drawing//phenomenology//drawing:
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phenomenological potential
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drawing//phenomenology//drawing

an exploration of the phenomenological potential of repetitive processes

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Through an investigation of repetitive processes of drawing and their subsequent effect on the drawer, the paper will consider the premise that repetitive processes of drawing are phenomenological. That is, repetitive processes of drawing have the potential to record both the movement of the drawer's mind and the drawing’s own making.

States of Consciousness

Whilst creating a series of drawings through differing repetitive processes including: drawing linear graphite marks over a charcoal laden surface (figure 1); scoring linear marks into the surface with a knife (figure 2); or drawing with charcoal (figure 3) it was notable that whilst the processes may differ, each induced a particular fluctuating state of consciousness. The repetitive action allowed for a certain detachment, the physical self completing the task and allowing the mind to be intermittently withdrawn from self-consciousness. In an attempt to articulate the effect repetitive processes of drawing - in this instance the repetitive perforating of a charcoal laden surface (figure 4) - had on consciousness the text rhythmical was written:

rhythmical

... drawing, body as machine, manoeuvring across the surface with methodical, rhythmical motion, mind disconnected from the activity, a robotic almost liminal state and yet grounded, all too aware of the now, the space is confined, a tension in the body as the only contact with the surface is through the tool, an extension of the hand, perforating the paper as it negotiates the surface, rasping and grating sounds reverberating around the room, the chalky air, an awareness of dust
particles floating, visible in the shaft of daylight streaming in through the window, a distinct smell and residue flowing in and out with the breath, a discomfort in the hand as pressure is applied and released, a heightened awareness of self amidst the apparent removal of thought – a meditative contemplation of self, as soon as recognised all but gone and the tedium of the process is apparent again, calm and ease dissipated, irritation and unrest again discernible …
As the passage of text suggests the state of consciousness fluctuates between awareness of being connected to the environment - a disconnection of the mind to the point of loss of awareness and conversely a heightened awareness of self within the environment.

The study of consciousness per se is not within the remit of this paper. However, for clarification, the paper adopts the position of Velmans’ (1996) reflexive monism, which identifies that,

The "contents of consciousness" encompass all that we are conscious of, aware of, or experience. These include not only experiences that we commonly associate with ourselves, such as thoughts, feelings, images, dreams, body experiences and so on, but also the experienced three-dimensional world (the phenomenal world) beyond the body surface.

Whilst drawing through repetitive action the drawer is intermittently acutely aware of: internal phenomena - somatic and psychic; external phenomena - the drawing and environment within which they are present. However, the definition of a third category of consciousness is also pertinent to a discussion of the state of consciousness induced during repetitive processes of drawing: - the fusion of awareness of both internal and external phenomena to a point of loss of self and the “… erasure of boundaries between inside and out …” (MacLaglan 2001, p.43).

It is therefore considered that repetitive processes of drawing induce a state of consciousness that fluctuates between identified aspects of consciousness: external - an acute awareness of the elements of the environment; internal - an acute awareness of self; and a fusion of the self (internal) with the environment (external) to a point of loss of self.

**Fusion**

The fusion of self with the environment is a distinctive element of the fluctuating state of consciousness experienced during drawing through repetitive action. The process generates not a loss of self-awareness as such,
but a loss of the awareness of the self as something separate from the environment. The process generates a sense of being a part of the matter of the environment, rather than as an entity experiencing it.

In this state of consciousness it is not possible to determine where the self exists. The fusion makes it difficult to discern whether the self incorporates the external elements as if they were internal or whether the self transcends the internal to become fused with external elements. The state of consciousness moves beyond the limits of prior experiences to something quite unthought. As Dewey (1934, p.202) states, “We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live our ordinary experiences. We are carried beyond ourselves to find ourselves.” Repetitive processes of drawing generate this feeling of transportation and moving towards another form of knowing that is strangely familiar but not grounded in any part of recalled experience.

A possible explanation of this aspect of the familiarity of something that cannot be recalled is discussed by Bollas (1987), and identified as an unthought known. An unthought known relates to experiences we had as an infant prior to having the capacity for thought or linguistic expression, consequently we have no conscious recall of the experiences. However, as infants, we experienced “… perceptual pre-conceptual experience[s] …” (Merleau-Ponty in Moran 2002, p.402). As a consequence, the experiences are part of our psyche and known to us even though we are unable to consciously recall them¹ (Bollas 1987).

Bollas (1987) relates the experience of fusion with external entities – for example, an aesthetic response to an artwork – to our pre-thought experiences of our mother; a time when our mother controlled our

¹Bollas (1987) discusses the ego as developing from both that which our mother passes on to us - her particular mode of being - and, alongside these ‘inherited’ norms our own ego. Bollas (1987, p.9) states, “The ego is the constitute factor in the unthought known. We are in possession of complex rules for being and relating, processes that reflect the dialectic of the inherited and the acquired. In the primary repressed unconscious we know these rules, but as yet only some of them have been thought. A very significant portion of our existence is predetermined by this unthought known into thought…”
environment and we had no concept of her as other. She performed the role of ‘transformative environment’\(^2\), attending to our every discomfort - we were aware of ourselves, as a part of, not separate to our surroundings. These experiences are retained as unthought but known experiences. Bollas (1987) suggests we seek out these experiences to relive the transformative environment and sense of belonging - experiencing it through fusion with an external entity such as, nature or an artwork. Bollas (1987, p17) states,

In adult life, therefore, to seek the transformational object is to recollect an early object experience, to remember not cognitively but existentially – through intense affective experience – a relationship which was identified with accumulative transformational experiences of the self.

This definition of the reason we experience fusion offers an explanation for why we have no conscious thought during the experience and yet conversely, we have the perception of familiarity\(^3\).

**The Occurrence of Fusion**

Fusion, as a state of consciousness, is not a part of everyday experience as such; however, prior to discovering this state of consciousness during repetitive processes of drawing this experience of fusion of self with something external had been experienced either during the viewing of certain artworks (notably Janet Cardiff’s ‘40 Part Motet’ 2001 and Anish Kapoor’s ‘Marsayas’ 2000) or during certain repetitive physical activities (such as swimming and aerobics). Both of these types of experiences generated a fluctuating state of consciousness between awareness of internal and external

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\(^2\) Bollas has developed the idea of the mother as a transformative environment from the research of Winnicott. Winnicott (1971) identifies the mother as ‘an environment mother’ due to the fact the infant has no concept of the mother as ‘other’ than himself. Bollas (1987, p.14) develops this idea by suggesting, “To this [Winnicott’s concept of the environment mother] I would add that the mother is less significant and identifiable as an object than as a process that is identified with accumulative internal and external transformations.”

\(^3\) Bollas (1987) suggests we experience these occasions as essentially ‘mute’ due to the fact that the experience corresponds to a time before we had the ability to use or even understand language. As a consequence, we have no language available to adequately represent the experience. Bollas (1987, p.36) states, “In a sense we learn the grammar of our being before we grasp the rules of our language.” De Bolla (2001) has also noted this inability to articulate this type of experience, suggesting the experience initiates ‘mutism’, which De Bolla relates to us not having the appropriate lexicon. Whilst De Bolla does not relate ‘mutism’ to experience prior to our capacity for language it is interesting to note the similarity of the thoughts of Bollas and De Bolla.
elements and a notable fusion of both internal and external elements. It is suggested then that the state of consciousness that includes this state of fusion as one of its elements, can be generated by: either the experience of nature; the experience of an artwork; the experience of a repetitive physical activity.

The element of a generation of fusion within these differing contexts has been the subject of the research of others (notably, Dewey 1934; Bollas 1987; De Bolla 2001; and Csikszentmihalyi 1988). However, the experience, whilst described with great similarity, is referred to by several terms, “aesthetic response”, “aesthetic experience” or “flow” depending on the context. As Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990, p.8) state, “The most likely answer is philosophers describing the aesthetic experience and psychologists describing flow are talking about the same state of mind.” “When this heightened sense of consciousness occurs in response to music, painting, and so on, we call it an aesthetic experience. In other contexts, such as sports, hobbies, challenging work, and social interactions, the heightened state of consciousness is called a flow experience” (Csikszentmihalyi, Robinson 1990, p.9).

**Fusion During the Experience of Artworks**

Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990) have carried out research, through interviews with museum officials, which incorporates this phenomenon of fusion of self with an artwork, identifying it as a major part of what they refer to as an “aesthetic response”\(^4\). The research of Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson...

\(^4\) Referred to as either aesthetic response or aesthetic experience - there seems to be a general acceptance that an experience of this type exists. However, there is much debate about the definition of what it consists of, or indeed where it resides. For example, for Beardsley (in Fisher 1988) the aesthetic experience resides in the qualities within the aesthetic object. Therefore one cannot have an aesthetic experience of a non-aesthetic object. Fisher (1988, p.8 in Mitias 1988) states, “The link between the beholder and the object is not, for Beardsley, found in some alleged creative act of the former in perception, but in the qualities of the object. When I have an aesthetic experience I attend to the qualities of an object …” Price (1979) in agreement with this position suggests an experience is always of something, and therefore the qualities of an aesthetic experience must lie in the object. Mitias (1982) refutes this claim stating that while it is valid to consider an object may be aesthetic, the object will not necessarily initiate an aesthetic response. As Fisher (1988, p.2 in Mitias 1988) states \(^5\) The question whether there can be aesthetic experience in the absence of aesthetic qualities, or whether there can be aesthetic qualities independent of aesthetic experiences are variants of recognizably old and persistent problems about both the work of art and the observer’s or auditor’s response.” Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson (1990) have completed the most comprehensive research into aesthetic response, which identifies the specific quality of fusion.

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(1990) sought to ascertain whether there were indeed identifiable and
generalisable elements of the experience they refer to as an aesthetic
response. In most cases interviewees described some element of fusion or
absorption in the work to a point of, “… loss of self or transportation outside
the self” (Csikszentmihalyi, Robinson 1990, p.68). This led Csikszentmihalyi
and Robinson to conclude that fusion with an artwork formed part of the
structure of aesthetic experience.5

Dewey (1934, p.228) also discusses fusion of the self with an artwork, stating,

…” the one who experiences the work of art loses himself in irrelevant
reveries unless his images and emotions are also tied to the object, and
are tied to it in the sense of being fused with the matter of the object. It
is not enough that they should be occasioned by the object in order to
be an experience of the object they must be saturated with its qualities.
Saturation […] so complete that the qualities of the object and the
emotions it causes have no separation.

The research of Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990) and Dewey (1934)
parallels the discoveries of the state of consciousness generated by repetitive
processes of drawing.

Fusion through Creative Activity

The repetitive action of the process of drawing appeared to create a
fluctuating state of consciousness that fluctuated between an absorption in
the process and movement to such a degree that a fusion between the self,
the drawing and the environment seemed to take place. However, this state
was only held for certain periods before something occurred that would break
this fusion and create a heightened awareness of the self - through a
discomfort in the body - or of the environment - as the light changed or the
temperature altered over time - bringing awareness back into focus and

5 Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson (1990, p.28) define aesthetic experience as consisting of four categories of responses:
“…a perceptual response, which centred on elements such as balance, form, and harmony; an emotional response,
which emphasised reactions to the emotional content of the work and personal associations; an intellectual response,
which focused on theoretical and art historical questions; and, finally, what we characterised as the communicative
response, wherein there was a desire to relate to the artist, or to his or her time, or to his or her culture, through the
mediation of the work of art.”
separating the self from the drawing and the environment. The repetitive action never failed to generate these fluctuating periods of fusion and disconnection of mind with heightened awareness of self or environment.

Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) have researched this phenomenon of fusion during activities such as rock climbing, playing chess and composing music, identifying it as a state of ‘flow’. They suggest that the flow states are times of optimal performance when creativity is at its height; typically the flow state occurs when the activity is feasible but challenging and the participant is working to their optimal ability. As with the state of fusion during drawing through repetitive action or in the presence of an artwork Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988, p.38) suggest, “… the clearest sign of flow is the merging of action and awareness. A person in flow has no dualistic perspective: he is aware of his actions but not of the awareness itself.”

Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) identify two necessary elements in order for flow to occur. Firstly, as mentioned above, the activity needs to be feasible - “… flow seems to occur only when tasks are within one’s ability to perform” (p.39). If the task is beyond the participant’s capabilities this will generate an awareness of self, rather than fusion – an awareness of self, attempting to complete the task. The repetitive processes of drawing, discussed within this paper, allow for the fusion of self or flow state because they are within the drawer’s capabilities. The format, media and process are all predetermined; therefore drawing occurs through a systematic procedure allowing for a disconnection of mind and absorption with the activity and environment. That is not to say that thinking and reflection does not take place during the activity of drawing; the fluctuating state of consciousness generates periods of self-awareness and lucidity when reflection and analysis will occur. What is relevant in this context, is that the activity is within one’s ability and therefore capable of generating flow or fusion, due to the systematic approach to drawing.
Secondly, Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) argue that for a flow state to occur there has to be a limited “stimulus field”. There has to be focussed attention on a limited range of stimulus to prevent elements that could be potentially distracting. In the context of this discussion, the limited stimulus field concerns the movement of the body drawing across the surface of the paper. At times, there is an awareness of the environment, however, this is generally part of peripheral vision and senses rather than a focal point. The mind is fully focussed on engaging the body to perform the task of drawing the media across the surface in methodical movements; the action and awareness of that action becoming fused. Therefore, the repetitive process of drawing contains the two elements deemed necessary by the research of Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988) to be capable of generating a state of flow.

**Rhythm in Repetitive Physical Activity**

In addition to these two identified factors - feasibility and limited stimulus field - required to initiate the potential for fusion, or a flow state, the repetitive process of drawing revealed a further factor deemed pertinent to the generation of fusion – rhythm. The rhythmical and continuous movement of the repetitive process of drawing generated an affect of the mind and body working in unison with one another. The repetition of action generating a rhythm through the pace of movement and pressure applied to the drawing media. However, as Halliwell (2007) states, “If an action is repeated for long enough, it soon becomes apparent that there is no such thing as a repeated action or experience.” The body is not a programmed machine; slight shifts in position alter the pressure or angle of application of media, recording the alterations through the trace of the mark. These slight deviations in the trace of the mark creating a rhythm across the surface as they document the fluctuating states of consciousness as they occur (*figure 5*).
As previously discussed, the state of fusion or flow was only one aspect of the fluctuating state of consciousness. It existed in opposition to an acute awareness of self or environment. The repetitive drawing process was capable of inducing long periods of fusion that led to several hours of time having the perception of a few minutes. The awareness of self or environment was reinstated when a discomfort in the physical self or boredom due to the monotony of the repetition of action renewed attentive awareness and the fusion or flow state was interrupted. As Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988 p.38) state, “… for flow to be maintained, one cannot reflect on the act of awareness itself. When awareness becomes split, so that one perceives the activity from “outside”, flow is difficult to maintain for any length of time without at least momentary interruptions.” These ‘interruptions’ are what generate the perception of a fluctuating state of consciousness, and ultimately are recorded through the rhythmical variation of mark. As Townsley (2007) states, “Each trace records the difference of each moment.” Each time a break in fusion occurred the established pace or pressure would be
interrupted and this, in turn, would be visible in the slight discrepancies in the mark left on the surface. Over a large area, once the drawing was complete, these would create a rhythm of fluctuating marks oscillating across the surface. It was considered that these discrepancies are what created the rhythm; as Dewey (1934, p.160) states if there is uniformity and an even flow there is no rhythm, rhythm, “… is ordered variation of changes.”

The significance of rhythm within repetitive action is its resonance with the rhythm of existence; a series of rhythms - the changing of the seasons, the sequence of night and day, life and death, or the beating of the heart, for example - which regulate being. Therefore, when we experience rhythm it resonates with the very core of existence and it is this factor that contributes to the generation of the state of fusion during repetitive actions; the mind and body are both involved in rhythmical motion that is capable of initiating a state of fusion. Dewey states, (1934, p.156) “Underneath the rhythm of every act and of every work of art there lies, as a substratum in the depths of subconsciousness, the basic pattern of the relations of the live creature to his environment.”

The consideration of these factors – feasibility; limited stimulus field; rhythm - related to repetitive actions has further significance when associated with a process of drawing.

**Drawing as Visible Trace**

Whilst there is much debate, and disagreement, concerned with answering the question – “What is Drawing?” - most (including: Farthing 2005; Petherbridge 2008 *in* Garner 2008; Fisher 2003 *in* Newman & De Zegher 2003) acknowledge both: the intimate and immediate manner of drawing, and the capability of drawing to record the trace of the drawer. Marden (*in* Farthing 2005, p.30) states there is, “Less between the hand and the paper than any other medium” suggesting drawing’s immediacy. When discussing drawing’s ability to record the trace of the drawer Newman (2003, p.70) states that,
“When we look, we enter the intimate space of a work that is as close to the action of an artist’s thought as one can get.” Taylor (2008, p.10) also believes in this quality of drawing stating, “… through the act of drawing we are not only left a trace of the physical act but a trace of the thinking process” In agreement with this, Bailey (1982, p.339) states, “More deeply than any other form in the visual arts, drawing immediately betrays how the draughtsman thinks.” Drawing, through its immediacy of means, reduces the space between the drawer and the drawing - leaving marks on the surface regardless of erasure - creating a visible trace of both the process of making and the drawer’s thoughts. Fisher (2002 in Newman & De Zegher 2003, p.222) states,

... the act of drawing makes possible the magical identity between thought and action because to draw is the quickest medium and can therefore protect the intensity of thought. To draw is never a transcript of thought (in the sense of writing) but rather a formulation or elaboration of the thought itself at the very moment it translates itself into an image.

Repetitive processes of drawing are predetermined and as such, “…delays decision making …” (Petherbridge 2006), the process is determined for the drawing, although reflection will subsequently determine the progression of the ensuing drawings. Consequently, the marks and traces present in the drawing will not reveal the thought process behind the drawing’s making, in the sense of making explicit changes in decision through erasure, generally associated with drawing. However, the repetitive process of drawing does have the potential to trace and record the generated fluctuating state of consciousness through the rhythm of marks on the surface. Avis Newman (2003 in Newman & De Zegher 2003, p. 170) states, “It is the rhythm of marks that frames and gives internal coherence to an image. The rhythm in a drawing allows one to experience the thing. It takes the eye from place to place.”
As a consequence of the effect of the repetitive motion on the state of consciousness a sense of rhythm is created in the progressive flow of linear marks; the repetitive process of drawing creating a rhythmic quality on the surface that reflects the nature of its production. This relates to the speed of application, pressure applied and distance between marks, which are created when absorption in repetitive motion has occurred generating fusion. Breaks in fusion create a fluctuating state of consciousness, which is perceptible through the changing rhythm of the marks generated by discrepancies in speed and pressure applied. Figure 6 details the metallic linear marks recording the process of drawing across the surface, tracking the movement of the body in time. The fluctuating line – generated by the inconsistency of the movement of the body - creates a rhythmical path across the surface. Rest periods are discernible, as the rhythm entered into during a period of drawing is interrupted. When drawing commences the pressure applied to the pencil would alter, varying the thickness and intensity of the linear mark. The marks on the surface record deviations in states of consciousness as the rhythm of drawing fluctuates in response to states of fusion and acute awareness. As a consequence, the direct recording, that is, phenomenological recording, of the state of consciousness through the process of drawing is made possible.

Figure 6 – graphite/charcoal
Drawing as a Phenomenological Process

Moran (2000, p.15) states the, “… term phenomenology is used, for the first-person experience of conscious states.” Husserl was considered to be the principle founder of phenomenology, developing the concept of the need to study phenomena, related to object or concept, as they appeared to consciousness. Husserl advocated that in order to access phenomena as they appeared in consciousness there was a need for ‘reduction’, “… phenomenology must pay close attention to the nature of consciousness as actually experienced, not as pictured by common sense or by the philosophical tradition” (Moran 2000, p.6). Phenomenologists seek to access phenomena without interpretation through social constructs, which create predetermined expectations; to see phenomena as they are, rather than how we are conditioned to think they should be. However, as Merleau-Ponty (2002, p.xv) later acknowledged,

The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction [...] If we were an absolute mind, the reduction would be no problem. But since, on the contrary, we are in the world, since indeed our reflections are carried out in the temporal flux on which we are trying to seize [...] there is no thought which embraces all our thought.

Merleau-Ponty acknowledged, in agreement with Heidegger (1962) that we are within a world and that world is our given reality. However, whereas Heidegger concentrated on the nature of Being, Merleau-Ponty concentrated on “… a new philosophy of the human body” (Johnson & Smith 1993, p.8). Merleau-Ponty (2004, p.56) sought to identify the specific role of the body as mediator between the world and self, he states, “… rather than a mind and a body, man is a mind with a body, a being who can only get to the truth of things because its body is, as it were, embodied in those things.” Identifying the specifics of the body in the world Merleau-Ponty (1964, p.163) suggests,

Visible and mobile, my body is a thing amongst things; it is caught in the fabric of the world and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. Things
are an annexe or prolongation of itself; they are encrusted into its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the same stuff as the body.

Merleau-Ponty discusses this philosophy of the body in relation to the production and viewing of artworks. Whilst he concentrated on the process of an artist painting (notably Cezanne), because Merleau-Ponty discusses the translation of the visible world into artworks, his philosophy has resonance for other creative practices, including drawing.

Merleau-Ponty (1964) suggests that the artist is able to recreate in his artwork the specific phenomena of the world, rather than a reproduction of how it is presumed to appear, through the mediation of his body. “Since things and my body are made of the same stuff, vision must somehow take place in them. […] Things have an internal equivalence in me; they arouse in me a carnal formula of their presence” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.164). They generate a particular response that can only be attributed to them. In this respect Merleau-Ponty suggests artists discover a system of equivalences\(^6\) that are translated into painting and in turn, will arouse in the viewer the response that only that ‘thing’ could. Using Cezanne’s painting as an example of, “… prescientific perception of the visible” (Johnson & Smith 1993, p.9) – the appearance of things as they appear – Merleau-Ponty suggests the artist is able to communicate his specific mode of being-in-the-world through his art, revealing the world through the trace left on the canvas or paper. “It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings […] that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.162). Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) emphasis on the role of the body, as mediator between the world and self has pertinence for this study. The body is mediator between the state of consciousness and the marks left on the paper through drawing; the body moves with the movement of the mind,

\(^6\) Merleau-Ponty (in Johnson & Smith 1993, p.91) states, “For each painter, style is the system of equivalences that he sets up for himself for that labor of manifestation. It is the universal index of the “coherent deformation” by which he concentrates the still scattered meaning of his perception and makes it exist expressly. […] We must see it […] developing in the hollows of the painter’s perception as a painter; style is an exigency that has issued from that perception.”
fluctuating between fusion; heightened awareness of self; and heightened awareness of the environment. Drawing is phenomenological in that it records, through mark-making, the trace of its making from inception to conclusion. As Rosand (2002, p.13) states, “The self-reflexivity of the drawn mark, alluding to its own making, quite naturally implicates the maker […] the line recalls the process of its becoming through the act of drawing, the gesture of the draftsman.” The repetitive process of drawing leaves the trace of the marks on the paper and, as previously stated, these marks correspond to the state of consciousness of the drawer. Therefore, it is suggested that the repetitive process of drawing, allows access to the phenomena of the state of consciousness as experienced, and records such through the trace of marks drawn on the paper by the movement of the body.

Merleau-Ponty states, “… perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.239). Whilst Rosand (2002, p.110) states, “Drawing records what has been seen and is known, but not after the fact – it is simultaneous with, and, for the draftsman, identical to perception.” The body perceives and drawing is perception, as Rosand states, “The gesture of drawing is, in essence, a projection of the body …” (Rosand, p.16) the body that is mediator between mind and world.

**Repetition as Time Trace**

A further consequence of the phenomenology of a repetitive process of drawing, capable of recording its own making, is the recording and reference to time. Bryson (2003 in Newman & De Zegher 2003, p.149) suggests that we, as viewers, are unable to reconstruct the process of drawing through the trace of marks in actual sequential order, but that there is instead a “… permanent visibility of each unit of production – or each line on its own.” The repetitive process of drawing offers the potential to reconstruct the process of making in sequential order and time. The process is laid bare through the repetitive linear marks drawn consecutively across the paper’s surface.
Rosand (2002, p.16) states, “Responding to drawings, we make our way back, through line, to the originary impulse of the draftsman. Interpretation involves a connecting act of re-creation, the self-projection of the viewer reimagining the process of drawing.” With the repetitive process of drawing the re-enactment of making through visible trace takes place through the presence of the linear marks upon the surface of the drawing. Each linear mark is a trace of the body’s movement during a portion of time spent drawing across the surface; each linear mark a visible record of a trace of time replicable by the movement of the eyes tracing that line. “A line is made by the movement of a point … the point may be compared to an instant in time, and the line may be likened to the length of a certain quantity of time …” (Da Vinci in Rosand 2002, p.111).

The directional marks across the surface have the potential to suggest a continuation of mark beyond the limitation of the paper, creating the illusion of potential extension beyond the paper’s edge. This generated the potential of the drawings to indicate a proportion of segregated time through the defined edges of the paper. The drawing is created within the limits of the paper’s edges; the paper creates delineation, an edge, a surface on which to exist. This creates an order, a definition of a beginning and an end, control and a limitation. However, in contrast, the marks on the surface appear limitless and suggest continuation beyond the paper’s edge intimating the continuum of time through repetition of marks ad infinitum. Fer (2005, p.192) states, “The idea of infinity itself presupposes an incomplete subject, and the work of repetition is the impossibility of completion.” The repetitive marks suggest limitlessness because the viewer is able to not only retrace and recreate the process of their making, but continue it through the imagined repetition of marks.

The paper concludes that repetitive processes of drawing are phenomenological. The identified fluctuating state of consciousness induced
by the repetitive action of drawing is visible in the marks drawn on the surface. The surface records the repetitive process as it occurs delineating a portion of time and offering the possibility to recreate the process in the mind’s eye. This offers the potential to not only record the state of consciousness of the drawer as it appears, but also to record the drawing’s becoming as it appears through the trace of marks on paper.

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