Transnational dissent: feeling, thinking, judging and the sociality of Palestinian solidarity activism

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Transnational Dissent
Feeling, Thinking, Judging and the Sociality of Palestinian Solidarity Activism

by

Brian Callan

A Doctoral Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

January 2015

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Abstract
This thesis examines the role emotions play in the practice and sociality of Palestinian solidarity activism in Israel and Palestine. It finds that emotion is a subtle and sophisticated, and often ambiguous, form of knowledge and perception which is implicit in forming, appraising and adjusting the relationships participants have with intimates, fellow dissenters and public discourses on identity and the regional conflict. Fieldwork was based in and around Jerusalem and carried out over twelve months in 2011-12. This is a highly diverse transnational field where Palestinians, Israelis and Internationalists come together at specific times and places to practice various forms of dissent, largely but not exclusively against the socio-political conditions of the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israeli State policy. I present three separate propositions on Weirdness, Wrongness and Love, which relate to three different affective dimensions; perception, morality and loyalty. Each proposition also develops upon what Hannah Arendt defined the innate political faculties or activities of the human condition; thinking, action and judging.

The perceptive quality of finding something Weird is found to produce doubt in the subjective mind, the purpose for which Arendt believed thinking to be a political act. The moral appraisal that something is Wrong, underwrites concerted political action in the public realm. Finally judging, as the attempt to understand the world from the perspective of another, is facilitated by the discourse of Love in the long-term loving relations activists have with friend and family, who are antagonistic to the aims of solidarity activism. Taken together these feelings are found to flow through and inform one another, constituting a nuanced affective understanding and appraisal of our world, one that is producing and maintaining a politically engaged transnational community of dissent. This community has been fostered to a large degree by the insistence and perseverance of a small number of Palestinians in villages across the West Bank and East Jerusalem, who call upon peoples of all creeds, colours and places to witness and experience the repression of non-violent resistance. If as researchers we are to understand the complexities of human life and practices, I believe we must carefully attend to this sophisticated form of emotional reasoning and begin to think not just about feelings, but also with feelings.
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Introduction

This thesis is about the role emotions play in political dissent. There is nothing novel in that itself and what original contributions I make are based on an attempt to draw together various understandings of emotion’s relationship to perception, knowledge and belonging. In doing so I step away from passions such as anger, fear and exhilaration to present a model of affect as a subtle, sophisticated, and often ambiguous, form of knowledge, perception and interpretation. These are feelings which emerge in our bodies as we move through the sensual world we share with others, feelings which inform and challenge our equally embodied acculturated understandings of the world. To properly understand the role these processes play in the emergence, practice and endurance of pro-Palestinian ‘solidarity activism’, much of the ethnography occurs outside of protests and the structures of particular movements. Instead I address the non-instrumental activities and relationships of dissenters which not only help the struggle to coalesce and endure, but are also producing something more akin to a complex transnational community than a social movement. The daily sociality of dissenters is intrinsic to this development. Yet in the final analysis the practice of protests at a dozen or so villages and neighbourhoods, initiated and lead by no more than a few hundred people, remains integral to this global phenomenon. The tactic of inviting others from around the world - week after week, year after year - to witness and experience the repression of unarmed resistance has been crucial in the growth of a politically engaged transnational community of dissent to Israeli policies and practices vis-a-vis the Palestinians. For academics and activists alike, this is perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from these few hundred ordinary activists.

The solidarity activism I explore is, the loosely organised, non-violent, collective resistance to Israeli policies and practices in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The ethnography reveals, in three separate propositions, that Weirdness, Wrongness and Love are all affects which help produce and maintain solidarity activism amongst a highly diverse transnational constituency. More generally, I argue that such a nuanced understanding of affect may better inform us in how we conceptualise relationships and actions regarding knowledge, nations, communities and intimate acquaintances. A corollary argument is that the works of Hannah Arendt on human political faculties and given conditions, is a useful framework for understanding the totality of being a political dissenter, both within the structures of a ‘movement’ and in the everyday complexity of relationships with the plural
world we all share. However in contrast to Arendt, I argue that the political faculties of action, thinking and judgment, rather than being impeded by the ‘passions’, are enabled and augmented by the human capacity for feeling. As researchers, if we are to understand the complexities of human life and practices, we must carefully attend to the sophisticated reasoning of feelings. This will require the development of new categories through which to think about what affect is and how it works, and where it emerges in new ways. To do so entails not only thinking about feelings, but also thinking with feelings.

The thesis emerged from a year’s ethnographic experience based in Jerusalem with practitioners of solidarity activism, which revealed affective commonalities powerful enough to overcome ambiguity, plurality and betrayal. The theoretical framework I develop is phenomenological which, in highlighting the role of affect in intentionality, also argues that the subject’s culturally constructed interpretive lifeworlds must be understood as an embodied emotional system. Methodologically, the focus is on feelings and ambiguity rather than on definitive emotions. Rather than referring to supposed primary/secondary emotions, such as fear or envy, this work addresses weirdness, wrongness and love as cascading feedback systems in meaning making. The thesis thus aims to contribute to an understanding of affect as flowing through perception, moralities, loyalties, memories and thoughts in an embodied critique and judgement on the lived experience. To achieve this, I draw together a variety of experiential, cultural and historical understandings of affect. The model I present, to a large degree, avoids two important factors which shape affective experience: language and gender. This is mainly a consequence of the highly diverse make-up of solidarity activism, where ‘second’ languages are often the primary means of communication and the complexity of different gender constraints make generalisation problematic. However, in adopting the categories of Weirdness and Wrongness, this work is also more focused on the pre-linguistic ‘wordless knowledge’ (Damasio, 2000) of embodied experience.

This was also an engaged ethnography, both in terms of my personal affinity with the aims of solidarity activism and in my attempt to become an activist with the guidance of other activists. However, I was very much the novice activist when I came to the field in 2011 and my affinity stems largely from family connections. My wife and two young children, who joined me in Jerusalem, are Jewish citizens of Israel and the possibility that my two sons will be conscripted into an army of occupation is a very real worry. My own terms of engagement thus moved between being the visiting Internationalist while also being an activist with a Jewish Israeli family, deeply connected to the Israeli national narrative. Much of the ethnographic insights thus emerged from this position, whereby concerns could be shared and
genuinely felt. The thesis is thus political both in terms of its subject matter and its application. It is hoped that the findings here will be of use both to academia and the practice of civil resistance. The main thesis is divided into three parts relating to three separate propositions on weirdness, wrongness and love respectively. Though each part in turn deals with a different categorization of affect and a related political faculty, the thesis demonstrates that such processes must not be understood in isolation but rather as the unfolding and reflexive experience of being.

**Background**

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been enmeshed in deep transnational processes for decades. It began with the nineteenth century origins of political Zionism in the European Diaspora, through British imperial acquisitions in the Levant, the refugees of the Holocaust, the United Nations recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 and the creation of a Palestinian diaspora in the same act. Such processes continued with the ingathering of Eastern Mizrahim Jewry in the 1950s, Pan-Arabism and Cold War alliances through the 1960s and 70s, American Jewry’s fervour for Israel post-1967, the broadcasting of the *First Intifada* on satellite networks across the globe in the 1980s. Today it includes the public diplomacy outreach programs of the Israeli state, political tourism and a network of ‘pro-Israel’ and ‘pro-Palestinian’ activists that spans the globe. Pro-Palestinian or Solidarity activism, has grown significantly over last the ten years since the end of the *Second Intifada* around 2004-5. This phenomenon encompasses a broad range of individuals, associations, grassroots movements, global NGOs, professional jurists, journalists, fundraisers, academics and more. Such a spectrum necessarily contains multiple motivations, aims and objectives and the ethnography includes individuals who would neither see themselves as activists nor primarily driven by the moniker ‘pro-Palestinian’. Furthermore, the ethnography is not focused on a particular ethnicity, organization, form of practice, or specific political aims with regard to the conflict. I therefore use the term *Transnational Dissent* to collectively describe the activities of participants who are (or were) involved in some way in agitating against the discourse that violent coercion is a legitimate means to either maintain or resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine.

The first chapter offers a political history of Israeli military occupation and colonisation practices and discourses in the Palestinian territories since 1967, and the history of various movements and discourses resisting such practices. It is intended to situate the reader in the contemporary context of the conflict and to highlight the continuity of
transnational processes which have shaped it. This chapter attempts to condense over forty years of history, focusing primarily on political and civil society movements’ adoption and adaption of varied discourses to legitimise or de-legitimise the appropriation of land by the Israeli state and the settlement of their citizens in these territories. This chapter is not an analysis or critique of transnational theory. Its main purpose is to (dis)orientate the reader as to the complexity of relationships and exchanges promoting, restricting or contesting state authority, including diasporas, international law and treaties, United Nations conventions, communism, liberalism, international media outlets and Global Civil Society. Most importantly the chapter highlights the historical heritage, continuity and development of transnational dissent to Israel’s military occupation and colonisation practices.

It must be acknowledged that this chapter by and large ignores both the history of the region prior to Israel’s acquisition of the territories in the Six Day War in 1967 and the gross levels of violence at the local level that also define this history. The Palestinian narrative is tightly bound to their indigenous link to the land preceding the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. Likewise the Zionist mythology self-identifies as a diaspora being finally redeemed after 2,000 years in exile. The sheer brutality of violence, often inflicted on civilians, and the feelings of euphoria and despair which always attend victory and defeat have left an indelible mark on lives near and far. Such episodes and emotions cannot be forgotten either by those who experienced them or the reader of this thesis. Nonetheless the subject of the dissertation is the contemporary practice of non-violent, or in Palestinian terms ‘unarmed’ civil resistance. For the past ten years such resistance has most notably involved Popular Committees from Palestinian villages agitating against the construction of the separation barrier on their lands, alongside Israeli and international visitors. The historical review outlines the historical continuity and deep knowledge basis by which such practices are themselves legitimised and reproduced over generations and demonstrates that peoples from all sides of the conflict have always proven the human capacity to transcend the passions that produce and reproduce violence when ‘everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes’ (Arendt, 1971, p. 191).

**Theory & Methodology**

In order to understand how the complexity of sometimes contradictory feelings of being a dissenter shapes their relationships to other activists, family and friends and wider society, I adopt a phenomenological approach which proceeds from the subjective experience and concept of intentionality. I take intentionality to be a fully embodied feedback experience,
cascading from lower through higher consciousness, through an equally embodied interpretive lifeworld in which affect plays a central role. This is drawn from a number of phenomenological, sociological and philosophical authors and from the experiences, thoughts, actions and feelings of participants encountered in the fieldwork period. The central affect theorists I utilise are neurologist Antonio Damasio (2000) who posits emotion as representing the relationship between ‘things’ and the subjective ‘organism’ and the philosopher Jesses Prinz (2004, 2007) who place emotions at the core of morality. These authors provide an understanding of affect as fully embodied, pre-cognitive, intentional perception with the capacity for nuanced appraisals which inform those ‘higher’ conscious processes associated with cognition and reason. However, we cannot take intentional affect to be a simple or dominant experience and what Damasio calls emotion’s ‘hint half-hinted’ may often be suppressed by the constraints of acculturated knowledge in the lifeworld, and the crowd of other embodied signals being constantly produced. This produces ambiguity, but at certain times and for certain feelings, Prinz argues, that the affective dimension of moral appraisal has the capacity to ‘dumbfound’ rational arguments which attempt to justify moral transgressions (Murphy, Haidt, & Bjorklund, 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Thus the salience of affect is highly contextual.

To address this tension I argue that the subject’s interpretive lifeworld is itself an embodied construct. This entails an examination of a number of sociological theories and theorists of affect and collectivity, such as Durkheim, Handelman, Levy and Deborah Gould in particular (Durkheim, 1912a; Gould, 2009; Handelman, 2004; R. I. Levy, 1973). Interactional Ritualism and the Dramaturgical model provide the foundations for positing an embodied lifeworld, a term originating from Husserl to describe the ‘unquestioned, practical, historically conditioned, pre-theoretical, and familiar world of people’s everyday lives’ (Desjarlais & Throop, 2011, p. 91). Durkheim’s Interactional Ritualism, as expanded upon by Handelman (2004), demonstrates how ‘public ritual’ coordinated by national bureaucracies help foster unquestioned affective associations to the symbols and narratives of the state, forging the collective identity of the nation. Dramaturgical theory expands on this by recognising the importance of culture in defining which emotions are to be experienced and how they are expressed, not just in ritual event but in all social situations (Lawler & Thye, 1999). Robert Levy’s work reinforces this by showing that even so-called ‘primary’ or universal emotions may be suppressed by cultural norms which assign alternative meanings to embodied experiences. As such, though embodied affect informs conscious appraisal, the acculturated interpretations of lifeworls also inform how the body emotes. Through this
cascading feedback process, I conclude that the lifeworld is not merely a stock of knowledge and practices retrieved from memory but, like the mind itself, is a fully embodied affective construct. This notion has affinities to Deborah Gould’s concept of an ‘emotional habitus’. The insight I take from Gould’s work is that the emotional habitus is a malleable construct such that the meanings of emotions may be altered, through a crisis of affective confusion. This last factor is crucial to understanding both the emergence of dissent to previously unquestioned interpretations and to the management of the inner turmoil which can accompany the practice of protest.

The attempt to situate this framework into a theory of political activism led me to Hannah Arendt’s work on three of her innate political faculties or activities of humanity: action, thinking and judging. Alongside labour as the need to sustain life and work the production of material things to furnish our world, action was for Arendt the third fundamental activity grounded in the vita activa, ‘the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man’ (Arendt, 1958 p.7). Action is the most political faculty for it is the only one which requires the development of a relationship with someone else. A key concept for Arend’s understanding of action is the inescapable plurality of the human condition. When people come to act together in concerted public political expression, power emerges through action. Such a conceptualisation is clearly evinced by this ethnography and the concerted action of the plurality of transnational dissent is of particular relevance to the proposition in Part II that a practice of community is emerging from a shared sense of wrongness. Arendt also posited the realm of the vita contemplativa as the life of the mind, which also has three fundamental activities; thinking, willing and judging. Judging she considered to be the most political faculty of the mind in that, as with action, it is an intersubjective activity by which one attempts to resolve the particularities of being with the generalisations of possibilities. It requires ‘the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view but from the perspective of all those who happen to be present’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 221). Judging thus produces understanding but this understanding resides neither in the self nor in the other but within a ‘third position’ of the intersubjective relationship. Again, this is supported by the ethnography and not just in the plurality of transnational dissent but, as I argue in the proposition on love in Part III, also within the long-term intimate relationships of dissenters to their ‘non-aligned’ friends and family members who opposed their political stances and practices. Finally thinking is the core activity which relates to the proposition on weirdness in Part I. The outstanding characteristics of thinking for Arendt are ‘its withdrawal from the common-sense world of appearances, its self-destructive tendency with regard to its
own results, its reflexivity, and the awareness of sheer activity that accompanies it’ (Arendt, 1971, p. 88). Equating ‘common-sense’ with the acculturated lifeworld, thinking represents the human capacity to transcend received interpretations. Though Arendt’s understanding was that thinking created nothing except doubt in the mind, she believed such doubt was crucial to the avoidance of ‘evil’. Part I of the thesis argues that the emergent feeling of weirdness is a pre-cognitive process which serves the same function by calling into question received wisdom and sowing doubt in the mind and body.

Despite the convergence between the ethnographic findings and Arendt’s political activities, this thesis argues for a number of adjustments to the understanding of these faculties. Most fundamentally, Arendt holds human emotions with low esteem. Her model harshly delineates between body, mind and soul, leading to a compartmentalised understanding of the form and processes of consciousness, affect, cognition and thought which is at odds with the embodied approach used in this thesis. In her ontology emotions are the ‘passions’ of the soul, bound by the body which provide only a functional role in human survival. Mind, where thinking’s activity resides, is a different and distinct kind from both body and soul. This thesis shows that action, thinking and judging are enabled and aided rather than inhibited by affect. Doubt can be created by the feeling of weirdness, concerted action supported though shared wrongness, and the intersubjective space required for judging is enabled by feelings of love. Emotion, I argue, is not by its nature an impediment to critical reflection and understanding; affect can positively aid us in the appraisal of what may be right and wrong and the effort to avoid evil.

The methodology chapter relates to my engagement with the ‘field’ and research participants. The protests of solidarity activism take place at a number of sites at weekly intervals. They are attended by people who come from near and far, who then return to scattered residences across the region. The first problem then is how to describe and define this ‘field’ of varied identities moving through sites of activism and secondly, what are the processes and form of knowledge by which ethnographic engagement accesses the affect lives of participants. Building on the notion of the plurality of the human condition, I understand fieldwork to take place in a shared world which social, sensual and imagined dimensions variously complement and contradict through the movement of participants in that world. I adopt Ingold’s (2011) concept of a meshwork as apposite to the task of defining this ‘fieldsite’. Life, Ingold asserts, is lived along lines of movement through the unfolding world which become inscribed as experience as a meshwork a texture of interwoven threads. This is not
merely an abstract network of connections but the totality of the affective experience of movement through the sensual world. It is an affective dimension of the embodied lifeworld. (Ingold, 2011). Transnational dissent is movement along particular ‘lines’ anchored by specific sites of protest practice and sociality in the regular schedule of solidarity activism. This meshwork of movement is not simply geographical, for as dissenters become familiar with travelling along these lines, the sensuality of repeated experiences becomes embodied in their own lifeworld. The structuration afforded by the villages and neighbourhoods where solidarity activism takes place thus produces a recognisable pattern of knowing and interpreting that also constitutes the field of transnational dissent.

Having thus defined the field, I turn to the general question of how ethnography can reliably access the emotional lives of its participants. Here, I base the validity of my assertions on my politically engaged approach with the aims of solidarity activism and on the trusting relationships developed with certain participants though the year. I again borrow from Ingold (2008) who understands anthropological knowledge as emerging from the practice of working with people in their world. For Ingold participant observation, as immersion in the world of participants’ activities, allows the anthropologist to see, hear and touch the world from the vantage points of those participants. I expand upon this to argue that it also allows us to feel the world from that vantage point. However, this is not to say that I somehow know what they feel and so to refine the form that knowing takes I turn finally to Michael Jackson’s interpretation of Arendt’s faculty of judging, in which knowledge and understanding exists in the third position of intersubjectivity (Jackson, 2009). Thus, though we may come to feel from the vantage points of our participants, we can neither become the participant nor lose our researcher self. Jackson argues that the ‘imaginative displacement’ which the ethnographer must adopt to reconsidering her own world from the standpoint of participants is in essence Arendt’s activity of judging. The ethnographic knowledge this effort produces is therefore reducible neither to the researcher’s nor the participants’ understandings, but emerges from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself – the third position. In synthesising Ingold and Jackson I argue that, having learnt to feel like a dissenter with the guidance of participants, the ethnographer’s act of displacement is not merely imaginative but includes a degree of shared embodied knowledge garnered along common paths in the meshwork of transnational dissent. It is these commonalities which afford insight into the subtle role that ambiguous and conflicting feelings of weirdness, wrongness, love and betrayal play in the sociality of dissent.

8
Structure
The main body of the thesis is divided into three parts, each of which presents a different proposition on the affective dimensions of dissent. Part I relates most directly to intentional, or reflex affect. It presents the proposition that Weirdness is a feeling which emerges when our received understandings fail to properly describe the world as experienced. It is an emotional encounter with the limits of the hegemonic certitudes of our lifeworld. This relates to subjective intentionality and Damasio’s (2000) understanding of emotion as a kind of ‘wordless knowledge’ about the human organism’s relation to the apprehended object or action. In affect studies this phenomenon is often referred to as reflex emotion. Weird therefore, is not a property of an object or action itself but of the relationships between the observer, the observed and the dominant cultural discourse to which the observer belongs. Although neither the Palestinian nor International dissenters can encounter Israel’s military occupation as normal, a focus on the Israeli constituency is most revealing. These individuals have been raised on the principles of Zionism their whole lives and are intimately acquainted with its hegemonic narrative and interpretations. This discourse describes a democracy forced to protect itself against an intractable and violent foe and encounters with the limitations of this truth are apt to be experienced as weird. The ethnography here does not highlight gross transgressions of this discourse, which can evoke the moral outrage often associated with social movement mobilization. Instead, the focus is on the banal and everyday instances of life under a deeply institutionalised military occupation. Affective encounters with this reality are described as baffling, crazy, bizarre, Kafkaesque or just weird and the experience reveals cracks in the patina of the hegemonic discourse which supports the occupation. As with Arendt’s faculty of thinking, weirdness produces doubt not through the reasoning of a disembodied mind but by the subtle, emergent and pre-cognitive embodied signals of feeling. The nuanced affect of weirdness prepares the subject to break with received wisdom and so opens the pathway to political dissent. Indeed, I argue that as the process of becoming a dissenter proceeds, weirdness moves from being simply an intentional experience to become an embodied wordless knowledge, a way of interpreting the world. The seasoned lifeworld comes to know that the logic and practice of occupation is an inherently contradictory form of social organisation for a state claiming to be a democracy in the twenty-first century. The intentional experience informs and refines the embodied knowledge of the lifeworld.

Part II turns to political action in the public realm by addressing collectivity in the transnational diversity of solidarity activism in Jerusalem and beyond. I argue that this collectivity is fostered by the affective dimension known as moral emotions. This is not
morality as an intentional moment of shock or outrage, but rather as a deep-seated and hard to shake feeling that something is wrong. The ethnography describes a huge diversity of Palestinian, Israeli and International actors coming together to act in concert. These individuals have widely different reasons for coming to dissent, are unapproved as to a future prognosis and face a complexity of deeply embedded, mature and often elusive structures of oppression in which a clear antagonist is deliberately obscured. The activists here have gone beyond weirdness and, I argue, come to share the affective sense that something is wrong. They are also, in Arendt’s terms, engaged in concerted political action based on this shared feeling. However, there is much more going on than protest performances at the sites of solidarity activism. There are legal teams, journalists, and hosts of NGO staff who, though not activists, are equally involved in resisting the occupation. In addition there are particular bars and coffee shops where dissenters meet and a high degree of non-instrumental socialisation occurs. In a critique of network approaches to the study of transnational dissent and macro level concepts like Global Civil Society, I argue that a transnational community is being produced by solidarity activism through this shared feeling of Wrongness. This argument addresses the transnational dimensions of solidarity activism and the equally complex and transnational dimensions which enable and legitimise the dispossession and disenfranchising of Palestinians. Drawing upon recent reassessments of community (Amit, 2012; Amit & Rapport, 2002; Djelic & Quack, 2010) the proposition here is that solidarity activism manifests not as simply as an effective network but also as an affective community. I thus present something of a challenge to academia by asking how researchers may validate and enable global practices of resistance by recognising and re-imagining transnational activism as not merely an episodic and instrumental action but as a praxis of fluid, interconnected and self-reproducing affective collectives.

This final proposition in Part III addresses a third dimension of emotion known as affective loyalty. As opposed to the intentional experiences of reflex emotions or moral interpretations of the lifeworld, affective loyalties develop and operate over long timescales as dispositions towards families, friends and nations. The ethnography here focuses on love and betrayal within these very intimate relationships as experienced by Israeli dissenters. Given that the hegemonic Israeli narrative demands that the nation is loved, the emergence of dissent from within its fold leads to reciprocal accusations of betrayal. While dissenters feel they have been betrayed by their upbringing in the nation, emotional tensions also emerge within the long-term concrete relationships between dissenters and their ‘non-aligned’ intimates. To understand how these relationships are maintained I turn to normative
discourses on kinship, in which intimacy is about love. The accommodation of betrayal within these affective loyalties is afforded by Gould’s (2009) observation that an emotional culture, or lifeworld, maybe be recast in times of crisis. As love comes to be accepted and understood as a complex process with an uncertain outcome Arendt’s notion of judging, as the production of intersubjective understanding, is enabled by the acceptance of plurality within long-term intimate relationships. This section follows the practice of dissent out of and beyond the boundaries of the social movement and its sociality and into the alternative socialites in which dissenters also belong. The experiences of Israeli dissenters reveal that intimate love not only has the power to overcome betrayal to the national collective, but that this capacity to endure also affects the validity of hegemonic interpretations in the lifeworlds of the non-aligned. No longer are dissenters ‘filthy traitors’ or ‘Arab fuckers’, they are sons, daughters, friends and loved ones.

Conclusion
From a theoretical perspective, the model of intentionality, lifeworld and experience as affective processes accords with the ethnography which shows that both human perception and interpretation are guided by a wordless knowledge which is felt. Weirdness, Wrongness and Love are all equally implicit in forming, appraising and adjusting the relationships participants have with intimates, fellow dissenters and public discourses on identity and conflict. Affect must be understood as a nuanced and sophisticated processes cascading through mind, body and the sensuality of a plural world. Methodologically, I assert that in order to access this world we must divest ourselves of pre-conceived categorisations of emotion and attune ourselves to the subtle and sometimes uncertain shifts signalled in the bodies and motions of our participants. The study of affect must move beyond the ‘passions which overwhelm’ and attend to the ambiguity of emotions, by thinking through and with our feelings and those of our participants.

In terms of the study of protest and the paradigms of social movement theory, I assert that social movements cannot be properly understood if studied as social isolates or instrumental networks with specific aims or end-goals. The ethnography shows that solidarity activism both affords and involves a great deal of non-instrumental activities and relationships, which help the movement hold together and endure. Furthermore, each and every dissenter is also part of a meshwork of relationships outside of the boundaries of the movement. Far from the performances of protest, the formulations of tactics and the struggle for resources, the daily sociality of dissenters is intrinsic to their capacity to endure the
demands of their efforts. To this end Arendt’s work on political action, thought and judgment have proved particularly useful in understanding the implications of the ethnographic findings here. Though I attempted to integrate various traditional social movement theories to these findings the results often ended only in critique of their limitations. I believe that once the caveat of affect has been introduced to Arendt’s theories, the application of her more generalised understanding of innate human political faculties and conditions can greatly enrich our understanding of collective social dissent and action.

Finally in relation to Palestinian solidarity activism itself, I believe that the protests at a dozen or so villages and neighbourhoods initiated and lead by no more than a few hundred people, has played a crucial role in the transnationalisation of dissent to Israeli policies and practices of dispossession and colonisation under military occupation. Though they may be maligned as ineffective, even from some Palestinian quarters, the insistence, proliferation, perseverance of popular committees in calling upon peoples of all creeds, colours and places to witness and experience the repression of these peaceful protests has galvanised a community of civilians across the globe. The tactic of emplacing others within the experience of oppression is then perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from these few hundred ordinary activists. I thank them and wish them the best in their endeavours.
1. Looking for Legitimacy

Contesting transnational processes in the Israeli colonization and decolonization of the Occupied Territories since 1967

Transnational Effects and National Legitimacy

This chapter situates contemporary solidarity activism within a historical context which highlights how both colonisation and decolonisation practices have sought legitimacy in transnational dimensions. This is not to say that nationalism, nationhood and national actors are not major forces in this conflict – the idea of Two States for Two Peoples – but that such forces are increasingly situated within a transnational complex. Manifestations of transnationalism in Israeli and Palestine are observed in the migrations of people, diasporas and notions of ethnic identity, in flows of capital and the production, adaptation and adoption of ideas and ideals, and in global networks of civil society organisations and the local presence of major transnational and supranational NGOs. The chronological account given is not a theoretical analysis of transnationalism, social movement or Global Civil Society per se. Such discussions will be addressed in later chapters and in relation to the contemporary practices of dissent observed in fieldwork. The main concern here is to show how competing discourses on colonisation/decolonisation have always referenced ‘external’ norms, practices and knowledge to underwrite the validity of their narratives and how these externalities themselves wax and wane in the transnational processes of producing local legitimacy. What is important to understand is that this is a history referenced and interpreted by the dissenters themselves.

The term ‘delegitimization’ is now in common use by journalists, security advisers and political society in Israel (Eldar, 2010; Hass, 2012; Ravid, 2011). It is framed as anything from a threat to particular state practices - such as how security forces can defend the nation – to being an assault on its very existence, on a par with nuclear annihilation, the indiscriminate carnage of terrorism, and the insidious and tenacious irrationality of anti-Semitism. The threat is seen seriously enough that extensive national resources are being leveraged to fund and coordinate diplomatic efforts, media campaigns, national civil society and the Jewish diaspora to ‘explain’ Israeli perspectives and practices to purportedly ill-informed foreign public and policy makers (Molad, 2012). This initiative, officially named Hasbara coordinates several government ministries, the IDF Spokesperson Division and the Jewish

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1 Hasbara (Hebrew) meaning ‘explaining’.
Agency for Israel to produce and disseminate print, electronic media, television and internet video channels and to equip foreign civil organisation and Israeli citizens travelling abroad with the ‘tools and information to deal with questions and criticism’ arising from ‘prejudice and misinformation related to Israel’⁴. Counter to the Hasbara apparatus is an ‘anti-Israel network [which] includes many disparate organizations functioning without clear protocols and with little cooperation. It can be said that there is no coordination of various objectives, no unified communications strategy, and consequently, no unified – indeed, often completely inconsistent – Hasbara messaging’ *(ibid*, p. 45). Though these competing discourses are about the legitimacy of national self-determination their exchanges are transnational, involving flows of images, peoples, monies and ideas across the globe.

Since their emergence, nation-states have legitimised their existence from and in reference to other similarly constituted entities. Initially the state was imagined and promoted as the ‘natural’ expression of peoplehood supposedly united by ethnicity, language or some timeless and unique mish-mash of traditional cultural practices. After the Second World War and with the establishment of the United Nations and other supra-national agencies and international conventions, legitimacy became increasingly claimed by reference to or accord with such agencies or regional-political blocs. Though born out of an *international* global order Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that the U.N. in particular is moving beyond this ‘old order’ and becoming the source of juridical and fundamental norms for ‘sovereign’ states. It is becoming a *transnational* entity. Alternative sources and adjudicators exist. Political, economic and military pacts or Blocs, such as the EU, NATO, OPEC or the Arab League, have also emerged and often compete, producing degrees of complexity, hierarchies and wiggle-room when it came to legitimate state claims-making. The growth of neo-liberal trade, the power of private networks of capital through business and the concurrent leverage of consumer practices must also be taken into account by states when deciding policy *(Beck, 2005)*. This latter constituency, oft posited as the Global Civil Society, has also seen remarkable growth in the formation of formal and informal civil society movements agitating for certain socio-economic practices across borders under ‘meta-narratives’ of democracy, justice and human rights *(Appadurai, 2008)*. Appadurai also employs the notion of

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² IDF – Israeli Defence Forces

³ Source: *Ministry for Public Diplomacy and Diaspora* website [available at]

transnational *scapes* of ethnicity, ideas, finance, technologies and media across and upon which such narratives are produced, disseminated and contested. Negri and Hardt go so far as to accord transnational civil society – or ‘the multitude’ - a revolutionary subjectivity with the potential to forge democratic alternatives in a global age (Hardt & Negri, 2000, 2005; Juris, 2008b; Juris & Khasnabish, 2013).

Examining such processes at the local level several authors have highlighted the limits of nation-state sovereignty: in transmigrant identity and remittance economies (Basch, Glick-Schiller, & Blanc, 1994); by the investment, withdrawal or withholding of capital by international corporations, charities and institutions of global finance (Green, 2008); through the transmission of ‘foreign’ discourses into local living rooms by transnational satellite television companies and internet publications (Sakr, 2001); in the production of ‘universal’ values and socio-economic models and their dissemination to local levels by international organizations and NGOs (Englund, 2006); and by the internationalist configuration of a wide variety of ideologies, such as democracy, neo-liberalism, anti-capitalism, environmentalism, politicized religion and global terrorism whose rhetoric necessitates that political action occurs outside national frameworks (Beck, 2005; Berglund, 1998; Cunningham, 2000).

Thus, though inherently framed in nationalist terms, the legitimacy of Palestinian and Israeli claims and counter-claims are – and have always been - subject to transnational effects of both formally instituted organizations such as the U.N. and the Arab League, and by dispersed and informal collectivities, notably Palestinian and Jewish diasporas and variously aligned civil society movements. The following examines the various tactics and practices employed in legitimising either the colonisation or decolonization of Jewish settlements in the ‘occupied Palestinian territories’ (oPt) since 1967. There is of course much greater historical depth prior to 1967 but that topic is better served by historians (see Morris, 2007; Pappé, 2006; Sa’di & Abu-Lughod, 2013). Instead I focus on the period from 1967 when Israel took control of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula in its astounding demonstration of military supremacy during the Six Day War. Though there have been many wars, mobilizations, military operations and acts of armed resistance since this time, my main focus in this period is on discursive and juridical attempts that have had to interpret and reinterpret the ongoing development of legitimate statehood.

The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly it provides context for the current state of the pro-Palestinian activism examined in this thesis. It identifies the major elements of the hegemonic narrative in Israel and the practices by which colonisation of the oPt was and is legitimised. Secondly, it demonstrates the historical continuity and transnational dimensions
of non-violent resistance to colonization, a fact that is often deliberately obscured by the fog (and smoke screens) of war and terrorism.

**State Foundations from the 19th Century to 1967**

In the Israeli national narrative, Zionism sits centre stage. Zionism, or more precisely Political Zionism, is in the official discourse ‘the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, [that] emerged in the 19th century within the context of the liberal nationalism then sweeping through Europe’ (Neuberger, 1999). The main forum for debate on the form and implementation of the Zionist idea was the Zionist Organisation (ZO) formed in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. While pre-state Zionism has its own complex history, in terms of contemporary discourses the most significant division in the movement occurred in 1923 when Ze’ev Jabotinsky left the ZO to form the Alliance of Revisionist-Zionists. Whereas, the ‘mainstream’ of the ZO became the socialist orientated Labour-Zionism, which adopted a *pragmatic-minimalist* approach to establishing some form of state for the Jewish people in Palestine, the Revisionist-Zionists were *maximalists* who demanded a Jewish state on both sides of the river Jordan. The vision of what some call Greater Israel, would have included territory both on the west bank of the Jordan and in some part of what is now the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Shafir & Peled, 2002). While these two forms of 'Left-wing' and 'Right-wing' Zionism have been the main proponents in the contest to define the hegemonic narrative, other forms such as Cultural Zionism and Messianic Zionism have also had significant impact and continue to impart legitimate meaning to the idea of Zionism for various groups or individuals.

After 1948 the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip were under the control of Jordan and Egypt respectively from 1948. Estimates vary on the number of Palestinian refugees from 1948 territories of Israel from 500,000 to 950,000 (see McDowall, 1987). Approximately one third of these found themselves in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, another third in the Gaza Strip and the remainder to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and beyond (PRRN, 2010). The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established in 1949 to provide for their needs across the region. The major political groupings and leaders which would come to represent the Palestinian nation emerged from the diaspora at this time. At the American University of
Beirut, George Habash, from the town Lydda⁴, helped found the Arab Nationalist Movement which would become the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Kazziha, 1975). In 1959 Yasser Arafat, the head of the General Union of Palestinian Students at Cairo University, helped found the Fatah political movement and in 1964, at its summit in Cairo, the Arab League initiated a Palestinian National Council. In May of that year at its first conference in Jerusalem, then under Jordanian occupation, the council proclaimed ‘the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a mobilizing leadership of the forces of the Palestinian Arab people’ (POMSP, n.d.).

1967 – 1977: Pragmatic Minimalism & Radical Activism

Despite the often cited euphoria felt in Israel following victory in the Six Day War, the maximalist tendencies in Zionism were not sufficiently empowered to embark on an extensive settlement program of the West Bank. The most pressing issue was to name and define the territories in accordance with the ruling Labour government’s ‘pragmatic’ or minimalist Zionism. Seventeen days after the cessation of military hostilities, the Knesset passed two laws in summary proceedings empowering the government to: 1) extend the boundaries of any city or district at will by means of ordinances⁵; and 2) expand Israel’s laws, jurisdictions and administration to ‘every part of Eretz Israel’ by means of ordinances⁶ (IMFA, 2011a, 2011b). The following day the government extended the city limits of Jerusalem reaching up to the Arab population centres of Ramallah in the north, Bethlehem in the south and Abu Dis in the east, merging East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem to form a single administrative entity.

The UN was ‘deeply concerned at the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City [and] considers that those measures are invalid’ (UN, 1967, p. 4). In countering the view that the change of Jerusalem’s status in Israeli law was de facto annexation, the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban wrote to the Secretary General. The unilateral change of status was legitimised by three arguments; protection of the city’s Holy Places; freedom of movement and civic cooperation; and the provision of municipal services to the entirety of the newly expanded city. The provision of services was an appeal to the pragmatic

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⁴ Lydda. A town between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem within the 1948 borders of Israel. Referred to as Lod in Hebrew

⁵ Municipal Corporations Ordinance (Amendment) Law (1967).

⁶ The Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law (1967).
aspects of Israel as a modernising force in the region, extending water supply, health-care, social welfare and educational infrastructure ‘to those for whom none have been available in the past’ (Eban, 1967). The civic cooperation argument presented a humanistic view of the Israeli administration as liberation for Arabs of East Jerusalem who were now ‘free to renew or initiate contacts with their Jewish neighbours…in the City from which the enduring message of human brotherhood was proclaimed’ (ibid). The larger part of the text legitimized Israel’s actions as designed to ‘furnish a legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem’ (ibid). This evoked a power higher than that of national or international authority, what Eban called ‘the universal interest’. More than just transnational the universal interest is almost transcendental. Despite protest in international forums and an absence in the statutes of the term ‘sovereignty’ or ‘annex’, the discourse that Jerusalem had been ‘re-united’ gained significant purchase in the national hegemony and the imaginings of Israeli nationalism. If prior to 1967 mainstream Zionism had concentrated on consolidating the 1948 state of 1949, the 1967 victory and the symbolic return of Jerusalem licensed more romantic and ambitious visions of the future Israeli state (Guyatt, 1998). Such visions would lead to the growing legitimization of maximalist narratives in the coming years.

**Naming the land**

The areas that fell under Israeli jurisdiction in 1967 were populated by residents of villages, towns and cities and the transmigrant population of Palestinian refugees. It also contained extensive tracts of cultivated land. The Israeli state, as a democracy with property rights encoded in legislation, found it necessary to construct a legal basis for the transfer of these lands to the state. Metzger et al outline several means by which this was achieved (Metzger, Orth, & Sterzing, 1983).

*State land:* Israeli authorities obtained the power of disposition over the largest part of lands by taking over Jordanian ‘state land’. Jordan had adopted the Ottoman system of land tenure, known as *meri* land, which was given to villages for cultivation. Although technically belonging to the state, the state had no right of usage to *meri* land which normally passed by inheritance through family lineages of cultivators. Israel denied Palestinian farmers access rights if they could not produce *tapo* certificates (land deeds) from the Ottoman period. Israel

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7 Numerous quotations in this text cite online resources, such as archive material and newspaper articles. In accordance with APA 6.0 standards, such citations do not include page numbers as these sources are not paginated. Full details of these sources are listed in the bibliography.
then nominated this land as ‘public domain’ and placed part of this land at the disposal of Jewish settlers.

*Purchase:* Land in the occupied territories was also purchased from private individuals. The authority to buy land was the exclusive purview of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Israeli Land Administration (ILA). Though the ILA is a state institution the JNF is a transnational organization which draws on the capital reserves donated from the Jewish diaspora and others and which allows the state to formally distance itself from certain acquisitions.

*Abandoned land:* A number of laws from the 1950s, including the Absentees’ Property Law 1950, allows for title transference to public authorities over ‘waste land’ or ‘abandoned land’ or ‘absentee property’ and enables the expropriation of private land and property that could not be purchased or claimed as state land.

*Military restriction:* Concerns of state security also provide legal alternatives for expropriation. Israel employs a combination of legislation from the two previous administrators of the West Bank. Under a 1945 law from the British Mandate the military commander of a region may declare a ‘restricted area’ for ‘security reasons’ thus barring access for cultivation. After three years the administration can then utilize a Jordanian law according to which land that has not been cultivated for three consecutive years must be registered as state land.

*Destruction:* A certain amount of territory came also into the hands of the occupying authority through the practice of destroying entire villages. The villages of *Emmaus, Beit Nuba* and *Yalu* which lay along the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem were the only Palestinian villages to be destroyed after the 1967 war. The JNF planted trees on the sites and lands of these villages establishing a forested public recreation area called Canada Park.

State expropriation of land and property is based largely on legislation. The combination of Ottoman, Mandate, Jordanian, Israeli civil laws and Military law in the oPt allows for

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8 Article 125 of the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.
creative manoeuvring in legal application. However, the legitimacy of this practice is based on the notion of ‘rule of law’ in state practices, a narrative with significant traction amongst Israelis and sections of the international audience. This legitimacy is of course highly contested. Most notably while the Absentees’ Property Law precludes Palestinian refugees from claiming property lost in 1948, no such prohibition exists for Jewish refugees who fled the oPt at that time. Jews can and do reclaim property in Hebron and East Jerusalem.

**Settling any Uncertainty**

Settlement activity initially focused on land of East Jerusalem with over 20,000 dunams\(^9\) ‘expropriated’ by the state by 1970 and zoned for the construction of whole new neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem. By 1972 over eight thousand Israeli citizens lived in these neighbourhoods (B’Tselem, 2011a, 2011b). Beyond East Jerusalem the appetite of the Labour government for construction was less than zealous, and no more than fifteen settlements had been established mostly in the Jordan Valley. This pattern was predicated on the Allon Plan, presented by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon in July 1967. In this the entire Jordan valley was designated a ‘security zone’ and many of the early settlements in this border region began as what former Prime Minister Golda Meir called “military agricultural outposts” (cited in Metzger et al., 1983, p. 30). The establishment of such outposts was institutionally facilitated by *Nahal* units, members of farming communities who also served together in the military. After a time civilian populations replaced the Nahal units in the settlements but in 1972 the settler population outside East Jerusalem was little more than one thousand. Though the planning for occupation and settlement of the West Bank grew out of a mixture of strategic and nationalist thinking in the 1950s among a group at the heart of the Labour party known as ‘the redeemers’ (Pappé, 2006) the maximalists, while growing in influence, were not yet in control of the institutions of state or dominant in the production of discourse.

This *raison d’être*, an irredentist ‘Greater Land of Israel’ ideology, linked the pragmatics of political Zionism to the divine promise of messianic Zionism. The ideological legitimacy of the movement was provided by the theology of Rabbi Abraham Kook, who argued that the secular Zionist pioneers were unwitting actors in a grand Divine plan, by virtue of the fact that they were ‘building up the Land of Israel which would eventually bring about redemption’ (*ibid*, p.198). This *Religious Zionism* stood in contrast with the ambiguous

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\(^9\) 1 dunam is 1km\(^2\)  20 dunams is 20km\(^2\)
or even antagonistic attitudes of other brands of Judaic orthodoxy which had had an uneasy relationship to the political state-building project since its inception. The perceived weakness of the Labour government, the possibility that it was willing to cede the territories ‘liberated’ in 1967 as part of the Allon Plan, galvanised the movement into action. Against the wishes of the government, activists began a campaign of establishing unauthorised ‘outposts’ in areas outside Allon’s security zone and deep within the zones planned for Palestinian autonomy. Continuous cat and mouse games of eviction and squatting continued for three years between Gush Emunim and a government who within certain constraints were prepared to tolerate these protests. This small group of national religious youth operated within the discourse of Zionism and pioneering and since they had no real access to the political elite they were not seen as a threat to Labour’s hegemonic order (ibid, p.219). Their position on the political periphery would change with the ‘upheaval’ (Ma’Hapach) of the Likud party’s election victory of 1977 and the empowerment of maximalist Zionism in the hegemonic discourse.

Spectrums of early Dissent

The major counter-hegemonic discourse espoused by Israeli-Jews at this time, and the most vociferous critique of the 1967 occupation, came from the Israeli Socialist Organization known as Matzpen. Formed in 1962 Matzpen drew on the ideological thought of communist internationalism and elevated universal socialist principles over nationalist aims. A month before the Six Day War Matzpen publicly equated Zionism with Western imperialism and colonization, called for the right of Palestinian refugees to return, and demanded the de-Zionization’ of Israel (Matzpen, 1969). Though never numbering more than a few dozen active members, the occupation galvanized the movement which held numerous demonstrations and disseminated overtly anti-Zionist critiques both in Israel and abroad. As a result of their head-on struggle with the occupation and Zionism ‘if you didn’t hate Matzpen you weren’t a patriot, you were garbage’ (Akiva Orr in Torbiner, 2003). Transnational splits and conflicts along Trotskyite and Maoist Third World lines splintered this small group in the early seventies and their pariah status forced many of their number to emigrate. However their radical analysis exerted considerable influence on the development of counter-hegemonic thought in Israel and abroad through exiles activists and the magazine Israca (Israeli Revolutionary Action Committee Abroad). Prior to this few in western civil society were aware of a pro-Palestinian narrative. Founding members such as Akiva Orr, Haim

10 Hebrew: Compass

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HaNegbi and Moshe Machover remain at the forefront of Israeli-Jewish anti-Zionist activism today (ILA, 2011c; ISRAC, 1969; Matzpen, 1968, 1969).

Globally, the late 1960s and early seventies had witnessed an extraordinary rise in social radicalism. This period saw mass protest against racial segregation and the Vietnam War in the U.S., student protests in Europe, and guerrilla movements in Latin America. The idea that grassroots organizations could challenge the authority of the state through civil disobedience or violent resistance was in the air (Greenstein, 2009). The rise of the ‘New Left’ found several local expressions in Israel such as Smol Israeli Hadash (SIAH)\textsuperscript{11} established in 1968 by a group of students in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In 1971 the Israeli Black Panthers sought a ‘Genuine Revolution’ to end the institutional Western discrimination and impoverishment of ‘Eastern Peoples’ (Black Panthers Israel, 1972; ILA, 2011d). However, the power of nationalist aspirations proved too strong for movements such as Matzpen, SIAH or the Black Panthers to unify the Arab and Jewish masses under the universalist notions of the proletariat or even regional collectives of the ‘Orient’. Indeed these organizations were anything but massive or unified, and when the ‘Mizrahi revolution’ came in 1977 its constituency of oriental Jews threw their electoral weight behind the Zionist maximalists of Menachem Begin’s Likud party (Shafir & Peled, 2002). Israeli-Jewish calls to destroy the Zionist entity became untenable and counter-hegemonic activism turned towards specific issues relating to minority rights, poverty, selective conscientious objection and the occupation (Greenstein, 2009). Such tensions led to the disintegration of SIAH in 1973, but the following year CAMPUS emerged as a student led alliance of Jews, Arabs, Zionists and Anti-Zionist united in their fight for peace, democracy and social progress (ILA, 2011a). The creeping annexation in the occupied territories and the shift to the right of the Marxist parliamentary party MAPAM also led to the emergence of the Left-Zionists organizations, Brit HaSmol, Moked, Sheli and Smol Sheli. Though they remained loyal to Zionist principles they served as constant voices of dissent within mainstream politics (ILA, 2011b). The spectrum of Israeli-Jewish dissent from Matzpen’s meta-critique of Zionism through to issue-based left-Zionist organizations differentially incorporated transnational notions of legitimate state practice into the Israeli national discourse. The predominantly Marxist, Internationalist perspectives and notions of race-class oppression were locally expressed as resistance to

\textsuperscript{11} Hebrew: New Israeli Left
Western colonialism, the ‘natural’ affinity of the proletariat and co-identification of the second-class *Mizrahim* ‘Arab-Jews’ with the oppressed Palestinian-Arabs.

**The Transnational Production of Palestinian Nationalism**

The same period also saw major developments in the organisation of institutionalized Palestinian opposition in the form of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Founded in 1964 by the Arab League with the mandate of ‘organising the Palestinian people to enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny’ (Hirst, 1977, p. 273). To a great degree, the 1967 war all but did away with the idea of Nassarism’s ideology of pan-Arab unity and discredited Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the PLOs first chairman who resigned shortly after. In early 1968 *Fatah*, a Palestinian diasporic political organization which had adopted guerrilla warfare tactics as a technology of coercion, began to formulate a new concept of ‘liberation’. Up to this point vengeance and anti-Semitic tropes from the West coloured the Palestinian discourse, but liberation could not be built on vengeance and the existence of a Hebrew culture in Palestine had to be addressed (*ibid*, p.288-291).

The history of Jewish persecution was studied by the *PLO Research Centre in Beirut*, and a distinction between Jews and Zionists was drawn. The power of the ‘Zionist machine’ in disseminating its discourse to Jewish immigrants was addressed, and the works of ‘Martin Buber, Issac Deutscher, Elmer Berger and Moshe Menuhin, all spiritual human Jewish thinkers, were read and re-read’ (Rashid, 1970, p. 16). The result was the report *Towards a Democratic State in Palestine* published by the Research Centre in 1970. Though liberation still meant the destruction of the Zionist state its framing now acknowledged the presence of Jews in Palestine and imagined a future Palestine of non-sectarian equality. When in 1974 *Fatah’s* leader Yasser Arafat, now Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine Revolution, was invited to address the United Nations General Assembly it was this discourse that was presented to the world on behalf of the Palestinian people (Arafat, 1974). That such a prominent global conduit was made available to this Palestinian discourse resulted from a growing international delegitimization of the Israeli narrative at this time, which in turn provided important impetus to various counter-hegemonic movements in Israel (Greenstein, 2009).

Though living in a stateless, dispersed, transnational sphere the Palestinians were now, contrary to the declarations of Israeli leaders Golda Meir and Levi Eshkol, constitutive of people and nation. Like other nations they were represented by an institutionalized elite stratum, armed with tools of coercion and producing and disseminating its own hegemonic
narrative. Like other nations this discourse was challenged from within and without. Against PLO hegemony stood Dr. George Habash and the Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who de-territorialized the instrumental violence of liberation, hi-jacking planes and attacking and killing civilians across the world. Other Arab nations nurtured their own expressions of Palestinian ‘self-assertion’, both by design and blunder: In Syria the Baathists patronized the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War, while the Iraqi Baathists had the Arab Liberation Front. Black September emerged from the violent expulsion of Fatah’s fighting forces from Jordan in 1970. Palestinian politics, practices and discourses at this time ‘were an Arab world in microcosm’ (Hirst, 1977, p. 305). With the rise of violence the transnational production and emergence of Palestinian nationhood would have to be directly addressed, at least by refutation, by the Israeli narrative which had studiously denied its existence up to this point.

1977-1987: Maximalist Ascendancy & Revisiting the Nation

On 17 May 1977, Menachem Begin and his union of nationalist and liberal parties, known as Likud, brought an end to three decades of Labour rule in Israel. The ‘right-wing’ Likud would dominate Israeli politics for the next fifteen years and represented the triumph of Revisionist-Zionism after fifty years of struggle against Labour-Zionism. This struggle was embodied in the figure of Ze’ev Jabotinsky who in 1923 denounced the World Zionist Organisation’s piece-meal approach to acquiring land and building settlements during the pre-state British Mandate period and had demanded nothing less than ‘a Jewish state on both sides of the river Jordan’ (Shlaim, 1996, p. 279). Jabotinsky regarded Arab hostility to Zionism as inevitable and concluded that only an ‘iron wall’ of superior military power could protect the Jewish state. ‘Distain for diplomacy and reliance on military power...characterised Revisionist Zionism from the very beginning’ (ibid, p.280), and Menachem Begin had been at the core of this movement since before the foundation of the state.

Co-opting the Mizrahi Revolution

Though Likud’s 1977 manifesto stated that ‘Judea And Samaria [the West Bank] shall...not be relinquished to foreign rule’ its electoral mandate came in large part not from

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12 Judea and Samaria. Biblical names used for the area roughly contiguous with the West Bank. Maximalist discourse tends to use these two names for the regions, and it is also the official Israeli government term for the oPt of the West Bank.
popular support for expansionist policies, but a consequence of structural inter-ethnic tensions amongst Jews in Israeli. The sub-altern status of Mizrahi (Oriental) Jews within the or Ashkenazi (European)13 Jews hegemonic narrative is well documented. From the offset the Zionist project was a European phenomenon. The majority of the diaspora had lived in Europe, its vision of a modern democratic state for Jewish nationals grew from the European nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, it was the European powers that the WZO had first lobbied, and it was the decimation of European Jewry in the Holocaust that catalysed the West and the diaspora into realising statehood after the WWII. The Jews of North Africa and the Middle East living in partibus infidelium had no experience of persecution and genocide, or nationalist projects, indeed from the Ashkenazi perspective no experience of ‘modernity’, and were considered lacking in the collective drives and dynamism of the Ashkenazim (Shumsky, 1972). They could however provide cheap labour and satisfy the Zionist mantra of ‘Jewish labour for Jewish land’. The Mizrahi were culturally, institutionally, economically and geographically marginalized being settled by state absorption dictate in municipal slums and ‘development towns’ far from the centres of power, employment and the valuable real estate held by the European veterans around the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem metropolitan areas (Dalsheim, 2008; Shafir & Peled, 2002; Shumsky, 1972; Smooha, 1993).

Throughout the 1970s the Likud party had recruited several Mizrahi mayors from the development towns whose vote winning ability amongst Israel’s Oriental Jews became key to the party’s success (Sprinzak, 1993). Despite Likud’s overt maximalist ideology the Oriental vote was predicated not on settlement expansion but on Labour’s failure in incorporating Mizrahim. Thus though ‘never fully committed to the idea of the Greater Land of Israel [Mizrahi voters turned to Likud] for social, psychological and economic reasons’ (ibid, p. 136). The legitimacy for settlement expansion was to a large degree based on a democratic mandate from an ‘anti-Labour’ disenfranchised and disaffected ethnic identity. Nonetheless, Menachem Begin immediately committed his government and the nation’s resources to the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and assisted in the construction of eleven new Gush Emunim settlements during their first year in office and helped ‘create the administrative and organizational structure for the future establishment of additional settlements’ (Newman, 2005, p. 195). However, in 1978 Begin also signed the Camp David

13 Mizrahi (pl.Mizrahim) Jews categorised as originating from Oriental or Arabic regions. Ashkenazi (pl. Ashkenazim) Jews categorised as originating from Occidental or European regions.
Accords with Egypt's president Anwar Sadat. This instigated Israel's largest ever decolonisation by removing over four thousand settlers from the Sinai Peninsula returning it to Egyptian sovereignty.

**Expanding the Network**

By the early 1980s, at the beginning of Begin’s second term, about seventy percent of Israelis living in the oPt were in the new neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. This reflected both the government’s ideological emphasis and resource allocations to the city and the pragmatic attraction of living in the national capital for many Israelis. In mainstream discourse these new ‘suburbs’ were not (and are not) settlements. Out on the frontier of the West Bank, the military security and Religious Zionism settlement discourses were proving too limited for legitimate large-scale expansion. The former had self-imposed security considerations, while the latter had exhausted its man/woman-power without significantly tilting the demographic balance of the West Bank in their favour (Shafir & Peled, 2002). To strengthen the settlement drive Likud devised a policy independent of Gush Emunim. The *One Hundred Thousand Plan* aimed to settle an additional 80,000 people in the West Bank by 1985. A new (second) settlement division within the Jewish Agency, was created for this plan. The agency’s original settlement division, which had been created to expand the settlements in the Allon ‘security zones’ of the Jordan valley continued its work in these regions, while the new division ‘adopted radically new methods for the fulfilment of its aims’ (*ibid*, p.173), namely, the commercialisation of the settlement enterprise.

In contrast to the state-centrist policies of the Labour party, Likud had from the beginning adopted the free-market economic policies being produced and disseminated from the U.S.. Neo-liberal ‘market forces’ were thus incorporated into the *One Hundred Thousand Plan*. For the first time in Zionist history settlement became a capitalist venture ‘encouraging the employment of private funds and private initiative in the construction of settlements’ (*ibid*). Expropriation practices were consistent with the past, but now land would first be targeted by ‘surveyors or prospectors’ who could turn a profit through property development (Guyatt, 1998, p. 10). The land would then be claimed by the state through the established means before being sold to private investors at rates heavily subsidised by the government.

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14 Jewish Agency for Israel. A diaspora NGO offshoot of the WZO that has been officially chartered by the 1952 ‘Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency for Israel Status Law’ to promote and affect Jewish immigration and settlement.
The state also invested heavily in the infrastructure networks to link the West Bank settlements together and to the metropolitan centres of Israel. The settlements were no longer isolated farming outposts connected to military bases, or pioneering ideologies, but desirable suburbs ‘attractive to middle-class Israeli’s seeking spacious yet affordable housing’ (Sprinzak, 1993, p. 125). Colonization was adapting to global trends in economic technology and aspirational living.

In 1980 the Knesset had also passed the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel. In addition to stating that ‘Jerusalem complete and united [as expanded in 1967], is the capital of Israel’ the law also stipulated that the government ‘shall provide for the development and prosperity...by allocating special funds and shall set up special bodies to this end’ (Knesset, 2011). East Jerusalem was thus further distanced from the notion of ‘occupied territories’ and settlements in the national discourse. The number of new settlements in the West Bank grew from twenty-two in 1976 to one-hundred-and-nine in 1984 and the settler population increased ten-fold, during ‘the great settlement years of 1979 to 1984’ (Sprinzak, 1993, p. 124). What had been ideological migration to self-sufficient agricultural settlements in the West Bank in the 1970s became an economic migration to sub-urban satellite towns of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in the eighties, leveraging free-market capitalism and middle-class aspiration to drive and legitimise massive settlement expansion.

Post-Zionist historiography and transnational trends in knowledge production

Around the same time that the Mizrahi revolution had denied electoral legitimacy to Labour's hegemonic narrative and inadvertently promoted the maximalist tendencies, Israeli historians and social scientists began a process which would undermine the nation’s founding myths. This critical turn was part of the maturing of post-modernism, in which foundational myths and power were being sceptically deconstructed and reappraised (Foucault, 1977, p. see; Gellner, 1983; Said, 1978). Up to this point Israel's official history of the ‘War of Independence’ portrayed Zionism as a beneficent and progressive force whose every offer of compromise was rejected by Arab belligerence. Poorly armed and outnumbered the pre-state Yishuv community fought five Arab armies (who were armed and assisted by the British), and irregular ‘gangs’ of local Arabs. In the course of the war the enemy states called on the local Arab population to quit their homes to facilitate the invasion. In the IDF’s official History of the War of Independence (1959), the Arabs of Lydda (now Lod near Tel Aviv) were happy at the possibility given to them of evacuating the town (Morris, 2007). The idea that the Arab populations of what would become the state of Israel, had left voluntarily and at the behest of
neighbouring Arab governments had been carefully nurtured in the official narrative, absolving the Jews from any responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. According to Morris, this version of history had shaped how Israelis, the Diaspora, and the West in general understood Israel’s foundation, and determined policy towards ‘Arabs’ in general and Palestinians in particular to this very day.

The revolution in Israeli historiography and academia was occasioned by both national and transnational processes. Nationally, the social trauma of the 1973 *Yom Kippur War* \(^1\), which saw an explosion of left and right-wing social movements, also helped foster an environment in which Israeli academics began to critique the veracity of ‘socialist and nationalist ideologies shaping the collectivist nature of the Zionist community’ (Likhovski, 2010, p. 1). This endeavour was aided by the de-classification, after thirty years, of security and diplomatic documents in the national archives of Britain, the U.S. and Israel. Thus beginning in 1978 a plethora of contemporary sources became available on the conduct of Israel in the 1948 war. The revelations by these ‘New Historians’ ran counter to both the official history and the progressive, humanist, Israeli self-image. In one instance it came to light that in 1948 Lt. Co. Yitzak Rabin (the same Yitzak Rabin of the 1993 Oslo peace accords) gave the order that ‘[Arab] inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age’ (Morris, 2007, p. 11) The expulsions of fifty to sixty thousand Palestinians from Lydda and nearby Ramle in July 1948, accounted for one tenth of the Arab ‘exodus’ in what was now being called the ‘First Arab-Israeli War’. For some Israeli historians the forced removal of Palestinians was a deliberately planned ethnic cleansing of Palestine (see Pappé, 2007).

Many of the New Historians engaged purely in critique of the official historiography. Although possessed of new empirical sources this academic movement remained rooted in the accounts of elites and political history (Likhovski, 2010). Within the wider, transnational realm of Western academia, the ‘critical turn’ was having a profound theoretical and methodological effect in how knowledge was produced and used. The cultural turn emerged in Europe and the U.S. in the seventies as a challenge to positivist academia and instead placed the histories and social experiences of the non-elite at the centre of analysis. Works such as Hayden White’s *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (1973), Michel Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977), and Edward

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\(^1\) Also known as the *Ramadan War* and the *3rd Arab-Israeli War*. Oct. 6-25th 1973.
Said’s *Orientalism* (Said, 1978) highlighted the nature and function of knowledge and its application as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Edward Said was particularly apposite to the old history and old historians of Zionism. Born in Jerusalem in 1935 to parents with Palestinian, Lebanese, Christian and American cultural identities, his work argued that the Western academic project of describing the Islamic Other was the handmaiden of imperialism. The search for and dissemination of the essences of ‘Arab society’ and the ‘Arab mind’ was political intellectualism, bent on the self-affirmation of superiority rather than objective study, and most damningly had been used to justify Western colonial projects (Said, 1978).

The critical turn affected a profound change in the subject matters, methodologies and theoretical underpinnings of history and the social sciences that no Western academic department, Israel’s included, could ignore. In essence it became a transnational technology of knowledge production. Much of what became known as post-Zionist scholarship was carried out in the decades following 1978, coinciding with the *First Lebanon War* and the First Palestinian Intifada. These events themselves seriously shook public confidence in the country’s humanist self-image, of a small imperilled nation defending itself against an ‘uncharitable, predatory world’ (Morris, 2007, p. 13). Scholarship moved from the critique of the foundational narrative to a critique of the contemporary social order and the ‘New Sociologists’ began to examine the internal tensions in the Zionist narrative. The study of Jewish unity and the sociality of Zionist in-gathering were replaced by the study of the state’s production and maintenance of difference. To some raised on the purity of hegemonic narratives the ‘New Histories’, of massacres and forced expulsion of Palestinians published in the 1980s and 90s, may have been shocking revelations but though many of their arguments have become mainstream in academia they stir little controversy in society at large. Certainly this has legitimised the Palestinian *Nakba* narrative across many borders but it did little to halt the colonial expansion in the West Bank, which accelerated greatly during this period. Its impact on Israeli society is thus debatable and Penslar argues that outside of academia many more have responded by ‘justifying Israeli aggression and brutality as unfortunate but necessary measures in an endless war against and unappeasable foe’ (Penslar, 2012, p. 156). Indeed, in the new millennium with a succession of governments more right-wing than the last it may be argued that neo-Zionism is now in the ascendancy.
Finding the Nation in Dissent

Along with the continuing activities of the radical left and the emergence of the post-Zionist critique, this period saw a huge rise in ‘consensual’ dissent, a position which supported the general Zionist project while objecting to specific events or practices. These movements, driven largely by the middle-class Ashkenazim and closely associated with the military, while assiduously Zionist in their core convictions began questioning the practices of settlement in the Occupied Territories and the legitimacy of warfare as Israel’s only chance for peace. Two movements in particular, Shalom Achshav (Peace Now) and Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit), seized upon the configuration of the Jewish State as a democratic entity to frame their narrative and have had a long term-impact on mainstream left-Zionist mobilization in Israel.

Shalom Achshav was founded in March 1978 by the publication of an open letter to Prime Minister Begin calling upon him to reverse his “Greater Israel” settlement policy and finalise a peace treaty with Egypt. Significantly the letter was drafted and signed by 348 reserve officers and soldiers from Israeli army combat units. With the signing of the Camp David Peace Accords in September 1979 came the sense that public mobilization in the name of peace ‘could and would dictate the course of history’ (Peace Now, 1978). Shalom Achshav became Israel’s largest peace movement and its mainstream appeal enabled it to mobilize previously unseen numbers of Israeli-Jews for political protest. The invasion of Lebanon in 1982, seen by many as Israel’s first ‘war of choice’ provided another cause for membership mobilization. Tens, even hundreds of thousands marched under its banner. The notion of ‘mainstream’ is of course problematic. Shalom Achshav has always been careful to disassociate itself from the radical left, and its instigators, policy shapers and support base has always been predominantly secular, male, well-educated, Ashkenazi soldier-citizens who had traditionally voted Labour (Zemlinskaya, 2004).

This self-perception of being the mainstream conflicts with the changes that had occurred in the political realm. The Labour party and its Ashkenazi constituency had been out-voted by an emergent Mizrahi political collectivity, and its ‘pragmatic’ minimalist approach to settlement replaced by the overt maximalism of Likud’s Greater Israel movement. The left-Zionists self-perception as mainstream Israel was ‘structural nostalgia’ - a yearning for a fictitious Edenic past when the purity of the nation was unpolluted by the

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16 Whilst military conscription is also mandatory for female (non-Palestinian) citizens of Israel, combat positions were not available to women until the late 2000 with the establishment of the Caracal Battalion.
corrupted institutions of the state (Herzfeld, 1997). This imagining, that ‘their’ pre-1967 Zionism differed from the post-1967, remains the core dilemma of ‘mainstream’ Ashkenazi left-Zionists as it cannot be reconciled with the national imaginings of the radical left, Mizrahi collective memory, Palestinian experience, or the visions of Israel seen from Jewish Orthodoxy or the Russian immigrants of the 1990s.

*Yesh Gvul* which emerged in direct opposition to the 1982 First Lebanon War was also a patriotic movement driven by and directed towards this male Ashkenazi demographic. Their mode of activism, selective conscientious objection, was more radical than *Shalom Achshav*’s and struck at the heart of Israel’s civil-militarism contract. By refusing to acknowledge the state’s monopoly to define a ‘just war’ and by utilizing symbolic meanings and codes from the state’s own militarist and nationalist discourses of citizenship, the movement successfully politicized and mobilized conscientious objection for the first time in the state’s history (Helman, 1999). Though portrayed as radicals at the time this movement now holds a place of honour in Israeli protest movements (ILA, 2011f) and has provided organizational experience, financial and moral capital to subsequent generations of conscientious objectors (Helman, 1999; Zemlinskaya, 2004). However, the effectiveness of appealing to ‘mainstream’ European Enlightenment morality as the guiding principle for the Israeli citizen-soldier would be offset by the decline of the Ashkenazi recruitment to combat units as they sought out alternative status markers in wealth and high-tech industry. This move was matched by a rise in Mizrahi, Russian and Religious men opting for the lucrative military path to social mobility in Israel (Shafir & Peled, 2002).

Both these organizations saw themselves as Zionist at their core, framing their critique in terms of the 1967 occupation, and not by the canons of exclusivity that physically and discursively removed the Palestinians from Israel narrative prior to 1967. Nonetheless they have both been serious partners in many of the *ad hoc* peace coalitions formed over the years and while often vilified, or worse politically ignored, the symbolic capital they inherit from their privileged position in society continues to legitimate the post-1967 de-colonization discourse. Such massive Israeli de-colonization mobilization completely disappeared after the assassination of Rabin, the collapse of the Oslo accords and the brutality of the second *Al-Aqsa Intifada* at the end of the twentieth century. However, their major contributions, such as *Shalom Achshav*’s “two states for two peoples” have been formally incorporated into official government policy, and more significantly as the prevalent public framing of future peace and prosperity (Hermann, 2009).
1987-1997: Natural Growth & the Dissent of Others

Transmigrant Strains

Two separate transmigrant groups were soon to challenge on the hegemonic structures that underpinned notions of legitimacy in the settlement programs. The first were the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, who had become a transnational ‘trapped minority’ when the Israeli state ‘migrated’ its administrative sphere after the 1967 war (Rabinowitz, 2000, 2001). The status of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories was determined by a contradiction in the settlement plans inherent in the desire to annex territory without making its residents citizens of Israel (Halper, 2008; Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 184). They remain the non-citizens of Israel. Though there had been various Palestinian agents and strategies countering the legitimacy of Israeli narratives and colonialisation, Israel had for twenty years largely been ‘able to maintain a low-cost, low-causality occupation’ (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 197). What ‘Arab’ violence there was in the territories between 1979 and 1984 had been ‘instrumental in dramatising the “viciousness” of the Palestinians’ (Sprinzak, 1993, p. 126) according them the status of foreign aggressors in the midst of the community, a security threat previously reserved for the surrounding Arab states. The First Palestinian Intifada which began in late 1987 was dissent on a far greater scale than previously encountered in the occupation. Prior to this the settlements had been economically beneficial to Israel. The availability of low-cost labour from the Palestinians had reduced production costs for Israeli business and the rebellion of these ‘labourers’, who were presumed to be grateful for the economic boom brought about by ‘benign occupation’, created a huge drain on state finances. The First Intifada is now recognised as being as extraordinary mobilization of grassroots civil disobedience rooted in popular committees, often steered by women and organizing economic boycotts, tax resistance, strikes and massive demonstrations (see Alimi, 2006; Jean-Klein, 2000, 2003; King, 2007; Qumsiyeh, 2011). The protests were met not by police but by the Israeli military that monitored and maintained the occupation. Images of Palestinian youth’s throwing stones at tanks became iconic across the globe. Yitzak Rabin, the Defence Minister in 1987, is said to have ‘ordered’ his troops to ‘break the bones’ of Palestinians who confronted his tanks with these stones. Alongside such beatings and live fire, there was the collective punishment of house demolitions, prolonged curfews, school and university closures, curtailed social services, the banning of media and civil organisations, and tens of thousands of agricultural trees were uprooted and crops destroyed (UN, 2008, pp. 27–30).
The supranational ‘arbiter of right-and-wrong’, the UN Security Council, issued several resolutions severely chastising the occupation authorities which ‘strongly deplored those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and in particular...the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians’ (UNSC, 1987 art.1). At around this time, Yasser Arafat read out the *Palestinian Declaration of Independence* at the closing session of the 19th Palestinian National Council in Algiers on 15th November 1988. In doing so he assumed the title of ‘President of Palestine’. In the violence of this period over 1,000 Palestinians and more than 100 Israeli civilians and 60 Israeli security forces personnel were killed (B’Tselem, 2014). By the early nineties the ongoing executions of by now over 800 Palestinians ‘collaborators’ by Palestinians and the widespread celebration as Iraqi Scud missiles overflow the West Bank en route to Tel Aviv in 1991, helped embolden the right-wing’s view that the ‘Arabs’ were not to be trusted and that conceding land for peace was out of the question (HRW, 2001, p. 49; Sprinzak, 1993). Thus Palestinian dissent to the occupation was used to entrench the legitimacy of the settlements in terms of security. Nonetheless, the *Intifada* was a global media event which broadcast the image of Palestinian people and peoplehood across the world and regardless of where sympathies lay; it was even less possible to claim they did not exist.

By 1991 an influx of migrants from states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which began with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, had profoundly impacted on Israeli demographics. These immigrants were not Zionists in the classic mould, motivated by a desire to settle the land of Israel, and it has been argued that many would have opted to migrate elsewhere given the opportunity (Bar On, 1993). Nonetheless, what had been a steady stream of people in 1989 was a swelled by 1990 and the state had to accommodate 250,000 newly arrived immigrants from the FSU. Suddenly there was a massive housing shortage and in June 1990 Ariel Sharon was appointed Housing Minister with a clear mandate to eliminate this shortage. The response was more ideologically than socio-economically motivated, and the distribution of building programs was directed to peripheral locations in Israel mainly the Negev, Galilee regions, Jerusalem and the West Bank (Landau, 1993). As a result the building of ‘new settlements, roads and infrastructure was tripled, even quadrupled. The scope and intensity of the building was unprecedented’ (Sprinzak, 1993, p. 135). This tactic did not however engender the ‘Russian Israelis' to the maximalist narrative and by late 1991 unemployment was the most pressing issue for the new immigrants (*ibid*). The channelling of funds to building projects in the territories rather than absorption projects
would not win votes for *Likud* in the 1992 election. The Labour party, led by Yitzak Rabin, pushed *Likud* out of power for the first time in fifteen years. The Mizrahi constituency, so crucial in the 1977 empowerment of the maximalist’s electoral mandate, also deserted *Likud* in the 1992 election (*ibid*). Though often seen as a vote for the ‘peace-camp’ to a large degree Labour rode to power on a wave of socio-economic discontent caused by the economic strain of migrant absorption (Landau, 1993).

**Womanhood and Solidarity**

This *First Intifada* period also saw the emergence of a new Israeli de-colonization critique led not by the masculine military-nationalism of concerned combat soldiers, but by women employing a discourse which stressed a universal pacifist and empathic femininity. In 1988 female members of *Dai LaKibush*\(^ {17} \) (itself an *Intifada* solidarity movement) instigated a weekly silent vigil in Jerusalem. Calling itself *Women in Black*\(^ {18} \) the movement dedicated the vigil to International Women's Day (ILA, 2011e). More than 24 organizations across the globe would eventually respond to their call for solidarity vigils in Europe, North America and South America. *Women in Black* (WIB) has become an international protest movement and symbol of feminist dissent to Palestinian oppression and the non-violent fight for peace. WIB’s cooperation with an emphasis on the plight of Palestinian women led to the formation of *Reshet*\(^ {19} \) at a good-will conference of Israeli and Palestinian women in Brussels in 1989. A joint declaration, framed through the discourses of nationalism and internationalism, the women agreed ‘to share the land according to [UN] resolutions 181 and 242, based on the principle of territorial separation’ (Reshet, 1990). The relationship between the women’s alignment with the Palestinian cause and critique of chauvinistic citizenship discourses in Israel was part of the wider spectrum of emergent dissent in Israeli society at this time, one driven by transnational feminist discourses (Halperin-Kaddari & Yadgar, 2010; Helman & Rapoport, 1997). These women’s movements and their counterparts in the territories actively transgressed the territorial limitations of the state by adopting a unifying conceptualisation of womanhood produced (and critiqued) by the traditions and activism of Western feminism.

\(^{17}\) Hebrew: ‘End the Occupation’

\(^{18}\) Neshim B’Shakhor in Hebrew

\(^{19}\) Hebrew: ‘Network’
The period was characterised by a discourse of *solidarity*, not just between the Israeli and Palestinian women’s groups but across a spectrum of grassroots movements.

Grassroots activism of this period was eclipsed by two major events, the *First Gulf War* of 1990 and the *Oslo Peace Accords* of 1993. In the first case, official and popular Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein’s launching of over forty Scud missiles at Israel reinforced the archetype of the ‘Arab’ hell-bent on the destruction of Jewish State, undermining the legitimacy of Israeli decolonization efforts. Secondly, the Oslo accords transferred onus of normalising Palestinian self-determination and Israeli de-colonization from the dissenting masses of the *Intifada* and onto the political and bureaucratic elites of the Israeli and Palestinian state.

**The Ontological Argument**

Discourses of national sovereignty dominated the Labour tenure under Rabin. Two States for Two Peoples. Many factors helped initiate the peace process which led to the signing of the *Declaration of Principles* (1993) and the *Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza* (1995) between Israel and the newly established *Palestinian Authority* (PA). In addition to the tensions resulting from intensive expropriations for settlement and the *Intifada’s* success in attracting public support worldwide through global media coverage, geo-politically the US administration felt empowered to promote its ‘New World Order’ after its victory in the Cold War. One part of that new order was the promotion of economic deregulation and liberalisation, the opening up of markets for free-trade and capital mobility. For its entire history the *Yishuv* and Israel have been dependant on unilateral capital transfers from abroad in order to ‘aid the absorption of propertyless [sic] immigrants, maintain a European standard of living, and foot military bills’ (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 238). However, due partially to regional conflicts the level of corporate multinational investment in Israel was one of the lowest in the world, and potential foreign markets for Israeli goods were closed due to Arab boycott (*ibid*). The pressing need to expand the economy and absorb the Russian wave of immigration led the Israeli business community to move firmly into the peace camp and for the first time redefine peace issues as economic ones (*ibid*, p. 259). In this new world order the pragmatic minimalists of the Labour Party also came to power at a time when, having lost its Soviet patron, the PLO had also moved further towards a pragmatic solution

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20 Referring to the argument for the existence of God, such as Anselm of Canterbury. This section is not a sociological discussion on ontology.
for its national aspirations. The prospect of the de-colonisation of the West Bank seemed a real possibility.

One of Yitzak Shamir’s final acts before his Likud’s defeat to Rabin’s Labour had been to approve 11,000 new homes which would house 50,000 settlers (Guyatt, 1998, p. 53). Despite having called for a settlement freeze during the election campaign Rabin approved the construction of these houses and exempted ‘greater Jerusalem’ from any freeze. Rabin explained that the construction contracts ‘had been signed by the previous government and would be hard to cancel’ (ibid). Indeed the freeze applied only to the establishment of entirely new settlements and not to the expansion of existing ones. Given that the Likud tenure had invested so heavily in establishing new settlements, the potential for expansion, or ‘natural growth’ within the existing infrastructure was huge. This form of ontological argument, that ‘natural growth’ needed to be accommodated, would become a corner-stone of settlement legitimacy for the expansion of the status quo. Thus even though the 1996 Interim Agreement stipulated that ‘neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations’ Rabin clarified his vision of ‘status’ in his speech ratifying the agreement to the Knesset. Territorial concession would not include; united Jerusalem, including the large settlements of Ma’ale Adumin to the east and Givat Ze’ev to the north, both of which lay outside the Jerusalem municipal boundary; the security corridor in the Jordan Valley; the satellite settlements along the 1967 border including (but not limited to) Gush Etzion, Efrat and Beitar; and settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria. This list included virtually all existing settlements in the West Bank, within which natural growth would need to be accommodated (ibid, pp.53-55). This period also saw the development of major road infrastructure servicing the settlements and by-passing Palestinian residential centres. Further land expropriation was carried out to realize this project (ibid, p. 31). When Likud returned to power after Labour’s term of peace negotiations and ‘settlement freeze’, incoming Finance Minister Dan Meridor thanked Rabin and Peres ‘for having increased the number of Jews in Judea and Samaria by 40% in the past four years’ (Meridor cited in ibid, p. 82).

1997-Present day: After Peace & Transnational Agitation
The years since have been marked by peace processes stalled and failed and by excessive and violent death. While no grandiose settlement plans were published, ‘natural growth’ of

21 Article 31:7
existing settlement continued apace. In 1998 Likud's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the approach thus: ‘Our policy is to grow and expand...This issue must be coordinated behind closed doors with the army and not in front of the media’ (Philo & Berry, 2004, p. 81). By 1999 the settler population in the West Bank overtook that of East Jerusalem for the first time. In the next ten years to 2009 the settler population of East Jerusalem grew 13%, while ‘natural growth’ in the West Bank saw the population increase by over 68%. Since 2003, additional land in the West Bank has been appropriated for the construction of the separation barrier, a process which continues under the auspices of national security. The death of Yasser Arafat and a violent schism also broke the Palestinian political realm in two, between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the PA in the West Bank. This schism was enabled and spatially accentuated by Israel's first de-colonization since the Camp David Accords when Ariel Sharon unilaterally removed over eight thousand settlers from Gaza in 2005. The lack of IDF presence in the Strip allowed Hamas to violently wrest control of the region from the PA in 2007. Subsequently severe restrictions on movement in and out of Gaza and the recurrent use of violent coercion there have all but isolated Gaza from the West Bank.

Migration and the Israeli Right

Since the beginning of this period the two veteran Israeli narratives of the Likud and Labour parties have had to accommodate the polyvocal expressions of politically and socially maturing migrant populations who now commanded particularist mandates, both in coalition government and social movements. Three of these groups represented significant sociological developments in the deepening of political fragmentation and instability in Israeli society (Shafir & Peled, 2002). Firstly a large constituency of the Mizrahi population has coalesced around the religio-political party Shas, who in 1996 became the third largest party in the Knesset and has regularly acquired ministerial portfolios in subsequent elections, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Housing and Construction up until 2011. This latter portfolio has a huge influence in the construction of settlements. Shas’s stance on the settlements was ambiguous. Its spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef on several occasions justified the return of territories. His halachic\footnote{Orthodox Judaic religious law} justifications have been based not on Palestinians’ right to national self-determination, or the moral dangers posed to Israel by continued occupation, but, instead, on ‘quietism’. This is a traditional Jewish notion that emerged in the Diaspora whereby ‘one should not provoke foreigners and thus endanger
Jewish lives’ (Yuchtman-Yaar & Hermann, 2000, p. 36). However, in a 2010 sermon Rabbi Yosef also preached that ‘Abu Mazen and all these evil people should perish from this world…God should strike them with a plague, them and these Palestinians’ (Haaretz, 2010). The party’s main concern was however to establish a nationwide welfare and educational network for Orthodox Mizrahi, reflecting the major concerns of its sub-altern constituency (Davis & Robinson, 2009). With the death of Rabbi Yosef in late 2013 the party’s future influence is uncertain and while Shas may have once held promise of a more ‘dovish’ religious nationalism its time in power was not marked by rapprochement.

The second group are the immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU), who by 2003 numbered about one million – one sixth of the Israeli population (excluding the four million Palestinians in the occupied territories). Though the Israeli ‘Russian’ community is not a single unit, but rather is politically and socially diverse, its sheer size has made it a potent political force since the migration wave began in the 1990s (Khanin, 2004). One political party, Yisrael Beytenu23, has emerged as a significant actor in the production of political discourse and two thirds of its 2009 electoral mandate came from ‘Russian speakers’ (Khanin, 2010). Formed in 1999 ‘as a national movement with the clear vision to follow in the brave path of Zev Jabotinsky, [the party] fulfills the three cardinal principles of Zionism: Aliyah (immigration), settlement, and defense of our homeland’ (Yisrael Beytenu, 2011). In 2009 it became the third largest party in the Knesset and in 2013 ran on a joint ticket with Likud. The Likud-Yisrael Beytenu alliance emerged as the largest Knesset faction and the main party in the governing coalition. Yisrael Beytenu is overtly maximalist and forms part of a ‘new right’ or neo-Zionism movement that emerged in the post-Oslo period. Its vision of the West bank settlements is also one of permanence and the territorial concessions proposed by its leader Avigdor Lieberman, involve the transfer of Israeli Arab population centres in the Galilee and Wadi Ara regions of Israeli proper in return for the land appropriated for settlements. According to Lieberman ‘we need to create true political division between Arabs and Jews, with each enjoying self-determination […] Therefore, for a lasting and fair solution, there needs to be an exchange of populated territories to create two largely homogeneous states, one Jewish Israeli and the other Arab Palestinian’ (Lieberman, 2010). I have found no indication the Lieberman has asked these Palestinian citizens of Israel – one fifth of Israel’s population – whether or not they wish to swap countries.

23 Hebrew: Israel Our Home
The third group are the settlers themselves who, having migrated to the West Bank over a period of forty years, now have an young ‘indigenous’ population raised and socialized in the semi-autonomous, educational and economic institutions of the settlements (Weiss, 2010). Two consequences of the normalizing tendencies of growing up in the settlements have been observed; self-interested pragmatism and radicalization. In the first case, studies have found that 59.5% of second-generation settlers ‘choose to remain there […] for good quality of life for themselves and their families’ (ibid, p.21). Weiss attributes this to neo-liberal economic management which, having reduced material security through the attenuation of ‘state-sponsored safety nets [...] leads many a young family to live near parents who can help out, in the West Bank or otherwise’ (ibid). The second tendency, embodied in the ‘Hilltop Youth’ who establish unauthorised ramshackle outpost settlements far from the state sponsored communities, have become the public face of the settlement movement in the international media. In doing so they lay claim to the pioneering practices of the Gush Emunim movement of their parents’ generation who took matters into their own hand while the minimalist governments of the early seventies dithered. The legitimacy of their actions, heavily influenced by the rabbincal educational institutions of the West Bank and the experience of their own upbringing as indigenous settlers, is heavily based on biblical history and messianic worldviews. Little credence is given to the appearance of legality, indeed the movement ‘abounds in spiritualist, anti-establishment rhetoric’ (ibid: 29). Illegality is not confined to constructing outposts without a permit and for the past decade masked settlers have taken to physically attacking Palestinians and destroying their crops. Ta’ayush24 an NGO of Jewish Israeli and Palestinian volunteers, dedicates a great deal of its efforts to accompanying Palestinians in the West Bank as the farmers tend their lands or children walk to school. They too are often attacked, and usually in the presence of the IDF who are tasked with protecting the settlements (Taayush, 2014).

The settler discourse currently has two high profile social expressions, Tag Mahir and HaBeit HaYuhudi. Tag Mahir, meaning Price Tag, emerged subsequent to the 2005 decolonization of Gaza and is expressed as ‘retributive’ vandalism and violence against actions perceived to threaten or inhibit the settlement enterprise. In practice this has led to the vandalising of Christian Monasteries and Muslim cemeteries in Jerusalem, the torching of a number of Mosques around Israel, attacks on IDF bases and vehicles in the West Bank and

24 Arabic: Together.
spray painting a slide in my children’s’ playground. This last incident, in which Tag Mahir and Kahane Zadak was written on a yellow slide with black aerosol spray paint, occurred in a remote Jewish and quite middle-class suburb of West Jerusalem. It illustrates how deeply the discourse has penetrated social awareness, so that (quite probably) bored teenagers adopt it in textual form and inscribe it upon forums far from its original intentional object. However, such atomised sympathy in the social discourse also facilitates a more coordinated and more sinister (un)civil society phenomenon. The text Kahane Zadak, meaning ‘Kahane was Right’, is commonly scrawled in Price Tag attacks and refer to Rabbi Meir Kahane whose Kach party was designated a terrorist organization by the Israeli state in 1994. The ‘folk-heroes’ Kahanist ideology include Yoel Lerner of the Jewish Underground who attempted to blow up the Dome of the Rock in 1982 and Dr. Baruach Goldstein who killed 29 in a Hebron mosque in 1994, wounding 125 others (Harel, 2008; Harel, Hovel, & Khoury, 2014). A second expression of settler society is the emergence of the HaBeit HaYehdi25, which though nominally a national-religious party now utilizes a strong settler discourse. Its leader Naftali Bennett was chair of the Yesha Council, which represents and coordinates the settlement communities of Judea, Samaria and Gaza – and is a successor organization to Gush Emunim. In 2013 Bennett and two other party members became government ministers in the Likud Yisrael Beytenu government. Bennett proposes to annex Area C as part of a program for ‘managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ (Bennett, 2010).

**Multiple Imaginings in Transnational Realm**

Mainstream Israeli peace movements, Shalom Achshav in particular, became smaller and less vocal in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Hermann, 2009). A second and brutally violent Al-Aqsa Intifada began in 2000 whose international image was not the stone throwing youth but the suicide bombings of commuter buses. This killed over one thousand Israelis and three thousand Palestinians in five years sowing fear and rage and resulted in a further deterioration of life for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Reflecting on this period Fatah leader Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida asked: ‘Show me one achievement of [the second] intifada. We were afflicted by all the possible disasters - the separation fence, the checkpoints, the expansion of the settlements, the split in the Palestinian people. I’m trying to think of a benefit we received from this campaign and am unable to do so’ (Harel & Issacharoff, 2010). The collapse of the political process and the increase in military

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25 Hebrew: The Jewish Home
intervention saw a new generation of Israeli combat soldiers experience the transition from civilian to military sociality, allowing them to contrast the hegemonic narrative with the lived experience of the Palestinians they encountered. For some the contrast was untenable and led to the mobilization of several Israeli-Jewish dissenter movements.

Formed in 1998 by female activists Profil Hadash\textsuperscript{26} defines itself as a movement for ‘the civilizing of Israeli society’. Its ideological orientation challenged the republican discourse which elevated and awarded military service and questioned the impact of militaristic culture on various aspects of social life (Zemlinskaya, 2004). Shministim, conceived of as an Israeli youth refusal movement emerged out of the publication of the Shministim Letter in the summer of 2001, signed by 62 high-school seniors. They declared their protest against Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and their refusal to take part in oppression of the Palestinian people. The group consisted of youth from very different ideological backgrounds but some of the core activists were the children of refusers from the Lebanon War whose fathers were among the founders of Yesh Gvul (ibid). In 2002 fifty reserve combat officers and soldiers of the IDF published the Combatants’ Letter in which they contended that the commands issued to them in the Occupied Territories ‘destroy all the values that we were raised upon’ and that the occupation had led to ‘the loss of IDF’s human character and the corruption of the entire Israeli society’ (CTR, 2002). This group, which called themselves Ometz LeSarev,\textsuperscript{27} mobilized a selective conscientious objection movement similar to Yesh Gvul. This was not though a pacifist movement and the soldiers remained committed to serving in the IDF, just not in the occupied territories. With the Second Intifada raging there was also a dramatic rise in Israeli antagonism towards left-wing movements at this time, and these conscientious objectors were often vilified. Internationally however public opinion, including sections of the U.S. diaspora, was generally more sympathetic to their causes (Hermann, 2009).

Driven by the media images of the Intifada, the renaissance of the universal human rights discourses, and the ability to produce, disseminate and coordinate alternative representations through the Internet, the transnational nature of decolonization discourses amplified in this period. In 2001 the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) was founded by a small group of primarily Palestinian and Israeli activists to support and strengthen non-

\textsuperscript{26} Hebrew: New Profile

\textsuperscript{27} Hebrew: Courage to Refuse
violent popular resistance ‘by providing the Palestinian people with two resources, international solidarity and an international voice’ (ISM, 2011). In 2005 the Occupied Palestine and Syrian Golan Heights Advocacy Initiative (OPGAI), an alliance of eleven Palestinian and Syrian-Arab civil society organizations was established during the preparation for the World Social Forum in Porte Alegre, Brazil. There they presented a call for a Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) program against Israel, based on the South African model (BDS, 2011). The success of the BDS movement which operates is such that the Israeli state now considers that this ‘delegitimization’ program constitutes an existential threat to the nation (Eldar, 2010, 2011; Ravid, 2011). Some in the U.S. Jewish diaspora are now leveraging the resources, organizational capacities and lobbying technologies of the U.S. political process through the organization J-Street. J-Street ‘gives political voice to mainstream American Jews and other supporters of Israel who, informed by their progressive and Jewish values, believe that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential to Israel’s survival as the national home of the Jewish people and as a vibrant democracy’ (J-Street, 2011). Alongside the likes of Jewish Voices for Peace (JVFP) and Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JfJP), J-Street is one of a spectrum of diaspora organizations across the West openly questioning and countering the legitimacy of the hegemonic maximalist narrative being produced in Israel (Landy, 2011). Such organizations are often opposed and sometimes denounced by veteran ‘pro-Israel’ U.S. diaspora organizations such as campus based Hillel, which aims to inspire Jewish students ‘to make an enduring commitment to Jewish life, learning and Israel’ (Hillel, 2104) and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). These latter ‘pro-Israel’ organizations are key transnational agents in the Israel state’s Hasbara program (Molad, 2012). Meanwhile, particularly since the Oslo accords, the occupied Palestinian territories have become a major centre for the global Human Rights industry. Relatively well funded and transnationally constituted agencies such as OCHA, OCHCR, UNESCO, UNTSO, UNWRA, UNOPS, UNICEF, ICRC, DCI, WorldVision and CARE are just a few of the localised expressions of the transnational third sector (Allen, 2013) 28. The contestation in the transnational realm over how Israel should be imagined now includes terms such as ‘vibrant democracy’, ‘high-tech innovator’, ‘threatened’, ‘justified’, ‘aggressor’, ‘occupier’, ‘coloniser’ and ‘apartheid’. These phrases

28 See glossary for these acronyms

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are not used in one voice but in polyvocal contestation of meta-narratives on nationalism, law, rights, justice and varied potential resolutions.

**Resistance in Local Fields**

One of the most persistent and transnationally manifest practices of decolonization over the last decade has been the local village protests organised by various Popular Committees. These protests began with the construction of the separation barrier in 2003-4, which both expropriated village lands for the security ‘seam’ of the barrier itself and in many cases cut villagers off from their lands on the other side of the wall. The Popular Committee protests in villages like Budrus and Bil’in, Nil’in organised the villagers, mostly on Fridays or Saturdays, to march down to the construction sites, sometimes attempting to halt work or access land on the other side. According to international human rights law, it is the obligation of the occupying power to allow residents of territories to protest. However, under Israel’s martial law, in the Order Regarding Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda Actions (Order 101), a permit is required for assemblies or marches of ten people or more in which a speech is made on a political subject – or a speech which may be ‘construed as political’ (ACRI, 2011). In practice almost no permits are issued and the protests are met by the IDF and Israeli Border Police. Marchers are dispersed, arrested, injured and some have been killed. These protests soon attracted Israeli and international activists who came in ‘solidarity’ with the Palestinian villagers effecting a particular form of transnational ‘political tourism’ (Gordon & Grietzer, 2013; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009). A plethora of anti-Zionist, left-Zionist, conscientious objectors, pacifists, and human rights activists coalesce around a space where the complexity of Palestinian grassroots representation stand in confrontation to the Israeli hegemonic discourse embodied in the form of its citizen-soldiers. Solidarity in the face of Israeli occupation is now fully transnationalised and demonstrates how such networks constitute innovative forms of sociality and interaction (Juris, 2008b; Koensler & Papa, 2011). The growth of this global movement over the last decade is, I believe, a remarkable achievement that is entirely indebted to grassroots activism of Palestinians in villages of the West Bank and neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. For years they have endured violence, arrest and death week-after-week in their insistence to non-violently protest against their oppressor. In doing so they have maintained social spaces which root transnational fluidity and inspire and affect those who come in solidarity. These people, protests and social practices are the core of this ethnography and parts of their story are told in the chapters that follow.
Conclusion

It is clear that colonisation and decolonisation discourses and practices have both adapted to and adopted from changing national, international and transnational contingencies sketched out in this chapter. The macro transnational processes are manifest as Appadurai’s (2008) *ethnoscapes* of collective identities, *technosvapes* of material and knowledge production, *ideoscapes* of statehood and dissent and the explosion of *mediascapes* which promote and problematise the fractures between the stated ideal and actual practice of the latter two competing social projects. There is also the growing engagement of global NGO presence at the local level and increasing networking through Global Civil Society. The unfolding contingencies and emergent powers within this complexity of authorities continue to shape the constraints and possibilities of international, national and local forms of socio-political expression. However, throughout its history the pattern of colonial settlement that served as the basis of state building in the *Yishuv* has never been discarded and the dispute between minimalist and maximalist forces concerned the extent and goals of expansion and not its desirability. What change there has been in the colonisation project is characterised by the perceived legitimacy of its various manifestations and the discourses used to validate the practices in the eyes of multiple observers. However, there is also continuity in the decolonisation project which has also validated its practices with reference to both historical precedent and the adoption of emergent supranational discourses on legality and morality.

The political momentum in Israel for the past fifteen or more years has been with the maximalists. By its nature overt nationalism is perhaps less concerned with the opinion of authorities outside its borders but it would be foolish to ignore the isolationist tendencies of such a policy. Globally, the *Hasbara* ideal that ‘Israel is a Western democracy in the middle of the Middle East [which] stands for freedom, equal rights for all’ (WUJS, 2002 attrib.) is losing traction even among traditional supporters of Zionism. As of late 2014, the Kerry Initiative, the latest round of Two State negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, came to naught in and the Palestinian Authority keeps threatening to turn to the supranational authorities of the U.N. and International Criminal Court to legitimise its decolonisation discourse. Civil society resistance, which has been defined by solidarity and justice discourses for the past decade or more, is increasingly promoting an apartheid framing of Israel’s socio-political policy, equating the state with the infamous and failed regime of South Africa. To point to the recent rightward trend in mainstream politics as a result of a dilution or aberration of the noble intentions of liberal Zionist pioneers to for Israel to be a ‘light onto nations’ would be wrong. Europe’s imperial splendour at the turn of the last
millennium was fully applauded by many a national liberal and Jabotinsky’s maximalism was as legitimate when proposed as was the minimalist approach, which was founded more on pragmatism than on aspiration. Both schools of Zionism grew from the European proclivity of the 19th century for turning up in a far-away land and claiming the right to possess and rule somewhere else. This is a core and undeniable dilemma for liberal-Zionists today. The right is also said to be resurgent in Europe post-9/11 and after the austerities imposed on national tax-payers to pay for the corporate bailouts after 2008. One cannot ignore the fact that in England the blatantly racist English Defence League (EDL) is a grassroots social movement or that UKIP is winning by-elections. Such resurgence of the right in Europe never goes unmentioned by the Israeli press. There is a two-fold irony here in that firstly Israeli flags are flown at EDL marches – because they all hate ‘Arabs’. Secondly and much more profoundly while a UKIP gaining a seat in Rochester & Strood in 2014 is seen as an uncomfortable warning in English politics, the Israeli executive branch has a Foreign Minister who proposes to disenfranchise citizens who are not Jewish and a Minister for Economics who wants to ‘manage’ the conflict by unilaterally annexing seventy-odd percent of the West Bank. As Neils Bohr pointed out - making predictions is very difficult, especially about the future – but just as the creation of the State of Israel relied on concerted transnational action so too will the realisation of Palestinian national self-determination be brought about by the cooperation of peoples both near and far.
2. A Phenomenology of Affect in Dissent

This chapter develops an understanding of affective subjective experience in a social plurality of relationships and situates the subject within political thought and action. This explicates the role of feeling in shaping the actions, thoughts and moralities in the complex relationships of solidarity activism’s participants. I begin by outlining a relational perspective on intentionality based on Damasio (2000) which combines the body and world in the production of mind and subjectivity. This is followed by a more extensive discussion of Damasio’s understanding of emotion as a form of ‘wordless knowledge’ and Prinz’s (2007) positioning of affect at the core of moral judgment. This highlights the feedback nature of affect which is filtered and interpreted through an equally embodied lifeworld, a term I borrow from Husserl to describe the acculturated dimension of being (Husserl, 1936). I shall thus define intentionality as a fully embodied affective feedback experience, cascading into awareness through lower and higher consciousness of the equally embodied interpretive lifeworld. Expanding on the acculturated lifeworld I turn to Interactional Ritualism and Dramaturgical affect theories to describe the formation of affective loyalties, the long-nurtured dispositions by which we come to feel to belong to families and nations. The discussion concludes with Gould’s (2004, 2009) observation that these dispositions, though deeply embedded in our lifeworld, are malleable and subject to change, a process which is crucial to understanding the emergence of dissent and political action. Though it is important to understand how these various dimensions of affect all contribute to a total experience, one that is at once both personal and social, it was through ethnographic fieldwork that I came to understand the degree of subtlety and sophistication of affective processes. Political protest is certainly infused with passion but the emotions of Weirdness, Wrongness and Love which I turn to in this thesis, contain degrees of ambiguity which are often felt as undercurrents and remain unexpressed in everyday exchanges.

The second section turns to political action, thinking and judging in the works of Hannah Arendt (1958, 1971). Though not prominent in the canon of social movement theory, Arendt’s work has particular utility and relevance to the thesis at hand for a number of reasons. In the first instance Arendt also proceeds from the phenomenological perspective of subjectivity but firmly situates the intentional observer within the ‘plurality of the human condition’. It is from within and through this plurality that action, as the ‘potentiality in being together’ emerges as political power. The emergence of concerted political action is aided by the innate human capacity to think, so that the received conventions of the lifeworld fall subject to doubt. However, Arendt argues that doubt is all that thinking produces and so the
equally fundamental activity of judging is required so that understanding may emerge from within the condition of plurality. Judging is ‘the ability to see things not only from one's own point of view but from the perspective of all those who happen to be present’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 221). Secondly, and most significantly, the relevance of Arendt’s theories is supported by the fact that the participants in this ethnography were clearly acting, thinking and judging within the plurality of transnational dissent. This is the major contribution that the ethnographic experience brought to the theory detailed in this chapter. While the first section aims to present a coherent understanding of multiple dimensions of affect – experiential, cultural, discursive and so forth – Arendt’s work had to be brought into this thesis subsequent to fieldwork, so as to account for the political processes and practices that emerged in the field. Nonetheless, two critical adjustments are made to this model. Firstly, action is not confined to the plurality of the public realm but may also be found in the equally plural private realm of intimate kith and kin. Secondly, Arendt’s rationalist perspective harshly delineates between body, mind and the soul where the ‘passions reside’. Whilst Arendt sees emotion as an impediment to the political activities, this thesis argues that acting, thinking and judging are enabled and aided by embodied processes. In concluding that the mind is of the body and that the soul is the feeling of mind I assert that thinking about and with our feelings can be more insightful than the ‘clarity’ of objective rational thought.

To properly situate the development of this theoretical model, I must first outline my positionality as a researcher. This is important for transparency but also because my experiences as a solidarity activist and my personal feelings towards the socio-political situation, were both implicit in the forms and categories of affect that emerged through fieldwork. In terms of experience of political activism prior to entering the field, I had almost none. Aside from some part-time participation, with Greenpeace and access rights with the Irish Mountaineering Council, I had almost never stood with a crowd of people demanding socio-political change or highlighting injustice. This stands in contrast to a style of ethnographic engagement, exemplified by anthropologists such as David Graeber and Jeffery Juris, who leverage their knowledge and expertise to assist and even help organise the social movement they are studying (Graeber, 2004; Juris, 2008a). In the methodology chapter that follows, I will discuss more fully the form of ethnographic knowledge produced by different levels of engagement, but here I wish to highlight how I felt entering the field as a novice activist; uncomfortable and alone.

Most of the demonstrations I joined are weekly events, with a core group of attendees showing up time and again. The demonstrations I began with in Jerusalem were usually quiet
affairs and familiarity amongst core activists leads them to congregate in small groups, chatting intimately. Thus, while I was introduced to participants by individuals I had known previously, I often found myself alone and trying to look involved. This had two immediate consequences that helped shape the ethnography; it gave me time alone, to think about how I was feeling and it gave me an affinity with other newcomers, mostly international visitors.

At protests like Sheikh Jarrah and Women in Black, I would usually take up one of the placards provided for the event and stand quietly, holding the sign for display at the side of the road. I found this quite uncomfortable. I felt foolish and somewhat fraudulent. I had not been driven to demonstrate by matters of conscience, I was been paid to be here. I also wondered about the efficacy of this form of protest, which had been going on for years whilst achieving little in terms of substantive change in Israeli policy. Though I was already fairly convinced that Israel’s intentions towards the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank were cynical and exploitative, I was not a dynamic and driven champion for universal rights with inspirational ideas of how to move a campaign forward. I was sceptical, uncomfortable and quite inept. Standing there quietly at the side of a road holding a sign, affords one time to wonder at feelings, that might otherwise go unnoticed in more intense or violent circumstances. It was in the lonely doubt and discomfort of the hot sun (and in later reflection while I wrote up my fieldnotes) that I began to notice the ambiguous but definite presence of feelings of weirdness and wrongness.

Being awkward and inexperienced also afforded me the opportunity to share and compare my uncertain feelings with other newcomers at protests. There was a regular turnover of international visitors and I found that many of them were also unsure of what to ‘think’ about the complex situation they found themselves in. Even within a few weeks, I could recognise such newcomers, standing aside looking a little hesitant. I found these individuals or small groups easy to approach and more importantly, I could empathise with and discuss the subtle emotions that were a far cry from the passion and certainty often associated with (or expected from) protesters and protests. Beginning from this position and with the guidance of my participants, I learnt to become a solidarity activist and to understand some the complex emotions that shape that process.

Quite aside from being paid to be an inept activist, I am a husband to a Jewish Israeli woman and father to our two young children. We all moved to Jerusalem in 2011, at the start of the fieldwork year. I had been regularly visiting the country since 2002, when my wife and I moved to Tel Aviv as newlyweds. There I met my wife’s cousin, who had just become one of the Sarvanim, a conscientious objector movement of reserve combat soldiers who refused
to serve in the occupied territories. This was in the middle of the random brutality of the Second Intifada and was my first introduction to Jewish Israeli political dissent. We became and remained close friends over the years, I met with many of his friends on the activist scene and from these Israelis I learned stories which ran counter to the mainstream Israeli narrative. However, the majority of my in-laws are middle-class, left-leaning individuals, who would have considered themselves part of that mainstream. At many an evening meal over the past decade, I have been privileged to hear their interpretations of unfolding events. These experiences and relationships, prior to my academic career, were fundamental in shaping my interest in Love and the intimate affects of dissent discussed in this thesis.

More generally, by the time I began my doctorate, I had serious doubts as to the sincerity of the ‘security discourse’, which is often adopted by both centre-left Israelis and the international community, to legitimise the suppression and disenfranchisement of Palestinians. I was definitely opposed to the occupation, which in some way helped alleviate my discomfort with the practice of public protest.

But I was not simply a foreign researcher with affine kin relations in the field. I was the father of two young boys who were to be raised as secular Jews in West Jerusalem. As a social scientist I was aware of how early the sense of belonging can formed. I had read Don Handelman’s (2004) Nationalism and the Israeli State, in which he states that acculturation to the Zionist mythology begins in kindergarten. I was also aware that, if things don’t change, my sons will someday face conscription into the Israeli Defence Forces. When, after about six months at pre-school, my two-year-old pointed to a flag and said in Hebrew hineh, deleg etzet Yisrael, I persuaded my wife to move the children out of the state pre-schools. The toddler had not just identified the ‘Israeli flag’, he had used the official (and semantically more sophisticated) term ‘Look, the flag of the Land of Israel’. From that point onwards the children attended ‘bi-lingual’ education institutions, first the nursery at the YMCA and then the Yad-b-Yad primary and secondary school. These are the two main institutions in the city where Jewish and Palestinian children learn together, using both Arabic and Hebrew, and which celebrate Christian, Judaic and Islamic religious festivals. For my ethnography, this brought me into contact with a sociality of dissent that extended beyond the network of the solidarity activists. However, these admirable institutions are not perfect havens and I worried about how and when my children would be exposed to the conflict, one which I was engaging with on a daily basis. This moment came violently close in 2014, when my six-year-old’s classroom was burnt down one Saturday night by Jewish extremists. I was relieved when he told me later, ‘you know, it wasn’t an accident – no, robbers did it’. I have genuine
fears about the growing level of intolerance and lack of compassion required to support contemporary Zionism, a fear which arises from my hopes for my children’s future. The following thesis is also framed by these feelings of hope and fear.

A Phenomenological Framework

At their core the various strands of phenomenology are concerned with ‘life as lived and human consciousness in all of its lived realities [...] an attention to the indeterminate and ambiguous character of everyday life’ (Desjarlais & Throop, 2011, p. 92). Intentionality, as a key concept in phenomenology, is widely debated and understood but may be generally described as ‘the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs’ (Jacob, 2010). Here I expand this definition so as to understand ‘mind’ as an embodied product, ‘representation’ as a relationship, and that relationship to be culturally situated and interpreted through an equally embodied lifeworld.

To begin with the emergence, formation and constraints of the intentional subject, Damasio (2000) contends that representation resides not in a disembodied mind but is inscribed upon the ‘theatre of the body’ in the form of the organism’s emotions. Secondly, he contends that representation is not about or of ‘things’ and ‘properties’ themselves but about the relationship between ‘things’ and the embodied subjective organism. As such, intentionality is not some innate property of mind as distinct from body nor of body as distinct from environment. Finally, this process of feeling our relationships to the world is not free-form but always what Heidegger referred to as ‘situated being’ (Heidegger, 1953). The intentional representation is potentially constrained by acculturated interpretations, ‘one’s submission to the prevailing or standard social definitions of the situation’ (Evens, 2008, p. 54). Thus intentionality is a product of the acculturated human organism’s interaction with the world. This understanding is a fundamentally relational perspective, combing the body and world in the production of mind and subjectivity.

Though Evens calls these standard social definitions a ‘socio-epistemological prison house’ (ibid), the human capacity to break out and transcend the constraints of a lifeworld is evidenced in the history of dissent, for if not slavery, patriarchy and violent coercion would still be widely regarded as the natural order of things. This capacity was also clearly evinced by many younger Israeli activists, some of whom had finished high school and entered the army with strongly nationalist outlooks, only to end up as anti-Zionist activists with Anarchists Against the Wall (AAAtW) or the Boycott, Divest and Sanction (BDS) movement. The ambiguity inherent in intentionality is crucial for such transcendence and is a product of
both the limitations of the subjective gaze and the received structures of the lifeworld. In the first instance, the nature of potential objects (and the potential nature of objects) in the intentional relationship is expansive. The objects of intentionality are not limited to the manifest or mentally recalled visual or auditory realms of wolves or thunder, but include the full sensual spectrum of experiences both banal and intense. While the alarming or the euphoric may be moments which we recall with intensity and point to as formative, the majority of lived experience relates to what Stewart calls the emergent creativity of ordinary things (Stewart, 2007, 2011). The ethnography of being a dissenter in West Jerusalem, where the greater portion of the weekly routine occurs far from protest performances, reinforced Stewart’s observations on the ordinary affects of daily life, as dimensions of community formation and practice discussed in the section on Wrongness. More generally, it is impossible for a temporally situated subject to experience the actual world in its entirety and to understand one’s self in the immediacy of the moment, experience is always subjective, incomplete and ambiguous. In the words of Merleau-Ponty there is ‘the absolute certitude of the world in general, but not of anything in particular’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 347).

Ambiguosity is also implied in Damasio’s model. In his opinion there is no evidence to suggest that we are consciously aware of all the embodied sensations at play in the theatre of the body, adding another degree of ambiguity alongside our limited ‘view’ of the moment. Below the horizon of conscious intentionality in which an object becomes salient to the subjective mind, there may be a wealth of sensorial engagements not attended to at a given moment in time or under certain circumstances may escape the constraints of a lifeworld which supresses the appearance of inconsistencies. In this thesis the section on Weirdness examines this capacity to escape the prison. It is important for our purposes to recognise that there is also ambiguity inherent in the hegemonic elements of the lifeworld. As ideals and abstract knowledge structures, they also produce a specific kind of ignorance in their inability to describe the fluid unfolding world of plurality in which we exist. However, that ambiguity works both ways and Herzfeld (1997) points to ‘social poetics’, the manipulation of normative codes and supposed cultural traits, as a way of maintaining the hegemonic order.

With added affect
Building upon the phenomenological framework outlined above I present here an understanding of affect not as distinct from cognition, mind or reason but as integral to their formation and functioning. Furthermore, I argue that affect is not a purely independent
subjective experience but rather, just as how we think and speak is shaped by discourse, how we feel and emote is also a highly acculturated sociological experience. Both the intentional experience and the lifeworld by which we order these experiences are fully embodied affective processes. I thus develop an understanding of affect as a continuous relational and recursive feedback process moving through levels of consciousness and knowledge which is intrinsic to body, mind and sociality.

To do so I draw upon a number of authors whose work pertains to three of Jasper’s (2011) five categories of affect; reflex, moral and affective loyalties. I begin with Antonio Damasio’s neurological investigation into the emergence of consciousness through the embodied organism’s interaction with the world. The general reflex model of affect which Damasio expands on is known as the James-Lange theory. Independently proposed by American phenomenologist William James and Danish physician Carl Lange in the late 19th century, the basic premise is that physiological arousal instigates the experience of a specific emotion (James, 1884; Lange, 1887). The sequence is important here for it is not that emotions instigate physiological arousal so as to prepare us for some action (like running away), rather the body changes prior to such cognition or judgement and so tell us how to feel. For James, we do not cry because we are sad; we are sad because we are crying. Though by no means uncontested, contemporary refinements of the James-Lange theory ‘has been hard to disprove, and most modern anxiety researchers think that the ultimate answer lies in feedback loops between the brain and the body’ (George et al., 2002, p. S60). I then discuss the theories of Jesse Prinz who expands on the perceptual dimension of affect to propose that subjective moral judgments on the rightness or wrongness of actions are instantiated as affective processes (Prinz, 2007). The idea that something is wrong is central to dissent and moral shock and outrage have been highlighted by a number of authors as a compelling factor in mobilization. But following on from Prinz I argue that the embodied judgement that something is wrong also outlasts the intentional moment and subtly shapes how we think about complex issues.

In Jasper’s categorisation the body of affective experiences is not however limited to these two so called reflex and moral emotions and to properly understand their underlying logic they must be situated within other embodied sensations - urges, moods and most significant to this thesis the affective loyalties felt towards families, friends and nations. As opposed to the intentional experiences of reflex and moral emotions, affective loyalties develop and operate over long timescales and are normally conceived as dispositions towards people and things and the feeling of belonging. I thus turn to a number of sociological
theories of emotion by which such loyalties are created and structured, most notably Interactional Ritualism and Dramaturgical theory (Durkheim, 1912a; Levy, 1973). These social processes constitute the affective dimension of a lifeworld and so shape subjective reflex and moral emotions. As such affect is tied to and supportive of culturally constructed epistemologies. We are though dealing with dissenters and in the case of the Israeli constituents in particular, raised on the tenets of Zionism, we must admit that such constraints are neither fixed nor insurmountable. To understand how the conflict between different affective loyalties may be managed and given new meaning in the intimate lives of dissenter, I turn finally to the work of Deborah Gould in which confusion emotions can be given new and productive meaning (Gould, 2004, 2009).

**Perception, affect and meaning**

Consciousness, according to Damasio, is ‘an entirely private, first person phenomenon which occurs as part of the private, first person process we call mind’ (Damasio, 2000, p. 12). Its emergence ‘consists of constructing knowledge about two facts: that the [human] organism is involved in relating to some object, and that the object in the relation causes a change in the organism’ (ibid, p. 20). This is an inherently phenomenological perspective of the intentional subject situated in an unfolding world. Damasio distinguishes between three stages along a continuum of affective processes by which consciousness emerges: a state of emotion, a state of feeling and a state of feeling made conscious. Emotions are the organism’s patterned neural and chemical responses to the object which are responsible for changes in the ‘theatre of the body’, altering its internal milieu, visceral, vestibular and musculoskeletal systems. The neural devices which produce emotions occupy a fairly restricted ensemble of sub-cortical regions (white rather than the grey matter) and are part of a set of structures that both regulate and represent body states. The purpose of these representations of the organism and all of its internal states is to monitor and maintain the organism within the narrow environmental band in which the organism can survive. These representations are continuously mapped in ‘pulses’ in the organism’s brain as what Damasio calls the ‘proto-self’. The sensory and motor structures activated by the interaction of the organism with the object are also mapped on the proto-self. These two ‘first-order’ neural patterns are nonverbal representations or images in the mind, pertaining to the proto-self and the object. Consciousness in this model emerges when the maps pertaining to the object cause changes in the maps pertaining to the organism, these changes producing further ‘second-order’ maps, images and representations. These second-order maps represent the relationship
of the object and organism, ‘a specific kind of wordless knowledge – that our organism has been changed by an object’ (ibid, p. 168). The mental images that describe the relationship are what Damasio calls feelings. We, the human organism, know we are conscious and feel we are in the act of knowing, for in relating to the world around us not only is our ‘proto-self’ changed by the emotion, we also feel that change which:

‘arises in the re-representation of the nonconscious proto-self in the process of being modified within an account which establishes the cause of the modification … Knowing springs to life in the story’ (ibid, p. 172 orig. emph.)

This perspective of emotion as a form of perception and always involving the apprehension (or recall) of an object, combined with the salience of that object as a form of appraisal is now widely applied in many disciplines. Emotions are a form of information processing and evaluation which is often faster than or prior to the operations of our conscious minds (Leventhal & Tomarken, 1986; Nussbaum, 2001; Prinz, 2004). However, emotions also call out to consciousness to request salience to a busy mind and affect must be understood as a cascading of relational, recursive formulations of feeling as doubling back on itself in constant reappraisal. Damasio calls this the feeling of the feeling and for Massumi affect is an emergent and autonomous ‘two-sided field’ of feedback of continuous nonconscious self-reflection by which the human organism ‘attains the level of conscious reflection’ (Massumi, 2002, p. 31).

Affect is therefore not equated with emotion; rather it denotes the continual feedback emotional processes of embodied meaning-making in the intentional experience of life. It cannot be understood as distinct in itself or wholly distinguishable from cognition or other dichotomies of mind-body, conscious-unconscious, subject-object, interior-exterior, nature-culture. Aside perhaps from deep sleep, meditative states, some psychotrophic states or pathology, affect is an unceasing process of experience which flows across common categorical dichotomies. It must be understood merely as a starting-point in the exploration of experience which extends outwards before folding back in on itself, as if on a Möbius strip or the ‘Ascending and Descending’ of Escher’s impossible stairwell. This is not to say that affects are meanings per se, rather they are embodied intensities which make thoughts and feelings possible (see Stewart, 2007). Moments in which affect’s wordless knowledge emerges from pre-conscious to the salience of the self - what Damasio calls the ‘hint half-hinted’ - may be suppressed by the constraints of a lifeworld’s acculturated knowledge or
crowd of other signals we constantly produce. A world of wordless knowledge awaits below the surface of awareness.

Before continuing it is important to highlight Damasio’s insight that human consciousness is not a monolith but occurs along a spectrum from simple to complex kinds. *Core consciousness* is its simplest kind and relates to the intentional immediacy of the now, that which has formed the discussion up to this point. ‘Core consciousness does not illuminate the future, and the only past it vaguely lets us glimpse is that which occurred in the instant just before’ (Damasio, 2000, p. 16). Similarly, the sense of self which emerges in this kind, is the ‘core self, a transient entity, ceaselessly re-created for each and every object with which the brain interacts’ (ibid, p. 17). Perceptual or reflex emotions emerge in core consciousness in these intentional moments. However, feelings like weirdness and wrongness would not exist nor have meaning without some referent to a past ‘normality’ and critical thinking is impossible without a future orientation. Such processes are only possible through *extended consciousness* and its corresponding *autobiographical self* which ‘places that person in individual historical time, richly aware of the lived past and of the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the world beside it’ (ibid, p. 16). Damasio asserts extended consciousness as being a complex biological phenomenon with many levels and grades evolving across the lifetime of the organism, dependant on conventional and working memory, possessed of identity, enhanced by language, and capable of reasoning. This evolving entity is what I refer to as the lifeworld. Though the lowly earthworm may elicit core consciousness it is only by cascading through the extended kind that human intentionality and its prodigious capacity for the abstractions of sociality emerge.

**Affect and moral judgment**

The James-Lange model focused on emotions as bodily states which inform cognitive and affective understanding of the subject’s relationship to the immanent (or absent) material object, such as the reflex fear of the wolf or sadness at the loss of a loved one. However, Jesse Prinz contends that it is a mistake to interpret the content of emotion as lacking in outward intentionality by representing the bodily states alone. Drawing on a wide range of studies his ‘embodied appraisal theory’ asserts that emotion and affect is also instantiated by, and represents judgements on, cultural abstracts such as flags or the adherence to or transgression of moral codes (Prinz, 2007). Considering together the perceptual dimension of affect and the notable affective dimension of *feeling* that something is wrong or right, Prinz applies Dretske’s (1988) theory of general mental representation to emotional states. Dretske
states that any mental representation represents that which it has the function of reliably detecting. In this, mental representations of ‘red’ are made by the activation of devices with the function of detecting ‘red’ and so equally emotions, like fear or sadness, are instantiated by ‘that which it was set up to be set off by’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 61) – fear represents danger and sadness represents loss. Prinz further argues for the existence of embodied affective devices to represent rightness and wrongness as being essential to the sociality of human existence. As such, the so called moral emotions like anger, contempt, disgust or pride specifically represent the apprehension of an act where cultural moral precepts have been either transgressed or adhered to. The significance and influence of the affective dimension of moral appraisal in relation its codified and cognitive processes is evidenced in the phenomenon of ‘dumbfounding’, in which rational arguments justifying acts of moral transgression have little effect in swaying subjects’ sense that the act was wrong (Murphy, Haidt, & Bjorklund, 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Prinz’s observation that ‘people don’t usually revise their moral assessment when their reasons are debunked’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 31) is particularly relevant to this dissertation’s discussion of the role of Wrongness in the practice of transnational dissent. While dumbfounding can act as an affective bulwark preserving a lifeworld perspective in the case of transnational dissent, where participants have already undergone at least a partial transformation, the underlying feeling that something is wrong overrules the varied and ‘reasonable’ discursive counter-arguments that attempt to mitigate oppression as just or necessary.

**Ambiguous feelings**

An innate ability to detect transgression and adherence to moral proscriptions does not imply the existence of a universal moral code. We are though moving now from the general process and towards specific affects. As such we must first attend to how specific feelings and emotions are linguistically labelled. There have been a great deal of cross-cultural studies on the subject of primary, secondary and tertiary emotions, most notably those stemming from the work of Paul Ekman (1972) and Robert Plutchick (1991). There have also been studies on the possibility that certain ‘types’ of moral emotion are widely elicited by violations of certain types of moral code. In the CAD Triad hypothesis contempt, anger and disgust are respectively aligned with transgressions of precepts of autonomy, community and divinity (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). However, this thesis does not relate to or attempt to address or distinguish between specific linguistic emotion concepts, such contempt or disgust or their Arabic/Hebrew equivalents.
Not only is this a notoriously difficult task further complicated by the transnational research subject (see Wierzbicka, 1986, 2003) but essentialised definitions of emotions run contrary to the ambiguous, emergent and cascading nature of intentionality I employ. I shall discuss the problematics of the relationship of feeling and language more extensively in the methodology section, but in an effort to focus on the pre-linguistic dimension of affect, I follow Jesse Prinz’s lead by adopting Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblance’. In this, I group together emotions through ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 66). Thus, my usage and understanding of Weirdness, Wrongness and even Love eschews the utility or necessity of applying folk or academic taxonomies to emotion and highlights how family resemblance exhibits ‘the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize different uses of the same concept’ (Biletzki & Matar, 2014). Secondly, though there may be a universal capacity to detect and experience wrongness or rightness, Prinz acknowledges that historical and ethnographic record show that morality is highly relativist social construct. What one feels to be wrong or right (or indeed weird) is entirely dependent on acculturation. Lifeworlds are therefore also constituted through and by emotion and so this discussion on affect concludes with the following discussion on how social practices produce the affective loyalties of belonging, dictate what emotions are felt and how they are expressed through dramaturgical codes, and how such constraints may be transcended in times of stress.

**Belonging & affective loyalty**

The focus up to this point has been on intentional experiences, filtered through acculturated interpretations. While I brought much of that theoretical knowledge with me to the field, the emphasis on lifeworld as an embodied construction is an inclusion demanded by the ethnographic experience. Given that it was fieldwork which produced important insights into this dimension affect, I shall go into more detail on the form and consequences of the embodied lifeworld in the methodology section to follow, particularly Pink’s notion of ‘emplaced sociality’ and Ingold’s concept of meshwork (Ingold, 2011; Pink, 2008). What follows is a discussion of well established understandings of how social processes leverage and shape emotional experiences, to foster collective identity and shared affective meanings. Whilst these theories have been developed from observations of a variety of social interactions, I found that many of my participants went through similar social experiences, in the processes of becoming and being solidarity activists. The formation of the embodied lifeworld is a social experience and, as such whether one is becoming a nationalist or an
anarchist, one is subject to the constraints and proscriptions of the group’s particular framings of affect and the practices by which they enforce them.

The role of emotion in producing collective identity has the longest pedigree in social sciences. Interactional Ritual theory derives from Durkheim’s (1912a) observations of heightened emotions attendant in religious rituals in which a common focus of attention on a totem is orchestrated and practised by and for the group. Durkheim's analysis is that of an emerging sense of an external power ultimately directed at the collective's totems, which itself being a representation of the group and evoking ‘collective emotion’ becomes central to the generation of cohesion and identification (J. H. Turner & Stets, 2006, pp. 33–34). Such emotional processes are not limited to ‘primitive’ societies or a belief in transcendental worlds or beings. All nation-states adopt totemic symbols and orchestrate collective rituals for the purpose of cohesion and identification. Handelman's (2004) study of the practices in Israeli nationalism expands the concept of ritual to apply to any ‘public event’ in which Israel’s national mythology of destruction, sacrifice and redemption is told and re-told through a series of codified emotional triggers in events ranging from kindergarten parties to Independence Day celebrations. So impressed is Handelman by the extent and penetration of bureaucratic organisation of public ritual and emotion in Israel that he sees it as structuring and constituting a cosmology. Extending on this observation, Smadar Lavie contends that Israeli public ritual forms a divine cosmology that includes ‘rituals that must be enacted, symbols that must be heeded, and dictums from higher authority that must be followed without question’ (Lavie, 2014, p. 19).

While there is certainly intentional affect for the subjective individual in attendance at public ritual, the notion of ‘collective emotion’ is problematic if it is assumed that the collective experiences the same emotion. Rather it must be understood that participants develop both ‘shared emotions (toward people, objects and ideas outside the group) and reciprocal emotions (toward each other), aiding in the development of collective identity’ (Jasper, 2014, p. 342). However, it cannot be assumed that all participants in a given ritual subjectively experience the same and intended affects. In reality individuals may feel a sense of entrapment, a lack of power, or an awareness of their position in the social hierarchy which can instantiate negative emotions, such as fear, anxiety, shame or guilt (T. D. Kemper, 1990; Lawler & Thye, 1999; Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990; Summers-Effler, 2002). Nonetheless, public ritual and its acculturation of affective meaning is part and parcel of the construction of imagined national communities and is central to the creation and reproduction of group
boundaries, dangerous others and ‘political belonging’, so much so that Mabel Berezin considers that the business of the Nation is emotion (Berezin, 1999, 2001).

Such emotions leave their imprint long after the public event is over ensuring persistent dispositions towards the symbols and mythology of the collective. Often expressed as collective identity formation in group theory, affect theorists refer to these imprinted dispositions as affective loyalties. Through publically orchestrated affective processes hegemonic norms become reinforced to such an extent that individuals come to ‘feel’ their sense of belonging and to react intentionally in socially valorised affective forms towards in-group/out-group objects in the world. Affective loyalties are therefore not of the immediacy of the reflex emotions in intentional experience. They are relatively stable, long-term dispositions of ‘attachment or aversions: love, liking, respect, trust, admiration, and their negative counterparts’ (Jasper, 2011, p. 14.3). They are not in themselves the intentional assessment but part of the affective component of a lifeworld through which intentionality must pass. The role of affective loyalties and the emotional conflicts that arise between Israeli dissenters, the nation and the equally affective loyalties they hold towards their intimate circle of friends and families comes to the fore in the discussion of Love in this thesis.

**The culture of affect and the affect of culture**

The impetus in Interactional Ritual is not as Durkheim suspected towards a frenzy of unspecified emotional state fuelled by liminality, adrenaline or narcotics but rather to associate specific emotions with specific objects. The inference of acculturated emotion and affective embodied lifeworld is further supported by the school of Dramaturgical theory which recognizes the importance of culture in defining which emotions are to be experienced and how they are expressed, not just in ritual event but in all social situations (Lawler & Thye, 1999). Cultural ‘scripts’, including ideologies, behavioural norms and rules, logic and stocks of knowledge guide which feelings should be experienced and how they should be expressed in face-to-face interaction. The dramaturgical code is a normative construct that forms part of the hegemonic structures. It not only defines what should cause anger, joy or pride but also how such emotions should be expressed, be it with stoicism or passion. Robert Levy found that acculturation can have impressive effects on both the embodied experience of affect and the subjective interpretation of those experiences. In his studies in Tahiti, his participants complained of feeling ill when they suffered some form of loss - though normatively speaking loss should be represented by sadness. Levy thus suggested that certain feelings may be hypercognized if strongly emphasized and valued or hypocognized if dis-
valued and repressed by the dominate cultural view (Levy, 1973, 1984). Theorists thus speak of ‘emotion cultures’ (A. R. Hochschild, 1979, 1983) or emotional habitus (Gould, 2009). These cultures need not refer only to hegemonic national codes and have also been observed in sub-cultures, peripheral groups and anti-hegemonic collectives and in the intensity of social protest movements which also produce and valorise their own particular dramaturgical code (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Juris, 2008b).

In her exploration of the American LGBT community Gould defines emotional habitus as a social grouping’s ‘collective emotional, and only partially conscious emotional dispositions, that is, its members’ embodied, axiomatic inclinations towards certain feelings and ways of emoting’ (Gould, 2009, p. 32). Following Bourdieu, Gould argues that one’s acquired habitus, including its affective or dramaturgical component, is so deeply incorporated that it makes the social in us ‘common sense’. To a large degree a socially acquired habitus ‘becomes one’s “nature”, one’s dispositions, one’s axiomatic orientation toward action in the various fields that one traverses’. (ibid, p. 34 orig. emph.). However, in relation to the theoretical concepts utilised in the present thesis, the correlation of habitus with lifeworld seems initially problematic, in that the ‘durability’ of external objects and structures in Bourdieu’s thinking seems incompatible with phenomenology’s subjectivism. In this Bourdieu argued that the world of objects is not the product of the ‘sovereign’ functioning of consciousness and felt that phenomenology is mistaken in its view of society as an emergent product of subjective intentionality. According to Throop and Murphy the overall theoretical framework in Outline of a Theory of Practice ‘explicitly holds that habitus is a non-intentional and non-conscious product of internalized structure’ (Throop & Murphy, 2002, p. 193; see also Bourdieu, 1977). However, they go on to argue that the two theoretical models overlap in many ways and that habitus ‘is often little more than a materialistic rendering of Husserl’s life-world’ (ibid).

For the purposes of this thesis we may thus pursue Gould’s emotional habitus as being equivalent with an affectively embodied lifeworld, all the more so since in Gould’s understanding though durable, a habitus is dynamic, malleable and always subject to alteration. Furthermore, in demonstrating the transformation of the emotional habitus of the American LGBT community during the 1980s AIDS epidemic, Gould considers that the malleability of habitus may be instrumental in generating social change. In her study of the ACT UP social movement of the time, repeated articulations by community activists altered the prevailing emotional culture of the gay and lesbian community. These public ‘speech acts’ renamed the complex, confusing and immobilising mix of shame and fear as legitimate
‘anger’ towards the government's inaction to the AIDS crisis. This renaming changed the meaning and interpretation of the embodied experience and galvanised the LGBT collective with moral righteousness and a sense of pride (Gould 2004, 2009). The outbreak of the AIDS epidemic was the crisis by which the LGBT emotional habitus was exposed as being dysfunctional to the needs of the community, so necessitating its reformation. The understanding that the lifeworld is a fully embodied, emergent and affective deeply seated structure of human experience is of central concern to the discussion of Love and Betrayal in this thesis.

At this juncture we have a model of intentionality as a product of the acculturated human organism’s relationships to the world. This interaction is fully embodied in that affect is fundamental to that process. Affect is not simply emotion but a continual feedback processes of embodied meaning-making cascading through the interpretive filter of the lifeworld which is itself a fully embodied structure shaping both how we think and feel. Though felt to be a natural component and extension of the self, a lifeworld is in large part a received social construct often reliant on hegemonic codified interpretations. However, it is not a fixed entity in that it is an ongoing process of construction and may also undergo radical deconstruction and transformation. However the model is overly passive in that it lacks attention to the plurality and intersubjective potential which Arendt (1958) characterised as a fundamental human condition. Most phenomenologists acknowledge that the world before us is held to be the same sharable and mutually inhabited world, where the bodies of others are objects and subjects for us, and so argue that ‘even our most basic experiences of physical objects both evidence and entail a foundational intersubjectivity’ (Desjarlais & Throop, 2011, p. 91).

To address the intersubjective nature of transnational dissent as practiced in the field, I turn to Hannah Arendt’s notion of action as a political activity in the plurality of this shared world. Alongside labour as the need to sustain life and work the production of material things to furnish our world, action was for Arendt the third fundamental activity grounded in the vita activa which describes ‘the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man’ (Arendt, 1971, p. 7). Arendt also posited the contrasting realm of the vita contemplativa, the life of the mind, as also having three basic activities, thinking, willing and judging. In the following I also attend to her understandings of thinking and judging because she also saw them as political faculties of the mind and more importantly because these were also activities frequently encountered in the ethnography. As such Arendt’s body of work offers a coherent framework with which to analyse political thought and action. Arendt’s model is
more akin to the notion of ‘revolutionary subjectivities’ discussed by a growing number of authors (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Pleyers, 2013a, 2013b) but offers more critical depth to describe and analyse the intersubjective character of both intentionality and practice in dissent.

The turn to Arendt is a direct consequence of fieldwork findings. Whereas I had reviewed much of the literature discussed in the proceeding prior to fieldwork, I had not come across the writings of Arendt, neither in relation to emotion nor in the canon of social movement theory. Arendt’s work, drawing extensively from Kant, is in the rationalist tradition and it is not surprising that she excludes emotion from the ‘proper’ practice of thinking, action and judging. On the other hand, given the overtly political nature of her work, the scant attention paid to her by theorists of protest and social movement is notable and my use of her work here is, in part, an attempt to rectify this oversight. However, to a much greater degree, her inclusion was necessitated by my findings in the field. I first encountered Arendt’s work through Michael Jackson (2009), whose interpretation of judging I use to expand on the form of knowledge the ethnography produced, which I describe in the methodology section. I also quickly realised that solidarity activists were going through the same difficult process, of trying to see the world from the perspective of another. Compelled to know more, I reviewed the literature, first on thinking and then on action. The correlations I found, between the affective processes I had chosen to discuss in this thesis and Arendt’s understanding of innate human practices and faculties, were striking and illuminating. The discussion in the second part of this theory section, indeed of the thesis as a whole, is thus an attempt to generalise a theory of affect and political dissent through the particulars of its ethnographic case study.

Arendt’s model does however require some adjustments. The notion of action as occurring in the ‘public’ realm is problematised by the observation of tensions within the intimate ‘private’ realm of the family which I discuss in the section on Love. The emergence of dissent within Zionist families starkly highlights the potential plurality within the private domain. More fundamentally Arendt seems at best suspicious of affect or as she refers to them the ‘the passions’. She posited strict delineation between the body, the soul where the passions rule and the mind where thought resides. This stands in opposition to the idea of the embodied mind and the knowing body described above. However, I believe that the ethnography in this thesis shows that the embodied mind does not necessarily inhibit the faculties of thinking and judging as supposed by rationalist thinkers like Arendt. On the contrary I aim to show that affect can aid and enable the positive outcomes that Arendt
believed came with the application of these faculties: action may be held in concert through feelings, feeling like thinking can also lead to doubt, and judging which produces understanding is enabled by love.

**Hannah Arendt and the Human Political Faculties.**

I address only three of the six activities which Arendt believed corresponded to the fundamentals of the human condition which she described in *The Human Condition* (1958) and *The Life of the Mind* (1971). Arendt’s work is laden with distinctions, value and hierarchical arrangement of both the worldly and mental activities and is often focused on the critique of the emergence of European totalitarianism in the twentieth century. In *The Human Condition* she critiques this latter phenomenon as a product of ‘the modern age—which began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity [though] may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 322). This dangerous political passivity of modern society she believed arose from an inversion of the classical Greek notion *polis* where political engagement was lauded in the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa* valorised over all else. The contemporary inversion, she argued, is a product of the modern age in which the scientific process, nationalism, modes of production, capitalism, consumerism and individualism lead to the pursuit of ‘life itself’ as the highest goal. An unthinking existence solely concerned with the labour of self satisfaction. Arendt’s belief was that the evils of totalitarianism could be restrained by a more politically engaged populace – *action* – and which has practiced to doubt received interpretations – *thinking* – and can come to understand the radical other – *judging*.

**Action in the Vita Activa**

A key consideration for Arendt’s concept of the *vita activa* was that the realization of a complete human life only occurs within the plurality of humanity’s social condition, ‘the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others’ (*ibid* p.58). Of the three activities it is action which she considered most political for it is ‘the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter [and] corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’ (*ibid* p.7). This inescapable diversity is both the *because of* and the *through which* of political life. In the intersubjectivity of action, which both includes and is enabled by speech, is the potential for *natality* – the creation of something new ‘affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he comes into contact’ (*ibid* p.184). Action is therefore the realization of
freedom in which individuals disclose their identities, who they are as distinct from what they are. Furthermore, given that this freedom only emerges from within, and acts upon, a plurality of other actors and reactors, the capacity to create the new in, albeit loose and uncertain concert, is where the potential for public political expression exists. This polis acting in concert and speaking with each other in the public space is for Arendt power, the ‘potentiality in being together’ (ibid p.201).

The freedom and power of action also comes with the potential for frustration and even danger for its consequences are boundless, unpredictable and irreversible. Action in the public realm cannot be contained by the dyad that initiated the new, for there is always a reaction which itself is a new action ‘that strikes out on its own and affects others’ (ibid p.190). Boundless growth and multiplying consequences carries the ‘burden of irreversibility and unpredictability, from which the action process draws its very strength’ (ibid p.233 emph. added). Arendt admitted that the unknowable consequences of action could be reason enough to hold action in contempt. To avert the dangers whilst maintaining the potential for a politically engaged polis Arendt highlighted two further human faculties - forgiving and promising. Forgiving is the ‘possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing [whilst the] remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises’ (ibid p.237).

For contemporary social movement theory, there is both a descriptive and prescriptive quality to this model of engaged action. It reflects a call for a return to the direct and participatory politics unconstrained by institutions, which Arendt felt characterised the Greek polis. The emergence of contemporary leaderless grassroots dissent protests, such as the Occupy X, Tahrir Square, and Hong Kong’s Umbrella movement illustrate how power can spring up as if from nowhere when people act in concert. The solidarity activism described in this ethnography is also an exemplar of plurality acting in sometimes tense and uncertain concert. Its transnational dimension, whereby its ‘community’ footprint extends far beyond the villages and neighbourhoods where protest occurs, is also reflected in Arendt’s vision of action in a plural world as unbound by space or place. ‘The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location [but] the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together…living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be’ (ibid p.198). Most of all the activism in this ethnography represents the refusal to live in the condition of sterile passivity and to actively resist the dominating political structures. A testament indeed to the innateness of the human faculty for action.
Thinking and judging in the *Vita Contemplativa*

There is more ambiguity in the political nature of her three mental activities in the *vita contemplativa*. Judging she considers ‘the most political of man’s mental abilities’ while thinking ‘has no political relevance unless special emergencies arise’ (Arendt, 1971, pp. 191–2). The special emergencies in which thinking becomes a political act is of particular relevance to the study of dissent, for when ‘everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join in is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action. In such emergencies [thinking] is political by implication’ (ibid). In the case of dissent versus being swept along, both thinking and judging are political activities. If the human condition of the *vita activa* is realised through the plurality of a shared world it is the ‘common-sense world of appearances’ which dominates the life of the mind as experienced by the intentional subject. Though appearances can never be fully overcome thinking and judging are faculties which transcend appearances in different but complementary ways. Thinking is generalised destructive abstraction, judging is particular productive reintegration. Whereas judging produces understanding, thinking is destructive leaving only doubt in its wake.

The outstanding characteristics of thinking for Arendt are ‘its withdrawal from the common-sense world of appearances, its self-destructive tendency with regard to its own results, its reflexivity, and the awareness of sheer activity that accompanies it’ (ibid p.88). Thinking stops all the fundamental activities of the *vita activa* – we literally stop and think. Thinking is not knowing which she related to the cognition of the world of appearances. It does not produce knowledge in itself and comes to no judgement on what is right or wrong but rather leads to ‘a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements of good and evil, in short, on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics’ (ibid p.175). It is thinking’s destructive tendency, its capacity to create doubt that Arendt believed ‘regardless of results and specific content, could […] be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually "condition" them against it (ibid p.5). The self-awareness that accompanies this activity creates a conscience out of self-consciousness and it is the conscience which Arendt believed enabled the faculty of judging.

Her thesis on judging was not fully developed before she died and appears only in fragments through a number of texts which do not present a unified theory and are perhaps somewhat at odds with each other (d’ Entreves, 2014). In contrast to the isolated inner world of thinking, judging has an endemic connection to the world of appearances and the plurality
of the human condition. Judging ‘does not leave the world of appearances but retires from active involvement in it to a privileged position in order to contemplate the whole’ (ibid p.94). By maintaining a link to the particular, that which is experienced in the sensual world of appearances, judging is the ‘gift’ of the mind which resolves the destructiveness and inapplicability of thinking’s generalisations. Whilst the thinking ego ‘remains forever concealed’ from others in the world of appearances, judging manifests to the plural condition of that world and is thus politically more applicable. Grounded by the plurality vita activa judging is ‘the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view but from the perspective of all those who happen to be present’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 221).

As with action, it seemed clear that many of the participants in this ethnography were engaging the mental faculties of thinking and judging, in the sense that many have come to doubt the interpretations which legitimise oppression and through the practice of solidarity have come to divest themselves of those interpretations in an effort to understand the world from the perspective of others. However despite these convergences there are major theoretical and methodological differences between Arendt’s work and this research. Methodologically Arendt drew her understandings from the ‘professional thinkers’ of the Western rationalist tradition, from Socrates to Kant, who preceded or had transcended the modern condition of passivity. In contrast this research proceeded from the phenomenon of dissent and relies largely on the testimonies of ‘amateur thinkers’, the activists. The convergence is thus more poignant, pointing to the utility of her framework to the study of social movements and supporting Arendt’s assertion that most anyone can think, though she wondered if perhaps Adolf Eichman was incapable of this (Arendt, 1963). More problematically, the thesis at hand takes emotion as its central object of analysis and Arendt is particularly at pains to stress that the passions and ‘concerns of the body’ are an impediment both to thinking and judging. My contention is that Weirdness, Wrongness and Love are to some extent all relevant to the activities of thinking, judging and action and thus we need to address and resolve the differences between Arendt’s theoretical framework and the one I utilise here.

**Thinking with feelings**

The fundamental issue is not that thinking without feeling is impossible, for certainly professional thinkers trained in the Western rationalist tradition may well be able to fully disconnect themselves as in a form of meditation. The problem is that Arendt’s ontology
harshly delineates between body-mind-soul, leading to a compartmentalised understanding of the form and processes of consciousness, affect, cognition and thought. This stands in contrast with the model presented earlier of a fully embodied cascading feedback in intentionality. Both models do share a phenomenological starting point as being grounded in a world of experience. Damasio’s organism-object relationship is Arendt’s world of appearances as presented to the five senses but Arendt argued that mind is a different kind from both body and soul and based this reasoning on their potentials for authentic appearance in the world.

To achieve this she ties the soul to the body. Her definition of body is not fully expanded upon beyond the hidden functioning of the ‘inner organs’ necessary for the sustenance of life, though notably there is no discussion of the brain as an inner organ. Her notion of the soul (or inner psyche) is more developed. It is ‘where our passions, our feelings and emotions arise […] a more or less chaotic welter of happenings which we do not enact but suffer […] and which in cases of great intensity may overwhelm us as pain or pleasure does’ (ibid p.72). Arendt lists a number of feelings which indeed are passionate, such as love which she asserted would not be possible without the sexual urge, and fear as being indispensable for our survival. Far from constituting part of a subtle and complex meaning making system, Arendt’s emotions are purely functional and ‘seem to have the same life-sustaining and preserving functions as our inner organs’ (ibid p.35). Arendt concluded, quite rightly, that emotions are not formed in the mind but are ‘bound’ by the body. The primacy of appearance (or non-appearance) helps convince her of this, for the invisibility of both the inner bodily organs and the soul can never ‘authentically’ appear. The expression of emotion is a filtered representation of the authentic feeling and though ‘love or joy overwhelms me, and similar physical sensations take possession of me with anger, wrath, envy [their outward expression is a] transformation and transfiguration through thought’ (ibid p.33). The body and soul are therefore of similar kind in that their workings are functional, uncontrollable and do not manifest authentically in the world of appearances. In contrast the life of the mind, she argued, is wilful activity that manifests itself authentically through speech. Though the ‘only’ outward manifestation of the act of thinking itself ‘is absent-mindedness, an obvious disregard of the surrounding world’ (ibid p.72), they become authentically manifest through speech. This authenticity is guaranteed because ‘mental activities … are conceived in speech even before being communicated’ (ibid p.32). Because we think in words, thinking’s activity can be authentically manifest through speech in the world of appearances and is made meaningful in the plurality of the human condition.
Arendt’s reasoning here is problematic and at times self-contradictory. She admits that the interconnectedness of thinking and speech ‘obviously do not apply to civilizations where the written sign rather than the spoken word is decisive’ (ibid p.100), and cites the examples of Chinese script and the Hebrew tradition of ‘hearing the truth of God’ as alternatives to thinking in words. Again she is inconsistent when she states the inner life of the soul, emotions, can be adequately expressed in ‘a glance, a sound, a gesture’ yet feels that appearing absent-minded is a different quality of expression. Most observers understand and distinguish what is happening in a friend’s ‘inner-world’ when they look pensive. The reasoning that such similar outward expressions are of a different order rests on the assumption that mind and soul are of a different order. Her separation of mind from body and soul relies on what she admits is the ‘metaphysical fallacy’ of inner and outer worlds and the triad of being she employs is inherited from classical Greek philosophy.

There are other difficulties. Her conceptualisation of consciousness as simply self-awareness and the notion of ‘common-sense’ (which may be some form of lifeworld or may be the world of appearances we sense in common) are also undeveloped in this work, but it is her understanding of affect that is most limiting. The ‘passions’ (the term itself is revealing) are intense, brutish uncontrolled things which intrude upon the mind. This rationalist distrust goes as far back as Plato and its adherents tend to list affects like anger, fear, lust, envy as base things to be suppressed and transcended. And I would tend to agree on that point, but limiting emotions to a realm of intense and irrational phenomena ignores the subtlety and nuance of human affective experiences in order to promote a particular agenda for proper and rational being. However, if we understand affect as a perceptual, sociologically shaped and shareable human capacity we can see that emotions both follow a logic of sorts and are full of meanings that are often more insightful and concise than spoken reasoning. We must at the very least acknowledge that Arendt’s assertions that we think in words and that there is no chiasmata (crossings) between body and mental phenomena (ibid p.33) are now basically unsupportable - though perhaps not uncommonly held.

In contrast to Arendt’s compartmentalised model, I argue that the mind is of the body, and what may be referred to as the soul is the feeling of that mind in its emergence and sensation of self. This totality emerges from and within a world of plural relationships, to both the minds of others and the sensuality of experience in this shared world. Experience is the unavoidable condition of being, from which the interpretations of lifeworld become embodied. The following chapter on methodology expands further on the sensuality of experience of the world but for now we may begin to formulate certain questions for the
ethnography of affect and being. What activity is taking place when I stop all other activities to reflect upon the affective signalling occurring in my body? Is this not thinking *about* emotions, not simply to find words which describe them, but to promote their salience in my consciousness so as to better interrogate their forms and meanings? Moreover, rather than wilfully suppressing subjective feelings so as to gain the ‘clarity’ of objective, scientific and so rational thought, if I pause to consider why I am feeling so, am I not gaining deep insights by thinking *with* emotions? I believe that for researchers and participants alike, affect neither negates the utility and importance of thinking and judging nor does it undermine the overarching aims and hopes of Arendt’s body of work, the belief that emergence of evil in society can be resisted. On the contrary one of the aims of the following thesis is to demonstrate that feelings also furnish the political mind in ways Arendt would deem positive. For just as Weirdness causes us to doubt, Wrongness affords concerted action by transcending plurality and Love affords the endurance needed to judge. I argue that if we stop to think about, through and with the feelings that our body furnishes our minds with we may actually augment our understanding of ourselves and the lives of others.
3. Methodology, Methods & Ethics

The main focus of interest in this thesis is on the emotional processes of being a dissenter. Since my understanding of affect has been dealt with in the preceding chapter what follows relates to the specifics of the sociality of fieldwork in and around Jerusalem and beyond. This is the social, sensual and imagined dimension in which the affective emerges through the movements of its participants. The discussion contains both reference to ethnographic theory and a substantial amount of description and self-reflection on my experiences as a fieldworker. This is not then a description of a methodology by which I approached fieldwork but my current understanding of the processes and forms of knowledge which ethnography produces subsequent to undertaking the endeavour. This chapter is divided into two main sections. I begin with two methodological concerns which to some extent were qualified prior to fieldwork. Firstly, I explain the pragmatics of distilling and dividing the complexity of identities in transnational research into the four categories of Israelis, Palestinians, Internationals and the ‘non-aligned’. Secondly I consider the possibilities of practicing politically ‘engaged’ ethnography as a means of establishing trusting relationships and a potentially richer way to participate in and with the lives of others. However, on a practical level my own lack of experience dictated that this thesis falls somewhere between cultural critique and activist research (Hale, 2006). This is followed by defining the ‘fieldsite’ in transnational research, a problem which came to the fore during fieldwork as a consequence of adopting Iris Jean-Klein’s ‘lateral’ approach to ethnography. In this, rather than selecting particular social places, groups or institutions to study, the lateral ethnographic approach follows the movements of participants (Jean-Klein, 2003). I find the resulting ethnography to be in accordance with Ingold’s (2011) understanding of the meshwork of the movement of myself, the participants and countless others from transnational dissent who proceed along ‘lines’ between particular places defined by sites of practice of solidarity activism. Though this transnational field is unbound, moving far afield with the bodies of its participants and into and through the pervasive digital realm, the focus of the fieldwork is its localised moments in Israel-Palestine.

The second section turns to the question of how ethnography can access the emotional lives of its participants and what form such an understanding takes. To a large degree this addresses the validity of the assertions I make in this thesis. Again I found myself turning to the work of Ingold (2008) who understands anthropological knowledge as emerging from the practice of working with people in their world. In this he asserts that the researcher’s immersion in the world of participants’ activities and lives, the method of participant
observation, allows the anthropologist to ‘see, hear and touch’ the world from their vantage point. Building upon this through the work of a number of authors I conclude the human condition as described by Arendt is not only plural, it is entirely and incessantly sensual. There is a particularity to the sensations of this sensuality which is guided by structuration of movement along specific lines in the meshwork of solidarity activism. To be a dissenter is to move not only between sites of weekly protest but to and through particular sites of leisure, labour and everyday life. In doing so participant observation leads to a recognisable patterning of dissent on the meshwork of the embodied lifeworld of the researcher. Thus in moving along the lines of the research site with participants I came to understand the field of transnational dissent because I came to feel it too.

To refine the form that such an understanding takes I employ Michael Jackson’s interpretation of Arendt’s faculty of judging as producing understanding in the third position (Jackson, 2009). Though as researchers we may come to feel from the vantage points of our participants we neither become the participant nor lose our researcher self. Jackson argues that the ‘imaginative displacement’ the ethnographer must adopt in order to reconsider one’s own world from the standpoint of another entails Arendt’s activity of judging. However, the understandings it produces are reducible to neither the researcher’s nor the participants’ but emerge from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself. The tension between researcher and participant is never lost, nor is it necessary for it to disappear altogether for such would be a completely unnatural intersubjective experience. The differences remain and are productive, for it is the requisite for the active engagement and conversation of judging, in which understanding is collaboratively produced with both researcher and participant. I argue that having learnt to feel as a dissenter often feels, the acts of displacement are not merely imagined but are also affectively experienced as empathy. The emotions discussed in this thesis are thus neither definitively my participants’ nor my own but the product of our genuine attempt to reveal their meanings.

**Transnational identities**

Having found both a spectrum of activities and historical continuity of peaceful resistance in the literature review, I decided prior to fieldwork to not focus on a particular organization, form of practice, or specific political aims with regard to the conflict. Furthermore, having an interest in the transnational dimension of contemporary sociality, I did not limit myself to working solely with Israelis or Palestinians. The research population would include anyone who was or had been in some way involved in agitating against the discourse that violent
coercion are legitimate means to either maintain or resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine, the categorical imposition I call transnational dissent. This encompasses activists, journalists, academics, professional NGO staff and other agents regardless of ethnic, religious or national affiliations whom I have encountered during fieldwork. However, to understand the contours of dissent one must also explore the discourses and practices which it opposes, the sociality of consent if you will. Since the Israeli state and society are both major producers and consumers of these discourses and the primary agents of their practice my fieldwork also paid close attention to radical, mainstream and uncertain support of Israel’s politics and practices. This latter end of the spectrum are referred to by one participant as ‘non-aligned’, a term I also adopt. To a great degree this was achieved simply by living in West Jerusalem where everyday activity predominantly occurs within a Jewish Hebrew speaking population, a positioning which necessarily weighs the ethnography towards being a dissenter in ‘Israel’ rather than ‘Palestine’ or say Canada. However, the ‘field’ of transnational dissent will be defined in a later section as a confluence of movements on a meshwork of lines largely structured by sites of solidarity activism.

Through my Israeli wife’s network of family and friends I was already familiar with a form of Israeli hegemonic identity well before fieldwork. This is a mostly secular, native born, Ashkenazi Jewish, middle-class, well-educated, Hebrew and English speaking, and mostly liberal, left-wing or uncertain Zionists. Through this family centred network, I came into personal contact both with the conflict and the practice of dissent and two of my long-term Jewish Israeli acquaintances served as gatekeepers to the research field. When not ‘in the field’ with participants and demonstrations or meetings, I attended to the busy ‘ordinary’ life of a father and husband. I lived in West Jerusalem where my wife worked and my children went to nurseries accredited by the Israeli state. Most every day I bought milk at the nearby petrol station where Mohammad, a young Palestinian man from Silwan in East Jerusalem, would greet me in Hebrew with a smile. I did my main shopping in the nearby Super Sol, where all the prices are in Hebrew, and visited and holidayed with my in-laws. I studied Hebrew in a state-run ulpan along with about twenty newly arrived immigrants, known as olaim, who were mostly grandparents from the former Soviet Union. The quotient practices of everyday life are a component of any ethnography and essential and sensual component of fostering Herzfeld’s (1997) cultural intimacy and understanding of the social field.

The field of activism in Israel and Palestine was thus pre-conceived as transnational by my preparatory academic training and literature review, and pre-prepared for me through
family relations and personal experience that pre-dated my engagement with social science. As a result I entered that social mix through and with something of both an Israeli and foreigner’s perspective but almost no experience of local Palestinian life. These identity terms are problematic in that they cloak subtleties and differences in their generalisation but to avoid endless hyphenation in this text I have found it necessary to use them and so the thesis utilises four main categories of identity: Israelis, Palestinians, Internationals and the ‘non-aligned’. The non-aligned mostly refer to the intimate acquaintances of Israeli dissenters whose opinions on the practice of dissent range from those unconvinced of its utility, its legitimacy or are even vehemently opposed to its premise. Internationals are in the simplest sense ‘foreigners’ who come to protest in solidarity. Palestinians are Arabs. Israelis are Jews. I physically wince typing these last two categories in particular. Such terminology is not only conflated and contested but is also a central component of the local and international hegemony of nationalism and ethnicity reproducing the violent and oppressive conflict which in many ways defines this dissertation.

In reality there are many Israeli-Palestinians involved in this research, often referred to (by activists and Palestinians) as 48ers, in reference to the Arab population who found themselves within the Israeli state after the 1948 war. This demographic includes other formal categories of the state such as Druze, Bedouin and Christians. There are of course also Palestinians from the occupied West Bank and Gaza who are considered by themselves and most authorities as definitely Palestinian, the only exception being some Zionist discourses who think all Palestinians are just Arabs. Similarly, despite being dissenters, Internationalists are Jewish and have often been raised with a strong positive connection to Israel and Zionism (see Landy, 2011). According to Israel’s the Law of Return they can automatically become citizens of Israel if they so choose. There are Israeli-Americans in this ethnography, or regional variants thereof, and one in particular who goes to prison for his conscientious objection to his Israeli-mandated side of military conscription. I have met diaspora-Palestinians from California at protests in East Jerusalem along with Communist Internationalists and as broad a spectrum of personal and collective identity markers one could ever hope to meet in a relatively constricted physical locality. Indeed for many Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs the practice of solidarity dissent entails a profound reassessment and movement towards the normatively antagonistic other. These four meta-groupings are more than a just a necessity in order to avoid incessant qualifications and caveats, for better or worse these categories are also commonly used amongst dissenters to describe with reference to themselves and others. When clarity is required individual participants in this
text are qualified according to their own needs and desires. Such taxonomic ambiguities are part and parcel of transnational research.

**Engagement with dissent**

Before moving on to the fieldwork methods through which ethnographic knowledge emerged I must address the general issue of objectivity in research and the notion of ‘engaged ethnography’. The idea that academic research should be applicable to wider society is not unique to anthropology. Acknowledging the overt political orientation of social protest Bevington and Dixon have called for the production of ‘movement relevant theory’ to go beyond the traditional concerns of social movement theory, such as the deconstruction of framing processes or the identification of political opportunity (Bevington & Dixon, 2005; see also Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). The debate revolves around whether this is best achieved through the discovery of objective truth or through some system of ethics. Probably the best known early anthropological proponent of the ethical school is Nancy Scheper-Hughes who advocated a ‘militant anthropology’ based on values (D’Andre, 1995; Scheper-Hughes, 1995). There is no consensus on this position but given the tradition of working with subaltern populations, and its recent history of radical critique, many anthropologists are open to her call to ‘speak truth to power’. The anthropology of social movements in particular has seen an increasing number of researchers taking an engaged stance, through cultural critiques of power structures, participation in protest actions and in some cases organizational input in struggles (see Graeber, 2004; Hale, 2006, 2008; Juris, 2008a; Juris & Khasnabish, 2013; Postill, 2013). However, movement relevant theory requires a critical examination of the field not a fawning retelling of its ideals. Despite this sympathetic bias and the effort at full immersion in ethnography, the awareness of the researcher-participant power relationship is not just crucial, it is also hard to forget. Between the related practices of participation and observation exists an ‘unnatural’ tension which the critically trained researcher should find productive. Despite the difficulties inherent in such an overtly aligned approach, to which I myself subscribe, its potential lies in ‘research outcomes that are both troubled and deeply enriched by direct engagement with the complexities of political contention’ (Hale, 2006, p. 96).

There are many practitioners and forms of engaged, activist, public or applied anthropology in many social spheres. In social movement theory and practice, as George Marcus points out, there is currently an increasingly mutual identification between anthropological research and social-movement activism, involving increasingly closer
engagement and collaboration (in Juris & Khasnabish, 2013). In a trend that owes a great
debt to the decades of politically committed feminist research, authors such as Geoffrey
Pleyers, Phillipe Bourgois, Jeffery Juris, David Graeber, Alex Khasnabish and Manisha Desai
are closely involved with homelessness and drug addition, anti-capitalist and Occupy X
movements, the Zapatista struggle, and the World Social Forum (Bourgois, 2003; Bourgois &
(2006) makes a distinction between activist research and cultural critique as forms of
engagement based largely on methodological grounds. The former Hale describes as, a
collaborative method involving explicit alignment with a politically organised group or a
struggle and involving strategy planning and advice, advocacy and resource mobilisation,
direct action activities and ‘a creative process of collective theorization and knowledge
production carried out from inside social movements’ (Juris & Khasnabish, 2013, p. 24). For
Hale, engagement in the form of cultural critique is a poorer approach in that political
alignment is expressed through the content of the knowledge produced, not through the
relationship established with an organised group of people in a struggle. If ethnography is
about establishing trusting relationships, which I believe it to be, then methodologically
activist aligned research is potentially a richer way to participate in and with the lives of
others.

However, my own ethnographic practice in this project is somewhere in between and
certainly at the beginning of fieldwork was closer to the critique end of the spectrum. This
was more a matter of pragmatics and experience rather than personal desire or ethical
considerations. From the outset I must state that I had serious reservations as to the policy
and conduct of the Israeli state towards Palestinians under its jurisdiction. Though I knew that
the Israeli state is and has always been subject to ideological opposition and instrumental
violence since its inception, perhaps most horrifyingly in the random explosive murders of
the Second Intifada, I was unconvinced by the ‘security discourse’ which I felt was cynically
invoked to justify decades of ongoing and often valorised processes of oppression,
dispossession and colonisation on the backs of an entire people because they exist external to
the hegemonic understandings of Zionism. My sympathies thus lay with the people engaged
in dissent to this situation. I began fieldwork thus disposed to my imagined understandings of
its aims.

That said, my capacity for activist research was limited for a number of reasons. As a
junior researcher I found myself in a complex field of delicately maintained relationships in
which participants had a much more profound knowledge and experience of local dissenting
practice and theory than I did. I had neither the expertise nor authority to provide insight or strategy. As time went on, my closest participants or newly arrived Internationals did begin to ask for my thoughts and a degree of collaborative knowledge production occurred, but these were interpersonal exchanges and not strategy meetings per se. I also limited myself by not directly participating in activities whereby I might get arrested. In the Occupied Territories in particular, getting arrested at demonstrations in lieu of a Palestinian protester is an important and strategic practice. Known as ‘de-arresting’ this normally involves holding onto a member of the security force so that a Palestinian, whom are usually the first targets of security forces, can flee across the fields. This is more than just a nicety or token sacrifice, for an Israeli or International protester will most probably be held in detention for only a few hours whereas a Palestinian is likely to face three months in a military prison. Being arrested in this way is something of a (not unproblematic) rite of passage for certain sections of Israeli and International dissenters but in my case this may have entailed deportation and so jeopardised my research project. Despite these limits I was most often positioned and welcomed as a sympathiser. Yet the tension in researcher-participant relationships remained and the intersubjective space of understanding was also described by a critical distance formed by my obscure interest in affect, ambiguity and sociality, which in many ways stood in opposition to useful tactical insights often sought by social movements (see Juris & Khasnabish, 2013). I shall turn to how this intersubjective space of understanding produces ethnographic knowledge in a later section but for now I shall turn to how the ‘fieldsite’ of transnational dissent is defined.

**Lines of enquiry as the transnational ‘field’ of dissent**

I began fieldwork on a sunny Friday afternoon in September 2011 by walking down to Kikar Paris in Jerusalem city centre where the *Women in Black* (*Neshim B’Sukhor*) have been holding a silent vigil against the occupation every Friday at 1pm for over twenty-five years. Later that same afternoon we walked across the city centre to join the weekly *Sheikh Jarrah* protest in East Jerusalem at 4pm. This routine was repeated for a year. No formal method for finding participants was applied as Philippe Bourgois said in a Manchester University lecture on his ethnography of heroin addicts - you just go up and ask people (see Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009). However, rather than observing the flows of sociality through these two sites, I adopted Jean-Klein’s (2003) ‘lateral approach’ to ethnography in which my participants would lead the researcher through the field. In this way I travelled the city and beyond to locations and events throughout Israel and the occupied territories, for the most
part not in search of experiences which I thought would be ethnographically useful, but because I was invited by participants. In contrast to an ethnography of a given place, such as Whyte’s (1943) *Street Corner*, the methodology used here could be seen as multi-sited (Marcus, 1995). However, it is not for the sake of comparison that different sites are visited but because movement reflects the ordinary practice of transnational dissent in Israeli and Palestine.

The lateral approach was fortuitous and, upon reflection necessary, for two main reasons. Firstly, the solidarity protest cycle is weekly, with demonstrations regularly held each Friday or Saturday. It would have been possible to live for instance in Sheik Jarrah so as to observe community life and activist organisation in the intervening six days. Certainly there is activity that continues after the protest, court cases and the potential for altercations with the settlers. However, this would have focused in-depth on a single site of dissent, where in fact most of the people are engaged with the weekly protests. This would be an ethnography not of transnational dissent but a site where transnational dissent takes place. Secondly, there is no ‘neighbourhood’ at where a community of dissenters reside. The very notion of ‘coming together’ in solidarity infers extant distances of space and identity. There are however certain bars, cafe’s and other public venues where dissenters pass through and encounter each other, which are as much on the political tourist map as are the village demonstrations of the popular committees themselves. Indeed new cohorts of EAPPI observers, who come from abroad for a three month placement in Jerusalem, are given tours by a departing observer where they are brought to the Educational Bookshop near the Damascus Gate in East Jerusalem. With an excellent collection of books on the conflict in various languages, regular film screenings and lectures this small quiet place serving cake and cappuccinos is a node of transitional dissent. Ask practically anyone from anywhere who has been involved in dissent in the city and they will point you the way.

From this sketch we can see that Solidarity Activism entails movement to and from specific sites of protest. There are also specific sites of commerce and leisure associated with dissent, offices, shops, cafes and bars. I have thus come to understand the research ‘field’ to be not just these sites of protest and ancillary services, but also the ‘lines’ along which dissenters move between them. This understanding builds upon Ingold’s concept of the *meshwork*. In this he asserts that anthropology proceeds along ‘observational paths of being’

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29 Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine & Israel
with their participants (Ingold, 2008, p. 87). Life, he asserts, is lived along such lines of movement through the unfolding world which become inscribed as experience in a meshwork, a texture of interwoven threads’ (Ingold, 2011 loc. 177). The meshwork for Ingold, is not merely an abstract network of connections but the totality of the affective experience of movement through the sensual world, in effect a dimension of the embodied lifeworld. In her work with Cittaslow gardening communities, Sarah Pink has highlighted the productive sociality of such sensuality through what she calls the ‘emplaced sociality which occurs when the sensual world is shared in collective activity. These ‘sensory socialities…the shared tastes, smells and textures of residents’ barbeques or sharing coffee prepared in someone’s home brought out into the garden to drink while chatting’ (Pink, 2008, p. 181) form part of the collective’s common knowledge. The meshwork is shifting and subjectively unique to the individual’s experience, yet when one engages in solidarity activism the paths along which one proceeds are defined by specific sites of dissent and their sociality. Just as generations are acculturated to a national collective by similar public rituals decades apart, so too must we realise that co-presence is not required for the sensuality of emplaced sociality to affect collectivity. For dissenters who move through Jerusalem and Hebron, Al-Massara and any of the village protests a pattern of experience emerges in their meshwork which is recognisable and sharable by others who have also followed along such lines. Though still unique to each individual the various patterns begin to elicit a family resemblance. The ‘fieldsite’ as such is a not a particular place or places but a convergence of patterning in the meshwork of participants movement though the world of transnational dissent in Palestine and Israel.

Sensually emplaced sociality is key to my understanding of this field, where the heat and the cold and humidity are affective experiences shared with (and compared by) the participants with whom I practiced dissent in protests. On one occasion it snowed at a protest in Sheikh Jarrah, a particularly rare event in Jerusalem, and the freezing grim pointlessness of twenty people protesting in front of no one was written and recognised in the grimly grinning faces of all. Such is camaraderie. However, I stress that copresence in time and space is not a requisite for such shared, or more precisely sharable, sensual experiences by which this field is produced. Even if one walks alone one Friday from Women in Black past the Old City and the Educational Bookshop to Sheikh Jarrah you are following a path

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30 loc. XXX here and in future citations refer to the location identifier in Kindle books in lieu of page numbers
trodden by a myriad of other dissenters at other times. The drive through the checkpoints into the West Bank, the sound of stun grenades on a hot day and the welcome winter breeze which disperses the tearing wretch of tear-gas are all sensual experiences which can be re-called, re-felt and recognised in subsequent exchanges with others. Such is the patterning process of transnational dissent on meshworks. Just as a state’s public rituals pattern the affective lifeworld so too do the ‘lone’ experiences of sensual movement through particular public places. The research field of transnational dissent in this ethnography lies along well trodden pathways under the parching heat of the sun, the coolness of a breeze, the smell of jasmine or tear-gas, the steepness of the hill or the sharpness of a cold beer after a tough day. This is part of the experience of dissent in which I participated sometimes by myself and often with others. Notably, such movement is not shared equally by all and in particular the Palestinians of the West Bank are not free to simply visit the Educational Bookshop – or even Jerusalem. No one in solidarity activism is unaware of this distinction and indeed the transnational flow is largely defined by constraints on Palestinian movement. Israelis and Internationalist go to Palestinian villages where locals attempt to walk to a given destination in space. Israeli security specifically aims to prevent this Palestinian movement by drawing some invisible line. This is the paradox of this transnational field. It is at once unbound, moving and reproducing far afield with its participants and through digital representations on social media, yet at the same time the logic of occupation actively limits the movement of Palestinians at the micro level. Israeli flesh, concrete and steel constrain movement on a daily basis on a scale measured in mere metres. This field thus understood, though unbound, is being experienced by myself from the privileged perspective of a non-Palestinian observer localised and reflexively less constrained by their residency in a West Jerusalem suburb. The human condition within that unbounded space is not only plural, it is entirely and incessantly sensual.

**Research constraints of the transnational field: On Language & Gender**

Before addressing the methods of ethnographic fieldwork and the forms of knowledge it produced, two significant omissions must be explained. In general, this thesis pays only passing attention to the issues of language and gender. These are both highly significant factors in the experience and understanding of emotion and are subjects of extensive theoretical consideration in anthropology and other sciences of humanity. Their exclusion from this thesis is more of a methodological constraint than a theoretical oversight. Put simply, the complexity of the transnational field encompassed both a multitude of tongues
and a diversity of cultural, generational and ideological attitudes towards gendered differentiation. Furthermore, given the fluidity of movement of this field, the constellation of participants at particular meeting points is forever changing. Under such conditions any attempt at generalisation would be fraught with caveats and the subject of the thesis would become the role of either language or gender in transnational dissent.

To begin with, proficiency in the ‘local’ language has long been an important component of ethnography, both enabling effective and subtle communication, fostering trust, respect and a cultural intimacy with the field and folk. It is seen as essential to intersubjectivity (Fabian, 2014). Having decided to enter this field from the Israeli perspective I undertook six months Hebrew training, beginning in September 2012 at one of the state’s ulpan language courses. I would say I am more efficient than proficient in the language. I had insufficient resources (or talent) to learn Arabic as well, beyond a few common phrases and greetings. I speak (or have spoken) a little French, German and Spanish, which was sometimes helpful in establishing rapport but the majority of this research was carried out in English. The question of language, power and communication in transnational practice of dissent has been highlighted by a number of authors and is an issue of great concern at events such as the World Social Forum (see Desai, 2013; Dörr, 2008, 2009; Juris & Khasnabish, 2013). More pointedly, when discussing emotions, the assignation of textual labels to embodied experience effects the experience itself. Language is part of both the dramaturgical code and the embodied lifeworld, through which experience becomes known and understood. Following on from Arendt’s (1958) contention that the private life of the mind can only be revealed through the transformation of ‘storytelling’, Jackson argues that speech not only transforms private experience into a form fit for public consumption, but that public discourse also transforms private experience. In what he calls the ‘politics of experience’ Jackson points out that, ‘the range of experiences that are socially acknowledged and named is always much narrower than the range of experiences that people actually have’ (Jackson, 2002, p. 23).

Language is clearly an important component of subjective experience and the section on Love in this thesis does address the impact of discursive ideals on the meaning of emotions. However, the joint emplacement of Israeli-Palestinian-International dissenters in clusters of small, interconnected, performances of dissent, presents an interesting and challenging instance of ‘language as local practice’ (Pennycook, 2010). The ‘local’ performance of spoken communication, in the convergence of highly fluid transnational lines,
is one in which communication is fraught with tied-tongues, stumbled sentences and misunderstandings, and speech acts are expressions of power, oppression, pride and shame.

To take the two largest local languages, Hebrew and Arabic, the former is imagined and institutionally implemented as a shibboleth of hegemonic national identity, spoken only in one country in the world, the Jewish National Homeland. This ignores Palestinian-Israelis, Russian speaking immigrants, Yiddish speaking orthodox communities and a significant number of others for whom Hebrew is a second language. The impressive revival of Hebrew is intimately tied to the building of the Israeli state and Israeli culture. Several participants have confided that they would not move abroad because, ‘Hebrew is how I think, how I express myself’. However, from my balcony in central Jerusalem, I am as likely to hear passing conversations in English or, because of the Maghreb synagogue beside our home - French. If I walk fifteen minutes north from my apartment, throughout the Jewish Orthodox neighbourhoods of Mea Sharim and Beit Israel, most of the residents are speaking Yiddish. As I turn East and leave Beit Israel, I cross the main road running north through the city. In doing so I cross ‘no man’s land’ and Green Line of the 1948 armistice, to enter the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah, where Arabic is the language of the street. This was my weekly walk to ‘work’, at the Sheikh Jarrah protest. It takes me less than half-an-hour and attests to the everyday contestation of hegemonic norms of language in the city of Jerusalem.

The majority of my Israeli participants spoke English better than I spoke Hebrew. There is a significant cohort in the older generation, from liberal or even communist traditions, who left the United States during the McCarthy witch-hunts or later in protest of the Vietnam War and its draft. Many of the younger generation are well educated, well travelled, dual passport holders, who grew up in homes speaking both English and Hebrew. Of my key participants, Vered was born and raised in England and came to Israel with her family when she was fifteen. Oz was born and raised in Israel but his parents came from Canada and the United States, where he himself lived and worked after his military service. Oz co-directs an NGO staffed by Palestinians and Internationals where English is the ‘office’ language. Moses was born in Israel but raised the US, returning to fulfil his national service duties - by refusing military conscription as a conscience objector and going to prison.

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31 The Maghreb extends from Morocco to Egypt on the northern edge of the Sahara much of which fell under French control after the nineteenth century. It was home to vibrant Jewish communities for millennia until the 1950s when for several reasons many Jew were either ‘absorbed’ under Israeli state immigration programs or went to France. Many Maghrebi (adj.) can speak Arabic and French.
Though they dissent and speak perfect English, these individuals see themselves as Jewish and feel no less Israeli than anyone else. The linguistic talents of these participants without doubt fore-grounded their roles in this ethnography and my own lack of talent excluded others who may have shaped this text in a different way.

The place and use of Arabic in the field is equally complex. Though Arabic is an official state language, very few Jewish Israelis have any real grasp of the language. Many of East Jerusalem’s Palestinians, those over the age of twenty, speak Hebrew but restrictions on movement and access to the Israel labour market over the last twenty years have greatly diminished the level of Hebrew for the younger generation and Palestinians in the West Bank. There are two notable exceptions to this linguistic otherness, both linked to conflict. Many Palestinians who have spent prolonged periods in Israeli military prison speak Hebrew and conversely, many Israelis who served in military intelligence units in the army are proficient in Arabic. However, as part of the deconstruction of the self, that accompanies the process of political dissent, some Israelis strive to become proficient in Arabic. ‘Learning Arabic completely changed how I saw this place [Jerusalem]’, Mayan a Jewish Jerusalemite told me. For Israeli dissenters, learning and speaking Arabic is not just a question of pragmatics or gaining an understanding of the Other, it is also a question of power and a discomfort with employing the ‘language of the oppressor’.

At the same time many of the Palestinians I met, at the forefront of the popular committee protests, are proficient in English and utilise this skill to disseminate news through websites and communicate with international visitors. English is also commonly used in exchanges with Israelis, both to welcome those who come in solidarity and to berate Israeli soldiers who obstruct them. At demonstrations, such Al-Maasara and Beit Unmar, were protestors stand face-to-face with Israeli soldiers, I have almost never heard Palestinians address Israeli soldiers in Hebrew. Arabic however, is leveraged as ‘local’ power and identity, in the slogans and chants, for passing on tactical manoeuvres and in snide comments delivered to the ears of the ‘clueless’ soldiers. Arabic used in this way is both a symbol and tactic of resistance but in terms of communication between Israelis, Palestinians and Internationals the use of English is pervasive. It is not that English is simply the lingua franca, it seems that between Israeli-Palestinian relations it also offers a degree of independence from the oppressor-oppressed paradigm, which is linguistically paralleled in Hebrew-Arabic.

English is the dominant language of the spoken exchanges which contributed to this thesis and shapes it conclusions. In-depth participation grew out of (or withered) because of
interpersonal rapport, which was greatly enabled by the fluid and productive ambiguity of spoken exchange. The question of discursive linguistic practices in transnational networks is challenging and complex, but is not the central concern of this thesis and the effort here is directed towards the ‘wordless knowledge’ of affect. My use of the categories of Weirdness and Wrongness are the result of the intersubjective nature of this ethnography. These categories neither fully describe the subjective experiences of my participants, nor are they captives of the particular textual labels they normally use to describe those experiences. They are products of the ‘third position’, a concept that comes once again from Arendt and form of knowing which I shall detail in the section on participant observation that follows.

Similarly, gender is not only recognised as a significant shaper of affective processes, it also often presents real challenges to the practice of transnational solidarity activism. One of the most important observations on gendered affect differences is Arlie Hochschild’s work on ‘emotion work’; the management of discrepancies between actual feelings and the dictates of an emotion culture. In this, Hochschild highlighted the particular constraints and expectations, of how female flight attendants should emote, constraints which reflected socially structured ideals of womanhood (Hochschild, 1979). Similarly, Kemper and Collins (1990) have documented the dynamics of power and status, or ‘prestige’, on the expectations and social exchange of emotion. As part of the wider social structure, which defines acceptable masculinities and femininities, any dramaturgical code necessarily reflects and reinforces gender roles. We may also point here to Gould’s (2004, 2009) work on the LGBT’s own particular emotional (sub-)culture in the US. There is also a substantial body of work on the role of gender in activism in general (see El-Bushra, 2007; Naples, 1998) and on various dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. Much of this has focused on women’s practices of resistance; in the occupied territories (Jean-Klein, 2000, 2003), in the Palestinian diaspora (Peteet, 1991), amongst Israeli Palestinians (Sa’ar, 2006) and on Palestinian and Israeli Jewish co-resistance (Mayer, 1994).

The problem of integrating such work into this thesis is, once again, comes from the methodological decision not to engage with a single group or organisation within the wider community of transnational dissent. As such the ethnography reflects an impressive array of cultural, religious, generational and ideological understandings of gender. Take for example the Women in Black, an organisation consciously formed and practiced as a female expression of dissent, standing in silence in opposition to ‘injustice, war, militarism and other forms of violence’ (WIB, 2014). Though some of the original women approach the
occupation with sophisticated socio-political critiques others like Tali who features in the section on Love, by her own admission, ‘doesn’t know much about politics’. She sees herself as a woman but not a feminist. On the other hand, Vered is an activist with the Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW), a collective which consciously struggles with gendered power imbalances within its own numbers. During fieldwork something of a crisis emerged in AAtW, when one of its female members was accused of sexually harassing one of the men in the organisation. Though there is a forty-year aged gap between Tali and Vered, they are both key participants in this work and they have often stood beside each other at the silent vigil in West Jerusalem, watching the Israeli men, who hurl disgusting sexual insults at them as they drive by.

Leaving the Women in Black and walking down to Sheikh Jarrah, many Israeli and International women join the Friday protest in this East Jerusalem neighbourhood. The current organisers, and authorities, of this protest are three local Muslim Palestinian men. Rarely do local Palestinian women join the roadside demonstration, but they do make themselves available to visitors down in their homes. Younger Palestinian female activists, from the Hebrew University do sometimes attend as does Amany, a confidently assured Muslim woman from Ramallah who chats easily with everyone. There are often young Jewish Jerusalemites who are also involved in the city’s small LGBT scene, who struggle for equality and justice both as members of the gay community and as solidarity activists. This stands in contrast to the large and vibrant LGBT community in Tel Aviv, which mostly disassociates itself from the politics of the occupation. In terms of international visitors, the female contingent varies in age, origin, sexual orientation and political critique from week-to-week, month-to-month. Sheikh Jarrah was a largely quiet affair during fieldwork and the dynamics of social interaction was causal. The hour-and-a-half that the protest lasts involves political conversation but not deliberation or tactical planning and affords little opportunity to encounter or confront gendered power imbalances.

Such differences do become more pronounced in the West Bank, where conservative Islamic attitudes are stronger. On one occasion in Beit Ummar, I met Vered and greeted her with a friendly hug and a kiss on the cheek, as we had become accustomed to doing. ‘Don’t kiss me here’, she whispered in my ear, ‘we’re in a Palestinian village now’. Such inappropriate actions occur on both sides and I have heard reports (though never direct) of young international women being sexually harassed by Palestinian men. I have never encountered local female Palestinians at the village protests in either Al-Maasara or Beit Ummar. These protests come eye-to-eye with the Israeli military. Though officially Jewish
Israeli women are conscripted, they do not generally serve in the combat units that police the Palestinian population in the territories and as such, there is a greater frequency of physical confrontation between opposing groups of men at these protests. Several female activists have lamented to me the underlying machismo that often accompanies this kind of dynamic.

However, women do not hide away. The annual Resist for Change Women’s Conference has brought Palestinian, Israeli and International women together in Beit Ummar since 2010. I also met with a group of female students from Scotland at Beit Ummar, who were impressing all with their fearless confrontations with the Israeli forces, physically grabbing the arms and legs of soldiers who were attempting to arrest male Palestinian protestors. The driving force behind protests and other actions in Al-Walaja, was Fayrouz, an unmarried Muslim polyglot in her early thirties. Frustrated by the apathy of the men in the village, she once threatened to take off her hijab in their presence, inferring that they were not really men so she had no need for modesty in front of them. There are many other instances where gendered power is both leveraged and contested, from ‘Slut Walks’ in Tel Aviv to Jewish women being arrested in Hebron - for being dressed as Palestinians in the hijab and the traditional embroidered dress (see Rothman-Zecher, 2012). I believe that a few of these women were at both protests. The problem of including gender in this thesis is thus two-fold; the multiplicity of different cultural constraints that come together and the variety of instrumental, social and private contexts in which such meetings occur. None of the female participants in this research were unaware the pervasiveness of chauvinism in almost all contexts. However, as I shall discuss later in this thesis, the practice of transnational dissent subsumes or at least sublimes multiple aspects of endemic difference, through a shared feeling of Wrongness.

**Ways and knowing with participant observation**

My understanding of participant observation and the forms of knowledge it produces primarily references the works of Tim Ingold and Michael Jackson. As a practice the validity of its method is underwritten by its occurring within the sensuality and sociality of the field of study, which grounds ‘knowing in being [and] means that any study of human beings must also be a study with them’ (Ingold, 2008, p. 83 orig. emphasis). In Ingold’s world of continuous motion there is a comingling of mind and world in which any particular phenomenon to which we may turn our attention enfolds within it constitution a totality of relations. It emerges in the moment of unfolding and so any given experience is not
comprised of the individual but of the world itself as experienced from a particular observational path. ‘It is a world not so much mapped out as taken in from a particular vantage point’ (ibid p.81). For Ingold, by immersing herself in the world of participants’ activities the anthropologist learns to see, hear and touch things from the vantage points of her teacher participants. I would add that as I moved along the lines of dissent with my participants its patterned threads became inscribed experiences in my own embodied lifeworld, and I also began to feel things from the perspective of my participants. This is not to say that I felt what they felt at synchronous moments in some sort of collective emotion but that I began to feel things that they would recognise in their own affective lifeworld.

To understand the meanings of these feelings I had to turn to my teacher-participants. This intersubjective practice of understanding is for Jackson (2009) the essence of ethnographic knowing and he adopts Arendt’s (1968) concept of judging as relating the particular to the form of knowledge ethnography produces. Though in learning to become a dissenter and moving along its lines with the guidance of others, I yet remained an academic. Such a tension, Jackson argues, exists whenever any two people engage in the activity of judging in the attempt to understand one another. Judging entails the attempt to see the world from the perspective of another, to distance oneself from the bias of our own lifeworld. One can never completely lose one’s self nor entirely become the other and so for Jackson judging requires ‘imaginative displacement’ from the self, the creative self estrangement of the ethnographer. Judging’s understanding, he thus considers, ‘implies a third position, reducible to neither one’s own nor the other’s: a view from in-between, from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself’ (ibid p.238). However, in combining Ingold’s belief that we may come to see and feel like others with Jackson’s understanding in the third position, we see that the act of judging need not merely be an act of imagination – a mental exercise. The following section expands on these two concepts, the practice of participant observation of affective worlds and the form of knowledge it produces. In a very real sense I came to understand the field of transnational dissent because I came to feel it too.

**Learning with others to become another**

Because I had a car I regularly provided transport to and from events. Methodologically, the car proved a valuable resource. Jerusalem has no public transport on Shabbat, from sun-down on Friday till sun-down on Saturday, which crosses the times when most of the regular demonstrations are held. The Palestinian villages in the West Bank are not easily accessed by Israeli public transport even outside Shabbat and the wonderful little
Toyota Starlette with over 300,000km on its clock became a stalwart of ethnography. With this car not only did I provide a valued activist resource but the confines of the automobile on the way to and from protests proved to be an excellent and intimate environment in which to have and to hear informal conversation. Outside of the automobile protests and prayer groups are public rituals of dissent, they are intermittent and short-lived, but repetitive expressions of dissenting practice with the potential for the affective intensity of Interactional Ritualism. However, the experience of being a dissenter is not described by attendance to protest alone. For most of the week people are not engaged with such activities nor, from an ethnographic perspective, do they reside in some dissenting village or neighbourhood in which the researcher can live and observe and participate in their daily rituals. Dissenters are dispersed within a society that is at best apathetic to their distress and at worst hostile to the point of aggressive vitriol. Part of my participant observation thus included simply living in West Jerusalem, going to the shops, to Hebrew lessons, reading the paper, collecting kids from nursery, taking the bus to town or going to celebrate family occasions. This also formed part of my understanding and empathy with being a dissenter in this particular place. One need not be actively performing protest to be experiencing feelings of dissent. All participants spoke of sensing the occupation and inequality everywhere, in the non-citizen Palestinians or East Jerusalem working on construction sites, pumping your gas, stacking shelves in supermarkets, and in the apparent ease with which Jerusalem Israelis ignore the situation. Whilst the occupation is certainly not the sole object of intentionality, the lifeworld of dissent comes to shape how the entire city is experienced and becomes a background disposition whose potential for affective emergence is hypercognized.

These are what Stewart (2007) calls the ‘ordinary affects’ of being, the particular twist here is that dissent constitutes a particular way of being. Far from the rush and fear and retching at protests in the occupied territories, participant observation also included all the mundane encounters and experiences that would be almost banal were they not so difficult for the dissenter to accommodate. I too began to feel the isolation participants spoke of within the flowing crowd of the city where almost no one is aligned with your views. I learnt that my tongue is sometimes best held and felt the relief and small joy when I met a fellow dissenter on the street. For a moment the griminess of the situation is freely expressed and laughed off before we continue on our separate ways. Aside from protests we would find ourselves at dinner-parties, birthdays, evenings out, holiday celebrations, sharing foods, laughs, backgrounds, reflections and hopes. These rich social exchanges are the stuff of ordinary sociality and are also always fully sensual experiences. Participation is experiential,
embodied, social and intentional. Sometimes intense and often banal, more than any other method it is through participant observation that I came to feel and to be recognized as *belonging* to the research field. This is the long process of learning *with* that leads to a certain kind of knowing, one which for research purposes is relatively close to the ordinary and fluid (un)certainty of living. The purpose is to become intimately and experientially acquainted with being and becoming part of the field of inquiry (Odland Portisch, 2010; Venkatesan, 2010). You don’t have to be an ethnographer to go through the process of learning with other people. Observing and engaging with people is how people generally become practicing dissenters themselves, which in essence manifests the intersubjective understanding of others which Arendt (1968) calls for through the application of judging. The participant observer merely goes through this process with an awareness of her academic lifeworld. This leads one to reflect upon dissenting practices in particular ways while the daily routine of needing to observe, remember and record, to write journal reflections and supervision reports maintains a critical tension between participation and observation. So it was that I didn’t *just* enjoy and take comfort from the sociality produced by dissent, I *also* began to develop a thesis around its social processes and the role emotions play in shaping those processes.

**Knowing of feelings in the Third Position**

Interpretation of experiences in the field began with issues that emerged in that field and the process of interpretation is not separate from but overlaps with ‘data collection’. Repeated encounters with a phenomenon began to shape the line of inquiry, such as with weirdness, and were discussed with participants; did they see or experience these phenomena in the same way as I did? Did they feel these are significant experiences and what meaning do they assign to them? In this process the inputs of key participants were – well, key. I openly began to discuss my thoughts on weirdness both with individuals and in groups where my intuition that this was a significant dimension of affect was reinforced. As one participant said to me, ‘If you’re looking at weirdness you’ve come to the right place’. With regards to emotion the question must be asked though as to the extent to which the embodied and subjective affect experiences of others may be recorded, analyzed, interpreted and represented with academic rigor and validity. The wonderful contention of Durkheim and Mauss (1903, p. 88) that ‘emotion is naturally refractory to analysis […] defies critical and rational examination’ is no longer an acceptable proposition. If the validity of the knowledge on affective experiences of others presented here is underwritten by having immersed myself
in their world and learnt with my participants, the form that knowledge takes is a product of ongoing intersubjective exchanges between myself and participants – our attempts to understand each other. Such knowledge, Jackson (2009) argues, resides neither in complete knowledge of the self nor the other but in what Arendt called the *third position* which emerges when people engage the faculty of judging in the attempt to truly understand each other.

In the first instance subjective experiences, though experienced in the body and mind, can be expressed and discussed verbally. Ricoeur (1991) pointed to the ‘derivative character of linguistic meaning’ and for Csordas such textuality not only represents but ‘discloses’ Heidegger’s *Dasein*, the process of embodiment and intersubjective experience of the world (Csordas, 1994, p. 42). Thus, if a participant says ‘this is bizarre’ or ‘it’s just not normal’ they are most likely genuine linguistic components of affective phenomenon. This is not to say that people do not hide or manipulate the affective meanings they ‘report’ to the researcher (A. R. Hochschild, 1979) but the long-term nature of ethnography fosters an intimacy which helps overcome misunderstandings. Firstly, there is interpersonal intimacy with key participants from which genuinely reflective and honest exchanges proceed. Secondly, there is cultural intimacy where one learns the ‘emotional culture’ of the field, its affective structures as it were (Herzfeld, 1997). As the researcher participates in being and becoming a dissenter she also feels the uncertainty, fear, anger, dejection, and fatigue. She laughs at the ironic in-jokes and looks forward to seeing her fellow dissenters next weekend. I came to understand the subtleties of the field and see the unvoiced emotions in the faces and bodies of people I knew. And they of course also read me. With a growing intimacy comes the capacity to empathize. This is true for any social field, indeed any sense of belonging or attempt to understand another necessitates the attempt to empathise emotionally (Arendt, 1968; Berezin, 2001; Hollan, 2008).

So emotions of others whether overtly expressed, clearly seen or half-sensed can be recorded and transcribed by the researcher with a relatively high degree of reliability. There are numerous systematic methods which can be applied to its analysis. Anthropology has various intricate and robust variations of semiotics, discourse, network or situational analyses and other modes of analysis which may be applied to such eminently codifiable qualitative data, as the where, when and why of given feelings. However, as Ingold (2008) points out, analyzing data and representing processes in such a fashion would be to deconstruct the whole in order to rebuild an abstraction and Jackson argues that the subjugation of ‘the bodily to the semantic is empirically untenable’ (Jackson, 1989, p. 122). On what basis then can I
claim the reliability and validity of my abstractions about the affective lives of my participants? How can I be certain that their experience of weirdness, wrongness and love are not merely my simplistic impositions on their complex and unfolding subjectivity? The simple answer is that for a time I too became a dissenter, moved along its paths, empathised with the plurality of its peoples, experienced the sensuality of its world in a particular way and became a trusted sounding board for the hopes and confusions of people I came to know well.

In this the positivist ‘flaw’ of reflexivity is inverted and the researcher must be affected by the field. Affect is an unavoidable consequence of the unavoidable relationships of ethnography and part of the process by which we all experience and make sense of the world and its plurality. For Jackson to realise this ‘eventfulness of being’ is to discover that what emerges in the course of human interaction confounds discursive labels such as male or female, Israeli or Palestinian. So for the ethnographer (or anyone else) to truly understand the subtle and ordinary complexity of others requires ‘distance from subjective private conditions [...] through imaginative displacement – reconsidering one’s own world from the standpoint of another’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 237). However, despite the wilful act of imaginative displacement which occurs when we try to understand the lifeworld of another, we do not lose our own being nor can we suppose to know the minds of others. Our thoughts are influenced by the thoughts of others and the knowledge is produced, ‘reducible to neither one’s own nor the other’s: a view from in-between, from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself’ (ibid, p. 238). This is true of any intersubjective attempt of judging, regardless of whether or not this occurs within a researcher-participant relationship. However, Jackson argues that the ‘creatively estranged attitude’ which ethnographers are trained to adopt is inimical to its knowledge and understanding. If we allow that in learning with people we come to see and feel as they sometimes do, then the ethnographer has moved beyond ‘imagination’ and towards empathising. Nonetheless, this attempt to lose the self and see the world from another’s perspective always remains incomplete but the effort itself is Jackson asserts, the practice of Arendt’s faculty of judging. The tension between researcher and participant is never lost, nor is it necessary for it to disappear altogether for such would be a completely unnatural intersubjective experience. The difference remains and is productive, for it is the requisite for the active engagement and conversation of judging in which understanding is collaboratively produced in the third position of intersubjectivity.

The knowing and understanding upon which this thesis is based comes both from my own experiences of being and moving along the lines of dissent and from relationships
developed with participants whose movements intersected with the trajectory of my particular lines. The emotional lives described are reducible to neither the researcher’s nor the participant’s but are a product of the intersection of academic and activist lifeworlds, a collaborative understanding created in the third position. I learnt by being ‘here’ to feel and attend to the shock of concrete at checkpoints and slabs cutting the countryside, to lament the heat of summer and unexpected winter snow, to walk the steepness of the city hills at a laconic pace and to check over my shoulder at the sound of a gas grenade being launched while leaving a protest site. Such sensuality was also in the company of others, affecting both the communality of Pink’s (2008) emplaced sociality and enabling the intersubjective production of understanding through judging as elided by Jackson (2009). I would stress that such understandings are not limited to people who have walked together at the same specific place and time, for more than frequently my memories of such experiences have been recognisably shared by people encountered far from protest sites whom have also travelled along similar lines along which dissent is practiced and experienced in Israel and Palestine. Such an understanding of participant observation and the form of the understandings it reaches is I believe a valid and productive method by which the uncertainty and ambiguity of any social experience becomes knowable and sharable.

**Ethics**

Fieldwork was carried out in line with Loughborough University's code of practice (LU, 2012) and the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK ethical guidelines (ASA, 2011). The physical, social and psychological well-being of participants is paramount and every effort was made to ensure their continued safety. All participants were explicitly informed of my role as a researcher in the field and consent to participate was requested prior to inclusion in the ethnography. In large groups or impromptu one-off conversations with individuals consent was often verbally sought and given, as handing out information sheets and consent forms was sometimes impractical. With formal interviews and in-depth participation over an extended period, written consent was sought and received. This process included issuing participants a project information sheet, a discussion of the protection of the individual's privacy and anonymity, and their right to withdraw from participation at any time. Informed consent was (and is) an ongoing process of negotiating the needs of the research and the trust and safety of participants.

Protests in Area C of the West bank are carried out in contravention of Israeli military law, and the activities of activists are overtly and covertly monitored by agents from the
police, the military and the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal secret security service. Several participants have been arrested or contacted directly for ‘casual conversations’ by the Shin Bet. As such pseudonyms have been used throughout the research project in all forms of recording, including fieldnotes and in the following ethnography. I remain vigilant and open about possible harmful repercussions of discussing sensitive issues or situations. This concern extends to representations presented in the ethnographic descriptions and to the safeguarding of the original fieldnotes. It is common practice in ethnography to also use a pseudonym for the place in which fieldwork was carried out. The use of pseudonyms for locations does however present both practical and ethical issues for using fictitious names in place of Jerusalem (al-Quds), Hebron (al-Hallil), Ramallah or Tel Aviv would so radically decontextualise these cities as to render their description and relationship to the practices of dissent unfeasible. It could have been possible to use pseudonyms for the various neighbourhoods and villages where dissent is practiced. However, these protests are not only well known but also most Palestinian activists are very concerned that their particular local struggle is publicized, and from an ethical point of view the engaged ethnographical approach taken in this project is also an attempt to do just that.

While it is imperative that no harm is done to research participants, to Loughborough University nor to the discipline of anthropology itself, the efforts outlined in the preceding are ethical minimalism. Such an approach is as much designed to protect or ‘bullet proof’ academia institutions (Strathern, 2006). As I write it is the end of 2014 and though fieldwork ended two years ago I remained in Jerusalem with my family. Since the end of the fieldwork period there had been the heavy munitions exchanges of Operation Pillar of Defence in November 2012. The following year saw the first official negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority since Annapolis in 2007. The process went nowhere and collapsed in April 2014 and the logic of this small coastal nation filled that void and descended into a brutality that is both depressingly familiar in form, yet more venomously expressed than previously experienced by many participants with whom I was still in close contact. Some Palestinians and Israelis came to feel it is legitimate to kidnap and kill children. On June 12, 2014 Eyal Yifrach (19), Gilad Shaer (16) and Naftali Frenkel (16) were abducted in the West Bank. Prime Minister Netanyahu blamed Hamas and launched Operation Brothers Keeper to find the boys during which the IDF arrested almost 300 Palestinians in the West Bank, most of them Hamas affiliates. Some of my participants told me they had not seen the IDF acting with such severity since the Second Intifada. The bodies of the three boys were found after eighteen days. It is now clear that the government and security officials knew the boys had
been killed immediately. It also seems highly unlikely that Hamas planned or sanctioned the kidnap and killings. I was aghast at the cynical exploitation of the tragedy and the vitriol of certain government officials. Two days later Mohammed Abu Khdeir (15) from Shua‘fat in East Jerusalem was kidnapped, taken to a forest in West Jerusalem, doused with petrol and burnt alive. Jewish Israeli mobs took to the street chanting *Mavat Aravim* (Death to Arabs), attacking Palestinians and Left-wing activists. Yet another Israeli ‘operation’ called *Protective Edge* began in Gaza and its death toll managed to exceed Pillar of Defence. During this time people are being shot and killed in places I used to demonstrate. In *Beit Ummar* where I regularly attended the weekly demonstration 3 people were shot dead. It seems that this demonstration differed in size and not tone to the ones I participated in. On three occasions air-raid sirens rang out over Jerusalem as rockets from Gaza approached. I took my children to stand in the stairwell with the neighbours on one occasion but my fear of being attacked in the street by Israeli right-wingers was most palpable. At the same time a family birthday brought me together with extended members who live in a *Moshav* just seven kilometres from the Gaza border. The mother, whom I’ve casually known for a decade, was at her wits end with the constant barrage of missiles and mortars. Though she lived in a proximity to the dangers, which the mobs of Jerusalem did not, her feelings were much more nuanced – and compassionate. ‘Hamas is one thing’ she argued with her father, ‘but how can one million people live like that?’.

Personally speaking, as an academic, as a resident of Jerusalem and as a father of two Israeli children, I am frankly disgusted by what came to pass in 2014 and I find it difficult to theoretically address ethical considerations. What is clear is that it is entirely insufficient that research ethics is understood as doing no harm. Something must be done to help.
Part I
Weird
4. Strange Things: Ethnography of the Unexpected

As with each of the three parts to this thesis, this section on weirdness is divided into two chapters. The first chapter begins with a general introduction to the forms and practice of the solidarity protests I engaged with in the fieldwork period. Though as mentioned before much of my ethnographic encounters involved the sociality of transnational dissent away from the schedule of demonstrations, these weekly rituals constitute fundamental anchor points which shape the recognisable pattern in the meshwork and socially emplace participants in a shareable sensual world which is particular to solidarity activism in Palestine and Israel. Indeed, though there are many other factors, I would argue that without the decision of the local committees in the various villages and neighbourhoods to invite Israelis and Internationals to participate in their acts of non-violent resistance, the global pro-Palestinian movement would have neither the same scale nor affective depth as it does today. These events are also where the ‘logic’ of Israel's military occupation is stressed and begins to seem weird. The second half of this chapter is an extended ethnographic account of a single protest in the West Bank city of Hebron. The aim of this account is to reveal, by inducement of this feeling in the reader, how weirdness also permeates the lives of Palestinians and their attempts to resist the daily impositions of occupation. The following chapter then develops a theory of weirdness and its relationship to hegemonic elements of the lifeworld, the faculty of thinking and social movement mobilisation. I submit that weirdness emerges in intentional experience as a feeling, a pre-cognitive form of wordless knowledge. What that affective knowledge represents is the failure of our acculturated expectations to accord with the intentional experience of the world. It is not an immediately motivating affect like fear and can be easily dismissed as a momentary aberration or trick of the eye, not something we need to think about too much. But sometimes the weirdness lingers, it can persist like a background mood almost unnoticed, it may recur or be recalled as almost forgotten in a different context at a later time. The initial intentional appraisal may thus turn to niggling doubt as to the validity or veracity of our received interpretations which failed to describe experience. This is not doubt as caused by Arendt's notion of thinking, but by a simple and sometimes subtle feeling. It this capacity to cause doubt that makes the encounter with the weird so potentially important to the emergence of dissent and the movement towards concerted political action.
Scary, boring, crazy: Forms of demonstration in the field

In truth I did not travel extensively during fieldwork and most of the demonstrations I attended were not ‘hot’, neither in the sense of being heavily attended nor in terms of having a reputation for lethal levels of suppressive violence being used by Israeli security agencies. From reports I received from participants and through social media Nabi Salah and Kafr Kadum seemed to have been both well attended and sometimes lethal. There was a death at Nabi Salah just before I began fieldwork and another just after I finished. Mustafa Tamimi and Rushdi Tamimi were both Palestinian, both from the same family in this small village of less than 400 people on a remote hilltop in the West Bank. I never felt in mortal danger, for you are much more likely to be killed if you're Palestinian for two main reasons. In the first instance, it is the local activists that conceive of, plan, mobilize and lead all actions and so they present a vanguard to Israeli forces. Israelis and Internationals are invited to protest in solidarity and most of them feel that their primary role is to bear witness to the proceedings. However, in doing so they also triple the size of the protest group for I would say that most actions I attended were made up of one third Palestinians, one third Internationals and one third Israelis. The Israelis in particular feel that their presence reduces the likelihood of excessive violence on the part of IDF or police. I would call this the lesser reason that it is mostly Palestinians who are killed, for it is difficult not to conclude that the greater reason is that they are primary targets and easier to kill in terms of consequences. It is Palestinians who get arrested first and the military courts have a 90 percent conviction rate. It is the homes of the popular protest committees that get raided at night and 90 percent of fatalities at protests are Palestinian. Most killings occur because of ‘improper’ use of non-lethal dispersal weaponry, tear-gas canisters being fired directly at the head or chest at short range and 90% of the military's investigations into fatalities are dropped because of insufficient evidence.

Though I have read various sources using these numbers I don't cite sources here for though 90 percent seems like an incontrovertible statistic to throw about, it contains enough ambiguity which strangely seems to serve the forces of occupation more than those who resist it. 90 percent of the time no one is killed, for which I feel grateful, but one can also say that most of the time soldiers are not gunning down unarmed protesters and so they are showing restraint. Often arrests are made in the West Bank because the IDF deems 90 percent of protests there are in direct convention of Military Ordinance 101 which prohibits ‘political’ gatherings of ten or more people. The use of stun grenades, gas, water cannon or physical restrain during arrests occasionally incurs injury, but only ten percent of the time and only for people clearly refusing to accord with the rule of law. In cases where the injury
is fatal the IDF conduct an investigation and very occasionally, they can publicise disciplinary measures against one their own as grave transgressions of military terms of engagement. Though in fairness I would guess this happens probably less than one percent of the time but such ruling receives at much more publicity in the mainstream Israeli press than the ‘legal’ killing of Palestinians – which basically isn’t reported. That Ten-to-One can encompass such certain ambiguity seems strange to me, but then again statistics and probabilities are dark arts to me so I can't be certain of anything at all and I have no figures to back up this feeling. The question thus becomes one of faith in the authority of the provider of what are said to be ‘facts’ about the world but are more often what Mills called the received interpretations of others (Mills, 1967).

Such are the given conditions of protest in the West Bank in particular and in the course of demonstrations I was witness to scuffles and shovings, stun grenade at my feet, some gas in my lungs, the odd ‘skunk’ cannon spraying nearby and also arrests. The grim brutality which soldiers and police are trained to instinctively employ when called upon always disturbed me. Though many soldiers often looked unsure and on-edge, there always seemed to be some in the armed line eager to unleash their training. Visibly frustrated by simply holding their ground they glared with the confidence of contempt at protesters, singling out an individual Palestinian with the unspoken but unmistakable threat of violence to come. The Israelis they would address more directly, asking them where they lived: “Ah you live in Tel Aviv? I live there too. I'll see you there”. I witnessed such intimate exchanges at Al-Massara and Beit Ummar, both of which are about forty minutes drive south of Jerusalem and were the West Bank weekly protests I attended most frequently. Unlike Nabi Salah and Kafr Kadum north of Jerusalem, where the protesters rarely get near security forces before the gas grenades are launched, the smaller demonstrations in Al-Massara and Beit Ummar are met by a line of soldiers with riot-shields. I was always behind the line of Palestinians - or even behind the soldiers which didn't seem to bother them. But when the order to break up the demo and arrest people came there was often a confusion of scattering bodies and I would run in self-preservation through some rocky olive grove while others got knocked to the ground with blood running from their heads. I was never of interest to the soldiers, except once towards the end of fieldwork. The protest at Al-Massara had finished and as we walked back to my car, the senior officer, a young and intimidatingly composed lieutenant with the Border Police, was walking beside us with one of his colleagues. “I've seen you before, haven't I – Beit Ummar?”’, he asked me in Hebrew. I admitted it, smiling with forced nonchalance and trying to maintain a leisurely pace. I barely missed a beat when
he asked me where I lived. “Ah”, he said “Moshav Ora, I know it. Maybe I'll see you there”. I didn't go back to Al-Massara.

I made many other more sporadic trips to the West Bank. I was at Susiya in the South Hebron Hills a number of times but only once during a demonstration. I visited Ramallah three times, twice for salon-type discussions on books about the systems of occupation and once when I was ‘deported’ from the Qalandiya checkpoint for irregularities in my paperwork. I often visited Hizme just over the concrete wall north of Jerusalem, where Salah, a Palestinian promoter of non-violence, lived with his family. Salah would also bring me to ‘coexistence’ type events in Jerusalem, where Israelis and Palestinians would meet. Sometimes he was the only Palestinian there. There were also a couple of larger events in Tel Aviv that were on the scale of thousands of people rather than hundreds or dozens. Combatants for Peace organised an alternative Remembrance Day event attended by maybe three thousand Israelis and a large and loud march through the Tel Aviv which encompassed a broad spectrum of Israeli dissent, from Anarchists Against the Wall, Shalom Achshav to the left-wing parliamentary party Meretz. All these trips were integral to my initiation and integration to the meshwork movements of dissent but the majority of fieldwork occurred in Jerusalem where I lived.

Two large and disturbingly frightening demonstrations occurred in Jerusalem during fieldwork. These were both annual calendar events, one marking Palestinian Land Day and the other Jerusalem Day. The former commemorates events of March 30th, 1976 when Israeli security killed six and wounded about one hundred Palestinian citizens at demonstrations across the state against government expropriation of Arab lands for Jewish settlement development. The latter celebrates Israel’s ‘re-unification’ of Jerusalem after the Six Day War in 1967. In the first a few thousand Palestinians gather across from the Damascus Gate, the social and commercial heart of East Jerusalem, and after holding mid-day prayers attempt to march through the gates and into the Muslim Quarter of the Old City. This attempt is met with formidable police resistance with stun grenades, batons and mounted units charging down Nablus Road and Salah HaDin Street. The muscular momentum of enormous police horses bearing down on me was more frightening than anything else I experienced and the barriers and narrow streets made it difficult to find safety in the mayhem. In contrast, Jerusalem Day, which occurs in June, is a family event sanctioned and promoted by the municipality and marked by state ceremonies and memorial services. It draws tens of thousands of Israelis waving huge Israeli flags heading for the Western Wall Plaza for the Dance of the Flags. This celebration also enters the Old City through the Damascus Gate and
proceeds through the Muslim Quarter. It has become a triumphant nationalist annual event, which for an Irishman like me was reminiscent of the Orange Order marching through Catholic neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland. A protest of maybe several hundred Palestinians and a few dozen Israelis and Internationals was organised and met just as with Land Day, by muscular policing, charging horse and all. The two events are only a few months apart. Two categories of people desire to march into the Old City via its most majestic (and most Palestinian) portico. One event allows tens of thousands of Jewish citizens to do so. At both events the ferocity of police actions are directed towards Palestinians and was some of the most intense and frightening I experienced in the field.

To a great degree violent confrontation between Israeli security forces and Palestinian protesters accorded with my expectations. In the beginning I was on edge when travelling to and through East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Only gradually did I learn to be most afraid when soldiers or riot police came into view. However, (here it is again) 90 percent of the protests I attended in Jerusalem did not involve Israeli security. Is this the reason there was no violence? There were a number of small demonstrations outside the Damascus Gate where only a few dozen people turned up, nobody passing by paid attention and I felt like an idiot standing in the intense and glaring heat of the midday sun. There is not a sliver of shade in that white limestone bowl. The weekly events I participated in were the silent vigil of Women in Black and the demonstration at Sheikh Jarrah. Oddly enough it is the former where tensions were more likely to rise, for it is an Israeli protest in front of an Israeli population. On a number of occasions the regular verbal vitriol directed at these women, most of whom are grandmothers, became intimidating when some muscular young man of military age decided to get in close and personal, maybe grab a placard or spit on the women before being held back by his mates. At Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem the protest has to some extent no apparent audience. Passing drivers honk their horns in support, orthodox Jews walk past on their way to the tomb of Simon HaTzadik unhindered and only twice in the year did I see an altercation with a settler.

It must be remembered that the popular committee protests are epiphenomena, usually consequences of particular acts of dispossession; a well in Nabi Salah, a strip of farm land taken for a security fence in Beit Ummar, the demolition of a portaloo on the barren hills of Susiya, or the eviction of a few scattered families in Sheikh Jarrah. Indeed in Sheikh Jarrah settlers have managed to take over the front half of one house, while the Palestinian family remains in the back half. Each of these instances of dispossession were, on separate occasions, described to me as ‘microcosms of the occupation’. Whilst security forces are
brought in to execute or protect expropriations it is the daily mundane control of the minutiae of life that best describes the logic of occupation. This logic is, by the necessity of maintaining some semblance and self-image of liberal democracy and rule of law, very strange. So too is life under its rule and the subsequent attempts to resist its impositions by the popular committees and solidarity activists. Take for instance the case of Hebron, also described as a microcosm, and its annual *Open Shuhada Street* demonstration described in the following section. In 1994 Baruch Goldstein, a doctor from the settlement of *Kiryat Arba* which adjoins Hebron, walked into the mosque in the Tomb of the Patriarchs dressed in his army uniform carrying his military Galil assault rifle and four magazines of ammunition. He killed 29 worshippers and injured more than one hundred more before being overcome and killed. A participant of mine who was a serving soldier in Hebron that day told me: “The Palestinians were piling bodies on car bonnets and driving off, I realised that day we were protecting the wrong people. We should have been protecting the Palestinians from the settlers”. Still in the logic of occupation Israel chose to impose restrictions on the Palestinians, rather than on the Israeli settlers in the city, contending that these restrictions were necessary in order to protect the settlers’ safety. At first, Israel forbade Palestinian commerce and vehicle traffic on part of the Shuhada Street, and only residents of the street were allowed to enter by vehicle. The situation has progressed since then and Palestinians are forbidden to even to walk along the section between the city centre Israeli settlement compounds of *Avraham Avinu* and the *Beit Hadassah* where about five hundred Israelis live. The army also prohibits Palestinian traffic on adjacent streets, thereby creating a contiguous strip of land in the centre of Hebron from the Kiryat Arba settlement in the east to the Jewish cemetery in the West in which Palestinian vehicles are completely forbidden. This has led to an economic collapse of the city centre and its historical market which has become a ghost town. The few Palestinian residents left on the street are prohibited from even walking on it or using their front doors, many of which have been welded shut by the military. Each Shabbat, Israeli settlers accompanied by Israeli security conduct tours for Israeli supporters through this deserted city centre. It is baffling.

I did not know it beforehand, but the Open Shuhada Street demonstration is probably the largest annual solidarity protest of the calendar year. There is something of a festival atmosphere to it with buses coming from all over the West Bank and Israel. Faces are recognised, greetings and welcomes made as the crowds converge at the starting point on the outskirts of the city, unimpeded in their movements by the total absence of the IDF. I would estimate the number of marchers to have been easily three thousand (I became quite good at
gauging crowd size by counting attendance at every demo and comparing crowds to nightclub dance-floors). The size of the protest was also matched by the military capacity which was organised to terminate the march just before the checkpoint to Shuhada Street in the city centre. Again to a large degree the ensuing clashes reflected the imagery famous in global media; green armoured cars and green armoured men against masked stone throwing youths in jeans abound. Yet there was much that surprised me that day in the centre of city which was obviously familiar with the logic and mayhem of occupation and repression. Cars continued to drive through the streets even as ambulances and armoured cars flashed by. Onions fell from the sky and we were invited for tea on the veranda. The Hebronites certainly do not think this is a normal life but that they're so well versed in managing such situations, is in itself difficult to comprehend. The following extract from my fieldnotes, though refined for readability, was typed up on the evening after the demonstration. It is included here not merely as an introduction to the discussion on Weirdness as an affect but also in an attempt to invoke that feeling in the reader. I recount the events of the day as I recalled experiencing them that evening. I do not attempt to make any given event in the day purposely bizarre or confusingly constructed but I ask the reader to remain open to moments in which they feel that events in the text simply don’t make sense.
Open Shuhada Street demonstration, Hebron city centre, 2012.

I arrived at the Jerusalem meeting point for transport to Hebron in Gan HaPamon at around 9am. The Jerusalem marathon was on that day and there were people everywhere in tracksuits and trainers. I saw Vered across the way and went over to see her. I got a hug. We boarded the privately hired coach and as we set off were given a briefing by someone at the front of the bus. We were told ‘buddy-up as it’s easy to get lost in Hebron’. Vered suggested we should be buddies for the day. She said she’d been tasked with videoing the demo for live streaming on the Internet and as we drove south she set up the streaming service application on her smart phone. I struck up a really nice conversation with Aaron. He seemed to be a bit worried and told me, ‘this is the first time I’ve been at this kind of demo’. He’d started protesting at Sheik Jarrah in East Jerusalem and had met people there who told him that he should come to South Hebron with Ta’ayush where he ‘could make a real difference’. He didn’t make much of his activism. He told me that he was no new to solidarity activism but his sense of the unknown and the tension surrounding Hebron would be a recurrent theme of many people I met that day. It was visible in the faces and bodies and testimonies of many people that day. As Hebron was also unknown to me I was rather unaware of the potential for danger and fear at this demo, I was blithely ignorant. Myself and Aaron had a good chat about Internet design and development. We enjoyed ourselves for the hour before we arrived.

There were other buses arriving at the rendezvous point somewhere in the suburbs of Hebron, no one seemed to know where we were exactly. People milled about and greeted and smiled. A young handsome man called me with his eyes as I passed and warmly introduced himself. He was a musician from Jericho and had come on a bus with 15 other Palestinians. ‘Buses have come from all over the West Bank’, he told me. Though smiling and friendly he was clearly nervous too and asked me, ‘Do you know what’s going to happen today, I’ve never been to Hebron or anything like this?’ I began to feel there was something I should be

32 The photo shows protestors approaching the IDF roadblock. I went not much closer than the black smoke in the background, which is the location of the ‘junction’ mentioned in the following. © Activestills
worried about. Vered came over and asked me to help fit her gas-mask on while someone gave her instructions for filming. ‘No cursing, no faces of stone throwers, no activist commentary, keep it to a minimum’. ‘When do I start filming?’ she asked. ‘You'll know when you get there’, was the reply. We set off with no one nearby certain where we were or where we were going. We just followed the crowd. ‘You look tense’, I said to Vered as we walked and she filmed. ‘I am tense!’

The march didn't look too big, a few hundred people, yet considerably bigger than anything else I’d been to which had never exceeded forty or fifty people. I still see no soldiers or police anywhere and I’m expecting to be stopped at any minute. I meet a guy from Tulkaram quite by mistake as I offered to let him pass at a tight spot, holding out my hand to offer him priority passage, he shook it instead and (thinking I spoke Arabic from my little intro) we struck up a conversation. He asked that we pose for a photo. I told him I had to catch up with my buddy and left. We would see each other again. We soon came to a halt outside a large mosque where another group was waiting. Our little march with banners and chants had just been a stroll to get to the start of the main demo. As we set off we were maybe one or two thousand people. Large banners, lots of flags –Youths Against Settlements movement was the main organiser but the lead banner at the front read (in English) ‘Open Shuhada Street’ and was carried by women who formed the vanguard of the main group. There was a car with flying Fatah flags and calling chants in Arabic through a megaphone. Hi-vis marshals ran back and forward to keep the Shebab and others from running too far ahead. I kept my eye on Vered guiding her as she walked backwards filming. Lots of chanting, lots of energy all round us. We walked for quite a while – about half-an-hour - which for reasons I don’t understand felt odd to me. We still didn't know where we were or where we were going.

Vered: ‘There's the army, see the blue light?’
Me: ‘I see some shoulders on a balcony’
Vered: ‘Help me with my mask’

We were fairly close to the front of the march, about 20 metres and there are hundreds of people in front and thousands behind us. The tension was now higher in me and Vered and myself kept close together. Then there’s a volley of loud percussions from gas-grenade launchers which hiss as they fly though air and the whole crowd in front of us – hundreds of people...
people – suddenly turn and run towards us. We rush to the side of the street clinging against a metal fence wall. Danger. This is dangerous. I am afraid the army is about to charge, I’m worrying about the crowd knocking us down. There's gas in front and behind us and we’re crouched in a corner beside a steel container. ‘We gotta go back!’ I shout at Vered and I lead us past the container, keeping close to the side, head down, glancing over my shoulder, beginning to feel the gas stinging my eyes and throat. We run back to a large junction in the road and turn off the main street to the right. Vered still has her gas mask on. I'm spitting and coughing and my eyes sting. It’s not so bad though once you get away.

People all around us are coughing up, all eyes are streaming. Then I get hit on the head by something falling from above. But it’s not hard like a stone. I see onions lying on the ground all around me and more are still falling. I look up to the roofs above where the onions are being thrown down by dozens of women. Sniffing onions is used to alleviate the irritant in tear-gas. Some kid offers me ‘alcol’ – the small surgical wipes which are also sniffed against tear-gas and work better than onions - no thanks I say, I have some. Another young girl comes along and asks me for ‘alcol’ wipes so I give her all I have – I'm thinking well the demo is now over so I won’t need them but down on the main road we see people (all men?) moving forward and then running back. It’s an urban area and the inclines of the side streets are steep enough to hide the main road below so we go back down to film from the junction we’d fled from. It’s about forty metres from the main IDF road-block. Amazingly cars are still driving on the main road even as ambulances go up and down to the clash point. The crowd mass has gone and there’s lots of people milling about. It’s quite easy for us to make our way back up cautiously towards the point we’d run from. Vered is filming and commentating.

Me: ‘If something happens we're running right, OK?’
Vered: ‘OK’

Suddenly a large armoured vehicle comes racing up the side road behind us, about to cut off our planned escape route and we dash back across the junction just before the looming lump of hard green roars past our heels. It feels as if the soldiers are coming, moving in, they're mobile now. We've no idea where to run to.

Vered: ‘I don't know where to go!’
Me: ‘Down this way!’
We run down an alley and find ourselves in some open ground at the back of the buildings. It feels safer but the tension follows us. Others are also scattering through this space and we hop over a wall after them as the sting of gas starts to bite again. We hear the engines of jeeps in high revs somewhere very near then a voice calling ‘Hello, hello! This way, this way’. I look up and there’s a man calling us from the roof-top four stories above us, signalling us to the entrance of his building. We find the door and climb the stairwell, panting and relieved.

As we pass the apartments on the way up we see many children, 4-8 year-olds, in the stairwell holding their noses, their eyes watering as the traces of gas come into the homes. We reach the top floor and come out onto the terrace roof from where we were hailed. There's others here too; a older man, a journalist from Cairo, a young Palestinian journalist from the Ma'an news agency, half-a-dozen others. The man who had called us up was the father of a family, a rotund and smiling gent well dressed and relaxed. ‘Welcome, welcome’, he said to all. He spoke no English nor Hebrew and we knew no Arabic. We were brought coffee and tea and chatted with the other Internationals and Israelis about what might be happening as we heard the puffs of gas, percussion bangs, glimpses of youths running and revving engines served as descriptors for continued points of contact. Then somewhere down below an American voice over a loudspeaker calls out ‘This is not a test’ and the LRAD\textsuperscript{34} non-lethal crowd control ‘sonic cannon’ starts to scream. I find it remarkably ineffective, but perhaps I have bad hearing. Suddenly we are being hit. Something is pelting us from above. Everyone is alert and altered, confused and quick, trying to find the source of attack way up here. Small white beads are landing on the roof we stand on, dozens then hundreds of them! It takes moments or intense milliseconds where all is appraisal and words are unused before - its hailstones, it’s hailing in Hebron in February. I look up from the ground and see everyone else look up at the same time. The host family seemed to have been going through the same process – we didn’t have to tell each other that we were, for we all burst into laughter in that moment as the riotous context of hail in Hebron hits us all with its punch line. The mother smiled at me with a kindness and seemed to say some approving words to her husband as I played with her young children up here on the roof above the violence.

The Israelis showed a lot less engagement with me, talking seriously between themselves. Even though we shared two languages, cultural and ideological proximity and a shared friendship through Vered nobody asks me anything, not even my name. I’m not a

\textsuperscript{34} LRAD. Long Range Acoustic Device
source of concern or knowledge nor do I have their intimacy of shared experience. Up here on some stranger’s veranda in the middle of a riot, I find their cliqueiness weird. Eventually Vered and I decide to go back down and we go back to the junction to film some more. Amazingly still see a couple of young men moving right towards the well-armed roadblock holding the Open Shuhada Street banner (see photo above). Here at the junction many young Palestinians are hanging around with a stone in one hand. We move tentatively forward a bit more, passing the junction. I can't believe it and I hadn’t noticed before but there’s a man cooking and selling kebabs from a stand at the middle of the intersection and people are buying. The road is still blocked by the army though there’s not as much gas now and the cars are still driving along street, beeping the youths out of their way. Ambulances are still going back and forth and people still dash in some direction every so often. A phone call tells us to rendezvous with everyone from Jerusalem at a clinic just one hundred metres back up the road from the junction. Just as we arrive at this relatively safe distance, a dash of people runs towards us and a fresh sting of gas blows our way and we hurriedly walk on towards the buses that will take us home. On our way, we pass a group of young men sitting on a wall quietly among the crowd. One smiles at me and says ‘It’s great to see you people here, sharing what we experience in Hebron’, I smile and wave back. I joke with Vered ‘Well, maybe us being here will help’.

Later back in West Jerusalem, Vered and I go for drinks in the Uganda bar.

Vered: ‘I always feel weird after protests, coming back, like it never existed. It’s like when you go away on holidays for a long time and you come back and it’s as if the holiday and the experiences you had never happened’

Me: ‘When I come back from places I've often found it hard to relate to my home and friends’

Vered: ‘Yeah, they haven't experienced the things, they don't understand, they can't understand because they haven't experienced them and they won't...and I think of the Palestinians who stay behind. Often I go home and there's no one there in my flat and I'm alone for the weekend. So I paint or listen to music’.

Vered’s been taking a few breaks from weekly activism after Shuhada Street. Doing gardening work for her dad. Mowing the lawn.
5. Emotional Encounters with Ignorance

Weirdness is hard to figure out, that is its function. That is its affect. As an embodied knowledge of the organism’s relationship to the object or action of apprehension, weirdness has the function of representing the failure of received expectations. This object or action is not a threat and so the feeling that something is out-of-place or not-quite-right is experienced in a subtle and elusive way. We may be at a loss to describe this not-quite-rightness in words but we call the wordless knowledge we feel Weird. In a perceptual sense it may be a momentary instance, some oddity which we glance in passing. We may furrow our brows at this and then simply shrug it off, for weirdness is not moral. Weird shit happens all the time and we’re pretty good at dealing with the unthreatening unexpected. If we admit that experience is inherently ambiguous we must also acknowledge that most of the time we are managing mismatches with the certainties or truths we have been lead to believe in. Our lifeworlds are full of what C Wright Mills called the interpretations of others, the received wisdom of the cultural apparatus, that allow us to judge the world we perceive as ‘normal’ (Mills, 1967). However, as Vered pointed out after the day of craziness in Hebron a perceptual affect can have lasting effect. If weirdness is recurrently encountered or so overwhelming as to be categorised as crazy, bizarre, Kafkaesque or some other term of aberration, a shrug alone won’t suffice to dispel the feeling of perplexity and we may be motivated to act on or against the weirdness in order to cognitively emplace the oddity. We cannot but impose order on abnormality. If weirdness can no longer be shrugged off it leads us to doubt the truth of the received wisdom. It may thus become an impetus for us to engage our powers of agency and so become a mechanism for social change. In Arendt’s (1971) terms the feeling of weirdness forces us to think. Despite this potential to shape our social practices the phenomenon of weirdness has received much less attention than the passionate affects such as fear, anger, or hate. I submit that the feeling of weirdness is an affective representation of acculturated ignorance which plays a subtle role in altering subjectivity and the emergence of dissent. The key relationships in the affective processes

35 Graffito on the garden wall of the occupied half of the Al-Quraish house in Sheikh Jarrah
discussed in the following are those we have to our normative imaginings of how the world is.

I had begun to realise after a few months in the field that I ‘thought’ it was weird here, that it didn’t make sense, that this wasn’t what I expected. This is of course common in the ethnographic encounter, indeed self-estrangement is a requirement of the ethnographic methodology. In a moment of exasperation, fatigue and confusion I said to my supervisor, ‘I dunno it’s just weird, maybe I’ll write a paper on weirdness’. I was half-joking, but as I began to scribble notes and consider the affective meaning of weirdness the possibility occurred to me that I was not the only confused person in the field. So I began to tell participants that I was looking at weirdness. This was as a solid, simple and concise answer to the recurrent question, ‘so what are you studying?’, but more significantly most participants reacted with a smile of slightly raised eyebrows that half-nods the head back in an embodied movement of agreement, as they let loose the wordless vocalisation of intersubjective affirmation and interest in the understanding of the other - ‘ahhhh!’. More explicitly one participant replied, ‘If you want to look at weirdness you’ve come to the right place’.

The affective phenomenon of weirdness in Israel and Palestine occurs through the opposition between, on one hand the formal discourse of a democratic state, seeking peace and defending itself against an intractable enemy and, on the other the everyday practices of an occupying and colonizing ‘ethnocracy’ (Yiftachel, 2006). This discussion first outlines a theory of weirdness as an embodied perceptual phenomena based on the models of phenomenology and affect that frame this research. Feeling that something is weird represents a failure of our received understandings to describe the world we experience and is thus an encounter with a certain kind of ignorance. Though not approached as an affective perceptual phenomenon, I also offer a brief account of other approaches or acknowledgements of this phenomenon, from Husserl’s phenomenological epoché, critical realism, cognitive dissonance, and the place of optical illusions in the development of cognitive science. The inference is that weirdness is common and potentially more influential than might be expected. I then turn to a short ethnographic piece of a small demonstration in the West Bank which more directly brought forth the feeling and expression of weirdness in one participant and follow this with a discussion of the experiences of Israeli soldiers who have become dissenters. Though military occupation is basically a strange way for a democracy to organise society in the twenty-first century, more than any others this latter group raised on the principles of Zionism highlight how important hegemony is in creating weirdness and how repeated encounters with its ignorance fosters doubt. I conclude that, in
relation to social movement theory in particular, repeated encounters with ignorance can play a significant role in the emergence of doubt in relation to the truth of hegemonic elements and interpretations in lifeworlds. Doubt may be suppressed or sublimated by any number of mechanisms but it may also be resolved by the critical assessment of the received interpretations that have failed to properly describe the world. This is to say that a feeling can instantiate the application of Arendt’s faculty of thinking (Arendt, 1971). Furthermore, weirdness moves beyond an intentional experience and as evidenced by tactics of some activists, it becomes a way of both understanding and resisting the occupation. I suggest here that firstly social movement theorists and practitioners could productively investigate the subtleties of weirdness in mobilising ‘by-standers’ to their cause. Secondly that in a transnational world, where sovereign states struggle to control collective understandings, anthropologists may also find it fruitful to understand that anybody may very well find the myths, narratives and interpretations of her own society a little weird when compared to its actual practice.

A theory of weirdness

Weird is not a property of an object or action apprehended, but of the relationship between the observer and that observed. It is a product of a moment of intentionality cascading through lifeworld which begins as affective perception, a patterned embodied experience that describes in Damasio’s (2000) terms the organism-environment relationship and how the organism has been changed by that relationship. Following from Prinz’s (2004) perceptual theory and in particular the representational quality of emotions, weirdness represents the failure of acculturated lifeworld to properly describe or accord with the actual experience of reality as just encountered. Though the hegemonic elements in a lifeworld are carefully crafted to provide us with definitive understandings they also contain a degree of ambiguity. They are susceptible to manipulation in the ‘social poetics’ of their usage (Herzfeld, 1997). They also exist in the complex and unfolding world of the inherently ambiguous intentional observer. So hegemonic norms can only attempt to delimit ambiguity based on particular abstractions and ideals that we understand as knowledge. However, in doing so they also describe a particular form of ignorance in refusing or failing to acknowledge or encompass that which does not accord with it greater narrative. We seem to come equipped to recognise when we have reached the limits of hegemonic knowledge for I would argue that weirdness is an affect that everyone experiences. As a reflex affect it represents an emotional encounter with our own particular form of ignorance.
Weirdness, as a family of feelings with convergences of certain characteristics, varies in intensity, is contextual and of course highly relativistic. Something may seem so unexpected in a given situation, such as the hail on the roof in Hebron during a heavy military clampdown, that it forces itself almost immediately to subjective consciousness. In the case of hail the sensation was propelled to salience by the potential for danger that lay four stories below. Later the sight of the food vendor plying his wares practically at the nexus of conflict was just bizarre to behold. In other contexts the flow of circumstances and admixture of affects may overwhelm the immediacy of weirdness, so that it may only register as an embodied understanding upon later recall and reflection. Certainly my own experience of the Hebron demonstration wasn’t one of puzzlement, mostly I was far too scared and stoic and uncertain, awash with teargas or adrenaline and relief, or hoping my ‘buddy’ Vered would have had enough of filming and nervously watching our backs as she did. Quirkiness was mostly drowned out by these other feelings but during moments of respite from intense affects its message could be heard. Even though they have been through such experiences time-and-time-and-time again many Israeli participants, Vered included, admit to being left with a feeling of weirdness once the dust has settled. After having discussed my ideas with one activist friend he wrote on his blog, ‘In hindsight, I often expect things to happen precisely as they do, and they’re still weird. Occasionally, when looking at past experiences in the Wild South [Hebron Hills] I recall or portray brutality as brutality, or generosity as simple generosity. These are mostly overly simplified. Weirdness is that infinitely complex spectrum between black and white on which experience actually occurs’ (see Radicalmonkeyclown, 2013 orig. emph.).

Hebronites such as the food vendor and other Palestinians in the territories don’t go home to a radically different everyday experience like Vered’s in West Jerusalem. Though they live under military occupation on a daily basis they are of course perfectly aware that such a life is far from normal. They know it is wrong, or unjust or illegal, yet they have also described the situation to me as ‘crazy’ or as Fayrouz an activist from Walaja described the logic of the Israeli security discourse ‘excuse my French but this is bullshit’. From his smiling face and relaxed demeanour I also got the feeling that the young man who greeted us at the end of the demo wasn’t referring to the brutality or injustice of ‘what we experience’ but to the craziness of it all. So we must acknowledge that something can be weird even though it occurred exactly as expected, as in the examples from Palestinians and Radical Monkey Clown and that weirdness can feedback from the intentional moment of ignorance to become part of the knowledge base of the affective lifeworld. I am pretty certain that the
occupation, not in its explosions of violence, but in its daily maintenance and administration is Kafkaesque and the practices of expanding colonization in Area C and East Jerusalem by whatever means fits the moment has the capacity to continually confound expectations. In this sense the unfolding being and becoming of occupation and colonization by Israel in the early twentieth century will always be weird. It may be that dissenters experience events as weird, even though they unfold in a familiar and expected format, because they cannot fathom the worldview of those who consent to, enable or fervently execute the occupation and suppression of others. The capacity for experienced activists to find expected experiences weird notwithstanding, I shall focus in this discussion on how this affect may subtly motivate the inexperienced and unknowing subject to become a dissenter, on how a believer safe in her lifeworld may come to doubt the truth by stepping beyond its bounds and experiencing the particular forms of ignorance it has created.

Some weird history
To call something weird, absurd, bizarre, baffling, crazy or Kafkaesque is an attempt to categorize and thus make sense of something that fundamentally doesn’t make sense. The assignation of these semantic labels, which though they vary in intensity and attribution all share Wittgenstein’s ‘family-resemblance’, is a post hoc semantic trick to express the feeling that we have experienced a mis-match between our expectation and our observation. This phenomenon, the oddities produced by a discrepancy between our expectations of the world is commonplace and has a long history in Western thought. Not only has this question of appearances and reality been of central concern to Western philosophy, it also played a crucial role in the emergence of cognitive science in the nineteenth century. Trompe l’oeil or tricks of the eye have a long history in art, the representation of three dimensions on a flat canvas being the obvious example, but in the late nineteenth century they were central to the development of cognitive science. Hermann von Helmholtz published his Handbook of Physiological Optics (Helmholtz, 1896) which theorised and described the importance of unconscious inferences for perception. Optical illusions were used to demonstrate how visual perception was not merely a mental facsimile of the object apprehended but was produced through subjective reference to expectations. Optical illusions are basically characterised by visually perceived images that differ from ‘objective’ reality and have three main types; physiological, such as afterimages of bright lights burned on the retina; pathological illusions such as Akinetopsia or motion blindness; and cognitive illusions theoretically caused by
unconscious inferences. Famous examples of cognitive illusions are the Necker cube, the Rubin vase and the Café Wall illusion. The Café Wall, which is drawn with parallel lines that appear to curve is known as a *distortion illusion*. Both the Necker cube and the Rubin vase are categorised as *ambiguous illusions* in that lines and/or shadings of each part of the picture are ambiguous by themselves, yet the human visual system picks an interpretation of each part that makes the whole consistent. Through the work of Helmholtz and others on tricks of the eye, the doors of perception were opened to critique.

Perception, unconscious inferences and ambiguity are also central themes of phenomenology which in various ways relate to the potential for weirdness to be a characteristic of the lived experience. Husserl realised that unconscious inferences drawn from lifeworlds fundamentally shaped how we perceived the world and that methodologically ‘only by suspending or bracketing away the “natural attitude” could philosophy become its own distinctive and rigorous science’ (Sawicki, 2011). It is questionable whether or not a phenomenological approach could or should be ‘rigorous science’ but this suspension or *epoché* recognises that our lifeworld’s assumptions and expectations present an impediment to understanding ‘reality’, if indeed such a thing exists. This approach is fundamentally akin both to cultural relativism in anthropological theory and ethnographic methodology, and to Arendt’s faculty of judging (Arendt, 1968). Recall too that according to Merleau-Ponty, ambiguity of experience prevails both in the perception of things, and in the knowledge the subjective self (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Weirdness would not exist without ambiguity and if we also consider Damasio’s assertion that we are not consciously aware of all the affective processes at play in the body and the various studies on the prodigious levels of visual perception that are unconsciously filtered out of awareness (Gerson, Parra, & Sajda, 2006), then we must admit that the human organism works hard at finding the world unambiguous.
Perhaps, the most developed theory of a common kind of weirdness is that of cognitive dissonance, which relates to the oft observable inconsistencies between peoples’ beliefs and their actions and our ability to simultaneously hold contradictory opinions. First described by social psychologist Leon Festinger, he proposed that the feeling of discomfort aroused by ‘the existence of nonfitting [sic] relations among cognitions, is a motivating factor in its own right’ (Festinger, 1957, p. 3). This influential theory has been applied to a wide variety of studies and paradigms, such as forced compliance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977), economic maximization (Gilad, Kaish, & Loeb, 1987), and risky sexual behaviour (Mannberg, 2012). The direction of gaze which shapes cognitive dissonance and the discipline of psychology in general tends towards inconsistencies which are thought to dwell within the subjective individual. In the first instance Festinger’s basic premise is that the individual strives towards consistency within himself. Secondly the mechanisms theorized to mediate dissonance and discomfort, such as self-affirmation, self-justification or the more sociologically inclined ‘New Look’ perspective are on the whole focused on the existence of internal contradictions (see Stone & Cooper, 2001).

However, for the purposes of the discussion here the contradictions signified by a feeling of weirdness are not simply internal but a product of the intentional relationship with what we assume to be an external ‘reality’. From the preceding we must concede that our hopes of an external realism may not be met – reality is more than meets the eye and sometimes it’s less. For Bhaskar (1989) the real is stratified and divided between reality itself, the actual world of our perceptions, and the empirical world of the characteristic observed in a determined event. According to this critical realism perspective, the empirical world mediates between supposed objective reality and the actual in that the empirical characteristic observed is assumed to contain both possibilities. There is clearly room for ambiguity here and the notion of mediation may allow for a lifeworld’s unconscious inferences to portray an actual world in which the ambiguities are reconstituted as a whole that is consistent with our expectations. When this mediation fails, when the characteristic observed cannot resolve actual perception and reality, we have moved beyond the limits of our acculturated lifeworld and the knowledge it references and produces. We are confronted by our own particular form of ignorance, a perceptive actuality signalled to the self through

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36 A school of psychology which attends to the role of acculturated and shared value systems in subjective interpretation.
the theatre of the body by the feeling of weirdness. Weirdness is the affective representation of an encounter with our own ignorance, it is the answer to the question we have not yet asked, but are probably always asking: Is this as I have come to expect? My ethnographic research suggests that the frequency with which we experience weirdness plays an underestimated role in social change. Whilst anger and moral outrage have long been recognised as strong motivating factors in the mobilisation of social movements, the subtlety of weirdness highlights the ambiguity of our received assumptions about the world, leading us to doubt their truth. Doubt in turn, if it is strong enough or frequently experienced, must be cognitively interrogated, requiring the application of critical thought. And so Arendt’s (1971) faculty of thinking is applied. Subsequently we come to perceive the cracks in the patina of received lifeworlds and its hegemonic interpretations.

The sense of not making sense
In January 2012 I joined the weekly protest in the West Bank village of Al-Maasara for the first time. I was becoming familiar both with the practice of ethnography and the practice of protest. A strong and fruitful researcher-participant relationship was developing between myself and Vered who had invited me along that day. Vered was by this time a dedicated and experienced Israeli activist with Anarchists Against the Wall. That day she had also brought her normally non-protesting father, Frank. Even though I’m told the entire area is a ‘closed military zone’ for the duration of the protest, the soldiers casually gathered at the entrance to the village do not stop our vehicle and we drive about a kilometre past small general stores, family homes and a mosque to the meeting point where about ten other people are gathered. One car load of Israelis have locked their keys in the car and I strike up a conversation about their dilemma with Edo, the car’s owner. Someone is calling Vered’s name, it is Fesal an organiser from the popular committee, who greets her and is delighted to meet her father. She seems well loved here.

Vered explains to Frank and myself what will happen. ‘We’ll march back down the road and the army will stop us and we’ll shout for a bit’. It is about half-an-hour of unhindered strolling with flags and banners, back past the mosque, houses and stores. It’s about twenty people, not moving in a block, but in small groups of two to five, strung-out over thirty metres or so. A few people glance at us as we walk by but I don’t see anyone join us. Frank is cold in the weak winter sun and loves complaining; ‘I came here to drill a few holes in the wall!’, he jokes referring to his daughter’s apartment and not the separation barrier. Frank and I exchange background stories, interests and anecdotes before we get to the
entrance to the village where about twenty-five soldiers and *Magav* border policemen are waiting for us. The security detail outnumbers the protest group. They are ready and blocking the width of the road in a line, riot shields held in formation. They stop the march from passing the junction. Across the road is a Palestinian quarry works and not much else from what I can see. It is the local men who stand face to face with the heavily armed soldiers. ‘We want to get to our land’ shouts Fasel in English, ‘**Yallah Shebab!**’\(^{37}\). There’s a push forward against the line of soldiers by a handful of the local men, insisting they be let through the line of riot shields. Scuffles ensue as the shields insist they do not pass. The scuffles stop and the men begin to chant in Arabic and English, joined by the Israelis and Internationals. I find myself wondering why are we stopped here? There is nothing behind the line of soldiers that could be identified as something that must be protected, only the main road which has no traffic on it and a few industrial sheds on the far side. By this stage several Israelis and Internationals are standing *behind* the security line without any trouble or opposition. They photograph, chant or just observe the proceedings. Somehow it’s perfectly reasonable to get to the far side of this ‘red line’ by simply walking around either side rather than pushing through it – so long perhaps as you’re not recognized as one of the local Palestinians. Time and again there are these small scuffles, with some breaks for chanting and occasionally Fesal, the head of the popular committee, speaks directly to (or at) the soldiers, leaning in close to their faces and asking in a voice loud enough so that all can hear ‘are you proud of yourselves, are you proud to say you stop people from getting to their lands?’ The soldiers ignore him as best they can, some joking with each other in Hebrew.

There is no moving the line. There is no charge or tear gas, no stone throwing. Suddenly a call comes from Fesal in Arabic and the protest group quickly turns to the right walking briskly towards an alternative exit from the village. I am perplexed at the sight of the soldiers stumbling along through a ploughed field beside the road in parallel to the protest group. They are trying to reach the alternate exit before the protesters, but the protesters don’t run, they’re not trying to escape. Indeed they’re not trying to get anywhere that is generally forbidden to them. This is the way in and out of the village and all these men use this road on a daily basis, mostly unencumbered. They could have come this way unnoticed two hours before and they will probably go this way later in the afternoon. None of this is what I expected, so as a diligent anthropologist I critically observe the dynamics and quietly

\(^{37}\) **Yallah Shebab!** (Arabic) Come on guys!
ask Vered for insights when I can. Frank however, is afforded no such professional or epistemological protection from the proceedings. He had kept his distance from the performance; five metres is sufficiently far to observe safely. ‘This is bizarre, this is Kafkaesque!’ he keeps repeating throughout the whole performance. He too is asking his daughter what is going on: Why can’t they cross the road? What will happen if we get to the other side? Where’s the wall going to be? Vered, who is very knowledgeable about the occupation and well experienced in protest dynamics explains that all protests are considered illegal and must be stopped, but unsatisfied by her own rationalizations she eventually sighs and says, ‘I don’t know, let’s ask them’. Turning to the soldiers she asks in Hebrew why we can’t cross the road. She gets no reply. After about an hour Fasel calls the protest to a halt and we turn and stroll back into the village. Soldiers fire a few gas canisters our way, a few stones are thrown towards them. We all casually walk back through the village past the stores, homes and mosque.

... Back at the meeting point I see Edo back at his locked car. They’d called a lock-smith who, much to their amusement, came from one of the near-by Israeli settlements. ‘I’m surprised they let him in to the village’, laughed Edo. We drive back out of the village, past the soldiers who are still hanging around. They pay us no heed.

It’s difficult to say why this protest is weird because this is precisely the nature and purpose of the feeling of weirdness. Its causes are subliminal and elusive but the wordless knowledge this affective perception is telling us is clear: ‘I’m not quite sure what is out of place here, but something doesn’t fit with what I expected’. This stands in contrast with the more assertive affective signal that something is wrong. The feeling of weirdness is not as impelling as the feeling of wrongness for it does not represent a clear moral transgression but rather something of a puzzle to the mechanisms of mind and senses. Of course the solution to such a puzzle pivots on an acculturated understanding of the world and subtle dispositions which shape how we see and judge a scene, our lifeworlds. Perhaps one may be disposed to agree that any state has the right and duty to protect itself, its citizens and infrastructure but at Al-Maasara one scans the horizon in vain to find either a viable threat or an endangered asset. The protest does not approach lands near a settlement fence nor a section of the separation barrier all of which are normally out-of-bounds. Without including the armoured vehicles, the Israeli security personnel outnumber the flag-holding protesters twenty-five to twenty, and the non-Palestinian contingent seem to be free to go where they want so long as they don’t
obstruct the obstruction of the protest. The soldiers themselves could not be said to be in danger and the protest is stopped simply because it is a protest. The line of Frank’s questioning illustrates that he cannot cognitively access an interpretation of the situation that makes sense to him, such that he can only describe it as bizarre and Kafkaesque.

This is not so weird if you are a Palestinian and have grown up in a world where the minutiae of life are restricted on almost a daily basis by military personnel. Living with militarily occupation has consequences in that no matter how unusual the routines of petty constraints, roadblocks and night-time arrests of children are from a global perspective. Palestinians have come to expect – though not condone - such an existence, yet they are well aware that in the wider sense that life under occupation is crazy. If you are an Israeli or international activist familiar with popular committee protests and disposed to see Israeli as a ‘fascist and apartheid state’ you may not experience much dissonance either. It all depends on the process of expectations and interpretations. Conversely, some radical settlers who’ve been nurtured to feel their right to these lands is exclusive and divinely commanded need not concern themselves with the earthly concerns. As Kierkegaard noted:

> When the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd — faith transforms it, but in every weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him. The passion of faith is the only thing which masters the absurd (Kierkegaard, 1851).

**Repeated encounters with ignorance**

Kierkegaard’s faith protects the believer from the absurd, such that this is its purpose. The purpose of all knowledge systems is in part to protect us from the chaos of free interpretation and it is only the infant or the insane that ‘stands alone directly confronting a world of solid fact’ (Mills, 1967, p. 405). However, the production of hegemonic knowledge also produces a particular form of ignorance when the world fails to conform to its interpretations. Perhaps the greatest opportunity for Jewish Israelis to sense that the world is not as one was lead to believe occurs during military service, when they leave childhood and become willing and armed conscripts for the state. The IDF promotes and prides itself on being the ‘most moral army’ in the world, with a code of ethics specifically developed to prioritize lethal engagement in situations where ‘responsibility for one’s own citizens takes precedence over the other responsibility to the non-dangerous neighbors [of terrorists]’ (Prof. Asa Kasher in Horovitz, 2011). All conscripts receive mandatory training in the ethics doctrine known as *The IDF Spirit*, which has been developed by Israeli Professor of Philosophy Asa Kasher.
Indeed military mantras such as ‘Purity of Arms’ and ‘Black Flag orders’ are familiar to all Israelis regardless of combat experience. ‘We receive weeks of combat training which is designed to prepare us for conventional warfare, basically with Syria’, Avner told me, ‘after that we get one week on dealing with a civilian population and then we’re sent to the West Bank to protect settlers from terrorists’. Avner is on the staff of *Breaking the Silence* (BTS) an Israeli organization of IDF veterans who ‘have taken it upon themselves to expose the Israeli public to the reality of everyday life in the Occupied Territories’ (BTS, n.d.).

While many of the 700 or more testimonies collected by BTS record cases of outright abuse, beatings, or ‘unnecessary’ killings where there is a sense that a moral boundary has been crossed in the course of an operation, the daily banality of occupation also affords soldiers the opportunity to regularly encounter situations that are difficult to make sense of through the security paradigm. Avner told me, ‘We’d go into these villages, basically poor encampments in the hills, even though we knew there were no weapons or anything there. Sometimes we go in out of boredom, sometimes on orders to “put in an appearance – let them know who the sheriff is” [...] We’d walk in, throw a few stun grenades about, turn over the tents, confiscate stuff’. For some soldier such practices seem dissonant with self-perception of purity of arms versus immoral terrorists which was instilled in them in basic training. Oz, another ex-combat soldier turned activist, agrees. ‘I hate all the stories about masochistic [sadistic] soldiers, it’s not about that at all. Do you know what’s weird in Israel? Our whole concept of violence. We’re so used to shooting guns that it’s not considered violent, so when we boarded the *Mavi Marmara*\(^{38}\) and killed nine people all that your heard on the radio was “our boys were being attacked”’. While it can be argued that military service generally involves activities foreign to most people’s experience, the combination of universal conscription in Israel and the heavily promoted purity of its intentions and actions paradoxically opens a space through which Israelis can encounter the dissonance between the narrative and the reality.

Israelis are often accused by their left-wing compatriots of wilfully ignoring the situation in the territories and of the people under its military occupation, of not wanting to know. Indeed it is normally fairly easy to avoid encounters with a reality that conflicts with the idea that Israel is a free and democratic country defending itself from an intractable

\(^{38}\) The Turkish registered ship, part of the Gaza Flotilla, which was boarded in international waters by Israeli naval commandos in May 2010.
enemy that wishes to destroy them. With the exception of a couple of journalists, notably Amira Hass and Gideon Levy of the newspaper *Haaretz*, there is almost no media coverage of the weekly popular committee protests, all of which are in the mainstream imagination dangerous confrontations with Palestinian stone throwing mobs. The release of *Five Broken Cameras* (Burnat & Davidi, 2011), a documentary on five years of the popular protest in *Bil’in*, helped reach a wider audience and dent this image in Israel when it was nominated for an Oscar in 2012. Attacks by radical settlers on an IDF base in the West Bank in 2011 also caused some to consider that perhaps the Palestinians were not the (only) threat in the territories (Katz, 2011). Though attacks by settlers against Palestinian farmers, crops and properties have been going on for years – often witnessed and recorded by *Ta’ayush* and IDF personnel as BTS testimonies confirm – this issue never even makes the back pages of major Israeli media. Having been convinced they are there to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinian terrorists, it is the Israeli soldiers confronted with an alternative to their expected reality, of settlers attacking Palestinians, who express this dissonance as weird, crazy or surreal. However, one need not be in the ‘front line’ to carry doubts as to the consistency of the Israeli hegemonic narrative. The occasional high-profile aberration reported in the media or heard in casual conversation between friends, and the exposure to alternative narratives that is inevitable in modern life, also affords occasions for civilians to encounter tales of weirdness. As Ronit, one of the *Anarchists Against the Wall*, pointed out to me when I asked her how she became an activist.

All my life there’d been holes in the story. I came from a [right-wing] *Likud* family and then I met a guy who was left-wing. He showed me what the holes were and when we broke up I was afraid I wouldn’t be able to see them anymore. But I could.

**Cracks in the patina: The social impact of weirdness**

Like all reflex emotions feeling weird is a complex intersubjective embodied experience occasioned by intentionality. While the embodied phenomenon of weirdness results from the immediacy of the organism’s interaction or apprehension with the environment, the subjective individual is not a free-floating agent continuously constructing an understanding of the world independently. Meaning-making is produced through our lifeworld which is laden with the ‘ready-made interpretations’ of others (Mills 1967). The embodied perception that weirdness represents is a failure of those expectations, but one that is neither so
threatening as to cause fear or so great a transgression as to evoke moral judgments such as anger, contempt or disgust.

As any anthropologist knows weirdness can be easily evoked as we journey through strange lands - by something as simple as milk being sold in a plastic bag rather than a waxed paper carton. Like all emotions its cause is culturally relative. However the stories we are told by others about ‘ourselves’ through national curriculae, the media, the military and other state institutions are not designed primarily so that our meaning-making will reveal the truth. They are often abstractions imposed upon reality in order to produce collectivity, ethnicity, nationhood, religiosity and so forth. Though they purport to represent authoritative truth clean and simple, hegemonic knowledge will regularly impinge upon the messy contradictions and ambiguities of social life. This ambiguity is not so much, as Mary Douglas’s (1966) socially proscribed impurity of ‘matter out of place’, but of matter all over the place in the complex reality of unfolding social life. This ambiguity and complexity is amplified by our awareness of and exposure to a variety of interpretations produced in the transnational dimension, which also limits the capacity of local propriety knowledge to define the normal (Hardt & Negri, 2000). In sum, national hegemonic processes not only specify ways of understanding and meaning-making, they must also produce specific forms of ignorance and in doing so define weirdness.

Weirdness is clearly a subtle experience and its sociological impact can be hard to observe and assess. While there has been much analysis on the social impact of acutely felt and hard to dismiss emotions – such as maintaining and reproducing social order through fear (Ulrich Beck, 1992; Glassner, 1999) or the ‘moral outrage’ thesis of social movement mobilization (Gould, 2009; Nepstad & Smith, 2001) – weirdness is by purpose and definition less certain and often fleeting and so its social impact is easy to overlook. Indeed, though we may often admit to feeling weird, I suspect that it isn’t generally considered an emotion; rather, it is a quality ascribed to an object or act apprehended external to us. Not until we postulate emotion as perception and a representation of our relation to the environment can we understand that when we look at a situation and say ‘that’s weird’ what we mean is ‘that is making me feel weirdness’. Research into this phenomenon has often focused on how we suppress its affect, the processes of denial, repression or sublimation and the pathologies that such efforts cause. Israeli anthropologist and army reservist during the First Intifada, Eyal Ben-Ari, writes on the social processes by which combatants suppressed dissonance upon return to civilian life. He argues that the significance of military service to social evaluation in Israel and the organizational culture of the military as the enactment of certain meanings,
naturalizes the Israeli army’s policing of a civilian population. This naturalisation diffuses ‘a more penetrating self-analysis...of “double standards” to behaviours within and across the Green Line [i.e. occupied territories]’ (Ben-Ari, 1989, pp. 383–5).

The various personal and social mechanisms used to diffuse or dismiss the subtlety of weirdness found in the military occupation of the Palestinian territories are significant and their effectiveness can be judged by the relatively small percentage of soldiers who turn to *Breaking the Silence*. However, the impetus for change contained in weirdness is also observable in the interpretations of Israeli activists, who much like Ben-Ari’s soldiers, are also engaged in the enactment of certain meanings – albeit meanings that run counter to those of the hegemonic narrative. They have come to see the weirdness – ‘the holes’ – everywhere. As I began to tell participants I was looking at weirdness, practically everyone would simply smile and nod in recognition of its pervasiveness from their vantage point. While many activists could cite a specific event which crossed a moral boundary, an event not just weird but definitively *wrong*, the exceptionally long duration of the military occupation and rapidly increasing colonization of the territories, allows for repeated occasions upon which the self-image of a nation under attack is dissonant with certain facts on the ground. Furthermore, some activists harness the weirdness of the situation as a tactic, employing ‘pink block’ frivolity and culture-jamming to stimulate the sensation in others. Thus there have been football matches played at the major ‘Israeli only’ checkpoint between *Al-Maasara* and Jerusalem, while Israel’s own ‘Clown Army’ regularly plays the motley fools as the IDF tries to disperse or arrest them (Ben-Abba, 2012; PSP, 2012). A group of Israeli women went to visit a Palestinian family on Shuhada Street and while inside they donned traditional Palestinian dresses and *hijab*[^39]. They then left the house and proceeded to walk down Shuhada Street, which as Israeli citizens they are permitted to do. They were arrested as expected. Apparently, it’s illegal for Israelis to walk on Shuhada Street if they dress like Arabs.

These people have closely examined the patina of hegemonic understandings and found them to be cracked and flaking, such that their inconsistencies can no longer be glossed over. They have come to experience reality in a way radically different to the hegemonic interpretations, in part because of doubt produced by almost insignificant but repeated failures of that system to describe the truth. The accumulation of doubt over time makes it

[^39]: Hijab (Arabic), headscarf.
more likely that a given act, law, argument or social policy will be seen as part of a systemic wrong rather than being excused as a singular aberration or a case of unfortunate but necessary exceptionalism. Repeated encounters of such imperfections atrophy the hegemonic corpus to a point where they understand that the world they live in is weird and weirdness becomes both a form of knowing and understanding which is leveraged in the practice of dissent.

Conclusion
At the macro-level, Israeli hegemonic self-understanding as a Jewish democracy with ruthless enemies is not a fabrication. There are regular multi-party elections for executive and legislative branches, an independent judiciary and rule of law, a capitalist economic system, freedom of religious practice and competitive press institutions. These various bodies are relatively free and capable of contesting with each other over the production of authoritative interpretations of the ‘national character’ of Israel. This narrative emphasizes the nation’s internationally acceptable and laudable reality, allowing Israelis to feel their society is normal in the Western sense. Like most hegemonic understandings it also attempts to obscure unacceptable and aberrant realities. Israel is not however a liberal democracy in terms of a state’s formal blindness to ethnicity, the model by which many nations are constrained. This is a significant distinction which many Israelis seem unaware of and so it is not weird for them that the legislative corpus contains laws based on ethnicity and the executive branches distribute national resources on the same basis. It is the Jewish state after all, so why shouldn’t Jewish nationals benefit more than others. If we also admit that for over forty years the state has exercised de facto authority and military control over an entire population denied voting rights, the notion of democracy itself becomes questionable. Indeed, with four million ‘native’ born non-citizens in the territories and two million non-Jewish citizens in Israel, the notion that the state is predominantly Jewish does not accord with its demographic reality. However, the narrative that ‘Arabs’ are enemies of the state allows them to be excluded from such calculations and so weirdness is not perceived at this macro level. At the micro-level, the daily harassment of farmers and labourers, the arbitrary dispossession of lands and the ongoing production of state and wildcat of settlements in Area C points more towards a policy of systematic colonization than an honestly defensive stance. Weirdness is most often perceived in the details.

There are of course historical contingencies through which this situation has developed, which themselves are contested through a multiplicity of discourses. The history
of the Jewish people in Europe, the purpose of the Zionist project and both the real and perceived animosity towards it are said to compel Israel to be different from all other nations. Israel is not alone in making the claim of ‘exceptionalism’, and in the United States conservative and neo-conservative writers have argued that American exceptionalism allows the nation to march ‘to a different drummer’ (Rose, 1989, p. 92). So Israel also leverages exceptionalism in its defence, both in the context of its foundation and its contemporary setting. Thus the state as described in the words of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, is a ‘villa in the jungle’. Despite the (possibly unintended) colonial undertones of this metaphor, Israeli exceptionalism is often presented as the rationale for why it is ‘forced’ into actions most other nations would consider aberrant. However, as Hardt and Negri point out, the function of exceptionality in the application of domestic and supranational norms or laws is to control and dominate a fluid situation, by granting the authority and capacity to define the demands of intervention and set in motion forces and instruments of repression and rhetorical force; ‘therefore is born, in the name of the exceptionality […] a form of right that is really a right of police’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 17 orig. emph.). The exceptionality in Israel’s hegemonic narrative thus grants them, and them alone, the authority and capacity to ‘police’ the occupied territories and its populations through laws and practices whom others might consider an absurd application of democracy. Excluding overtly maximalist Zionist tendencies in Israeli society, whose political representatives unabashedly call for population transfers and annexation, there are still and perhaps growing discrepancies between the national theory of a progressive democracy under threat and the national practice of occupation and colonization. It must be noted here that Foreign Minister Lieberman has publicly called for the disenfranchisement of Israel’s Palestinian citizens in any peace agreement (Lieberman, 2010) and Housing Minister Bennett has presented a plan to ‘manage’ the conflict by annexing Area C of the territories (Bennett, 2010). Such tendencies are not on the fringes of society but in the executive branch of government and so the space between hegemonic ideals and the unspoken reality where opportunities to perceive weirdness arise is widening.

In any case, the phenomenon clearly plays a significant role in the emergence and development of counter-hegemonic processes for Israelis, by causing them to doubt their received interpretations. As such it should be of particular interest to the study and practice of social movements and dissent in other regions. It also comes to form part of the pattern of dissent in the meshworld of the affective lifeworld, a way of interpreting the occupation. Many activists are clearly aware of the absurdity in the security narratives and leverage this
through clowning, changing costume and even, as with Al-Maasara, the choreographed weekly attempts to cross a road as a group. Weirdness stems from an intentional affective moment, the sense of not making sense, but we can come to accept that this appraisal is more valid than those we had been taught to use in our relationship to hegemonic acculturation. It becomes a way of understanding the world. That others acknowledge and agree with this understanding indicates shareable commonalities in our affective lifeworlds. In the next section I address directly how such shared affective processes produce sociality and enable for concerted action in the political sense with a discussion on wrongness. More generally, in summation of Part I, the everyday nuances of life’s ambiguous nature could be fruitfully explored by social movement theorists and practitioners. Highlighting the inconsistencies and even absurdities of the logic of occupation or other systems of dispossession may well be more accessible to potential recruits than its bare brutalities. Humour may be of help in this for as Oscar Wilde said to have noted: If you want to tell people the truth, make them laugh, otherwise they'll kill you. Secondly, in the complexity of contemporary transnationalism which touches most lives everywhere, access to alternative interpretations to the ones we received in youth may accelerate. It seems plausible then that people everywhere may find their own world a little weird now and then, and so as anthropologists asking when and why this happens (or doesn’t happen!) may be a valuable way to explore how our participants understand their world.
Part II
Wrong
6. The Eternal and Undivided City

There may come a point after weirdness, after some reflective thought and maybe a bit more weirdness and thinking, that the situation is no longer just crazy or confusing but comes to be understood as unjust or oppressive or fascist. These are just three of the categories commonly used to describe the Israeli-Palestinian condition by dissents and reflect the wide range of discourses, or framings, of the situation. Part II of the thesis turns away from the subjectivity of the feeling-thinking mind to analyse and understand the inherent diversity in transnational dissent and how action in this plurality is underwritten and supported by affect. This first chapter in this second section presents an extended ethnography which describes the complexity within both solidarity activism and the forces which it resists. The focus here is not on the affective perceptions of dissents but on the diversity of backgrounds, genders, motivations and understandings encompassed in sites of protest. I also highlight the diversity of modes of dispossession and colonisation with particular attention paid to the evictions at Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem. The interaction of these two complexities produces a high degree of uncertainty and differences in discursive diagnoses of the issue. As Abdul from Sheikh Jarrah notes, every place in Jerusalem has its own story.

In the following chapter I will argue that despite the lack of a clear unifying framing in solidarity activism, collective action continues nonetheless because of a shared sense that something is wrong. This feeling exemplifies Prinz’s (2007) understanding of affect as the pre-cognitive foundation of morality. The definite feeling of wrongness has the capacity to overcome uncertainty in the face of complexity and is an affective critique shared by all dissents. I then turn to consider the unintended social consequences of collective action in the field and argue that the practice of Palestinians, Israelis and Internationals coming together in solidarity is producing a community of sorts. I base this on a number of factors and processes. In the first instance the sites of protest act as fixed points which dissents have repeatedly moved to and through over the years. Building upon Ingold’s (2011) notion of wayfaring through a sensual world and Pink’s (2008) idea of emplaced sociality I argue

One of the Women in Black at the weekly vigil in Kikar Paris, West Jerusalem

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that a particular pattern of dissent experience is inscribed upon the affective lifeworld. This pattern is recognised, shared and sharable with others. In addition to the protests themselves the practice of dissent also incurs and affords a great deal of non-instrumental sociality and also provides avenues for occupational specialisation, channels economic activities and affords spaces and occasions for casual socialisation and leisure. Following on from contemporary reassessments of the concept and formation of community, I highlight how the sociality of participants reflects the ‘traffic relations’ and consociation which have been seen to produce a sense of belonging in other novel community formations (Amit, 2012; Amit & Rapport, 2002; Djelic & Quack, 2010; Wallman, 1998). Finally, I shall situate this community in relation to the use of networks and networking to describe the sociality and practice of transnational social movements elsewhere (Castells, 2004, 2012; Juris, 2008a). The tentative critique I offer here is that, by ascribing the notion of networks to transnational social movements, we may be denying its practitioners the social legitimacy which comes with community and which affords sense of belonging and potential which many long-term struggles will require if they are to endure.

**Action in the public sphere**

The second half of my Friday is beginning. The demo in the village of Palestinian Walaja in southern Jerusalem was small. Fayrouz, one of the resident activists had just given us an informative tour of the village and the huge concrete wall that is being built to entirely encircle it. During this tour Fayrouz described the Israeli discourse of ‘security’, used to legitimise the barrier here, as ‘bullshit’. ‘Where are we going to go?’, she pointed out, ‘Once we get outside of the loop that encloses the village, we’re still behind the rest of the wall’. The tour ends with some pensive looks and groups of people wondering what to do next. It becomes clear that people are in need of transportation to get to where they want to go and as I have a car I offer a lift to anyone going to the Sheikh Jarrah protest north of the city centre. As I mentioned the dispersed locations of the regular protests and lack of public transport between them made my car a particularly useful resource. Walaja is in southern Jerusalem and Sheikh Jarrah is north of the centre. It’s not a big city but to get between the two without a car, involves walking, hitching, changing buses and a major checkpoint in Bethlehem. I can take four people there in less than half-an-hour and have a nice intimate chat inside the vehicle with these foreign visitors. So I set off and ask the passengers where they come from, why they are here, the standard research questions. There’s Byron a young researcher from Holland whose father is Arab and mother from the Far East, Luke a photographer from
Australia, Mia from Sweden who is here with the International Solidarity Movement, and another young woman who doesn’t say much. I know this area, so I get to give running commentaries of the landscape, the checkpoint locations and the Jewish and Palestinian neighbourhoods as we drive. The route we take drives northward and is rarely more than a few hundred metres from either side along the unseen route of the Green Line\textsuperscript{41} which divides Jerusalem into East and West.

We are a little early for the Sheikh Jarrah protest so I sit and chat with Bill. The protest here began in 2009 when four families were forcibly evicted from their homes. The evictions were carried out by the police for Nahalat Shimon Ltd. whom the Israeli courts ruled to be the legal owners and authorized the eviction orders on the grounds that the tenants were in breach of a rental agreement. The Palestinians in this small plot of residential units are all 1948 refugees from places like Jaffa and Ramle who like the residents of Walaja ended up on the Jordanian side after the war. They contest that they were given ownership of the land in the 1950s by the Jordanian authorities and UNRWA, as part of an effort to solve the housing crisis for refugees. In return for taking the houses built by UNRWA, the twenty-eight Palestinian families renounced their refugee status. However, the law of the land changed under their feet again in 1967 with the annexation of East Jerusalem and in the early seventies two organizations, the Sephardi Community Committee and the Ashkenazi Knesset Yisrael Committee, began to sue for legal ownership of the land. They initiated a series of legal suits against the Palestinian inhabitants including demands for rent and later requests for the houses to be evacuated. This land had indeed been bought by these two Jewish community trusts for 16,000 Francs in 1876, and it is on the basis of these Ottoman deeds that the Israeli courts granted ownership\textsuperscript{42}. An adjacent plot of land was purchased by a private company in 1891 and plots sold to individuals of mostly Yemenite, Halabi and Georgian Jewish origin.

\textsuperscript{41} The 1948 Armistice boundary between Israel and Jordan. While the Green Line marked the boundary of Jordanian jurisdiction the lesser know Red Line drew the extent of Israeli control. In several places the space between the two lines was ‘no man’s land’. Nineteen years of non-development helped shape the current infrastructure and the major road north from the city centre, along which the tram line also runs, follows the route of no man’s land.

\textsuperscript{42} The entire region of Israel-Palestine and beyond was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to 1917. The walls that still surround the Old City were commissioned by Suleiman the Magnificent. Control passed to the British Empire in 1923 until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.
1916, 93 Jewish families, comprising 259 individuals, lived in this neighbourhood, which had four synagogues as well as the tombs of Shimon HaZadek and the Small Sanhedrin\textsuperscript{43}. During the conflict of 1948 these Jewish families left the area for the sanctuary of Israeli jurisdiction and the neighbourhood found itself adjacent to the Green Line. It was during this period in the 1950s that the Palestinian families moved into the houses built by UNRWA and the Jordanians on empty land in the Ashkenazi trust’s parcel of land. Israel's Custodian General of the Ministry for Justice took control of the land after the 1967 war and in 1972 the two Jewish trusts completed legal proceedings for the release of properties to them and registration in their names (see Reiter & Lehrs, 2010). After that it gets complicated, or rather the historical complexities become subject to the intricate discourse of civil law regarding property, holy places, Palestinian absentees, municipal zoning, national parks, archaeological and religious sites and political imperatives in Israel. One law in particular stands out in the argument over ownership, the Absentee's Property Law (Knesset, 1950). The net effect of this law is such that property belonging to Palestinian refugees of 1948 was turned over to the Israeli state and they are barred from reclaiming it or seeking compensation. This does not apply to Jews, so while the Sephardi Community Committee and the Ashkenazi Knesset Yisrael Committee are free to claim ownership of property they abandoned during the war, Palestinians are prohibited from litigating for property in Jaffa, Haifa, Ramle or any place within Israel proper.

In August 2009 one family refused to leave the area after their eviction. They set up a tent to live in and found themselves joined by a growing number of people protesting against this situation. The district police began to take notice, indeed Member of Knesset (MK) and former Tourism Minister Benjamin Elon had called for a greater police presence in the neighbourhood to protect Jews from Arabs:

‘This is a holy site – the 2,000-year-old gravesite of Simon the Just – and an area where people come to pray at all hours of the night; Arabs often throw rocks there, yet the police are not there’ (Fendel, 2009a).

\textsuperscript{43} Simon the Righteous (or the Just) was a High Priest of the Second Temple and the Small Sanhedrin was a lower law court of the same period. The traditions that the priest and the jurists are buried here certainly date back hundreds of years.
Arutz 7, an overtly pro-settlement news outlet which published MK Elon's request for police called him ‘the driving force behind the reclamation of the Shimon HaTzaddik/Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood’ and also described the beginnings of what would be a high profile protest in the neighbourhood.

‘What is happening in Shimon HaTzaddik is a microcosm of the entire story of Jerusalem,’ Elon told Arutz-7 … Earlier this week, another home in the neighbourhood was “inherited” by a Jewish presence; the Arab squatters living there left, in accordance with the eviction orders, except for one family that defiantly remains (ibid).

MK Elon has long been interested in developing this area and was instrumental in bringing together Israeli and international investors to form Nahalat Shimon Ltd. who purchased the property rights from the two religious trusts, and raised further funds ‘to invest some $4 million in ‘compensation for the evacuation of the Arab residents, as well as in the planning and rebuilding of the area to establish a Jewish neighbourhood’ (Shragai, 2001). This part of a policy, overtly stated by a number of individuals and organizations, which has grown in significance over the last ten years to ‘Judaize’ East Jerusalem:

‘Our strategic plan for the city is one: a belt of Jewish continuity from east to west’ Elon said during a press tour of the Sheikh Jarrah...Six Jewish families currently live in the neighbourhood, under 24-hour guard amid hundreds of Palestinians’ (UJF, 2002).

The police came in large numbers. They declared the protest to be unlicensed and therefore illegal and told the crowds to disperse. When the protesters refused to do so they were arrested. By December 2009 sometimes as many as 25 people were being arrested each week at - or while going to - the protest. Armed and masked riot police were in attendance, as were police horses. The months of aggressive police tactics and arrests greatly increased media coverage of the protest, which then grew larger and larger. At one point, I am told, an activist brought flowers and laid them at the feet of the coordinating officer, in thanks. Sheikh Jarrah is not a backwater or impoverished neighbourhood. The British Consulate and the
The Quartet\textsuperscript{44} are based here, as are other consulates and several large offices of the Red Cross and the UN. The neighbourhood had also seen the construction of several large villas by notable Palestinian families in the nineteenth century, as well as being the site of a medieval mosque which houses the tomb of Sultan Salah al-Din’s physician. As such the ‘just’ evictions of ‘Arab squatters’ and plans to develop the area for Jewish residents had been noted and publicly criticized by the United States and the European Union (Arutz 7, 2009a, 2009b; Fendel, 2009b). The violent arrests and dispersal of protests brought established activists, others who had never publicly protested, foreign diplomats, Israeli politicians, and people from across the world to the neighbourhood. It was several months before the police relented to petitions of prominent Israelis and court rulings that they had no legal basis for banning the protest and arresting people.

Byron had been here in 2010 when the protest (or the police reaction to the protest) was at its most violent. It must be stressed that, having come to know many of the activists since and having seen arrests made, these are not violent protesters but protests violently dispersed. As is the case elsewhere, security forces are authorized by the state to employ violence and removing protesters entails such action. There is no longer a police presence at the protest nor are there the crowds of over five hundred. In September 2011 due to the success of the protests the Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity Movement, which had burst onto the Israeli activist scene, helping to mobilize and publicize the protest efforts and invigorating the Israeli Left, decided to change direction and expand its activities:

‘The settler takeover of properties in Sheikh Jarrah has been hindered in parts of the neighbourhood, and halted in other parts. The courts have begun, for the first time in years, to rule against the settler organizations in hearings about the future of the neighbourhood. The police, the executive arm of the settlement, has retreated from the neighbourhood. Arrests of neighbourhood residents have dwindled to next to nothing, and as a result, our freedom of action and that of the neighbourhood popular committee have increased. Most importantly, the political reality in East Jerusalem has begun to change. The joint Palestinian-Israeli political struggle has become a byword in East and West Jerusalem’ (SJSM, 2011).

\textsuperscript{44} The Quartet on the Middle East, (aka the Diplomatic Quartet, the Madrid Quartet, or the Quartet. A mediating organization in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it represents the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia.
Some of the locals who had been or still faced eviction wanted to continue the protest, and throughout 2011-12 they maintained the weekly event which is regularly attended by around forty individuals. Dr. Mahmood, the veterinarian, and Abdul who’s retired, arrived first, walking down together from the shops, followed by Rafik who hops off a mini-bus. Rafik and his family were amongst those evicted before the protests froze the process in the courts. He and his family are living across town with relatives. I still didn’t know these men who constitute the small core of locals maintaining the protest, so I introduce myself and ask Abdul for an interview during the week. The regulars gradually arrive, people from Ta’ayush, B’Tselem, Breaking the Silence, Yasamba, Anarchists Against the Wall, Women in Black, Rabbis for Human Rights, Boycott from Within, New Profile, Courage to Refuse, Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, Solidariot, International Solidarity Movement.

I notice a man with a group I had not seen before and ask him why he came here. He tells me he is leading a ‘fact finding mission’ with a group of Dutch people. They’re visiting and having tours with both Palestinian and Israeli groups, looking to hear both sides of the story so as to make a more informed, nuanced decision.

‘We are a group from a Protestant Church in the Netherlands. Most of the people with us are clergymen in that Church...I lived in Jordan for some time and got connected with the Palestinians about ten years ago. Since then I am active in this field, writing articles...if you don't write about it people won't know. So what I have seen here things like the expansion of settlements etc. are all facts that I know, but still when you see it is different experience from reading it.

[he continued]

‘I'm also a member of [a mainstream political party] in the Netherlands and I try to give them a view on the situation. The political view in the Netherlands is still very traditional pro-Israeli so the opinion of the CXP is quite important as the attitude of Europe to Israel is vital because the USA is very much siding with Israel due to internal pressure, restrictions etc. So Europe is quite important.’

Byron who is with me, agrees with the assessment that Holland is very pro-Israel. I ask the Dutch gentleman how effective his work is in Holland.
‘Still disappointing, although maybe the feeling of ‘justice’ and the sake of Palestinians may slowly be progressing, but the people are still very much sticking to their old positions. Within my own CXP I can say I’m one of the leading people promoting a more balanced view. I’m a member of a committee of eight people who are studying this project and we are two out of eight, a minority. Recently I would have been the only one. The government are very hesitant to allow what they see as a minority opinion in the report. So the pressures of the past still dominate. But on the ground level I think there are more people looking for a more balanced view. I’ll give you an example. About half of the people are clergymen in these Protestant Churches and one reason they wanted to join this very journey is that they have a balanced position. This afternoon we spoke to Rabbis for Human Rights we also had a presentation by a colonist [settler]. There are people on this journey who have spoken to others who took part in previous journeys, typical traditional pro-Israeli tours. They have a feeling that it’s not the journey they want; they want a point of view from both positions.’

I moved to talk again with my hitchhikers, one of whom is Mia who has come from Sweden with the ISM who were holding a nightly vigil in a tent in the garden of the al-Quraish house. The situation in this front garden is hard to believe. During the decades long court proceedings over contended or intended ownership, a small extension built onto the al-Quraish household was deemed to be in contravention of a contested rental agreement. In 1999 the Palestinian family was evicted from this one room and the unit sealed. Following this, Jewish settlers managed to covertly break into to the sealed unit and have maintained a constant presence of up to four young religious men in the sparsely furnished room. Lately they got a rather fierce guard dog. In this situation the settlers live in the front part of the house while the al-Quraish family occupy the back. Though for the most part it was quiet in

45 In 1982 the two Jewish trusts filed suits to have 17 apartments removed from the site. Their lawyer negotiated an agreement which gave the residents long-term rental rights, thus requiring them to pay rent and maintain property appropriately. Most of the residents refuse to recognize this agreement on the basis that their lawyer made it without their consent, and refuse to pay rent on property which they feel they rightfully own. This ruling is the legal basis for the evictions: failure to meet their obligations as tenants of rental property (see Reiter & Lehrs 2010 for an extensively referenced account of the court cases).
2012 the garden is a fulcrum of confrontation, one of those microcosms of the occupation. The garden walls are awash with an ongoing graffiti dialog in at least three languages: ‘Free Palestine’ is followed by ‘of Leftist Scum!’ which is rejoined by ‘Free Yourselves’. The vigil ‘tent’ is a makeshift gazebo which separates the front half of the house from the back. It contains a couple of sofas and an old oil drum for making a fire at night. Although it is mostly quiet there is no love lost in this garden. Mia tells me how the settlers had spat and thrown water at her during the night, using sexually explicit language. On occasions when the protest group goes down and fills the garden tensions rise if a settler comes out. Some protesters may shout ‘thieves, thieves’, or the drummers might lead a chant ‘fascism won’t come here’. Once when I joined a relatively large and vocal group of about fifty who had marched from town, two men came out of the room with large Israeli flags and the guard dog, which snarled and snapped out as the crowd filled the garden. Someone threw a stone hitting the man with the dog and cutting him under the eye. It was tense, frightening and unpleasant.

Today though the demonstration stays up at the main road, far from the contested houses. As I chat with people an old friend jumps up from behind to surprise me. ‘Hello my friend, how are you doing?’, says Oz smiling. I've known Oz for ten years. We had lived together in 2003 when he was a signatory to the Ometz LeSarev (Courage to Refuse - CTR) letter. Letters written by serving soldiers is a generational dissenting practice in Israel. Like the letters which spawned Shalom Achshav in the seventies, and Yesh Gvul in the eighties. The CTR signatories were members of reservist combat units, who comprise a significant part of Israel's offensive capabilities. This last ‘refusenik’ movement, as they are known in Hebrew, emerged out of the violence, death and destruction in the Second Intifada. At the time the signatories refused to serve in the Occupied Territories on the grounds that they were oppressing a people rather than providing security for the state, not a general pacifist conscientious movement but a refusal to operate in a given area (see CTR, 2002). Time, travel abroad and the ongoing situation in his country had radicalized Oz further. ‘I would not sign that letter now’, he once told me, ‘macho bullshit’. He could no longer agree with the overt militarism and ‘values of Zionism’ referred to in the Combatants Letter, he was a Zionist no more. By his own admission he wasn't really an activist anymore, certainly not in

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46 Ometz LeSarev (Heb) Courage to Refuse; Shalom Achshav (Heb) Peace Now; Yesh Gvul (Heb) There is a Limit (Border);
terms of running over the South Hebron Hills with Ta'ayush\textsuperscript{47}, or getting arrested for demonstrating against the wall. He now had a young child and a successful academic career. Such personal and family commitments make it difficult to overcome the eventual burnout that most activists I talked to eventually feel. So Oz comes here once in a while and meets up with people he knows from his past actions. He introduces me to some people. Shai who worked at Radio Kol HaShalom\textsuperscript{48}, Benny who is a researcher with B'Tselem\textsuperscript{49}, and the legendary veteran Israeli activist Zvi. Oz goes off to talk to some other friends and acquaintances and I chat with his mother Tali who is one of the Women in Black and his father Pauli who tells me, ‘There is no hope for this country...they are talking about bombing Iran, that will be the end’. I also see Mags from Finland and Jost from Switzerland, two volunteers with the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program for Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) program. I had first met them at the Women in Black vigil over in Western city centre and we were becoming nicely acquainted with each other. The protest only lasts about ninety minutes, so conversations are often quick-catch-ups. Today I end up spending most time with Gur, ‘You must meet him, he is a lapsed activist but we're getting him back’, said Tali as she introduced me. Gur is a maths teacher and loves to talk about the history of Palestine before 1948, of physics, the discovery of zero and almost any subject other than who he is and why he comes to Sheikh Jarrah.

Sheikh Jarrah is a very social affair. It is easy for Jerusalemites to reach and begins around 4 pm so that people returning from the noon-time demonstrations in the territories can drop by on their way back to the city. Now that the police no longer break up the

\textsuperscript{47} Ta'ayush (Arabic) 'Living Together' or 'Coexistence'. Founded in 2000 as a Jewish Arabic partnership movement is particularly active working with poor and peripheral rural Palestinians in the South Hebron Hills.

\textsuperscript{48} Radio Kol HaShalom (Heb) All for Peace Radio is a Palestinian-Israeli radio station with offices in Ramallah and Sultan Amir. It broadcast its signal from Ramallah but was shut down by the Israeli Communications Ministry. It still broadcasts through the internet.

\textsuperscript{49} B'Tselem (Heb) ‘in the image of’ (taken from the Book of Genesis 1:27 "And God created humans in his image"). Established in 1989 B'Tselem is 'The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories...It endeavours to document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in Israel'
demonstration and Solidariot have called an end to their activities, the protest group is made up of only some of the locals and people who are often involved with other organizations, other protests. It could be said that the individuals who come here are representing one of the organisations or social movements they claim affiliation to. On some occasions this is true for some individuals and to a degree I was always representing Loughborough University. However, the sample of movements mentioned above, the political parties, and human rights organizations are not mobilising their membership to come here. For the most part people come here because some of the locals wish to continue the weekly protest and they wish to be supported in this effort. They are joined by visiting groups such as the Protestant Church group from Holland, New York Communists, members of a French Palestinian Solidarity Movement, the Speaker of the Irish Parliament, who come to show support and to find out exactly what's going on here. Although this is an orchestrated event, with a bag of placards provided in three languages, and Palestinian flags flown, with slogans and chants called out over a mega-phone, and central players discussing direction and tactics, any sense of collective action or call-to-arms is loose. Some people hold placards, some people chant, some people don't like the rhetoric of certain slogans, some people are positive about the future outcome, others say the protest is ‘in danger of becoming like Women in Black’. Their 23 year weekly vigil against the occupation is seen by some as an ineffective symbolic act, or even a symbol of ineffectiveness. Why do you come here? I asked Benny many months later. With his wry smile he replied, 'It's handy. It’s on my way home, I can do some shopping, meet some people, you know'.

A week later I interviewed Abdul, a quiet man in his sixties and one of the three or four locals who are still actively maintaining the weekly protest. He is one of the residents who are fighting the eviction in the courts. Though the protest is a social affair it occurs because of a deep sense of injustice, personal suffering, and purposeful resistance. As a child Abdul and his family were exiled from Jaffa, one of the refugees from 1948. As someone who might be, for the ‘greater good’ of Zionism, expelled from his family home for the second time in his lifetime described his understanding of the situation to me:

‘Actually they want to take the whole area, not one or two houses. There are about seven properties disputed in the courts right now. But after they got rid of the first two families, they froze the eviction cases because they didn't expect there would be this kind of action. They thought that we'll give up after one or two months. The protest
made the government and the courts think that if they evicted another family there would be further reactions. So now every court case has been postponed - mine was postponed for one year. One year. Why? They didn't wait one year for the evicted families – it was our reaction and the protests that made them think. And I hope that with our purpose and the media we generate, with everybody that comes from overseas, from England from Europe from several countries and more...they will see all this and go back to their country, their family and tell them what's going on here.’

Brian Callan (BC): You said you have faith in the court process. Do you believe it will work in your favour?

‘Yes. Our case is a human case, it’s not a political case. Not just my family, all the families here, they didn't steal the land, they didn't build the houses. The land and houses was offered by the Jordanian government and UNWRA to solve the problem of the refugees. So they offered us land and UNRWA build the houses and everyone was happy. The house was released in our name and everyone got a home. What they the settlers claim on the other side is that they owned the area before 1948, but we are not guilty of stealing it. Let me just say, everybody who came here in 1948 has property in Israel. Everybody has houses and land. My family has two houses in Jaffa. So how can they have the right to take back these houses and we don't have the right to take back our houses? We also have maybe 450 dunams in South Tel Aviv, that's our property, to hell with this property! So there is a right for them to get properties but we have no right to get our properties back. Two kinds of law - one for Israelis and one for Palestinians.’

BC: What are you using in the court as your defence?

‘Our lawyers went to Turkey to look for the old Ottoman deeds of the land. And they found 12 documents stating that this land belonged to a Palestinian family who used to live in the cave - down there. This was a Palestinian who rented the land to another man. So at one stage the old Jewish residents moved from renting to owning - they falsified papers and documents to say they owned this land. Now they are trying to submit these false papers to courts, but they don't succeed. If they do succeed to take this land they will not stop here, they will continue to Wadi Joz, Mount Olives, Ras-al-Amud, Silwan. They want to circle the Old City with settlements and their program
here if they succeed - although they will not - is to build 250 family units for Jewish settlers only.‘

‘Every place in Jerusalem has its own story. Here in Sheikh Jarrah the story is not the same as Silwan, Ras al-Amud. Here as I told you they didn't steal the land they didn't steal the houses. In Silwan it’s different problem, they built houses by themselves without permits so their case is different. Our struggle here is social, we don't have relationship with political organizations like Fatah, Hamas. If we change to politics, there will be police arresting people, there will be violence. So we say our struggle is peaceful and non-violent and that's why we succeed.’

I thanked Abdul his time and asked him what I could do to help. ‘Your visit here helps us continue’, he replied, ‘send back the story and maybe you can also bring your family too, to come here and to see’.
7. Something’s Wrong Here

Transnational dissent and the unimagined community

For millennia Jerusalem has been a crossroads and a destination, a site of transnational social emplacement where armies triumphed and retreated, merchants paid their toll and kept their piece and migrants and pilgrims came and went and stayed. The city is a repository of the unending cultural accretion of thoughts, tongues, texts, deaths, and lives that touch upon its hills. Today solidarity activism is a significant contributor to these ongoing processes. In this chapter I focus on the inherent diversity of this latter-day transnational process which moves to and through the established sites of weekly protest. This takes us away from the subjectivity of weirdness and its relationship to critical thinking and into Arendt’s notion of action within the plurality of the human condition (Arendt, 1958). In addition to the instrumental practices of demonstrations I shall highlight that being a dissenter also incurs a great deal of sociality and also provides avenues for occupational specialisation, channels economic activities and affords spaces and occasions for casual socialisation and leisure. I therefore assert that the practice of Palestinians, Israelis and Internationals coming together in solidarity is producing a community of sorts. I base this assertion on contemporary reassessments of what this ambiguous unit of sociality might be or becoming in contemporary times (Amit, 2012; Amit & Rapport, 2002; Djelic & Quack, 2010). I situate this community in relation to two important theorisations in social movement theory; the micro-level processes of collective action frame production and more importantly, the structural conceptualisation of networks at the macro-level of Global Civil Society (Beck, 2005; Juris, 2008a). The argument I present is that, while solidarity activism can certainly be understood and analysed as a network, it is also characteristic of what could described as a community. The difference is important in that community can convey ideas of capacity to include, to care for, to reproduce itself over time and to endure. One may be part of an extensive network, but one belongs to a community.

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50 A protester at Sheikh Jarrah
A number of factors are producing this particular transnational community. In the first instance there is Arendt’s (1958) action, as a political activity within uncertain outcome in the plurality of solidarity activism. This action entails repeated movement along specific lines defined by the locations of protest and sites of dissent leisure. We have then the shared sensuality of both Pink’s (2008) emplaced sociality and recognisable patterns in Ingold’s (2011) meshwork. The affective lifeworld of any solidarity activist thus contains experiences and understandings that can be shared and exchanged with another, even if they never shared these spaces and the same times. To a great extent this is enabled by the long duration of weekly resistance to an unending occupation, which allows for a great many people to have moved between these sites over a decade or more. A second consequence of this is that the long duration has afforded the emergence of specialisation, occupational possibilities, generational legitimacy and knowledge based on the practice of dissent. Thus the community is not comprised simply by ‘activists’ at site of protest but of a wide range of people who are or have been resisting the processes of dispossession directed at Palestinians by the state of Israel. The ethnography shows that there is no underlying practice, interest or episteme which can be said to be a common factor in reproducing this community. What all dissenters do share is simply the feeling that something is wrong. The diverse and dispersed transnational community is thus driven to action by the certainty of an ambiguous yet hard to shake affective moral appraisal. However, I shall begin with a brief discussion of how the transnational sociality of dissent is often imagined, both by my participants and certain theories on transnational social movements. The point I wish to make here is that for the most part very few people seem to imagine it as a community.

**Imagining transnational sociality**

The notion of community is sometimes used by the highly heterogeneous collective of dissenters, however it is often imagined to be small, weak and fractured. Its boundaries are thought to terminate at municipal or state borders and it is fractured along ideological spectra, prognoses and tactics. The categories used by members to describe their community reflect traditional and idealised understandings of community, as a geographically bounded population which possesses a relatively harmonised outlook on the world. We have thus the ‘Israeli Leftwing community’ which collapsed after the Second Intifada, or perhaps exists ‘in Tel Aviv but not Jerusalem’. For the Palestinians there are the local ‘popular committees’, however judging by the low local turnout at most protests these committees may not be that popular locally. Contemporary research of transnational social processes in fields such as
economics, international relations, migration studies, knowledge production and global elites are now decoupling the notion of community from place and finding communities of practice, purpose, interest, episteme. Building on this body of work the following discussion ultimately asks why the field of transnational activism studies has ‘on the whole not used or appropriated the term “community”, preferring terms such as “networks” or “social movements”’ (Djelic & Quack, 2010, p. 41). This absence highlights certain problematics that the practice of transnational activism poses for paradigms and concepts in traditional social movement theory, at both the micro-level specificities of framing process theory and the macro-level abstraction of Global Civil Society commonly used to describe and analyse this phenomenon.

In the first instance framing process theory, or collective action frames, may be more divisive than cohesive and often unsuitable for addressing the elusive and fluid nature of contemporary transnational power and resistance. More importantly terms such as Global Civil Society and Transnational Networks are structural abstractions which though descriptively and analytically powerful, can obscure the affective and potentially productive dimension of ‘belonging’ that community affords. By the turn of the millennium Global Civil Society (GCS) was an idea of ‘unusual promiscuousness’ (Keane, 2003, p. xi) employed both by academics as a major sociological potential (Beck, 2005) and by proponents as ‘an expression of the love of life, freedom, community, and democracy that resides deep in the soul of every human being’ (Korten, Perlas, & Shiva, 2002). Like grand ideas such as Nation or Society, GCS has always been an imprecise concept, at once manifest yet difficult to empirically define. Network analysis has indeed proved a sophisticated and empirically grounded methodology from which to approach its various emergent instances. Its tool-kit provides comparisons on signature characteristics, goal-achievement, communication flows, mobilization processes, the extensity, intensity and velocity of its macro-structure and the constitution of global public spheres through hyper-network structures of inclusion and exclusion (Anheier & Katz, 2004).

Though well suited to describing and analysing transactional exchanges, many affective dimensions of dissent have also been addressed through network concepts. Juris in particular highlights how the shared experiences of intense emotions at mass direct action events like Seattle, Prague or Athens generate affective solidarity, which is ‘particularly important with fluid, network based movements that rely on non-traditional modes of identification (Juris, 2008a, p. 63). However, in the tension between descriptive and normative capacities of social sciences there is always the problem of reifying our object of
analysis through our methodology. Our abstractions can become essences in the minds of academics and practitioners alike. Pro-Palestinian dissenters are keenly aware that they are part of a transnational network and they do imagine themselves as belonging to such a structure. However, in the following I suggest that another significant affective process occurs but is overlooked both by academics and practitioners; the production of community. I believe that this affective consequence of dissent may be significant, for just as the sense of community belonging is leveraged by major polities to promote cohesion and durability (Anderson, 1991; Berezin, 1999, 2001), it is possible that by imagining themselves as part of a wider transnational community dissenters may also overcome fragmentation and fatigue.

Community is also a fuzzy subject having both concrete and constructed connotations (Fog Olwig, 2002). Certainly there are concrete relationships involved and as with any community these may come to be defined through both friendship or enmity, but I suggest that the practice of dissent by a diverse and distributed population is also akin to what is normally seen as an imagined community. This is partially a consequence to the ongoing nature of the conflict. In contrast to the intense affect of mass mobilization described by Juris (2008a), dissent sociality in Israeli and Palestine is shaped by long duration, scheduled protest and the interim and uneventful daily routine of being a dissenter. Though there are often intense confrontations these happen mostly on Fridays and Saturdays in locations far removed from each other. There are also professionalised dissenters, those in local or international NGOs, who may not even attend or are contractually prohibited from participation in such events. There are also the unspectacular and banal everyday practices of daily life of living in the city as a dissenter. The meeting of friends, family and colleagues, going shopping, writing emails, dropping the kids off to school or taking the bus. However, following Amit (2012) and others I shall argue that over time it is precisely through such familiar and concrete routines and faces that we come to feel we belong to a community.

**Who are we? Protest demographics & discourses in Jerusalem**

There are places across Israeli and Palestine where the sociality of dissent occurs. Some, like the regular weekend protests are scheduled in time and space. Others, like the cafes, bars, info-centres and offices are available during trading times and yet more like the city streets, the private homes and the social media sites afford random access. These sites are knots of sociality in the meshwork of dissent. Fridays and Saturdays are routine. I leave the kids off to nursery, then get a message that the protest at Walaja is called off so I go to West Jerusalem to join the silent vigil held by *Women in Black*. Dina who keeps the black hand-shaped
placards usually arrives first with Tali. They are joined by half-a-dozen other Israeli women dressed in black. About three to five internationals with the EAPPI also arrive. They are volunteers on three month rotations in the region and their movement between protest sites or security checkpoints is dictated by their coordinator. I met Mags and Jost here on my first day in the field, she from Finland and he from Switzerland. They had also just begun their three month placements with the Jerusalem team. The vigil is laid out along three sides of Kikar Paris, a small square that sits between four of Western Jerusalem’s major thoroughfares. Given the small size of the group, which is usually no more than twenty people, the protest body is dispersed in clusters rather than grouped in a block. I usually chat with a few different people catching up on the weekly news both personal and political and keeping an eye on fellow protesters being angrily berated or insulted by passers-by. The silent vigil has gathered here in West Jerusalem every Friday for the last twenty-six years, demanding to Di LaKibush or End the Occupation. Having abjectly failed to achieve this aim I asked Tali why they continue? ‘We keep this space open, so that people know they can come here on any Friday’. At the stroke of two the women greet the end of the vigil with smiles and light-hearted relief. There is a small bustle of chit-chat as everyone comes back together to return the placards to Dina’s bag and with a criss-cross of Shabbat Shaloms everybody heads on their way.

This leaves me an hour or so to cross the city centre to the weekly protest in Sheikh Jarrah. The distance is walk-able and takes you from predominantly Jewish West Jerusalem, up to the Old City walls and down past the commercial heart of predominantly Palestinian East Jerusalem at Bab al-Amud. On the way there is enough time to drop into the Educational Bookstore on Salah Ad-Din Street. Mags and Jost had told me about this place, full of books in English relating to the conflict and cappuccino and cakes. The EAPPI teams are brought here as part of their induction training. This is also where I met Avner properly for the first time, a young Israeli man whom I’d seen several times before at Sheikh Jarrah chanting out slogans in Arabic over the mega-phone. In the quiet proximity of the bookshops our glances of recognition turned to handshakes and first names exchanged and we walked on down the road together to join the Sheikh Jarrah protest at four.

51 Di LaKibush (Hebrew) meaning End the Occupation. This is written on each black-hand placard in one of three languages, Hebrew, Arabic or English.

52 An Arabic name for a major gateway on the Old City walls. Also known as Sar Schem in Hebrew or Damascus Gate in English.
Dina and Tali from the *Women in Black* (WIB) are usually parking the car by the time I get there. I see Mags and Jost with some others from the EAPPI\(^3\) and I’m drawn to them by their welcoming smiles. A handful of local men who have been evicted or face eviction from their homes constitute the core of the group. One brings a fine gold frilled Palestinian flag on a long pole. Occasionally other locals join, children play with crayons and Palestinian activists from the Hebrew University turn up. A regular group of Israelis bring a megaphone and a bag of placards. Sometimes the *Yasamba* drummers add volume to the protest. As I mentioned Sheikh Jarrah is a meeting point for a plethora of activists, NGO staff, journalists, photographers, political tourists and the odd politician from abroad. It is like the WIB’s vigil, a *space* kept open by local Palestinians who put out the call for solidarity. Its normally quiet, there are no police here now and though this fact is becoming a critique from some quarters – explicitly and negatively comparing the protest to WIB – the peacefulness enables casual socialisation. At the end of the protest the activists disperse, heading home perhaps or to meet friends or prepare for Friday dinner. I head to the *Uganda* bar, one of a few places in West Jerusalem that stays open on *Shabbat*. It’s usually quiet at this time and I write up my field-notes, but often others I know or have only seen drop in at this time, on their way back from the West Bank. Like Nur who I recognized from a march in Tel Aviv. She’s here to meet Rachel, a Jewish activist arriving from England and we talk over beer and humus. Rachel kindly offers me a place to stay in London for my upcoming conference.

Though initiated and led by ‘locals’ neither the WIB vigil nor the Sheikh Jarrah protest are particularly constituted either by a local community or a single movement. This is generally true of most of the weekend protests which, though they number less than one hundred people at best, are impressively transnational in their make-up. Not present at the protest are teams of dedicated lawyers engaged in the ongoing court cases deliberating the evictions or those who secure representation for arrested activists. Neither can you see the Norwegian Refugee Council, which along with several other local and major international NGOs are based in the area, also coordinate some of the legal assistance. Journalists, researchers and various other agencies monitor, assist, publicise and interject in Sheikh Jarrah in various ways. This snapshot of Sheikh Jarrah is just one moment in the dissenting community in Israel and Palestine. The protest is temporal social ‘performance’ in Turner’s (1988) terms which for an hour or two brings together people from various neighbourhoods.

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\(^3\) EAPPI, Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine & Israel. A voluntary human rights observer program coordinated by the World Council of Churches (https://www.eappi.org/en/about)
cities, countries and predilections. Aside from a few organisers and shapers of the protest practice, the majority are not fully engaged with a given script for this performance. It is not a Durkheimian cohesion ritual focused on a collective totem (Durkheim, 1912b) nor a carnival affair or intensely affective direct-action event (Juris, 2008a). Some chant, some don’t, some don’t like certain slogans, the volume of the drums annoys one while others do a little shimmy. Mostly people are sitting or standing in small groups chatting casually and on the whole participation is fluid, informal and elective. I began to explore the various understandings of the situation by appropriating the classic protest chant and asking participants ‘What are we fighting for?’.

**The Moral Multiverse**

Nilli: ‘What are we fighting for - oh that’s a hard one - we’re fighting for different things you see - I don’t know, can I get back to you on that’

Vered: ‘I’m fighting so I can go camping, hiking at the weekend. I want a normal life’

Moshe: ‘I could give you the political answer, justice, equality, bla-bla-bla, but I just want to live in a normal city. Like Montreal’

Abdul: ‘This is not political this is social’

Kate: ‘I’m here in solidarity with the Palestinians’

As the above responses demonstrate, ideological discourse is also fluid and relatively un-ascripted. While Palestinian national flags are present and the chants call out ‘Free Free Palestine’, such overtly nationalist symbols and notions are often rhetorical devices. This is true even for the Palestinian organizers, as Abdul’s own statement shows. Though in many imaginations the Two State Solution is the obvious answer, Farouk from *Hizme* in the West Bank tells me he doesn’t care what flag flies, ‘so long as I’m left alone to build a house and raise my family, find work – that’s what peace is’. Amongst Internationals, Palestinian national liberation and justice are strong tropes, as is anti-Semitism as one Israeli activist uncomfortably acknowledge to me. Others talk of respect for Human Rights or liberal democratic values, while some defer judgement saying they are on ‘fact-finding’ tours. Israeli
critiques and visions of the future are also fragmented. While the Women in Black call for an end to occupation Yigal from B’Tselem thinks this ‘a rather outdated notion’. The One State Solution is openly posited while another sees hope in the future primacy of urban polities and focuses his efforts on Jerusalem. Subjective critiques are unfolding and coming to Sheikh Jarrah has also changed peoples’ perceptions. Moshe, an Israeli citizen raised in the U.S. ‘came to Sheikh Jarrah a classic left-Zionist Two State activist...after that year I was an anti-Occupation activist’. Tomer who had never protested, came here because he ‘didn’t think it was right that the police were arresting people’ and is now with the rather more radical Israeli collective Anarchists Against the Wall.

Sheikh Jarrah is fairly typical of much of the popular committees’ form of solidarity which has been prevalent for the past decade or more. Its focus is a particular localised instance of dispossession, it insists on being peaceful and avoids overt alliance to the major Palestinian political parties. It invites Israelis and Internationals to join and persists in the face of physical coercion and incarceration by state and private security agencies. These protests are all monitored by numerous Palestinian, Israeli and international NGOs, journalists, film-makers and researchers. Reportage is published in local and international media outlets and included in publications by and for major global governance organisations such as UNICEF, UNDP, The European Union, and the Quartet. Efforts at direct contact and coordination between the various protests are now being attempted through personal networks, conferences, and strategy meetings. However, with the exception of one or two isolated cases these protests have had few definitive victories in terms of rolling back dispossession. In the absence of any political opportunity structure over the last number of years, these protests are now critiqued by some as symbolic acts (al Saafin, 2012). Debates on indices of success or failure and the importance of symbolic acts aside, we can concretely say that these protests have managed to endure for years and have played a significant role in the growth of international dissent to Israeli policies (Landy, 2011). By calling upon and welcoming people from all over the world to join them in solidarity, the Palestinian activists have played a major role in the growth of grassroots transnational opposition to Israel’s politics and practices. Though we can rightly call this diverse set of peoples and practices a network, what sustains these protests week after withering week is the affective component of the sociality of prolonged dissent, which is producing what maybe properly understood as a transnational community.
What is community?

‘There’s a left-wing community in Tel Aviv, but not here in Jerusalem’

answered Sarah

Vered Amit points out that the historical practice of ethnography has reinforced a correlation between place and community, in effect employing location as the unit of analysis rather than the object of research (Amit in Amit & Rapport, 2002). The discipline took its time in coming to understand that their cultural isolates were not timeless units of utopian sociality. In the 1950s Max Gluckman and the Manchester School confirmed that ‘tribal’ life was neither harmonious nor isolated. Gender, generation, blood-lines and indeed any facet of a social structure as much shaped dissent as it did order (Epstein, 1969; Mitchell, 1969; V. Turner, 1957, 1967). Some time passed before this observation was applied to that great community of modernity, the Nation. Gellner and Anderson were amongst the first to unpick the historical contingency and the mechanisms through which national communities had come to be imagined in the minds of their members (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983, 1994). The later turn to transnational studies has further problematised traditional concepts of belonging and also questioned the role that academia has played in reproducing the notion of nation as the natural representation of modernity (Appadurai, 2008; Beck, 2005; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002).

If communities need not be constructed from harmonious outgrowths of concrete social bonds and face-to-face relationships, then what are they? There is insufficient space to fully address this debate here, but the transnational turn has led to a reformulation of the concept in various ways. Studies on migration, business and finance, trade agreements, tourism, scientists, elites and more now talk of transnational communities in which ‘place’ is of secondary importance or less. Instead we have communities of practice, purpose, interest and episteme which are based on shared convictions, values, expertise, goals or socio-political visions. What most authors agree on is a sense of belonging emerging from mutual interaction, a common project and/or imagined identity and the active involvement of some of its members (Basch et al., 1994; Djelic & Quack, 2010; Hannerz, 1992; Levitt, 2001; Mayntz, 2010; Metiu, 2010; G. Morgan, 2001; G. Morgan & Kubo, 2010). Despite the perceived explosion in transnationalism ‘approaches that dominate the study of globalization direct attention selectively to markets, organizations, and networks, neglecting other kinds of social collectives extending beyond national boundaries, such as communities’ (Mayntz,
Though some authors are now beginning to critically apply the term to transnational socialites (Dobusch & Quack, 2010; Mariussen, 2010; Metiu, 2010) its general absence limits our understanding of both the role and impact of novel community formations in the studies of social protest and the wider discussion of how and when community is produced.

**How is community?**

Amit uses the term community to distinguish a collective connection that is not merely or even primarily instrumental. This excludes for example members of a workforce if they engage only through formal roles. However, when co-workers begin to meet for coffee, lunch conversations, or go bowling together some of them may come to feel part of a community.

‘Most of our experiences of communality arise similarly out of more or less limited interactions afforded by a variety of circumstantial associations, with our neighbours, the parents of children at our children’s school, or team-mates, fellow students, club members, conference-goers and more’ (Amit in Amit & Rapport, 2002, pp. 58–9)

This sense of belonging, through quotidian and banal interaction which Amit calls *consociation*, emerges first through eye-contact, recognition, then being able to put names to faces, telling stories about mutually shared experiences, and in some cases leading to friendship, intimacy, love or lasting animosity. An example is Dyck’s observation of the construction of community sentiment in suburban Canada through the consociation practices of parents supporting their children at track and field days. At these weekly events parents shared the purposes and practices of positive child rearing, leading to formal identification as a ‘track parent with reference to a person’s history of co-participation with others in happenings’ (Dyck, 2002, p. 116). Repeated presence at and participation in track days, entails casual social interactions and a growing intimacy with both the people there and certain behavioural norms. This, Dyck argues, can lead to one being identified with – and feeling as part of - a community. Even more limited, less formal and indirect familiarities are produced through the proclivities of our daily routines. Over time we begin to recognise others, at shops, bus stops or our favourite bars. By regular movement through spaces we learn the rhythms of the lives of people whom we do not know. For Wallman (1998) recognising and occasionally being recognised by others in these ‘traffic relations’ also fosters a sense of belonging, without the need for direct interpersonal relationships or
substantial exchange. Implicit in Wallman’s analysis is the awareness that community imagination comfortably accommodates an affinity to others whom we shall never meet. This understanding is of course in line with Anderson’s (1991) formulation of national belonging and also evokes ‘a wider set of social potentials that exist for a specified population’ (Pink, 2008, p. 171). However, the community of dissent which passes through Israel and Palestine is a rather ambiguous population to specify. Due to its diffuse and dispersed constituency, in which ‘belonging may or may not be recognized, interpreted, responded to and felt’ (Amit in Rapport & Amit, 2012 loc. 388) and because of its non-traditional modes this population is not well imagined as a community along its transnational dimension, either by observers or practitioners.

**Division and unity through complexity**

There are though significant obstacles to a sense of community amongst this collection of peoples, obstacles both real and imagined. This is an impressively heterogeneous group containing a mix of cultures, experiences, genders and generations. It contains a multitude of different understandings of the problem and its resolution. Such diversity of opinions is inevitable for three main reasons. Firstly there is the obvious relativity of acculturated understandings, experiences and expectations of Palestinians, Israelis, and Internationals. This is further compounded by the historical depth and unfolding nature of the situation, and the complex production of narratives and counter-narratives. These narratives have been central characters in a major geo-political performance for over a century now with each character vying for the attention, sympathies and assistance of audiences and powers near and far. Thirdly in this period of ‘relative’ quiet, expropriation of Palestinian land and property is not simply a state controlled exercise. As described in the previous chapter it is a transnational project where private capital, diaspora resources, urban planning, archaeological preservation, environmental quality, messianic beliefs and other stakeholders devolve the state from culpability. This is important to understand; both the Israeli state and the Jerusalem municipality claim Sheikh Jarrah is a civil matter in which they are prohibited from interfering. The *Judaisation* of East Jerusalem (as it is now being referred to by *both* concerns), has nothing to do with it, seems, either local or national politics.

This third reason is particularly effective in creating differentiation in dissenters’ understandings and misunderstandings of the problem and in their capacity to define exactly what is wrong here. In East Jerusalem alone a property developer and a religious tomb are driving evictions in Sheikh Jarrah; in *Silwan* illegal homes are demolished and a bronze-age
archaeological dig undermines the foundations of others; a national park is established on the land of Issawiya and a by-pass road is set to cut Beit Safafa in two. Why would the municipality not maintain the rule of law and develop the city’s religious, tourist and leisure areas? In Area C of the West Bank, where the Israeli military has jurisdiction over the Palestinian civilian population\(^{54}\) dispossession occurs by various means. The construction of the West Bank ‘barrier’ around Walaja, the settlement security fences near Beit Ummar and the military Firing Zone 918 all confiscate land on the grounds of security needs. Is the security of citizens not the paramount concern of the state? Construction companies expanding settlements in Area C and the road systems that serve them, expropriate land under the rubric of infrastructure development and ‘natural growth’. What state would not serve the basic needs of its citizens and growing population? Absence of infrastructure is also an effective mean of dispossession, as when raw sewage from the Betar Illit settlement pollutes Palestinian agricultural land in the valley below, degrading its capacity to support farmers and their families. Perhaps these are unfortunate accidents? Bureaucracy is useful everywhere. Palestinian villages like Susiya are ‘unrecognised’ by the Israeli state and so they are not connected to transport, water nor the power grid. They also have their homes, schools, sheep pens and portaloos demolished on a regular basis on the grounds that even a portaloo is an illegal construction. Susiya and the surrounding villages are also subject to less subtle means of harassment and dispossession. Nearby settlers regularly pull up or burn olive trees and physically attack shepherds, but you’ll find a few bad apples in every lot.

Identifying blame and thus a resolution are difficult to clarify. In terms of collective action framing there is no unifying diagnostic to describe the problem, no definitive protagonist to blame and no certain prognosis for resolution. Framing process theory sees movement actors as ‘signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, bystanders or observers’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). Collective action frames function to organise experience and guide action ‘by simplifying or condensing aspects of “the world out there” but in ways that are intended to mobilise potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilise opponents’ (ibid, p. 614). While I do not dismiss the descriptive and analytic utility of framing theory, the diffuse powers that transnational collectives of dissenters face

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\(^{54}\) In the West Bank since the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority nominally administers civil and security matters in Area A and civil matters in Area B. Israel administers security in Area B and both civil and security matters in Area C.
problematises these framing processes, a fact that is compounded by the diversity of backgrounds and experiences within the transnational collective itself (W. L. Bennett, 2005; W. L. Bennett & Segerberg, 2011; Olausson, 2009; Schrock, Holden, & Reid, 2004). Such diffusion of power is not unique to the Israeli-Palestinian context and indeed is now quite common across the neo-liberalised globe. While the dictator’s delight in pasting his bust on every street corner ultimately identifies him as the head that must roll, the Palestinians evicted from Sheikh Jarrah are locked in an Israeli court fight over private property rights with a faceless incorporated legal body, arguing over the validity of Ottoman era documents. That their opponents in court are Nahalat Shimon International, one of a number of US funded organisations that have explicit Zionist motivations to settle Jews in East Jerusalem, has no bearing on the proper proceedings of Israeli civil courts (Fendel, 2010; Ir Amim, 2009; OCHA, 2010; Reiter & Lehrs, 2010). Apportioning blame in Sheikh Jarrah is highly problematic and this is just one of many instances of how dispossession has been advanced during this period of (very) relative quiet. One eventually comes to hear and understand the common term used in dissenting circles; ‘creeping annexation’.

However, a lack of unified diagnostic or prognostic has not precluded participation in protest nor inhibited non-instrumental socialisation by the dissenters. Given that most protests are routine events, there is a limited need for tactical or urgent meetings during the week and those that occur are not open to the dissenting ‘masses’. Being ‘normal’ people dissenters spend much of their week tending to the ordinary needs of living, the quotidian affairs. In doing so a complex of intersecting personal networks and structural momenta produce a high-degree of non-instrumental exchange as a matter of routine, hospitality, friendship and chance. A Rabbi, an Anarchist, and an Arab walk into a bar…it’s no joke, the bar just happens to be Uganda. Stewart (2007) refers to such movement and exchanges as the ‘ordinary affects’ of life, the unceasing and unremarkable encounters which make up most of our days. The residents of Sheikh Jarrah invite activists to join them in breaking the Ramadan fast for *Eid al-Fitr*. Vered visits a hospital in West Jerusalem to be with the family she knows from *Bil’in* in the West Bank. She hasn’t seen them in almost a year and their young son is seriously ill. A Jewish-American protestors falls in love with and marries a Palestinian activist in the West Bank, they first met while she clung to him trying to prevent his arrest. Mags returns to Jerusalem from Finland for a short visit and we go for coffee where an(other) anthropologist friend of hers joins us. I’m asked to collect someone’s cat from the vet in West Jerusalem and bring it to Bethlehem. Introductions are made at dinner parties and I discover that Jerusalem’s bi-lingual school is also a haven for dissenters where their children learn of
alternative narratives to the Israeli national curriculum, my own two boys included. At these schools I meet the Israeli-Palestinian lawyer who represents Susiya in the Israeli High court, the local head of UNICEF, the Reuters journalist covering the West Bank. If all this direct and indirect sociality, structure, specialization, leisure activity, exchange and contestation existed within a village or neighbourhood there wouldn’t be much compunction about using the term community.

Is the colloquial use of ‘community’ just shorthand for dissent’s capacity to produce social capital - ‘ties that are based on mutual trust and mutual recognition [that] do not necessarily imply the presence of collective identity’ (Diani, 1997, p. 129)? To what extent is collective identity essential to the notion of community, indeed how and why should we be talking about community at all? In the last section I build upon the earlier critique of contemporary community practice in the transnational realm to suggest that what links the various interpretations, practices, purposes and interests into community is the shared feeling that something is wrong. To use Nate Silver’s (2012) term wrong is the affective signal which cuts through the discursive noise, it motivates the disparate individuals to concerted political action imprinting a particular pattern in the meshworlds of participants. In an unintentional turn this practice also fosters non-instrumental consociation. The consequent emplaced sociality of this political tourism, structured by the famous protest performances and the intervals of ordinary living, follow and create lines of dissent sociality that are often devoid of strategic content. In the small and severely constrained landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the daily reality of military occupation creates inescapable avenues along which dissenters are common wayfarers. When one chooses to attend the performances of dissent and follow the pathways that lead from one to another the faces and places encountered become familiar, shared and sometimes intimate.

Is this what we might call community and why might it be important to do so? From an academic point of view I would concur with Vered Amit’s assertion that community is conceptually good to think, as in: ‘How, when, where and why do people come together? What are the terms of their engagement? To what extent are they able to establish and perpetuate a coordinated effort? How do they feel about it?’ (Amit, 2012 loc. 428). This last question highlights what I believe is a problem in the recent turn to understanding transnational protest as a ‘network’ phenomenon and practice (Anheier & Katz, 2004; Castells, 2004, 2012; Juris, 2008a). My fear is that such descriptions fail to ascribe social legitimacy on the practice of collective dissent, both in the minds and feelings of practitioners and the forces they oppose. We are all comfortable with descriptions of the ‘Jewish
community’ or ‘business community’ and equally familiar with the more sinister collectives of spy and terrorist networks. So I also believe that it might be of value in perpetuating the coordinated effort of solidarity activism for Palestine if we allow ourselves think and talk about community. To emphasise this, I present a short piece written by Vered and sent to me one dark night as she wasn’t beginning to feel overwhelmed by the effort of it all. I include it here in full for it reflects both the deep emotional strain of sustaining a life of active dissent and the solace and power taken from the knowledge that ‘we’ do not struggle alone.

Vered, August 2012, 3am

‘I know you. I know what you are going through. I know that sometimes you feel like tearing your hair out at the insanely popular self destructive habits humanity has. I know that sometimes it does not make you sad to think of us not here. I know you've found solace in the beauty and wondrous nature of the planet, of the universe, of the unknown and the known and cry tears of utter pain at what we are destroying. I know that you, like I, have wondered out loud, alone, with adversaries and with rebels, with the television, with strangers, on twitter, on tumbler, with your photos, your planting, your poems, your images, your songs, your chants, your Mic checks, your creative intelligent anger finding outlets….we wonder.

‘I know that you have despaired when storms arise with your fellow troublemakers. We debate tactics, we share roles, at every step strive to live the life we speak of. We discuss new ways. We invest our time our energy our love our understanding our patience and the weight of what we see sometimes hangs on us heavily. We try to share all this, we all try to participate. And I know you also fail. We try to be aware, mindful of the sexual tensions, the racial understanding, the privileged and the not. We have also ignored the brazen patriarchy, the racial tensions, the discrimination. We too have at times read the news and believed what we thought was right. How open am I to changing my mind? I know you have felt guilt. When you leave and when you stay. I know you have had to stop sometimes to just. Breath. I know that you get tired. I know that you rage. I know that you have questioned what it is that we are doing. I know that you have been angry or frustrated at times when your privilege was, even if for a moment, no longer the white elephant in the room. Or deeply questioning perhaps even occasionally rejecting the contentious solidarity beings who
come from your oppressors society. And you all also had to face what it is that makes something deep inside you move into action.

‘I know that you have found various ways to survive. When so many new experiences force you to rethink how you see the world. Sometimes we get locked in our trauma. I know that you have found escape in numbing the brain. I know you have also sometimes forgotten what it is to love. Where compassion and >> [sic] meet. I know that your anger has taken hold of your insides and twisted them up. Hands tingling at the thought of picking up a baton, of pushing back hard, of kicking that tear gas canister back in the direction it has come from. I know that you want to survive. I know that you do not care when the money gets hurt. A glass window, the tires of a truck, the D-locks, the padlocks, the black bloc, the arms in concrete, the mind in front of the machine. I know that you do not care that they call us violent, disturbers of the peace, disorders of the public, naysayers, betayers, enemies of the state, downfall of society. I know you that you “prefer stirring things up to keeping the peace.” We are everywhere and we are more or less the same. The lines between us blur. I know you know that “culture and ethnicity should be springboards for overthrowing the state.” The Silk Road is our information highway. The Spice Road is our cultural orgy. The issues, concerns, and passions that drive us are shared, overlap, hug one another. And sometimes contradict. However I know that you stand tall opposite the energy that bears force. I know you and you know me. I just wanted to let you know that I know you are around and that makes me feel whole. We Are Everywhere.’

Communities of practice, purpose, interest or affect

Authors have been re-imagining the concept of community in the face of novel socialities at the turn of the millennium and Djelic and Quack highlight four common understandings in transnational studies (Djelic & Quack, 2010). Perhaps we could describe the transnational flows that pass through the performances of solidarity activism as one of these kinds; a community of practice, purpose, interest or episteme? While the popular committee protests do share a mode of practice in non-violent or more properly ‘unarmed’ resistance, practice alone would exclude the professional contingency of journalists, legal experts, fund raisers and NGO assistance that have such crucial and engaged roles. The purpose of protest
performances are well stated in the local dimension; resisting evictions, dispossession, restriction, ending the occupation etc. However, there is no consensus on the greater purpose of the network of protests, as Nilli admitted earlier ‘we are fighting for different things’. Perhaps, we can better imagine this transnational dissent as producing a community of interest or episteme. However, as Mayntz points out interest ‘must be understood in a very general sense to avoid misinterpretation’ (Mayntz, 2010, p. 66) and episteme has more generally been applied to communities of ‘professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3), such as doctors and academics. We can say though, that even while practices, purposes, interests and episteme are differentially constructed and constrained, everyone from the Palestinian waiting at the checkpoint, to a Rabbi for Human Rights, the Anarchist blocking a bulldozer, the UN report compiler, the fact finding Christian or Fasel from Sheikh Jarrah who wants his house back, all share the feeling that something is wrong here.

Following the model of affect used in this thesis we must affirm that this feeling is not of secondary importance, nor is it a mindless reaction. It is a sophisticated, pervasive and often astute process by which we perceive, understand and judge our world. The feeling that something is wrong is Damasio’s ‘wordless knowledge’ and Prinz’s embodied judgement. It remains independent of conscience, discursive critiques or framings, both those which aim to support it and the counter-frames which attempt to deflect its critique. The feeling constitutes the core of moral reasoning and dumbfounds the complexity arguments to the contrary. I cannot argue here for a historically consistent universal codification of Right or Wrong which we all access. Wrong is a cultural construct and we cannot doubt that those advocating a ‘Greater Israel’ through the expansion of settlements feel this to be the right thing, but all transnational dissenters be they foreign or local come to the scheduled sites of protest because they feel something is wrong. They may arrive there by different paths but they have all become moral actors. Palestinians who have lived for generations under both banal and violent expressions of military occupation have little reason to judge their lot as somehow legitimate. Many Israeli dissenters have had to overcome nationally promoted sentiments of right and wrong and both they and the Internationals are no doubt also being acculturated in some way by the emergent ‘moral entrepreneurs’ of Global Civil Society (Beck, 2005). Given that the feeling that something is wrong is the basis of any moral judgement and precedes cognitive formulation, the need for unifying discursive frames is not proven for collective mobilization. Regardless of its origin or object of attribution, what resonates with all dissenters is the sense of wrong and the ethnography shows that this is enough to sustain
dissent, overcome discursive complexity, ideological tensions and post-modern obfuscations of oppression. Driven by this ambiguous certainty of wrongness these people move through and come to share the established and emergent physical spaces in which first faces and places become familiar and then possibly loved or loathed in concrete relationships. Yet others in the dispersed population equally engaged by this sense of wrongness pass by unmet in the bustling commerce of dissent. This is the recognisable pattern in the meshworks of dissenters in this ethnography. It is not only apposite and analytically useful to conceive of dissent in Israeli and Palestine as producing community on the basis of a shared sense of wrong, it is in many ways a more concrete and inclusive unit of analysis than the practices, purposes, interests and episteme.

**Imagining the Unimagined**

It would be wrong to ignore the impediments that this community faces. It is certainly not a peaceful ‘place’ to be and it is the object of systematic derision, oppression, incarceration, and occasionally violent death. Its fragmentation along national identities is highly problematic. Despite being ideal candidates for cosmopolitan identity the mobile, affluent and urbane Israelis find it particularly hard to subordinate their own national identity and their role as the oppressor. Palestinians in the occupied territories have a severely impeded capacity for movement, which restricts their opportunity for non-instrumental sociality within the community. One cannot simply go for coffee in Jerusalem. One cannot simply go to Jerusalem. The Israeli and Palestinian activists are not only a minority in the populations in which they live, they are also dispersed across a dozen or more performances which mostly happen at the same time on Friday or Saturday, thus diminishing their visible extent. Though the Internationals bring much needed vigour (and numbers) to activities, their framings and actions sometimes unintentionally offend both Palestinians and Israelis. For this they are mostly forgiven but their high turnover diminishes the sense of permanence of the community. The professionalisation of dissent and service provision by NGOs is also open to accusations of profiteering or ‘normalisation’, of helping to maintain the occupation through the provision of services, whose responsibility should be with the occupying power, Israel (Allen, 2013; Nakhleh, 2012). Finally, it cannot be said that there has been much material success in terms of ending the occupation, and few Palestinians or Israelis speak of hope.

Communal divisions, costly misunderstandings, a fast and fluid turnover of people, and institutional dysfunction are perhaps inevitable in transnational communities, indeed we have come to expect as much from their traditional counterparts. However, such issues will
inevitably play out through framing processes and novel negotiations in the unfolding global civil structures. A lack of instrumental progress or hope and subsequent burnout and despair are perhaps the most difficult and most important issues to address, and not just for pro-Palestinian activism. Many other contemporary social issues requiring major structural realignment will not come quickly and will inevitably be opposed by resource rich embedded interests. If as academics we recognise that community is good to think with we can still critically approach the ambiguities of its instances in terms of scale, duration, mediation, formalization and so forth (Amit, 2012). Perhaps more relevant to the performance of dissent, given that community is traditionally evoked to express and harness social capacity and a sense of permanence, its appropriation by academia may also assist its practitioners in re-imagining the extent and potential of their own novel social formations. The knowledge that from within Global Civil Society distributed communities emerge, interact and provide a legitimate sense of belonging may assist dissenters in imaging their capacity to endure what may be many years of striving to put the obvious wrongs of the world to right.
Part III
Love
8. Love & Betrayal and the Intimate Affects of Dissent

In a number of ways this section on Love differs significantly from the preceding texts on Weirdness and Wrongness. Firstly, whilst the first two themes emerged from encounters in the field, the tensions between dissenting Israelis and their ‘non-aligned’ intimate acquaintances was an issue which I had been concerned with since my Master’s thesis. How such relationships may inhibit or enable protest and how they are managed within the network of mixed and passionate political ideologies and practices were questions I had determined to ask before I entered the field. Such lines of questioning and the development of participant relationships, though not always determined by the import this concern, were constantly at the back of my mind. My own theoretical concerns were shaping my ethnographic praxis. Furthermore, the praxis for understanding love also differed fundamentally from the previous topics in that, whilst I personally experienced the affects of weirdness and wrongness in the field, I have not experienced the sense of betrayal upon which this discussion of love and intimacy in dissent pivots. Though I am long enough in the tooth to have loved and lost more than once, and to have had and overcome fraught times with my own father, I simply have not had the kind of relationship with my nation that Israelis have with theirs. This is crucial to my argument and I shall devote the first chapter of this section to the Israeli hegemonic proscription to love the nation, without which the sense of betrayal afforded by dissent would not emerge. This is not to say that patriotism isn’t taught in Irish schools but - perhaps because of a post-colonial distrust of authority, the cultural backwardness and economic crappiness of my seventies upbringing, and the fact that the term ‘nationalist’ was associated solely with the IRA in that period – in my own experience national pride came third place to cynicalism and emigration.

Fundamentally, I have no personal reference or ability to empathise with the notion of loving the nation in the way that, I argue, Israelis are at least expected to, certainly I cannot imagine any of my friends or family ever accusing me of betraying my people or my nation unless I actually committed espionage, and even then I’m not sure it would come to that. The knowledge I present here is therefore qualitatively different from the preceding, in that the third position of understanding here is less focused. It spans a greater intersubjective space of difference than occurred with weirdness and wrongness. My own experiences of these affects was something I shared with my participants, a commonality that acted as a conduit to understanding. It can be argued in a positive sense that my participants’ voices are therefore stronger in this section, but personally I worried more about this section because I felt I was projecting my theories upon my participants’ experiences. In an attempt to alleviate this
feeling and reduce the impact of my own impositions, I have asked the key participants referred to in the two following chapters to review, revise and if need be refute these texts. Methodologically, then the knowledge presented in the following is more collaborative in terms of the production of text but experientially less shared, and less understood, by the researcher.

The second major difference in this section relates to affect theory and the form and quality of emotion being discussed. The kind of love I attempt to relate to and describe here is not generally considered to be of the perceptual quality dealt with in the preceding, it is not love on first sight but falls into the emotional category known as affective loyalties. Though we may unexpectedly feel a rush of positive sensuality when we apprehend a significant other, as I do sometimes when I check on my sleeping children, such wonderful embodied affirmation does not describe the complex, unfolding and often conflicting sensations that both emerge from and produce long-term intersubjective intimacy. In many ways this section provides balance to the focus on perceptual affect discussed previously, in that it relates to the construction of affective meaning through social practice; to wit through the ongoing practices of caring and resource giving in these otherwise tense relationships. Following from Bauman’s (2003) understanding of love as containing a sacrificial dimension, I submit that we may come to call ‘love’ that confusion of irreconcilable signals we experience simultaneously when we live in fundamental disagreement with intimate others, precisely because we continue to maintain practices of sharing and caring despite painful and highly emotive difference. We come to understand through the intimate affects of dissent that love is not happily-ever-after but diffuse and enduring affection through fundamental and highly emotional charged moral disputes. While Gould (2009) and others have pointed out how the ‘speech acts’ of others can recast complex emotions of fear and shame into ‘anger’, I theorise that the affective confusion of dissent is renamed and recast as love, not by an act of speech but through enduring acts of social intimacy and by the prevalence and appeal of the western discourse that friendship and family is about love. Both practice and discourse reshape the affective dimension of lifeworlds and meanings,

Part III is also divided into two chapters. The first lays out the formation of powerful affective loyalty to the nation and subsequent accusations (and feelings) of betrayal that result from the becoming of dissent. Betrayal is reciprocal here. For the ‘true’ patriot the Israeli left are clearly traitors and self-hating Jews, but the dissenters too have been betrayed by the nation that raised them to believe in the righteousness of its cause and the ‘principles of
Zionism’. The following chapter moves on to the affects of dissent within the pre-existing intimate network of family and friends, and addresses the thesis on complex love outlined above. Furthermore, the recasting of love out of confusion and betrayal and maintenance of intimate relationships has, over time, a queering effect on normative Israeli notions of the patriotic family. In this I suggest that the lifeworlds’ of the non-aligned intimates are suspended, or even reshaped, in the effort to understand the dissenting loved one. The intimate effects of dissent may thus lead to the application of Arendt’s (1968) faculty of judging and the intersubjective production of understanding in the third position. This trying process occurs not in the briefness of an ethnographic research project but over the decades of long-term relationships. I therefore begin with a short life story from the field, which sketches out some of the ambiguities in affective loyalties experienced by Tali, one of the Women in Black, over three generations of dissenting activity in Israel.

Tali’s Story

‘A few hours after the birth of my first son Oz I was asked by the other new mothers in the maternity ward, ‘Is it a boy or a girl?’ When I told them it was a boy they exclaimed, ‘Oh wonderful. We need soldiers!’ I was shocked and this has stuck with me forever. Is this what we are bringing children into the world for? When Israelis say that Arabs don’t love their children, that they only want to make martyrs, I think of this moment’.

Tali had another child a few years later, a boy named Nadav. They grew up together in a house in Ein Karem, a beautiful old Arab village on the southern outskirts of Jerusalem. The entire village had been abandoned in the war of 1948. It is a Nakba house, in a now famously idyllic Nakba village full of Israeli artists and tourists. She began to protest against the occupation in her unassuming way in late 1970s. She makes no claims to know solutions, does not debate the finer points, is not a shaper of tactics or leader of protest movements. Nonetheless, along with a handful of other women, she has helped maintain that ‘space’ where the occupation is publically presented to an Israeli society that would rather ignore or deny its existence, Kikar Paris in the centre of west Jerusalem. Her husband, Micha has also been a long-time dissenter to his nation’s hegemonic narrative.

In 1991 Oz sat his mother down to tell her he was joining an elite combat unit. Though military service is compulsory for most secular Israeli Jews, one need not join a
combat unit. Oz worked hard to get into the unit and get through basic and advanced combat training. He served his three years of compulsory service and began his annual reserve rotations in 1996. In 2000 he was called up during the Second Intifada. In 2002 at the apex of violence, Oz signed the Combatant’s Letter and became one of about 600 reserve officers and combat soldiers publically refusing to serve in the occupied territories. Over the next ten years Oz became involved in the transnational dissenting community, befriending and working with a variety of organizations, Ta’ayush, Anarchists Against the Wall, G8 protests in Edinburgh, Samba Bands in the West Bank and Tel Aviv. By 2010 his critique of Israeli politics, policies and society moved further away from the left-wing Zionism of Courage to Refuse. It was around this time that he described the Combatants Letter to me as ‘macho bullshit’. For Oz the end to the occupation wouldn’t be the end to his society’s ills, he was part of an illiberal nation: ‘People can move here from abroad and just because they are Jewish they have more rights than people born here, people who have been here for generations. I hate to think what would happen if the occupation ended today – the racism…’, he shook his head and spoke of his fears through his silence.

At the height of his dissenting activity in Israel, he met and fell in love with Rinat. They married in 2009 and had their first child in 2010. Rinat describes her family and upbringing as ‘pretty’ right-wing, a euphemism understood by those who know how Israeli Likudniks speak and feel about Arabs and the righteousness of a maximalist Jewish State. Oz’s critique was profoundly radical for her, antithetical to her upbringing and how she understood the conflict but clearly this was not a barrier to their relationship. Within a few years she was reading The Invention of the Land of Israel by Shlomo Sands and wondering out loud, how can a people come to a foreign land and claim to own it.

Tali meanwhile is now delighted with her grand-daughter and at the weekly vigils she tells me of her malapropisms and of her innocence. There is a sadness when she thinks of that innocence. Nadav her younger son moved to Berlin in 2010 and doesn’t have any plans to come back in the near future. Oz and his family spent 2012-13 in Paris on a post-doctoral research project. I asked Micha once how he felt with his children living abroad: ‘It’s great, I hope they don’t come back. There is no future in this place’. For her part, though they live so far away from each other, Tali is proud that her two sons are such good friends: ‘That’s what I’m happiest about’. Oz and Rinat did return though. They have family here and Rinat is a psychologist who works primarily through Hebrew. In 2014 she gave birth to a son. Both are doing well.
Like other life stories Tali’s is told through significant events that are far from the ordinary affects of which I have dealt with previously, the minutiae of everyday from which sociality and action emerge. Tali has experienced the birth of two children and their transition into adulthood, wars, sudden and unexpected acts of brutality, moments of pride and loss of innocence, acts of love and care and instances of betrayal. The story as I have presented it is drawn together from snippets of conversations we had over the course of a year or more, at the Women in Black vigil, over coffee in her home, driving to Tel Aviv and more. Like other life stories it is not the course of a single history, isolated and aloof, but the inevitable threading together of the lives of others. There is a tremendous amount of lived experience and other relationships left out of my terribly thin description of Tali and the relationships she has and has had, but the device highlights the particulars I wish to discuss in the following; the triad of family, love and nation from which betrayal emerges.

**Part I: Love & Betrayal in the Nation**

Oz was not necessarily destined to dissent. His upbringing in a village abandoned by Palestinian families in the 1948 war by parents actively engaged in protesting the state’s occupation, did not prevent him from enlisting in an ‘elite’ combat unit and serving in the territories. His brother Nadav did not serve, opting for the ‘grey refusal’ of being psychologically unfit for service, though he never became involved with organised protest or activism. Neither the family nor the state independently determined the nature of the boys’ affective loyalty to the nation but the notion of ‘love’ for Israel is overtly and effective promoted in hegemonic discourse. The ‘Combatants Letter’ which Oz signed at the beginning of his dissenting process begins:

‘We […] who were raised upon the principles of Zionism, self-sacrifice and giving to the people of Israel and to the State of Israel, who have always served in the front lines, and who were the first to carry out any mission in order to protect the State of Israel and strengthen it.’

The ‘principles’ of Zionism are a discursive product and so open to contextual adaptation and manipulation in the ‘social poetics’ of their reproduction (Herzfeld, 1997). Though not a political or structural principle the notion ‘love of Israel’ or ‘love for Israel’ runs prior to and through the history of modern Zionism. In the context of divisiveness in the early Diaspora, first century (CE) Talmudic sage Rabbi Akiva made the injunction of loving one’s neighbour
into a rule. Later Chazal (sages) interpreted that rule as a commandment to love thy close neighbour, the Jew, an interpretation that became institutionalized in the 12th century by Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah\textsuperscript{55} (Illouz, 2014). In the late nineteenth century Hovevei Tzion – which in Hebrew means Lovers of Zion - was a forerunner of the modern Zionist movement, establishing Rishon LeZion in 1882 as one of the first new Jewish settlements in Palestine. The name of the settlement, now a city, is Hebrew for First of Zion. Rabbi Kook, the first Ashkenazi rabbi of Israel added spiritual import writing, ‘Love for the Jewish people and the work of defending the entire people and every individual is not just an emotional accomplishment. It is an important area of the Torah’ (Malachim Kivnei Adam, p. 483 cited in Shulman, 2012). Rabbi Kook also founded the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement that seeks to ‘foster within each student a love of Hashem and a lifelong commitment to Talmud Torah, Am Yisrael and Eretz Yisrael’ (Bnei Akiva, 2012). That Religious Zionism often seems to marry love of God, the Talmud, and the People and Land of Israel into an overarching nationalist ideology, is also supported by an encounter I had in the ISM Solidarity tent in the al-Quraish home in Sheikh Jarrah, a building where the front-half of the house has been occupied by yeshiva students while the Palestinian family remains resident in the rear-half.

‘I was sitting in the makeshift tent with Liv from Finland. She’s here with the ISM. It’s cold dark, boring and winter. She asked me along because they were short of people for the night-time vigils. We chat about each other’s past, present and possible futures and tend to the fire to pass the hours. The point of the vigil is to prevent the settlers in the front of the house from harassing the family at the back. The tent, more of a canvass gazebo, sits over the passageway between the two. Micro-settlement practices. Liv tells me they also hassle her, ‘spitting, throwing water, cursing at me in English and Hebrew’. At around midnight two or three of the young orthodox men return and one, known to the ISM people as ‘the Rat’ comes to the entrance to the tent and starts to talk to us in English – a little jeering I think. I say ‘Shalom, erev tov’ – hello, good evening in Hebrew – and he turns to me, perhaps surprised asking ‘You speak Hebrew?’ I tell him my wife is from here and I’d learnt Hebrew at Ulpan. ‘Ve

\textsuperscript{55} A foundational code of Halakha (Jewish religious law) authored by Rabbi Moshe Ben Maimon, also known as Maimonides in English and Rambam in Hebrew.
ata ohev haYudim?’, he continues – And do you love the Jews? In the second while I
tried to formulate a nuanced response to such a declarative question, the Palestinian
grandmother starts to shout in Arabic from the back of the house. The young man
quickly made his departure into his almost bare one room abode.’

Learning to love of the Am Yisrael (People of Israel) - and – by conflation of the
concept of peoplehood as nationhood Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel) - is not in any way
confined to religiosity. Perhaps most famously an argument between two great twentieth
century Jewish philosophers seemed to hinge on this point as an exceptional characteristic of
‘Jewish tradition’. In an exchange of letters between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt,
Scholem, a scholar of Jewish mysticism, accused Arendt of not having demonstrated ‘Ahavat
Israel’ in her analysis of the Adolph Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1963 and in her thesis on
the banality of evil therein (Arendt, 1963; Scholem, 2002). Scholem wrote:

I will clarify what stands between us. It is the heartless, the downright malicious tone
you employ in dealing with the topic that so profoundly concerns the center of our life
[the Holocaust]. There is something on the Jewish language that is so completely
indefinable, yet fully concrete – what the Jews call ahavat Israel, or love for the
Jewish people. With you, my dear Hannah, as with so many intellectuals coming from
the German left, there is no trace of it (Scholem, 2002, pp. 395–6 orig. emph.).

It is interesting that Scholem describes this love as ‘indefinable yet fully concrete’ for, in a
paper in which I struggle for some such a definition, this phrase could plausibly be used to
describe any kind of love, yet Scholem feels this to be exceptional to ‘Jewish language’.
Kaposi (2008) argues that subsequent conflations of Scholem’s love of the Jewish people
with love of the State of Israel are ideologically laden and mistaken, yet Arendt’s written
reply addresses love of the collective in various forms:

How right you are that I have no such love, and for two reasons: first, I have never in
my life “loved” some nation or collective – not the German, French or American
nation, or the working class, or whatever else might exist. The fact is that I love only
my friends and am quite incapable of any other sort of love. Second this kind of love
for the Jews would seem suspect to me, since I’m Jewish myself…[T]he
magnificence of this people once lay in its belief in God – that is, in the way its trust
and love of God far outweighed its fear of God. And now this people believes only in itself? (Scholem, 2002, p. 399).

In the production of sociality and value system in contemporary and secular Israel, the inculcation of love of land and nation is also evident. I’ve been told by participants that scouts and schools are also instilled with such values, on hikes in the hills and desserts. The ‘IDF Spirit’ is an official codified document which outlines the ‘ethics, doctrine and values’ of the Israel Defence Forces. The document lists as its second value (after defence of the state), ‘Love of the Homeland and Loyalty to the Country’ (IDF, 2011). Every Israeli who goes through basic training is taught this code of ethics. In the transnational dimension amongst the Jewish Diaspora, blog posts, ‘pro-Israel’ web-sites and even conferences are replete with proclamations of ‘Love for Israel’. Ahavat Israel, which Illouz describes as ‘a form of hyper-solidarity’ became in her opinion increasingly institutionalised as a value after World War II, not just in Israel but in the transnational Diaspora, to such an extent that ‘the imperative of hyper-solidarity has been the dominant political ethos and pathos of contemporary organized Jewry’ (Illouz, 2014). More recently, during operation Protective Edge on Gaza in the summer of 2014, the idea that this love is not only exceptional but also trumps almost all other consideration was, to use a military term, reinforced by questions over the conflict. Addressing Jewish Diaspora dissent to the operation in the New York Times, in an accusation remarkably similar to Scholem’s, Shmuel Rosner explicitly raised the issue of love in relation to rights and belonging and on ‘matters of life and death, war and peace’:

‘If all Jews are a family, it would be natural for Israelis to expect the unconditional love of their non-Israeli Jewish kin. If Jews aren’t a family, and their support can be withdrawn, then Israelis have no reason to pay special attention to the complaints of non-Israeli Jews’ (Rosner, 2014).

Like most nationalisms, patriotic feelings of love and pride towards the country are both promoted by the state and experienced by individuals. If it is the job of the state to organise and administer, it is the job of the nation to promote affective loyalty (Berezin, 1999, 2001). This affect is promoted and produced through interactional ritualism, educational curriculae, civil society organisations, state institutions and local media (Handelman, 2004). As such feelings of love and pride towards the nation are the
dramaturgical element of the hegemonic order of things. It becomes natural and right to love
the nation, this is how we should tend to and express emotions relating to the nation-state. As
my exchange with the settler in Sheikh Jarrah above shows, in ethno-nationalisms such as
Israel’s and Palestine’s, the nation conflates with peoplehood (see also Kanaaneh, 2003).
Even though I was taken aback by the question, it is perfectly natural then for the young man
in the tent at Sheikh Jarrah, to have asked me if I love the Jewish people. It has become a
contemporary shibboleth of a ‘proper’ Zionist if you will, with the inference that such love is
unequivocal and absolute. While ‘Love of Israel’ may not be a principle of Zionism per se it
is a desired affect.

Acts of Betrayal I: Apostasy
If un-questioning Love of Israel is the dramaturgical expectation of Jewish acculturation
process in the state, even an obligation for ‘proper’ Israelis, any perceived transgression of
that affective order is itself a moral transgression. It is wrong simply not to Love your nation,
not to feel pride when you see the flag and so to act ‘against’ the nation is quite a different
order of transgression. As Prinz (2007)argues, morality is an embodied judgement on a
transgression apprehended in action or thought and evokes reactions such as anger, contempt
and disgust. The evocation of these three particular emotions has been linked to the violation
of three moral codes in the so called CAD triad hypothesis. Developed by a team of social
psychologists through cross-cultural experimental tests, anger is linked to the violation of
individual autonomy, contempt to the violation of communal codes including hierarchy, and
disgust to violations of purity, sanctity and divinity (Rozin et al., 1999). Moral disgust
signifies a betrayal of the very natural order of things. I have spoken previously about the
vitriol directed towards the Women in Black as they protest the occupation every week in
front of an Israeli audience. The women have told that Jerusalem is a ‘very right-wing
city…you see all the skull-caps’, referring to the high level of religiosity in the city and a
strong secular association in Israel of religion with fanaticism. Personally, I don’t believe
fanaticism is confined to religion in Israel and the secular proscription to love Israel without
equivocation can also be observed through reactions to that transgression by ‘ordinary’
Israelis. A particularly violent reaction occurred in late 2011.

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I see a woman in her mid-twenties talking seriously on the phone in a very English accent. Thinking she's another foreign researcher I introduce myself before the protest gets going. She is Vered, the woman who would become one of my key guides and participants. She's very friendly and tells me about her activism. Her phone rings again. ‘Some activists were attacked by settlers this afternoon, just North of Jerusalem – Anata or somewhere, do you know where it is?’ I don't but I offer her a lift in my car if she can get directions – ‘No, they've hired a mini-bus and they think it’s better to go in a group’. She admits she's very unsure about going herself – will it help she wonders? It seems many activists are converging on the place. The Sheikh Jarrah protest is finishing and there's a palpable tension in the exchange of information going on - people are looking intense and intentional. It’s getting dark. I want to go home. I feel there will be trouble. I don't know why, I'm still afraid of possible violence like the kind I've seen on the news and I decide not to follow the mini-bus in my car. I avoid the trip on the pretext of self-preservation and the continuation of the project - health and safety and the good name of the university. But really it’s because I'm tired and afraid and instead I go to the American Colony Hotel to write up my fieldnotes.

The group of Israeli activists went up to Anatot (not as Vered thought the Palestinian village of Anata) to protest against the fact that, earlier that day the residents had come out from the gated community, walked up the hill to where a small group was sitting in solidarity with a Palestinian landowner whose land was being taken by expansion of the settlement. The incident was video recorded. Some of the residents approached the group, one man spitting out the word mityavenet – a particularly poetic term for a female traitor (bodeget) meaning ‘she who has become Greek’. This refers to the apostasy of Hellenised Jews who adopted Greek customs and culture during the Seleucid rule in the second century BCE. The successful Maccabean revolt, celebrated in the festival of Hanukah, is also celebrated in Zionist narratives as a powerful exemplar of Jewish militarism. The sin of elective apostasy is an anathema to the Zionist natural order. A larger group of activists, Vered among them, returned that evening to the settlement to protest the first assault which had left the Palestinian landowner and his wife in hospital. The second group gathered outside the closed gate of the settlement, while a group of mostly male residents gathered on the other side. After some time the settlement security official opened the gate and what several people have described to me as a lynching ensued, culminating with perhaps up to one hundred men,
carrying Israeli flags marching in triumph as they drove away the activists chanting ‘Death to Arabs’ and ‘Death to Leftists’\(^5^6\). This event was significant, it made the papers (a rarity for left-wing activism). Though she’s been gassed and arrested at Palestinian protests in the territories Vered had ‘never seen anything like it’. Some news reports of the time reflect this level of vitriol:

*Israeli Police Join Settler Pogrom at Anatot, 23 Israeli, Palestinian Activists Injured*

‘Israeli activists who were present saw that settlers were wearing police issue T-shirts and their service weapons, which are distinctive for the police. They brought their police attack dogs as well. The hooligans broke bones, smashed car windows, slashed tires and destroyed cameras, all in good fun. And no one, of course, was held accountable nor will anyone’

(Silverstein, 2011)

*Israel Police turned a blind eye to a lynching*

‘What happened Friday afternoon at the entrance to the settlement of Anatot was a pogrom, a lynching. There’s no other way to describe an event in which hundreds of large men are wildly beating and pursuing a nonviolent group of male and female activists for an extended period of time. There's no way to convey to those who weren't there the threatening sense of the approaching dark - not in words, not in pictures, not even in video’

(Raz, 2011)

What was considered most significant by many activists is that Anatot is not home to ‘radical’ religious-Zionists, but a secular community of a type known as ‘quality of life’ settlements. One activist/author wrote:

‘These settlers were not necessarily identified with the hardcore religious right. Their sociological background is reflected in their voting patterns: in the last Knesset elections…54% voted Likud, 18% Kadima, 11% voted for Lieberman and his Yisrael

\(^5^6\) Edited video footage of the day’s events are available on the *Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity* web site at [http://www.en.justjlm.org/601](http://www.en.justjlm.org/601) and YouTube at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKzNrNhTu5w](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKzNrNhTu5w)
Beiteinu party, and the National Unity Party (which received the majority of votes in most “hardcore” religious settlements) received only 5% of the vote. The takeaway is clear: the idea of “quality of life settlers” is a fiction. The violence that these same dozens of Anatot residents enacted last week would have made the extreme/radical outpost settlers proud’ (Etkes, 2011).

The proscription, or hegemonic inference, that one should Love one’s nation is in no way unique to Israel. The degree of distain currently directed towards Israeli dissenters is however striking and a growing intolerance of ‘others’ has been noted by public figures. Retired Shin Bet security chief Yuval Diskin notes that over the past 10-15 years, ‘Israel has become more and more racist. All of the studies point to this. This is racism toward Arabs and toward foreigners, and we have also becoming a more belligerent society’ (cited in Ravid, 2012). However, expectations of loyalty to the state have always been high in Israel and in the Zionist narrative even moving abroad has been equated with treason. In this narrative ‘exile’ is a place of isolation, degradation and suffering and Jews who live in the diaspora should move to Israel. The ingathering of exiles is a core principle of Zionism and Israelis who leave are regarded as traitors and losers, they are ‘yordim (‘stigmatized emigrants’) and Jewish communal deviants in the eyes of at least some members of those social groups’ (Gold, 2004, p. 331). Prime Minister Itzak Rabin stated this much publicly and more recently Finance Minister and leader of the secular centrist party Yesh Atid57 Yair Lapid berated Israeli expats on his official Facebook for being ‘willing to throw away the only Jewish country just because Berlin is more comfortable’ (cited in Sterman, 2013). As most of the withering replies from Israelis in Berlin pointed out to the Finance Minister, emigration is most often an economic consideration. Seeking a better quality of life by moving to a state subsidised settlement in the occupied territories is not considered radical but reasonable, but moving ‘abroad’ for the same reason is an act of betrayal. That an economic consideration can be framed as treason gives some indication as to the regard in which resident political activists are held in Israel. Those who are most generous think them naïve to believe they can affect change. Less generous are those who think them naïve to believe the ‘Arab mentality’ will ever accommodate peace with Israel. And then there are those who feel that dissenting Israeli Jews are scum who should die for peacefully agitating

57 Yesh Atid (Hebrew), There is a Future
for an end to military occupation and settlement expansion, for seeking two States for two Peoples or G-d forbid, a single state for all its citizens. There is a phrase in Hebrew for such people, regularly shouted at the Women in Black by passers-by: Go’al Nefesh – something that disgusts you to your very soul.

**Acts of Betrayal II: Deceit**

The feeling of betrayal is not one-directional, affect at its core always has an intersubjective foundation. The progression from a sense of unease flagged perhaps by weirdness, through the wordless knowledge that something is wrong, and the uncertain and unceasing cognitive wrangling with political diagnostics and prognostics, is accompanied by a critique of one’s self, society and culture. Israeli dissenters are not only wilfully engaging in Arendt’s judging with the Palestinian other but also with their own compatriots and nation, those with whom they learned to be Israelis. One of the most common terms used by my participants to describe the non-aligned is ‘brainwashed’. Raised on the principles of Zionism, in schools, scouts, as soldiers and in civilian life, in the face of their dissenting experiences and lifeworlds, they come to feel lied to by authorities, teachers, perhaps parents too but certainly lied to by the nation and its hegemonic forms and practices.

**Thursday, March 22nd 2012. Tel Mond, Israel**

‘In view of recent unfortunate developments in Israel I witness a sort of weakness and maybe even fatigue among fellow scholars, educators and mental health practitioners who are also dedicated to human rights. I have therefore disclosed and discussed these difficulties with our friend and colleague Dr. J from New York who will be visiting here. She agreed to meet with activists of Psychoactive, PCATI and other concerned mental health workers at our home in Tel Mond where she will address the issue of vicarious traumatization and the cost of being a moral witness’

The above email has been forwarded to me by a participant who knew I was interested in morality. I contacted the organisers asking if I could attend as an observing researcher and found myself driving down to the coastal plains to a small village with Nilli, who worked with Psychoactive, and Tami an American (and Jewish) intern with Physicians

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58 G-d: A Judaic custom for substituting the writing of ‘God’ with ‘G-d’ based on the practice in Jewish law of giving God’s Hebrew name a high degree of respect and reverence
for Human Rights. About forty people were gathered for the evening and the majority were older than me, in their fifties and sixties. Food and drinks had been laid out and after a few pleasant minutes eating and mingling Dr. J began her talk in English. She had described her presentation in an email as follows:

‘I think it might be interesting to speak about the high price professionals and non professionals alike pay when they find themselves witnesses to political and individual abuse. My thinking is influenced in part by Margalit's work, in which he defines the moral witness as an eye witness to human suffering that has been caused by evil; he adds that a moral witness must be exposed to risk in the act of witnessing. As I see it, for those of us who work with traumatized patients, or who are bystanders to political abuses that the Israeli government is currently committing in the territories, the risk is vicarious traumatization. I would go on from there to describe some of the practices that we found to be helpful in dealing with vicarious trauma and shared trauma in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina’

In this she posited the Israeli activists as witnesses to the suffering and even violent death of Palestinians. She stressed their trauma through Lacan’s notion of ‘symbolic death’, a person’s symbolic world is also often destroyed when disaster or violence is visited upon them. Again she referenced this violence and symbolic death to Palestinian experience. After the presentation the floor was opened to discussion and, after some hesitation, I posed what I thought to be the question that nobody seemed to be asking. I had been talking to a man in his sixties before the presentation and like many of the Women in Black he had come to Israel from the United States in the late sixties, ‘To escape the draft and the Vietnam war’ which he opposed on conscientious grounds. ‘To come to Israel and build a nation on socialist values [of the Kibbutz movement] seemed like a valuable goal compared to the war and civil rights turmoil that defined America at that time. I came to build a better society.’ When I asked how he felt about Israel today, he exhaled his pipe smoke and silently shook his head. This generation of liberal Israelis are aghast at the state of their nation. The question I asked of Dr. J was ‘Is it not the Israelis who experience symbolic death? Is it not their worldview which has been destroyed? Is the trauma not vicariously linked to witnessing the suffering of others, but in the knowledge that their nation is not a better society but one which inflicts suffering?’

No one voiced an objection to my interjection, indeed the room went quiet for a moment, many heads were bowed, eyes fixed on the floor. I need not draw cautious
inferences from that silent pause to say Israeli dissenters come to experience a symbolic
death. Nearly all of the *Women in Black* spoke of it - ‘we were so innocent before 1967’ as
Tali told myself and Elisheva, a young anti-Zionist Israeli activist as we walked one evening
near the Green line in Jerusalem. Rinat, another of the *Women in Black* who sadly and quietly
passed away during the fieldwork period, told me how she felt about the nation. Born in
Germany in the late 1920s her family escaped to the United States before the war and as she
turned thirty she made the decision to immigrate to Israel. ‘I wouldn’t have come if I’d
known what I know now’ she told me, ‘I gently encourage my children to leave, but they
want to be near me and of course I want them to be here. I’m too old to go anywhere myself’.
There was no drama to her statements, her deep sadness was measured and reasoned. She was
84 when she passed away in February 2013. She had still been attending at *Kikar Paris* two
months before.

**Judging from Deceit**

'This corrosive Israeli exercise in the control of another people, breeding the contempt
of the powerful for the oppressed, is a betrayal of the Zionism in which I still believe’
(Cohen, 2014).

The break-up of a long-term relationship can be fraught and occurs over an extended period
of time. The longevity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affords a lifetime of assessment on
the correlation between the hegemonic discourse which legitimises the state’s positioning and
the actions the state executes. In the effort to reproduce the occupation, discourse and actions
change over time as they adapt to changes in technologies, practices of resistance and the
transnational dimensions of local legitimacy. So it is that ‘indefensible borders’, ‘benign
occupation’, ‘disputed territories’, ‘regional instability’, ‘terrorism’ ‘Western democracy’ and
‘biblical heartland’ are all elements that have long been utilised to resist withdrawal to the
1967 borders. Such arguments must contend with changes in strategic appraisals, alternative
discourses, internal critiques and varied external forces using terms such as ‘belligerent
occupation’, ‘colonialisation’, ‘International law’, ‘fascism’ and ‘apartheid’. The host of the
event in *Tel Mond* did not feel it necessary to list the ‘recent unfortunate developments in
Israel’, we can safely presume that almost everyone in his target audience would agree with
his assessment. The inference is that the people gathered together that evening are already
engaged in critically *judging* the acts of the nation and finding them in discord with its
notional ideals. These are a people who were experiencing ‘a sort of weakness and maybe even fatigue’ as the state they served and helped to build, seems to move further away from their hopes of a better kind of society.

As Jackson points out, understanding others through Arendt’s (1968) intersubjective judging requires more than an intellectual movement from one’s own position to theirs;

‘[I]t involves physical upheaval, psychological turmoil, and moral confusion. This is why suffering is an inescapable concomitant of understanding – the loss of the illusion that one’s own particular worldview is universally tenable, the pain of seeing in the face and gestures of a stranger the invalidation of oneself. And it is precisely because such hazards and symbolic deaths are the cost of going beyond the borders of the local world that we complacently regard as the measure of the world that most human beings resist seeking to know others as they know themselves’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 239 emph. added).

For Israel dissenters that invalidation of oneself is also an invalidation of the nation’s actions and the narratives used to legitimise a forty-year military occupation, ongoing dispossession, settlement expansion, a slew of illiberal legislation and a society which seems to lack compassion for others. The narrative they were raised on and believed in, has been a deceit and through this act of betrayal has forced them to divest themselves of the particulars of the national hegemonic worldview. This is not a better society but a place they think of leaving or hope that their children will leave. Though the nation has betrayed them, it will not itself attempt the costly and difficult task self-deconstruction to rectify or even examine the cause of such a transgression. While, in the process and practice of dissent, the sense of betrayal is reciprocal, the purported love of the nation is not reciprocal in the sense of giving away of the self. As Chaim Shalev notes in his critique of Rosner’s of the ‘unconditional love’ expected by the national family. ‘Fair enough’, Shalev admits, ‘but leftists and liberals might also have their own expectations of family’ (Shalev, 2014). Perhaps, in Bauman’s understanding, the nation cannot love its citizens. There never was, nor ever can be reciprocity in that relationship. For if the ‘loving self expands through giving itself away to the loved object’ (Bauman, 2003 loc. 269) - just as a citizen-soldier might do and die for love of country - the nation requires and so desires citizens. For Bauman desire is not love but ‘the wish to consume [to] imbibe, devour and digest – annihilate…to strip alterity of its otherness; thereby to disempower’ (ibid). If we apply Bauman’s critique of love, against desire disguised as
love, we can say that though the nation may reward the citizen for their services it cannot give itself away, only the resources and symbols it has gathered onto itself. Furthermore the nation will only bestow such favours onto the individual who has been stripped of her alterity and consumed into the body politic, the ‘true’ patriot who does not dissent to practices.

To return to Arendt, she could not and would not love the collective, even one to which she felt she belonged. Her ‘dismissal of ahavat Israel runs even deeper than her distaste for collective narcissism, [it] threatened what [she], and many other thinkers before her, defined as the very essence of thinking: namely, independence of mind’ (Illouz, 2014). For Ardent, the unwillingness or ‘quite authentic inability to think’, unimpeded by prejudices and traditions, precludes the possibility of knowing the truth and allows for what she sees as evil to be a product of the everyday and banal sociality. Conversely, when the ambiguities of actual experience confront the certainties of received narratives, we may be unwillingly forced to think about the truths we had previously received. In the case of the contemporary Zionist ethos in Israel to question or doubt is to betray, and there is less and less room for ambiguity. Such belligerence, which underwrites a belligerent occupation, and the vindictiveness, vitriol and violence which increasingly accompanies the insistence to love Israel unconditionally, is a betrayal of historic Jewish values and the Zionist dream that Israel would be a light unto nations. Israeli dissenters are however, not simply atomised individuals in a strange and estranged collective. They too like Arendt love their friends and the families who raised them and it is the interpersonal tensions in these intimate relationships that arise through the emergence of dissent which are addressed in the following chapter. In this I shall suggest that, whereas the desirous and selfish-love that a collective demands inhibits the faculty of thinking, the practice of love as a sacrificial disposition which gives itself away to the loved intimate can enable the faculty of judging and lead to an understanding of dissenting perspectives and lifeworlds.
9. Love & Betrayal and the Intimate Affects of Dissent Part II

The resource rich and institutionalised state plays a significant role in collectivising both discursive and affective elements of our lifeworld, in preparing and producing how we interpret our environment, but thankfully it is not the only available collective, nor the sole provider of interpretations. This chapter moves from the abstract yet concrete relationships between citizen and state to the concrete yet still ambiguous long-term interpersonal relationships with family members and friends. Some networks, such as families with a strong left-wing or liberal Zionist traditions, may have a high-density of relationships supportive or at least sympathetic to dissenting thought and practice. For Aaron this liberal background fostered his movement towards dissent. ‘We were raised to be politically engaged with society and the development of the state. We would always discuss politics at the dinner table. It’s because of this that I could become radically critical’. However, for many of the active Israeli dissenters with whom I’ve worked their discourse and critique is far from the left-wing Zionist tradition, a distance difficult to bridge. Ideas like the Two-State solution is not necessarily considered relevant or possible today. Furthermore, there are also a significant number of activists whose personal networks contain radically different right-wing interpretations on the nature and actions of the state. A number of participant activists were raised in strongly Zionist backgrounds, secular right-wing Likudniks, national-religious Zionists, individuals raised in ‘settlement society’ in the occupied territories and even extreme right-wing Zionist Kahanists. The emergence of dissent within such a family incurs accusations of betrayal which are not only thrown by or directed at the nation but occur within intimate personal networks and across dinner tables.

In this final section I turn to the intimate affects of dissent within the network of long-term concrete affective loyalties in which the term ‘non-aligned’ is an understatement. I focus on the continuity of practices of care, sharing and intimacy that ignores and overcomes powerfully conflicting and highly emotional differences of opinion with regards to the nature of the nation-state. This is not to say that irrevocable schisms do not occur, merely that the affects of continuity, when it does occur, are a recasting of love in the relationships as a complex, sacrificial, painful and uncertain exchange. ‘The joys of parenthood come’ as Bauman warns, ‘in a package deal with the sorrows of self-sacrifice and the fears of unexplored dangers’ (Bauman, 2003 loc. 840). Significantly in terms of the social
construction of emotion, the dramaturgical code, it is the discursive ideal in Western imagination that family and friendship are ‘about love’, that allows this conflict to be recast as such. I’m reminded of the words of one dissenting acquaintance here: ‘Of course I love him, he is my father’. Furthermore, when love is recast as complex and sacrificial the continuation of practices of care and intimacy subtly facilitates a queering of the normative ideals within these intimate relationships. The dissenter is not some radical other, or traitor, or whore but a daughter or friend, someone whom you may have known and cared for years before the emergence of dissent. The persistence of both love and dissent necessitates a movement away from the certitude of hegemonic interpretations. For, if ‘judging, in Arendt’s sense of the term, is always, in practice, less a question of a person’s intellectual acuity than of his or her emotional and social capacity’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 238), then love facilitates the faculty of judging.

Methodologically, this discussion on intimate interpersonal relationships did not emerge from my own participation in these personal networks. The fieldwork period did not evolve into a kinship study and the intimate networks were much more difficult to access than the dissenting community was. I could not live with a dissenter’s family, for I have a family of my own and indeed, few dissenters cohabited as a multi-generational kinship unit. The cohort in their twenties and thirties are often in shared apartments far from ‘home’. Some of the older generation were starting families of their own, grandparents remained in the original family abode. Longstanding friendships were also widely dispersed networks, often living in other cities, with whom dissenters met infrequently. This is not to say that these relationships were insignificant, only that contemporary social life for ‘middle-class’ Jewish Israelis is geared more towards movement than continuity of residence across generations. Much of the ethnography presented here is thus based on how people talked about family and friends and much of my inferences come from the intonations, subtle movements and even pauses of my participants. In this effort I was greatly assisted by the patience, trust and openness of a number of key informants with whom I became very close and who have reviewed and revised the text presented here.

Theoretically, we must keep in mind the discussion that has gone before, the cracks in the hegemonic patina that seem just weird at first, the growing certainty that something is wrong and the immersion within a community of dissent. These are processes that have taken time and occurred within longstanding relationships which pre-date dissent. These relationships, which include both kinship and friendship, are normatively understood in the dominant discursive force of Western intimacy as loving. This discourse also presents love as
self-fulfilment, pure, certain and an end in itself (Berlant, 2012; Illouz, 2013; Schneider, 1968; Watanabe, 2004). The emergence and practice of dissent requires that the understanding of love is recast as complex, sacrificial and uncertain, an intersubjective ‘creative drive, and as such fraught with risks, as all creation is never sure where it is going to end’ (Bauman, 2003 loc. 228). This is not merely a change in normative understandings but a reforming of an affective lifeworld (Gould, 2009). Subsequently, the relationship endures dissent and in doing so the non-aligned intimates begin to understand the activists not as the traitors and whores of the nationalist narrative, but as committed and compassionate sons, daughters and friends. The maintenance of relationships through love enables Arendt’s (1968) faculty of judging to produce new understandings, in which neither the self is lost nor the other subsumed. It produces knowledge in the third position. Before expanding on these processes and relating the narratives which support them, I shall begin with a short theoretical discussion on the intimacies which underwrite them.

**On Intimacy: Kinship, Caring, Sharing, Shouting & Love**

**The Practice and Feeling of Kinship**

David Schneider (1968) famously concluded that kinship does not exist, certainly not as a distinct cultural system or a category of comparative analysis. His critique dismissed Western folklore traditions of blood-ties and biology and led to serious reconsideration of the genealogical paradigm which had long dominated both modernist kinship studies and the Western concept of family (Edwards, 2009). Ethnographic accounts have revealed a wondrous array of means of defining parental, sibling and multi-generational relations which discount or ignore blood, birth and biology in lieu of fluidity, choice and social practice (see Bamford, 1998, 2009; Bodenhorn, 2000; Middleton, 2000; Schweitzer & Nuttal, 2000). Such fluidity and electability of relationality is not exclusive to non-Western societies and various authors have noted changing forms of kinship and the ‘queering of family’ in Europe, the US and elsewhere through reproductive technologies, economic constraints, individualization and the legitimisation of LGBT discourses and practices (Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Edwards, 2009; Handler, 1988; D. H. J. Morgan, 1996; Roseneil & Budgeon, 2004; Stacey, 2005; Watanabe, 2004).

Much of the focus on kinship has shifted away from the genealogical paradigm towards the production of relationality through processes and purposeful acts, such as feeding, sharing of substances, and acts of caring (Carsten, 2004; Strathern, 1988; Strazdins & Broom, 2004; Weismental, 1995), leading many anthropologists to link kinship with
‘feelings of intersubjective mutuality of being, using such terms as “conviviality”, “love”, “amity”, and “enduring diffuse solidarity”’ (Stasch, 2009, p. 133). Such terms point to the enduring elusiveness of firm ways of separating kinship from other types of relationships, and scholars of Western familial life speak of the ‘post familial family’ or ‘family practices’ (Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; D. H. J. Morgan, 1996). Nonetheless, Family (much like Nation) survives academic deconstruction and people continue to ‘reflect upon and argue over ‘kinship’ and ‘family’ in their social discourse and practice’ (Watanabe, 2004, p. 19) and to experience ‘the mysterious effectiveness of relationality’ (Viveros de Castro, 2009, p. 243). Family may be a normative ideal but it is also an ongoing practice with a deep affective component.

**Love and Discourse**

To what extent can the affective component of such mutuality be called love? Though Schneider found that American kinship was *about* love, which he defined as ‘enduring diffuse solidarity’, this related to how family relations became idealised in contemporary Western discourse (Schneider, 1968, p. 51). Neither the historical nor cross-cultural records support this supposition and almost anyone could concur with Shalins when he notes that ‘in practice not all kin are lovable – and often the closest relatives have the worst quarrels’ (Sahlins, 2011a, p. 12). Many authors have pointed to the 9th and 10th century European origins of early romantic love when the ‘language of love and feelings’ between a man and a woman emerged with the pacification of courtly society leading to the ‘transformation of desire’ in poetry, song and literary works (Belsey, 1994; Elias, 1982, 1983). Outside of Europe, Lindholm also suggests that ‘a powerful ideology of romantic love was well developed, at least among the elite, in many premodern non-Western complex societies’ (Lindholm, 2007, p. 11), including Japan, China, India, the Middle East, ancient Greece and Rome. However, the love lives of elites are hardly representative of the majority of men and women. For many throughout history the family was to a great extent a unit of economic necessity, such as 17th century colonial Quakers where ‘households required self-denying laborious parents and children’ (A. B. Levy, 1988, p. 27). For Levi-Strauss (1969) the elementary structures of kinship were not love but a taboo on incest that determined which women could be suitably exchanged for reproduction purposes. Much of classic kinship and social network studies had observed the effort at reproducing and maintaining kin, social norms and political structure through the ‘expectations and obligations’ contained within
codified kin relations and practices (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Gluckman, 1955; Kapferer, 1969; V. Turner, 1957). Little talk of love here.

Nevertheless, the depth of the discourse of love as the idealisation of interpersonal relationships in Western societies can be read from the breath of its critique. Though family may be ‘about love’ this does not equate to being or feeling loving. Feminist critiques have highlighted the reproduction of patriarchy in pair-bonding, in how marriage benefits men more than women, and that talk (and expectations) of love obscures gender inequalities and struggles for power in social institutions which promote and define gendered difference (Burns, 2000; Duncombe & Marsden, 1993; Illouz, 2011; Weisser & Atkinson, 1974). Simone du Beauvoir’s has noted that in love men retain their sovereignty, while women aim to abandon themselves (Beauvoir, 1949). These are the acculturated imperatives of a hegemonic dramaturgical code, the affective dimension of lifeworlds which are central to Western patriarchy. The romantic happily ever after narrative of true love is a trap – and clearly a fallacy to anyone who has actually fallen in love. But the critique also points to the power of that narrative, namely that ‘the idea of romantic love has come to dominate the relations between the family and marriage has become dependent on emotions instead of economic necessity’ (Wehner & Abrahamson, 2004, p. 1). Here we see an extension of love beyond the pair-bonding of courtly romance and onto the (Western) family unit as a whole and constructs belonging to society itself through the ‘love plot of intimacy and familialism’ (Berlant & Warner, 2000, p. 318). For better or worse, it is the power of the discourse that family is about love that plays a significant role in how we should and how we do feel about our intimate kin.

**Intimacy beyond the Family**

This is not to say that such relations do not carry with them expectations and obligations, socially defined and interpersonally borne. However, over the course of years expectations will be unmet and obligations unfulfilled at various times, yet families – if not all families or the ‘whole’ family – mostly endure. The same can be said of some friendships. Though in the Western genealogical model friendships are normatively excluded from the imagined ideal unit, friends are an important source of care, affection and comfort to many of us. Some friendships may have been tested, severely at times or may have been forged in testing times. For the Trukese, two hunters who have shared hardship and isolation far out at sea become ‘siblings from the same canoe’. In the west they may become friends for life.
When such friendships do endure, I suggest that they too contain within them something of Sahlins’ mutuality of being (Sahlins, 2011a).

Furthermore, though the idea of family and normative forms of relatedness still hold a powerful sway on how relationships endure over time, we must also recognise that often in contemporary western societies ‘much that matters to people in terms of intimacy and care increasingly takes place beyond the “family”, between partners who are not living together “as family”, and within networks of friends’ (Roseneil & Budgeon, 2004, p. 135). The notion of intimacy I use here thus includes both friends and family – kith and kin. It does not flatten the two nor privilege one kind over the other, but is an ambiguous and unfolding solidarity of uncertain outcome that includes joys and thanks and praise, endures betrayal and continues in hope. This is not a theoretical sleight of hand designed to suit my data but is based on the testimonies and practices of my participants. What Vered calls her ‘safety net’ is comprised of some of her family and some of her friends and for Roy it is inconceivable that his relationships with friends from the army will end because of stark political differences - ‘They’re my boys!’, he exclaimed, ‘what am I going to do’. Just like Arendt, we may love our friends too.

It may be (and has been) argued that love has nothing to do with the reality of affine, consanguine or alternative constructs of intimate relations. Yet anthropologists have repeatedly remarked upon caring, sharing, conviviality, amity, enduring diffuse solidarity, mysteriousness and mutuality to describe such affective loyalties. Illouz argues that romantic love is not the source of transcendence, happiness and self-realization but part of the discourse which disempowers women. However she continues; ‘Patriarchy explains the structural imbalances in the sexes but does not explain the powerful hold that the experience of love, or its hoped for fulfilment, exerts on both men and women (Illouz, 2013 loc. 235). We may add that familial love and other intimate relationships are also difficult and demanding practices shaped by ill-informed ideals of loving but which nonetheless manage to endure the reality of disappointment and even betrayal. Ultimately, the power of love does not reside in its truth but in its affect, its potential to make us feel and think in certain ways and in the intimate moments when we experience or recall its touch. I turn now to the narratives of a handful of my participants who have been generous enough to recall such moments for me on their difficult journey into dissent.
Intimate Affects of Dissent I: Turmoil

Yoav and his Family

I first met Yoav on the last day of 2011. It was an early Friday afternoon under City Tower in Kikar HaMashbir the commercial heart of West Jerusalem. The Israeli activists were gathering for a march through town to the Sheikh Jarrah demo. At the height of the Sheikh Jarrah Solidariot protests a year before such marches were common-place and large but this was the first in some time. A few dozen people were hanging around in small groups and three or four drummers from Yasamba were drawing the attention of delighted non-aligned shoppers. I was standing alone smoking a cigarette. I smoke cigarettes when I’m alone so as to look busy and self-contained. Smokescreen. Yoav approached me dressed in his mid-twenties with a Palestinian Keffiyeh wrapped around his neck and tucked into his black jacket. He asked me for a light. He doesn’t figure much in my field-notes of that day’s march and demo:

‘Quite the event, invigorating shouting Di LaKibush [End the Occupation] at perplexed shoppers – though I didn’t shout at all but talked to [Yoav], whom I’d met through the magic of cigarettes’ (31/12/2011).

It was an unusual day with public profile, scuffles, dog attacks, stones thrown at ‘us’ and at ‘them’. ‘Just like the old days’, Tali told me. Though I didn’t feel it at the time I was getting into the swing of being an activist and an anthropologist. I met a lot of people I knew and a lot of people new. Yoav and I had the normal conversation, exchanging presents and pasts. I was a researcher who introduced him to some people, he was an Israeli who’d just gotten back to the country and hadn’t been an activist before he’d left. He was interested in what I did, what I knew and thought. He’s not sure if he’s come back to stay, he’s not comfortable with what’s going on here. We swapped numbers before we parted.

We exchanged a few texts and voice mails over the next week but didn’t meet again until the 11th of January, at the Educational Bookshop on Salah HaDin, in East Jerusalem. My notes read:

‘Yoav is depressed, overwhelmingly so, by how ‘closed’ Israelis are here. He’s just back he can’t stand it. He’s looking to me for advice and inspiration. I too was feeling depressed…I fish out some reasons why he should stay – why didn’t I tell him to
leave? I use logical reason, talk about aggressive liberalism. He keeps telling me how he values my opinion. How I’m moral and humanist, how I’m doing something important. He feels he’s going to have a breakdown if we stay here. We drop off a book to Roy, an Israeli co-director of an NGO with an office in Sheikh Jarrah, then we go to the American Colony Hotel and share a bottle of Malbec. It’s good, I enjoy it, its deeply political always linked to the ‘situation’; on anti-Semitism – he felt it at first abroad, it’s a primed defence mechanism but only a 1% phenomenon; on religion – he doesn’t feel tribally Jewish anymore; Israelis are brainwashed, isolated. He’s having real problems and now ‘feels like a stranger among Israelis while I used to identify with them closely, I have grown worlds apart’. Like Oz.’

We met again the following Friday. He’d gone down to Sheikh Jarrah again but I’d been elsewhere. There was no big march that week but the protest had gone down to the Al-Kurds house and he’d found it intimate and invigorating. ‘I talked to the Palestinians, they told me some of the things that had happened…it felt good, I felt I had more in common with the Palestinians [than the Israelis].’ We went to the Cinematheque for some food and he talked animatedly about his dismay and anger – at Israel and his upbringing, which was for him traumatic. It was in the army that his disbelief began, ‘I knew from the first day that this wasn’t right, but I still had to overcome my background, the Zionist indoctrination I received did not allow me to see the situation for what it was. It blinded me from seeing the full picture’. But, I said, you seem more upbeat than when we met in the Bookshop. ‘I am, I know I’m going to stay. I’m going to do something, you convinced me of that’. I hadn’t felt that convinced myself. He talked of the distance he felt from his old friends and a growing identification with Palestinians. ‘I was ostracised too as a religious child…I couldn’t look at a woman without feeling guilt’.

Yoav would later reveal to me that his family and upbringing were really right-wing, ‘no I mean really’, he said turning to look me in the eye as we walked past the Moskavia prison complex in the city centre. As a child his parents would take him to demonstrations in support of imprisoned HaMachteret Hayehudit (Jewish Underground activists), to events where new settlements were established in the territories, and visits to Nablus and Hebron when new Torah scroll were brought in to synagogues. The Jewish Underground was a terrorist organisation linked to the Gush Emunim settler movement who had carried out a series of bombings and shootings on Palestinians in the early eighties. Its most prominent plot was Yoel Lerner’s 1982 foiled plan to blow up the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount
complex. When he was young Yoav’s family were sympathetic to the aims and worldviews of the radical Zionist right which has its own tradition in Israel. *Kach*, a far-right political party formed by Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1971, was designated a terrorist organization in 1994, but the now deceased Kahane and his political thoughts remain a potent symbol of the religious far-right. Other heroes of this social milieu included Dr. Baruach Goldstein who perpetrated the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in Hebron in 1994, killing 29 Palestinian worshipers[^59], and Yigal Amir who assassinated President Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. At one demo Yoav got arrested. He was eleven years old at the time.

I never met his family and Yoav himself was moving around a lot at this time. Though feeling isolated in Israel he spent a good deal of his time in Ramallah, making Palestinian friends, going to parties. He later explained ‘being in Israel was painful since I changed so much and could not relate to it, but with my new found identity as a humanist, I could relate to Palestinians who were not brainwashed by the regime’. His family connections at this time though were clearly a cause of concern and frustration. At one point in late 2012 he became very upset with me when I used a picture of my son in the Facebook photo campaign *Stand with Susiya*. He wrote to me ‘look, my mother and her step father used to take me to demonstrations from age 5 so I am very sensitive to exploiting children for political gains’. He then ‘unfriended’ me from Facebook for a time.

That summer though he asked my advice on a family matter - should he, could he bring a Palestinian friend to his brother’s wedding in May. The up-coming and unavoidable family event, coming as it did in the midst of a period of radical shift in his feelings, identity and political critique, was a discomfiting proposition.

**Not Uncommon Bonds**

Yoav’s story of moving far from the narrative he was nurtured upon is not particularly unusual. I also met Shira who grew up in a settlement in the West Bank who ‘never realised it was a settlement, or what a settlement was, until I left Israel’. Amit also grew up in a right-wing family, his brother is a lawyer who represents settlers and they no longer talk to each other. And there is Yael an activist in her mid-twenties, whom I came to know well:

[^59]: Recall that in the logic of the occupation, the IDF’s response to the Goldstein Massacre was to first to restrict and eventually deny all Palestinian access to Shuhada Street. The demonstration which began this ethnography is a product of this event.
I grew up in a very right wing family in Jerusalem, with my mother. My school was national-religious and we used to sing songs like ‘Baruch Goldstein he’s the hero’. I used to climb up to the top of the hill near Walaja [in Southern Jerusalem] and get to the top with such a sense of pride and achievement, I had no idea that it was occupied territory. The first time my mother threw me out of the house was when I joined Meretz in my teens. They’re a left-Zionist political party. The second time she threw me out was when I told her I was anti-Zionist.

Many of the Israeli activist cohort in their twenties and thirties have made a similar movement. These are individuals who grew up with and through the first Lebanon war, the First Intifada, the Oslo Peace process, the assassination of Rabin, the Second Intifada. Yael has witnessed the blood and screaming and the smell of burning flesh on the streets of central Jerusalem, the brutality of the suicide bombings. Most of this cohort also came into adulthood with some form of service in the Israeli Army. Their critique is also far to the left of Liberal or Left-wing Zionism and few activists of this age group believe in the possibility, utility or desirability of the Two State Solution. One doesn’t have to come from a right-wing background to have ongoing intimate relations with people opposed to your socio-political critique.

Roy was a combat soldier serving in Hebron during the Second Intifada. He was at the siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in April 2002 when he ‘totally shot Manger Square to pieces’ and at the siege of the Yasser Arafat’s Mukataa [headquarters] in Ramallah later that year. ‘We rolled into town on tanks singing Bob Dylan songs, then took control of all the buildings around the Mukataa - room by room, floor by floor – putting all the families in the basements and then executed Tsir Lahats [pressure cooker]. We just opened fire with everything we had, shooting at the building for twenty-four hours straight’. He was involved in the formation of Breaking the Silence, an organisation that records testimonies from Israeli soldiers serving in the occupied territories. He now co-directs an NGO for grassroots Palestinian empowerment in Jerusalem and still maintains close and frequent contact with his army buddies, ‘they’re my boys, what am I going to do!’.

The rhetoric of familial bonds is often strong within military units, that ‘band of brothers’. In the Israeli military, particularly in combat units, the term Achi (Hebrew: my brother) is routinely used to address a fellow member of the unit. The structure of reserve service also results in the practice whereby most soldiers continue to serve in the same unit, with the same company and commanders, from their late-teens to their mid-forties, thereby
developing lifelong connections with their fellow-reservists, the unit gradually becomes an ‘extended family’ (Zemlinskaya, 2004, p. 8). Testimonies from Breaking the Silence support Roy’s experience; ‘Y: We’ve always done reserve duty together...They know everything about me, the way brothers do. My refusal caused some unpleasantness, but the ties weren’t severed’ (Chacham, 2003, p. 61). There is something of the Trukese canoe sibling effect in the shared experiences among soldiers, but thankfully intimacy does not insist on the intensity, fear of death and killing. There is enough intensity in the ambiguity of ordinary life for lasting, supportive and loving friendships to form and endure. Vered’s ‘safety net’ includes a handful of friends from high-school. She had moved from England to Israel with her family in her early teens, very much against her will. She didn’t talk to her parents for two years. But at the same time the people who supported her at school during this period became and remain close intimates, despite the fact that she herself became radicalised through activism and its proximity to the occupation. Throughout the fieldwork period Vered was very much concerned with and at a loss to explain, to herself as much as anything, why these friends did not join the protest, were not angry and aghast at the actions of their state, argued against her and refused to be moved by her testimony. Still it was these friends who texted her on Friday and Saturday evenings ‘Hey babe, hope you’re not arrested’.

**Intimate Affects of Dissent II: Tentative thoughts on Endurance**

**Making Meaning from Conflict and Confusion**

The importance of strong personal bonds on the ability to mobilize resources, foster cohesion and maintain membership for social movements has long been highlighted by a number of researchers (Booth & Babchuk, 1969; Della Porta, 1988; Diani, 2004; Diani & Lodi, 1988; McAdam, 1986; Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 1980). Conversely other researchers have noted that affections for families and sexual partners can interfere with loyalty and the fulfilment of duties to the activist collective (Goodwin, 1997; Jasper, 2004; Klatch, 2004). I do not address here questions of mobilization nor of straying from the path of collective dissent. In the first instance there was almost no concerted effort made to recruit Israelis by any of my participants or the organizations during the field work period. The common trope is that ‘there is no point talking to Israelis’. Most activists are of the opinion that Israeli society is too brainwashed and that change will only come from outside pressure – in the transnational dimension. I also have little access to participants who stopped coming to protests and worked closest and longest with those who recurrently came out at the
weekends. The main concern here is with how dissenters cope with interpersonal strains on important relationships and the affects of those relationships. I do so tentatively, for of all the experiences I went through in becoming a dissenter with other dissenters, the unfolding and loss of a deep relationship to Israel and the subsequent unfolding and loss of deep relationships to people is not something I can say I have myself experienced. Nonetheless, I believe there has been sufficient collaboration on this section to support the thesis that love is an affective disposition which enables the judging of radically different lifeworlds.

Certainly we can admit that the support of friends and family in any difficult endeavour can be important and both Roy and Vered are thankful that their parents are behind them. But some relationships do atrophy and are lost to dissent. Emotionally speaking the cohort in question here – twenty to thirty-something Israelis – grew up in an emotional habitus (Gould, 2009) where feelings toward the nation were carefully nurtured in collective practices, as outlined in the previous chapter. As discussed in the theory section, despite theoretical conflict, Bourdieu’s habitus can be equated with phenomenology’s lifeworld (Throop & Murphy, 2002). Furthermore, just as Gould highlighted the place of emotion in habitus, a lifeworld is also a fully embodied and intrinsically affective phenomenon. With the emergence of dissent, feelings of positivity and pride towards the Israeli collective cease to be experienced and so such experiences cease to be shared with some members of one’s personal and intimate network. The inability, or refusal, to feel the ‘right’ way about the nation not only reduces the opportunities for the practices of sharing which have fostered intimacy in the first place. Not feeling as one should is also a transgression of the dramaturgical code which may be felt as moral transgression against the national collective, against personal acquaintances, perhaps even against the natural order. For the CAD hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999), this single but sweeping transgression has the potential to evoke feelings of contempt, anger and disgust in a single intentional outburst.

If we can say that the ability to feel the same way about events would seem to be generally significant in maintaining strong bonds within any collective (Jasper, 2011, p. 14.10) then feeling differently is not going to help. There is in the relationship reciprocal anger at action and inaction, remembrance of pasts and hopes and questions of who is betraying whom, there is anxiety and even fear that the relationship maybe lost. It becomes a confusion of affective states, reflexive and moral emotions and affective loyalties, which has no clear form and no certain expression. It is an intensity of feelings that remains unnamed. In her exploration of affective confusion in activism, Gould has suggested that specific communities in stress and experiencing emotional uncertainty may have their emotional
habitus ‘transformed’. She found that ACT UP, which agitated for legislation, medical research, treatment and policies to fight the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, successfully mobilized support from the U.S. gay community through ‘speech acts’ of movement leaders. Repeated articulations by movement leaders altered the prevailing emotion culture of the gay and lesbian community, recasting what was felt as shame and fear of rejection with a collective pride and legitimate anger at government inaction (Gould, 2009). The confusion of emotions was named and so given meaning.

There are no movement leaders in Israel addressing and transforming the emotional habitus of Israelis. All those I worked with had already been through the transformative experiences of experiencing weirdness and wrongness but this transformation leads to stress and uncertainty within their pre-existing intimate relationships. I submit that a further transformation occurs in which the emotional confusion within intimacy is named love and given meaning by the endurance of solidarity. It is named love not by a charismatic leader but by the powerful and pervasive discourse that family and friendship is ‘about love’ and the endurance is demonstrated by continued practices of care and intimacy. Out of the confusion love is recast by both discursive incantation and ritual performance. Love becomes understood not as a simple thing felt as goodness but as a sacrificial, sometimes painful, ongoing and uncertain effort. I turn to Yael and Yoav, who more than any others I knew were in the midst of such intimate uncertainty.

Moving Back

Yael is moving back in with her mother and I’m packing my car with all her stuff for the short journey across town. She can’t afford to rent a place on her small salary from the store. ‘Maybe don’t tell her you’re not Jewish’, she says as we drive off and I agree somewhat hesitantly, hoping that perhaps the issue won’t come up. Yael goes up to her mother’s apartment first and I carry bags of stuff up the stairs after her, back into the small and already packed apartment she grew up in. I’m introduced to Yael’s mother, smile and say hello before returning to the car for more bags of stuff. It’s a hot day and when I bring up the last of the cargo Yael’s mother insists that I drink some water. She’s being very nice to her daughter’s friend and thanks me for helping her. She asks the usual questions strangers politely ask each other; where I’m from, what I’m doing here, how I know Yael, and so I tell her my story of meeting an Israeli woman, having children and coming to carry out research. ‘Are you Jewish?’, she asks and without hesitation or awkwardness I tell her, no I am not. No drama or recriminations ensue and we discuss Zionist history and books on Zionist history
that we have and haven’t read. Before I leave Yael’s charming and hospitable mother insists on giving me two books in Hebrew for my children. I politely depart with thanks and smiles, leaving Yael’s mother to help her anti-Zionist daughter settle back home.

Yoav, of course, went to his brother’s wedding dressed smartly in a suit. He did not bring a friend but spent the time alone with his family. After the wedding he posted the following on his Facebook wall:

‘For my family's credit I must say they gave me an honor of sayonara [sic], several blessings at the wedding and accepted me with open arms while simply refraining from talking about politics or arguing. They know I am different but do accept me as I am though of course they wholly disagree. They gave me several honors and I was quite moved and surprised by that.’

This is the enduring solidarity of kinship which Schneider spoke of and that Shalins sees as the ‘magic’ of mutuality of being (Sahlins, 2011a, 2011b; Schneider, 1968). Love is felt at these moments of generosity. A generosity which by many rational calculations is undeserved but which is given nonetheless because we care for other. Though love may not be a source of transcendence and self-realization, the social construct that family is about love is not just a dry, proscriptive trap it is also a meaningful and affective aspect of lifeworlds which has a powerful hold on our experiences and hopes. The discourse of love is a powerful incantation which situates our interpersonal strife, shapes our affects and perceptions and enables us to confront the other with compassion.

Intimate Affects of Dissent III: Provisioning for the Third Position

‘No one can be fully aware of another human being unless we love them.
By that love we see potential in our beloved.
Through that love, we allow our beloved to see their potential.
Expressing that love, our beloved’s potential comes true.’

(Frankl, 1946)
The above quote is a succinct paraphrasing\(^{60}\) of psychiatrist Viktor Frankl’s thoughts on the intersubjective power of love. Between 1942 and 1945 Frankl laboured in four different Nazi death camps, including Auschwitz, while his parents, brother, and pregnant wife perished. His book *Man’s Search for Meaning* both documents this time and presents his hypothesis that the essence of humanity is characterised by the constant striving for meaning and that in truth, ‘The salvation of man is through love and in love’ *(ibid* p.37). The search for new meaning through love is the final yet ongoing intersubjective intimate affect of dissent. Love for the dissenting other enables intimacy to endure. In that endurance lie the foundations from which Arendt’s (2009) judging may begin to emerge. The hegemonic certainties of the lifeworld, in which the dissenter is a vile aberration, have already begun to flake and fall. The dissenter is not an Arab fucking whore deserving of death, she is a wife, a daughter, a childhood friend, a cherished hope. I began to consider this possibility on the bus-ride back to Jerusalem after the Open Shuhada Street demonstration in Hebron. I found myself sitting beside Meira. She is perhaps in her mid-forties, married with children and works with Psycho-Active, a collective of psychologists providing therapy for activists and publishing articles on impact of the occupation on mental health. As we chatted about my work and her life she told me that her husband was ‘right-wing’. I asked how that works out. ‘Oh, you know we argue all the time, but when we’re with company and he thinks I’m not listening, I hear him arguing my side of the story’. Still, despite my prompting of close participants I rarely encountered the intimate lives of the non-aligned intimates of dissenters, certainly not to the extent that I could develop deep and trusting relationships to them. The dissenters themselves, like Vered, were often sceptical as to their ability to affect the perspectives of even those closest yet opposed to them. Most claimed that they don’t even bother trying.

Then on Friday the 14\(^{th}\) of February 2014 I met up with Vered at Uganda, the bar in central Jerusalem where we used to debrief each other every Friday evening after demonstrations during my fieldwork period. These early evenings before Shabbat came in had become such a important part of our relationship as researcher, participant and friends. Though neither of us went regularly to protests anymore by 2014, we continued to take the time, when we could, to sit and tell each other about our worries and joys and to offer and hear advice on how to proceed. She had been busy organizing the annual Women’s Conference at Beit Ummar and was deeply concerned about ‘normalization’. If the past ten

\(^{60}\) As intoned by fictional psychopath Hannibal Lectur. For the longer original text see Frankl, 1946 p. 111.
years of Palestinian dissenting practices have been characterised by Solidarity - Normalization is positioned to be the dominant discursive tactic in the coming future. It is aimed at boycotting institutions or events which bring together Palestinians and Israelis, but which do not place resistance to oppression and occupation as its goal (PACBI, 2011). However, normalization is also impacting Israeli participation in the joint struggle. Our conversation on the topic soon turned towards the related issue, mostly ignored by ten years of solidarity activism, of Israeli dissenters addressing their own population. I wrote the following immediately after we met that evening, which only coincidentally happened to be Valentine’s Day.  

_Uganda, Feb 14th 2014_

Vered is talking about normalization issues – ‘My friend Nomi from the Anarchists and BDS says it’s all over Twitter. It’s all they’re talking about but Nomi thinks they’re wasting time doing nothing, lazy. I asked Salah and Rachael what they thought about it’. Salah runs the popular committee in Beit Ummar. ‘He just said derogatorily’ Vered continued “those girls on Twitter and Facebook sitting in the malls in Ramallah, you think they know what to say?” She then brings up the issue of talking to Israelis. This has become a suggestion, or more an accusation, emerging out of the normalization debate. Some Palestinian activists argue that solidarity has had its day and achieved nothing, that Israeli activists are just making themselves feel better by going to demos in the West Bank – ‘What are you doing here, you should be talking to your own people’. Vered too thinks the time has come and wants to put together a full frontal media assault, papers, TV ads showing what the occupation really is. ‘You want to shock Israelis?’, I ask. ‘Yes we must!’

We talk of possible tactics, doing seminars in Jerusalem, perhaps the universities or even here in Uganda. Then she mentions her non-aligned friends, whom for years have tolerated and endured her lefty rantings. ‘You remember Shanieh and those guys [her oft spoke of “safety net”] they’re ready to hear, they’re asking me to show them, I want to set up a meeting – I could get 20 non-aligned people together to listen no problem. They’re saying to me, alright Vered we get it, we want to know’. We talk about where and how we might put something together for such a group. Maybe Roy, with whom we are both close and who as an accomplished and sensitive communicator on the subject could lead a relaxed and friendly forum. A social action. She suggested a meeting at her place, ‘because I want it to be safe for

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61 The text has been revised for clarity
them *and to shock them*. I understand *where* she means, these are her friends and mostly she wants to make them feel safe. The shock should be mitigated by the sense of security and honesty and mutual care they have for each other. She wants to shock them but not hurt them. We imagine the routes of possible tours around Jerusalem through the Qalandiya checkpoint in towards the territories, all the time bearing in mind the image of these close friends. These people, part of her safety net, are the reason she could ‘stay in this hell hole’. Along with the feeling she’s involved in something important here, these people and others including her parents, enable her, even force her, to stay here to continue to resist despite the exhausting intensity of it all. These are after all the people who texted her hoping she’s not been arrested.

Perhaps Vered’s friends are in a position to divest part of themselves and to understand her. Perhaps this will affect some small change. They seem to be engaging in judging. Perhaps love, like knowledge, is also of and in the third position. Perhaps love is the affective *sine qua non* of judging, knowledge and understanding. [End fieldnote]

**Conclusion**

When we combine the first section on Love and Betrayal in the Nation with the forgoing, I have presented these intimate affects of dissent as a comedy, rather than tragedy, narrative – an exposition, complication, resolution and coda in which it could be said the characters are better off than where they began. Though based on my experiences and understanding of the lives of others I present these affective processes through their positive rather than focusing, say on the emotional management of irrevocable loss. It is not however a presentation of how they understand their experiences, there is too much stringing together of my academic esoteric for it to be anyone else’s modus of meaning and in that sense I am, in the final part of this thesis, leaning a bit too far over the shoulders of my informants. But still there seems to be a space created by participants and their intimates through an understanding and demonstration of intimacy as being about love, in the sense that Bauman (2003) conceives of its sacrificial and sometimes painful dimensions, which merges with Jackson’s interpretation of Arendt’s judging as a painful and fraught process of divestment of the self’s certainties.

It must be stressed that the self-divestment required by judging, as evidenced by Vered’s talk of her friends being ‘ready’, did not just occur as a function of their relationship alone. Those relationships are situated within the wider social milieu and precisely because they are long-term relationships they are also witness to long-term trends and dramatic local
and transnational episodes which continuously impact on how they understand the world they live in. In Israel the practices of the state, the socio-political swing to the right over the last ten years or more, the dominance of and investment in the settlement lobby, the shrill and expanding definitions of terrorism in the relative quiet of the last ten years and the dubiousness of ‘pro-Israeli’ posturing in the International arena are all causes of great concern to many Israelis in the traditional liberal or Zionists left. Furthermore the tale of Vered and her safety net is not one of extreme epistemological distance between intimates, as is the case with Yoav and Yael. Yet the possibility still holds that the discursive thorns of intimacy as being about love, may also be potent points by which - with due care - the false certainty of the received interpretations in our lifeworlds may be gently torn to allow a space for judging the lives of others, a space in which new understandings and knowledge may be collaboratively constructed in third position. A space in which we may imagine a better place.
Conclusion

It is has been difficult for me to draw conclusions from this thesis, or more precisely it was difficult for me to draw this thesis to a conclusion. In the first instance the sectioning of the discussion on weirdness, wrongness and love are to some extent potentially standalone processes which do not necessarily and definitively lead from one neatly to the next in the way I have presented them. To say that these processes have occurred for some people and might happen again for others is trite. Each section also draws on a number of theoretical fields, from subjectivity and perception, to collectivity and social movement theory, to kinship and concrete relationships. To link these together through a theory of affect is the obvious point of the thesis, and to say that emotion runs through all facets of being would add nothing new to this body of work. However, my greatest difficulty stems from the fact that the ethnographic time period of my fieldwork represents a thin sectioning of an inconclusive and often ugly history. Worse still, the situation violently deteriorated after fieldwork ended. Because of my family connections and commitments I remained in Israel to write this thesis through 2013-14. Life went on, kept becoming and the weirdness, wrongness, loves and losses continued to unfold around me, and within me. Though I had stopped going to demonstrations regularly in late 2012 to give myself some space to reflect and write, and to share the freer times with my children, my own social network and lifeworld remained closely tied to my participants in dissent. Then in the Summer of 2014, after the collapse of the Kerry peace initiative in the Spring, I experienced vitriol and violence of an extent and quality that went far beyond what had gone before. My fieldwork friends and acquaintances were also shocked to their core. I was and am disgusted and so relating to or drawing conclusions from a research period defined by peaceful resistance to institutional and measured violence is eclipsed by appalling instrumental violence and raw hatred. That said I am neither sure that the brevity of an ‘eclipse’ nor the sense of ‘instrumental’ as meaning useful are the right words for describing what happened and keeps happening here.

I shall start with the first issue of formulating a theoretical conclusion, for this is an easier task to overcome, shielded as it is (and should be) by a requirement to think independently of my immediate moods. To begin with, in terms of the model of intentionality and lifeworld as affective processes presented at the beginning of this thesis, I have argued that both human perception and interpretation are guided by that wordless knowledge which is felt. Weirdness, Wrongness and Love are all equally implicit in forming, appraising and adjusting the relationships participants have with intimates, fellow dissenters and public discourses on
identity and conflict. Though, according to this model feeling can occur before ‘thought’ and at times may overrule ‘rational’ options or understandings, we cannot elevate affect over other human faculties. Weirdness is most definitively a subtle and ambiguous signal, easily dismissed. The feelings of wrongness discussed, though possessed of a degree of certainty, are not of the intensity of moral shock or outrage. This wrongness demonstrates a capacity to listen quietly to a well reasoned argument and unfolding contingencies. It can defer judgment as it were, and rather than leaping back in anger when its turn comes it merely asserts to the self that - ‘no this is still not right’. Even the love spoken of here is susceptible to doubt. None of these are passions that overwhelm, they are affective perspectives cascading through incessant reiterations of interpretation in our lifeworlds and those of others. Though thinking may be wilfully decoupled from feeling by an intellect practiced in such an art, we must acknowledge the subtle and prescient processes that make mind of the body.

The nuance and sophistication of affective processes is, I believe, also essential to understand from the methodological perspective of researching affect as anthropologists. If we simply go about looking for emotions which we have pre-defined then those are the ones we are going to find. As I have noted, my inclusion of love in this thesis was to a significant extent driven by my desire to understand the intimate perils of being an Israeli dissenter. However, I did not go looking for the weird and the wrong. Indeed, I had never considered that weird was a feeling until half-way through fieldwork. Certainly we will never advance our understanding of how affect and affective lifeworlds are constituted if we think in terms of a handful of distinct ‘basic emotions’, many of which are found in Darwin’s (1872) *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. In this I found that Wittgenstein’s (1953) family resemblance proved very useful here in freeing my understanding from categorical constraints and allowing the ambiguity of affective experience to rise to salience. It also frees the researcher from the methodological red herring of not being able to definitively know what someone else is feeling. I suspect that the times that people experience pure joy or hatred are rare and fleeting. As with all experience affect is always ambiguous and unfolding and yet in the ordinary condition of plurality people empathise, understand and act with others all the time without definitively knowing the mind of others. Our understanding of others is always in the third position. Paying attention to the movements, tone and testimonies of participants, interrogation of our own embodied reactions in fieldwork situations and exploring those emotions with participants is all that is required to access the uncommon and complex ways in which we feel. If we then integrate this knowledge with how people act and what they talk about, then we can develop new categories through which to theorise what
affect is and how it works, and where it emerges. To paraphrase Ingold (2008), the anthropology of affect cannot be thinking about feelings, it must be thinking with feelings.

Finally, we must ask how this relates to social movements theory and understandings of activism in general. Perhaps more importantly, how can we apply the findings of this thesis in a way that will assist the non-violent efforts of solidarity activism and what can other movements learn from this ongoing struggle? Again, the first question is easier to answer for the role of affect is already well recognised by multiple authors cited in this work in terms of mobilisation, cohesion, internal dynamics and so forth. But again the emphasis here is often on the passions, the use of moral outrage and anger to mobilise, evocations of pride and righteousness to maintain momentum, and the intensity of mass mobilisation and clashes with security which foster collectivity. This thesis suggests that the dynamics of affect in protest involves a great deal more ambiguity and even uncertainty caused by the diversity in practitioner’s backgrounds, experience and knowledge. The ethnographic researcher is particularly well placed to observe the effect of such personal and interpersonal nuances on the practice and possibilities of collective dissent. Furthermore, in order to properly understand how social movements hold together the researcher must look beyond the movement itself. It seems reasonable to assume that Palestinian solidarity activism is not unique in affording and involving a great deal of non-instrumental sociality or that activists everywhere are also embedded in a world of sociality outside of the ‘movement’. The potentials and tensions in this multiplicity of relationships, coupled with the efforts of other loosely aligned struggles and the economic and occupational possibilities in the third sector present a complexity of possibilities. Such complexity is though anthropology’s bread and butter today, and social movements cannot be properly understood as social isolates or instrumental networks of exchange anymore than any other social formation. To this end, Arendt’s work on political action, thought and judgment have proved particularly useful in understanding the implications of the ethnographic findings here (Arendt, 1958, 1968, 1971). Though I attempted to integrate various social movement theories to these findings the results often ended in critique due to the limitations of imagining dissent as distinct from everyday life. Once the caveat of affect has been introduced to Arendt’s theories, I believe that the application of her more generalised understanding of innate human political faculties and conditions could greatly enrich our understanding of this phenomenon.

The complimentary concern of what Palestinian solidarity activism can teach us and subsequently what insights this thesis can provide to activism in general causes me to pause
in thought, producing doubt. Of all the emotions not discussed in this work hope is perhaps the one most poignant in terms of its absence. Lack of hope though not ubiquitous is prevalent with Palestinians and Israelis in particular. This is a condition of this struggle; for decades nothing has worked. Marches, strikes, boycotts, petitions, legal recourse, squatting, lobbying, blogging and even hunger strikes have all patently failed to resolve the conflict, or even halt Israel’s systematic dispossession of Palestinian land and sociality. Most dissenters living here tell me the situation has never been worse. Yet at the same time there is cause for hope. Beyond the undetermined borders of Israel-Palestine an underlying sense of wrongness seems to be growing at a grassroots level, within traditional political alliances and also amongst the global Jewish Diaspora. I would be the first to admit that this feeling is greatly indebted to Israel’s rightward momentum since the horrors of the Second Intifada. Palestinian violence hasn’t worked either. Yet Israel’s security narrative appears less and less sincere in the face of an emboldened and politically empowered neo-Zionist movement which seems to delight in the exceptionalism of Jewish hegemony, the righteousness of colonialisation and even the purported morality of periodically killing, literally, thousands of civilians to prevent or revenge the murder of a handful of its (Jewish) citizens. However, I also believe that solidarity activism has played a crucial role in the transnationalisation of dissent here. Though they are now being maligned as ineffective even from Palestinian quarters, the insistence, perseverance and proliferation of popular committees in calling upon peoples of all creeds, colours and places to witness and experience a decade of repression of peaceful protest has galvanised a community of civilians across the globe. At these protests those normally distant from the weirdness, wrongness and even moments of love, are afforded the opportunity to see and feel for themselves. The tactic of emplacing others within the experience of oppression is then perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from these few hundred ordinary activists.

My own experience of the practice of this tactic was not however unproblematic, and nor was it easy or simply empowering for most any of the participants I came to know. In the hope then that this thesis may provide insight to my own participants and dissenters in general I offer three suggestions for consideration. First of all, be welcoming. The small size of the protests, their weekly rhythm and the tightness of various micro-movements involved is fostering ‘cliqueiness’. The flip-side of the sociality of dissent and sociality in general is exclusion. The moral uncertainty of why we protest and the weirdness of the activity itself can dominate the experience of the newcomer. The polarising simplicity of chanting and political rhetoric can as easily disturb as motivate participants, who have just turned up
because something is either not quite right or something is definitely wrong. In the process of becoming a dissenter that ‘something’ is often as yet undetermined, so it is important not only to be welcoming but also to be patient so that people can come to terms as they remove the veil of complexity which they have been accustomed to. It takes time (and sometimes love) to divest the deep complexities of the self. Collective dissent is not the social norm today and slogans in themselves are not sufficient to alter the subjectivity of the ordinary complexity of being. Secondly, take time to appreciate and even celebrate the resistance. The small size of Palestinian solidarity protests pretty much precludes the empowering affect of mass mobilisation, yet its capacity to endure and continuously attract support week after week, year after year is an achievement in itself. Taking a leaf out of the self-aggrandisement of nationalism’s imagined community, time taken to acknowledge and praise the unimagined community of transnational dissent could equally serve the purposes and aims of such social endeavours.

Finally and most generally; we must normalise the practice of collective dissent. There are so many impediments to activism. It is in equal parts boring, dangerous and unrewarding. Given that these are very real and rational reasons not to become dissenter only highlights the importance of affect in its emergence. But the greater problem may be that consent is the standard valorised by contemporary society, or by established elites. Consent in itself is not necessarily negative but, given the proclivity for power and inequity to emergence within any social system, collective dissent must always be considered a legitimate political expression. In the final analysis I would have to agree with Arendt that unthinking political passivity allows for evil. Contemporary conceptualisations of legitimate political participation as consisting solely of periodically voting for national legislature and execution is (still) clearly insufficient to counter either the inequities of oppressive nationalism, or the prowess of transnational networks of embedded elites and institutions. In such a reality Arendt’s (1958) call to valorise universal and direct political action, as the highest form of political activity resonates strongly. If there will always be power then there must always be we, the polis. A community of doubters and definite dissenters who will feel and speak that some form of truth exists beyond the narratives we were taught to receive and accept.

Inconclusions
Sadly I cannot conclude this dissertation at a point of theoretical positivity. Life goes on, keeps becoming and the weirdness, wrongness, loves and losses become familiar facets of the
lifeworld by which the dissenter beholds the world. Israel’s occupation hasn’t come to a conclusion and doesn’t go away even when fieldwork ends. Writing my thesis in Jerusalem took longer than I had anticipated and so I remained in close contact with and part of the concerns of dissent. Some became and remain my friends and with them I experienced the shock, horror, impotency and dismay of the abject brutality and naked hatred of the summer of 2014. I took no fieldnotes during this time, just hasty scraps written in cafes and bars as I tried to make sense of what was happening, as I tried to understand what I was feeling. I use no citations or references here, I simply offer my considered opinion. When unarmed protest is violently repressed, when transnational grassroots agitation is dismissed, when diplomatic efforts are derided a space opens up where men of violence are free to roam.

The kidnappings of Naftali Frenkel (16), Gilad Shaer (16) and Eyal Yifrach (19) on June 12 were not far-off events. These young men were kidnapped while hitchhiking between al-Maasara and Beit Ummar, a road I’ve travelled many times. Eyal was a student at the Shavei Hevron Yeshiva, on Shuhada Street in Hebron. The background to the summer was the failed negotiations mediated by U.S. Senator John Kerry. By this time I have friends in the U.S. State Department who have not needed to feature in this story but who believe that, regardless of the spin offered by the Israeli government and media outlets like the Jerusalem Post, the talks failed at the end of April at the behest of the Israeli administration. The right-wing coalition cannot accommodate concessions and quietly delights in the creeping annexation afforded by the post-Oslo status quo. During June, at a birthday party I listened to and chatted with people who had gone to Hebron during the search for the three boys. They said they hadn’t witnessed such devastation since the Second Intifada; a child’s cot smashed to pieces, faeces in a sink. Wanton and vengeful was the search for the boys.

Hamas, according to Prime Minister Netanyahu, were to blame and hundreds of Hamas affiliates were arrested – many of whom had just been released as part of the Kerry negotiations. I did not believe Hamas were responsible, it didn’t make sense. I also did not believe the three boys would survive, I thought of their fear if they were alive. Nine Palestinians were killed during the eighteen day search until the bodies of the youths were found in shallow graves in fields west of Beit Ummar on the 30th of June. The boys had been killed within minutes of their abduction. The Israeli authorities were almost certain of this a day or two into the search, but placed a gag-order on the recording of Gilad Shaer’s whispered call to the emergency services until after the bodies were found: ‘They’ve kidnapped me’, Gilad was heard to whisper, followed by the sound of automatic gunfire. Then singing in Arabic.
None of this would be sufficient and Rabbis, Members of Knesset and Facebook groups publically screamed vengeance. On the night of Tuesday 1st July men tried to abduct 10-year-old Moussa Zalum, on the main street of Shua’fat in Jerusalem, just a few minutes north of Sheikh Jarrah. It was said they put a rope round his neck but his mother beat them off with her bag and the men sped off in a car. Early on Wednesday morning, 16-year-old Mohammad Abu Khdeir was abducted from the same Palestinian neighbourhood, brought down to a nearby forest and burnt alive. This is the evolution of legitimacy here. Perhaps suicide bombings are too complex, or killings in the name of security don’t send a strong enough message. What we really need to be doing is picking up children from the streets and murdering them with righteous glee. Or so the logic seems to go. Almost incidentally a conflict in Gaza escalated. It could have been avoided, but why should it be? Conflict in Gaza is the status quo. Killing random children is new. Sirens hailed three times over Jerusalem as rockets approached, the nations rallied and rioted and righteousness and violence ran amok. Once I took my children to the stairwell when the sirens went off but neither they nor I were scared. What I feared was the roving mobs of Israelis, teenage boys and girls off school for the summer, grown men and mothers gathering in the centre of town chanting Ma’vat Aravim – Hebrew for Death to Arabs. I could hear the chants from my balcony, born along on the summer breeze. Ma’vat Aravim was painted on my children’s ‘bi-lingual’ school. It was more than just talk. Palestinians were accosted and beaten by gangs. Israelis too when they strayed into the wrong neighbourhood. None of my Israeli activist friends had experienced such overt fascism on the streets. Protests for peace were organised and attacked. Protective presence patrols were coordinated in an attempt to prevent or at least to bear witness to attacks on the streets. I began to join these, alternating nights with my wife – one of us would be out at night and it was scary. Yael stood in one demonstration, facing her mother in the counter protest. The Women in Black seriously considered cancelling their vigil. I joined them again and asked the protective presence folk to come along. The women contacted the police directly and insisted on increased police presence at the square. Departures were coordinated and we’d go in groups back to the parked cars. Attacks often came after the protests were over and the police had left. I went to Sheikh Jarrah that same day. It was peaceful and pleasant, the ordinary Israeli nationalists don’t come down here. By the end of the demo we heard that three people had been shot and killed at a protest in Beit Ummar.

This is on top of everything. Beneath the beatings and burnings, the blood, corpses and rubble the banality of life and occupation remained. A Palestinian friend from the territories was arrested and sent to military prison for three weeks while seeking work in
Jerusalem without a permit. I visited his family and gave them some food and money so they could have some form of meal at *Eid al-Fitr*. I had difficult family decisions to make at this time whose outcomes were beyond my certainty. I tried to make sense of what I was feeling amongst the chaos and the only name I could find was disgust. In August I took out a bank loan and left the country with my two children. I couldn’t take it anymore. Israel and Palestine is framed as being between two separate and distinct peoples or nations pitted against one another, but it is a single society reproducing itself through generations of oppression and Simmelian conflict. A righteous and cruel dystopia.

I finish with the words of an Israeli friend who posted the following on his Facebook page as the chant ‘Death to Arabs’ reached my Jerusalem balcony on the breeze and the 2014 death toll in Gaza grew and grew.

**Camous, July 23, 2014 Jerusalem**

‘To my non Middle Eastern friends, I have a little request for you.

I see that many of you are posting videos, pics and posts about what is happening over here. Most of it is about the Israeli aggression in Gaza, parts are about rockets and tunnels that target Israelis. This is not the time to write down my thoughts about who is right in this horrible mess, I still haven't done that in Hebrew, but for now let me just say that there are no winners in war, and I wish we’d learnt that lesson already.

And it's not about who's right to begin with. It's not even about that so many of those videos were not shot in this war, or even in this region, which is weird cause we have so much horror going on here that I don't understand why fake it. It's about madness. We’re drowning in it, in blood and hate. We're drowning in fear and disbelief, getting sucked in dehumanizing the enemy, and the definition of that enemy is getting wider every day.

What's happening here, in my eyes, is illness. We are ill. All of us, Israelis, Palestinians, whether holding a gun or not. Please, if you want to help, raise awareness, stop the killing, we don't need any more blame and finger pointing, we have enough of that, and we are totally immune to it anyhow. What we need is healing, and if you want to help, you can start by reminding us,
My friend,
My dear friend,
What happened to you
You used to be so lovely and full of dreams,
You used to call this land the holy land and there's nothing holy in watering it with blood

You used to be so much more creative, if you can create bombs and war strategies surely you can create peace, if you can dig death tunnels surely you can dig your way out of this,

if you can believe in your strength to carry the heavy losses, surely you can believe that under the hard skin of your enemy there is a beating heart like yours, what happened to you, my dear friend, that you covered yourself with fear and hate, show me where it hurts, so I can kiss you there, and remind you that whatever illness your heart caught, there is nothing you cannot overcome, whatever horror scenarios and memories keep you shivering in the shadows, greater are the wings that hope will give you,

rise from this war, my friend, awake from your nightmare, you have proven yourself to have such powers and bravery to stand in front of your enemy, now use them to cleanse the enemy within, now use them to be free from fear, if you are who you say you are, my friend, and you are, please stop hiding if you want to be a light to the rest of the world, well, my friend, it is time to shine.

If you are truly our friends, believe in us. For it seems we do not believe in ourselves. In times like these, of despair and hopelessness, remedy lies not in choosing the side that is suffering more but in showing a way out of suffering for all, not in choosing the righteous one but in the drawing of the field that is beyond right and wrong, where we all belong, where we all dance, where we can all get to if we will dare to believe.
(Yes, I get emotional. You should too. You don't need to get all mystical and hippie - though it's a lot of fun - but please do feel us, and please do act out of kindness and compassion, seriously now, we really need that)

(posted on Facebook July, 2014)
## Appendices

### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Mazen</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Mahmoud Abbas. The kunya form of the Palestinian President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa Intifada</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>The Second Intifada (2000-2004/5), also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Named after the Al-Aqsa mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Hallil</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Hebron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Quds</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashkenazim</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>(Hebrew: אַשְׁכְּנַזִּים). Jews of European origin, sometimes including Jews of the former Soviet Union states. The adjective form is Ashkenazi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brit Shalom</td>
<td></td>
<td>British Mandate period political organisation advocating Cultural Zionism over the establishment of a Jewish State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTS</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Breaking the Silence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td></td>
<td>An international humanitarian agency delivering emergency relief and long-term international development projects.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dai LaKibush</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>End the Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Defence for Children International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunam</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Standard unit of land area in the Ottoman Empire. Still widely used. It now represents 1000sqm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPPI</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eretz Israel</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Land of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>(Arabic: فتح Fath). Formerly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. A leading secular Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 1948 Armistice boundary between Israel and Jordan. While the Green Line marked the boundary of Jordanian jurisdiction the lesser know Red Line drew the extent of Israeli control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halakha</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>(Hebrew: הלכה; also transliterated as halacha or halachah). The collective body of Jewish religious laws derived from the Written and Oral Torah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasbara</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>(Hebrew: הסברה, &quot;explaining&quot;). Israel's 'Public diplomacy' program to disseminate positive information about Israel abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hijab</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>A veil that covers the head and chest, which is particularly worn by a Muslim woman beyond the age of puberty in the presence of adult males outside of their immediate family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Israel Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intifada</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>(Arabic: انفاذة). Meaning &quot;shaking off&quot;, though often translated as &quot;uprising&quot;, &quot;resistance&quot;, or &quot;rebellion&quot;. It is often used as a term for popular resistance to oppression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISM</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>International Solidarity Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Jewish Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Jewish Agency for Israel (Hebrew: הָסְכָנַת הָיוֹדְעִית לֶארץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, HaSochnut HaYehudit L’Eretz Yisra’el) is the largest Jewish nonprofit organization in the world. Previously called the Palestine Zionist Executive, it was designated in 1929 as the &quot;Jewish Agency&quot; provided for in the League of Nations' Palestine Mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNF</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Jewish National Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judea</td>
<td></td>
<td>The biblical name for the mountainous region south of Jerusalem. The official Israeli state's designation for the Southern part of the West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keffiyeh</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>(Arabic: كوفية kūfiyyah). A traditional Middle Eastern headdress fashioned from a square scarf, usually made of cotton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magav</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>The Israel Border Police (Hebrew: מִשְׁמַר הַגְּבוּל, Mishmar HaGvul) is the gendarmerie and border security branch of the Israel National Police. It is also commonly known by its Hebrew abbreviation Magav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavat Aravim</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Death to the Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizrahim</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>(Hebrew: מזרחים) Jews descended from communities in the Middle East and sometimes including North Africa. The adjective form is Mizrahi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moked</td>
<td></td>
<td>Israeli left-wing political party of the 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moshav</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Originally a form of collectivised farming community established as part of the settlement program. Many Moshavs are now residential villages with less emphasis on farming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakba</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Catastrophe, disaster or cataclysm. The term used to refer to the expulsions and displacement of Palestinians in the 1948 war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>acron.</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. A United Nations (UN) body formed in December 1991 by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 to strengthen the UN's response to complex emergencies and natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. A United Nations agency that works to promote and protect the human rights that are guaranteed under international law and stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The office was established by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 1993.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olaim</td>
<td>Hebrew (plural) Literally meaning to ascend, it is the term used to denote new immigrants to Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ometz LeSarev</td>
<td>Hebrew Courage to Refuse. An organization of reserve officers and soldiers of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) who in 2002 signed the Combatants Letter in which they stated their refusal to serve in the oPt, but would continue to serving in the IDF elsewhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>acronym. Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>oPt</td>
<td>acronym. occupied Palestinian territories (also OPT). A widely used acronym to refer collectively to West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>acronym. Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartet</td>
<td>The Quartet on the Middle East, (aka the Diplomatic Quartet, the Madrid Quartet, or the Quartet. A mediating organization in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it represents the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samaria</td>
<td>The biblical name for the mountaineous region north of Jerusalem. The official Israeli state's designation for the Northern part of the West Bank</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalom Achshav</td>
<td>Hebrew Peace Now. An Israeli organisation whose objectives include the implementation of the Two State Solution. Formed in 1978 during the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel, it mobilised some of Israel's largest marches in the 1990s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shebab</td>
<td>Arabic Youths A colloquial term referring to young men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ta'ayush</td>
<td>Arabic Living Together or Coexistence. Founded in 2000 as a Jewish Arabic partnership movement is particularly active working with poor and peripheral rural Palestinians in the South Hebron Hills.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tag Mahir</td>
<td>Hebrew Price Tag. An Israeli far-right organisation, doctrine or tactic given to acts of violence aimed at the Palestinian population, non-Jewish institutions and building and occasionally even IDF resources in the West Bank. Emerging around 2008 the frequency of attacks has increased since 2011. My sons classroom was attacked and burned down in late 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>acronym. United Nations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, formerly known as the United Nations Special Coordinator (UNSCO). A United Nations body which leads the UN system in political and diplomatic efforts related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as part of the Middle East Quartet. It also coordinates other UN agencies and programmes in the occupied Palestinian territory and was established in June 1994 following the signing of the Oslo Accords.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. A peacekeeping body founded on 29 May 1948 to providing military command structure to the peace keeping forces which oversaw the Armistice Agreements at the end of the Israeli War of Independence/Palestinian Nakba. It is still in operation today and based in East Jerusalem.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. A relief and human development agency, originally intended to provide jobs on public works projects and direct relief for the original Palestinians who fled or were expelled from their homes during the fighting of the 1948 Israeli War of Independence/Palestinian Nakba. It is still in operation today in the oPt and beyond providing education, health care and social services approx 5 million registered Palestinian refugees, including survivors from the 1948 and 1967 wars and their descendants.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WIB</td>
<td>Women in Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>WorldVision International</td>
<td>An Evangelical Christian humanitarian aid, development, and advocacy organisation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WZO</td>
<td>World Zionist Organisation</td>
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Maps & Figures

The following maps are taken from Google maps.
Fig. 1 A typical Friday drive from Moshav Ora to Walaja, then Kikar Paris and onto Sheikh Jarrah. The dotted line marks the 1948 Armistice boundaries, aka the ‘Green Line’
Fig. 2 The route from fig. 1 expanded to include the journey to Al-Maasara and Beit Ummar.
Fig. 3 The route from fig.2 expanded to include the journey to Hebron, Susiya in the South Hebron Hills and Tel Aviv.
Fig. 4 The route from fig. 3 expanded to show Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories in its regional setting
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