It isn’t easy being a fading post-imperial power: British and Commonwealth national newspaper constructions of Britain during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games

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BRITISH AND COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL NEWSPAPER CONSTRUCTIONS OF BRITAIN DURING THE 2012 DIAMOND JUBILEE AND LONDON OLYMPIC GAMES

By

Jack Black

Doctoral Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University

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**Appendix I**
Abstract

This thesis explores the construction, framing and representation of Britain and British identity in British and Commonwealth national newspaper coverage of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games. Specifically, national newspapers from Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales were examined using a qualitative thematic content analysis. From this sample it is argued that when viewed as part of a long-term process, the relationship between Britain’s national and imperial histories can be used to explore contemporary media discourses on Britain and British identity.

Theoretically the work of Norbert Elias and the process sociology perspective was used to explore how past and present figurations form an important part of group identifications. Notably, the adoption of a process sociological approach to national identity formation provided the opportunity to explore how changes both within and outside the ‘nation’ have served to underlie its discursive construction. That is, by drawing upon an established-outsider model, power-balances within Britain (U.K.) and between Britain and the Commonwealth were used to explore how complex relations and multi-national dynamics served to affect the framing of Britain in national newspaper discourses.

The findings reveal that references to Britain’s imperial history and memories of its imperial past were routinely highlighted in both the British domestic and Commonwealth press. However, when considered interdependently, it was evident that constructions of Britain revealed processes of integration and attachment (British unity) as well as disintegration and (dis)attachment (British dis-unity). This was reflected in the discursive construction of home nation and British-Commonwealth relations (established-outsider relations), group identifications (national/British) and notions of disorientation, anxiety and apathy (post-imperial British decline). Correspondingly, while newspaper discourses served to provide particular ‘established’ constructions of Britain, at the same time, representations of Britain were both resisted and (re)constructed by ‘outsider’ groups (Scottish Independence Referendum). Here, it was possible to observe how newspaper constructions were related to power balances within and between the British state and Commonwealth, that is, as ‘integration struggles’.
Indeed, what emerges from these conclusions is how both established and outsider constructions within the British domestic and Commonwealth press served to dynamically frame Britain as well as actively (re)construct their relationship with Britain in ways that revealed processes of unification, re-unification and dis-unification. Therefore, in accordance with a multi-figurational analysis of Britain, this thesis argues that the ability to explore established-outsider relations and we/they images can allow one to consider how the construction, framing and representation of Britain and British identity is ‘multi-layered’.
Introduction

I. The research aims

This thesis will explore the construction, framing and representation of Britain and British identity in national newspaper coverage of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games. In particular, this thesis will argue that when viewed as part of a long-term development, the relationship between Britain’s national and imperial histories can be used to examine contemporary media discourses on Britain and British identity (Barkawi and Laffey, 2002; Cohen, 1995; Darian-Smith et al., 2007; Darwin, 2010; De Cillia et al., 1999; Goudsblom et al., 1996; Howe, 2010; Kumar, 2000; 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2010; MacKenzie, 1984; 1994; 1998; 1999; 2001; Mycock, 2010; 2012; Thompson, 2001; 2005; Ward, 2001a; 2001b). These discourses will be used to examine how the mediated construction of Britain remains fixed upon a range of discourses pertaining to, and, influenced by, the British Empire (Darwin, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2010; MacKenzie, 2001; Story and Childs, 1997; Thompson, 2000; 2005; Ward, 2001a; 2001b).

Theoretically the work of Norbert Elias and the process sociology perspective will be used to explore how past and present figurations form an important part of group identifications (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012). Indeed, constructions of Britain are often ‘caught between the decline of old political identifications and new identities that are in the process of becoming’ (Mac An Ghaill, 2001: 194). Consequently, by drawing upon a process sociological approach, attention will be given to examining the ‘sequence of changes’ (Mennell, 1996b: 128) that have underlined Britain’s state formation as well as its imperial expansion and decline. Therefore, the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games will be used to explore ‘how far, and in what ways, the Imperial experience’ (Bayly, 2001: 71) served to shape the press’ framing of both events, and, as a consequence, will be used to consider how national circumstances within Britain and the former dominions make sense and give meaning to constructions of Britain and British identity, today. To this end, a qualitative thematic content analysis of the British domestic (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales) and selected Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand) national press will be used to examine the discursive construction of Britain during both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.
Previous research has highlighted how the discursive construction of the nation and its national identity forms an important part of the framing of national and international events (Lee and Maguire, 2004). According to Kellner (2003), media spectacles ‘are those phenomena of media culture that embody contemporary society’s basic values, serve to initiate individuals into its way of life, and dramatize its controversies and struggles’ (2003: 2). In addition, Dekavalla (2012) notes that media events can help bring ‘together heterogeneous communities at a national or transnational level, marking a new era and/or re-establishing the status and power of the organizers as social actors’ (2012: 297 [italics added]).

With this in mind, both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games were not merely ‘British’ national events. Instead, both occasions formed part of a history of British and imperial/Commonwealth relations and took place within a fragmented and possibly dis-united, post-imperial Britain. Indeed, while national media texts can be viewed as both active and functional in framing and representing societal relations and national identities (Tonkiss, 1998), such texts can also be used to examine how balances of power are produced in, and through, the discursive construction of the nation/nation-state (Bloyce et al., 2010; Malcolm, 2012; Poulton and Maguire, 2012).

In light of this, it is possible to look closer at national newspaper representations of Britain in order to explore the power dynamics that underlie the discursive construction of Britain and British identity. In particular, this thesis will employ an established-outsider model to highlight how power-balances within Britain (UK) and between Britain and the Commonwealth helped frame the press’ coverage (Bloyce et al., 2010; Maguire, 1993a; 1993b; Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Maguire and Tuck, 1998; 2005).

Finally, by taking the above into consideration, a detailed examination of the multi-layered aspects of national habitus will be outlined (De Cillia et al., 1999; Maguire, 1999; Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 2005; Mennell, 1994; Poulton, 2004; Tuck, 2003). Indeed, 2012 provided a crucial opportunity to study contemporary British culture and identity in relation to both its domestic and international construction. With this in mind, this chapter will seek to further explore these issues in regards to both royal and sporting occasions. Additionally, work on the imperial history of Britain will be discussed before a brief introduction of the process sociological perspective is provided.
II. Analysing Britain and British identity: a ‘diverse, highly contested and varied label’

Geographically defining ‘Britain’ is a complicated process that has, over time, derived various definitions (Bradley, 2008). Indeed, in 1603 the Union of the Crowns introduced the term ‘Great Britain’. After 1707, the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain’ was used to refer to the political amalgamation of England, Scotland and Wales. Later in 1800, Ireland was added resulting in the ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’. Alongside Britain’s imperial expansion, ‘Greater Britain’ has been used to refer to Britain’s overseas dominions, colonies and territories (Howe, 2008). After the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922, domestically Britain became known as ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’. Variations have included the ‘British Isles’, which refer to England, Scotland and Wales, minus the separated Ireland. In addition, the four separate nations of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are commonly referred to as the ‘home nations’. Throughout the course of this thesis the terms ‘United Kingdom’ (UK) and ‘home nations’ will be used to refer to England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

Aside from its geographical classifications, however, determining, and, indeed, defining, British national identity follows an equally complicated path. In fact, Storry and Childs (1997) note that British identity is a ‘diverse, highly contested and varied label’ (Storry and Childs, 1997: 8). Indeed, it is a ‘label’ that has been shaped and reshaped by numerous international and intra-national processes, which have often served to undermine popular understandings of Britain and purported ‘hallowed British traditions’ (Rojek, 2007: 10). This has, amongst many academics and commentators, led to questions regarding ‘what “being British” means today’ (Rojek,

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1 In 1603 James VI (James I as King of England and Ireland) ascended the thrones of England and Ireland. The union reflected the unification of the three realms – England (Wales was included under England), Scotland and Ireland – under one monarch. All three kingdoms, despite sharing the same monarch, remained sovereign states.


3 The Union with Ireland Act (passed by the Parliament of Great Britain) and The Act of Union (Ireland) (passed by the Parliament of Ireland) united the Kingdoms of Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The union came into effect on 1st January 1801.

4 In September 1997, the Parliament of the United Kingdom devolved some of its power to the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the intermittent Northern Ireland Assembly. England remained un-devolved.
2007: 10). Indeed, for Baxter (n.d.) ‘the [British] nation has struggled to redefine its place on the global stage’, adding that: ‘It used to be simple: “British” meant global kingdom, “British” meant meticulous attention to manners, “British” meant military might and industrial power – “British” meant the top of the world’ (n.d.).\(^5\) Critically considered Baxter’s (n.d.) comments reveal how the nation’s past (‘military might and industrial power’) can often serve to underscore concerns regarding the nation’s contemporary significance (‘struggled to redefine its place’). Furthermore, while notions of ‘group charisma’ (Elias and Scotson, 1994) form an important part of the nation’s ontological security (Karakul, 2010), constructions of Britain can reveal confused and disorientated visions that seek to delineate between those who should and shouldn’t belong.

Indeed, twelve months after the 2012 Olympic Games, the British and Irish Lions achieved their first test series victory in sixteen years against Australia, a former dominion of the British Empire.\(^6\) Guardian journalist Martin Kettle (2013) commented that:

The Lions were our team. But who is this we? The team is made up of English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish rugby players, the Irish from north and south of the border, all playing as one. (2013 [italics added])\(^7\)

In the same weekend as the Lion’s victory, the Scottish born, British tennis athlete, Andy Murray, became the first British ‘male’ tennis player to win the Wimbledon Tennis Championship in 77 years.\(^8\) Again, Kettle (2013) highlighted that:

A day later we – whoever exactly we are – basked in Andy Murray’s hoodoo breaking Wimbledon triumph. But is Murray a Scot or British, or both? Is he ours? Do the Irish, whose tries we cheered on Saturday get a slice of Murray reflected glory too? (2013 [italics added])\(^9\)

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\(^6\) The British and Irish Lions represent the combined rugby union test side that participates in rotating tours held every four years in Australia, South Africa or New Zealand. Players are chosen from England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland (both from the Irish Free state and Northern Ireland). Indeed, Bloyce et al. (2010) note that ‘the Lions series as a whole provides an interesting paradox in its juxtaposition of Celtic and Anglo-Saxon rivalries with international rivalries whilst, at the same time, it reflects unifying and divisive elements of national identity between, and for, the four Home Nations’ (2010: 463).


\(^8\) Female British tennis player, Virginia Wade, won Wimbledon in 1977, the tournament’s centenary year. 1977 was also the year of Queen Elizabeth’s Silver Jubilee.

In accordance with Baxter (n.d.), Kettle’s (2013) remarks share in the same confusion and sense of bewilderment that stem from questions directed at determining who ‘exactly we are’ (2013).10 More importantly, this confusion seeks to form part of discussions regarding who are believed to constitute the national collective and those who fail to share the same allegiances (‘Is he ours?’). Certainly, Murray’s allegiance to both his home country and his participation in the British Olympic Team (Team GB) has served to expose the tensions underlying Scottish and British relations in light of the 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence (McGinty, 2013).11

These same discussions regarding British belonging are echoed in debates on British multiculturalism. Rojek (2007) highlights that:

Many ethnic British are equally confused about who they are and where they stand – in areas of mixed ethnic composition their children often suffer labelling and discrimination that leaves them feeling themselves to be strangers in their own land. (2007: 10)

Indeed, debates on British multiculturalism and its ‘multiple iterations of national identity’ can be located in Britain’s overlapping and intersecting ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ histories, which have led to complicated and often varied definitions regarding the identity of Britain and its constitutive nations (Codell, 2003; Howe, 2010; Quirk, 2003; Van Duinen, 2013; Wilson, 2006). For many, this history has been forged around the exploration and colonization of the globe by European imperialism. In doing so, the various communities that operated throughout the British Empire, apart from being informally influenced by British values, were also geographically diverse, exhibiting a number of common themes and differences across time and space (Bickers, 2010; Maguire, 1995; Misra, 2008).

Yet, despite these common themes and notable differences, the effects of empire and its impact upon British society have received only recent academic attention (Howe, 2008; 2010; Stockwell, 2008; Ward, 2001a; 2001b). Moreover, to focus entirely upon the identity politics surrounding the British ‘home nations’, is to ignore

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11 This thesis began in 2011 and finished in the same month of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Due to these time constraints, the result of the referendum was not included in the project’s design or research aims. Instead, the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games provided a valuable empirical source whereby the multi-national construction of Britain could be investigated and interpreted.
those other Britons who once formed part of the world’s largest global empire (Howe, 2010). Here, ‘the most important parts of the empire were seen as being Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; sometimes described as parts of a world wide national family, a “Greater Britain.”’ (Howe, 2008: 163).

Consequently, forming part of a larger British Empire, speaking English and embodying ‘Western’ economies and cultural values (Ashkanasy, 2002), the white dominions display an archetypal British mix that is exemplified in their constitutions and political elites (Hopkins, 1999). In fact, towards the end of the nineteenth-century, the ‘settler-Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the prairie provinces of Canada’ were perceived ‘as a pastoral, rugged alternative to the effeminacy of industrial British life’ (Llewellyn, 2012: 49). Certainly, the support of Australia and New Zealand in the Iraq War and the jubilation which was met by Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip’s visit to Australia in 2011 (Mercer, 2004), both reveal that to some extent the ‘British’ still are an imperial people.

Today, former imperial ties between Britain and the former dominions are maintained via the Commonwealth of Nations. Head of this Commonwealth and the Head of State for Australia, Canada and New Zealand is the British monarch, Queen Elizabeth. Indeed, Gare (2000) has argued that, ‘remnants of Australian Britishness still exist … the mere fact that many Australians are not prepared to discard an English monarch as their own testifies in part to this fact’ (2000: 1146). Accordingly, apart from providing an enduring legacy of British imperialism in each of the now independent states, the role of the monarchy has continued throughout republican debates, revealing the importance that the monarchy plays in discussions regarding identity and citizenship within the former dominions (Gorman, 2010; McDougall, 2005; McGregor, 2006).

Furthermore, within Britain, Grove-White (2012) notes that the ‘presence and contribution’ of Commonwealth members has ‘driven development of many of the key sectors of the UK economy and public services since the second world war, … shap[ing] cultural life in ways which have largely become absorbed into what is thought of as “Britishness” (2012).12 Nonetheless, this absorption has not been without its tensions. In fact, while Freedland (2013) points out that the British female tennis player ‘Laura Robson was born in Melbourne and … So many England

cricketers were born in South Africa’ (2013), the labeling of certain British athletes by some members of the British press as ‘Plastic Brits’ (Poulton and Maguire, 2012), reveals how understandings of British national identity are interlinked with a power-laden rhetoric that seeks to clearly delineate the national ‘we’ from the foreign ‘they’.  

Accordingly, Britain’s transition from a small state of nations to an imperial power remains an important aspect in understanding the development of British identity and the complexities that this development has ensured (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012). The importance of the imperial period in British history is exemplified by Kumar (2003), who notes that:

Practically everything in the relations between England and its Celtic dependencies, and in the structure of those dependencies themselves, can be found somewhere or other, at some time or other, in the history of imperialism, including the later history of British Imperialism (2003: 88)

However, while Kumar’s (2003) analysis focuses specifically on English nationalism, this thesis will argue that these relations can also be examined in order to elucidate upon the ‘identity crisis’ that has surrounded debates on Britain and British identity since the Second World War (Blake, 1986; Goodhart, 2013a; Nairn, 1977). Indeed, writing before the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, Goodhart (2013b) suggested that:

The coming few years will certainly require big arguments over the national question: about Scotland, England and the future of the United Kingdom; about Britain’s relationship to Europe, including the real possibility of leaving the EU; and about a conflict between a middle England view of the country

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13 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/08/andy-murray-ghosts-sporting-failure, retrieved: 9 July 2013. Moreover, this is not necessarily a ‘new’ phenomenon. Historically, notions regarding British citizenship can be seen in the loose and seemingly interchangeable definitions of British subjecthood (citizenship)’ that surrounded early sporting competitions (Llewellyn, 2012: 48). At the 1936 Winter Olympic Games nine of the 13 man British squad that won gold in the ice hockey were from Canada (Fordyce, 2013). Similarly, Llewellyn (2012) notes that: ’At the inaugural Athens games in 1896, London-born middle-distance star, Edwin ’Teddy’ Flack, claimed two gold medals in the 800- and 1500- meter events for Australia … In turn, British-born athletes residing in British territories overseas sometimes opted to compete for the old mother country … world-class walker Ernie J. Webb also opted to compete under the colours of the Union Jack rather than those of Canada, a country where he had long resided’ (2012: 48). Whereas, Llwellyn (2012) goes onto comment upon the exclusion of those subjects from Britain’s ‘darker’ colonies, his comments highlight how the ‘lines between Britain and Empire’, particularly across its white dominions, ‘were far more fluid’ than is commonly perceived (Llewellyn, 2012: 48).
(represented by the Daily Mail and UKIP) and a London metropolitan view. (2013b)\(^{14}\)

Accordingly, taking the above into consideration, this thesis will aim to provide its own insight into the ‘national question’, specifically, the ‘British national question’. In doing so, a range of secondary sources will be used in order to trace the historical development of British identification within the British home nations and the former ‘old white dominions’ of Australia, Canada and New Zealand.\(^{15}\) More importantly, this will provide a segue to exploring how the British national and selected Commonwealth press constructed, framed and represented British identity during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.\(^{16}\) The following section will explore both these events in further detail.

III. 2012 – a year of British celebration

Discussing the impact of empire on Britain, Darian-Smith et al. (2007) highlight that:

> At all levels of society, from the governing class to the factory workers, it has been argued that British culture and values during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were fundamentally shaped by its imperial possessions: militarism, heroism, masculinity and \textit{monarchy} formed a cluster of the core beliefs of imperial patriotism (2007: 4 [italics added])

In fact, one additional British imperial possession that sought to shape the British Empire was sport (Maguire, 1999; Mangan, 1992a).\(^{17}\) The high status accorded to British institutions, such as, the British monarchy as well as the sporting practices of an imperial elite, helped to establish the socio-cultural codes that were typical of an imperial identity.

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15 The term ‘old white dominions’ was commonly used to refer to the dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland and South Africa (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003b; Rhodes et al., 2009). Similarly, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are also referred to as the ‘White Commonwealth’ due to their majority white and English speaking populations (Paren et al., 2003). For the purpose of this thesis, the terms: ‘former dominions’, ‘old white dominions’ and ‘dominions’ will be used to refer to Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
16 The Diamond Jubilee took place from the 2nd to 5th June 2012 and the London Olympic Games officially started with the Opening Ceremony on the 27th July and finished with the Closing Ceremony on 12th August.
17 Ho (2013) explores the relationship between Britain and Hong Kong, during the 2012 London Olympic Games. Here, Ho (2013) highlights that ‘Britain is perhaps more deeply entangled with the world than any other country in spreading sports around the world through their empire’. (2013: 2220). As a result, ‘studies on the London 2012 Olympics should examine not only the celebration of nationalism, globalism, cosmopolitanism and Olympism; Britain’s distinctive relation with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales; and the establishment of a sense of Britishness but also Britain’s colonial (re-)connectivity with the colonised’ (Ho, 2013: 2220).
‘expansionist occidental cosmology’ (Galtung, 1991: 150 see Maguire, 2005: 13). Collaboratively, these codes were maintained by a fusion of symbolic acts comprising imperial spectacle and ritual (Cannadine, 2001; McCarthy, 2010; Merchant and Rich, 2004; Polley, 2014). In doing so, the British achieved considerable success in legitimising their rule through the form and continuity that the imperial spectacle provided (Merchant and Rich, 2004).

Indeed, the relationship between sport and the monarchy can be highlighted in the 1911 Festival of Empire, held to commemorate the coronation of King George V. The festival included an inter-Empire sports championship with competing teams from Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom (Moore, 1986). Similar to the hosting of contemporary Olympic Games, Moore (1986) notes that:

The overall scale of the Festival was massive, incorporating not only physical displays but also the Pageant of London, involving thousands of performers, in which the history of London, England, and the Empire would be recreated from prehistoric times (1986: 85).

Accordingly, while sport was at the centre of an imperial culture of distinction that ‘often reflected what was then widely held to represent, in social terms, the best of British’ (Apter, 2002: 582), the symbolic rituals associated with the British crown provided imperial rule an outward symbol of superiority and legitimacy (Cannadine, 2001; Dawson, 2006; James, 1984; Kitchen, 1996; Maguire, 1999; Mangan, 1992a; 1992b; Moore, 1986; Stoddart, 1986; 1988). Here, Ward (2001b) argues that ‘the link between empire and the idea of a “greater Britain” was one of the formative influences in the evolution of a transnational “British” identity’ (2001b: 13 [italics added]). This multinational appreciation of Britain and British identity draws attention to the ‘inherently contestable and indeed frequently contested’ defining of national identity (Karner, 2013).18 In doing so:

monolithic accounts need to give way to analyses capable of illuminating the symbolic and institutional struggles, contradictions and ambivalences shaping and surrounding national identity negotiations. (Karner, 2013)19

With this in mind, it would be detrimental to view both national and international events as providing homogenous and unifying displays which accurately reflect the host nation and its population and which reveal no tension or discord (Cannadine, 2001; Mihelj, 2008). Barnes and Aughey (2006) suggest that while national commemorative events provide an important role in sustaining national identifiers, they can also carry great risk, as often there are multiple national histories to be told and multiple versions of the nation to be found. In fact, Rowe (2012) suggested that London 2012 ‘operated as something of a popular forum for debates on British multiculturalism and its associated, multiple iterations of national identity’ (2012: 5 [italics added]). Indeed, the ‘multiple, partial and conflicting meanings that such events generate’ (Dawson, 2006: 7) can reveal dominant, residual or emergent versions of national identity, which over time are strengthened, show resistance or increase in variety (Easthope, 1999; Elias, 1978; 1996; Maguire, 1999; 2005; Williams, 1977). To this extent, the ‘institutional struggles, contradictions and ambivalences’ (Karner, 2013) that shape and re-shape national identity, occur ‘not in isolation, but in the larger context of a network of interdependencies that stretch across time and space’ (Maguire, 1995: 16).20

Here, one can begin to examine how British identity and British culture is intricately entwined with complex power dynamics, integration struggles and numerous paradoxes, which at the discursive level, are produced by the national media to ‘celebrate and denounce, project and promote, persuade and display’ the nation (Rowe, 2012: 2). Taking this into consideration, the following section will explore how analyses of Britain can be considered in relation to the networks of interdependence that have shaped British history.

IV. The study of Britain and British identity: an imperial perspective

The ‘vigorous survival of a distinctive national cultural ethos … within the communities of Scotland and Wales’, echo Britain’s multi-national history (Bradshaw and Roberts, 1998: 3; see also Howe, 2010; Mangan, 1992a; Pocock, 1974). This is alluded to in a statement by former British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, who noted that ‘the diversity of modern Britain expressed through devolution and multiculturalism is more consistent with the historical experience of our islands’

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20This is shared by Calhoun (1997) who notes that ‘The idea of nation is also inherently international and works partly be contraposition of different nations to each other’ (1997: 93).
(Cook, 2001, cited in Condor et al., 2006: 125). Here, Cook presents a vivid link between Britain’s diverse past and its multi-cultural present, but, perhaps, more importantly, his remarks are presented ‘both as a post-Imperial phenomenon, and also an enduring aspect of “our” way of life’ (Condor et al., 2006: 125). That is, when considered as part of a long-term development, past and present analyses of Britain reveal a complex and often contested interplay between its multi-national state formation and an encompassing British identification (Cohen, 1994; Kumar, 2003; Llewellyn, 2012; Ward, 2001a).

In effect, this interplay is explored further in Bradshaw and Roberts’s (1998) remarks on the concept of ‘Britishness’. They note that:

Its genius as an ideological concept is found in it capaciousness: its capacity to seem to buttress the self-esteem of each of the constituent nationalities of the British conglomerate – apart significantly from that of the Irish – while at the same time subsuming these identities under a more comprehensive category of nationality (Bradshaw and Roberts, 1998: 3)

Importantly, however, this does not suggest the homogenous spread of a specific global culture, nor does it suggest that the intermixture of cultures within Britain and the former British Empire have inhibited the production of independent national identifications (Burton, 2010; Maguire, 1999). Indeed, Arendt (1968) argues that ‘wherever the nation-state appeared as conquered, it aroused national consciousness and desire for sovereignty among the conquered people’ (1968: 7). Instead, Bradshaw and Roberts (1998) draw attention to the overlapping and intersecting national and imperial discourses that constitute constructions of Britain (Codell, 2003).

Arguably, such statements demand an attention to British identity that is considerable to the constitutive identities of which it comprises (Cohen, 1994). Here, the entwining of British ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ histories has led to complicated and often varied definitions regarding national identity in both Britain and the former British Empire (Quirk, 2003). In fact, Codell (2003a) highlights that ‘each colony had its own relationship to Britain, to imperial life and authority, to its own history and to its own unstable, struggling national identity’ (Codell, 2003a: 21). According to
while Hechter (1975) argues that ‘all modern states participate to varying degrees in a world system which impinges upon many of their internal processes’ (1975: 234), Maguire (2005) asserts that:

stress needs to be placed on the plurality of civilisations, noting the nature and extent of their interdependence, while also establishing their distinctive and formative features. Understood in this way, civilisations are total phenomena: they entail economics, politics, and culture, which in various combinational syntheses move civilisations and their contacts with others in different directions (2005: 13)

Consequently, this suggests ‘a closer connection … between empire and what later evolved into the nation-state’ (Kumar, 2006b: 3). Moreover, it indicates that by being aware of the interconnections between nationalism and imperialism (Thompson, 2000), one can begin to explore the relationship between Britain’s largely imperial past and its fractious present in light of its effect upon and, relation to, contemporary national identity politics (Hopkins, 1999). That is, Hopkins (1999) argues, ‘it ought to be possible to restore the international and essentially imperial dimension to national history without installing its former accompanist, deference too’ (1999: 216).

Therefore, in order to understand present social structures and patterns of action ‘an understanding of the past is not only desirable, it is necessary’ (Maguire, 1995: 7 [italics added]). Indeed, while the British home nations and the old dominions try to forge – or in some cases invent – their own separate identities, in light of wider pluralising global flows, they remain fixed to a history that was once determined by imperialism (Howe, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2010; Maguire, 1993b).

Certainly, historians and sociologists have long been aware of Britain’s imperial history and its characteristics (Pocock, 1975; MacKenzie, 1984; 1994; 1998; 1999; 2001; Said, 1995; Thompson, 2000; 2005; Ward, 2001a; 2001b). Nonetheless, analyses of population growth, devolution, international unions and multiculturalism are written from a national history perspective, which is ‘inclined to minimize or even

(Hopkins, 1999: 215). In both instances, it was the interaction between people and states, which resulted in the fragmentary basis of so many national identities (Burton, 2010).

Various academics have considered the relationship between imperialism and the expansion of the nation-state (Arendt, 1968; Hayes, 1976; Mansergh, 1976).

Indeed, this is of particular importance, especially when one considers that the relationship between Britain’s imperial experience and its domestic society can illuminate upon the complimentary processes underpinning British identity, British state formation as well as Britain’s imperial expansion and decline (Elias, 1996; Darwin, 2010; Hopkins, 1999; 2008; Kumar, 2003; Thompson, 2000).
edit out countervailing themes’ (Hopkins, 1999: 202). In particular, ‘one of the most striking features of the study of modern British history is the way in which the history of the nation-state has been separated from the history of the empire’ (Hopkins, 1999: 207).24

Therefore, it should not be forgotten that the ‘dominant European powers … were empires as well as states’ and that such statements are not modern assertions (Cox, Dunne and Booth, 2001: 6-7 cited in Barkawi and Laffey, 2002: 111).25 While drawing upon the work of Hobsbawm (1990), Diaz-Andreu (2004) notes that:

From the 1830s to the 1870s the criteria to define a successful nation were transformed. It increasingly became crucial not only to be an instituted, large state and have long-established cultural elite with a literary and administrative tradition in the vernacular language, but also … to have the capacity for conquest, to be an imperial people. (2004: 227 [italics added])26

As a result, while many have alluded to the fact that the decline of the British Empire has led to a ‘rekindling of the suppressed nationalisms’ within the British Isles (MacKenzie, 1998: 231), MacKenzie (1998) notes that the establishment of a set of ‘world-wide connections and global loops’ meant that Empire ‘had just as much an effect upon the preservation and strengthening of the distinctive identities of the Scots and the other ethnicities of Greater Britain’ (1998: 231). In the same way that ‘France’s revolutionary traditions are at the core of being French … Britishness was traditionally inextricably linked with empire’ (Jones, 2011).27 This encourages us to view national identity within Britain and the British Empire as part of an imperial web of interconnecting stories (Howe, 2010).

Accordingly, in such instances nationalism and imperialism are not incompatible but instead are interdependently linked (Peers, 2002). In fact, Hopkins

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24 This is echoed by Cannadine (2001) who notes that ‘the history of the British Empire is still all too often written as if it were completely separate and distinct from the history of the British nation’ (Cannadine, 2001: xvii).
25 Indeed, the integration of both the nation-state and empire can be found in Henry VIII’s Act in Restraint of Appeals in 1533, which stated that ‘this realm of England is an empire’ (cited in Kumar, 2006b: 3). As a result, Kumar (2006b) notes that the ‘concept of empire was often closely related to the original meaning of imperium as sovereignty, rather than to its somewhat later – and generally modern – meaning of rule over a multiplicity of lands and people’ (2006b: 3).
26 Similarly, according to Miliori (2005), ‘in the eyes of a number of nineteenth-century British historians, interested as much in the exploration of a shared European past as in contemporary European developments, the simplistic binary identification of “Empire” with the past and of “national liberty” with the future did not adequately describe the emergence of European modernity’ (2005: 29).
(1999) notes that:

> Seen from an imperial perspective, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were designed to be developmental states on the British model. Greater Britain was to produce good Britons, and, if possible, better Britons. The ideal colony of settlement was to be a suitably docile copy of the home country, though one assisted, of necessity, by social engineering (1999: 218)

Subsequently, while the nation’s history can provide a number of ‘mnemonic’ cues, in the case of Britain, this history is constructed within a wide range of overlapping and, at times, competing layers of identification (Mennell, 1994; 2007; Wilson, 2006). Indeed, Schlesinger (1991) has argued that ‘we need to think in terms of the simultaneous interaction and parallelism of different cultural levels within given social formations’ (1991: 305 [italics added] cited in Boyle and Haines, 1996: 550-551). Consequently, in order to examine how these ‘levels’ have, under various circumstances, shaped and continue to shape Britain and British identity, a process (figurational) sociology perspective will be adopted.

In particular, this theoretical perspective will be used to argue that these ‘cultural levels’ are not just part of contemporary ‘social formations’ (Schlesinger, 1991: 305 cited in Boyle and Haines, 1996: 551) but are instead related to past and present figurations.28 That is, by commenting upon the social historical context in which relations of interdependence between ‘Britain’ and the former dominions were forged, ‘a thoroughly processual and relational model’ can be formed that can elucidate upon the multifaceted and complex aspects of British identity which have accompanied its national and imperial transitions (Mennell, 2007: 4; see also O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012). As a result, this thesis will be guided by an intention to examine the interdependent British domestic and imperial/Commonwealth figurations.

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28 This ‘layered’ approach to the study of state formation and national identity will be returned to frequently throughout this thesis (see chapter three and conclusion chapter). Indeed, the use of the term ‘layer’ is not intended to represent a hierarchical, pyramided structure, but is instead used to reflect the complex attachments that groups within groups possess. To this extent, ‘layers’ can be identified in an individual’s attachment to a particular family, town, county, nation-state and continent. In addition, these ‘layers’ are marked by variations in attachment. Accordingly, while Schlesinger (1991) refers to various ‘cultural levels’ existing in a given social formation, Calhoun (1997) highlights how changes at the level of state formation are related to the formation of ‘new identities’. Therefore, ‘New identities and movements arise, not just in response to but on the basis of the new scale of social organisation and cultural transmission’ (Calhoun, 1997: 92 [italics added]). In such instances, new forms of social organisation may serve to add another ‘layer’ to an individual/group’s identity. Notably, however, such changes are also matched by processes of disintegration though which certain layers may be marked by degrees of (dis)attachment.
V. The study of Britain and British identity: a process sociology perspective

Malcolm (2012) highlights that ‘[process] sociology provides us with a particular framework for understanding national character and national identity’ (2012: 170). Underpinning this framework is an attention to long-term social processes and the levels of interconnection that these processes reveal (Anderson, 2003). For Elias (1978; 2010; 2012), these interconnections are expressed through chains of interdependence, which combine various nation-states in larger supra-national relations. Indeed, Linklater (2011b) highlights that Elias ‘was adamant that it was impossible to understand relations within societies without understanding relations between them’ (2011b: 3 [italics added]).

Therefore, in the case of Britain, the process sociology perspective can provide an important step in bridging the gap between Britain’s ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ histories as well as offering an appreciation of the ‘many incarnations of “Britain” over time and across space’ (Burton, 2011: 77).29 Indeed, this is echoed by Wilson (2006) who argues that the study of empire can:

present us with interconnected and interdependent sites, territorial and imaginative, that disrupt the naturalized oppositions between metropole and colony and exceed the boundaries of ‘national’ histories to account for the complexities generated by the flows of people, goods, and ideas across the globe since the late fifteenth century (2006: 212 [italics added]).30

In addition, the work of Lester (2001) has also sought to highlight the ‘geographies of connection’ that existed between Britain and the empire (2001: 5).

Importantly, by focusing upon ‘long-term processes’, examinations of ‘historically and spatially located relationships or figurations that underpin … group

29 Indeed, an important aspect of the process sociology perspective is avoiding dichotomies such as ‘past’ and ‘present’ for accounts of society that reveal historical processes (Dunning et al., 2004; Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Elias, 1978; 1996; 2012; Maguire, 1995). Indeed, such an approach can prove invaluable in understanding how representations of the national past are used in contemporary constructions, especially when such constructions are perceived as either ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ (Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). In fact, a historical perspective offers a useful way of communicating and understanding the changing interdependencies, power balances and spacial orientations that impede upon the nation. By historically locating social research (Dunning, 1992), social investigations can avoid perceiving social life as timeless or radically different in post-modern times (Maguire and Young, 2002).

30 This interconnected approach to the study of British history is shared by Cannadine (2001). Commenting upon the study of British history, Cannadine (2001) argues that ‘By stressing the interconnections between social visions of the metropolis and the periphery, and the structures and systems that unified and undergirded them, it seeks to put the history of Britain back into the history of empire, and the history of the empire back into the history of Britain’ (2001: xx).
identities and behavioral standards’ can be observed (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012: 483). Here, Elias’s (1991; 1996; 2008; 2012) conception of national habitus can provide a powerful tool in highlighting the underlying aspects of national culture and identity (Mennell, 1994).\(^3\) In particular, national habitus is not biologically fixed, but is instead closely connected with state formation processes, state apparatuses and citizen behaviour (Elias, 1996; 2012).

Accordingly, for Elias, this required developing a conceptual vocabulary, whereby both society and the individual were presented not as separate but as part of long-term processes of sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformation (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Mennell and Gouldsblom, 1998; O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012). O’Connor and Goodwin (2012) explain that while the sociogenetic level examines how ‘behavioral standards have merged and changed through long-term processes over generations and time’ the psychogenetic refers to the ‘individual level where individuals learn the adult standards of behavior and feelings of their society’ (2012: 477). Indeed, by understanding this relationship one can begin to elucidate upon the processes of identity formation and reformation, which underlie historically changing and emerging constructions of the nation (Beckstein, 2013). In such instances, national identity is formed and transformed ‘within and relation to representations’ which ‘generate a specific sense of identity, loyalty and allegiance’ (Maguire, 1994: 71). Here, shared national characteristics formulate ‘sleeping memories’ within the individual, memories that become crystallized around national institutions and symbols (Maguire, 1999: 184). Such national ‘memories’ can be brought to light during the media coverage surrounding sporting and royal events, through which a narrative of the nation becomes produced and re-produced (Lee and Maguire, 2009; Poulton, 2004; Tuck, 2003; Wardle and West, 2004). Maguire (1999) notes that:

> By studying media discourse, aspects of the process through which national habitus/character construction is framed, constructed and represented by and through discursive practices becomes more evident (1999: 206 [italics added])

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\(^3\) Studies of British national habitus are used comparatively in Elias’s The Civilizing Process (2012) and The Germans (1996). Whereas, both these studies tend to focus on French and German national identity, Elias’s work on the British Royal Navy (see Elias, 1950, ‘Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession’, British Journal of Sociology 1, 4: 291-309) provides a critical insight into the changing power balances at play within the Naval profession and its relationship with English habitus more generally. Due to the study’s unappreciated reception, the work was not fully completed. Therefore, a selection of secondary sources and recently re-published material was used in order to draw upon the key analytical terms that Elias used in his analysis of British society (see also Elias, 2008a; Loyal and Quilley, 2004; Mennell and Gouldsblom, 1998; Moelker, 2003).
However, in order to recognise that such media coverage is based upon particular social, political and historical contexts and that this coverage, rather than fixed, is based upon variations and negotiations in representations of the nation, then an analysis of the discursive construction of power relations is required.

With this in mind, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model will be used in order to examine how constructions of Britain are shaped by interdependent multi-level figurational dynamics (British domestic figuration and imperial/Commonwealth figurations). In addition to identifying examples of marginalisation, stigmatisation, group charisma and group disgrace within the press’ discourse (Elias and Scotson, 1994), the established-outsider model can help ‘to capture aspects of the construction and expression of national relations and tensions, and the ways in which power relations and interdependencies within, and between, national communities are produced in, and through, the meanings of newspaper texts’ (Bloyce et al., 2010: 451).

VI. Concluding remarks: research aims

It has been the purpose of this introduction chapter to outline the overall aims of this thesis of which the above sections have endeavoured to provide a brief overview of the underlying problems but also the prospective potential in re-examining constructions of Britain and British identity in 2012. Indeed, this conclusion section will return to these aims as well as provide an overall structure of the forthcoming thesis. Before this however, a number of important distinctions can be drawn from the above sections.

First, it has been the purpose of this chapter to highlight how analyses of Britain and British identity, and, indeed, the complications that so often arise when studying such a topic, have a history. This is not just a history including important dates (1603, 1707, 1801) or important people (William Wallace, James I [James VI of Scotland], Alex Salmond) but a history of international and intra-national contact, through which the formation of Britain and British identity has been formed upon the contestations of particular groups. Furthermore, there are sequences, and, more importantly, changes within these sequences, that can serve to elucidate upon the processual nature of national identity and its relationship to processes of sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformation (Elias, 2012; Van Krieken, 1998). Indeed, at a
much larger level of analysis, Maguire (2012) notes that while ‘western civilisation, at this stage in human development, can be regarded as the established group in global terms, its history suggests that it too is part of a specific multi-civilizational sequence’ (Maguire, 2012). Accordingly, to some degree this history has, in part, been forged around the exploration and colonization of the globe by European imperialism, of which the British Empire formed the largest global empire (Howe, 2010). What is not clear however is the ‘impact that empire had on domestic politics and domestic culture’ and how underlying ‘imperial’ ideas and myths have influenced British identity today (Bickers, 2010; Cohen, 1994; Colley, 2005; Mackenzie, 1984; 1999; Maguire, 1993b; 2011; Moore, 1986; Woollacott, 1990).

Subsequently, one way in which this thesis intends to explore these complicated congruencies and contiguities is through the media’s, and, more specifically, the national press’, construction of Britain and British identity. By using substantive documentary evidence from examinations of contemporary press coverage, certain ‘symbolic elements in the language and ideology of nationalism’ (Smith, 2010: 3) will be used to explore the discursive relations that served to construct, frame and represent Britain during both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games. By analysing what is produced, consumed and ignored as well as who is included and excluded during national mediated spectacles, one can develop a critical analysis that, in part, can elucidate upon contemporary Britain (Kellner, 2003).

In addition, it is important to note, that despite attempts to re-align British identity around the importance of the empire no single study can investigate the British Empire in its entirety. More importantly, the scale of diversity found across the former British Empire would far exude any single attempt to provide a complete analysis of Britain and British identification (Llewellyn, 2012). Therefore, while analyses of British identity must consider the interdependent actions of both ‘Britain’ and the former dominions, which have collaboratively helped to define and re-define ‘British’ ‘values, attitudes and lifestyle’ (Jacobson, 1997: 188), the boundaries of each analysis, both geographical and empirical, should be clearly stated. Consequently, the former dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand reveal a rich history of shared culture, common sentiment and institutional values that links the national histories of these nations to the British Empire (Pietsch, 2010).
Theoretically, it has been argued that a process sociology perspective can be used to explore Britain’s ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ dynamics. Certainly, this is not the only perspective that could have been used in this study and chapter one will aim to draw upon other theoretical approaches that have been used to analyse the nation/nation-state, nationalism and national identity. However, what the process sociology perspective can provide is an analysis of British identity, viewed not as an isolated phenomena forged upon a specific set of unchanging values and characteristics, but as influenced by long-term processes of alteration and contestation across larger networks of international ‘imperial’ interaction (Bickers, 2010). Arguably, these interactions remain important when monarchical and sporting ties between Britain and its former empire remain, for now, in tact. With this in mind, the final part of this conclusion shall provide an overview of the forthcoming chapters.

VII. Concluding remarks: the study at hand

The aim of chapter one will be to survey relevant literature on the nation/nation-state, nationalism and national identity in order to trace a suitable conceptual framework for this thesis. In doing so, work by selected academics (Bauman, 2000; Billig, 1995; Giddens, 1985; 1990; 1991; 1993; 1998) will be considered in order to provide a theoretical overview of the study of nationalism and national identity as well as exploring the effects of processes of globalisation on the nation (Held and McGrew, 2007; Robbins, 1991). Following this, chapter one will aim to explore both the civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation and nation-state. While the merits of both approaches will be considered, it will be argued that traditional civic-ethnic dichotomies can be transcended in order to consider broader processes of historical development, most notably, how processes of imperial expansion, have impacted upon both colonizing and colonized nation-states. In accordance with section V, the final part of this chapter will seek to highlight that the civic/ethnic dichotomy can be overcome by viewing the entwined processes of state formation and national identity as *processually* orientated (Elias, 1996; 2012; Maguire, 2005; Malcolm, 2012; Mennell, 2007). Here, Elias’s (2012) socio-historical account of European history, social development and national identity, will be considered. Specifically, this will introduce Elias’s conception of national habitus and how this habitus forms part of state formation processes (sociogenetic/psychogenetic transformations). Therefore, this chapter will establish a conceptual framework, which is, appropriative of and
augmentative to, debates concerning national identity, national habitus and state/imperial formation.

Chapter two will elaborate upon these aims by applying the process sociology perspective to the study of Britain and British identity. Specifically, Elias’s notion of the figuration, interdependence, national habitus and personal pronouns will be used to examine the British domestic and imperial/Commonwealth figurations. More importantly, this will be used to conduct a socio-historical analysis of the literature on Britain and British identity. To this extent, the purpose of this chapter will be two fold.

First, this chapter will trace the emergence of the British imperial figuration after the American Revolution (1775-1783). From this, a selection of important social developments within the formation of the British state and later the British Empire will be considered. In particular, this will focus on the impact of the industrial revolution and the nationalization of the British royal family.

Second, an examination of the history of the British Empire as dictated via a synthesis of secondary sources, focusing in particular on the UK as well as Britain’s relationship with Australia, Canada and New Zealand will be provided. This will include an examination of the interrelated processes affecting the British Empire during the twentieth-century, including processes of devolution within Britain, the move towards independence within the colonies and the integration of Britain within the European Union (EU). Accordingly, it will be highlighted that ‘multiple axes of identification’ have resulted in Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales revealing overlapping similarities and differences between themselves and Britain (Cohen, 1994).

Therefore, chapter two will provide an appreciation of the interdependent and overlapping histories that have been forged between Britain and the former empire, through which the multi-layered and interconnected nature of British identity can be explored (Maguire, 1993b; Mennell, 1994). Indeed, this will be elaborated upon in chapter three, where the multi-layered and multi-dimensional nature of national habitus will be considered. In particular, it will be argued that in order to explore ‘the emotional dynamics of we-images among large and complex groups of interdependent people’ (Mennell, 1994: 191), Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model can provide an examination of the long-term structural developments and multi-national sentiments underpinning Britain’s domestic and imperial/Commonwealth
configurations. Ultimately, this can reveal important developments in the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of British identity, in particular, the long-term ‘historical’ processes underpinning British habitus.

To this extent, chapter three will begin the process of interpreting and analysing constructions of Britain and British identity. That is, by examining important aspects in the social development of the British state and empire, this chapter will be used alongside later empirical work in order to shed light on the complex nature of British identity. Accordingly, instead of analysing Britain in isolation, it will be argued that the processual development of Britain’s state formation, imperial expansion and decline, can reveal a number of transformations in the power balances between the British home nations and the former dominions, which have interdependently served to shape and re-shape the construction of Britain and British identity.

Following this, chapter four will outline the research strategy employed. Specifically, it will detail how a qualitative thematic content analysis of the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and British press was conducted. A brief overview of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games will be provided before chapters five and six present the research findings.

Chapters five and six will be organised around themes related to British unity and dis-unity. More importantly, these categories should not be seen as separated. Indeed, throughout the analysis of data and the collating of themes, particular discourses would often overlap. As a result, the separation of the findings into two findings chapters was based upon the ability to categorise particular significances across the data. To this end, it was decided that in order to accurately reflect the press’ coverage, examples of British unity and dis-unity provided an overarching structure. With this in mind, both chapters will seek to expose the discursive construction of established-outsider relations within the British and Commonwealth press as well as highlight how these constructions were tied to processes of British unity/dis-unity and forms of British attachment and (dis)attachment, both within the

\[32\] In light of work by MacInnes et al., (2007) (see also Rosie et al., 2004; Rosie et al., 2006) the term ‘British’ national press is used collectively to refer to national newspapers in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. It is not, as the aforementioned academics have highlighted, a way of neglecting the nationalist dimensions inherent in national newspaper coverage. With this in mind, care was taken to select national newspapers from each nation that provided a varied account of British identity. Each country’s selected ‘national’ newspaper will be considered in Chapter four.
British and Commonwealth press. Key aspects of these findings will be re-considered in the concluding chapter.

Therefore, in sum, this thesis will focus on the construction, framing and representation of Britain and British identity during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games. Upon analysing the representation of British identity within the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and British newspaper coverage, a comprehensive and illustrative account of the press’ construction of Britain and British identity will be presented. In doing so, a much wider analysis of the complex, contested and rapidly changing nature of Britain, one that is considerate to the complex and variable nature of British identity, will be made (Howe, 2010).
Chapter One: Typologies of Nationalism

Introduction

Across the academic literature there exists a diverse range of explanations regarding the conceptualisation of various categories of people and collective identity more generally. Many of these explanations have examined the relationship between the nation/nation-state, nationalism and national identity (Anderson, 2006; Elias, 1991; 1996; 2010; Gellner, 1964; 1963; 2005; 2008; Guibernau, 2006; Hutchinson, 1987; Mayall, 1990; Smith, 1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010). Indeed, there are differences between those who examine the ethnic origins of nationalism (Smith, 1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) as well as those who consider its emergence to be closely tied to the industrial revolution (Gellner, 1964; 1963; 2005; 2008). For others, nationalism has formed part of the emergence of print capitalism (Anderson, 2006) or the modern state (Mann, 1992). In contrast, nationalism has also been examined in relation to discourse and its ability to be performed in everyday routines and practices (Calhoun, 2004; Lavi, 2013). Elsewhere, studies on globalisation have argued that global processes have served to re-structure national boundaries and disrupt local/national communities (Robins, 1991). This has led to a multiplication or fracturing of national identities across a broader global platform, with individuals harbouring ‘multiple identities’, with little discord or tension (Jacobson, 1997; McGregor, 2006).

Indeed, there are, within each of these approaches, variations in how a subjective sense of belonging and patterns of shared feeling form part of an individual’s identification with a particular collective group (Duchesne, 2008). In fact the level of intensity that nationalism can evoke (Duchesne, 2008), is explored by Schumpeter (1976), who notes that:

No other appeal is as effective, except at a time when the people happen to be caught in the midst of flaming social struggle. All other appeals are rooted in interests that must be grasped by reason. This one alone arouses the dark powers of the subconscious, calls into play instincts that carry over from the life habits of the dim past. Driven out everywhere else, the irrational seeks refuge in nationalism – the irrational which consist of belligerence, the need to hate, a goodly quota of inchoate idealism, the most naive (and hence also the most unrestrained) egotism. This is precisely what constitutes the impact of nationalism. (1976: 73)
There are, within Schumpeter’s (1976) description, a number of important distinctions that can be drawn upon when investigating nationalism. First, the extent to which nationalism can be aligned with moments of ‘social struggle’; second, ‘the dark power of the subconscious’ where, according to Schumpeter (1976), nationalist ‘instincts’ reside; third, nationalism’s connection with ‘habits of the dim past’ and fourth, the ability to distinguish between a nationalist ‘us’ and ‘them’ so often portrayed through ‘the need to hate’. Indeed, there is also the sense that Schumpeter’s (1976) remarks serve to portray nationalism as a dangerous and destructive phenomena.

On the contrary, more can be said when one observes how nationalism is observed as part of an integrational tension (‘struggle’), when it is perceived in relation to habitual practices and ways of being (‘subconscious’) and when a consideration of the past is observed in relation to contemporary constructions of the present (‘habits of the dim past’). Enveloped in these aspects are emotional attachments that serve to differentiate between the national ‘we’ and ‘they’ (‘the need to hate’). Both the following and forthcoming chapters will explore these latter aspects in further detail.

For now, however, the following sections will explore how various approaches have aimed to examine and explain the development of national ‘we-identities’. In particular, it will critically consider a range of theoretical approaches regarding the nation and nation-state as well as nationalism and national identity in order to develop an applicable model for this thesis. Consequently, the first section shall briefly consider identity, national identity and the impact of globalisation processes. These processes will be considered in light of the paradoxes (homogenisation/heterogenisation) that have structured debates on globalisation and national sovereignty. This will be followed by an examination of popular theoretical perspectives regarding nationalism and national identity (Bauman, 2000; Billig, 1995; Giddens, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008). In addition, civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation/nation-state will be considered in regards to the work of Ernest Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008) and Anthony Smith (1986; 1991; 1995; 2001; 2005a; 2005b; 2010). Indeed, the work of both authors has remained a ‘dominant contrast in typologies of nationhood’ (Wright et al., 2012: 470).
Following these discussions, the application of several Eliasian theories on state formation and national identity will be considered. It is argued here that one of the most sociologically significant aspects of Elias’s work is his emphasis on the long-term processes underpinning national identity formation. In particular, these long-term processes can be used to provide further insight into the interdependencies that exist between national and imperial formations. As a result, an imperial outlook will be proposed, which through a process sociological perspective can be used to examine the gradual emergence of the nation-state and its identity via Elias’s (1991; 1996; 2012) conception of national habitus.

1.0. Reaction and pressure: national and global debates – a brief discussion

The complex nature of national identity has been considered in relation to the effects of ‘globalizing pressures’ and forces (Karner, 2013). Conceptually, work regarding globalization has often been constructed along paradoxical lines. On the one hand, national boundaries and identities are re-configured by homogenizing influences (Held and McGrew, 2007; Maguire, 1999; 2005; 2011b). In such instances, it has been assumed that greater global integration has resulted in the creation of a ‘global culture’, derived primarily from the influence of North America (Americanization) or Western Europe (Westernization) (Maguire, 1999). In particular, the management and control of sport, based upon Western models, has led to questions regarding the sustainability of national differences in light of the ‘sports-industrial complex’ (Maguire, 2005).

Indeed, there are, as McCrone (2006) highlights, ‘de-merits’ in adopting a homogenous appreciation of globalization and its threats upon the nation, especially with regards to the extent that it ‘universalises and essentialises social and cultural change in an unwanted manner and degree’ (2006: 17). Accordingly, Mihelj (2011) adds that:

the perception of globalisation as a threat to nation-states and national culture is far too simplistic to account for the nature of interaction between the global and the national in the contemporary world. (2011: 28)

Alternatively therefore, heterogenizing influences have explored how national identifications have remained a prominent force within contemporary society (Bairner, 2001). Here, national symbols, flags and anthems, and more
importantly, national teams remain an important part of sporting mega-events (Black, 2007). While globalization processes have undoubtedly led to greater awareness of the international world, Hall (1992) assumes that national identities are instead strengthened as a form of resistance against globalization. Accordingly:

the reinvigoration of national identities in the 21st century is, in part, to be understood as a reaction against boundary-transcending markets, as a retreat from globalizing pressures to the local, regional and familiar. (Karner, 2013)¹

Indeed, Maguire (2012) notes that the ‘demands of the Celtic fringe provide a very good example of these processes at work’ (2012). Here, the singing of ‘The Soldier’s Song (the national anthem of the Republic of Ireland) or the Flower of Scotland at rugby union matches’ (Maguire, 2012) provide two notable examples of Irish (Republicanism) and Scottish national identification that are presented in spite of Britain’s all-encompassing, ‘God the Save the Queen’.² Ultimately, however, the relationship between the nation and the wider international sphere, calls into question what is secular and secure about the national image and as a consequence can threaten or dislodge traditional conceptions regarding the nation and its ‘people’.

To this extent, the work of Giddens (1990; 1991; 1993), Beck (1992) and Beck et al. (1994) has highlighted how identity formation is affected by the unpredictability of life in post-modernity (Moore, 2010). Moore (2010) notes that ‘gone are the traditional social structures and collectivities that shaped and constrained an individual’s life experience and expectancies and in their place are individual choice, self-creation and self-determination’ (2010: 1.1). As a result, identity is viewed as being fluid, fragmented and ‘liquid’ (Bauman, 2000), aligning with McCrone’s (2002) suggestion that national identity can be both a stable and salient phenomenon.

The following sections will elaborate upon this further, focusing in particular on the extent to which processes of globalization and the stability of national identity can be both salient and banal. Specifically, this will be considered in

² The tensions surrounding the British ‘national’ anthem will be returned to in the findings chapters (see chapter five, section 5.2.4.).

1.1. Collective forgetting and collective projection: Billig’s banal nationalism

Ontological understandings of identity have often been divided between those that focus upon the individual self (Cohen, 1994; Mead, 1934) and those that focus on group affiliations (Du Gay and Hall, 1996). Although discussions on identity can include age, class, gender, race and even place, national identity can be conceived as being constructed via ‘culturally specific narrative strategies, language[s], beliefs, and practices that conceal assumptions about individuals, members of the group, and others’ (Gaines, 2012: 169). It is these concealed assumptions based upon everyday existence, which Billig (1995) explores in his work on the ‘banal reproduction of nationalism in established nations’ (1995: 37).

For example, in Billig’s (1995) work the reproduction of national identity in national songs, popular expressions and sporting competitions forms part of a two-way process of remembering and forgetting the nation. Drawing upon the work of Freud, he notes that:

Freud claimed that projection depends upon forgetting. He was referring to the individual repressing personal experiences of the past from conscious awareness. There is also, by analogy, a form of collective forgetting and collective projection … ‘Our’ nationalism is routinely forgotten, being unnamed as nationalism. Nationalism as a whole is projected on to others. But, again and again, not only ‘their’ nationalism seems to return; ‘ours’ does too (Billig, 1995: 49)

Importantly, Billig’s (1995) understanding identifies clearly the implied togetherness (‘our’, ‘they’) that is associated with examples of banal nationalism, particularly those subliminally used within the national press.

However, Billig’s (1995) approach reflects an unproblematic appreciation of the national differences that continue to divide and which are often contested within multi-national units. This is revealed in his analysis of press readership, which seemingly works to dissolve national difference. MacInnes et al. (2007) state:

Billig’s account overlooks how the envisioned boundaries of the ‘national’ vary in terms of territory (Britain, Wales, Scotland) and meaning (from ‘state-wide’ to a geographical or market area to a community imagined in
specifically national terms); and ignored the various ways in which titles’ [newspaper’s] content may change as they cross ‘national’ boundaries within the UK (2007: 190 [italics in original])

As a result, Billig’s (1995) work paradoxically exemplifies the very banal nationalism, which his analysis sought to highlight (MacInnes et al., 2007).

Furthermore, whereas, elements of banality may be found in the production of nationalism across the established world, Billig’s (1995) approach offers little explanation in regards to why nationalism has become such a powerful political force during the modern era (Wallwork and Dixon, 2004). Instead, Billig (1995) re-instates a unilinear analysis of the nation through which established nation-states have achieved a theological ‘banal nationalism’ (Mihelj, 2008). In fact, processes of national integration and dis-integration as well as possible ruptures and changes within the national consciousness are ignored and unaccounted for. In addition, in his work on South Korean national identity, Lee (2013) highlights that a fundamental part of the South Korean national consciousness is sustained through the ‘everyday and commonplace reminders of the Japanese Other’ (Lee, 2013: 5). This is, Lee (2013) notes, ‘beyond “banal”, and instead, ‘quiet conspicuous’ (Lee, 2013: 5). Indeed, this is particularly evident in ‘the highly publicised moments that have drawn international attention to the continuing antagonism between South Korea and Japan’ (Lee, 2013: 5). Accordingly, Lee (2013) adds that:

While moments such as this occur on the occasion, one should also consider the role of the legacies of Japanese colonial hegemony as it functions more routinely, such as in presidential discourse, or at national museums (Lee, 2013: 5)

In regards to British identity, therefore, this issue becomes particularly important when placed within the context of its multi-national state and multinational imperial history (see MacInnes et al., 2007). Here, Billig’s (1995) approach provides only a limited account of whether forms of banal Britishness are uniformly presented across the UK and whether this is shared, and, by extension, how it is shared, by former colonial and dominion territories within the former British Empire and the contemporary Commonwealth of Nations. Instead, by enquiring into exactly what is ‘flagged’ by both the national and international press coverage, the embodied habits of social life that serve to reproduce national
identity and its dynamics can be traced.

1.1.1. The ‘reflexive self’: Giddens and nationalism

Whereas the work of Billig (1995) explores how nationalism forms part of the banality of daily routines, Giddens (1985; 1991; 1998) considers how nationalism is brought to attention when the ontological security of the nation or when daily routines are disrupted. Accordingly, Giddens (1985; 1991; 1998) proposes that the centrality of the nation-state in international affairs and attachments to the nation have become eroded under modern social conditions. Indeed, Giddens’s (1998) view of globalisation is conceived as impacting upon the nation-state in the following of ways. First, Giddens’s (1998) argues that power would be acceded from the nation-state to inter-governmental organisations. Second, the nation-state would be decentralised by local and regional powers, undermining the nation-state as a legitimate political actor. Third, regions, cities, continents would be able to side-step national governments on issues relating to cross-national matters. More importantly, although Giddens’s (1998) believed the nation-state’s power would be fundamentally curtailed by globalisation, he still conceded that the nation-state would provide a role in the modern era. However, this role would be very different to that which it performed in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries.

In light of this, Giddens’ (1985; 1991; 1998) proposes the concept of the ‘reflexive self’, which serves to highlight the fluid and alterable nature of identity. Giddens’ (1991) notes that:

The process of ‘reaching back to one’s early experiences’ … is precisely part of a reflexive mobilising of self-identity … a general feature of modern social activity in relation to psychic organisation (1991: 33)

As a result, identities are chosen and changed via a ‘reflexive project of the self’ as individuals create and re-create their lifestyles (Giddens, 1991). Indeed, these choices are made within a context of high modernity, through which nationalism becomes ‘a phenomenon that is primarily psychological’ (Giddens, 1985: 116).

To this extent, Giddens’s (1991) insights may in fact place too much emphasis on individual agency and the ability of the individual to reflexively invent and reinterpret their identity. Whereas, Giddens (1985) is undoubtedly aware of the effects that economic factors can have on an individual’s social
position, he forgets ‘that there are always simultaneously many mutually
dependent individuals, whose interdependence to a greater or lesser extent limits
each one’s scope for action’ (Elias, 1978: 167 [italics added]). Instead, for
Giddens the idea of national culture is intimately related to both the ontological
security of the individual and the legitimacy of the corresponding administrative
apparatus which seeks to uphold the nation-state (Arnason, 1989). However,
Meech and Kilborn (1992) highlight that in the wake of the Soviet Union collapse,
the effect of culture aiding the identity of national groups that were not ‘nation-
states’, has revealed how particular groups can have a strong ontological security
without the benefit of state structures. Accordingly, such processes are evidently
To this extent, there is the tendency within Giddens’s (1991; 1998) approach to
separate analyses of national identity between its political functionality and its
psychological dimensions. That is, there is a separation between the ‘sociological’
and ‘psychological’ aspects of national identity, rather than viewing the two as
interconnected.

1.1.2. The ‘cloakroom community’: Bauman and nationalism

In contrast to Giddens’ (1991) primarily psychological approach, Bauman (2000)
presents a much more sociological understanding of nationalism and national
identity. Bauman (2000) argues that certain events can, for a certain period, bring
together a community or nation in recognition of its shared aspects, allowing
dividing interests to be ‘temporarily laid aside, put on a slow burner or silenced
altogether’ (Bauman, 2000: 200). Indeed, the surreptitious reminder of these
shared aspects are reinforced occasionally by particular events (Pritchard, 2012).
Corresponding with Billig’s (1995) ‘banal nationalism’, this process of
remembering the nation is formed through the elicitation of shared interests that
lie dormant in otherwise disparate individuals (Bauman, 2000). Adopting the
analogy of an evening performance, Bauman (2000) notes that:

It is the evening performance which brought them all here – different as their
interests and pastimes during the day could have been. Before entering the
auditorium they all leave the coats or anoraks they wore in the streets in the
playhouse cloakroom … During the performance all eyes are on the stage; so
is everybody’s attention. Mirth and sadness, laughter and silence, rounds of
applause, shouts of approval and gasps of surprise are synchronized – as if
carefully scripted and directed. After the last fall of the curtain, however, the spectators collect their belongings from the cloakroom and when putting their street clothes on once more return to their ordinary mundane different roles, a few moments later again dissolving in the variegated crowd filling the city streets from which they emerged a few hours earlier (2000: 200)

To some extent Bauman’s (2000) ‘cloakroom community’ highlights the sociological dynamics that are forgotten within Giddens’s (1991) notion of reflexivity. In addition, the functional aspects of the evening performance provide a useful interpretation of the communal characteristics that are displayed during national events (Constantine, 2006; Dayan and Katz, 1992; Lee and Maguire, 2009; Shaw, 2004; Wardle and West, 2004).

However, Bauman’s (2000) analysis can overemphasise the temporal nature of the community and its slow erosion at the hands of an ‘inherently transgressive, boundary-breaking, all-eroding modernity’ (2000: 6). In regards to the sustainability of communal forms of organisation, such as those associated with the nation, Bauman’s (2000) insights simply reinvent its own continuity/discontinuity paradox.

The above theorists all highlight the exploratory potential of various approaches to the study of nationalism. With this in mind, the following sections will aim to elucidate upon this work by exploring how understandings of nationalism and national identity have been based upon disparate civic and ethnic interpretations. In correspondence with the above, such a discussion can help to orientate examinations of nationalism and national identity by exploring its emergence and correspondence with the nation’s history and cultural background as well as its emergence alongside wider processes, such as, the industrial revolution.

1.2. A sovereign, united and unique nation: the civic approach

Drawing upon the geographical importance of the nation, civic interpretations argue that the nation must possess a compact and well-defined territory. In such instances, the formation of the modern nation-state is perceived as an artifact of modernity (Anderson, 2006; Breuilly, 1994; Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008; Hobsbawn, 1983; 1990). Originating from the work of Ernest Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008), modernists believe that the nation is primarily a civic creation, forged for the purpose of civic politics (McCrone, 1997). Here, the defining of
boundaries and the establishment of a collective identity provide the crucial components of a political ‘national’ community that forms part of a modern world system of nation-states (Calhoun, 1994; Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008). As an extension of Gellner’s work, Hechter (1975) locates nationalism in the uneven development of capitalist relations. Here, ‘a complex web of colonial dependencies and centre-periphery dynamics’ are formed (Mihelj, 2011: 72). These relations resulted in the emergence of nationalist projects, and, as a result, are closely aligned with the economic and political effects brought on by the industrial revolution (Gellner, 2008). Ultimately, this dictates that ‘nationalism and nations simply could not exist outside of the context of modern societies’ (Mihelj, 2011: 73).

Undoubtedly, the effect of the industrial revolution had a profound influence on the making of modern nation-states, particularly Britain. Domestically, Robbins (1988) notes the importance which industrialization had on uniting the British Isles. Improvements in transport links such as the railway provided journeys across England, Scotland and Wales to be completed much faster. More importantly, these improvements led to a standardization of time across the country, creating a greater sense of interconnectedness. Robbins (1988) notes:

Time-tables could not function properly when ‘local time’ prevailed in different parts of the country. By the late 1840’s, the [train] companies had succeeded in enforcing a uniformity across Britain which Greenwich standard time offered … However unpopular in particular localities, especially in the West, this measure was an ever-present reminder, from John O’Groat’s to Lands End, that all communities belonged to Britain (1988: 27)

To this extent, modernists argue that nationalism places at its centre the sovereign, united and unique nation, instilling in the population a secular respect for the state and its laws (Anderson, 2006; Smith, 2005a).

However, in regards to Britain, Wellings (2003) has stressed that rather than emphasising popular sovereignty, Britain venerated its national institutions, indelibly linking British nationalism with a head of state and the British parliament. Outside of the British Isles, the adoption of the parliamentary model and adherence to Westminster and the British crown, provided the groundwork for containing the imperial colonies within an extensive British polity (Meaney, 2003). Through the ‘invention’ of British ‘traditions’ and ‘imagined’ conceptions
of the ‘British race’, British state apparatuses formed part of an expansive network of colonies and imperial territories (Lester, 2001; 2006). The following sections will elaborate upon these processes in further detail.

1.2.1. ‘Imagining’ and ‘inventing’ the nation-state

Whereas the work of Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008) views both the nation and nationalism as the foundation to statehood and sovereignty in world affairs, Anderson (2006) highlights how the importance of print capitalism, fuelled by the formation of a shared vernacular language, helped to establish the nation and its people as an ‘imagined community’ (2006: 6). Importantly, Anderson (2006) provides some theoretical light between his work and that of Gellner’s, when he states that, ‘Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’’ (2006: 6 [italics added]).

Consequently, due to changes in the development of print capitalism, mass populations were able to think about themselves and others as well as relate to themselves in profoundly new ways (Anderson, 2006). Through vivid and identifiable ways, the nation was able to establish itself in a political and cultural domain previously held by monarchies, dynastic states and the aristocracy (Smith, 2010). In doing so, the appearance of ‘linguistic-nationalism’ provided elites the opportunity to escape marginalisation and to re-imagine themselves within the imagined community (Anderson, 2006: 101).

In particular, Anderson (2006) highlights how literacy and national history were both used to manufacture national identifications across the nation, a key aspect of which was the importance given to the historical characteristics of the nation. Often, historical legacies are evoked during sporting and national ceremonies via the use of ‘invented traditions’ (Maguire, 1999: 178). Hobsbawm (1983) notes that:

‘invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past (1983: 1)

Here, Hobsbawm (1983) draws attention to the flourishing of national history, mythology and symbolism which occurred in Europe from 1830 onwards and
which culminated in a range of national traditions being established, such as, national anthems and national flags. Central to this is the role of politicians, historians and journalists in the management of the nation-state and its associated nationalism. This can be seen in the work of the imperial historians such as Cain and Hopkins (1993a; 1993b) who sought to direct the study of the British Empire towards the ‘gentleman capitalists’ who drove Britain’s imperial expansion.

In such instances, both the nation and its nationalism rested upon ‘exercises in social engineering that [were] often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 13). Often, the source of such invention was forged in relation to an awareness of the ‘other’ (Constantine, 2006). Colley’s (2005) analysis of Britishness serves to expand upon this awareness by highlighting that in the history of Great Britain the role of the ‘other’ was provided and maintained via a series of wars against the Catholic French and North American rebels. These historically diverse cultural and ethnic divisions signified ‘an invented nation superimposed, if only for a while, onto much older alignments and loyalties’ (2005: 5 [italics added]). Indeed, such thoughts are shared by Gellner’s (1964) maxim that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’ (1964: 169). Consequently, whereas, it is clear that Anderson (2006) would prefer to view this invention as an imagining, the work of Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008), Anderson (2006) and Hobsbawm (1983) points towards the functionality of nationalism and national identity as tools of national sovereignty through which political governments can channel their own ideals and policies (Varadarajan, 2008).

However, while focusing on the political motives behind the nation, nationalism and national identity, both Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined’ and Hobsbawm’s (1983) ‘invented’ approaches, reveal a rather egocentric consideration of the nation and its identity. In both instances, relations between the state and its population are presented as discrete and internally driven. In contrast, the ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ nation may in fact be aligned with wider collective communities that transcends the nation-state (MacInnes et al., 2007). MacInnes et al. (2007) indicate that:

In February 2003 millions demonstrated across the world against the
invasion of Iraq, exercising an imagination that stretched not only to alternative visions of the destiny of their particular state or nation, whether established, contested or not, but also to a community of interest well beyond any form of the national (2007: 204)

Subsequently, whereas ‘the rise of industrial and mobile societies and the modern state makes some form of imagining beyond the ‘directly apprehended locality’ inevitable, it does not necessarily follow … that this must entirely supersede either more local or more global identities’ (MacInnes et al., 2007: 192).

Furthermore, McClintock (1993) claims that Hobsbawm’s analysis suffers from a ‘breathtaking Eurocentricism’ (1993: 67). As a result, McClintock (1993) asserts that:

there is no single narrative of the nation. Different genders, classes, ethnicities and generations do not identify with, or experience the myriad national formations in the same way; nationalisms are invented, performed and consumed in ways that do not follow a universal blueprint. (1993: 67)

McClintock’s (1993) comments are useful in highlighting how various interpretations of the nation can impact upon nationalism. In fact, McClintock (1993) adds that ‘we might do well; to develop a more theoretically complex, and strategically subtle genealogy of nationalisms’ (1993: 67 [italics in original]). Indeed, there is much merit in this perspective, particularly in regards to the ‘distinct’ yet ‘overlapping trajectories’ (McClintock, 1993: 67) which have resulted in varying interpretations of British nationalism. To this extent, the transference of British culture throughout the British Empire directs attention towards processes of acceptance, negotiation and resistance as well as its construction and (re)construction.

Accordingly, instead, of the imagined community forming a coherent group, other communities, both within and outside the nation can be imagined (Mihelj, 2011). This suggests a more expansive conception of the ‘imagined community’, indeed, one that goes beyond the nation-state frontier to include more expansive spaces of association, such as, those drawn across former imperial networks. Here, the British Empire provides a critical example of the role played by societal elites in using both the monarchy and sport in re-creating British culture throughout the empire (Colley, 2005; Mangan, 1992a).

Finally, in sum, many nation-states can be found to pre-date processes of
industrialization (McCrone et al., 1998). As a result the origins of the nation need to be located much further back than the modernists consider (Hastings, 2005). Consequently, Smith (2010) stresses that:

Nationalist ideals are powerful in their own right; indeed, they have the power to lead people astray, to disorientate them and ultimately destroy them. For Gellner, ideas have no such power, and the ideology of nationalism merely masks the true workings of industrial culture … [this] points to a glaring omission in modernization theory: it has no place for the role of individuals and their ideals (2010: 72)

For Smith (2010), the ethnic origins of the nation are pre-modern and serve as the basis from which particular nationalisms have emerged. Indeed, the following section will elaborate upon this process in further detail.

1.2.2. Ancestrally related and culturally distinct: the ethnic approach

The ethnic approach to nationalism and national identity derives much of its argument from the work of Anthony Smith (1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010). Smith argues that the nation is not just a political entity but a system of cultural representation that produces meaning and which influences and organises human action (McCrone, 1997). Thus, nations are embedded in particular collective pasts that emerge over long time spans through specific historical processes (Smith, 2005a). Here, Smith highlights the role of ethnie, a term that Smith uses to denote ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland’ (Smith, 2005a: 25).

As a result, some nations can be found to pre-date modernity, revealing ethnic antecedents (Smith, 2005a) that are associated with a national culture. Indeed, these ethno-national attributes are often depicted via a shared language, religion or particular geographical topography (Bairner, 2009; Smith, 2010). In the following example by Laba (1992) both the geography of Canada and its national sport, ice hockey, are symbiotically used to help explain the sports popularity amongst ‘Canadians’:

The romance of hockey is mythic – a romance that has regarded and rendered the game as a natural outgrowth of the daunting challenges of Canadian geography and climate, as organically rooted as snow, ice, forest, prairie, rock shield and the myriad of the country’s other geographic and
climatic facts (Laba, 1992: 343)

Consequently, ethnically driven distinctions can help formulate a national identity that draws upon common cultural elements that are attributable to a particular ethnic group (Bairner, 2009; Smith, 2010). Whereas, a civic interpretation views the formation of the nation as a specifically modern invention, ethnic accounts, view the nation as a historical phenomenon (Smith, 2005b).

Drawing upon an historical perspective is the work of both the perennial and primordial paradigms. Indeed, for the perennial perspective nations have existed throughout history and since time immemorial (Smith, 2010). Here, the nation reflects a recurrent form of social organization, through which nationalism represents a perennial mode of cultural belonging (Smith, 2005a). As a result, the ‘perennialists approach suggests depth of attachment, if only because it portrays nations as long-enduring, historic identities’ (Fenton, 2007: 323). However, Smith (2010) stresses that:

Perennialism should not be confused with a naturalist conception of the nation, which is the basis of latter day primordialism … All that is necessary for perennialism is a belief, founded on some empirical observation, that nations – or at least some nations – have existed for a long period of time, for whatever reason. They do not have to regard nations as natural, organic or primordial; indeed they may and often do reject such ahistorical accounts (2010: 50 [italics added])

Subsequently, primordial accounts tend to occupy a more ‘organic’ conception of the nation. These often prescribe a socio-biological conception of the nation’s population, whereby cultural symbols act as markers of biological affinity and supremacy (Smith, 2010). This socio-biological approach to the nation and its people can be found in sporting practices that helped to confirm the supremacy of the Christian British character as well as in sports use as a method of indoctrinating indigenous populations (Mangan, 1992a). Similarly, Hokuwhitu (2003) notes how racial images of the Maori culture propagated the education of indigenous people. Drawing upon the work of Simon (1990), Hokuwhitu (2003) highlights how one parliamentarian believed that:

The ‘Haka’ is an expose of the evil which really lies at the root of their present prostrate condition, an exhibition of the substratum of utter immorality, depravity, and obscurity, which forms the ground work of their race … we shall do nothing until we alter their entire character, by taking in

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hand the education, per force of the younger growing saplings (Simon, 1990: 86 cited in Hokuwhitu, 2003: 199)

Subsequently, imperial education was used to encourage the superiority of the British race, a superiority that was ultimately based upon a white male imperial fraternity (Hokuwhitu, 2003; Mangan, 1992a).

Today, primordial elements still remain part of identity constructions and concepts regarding national citizenship (Giesen, 2003). There are, however, a number of problems regarding the ethno-centricity of the nation. In particular, ethnic accounts can be depicted as constant and unchangeable (Goulbourne, 1991), presenting a rather essentialist appreciation of national identity that fails to distinguish between the multiplicity of ethnicities that can exist within a nation. Similarly, national identity can also provide a straddling ambiguity between the social and the spatial, denoting both a ‘people’ and a ‘place’ (Wallwork and Dixon, 2004). With regards to the British nation-state, these ‘people’ were not only spread across the four ‘domestic’ nations of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales but also across a vast geographical network, incorporating a variety of cultural specificities both within the internal British nation-state and its external global empire (Armitage, 2000). More importantly, for the purpose of tracing British identity across time, the ethnic approach can ‘struggle with the undoubted discontinuities between the past and the present’ (McCrone et al., 1998: 16). It is here that empires have played a decisive role in shifting populations and mixing ethnic groups. The colonial migration of Indian railroad workers to Kenya highlights one example of inter-cultural mixing within the British Empire (Sunderland, 2004). Indeed, difficulties can often arise in regards to which ethnie should be employed for which nation-state (Calhoun, 1994).

1.3. Moving beyond the civic/ethnic dichotomy

Taking the above section into consideration, it is clear that the subconscious bond that derives a common sense of belonging, a common language and a common history, between groups of people, has been widely attributed to the nation (Smith, 2010). Constructions of the nation perceive it as something more than just human nature maintained through human membership, but instead a phenomenon, which is reified through a national discourse concerning place and identity (Bairner, 2009; Wallwork and Dixon, 2004). Here, a connection to a territory, totemic site
or style of architecture forms the foundation of national culture (Smith, 2010; Wallwork and Dixon, 2004).

Nevertheless, ‘a good deal of the nation’s credibility and its attraction as the warrant of safety and durability has been derived from its intimate association with the state’ (Bauman, 2000: 185). Accordingly, while the civic state represents a territorial sovereign, which is related to a demarcated boundary (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008), the nation-state is formed when the border of a state corresponds with a collective national group (Smith, 2010). For a nation-state to function, inhabitants of the state have to become citizens (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008). This process is usually established by creating a sense of national identity amongst the population and by experiences that evoke a national identification (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008). This has led some authors to conclude that it is the state that precedes the nation (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008; McCrone, 2002).

Accordingly, it is possible to observe that traditional conceptions of what constitutes the nation-state have across ‘all of Western and Eastern Europe, been shaped by the internal discourse of nationalism – including both ethnic claims and civil projects of popular political participation’ (Calhoun, 1997: 89 [italics added]).

Since civic networks are often interwoven with ethnic ties and sentiments, it remains conceptually difficult to ignore one for the other (Kumar, 2006a; 2006b). Indeed, in order for the nation to be ‘imagined’, the ‘imagining’ must be held by all members of a particular nation (Sumartojo, 2012). Similarly, while the nation may also be ‘invented’ it is invented in multiple ways (Sumartojo, 2012).

To this extent, the path to ‘nation building’ can become increasingly complex when related to a particular political community. In Britain, this can be identified in recent government papers that seek to ‘recognise the diversity of Britain’ and ‘the common values and bonds that being British provide[s]’ (Leith, 2010: 290). Referring to the foreword written by former British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and foreign secretary, Jack Shaw, Leith (2010) highlights how the 2007 Green Paper ‘clearly conflates nation and state, and society … proclaiming Britain as a nation, with a ‘shared national purpose’ (2010: 290). In doing so, ‘the document consistently enforces the idea that the UK is a nation – even though the contemporary conception of the UK is that of a union state’ (2010: 290 [italics added]).
Similar confusions can also be brought to light through the attempts made by the British state to define nationality in accordance with parliamentary legislation. Indeed, a central part of both the 1948 and 1981 British Nationality Acts involved framing a conception of British citizenship that included both the domestic British populous as well as those ‘Britons’ located within the British Empire. As a result, both acts were marred by tension and confusion regarding UK citizenship and British identity (Mycock, 2010).

Therefore, in contrast to adopting particular civic or ethnic conceptions, attention can be turned to an understanding of the nation and national identity that is fundamentally related to broader processes of historical and social development. Indeed, Goudsblom (1977) argues that we should ‘see all social phenomena as ‘becoming’ (1977: 148). That is, the study of social phenomena should be viewed as an emergent part of larger structures ‘of development, the course of which can be studied precisely and systematically’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 148).

To this extent, few analyses within the study of national identity have thought critically about the political/civic and cultural/ethnic dichotomy in relation to historical processes of national development, such as, the emergence and decline of empire. As a form of territorial organisation the ‘nation-state’ only began to take precedent during the twentieth-century before which the majority of the globe was part of, or, shaped by, imperial empires (Conrad, 2013). To this extent, the following sections will explore the relationship between nationalism and imperialism in order to outline how imperial processes can disrupt traditional civic and ethnic dichotomies.

1.3.1. Nationalism and national identity: an imperial outlook

With regards to the civic approach it has been highlighted that Hobsbawm (1983) viewed the nation through the invention of particular national traditions. Yet, it is also evident that attempts to ‘invent’ the nation, as separate to others, occurred alongside attempts to globalize the nation in particular ways. For example, in comments relating to ‘The Parthenon Marbles’, Rose-Greenland (2013) highlights that:

The marbles were imported to Britain. They became emblems of British nationhood. They functioned as signifiers of particular as well as universal cultural identity. They belonged simultaneously to no nation, to every
nation, and to Britain. (2013)

Taken from Greece, the Marbles were subsequently redefined as an expression of British national character but also as an expression of global civilisation. In such instances, we can observe that while the Parthenon Marbles were ‘invented’ as an emblem of British nationhood, ‘national’ symbols and artifacts could also carry ‘global’ connotations. Rose-Greenland (2013) adds:

For scholars of nationalism, the case presents a conceptual puzzle. The nationalism literature takes for granted a nation’s desire to present itself as special and elect, relying on homegrown cultural products – from cuisine to folk costumes and artworks – to strengthen its ‘nationness’. The Parthenon marbles, however, puts a curious kink in this line of thinking. The sculptures were imported to Britain but they have become emblems of British nationhood. (2013)

As can be seen in the above example, it is evident that notions of imperial prestige, national distinction and national culture were symbiotically tied to the imperial expansion of Britain, a process that arguably afforded it the ability to ‘appropriate’ a number of historic artifacts.

Elsewhere, Darwin (2010) redefines the relationship between empire and ethnicity as a ‘imperial ethnicity’ (2010: 386). Here, the cohabitation of various ethnic populations within an empire would often result in social and political practices being implemented in order to forge supranational identities of imperial citizenship (Gerasimov et al., 2005: 51). For the ‘old’ dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, Britishness not merely co-existed in the civic sense (joining the colonial nations in alignment with the imperial empire under an allegiance to the British crown), but also in an ethnic sense, by being substantially constitutive and mutually interactive within the formation of their own national identities (McGregor, 2006; MyCock, 2010).

Taking this into consideration, it is important to appreciate that wider levels of identification can envelop our perspective of the isolated nation/nation-state. Goulbourne (1991) provides a summary of this process with regards to Britain, highlighting that:

the nations of Britain have kept together despite strong ethnic sentiments in its historically quite distinct parts of England, Wales and Scotland … Thus, a *variety of loyalties*, often conflicting, logically irreconcilable and practically unrealizable, have bound different peoples together under traditional
nationalism (Goulbourne, 1991: 218 and 219 [italics added])

Whereas, Goulbourne (1991) refers to a variety of loyalties being held together under an overarching ‘traditional nationalism’, the same can also be said of those colonies, dominions and independent states brought together under much larger ‘imperial’ or ‘supranational’ collectives.

Indeed, Bowden (2012) provides a further examination of this wider perspective with regards to the study of civilisations. Drawing upon the work Durkheim and Mauss (1971) as well as Braudel (1993), Bowden (2012) notes that ‘a civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole’ (Durkheim and Mauss, 1971: 811 cited in Bowden, 2012). Correspondingly, Braudel (1993) argues that ‘there can be no civilizations without the societies that support them and inspire their tensions and their progress’ (1993: 15 cited in Bowden, 2012). In the British context, these ‘tensions’ (Braudel, 1993 cited in Bowden, 2012) become all the more prominent when considered in regards to Britain’s imperial history (Burton, 2010; Hopkins, 1999; Mac An Ghaill, 2001).

Accordingly, whereas ‘in the imperial age, transnational connections reinforced the emerging British state and helped to create new states overseas’, correspondingly, ‘in the post-colonial world global influences challenge national boundaries and identities’ (Hopkins, 1999: 231). Indeed, this corresponds with traditional debates regarding the sovereignty of the nation and its dependency upon a particular population and territorial boundary. Here, the distinctions made by the ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ approaches have provided important boundaries in determining the permeability of those barriers used to delineate between the national group and the foreign outsider (Wright et al., 2012).

With this in mind, the final section of this chapter will seek to draw upon the above in conjunction with Elias’s conception of national habitus. Significantly, this discussion can be useful in highlighting the effects of global interdependencies, not only in intra-state relations but also in regards to national identity formation (Elias, 1991; 2012).

1.4. National identity as ‘a continuous process of development’

The theoretical work of Elias (1978; 1987; 1991; 1996; 2012) can help transcend
the formulation of distinct historical periods (traditional and modernity) (Bauman, 2000; Giddens, 1985; 1990; 1998), civic/ethnic dichotomies (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008; Smith, 1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) and imperial neglect (Hopkins, 1999; Howe, 2010) by proposing a ‘continuous process of development’ both within human personality structures and social relations (Van Krieken, 2005: 8).

Certainly, processual accounts of the nation are not unique to the process sociology perspective. Indeed, Calhoun (1997) has examined how national identity is processually constructed through discursive practices related to how individuals talk about the nation. This is shared by Wodak et al. (2009) as well as by others who have sought to examine how national identities are continually performed through practical everyday routines as well through formal rituals and national ceremonies (Edensor, 2002; ref). In fact, Mennell (1990) has argued that while sociologists have often condemned ‘progress’ theories, there is a relative acceptance that societies have become more complex. Elias’s conception of ‘process’, however, allows us to highlight ‘relationships past, present and (possible) future’ as well as highlight ‘changing balances of power and changing interdependencies’ (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012: 482-483).

One particular benefit in adopting a processual account is the ability to debunk frequently used concepts, such as, ‘modern’ or ‘post-modern’. Indeed, the de-merits of such terms are highlighted by Inglis (2013):

Dichotomies of the supposed ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ abound in classical theory, attesting to a very strong sense, held across generations, reinforced by educational institutions, and shared by those otherwise intellectually and politically opposed to each other, that the times they lived in were somehow radically qualitatively different from those in which people of the past had lived (2013: 7)

Instead, if societies are ‘radically’ and ‘qualitatively different’ (Inglis, 2013: 7), then it is due to changes in their social structure and relations. Indeed, this requires a long-term analysis of social processes:

A sophisticated understanding of the contemporary world is made possible only by an equally sophisticated understanding of long-term historical processes, not just over the last five hundred years – since the so-called ‘dawn of modernity’ – but over many millennia, and not just in ‘the West’ but across the whole planet. (Inglis, 2013: 2)
Consequently, while the work of Bauman (2000) and Giddens (1985; 1990; 1991; 1993; 1998) has explored the disintegration of traditional forms of social bonding, in contrast, process sociological approaches view such changes in accordance with the multiplying of chains of interdependence.

To this extent, it is important that national identity research focuses on the social processes inherent in national identity formation and how these formations are themselves constantly changing and adapting as well as being reproduced, reinterpreted and represented (James, 1997). In addition, these processes form part of the discursive reproduction of national identities via social systems, such as, the media. Here, the national press and in particular the tabloid press has proven particularly adept at ‘imagining’ the nation (Anderson, 2006). Conboy (2006) notes:

The material connection between the language of the tabloid newspapers and the longer narratives of the nation provides an essential element in enabling the imaginary community of the nation to retain its cultural and political authority … in its tabloid manifestation … [the nation] is able to reformulate and revise itself at prodigious speed to retains its claims to authenticity in the modern world (2006: 68)

Indeed, this can have important implications in the context of Britain’s ‘imperial’ history, particularly, in regards to the editorial and linguistic strategies employed by the media and its appropriation of the nation’s past within the present (Conboy, 2006). More importantly, however, this can also elucidate upon ‘the actuality of constitutively different human natures formed across different societies, and … the contradictory subjectivities formed within the same society or the same person, [which] are often either disregarded or relegated to the realm of psychoanalysis’ (James, 1997: 185). In such instances, identity is not just related to the psychological but is instead socially established through interdependent networks of societal relations and changing networks of interdependency that have characterized Britain’s history and which have left an indefinite mark on its culture and identity (Elias, 1978; 1996; James, 1997). More to the point, such processes can be examined in relation to the Eliasian concept of habitus.

1.4.1. Habitus: sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes

Although popularised by Bourdieu, Elias’s use of the term *habitus* fits more
broadly with his process sociology framework by highlighting how ‘the dynamics of figurations are also dependent on the formation of a shared social *habitus* or personality make-up which constitutes the collective basis of individual human conduct’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 89 [italics in original]). Consequently, Mennell (1994) adds that ‘the meaning of the technical term ‘habitus’ is, as Elias used to remark, captured exactly in the everyday English expression *second nature*’ (1994: 177 [italics in original]). Accordingly, Elias (1991) notes that:

> the concept of the social habitus enables us to bring social phenomena within the field of scientific investigation previously inaccessible to them. Consider, for example, the problem that is communicated in a pre-scientific way by the concept of national character. That is a habitus *par excellence* (1991: 182 [italics in original])

Here, habitus is not just reflective of the individual but forms part of a complex inter-related socio-psychogenesis transformation (Maguire and Tuck, 2005). Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) add:

> It seems that our individual habitus guides our behaviour; but, then, habitus itself is formed and continues to be moulded in social situations, marked by specific power differentials, and those situations, in turn, are embedded in larger social structures which change over time (1998: 15)

Notably, Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) highlight how the individual habitus can only ever be understood ‘as an aspect of the wider social habitus’ (Moore, 2010: 2.4). To this extent:

> At the individual level, there are a series of learned behavioural dispositions which are unique to the person. At the social level, there reside a collection of personality characteristics which individuals share with other members of their group. The social habitus of people forms a foundation from which more individual feelings can develop (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 111)

As a result, the concept has increasingly been used within studies of national identity, in order to capture the largely unconscious set of characteristics, which exist between members of a national community.

Arguably, therefore, it is possible to draw upon traditional conceptions of nationalism in conjunction with Elias’s overall approach to state development. Indeed, Elias’s use of Freud, in his conception of habitus, served to elucidate upon the existence and development of unconscious and conscious actions, values and
practices (Dunning and Hughes, 2012). To this extent, Billig’s (1995) analysis of the omnipresent nature of nationalism is one that is shared by Calhoun’s (1997; 2004) focus on the naturalness of speaking and thinking through a national identity, both of which can be incorporated into Elias’s conception of national habitus. Through the familiar, taken for granted, daily actions that bind us to our national habitus, our particular ‘I/we identity’ is constructed (Maguire and Burrows, 2005). Similarly, in response to outsider groups, the ‘we-identity’ of the national collective is brought closer to the individual’s ‘I-identity’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005). In doing so, the ‘individual can thus become the embodiment of the nation, and the social group represented by the nation, becomes that individual’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 113 [italics added]). Here, ‘the indissoluble link between socialization and individualization’ can be observed (Duffy, 2008: 62).

Furthermore, habitus can also be used alongside Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983) ‘invented traditions’ in order to consider the myths that are often associated with national traditions (Maguire, 1999). By highlighting the deeply rooted and invented traditions that are used in generating a greater sense of national awareness the ‘impersonal symbols of a hallowed collectivity’ (Elias, 1996: 148; see also Smith, 2010) become closely ‘linked to the development of a national ethos that reflects, and is reflected by, the individual’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 111). Consequently, ‘the French, the Germans, the Dutch, the Italians have different national habituses, differences that are shaped by their history and, in turn, help to shape it’ (Smith, 2001: 128). Here, the importance of the nation’s past can help to reveal how cultural myths, memories and symbols are carried by various institutions into the modern epoch (Smith, 2010). To this extent, an understanding of contemporary identity politics demands an appreciation of the wider social structures through which the individual and the national (including its civic and ethnic origins) have acquired their meaning (Elias, 1978; 1991; 2008b; Mennell and Gouwsblom, 1998).

With this in mind, it is possible to highlight how, in contrast to Bourdieu, Elias’s conception of habitus seeks to explore the relationship between the psychogenetic and sociogenetic transformation underlining habitus formation. That is, through a series of ‘very grand and general observations’ (Mennell and Gouwsblom, 1998: 15), Elias (2012) was able to view the development of habitus as strongly linked to wider social processes that were, over time, correspondingly
reflected in the refinement of individual manners and control of emotions. Here, gradual shifts in the power relations between social groups ensured ‘both a social transformation (sociogenesis) and an associated psychological transformation (psychogenesis)’ in the personality structure of the individual (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 110; see also Elias, 2012; Mennell and Goudsblom, 2008). In other words, it was through changes in the social structure that corresponding changes in the identity and emotional conduct of social human beings could be observed (Mennell, 2007).

For example, by undertaking a long-term perspective on the development of present societies, Elias (2012) observed how more and more people were forced to live in peace with each other. This resulted in a ‘moulding of affects’ and alterations in the ‘standards of emotion-management’ (Elias, 2012) amongst individuals. Indeed, this process can be observed in the appearance of the ‘court’ in England. Drawing upon the work of Trevelyan (1985), Braithwaite (1993) notes that ‘the eighteenth-century reign of Beau Nash at the quasi-court of Bath civilized country squires by hastening the disappearance of the sword as the proper adornment of a gentleman’s thigh; as a result, the settling of disagreements with cold steel became increasingly infrequent’ (1993: 4). As a result, alongside the emergence of the English court, forms of violent conduct were substituted for mastered gestures of emotional constraint and the gradual emergence of a more general pacification of the state (Braithwaite, 1993).

Consequently, as the above example illustrates, gradual changes in state formation and emotional control form part of much longer civilising processes (Van Benthem van den Bergh, 2012), through which individual security became increasingly provided by the state (Elias, 2012). In doing so, Elias drew attention to the ‘complex inter-related socio-psychological transformations’, which led to collective identifications, such as, national identity (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 111). The following section will elaborate upon these ‘socio-psychological transformations’ in order to highlight how national identity emerged from gradual changes in the way humans have been socially organised and collectively recognised (Dunning and Hughes, 2012). Indeed, this ‘theoretical design’ will form the foundation for the proceeding chapters.
1.5. State development: sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformations

Drawing upon the work of both Marx and Weber (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Van Krieken, 2001), Elias’s sociological approach strove to move away from static conceptions of society and societal functions in order to examine how societies are fundamentally dynamic. Van Krieken (2001) notes that:

[Elias] drew on Marx’s materialism to explain the development of a particular personality structure, emphasising its ‘production’ by particular sets of social relations, and elaborated on Freud’s understanding of the effects of developing civilisation on psychic life in terms of Weber’s conception of the state as organised around a monopoly of the means of violence (2001)

However, Elias (2012) differed from Weber, by arguing that the move from medieval to absolutist states witnessed both a monopolisation of the means of violence and a monopolization of the means of taxation. Linklater and Mennell (2010) note how the decline in power of the cavalry and the nobility followed the development of a surplus manpower who helped form infantry armies, a process that no longer left the state dependent on the noble classes for protection and battle expertise. As a result, the state’s ability to monopolise the collection of taxes helped, in part, to ensure the territories survival by allowing its rulers to pay for armies and forms of defense. Correspondingly, the state’s monopolisation of the means of violence ensured that the flow of capital and trade was protected as well as forms of rational planning conducive to the running of a large, yet emerging, state could be administered (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).

In order for the above to occur, however, the ‘taming of the warriors’ – a necessary element in any process of state formation – was required (Mennell, 2007). Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) elaborate:

One way in which this transformation occurred was through what Elias called ‘the taming of the warriors’: an upper stratum of warlords who, in the early Middle Ages, ruled over their own territories almost unrestrained by any outside authority, and were gradually transformed into a courtly aristocracy, subject to the never-ceasing constraints of life at a royal court (1998: 24)

Indeed, Elias (2012) conceptualises this process in his theory of monopoly mechanism. Here, Elias ‘seeks to capture the structured processes at work over time and place as social differentiation and integration among increasingly larger
groups become dominant and greater concentrations of power occur’ (Maguire, 2005: 9). He highlights that:

Its starting point is a situation where a whole class controls unorganized monopoly opportunities and where, accordingly, the distribution of these opportunities among the members of this class is decided by free competition and open force; it is then driven towards a situation where the control of monopoly opportunities and those dependent on them by one class, is centrally organized and secured by institutions; and where the distribution of the yields of monopoly follows a plan that is not exclusively governed by the interest of single individuals or single groups, but is orientated on the overall network of interdependencies binding all participating groups and individuals to each other and on its optimal functioning (Elias, 1982: 115)

Variations of this general theme can be found within the development of the French, German and British states as well as across state-formation processes in Asia (Elias, 2012; Mennell, 2007). These processes typically led to the formation of ‘central governments capable of exerting a considerable control over increasingly large numbers of people’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 142). Indeed, these changes were central to Elias’s development of culture and civilization (Elias, 2012; Fletcher, 1997) but also to a number of observable paradoxes in individual and state development. That is, while the interconnections between societal groups grew larger, the civilizing process allowed individuals:

the capacity to have a detached attitude towards themselves and their relationships with others … at the same time, however, the civilizing process join[ed] people together … human beings [were] drawn into ever-denser relations of mutual interdependence (Smith, 2001: 22)

Consequently, as people were brought together in greater interdependence, a more detached perception of themselves paradoxically emerged. In fact, similar paradoxes can also be seen in the nature of violent actions. That is, while internal pacification of the state was achieved, and, in particular, more pleasurable forms of killing became condemned, violence between rival societies was not only permissible but increasingly destructive (Linklater and Mennell, 2010). Therefore, while the state became pacified, the acquiring of new territory from neighbouring states required a largely organised and pacified internal population, which could both logistically prepare for, and, indeed, carry out, acts of war on neighbouring territories (Linklater and Mennell, 2010).
1.5.1. Functional democratization: an idealized image of nation and empire

While the previous section has detailed how changes in the social structure could impact upon the personality structure of particular individuals/groups, it is important to highlight how the development of a new form of psychogenesis (national identity) can be attributed to the growing commercialisation of the nation-state and the rise of the bourgeoisie classes (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998).

Indeed, corresponding with the Enlightenment movement across Europe, ‘the British people’s image of themselves as a sovereign collectivity, as a nation, was formed, as a matter of course, in accordance with the demand of a moral code’ (Elias, 1996: 165-66). Here:

Privatization and internalization … led to the transformation of private power, formerly held by individual rulers, into public power. In other words, the creation of a monopoly of power in the private person of the individual ruler was increasingly displaced by its investment and dispersal in the public institution of the state (Ju Kim, 2006: 59)

With regards to the parliamentization of British society, the habits and moral codes of both the aristocracy and the rising middle classes formed part of a wider process of functional democratization within Britain. Here, the emergence of an individual self-hood alongside the nation-state provided the context for an ideological framework of national identity based on the collective appeal of the nation (Ju Kim, 2006). Whereas a nation’s identity had previously been in the possession of the private person, such as, the royal monarch, the ‘awareness of self and other, which began to develop under medieval court society, was manifested in a new bourgeoisie sensibility’ (Ju Kim, 2006: 59). As a result:

The greater interpenetration of aristocratic and middle-class traditions from the eighteenth century on … and … the attempt of sections of the British middle class to combine the aristocratic code of norms in inter-state relations with the moralist and humanist code with which they had risen to the top, is only one of several instances of this basic sociological fact. In this case, that is, the greater interpenetration of neighbouring social strata facilitated a specific fusion of their codes of norms and a general inclination towards pragmatic compromises (Elias, 1996: 165)

In light of these social changes, national identity became inspired by an emphasis
on the civic rights and duties of the citizen (Gerasimov et al., 2005). In doing so:

Almost everywhere in Europe, the intellectual elites of the rising eighteenth century middle classes shared a general belief in moral principles, in the rights of human beings as such and in the natural progress of humanity … When, in one European country after another, men of middle class descent rose to power … [and] replaced aristocratic groups as the ruling groups of their countries … an idealized image of their nation moved into the centre of their self-image, their social beliefs and their scale of values (Elias, 1996: 134-135)

Here, functional democratization reflected a fundamental change in the total structure of national societies, which helped to consolidate social behaviour and national habitus within the individual (Dunning, 2004; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998). Accordingly, ‘compared to their medieval predecessors, the members of European societies from the “Renaissance” on climbed to a new level of self-consciousness’ (Elias, 1998b: 275). These values had a decisive role in forming a political discourse of national sovereignty, which, in part, evolved around the balancing of state governance with moral values in state authority (Gerasimov et al., 2005).

Within Britain, the ‘nation was now regarded as the balanced combination of royal and parliamentary power’ (Breuilly, 1994: 86; see also Elias, 1996). Indeed, through processes of functional democratization, the middle classes had become more numerous and powerful by the end of the nineteenth-century (Thompson, 2008). Whereas the parliamentization of British social life occurred much earlier compared to other European states (Elias, 1986; 1996), the monopoly of the English parliament was able to unite the three kingdoms, at least politically, from the eighteenth-century onwards, with Ireland joining the Union in 1801. Here, British power was ultimately organised and expressed through Parliament (Wellings, 2008) which provided both an ‘ideological and organisational function for the British state’ (Breuilly, 1994: 85). More importantly, however, in ‘an age to which the notion of natural rights was foreign … the constitutional rights of Parliament had to be based upon historical precedent’ (Breuilly, 1994: 85). Therefore, middle class elites and its intellectual sections, increasingly founded an ideal image of themselves based not on family ancestry (a trait readily available for the aristocracy) but on the nation’s past (Elias, 1996). Here, in conjunction with the working classes, national pride and sentiment became rooted in a nation’s
ancestry and past achievement (Elias, 1996). In the case of Britain, however, such pride was also symbolically tied to its position as head of the a global empire (Elias, 1996; Howe, 2010; Kumar, 2003; ref)

Accordingly, the parliamentization of a predominantly middle class electorate was entwined with the national image of a modern monarchy and an industrial bourgeoisie morality of middle class values. More importantly, however, for Britain this process would also contain an important imperial dimension. That is, alongside ‘the emergence of a state in which aristocratic principles of governance increasingly gave way to professional ones’ (Thompson, 2008: 46) stood a ‘burgeoning bureaucratic and professional middle class [that] saw the British imperial world as their oyster; and their increasingly prominent and powerful position in the state is to be explained as much by their achievements abroad as at home’ (Thompson, 2008: 48). Indeed, while ‘The contest between the aristocracy and the professions, as it manifested itself in the imperial sphere, was about where social authority ultimately lay’ (Thompson, 2008: 46), Devine (2011) notes that:

The eighteenth century can, in retrospect, be seen as the classic period of British imperial expansion. The following one hundred years maintained the territorial momentum but at the same time saw unprecedented British influence expand across the globe, even over nations where the United Kingdom claimed no sovereign authority. (2011: 56)

Consequently, empire proved an important factor in creating a ‘Greater Britain’ outside the British Isles. Proposed plans to form an ‘Imperial Federation’ during the nineteenth-century aimed to forge a military, economic and political union between Britain and the colonies (Schumpeter, 1976) as well as revealing how the ‘imperial world’ (2008: 48) played an important part in notions of civilization and state identity.

Indeed, elsewhere Van Krieken (1999) has explored how processes of colonisation formed part of broader ‘civilizing processes’. In fact, Dunning and Hughes (2012) highlight that according to Elias:

the concept of ‘civilisation’ in French and English had … come to be a high-praise term that expresse[d] the national self-consciousness of colonising peoples who had enjoyed secure national boundaries and a corresponding sense of national identity for centuries. Together with this, went a tendency to want to ‘civilise barbarians’ in fact as well as in ideological justification
Accordingly, ‘Civilisation’ and its accompanying personality and behavioural tendencies were to reflect a ‘hegemonic belief in a European cultural mission and the concept of the gradual “elevation” of backward societies’ (Conrad, 2013: 553). Conrad (2013) notes:

As evolutionist ideas became widespread, such ideas became pre-dominant, supported as they were by liberal, Social Darwinist and racial world-views. … All these initiatives, however, needed to engage with, and were frequently informed by, the hegemonic ideology of civilising mission and development. (2013: 553)

As can be seen, perceptions regarding Europe’s higher state of civilization can be seen as emerging from the gradual transformations that began with the absolutist state (Linklater and Mennell, 2010). Here, ‘Civilisation’, enacted through imperial nationalism, came to be the dominant mode of self-expression amongst Western states (of which the move from ruling class to state control had been achieved).

Conclusion

Through his theory of ‘civilizing processes’ Elias (2012) was able to highlight a number of underlying structural processes in the relationship between state formation and personality structures. Here, Elias (1982) argued that ‘civilization is very closely related to the growing interweaving and interdependence of people … this interweaving can be seen as it were in the process of becoming’ (1982: 52 [italics added]). To this extent, a process sociological approach to national identity formation can be used to explore how past and present changes within and outside the nation have served to underlie its discursive construction.

With this in mind, this chapter has drawn upon various theoretical discussions regarding national identity as well as popular orientations regarding the nation and the emergence of the nation-state. Indeed, when viewing the gradual emergence of the nation-state links can be drawn between the work of Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008), Smith (1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) and Elias (1996; 2010; 2012). Indeed, while Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008) viewed nationalism as a political principle that emerged from within industrial societies, Elias’s approach viewed such processes as closely entwined with the gradual formation of the state, a process that was predicated on changes in the balance of power between the aristocracy and a
rising middle class (monopoly of taxation and violence/’taming of the warriors’). From this, a collective national identification emerged, through which both the ‘imagining’ (Anderson, 2006) and ‘inventing’ (Hobsbawm, 1983; 1990) of the nation, its history, culture and identity (Elias, 1996; Maguire and Tuck, 2005) formed an important part of the construction of national identity.

Similarly, Elias’s attention towards the long-term developments (sociogenesis/psychogenesis) underpinning state formation and national identity corresponds with Smith’s (1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) work on national ethnie. Contrary to Smith however, is Elias’s ability to inter-relate socio-psychological transformations with the promulgation of an idealised national self-image (Maguire and Tuck, 2005). Here, transformations at the sociogenetic level can – over-time – have a gradual effect on identity and the emotional repertoire of individuals and collective groups.

Taking into consideration Elias’s work on state development processes and national habitus, it is possible to observe how civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation serve to analytically separate ‘ethno-linguistic layers of social habitus on the one side, and layers where the state has influenced the social habitus on the other’ (Kuzmics and Axtmann, 2007: 7). This dichotomy denies examinations of how ‘composite’ or ‘multi-layered states or empires’ are formed over time, and, more importantly, that ‘ethno-linguistic layers’ and state influences are fundamentally interdependent (Kuzmics and Axtmann, 2007: 7). In particular, by exploring ‘processes and change in figurations’ (Kaspersen and Gabriel, 2008: 374; see also Atkinson, 2003; Connolly and Dolan, 2012), studies of social habitus can go ‘beyond’ the nation-state in order to include broader processes of imperial expansion (Darwin, 2010; Rose-Greenland, 2013).

With this in mind, the following chapter will explore how ties of interdependence, both within the UK and the British Empire, formed an important part of Britain’s state formation and imperial expansion. Specifically, it will consider the effects of these processes in relation to the emergence of the British ‘domestic’, and, later, ‘imperial’ figurations.
Chapter Two: Britain – From State to Empire

Introduction

This chapter will develop upon the conclusions presented in chapter one by exploring how the complexity of international relationships can effect national identity formation. Consequently, it will be argued that national identity ‘never signifies anything static, unchanging, or substantial, but rather is always an element situated in the flow of time, ever changing, something involved in a process’ (Wodak et al., 1999: 11 [italics added]). With this in mind, a process sociological perspective will be used to examine the relational complexities surrounding identification processes. In particular, this will be used to examine how state formation processes (‘taming of the warriors’/monopoly of taxation and violence) are related to, and, affected by, expanding webs of international interdependency.

Furthermore, this chapter will be underpinned by an Eliasian appreciation that our ‘whole outlook on life continues to be psychologically tied to yesterday’s social reality’ (Elias, 1986: 35 cited in Van Krieken, 1998: 58). Often, the ‘baggage handed down through the generations’ contains ‘a range of possible roles available to a given generation at a given time’ (Duffy, 2008: 62). As a result, in the decades following the American Revolution, both the United States and British Canada (Upper Canada) were shaped by the imperial experiences of both Thomas Jefferson (third President of the United States, 1801-09) and John Graves Simcoe (first Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, 1792-98). Hatter (2012) notes:

The common trans-continental ambitions of Jefferson and Simcoe and their similar prescriptions for empire reflect their shared experience as citizens of the British Atlantic world. The shared past of Jefferson and Simcoe, as subjects of the British Empire, shaped the way both thought about governance, politics and economics (2012: 139)

Both Jefferson and Simcoe’s visions of empire would reflect their own common experience of Anglo-American relations (Hatter, 2012). In the case of Britain, this reveals the important role-played by its imperial history and how this can be utilised in order to examine contemporary forms of national identification. Specifically, how do historical interrelations between former imperial and colonial nations allow us to make sense of national identifications?

The following sections will attempt to answer this question by examining the
dynamic complexities surrounding both national and imperial identifications across multinational, imperial units such as Britain and the former British Empire. Consequently, developing upon the arguments presented in the previous chapter, this chapter will serve to elaborate upon the entwined complexities involved in both state formation (sociogenesis) and national identification (psychogenesis) processes. Maguire (1999) has commented upon the complexity of identity with regards to multi-national state systems, noting that, ‘people in complex nation-states, have multiple identities that are many-layered – local, regional, national [and] global’ (1999: 185). Elsewhere, Elias (1996) also argues that ‘a multi-party parliamentary system is a considerably more complex and difficult governmental form which requires a correspondingly more complex and more differentiated personality structure’ (1996: 292). Subsequently, while ‘national identities in the United Kingdom are highly complex and ambiguous’ (McCrone, 1992: 208), a process sociological approach can provide a critical examination of the complex relations and multi-national dynamics underpinning British identity.

With this in mind, sections 2.0 to 2.1.1. will seek to draw upon a range of process sociological concepts and theories in order to examine how Britain’s domestic and imperial relations have been shaped by processes of functional democratization, expanding ties of state and imperial interdependence and the ‘figurational relationships and changing dynamics of “I”, “we” and “they” pronouns’ (Moore, 2010: 3.3). More importantly, however, this discussion will be supplemented with an examination of the historical development of British identity both within Britain and the former British Empire (Goudsblom, 1977).

Indeed, studies of British identity have often focused upon the social and cultural context of the British Isles. Rarely are the old dominions of the former empire given equal consideration. Here, a historical analysis of the literature on the British Empire can expose the complex nature of British identity across the UK and the former British Empire. In particular, by focusing on the imperial interdependences between Britain and the former dominions, an investigation of the structural processes underlying Britain’s state-formation as well as its imperial expansion and decline, can be considered. Moreover, this can provide a socio-historical analysis of the social processes that have served to shape the British national consciousness (Mennell, 1994). To this extent, sections 2.3 and 2.3.1. will draw upon available literature regarding the British Empire, focusing in particular on Britain and the white dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Central to this understanding will be a consideration of the social, cultural and
political relations between Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales.

Importantly, however, this chapter is not intended to offer a complete history of the British Empire. Instead, the following sections will draw upon specific elements of the literature on British history that focuses specifically on British identity. Consequently, the focus will be on the long-term developments in British identity and how this has impacted upon British social habitus (Elias, 1996). For this to succeed, a closer look at Elias’s (1978) concept of the ‘figuration’ is required.

2.0. Adopting a ‘figurational’ analysis

Central to the work of Elias, and the process sociology perspective, is the concept of the ‘figuration’. Elias (1978) explains:

The image of the mobile figurations of interdependent people on a dance floor perhaps makes it easier to imagine states, cities, families and also capitalist, communist and feudal systems as figurations. By using this concept, we can eliminate the antithesis, resting finally on different values and ideals, immanent today in the use of the words ‘individual’ and ‘society’. One can certainly speak of a dance in general, but no-one will imagine a dance as a structure outside the individual or as a mere abstraction. The same figurations can certainly be danced by different people; but without a plurality of reciprocally orientated and dependent individuals, there is no dance. Like every other social figuration, a dance figuration is relatively independent of the specific individuals forming it here and now, but not of individuals as such. It would be absurd to say that dances are mental constructions abstracted from observations of individuals considered separately. The same applies to all other figurations. Just as small dance figurations change – becoming now slower, now quicker – so too, gradually or more suddenly, do the large figurations we call societies (1978: 262)

Indeed, Elias’s use of the dance floor metaphor serves to reflect how analyses of the nation-state form part of a far larger history of human organisation, before which, families, clans and tribes served as the basis of social organisation (Ozdalgo, 2005). In fact, Goudsblom (1977) states:

Since families form part of larger social figurations, it will be very difficult to explain the observed changes in terms of family life alone. A wider perspective, in both a spatial and a temporal sense, is needed: the family must be seen in the context of other groups, and the changes occurring here and now must be recognised as episodes in much further reaching long-term developments (1977: 3)
With this in mind, it is possible to observe how nation-states form part of much wider global figurations of nation-states, each comprising their own interdependent relations (Goudsblom, 1977).

There are important implications underlying this perspective. Indeed, rather than viewing both the individual, and, at a larger level, nation-states, as independent, Elias’s figurational approach chose to explore the various pressures that individuals and groups placed on one another (Linklater and Mennell, 2010). Maguire (2012) outlines this approach when he refers to the role of ‘civilizational complexes’:

Civilizational complexes can encompass whole families of societies … Such complexes clearly have long-term temporal dimensions, stretching across successive generations and societal formations … It is also important to note that, within these overall complexes, regional figurations arise and relatively distinctive patterns, and countervailing tendencies have and do emerge (Maguire, 2012)

Importantly, this requires paying close attention to the inter-civilizational relations that have formed part of a long-term overall process of changing social development, whereby, the individual and the state have emerged to form part of increasingly complex and more closely integrated international networks (Mennell, 2007; Quilley and Loyal, 2004).

However, while we cannot deny the omnipresence of change in society, we fail to apply these same dynamics to social categories, which are inevitably portrayed as static and unchangeable. Goudsblom (1977) elaborates:

Our whole vocabulary is attuned to a static conception of the social world; it tends to reduce all processes to conditions. Terms expressing process like bureaucratization and industrialization are only derivatives from ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘industry’; the static concepts come first … There have been few attempts to put dynamic concepts at the centre of sociology (1977: 133)

The state centricity of national identity research has often circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand the vast ensemble of globally-orientated movements, exchanges and practices, which are not reducible to the state (Biswas, 2007). Thus, by ‘being committed to certain groups and to the immediate hopes and fears of these [national] groups’ they fail to ‘grasp larger figurational structures and long-term developments’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 8).

Consequently, while it is just as important not to think of individuals as fixed and invariable, it is equally important not to conceive national identity as static but as
continually changing and developing over the course of time and across space (Maguire, 1995). Goudsblom (1977) acknowledges this development when he notes that:

human societies themselves are not an eternal given; and in the few hundred millennia of their known existence, they have undergone such profound changes that it makes little sense to try to account for any given social structure without considering its developmental nature (1997: 133)

Accordingly, while ‘British people moved around these transnational networks, webs, or systems, Britishness itself shifted and moved’ (Van Duinen, 2013: 344).

Parenthetically, these concerns are observed within the work of Williams (1977), who while commenting upon the ‘social’ nature of language, argued that the synchronic isolation of linguistic structures excluded the role of historical change (Morgan and Preston, 1993). In line with Elias (1996), one can only begin to grasp these changes ‘when static models are replaced by dynamic models, when societies as well as individuals are seen as processes of development’ (1996: 335 [italics added]).

Here, processes of re-imagination (Anderson, 2006) and re-invention (Hobsbawm, 1983) can be used to grasp the continuous fluctuations affecting national identity in light of ‘post- or late-modern expressions of nationalism’ (McCrone et al., 1998: 16). As a result, national identity, much like social development, is not unilinear or inevitable but subject to adaptation, alteration and negotiation (Goudsblom, 1977). Indeed, R. Collins (2012) provides a similar argument by advocating for a ‘dynamic theory of nationalism’, which is moulded by the ‘time patterns of social processes’ (2012: 3). Viewed through an Eliasian lens, however, social processes of functional democratization within state formation and gradual changes in the personal identification of the individual with the nation, can be seen as occurring, not independently, but alongside a ‘dense web of interdependence under the aegis of a stable power monopoly’ (Smith, 2001: 127). Indeed, the observed fluctuations in social relations (highlighted in the monopoly mechanism) can be used to consider ‘changes in the way people habitually orient themselves in the world in which they live’ and how ‘these changes are directly related to the way they are bonded with each other’ (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998: 19 [italics added]).

Ultimately, therefore, the desire here is to view the nation-state not as a static and separated phenomenon, but instead, to see its emergence, character and identity as part of a complex of past and present figural relations. In fact, in reference to
Britain, Rojek (2007) argues that the:

values of each [home] nation in the union have been formed largely through their historical, economic, political and cultural relationships with the other three. The past, present and destiny of the four nations are so intermingled that any attempt to regard them as separate entities would be misleading. (2007: 20)

Indeed, this is shared by Hopkins (1999) who notes:

the tradition of arranging history so that it fits within national borders surely needs to be revised. It is increasingly at variance with the state of the world as it stands at the end of the twentieth century and it captures only a part of the past that it seeks to explain (1999: 243)

With this in mind, a figurational analysis can help to provide ‘a more adequate theorisation of the “international” as a distinct space of social interaction – a space within which processes of mutual constitution are productive of the entities which populate the international system’ (Barkawi and Laffey, 2002: 111).

In fact, interdependent relations can be traced to the sixteenth century, where, within Britain, the combination of English, Danish and Norman social elements helped forge an ethnic community that was stabilised and preserved under the impact of external wars with Spain and France (Smith, 1986). Kumar (2003) suggests that ‘this has been the common experience of many peoples at all times, most of whom have lived in ‘composite’ or multi-layered states or empires’ (2003: 149). This corresponds with the previous chapter’s discussion on civilisations and how numerous societies have formed part of larger civilizational networks (Bowden, 2009). Here, national identities can only be given meaning when considered alongside wider social, political and cultural contexts (Malcolm, 2012). Moreover, whereas Elias did not focus on imperial relations per se his insights into European state development provide a framework for exploring the effects of ‘widening chains of interdependence’ within larger multi-national units, such as, the British Empire. The

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1 See chapter one, sections: 1.3.1, 1.5. and 1.5.1.
2 In fact, Gallo (2014) argues that the ‘imperial dimension’ and the evidence of an ‘imperial character’ have been neglected from Elias’s (1996; 2012) work on state formation. Here, Gallo (2014) notes that Elias and his followers ‘did not fully consider the elitist, Eurocentric, and “dirigist” aspects of “civilising processes”, in which the imperial dimension is embedded’ (2014). In fact, Gallo (2014) goes as far as to state that an ‘imperial dimension’ may form ‘a distinctive and recurrent feature of supposedly elite-driven and Eurocentric tendencies’ (2014). To a certain extent, this is echoed by van Krieken (1999) who notes that, ‘The ways in which we might analyse civilizing processes outside Western Europe remains a badly under examined area of study. Central here is the question of colonialism and imperialism, the ways in which nation-states have established a brutal and violent
following section will consider this in further detail.

2.0.1. Adopting an ‘interdependent’ analysis

The above section has served to trace a theoretical path that encourages us ‘to give up thinking in terms of single, isolated substances and to start thinking in terms of relationships and functions’ (Elias, 1991: 19 [italics removed]). Consequently, instead of simply examining how the ‘other’ can play an important part in delineating the specificities of a national group (Colley, 2005), Malcolm (2012) argues that ‘to fully understand such relationships one must examine the dynamic interdependence, rather than simply the co-existence, of the respective parties’ (2012: 167 [italics added]). Here, powerful and less-powerful nation-states are drawn together through processes of dynamic interdependence, in which both internal and external processes can encumber the nation (Van Benthem van den Bergh, 1992: 15). Indeed, it is these processes that serve to shape group identity (De Swaan, 1995; Mennell, 1990; Kaspersen and Gabriel, 2008).

With regards to processes of identification, however, Elias (1978) argues that in order ‘to perceive oneself as a person of whom one says “I” involves perceiving other people as “he”, “she”, “we”, “you” or “they” (1978: 125). This relationship between the individual ‘I’ (I-identity) and the collective ‘we’ (we-identity) offers one approach to transcending traditional individual/society debates (Quilley and Loyal, 2004). Elias (1978) noted that such a dichotomy:

[lead] people to believe that their actual ‘selves’ somehow exist ‘inside’ them; and that an invisible barrier separates their ‘inside’ from everything ‘outside’ – the so-called ‘outside world’ … this mode of self-perception and this image of mankind … lend[s] staying power and conviction to the ideas of ‘society’ existing beyond individuals or ‘individuals’ existing beyond society (1978: 119)

Indeed, these concerns work alongside Elias’s critique of the homo clausus (closed people) image of society (Elias, 1978; Elias, 1991; 2008b).3 Elias (1994) elaborates:

The conception of the individual as homo clausus, a little world in himself who

relationship between their own “civilization” and the supposedly “barbaric” cultures of subjected peoples’ (Van Krieken, 1999: 302 [italics added]).

3 Furthermore, O’Connor and Goodwin (2012) elaborate that Elias persistently saw the homo clauses perspective of society as dominating sociology and leading ‘sociologists [to] continually … view the individual as something existing outside of society and society as existing beyond individuals’ (2012: 483).
ultimately exists quite independently of the great world outside, determines the 
image of man [sic] in general. Every other human being is likewise seen as a 
*homo clausus*; his core, his being, his true self appears likewise as something 
divided within him by an invisible wall from everything outside, including 

Accordingly, theoretical models, such as symbolic interactionism, ‘fail to move 
beyond … [a] *homo clausus* model of human beings as possessing some basic identity 
prior to their interaction with others’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 65). Moreover, such 
perspectives fail to account for those unplanned actions that are neither planned nor 
controlled by social actors (Elias, 1978). Here it is evident that the ‘unplanned 
consequences of planned human action arise from their repercussion within a web 
woven by the actions of many people’ (Elias, 1978: 146). As a result:

> without an adequate understanding of the essential *interdependence* of human 
beings within a wide network of relationships, even theories of interaction 
would posit a pre-social individual who only became social when they engaged 
in social interaction (Van Krieken, 1998: 65 [italics in original])

 Appropriately, in counteraction to the *homo clausus* perception, Elias proposed his 
concept of *hominis aperti* (open people) (Elias, 1978; 1991; 2008b). This allowed 
one to understand that ‘the concept “individual” refers to interdependent people in the 
singular, and the concept “society” to interdependent people in the plural’ (Elias, 
1978: 125). This prevents the unnecessary separation of both the individual from 
society and *vice versa* and encourages one to consider the dynamic interdependencies 
that are forged between individuals within society as well as between societies (Elias, 
1991; 2008b; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998; O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012; Van 
Krieken, 1998).

Indeed, the process of distinguishing between the self (‘I’) and other (‘you’) has 
over the course of human history seen a closer alignment between that of the 
individual self (‘I’) and the national collective (‘we’) (Elias, 1991). That is, at the 
societal level, one of the most potent forms of collectivity that one can refer to is the 
individual nation (Maguire and Burrows, 2005). Elias (1991) elaborates:

> Collectivities which generate a nationalist ethos are structured in such a way 
that the individuals who from them can experience them – more specifically 
their emotion-laden symbols – as representatives of themselves. The love for 
one’s nation is never only a love for persons or groups of whom one says ‘you’; 
it is always also the love of a collectivity to which one can refer as ‘we’ (1991: 
151)
Accordingly, the ‘multi-layered qualities of habitus, and the intertwining of the individual and society, can be understood by thinking in terms of what Elias (1991) called the ‘we-I balance’’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 111). Drawing upon the work of Sigmund Freud, Elias (1996) suggested that:

an individual does not only have an ego-image and an ego-ideal, but also a we-image and a we-ideal. It is a central aspect of the nationalization of individual ethos and sentiment, which can be observed empirically in nineteenth-and twentieth century industrial states-societies, that the image of these state-societies, represented, among others, by verbal symbols such as ‘nation’, form an integral part of the we-images and the we-ideals of most of the individuals who form with each other societies of this type. This, in short, is one of the many instances of correspondence between specific types of social structure and specific types of personality structure (1996: 152)

Conductive with Elias’s individual (psychogenesis) and social (sociogenesis) relational analysis of civilizing processes, the conflation of the individual’s I-identity with that of a national ‘we’ corresponds with a group of people who can be distinguished as belonging to the nation and those who are deemed to be outside of it, often refereed to in the same set of pronouns as ‘they’ (Elias, 1991).

Mennell (2007) argues that:

The intellectual and emotional construction of a group’s ‘we-image’ and ‘we-feelings’ always takes place in tandem with the construction of a ‘they-image’ about some other group or groups of people, and with the development of feelings about them. (2007: 40)

In fact, elsewhere, Wagner-Paciﬁci (2010) has noted that ‘Collective shifters like “we” and “they” become particularly charged in historical transitions in which identities change or in which the identity differences are being highlighted or elided’ (2010: 1360).

Indeed, changes within the British state, most notably, post-war immigration, have resulted in attitudes towards a collective British ‘we’ taking on greater political and social significance. The perceived relationship between the collective national

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4 Maguire (1995) adds: ‘Identification with the ‘we’ perspective of different groups is necessary so the researcher can understand something of the sense in which certain actions are ‘meaningful’. At the same time it is necessary to grasp that no matter how sincere, these interpretations can be misleading. Comparison of different ‘we’ perspectives will help, but the employment of ‘they’ perspectives which show the interrelationships from a greater distance offers a more adequate view of how the intentions and actions of the various groups are interlocked’ (1995: 16)
‘we’ and the distinctly outsider ‘they’ has remained a contentious issue since the British Nationality Act of 1948.\(^5\) Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech provides a particular example of the political dynamics surrounding such a relationship and the ‘homogenous we’ that a common sense of identity can elicit. A summary of Powell’s description of Britain is provided by Parekh (2000):

Britain was a fundamentally individualist society and had always cherished the rights and liberties of the individual. This was more true of it than of any other society, and the roots of its individualism went as far back as the beginning of its history and were deeply embedded in the character of the British people … The British were a cohesive people, intensely aware of their ethnic identity, and bound by deep ties of kinship and loyalty to those of their kind at home and abroad. They had a strong sense of ‘the homogenous we’ and instinctively knew who was ‘one of them’ and who was an ‘outsider’ (2000: 9 [italics added])

Ironically, Powell’s portrayal of collective identity, common values and shared British character reflects a more general attitude within contemporary British identity politics (Parekh, 2000; see also Kramer, 2003; Milbank, 2011; Settle and Curtis, 2007; The Economist, 1999). A more recent speech by British Prime Minister, David Cameron, stated that:

What I’m about to say is drawn from the British experience, but I believe there are general lessons for us all. In the UK, some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practised at home by their parents whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries. But they also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity (Cameron, 2011, PM’s speech made at the Munich Security Conference [italics added])

The idea of a shared collective identity (‘our collective identity’) is assumed through assumptions regarding a common British experience and the distinguishing of the ‘they’, those whom find it difficult to assimilate with such values (Condor et al., 2006). Former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, shared similar assumptions, noting that:

While the United Kingdom has always been a country of different nations and thus of plural identities – a Welshman can be Welsh and British just as a Cornishman or woman is Cornish, English and British – and maybe Muslim, Pakistani or Afro Caribbean, Cornish, English and British – the issue is whether we retreat into more exclusive identities in 19th century conceptions of blood,

\(^5\) This allowed imperial British subjects from locations, such as, the West Indies, to work within Britain without a visa (Rush, 2011).
race and territory, or whether we are still able to celebrate a British identity which is bigger than the sum of its parts and a Union that is strong because of the values we share and because of the way these values are expressed through our history and our institutions (Brown, 2004, ‘British Identity’, British Council Annual Lecture, 7 July cited in Condor et al., 2006: 127 [italics added])

The portrayal of shared values and common history within Cameron and Brown’s speeches can be identified as highlighting the collective embodiment of a national ‘we’ image, which is based upon a common history and shared experience (Elias, 1991). Moreover, Brown’s mention of the ‘plural identities’ comprising Britain seeks to point towards the multiple and various levels of identity within Britain.

Therefore, in order to examine these multiple and various levels of identity within Britain, it is important to expand analyses of the nation to include the interdependencies that constitute and encompass the nation-state. In fact, in much the same way that individuals recognise one another, Hegel (1967) argued that a ‘state is as little an actual individual without relations to other states as an individual is actually a person without rapport with other persons’ (1967: 331n). In this respect, Elias’s (1991) understanding of ‘we’ and ‘they’ identities can be used to further elaborate upon the interdependencies between, and, within, states as well as their effects upon the national-self image (Moore, 2010). This can be particularly beneficial for the study of multi-national forms of identification, such as British identity, as well as those nations formerly part of larger imperial figurations. Indeed, the work of Pocock (1975; 1992; see also Bourke, 2010) points to the mutual and reciprocal relations that both Elias (1978; 2012) and Goudsblom (1977) highlight in

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6 The following example by Elias (1991) can help to further elaborate on the importance of this wider collective: ‘One does not understand a melody by considering each of its notes in isolation, unrelated to other notes … It is similar with a house. What we call its structure is not the structure of the individual stones but of the relations between the individual stones of which it is built; it is the complex of functions the stones have in relation to each other within the unity of the house … the structure of the house, cannot be explained by thinking about the shape of the individuals stones independently of their relations to each other; on the contrary, the shape of the stones can only be explained in terms of their function within the whole functional complex, the structure of the house. One must start by thinking about the structure of the whole in order to understand the form of the individual parts. These and many other phenomena have one thing in common, different as they may be in all other respects: to understand them it is necessary to give up thinking in terms of single, isolated substances and to start thinking in terms of relationships and functions. And our thinking is only fully equipped to understand our social experience once we have made this switch’ (1991: 18-19 [italics in original]). Consequently, while we cannot understand the house without the individual stone, similarly, one cannot understand national identity without considering the wider global complex (Elias, 2012; Goudsblom, 1977; Maguire, 2011; Smith, 2010).
their ‘interdependent’ examinations. Here, Pocock (1975) directs attention towards relations within the UK but also its culture overseas, both interacting with one another in multiple and complex ways. Subsequently, Pocock (1982) states that British history:

cannot be written as the memory of a single state or nation or as the process by which one came into existence. It must be a plural history, tracing the processes by which a diversity of societies, nationalities and political structures came into being and situating in the history of each and in the history of their interactions the processes that have led them to whatever forms of association or unity exists in the present or have existed in the past (Pocock, 1982: 317, 320 cited in Kumar, 2003: 13)

To this extent, the formation of the British state was itself a process closely entwined with the development of an imperial web of interdependence (Mennell, 1990). Consequently, by focusing upon the functional dynamics that structure collective groups, one is able to consider that how people and nations as well as multi-national organisations, such as, empires, both at an individual and a collective level, are interdependently related (Elias, 1978).

Despite this, however, examinations of the effects of globalisation processes and the intermingling of national economic, political and cultural structures, have often considered empire as a ‘pre-national category’ (Gerasimov et al., 2005: 35). Indeed, the realities of a post-national world have resulted in what Howe (2010) describes as a lack of ‘big ideas’ in the study of empire, and in comparison with other spheres of historical and social scientific research, a lack of ‘theory building’ (2010: 5). Accordingly, it is here that the process sociological framework, and, in particular, its use of the ‘figuration’, can be used to provide an understanding of empire beyond the limited periods of the nation-centered analysis (Hutchings, 2006; Moore, 2010).

2.1. Analysing the British domestic and imperial figurations

The work of Darwin (1991; 1999; 2000; 2009; 2010; 2012) has been influential in building an approach to empire that is reflective of a networked imperial space. This ‘networked’ approach is one advocated by Lester (2001; 2006) who argues for a focus

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7 Indeed an early advocate of a ‘new imperial history’ approach, Pocock, throughout his work, encouraged the expansion of British history to consider imperial societies located outside of the British Isles.

8 Others have referred to a ‘British World-System’ (Darwin, 2009).
on ‘Imperial Networks’. Lester (2006) notes that:

Scholars who propose a networked conception of empire generally consider it more useful to try to examine multiple meanings, projects, material practices, performances and experiences of colonial relations rather than locate their putative root causes, whether they are ‘economic’, ‘political’ or indeed ‘cultural’. These relations were always stretched in contingent and non-deterministic ways, across space, and they did not necessarily privilege either metropolitan or colonial spaces. They remade both metropolitan and colonial places in the act of connecting them. (2006: 131)

The possibility for colonial sites to be ‘remade’ is considered further in Misra’s (2008) examination of ‘imperial agency’. Indeed, while there has been ‘an understandable search to recover indigenous agency’ (Misra, 2008: 136) in imperial research, Misra (2008) argues that there is a tendency to exaggerate the effects of national agency within empire. Consequently, in accordance with Lester (2001; 2006), Misra (2008) focuses attention on thinking about the British Empire as a system or network (Misra, 2008). Both Misra’s (2008) ‘system’ and Lester’s (2006) ‘network’ conceptions can be viewed through Elias’s conception of ‘figuration’. Accordingly, much like Lester’s (2006) promotion of an imperial ‘web’, a figurational analysis can serve to elucidate upon the ‘double nature of the imperial system’, its ‘fragile’ and ‘dynamic’ qualities, as well as ‘remind[us]’ that empires were not just structures, but processes as well’ (Lester, 2006: 133).

More importantly, however, a figurational analysis can conceptualise these ‘processes’ in relation to ‘power balances’. Here, balances of power between groups form an integral part of inter- and intra-group dynamics. Calhoun’s (1994) references to the tensions underlying European identity serves to highlight the power balances that exist between larger collective units and smaller national communities:

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9 Potter (2007) elaborates upon this change in analyses of the British Empire, noting that, ‘Historians of the British Empire have recently also begun to write about webs and networks and to discuss the role of the mass media in creating imperial communities. In particular, historians of the early nineteenth century have shown how groups of white settlers used newspapers to communicate information and opinion to audiences in Britain and other parts of the empire. Some of these historians argue that, in the process, settlers rehearsed claims to membership in a global British community and discussed ideas about the nature of “Britishness.”’ (Potter, 2007: 621). In relation to analyses of the mass media, Potter (2007) adds that a networked conception, as used by scholars of globalization as well as by imperial historians, does help us escape a narrow national analyses of the mass media.

10 Corresponding with studies that focus solely on the nation, examination of ‘imperial agency’ may tend to inevitably discover or over-exaggerate national differences and the nation’s unique aspects, rather than seeing the nation as part of a relational process (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).

11 In Misra’s (2008) article, greater importance is placed on thinking about the British Empire as a system or network. For the course of this thesis Misra’s (2008) ‘system’ will be supplemented with a process sociological vernacular, which shall view the empire as an ‘imperial figuration’.
Programs for the unification of Europe draw on new histories which emphasize the commonality of the European experience and identity; the specificity of Europe is counterposed to the rest of the world, rather than the specificity of France being counterposed to Britain or the Netherlands. At the same time, fringe nationalist movements (and claims for regional autonomy) flourish within the European Community, while on its eastern border, the former Yugoslavia and perhaps other countries seem set to splinter into tiny nation-states (1994: 319).

Accordingly, the applicability of Elias’s conception of power and its relation to investigations of British identity will be considered further in Chapter Three. For now, however, it is possible to note that national identity is often dependent upon ‘complex and multi-perspectival stor[ies] of interconnectedness and interdependency’ (Moore, 2010: 3.7), through which balances of power and struggles of integration form an important part of identification processes.

Subsequently, in order to make sense of ‘contemporary social behaviour’ it is important to observe how identities and ‘behaviours are formed, transformed, and understood over time, mainly as a result of shifting social interdependencies between people’ (Atkinson, 2003: 7). As a result, ‘the whole position of the individual in his [sic] society, and thus the personality structures of individuals and their relations to each other, are changed in a specific way’ (Elias, 1991: 177). That is, as the structural characteristics of societies change, so too does the personality of its inhabitants (Mennell, 1990). Indeed, when applied to the literature on Britain and British identity it is possible to examine how from 1707 onwards, national identity, amongst those nations comprising the imperial figuration, was often found in relation to the British Empire. In effect, whereas Kumar (2003) highlights the imperial aspects within English national identity, he presents just part of a wider imperial picture: the

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12 See chapter three, section 3.1.
13 This analysis can also be considered in relation to micro and macro dynamics. Mennell (2009) highlights that Elias’s work combined both micro and macro endeavours within sociological research by exploring how behaviour by and between individuals was related to the formation and emergence of the nation-state (Mennell, 2009). Here, Malcolm (2012) notes that changes in the social structure occur in accordance ‘with micro-level developments in emotional control’ (Malcolm, 2012: 170). In regards to national identity, Malcolm (2012) adds that, ‘If … micro-level changes in emotional control relate to broader social structural changes, then it stands to reason that people in different social structural arrangements – that is to say nations – behave in different ways’ (2012: 171).
14 The union of 1707 can be regarded as a significant point at which the conception of Great Britain was established, signifying the political union between England, Wales and Scotland. Later, in 1801, Ireland would be included, forming the United Kingdom of Great Britain (Pittock, 2012). Whereas, Colley (2005) highlights that such a union was made in defense of threats from abroad, predominantly the French, Cohen (1994) elaborates upon this to suggest that Britain was also perceived in light of the external opportunities provided by its expanding empire.
British Imperial picture. Here, the British Empire helped to formulate a British national-imperial consciousness that drew together an extended range of national groups, whereby, the protection and oppression of national identity were ‘closely related social functions’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 147).

With this in mind, it remains necessary to map out precisely how this relates to the ‘deep-structural processes’ underpinning the British state and empire (Dunning, 1986: 214). As highlighted in the previous chapter, one can begin to perceive the social transformations, which occurred during the eighteenth century, as an important moment in the emergence of national characteristics and sentiments across Europe.\(^{15}\) For Britain, this ideal image of the nation would, during the eighteenth-century, be marked by its imperial expansion, a process that would have important implications with regards to the identity, nature and character of Britain. With this in mind, the following sections will consider the gradual emergence of the British domestic and imperial figuration.

### 2.1.1. Growing ties of interdependence: the gradual emergence of the British domestic and imperial figurations

The gradual emergence of the British state in 1707 was driven by the four warring home nations. Indeed, Devine (2011) notes that ‘Scotland’s emergence as a nation made out of miscellaneous tribal groupings in the medieval period was in large part the result of a centuries-old struggle to defend the kingdom from English aggression’ (Devine, 2011: 8). Similarly, within Ireland, English involvement can be traced to the twelfth-century. After Henry II’s invasion in 1171:

Anglo-Norman knights subsequently came to own significant quantities of Irish land, adopted a range of Irish customs and manners and, in the process, became distanced from the interests of the English. Ultimately, however, this group were never fully integrated, and formed the core of what subsequently became known as the Anglo-Irish. (Malcolm, 2012: 90)

Furthermore, in 1284 Edward I, defeated the last of the Welsh princes, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (1223-1282) (Malcolm, 2012). Absorption of Welsh culture, education and legal systems were incorporated with England when the Tudor dynasty took charge of

\(^{15}\) Elias (1996) states that ‘a shift in priority from humanist and moral ideals and values applicable to people in general to nationalist ideals which placed an ideal image of country and nation above general human and moral ideals in one’s scale of values, can be observed in the outlook of the middle classes of most European countries between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries’ (1996: 134).
the English throne in 1485 (Weight, 2002). In 1536, Henry VIII’s Act of Union officially incorporated Wales into the English realm (Weight, 2002).

Accordingly, while tensions between the four home nations would continue throughout the eighteenth-century it is possible to identify a sense of cultural nationalism in England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, held together by powerful emotional attachments to distinct ethnic groups (Bairner, 2001; McCrone, 1992; 2006; Perryman, 2009). Indeed, despite the successful union of England, Scotland and Wales in 1707, cultural and national individuality was still prevalent, demonstrated via the Welsh language and the continuation of Scottish law and religion within Britain. Not only did these national distinctions highlight the disparities between England and the surrounding Celtic nations but also between the individual nations themselves (Colley, 2005).

In particular, Colley (1984) notes that ‘one of the most notable phenomena in the social history of this period – the proliferation of clubs and learned societies – reflected an increase in patriotic as well as in dissident pressure groups (they could indeed be one and the same)’ (1984: 98). In such instances, ‘one could both retain one’s distinctiveness in ethnic or even national terms and, at the same time, share in the new British identity made available by the newly created British state’ (Kumar, 2003: 145). This apparent assimilation between both national and British identifications was itself emerging as early as the Union of the Crowns in 1603. Pittock (2012) notes that ‘the Union of the Crowns created a paradox with respect to Scottish sovereignty: within it Scotland both was and was not a state in the Westphalian sense’ (2012: 12). In fact, attempts at establishing various forms of British Union were tried by Edward I and Oliver Cromwell but these were largely ‘attempts’ and nothing more (Rojek, 2007). Accordingly, after the Union of 1707, ‘a militaristic tradition had been developed … in which ‘Scottish’ and ‘British’ were not incompatible’ (McCrone, 1992: 209). By connecting both nationalist and British discourses, the British state provided a space in which British identity could be adopted, redefined and contested.

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16 Rojek (2007) notes that, ‘the efforts of Edward I (1239-1307) – who sought to create the first ‘Empire’ in the British Isles by subduing the Welsh and crushing the Scots (one of his sobriquets was ‘the Hammer of the Scots’) – and Oliver Cromwell’s conquest of Ireland and Scotland during the seventeenth century ‘Commonwealth’… both laid the ground for durable alliances between national factions in all four nations and London and sowed the seeds of lasting enmities’ (2007: 14)
With this in mind, two interrelated factors helped lay the foundations for an emerging British identity during the eighteenth-century (Colley, 2005; Kumar, 2003; Schama, 2001). Firstly, whereas the work of Colley (2005) highlights the importance of the Protestant religion in uniting both Britain and its emerging colonies, Kumar (2003) reveals that ‘competing regional and even national identities could crystalize around whichever branch of the Protestant family happened to be dominant’ (2003: 160). In fact, broader attempts to explain the development of Western nation-states have often been aligned with Max Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’ (McCrone, 1992). Commenting upon the work of Gordon Marshall, McCrone (1992) notes that ‘by the late seventeenth century, certain Scottish entrepreneurs … not only adhered to the principles of capitalist business practice, but did so through the values and ideals of ascetic Calvinism’ (1992: 38-39).

Accordingly, these values and ideals were part of a much broader process of cultural, economical and political transformation occurring within Britain. Instead, the Protestant faith obtained its greatest strength when it ‘could be seen as the core of a worldwide empire through which Protestant culture could be diffused on the widest possible scale’ (Kumar, 2003: 164). Consequently, whereas religion would provide a paradoxical role in Ireland, as well as display its own national variations within Scotland and Wales (Coakley, 2004), the Protestant faith helped forge a sense of British unionism and entitlement against the Catholic-French during the Seven Years War (Colley, 2005). Britain was not necessarily a deeply religious state but the Protestant faith remained so engraved within the forming of British culture that it continued as an enduring part of people’s daily lives (Colley, 2005).

Secondly, alongside a shared Protestant faith was the rise of a ‘British’ landed gentry across Britain (Colley, 2005). Indeed, Colley (2005) notes that:

all of these developments – a massive transfer of land by way of inheritance and purchase, an unprecedented rise in the profitability of land and increasing intermarriage between Celtic and English dynasties – helped to consolidate a new unitary ruling class in place of those separate and specific landed establishments that had characterised England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland in the Tudor and Stuart eras (2005: 161)

Consequently, whereas the amalgamation of upper and middle-class behaviours, such as that witnessed between the urban bourgeoisie circles and the landed nobility, helped to forge the beginnings of a British ‘nationalization’ (Elia, 2012), local rule of
Britain’s peripheral nations was intricately tied to the British state. Here, the example of Highland dress reveals how:

Highland elites used cultural imagery because it helped them to secure political capital within the fiscal-military state. Counter-intuitively, in adopting Highland dress, elites attempted to express a Highland affinity with Whig narratives of Britain’s political, commercial and constitutional pre-eminence, thus advancing the legitimacy of local rule. As had been the case for several generations of Highland elites, good relations with the state were believed to be the surest means of safeguarding certain socio-economic aspects of local authority. (Dziennik, 2012: 145)

Therefore, it is possible to conceive how the legitimacy of the Highland elite in Scotland was a status that was interdependently tied to the wider political balance of power within Britain, power that ultimately resided in London.

In fact, from the beginning of the English settlement in Ireland, to the political union of England, Scotland and Wales, a series of power relations between the four nations can be sketched. Indeed, this can reveal broader structural processes underpinning the development of Western European nations more broadly. Elias (1982) states that in ‘The mechanism of state-formation … we always find, at least in the history of the great European states, an early phase in which units of the size of a territory play the decisive role within the area later to become a state’ (1982: 98). As a result, ‘areas like the principality of Wales or the kingdom of Scotland, now merged with England in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (Elias, 1982: 98).

Consequently, national identity and British identity were not static classificatory systems but processes of development that occurred alongside changes in the social structures surrounding them (Goudsblom, 1977). More broadly, these developments within Britain can be aligned with changes in the concept of empire and the European sense-of-self. Smith (2001) highlights that:

In this broad sense, empire has a close relationship to the idea of sovereignty, the absolute control asserted by secular monarch over their subjects and, later, by the state within the polity. The term ‘empire’ also refers to the total command over nature envisaged by Europe’s philosophers of science from Francis Bacon onward … The idea of human empire was a major ideal and legitimizing concept in modern Europe, especially as religious authority declined and belief in divine guidance began to fade. Scientific exploration, service to the state and the conquest of other peoples were mutually supportive activities, all expressing the belief in ‘empire’ (2001: 122)
Indeed, the awareness of an external geography outside of Britain helped to facilitate a sense of Britishness that allowed British citizens to believe themselves as different from those within Europe (Colley, 2005). As a result, the enclosed British Isles provided a British boundary that exhibited a stark contrast to Europe, where national boundaries would continue to fluctuate throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Colley, 2005).

Certainly, within Britain, a combination of ‘imperial’ interpretations would occur. That is, changing power balances within British society, reveal a major shift, not only in the decentring of power from the monarchy (a heredity position that had been weakened greatly by the English Civil War) but also in the early formation of a collective ‘imperial’ British identity. Accordingly, if ‘imperial prosperity was to continue apace, then the four diverse preindustrial cultural ‘nations’ that constituted the UK had to be reconciled to an ideological ‘Greater Britain’ (Pittock, 2012: 328). In part, this would be shaped by the resulting acquisitions in colonial territory that followed Britain’s victory in The Seven Years War (Colley, 1984). As a result, over the coming century British identity would undergo its own transformations in relation to changes within ‘state power, increased long-distance economic ties, new communications and transportation capacities, and new political projects’ (Calhoun, 2004: 29). In such instances, empire, monarchy, sport and spectacle would begin to take on a more ‘imperial’ role.

With this in mind, the following sections will examine how particular processes within the development of the British state and empire served to underlie the formation of the British sense of self. In particular, these sections will stay true to Elias’s figurational analysis by examining how changes in the interdependencies between groups impacted upon forms of national identification. Importantly, however, Dunning and Hughes (2012) note that:

Elias’s emphasis on long-term ‘blind’ historical processes should by no means be taken as denying how, at particular historical junctures and under certain figurational conditions, specific individuals have been able for a while to ‘steer’ the course of social development in limited but nonetheless important ways. … Napoleon in France in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries and Hitler in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s are obvious examples. (2012: 153)

To this extent, the following sections will examine three important processes or strands in British history that helped ‘steer’ the emergence of the British state and the
construction of British identity. First, consideration will be given to the American War of Independence (1775-1783); second, the British monarchy, in particular, the reign of George III and the emergence of the British royal image, and, finally, the Industrial Revolution and British imperial emigration, will be considered.

2.2. The American Revolution: crisis and reinforcement in British Identity

Originating from Britain’s economic links in North America and the West Indies, early attempts at empire were largely driven by commercial incentive (Schama, 2001). Whereas, America would gain independence in 1783, political life within the British colonies would be situated upon a balance between metropolitan authority and colonial autonomy (Anderson, 2000). Indeed, this would be supported by mass immigration, economic legislation, ethnic ancestry, royal patronage and sporting heritage (Guttmann, 1994; Malcolm, 2012; Maguire, 1993b; Mangan, 1992a).

Accordingly, throughout the 1800s, Britain’s external empire would expand via the colonization of Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand. In particular, within New Zealand, a long tradition of European and North American trading links had led to British vessels frequenting the northern harbours of the island taking cargoes of flax and timber as well as trading with the indigenous Maori population (Dalziel, 1999). Crucially, the importance of these trade links (along with the introduction of guns and farming) would ensure that the New Zealand islands maintained a close connection with the developing British Empire (Dalziel, 1999; Mein Smith, 2012).

Importantly, however, the colonisation of Australia, Canada and New Zealand would follow in the wake of Britain’s failed attempt to maintain the thirteen colonies. For many who had migrated to the North American colonies, the ‘British’ adjective seems to have provided a ‘common term to describe their heritage, the central symbol of which was their common allegiance to the British crown’ (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a: 2-3). Indeed, Anderson (2000) argues that this ‘transatlantic political community … questioned neither their common allegiance to the Crown nor their common British identity’ (2000: xxiii). However, inspired by the spread of egalitarian values across Europe:

men like Washington and Franklin, who otherwise would have liked nothing better than to pursue honor, wealth, and power within the British imperial framework – were compelled to confront issues of sovereignty in ways that imparted new, universalistic meaning to an inherited language of rights and
liberties (Anderson, 2000: 745)

As a result, in accordance with the imperial rhetoric of the period, the American Revolution provided the opportunity to form what the revolutionaries described as an ‘empire of liberty’ (Anderson, 2000: 745).

Indeed, within Britain, concerns regarding the loss of the American colonies were highlighted by the Whig politician, Horace Walpole, who noted that ‘whatever way this war ends, it will be fatal to this country’ (Cunningham, 1857: 385-6 cited in Wasson, 2011: 22). Thus, Wasson (2011) argues that ‘The … American Revolution was not lost on the political elite. Attempts were made to reconstruct the governance of the remaining colonies and, whether by accident or design, more and more territory was added to the burgeoning empire’ (2011: 85). Accordingly, the outbreak of revolution in the North American colonies in 1775 would have a resounding effect on British identity and the British social habitus (Hatter, 2012). In particular, whereas before 1775, the British Empire reflected a geographically incoherent and politically isolated cluster of disparate colonies (Bumsted, 2008), by the end of the nineteenth-century this cluster would resemble a plethora of tightly linked colonies, some displaying responsible government, but all embraced under a collective British identity (Bumsted, 2008; Rush, 2011).

Furthermore, Anglo-Scottish relations would also be cemented during the American War of Independence, a relationship that would be reinforced during the Napoleonic wars. Devine (2011) notes that:

Between 1776 and 1783 the Scots were enthusiastically loyal to the British Crown. Even in the American colonies more loyalists were apparently born in Scotland than in any other country. (2011: 11)

After independence, Britain was left with territories in the north, soon to become Canada (Devine, 2011), whereupon Scottish emigrants were ‘able to introduce Scottish institutions into the fabric of wary colonial society’ (Devine, 2011: 19). In this respect, the loss of the American colonies in 1783 reveal not the dispelling of a wider British imperial identity but instead a moment of deep introspection within Britain with regards to the consolidation of its imperial empire

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17 Indeed, more importantly for Britain, the loss of America did not dislodge Britain as a world or naval power (Gould, 2008).
and image (Colley, 1984; Hatter, 2012). Consequently, whereas:

the war of American Independence created a new nation in the United States of America … It helped forge a very different Great Britain in which both men and women would have to work out their ideas of patriotism as never before (Colley, 2005: 145 [italics in original])

To this extent, the American war of Independence helped reinforce the perception of Britain’s empire as a vast diasporic nation (Gould, 2012), indeed, one that was acknowledged as forming part of a much larger British polity. Thus, for Britain and the remaining empire, it became essential to reconfigure the relations between the mother country and the colonies in order to forge an enduring and closely integrated global polity (Bell, 2006). Owram (2001) notes:

the British North American colonies were a laboratory in the period between the fall of the first British Empire and the rise of the second. Britain had learned from the American defeat that colonial government required a measure of colonial autonomy and a degree of flexibility (2001: 149)

Consequently, there emerged a far more conscious and officially constructed attempt to foster British patriotism during this period (Bayly, 2001).

Accordingly, the American Revolution instigated the beginning of a second British Empire, distinguishable to the old colonial system of the British Atlantic world and underscored by an industrial imperial objective (Bayly, 2001; Armitage, 2000; Mac An Ghail, 2001). The following years would also witness ‘both the remodelling of authority within Great Britain, and a recasting of what it meant to be British’ (Colley, 2005: 193). This would include ‘the British monarchy assuming many of the characteristics and much of the patriotic importance that it retains today’ (Colley, 2005: 193). These characteristics will now be considered.

\[18\] Indeed, discussions regarding the future of the empire would not again take shape until the Boer War (1899-1902), whereby Britain’s image as a global power would once again come under attack (Pugh, 2008).

\[19\] Hatter (2012) reveals that this re-construction of empire was not just attributed to the efforts of Westminster but also by the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, John Graves Simcoe. Hatter (2012) notes that ‘Simcoe articulated a vision of western development in which the perfection of English, social, political, and legal institutions would place Upper Canada at the heart of a transcontinental empire’ (2012: 135).
2.2.1. Britain and the royal image

Commenting upon the English Civil War, Schumpeter (1976) notes that:

Under the Tudors and Stuarts the absolute monarchy developed in England much as it did at the same time on the Continent. Specifically, the British Crown also succeeded in winning over the part of the nobility, the ‘cavaliers’, who subsequently sided with it against the ‘roundheads’ and who, but for the outcome of the battles of Naseby and Marston Moor, would surely have become a military palace guard. (1976: 76)

In contrast to Europe, an ‘early symptom of democratisation’ within Britain was the curbing of monarchial powers (Dunning et al., 2004: 9). Indeed, Dunning et al. (2004) elaborate that ‘a variety of processes contributed in England to the landed classes retaining a high degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the monarchical state and also, via parliament, sharing with the monarch in the tasks of ruling’ (2004: 9-10).

Accordingly, alongside the gradual emergence of Britain’s parliamentization, examinations of Britain’s monarchical families can reveal how the British royal family emerged as an important part of, and, indeed, a contentious factor in, the construction of Britain and notions of Britishness. Here, the work of Elias (1982; 1996) and Colley (2005) can be used to examine the establishment of the British royal family as a constitutive part of Britain’s national, and, later, imperial image. In particular, it is Colley’s (2005) reference to the reign of King George III, which can be used to trace long-term developments in the nationalization of the British royal family (Elias, 1978; 1996).

Referring to the loss of the American colonies in 1783, Colley (2005) reveals that:

As a limited monarch, [King] George was able to evade most of the blame for British defeat in America. The former Prime Minister, Lord North, was made the scapegoat for national humiliation; while [King George], because of his undoubted domestic prohibity, his obstinate patriotism and his adroit alliance with the boy wonder, William Pitt the Younger, came to represent for many Britons reassuring stability and honest, uncomplicated worth in the midst of disaster and disillusionment (2005: 212)

Indeed, the reign of King George III has been widely debated within literature on the influence of the British royal family during this period (Butterfield, 1957; Reitan, 1964). Much of this has centred on the King’s failure at maintaining the loyalty of the
American colonies during the American War of Independence (Middlekauff, 1982).\footnote{20} In fact, Colley’s (1984) analysis of London prints during the late 1760s reveals a propensity to ridicule both George and the British monarchy.

Yet, from the late 1780s onwards, a shift in the public image of George seems to have occurred. Colley (1984) highlights that ‘after 1789 prints portrayed him regularly as St. George, as John Bull and, after his mental collapse in 1810, as a wise, Lear-like patriarch and the celestial guardian of his nation’ (1984: 102).\footnote{21} Similarly, in many respects, King George III can be regarded as the first ‘British’ monarch. Indeed, he was the first Hanoverian monarch to be born in Britain and speak English as his first language (Watson, 1960). Furthermore, King George would also go on to survive a reign lasting longer that any of his predecessors.\footnote{22}

More importantly, however, are the characteristics of British royalty, which were established during George III’s reign. Here, royal pageantry and spectacle as well as values of domestic and familial responsibility became established as key tenets of the royal image. In regards to the ability of the monarchy to draw together Britain’s disparate nations, the ‘supreme symbol of integration … was the monarchy’ and in doing so the ‘royal function became an identifiable reality as well as a symbol in a way it had never become before’ (Robbins, 1988: 171 [italics added]). Similarly, during the Georgian period: The union flag, Jerusalem, Rule Britannia, Ordnance Survey maps, national debt, the Bank of England, national budget, public railways and the industrialisation of London, Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow would become established (Betts, 2014). In addition, Georgian Britain would also see the materialization of the office of prime minister, with the term ‘first minister’ entering common usage (Wasson, 2011).

Later, royal visits to Scotland during the nineteenth-century would help to encourage Scottish attachments to the British monarch. The kilted King George IV’s visit to Scotland in 1822 helped to reinvent the plaided tartan (a symbol of highland culture) as an iconic image of Scottish national identity and heritage (Hobsbawm, 2000).

\footnote{20} The Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by King George III would help fuel colonial unrest within the thirteen colonies.

\footnote{21} Referring to the King’s reign, Colley (2005) notes that ‘George III’s unusual longevity both as a king and as a man could be seen as a symbol of his nation’s relative stability … Very easily, the king became a lucky charm’ (2005: 224).

\footnote{22} Only Queen Victoria and the current monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, have reigned longer. Indeed, Colley (1984) adds that ‘the wartime context which allowed the king to be celebrated not only for his royalty but also because his uniquely long reign had become the prime symbol of Britain’s national identity and, in European terms, her singular success in resisting French domination’ (1984: 113).
In fact, within Wales, British sentiments were aided by ‘the monarchical embodiment of state and people’ (Loughlin, 2013: 4). Commenting upon the royal-Welsh connection, Loughling (2013) notes that:

In Wales national myth had a distinctly Whiggish character, an early history of English persecution having long been resolved through a sense of identity rooted in the Welsh origins of the Tudor dynasty, reinforced – despite sectional antagonism – by a state-wide Protestant heritage, and resulting in a sense of national identity as much British as Welsh, with the region’s respectable Nonconformist values un-problematically mirrored in those of the queen. Thus the royal-Welsh relationship in the later nineteenth century might be seen as an ‘organic’ relationship establishing emotive bonds of belonging that transcended the local and national spheres of life – even if in reality it was mainly one-sided – in a way the monarchy’s relationship with Catholic and nationalist Ireland did not. (2013: 18)

Within Scotland, the efforts of Queen Victoria would succeed ‘in establishing a Scottish identity for the monarchy’ (Loughlin, 2013: 7). Through the British monarchy, and, most notably, through the close connection between Queen Victoria and her Balmoral estate, ‘Highlandism … [was] given wholehearted royal approval and tartan [was] recognized as the badge of Scottish identity’ (Devine, 2011: 170). Here:

Victoria deliberately set out to take possession of the Scottish royal past in both its Catholic Jacobite and post-1688 dimensions, presenting herself as the personal embodiment and synthesis of those separate strains, identifying with Scottish cultural traditions, especially its hegemonic Presbyterian faith. (Loughlin, 2013: 7)

Notably, the reign of Queen Victoria would also serve an important imperial function. Coinciding with Britain’s emergence as the leading industrial global power, her idealised representation across the empire served as a linchpin of British imperial identity (Bell, 2006). Furthermore, her reign would also see the organisation of both a Golden and Diamond Jubilee (Thompson, 2005). Whereas, the Golden Jubilee of 1887 would be a largely British affair, the 1897 Diamond Jubilee was proclaimed a festival of the British Empire (Waller, 2006). This included troops and politicians from across the dominions, whom all took part in the imperial celebrations (Hibbert, 2001; Thompson, 2005; Waller, 2006). Cannadine (1983) highlights that:

from 1877, when Disraeli made Victoria empress of India, and 1897, when Joseph Chamberlain brought the colonial premiers and troops to parade in the
Diamond Jubilee procession, every great royal occasion was also an *imperial* occasion (1983: 124 [italics in original])

This was encouraged, in part, during the Victorian period by the expansion of the press (Pugh, 2008). Here ‘both the national dailies and the expanding women’s magazines promoted popular interests in the monarchy with the extra advantage of photographic illustrations’ (Pugh, 2008: 95). Indeed, it is here that relations between the British monarchy and the British media would gradually emerge with the media acting as an important link between the often obscure royal family and their British and imperial citizens. In addition, imperial relations would become closely aligned with the British monarchy during and after the reign of Queen Victoria, with frequent royal tours throughout the empire occupying the royal calendar. However, despite the royal grandeur of such occasions, the British Empire would, under the reign of Queen Elizabeth II, undergo further transformations, most notably, in its name.

Despite such changes, however, the British monarchy would remain closely tied to Britain’s imperial image. Cannadine (1983) notes:

> The last great ceremony … successfully conflating monarchy and empire, stressing stability in an age of change, and celebrating the continuity of Britain as a great power, was the coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953. For it was still avowedly an *imperial* occasion, with the queen’s dress containing embroidered emblems of the dominions, with regiments of Commonwealth and colonial troops marching in procession, with the prime ministers of the Dominions and India present in the Abbey, and an assortment of heads of state from various exotic colonial protectorates (1983: 153 [italics in original])

Nevertheless, while royal occasions were presented as ‘imperial’ occasions, from Elizabeth’s coronation onwards a ‘more “modern” attitude would begin to emerge towards royalty’ (Coward, 2008: 134). For those news journalists returning from the Second World War with ‘democratic ideals and new attitudes towards popular journalism’ a new, less deferential, relationship was forged between the British royal family and the British press (Coward, 2008: 134). This would stand in contrast to the pre-war royal press coverage that tended to report on royal matters in an awed and hushed manner (Cannadine, 1983).\(^23\)

Indeed, this relationship would come under considerable strain in light of

\(^{23}\) Indeed, the British press refrained from reporting on the ‘scandalous’ aspects surrounding the abdication of Edward VIII (1936). Instead, foreign newspapers (particularly America) provided the bulk of news regarding the Royal crisis.
Princess Diana. Coward (2008) notes:

It is impossible to separate Diana’s life from her relationship with the press and equally impossible to look at the press’ relationship with the monarchy without considering the Dianna effect. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s she was a tabloid sensation: the human face of royalty, the first glamorous and media-friendly British royal. She also became half of an unprecedented royal divorce which exposed hitherto areas of royal behaviour (2008: 136)

While Diana’s own ‘mediated’ image provided reflection on what it meant to be a modern woman during the 1980s, her death during the 1990s led to further questions regarding British identity and the its relationship with the monarchy (Coward, 2008). While the nation mourned its national ‘sweetheart’, the Royal family itself came under fire from a UK who questioned their own desire for an out-dated regime (Greenslade, 1997).

Despite this, however, it is possible to observe how, over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries; the British Royal family became intricately related to the British ‘we-image’ (Elias, 1996). Together, with increasing levels of democratization across British society the ‘symbolic function of royalty as a living representation of a national ideal steadily … increased’ (Elias, 1996: 165). 24 Indeed, Elias (1996) elaborates:

Royalty … as the living symbol of how Britons ought to behave, of the national we-ideal, had to comply, therefore, with the demands of middle-class and later of working class morality. The royal dynasty retained a limited place in the multipolar power equilibrium of British society and a larger place in the affections of the people as the embodiment of the ideal ‘we’, the collective self of the nation, provided the members of the royal house fitted into the role of a living ideal and complied, or appeared to comply, with the demands of middle- and working-class morality (1996: 166)

As a result, the symbolic function of the royal family along with the greater emphasis upon royal spectacle within Britain, helped to further stimulate a sense of Britishness across the UK (Moelker, 2003).

2.2.2. Industrialization and immigration

Together, industrialization and migration from Britain and the colonies as well as

24 In addition, continued war with France on the continent and a decrease in monarchical power within Britain, helped celebrate Britain’s national liberty, a constitutive part of its social and civic duty (Colley, 1984).
between the colonies would serve to further encourage a sense of Britain overseas (Gaines, 2012; Rush, 2011; Varadarajan, 2008). Industrial developments across Britain underscored Britain’s naval expansion (Devine, 2011) allowing for the transportation of people as well as encouraging investment in the developing colonies (Devine, 2011). Many Scottish workers, driven out by a British domestic economy that failed to provide enough jobs for its growing labour force (MacKenzie, 1998; Pugh, 2008), looked towards the colonies for work. Accordingly:

although the administration and legal systems of empire seemed to be predominantly English, the Scots set about exporting those aspects of their civil culture that had been preserved by the 1707 Act of Union. They asserted their right to develop Presbyterian missions and education in India freed from the established Anglican hierarchy. They developed colleges and schools in India and elsewhere in the dependent territories. (MacKenzie, 1998: 222)

In addition, the British Empire would also provide an opportunity for Irish Catholics to flee ethnic persecution in Ireland. Clayton (2005) notes that:

The Irish colonial experience included two contradictory elements, both shared by other colonised peoples. On the one hand, there was an intensification of the long tradition of subjecting the Catholic Irish to racist stereotyping, whose content and motivation was almost identical to that experienced by indigenous peoples in other parts of the British Empire. On the other hand, Irish Catholics played a part in the empire not only as subjects but as agents of the imperial power in the maintenance of the empire (2005: 236)

As a result, within Australia and New Zealand, Irish immigration aided the spread of both national and British culture across the colonies. In fact, Parent (2007) alludes to the greater ‘British’ cohesion that was found within the dominions compared to Britain. He notes:

Those of British ancestry cohered reasonably effectively in Australia because of expedience; they needed to cooperate to secure a distant outpost of British imperialism. So while in the British Isles there was much conflict between the Irish and the British, in Australia, though there was some friction, the Irish were generally integrated into the dominant ethnic group of whites with British ancestry (2007: 6)\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\) Similarly, Irish influence in Australia would also be found within sport. McConville and Hess (2012) note that in the emergence of Australian Rules Football, ‘the driving influence in the Victorian game [Australian Rules Football] seemed to come, as in so many of the new institutions of the gold colony, from men whose background was in Ireland rather than England. Thomas Henry Smith, a sports master at Scotch College (which along with the Melbourne Grammar School was one of the schools competing in the landmark game of 1858) had graduated from Trinity College, Dublin’ (2012: 2361).
Subsequently, during the assimilation of Irish Catholics abroad, many ‘found it easier to accommodate themselves to Britishness abroad than at home’ (Dubow, 2009: 11). The effects of the Great Famine in Ireland would eventually result in Irish migration far outnumbering England, Scotland and Wales throughout the nineteenth-century (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003b).26

Within Wales, Jenkins (2008) notes that ‘by the mid-nineteenth century … Australia was viewed by the Welsh as a land of opportunity rather than a place of exile’ (2008: 189). Supported by the gold rush of the 1850s ‘energetic prospectors and Welsh families determined to make a fresh start’ were migrating to the emerging dominion (Jenkins, 2008: 189). Along, with their Scottish and Irish counterparts, Wales’s own identity became increasingly entwined with the British Empire.

Indeed, the dispersal of British emigrants throughout the colonies would also help to encourage a separate and distinct form of colonial identification. In particular, immigration provided an important source of labour for the imperial system while at the same time acting as a powerful agent in its subversion (Varadarajan, 2008: 271). As a result, anti-British sentiment was fostered amongst the Australian working class who helped to encourage indigenous forms of national identification (Mein Smith, 2012).

Notably, the migration of Irish, Scottish and Welsh citizens during this period followed in the wake of the cramped conditions emerging in the industrial cities of Britain. Following the industrial expansion of Britain the ‘tobacco lords of Glasgow, the jute manufacturers of Dundee, the steel magnates of Sheffield, the millocracy of Manchester … the merchant princes of London and the outports, and the discreet bankers of the City’ obtained a wealth that was directly dependent on empire and imperial expansion (Hopkins, 1999: 210). Accordingly, for many of the ports and harbours throughout the empire, the outward destination was not England but the industrial ports of Aberdeen and Glasgow. Throughout this period Scotland was becoming, along with Britain, an industrial society (McCrone, 1992). In addition, Wales would also see an expansion of its commercial and urban communities (Evans, 1989). Here, ‘iron and coal production from south Wales became vitally important, particularly in terms of British imperial ambition’ (Pritchard, 2012: 328). Clydeside

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26 The Great Famine occurred between 1845 and 1852 causing mass starvation and disease across Ireland.
and the South Wales would help form the ‘control points from which trade and manufacture flowed out to the world, carried in part by the trade routes of the British Empire’ (Kumar, 2003: 168). As a result, the effects of Britain’s industrial revolution served to strengthen its ties of interdependence within Britain via an expanding global network of trade and commerce.

Furthermore, while accounts of the industrial revolution have often considered it to be a largely British phenomenon, it was also a revolution that was sustained and encouraged by the British Empire. Here, ‘the vital contribution of the slave trade, slavery … [and] colonial relations’ helped to maintain its development (Bhambra, 2010: 138). In fact, in her critique of Mann’s (2006) analysis of the Industrial Revolution, Bhambra (2010) argues that ‘industrialization continues to be regarded as a European phenomenon subsequently diffused to the rest of the world rather than one which was global in its instantiation and which had differential impacts across the globe’ (2010: 138).

Consequently, in conjunction with the rise of industry across Britain came social changes in the composition of British society. Most notably, industrial changes aided the emergence of ‘a British working class and a British labour movement’ (Kumar, 2003: 169). While for many, class loyalties provided an important sense of identification (Kumar, 2003), across British society, entrepreneurs and factory owners, along with various other middle class professionals, formed part of a rising middle class elite (Allen, 2009; MacKenzie, 1984; Kumar, 2000). Through a greater permeability in stratum barriers ‘the large industrial classes, one after the other, rose into the position of ruling classes’ (Elias, 1996: 165-66). Accordingly, ‘Oxbridge’ graduates would form just part of a wider ‘colonial’ diaspora that would help serve as ‘part of the bureaucratic machinery that formed the very basis of imperial power’ (Varadarajan, 2008: 283; see also Gaines, 2012). Here, sport would provide an important role in transferring ‘Western notions of civilized conduct … across the world as the ideas of the imperial ruling strata spread to the belief systems in the colonies’ (Linklater and Mennell, 2010).

Nevertheless, the social and political structure within Britain would also be closely dependent upon its emerging colonies. Indeed, ‘many of the central principles of modern British democracy were experimented with in the colonies of settlement and shipped back to the United Kingdom’ (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a: 5). Bridge and Fedorowich (2003a) elaborate:
in the 1840s, Canada, not Britain, was first to define responsible government. By the 1850s, five of the six Australian colonies had developed the secret ballot, more than ten years before it was introduced in the United Kingdom. In 1893, New Zealand women were the first in the empire to gain the vote, a generation before their sisters in Britain. The schools in the Australian colony of Victoria were ‘secular, compulsory and free’ well before their counterparts back home (2003a: 5)

With this in mind, the following sections will explore, in further detail, the effects of these processes in shaping British identity both within the British home nations and the former dominions.27

2.3. Imperial Britain: British identity in the UK

Within England, concerns regarding British nationalism and English patriotism, were denounced by a Westminster government who was ‘at pains to praise the imperial instincts of England’s neighbours precisely because they felt that they needed reassuring that the cry of a shared allegiance to empire was not a cloak for English aggrandisement’ (Thompson, 2005: 198). To this extent, Thompson (2008) argues that the Scots ‘were the first peoples of the British Isles to take on an imperial mentality and possible the longest to sustain one’ (2008: 51).

Indeed, over the course of the eighteenth-century Scottish involvement in empire would form an important part of Scotland’s domestic society. Despite many who assumed Scotland’s position within the British state to resemble that of Britain’s overseas colonies (Hechter, 1975), the Scots played a vital role in the administration of the British Empire. Finlay (1997) argues that:

The political vocabulary of nineteenth-century Scotland was replete with the words empire and imperial. The Union with England was referred to as the imperial partnership, Scottish Members of Parliament sat in the Imperial parliament at Westminster, Glasgow was Second City of the Empire, the Scottish economy was the Workshop of Empire and the Scots themselves were a race of Empire builders. (1997: 16)

Accordingly, throughout the nineteenth-century Scottish politicians would attempt to make the empire their own, with Scottish law, education and medicine providing the

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27 In particular, section 2.3. will focus upon the effects of the British Empire on the Scottish, Welsh and Irish identities. A closer examination of England and English identity will be considered in chapter three, section 3.2.2.. This section will explore how English constructions have formed an important part of the hegemonic representation of Britain.
backbone to the British imperial project (Colls, 2002). In addition, McCrone (1992) adds that:

by means of the tobacco trade – a supremely ‘colonial activity’ – Glasgow was raised from the status of provincial centre to its latter dominant position in the Scottish economy. Building on its native traditions, an indigenous bourgeoisie began to prosper in what was a considerably open system of social mobility (1992: 44)

As a result, towards the end of the eighteenth-century, a combination of imperial expansion and marriage alliances between the English and Scottish peerage, aided the development of a ‘British’ identification between the two nations (Colley, 2005).

However, some have perceived the lack of Scottish political autonomy as resulting in a crisis in the Scottish national consciousness (Finley, 1997; Nairn, 1977). Here, ‘Industrialisation and urbanisation was transforming the country, destroying old rural ways and values and the urban conurbations which rose up in their stead were indistinguishable from those in England’ (Finlay, 1997: 14). Underlying these developments sits a distinction between the benefits unionism offered for the Scottish elite and the Scottish public (Hechter, 1975; McCrone, 1992). Accordingly, Nairn (1977) has highlighted how the British Empire served only to benefit a small Scottish elite, whose alliance with England and Wales in 1707 served to form part of a wider British social stratum. In contrast, however, Finlay (1997) notes that the ‘value-laden judgement’ of such assessments is often based upon the assumption ‘that Scottish nationalism must be intrinsically hostile to the British state’ (1997: 15). Instead, ‘for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century there was no sense of contradiction in being both Scottish and British’, in fact for Finley (1997), ‘they were mutually reinforcing’ (1997: 15).

Consequently, it is possible to observe how the ‘expansion of capitalism in Scotland seems to have owed more to external changes than to anything going on within its boundaries’ (McCrone, 1992: 41). Pugh (2008) elaborates:

Scotland had become a major element in the Victorian success story by taking advantage of the wider market for her coal, iron, ships, textiles and chemicals … Scotland was, in fact, so bound up with empire that great imperial crises like the Boer War generated powerful political support for the British cause north of the border (2008: 82)

In fact, it was during times of crisis, such as, the Boer War, that Scottish allegiances
to Britain were openly displayed, particularly, amongst its Highland elite (Reid, 2013). Indeed, Reid (2013) highlights that ‘The willingness of Highlanders to serve in the British imperial forces … was always displayed more overtly by Highland communities in times of imperial crisis’ (2013: 2107). Indeed, the loyalty of Scotland’s Highland elites suggests how the Anglicisation of Scotland worked alongside wider British expressions. Reid (2013) adds:

The image depicted included the reproduction of tartan symbolism and clan regalia, and images of harmony between social classes in the Highlands. This constructed representation came to symbolise an unstated acceptance of a particular expression of Britishness. This Anglo-British Celtic vision of Scotland drew on a sentimental and romantic image of Scotland’s Gaelic past, but reinforced the hegemony of the British (including Scots) social elite in the Highlands. (Reid, 2013: 2105 [italics added])

The cultural representation of Scotland through its Highland elite was particularly noticeable in its style of dress through which ‘Highland dress was manipulated to demonstrate an unerringly ‘British’ social hierarchy’ (Dziennik, 2012: 136). Here, Highland imagery helped to underlie Scottish interests in the Union:

Highland dress was a visual declaration of modernity: a visual declaration of a gendered, refined, outward-looking and imperially connected society. Highland elites, particularly those who wished to gain personally from the increasing fiscal-military outlay of the imperial state, recognized the value of the region’s inclusion in the British nation, and used the imagery of Highland dress to advance these processes. (Dziennik, 2012: 120)

To this extent, it is possible to observe how Scottish attachments to Britain were both complex and contradictory. In fact, attempts to suppress regional identities through educational and linguistic policies were often unsuccessful, and, instead, had resulted in a number of cultural revivals (MacKenzie, 1998). Equally, the British Empire provided the opportunity for Scottish culture to go ‘beyond Scotland’ (MacKenzie, 1998). Often this was the result of migrant Scots ‘eager to maintain their cultural identities in colonies of settlement, notably Canada and New Zealand’ (MacKenzie, 1998: 231). As a result, through empire:

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28 Dziennik (2012) notes that ‘The military symbolism of Highland dress allowed elites to define the Highlands as a military region par excellence, and thereby to benefit from the political capital this gave them as consummate supporters of British expansion’ (2012: 122).
emigre Scottish communities were quick to adopt the symbols and traditions of Scotland with pipe bands, Burns’ Nights, statues to Wallace and Bruce and Highland Games abounding in ‘little Scotlands’ all over the globe. Furthermore, emigre communities had extensive contacts with the homeland as such representations were transmitted back to Scotland which had the effect of further reinforcing imperial notions of Scottish identity. (Finlay, 1997: 16)

Consequently, within Scotland imperial service would become the focus of a specifically Scottish national pride (Bayly, 1989: 136 cited in Kumar, 2003: 171).

Elsewhere within Ireland, the dominance of the Irish Protestant classes would secure Ireland’s union with Britain in 1801. Accordingly, while unionism within Ireland would often be supported by the Protestant classes this did not defer them from referring to themselves as Protestant ‘Irish’ (Kumar, 2003). Indeed, this sense of Irish identity would be supported by continued campaigns for Irish self-government within the United Kingdom. Conversely, Irish Catholics tended to display a form of colonial nationalism that centred on defending Irish interests and fostering greater independence from Britain (Coakley, 2004). This evolving character allowed Ireland to uphold a constitutional and institutional separateness, which common to British rule, paradoxically allowed it to be both distinct and analogous to British culture (McDonough, 2005; Moynahan, 1995). Accordingly, Connolly (2010) notes that:

The rise from the 1690s of the Irish parliament, and the emergence of a partnership between British chief governors and Irish undertakers, on the basis of a division of patronage and influence, can be seen as part of the same development (2010: 385)

Subsequently, Irish leaders, such as William Molyneux and Henry Gratton, placed great importance in harbouring Irish claims for legislative freedom in Ireland, drawing upon the Protestant ethnic heritage of the ‘free born Englishmen’ and promoting Ireland’s role within the empire (Kumar, 2003; Pugh, 2008). Here, ‘political calculation thus combined with … a new sense of national unity transcending long-standing religious differences’ (Connolly, 2010: 418). Accordingly, the formation of an independent Irish parliament in 1782, not only led to a repeal of the Penal Laws against Irish Catholics as well as allowing Catholics the right to cast vote in Ireland, but also more importantly, revealed that for a period of time, Irish nationalism was interdependent with Irish Protestant culture (Barnard, 2003; Connolly, 2010; Kidd, 1993; Kumar, 2003).

Indeed, the complicated relationship between Britain and Ireland is echoed in
attitudes towards the viceroyalty. In fact, while the viceroyalty was positioned within Ireland ‘as a surrogate for the [British] monarch’ the position’s principal priority ‘was … to secure British rule in Ireland’ (Loughlin, 2013: 3). However, ‘nationalists came to regard it as an important signifier of Ireland’s distinctive national status under the Union, and were generally opposed to its abolition’ (Loughlin, 2013: 3). Accordingly, Ryder (2005) elaborates that:

Leading nationalists like Daniel O’Connell usually made a clear distinction between Ireland’s political status and the status of Britain’s colonies in Asia, Africa, Australia, North America and New Zealand. Colonial activity in itself was not necessarily seen in a negative light- and Irish nationalist like William Smith O’Brien could be a whole-hearted advocate of ‘colonization’ scheme in Australia at the same time as he argued for Irish self-determination (2005: 165)

In many respects, Ryder’s (2005) extract can highlight the competing dynamics at play within ‘imperial’ and ‘national’ identifications. What is clear, is that in a similar vein to England, Scotland and Wales, the Irish were often enthusiastic contributors to the British imperial project overseas, joining their Welsh, Scottish and English brethren in the enterprise of empire (Kumar, 2003; Ryder, 2005).

Indeed, Welsh involvement in empire would be bolstered by the work of Welsh Christian missionaries throughout Africa and India (Evans, 1989; Pittock 1999). For many, the harbouring of a British identity was in no way detrimental to Welsh nationalism. Jenkins (2008) highlights that:

To be part of the imperial adventure was a matter of great pride rather than shame to leading Welsh liberals and to the soldiers and sailors who extended British colonial rule in wars against Afghans, Zulus and Indians. By the end of the Victorian era, the British empire constituted one-fifth of the world’s landmass and no one cheered louder than the Welsh when the seemingly indestructible Queen Victoria – the ‘Great White Mother’ – celebrated her Golden Jubilee in 1887 and her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 (2008: 224)

Nowhere was the interdependency between Welsh nationalism and British imperialism more apparent than in sport. Here, the game of rugby provided an important medium through which Welsh patronage could be fought for. Yet, it also provided the opportunity to reinforce the Welsh identity within the British state.

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29 The position’s official name was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The position would stand until December 1922 when the Irish Free State gained independence from the UK.
30 Indeed, Loughlin (2013) notes that the position ‘would be retained in the Home Rule schemes devised by Gladstone’ (2013: 3).
Andrews (1991) reveals:

The rejection of the leek and the subsequent adoption of the Prince of Wales’ three plumed insignia as the motif worn on international jerseys, along with his motto *Ich Dien* (I Serve), represented a move by the Welsh rugby administration to … underline its loyalty to and place within the British Imperial state formation (1991: 346)

Together, these aspects fitted more broadly with the proudly dubbed belief that Wales represented ‘Ancient Britain’ (Jenkins, 2008). This affirmed ‘their standing as the first possessors of the British Isles, as the speakers of the senior “British” tongue and as the guardians of the authentic “British” history’ (Jenkins, 2008: 172). As a result, Welsh culture and British imperialism were interdependently woven into the fabric of the Welsh identity (Pritchard, 2012).

### 2.3.1. Imperial Britain: British identity in the ‘old dominions’

For much of the nineteenth-century Australia would operate as the mode of Great Britain in the Pacific (Dubow, 2009). Originally, serving as a penal colony for Britain, the ‘termination of transportation to the eastern Australian colonies in the 1840s and 1850s helped to reduce some of the negative publicity previously associated with free migration there’ (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a: 4). As a result, ‘Australia developed, and came almost to full stature, as a European settlement on the other side of the world, which remained European in its customs and manners’ (Miller, 1965: 159). This was most apparent in relation to British culture, where McGregor (2006) notes that:

Britishness was the source of heritage, history, culture and symbols, that made Australia heir to a glorious past … Aborigines did not have a ‘history’ in the sense demanded by late-nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalists. Relics of humanity in a prehistoric phase, their past was inglorious, their present deplorable and their future extinction (2006: 502)

As a result, British history provided a key sense of national cohesion within Australia, a process that underscored both Australian and British attachments (Van Duinen, 2013). This is echoed by Van Duinen (2013), who argues that ‘These identities [Australian and British] interacted at different times and in different ways in response to shifting national and international imperatives but, rather than being antagonistic, they were ambivalent or intermingling, or even mutually reinforcing’ (2013: 346).
Accordingly, throughout both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Australianness would reflect an acceptance and negotiation of Britishness, exhibiting a degree of mutuality between the two (McGregor, 2006).

In particular, for the Australian middle classes, a sense of Britishness proved to be an important part of their ‘national’ identity.31 As Cashman (1992) elaborates:

middle-class Australians viewed themselves as dual citizens, as much British as Australian; they were citizens both of a particular nation and a wider empire. In the minds of middle-class Australia, there was no clear distinction between an Englishman or a Scot and an Australian. The essential difference was between a metropolitan and a colonial citizen. The common reference to Britain as ‘home’ underline the strength of the British attachment. A successful return to England or Scotland was a desirable form of progression for middle-class Australians. Most regarded ‘home’ as culturally superior (Cashman, 1992: 128)

Indeed, it was a colonial middle class that provided the force of pro-imperial sentiment during the nineteenth-century, with a greater proportion of these individuals originating from England and Scotland (Cashman, 1992). Consequently, when ‘indigenous nationalism began to emerge from the 1860s, it was not in any sense anti-British; rather, it was decidedly Anglicist and expressed in terms of Anglo-Australian ideals’ (Cashman, 1992: 128).

In many respects, similar national motivations can also be observed within Canada. Korneski’s (2007) study of social division within the city of Winnipeg notes that:

it was obvious and often deeply unsettling, to many middle-class observers that a large number of settlers were from an array of kingdoms and countries. Britishness defined in the [ethnic way] … was appealing because, even though there may have been no obvious core ‘ethnie’, nationalists could maintain that with a measure of diligence on their part, a still-developing, linguistically and ethnically uniform, fixed Canadian type would be British, meaning that it would conform to the politico-ethical principles that were common to the most ‘advanced’ and globally predominant segments of humanity. They could hold that the diverse collection of men and women within Canada could be ‘refined’ into Britishness, meaning that they could be infused with the qualities necessary to realize the ideally functioning liberal-capitalist society nationalists envisaged (2007: 169)

Importantly, throughout this period a flexible conception of Canadian identity can be

31 Pietsch’s (2010) examination of the diaries of J.T. Wilson (a young Scottish medical student who between 1884 and 1887 travelled to Australia), notes that, ‘Australia seemed very much to be a part of Britain’ (2010: 444). Importantly, for Wilson, this was an Australia where ‘Scots played a prominent role’ (Pietsch, 2010: 444).
observed (Hastings, 2008; Korneski, 2007). In particular, ‘English-Canadian commentators often sought to explain and negotiate Canada’s status in relation to both the British metropole and the other colonies’ (Hastings, 2008: 8). In doing so, imperial connections with Britain provided a source of pride and protection from its North American neighbours (Owram, 2001). Indeed, British-Canadian relations would be heavily influenced via the movement of Scottish settlers after the American War of Independence (Devine, 2011). Although ‘highly critical of the British establishment in the home context, in Canada the Scots came to occupy a central place in government, and emerged as a highly loyalist, pro-British element against the pressures exerted by both France and America’ (Pugh, 2008: 113).

Elsewhere within Canada, Anglophone dominance would be strengthened, most notably, within Quebec. While Quebec would maintain strong cultural attachments to its Francophone origins, Anglophones would maintain ‘a privileged and superordinate position in Québec society, particularly because they controlled Québec’s economy’ (Pettinicchio, 2012: 2). This dominance would continue throughout the first half of the twentieth-century (Pettinicchio, 2012). Consequently, despite the ‘cultural division of labour’ within Quebec (Pettinicchio, 2012: 2), Canadian identity throughout the nineteenth-century existed through an imperial context that was closely connected to the British Isles (Korneski, 2007; Owram, 2001).

Within New Zealand, Maori culture would remain a residual part of contemporary New Zealand society providing an important reminder of New Zealand’s position within a wider imperial collective. In fact, New Zealand’s support for Britain in both the First and Second World War would be based upon a sense of imperial identification. Dubow (2009) notes that:

For Australia, New Zealand and Canada, participation in these conflicts showed that it was possible to express one’s colonial nationalism through the medium of imperialism … New Zealanders could become ‘better Britons’, as politicians and opinion-formers in the early years of the twentieth century promised, namely, to outdo the mother country (and their Australian cousins) by exemplifying British virtues and eliminating its vices (2009: 14)

Consequently, the distance travelled by New Zealand forces during the First and Second World War was not ‘an impediment to be regretted as an endeavour to be celebrated’ (Jeffery, 2008: 454). Therefore, whereas in New Zealand ‘the maturing of a native-born generation [had] led to self-conscious attempts to express a new identity
in Native Associations, nationalistic literary journals, and through competition in sport’ many did not see ‘this nationalism as in any way contradictory to a continued dependence on British markets and British naval force’ (Dalziel, 1999 [italics added]). Here, a British imperial identity could be used to fulfil ‘nationalist aspiration for unity while maintaining solidarity with the wider British world’ (McGregor, 2006: 501). Dalziel (1999) adds:

A strident Imperialism and the presentation of New Zealand as a social laboratory for the new century were both attempts by a settler society to convince themselves and others that they had secured a home and an identity yet remained part of an important global community (1999: 595)

As a result, New Zealand nationalism would often attempt to highlight its ethnic homogeneity with the ‘Mother Country’ in what Belich (2001) defines as a process of ‘re-colonization’. In contrast to ‘the steady development of national maturity and independence’ (Belich, 2001: 182), Belich (2001) argues that New Zealand’s ‘re-colonization’ represented ‘a tightening of links with the metropolis’ (Belich, 2001: 182). Consequently, re-colonization resulted in the consolidation of colonial myth-history. While this served to distinguish New Zealand from Australia it also helped to transform its national image during the twentieth-century. In fact, relations between Britain and the dominion’s would undergo a number of transformations during the twentieth-century. The following section will explore this in further detail.


At the turn of the twentieth-century, Howe (2008) argues that ‘empire was at its most important to Britain, when popular enthusiasm for imperialism was at its height, and when ideas about empire most thoroughly saturated domestic British culture’ (2008: 160). That is, while imperial supremacy had formed an important part of British culture, ‘specialized colonial exhibitions designed to maintain public support for imperial projects’ (Smits and Jansen, 2012: 176) aimed to ensure that the British Empire remained an important part of British public life. Consequently, MacKenzie (1998) argues that:

All the characteristics of an imperial culture seem, on the contrary, to continue in a relatively unbroken line until after the Second World War. Despite the
economic disasters of the inter-war years, for example, Glasgow continued to stress her imperial status and emphasised the municipal socialism that was closely related to it. (1998: 228)

Similarly, across the Commonwealth, Australia, Canada and New Zealand would become an integral part of and equal partner in Commonwealth activities both politically and culturally (Meaney, 2003; Miller, 1965; Owram, 2001). By the 1890s, indigenous nationalism within Australia was able to challenge the pro-British tenets of imperial identity, encouraging a distinct Australian identity via a range of cultural attributes arising from art, literature and, importantly, sporting prowess (Cashman, 1992; McGregor, 2006). Nevertheless, McGregor (2006) notes that:

such cultural fragments did not add up to the rich and complex heritage essential for a people to imagine itself as a community of destiny … The myths and memories that resonated most deeply and meaningfully among the Australian people were Britannic myths and memories (2006: 502)

As a result, Australian republicanism became motivated by a right to express their constitutional rights despite loyalty to the British Crown (Gare, 2000). In fact, ‘loyalist first, and republican second’ would often characterise republican attitudes during the nineteenth-century (McKenna, 1996: 58 cited in Gare, 2000: 1154).

Consequently, despite republican movements, a series of constitutions gradually set about installing responsible government within the white settler colonies, of which ‘dominion’ status was eventually conferred on those colonies ‘settled by men of British race and tradition inheriting or acquiring representative institutions’ (Colls, 2002: 99-100). Here, dominion status formed an important part of the emerging national narratives of Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Barnes, 2013). As a result, ‘progressive nationalist narratives, joining the experiences of the Great War, the development of “national” schools of art and literature and even the rise of Labour politics’ were reflective of the ‘[British] empire’s loosening grip on the dominions in the first part of the twentieth century’ (Belich, 2013: 4). Here, the colonies would

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32 In particular, Barnes (2013) has explored how dominion involvement in the Empire Marketing Board’s various campaigns coalesced with dominion attitudes towards the empire, and, more importantly, their position within it. Indeed, Barnes (2013) notes that ‘it was not simply membership in a wider empire that acceptance of the [Balfour] declaration preserved, but their special position as dominions within it. Read this way, New Zealand, for example, no longer appears to be a reluctant dominion, clinging to ‘colonial’ status, but determinedly one’ (2013: 3).

33 Later during the First World War the treatment of conscript colonial recruits by British generals would help propel the working class movement towards an insular nationalism as opposed to a collective imperialism (Cohen, 1994).
begin to impose their own values and moral authority upon the empire as accepted dominions (Hastings, 2008).

In particular, colonial relations would undergo further changes after the First World War. Writing in 1922, Alfred P. Dennis notes that:

The change came through war, but a war in which the dominions played their full part side by side with Great Britain. The young men of Canada, of Newfoundland, of Australia, of New Zealand, and of South Africa died for the unity and preservation of the empire. By their blood thus freely given they brought about a rapid evolution in the constitution of the British Empire and won for the dominions a new voice in British foreign policy and representation in the diplomacy of the world (1922: 590)

Subsequently, after the First World War, English Canadian nationalism would begin to openly look for autonomy from Britain rather than dependence (Owram, 2001).

This was shared by Dennis (1922) who argued that ‘in addition to their rights in the matter of commercial treaties [the] dominions were now also to have a part in making political treaties for the empire as a whole’ (1922: 590). Accordingly, Owram (2001) adds that ‘Dominion participation in the war effort and Dominion insistence on recognition in London promoted the final constitutional step’ so that ‘by 1917 the British government had recognized the equality of the nationhood between the dominion and the Mother Country’ (2001: 151). As a result, during the 1926 Imperial Conference the dominions were provided equal status with Britain, with shared allegiances in the British crown (Hamer, 1994). This was later formalized in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster, which established legislative equality for the self-governing dominions of the British Empire and formerly demonstrated the independence of Australia, Canada and New Zealand to the world (Kitchen, 1996).

In doing so, imperial loyalty was sustained via the benefits that the Commonwealth provided. Accordingly, for New Zealand and Ireland:

Possible trading opportunities – especially based round the potentialities of empire flax-growing to supply raw material for the linen industry – were a constant theme in public speeches, and the itineraries arranged for visiting

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34 Similarly, in Australia, the First and Second World Wars would also help to challenge Australian Britishness in the soon-to-be independent nation (Gare, 2000). Australian dissatisfaction with Britain had been dealt a decisive blow when Britain failed to secure the safety of Australia from the threat of Japanese invasion (Gare, 2000).

35 Whereas, the relationship between Britain and the dominions had been formerly organized within the Statute of Westminster, various forms of self-government had been actively in place within the colonies since the mid 1800s.
politicums (Jeffery, 2008: 468)

Here, Commonwealth relations provided an important role in maintaining the expansion of ‘local nationalism into a wider sense of belonging’ (Dubow, 2009: 15). Notably, Miller (1965) notes that ‘To be effective, Canadian national unity needed the symbols of national status. And it is here that the Commonwealth, as a form of political association, has been of crucial importance in Canadian development’ (1965: 124).

Consequently, the loosening of imperial links between Australia, Canada and New Zealand were, arguably, rather gradual. Bridge and Fedorowich (2003a) elaborate:

In 1965, the senior Dominion [Canada] replaced its old flag, the union Jack, with a new one featuring a maple leaf. It patriated its constitution in 1982. Imperial honours were abandoned in Australia in 1975 and in New Zealand in 1996; Canada had done it in the 1920s. Australia’s High Court finally pronounced that Britain was legally a ‘foreign’ country in 1999! Nonetheless, the Crown remains a central part of the constituents of Australia, Canada and New Zealand (2003a: 10)

Subsequently, throughout the second half of the twentieth-century, British imperial control would shift from colonial rule to one of informal influence (Butler, 2002). The development of a larger Western Bloc, comprising the former colonial nations, would play an important part in global power relations, as Britain maintained its alliance with the US (Butler, 2002). As a result, ‘co-operation, equality and autonomy rather than coercion’ characterised Britain’s international relations during this period (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a: 8). Accordingly, Brand (1978) states that by the 1960s:

[Britain was] shorn of her imperial splendour. At the same time she became more prosperous than for many years. The austerities of the 1940s and 1950s had gone but the new wealth existed alongside a feeling almost of irresponsibility. This was, after all, the swinging sixties. Britain seemed released from the cares and self-consciousness of being a world power (1978: 50)

Therefore, whereas Britain’s political power across the globe would begin to weaken, its imperial legacies would continue to dominate British politics throughout the twentieth-century. This would have important implications upon the British we-image (Thompson, 2005), most notably, in regards to Britain’s relationship with the
EU.\textsuperscript{36}

2.4.1. ‘Little England’ or ‘Cool Britannia’: reconstructing post-imperial Britain

Politically, Britain’s commitment to the EU would serve to dissolve Britain ‘from a global sense of Britishness which had given many of the white dominions their identity’ (Meaney, 2003: 124). Indeed, this unique sense of British identity, was far different to that on the continent, as the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made clear: ‘I always said and believed that the British character is quite different from the character of the people on the continent – quite different’ (Margaret Thatcher, Newsweek, 1992 cited in Parekh, 1999: 323). In fact, similar traces of Euroscepticism echoed across Britain. Such skepticism acted ‘as the guardian of powerful national myths and drew on assumptions about British political identity that appeared to further the process of post-imperial decline’ (Gifford, 2008: 10). For many, Britain’s declining empire proved to be a fundamental part of its inability to commit to the EU. In an interview with the former German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, Schmidt stated that ‘Winston Churchill was a great European but he was quite clear that Britain was not joining because it had the empire. But it’s gone, even though you think it still exists’ (Elliot, 2013).\textsuperscript{37}

Despite such sentiments, since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, Britain has been committed, in principle, to Europe (Kumar, 2003). Indeed, for many, Britain’s move towards Europe suggested a ‘significant loss of the parliamentary sovereignty that ha[d] been the central pillar of the British constitution’ (Kumar, 2003: 241). Particularly within England, this has been echoed in concerns regarding its own ‘crisis in identity’ (Doty, 1996; Kumar, 2003; Maguire, 1993b). Accordingly, suggestions of ‘Little England’ and an increase in English nationalism followed Britain’s imperial downsizing, leading to exclusionary practices regarding immigration and ethnicity (Doty, 1996).

Further confusion regarding ‘Britishness’ has also filtered throughout British political discourse since the 1970s. For Thatcher and John Major, Britishness was seen to reflect a heavy dose of nostalgic sentiment, with the Falklands War providing a return to imperial Britain and the battle for an invaded British land (Mandler, 2006; 36 See Thompson (2005) for his analysis of the Suez Crisis, the Falklands War and the passing of Hong Kong to China in 1997 as key events in the decline of the British Empire. 37 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/22/helmut-schmidt-europe-crisis-interview, retrieved: 5 January 2014.
Osmond, 1988). This sense of nostalgia would be all the more profound in Major’s famous declaration of Britain as the country of ‘long shadows on county (cricket) ground, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pool fillers’ (*The Independent*, 1993). Major’s ‘British’ was undoubtedly very ‘English’, and, as such, was largely ignorant of Britain’s Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh population. In fact, such imagery often failed to inspire those in the North of England whose industrial centers were a far cry from imagery more commonly associated with the southern countryside.

Consequently, under New Labour the defining of British identity was equally important and a new cultural tone was promoted (Mandler, 2006). Mandler (2006) highlights that ‘just as one American news magazine, *Time*, had dubbed London ‘the Swinging City’ in April 1966, now another, *Newsweek*, publicized ‘Cool Britannia’, from where it was greatly received by New Labour’ (2006: 236). In particular, it would seem that the Labour government hoped to unify Britain by implementing greater autonomy, in the form of devolution, to both Scotland and Wales. Indeed, Britain’s devolutionary measures have led to numerous debates regarding the effects of such measures on British identity and a possible increase in contrasting ‘Scottish’ and ‘Welsh’ identifications (Holden, 2011; Leith, 2010; Perryman, 2009). Indeed, the manner in which Britishness and Scottishness is framed provides a crucial understanding of the impacts of devolution in Scotland and its future within the UK (Leith, 2010).

Surprisingly, however, similarities can be found between New Labour’s ‘Britain’ and the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) attempt to frame its own independent Scottish identity. Whereas, Labour’s framing of Britain would lack a sense of the imperial history that had once formed an important part of the British consciousness, the SNP has frequently overlooked Scotland’s history within the British Empire (Mycock, 2012: 63). For example:

Enduring anti-imperialist themes evident within SNP narratives of Scottish nationalism and independence reflect a propensity for Scotland to focus too much on its own ‘colonization’ by England whilst overlooking that modern Scotland is a ‘product of empire’ whose economic success had a dark side linked to exploitation and slavery (Mycock, 2012: 63)

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Ironically, post-1945 metropolitan societies and cultures have found themselves ‘more deeply marked by the long-term effects of Imperial connections than in earlier generations when Empire seemed real but remote’ (MacKenzie, 1999b: 231). Consequently, while significant post-imperial developments have taken place both within Britain and across the globe, ‘reconstructions of empire’ can also be found (Shaw, 2002: 331 [italics in original]). The effects of which will be considered in the final part of this chapter.

**Conclusion**

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that while one cannot ignore the gradual decline of the British Empire over the course of the twentieth-century, the evidence of previous centuries should not be forgotten. That is, it should not be forgotten that British identity was fashioned through a tapestry of domestic and international relations that were interdependently linked across both a ‘domestic’ and ‘imperial/Commonwealth’ figuration. Rüger (2004) provides a similar argument when he states that:

> [The] complex landscape of identities [within Britain] does not necessarily have to be interpreted in terms of conflict or friction. There were multiple and contingent sense of national belonging, and there is evidence that for many living in the British isles it was normal to ascribe changing national attributes to themselves, depending on context and situation (2004: 163)

Consequently, in accordance with chapter one, Ruger’s (2004) remarks encourage us to understand national identities, not as static, isolated phenomena, but as processes that are written and re-written, imagined and re-imagined, invented and re-invented over time and across space (Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm, 1983; Thompson, 2000). Arguably, it encourages us to evaluate the development of these identities in relation to state formation processes both at the national and international (imperial) level (Delmotte, 2012).

Therefore, based on the above sections, the multi-national character of the British Empire can be used to shed new light on British identity in relation to its imperial context. Indeed, both European and British politics, national culture and economic order were ‘thoroughly embedded in the practices and assumptions of

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39 Former concerns regarding the role of empire and imperialism, may now be shaped by new debates regarding the role of transnational corporations, continental unions and supranational organisations (Rhoden, 2012; Ward, 2001b).

40 See chapter one, section 1.4.
imperialism’ (Smith, 2001: 123). Furthermore, while analyses of Britain have served to focus on Britain’s decline as an imperial power (Nairn, 1977), Ward (2001b) highlights that ‘work on empire and metropolitan culture has collectively shown, an imperial outlook’ and has subsequently ‘been an integral feature of British public life for several generations’ (2001b: 4 [italics added]). Set against the literature in this chapter and Elias’ (1991) comments regarding the long-term transformations of the social habitus, debates concerning the end of empire (Colls, 2012; Strachey, 1959; Nairn, 1977) suggest not a sudden dislocation of imperial attitudes and sentiments but instead a balancing of nationalist agendas through an imperial prism (Ward, 2001a).

With this in mind, this chapter has sought to draw upon the sociology of Elias and the process sociology perspective in order to examine how the nation-centered analysis can be expanded upon in order to include a ‘panoramic and pan-imperial view’ (Gerasimov et al., 2005: 51). Therefore, in sum, it has been the purpose of this chapter to highlight important social changes that have occurred across both the UK and British Empire.

Subsequently, it is the contention of this chapter that studies of Britain and British identity need to be related to the long-term processes underpinning Britain’s state and imperial development (Delmotte, 2012; Hobson, 2012; Linklater, 2011a; 2011b). The importance of observing broader historical changes in the structure of societies and the individuals who form them is central to Elias’s desire to relate long-term changes in interdependence and power balances with broader processes of social development (Elias, 1991; 2008c; 2008d; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998). The long-term developments discussed in the above sections have endeavoured to portray, how changing power relations and social development processes, both within and between states, can have a powerful effect on the national we-image (Delmotte, 2012; Elias, 1991; Mennell, 1994). Importantly, this encourages an examination of how the national habitus is developed over time and between increasingly interdependent social groupings (Elias, 1982).

To this extent, while political integration may, today, only be maintained via the Commonwealth, the emotional identification between the former dominions and the current British monarchy remain persistently strong. Similarly, through sporting ties such as the Commonwealth Games, British and Irish Lions tours’ and the Ashes, extremely emotional, and often, extremely competitive, relations are preserved between Britain and the former dominions. Mennell (1994) elaborates upon these
as a small nation (in terms of population) closely entangled in a world economy and global society, [Australia] is still looking for a wider we-identity. Politically (or economically) motivated exhortations to Australians to identify with Asia seem as yet unconvincing, given that the cultural and institutional roots of Australia are still preponderantly European (1994: 190)

For the former dominions, those tensions inflicted by national and global levels of affiliation (such as empire) have often required and still do require negotiation (Rüger, 2004). For Britain, the evidence of a wider we-identity, with that of Europe, remains questionable, particularly in light of the national press coverage of sporting events (Maguire et al., 1999; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Vincent et al., 2010).

With this in mind, how does one begin to examine these processes with regards to the present? In this instance, one of the major changes in the development of the British state has been its degradation from an imperial global power. Accordingly, Elias (1991) notes that:

In studying social development processes we repeatedly come across a constellation in which the dynamic of unplanned social processes is tending to advance beyond a given stage towards another, which may be higher or lower, while the people affected by this change cling to the earlier stage in their personality structure, their social habitus. It depends entirely on the relative strength of the social shift and the deep-rootedness and therefore the resistance of the social habitus whether – and how quickly – the dynamic of the unplanned social process brings about a more or less radical restructuring of this habitus, or whether the social habitus of individuals successfully opposes the social dynamic, either by slowing it down or blocking it entirely (1991: 211).

Subsequently, much like its former dominions, Britain’s transformation from empire to nation can illuminate upon the ‘deep-rooted’ nature of habitus and how this habitus is restructured in relation to changing social dynamics (Elias, 1991; Goulbourne, 1991; Van Krieken, 2005). Issues of power and distinction play and important part in this process and will be duly considered within the following chapter, whereby Britain’s internal (domestic) and external (imperial) dynamics will be examined in relation to the discursive construction of power.
Chapter Three: Power, Discourse and Established- Outsider Relations

Introduction

As highlighted in chapter two, the impact of British imperialism can be seen in the effects of the American revolution, the emergence of the royal family as a symbol of the British state and through the expansion of British industry (Colley, 2005). For British home nations, such as, Scotland, ‘British national and imperial identity chimed quite nicely with a powerful strand of Scottish national identity, reinforced by Protestantism, Unionism and militarism’ (McCrone, 1992: 209 [italics added]). Subsequently, while the British Empire expanded, so did Britain’s perception of itself as an imperial nation.

Here, the relationship between home nation and dominion nationalism reveals a particular complex within the construction and representation of Britain and British identity. Indeed, Osmond (1988) notes:

When the particular nature of the survival of England’s Parliamentary tradition is joined with the consciousness of an Anglo-British military and imperial extension into the world, and the whole is held in a monarchical embrace, there is a formula for a unique and powerful identity (1988: 24)

However, while Osmond’s (1988) discussion of a ‘unique and powerful [British] identity’ may suggest a sense of British uniformity, and, indeed, an underlying English-centricism, Thompson (2005) provides a more critical reflection on regional disparities embroiled within Britain and the empire. He adds that:

While a range of domestic forces – railways, education, migration and sport – were working to ‘blend’ different cultures within the United Kingdom, regional distinctiveness was as likely to be underlined as undermined by the empire (Thompson, 2005: 198)

Accordingly, alongside Britain’s vast and varied imperial control (Perkin, 1989), the ‘blending’ of various cultures within Britain and the empire exposes the important dynamics surrounding Britain’s ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ identifications. Specifically, the inherent contradictions embroiled in the moral and libertarian values that followed the French and American Revolutions resulted in Britain occupying a curious position with regards to both its claims of civic duty and its imperial aspirations. Easthope (1999) notes that ‘imperial cultures must claim they are doing what they have to do in the name of some universal idea rather than a narrow, national interest’ (1999: 27). In
sum, Easthope (1999) asserts that for imperial power to be achieved, national distinctiveness must be subjected. As a result, this has largely been evident in the lack of any specific English identity and the encompassing of a much broader sense of Britishness that included both the domestic nations and imperial colonies.

Nevertheless, while Easthope (1999) seeks to highlight the problems posed by national interests in the wake of larger imperial projects, conversely, empire could also serve to underline ‘national sentiment’ (Schumpeter, 1976: 73). That is, ‘the acquisition of colonies’ could become ‘a matter of national prestige’ (Whittam Smith, 2013).¹ In such instances, empire could help encourage a sense of national superiority. Accordingly, Linklater and Mennell (2010) note that:

during the eighteenth century the Europeans came to think that civilization was not a process but a condition that was part of their natural endowment – and from that point on, they assumed the right to civilize others, to mold them in the image of the European or Western powers. (2010: 409)

This is echoed by Schumpeter (1976), who argues that colonial accession provided a form of exploitation that served to exclude foreign nations.² As a result, throughout human history, established groups – on a global scale – have often been imperial powers, a logistical capability that modern states could perform and maintain (Linklater and Mennell, 2010).

Indeed, one can draw connections between Schumpeter’s (1976) highlighting of an ‘instinctive urge to domination’ (1976: 73) and notions of imperial prestige that inevitably followed the conquering, occupying and annexation of large parts of the globe (Elias, 1996; Wood, 2014). Consequently, Wilson (2004) argues that:

Georgian Britons fretted over or boasted about the distinctiveness, superiority, and modernity of Britishness, and British imperial endeavours played a large role in sustaining or challenging that perception and self-image (2004: 8)

Consequently, Wood (2014) has explored how national prestige, and, most notably,

² Schumpeter (1976) provides one example of the ‘national’ desire to dominate other territories. He notes that ‘In 1815 the Ionian Islands became an English protectorate, not to be surrendered until 1863. Long before then, however, one foreign secretary after another had realized that this possession was meaningless and untenable - not in the absolute sense, but simply because no reasonable person in England would have approved of the smallest sacrifice on its behalf. Nevertheless, none dared surrender it, for it was clear that this would have appeared as a loss and a defeat, chalked up against the cabinet in question. The only thing to do was to insist that Corfu was a military base of the highest importance which must be retained’ (1976: 74).
notions of imperial prestige, form an important part of the nation’s image (see also Zarakol, 2010). Here, national myths and symbolism are closely tied to accounts of the nation’s political, military and technological endeavours. What is apparent, however, is the extent to which notions of national prestige, pride and significance are interdependently shaped and affected in ‘relation’ to other nation states. For example, China’s investment in Britain’s high-speed rail project, encouraged the following response from Ringen (2014):

To beg the Chinese state for these investments is to represent Britain as a poor developing country that cannot afford to make its own necessary investments. For a British prime minister, a leader of the democratic world, to crawl on his knees in front of the masters in Beijing, is to do damage to the standing of democracy in the world. (2014)3

As can be seen in Ringen’s (2014) account of a ‘begging’ Britain, notions of British prestige had clearly been undermined by the involvement of Chinese investors in a ‘British’ rail project.

With this in mind, this chapter will seek to develop upon the multi-national analysis adopted in chapter two by exploring how the subjection of national distinctiveness, notions of imperial prestige and the blending and mixing of national cultures, has formed an important part of the construction, representation and framing of Britain. Specifically, this task will draw upon an interdependent analysis of power, one that hopes to steer attention away from traditional economic and political notions (Calhoun et al., 1993; Foucault, 1978; 1980; 2000a; 2000b). Here, the discursive construction of power balances within media discourses will be used to examine how established and outsider relations form an important part of the construction of Britain and British identity (Bignell, 2002; Fairclough, 1995; De Cillia et al., 1999). In particular, the ‘tension filled mutual engagement between established and outsider groups’ (Smith, 2001: 128) will be used to explore the ‘integration struggles’ that underlie constructions of Britain and the tensions that these struggles reveal (Mennell, 2007). Indeed, the study of intra-group tensions, their history and the effect that these tensions have had on national personality formed an important part of Elias’s (1996) examination of German society (Heinich, 2013). Therefore, it will help to provide a theoretical framework that, based upon the history of Britain and the British Empire, can be used to examine the domestic and Commonwealth press.

3.0. British ‘integration struggles’: the ‘nationalism/imperial loyalty’

Analyses of Britain and the British Empire reveal a complex social network of national interdependencies. That is, through internal and external relations, competing as well as complementing ethnic and cultural groups have formed collective identities that have been constructed and (re)constructed across pluralistic lines. While commenting upon the plurality of ‘identities’ that are found across Britain, Dawson (1997) writes that ‘Britain today is a very complex society made up of people from numerous backgrounds’ (1997: 327 [italics added]). Certainly, while such statements shed light upon the possible number of national identities – both domestic and foreign – within Britain, the belief that this ‘complex society’ is a depiction of Britain today stands in contrast to the literature considered in the previous chapter.

Indeed, from 1707 onwards, the British Empire was not a singular place but a set of interdependent geographical and cultural spaces. Central to this was a set of common characteristics that encompassed a wider ethno-cultural family of collective identities and aspirations (Elias, 1991; Smith, 2010). Kumar (2003) notes:

While Britishness might be seen to have a civic rather than an ethnic character – a point emphasized particularly by Scottish and Welsh nationalists – it has over the centuries developed a set of institutions, symbols and traditions that can lead to a form of emotional identification remarkably similar to that evoked by ethnic nationhood (2003: 238-239)

These ethnic origins can be found throughout recorded history across various nation-states, held together by a plethora of networks (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003b). Consequently, through mass migration, a British imperial identity emerged alongside varying forms of colonial nationalism. In most instances, national identity throughout the empire was not restrained by a wider British identification but instead harboured within the imperial context that aided its development (McGregor, 2006).

Subsequently, MacKenzie (1998) has proposed that instead ‘of creating an overall national identity’, the British Empire may have ‘enabled the sub-nationalisms of the United Kingdom to survive and flourish’ (1998: 230). The same can also be said with regards to the former dominions, where for Australia:

late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Australian nationalism were compounded by ethno-cultural elements deriving from a Britannic heritage and
civic/territorial components centring on the distinctive entitlements and obligations of the Australian citizen and commitment to an Australian homeland (McGregor, 2006: 499)

For many colonial nations this ‘national’ commitment was dependent upon ‘British’ cultural codes, through which British sporting practices provided an important role (Mangan, 1992a). Here, imperial sport was embroiled with ethnic-colonial characteristics that bound ‘cousins of the tongue far more closely than any amount of diplomacy and trade convention’ (Cambridge University Magazine, 20/06/1886, pg. 21 cited in Mangan, 1992b: 5).

Nevertheless, sporting diffusion could also serve to highlight some of the contradictions underlying British imperialism. Here, the game of cricket ‘provides an excellent example of the way in which cricket was taken to a new cultural environment by British colonizers, was embraced by a colonized people, and was subsequently a vehicle for the assertion of a separate and distinct “national” identity’ (Malcolm, 2012: 77). Indeed, such examples serve to highlight how ‘the “nationalism/imperial loyalty” dynamic was much more complicated than such an either/or choice, particularly for the dominions’ (Van Duinen, 2013: 351).

To this extent, attachments to Britain elicited a number of tensions, most notably, in the Union of 1707 and in the colonization of the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand colonies. Indeed, while antagonisms with the French in Quebec would continue to provide a source of confrontation with Canada’s encroaching Anglicisation, Maori and Aboriginal populations would also suffer at the hands of British imperialism. This would be further compounded by the development of distinctive national identities within each of the colonies.\(^4\) Subsequently, both within Britain and across the dominions, ‘The “national” found itself propelled towards the “imperial”’ (Nairn, 2014).\(^5\) It is here that tensions between a separate and distinct national identity, and, participation in, and identification with, a larger ‘imperial’ Britain can be found.

Accordingly, while imperial expansion could arouse ‘an intense emotional and intellectual response’ others such as ‘leading liberal, socialist, and communist

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\(^4\) In fact, Hopkins (2008) has highlighted how campaigns for the rights of indigenous populations increased after the Second World War, providing an important and counteracting part in the nationalist movements of the dominions and their decolonization.

thinkers, attacked it bitterly’ (Wright, 1976: ix). Indeed, within Britain, the ‘colonisation’ of Scottish minds (Williamson, 2009) was revolted against through the poetry of Robert Fergusson and Robert Burns, who, Williamson (2009) notes, ‘kept a unique sense of Scottish identity alive and visible whilst the upper classes were celebrating their new-found Britishness in pretentious displays of Anglicised diction’ (2009: 59). Certainly, this tension in maintaining a ‘Scottish identity’ while ‘celebrating … Britishness’ is not left to the past but forms part of a recurring theme in British history and contemporary British relations. Here, competing visions of Britain and the identities of its home nations have formed part of the long-term development of the UK (Colley, 2014a; 2014b). Indeed, Colley (2014b) notes that:

It is a reminder, to begin with, that fiercely competing visions of the organisation and identities of the UK have a long history. Accounts of the forthcoming independence referendum in Scotland sometimes give the impression that it’s merely a recent and specific piece of purely local difficulty. In reality, there have always been cracks in the fabric, and not just north of the border. Many of the Victorian and Edwardian activists who campaigned for Irish home rule, for instance, also wanted what they called ‘home rule all round’: separate parliaments not simply for Ireland, but also for the Scots and the Welsh – and for the English. (2014b)\(^6\)

Accordingly, under Gladstone, national reform was directed towards advocating for ‘disestablishment and equality with other national groups’ in Wales (Loughlin, 2013: 10) and ‘legislative autonomy’ in Ireland (2013: 10).

Subsequently, while drawing upon the work of Doyle (1986), Bowden (2011) notes that imperialism is often unequal, a power relationship ‘that constitutes a vast web of connections in an increasingly globalized world’ (2011: 192). Therefore, representations of Britain, British identity and British culture can be viewed ‘as a set of meaning-producing practices developed in contexts of power [that were] fundamental to the shaping of identities in both metropole and colony’ (Pietsch, 2010: 426). More importantly, these ‘meaning-producing practices’ are related to changing interdependencies and are underscored by power balances (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Elias, 1978). While forms of British identification could reveal ‘collaboration and consensus’ they could also generate tensions via ‘conflict and coercion’ as well as through ‘derogatory stereotypes of other, alien, subordinated societies’ (Cannadine,

To this extent, definitions of Britain have been largely contested, both within Britain and the former dominions (Jackson, 2014). In fact, the close historical connections between the British home nations and the former dominions has resulted in a number of untanglings in the legal and symbolic attachments that once bound Britain to its former dominions and which have undoubtedly shaded their post-imperial developments (Fox, 2014). Yet, in order to explore as well as ‘use’ these contestations as part of the study of Britain, such struggles, complexes and tensions can be viewed as reflexive of broader power relations and discursive constructions (Maguire, 2005). Whereas the British Empire may have helped to ensure a ‘plurality of British identities’, an examination of the discourses used to construct Britain can serve to reveal how this ‘plurality’ is based upon broader balances of power. Here, the process of identifying a British identification should fundamentally be considered not in isolation but as part of a wider process of interdependent developments emerging out of power relations between the British home nations, and, eventually, a global empire. That is, the capacity for mutual identification on a British domestic and later imperial scale was itself embedded within power relations characteristic of established and outsider groups (Elias and Scotson, 1994).

Consequently, before attention is given to examining the applicability of an established-outsider framework to the discursive construction of British identity, the following section will seek to draw upon traditional theoretical conceptions of power (Bauman, 2000; Foucault, 1972; 1978; 1980; 2000a; 2000b; Van Benthem van den Bergh, 1992; Williams, 1977) in order to consider how the use of power in discourse can help to elucidate upon interdependent relations and national identifications.

3.1. Notions of power

The relationship between culture, nationalism and power is referred to by Mihelj (2011), who highlights that:

The link between culture and power lies at the core of any form of nationalism in the modern world. … nationalist movements around the world transformed culture into a fundamental basis of social organisation and power relationships.

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7 Jackson (2014) notes that ‘For proponents and opponents of religious instruction in Ontario the British identity served as a battleground over which rival interpretations of the nation competed’ (2014: 12).
Indeed, the transformation of culture in the pursuit of nationalist agendas has been explored in, and, applied through, the work of Foucault, particularly to the extent in which techniques of power have been imposed upon colonised territories. Here, colonial forms of power could also rebound upon the domestic societies of the West. Foucault (2003) argued that:

while colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself. (2003: 103 cited in Pugliese, 2010: 52)

Certainly, this approach serves to divert attention away from literary scholars whose analysis of ‘system[s] of power and domination’ (Cannadine, 2001: xvi) – although important – can focus too much on how particular colonial groups were subject to a ‘hegemonic imperial project’ (Cannadine, 2001: xvi). Instead, power relations can have important effects on the personality of both colonising and colonised groups, revealing a two-way power relationship between the metropole and periphery.

In convergence, therefore, both Elias (1978; 1991) and Foucault (1978; 1980; 2000a; 2000b) sought to explore how individual behaviours became increasingly self-regulating, and, more importantly, were formed through social relations (Burkitt, 1993). For Foucault (1978; 1980; 2000a; 2000b) social relations and political power served to define the ‘subject’, upon which, ‘domains of knowledge’ and ‘relations with truth are formed’ (Foucault, 2000b: 15). To this extent, Foucault’s (1978; 2000a; 2000b) analysis reveals how forms of ‘truth’ and ‘technologies of the self’ are legitimised in particular historical conditions.

However, while Foucault’s analysis can help to uncover how particular groups serve to dominate and apply their power, less is said on the hegemonic contestation of power (Hall, 1988), and, more importantly, its effect upon processes of identification between multiple groups with various power differentials. Instead, the consideration that national identity is embroiled in an ever-changing network of social relations can be seen as dependent upon the appreciation that social processes are themselves involved in a relationship of changing *power balances* (Newton, 1999). Importantly,
‘power is not an amulet possessed by one person … [but] is a structural characteristic of … all human relationships’ (Elias, 1978: 74 [italics in original]). This makes it difficult for any one group, or indeed, any one nation, to determine history, as social and international actions are moderated by their dependence upon others (Newton, 1999).

This ‘power balance’ contrasts with that of Bauman (2000) who states:

For power to be free to flow, the world must be free of fences, barriers, fortified borders and checkpoints. Any dense and tight network of social bonds, and particularly a territorially rooted tight network, is an obstacle to be cleared out of the way. *Global powers* are bent on dismantling such networks for the sake of their continuous and growing fluidity, that principal source of their strength and the warrant of their invincibility (2000: 14 [italics added])

Whereas, Bauman’s (2000) comments show an appreciation of the ‘human bonds and networks’ that structure power relations, his focus on the fragility of these networks in the face of ‘global powers’, fails to appreciate how such powers are often obtained, and, as a consequence, are maintained by, such networks. As a consequence, power is perceived as external and removed from such networks, rather than the product of social interdependence (Moore, 2010).

This is echoed by Said (1995) and his work on Western interpretations of the ‘Orient’. Whereas, Said (1995) considers the role of power in the forging of boundaries between groups, he tends to homogenize hegemonic relations, rather than exploring the relational dynamics that power exerts on both parties. In doing so, he essentialises the complex nature of identities, disregarding the possibility that dominant and dominated groups are mutually subject to corresponding assumptions (McKerrell, 2012; Van Dijk, 1988; 1997; 2011). Here, a binary opposition is proposed between East and West, which fails to consider how orientalist discourses can be negotiated and rejected. As a consequence, Mackenzie (1994) highlights that ‘the record of constant change, the instability, heterogeneity, and sheer porousness of imperial culture’ stands in contrast to the ‘essentialialized … unchanging self’ (MacKenzie, 1994: 12), which Said promotes.

In contrast, therefore, Van Benthem van den Bergh (1992) seeks to explore international relations amongst the global powers over the past three centuries. Notably, he highlights that when examined from a long-term perspective, neither the dominant power of the time nor its rivals had complete ‘hegemonic’ control but
instead were locked together in a series of trans-national power relations. Importantly, this analysis can highlight important aspects regarding the multi-polar nature of imperial rule and its capacity to maintain conflicting and sometimes contradictory trends and characteristics.

Similarly, Williams’s (1977) examination of social experience provides a further alternative to Bauman’s (2000) and Said’s (1995) analyses. He notes that ‘no mode of production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human agency, and human intention’ (Williams, 1977: 125 [italics removed]). Consequently, in all nations, national identities can reveal dominant, emergent and residual forms (Maguire, 2005; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Williams, 1977).8

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that while imperialism could provide particular discursive and epistemic conditions, through which colonised groups were subject to differential power relations, there are many examples – some of which have been highlighted in previous sections – of colonised groups resisting and reinterpreting the culture, values and identities of imperial groups).9 As a result, concepts like ‘orientalism’ were for Elias:

- a very typical facet of the relations between more powerful established groups and less powerful outsider groups; that such concepts came under challenge in the present century is also to be seen as a typical manifestation of relatively more equal power ratios between such groups (Mennell, 1996b: 126 [italics added])

Indeed, the variety of cultural relations that exists between and amongst various groups as well as the social and historical dynamics surrounding them, requires a more dynamic appreciation of identity and the boundaries it creates. That is, through processes of functional democratization changes in the power relations between groups could subsequently have, over long periods of time, a corresponding change in the personality and behavior of the groups involved (Mennell, 2007). Here, the ability to see power in the form of a balance or a ratio can be achieved when one considers that no single individual or group are independent but rely on the actions and

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8 Eldridge and Eldridge (1994) provide a summary of these categories: ‘The residual, the continuation of earlier values, beliefs and practices, could sometimes be seen as an alternative to the dominant forms, for example rural life in opposition to urban industrial capitalism. The emergent – the development of new meanings, values and practices, as in working-class movements of the nineteenth century – could also provide oppositional elements to the dominant culture’ (1994: 96 [italics added]).
9 See chapter two, sections 2.2., 2.3., 2.3.1. and 2.4.
constraints imposed upon them, both by more established or less-established individuals/groups (Burkitt, 1993). That is, within a figuration, ‘everyone has a degree of power to determine one’s own actions as well as the actions of others’ (Burkitt, 1993: 52 [italics in original]).

In sum, therefore, while Foucault (1980; 2000a; 2000b), Bauman (2000) and Said (1994; 1995) perceive power in an oppositional sense, both negate how such actions form part of power balances. Indeed, while much can be borrowed from Foucault’s analysis of discourse, and, indeed, this will be considered in section 3.2.3., for now, Elias’s (1978) balanced conception of power will be discussed in order to examine how the relationships between multiple groups can serve to shape and define national identity construction.

### 3.2. The established-outsider model: analysing power relations

Analyses of power has often been considered in relation to the accumulation of various resources by particular groups. The work of Bourdieu (1984) has served to extend Marx’s own analyses of power by examining how the accumulation of various forms of ‘capital’ are obtained by particular groups (see also Calhoun et al., 1993). For Elias, however, power is fundamentally a relational concept that rather than depicting hierarchical stratifications, is instead, perceived through forms of interdependence (Arnason, 1989; Burkitt, 1993; Heinich, 2013). To this extent, Elias’s (1978) analysis of power reveals how certain resources and functions, within a given figuration, are ‘determined by their function in the entire figurational network of social interdependence and thus can be understood only by placing them in the context of the changing pattern of power balances between different social groups’ (Burkitt, 1993: 51).

As a result, contra Foucault, power is not apriori or reified as a separate entity that establishes its own intentions and plans (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) but is instead part of sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes (Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987). It is here that:

one should always look for the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of the values and traditions in changing social structures (particularly balances of power and control), and then at the ways in which values and traditions have become

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10 Notably, power did not only reside in human relationships but could also be found in the relationship between humans and nature (Arnason, 1989).
embodied in social structures and practices (Mennell, 2007: 313)

Indeed, Burkitt (1993) points out that ‘the psychogenesis of individuals – their capacity for autonomy in constituting action and also the social contour that are built into the psyche – is always linked to the sociogenesis of social power in the figuration’ (1993: 54). In such instances, the drives and personality of the individual are altered in accordance with the power relations of the figuration (Burkitt, 1993).¹¹ Thus:

In Elias’s theory, none of the emotions remain in a pure form but are malleable and open to change within social experience; they exist together as part of the life of a social being an they change together, blending and remixing as the personality itself is restructured in social change. … the aim and intensity of all drives are open to transmutation and remodelling. (Burkitt, 1993: 69)

More importantly, Burkitt (1993) notes that ‘a restructuring of social relations, involving a redistribution of power and freedom, would also alter the whole structure of constraints and the form of conflict within society’ (1993: 68).¹²

Therefore, in order to explore how a ‘restructuring of social relations’ can impact upon identity processes, an examination of the power differentials embedded in established-outsider relations can be made. Specifically, this can be used to explore how power inequalities can become ‘common sense’ (Hanson-Easey et al., 2014), forming an important part of ‘we-images’ and group charisma (Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987). Indeed, the effects that power can have upon particular groups is highlighted by Mennell (2007) who notes that ‘when some people have a larger power advantage, the experience affects in quite specific ways how they perceive themselves and others’ (2007: 311 [italics added]). Consequently, in the context of imperial relations, power differentials can be used to examine how economic, political and cultural forms of domination can have both cultural and psychological repercussions

¹¹ Accordingly, as Burkitt (1993) highlights, such a notion stands in contrast to Foucault’s appreciation of human drives remaining consistent and unchanged as well as embedded in a state of ‘permanent provocation’.

¹² This is also explored in the work of Hechter (1975) and his internal colonialism model. Hechter’s (1975) model examines how unequal distributions of resources between dominant and subordinate groups are driven by the monopolisation of particular advantages for the dominant groups, usually within the realm of political or material gain. Hecher (1975) argues ‘The uneven wave of industrialisation over territorial space creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups, and therefore acute cleavages of interest arise between these groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage there is a crystallisation of the unequal distribution of recoups and power between the two groups’ (1975: 39). A stratification system is formed, which affiliates particular roles and identities on the dominant and subordinated groups.
for colonised (outsider) groups. With this in mind, a brief introduction of Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model is required.

3.2.1. The established-outsider model: the study of Winston Parva

Elias and Scotson’s (1964/1994) original study examined the town of Winston Parva, and, specifically, two neighbourhoods within the town. During their analysis it was observed that a number of important characteristics were at play between two interdependent, yet, seemingly, separated groups. Indeed, what they observed was an established neighbourhood, whose history within the town had allowed them to forge closely-knit relations and established positions and an outsider group who were stigmatized and perceived to be an inferior collective. Unlike the established neighbourhood, the outsider group failed to control the same positions of power as well as have the historical longevity and ties of interdependence that the established group had been able to achieve. Accordingly, through interviews with the town’s residents Elias and Scotson (1994) were able to observe particular ‘systems of inferiority’ that served to stigmatize the outsider group. Based upon the established group’s exclusion and derision, feelings of inferiority formed part of the outsider group’s collective conscience. Indeed, this contrasted with the established group’s ‘group charisma’ and sense of superiority.

To this extent, Elias and Scotson (1994) were able to observe a number of characteristics that at a larger level could be used to examine power relations within multi-group scenarios (Lake, 2013; Mennell, 2007; Sutton and Vertigans, 2012; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987). That is, when one particular group has more power than another, forms of superiority and virtue can form part of the group’s collective conscience as well as their established status. Similarly, for outsider groups, exclusion from important resources and positions of power can result in feelings of inferiority that form part of the outsider group’s collective conscience and we-identity.

Taking the above into consideration, I wish to argue that this established-outsider model can be used to examine how established and outsider groups, in the context of British domestic and Commonwealth relations, serve to construct Britain and British identity. Indeed, while Elias and Scotson’s (1994) study did not focus specifically on national identity, the dynamics explored within the relationship can be used to examine how ‘national identity “works”’ by contrasting the best elements of
“us” (the established) with the worst elements of “them” (the outsiders)’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 112). Importantly, relations of inclusion and exclusion are central to this process, particularly in regards to the formation of ‘systems of states and the growth and development of inter-state balances of power’ (Mennell, 1990: 360 [italics in original]; see also Moore, 2010). Central to these systems is Elias’s (1978) reference to the double-bind processes at work within them. That is, the emotional fantasies and beliefs of interdependent groups form part of a double-bind process whereby ‘each side’s they-image involves a distortion of the vices of the other side, just as its we-image is an exaggerated picture of virtue’ (Mennell, 1990: 366). Therefore, in accordance with a media analysis, an established-outsider framework can be used to highlight how media discourses seek to discursively construct ‘hierarchical assumptions’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 169).

Notably, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model presents the opportunity to examine how differences between groups are constructed and formed. Indeed, it has already been highlighted that the use of personal pronouns can be used to separate who is ‘one of them’ and who is an ‘outsider’ (Parekh, 2000: 9; see also Elias, 1991). Accordingly, by exploring how outsider groups interpret and translate their apparent inferiority, conclusions can be drawn regarding the intergroup dynamics of particular figurations and how the particular characteristics of such figurations can provide a context through which forms inclusion and exclusion, superiority and inferiority are formed.

3.2.2. The established-outsider model: acceptance, resistance and negotiation

It is evident that feelings of superiority and inferiority go hand-in-hand with the colonisation of foreign territories (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Linklater and Mennell, 2010; Schumpeter, 1976; Van Krieken, 1999; Zarakol, 2010). While the acquisition of foreign lands formed an important part of England’s national, and, later, imperial prestige (Wood, 2014), elsewhere, Van Duinen (2013) notes that attempts ‘to identify a number of early champions of Australian nationalism in politics or the arts, … were found to be trumped or drowned out by various manifestations of Britishness’ (2013: 345). As a result ‘the perceived need for British military protection’ and ‘a conservative and frustratingly prevalent “Anglo-Australianness”’ stood alongside ‘a nagging inferiority complex or “cultural cringe”’ (Van Duinen, 2013: 345-346 [italics added]).
In fact, similar examples can be observed in media discourses on immigration (Hanson-Easey et al., 2014; Loyal, 2000). These discourses serve to highlight the perceived individual/group’s lack of resemblance and failure to adhere to the established culture of the home nation. Accordingly, Hanson-Easey et al. (2014) argue that refugees ‘do not arrive and occupy an empty discursive and representational context, enabling them to construct and manage their own group identity(ies)’, instead, ‘they are socially constructed by the in-group and, thus, positioned relative to a pre-formed social matrix of understandings’ (2014: 376 [italics added]).

In such instances, practices of stigmatisation and exclusion are adopted by the established group (‘in-group’) in order to assert their superiority (Engh et al., 2013) but also to delineate markers of cultural distinction and prestige. These markers are distinguishable through various attributes and affects, indeed, what Bourdieu (1984) has referred to as tastes or markers of distinction. Other examples can be found in relation to the use of speech and manners as ascriptions of established behaviour, characteristics that are subsequently used to delineate between established and outsider groups. In particular, the dominance of English cultural and linguistics expressions has come at the cost and growing decline in the Gaelic (Goidelic) languages. Similarly, Craig (2011) notes that:

[The Scottish] language or dialect was rejected as inferior and the centres of power and influence increasingly moved outwith the country. Following the Union, the definition of good manners, pronunciation and correct usage of the English language emanating from the English ruling class led the Scots to question their speech and manners. (2011: 276)\(^\text{13}\)

As can be seen from Craig’s (2011) remarks, the influence of established groups can often provide a form of emulation for outsider groups to follow. Indeed, with regards to the Thirteen Colonies in North America, Eustace (2008) notes that:

Wish though they might to assert their full membership in the British Empire, colonists frequently found themselves placed at the literal and figurative periphery of British life, their attempts to master the emotional subtleties of British-style gentility ignored or even mocked by those in the metropolis. (2008: 8)

\(^{13}\)Indeed, Little (2014) reports that ‘Scottish children had always been punished for using Scots idioms and locutions in school. Standard English was thumped into you’ (2014: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-28882770, retrieved: 29 August 2014)
However, despite attempts by the colonists to emulate the British gentility, such emulation did not prevent the eventful disruption of the colonies from the British Empire.

Therefore, while the power differentials between established and outsider groups can reveal examples of inferiority (Craig, 2011) and emulation (Eustace, 2008; Mennell, 2007), examples of ‘outsider’ resistance can also be identified (Vogler, 2000). This is, however, a process that is clearly power balanced and based upon the tensions between a desire for national autonomy/distinctiveness and attempts to follow established models of state rationalization. Whereas peripheral nations ‘often try to emulate or appropriate models developed by the world’s most powerful nations’ they can also develop ‘alternative models of nation-building’ (Mihelj, 2011: 31). Nonetheless while nation-building can often take diverse and contrasting approaches, particularly within former colonial societies, ‘the imprint of earlier imperial systems of thought still exists in many parts of the world and continues to colour perceptions of identity, definitions of difference, and expectations of community’ (Manz, 2003: 72 [italics added]). In fact, Mihelj (2011) argues that ‘even post-colonial states, established after decolonisation in the 1940s and 1950s, were all quite consciously replicating the model of the modern state and forms of rule’ (2011: 31).14

In such instances, there are degrees of acceptance, as can be seen in comments by Nairn (2008), who notes that while Scotland avoided ‘conquest or assimilation’, the Scottish performed an act of ‘self-colonisation’ that allowed them to ‘conserv[e] a distinct civil society – but only by accepting (and in fact eagerly embracing and preaching) the broader rules of the new age, as laid down by France, England and other more viable polities’ (2008).15 Accordingly, power relations between

14 Elsewhere, Shaw has (2002) highlighted that ‘India today is a vast state ruling more people than belonged to the entire British empire in the mid-20th century. The gap between rich and powerful and the village poor is huge, and the centre disposes its armies to hold on to rebellious Kashmir, even to the point of risking nuclear war with Pakistan, in a way that reminds us of how European empires blundered to war in 1914. It is of more than polemic significance to suggest that the British Raj was not abolished but Indianised and Pakistanised by the new national elites’ (2002: 333). Importantly, these processes reveal that in order to understand national identity, the integration of the nation-state with imperial factors is essential and should not be ignored (Darwin, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2010; Pocock, 1975; 1991).

15 See https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/globalisation/institutions_government/nationalism_the_new_deal, retrieved: 3 October 2014. Indeed, Finlay (1997) adds that ‘The failure of Scottish nationalism to manifest itself into a major force in mid-nineteenth century Scottish politics can be accounted for by the ability of the Scots to re-invent their national identity in ways which accommodated themselves to
established and outsider groups are not fixed but can, over time, change (Sutton and Vertigans, 2002). That is, whereas:

many bourgeoisie people in *ancien regiem* France followed aristocratic models as best they could in manners, speech and fashion … [this] did not prevent them simultaneously resenting aristocratic privileges. Nor did it prevent the French Revolution (Mennell, 2007: 313)

In fact, Vogler (2000) has noted that national identities become strongest amongst those ‘outsider’ groups when they ‘feel relatively excluded from the polity … and who are also experiencing significant economic and social dislocation’ (2000: 31).

Indeed, these examples suggest a degree of flexibility when investigating those actions, customs and identities that help construct the *boundaries* between various groups (Cohen, 1994). Accordingly, while ‘Imperialism was repressive in many ways, … throughout the British Empire, it had a tendency to perpetuate and enhance regional and ethnic identities among indigenous peoples, whether through indirect rule policies or divide and rule tactics’ (MacKenzie, 1998: 231). With this in mind, it is important to note that established-outsider relations are neither fixed nor static but are dependent upon multi-figurational dynamics. Indeed, this posits an examination of the relations between established-outsider groups at various levels (British domestic and Commonwealth) and the processes of attachment and (dis)attachment that this entails. This can be identified in the ways that the ‘habitus of the established groups is acquired, typically in a slightly altered form, by the outsider groups which in the same process ceases to be “outside” to the same extent’ (Smith, 2001: 128).

Importantly, this does not mean that outsider practices disappear (Elias and Scotson, 1994; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002).

With this in mind, the following section will explore how established-outsider
relations amongst the British home nations as well as between Britain and the Commonwealth have served to shape constructions of Britain. Again, an historical analysis of the emergence of the British state and empire as well as the power relations that Britain’s imperial expansion helped forge can prove effective in elucidating upon the tensions and struggles that form part of the construction and representation of Britain and British identity. To this end, it is appropriate to explore how constructions of Britain have often been tied to, and, used as, a reflection of English attributes and characteristics, a process that is closely tied to the imperial expansion of England (Kumar, 2003).

3.2.3. The established-outsider model: established England/Britain

While the formation of the 1707 Acts of Union can be viewed as a partnership between the British home nations, it was undoubtedly a partnership with one dominant and two weaker nations (Malcolm, 2012). Indeed, Malcolm (2012) notes that:

The conquest and colonization of the ‘Celtic fringe’, it has been argued, acted as a kind of trial run of English, later British, imperialism. There are a number of parallels between the internal and external phases of colonialism which provide empirical support for this view. The various Celtic peoples were stereotyped and stigmatized in ways which bolstered English self-images of superiority. At times a civilizing mission was evoked to legitimize English expansion. In Wales and Ireland in particular, English communities existed in parallel with ‘native’ communities and dominated the main cities, occupied the best land, etc. The language and culture of English communities and their laws and administrative systems became pre-eminent. As in North America and Australia, the attitudes English emigrants expressed toward the ‘mother country’ fluctuated between anglophile and angry resentment at their ‘unfair’ treatment. Forms of colonial resistance were evident throughout, and in Ireland particularly violent. (2012: 89-90)

Hechter (1975) and Kumar (2003) have each examined how, in varying ways, England’s dominance within Britain was reflected as a form of ‘internal colonialism’ and that the unification of Britain represented ‘the first English Empire’ (Kumar, 2003: 60). As a result, ‘England’s contentment with the United Kingdom and its traditional attachment to a British identity can be largely explained by England’s hegemony of the commanding heights of Britain’s constitution, institutions and
economy’ (Evans, 2013). In fact, Devine (2011) notes that ‘The English state had been pursuing a policy of aggressively extending its economic and military resources since c.1650 and the process was virtually complete by the time of the Anglo-Scottish Union in 1707’ (2011: 3). Similarly, within Ireland, Bartlett (2004) notes that:

While individual Irish merchants, and small houses, were to be found throughout the chief trading ports of the empire, the Irish colonial trade was dominated by England merchant houses, English intermediaries and English capital. (2004: 67)

To this extent, it is possible to trace how England’s established position within the British domestic figuration has resulted in attitudes of superiority and a propensity to prioritize ‘England’ in constructions of ‘Britain’. In fact, commenting upon the Battle of Trafalgar, Wasson (2011) highlights that while Nelson’s ‘ships went into battle off the southwestern coast of Spain against a combined French and Spanish fleet, Admiral Lord Nelson (1758-1805) famously signalled: “England expects every man will do his duty” (2011: 76-77). However ‘the patriotic symbols, music, and emotions engulfing the ships and sailors appears to have been “British” not “English’” (Wasson, 2011: 77). Indeed, the same ‘England expects…’ call would also be used in the conscription of British troops during the First World War.

Consequently, Macphee (2013) has commented upon ‘imperial Britishness’ and its ‘decidedly English character’:

The power of imperial Britishness lay precisely in its claim to rise above ‘particular’ nationalisms (and so provide a home for them under its overarching banner), while at the same time giving its supposedly inclusive framework a decidedly English character. … what this meant was that Britishness could sustain an appeal to universal political ideals (legality, freedom, justice) while inflecting these ideals in terms of the habits, values, and interests of a particular social coalition, an intra- and cross-class alliance centered on South-East England but with varying levels of penetration across the British Isles. While Britishness is much more English than it is prepared to admit, Englishness is much more imperial than it likes to remember. (2013)18

Accordingly, while both Britain and the British Empire were shaped by ‘a decidedly English character’, it is important to remember that ‘the Anglo-Saxon dominance’ of

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Britain ‘has never been complete’ (Ramsay, 2014b).\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, the aforementioned ‘tensions’ underlying British relations have served to reveal the contested nature of identification in Britain.\textsuperscript{20} Rojek (2007) argues that ‘there are problems in proposing a “dominant nation thesis” of the UK which posits that England defines the context in which the other three nations function’ (2007: 19 [italics in original]). Here, he adds that:

The United Kingdom is a decollate balance of contradictory elements, legally binding and unwritten conventions and reciprocal understandings that organise relations between the four nations. Although English dominance is pivotal, it has not resulted in uniform acculturation – Britain is one thing, but England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are different. (Rojek, 2007: 19 [italics in origional])

Certainly, this difference between the British home nations should not be ignored. Indeed, the previous section has endeavored to highlight how outsider groups can often resist and reassert their we-image in relation to acts of stigmatisation or exclusion. Yet, it is the ‘contradictory elements’ (Rojek, 2007: 19) within constructions of Britain and Britishness that serve to reveal wider power differentials within the British state and which are brought to light in the construction of Britain and British identity. As a result:

Despite the disproportionate Scottish influence in the Union, England remained by far its largest member. Once enthused with the idea of being British, the English had the power to dominate the construction and articulation of Britishness and to make economic and political decisions in affairs of state which often disregarded, and at time prejudiced, the interests of their partners. (Weight, 2002: 10)

Here, England’s power and dominance within Britain, ‘resided precisely in its assumed hegemony over “the nations” and historically over the Empire’ (Seth-Smith, 2013).\textsuperscript{21}

Accordingly, ‘centered on South-East England’ (Macphee, 2013), England’s ‘assumed hegemony’ (Seth-Smith, 2013) and ‘arrogance born of ancient prejudice’ (Weight, 2002: 10) has formed an important part of anti-English sentiment in both


\textsuperscript{20} See chapter two, sections 2.3, and 2.3.1.

Scotland and Wales (Bloyce et al., 2010). Underlying these attitudes, established-outsider dynamics can be observed. In fact, England’s imperial ambitions has led Weight (2002) to exclaim that ‘the English were extremely reluctant Britons’, adding that:

Reared on images of Scotland as a barbarous country, they saw the Union as a plank for a parasitic people to feed off England’s greater wealth and superior civilisation. Protests about the success of Scottish trade and the influence of Scots in public life were common. Consequently, while their partners came to think of themselves as Scottish/Welsh and British, the English refused to adopt a dual national identity. (2002: 5)

Even after Union, opinion in England sought to view the Scots ‘as greedy mendicants growing wealthy on England’s rich pastures’ (Devine, 2011: 11). As a result, Marshall (2008) has noted that while the Union in Scotland was perceived to be a partnership, in England it was an acquisition. Indeed, while ‘well-born and educated Englishmen … [were] more likely to have the pick of the jobs at home through established networks of personal connection and patronage. … Within the imperial relationship the Scots could feel that they were the peers of the English’ (Devine, 2011: 29 and 168 [italics added]). As a result, Devine (2011) argues that it was ‘the “outsiders” within the British Isles who were most willing to abandon their home country for overseas adventures’ (2011: 29 [italics added]).

Consequently, when examining constructions of Britain and British identity one is drawn to a context in which relations of power were interdependently dispersed across both a domestic and imperial figurational complex. Indeed, whereas, constructions of Britain took shape alongside the historical and cultural dominance of England, or, in the case of Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework, in a context of an ‘established’ English and ‘outsider’ home nation and dominion periphery, empire provided the opportunity for these established-outsider relations to be transplanted to a wider level of imperial interdependence. Here, the expansion of the British Empire interdependently allied the home nations with a wider imperial network. In doing so, a larger ‘imperial’ balance of power between Britain and the

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23 Here, connections can be drawn with the imperial expansion of Britain (Kumar, 2003; Malcolm, 2012).
empire emerged, a process that provided Britain and its constitutive home nations the opportunity to form part of an imperial established strata, the British metropole (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a; 2003b; Hall, 2008, Ward, 2008).

In such instances, British tastes, values and culture formed an important part of British imperial power, reflecting the established status of the imperial British (MacKenzie, 1999; 2001; Wood, 2014). Consequently, through empire, Britain’s established classes served to impose their values, tastes and customs – their habitus codes – onto the outsider dominions, colonies and territories (Maguire, 1999). Indeed, sporting practices played an important part in this process (Maguire, 2005). Engh et al. (2013) note:

Their sports confirmed their gentlemanly civilized status – for it was men who composed the established group within the imperial elite. The clubs and playing fields acted as zones of prestige that helped stratify relations not only among the British themselves, but also in their dealings with the ‘natives’. These zones of prestige thus conferred distinction, and allowing gentlemen to embody the qualities of honour, chivalry and fair play. Access to such prestigious clubs and playing fields could be regulated – only chosen outsiders would be allowed to emulate their imperial masters and become, through the adoption of their sports, more British than the British. Such individuals, acting as players, teachers and administrators, could thus spread British sports, and thus, British influence, more widely and deeply within a colony. (2013: 784)

The diffusion of British sporting practices serves to reflect the cross-national and cross-imperial relations underlying Britain’s domestic and imperial figurations. Specifically this can be seen in how ‘British men’ transferred ‘qualities of honour, chivalry and fair play’ to the ‘natives’ (Engh et al., 2013: 784). While domestic Britain revealed a society based upon an established England, at the imperial level, this established image was interdependently related to the home nations’ established ‘British’ status.

In fact, dominion and colonial relations within the British Empire could also reveal their own established-outsider dynamics. Indeed, this ‘was expressed politically in the incremental development of dominion status’ (Barnes, 2013: 20).
Therefore:

The white colonies of settlement insisted instead on recognition of their metropolitan-like attributes, a position that required they leave both their own colonial pasts, and other, dependent, colonies, behind. Constitutional change therefore helped construct empire as a cultural hierarchy and affirmed the dominions’ superior place within it. (Barnes, 2013: 20)

Over time, this ‘cultural hierarchy’ (Barnes, 2013: 20) within the empire would undergo transformation with the dominions seeking their own ‘radical nationalist histories’ separate from Britain (Van Duinen, 2013: 346). Similarly, with regards to sport, Engh et al., (2013) argue that ‘the British, … experience[d] the same double-bind processes that can be traced to the processes associated with functional democratization’ (2013: 784). Accordingly:

try as they might to maintain their own civilized status, gradually the cultural markers of power and prestige seeped out from beyond their exclusive control, and in the case of sport, the imperial masters began to be beaten at their own games. (Engh et al., 2013: 784)

Consequently, entwined within these processes are questions of identity, in particular, the use of sport to help promote and articulate an independent national identity. Indeed, both within the UK and the empire, sport provided an important cultural signifier, with the desire to beat the English and the British adding to the spectacle of domestic and imperial sporting occasions (Maguire, 2005). More importantly, however, the above remarks reveal how ‘cultural markers’ are subject to processes of functional democratization. Indeed, it can be noted that as the empire became more closely entwined, there was a paradoxical move towards greater political freedom for the dominions (Kaul, 2006). Accordingly, while ‘the cultural markers of power and prestige seeped out from beyond’ (Engh et al., 2013: 784) relations between the British and its colonies became more equal (a process which was reflected in the granting of dominion status).

Here, relations between established-outsider groups can be considered with regards to a power balance, upon which power ratios between established and outsider groups – over time – become relatively more equal. These sociogenetic transformations corresponded with the gradual emergence of a separate dominion national identity, which began to reflect the distinct national culture and values of the dominions (psychogenesis). This was, however, not an identity that was completely
‘re-invented’ (Hobsbawm, 1983), but instead included certain characteristics that were drawn from their historical relationship with Britain and the British Empire.

Moreover, the effects of this historical relationship reside in the relations between the British home nations, most noticeably, between Scotland and England. In fact, in interviews with members of the Scottish diaspora, Whigham (2012) has highlighted that:

One contrast cited by a majority of respondents was the view that England was financially richer than its neighbours in Scotland, positioning Scotland as an underdog in the relationship between the two countries. The perceived differences in wealth and lifestyle were also deemed to impact upon certain characteristics of the stereotypical English persona, such as a sense of superiority and entitlement. (2012: 11)

Drawing upon the above, it is evident that an ‘outsider’ image of Scotland as ‘underdogs’ is interdependently constructed in relation to an established sense of English ‘superiority and entitlement’ (Whigham, 2012: 11). Yet, expressions of this ‘underdog mentality’ were often ‘portrayed as a positive quality, with emphasis on the common bond felt with other nations who were felt to possess similar positions within global society’ (Whigham, 2012: 12). In such instances, Scotland’s outsider location acted as a source of national distinction and camaraderie but also an expression of anti-English sentiment (Whigham, 2012). Such examples, reveal how an outsider status can prove to be an important signifier in contesting established representations of outsider groups, that is, as a ‘David-and-Goliath relationship with the English’ (Whigham, 2012: 16). Indeed, whereas, Whigham (2012) draws upon the work of McCrone (1992) to argue that ‘these perceived economic, cultural and political differences reflect a number of the “myths” of the Scottish nation’ (Whigham, 2012: 11), their prevalence within institutions such as ‘the media’ can form an important part of the construction of English-Scottish relations.

Moreover, they can also provide an important comparison with changes in the established image of England. That is, in accordance with changes in the balance of power between established and outsider groups, it is possible to observe how England’s subsumed status within Britain and the British Empire has undermined the post-imperial identity of England. From the point of view of a separate English identity much like that of its peripheral nations, constructions of England often draw upon British characteristics. While it has been argued in this section that this can be
conceived in relation to England’s established position within Britain, a process that served to impede any separable conception of Englishness (Kumar, 2003; Malcolm, 2012), such concerns have proven particularly significant when recent devolutionary measures have failed to provide England any separate political representation of its own (Perryman, 2009).

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that relations between established and outsider groups are often marked by processes of consolidation and emancipation. Indeed, Van Stolk and Wouters (1987) note that, ‘when studying established-outsider figurations, it is relevant to ask to what extent they are characterised by an ideal of harmonious inequality’ (1987: 484). That is:

In a phase of consolidation and resignation the figuration ideal of harmonious inequality goes largely unchallenged, while in a phase of emancipation and resistance it is attacked, becoming subject to stress from the increasingly important ideal of more equal social contact. (1987: 485 [italics in original])

Indeed, it is through phases of ‘consolidation and resignation’ as well as ‘emancipation and resistance’ (Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987: 485 [italics removed]) that attachments and (dis)attachments to Britain can be traced. In particular, however, Van Stolk and Wouters (1987) ‘phases’ can be viewed in correspondence with the power differentials between particular groups and the balances of power that ultimately alter and reconfigure interdependent relations.

Therefore, by utilising the established-outsider model, constructions and (re)constructions of Britain within both the domestic British and Commonwealth coverage can be observed. These constructions will be used to consider how, in a relational context, the framing of Britain is related to both the national identities of each nation as well as to larger British identifications. More importantly, it is here that the established-outsider model can be used to consider cross-figurational interdependencies and balances of power between a British domestic and a larger imperial/Commonwealth figuration. Here, tensions (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Elias, 1996), changes (Dunning et al., 2004; MacAlloon, 1984; Williams, 1977) and integration struggles (Mennell, 2007) can be observed in the discursive construction of Britain.

That is, in light of Britain’s post-imperial decline and devolutionary measures, do constructions of England remain wedded to, and, is the marginalisation of the rest of the UK, still apparent in representations of Britain? Similarly, do the former
dominions still maintain attachments to Britain? In light of these questions, the final section of this chapter will examine how power is discursively constructed within media discourses. Indeed, adherence to the conception of power as fundamentally balanced will be maintained (Elias, 1991; 2010). What will be considered, however, is the extent to which a discursive analysis of the British domestic and Commonwealth press can be used to examine how constructions of Britain and British identity are reflective of British domestic and Commonwealth established-outsider relations.

3.2.4. The established-outsider model: mediated discursive constructions and established-outsider relations

The study of discourse has endeavoured to explore how social practices are related to social structures of power and control (Fairclough, 1995). In particular, Foucault (1978) has examined how discourses refer to systems of thought that seek to reflect particular knowledge claims. Indeed, they perform an important role in aiding the individual through particular social encounters and constructing the individual’s own subjectivity (Foucault, 1978). Similarly, Hall (1988d) argues that discourse ‘gives questions of culture and ideology, and the scenarios of representation – subjectivity, identity, politics – a formative, not merely an expressive, place in the constitution of social and political life’ (1988d: 27 cited in Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 63).

To this extent, it is possible to examine how the ‘psychological field [is] constituted through the social domain of discourse’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 75). Here, language has the capacity to present various forms of reality as well as organise and construct reality in various interpretive contexts (Barthes, 1972). Relations within texts, the combining of its various elements and grammatical forms (Fairclough, 2003), are enveloped with cultural meanings that serve to organise social settings through which particular discourses can be identified and analysed (Van Dijk, 1997). Indeed, such understandings are not dependent solely on language but ‘are performed, enacted and embodied through a variety of linguistic and non-linguistic means’ (De Fina et al., 2006 : 3). As a result, discourses of national culture provide ‘a way of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and our conceptions of ourselves’ (Hall, 1995 : 613) across space and time as well as in relation to other national groups (Maguire, 1995). These discursive contexts provide
national identity a social and psychological significance (Wetherell and Potter, 1992) through which language, collective memories and national behaviours are conveyed. Here, routine habits, personal expressions and ways of living (Rapport, 2012) form part of the nation’s long-term development ‘and should be perceived as individual and social at the same time’ (Van Daalen, 2013).

Nevertheless, De Cillia et al. (1999) note that ‘if we regard national identities purely as discursive constructs which are made up of specifically constructed national-identity narratives, the question remains why somebody will produce a specific given discursive construction’ (1999: 155-156). Indeed, the work of Giddens (1991) provides one answer by allowing us to consider that national identity is not just located at a discursive level but also occupies a real and emotional vocabulary at the practical level too. Giddens’s (1991) elaborates:

All human beings continuously monitor the circumstances of their activities as a feature of doing what they do, and such monitoring always has discursive features … The knowledgeability of human agents, however, is not confined to discursive consciousness of the conditions of their action. Many of the elements of being able to ‘go on’ are carried at the level of practical consciousness, incorporated within the continuity of everyday activities. Practical consciousness is integral to the reflexive monitoring of action, but it is ‘non-conscious’, rather than unconscious. Most forms of practical consciousness could not be ‘held in mind’ during the course of social activities, since their tactic or taken-for-granted qualities form the essential condition which allows actors to concentrate on tasks at hand (1991: 36)

In such instances, Giddens’s (1991) practical and discursive levels of consciousness can be compared with Freud’s structural model of the psyche. Giddens (1993) notes that ‘the use of “I” [or “ego”] develops out of, and is … associated with, the positioning of the agent in social encounters’ (1993: 94). However, while Giddens’s (1991) analysis views both discursive and practical consciousness as separate, through an Eliasian lens, the positioning of the ‘I’ forms part of on-going balance between the ‘I-identity’ (ego-image) and ‘we-identity’ (super-ego-image). Accordingly, in contrast to Giddens (1991), the construction of I/we identities are interdependently formed ‘through discursive practices and practical actions, both of which have an unacknowledged affective component’ (Maguire, 2005: 132).

25 Whereas, De Cillia et al. (1999) draw upon the work of Martin (1995), this thesis will refer to the work of Giddens (1991) which has commonly been used within studies of the media, national identity and process sociology (Maguire, 1999; 2005; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Maguire and Tuck, 1998; Poulton, 2004; Tuck, 2003).
Subsequently, when examining national identity/habitus, one is essentially dealing with interconnected funds of social knowledge that operate at both practical and discursive levels of consciousness (Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Maguire and Burrows, 2005). To this extent, national habitus/character is framed, constructed and represented by and through the discursive practices of the media and which are interwoven with activities occurring at the level of practical consciousness (Maguire and Burrows, 2005). As a result, a two-way traffic emerges between the two levels; a ‘mental traffic’ that reawakens sleeping memories, and which, at the practical level, makes the nation seem more real (Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 1998). Here, national newspapers can play an important role in discursively constructing the nation (Anderson, 2006; Billig, 1995; Maguire, 2005). That is, the media ‘perform a “gate-keeping” role, filtering and restricting news input’ (Fowler, 1991: 13). Fowler (1991) elaborates:

News values … are to be regarded as intersubjective mental categories. In determining the significance of events, the papers and their readers make reference, explicit or more usually implicit, to what are variously called, in cognitive psychology and in semantics, ‘frames’, ‘paradigms’, ‘stereotypes’, ‘schemata’ and ‘general propositions’ (1991: 17)

Here, the ideological categories and classifications, which are familiar to certain groups within society, can be identified through particular themes that delineate between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Fairclough, 1995). Consequently, within a newspaper article, the overall organization of its contents forms part of a larger thematic structure (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Fairclough, 1995; Joffe and Yardley, 2004; Lee and Maguire, 2009). Locating these structures is, as Fairclough (1995) notes, intrinsic to understanding:

the mental models of events and situations which reports bring to bear in interpreting events and source texts, models which reporters try to convey to audiences in the way they write reports, and models which audiences (readers etc.) draw upon in interpreting reports. This cognitive perspective helps to
specify how exactly the ‘news values’ that have been identified as shaping news coverage influence the way particular reports are produced (1995: 30)

The ‘mental models’ that Fairclough (1995) comments upon provide a similar account of the ‘mental traffic’ (Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 1998; Tuck, 2003) that occurs between both the practical and discursive levels of consciousness. If news stories are to be ‘constructed on the basis of mental categories which are present in readers and built on by the media’ (Fowler, 1991: 19) one can assume that the ‘mental models’ employed by journalists within media discourse can be investigated as one form of discursive practice whereby the constitutive role of discourse seeks ‘to construct and reconstruct social identities, relations and structures’ (Amer, 2012: 118; see also Fairclough, 1995; Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Tuck, 2003; Wodak et al., 1999). Consequently, in regards to the British Empire, imperial representations and the discursive construction of the empire’s colonial ‘others’ formed a regular part of British newspaper discourses and were included in the carried information on board British ships (Lester, 2001). Therefore, through the discursive construction of the empire, both the colonies and the metropole were interdependently linked, but, also, more importantly, discursively represented (Lester, 2001).

Such representations, however, are always ‘re-representations’ of a particular reality. Indeed:

There is always a mediating effect whereby an event is filtered through interpretative frameworks and acquires ideological significance. News, then, provides its audience with interpretive frameworks, ways of seeing the world and defining reality (Poole, 2002: 23 cited in Meer et al., 2010: 91)

Subsequently, by analysing such ‘interpretative frameworks’ in accordance with Elias’s (1978) conception of power, it is possible to examine how constructions of the nation are based upon established-outsider relations, at various levels of interdependence. Indeed, this complex interplay between Britain’s domestic and Commonwealth figurations works against a conception of discourse as dictated solely by those who command social power through mechanisms of control (Foucault, 1978). Instead, these discourses can form part of wider interdiscursive processes through which the discursive construction of identity is contested, re-framed and re-invented (Scollon, 1998). In doing so, national identity is neither fixed nor static but processually negotiated in accordance with past and present contexts. Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that:
identity and forms of subjectivity which become instantiated in discourse at any given moment should be seen as a sedimentation of past discursive practices. A sense of identity and subjectivity is constructed from the interpretative resources – the stories and narratives of identity – which are available, in circulation, in our culture (1992: 78 [italics added])

Indeed, the use of ‘past discursive practices’ forms part of ‘the stories and narrative of identity’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 78) that construct the nation and its national identity. In fact, Schumpeter (1976) argues that ‘life habits of the dim past’ play an important role in constructing the nation (1976: 73).

However, whereas discursive constructions seek to frame the nation through, amongst other means, continuities with the nation’s past (Conboy, 2005; Falcous and Silk, 2010) they can also reveal dis-continuities and debates regarding the national self (Wodak et al., 2009). Here, Lavi (2013) explains that:

The national flag flying in front of a house, for example, takes place in concrete time and space. However, it receives its national meanings since it is embedded in the national historical narrative. This is not to say that this narrative is given or static; the national narrative loads the flag with its national meanings while the flag (re)affirm the national narrative. In a different context, the same flag could have been considered as strange or even subversive. (2013: 6)

Accordingly, while Lavi’s (2013) comments serve to highlight how national meanings are appropriated from earlier generations and are acquired personally, it also reveals how differing levels of integration (‘different context[s]’) can provide variations in national meaning. By extension, Lavi’s (2013) comments can be used to explore the variations in national narratives and national meanings amongst established and outsider groups. Here, changes in the balance of power between established and outsider groups (processes of functional democratization) can result in reinterpretations of the nation and its past. In such instances, national identities ‘are discursively, by means of language and other semiotic systems, produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed’ via social institutions such as the media (De Cillia et al., 1999: 153 [italics in original]).

Indeed, these reproductions, transformations and deconstructions can be considered in the relationship between the past and contemporary constructions of the nation. Consequently, the dissemination of national symbols, national traditions and nationalist images, during sporting and royal events, are themselves simultaneously present in the discursive and practical levels of consciousness that help to preserve
collective memory (Tuck, 2003). Indeed, Conboy (2007) has explored how tabloid newspapers serve to present ‘a particular sort of history’ (2007: 257) that represents past occasions, events and individuals as myth (see also Barthes, 1972). However, while myths are often connected ‘to the present in a highly significant and politically charged way’ they can also ‘be brought up against real experience of the past’ (Conboy, 2007: 268).

Whereas, Billig’s (1995) ‘banal nationalism’ highlights the banal nature of such actions, these actions can be made ‘real’ through the reifying and figurative discourses that frame national news media (De Cillia et al., 1999; see also Poulton, 2004). An analysis of these discourses can allow us to examine how particular events can become constructed by the ‘memories that connect a nation’s present with its past’ and which serve as a reflection of the deeply enmeshed processes that structure the national habitus (Maguire, 1999: 177; see also McCormack, 2012; Poulton, 2004; Tuck, 2003). As a result, rather than merely reflecting repetitive performances (Butler, 1990) the discursive construction of the nation, its history, and, in particular, its national identity, is constructed and (re)constructed through interdependent relations, past and present tensions and balances of power.

Therefore, taking the above into consideration, it is evident that the discursive construction of the nation in newspaper discourses posits a valuable source of enquiry regarding the construction, representation and framing of Britain. More importantly, however, when considered through an established-outsider lens there is the potential to examine how the discursive construction of Britain is related to broader balances of power within the British state as well between its former dominions. To this extent, this thesis argues for an extension of Elias and Scotson’s (1994) original model in order to examine how established-outsider relations form part of the discursive construction of the nation and national identity. Indeed, rather than focusing on one particular population (Winston Parva) forthcoming chapters will seek to expose how established-outsider relations are shaped as well as re-shaped in accordance with changes in figurational interdependence. It is here that accounts of the British past can prove particularly elusive in examining contemporary constructions of Britain as well as elucidating upon forms of attachment and (dis)attachment. Indeed, Schumpeter (1976) argues that:
customary modes of political thought and feeling in a given age can never be mere ‘reflexes’ of, or counterparts to, the production situation of that age. Because of the persistence of such habits, they will always, to a considerable degree, be dominated by the production context of past ages. (1976: 71)

Here, the persistence of the past, and, more specifically, Britain’s imperial past, can prove effective in examining how the decline of established groups (England/Britain) are reflected in newspaper discourses (Conboy, 2007). That is, how far back within history does the national habitus relate too and to what extent is national habitus shaped and affected by processes of development and transformations in social relations? In doing so, one can ‘consider how memories of empire did not simply neatly disappear but could be reactivated in more modern environments’ (Littler, 2006: 25).

**Conclusion**

Alongside chapter two, the overarching purpose of the above sections has been to trace, from 1707 onwards, the interrelated processes underlying Britain’s state formation, imperial expansion and subsequent decline. With regards to British identity, Thompson (2005) argues that:

‘Imperial Britishness’ was not something superimposed over an array of disparate cultures and identities that made up the United Kingdom. Rather, to varying degrees, the Scottish, the Welsh, the Irish and the English regions were to find in the empire a form of self-affirmation that helped them better contend with the political and cultural challenges they were facing (2005: 200)

However, while Thompson’s (2005) remarks highlight how both ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ dimensions served to underlie British ‘self-affirmation’ (2005: 2000), the contents of this chapter has sought to expose how contending political, cultural and historical challenges and tensions have formed an important part of the construction of Britain. Indeed, to a large extent, this approach has been structured by the requirements of the project and the problems it proposes. Primarily, this involved accounting for a multi-national analysis of Britain, which based upon its diverse and international history, could provide numerous constructions and representations. As a result, this chapter has sought to focus attention on the balances of power between the British home nations and former dominions in order to examine how past and present interdependencies continue to construct and frame Britain and British identity.

Consequently, in order to make sense of these characteristics, the above sections
have explored how an established-outsider model can be used to elucidate upon the discursive construction of Britain, both within the domestic and imperial/commonwealth figurations. More importantly, however, it is through the interdependencies between these figurations that the established-outsider model can provide an insight into the various ‘national’ discourses that construct, frame and represent national and international events. Indeed, these discourses are not fixed but are dependent upon changes in the interdependencies between groups. Accordingly, while ‘the formation of habitus is a function of social interdependencies’ it is a formation that varies ‘as the structure of the society varies’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 58). Therefore, in accordance with changes in the balance of power between established and outsider groups, it is possible to observe how the discursive construction of Britain has been shaped and re-shaped by its imperial past and multi-national relations (Thompson, 2000). Indeed, this is of particular importance when analysing the long-term processes that underlie national identity formation (Colls, 2012; Elias, 1996).

Furthermore, in the case of global media events, the symbolic operation of the media can help to produce and re-produce national ideologies (Blain et al., 1993), providing important ‘anchors of meanings’ for the nation (Maguire and Tuck, 1998: 112). In particular, the media coverage surrounding sporting and royal events can prove useful when ‘studying beliefs, attitudes and human relations’ (Andriotis, 2010). These attributes become communicated through a media discourse, which portrays the stories, memories and images that help form part of the ‘narrative of the nation’ (Maguire and Tuck, 1998: 105; see also Lee and Maguire, 2009). As a result, section 3.2.3. served to highlight how an analysis of newspaper discourses can serve to elucidate upon such narratives. By referring deliberately to narratives in the plural, one can direct attention to Britain’s domestic and imperial (Commonwealth) histories as well as the interdependent relations, shared identity characteristics and power struggles that form part of the construction of Britain.

Consequently, by drawing upon a processually relational analysis of Britain (chapter one) and by providing a multi-national analysis of British identity (chapter two), it became apparent that Britain’s imperial past has formed an important part of the discursive construction of Britain. In such instances, a historical perspective offers a useful way of communicating and understanding the changing interdependencies, power balances and spacial orientations that impede upon the nation. By historically locating social research (Dunning, 1992), social investigations can avoid perceiving social life as timeless or
radically different in post-modern times (Maguire and Young, 2002 see Bauman, 2000 and Giddens, 1985; 1991). Furthermore, Dunning (1992) and others (Maguire, 1995; Maguire and Young, 1992) have noted that by understanding how present circumstances are ‘historically’ formed, a greater level of detachment by the researcher can be achieved (Elias, 1987).

Ultimately, therefore, this proposes a complex analysis of British identity and a focus upon the ambiguities that envelop multi-national identifications, such as, Britain. Indeed:

any long-term enquiry into state-formation and nation-building processes can show that every spurt towards greater interdependence, towards closer integration of human groups which were previously independent – or less dependent, or less reciprocally dependent – on each other runs through a series of specific integration tensions and conflicts, of balance of power struggles which are not accidental, but [rather] structural concomitants of these spurts towards greater functional interdependence of ‘parts’ within a ‘whole’. (Elias, 2008a: 111)

Accordingly, if one considers, the gradual emergence of the British state and empire as well as its eventual decline, then one can observe how long-term processes of integration and dis-integration form an important part of the construction of Britain. To this extent, analyses of Britain should pay attention to the historical complexity of particular events as well as the changes and continuities that they propose. Here, identification processes form part of complex national and transnational contexts through which representations are shaped and re-shaped in accordance with a historical context of power relations.

Crucially, this can not be achieved by viewing the nation and its identity in isolation but instead as part of a much wider investigation whereby changes at the level of human organization can elucidate upon those processes involved in the methods of inclusion/exclusion that are attributed to ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions and which delineate between established and outsider groups within a particular social figuration. The ability to examine established-outsider relations and we/they images can allow one to consider how habitus and identification is ‘always – in the modern world where people belong to groups within groups within groups – multi-layered’ (Mennell, 1994: 177 [italics added]). Indeed, Elias (1991) argues that:

The usefulness of the concept of the we-I balance as a tool of observation and reflection may perhaps be enhanced if we pay some attention to this multi-layered aspect of we-concepts. It matches the plurality of interlocking integration planes characteristic of human society at this present stage of development (1991: 202
Consequently, there can be a multiple of we-relations occurring across various integration levels, each with their own intensity of identification (Elias, 1991; Maguire and Tuck, 2005). When adopting Elias’ processual view, it is important to remember that these identifications, individually experienced and collectively authored, should be seen as a long-term process (Moore, 2010). In this regard, by turning to an examination of the British ‘imperial figuration’ and its formation and reformation over time, one can further elaborate upon the ‘multi-layered aspects of we-concepts’ and its relation to British we-images, as perceived by both ‘Britain’ and the former dominions (Elias, 1991: 202). This, in turn, requires a methodological process that can seek to support as well as critically analyse a multi-national analysis of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games. With this in mind, the following chapter will outline this process in further detail.
Chapter Four: Method and Methodology – Involvement and detachment, Thematic Coding and the Data Sample

Introduction

In light of previous chapters, it is evident that British identity has been inextricably linked to both nationalist and imperialist ideologies and characteristics (Colley, 2005; Darwin, 2009; 2010; Darian-Smith et al., 2007; Howe, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2006; Lester, 2001; 2006; Maguire, 1993b; Malcolm, 2012; Stockwell, 2008; Van Duinen; Ward, 2007; Wilson, 2004; 2006). Indeed, these two dynamics provide the framework through which the social, cultural and political circumstances surrounding Britain and the British Empire can be conceived. Here, imperial history provides a crucial segway to understanding the identity, values and character of contemporary Britain (Howe, 2010). However, what is also apparent is that contrary to nationalist rhetoric, it remains difficult to locate an essential identity or character that can be demarcated to a specific geographical boundary or particular national group (Cohen, 1994). In fact, such deductions lack historical perspective and how national culture, identity and history are based upon interdependent interactions, both internal and external, between various nations/nation-states.

With this in mind, this thesis has sought to follow an interdependent path by exploring how the historical emergence of the British state and empire was based upon, and, indeed, helped to consolidate, a number of national groups, both within the UK and the Commonwealth. To this extent, this chapter will continue on this path by laying the foundation for a multi-national examination of the national press coverage of both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games. Specifically, this chapter will outline how an analysis of the domestic ‘British’ as well as Australian, Canadian and New Zealand national press provided the opportunity to explore the national mediated construction of Britain and British identity. Before this, however, a return to the research problem/aims will help draw together the former chapters in accordance with the research’s methodology.

4.0. Returning to the research problem

As detailed in the Introduction, this thesis aims to explore how the British domestic and Commonwealth national press sought to construct, frame and represent Britain and British identity during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games. Indeed, as highlighted in chapter’s one and two, British identity was not just confined
to the UK but was also shaped by a wider ‘imperial figuration’ comprising – in this instance – the ‘old dominions’ of Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Boyce, 2008; Darwin, 2010; Howe, 2010; Peers, 2002; Mycock, 2010; Wellings, 2003). The relationship between Britain’s domestic home nations and former dominions was considered further in chapter three. Here, it was argued, that when conceived through a multi-layered analysis, Britain’s state and later imperial development and decline had resulted in various levels of integration within Britain and the Commonwealth. Accordingly, in order to account for these layers/levels and their tension struggles (Mennell, 2007), an established-outsider model was adopted in order to explore how such tensions between the British home nations and the former dominions have shaped, and, indeed, continue to shape, the construction, framing and representation of Britain. In doing so, it was highlighted that a multi-national analysis of the British domestic and selected Commonwealth national press can be used to explore how Britain’s multi-figurational dynamics are discursively constructed along established-outsider lines (Elias and Scotson, 1994; Fairclough, 1995).

With this in mind, this chapter will explore how ‘an analysis of texts is a significant part of sociocultural analysis of media, by linking properties of texts to ideologies, power relations and cultural values’ (Fairclough, 1995: 24). More importantly, in accordance with chapter three’s discussion on the discursive construction of power balances within media discourses and in light of Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model, the selected research techniques that have been used to analyse both the British domestic and Commonwealth national press will be considered. In addition, this chapter will reflect upon the role of the researcher with regards to knowledge production as well as their position in the overall research process (Elias, 1987; 2008).

Taking the above into consideration, this thesis is amenable to the critique that at this point in the research certain denigrations may suggest a level of ‘armchair’ theorising with regards to the theoretical foundations that have been declared thus far. That is, a separation of research and theory has occurred in which the application of a process sociological established-outsider model has been chosen, and, as a consequence, will continue to be used in order to interpret the data in an apriori fashion. Therefore, in response, I would argue that an overriding aim of this thesis has been to undertake a processually orientated and relational account of Britain that has sought to consider how Britain has been constructed and represented under
particular figurational conditions, emanating from its state (1707) and later imperial emergence (post-1783). 1 Under such an aim, it has been noted that constructions of Britain are based upon domestic state relations between the home nations as well as between a wider imperial metropole and periphery, of which the old dominions have been selected for further analysis. Accordingly, revisiting literature on Britain and British identity from 1707 onwards has revealed how constructions of Britain were predicated on particular tensions, integration struggles, paradoxes and power balances. Indeed, such interpretations have subsequently been viewed through an established-outsider lens and previous research, which has also used this model, has been consulted and drawn upon (Bloyce et al., 2010; Bucholc, 2013; Engh et al., 2013; Lake, 2013; Loyal, 2011; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Maguire, 2011; Mennell, 2007; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987; Velija and Flyn, 2010; Vogler, 2000). The contention here is that national newspaper discourses can reflect and be interpreted through the established-outsider model in order to ascertain concernable similarities and difference within each nation’s newspaper coverage. Certainly, while this has provided, and, will continue to provide, a lens for the interpretation of the data, the Conclusion will highlight – in light of the data – revisions and adaptations to the established-outsider model, a process that not only seeks to build a link between theory and data, but which is also based upon important significances from the data. To this extent, the following section will explore how my involvement with the topic has shaped the research design.

4.1. Involvement and detachment: defending and distancing

Unavoidably, the identity of the social scientist is embedded within the social and cultural systems of various social groups. Indeed, Billig (1995) accurately reflects the ‘involved’ nature of sociological research on nationalism when he states that ‘one cannot step outside the world of nations, nor rid oneself of the assumption and common-sense habits which come from living within that world’ (1995: 37). Accordingly, the effect that such assumptions can have is highlighted by Biswas (2007) who, while drawing upon the work of Said, notes that:

Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries,

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1 See chapter two, section 2.2
particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination (2007: 125-126)

Certainly, while accepting that ‘analysts must expect to be affected by what should be the object of their study’ (Billig, 1995: 37), such assumptions can reflect both a cost and a benefit (Perry et al., 2004). Baur and Ernst (2011) argue that ‘the problem is not whether subjectivity influences perception – it does’, instead, what is required is an understanding of ‘how it frames perception’ (2011: 120 [italics in original]).

Consequently, while subjectivity displays the capacity to distort social research, it also provides a means for understanding the significances behind human action (Baur and Ernst, 2011). Indeed, this can allow the social scientist to ‘accurately [reflect] the reality of the personal situations of social researchers’ compared to that which traditional scientific methods allow (Perry et al., 2004: 139). Elias (1987) notes:

By and large, theories of science still use as their principal model the physical sciences – often not in their contemporary, but in their classical form. Aspects of their procedures are widely regarded as the most potent and decisive factor responsible for their achievements and as the essential characteristic of science generally. By abstracting such aspects from the actual procedures and techniques of the physical sciences, one arrives at a general model of scientific procedure which is known as ‘the scientific method’ (1987: 17)

Thus, detached forms of social control, induced emotional restraints and embodied conceptual tools have become institutionalized as part of the scientific tradition (Elias, 1998a). Here, Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) elaborate:

It is the conception of the person (in the singular) as the ‘subject’ of knowledge, a single thinking mind inside a sealed container from which each one looks out and struggles to fish for knowledge of the ‘objects’ outside in the ‘external world’. Among those objects are other minds, equally locked inside their own sealed containers, and one of the most difficult questions epistemologists (and sociologists influenced by them) pose for themselves is of how one thinking subject inside its own container can ever know anything of what is being thought and what is known by those objects – those other subjects – thinking away inside their own containers in turn (1998: 33)

As can be seen from Mennell and Goudsblom’s (1998) remarks, such conceptions of the individual and the scientific method that this employs, has resulted in an approach to science, whereby a level of ‘detachment’ towards physical events has become the dominant method for acquiring ‘scientific’ knowledge (Elias, 1987) and the
measuring of ‘truth’ (Dunning and Hughes, 2012). Here the scientist ‘takes up his position “in” the single individual … He looks through his eyes at the world “outside” as if through small windows; or he mediates from the same standpoint on what is happening “within” (Elias, 1998b: 290).

In contrast to this approach, Elias argued that ‘sociological analysis moves constantly between the two poles of ‘involvement’ and ‘detachment’, between an expression of the sociologist’s subjective experience of the world, and the attempt to transcend that experience in gaining an objective, scientific perspective’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 71 [italics in original]). What is required from the social scientist, therefore, is a ‘detour via detachment’. Dunning and Hughes (2012) elaborate:

What the metaphor of a ‘detour’ means is that, like other social scientists, sociologists have specific interests to defend emotionally involved positions but should strive to learn, at first, to distance themselves from and control them, and then return to them via a process of ‘secondary involvement’. (2012: 13)

The process of moving from an involved to a detached position and then back to a more involved perception can help achieve what Elias (1987) referred to as ‘reality-congruent’ knowledge (Dunning and Hughes, 2012). Indeed, while the social scientist should not achieve complete detachment, the involvement-detachment balance can best be ‘viewed as a key sensitizing concept: one that brings to the forefront of the researcher’s consciousness the complexities – and, in particular, the risk of distortion – inherent in the process of conducting qualitative research’ (Perry et al., 2004: 138). These concerns help sensitize the researcher to issues regarding the distance between participant and inquirer. It acknowledges that ‘it is impossible to objectively analyse the social world because researchers are simultaneously analysts of and interdependent actors in the social processes they seek to understand’ (Moore, 2010: 1.3). Importantly, however, these dynamics can allow the researcher to ‘bring with them their own experiences, assumptions and their own, largely unconscious, habitus’ (Moore, 2010: 1.3). It is here that:

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2 Here, Elias (1987) aimed to move away from a distanced conception of knowledge, performed by an isolated and essentially rational human being. Instead, and, in accordance with his processual orientations, Elias viewed knowledge as being developmentally tied to particular figural arrangements. That is, knowledge is entwined with particular figural contexts and human psyches, of which progression and regressions can occur (Dunning and Hughes, 1987). See Burkitt (1993) for a discussion of Elias’s concerns regarding the work of Nietzsche and his lack of ‘detachment’.
The task of social scientists is to explore, and to make people understand, the patterns they form together, the nature and the changing configurations of all that binds them to each other. The investigators themselves form part of these patterns (Elias, 1998a: 225 [italics added])

Indeed, it is this degree of critical reflection that this thesis will attempt to demonstrate and apply when analysing the printed press coverage.

4.2. Data sample: analysing the printed press – benefits and justifications

The reasons for analysing national newspapers have already been considered in chapter three. However, in line with this chapter’s broader methodological discussions, the aim here will be to explore some of the benefits and justifications of performing a printed press analysis. Historically, since the invention of the printing press, newspapers have provided a central role in re-presenting the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006). Similarly, Colley (2005) argues that the consumption of early newspapers allowed the population of Britain to ‘imagine’ itself as a larger polity. The reporting of national events, such as the death of a member of the royal family, became instantly framed by newspaper coverage, demonstrated through both the text and layout of the newspaper.

Indeed, whereas, the format of the traditional printed newspaper may have undergone its own variations over time, the newspaper still commands a prominent role in communicating textual information (Whitlam and Preston, 1998). Young and Dugas (2012) note that ‘newspapers remain an important contributor to public discourse on controversial issues, and are a key means by which claims and narratives are communicated and legitimized to the ‘lay’ public’ (Young and Dugas, 2012: 27). Accordingly, Holland (2008) argues that the newspapers ‘usefulness as a primary source for students, authors, and researchers is unrivalled; the wide range of topics and subjects they cover appeals to a broad range of users’ (2008: 18). Unsurprisingly, therefore, analyses of newspaper content have been subject to numerous qualitative and quantitative investigations.

3 See section 3.2.3.
4 In one particular example, Colley (2005) notes that ‘When the Prince Regent’s daughter and heir presumptive to the throne, Princess Charlotte, died in childbirth in November 1817, several provincial newspapers experimented with outlining their front pages in black for the occasion. This became the standard practice for subsequent royal casualties, adding drama to reportage and instantly communicating the fact of national loss to those who could only look at print, not read it’ (2005: 220).
However, while press analyses have proven a popular source of enquiry in media analyses (Mayring, 2000), such an approach ignores the benefits associated with investigations of audience perception. Subsequently, audience analyses can provide a further insight into the effects of media production and how the audience relate and ‘make sense’ of media texts relative to the ‘agenda setting’ capacity of news producers (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). In addition, decreasing newspaper sales and increasing use of online sources for news information have led to questions regarding the popularity and validity of the traditional printed press (Bardoel, 2002).

Nonetheless, the purpose of this thesis, is to investigate how national, global and imperial forms of identification, were framed across the former old white dominions of the British Empire. Accordingly, while newspapers have often claimed ‘national’ status ‘their textual contents … provide useful evidence for examining perceptions of nations and national identity’ (MacInnes et al., 2007: 188). Consequently, examinations of media content provide a useful approach to analysing a range of international media outlets. Indeed, five main benefits were identified.

First, cross-cultural analyses of newspaper titles can be used to help produce a more nuanced sense of the various thematic representations that are used to denote a particular national identity across several national newspapers. Whereas, the researcher should remain aware of the different linguistic conventions across cultures and the variations this may have upon text production, such differences can often reveal corresponding differentiations in the psychological and sociological structure of particular cultures (Lee and Peterson, 1997). Accordingly, Goldthorpe (1987) states:

In order to explain patterns of variation in social structure and culture, comparisons between societies are clearly essential; and if the range of comparison is not to be severely restricted then societies of the past as well as of the present must undoubtedly be included in the analysis (1987: 168)

In such instances, ‘it is often through comparison with other worlds, historically as well as geographically distant, that our own social existence is made most intelligible’ (Goldthorpe, 1987: 170).

Second, while Goffman (1979) assumed that the media played a vital role in shaping what was normal and desirable within society, often, the press’ use of agenda setting can help raise the salience of particular issues, which are portrayed within the
public agenda (Collins et al., 2006). In the context of national identity these concerns can reveal how the media reflect and reinforce dominant ideologies of the nation.

Third, by acknowledging that the news is shaped by commercial, ideological and semiotic structures, is to conceive that all news stories are distorted and that journalists remain largely biased (Bell, 1991; Bignell, 2002). As a result, news stories ‘never simply denote a reality ‘objectively’’ but ‘always encode connoted meanings … which support a particular ideological point of view’ (Bignell, 2002: 86). The uncovering of these meanings can allow the social scientist to observe and describe the multiple patterns and themes that help frame the news story via the on-going processes that structure the nation and national identity (Holden, 2011).

Fourth, Fairclough (1995) argues that ‘there tends to be a rather monolithic view of the role of media in ideological reproduction which understates the extent of diversity and change in media practices and media discourse’ (1995: 28). Indeed, the extent to which media discourses can change over time is often a reflection of the wider social developments within national and international society (Connolly and Dolan, 2012). This stands in contrast to the use of interview and survey data, which simply document and describe national identifications without appreciating that such data ‘may be subject to historical change and contextual variability’ (Collins et al., 2006: 125). Accordingly, the use of archival newspaper sources can help to achieve a longitudinal analysis that identifies social changes over a specific period as well as provide an appreciation of the variable nature of newspaper content in relation to differences in newspaper nationality, ownership and political orientation.

Finally, newspapers can be used as ‘sensitive barometers of cultural change’ (Fairclough, 1995: 60; see also Dimitrova et al., 2005). Dimitrova et al. (2005) argues that:

Despite the similarities of mass media institutions across societies, the media are by origin, practice and convention very much national institutions and respond to domestic political and social pressures and to the expectation of their audiences. They reflect, express and sometimes actively serve the ‘national interest’, as determined by other, more powerful actors and institutions’ (McQuail, 1994: 121 cited in Dimitrova et al., 2005: 24 [italics in original])

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5 In addition, investigations of online blog material have also contested the originality of news material, with concerns that these sources repeat the information from official news sources (Young and Dugas, 2012).
Consequently, the newspaper-based analysis situates the interpretative capacity of the research at its heart allowing them to critically explore power relations and identity politics.

With this in mind, a critical analysis of the construction of Britain and British identity across a data sample that included selected national newspapers from Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales was chosen. MacInnes et al. (2007) note that whereas ‘a nation has an identifiable spatial boundary, the greater the extent to which newspaper circulation is concentrated within and evenly distributed across it the greater the potential claim to national status’ (2007: 194 [italics in original]). As a result, national newspapers from each nation were selected according to: readers ‘national identity’; location of ownership; finance control; location of editing; publishing and printing; presentation and self-description and editorial objectives (MacInnes et al., 2007).

Subsequently, in total 15 national newspapers were selected. Five English tabloid and broadsheet newspaper were analysed (the Daily Mirror, the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, The Independent), two Scottish (The Scotsman, the Herald), one Welsh (Western Mail) and one Northern Irish (Belfast Telegraph). From the Commonwealth press, two Australian (The Australian, The Age), Canadian (The Globe and Mail, the Vancouver Sun) and New Zealand (the Dominion Post, the New Zealand Herald) national newspapers were selected. Sunday editions of each newspaper were included and supplementary magazines and ‘pull outs’ were also analysed. Whereas, hard copies of the Daily Mirror and the Western Mail were obtained, the remaining newspapers were downloaded using the ‘Press Display’ online service. Each newspaper was selected in order to reflect the national perspectives of newspaper readers in each nation. The following sections will discuss how each of these newspapers was collated and analysed.

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6 UK editions of each newspaper were selected. Indeed, each of the major UK newspapers produces ‘Scottish’ editions that are sold and distributed within Scotland. Despite this, UK editions are sold and available in England, Northern Ireland and Wales. Consequently, despite the fact that the ‘English’ newspapers are sold across the UK they are all based in London, England and are sold and read throughout England. Indeed, the London-centric nature of the UK press has helped to spawn nationalist titles within the other home nations. To this extent, The Scotsman, the Herald, the Belfast Telegraph and Western Mail offer a forum for reporting on nationalist debates and issues.

7 PressDisplay.com is an online newspaper service that allows you to browse and download newspapers from around the world. This allowed access to the Australia, Canadian, New Zealand, English, Northern Irish and Scottish newspapers on the day that they were published. Importantly, the service allowed access to the printed editions of each newspaper.
4.3. Reading cultural texts: newspaper analysis

Notably, Elias (1991) argued that the make-up of the social habitus ‘grows out of the common language which the individual shares with others and which is certainly a component of his [sic] social habitus’ (1991: 82). Indeed, if signs give form and meaning to thought and experience, then our own ‘identity’ and our own interpretation of these signs, is dependent upon a set of specific meanings that are socially constructed (Gaines, 2012). Thus:

When we consider advertising, news, and TV or film texts, it will become clear that linguistic, visual, and other kinds of sign are used not simply to denote something, but also to trigger a range of connotations attached to the sign (Bignell, 2002: 79)

Accordingly, examinations of language-based media can prove crucial in understanding the culturally symbolic nature of particular signs, connotations and discursive practices, which are used to refer to a particular individual or national group (Gaines, 2012). In such instances, human interaction involves the employment of socially learned signs, which are dependent upon the individual’s habitus (Danesi and Peron, 1999; Van Krieken, 1998). Correspondingly, these signs reflect and form part of larger forms of human organization, such as the nation-state, which reflect their own national habitus codes.

Accordingly, in order to make sense of the particular signs, patterns and thematic categories that can be deduced from newspaper articles, an analysis of newspaper discourses is required that can help to elucidate upon the article’s notable characteristics. Indeed, content analysis approaches can provide an effective method for collecting and counting particular themes within large quantities of data. As a result, the method has often been used in relation to quantitative studies that have sought to make statistical and numerical inferences (Hedenborg, 2013). However, in such instances, forms of meaning and wider discursive contexts are often ignored and a static reading of the text is provided.

Nonetheless, despite these deficiencies the content analysis method can be used in combination with various other forms of data collection and analysis (Cotter, 2001). In particular, analyses of the thematic content of a wide range of newspaper articles can be inferred from examining and collating particular discourses within the text. These discourses can be thematically highlighted and organised in order to
examine how notions of power, particular representations of ‘reality’ and the construction of social relations and identities form part of newspaper discourses (Millington and Darnell, 2014). In fact, Edmunds and Turner (2001) argue that ‘it is the task of the sociologist … to discern patterns’ within data (2001: 88).

With this in mind, a qualitative thematic content analysis was chosen as an effective method for examining the discursive properties and thematic patterns inherent within the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and British newspaper coverage (Deacon et al., 1999; Jensen and Jankowski, 2002). Providing a much broader vision to the traditional ‘content analysis’ method, which simply counts and describes the attributes of data, thematic content analysis extracts, categorises and interprets the essential characteristics of the newspaper article (Joffe and Yardley, 2004; Kohlbacher, 2006). This can be used to critically examine the language, meaning and tone of a newspaper article (Gunter, 2000). In addition, this method can also be harnessed for national, international and cross-national analyses (Lee and Peterson, 1997). Thus, it can provide a suitable method of analysis for the multinational approach used in this thesis.

4.4. Thematic analysis: coding the data

In accordance with the research aims, each newspaper article was analysed in order to highlight particular aspects of the article that alluded to the representation or framing of Britain and British identity. Indeed, Berg (2006) notes that ‘In its simplest form, a theme is a simple sentence, a string of words with a subject and a predicate’ (2006: 312). However, this is not to suggest that all themes are clearly demarcated and distinct nor is it to argue that the collection of themes should be arbitrary. Rather, it is to suggest that the obtaining of particular themes is based upon a process of categorisation whereby examination and comparison of the text is used to represent frequently occurring sentiments or significances.

Accordingly, underpinning the development of themes within thematic analysis is the coding of specific aspects of an article, which are assigned a particular ‘code’ or ‘theme’ (Hilton and Hunt, 2010). These codes are subsequently recorded onto coding sheets. Indeed, this process is dependent upon whether themes are drawn from existing ideas that the researcher brings to the data (deductive coding) or

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8 See chapter three, sections 3.1. and 3.2.3.
9 See Appendix I for an example of the coding sheet used in this study.
from the raw data itself (inductive coding) (Mayring, 2000). Consequently, in 
*deductive coding* the focus of analysis tends to rely more on the verification of themes 
found in previous research (Sterkenburg et al., 2010). Indeed, whereas the use of 
provisional ideas was obtained during the literature review, *inductive coding* ensured 
that new themes were allowed to emerge (Sterkenburg et al., 2010).

With the above concerns in mind, it is evident that the ‘coding and analysis of 
data are activities that can begin in the early stages of data collection’ (Seale, 2004: 
319). These stages will often involve interpreting both the manifest and latent content 
of the article. In regards to the former, *manifest content* relates to characteristics that 
are directly observable from the article. Conversely, *latent content* relates to the 
implicit meanings embedded within the article, whereby something is implicitly 
referred to (Joffe and Yardley, 2004). In relation to thematic analyses, Joffe and 
Yardley (2004) note that:

Thematic analyses often draw on both types of theme, and even when the 
manifest theme is the focus, the aim is to understand the latent meaning of the 
manifest themes observable within the data, which requires interpretation 
(2004: 57)

More importantly, this requires staying ‘true to the raw data, and its *meaning* within a 
particular context of thoughts, rather than attaching too much importance to the 
frequency of codes which have been abstracted from their context’ (Joffe and 
Yardley, 2004: 67 [italics added]). Measuring the frequency of codes is more 
commonly associated with quantitative thematic analysis, such as, the previously 
mentioned ‘content analysis’ method (Kohlbacher, 2006). Here, the exclusive coding 
of each article (assigning a single theme to the whole article) is an important part of 
providing statistical results (Joffe and Yardley, 2004).

However, the ‘meaning’ of an article can often be deduced through the use of 
a number of themes. Indeed, for this thesis it was decided that an exclusively 
‘quantitative’ approach to coding would not elucidate upon the various attributes of 
the article. Accordingly, a qualitative method of analysis was used to understand the 
*ways* in which the print media represented British identity (Andriotis, 2010). As a 
result, it was decided that each article would be coded for as many themes as it 
contained (Joffe and Yardley, 2004). Indeed, this decision was supported by a 
process of open and axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Vincent et al., 2010).
Strauss and Corbin (1990) define open coding as ‘the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising, and categorizing data’ (1990: 61). This systematic approach to the generation of themes allows the researcher to become familiar with the text, highlighting and recording key sections of the text, which relate to a specific theme (Chamberlain, Camic and Yardley, 2004). Consequently, ‘this stage involves initially underlining significant events, facts, and incidents … that assist in the identification of themes or key words’ (Noiseux and Ricard, 2008: 1151). In short, this can be conceived as stepping into the data, as the researcher consciously involves themself with the article’s characteristics, meaning and tone (Elias, 1978). Accordingly, an open coding of each newspaper article formed the first stage of analysis.

The second stage of analysis involved refining the specific themes obtained during open coding (Noiseux and Ricard, 2008). This stage of analysis is referred to as axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Vincent et al., 2010). Here, initial themes are examined for explanation, justification and verification (Perry et al., 2004). In doing so, the researcher begins ‘to confirm and elaborate the scope of categories established earlier’ in order ‘to identify how they may be related, and to identify limits to their applicability’ (Chamberlain et al., 2004: 76). This helps to uncover relationships between themes, which were subsequently identified and clustered under broader thematic titles that underpin their association (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Indeed, this requires a degree of detachment from the researcher as they step out of their original involvement in order to consider the broader thematic structure of the news coverage (Elias, 1978; Lee and Maguire, 2009).

4.4.1. Managing a thematic analysis: issues and concerns

Overall, a crucial aim of the analysis of each newspaper was based upon ensuring that each theme was represented fairly across both the domestic and foreign press coverage. Indeed, the open-coding stage ensured that the collected themes were sufficiently exhaustive in order to account for each variation in the article’s content (Berg, 2006). As a result, this stage of coding worked inductively. Axial coding provided a second stage whereby themes were compared, contrasted and justified (Berg, 2006). Accordingly, axial coding ensured that less frequent themes were not forgotten or ignored but were considered in regards to their relationship with the overall thematic structure. Ultimately, this stage of analysis provided a deductive
The reading of the data as broader themes were developed and related to the overall thematic structure as well as the existing literature (Chamberlain et al., 2004; Elias, 1978). This allowed for the development of theoretical concepts and ideas to contribute to an analysis of the evidence (Maguire and Young, 2002). Consequently, thematic categories were formed through theoretical discussions relating to existing bodies of knowledge regarding Britain and the established-outsider model. In such instances, an interweaving between themes and theory was achieved (Elias, 1978; Maguire and Young, 2002).

Incidentally, during the formation of thematic categories my own ‘theoretical sensitivity’ proved particularly important (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Theoretical sensitivity refers to the ‘ability to give insight and meaning to data’ by understanding the role of the researcher in the research process (McCreaddie and Payne, 2010: 787). Ultimately, whereas, my own apriori beliefs, emotions and assumptions were reflective of my involvement with the subject, ‘the interpretive capabilities of the research can be enhanced – or diminished – by some degree of involvement’ (Perry et al., 2004: 144 [italics added]). Therefore, a central part of the research process involved maintaining a balance between an inductive and deductive coding of the data, indeed, this worked alongside Elias’s (1978; 1987) involvement-detachment balance. As a result, ‘no theme can be entirely inductive or data driven, since the researcher’s knowledge and preconceptions will inevitably influence the identification of themes’ (Joffe and Yardley, 2004: 58). Subsequently, this influence was managed via the use of a notebook during the coding process, which allowed for any thoughts and observations to be recorded and used during the research process.

4.5. Analysing the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games: the research process

In regards to the media’s reporting of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games, it was decided that the following data ranges would provide sufficient coverage of both events: Diamond Jubilee: 1st June 2012 to 5th/6th June, Olympic Opening Ceremony: 26th to 28/29th July 2012 and Closing Ceremony: 11th to 13/14th August 2012.10 In addition, it was also decided during the collection of data that

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10 The Olympic Opening Ceremony took place on Friday 27th July 2012. The Olympic Closing Ceremony took place on Sunday 12th August 2012. Due to the time differences between Australia,
coverage of Team GB’s ‘Super Saturday’ (4th August) should also be included.\textsuperscript{11} Collected articles were divided into two categories, domestic UK press coverage (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales) and Commonwealth press coverage (Australia, Canada, New Zealand). These were analysed separately. In total 15 newspapers and their Sunday equivalents were chosen. Overall 772 newspapers were analyzed.

Once all the newspapers had been collected, downloaded and separated into their respective categories the data process could begin. Firstly, this involved reading through each newspaper in order to select those articles that related to the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic Games. Once all the articles had been collected, each article was read through a second time in order to ensure that those articles relevant to the research aim were kept and those that were irrelevant were discarded. This involved selecting articles that focused upon the following issues: their portrayal of Britain (people, landmarks, customs), reference to assumed British characteristics or values and any noted similarities and differences between Britain and the national origin of the newspaper. In the case of the Diamond Jubilee, issues regarding the Commonwealth or suggestions of republicanism were also collected.

Conveniently, this process ensured that each newspaper/article had gone through a process of filtration, whereby content that did not relate directly to the aims of this thesis could be eliminated (Fan, 1988). Appropriately, this also began the process of ‘immersing’ the researcher within the data, allowing them to become acutely aware of its contents and themes (Mayring, 2000).

Once all relevant articles had been selected attention turned to analysing each article. Following the previously discussed research strategy, each article was coded inductively, drawing upon both its manifest and latent content (Joffe and Yardley, \textldots). 

\textsuperscript{11} ‘Super Saturday’ referred to Day 8 of the Olympic Games (4th August). On this day, Great Britain achieved its most successful day at an Olympic Games since the 1908 London Olympic Games. Team GB won 6 gold medals in rowing, cycling and athletics. The day culminated in three of the gold medals being won in the space of 46 minutes. This included Jessica Ennis in the women’s heptathlon, Greg Rutherford in the men’s long jump and Mo Farah in the men’s 10 000 meters. Due to the success of Team GB on this day it was decided that the day’s media coverage would provide a valuable insight into the press’ construction of Britain on this day. As a result, press coverage on the 4th, 5th and 6th of August was included. Therefore, the data ranges for each event was (including British and Commonwealth press coverage): 01/06/12 – 06/06/12 (Diamond Jubilee); 26/07/12 – 29/07/12 (Olympic Opening Ceremony); 04/08/12 – 06/08/12 (‘Super Saturday’) and 11/08/12 – 14/08/12 (Olympic Closing Ceremony).
This involved reading through the whole article and selecting those areas that related to a particular theme. This was then coded onto a separate coding sheet, upon which the title of the theme and an example were recorded. If an article contained more that one theme then each theme was recorded onto the coding sheet. This stage of analysis followed an ‘open’ method of coding analysis, resulting in a large collection of themes being obtained (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Once each article had been coded, axial coding could begin.

As previously discussed, the axial coding stage allowed for the previously obtained themes, to be subsumed by broader overarching thematic categories. Again, this required returning to the data in order to ensure that these broader categories accurately reflected the previously obtained themes. Eventually, several sub-themes were obtained forming an overall thematic structure for both the UK and foreign press. The findings of which will be considered in the following chapter.

However, before attention turns to the findings chapters, the following conclusion will provide a short discussion of the chapters’ aims and purposes, include a brief overview of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games as well as highlight some general observations that were recorded during both events as well as during the research analysis.

4.6. The data: aims and purposes

Preliminary discussions of the data had initially sought to find distinct comparisons between the various national newspapers, with the aim of uncovering a number of important contrasts across each nation’s coverage. However, after numerous readings of the data, the degree of difference between each newspaper, in respect of providing a significant comparison, was of only minor significance. Instead, it was found that nationalizing any particular set of themes served to ignore broader similarities across each nation’s coverage. Accordingly, while the national particularities of each newspaper will be noted, the following chapters shall only refer to important differences where a substantive significance within a particular thematic category was observable.

With this in mind, the following themes, when placed within a wider historical narrative of Britain, will allow one to observe ‘thematic’ patterns across the data.

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12 See section 4.4.
13 These discussions took place between my tutor and myself.
Indeed, it is important not to view the following chapters as disparate sections but as part of a wider discussion relating to the press’ construction, framing and representation of British identity. In accordance with the aforementioned research process, themes were selected due to their frequency but also, more importantly, upon the resonance that certain themes prescribed.14

Consequently, whereas previous work has sought to draw upon the relationship between Britain, British identity and the British Empire, the following chapters will reveal how contemporary constructions of Britain, were shaped by Britain’s imperial history, contemporary despondency and domestic contentions. Indeed, for the moment, such suggestions provide a precursory insight into the multi-layered construction of habitus and the paradoxes, struggles and frictions that underlie representations of Britain. As a result, these issues will be returned to in the conclusion chapter.


Building upon the level of constructed patriotism and national fever which had surrounded the press’ coverage of the 2011 Royal Wedding, the preceding 2012 Diamond Jubilee provided an additional source of British ‘celebration’ (Poulton and Maguire, 2012). The Diamond Jubilee consisted of a four-day national holiday for the UK, commencing on the 1 June. Notable amongst the celebrations was the River Thames Diamond Jubilee Pageant on the 3 June and the Diamond Jubilee Concert hosted outside Buckingham Palace on the 4 June.

Commenting upon the Thames Pageant, Gardiner and Westall (2012) suggested that the flotilla conflated ‘three main historical moments’ relating to Britain’s ‘dominance over the Spanish Armada, Trafalgar, and Dunkirk’ (Gardiner and Westall, 2012).15 Echoing the 1662 flotilla held for Charles II’s restoration, the 2012 ‘record-breaking’ flotilla served as a reflection of the relationship between Britain, its maritime past and the British Empire (Black, 2005).16

14 See section 4.4.
16 The flotilla surpassed the previous record of 327 for the largest parade of boats (BBC, 2012a).
The prevalence of the British Royal Family would also continue throughout the London Olympics. The attendance of Prince William and Kate Middleton (the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge) and Prince Harry (Prince of Wales) was largely acknowledged across the press. Indeed, this included the participation of Zara Phillips, a Team GB silver medalist in the team equestrian. Undoubtedly, however, this royal attention followed in the wake of the Queen’s dramatic involvement in the Games Opening Ceremony. Here, alongside the fictional character, James Bond (played by the British actor Daniel Craig), the Queen provided a short segment, in which both she and Bond boarded a helicopter en-route to the Olympic stadium. Upon arrival, a pre-recorded film and a live helicopter hovering above the stadium, heralded the Queen’s dramatic entrance to the Games, with a stuntman providing the illusion of a parachuting Queen Elizabeth and James Bond. Certainly, whereas elements of Britain’s past were clearly visible throughout the ceremony, this particular segment provided a preliminary insight into the reframing of Britain’s image during the games. Since the games, the renamed Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park has sought to further cement the Royal’s relationship with the London Olympics (BBC, 2010).

Overall, the Opening Ceremony’s creative director, Danny Boyle, aimed to provide a ceremony ‘that celebrate[d] the creativity, eccentricity, daring and openness of the British genius by harnessing the genius, creativity, eccentricity, daring and openness of modern London’ (Boyle, 11 cited in LOCOG, 2012). In fact, despite the ceremony’s English-centered prelude depicting ‘a pastoral vision of a “green and pleasant land” complete with real sheep, pigs and goats’ (Gibson, Guardian, 27/07/12), traditional hymns from the four British home nations served to officially declare the ceremony open.17 Here, England’s ‘Jerusalem’ was followed by Northern Ireland’s ‘Danny Boy’, Scotland’s ‘Flower of Scotland’ and, sung in English, Wales’s ‘Bread of Heaven’ (Peters, 2012).

The celebratory atmosphere of the Opening Ceremony continued during the games official finale, the Closing Ceremony, which offered a representation of Britain ‘TM’ (Leonard, 1997). Performances by an array of British musicians, a stage set designed by British artist, Damien Hirst, and a catwalk of British models, including

17 See chapter five, section 5.2.1. for more detail.
Kate Moss and Naomi Campbell – all modelling British designers – served to display a rather commercial and largely branded representation of Britain and British culture.

4.6.2. The research sample: general observations

Variations in the amount of coverage across each national newspaper were clearly visible during the collection and analysis of data. In particular, within Britain, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail and The Scotsman focused specifically on the jubilee celebrations. In addition, commemorative and souvenir editions were included (Dominion Post, 02/06/12; Vancouver Sun, 02/06/12) and coverage tended to center on each nation’s domestic jubilee celebrations, with articles focusing upon each nation’s relationship with the monarchy but also local celebrations.

Whereas, none of the newspapers attempted to ignore the jubilee entirely, The Australian, The Age as well as The Independent provided the least amount of coverage. Scotland’s the Herald was the most negative source of coverage on both the jubilee and the royal family, framing the majority of its content in light of the upcoming Independence Referendum. Incidentally, there was also a lack of jubilee coverage in the Belfast Telegraph on the 04/06/12 due to the passing of the London Olympic Flame Relay through Belfast and Northern Ireland on this day.

Unsurprisingly, in their coverage of the Olympic Opening Ceremony, each national newspaper included interviews with, and, editorials on, the medal hopes of its competing ‘national’ athletes. In this regard, the Belfast Telegraph was the most nation-centric in its coverage of competing athletes. However, this included articles on athletes from both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This was continued across all newspapers in their coverage of the Closing Ceremony.

More broadly, coverage of the Opening Ceremony was widely reported across all the Commonwealth newspapers. ‘Olympic’ commemorative editions and special ‘pull-outs’ were also used within the British press. Critical attention of the games was provided by the Herald, which tended to include articles relating to problems with tickets and disruptions to the transport system. Indeed, whereas the above comments suggest that the amount of coverage tended to vary with regards to each nation, the following sections will focus specifically on those articles relating to the construction, representation and framing of Britain and British identity during both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.
Chapter Five: ‘A Dis-United Kingdom’: devolution, British uncertainty and the survival of the British State?

Introduction

Writing a decade before the SNP’s victory in the 2011 general election, Edmunds and Turner (2001) proposed that devolution brought ‘no dramatic “break-up” of the UK’ a process that they believed to be ‘entirely consistent with the past’ (2001: 105). Here, devolution did not represent the complete dislocation of Britain, but ‘rather, … the redistribution of selected responsibilities, with core state power residing in the national, that is, the British parliament’ (Wilson and Stapleton, 2006: 2). In such instances, devolution reflected a continuation of the flexible and partial union of Britain, a relationship which Colley (2014a) believes has underlined the historical development of Britain since the Union of the Crowns in 1603. However, while devolution may form part of a long-term tradition in relations between the British home nations, ‘in recent decades … the flux, uncertainty and debate[s] that have characterised Great Britain and the United Kingdom have become more evident and more raw’ (Colley, 2014a: 7; see also Colley, 2014b). Consequently, in accordance with the possible strengthening of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish nationalism, some have alluded to the lack of support for traditional British culture, ideas and values (Colley, 2014a; 2014b; Perryman, 2012; Rojek, 2007; Ward, 2004). Indeed, devolution may have ‘entrenched a process that whilst not yet complete nevertheless imprints an indelible question mark on what remains of a tattered and torn Union Jack’ (Perryman, 2012: 203).

With this in mind, both the Diamond Jubilee and the Olympic Games took place within a British domestic figuration of continuing ‘dis-unity’. As a result, Hoey (2012) questioned the Queen’s reaction to devolution and its effects upon Britain, noting that ‘as Head of State of the United Kingdom she cannot have welcomed devolution in Scotland and Wales, perhaps seeing its as the possible start of the break-up of her realm’ (Western Mail, 02/06/12). In fact, the disparity between England and its neighbouring nations was exemplified in Morgan’s (2012) remarks that ‘the Olympics is bringing out a few of the inherent tensions in that curious balance between the overwhelming size of England and the three far smaller Celtic countries’ (Western Mail, 28/07/12). In particular, Morgan’s (2012) remarks sought to highlight the tensions between an ‘established’ England, dominant in size, and a smaller

However, while Morgan’s (2012) remarks can be considered in relation to the dominance of English culture in constructions of Britishness, for the English press, such tensions were perceived as relating to a degree of uncertainty regarding the ‘future unity of the United Kingdom’ (Guardian, 02/06/12a). Consequently, Taylor (2012) asked ‘do we still run to “national” events capable of bringing a significant percentage of the population into the streets with a common purpose?’ (Daily Telegraph, 02/06/12). Similarly, Riddell (2012) added, ‘The economy is suffering, and so is Britain’s claim to be the cohesive country on display throughout the Jubilee’ (Daily Telegraph, 05/06/12).

Accordingly, it is possible that concerns regarding Britain’s lack of world role and anxieties regarding its future were related to a potential ‘break-up’ of Britain. Indeed, in one of the very few comments related to the Scottish Independence Referendum within the English press, Sandbrook (2012) noted that:

Even the survival of the United Kingdom itself, perhaps the most successful state in history, now seems in doubt. Once an eccentric sideshow, Scottish and Welsh nationalism have been growing in confidence since the early Seventies. With a Scottish independence referendum scheduled for 2014, it is a sobering thought that by the seventh decade of her reign, Elizabeth II may no longer preside over a united realm, but a ramshackle collection of squabbling little kingdoms, jumbled together across the British Isles (Daily Mail, 02/06/12)

Sandbrook’s (2012) comments clearly highlight how the very unity of the ‘United’ Kingdom was itself under question by Scottish attempts to pursue independence.

To this extent, concerns regarding British cohesion (Riddell, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012) and the apparent resurgence in national identifications across the UK (Perryman, 2009) may reflect the disintegration of the British state as a structural apparatus and the decline in British identity as an effective collective attachment (De Swaan, 1995). Indeed, such concerns can be viewed as part of the ‘inherent tensions’ (Morgan, Western Mail, 28/07/12) that arise when the British home nations are brought together to compete in international sporting events or to celebrate national occasions. Certainly, as chapters two and three have highlighted, such tensions do not arise independently but are located within a figuration of changing power balances between different groups (Burkitt, 1993). The fact that England failed to receive its own devolutionary measures provides one example of how established-outsider
relations within the British state, that is, the balance of power between England and
the other home nations, has changed since devolution. Instead of reinventing national
polarities, attention can be given to exploring the relational aspects, which underscore
contemporary constructions of Britain. To this extent, it is possible to observe how
the British and Commonwealth press seek to negotiate their representation of, and,
relation to, Britain.

With this in mind, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) work on established-outsider
relations will be used in order to explore how changing power relations between
various groups are related to changes in national habitus (Mennell, 1994; Velija and
Flynn, 2010). Indeed, this works alongside previous chapters, which have
endeavoured to highlight how British home nation and imperial relations have
‘coexisted and competed … according to complex rhythms’ (Potter, 2007: 646).
Consequently, the following sections will explore these ‘complex rhythms’ in relation
to changes in the British domestic and imperial/Commonwealth figurations (decline
from empire, emergence of the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’, devolution). Therefore,
this chapter will be divided into two interrelated sections.

The first section will aim to examine how constructions of Britain’s past and
anxieties about its future were drawn upon in the British and Commonwealth
coverage. More importantly, this will explore how past/present constructions were
used in the press’ framing of Britain, not just within coverage from the British home
nations but also within the former dominions. Rather than being viewed as distinct
and separated however, such constructions can be used in order to ascertain a
processual account of the press’ representation of Britain and British identity. This
will be considered further in the second part of this chapter, where Elias and
Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework will be employed. Primarily this
section will seek to observe how representations of Britain within the domestic – in
particular, Scotland and England – and Commonwealth press coverage, underwent
negotiated constructions of alteration, assimilation and contestation (Atkinson, 2002;
Bucholc, 2013; Mennell, 2007; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Van Stolk and Wouters,
1987; Velija and Flynn, 2010). In particular, the established-outsider theory will be
used to explore how relations between the British home nations and the former
dominions can elucidate upon aspects of British ‘dis-unity’ during both the Diamond
Jubilee and London Olympic Games. It is here that a relational analysis of the
media’s coverage will be utilized in order to consider how constructions of British
identity are reflective of wider – yet changing – power structures involving both Britain and the Commonwealth.

5.0. British history: imperial power, imperial decline, fractured state

According to Gillis (1996) ‘National identities are, like everything historical, constructed and reconstructed; and it is our responsibility to decode them in order to discover the relationships they create and sustain’ (1996: 4). Indeed, nations and their identities are often depicted in relation to their history and past achievements (Anderson, 2006; Elias, 1996; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Here, portrayals of the nation’s past are produced and reproduced in response to changing social dynamics, which evoke ‘sleeping memories’, embedded in the national unconsciousness (Maguire, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 2005; Poulton, 2004). In such instances, national holidays or national events can provide an institutionalized occasion for remembering, whereby the nation’s past and present are given historical meaning (Zerubavel, 1997).

However, Le Goff (1992) argues that if ‘attachment to the past can admit novelties and transformations, the direction of the evolution it perceives is usually that of a decadence or a decline’ (1992: 9). In such instances, the depiction of a romanticized and largely re-created national past, serves to underlie contemporary crisis and purported problems regarding the ‘national sense of belonging’ (Hassan, 2013a).

Indeed, changes within the nation are often related to feelings of degeneration, whereby, a sense of national loss and a reverence for the past become reflected in the personality of the nation and its inhabitants (Elias, 1996; 2010; 2012). Accordingly, while the importance of Britain’s past was highlighted by Kissane (2012), who noted that Britain was ‘a nation that revels in its history and loves looking back’ (The Age, 02/06/12), it could also serve to emphasise contemporary problems within Britain. With this in mind, the following sections will examine how representations of Britain’s past and present formed an important part of the British and Commonwealth press’ coverage.

5.1. Britain – then and now: an ordered past meets an uncertain future

The hosting of both a national and international event provides a notable opportunity for the host nation to present a positive image of its history and culture (Rowe, 2012).

Indeed, such events are often reported to have a significant effect upon the emotions and attitudes of the host nation’s population (Ismer, 2011; see also Dayan and Katz, 1992). However, in the case of Britain, it was evident that a sense of anxiety underlined the press’ coverage of both the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic Games, with particular reference to Britain’s economic problems and the cost of the Games (Baum, 2012; Riddell, 2012; The Weekend Australian, 2012; see also Mangan et al., 2013). Writing in the Vancouver Sun, Holden (2012) noted that ‘the chance of some extra days off work and to enjoy the sort of extravaganza and public ceremony for which Britain is renowned has made it a welcome break from austere times, pay freezes and deep public spending cuts’ (02/06/12). Here, the Olympic Games were seen to underscore Britain’s ‘national malaise’ (Hayward, Daily Telegraph, 27/07/12). Indeed, Hayward (2012) argued that:

Smart modern nation or raddled old kleptocracy? Rule of law or oligarchical carveup? If we have not been asking these questions about the hosts of London 2012 then we have disengaged our brains. The problem for the Games themselves was that large tracts of the population had come to regard them as a symbol of national malaise, with their hubris, overspend, rampant security needs, branding zealotry and probable failure to do much about rising obesity. (Daily Telegraph, 27/07/12)

For, Freedland (2012b) such problems bared a similarity with Britain’s recent history and its ‘troubled political past’:

Even up to the last minute, in the final days of preparation, the question of whether Britain can actually pull this off has seemed in doubt. A weary familiar narrative is already in place: the Britain of the Daily Mail and Crap Towns, the Britain where nothing works any more. If it wasn’t the failure of G4S to provide security staff, it was the threat by the PCS to call border guards out on strike. One an incompetent company made rich by privatisation, the other a militant-led trade union, the two seemed to spell out twin aspects of our troubled political past: Thatcherism and the winter of discontent uniting to ruin the Olympics. (Guardian, 27/07/12b)

In fact, British austerity proved to be a reoccurring theme in the Commonwealth press’ analysis of Britain and its analysis of Britain’s capacity to both afford as well as host the Olympic Games. Milner, Waldie and Reguly (2012) highlighted that many of the generated jobs were temporary with ‘optimism … fading about what will happen when the Games end next month. (The Globe and Mail, 26/07/12).
Further examples of Britain’s ‘insecure environment’ were drawn upon by Saunders (2012), who sought to align Britain’s pre-Olympic problems with its recent history of riots, recession and rain. Saunders (2012) argued:

Right up through the opening week of the Games, it was being called the shambolympics – an event defined by eye-bleeding budget overruns, ham-fisted sponsors, security fiasc6es and acres of incomprehensibly empty stadium seats. Britain has had a recent history of botching big, expensive events, such as the millennium celebrations or the re-opening of Wembley Stadium. The ebullient mood is a welcome reprise after a 12month period that began with riots and descended into multiple quarters of recession, a budget that slashed public services and non-stop rain. (The Globe and Mail, 13/08/12)

As highlighted in the above examples, the representation of Britain was embedded in wider discourses relating to its recent economical and political problems. In such instances, understandings of Britain were evidently mired by its economic instability and continuing austerity. This was confirmed by Nelson (2012), who noted that, ‘in a country already paralysed by massive welfare spending, spiraling unemployment and rising social problems, Britain is becoming an increasingly insecure environment’ (Dominion Post, 27/07/12 [italics added]).

Indeed, both Burkitt (2008) and Megill (2011) highlight how concerns regarding identity can be embedded within particular locations and that these identities are predicated upon a feeling of security (Zarakol, 2010). Burkitt (2008) has explored how particular places, such as, the town, city, or the nation, are closely related to an ‘ontological sense of reality’ (2008: 155). Here, national identity is intimately attached to a particular geography or topography that is deemed to be irreducibly evocative of the national ‘place’ (Bairner, 2009; Burkitt, 2008). In fact, Megill (2011) has argued that ‘in a world in which opposing certainties constantly come into conflict with each other and in which a multitude of possible identities are put on display, insecurity about identity may be an inevitable by-product’ (2011: 194). As a result, ‘if these places decay or are destroyed, so too are the spaces and rhythms of life, the very substance of our ontological security’ (Burkitt, 2008: 155).

Consequently, in light of the previous examples (Freedland, 2012b; Hayward, 2012), it was evident that the press’ reference to Britain’s economic problems had clearly resulted in feelings of insecurity regarding British identity. In particular, there resided a belief that life in Britain, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, had become
worse (Hayward, 2012; Taylor, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a). Writing in the *Herald*, McKie (2012) argued that:

When the Queen acceded to the throne, Britain was in an era of austerity, a nation with its coffers empty, its international influence in decline and facing an uncertain future. Indeed, unless you think George Osborne is an improvement on Rab Butler as Chancellor, and I think we can be fairly sure you don’t, things may be a good deal worse than they were in 1952. (04/06/12)

To this extent, it became possible to observe how Britain’s contemporary problems, indeed, its ‘increasingly insecure environment’ (Nelson, *Dominion Post*, 27/07/12), were predicated upon comparisons with Britain’s past. In their analysis of the Olympic Opening Ceremony, Reguly and Waldie (2012) noted:

as Boyle’s £27-million ($42.6-million Canadian) creation pranced through the ages like a manic show horse, the message wasn’t just that Brits are an odd folk; it was that Britain’s past is more important than its future. But what a past. Your country should be so lucky. (*The Globe and Mail*, 28/07/12)

Accordingly, the sense that Britain’s past was ‘more important than its future’ served to emphasize the disparity between Britain’s illustrious history and its contemporary problems. In particular, this distinction was alluded to by Tweedie (2012), whose comments relating to Britain’s royal history suggested:

Bloated royal families are fine when you run a quarter of the world and have to supply the crowned heads of 19th century Europe; not so good when you are in charge of a diminished, austere Britain, grappling with recession in the early 21st century. (*Daily Telegraph*, 06/06/12)

Consequently, against concerns regarding Britain’s continuing austerity and economic instability (Baum, 2012; Ridell, 2012; *The Weekend Australian*, 2012) were examples within the press that sought to draw upon nostalgic interpretations of Britain and British society. Here, reports of Britain’s ‘past offered a screen on which desires for unity and continuity could be projected’ (Gillis, 1996: 9), indeed, a representation of Britain through which its sense of self could be ontologically secured (Burkitt, 2008). Richards’s (2012) noted that:

The artificial unity tries to meet the burning appetite for community as there seems to be so few other options. Not so long ago, the church, political parties, social clubs helped to bring people together. Workplaces were also communities, the mining villages, the shipyards and the rest. I am not romanticising the often horrendous working lives in these places. Often the
horror formed part of the bond that gave these areas a vibrancy and sense of intense belonging. (*The Independent*, 05/06/12)

From Richard’s (2012) comments it is possible to see how a sense of community was construed as forming an important part of the ‘vibrancy’ of Britain (Richards, *The Independent*, 05/06/12). Moreover, Richard (2012) seeks to delineate between a sense of community deeply rooted in Britain’s past and the ‘artificial unity’ of the contemporary period (*The Independent*, 05/06/12). In fact, elsewhere, Elias (2008a) has noted that analyses of ‘community’ are often presented in positive terms, adding that:

> Life in communities, by contrast, is warmer, more homely and affectionate. Solidarity and harmony, unity of purpose and co-operation, ensured by a firm tradition, are greater. … [It has] romantic undertones. It reflects, at least in its initial version, the discontent and suffering connected with increasing urbanisation and industrialisation; it betrays a certain longing for a reversal of the trend, for a return to an earlier stage in the development of societies where life was simpler and appeared to posses all those desirable qualities that are missed in the present. (2008a: 121)

In such instances, the notion of ‘community’ spirit can help cement a positive ‘we-image’ (Mennell, 1994), which despite ‘horrendous working lives’, form the ‘bond’ that underlies feelings of ‘intense belonging’ (Richards, *The Independent*, 05/06/12).

Indeed, this sense of community and belonging was also highlighted in reports of the British population. Jones (2012), suggested that the Diamond Jubilee celebrations in her local town had ‘given it a retro air – harking back to a time when people were friendly rather than resentful’ (*The Mail on Sunday*, 03/06/12 [italics added]). Consequently, for Harris (2012c) the Games helped turn ‘the clock back to an era when Britain had a highly motivated workforce, proud of its country and eager to show a positive face to the world’ (*Daily Mail*, 13/08/12b). In both examples, the past was perceived as representing a positive Britain (Harris, 2012c) with a population more friendly than resentful (Jones, 2012). Indeed, similar constructions could also be identified in reference to the Second World War.

In fact, Conboy (2005) notes that the period of British history involving the Second World War is:

> particularly important to popular historical memory as … [it] coincide[s] with the lived experience of a significant number of people, directly or vicariously, through the many popular cultural re-imaginings of this period. (2005: 71)
Forming part of these ‘cultural re-imaginings’ is the British monarchy, whose own survival during the Second World War served to underline the supremacy of the British state and the united British nation who stood in defiance of the Nazi threat (Rojek, 2007). Indeed, reenactments of wartime Britain were actively celebrated during the Diamond Jubilee, whereupon certain members of the British public staged ‘nostalgic recreations of life in wartime Britain’ (Devine, Western Mail, 01/06/12). Similarly, the Daily Mirror’s Tony Parsons’s (2012a) noted that ‘for one sweet moment, we were more united than at any time since the war’ (Daily Mirror, 04/06/12a [italics added]). Indeed, Parsons (2012a) added that:

The British celebrated their Queen, but they were also celebrating themselves. In an uncertain and frightening world, the Diamond Jubilee celebrations have been an affirmation of national identity and pride. (Daily Mirror, 04/06/12a)

As can been seen from the above examples, the Second World War provided a notable moment in British history that served to celebrate the British monarchy but also provided an opportunity for the British population to celebrate ‘themselves’ (Parsons, Daily Mirror, 04/06/12a). Consequently, while references to the Second World War may, as Hassan (2013c) argues, form part of an ‘increasing obsession’ for Britain, Colley (2005; 2014a; 2014b) notes that British battles against a range of foreign adversaries, such as Napoleon and Hitler, have often helped to unite Britain in common purpose and action. Indeed, Gilroy (2005) has argued that for the British ‘white’ population, the Second World War signified a period in time when feelings and sentiments towards Britain were unperturbed and Britain’s world power status was secure. Drawing upon the English football chant ‘two world wars and one World cup’, Gilroy (2005) argues that the chant helped to reinforce ‘a sense in which Britain’s brave but confused affiliates prefer[ed] an ordered past in which they were exploited and pauperized, but nonetheless knew who they were’ (2005: 109 [italics added]). As a result, in much the same way, Richards’s (2012) descriptions sought to draw upon an articulation of Britain’s ‘ordered past’ (Gilroy, 2005: 109) whereupon Britain’s contemporary insecurities were representatively juxtaposed against the invariable portrayal ‘of intense belonging’ and community spirit (Richards, The Independent, 05/06/12).

To this extent, when considered in light of the above examples, references to Britain’s wartime victory and the British armed forces, helped to provide a notable
contrast to an ‘uncertain and frightening world’ (Parsons, *Daily Mirror*, 04/06/12a). In such instances, reports of wartime Britain were ‘driven by the need to get back to the place or moment before the country lost its moral and cultural bearings’ (Gilroy, 2005: 90). Davis (2011) has argued that when:

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we are susceptible to feelings of anxiety and concern for our future selves when we are brought up short by some untoward historic event or intrusive social change, it can be seen how at the most elemental level collective nostalgia acts to restore, at least temporarily, a sense of sociohistoric continuity with respect to that which had verged on being rendered discontinuous. (2011: 449 [italics added])

Accordingly, while Richard’s (2012) description of ‘the mining villages’ and ‘the shipyards’ underlined a particular desire to regain a sense of ‘British’ community (Richards, *The Independent*, 05/06/12) and whereas ‘nostalgic recreations of life in wartime Britain’ (Devine, *Western Mail*, 01/06/12) were not only performed but also reflective of a Britain ‘more united than at any time since the war’ (*Daily Mirror*, 04/06/12), (re)constructions of Britain’s ‘collective nostalgia’ (Davis, 2011: 449) served to underwrite the sense of decline (Lott, 2012; Paxman, 2012), increasing economic insecurity (Freedland, 2012b; Hayward, 2012) and lack of community (Richards, 2012). Given what has been shown, it is possible to view these representations as reflecting wider disparities in the discursive construction of contemporary Britain, a distinction that was clearly related to Britain’s post-imperial decline.

5.1.1. Nation in decline: ‘wilful nostalgia’, memories of empire and the maritime nation

Taking the above sections into consideration, it is evident that representations of Britain were related to ‘a relatively recent past that [was] constructed – in positive contrast to the present – as the nation-state’s heyday and as a now bygone era of purported order, stability, standing-in-the-world and security’ (Karner, 2013).

2 Indeed, ‘closely linked to nostalgia is a sense of melancholy – a longing for a time, a place or, sometimes, a person’ (Maguire, 1999: 189). In such instances, these

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‘strategies of nostalgia’ served ‘to hide the cataclysmic decline in Britain’s international status’ (Rojek, 2007: 171).

In fact, ‘the story of nation in decline’ was one that was often drawn upon in relation to Britain’s former imperial status (Paxman, Daily Telegraph, 12/08/12). Indeed, Bradley (2007) has noted that:

Where once British identity was about feeling superior, there is now perhaps something of an inferiority complex, allied to a culture of low expectations, an acceptance of the second-rate and a lack of drive and dynamism. (2007: 63)

Consequently, the decline of the British Empire was compared with Britain’s lack of sporting achievements, a narrative which for Paxman (2012), ‘fitted comfortably into the story of a nation in decline, a country that has lost an empire and failed to find the goal net’ (Daily Telegraph, 12/08/12). Similarly, in reference to Queen Elizabeth’s coronation – ‘the last heyday of Empire’ (Sandbrook, Daily Mail, 02/06/12) – Sandbrook (2012) added:

In school classrooms, maps still showed much of the world coloured British pink, from the great dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand to the future independent states of Malaysia, Tanzania, Nigeria and Uganda. After the Coronation, there was much talk of a New Elizabethan Age, encapsulated by the stunning conquest of Everest by Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing, a New Zealander and a Nepali, representing an Empire on which the sun never set. (Daily Mail, 02/06/12)

In relation to the above examples (Paxman, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012), Van Stolk and Wouters (1987) note that ‘changes in the international balance of power – being conquered in war, or losing a colonial empire – can affect the self-respect of an entire nation’ (1987: 482). Analyses of Queen Elizabeth’s reign have highlighted how:

Instead of reigning over an expanding empire she was destined to preside over its dissolution and symbolically the queen’s reign witnessed the ‘midnight hour’ of various independence celebrations, which linked her not only with decolonisation, but also with the transition from empire to commonwealth. (Craggs and Kumarasingham, 2014: 5)

Indeed, the effect of this ‘transition from empire to commonwealth’ and the impact of Britain’s imperial decline on the British sense of self was exemplified by Norman (2012), who noted:
God knows it’s not easy being a fading post-imperial power, and Britain has struggled dementedly with the diminishment for the Queen’s entire reign. The roots of the psychological disorder lie, needless to say, in the war. Winning that rarest of things, an unarguably just war, induced an understandable sense of moral superiority that would later curdle into distasteful arrogance. Being effectively bankrupted by the victory – having to watch Germany and Japan became rich while food was still rationed here - encoded not just confusion but profound defeatism into the national DNA. Victory made the US and the USSR superpowers, and reduced Britain to an absurdity, feigning great power status long after Eisenhower’s peremptory order to Eden to get the hell out of Suez clarified the truth about that. *(The Independent, 06/06/12)*

However, while Norman’s (2012) remarks seek to suggest that Britain’s ‘feigning great power status’ was informed by its experiences during the second world war and its decline as a world power (Ward, 2004), (re)constructions of Britain’s proud history could also serve as a reminder of its former hegemony. That is, while representations of the nation can serve to glorify the nation’s past ‘through a shared sense of descent and destiny’ (Rivera, 2008: 622), it can also be used to provide ‘evidence of a country’s superiority’ (Rivera, 2008: 622).

Drawing upon the work of Hyam (2010), Wood (2014) argues that notions of ‘imperial prestige’ empowered ‘Britain to govern a vast, far-flung network of colonies’ (2014: 100). In addition, Daddow (2013) notes that ‘memories of Britain’s global pre-eminence were never very far from the surface of British political debate or cultural repertoire’ (2013).³ Here, the British Empire served as an example of what Britain could achieve:

> From the moment we knew that the Olympics were coming to our shores, there was a symphony of self-loathing. It would be rubbish compared to Beijing. They would be too expensive. London would grind to a humiliating halt. The poor old British can no longer organise a drink-up in a brewery. Wrong, wrong, wrong. *The British ran an Empire covering the world for three centuries – why the hell did we ever doubt that we could run a sporting event for two weeks?* (Parsons, *Daily Mirror*, 11/08/12c [italics added])

Similarly, for some, the ceremony was a reminder of Britain’s former role as head of a ‘global network’ (Grant Gascoigne cited in *The Australian*, 14/08/12). Writing in the letter pages of *The Australian*, Grant Gascoigne noted that:

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Many of us are happy to sink a boot into the British as only a shadow of its former self, but the magnificent closing show for the London Olympics put a sock in my mouth. The immaculate planning, design, timing, direction of an imaginative display on such a scale reminds us the Poms established a global network of democratic, productive nations with laws, governments, defence and industry unmatched in scale anywhere else in the world. (Grant Gascoigne cited in The Australian, 14/08/12)

This was echoed in reports of the Opening Ceremony, which according to Reade (2012) served to highlight ‘our genius, tolerance, humour, and all we have given to the world’ (Reade, Daily Mirror, 28/07/12 [italics added]).

Indeed, representations of what Britain had ‘given to the world’ were clearly evoked in the Opening Ceremonies depiction of the Industrial Revolution as well as more recent cultural icons, such as, the Beatles and the popular Harry Potter books (Brown, 2012; Harris, 2012a; MacDonald, 2012a). The Scotland on Sunday (2012) noted that:

What Danny Boyle’s opening ceremony did on Friday night was provide an alternative narrative of what it means to be British. What it takes from history are the virtues of innovation, industriousness and shared endeavour – but its defining feature is the enormously rich legacy of half a century of British popular culture, and particularly pop music. Dynamic, democratic, stylish and creative, it is Britain’s gift to the modern world. (29/07/12)

Similarly, the game’s Closing Ceremony, provided ‘a set featuring outsized London landmarks covered in newsprint bearing quotations from Shakespeare, Dickens and other luminaries’ (Gibson, Guardian, 13/08/12), with Gibson (2012) adding that ‘the show was a camp, joyous romp through pop culture’ (Guardian, 13/08/12).

Accordingly, in comparison to the 2008 Olympic Opening Ceremony in Beijing, Mangan et al. (2013) suggest that ‘if Beijing 2008 expressed Chinese cultural pride focused on Asian historic culture, the London Games displayed more cultural elements, which have had global impacts’ (2013: 1845-1846 [italics added]). Such ‘global impacts’ were representative of ‘London’s self-immersion in the modern world’ (Mangan et al., 2013: 1846) and were a reassurance of its prominent role in global popular culture (Mangan et al., 2013). This sense of reassurance was echoed in The Observer (2012):

Boyle’s lore took in Shakespeare, Milton, Brunel and Tim Berners Lee. It sought to sum up a country – a very multicultural land manifestly – which had played a full part in world literature, world construction, world invention
(even if very few of those feats are taught in our core curriculum these days). (29/07/12 [italics added])

As can be seen, while Britain was no longer an imperial power, its global impact was still felt in relation to its impact on music, sport, literature and art. Indeed, Mangan et al. (2013) argue that while Britain ‘had once been called an “Empire on which the sun never sets”, arguably in a very different way, was still an “Empire” as an innovator in the contemporary global popular culture industry’ (2013: 1848).

Consequently, whereas, the press’ coverage of the Olympic Ceremonies portrayed Britain as a ‘Dynamic, democratic, stylish and creative’ nation (The Scotland on Sunday, 29/07/12), comparatively, the Diamond Jubilee was represented as a appropriate display of British culture and history. Commenting upon the organization of the Diamond Jubilee’s River Pageant both Phillips (2012) and Routledge (2012) heralded the flotilla as a form of celebration that was particularly reflective of the British sense of self. For the former:

Putting this pageant onto river boats touched yet further deep and emotional chords. The great artery of the Thames is a symbol of the now too-often overlooked fact that this island kingdom was always a maritime nation. (Phillips, Daily Mail, 04/06/12)

Indeed, the ‘visceral connection’ that the pageant forged between the British people and their collective history (Phillips, Daily Mail, 04/06/12), was something that ‘clearly resonate[ed] with our island population’ (Routledge, Daily Mirror, 04/06/12 [italics added]). Together, both Phillips’s (2012) and Routledge’s (2012) remarks sought to draw upon two abiding images in the construction of Britain: the island nation and the sea.4 Indeed, here the pageant served as a reminder of the ‘maritime nation’ former naval supremacy (Phillips, Daily Mail, 04/06/12) that helped ‘to reinforce a sense of empire and of a dominant maritime presence’ (Lunn and Day, 2004: 135).5 Continuing the nautical theme, Jack (2012) noted:

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4 In fact, the importance of Britain’s maritime history has been highlighted by the Guardian (2014). In comments regarding the undermining of Britain’s nautical heritage, the Guardian (2014) noted that: ‘Perhaps it was the rising costs of ships, perhaps it was the changing global security climate, but – from the first Gulf war onwards – the UK seems to have made the transition from feeling like a naval nation to feeling like an army nation. Not since the Falklands war have we collectively thought nautical” (2014: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/20/guardian-view-public-services-post-naval-nation, retrieved: 21 July 2014).

5 Similarly, South Korean coverage of the 2012 bid process sought to draw upon Britain’s imperial rivalries with France, in light of the competing London and Paris Olympic 2012 bids (Mangan, et al. 2013). Here, the South Korean coverage drew upon Lord Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in
Spithead, however, showed what the nation was about. The convoy that followed the royal yacht around on its inspection duties included a large Atlantic liner, the Campania, filled with parliamentarians and newspaper reporters – witnesses and publicists to the naval supremacy that, in the words of the Times, was the ‘true bond’ of the British Empire. Since Nelson, Britain had thought of itself as a country of singular nautical genius. Certainly in no other country did seafarers enjoy so much respect and affection, or parents put so many of their children into sailor suits. (Guardian, 02/06/12)

Indeed, this historical moment was also highlighted in the Vancouver Sun (2012):

When Queen Victoria celebrated her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 at the age of 77, the Royal Navy mustered for a fleet review. British naval might was at its zenith. The 23 battleships, 51 cruisers and a multitude of destroyers and other ships covered 25 square kilometres of the English Channel. (02/06/12)

Similarly, Tweedie and Harding (2012) added:

For mile upon mile they stretched, their flag-bedecked ranks receding into the haze. The ships of the Royal Navy, 165 of them, drawn up at Spithead on June 26 1897 to mark the diamond jubilee of Victoria, for 60 years Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and her dominions beyond the seas, and, since 1876, Empress of India. There were 21 battleships and 44 cruisers, their names conveying the confidence of a worldspanning Empire: Victorious, Renown, Powerful, Terrible, Majestic and Mars. A vast, intimidating presence intended to impress on friend and foe alike the continuing potency of the British behemoth. And what was more, the assembly of this great fleet had required the recall of not a single ship from the Mediterranean or the farflung squadrons guarding the imperial sea lanes. (Daily Telegraph, 02/06/12)\[6\]

It is worth noting that Conboy (2007) has argued that ‘The tabloids develop their construction of a common history for their readers by integrating selected episodes from the past into their already powerful, rhetorical strategies of popular imagination’ (Conboy, 2007: 265 [italics added]). In doing so, the nation is ‘imagined historically’ (Conboy, 2007: 265). However, as the above examples reveal, such ‘selected episodes’ (Conboy, 2007: 265) could also be recalled by both the broadsheet (Jack, 2012; Tweedie and Harding, 2012) and foreign press (Vancouver Sun, 2012).

1805 to help frame London’s success over its Paris rivals (Mangan, et al., 2013). Similarly, Weight (2002) has argued that ‘in the half-century following the Battle of Waterloo, victory over Napoleon formed the basis of a sustaining national legend of strength through unity’ (2002: 6).

\[6\] Evidently there are differences in the historical record, with the Vancouver Sun (2012) highlighting that there were 23 battleships and 51 cruisers and Tweedie and Harding (2012) noting that there were 21 battleships and 44 cruisers at the 1897 fleet review.
Furthermore, while each example served to emphasise Britain’s naval supremacy during the reign of Queen Victoria, Colley (2014a) notes that during the late 1800s the Royal Navy ‘came to be widely represented and viewed as an emblem and metaphor for Britain itself, its increasing victories and reach an expression and embodiment of national virility’ (2014a: 26). Indeed, such accounts can have a particular effect when considered in accordance with present events. Conboy (2007) argues that ‘Combined with the didacticism concerning the past is a campaign very much associated with the present’ (2007: 266). That is, ‘the celebration of national heroes’ (Conboy, 2007: 266), such as, Admiral Lord Nelson, or reports of former naval dominance (Jack, 2012; Phillips, 2012; Vancouver Sun, 2012), can serve ‘as a way of reaffirming the values of the country in militaristic terms’ (Conboy, 2007: 266). Yet, in the case of Britain, there is a disparity in such accounts.

Indeed, while the naval supremacy of sea-borne power ceased to be of importance by the 1960s, Blake (1986) argues that ‘of all the many changes which occurred during the period, this was the one that affected Britain most profoundly’ (1986: x). Consequently, when viewed alongside those examples that served to emphasise Britain’s impact upon contemporary popular culture (Gibson, 2012; The Scotland on Sunday, 2012), notions of British decline were discursively implied in the Vancouver Sun’s (2012) suggestion that during the reign of Queen Elizabeth ‘Britain remade itself as an agile middle power that punched far above its weight in science, technology, the arts and entertainment’ (02/06/12 [italics added]). Whereas the empire was chosen as a particular period, where British achievements were at their greatest and its global power was at its zenith, such reports could, paradoxically, serve to underline Britain’s contemporary decline.

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that both the Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Ceremonies were irreducibly bound with collective memories of empire. This is significant, particularly because, despite the brief inclusion of a model Empire Windrush during the Olympic Opening Ceremony, references to Britain’s imperial history were noticeably absent during the ceremony’s performance. Indeed, the absence of empire was condemned by De Chickera (2012) as revealing:

a very convenient – selective – history. All good. All celebration. No bad. No reflection. One may argue, that this was the point – it was a celebration – no point dragging the mood down by raising that ugly issue, particularly when
half the countries represented at the games and the opening ceremony, were victims of this ‘episode’ in history. (2012)\footnote{See \url{http://www.opendemocracy.net/amal-de-chickera/games-have-begun-opportunity-missed}, retrieved: 28 July 2012.}

As a result, despite the decline of the British Empire, depictions of empire continued to form an important part of the press’ representation of Britain and British pride. In addition, these discourses could also work in dialectic ways. That is, while certain reports sought to return to a nostalgic and largely (re)constructed national representation of Britain (Harris, 2012c; Jack, 2012; Jones, 2012; Maguire, 1999; Richards, 2012; \textit{Vancouver Sun}, 2012; Tweedie and Harding, 2012), other reports provided reassurance of Britain’s continuing global relevance (Phillips, 2012; The Scotland on Sunday, 2012). In these instances, it was clear that a disparity existed between who the British once were and who they now believed themselves to be.

\subsection*{5.1.2. ‘What kind of nation are we anyway?’: false imaginings and the ‘national malaise’}

The sense of confusion surrounding Britain and the British sense of self was highlighted by Taylor (2012) who asked, ‘do we have any national signifiers left in 2012?’ (\textit{Daily Telegraph}, 02/06/12). Subsequently, for Rawnsley (2012) such ‘national signifiers’ had suffered from a lack of confidence and trust:

\begin{quote}
  The BBC, the monopoly broadcaster at the time of the Queen’s coronation, now has a cacophony of competition. The Church of England is divided in its beliefs and confused about its role. The City of London is feared and loathed for what the bankers did to the economy. At the time of the accession, the House of Commons was held in such esteem that a book could be published with the title The Glory of Parliament, not a proposition that would today secure an advance. (\textit{Guardian}, 03/06/12)
\end{quote}

As a result, ‘in the middle of a national carnival of disillusionment’ (Hare, \textit{Guardian}, 02/06/12) the Diamond Jubilee was viewed as ‘infantilising us with false imaginings and a bogus heritage of our island story’ (Toynbee, \textit{Guardian}, 01/06/12a). Here, the ‘imagined greatness’ of the Thames Pageant reflected a ‘decontextualised, nostalgic and branded history’ of Britain that stood in stark contrast to its contemporary problems (Gardiner and Westall, 2012).\footnote{See \url{http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/michael-gardiner-claire-westall/last-great-british-summer-for-england}, retrieved: 13 May 2012.}
In contrast, the Olympic Games was perceived as providing an important opportunity for Britain to highlight to the world, and, itself, exactly what the British people were capable of. *The Scotsman* (2012d) noted:

And we very much hope the Games will live up to all that has been claimed for them, both in terms of regeneration of a problematic area of east London and also as a demonstration to the world of what we are capable of as a people. (*The Scotsman*, 27/07/12 [italics added])

Thus, for the ‘diminished’ and ‘austere Britain’ (Tweedie, *Daily Telegraph*, 06/06/12), the Olympic Games provided an important moment to regain a sense of British pride. Patterson (2012) argued that, ‘it was nice to feel a little stab of pride, because in the seven years since he [Jacques Rogge] announced London would host this year’s Olympics, pride hasn’t always been the main thing most of us have felt’ (*Belfast Telegraph*, 26/07/12). This was shared by *The Weekend Australian* (2012) who highlighted that, ‘after three successive quarters of negative growth, Great Britain and its capital need a confidence and economic boost now almost as much as in 1948 when London last hosted the Olympics as it struggled to emerge from post-war austerity’ (28/07/12).

Certainly, the post-war image of Britain as a nation beset by decline and ‘where nothing works’ (Freedland, *Guardian*, 27/07/12b), served to overshadow Britain’s attempts to redefine its image in the run-up to the Olympic Games. Baum (2012) alluded that:

If a theme could be inferred, it might have been that post-empire, post-war Britain had lost its way, but now was back. It is not true, of course – look at the economy, already severely stressed, and soon with a pile of Olympic bills to pay (ultimately, Greece buckled beneath them). (*The Age*, 28/07/12)

In fact, while Britain was ‘a country that has always imposed its view on the world, through imperial adventure, culture and commerce’ (Hayward, *Daily Telegraph*, 27/07/12), Hayward (2012) added that:

now the Games open in east London in an age of mass insecurity and collapsed assumptions, stemming from last summer’s riots, the Leveson inquiry, double-dip recession and the banking scandal, which has shaken all our senses of what Britain really is. (*Daily Telegraph*, 27/07/12)

Consequently, despite the fact that Britain ‘looked very good’ during the games, Saunders (2012) was clear to point out that this was ‘something that Britain once took
for granted’ (*The Globe and Mail*, 13/08/12). Implicitly, Saunders’s (2012) remarks served to signify Britain’s post-imperial troubles and its decline from power.

Indeed, elsewhere Ward (2002) has noted how Britain’s ‘world position’ formed an important part of its identity, arguing that the sense of crisis surrounding such a loss was bound to be severe. Accordingly, for Britain such insecurity was intimately bound with perceptions regarding its ‘place in the world’ (*Freedland, Guardian*, 27/07/12b). Freedland (2012b) suggested that:

> these Olympic weeks will offer answers to a clutch of questions that have nagged at us since the last time London hosted the Games in 1948. *What exactly is our place in the world? How do we compare to other countries and to the country we used to be? What kind of nation are we anyway?* (*Guardian, 27/07/12b* [italics added])

Correspondingly, before the Opening Ceremony Toynbee (2012b), asked, ‘What will these visitors see? … What will they make of us, when we hardly know what to make of ourselves?’ (*Guardian, 27/07/12b* [italics added]). Again, drawing upon the work of Burkitt (2008), both Freedland (2012b) and Toynbee’s (2012b) remarks can be considered in light of the effect that a particular place can have on our ‘sense of the world and our position within it’ (Burkitt, 2008: 155). In addition, ‘place is not just made out of bricks and mortar: place is composed of relations – to the objects and people around us, and also to the people, real or imagined, outside of that pace who judge those living within it’ (2008: 155 [italics added]). Indeed, elsewhere, Rojek (2007) has argued that:

> Tepid about Europe, pining for the long-lost global authority that Empire vested in British opinion and undergoing pressure for devolution from Whitehall to national and regional assemblies, the British are in the midst of a troubling assessment of who they are and where they figure in relation to other nations. (2007: 156 [italics added])

Consequently, in light of Toynbee’s (2012b) concerns it was evident that a secure and identifiable British ‘we-identity’ was interdependently predicated upon a sense of confusion surrounding the British sense of self: ‘What will they make of us?’ as well as foreign visitors’ interpretations of Britain: ‘What will these visitors see?’ (Toynbee,

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9 Elsewhere, Elias (1996) has noted that such descriptions are ‘particularly true of countries which have sunk in the course of time from a higher to a lower position within the pyramid of states’ (1996: 17).

10 Similarly, Wood (2014) highlights that, ‘In any nation, … a critical mass is concerned about what others think of them. Most want their nation to be admired and are enthused by the transmission of esteem’ (2014: 111)
*Guardian, 27/07/12b*). Evidently, in such instances, constructions of Britain were based upon a reflexive interdependence.

### 5.1.3. Imperial Fantasies

Despite reports that served to question ‘who’ the British were, research on the British monarchy and its associated iconography has often been found to form an important part of Britain’s identity and history (Bradley, 2008; Cannadine, 1983; Colley, 2014a; 2014b; Jeffery, 2006; Ward, 2004). Commenting upon the Diamond Jubilee, McNulty (2012) highlighted that ‘the monarchy is a symbol of Britain’s imperial past’, yet was clear to point out that ‘grandeur is expensive’ (*The Scotsman, 02/06/12*). Indeed, McNulty’s (2012) comments provide a clear disparity between the relevance of a monarchy located within Britain’s imperial past and a contemporary Britain, whose continuing economic instability served to emphasise the expenditure required in maintaining such an institution. Correspondingly, Toynbee (2012a) noted:

> The more outrageously glorious the performance, the more preposterous its purpose. There at the heart, in the dead centre of all this pomp and circumstance, is the great emptiness, the nothingness, the Wizard of Oz in emperor’s clothes. The louder the bells, the more gaping the grand vacuity. What are we celebrating? A singularly undistinguished family’s hold on the nation, a mirage of nationhood, a majestic delusion. … The cost of the monarchy, though a hundred times the price of the modestly likeable Irish presidency, is counted not in palaces and royal trains, but in the fantasy of imperial power the crown bestows on British politics. Punching above our weight, we have just ordered a new Trident to cling to an undeserved UN security council seat from which to hector the world about a democratic idea so weakly applied at home. (*Guardian, 01/06/12a* [italics added])

Clearly, accounts of the Diamond Jubilee and the British monarchy were seen to form part of the British ‘fantasy’, that is, the ‘majestic delusion’ behind Britain’s nationhood (Toynbee, *Guardian, 01/06/12a*). In fact, Cannadine (1983) has noted that the pageantry associated with the British monarchy reflects an ‘invented tradition’, harking back to Britain’s imperial glory and in so doing hiding the cracks in its post-imperial status.

Consequently, between the British monarchy’s ‘imperial past’ and ‘expensive grandeur’ (McNulty, *The Scotsman, 02/06/12*), the ‘majestic delusion’ (Toynbee, *Guardian, 01/06/12a*) underlying notions of Britain served to highlight how representations of the nation can reflect magical-mythical beliefs (Elias, 1978; 1996;
Beliefs of this kind … may provide a degree of comfort, emotional warmth and satisfaction in what is for many people a cold, impersonal, rapidly changing, complex and puzzling social world, especially if the beliefs are shared with others and involve the group performance of apparently meaningful rituals. (2012: 145)

In such instances, when ‘confronted with the difficulties of a highly mobile and quickly changing world one is apt to seek refuge in the image of a social order which never changes and projects it to a past that never was’ (Elias and Scotson, 1994: 160).

This is echoed by, Dawson and West (1984):

the gap between ‘who we are’ and ‘who we think we are’ has steadily widened, so that in recent years ‘British national identity’ had taken on aspects of fantasy. Despite economic decline, the long withdrawal from Empire and a subordinate relation to the US, ‘Britain’ has clung to a grandiose world role. (1984: 13 cited in Osmond, 1988: 31)

Indeed, the importance of Britain’s world role has often been allied with exaggerated appraisals of British power (Gilroy, 2005; Kumar, 2003; Malcolm, 2012). In particular, the impact of Britain’s post-imperial decline and its diminished world role is drawn upon by Cowley (2013) who highlights how the British Empire had a defining impact upon his own recollections of England/Britain:

As someone who was born in the 1960s, the son of wartime evacuees from London, I had a sense from an early age that England, or Britain (during my childhood the two nouns seemed to be interchangeable), was oppressed by a lost greatness. As my father grew older, he seemed to become ever more nostalgic for an England that no longer existed – or had never existed, except perhaps as a construct of the imagination. (2013)

As can be seen, Cowley’s (2013) account of his father’s ‘imagined’ Britain, indeed, a Britain that may have never existed, echoes Dunning and Hughes (2012) comments on the ‘degree of comfort, emotional warmth and satisfaction’ that can be imparted upon a nation whose location within ‘a cold, impersonal, rapidly changing, complex and puzzling social world’ (2012: 145) is underscored by a sense of ‘lost greatness’ (Cowley, 2013). This was brought to light in Toynbee’s (2012a) suggestion, that the

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British sense of self, and, in particular, the cost of the British monarchy, were today clearly based upon a ‘fantasy of imperial power’ (Guardian, 01/06/12a). This was echoed in the Australian press where the sense of pageantry and the imperial fantasy that it helped to sustain, was highlighted in comments made by the London-based Australian author, Kathy Lette:

the pageantry reminds the British of their glory days, when they ruled the empire and were not just one of the planet’s postscripts…The jubilee festivities are like a psychological sorbet in a diet of doom and gloom. (Lette cited in Kissane, The Age, 02/06/12 [italics added])

As a result, while the reign of Elizabeth I would lead Britain ‘to centuries of expansion and empire. In Elizabeth II’s case, the monarchy was a necessary mask to help Britain come to terms with its decline from empire to island’ (Strong, Vancouver Sun, 01/06/12). This was echoed by Holden (2012), who highlighted that despite Queen Elizabeth’s ‘auspicious beginnings’:

Elizabeth’s reign has not been all smooth sailing. She has spent a large majority of her time saying farewell to the British Empire amassed by her forebears from Kenya to Hong Kong, although she remains head of state for 16 countries and head of the Commonwealth. (Vancouver Sun, 02/06/12)

Clearly, the above examples seek to suggest that Britain’s royal celebrations and monarchial grandeur failed to summon the same international role that it once held. Here, constructions of the past, particularly within an increasingly changing national context (Cantle, 2013; Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Gilroy, 2005; Goodhart, 2013a; 2013b) can provide an image of social order (Dunning and Hughes, Elias and Scotson, 1994; Elias, 1987). Indeed, such fantasies are based upon the power relations that help to form part of, and, indeed, serve to maintain, group charisma (Malcolm, 2012). In doing so, national fantasies are often built upon a picture that is far removed from reality (Elias, 1996).

regarding the nation can form an important part of an individual’s identity (Elias, 1996; 2010; Elias and Scotson, 1994).
5.2. Britain 2012: an established-outsider dynamic – established practices and changing relations

It is evident that constructions of Britain’s past were routinely drawn upon in both the British and Commonwealth press. Indeed, for Williams (1973) ‘the idea of an ordered and happier past set against the disturbance and disorder of the present’ is an ‘idealisation … based on a temporary situation and on a deep desire for stability, served to cover and to evade the actual and bitter contradictions of the time’ (1973: 45). In the case of Britain, such ‘contradictions’ stood alongside an acknowledged uncertainty and a lack of clarity regarding British identity (Hayward, 2012; Hoey, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012). Certainly, while the above examples have suggested that such ‘contradictions’ can result in nostalgic representations (Hardman, 2012; Hayward, 2012; Holt, 2012; Jack, 2012; Parson, 2012; Phillips, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012) as well as ‘fantas[ies] of imperial power’ (Toynbee, Guardian, 01/06/12a), they can also allude to dynamic changes within the discursive construction of the nation (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).

Accordingly, contrary to Durkheimian approaches that seek to view national events as integrative devices (Dayan and Katz, 1992), periods of social transformation can often reveal processes of construction and/or (re)construction in the national image (Mihelj, 2008; Poulton and Maguire, 2012). Consequently, while ‘media events’ can help to sustain established institutions (Dayan and Katz, 1992), the second part of this chapter will utilize Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework in order to examine how the press’ coverage of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games revealed processes of negotiation and contestation in their construction of Britain and British identity.13 Here, the established-outsider framework can prove particularly useful in exploring how social changes impact upon media discourses and how ‘social relations of power and domination’ (Fairclough, 2000: 158-159) can be observed between national newspaper coverage of the same event. More specifically, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) approach will be used to examine how newspaper discourses reflected wider power relations within the British state and Commonwealth (Atkindons, 2002; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987).

13 See section 5.2.3. and section 5.2.4.
5.2.1. Confused boundaries and allegories of England: ‘Stiff upper lips’ and a ‘Green and Pleasant Land’

It was highlighted in chapter three that Elias and Scotson’s (1994) analysis of established-outsider relations revealed how the longevity of the ‘established group’, that is, their shared common history, served as an important component of their superiority and established status. Indeed, ‘history can often be used as an instrument for the imposition of power over others’ (Panagiotopoulou, 2010: 243) with historical narratives serving to legitimate boundary formations (Chan, 2012) as well as maintaining apparent distinctions between established and outsider groups (Elias and Scotson, 1994).

Indeed, the framing of Britain as an ‘established’ nation was illustrated by The Independent on Sunday (2012a) who noted, that according to The New York Times, ‘Britain [had] offered a display of humour and humbleness that can only stem from a deep-rooted sense of superiority’ (29/07/12a [italics added]). As can be seen, the ‘group identity’ of Britain was clearly predicated ‘on ideals transmitted from the past’ (Sutton and Vertigans, 2002: 62), in this instance, ‘a deep-rooted sense of superiority’ (The Independent on Sunday, 29/07/12a) that still ‘continue[d] to have a resonance in the present’ (Sutton and Vertigans, 2002: 62).

As a result, appreciations of Britain’s established superiority were exemplified in press reports that often served to present such assertions as taken for granted and widely acknowledged British traits. Indeed, this was exemplified by Collins (2012):

We dislike being instructed on how to behave by people wholly unqualified to offer such instruction. It is one of our oldest and most endearing traits. In any case, our history has earned us the right to exercise our own choice on these matters. Again, it is central to who we are. (The Mail on Sunday, 29/07/12 [italics added])

Similarly, Phillips (2012) noted that:

We recognised our history with pride and unashamed acceptance that it has made us the country we are today, a country still able to put on such an extraordinary event with style and to welcome visitors from around the world with open arms and with open minds. (Daily Mirror, 28/07/12)

Such accounts were closely tied to a ‘British system of national beliefs [which] had, since time immemorial, legitimated their claim to superiority at least partially through
Britain’s service and achievements for others, for humanity and civilisation’ (Elias, 1996: 348). Subsequently, *The Mail on Sunday* (2012) argued:

> We have no need to assert ourselves. These small islands have influenced the world in countless ways for centuries. No other capital has hosted the Games three times, or is likely to do so. (29/07/12)\(^{14}\)

Accordiingly, while the games provided ‘confirmation of London’s predominant place in the world’ (Milner, Waldie and Reguly, *The Globe and Mail*, 26/07/12), the recognition of London as the only city to have hosted the Olympic Games three times, served to underscore Britain’s influential world role, a role which, rather ironically, did not need asserting.

However, closer examination of the above examples, reveals that it was the *English* press that sought to draw upon Britain’s history as a powerful signifier of its established position within the world (Collins, 2012; Crompton, 2012; Phillips, 2012). While this was bolstered by the fact that it was the English capital, London, which was hosting the Games for a third time, accounts of British history reflected a particular form of ‘group charisma’ and established status within the English press (Elias and Scotson, 1994; Kumar, 2003; 2006b).\(^{15}\)

In relation to the coverage of the Opening Ceremony, representations of Britain’s past were sanctioned by a traditional interpretation of ‘Britain’ which depicted the British landscape and its people as an ‘essentially pastoral island’ of milking maids and morris dancers (Storry and Childs, 1997: 21-22). Consequently, in Hardman’s (2012) report of the Opening Ceremony, she noted that:

> The stadium show opened to a quintessential rural idyll of happy yokels set in a non-specific sepia-tinted yesteryear. Boyle called this his ‘Green and Pleasant Land’ section and a choir duly sang Jerusalem over the top of it all. A waterwheel spun round above a babbling brook while young maidens danced around maypoles, plodding farmhands tended real sheep and cows and young blades enjoyed a game of cricket (*Daily Mail*, 28/07/12)

Here, the Opening Ceremony presented a dramatic representation of an ‘immutable pastoral England’ (Reviron-Piegay, 2009: 4). As a result:

\(^{14}\) Again, comparisons can be made between the press’ representation of ‘These small islands’ (*The Mail on Sunday*, 29/07/12) and Littler’s (2006) analysis of the 1952 Festival of Britain. In particular, Littler (2006) notes that, ‘The Britain being represented around the Festival was often portrayed as whimsically small: a little country with a big history’ (2006: 31).

\(^{15}\) See chapter three, section 3.2.2.
The bucolic scenes on the stadium’s infield were pleasingly evocative of Olde England and happily quirky. The ‘Pandemonium’ of the transformation wrought by the Industrial Revolution and the turning of the nation into a land of dark satanic mills was a darkly magnificent sequence. (Holt, Daily Mirror, 28/07/12)

This was continued in the New Zealand Herald (2012) whose post-ceremony analysis sought to highlight how the inclusion of ‘meadows’, ‘livestock’, ‘a farmer ploughing his field’ and the very English ‘cricket match’ during the Opening Ceremony, helped to ‘evoke a pastoral idyll, the “green and pleasant land” described in William Blake’s poem Jerusalem, which, set to music, is regarded as England’s unofficial national anthem’ (26/07/12). Evidently, ‘evocative’ recreations of ‘Olde England’ and its ‘Green and Pleasant Land’, served to recreate an idealized portrayal of Britain, indeed, one that was drawn upon in both the English and Commonwealth press.

Accordingly, Weight (2002) has highlighted that:

The squalor caused by industrialization provoked a reaction to Victorian economic liberalism and to urban life. … From around the 1880s, this transformed the popular image of the countryside from that of backward hovel into a picturesque repository of national values. (2002: 7)

However, what is noticeable in the above examples is the degree to which a rather ‘English’ portrayal of Britain was adopted within the press’ coverage. On the contrary, Weight (2002) has argued that while ‘the British were … the first people in the West to romanticise the countryside’ (Weight, 2002: 7), this was not, ‘a peculiarly English fixation’ (2002: 72). In fact, there are ‘countless books, songs and paintings which celebrated the Scottish and Welsh countryside’ (Weight, 2002: 73).

Nonetheless, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have argued that the rural depiction of England suggests a form of ‘metonymic stereotyping [that] is partial and involves exclusion’ (2001: 65). In doing so, such constructions ‘[become] a mode of domination rather than a possible form of identification’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001: 65). In exploring Reicher and Hopkins (2001) analysis further, it is possible to draw a

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16 Indeed, this is undermined somewhat by Weight’s (2002) example of a BBC publicity statement for the British soap opera, The Archers, which described the soap’s fictional village as ‘a gentle relic of Old England, nostalgic, generous, incorruptible and (above all) valiant. In other words the sort of British community that the rootless townsman would like to live in and can involve himself in vicariously. (Laing, 1992: 146 cited in Weight, 2002: 159 [italics added]).

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comparison between the press’ 2012 discourse and the 1952 Festival of Empire. Here, Littler (2006) notes that:

The villages of Finchingfield, Thaxted and Bardfield had been singled out by Essex Rural Community Council to be put on display because they had a ‘community spirit lively enough’ and because they were deemed to be ‘beautiful in setting and style’ as well as being close together. If such activity, where people were recurrently described as ‘playing their part’, indicated the participative nature of the Festival (accompanying its equally vehement emphasis on top-down planning), it also indicated the ‘littleness’ of Britain under construction – a Britain most often depicted in the national press as English, despite the activities going on in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. It created a Britain of a nation of villages, the whole as the sum of very small and very picturesque parts. (2006: 31 [italics added])

Littler’s (2006) highlighting of the distinctly rural, and, reportedly English, depiction of Britain, strikes a notable similarity with the English and Commonwealth press’ coverage of the 2012 London Olympic Opening Ceremony. To this extent, it is possible to observe how the dominance of ‘England’ within representations of ‘Britain’ have formed, and, continues to form, an important part of the press’ representation of popular ‘British’ culture and community.

Similar representations could also be identified in reference to the British ‘stiff upper lip’, used in both the domestic (Freedland, 2012a; Goring, 2012; Smith, 2012; Walker, 2012) and Commonwealth coverage (Hinds, 2012; Lane, 2012; McLaren, 2012). Indeed, Vincent and Harris (2014) note that the British ‘stiff upper lip’ is a characteristic that is deeply evocative of the civilized English gentleman, one that ‘emerged during the age of imperialism when the British/English code of civility was revered for its socializing influence on colonial subjects’ (Vincent and Harris, 2014: 232; see also Hislop, 2012). Other labels, such as the Australian label ‘Pom’ – used to refer to England immigrants within Australia – could also be found within the Australian press (Hinds, 2012; Lette, 2012; Silvester, 2012). Together, these constructions all served to provide a particularly ‘English’ representation of Britain, with Lette (2012) noting that ‘in a Stiff Upper Lip competition, there’s no question the Poms would win bronze, silver and gold’ (The Age, 28/07/12).

Consequently, whereas a number of commentators have alluded to the growing separation between England and Britain (Bragg, 2014; Perryman, 2012), Colley (2014a) notes that:
the unfortunate English habit that still lingers of using ‘England’ as a synonym for the entire island of Britain is often interpreted as one more expression of English arrogance. Might it not also testify to a certain lack of clarity about boundaries and identity? (2014a: 60)

With this in mind and with the above examples considered, it is evident that ‘this unfortunate English habit’ (Colley, 2014a: 60) was one that was shared by the Commonwealth press (Hinds, 2012; Lette, 2012; Silvester, 2012). That is, while the English press revealed a propensity to resort to nostalgic depictions of England/Britain (Harris, 2012c; Holt, 2012; Jones, 2012; Richards, 2012), correspondingly, the Commonwealth press served to frame ‘Britain’ through the use of a distinctly rural and imperially ‘English’ form of representation (‘stiff upper lip’/’Pom’) (Goring, 2012; Hinds, 2012; Lane, 2012; McLaren, 2012; Smith, 2012; Walker, 2012). Here, constructions were historically rooted in, and continually related to, Britain’s imperial past. Indeed, despite wider processes of change within Britain and the British ‘we-image’, most notably, the decline of the British Empire and the devolving of the British state (McCrone, 2006; Perryman, 2009; Wilson, 2006), newspaper coverage remained tied to an English-centered and imperially constructed, representation of Britain.

Nonetheless, whereas the above examples reveal how established practices formed an important part of the English press’ discourse, these constructions can also be considered in relation to wider changes within the British figuration. Indeed, while the previous section sought to highlight how examples of Britain’s imperial past could be used as a form distinction within the press’ coverage, section 5.1.2. noted how this past could result in ‘imperial fantasies’ (Toynbee, 2012a). With this in mind, Loyal (2011) notes that:

The nature of group fantasies and emotions, which can often slip through theoretical conceptual nets, need to be acknowledged: their logic is, however, not arbitrary but possesses a structure and discernible dynamic of its own. (2011: 192)

Accordingly, the ‘discernible dynamic[s]’ underlying ‘group fantasies and emotions’ (Loyal, 2011: 192) in addition to feelings of contemporary decline, may be reflective of broader changes in the figurational dynamics between established and outsider groups. Consequently, the following section will consider the effect of these changes within the Commonwealth press.
5.2.2. Britain and Commonwealth interdependence: new relations and old anxieties

In comments related to the British royal family, the remarks of one individual were highlighted by Stone (2012):

King Charles is about as un-Kiwi as they come. It’s not his fault, he’s a born-and-bred British aristocrat. It’s just plain daft expecting him to be a symbol of New Zealand. And I’m sure that if Kiwis were given the chance to choose, they would back one of their own as head of state. (Dean Knight cited in Stone, New Zealand Herald, 02/06/12)

Indeed, the belief that the British royal family no longer reflected the former dominions was shared by Holden (2012) who noted that ‘in the latter half of the Queen’s reign New Zealand’s national identity has developed to the point where most New Zealanders see the monarchy as irrelevant, the royals as a slick public relations machine’ (Dominion Post, 04/06/12). Rothwell (2012) added that:

by 1986, it was clear New Zealand’s love affair with the Empire was waning. The Queen’s tour was only nine days long and marked by two incidents of activism. (Dominion Post, 02/06/12)

In fact, the disparity between the ‘English’ royal family and New Zealand was drawn upon in Milne’s (2012) questioning of the royal’s sporting allegiances:

The Duke and Duchess of Cambridge are lovely people, but they’re English through and through. They don’t understand Christmas on the beach, or pohutukawa. They can’t cheer for the ALL BLACKS. And when we’re desperate for the Black Sticks to win, Kate is ‘jumping for joy’ at seeing them miss out on a medal. They can never be loyal supporters of New Zealand – so how can they ever expect us to be their loyal subjects? (New Zealand Herald, 12/08/12)

Frustrations with the monarchy were evident in reports of the Diamond Jubilee. Watkins (2012) sought to draw upon New Zealand frustrations with the Jubilee’s year long celebrations:

Public servants are losing their jobs by the tens of thousands, pay packets are frozen and Britain’s national debt is a staggering £1.2 trillion. But poor Britannia can still afford to throw a glittering Diamond Jubilee bash for Queen Elizabeth – and Commonwealth countries including New Zealand are helping to foot the bill for the year-long celebration. (Dominion Post, 02/06/12)
This was echoed in the Australian coverage, which noted that ‘any excitement about the whole occasion seems about as remote as, well, England’ (Southphommasane, *The Age*, 04/06/12a). Instead:

Here in Australia, we are holding no equivalent river pageant to that in London to mark the Queen’s diamond jubilee. There is no bunting in our city streets, no memorabilia being mass-produced. So far as official commemoration goes, Prime Minister Julia Gillard will light a jubilee beacon on Parliament House today. But that is about it. (Southphommasane, *The Age*, 04/06/12a)

Alluding to Australia’s failed republican referendum in 1999, Carney (2012) stated that:

only a little over 10 years ago, there appeared to be a genuine prospect that Australia would come to look upon these activities in the way that Americans do: fondly, but at a remove, the expression of a peculiar form of British nationalism that no longer had anything specifically to do with us. But it was not to be. (*The Age*, 06/06/12 [italics added])

Clearly for Carney (2012) the feeling that such royal celebrations ‘no longer had anything specifically to do with us’ (*The Age*, 06/06/12 [italics added]) served to emphasise Australia’s loosening attachment with the British monarchy. This was shared by Tate (2012), who’s disdain for the Australian media’s ‘gushing about our ties to the ‘motherland’ (*The Sunday Age*, 29/07/12), helped to unveil a much more problematic issue during the Opening Ceremony. In reference to the pre-Olympic debate surrounding which Australian athlete would carry the Australian flag during the Opening Ceremony, Tate (2012) noted:

So the delightful Lauren Jackson won the race that seemed to matter most to our athletes in the lead-up to the London Olympics – carrying the Australian flag into the opening ceremony. It’s a shame then that this undoubted honour saw one of our sporting greats hoisting an ensign that prominently featured the flag of the host nation. All those union flags waving madly in the crowd may be comfortingly familiar, but were also a reminder of how infantile we are when it comes to national symbols. Is it any wonder our Canadian cousins regularly cack themselves laughing at us (and New Zealand) during these soirees. And while the athletes’ joy is well earned, the orgy of nationalist backslapping that is about to overwhelm us would be easier to take if the oi, oi, oi hangers-on weren’t so laughably idle in forging real change. You know, simple things like getting your own flag. Australia’s elite athletes would never win a medal if they were as lazy and scared in competition as the rest of the country appears to be on the issue of changing ‘‘old hoary’’. (*The Sunday Age*, 29/07/12)
Evidently, both Carney (2012) and Tate’s (2012) use of the personal pronouns ‘our’, ‘we’ and ‘us’ served to highlight Australia’s contested relationship with Britain.

Moreover, what is apparent from the above examples is the extent to which the use of personal pronouns reflected Australia’s ambivalent post-imperial relationship with Britain. Whereas the use of the pronouns ‘our’ and ‘we’ were clearly used to dissociate Australia from Britain, it was a separation that sat alongside ‘our Canadian cousins’ (Tate, The Sunday Age, 29/07/12 [italics added]). Here, Australia’s former imperial history was clearly evoked in its attachment to those Canadian’s whose own history was tied to the British Empire. In such instances, Tate’s (2012) use of the personal pronouns ‘us’, ‘we’ and ‘our’ sought to distinguish Australia from the former ‘motherland’ (Tate, The Sunday Age, 29/07/12). Evidently, the use of personal pronouns by the Australian press served to reflect wider confusions regarding the multi-national imperial history of the British Empire (Malcolm, 2012).

Similarly, reports pertaining to the dominion’s imperial history could also be found within the New Zealand coverage. Indeed, Rothwell (2012) noted:

The New Zealand that the Queen met as she stepped off the Gothic was quite different from the New Zealand she would find today. Emerging from World War II, it was the period of the happy family, where birth rates were rising, where 80 per cent of the population could trace their ancestry back to Britain, where people rarely left New Zealand except by arduous ship voyage. We were proud as a country – Edmund Hillary had just given the Queen his coronation ‘gift’, the first summit of Mt Everest. … During her first welcome, she told crowds of adoring Kiwis that she was delighted to be ‘not in a foreign land and amongst alien people, but at home with our kinsman’. When she gave her Christmas address from Government House in Auckland, she said, ‘I want to show that the Crown is not merely an abstract symbol of our unity but a personal and living bond between you and me’. Many people in the 1950s, with memories of World War II and New Zealand’s part in protecting Britain still an important part of our identity, would have felt that. (Dominion Post – Your Weekend, 02/06/12 [italics added])

Clearly, Rothwell’s (2012) comments reveal the importance afforded to New Zealand’s British heritage and the significance of this heritage, particularly with regards to its involvement in the scaling of Mount Everest and its part in aiding the British forces during the Second World War. However, as Rothwell (2012) clearly states, while Britain was once ‘an important part of … [New Zealand] identity’, today New Zealand was signaled as being ‘quite different’ (Dominion Post – Your Weekend, 02/06/12).
To this extent, accounts of Britain’s imperial decline served to highlight the differences between Britain and the former dominions. Indeed, Hyder (2012) sought to measure Canada’s recent successes by noting that:

If Britain has become modest by coming to terms with the fact that its days as a global empire are behind it, Canada has increasingly built on its recent successes to become emboldened by the emerging role we have assumed on the world stage. (Vancouver Sun, 11/08/12)

As can be seen, whereas the decline of the British Empire had helped to create an emerging sense of modesty within Britain, Canada had undertaken its own emerging role within global politics.

Notably, the emergence of Canada ‘on the world stage’ (Hyder, Vancouver Sun, 11/08/12) offered a stark contrast to reports within the Australian press. Here, Australia’s ties with the former British Empire revealed ‘deep concerns about the status of its historical experience’ (Hughes-d’Aeth, 2003: 220). Indeed, commenting upon Australian anxieties towards the former motherland, Van Duinen (2013) has argued that whereas Australian nationalism was clearly evident in politics and the arts:

all too often such proto-nationalist voices were found to be trumped or drowned out by various manifestations of Britishness: the perceived need for British military protection; a conservative and frustratingly prevalent ‘Anglo-Australianness’; and, associated with the latter, a nagging inferiority complex or ‘cultural cringe’. (2013: 345-346)

In fact, since the 1960s, debates concerning the ‘quality of Australian nationhood’ have been widely contested and deeply embedded in discussions relating to its national history (Ward, 2007: 239). Indicative of these debates was the launching of Rupert Murdoch’s Australian newspaper in 1964. In its inaugural editorial, the paper noted that:

We Australians have always been proud – and perhaps a little self-confident too – about describing our country as a ‘young country’ … Yet something we all know in our hearts when we are very young is that sooner of later we will be grown up … We have fought successfully against British control of our political affairs. We have made a lot of obey, speaking of us collectively. But have we really grown up? It seems we have not … We are growing up. But we have manifestly not yet achieved maturity. (Australian, 15/07/12 cited in Ward, 2007: 239)
Accordingly, in 2012, the ‘maturity’ of Australia was still being questioned. While the previous example from Tate (2012) sought to remind its Australian audience of how ‘infantile’ the nation was, other reports revealed that feelings of anxiety, continued to impact upon Australian identity and culture, particularly with regards to Britain, and, as the following example reveals, with specific reference to the British monarchy:

The idea of someone inheriting the highest public office in the land offends democratic principles, pure and simple. This gets to one of the anomalies of Australia remaining a constitutional monarchy. How odd that a country that prides itself on being egalitarian has a constitutional framework that is anything but. One of the problems is that grandeur and glamour still attach to royalty. There is also the vexed question of which model of republic Australians may want. After all, what kind of aspirational society are we talking about when Australians cannot even aspire to be the head of state? (Southphommasane, The Age, 04/06/12a [italics added])

As can be seen, while attempts to disassociate Australia from Britain were evidently pursued (Carney, 2012; Tate, 2012), Australia’s national history was undermined by the contradictions and insecurities surrounding its transnational imperial heritage (Codell, 2003; Darian-Smith et al., 2007; Hughes-d’Aeth, 2003; Ward, 2007).

In addition, while concerns regarding Australia’s monarchial ties were highlighted within the press, Britain’s successful Opening Ceremony brought further concern. With regards to the Opening Ceremony, Hinds (2012) noted that:

Infuriatingly, the dour, buttoned down Poms had come up with an opening that was part artistic triumph; part rollicking, self-mocking celebration of their nation’s endearing quirkiness. A tribute to a country that doesn’t take itself nearly so seriously as it tries to make us think. Not even, you couldn’t help thinking, as seriously as we take ourselves. (The Sunday Age, 29/07/12)

In fact, the success of London 2012 encouraged a reflexive attitude within the Australian press. Here, Australia’s poor performance at the games resulted in wider questions regarding the Australian national character. As a result:

For Australia, London 2012 may just have said something about the rise of a cocky and complacent nation – which has forgotten the role of luck in life. It was once the mark of the national character that we were laconic and resilient people. London highlights that we may have become a braggart nation that can’t always walk the walk. (Southphommasane, The Age, 13/08/12b)
Similarly, Cooper and Butt (2012) considered:

Which is worse – Olympic defeat to Britain or New Zealand? Australians like to say we punch above our weight at the Olympics, but even taking population into account won’t mask an underwhelming medal tally at the London Games. (*The Age*, 14/08/12)

Indeed, Wilson (2012) went as far to suggest that London had ‘knocked Sydney off its pedestal as the best host of a modern Olympic Games’ adding, ‘as awful as it is to admit, London 2012 was bigger, slicker, almost as friendly and more thoughtfully planned than Sydney in terms of the legacy it will leave the host city’ (*The Australian*, 13/08/12).  

To this extent, comparisons with the former British motherland reflected the hierarchical organization of the former colonial period (Trovao, 2012). Cole (2001) has examined how colonial memories often draw upon the ‘tensions and contradictions’, within former colonial territories (2001: 281). In the case of Australia, however, such tensions and contradictions sought to reveal a sense of inferiority towards Britain, especially when compared to both the Canadian and New Zealand coverage. The inability to freely choose its own head of state (Southphommasane, 2012a) as well as concerns relating to that fact that Britain had beaten Australia both in the medal tally (Cooper and Butt, 2012) and its hosting of the games (Hinds, 2012), all served to underline a sense of Australian inadequacy and anxiety within the press. Accordingly, despite Australia’s independence, the Australian press’ construction of Britain was forged in relation to Australia’s historical location within a wider British imperial/Commonwealth figuration.

### 5.2.3. Scotland: the challenging outsider

While previous chapters have explored how national identity could serve as a form of distinction and resistance to British imperialism (Darian-Smith et al., 2007), the above examples suggest that constructions of Britain, within the Commonwealth press, were dependent upon a residual understanding and contested appreciation of Britain’s imperial history. Indeed, for Scotland, both the Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games provided a context in which old alliances could be questioned and

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17 Equally, London’s attempts to help rejuvenate the Stratford area, was also heralded in reports within the South Korean media (Mangan et al., 2013).

18 See chapter two, sections 2.3., 2.3.1. and chapter three, section 3.0.
identities debated. In fact, whereas Boyle and Haynes (2012) noted that the Olympic Games ‘revealed a temporary suspension in the pressing debate on Scottish independence, with hegemonic Britishness and the symbolic flying of the Union Jack more in evident across the UK than had been witnessed in recent decades’ (2014: 91), within the Scottish press, questions on ‘the current mood of Scotland and Britain’ (Hassan, The Scotsman, 02/06/12) formed an important part of the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic coverage.

Accordingly, while the games represented ‘an astounding success story for Scottish and British sport’ (Spiers, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12), Spiers (2012) noted that:

there is currently a complex cultural and political game being played out between these Olympics, Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond, and the theme of 2014 and Scottish independence (Sunday Herald, 12/08/12)

In particular, Spier’s (2012) comments can be read alongside wider concerns regarding the disillusionment and lack of confidence in the central Westminster government. Porter (2014) added that:

To sympathise with the Scottish independence movement, yet at the same time ardently hope that the UK remains intact is an odd position to take, but there is some consistency if you look at Westminster’s political decline … I’m not the only one who has lost faith in Westminster, and that can be felt just as keenly in London as in Edinburgh. (2014 [italics added])

However, the sense that ‘Scotland’ could leave the Union with Britain was echoed in Hassan’s (2012) remarks on the need ‘to junk the stories of decline and disappointment, and find a new northern song’ (The Scotsman, 02/06/12). Correspondingly, others were clear to point out Scotland’s increasing disillusionment with the Union. Cowing (2012) noted:

But many Scots have been left unmoved by such overt Union-pushing marketing. With discussions about independence and the Union at a critical time, the Union flag has become a symbol that many Scots not only reject, but associate with negative sentiments (The Scotsman, 03/06/12)

Instead, ‘in 21st century Scotland, the Union flag has acquired a political significance that robs it of its traditional power as a unifying symbol’ (Herald, 02/06/12a).

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Similarly, Hamilton (2012) noted:

The sense of cohesion and co-operation which ‘Team GB’ exudes is all about parity of esteem and harnessing individual ambition towards a common goal. I can’t think of a better description of precisely what an independent Scotland would be seeking to achieve. (The Scotsman, 05/08/12)

Accordingly, in each of the above examples, attempts were clearly made within the Scottish press to highlight Scotland’s growing separation from the British state. Indeed, such disillusionment with the Westminster system may reflect broader processes of functional democratization; in which the granting of devolved legislature and executive powers across the UK have led to greater insecurity and anxiety regarding a coherently stable British identity and culture. However, closer examination of the above examples revealed an underlying shift in how the British state was being perceived, that is, primarily as an entity that was unrepresentative of Scottish interests (Macwhirter, 2012).

Consequently, despite the Opening Ceremony’s rather positive portrayal of Britain, it was clear that the Britain being performed ‘bore little relation to the social reality of the UK under the Coalition’ (Macwhirter, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12). In fact, for Macwhirter (2012), the myths surrounding Boyle’s Britain had a far more unfavorable effect:

And though Danny Boyle’s Britain is a myth, it remains a potent one. It was what persuaded Scots to meekly hand over Scotland’s oil to the British state, in a gesture of almost wilful altruism, in the 1960s and 1970s. (Sunday Herald, 12/08/12)

Notably, Macwhirter’s (2012) remarks did not reflect any apparent longing for the past (Boym, 2001) but instead revealed an implicit criticism of the ‘British myth’ and its effects upon Scottish national sovereignty. More specifically, Macwhirter’s (2012) comments elucidate upon what Hassan (2013b) has referred to as a change in ‘the way the British state and government is seen in Scotland’ (2013b). Whereas, Hassan (2013b) makes the distinction that in the past referring to the British state ‘marked

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20 There are varying forms of and definitions attributed to the term ‘Westminster System’ (Rhodes, Wanna and Weller, 2009; Rhodes and Weller, 2005). In this instance it is used to refer to the executive power, which is currently held by the Queen Elizabeth, the British government and the devolved national authorities.

you as a dangerous left-wing nationalist’, today, ‘it has entered wider popular usage and behind this lies a shift in how it is understood’ (2013b).22 Here:

The British state has come to be seen increasingly as a problem for Scotland: in how it governs for a small elite and an unrepresentative corner of the UK in a way which harms Scotland’s national interests (along with a majority of the people of the UK). (Hassan, 2013b)23

In fact, in comparison with the Scottish coverage, English press reports revealed a distinct lack of opinion on Scotland, Scottish society and the forthcoming Scottish Independence Referendum.24 This stood in contrast to Scottish reports, which actively sought to frame both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Ceremonies in light of the forthcoming Scottish Independence Referendum.

As a result, for the Scottish press, both the Jubilee and the London Olympic Games provided a wider context in which Scottish interests in the Union could be debated. Barnes (2012) argued that:

This extraordinary political backdrop to the Games in London has been a running thread over the last two remarkable weeks of spectacle and drama. From the singing of the Flower of Scotland in the opening ceremony, to the sight of Edinburgh’s Sir Chris Hoy leading out Great Britain’s competitors, to the spectacle of Dunblane’s Andy Murray highfiving London’s Laura Robinson in the mixed-doubles tennis, and Glaswegian rower Kath Grainger hugging Sir Steve Redgrave after finally winning Olympic gold, the images have placed the question of Scotland’s status in the United Kingdom far more graphically than any politician’s speech. (The Scotsman [pullout], 12/08/12)

Indeed, while the London Olympics provided a ‘political legacy’ for Scottish involvement in the Union, it also proved ‘to be a watershed moment in the complex debate about national identity that lies at the heart of Scotland’s independence referendum’ (Scotland on Sunday, 29/07/12). As a result, despite the Opening Ceremony’s theatrical portrayal of ‘Great Britain’, MacDonald (2012b) argued that

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24 Certainly, while Scotland’s decision to vote on independence in 2014 would affect both Northern Ireland and Wales, the general trend within the English coverage was to ignore England’s relations with the home nations. Accordingly, while other examples have highlighted Northern Irish concerns regarding the Queen (Curran, 2012) as well as the tensions that arise between England and its Celtic partners (Morgan, 2012; Spiers, 2012), within the English press, attention focused primarily on those non-English athletes who failed to participate in singing the national anthem.
‘Scotland and Great Britain still have questions to address that cannot be answered by an opening ceremony, however brilliant and barmy’ (Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b).

Indeed, the distinct lack of attention towards Scotland and the Scottish Independence Referendum by the English press, shares in Craig’s (2011) analysis of Anglo-Scottish relations. Craig (2011) notes that:

the Scots’ view of England and the English are complex and vary enormously. The range of views testifies to one important fact about the Scots – England matters very much to them. Yet Scotland barely registers on the English horizon. (2011: 282 [italics added])

With this in mind, it is possible to observe how the Scottish press formed part of a wider British figuration of established-outsider relations. Indeed, Mennell (2007) notes that, ‘a general characteristic of established-outsider relations [is] that the outsiders “understand” the established better than the established do the outsiders’ (2007: 312). As a result, comparisons between the Scottish and English press revealed that Scottish reports provided a far more detailed assessment of the differences between Scotland and England. Notably, such detail was absent within the English coverage. That is, the English press, failed to elucidate as well as provide any informed discussion on the differences between England and Scotland. Indeed, one particular difference that was highlighted within the Scottish press was in its celebrations of the Olympic Games and the British monarchy. The Herald (2012b) noted that:

Many Scots have succumbed to Olympic fever only belatedly. In the years following the 2005 announcement, there was much carping over the escalating scale of taxpayer support for an event from which Scotland had seemingly little to gain, especially as it was conceived in an era of prosperity but delivered amidst mounting austerity. The somewhat restrained Scottish response to the royal Diamond Jubilee celebrations prompted suggestions that attitudes north of the Border to emphatically British events might have been tempered by the debate about independence. Would the same apply to London 2012? (28/07/12b)

Consequently, whereas ‘the lack of interest’ in the Jubilee was seen to represent Scotland’s disillusionment and loosening attachment with the British monarchy (McNulty, The Scotsman, 02/06/12), it was also seen as a particularly ‘Scottish’ way of celebrating. This stood in contrast to England, where Fry (2012) noted that:

if the Scots do not show their attachment to the Queen in the same way as the
English show theirs, then somehow the Scots are wrong – even though recent opinion polls demonstrate that the level of support for the monarchy is roughly the same in both countries, at about three quarters of those asked. *(The Scotsman, 05/06/12)*

Consequently, instead of denouncing the British monarchy, it became evident that the Scottish press constructed a distinctively Scottish, and, more importantly, non-English, form of royal celebration.

Elsewhere, Craig (2011) has examined the differences between Scottishness and Englishness, noting that Scottish identity and character is often juxtaposed against the English via the statement: ‘*The Scots are not English*’ (2011: 266 [italics in original]). Here, she argues that:

No matter what happens it is still there. And the very fact that it is always there has helped the Scots resist some of the pressures of continual Anglicisation and assimilation, and ensured the continuation of a strong *Scottish* sense of self. So if we were trying to chart why Scottish identity since 1707 has been robust and resilient, the sense of ‘not being English’ is our first port of call. *(Craig, 2011: 266 [italics in original]*)

Accordingly, such sentiments were clearly uncovered by Fry (2012), who in comments regarding the British monarchy, noted that ‘Scotland’s relationship is simply not conducted on the same terms as England’s relationship with the monarchy’ *(The Scotsman, 05/06/12)*. This was, as Fry (2012) explains, a historically typical response to the British monarchy in Scotland:

the subdued attitude to royalty in Scotland is an old one rather than a new one. I can trace it back at least to the beginning of the 19th century, when Britain was embroiled in one of the earliest of its world wars, the fight to the death with Napoleon Bonaparte. Again, certain keen observers among the English detected that the Scots were not quite with them. Then too, it was less a matter of any real sympathy with the French, whose failure to give effective help to the rebellions of the 18th century had convinced even Jacobites that they were just too shifty, and never again to be trusted. Somehow, all the same, the Scots were not true-blue enough. *(The Scotsman, 05/06/12)*

Evidently, Fry’s (2012) comments served to draw upon the fact that Scottish indifference to the monarchy had formed part of Scotland’s ‘robust and resilient’ history of maintaining a Scottish *attitude* to the royal family *(Craig, 2011: 266)*. Indeed, Fry (2012) added that:

In a nutshell, the answer to the charges of deficient devotion must then be that
Scotland does not always do things in the same way as England does them, something which we all ought to have known already. We might have hoped, in these days of devolution, that the idea had got around of Scotland being allowed to do some things in its own way. (*The Scotsman*, 05/06/12)

In such instances, it was evident that discussions pertaining to the British monarchy were a signification of the differences between Scotland and England as well as the cultural and political tensions that underlie British events (Cowing, 2012). As a result, Fry’s (2012) reference to devolution suggested that such differences, and, indeed, Scotland’s ability ‘to do some things in its own way’ should not only be permitted but also acknowledged by its English neighbours (Fry, *The Scotsman*, 05/06/12).

Consequently, contrary to revealing a complete disavowal and (dis)attachment with the Jubilee, the Scottish press sought to define Scotland’s location within a wider British collective by demarcating its own ‘Scottish’ relationship with the monarchy, a relationship that stood in contrast to England’s. Here, Scottish differences were perceived as traditional and long-standing. As a result, in comments relating to the 2002 Golden Jubilee, Randall (2012) suggested that:

> But there is another reason why the Golden Jubilee was marked in a different way…This has less to do with any political antipathy to the institution than to the type of people that we are. Scots as a whole tend to be more reserved and less demonstrative on occasions of this sort…Such plainness is not necessarily a lack of enthusiasm, but, on the contrary, evidence of a wish to be direct and true in our public gestures. For us, less is more. (*The Scotsman*, 02/06/12)

Therefore, while Scottish reports served to highlight how analyses of Scotland are often measured by ‘the usual assumption of the dominant nation in the United Kingdom’ (Fry, *The Scotsman*, 05/06/12) – i.e. England – the above examples reveal how outsider groups can draw upon their outsider identification as a way of negotiating or resisting established groups. In fact, in interviews conducted with Scottish respondents, Whigham (2012) noted that the presence of an ‘underdog mentality’ within Scotland was often ‘portrayed as a positive quality, with emphasis on the common bond felt with other nations who were felt to possess similar positions within global society’ (2012: 12). In such instances, Scotland’s ‘underdog mentality’ or ‘outsider status’, *vis-à-vis* England, was not ignored but was instead used to discursively construct Scotland in contrast to those ‘south of the border’ (Cowing, *The Scotsman*, 03/06/12; see also Rojek, 2007: 158).
Accordingly, while Scotland’s outsider image formed an important part of its self-identification, this process was predicated on its location within a wider British domestic figuration. That is, within the context of celebrating the British monarch the Scottish coverage discursively worked as a form of resistance to, and, separation from, its established English neighbour. While certain reports served to highlight Scotland’s growing separation from the British state (Hassan, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012), the differences between Scotland and England (Herald, 2012a; 2012b; Randall, 2012), were based upon, and, framed by, Scotland’s position as a distinct and separate ‘outsider’ nation within Britain (Fry, 2012; Hassan, 2012). Indeed, such discourses do not occur independently but are forged in relation to wider figurational dynamics and established discourses. With this in mind, the following section will explore how tensions between the British home nations were portrayed within the British press.

5.2.4. British tensions: marginalisation, stigmatisation and where is Northern Ireland?

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that the Scottish press was well attuned to dominant perceptions of Britain and the differences between themselves and England. In addition, examples of marginalisation were frequently noted. In regards to the success of Team GB, anger towards the marginalisation of Scotland’s contribution to Team GB’s victory over New Zealand in the Hockey was clearly evoked by McCall (2012):

The British Olympic Association might have heralded this victory over New Zealand with a press release entitled ‘England women on their way’ but Scots Kim Little and Ifeoma Dieke were both central to a gritty display in the opening event of the 2012 Games at Cardiff’s Millennium Stadium. (Herald, 26/07/12)

Indeed, concerns regarding Scottish marginalisation are highlighted by Craig (2011), who compares the effects of Scotland’s relationship with England to that of a marriage.25 She notes:

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25 In fact, in light of Scottish and English relations, the marriage metaphor has often been used to describe Scottish contentions towards its established English neighbours (Craig, 2011; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Drawing upon their interviews with Scottish MP’s and the Scottish author, Irvin Welsh, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) highlight how representations of England and Scotland are often presented as ‘partners in a marriage’ whereby ‘the marriage is unhealthy and abusive, and what is more, the abused partner is psychologically trapped into the relationship’ (2001: 98). Elsewhere,
Women’s experience of marginalisation is similar to the daily experience of many Scots. This helps to explain the Scots’ greater sensitivity about terminology on the BBC or other English-dominated media. When ‘England’ is used instead of ‘Britain’ many Scots intuitively know it symbolises Scotland’s marginal status; her role as ‘inessential Other’. (Craig, 2011: 275)

In accordance with debates surrounding the Scottish Independence Referendum, anger towards Westminster’s alienation of Scottish aspirations echo Craig’s (2011) analysis of Scotland as the ‘inessential Other’ (2011: 275). Indeed, Cowley (2014) notes that:

For far too long, the Westminster establishment has been complacent about Scotland and the aspirations of the Scottish people. It’s as if they misunderstood or hadn’t bothered even seriously to think about why so many Scots were restless for change. Or why so many Scots felt alienated from the globalised quasi-city state that is London and from the Westminster jamboree. (2014)26

To this extent, McCall’s (2012) remarks served to highlight how Scottish success during the Olympics mirrored Scottish grievances regarding its lack of sovereignty in issues related to the British state (Macwhirter, 2012). Similar forms of marginalisation were also reported within the Belfast Telegraph, which served to draw attention to Northern Ireland’s lack of representation in the ‘Team GB’ name. Poole (2012) noted that ‘there have been calls recently to have the Team GB name changed to Team UK, as it does not reflect Northern Ireland athletes’ presence’ (Belfast Telegraph, 06/08/12). In the face of such exclusion, Wathan’s (2012) remarks sought to ensure that Wales’s contribution to the hosting of the Olympics was duly noted:

Still, Wales did its bit and played its part in history. The record books will forever state that the 2012 Games began in Wales and the Olympics can be added to a list that already boasts the Rugby World Cup, FA Cup, Ryder Cup and the Ashes in recent years alone. (Western Mail, 26/07/12)

Evidently, the marginalisation of Britain’s Celtic periphery served to highlight how particular tensions can emerge in constructions of the multi-national British state. Indeed, as highlighted in Poole’s (2012) remarks, these tensions could also be found in the marketing of ‘Team GB’. In fact, elsewhere, Bradley (2008) notes that at various airports across the UK, it is ‘English’ goods, ranging from ‘policeman’s

Colley (2014a) draws upon the Seamus Heaney poem ‘Act of Union’, where the Union between Britain and Ireland in 1801 ‘becomes a rape, perpetrated by an imperially male Britain upon a female Ireland who turns her back in pain and revulsion’ (2014a: 96).

helmets and models of London taxis’, that can be seen on the shelves of ‘Glorious Britain’ shops (2008: 49). Noticeably absent from such stores are ‘any Saltires, Welsh Dragon or St. Patrick’s flags’ (Bradley, 2007: 49).

Consequently, by taking the above into consideration it is evident that the marginalisation of the home nations within the UK is often at the behest of a tendency to either ignore the home nations altogether (McCall, 2012; Poole, 2012) or to represent Britain in solely English ways (Bradley, 2007). Accordingly, while previous sections have highlighted how representations of England tended to underlie constructions of Britain, it is possible to locate these examples of marginalisation as characteristic of broader established-outside relations (Bucholc, 2013; Elias and Scotson, 1994; Lake, 2013; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987). Here, ‘exclusion and stigmatization are powerful weapons for maintaining identity, asserting superiority, and for keeping others subordinate’ (Loyal, 2011: 191). More importantly, when confronted with changes in the relationship between established-outsider groups, established groups will often resort to particular measures in order to secure and reinstate their established status (Atkinson, 2003). In such instances, appropriate ‘established’ practices and forms of conduct serve to reinforce the outsider’s marginalisation, a process that maintains the interests of the established group, and, which consequently, helps to sustain the wider figuration (Elias and Scotson, 1994; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987).

Subsequently, in accordance with the aforementioned examples of marginalisation (McCall, 2012; Poole, 2012), overt displays of Scottish and Welsh nationalism served to follow a particular pattern of derision within the English press. Moss (2012) highlighted that during Andy Murray’s gold medal win in the Men’s

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27 The website for ‘Glorious Britain’ notes that ‘Glorious Britain is the UK’s premier gift and souvenir retailer and we are pleased to bring many of our customers’ favourite products together for you to buy online. Our award-winning airport stores serve thousands of customers every month with our wide range of quirky souvenirs and essentially British gifts and souvenirs’ (see Glorious Britain ‘About Us’ https://www.gloriousbritain.co.uk/staticpage.aspx?spageid=101472).
28 See section 5.2.1.
29 Elsewhere, Mennell (2007) has noted how changes in the relationship between established-outsider groups can elucidate upon how both groups perceive themselves and others.
30 Attempts to maintain the current British state and discourage Scots from voting ‘Yes’ in the forthcoming Independence Referendum were bolstered by declarations from the British Chancellor, George Osborne, that an independent Scotland would not be able to join a currency union with Britain. The prospect of an independent Scotland, financially marginalised from the rest of the UK was, as Freedland (2014b) highlights, ‘an attempt to scare Scots into rejecting independence’ (2014: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/scottish-independence, retrieved: 30 March 2014).
single tennis, ‘Murray Mount was a sea of union flags, and there was hardly a saltire in sight – this has been a tricky week for Alex Salmond, with a vibrant new Britishness born before our eyes’ (Guardian, 06/08/12). Elsewhere, the Daily Mail (2012d) noted that:

Our sporting heroes, who wrapped themselves so passionately in the Union Flag, came from England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – silencing the nationalists and proving irrefutably that we are stronger united. (13/08/12 [italics added])

Here, the Daily Mail (2012d) follows a similar trend to that seen in British media reporting of Northern Ireland (Billig, 1995). Indeed, while Britain’s sporting success was believed to have silenced ‘the nationalists’ (Daily Mail, 13/08/12), Billig (1995) notes that:

In describing political events in Northern Ireland, the British media typically use the term ‘nationalist’ to describe those who seek to abolish the border between the United Kingdom and Eire, especially if they advocate violence in the pursuit of these aims. (1995: 48)

Accordingly, while the use of the term ‘nationalist’ was clearly used as a source of derision for those who wanted the break-up of Britain, Sanbrook (2012) noted that ‘once an eccentric sideshow, Scottish and Welsh nationalism have been growing in confidence since the early Seventies’ (Daily Mail, 02/06/12 [italics added]). Noticeably, Sandbrook’s (2012) comments seek to portray both Scottish and Welsh nationalism as in some way different, even, ‘mad’ (‘eccentric slideshow’). In doing so, he discursively marginalises both nationalisms as a peculiarity, and, in the process, undermines their legitimacy.31 In other instances, attempts by Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, to garner support for Scottish Independence were openly criticised by the English press.32 In one example Parsons (2012c) argued that ‘Alex Salmond no longer looked like the cat who got the fried Mars bar’ (Daily Mirror,
Indeed, closer examination of these examples can reveal how examples of ironic humour and condensation were used by Sandbrook (2012) and Parsons (2012) in their framing of British home nation nationalism and Scotland’s First Minister. Indeed, Tyler (2008) has explored how ‘laughter’ or the use of certain phrases to induce comedy ‘is always shared’ and based upon an ‘other’ which sits as the ‘object of comedy’ (2008: 23). Consequently, ‘In the case of laughter at those of a lower class’, Tyler (2008) notes that laughter can be ‘boundary-forming’, that is, ‘It creates a distance between “them” and “us,” asserting moral judgments and a superior class position’ (2008: 23). When considered through an established-outsider lens, however, it is possible to apply Tyler’s (2008) analysis to the stigmatisation that underlies both Sandbrook’s (2012) ‘eccentric slideshow’ (Daily Mail, 02/06/12) and Parson’s (2012) ‘fried Mars bar’ remarks (Daily Mirror, 11/08/12). In each instance, Sandbrook (2012) and Parsons (2012) create a distance between “them” and “us” (Tyler, 2008: 23), by using their descriptions of Scottish and Welsh nationalism and Alex Salmond as a discursive attempt to assert English authority. Indeed, examples of stigmatisation and marginalisation were also evident within English coverage of Team GB’s Scottish and Welsh athletes.

Accordingly, Platell (2012) sought to openly deride those Scottish and Welsh athletes who failed to sing the British national anthem, ‘God Save the Queen’. Platell (2012) argued:

two of Team GB’s women footballers, Kim Little and Ifeoma Dieke, refused to sing the National Anthem because they are Scottish. They were playing in the very first event in the 2012 games – the greatest sporting occasion many of

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33 A deep-fried Mars Bar involves the frying of a chocolate bar in batter. Originally the item was believed to have originated in Scotland and has since become a signifier of Scotland’s unhealthy eating habits. As can be seen from Parsons (2012) remarks, it has also become a source of negative cultural appropriation for Scotland as a whole. The item has since become a novelty dish in Scotland (Brocklehurst, 2012).

34 Acting as a ‘musical sign of the UK’s asymmetric constitution’ (Withers, 2012) the use of ‘God Save the Queen’ is the official national anthem of all four of the British home nations. Incidentally, the song is also shared by New Zealand (which has two national anthems) as well as acting as the Royal Anthem of Australia and Canada. Despite this, within the UK during political, national and sporting events Scotland (‘Flower of Scotland’) and Wales (‘Land of my Fathers’ [Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau]) often choose to sing their own national songs, a distinction, which was reflected in the Opening Ceremony. In Northern Ireland the official national anthem is ‘God Save the Queen’, apart from the Commonwealth Games, where the lyrics for ‘Danny Boy’ are set against the tune for ‘Londonderry Air’ (Bairner, 2001). Officially, England has no associated national anthem, despite the Opening Ceremony playing ‘Jerusalem’ as England’s national song.
us will ever witness in our country. Frankly, this mean-spiritedness was not just disgraceful but a national embarrassment. (*Daily Mail*, 28/07/12)

The *Daily Mail* (2012c) added:

> What a pity that a small minority of Scottish and Welsh athletes, while prepared to play under the banner of team GB, have so sourly refused to sing the national anthem – cheap, parochial point-scoring that is the very antithesis of the Olympic spirit. (28/07/12c)

Indeed, the lack of respect Welsh athletes afforded the ‘Olympic spirit’ was seen to be particularly enraging for Kelly (2012), who noted:

> The sight of Welsh players standing there tight-lipped as the camera panned along the line of the British football team at Old Trafford on Thursday night was embarrassing. It was rude, dispiriting and out of keeping with the Olympian spirit. This is a quite simple scenario. If you’re British enough to wear the Team GB badge and represent Britain at the Olympic Games then you should be British enough to sing the National Anthem. That just happens to be God Save The Queen. So sing it. (*Daily Mail*, 28/07/12)

This was echoed by the British Olympic Association, who according to Faulkner, Madeley and Eccles (2012), were said to be ‘furious’ about Little’s decision not to sing the anthem. Faulkner et al. (2012) added that ‘a spokesman for the association – which has previously stated that all athletes should learn the National Anthem – gave a terse statement saying it was Miss Little’s choice whether or not to sing but that all British athletes should ‘show respect’’. (*Daily Mail*, 27/07/12).

Certainly, tensions regarding the British national anthem remain a contentious issue within sporting competitions where the British home nations compete as a united British team (Holt, 2012; Tongue, 2012). The singing of national anthems has been widely acknowledged as an important part of engineering national pride and identity (Billig, 1995; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Zuev and Virchow, 2014). However, despite reports on the lack of passion presented by English footballers during international events, most noticeably, the lack of singing by England striker Wayne Rooney (Kelly, 2012), Scottish and Welsh objections proved particularly enraging for the English press. To such an extent, English derisions of the ‘cheap, parochial point-scoring’ (*Daily Mail*, 28/07/12c) and ‘mean-spiritedness’ (Platell, *Daily Mail*, 28/07/12) which were displayed by the athletes was perceived as a national ‘embarrassment’ (*Daily Mail*, 28/07/12), indeed, the ‘very antithesis of the Olympic spirit’ (*Daily Mail*, 28/07/12c). Ultimately, such reports revealed a
particular inability to identify and engage with the national identities and national objections of Team GB’s Scottish and Welsh athletes (Abell et al. 2006).

Evidently, the English press sought to actively construct a normative code of Britishness in which the singing of the national anthem played an important part in ‘performing’ Britishness (Bhabha, 1994). However, this was not the same for all Scottish athletes, in particular, the Scottish born, Team GB Gold medalist, Andy Murray. The ranked British No. 1 tennis player beat Rodger Federer in the final of the Men’s singles becoming the first British men’s single champion since 1908.35 Despite Murray’s success, his identity has often been commented upon within the English media, with some suggestions that comments by the player have been ‘anti-English’ (BBC, 2006; Mott, 2012; Parsons, 2008).

Consequently, while Peck (2012) was clear to point out ‘the man has occasionally had a difficult relationship with the English, mainly because his words have been misrepresented’ (The Independent, 06/08/12), his efforts to sing the national anthem during the medal ceremony provided a stark contrast to the coverage surrounding the Welsh and Scottish athletes who refrained from singing (Daily Mail, 2012c; Platell, 2012). Instead, Peck (2012) noted that ‘when the medal was placed round his neck and the national anthem played. … His lips at least moved in pattern with the words of “God Save the Queen” (The Independent, 06/08/12). In addition, Harris (2012b) noted that ‘he even had a stab at mouthing the national anthem – and willingly draped himself in a Union Flag after being presented with his first Olympic gong’ (Daily Mail, 06/08/12b). In such instances, Murray’s construction within the English press was negotiated in accordance with his ability to display those normative codes, which were believed to help signify his ‘Britishness’.

Indeed, these examples expose how the ‘socio-dynamics of stigmatisation’ (Sutton and Vertigans, 2002: 64) are embedded in newspaper discourses. Here, encoded messages and established cultural codes seek to define appropriate forms of British identification. However, while such codes can serve to stigmatise and degrade ‘outsider’ individuals/groups who do not conform to established practices, they can also reveal how such constructions are not fixed but instead are subject to processes of change and negotiation (Engh et al., 2014; Loyal, 2011). As a result, once Murray’s actions were eventually perceived as aligning with the established status quo, his

35 Incidentally, Federer had also beaten Murray in the Wimbledon final in the previous month.
rather unfavourable media image was noticeably reconstructed (Harris, 2012b; Peck, 2012; Mitchell, 2012; see also Addley, 2014). Murray’s performance highlighted how ‘Murray went in as the underdog and emerged as the victor, and there’s nothing a British crowd likes better than that’ (Harris, Daily Mail, 06/08/12b). Similarly, Mitchell (2012) noted that ‘the mutual affection has grown since he wept openly on Centre Court at Wimbledon after losing with grit and style to Roger Federer in the men’s final. How typically British is that?’ (Guardian, 05/08/12). Rather than being portrayed as an outsider to Britain, Murray’s outsider (re)construction was negotiated within the English press coverage to the extent that Murray’s underdog image was constructed as being ‘typically British’. In doing so, Murray’s Scottishness was ignored, and, as a consequence, his Britishness was highlighted. In this instance, Murray was reframed with regards to established British practices, such as singing the national anthem, a narrative that allied with the established English press. Indeed, ‘this illustrates how established-outsider relations are under constant negotiation and change’ (Engh et al., 2014: 793).

5.2.5. ‘Getting it wrong’: Scottish apprehensions and the fear of failure

In commenting upon the relationship between established-outsider groups, Mennell (2007) highlights that the relationship is often characterised by a sense of ambivalence, which is forged upon a ‘sense of inferiority and superiority to “the others”’ (Mennell, 2007: 44). In fact, in their analysis of women who had suffered from domestic abuse, Van Stolk and Wouters (1987) found that despite changes in the balance of power between the sexes, one interviewee seemed ‘poised between resignation and resistance, between submission and emancipation’ (1987: 479). In reference to the same study, Mennell (2007) notes that the women’s relationship with their husbands was ‘highly ambivalent’, adding that:

in part, the women’s conscience still took the husband’s side, and his view remained embedded in her personality; that was why they were ‘torn two ways’, and typically returned at least once to their husbands. (2010: 313 [italics in original])

Accordingly, while attempts were made to clearly identify Scottish differences within

36 Similarly, the reflections of how the English press ‘loves a trier’ have also been noted in analysis of the English cricketer, Freddy Flintoff (Malcolm, 2012).
the Scottish coverage (Fry, 2012; Hassan, 2012), the feeling of being ‘torn two ways’, that is, between Scotland’s ‘British’ history and an independent ‘Scottish’ future, were conveyed. This could be seen in *The Scotsman* (2012b), which debated the symbolism of the British monarchy in an independent Scotland:

In the debate about Scottish independence, the issue about whether the Queen would remain head of state if Scotland secedes is likely to be a key issue. In discussing a post-independence Scotland, the British monarchy is either a symbol of a country starting with a clean slate and ending centuries of shared history, or a symbol of enduring relationships between the British nations (03/06/12b)

In fact, Delaney (2014) has argued that ‘understanding the relationship between identity and risk, … is key to understanding how citizens engage with and indeed determine constitutional change’ (2014). Consequently, analyses of the Scottish press revealed a multitude of anxieties and apprehensions regarding the possibility of an independent future. Indeed, MacDonald (2012b) noted that:

The odd, daft Tory was predictably upset but there may be just some genuine concern for Alex Salmond. The biggest political theme for the Caledonian observer was not the promotion of healthcare for all or inclusion for everyone. It was the idea that Britain is an entity and one that is bigger and better when all its parts are joined together. This, of course, is not the script for Salmond’s blockbuster that is due to premiere in the autumn of 2014. Before that, Glasgow hosts the Commonwealth Games and it will be intriguing to see how political parties use that event to further arguments. (*Sunday Herald*, 29/07/12b)

In accordance with suggestions that Britain was ‘bigger and better when all its parts are joined together’ (MacDonald, *Sunday Herald*, 29/07/12b), reports within the Scottish coverage revealed that the possibility of voting on Scottish independence alighted with Scottish fears of ‘getting it wrong’ (Craig, 2011: 288). Indeed, Macwhirter (2012) noted:

Becoming independent requires immense self-confidence and a willingness to draw attention to yourself – qualities that timid and self-doubting Scots lack. You have to stand alone, exposed in the world, for what you really are. (*Sunday Herald*, 12/08/12)

Accordingly, whilst Williamson (2009) notes that it is a ‘politics of identity and self-confidence’ which are ‘central to any project in Scotland that seeks to increase and strengthen democracy to the point of self-government and independent statehood’ (2009: 66), the above examples present a far different picture. Here, uncertainties
surrounding whom exactly the Scottish were, served to underline the risks enveloped in Scottish independence. The *Sunday Herald* (2012) asked:

> Who are the Scots? Would independence weaken our sense of Britishness – and does that matter anyway? Do we risk alienating our neighbours by going it alone, or would our relationships with England, Europe and the rest of the world actually be enhanced? Do non-native Scots care whether a 300-year-old wrong is righted … and what role should history play in a decision that affects our future? (05/08/12)

Consequently, while emotional attachments to Britain served to question the independence vote, highlighting the sense of unity felt across Britain during the Diamond Jubilee (Barnes, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012), with regards to the Opening Ceremony, Macwhirter (2012) remarked:

> I’m not saying sport will determine, or even greatly influence, the outcome of the independence referendum in 2014. However, it would be foolish to dismiss the Olympic effect. Even I felt a sense of emotional solidarity with the multi-talented and multicultural UK team. (*Sunday Herald*, 12/08/12)

As a result, Scottish ambivalences towards Britain were clearly portrayed after the success of Team GB, and, more specifically, the Opening Ceremony. Indeed, for Macwhirter (2012):

> the Danny Boyle pageant of British history, The Isle of Wonder, brought a tear to my cynical eye, as it did to most people’s. Boyle’s opening ceremony did more for the Unionist cause than all of Gordon Brown’s and Alistair Darling’s speeches put together. (*Sunday Herald*, 12/08/12)

In fact, Kidd (2012) has argued that ‘it is Salmond himself who has made the most compelling case for union’ (2012: 9). In a Hugo Young lecture delivered by Salmond in January 2012, Salmond argued that:

> when you consider our shared economic interests, our cultural ties, our many friendships and family relationships, one thing becomes clear. After Scotland becomes independent, we will share more than a monarchy and a currency. We will share a social union. (2012 also cited in Kidd, 2012: 9)\(^{37}\)

Instead the sense ‘that Scotland and England should be on an irrevocable path to

separation were weakened by a display which demonstrated the value placed in UK institutions such as the NHS, the love of a shared culture and a team led into the Olympics stadium by a Scottish athlete’ (Barnes, The Scotsman, 29/07/12). As a result, the sharing of a Scottish-British ‘social union’ (Salmond, 2012) was vividly framed by the Guardian’s Jonathan Freedland (2012c), who stated that, ‘Alex Salmond cannot easily claim the union has lost its emotional pull, not after he’s seen the ease with which so many Britons, including Scots, draped themselves in its once terminally unfashionable colours’ (11/08/12c).38

Conclusion

It has been the intention of this chapter to locate constructions of Britain and British identity alongside wider changes in the post-devolution British state. Here, attention has been paid to relations between the British home nations, in particular England and Scotland, as well as the former dominions. Furthermore, in order to explore how the press’ construction of Britain reflected particular tensions and changing power relations between an ‘established’ England and an ‘outsider’ home nation and Commonwealth periphery, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework was used. This helped to elicit the following results.

First, the findings examined how interpretations of British history were used to frame Britain within the British and Commonwealth press. One consequence of this was the ability to see how discourses regarding Britain drew upon Britain’s contemporary decline and low self-esteem (Baum, 2012; Hayward, 2012; Norman, 2012; Paxman, 2012; Richards, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012; The Weekend Australian, 2012). Coupled with the possible disintegration of the British state, deeper uncertainties regarding the British sense of self were debated (Toynbee, 2012b). Yet, despite such uncertainties, the predominance of a particularly ‘English’ representation of Britain was found to form an important part of the English and Commonwealth press’ discourse. Here, the representation of a pastoral, rural ‘England’ during the Olympic Opening Ceremony (Hardman, 2012) and references to the British ‘stiff upper lip’ (Freedland, 2012a; Goring, 2012; Smith, 2012, Walker, 2012; Lette, 2012) could be identified. In both instances, such examples served to represent England’s cultural dominance over the other home nations, a dominance

that could be identified by the fact that popular constructions of the ‘English’
countryside, the civilized ‘English’ gentleman and the imperial hegemony of England,
continued to be used as representative signifiers of the wider British state (Hardman,
2012; Holt, 2012; New Zealand Herald, 2012). Similarly, references to Britain’s
imperial history and memories of its imperial past were routinely highlighted in
accounts of the post-imperial decline of Britain as well as in efforts to draw upon
Britain’s imperial supremacy in order to evoke feelings of national pride and prestige
Interwoven with representations of ‘England’s’ established status, these discourses
served to reveal how the hosting of royal events were perceived as reflecting a fantasy
image of British imperial power (McNulty, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a).

Second, within the Commonwealth press, constructions of Britain were
predicated on its imperial history as well as discussions regarding the relevance of the
Commonwealth for each nation (Arthur, 2012; Milne, 2012; Rothwell, 2012; Watkins,
2012). Comparisons with Britain provided an opportunity for each nation to evaluate
their own societies, which in the case of both Canada and New Zealand, was
positively presented (Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012). In contrast, examples of anxiety
were routinely highlighted within the Australian press, particularly with regards to the
maturity of the Australian state and the preserving of its ‘British’ Head of State
(Cooper and Butt, 2012; Hinds, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012a; Tate, 2012).

Third, while the Scottish press served to highlight Scottish disillusionment with
the British state (Hassan, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012), such constructions were often
based upon discourses that aimed to emphasise the differences between Scotland and
England. Accordingly, while these differences were used to highlight Scotland’s
outsider identity vis-à-vis England, they remained part of a wider British dynamic.
Notably, this could be observed in accounts of Scotland’s relationship to, and,
celebration of, the British monarchy (Fry, 2012; Herald, 2012b; Randall, 2012).

Fourth, normative accounts of established ‘British’ behaviour within the English
press sought to marginalise Team GB’s Scottish and Welsh athletes who declined
from singing the British national anthem (Daily Mail, 2012c; Platell, 2012). Indeed,
feelings of marginalisation were also shared by the Northern Irish press, who felt that
their status within The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was
undermined by the lack of recognition afforded to ‘Northern Ireland’ in the ‘Team
GB’ name (Poole, 2012).
Finally, while attempts to highlight Scottish differences were actively pursued within the press, forms of ambivalence were also noted. That is, in regards to the possibility of an independent Scotland, some sections of the Scottish press conveyed a sense of apprehension towards leaving Britain (Barnes, 2012; MacDonald, 2012b; Macwhirter, 2012).

Taking the above into consideration, it is important not to view these relations as static but as part of a process of changing power balances between the British home nations and the wider Commonwealth (Dunning and Hughes, 2012). Indeed, the effects of devolution within the British state, the sense of national confidence within Canada and the forging of new international relations in New Zealand as well as the possible threat of Scottish independence in 2014, all alluded to changes in the British domestic and imperial/Commonwealth figurations. Indeed, what emerges from these conclusions is how both established and outsider constructions within the press served to dynamically frame Britain as well as actively (re)construct their relationship with Britain. Therefore, while English reports were clear to point out Britain’s imperial history and former imperial supremacy, coverage from the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish press, sought to actively construct their own press coverage in resistance to, or, in accordance with, the wider British domestic figuration. This was echoed across the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand coverage.

Accordingly, while this chapter has highlighted how the British and Commonwealth press sought to draw upon examples of British dis-unity, evidently, the research findings present a far more complicated picture. That is, across both the British and Commonwealth press, examples of (dis)attachment to Britain were shared with examples of British attachment. This was most apparent in section 5.2.5., which noted that Scottish apprehensions towards independence were framed in relation to its shared ‘British’ culture (The Scotsman, 2012a; 2012b). Similarly, Commonwealth reports provided a complicated account of their own imperial histories and continuing ties with Britain (Carney, 2012; Rudman, 2012; Southphomassane, 2012a).

Consequently, in correspondence with a ‘layered’ conception of social habitus (Elias, 2012; Mennell, 1994), forms of attachment and (dis)attachment can help to elucidate upon processes of social integration and disintegration, particularly with regards to national identity. Indeed, Conover and Feldman (1987) note that national patriotism is based upon ‘a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation’ (1987, 1). This is often reflected in displays of national pride. However, as previous chapters
have suggested forms of group attachment are forged interdependently.\textsuperscript{39} That is, while particular national groups are comprised of groups in addition to being part of lager multi-national groups, forms of (national) attachment are rarely forged in isolation but are instead marked by intensities of attachment and (dis)attachment to local, regional, national and multi-national group formations (Mennell, 2007; Van Benthem van den Bergh, 1992). Accordingly, in such instances, examples of attachment and (dis)attachment, are shaped by processes of alignment and contestation (Burkitt, 2008; De Swaan, 1995; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987).\textsuperscript{40} To this extent, the present chapter has highlighted how forms of (dis)attachment to Britain – both past and present – were represented within newspaper discourses on Britain and British identity. Here, examples of (dis)attachment were reflected within the discursive construction of home nation and British-Commonwealth relations (established-outsider relations), group identifications (national/British) as well as feelings of disorientation, anxiety and apathy (British decline).

Therefore, in conjunction with these findings, the following chapter will continue along this path in order to explore how examples of British unity were constructed within the British and Commonwealth press’ framing of Britain. In particular, it will examine how the press’ construction of Britain was predicated upon established-outsider relations and past (re)constructions that served to reveal examples of British attachment within the national press.

\textsuperscript{39} See chapter one, sections 1.3.1., 1.5.1. and chapter two, sections 2.0.1., 2.3. and 2.3.1.
\textsuperscript{40} In opposition to using the term ‘detachment’, I am using the prefix ‘dis’ in reference to its Latin meaning. Here, the prefix is used to denote a reversing force, such as, ‘apart’ or ‘away’ and as a result is often used to refer to a negative or opposing relationship. In the context of this thesis, it provided a useful description of how particular groups may represent their ‘attachment(s)’ in both negative and opposing ways. Hence, they would present a ‘(dis)attachment’ to a particular ‘attachment’.
Chapter Six: ‘A United Kingdom’: Britain’s ‘finest hour’, multiculturalism and unnecessary doubt

Introduction

It was suggested in the previous chapter that the press’ attention towards the mythologized and idealized representation of the rural, pastoral idyll in the Olympic Opening Ceremony was reflective of a particularly ‘English’ construction of Britain and an example of the ‘wilful nostalgia’ that is drawn upon by the English press more generally (Maguire, 1999; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Vincent and Harris, 2014). Certainly, whereas these constructions may serve as a particular point of discord with Scottish, Northern Irish and Welsh depictions of ‘Britain’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001), Ismer (2011) has noted how social conflicts within the nation can often lead to a ‘growing need for unifying moments’ (2011: 560). Therefore, in accordance with the previous chapter’s findings on British ‘dis-unity’, it was clear that some sections of the press sought to highlight how the Olympic Games provided a ‘unifying moment’ for Britain (Ismer, 2011: 560), paying particular attention to the shared sense of unity that being British provided the home nations. In reference to the Olympic Games, the Guardian (2012b) highlighted that:

The Games brought out much that is best in this country. They allowed us a golden glimpse of a nation that celebrates men and women with equal awe, and embraces British athletes of all racial backgrounds. They celebrated the rich shared Britishness of competitors and supporters who are also fiercely proud of diverse roots. London had a wonderful Games, to be sure, but so did Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and English counties from Buckinghamshire to Yorkshire. Few events have done more to rescue the Union Jack from racists and royalists alike, creating a generous mood and a flag to share. (13/08/12b)

Alongside Britain’s diverse ‘racial backgrounds’ the Olympic Games were framed as a reflection of a united Britain, undeterred by those ‘nationalists’ seeking the break-up of the UK (Hassan, 2012). Parsons (2012b) added that ‘for two weeks, we are not English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish – we are British, and that beautiful old flag belongs to all of us’ (Daily Mirror, 28/07/12b). Similar sentiments were evoked by Lott (2012):

For this, more than anything else, was a collective Games, appealing to our collective, unitary consciousness. I would now joyfully include the Scots and the Welsh in this definition of national personality, because the Games also
brought home something else that has lately become counter-intuitive: that we are, truly, a United Kingdom, not just a drifting set of disparate nations making their own way. (*The Independent, 12/08/12*)

Consequently, while Lott’s (2012) remarks neglected the inclusion of those Britons in Northern Ireland, the belief that the games represented a ‘truly … United Kingdom’ was a feeling that was underscored by its ‘collective, unitary consciousness’ (*The Independent, 12/08/12*).\(^1\) Therefore, when set against the sense of confusion that pervaded newspaper concerns regarding British identity (Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012; Riddell, 2012), the above examples served to remind the British of their sense of unity and purported pride (Dayan and Katz, 1992; Ismer, 2011). That is:

> At a time when Britain has been demoralized by the unintended consequences of welfarism, the upheavals of devolution, rampant political correctness and social dysfunction, the Games are another important opportunity for the British to rediscover their national pride, building on the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee. (*The Weekend Australian, 28/07/12 [italics added]*)

In fact, the Olympic Games served as a potent reminder of ‘the capabilities of this odd little island and its people’ (*The Independent on Sunday, 12/08/12b*), a sentiment that was shared by the Commonwealth press. Accordingly, while Scanlan (2012) considered that ‘something about these Games has brought the British out of themselves’ (*Vancouver Sun, 11/08/12*), Baum (2012) noted that the Games ‘might act as the UK’s timely reminder to itself about what is possible when it puts its mind to it and its heart in it’ (*The Age, 13/08/12 [italics added]*). Lane (2012) added:

> the Games of the 30th Olympiad have been exceptional. Viewed from the other end of the planet they have achieved a glorious synergy: majesty with the common touch, modernity with tradition, boisterous celebration with dignity, and fierce striving for victory with countless illustrations of Pierre de Coubertin’s dictum that the taking part is more important than the winning. All against a perfect backdrop: one of the world’s great cities. A brilliant, creative nation has had occasion to once again believe it hasn’t lost it. (*The Sunday Age, 12/08/12*)

In particular, Lane’s (2012) remarks chose to frame Britain’s sense of achievement as a direct reflection of the country *it used to be*, a country that, according to Lane (2012), ‘hasn’t lost it’ (*The Sunday Age, 12/08/12*). Echoing such sentiments, Crompton (2012) stated that during the Olympic Games ‘Britain … begun to

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\(^1\) Indeed, elsewhere, Orwell (1941) has referred to an ‘invisible chain’ that binds the nation.
remember the country it can be’ (Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12 [italics added]) providing ‘a potent reminder of the sheer creative potency of such a small island’ (MacDonald, Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b [italics added]).

As can be seen from each of the highlighted examples, comparisons with Britain’s past, and, in the case of Lane (2012), its former self, were set against notions of British decline (‘the country it used to be’). To this extent, it was the Olympic Games which were portrayed as ‘reminding’ the British of what it was capable of as well as allowing it to ‘rediscover’ its ‘national pride’ (The Weekend Australian, 28/07/12).

Consequently, amidst the ‘sheer creative potency’, which the Opening Ceremony displayed (MacDonald, Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b), was an underlying sense of surprise within the press’ coverage. Indeed, in comments relating to the Closing Ceremony, Saunders (2012) reported that ‘when it ended in a spectacle of pomp-free pop and quintessentially East London polyglot pageantry, there was a very surprising national sense of elation’ (The Globe and Mail, 13/08/12 [italics added]). Saunders (2012) added that ‘the mood of national euphoria – and it can be witnessed far beyond the tightly controlled bubble of London – has been cathartic and entirely unexpected’ (The Globe and Mail, 13/08/12). Wilson (2012) added that there was a:

feeling of surprise among ordinary Londoners and people close to the Games that after all that anticipation and all their doubts, they had pulled it off so well. It is not a sense of ‘We told you so’, more one of ‘My god, we actually did it!’ (Wilson, The Australian, 13/08/12 [italics added])

Within the British press similar feelings were shared by Collins (2012), who argued that, ‘the entire process is being carried out with an air of blushing disbelief, for the development seems wholly un-British and thoroughly admirable’ (The Mail on Sunday, 05/08/12). Similarly, Rose (2012) noted that ‘it is hard now to imagine the success of the Games was ever in doubt’ (The Scotsman, 13/08/12). Instead:

The political crisis when G4S revealed it could no provide the promised security, the fears that the London transport system would collapse under the weight of millions of visitors, or that the games would be the target of a terrorist attack, all seem a lifetime ago. There was a happy buzz around the city. Police and stewards chatted with fans as they entered the Olympic complex in Stratford. (Rose, The Scotsman, 13/08/12)

In fact, the sense of apprehension that pervaded the post-Olympic coverage, was
Ever since it was announced back in 2005 that London would host these Games, the volume of grumbling from the naysayers has rarely dipped below the audible. Anger over budgets, rows over allocation of funding, discontent with the economic benefit to Wales, ticketing problems, the Team GB football saga, and the G4S scandal that threatened to engulf the Games before they even started – for seven years, a negative headline was never far away. But as the first participants entered the Olympic Stadium for a remarkable opening ceremony, all those concerns dissolved. Those early empty seats aside, this has been an impeccably managed event of almost unimaginable scale. (13/08/12)²

In such instances, the games were perceived as seeing ‘a more confident Britain emerge’ (Southphommasane, The Age, 13/08/12b). Southphommasane (2012b) added:

The opening ceremony also served to underscore that Britain remains an ongoing project; it is still working towards that New Jerusalem. This might just be the cultural legacy of these Olympics: equipping Britain with a new confidence and an ability to speak about itself, to itself. (The Age, 13/08/12b)

Certainly, the belief that Britain had achieved a new sense of confidence was echoed by the Daily Mirror’s, Tony Parsons (2012c), who highlighted that ‘the legacy of these Games will be a massive boost to national self-confidence’ (11/08/12c). In fact:

When they are over, and the bunting is packed away, there will still be one million young people on the dole. But somewhere deep down in our national soul, London 2012 has made us believe in ourselves again. (Parsons, Daily Mirror, 11/08/12c)

Evidently, the Olympic Games were portrayed within the British and Commonwealth press as allowing Britain to ‘regain’ its sense of national confidence. This was confirmed by Hubbard (2012) who suggested that the Olympic Games had been ‘received with a pride that ha[d] been lacking in the nation of late’ (The Independent, 12/08/12).

With these examples in mind, it is important that such constructions are located alongside those concerns which were highlighted in the previous chapter, in particular, the sense of disenchantment within Britain (Toynbee, 2012b) as well as wider insecurities regarding its political culture and economic instability (Lott, 2012;²

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² See chapter five, section 5.0. and 5.1.
Moore, 2012; Norman, 2012). In analyses of the South Korean media, Mangan et al. (2013) highlighted that various South Korean media outlets served to highlight Britain’s ‘political, social and economic fragility’ (2013: 1841). Consequently, alongside such concerns, Lawton (2012) noted that:

> We came so fragile and, let’s be honest, fearful into the 30th Olympic Games that ended here last night with all the poignancy of the sweetest parting. Already it seems like an impossible stretch of memory but it is true and it is why the closing rites were filled with so much pride and emotion and, maybe above all, a feeling not so much of a job well done but a spirit regained, a sense of ourselves and the world around us that might just defy, for a little while at least, the bleakest forecasts. (*The Independent*, 13/08/12)

Indeed, the sense of a ‘spirit regained’ (Lawton, *The Independent*, 13/08/12) posited a poignant ‘a reminder of what Britain [could] still achieve, even in the most testing times’ (*Daily Mail*, 27/07/12b). The former British Athlete, Sir Roger Bannister, expressed similar feelings when he stated, ‘how thrilling it is that I can see again today, on the Olympic track, the spirit that I recall from another era’ (*The Mail on Sunday*, 12/08/12). Here, Britain’s renewed ‘spirit’ was entwined with a belief that contemporary Britain had reconnected with a past notion of Britain, that is, a Britain ‘from another era’ (Bannister, *The Mail on Sunday*, 12/08/12). Indeed, the regaining of a particular ‘spirit’ can prove effective in providing ‘a sense of renewal based upon coherence and inspiration’ (Rojek, 2007: 68). Such sentiments were revealed in Sandbrook’s (2012) declaration of a ‘rekindling of Britishness itself’, indeed, something that had been ‘in danger of dying out’ (*Daily Mail*, 11/08/12).

Taking the above into consideration, it has been the purpose of this introduction to briefly highlight how the British and Commonwealth press sought to frame and represent a sense of British unity and confidence within their coverage of the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Ceremonies. Subsequently, while post-Olympic concerns regarding a ‘fragile’ Britain (Lawton, *The Independent*, 13/08/12) were expressed, other reports suggested that Britain had begun to ‘remember’ the country it could be (Crompton, *Daily Telegraph*, 11/08/12), resulting in an ‘affirmation of national identity and pride’ within the UK (Parsons, *Daily Mirror*, 04/06/12a).

Accordingly, the following sections will explore how constructions of Britain served to represent its contemporary self both in relation to the nation’s purported history and in contrast to its former self. Indeed, in the case of Britain, any form of
national regeneration, stands precariously ‘between two identities – the imperial and the post-imperial’ (Colls, 2012: 111). While Britain’s ‘post-imperial’ identity may be vividly portrayed in reports on Britain’s multicultural society and its diverse population, such reports are formed in relation to the nation-wide rioting which blighted British cities in the summer of 2011 as well as Britain’s ‘long-standing economic and political struggles’ and reported ‘corruption among the police, the financial sector, the press and the politicians’ (Lott, The Independent, 12/08/12).

With this in mind, a critical examination of constructions of British ‘unity’ within the British and Commonwealth press will be provided. More importantly, the aim of this chapter will be to explore how such constructions were allied with the national identities of each considered nation. Consequently, the following sections will be divided into four broad sections. First, attention will be given to exploring how the British and Commonwealth press constructed Britain in relation to its past. Here, it will be argued that the press’ framing of Britain chose to actively dissociate contemporary Britain from its former self. Section two will develop upon this by considering how the success of the Team GB athlete, Mo Farah, and reports of Britain’s cultural diversity, reflected a ‘new’ and ‘modern’ Britain. Indeed, the complexities and tensions involved in these constructions will be explored as part of a wider discussion regarding British multiculturalism and post-imperial immigration. Furthermore, in accordance with chapter five, this section will also draw upon Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework in order to reveal how discourses surrounding Britain’s multicultural image underlied established practices, based upon presenting a progressive, inclusive, modern Britain (Engh et al., 2014). Finally, sections three and four will separately consider how attachments to Britain and British identity were framed within the Commonwealth and British press.

6.0. Living with the ‘truth’: constructing Britain as a ‘different place’

In his analysis of national identity, Colls (2011) notes that national identity ‘is probably best understood in terms of how we manage our collective relationship with the past’ (2011: 580). That is, Colls’s (2011) remarks can be elaborated upon in order to consider how changes in the nation are perceived in relation to the nation’s past. For Walker (2012), writing in the Belfast Telegraph (2012), such changes were particularly evident in regards to Northern Ireland’s violent history. In comments relating to the Diamond Jubilee, Walker (2012) highlighted that ‘10 years ago, we
would have had furore and anger. But not now. We are all changing. And that is reason enough to keep on celebrating’ (Belfast Telegraph, 05/06/12).

Consequently, while Walker’s (2012) remarks sought to draw upon Belfast’s complicated history with Britain and its royal patronage, other reports sought to highlight how the Diamond Jubilee served to underscore wider changes in the British sense of self. Indeed, in his analysis of the British monarchy, Cannadine (1983) notes that ‘it is … elements of continuity which both disguise and explain changes in ‘meaning’. (1983: 150 [italics in original]). As a result, amidst the continuity of Britain’s royal pageantry was a sense that the Diamond Jubilee represented ‘a Britain, whose like will not be seen again, because it is passing so swiftly into history’ (The Independent, 06/06/12). The Independent (2012) added:

It was not just the carriage procession from Westminster Hall, or the cavalry, or the massed military bands, with their air of empire and antiquity, that harked back to another age – they have a few outings left in them – but the church service itself, and above all the congregation: mostly white, of a certain age and a certain background. But the Anglican cathedral experience is no longer as widely shared as it was. As the flag-waving crowds on the Mall testified, Britain is already a different place. (06/06/12)

Indeed, the feeling that Britain was a ‘different place’ was echoed by Norman (2012), who argued that:

without wishing to lessen by an iota the grotesque social problems and horrendous economic and political uncertainties, I cannot lie by denying the unwontedly warm feeling about Britain which the four-day weekend leaves, for today at least, in its wake. … From the tone to the celebrations, nebulous to the point of meaningless though this must sound, there was a sense of a country finally learning to live with the truth about itself. (The Independent, 06/06/12 [italics added])

In fact, the belief that Britain reflected a ‘country finally learning to live with the truth about itself’ (Norman, The Independent, 06/06/12) was one that was echoed in discussions regarding Britain’s place within the world. Indeed, Freedland (2012b) stated that ‘London 2012 is predicated on an answer to that stubborn question about where we belong’ (Guardian, 27/07/12b). Here, Britain’s post-imperial decline was duly acknowledged as a part of British history that Britain had finally managed to overcome. In such instances, the Olympic Games represented a particular ‘turning point’ (Lott, The Independent, 12/08/12). Lott (2012) noted:
For me, the Olympics feels like a turning point, a moment in which for the first

time since our decline from empire, we felt genuinely self-confident. For the

first time I can remember, we like ourselves. (*The Independent*, 12/08/12)

Consequently, ‘no longer was Britain casting itself as the imperial power, which once
came to the countries of others, determined to shape their futures’ (*Freedland,

Guardian*, 27/07/12b), but instead the Olympic Opening ceremony ‘celebrated
modern Britain, a post-imperial nation, still half in and half out of Europe but
surprisingly comfortable with its role’ (*The Independent on Sunday*, 29/07/12b).

Accordingly, whereas the previous chapter revealed how references to the
British Empire sought to reveal wider anxieties regarding Britain’s post-imperial role,
its sense of identity and declining power (Lott, 2012; McKie, 2012; Norman, 2012;
Paxmans, 2012; Strong, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a) the above examples reveal a far
different appraisal of Britain’s imperial past and its contemporary self. In such
instances, a changed Britain (Lott, 2012) one that was both ‘modern’ (*The

Independent on Sunday*, 29/07/12a) and ‘self-confident’ (Lott, *The Independent,

12/08/12) was juxtaposed against Britain’s ‘decline from empire’ (Lott, *The

Independent*, 12/08/12). Here, the British Empire and Britain’s imperial identity was

used to underscore Britain’s renewed sense of self. In fact, Lawton (2012) argued that

‘what the Olympics have is renewal, a wiping-away of the past and a huge investment

in the moment’ (*Belfast Telegraph*, 28/07/12). This was shared by the *Western Mail*

(2012), who added that ‘today, Britain wakes up to life after London 2012 feeling like

a different country … Already, this feels like a truly momentous fortnight in the

history of this nation’ (13/08/12).

Elsewhere, Falcous and Silk (2010) have observed how ‘contemporary concerns’ can be
superimposed ‘onto reconstructed versions of the past’ (2010: 175). Indeed, they argue that ‘these narratives are mythologies that point to the capacity of

the media to tell us stories about ourselves’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010; see also Barthes,

1972). Similarly, these ‘mythologies’ can be identified in the work of Wetherell and


how national discourses seek to convey the ‘common fate’ of the nation, that is, a

group of people ‘travelling together through time’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 141).³

Instead, however, the above examples served to reveal a dis-continuity with the

³ This is shared by Hobsbawm (1983) who notes how a cohesive national society is one that is

predicated on an established continuity with the nation’s past (Hobsbawm, 1983).
British past, centered on the assumption that Britain had traversed its post-imperial decline in order to present a united and largely confident depiction of itself. Here ‘particular cultural values and traditions’ (Meer et al., 2010: 93) were believed to be largely irrelevant and, indeed, unreflective of contemporary British society (The Independent, 2012b). It was during the Olympic Games that ‘we got a glimpse of another kind of Britain’ (Freedland, Guardian, 11/08/12c). In addition, The Independent on Sunday (2012b) highlighted:

We may not be galvanised by the Olympics into suddenly transforming the economy or curing the ills that tainted our streets last summer. But we’d like to think that more than a passing feel-good factor has been generated by London 2012 – not just the immediate luster of gold, silver and bronze, but the knowledge that this was a triumph not of old Britain, but new: competitors in their teens or fifties, black, white and shades in between; ageing rockers, young rappers; women, contributing nearly half the glory and more than their shares of the smiles; volunteers from every background; the witty, the imaginative, the accomplished. The knowledge of that, the confidence to be drawn from it, could be the real legacy of these Games. (12/08/12b [italics added])

Underlying such remarks was a sense of British unity that was bolstered by a shared sense of British identification. For The Scotsman (2012c) the fact that the celebrations continued, despite the poor weather, ‘was nothing if not typical of the sort of people we are right across the UK … that alone is cause for celebration’ (04/06/12c [italics added]).

As a result, in contrast to those examples that sought to draw upon Britain’s post-imperial decline (Lott, 2012; Paxman, 2012), efforts within the press to dislodge contemporary Britain from the ‘one [it] used to be’ were evidently pursued (Freedland, Guardian, 11/08/12c). Indeed, for Freedland (2012), ‘the opening ceremony set the tone, suggesting that we should love the country we have become – informal, mixed, quirky – rather than the one we used to be’ (Guardian, 11/08/12c). Similarly, Collins (2012) added ‘no longer prisoners of our stultified, stiff-lipped past, we have made a real effort to become the kind of people we always hoped we might be’ (The Mail on Sunday, 05/08/12). Clearly such accounts suggested a sense of renewal regarding the British sense of self. The belief that Britain was ‘informal, mixed, quirky’ (Freedland, Guardian, 11/08/12c) served to construct an image of the

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British far removed from its ‘stiff upper lip’ portrayal (Goring, 2012).\(^5\)

Accordingly, the above examples reveal a clear demarcation between a past Britain and a sense that the country had to some extent discovered ‘who’ it was (*Daily Telegraph*, 2012; Lott, 2012). Indeed, Rojek (2007) has argued that:

> If it is right to propose that the contemporary British are riddled with anxieties and doubts about who they are and where they are going it prompts us to ask *who they formerly believed themselves to be and what sense of national direction they had*. (2007: 12 [italics added])

This was shared by Lott (2012) who noted that ‘over the past several generations we have been a nation obsessed with “who we are” (*The Independent*, 12/08/12). Here, the Diamond Jubilee was regarded by some, as a significant celebration of who the British were. The *Daily Telegraph* (2012) suggested that:

> Over this Diamond Jubilee holiday, the people of the United Kingdom have come together not only to celebrate, but also to show their pride in who and what the British are. The events of the Jubilee show that it is a pride that shines undimmed. (04/06/12)

Indeed, this was echoed in accounts of the Olympic Opening Ceremony, which the *Sunday Mirror* (2012) declared, ‘told the world what the United Kingdom is about and, even more, what the Games mean’ (29/07/12). Kenyon (2012) added that the ceremony was ‘a supremely humane vision of where we are now, and how we have become what we are’ (*The Observer*, 29/07/12).

Indeed, attempts to define Britain can be located as part of a long-term process of defining and re-defining Britain and the British populace. For instance, British history provides a number of examples relating to discourses concerning the formation of a ‘new Britain’: 1945 and the beginning of the welfare state; 1979 and the election of Britain’s first female Prime Minster; 1997 and the election of ‘New Labour’. In each example, a new confident Britain, united in purpose and popular support, was portrayed (Rojek, 2007). Correspondingly, while the reports of the Olympic Ceremonies served to construct Britain as an ‘informal’, ‘mixed’ and ‘quirky’ nation, in no instance was a clear depiction provided of exactly *who* the

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\(^5\) Elsewhere, Turmen-Dervisoglu (2013) has highlighted how, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, state elites sought to renounce Turkish history of its Ottoman myths and memories and, in the process, install a new Turkish state identity. In doing so, commemorative narratives surrounding the Turkish nation, that is, its ‘founding myths and memories’ (2013: 4), were undermined via ‘attempts by the state elites to cause collective amnesia’ (2013: 4). See also chapter five, section 5.2.1
British were and what exactly they had become. Certainly, this aligns with chapter five, whereby questions regarding the British ‘we’ were debated and discussed within the press’ coverage.  

To this extent, such confusions can be related to the temporal construction of the nation in coverage pertaining to national media events (Lavi, 2013). Mihelj (2010) highlights that:

The clock time that governs the routines of media production is … ultimately an extension of calendar time, and the news stories of today derive their meaning and newsworthiness from the historical narratives stretching back into the depths of calendar time. (2010: 143)

Indeed, while there is the potential in Mihelj’s (2010) remarks to view both time and history ‘as inevitable progress’ (Dunning et al., 2004: 2), something that becomes reified in her use of ‘clock time’ and ‘calendar time’, it is possible to use Mihelj’s (2010) comments in order to highlight how such terms are used as a form of orientation by the media (Dunning et al., 2004). That is, while selected mediated constructions may seek to portray a particular version of the national past, these constructions can reveal stories about the nation that, for the purpose of contemporary identifications, seek to orientate the nation through processes of ‘re-invention’ and ‘re-imagining’ (Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Silk and Falcous, 2005).

Consequently, as the above examples reveal, an important aspect of the press’ (re)construction relies upon the use of ‘past [national] events in order to shape the national collective in the present’ (Lavi, 2013: 4). Accordingly, rather than presenting the nation-state as an entirely modern construct (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008), ‘detached from the past’ (Lavi, 2013: 5), the mediated representation of the nation suggests an interdependent relationship between ‘contemporary concerns’ and ‘reconstructed versions of the past’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 175 [italics added]; see also Hare, 2012; Jack, 2012; McNulty, 2012; Norman, 2012; Phillips, 2012; Richards, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; The Independent, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a; 2012b; Tweedie, 2012; Tweedie and Hardin, 2012). That is, the relationship between the press’ defining of ‘past’ and ‘present’ creates a temporal representation tangibly located within the national collective memory and open to disparity, discontinuity and

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6 See chapter five, section 5.1.2.
(re)construction. For example, Bastani (2012) highlights how:

London 2012’s opening ceremony offered an epic history of the British worker, but with no acknowledgement of what contemporary work is like. Its celebration of modern Britain was a trans-historical mash-up, flattening all history as repackaged and ‘inevitable’ British national identity. (2012)

Therefore, rather than acting as ‘mere reflections of far more fundamental realities’ (Mihelj, 2010: 13), the press’ ‘flattening’ and repackaging of the nation’s past (Bastani, 2010) can result in competing and contested imaginings of the nation (Anderson, 2006). Here, the press:

simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past (Bell, 2003: 75 cited in Falcous and Silk, 2010: 175 [italics added])

In particular, such (re)constructions served to highlight the tensions and difficulties involved ‘in engineering a new, viable post-imperial identity in Britain’ (Rojek, 2007: 191). With this in mind, it is towards the analysis of the press’ construction of this ‘post-imperial, multicultural, multi-ethnic Britain’ (Rojek, 2007: 191), which we now turn.

6.1. The ‘Rebirth of Britishness’: established-outsider relations in multicultural Britain

Accordingly, while the construction and (re)construction of the nation is ‘subject to constant change’ (Lavi, 2013: 7), in the case of Britain, such changes were represented as reflecting a ‘new’ multicultural Britain, uniquely diverse and happily multi-ethnic (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012; The Observer, 2012). In fact, nationalist movements have often drawn upon ‘stories’ of the nation for emotive purposes, particularly around ideas surrounding national ‘rebirth’ (Bell, 2003: 67). For the media, however, this ‘rebirth’ was closely aligned with the representation of a new multicultural Britain (Sandbrook, 2012). In these instances, athletes, such as, Mo Farah, formed part of the press’ collective pride in Britain’s inclusive multiculturalism (Fortier, 2005). Here, the nomination of ‘national icons or symbols that will be

relevant to post-imperial, multicultural, multi-ethnic Britain’ (Rojek, 2007: 191) can prove particularly useful in identifying wider power relations and discursive codes. That is, if the mediated construction of the nation was open to processes of ‘re-invention’ and ‘re-imagining’, then examining how minority cultures were involved in such processes, and, in particular, who was being (re)presented within the national culture, can provide an insight into exploring the discursive construction of multicultural Britain.

Consequently, in accordance with chapter five, the following sections will seek to draw upon Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework in order to explore how discourses pertaining to British multiculturalism were constructed within the press. Indeed, previous research has highlighted the tensions that can arise in discussions relating to multiculturalism and national identity (Goodhart, 2013a; 2013b; Rietveld, 2013). Here, debates suggest ‘that multiculturalism erodes the shared foundations of national citizenship’ degenerating feelings of national solidarity, trust and loyalty (Rietveld, 2013: 2). With this in mind, the application of an established-outsider framework to discussions on multiculturalism and national identity can be used to identity how established cultural codes seek to construct the boundaries between groups. In addition, these codes can also be examined in order to explore how established nations seek to construct a developmental and progressive image of themselves (Falcous and Silk, 2010; Engh et al., 2014). Consequently, attention will be given to exploring how the press sought to draw upon Britain’s achieved multiculturalism as an important part of its established image. Here, representations of the Team GB athlete, Mo Farah, will be considered in order explore how the press’ framing of Farah reflected broader tensions in the discourse surrounding immigration within Britain.

6.1.1. ‘As British as fish and chips’: constructing British tolerance and newspaper representations of Mo Farah

Often, constructions of the national ‘we’ are based upon the nation’s ability to appropriately re-define a positive relationship with the nation’s past while at the same time construct a unified account of the nation that is not undermined by cultural diversity and mass immigration (Littler and Naidoo, 2004). To this extent, Lott

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8 See chapter five, sections 5.2. to 5.2.5.
(2012) was clear to point out that during the Olympic games ‘our multicultural character felt very natural and unforced now, deeply and uncontroversially part of who we are’ (The Independent, 12/08/12 [italics added]). Indeed, Southphommasane (2012b) argued that:

But more than anything else, Danny Boyle’s charming and authentic opening ceremony set the tone. Here was a Britain possessed with wit, humour and self-deprecation. One that finally seemed comfortable in its own post-imperial skin. A mature Britain acknowledging the multitude of voices within its borders – those not only of the nations within the union, but also of its increasingly diverse population. (The Age, 13/08/12b)

In fact, writing in the Sunday Herald, Macwhirter (2012) added that ‘the London Games have provided an image of the UK that isn’t just about imperialism, English nationalism and public schoolboys singing Rule Britannia on the last night of the proms. It isn’t white any more, you know’ (12/08/12). As can be seen, references relating to the ‘multitude of voices’ that now resided in a ‘mature Britain’ (Southphommasane, The Age, 13/08/12b), sought to construct a sense that Britain was no longer ‘just about imperialism’ (Macwhirter, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12) but was instead surprisingly comfortable with its ‘multicultural character’ (Lott, The Independent, 12/08/12). This sense of British multicultural unity was echoed in Alibhai-Brown’s (2012) observation:

But these two weeks have been a watershed of true significance. There has been a visceral reaction among black and Asian Britons to what we have seen. For some, it has been perhaps the first time they have really felt a part of this country. For others, the promise of tolerance and integration has come true. Seeing the mixed-race and black competitors fighting fiercely for their personal bests and for their country has been the moment when history turned a page. (Daily Mail, 13/08/12)

Here, Alibhai-Brown’s (2012) reference to black and Asian Britons and the effects of seeing mixed-race and black competitors compete ‘for their country’ was reflective of the fact that Britain’s ‘promise of tolerance and integration ha[d] come true’ (Daily Mail, 13/08/12). This was echoed by Walker (2012) who noted that ‘Britain may not be homogenous any more but it is inclusive’ (Belfast Telegraph, 05/06/12).

In fact, the effects of immigration within Britain form an integral, yet often ignored, part of Britain’s history. Eighteenth-century London possessed an already large population of black immigrants as well as Chinese and Indian sailors (Colley,
Similarly, by 1911, Cardiff was ‘a city where half the population came from somewhere else, not just from other parts of Europe and the UK, but also from the West Indies, China, Central American and East Africa’ (Colley, 2014a: 29). The arrival of the Empire Windrush to Tillbury’s docks in June 1948 formed another part of Britain’s post-war immigration (Colley, 2014a). Today, it may be difficult to determine the extent to which these immigrants felt ‘British’ but what it does reveal is that multi-national and multicultural Britain had been in existence for large parts of its recorded history.

Accordingly, in their analysis of London’s Olympic bid, Falcous and Silk (2010) note that the bid formed part of a wider initiative to promote Britain as a tolerant and multicultural nation, an initiative that was dependent upon presenting non-white British athletes ‘as proud subjects of multicultural Britain’ (2010: 177). In fact:

selective narrations of olympic bidding take impetus from a coalition of interests: state-political, civic, sporting and corporate. Their significance is in asserting a mythic, inclusive post-imperial Britain. … The representations of harmonious, youthful multiculturalism and the provision of ‘ideal’ multicultural subjects within London 2012 Olympic bidding that we have observed are proffered as embodiments of this very assertion. (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 178)

Britain’s Olympic bid served to construct an understanding of Britain ‘as being developmental, multicultural and progressive’ (Engh et al., 2014: 785). Indeed, such constructions can form part of a wider ‘developmental discourse’ in established nations (Engh et al., 2014). Fortier (2005) notes that:

The effect of the politics of pride is to separate ethnic ‘others’ into subjects that must be hailed as figures of the tolerant, multiracial Britain that many commentators ‘cherish’. They constitute ‘our’ diversity, which is what ‘we’ are proud of. (2005: 568)

This can be identified in Engh et al.’s (2014) analysis of youth football tournaments in Scandinavian countries and how such tournaments served to maintain a clear distinction between the Scandinavian organisers and the invited African teams. Employing an established-outsider model, Engh et al. (2014) noted that while the Scandinavian communities were portrayed as communities of ‘democracy, peace, equality and multicultural tolerance’, perceptions of the competing African nations failed to elicit the same ‘established’ qualities (Engh et al., 2014: 788). In much the
same way, reports within the British press shared in Engh et al.’s (2014) findings. Here, Britain’s ‘inclusive’ image was used in order to portray Britain as an established, progressive, multi-cultural nation (Walker, *Belfast Telegraph*, 05/06/12).

With this in mind and without any objective qualification (see Alibhai-Brown, 2012), much of the coverage on the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games stood to suggest that foreign immigration had resulted in a multi-ethnic and multicultural British society, which, as a consequence, had resulted in a reconstructed sense of Britishness, based not on homogeneity but on diversity (*Guardian*, 2012b; Lott, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012b). In doing so, the press aimed to portray Britain along favourable lines, that is, as a multicultural nation *par excellence*. Here, Britain was portrayed as an established nation who had successfully managed to become a multicultural nation (Alibhai-Brown, 2012).

In fact, these reports failed to highlight Britain’s multicultural imperial history and stood in stark contrast to the rioting, which afflicted London’s streets in 2011. Mitra (2013) notes that the riots ‘threatened the very multicultural fabric of the British society’ (2013: 6). As a result:

According to reports in the British media, the country’s reputation as an inclusive setting in which people from diverse communities came together as a peaceful and respectful whole was fatally damaged in light of the full outworking of these riots. They revealed a less tolerant side of the British society, it was said, and with the Olympics then only 1 year away, question marks were raised over aspects of the country’s very fabric, in terms of its security situation, ethnic assimilation (the riots are said to have been sparked by the killing of a 29-year-old man of mixed race) and the difference between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ resident in the country. (Mitra, 2013: 6-7)

In contrast to the above, and, in spite of the 2011 London riots, the 2012 Olympic Games provided a powerful space for a multicultural Britain to be displayed.

As previously mentioned, however, an important part of this representation was the framing of Black-British and Black-Asian athletes ‘as exemplary embodiments of multicultural Britain, the perfect rejoinder to assertions of ethnic essentialism, racism, and intolerance’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 178). Whereas this formed an important part of the 2012 Olympic bid, the Games coverage continued this trend with the representation of Team GB’s non-white athletes as examples of a ‘tolerant’ and ‘inclusive’ nation (Falcous and Silk, 2010; see also Alibhai-Brown, 2012). Indeed, one particular Team GB athlete who was seen as representing Britain’s new
inclusivity was the athlete Mohamed Farah, commonly known as, Mo (Macwhirter, 2012).

In contrast to the Sheffield born, mixed-ethnicity, ‘Golden Girl’, Jessica Ennis, Farah’s identity provided an interesting insight into Britain’s multicultural identity. Farah competed as part of Team GB’s athletic squad, running in both the long and middle distance track events, where he succeeded in achieving Olympic Gold in the 10,000m and 5,000m events. Originally born in Somaliland, an unrecognised sovereign state that succeeded the former British Somaliland protectorate, Farah moved to Britain as a child.9 Farah is also a devout Muslim, the abbreviated ‘Mo’ for ‘Mohamed’, being a common Islamic name.10 More importantly, however, was how the press sought to draw upon Mo’s Somali-born British identity as a way of highlighting Britain’s multicultural society. Indeed, Samuel (2012) questioned ‘is there a nobler representation of what modern Britain is about than 10,000 metres champion Farah?’ (Daily Mail, 06/08/12 [italics added]). Similarly, Holt (2012) argued:

Farah has become a powerful symbol at these magical London Olympics. … there is a sense that these Games have helped this country cross the Rubicon in the last two weeks. … as a nation, we are finally celebrating what we are, not what we were. … this win for a son of Mogadishu was a victory for our oft-maligned multicultural society. (Daily Mirror, 13/08/12)

In doing so, ‘the Games … allowed Britain, almost for the first time in memory, to celebrate its history while acknowledging its rich multicultural present, which is now leading the way into the future’ (Crompton, Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12).

In each of the above examples, Farah’s depiction within the press was used to construct a ‘modern Britain’ (Samuel, Daily Mail, 06/08/12) which was finally able to celebrate ‘what we are, not what we were’ (Holt, Daily Mirror, 13/08/12). Ultimately, Farah’s acceptance within British society was regarded as a signifier of British tolerance, as noted by Crompton (2012):

the tolerance that welcomed Mo Farah when he arrived as a child from Somalia – and which has been rewarded with one of the best pictures of the Games, the

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10 In fact, Farah has mentioned that his full name ‘Mohamed’ often results in him being stopped at US airports by custom officials in order to be questioned on the suspicion of terrorism (Wilkes, 2013).
sight of Britain’s greatest distance runner wrapped in a flag, hugging his wife and child, applauded to the skies. (*Daily Telegraph*, 11/08/12)

Crompton’s (2012) framing of Farah as ‘a child from Somalia’ who had become ‘Britain’s greatest distance runner’ (*Daily Telegraph*, 11/08/12) clearly constructed Farah as a unique ‘symbol’ (Holt, *Daily Mirror*, 13/08/12), a process that not only reflected Britain’s achieved multiculturalism but which also presented Farah as being unquestionably British.

Indeed, elsewhere, Storry and Childs (1997) note how non-white British athletes have often had to manage their British identity. Indeed:

Frank Bruno, the heavyweight black boxer has in contrast remained closely connected to an idea of national representation in which his physical strength and modest, self-depreciating personality have caused him to be accepted as ‘British’. Sport has in this sense been a way of reinforcing black stereotypes while at the same time providing more visibility for black people and hence a recognition of the ‘multicultural’ nature of modern Britain. (Storry and Childs, 1997: 323)

Certainly, the recognition of ‘the “multicultural” nature of modern Britain’ (Storry and Childs, 1997: 323) corresponded in reports relating to Farah (Samuel, 2012). In fact, ‘a growing openness and tolerance of difference in … definitions of “Englishness”/’Britishness” have also been found in examinations of English cricket and the English cricketer Monty Panesar (Fletcher, 2011: 23). Accordingly, although he was ‘born in Somalia’ Farah was ‘as British as fish and chips’ (Beacom, *Belfast Telegraph*, 06/08/12), indeed, ‘a product of the UK system’ (Gillon, *Herald*, 06/08/12). This was aided by Farah’s apparent embracing of British culture. Alibhai-Brown (2012) highlighted:

Today Mo, while remaining a devout Muslim, extols his adopted country. When he was asked last week after his victory in the 10,000 metres if he’d rather be representing Somalia, his simple response spoke volumes. ‘Not at all, mate. This is my country’. His joyful embrace of Britishness, replicated by other British Olympians of immigrant stock, has aroused the same rapturous feelings of pride in people who, until now, were wary of nationalistic celebrations and expressions – including me. (*Daily Mail*, 13/08/12)

Similarly, Sandbrook (2012) added:

In many ways, the most heartening Rebirth of Britishness moment of the Games came at Mo Farah’s post-race press conference, when an African journalist asked him whether he would rather have competed for Somalia, where he was
born. ‘Look, mate’, Farah said firmly. ‘This is my country. When I put on the Great Britain vest, I feel proud. Very proud’. Farah – whose victory in the 10,000 metres was, for me, the defining and most emotional moment of the Games – came to this country from Somalia at the age of eight. He did not speak a word of English. But here he was, a proud Londoner and a proud Briton, suffused with joy after winning in front of his home crowd. What better symbol could there be of a united, inclusive country in the post-imperial age? What better advert for British identity: confident and colour-blind? (Daily Mail, 11/08/12)

In such instances, those born outside Britain (Littler and Naidoo, 2004) or those from non-white ethnic communities (Fletcher, 2011) were continually required to justify their presence within Britain, and, as Alibhai-Brown (2012), Sandbrook (2012) and Beacom (2012) revealed, were continually required to justify their Britishness. Indicative of such concerns has been the implementation of a citizenship test for those seeking British citizenship, a process that includes an oath of allegiance to the British Queen and the learning of the national anthem (Bryne, 2013; Vincent and Harris, 2014). Furthermore, in contrast to Crompton’s (2012) assertion that Britain ‘celebrate[d] its history while acknowledging its rich multicultural present’ (Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12), Farah’s representation within the press served to detach Farah from the historical context that brought him to the UK as well as wider issue relating to skin colour and religion in order to present an image of Farah as thoroughly British.

As a result, in accordance with the ‘Rebirth of Britishness’ (Sandbrook, Daily Mail, 11/08/12) Farah was ‘the multicultural pin-up for the new Britain’ (Macwhirter, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12). In these examples, references to Farah’s ‘Britishness’ were required in order to justify his acceptability as a ‘Brit’. As a result, Farah became an important signification of Britain’s achieved multiculturalism. Indeed, there are similarities here with Carrington (2000) who argues that non-white athletes are often heralded as important and celebrated examples of the nation. Certainly, the sense that Farah represented a ‘new’ Britain was clearly evident in the above examples (Macwhirter, 2010). In doing so, they reveal how Farah’s difference was used to enhance a constructed multicultural Britain.

However, at a more latent level the above examples reveal the complexities surrounding dual-nationals, particularly between notions of an Anglo/Celtic Christian model of Britishness and ‘outsiders’ (Poulton and Maguire, 2012). Indeed, the ability of established groups to allow certain ‘outsiders’ to become part of established discourses is often ‘contingent on them toeing the line(s) in several ways – corporate,
nationalist, conservative, and gendered – as “appropriate” national subjects’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 172). Consequently, although non-white British athletes may be ‘taken up as legitimate multicultural racialised subjects’, there ‘inclusion is contingent’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 173). Indeed, ‘they are “allowed” to be “racialised” but only in bounded ways’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 173).

Similarly, while Farah’s success allowed him to be constructed within the press’ reports as a signifier of Britain’s multicultural society and apparent tolerance towards immigrants, his story revealed a form of ‘double consciousness’ (Whannel, 2002: 175). That is, despite Farah’s declared Britishness being exemplified, in each of the above examples, Farah’s outsider status was reaffirmed through the qualification of his Somali heritage. In fact, Farah’s Somali background was largely inescapable as the following examples reveal: ‘son of Mogadishu’ (Holt, Daily Mirror, 13/08/12); ‘Mo Farah, who came here from Mogadishu’ (Ashley, Guardian, 06/08/12); ‘child from Somalia’ (Beacom, Belfast Telegraph, 06/08/12) and ‘Mo Farah, from Somalia’ (Macwhirter, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12). Indeed, alongside the qualifications required to reaffirm Farah’s Britishness, Farah’s ‘outsider’ heritage was routinely acknowledged.

Accordingly, while previous work has highlighted how Britain’s non-white athletes are routinely presented within the press as ‘racialized subjects’ (Fortier, 2005: 569), a similar process can be identified in the press’ representation of Farah due to the continued reference to his original place of birth. In such instances, the press sought to continually (re)define Farah as once ‘Somalian’ but now ‘British’. In such instances, it was evident that immigrant ‘outsiders’ were required to prove their Britishness, by demonstrating their identifications with British culture (‘as British as Fish and Chips’ [Beacom, Belfast Telegraph, 06/08/12]; see also Rojek, 2007).

Nowhere within the press’ coverage were attempts made to certify the Britishness of the mixed-ethnicity Jessica Ennis. Certainly, Farah’s double Olympic gold’s undoubtedly resulted in greater press attention but the latent need to qualify Farah’s British identity revealed wider complexities surrounding British multiculturalism and British identity.

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11 Similar processes can also be observed in the work of Carrington (2001) and Burdsey (2008).
6.1.2. Accepting diversity: English anxiety and immigration

The above examples regarding Mo Farah can be seen as forming part of a wider, yet limited, assimilation of immigrant ‘outsiders’ within Britain (Vogler, 2000). Indeed, Rojek (2007) highlights that:

A gap has opened between the representation of the nation and the positioning of the population in relation to ‘the nation’. In this gap are emerging a wide variety of flexible, strategic approaches to British national identity. (2007: 176)

Accordingly, Ward (2004) has considered how the effects of multiculturalism within Britain has resulted in it having ‘much in common … with countries like Australia and Canada, where the unraveling of Greater Britain has given rise to new multicultural civic identities’ (2004: 257 [italic added]). With this in mind, it was the emphasis on the ‘new’ that seemed to underlie the press’ coverage of Britain. As a result, while reports of Britain’s achieved multiculturalism were evident within the press, such accounts revealed how processes of assimilation, civic integration and national cohesion could be invoked in reports on Farah and British diversity (Anthias, 2013; Ward, 2004).

Indeed, elsewhere Littler and Naidoo (2004) highlight how contemporary accounts regarding multiculturalism and diversity follow a ‘white past, multicultural present’ formula. They note that:

The ‘white past, multicultural present’ formation occurs simultaneously as a lament and a celebration – a celebration of our nation being modern, young, hip and in tune with the globalized economy as well as harbouring a nostalgia and lament for a bygone contained, safe and monocolutral world. (Littler and Naidoo, 2004: 338)

Consequently, in accordance with the press’ coverage of Mo Farah, it is evident that a similar process was at play. That is, by highlighting Farah’s tolerable acceptance as ‘British’, Farah was heralded as a potent ‘symbol’ (Holt, Daily Mirror, 13/08/12) of Britain’s modern, diverse and multicultural society, in fact, as a symbol of the ‘Rebirth of Britishness’ (Sandbrook, Daily Mail, 11/08/12). However, as previously revealed, such discourses stood alongside wider lamentations regarding Britain’s imperial past (Norman, 2012) and former imperial supremacy (Toynbee, 2012a). Here, the effects of the ‘white heritage, multicultural present’ dynamic reinforced the

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12 See section 6.1.
disparity between past Britain and new Britain (Littler and Naidoo, 2004).

With this in mind, the topic of immigration within Britain has formed an important part of debates concerning Britain and British identity and the ability of immigrants to assimilate with, or, from part of, British society (Burdsey, 2012; Mitra, 2013). Accordingly, one of the consequences of immigration has been a concern that ‘old certainties’ regarding values of Britishness have been called into question (Fletcher, 2011: 19). Indeed, since the end of the Second World War, such debates have aimed to determine what constitutes Britishness, and, perhaps, less favourably, who shouldn’t be included (Gilroy, 2005; Goodhart, 2013a; 2013b; Rojek, 2009). Coalescing with the loss of Britain’s imperial prestige, devolution and the EU, multiculturalism is seen as forming part of a wider process of British decline. Ewen (2012) notes that ‘intellectuals of the conservative right Roger Scruton, Simon Heffer, Ferdinand Mount, Peter Hitchens and Melanie Phillips are fond of arguing that Britain’s “greatness” has been banished to history; its coherent culture lost to the past’ (2012: 315). In part, such disdain has been fuelled by those on the far right, with the National Front, and, the more recent ‘English Defense League’, serving to re-invoke national fervor with the aim of excluding those from black or Asian descent (Edgar, 2013).

Accordingly, for England, the issue of immigration has proved particularly provocative. Commenting upon the diversity of Britain and the problems this has caused for England, Kumar (2006a) notes that ‘the English are alarmed at the pluralism they have so far encouraged, but find it difficult to define the model of English or British identity to which they might expect people – themselves included – to conform’ (2006b: 424). Indeed, such fears coalesce around a revamped sense of Englishness, which is often set against a pluralized British culture (Fletcher, 2011; Maguire, 2011), resulting in a defensive ‘Little Englander’ mentality (Burdsey, 2006; Gilroy, 2005).

Certainly, the sense that Britain’s increasing diversity had changed Britain, was highlighted in accounts that sought to measure Britain’s transformation during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The Sunday Telegraph (2012) noted that:

The Queen’s capacity to unite her subjects in admiration and respect for her and for the achievements of her reign is remarkable. Britain is a far more diverse country than it was in 1952, when [Queen Elizabeth] came to the throne. The fissures between us are more obvious, and in some ways deeper and sharper,
than they were 60 years ago. Britons no longer share a single common culture. In 1952, the nation was still emerging from the shadow of the Second World War. Some goods were still rationed. Most of us wore the same clothes, ate the same food, and shared the same religion and amusements. In the years since then, parts of our cities have been transformed in ways which, in 1952, would not have been recognised as ‘British’ at all. While we all enjoy a much higher standard of living, the gap between rich and poor is larger than it was in 1952. And resentments over immigration have increased, largely because in 1952, there had been very little immigration. (03/06/12)

As can be seen, while the *Sunday Telegraph* (2012) sought to ignore Britain’s history of imperial immigration and migration (Colley, 2014a; Ward, 2004), the conflicts surrounding immigration were vividly outlined by Riddell (2012), who noted that:

> With beacons of welcome ablaze around the Commonwealth, we forget at our peril that economic interest decrees a sensible immigration policy, while our shared humanity demands that Britain, a nation of migrants spearheaded by a monarch of German ancestry, offers safety to the tortured. (*Daily Telegraph*, 05/06/12)

In fact, although Riddell (2012) was able to point out the British monarchy’s ‘German’ ancestry, it was clear that Britain’s ‘openheartedness’ was a cause of concern, particularly, regarding its sense of culture and identity. Here, Riddell (2012) added that, ‘in a Jubilee of fantasy and imagination, listen out amid the celebration of this country’s openheartedness for a rustle from the chancel of Holy Trinity Church in Stratford. That would be Shakespeare turning in his grave’ (*Daily Telegraph*, 05/06/12).

Indeed, the image of England’s most famous playwright ‘turning in his grave’ served to manifest around English fears concerning Britain’s cultural erosion in the face of continued immigration. This was exemplified by Taylor’s (2012) reference to ‘the creeping cultural fragmentation that anyone over the age of 50 becomes darkly aware of the moment he or she opens a newspaper’ (*Daily Telegraph*, 02/06/12). Similarly, Moore (2012) added that:

> Behind these irritations lies an uneasy feeling that London is ceasing to be umbilically British. If this is a place where a third of the births are to parents not born in this country, if this is Londonistan, or Londongrad, does it have any unity? How would it survive the strain of economic disaster, let alone of physical attack? (*Daily Telegraph*, 28/07/12)

In accordance with the sense of unease, which surrounded Britain’s economic and political problems, English press reports sought to actively highlight Britain’s
‘cultural fragmentation’ and lack of unity as a consequence of its increasing diversity. In such instances, the reports suggested that foreign migration had polluted the purity of Britain, resulting in London feeling less and less ‘British’ (Moore, Daily Telegraph, 28/07/12).

To this extent, it is possible to locate these examples in relation to wider concerns regarding national decline and crisis. Indeed, Karner (2013) argues that feelings of decline and national crisis reveal ‘a disposition to seek and find solace in nationalist populisms that are often equally opposed to “those up there” and to “those out there”’ (Karner, 2013). Consequently, for the Daily Mail (2012a), it was ‘those out there’ who had come to Britain in ‘unprecedented waves of mass immigration’ and as a result had ‘challenge[d] our identity as a people’ (02/06/12a). This has been echoed by government proposals concerning the effects of immigration within Britain and the sense of disruption this has afforded British communities (Watt, 2011). In a speech made by David Cameron in 2011 on immigration, Cameron referred to ‘a kind of discomfort and disjointedness in some neighborhoods’ due to the ‘significant numbers of new people’ who had arrived in British ‘communities’ unable to speak the English language (BBC, 2011; see also Bryne, 2013; Edgar, 2013; Watt, 2011).

In such instances, the Guardian’s Jonathan Freedland (2012c) was able to point out that the success of the Olympics would fail to change British opinion on immigration. Freedland (2012c) highlighted that:

False dawns are frequent, in sport especially. Witness the victorious French football team of 1998 that was meant to hail a new, racially inclusive future for that country: it didn’t quite work out that way. As today’s Guardian/ICM poll shows, most Britons are not going to let the Olympics shift their views on immigration: those Somali-born asylum seekers unblessed by Mo Farah’s gifts will not be applauded as they walk into the pub. Our problems haven’t gone away just because the news bulletins have barely mentioned them for two weeks. (Guardian, 11/08/12c)

In fact, work by Poulton and Maguire (2012) and Meet et al. (2010) has highlighted how the right-wing British press tend to frame stories that argue for tougher immigration policies within Britain. Meer et al. (2010) note that for ‘the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail, Britishness is not multicultural’ (Meer et al., 2010: 13).

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13 See chapter five, section 5.0.
Accordingly, as the above examples reveal, this was also evident within both the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic press coverage, with a clear sense of paranoia embedded within the right-wing English press’ views on immigration (Daily Mail, 2012a; John, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Sunday Telegraph, 2012). This was exemplified in John’s (2012) comments, which suggested:

> we’re going to need the Olympic village to accommodate all the ‘overstayers’. It looks like the ‘legacy’ of the Games is going to be another milestone in Britain’s world-class record for accepting asylum seekers, no questions asked. (Daily Mail, 27/07/12)

Similarly, in interviews with individuals involved in the organisation of Scandinavian youth football tournaments, Engh et al. (2014) highlighted that ‘the risk of team members “jumping off” and applying for asylum in either of the Scandinavian countries prior to or after participating in a tournament’ was based on ‘a logic that presume[d] that individuals from so-called “poor countries” [were] likely to use their participation in a tournament as a migratory opportunity; a way into Scandinavia’ (2014: 792). In accordance with John’s (2012) remarks, Engh et al. (2014) highlighted that such suggestions helped to form an established image of the host nation, that is, as a ‘promised land’ upon which those from outside groups wished to join (Engh et al., 2014: 792). In doing so, ‘outsiders’, in this case, athletic ‘asylum seekers’ (John, Daily Mail, 27/07/12), were constructed upon a ‘minority of the worst’ distinction (Elias and Scotson, 1994). In fact, just one year after the 2012 Olympic Games, British Home Office vans patrolled London’s streets in order to tackle illegal immigration within Britain by warning illegal immigrants to ‘go home or face arrest’ (Casciani, 2013).

To this extent, it is possible to observe how various ‘kinds of nationalistic discourse may come to be strengthened and magnified by paranoid social defence mechanisms in which shame about the nation’s weak or declining international position is associated with anger and rage against foreigners and the enemy within who are seen as to blame’ (Vogler, 2000: 31). Certainly, such an explanation would align with those, primarily English, fears regarding the erosion of British culture (Richards, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Taylor, 2012) and its sense of unity (Hayward, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012). Here, Mennell (2007) notes that ‘the advent of

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multiculturalism and separatism is more likely a symptom of the dynamics of established-outsider relations during a period of high immigration than a significance cause of a possible failure of the assimilating process’ (2007: 223). Accordingly, for ‘established states, an important condition is “age” and “continuity” (Van Bentem van den Bergh, 2001: 210). Here:

Homogeneity is a result of long-term integration processes that make minorities disappear. The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and France are examples of such highly integrated state-societies, though long-distance migration now disturbs the self-evident character of their ‘we-feelings’. The United States has always combined a high level of national integration with recognition in politics of different ‘we-groups’ named according to their country of origin – the ‘ethnic vote’. (Van Bentem van den Bergh, 2001: 210)

To this extent, such anxieties regarding immigration may reflect wider insecurities in the British ‘we-identity’. More specifically, in comparison with the Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh coverage, it was clear that concerns regarding immigration within Britain, formed an important part of the English press’ coverage. Here, concerns regarding immigration may have alluded to a sense of English insecurity regarding Britain and British identity, one that was reflected in the attention given to the topic of immigration within the English press. Notably, it was England’s ‘Shakespeare’ who was viewed as being besmirched by the assimilation of diverse ethnic groups (Riddell, 2012). In doing so, the English press revealed a common practice amongst established groups, which involved confirming their history and cultural superiority in relation to changes in the British domestic figuration (Bucholc, 2013; Elias and Scotson, 1994).

Indeed, elsewhere, it is claimed that processes of globalisation, multiculturalism and transnational global developments have increasingly destabilised dominant or established notions of the nation and its national identity (Maguire, 2011). Certainly, the British press’ ability to herald the success of Farah and other Team GB athletes while at the same time anxiously debate the presence of immigration within Britain, suggests how such processes can form part of the complexities and ambiguities involved in newspaper (re)constructions of Britain. The fact that Britain’s successful

17 Indeed, Burdsey (2006) notes that ethnic minorities within Britain often find it easier to identify with the British identity rather the English identity. In fact, ‘the reasons for this identification with “Britishness” rather than “Englishness” are multiple, and contextually and temporally specific’ (Burdsey, 2006: 16).
athletes were being framed as a representation of a modern, multicultural, post-imperial Britain, may, on the one hand, present a over-zealous picture of multicultural and multinational British unity. The sense that Britain’s ethnic communities represented an allegiance to Team GB and the monarchy during both events is undermined by analyses, particularly within sport, which have endeavoured to reveal how:

The sporting affiliations of young diasporic citizens are multiple, with interest and support simultaneously directed towards nations of residence and those of ancestry. Indeed, research on minority ethnic Britons shows that sport is an important arena for the reproduction and contestation of ethnic and national identities, and that these patterns are complex, nuanced and influenced by a wide range of factors. (Burdsey, 2012: 78 [italics added])

However, on the other hand, the lack of British posturing regarding its imperial heritage during the Opening Ceremony may have ‘helped make possible re-appropriations of the flag in later contexts, not least Mo Farah victoriously wrapped in it’ (Branston, 2012: 2).

With this in mind, Loyal (2011) draws upon Gramsci’s (1971) ‘contradictory common sense’ (1971: 323-343) in relation to ‘the contradictory attitudes … which many in the indigenous population have towards immigrants’ (Loyal, 2011: 186). Here, Loyal (2011) highlights how ‘specific concerns about … jobs and pay levels … co-exist with feelings of mutual identification and humanitarian concern towards asylum seekers and migrants and their social conditions in other social contexts’ (2011: 186). Certainly, the above examples revealed a particular propensity for the English press to highlight specific concerns and anxieties regarding immigration and its effects upon British culture and identity. At the same time, however, other reports took the time to herald Britain’s multicultural diversity and unity.

Furthermore, while it is evident that such feelings may reflect ‘specific concerns’ regarding wider changes to the British state (Loyal, 2011: 186), in the case of Scotland, immigration provides a notable difference to England. Here, the SNP has actively encouraged immigration in an independent Scotland (Freedland, 2014a; Jack, 2013). While this may provide another example of the disparity between Scotland

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18 The only notable signifier of Britain’s imperial history was the inclusion of a model Empire Windrush.
and England, it can also add to the complex and contradictory attitudes regarding immigration within Britain.

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that a number of paradoxical processes were at play in the press’ construction of Britain and its multicultural depiction. Indeed, Maguire (2011) asserts that ‘the discourse and actions of dominant groups within a national culture constructs identities that are ambiguously placed between past and present’ (2011: 981). As a result, there is ‘both a drive to return to former glories and a drive to go forwards ever deeper into modernity’ (Maguire, 2011: 981). In light of this, section 6.1. suggested that while representations of Britain’s ‘new’, and, largely, multicultural identity, were constructed within the press, the above examples reveal how anxieties regarding immigration, and, in particular, the assimilation of ‘outsider’ cultures, served to reveal wider ambivalences regarding the representation of a multicultural Britain (Bygnes, 2013). Accordingly, while Bygnes (2013) reveals that ‘multicultural society is [ambivalently] described as both hopeful and problematic’ (2013: 127), set against Britain’s imperial history, the press’ coverage served to reveal the ambiguities ‘between past and present’ (Maguire, 2011: 981), that is, between a representation of the Britain that ‘used to be’ and the one that it had ‘become’ (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Parsons, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Sawer, 2012; The Independent on Sunday, 2012b). Here, discourses within the press reflected a ‘(cultural) politics of diversity’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 171), split between a multicultural Britain (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Guardian, 2012b; Macwhirter, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; The Independent on Sunday, 2012b) and a hostility to immigration (John, 2012; Moore, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Sunday Telegraphy, 2012).

Consequently, ‘as people recognise and experience the variety of the present’ (Storry and Childs, 1997: 327), other complexities surrounding Britain’s ‘multinational’ history were revealed. Indeed, Ridden (2004) notes that while:

On the one hand, Britishness has formed part of the basis for a common citizenship and for social cohesion among diverse groups, associated with attempts to extend identity from the center outward to the periphery, either in the form of anglicisation or as a flexible umbrella form of identity. On the other hand, Britishness has been consistently associated with attempts by various interest groups to change the relationship between the British state and its constituent parts, or between the various social groups that live within the United Kingdom. (Ridden, 2004: 197)

Drawing upon Ridden’s (2004) comments, we can extend the centre to periphery
analysis by exploring those within the wider ‘Commonwealth’ periphery. Here, the
Diamond Jubilee celebrations provided an opportunity for both Britain and the
dominions to share in the celebration of its mutual Head of State.

6.2. ‘Connecting cultures’: constructions of Britain within the Commonwealth
press

Forming part of the Jubilee’s theme of ‘Connecting Cultures’ (Grove-Wright, 2012),
the lighting of beacons across Britain and the Commonwealth sought to symbolically
unite the British home nations with its former dominions. McLaughlin (2012)
recorded that:

From an extinct volcano in Fife to a sunkissed archipelago in the South Pacific,
they were the sites coming together in a show of unity which reached around
the globe. In what was one of the most visually striking celebrations of the
Queen’s Diamond Jubilee, thousands of beacons were set alight the world over
yesterday, as communities touched by the monarch’s six decade-long reign paid
tribute with an ancient British custom. (The Scotsman, 05/06/12)

Indeed, the cross-national sense of community was shared by Pelling (2012), who
noted that, ‘it’s these moments of sudden camaraderie that I find hardest to explain to
the cynics and naysayers: the peculiar sense that you really are one big British and
Commonwealth family, headed by an extraordinarily admirable matriarch and united
by a common heritage’ (Daily Telegraph, 05/06/12). While Zerubavel (1997) has
examined how certain events can focus attention on a particular moment in the past,
providing a moment of ‘mnemonic synchronization’ across the nation (Zerubavel,
1997: 97), the above examples reveal that such commemorations of collective
sentiment could also work trans-nationally, by synchronizing attention to a particular
event with shared historical meaning. In the case of Britain, this mnemonic
community reflected a legacy of imperial contact (Berg, 2012), which today was
framed, rather positively, as ‘one big British and Commonwealth family … united by
a common heritage’ (Pelling, Daily Telegraph, 05/06/12).

In fact, references to the Commonwealth’s ‘family arrangement’ (Craggs and
Kumarasingham, 2014) were alluded to in Blair’s (2012) description of Britain,
suggesting that Britain:

is not a youngish country trying to find its sea legs on the international sports
landscape. It is rather a much-beloved, huggable older relative – a bit dusty, still
wearing clothes that are a little tight from a kind of mid-life crisis when ‘Cool Britannia’ was all the rage. *(The Globe and Mail, 28/07/12)*

Blair’s (2012) rather affectionate account of Britain as the ‘much-beloved, huggable older relative’, served to reveal how forms of figurative connection continue to underlie the post-imperial relationship between Britain and the former dominions (Winter, 2006). Incidentally, these relations could also reveal tangible familial ties.

Consequently, while one New Zealand school helped to ensure that its students ‘learnt about where they came from’ *(Dominion Post, 02/06/12)* other reports reflected upon the Commonwealth diaspora in Canada. In accordance with Winter’s (2006) analysis of Empire as a ‘family history’, the family history of one interviewee was drawn upon by Alldritt (2012):

Zelley’s life is a classic example of the Commonwealth diaspora. Shortly after Elizabeth was crowned, Zelley’s family emigrated to Canada to join his father, a recently demobilized Seaforth Highlander. A sea voyage to Montreal was followed by a train ride across the continent and a final ferry ride to Nanaimo. ‘Canada’s a good place,’ said Zelley, now a semi-retired accountant. ‘If we keep the monarchy we’ll just keep getting better. It’s part of our history and it’s a good system. It’s a successful method and it has history. It’s a multi-layered positive thing’. *(Vancouver Sun, 02/06/12)*

Clearly, Zelley’s ‘private memories’ of emigrating to Canada highlight the ties of interdependence which were forged between Britain and its former dominions by empire (Schilling, 2013). Here, Zelley’s comments represented how national attachments (‘Canada’s a good place’) were forged in interdependence with Britain, and, more specifically, through Canada’s monarchical ties with Britain.

Accordingly, elsewhere, the image of Queen Elizabeth was seen as being particularly reflective of the New Zealand national character, as Oldfield’s (2012) comments suggest:

There’s something about the Queen that appeals to our national character. She inherited her father’s reserve and work ethic and her mother’s practicality and dry Scottish sense of humour – none of which differs greatly from the traits of her Kiwi subjects. We, too, are frank, straightforward and not prone to displays of excess emotion. But her intense dedication to duty marks her out as a truly extraordinary person. *(Dominion Post, 02/06/12)*

Here, the Queen’s ‘dry Scottish sense of humour’ was constructed as reflecting that of ‘her Kiwi subjects’ (Oldfield, *Dominion Post, 02/06/12*). In addition, the *Vancouver Sun* (2012) noted that, ‘she has proved one of the most durable, remarkable and

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beloved monarchs in British history – and, by extension, in Canada’s history as a
fond, former, British colony over whose constitutional monarchy she still presides as
symbolic head of state’ (02/06/12).

Evidently, emotional attachments to Britain (Blair, 2012) the ‘Commonwealth
family’ (Pelling, 2012) and Queen Elizabeth (Alldritt, 2012; Oldfield, 2012; Vancouver Sun, 2012) were clearly evoked within some sections of the British and
Commonwealth press. These constructions, while highlighting shared family ties and
common history, helped to maintain a symbolic link with Britain that transcended
national boundaries for a sense of tradition based upon transnational associations.
Elsewhere, Ho (2013) has viewed such attachments as a form of ‘Colonial
(re)connectivity’, a process which defines the ‘emotional imagination and
reconnection between the coloniser and the colonised’ (2013: 2210). Whereas the
imperial prestige of royal occasions throughout the 1900’s helped to encourage a
‘sense of belonging to the Empire’ (Ward, 2004: 19), the 2012 Diamond Jubilee
provided a comparable form of imperial extension via the Commonwealth’s shared
cultural values (see also Cannadine, 1983).

In fact, while the reign of Queen Elizabeth had ‘overseen the transformation of
the Commonwealth, as it threw off its colonial past to become a international
organisation based on shared history and values’ (The Scotsman, 02/06/12a) the belief
that the ‘Anglosphere’ continued to be of value for Australia, was drawn upon by
Berg (2012):

The Anglosphere is not about the English language. It is about a collection of
values – individual liberty, the common law, parliamentary democracy, and
open markets – we share with Britain, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the
US. It recognises that different nations are joined by a common political
culture. Carr and Rudd can protest all they want: the existence of that common
culture is beyond question, and we are part of it. (The Sunday Age, 12/08/12)

Clearly, Australia’s ties to Britain remained prominent within its domestic politics. In
accordance with the above, this ‘common political culture’ was held together through
a shared collection of values. Indeed, these values and its history was something
which Australia should not be ashamed of:

It is obvious and important that we are part of the English-speaking world. Our
heritage is not something to be ashamed of. It is not a coincidence the oldest
surviving democracies are in the Anglosphere. Or that the Anglosphere
harbours the wealthiest countries. Or that a tradition of liberty, stretching back
to the Magna Carta, has given English-speaking nations a greater protection of human rights and private property than anywhere else. We ought to be proud, not bashful. … for Australia, the Anglosphere will still shape our social, cultural and political views over the next 100 years. It’s a shame only conservatives feel comfortable talking about it. (Berg, The Sunday Age, 12/08/12)

As can be seen, the conviction that ‘a tradition of liberty’ and the protection of human rights and property which this endowed, helped to provide an emotional foundation for continuing relations between Britain and the Commonwealth. Indeed, the ‘language of liberty’ has often been used in support of British unionism both within the UK and the former empire, as well as being universally adopted by a majority of Western nation-states (Colley, 2014a: 39; see also Colls, 2012; Rojek, 2007). Equally, while liberty has played a significant part in constructions of Britishness and British identity it has also provided a locus for various resistance and revolutionary movements around the world, most notably, the American Revolution (Colley, 2014a). As a result:

while liberty has provided a broadly accessible and multiform master narrative whereby varieties of Britons over the centuries have been able to tell and organize stories about themselves and their state, the political repercussion of this have been decidedly mixed. (Colley, 2014a: 37)

Consequently, while Berg’s (2012) comments reflected a distortion of the wider ambiguities surrounding ‘British liberty’, reference to Commonwealth freedoms and the ‘liberties’ they entailed continued to be reflected upon within the Commonwealth press.19 Accordingly, Foster-Bell (2012) noted that:

As the head of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Queen plays an important role binding together this disparate group of 54 countries – 16 of which she serves as head of state. The promotion of democratic good governance, the rule of law, individual liberty, prosperity through free and fair trade and peaceful international relations remain the key tenets of the Commonwealth. These are all values to which New Zealand readily subscribes. This country plays an active and useful role in the Commonwealth, having furnished its immediate past secretary-general, Sir Don McKinnon, and lobbied for suspension of membership for states that violate democratic norms. (Dominion Post, 04/06/12)

19 Indeed, Rojek (2007) argues that ‘by no means can the country be said to have a spotless record in applying or protecting these values - many examples of official national policy against the Irish and other colonised peoples and refugees demonstrate that these values have been vitiated’ (2007: 110)
Here, the Commonwealth presented not only an opportunity to represent New Zealand’s interests but also acted as an important intermediary in maintaining ‘democratic norms’ amongst its member states. In doing so, New Zealand was construed as an important part of the Commonwealth playing ‘an active and useful role’ in its endeavours (Foster-Bell, *Dominion Post*, 04/06/12).

To this extent, attachments to the monarchy were not fixed upon present conditions but instead formed part of a cumulative process, based upon past interactions and future contact (Gordon, 1990). Interdependently, these discourses served to contribute to the maintenance of former imperial links by collectivizing cross-national sentiment between the former dominions and Britain (Berg, 2012; Foster-Bell, 2012; Oldfield, 2012). Here, national identity was constructed in interdependence with constructions of Britain. Moreover, while accounts of national identity in Australia, Canada and New Zealand have aimed to examine how such identities were formed as part of the British Empire (Berg, 2012; *Dominion Post*, 2012; Oldfield, 2012), these examples suggest that the legacy of British imperialism has not resulted in a cross-national homogenous account of Britishness. Instead, they reveal how former dominions have internalized certain values and customs and used them to form part of their own national cultures. Consequently, while:

> The British world provided opportunities for colonized people to become British, and they could rework Britishness to their own ends, including anti-colonial ones; but in doing so they accepted its legitimacy and the hold of its social institutions on their lives. (Darian-Smith et al., 2007: 9)

In doing so, certain ‘British’ values remain an important part of contemporary post-colonial identity. Here, symbolic links with Britain and the former empire were maintained through the British and Commonwealth press’s construction of ‘imagined communities’ based on Commonwealth ties and shared history (Anderson, 2006).

Therefore, while it was clear that the former British Empire continued to shape the national histories of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, equally, these imperial histories continued to impact upon the press’ construction of both themselves and Britain, post-empire (Hyder, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012b; Stone, 2012). Indeed, previous sections have highlighted how the press served to re-construct the former imperial figuration via accounts of each nation’s contemporary standing vis-à-vis
This was, however, a varied re-construction, with Australia revealing a greater degree of insecurity regarding the strength of its national character, compared to Canada and New Zealand (Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012; Tate, 2012). Whereas Black (2005) argues that ‘the now-independent former colonies widely reject the legacy of British colonial rule as part of their public foundation myths’ (2005: 365), the above findings suggest a far more complicated attachment to Britain. Accordingly, while on the one hand, the legacy of empire and British imperialism can provide a familiar and consensual part of the national history of the former dominions, on the other, it can continue to be portrayed as impacting upon the tensions and ambivalences between Britain and its former dominions.

6.2.1. A ‘United’ Kingdom: national pride and the ‘continuity’ of Britain

In relation to the previous section, it is evident that Britain’s multinational history can serve to reveal a number of contradictions with regards to the post-imperial construction of Britain. In such instances, Nairn’s (2013) more recent concern with ‘boundaries’ can prove particularly unhelpful as it directs attention towards the contrasts that lay beyond a specific location rather than the tensions that exist between national and multi-national figurations, such as, former imperial groups. Furthermore, while analyses of ‘the other’ can prove analytically important, such approaches can fail to consider the multiple interactions that underlie national identifications.

Consequently, while ‘the national “we” invoked by celebratory media events can accommodate many competing and even incompatible definitions of national identity’ (Mihelj, 2008: 477), the mediated coverage of such events can also reveal moments of cross-national interdependence. Indeed, in the case of Scotland, the historical interdependence between England and Scotland was drawn upon by Hamilton (2012), who noted:

we are already a fusion of different identities. That is the inevitable consequence of our history. It is also the nature of the modern world where the EU, IMF and UN dominate the daily news in a way that rams home the advent of global citizenship. There are two paths here – one is to become obsessed about purity of identity, the other to relax and enjoy the inevitable cross-currents of an interdependent world. My overwhelming sense here is that Scots, like most others around the globe, have already chosen that second path. (The Scotsman, 05/08/12)

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20 See chapter five, sections 5.2.2.
Similarly, Macwhirter (2012) added:

The United Kingdom, as the name suggests, was created by the Union of the Crowns in 1603, not the Treaty of Union in 1707, and that won’t change just because the Scottish Parliament acquires economic powers. The difference is that for 300 years, Scotland existed as a nation without a state. If and when Scotland achieves statehood, Scots may legitimately regard themselves as part of a kind of ‘continuity’ Britain. (*Sunday Herald*, 12/08/12)

Instead of reflecting a complete disassociation with Britain, the ‘if and when’ surrounding Scottish statehood, was perceived as a progressive continuation of Scottish associations with Britain and an important part of Scotland’s ‘British’ history. In fact, while drawing upon the work of McCarthy (2005), Whigham (2012) highlights that whereas Scott’s living in England may adopt ‘a more implicit, social-mental Scottish identity’ (2012: 8) this does not prevent their integration within the local culture. Indeed, such associations stand in the way of debates concerning national identity that seek to polarize analyses along an either/or distinction (Nairn, 2013). Accordingly, whereas some sections of press sought to highlight Scotland’s growing disassociation with Britain via suggestions that argued for a conspicuously independent Scottish identity (Fry, 2012; Hassan, 2012), in other instances, Scottish identity was widely accepted and seen as an important part of the British identity.

Subsequently, in analyses of the effects of devolution in Scotland, Ichijo (2012) argues that:

With affirmation of Scottishness firmly entrenched in political discourse, the focus of the discussion of national identity in Scotland appears to have shifted to debates on Britishness, a vexed question for the UK as a whole. (2012: 35)

In fact, Scottish devolution has, Ichijo (2012) notes, proved ‘a double-edged sword in managing multiple national identities’ (2012: 35). Consequently, with the SNP claiming that ‘it isn’t just Unionists who can claim to be both Scottish and British’ (*The Scotsman*, 12/08/12), the assumption that British attachments require a choice between two identities: British or English; British or Scottish; British or Welsh and British or Northern Irish, may be a false one. Indeed Orwell (1941) argued that:

It is quite true that the so-called races of Britain feel themselves to be very different from one another. A Scotsman, for instance, does not thank you if you call him an Englishman. You can see the hesitation we feel on this point by the fact that we call our islands by no less than six different names, England,
Britain, Great Britain, the British Isles, the United Kingdom and, in very exalted moments, Albion. Even the differences between north and south England loom large in our own eyes. But somehow these differences fade away the moment that any two Britons are confronted by a European. It is very rare to meet a foreigner, other than an American, who can distinguish between English and Scots or even English and Irish. (1941: 21-22)

Orwell’s (1941) account of the foreigner’s inability to distinguish the British home nations may find evidence in the shared history, culture and sense of unity that could be found in both the British and Commonwealth coverage (Berg, 2012; Blair, 2012; Pelling, 2012). Accordingly, writing in The Scotsman, Labour MP and Shadow Foreign Secretary, Douglas Alexander (2012) argued that:

The nationalists have worked hard at their story of Scotland over the last decade. They have worked hard to harness to the cause of independence the confidence and prosperity built in the years following the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. ‘Be Part of Better’, their slogan in the 2011 elections, captured their determination to try and make voting SNP the inevitable choice for voters with a sense of pride and aspiration for Scotland. In pursuit of their goal – separation of Scotland from the UK – the nationalists have had to tell a story about Britain to justify the break-up they seek. That’s why, despite their claims to be ‘positive’, they suggest at every opportunity that the rest of the UK is now so foreign in its values and so different in its outlook that break-up is not just appropriate but inevitable. The problem for the nationalists is that this narrative of separation has never proved a winning story. It does not ring true to the majority of us because whether through reasons of family ties and friendship, an affinity with aspects of shared culture, or an admiration of shared institutions from the NHS to the BBC and Team GB, millions of us reject separation as our fate. These feelings, held by millions of Scots, help explain why the Olympics have proved such a nightmare for the nationalists. It is not simply that their unwillingness to offer good luck to Team GB made them sound small, and their talk of Scolympians just sounded embarrassing. (13/08/12)

As can be seen in Alexander’s (2012) remarks, notions of shared culture, shared institutions and familial ties between Scotland and England were clearly evoked. In fact, the normalization of Scottishness within political debates was drawn upon by Hamilton (2012), who sought to emphasize the shared support for both Scotland and Britain during the Olympics:

First, the Olympic Games has nothing whatsoever to do with whether Scotland want to become independent in 2014. One is a global sporting spectacle showing human endeavour and spirit at its most fabulous, the other is a local political decision for Scots on the best political and economic future for our country. Secondly, it is wholly possible to be a passionate Scottish Nationalist
supporting ‘Team GB’ (I’m, happy to be ‘Exhibit A’) just as avowed Scottish Unionists will doubtless be right behind ‘Team Scotland’ in the Commonwealth Games in 2014. (Hamilton, The Scotsman, 05/08/12)

In fact, Britain’s ability to successfully host the Olympic Games provided a source of confidence for Glasgow’s hosting of the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The Scotsman (2012e) argued:

The London Games have also shown what we are capable of in terms of staging, organisation and logistics – all the more creditable given the real doubts that surrounded this event. This has set a high bar for the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow in 2014. But it has also shown what, with foresight and dedication, our public authorities and services can do. (13/08/12e)

Indeed, this stands in contrast to Perryman (2013) who suggests that Glasgow’s Commonwealth Games reflect another form of separation between Scotland and Britain. Rather, the above comments reveal a far more positive account of Scotland’s hosting ability and one that is based upon the success of the London Olympics and its transference to Glasgow. Accordingly, Chairman of the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games, Michael Cavanagh (2012), highlighted:

Team GB has grasped the opportunity of home advantage with both hands and our intention is to do the same with Team Scotland in 2014. Team GB, as a name for the British Olympic team, has been used since the Sydney 2000 Games but it’s only in the last few weeks that the whole country has become aware of it to the extent that every second person on the streets in London seems to be wearing Team GB kit and the venues are resounding to chants of ‘GB’ whenever any British athletes are performing. (The Scotsman, 11/08/12)

Indeed, the sense that Scottish success and pride stood alongside that of Britain, was mirrored in Welsh reports of the Olympic Games and its hosting capabilities. This could be seen in comments relating to Wales’s hosting of the Games opening football event (Wathan, 2012). Liew (2012), writing in the Daily Telegraph, noted that:

They kept a welcome in the hillside, and in the grandstand, and also in the bars and the hot dog stalls, and on the streets. A giant sculpture in the form of the Olympic rings stood proudly outside City Hall in Cathays Park. For this, the prologue to these Olympic Games, was Wales’s moment as much as it was London’s. There was a certain irony in the fact that Team GB were playing here – as well as once more on Saturday and the men’s team next Wednesday – given how ardently the Football Association of Wales once strove to extinguish it. But where once there was suspicion, there is only goodwill, as exemplified on the front page of the Western Mail yesterday morning, which simply read: ‘Welcome to Wales’. (26/07/12)
Indeed, Boyle and Haynes (2014) note that ‘part of the rhetoric of London 2012 suggested the Games would not only engage people in the capital but also everyone living across the UK’ (2014: 89). In doing so they note that:

One might conclude from the BBC’s presentation of national unity in its coverage that the geopolitics of sport, at least in the British context, had subsumed any discordant or contradictory voices from Celtic nations about the overbearing London-centric nature of the Games and had created the sense that the entire British population was engaged in the event with equal emotional investment and resonance. (Boyle and Haynes, 2014: 91)

While ‘contradictory voices from Celtic nations’ were clearly visible within both the Celtic and English coverage, the domestic press provided a slightly different ‘presentation of national unity’ (Boyle and Haynes, 2014: 91). Here, home nation achievement was constructed alongside, and, as an integrative part of, Britain’s successful hosting of the games. That is, in addition to Wales’s credited hosting abilities (Liew, 2012), a sense of Welsh achievement was also reflected in their contribution to the ‘Team GB’ medal count. Griffiths (2012) highlighted:

But if these Games have become a source of British pride for decades, then Wales has every right to take a bow. Seven medals we claimed, three golds, three silvers and a bronze. Who could have dared dream we would punch above our weight in such style? Organiser-in-chief Lord Sebastian Coe said he wanted great British moments from these Games and Wales helped grant him his wish. (Western Mail, 13/08/12)

Moreover, while advocates for Welsh independence remained somewhat muted, historical loyalty to Britain and the empire have been largely compatible within Wales (Colley, 2014a; Macleod, 2013; Ward, 2004).21 In accordance with Griffiths’s (2012) remarks and in contrast to the BBC’s attempts to divert attention away from ‘the overbearing London-centric nature of the Games’ (Boyle and Haynes, 2014: 91), Welsh reports sought to capitalize upon the success of the London Games by highlighting the combined home nation effort of Britain. The Western Mail (2012) argued that:

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21 Indeed, Macleod (2013) notes that it has been Wales’s intense localism, not its incorporation within Britain, which has led to contestations over definitions of ‘Welshness’. Colley (2014a) adds that imperial ‘ideas circulated widely in print and manuscript until at least the eighteenth century, and the notion that Britain – and its empire – had originally been Welsh creations seems to have allowed some men and women in Wales to rationalize and cope with the loss of their country’s independence’ (2014a: 79). In such instances, Wales’s incorporation within Britain and its imperial administration may have allowed Wales to develop and maintain ‘dual identities’ (Colley, 2014a: 79).
And the wonderful light in which Britain – all of Britain – has been shown must be capitalised upon. London has grown immeasurably over the past two weeks. We must make sure that the same is true for Wales and the rest of the UK. (13/08/12)

Indeed, such remarks reveal a far more stable relationship between Wales and Britain, one that was secured by Wales’s integrative role within Britain’s hosting and medal success.

**Conclusion**

In accordance with chapter five, the aim has been to examine how both the British home nations and the former dominions sought to construct, frame and represent contemporary relations between themselves and Britain during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Ceremonies. Here, it was perceived that a relational account of the press would help elucidate upon contemporary constructions of Britain and British identity within both Britain and the former dominions. In doing so, examples from the data were used to highlight how the press’ coverage sought to reveal themes related to aspects of British ‘dis-unity’ and British ‘unity’. Accordingly, while it was found that in some instances, contemporary relations remained consistent, in other instances, these relations were being re-negotiated or contested.\(^{22}\) With this in mind, the final part of this chapter will briefly summarize some of the key aspects of this data. These themes will be returned to in the conclusion.

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that a sense of British unity and British attachment was clearly evoked within the British and Commonwealth coverage. In particular, it was found that during both the Jubilee and London Olympic Games, Britain was represented as a new, confident and modern nation (Southphommasane, 2012b), happy with its place in the world and finally over it post-imperial decline (Lott, 2012; *The Independent on Sunday*, 2012b). In doing so, Britain was framed as a multicultural nation (*The Independent*, 2012b), with a shared attachment for the British monarchy (Berg, 2012; Pelling, 2012) and a united sense of pride in its successful hosting of the 2012 Olympic Games (Parsons, 2012b; *The Independent on Sunday*, 2012b; *The Scotsman*, 2012d; 2012e). Nevertheless, this is

\(^{22}\) See chapter six, sections 6.2. and 6.2.1. and chapter five, sections 5.2.2. and 5.2.3.
not to suggest that the press’ coverage was entirely positive. Indeed, in accordance with the previous chapter’s findings it is clear that a sense of anxiety still pervaded the right-wing English press’ views on immigration and its effects upon British culture and identity (John, 2012; Riddell, 2012).

Similarly, while drawing upon narratives of imperial and national history, the Commonwealth press reports exposed tensions within their framing of Britain during both events. That is, whether revealing examples of anxiety relating to Australian society and its national character (Hinds, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012b), championing Canadian success (Hyder, 2012) or revealing disillusionment with an ‘English’ monarch (Milne, 2012; Rothwell, 2012; Stone, 2012), attachments to Britain oscillated between processes of attachment and (dis)attachment. This was exemplified in the following comments by Rudman (2012):

Most of us have grown up with the Queen as head of state, safely in her place in Buckingham Palace, as permanent as the sun and the moon. It no doubt made some sense when New Zealand’s role was the supplier of food and fighting men to the motherland. But at the end of her reign, in an era where our future is bound up with Asia, the concept of a new head of state, who must be Anglican, and preferably a male, oh yes, and comes from an English farming family called Windsor, is just barking mad. (New Zealand Herald, 06/06/12)

Here, the changing character of interdependence between New Zealand and Britain – and the emerging interdependence of New Zealand with Asia – served to highlight a change in attitudes towards Britain and the British monarchy. Furthermore, in conjunction with analyses of sport (Collins, 2011; Falcous, 2007; Maguire, 1993b; 2011c; Malcolm, 2012) and Commonwealth war commemorations (Winter, 2006), ties between Britain and the Commonwealth served to reinforce former imperial associations and memories of empire, while interdependently serving to fortify contemporary national identity in the former dominions (Rudman, 2012).

In addition, the overwhelming support that was afforded the Somali born, British Muslim, Mo Farah, was one example of how British identity was constructed as inclusive and diverse. To this extent, it is important to view these representations as part of a wider dynamic of established and outsider relations and images (Atkinson, 2002). That is, while Goodhart (2013b) refers to Britain’s ‘new’ identity as a ‘shedding of a skin’, adding that, ‘as we move further away from the purposes and symbols of one national period – the British imperial and then post-imperial period – we gradually put on the clothes of another’ (2013b), such descriptions fail to
acknowledge how the press’ coverage of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games revealed underlying tensions regarding the framing of Britain.\textsuperscript{23} With regards to the coverage on the Scottish athlete, Andy Murray and the Somali born, Mo Farah, both individuals were regularly constructed within the press as assimilating to ‘established’ British images. As a result, instead of ‘mov[ing] away from the purposes and symbols of one national period’ (Goodhart, 2013b), such examples suggest that normative accounts of constructing Britain continued to underlie the press’ coverage during both events.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, references to, and, representations of, Britain’s imperial history proved to be a reoccurring theme throughout the British and Commonwealth coverage. Similarly, accounts of Britain’s past were also maintained via the press’ reference to the Second World War (Parsons, 2012a).

With this in mind, it is possible to consider whether constructions of a multicultural and diverse Britain are accurate reflections of a ‘new’ or ‘changed’ Britain. In such instances, do these multicultural representations undermine established images of Britain’s imperial history and past depictions of a united British society? Is multicultural Britain a new articulation of this same unity, one that will be able to accommodate the further fragmentation of the British home nations? How will these changes impact upon British identity, its collective significance, its emotional appeal and its mediated construction?

In light of such questions, it is evident that both established and outsider groups will construct and (re)construct the nation, drawing upon both national and cross-national influences. That is, whether heralding British ‘unity’ through reports of its shared imperial history, popular British culture, and diverse society, or by reflecting upon British ‘dis-unity’ via accounts of its post-imperial decline, contemporary problems and lack of world role, the findings of this research reveal that representations of Britain and British identity are constructed and (re)constructed in a figuration of national, cross-national and historical interdependence. This suggests that while certain histories will be dramatized as part of the nation’s collective unity, identity and memories, alternative representations that aim to highlight national distinctiveness and emerging constructions of the nation will also be formed. It can


be assumed that such changes will further impact upon established and fantasy-laden images of Britain’s former imperial supremacy. For now, however, it is possible to suggest that the contested framing of Britain’s past, alongside its diverse present, will continue to form an important part of the press’ framing of Britain.

Consequently, when considered in accordance with chapter five it is evident that constructions of Britain involved processes of integration and attachment (British unity) as well as disintegration and (dis)attachment (British dis-unity). Furthermore, these constructions served to divide identifications as well as unite cross-national attachments. Indeed, while press discourses can serve to define sanctioned constructions of the nation (Dayan and Katz, 1992), they can also be resisted and (re)constructed (Maguire, 2011; Mihelj, 2007). Subsequently, through an interdependent analysis of the domestic and Commonwealth press’ construction, framing and representation of Britain and British identity, we can begin to see how these constructions are related to power balances within the wider British state and Commonwealth. In particular, it highlights how British identity works by paradoxically enabling national identification as well as subsuming such national identifications under a larger more capacious British identification. Freedland (2014a) has argued that:

‘British’ has become a capacious, even a generous, category. It hyphenates easily. Because it always stood for a plural, multinational identity, it is able, by definition, to accommodate difference: you could always be Welsh-British or Scottish-British, so now you can be Black British or Muslim British. (2014a)

To this extent, while it is evident that a nation’s history provides a prominent marker in constructions of the nation and its national identity, these findings suggest that it is a construction that is marked by processes of unification, re-unification and dis-unification as well as wider structural balances of power. Discussion of these processes and what they reveal about British identity in 2012 will be concluded in the following chapter, whereupon attention will also be given to the multi-layered British habitus.

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25 Indeed, this figurational framework can be used to study numerous power relations comprising smaller national differences, such as that seen in the divide between Northern and Southern England as well as larger figurations, such as the differences between the white dominions within empire and Britain’s colonies in Africa and the Asian pacific.

Conclusion

I. Britain in 2012

Commenting upon the social construction of ‘time’, Dunning et al. (2004) note that:

‘Time’, ‘year’ and ‘century’ are symbols constructed by humans, means of *orientation* developed to aid their understanding and to *control* and *coordinate* their activities in the socio-physical universe in which they live. (2004: 2 [italics added])

Accordingly, while the social construction of time allows humans to orientate themselves, control their surroundings and coordinate their lives, comparably, nations follow a similar process when constructing national images and ideologies. In such instances, national constructions help to orientate humans into national groups, control who is and who isn’t part of the nation as well as coordinate the national present in relation to the nation’s past.

Equally, both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games can be considered in relation to the ‘succession of changes’ that societies undergo in the sequence of time’ (Elias, 2008a: 127 [italics added]). That is, both events did not occur independently but took place within a multi-national state whose cultures and populations have undergone numerous changes and transformations. The temporality of both events, while forming part of a long-line of British royal and sporting occasions, stood to mark two important ‘moments’ in British history.¹ Here, it was possible to examine how contemporary constructions of Britain and British identity were historically related and developmentally formed (Dunning et al., 2004; Falcous and Maguire, 2013; Maguire, 1995).

Accordingly, Chapters One and Two both examined how Elias’s attention towards sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformations could, in the context of Britain, be used to explore how state development and national identity are interdependently related. Here, attention shifted away from viewing Britain as a separate category towards one that was interdependently related to those nation-states outside of the UK, whose own national histories were once ‘British’. Following this, Chapters Two and Three served to highlight the trans-national entanglements

¹ The Diamond Jubilee marked the sixty-year reign of Queen Elizabeth II – only the second British monarch in British history to reach this milestone – and the London Olympic Games represented the third time that the games had been held in London.
surrounding British identity. This approach was further developed in Chapter Three, which outlined an analysis of the press that was fundamentally relational and historically rooted in the socio-historical development of the British State and empire. Here, national and multi-national identifications, such as Britain’s, were viewed as being constructed in accordance with broader balances of power, in which British representations have often been framed by an established English/British discourse. In doing so, this chapter examined how changes in the balance of power between functionally interdependent groups, in this case, between the British home nations and the former dominions, were reflected in the discursive construction of Britain.

In particular, appropriating for the past and making sense of the present formed an important part the discursive construction of Britain. Chapter Five examined how Britain’s sense of displacement was often reflected in examples of British dis-unity and decline. Here, the belief that Britain was very different to its former ‘imperial’ self was clearly visible within the press’ attempts to ‘orientate’ as well as ‘re-orientate’ their constructions of Britain (Haywar, 2012; Phillips, 2012; *The Independent on Sunday*, 2012b). This was further considered in Chapter Six, whereupon the press’ framing of Britain’s multicultural society was used to (re)construct Britain’s image (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Lott, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012).

To this extent, while Falcous and Silk (2010) highlight that ‘Britain’s post-imperial self imaginings’ posit an important insight into Britain’s ‘ongoing national anxieties’ (2010: 170), newspaper coverage of both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games revealed a number of ‘resolutions’ and ‘anxieties’ in the discursive construction of Britain. As a catalyst, each event served to draw upon Britain’s past, present and possible future(s), through discourses that gestured towards the complexity and ambiguity of British identity. Here national ‘symbols’ were constructed in particular ways, presenting versions of the nation and orientating particular individuals and groups (Dunning et al., 2004).

Indeed, the following sections will argue that constructions of national identity and national habituses are complex phenomena that, in the case of Britain, are predicated upon social relations, historical contingencies and balances of power. Indeed, this is driven by the research findings which revealed that constructions of Britain were not based upon an unlimited conception of Britain’s ‘multiple identities’ (cf. Llwellyn, 2012; 2014), that is, a capacious notion of Britain, both vast and indefinite (cf. Bradshaw and Roberts, 1998), but instead formed upon a multi-layered
construction of Britain and British identity. To this end, each of the following sections will explore the multi-layered construction of Britain as it was presented both within the domestic and Commonwealth national press.

II. The multi-layered construction of Britain

As previously noted, if changes in national identification are to be examined, then changes at the ‘level of state-building’ (Bowden, 2009) should also be examined. Indeed, Goulbourne (1991) argues that:

If we accept that it is sufficient for groups of people to feel that they share certain things in common and want to be separate from others, then we can easily enough envisage very many more nation-states being formed out of present nations-states … There would be, for example, minorities of English and Welsh people in an independent Scotland as well as Scottish minorities in other parts of Britain … [This also suggests] that – like individuals and groups within nearly all Britain’s ethnic minorities today – individuals and groups within new national majorities of a dis-United Kingdom would experience, simultaneously, majority and minority statuses, depending on their specific points of location at particular moments (1991: 223 [italics in original])

Taken into consideration, Goulbourne’s (1991) remarks indicate the various ‘levels’ of social organisation enveloping the nation and how such ‘levels’ are based upon majority/minority statuses. Similarly, Calhoun (2004) adds, ‘large families are always composed of smaller families’ and along a ‘sliding scale of loyalties’ (2004: 38).

Accordingly, there are important implications in both Goulbourne (1991) and Calhoun’s (2004) analysis. In particular, relations between majority and minority groups (Goulbourne, 1991), which can be locationally and temporally defined along a ‘sliding scale’ (Calhoun, 2004) of ephemeral or long term identification, can be afforded a more critical consideration when the relationships between individuals/groups are viewed as power balances. Here, national constructions and discourses (De Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak et al., 1999; Van Dijk, 1988; 1997; 2011) as well as identification processes (Elias, 1991; 1996; 2008a) are never homogenous or unchanging but are instead formed in relation to the balance(s) of power between groups. De Swaan (1995) elaborates:

Social identification is a process in which people come to feel that some other human beings are much ‘the same’ as they are and still others are more ‘unlike’ them. It occurs in the course of group formation, as part of the dialects of inclusion and exclusion from which groups emerge in a dynamics of
Drawing attention to the processes underlying group formation, De Swaan’s (1995) ‘dialectics of inclusion and exclusion’ posits a far more contested appreciation of the multi-layered dynamics concerning social groups (‘dynamics of competition’) and of majority/minority statuses in general. In particular, De Swaan’s (1995) remarks point towards the contested relations underlying identification processes. As a result, while Elias (1991) is clear to point out that ‘the use of the pronoun “we” is probably strongest in relation … to a nation-state’ (1991: 202), it is evident that there are a multitude of we-identifications existing at various levels of human organisation. Therefore:

It is to give a mere selection of the possible we-relations to point out that people can say ‘we’ in relation to their families or friends, to villages or towns where they live, to nation-states, to post-national units combining several nation-states and finally in relation to mankind. (Elias, 1991: 202)

Consequently, if identification with the nation-state continues to provide a powerful source of ‘we-identity’, then it is plausible to suggest that across the British Empire similar ‘we-relations’, that is, an ‘imperial we-identity’, was formed in relation to the empire’s constituent dominions and colonial territories.²

Indeed, beginning with the contested emergence of the British state in 1707, constructions of Britain were later expanded into ‘one large categorical identity’ – the British Empire – a process that encompassed many ‘smaller categories’ of dominions, colonies and territories (Calhoun, 2004: 39). Here, the ‘distinct cultural codes, institutional arrangements and ideologies’ (Maguire, 2005: 14) within Britain, formed part of a wider integrated network of figurational interdependence. Consequently, it was examined in Chapter Two how the formation of a denser social network of interdependence across Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Elias, 2012), helped to forge a collective – yet always contested – British identification.

This extends our understanding of national habitus codes by indicating the wider identifications that can be made between individuals, the nation and larger collective units (Mennell, 1994). In such instances, examinations of the British

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² Accordingly, while various scholars have considered how relatively recent trans-global interactions have eroded nation-state sovereignty (Appadurai, 1996), national cultures have been restructured and re-imagined as part of empire and imperialism for far longer. As a result, national memberships and attachments have often been multiple, contested and constructed along complex axes of national and imperial association as well as through coloniser and colonised relations.
‘imperial’ figuration revealed that individuals were not shackled to one ‘national’ consciousness, history or culture but could possess ‘multiple and complex identities’ through which various (national) categories of people could share a collective ‘imperial’ consciousness (Maguire and Tuck, 1998: 104; see also Mennell, 1994). Accordingly, as both national and imperial affiliations were functionally dependent on one another, the British Empire became deeply embedded within the shared histories and collective memories of the colonial nations that constituted it (Stockwell, 2008). Indeed, as highlighted by one member of the ‘Commonwealth diaspora’ (Alldritt, *Vancouver Sun*, 02/06/12), Canada’s monarchial links were ‘a multi-layered positive thing’, adding that, ‘It’s part of our history’ (Zelley cited in Alldritt, *Vancouver Sun*, 02/06/12, [italics added]). Thus, Moore (2010) argues that:

> Individual identity/habitus has to be understood, not only in the context of the collective habitus/identity but also as a temporal phenomenon formed over generations and linked as much to the past as it is to the present. It is also important to recognise that identity and habitus are multi-layered and multi-perspectival and are shaped by the relations or figurations we have with those around us (Moore, 2010: 4.6)

With this in mind, it is possible to apply Moore’s (2010) analysis to the multi-figurational dynamics underlying constructions of Britain and British identity and how these constructions are themselves shaped by past/present reflections and interdependent figurations. Here, the ‘multi-layered aspect of we-concepts’ (Elias, 1991: 202) can be seen in McCrone’s (2006) suggestion that:

> If Scotland was ‘unionist’ and politically British in the 1950s (there was virtually no difference in how Scotland and England voted in this decade, nor in the 1960s), it was not because its people did not think of themselves as Scots rather than Brits, but because these territorial identities were sufficiently nested one in the other, and the political frames of reference were very similar. Since the 1970s, we have grown used to the apparent contradiction between the frames of reference because of the emergent political-cultural conditions of the period. The point is not that suddenly Scots changed their values and attitudes, but that the political prism through which they expressed these altered. (2006: 19 [italics added])

Consequently, there can be, during particular periods, a multitude of we-relations occurring across various integration levels that can result in a restructuring of relations, attitudes and identifications. Importantly, however, these changes are related to emerging political, cultural and national ‘prisms’ through which particular
values and attitudes may undergo various changes in intensity (De Swaan, 1995; Elias, 1991; Maguire and Tuck, 2005; McCrone, 2006).

Furthermore, McCrone’s (2002) reference to the ‘nested’ identities of Scotland can be identified in McEwen’s (2013) analysis of Scotland’s position within the British Union during the Scottish Independence Referendum. Indeed, McEwen (2013) has noted how the referendum increasingly reflected Scotland’s ‘embedded independence’ within the UK. In such instances, an independent Scotland would reconfigure Scotland’s relationship with the British state as one based upon ‘a partnership of equals’ (McEwen, 2013).3 These sentiments were echoed in the SNP’s assertion that Scotland would maintain ties with the British pound (via a currency union) and would maintain the British monarchy as its Head of State (Merco Press, 2013).

What is made clear in the above examples is the extent to which the balance of power between groups, in this instance between Scotland and the rest of UK, is related to ‘the emergent political-cultural conditions of … [particular] period[s]’ (McCrone, 2006: 19). To this extent, when viewing power as relational and historically contextualised, understanding multi-national group identifications, such as Britain’s, requires a closer examination of how processes of marginalisation, relations of power and historical traditions, form an important part of group identity. Much like ‘the conditional nature of [social] integration’ (Rojek, 2006: 677), social identities are not definite, unchanging or unceasingly multiple, but are instead constrained and enabled by wider processes of interdependence and balances of power. Indeed, rather than revealing a sudden change in values and attitudes, processes of identification can reflect the complexity and residuality of group attachments. Such attachments often change over time as well become more or less salient for particular groups.

Therefore, when examining the construction, representation and framing of Britain and British identity one can begin to perceive the ‘multi-layered aspects of we-concepts’ and its relationship to British we-images (Elias, 1991: 202; Moore, 2010). While personal pronouns are often used to help create and forge a sense of group belonging, in certain instances ‘they/them’ distinctions may be ignored or

3 See http://www.scotsman.com/news/nicola-mcewen-partnership-after-independence-1-3051194, retrieved: 2 April 2014. Indeed, such processes are echoed in other independence movements, such as, Catalonia and Quebec.
undermined by larger ‘we’ identifications. As a result, there can also be ‘We-We balances’. That is, it is possible to conceive how at a national level, the national ‘We’ can form part of, and, indeed, has formed part of, larger levels of multi-national identification.

For example, if one returns to Elias and Scotson’s (1994) original investigation of the town ‘Winston Parva’, it was evident that the disparity between an established and outsider group within the town was subsequently reflected in the identities of each group. That is, an established ‘We’ identification existed amongst the established group, and, correspondingly, an outsider ‘We’ identification existed amongst the outsider group. However, by extending this level of analysis, both groups belonged to – despite their various appropriations and housing locations – ‘Winston Parva’, and, as a consequence, could both subscribe to a ‘Winston Parva’ ‘We’ identification. Further still, let us imagine that the investigation had been extended to consider a neighbouring, less favorable town, yet one that was still located in the same region. In this hypothetical scenario, interviews with ‘Winston Parva’s’ established and outsider groups may have revealed a larger established-outsider dynamic existing between ‘Winston Parva’ and the neighbouring town, one, that may have possibly resulted in ‘Winston Parva’s’ residents (both established and outsider) appropriating the ‘established’ identification in comparison to their ‘outsider’ neighbours. Indeed, in accordance with process sociological work on football hooliganism, ‘we-group’ identifications and ‘we-bonds’ can form part of, as well as, go beyond residential, local, regional and national borders.4

In the extended example used above and in investigations of ‘we-identities’ in general (De Swaan, 1995; Malcolm, 2012; Mennell, 2007), it is evident that there are ‘degree[s] of difference’ (Skey, 2014), ‘degree[s] of social differentiation’ (Loyal, 2004: 137), ‘sliding scale[s]’ (Calhoun, 2004: 38) and intensities of attachment and/or

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4 Indeed, this is considered further in Bairner’s (2006) discussion on ‘The Leicester School’s’ contribution to the study of football hooliganism. Indeed, Bairner (2006) states that ‘in attempting to establish a sociological understanding that is capable of transcending national boundaries, the Leicester School notes that in all cases the shared characteristic consists of social formations that involve intense “we-group” bonds’ (2006: 593). In spite of certain criticisms (Armstrong, 1998), Bairner (2006) adds that in the case of Northern Ireland, ‘The Leicester School’s’ analysis provides ‘an accurate description of the source of the problem in Northern Ireland where, despite the presence of an alternative fault line, much of the hooliganism that has occurred owes more to *segmental bonding* within lower working-class Protestant communities than to divisions between nationalist and unionist fans’ (2006: 593 [italics added]).
(dis)attachment at play (De Swaan, 1995; Elias, 1991).5 Amidst these ‘integration struggles’ (Mennell, 2007) the application of the established-outsider model has provided a ‘matrix of interpretation’ (Atkinson, 2003: 210) that is particularly adept at examining national and multinational forms of identification and interdependence. Through its use, it is evident that the press’ construction, representation and framing of the British ‘we’ was fundamentally multi-layered due to the numerous ‘we’ identifications it enveloped. Indeed, while this is reflected in the examples referred to above (McCrone, 2006; McEwen, 2013) it is also apparent in the extent to which national newspaper discourses can reveal tensions in the ‘We-We balance’ as social integration is altered or the balances of power between groups’ changes (see Cowing, 2012; Guardian, 2012; Herald, 2012b; Hoey, 2012; Holt, 2012; Lawton, 2012; Lott, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012; Morgan, 2012; Norman, 2012; Poole, 2012; Randall, 2012; Rudman, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012a; 2012b; Taylor, 2012; The Independent, 2012; The Independent on Sunday, 2012; Tongue, 2012; Walker, 2012; Western Mail, 2012). In fact, the ability to examine established-outsider relations across multiple and interdependent figurations provided the opportunity to consider how habitus is power related and is ‘always – in the modern world where people belong to groups within groups within groups – multi-layered’ (Mennell, 1994: 177 [italics added]).

III. British history: imperial characteristics and established practices

If it is understood that recollections of the past serve to ‘orientate’ the nation (Dunning et al., 2004), then it is possible to observe how national ‘myths’, former figurations and past identifications can occupy a residual place within the national habitus, a residuality that can, at certain times, be re-imagined and re-invented for particular purposes. In fact, Braudel (1994) argues that:

Just as civilizations may welcome or refuse elements from another civilization, so it may accept or reject survivals from its own past. It does so slowly, and almost always unconsciously or partly so. In this way, it gradually transforms itself. Little by little, it sifts the mass of data and attitudes offered by the remote or recent past, stressing one or setting aside another; and as a result of its choices it assumes a shape which is never wholly new but never quite the same as before (1994: 30-31)

Here, Braudel’s (1994) remarks serve to highlight how the gradual transformation of

particular civilizations are formed in relation to perceptions of its past. In doing so, former traits or characteristics can occupy a residual place within contemporary societies and can be re-interpreted and re-used. This was reflected in the Commonwealth coverage whereby references to the ‘British stiff upper lip’ were used to frame the British people (Goring, 2012; Lette, 2012; Walker, 2012). However, what is also apparent is the extent to which civilizations consciously or unconsciously choose which elements to accept, adapt or reject and, perhaps more importantly, ‘what’ is and ‘who’ is being rejected in the process. There are, therefore, relations of power at play.

Consequently, to return to the Commonwealth press’ use of the ‘British stiff upper lip’, it is evident that constructions of Britain were still predicated on past ‘imperial’ images. Indeed, in comments related to the marginalisation of Scottish and Welsh culture, O’Hagan (2014) notes:

> the English domination of Britain has led to the marginalisation – if not jingoistic ridiculing – of Scottish and Welsh identity. Our unique cultures and languages are habitually erased in favour of an umbrella Englishness. To take a trivial example: the book and Twitter account Very British Problems portrays the British as socially awkward, Earl Grey-sipping Hugh Grant caricatures. But that’s not an image I recognise from Wales – it’s not even an image I recognise in a lot of England (try looking for a stiff upper-lip on a night bus in Liverpool). It’s a particular stereotype of the English upper-middle classes which has been extrapolated to represent everyone in Britain, overshadowing Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (and the English working class) in the process. (2014)6

Both the Commonwealth press’ use of the ‘stiff upper lip’ representation and O’Hagan’s (2014) remarks suggest that, in the case of Britain, ‘survivals from its own [imperial] past’ (Braudel, 1994: 30-31) continue to form an important part of the construction, framing and representation of Britain. Moreover, these constructions were based upon an established, and, in the case of O’Hagan (2014), evidently middle-class, representation of Britain, that served to marginalise and undermine both Scottish and Welsh culture. In such instances, Britain’s imperial characteristics had not vanished but instead form a residual part of the British character (Williams, 1977). With this in mind, reports of Britain’s history elicited a number of important distinctions.

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First, within the English press, it was clear that references to Britain’s imperial past were frequently drawn upon in its construction of Britain (Parsons, 2012a; 2012c; Sandbrook, 2012; Phillips, 2012). However, while accounts of Britain’s history could serve as a form of national distinction (The Independent on Sunday, 2012b), it could also reveal examples of nostalgia. That is, a ‘golden era’ when Britain’s contemporary economic and political problems as well as its wider cultural insecurities were non-existent (Hayward, 2012; Norman, 2012).

Second, whereas reports of Britain’s imperial history formed an important part of the English press’ construction of Britain, when compared with the Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh coverage, it was clear that Britain’s imperial past failed to elicit the same attention. Certainly, while historical discourses were drawn upon within the Scottish coverage (Fry, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012), these were often used to help highlight a specific Scottish attachment to the British monarchy, one that was notably different to the English (Herald, 2012b; Randall, 2012).

Third, across the selected Commonwealth press, references to Britain’s imperial past were widely used in the construction of Britain (Hinds, 2012; The Australian, 2012; Vancouver Sun, 2012). In fact, while Britain’s imperial history formed an important part of the Commonwealth press’ coverage, it also served as an opportunity to reflect upon their shared imperial history (Tate, 2012). Notably, however, these discourses served to highlight the disparity between Britain’s imperial past and its contemporary problems (Kissane, 2012; Milner et al., 2012). Contra Britain, such examples helped to emphasise the positive developments that the former dominions had made since achieving independence (Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012).

Taking the above into consideration, Conboy (2007) has noted how the tabloid press serve to ‘recreate a chronicle of national history’ (2007: 258). In particular, with regards to the sixtieth-anniversary of the D-Day landings, Conboy (2007) argues that the tabloids used this ‘history to create a picture of the British past but, … [also] to use it as a context to both criticize and celebrate the British present’ (2007: 258 [italics added]). Indeed, while similar processes were observed within the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic coverage (Richards, 2012; Tweedie, 2012), the above examples suggest two important distinctions. That is, in contrast to Conboy (2007), references to Britain’s history were conspicuous across both the tabloid and broadsheet coverage. Furthermore, such historical contextualisation was not resigned to the ‘British present’ (Conboy, 2007: 258 [italics added]) but instead served as a context in
which the former dominions could compare their own post-imperial societies to Britain’s imperial past (Hyder, 2012).

IV. Constructions of Britain: permitting some ‘degree of difference’

Consequently, as the above examples highlight, while it is impossible ‘to escape the weight of the past’ (Fox, 2014: 499), interpretations of the past can be used to elucidate upon wider concerns regarding the present. How constructions of the past help to form ‘a consistent sense of [national] “self” (Zarakol, 2010: 3) are consequently based upon an understanding of what traces of this past remain important today. In fact, Fortier (2005) argues that ‘One of the challenges in facing up to the past lies in the tension between acknowledgement/interpretations of the past, … and accountability/self-examination for social relations in the present’ (2005: 564). This can be found in the ‘identity crisis’ that has surrounded debates on Britain and British identity since the decline of the British Empire and its move towards the EU (Goodhart, 2013; Nairn, 1977). With this in mind, it was evident that the press’ construction of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee stood awkwardly between a form of celebration that reflected Britain’s monarchical traditions but also as a marker of British change, most noticeably, the extent to which the Jubilee no longer represented contemporary Britain (Hare, 2012; McNulty, 2012; Norman, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a).

Accordingly, there are important decisions that remain to be made regarding how Britain’s imperial history is interpreted, re-used, and, perhaps, forgotten. Indeed, the literature has explored the effects of national trauma and global decline on particular nations (Neal, 1998; Olick, 2005). Often a desire to ‘move on’ is highlighted, a process that still requires agreement on how and what exactly the ‘move’ should be. This is a contested process however, and, as the findings reveal, one that is based upon the demarcation between a perceived ‘us’ and ‘them’.

In fact, the following comments by Ramsay (2014a) highlight how understandings of the past serve to delineate between particular groups within the present. He notes that:

We … cling with white fisted knuckles to the notion that Britannia rules, unwilling to let go of our imperial past for fear that we might find we are just another European country. It’s a myth which works much more in England, and which helps explain differences in the tendancy to believe immigrant scapegoating North and South of the border ‘if Britain is uniquely great’ people infer ‘it can’t be the system that’s to blame, it must be outsiders’. (Ramsay,
As can be seen in Ramsay’s (2014a) remarks, for Britain, and in particular, for the South of England, notions of British national prestige reside heavily in constructions of its imperial self. Indeed, Gilroy (2005) has argued that ‘the multi-layered trauma – economic and cultural as well as political and psychological – involved in accepting the loss of the empire’ (2005: 99 [italics added]) has resulted in confused understandings and contested identifications within Britain. Similarly, this is echoed by Baxter (n.d.) who asserts that, ‘Without the defining characteristics of an empire, modern Britain seems lost as how to clearly define itself’ (n.d.)

What is of perhaps greater concern, however, is the extent to which this past and Britain’s subsequent decline is found in examples of ‘immigrant scapegoating’ (Ramsay, 2014a). That is, it is Britain’s ‘unique form of life’ (Billig, 1995: 72), its national identity and history which allows the ‘English’ to ‘cling with white fist knuckles’ to its imperial past and which is subsequently threatened by ‘outsiders’ (Ramsay, 2014a; see also Moore, 2012; Taylor, 2012). Beyond the ‘patriotic card’, recollections of Britain’s imperial past often ‘evok[e] anger against those who would cause “us” to abandon “our” heritage, “our” duty, “our” destiny’ (Billig, 1995: 101). Indeed, while perceptions of the ‘other’ form an important part of the national sense of self, Ramsay’s (2014a) comments reveal how these perceptions are based upon the balance of power between established and outsider groups (‘it must be outsiders’).

In fact, while ‘national histories are continually being re-written’ an established-outsider framework can observe how ‘the re-writing reflects current balances of hegemony’ (Billig, 1995: 71). In such instances, and in accordance with processes of historical and social change (Dunning et al., 2004; Elias, 2008a; 2008c; 2008d), past and present narratives can be used for the imposition of ‘power over others’ (Panagiotopoulou, 2010: 243), a process that can result in ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions becoming particularly charged (Maguire and Tuck, 1999; 2005; Tuck, 2003).

With this in mind, it was evident that embedded within newspaper discourses were encoded messages and established cultural codes that sought to define

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appropriate forms of British identification. This was most noticeable within the English press. Indeed, Hastie and Rimmington (2014) highlight that:

Privilege allows you to assume a homogenisation of experience, whereby you are not required to have knowledge of the experiences of others, instead assuming you can understand others through the lens of your own (dominant) culture. (2014: 2)

Noticeably, these comments expose how the English coverage represented a homogenously ‘English’ version of Britain as well as a rather negative, and, at times, ignorant, attitude towards the other home nations.

To this extent, the discursive construction of privilege and entitlement is a complicated process. Indeed, while established discourses can serve to marginalise outsider groups (Engh, 2014; Lake, 2013; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987), social differences are often based upon contested boundaries of separation and processes of inclusion and exclusion (Silk and Francombe, 2011). That is, while it is the point of origin that takes precedent in the construction of diasporic communities (Anthias, 2001), the inclusion of ethnic minorities is often predicated on their ability to declare and confirm their attachment to the host nation. In fact, in his analysis of ethnic minorities in Norway, Bucholc (2013) highlights how processes of ‘relative exclusion’ between established and outsider groups was evident (2013). Accordingly, Fortier (2005) has examined how ethnic minorities are continually obliged to ‘hail’ their Britishness, a process that ‘re-racializes the speakers in a particular way’ (2005: 571).

Here, it is possible to apply Fortier’s (2005) examination in order to explore how established groups seek to confront, and, on particular occasions, may accept outsider individuals/groups.11 In relation to the topic of immigration, Skey (2014) notes how in interviews with members of the ethnic majority in England, it was found:

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11 This has been explored elsewhere by Lake (2013). In his analysis of established-outsider relations at a prestigious tennis club, Lake (2013) noted that certain, new ‘outsider’ members were, overtime, slowly accepted within the club’s established circles. This was a process that was beneficial for the established group as new members ensured the continuation of the club, and, as a consequence, their established status. However, Lake (2013) notes that this acceptance was based upon those characteristics that the established group deemed most worthy. Here, acceptance was predicated on established terms. There were ‘yardsticks’ that outsider individuals/groups had to achieve in order to ‘belong’. 
that some degree of difference is permitted, even welcomed, provided it
doesn’t threaten the status and position of those who claim to belong at the
heart of national life. … it … explains the somewhat puzzling and often
contradictory attitudes that many express when wrestling with these issues.
(2014 [italics added])

It is possible to observe Skey’s (2014) remarks through an established-outsider lens,
notably, via the ‘degree of difference’ that is allowed and permitted by outsider
groups believed to be of threat to established positions (i.e. jobs, housing, welfare).
However, these are, as Skey (2014) notes, contested processes, exemplified in
‘contradictory attitudes’ (2014). As a result, alongside reports of Farah’s Somali background, newspaper
discourses continually served to confirm Farah’s British identity via references to his
own British declarations during an Olympic press conference (Alibhai-Brown, 2012;
Crompton, 2012; Samuel, 2012). This was often supported by reports that highlighted
his London accent (Sandbrook, 2012). Evidently, British acceptance was something
that had to be achieved, debated and performed, indeed, a process that paradoxically
served to re-define Farah as ‘different’. This could also be identified in the Olympic
pre-coverage whereby the ‘Britishness’ of those Team GB athletes who had been born
outside the UK was continually scrutinized (Poulton and Maguire, 2012). In doing so,
processes of exclusion and stigmatisation (Kelly, 2012; Parsons, 2012c; Platell, 2012;
Poole, 2012) were used to construct a sense of Britain that adhered to a ‘dominant’
appreciation of how to be British.

Furthermore, while reports within the English press served to highlight
concerns regarding immigration and its negative effects upon ‘British’ culture
(Moore, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Taylor, 2012), in other instances, newspaper coverage
was proud to hail Britain’s multicultural society as representative of contemporary
Britain (Guardian, 2012b; Lott, 2012; The Observer, 2012). To this extent, it can be
argued that an established-outsider dynamic can extend Fortier’s (2005) original
analysis by exploring how processes of acceptance and non-acceptance were apparent
within the press’ discourse. In particular, comparisons can be made between Farah
and the press’ representation of the Scottish Team GB athlete, Andy Murray. In each
instance, ‘allegiance to the nation’ was for, both athletes, ‘something [that had] to be

achieved and repeatedly tested’ (Fortier, 2005: 571). Correspondingly, while the press served to highlight Farah’s British identity, Murray’s allegiance to Britain centered on his singing of the national anthem. In doing so, both athletes were repositioned as acceptable ‘Brits’; yet, it was an acceptance that was predicated on their construction as both the same and different (Fortier, 2005).

Consequently, while Andy Murray and Mo Farah were represented via discourses that served to accentuate their British behaviour (Sandbrook, 2012), at the same time, other discourses served to marginalise home nation nationalism (Daily Mail, 2012c; Platell, 2012) as well as highlight problems and fears regarding immigration (Freedland, 2012b; John, 2012; Riddell, 2012). Notably, the ambivalent representation of both athletes in the English press (Bygnes, 2013; Schall, 2014), failed to elicit the same amount of attention in the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish coverage.

V. Past and present constructions and established-outsider discourses

Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that two important strands within the press’ discourse can be brought together. First, the contemporary construction of Britain’s past, and, second, the existence of both established and outsider constructions of Britain. Indeed, with regards to the latter, evidence of an outsider ‘group disgrace’ and sense of inferiority was clearly evident within the Scottish and Australian press. In fact, despite devolution and independence, Scottish apprehensions regarding Scottish independence and examples of Australian anxiety could be found. For Scotland, the prospect of independence suggested an underlying anxiety regarding the potential break-up of the UK and the possibility of achieving an independent future (MacDonald, 2012b; Macwhirter, 2012; Sunday Herald, 2012). As a result, anxieties and apprehensions within the Scottish press were formed in relation to an ‘established’ England/Britain (Cowing, 2012; Fry, 2012).14 Within the

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14 Indeed, the discursive construction of English dominance can be found in various reports on British home nation relations. For example, in February 2014 the South Coast of England suffered severe weather conditions that resulted in major damage to transport networks, homes and businesses. In comments that drew upon the storms, the Scottish Independence Referendum and the 2012 Olympic Games, The Observer (2014) noted that: ‘Vast areas of Somerset are under water. Dozens of flood warnings come and, occasionally, go. Cornwall’s rail artery is suddenly severed. More gales and lashing rain spiral across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, in Stratford, east London, the prime minister delivers an eloquent speech asking people in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to get on the phone and urge their friends and relatives in the north not to break away. Mr Cameron, wrapping himself in the glories of Chris Hoy, wants Team GB to win again. At which point, Alex Salmond, beginning to
Australian coverage the overall success of Team GB as well as Britain’s successful hosting of the Olympic Games was perceived to have overshadowed the Sydney Olympics, held twelve years previously (Wilson, 2012). In particular, the Australian press displayed an increasingly critical attitude towards Australia and Australian society (Cooper and Butt, 2012; Hinds, 2012; Tate, 2012). Consequently, while Australian discourses remained part of a wider power structure in which the national representation of Australia was wedded to its former imperial metropole, considered alongside the Scottish reports, it was evident that each nation’s position within a British ‘domestic figuration’ and a wider ‘imperial/Commonwealth figuration’ was interdependent to an established England/Britain.

Combining the above with contemporary constructions of Britain’s past, it is evident that references to Britain’s history, and, in particular, its imperial history, served to underlie the established status of Britain (Collins, 2012; Hayward, 2012), a status that was correspondingly acknowledged by the Commonwealth press (Kissane, 2012; Milner et al. 2012; The Australian, 2012). As previously highlighted, however, it was the English press who served to draw upon and highlight Britain’s ‘imperial’ history (Parsons, 2012a; 2012c; Sandbrook, 2012; Tweedie and Harding, 2012). This emphasised how historical legitimacy, most notably England’s former imperial hegemony, formed an important part of England’s established image and imagined charisma (Elias, 1996).

Indeed, this raises some important questions regarding the use of history by the press. That is, what motivates the construction and (re)construction of certain historical periods within contemporary reports (Edy, 1999) and how are constructions of the past related to, and, indeed, shaped by, established-outsider relations in general? In fact, when compared to Britain’s contemporary problems and the possible break-up of Britain, such discourses allowed the press to redirect attention to a period of British history when Britain, and, in particular, England, was head of the world’s

sense momentum for his own referendum dreams of Scottish independence, snorts that Mr Cameron would be better off visiting Somerset, and certainly better anywhere but preaching to Edinburgh from London, the rich city state of national disconnection’ (2014: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/08/londonism-flooding-scotland-observer-editorial, retrieved: 16 February 2014). Evidently, while the 2012 Olympic Games provided an important moment for British unity, one that was being actively used by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, the sense that England’s established position within Britain and, indeed, the sense that Britain was still a united state, was evidently undermined by a growing disparity between England and Scotland.
largest global empire.\textsuperscript{15} In such instances, there was a tendency to reference Britain’s ‘eternal, unalterable heritage’ (Elias, 2012: 508) through accounts of its rural landscape and imperial history. In effect, such rhetoric forms part of the invented traditions that envelop national constructions (‘Olde England’). Indeed, in comments regarding the sport of cricket, Fletcher (2011) notes that:

\begin{quote}

In particular, such discourse can be seen as a ‘defensive reaction’ to figurational changes within the British state, such as: Britain’s post-imperial decline, colonial independence, devolution and the Scottish Independence Referendum. However, in accordance with processes of functional democratisation, examples of established-outsider interdependence are based upon contested processes (Elias, 2012). Indeed, it has been argued in chapter three that while the British home nations formed an established part of the British imperial project, British culture and its national
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, Elias (2012) notes that, ‘The idea of the unique nature and value of one’s own nation often serves as legitimation for that nation’s claim to lead all other nations. It is this self-image, this claim to leadership by the older industrial nations, that has been shaken in the second half of the twentieth century by what is still a very limited increase in power among the poorer, previously dependent and partly subjugated pre-industrial societies in other parts of the world. … this reality shock … merely reinforces a tendency already present in national feeling that what the nation is and always has been - its eternal, unalterable heritage - posses a far greater emotive value, as a means of self-legitimation and as an expression of the national scale of values and the national ideal, than any promise or ideal located in the future’ (2012: 508).

\textsuperscript{16} This has been explored elsewhere by Little (2006), whose analysis of the 1951 Festival of Britain, revealed a discourse of ‘heroic littleness’ could be found. Little (2006) notes that ‘the construction of insularity’ within certain parts of the Festival could ‘be understood as a defense mechanism against loss of power in which decolonisation played a major part’ (2006: 32).
variations was adopted, reinvented and resisted within the dominion societies (Barnes, 2013). In regards to the findings, however, it is evident that while ‘[p]rocesses of exclusion and stigmatization alter as power ratios between groups become less uneven’ (Loyal, 2011: 196), there is the possibility for outsider groups to *challenge* traditional and established discourses.

Consequently, Commonwealth press reports openly highlighted a sense of (dis)attachment with the British monarchy (Carney, 2012; Holden, 2012; Rothwell, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012a; Stone, 2012; Watkins, 2012). In addition, further reports served to emphasise how other forms of global interdependence, such as Asia, may represent a more productive source of interdependence (Rudman, 2012). Notably, it was here that changes within the long-term, historical relationship between Britain and the former dominions could be observed. Evidently, these discourses served to reveal how established-outsider relations form part of broader, and, indeed, changing processes of interdependence through which ‘integration struggles’ between established and outsider groups are continually negotiated and challenged.

Therefore, the contested nature of established-outsider relations are, in part, a product of historical developments and interdependencies, through which, ‘The power to stigmatize … diminishes when a group can no longer maintain a monopoly on the principal sources of power available’ (Loyal, 2011: 196). Consequently:

> Over the long term, power differences may lessen between established natives and immigrant outsiders, the fantasy-laden collective ‘we-images’ of social superiority characteristic of the established may begin to diminish. … Outsider groups that had formerly accepted their inferiority and low position in the social hierarchy may come to challenge and contest their stigmatization, and to pursue a more equal access to various power resources in a dialectic of oppression and counter-oppression. (Loyal, 2011: 196)

Indeed, through ‘a dialectic of oppression and counter-oppression’, the research findings reflect how newspaper constructions of Britain during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games revealed a number of changes within the British figuration which were reflective of, and, contoured by, established-outsider discourses.
VI. The multi-layered construction of Britain: balances of power and established outsider relations

With this in mind, it is evident that established-outsider discourses were clearly visible within the press’ construction of Britain. Elsewhere, Silk and Francombe (2011) note that:

sporting discourses often serve as a means by which particular dominant groups further (re)define the parameters of the ‘sanctioned’ national identity and these discourses are often mobilised and appropriated with regard to the organisation and discipline of daily life. (2011: 262 [italics in original])

Accordingly, while it is possible to observe how the English press sought to construct a particular representation of Britain, indeed, a “‘sanctioned’ national identity”, the above examples reveal how this ‘(re)defin[ing]’ of the nation is not a one-sided process commanded by established groups (‘particular dominant groups’) but is instead based upon balances of power between established-outsider groups. Here, power is interdependently experienced as part of a multi-figurational dynamic through which national habitus is produced, learned and altered. More importantly, this is not to suggest that the power of established groups is ‘common sense’ (Grasmei, 1971) or authoritively imposed (Foucault, 1972), but is instead balanced upon ongoing processes and historical contingencies.

Subsequently, in light of the research findings, this thesis argues that constructions of Britain and British identity are based upon a contested national habitus, one that can be observed when broader state formation processes, such as, the expansion of empire, are taken into consideration. These larger sociogenetic transformations have impacted upon nation-states in multiple ways, often resulting in well defined, yet, contested forms of identification. Indeed, Mennell (2007) notes that:

one should always look for the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of the values and traditions in changing social structures (particularly balances of power and control), and then at the ways in which values and traditions have become embodied in social structures and practices. (2007: 313 [italics added])

Consequently, constructions of Britain and British identity, are never stable, nor are they based upon a simple ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamic. Instead, forms of British mutual identification are far more complex and predicated upon ‘tensions’ between
established-outsider groups, both ‘within’ and ‘outside’ the UK. In fact, Jenkins (1975) argues that ‘The British way of life is one of balance in tension rather than that of a unified community moving towards a commonly acknowledged goal’ (Jenkins, 1975: 136 cited in Bradley, 2007: 34 [italics added]). Indeed, ‘balance[s] in tension’ and/or balance(s) in power (Elias, 1978) serve to highlight ‘the conditional nature of integration’ (Rojek, 2006: 677). Here we-identities, much like ‘social bonding which is both constraining and enabling’ (Rojek, 2006: 677), are based upon segmented forms of identification and interdependent associations. ¹⁷

Subsequently, it is evident that by following an established-outsider dynamic, particular ‘integration struggles’ within the press’ discourse can be located between examples of British ‘unity’ and ‘dis-unity’ and within conflicting attachments and (dis)attachments with Britain. Indeed, Moore (2010) has noted that while identities are characterised by ‘similarity, belonging and interconnectedness’ they are also marked by processes of ‘difference, otherness and separation’ (Moore, 2010: 4.4). In fact, elsewhere, Bolin (2010) has recorded similar characteristics in his analysis of the effect of national and international representations during the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). Here, the ESC was ‘analysed as both integrative and conflictual simultaneously’ (Bolin, 2010: 131), with Bolin (2010) highlighting that ‘the idea of the nation-state and … the value of Europeanness’ (Bolin, 2010: 131) were both evident. Similarly, with regards to Britain, Colley (2014a) has noted that ‘while monarchy has often functioned as a national cement and emblem, it has also served to connect all or sections of these islands with other parts of the world’ (2014a: 45).

Accordingly, while national and international events may offer an opportunity for ‘proposed integration’ (Bolin, 2010: 134 [italics removed]), they can also be employed to ‘performatively … energize different “social solidarities”’ (Cottle, 2006: 428). To this extent, the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games were ‘integrative and conflictual simultaneously’ (Bolin, 2010: 131). Here, both the home nations and the former dominions were interdependently related in their constructions of Britain, whether attaching themselves and their national histories within a larger British imperial history (Berg, 2012; Tate, 2012) or by highlighting differences between themselves and Britain (Carney, 2012; Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012).

With this in mind, the following sub-sections will aim to briefly summarise

¹⁷ See footnote 4.
three key paradoxes within the British and Commonwealth press’ construction of Britain and British identity. These paradoxes suggest that there is a need of caution when examining media constructions of Britain, particularly due to the contradictory, and, often, ambiguous framing of Britain and British identity. Specifically, they serve to reveal how established-outsider discourses are used in constructing national identifications. Therefore, the aim will be to explore the paradoxical construction of Britain in relation to three ‘integration struggles’ that were identified within the press’ discourse: British attachment/(dis)attachment, past/present constructions and British multiculturalism. Indeed, these three discourses will be used to provide a final summary of the research findings but also to outline important significances regarding the future of Britain and British identity.

VII. Integration struggles: British attachment and (dis)attachment

Colley (2014a) highlights that ‘Virtually every state that has ever existed has contained multiple fault-lines, be they ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural or territorial differences, or other sources of internal division’ (2014a: 4). As a result:

the divided nature of these islands is hardly exceptional, and the current disputes over these divisions possess ample precedents. Although ‘Britain’ is still sometimes viewed as an old and peculiarly stable country, these are selective visions. Historically speaking, Great Britain, and still more the United Kingdom, are comparatively recent and synthetic constructs that have often been confused and in flux in the past, just as they continue to be contested and in flux now. (Colley, 2014a: 4)

As previously highlighted, this sense of flux and contestation is predicated on Britain’s multi-national structure. This has resulted in varying, and, at times, contested appreciations of Britain. Indeed, in regards to the Act of Union, Weight (2002) notes that:

While the English came to regard the arrangement as permanent, the Scots continued to see it as conditional upon their getting a good fiscal return on the loss of their sovereignty. The conditional way they viewed the Union was highlighted by the fact that people north of the border called the agreement the Treaty of Union while south of the border it was referred to as the Act of Union. (2002: 3)

As a result, it is evident that discourses pertaining to Britain can be viewed across various spatial scales as well as numerous national conditions. That is, collective
memories of Britain’s shared imperial history, while providing a common cross-
national past for the British home nations and the former dominions, has resulted in
an array of diverse challenges and national identity politics. It is here that
constructions of Britain can be seen to be undermined and disrupted by its constitutive
nationalisms both within Britain and the Commonwealth.

Yet, to perceive these various national interpretations as exclusive is to ignore
the discursive complexity of national identity but also, more importantly, its multi-
layered construction. Accordingly, Ward (2009) has argued that:

Historians such as J.G.A. Pocock and Hugh Kearney have emphasised just how
important it is to consider the history of the Atlantic archipelago in its Britannic
context, as a history consisting of *unity and integration* as well as *disunity and
disintegration*. This array of historical examination suggests that current debates
are part of a continuum rather than a break with the past. (2009: 3 [italics
added])

This ‘array of historical examination’ is reflected in the unity and dis-unity of the
‘Britannic context’, through which the layers of British habitus are structured by
intensities of attachment and (dis)attachment.

In fact, international events, such as the Commonwealth Games, have aimed to
promote British and cross-Commonwealth relations and celebrate their shared
sporting and cultural heritage (The Round Table, 2002). Here, ‘important similarities
(as well as instructive differences) in institutions, values and cultures’ (Schreuder,
2002: 653) can be identified. In particular, while both the domestic and
Commonwealth reports served to represent British and Commonwealth unity
(‘important similarities’), each nation’s construction of Britain was framed by their
own national figurations (‘instructive differences’). Here, the Commonwealth
coverage presented an amalgam of British identifications. Indeed, while attempts
were made to highlight the continuing importance of Commonwealth relations
(Foster-Bell, 2012; Oldfield, 2012; Rothwell, 2012) and references to the British
Empire remained conspicuous (Lette, 2012; *The Australian*, 2012; *Vancouver Sun*,
2012), examples of (dis)attachment from each nation’s imperial history and the
possibility of further international relations, separate from the Commonwealth, were
displayed (Carney, 2012; Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012). Consequently, ‘as the British
empire fades into historical memory and regional blocs and organisations grow in
salience’ (Black, 2007: 267) struggles between the former dominion’s own imperial
heritage and a future of lessening Commonwealth involvement and monarchical relations could be found (Oldfield, 2012; Rudman, 2012).

With this in mind, it is apparent when studying constructions of Britain and British identity that a focus upon British interdependence – and the tensions this creates – must be considered. Not only does this help to extend analyses of Britain beyond a nation-centric approach but it also directs attention to the emotional intensity underlying particular forms of attachment/(dis)attachment. Indeed, within any figuration, and, more importantly, between figurations, there are:

specific functional interdependences which at a given stage bind those who form a community more closely to each other than to those who do not belong, and at the same time those other interdependences binding them, individually and communally, to others outside (Elias, 2008a: 153)

This collective ambiguity forms an important part of the identifications of larger social units, such as, multi-national unions and federations. In such instances, ‘the threatened loss of function and power of social units on the verge of becoming a lower level of integration leads to struggles of dominance, to balance of power struggles of a specific kind’ (Elias, 2008a: 137). As a result, it is these power struggles that are echoed across the research findings and which go some way to exposing how discourses on British integration are dialectically marked by processes of ‘partial disintegration’ (Elias, 2008a: 146 [italics added]). This echoes Calhoun’s (1997) assertion that ‘The discourse of nationalism can be employed equally in the service of unification or secession’ (1997: 103 [italics added]). To add, I would argue that discourses of British nationalism are based upon examples of British attachment (‘unification’) and (dis)attachment (‘succession’) (Calhoun, 1997). That is, national newspaper constructions of Britain ‘were bound up in the dual-sided production of national difference and “sameness”’ (Bloyce et al., 2010: 464).

18 Indeed, these integration struggles echo Mannheim’s (1933) theory of distanciation (Kilminster, 2004; 2007). In fact, it is possible, within the press’ discourse, to uncover requisite levels of social distance in each nation’s attachment to Britain. That is, while constructions of Britain revealed particular forms of distanciation (dis-attachment) within each nation’s newspaper coverage (Scottish and Northern Irish marginalisation, Scottish celebrations of the monarchy, Welsh pride in Team GB success, Commonwealth significance), other examples exhibited processes of de-distanciation (attachment) with Britain (British unity, Commonwealth unity, Team GB success). Consequently, via an interdependent analysis of the domestic and Commonwealth coverage, it was possible to perceive how levels of attachment/dis-attachment were related to particular national contexts, and, as argued in the conclusion to chapter six, particular historical perspectives.

19 Indeed, while the success of Team GB can serve to unite the British home nations in shared celebration, ‘When England play Scotland at rugby the skirl of nationalism echoes across Murrayfield’ (The Observer, 2014).
Indeed, these dynamics stand in the way of political attempts to define Britain, Britishness and British values in relation to a distinct set of national moral values or ideals (Wintour, 2014). Instead, claims of British dis-unity, debates on British identity and reports of British decline are predicated upon observations of Britain that seek to focus on the disintegration of a particular ‘version’ of Britain. In doing so, these announcements fail to acknowledge the ties of interdependence, or, to a greater or lesser extent, the processual reconfiguration of these ties, that underlies the construction, representation and framing of Britain. In effect, it is a multi-layered conception of identity – local, regional, national, British and Commonwealth – that has underscored both the political arrangement and discursive construction of Britain and which is ultimately marked by processes of British attachment and (dis)attachment.

VIII. Integration struggles: past and present constructions

It has already been highlighted that the sharing of a common heritage forms an important part of belonging to the nation. For example, during the Olympic Opening Ceremony a sense of continuity with Britain’s past was theatrically presented via performances that served to draw upon Britain’s rural heritage, the industrial revolution and its contribution to global popular culture. Similarly, with regards to the Diamond Jubilee, the royal pageantry and river flotilla were represented as a recurrent part of Britain’s history, indeed, a form of celebration and part of British culture that was effectively representative of the British populace (Phillips, 2012; Routledge, 2012). In doing so, references to Britain’s ‘island character’ were closely tied to its imperial heritage and former naval supremacy. However, it is important to note that:

It is not the island situation … which sets its stamp on the national character of the population, but the significance of this situation in the total structure of the island society, in the total context of its history. (Elias, 2012: 599)

Consequently, while references to Britain’s ‘island kingdom’ (Phillips, Daily Mail, 04/06/12) were closely allied with Britain’s imperial past (Jack, 2012), the degree to which Britain’s imperial history continued to form part of the construction of Britain revealed a number of problems.

Indeed, reports pertaining to Britain’s imperial heritage suggested a particular
sense of ‘English’ insularity. This conclusion has argued that such insularity may form part of a defensive reaction amongst the English press, based upon the decline of the British Empire and a lack of political representation within the current British political system. Accordingly, Bunting (2014) argues that:

The Celtic Atlantic seaboard has been powerfully creative and outward orientated, the crucial counterbalance to English caution, reserve and desire for privacy. This has rarely been acknowledged; initially because of a persistent strain of Anglo-Saxon racism which has now morphed into a South-East metropolitan self-absorption. … The danger is that without a strong Celtic component, England becomes self-absorbed and insular. The ever-present temptation in Englishness is a retreat into a nostalgia about the pastoral English ideal of soporific village greens and the ‘old maids cycling to church in the mist’ nonsense. (2014)

As a result, newspaper discourses regarding the Olympic Opening Ceremony’s ‘Green and Pleasant Land’ section served to construct a specifically nostalgic recollection of England/Britain (Holt, 2012; New Zealand Herald, 2012). In addition, while the rural depiction of ‘Britain’ provided a rather English-centric account of Britain’s past, constructions of the rural countryside have also been marked by connotations of a predominantly white ethnic background (Cloke, 2006; Neal and Agyeman, 2006). Here, nostalgia for a ‘pastoral English ideal’ (Bunting, 2014) served to cement an English preponderance in constructions of Britain (Neal and Agyeman, 2006). Ultimately, such constructions conflicted with representations of British multiculturalism, an aspect of British society that had provided an important ‘selling point’ for the 2012 Olympic bid campaign (Falcous and Silk, 2010).

To this extent, I would argue that it is England’s association with a history of British imperialism and a sense of British global power – however misguided – that serves to encourage English isolationism. Indeed, this dilemma is considered further in the concluding chapter of Kumar’s (2003) analysis of English nationalism. With regards to the present study, however, it is this imperial outlook and a sense of imperial authority that serves to underscore Britain’s global image. Indeed, this was echoed by the current Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, who in response to the prospect of Scottish Independence, stated that ‘We are on the verge of trashing our

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global name and brand in an act of self-mutilation that will leave our international rivals stunned, gleeful and discreetly scornful’ (Johnson, 2014 [italics added]). In such instances, Britain’s ‘global name’ is presented as being undermined by home nation nationalism (Ramsey, 2014), rather than viewing these nationalisms as constitutive parts of Britain’s global history.

Indeed, there is the opportunity here to further explore how ‘established’ imperial images remain part of the national habitus of established groups. The equaling of power balances amongst the home nations (Loyal, 2011) and the absence of British involvement in international military action, such as Britain’s decision to abstain from its inclusion in the ‘Syrian Crisis’ (Toynbee, 2013), may help to defer Britain away from former imperial images and representations. Similarly, in the case of England, it may also ‘help nudge England away from delusions of exceptionalism and imperial grandeur … towards a more normal position as an average sized wealthy country on the edge of Europe’ (Ramsey, 2014c [italics added]). In effect, therefore, a reconfiguration of British constructions, one that moves away from a particularly imperial, and, subsequently English-centric representation, is required (Colley, 2014a; Perryman, 2009; Ramsey, 2014). Certainly, any attempt to do so will be interdependent to outsider constructions of Britain; constructions that at the moment, particularly within the Commonwealth, remain wedded to imperial discourses.

IX. Integration struggles: British multiculturalism

Reports concerning Team GB’s success, and, in particular the athlete Mo Farah, served to frame Britain as a nation upon which multiculturalism and diversity were widely accepted (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Southphomassane, 2012b; Walker, 2012). Here, Farah was heralded as an important emblem of Britain’s post-imperial identity, its multicultural character and diverse citizenship. Indeed, Rietveld (2013) argues

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emphasis[ing] shared national values and identity … would not contradict multiculturalism but rather provide it with a ‘civic re-balancing’, emphasising shared citizenship alongside the accommodation of minority cultural identities (2013: 2)

Yet, this is to ignore the limitations and boundaries that discursively underlie forms of ‘accommodation’ and ‘inclusion’. Here, ‘inclusion’ is not achieved or unquestionably accepted but is instead constrained by balances of power and established-outsider dynamics. Accordingly, Falcous and Silk (2010) argue that:

soft Olympic narratives have nothing to say about the complexities of everyday life as it surrounds the Olympic games and beyond: intensified hostility towards British Muslims since the commencement of the ‘war on terror’; feelings of disillusionment and resentment; ‘Islamophobia’; urban segregation; disproportionate levels of unemployment, health, and poverty; and differential immigration statuses and the concomitant restrictions of rights (2010: 180)

In such instances, outsider groups maintain a liminal space within newspaper discourses (Fortier, 2005). That is, while newspaper reports served to celebrate Britain’s achieved multiculturalism, representations of Farah continually highlighted Farah’s ‘difference’ (via references to his Somali background) as a central part of his newspaper construction (Fortier, 2005).

Indeed, this process of accepting certain outsiders as part of the nation may exist as a residual part of the British imperial character. As previously referenced, Maguire (2005) highlights that:

Access to such prestigious clubs and playing fields could be regulated – only chosen outsiders would be allowed to emulate their imperial masters and become, through the adoption of their sports, more British than the British. (2005: 11 [italics added])

Subsequently, in the same way that ‘chosen outsiders’ were ‘allowed to emulate their imperial masters’ (Maguire, 2005: 11), the adoption of particular ‘British’ attributes allowed both Farah as well as Murray the opportunity to be ‘British’. Indeed, rather than accepting difference, acceptance was grounded in assimilation with established ‘English/British’ practices.

Nevertheless, while the above sections have highlighted how particular ‘outsider’ individuals can become accepted within established discourses, such
processes can also have particular benefits for established groups. Indeed, depicting a progressive, multicultural Britain, happily diverse and safely heterogonous, could also serve as a form of established status (Engh et al., 2014). Falcous and Silk (2010) elaborate:

the Olympic Games are framed as an exemplar of our own apparently unproblematic diversity and inclusivity. The unresolved contradiction in subsequent media coverage arises in how the olympics are framed as both a symbol of how ‘our’ values differ from ‘others’ and also an exemplar of our apparent inclusivity and ‘tolerance’. In a familiar construction, sport, as a soft-core ideological domain, is constructed as a utopic social field – the foremost exemplar of integration and multiculturalism. Yet, it also serves as a symbol of our humanism and civility in (apparently) stark opposition to that of others. (2010: 179)

Similarly, during the London games, the press’ framing of Britain’s multicultural pride, tolerance and inclusivity served to bolster its established image as a progressive multicultural nation state (Engh et al., 2014). In doing so, reports of Britain were notably positive, with certain suggestions that a new and more confident Britain had been displayed. Indeed, such positive reports can have a particular effect on a nation’s sense of self, especially when there are disparities between the national past and present. Black (2007) has highlighted how there is a ‘pursuit of symbolic politics’ at play during the hosting of sporting mega-events that offer a chance to change and to “reframe” dominant narratives about the host, and/or reinforce key messages about what the host has become/is becoming’ (2007: 262). It is apparent that a similar process can be identified in the press’ reporting of the 2012 London Olympic Games. Here, reports pertaining to British multiculturalism served to reflect the national prestige of Britain by presenting a revised society, based upon its accepted diversity (Guardian, 2012b; Sandbrook, 2012).

More pertinent, however, was what dominant narratives were being ‘reframed’ and who was reinforcing key messages. Accordingly, while it has been observed that Britain’s achieved multiculturalism, and diversity was signified as representing a ‘new’ Britain, closer examination of the press’ discourse reveals that these ‘symbolic politics’ were discursively constructed in accordance with established criteria.

To this extent, it wasn’t until the final performance of the Olympic Opening Ceremony, in particular, during its ‘multicultural’ section, that ethnic diversity was regarded as a normative part of British society. In these instances, a clear distinction
was made between Britain’s ‘past’ and ‘present’ society. This was echoed in the newspaper coverage, whereby references to British multiculturalism were used to construct a decisively ‘new’ Britain, one that had overcome, and, was different to, its imperial self.

Accordingly, whereas on the one hand, recollections of the past within the press’ coverage aimed to transcend difference in order to highlight Britain’s distinct origins and national characteristics (‘island nation’), on the other hand, this difference served as a key marker of Britain’s ‘new’ society. As a result, newspaper coverage reflected a disparity between Britain’s ‘white past and multicultural present’ (Littler and Naidoo, 2004: 338), a process that revealed broader ‘integration struggles’ regarding the acceptance of outsider individuals within established constructions of the nation.

With this in mind, Black (2007) argues that the ‘various signals and representations of unity, transcendence and cosmopolitanism are therefore at best partial and caricatured. As such, they tend to mask as much as they reveal’ (2007: 270). In light of this, British multiculturalism provided the press an opportunity to separate Britain’s imperial past from its multicultural present, yet, at the same time, dictate a liminal acceptance of outsider groups (Fortier, 2005). In doing so, analyses of the press served to highlight how such events ‘become vehicles for similar messages with potentially contradictory implications’ (Black, 2007: 262).

X. Final Comments

This thesis has aimed to examine how the British domestic and Commonwealth press constructed, framed and represented Britain during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games. With this in mind, it has endeavoured to explore the relationship between both the domestic and Commonwealth press in order to shed further light on the complexities and struggles embedded in newspaper constructions of Britain and British identity. In addition, this analysis has served to draw upon ‘the fundamental importance of power differentials in society’ (Maguire, 2005: 9) by exploring how contemporary constructions of Britain were framed in relation to power differentials between the British home nations and the former dominions.

Indeed, tracing historical patterns can allow one to observe how the construction of identity is predicated upon changing balances of power. Consequently, attention has been given to exploring the historical development of the British state, its imperial
expansion and eventual decline. This was considered further in the use of Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model. In particular, by applying this model to an analysis of Britain, inter- and intra-figurational dynamics could be observed. Here, particular ‘integration struggles’ were highlighted (Mennell, 2007), struggles that served to reveal a sense of decline, examples of marginalisation and a ‘sliding scale’ (Calhoun, 2004: 38) or ‘degree of social differentiation’ (Loyal, 2004: 137) in the press’ construction of Britain.

With this in mind, a key part of undertaking this research was based upon the assertion that studies of national identity have seemingly overlooked the importance of larger multinational figurations and the effects of such forms of organisation on the construction and framing of national identity. Accordingly, this research has explored how changes within the British state and empire have impacted upon constructions of British identity. Indeed, Ridden (2004) states:

Historical analysis which provides a more sophisticated assessment of how various competing groups have sought to create change in the British state and its relationship to the various constituent groups, and how these changes were connected with various interpretations of Britishness, is increasingly showing that Britishness was never either static or wholly stable. Instead, British identity was contested, highly politicised and adapted in response to changing circumstances and pragmatic political strategies. (2004: 210)

Subsequently, rather than providing an ahistorical and static appreciation of British identity, the process sociological application of a long-term, interdependent analysis has allowed for a multinational analysis of Britain to be undertaken. Moreover, by examining national identity, and, in particular, British identity, as a processually related phenomenon, a detailed examination of the multi-layered construction of British social habitus was achieved. To this end, this concluding chapter has served to highlight how constructions of Britain are predicated on a number of important characteristics. First, there is a historical context underlying the press’ construction of Britain (past and present constructions). Second, these constructions are interdependently formed (established-outsider relations). Third, a number of integration struggles serve to shape the press’ construction of Britain.

With this in mind, this research has also hoped to extend the application of process sociology. In comments relating to process sociological work on football hooliganism (‘The Leicester School’), Giulianotti (1999) has noted that the work of process sociologists:
make no meaningful attempt to employ Elias’s figurational approach at the everyday level. The Leicester researchers fail completely to examine the complexity of figurational dynamics within a football hooligan group, such as the interdependency of individual hooligans or the fluidity of power relations within the group generally. (1999: 47)²⁵

Whereas this study has not attempted to investigate football hooliganism, it has aimed to meet these criticisms, most notably, Giulianotti’s (1999) concern regarding ‘the complexity of figurational dynamics’ and ‘the fluidity of power relations’ (1999: 47). By examining how the meditated construction of Britain and British identity are interdependently related to wider power balances within the British state and Commonwealth, the complexity of multi-figurational and processually changing relations of power have been highlighted.²⁶ Furthermore, while the process sociological concepts of figuration and interdependence have been employed, this research has also drawn upon Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model in order to examine how media discourses serve to construct power balances. Indeed, in using the established-outsider model, two important distinctions can be made.

First, this thesis has aimed to extend its application in order to examine its effectiveness across multiple figurations, that is, across a domestic ‘British’ and an ‘Imperial/Commonwealth’ figuration. This hybrid analysis aimed to explore how established and outsider groups were located across various established-outsider relations and figurations (Bucholc, 2013). In fact, Mennell (2012) argues that:

Not all forms of social oppression of one group by another take the form of class relations. … the class model is too narrow; one needs a broader overall concept to deal with the varieties of group oppression and group rise. I have found it helpful to use the term established-outsiders relationships as a more comprehensive concept in that sense. (Elias, 2012: 475, F/N: 6)²⁷

It is in this ‘more comprehensive’ sense that the established-outsider concept has been used in this thesis. In fact, the established-outsider model ‘serves as an empirical exemplar for more general dynamics involving power and inequality’ (Quilley and Loyal, 2004: 14). To this extent, it has provided an insight into the dynamics at play

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²⁵ Similar criticisms are made by Layder (1990).
²⁶ In addition, Bairner (2006) in his own appraisal of the ‘The Leicester School’ argues that it is perhaps ‘not worth devoting too much time … to considering the pernicious influence that Giulianotti claims the Leicester School has exerted on academic debate on football hooliganism’ (2006: 588).
²⁷ The following quote is an author’s note that was included in the 1982 English translation of Elias’s ‘The Civilising Process’. It was subsequently included in the 2012 edition, from which the following quote is taken from.
within domestic and national newspaper discourses; particularly how notions of ‘power and inequality’ are discursively constructed and how intensities of mutual identification can be felt between nation-states as well as between established-outsider groups within the nation-state (Mennell, 1990). Rather than being viewed as binary classifications, this thesis highlighted how established-outsider relations and identities are based upon dynamic processes of unity and dis-unity and attachment and (dis)attachment.

Second, the work of Billig (1995) has examined how established nation’s remember their identity through subtle ways of ‘forgetting’:

national identity in established nations is remembered because it is embedded in routines of life, which constantly remind, or ‘flag’, nationhood. However, these reminders, or ‘flaggings’, are so numerous and they are such a familiar part of the social environment, that they operate mindlessly, rather than mindfully. (1995: 38)

Here, ‘small words instead of grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but barely conscious, reminders of the homeland, making ‘our’ national identity unforgettable’ (Billig, 1995: 93).

However, there is a distinction between national practices and attitudes, a distinction that Billig’s (1995) analysis may ignore. Indeed, Ismer (2011) argues that there are practices that reproduce the nation and attitudes that are expressed regarding the nation. Accordingly, while national practices may construct and (re)construct the nation, national attitudes are historically and socially variable (Ismer, 2011). Thus, ‘banal reminders can in fact accommodate many competing and even incompatible definitions of collective identity, which allows the exact content and boundaries of the fictive “we” to remain fuzzy and flexible’ (Mihelj, 2011: 99-100). In such instances, nationalism, national identity, and the attitudes and practices that surround it, are very rarely stable, uncontested or entirely ‘banal’. Instead, ‘banal’ reminders of the nation are predicated upon power relations that are often organised and reflective of particular national distinctions (Mihelj, 2011).

Furthermore, the potential for national events to unite the nation are ‘not always … consensual nor uniformly inflected’ (Cottle, 2006: 415). In fact, Cottle (2006) notes that in order:

To avoid Durkheim’s totalizing claims about the nature of ‘society’ we would do better to situate our analysis in respect of a particular society or constellation
of social relations at a particular moment in time and, importantly, to see these as structured and invariably conflicted. (2006: 415)

In most instances, discourse analyses have aimed to explore how power is constructed through language (de Cilla et al., 1999; Wodak et al., 1999). Consequently, this research has indicated how changing power relations between the British home nations and its former dominions were reflected in discourses concerning Britain.

Finally, I am fully aware that this research is indebted to the process sociology framework. Indeed, the above comments have sought to highlight how its use has served to meet certain criticisms (Giulianotti, 1999; Layder, 1990) as well as provide a further extension of the theory. In this endeavour, the aim has always been to use the process sociology perspective as ‘an interpretative and analytic framework’ (Malcolm, 2013: 166). Consequently, this framework has served to direct attention towards the long-term social processes underlying state formation, to explore relationships of dynamic interdependence and to be aware of changes over time. To this extent, the emergence of the British state, the loss of the American colonies, the nationalization of the British royal family, the expansion of the British Empire, the social impact of the industrial revolution, the move towards dominion status within the colonies, the effects of the first and second world war, the statute of Westminster, the decline of empire, the diversification of British society through immigration, Thatcherism and New Labour, are just a few of the large scale social processes that have been considered in this thesis and which have impacted upon the construction of Britain and British identity in complex and diverse ways.

With this in mind, I would like to suggest that this analysis presents an opportunity to further extend this research by including other former imperial locations. Indeed, it has not been possible to examine the former British Empire as a whole. Instead, this project has been constricted to an analysis of the old ‘white’ dominions. To this extent, there remains the potential to explore the construction of Britain and British identity in other independent nation-states who were once formerly part of the British Empire. Accordingly, analyses of the South African and Indian press would elicit further details regarding the post-imperial construction of Britain and its relation to the national identities of each nation. In addition, the framework of this analysis could also be extended to include archival examinations of national newspaper coverage on former imperial occasions. The coronation and death of Queen Victoria as well as the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II would provide further
investigation. Similarly, analyses of imperial sporting occasions would provide additional insights into the mediated construction of ‘imperial Britain’. To this end, the Commonwealth Games would provide a notable source of comparative examination.\textsuperscript{28}

To this extent, the examinations of both royal and sporting occasions would, as this thesis has aimed to explore, provide an examination of Britain via two important, and, often, cited, British characteristics: monarchy and sport. Indeed, while it was the British who codified most of today’s sporting practices, a process that was fuelled by empire, royal events and the pageantry of monarchy have formed an important part of Britain’s identity and history. As a result, events that seek to bring together Britain’s royal and sporting endeavours, such as those in 2012, provide a valuable opportunity to examine the construction, representation and framing of Britain.

In support of this, future investigations could seek to explore the year 1953. Much like 2012, this year also saw two important ‘British’ events. On May 29\textsuperscript{th}, Edward Hillary, from New Zealand and Tenzing Norgay, a Sherpa from Nepal, scaled the summit of Mt. Everest, the first time it had been achieved. The news of ‘Britain’s’ victory was announced on 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 1953, the day of Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation (Hansen, 2000). The extent to which British imperialism served to underlie the press’ construction of these events, and, more importantly, how this post-imperial period served as the beginning of the end for the British Empire, would offer a valuable and accompanying investigation to this thesis’s topic.

Undoubtedly, however, future analyses of Britain will be required to explore the changing power relations between the British home nations, most notably, between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Here, there are continuing ‘sociogenetic changes’ affecting Britain and British identity, which can be explored (Atkinson, 2003: 8). Accordingly, future examinations could extend the use of the established-outsider model in order to consider how processes of functional democratization in the British state have shaped the Scottish Independence Referendum and its aftermath. Equally, the strengthening or weakening of ties with Europe, both for Britain and its (independent?) home nations, will only serve to encourage ‘the degree of social

\textsuperscript{28} In fact, Polley (2014) notes that ‘Intriguingly, the Games have also been under-explored within the large literature on sport and British imperialism. This literature has been dominated by cricket and rugby union. Important as these sports are for their high profile, and for what they tell us about the cultural meanings that have been attached to imperial relations, they have only ever included a fraction of the territories that have made up the Empire, and still make up the Commonwealth’ (2014: 384).
differentiation’ (Loyal, 2004: 137) within Britain. Central to this will be the contested longevity of ‘Britain’ as a common source of identification, indeed, a process that will undoubtedly have both royal and sporting implications for the British home nations.
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### Appendix I

#### Coding Sheet

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