global governance. This is observable both in domestic statutory policy and in international law, and largely continues to be the case despite claims that state sovereignty has weakened more recently and therefore that the nation state ‘can no longer be properly regarded as the ultimate legal authority’ (Clayton 2010: 29-30, my emphasis).

States have seized, in effect, a monopoly over the legitimate means of long-distance movement (Torpey 1998). The rationale for their monopoly is based on the notion of the state as a ‘political community’ bearing a right to self-determination (Fine 2013). Ethically, this perspective is concerned with citizens’ rights and freedoms to ‘disassociate’ (contra to the freedom to associate), ‘to decide which direction [political] institutions will pursue, and to decide who will make these sorts of decisions in the future’ by controlling the shape of the citizen body (ibid.: 258, 260). The sovereignty of the state has thereby widely come to be regarded as a ‘common sense’ and essential function, both legally and morally, of the state to establish its own ‘membership rules’ and exclude foreigners at its borders (Carens 1987: 251; Fine 2013: 254). Hence, immigration law and its definitions come in pursuit of the national interest, even in instances where that interest conflicts with the entry of ‘peaceful, needy foreigners’ (Carens 1987: 251).

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44 A critical result of this is that statutory immigration control only ever addresses the symptoms, rather than the root causes, of international migration (in Clayton 2010: 39; Castles 2004).
45 On the one hand some scholars argue that state sovereignty has weakened in the face of international and domestic legal obligations (e.g. EU rules on freedom of movement, the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Human Rights Act 1998, court rulings) (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 197) and globalisation (e.g. increasing irregular migration) (Sassen 1996). On the other hand, Statham and Geddes (2006) argue that states still reserve significant scope to control their borders and are restrictive. For instance, international human rights agreements are usually enacted on the basis of states opting in, with limited inducements to make their enactment or faithful implementation compulsory (Joppke 1998: 269).
46 By way of example for how widespread this common sense view has become, consider that polling organisations tend not to ask the public ‘should the state control immigration or not?’ but ‘should immigration be reduced a lot, be reduced a little, stay the same, be increased a little, be increased a lot?’ with the agent of these various actions, the state, deleted and, therefore, assumed.
47 This is the case even to the extent that states mostly bear the initial decision-making power to grant asylum or not – the only obligation of the state being to consider an asylum seeker’s case – not necessarily to admit them (Zolberg 2012: 1217). This constitutes the ‘partial’ (Gibney 2004) or ‘particularist’ (Schuster 2003b) view of the state’s ideal role. This can be contrasted with the ‘impartial’ (Gibney 2004) or ‘universalist’ (Schuster 2003b) view – which impels the state to observe utilitarianist outcomes for everyone affected by its actions rather than in its own interests (Schuster 2003b: 44; Carens 1987).
Statutory immigration policy has also become intertwined with, if not a facet of, broader social policy and population policy. The stated objectives of immigration control are usually concerned with maintaining public order, protecting labour and housing markets, preserving the welfare state (Vedsted-Hansen 1999) and promoting economic growth for a capitalist economy. In British immigration politics, some of these aims have been particularly prominent, for example in the consistent use of arguments claiming that ‘good race relations’ rely on restrictive immigration controls (Layton-Henry 1994: 275-276). Immigration controls are therefore ‘widely viewed as essential to protect the material prosperity and social fabric of the host society’ (Wray 2006: 305). As immigration to the UK has increased, particularly from the latter quarter of the twentieth century onwards, there has been significant, telling pressure on successive governments to, in the words of the Home Office, ‘reduce and keep new immigration to a small and inescapable minimum subject to the rights of dependents and the needs of the economy dealt with through the work permit system’ (in Coleman 1996: 195). Immigration policy is therefore derived from instrumental rationales (e.g. economic migration policy) in addition to moral rationales rooted in humanitarian rights (e.g. family reunification). Sometimes policy may constitute a hybrid of motivations, as, for example, with the so-called ‘European Volunteer Workers’ of the mid-twentieth century, who had been ‘displaced’ by the events of the Second World War and were recruited into industries experiencing labour shortages from 1946 (Kay and Miles 1988).

Importantly, state sovereignty is deemed legally and morally defensible only in the case of immigration, which Zolberg claims exposes the ‘striking asymmetry’ of the liberal world order (2012: 1217). While states are expected to set entry requirements, it is not considered permissible for them to control emigration or to set quotas or conditions for exit (Hayter 2004: 47).

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48 This argument may in fact have exacerbated social tension when employed in the 1960s in suggesting that the presence of the New Commonwealth immigrants already settled in the country was in some way problematic (Layton-Henry 1994: 275-276).

49 The freedom to exit was mostly observed across the world in the twentieth century with the exception of some Communist nations, but see Carter et al. (1987) for an overview of how departments of 1950s UK governments may have breached the terms of Article 13 in pressuring colonial governments to delay or disrupt colonial subjects’ passage to the UK, as a form of immigration control (Hayter 2004: 47).
include one to enter another\textsuperscript{50} (Zolberg 2012: 1217). Furthermore, ‘everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state’ (UN 1948). In other words, it is only mobility from outside the borders of a nation to inside the borders of a nation that has become legitimately contestable and controllable on the part of the state.

The ‘common sense’ view of state sovereignty in immigration issues has only translated into immigration control legislation and the widespread usage of passports relatively recently, however (Hayter 2004: 1) – close, in fact, to the start of the time period studied in this thesis. The first major and sustained piece of immigration control legislation in the UK came in 1905 with the Aliens Act, while passports became compulsory for Britons wishing to travel internationally with the introduction of the Defence of the Realm Act in 1915 amid the heightened tensions of the First World War (O’Byrne 2001). It has since been observed that the introduction of the 1905 Act provided symbolically the ‘irreparable breach in the principle of free movement which permitted all [immigration control] that came after’ (Wray 2006: 303).

The previously liberal, \textit{laissez faire} approach to immigration policy had ostensibly been maintained and motivated by two main causes. First, mass emigration to the colonies necessitated a replenishing of the labour force to meet the demands of the industrial revolution (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 52). Second, allowing the freedoms of the individual enabled the maintenance of a moral superiority driven by racial theories which placed North Europeans ‘at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of ‘races’’ (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 53). Immigration control was therefore considered ‘irrelevant, unnecessary – a symbol of national decline’ (Foot 1965: 84). The strength of these factors was eroded when ‘British capitalism entered a period of decline, and economic crisis and high unemployment diminished the demand for labour’ (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 53). Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Jewish refugees arrived having escaped from pogroms in Russia and eastern Europe, and were met with hostility and proposals for legislation driven by fascist organisations (Hayter 2004: 21-22; Holmes 1988: 70; Cohen 2006: 27-29). Particularly in the early years of state control, the case for restriction gained modest

\textsuperscript{50} ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his [sic] own, and to return to his country’ (UN 1948).

Nevertheless, it remains the case that immigration restrictions necessarily rely on coercion\(^{51}\). As Joseph Carens succinctly puts it, ‘borders have guards and the guards have guns’ (1987: 251). Taking this into account, some scholars argue that the state’s exercise of territorial sovereignty is not only invalid, but actively harmful, with its resulting effects experienced on a widespread scale among the present or prospective immigrant population (Huemer 2010; Hayter 2004; Carens 2013, ch. 11). In this view, exclusion (and the way in which it is practiced) are both constitutive and generative of disempowerment, disenfranchisement and disadvantage, encompassing inter alia ‘insecurity and harassment from state agencies,...deportation, detention without trial, family separation, shuttlecocking, interminable delays, and all the associated personal suffering and indignities, of which the ‘virginity tests’ revealed publicly in the Guardian (1 February 1970) are only the most extreme\(^{52}\) (Ben-Tovim and Gabriel 1982: 146).

**From territorial exclusion to social exclusion**

Beyond these grievances, for those able to become resident within the state, migrants are also subject to various other forms of social exclusion, including racist and discriminatory behaviour, which become manifest in their being generally under-represented, underemployed, underpaid, under-rated and underprivileged (van Dijk 1991: 32) through ‘routine or familiar practices in everyday situations’ (Essed 1991: 52). It would be fair to assume that this has largely remained the case in the longue durée.

\(^{51}\) This coercion may be realised in ‘active’ or ‘passive’ form. Active forms include the interception of refugees, the construction of physical barriers and deportation; passive or ‘pre-emptive’ forms include visa requirements, carrier sanctions and financial requirements for the sponsors of family ‘dependents’ (Stern 2014: 27). The usage of passive forms may be more appealing to politicians and publics alike since they ‘act as deterrents rather than as experienced obstacles’ and it is therefore difficult to assess how many people they affect (ibid.).

\(^{52}\) Since this claim was made we might add physical assault and deaths in the custody of immigration officials and contractors (Fekete 2011: 89), of which the Angolan asylum seeker Jimmy Mubenga’s in 2010 is a notable and recent case. Mubenga died while being restrained by three G4S guards during an attempt to deport him at Heathrow airport. On a related note, notable incidences of migrant deaths either in transit or after arrival in recent years include the discovery of the bodies of 58 Chinese migrants in a lorry in Dover in 2000 and the deaths of 23 Chinese cockle-pickers who were working illegally at Morecambe Bay in 2004.
Indeed, Holmes claims in a discussion of British immigration history from 1871 to 1971 that ‘even if opposition was not universally persistent, the cumulative evidence of expressions of hostility cannot be ignored. In considering the years from 1871 onwards, opposition surfaced at the level of ideas, whether in spoken or written form. It resulted sometimes in discrimination. It influenced outbreaks of collective violence. The weight of such evidence qualifies the widely-held view of Britain as a tolerant country’ (1991: 100).

Accordingly, there is a wealth of evidence which shows the ways in which immigrants and ethnic minority groups in Britain have been subject to institutional discrimination and disadvantage. Taking employment as just one example, despite some variation in the labour market position of certain migrant groups (such that some groups of migrants tend to be employed and paid similarly to the ‘white British’ average contemporarily), (especially non-white) immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than the ‘native-born’ population and tend to have a lower occupational status (Castles and Miller 2009: 226-227; Dustmann and Fabbri 2005). This has led Castles and Miller to suggest that ethnic inequality has become a ‘long term feature of the labour market’ (2009: 227). A ‘dividing line’ between white and non-white immigrants in the receipt of wages means that, while white immigrants tend to have higher wages than British born workers of the same skill group, all groups of non-white immigrants tend to have lower wages. Indeed some racialized groups (e.g. Bangladeshi workers) earn substantially less than their white British counterparts (Dustmann and Fabbri 2005: 458, see also National Equality Panel 2010). Further, these disadvantages hold when factoring in variables such as educational attainment and skill (Richardson 2004: 30; Runnymede Trust 2000: 193, 197).

This pattern has developed despite the introduction of legislation which has sought to eliminate institutional discrimination, for example in the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968, 1976 and its 2000 Amendment Act, and the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010.

**Which political elites control policy?**

Since the legal and symbolic power to set the terms of national belonging are closely linked, it is important to consider how the entry and membership criteria of the nation defined legally may have a productive or reproductive relationship with the symbolic definition of national belonging in the national press. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the findings of decades of research suggest that it is elites who are often best positioned to shape the terms of media debate. It is also largely the same elites who shape the terms of entry and membership of the nation. The role of such elites will now be considered in more detail in regards to the UK context.

Immigration touches upon a wide range of potential policy areas, so it is perhaps unsurprising that a number of governmental departments and committees are involved in the formation and implementation of immigration policy. This has in the past included departments as diverse as those concerned with employment, health, ‘colonial relations’, the treasury, education and even rural affairs (Spencer 2011: 19-20). These departments may promote competing interests when it comes to immigration policy\(^{53}\), but the dominant department in exercising the executive power of immigration control overall has been the Home Office (ibid.: Clayton 2010: 27).

Accordingly, the Home Secretary has held a particularly prominent role in the administration of immigration policy. Below the Home Secretary in the executive hierarchy are members of the civil service, immigration officers and entry clearance officers (Clayton 2010: 27). The Home Secretary’s role comes most importantly in the exercise of discretionary powers, which allow for more variable and expansive interpretations of the law than would the application of specific rules (ibid.). This feature is recurrently found in immigration law and is central to many of the sustained criticisms aimed at such legislation (ibid.). Further, statutory law contains ‘none of the specific provisions which govern whether a person may gain entry to the UK or leave to remain’ which are, instead, contained within the Home Office-designed Immigration Rules (ibid.: 31; Moore and Wallace 1975; Sachdeva 1993). The immigration rules are voluminous, frequently amended, govern nearly every immigration case (and have an impact on asylum cases) and crucially therefore ‘contain the practical substance of immigration law’ (Clayton 2010: 31). The rules are subject to very limited, or no, parliamentary scrutiny (Moore and Wallace 1975: 9; Clayton 2010: 32) and serve an ambiguous legal role, such

\(^{53}\) This can be seen, for example, in the formation of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. The Colonial Office wished to preserve positive relations with governments in former colonies, while the Treasury ‘argued that there was no economic justification for restrictions on immigration’, but the Home Office strongly opposed further immigration ‘believing it likely to lead to unrest’ (Spencer 2011: 24, see also Smith 1991).
that their misapplication is not necessarily contestable as a point of law (Bevan 1986: 13-14). In addition, internal instructions guide civil servants in their (discretionary) application of the law in individual cases (Clayton 2010: 34-35; Bevan 1986: 14). This guidance has only relatively recently begun to be published online (Clayton 2010: 34). The volume, imprecision, secrecy and complexity of immigration law are problematic issues for the delivery of due process in the field of immigration in their own right. But they also leave immigrants and the public alike with little accessible information upon which to guide their behaviour and perceptions of the immigration system, and are also therefore deleterious to the prospects of an open, accessible public debate.

With the introduction and expansion of carriers’ liability and sanctions (dating back to the Aliens Act 1905), the externalisation of appeals to outside the UK (Sachdeva 1993: 25), and ‘internal controls’ (dating back to the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 but which have since accelerated), the British state’s executive power and surveillance has extended outwards and inwards from the border. This has effectively placed the responsibilities of immigration control in the hands of airline, rail and shipping staff, lorry drivers, marriage registrars, employers, the police, healthworkers, local authority workers, voluntary sector workers and staff within educational institutions (Gordon 1985; Sachdeva 1993; Cohen 2006, ch. 8; Sales 2007: 173-176). This is executed either through the imposition of penalties on such people if they fail to check the immigration status of those they come into contact with professionally or as an integrated part of their job responsibilities. Major effects of this include the exclusion of people deemed to have a questionable immigration status from social benefits (Clayton 2010: 14) and the denial of legal travel.

54 See, for example, Sachdeva (1993), Moore and Wallace (1975), Smith and Marmo (2011), Souter (2011) and Jubany (2011) for discussions regarding the harmful effects which the exercise of discretionary power and a ‘culture of disbelief’ within state decision-making bodies have had on the application of immigration and asylum law and, ultimately, an often abusive and negligent reception for immigrants.

55 The Act made shipping companies legally liable not only to a fine for the transport of passengers who arrived without leave to enter, but also to the recovery of costs within six months for the return journey of any expelled migrant who had been brought on a company’s ship (Clayton 2010: 224). Carrier sanctions were significantly expanded following the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987, and have since been expanded to cover the arrival of immigrants without documentation by sea, plane, rail or car, even if they remain ‘undetected’ during transit (ibid.).

56 The Act introduced a requirement for all aliens to register with and report to the police on a regular basis (including registering changes of address or occupation [Gordon 1985: 11]), a measure which was renewed annually until the introduction of the Immigration Act 1971 (Holmes 1988: 113). A more recent example came with the introduction of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, which required employers to check the immigration status of prospective employees and which may have had discriminatory consequences as a result (Ryan 1997).
for refugees, who perhaps unsurprisingly are unable to obtain sufficient travel documentation from the authorities which persecute them\textsuperscript{57} (Hayter 2004: 75; Schuster and Solomos 1999: 60-61). Perhaps more subtly, however, whether in having to prove one's eligibility to work to a prospective employer or in showing one's passport to airline staff at the airport, immigration controls have become \textit{banal} (c.f. Billig 1995) – an ordinary and mundane part of daily life for many people, whether experienced as workers or as citizens. Further, the Home Office has begun to encourage and rely on information provided by members of the British public regarding individuals living in their community whom they suspect of being involved in irregular migration. Over 100,000 allegations are received a year and the information is used to carry out raids on properties and places of work (Dzenovska 2014). For immigrants, this all means that ‘the border effectively follows them inside’ (Bosniak 2006: 2-4 in Spencer and Pobjoy 2011: 13).

It has been argued by some that the politics of immigration have opened up to external pressures, in the form of social actors who seek to shape policy in their own interests. For example, Sassen argues that the ‘numbers and kinds of political actors involved’ in immigration policy grew sharply in the latter stages of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century in the USA, Western Europe and Japan, and that although the policy process was never wholly confined to a ‘narrow governmental arena of ministerial and administrative interaction’, public opinion and political debate have become ‘part of the arena wherein immigration policy is shaped’ (Sassen 1996: 74).

For example, Studlar (1974, 1980) has suggested that the restrictive policy which marked the immigration politics of the 1960s may have been due to the constraining influence of public opinion. In his view of the then-contemporary situation, ‘when public opinion is more evenly divided...there is much more freedom for political elites to act’ (1974: 376). Similarly, Dummett argues that the response of politicians has, since the politicisation of immigration in the 1960s, been characterised by an elitism which considers the ‘British masses’ to be racist and compellingly demanding of restrictionism (1973: 244). With the

\textsuperscript{57} Measures such as this ‘[contravene] the spirit, if not the letter, of Article 31 of the 1951 [UN] Convention [Relating to the Status of Refugees], which prohibits the imposition of penalties for unlawful entry’ (Schuster and Solomos 1999: 61).
addition of a weak-but-seemingly-threatening influence from far right, anti-immigration parties, politicians have been led to firmly believe that anti-immigration politics have the potential to mobilize the electorate (Layton-Henry 2004: 332). Nonetheless, at the parliamentary and executive level, it is political elites who ultimately continue to wield decisive authority in the formation of immigration policy (Statham and Geddes 2006). Due to a need to meet economic or labour market objectives, it has therefore been claimed (at least in regards to skilled migration) that politicians are ‘content to provide anti-immigration rhetoric while actually pursuing policies that lead to more immigration’ (Castles 2004: 214).

Finally, in terms of the power of the courts to determine policy, there have been ‘important British cases, where courts have rejected restrictionist immigration legislation introduced by a government’ (Statham and Geddes 2006: 255). Keyes remarks that, especially since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (but also to some extent prior to its introduction), British courts have had a ‘tradition of judicial activism in the development and interpretation of asylum law’ (2004: 411). The imposition of international human rights constraints by the courts on the executive in asylum policy has been described by Michael Tolley as a process of ‘juridification’, in which ‘a political system comes to rely more on law and courts than ordinary politics as a mode of governance’ (2012: 14). Despite criticisms from some quarters that this process is undemocratic, Tolley argues that it is in fact enabled by legislation (e.g. the Human Rights Act), and therefore by parliamentary approval (ibid.). Ironically, despite the apparent approval from parliament for the increased intervention of the courts in asylum policy, the process nevertheless generates tension between a restrictive political sphere and the judiciary, which is ‘visible and expansionist within limits’ (Statham and Geddes 2006: 254). As a result governments have frequently introduced primary legislation in order to reverse higher court decisions and to reassert their direct executive dominance in the immigration field (Clayton 2010: 15). The recurrence of this influence (enabled by the absence of a bill of rights in the UK) leaves the British courts relatively inert and reactive in the long-term direction of policy and means that sovereignty lies overwhelmingly with parliament (especially the executive), leaving minorities ‘extremely vulnerable to the whims of the majority’ (Joppke 1998: 288-289).
The responsibilities of the receiving country

The notion that the state has the right to exclude outsiders provides a prism through which the related and encompassing issues pertaining to immigration are viewed. If immigration control is ‘common sense’, then press debate is left to focus on secondary issues: what selection criteria may be employed, who ought to be subject to control, what are ‘our’ duties to immigrants, which of the consequences of immigration are significant, how should ‘we’ deal with these consequences and what may ‘we’ demand of immigrants (see Fine 2013: 255). Some of these issues thereby invoke both ‘our’ rights as well as ‘our’ responsibilities and, correspondingly those of immigrants.

For immigrants, numerous rights are affected in the course of a state exercising its sovereignty in immigration matters, including rights to life, to move, to a home and protection, to justice and due process, to non-discrimination, to marry and to family life, to work, to liberty, to full political and civil status and to privacy (Bevan 1986: 3-4). However, in migration debates, these rights are often presented as if depending necessarily on the honouring also of a set of responsibilities on the part of a migrant. The construction of a ‘social contract’ of immigration is, for example, evident in debates surrounding multiculturalism, integration and assimilation, and is based on the notion that to migrate is to implicitly accept the values and customs prevalent within the receiving society in exchange for the opportunities associated with migration (Rose et al. 1969: 662). Citizenship policies have been enacted (e.g. in the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act) which have compelled migrants to demonstrate their language skills and knowledge of British culture in order to prove that they ‘deserve’ citizen status58. Citizenship is thus depicted as something to be earned (Clayton 2010: 26), rather than simply awarded upon application. Indeed, the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act introduced the possibility of being awarded ‘points’ for performing certain civic duties which could reduce the time taken to acquire citizenship.

Further, the existence of a variety of different types of immigration, and therefore immigrant, mean that there is a range of issues to which the state must attend in the kind

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58 This echoes the demands placed upon immigrants with the introduction of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, which meant that those seeking naturalization had to convince the Secretary of State of their ‘good character’ and ‘adequate knowledge of the English language’, also taking an oath of allegiance (Panayi 2010: 211).
of political solutions it pursues. For those they admit, issues of citizenship and therefore of civic and political rights are of great importance if immigrants are to aspire to participate in society on parity with other residents. Some argue that states also have duties in some respects to those they refuse to admit and even to those present without authorisation (Fine 2013: 255). To further complicate matters, it might be argued that states bear special responsibilities to certain categories of migrant, including refugees, people from their former colonies, family members of citizens and residents, long-term irregular migrants and/or prospective immigrants from poor countries (ibid.). How these issues have been addressed in the UK legislatively is the focus of the next section.

Defining migration

Competing definitions

As the previous section illustrated, immigration policy matters, both in the sense that it legally awards or denies freedoms to prospective migrants and therefore shapes the size and character of migratory movements, and in the sense that it empowers political elites symbolically in the politics of immigration. This section will consider how these issues converge within cultural understandings and categorisations of immigration and immigrants.

A first point to note is that immigration legislation has invariably been produced reactively, rather than pro-actively, in response to problems postulated to be associated with various migratory patterns and therefore migrant groups (Bevan 1986: 22-23; Sachdeva 1993: 13). Even for legislation produced in general terms, concerns about immigrants in several respects are evident in the consistent embedding of these assumptions in statutory provisions. For example, assumptions that migrants may represent an inordinate threat to public funds, the health of others, or as criminals are reflected in current requirements for all categories of entrant to convince immigration officials that they will not be reliant on public funds, to possibly undergo medical examination and to accept that serious criminal activity may give grounds for deportation (Clayton 2010: 8). Legislation itself thereby appears to give legitimacy to rarely substantiated concerns (ibid.; Sales 2007: 132-133) which circulate in parliamentary or
extra-parliamentary debate prior to the passing of legislation about the inordinate threats presented to the country by prospective immigrants.

Policy also helps to construct the political categories associated with immigration, across dimensions of legality, permanence and corresponding rights (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 112; Kivisto and Faist 2010: 50). Policy decisions and the categories and definitions they produce are therefore important for the way they structure the conditions of migration. For example, migrants denied legal status (i.e. irregular migrants) are inevitably unable to exercise rights in relation to employment, health care or home ownership and may therefore consequently suffer certain hardships in relation to this (ibid.). In establishing names for legal categories which correspond strongly with certain migration experiences, the definitions created by policy are likely to resonate more widely due to their explanatory appeal.

The power of political elites to determine the terms and bounds of the public debate concerning immigration is not necessarily hegemonic, however. The previous section, for example, outlined the uncertainties of immigration law and the immigration process. Certainly, as will be discussed in further depth in the next chapter, the public do not always view immigration in the same framework as the government, to the extent that the public’s ‘imagined immigration’ can be contrasted with ‘statistical immigration’ (Blinder 2013). Ultimately this might be one reason ‘why states may find themselves unable to fulfil public demands for restrictive immigration policy’ (ibid.: 2).

‘Official’ definitions: How has the state legislated for immigration?
United Kingdom statutory law does not actually technically designate anyone as ‘an immigrant’, as there is no such legal definition. Instead, there is a ‘key distinction between those who have the ‘right of abode’ in the UK...and those who do not have this right’, also known as ‘Persons Subject to Immigration Control’ (Anderson and Blinder 2014: 3).

Further, the UK has for most of its history made no distinction between subject and citizen (Layton Henry 1984: 12), traditionally being based on what Castles and Miller call the ‘imperial model’ of citizenship (2009: 44). The main distinction made between people has historically therefore been between ‘subjects’ and ‘aliens’ – aliens being those owing
no allegiance to the British Crown\textsuperscript{59} (Layton Henry 1984: 12). Prior to 1948, the distinction was binary: those with right of abode were British subjects; those subject to immigration control were aliens (Clayton 2010: 71). The rights conferred on subjects ‘came to be subsumed under the grandiose notion ‘Civis Britannicus sum’ and became part of the ideology which legitimised’ Empire\textsuperscript{60} (Layton Henry 1984: 12). The history of British immigration law is thus bound up with the history of its nationality law (see Appendix A).

Perhaps the most crucial change associated with the categories of subject and alien in recent UK history concerns Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth and what is now known as the European Union. When Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973, European citizens gained labour and residence rights. In the prior years, the UK’s relationship with the Commonwealth had shifted unalterably, accompanied by a curtailment in the rights of Commonwealth subjects amid a highly politicised debate about the effects of their immigration to the UK. Between 1945 and the 1970s, then, European citizens hereby regarded as aliens switched places with Commonwealth subjects to enjoy rights of residence and employment in the UK – while the status of the former subjects was ‘largely reduced to that of aliens’\textsuperscript{61} (Spencer 2011: 25). This was achieved through a re-definition of the categories of people able to obtain British passports and those subject to immigration control, through both immigration and nationality law\textsuperscript{62}. Overall and most importantly, from 1968 legislation was introduced which began a shift from the \textit{jus soli} (right of the soil), culminating in a hybrid form of the \textit{jus sanguinis} (right of blood) (Clayton 2010: 72-73). Put simply, a parental (or grand-parental) connection to the UK essentially became a requirement for the acquisition of a citizenship.

\textsuperscript{59} Note that the contemporary citizenship process produces \textit{British} citizenship, rather than English, Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish citizenship.

\textsuperscript{60} The key to this approach, it is argued, is that it ‘veils the dominance of a particular ethnic group or national over the other subject peoples’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 44).

\textsuperscript{61} The Immigration Act came into force on the same day as the UK formally joined the EEC, a set of circumstances which symbolically concluded the replacement of a sense of obligation towards the citizens of the Commonwealth with a vision of Britain as an integral part of Europe (Holmes 1988: 263). Interestingly, the current population of EU citizens able to live in the UK is approximately 500 million, comparable to the 600 million Commonwealth subjects who could move to the UK until restrictions were introduced (Bloom and Tonkiss 2013: 1067).

\textsuperscript{62} Those currently subject to immigration control range across several categories, including: ‘Aliens’, (most) ‘Citizens of Commonwealth countries’, ‘British Dependent Territories citizens’ and ‘British Overseas citizens’, leaving only British citizens and Commonwealth citizens (with right of abode as of 1 January 1983) to automatically have right of abode (Clayton 2010: 73).
British passport, a connection which became known as ‘patriality’ in the 1971 Immigration Act (Anderson 2013: 40).

These shifts were triggered by concerns on the part of the public as much as on the part of politicians about the level of immigration from the non-white countries of the New Commonwealth (Spencer 1997). This is reflected across the modern history of the immigration debate, in which a twin focus on numbers and ‘race’ (and the general avoidance of the positive economic case until relatively recently\(^{63}\) [Freeman 1994: 298; Bevan 1986: 6-7]) has recurrently combined to produce the argument that ‘there are too many people of particular races and classes’ (Finney and Simpson 2009: 49; Mynott 2002: 13). A focus on particular groups in different periods means that there are several identifiable ‘phases’ of statutory UK immigration control, summarised by Sales (2007: 131) as comprising: the ‘control of mainly Jewish migration’ from 1905 until circa 1945 (see Pellew 1989; Wray 2006; Mynott 2002), ‘controls on New (black) Commonwealth immigration’ from the 1960s onwards (see Spencer 1997), ‘controls on asylum seekers’ from the late 1980s onwards (see below) and the period of ‘managed migration’, constituting ‘greater selectivity in labour migration’ and ‘stricter controls on asylum’, in the 2000s. Appendix A outlines and summarises the legislation which has marked these main phases of control.

Prior to the 1990s, a bipartisan consensus on immigration had already effectively been established (Bevan 1986: 24-25), albeit with intra- and inter-party conflicts. This meant that, ultimately, although the Labour Party and the Conservative Party each had their own essentially distinct broad policy agenda, by the publication of Labour’s 1965 White Paper the leadership of both parties were in agreement that restrictive immigration control was necessary\(^{64}\). The Labour Party did, however, ‘soften the blow’ by introducing

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\(^{63}\) In contrast with the case against immigration on economic grounds, which usually centres on arguments that immigration depresses the wages of lower-skilled workers and reduces ‘native’ employment through competition in the labour market (see Castles and Miller 2009: 230-233 for the issues surrounding this ongoing debate), the case for includes ‘economic advantage, capital investment, expanding the labor force, international contacts and trade, and the acquiring of enterprise and entrepreneurial skills’ (Layton-Henry 1994: 276), to name a few.

\(^{64}\) An obvious example of this lies in the fact that the Labour Party followed the Conservative Party’s Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 (Somerville 2007: 17). For the Labour Party, this represented quite a reversal of their position following the 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill, comprising ‘total opposition towards immigration controls for Commonwealth
– albeit in ‘piecemeal fashion’ – race relations law in 1965, 1968 and 1976 (ibid.: 25). On immigration control, backbench – and the occasional front-bench (e.g. Enoch Powell) – dissent could be expected, but legislation has reflected intricate discussion about the limits of control and its effects rather than more fundamental differences (Sales 2002: 471).

Particularly since the 1990s, however, the introduction of immigration control legislation has intensified. This has entailed more frequent and more comprehensive legislation. The Labour Party, for instance, introduced seven major pieces of legislation between 1999 and 2009 (plus many other pieces of legislation with an immigration dimension [Mulvey 2010: 439]), created 84 immigration offences within six of these acts whereas only 70 had previously been created since 1905 (Aliverti 2013) and made 47 changes to the Immigration Rules between 2004 and 2009 (Spencer 2011: 13). These measures were subsequently criticised for their reactivity and populism (Mulvey 2010: 439). The ‘political hyper activism’ (Spencer 2011: 13) which has marked them is, in fact, one suggested cause of policy failure, whereby the political expediency of gaining ‘points’ from the media and elsewhere for new proposals and legislative acts outweighs the substantive work of ‘efficient implementation or in evaluating past initiatives’ (Dunleavy 1995: 61 in Spencer 2011: 13) and may simply invite political pressure to extend legislation further by fuelling an immigration problematic.

Party politically, there has been a historical tendency for parties to retain their opponent’s policies upon election to government, even despite vocal criticisms while in Opposition (Spencer 2011: 20). This is likely because being in Opposition affords parties the chance to promote a set of policy proposals that do not necessarily have to be delivered but which can remain true to the party’s basic ideological commitments, a luxury that is lost upon election when the logic of political crises, international obligations and economic imperatives takes over (Bale 2013: 33-34). This tendency can be observed in the early-twentieth century with the Liberal Party’s reluctant enforcement of the Aliens Act 1905 (Pellew 1989), in the mid-twentieth century with the Labour Party’s abandonment of opposition to Commonwealth immigration controls once in power (Foot subjects, strong support for the ideal of a multiracial Commonwealth, and support for legislation to combat racial discrimination’ (Layton Henry 1992: 74, see also Foot 1965, ch. 8).
1965: 186) and in the late-twentieth century with the transition from Conservative asylum policy to New Labour asylum policy (Spencer 2011: 20; Schuster and Solomos 2004).

Further, Studlar notes that ‘however much party policies on immigration may diverge during the course of a particular Government, the approach of a general election induces a convergence of policy’ (1980: 213). This strategy reputedly attempts to appease the middle-ground of public opinion and anticipate criticism of policy in what has become a highly divisive debate. For the Labour Party, it is claimed that this has meant not only muting its prior criticisms of immigration policy but also its discussion of immigration politics generally; while the Conservative Party leadership attempts to minimize the electoral influence of its anti-immigrant members and supporters and appeal to more numerable moderate voters (ibid.).

Due in large part to the influence of Enoch Powell, the Conservative Party have secured an image of being ‘tougher on immigration’ than their Labour opponents since the 1960s (Saggar 2003: 180, 183). It is for this level of dominance that Layton-Henry claimed, writing in 1992, that the Conservative Party had ‘dictated immigration policy since 1962’ (1992: 176), something that the Labour Party attempted to change during their years in government from 1997. Nonetheless, while the Conservative Party’s lead amongst the public as the ‘best party on immigration’ has narrowed from the heights of 54% in 1970 (Saggar 2003: 180) over time, it remained 23% in 2010 (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 109).

A notable and related issue to this dynamic is in the establishment of overwhelming ethnic minority support for the Labour Party in the post-1945 era (measured at approximately 80 per cent between the October 1974 election and the 1997 election), such that ethnic minority voters (which included increasing numbers of New Commonwealth immigrants during this period) have become considered to be amongst their ‘safest constituencies’ (Saggar 1998: 26). This support remained relatively unchanged in the 2010 election; reductions in ethnic minority support (from 82% in 1997 to 69% in 2010) can be compared with larger reductions in majority ethnic Labour support (from 47% in 1997 to 29% in 2010) such that ethnic minority voters ‘now constitute a larger share of Labour voters than they did in 1997’ (Heath et al. 2011: 265-266).
Legislatively, regardless of the party in government, immigration law has frequently been oriented towards stopping the immigration of certain racialised groups. Governments have naturally been eager to construct immigration control policy in ways which could not be construed as having been based on arbitrary, racialised – and, therefore, illegitimate – categories (Mynott 2002: 13; Hayter 2004). The motives for immigration controls have therefore often been cloaked by discrimination along surrogate dimensions which are deemed to constitute acceptable criteria, such as through, or at the intersections of, nationality, class (Joshi 2002) or concepts such as ‘patriality’. This applies, of course, in relation to a rationale for immigration control to meet the demand-side needs of the capitalist economy, meaning that the immigration control system is perhaps best described as a ‘filter’ rather than as a ‘rigid barrier’, allowing migrants deemed desirable in and obstructing the remainder (Smith and Marmo 2014: 348).

In 1905, for instance, immigration officers checked incoming passengers at designated ports, rejecting the ‘undesirable’, i.e. anyone ‘unable to show that he [sic] was capable of ‘decently’ supporting himself and his dependants’ (Pellew 1989: 373). This criterion applied especially strongly to impoverished Jewish migrants who had become the source of much contemporary debate (Mynott 2002: 14), but nowhere was this association explicit in the text of the statute. Similarly, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act introduced work vouchers in three categories for those wishing to enter the UK: Category A was reserved for those who had a job to come to, Category B was reserved for those possessing special skills in short supply and Category C was reserved for a ‘large undifferentiated group’ of unskilled workers ‘whose numbers would be set according to the labour needs of the UK economy’ (Spencer 1997: 129). The racist impact of the Act can be deduced in two main ways. Firstly, Irish immigration was again exempt from immigration control despite comprising the largest group of immigrants at the time.

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65 The established rule of thumb defined this as the possession of ‘five pounds with two additional pounds for each dependent’ (Pellew 1989: 376-377), which was applied only to ‘steerage’ passengers on ships carrying more than twenty people, thus exempting those in first- or second-class.

66 The position of Irish immigrants has historically been exceptional in that they have occupied a ‘middle-ground’, ‘acknowledged to be sufficiently similar to gain entry into the territory, yet identified as sufficiently different to be ever known as Irish’ (Paul 1997: 91). The UK and Ireland have so far opted out of rules governing the Schengen area of large parts of Europe, but together (along with the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands) share a similar partnership known as the ‘Common Travel Area’, which ensures freedom of travel for UK and Irish citizens within the British Isles. The Common Travel Area has been the norm for ‘most of the period since the Irish Free State was founded on 6 December 1922’, essentially
(Hartmann and Husband 1974: 12). Secondly, it had been expected that A and B vouchers would go to skilled white workers from the Old Commonwealth, and that C vouchers – later abolished entirely by the Labour Party’s 1965 White Paper ‘Immigration from the Commonwealth’ (Patterson 1969: 26) – would apply particularly to those in the New Commonwealth, i.e. non-white immigrants67 (Sales 2007: 140; Hayter 2004: 47-48). Moreover, the 1962 Act was the culmination of years of disproportionate political attention and restrictive elite attitudes towards New Commonwealth immigration since the arrival of the Empire Windrush. In fact, it merely instituted into formal policy certain informal though widespread administrative measures which were designed to delay and obstruct New Commonwealth immigration during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s (see Carter et al. 1987; Spencer 1997; Layton-Henry 1992: 28-36). The 1962 Act was therefore introduced on the very basis that it provided the appearance of non-discrimination (Spencer 2011: 24) while converting the often de facto denial for New Commonwealth immigrants to assert their rights to migrate to the UK into de jure policy (Carter et al. 1987: 337).

The racism which animated these political responses to immigration does not, however, appear to be the explicit driver of contemporary legislation. Instead, the UK has entered an era of ‘managed migration’, in which migrants are valorised (even more than previously) according to their perceived economic utility, which has coincided with the emergence of a more ‘technocratic’ mode of argument in the political debate (Anderson 2013: 57). In contemporary immigration law, this has meant that immigrants are stratified within a ‘points-based system’ when applying for work visas. Currently, the first ‘tier’ of this system enables migrants from several categories to apply for a visa, including as ‘entrepreneurs’, those with ‘exceptional talent’, ‘highly skilled migrants’, ‘graduate

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67 The then Home Secretary, Rab Butler, was later quoted (in documents released under the 30-year rule) as telling Cabinet colleagues in 1961: ‘The great merit of this scheme is that it can be presented as making no distinction on grounds of race or colour...Although the scheme purports to relate solely to employment and to be non-discriminatory, the aim is primarily social and its restrictive effect is intended to, and would in fact, operate on coloured people almost exclusively’ (Hayter 2004: 47, see also Spencer 1997: 116). The British Nationality Act of 1948 had entrenched the rights of Commonwealth migrants to take up employment without the restrictions placed on others. European workers, in contrast to British subjects from the Commonwealth, were ‘subjected to strict labour controls and could be prosecuted or deported if they broke their conditions of recruitment’ (Layton-Henry 1984: 20).

continuing prior practice (Ryan 2001: 856). The arrangement has meant that Ireland has historically been the largest source of migrants to the UK until the 2011 census, having been well established in the nineteenth century (see Panayi 2010: 44; Holmes 1988: 20).
entrepreneurs’ and ‘investors’ (gov.uk, n.d.). Meanwhile, Tier 5 is reserved for a variety of temporary workers and young adults wishing to live and work in the UK for a maximum of two years. This is the basis for the assessment that the immigration regime constructs ‘welcome outsiders’ (e.g. non-European business executives), who are not ‘kith and kin’ like ‘welcome insiders’ (e.g. people of British and Irish descent), but who are viewed as ‘more assimilable or bringing essential capital investment and managerial skills’ (Layton-Henry 1994: 273-274). Therefore, despite the fact that the rationale behind immigration control may have become less conspicuously racist in intention, the fact that the global distribution of capital and skills has not fundamentally altered since the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts were introduced means that the effects of legislation in its construction of who can immigrate to the UK are likely to be similar. Indeed, the ‘segmented labour market’ theory of migration posits that the structural demand of advanced economies for highly skilled workers (employed in finance and management roles, for instance) and lower-skilled manual workers (employed in menial production or service roles) (Castles and Miller 2009: 23) has caused ‘economic polarization’ within recent decades, especially so in ‘global cities’ such as London. Those in the first group are likely to be a member of the majority ethnic group, male and to have attained legal migration status, while those in the second group are more likely to be a member of a minority ethnic group, female and work illegally (ibid.: 23-24).

Alongside the ‘managed migration’ era, there has been an increasing political interest in the distinction between immigrants and refugees, associated with a considerable rise in the number of asylum applications during the late 1980s and early 1990s and the introduction of a substantial amount of related statutory legislation. Centrally, the debate comes down to questions about state responsibility and its limits (Rajaram 2013: 681). On the one hand, it is widely acknowledged internationally that political refugees ought to be prioritised ahead of economic migrants (Zolberg 2012: 1220; UN 1948, Article

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68 The last of these categories is reserved for people who wish to migrate to the UK and who are prepared to invest £1 million in government bonds, share capital or loan capital; these migrants are able to apply to settle in the UK earlier if they invest more capital (after 2 years if investing £10 million or after 3 years if investing £5 million).

Nevertheless this does not come without disagreements regarding who should be counted as a refugee (Zolberg 2012: 1220). Such disagreements have often been driven by strategic self-interest, either for reasons to do with foreign diplomacy\(^{70}\) (Sales 2007: 70; Bloch and Schuster 2005: 499-500) or in order to suppress refugee admission\(^{71}\), but are enabled by the divergent potential interpretations of the refugee definition provided by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Keyes 2004: 401; Mulvey 2011: 1479–1480).

Historically, the political significance of asylum and its limits have therefore undergone significant semantic and practical shifts over time, which has marked the narrowing of the associated set of eligibility criteria and entitlements for refugee status (Zetter 2007: 180). Since borders were virtually open prior to the twentieth century, no legal distinction was necessary for the formal allocation of refugee status. It had therefore been used only in a non-institutional and expansive sense in the British context with the arrival of the Huguenots (Sales 2007: 76) and came as a product of an emergent political liberalism and moral superiority (Shaw 2012; Schuster 2002). No formal, institutional distinctions were even made during the inter-war period in favour of aliens seeking asylum compared with other aliens, despite the fact that many of these aliens had fled religious or political persecution (Schuster 2002: 53). In fact, it was not until the introduction of the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act that asylum applications were handled distinctly from immigration applications and the 1951 Refugee Convention formally incorporated into British statutory law (Stevens 1998: 208; Schuster and Solomos 2001).

From the arrival of Tamil refugees in the 1980s – characterised as ‘bogus’ or ‘economic’ refugees (Runnymede Trust 2000: 212-213; van Dijk 1997), an increase in concern on the

\(^{70}\) As early as 1904, Arthur Balfour commented that ‘Britain is always ready to extend political asylum to those with whose politics her governing party agrees’ (paraphrased by Foot 1965: 107). Sales points out that it was for this reason that a Conservative government refused to accept refugees from General Pinochet’s Chile in 1973, only some of whom were later accepted by a Labour government (2007: 70). The more recent creation of ‘white lists’ of supposedly ‘safe’ countries to arbitrarily determine asylum cases as ‘unfounded’ also bears such diplomatic motives (ibid.).

\(^{71}\) For example, Dean notes an interview conducted by Jeremy Paxman on Newsnight in early 2003 with then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in which Blair said ‘I would like to see us reduce it [asylum numbers] by 30 per cent to 40 per cent in the next few months and I think by September of this year we should have halved it’, adding ‘I think we can get below that in years to come’ (in Dean 2012: 211). As Dean comments, arbitrary targets such as this breach the principles of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
part of the government saw the process of seeking asylum become increasingly
criminalised and deterred by lawmakers seeking to assuage and capitalise on related
public concerns (c.f. Banks 1998; Malloch and Stanley 2005; Aliverti 2012; O’Nions 2006;
Hassan 2000; Morris 2002: 416-418). The chief result of this has been what Zetter calls
the ‘fractioning’ of the refugee label at the bureaucratic level for instrumental, political
reasons, which has produced ever nuanced and elusive entitlements to refugee status
(e.g. with the rise of the ‘bogus’ asylum seeker) (Zetter 2007; Morris 2002: 416-418;
Gibney 2004; Schuster 2003b). As Zetter points out, this strategy has produced more
labels, but fewer refugees72 (ibid.).

While refugee status has become an ever-elusive entitlement, these political and
linguistic developments – abetted by hostile press coverage (Kaye 1998) – have produced
a dichotomy between the ‘bogus’ (or perhaps ‘undeserving’) asylum seeker, and the
‘genuine’ (or perhaps ‘deserving’) refugee (Sales 2002). The refugee label in its originally
more expansive and non-discretionary sense is therefore now used only by some NGOs
and international rights organisations73. According to Flynn, the disparity between the
promotion of ‘managed migration’ and the deterrence of asylum during this time is
consistent with the promotion of a view in which ‘in the new world of globalised reality,
the concept of ‘rights’, if it is applicable at all, should be reserved for those who have
made themselves useful to the needs of a growing and dynamic world economy, and who
are actively contributing to its further development’ (Flynn 2003: 2 in Anderson 2013:
57). In contrast, there is now a ‘widespread perception of asylum as an act of charity and
not as a right’ (Jubany 2011: 85).

Nonetheless, the institution of asylum remains intact, albeit in diminished form. Why
might this be? Gibney (2014) offers three possible reasons for its resilience despite often
strong public and political opposition: offering asylum helps to affirm the legitimacy of
immigration controls by providing the exception to the general rule (see also Carens

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72 Indeed, between the 1980s and the 1990s, refugee admission rates were dramatically reduced from
approximately 80 per cent to approximately 20 per cent (Runnymede Trust 2000: 214, see next chapter).
73 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees allocates refugee status ‘collectively rather than on
a case-by-case basis and it is done prior to refugees seeking settlement in a safe country’ (Kivisto and Faist
2010: 53). This contemporary usage of the term in its wider sense is designed to encourage an international
humanitarian response to provide essential aid to large groups of people (often sheltered in makeshift
refugee camps) displaced by persecution, civil war, and so on without the semantic and technical delays in
determining the status of each refugee.
2013: 194), offering asylum reinforces the state as a ‘community of value’ rather than as a random collection of individuals (see also van Dijk 1992: 109-111; Stern 2014; Schuster 1998, 2002: 55, 2003b: 173-174), and that the paradox of offering asylum despite the opposition of the demos is anyway an intrinsic, fundamental tension between the rights of the individual and democratic rule in liberal democratic states.

A final point to consider with regards to immigration categories is that some distinctions are made between immigrants and others in terms of their rights within the receiving society. Further, as residency, settlement, the granting of citizenship or naturalisation entail differentially meaningful relationships with the state, immigrants and refugees are still subject to distinct categories in terms of their associated rights even after immigration. Those granted full citizenship ‘belong’ in the nation and are afforded ‘superior and exclusive’ rights (Runnymede Trust 2000: 206). Commonwealth immigrants have the right to vote and stand in general elections, for instance. This has made Commonwealth immigrants a considerable voting ‘constituency’, in contrast with EU citizens, who can vote only in European and local elections. Kivisto and Faist (2010) therefore separate the legal status of immigrants into ‘alienship’, ‘denizenship’ and ‘citizenship’ (see Figure 3.1), with aliens holding the least rights and citizens the most.

**Figure 3.1:** Categories of legal status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>Immigrant categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alienship</td>
<td>• Migrants with temporary residence and work permits (e.g. seasonal workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Asylum seekers, ‘de facto refugees’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Irregular migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denizenship</td>
<td>• Labour migrants with permanent residence status and their dependents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recognised refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>• Citizens of immigration nation-states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Citizens of EU member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• (Citizens of autonomous regions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Kivisto and Faist (2010: 226).
Normative definitions: How else are immigrants defined?

As noted earlier, by establishing the parameters that determine entry status states not only have a monopoly on ‘who is and who is not an immigrant’ (at least in the sense of who is subject to control), but they also ‘define types of immigrants’ (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 50) – so sociological and popular typologies never stray too far from the definitional frames imposed upon them by legal categories.

Moreover, the legislative climate of immigration politics may have partially helped to blur apparently differing types of immigration together, providing a self-perpetuating and justificatory logic to the creation and construction of such categories as ‘bogus asylum seekers’. For example, the labelling of asylum seekers whose claims are subsequently refused as ‘illegal immigrants’ (e.g. see Kenyon 2010: 14) relies on the apparently self-evident assumption that, despite asylum refusals constituting an arbitrary artefact of policy, they provide ‘proof’ that asylum claims must necessarily be fraudulent (Bloch 2000: 35). As refusal rates increase, so too apparently does the evidence that asylum seekers are ‘bogus’. Other such artefacts of policy include the possible creation of the ‘asylum-immigration nexus’ in which it becomes difficult to distinguish the motives for migration (Sales 2007: 75), as a result of the establishment of voluntary routes and sources of migration which are then used by refugees and migrants alike; increased irregular migration, in order to circumvent policies deterring asylum (Koser 1998; Gibney 2008: 151); and increased asylum applications, in order to circumvent the closure of ‘primary immigration’ routes (Stevens 2004: 92).

Whereas the orderly legal categories imposed upon migrants by states bear witness to the instrumental (ideological and bureaucratic) purposes of control, sociological typologies are broader, focussing on the lived experiences and conditions of various types of immigration. ‘Voluntary versus forced migration’, for instance, ‘ought to be treated as a continuum rather than in dichotomous terms’ (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 43), which affords a more nuanced consideration of structure and agency than the demarcations of international and domestic law ordinarily allow.

Addressing the above concerns, Anthony Richmond has proposed a multivariate typology which considers migrants in terms of the extent to which their decisions are reactive or
pro-active, as well as how far they are based on political or socio-economic factors (1988). This manages to therefore make distinctions not only on the level of structure and agency but to acknowledge that political and economic causes of migration can be difficult to disentangle, which state definitions neglect to account for74 (Turton 2003: 9). In Richmond’s typology, pro-active migrants include ‘retirees, transilients, returnees, reunited families and ordinary ‘emigrants’ along with spies; whereas reactive migrants include ‘UN Convention refugees, stateless persons, slaves and forced labourers’ (Richmond 1988: 20). Figure 3.2 illustrates the matrix along the reactive-proactive and economic-sociopolitical dimensions75.

Figure 3.2: Richmond’s matrix of international migrants (1988: 20)

74 As Turton argues, ‘those who starve in a famine do so because they have insufficient *entitlement* to food, a political issue, not because there is insufficient food available’ (2003: 9, emphasis in original). Likewise, Sivanandan and Gonzalez note that ‘resistance to economic immiseration is inseparable from resistance to political persecution. The economic migrant is also the political refugee’ (2001: 88; see also Philo et al. 2013: 14).

75 For Richmond, ‘the vertical axis represents decision-making on a continuum from maximum to minimum autonomy. The horizontal axis represents the interaction of economic and socio-political forces, reflecting that they come full circle as internal and external state powers converge’ (1988: 20). Turton criticises the lack of agency the model affords the most reactive migrants, claiming that ‘even at the most ‘reactive’ or ‘involuntary’ end of the continuum, people probably have a lot more choice than we might think...[t]hey may have choices not only about whether but also about when, where and how to move which cannot be encompassed by continua of this kind’ (2003: 10).
A typology of immigration to the UK

Despite the difficulties of extricating some flows of migration from others, the following normative typology helps to group some types of migrant together and identify at which points the distinctions between groups become experientially significant. This precludes analysis from treating, for instance, ‘the IT person leaving the high-tech sector in Hyderabad for Silicon Valley’ and ‘the peasant fleeing drought conditions in the Sahara’ the same76. The key to recognising that there are somewhat discrete points on a continuum comes due to the distinct but malleable political and moral responses to immigration of differing causes and consequences.

‘Voluntary’ migration

Voluntary migration relates to the movement of ‘discretionary migrants motivated by economic or family considerations’ (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 102). Although describing all forms of such migration as ‘voluntary’ is questionable since migration theories tend to suggest that there are forces of compulsion as well as attraction involved in immigration processes (see Castles and Miller 2009: 20-33 and Kivisto and Faist 2010: 33-45), it can be used to describe many of the migrants on the ‘pro-active’ side of Richmond’s typology. Immigration in this sense is defined by the International Organisation for Migration as ‘a process by which non-nationals move into a country for the process of settlement’ (IOM 2004: 31). The aspect of ‘settlement’ (of at least several months, if not one year) is considered integral to distinguishing between people notionally considered to be immigrants and those considered to be non-immigrants who nevertheless cross borders, such as tourists, ambassadors and border officials (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 49). Particularly since the Second World War, the most significant forms of immigration to the UK have been ‘voluntary’, comprising labour (or ‘economic’) migration, migration for family reunification77 and student migration (Spencer 2011).

76 Examples provided by Kivisto and Faist (2010: 43).
77 In the UK context, much of this came in the aftermath of the attempted closure of primary immigration from the New Commonwealth in the legislation of the 1960s and 1971. This type of migration includes not only the staggered migration of a single person who is subsequently joined by their family, but also ‘family formation’ in which someone is joined by a partner from abroad whom they intend to marry and ‘whole family’ migration when the entire family moves at once (Kofman 2004 in Spencer 2011: 130).
‘Forced’ migration

In contrast, forced migrants have a far smaller degree of agency (though their mobility is not completely without agency), and many can be placed on the ‘reactive’ side of Richmond’s typology. There are three main groups of political refugees, related to the reasons for which they are persecuted. These are: ‘activists’ who ‘flee the regimes to which they are opposed’; ‘targeted refugees’ who are persecuted due to membership of a particular group and ‘victims’ who are ‘accidentally caught in a violent situation’ (Zolberg 1989: 269 in Richmond 1993: 9). Beyond this there are also other kinds of refugees, such as those escaping natural disasters.

As noted in the previous chapter, much of the political and press attention surrounding refugees and asylum seekers from the mid-1980s has suggested that asylum seekers are essentially ‘economic migrants’ and make a calculated and cynical distinction between the merits of claiming asylum in Britain compared with other countries, heading for the so-called ‘soft-touch’ UK as a result (Buchanan et al. 2003; Mollard 2001; Lynn and Lea 2003; Kaye 1994, 1998; Philo et al. 2013; Matthews and Brown 2012; Gibney 2008). In the terms of migration studies scholarship, they have essentially been constructed as an augmented version of anticipatory refugee movements, rather than acute refugee movements78 (Kunz 1973). As Kunz puts it,

‘The anticipatory refugee... leaves his [sic] home country before the deterioration of the military or political situation prevents his orderly departure. He arrives in the country of settlement prepared; he knows something of the language, usually has some finance and is informed about the ways by which he can re-enter his trade or profession’ (ibid.: 131-132).

Kunz claims that situations such as these, despite superficially resembling voluntary migration, should still be classified as refugee movements (ibid.: 132). However, the ‘fractioning’ (Zetter 2007) of the refugee label has essentially restricted common understandings of refugee situations to an ideal which fits the ‘acute’ model, in which

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78 Day and White add the ‘blocked return’ scenario, in which an asylum application is made well after entry due to changes of circumstance in the place of origin (2002: 18).
‘the 'push' motive is overwhelming, and...follows only after the refugee’s situation deteriorates to the point where he [sic] finds it intolerable to stay any longer’ (Kunz 1973: 132). Nonetheless, research has shown that many asylum seekers do tend to broadly fit the acute refugee scenario, relying on limited or non-existent information about their country of destination (whether in regards to systems such as those which determine welfare support and asylum determination, or even generally) and often, therefore, also on the decisions of expensive agents (i.e. ‘smugglers’) to determine their route for them (Crawley 2010; Day and White 2002; Gilbert and Koser 2006; Hayter 2004: 100). Of those who are able to exercise agency in deciding where to go, family or social networks are a key influence in that decision-making process (Crawley 2010; Gilbert and Koser 2006), in addition to English language proficiency of some kind (Day and White 2002). These factors, as in other areas of immigration to the UK, seem to underline the importance of Britain’s historical, cultural and ultimately colonial links with people around the world. For the receiving country, the sudden arrival of a number of refugees means that they are ‘forced to respond rapidly, and immigration can rarely be phased’ (Peach et al. 1988: 601).

Having felt compelled to leave their nation of birth or residence, asylum seekers are almost by definition one of the most enduringly disempowered groups in society upon arrival (Goodman and Speer 2007: 166). Their journeys have becoming increasingly dangerous if not fatal as the states of the ‘Global North’ have attempted to deter their journeys (Banks 1998; Malloch and Stanley 2005; Aliverti 2012; O’Nions 2006; Hassan 2000; Bloch 2000; Spencer 2011). Upon arrival, they are then subject to various forms of ‘exclusion’ by the state, whether through deportation, detention or dispersal (Schuster 2007), and thus occupy an ‘interstitial’ position in society (especially while waiting for a decision about their application) (Stewart 2005).

Undoubtedly the most important definition for the allocation of refugee status by international humanitarian standards comes from the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (and its 1967 Protocol), of which the UK is a signatory. Signatory states are expected to at least consider each case for asylum individually79 and

79 This has been called into question in the UK in recent years with various politicians committing to arbitrary reductions in successful asylum applications, the creation of ‘white lists’ in 1996 and 2002.
have a duty to not return refugees to places where they will be persecuted, a key idea in refugee law known as non-refoulement (Spencer 2011: 46).

The Convention defines a refugee as ‘any person who is outside the country of his [sic] nationality...because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality’ (UNHCR 1951). The definition provided by the Convention does not offer protection for people increasingly displaced by natural disasters (e.g. floods, volcanoes), environmental change or human-made disasters (e.g. deforestation, climate change and industrial accidents) (Philo et al. 2013: 14).

A typical definition of asylum seekers defines them as ‘persons seeking to be admitted into a country as a refugee and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments’ (IOM 2004: 8).

‘Irregular’ Migration

‘Irregular’ migrants straddle the pro-active/reactive divide, given the numerous configurations of possible irregular status. Such migrants are not necessarily ‘rule breakers intent on living and working in Britain without permission’ (Spencer 2011: 158) or helplessly passive victims of circumstance. Migrants gain ‘irregular’ (or ‘illegal’ in media and parliamentary parlance) status in a number of ways: by clandestine entry (including by evading border officials and deception such as by using false documents), by overstaying the date agreed in their original or revised terms of entry, by ‘semi-compliance’ with their terms of entry (such as by working without permission), through being born to parents with irregular status or through retrospectively-applied legislation which have enabled the Home Secretary to summarily reject applications from selected countries ‘in which it appears... there is in general no serious risk of persecution’ (in Stevens 1998: 211-212), the ‘fast-tracking’ of selected cases and ‘passive’ methods of interdiction such as visa requirements and carrier sanctions which impede the presentation of asylum cases (Stern 2014: 27).

Moreover, normatively distinct processes such as ‘smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ are not necessarily as easily demarcated in practice, despite the confident definitions of government officials (c.f. Geddes 2005: 327) ‘Irregular’ is the preferred term in scholarly and NGO discourse due to its lack of association with established policy positions, in recognition of the fact that irregular migrants may have ‘differing degrees of departure from legal status’ and for its distancing from the criminalizing connotations of terms such as ‘illegal immigrant’ (Spencer 2011: 158). For many people, the term is preferred because ‘defining people as illegal denies their humanity: a human being cannot be illegal’ (Koser 2007: 54).
administrative measures (Spencer 2011: 163; Geddes 2005: 326; Jahn and Straubhaar 1998: 18-19). Irregularity may therefore be a shifting status that migrants move into or out of quite fluidly, whether into or out of ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ migration statuses.\(^{82}\)

In living beyond the reach of the state, they are highly vulnerable to ‘poverty, social exclusion and exploitation’ (Spencer 2011: 161). Further, states view their obligations towards irregular migrants minimally (in comparison to other types of migrant) in response to what they see as violations of their sovereignty on the part of irregular migrants\(^{83}\) (Hovdal-Moan 2012), while they hold few legal protections in international politics (Morris 2002: 421).

The political significance of irregular migration comes with a tension between, on the one hand, its unpopularity and its contribution to perceptions that migration is ‘out of control’ (Spencer 2011: 161; Geddes 2005: 330) and, on the other, the fact that it is administratively unmanageable, owing to its intractable set of supply and demand forces (i.e. the ‘shadow economy’) and intrinsically illicit characteristics (Jahn and Straubhaar 1998). Policies therefore tend to focus on counteracting irregular migration from within the borders of the state using methods of internal control, which are cheaper methods than implementing ‘complete’ border control and can intercept those who become irregular beyond the border (ibid.: 28, 31).

**Summary**

This chapter has shown how the politics of immigration structure the conditions of immigration, and therefore in many respects what the categories, definitions and boundaries are that people come to know immigration by. In other words, examining the politics of immigration helps to provide a background regarding the ways in which the state ‘sees’ immigration, which may find themselves privileged in news accounts of immigration.

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\(^{82}\) Examples of this provided by Koser (2010: 183) include: an irregular migrant who successfully applies for asylum, a migrant who enters through legal means before overstaying their visa, and an asylum seeker whose application is rejected but who subsequently remains in the country without authority.

\(^{83}\) This logic is summarised by the ‘implicit’ claim that ‘since the state *could*, given the chance, have excluded these immigrants at the territorial border, it can also deny them certain liberties and exclude them from the social rights associated with legal stay in the state’s interior’ (Hovdal-Moan 2012: 1227, emphasis in original). Indeed, terms such as ‘legal migration’ and ‘illegal migration’ depend upon the state’s right to decide who is a legitimate migrant (Geddes 2005: 326).
More specifically, the chapter has provided a profile of the way in which certain groups of immigrants to the UK have been welcomed or rejected by immigration policy historically, and therefore what the political climate has been in respect to a range of types and groups of immigration. The importance of the media’s role in potentially engendering, entrenching, approving or contesting the assumptions and consequences of this climate cannot be presumed but it also surely must not be ignored. The ramifications of the relationship between legislative, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary definitions of immigration and media representations of immigration form an important basis upon which to assess the data presented in the analytical chapters of the thesis.

However, the politics of immigration are not restricted to the world of political and media discourse. Immigration is a phenomenon ‘out there’, which is experienced and perceived by migrants and public alike. The next chapter briefly explores this in relation to the patterns of immigration and the response of the public.
4: The Politics and History of Immigration: Demography and Public Opinion

Introduction

The patterns of immigration and the public reaction to immigration are inseparable from the political and media discourses to which they are responsive and productive. These aspects provide a further backdrop to the debates already considered, and seek to show that important changes have taken place over time in the profile of immigration to the UK, but that there have been sustained features of the policy preferences demonstrated by the general public. They therefore bear important ramifications for an adequate understanding of the media coverage produced over the sampled time frame in terms of both representation and reception. Placing these issues together draws attention to the linkages between them as ‘real-world indicators’ and invites comparison between the level and nature of immigration coverage and these facets of immigration politics.

The chapter begins by providing a broad overview of the demographic changes in immigration which have occurred over the sample period. This section contextualises immigration to the UK historically and internationally, considers some of the most significant changes in the character of immigration to the UK since the middle of the twentieth century and provides some specific information about patterns relating to different types of migration. This is followed by a section focussing on the ‘public debate’. Through a discussion of the history of opinion polls relating to immigration and ‘race’, certain conclusions are made about public preferences in immigration politics and what the democratic implications may be for these preferences. Since audiences are constituted by the public, this section also contextualises the readership preferences of newspaper audiences.

Demographic Patterns

As so much of the political and media debate has focussed on the ‘numbers game’ and the politics of immigration control, it is essential to measure the context against which this framing has taken place. This section will provide a chronological overview of the patterns which have marked immigration to the UK since the beginning of the twentieth century. Firstly, it examines which groups of migrants were already established prior to
1918, before outlining the long-term patterns of continuity and change which took place between 1918 and 2010. Given the extent to which immigration to the UK and global migration have changed over the past fifty years, this period has been focussed on in particular. Finally, due to the prominence and exceptional status of issues relating to forced migrants and irregular migrants in political and media debate, the patterns of immigration of these groups will be considered in isolation from wider developments.

The ‘Pre-History’: Prior to 1918

As suggested in the Chapter 1, immigration has played a considerable role in the formation of the UK and its history. Castles and Miller argue, however, that the ‘denial of the role of immigrants in nation-building has been crucial to the creation of myths of national homogeneity’ (2009: 79). Stuart Hall relates this in the British case to the spectre of Empire, describing a ‘profound historical forgetfulness...a kind of historical amnesia’ (1978: 25) adopted within British culture about race and Empire in or by the mid-twentieth century, which attempted to efface the uncomfortable history of Empire and deal with the trauma of surrendering colonial gains in power and territory. It also helped, in his view, to sever the past from the present and extricate the past actions of the once-colonial power from its post-colonial responsibilities (see ibid.: 24).

Defined in the broadest terms, ‘migrants’ have in a sense existed in Britain (or Britannia) for millennia. Significantly, though, 1066 provides the symbolic rupture at which point population movement into Britain could no longer be classified as ‘invasions’, heralding instead relatively peaceful migrations into an inchoate society (Panayi 2010: 12). This stemming of invasions, along with Britain and Ireland’s separation from the rest of continental Europe thousands of years previously, has also contributed to the hegemony of national myths which suggest that Britain possesses ‘multiple, unbroken connections between past and present’ (Runnymede Trust 2000: 18). It is from this point that the entry of ‘aliens’ and (albeit occasional and unsuccessful) restrictions on their entry, whether through crown prerogative or statute, began⁸⁴ (Panayi 2010: 13). Thereafter, the

⁸⁴ For example, Edward I expelled all Jews from England in 1290, a measure which was not officially repealed until 1656 (Holmes 1988: 5-7), Elizabeth I expelled or imprisoned Irish people in the late sixteenth century (Clayton 2010: 7) and recommended that black people present within the country – trafficked as slaves into Britain at that time by people involved in the triangular trade – be expelled from the land (Hall 1978: 23). Thereafter, parliamentary legislation dealt ineffectually and sporadically with deportation, or
movement of ‘continental tradesmen, bankers and craftsmen’ in the ‘high and late middle ages’, ‘religious refugees, economic migrants and slaves’ from 1500 to 1650 and economically-based migration from circa-1650 to the beginning of the nineteen century marked the major periods of early immigration in the more recognisable form in which it is now conceptually defined

Migratory patterns sharpened considerably in the late nineteenth century, such that, leading into the twentieth century, the number of aliens recorded by the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration was 135,640 in 1881, 219,523 in 1891 and 286,925 in 1901, many of whom lived in London (Layton Henry 1994: 281; Foot 1965: 90). However, this put the ‘alien presence’, upon which so much political attention was now focused, at .69% of the total British population, compared with corresponding figures of approximately 1.4% in Germany, 2% in Austria, 2.7% in France and 9.6% in Switzerland (Foot 1965: 90).

By this time several migrant groups had been well established. By far the most numerous were Irish migrants (crucially not considered ‘aliens’ by the earliest immigration laws), who were well established in Britain by the late nineteenth century, particularly in London, Lancashire and Scotland (Holmes 1988: 20). The Irish migrant community had declined from the heights of roughly 727,000 in 1851 and 806,000 in 1861, and by 1911 was recorded as 550,040 people (1% of the total population of England and Wales, and 3.7% of the total population of Scotland) (ibid.: 21). Far less numerous though certainly to become of more political interest, the Jewish community numbered 51,250 in 1875 (Holmes 1988: 26); these people were joined in Britain, due mainly to anti-Semitic pogroms and repression in eastern Europe, by approximately 120,000 Jews between 1875 and 1914, many of whom settled in the East End of London (Foot 1965: 86). The 1911 census also recorded 95,541 Russian Polish migrants (of some overlap with the

85 Beyond the migrant communities mentioned in the previous footnote, other groups included Dutch and Belgian refugees from the Low Countries in the sixteenth century, an estimated 50,000 French Huguenots in the late seventeenth century and 10,000 Palatine refugees in the early eighteenth century (Hayter 2004:14; Foot 1965: 80-81). Additionally, it has been estimated that there were 15,000 black people in London in 1770 as a result of the slave trade (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 10).
Jewish community) in England and Wales in 1911 (.3% of the population) (Holmes 1988: 26), 53,324 German migrants (.1% of the population) (ibid.: 23) and 20,389 Italian migrants (ibid.: 30). Beyond these groups there were also much smaller immigrant populations in London and beyond, including Chinese, Indian, French, Spanish, Czech and American communities (ibid.: 32-36).

Broad patterns, 1918-2010

At the start of the twentieth century, the UK was well established as a ‘net exporter’ of population (Hicks and Allen 1999: 7). Indeed, one set of estimates claims that between 1871 and 1931, Britain saw a mass emigration, mostly to various places in its Empire, of over 3 million people (Foot 1965: 80; see also Layton-Henry 1992: 2), while another claims that the total number of emigrants between 1846-1924 numbered approximately 17 million people, which would have made the UK by far the country of the most emigration in Europe during this time (Ferenczi 1933: 436). Figure 4.1 shows that this was reversed during the interwar years, ‘as many migrants returned home to ‘weather the storm’ of the depression years’ (Hicks and Allen 1999: 7). No census data was recorded in 1941 due to the Second World War, but the 1949 Report of the Royal Commission on Population estimated that net migration between 1931 and 1940 was +650,000 overall (Layton-Henry 1992: 2). The net emigration of the 1970s and 1980s is explained by the re-establishment of British migration to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (Hicks and Allen (1999: 7), though this was relatively short-lived. A decline in the emigration of British citizens and a rise in the immigration of foreign citizens in the 1990s produced a pattern of net inward migration again, though consistently so only from 1994 (see Hatton 2005: 721-722). The first decade of the twenty-first century saw net migration soar to an average of almost +200,000 a year, with estimates of immigration itself breaching 500,000 in 2002 and numbering between 567,000 and 596,000 a year from 2004 to 2010 (see Spencer 2011: 31; Vargas-Silva 2014a).
Contemporary patterns

The rapid alteration of immigration patterns seen in the 1990s and 2010s provides an important context to the legislative developments of the 1990s onwards as discussed above. Interestingly, however, the deployment of the ‘numbers game’ pre-dates this rise (Bevan 1986: 34), while the political debate has long been reliant on recurrent arguments either in favour of or against immigration (see ibid.: 6-12), which have been informed by and adaptive to these changing patterns but ultimately remain intact.

Importantly, these patterns can be placed in the context of wider, global patterns of migration. Indeed, the period after 1945, especially from the 1980s onwards, has been called the ‘age of migration’ by migration scholars Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (2009), who claim that the mass, mostly transatlantic migrations of the period 1850-1914 can be contrasted with the unprecedented migrations of the contemporary age, which

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86 Caution must be exercised when assessing estimates such as this, since figures prior to the introduction of the International Passenger Survey in 1964 rely on inferences made based on census data, by ‘measuring the proportion of population change that is not attributable to recorded births and deaths’ and calculating the mean average for the years between censuses to give an annual estimate (Hawkins 2013: 8). However, ‘not all the population change that is unaccounted for is necessarily due to long-term international migration’ (ibid.).

87 This period has alternatively been dubbed the ‘new migration’ in relation to Europe (Koser and Lutz 1998).
they say affect all regions of the world, which have expanded exponentially and which are having ‘enormous economic and social consequences’ (ibid.: 2-3). They identify several general tendencies across the globe which characterise this age of migration, including the globalization of migration, the acceleration of migration, the differentiation of migration, the feminization of migration\(^88\), the growing politicization of migration\(^89\) and the proliferation of migration transition\(^90\) (ibid.: 11-12). I will now briefly consider the first three of these due to their important interconnections with the UK experience.

The ‘globalization of migration’ refers to the expansion in the number of receiving and sending countries around the world, ‘so that most countries of immigration have entrants from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 10). Globalization is reputedly driven not only by the movement of people, but also by the ‘cross-border flows’ of ‘finance and trade, [...] democracy and good governance, cultural and media products and environmental pollution’ (ibid.: 51). This process has therefore challenged state sovereignty ‘from above and below’ (ibid.: 12), be it from obligations towards global or supra-national institutions, or from large, sometimes undetectable, migrations with seemingly implacable causes (Sassen 1996). It is suggested, then, that globalization has both motivated immigration ‘flows’, such as those of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, and challenged the state’s capacity to address them through legislative means.

Further, Vertovec argues that, along with the reversal of net migration from emigration to immigration, the multiplicity in migrants’ places of origin (along with other markers such as language and religion) since the 1990s means that Britain is now characterised by ‘super-diversity’ (2004: 1029). This is emphasised by the expansion in the range of migrants’ places of origin which have no particular historical (e.g. colonial) links with

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88 This relates to the way in which patterns of migration have moved from being male-dominated to constituting increasing numbers of female migrants, such as with labour migration and refugee movements since the 1960s (Castles and Miller 2009: 12).

89 This corresponds to the way in which ‘domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies of states around the world are increasingly affected by international migration’ and the corresponding degree of attention paid to solutions based on global governance and ‘cooperation between receiving, transit and sending countries’ (Castles and Miller 2009: 12).

90 This refers to the evolution of countries traditionally associated only with emigration to countries predominantly of transit migration and, perhaps eventually, immigration (e.g. Poland, Spain, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea) (Castles and Miller 2009: 12).
Britain, in addition to new links such as with the EU. For example, in 1971 Old Commonwealth countries accounted for 30% of immigration to Britain, New Commonwealth immigration accounted for 32%, EEC citizens accounted for 10% and those from the ‘Middle East and Other’ data category in government statistics accounted for 16%. By 2002 people from Old Commonwealth countries accounted for 17% of immigration, New Commonwealth immigration accounted for 20%, EU migration accounted for 17% and people from the ‘Middle East and Other’ accounted for 40% (ibid.: 1029; see also Berkeley et al. 2005).

Since the accession to the EU of the A8 countries in 2004, upon whose citizens the UK, Ireland and Sweden imposed no transitional controls unlike elsewhere in the EU, the proportion of EU immigration has risen considerably, peaking at 34% and consistently outnumbering migration from the ‘Other’ category. However, between 2004 and 2010, EU immigration was less than combined (i.e. ‘New’ and ‘Old’) Commonwealth immigration.

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91 New Commonwealth immigration increased considerably during the 1950s, often in a close correlation with labour demands (see Rose et al. 1969: 74-75), and rapidly so in the build-up to 1962 as people attempted to ‘beat’ the imminent introduction of what was highly-anticipated legislation. In absolute terms, estimated net immigration from the New Commonwealth rose from 42,650 in 1955 (of which 27,500 was from the West Indies) to 57,700 in 1960 (of which 49,650 was from the West Indies), and to 136,400 in 1961 (of which 66,300 was from the West Indies), while immigration from India rose from 5,900 in 1960 to 23,750 in 1961 and immigration from Pakistan rose from 2,500 in 1960 to 25,100 in 1961 (Layton-Henry 1994: 13). The Commonwealth Immigrants Acts did manage to curtail immigration from the West Indies, but essentially instituted the family migration which came after (Hansen 2000: 123-124; Spencer 1997).

92 The ‘Other’ category in government statistics includes people from Eastern Europe (prior to EU accession), South America, Central America, non-Commonwealth African countries, South-East Asia, China, Japan and others (Berkeley et al. 2005: 10).

93 These comprised Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Cyprus and Malta also joined but were already members of the Commonwealth.

94 Upon the accession of the A2 countries, Romania and Bulgaria, in 2007, this time the UK did place transitional controls on Bulgarian and Romanian migrants’ opportunities to move to the UK as workers. This restricted A2 immigration to the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme scheme in place at the time, skilled workers with a job unable to be filled by a resident worker, low-skilled workers under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and Sector Based Scheme (SBS) and students. Between 2007 and 2013, the population of A2 nationals increased by 148,000 (40,000 Bulgarian, 108,000 Romanian) (Gower and Hawkins 2013: 5, 7).

95 Total annual immigration from the EU (excluding British citizens) had been maintained below 70,000 since 1999 having previously reached a peak of 82,000 in 1998, but immigration from the A8 countries alone was (approx.) 53,000 in 2004, 76,000 in 2005, 92,000 in 2006, 112,000 in 2007 (peak year), 89,000 in 2008, 68,000 in 2009 and 86,000 in 2010. This contributed to all EU immigration reaching 130,000 in 2004 (22% share of all immigration), 152,000 in 2005 (27%), 170,000 in 2006 (28%), 195,000 in 2007 (34%), 198,000 in 2008 (34%), 167,000 in 2009 (30%) and 176,000 in 2010 (30%) (Migration Observatory n.d.-a; Vargas-Silva 2014).
immigration in all years except 2007 and 200896 (Vargas-Silva 2014a). Corresponding with
the long-term diversification of immigration to the UK, the population of the top 10
foreign-born nationality groups as a percentage of all foreign-born residents has reduced
from 66% in 1961 to 45% in 2011 (ONS 2013). A notable effect of all this is that, as
immigration to the UK has comprised an ever broader spectrum of people, much of the
political focus has centred on its secondary effects, as with issues of citizenship,
multiculturalism, social integration and community or ‘race’ relations’, and with Britain’s
foreign policy, specifically its relationship with the EU.

The ‘acceleration of migration’ relates to the quantitative growth in the volume of
international migration ‘in all major regions at the present time’ which ‘increases both
the urgency and the difficulties of government policies’, though does not completely
preclude governmental action (Castles and Miller 2009: 11). This has become the case
due to factors such as ‘falling transportation costs, increasing economic integration, path-
dependent migration linkages, structural demand for labor within host states, and global
demographics’ (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 106). Due to population change, the
proportion of the world’s population who are migrants has remained largely unchanged
for the last two decades, at around 3% (Spencer 2011: 6). However, numerically, the
acceleration of migration has meant that the global number of international migrants
increased from 76 million in 1960 to 191 million in 2005 (an increase of 151%), the
number of international migrants in ‘more developed regions’ increased from 32 million
in 1960 to 115 million in 2005 (an increase of 259%) and the number of international
migrants in Europe increased from 14 million in 1960 to 64 million in 2005 (an increase of
357%) (Castles and Miller 2009: 5). This has coincided with a marked increase in the
number of foreign-born residents in the UK during this time, which has increased from
1.9 million in the 1951 England and Wales census, to 2.3 million in 1961, 3.1 million in
and who therefore now comprise 13% of the population (ONS 2013). The increase in the

96 Commonwealth immigration was recorded as 215,000 in 2004 (37% share of all immigration), 180,000 in
2005 (32%), 201,000 in 2006 (34%), 174,000 in 2007 (30%), 165,000 in 2008 (28%), 171,000 in 2009 (30%)
and 187,000 in 2010 (32%).
‘Other’ immigration was recorded as 155,000 in 2004 (26% share), 137,000 in 2005 (24%), 143,000 in 2006
(24%), 131,000 in 2007 (23%), 142,000 in 2008 (24%), 132,000 in 2009 (23%) and 135,000 in 2010 (23%)
(Vargas-Silva 2014).
foreign-born population between the 1961 census and 2005 figures (Finney and Simpson 2009: 55) was 135%\(^7\), a smaller comparative rise than patterns globally, in developed regions and in Europe. This does, however, mean that almost half (45%) of the population increase in England and Wales between 1951 and 2011 was due to migration (ONS 2013). Nevertheless, similarly to patterns at the start of the twentieth century, and despite significant levels of immigration during the rest of the century, the proportion of the foreign-born population is presently smaller in the UK than in many other countries, including 16 other OECD countries\(^8\) (OECD 2013) though slightly above the European average (Vargas-Silva 2014b). In absolute terms, however, the UK is sixth behind USA, Germany, Canada, Russia and Saudi Arabia (OECD 2013).

The ‘differentiation of migration’ refers to the expansion in different types of migration which countries receive, from refugees, to labour migrants, to ‘family migrants’ (Sales 2007: 34), to student migrants, to temporary migrants, and so on. This process complicates the role of national and international policy makers (ibid.), whose focus has had to widen to consider fundamentally diverse causes of migration and their obligations towards different groups. Chains of migration, which help to establish support networks and infrastructure related to the culture and socio-economic development of the diaspora (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 29), can evolve from constituting one form to several, regardless of legislative intervention (Castles and Miller 2009: 12). For the UK, however, this global trend must be seen in light of the legislation introduced since the 1960s, which has attempted to attract skilled migration to meet the demands of its economy, to limit immigration from the New Commonwealth to family migration (Hansen 2000: 228), to thereafter limit family migration (Bevan 1986: 37), to suppress refugee admission and to attract student migration as a lucrative ‘export’ (see Spencer 2011, ch. 3). The curtailment of major routes of immigration through legislation combined with a sustained pre-occupation in public debate about the ‘numbers game’ has seemed only to invite attention towards those forms of immigration which remain, even if this proves difficult to impossible to achieve (Bevan 1986: 37). For example, the UK government has had little

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\(^7\) For completeness, from 1961 to 2011 the growth in the foreign-born population was 226%, and from 1951 to 2011 it was 295%.

\(^8\) In order of largest proportion of foreign-born population: Luxembourg, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Canada, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Estonia, Slovenia, Spain, Germany, Norway, and USA.
control over EU migration (also including British return migration) and the irregular migrant population can only be estimated within a fairly wide range, let alone successfully addressed by policy.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the diverse range of purposes given in official statistics for voluntary immigration between 1991 and 2011. Immigration for people to study or for those with a job offer have each increased significantly over these twenty years, from a low of (approx.) 42,000 in 1992 to a high of 238,000 in 2011 for formal study immigration and a low of (approx.) 48,000 in 1992 and 1993 to a peak in 2007 of 171,000 for those with a definite job offer (Migration Observatory, n.d.-b). The 'looking for work' category has also seen an increase in this time, from (approx.) 21,000 in 1991 to 80,000 in 2005 and 81,000 in 2010, while family migration ('accompany/join inflow') and those not stating a reason have remained relatively steady.

**Figure 4.2:** Immigration by reason 1991-2011

(Migration Observatory, n.d.-b)
Asylum Seekers and Refugees

The UK is currently home to 1.1% of the world’s refugees and .35% of the UN’s estimated total global population of concern (including asylum seekers, the internally displaced and the stateless) (UNHCR 2014) and ranks 16th for asylum applications per capita among the EU27 countries (corresponding to five asylum applications per 10,000 people in the UK and eight as an average in the EU27) (Hawkins 2014: 12; see also Messina 2007: 118 for data relating to select Western European countries 1995-2002). In relation to immigration figures generally, recent figures show that asylum seekers made up approximately 4.5% of total ‘immigrants’ to the UK in 2012 (Hawkins 2014: 3) while refugees comprise 0.3% of the population (Vargas-Silva 2014b). Figure 4.3 shows the total applications for asylum (excluding dependents) from 1979 to 2010. The chart for this period shows that asylum applications increased dramatically between 1988 and 1991 and again between 1996 and 2002 (in line with the rest of Europe [see Bloch and Schuster 2005: 492; Spencer 2011: 49]), before decreasing considerably again between 2003 and 2007.

Figure 4.3: Applications for asylum (excluding dependents), 1979-2010

Figure 4.4 shows the outcome of initial decisions for asylum seekers (excluding dependents and decisions made on appeal). The UK has had an initial asylum acceptance rate of less than 30% for over 10 years, compared with countries such as Finland and Switzerland where the rate is over 70% (ibid.: 5; Refugee Council 2013). This is a reversal of the situation prior to 1991, at which point refusal rates were as low as 13% in 1989. As Figure 4.4 shows, at about the time of high asylum application rates (i.e. 2000 and 2001), refusal rates were numerically very high (89,308 in 2001), though were proportionally higher in many other years (substantially so between 1994 and 1997 and 2003 and 2006), reaching a peak of 88% in 2004. Of the three-quarters of asylum seekers who appealed their decisions after initial refusal between 2004 and 2012, approximately a quarter were successful (Hawkins 2014: 8).

Figure 4.4: Initial Decisions of Asylum Applications 1984-2010

Slightly over a fifth of asylum seekers are detained at some point in the asylum process (Phelps 2013: 46); between 2,000 and 3,000 people (almost half of whom are asylum seekers, the rest of whom are mainly failed asylum seekers and irregular migrants) are currently detained in immigration detention centres and prisons at any given time and

n.b. Decisions do not necessarily relate to applications made in the same year, due to system delays.

Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics, October to December 2013, Asylum Tables Volume 1, Table as_01.
approximately 30,000 people are detained annually (Silverman and Hajela 2013). A small minority of asylum seekers are detained for up to several months or for more than a year (ibid.). The widespread use of detention without trial was once only contemplated in times of crisis or emergency (such as in wartime or to otherwise contain immediate threats to the state), but since the early 1990s has become an ordinary and integral part of the administrative management of immigration and asylum (Bloch and Schuster 2005).

**Irregular migrants**

Irregular migration ‘stocks and flows’ are inherently difficult to measure since irregular migrants are understandably reluctant to make themselves known to the authorities (Koser 2010: 183), and because of the shifting ways in which people attain or lose irregular status (see previous chapter). The data available regarding the number of irregular migrants resident in the UK is therefore subject to dispute, re-calculation and relatively wide margins of error compared to other migrant groups. In the UK, the Home Office estimated that in 2001 the number of irregular migrants in the UK was between a range of 310,000 and 570,000, with a median estimate of 430,000 (ibid.: 186). This figure was updated to between 417,000 and 863,000, with a central estimate of 618,000 for 2007 (Gordon et al. 2009), but a recent estimate, based tentatively on an extrapolation of data collected in the course of the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Operation Nexus’ (in which immigration officers were stationed in custody suites across London in order to check the immigration status of arrestees), puts the irregular migrant population at ‘about 70,000’ (Portes 2012). The irregular migrant population of the UK is therefore estimated to be in the region of between 0.1% and 1% of the total population.

The importance of the figures discussed in this section of the chapter for policy is related to the way in which policy enables and circumscribes these migrations, and how it might provide conditions for hospitability and hostility towards the various migratory groups that it allows to ‘filter’ into the country. What is interesting about such figures for the media debate is the level to which the media makes such linkages and to what extent audiences are able to make sense of demographic change due to migration. The next section will therefore give an indication as to what the public knows and thinks about immigration to the UK as mostly demonstrated by public opinion poll data.
The Public Debate

Public Opinion

Whether migrants face hospitality or hostility upon arrival in the UK has much to do with the receptiveness of the rest of the general population. How this translates into the political domain is important for both the health of democracy but also for the rights of the individual. On the one hand it is important in a democratic society for the policy preferences of the public to be sufficiently represented in official policy, but on the other, the non-immigrant population has historically far outweighed the immigrant population, whose rights may be curtailed by a ‘tyranny of the majority’ if heavily restrictive policy is enforced. For this reason, public opinion is taken seriously by scholars, politicians and the press as a crucial element in the politics of immigration. Hospitality and hostility can, of course, emerge through various means – resentment can come in the form of discrimination or violence, for instance – but opinion poll data is predicated on its more representative demonstration of the attitudes of the public (and, therefore, the electorate)\(^99\).

Indeed, the ‘racist public’ thesis claims that elite politicians in the 1960s were ‘responsive to the public’ rather than autonomous on immigration policy (including Enoch Powell, who it is claimed ‘articulated the feelings of the public’ [Studlar 1974: 381] rather than pioneered a new perspective). In this view, the public are and were (viewed as) so strongly negative towards immigration that no politician or political party would jeopardise their chances of electoral success by announcing policies at odds with public opinion (Studlar 1980: 217). On the other hand, politicians may feel a responsibility to refrain from ‘playing the race card’, while some theorists have posited that, in fact, a democratic deficit exists between the public’s highly restrictive demands and official policy, known as the ‘gap hypothesis’ (see Cornelius et al. 1994; Joppke 1998). A further danger lies in the possible exploitation and manipulation of public opinion data when it is simplistically interpreted and reified as ‘the will of the public’ in order to legitimise pre-existing policy options.

\(^{99}\) ‘When conducted according to accepted professional standards, polls and surveys are reliable as snapshots of public opinion, at least for the questions that pollsters or academics choose to pose to the public. But interpreting them always requires care and caution, for they have important limitations and flaws’ (Blinder 2011: 2).
Regarding the press, although it is virtually impossible to identify causality in the relationship between newspaper readership and attitudes towards immigration, there are distinct differences between the attitudes and perceived importance of immigration among readers of different newspapers, at least contemporarily. On the one hand, this could be because people seek out information which confirms their existing attitudes, and on the other their attitudes could be shaped by the information available to them, or a combination of both. The result of this is that, because citizens of the ‘imagined’ national community (Anderson 1991/1983) cannot expect to meet the vast majority of the immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers upon whom they might base their opinions about immigration\textsuperscript{100}, the general tendency for the public to favour restrictions on immigration means there is a ‘basic business case for anti-immigration content’ (McNeil 2014). Even for news media which ‘champion liberal policies’, it is argued that they are simply ‘presenting what will be appealing to their readers’\textsuperscript{101} (ibid.). In a 2011 study, readers of the Guardian were found to be least likely to favour reductions in immigration (46% responding that they wished to see immigration ‘reduced a lot/a little’), with readers of the Times (68%) and Daily Telegraph (78%) favouring more reductions, and readers of the Mirror (83%), Sun (85%), Mail (89%) and Express (89%) considerably supportive of reductions (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 93). This hierarchy of attitudes has also been generally observed in these readers’ perceptions of the importance of immigration/race relations as an issue in Issues Index surveys (ibid.: 94), though these disparities grew drastically between 1996 and 2013\textsuperscript{102} – suggesting that differences in attitude and perceived levels of importance are not unchanging over time.

The press have increasingly commissioned opinion polls regarding immigration themselves, emphasising the major (or at least amenable) findings in headlines and front-
page articles and framing them as calls for political action. Despite this, ‘audiences are rarely informed about the question design, sampling techniques or analysis methods of these surveys’ (Finney & Peach 2004: 13). These aspects of survey data have the potential to yield dramatically different findings depending on the design of the research, a fact which survey commissioners might be keen to capitalise on: ‘newspapers and other organisations concerned with problematising the issue of migration, such as MigrationWatch UK, may seek to commission a poll that ‘proves’ this issue is of primary concern to the British public, while refugee rights organisations may use polls to expose the level of ignorance about asylum issues, or reveal more tolerant views than are commonly expected’ (ibid.: 14). The overall picture, however, is that in general journalists rarely make specific reference to independent opinion polls in their reporting, and often rely on unsystematic evidence, whether through anecdotal inferences of the ‘public mood’ or through the use of vox pops (Lewis and Wahl-Jorgensen 2005). A further problem in engaging citizens in the news comes in the lack of opportunities citizens are generally given to make direct suggestions about policy and actively participate in public deliberation (ibid.: 105). Citizens in news coverage are therefore often shown giving or failing to give support for the policies of political leaders (ibid.) – a problem which might be compounded in relation to opinion polls, since opinion polls are usually structured in ways which do not retain the nuances of public opinion upon the compilation and presentation of the associated data.

**A restrictive and concerned public**

The 1960s arguably marks the decade in which immigration and its related issues, via the lens of ‘race’, first became of sustained legislative and electoral importance in the UK\(^\text{103}\), and it was on the cusp of that decade that the first surveys about public opinion on immigration – and ‘race relations’ – began to be taken\(^\text{104}\). A subsidiary though no less important artefact of its politicisation at that time came with the collapsing of immigration questions in such polls with those of ‘race’ and ethnic diversity – a product

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\(^\text{103}\) As evident in the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, the 1964 general election (Singham 1965: 360-368) and Labour’s 1965 White Paper.

\(^\text{104}\) The first polls were carried out in the context of the aftermath of the 1958 riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham (Wybrow 1989: 55). Asked in September 1958, 55% of respondents to a Gallup poll wanted restrictions on ‘coloured’ immigration, with 49% saying the same for white immigration. ‘One in three said they would consider moving if coloured people came to live next door, rising to three in five if the coloured people were in great numbers’ (ibid.).
of immigration being ‘effectively a codeword’ during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s for New Commonwealth migration (Saggar 2003: 181). The collapsing of immigration and ‘race’ has remained the case in some surveys (e.g. Ipsos-MORI’s ‘Issues Index’), ‘making it impossible to isolate public concern over immigration in particular’ for such data (a problem when taking into consideration changing sources of immigration flows, such as with the growth in EU migration in recent years) (Blinder 2011: 5).

During the inaugural years of polling from the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, respondents to Gallup polls overwhelmingly approved of the control of immigration – couched in terms of immigration from the Commonwealth. The mean level of restrictionist responses to questions variously put to respondents about government plans for immigration control was 69.5% across eight polls between November 1961 and September 1972 (Studlar 1974: 375), reaching a high during this time of 87% in August 1965 and a low of 57% in September 1972\(^{105}\). This was compared with a mean of 18% for those disagreeing with limits and 12.6% for ‘don’t know’ responses (ibid.).

In general, the public as a whole has since continued to demonstrate overwhelmingly restrictionist views towards immigration. Figure 4.5, however, indicates that ‘demands for reduced migration’ bear little relationship with the level of immigration (Ford 2011a). It would appear that for large sections of the public, immigration at almost any level during this period constituted ‘too much’. Due to differences in question-wording and response options over time, the trend line relating to restrictionist attitudes ‘should not be taken as evidence of a decrease over time’ (Blinder 2011: 4) but, nonetheless, the percentage of respondents opposing immigration has remained above 50% in all iterations of such surveys since the 1960s\(^{106}\).

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\(^{105}\) Questions varied, though always applied to Commonwealth immigration specifically or in general, and included: ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the measures the Government intends to take in controlling immigration from Commonwealth countries?’ (November 1961 [1], November 1961 [2] and December 1961), ‘A strict limitation on the number of immigrants allowed from the Commonwealth is being applied. Do you approve or disapprove of this restriction in their numbers?’ (August 1965), ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the measures the Government are taking in controlling immigration from Commonwealth countries?’ (March 1968), ‘There are a number of Asians in Kenya holding full British passports. Do you think there should or should not be any limitation on their entry into this country?’ (January 1969), ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the Government’s new Immigration Bill?’ (March 1971), ‘Do you think we should or should not let the Uganda Asians settle in this country?’ (September 1972) (Studlar 1974: 375).

\(^{106}\) The data shown here do not include the Gallup poll results.
Despite the consistency with which the public have been opposed and restrictive towards immigration, the perception of its importance as a political issue has fluctuated – only growing markedly in the 2000s after relenting in the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 4.6). While there is little relationship between the level of immigration and restrictionist views, there has been a correlation between an increase in net migration and public concern about immigration/race relations as a political issue. It would, however, appear that there was a minority of people who considered immigration an issue even during a period of zero net migration or even net emigration. Between the late 1980s and the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the number of respondents who regarded immigration/race relations as an important political issue remained very low, only growing from 2001 onwards after a sharp rise in net migration at the end of the 1990s.

107 On a monthly basis, pollsters for Ipsos-MORI’s Issues Index ask respondents to name the nation’s ‘most important issue[s]’ and ‘any other important issues’ without any further prompting (Blinder 2011: 5); the responses to this question are categorised within one of 47 categories (one of which is ‘immigration/race relations’). Responses are usually aggregated for an issue’s appearance in the ‘top 3’ issues of a poll.  
108 Interestingly, the small spike in the number of people for whom immigration/race relations was an important issue in the late 1970s came in the same month (January 1978) that then Leader of the Opposition Margaret Thatcher voiced her concerns in a Granada World In Action interview that people were afraid that the UK might be ‘swamped’ by ‘people with a different culture’.
Further, public concern about immigration and its salience on the public agenda in the UK over the past decade has been shown through various studies to supersede that of concern in other countries, including in Europe (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014, Blinder 2011, Ford 2011a).

Public confusion
Polling data also shows that many people generally lack a great deal of understanding about the size of immigration levels, often grossly over-estimating the proportion of the population consisting of immigrants by several times\textsuperscript{109} and estimating on average that the UK receives up to ten times more of the world’s asylum seekers than it does (Crawley 2005: 24-25). One of the reasons for such over-estimation may lie in a phenomenon known as ‘emotional innumeracy’, whereby people’s concerns (their ‘directional goals’) affect their ability to estimate accurately (their ‘accuracy goals’) (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 27). Blinder terms the distinction between actual and perceived levels of immigration ‘statistical immigration’ and ‘imagined immigration’ respectively (2013: 2).

Such misperceptions are, for many respondents, key to understanding their policy preferences. When presented with official estimates, almost half of the respondents from \textsuperscript{109}In a recent poll for Ipsos-MORI, the mean estimate of the foreign-born population of the UK was 31%, compared to an official estimate of 13% (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 22). This phenomenon has been observed elsewhere: respondents across Europe in a survey conducted in 2002-2003 believed that their country attracted more immigrants than others in Europe; 19% said ‘far more people come to live here’ and 38% said ‘more people come to live here’, with respondents from every country surveyed overestimating the foreign-born population of their country (Sides and Citrin 2007: 486-487).
one study who had over-estimated by at least twice the official estimate responded by rejecting the official figures outright (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 24). In another, the proportion of respondents who had demanded a reduction in net inward migration lowered by 15% when they were presented with official estimates (Ford 2011a: 1). These responses suggest, as Ford argues, that ‘a significant portion of current opposition to migration stems from exaggerated views of the situation’ (ibid.). As Sides and Citrin add, a more-informed public would likely have a reduced opposition to immigration and less commonly self-report perceived threats from immigration (2007: 501). The implications of such misperceptions and (possibly corresponding) levels of concern on both the policy debate and on public perceptions regarding government performance are therefore potentially critical (Gallagher 2014; Blinder 2013).

What constitutes ‘immigration’ or ‘an immigrant’ may, however, differ from person to person. In other words, respondents often have different things in mind when asked their opinion about immigration. Overall, there is some contagion in the public imagination between various groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, immigrants and asylum seekers) (Saggar 2003: 185; McLaren and Johnson 2007: 728), possibly related to differing and sometimes ambiguous official definitions of each category (Anderson and Blinder 2011). This may have an impact upon the results of surveys which ask about immigration or immigrants in general. For example, when respondents are asked about which type of people they have in mind when they think about immigration, asylum seekers and refugees are mentioned more often than any other group (versus immigrants for work, for study, or for family reunification), despite being the least common form of immigration (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 76, Blinder 2013: 9). The contrary is true for immigration for the purposes of study, which is contemporarily the most common type of immigration, but the least commonly mentioned.

However, respondents also demonstrate variegated policy preferences when explicitly asked about immigration from different places in the world, which suggests that treating attitudes to immigration as though people regard various types and groups of immigrants as an ‘undifferentiated mass’ (Ford 2011b: 1018) would be inaccurate. For instance, immigrants seen as more ‘culturally different’ are more likely to be opposed than those regarded as ‘culturally similar’ (Ford 2011b; Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 80; Ivarsflaten
People also have variegated policy preferences depending on the type of migrant in question and their perceived value or threat to the society. For example high-skilled workers are favoured by respondents while asylum seekers, people seeking extended (rather than nuclear) family reunification and low-skilled workers are opposed (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 77). Nonetheless, it would seem that cultural ‘threats’ are perceived as more pressing in concern than economic ones – a trend seen across European publics in a study of responses in the early 2000s (Sides and Citrin 2007).

There is some evidence that public concern and perception is correlated with political developments regarding the management of immigration. Ford observes, for instance, that ‘sharp increases in public concern followed the widely reported ‘crisis in the asylum system’ (2001-3) and unanticipated levels of immigration from European Union Accession 8 countries (2004-6)’ (2011a: 3), concluding that it was the ‘political management’ of these migrations (rather than these events in and of themselves) that contributed to these increases in negative opinion. Combined with a lack of public understanding of immigration patterns (for which politicians may be just as culpable as media coverage), ‘over-promising and under-delivering’ to a restrictive public appears to produce both distrust (ibid., Saggar 2003: 194) and calls for even more ambitious measures to realise the objectives of previous policies – perpetuating an impression of ever-diminishing returns. Poor impressions of the political management of immigration are exacerbated further by the long-term nature of immigration processes lying in direct conflict with the short-termism of political demands and the political cycle (Castles 2004: 223), while the public very often express their wish to see immigration flows (e.g. EU immigration) reduced which are difficult if not impossible to stop due to foreign policy or legal commitments (Anderson 2013: 52).

Summary
The implications of the issues identified in this and the previous chapter for the news coverage of immigration are manifold. The relative recency of immigration policy, especially in relation to the earlier election campaigns of the study, means that it is possible that there may have been an evolution in expectations and perceptions about inter alia the aims and limits of government control, the rights of migrants and the importance of public consultation in the formation of policy. Further, the increasing
frequency by which legislation has been introduced, the politicisation of both immigration and asylum politics, the development of a bipartisan and essentially restrictive political agenda, the questionable grounds upon which distinctions have been made regarding the groups of migrants subject to control, and the relative normalisation of immigration control in multiple facets of everyday life may have not only helped to entrench the ideological basis upon which immigration policy is understood (and therefore limit the possibility for fundamental criticisms of immigration policy), but also have structured the terms of meaningful debate and thereby (re)constructed the boundaries of belonging more generally. The press have been critically involved in the long-term in relaying and re-shaping a political climate such as this.

The second section of this chapter illustrated the lack of success the mass media has had in helping to produce an informed citizenry. There is ample evidence that the public’s estimates of the extent to which Britain has received immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers bear little relation with reality. These misperceptions appear to be central to the grounds upon which the ‘basic business case’ (McNeil 2014) for negative news coverage towards immigration are based. Certainly, the consistently negative presentation of immigrants and immigration identified by previous studies, as discussed in Chapter 2, correlates with the strongly restrictive attitude towards immigration displayed by the public over time. Particularly for the conservative press, audiences are provided with, and possibly seek, coverage of immigration which provides for a highly restrictive and disdainful view of immigration. Importantly, despite the existence of strongly restrictive public attitudes almost regardless of immigration patterns, the strong positive correlation between public concern over immigration and net migration levels contemporarily suggests that the public are to some extent aware of fluctuations in the demographic patterns of immigration and that this may be plausibly due to the mediation of immigration by the mass media.

With some immigration scholars claiming that policy follows, or at least is constrained by, public opinion, the role of the press in escalating public concern, reinforcing stereotypes and encouraging the adoption of ever-more restrictive and coercive policies is potentially critical. It is of course difficult to know definitively whether the developments discussed in these past two chapters are as a result, or indeed generative, of the frequency or
content of media coverage, but they provide an essential background to understanding the nature of the environment within which press coverage of immigration was produced during the time-span of the coverage investigated in this thesis.

It is against this background of long-term trends of continuity and change in the politics and representation of immigration that the findings of this study will be assessed. Before these findings can be presented, however, it is essential to provide some detail about the research design and some relevant operational concepts of the study.
5: Methodology

Introduction
This chapter outlines the research methodology chosen in the completion of this study and the rationale for the decisions made in this process. The first part of the chapter discusses those decisions made in the collection of the data sample, including the selection of newspapers studied, the temporal range of study, the qualifying criteria for the sample, the unit of analysis and the key research questions to which the study orientates. The second and third parts of the chapter briefly examine the justifications behind the research methods chosen, namely content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA). These methods were chosen, it is argued, in order to provide a complementary combination between their respective methodological strengths. As such they have been implemented according to a mutually reinforcing logic, in which the corpus chosen for qualitative analysis was drawn systematically from the sample created through the quantitative analysis. Both methods are outlined with regard to their methodological principles and their application to the research objectives of the study, in addition to the necessity of a dual methodological approach.

Research Questions
This research is oriented towards studying representations of immigration in the British national daily press in election campaigns. Importantly, this study comes in the form of a historical analysis which seeks to place these representations in their temporal context and to assess whether the observations of news studies scholars, whose work has rarely analysed news coverage of immigration beyond the short-term or historically, are fixed or variable. Recurrences, fractures, reformulations and developments in news discourses of immigration therefore enable conclusions to be made about how these discourses are constructed in the short-term and how we may situate them in relation to historical traditions, in terms of continuities and/or contrasts.

Further, the selection of the British national press entails the analysis of several news outlets, each holding their own editorial perspective, style and format, all of which are subject to shifts or profound transformations over longer distances of time. In selecting several news outlets, not only do aggregate presences and absences in coverage become
apparent (at least, at an intra-level), but ‘alternative depictions of reality’ are able to be confronted, along with the identification of ‘the specific discursive traits of a given news outlet’ (Carvalho 2008: 171-172). Carvalho refers to this as ‘comparative-synchronic analysis’, an approach which complements the ‘historical-diachronic analysis’ approach taken, of producing ‘a history of media constructions of a given social issue’ (ibid.).

As Titscher et al. note, ‘the routes to be followed in empirical research will be decided initially by the general research questions’ (2000: 6). Several research questions were therefore decided upon based on the broader research objectives above to constitute the primary interrogations of this study:

1. To what extent has immigration been a part of electoral discourses in the UK press over time and, moreover, what does this say about how the news value of immigration issues has fluctuated and developed over time?

2. Which social actors are most prominent in coverage over time? What is the place of migrants in this?

3. Which social actors are able to gain most news access over time? How does news access compare with news presence, particularly with regard to migrants?

4. Which perspectives are most likely to gain access to the news, particularly with regard to supportive or critical attitudes to immigration?

5. Which topics (i.e. themes) are most associated with immigration, i.e. what is immigration ‘about’ during campaigns? What is the thematic plurality of the press debate?

6. How are migrant groups discursively constructed?

7. How are migrations and their social effects discursively constructed? How are ‘our’ rights and responsibilities contrasted with those of migrants?

Sample
Several areas must be addressed when formulating a sampling strategy. Firstly, the sampling strategy should be approached with the research questions in mind. As Deacon
et al. contend, the population to which any data sample corresponds is defined by the research objectives of the study in question (2007: 47). The rationale for the selection of the population of the study will therefore be outlined here first (the ‘why’ question). Secondly, the details of the sampling strategy and the sample ultimately drawn from this strategy can thereafter be given (‘what’ and ‘when’). In more detail, the practicalities of the research and the more microcosmic elements of the data gathering process will then be briefly outlined (‘how’).

The focus of both the content analysis and CDA on the British national press comes partly because the press, unlike other media sectors, has existed throughout the sampling period and for which archival material is generally accessible for media scholars. Importantly, this approach also recognizes the power of the press to set the broader agenda for media coverage in Britain and the unfettered partisanship which has dominated its representation of political and social affairs and meant that a range of ideological content can be found across the pages of several newspapers. Due to the greater reach and significance of the national press, but also due to substantial differences in editorial agenda, audience profile and the accessibility of archive material, the local and regional press was omitted from the study. Also omitted were the Sunday equivalents of the daily titles sampled, partly due to the limited level of access the researcher had to such material, but also due to the significant differences in format and editorial agenda the Sundays have traditionally represented.

Further, the study involves a detailed, manual and visual review of microfilm newspaper content. This is necessary due to difficulties in accessing digital or physical archives of a large majority of the press and because keyword searches of digital archives may produce validity and reliability concerns (Deacon 2007). A validity concern which applies in particular to keyword searches in the media analysis of social issues as semantically complex as immigration lies in the potential for false positives and false negatives (ibid., Soothill and Grover 1997). For example, terms elementary to a study of immigration coverage such as ‘migration’ and ‘asylum’ will inevitably produce false positives wholly unrelated to the topic of interest. With regards to false negatives, immigration and asylum are issues which over extended periods of time may well have been discussed in variable ways, and therefore for which some flux in the referential strategies and
rhetorical tropes found in newspaper discourse can be expected. Chapter 2 identified a number of ways in which the expression of racist ideas has altered in response to moral prohibitions on prejudice, while the widespread usage of metaphors in discourse about immigration may obscure in certain respects what is being talked about. A manual review can eliminate these issues from affecting the sample.

**Sample identification and size**

The sample was prepared according to considerations of two ‘vectors’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 122), essentially of breadth and depth: ‘how far backwards or forwards’ the sampling period should range and the extent to which data should be sampled across the ‘population’ (ibid.). As Deacon et al. argue, the statistics generated from appropriate sampling in content analysis enable inferences to be made ‘about the processes and politics of representation’ (ibid.: 119). In order to acquire the degree of representativeness necessary to make such claims, the research adopted a systematic sampling approach. As the focus of the research was on the newspaper coverage of immigration in election campaigns longitudinally, the selection of 1918 as the departure point was made due to the considerable temporal distance over which analysis could be undertaken (with 25 elections between and inclusive of 1918 and 2010), but also due to its symbolic significance following the substantial extension of the franchise to married women and those of independent means over the age of 30 following the Representation of the People Act 1918 (Harmer 2012: 111). Further symbolic importance is attached to the period in relation to immigration because it comes on the cusp of the introduction of immigration legislation (the Aliens Restriction Act 1919) regarded as having definitively abandoned the *laissez-faire* approach of the Victorian age in immigration policy (Holmes 1988: 114).

A pilot study was undertaken to determine, in part, an appropriate number of sample days within each campaign (collecting and coding a month of coverage of the Daily Mirror in 1935, 1959 and 2010). It was determined that a month of coverage in each election would take an unfeasible amount of time, but that coding a week of each campaign across seven newspaper titles would be practicable and sufficient to produce a large dataset. In each campaign, the dates of coding were therefore determined as comprising
the week (not including the Sunday, i.e. 6 editions) leading up to and including polling day. The full dates of coding can be found in Appendix B.

In terms of depth, the seven national newspapers chosen were deliberately selected in order to obtain a comprehensive portrait of the editorial diversity of the national press during the sample period. The newspapers selected for the study were the *Guardian, Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Daily Herald* (until the 1964 campaign) and *Sun* (from the 1964 campaign when the *Daily Herald* was re-launched under its new name). These titles were selected due to their longevity and mass appeal over time, but also because they can be located across a relatively broad political spectrum during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, despite notable shifts in the editorial positions of the *Daily Mirror* and *Daily Herald/Sun* within this time. Over 25 election campaigns, the selection of these seven newspapers for six days of each campaign week provided approximately 148 weeks (or slightly less than 3 years) of equivalent continuous newspaper coverage.

The majority of this research was conducted in the Social Sciences department at Loughborough University, after the Loughborough Communications Research Centre (LCRC) acquired a substantial historical news archive. In conjunction with access provided by the University library to the ‘full view’ digitalised archives for the *Daily Mirror, Guardian* and *Times* for nearly all of the sample period, access to the LCRC archive provided microfilm copies of the reporting for all the other national titles listed above, for almost every election campaign. Editions which were unable to be accessed through either of these forms were then sought from the British Newspaper Library at Colindale, London.\(^{110}\)

This method of sampling generated 1147 items for analysis (see Table 6.1 for a breakdown of these items by newspaper title).

**Unit of Analysis**

For the purposes of coding, newspaper coverage must be divided into units for analysis, otherwise known as newspaper ‘items’. Different elements of these items were then

coded according to a set of variables and variable values defined as part of a coding frame for the content analysis and the headlines and lead paragraphs recorded for the purposes of CDA.

In most cases, each item had its own headline. However, other features such as lines of demarcation and by-lines were also observed to determine where one complete newspaper article ended and another started. Photographs and pictures were counted if accompanying text met the qualifying criteria; the text would then be coded. Sport, business/city, ‘celebrity’/‘showbiz’, advertisement, obituary, letters to the editor and book review items were omitted due to differences in their function as part of the newspaper, as well as for considerations of time and scope. This was offset against an expectation that many of these areas of the newspaper would be unlikely to feature much discussion of immigration issues in any case, based on observations made during the pilot study. This approach nonetheless left a significant degree of news, comment and editorial material for coding.

Qualifying Criteria

Having defined the units of analysis, establishing qualifying criteria for their identification further systematises the sampling of data. As an amorphous and semantically complex sociological phenomenon, ‘immigration’ is an inherently difficult issue to define, particularly in a historical study for which constructions of its causes, consequences and linguistic representation are subject to potential variation over time. A particular set of criteria was therefore developed to accommodate this difficulty. An item was defined as an ‘immigration item’ if it made reference to one of the following:

- a person or group of people’s immigration or asylum/refugee status,
- immigration or ethnic demography patterns/processes (including processes particular to the experiences of immigrants such as naturalisation or deportation),
- or to the state apparatus or policy of immigration control.

‘Immigration’ and ‘immigrants’ (or ‘asylum seekers’/‘refugees’) were taken here to be terms used to refer to the processes or actors involved in the cross-border movement of people into the United Kingdom, for the purposes of residence, prolonged stay or, if
given, of settlement spanning more than 3 months. In this way, those described as having migrated previously, currently in the process of migrating or with intentions to migrate to the UK were all included but, for example, tourists and visitors were not.

This set of criteria also acknowledges the issues discussed in Chapter 3, in that while ‘immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees technically and inherently refer to different groups of people...the general macro-structure surrounding these groups bear overall identical evaluations hence, the technical distinctions do not come to be crucial in the production and interpretation of their discourse’ (KhosraviNik 2010b: 21-22).

In order to chart fluctuations in the routine and background presence of immigration issues in mediated campaign debates, and contrary to many content analysis studies, passing references to immigration were coded as part of the study as ‘peripheral’ immigration items (see Chapter 6 for findings related to this aspect of coverage).

Items about the election itself were also coded in order to contextualise the place of immigration within wider electoral discourses which focus on other public policy areas and social issues. Further, revealing the quantity of immigration coverage which is apparently not, at least overtly, related to the election gives an indication of, for example, the contemporary news value and accompanying news topics of immigration matters, even if not articulated according within the rubric of party or electoral politics. An item was defined as an ‘election item’ if it made reference to one of the following:

- the UK election campaign process (i.e. the poll itself, canvassing, party manifestos and policies, campaign trails, candidate selection, etc),

- or parliamentary candidates either by name or post (e.g. ‘the Prime Minister’).

The second of these criteria ensured that the definition of an ‘election item’ for the purposes of the research would be very broad. It is my claim, however, that the activities of politicians, though not always apparently conceived of as ‘campaign events’, nonetheless often invoke evaluations of their probity and ability irrespective of the degree of agency to which the politician may wield influence over their mediation. For this reason, items were counted as election items if politicians were mentioned or quoted at party events, in their executive/legislative roles, in their private affairs, and so on. This
was also done in the knowledge that this definition would remain throughout the data sample, thereby ensuring reliability.

Although the focus of the study is located within the frenetic logics of the final week of general election campaigning, both election oriented and non-election oriented immigration articles were taken into consideration, partly because of the way that ordinary issues sometimes gain symbolic import during the campaign period (Seymour-Ure 1974: 225), but also to acknowledge such issues' wider, mundane and possibly incidental appearance in the news during these period. This therefore also allows for comparison and contrast between the features of electorally oriented and non-electorally oriented coverage. Electorally oriented items are hereby referred to as ‘immigration-as-electoral-issue’ (IAE) items, the qualifying criteria of which combined those of both ‘immigration items’ and ‘election items’. Of the 1147 ‘immigration items’, 781 were ‘IAE items’ (see Table 6.2). In total, 28341 election items were counted.

This distribution of coverage and the relationship between each set is represented as a Venn diagram in Figure 5.1 below (scaled proportionally to the size of each set overall):

**Figure 5.1:** Sample sets

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111 In rare instances (n=7), items may have been coded as an immigration item and as an election item but not as an IAE item if qualifying mentions of immigration and the election were exclusive to each other within an item.

112 This diagram was generated using Google Charts.
In defining the sample, the utilisation of these qualifying criteria therefore contributed to charting the frequency of coverage and answering the first research question.

Methods

Methodological Framework
As will be argued, for differing reasons, the research questions selected lent themselves particularly well to the application of content analysis and CDA. An appropriate combination of methods such as these means that ‘the weaknesses of any single method, qualitative or quantitative, are balanced by the strengths of other methods’ (Williams, Rice and Rogers 1988: 47 in Deacon et al. 2007: 117). This dual approach allows researchers to generate both ‘extensive perspectives’ as well as providing ‘intensive insights’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 45, citing Maykut and Morehouse 1994: 56).

The research approach taken operates in accordance with two dimensions of news coverage: the ‘interpretative’ dimension and the ‘evaluative’ dimension, adapted from the approach outlined in Golding (1990) and Deacon and Golding (1994: 19), originally designed to address media responses to policy change. According to Deacon and Golding, the interpretative dimension asks ‘what is this issue about?...what aspects...are rendered visible, named and promoted?’, while the evaluative dimension asks questions of fairness, objectivity and impartiality (i.e. ‘is the report pro or anti some policy, party or initiative?’) more conventionally associated with assessing the adequacy of news reports (ibid.). Nevertheless, as Golding suggests, the interpretative dimension can also ‘introduce indirect evaluation by linking a policy with preset responses to key issues’ (1990: 97). Hence, while the interpretative dimension is concerned primarily with what is ‘rendered visible, named and promoted’ rather than with the balance of coverage per se, it is still essential to consider that dominant and persistent patterns of presence in coverage (e.g. in ‘agenda balance’) can nonetheless lend themselves to a ‘preferred reading’ (Hall 1980) of coverage.

Chapter 7 attends most overtly to the evaluative and interpretative dimensions respectively through a discussion of the ‘fairness’ and ‘fullness’ of mediated debate. In terms of fairness and the evaluative dimension, assessing the range of attitudes expressed by actors afforded news access within the press gives an insight by proxy into...
the extent to which coverage is critical or supportive towards immigration. In terms of fullness and the interpretative dimension, examining which themes dominate coverage and which are absent provides an understanding as to what immigration is deemed to be most fundamentally about for the press and which frames of understanding are deemed to be beyond discussion or incongruous with the values and formats of press reporting. This is complemented by an overview of common terms found within coverage in Chapter 7 and a critical discourse analysis of three key themes in Chapter 8, from which conclusions regarding both dimensions can be drawn.

Content Analysis

There are several reasons content analysis is particularly suitable for the aims of this research, which come in tandem with a set of methodological objectives established since the method’s emergence and in its subsequent development. The definition of content analysis provided by Berelson claims that it is a ‘research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson 1952: 18), a definition which has ‘subsequently been widely adopted as the definitive description of quantitative content analysis’ (Richardson 2007: 16, emphasis in original), despite concerns over the impossibility of maintaining an ‘objective’ perspective in research. As Deacon et al. note, ‘content analysis is a directive method; it gives answers to the questions you pose’ (2007: 119) and is therefore at the mercy of the subjectivities of the researcher. Nonetheless, the systematic and statistical nature of its results mean that ‘if...you want to establish patterns of representation in media content over a given period of time – several months, say, or even several years – content analysis provides you with a suitable method for doing so’ (ibid.: 138). For this reason, content analysis can be considered ideal for a study of this type.

More specifically, Berelson (1952) outlines three assumptions that content analysis makes, and which make content analysis especially suitable for the study of a large sample of historical material:

1. ‘Content analysis assumes that inferences about the relationship between intent and content or between content and effect can validly be made, or the actual relationships established’ (1952: 18).
Along with a requirement for content analysis to be systematic, the method provides the making of ‘replicative and valid inferences from data to their context’ (Krippendorff 1980: 21). As Deacon et al. put it, the statistics which emerge from quantifying the ‘salient and manifest features’ of a large number of news reports can be used to make ‘broader inferences about the processes and politics of representation’ through ‘delineating trends, patterns and absences’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 119). In this way, content analysis is able to provide ‘a systematic procedure for establishing both what is relatively constant and what might change’ across a longitudinal timeframe (ibid.: 139).

2. ‘Content analysis assumes that study of the manifest content is meaningful. This assumption requires that the content be accepted as a “common meeting-ground” for the communicator, the audience and the analyst’ (Berelson 1952: 19). In other words, ‘when you and I read the same paper we not only understand it in the same way but also understand it in the way intended by the producer of the text’ (Richardson 2007: 17). This potentially problematic assumption is therefore most appropriately applied to ‘denotative’ rather than ‘connotative’ meaning, encouraging the content analyst to code as far as possible features of the data which can be considered ‘evident or unmistakable’ (ibid.). This is linked to the definition of content analysis as a method for studying manifest rather than latent content, such as ‘aesthetic or rhetorical nuances’ within texts (Deacon et al. 2007: 119).

3. ‘Content analysis assumes that the quantitative description of communication content is meaningful. This assumption implies that the frequency of occurrence of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the communication process’ (1952: 20).

As Richardson points out, however, textual frequency and co-location are not able to indicate the agency of social action (2007: 18), so frequencies within texts must therefore be carefully analysed as a product of the researcher’s approach and, where applicable, as the starting point for focused qualitative work. To this end, features of texts can be targeted where changes in frequency, rather than form, are in themselves important indicators of changes in discursive practices. As an example, a quantitative change in the extent to which news about a defined social issue, such as immigration, appears on the
front pages of the national press over multiple comparative time frames might be used to make an inference about a fluctuation in its news value.

**Variables**

The coding frame recorded a number of variables, each created with the methodological considerations mentioned above in mind (see Appendix C for a full list). Several elementary features, such as the date, newspaper title and page of each report could be coded prior to examining its contents in detail. Macro-textual features could often be coded secondarily, after a cursory glance at the entire article and following the decision for its inclusion. These included the type of article (e.g. ‘hard news’, ‘editorial’, ‘interview’, etc) and the degree of focus on immigration issues in the article (whether or not the item was mainly or secondarily about such issues). Next, the item was read through and a number of further details could be coded. These included whether or not the item was ‘electorally oriented’ according to criteria mentioned above and the ‘themes’ of the article, up to a maximum of 3 theme codes from a range of 27 broadly-defined theme values (see Chapter 7 for a complete list). Themes were prioritised from a primary to a tertiary theme according to prominence and positioning, but were aggregated in the content analysis.

Further, five actors were coded per item from an extensive list of values, in addition to the presence of any pressure groups in the report. Again, positioning and prominence (respectively) were used to determine inclusion in this list of five actors and to order them, but these were again aggregated in analysis. Actors were included on the basis of being an ‘active subject’ within the story, in other words ‘either being quoted, pictured or described independently of other actors’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 123). It was therefore not enough for an actor to appear ‘only in the context of other people’s comments’ (ibid.). In order to differentiate between news presence and news access, the direct quotation (in words) of actors was also coded. Additionally, in order to track the ‘evaluative features’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 124) of media access, the ‘tone’ of actors was coded as supportive, critical, mixed, neutral or indeterminate with regards to the immigration issue at hand or in general. In general terms, this meant that an explicitly restrictive attitude towards immigration control or the arrival of immigrants could be counted as critical, while
attitudes explicitly sympathetic to a relaxation in immigration control or the arrival of immigrants would be counted as supportive.

Finally, in order to further track interpretative features of coverage, several more aspects of texts were coded inductively. These relate to the news presence of migrants not included as actors, either because they came outside the first five actors of the item or because they had a passive role in the report. Though they dealt with news presence, another key factor lay in the evaluative dimension of news reports (Golding 1990; Deacon and Golding 1994). Tracking these presences through their lexicon, the positive, negative or benign connotations of lexical constructions of immigration and immigrants over the longue durée begin to reveal themselves (and invited further, qualitative analysis). A ‘descriptor’ variable tracked the terms by which migrations were referred to over time, whether through the use of verbs (such as those formed from ‘to come’, ‘to migrate’, ‘to swamp’, etc), nominalizations (e.g. ‘immigration’, ‘influx’), collective nouns (e.g. ‘hordes’, ‘swathes’, ‘masses’, etc), and so on. The other two variables of this kind dealt with reference to the ethnicity, nationality, religion (e.g. through ethnonym) or provenance (such as through the use of the preposition ‘from’) of migrant groups in coverage, and reference to the type of migrants present in coverage (whether formally such as with ‘refugee’, informally such as with ‘asylum cheats’ or by reference to appropriate processes such as with ‘claimed asylum’).

**Inter-coder reliability**

Reliability is a fundamentally important principle in carrying out credible research, so its testing is important in ensuring consistency and ‘repeatability’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 130). The use of a single coder over a long-period of data collection and coding means that issues of reliability are more likely to surface. To remedy these concerns, an inter-coder reliability test was performed by a second coder. This ensures that the concepts used in the coding frame are intelligible to other researchers and that the coding of data is consistent across the dataset.

Table 5.1 displays the percentage of agreement between the author and second coder for all variables used in the subsequent analysis across 52 articles (approximately 4.5% of the dataset).
Table 5.1: Inter-coder reliability results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percentage Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>100% (52/52 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>100% (52/52 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>100% (52/52 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Article</td>
<td>92.3% (48/52 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is item IAE?</td>
<td>96.2% (50/52 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>90.4% (47/52 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes (aggregated)</td>
<td>89.1% (139/156 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors (aggregated)</td>
<td>85.4% (222/260 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum direct quotation</td>
<td>2074 / 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor tone</td>
<td>87.7% (228/260 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptor terms</td>
<td>89.1% (139/156 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant group terms</td>
<td>89.7% (140/156 responses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration type terms</td>
<td>96.2% (150/156 responses)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Proponents of critical discourse analysis frequently define it as an ‘approach rather than a method’, and as a research programme/school of likeminded scholars, with a set of shared assumptions, principles and goals (see, for example, Meyer 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2009: 5; Titscher et al. 2000: 144-146; van Dijk 1993c). The methodological diversity of CDA therefore allows for an array of techniques to be used from a variety of sub-approaches, which include van Dijk’s ‘sociocognitive approach’, the ‘corpus linguistics’ approach, van Leeuwen’s ‘social actors approach’, Fairclough’s ‘dialectical-relational approach’ (Titscher et al. 2000: 25-27) and the ‘discourse historical approach’, of which Ruth Wodak has been a central pioneer. CDA research is often orientated towards concerns with social problems, power in and over discourse, the production, reproduction and transformation of society and culture, the ideological use of language and the historical context of discourse (Titscher et al. 2000: 146).

Since content analysis looks at ‘aggregated meaning-making across texts, the methods tends to skate over complex and varied processes of meaning-making within texts’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 119). As Richardson argues, this means that the ‘context that surrounds the formation of content’ is ignored (2007: 20). In response, CDA can ‘offer interpretations of the meaning of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and
deriving meaning from this; situate what is written or said in the context in which it occurs, rather than just summarising patterns or regularities in texts; and argue that textual meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and consumer rather than simply being ‘read off’ the page by all readers in exactly the same way’ (ibid.: 15, emphasis in original). Further, content analysis – being directive – may lead researchers to neglect to answer questions they don’t pose at the outset of the research. CDA, on the other hand, due to its analytical procedure of moving between data collection and analysis ‘[meets] the requirements of grounded theory’ (Titscher et al. 2000: 167) and, it can be argued, offers opportunities to ‘explore texts in order to develop ideas and insights’ (Deacon et al. 2007: 119) that content analysis does not. Utilising content analysis and CDA together is therefore useful because by sequencing the methods suitably it is possible to study news coverage in great volume and in necessary detail and move beyond the inadequacies of each method, thereby providing a ‘general picture’ of the object of research (Bryman 1992: 60-61). In fact, the quantitative analysis assists the qualitative analysis, since the qualitative research ‘may facilitate the interpretation of relationships between variables’ (ibid.).

It is essential to demonstrate the historical contingencies of news discourses through a critical perspective. This is because an unfortunate consequence of critical research which takes a short-term approach is that in privileging the study of contemporary manifestations of hegemonic power and assuming that contemporary discourses have prevailed historically, they neglect to imagine which alternative constructions were available to those responsible for the creation of the ‘first draft of history’ and to connect which others were marginalised or included cross-temporally. As Richardson puts it, ‘the difference with a more interpretative (and some would say critical) textual analysis is that the analyst examines the text in terms of what is present and what could have been but is not present’ (Richardson 2007: 38).

The CDA approach chosen for this study was the Fairclough model (see Fairclough 1989, 1995; Titscher et al. 2000), supported by the analytical insights of Richardson (2007), van Leeuwen (1995, 1996, 2008) and Conboy (2007). Fairclough’s approach, in which texts, discursive practices and social practices exist in an ongoing ‘dialectical-relational’ relationship, is particularly conducive to an application of CDA to historical material. As
Titcher et al. point out, Fairclough’s ‘historical foundation is that texts are good indicators of social change’ (2000: 152). The model can be illustrated using Figure 5.2 below:

**Figure 5.2:** The Fairclough model of CDA (Fairclough 1995: 98)

This model, Fairclough contends, defines the dimensions of ‘each discursive event’ (Titscher et al. 2000: 150) which are in an interactive relationship due to the contention that ‘language is not only socially constitutive, but is also viewed as socially determined’ (ibid.: 149). In terms of each dimension (Titscher et al. 2000: 150-151):

- ‘at the **textual level** content and form are analysed’ and are considered ‘inseparable’. Richardson feels ‘it is best to start with the text itself, gradually building outwards to include more complex discursive and social practices’ (2007: 37);

- ‘**discursive practice**...is to do with the socio-cognitive aspects of text production and interpretation’ which ‘leave so-called **cues** in a text and interpretation takes place on the basis of textual elements.’ At this level, Fairclough emphasises intertextuality in a manner which owes a debt to Bakhtinian dialogism (see Fairclough 1992);

- ‘**social practice** relates to the different levels of social organization: the situation, the institutional context, the wider group or social context. Questions of power
are of central interest; power and ideologies may have effect on each of the contextual levels’.

One implication of this approach is that CDA offers an emancipatory examination of ‘the role that journalism plays in maintaining and/or transforming social inequalities’ (Richardson 2007: 38) and therefore ‘seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships’ (Titscher et al. 2000: 147). This comes in response to the way that inequalities can be concealed through the representation of transient but dominant (i.e. hegemonic) ideologies as ‘eternal, natural, inevitable or “rational”’ (Jones 2001: 227 in Richardson 2007: 34) to the suppression or containment of alternatives (Fairclough 1989: 91). This response is applied by critical discourse analysts particularly to ‘relationships of disempowerment, dominance, prejudice and/or discrimination’ (Richardson 2007: 26). This part of the research design therefore takes as central to its conceptualisation the functionalist definition of discourse as ‘language in use’ (ibid.: 23-24). This definition is most associated with Halliday, who argues that ‘the particular form taken by the grammatical system of a language is closely related to the social and personal needs that language is required to serve (1970: 141 in Titscher et al. 2000: 170, n. 1).

A criticism sometimes aimed at critical discourse analysts is that their analysis may be directed by pre-existing researcher bias, in which (at it most vehemently expressed) ‘interpretation in support of belief takes precedence over analysis in support of theory’ (Widdowson 1995: 159). This may lead to ‘cherry-picking’ examples, a problem best avoided by ‘integrating quantitative and qualitative methods’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 11), as here. The way in which this is done within this study is by selecting themes in coverage of high quantitative frequency, and analyzing the linguistic features of their headlines and leads. The presentation of this analysis can be found in Chapter 8. The next short section will discuss the particular ideological and stylistic features of headlines and leads.

**Headlines**

Headlines and lead paragraphs are an exceptionally important unit of qualitative analysis, for their stylistic conventions as much their ‘pragmatic’ function (Iarovici and Amel 1989: 441-443 in Richardson 2007: 197).
Firstly, the position and size of headlines draw the initial attention of the newspaper reader to the article, and therefore structure the reader’s understanding of the article which follows (van Dijk 1991: 50). They invariably contain grammatically incomplete clauses (e.g. the routine deletion of the definite article) in paring multiple processes/events down to a single ‘main’ event (Bell 1991: 187) for reasons of brevity, necessarily producing partial representations of the complexities involved in social actions and events. Tabloid headlines, in particular, are often constructed as simple noun phrases instead of full clauses (Richardson 2007: 203).

The paring of multiple events down to single events is the product of the discursive practices of the newsroom, according to what is seen (usually by a sub-editor) to be the most important aspect of the story. Headlines can therefore ‘upgrade’ or ‘downgrade’ topics (van Dijk 1991: 51) depending on the subjective decisions of newspaper staff, who come to produce one of a myriad of potential constructions. Whether by referential or syntactic choice, headlines therefore supply an indication of a ‘preferred reading’ of a story to newspaper audiences (van Dijk 1988: 40), demonstrating to a significant degree the newspaper’s ideological preferences and socio-cultural orientation (Conboy 2007: 58).

These choices are also reliant on news values, whether in general or specifically for a particular newspaper in the context of its market position and expected stylistic register (ibid.: 15). In general, for example, news values tend to mean that political figures, officials, celebrities, sportspersons, professionals and other public figures, criminals and the accused, human interest figures and participants in news events (e.g. victims and witnesses) are placed first in headlines in active positions (Conboy 2007: 15, citing Bell 1991: 194). Indeed, reference is made to such people so frequently in this way in some newspapers that they may be categorised into one of a number of noun phrases (e.g. ‘Honest Taxpayers’, ‘Soccer Star’, ‘Health Bosses’) which ‘act as a distillation of the news value of the actor to the newspaper in question’ (Conboy 2007: 15). When it comes to news reports involving political elites and other officials, news values may dictate that the headline and article will be concerned primarily with what they say or do simply because their high status and power is assumed to be of self-evident importance to the audience.
The first – or ‘lead’ – sentence (or paragraph) of news articles, in turn, elaborates on and clarifies the headline, by providing the ‘wh-’ details of the news report (i.e. the who, what, when, where, why and/or how), and is also therefore organised as part of the ‘summary’ of the article along with the headline (van Dijk 1988: 15). The lead is, in fact, written prior to the headline by the journalist responsible for the article, whereas the headline is written by the sub-editor (Bell 1991: 186). The major descriptive details featured in the lead are followed by extra or further elaborative details deemed to be of lesser importance thereafter, a convention commonly known as the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure of hard news reports. Again, the information found here is the product of a strict process of selection, subtly condensing the values of the newspaper into as succinct and coherent narrative as possible (Conboy 2007: 17). They, too, therefore bear ideological implications.

The next chapter introduces the findings of the content analysis.
6: The Quantity of Coverage and the Actors in Coverage

Introduction

This chapter and the next will examine quantitative patterns of frequency and form in the press coverage of immigration issues across the final week of the 25 election campaigns from 1918 to 2010, in order to assess key continuities and changes in these issues’ representation.

The chapter will address two elements of coverage. First, it will examine the quantity, frequency and depth of coverage over time and across the sampled newspapers, and further in terms of the extent to which immigration coverage has appeared in electoral coverage and the extent to which it has appeared in various news formats. Second, it will provide an assessment of the level of news presence and news access of social actors in/to the news, also over time and across the sampled newspapers. This chapter is therefore oriented towards answering the first three research questions identified in Chapter 5 and elaborating on the issues identified in the initial theoretical chapters.

Firstly, it is important to assess to what extent and when immigration stories have been the domain of the quality, mid-market and/or popular press in the longue durée. This enhances not only a general understanding of the character of the coverage, but assessing quantitative differences in their coverage helps to determine in what ways issues of immigration are able to be problematised and articulated in terms coherent and meaningful to various audiences at particular junctures.

Secondly, identifying recurrences, fractures, reformulations and more general developments in the coverage over time will enable further conclusions to be drawn about how these discourses are constructed in the short-term and how we may situate them in relation to historical conditions. These conclusions will consequently inform the latter qualitative stages of analysis.

Quantity and frequency: How much and when?

The quantity and frequency of items coded about a certain issue in a content analysis gives an indication of the extent to which the issue is able to satisfy a variety of ‘news values’ and therefore its perceived importance to news audiences. The hyper-
competitiveness of the final week of election reporting means that at this point in time
critical issues might find heightened news value to the marginalisation of those not seen
to be so crucial. When ‘immigration’ is present on the news agenda during a campaign
week, it can therefore be inferred that in that particular period immigration issues are
able to readily fit into a narrative which satisfies a number of news values and that
immigration is deemed to be an issue of significance in the political landscape of the day.
The first part of this section of the chapter gives an overview of the amount of
immigration coverage that featured within the press over time and across newspapers.

The number of immigration items and the campaigns in which they were published is
shown in Figure 6.1. It illustrates the points at which all 1147 immigration items appeared
during the 25 election periods from 1918 to 2010. The mean number of items per edition
was 1.10 and 1039 editions were coded in total\textsuperscript{113}. Notable peaks in the coverage include
the 1918 campaign in the inter-war period, and the 1970, 2001, 2005 and 2010
campaigns in the post-1945 period. The majority of interwar campaigns and the first
post-Second World War campaigns featured little coverage of immigration issues.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{113} In 1918, the Daily Herald was published only on Saturdays, so the number of cases for the 1918
campaign was 37; in 1979, an industrial dispute suspended publication of the Times, so the number of
cases for the 1979 campaign was 36. Further, the 8\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th} June 1970 were used for all newspapers
instead of the 12\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th} June due to strike action by printers, and the Daily Telegraph of the 21\textsuperscript{st}
February 1974 was used instead of the 28\textsuperscript{th} due to strike action by journalists at the Daily Telegraph.
The mean number of items for the 1918 and 1979 campaigns is therefore higher than would be suggested
by Figure 6.1, due to the fewer number of editions published during these campaigns.
\end{flushright}
Figure 6.1: Sum total of immigration items per campaign

Table 6.1 demonstrates the overall number of immigration items by publication, in addition to the mean number of items published per edition in each. Of the 1147 items coded, the Guardian contained the most immigration items, while the Daily Mirror contained the fewest. Four of the seven publications, including all three ‘quality’ newspapers, contained an average of more than one immigration item per campaign day.

Table 6.1: Sum total and mean number of immigration items by newspaper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper Sector</th>
<th>Title of publication</th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Quality’</td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Quality’</td>
<td>Times</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Quality’</td>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Mid-market’</td>
<td>Mail</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Mid-market’</td>
<td>Express</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Popular’</td>
<td>Mirror</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Popular’</td>
<td>Sun/Herald</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1147</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the frequency with which items were published across three newspaper sectors by campaign. The data shows the sum total of items (in Figure 6.2) published within the ‘quality’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘popular’ press for each campaign period,
with the mean value (in Figure 6.3) providing an average of items per published edition (which therefore adjusts for missing editions and the broader ‘quality’ sector, which includes three newspapers rather than two). Over the totality of coverage, the data shows that 684 items were published in the ‘quality’ press (or 1.54 per edition), 277 items were published in the ‘mid-market’ (‘mids’) press (or .92 per edition) and 186 items were published in the popular (‘pops’) press (or .63 per edition).

The data demonstrates that the large expanse in coverage of immigration issues which has occurred in the post-Second World War period has been led, at least numerically, by the quality press. This is likely due in part to the wider ‘newshole’ of the quality press, which tends to contain more pages than the newspapers of other sectors and which until format changes between 2004 and 2006 were far larger than their tabloid and mid-market counterparts (see Lewis et al. 2008a; Williams 1976: ch. 3). However, despite this caveat, the links made within a number of studies between racist and discriminatory coverage of issues relating to ‘race’ and immigration with the red-top tabloids and the mid-market press (as discussed in Chapter 2) has not meant that these are the areas where the most coverage of immigration can necessarily be found. Indeed, in some election campaigns, such as in 1970 and 2005, the quality newspapers overwhelmingly dominated the discussion of immigration in the press. Meanwhile, the popular press produced very little immigration coverage compared with the other two sectors in campaigns such as 1997 and 2005, and have rarely surpassed the levels found in the mid-market newspapers in the post-war era.
**Figure 6.2:** Sum total of immigration items across press sectors by campaign

![Graph showing the sum total of immigration items across press sectors by campaign.](image)

**Figure 6.3:** Mean number of immigration items per edition across press sectors by campaign

![Graph showing the mean number of immigration items per edition across press sectors by campaign.](image)
There are, nonetheless, some notable exceptions to this general domination by the quality press. As is shown, far fewer immigration items were published in most campaigns during the interwar period than in those from the 1950s onwards. The 1918 campaign did, however, produce a relatively high degree of immigration coverage\textsuperscript{114}. Though driven mainly by a higher number of items in the quality press sector, Figure 6.3 demonstrates that the popular press published more immigration items in 1918 on average than the other sectors (in the Mirror’s six editions and the Herald’s single Saturday edition). This pattern was echoed in the later 1922 and 1935 campaigns, in which the popular press again averaged a larger number of immigration items. Regardless, after the 1918 campaign the mean number of immigration items never surpassed one item per edition in any sector again until the 1964 campaign.

Despite limited private concerns about immigration within central government after the arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948 and the post-hoc (if accurate) attachment of seismic symbolism to the passage of the British Nationality Act 1948 (see Spencer 1997; Hansen 2000), the press were yet to seriously address immigration issues by the 1950 campaign, and barely had in the 1945 campaign. The issue also failed to arise as it had on previous occasions, such as in 1931 and 1935, in which any possible political implications of the issue’s presence were not made explicit – its appearance being an artefact of the typical and incidental way in which issues such as immigration happen to appear at critical times.

Overall, immigration coverage has grown markedly during the 2001-2010 era, with a notable peak also in 1970. From a limited depth of coverage in the interwar period, coverage relented to a virtual or total absence immediately following the Second World War. Thereafter, it quickly grew over several campaigns to the then-peak of the 1970 campaign, before stabilising to lower levels for several campaigns. From the 2001 campaign onwards, immigration coverage grew continuously and rapidly at a rate not previously seen in any period in the previous several decades. The quality press has been at the forefront of much of these developments. Some caution should be exercised in

\textsuperscript{114} The vast majority of the coverage from 1918 concerned the presence of German migrants in the country and proposals on the part of politicians (such as David Lloyd George) to forcibly repatriate all such so-called ‘enemy aliens’.
assessing inclines in the volume of coverage of political issues given the two-to-threefold increase in the pagination of the national press, especially since 1985 (Lewis et al. 2008a: 35-37), but this can also be offset by a gradual decline in political (and parliamentary) coverage (Negrine 1999: 332). Regardless of these caveats, the degree to which immigration coverage has seemingly exploded on the news agenda since the 2001 election demands closer attention on the circumstances of this trend.

Two dimensions of the coverage are obscured by a perspective focussed on coverage in its totality. Firstly, the coverage needs to be considered in terms of the extent to which fluctuations in coverage, such as the post-1945 expansion and that of the 2000s, are due to a focus on immigration primarily or whether in fact its appearance is predicated on its infiltration into discussions of other topics, as a subsidiary issue. Secondly, the coverage ought to be considered in terms of when immigration is explicitly associated with the politics of the election and when it appears as a residual and un-politicised issue.

Focus of coverage
While immigration issues may have become a prominent part of the campaign environment, it might also be said that they are an ambient part of this environment. In other words, their rise in prominence may not be the result of a move to the centre of mediated political debate – they may instead play a peripheral role in campaign debates as a subsidiary electoral issue. In order to assess the intensity and depth of coverage beyond measures of its quantity and frequency, therefore, the notion of ‘focus’ may be applied to separate coverage which discusses immigration in depth from coverage which examines it superficially in the course of discussing other issues.

A binary distinction divides the coverage into ‘main’ focus items, whereby items prominently and predominantly featured immigration issues, and ‘secondary’ focus items, whereby items featured immigration issues on parity with several other issues, secondarily to other issues or peripherally.

Figure 6.4 shows the depth of focus within all immigration items by campaign. Across all 1147 items, 520 (or 45.3%) of the 1147 total immigration items were of main focus, and 627 (or 54.7%) were of secondary focus.
Despite a large expansion in immigration coverage overall which culminated in the levels of immigration coverage found in 2005 and in 2010, much of this expansion can be accounted for by an unprecedented growth in immigration items of secondary focus that began with the 2001 campaign, with only a fairly modest growth between 1997 and 2010 in coverage which dealt centrally with immigration. In fact, the 2010 campaign (47 items) was third to the 1970 campaign (70 items) and the 1987 campaign (51 items) in terms of main focus immigration coverage.

Exploring patterns of focus distributed according to newspaper type, Figure 6.5 shows the mean distribution per newspaper title of immigration items of main focus across the quality, mid-market and popular press sectors over time, while Figure 6.6 shows the same but for immigration items of secondary focus.
Figure 6.5: Mean distribution across press sectors of main focus immigration items over time

Figure 6.6: Mean distribution across press sectors of secondary focus immigration items over time

Figure 6.5 reiterates that the quality press have generally tended to dominate the discussion of immigration in the post-1945 era, including more in-depth coverage.
However, the mid-market press has on occasion contained more main focus immigration items than the quality press, such as in 1992 and 2010.

Interestingly, no sector dominated the inter-war period in discussing immigration. Overall, only during the 1922 and 1935 campaigns did the popular press produce more immigration items of main focus than either of the other two press sectors. Figure 6.6 illustrates that both the mid-market and popular press sectors saw a large increase in secondary focus immigration items in 2010, but it was the quality press which accounted for the most secondary focus items in 1970 and which saw a steep rise in such items during the 2000s, not just in 2010. Overall, dividing coverage into ‘main focus’ and ‘secondary focus’ coverage has shown that the dominance of the quality press in reporting immigration affairs is less substantial than it would appear at first glance. Although these newspapers have rarely been surpassed by the newspapers of other sectors in the quantity of their immigration coverage, the quality press produced less discussion of immigration issues in 2010, while much of its dominance and its increases in immigration coverage overall are primarily due to the discussion of immigration as an issue secondarily to others.

The overall growth of coverage which features discussion of immigration secondarily to other issues suggests that immigration has been established politically as an issue which needs no introduction and which can be considered in relation to a number of other issues. In other words, it has become something of an ordinary and ‘touchstone’ political issue. This argument will be explored in more detail in relation to IAE coverage below.

As an electoral issue

As suggested previously, it is important to know in analysing the news coverage of an issue in electoral periods how much of the coverage of the issue is specifically related to discussion of policy and electoral fortunes. On the one hand, this enables inferences to be made about the political and electoral importance of the issue (for IAE coverage), while on the other hand it gives an indication as to the extent to which the issue is an ambient part of ordinary news coverage (for non-IAE coverage).

Table 6.2 shows the level of immigration and IAE coverage over time. The table shows that, of 1147 immigration items 781 were IAE items. This means that 68.1% of all
immigration coverage was connected in some way to the election. This provides an average of .75 IAE items per edition across the entirety of coverage.

**Table 6.2: Sum and mean number of ‘immigration items’ and ‘IAE’ items per campaign**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IAE items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IAE items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IAE items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IAE items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IAE items</strong></td>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the amount of immigration coverage has expanded in recent years, Table 6.2 suggests that this is due in the most part to a large rise in the extent to which ‘immigration’ has grown as an almost exclusively electoral issue in those campaigns.

To demonstrate this, the data from Table 6.2 can be shown in the form of another table, Table 6.3, which displays the percentage of immigration items which were also election items (i.e. IAE items) in each election. This data shows that the proportion of IAE coverage grew towards the latter campaigns of the sample, a trend which is especially apparent from 1992 onwards, from which point the proportion of IAE items consistently exceeded 70%. During the 1992, 2005 and 2010 campaigns, the proportion of IAE items of total immigration coverage reached 84.8%, 82.6% and 94.5% respectively. These figures are somewhat higher than those found for the campaigns in the 1960s during which time immigration (and ‘race’) became a highly politicised issue, and are in stark contrast with other campaigns such as the 1931 and 1935 campaigns, the immigration coverage of which featured no reference to the election.

Table 6.3: The percentage of immigration items coded as IAE items per campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>campaign</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total immigration items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974a</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974b</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>1147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One way to perceive these results is that, in some elections, the presence of immigration on the news agenda ostensibly results from the co-incidence of the ordinary news cycle with the campaign week. Nonetheless, the consistent establishment of an electoral element to immigration news in campaign week is suggestive of a trend in which
immigration has increasingly become an issue that is barely ever able to transcend its association with the election. Immigration may have been covered to some degree as an issue of electoral import in earlier campaigns, but it is the increased consistency and depth to which it has become articulated in these terms which distinguishes recent campaigns from their earlier counterparts. In short, it has become an election issue.

This can be explored from another angle by placing IAE coverage in the context of election coverage in general. This helps to broaden the overview provided so far to assess to what extent the ebb and flow of IAE coverage can be explained by wider fluctuations in editorial priorities and resources vis-à-vis political and electoral news coverage and to what extent immigration issues have been established amongst a range of other issues which come to the fore during campaign periods.

To this end, Figure 6.7 shows a comparison between the mean number of election items per edition and the mean number of IAE items per edition in each campaign. The results show that, across all 25 campaigns, the mean number of election items per edition was 27.3. However, this figure has deviated from the mean considerably over time. Most notably, the number of electoral items changed dramatically between the interwar period and the post-1945 period. During the campaigns of the early 1920s, in particular, the average number of election reports reached distinct peaks: 38.3 per edition in the 1922 campaign, 41.8 per edition in 1923 and 55.4 per edition in 1924. The lowest number of election items for any campaign in the interwar period was 26.7 items per edition in the 1918 campaign, comparable to the peaks of the post-1945 period. Indeed, from 1945 onwards, the number of election items per edition ranged from 18.4 in 1945 to 27.3 in 1959. The marked difference between the level of election coverage between the interwar and post-1945 periods can be attributed to at least some extent to changes in the unitisation of news between these periods rather than wholly because these newspapers featured more substantial discussion of electoral politics. Further, the low number of items in 1945 can be attributed to the rationing of newsprint, which reduced the size of newspapers to four pages in this campaign (Wieten 1988; Williams 2010: 176-177). These considerations are important in assessing the limits of what Figure 6.7 can say about the level of election coverage over time, but since it is the comparison between
election coverage and IAE coverage that is of note here it is not essential to standardise these factors across time to understand the comparison.

Comparing the two figures for each campaign, the level of IAE coverage in relation to the level of election coverage in the interwar period renders immigration issues a barely visible aspect of the wider election news agenda during this time. The mean number of IAE items per edition was 0.5 in the 1918 campaign, 0.2 in the 1922 campaign and 0 for the 1931 and 1935 campaigns, a fraction of the election coverage in these campaigns (the 1931 campaign featured 36.9 election items on average per edition while the 1935 campaign featured 30.7 items on average). After the continuation of this trend in the first few elections of the post-1945 era, the level of IAE coverage grew within a few campaigns from 0.3 per edition in the 1959 campaign to 0.7 in 1964, 0.9 in 1966 and 1.9 in 1970, before diminishing to 0.8 and 0.4 in the two 1974 campaigns. In the 2000s, this figure reached 1.3 in 2001, 2.9 in 2005 and 4.9 in 2010, thereby coming to comprise a sizeable proportion of total election coverage.

**Figure 6.7:** The mean number of election items per edition compared with the mean number of IAE items per edition by campaign
As Figure 6.7 indicates, increases or decreases in election items do not necessarily translate to increases or decreases in IAE items. In fact, the Pearson correlation coefficient for the entire time period is -0.37 and for the campaigns from 1945-2010 the Pearson correlation co-efficient is -0.33. This means that there is a weak negative correlation between the number of election items and IAE items over time. In other words, it would appear that immigration issues have risen in prominence in campaign coverage despite an overall stagnation in the amount of election coverage produced across the press in the post-1945 era.

Figure 6.8 reformulates the same data, showing what proportion of all election coverage was IAE coverage, as a percentage.

**Figure 6.8: Percentage of election items counted as IAE items**

Figure 6.8 pronounces further the steep, recent incline in immigration’s cache as an electoral issue, replicating patterns identified elsewhere over some of the more recent campaigns (e.g. Billig et al. 2005). Nonetheless, the 1970 campaign is notable for the salience of immigration as a contemporary electoral issue, exceeding even the 2001 campaign in this regard. Even earlier, the 1918 campaign can reasonably be compared in this sense to some of the campaigns between the 1960s and 1990s. The 2005 and 2010
campaigns, however, show an even further entrenchment of immigration as an electoral issue than any prior campaigns, with 15% and 22.5% of all election coverage respectively containing some reference to immigration issues. To a large extent, the rise in this statistic between 2005 and 2010 can be accounted for by the drama generated by the ‘bigot-gate’ incident which came late into the 2010 election campaign. Much of the news interest for this incident came in its intrinsic newsworthiness as a ‘gaffe’ and for its symbolic importance as part of Gordon Brown and the Labour Party’s bid for election. Nevertheless, it can also be seen as an incident fuelled by the contemporary importance of the main issue raised by Duffy – immigration – to which it was widely assumed Brown’s ‘bigot’ comment related. The residual news value of immigration – intertwined with the wider immigration and party politics of the preceding years – therefore quite conceivably accounted not only for a substantial amount of immigration coverage during the campaign but also for the propulsion of the bigot-gate incident on the news agenda.

Beyond the quantity of items, the placement of items in a newspaper gives an indication of their newsworthiness and presupposed importance. While a page number closer to the front of the newspaper does not necessarily provide categorical evidence of an item’s potential ranking in terms of importance, when taken in relation to the total coverage of that issue during a week of coverage it more reliably indicates the significance of that issue on the news and electoral agenda. Table 6.4 shows the number of immigration items and IAE items located on the front page per campaign, in addition to these numbers as a proportion of all immigration items and IAE items. It is important to note here that the significance of front page status only became widespread across national newspaper titles in the 1960s; the front page of The Times until the 1960s and the Daily Mail until the 1930s, for example, featured only classified ads rather than news stories, while there were also a number of general changes in newspaper design between 1918 and 2010.

The results shown in Table 6.4 suggest that the prominence of immigration coverage generally reflects the quantity of total coverage. Results from the 1970, 1987 and 1992 campaigns are of interest in particular, though, for the level to which IAE coverage featured on the front page during these campaigns. During the 1970 campaign, for example, immigration coverage was quantitatively high, which was reflected in the level
to which it made the front page. In this sense, it was both prominent and pervasive. In 1992, on the other hand, total immigration coverage was relatively low, but it made the front page proportionately more than in most other campaigns. In this sense, then, immigration coverage during the 1992 campaign can be characterised as highly prominent more than pervasive. Recent campaigns are also notable for an emerging consistency with which IAE coverage features on the front page, at between 4% and 6% of all IAE coverage in 2001, 2005 and 2010.
Table 6.4: Front page immigration and IAE items by campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>campaign</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigration items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAE items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>campaign</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigration items</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAE items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigration items</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAE items</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigration items</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAE items</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
<td>% of total items per category</td>
<td>Number of front-page items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigration items</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAE items</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5 cross-tabulates the focus of items (i.e. items of main focus vs. Items of secondary focus) against their electoral orientation (i.e. IAE items vs. non-IAE items), demonstrating that a large proportion of items of secondary focus were electorally-
oriented (84.1%), in contrast with the proportion and number of main focus items which were electorally-oriented (48.8%).

**Table 6.5: Focus of immigration items by electoral orientation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>focus</th>
<th>IAE</th>
<th>non-IAE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>main</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.1%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>781</strong></td>
<td><strong>366</strong></td>
<td><strong>1147</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages are row percentages. Percentages are rounded so may not total 100%.

This disparity between the two focus categories and their electoral orientation might be explained as indicative of the embedding of immigration issues into general campaign narratives, so that a large number of immigration items in the latter campaigns might not have centred mainly on immigration issues but were related to the election. Figure 6.9 provides a temporal overview of the depth of focus in IAE items by campaign.

**Figure 6.9: The focus of IAE items (raw counts) by campaign**

![Figure 6.9: The focus of IAE items (raw counts) by campaign](image)

Figure 6.9 thereby accounts for the volatility inherent in the presence of non-IAE coverage during campaigns, which might centre on events coincidental to the campaign.
The 1970, 1979 and 1987 campaigns, particularly, contained a large amount of non-IAE coverage. Figure 6.9 shows that the 1970 and 2010 campaigns contained the most IAE coverage of main focus at 41 items each and that each campaign was preceded by a gradual incline in prior campaigns in the level of main focus IAE items. The major difference between these two campaigns lies, therefore, in the extent to which IAE coverage of secondary focus featured heavily in the 2010 campaign, only a fraction of which featured comparatively in 1970.

The following set of examples illustrates how the peripheral appearance of immigration in electoral news manifested itself textually in the 2010 campaign:

‘WHATEVER you do, wherever you are on Thursday, it is your duty to vote. You don’t have to be interested in politics but, if you care about schools, hospitals and fighting crime, it’s your duty to vote. If you care about the minimum wage, immigration, the war in Afghanistan, it’s your duty to vote.’

**Fiona Phillips’ column: ‘Do Your Duty’, The Daily Mirror, 1 May 2010.**

‘In the document [the Conservative Party manifesto], the Tory leader sets out the promises he intends his government to deliver, including slashing wasteful spending, fighting crime and, crucially, controlling immigration.’

**Now Cameron sets out his key pledges for a new Britain, The Daily Express, 1 May 2010.**

‘Surprisingly, he [Gordon Brown] slammed Mr Clegg on immigration – the subject that will be carved on his political tombstone. But he simply could not give us a convincing reason why, after 13 years, Labour should win yet another chance.’

**Tory chief looks like a real PM in waiting, The Sun, 30 April 2010.**
‘...the debate seemed to be the same one we’d had twice before: immigration, tax, schools, “fairness” and “unfairness”.’

The winner is...the BBC, with a good gig in Brum, The Times, 30 April 2010.

Therefore what appears at first glance to be an explosion in coverage of immigration during the election campaigns of the 2000s is mostly explained due to the way in which it has leaked into other domains of electoral coverage, becoming part of the contextual environment in which electoral discussions are held. Nevertheless, it is important not to dismiss the smaller rise in more focussed discussion of immigration which has accompanied this trend and which invites comparison with the extent to which immigration featured in press during the 1970 campaign at the height of Powellism. The dramatic and potentially crucial impact of ‘bigot-gate’ undoubtedly transformed the electoral agenda unpredictably during the 2010 campaign, but there were no comparable dramas in 2001 and 2005 and yet the pattern seen here began to emerge.

Formats of coverage
The forms of journalism within which immigration appears contend to shape the extent of the descriptive and evaluative contours of immigration reporting, and therefore the nature of the political debate on its issues generally. Table 6.6 demonstrates that the reporting of immigration issues was not insulated from wider developments in journalism in the UK over the twentieth century. During this time, and particularly in its latter years, the national press increasingly allocated space to commentary and opinion journalism, in what Brian McNair has termed ‘the columnar explosion’ (2008: 117). Regarded as a highly cost-effective means of filling expansions in news space, McNair notes that the commentator is able to complement the news reporter’s ‘this is what happened’ with their own ‘this is what I think about it’ (ibid.: 115), while their capacities of persuasion are limited only by their perceived expertise, insidership and passion for the subject. Meanwhile, the editorial and op-ed pages have given newspapers a chance to air their editorial stance towards various political issues, immigration among them. As Wahl-Jorgensen notes, ‘editorials are designed not only to influence governments or parties,
but also the newspapers’ readers, who are presumed to draw on the information contained in the editorials for their political knowledge and judgements’ (2008: 73).

Table 6.6 shows that, as immigration issues have received more prominent coverage, editorials, commentary and analysis about such issues have proliferated to comprise in combination over half of all coverage in the campaigns from 1992 to 2010. Meanwhile, the appearance of immigration in hard news stories has not increased as much in absolute terms despite expansions in coverage and therefore has proportionally eroded to constitute approximately a third of immigration coverage in the campaigns since 1992 (from well over half of all immigration coverage previously).

**Table 6.6: Types of immigration stories over time**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>‘Straight News’</th>
<th>Editorial/Comment/Opinion/Column</th>
<th>Analysis/Background/Facts &amp; Figures/Feature/Profile</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Visual/Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-1929</td>
<td>72 84.7</td>
<td>11 12.9</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>2 2.4</td>
<td>85 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1951</td>
<td>31 91.2</td>
<td>1 2.9</td>
<td>1 2.9</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>34 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1970</td>
<td>162 62.3</td>
<td>25 9.6</td>
<td>68 26.2</td>
<td>3 1.2</td>
<td>2 0.8</td>
<td>260 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1987</td>
<td>148 58.3</td>
<td>26 10.2</td>
<td>72 28.3</td>
<td>2 0.8</td>
<td>6 2.4</td>
<td>254 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-2010</td>
<td>172 33.5</td>
<td>152 29.6</td>
<td>172 33.5</td>
<td>14 2.7</td>
<td>4 0.8</td>
<td>514 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>585 51.0</td>
<td>215 18.7</td>
<td>313 27.3</td>
<td>20 1.7</td>
<td>14 1.2</td>
<td>1147 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages are row percentages. Percentages are rounded so may not total 100%.

Dividing coverage into IAE coverage and non-IAE coverage reveals an interesting difference in the types of article in which immigration appears in each. Almost 85% of non-IAE coverage was ‘straight news’ coverage. This is the case for only approximately 35% of IAE coverage, while 25% of IAE coverage was categorised as Editorial/Comment/Opinion/Column, 37.7% was categorised as Analysis/Background/Facts & Figures/Feature/Profile, 1.8% was categorised as Interview
and .3% was categorised as Visual/Other. Although this may be a result of the way in which election issues are reported in general, the effect of this means that there are critical differences in the range of ways in which immigration is discussed depending on whether it is being discussed in relation to the impending election or not. IAE coverage is effectively spread out over the pages of the newspaper, and editorialised coverage provides for a significant proportion of its appearance. In comparison, editorialised (i.e. Editorial/Comment/Opinion/Column) coverage accounts for just 3.2% of non-IAE coverage.

The increase over time in the extent to which newspapers have editorialised the issue, particularly in IAE coverage, suggests a growth in prominence of their role as political actors in the debate. This seems to corroborate data showing that the prominence of (restrictive) claims on immigration made in newspapers by the media grew from the late 1990s to rival the prominence of claims made by government figures (Carvalho 2015: 167). Although the rise of editorialised immigration coverage does not give definitive proof that such debate will necessarily have a significant impact on the political debate (or on public opinion), it suggests that as immigration has become more politicised the news media have become far more confident in attempting to not only report on but intervene into and steer the public debate by presenting definitions, explanations and evaluations in regard to the situational context (van Dijk 1989).

The findings identified in this section suggest that immigration has established itself as a prominent part of the campaign. It has become an embedded electoral issue and an ordinary part of the political environment. The growth in discussion of immigration in the campaigns of the 2000s has, however, to be seen as often rather superficial in its depth, alongside a core element of discussion which rivals the extent to which it has appeared in election campaigns before, such as in 1970. It has also been established that the ‘rise of the commentariat’ (possibly acutely in election coverage) has had an impact upon the extent to which immigration has become subject to increased editorialised and columnar discussion.

The next section outlines the extent to which various actors appear within immigration coverage.
‘Who was the coverage?’ Presence and Access

Which social actors appear in news coverage is a question of significant interest in many contemporary news studies, such as the ability to critically assess the variable capacity of individuals and groups in society to define the media debate and have their perspectives aired in the press. On the other hand, it enables researchers to illuminate the marginalisation of disempowered groups and to assess whether their presence in the news is matched by their access to the news. Comparing these facets of coverage is essentially to ask ‘who is talking about whom?’

‘Who appears in the coverage?’ and ‘who gets to speak?’ are thus linked but separate issues. Notions of ‘news presence’ and ‘news access’ can be deployed to provide a strategy for distinguishing between these two forms of representation. Deacon defines news presence as ‘the frequency with which the actions and opinions of individuals and organisations (‘news sources’) are the subject of editorial discussion’ and news access as ‘the extent to which particular sources interact directly with journalists to provide information and convey their opinions’ (2008: 124). The typical contemporary example Deacon gives is that of the terrorist organisation, who ‘often command considerable news presence through their threats and actions’, but ‘opportunities to justify directly their actions, explain their demands and so on’ (i.e. their news access), remain ‘negligible’ (ibid.: 125).

As Deacon goes on to suggest, news presence is more straightforwardly operationalised than news access; news presence can be assessed in one regard by measuring the frequency of mentions/quotations of social actors in reports, but

‘It is less easy to use such a comparison to measure news access as there can be occasions when powerful sources exert surreptitious influence ‘behind the scenes’. Nevertheless, the frequency with which sources are directly quoted in coverage does provide a telling, if imperfect, indicator of the availability and/or perceived credibility of news sources by journalists’ (ibid).
News Presence

Table 6.7 shows the news presence of 13 categories of social actors across all campaigns. A maximum of five actors were coded per news item, placed in order of appearance or, where more than five actors were present, by prominence (based primarily on length of direct quotation in words where applicable). The table illustrates that the news presence of opposition actors was higher than actors from any other category, although incumbent party plus other government actors were slightly more numerable if combined. When combined, the citizenry were also highly prominent (n=797), although if divided into categories comprising non-migrant citizens and migrant citizens it is revealed that this is mostly though not overwhelmingly due to the presence in the news of migrant citizens. Not all migrant actors appeared in the news as citizens, but the 482 migrant citizens who appeared in coverage comprised 79% of the 611 actors who were counted in total as migrants in news reports (this is not shown by Table 6.7). Thus, migrants appear mostly as citizens in the news rather than in other capacities.

Judiciary and police actors were also somewhat prominent, while immigration pressure groups received a fairly minor amount of news presence. Lastly, despite the implications of international migration to the UK for other nations and supranational bodies, international political actors received a relatively insubstantial news presence.

Table 6.7: The news presence of actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Incumbent party</th>
<th>Other government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>International political</th>
<th>Other political</th>
<th>Public professionals and celebrities</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Other private sector</th>
<th>Non-migrant citizenry</th>
<th>Migrant citizenry</th>
<th>Other civil</th>
<th>Immigration pressure groups</th>
<th>Judiciary and police</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages are row percentages. Percentages are rounded so may not total 100%.

The news presence of these actor groups may, nonetheless, vary across time. Table 6.8 shows the count for the news presence of the five most prominent actors in each
campaign period. The results demonstrate that the prominent news presence of migrant citizens has been a perennial aspect of press coverage of immigration, and they were frequently the most prominent type of actor. However, from 1992 their presence was somewhat backgrounded by the prominence of political party actors, especially the opposition in 2001, 2005 and 2010.

The salience of opposition actors was nevertheless not an exclusively modern phenomenon, but their prominence and predominance often arose during campaign periods yielding the largest quantity of coverage (e.g. 1970, 2005, 2010) and they consistently found news presence after the 1959 campaign. This suggests that as immigration has become a more prominent issue, and especially when immigration is a particularly salient issue in a campaign, the speech and actions of the opposition have become considered to be of increasing importance. Beyond the frequent presence of party political actors, those from the judiciary and courts also obtained recurrent visibility, appearing in the top five actors in 12 of the 25 campaigns.

It is also interesting to note that there is little evidence for an increase in the news presence of immigration-related pressure groups in recent campaigns – their only appearance in the top five actors for any campaign came in 1966. This suggests that election news reporting is an environment in which political parties rather than pressure groups have a better chance of securing a news presence in the field of immigration, even as pressure groups have expended more resources on news media activities.

Table 6.8: Five most prominent actors per campaign (raw count of appearances)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incumbent party</th>
<th>Non-migrant citizens</th>
<th>Migrant citizens</th>
<th>Judiciary and police</th>
<th>Other private sector</th>
<th>Other government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Non-Migrant Citizens</td>
<td>Migrant Citizens</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Incumbent Party</td>
<td>Non-Migrant Citizens</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>1955</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
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<td>91</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>1974b</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Incumbent Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
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</table>

As stated above, the migrant citizens category does not account for all migrants within coverage. The question over to what extent migrants appear within immigration coverage remains. This is an important aspect of coverage not only because news access
is necessarily predicated upon news presence, but also because it reveals the extent to which migrants are tangibly present within press debate rather than marginalised and obscured behind immigration as a social process and issue.

Table 6.9 shows that, across all campaigns, 27% of actors were identified as being migrants, whether through the use of nouns (e.g. ‘immigrant’) or verbs (‘[the actor] migrated to the UK/sought asylum in the UK’, etc.)\textsuperscript{115}.

Nonetheless, Table 6.9 demonstrates that the presence of migrant actors ranged widely between 1918 and 2010, equalling or exceeding 50% of all actors in the four campaigns from 1929 to 1945. Their presence of more than 40% of actors during the 1979-1987 campaigns, likewise, indicates a high prominence of such actors during this period. Subsequently, however, migrants’ news presence did not exceed 25% during the campaigns from 1992 to 2010, and reached lows of 15.9% and 9.8% in 1992 and 2010 – campaigns notable for the prominence of immigration on the electoral agenda.

Therefore, despite huge increases in the quantity of immigration and IAE coverage during the 2005 and 2010 campaigns, they were not accompanied by a rise in migrants’ news presence. This suggests an increasingly abstracted political debate, in which migrants are intangibly ‘othered’ rather than directly and personally engaged with.

\textsuperscript{115} This measure applied only to actors considered to refer to people rather than to institutions, as either ‘migrants’ or ‘non-migrants’, which explains the lower number of total actors cited by this measure.
Table 6.9: News presence of migrant actors versus non-migrant actors by campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Migrant(s)</th>
<th>Non-migrant(s)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>611</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>1665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, another set of actors it is worth some deeper investigation into lies within the identity of pressure groups present (and sometimes quoted) within coverage, despite their general inability historically to rival the news presence of party political actors. In recent years, as Table 6.10 suggests, the anti-immigration pressure group Migrationwatch have enjoyed episodes of access to conservative sections of the press that, it has been argued, have employed Migrationwatch’s research findings to advance a case for a restrictive immigration policy (Balch and Balabanova 2011), doing so through the use of a ‘technocratic mode of justification’ (Boswell 2009: 127).
However, in others areas of public policy reporting, journalists have been described as distinguishing between sources on the basis of their roles as ‘arbiters’ or ‘advocates’ (Deacon and Golding 1994: 15). Arbiters might be defined by their ‘expertise’ within particular fields, whereas ‘advocates are the sources that journalists recognize as having explicit, vested political or professional interests which frame and inform their contributions’. Indeed, although arbiters appear less frequently, their ‘perceived expertise is highly valued by journalists’ and they are therefore approached with a far lower degree of scepticism (ibid.). Some pressure groups (Migrationwatch being a good example) may on occasion play the part of both in what Deacon and Golding term a ‘covert advocate’ role (ibid.: 16). For the most part, though, the ‘immigration pressure groups’ counted within news reports in Table 6.10 may be largely regarded as assuming the role of overt advocates, representing either groups of migrants or citizens with concerns about migration to the UK.\footnote{An ‘immigration pressure group’ was defined for the purposes of Table 6.10 as any named group in an article whose presence in the story was explicitly predicated on the furthering of the political views of a larger set of people concerning the immigration issue at hand without being an established political party. Discrepancies between the total pressure groups found here and in the ‘immigration pressure groups’ actor category are the result of several causes: the grouping of several pressure groups as one actor where they were represented by one spokesperson (e.g. in 1966 the Indian Workers’ Association, the Pakistani Welfare Association and the West Indian Standing Conference were often represented by one source), the lack of nominal identification for groups identified only as pressure groups in general, the appearance of multiple spokespersons per pressure group (e.g. in a story in the 1970 campaign the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [JCWI] was represented by the patron and the secretary of the organisation), and occasions on which pressure groups were not present within the five actors coded but did appear in the article (e.g. in one instance in 1970 the JCWI appeared beyond the first five actors).}

To a large extent Table 6.10 shows that pressure groups have been marginal and sporadic figures in immigration coverage during campaign periods, but MigrationWatch have been the most prominent overall, managing to gain mainstream traction in 2005 which was consolidated in 2010. This represents a departure from the lack of success for pressure groups previously. The four next most-sourced immigration pressure groups were ethnic minority representation groups whose successes in this regard were exclusive to the campaigns 1966 to 1983. During the 1992-2001 campaigns no pressure groups were counted as sources, while prior to the 1966 campaign only the White Defence League in 1959 and the Birmingham Immigration Control Association in 1964 were present (none were coded prior to 1959). Prominent members of organisations such as the White
Defence League, the Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration and the British Campaign to Stop Immigration were involved in the organisation of the National Front (Troyna 1982: 262-264), which demonstrates the limited successes of far-right activist groups to attract attention regarding immigration during election campaigns.

**Table 6.10**: The presence of ‘immigration pressure groups’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign(s) present</th>
<th>Responses N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrationwatch</td>
<td>2005 (5), 2010 (8)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Workers’ Association</td>
<td>1966 (7), 1974a (1), 1979 (1)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indian Standing Conference</td>
<td>1966 (6), 1979 (1), 1983 (1)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Welfare Association</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens UK</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on U.K. Citizenship</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation of Indian Organisations</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Overseas Pakistanis</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Defence League</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-West Indian Conservative Society</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham Immigration Control Association</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Campaign to Stop Immigration</td>
<td>1974a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brixton Immigrant Action Group</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Committee of Indian Organisations</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Rights Association</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Bangladeshi Orga</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian Legation</td>
<td>1974a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Association of Britain</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Overseas Forum</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Pakistani Youth Council</td>
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<td>Refugee Council</td>
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<td>UK Tamil action committee</td>
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<td>Ukrainian Association</td>
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<td>Union of American Exiles</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
News presence, however, does not necessarily indicate that sources had significant news access. The depth of the news presence of migrant actors, in particular, must be assessed in relation to the depth of their news access in order to understand how far their news presence translates into news access and the contribution of migrants’ voices in the public debate. In other words, were migrants seen but not heard? Likewise, the same questions can be asked of other groups. The following section therefore progresses the discussion in terms of news access.

**News Access**

News access, and the depth and breadth of voices in the news, is defined here in terms of the direct quotation of various groups, taken as the number of words attributed to actors in direct speech in news reports. Taking access in this way, its importance lies in the discursive privileges it presents to its recipient(s), who is or are able to contribute to the definition of the issue at hand and to rhetorically advance their arguments, and therefore also the diversity of views available to audiences. Debates around, for example, ‘soundbite culture’ and the rise of the mediator’s voice are thus implicated here. As suggested above, it answers the question ‘who gets to speak?’

Figure 6.10 charts the temporal distribution of a total of 40,395 words quoted by the first five actors in each item by campaign. The total amount of direct quotation on immigration matters increased rapidly between 1950 and 1970 and again between 1997 and 2010, with an equally dramatic decrease between 1970 and 1974. However, the amount of direct quotation is strongly linked to the number of immigration items per campaign; the Pearson’s correlation co-efficient for the number of immigration items per campaign correlated with the number of directly quoted words per campaign is 0.97.
Figure 6.10: Sum number of directly quoted words per item in each campaign

Figure 6.11 shows the total sum of direct quotation for each actor category between 1918 and 2010. Opposition voices were directly quoted on a larger amount of words than both incumbent party sources and other government sources put together. Further, citizen voices (comprising both migrant and non-migrant citizens) were quoted on in excess of 9000 words in news reports, rivalling or exceeding party political voices in this regard. Migrant citizen actors accounted for 46.2% of this figure, indicating that migrant citizens secured a significant degree of news access and that this was also the case for other, non-migrant citizens (though see Table 6.13 which shows the proportion of migrant actors’ news presence versus their news access).
Table 6.11 elaborates on Figure 6.11 by presenting the percentage of news presence and news access each actor category received by campaign. Hence, it becomes possible to compare the proportion of news presence of an actor category (i.e. mentions in news reports) with their corresponding proportion of news access by direct quotation, and to assess the extent to which certain groups of actors are given the opportunity to speak as well as appear in immigration coverage.
<table>
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<th>Incumbent party</th>
<th>Other government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>International political</th>
<th>Other political</th>
<th>Public professionals and celebrities</th>
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<td>P</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>9.1</td>
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<td>25.8</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>33.4</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>5.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>29.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean (unweighted) | 13.2 | 14.7 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 14.5 | 15.9 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 5.2
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Media A</th>
<th>Other private sector P</th>
<th>Other private sector A</th>
<th>Citizenry P</th>
<th>Citizenry A</th>
<th>Other civil P</th>
<th>Other civil A</th>
<th>Immigration pressure groups P</th>
<th>Immigration pressure groups A</th>
<th>Judiciary and police P</th>
<th>Judiciary and police A</th>
<th>Other P</th>
<th>Other A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>12.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean (unweighted) | 3.4 | 3.6 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 34.3 | 19.9 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 11.7 | 13.7 | 5.4 | 8.1

All figures represent row percentages per category (P and A). P represents News Presence (mentioned in the first 5 actors of a coded report), A represents News Access (directly quoted words). N/A is used where a category totals 0%.
For much of the interwar period from 1923 onwards (and the few campaigns shortly after 1945), the new access of the opposition in comparison to incumbent party and government sources was non-existent. However, the opposition were ‘over-accessed’ (Hall et al. 1978: 58) in terms of direct quotation acutely in the 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1992 campaigns, during which the proportion of their news access notably exceeded that of their news presence. Indeed, from 1964 onwards, opposition sources were frequently the recipients of greater access than presence in comparison with incumbent party and other government sources. On the other hand, incumbent party and other government sources received a disproportionate level of news access in the 1918, 1992 and 2010 campaigns, during which such sources were highly prominent in the immigration debate.

Contrary to expectations of a strong ‘incumbency bonus’ in political news (Brandenburg 2006: 166; Tiffen et al. 2013: 382-383; Hopmann et al. 2011), for immigration news it is the opposition who have been routinely sourced over and above the level of incumbent party sources in the post-1945 period. This indicates that the politics of immigration are problematised in a way which offers opportunities to opposition parties to challenge the competence and credibility of incumbents. This modern trend is in stark contrast to earlier campaigns when incumbent party and other government sources could expect very little challenge from opposition sources.

Beyond the news access of party sources, immigration pressure groups also received a high degree of news access comparable to their news presence most notably in 1964, but also in 1970, 1979 and 2005, while their ability to maximise the potential of their presence was diminished distinctly within the 2010 campaign.

The coverage can be characterised in another way by comparing news access across press sectors. It becomes apparent from Table 6.12 that the opposition’s traditional successes in defining the immigration issue came in no small part thanks to a disproportionate level of news access in relation to news presence in the quality press, along with, to some extent, the mid-market press. Nevertheless, the popular press led in providing an over-accessing of the news to incumbent party sources.

The citizenry were under-represented in terms of news access to news presence across all three sectors, but found the most marginalisation in this sense in the quality press.
The mid-market and popular press, however, despite a proportionate under-representation of citizen voices in comparison to their presence within the news, the securing of almost one-third of all news access by citizen actors confounds the usual overwhelming marginality and trivialization of citizen voices in the news (Lewis and Wahl-Jorgensen 2005).

Table 6.12: News Presence and News Access by newspaper sector (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sector</th>
<th>quality</th>
<th>mid-market</th>
<th>popular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent party</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International political</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other political</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public professionals and celebrities</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other private sector</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenry</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other civil</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration pressure groups</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary and police</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

All figures represent column percentages per category (P, A). P represents News Presence (mentioned in the first 5 actors of a coded report), A represents News Access (direct quotation). Figures may not total 100 due to rounding.

A final question lies in the extent to which migrants were able to define migration issues themselves. As mentioned above, migrant citizens contributed to a significant proportion of all citizen actor news access, but this was markedly different between sectors of the press. Proportionally, 54.2% of citizenry news access in the quality press, 41.9% of
citizenry news access in the mid-market press and 29.2% of citizenry news access in the popular press was due to the news access of migrant citizens.

Table 6.13 takes the same principles of news presence and access as in Table 6.12 but re-applies them to migrants’ news presence and access as a subset of the news presence and access of all actors, in order to compare their representation within the press across newspaper titles.\(^\text{117}\)

**Table 6.13: News Presence and Access of migrant actors by newspaper title**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
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<td>Express</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Mirror</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sun/Herald</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.6%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the news presence of migrants surpassed their news access in every newspaper. Nevertheless, in the mid-market press migrant actors achieved an almost proportionate amount of news access to news presence, while in the popular press they received news access to approximately half the level to which they received news presence. The press as a whole, though especially the popular press, can therefore be said to have engaged with migration in a way which to some extent alienates and abstracts migrants themselves from the debate, with migrants unable to substantively voice their experiences of and attitudes towards migration in coverage.

\(^{117}\) As opposed to Table 6.9, news presence here is taken from all actors including institutions – for which migration status was invariably coded as N/A. This enables for comparison between the depth of presence and access of migrants when all actors are taken into consideration (as institutions often receive news access via spokespersons).
Summary

The two overall foci of this chapter have centred on issues of quantity/depth of items and presence/access of sources in a quantitative account of immigration news in the final week of the 25 election campaigns from 1918 to 2010.

The evidence shown indicates that immigration has become more central to the mediation of the campaign, especially recently. The greatest peaks in coverage occurred in 1970 and the 2000s, with the quantity of coverage in 1970 exceeding that of many later campaigns including 1992 and 2001.

This rise in the quantity of coverage is largely due to a rise in IAE coverage, so that when immigration is mentioned it is increasingly inevitably cast within an electoral rubric, while election coverage in general has increasingly featured immigration issues proportionate to other issues.

The data shows that the new, greater resurgence in immigration and IAE coverage of 2005 and 2010 has, in fact, predominantly arisen from a significant increase in a number of items only marginally concerned with immigration. Though IAE coverage has become an increasingly larger constituent of election coverage, this is predominantly due to the extent to which immigration has become an entrenched electoral issue among a whole set of policy issues. Moreover, in 2010, the political cache of immigration impregnated the ‘Bigot-gate’ incident in a way which suggested that immigration now arguably has the capacity to play a part in ‘electoral process’ coverage as well as policy coverage. News about immigration during the campaign has therefore become, at least for now, a routine and predictable facet of campaign reporting, even if the circumstances in which it emerges change with the influence of various contemporary factors each time.

Much of the campaign coverage of immigration came within the quality press, contrary to the issue’s association with the popular and mid-market press. This is the case for both immigration coverage which is primarily about immigration and immigration coverage which is not. All three sectors have, though, contributed substantially to the recent expansion in references to immigration in coverage primarily about other issues.
In terms of patterns of sourcing, opposition sources received the most news access overall, indicative of the way that immigration offers opposition parties opportunities to criticise government competence. This has, naturally, led to a stymieing of ordinary expectations of ‘incumbency bonus’ on the part of incumbent party sources.

The relatively new, emergent appearance of pressure groups whose presence in the news is predicated on assumptions as to their technocratic credibility (e.g. MigrationWatch), rather than their commitment to the representation of minority groups (e.g. Indian Workers’ Association) or far-right politics (e.g. White Defence League), potentially indicates a shift in the kinds of pressure groups that are able to influence the news agenda on matters of immigration.

Citizens have tended to be quite prominent in debate, but citizens found particularly substantive expression in campaign news only in more recent campaigns, having previously been marginalised in this sense in the campaigns of 1970 and 1992.

While migrant actors received an often substantial minority proportion of news presence (between approximately 20% and 30% of all actors), their opportunities for news access were more limited, though they fared best in this sense in the mid-market press. Further, migrants’ news presence declined after reaching a peak in the 1980s, suggesting that the media debate around immigration has begun to engage less directly with migrants and more with immigration as an abstracted issue. The effect of this may be to construct migrants as an ‘othered’ and intangible group of people. This accords with prior research into immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, which have suggested that, for instance, refugees and asylum seekers ‘are only quoted when they themselves are the subject of a report and rarely contribute directly to the policy debate’ (Buchanan, Grillo and Threadgold 2003: 9), while migrants in general are ‘mostly represented in the news as speechless actors involved in negative acts’ (ter Wal 2002: 428, see also van Dijk 1991, 1993a, 1996).

Many of these findings require further investigation. A growth in immigration coverage and its increasing electoral association might not have necessarily translated into an increasingly negative treatment of immigration issues. Likewise, the news access received by opposition sources may not have converted into extensively or uniformly negative
quotation in press coverage. The ‘stopwatch balance’ of news access needs to be complemented by an examination of coverage in terms of ‘agenda balance’ and ‘directional balance’ (Norris et al. 1999: 20), while the lexicon of coverage can be explored to help to understand to some extent how immigration is discussed in the press, beyond the extent to which it appears.

The next chapter therefore addresses these issues, focusing on the interpretative and evaluative dimensions of coverage in order to add to the data discussed in this chapter.
7: The Evaluative and Interpretative Dimensions of Coverage

Introduction

The previous chapter explored fluctuations in the volume of campaign-based immigration coverage, the intensity of coverage and the news presence and news access of social actors in coverage. The following will elaborate on these findings to explore the coverage in terms of the ‘fairness’ and ‘fullness’ of coverage.

Insofar as the media debate is characterised by a diversity of perspectives and even-handedness towards them it can be said to be fair. The national press, free from the regulatory imperatives of due impartiality that broadcast news outlets are subject to, exist along a spectrum of editorial positions. Nonetheless, balance and neutrality are among the most common measures by which the performance of the news media is understood by both journalists and audiences alike, with conspicuous bias and partiality regarded as unfair symptoms of inadequate or compromised journalism. A press debate characterised by fairness could be assumed to grant more-or-less equal news access to competing perspectives and consistently retain this balance regardless of fluctuations in the volume of coverage (c.f. Norris et al. 1999). This concern is therefore focussed on the ‘evaluative dimension’ of coverage and asks essentially ‘whether the media account is pro or anti the...matter being described’ (Golding 1990: 97). This chapter will therefore explore the tone and terms of coverage.

Insofar as the media debate is characterised by a comprehensive exploration of the numerous areas of public life in which immigration is socially, politically and culturally meaningful it can be said to be full. As John Berger has observed: ‘the migrant is not on the margin of modern experience – he [sic] is absolutely central to it’ (Berger and Mohr 1975, front cover). Is this centrality reflected in media representations of ‘the migrant’? Does coverage represent immigration as pervading all manner of topics to a similar degree, or are there imbalances in the depth of coverage afforded to some aspects of the debate over others? A press debate characterised by fullness would discuss immigration in terms of its relationship to a range of issues, in sufficient depth so as to impart nuance and detail to their coverage. Further, in the case of an increase in the volume of coverage, a full debate would conceivably offer space for more diversity in the range of
themes discussed, especially as the wider and indirect consequences of immigration become established. This set of considerations can be located within the ‘interpretative dimension’ of coverage, which asks ‘what aspects...are rendered visible, named and promoted’ (Deacon and Golding 1994: 19). Further, asking ‘what is included and what is excluded, what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded, what is thematized and what is unthematized, what process types and categories are drawn upon to represent events, and so on’ (Fairclough 1995: 103–4) is to answer to what extent the coverage is as full as its potential, with respect to presences as well as absences. Further, ‘indirect evaluation’ may be introduced in this dimension (Golding 1990: 97), in this case by the establishment of a framework in which immigration and its concomitant issues are routinely addressed within the bounds of certain thematic categories. This chapter will therefore explore the ‘agenda balance’ of coverage (Norris and Sanders 1999: 20), i.e. the extent to which the coverage is attendant to a range of issues over time and across newspaper and press sectors.

In order to bridge these areas of analysis and to provide a systematic analysis of the terms of debate, the lexicon of reporting is examined in order to illustrate the ways that immigration is constructed by journalists over time, which can be used to both illuminate the kinds of migrants that the coverage is about and infer the favourability or unfavourability of such constructions.

As shown in the previous chapter, there has demonstrably been a rise in the volume of immigration coverage during recent campaigns as well as in 1970. Further, immigration is increasingly a significant issue not just on the press agenda but also on the electoral agenda during campaign periods. In particular, from 2001 onwards, the amount of immigration coverage increased dramatically. Alongside this development, the gravitational pull of election campaigns on immigration coverage was such that it became overwhelmingly linked with the electoral implications of immigration issues from 1992 onwards, while there was a correspondingly dramatic rise in the proportion to which overall election coverage featured IAE coverage from 2001. However, it was also shown that the major quantitative difference between the peak of 1970 and the peaks of the 2000s was largely due to expansions in the amount of coverage which only dealt with immigration as a subsidiary issue. To what extent can it be said that these short-term and
long-term increases in coverage have given rise to a more expansive and pluralistic debate? In other words, is there more and more coverage dealing suitably with more and more substance? Or is there more and more about less and less?

Moreover, contemporary media coverage of immigration is frequently seen to be negative in tone, with peaks in coverage apparently the manifestation of a problematisation of immigration issues on the part of politicians and the press. Based on data from the previous chapter, it would therefore be expected that the 1970 and 2000s campaigns, particularly, would contain a large amount of negative quotation and that the press’ vocabulary of immigration would grow to become more pejorative over time. An additional question lies in how the electoral implications of immigration coverage during election campaigns have been manifest directionally and thematically.

Regardless of the direction in tone of coverage, linking attitudes to the actor groups responsible for their expression will also enable deeper insights into some of the data shown in the last chapter. For instance, to what extent is the high news access that opposition sources have received negative in tone? Do incumbent party and other government sources defend their record on immigration by providing positive quotation, or do they attempt to ‘appear tough’ in a bid to outflank their political opponents? Is the high news access of citizens representative of disaffection with immigration policy and trends, either positively or negatively? Finally, are migrants more likely to provide support for immigration, and what can be said for the tone of immigration pressure groups – do advocates dominate over arbiters (Deacon and Golding 1994)?

**The Fairness of Coverage: Directional Balance and Lexicon**

**Directional balance**

The balance of attitudes expressed towards immigration and the lexicon used by journalists and actors to construct immigration groups and processes in coverage over time and across newspapers and press sectors are both important factors in assessing the extent to which the media account of immigration has been ‘pro or anti’ over time, and by implication how ‘fair’ the coverage has been towards immigration issues.
In terms of attitudes, ‘supportive’ and ‘critical’ voices in news reports are assumed to correspond with the notions of ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-’ within the evaluative dimension (Golding 1990) and a suitable measure of the directional balance of debate (Norris et al. 1999: 20). These categories are supplemented by a ‘neutral’ category and a ‘mixed’ category (comprising quotes from sources in which there was both approximately equal supportive and critical content). The link between supportive/critical and pro/anti is suggestive as the access of certain perspectives to the news does not necessarily translate into favourable treatment of those perspectives. Though journalists often attempt to construct coherent and ‘balanced’ news reports by establishing presupposedly conflicting perspectives in what they see as equal or proportionate measure, there are abundant means by which strongly and extensively expressed views might be intentionally or unintentionally subverted by the circumstances of their inclusion. Nevertheless, the measure provides a general picture of the attitudinal landscape over time, and it would be reasonable to expect that the ‘directional’ trend of media accounts would be manifest in any systematically disproportionate accessing of either supporting or criticising sources.

Utilising the notion of ‘directional balance’ goes further than that of ‘stop-watch balance’ (Norris et al. 1999: 20) in measuring the number of seconds of television coverage, newspaper column inches or, as was the case here, directly quoted words given over to the views of relevant social actors and for which significant variation in such measures between competing political parties might be assumed to be constitutive of partiality or bias. As Norris and Sanders argue, ‘in this familiar perspective, which draws on classical liberalism, news is defined as impartial if even-handed towards the pros and cons of any argument’ – directional balance is ‘one of the commonest ways for journalists to understand objectivity’ (1998: 4). Like studies of ‘stop-watch balance’, though, those concerned with ‘directional balance’ are often pre-occupied with observing the level of neutrality in coverage in a party political framework (ibid.). Directional balance is therefore re-applied here to immigration as an issue, rather than to party advantage.

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118 The ‘supportive’ tone was used for each of the (up to) first five actors in each item whereby the actor was directly quoted and, overall, their quotation was explicitly supportive, ‘tolerant’ or favourable towards the presence of all migrants, of a group of migrants or of individual migrants (where their migration status was material to the actor’s quotation) or towards the impact of immigration processes on general social developments or institutions, and vice versa for ‘critical’. 

178
As outlined in Chapter 2, prior research contends that news coverage about immigration and its related issues is overwhelmingly negative in tone. These accounts suggest that immigration news is partial, favouring perspectives which negatively represent immigrants as ‘threats’ or ‘problems’. It would be expected, therefore, that actors critical of immigration will have been sourced more frequently and at greater length. Further, as has been shown in the previous chapter, opposition sources were more frequently present and accessed over the entirety of the coverage (i.e. the opposition ‘win’ in ‘stopwatch’ terms). The strategic value of criticising incumbents’ immigration policies during the campaign might therefore lead to the expectation that the disparity in access would translate, or at least contribute, to a more negative trend in the tonality of coverage.

Table 7.1 shows the total amount of direct quotation by tone over the entire coverage in words. Taking the proportion of neutral quotation and mixed quotation together, they comprise 54.1% of the total.

**Table 7.1: Direct quotation by actor tone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Criticising</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total direct quotation (words)</strong></td>
<td>18757</td>
<td>3095</td>
<td>6227</td>
<td>12316</td>
<td>40395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

More importantly, however, the table shows that critical quotation was almost twice as likely to appear in the coverage as supportive quotation, at 30.5% to 15.4%.

It is important to know whether there are any major differences between IAE coverage and non-IAE coverage in order to understand whether the disparity between critical quotation and supportive quotation overall is driven by differences between these types of coverage. Dividing the coverage in this way produces Tables 7.2 and 7.4.
Table 7.2 demonstrates that, in IAE coverage, the proportion of critical quotation was even higher than across the total coverage, with a ratio of critical to supportive quotation of 2.8 to 1 in IAE coverage compared with almost 2 to 1 overall.

**Table 7.2: Direct quotation by actor tone in IAE items**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Criticising</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total direct quotation (words)</strong></td>
<td>9139</td>
<td>2831</td>
<td>3783</td>
<td>10727</td>
<td>26480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

Nonetheless, this disparity was caused not by a substantial loss in the proportion of supportive quotation within IAE coverage, but by a loss in the proportion of neutral quotation of almost 12%. Additionally, the proportion of mixed quotation was 10.7% in IAE coverage compared with 7.7% in total immigration coverage.

In other words, the sum total of quotation by actors critical of immigration was likely to be greater when immigration was covered with regard to its electoral implications than otherwise, and the IAE debate may be characterised as containing less neutral tonality overall compared with the immigration debate at large.

Further, Table 7.3 shows that 127 more critical actors were sourced in IAE coverage than supportive actors, but also that actors whose tone was either critical or mixed were likely to be quoted at greater length (i.e. more words per actor) than those whose tone was supportive. Actors whose tone was mixed, particularly, were likely to be sourced at even greater length, indicative of a greater discursive authority and the increased requirements of space for actors pursuing arguments which contain both supportive and critical statements.
Critical actors therefore appear to have had a two-fold advantage over their supportive counterparts in IAE coverage: they were more likely to appear and when they did they were quoted at greater length.

In contrast, as Table 7.4 shows in relation to non-IAE coverage, when the electoral element was absent, supportive quotation outweighed critical quotation.

### Table 7.4: Direct quotation by actor tone in non-IAE items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Criticising</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total direct quotation (words)</td>
<td>9618</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>2444</td>
<td>1589</td>
<td>13915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

Contrary to the balance of tonality in IAE coverage, then, where immigration coverage contained no electoral relevance, critical quotation comprised a fraction of total quotation, at 11.4%. Instead, neutral quotation was by far most frequently sourced at 69.1% of all quotation, but supportive sources also received more space than critical sources. In short, the sharply critical voices found in IAE news were more-or-less blunted in non-IAE items (i.e. when immigration is a social issue but not politicised as an electoral issue), while it can be said that the debate was premised on a greater degree of neutrality overall.

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119 A number of actors were not quoted; they therefore do not appear in Tables 7.3 and 7.5.
Table 7.5 shows similar data to that presented in Table 7.3, but for non-IAE items. In contrast to the differences between the amounts of quotation per actor by tone category found in IAE coverage, the data shown here indicate that differences between tone categories in terms of total quotation in non-IAE coverage can more easily be accounted for by the number of actors sourced. Nonetheless, supportive and critical voices tended to be quoted on a proportionately higher number of words on average compared with neutral or mixed voices.

Table 7.5: The number of quoted actors by tone category in non-IAE items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Criticising</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoted words per actor</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

Figure 7.1 reiterates the differences in directional balance between IAE coverage and non-IAE coverage. It demonstrates that their differences can be accounted for by the absence of critical voices in non-IAE coverage and the proliferation of neutral or mixed voices, rather than a large difference in the proportion of supportive quotation, which is negligibly different between the two forms of coverage. Overall, IAE coverage can be characterised as constituting a far more divisive debate in which the directional balance of debate is highly partisan towards anti-immigration attitudes, while non-IAE coverage was dominated by less impassioned voices on either side of the debate and offered more space for pro-immigration attitudes than anti-immigration attitudes.
Figure 7.1: Comparing the directional balance of IAE coverage and non-IAE coverage

The next section examines the extent to which the tonality of coverage has fluctuated over time, in order to help understand whether expansions in coverage have occurred alongside more positive or negative attitudes in coverage.

Balance over time

Figure 7.2 shows the total quotation in words by tone in each campaign for IAE coverage. The depth of availability of critical opinion across the press in all immigration coverage has certainly risen dramatically in recent campaigns, and was also prominent in 1970. Indeed, the 1970, 1992, 2005 and 2010 campaigns collectively comprised 70% of all critical quotation in IAE coverage, while there was also a large disparity between critical and supportive quotation in 1918 and in the second 1974 campaign.

The dominance of critical voices in IAE coverage overall was not, though, a trend which was uniform across all campaigns. In fact, as Figure 7.2 shows, supportive quotation in IAE items outnumbered critical quotation during five campaigns in the post-war period (1974a, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 2001).

‘Other’ combines the Neutral and Mixed values.
During the interwar period, supportive quotation was almost entirely absent in comparison to critical or other quotation in election-related items. After 1945, however, supportive voices were mobilised more effectively in the press. The period from 1979 to 1987, in particular, represents something of a reversal of the norm, as the depth of critical voices from the 1970 and second 1974 campaign relented.

Following the 1992 campaign, the 1997 and 2001 campaigns contained little coverage and consequently little quotation overall, but of the voices present within coverage most were neutral or mixed (i.e. other).

These campaigns were followed by a huge incline in the amount of critical and other quotation in 2005 and 2010. The accompaniment of non-partisan quotation along with critical quotation is new to recent campaigns; previous campaigns containing large spikes in critical quotation (as can be seen in 1970, 1974b and 1992, for example) contained far less neutral quotation.

Further, this incline is largely only a reflection of the expansion of immigration coverage during this period, as Figure 7.3 demonstrates. By taking the mean number of directly quoted words for each tone category per item, Figure 7.3 adjusts for the peaks and
troughs in coverage and therefore enables for comparisons between campaigns in the level to which news reports were anti- or pro-immigration on average.

**Figure 7.3:** Mean directly quoted words by actor tone per item over time (IAE items)

![Graph showing mean directly quoted words by actor tone per item over time (IAE items)](image)

The figure illustrates that, while the breadth of coverage in the 2010 campaign translated into an unprecedented degree of critical quotation regarding immigration issues, several prior election campaigns contained more critical quotation per item – though the 2010 campaign also contained far less supportive quotation per item than in many of those campaigns, too. Taking into consideration a disparity such as this, 2010 IAE items featured on average 5.8 times as much critical quotation as supportive quotation. In 2005 this figure was 3.9, in 1992 it was 2.9, in the second 1974 campaign it was 7.8, in 1970 it was 4.4 and in 1964 it was 2.4. This suggests that, although there are campaigns in which critical attitudes are generally subdued, there have been several campaigns in which hostile attitudes to then-current immigration circumstances surfaced dramatically, and provided an overwhelmingly negative balance of attitudes in coverage dealing with immigration as an electoral issue. On the contrary, supportive quotation has decreased slightly as an average over time and there have been no such breakout campaigns for the pro-immigration case.
Critical quotation has, however, surfaced slightly less dramatically within both peak campaigns since 1974b (1992 and 2010). Indeed, several campaigns contained more critical quotation on average per item than the 2010 campaign (although the data for the average quotation within interwar campaigns was more volatile due to their lower number of cases). It is difficult to know if this is related to longer-term compressions in quotation time and ‘soundbite culture’, but it is also possible that this trend may be due to critical voices having become an established and normalised part of the debate beginning with the 1959 to 1970 period. The grounds for believing that this may be the case rest on an argument that certain, hegemonic perspectives – in this case critical viewpoints – begin to ‘dominate and direct public discourses, until they become “common sense”’ (Jacomella 2010: 92). Certain key phrases thereafter became shorthand for broader and more sophisticated ideas and the onus on actors critical of immigration to elaborate on their objections and criticisms gradually diminishes.

Focusing on non-IAE items, Figures 7.4 and 7.5 demonstrate the extent to which neutral quotation has largely prevailed in non-IAE items throughout the sample period, though also the disparity between supportive and critical quotation.

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120 The mean average number of words of critical quotation per item was 18.9 words in 1964, 30.7 words in 1970, 34.9 words in 1974b, 26.6 words in 1992 and 14.2 words in 2010.

As Figure 7.5 shows, supportive quotation peaked most notably in 1959, 1974b, 1997, 2005 and 2010. In the interwar period, on the other hand, critical quotation was more
likely to be found, in 1931 and 1935. The almost complete absence of supportive quotation in the interwar period is therefore common to both IAE and non-IAE coverage and suggests either or perhaps both that pro-immigration sources were unorganised and failed to mobilise media responses prior to the late 1950s and/or that such sources were not deemed of significance to the debate by journalists.

As noted earlier, making sense of patterns across campaigns is difficult with regards to non-IAE items, as the impetus for this kind of coverage is largely incidental and is therefore subject to less consistent logics than those which might contribute to patterns in IAE coverage. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to assume that the results for each campaign shown in Figure 7.4 are particular only to their contemporary conditions and thus wholly discrete from each other when considering the directional balance of coverage. This is the case not least because news values (along with journalists’ notions of objectivity) are unlikely to shift dramatically from one campaign to the next.

Overall, this kind of coverage serves as a counterpoint to the highly critical features of IAE coverage, and is indicative of an approach on the part of the press to consult a more sanguine range of voices on immigration issues when debate moves beyond immigration as an electoral issue. The disparity between supportive and critical quotation is, however, far more pronounced in IAE coverage and it is arguable as to whether the potential counterbalancing effects of the higher degree of supportive quotation than critical quotation in non-IAE items are able to have an impact during election campaign weeks in which campaign coverage is highly prominent and, where relevant to immigration, contains highly critical voices.

**Differences between actors**

Who was responsible for these critical voices? Figure 7.6 shows the quotation by tone for categories of actor in the coverage, revealing to what extent certain kinds have been critical or supportive (as well as neutral or mixed) towards immigration.
Overall, much of the dominance in quotation of neutral and mixed voices came from citizen, incumbent party, opposition, judiciary/police and other government actors. Opposition sources were vocally critical of immigration, while incumbent party sources were also highly critical in tone (collectively contributing to 67.9% of all critical quotation). It can be suggested that this is a product of the gravitational pull of opposition voices on incumbent party sources, who might wish to respond in kind to critical opposition voices in order to maintain a perception that criticisms of immigration policy have been recognised and in an attempt, therefore, to appear ‘tough’ on immigration.

Citizen voices were critical and supportive in almost equal measure, with the vast majority, over 70%, of their total quotation being of mixed or neutral tone. This largely corresponds with the conclusions drawn by Lewis et al. (2005: 34) who claimed that citizens’ lack of clear expressions of partisan opinions in the news means that citizens are often represented as being ‘apolitical about manifestly political issues’.
For their generally subdued depth of news access, pro-immigration pressure groups were given virtually the same space to advance their arguments as their anti-immigration counterparts.

Several kinds of actors were, albeit slightly, more supportive than critical overall, including other government, international political, public professionals and celebrities, media, citizenry and other sources, with some of these responsible for hardly any critical quotation at all. The lack of critical quotation (and the presence of supportive quotation) from other government and international political sources, in particular, is unsurprising given that motives to electioneer are absent for these actors compared with incumbent and opposition party sources. Their news access is perhaps, instead, predicated on their role as ‘arbiters’ (Deacon and Golding 1994: 15-17) and the authority that their administrative responsibility and expertise affords them.

In terms of the quotation of migrant actors, Table 7.6 shows that very little of their quotation was negative towards immigration issues. A larger minority of quotation was supportive, but over 80% was mixed or neutral in tone.

Table 7.6: Sum quotation by tone of migrant actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>5374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

The reason for a lack in quotation critical of immigration on the part of migrant actors is self-evident, but it can be suggested that a relative lacking in supportive quotation (at least in comparison to neutral and mixed quotation) is the result of a combination of two factors: reticent or ambivalent attitudes on the part of migrant actors and/or a positioning and marginalising of migrant actors in news reports which enables merely blunted support towards immigration or other immigrants. Together with the findings regarding news access from the previous chapter, Table 7.6 demonstrates a general

122 ‘Other government’ sources comprise, for example, civil servants and government department spokespersons who are not permitted to express partisan attitudes towards issues of policy, while ‘international political’ sources comprise, for example, other international governments and foreign diplomats who are unlikely to have strong opinions about immigration to the UK.
inability for immigrants to express firm opinions or to provide support for immigration, providing further proof of their marginalisation from the definition of their own circumstances or of immigration politics generally.

**Differences between newspapers**

Differences in the ideological and market positions of newspaper titles may potentially generate differences between titles and press sectors in their evaluative treatment of immigration issues, including the availability of critical and supportive voices in immigration coverage. Figure 7.7 compares the directional balance of each newspaper by focussing on mean quotation per item by tone across each title.

**Figure 7.7: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers**

The data demonstrates, primarily, that newspaper titles cannot necessarily be characterised in this regard according to their market position – differences within press sectors are in many cases greater than those between sectors (for example in the mid-market and popular press). The Sun/Herald, for example, had more in common with regard to the proportion of directional balance with the Express than with the Mirror, which in turn had more in common with the Mail than the Sun/Herald. Further, the Guardian included slightly more supportive than critical quotation overall, at 27.4% to
26.3% of all quotation (or 9.6 to 9.2 words per item on average) and was therefore unique among the quality press and indeed all titles in its superior affordance of supportive voices compared with critical voices across all immigration coverage. Meanwhile, the difference between critical and supportive quotation was far less pronounced in the Telegraph than in the Times.

Overall, for each title, neutral/mixed (i.e. other) quotation surpassed that of both critical and supportive quotation. The amount of critical quotation was, on average, highest in the Daily Express, and lowest in the Daily Mirror, while the amount of supportive quotation was highest in the Guardian and lowest in the Mirror. There was more than twice as much critical quotation as supportive in each of the Times, the Mail and the Mirror, while there was over 4 times as much critical to supportive quotation in the Express and the Sun/Herald.

Figures 7.8 and 7.9 elaborate on Figure 7.7 to explore the disparities in directional balance within IAE coverage and in non-IAE coverage. Figure 7.8 shows the mean number of directly quoted words per item by tone in each newspaper in IAE coverage, while Figure 7.9 shows the same data for non-IAE coverage.

**Figure 7.8**: Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers in IAE coverage
The results show the pervasiveness by which critical quotation was higher than supportive quotation across the press. This disparity was most acute in the Sun/Herald, Mirror, Times and Express, demonstrating that where immigration had an electoral element, critical attitudes were afforded more space independent of factors of market position. For the Guardian and Telegraph, on the other hand, the ratio of critical to supportive quotation was 1.5 to 1 and 1.8 to 1, far less than the almost 10 to 1 of the Sun/Herald.

**Figure 7.9:** Mean quotation per item by tone of newspapers in non-IAE coverage

As is clear from Figure 7.9, the presence of neutral and mixed (i.e. other) quotation in non-IAE coverage was proportionally much higher than in IAE coverage. In the Express, for instance, other quotation comprised 85.7% of all quotation. In terms of the directional balance between critical and supportive quotation, though, supportive quotation was greater on average than critical quotation in 5 of the 7 newspaper titles, with the Guardian displaying a particularly large disparity in favour of supportive quotation at a ratio of slightly over 10 to 1 quoted words compared to the more modest disparities of the other 4 such titles (between 1.5 to 1 and 3.2 to 1). These results reinforce the significance of immigration as electoral issue: in terms of which voices prevail, the casting
of immigration within an electoral rubric is crucial to the directional balance of coverage in most of the press, even in those which can be characterised as relatively generous with the affordance of supportive voices, such as the Guardian.

For the Mail and the Express, however, critical quotation surpassed supportive quotation even in non-IAE coverage – and, for the Express, the directional balance between critical and supportive remained of a similar ratio between both IAE and non-IAE coverage. In this sense, the mid-market press were unique in that they comprised the only market sector, and thus individually the only newspapers, to feature a disproportionate amount of critical to supportive quotation in both IAE and non-IAE coverage. Whereas other newspapers approached non-electorally significant immigration issues by providing the sort of platform for positive voices not seen in their IAE coverage, the mid-market press remained consistent in their marginalisation of these voices regardless of the electoral ramifications, ostensibly operating according to different logics of sourcing than other titles.

**Differences between newspapers across time**

It cannot be assumed that these results uniformly represent the directional balance of coverage across time, however. As the news value of immigration grew or contracted, and as certain actors came to the fore in media debates, it is conceivable that this would be reflected in fluctuations in the directional balance of coverage, both within individual titles and collectively as a national press. Moreover, the editorial politics of newspapers alter over time, too, potentially influencing reportorial practices in regard to a myriad of issues, immigration among them – and symptomatically the directional balance of coverage. The nuances of such developments for the histories of the Mirror and the Sun/Herald, for instance, are lost by simply providing a cumulative summation of the directional balance of these newspapers across several decades.

Table 7.7 divides the 25 sampled campaigns into five quintiles, which periodise the directional balance of coverage by mean direct quotation per item across in each newspaper. The overall results show marked distinctions between periods of time: in the interwar and immediate post-1945 campaigns, supportive quotation was virtually (1918-1929) or even completely (1931-1951) absent. Indeed, the 1922, 1929, 1931, 1935, 1945,
1950, 1951 and 1955 campaigns featured no supportive quotation whatsoever. In comparison, this was the case for critical quotation only in 1923, 1945, 1950 and 1955.\(^{123}\)

During the 1955-1970 period, however, supportive voices began to be established in the press, though critical quotation still outnumbered supportive on average by a ratio of over 2 to 1. The period from 1974-1987 was the only one in which supportive quotation outnumbered critical quotation, before the 1992-2010 period restored a similarly proportionate disparity in favour of critical quotation to that seen between 1955 and 1970.

**Table 7.7:** Mean direct quotation in words per item by tone across time in all coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of publication</th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>1918-1929</td>
<td>1918-1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1931-1951</td>
<td>1931-1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992-2010</td>
<td>1992-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticising</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>26.1</td>
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</table>

\(^{123}\) The 1950 campaign produced no immigration items, while the 1945 and 1955 campaign coverage included neutral and mixed quotation only.
In summarising directional balance across the press over time, three periods in general can be identified. During the interwar period, where actors were partisan they were very often critical in tone. Pro-immigration advocates were yet to emerge as sources in the press, but these groups had notable successes in some quarters of the press in several post-1945 campaigns, particularly between 1974 and 1987. While the presence of pro-immigration voices did not entirely relent from 1992 onwards, critical voices became once again more prevalent in all but the Guardian and the Times, and were especially dominant in the Express and the Sun. The dominance of critical voices in the post-1992 modern era echoes similar trends from earlier, interwar campaigns, though this is now accompanied by the presence of a more consistent, if somewhat muted, representation of supportive voices.

The Lexicon of Coverage

It is often argued that the terminology used to describe migrant groups and their movement is able to frame the way such groups and movements are perceived. As noted in Chapter 2, the use of metaphors in immigration coverage, for example, demonstrates the rhetorical and pejorative force of certain textual features to structure narratives about the issues involved and may work subtly enough to go unnoticed by many readers. Journalists might, on the other hand, deliberately seek to use quasi-legal or otherwise non-pejorative terms and phrases in order to avoid prejudicial descriptions of migrants and migration and to maintain a neutral, or even positive, portrayal of events.

Counting the frequency of lexical choice, in terms of both descriptions of groups and movements, is therefore an important aspect of studying both the interpretative and the evaluative dimensions of immigration coverage. Further, charting change and continuity
in lexical use is also of paramount importance, as it is argued that the frequency of lexical choice can alter dramatically depending on political circumstances, even in the short term (McLaughlin 1999). In the longer term, and for a wider variety of reasons, certain terms might be subject to sustained usage, fall out of favour, gain currency, and so on.

**The terminology used to describe migrant groups**

With this in mind, Table 7.8 charts the usage of the 6 most frequently used terms for migrant groups in coded reports across the five broad periods of time between 1918 and 2010. The usage of these terms by actors and journalists was separated, in order to recognise the higher threshold of endorsement afforded to a term when used by a journalist, as compared to the relative detachment that its presence in direct speech might bring. For this reason, the number of times a term was used by journalists appears in brackets underneath its total usage. For the most part, Table 7.8 demonstrates that it is rare for terms to be used exclusively by actors in reports and, therefore, that the terms shown are largely ‘endorsed’ by journalists in this regard.

**Table 7.8: Raw count of top six terms used for migrant groups in each period**

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>alien(s)</td>
<td>36 (28)</td>
<td>alien(s)</td>
<td>11 (11)</td>
<td>immigrant(s) 107 (100)</td>
<td>immigrant(s) 61 (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugee(s)</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>undesirable(s) 1 (1)</td>
<td>alien(s)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>refugee(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enemy alien(s)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>slave trafficker(s) 1 (1)</td>
<td>refugee(s) 3 (3)</td>
<td>illegal (im)migrant(s) 8 (8)</td>
<td>asylum seeker(s) 55 (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traveller(s)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>migrant(s)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>alien(s)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undesirable(s)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>newcomer(s) 3 (3)</td>
<td>boat refugee(s) 3 (3)</td>
<td>refugee(s)</td>
<td>27 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrant(s)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>traveller(s) 1 (1)</td>
<td>migrant(s) 2 (2)</td>
<td>economic migrant(s) 11 (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Up to 3 terms could be coded per item. Each term could be coded once per item. Where a term was used by the journalist and 1 or more actors, the usage of the term by the journalist was coded only.
Figure 7.10 shows how usage of the 6 most frequently used terms overall (by either actors or journalists) fluctuated over time.

**Figure 7.10**: Fluctuations in usage of terms over time (sum frequency of usage per campaign)

The results illustrate the rise and fall (or vice versa) of several terms. The usage of the term ‘alien(s)’ was superseded in post-war coverage by the usage of the term ‘immigrant(s)’. On a superficial level this reflects changes in the usage of both terms in legal and political discourses (e.g. the naming of Acts of Parliament concerned with immigration control), but this development may also reflect a growing discomfort at the pejorative connotative potential of the term ‘aliens’ and its incompatibility with the lexicon of a society which came to regard itself as more inclusive.

The term ‘refugee(s)’ appeared in every period except for during the campaigns of 1931-1951, and has been joined in recent years by the usage of the term ‘asylum seeker(s)’, an expansion that seems likely to be illustrative of the greater political and media focus and antipathy towards the issue of asylum during that time.

Further, emergent concerns over irregular migration are reflected in the growth in usage of the term ‘illegal (im)migrant(s)’, particularly from 1992 onwards (it was the most
frequently used term in 2010), while the term ‘economic migrant(s)’ has surfaced too. The usage of many of the more frequently used terms shown in Table 7.8 can surely be attributed to their roots in contemporary legal and political discourses and presumably would appear to have been used in order to describe migrant groups relatively dispassionately and according to journalistic norms of neutrality.

Those which owe less to their proliferation in legal and political domains (e.g. ‘enemy alien(s)’, ‘undesirable(s)’, ‘newcomer(s)’), on the other hand, prove more interesting with regard to assessing their evaluative implications, even if there is not always a consensus on their connotation. An example of the division which marks the politics of language surrounding immigration can be found in the contemporary use or lack of use of the term ‘illegal immigrant’, for instance. Allen and Blinder (2013) found that UK newspapers use the term on a fairly regular basis, but the Associated Press stylebook now prohibits the term (AP 2013) and the Guardian has recently initiated a discussion via the newspaper’s readers’ editor to discuss the legitimacy of its usage (Elliott 2014).

The 1992-2010 period contained three times as many individual formulations for describing migrant groups as in the 1918-1929, 1955-1970 and 1974-1987 periods (27 terms were coded at least once from 1992-2010 compared to 9 in these three prior periods), and the 3 earliest periods were almost completely dominated by the most frequent term. Both of these trends indicate that there has been an expansion in the articulation of immigration in the latter period, a phenomenon referred to by critical linguists and critical discourse analysts as ‘overlexicalization’. As Richardson suggests, overlexicalization ‘should be taken to indicate an intense ideological preoccupation’ with the subject at hand (2009: 363). For terms relating to forced migration politics, this development can be seen in light of the ‘fractioning’ of the refugee label within the political domain (Zetter 2007), which may have transferred to the media domain. Further, Figure 7.10 shows that the 1970 campaign was dominated by the usage of the term ‘immigrant’ to the almost total exclusion of other terms, while the latter campaigns were more diverse in the range of groups mentioned.

While terms such as ‘immigrant(s)’ and ‘alien(s)’ were the most frequent overall, there are many more terms which may act as a guide towards the character of the lexicon of
the mediated immigration debate that are missed by a focus on the depth of lexical usage rather than its breadth. Further terms outside of the 6 most frequent from 1992-2010 include, for example: ‘illegal(s)’ (8 times), ‘bogus refugee(s)’ (6), ‘genuine refugee(s)’ (5), ‘failed asylum seeker(s)’ (5), ‘overstayer(s)’ (3), ‘bogus asylum seeker(s)’ (3), ‘genuine asylum seeker(s)’ (2) and ‘illegal asylum seeker(s)’ (2). This apparent preoccupation with the reliability of asylum seekers’ claims for refuge (including the dichotomised categories of ‘genuine’ vs. ‘bogus’ refugees) and the conflation of forced migration with irregular migration seem grounds for evidence of indirect evaluation, if not active criticism of refugees and asylum seekers.

The terminology used to describe migration processes

Of similar importance is the application of verbs and nominalizations which describe the process of immigration. Table 7.9 therefore shows the words used to describe the movement of migrants across time. This time, only the terms used by journalists were counted. Conjugations of verbs, as well as nominalizations, were usually conflated with the infinitives they were derived from. In rare instances, nouns were coded (e.g. ‘waves’), and nominalizations deemed significantly different and of sufficient interest were coded separately from similar terms (e.g. ‘mass immigration’). Further, in this case, due to the increased diversity of terms than in Table 7.8, up to the fifteen most frequent terms used per period are shown.
Table 7.9: Raw count of top fifteen terms used to describe migrants’ movements in reports

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<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>278</td>
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<tr>
<td>land</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>immigrate/immigration</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>return</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>arrive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>smuggle</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>domicile</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enter/entry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invade/invasion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>embark</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>import</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crawl</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>swarm</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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*’seek asylum’ also includes variants such as ‘ask for’, ‘claim’, ‘plead for’, etc.; ‘gain asylum’ also includes variants such as ‘be granted’.
Up to 3 terms could be coded per item.

Most notably, ‘immigrate/immigration’ itself was not the primary term by which inward migration to the UK was described by journalists prior to latter campaign periods, finding itself less frequently used than ‘come’ and ‘land’ between 1918 and 1929 and less frequently used than ‘come’, ‘enter/entry’ and ‘influx’ between 1931 and 1951. Thereafter, though, it became the dominant term by which migration was described.

The most frequent terms in latter campaigns such as ‘immigrate/immigration’, ‘come’, ‘arrive’, ‘stay’, ‘migrate’, ‘gain asylum’, and so forth, might reasonably, and similarly to the results found in Table 7.8, be described as containing neutral connotations. Some are simply indicative of the popularity of various modes of transport used to arrive in the UK (e.g. ‘land’, ‘fly’) according to developments in the accessibility of long-distance transportation during the twentieth century. Visible, too, is the prominence of ‘return’
migration, with the attached rights of residency seemingly shaping the way this kind of migration was described by journalists (‘return’, ‘reunite’).

Other terms, however, might be considered less neutral; some are reminiscent of the semantic fields of animal/insect movement (‘swarm’, ‘crawl’), trade (e.g. ‘import’, ‘smuggle’, ‘send’, ‘bring’), war (‘invade/invasion’) and natural disaster (especially the movement of water) (‘influx’, ‘inflow’, ‘flood’, ‘waves’), which corresponds closely with the results found in a number of other studies. Moreover, the sudden emergence of the term ‘mass immigration’, almost non-existent prior to the 1992-2010 period, conceivably adds connotations of unmanageability and lack of control to the term ‘immigration’.

Once again, the 1992-2010 period contained a broader range of terms than in any other period (53 individual terms to the 29 found in 1955-1970 and 27 found in 1974-1987), and more individual terms per article than in any other period (1.13 to 0.79 in 1974-1987, 0.94 in 1955-1970, 0.71 in 1931-1951 and 0.46 in 1918-1929).

Here, contemporary concerns about irregular migration were evidenced by further expansions on ‘immigration’ found in ‘illegal (im)migration’ (6 times) and ‘mass illegal immigration’ (1 time). Water-based terms found diverse expression in this period, too: ‘floodgates’ (3 times), ‘waves’ (2 times), ‘tide’ (2 times), ‘swamp’ (2 times), ‘stream’ (2 times), ‘inflow’ (1 time) and ‘pour (into)’ (1 time) were all present. Less frequently, the animal/insect-based terms ‘flock’ (4 times) and ‘infest’ (1 time), the war-based terms ‘invade/invasion’ (2 times) and ‘hordes (of)’ (1 time), the organism/food-based term ‘be absorbed’ (1 time) and the trade-based terms ‘send’ (6 times), ‘smuggle’ (2 times), ‘import’ (1 time), ‘(be) trafficked’ (1 time) and ‘(be) exported’ (1 time) were all nonetheless notable for the strength of their imagery. Notable, too, though for its unquestionably positive connotations, a single use of the term ‘(be) welcomed’ was found between 1992 and 2010.
The Fullness of Coverage: Themes

With the onset of the macro-processes of late modernity, such as globalisation and transnationalism, the argument that ‘the migrant’ resides at the core of modern experience rather than at the periphery (Berger and Mohr 1975: front page) would surely be made more forcefully now and in the intervening years than it had been in 1975. Along with the more recent effects of Britain’s transition to a nation of consistent net immigration, migration processes have seemingly come to demand consideration for their effects within all manner of public policy areas. Alongside these developments, if the migrant is to be centrally located in the functioning of society an adequate press debate might be suitably expected to focus on immigration as a social and political issue which is multifaceted and for which there have been competing and diverse perspectives with regard to its effects, problems and solutions.

It has been argued, however, that ‘immigration control, fashioned through debates about numbers and quotas, constitutes the dominant policy concern for the media’ in recent years, which has the effect of constraining considerations of ‘labour market economics, human rights, anti-racism or justice’ from establishing a position in public discussion (Berkeley at al., 2005: 25). It has also been noted that immigration news usually consists of ‘a few main topics’ (van Dijk 2012: 22-23, 1991; Law 2010: 193). Nonetheless, despite the dominance of ‘the control frame’ and the limited set of topics which pervade much modern immigration coverage, it is important to assess how this may have changed over time, and to understand the place of contemporarily peripheral issues historically. Assessing the extent of coverage of issues such as housing, education, health and employment – often examined in such studies (Hartmann and Husband 1974: 129-131; van Dijk 1991: 80) helps to scrutinise the extent to which immigration coverage adequately interrogates both the breadth and depth of immigration as a social issue. This part of the study is therefore oriented to the interpretative dimension, in which researchers must ask ‘how full is the coverage’? Have campaign periods always been dominated by the ‘control frame’? Are certain issues disproportionately dwelt upon more than others, thereby introducing indirect evaluation (Golding 1990) and promoting the association of immigrants with problems of reception (van Dijk 2000)? Have expansions in coverage provoked interest in previously disregarded issues?
The Thematic Dimensions of Coverage

Table 7.10 shows the frequency with which various themes appeared on the news agenda with regard to immigration over the entirety of immigration coverage sampled. The results show that, ordered by the frequency of themes in main focus coverage, articles featuring discussion of Immigration Services Procedure were ranked first, accounting for 12.5% of coverage\textsuperscript{124}. Also highly frequent were the themes of Crime, Forced Migration, Numbers and the Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates. The dominance of Crime, Forced Migration and Numbers suggests that historically immigration news during election campaigns has formed part of an interpretative framework in which immigration is routinely associated with crime, in which certain routes of migration are focussed on disproportionately and in which arguments about the number of people immigrating into the UK are seen as of paramount importance to the exclusion of other considerations. Finally, the frequent presence of the ‘Influence…’ theme is indicative of the growth in the national constituency of migrant voters in the latter half of the twentieth century, whose increasing presence necessitated a discussion of their electoral participation.

Table 7.10: The themes of immigration coverage

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Main Focus Coverage Responses</th>
<th>All coverage Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Services Procedure</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Migration</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Migration</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disillusionment with Political Response</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment/Trade</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General/Indeterminate</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return Migration</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{124} This theme was defined as encompassing discussion of (i) the aptitude by which immigration officials are seen to implement government immigration policy and (ii) the interactional processes between migrants and state institutions and structures. It is therefore similar in definition to the way in which other such studies designate a ‘control’ frame/theme.

204
The results also show stark differences between the rank of themes in main focus coverage and all coverage, i.e. including coverage for which immigration was one among a number of other subjects. The limited depth of expression that this kind of coverage affords to discussion of immigration elevates some issues at the expense of others, and can be related to the growth in immigration’s appearances as part of the general coverage of the campaign. For example, the ranking of themes in all coverage places General/Indeterminate, Disillusionment with Political Response and Numbers in the top 3 themes (replacing Immigration Services Procedure, Crime and Forced Migration). The theme of Numbers is the only one of these which appears in the top 5 themes for main focus coverage as well as in all immigration coverage, indicative of the capacity of such concerns to be articulated in detail as well as briefly.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{125} By way of hypothetical example, an article might report the release of official government statistics and their perceived implications (main focus coverage) or, alternatively, the numerous campaign pledges of a party or candidate, one of which promises to introduce a quota on immigration numbers (secondary focus coverage).
In addition to notable presences, it is also important to consider notable absences. The results indicate that some of immigration’s related issues suffer a paucity of attention compared with others. The lack of focus on these less frequently present issues means that, as can be seen from the lower part of Table 7.10, discussion of the UK’s international obligations, the direct economic implications of immigration, routes of migration other than those relating to irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, the allocation of resources used to administer immigration controls and the cultural impacts of immigration are ordinarily left relatively un-discussed.

In terms of the routes of migration, for instance, the thematic categories of Forced Migration and Irregular Migration comprised 8.3% and 6.8% of the themes for main focus coverage respectively, compared with 3.2% for Return Migration, 1.9% for Voluntary Migration and 1.5% for Temporary Migration (Education, related in part to student migration, accounted for 1.7%). This is suggestive of a perspective which normalizes certain forms of migration, deeming these less problematic and worthy of less attention. Voluntary migrants, for example, have historically constituted an overwhelmingly large proportion of all migrants to the UK, but their movements may be deemed unremarkable and lacking in newsworthiness precisely due to the permanency and perceived legitimacy of this status, while cyclical concerns about the illegitimacy of other routes are seen to require persistent attention. This is not to suggest that voluntary migrants do not appear in the news; voluntary migrants appear regularly in the news, but this aspect of migration is often not manifestly topicalised, likely because it is normalised or seen as a less problematic form of migration.

Moreover, the themes of The UK and the European Union/Europe, The Economy and The UK and the Commonwealth were each present less than 1% of the time in main focus coverage. These three themes, in particular, are less conducive to the reporting of news which is very often episodic in scope, ostensibly requiring sufficient space for contextual detail. This is not to suggest, of course, that the macro-economic or geo-political implications of immigration might never be inferred from the way that immigration is reported, but simply that immigration ‘events’ are generally reported without coherent attendance to their structural and historical factors in any great detail. This reveals how news values may have an impact upon the thematic breadth of immigration coverage,
which provides episodic and personalised narratives that neglect the abstract and latent forces that play a part in the unfolding of immigration processes.

**Themes over time**

Over such an expansive period of time, it is questionable as to whether the dominant themes of debate shown above will have remained static. The dominant themes of any area of public policy are at the mercy of the influence of wider contemporary debates and are thus subject to fluctuation over time, and the major issues associated with immigration during the inter-war period, for example, might reasonably be expected to differ from those of more recent times. Nonetheless, the issues to which these varying priorities relate might also comprise perennial and generic concerns. In order to assess to what extent the priorities of discussion have changed, Table 7.11 shows the most common themes in main focus coverage in each quintile of time.

**Table 7.11: Themes of main focus coverage over time**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1918-1929</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1931-1951</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1955-1970</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>Immigration Services Procedure</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>Immigration Services Procedure</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Immigration Services Procedure</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employment/Trade</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Irregular Migration</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>Social Cohesion</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>Disillusionment with Political Response</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-27</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen from Table 7.11, Crime constituted by far the most frequent theme in earlier campaigns, and its subsequent reduced (though still substantial) frequency has only relented in proportion to other themes recently (between 1992 and 2010 there were 9 stories for which Crime was a theme). The post-war periods saw much discussion of the democratic rights and representation of migrants, though the Influence and Mobility theme also appeared in 1922 (due entirely to the publication and denunciation of a forged ‘manifesto’ purportedly published by the Labour Party, which ironically encouraged Austrian and German residents in the UK to ‘vote Labour’ despite their inability to do so). Recent coverage has focussed on issues, among others, such as Numbers, Forced Migration and Irregular Migration. Though Forced Migration was present to a large degree in coverage during the period between 1974 and 1987, the frequency of Numbers and Irregular Migration coverage between 1992 and 2010 make these a stark and recent addition to debate, to the loss of Crime and Influence and Mobilisation stories. In short, though earlier periods often reduced discussion of immigration to issues of Crime, post-1945 coverage increasingly attended to the democratic implications of Commonwealth migration and the perceived indirect effects of migration (Social Cohesion, Disillusionment). Latterly, there has been a shift towards a focus on discussion of immigration control (Numbers, along with the perennially frequent Immigration Services Procedure), which has dovetailed and combined with discussion of
certain routes of migration to the virtual exclusion of others (Forced Migration, Irregular Migration)\textsuperscript{126}.

\textbf{The plurality of debate}

With fluctuations in the volume of coverage, it is important to assess whether the debate became ‘fuller’. In other words, did a small range of topics dominate discussion or did an increase in volume correspond to more pluralism in the range of themes available? Table 7.11 shows that there was a steady incline in the post-1945 era in the volume of coverage that the top 5 themes of each quintile comprised. In this sense, these results indicate that the dominant themes of coverage have come to dominate more sharply in each era during this time. Using a stacked bar chart, Figure 7.11 shows the extent to which the overall top 5 themes in main focus coverage (i.e. Immigration Services Procedure, Crime, Forced Migration, Numbers and Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates) dominated coverage over all campaigns.

\textbf{Figure 7.11:} The dominance of the five most frequent themes in main focus coverage

\textsuperscript{126} Between the 1992 and 2010 campaigns, there were 2 stories about Voluntary Migration, 2 about Temporary Migration and 0 about Return Migration.
It would be expected that, during campaign periods of particularly high volumes of immigration coverage, the proportion of the top 5 themes would need to decrease in order to make way for discussion of other thematic areas if the debate is to be regarded as fuller and more pluralistic, and vice versa for the discussion to be regarded as less full and constrained to a smaller range of thematic areas. Taking the four campaigns of 1970, 2001, 2005 and 2010 into consideration as periods in which the volume of coverage was at its most expansive, in only 2001 did the top 5 themes exceed 50% of all coverage, while the rise in volume of coverage produced a slightly more plural debate. Nonetheless, the accumulated presence of other themes in 2010 was by no means relatively substantial, while the 1970 campaign was barely distinguishable in this sense from those which preceded and followed it. The general trend in the second part of the twentieth century and beyond was, in fact, of a growing dominance of the top 5 themes which only decreased for two or more consecutive campaigns relatively recently – and even then under-proportionately to a large corresponding increase in the volume of coverage. It can be suggested, therefore, that the debate has not become pluralistic proportionate to the volume of coverage. On the whole, the most frequent themes of coverage have been disproportionately present in coverage and have increasingly tended to dominate discussion, while other possible themes of coverage are overlooked or excluded. The Pearson’s correlation co-efficient for the correlation between the number of main focus immigration items and the proportion of top 5 themes among all themes was 0.02, suggesting that there is almost no relationship between changes in the volume of coverage and the level of thematic plurality of the debate.

**Themes by newspaper**

Table 7.12 disaggregates the general findings to show the top 5 themes coded in each newspaper across all 25 elections in main focus coverage. In terms of the degree of uniformity in the subjects available in the press overall, the coefficient of concordance for agreement between the themes of main focus coverage across all newspapers is 0.64 for Kendall’s $W^{127}$, indicating a fairly strong degree of uniformity across the press in the extent to which similar themes were covered. It is observable from Table 7.12, for example, that many of the top 5 themes within individual newspapers were also present

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127 Chi Square $X^2=117.2893$, p=<0.0001, calculated using [http://www.statstodo.com/KendallW_Exp.php](http://www.statstodo.com/KendallW_Exp.php).
within the top 5 themes overall, while almost all of those which weren’t were at least in the top 10 themes overall (e.g. Social Cohesion, Irregular Migration, Employment/Trade). The results show, then, that there was a limited degree of difference in the themes of discussion which have appeared in the press during campaigns.

Nonetheless, there were at least some notable differences in the ranking of the most frequently covered themes between newspaper titles. Stories about Social Cohesion were more frequent in the Guardian than in any other newspaper, Irregular Migration was in the top 3 themes for every newspaper except for the Guardian and the Times (for which it was 12th and 13th respectively), while Employment/Trade was in the top 5 themes in only the Express.

Beyond these differences, however, smaller contrasts are also revealing. In terms of intra-sector differences, the Times and the Mail contained more stories about Forced Migration than their market competitors. Meanwhile, the Guardian and the Telegraph focussed on the emergence of the minority vote to an extent that the Times did not. The Mail, Express and Mirror contained a greater proportion of Crime stories compared with other titles, though Crime stories were also somewhat present in the quality press. Finally, although the theme of Numbers was common to all titles except for the Mirror (for which there were 0 stories concerning Numbers), it was proportionately most prominent in the Times, the Mail and the Sun/Herald.
Table 7.12: Themes by newspaper in main focus immigration coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guardian Theme</th>
<th>Times Theme</th>
<th>Telegraph Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Services Procedure 1</td>
<td>Immigration Services Procedure</td>
<td>Influence and mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates 2</td>
<td>Forged Migration</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion 3</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime 4</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Migration 5</td>
<td>Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates</td>
<td>Forced Migration</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 6-27</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>172</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mail Express Theme</th>
<th>Mirror Theme</th>
<th>Sun/Herald Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers 1</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime 2</td>
<td>Irregular Migration</td>
<td>Forced Migration</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Migration 3</td>
<td>Immigration Procedure Services</td>
<td>Irregular Migration</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Migration 4</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Return Migration</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Procedure Services 5</td>
<td>Employment/Trade</td>
<td>Immigration Procedure Services</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 6-27</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages are rounded so may not total 100. Up to 3 themes could be coded per news item from 27 possible theme categories. N corresponds to responses.
**Electoral themes**

Finally, an overview of which themes were most present in IAE coverage gives a more definitive insight into which aspects of immigration have been regarded as most electorally significant during election campaigns. Table 7.13 shows the frequency and proportion of themes in main focus IAE coverage compared with main focus immigration coverage, indicating the extent to which themes were covered with specific regard to the election. For example, the electoral implications of the Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates theme are self-evident, which explain why its appearance on 59 occasions in immigration coverage generally were all in IAE coverage.

Table 7.13: The frequency of themes in immigration and IAE coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Immigration coverage</th>
<th>IAE coverage</th>
<th>IAE as % of all immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disillusionment with Political Response</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Services Procedure</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Migration</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General/Indeterminate</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Migration</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment/Trade</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and Structure of State Apparatus</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Provision</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK and the European Union/Europe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return Migration</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Migration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunification</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK and the Commonwealth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Migration</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Integration</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Up to 3 themes could be coded per news item from 27 possible theme categories. N corresponds to responses.
Beyond this, the themes of Numbers, Disillusionment with Political Response, Social Cohesion, Racism, Resources and Structure of State Apparatus, Repatriation and Housing were reported with their electoral repercussions sharply in focus, too. The politicisation of some of these, such as Repatriation and Numbers, can be explained by their placement on the electoral agenda by campaigning politicians, while others, such as Disillusionment and Social Cohesion might be more fittingly attributed to popular displays (or, at least, inferences) of disaffection on the part of sections of the public.

Other themes, however, seem to have relatively avoided equivalent electoral association, such as the themes of Immigration Services Procedure, Forced Migration, Crime, Irregular Migration, Return Migration, Family Reunification, Temporary Migration, Cultural Integration, Education and Health. These issues are therefore either left relatively undisputed or un-problematised (at least in ways conducive to their electoral politicisation), although it might be the case that discussion of such issues is premised on taken-for-granted assumptions about their problematic status, leaving little need for overt association with politicians or the election.

**Migrants as 'themes' of coverage**

Another way to view ‘thematic’ patterns in the coverage in terms of interpretation is to assess which kinds of ethnic, regional, national or religious groups of migrants the coverage was about.

Table 7.14 shows the ‘visibility’ of certain such groups by their origin over time. The data shown here has been pared down from a larger set of categories (from 114 to 34), which were originally coded as close to the terms used in reports as possible. These have been re-categorised into categories relating to geographic regions, religious identity and ascribed skin colour/other (owing to the impossibility of conflating these three sets of category together).
Table 7.14: Top ten groups the coverage was about by time period (raw counts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>‘black’/’coloured’</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Ireland</td>
<td>13 (8)*</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Western Europe and Ireland</td>
<td>6 (2)*</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘white’</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commonwealth (generally)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Western Europe and Ireland</td>
<td>13 (7)*</td>
<td>British/English</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Asia (generally)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia/Middle East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Africa (generally)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Central Europe</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South Americas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>British/English</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each article could be coded for up to 3 separate ethnic, regional, national or religious groups mentioned by journalists or actors.

*The number in brackets refers to the subset of which relates to Irish migrants

Principally, there are two main developments of interest shown by Table 7.14: firstly, there has been a recrudescence of the visibility of Central and Eastern European migrants in coverage, who were highly visible in the interwar period but whose re-appearance (along with South-East Europeans) was completed during the 1992-2010 era, albeit in altogether different circumstances than originally. Secondly, the indelible mark on British culture left by the arrival of ‘New Commonwealth’ migrants in the post-war period is reflected in post-war patterns in the interpretative framework of immigration reporting during campaign periods (and perhaps generally). Indeed, from 1955 to 1987, large parts of the coverage
dealt with migrants from South Asia, East Africa and the Caribbean (as well as the Commonwealth in general and ‘black’/’coloured’ migrants).

Further, the sudden appearance of Muslim migrants on the electoral news agenda in the 1992-2010 period accords with the findings of a number of news studies which have charted the rise in visibility and problematisation of Muslims within news coverage generally and during election campaigns (e.g. Richardson 2009). Accompanying this coverage, a rise in and the normalisation of anti-Muslim prejudice and the construction of their outsider status on the basis of their allegedly ‘qualified patriotism’ (Field 2007) is, in many respects, similar to the features of anti-Semitism which prevailed in Britain in the first-half of the twentieth century (Linehan 2012). This background suggests that there may be some parallels between the patterns found in earlier periods and those found in latter periods regarding the visibility of Jewish and Eastern European migrants in the former and Muslim migrants in the latter.

Along with other findings relating to the thematic profile of immigration coverage, the question of which kinds of migrants were present in coverage suggests that there are notable qualitative differences between contemporary coverage and previous coverage. Contemporary press debate during campaigns has been concerned with issues regarding ‘numbers’, forced and irregular migrants and what was called ‘immigration services procedure’, a theme which has much in common with the ‘control frame’ identified as dominant in other studies of immigration news. In tandem with the findings of this section, there is a suggestion that much of the discussion of these issues is associated with what has been termed the ‘New Migration’ in Europe (Koser and Lutz 1998) and the replacement of an overwhelming focus on migration from the countries of the New Commonwealth (e.g. such as the ‘black’/’coloured’, South Asia, Eastern Africa and Caribbean categories) between 1955 and 1970. As an increase in the volume of coverage has come alongside an expansion in the volume of global migration and immigration to the UK, so the themes of press debate as revealed here suggest that immigration coverage refracts recent changes in the profile of immigration to the UK and the social construction of such changes in quantifiable ways.
Summary

During the course of this chapter, immigration coverage has been analysed in two main ways: according to its ‘fairness’ and according to its ‘fullness’. This analysis has added further detail to and consolidated on the findings of the previous chapter. The chapter has sought to expand upon the implications of issues regarding longitudinal patterns found in aspects of the coverage such as its volume, the context of campaign coverage generally and the news access of sources.

In doing so, it has addressed whether press discourses have become more negative, particularly in light of increased press attention on immigration issues. This relates to the issue of ‘fairness’ of coverage, and in assessing the extent to which views critical and supportive of immigration were voiced in coverage, the ‘directional balance’ of immigration coverage has been shown to be largely critical. Recent coverage in particular has provided audiences with an increased availability of critical attitudes in the press – if simply by dint of increases in the sum volume of coverage.

It appears that there is a dichotomy in the way that immigration is represented depending on whether or not electoral politics are at stake. Where immigration has been discussed in terms of its electoral relevance, ‘IAE’ coverage has been shown to have produced a large quantitative disparity between the expression of critical attitudes and supportive attitudes across the press at a ratio of over 2 to 1 directly quoted words by actors overall. In some newspapers (e.g. Sun/Herald, Express), this disparity was even greater, which ultimately meant in some newspapers that for every IAE immigration item there was very little positive sentiment expressed towards immigration at all.

Coverage which is not politicised in relation to electoral politics has tended to offer a more neutral, even positive, picture. Specifically, ‘non-IAE’ coverage, as it has been referred to, features more neutral and mixed quotation (and in this sense can be characterised as a less divisively debated topic), a closer ratio between critical and supportive quotation which more aptly meets journalistic notions of balance than can be said for IAE coverage and, as supportive quotation was more prominent than critical quotation, that immigration was regarded in this sense as a subject which merited positive advocacy rather than automatic problematisation. This was true of all newspapers except for the mid-market press, which
remained a platform for more critical quotation than supportive quotation even in non-IAE coverage.

Elite sources were by far most sourced for their critical perspectives, to an even higher degree than neutral and mixed quotation, accounting for over two-thirds of all critical quotation overall. While opposition sources were able to exploit and generate the opportunities that immigration issues provided space for, and thus received more space for critical quotation than incumbent party sources, incumbents attempted to respond in kind and contributed for their own part, too. Converse to the expectations of incumbent party bonus seen in campaigning generally, the reporting of immigration appears to reassign this bonus to opposition sources. This, however, seems to provoke a response from incumbent party sources presumably fearful that this will leave them exposed on the issue in the minds of a highly restrictive public.

Who doesn’t get to define the issue is also of importance. Notably, migrant sources were shown in the previous chapter to receive more news presence than news access, and in this chapter that over 80% of their contributions to the debate were of neutral or mixed tone. Migrant sources are therefore unable (though possibly unwilling) to provide a counterbalancing effect of supportive quotation to the abundance of critical quotation in the press generally, with their lack of news access in general compounding this to the detriment of their involvement in the construction of immigration in the press.

Bridging the dual concerns of the directional balance (i.e. fairness) of coverage and the thematic dimensions (i.e. fullness) of coverage, charting the terminology of coverage has not only given an insight into the lexical construction of immigration in its positive and negative terms, but is also indicative of the kinds of topics and groups of migrants through which immigration issues are most prominently associated. The findings illustrate that the lexicon of immigration coverage has proliferated (particularly more recently), and that this proliferation has coincided with an expansion in the range of terms including dehumanising metaphors and categories occupied with the generation of a ‘genuine’ vs. ‘bogus’ dichotomy in discussions of asylum seekers and refugees. However, certain terms not generally considered to be pejorative have tended to dominate the definitional aspect of debate.
The chapter has also assessed the extent of plurality in the immigration debate, in particular whether more plurality is associated with more immigration coverage. Overall, the top five themes in main focus coverage were Immigration Services Procedure, Crime, Forced Migration, Numbers and the Influence and Mobilisation of Migrant/Minority Voters and Candidates. These themes very often constituted the major areas of discussion, with little erosion in their prominence during campaigns of increased immigration coverage. Moreover, the dominant themes of media debate have been moderately uniform in their presence across the press, with minor differences between newspapers. Issues such as the UK’s relationships with the Commonwealth and the European Union in relation to immigration barely featured, while the economic context of immigration, its cultural impact and routes of migration other than forced and irregular forms as explicit topics were also largely ignored. Indeed, during recent campaigns a focus on asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants has been in stark contrast to the lack of discussion of other routes of migration specifically. Finally, there has been a general shift in the focus of coverage on different migrants, beginning with migrants from Europe in the interwar period, to those from the countries of the New Commonwealth in the decades following the Second World War, to a predominant focus on European migration (with some residual focus on New Commonwealth migration) in the campaigns 1992-2010.

The next chapter will focus on the qualitative features of the dominant themes of immigration coverage. In doing so it will explore how the press have constructed key elements of the ethics of immigration in regards to a framework concerning the representation of ‘our’ rights and ‘their’ responsibilities.
8: Negotiating Rights and Responsibilities: The Ethics and Politics of Immigration

The previous two chapters have charted many of the quantitative features of immigration coverage during election campaigns, including the volume and frequency of articles, the news presence and news access of social actors, the ‘directional balance’ of coverage, the frequency of key terminology and the dominant themes of coverage, across the output of several newspapers. These findings invite elaborative analysis into how these patterns are manifest qualitatively. In particular, examining how the press has constructed the terms of citizenship for immigrants as immigration has risen as a political/electoral issue is integral to understanding its role in reshaping the terms of the ethics and politics of the immigration debate in general. Specifically, these are viewed through the dimensions of ‘our’ rights and responsibilities (i.e those of ‘us Britons’) versus ‘theirs’ (i.e. immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees), in a framework similar to the ‘us/them’ binary and the ideological square observed by a number of other scholars relating to representations of immigration and ‘race’ (e.g. Sonwalkar 2005; van Dijk 1988, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2012; Richardson 2004, 2007; KhsoraviNik 2010b). To this end, this chapter explores the headline constructions of three aspects of the coverage which attracted a large degree of attention in the press overall in order to uncover how the press has shaped the boundaries of belonging and promoted a set of values in relation to some of the most fundamentally important aspects of the politics of immigration. There are two main reasons for analysing these areas of coverage.

First, qualitatively investigating the immigration news of campaigns of quantitatively high levels of coverage enables an insight into the ‘temporal evolution of media(ted) discourses’ (Carvalho 2008: 172) so points of quantitative intensity in the debate are of interest since they are assumed to index, in certain respects, a qualitatively intense debate. Such points of intensity are referred to as ‘critical discourse moments’ (Chilton 1987; Gamson 1992: 26; Carvalho 2008), in the sense that they reflect the escalation of contemporary ‘concerns’ and are sites of contest over the establishment of hegemonic narratives. These moments therefore invite the researcher to ask ‘did arguments change? did new/alternative views arise?’ (Carvalho 2008: 166). Choosing to analyse coverage of intensity in this respect therefore not only mitigates criticisms which suggest that qualitative analysts ‘cherry pick’
examples (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 11), but also exposes continuities and contrasts within the media narrative of key thematic issues.

Second, investigating the news presence and news access of social actors has suggested that elite political actors and citizens are privileged in terms of news access over other actors, while the news access of migrants fails to match that of their presence in the news. Pejorative terms have also proliferated (though not necessarily dominated) in the description of migrant groups in more recent campaigns and critical voices have been highly prominent in immigration coverage of electoral import. Discourse analysis can add further detail to these findings by asking, for example, which referential and predicational strategies social actors and their actions are subject to, how social relations are represented and how evaluations of actors, actions and events are normalized as parts of ‘common sense’ ideas within texts (as a part of discourse). Following the assumptions of Fairclough’s ‘dialectical-relational’ model of CDA, tracking such textual features over time helps to reveal the development of the power relations and ideological struggles present within discursive and social practices with regard to immigration.

Specifically, the chapter will focus on headlines and the first paragraphs of coverage within three salient and distinct thematic areas of coverage, namely i) ‘precarious routes’, ii) ‘numbers’ and iii) ‘the migrant vote’ and migrant candidature. These topics constitute a selection of some of the most frequent thematic areas in coverage\textsuperscript{128}, thereby each generating a suitably large corpus within which temporal comparisons may be made and mitigating possible biases in selection by the researcher. Where ‘critical discourse moments’ is a term used to refer to periods of time for which coverage (of particular topics) is particularly salient, sub-topics of particular prominence might therefore be called ‘critical discourse themes’, and tracking diachronic change within their discursive representation helps to focus attention on their place within the development of the politics of immigration in general.

\textsuperscript{128} ‘Immigration Services Procedure’, ‘Forced Migration’ and ‘Numbers’ were the 1\textsuperscript{st}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} most frequent themes in immigration coverage of main focus respectively. Though Irregular Migration was the 6\textsuperscript{th} most frequent theme in main focus coverage, it has been combined with Forced Migration coverage due to similarly observable patterns in their discursive construction and due to their conflation as observed in the lexicon of coverage in latter periods. Further, although Crime was the 2\textsuperscript{nd} most frequent theme in main focus coverage, an analysis of its characteristics was eschewed here due to the wealth of existing literature which analyses crime, threat and deviancy in relation to media coverage of immigrants and ethnic minorities (e.g. Hall et. al 1978; van Dijk 1989, 1991; Law 2002; Philo et. al 2013; Hartmann and Husband 1974).
'Precarious’ Routes: The Responsibilities of the Host?

Asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants were among the most visible categories of ‘migrant’ within the immigration coverage sampled. The themes of ‘forced migration’ and ‘irregular migration’ were very prominent, especially when considered in comparison to other themes such as ‘voluntary migration’ and ‘return migration’. As Figure 8.1 shows, much of this coverage came after 1970, peaking in 1979 and later 2010. Nonetheless, Figure 8.1 also shows the (albeit less frequent) prevalence of such stories in periods as early as 1918, 1922 and 1923. The corpus for this section of analysis consists in total of 78 headlines/leads, selected on the basis of being primarily about either Forced Migration or Irregular Migration and primarily focussed on immigration issues (i.e. of main focus).

It was during latter campaigns that asylum and irregular migration were electorally prominent, as is also evident from Figure 8.1 in the quantity of forced migration/irregular migration items in IAE coverage. The 2010 campaign was in fact the only campaign during which such issues were resonant to any substantial degree, with 11 items during the campaign primarily about either forced migration or irregular migration bearing the imprint of contemporary anxieties and debates about these kinds of migrants, over a range of stories.

Approximately half (51.3%, or 40 of 78 articles) of main focus ‘precarious migration’ coverage came in the quality press, with 21 articles in the mid-market press and 17 articles in the popular press.
Forced migration and irregular migration have been grouped in this analysis for a number of reasons. Despite their differences in several respects (which will also be considered in the analysis), as discussed in Chapter 3, forced migration has become increasingly deterred and criminalised in similar respects to the way in which irregular migration is essentially ‘unwanted’ for various reasons by governments (even if there is a strong demand for this type of migration by employers in the ‘shadow economy’). Further, such migrants are subject to the same ‘macro-structures’ (KhosraviNik 2010b: 21-22), facing in common various traumatic upheavals – among them geographic displacement, losses of wealth and property (leading often to destitution), exploitation, arbitrary detention, deportation, a lack of access to public services and associated risks to health and mortality. ‘Precarious’ migrants thereby constitute some of the most disadvantaged of people in society. That in many circumstances they cannot even be said to be permitted to exist in society (except for those granted refugee status, who nonetheless continue to suffer from many of the issues

\[\text{Figure 8.1: The coverage of ‘precarious migration’ (i.e. ‘forced migration’ and ‘irregular migration’)}\] over time\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{129} The data points representing all ‘precarious’ migration coverage correspond to all coverage (i.e. including instances in which such coverage was a secondary or tertiary theme and/or immigration not the primary focus of an item). The data points corresponding to main focus immigration coverage are therefore a subset of this category of coverage, and those corresponding to main focus IAE coverage are a subset of both.
mentioned above) is an indication of their prescribed (or perhaps proscribed) status as ‘non-citizens’. Escaping the worst excesses of these problems has relied historically on the extent to which the societies of receiving countries have accepted a ‘responsibility to protect’ such people. This responsibility is negotiated by asking which ‘precarious migrants’ deserve ‘our’ assistance (whether in allowing entry and/or aiding settlement) and which conditions can reasonably be placed upon this assistance. Press discourses of such issues, written by and therefore from the perspective of members of an in-group which (in accordance with the logics of liberal democracy) partly bears this responsibility, are therefore interesting sites for analysing the discursive (re)production of the membership of associated in- and out-group categories and the limits of the UK’s (i.e. ‘our’) humanitarian obligations. The section will begin with a discussion about the specifics relating to the coverage of forced migrants, followed by a discussion relating to the coverage of irregular migrants. Finally, the conflation of these migrants in press discourse will be considered.

**Forced migrants: asylum seekers and refugees**

This theme was coded in the content analysis based on whether or not coverage featured discussion of people having immigrated, or in the process of migrating, to the UK due principally to ‘push’ factors or as an ostensibly enforced decision. Discussion of asylum seekers and/or refugees described as immigrating to the UK seeking refuge for reasons of persecution in their home or previous nation of residence therefore fell into this category (see Appendix C).

The previous chapter illustrated patterns in the lexicon of the immigration debate over time. The usage of words to describe migrant groups coalesced primarily around categories such as ‘alien(s)’ and ‘immigrant(s)’, with ‘illegal (im)migrant(s)’, ‘refugee(s)’, ‘asylum seeker(s)’ and ‘migrant(s)’ also among some of the most commonly used terms. Particularly in campaigns from the 1990s onwards, the coining of various neologisms (e.g. ‘bogus refugees’ and ‘genuine refugees’) was evident, which has broadened the range of vocabulary within media debate as well as functioned to delegitimize the asylum claims of the ‘non-genuine’. As these examples suggest, analysing referential/predicational strategy with regards to forced migrants is able to give some indication of which ideas dominate and define the politics of this type of migration. The discursive construction of asylum seekers and refugees will therefore now be focussed upon to identify how this may change over time.
In earlier periods, forced migrants were most typically described using the term ‘refugee(s)’ in an expansive sense, as shown in the following such stories selected from the interwar period:

1. ‘The repatriation of Belgian refugees has begun’, Belgians going back, The Daily Mirror, 9 December 1918;
2. RELIEF OF IRISH REFUGEES, The Times, 9 November 1922;
3. REFUGEES FROM IRELAND, The Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1922;
4. ‘...Princess Catherine Galitzine, a refugee from Russia, married in London yesterday’, RUSSIAN PRINCESS WEDS [picture caption], The Daily Mirror, 13 November 1922.

These stories were reported in an era in which very few practical distinctions were made between immigrants of differing types (e.g. between refugees and immigrants), so terms such as ‘refugee’ could be used without the endorsement of legal decisions. However, these examples also suggest that the categorisation of these forced migrants as refugees rather than the possible contemporary alternative ‘aliens’ also depended on the legitimising role played by government intervention in the specific politics of the Belgian and Irish cases,

for example. Further, the description of Princess Galitzine as a refugee from Russia seems to provide, if momentarily, an index of the way in which popular discourses of forced migration tend to confirm the values of the ‘liberal self’ while implying those of the ‘illiberal other’ (see Anderson 2013: 55-56; van Dijk 1992: 109-111; Stern 2014). This dichotomy was ostensibly at work also in a similarly subtle example from several decades later: ‘Refugees from the Jordan fighting disembark at Gatwick from a R.A.F. Britannia’ [picture caption], The Times, 15 June 1970.

However, with the dual forces of the ‘fractioning’ (Zetter 2007) of forced migration categories and the ‘juridification’ (see Chapter 3) of forced migration cases, the usage of the

130 In the case of the Belgian refugees, their repatriation came at the end of a longer process of initial sympathy which eventually culminated in residual sympathy, apathy, some hostility but ultimately international co-operation between the two governments for their removal (Holmes 1988: 100-102; Kushner 2003: 264). In the case of the Irish refugees, the compensation provided to Irish loyalist victims of the civil war by the government until such people could find work or return to Ireland essentially conferred refugee status on those compensated (Brennan 1997).
refugee term in an expansive sense and without a dependence on overtly political considerations began to be deployed less frequently in the coverage from around the late 1980s – its usage coming almost exclusively in circumstances whereby it had been conferred (or not) by law. In other words, its usage became more precise and functioned to differentiate between legal stages of the asylum application process; ‘refugee’ was no longer sufficient as an almost ‘catch all’ term. Examples in which the term was used or avoided (i.e. in which other terms, such as asylum seeker, had become available for use) often arrived in the form of court reports in the broadsheet press:

4. **Home Secretary applied wrong test to refugee**, *The Times*, 8 June 1987;
5. ‘New legal safeguards should be available for people who overstay in this country and claim asylum, according to the European Commission of Human Rights’ [my emphasis], **Tamil case leads to asylum review**, *The Times*, 5 June 1987;

In fact, constructions of forced migrants as ‘asylum seekers’ and the elaborative though different ‘failed asylum seekers’ in this kind of coverage emerged only in latter campaigns, as seen in examples below:

8. ‘The Home Secretary won High Court backing yesterday over a decision to return a Turkish asylum seeker to France’, **Asylum judges agree that France is ‘safe’**, *The Times*, 1 May 1997
9. ‘A FAMILY of failed asylum-seekers is to challenge a government decision to deport them on the ground that it breaches their human rights’, **Failed asylum family fights order to deport them back to Angola**, *The Times*, 3 May 2005

Interestingly, in contrast with the discourse of the broadsheets, the third of these examples is revealing of a way in which the *Daily Express* constructs asylum seekers as not part of the
‘we’ which constitutes ‘our’ society. The headline is constructed in this way to delegitimize the policy proposals of the Liberal Democrats and provides a sense of injustice at the supposed gift of ‘our jobs’ (gained presumably by birthright) by the party to asylum seekers who we are asked to believe do not deserve such frivolous charity. The example thus demonstrates how the context of such terms can help to re-construct the entitlements associated with them and in turn re-constitute what seem to be relatively neutral terms into categories with highly negative connotations.

Notably, *The Sun* provided something of an exception to these developments during the 2010 week in an article typical of the narrative style of the newspaper, in which small reports surface about apparently trivial-but-peculiar events:

11. ‘Four Afghan refugees held in Hungary astonished cops by telling them they were WALKING from Kabul to London and had done 4,000 miles’, *Afghans’ UK walk*, *The Sun*, 1 May 2010.

Although this example seems to correspond with a narrative (often advanced in the conservative tabloid press) which suggests that Britain is overwhelmingly attractive to asylum seekers, *the Sun’s* use of ‘refugee’ (without the endorsement of any legal decision) helps to construct the four Afghan men of the piece as essentially sympathetic characters. It can only be speculated in this instance as to the extent to which the UK’s possible culpability for their desperation and the extra-ordinary nature of their journey may have deemed ‘refugee’ a more appropriate term in this instance than alternatives (e.g. ‘asylum seeker’) which have been associated in newspapers such as *The Sun* with deception and avarice (Conboy 2006: 98-100).

The functionalisation of forced migrants as ‘refugees’ in earlier periods (and in the single latter instance) therefore constructed them definitionally as essentially deserving of refuge, and it is of little surprise that the comparatively minor news value of forced migration in earlier periods (as manifest in the quantity of coverage over time) can be tallied with very little elaboration in terminology. Divergent (or ‘fractioned’) definitions of the notions of the ‘refugee’ and the ‘asylum seeker’ came later, and on the surface might be defended as the innocent and necessary means of demarcating between those with either pending or successful claims for asylum. However, along with other pre-modifiers such as ‘genuine’,
‘bogus’ or ‘failed’ can be reconsidered in terms of ‘overlexicalization’ – the expanded use of ‘repetitious, quasi-synonymous’ terms which are ‘woven into the fabric of news discourse’ (Teo 2000: 20). The rise of over-lexicalization in discussion of asylum indicates a more intense ideological interest in the issue at hand over time which requires an expansion in available lexical categories (Richardson 2009: 363). Indeed, the ‘bogus asylum seeker’ term emerged in the mid-1980s in negative reference to Tamil refugees fleeing Sri Lanka to Europe (Runnymede Trust 2000: 212-213; van Dijk 1997). Over-lexicalization therefore ‘often has a pejorative effect as it signals a kind of deviation from social convention or expectation and reflects perceptions and judgements’ (Teo 2000: 20-21). Even supposedly ‘positive’ terms, such as ‘genuine asylum seeker’, are dependent on their mutual opposites and help to sustain the assumption that many asylum seekers are not in legitimate need of our assistance.

As suggested by van Leeuwen (1996: 58), immigrants are classified more often in contemporary discourse by their country of origin or ethnicity than by other factors such as class, race, education/skilledness, wealth or religion, a general rule which suggests that evaluating immigrants based on their geographic origins is deemed to be highly important to (as in his study) newspaper audiences in Western societies. It is noticeable from the examples already given that nationality is a routine category by which asylum seekers and refugees are classified. In newspaper discourse, the nationality of an asylum seeker may find importance in the ability for this information to construct the ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ status of asylum seekers depending on what the audience knows or thinks about the relationship that the specified country has with the UK and with the prevailing political conditions of that country.

However, it is also likely, due to developments in asylum law, that an asylum seeker’s country of prior residence (and therefore where he/she has travelled from before arriving in the UK) is also an important factor in the construction of deserving or undeserving status. This is important in the international politics of asylum due to issues surrounding, for example, the principle in international law of ‘non-refoulement’ and the adoption of the Dublin Convention in European asylum law.131 Domestically, the introduction in asylum

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131 The Dublin Convention requires asylum seekers to ‘lodge their application only in the first EU member state entered’, which deals principally with the application (Toshkov and Haan 2012: 662-663). This occasionally
policy of ‘white lists’ to automatically determine supposedly ‘unfounded’ cases (as well as diplomatic reasons) mean that asylum seekers from certain designated countries are not at all likely to be considered ‘genuine’ refugees according to law, a framework which may be reflected in newspaper discourse.

The previous chapter charted the prominence of this information (in terms of both nationality and country of previous residence) in coverage. Table 8.1 shows proportionately how likely it was for immigration coverage (for which immigration was of main focus) to feature any such reference within forced migration coverage, irregular migration coverage and in other thematic areas of coverage. Although the implications we may draw from a small number of cases are limited, Table 8.1 shows a disparity between the proportion of items in which the country of previous residence or nationality of migrants within forced migration coverage is mentioned compared with other thematic areas of coverage. This suggests that, where asylum seekers and refugees are concerned, where they’re (coming) from is a more important aspect of their representation than for other types of migrant. As suggested above, the likely function of such information is therefore to associate certain asylum seekers and refugees with ongoing political or humanitarian crises in shorthand, and to implicitly assign ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ status.

Table 8.1: The proportion of articles in which migrants were referred to by country of previous residence or nationality in main focus coverage

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precarious migration coverage</th>
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<th>Overall coverage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Forced Migration coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>44/47 93.6</td>
<td>24/31 77.4</td>
<td>371/442 83.9</td>
<td>439/520 84.4</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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N applies to cases rather than responses. The figures apply to whether such a term was used within the whole article. Up to three terms could be coded per item, but the results shown correspond to whether a minimum of one relevant term was used.

combines with the principle of non-refoulement to mean that governments are unable to deport asylum seekers to a country which may in turn deport the asylum seeker to a country in which they may be persecuted.
Consider, for instance, the following examples:

12. ‘TWO Russian defectors believed to be runaway sweethearts were yesterday given permission to stay in Britain’, RUSSIAN COUPLE TO STAY, The Sun, 3 May 1979;
13. ‘MISHA, the 13-year-old Russian boy freed from the Soviet Union after a world-wide campaign, started school near Cambridge yesterday…’, Welcome for the new boy, The Guardian, 3 May 1979;
14. ‘Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, has put pressure on an Anglican church in Manchester to end the sanctuary it is giving to a Sri Lankan Communist, it was disclosed yesterday’, Priests ‘pressed to end sanctuary’, The Guardian, 10 June 1987;

In many of these cases, information regarding where the respective asylum seekers/refugees were from was a very prominent detail in contextualising the circumstances of their applications for asylum in the headline or lead. When asylum seekers/refugees were categorised in terms of their nationality and made the subject of an active headline or the object of a passive headline, this served to prioritise linguistically this information ahead of numerous other salient details.

Further, in each of these examples, terms such as ‘defectors’, ‘freed’, ‘welcome’, ‘sanctuary’ and ‘spared’ perform particular functions in these headlines/leads when read alongside what the audiences of these newspapers may know or suspect about the then-contemporary connotations of being a ‘Russian’, ‘Sri Lankan (Communist)’ or ‘Iranian’ refugee, as well as to confirm the liberal and hospitable values of the UK. It is also notable that none of these asylum seekers or refugees are involved in transactive processes; they are either active in intransitive action processes (Richardson 2007: 55) or are passive agents. Refugee and asylum seekers are shown with little agency (in both a sociological and linguistic sense) within these examples, while those responsible for giving Russian defectors permission to stay, freeing Misha from the Soviet Union or sparing the Iranian civil rights activist from deportation are not provided by the constructions of these headlines/leads. The backgrounding or deletion of active agency may be deployed in discourse either due to
its ideological inconvenience or because such information is assumed to be known and unworthy of comment.

The nationality, ethnicity or previous country of migrants can be represented in various ways. Firstly, this can be done through the use of nouns (e.g. **BELGIANS GOING BACK, The Daily Mirror, 9 December 1918; Threat to Asians, The Guardian, 26 February 1974; Afghans’ UK walk, The Sun, 1 May 2010**). Secondly, prepositions can be used in reference to an asylum seeker/refugee’s previous country of residence (e.g. **REFUGEES FROM IRELAND, The Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1922; ‘Refugees from the Jordan fighting disembark at Gatwick from a R.A.F. Britannia’ [picture caption], The Times, 15 June 1970**). Thirdly, and most commonly, nationality or ethnicity can be given through the use of adjectives (e.g. **RELIEF OF IRISH REFUGEES, The Times, 9 November 1922; Russian defector changes his mind, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1979; Yemen envoy seeks asylum, The Times, 30 April 2005; Iranian asylum seeker fears ‘honour killing’, The Guardian, 5 May 2010**). The effect of using especially nouns, though also adjectives, to represent the nationality or ethnicity of asylum seekers and refugees lies in their foregrounding of the importance of such information (and thereby their reification of the meaning of such categories) and in their essentialising of people into an impersonal framework of categorisation which allegedly helps ‘us’ to understand ‘their’ circumstances.

As noted above, the countries through which asylum seekers and refugees journey on their way to the UK have become of major importance in the legal decisions made in the modern asylum process. One such country has been France, the proximity and perceived importance of which is evident in the following examples:

16. **Asylum judges agree that France is ‘safe’, The Times, 1 May 1997**;

17. **Refugee alert as France leaves ports unguarded, The Daily Telegraph, 4 June 2001**.

Within these examples, presuppositions (see Conboy 2007: 69-70; Richardson 2007: 62-64) work to suggest that a pre-existing statement has been made to suggest that France is ‘safe’ (in example 17) and that France should usually leave its ports ‘guarded’ (in example 18). In the first of these examples, three judges at the High Court have ‘agreed’ with a decision made by (or on behalf of) the Home Secretary. An alternative construction might have
suggested that the asylum judges disagreed with the applicant and her lawyers (who argued that ‘the French authorities did not properly consider asylum claims and that she would be in danger of being returned to Turkey, where she feared persecution’). This choice was made seemingly on the basis of the Home Secretary’s status, but the effect of this is to emphasise consensus concerning the description of the safety – rather than dissensus concerning the possibly fatal danger – of deporting somebody to France (although the use of scare quotes is noted). In the second example, the use of the ‘temporal conjunction’ as (Bell 1991: 181) suggests that there is a connection between ‘France [leaving its] ports unguarded’ and a refugee ‘alert’. The usage of ‘refugee alert’ is a noun phrase sufficient both to eradicate agency from the construction of this alert and to reify a specific, alarmist way of evaluating the events which had taken place at the French port. The article also conflated refugees with irregular migrants, which will be discussed below.

**Irregular migrants**

This theme was coded in the content analysis based on whether or not coverage featured discussion of migrants perceived to have overstayed their terms of leave to remain, entered through ‘clandestine’ means (including by providing false documentation or those victim to trafficking and smuggling), or who are only semi-compliant with their terms of entry (e.g. by working without permission).

Previous findings show that the coverage of irregular migration does not construct the migrants within such coverage in terms of their nationality, ethnicity or country of previous residences with as much frequency as the migrants within forced migration coverage. This was discussed in terms of the function of providing such information in coverage of asylum seekers and refugees in part in order to help audiences to reach judgements about the circumstances of asylum applications and implicitly help to assign ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ status to asylum seekers and refugees. This function appears to have been less relevant for journalists in their construction of irregular migrants, who were represented overwhelmingly in a dichotomy as either ‘undeserving’ predicated on their status as ‘illegal’ people or ‘helpless’ and passive victims predicated on the absence of any ‘status’ whatsoever – as people of little agency or consequence. These migrants therefore need not be constructed in comprehensively ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ terms. This is not to say that such terms were absent, however; they were simply less prominently placed.
Nonetheless, vague references to ‘Asians’ (e.g. **LEA ‘PAID’ TO LET ASIANS IN**, *The Daily Express*, 16 June 1970), ‘Chinese’ (**LAUNDRY SLAVES. CHINESE SMUGGLED INTO ENGLAND***, *The Daily Mail*, 1 December 1934) and ‘Africans’ (**A MR FIX-IT who charged Asians and Africans up to £1,000 a time “to turn them into British citizens” was behind prison bars last night**, *Mr Fix-It conned Asians*, *The Sun*, 1 May 1979) are conspicuous precisely because they prominently collectivise and reduce their referents to partial aspects of their identity. Their representation in these terms might well have been premised foremost on a foundation of banal nationalism (in which such categories appear to be the most natural descriptor) (Billig 1995) but in collectivising and impersonalising (van Leeuwen 1996) irregular migrants they also serve to provide the raw materials for the manufacture of panics about faceless and innumerable people from ‘alien’ places. The prominence of these national/’ethnic’ labels (e.g. in headlines) was nonetheless less apparent than in forced migration coverage.

Reference to such migrants as ‘illegal’ is a relatively contemporary phenomenon. For example, within the 31 stories from which irregular migration headlines were taken, 16 contained references to either ‘illegal(s)’ or ‘illegal immigrant(s)’ – all from 1974 onwards. As with forced migration, these neologisms therefore arrived in conjunction with the rise in news value of irregular migration issues: prior to the 1970 campaign there had been just 5 irregular migration stories, after which there were 26 (including 9 in 2010). The criminalising connotations of the premodifier ‘illegal’ to the noun ‘immigrant’ are obvious, and their sustained and combined usage ensure that the people the term refers to ‘become locked into a cyclic, stereotypical logic’ in which their ‘illegality’ is recurrently assumed and reinforced (Lynn and Lea 2003: 428).

Occurrences of the term ‘illegal(s)’ without ‘immigrant(s)’ came in *The Sun*, whose colloquial register and highly critical stance towards irregular migration combined in the usage of ‘illegal(s)’ in two stories in 2010 (**CLEGG IS FRIED ON ILLEGALS**, *The Sun*, 30 April 2010; **ONLY HERE FOR THE BLEARS. Campaign worker is an illegal/ILLEGAL HELPED BLEARS ‘TO TRY AND STAY IN THE UK’**, *The Sun*, 1 May 2010). Demonstrating the possibility of its usage in both singular and plural forms, the expressive properties of the term served to leave the reader in no doubt of *The Sun’s* political stance towards the two issues at hand – the Liberal Democrats’ proposal for an ‘amnesty’ for irregular migrants after 10 years’ residence in the
UK and the rights of irregular migrants to work (particularly scandalous here as it was for a Labour campaign team).

Irregular migrants were consistently subject to representations which foreground their objectification and victimhood and back-ground their agency. For example, irregular migrants were often described as having been ‘smuggled’ by criminal, foreign smugglers (e.g. LAUNDRY SLAVES, The Guardian, 1 December 1923; LAUNDRY SLAVES, The Daily Mail, 1 December 1923; Smuggler who got rich quick\(^{132}\), The Daily Mirror, 28 February 1974) or as ‘slave traffic’ (WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC IN LONDON, The Daily Mirror, 13 November 1935).

As irregular migration became a more frequently covered topic, those seen as culpable for migrants’ exploitation were focused on more personally and represented as folk devils. This came either in the form of ‘insiders’ betraying loyalties to nation (e.g. the British diplomat Brian Lea variously described as involving himself in a ‘plot’ to help Asians in the Daily Mirror\(^{133}\) or who ‘let in’ Asians\(^{134}\) “by the back door”\(^{135}\) in the Daily Express/Daily Telegraph, while the examples given above from 2010 of the representations of Nick Clegg and Hazel Blears also arguably borrowed elements of this narrative) or as ‘outsiders’ circumventing state sovereignty (e.g. Mr Fix-It conned Asians, The Sun, 1 May 1979; How Uncle Azad, the master forger, gave thousands of illegal immigrants a passport to Britain, The Daily Mail, 1 May 2010). On the other hand, in the absence of any ‘accomplice’, John Motioheloa from South Africa ‘stowed away’ on a ship headed for the UK and was congratulated with appraisals of his ‘ambition’ (THE STOWAWAY WITH AMBITION, The Daily Mail, 21 May 1955), while the director of a pirate radio station – Urs Emmenegger – was described quite freely of criticism as ‘slipping’ into Britain after having been refused entry by immigration officials the previous week (POP PIRATE SLIPS IN AFTER AIRPORT BAN, The Daily Express, 8 June 1970). It is difficult to imagine such sanguine narratives of irregular migration being published in the Daily Mail and Daily Express in more contemporary times, which if correct suggests both that irregular migration has become

\(^{132}\) The lead for this item states: ‘AIRPORT baggage handler Andrew O’Brien got rich in a matter of months when he joined a gang smuggling Asians and drugs into Britain’. The linguistic association of ‘Asians and drugs’, along with the back-grounding of their status to the object of the lead – rather than as a prominent feature of the headline and story – arguably serves to collectivise the migrants referred to and dehumanise them to the status of objects in a trade.

\(^{133}\) ENVOY ‘IN PLOT TO HELP ASIANS’, The Daily Mirror, 16 June 1970.

\(^{134}\) LEA ‘PAID’ TO LET ASIANS IN, The Daily Express, 16 June 1970.

\(^{135}\) LEA TOOK £6 BRIBES TO AID IMMIGRANTS, INQUIRY TOLD, The Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1970.
highly politicised and problematised but also that the sovereignty of the state has become ideologically more embedded within the assumptions to be found in immigration discourses.

Stories about irregular migration relented between 1983 and 1997, but upon the re-emergence of the topic news reports in the tabloid and mid-market press largely backgrounded referential strategies which placed irregular migrants as victims and foregrounded those which constructed them as threats and which conflated asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants together. A crisis frame (for us, rather than them) seems to have been readily available to journalists in this period, with single aberrant events or short-term patterns extrapolated to warn of present and future catastrophe. Such events elicited ‘fears’ over an expected increase in asylum applications (The Daily Mail)\textsuperscript{136}, caused the aforementioned ‘refugee alert’ due to French ports being left ‘unguarded’ (The Daily Telegraph)\textsuperscript{137} while Britain’s ‘small ports’ were described as being ‘hit’ by a ‘tide of migrants’ (The Daily Mail)\textsuperscript{138}.

Much of the coverage relating to irregular migration during the 2010 campaign was explicitly and prominently related to the election for the first time across all campaigns, and concerned mainly the so-called ‘amnesty’ proposals (a term usually applied to the pardoning of criminals) of the Liberal Democrats (e.g. CLEGG IS FRIED ON ILLEGALS. He flounders over an amnesty, The Sun, 30 April 2010; Migrants plan puts Clegg on back foot, The Daily Express, 1 May 2010; Opponents seize on amnesty policy, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 2010) and the Hazel Blears scandal in The Sun (ONLY HERE FOR THE BLEARS. Campaign worker is an illegal/ILLEGAL HELPED BLEARS ‘TO TRY AND STAY IN THE UK’, The Sun, 1 May 2010).

These stories provided evidence of the growing politicisation of irregular migration both in terms of its importance as a policy issue and for its potential importance as an issue with implications for electoral process. A consequence of this politicisation, however, is in the tendency for the active fore-grounding of political elites such as Clegg and Blears to come at

\textsuperscript{136} Fears over 58pc increase in admissions from abroad. For asylum seeker, read bogus student, The Daily Mail, 29 April 2005.

\textsuperscript{137} Refugee alert as France leaves ports unguarded, The Daily Telegraph, 4 June 2001. The lead for this article states: ‘BRITISH ports are facing a sudden influx of illegal immigrants forced to find new ways into the country’.

\textsuperscript{138} Small ports hit by tide of migrants, The Daily Mail, 5 June 2001. The lead for this item continues the metaphor, stating: ‘ILLEGAL immigrants are flooding into Britain through small French ports as police seal off the traditional smuggling routes via Calais and the Channel Tunnel’.
the expense of the impersonal, passive, back-grounded and even overtly pejorative representation of irregular migrants.

Convergence

The conflation of these types of migration has already been characterised by illustration of the prevalence of neologisms in latter campaign coverage in the previous chapter. The proliferation of these terms is a highly notable aspect of ‘precarious migration’ coverage (e.g. the growth in usage of ‘illegals’ and ‘failed asylum seeker’ as seen in earlier examples). As noted earlier, this development constitutes ‘overlexicalization’, indicating a ‘more intense ideological interest in the issue at hand’ (Richardson 2009: 363). Another way in which conflation can be realised includes through association, as evident in the superfluous co-location of both forms of migration in coverage (e.g. ‘Following widespread criticism of the party’s call for an amnesty for illegal immigrants, the Lib Dem leader came under attack over proposals to lift the ban on claimants taking employment in the UK while waiting for their asylum applications to be processed’ in Lib-Dems want to give asylum seekers our jobs, The Daily Express, 6 May 2010). However, it is through the more specific strategy of ‘re-lexicalization’ that conflation is most evident in latter coverage. This is, for example, overtly evident in the sub-headline ‘For asylum seeker, read bogus student’ (Fears over 58pc increase in admissions from abroad. For asylum seeker, read bogus student The Daily Mail, 29 April 2005), which quite literally invites the reader to substitute instances of the usage of ‘asylum seeker’ for an epithet associated with irregular migration. Similarly, ‘refugee’ was re-lexicalized from the headline to ‘illegal immigrants’ in the lead of Refugee alert as France leaves ports unguarded (The Daily Telegraph, 4 June 2001). In contrast, in other examples ‘migrants’ appeared in the headline but ‘illegal immigrants’ appeared in the lead (Small ports hit by tide of migrants, The Daily Mail, 5 June 2001; Migrants plan puts Clegg on back foot, The Daily Express, 1 May 2010; Lib Dem no to Clegg migrants ‘amnesty’, The Daily Express, 3 May 2010). This strategy is notable for sequencing this re-lexicalization only in this order; the reverse would ostensibly contradict the norm in which the lead elaborates details in the headline. In this sense, it becomes clear that ‘migrants’ is

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139 The lead claimed ‘BRITISH ports are facing a sudden influx of illegal immigrants forced to find new routes and new ways into the country’.
140 This story later referred to the same people as ‘refugees’.
141 The lead of this article also referred to irregular migrants as ‘border cheats’.
semantically structured as the hypernym of ‘illegal immigrants’ (the hyponym) in these examples, rather than as its synonym. However, the initial implication in each case that these stories are in reference to all ‘migrants’ is therefore shown to speciously conflate groups of migrants together.

As may be evident from the numerous examples above, precarious migration coverage is almost exclusively occupied with stories concerning the entry and deportation of such migrants; rarely have such issues been covered without an emphasis on the prospect of either of these consequences. The overarching logic of this coverage is one which places precarious migrants in opposition to immigration officials, politicians and/or the nation at large. However, with the politicisation of both forced migration and irregular migration, there have also been notable if rare cases in the broadsheet press of sympathetic commentary about forced and irregular migrants represented as having suffered the consequences of the inadequacy of political measures to protect the vulnerable or of the impersonal excesses of state bureaucracy:

18. **THE NEW SLAVE TRADE.** Abducted, sold by their families and raped by pimps, thousands of girls - many just 14 - end up as prostitutes in cities such as London. We reveal the barbaric trade that shames Europe, *The Daily Mail*, 2 June 2001;


The second of these stories was accompanied by an editorial (**CLOSING THE DOOR. The United Kingdom's asylum system is still inadequate**, *The Times*, 30 April 2005) which simultaneously put the positive and humanitarian case for migration (while calling the Immigration and Nationality Directorate ‘Kafkaesque’), and argued for ‘economic refugees’ to ‘use the immigration, not the asylum route’. In doing so it managed to sustain the bogus vs. genuine dichotomy (‘there are concerns about those coming here under false pretences, who leave less room for those with the most deserving asylum claims’) and limit criticism to issues of procedure rather than anything fundamental about the ethical basis of the immigration and asylum system. For example, the use of ‘still’ in the headline of the editorial suggests that ‘the United Kingdom’s asylum system’ can in future be remedied to
become ‘adequate’, while the lead suggests that the case ‘throws up questions about how far the asylum system still has to go in terms of efficiency, humanity and fairness’.

**Numbers: The Rights of the Host**

If precarious migration coverage entails questions of ‘our’ responsibilities, then numbers coverage can be said to conversely entail those of ‘our’ *rights* concerning those of the state to limit immigration and set entry requirements. This theme was coded in the content analysis based on whether or not coverage featured discussion of the numbers of immigrants thought to have migrated in recent weeks, months, years or decades, or estimates of future migration in similar terms. As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, the issue of ‘numbers’ has driven and dominated the political debate of immigration since at least the 1960s, while this aspect of discussion is one of the four major themes of immigration coverage identified by Law (2010: 193). The corpus for this section of analysis consists of 39 headlines/leads, selected on the basis of being primarily about the theme of ‘Numbers’ and primarily focussed on immigration issues (i.e. of main focus).

Numbers coverage comprised the fourth most frequent theme in all immigration coverage of main focus. As Figure 8.2 demonstrates, much of this coverage appeared in 1992 and 2010, though with some appearances on the agenda in the 1960s and 1970 campaigns. The high quantity of ‘numbers’ coverage in 1992 is in contrast to the seemingly low level of precarious migration coverage in the same campaign (see Figure 8.1); framed in terms of numbers first and foremost, the ‘asylum scare’ stories (Billig and Golding 1992a, 1992b; Thomas 1998) of this campaign also contained discussion of forced and irregular migrants in particular, but the emphasis was on the numbers involved. For the 2001 campaign, during which numbers coverage (as a primary issue in main focus coverage) was absent, the inverse was true. Then, the inflection was on the primacy of precarious migration (either forced or irregular) as ‘the issue’, with numbers a subsidiary concern in several cases.
Figure 8.2: The coverage of numbers over time

As shown by the results in Figure 8.2, the level of numbers coverage of secondary focus reached new heights in the 2010 campaign. In the 1966 and 1970 campaign, though, there was also a considerable amount of peripheral/subsidiary discussion of numbers, which translated into a small amount of coverage which fore-fronted the theme.

Over the entire sample period, relatively little ‘numbers’ coverage was found in the popular press at 15.4% of all main focus coverage (i.e. 6 of 39 articles). The quality press and mid-market press shared the remaining coverage almost equally, at 17 to 16 articles respectively.

Only a relatively small proportion of numbers coverage (13%) did not contain some reference to either the election or candidates, suggesting that when arguments about the volume of immigration have surfaced, they have recurrently been reported as an aspect of the debate which falls under the remit of politicians and which may have significant electoral relevance and consequences.

As Bell notes, numbers lie at the core of the ‘facticity’ of news reporting, undergirding the ‘objective, empirical claims of news’ even as they simultaneously ‘undermine that principle’
in a bid to enhance the news value of the story (1991: 203). The publication of migration figures (especially if cited from reports of official statistics) offers newspapers a routine opportunity to provide an ostensibly dispassionate, objective and authoritative assessment of the scale of migration. Unfortunately, especially when figures are given without any context, the audience is ‘in no position to gauge whether a particular statistic is large, small or insignificant’ (ibid.). Certainly, Chapter 3 illustrated that confusion and misperception seem be abundant in the public’s knowledge and interpretation of migration figures. Further, a concern for coverage which focuses so heavily on the supposed scale of immigration to the back-grounding of other possible issues within the debate is that migrants will inevitably be represented in aggregated or collectivised ways which reduce them to their supposed membership of socially constructed groups and thus depersonalise and dehumanise them (KhosraviNik 2010a, 2010b; van Leeuwen 1996), or in the case of ‘functionalisations’ (e.g. ‘asylum applicants’), objectify them as things to argue over or to provide controversy (KhosraviNik 2010b: 13). Further, as immigration has become subject to sustained politicisation and the news value of immigration events has increased, research findings are able to be drawn upon to expose ‘scandal in the form of political transgressions’, particularly in the defense or criticism of the record of incumbents (Boswell 2009: 102-103), therefore consolidating the news value of facts and figures in the mediation of immigration.

**The authority of facts and figures**

The sophistication of the bureaucracy surrounding immigration procedures is a product of structures created through immigration legislation, and it is these structures which enable the categorisation of immigrants and their precise numeration for the purposes of immigration control. As a result of the bureaucratic and political function of figures, numbers in news reports can very often be represented through what Richardson calls ‘quantification’: whether through ‘exact quantification’ (i.e. approximate or precise figures), ‘relative quantification’ (i.e. given through terms such as ‘lots of...’, ‘a large population of...’ alongside ‘excessive quantity adverbials’ such as ‘huge numbers’ [KhosraviNik 2010b: 14]) or ‘fractional quantification’ (i.e. by using percentages) (2009). In combination with ‘non-modal categorical assertions’ (Richardson 2007: 61), the numeration of immigrants in articles dealing with official figures can be legitimised as though a naturally-occurring fact, with the
details of their collation and discursive production elided altogether. This is the case, for example, in a headline from the 1987 week which stated that ‘Immigration in the first quarter of the year was 10,840–1,140 less than the same period last year’ (Immigration trend down, The Daily Telegraph, 11 June 1987). As this example shows, leads usually give the ‘exact quantification’ that is rarely given in the headline, which tend to use ‘relative quantification’ (e.g. MORE MIGRATE TO SCOTLAND, The Daily Telegraph, 8 October 1974; IMMIGRANT DROP, The Daily Telegraph, 15 June 1970). Occasionally, exact figures are given in the lead but it is mainly through the headline that evaluative narration is provided. For example, one article claimed in the lead: ‘Aliens landing in the United Kingdom during July, August and September, totalled 121,363. Five hundred and eight were refused permission to land, while 131,021 embarked. For the first nine months of the year 258,441 landed, 250,336 embarked, and 1,402 were refused leave to land.’ The extensive use of exact figures in this article was not reflected in the headline: ALIENS’ EBB AND FLOW (The Daily Herald, 11 November 1922), which reduced these patterns to a water-based metaphor suggestive of a predictable and ongoing pattern. In all, the linguistic ‘assimilation’ (van Leeuwen 1996: 48) of immigrants in news reports, while prima facie an objective reporting of measurable figures, bears the ideological imprint of its administrative purposes, and in so doing serves to homogenise and impersonalise immigrants while providing the perspective of the state. In short, migrants are treated as statistics, not people (van Leeuwen 1996: 49).

Moreover, presupposition is able to implicitly provide a narrative of previous developments (e.g. ‘IMMIGRANT DROP’, ‘Fall in immigrants allowed to stay’, Immigration trend down’, emphasise mine). In the most recent campaign, the findings of a Migrationwatch report were re-presented in the headline 1m more migrants by 2015 (The Daily Express, 3 May 2010). These presuppositions work through the use of ‘orientational metaphors’ of immigration, such as with ‘levels’ going ‘up’ or ‘down’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, ch. 4). Despite the precision of the exact quantification provided in the body of numbers items, the headlines above suggest that some degree of explanatory interpretation is seen to be required in headlines in order to fit them into an ongoing narrative – at the second of two general points in time, with a third and more presumably to come.

Other devices provide a sense of precision and assured authority to figures. Non-modal categorical assertions (e.g. is/are, was) are used instead of less assertive modal claims in
order to maximise their ‘argumentative force’ (Richardson 2007: 61), while ‘utterance autonomisation’ is a form of metonymy in which ‘social actors are represented by means of reference to their utterances’, affording the corresponding utterances a considerable degree of ‘impersonal authority’ (van Leeuwen 1996: 60). In combination, they allow journalists to make strong interpretative claims about the statistics available. An example of this is the following lead: ‘There has been a big drop in the numbers of immigrants allowed to settle in Britain, according to new figures from the Home Office’ (Fall in immigrants allowed to stay, The Times, 11 June 1987, my emphasis). The report thereafter detailed the ‘new figures’ (e.g. ‘A total of 47,000 people were accepted for settlement in 1986, compared with 70,000 in 1980 and 80,000 in 1976’) in a manoeuvre presumably intended to justify the figures (quite literally) ‘speaking for themselves’. In the only prominent ‘numbers’ article from campaigns in the first half of the twentieth century (ALIENS’ EBB AND FLOW, The Daily Herald, 11 November 1922), ‘utterance autonomisation’ was entirely absent in an article far shorter than its later counterparts, with the journalist(s) in this earlier example from 1922 refraining from complementing the figures with the insertion of their own interpretation beyond that of the headline. In other words, in the earlier example, figures are given without their source while in the latter, the source (the Home Office) is named. We can only assume that the 1922 figures come from government records, but these examples seem to indicate both that the publication of official figures has an intrinsic news value in itself (even before the intensification in the volume of immigration coverage) and that official figures have become more likely to feature ‘distance markers’ (e.g. according to [source]) which caveat the claims made about them.

The evidence suggests, therefore, that there has been some continuity overall in the representation of migrants in numbers coverage, with little that has changed. However, a notable difference comes in the increase of such coverage in campaigns including 1992 and 2010. It is possible that an increase in the focus on numbers within the debate brings with it a differentiation in its discursive features.

1992 and 2010

Numbers coverage in the 1992 campaign focused on numbers as the primary theme among a number of other, recurrent but subsidiary themes (particularly social cohesion, forced
migration and irregular migration). Several metaphors dominated the news narrative, including:

- water-based natural disaster ([HUMAN TIDE LABOUR WOULD LET IN](#), *The Sun*, 4 April 1992; [BAKER’S MIGRANT FLOOD WARNING](#), *The Daily Express*, 7 April 1992; [Major stands firm against migrant flood](#), *The Daily Mail*, 8 April 1992);
- social cohesion (including the defeat of extreme right parties) and net migration as a zero-sum game (in an opinion piece.headlined [We risk sowing seeds of fascism](#), *The Sun*, 4 April 1992);
- the nation-as-home/immigrants-as-guests ([Paddy puts out the welcome mat for 4m from Hong Kong](#), *The Daily Mail*, 7 April 1992);

The first three of these represented the UK as an extraordinarily unwilling receiver (or victim) of immigration which (as with the social cohesion vs. net migration metaphor) would be self-inflicted, in the sense that these undesirable events could seemingly only be brought about with the election of the Labour Party. As was shown in the previous chapter, water-based natural disaster metaphors formed part of the interpretative framework through which immigration was described in several campaigns. In their usage here we see that Labour would *let* [‘the] human tide’ in, Norman Baker providing a ‘warning’ of a ‘migrant flood’ (though the party/parties to whom he issued this warning was omitted) and John Major standing – apparently alone – in defiance of the same ‘migrant flood’. With a section of the press 144 apparently prepared to use Labour’s opposition to the Asylum Bill as capital for Tory support (Billig et al. 1992a, 1992b; Thomas 1998), the participation of political actors and the back-grounding of the utterances and actions of immigrants themselves is not surprising. Whereas politicians were individualised and personalised (consider ‘Paddy,

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142 This article was accompanied by an illustration in which arrows headed EASTERN EUROPE, ASIA, MIDDLE EAST and AFRICA, detailing the numbers in the thousands of prospective ‘bogus refugees’ from various countries point towards an outline of the UK, filled by an image of a large crowd of people placing the image’s audience in an elevated position.

143 Also prominently found in a headline during the 1970 campaign: [9,000 KENYA ASIANS ‘READY TO FLOOD HEATHROW’](#), *The Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1970.

144 Numbers coverage in the 1992 campaign emerged in the Daily Express (2 articles), Sun (3 articles), Daily Mail (4 articles), Times (1 article) and Daily Telegraph (1 article).
‘Baker’ and ‘Major’) and their utterances transformed from complex verbal processes (such as with speech taken from press conferences) to more categorical material processes (e.g. to ‘stand firm’), immigrants were assimilated, back-grounded through nominalisation and dehumanised through metaphor (e.g. ‘...4m from Hong Kong’, ‘immigration’ and ‘migrant flood’/‘human tide’).

It has been argued that in recent years, the currency of ‘expertise’ in settling disputes regarding immigration issues in the press and Parliament has risen (Boswell 2009). In opposition, Conservative politicians recurrently voiced insistence on the collation of more ‘reliable’ immigration figures, while the impact of the think-tank ‘Migrationwatch’ on a necessity for ‘technocratic’ forms of justification in media and political debate was relatively considerable, especially in the early part of the 2000s (ibid.). Politicians have become accustomed to their invocation of statistics being heavily scrutinised, particularly with regard to past or projected levels of immigration (though also with regard to related economic figures and estimates). Indeed, during the 2010 campaign, accusations recurrently abounded regarding the apparent ‘misuse’ of statistics by politicians, with Gordon Brown, Nick Clegg and Immigration Minister Phil Woolas charged with using supposedly ‘wrong’ figures, or even wilfully ‘misleading voters over EU migration’ (The Daily Telegraph, 5 May 2010), as can be seen in the following examples:

- **Immigration figures used by Clegg ‘wrong’,** The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 2010;
- **Flip-flop Clegg gets his migration sums wrong,** The Daily Mail, 1 May 2010;
- **PM faces inquiry over ‘wrong’ numbers,** The Daily Mail, 3 May 2010;
- **Fury over 1.2m EU workers in Britain,** The Sun, 5 May 2010;
- **THE EU MIGRANT LIE,** The Daily Mail, 5 May 2010;
- **Labour accused of misleading voters over EU migration,** The Daily Telegraph, 5 May 2010.

Despite such strong claims, in the main body of many of these articles it transpired that such accusations were essentially the product of disagreements between these politicians and journalists regarding the boundaries of migrant categories and for what arguments certain figures may be used. Nevertheless, in constructing these differences as the misappropriation of statistics, these reports drew on the idea that some figures are
indisputably ‘correct’ and elided consideration of how such statistics are initially collated, under which categories, and for what purpose. Overall, these examples suggest that politicians claimed to be abusing official statistics can be criticised on grounds of either incompetence or untrustworthiness and even wilful deceit. The appearance of several similar reports about the misuse of statistics in 2010 numbers coverage suggests that debate around the facts and figures of immigration are highly contested and of great rhetorical force in the contemporary politics of immigration. Ironically, official statistics published usually by the government are selectively appropriated by the press in order to hold government actors accountable, criticise government incompetence and invoke questions of longer-term trust in the government’s ‘management’ of immigration. The headlines and leads of these articles thereby magnified statistical use and misuse to the detriment of substantive discussion about the politics of bureaucracy. The 2010 campaign might therefore be said to have constituted the concentration of ‘the numbers game’ down to its bare essentials: the statistics game. Within this development, numbers coverage in 2010 suppressed the presence and agency of migrants to perhaps their most acute levels. Indeed, it was very rare in numbers coverage for the utterances and actions of migrants and ethnic minorities to be the focus of headlines and leads.

Moderate spokespersons

An exception to this rule came in the 2005 campaign, in which polling data from MORI (commissioned by the BBC Asian Network) was used in reports in the Mail and Express, suggesting in part that 60% of British Asians believed that there were ‘too many immigrants in Britain’ (Most Asians want a cut in immigration, The Daily Mail, 29 April 2005; BRITAIN HAS TOO MANY MIGRANTS SAY ASIANS, The Daily Express, 30 April 2005). There are several things to be said for these articles in their usage of this survey data. The sourcing of ‘Asians’ (‘British Asians’ and ‘Britain’s Asians’ in the respective leads) in both is symptomatic of what van Dijk has described as one effect of the lack of access minority speakers have to journalists: if ‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’ are not used to ‘facilitate ridicule or attack’ (van Dijk 1996: 93) then, as here in the Mail and Express, ‘moderate spokespersons will be quoted who share the opinions or perspective of the majority’ (ibid.). There were several other findings reported by the BBC/MORI, which made an appearance later on in the reports. For instance, 75% of respondents thought Britain had ‘good race relations’, 23% thought it
possible that Britain could have its first Asian Prime Minister within 20 years, trust in politicians on immigration was lower than 50% for each of the three party leaders, 75% of respondents said they would not change their vote ‘simply because one of the candidates on the ballot paper was Asian’ and 75% thought that ‘the decision to go to war in Iraq was wrong’. These findings were sequenced in this way in the Mail report, but in the Express’ front page article (which was continued on page 2), the findings were sequenced in order of ‘too many migrants’, trustworthiness on immigration, ‘good race relations’, lack of preference for Asian candidates and opposition to the war in Iraq. Opposition to the war in Iraq was placed in the last paragraph on page two (the others appeared on the front page), as a ‘further blow to Mr Blair’, while the minority who predicted that there would be an Asian Prime Minister within 20 years were excluded from the Express report entirely. The backgrounding in each report of respondents’ opposition to the war in Iraq is interesting given that the consensus on this point was higher than the headline finding (75% to 60%) in a campaign for which Iraq was a major issue featuring more prominently in the quality and mid-market press than asylum and immigration issues (Deacon et al. 2006). It would appear that the opportunity to use an apparent ‘concession’ by British Asians that there were ‘too many’ immigrants in Britain proved too appealing to the editorial staff at the Mail and Express in their choice of headline ‘focalization’ in this instance (Fairclough 2003: 84).

The re-contextualisation of this finding in each headline is also of note in itself. In the Mail the ‘perceptive’ (van Leeuwen 1995: 87) mental process ‘to believe’ (that ‘there are too many immigrants in Britain’) changes to the ‘affective’ (ibid.) mental process ‘to want’ (a ‘cut in immigration’). This recontextualisation is important, as it therefore assumes and inserts a connection between the perception of a problem (‘too many’) and a related political proposal to alter that state of affairs. The Express headline, on the other hand, elides mention of the 40% of respondents who didn’t regard Britain as having ‘too many immigrants’, instead choosing to represent the findings through a form of indirect discourse (‘...say Asians’) as though all (British) Asians had come to a unified consensus on the issue, only clarifying the percentage after both the headline and lead. Overall, the effect of these headlines is to suggest that even Asian Britons, a traditionally marginalised and negatively represented group in these newspapers, are disillusioned with the amount of immigration there has been to the UK. The other political interests and dissensus of such out-groups are,
however, relegated or suppressed entirely. The representation of the political interests of immigrants and ethnic minorities will be discussed more in the next section.

‘The Migrant Vote’: Insiders or Outsiders?

This theme was coded in the content analysis based on whether or not coverage featured discussion of the impact of the political representation of migrant/ethnic minority interests on patterns of turnout and vote distribution, plus discussion of the candidacy of migrant or ethnic minority politicians (see Appendix C). The corpus for this section of analysis consists of 52 articles, selected on the basis of being primarily about the theme of ‘the Influence and Mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates’ and primarily focussed on immigration issues (i.e. of main focus).

As immigration from Commonwealth countries to the UK increased in the aftermath of the Second World War and in tandem with their pre-existing rights to vote as British subjects, coverage of the mobilisation of ‘the migrant vote’ in election campaigns correspondingly began to increase (see Figure 8.4). This kind of coverage provided an overt connection between immigration and its more direct civic consequences: the enfranchisement of migrants, their political mobilisation and the potential influence of their presence on local constituency politics and electoral outcomes. This coverage therefore disrupts the rights/responsibilities framework. The representation of migrants’ political interests presents a dilemma: on the one hand, ignoring the specific group interests and personal experiences of migrants in discussions of political decisions which affect them is potentially negligent, even if this approach recognises the commonalities of migrant attitudes and behaviours with those of the rest of the population and attempts to represent them in terms of aspects of their identity other than those which reduce them solely to their migrant experience. On the other hand, however, presenting migrants’ political preferences in every instance as differentiated is also problematic for the way in which it constructs migrants as segregated groups distant from the rest of society (c.f. Richardson 2009). The question for this kind of coverage is arguably therefore, instead, whether and how migrants are placed inside or outside of the imagined nation by the representation of their political attitudes.
As Figure 8.3 shows, this coverage reached its peaks in 1922, 1970, 1979 and (to a lesser extent) in 2005. In fact, in terms of all coverage (i.e including coverage of both main and secondary focus), this issue appeared on the election news agenda in every campaign from the 1950s onwards, with the exception of 1992. For self-evident reasons, this coverage was uniformly found as IAE coverage.

A stark aspect of this kind of coverage comes in its distribution across the press. The quality press was responsible for 41 (almost 80%) of the 52 articles in this coverage, compared with 4 in the mid-market press and 7 in the popular press. This is largely an artefact of the larger space and resources allocated to local electoral news in this section of the press, and much of the discussion of the mobilisation of ‘the migrant’ vote came through discussions of their impact on individual constituency outcomes in ‘constituency roundup’ items or through the public pronouncements of pressure groups.

**Figure 8.3: The coverage of ‘the migrant vote’ and candidature over time**

The German and Austrian voters forgery, 1922

The earlier coverage of the 1922 campaign came about due to the sudden appearance of a letter (‘manifesto’) addressed to German and Austrian immigrants resident in the country, implausibly asking them to ‘vote Labour’ due to their apparent sympathy towards Germany.
These reports surfaced despite the inability of German and Austrian ‘aliens’ to vote unless as naturalized citizens. The Labour Party and the apparent publishers of the manifesto denied all responsibility for its publication, with the contention being that its forgery was intended to damage Labour’s electoral hopes. The emergence of the letter and the Labour Party response were reported within the broadsheets, the Mail and the Labour-supporting Daily Herald (e.g. ALIENS AND Labour. APPEAL TO GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VOTERS, The Times, 9 November 1922; APPEAL TO ALIENS WHICH LABOUR DISOWNS. "AN ENEMY HAS DONE THIS THING", The Guardian, 10 November 1922; LABOUR REPUDIATION OF "ALIENS" MANIFESTO. A FALSE IMPRINT, The Times, 10 November 1922; BOGUS LEAFLET TO FIGHT LABOUR, The Daily Herald, 10 November 1922; "ALIENS & LABOUR." A FORGED LEAFLET, The Daily Mail, 10 November 1922; "ALIENS AND LABOUR." A FALSE IMPRINT, The Daily Telegraph, 10 November 1922). The Daily Herald’s coverage alone made clear the redundancy of any such appeal to German or Austrian migrants. In their printing of the original story, the rest of the press betrayed an absence in their working knowledge of the civic rights of migrants, for example in the particularly conspicuous Times headline which claimed an ‘APPEAL TO GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VOTERS’ early on in the reporting of the issue – presupposing that such voters existed in substantively large numbers. Whereas later coverage on this theme would discuss the legitimate and influential role of migrants on electoral outcomes and in terms of their allegiances, the fallout of these stories revealed the lack of voting rights afforded to certain resident migrants and could have provoked questions regarding the legitimacy of this situation, but the issue dissipated as quickly as it had arrived once the forgery became clear.

The migrant vote
Overall, however, the headlines of this coverage approached the issue from two angles. The first came from a perspective which considers migrant political expression in particular as ethnic minority voting blocs, whether in general or as narrower electorates:

- Coloured vote may decide London marginals, The Guardian, 30 April 1979;
- Ethnic vote to be analysed, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1979;
- Parties seek ethnic vote but fail to offer minorities safe seats, The Times, 4 June 1983;
- Asian Tory woos ethnic vote, The Times, 6 June 1983;
- **Labour cannot count on the votes of ethnic minorities this time**, The Guardian, 4 May 2005;
- **Vote Labour, Pakis told**, The Sun, 9 June 1970;
- **The Muslim vote could be decisive in 40 constituencies**, The Guardian, 29 April 2005.

The second was a perspective which focused on the fortunes of migrant candidates, whose ethnic minority or immigrant identity was represented in coverage as a substantive aspect of their appeal to migrant voters and therefore as the category within which their identity could be described first and foremost.

In the post-war period, stories about the migrant presence and vote emerged from the 1959 campaign and gathered momentum throughout those of the 1960s. During this period, stories mostly concentrated on the presence of New Commonwealth and Irish immigrant voters as an influence on the outcome in local constituencies, with estimations usually given for the size of the local population of certain groups. For example, migrant voters were sometimes described in headlines and leads in terms of their number through a pseudo form of ‘exact’ quantification which nonetheless remained imprecise in its rounding to the nearest thousand:

- **IMMIGRATION AN ISSUE IN CLAPHAM. 5,000 COLOURED PEOPLE**, The Daily Telegraph, 10 October 1964.
- **Gratitude will sway votes of 12,000 Asian refugees**, The Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1974.

Here, precision was secondary to communicating the substantial influence which established migrant communities contributed to the outcome of certain constituencies in terms of the size of their vote (although within these headlines no other comparative figures are given for the size of the electorate of either constituency). As in numbers coverage, this kind of construction aggregated migrants, the result of which was to differentiate migrants from the rest of the electorate as a group of voters requiring special consideration, and as though their political concerns were of some dissimilarity to the rest of the public. The first of these headlines did this vaguely through the general category of ‘coloured people’, in an
article which identified housing as ‘inevitably related to the colour problem’ and which particularly reported on the chances of the Labour candidate and a Conservative candidate ‘unafraid to speak openly on such a sensitive issue’ – that of the ‘Immigration question’. One potential effect of a strategy in which ‘coloured people’ are identified as a sizeable and valid category by which to refer to voters would be in the potential recognition of mutual challenges involved in common aspects of the migrant and diasporic experience, but in this case it appears to be the result of an arbitrary differentiation from the white population and voters of Clapham. On the other hand, in the second example (also taken from the Daily Telegraph) in the campaign which came almost a decade later, it is precisely through a perception of the common experiences of Asian refugees on which their political decisions were presumed to be based (i.e. ‘to be swayed’ by ‘gratitude’).

The only instance in which the votes of Irish immigrants was mentioned came in the 1959 campaign, in a Daily Telegraph report from the Paddington North constituency in London (HORSE AIDS IN WINNING OVER ELECTORS. READY MONEY STILL THE IRISH FAVOURITE, 8 October 1959). Irish voters were here described as ‘electors’ (in the headline) and ‘the Irish electorate’ (in the lead), and were numerated in the lead as constituting ‘just over a vital 1,000 voters’. In reference to a horse jockeyed by the Conservative candidate who apparently won ‘£2,000 of Paddington-Irish money’ in a 1959 horse race, the headline also claimed such a thing as ‘THE IRISH FAVOURITE’, whose gratitude was presumed to be collective and meaningful to the outcome of the local campaign. As with much migrant vote coverage, Irish voters were not exempt from treatment as a voting bloc with incredibly basic loyalties and motivations as in this example.

The appearance of pressure groups during the 1966 and 1970 campaigns (see previous chapter) had much to do with the growing influence and political mobilisation of migrants, and many of these pressure groups appeared in this kind of coverage as prominent actors. These organisations invariably appeared when encouraging migrants to withhold their vote, allocate it to particular candidates or allocate it to a party at the national level. During the 1966 campaign this was related to immigrants mainly at the constituency level, as the Indian Workers’ Association, the Pakistani Welfare Association and the West Indian Standing Conference encouraged immigrants to abstain completely in the All Saints and Sparkbrook constituencies in Birmingham in protest at the immigration policies of the major political
parties and in particular their disillusionment with the Labour government (e.g. 'Don't vote' appeal, *The Sun*, 25 March 1966; IMMIGRANTS URGED NOT TO VOTE, *The Times*, 25 March 1966; 'DO NOT VOTE' PROTEST BY COLOURED GROUPS, *The Daily Telegraph*, 25 March 1966; DON'T VOTE PLEA TO MIGRANTS, *The Daily Mirror*, 25 March 1966). The only relation made to immigrants at the national level was in the later clarification that immigrants ought to vote Labour elsewhere, as the Birmingham protest was the result of the specific withdrawal of support for Labour's Brian Walden and Roy Hattersley (IMMIGRANTS TOLD TO VOTE LABOUR, *The Daily Telegraph*, 30 March 1966).

During the 1970 campaign it was at the national level that this advice was issued and the growing political influence of migrant voters recognised. Pakistani and Indian voters were again the predominant targets for such advice, this time 'told' to vote for the Labour Party, despite reservations, by the League of Overseas Pakistanis and the Central Committee of Indian Organisations (Vote Labour, Pakis told, *The Sun*, 9 June 1970; PAKISTANIS TOLD 'VOTE LABOUR', *The Daily Telegraph*, 15 June 1970; Indians choose Labour, *The Guardian*, 17 June 1970). A stark distinction can be seen in the construction of the headlines of the *Sun* and the *Guardian* in these examples. The *Guardian* headline suggests that the endorsement of the Central Committee of Indian Organisations was sufficient to suggest that Indian voters had freely chosen Labour, while the *Sun* suggests with more hostility – and with the highly provocative colloquial term 'Pakis' – that Pakistani voters were (perhaps illegitimately) directed to vote for the Labour Party. The use of the term others this group of citizens – as a collectivized group far removed from 'our' ordinary experiences, stigmatised through the usage of a term widely accepted in hindsight as distinctly pejorative. Within the *Guardian* headline, the assumption was made that this group spoke for 'the Indian community' rather than at 'the Indian community', but in both types of construction the presupposition that such a community (either as Indian or Pakistani) exists as a politically cohesive entity went unquestioned.

A dichotomy appears to have emerged in headline constructions over these campaigns, dependent on whether the matter at hand was an instruction to abstain or an instruction to vote for Labour candidates. Where immigrants were asked to abstain in the 1966 campaign, this was construed variously as an ‘appeal’, ‘plea’, ‘[urge]’ and ‘protest’, with paraphrasing and indirect quotation providing the substantive argument of the pressure groups who
issued the instructions. It is perhaps of little surprise that the sanctity of expressing one’s right to vote was what made the headlines here given the pride with which the UK’s democratic history is held and expressed culturally, but this part of these organisations’ pronouncement came ahead of the reason for their proposals, which were based on opposition to the immigration policies of the major political parties (e.g. ‘Don’t vote’ appeal, The Sun, 25 March 1966). The Telegraph allowed the organisations enough space to even suggest that the two main parties were engaged in a race to see ‘who will keep the most number of blacks out’ (‘DO NOT VOTE’ PROTEST BY COLOURED GROUPS, The Daily Telegraph, 25 March 1966). Statements such as this appear rarely in the press, and it was ostensibly due to the potentially self-imposed abstention of migrant voters and the limited threat that this might have posed to the democratic pretensions of the UK parliamentary system that seemingly made this local issue of mainstream national importance. The disillusionment of these voters seems to have therefore been taken seriously, reflected in the nominalised usage of ‘metapropositional directive’ verbal process words (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 306) such as ‘appeal’, ‘plea’, and ‘protest’, which suggest that these pressure groups may bear some persuasive influence over those addressed. In contrast, any struggle for influence was absent in the verb ‘told’, found in the later headlines wherein migrants were being advised to allocate their vote to the Labour Party. Through the usage of ‘told’ in these three headlines, the legitimacy of these pressure groups to issue their advice was arguably called into question because, in a democratic electoral system, voting is regarded as a personal choice free from external pressures.

The focus on the importance of the immigrant vote at the constituency level persisted, in the main, throughout campaigns in the 1970s and early 1980s, usually emerging from the ‘constituency roundup’ items and reportage commonly found in the broadsheets (e.g. Election Sketchbook. No Gujarati voice for Thorpe, The Daily Telegraph, 5 October 1974; Immigrants hold balance in Labour’s Leicester marginal, The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1979; Coloured vote may decide London marginals, The Guardian, 30 April 1979; Asian Tory woos ethnic vote, The Times, 6 June 1983; Parties woo the Asian voters, The Guardian, 7 June 1983; VOTES IN URDU, The Daily Telegraph, 9 June 1983). Nonetheless, in the 1979 campaign, there was a return to the national perspective in some items (e.g. LABOUR VOTE URGED, The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1979; WHY IMMIGRANTS SHOULD VOTE FOR
MAGGIE, The Sun, 1 May 1979; Ethnic vote to be analysed, The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1979; Pakistanis urged to back Liberals, The Guardian, 3 May 1979), a perhaps unsurprising development given the concomitant growth in the quantity of coverage generally during that campaign. The Sun ‘spotlight’ on ‘why immigrants should vote for Maggie’ welcomed the influence of the migrant vote and included four ‘vox-pop’ style aspects of the Conservatives’ policy programme that particular migrant voters were supportive of. As Richardson (2007: 63-64) remarks, the use of ‘wh-’ questions is an indicator of presupposition and here the use of a ‘wh-’ statement helps to support the use of the modal verb ‘should’ regarding what migrants ought to do. The usage of the impersonalised ‘immigrants’ helped to subsume the divergent and dispersed political interests of various migrants as though reconcilable, while the nicknamed reference to Margaret Thatcher further helps to personalise her as the friendly face of a Conservative vote.

During the 2005 campaign, the Guardian printed 3 reports on this issue from ethnic minority perspectives, which discussed the ‘Muslim vote’ (The Muslim vote could be decisive in 40 constituencies. Don’t take us for granted, The Guardian, 29 April 2005), ‘the votes of ethnic minorities’ (Labour cannot count on the votes of ethnic minorities this time. Beyond the prism of race, The Guardian, 4 May 2005) and the ‘new generation’ of Muslims ‘breaking with Labour’ (A new generation of Muslims is breaking with Labour. Ties that no longer bind, The Guardian, 5 May 2005). The presence of such voters in this discourse, particular to the Guardian, also came alongside an otherwise lack of interest in the issue, possibly signalling a new phase in which ‘the migrant vote’ is less problematised and an ordinary part of the electorate which requires only occasional special attention. The shift to a focus on the ‘Muslim vote’ (c.f. Richardson 2009) alongside that of ‘the votes of ethnic minorities’ (more prominent in recent campaigns than ‘the (im)migrant vote’) is telling, possibly signalling a change in elite perceptions about new ‘outsiders’, disaffected and a significant challenge to an inclusive democracy.

On occasion, the extant migrant community translated into the emergence of nominally ‘migrant’ candidates, often presumed to embody migrant interests first and foremost with their political affiliations and other proposals reduced to a sub-plot:

- LONDON DAY BY DAY. Immigrant Ticket, The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1964;
• The candidate who opposes crash helmets, *The Daily Telegraph*, 27 February 1974;
• Asian Tory woos ethnic vote, *The Times*, 6 June 1983;
• Begorrah! It's England's only Paddy-stani, *The Daily Express*, 9 June 1987;

These examples are indicative of the strength with which migrant candidates are represented as migrants first and foremost but also in many cases as having allegiances primarily to a supposed ‘migrant bloc’. This serves to trivialize migrants’ political candidacy and the diversity of migrants’ political leanings in the wider electorate. Despite these issues, it is only the last of these examples which convincingly presents a migrant candidate as part of the ‘we’ of the nation, by describing him as a ‘Ugandan Asian Briton’ and by its suggestion that he may be ‘Britain’s first Asian prime minister’ in the lead.

In several ways, then, the allocation of immigrants’ votes was ordinarily seen as the allocation of *the* immigrant vote, despite disparities between or within certain communities’ ideological commitments. The mobilisation of migrant voters, and even candidates who happened to be migrants, came to be seen as a voting bloc (or at least a largely coalesced cluster of voting blocs), whose influence on electoral outcomes became increasingly crucial as the migrant population increased in the latter part of the twentieth century.
9: Conclusion: continuity and change?

Introduction

This thesis has been concerned to study a number of different aspects of the way in which the national press has represented immigration during general election campaigns. The rationale for the study, in accordance with both the self-professed claims of the news media’s democratic credentials as well as normative theories about their role, is predicated upon the importance of the national press of democratic societies during such periods to mediate social and political issues comprehensively and therefore to sufficiently inform the public about such issues. In a number of different ways, the research presented within this thesis has attempted to ascertain whether the press has adequately met these duties. The conclusions which can be drawn from this study therefore intersect the concerns of a number of different research agendas, in particular research focused on the mediation of immigrants and immigration as well as the study of election reporting in general.

Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 established the necessity for the study of news discourse of immigration and electoral news coverage in the longue durée. Numerous studies have shown that immigration has consistently been represented as a problem or threat, and that this contributes to an overall picture in which immigrants are symbolically excluded from the imagined national community. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 demonstrated that this impression has done much to shape and be re-shaped by the introduction of immigration policy and its definitions, which structure the conditions and experiential features of immigration. The political environment of immigration policy has meant that symbolic exclusion has come alongside (and quite conceivably been enabled by) exclusions both territorial and material. Meanwhile, public majorities (who ultimately constitute news audiences) routinely demonstrate a set of attitudes which are restrictive, alarmist but ultimately highly misinformed. A media and political environment such as that indicated by this evidence would suggest that the mediated electoral politics of immigration would be characterised by negativity and the problematisation of immigration, alongside the marginalisation of positive views and the exclusion from discourse of migrants themselves. However, much of the existing research, demonstrating the evidence upon which such a
prediction can be based, has been temporally limited in its focus, with little interrogation of longer-term trends.

For example, little research was conducted to explore the representation of immigration in the British news media prior to the 1960s. The politics of immigration were transformed during this period in response to the immigration of people from Britain’s former colonies, which ultimately precipitated the collation of public opinion data about immigration and heralded distinctive changes in immigration policy and demographic patterns. There is, however, a paucity of systematic work to examine developments in the representation of immigrants and immigration as a broader issue over an extensive time frame, and to investigate the extent to which these post-1945 developments are possibly rooted in prior discourses of immigration.

A related issue exists within studies of electoral news, which very often focus on the events and mediation of single campaigns (e.g. the Nuffield election studies) or provide a comparison of only a few campaigns (e.g. Deacon et al. 2005). Many such studies, being concerned with the mediation of the campaign overall, fail to explore the representation of specific issues beyond a superficial examination of their presence in the campaign debate. However, these studies at least provide some idea of the discourses which circulate during election campaigns, whereas this is not always the focus of studies of the representation of immigrants and immigration. This study has aimed to marry these two areas of research in order to address these issues. In doing so, it provides a lens through which conclusions regarding continuities and contrasts in patterns of representation can be made, while the examination of the content of several newspaper titles and the incorporation of both qualitative and quantitative methods has provided a necessary breadth and depth to the analysis.

Chapter 5 outlined a number of key research questions which have been the focus of this study. These were related to the extent to which immigration has been a part of electoral discourses over time, which social actors have received most news presence and news access over time, whether the debate has been characterised by pro-immigration or anti-immigration voices, what the thematic profile of the debate has been, how migration and migrants have been constructed discursively over time and how certain aspects of the ethics
and politics of immigration have been negotiated qualitatively. I will now reiterate the major findings of the study in these terms, and discuss their implications.

Summary of findings and discussion

In every election campaign since the 1950s immigration has been a part of electoral coverage to at least some degree, and in some of these campaigns it has been particularly prominent in terms of its representation as an electoral issue. There has, notably, been a substantial spike in immigration coverage overall in recent campaigns, culminating in the peak of the 2010 campaign. However, recent expansions in coverage have largely been caused by the expansion of coverage for which immigration issues were secondary or peripheral. This is perhaps the starkest difference between the immigration coverage of the 1970 campaign and that of the 2010 campaign: the 1970 campaign featured the most coverage for which immigration was prominently discussed overall.

However, the 1970 campaign featured far less of the ‘ambient’ coverage of immigration (i.e. of ‘secondary focus’) so abundant in the 2010 campaign, and came off the back of the rise of Powellism. There has arguably been no parallel figure to Enoch Powell in the contemporary debate (although Nigel Farage may in time claim the mantle) and yet immigration has ascended onto the news agenda with comparable vigour to then. The rise in immigration coverage in the 1960s which culminated in the peak of the 1970 campaign may appear to have foreshadowed the trend leading towards the 2010 campaign in that both featured a similar degree of immigration coverage of ‘main focus’, but this earlier peak was succeeded by a dramatic decline in immigration coverage. Whether the 2010 campaign represents a departure point from which immigration will become a permanent and occasionally defining feature of the mediation of campaign politics, or something resembling more of a plateau or peak, remains to be seen in the forthcoming 2015 campaign and beyond.

Using the concept of ‘immigration-as-electoral’ (IAE) coverage, it was also established that IAE coverage has increased despite an overall stagnation in the amount of election coverage produced across the press in the post-1945 era. Again, it is recent campaigns which have broken in particular from the campaigns between 1959 and 1997 (excluding 1970), which featured less IAE coverage than post-1997 campaigns but more in comparison than those up to 1959. The proportion of electoral coverage for which immigration issues were constituent
rose from 2% of all election coverage in 1997 to 6% in 2001, 15% in 2005 and 22.5% in 2010. The latter of these figures can surely be credited to the dramatic fall-out from ‘bigot-gate’, but the incident was telling in its own right and bears the imprint of the long-term rise in the electoral currency of immigration. With immigration coverage having become increasingly cast within an electoral rubric, such that almost 95% of all immigration news in the press during the 2010 campaign was IAE coverage, immigration has become highly politicised and its discussion dominated by considerations of electoral implications and broader outcomes.

Although coverage was not broken down into discussion of policy stories and process stories, the ascension of immigration as a predictable election issue and of great concern to the public means that immigration has become a strategic battleground in electoral conflict. If claims that there has been a rise in ‘strategic framing’ are warranted, and therefore that news is more often devoted to campaign trail activities, tactics and strategies: “process” stories at the expense of coverage of substantive issues’ (Scammell and Semetko 2008: 82), then the implications of this for immigration coverage may be significant. Certainly its establishment as one of a number of political ‘issues’ may have particular consequences. In contemporary media debate for example, the word ‘immigration’ carries all the baggage of what journalists assume audiences know about problems, public concerns and political responses, far removed from recognition of the variety of journeys and stories which are inadequately and partially connoted by the nominalisation of the process itself. People’s lives are therefore reduced to an ‘issue’, for which discussion centres on ‘how the debate can be won’ rather than about the ethics or legitimacy of state practices (KhosraviNik 2010b: 16-17). So while there may be political winners and losers in such coverage, immigrants are rarely active or in the foreground; they are ‘passive, unified, motionless and mute people (or figures) who merely constitute the topic of the debate’ (ibid.). The media furore which came in the days following Gordon Brown’s ‘bigot-gate’ gaffe and which focussed essentially on the reactions of Brown’s detractors provides one example of this, but the previous chapter showed that politicians seen to be abusing immigration figures (an example of abstraction [see van Leeuwen 1996]), regardless of the complexities and politics involved in interpreting and representing such information, were depicted in coverage as ‘wrong’ (if not deceitful and incompetent), and therefore as not playing the numbers game.
by its established rules. Since deceit and incompetence signal weakness, ‘wrong’ politicians can be shown as losing on the issue and helpless to make the facts work in their favour.

The rise in immigration coverage in the longer term, particularly non-electorally focused immigration coverage, might admittedly be expected given the substantial developments in immigration patterns that have occurred during the last several decades. Immigration has been a significant contributor to population change in the UK, and within the last century the UK has become a country of net immigration and begun to receive immigrants from a broader range of places such that its society has begun to be described as ‘super-diverse’ (Vertovec 2004). A political and media response to social change of this kind is not only to be expected, it is also arguably necessary. The question, however, is what form this response has taken. The volume of coverage is therefore but one element of the development of coverage.

Another comes in the news presence and news access of key social actors. Opposition actors appeared and were sourced particularly frequently in campaigns of high coverage, suggesting that when immigration is a particularly salient issue in a campaign, opposition actors are able to capitalise on and further entrench an immigration problematic which places pressure on government. Moreover, despite expansions in coverage, the news presence of migrants themselves has decreased in recent campaigns, suggestive of a press debate in which migrants are abstract ‘others’ rather than addressed directly and personally. In terms of news access, or ‘who gets to speak’, opposition and citizen sources were quoted the most in coverage, with incumbent party sources receiving the third-most news access. However, while both incumbent and opposition sources were ‘over-accessed’ (Hall et al., 1978) in terms of the proportion of their news access to news presence, citizen sources have been overwhelmingly ‘under-accessed’ on average over time (the only exceptions coming in the second 1974 election campaign, 1987 and 2010), particularly in the quality press, less so in the popular press and only marginally in the mid-market press. As for the news access of migrants, they were highly marginalised in the popular press (receiving approximately half the proportion of news access they received in presence), though to varying levels they were under-accessed across the entire press, an artefact of their abstraction from media debates concerning their personal experiences and reflective of a general neglect to seek their opinions on the policies which structure their lives.
In order to explore the evaluative dimension of coverage, the study utilised a measure relating to actors’ tone in direct quotation to help establish the extent to which coverage has featured attitudes supportive, critical or neutral towards immigration issues. Overall, critical quotation was more prominent in immigration coverage than supportive. However, dissecting the coverage in terms of the extent to which it related to the election or not revealed that critical quotation dominates IAE coverage, while in non-IAE coverage neutral and mixed attitudes compose almost 70% of the quoted voices, while supportive quotation is more frequent than critical quotation.

These findings have dramatic implications for what can be said about immigration as an electoral issue in the press. They illustrate that the marginalisation of the positive case for immigration in electoral politics provides more space for negative attitudes, makes for a more divisive debate (i.e. with a lower proportion of mixed and neutral quotation), and appears to mean that journalists have less regard for balance between pro- and anti-attitudes to immigration. This is not to suggest that critical quotation equates to critical coverage, but the availability of these perspectives is nonetheless able to shape news reports and promote a partial understanding of immigration issues and events, with potentially momentous political ramifications. Following Hallin’s spheres of media debate (1986), this evidence suggests that immigration has become an issue so toxic in party politics that positive views of immigration lie somewhere on the outer regions of the sphere of legitimate controversy, if not in the sphere of deviance for some newspapers. When immigration is not seen in this light in terms of the evaluative dimension it is practically a different subject altogether – journalists attend to notions of objectivity and balance with a far greater degree of consistency.

Another aspect of the evaluative dimension concerns the lexicon of immigration coverage, which has proliferated over time – particularly in latter campaigns. Linguistically, the neologism, ‘over-lexicalization’ and ‘re-lexicalization’ which have marked this shift are indicative of a deepening of concern over the arrival of certain kinds of migrants – whether according to the worthiness of those who apply for asylum or the invisibility of irregular migrants. Some terms received elaborative prefixes (e.g. ‘illegal immigrant’) or intensifying modifiers (e.g. ‘mass immigration’) while others were new to latter campaigns altogether (e.g. ‘ overstayer’). This indicates that the vocabulary available to journalists to describe
migrants and their movements has grown and been subject to innovation as press interest in the subject has broadened. There is thus an additional dimension to the expansion of coverage in that there has been an *intensification* of discourses about immigration.

Although the vocabulary of immigration news grew, many of the most dominant terms remained popular throughout (e.g. immigration), with the transition from ‘alien(s)’ to ‘immigrant(s)’ the primary major terminological shift. The dominance of such terms can be regarded as symptomatic of a coalescing around terms borrowed from judicial and political domains due to a perception of consensus and expertise associated with these fields, with more contentious and evaluative terms infrequently used for this reason also. Of these evaluative terms, many process-based terms were based on metaphors of natural disaster, animal and insect migration, trade and war, while group-based terms – particularly in latter campaigns – conflated irregular migration with forced migration and generated a dichotomy between refugees and asylum seekers seen as either genuine or ‘bogus’. The vocabulary of the debate can be divided into two types in the contemporary era. There is what we might call ‘state speech’, which comprises terms such as ‘aliens’, ‘immigrants’, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’ which have inscribed into them as categories a level of explanatory appeal and authority and which therefore tend to present journalists with relatively uncontroversial choices to make regarding referential strategy. But there is also what might in certain circumstances based on its potential effects be called a form of ‘hate speech’. The growth of negative connotations within terms such as ‘asylum’ and the conflation of asylum with irregular migration risks damaging public impressions of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants, and stoking social tension. The terms which have circulated in immigration and asylum debates from the 1990s onwards have contributed to the conflation of both groups of migrants and the corresponding elision of definitional differences between two distinct (though linked) forms of migration. It is certainly the case that the public remain confused about the size and nature of both irregular migration and forced migration ‘flows’, and that this may be the basis upon which restrictive attitudes find legitimacy and numerically-driven reductions in immigration are not deemed credible (see Chapter 4). In an environment of press-fuelled hostility in which asylum seekers are deemed to be equivalent to irregular migrants (and in which irregular migrants are referred to as ‘illegal’ people unlike any other kind of civil or criminal lawbreaker), the worst excesses of
the contemporary asylum regime and the supposedly common sense assumptions which underpin it are therefore able to go unchallenged. From this, audiences of such kinds of coverage may find themselves asking ‘who (if anyone) deserves our assistance?’ Moreover, at perhaps their most disturbingly influential, terms such as those found in this study are reflected in those used during the committal of racist attacks against migrants or people deemed to be migrants (Casciani 2004 in Philo et al. 2013: 6).

In order to explore the interpretative dimension of coverage, the presence of a number of themes was examined to help assess what the immigration debate is ‘about’ in general, how this has changed over time, what differences exist between newspapers and whether expansions in coverage have led to an opening up of the debate to consider a wider range of themes. Overall, the dominant themes of (main focus) coverage centred primarily on ‘immigration services procedure’, crime, forced migration, numbers, the influence and mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates and irregular migration. These issues dominated even as coverage expanded. Many themes of coverage, however, were almost wholly absent, particularly those which would necessarily invoke explicit discussion of Britain’s links with the European Union, the Commonwealth, the economic impacts of immigration, its cultural effects, and routes of migration other than those which contain asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants were they to be present. Across the press, a degree of uniformity in the selection of themes within newspapers suggests that the press is in general in agreement about what immigration is centrally ‘about’. The news values which contribute to immigration issues and events becoming news have therefore been interpreted in similar ways across the time as well as across newspaper titles.

This thesis has also explored the way in which immigration coverage helps to (re)construct the ethics of immigration, in terms of what ‘our’ rights and responsibilities are towards migrants. Through an analysis of headlines, which are assumed to provide a ‘preferred reading’ of the narrative of immigration-related newspaper content, the themes of ‘precarious’ migration (a composite of the themes of forced migration and irregular migration), numbers and the migrant vote and candidature were investigated to understand how continuity and change in press representations of immigration and immigrants might be manifest qualitatively in coverage.
For discourses concerning forced migration, some notable discursive shifts are evident in the extent to which, for example, there has been a ‘fractioning’ (Zetter 2007) of the refugee label, indexing the broader political shifts which have taken place in the international, non-governmental, domestic and ‘juridified’ politics of forced migration. However, with striking continuity, the nationality or country of origin of forced migrants is frequently and prominently given which, it is argued, provides in shorthand the likely degree to which forced migrants are deserving or undeserving of refuge.

Irregular migrants were often backgrounded in coverage: constructed as victims in earlier periods, they were later represented as reliant on insider or outsider folk devils who circumvented the sovereignty of the state for personal gain. Latterly, however, they became increasingly represented in terms which positioned them as a threatening potential presence. This is generally in keeping with the observation made by Teun van Dijk that ‘minorities are often represented in a passive role (things are being decided or done, for or against them), unless they are agents of negative actions, such as illegal entry, crime, violence or drug abuse’ (van Dijk 2000: 40).

Of the two aspects of precarious migration coverage, forced migration was far more consistently an aspect of immigration coverage overall, while irregular migration appeared in some campaigns in the 1950s and 1970s, but was absent throughout the 1980s and 1990s, finally returning to become a highly salient topic in 2010. The growth in political (i.e. legislative and electoral) attention on forced migration and irregular migration was manifest in a growth in the extent to which precarious migration coverage appeared as IAE coverage in the campaigns of the 2000s - evident in the foregrounding (and nomination) of elite political actors in headlines (e.g. Clegg and Blears in 2010) and an over-representation in the ‘indirect discourse’ (Fairclough 1992: 107) of headline quotation that elite social actors’ speech and actions were afforded. This privileging of elite social actors is, nonetheless, not a totally new phenomenon; earlier coverage from 1918 and the 1920s extensively reported the speech and actions of political actors and members of the judiciary in headlines.

In terms of discourses about ‘numbers’, the establishment of the primacy of arguments over ‘numbers’, particularly since the 1960s is evident in the amount of such coverage which has been produced during this period. The headlines of this kind of coverage aggregated and
back-grounded migrants through various forms of quantification, which elide their differences and thus homogenise them. The ‘numbers’ debate in itself is premised on assumptions which implicitly contribute to an assumption that policy decisions ought to be based on arbitrary quotas and that higher immigration equates to more problems for the receiving society. A shift within such coverage to more contestation over the precision or validity of the figures used by politicians, as evident in the 2010 campaign, is suggestive of the rhetorical and ideological power of numbers to support arguments in a debate based on such assumptions. For one thing, journalists are likely to selectively cite sources whose interpretation of figures accords with their own editorial agenda (van Dijk 1991: 175; Balch and Balabanova 2011: 901). But further, as Hall et al. (1978: 59) suggested in support of the primary definition model, ‘liberal’ spokespersons who try to prove that immigration figures are exaggerated ‘subscribe, implicitly, to the view that the debate is ‘essentially’ about numbers’. When the immigration debate turns, as it often does, to discussions concerning the ‘numbers’ of arrivals – which are assumed to create problems for ‘us’, this introduces indirect evaluation simply by dint of its mention.

The political mobilisation of migrants has been represented in the press in two main ways, both of which have done little to advance an impression that migrants have political beliefs which are unrelated to their specific identity as migrants or as people of ethnic minority groups. The first of these relates to migrants as electors, the coverage of which tends to use terms that represent migrants as existing in voting blocs, removed from the rest of local or national electorates and preoccupied with different, migrant or ethnic interests. In some of this coverage, migration is elided with ethnicity in ways which suggest that issues surrounding migration are the preserve of ethnic minorities, and vice versa. The quantification of migrant voters suggests that their vote counts in as much as their presupposed bloc vote may have an impact upon local electoral outcomes (in coverage during the 1960s and onwards) or national electoral outcomes (from campaigns in the 1980s onwards). The marginalisation of migrants as political subjects in this sense seemed to find little improvement in the way that migrants were represented when candidates. In much the same way, the migrant status of such politicians was foregrounded in these accounts, and either through constituency profiles or personal features, it was often assumed that they would be reliant on the bloc votes of other migrants.
Continuity and change

In providing an overview of several major aspects of electoral immigration coverage over time, this thesis affords an opportunity to form a broad retrospective about what has remained consistent and what has changed over these periods.

The summary of findings within this chapter suggests that there have been four broadly distinct periods in the electoral coverage of immigration. The period 1918-1959 was characterised by a general lack of politicised or prominent coverage of immigration (except for the 1918 campaign). Immigration coverage grew from 1959 and culminated in an explosive 1970 campaign, charting the emergence of a steady immigration ‘flow’ from the countries of the New Commonwealth, the Smethwick campaign of 1964 and a restrictive political debate in general. The politicisation of immigration did not thereafter relent to the levels prior to 1959, but the frenetic electoral debate of the 11-year and 4-campaign period of 1959-1970 could not be sustained between 1974 and 1987. The prominence of the electoral politics of immigration from 1992 (especially from 2001) in the press cannot be ignored, and may have been encouraged by the success of the highly prominent front page coverage immigration received in 1992. Certainly, the increasing potential for immigration and asylum to be exploited in this way during the campaign was recognised at the time by Conservative party strategist Andrew Lansley, who was reported to have observed that the issue had ‘played particularly well in the tabloids and has more potential to hurt’ (in Spencer 2011: 29). It would seem that this was a modest assessment of the capacity for the immigration ‘issue’ to emerge and become an essentially low-threshold electoral issue.

The question for current forms of coverage is in whether such distinctions in representational patterns reveal emergent and disjunctive changes in the rhetoric of the past or whether they are simply amplifications and accentuations of discursive features which have become etched into the public debate of immigration. Has the expansion of immigration coverage and the reduction and trivialization of immigration to a strategic game coincided with a more embittered and marginalising discussion? The results from this study suggest that there have been some improvements, but that well-worn features of discourses about immigration and immigrants remain similar. Returning to some of the issues discussed in Chapter 2 which perhaps account for this, it is pertinent to reiterate that immigrants, refugees and people from ethnic minority backgrounds have been consistently
under-represented in national newspaper newsrooms, that news values remain ‘homocentric’, that there has always been a lack of teeth to any self-regulatory bite and that migrants suffer various forms of exclusion with regards to access to news media discourses. It is hardly surprising, given the strength of these constraining factors which underpin news discourse about immigration, that there has yet to be a radical overhaul in the practices and ideologies of mainstream journalism in the UK relating to immigration issues, and therefore that textual patterns remain relatively similar in a number of respects over time.

Nevertheless, there have been some notable differences, for example in the pre-eminent themes of debate in each period (even if thematic diversity overall is limited), the national, ethnic or religious groups subject to discussion and the level of support for migrants based on the growth in migrant advocacy groups. A relatively recent approval in political and media discourse for an apparent need for ‘managed migration’ and politicians’ frequent invocation of the economic ‘positive case’ for immigration also means that there is less overtly condemnatory coverage of skilled migrants in contemporary discourses. Speculatively, if this common type of immigration were to be problematised to the same extent that ‘precarious migration’ has been, we would expect to see ‘voluntary migration’ prominently placed in the thematic dimension of coverage and much ‘overlexicalization’ in descriptions of voluntary migrants (beyond the fairly recent introduction of ‘economic migrants’). Instead it is asylum seekers, Eastern Europeans and anyone else who is unable to significantly add wealth or skills to ‘UK plc’ and ‘integrate’ seamlessly that are unwanted, and therefore prominent in media debate. This is little different from the demands made on the ‘wanted’ migration of the past, and suggests that a symbiosis or advantageous dynamic is expected of the immigrant-state relationship. Freedom of movement is thereby not a right, it is a transaction conditional upon ‘our’ generosity and hospitality.

It is perhaps difficult to imagine headlines such as THE HUN INVADERS (The Daily Mail, 11 December 1918), Send the immigrants home says Whittle (The Sun, 13 October 1964), Vote Labour, Pakis told (The Sun, 9 June 1970), or A charmer from the National Front (The Daily Mail, 22 February 1974), to provide a few of the starkest which appeared in coverage over time, appearing with much regularity now. But as Hall (1990) astutely noted, ‘inferential racism’ has not replaced ‘overt racism’; it has supplemented it. These headlines appeared in the context of a contemporary political and social milieu, and while forcible repatriation,
terms of abuse such as ‘Paki’ and overt admiration for fascist politicians have largely been eschewed in the recent coverage of our sampled newspapers, it is not inconceivable that overt racism will surface in the coverage of immigration in present news content, and certainly not inconceivable that migration will be likened to invasion in current headlines. More insidiously, the ‘deracialization’ of discourses about immigration and asylum (Goodman 2007; Goodman and Burke 2010, 2011; Augoustinos and Every 2007), along with arguments that society is now ‘post-racial’ and the multiplication in immigrants’ places of origin in the profile of immigration to the UK, mean that discriminatory sentiments are able to be represented as superficially ‘sensible’ and ‘rational’ solutions (e.g. on economic grounds) to ‘the [latest] immigration problem’, which target the general category of immigrants and thus pre-empt criticisms that immigration policies have disproportionate effects on racialized and impoverished groups.

Hence, despite improvements in the coverage of ethnic minorities, this has as yet not dragged some newspapers’ editorial lines along in relation to immigrants. Immigrants are still depicted as symbolic outsiders (forced and irregular migrants especially so) and many apparently sanitised ‘concerns about immigration’ implicitly reveal their latent racism, such as those relating to ‘minority white cities’, the crimes alleged to be associated with certain ethnic minority groups, the voting rights of Commonwealth citizens (e.g. Doyle 2013) and the assumption that ‘they’ (the immigrants and asylum seekers) are taking ‘us’ for a ride have all surfaced in contemporary media debate. These concerns seem to re-inscribe a ‘common sense’ in notions that migrants ought to receive fewer privileges. Such arguments converge not only in the press but also in legislation such as the Immigration Act 2014. It is plausible, therefore, that discriminatory and exclusionary rhetoric has excelled in immigration coverage even as it has been placed in superficially reasonable language. But this rhetoric, as discussed in Chapter 2, borrows and adapts from the past, and it is not difficult to find the same or similar generic arguments about immigrants in the political and media discourse of many points along the journey from the early twentieth century to the present.

The ‘so what’ question

It has been recognised by scholars of journalism and political communication that elite dissensus and disunity can foster opportunities for the press to engage in a more open
debate and encourage voices critical of established positions (McNair 2009: 66; Deacon and Golding 1994; Bennett 1990; Hallin 1986). However, reminiscent of this it is also the view of scholars of the politics of immigration in Britain that ‘when public opinion is more evenly divided [on immigration] there is much more freedom for political elites to act’ (Studlar 1974: 376). Since elite politicians believe the British public to be unyielding in their appetite for ever-more restrictive policies (Studlar 1974, 1980; Dummett 1973: 244; Layton-Henry 2004: 332) it is therefore logically the case from this view that the political and therefore media environments relating to immigration are at their root led by public antipathy. More directly, an immigration narrative in the press palatable to the middle ground of ‘white opinion’ and sympathetic to restrictionism is encouraged by the views held by large sections of society and the profit-orientation of newspaper titles (Cottle 2000a: 20; McNeil 2014). It would seem that there is a complex relationship between the press, party politics and the public, through whom a self or nation-centric interest provides the driving force behind an exclusionary political and media landscape.

However, suggesting that the media and politicians follow the public ignores the role of the press in mediating social issues for which readers have little direct knowledge or evaluations of alone. It is one thing to recognise that public concern about immigration has risen in correlation with changes in net migration, but another to suggest that the public learn of this almost by intuition. There therefore appears to be an agenda-setting/framing role (Blinder 2013: 17; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Philo et al. 2013; Hartmann and Husband 1974) as well as something of an agenda-reflecting role for the mass media in the immigration debate. For example, contemporary public opinion data suggests that when people think about immigration they have in mind asylum seekers and refugees rather than more common forms of migrants such as international students, and yet refugees comprise 0.3% of the population and a sizeable number of asylum seekers are detained, dispersed or deported away from regular contact with the public (Bloch and Schuster 2005).

The view that the media (and politicians) are simply responding to public concerns therefore somewhat absolves the news media from their duties in regards to functions both to transmit information as well as to ‘bring readers together as part of a community’ (Williams 2010: 10, citing Carey 1989, ch. 1). It would appear that both the information and community constituted through newspaper discourse about immigration are partial. The
evidence suggests that for many of those for whom immigration is an issue of major concern and who demand tighter restrictions, it is a lack of a sufficiently informative media debate premised on their necessary reliance on the mass media that help to form the basis of their political views. As for the ‘ritual’ function of newspaper discourse, the vocal majority of people who wish to see immigration reduced do not represent the entirety of the public, and migrants are of course symbolically excluded from this imagined community. The community brought together by a partial representation of the wider society is thus likely to create disenfranchisement and the fracturing of social cohesion.

This view also ignores some of the more positive conclusions that may be drawn about the development of the politics of immigration and the character of the mediated immigration debate. The albeit problematic preservation of sympathy towards so-called ‘genuine refugees’, the piecemeal growth in the media’s symbolic inclusion of Britain’s ethnic minority citizens, the rise of pro-migrant advocacy groups and the supportive views which emerge when immigration is not placed in a party political frame provide some encouragement that such ‘cracks in the hegemony’ (Richardson 2007: 209) might be capitalised on to provide a more impartial, humanising and inclusive debate.

Just as newspapers have gradually acknowledged the presence of people from ethnic minority groups in society and included such people in the ‘we’ of society (Statham 2002), so too in future might the continued if not increased presence of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees contribute to a reluctant acceptance that such people constitute a significant proportion of society, whose stigmatisation may well grow to be commercially imprudent as well as socially irresponsible. However, as Conboy notes, globalisation and an ‘increased recognition of the diversity of people and places’ might actually reinvigorate nationalist, exclusionary reactions once again, driven by ‘an increased search for ethnic and national identification, possibly exacerbated by the national imperatives which structure our understandings of the world through our news media and by cultural insecurities when faced with such an unstable world’ (2007a: 152-153). As Lynn and Lea (2003: 427, citing Billig 1995) argue, ‘it is in times of crisis or triumph, when geographical or territorial boundaries are breached and an ‘Other’ is confronted or threatens, that a collective identity – a British identity – is invoked: those characteristics that signify ‘Englishness’ are then transposed’. As the ‘age of migration’ continues apace, refugees continue to be displaced by
political, economic and – increasingly – environmental events, the domestic population continues to age and the automation of the workplace expands, the global population continues to increase and debates continue regarding Britain’s place in the global economic order and the European Union, the isolationist and exclusionary rhetoric which marks much newspaper discourse regarding immigration may begin to become less tenable but more resolutely advanced.

Particularly in a stratified society such as the UK’s, the arrival of new groups of people can appear to some to place a strain on the availability of scarce resources (Philo et al. 2013: 165). The mass media can respond to immigration and integration processes by providing some perspective, be it via international comparison, historical comparison or by advancing a moral framework which acknowledges Britain’s intimate role in helping to create the political and economic conditions that prevail around the world and which prompt migratory movement. The first two of these would reveal that modern-day Britain is no ‘soft touch’, while the third would demonstrate that it has the capacity to constitute a society of greater equality and justice. Some newspaper titles in particular choose, however, to appeal vocally to a base of potential audiences who remain resolutely concerned and contemptuous of ongoing patterns of immigration, many of whom presumably refuse to recognise the historical deeds which have helped to structure the privileges that allow their freedom and deny those of others. These sections of the press seem locked in a cycle of populist indignation driven by this apparently sound business case for anti-immigration stories and the entrenchment of common sense ideas about the ‘soft touch’ state and opportunist ‘illegals’ allegedly posing in refugee disguise. Certainly in the contemporary period, it has been left to the centre-left and quality press, supported by pro-migrant advocacy groups, to expose political scandals affecting the rights of migrants and make the case for more humane treatment of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants.

Even for those news outlets which take a more sanguine approach, however, the ideologies and practices of news production mean that it is difficult to escape contributing to the construction of a narrative defined by ‘high-profile events’ (Suro 2011: 8) that ignore the processual and cumulative contribution to history of smaller events. Further, as van Dijk suggests (1991: 247-248), these news outlets are unable to reach the same mass audiences as those more critical of immigration and as such have a limited range of influence on the
wider debate. If anything, it appears that they are unable to escape using similar discursive patterns as found in the conservative press, and often tend to rely on the us/them framework which inscribes victimisation and paternalism into reports and fails to undermine the assumption of power differentials between migrants and elites (ibid.; KhosraviNik 2010b). The ‘common sense’ view of the state’s right to exclude is rarely, if ever, questioned across the press, meaning that criticism is restricted more often to issues of procedural adequacy and error rather than issues of substance relating to systemic and intrinsic failures (see Entman 2004: 5-6).

This thesis was devised in recognition of the importance of studying election campaign press coverage. Elections and their campaigns are unquestionably critical junctures in the life of democratic societies, and the study of electoral news coverage is of essential symbolic and discursive importance. Even within the tabloid press, which tends to represent politics in sensationalised and personalised ways (Conboy 2006: 152), coverage of the campaign is in general sustained and prominent. It is pertinent to consider, as a final point therefore, the question of whether immigration has received coverage in accordance with the normative democratic roles that many see the press as responsible for during election campaigns, especially its role in regard to informing and/or representing its audiences (see Chapter 2: The role of journalism). Certainly these are the standards newspaper staffs often claim for their work, even if there are plenty who might see the ultimate aim of a newspaper as economic survival – of simply capturing a paying readership (whether by cover price or by their saleability to advertisers) whatever the result for its editorial direction. If journalism ultimately exists for anything as a discrete form, though, we can say that it exists ‘to enable citizens to better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world’ (Richardson 2007: 7). If newspapers were to pursue and succeed in this essential function in relation to immigration, they could hardly avoid offering a sound basis upon which an informed, responsible and democratic debate could take place. There is also an opportunity to consider at this stage the effects of such developments on contemporary and future prospects.

The study has shown, on the one hand, that immigration has grown to become embedded as one of the major policy issues discussed across election coverage during the campaign, especially in the 1990s and 2000s when immigration patterns changed dramatically. On the
other hand this study has shown that such coverage is, interpreted according to what might be hoped of press performance, somewhat disquieting. The role that sections of the press claim as that of representing the public is arguably partial and suggests a highly restrictive and unwelcoming society, even as the coverage of such newspapers also organises and helps to shape the self same public opinion. A creative elision between readership and citizenry creates the opportunity for the commercial opportunism by which opponents in many guises may be marginalised and the representative role is advanced. The intensity and perceived influence of these newspapers’ campaigning (and a routine blurring between news and editorial) mean that immigration has not only become an ordinary political issue the presence of which no modern campaign would be complete without, but that it has also become imbued with sufficient cache to puncture the electoral fortunes of politicians who do not subscribe to a sufficiently negative immigration problematic.

Despite this, a perception has been promoted in certain sections of the press – as evident in the *Daily Mail* headline mentioned in Chapter 1 – that politicians have maintained a conspiracy of silence on the issue, and that it is up to the press to take the government to task over this on behalf of the public. This narrative – that the attitudes and influence of metropolitan elites represent a treacherous betrayal to those of ‘us’ living across the breadth of an imagined national community – should be familiar to readers of the conservative press. This ‘pretence of censorship’ (van Dijk 1992: 105) seems likely to remain, while politicians and commentators will presumably continue to ritually announce that ‘we’ need to have a more open, honest or mature debate about immigration – a debate which never seems far away but frustratingly also never seems to arrive (Titley 2012). The rhetorical power of strategies of reversal which assign victim status to ‘us’ (van Dijk 1992), which claim a conspiracy of silence and censorship, and which make demands of the terms of debate is, ironically, to limit the horizons of discussion and to effect exclusion ‘not just in plain sight, but under the sign of openness and increased democratic participation’ (Titley 2012: 67). As the media critic Charlie Brooker (2010) sarcastically put it in a *Guardian Comment Is Free* (also published on page 5 of the G2 section in print) piece during the 2010 campaign, immigration is a subject ‘so taboo in modern Britain that even fearless defenders of free speech such as the Mail and the Express only dare mention it in hushed capitals tucked away on the front page of every edition’.
Indeed, this thesis has shown that – in terms of the *informational* part the press plays in informing the electorate – the press have talked about immigration a great deal, especially from the second half of the twentieth century. What is more, it has been discussed in fairly narrow and negative terms, which may have dramatic consequences for the responsibilities felt towards immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. As Gary Younge (2010) suggests,

‘there can be no meaningful debate about immigration in Britain...that does not address neoliberal globalisation, trade policy, development aid, colonial legacy, the European social fund, the dependency ratio and the low paid. But that is not the debate we have been having. Indeed it is not a debate we have ever had. It’s not accusations of racism that are stopping that conversation, but racism itself. For if there is a liberal elite out there thwarting discussion on immigration, it is doing a very bad job. The tabloids and middle market papers seem to talk about little else, and whenever they play their inflammatory tunes the politicians duly dance. Each tries to sound tougher than the last and with each effort they all sound more deluded’.

Thus, the press have talked about immigration at great length and have been given ample opportunities to conduct a full, fair, multiperspectival and inclusive debate recognising Britain’s historical and present role in the world, mitigating and reducing social tensions and outbreaks of racist violence and representing the politics of immigration and the political mobilisation of immigrants in emancipatory ways. In their failure to do so, they have talked at considerable length without espousing a particularly constructive discussion.
References


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### Appendix A: Major Statutory Immigration and Nationality Legislation prior to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governing Party</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Brief Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Aliens Act</td>
<td>First major immigration control. Excluded ‘undesirable’ aliens and designated ports of authorised entry for ‘immigrant ships’ (those carrying more than 20 steerage passengers) (Bevan 1986: 70).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Aliens Restriction Act</td>
<td>Emergency, wartime legislation (passing all parliamentary stages in a single day) endowing the Home Secretary with extensive powers over the ‘landing, registration, movement and deportation of all aliens’ (Holmes 1988: 94), including the repatriation and internment of perceived ‘enemy aliens’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Conservative-led Coalition</td>
<td>Aliens Restriction Act</td>
<td>Consolidated wartime powers of Aliens Restriction Act 1914 thereby converting emergency legislation into general law; ‘skeletal in form’, again conferring extensive powers on the Secretary of State (Clayton 2010: 9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>British Nationality Act</td>
<td>Affirmed the British subject status of Commonwealth citizens in the face of colonial independence movements and their implications for Commonwealth citizenship, thereby entrenching the rights of 600 million people to enter the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Commonwealth Immigrants Act</td>
<td>Ostensibly a reaction to the implications of the 1948 Act, and the first immigration control of Commonwealth citizens. Introduced work vouchers in three categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Commonwealth Immigrants Act</td>
<td>Removed settlement rights of East African Asians, who had begun to arrive in increasingly large numbers (Spencer 1997: 140-141). Began the move from <em>jus soli</em> to <em>jus sanguinis</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Immigration Appeals Act</td>
<td>Established a ‘comprehensive structure of appeals against decisions of the Secretary of State’ (Sachdeva 1993: 25).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Immigration Act</td>
<td>Formed the skeletal structure for subsequent legislation; enabled the Home Secretary to make Immigration Rules which now formed the body of the law (Bevan 1986: 13); consolidated concept of ‘patriality’; virtually ceased ‘primary immigration’ from Commonwealth. Came into force on the same day (1 January 1973) that the UK entered the European Community (Sales 2007: 143).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>British Nationality Act</td>
<td>British citizenship established and based on the categories introduced by earlier immigration law; no <em>automatic</em> rights of citizenship for those born in Britain to non-British citizens (Sales 2007: 143).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act</td>
<td>Introduced fines of up to £1,000 for carrying passengers without correct documentation (Schuster 2003: 143), which doubled in 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Immigration Act</td>
<td>Restricted rights of appeals against deportation for irregular migrants (Hayter 2004: 57); reduced the rights of entry for multiple spouses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act</td>
<td>Incorporated 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; introduced in-country right of appeal; ‘fast-tracking’ of asylum claims ‘without foundation’; allowed the detention of asylum seekers (Stevens 2004: 165-166).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Asylum and Immigration Act</td>
<td>Expedition of asylum claims from countries deemed safe (i.e. on the ‘white list’) or if having travelled via a ‘safe third country’; expansion of ‘fast track’ procedure; abolition of in-country appeal; fines for employers of up to £5,000 if employing irregular migrants; limiting or withdrawal of non-contributory benefits for asylum seekers and some immigrants (Sales 2007: 134; Schuster and Solomos 1999: 51; Stevens 2004: 170-171);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Immigration and Asylum Act</td>
<td>Introduced subsistence system of vouchers (£35 per week) and ‘no-choice’ dispersal system for asylum seekers; expanded use of detention centres and prison facilities; appeals reduced to ‘one-stop’ procedure; expansion of powers of immigration officers to enter and search premises, arrest without warrant, and [regarding the] use of force (Stevens 2004: 177); extended criminalisation of irregular entry; registrars responsible for reporting ‘suspicious’ marriages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act</td>
<td>Contraction of claims for support and accommodation of asylum seekers; removal of right to work for asylum seekers; ‘right to obtain physical data such as imprints of the iris’; ‘new powers of entry and search’ (Stevens 2004: 197); introduction of citizenship exams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act</td>
<td>Now a criminal offence to destroy travel documents (e.g. passports); combined asylum and immigration appeals into a one-tier system; further reduced rights of appeal; support for failed asylum seekers conditional on cooperation with removal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act</td>
<td>Incorporated points-based system; limited appeal rights for work and study visas; increased penalties for employing irregular migrants; increased powers and ‘intelligence coordination’ for immigration officers and police (Clayton 2010: 23); granted Home Secretary the power to remove citizenship from dual nationals or deny asylum to people deemed to be criminals/terrorists; electronic tagging used as an alternative to detention; gave recognised refugees limited leave to remain of five years, subject to review at any time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>UK Borders Act</td>
<td>Introduced compulsory biometric ID documents for non-EU immigrants; allowed deportation of criminals imprisoned for longer than a year or for certain serious offences; granted Border Agency officers with powers of detention, entry, search and seizure (Guardian 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Criminal Justice and Immigration Act</td>
<td>Followed an increase in terrorism-related legislation (e.g. Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act 2006); enabled the Home Secretary to remove rights to social benefits and to restrict the residence and work of people with criminal convictions, such as people convicted of terrorism offences (Clayton 2010: 25).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act</td>
<td>Intended to make gaining citizenship harder, introducing ‘probationary citizenship’ and the requirement to earn ‘points’ in the pursuit of full citizenship (which could reduce the time taken to acquire citizenship).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Coding Dates

The table below summarises the dates coded within each campaign for Monday to Saturday editions (i.e. any Sundays which fell within these dates were not coded). In each campaign the final day of coding was polling day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>9th December-14th December</td>
<td>Herald published only on Saturdays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>9th November-15th November</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>30th November-6th December</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>23rd October-29th October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>24th May-30th May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>21st October-27th October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>8th November-14th November</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>29th June-5th July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>17th February-23rd February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>19th October-25th October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>20th May-26th May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2nd October-8th October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9th October-15th October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25th March-31st March</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8th June-9th June, 15th June-18th June</td>
<td>8th and 9th June used due to strike action by printers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974a</td>
<td>21st February-28th February</td>
<td>21st February used for the Daily Telegraph instead of the 28th due to strike action by journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974b</td>
<td>4th October-10th October</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>27th April-3rd May</td>
<td>The Times not published due to strike action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3rd June-9th June</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5th June-11th June</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3rd April-9th April</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>25th April-1st May</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1st June-7th June</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>29th April-5th April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>30th April-6th May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Content Analysis Variables

**Date**: Date of the article’s publication in dd.mm.yyyy format.

**Paper** – Title of publication: Guardian, Times, Telegraph, Mail, Express, Mirror, Sun/Herald.

**Page number**.

**Type of article**: Straight News, Editorial/Leader, Comment/Opinion, Picture caption, Interview, Sketch, News Analysis/Background/Facts & Figures, Feature/Profile, Signed Column, Other.

**IAE** – Whether the article mentions the election or politicians/candidates: Yes, No.

**Focus** – The extent to which the article focuses on immigration: main (the article prominently and predominantly focuses on immigration issues, e.g. in the headline, lead, or throughout the article), secondary (the article features immigration issues but they are not the principle topic of discussion, are as equally prominent as several others or are mentioned in passing).

**Pressure group** – the name of any pressure groups mentioned in the article (up to 3).

**Themes 1, 2, 3** –

The theme categories are used to indicate broadly what the article is about. It may be that the article is concerned with only one theme, but up to three themes can be coded. If there are ostensibly several ‘themes’ within the item, a judgement needs to be made based on the space taken up by themes within the article, the prominence of the theme within the article and/or the use of headlines and sub-headlines which relate to the theme values.

In order to be coded, a theme must occupy at least two full sentences in an article – unless shorter than two sentences in which case the article is coded in one theme field according to the most prominent theme (if mixed, use ‘general/indeterminate concern’).

Themes are defined as follows:
resources and structure of state apparatus: discussion of the ability to which immigration officials and the state are able to implement government policy (e.g. reference to statutory organisations charged with enforcing immigration control policy to carry this out, provision of resources for these organisations, the operational facilities of detention and deportation, etc.).

immigration services procedure: discussion of the competence, efficiency and adherence to law thought to have been practised by those in charge of implementing government policy (e.g. reference to the time taken to process immigration or asylum applications, appeals to deportation orders, the decisions made at various stages of asylum applications, allegations of negligence, rulings made by the European Court of Human Rights, etc.).

numbers: discussion of the numbers of immigrants thought to have migrated in the past x week(s), month(s), year(s), decade(s), or estimates of future migration in similar terms.

voluntary migration: discussion of the settlement of people described as having immigrated, or immigrating to the UK, due principally to ‘pull’ factors. While the term ‘voluntary (im)migration’ is used, it is with the mitigation that the agency of migration is unlikely to be wholly with the migrant, who ‘it is important to locate…within the parameters of a capitalist order in a world system’ (Kivisto and Faist 2010: 18). It simply provides some distinction between those considered to have ‘freely’ arrived and those for whom migration is considered temporary, forced or irregular.

family reunification: discussion of migrants described as migrating for the purposes of rejoining family members who have already migrated to the UK, as well as ‘family formation’ and ‘whole family’ migration.

forced migration: discussion of permanent settlers described as having immigrated, or immigrating to the UK, due principally to ‘push’ factors or as an ostensibly enforced decision. Asylum seekers and/or refugees described as having immigrated/immigrating to the UK having sought/to seek refuge for reasons of persecution in their home/previous nation of residence fall into this category.

irregular migration: discussion of migrants who are perceived to have overstayed their terms of leave to remain, who have entered ‘clandestinely’ (including by providing false
documentation or those victim to trafficking and smuggling), or who are only semi-compliant with their terms of entry (e.g. by working without permission).

**Temporary migration:** discussion of migrants described as lacking possession of, or aspiring towards, permanent settlement rights (e.g. students, workers on short-term visas, but not visitors, such as holidaymakers, those in the UK for business purposes, visiting foreign dignitaries, etc.), but whom are described as intending to stay for several months or longer.

**The UK and pan-European institutions:** discussion of the implications of immigration within the UK’s accession and maintained subscription to the EEC/EU, the implications of the Schengen agreement for the UK (discussion of any proposed UK accession or any perceived indirect effect of others nations’ accession), accession of other countries to the EU, decisions made at the European Court of Human Rights, obligations according to the European Convention on Human Rights, European Commission, Council of Europe, European Parliament, etc.

**The UK and the Commonwealth:** discussion of the impact of processes of post-colonialism upon levels of immigration from within the British Empire/’the colonies’ (such as the gaining of independence by member nations). NB. this does not cover stories simply about immigration from the Commonwealth, which are captured elsewhere.

**Employment/trade:** discussion of the employment or unemployment of migrants and/or its social and personal effects (includes trade unionism).

**Housing:** discussion of the distribution (geographic, numerical or otherwise) of public housing in relation to migrants, or of destitution among migrants, or of other discussion relating to migrant-owned or -rented private housing.

**Education:** discussion of the educational attainment and prospects of migrants in full-time education and their effects.

**Cultural integration:** discussion of the diffusion of cultural practices and other such ‘imports’.

**Social cohesion:** discussion of the perceived strength of community-based relationship dynamics, particularly when between groups of people of potentially different ethnic and cultural backgrounds.
citizenship: discussion of the apparent affordance and attainment of official legal, political and civic rights of citizens.

welfare provision: discussion of the perceived rights, availability of and subscription to social welfare provision provided by the state to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

racism: discussion of behaviour or attitudes described as racist or discussion in terms of differential treatment on grounds of ethnicity, ‘race’ or nationality.

health: discussion of the quality of access to healthcare available to migrants, or discussion in which a connection is made between migrant(s) and a health issue.

crime: discussion of crimes committed by citizens described in terms of their migration status, or against citizens described in terms of their migration status.

security: discussion of issues regarding perceived threats to the safety of the general public and the preservation of institutions of strategic political or economic importance from acts seen as politically illegitimate. This would include discussion of terrorism, espionage, etc.

influence and mobilisation of migrant/minority voters and candidates: discussion of the impact of the political representation of migrant interests on patterns of turnout and vote distribution, plus focus on the candidacy of migrant or ethnic minority politicians.

disillusionment with political response: criticism directed at political institutions or politicians for an apparent failure to previously address their perceived responsibilities to the social actor/identified stakeholders in immigration to the UK.

repatriation: discussion of the supposed merits, consequences of and enforcement of schemes which are occupied with the arbitrary repatriation of citizens of the UK to a previous nation of birth/citizenship, enforceable according to ethnic, national, ‘racial’ or other arbitrary social characteristics. NB. reports of individuals’ deportation are coded elsewhere.

return migration: discussion of UK citizens or people previously settled in the UK re-migrating to the UK.

the economy: discussion of the economic causes or consequences of immigration to the UK.
**general/indeterminate concern:** discussion of immigration with no specifically identified frame of debate, or of mixed debate but discussed for less than two sentences.

**Actors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Leader of the Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Home Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Immigration Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shadow Home Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Other Government Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other Shadow Cabinet Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Other Government MP</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Other Opposition MP/Candidate</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Other Party Leader</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Former Prime Minister</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Former Party Leader</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Former Senior Politician</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Liberal Democrat Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Other Political Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>The Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>The Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Parliament/MPs (in general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>The European Union/European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Millbank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Quango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Charitable Organisation/NGO/Other Pressure Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Civil Servant(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Celebrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>European Leader/Politician/Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>EU Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>World Leader/Politician/Government (not European)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Heckler/Demonstrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Media Commentator/Journalist/Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>'The Media'/Media Outlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Police/Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Anti-immigration pressure group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Pro-immigration pressure group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Trade Union/Representative/Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Unnamed source - non-party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>University Academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Citizen(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Other Government Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Television Broadcaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Think Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Other General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Religious figure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Corporate spokesperson/representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Other pan-European institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Civil Servant(s) - Immigration entry staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Other Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Liberal party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Alliance (SDP-Liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>'Community Leader/spokesperson'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Race Relations Board/Community Relations Commission/CRE/EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Community liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Immigrants' Advisory Service/Immigration Advisory Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Diplomat (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Diplomat (non-UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Private sector immigration/asylum representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Port staff (non-immigration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

323
Actors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 – direct quotation: if the actor is directly quoted, how many words they are quoted on, if any, where the actor is discussing immigration issues.

Actors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 – tone: the actor's tone in terms of the immigration issue at hand (supporting, criticising, mixed, neutral, indeterminate). This includes in direct or reported speech. nb. a restrictive tone on immigration control can be counted as criticising, while a tone in support of a relaxation in controls can be counted as supporting.

Descriptors 1, 2, 3: The first three terms (if necessary) used by the journalist to describe the process of immigration to the UK should be coded – i.e. these terms must ‘escape the speech marks’. This variable includes verbs (such as those formed from ‘to come’, ‘to migrate’, ‘to swamp’, etc), nominalizations (e.g. ‘immigration’, ‘influx’), collective nouns (e.g. ‘hordes’, ‘swathes’, ‘masses’, etc), and so on.

The following values were coded inductively:

1 crawl

2 enter/entry
3 invade/invasion
4 come
5 domicile
6 immigrate/(immigration)
7 land
8 arrive
9 smuggle
10 return
11 influx
12 flee
13 slave traffic
14 settle
15 flock
16 flood
17 bring
18 swarm
19 embark
20 import
21 flow
22 waves (of)
23 migrate
24 fly
dash
visit
send
inflow
set foot
slip
go
admit/admission
join/rejoin
concentrate
trickle
illegal (im)migration
move/ment
get into
seek/ask for/claim/plead for (political) asylum
stay
remain
gain/be granted (political) asylum
reunite
mass immigration
overstay
emigrate
move to
tide
be let in
pour into
swamp
floodgates
be absorbed
allow in
economic migration
descend on
stream
travel
escape to
granted refuge
welcomed
head for
mass illegal immigration
trafficked
exported
hordes (of)
refused asylum
infest
Immigrant group 1, 2, 3: the first three terms (if necessary) used by either the journalist or actors to describe the ethnicity, nationality and/or religion of migrants referred to in the article.

The following values were coded inductively:

1  Belgian
2  American
3  German
4  Chinese
5  Hungarian
6  Colombian
7  Russian
8  Irish
9  Polish
10 Jewish
11 Roman Catholic
12 Spanish
13 Italian
14 white
15 Czech
16 coloured
17 West Indian
18 Cypriot
19 African
20 French
21 Jamaican
22 Swedish
23 Austro-Hungarian
24 Protestant
25 Austrian
26 South African
27 black
28 Commonwealth
29 Turkish
30 Indian
31 Canadian
32 Finnish
33 Pakistani
34 Southern Rhodesian
35 USA
36 Asian
37 Japanese
38 English
39 British
40 Ghanaian
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Ugandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>British Asians</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kenya Asians</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Trinidadian</td>
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<td>Uganda Asians</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Australian</td>
</tr>
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<td>48</td>
<td>East African Asians</td>
</tr>
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<td>East African</td>
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<td>Mauritian</td>
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<td>Ethiopian</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>Romany Gypsies</td>
</tr>
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<td>Jordanian</td>
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<td>Dutch</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
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<td>Hong Kongese</td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Tanzanian</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
63 West German
64 white Rhodesian
65 black Rhodesian
66 Soviet
67 Iranian
68 Moroccan
69 Rhodesian
70 Vietnamese
71 Argentine
72 Lithuanian
73 Palestinian
74 Lebanese
75 Greek
76 Sri Lankan Tamil
77 North African
78 Zairean
79 Angolan
80 Somalian
81 Muslim
82 Togolese
83 Nepali
84 Afghan
85  Albanian
86  Zimbabwean
87  Ukrainian
88  Kosovan
89  Yemeni
90  non-EU
91  Congolese
92  Nigerian
93  Algerian
94  Dependent Territories
95  Brazilian
96  Sierra Leonean
97  Bolivian
98  Romanian
99  Vincentian
100  Ivory Coast/Côte d'Ivoire
101  Gujarati
102  Bulgarian
103  New Zealand
104  Israeli
105  Grenadian
106  Thai
These were later re-coded into the following categories in the analysis:

1. Europe (general)
2. Central Europe
3. Eastern Europe
4. Southern Europe
5. South-East Europe
6. Northern Europe
7. Western Europe and Ireland
8. Americas (generally)
9. North America
10. Caribbean
11. Central and South Americas
12. Africa (generally)
13. Northern Africa
14 Central Africa
15 Eastern Africa
16 Western Africa
17 Southern Africa
18 Asian (generally)
19 Central Asia
20 East Asia
21 South-East Asia
22 South Asia
23 Western Asia/Middle East
24 Oceania
25 Other
26 black/coloured
27 white
28 Jewish
29 Roman Catholic
30 Protestant
31 Commonwealth (generally)
32 British/English
33 Sikh
34 Muslim
**Immigration type**: the first three terms (if necessary) used by *either the journalist or actors* to describe the type of migrants referred to in the article. However, in order to distinguish between the terms used by journalists and the terms used by actors, inverted commas (‘) are used to denote those used by actors. Note that, in terms of the inverted commas rule, the use of a term by a journalist supersedes that of an actor. The following values were coded inductively:

1. refugee(s)
2. alien(s)
3. traveller(s)
4. undesirable(s)
5. enemy alien(s)
6. Communist alien(s)
7. stowaway(s)
8. immigrant(s)
9. emigrant(s)/émigré(es)
10. newcomer(s)
11. political refugee(s)
12. slave trafficker(s)
13. wanderer(s)
14. migrant(s)
15. illegal (im)migrant(s)
16. visitor(s)
17. boat refugee(s)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>economic migrant(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>bogus refugee(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>genuine refugee(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>asylum seeker(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>settler(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>economic refugee(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>economic asylum seeker(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>illegal entrant(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>bogus student(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>illegal(s)</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>border cheat(s)</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>overstayer(s)</td>
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<td>failed asylum seeker(s)</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>boat people</td>
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<tr>
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<td>bogus asylum seeker(s)</td>
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<td>illegal asylum seeker(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>illegal newcomer(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>undocumented migrant(s)</td>
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