Recording the stream of consciousness: a practice-led study of serial drawing

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Abstract

How is a process of serial drawing understood to record the phenomenological ‘stream of consciousness’ that underpins it? This research question emerges from a hypothesis driving the research: that when considered as a form of expression which ‘speaks’ in a particular way (Tormey, 2007), drawing re-presents (‘records’) the stream of consciousness underpinning it in a rather fundamental manner. The purpose of this first person, practice-led research is to question how this hypothesis is understood, treating it as an assumption to be tested via practice and theory combined. Within the research this hypothesis is linked to both the wider assumption that ‘drawing records thought’ (Rosand, 2002) and to the contemporary idea that drawing is a form of ‘perpetual becoming’ (Hoptman, 2002; de Zegher & Butler, 2010) given the temporality which underpins the act of drawing. To help facilitate investigation of the hypothesis, the assumption that ‘drawing records thought’ is duly suspended (bracketed) for the duration of the research, allowing the structure and process of serially developed drawing (Chavez, 2004) in conjunction with first-person methods for approaching phenomenal consciousness (Varela & Shear, 1999; Depraz, 1999) to investigate it in practical terms.

The significance of the research resides in a scrutiny of the drawing process, undertaken in close relation to Husserl’s (1931/2012; 1950/1999) Phenomenology. As a result, the phenomenon of drawing is re-described as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, emphasising how the appearance of drawing (noun) not only re-presents the prior act of drawing (verb) which produced it, but also provides the practitioner with a look ahead, indicating the hope and expectation of drawings not yet made. This claim emerges via the specific manner in which my serially developed drawings demonstrate re-presenting the ‘streaming’ of consciousness described (in Husserlian terms) as the self-temporalization of consciousness, experienced within the duration of now. This phenomenological description of how drawing operates builds upon Rawson’s (1969/1987) statement regarding the ‘special charm’ of drawing - the underlying quality of movement that drawings (noun) exhibit on the basis they were drawn. Husserl’s protentional focus on ‘hope’ and ‘expectation’ (de Warren, 2009) allows the research to expand upon this idea, describing the underlying movement within drawing as a form of self-temporalization that also points ahead to what is not yet drawn. This forward looking, practitioner centred claim is intended to compliment the focus on ‘trace’ and ‘memory’ that a proportion of the current critical discourse on drawing remains engaged with (Newman M, 1996; Tormey, 2007; Newman & de Zegher, 2003; Derrida J, 1993).
Acknowledgments

I wish to thank my supervisors Dr Marion Arnold and Simon Downs for their continued enthusiasm for the project, and for their unstinting support throughout the duration of my research.

I also wish to thank The School of the Arts, English and Drama at Loughborough University for providing me with a full PhD Studentship, thus permitting me to take up my studies and produce this body of work.

And finally, a thank you to Rob, Joanna and Erin. For everything else.
List of Illustrations

Series One & Series Two drawings are both part of a larger transfer drawing series titled *Druckkopf* (2012). All works in this series are Indian ink on Fabriano watercolour paper, 29 x 38cm.

Series Three & Series Four drawings are both part of a larger metronome drawing series titled *The Specious Line* (2013). All works in this series are produced with a Wacom Inkling digital pen on cartridge paper, 25 x 25cm. The images presented in the thesis are taken from the 600dpi digital file recorded by the pen.

- Figure 1: Series Four, *The Specious Line* (2013). No.13, 15 & 18.
- Figure 2: Joe Graham, *Flea* (2011). No.27 - 29. Pencil transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 21cm. Series of 75.
- Figure 3: Michael Landy, *Creeping Buttercup & Common Toad Flax* from the series ‘Nourishment’ (2002). Etching on paper, 39 x 55cm & 67 x 49cm. Collection: Tate Gallery.
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Figure 45: Series One, *Druckkopf* (2012), No.4 - 6.
As an artist who draws, I produce serially developed drawing as a means to draw out my ideas from the process as it unfolds. On this basis the concepts that emerge from my artistic practice may be considered coherent in the sense they arise in dual combination - from **within** and **without** the act of drawing. Elements ‘within’ the act of drawing relate to drawing as a process. Elements ‘outside’ the act of drawing include introducing ideas from other disciplines, such as philosophy, as a means to structure my work and direct the process as it unfolds. I produce work in this manner to see how thought may be developed via the making of work, basing my approach on what the artist Clodagh Emoe (2014, p. 14) recently described as, ‘performing philosophy in a non-philosophical way’.

I consider this seemingly counterintuitive statement particularly useful for my current artistic research, for it suggests that, instead of turning art into an object for philosophy, the artist, ‘uses philosophy to reveal the specific form of thought that is immanent to art’ (Emoe, 2014, p. 15). The thought which I posit is immanent to drawing as a form of art is the idea that drawing (noun) is a, ‘perpetual state of becoming’ (Hoptman, 2002, p. 11) based on the temporality which underpins the act of drawing (verb). My practice-led research can be considered a concerted attempt to make this thought explicitly understood, using the philosophy of Phenomenology to focus attention on establishing how drawing is understood to record the ‘stream of consciousness’ as a purely phenomenological understanding. To that end I follow a similar line of thinking to that which underpinned the scope of *Drawing Now: Between the Lines of Contemporary Art* (2007) which was, ‘founded on the premise that drawing thinks/talks in a particular way’ (Tormey, 2007, p. ix). Thinking of drawing as a particular way of speaking means I wish to comprehend how drawing, understood as a particular form of ‘becoming’, expresses the form of consciousness understood to ‘stream’.

The **stream of consciousness** is the metaphor introduced by William James (1890/1950) to describe phenomenal consciousness as a form of becoming, where we encounter the experience of ‘being conscious’ as a changing, yet unified and continuous process - a

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1 ‘Phenomenology’ (with a capital ‘P’) is used in reference to the philosophical discipline of the same name, whereas the term ‘phenomenological’ can refer to either first or third person approaches connected with the study of conscious experience. As I am conducting a first-person enquiry, the term ‘phenomenological’ is used in this thesis in reference to a first-person position only.
perpetuation of the world and our sense of self which persist despite the ceaseless flow of events we encounter in subjective terms. It is my practically derived intuition that the unity and continuity that the process of drawing entails, especially in linear form, can represent this strange phenomenon in a manner very different to other forms of expression, such as writing. The purpose of my research is to make this intuition explicitly understood.

Figure 1: Series Four, The Specious Line (2013) No.13, 15, & 18

The investigation proceeds by scrutinising my serially developed drawing practice in close relation with Husserl’s (1931/2012) understanding of temporality, which ultimately resulted in the ‘streaming’ of consciousness described as a form of self-temporalization (de Warren, 2009). As a result of applying the ideas within Husserl’s philosophy to my research, I emerge with the ability to clearly ‘hear’ my practice articulate the knowledge that to some degree had lain latent within my understanding of drawing – that in representing the streaming of consciousness as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, drawing (noun) is also revealed as a self-temporalizing phenomenon. The self-temporalization of drawing describes how the past act of drawing (verb) re-presented in the present drawing (noun) is a continually modified interpretation on the part of the practitioner - where the modification also includes a look ahead, towards the hope, or expectation, of drawings not yet made. Serially developed drawing (fig.1) opens out this understanding due to its serially presented form, but I suggest it is present whenever drawing (noun) is conceived in relation to the temporality that the act of drawing (verb) indicates.

As the ‘stream of consciousness’ is a fully phenomenological understanding concerning how consciousness is experienced, my research is undertaken within the epistemology of Phenomenology. Within that framework, I make use of a bricoleur methodological approach; one that becomes increasingly Husserlian in scope as the investigation progresses and my understanding of phenomenology grows (Depraz, 1999; Varela & Shear, 1999). One immediate result of this approach to note here however, is the idea
‘drawing records thought’ is recognised as an important assumption underpinning the research as a whole, given it contains the idea that drawing can ‘record’ consciousness. Because of my Husserlian approach to research this assumption is duly suspended for the duration of the enquiry - meaning put out of play, or ‘bracketed’. Bracketing (Einklammerung) is a phenomenological tool developed by Edmund Husserl (1931/2012; 1950/1999) for ‘doing’ phenomenology essentially, where the aim is for the practising phenomenologist to recognize and suspend any assumptions connected to their research they find themselves holding within their ordinary (natural) attitude.

In brief, the aim of implementing the procedure of bracketing is to recognise the importance of trying to remain neutral – that is, neither seeking to either support or deny the hypothesis/assumption that the research question contains. The desire is simply to recognise the assumption as an assumption, followed by ‘putting into suspension’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 52) all thoughts concerning its potential veracity while one sets about producing evidence in ones chosen format (i.e. drawings) that test it in practical terms. This action was not performed right at the beginning of the investigation however, for at that time I was not aware of the phenomenological reduction, or how to implement it as a form of praxis (Depraz, 1999). Instead, it was introduced during the first practical test of my ideas in Chapter Two, once I had clarified its potential use within my Methodology (Chapter One). I introduce it here to dispel any confusion about the nature of my research – this investigation is questioning the assumption that drawing ‘records’ thought by asking how it is understood to re-present the stream of consciousness. The aim is to use this and other methods to clarify my own understanding for how drawing operates as a form of expression, in order that I may then be able to share that knowledge with others.

**Research Question**

*How is a process of serial drawing understood to record the phenomenological ‘stream of consciousness’ that underpins it?* This research question emerges from the bracketed hypothesis that drives the research: the idea that drawing does record (re-present) the stream of consciousness that underpins it in a rather fundamental manner. This idea can be articulated in a range of different ways according to the particular sensibilities of the practitioner who entertains it. It can for example be supported by such statements like

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2 Bracketing is discussed in further detail in Chapter One: Methodology as the initial part of the procedure known as the phenomenological reduction (p.42), itself the cardinal method associated with Phenomenology.
this one, from Edward Hill (1966, p. 8), ‘drawing diagrams experience. It is a transposition and a solidification of the mind’s perceptions.’ The purpose of this first-person practice-led research is to question how this bracketed notion is understood, when ‘drawing’ refers to a process of serially developed drawing and ‘experience’ refers to the stream of consciousness that underpins it. In working through the research question in coherent fashion, the thesis constitutes a piece of first person, self-reflective, qualitative research: presented as a series of ‘thoughts on the phenomenon’ (phenomeno-logy) of both drawing and consciousness combined. A concern with examining the relationship between them as phenomena means I do not wish to focus on discussing one at the expense of the other. Instead, my aim is to strike a balance whereby the notion of ‘recording consciousness’ can be brought to light, exemplifying what it means within the context of drawing. This is a decision that has implications for the way in which the research is conducted, reflected in the structure of the thesis, and the conclusion(s) able to be reached.

**Role of practice**

Embarking on a practice-led approach means the role of practice within the research is not considered in any way supplemental to the theory – the theory emerged in the form in which it did because of the questions the practice raised. The role of practice is to demonstrate, rather than illustrate, the practical testing of my hypothesis, where my drawings are developed as forms of evidence that seek to support my argument, bringing the theoretical strands of my research together within the practice of drawing in order to render them visible. With regard to the particular importance of my own practice and its role in the research, the hypothesis emerged from a gradual process of reflection directed towards my serially developed drawings over a number of years. I looked to continue this trajectory within the context of practiced-led artistic research, in order to help make explicit two insights into drawing that the gradual development of my practice had brought to my attention. The first insight centred on the idea that the flow of drawing perceived as a physical act which takes up space, must relate in some close manner to the flow of thought conceived as a mental event that takes up time. When the two appear

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3 As I make use of the Husserlian method of active reflection identified within the second, validating stage of the phenomenological reduction - the search for the invariant – which characterizes phenomenological research on Husserl’s terms (Depraz, 1999, p. 101), I do not implement the model of reflection-in-action connected with Schon (1984) and more normally associated with practice-led/practice-based research. The Husserlian method is particularly apt for my research for it requires the varied results (the drawings) to be presented in series in order for the act of reflection to be carried out. This technique is discussed in the summary of both Chapter Two and Chapter Five.
in tandem via the act of drawing, a more widely held idea emerges that the form of one somehow represents the form of the other. The second insight asked whether my serially developed drawing practice could function as a means to help facilitate this process of one form re-presenting the other, based on the strong metaphorical connection between a series of drawings, and a succession of thoughts, perceptions or feelings that constitute the ‘stream of consciousness’ occurring concurrently with those drawings. As my practice developed, I sought for a way to concretise these insights and make them more explicitly understood, which led into the immediate background to the research.

**Background to the research**

The research question emerged from a process of reflection directed towards my serial developed drawing practice during my MFA. This period of reflection was ignited by the position outlined in an academic paper titled: *Art as a metaphor of the mind* (Lavazza, 2009), which used William James (1890/1950) nucleus/fringe model of the ‘stream of thought’ to examine the idea that art can function as a metaphor of the human mind. The idea put forward was that appreciation of art includes vague fringe content of which the viewer is not fully aware, in addition to the more explicitly perceived forms and meanings that the artwork presents. Lavazza (2009) suggested that, much like the manner in which the phenomenological fringe within the stream of consciousness was described by James (1890/1950) as directing the flow of thought from one ‘substantive’ thought to another (please see the definition on p.11 for more details), the perception of vague fringe feelings within aesthetic experience might also be responsible for directing the appreciation of art, to a degree. I came away from my encounter with this idea with a desire to test it - to explore how the metaphorical relationship it described might be perceived and understood within drawings themselves.

To do so, I turned to what I perceived to be a form of existing ‘fringe’ content within my own drawings, where the term ‘fringe’ was physically understood in the context of various nonrepresentational marks or gestures. I wanted to learn more about how such marks might ‘stand in’ for the phenomenologically understood fringe within thought. In formulating a research project, my ambition was to develop a series (or more) of drawings to see whether fringe elements within them could be found, and if so, what

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4 This paper focused on a neo-Jamesian perspective concerning the phenomenology of art and aesthetic experience, using the distinction between the nucleus and fringe in the stream of consciousness described by William James (1890/1950) to argue that ‘our appreciation of a work of art is guided by a vague and blurred perception of more powerful content of which we are not fully aware. Accordingly a work of art is seen as a kind of metaphor of our mental life’ (Lavazza, 2009, p. 159).
such elements might tell me about their relationship to the purported ‘fringe’ elements within the stream of thought that underpinned their production. The type of serially developed drawing I am referring to here is epitomised in the series Flea (Graham, 2012), produced during my MFA and subsequently published by the Centre for Recent Drawing as an artist book (fig.2). This series comprised 75 pencil transfer drawings that used William Blake’s ‘The Ghost of a Flea’ (1819-20) as a starting point. The process of drawing involved the development of a particular transfer technique to produce an extended series of pencil prints (as ‘transfer drawings’), where each new image in the series was based upon an imperfect copy of the previous.

![Flea (2011) No.27 - 29](image)
Pencil transfer drawings on paper, 29 x 21 cm. Series of 75.

Each drawing in the series was produced by tracing over the previous image using tracing paper, and then scoring the reverse of the tracing to transfer the graphite onto a new sheet of plain paper. This produced an imperfect mono-print of the image reversed along the vertical axis, which was then creatively added to. The structure of the series was utilised to present a range of changing forms resembling a flea ‘hopping’ from one image the next, with the parasitic process of copying helping to make this understood in conceptual terms. Important within the context of the paper referred to (Lavazza, 2009), was that this process carried fringe shades of content from one image to the next, as some marks were lost and new ones introduced in order to create a new image and keep the process ‘alive’. In structural terms, this meant each new drawing appeared as a ‘look ahead’ towards the next potential drawing in the series, as well as a ‘look back’ to the previous. Other series of drawings I produced worked in a similar way. They all presented a stream of impressions that represented (recorded) various narrative strands, allowing each series to function as a, ‘metaphor of mental life’ (Lavazza, 2009, p. 159).
In addition to both this way of developing drawing and the academic paper (Lavazza, 2009) just discussed, the background to the research involved rumination upon this written account, below, of the historically close relationship between the sense of ‘flow’ that underpins drawing, and the sense of flow that underpins life as we experience it. In the opening section of his practically orientated treatise *The Language of Drawing*, Hill (1966, p. 2) gives the following statement describing what one might call the phenomenology of the drawn line

Speculating about the origin and evolution of drawing, we may suppose palaeolithic man innately to have sensed the power of the drawn line as he idly traced with finger or stick in the soft earth. Slowly, over a great span of time, the phenomenon of line must have become associated with a larger share of man’s experience - the trajectory of moving life.

This quote by Hill offered me a way to think about the broader aim of my entire research, placing it to a degree within the history of drawing itself. Through a process of active reflection directed towards my own practice of serially developed drawing I sought to produce work that could articulate the depth of the metaphorical ‘association’ that holds between the phenomenon of drawing and what Hill refers to as the ‘trajectory of moving life’ – a phenomenon otherwise known as the *stream of consciousness*.

**Definition of Terms**

*Drawing*

Within the context of this thesis, I understand serial drawing to mean, ‘a type of repeated form or structure shared equally by each work in a group of works made by one artist’ (Chavez, 2004, p. ix). Fig. 3 is an example of work within this approach produced by

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5 Although both the ‘trajectory of moving life’ and the ‘stream of consciousness’ are literary metaphors, they point towards the concrete experience whereby consciousness is understood to ‘stream’. The phenomenological argument (Husserl, 1931/2012, Merleau-Ponty, 1962) suggests this experience can be approached ‘in itself’ by the subject, simply by being felt (intuited). I agree with this phenomenological understanding, but I do not follow it in this enquiry with Husserl’s logocentric position – I understand that once the physical experience of consciousness is expressed in some form (written, or drawn) this is then metaphorically (Lakoff, 1993) rather than apodictically (Husserl, 1950/1999) understood, according to the terms governing the manner in which the metaphor is agreed to function (Searle, 1993). Please see the definition of metaphor used within the thesis given on p.13 for more information.
artist Michael Landy. I understand ‘seriality’ (which includes serial drawing) to mean that the overall structure of each series is produced by a, ‘single indivisible process that links the internal structure of a work to that of other works within a differentiated whole’ (Coplans in Chavez, 2004, p. ix). I do not refer specifically within the thesis to ‘iterative drawing’ – instead, I use the word iteration to indicate the act of repetition integral to the idea of a repeated form. Each act of repetition within the process of serially developed drawing is an iteration of that act, and the results of one iteration are then used as the starting point for the next (although the decision for how they are used in this manner changes from one series to the next). Although it is notoriously difficult to define ‘drawing’ per se (Kingston, 2003), I put forward the following description as a working definition for use within the research. In line with the earlier reference to drawing as a form of ‘perpetual becoming’ (p.1) based on the temporality underpinning the act of drawing, my definition begins with the description given by de Zegher (2010, p. 23), who describes drawing as

Characterized by a line that is always unfolding, always becoming. And in the drawing’s stages of becoming – mark becoming line, line becoming contour, contour becoming image – the first mark not only structures the blank page as an open field but also defines it temporally, as the drawing’s marks follow one another in time.

On the phenomenological basis of intentionality, drawing is referred to throughout the thesis in relation to both the verb (act) and the noun (object) on the basis that both are given (intended) within the appearance of drawing understood as intentionally produced: a ‘drawing’ only appears via the intentional act of drawing. This intentional underpinning to the investigation means I understand drawing to be an art of time – an act of becoming that indicates time, where the spatial form of the drawing is defined by an act that unfolds in temporal succession. My practical understanding of drawing is largely derived from my own artistic practice, but is also informed by the wider conversation on drawing described in a range of edited volumes (Hill, 1966; Rawson, 1969/1987; de Zegher & Butler, 2010; Gansterer, 2011; Rosand, 2002; Hoptman, 2002; Deacon, 2014; Cooper & Lampert, 2009; Tormey, 2007; Newman & de Zegher, 2003; Adolphs & Krummel, 2009; Dexter, 2005; Godfrey, 1990).

‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher’s word, used as part of the phenomenological epistemology that frames the research as a whole. It is discussed in more detail on p.89 in reference to Husserl’s description of consciousness as intentional, on the basis that ‘consciousness’ simply means consciousness-of (Husserl, 1950/1999, p. 33).
This working definition also includes my attitude for what drawing is not within the thesis, namely a means to accurately represent something seen via perception in a purely mimetic sense. For me, drawing is not solely about representing in this literal manner – for while drawings are always constrained to re-present, I lean more towards Rawson’s (1969/1987, p. 21) comment that drawings are made, in the sense of presenting a conceptual construction of the artist’s imagination with the aid of perception, rather than a straightforward representation of something one sees with one’s eyes. My understanding of drawing as the point of exchange between the percept and the concept is perhaps closer to what Berger (2005, p. 109) describes as drawing being, ‘a way of addressing the absent, of making the absent appear.’ Berger describes this as the role of drawing that had existed prior to the Renaissance interest in questioning something visibly there.

Figure 3: Michael Landy, *Creeping Buttercup & Common Toad Flax* from the series ‘Nourishment’ (2002)
Etching on paper, 39 x 55 cm, 67 x 49 cm. Collection: Tate Gallery

This attitude finds an echo in Derrida’s (1993, p. 2) discussion of drawing as a ‘hypothesis of sight’. Although this Derridean deconstructive understanding of drawing lies to the edge of this resolutely phenomenological investigation, I refer to it in Chapter Three in relation to Newman’s (1996) concern with the trace. I also refer to Derrida in my

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7 Within the thesis, I do not extend the discussion to include Derrida’s wider critique of Husserlian Phenomenology. Although Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserl constitutes a large and varied body of work (Derrida J., 1973, 1989, 2005), it also forms an entirely language-bound assessment of the logo-centric assumptions within Husserl’s writing on Phenomenology, rather than assess how the practice of phenomenology using non-lexical forms of evidence (i.e. drawings) might fruitfully examine subjective experience. Deconstruction of the written text allowed Derrida to expose the foundationalist pretentions that Husserl’s focus on the transcendental ego resulted in, but as a drawing researcher I have no interest in furthering Husserl’s aim for, ‘establishing a science of the eidetic essence of a transcendent subjectivity’ (Husserl, 1931/2012, p.xxxvi). To that end the explicit inclusion of Derrida’s critique of Husserl, with its emphasis on a textual analysis of Husserl’s published work, is not deemed relevant for helping to further this practice-led body of research, and is largely omitted as a result.
thesis Conclusion, in relation to de Warren’s (2009) interpretation of Husserl, and again in my speculative application for the research (Lawlor, 2002). It is on this topic of ‘seeing’ in relation to drawing that I disagree slightly with Hill (1966), whom I otherwise refer to extensively. For Hill (1966, p. 8), drawing is seeing in the purely perceptual sense, meaning the practice of drawing is a means to sharpen the powers we have of observation, ‘beyond the ordinary level’ (Hill, 1966, p. 9). The question is not so much about disagreeing with Hill outright. My practical intuition is that drawing does increase ‘visual sensitivity’ (Hill, 1966, p. 9) to some degree, and with it the knowledge one has of the things one draws - if that thing happens to be a perceivable object and can be said to ‘exist’ on those terms. However, to say this means, as Hill (1966, p. 9) does, that, ‘drawing = seeing’ is perhaps too strong, because perception is a notably complex affair, and this leads to the suspicion that drawing considered as a ‘correct’ mimetic semblance of an original is an inherently flawed position to take (Zummer, 2012).

Figure 4: Flea (2011) No.62 - 64
Pencil transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 21 cm. Series of 75

Rather than state drawing is definitively not about seeing however, I proceed on the basis that it depends how the term seeing is interpreted, and where the emphasis is placed within the interpretation, over and above ruling it either in or out. For my overriding concern with drawing within this enquiry - from the initial desire to use drawing to record the potentially invisible ‘fringe’ of consciousness, through to establishing how drawing is understood as a form self-temporalization that indicates a temporal horizon beyond what is given in current perception - remains motivated by the phenomenon of drawing as the means to make the absent appear (fig.4).
The stream of consciousness

The term ‘stream of consciousness’ is used throughout the thesis in a developing fashion. It remains however, in reference to the first-person experience the subject has of their own seeming ‘flow’ of consciousness, which includes literally everything they are conscious of: thoughts, perceptions, memories, sensations, bodily feelings etc. It begins as a term with my original Jamesian (1890/1950) understanding, identified in the initial form of my research question: Streams of consciousness: how does a process of drawing record the phenomenological ‘fringe’ within the flow of thought? This question, and the description of phenomenal consciousness it refers to, is based upon the nucleus/fringe model described by William James (1890/1950, p. 224) in his description of the ‘stream of consciousness’. James identifies the stream of consciousness as a) ‘referring to personal form’ and b) indicating that, ‘thought is in constant change’ (1890/1950, p. 229). Putting these together indicates the flow of thought to be a somewhat paradoxical understanding, for ‘we’, that is our sense of self, are found to persist despite the constant changeability of our thoughts, feelings and perceptions. The flow of thought described as a temporal form of unity within continuity remains at the heart of how I conceive the stream of consciousness throughout the thesis, where experiences are found to hold together both at a time and over time (Dainton, 2000).

A critical part of James’ definition that I begin the research with, is the emphasis placed upon what James describes as a different pacing to the parts of thought when it is described as a ‘stream’. Although James states that the stream of consciousness is continuous, broken only by periods of unconsciousness or sleep, there is nevertheless, ‘sudden contrasts in the quality’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 239) of successive segments in the stream. These contrasts bring about an awareness of a difference between comparatively restful and stable thoughts ‘about something’ in particular, and the passage between those thoughts and others. James describes the resting places using the term ‘substantive parts’ and the passages between with the term ‘transitive parts’ of thought (James, 1890/1950, p. 243). James also refers later in the same chapter to the substantive parts as the nucleus of thought, surrounded by a ‘fringe’ or ‘suffusion’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 258).

8 The term phenomenal consciousness denotes the basic understanding of consciousness within which the ‘stream of consciousness’ as a concept resides. For a further discussion of this topic, please see Chapter Four (p.87).
The fringe indicates the vague or dimly perceived awareness of relation between the current thought and others connected to it. The fringe can be identified when, for example, we have a thought ‘on the tip of our tongue’ – not (yet) explicable in terms of what it is, only in terms of what it is not. The proximity of understanding between James description of the fringe and the transitive parts of thought is an area I discuss in more detail in Chapter Two, in relation to Bailey's (1999) interpretation of James, which is brought in specifically for that purpose (p.50). This description of how consciousness is understood to stream refers to the experience that I initially set out to try and record through drawing, treating the drawings as a form of evidence towards this claim. It then develops in conceptual terms as the thesis develops⁹, moving more towards the Husserlian description. Husserl’s phenomenological interpretation of the stream of consciousness is similar to James, in that it emphasises unity and continuity within the flow of thought – as Moran and Cohen (2012, p. 308) describe it:

The sense that consciousness is constantly flowing and streaming while somehow remaining unified into a single personal egoic consciousness is at the heart of Husserl’s conception. This account of the holistic stream of consciousness can be compared with similar conceptions in William James and Henri Bergson.

However, Husserl emphasises two aspects over James description that become of fundamental importance to my research as it progresses. The first is the temporal aspect to the stream of consciousness, emphasised by the fact that the term ‘stream’ refers, not to space, but to time. The second is the intentional aspect, found when we reflect that, as Husserl (1950/1999, p. 33) says, the term ‘consciousness’ inevitably means consciousness-of. The intentional directedness to consciousness indicates the ‘flowing’, ‘streaming’ aspect in itself, where we are understood to be conscious-of thoughts, events, perceptions, memories etc. that follow one another in time. The descriptions by James and Husserl are seen as complimentary in their outline of phenomenal consciousness as a stream-like experience, and can be considered as providing much of the bedrock that the contemporary philosophy of mind engaging with consciousness from a phenomenological perspective (Dainton, 2000; Crane, 2013; Kriegal, 2013; Block, 2002; Blackmore, 2005) rests upon.

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⁹ This development is due in part to the difficulties I encounter at the end of Chapter Two concerning my attempt to ‘record’ the stream of consciousness based solely on using James theoretical description, whereupon I cite a lack of reliable evidence within the drawings themselves. Please see the summary of Chapter Two for further details.
Metaphor

The concept of metaphor is defined within the thesis on the basis that I understand drawing to be, at core, a metaphorical expression of consciousness, given that drawing fundamentally ‘represents’. Aside from the ‘stream of consciousness’ (James, 1890/1950) being a literary metaphor for the first-person phenomenological experience of consciousness, I derive my practical understanding of metaphor for use within the thesis on the basis of what Lakoff (1993) defines is not metaphorical – the ubiquity of metaphor (representation) is such that it can be applied to most forms of communicable expression, regardless of what other terms are put in place. However, as Lakoff (1993, p. 203) points out, not everything is metaphorical - there are, he affirms, a great range of non-metaphorical concepts.

A sentence like “the balloon went up” is not metaphorical, nor is the old philosophers favourite “the cat is on the mat.” But as soon as one gets away from concrete physical experience and starts talking about abstractions or emotions, metaphorical understanding is the norm.

Rather than forming an indexical relation in the manner of stating a balloon goes ‘up’, or that smoke indicates a fire, I consider my drawings to be representations that metaphorically express the stream of consciousness as a physically lived experience, rather than, for example, presenting within themselves the entirety of the consciousness I experienced whilst drawing. This understanding is clarified in Chapter Two as part of my assessment of the practice. On this basis, my concern is not with questioning whether my drawings are understood metaphorically, but how the metaphor functions, given it is implied within the term ‘record’. The aim of my phenomenological research is to investigate the assumption that drawing records thought, which means investigating the assumption as a working metaphor. I consider the metaphor to be working in the sense that it is found to operate within the relationship between two phenomena I am investigating – drawing and phenomenal consciousness.

Connected to this practical understanding of metaphor is the way in which Husserlian (1931/2012; 1950/1999) phenomenology impacts upon it. Although I make greater use of a Husserlian approach to research as the investigation progresses, I do not adopt his explicitly logocentric attitude by making a distinction between ‘expression’ and ‘indication’ in relation to language, thereby relegating the rhetorical or metaphorical below the supposedly logical, apodictic foundations of self-present thought. For Norris (1983) in line
with Derrida (1973) this separation means Husserl privileges, ‘inward speech above the detours and vagaries of writing’ (Norris, 1983, p. 49). As an artist who seeks to express himself by making works that convey the sense of that expression within the works themselves, I make no such similar distinction, in this thesis or otherwise. Instead, I describe my drawings as outward expressions of my flow of consciousness, put forward to be shared with others both as works of art, and as launch pads for discussing the phenomenon of drawing. In the context of this thesis my drawings are re-interpreted by myself, using the theoretical tools I have at my disposal, in order to question what it is they ‘express’ about their relationship to the consciousness that underpinned their production. This means I do not consider them bearers of an absolute self-present meaningful intention beyond the context in which they sit. It is on this same basis that intentionality is used to think about what the metaphor implied by drawing ‘recording’ consciousness indicates. This includes establishing a flexible and on-going interpretation of my drawings that progress as the investigation progresses. This mobile interpretation is itself drawn out over a number of potential others, and helps to direct the development of my drawings, rather than to point with any form of absolute certainty to one interpretation over another.

**Phenomenon**

The term ‘phenomenon’ is understood throughout the thesis to mean ‘that which appears’ in relation to the Greek *phainomenon*10. Appearance understood in this context also includes that which is given as an experience (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 251). As such, the terms ‘appearance’ and ‘experience’ refer to each other and are used throughout the thesis on an interchangeable basis, selected according to the subtleties of what is being expressed. In simple terms both drawing and the stream of consciousness are considered as ‘that which appears’ to the subject who draws. On the basis of intentionality (Husserl, 1950/1999; Kriegal, 2013) the appearance of consciousness is considered to be dualistic - as a ‘stream’ of experiences it incorporates noetic acts of consciousness that are directed towards the noematic objects within consciousness. As this is a piece of phenomenological research, the definition of phenomenon extends to

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10 The precise understanding of the term ‘phenomenon’ I use in this thesis is Husserlian, taken from the Greek *phainomenon* meaning ‘appearance’. According to Moran & Cohen (2012, p.251), ‘phenomenology treats everything that is given or appears as a phenomenon’. Yet, in addition ‘the concept of phenomenon includes the idea of something that manifests itself and also the experiencing of that manifestation’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 252). On this basis appearance refers to the experience one has of the appearance, hence the terms ‘appearance’ and ‘experience’ are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
the way in which it is understood according to the difference between ‘fact’ and ‘essence’ - a difference which finds its source within Husserl’s use of the term *eidetic* and the procedure known as ‘eidetic variation’.

**Eidetic variation**

The term ‘eidetic’ refers throughout the thesis to the phenomenological concept of *essence*, and ‘eidetic variation’, ‘eidetic function’, ‘eidetic procedure’ or ‘identification of the invariant’ all refer to the manner of searching for the invariant essence of a phenomenon by varying the facticity of individual instances that constitute ones conception of it. The concept is derived from Husserl's (1931/2012, p.19) core understanding of the difference between ‘fact’ and ‘essence’ where, ‘for Husserl, fact (*Tatsache*) is in consequence abstract and the essence, concrete’ (Depraz, 1999, p.101). In other words, ‘facts’ describe the fact of this chair *here*, or the fact of that chair *there*, but the essence of what a ‘chair’ might be can be found elsewhere and otherwise. Eidetic variation is performed in order to describe that which is *invariant* - the concrete understanding that emerges by varying the range of singular instances on display. For example, varying the results of a series of drawings might result in the practitioner grasping what is essential about drawing - the essence of what drawing ‘is’, or *could be*. The eidetic procedure is fundamental to the sensible practice of phenomenology, because Phenomenology remains an eidetic discipline that looks to describe the *eidos* - the, ‘thought without which the object cannot be intuitively imagined as such’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p.93). It continues in Ihde’s (1995) postphenomenological project for example, where the term ‘essence’ is replaced by ‘multistability’, and ‘eidetic procedure’ by ‘variational practice’, but the principle remains the same – to hunt for the invariant, multistable understanding by varying the range of singular results that the (bracketed) investigation should produce.

Within my research I use the eidetic procedure to search within my series of drawings, conceived in Husserlian terms as factual forms of evidence, for what is essentially understood - the invariant understanding that might persist despite the variable differences between one drawing and the next. The search for the invariant is crucial within my investigation for analysing my results (the drawings) in order to unpack the hypothesis I am investigating and develop my research in incremental fashion, where each new stage is built upon the invariant finding of the previous. For a discussion of how the eidetic procedure enables one to look for that which is invariant, please refer to the section ‘identification of the invariant’ in Chapter One: Methodology.
Thesis structure

The thesis structure replicates the structure of the research. The relationship between practice and theory is reciprocal throughout, meaning the process through which the enquiry progresses oscillates between practice and theory in stages that overlap. I produced four series of drawings in total. Series One & Two ink drawings are developed to respond to the first form of my research question: Streams of consciousness: how does a process of drawing record the phenomenological ‘fringe’ within the flow of thought? These are discussed in Chapter Two and visual examples are presented interweaved with the text. Series Three & Four drawings are discussed in Chapter Five, and are also interweaved within the text. They are produced in response to a tailored review of the relevant literature across Chapter’s Three & Four. These are introduced to help clarify problems encountered within my assessment of Series One & Two drawings discussed in Chapter Two. Series Three & Four drawings address the second (and final) form of my research question: How is a process of serial drawing understood to record the phenomenological ‘stream of consciousness’ that underpins it? This question can be considered as a refinement of the first version, rather than a radical overhaul, based on absorbing the results of my research process and tailoring my focus accordingly.

The visual examples of my drawings given as figures within the text provide the immediate material to consult for reference purposes when reading the thesis. At the end of the thesis is included an Appendix with large format illustrations of all four series of drawings for reference purposes, should the reader wish to consult them to gain a clearer presentation of the manner in which the drawings appear. With this in mind, the structure of the thesis looks as follows:

- Chapter One: Methodology
- Chapter Two: Practice One
- Chapter Three: The Phenomenon of the Drawn Line
- Chapter Four: The Phenomenon of Consciousness
- Chapter Five: Practice Two
- Conclusion

The literature review runs throughout the thesis, although it is especially developed in Chapters Three & Four. I made the decision to begin with a practical test of my ideas in Chapter Two, rather than begin by conducting a separate review of the literature, in order to focus the area my on-going review should cover. This decision was taken on the basis
this is practice-led research i.e. the theoretical problems within the research are clarified first by practice, which then dictates the scope of the reading that it is to follow.

**Chapter Summaries**

*Chapter One: Methodology*

Chapter One details my ‘bricoleur’ approach towards developing a methodology (Grey & Malins, 2004). The purpose of this chapter is to outline an understanding of the four methods that constitute my bricoleur methodology, in order to then establish, through practice in Chapter Two, which are best for using in my research. The four methods I examine are *Serial Drawing*, as my primary method for producing drawing, followed by *Meditation*, *Introspection as Practice* and *Phenomenology* as potential methods for approaching the study of consciousness from a first-person position. My aim is to test these in combination with a process of serially developed drawing when first attempting to practically address my research question in Chapter Two. I begin by outlining why I select the bricoleur approach itself: on the basis that my initial research question emerged from a body of tacitly understood knowledge (Barrett & Bolt, 2010) connected to drawing. As an artist without either a philosophical or research-orientated background, I cannot articulate in advance which is the best first-person method for approaching consciousness. On that basis, I need to identify in this chapter a selection of suitable candidates that fit within the overall epistemology of Phenomenology, before testing them in combination with process of serially developed drawing in Chapter Two. This is in line with the aim of the bricoleur, ‘who works by means of process’ (Petherbridge, 2008, p. 35) rather than solely by means of prior concepts only.

The three first-person methods for approaching the study of consciousness (*Meditation*, *Introspection as Practice* and *Phenomenology*) that I select for testing with drawing are those identified by Varela & Shear (1999) in their book *The View from Within: First person approaches to the study of consciousness* (1999). This comprises a survey of historically relevant first-person approaches towards the study of phenomenal consciousness. They are included in my methodology on the basis they are methods for actively reflecting upon the stream of consciousness. Given that my bricoleur methodology is understood as an, ‘emergent construction’ (Grey & Malins, 2004, p. 74), the need for testing such methods out - rather than simply assuming their veracity in advance - is of paramount importance, and must be undertaken.
Chapter Two: Practice One

The purpose of Chapter Two is to address the first form of my research question (Streams of consciousness: how does a process of drawing record the phenomenological ‘fringe’ within the flow of thought?) using the four methods identified in Chapter One: Methodology. Serving as a test of all four methods, this chapter begins by outlining how these methods are to be deployed, before detailing the process of serially developed drawing that resulted. This is then followed by the analysis of the chapter in terms of how these methods addressed my research question. In order to clearly communicate to the reader the process through which practice and theory work together to address my question, I utilise Riley’s (2008) ‘functions of drawing’ model to structure the practical chapters (Chapter’s Two & Five). This proposes three clear elements that outline the function of drawing as a means of communication - the Experiential, the Interpersonal and the Compositional functions. Although they are experienced simultaneously within any given drawing, I separate them within Chapter Two & Five to aid the layout and description of my test, with images interwoven.

Figure 5: Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.1 - 3
Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

I begin by testing the method of Phenomenology, which centres on the deployment of the phenomenological reduction as praxis (Depraz, 1999). The first stage of this procedure involves ‘bracketing’ my research question - the notion that the ‘fringe’ will definitely be recorded via drawing is suspended until the drawings are complete and ready to be assessed. Within the Experiential section, I describe the experience I am aiming to represent - the ‘fringe’ within my stream of consciousness. This is then followed by the Interpersonal section, where I describe my mood and attitude towards producing this
representation of my experience. This means I aim to use the methods described by *Introspection as Practice* and *Meditation* to help me focus on certain specific content within my stream of consciousness while I draw, while the method of *Serial Drawing* will produce the physical drawings. The *Compositional* section is where I describe the manner in which I then bring together and compose these methods within the practicalities of the test itself, using a serially developed process of inkblot transfer drawing I devise for that express purpose (fig.5).

I then proceed to analyse the drawings themselves. First, I reflect on the experience of drawing, and in doing so ascertain that I have encountered problems at this stage of my research - the ‘fringe’ of consciousness is not evident, as an understanding or otherwise, within the drawings themselves. To help me get past this difficulty, I engage the second stage of the phenomenological reduction as *praxis*: the search for the invariant, as the eidetic procedure discussed in my definition of terms. This involves imaginatively varying the results of my investigation to establish that which is invariantly understood. The results are deceptively straightforward - the drawings are found to be invariably drawn, while the stream of consciousness is invariably understood to stream. Although seemingly obvious, these results and the manner in which I fix them as understandings help me develop the trajectory of my research. This centres on a decision to clarify, in theoretical terms, the kinetic underpinning to both phenomena, by researching a key formal understanding of each across Chapters Three & Four. I then apply this theoretical development within the practical re-testing of my ideas in Chapter Five.

**Chapter Three: The Phenomenon of the Drawn Line**

The initial practical test of my ideas in Chapter Two was conducted in order to firm up the trajectory of my research, allowing me to decide, as a bricoleur researcher, what course of action to take. This includes deciding upon the specific area of literature I need to consult to further my research. The purpose of Chapter Three is to conduct one half of this literature review by expanding upon the first invariant finding which emerged in the assessment of Chapter Two: that if drawings are invariably drawn, I need to gain a better understanding of a form which this act invariably produces. For this invariant, I decide upon the form of the drawn line. My aim is to use the focus on the line itself to further my research into drawing along a more refined path, and hopefully not repeat the same difficulties I encountered in Chapter Two. To that end I focus on exploring the drawn line as a spatially understood phenomenon, meaning I look to describe how it spatially ‘appears’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 251) to the subject who draws. I select six points,
below, to describe the (spatial) kinetic progression of the line from its inception via a moving point, focusing my review upon a small number of authors (Rawson, 1969/1987; Rosand, 2002; Ingold, 2007; Newman M., 1996; Maynard, 2005) in the main body of the text, whilst referring to others (Petherbridge, 2010; de Zegher & Butler, 2010) where necessary:

- The moving point
- The trace of the point
- The intentionally drawn line
- The drawn line as a record
- The dualism of the line
- The rhythm of the line

As a practitioner with a history of developing drawing in various forms, my aim is to narrow my field of understanding and clarify any hidden assumptions I hold in my ‘natural attitude’ (Husserl, 1931/2012) regarding what drawing a line entails. This chapter focuses primarily upon the drawn line conceived in terms of its spatial appearance (noun), which is underpinned by the temporally extended act of drawing (verb), although the writers I reference do not always clearly separate the two.

**Chapter Four: The Phenomenon of Consciousness**

In Chapter Four I enlarge upon the second invariant finding clarified in Chapter Two - that consciousness invariably appears to ‘stream’ to the subject who experiences being conscious. The purpose of this chapter is to conduct the second half my literature review, outlining the **streaming** of consciousness as an on-going phenomenon that we experience over time. My desire is to combine this theoretical knowledge with that discussed in Chapter Three, within my next round of practice, Chapter Five. It is my hypothesis that combination of both sets of theoretical knowledge will allow me to develop my research question in a more coherent fashion, and thus tailor a more focused way to approach uncovering the hypothesis which the initial question aimed towards. I undertake this review in a similar fashion to the previous chapter, detailing the invariantly temporal nature of consciousness as a kinetic form of understanding across six points - for I discover the term ‘stream’ refers not to space, but to **time** (Crane, 2013). I focus upon a range of writers (Husserl, 1931/2012; Dainton, 2000; Block, 2002; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; James, 1890/1950) who discuss the phenomenon of consciousness from a first-person position across these six points:
- Phenomenal consciousness
- Consciousness as intentional
- The stream of consciousness
- Temporality
- The specious present
- The rhythm of now

My aim in discussing consciousness in this manner is to clarify any hidden assumptions I hold in my everyday (natural) attitude concerning the streaming of consciousness as a temporal phenomenon. This is especially relevant at this point in my research, for it transpires there are intriguing problems which the metaphor ‘stream’ poses in regards to ascertaining precisely how it describes time understood to ‘flow’ or ‘pass’ by (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The philosophical thinking behind question this re-focuses the research away from the phenomenological ‘fringe’ and towards the idea of the ‘specious’ present (James, 1890/1950; Varela F. J., 1999), otherwise understood as the duration of now - the time ‘in which’ the streaming of consciousness occurs.

Chapter Five: Practice Two

Figure 6: Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No.9, 15, & 21
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

The purpose of Chapter Five is to detail the second and final practical test of my ideas, where I combine the theoretical understandings of Chapters Three & Four within a serially produced, demonstrative drawing exercise developed in response (fig.6). In addition, my research question now reflects the development to my research - the focus on the Jamesian (1890/1950) ‘fringe’ is removed, replaced by the specious present (now) as something potentially measurable, and therefore recordable. This generates the second (and final) form of the research question: How is a process of serial drawing
understood to record the phenomenological ‘stream of consciousness’ that underpins it? To record (re-present) this experience of the specious present (now) the phenomenological understandings of the drawn line and the stream of consciousness are brought together via the use of rhythm (Lefebvre, 2004/2013). Rhythm is selected on the basis that it emerged in both Chapters Three & Four as underpinning both phenomena (Speed, 1917/1972; Abraham, 1995), and on the basis it unites our understanding of space and time (Lefebvre, 2004/2013). I decide that rhythm can help structure the relationship between ‘drawing’ and ‘consciousness’ in closer terms than Chapter Two, and perhaps generate a better means to identify how the form of one (drawing) re-presents the form of the other (consciousness). I describe the test according to the same structure used in Chapter Two (Riley, 2008). I put the standalone methods of *Introspection as Practice* and *Meditation* aside as having served their purpose, but I retain the method of *Phenomenology* as being the most useful method to compliment *Serial Drawing*. This means the question of what the drawings do/do not ‘record’ remains bracketed for the duration of my test, while I produce drawings in response. Once complete I then search again for the invariant element from within the variation presented across each series in a similar manner to Chapter Two.

The results are interesting - while I cannot claim that the full scope of my temporal experience is invariably recorded within the drawings themselves, I learn to comprehend how the drawn line *invariably* records the movement which underpins it – a movement which is now theoretically understood as being continually re-presented within the speciousness of a present that ‘moves’. By applying the phenomenological material discussed in Chapter Four to the assessment of my drawings, in particular the Husserlian understanding of the self-temporalization (‘streaming’) of consciousness found within the form of the now (coupled with the notions of *protention* and *retention* that explain it) I argue my drawings sensibly re-present (record) the self-temporalization of consciousness in Husserlian terms. This understanding facilitates my ability to clearly and coherently articulate my claim for new knowledge in the thesis Conclusion.
Chapter One: Methodology

Introduction

At the outset of my enquiry, I recognized that my methodology needed to respond to two principle demands of the research. The first requirement was for it to be both rigorous and transparent in order for it to develop according to the needs of being practice-led. The second requirement was that it should be framed according to the first-person, subject orientated manner in which the research question was first posed: Streams of consciousness: how does a process of drawing record the phenomenological ‘fringe’ within the flow of thought? It is towards addressing this first form of the question - with a specific focus on the ‘fringe’ of consciousness - that the methodology is initially devised and potential methods selected.

As previously stated, my background as a fine arts practitioner means my research question is devised on the basis of knowledge that is largely tacitly understood - I learnt to draw through the practice of drawing. As a result, there is an element of ‘unknowability’ at this initial stage of the research connected to what kind of knowledge my serially developed practice might reveal when it uses Phenomenological theory to help question the assumption that ‘drawings records thought’. As Barrett (2007, p. 6) remarks, it was on the basis of Heidegger’s notion of ‘praxical knowledge’ that we can understand the concept of an emergent methodology for practice-led/practice based research. Because of the reflexive process common to practitioner-based research, Barrett (2007, p. 6) suggests that, ‘methodologies in artistic research are necessarily emergent and subject to repeated adjustment, rather than remaining fixed throughout the process of enquiry’. With these points in mind, my concern is to ensure my emergent methodology will be flexible enough to allow room for development to both the research and the research question. Development to my initial research question will likely occur as a result of my making explicit what was only implicit (implied) in my initial understanding of it.

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11 In framing my methodology from the start on the basis of being both practice based and qualitative I refer to what Grey and Malins (2004) feel constitutes practitioner led research methodology for use within Art and Design, ‘methodology is responsive, driven by the requirements of practice and its creative dynamic. It is essentially qualitative and naturalistic. It acknowledges complexity and real experience’ (Grey & Malins, 2004, p.21).
To that end, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the emergent bricoleur approach I adopt towards developing my methodology, with a focus on outlining the four methods I have selected at this stage of my research, and describing the distinctions between them. The first method is *Serial Drawing*, given as the practical method of drawing that underpins my research as a whole. This is followed by *Introspection as Practice*, *Meditation* and *Phenomenology*. These choices emerged from my initial review of the methodological literature pertinent to my first-person enquiry investigating consciousness, especially as suggested by Varela and Shear (1999) in their edited volume: *The View from Within: First person approaches to the study of consciousness* (1999). This provides an in-depth survey of the most historically relevant first-person approaches for the study of phenomenal consciousness, providing my research with the three potential methods for using in combination with serially developed drawing.

The term ‘potential’ refers to the fact that all three methods (*Introspection as Practice*, *Meditation* and *Phenomenology*) are entirely untested by me prior to commencing the research. I do not envisage using all three throughout the entire investigation, but I do need to establish through practice which one (or combination thereof) are most suitable for advancing my ideas early on. They all fit within the phenomenological, ‘paradigm of inquiry’ (Grey & Malins, 2004, p. 19) or epistemology I have established, on the basis that both ‘drawing’ and the ‘stream of consciousness’ are treated as phenomena to the subject who draws. As an emerging artist-researcher without prior experience of artistic research, I am required to test these methods first rather than commit myself to a fixed set imported in from a different discipline. Testing would also allow for the rigour and transparency of the research process to be evident, where, ‘all mistakes are revealed and acknowledged for the sake of methodological transparency’ (Grey & Malins, 2004, p. 21).

**Tacit knowledge**

My recognition that the knowledge I have acquired about drawing is largely tacitly understood is of great importance in helping me develop a research methodology. Although my practice has been developed within the framework of a fine arts educational background, I had never been explicitly trained in ‘how to draw’ - this has not been the pedagogical approach towards teaching drawing for quite some time (Faure Walker, 2005, p. 16). The studio based environment I encountered as an art school student took a degree of pride in encouraging a resolutely untheorised mode of learning. Describing a
similar trajectory to the one I encountered, Petherbridge (2008, p. 34) adds this comment that I reflected upon when devising my approach to research

Tacit knowledge is something very familiar to artists, and a lot of untheorised teaching in art and design schools resides in the passing on of tacit knowledge between tutor and pupils. This concept has had a particularly strong impact on the issue of contemporary drawing practice - and perhaps has always inflected issues of drawing.

For Barrett (2007) ‘tacit knowledge’ referred to embodied knowledge or “skill” which was developed as a process by practitioners during the course of developing their practice. This embodied knowledge is, ‘applied in practice and apprehended intuitively’ (Barrett, Introduction, 2007, p. 4). Accordingly, this notion of tacit knowledge emerging through practice is connected to what Pierre Bourdieu theorised as the, ‘logic of practice’, or of being in-the-game, where strategies are not-predetermined but, ‘emerge according to specific demands of action and movement in time’ (Barrett, Introduction, 2007, p. 4). For Petherbridge (2008, p. 34) the way in which tacit knowledge is acquired and learnt in a, ‘hands on fashion by artists in art schools is not present to the same degree within the fields of present-day architecture and design practices. In these disciplines other factors - such as computer aided production systems - have long since bypassed much that could be learnt tacitly, and instead rely on explicit instruction’.

I find this understanding to be concordant with my own experience as an undergraduate student studying painting, which was entirely non-explicit in terms of how one should learn to paint – I learnt to paint largely through the process of painting and by looking at other paintings, rather than reading about painting. Petherbridge (2008, p. 35) claims this bears a curious relationship to the distinction introduced by Claude Levi-Strauss in the 1960’s between the bricoleur and the ‘engineer-as-scientist.’ At its most basic, the difference between them was that the engineer worked mostly by means of concepts and the bricoleur by means of process. Post my fine art painting degree I became a process-based drawing practitioner who built up a body of tacit, intuitive and practically based knowledge connected to how I understood serially developed drawing. As such, I decided to opt for a bicolour approach towards designing a research methodology, framed within my overall phenomenological epistemology.
**Bricoleur approach**

For Grey and Malins (2004) the fact that the bricoleur approach was to some degree do-it-yourself did not mean a ‘pick and mix’ research strategy that mingles paradigms - on the contrary, the methods chosen are related and form a coherent set. Quoting from the description of the qualitative researcher given by Denzin and Lincoln in their *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (1994) they add, ‘the choice of which tools to use, which research practices to employ, is not set in advance. The choice of research practices depends on the questions that are asked, and the questions depend on their context’ (Grey & Malins, 2004, p. 74). According to Petherbridge (2008, p. 35) Lévi-Strauss distinguished the scientist from the bricoleur by the, ‘inverse functions that they assign to events and structures as ends and means’. For *bricolage*, this means that the bricoleur ‘speaks’ not only with things but, ‘also through the medium of things: giving an account of his personality and life by the choices he makes between the limited possibilities’ (Petherbridge, 2008, p. 35).

As previously stated, the possibilities with which I began the research consisted of a prior method of serial drawing coupled with three potential first-person approaches for the study of consciousness that I identified within my initial literature review - *Introspection as Practice, Meditation* and *Phenomenology* (Varela & Shear, 1999). I establish early on that this practice-led enquiry needs to be able to clearly and transparently communicate the results to others as research through drawing. This means I require a framework to understand how the methodology will frame my drawings as research - to allow for what Frayling (2006) called research *through* art rather than research ‘into’ art. In other words, I require a framework to present how the drawings are able to express or communicate knowledge on the basis of being drawings, rather than words.

Riley (2008, p. 158) provides a clear and simple framework for understanding drawing as form of communication, related to what he describes as three elements within the, ‘social functions of drawing’. These are the *Experiential*, the *Interpersonal* and the *Compositional*

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12 Collier (2011) makes extensive use a bricoleur methodology in relation to creative practice and phenomenology in his PhD thesis: An evaluation of the link between abstraction, representation and language within the context of current theories of Environmental Aesthetics and Phenomenology. Primarily concerned with investigating how art allows us to mediate our subjective experience of the natural world, Collier tied the bricolage approach to an overlapping time frame in order to respond to ‘real world’ challenges – the approach proposed by Claude Levi-Strauss (1968) who introduced the term bricoleur. Interesting in relation to my enquiry, Collier declares the bricolage approach is the, ‘closest model to a phenomenological approach to research I have come across’ (Collier, 2011, p. 28). This is pertinent to note given that Levi Strauss dedicated *The Savage Mind* (1968) to Merleau-Ponty.
functions. Described slightly differently in a later essay, where the term ‘Experiential’ is replaced by the term ‘Representational’ (Roberts & Riley, 2012, p. 68) this framework identifies the three main functions that any code of communication must have

To represent some aspect of our experiences of the world; to both express our attitude and mood regarding our experience, and to position the receiver in terms of mood and attitude towards that which is being represented; and to structure these two into a coherent, perceptible form. These functions may be termed the representational, the interpersonal and the compositional.

On the basis that this structure allows a clear means to present the serial drawings as visual evidence in support of my claims, coupled with the theoretical context that frames them as the repository of knowledge within the research, I include Riley’s (2008) ‘functions of drawing’ as part of my bricoleur approach. I do so primarily on the basis that it provides me with a template to clearly and coherently express my practical drawing tests within Chapters Two & Five, where the Experiential, the Interpersonal and the Compositional functions will be used to divide up the chapter and structure the delivery of my practical test to the reader.

Methods

Varela and Shear (1999, p. 1) suggest that a first-person approach refers to the ‘lived experience’ associated with cognitive and mental events. This implies that phenomenal consciousness, conscious experience, or simply ‘experience’ has a distinctly subjective side i.e. appears to manifest for a self or subject that can provide an account of it. In contrast, third-person scientific or cognitive descriptions of natural phenomena i.e. black holes, chemical reactions or even synaptic voltages, are also experienced and described (interpreted) by human agents, but the contents of such descriptions do not directly refer to the experiential-mental sphere of those same individuals doing the interpreting. Varela and Shear define the three methods of Introspection as Practice, Meditation and Phenomenology as the, ‘extant methodological traditions’ (1999, p. 5) for approaching the irreducibility of lived experience that the topic of consciousness entails. They define

13 The first-person approach is not always the default position within a phenomenological enquiry. For an example of a third-person phenomenological method, see the procedure of ‘heterophenomenology’ advocated by Dennett (2006).
the distinction between them on the basis of the *manner* of approach they permit the investigator to reflect upon their flow of consciousness, but they do overlap - for example all three approaches involve elements of introspection, for it is the faculty whereby the subject simply reflects upon their flow of consciousness in 'real time' and cannot be avoided.

One other important reason for testing all three methods suggested by Varela and Shear (1999) needs to be raised here. Although my enquiry is located within the overall epistemology of Phenomenology, a cursory examination at the start of my research of the main method associated with it - the phenomenological reduction – does *not* make clear to me how it can be practically applied. It presents itself as a largely theoretical gesture used by Phenomenological philosophers such as Husserl (1931/2012) Fink (1988/1995) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) for comprehending wider ‘transcendental’ or existential problems within their philosophical outlook, although an indication is given this might be otherwise understood (Depraz, 1999). On this basis, I needed to test the method of doing *Phenomenology*, rather than simply decide to use it on the basis it forms my overall epistemology. The other two approaches – *Introspection as Practice* and *Meditation* – appear easier to digest in practical terms, given they advocate a method of focusing upon something concrete within consciousness, rather than simply engaging in ‘suspending judgments’ which the method associated with *Phenomenology* seems to encourage. My consideration of how to test them as methods was based upon Varela and Shear's (1999, p. 6) two point criteria for understanding them as such

1) Providing a clear *procedure* for accessing some phenomenal domain

2) Providing a clear means for an *expression and validation* within a community of observers who have familiarity with the procedures as in (1)

**Method 1: Serial Drawing**

I began the research having previously developed a process of serially developed automatic-type transfer drawing (Graham, 2012) as detailed in the thesis Introduction. By ‘transfer drawing’ I refer to a particular method of *Serial Drawing* that involved tracing and transferring graphite marks from one image to the next in sequence (fig.2 & 4). By ‘automatic-type’, I refer to a process of drawing that creatively used mistakes to create what were in effect mono-prints. This process will be discussed in further detail in the subsection *Seriality as process*, below. In structural terms the individual drawings
achieved their full meaning only when seen within the structure of the series overall. In view of the process by which they were made, each drawing formed a particular instance within a stream of impressions that recorded their fact of being made. Understanding seriality as produced through both process and structure in this manner means I understand Serial Drawing as a method for research, rather than a style of drawing (Chavez, 2004, p. viii).

As a standalone method, Serial Drawing is formed according to the serial needs of one's own particular drawing practice and whatever 'style' emerges from that decision, rather than the other way around (Hill, 1966, p. 29). My desire is to use the unified structure and intentionally driven process connected to the method of Serial Drawing to express the stream of consciousness as a unified, intentional experience (Husserl, 1931/2012; James, 1890/1950). Thinking of the relationship between them in metaphorical terms as outlined in my Introduction (Lakoff, 1993), I note that the successive nature to the 'streaming' of consciousness (Dainton, 2000) inevitably leads to a mapping from one domain to another: serially developed drawing is able to re-present the serial nature of consciousness as the successive appearance of events without the need for actual work to be produced. Given this metaphorical link is already established however, my aim is to question how it functions in practical terms, which entails the production of serial drawings.

Figure 7: Ellsworth Kelly, The Mallarme Suite, (1991)
Pencil and collage on paper, 61 x 50 cm. Series of 11

There are also a number of other factors for selecting the method of Serial Drawing to investigate my hypothesis in a transparent fashion. These are based on Riley's (2008) semiotic 'functions of drawing' model. Firstly, in order to satisfy the Experiential function,
serial drawing can provide me with a clear structure for representing stage by stage the experience I am investigating - the temporal unfolding that the ‘streaming’ of consciousness signifies. Secondly, on an Interpersonal basis I want to see what the process of serial drawing will allow me to express when placed within the theoretical context of my Phenomenological epistemology. Thirdly, I wish to compose my research in such a manner that the structure and process of seriality can function as a means to coherently develop the research, comparing and contrasting the individual drawings with each other, and then address the research question on the basis of this serial analysis.

**Seriality as structure**

According to Chavez (2004, p. viii) there is no single definition of ‘serial drawing’ - the definition of seriality is inherently unresolved, on the basis that, ‘as many definitions of serial art exist as works produced according to this method.’ According to the Collins English Dictionary (1994, p. 1412), the word ‘series’ has a number of different definitions, all of which derive from the first, ‘a group or connected succession of similar or related things, usually arranged in order’. On this understanding, the notion of structure emerges connected to *Serial Drawing* used as a method, where the key element is - repetition. The repetition, iteration or rhythm of certain periodic elements is crucial for seriality to be understood as a succession of similar things, although it leaves a lot of room to decide what that element might be. For some practitioners seriality is a defined by permutation, progression and succession (fig.7), whereas for others it offers the, ‘ability to follow, from one drawing to another, the irrational moment in art by relying on chance and randomness’ (Chavez, 2004, p. ix). A more concerted attempt at defining seriality in terms of structure was put forward in one of the first art exhibitions devoted to seriality, *Serial Imagery* (1968)

A type of repeated form or structure shared equally by each work in a group of related works made by one artist…Serial structures are produced by a single indivisible process that links the internal structure of a work to that of other works within a differentiated whole. While a Series may have any number of works it must, as a precondition of Seriality, have at least two (Copland in Chavez, 2004, p. ix).

According to de Warren (2004, p. 11) the notion of structure is central to understanding serial imagery, for it is often the structure which provides the meaning of the work, given across a number of individual instances. On this basis each part of a series can be considered a ‘local structure’ based on a simple arrangement of forms that facilitates, ‘the
integrity of the serial work as a whole’ (de Warren, 2004, p. 11). This also means that the seriality of a given work exists across a series of instances rather than found within the singular - the ‘singular plurality’ rather than the ‘plurality of the singular’. On this structural basis, de Warren states that seriality must be sharply distinguished, ‘from a series of works on a unifying theme or image’ (de Warren, 2004, p. 11). A good example of the structural dynamic de Warren is referring to can be seen within Sol Lewitt’s *Incomplete Open Cube* series (1974) (fig.8), where each drawing represents a particular variation on the theme of incomplete open cubes. As the total number of possible formations is 122, each specific iteration of the cube is only part of the whole, meaning each individual instance receives some or all of its meaning from this fact alone. Similar use of organisational principles based on numerical or alphabetical structure is found across many examples of serial drawing, too numerous to list.

![Figure 8: Sol LeWitt Variations of Incomplete Open Cubes (1974)](image)

**Seriality as process**

The ‘single indivisible process’ that Copland refers to (Chavez, 2004, p. ix) is what links the internal structure of a work to that of other works in a series. The element of process then emerges intertwined with the notion of structure as a method for serially developing drawing. On the basis of the transfer drawing process I developed prior to the research (fig.4) I seek to include seriality in similar terms, utilising a process that is loosely based upon automatic-type drawing. Automatic drawing is a process of making that, along with
automatic writing, spans a very long tradition, notably advanced within the heyday of Surrealism (Leiris, 1987; Carels, 2012; Gascoyne, 1935/1970). For a variety of reasons, there are difficulties with the concept ‘automatism’, not least in terms of what it implies about the drawing process and the intention that lies behind it. This has resulted in a situation today where, as far as the conceptual motivation behind much automatic drawing is concerned, ‘the grass is trodden flat’ (Maclagan, 2014, p. 149). Despite this, it remains a process deployed by many artists as part of a generalised way of making drawing, whereby one draws freely and without conscious intervention, and though which images emerge while the drawer simply, ‘helps them along’ (Laning, 1971, p. 49). On the other hand, the guiding aim of, for example, *Surrealist automatism* was to

Reduce and finally to dispose altogether of the flagrant contradictions that exist between dream and waking life, the “unreal” and the “real”, the unconscious and the conscious, and thus make what has hitherto been regarded as the special domain of poets, the acknowledged common property of all (Gascoyne, 1935/1970, p. 10).

My phenomenological enquiry does not engage directly with this particular set of concerns. What does concern my research is the difficulty the term ‘automatic’ engenders. This is rooted in this question of *intention* on the part of the artist, and the degree to which it is understood to be present and facilitating/directing the process of drawing. As Macfarlane (2012, p. 8) points out, the term automatic begs a number of questions, chief among them being, ‘at what point does the medium take over, become automatic, and determine the outcome?’ As my enquiry is rooted in a Phenomenological epistemology, consciousness is considered throughout as simply intentional (Husserl, 1950/1999, p. 82). This has implications for how the term ‘automatic’ is to be interpreted as a process of drawing used within this investigation. For example, the use of non-phenomenological concepts that automatism implies, such as the ‘subconscious’ or the ‘unconscious’ prove impossible to comment upon.

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14 It is not my concern here to delve deeply into the history of automatism within Surrealism (Gascoyne, 1935/1970) and the links it had with the Dada movement (Richter & Britt, 1978). My aim is to clarify how ‘automatic-type’ might fit within my phenomenological approach, especially relevant given the assumptions Surrealism makes regarding the ability of drawing to express the ‘unconscious’.

15 The topic of the ‘unconscious’ raised what appeared to be an uncomfortable epistemological issue for my phenomenological research. As I was now working with a predominantly Husserlian understanding concerning the ‘stream’
Not on a cognitive or psychological level concerning the supposed evidence for such states, but simply because they are not accessible to direct conscious awareness, hence not phenomenal. Stepping to one side of such epistemological concerns, the usefulness of automatic drawing resides in the performative element of what the process produces, rather than in the theoretical validation for it as truly ‘automatic’. The process associated with automatism allows automatic-type drawings to develop in serial fashion, permitting images, concepts and ideas to emerge within the structure of the work\(^\text{16}\). This process of emergence is then also concordant with my bricolage methodology. Henri Michaux (2000) and the sixty-four automatic-type ink drawings found within in his book *Mouvements* (1951) form an excellent example of this approach (fig.9).

As Krcma (2012) points out, each sheet in *Mouvements* displays an array of subtle black glyphs, situated somewhere between automatic drawing, ideograms and pictograms. According to Krcma, Michaux’s aspiration was to develop an alternative mode of expression to formalised language, one that would be, ‘composed of bodily traces corresponding to the dynamics of his singular experience in time’ (Krcma, 2012, p. 52). The brush was to act like a kind of seismograph recording or registering, ‘the tremors of psychic and corporeal life’. I introduce Michaux’s work at this point as a means to think how I might devise a method of serially developed automatic-type drawing to express the ‘streaming’ of consciousness. Michaux’s concept of ‘cinematic drawing’ described in the following manner offers a place to begin

\[
\text{Draw the consciousness of existing and the flow of time. As one take ones pulse.}
\]
\[
\text{Or again, more modestly, that which appears when, in the evening, the film that}
\]
\[
\text{has been exposed to the day’s images, but shorter and muted, is rerun. Cinematic}
\]
\[
\text{drawing (Krcma, 2012, p. 53)}\]

\(^{16}\) Rose (in Pollock, 1979) discusses the way in which American Abstract Expressionists like Robert Motherwell understood automatism after the Surrealists, quoting him as stating, ‘Plastic automatism…is…very little a question of the unconscious. It is much more a plastic weapon with which to invent new forms’ (in Pollock, 1979, p. 19). This reflects my own views on automatism – as a tool, or way of thinking about how to generate form, rather than as a link to the buried ‘psyche’.

\(^{17}\) My interest in Michaux’s work within the thesis does not extend to the mescaline drawings (Michaux, 2002) produced during the 1950’s. These drawings can either be described as concerned with recording his flow of consciousness while under the influence of the drug, or as recording the effects of the drug upon his flow of consciousness, or both. Either way, this particular body of work lies outside the bounds of my investigation.
Method 2: Introspection as Practice

Introspection, understood in general terms, is the mode of internal reflection in which the subject examines their thoughts and feelings, and discovers the experience of being conscious is rather ‘stream-like’ as a result. It is via the act of introspectively reflecting on the flow of thought that the phenomenological contents of consciousness (thoughts, perceptions, memories, bodily feelings etc.) present themselves as flow-like in their manner of appearance, unified and continuous both at a time and over time (Dainton, 2000; Bailey, 1999; James, 1890/1950). In making this stream-like experience of simply ‘being conscious’ explicit, the act of introspection underpins all methods of phenomenological reflection directed towards the stream of consciousness by the subject, forming an integral part of both Meditation and Phenomenology discussed in this chapter.

Figure 9: Henri Michaux, Untitled (Mouvements) (1950)
Indian ink on paper, each 32 x 25 cm

This indicates the sense in which introspection will be unavoidably applied within my practice in the next chapter – as the reflective act I direct towards the flow of my thoughts, perception, memories etc. whenever I draw. This act of reflection should (in theory) permit me a degree of insight to help ask how the act of drawing was understood to ‘record’ the stream of consciousness that occurred in tandem with its production.
However, Vermersch (1999, p. 17) promotes a standalone method called *Introspection as Practice* which advocates a more singular use for introspection on the basis that

Phenomenology, as a global idea, gives us a clue and indicates the requisite epistemology, but does not seem to provide the know-how, nor does it specify the practice, since the philosophers who established and developed it (Husserl, Fink, Patocka, Merleau-Ponty) did not succeed in specifying this practice, while many of those who are indebted to the method today seem to be more concerned with the study of historical texts that with anything like phenomenological practice.

This description of phenomenology ‘not providing the know-how’ reflected my concerns described at the start of this chapter, in the sense that I could not yet comprehend how the method of *Phenomenology*, the phenomenological reduction as *praxis* (Depraz, 1999), might serve the development of my research. Vermersch’s *Introspection as Practice* on the other hand, appeared to provide an answer in the form of a resolutely practical procedure, despite the speculative theory that emerged from many of its early discoveries (Vermersch, 1999, p. 20)\(^8\). Although I will be reflexively deploying the act of introspection during the act of drawing, I wished to take note of the more formalised method that Vermersch suggested, in order to better understand how to apply introspection within my practical test. The practical act connected with *Introspection as Practice* lay with intentionally directing ones attention towards a defined task, in order to then report on how that experience *unfolded in time*. This focus on time is considered at this pre-practice stage of my research to be a key element for understanding how the experience of consciousness is understood to ‘stream’, albeit in a way that needs to be clarified through practice. Vermersch (1999, p. 31) describes *Introspection as Practice* as method for reflecting on the temporal flow of consciousness via a series of stages, whereby the subject describes an experience as a form of temporal connectedness

Describing an act structure requires that one describes its temporal unfolding at different levels of density: the linkage between subordinate goals, the succession

\(^8\) Problems with introspection on this account were common to criticisms within the hermeneutic and cognitive fields; ‘how do you know that by exploring experience with a method you are not in fact, deforming or even creating what you experience?’ (Varela & Shear, 1999, p. 13). As I am questioning how drawing is used to express the ‘streaming’ of consciousness via the experience of drawing, the question of deforming supposedly ‘pure’ conscious experience is not at stake.
of stages and, at the heart of each stage, elementary actions seen both as acts to be accomplished and as information-gathering acts, then the micro operations, etc.

For example, James' understanding of the stream of consciousness was introspectively derived in a similar manner. James used his introspective analysis of the way in which consciousness appears to stream to specify a difference between the ‘fringe’ and the parts of thought that were not the fringe i.e. the ‘substantive parts’, as outlined in my definition of terms. This distinction was described by James as indicating the *temporal connectedness* between subjective states, or the ‘temporal unfolding’ in Vermersch's terms. Although thought was experienced in the manner of a flow, there appeared to be a different pacing to its parts - much like a bird's life, James (1890/1950, p. 243) felt the stream of consciousness alternated between ‘flights’ and ‘perching’s’, which metaphorically describes the temporal unfolding of thought, rather than anything moving in space. This focus on the temporal element to the stream is the area I wish to introspectively focus upon in my next practical test, hence why this method (or a variant thereof) will be useful.

However, as the metaphor ‘stream of consciousness’ also indicates, *Introspection as Practice* required some form of concrete means of expression to convey the internal act of introspection by the subject to those external, which was usually written or verbalized, and often highly metaphorical in style. For Vermersch this centred on the conversation where one subject describes their introspective experience to another subject, for example in an interview situation (Vermersch, 1999, p. 38), whereas for James it went into his philosophical prose. My aim in the next chapter is to pay introspective attention to my stream of consciousness as I draw, but use serially developed drawing to express the ‘temporal unfolding’ of my stream of consciousness in place of writing.  

There remains however, one further element to take note of with respect to the focus of my current investigation - for while the method of *Introspection as Practice* will be utilised in some form to allow me to reflect upon the temporal unfolding my stream of consciousness while I draw, I also need to regulate my ‘mode of access’ (Vermersch, 1999, p. 17) in order to focus upon something in order to allow the ‘fringe’ of

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I recognize here a distinction between drawing and writing, and I do not wish to make the case that they are equivalent. It is here that I agree with Godfrey (1990), who disagrees with Rawson (1969/1987) over the supposed linguistic equivalence of drawing. Whereas Rawson’s overall appeal is to the language of marks, Godfrey suggests that rather than seeing drawing as language, we should see it as, ‘the residue of an activity, perhaps similar to the footprints that a dancer will leave in the sand, or…the coruscations left in the beach by the receding sea’ (Godfrey, 1990, p 17).
consciousness (whatever it might be) to potentially emerge as some form of relation between other more ‘substantive’ forms. This is where the subtle distinction between *Introspection as Practice* and *Meditation* begins to emerge. Although a highly speculative series of events at this pre-practice stage, I realise that, if the fringe is as James (1890/1950, p. 258) described it – a form of relation that suffuses ‘between’ or ‘around’ more substantive thoughts - then I need to focus my stream of consciousness upon something concrete in order to allow it to emerge. In short, in order to carry out this test of my ideas I need something to focus upon and draw. On that basis I look toward the other method suggested by Varela and Shear (1999, p. 8) – *Meditation* - for guidance on how to remain singularly focused upon specific content within a stream of consciousness, which is something neither *Introspection as Practice* nor *Phenomenology* specify.

**Method 3: Meditation**

For Varela and Shear (1999, p. 7) the procedure of meditation was based upon mindfulness, where ‘sustained attention’ and ‘uncontrived awareness’ were followed up with a gradual suspension of mental activity as a result. The validation for *Meditation* as a first-person method within the form of mindfulness lies largely in verbal or written accounts, similar to *Introspection as Practice* (Vermersch, 1999). The difference between them as a methods lies in the manner of approach - the reflective act of introspection, whether as Vermersch describes it otherwise, does not require one to meditate in the focused manner of mindfulness. Mindfulness is a non-Buddhist variant of meditation (Gunaratana, 2002; Wallace, 1999), and is considered epistemologically concordant with my phenomenological approach on the basis that both treat the phenomenon of consciousness as appearing fundamentally ‘flow-like’ for the subject in question. The potential use of *Meditation* via mindfulness lies in its ability to frame my focus during the act of drawing, allowing me to meditate upon a substantive form in order to draw it, whilst using the guidance of *Introspection as Practice* to introspectively reflect on the temporal unfolding of my stream of consciousness.

There are two main techniques of mindfulness that can be practically applied - *Vipassana* (Gunaratana, 2002) and *Samatha* (Wallace, 1999). Both techniques focus on some sort of substantive object, either mental or physical. Rather than engaging in a theoretic gesture that the method of *Phenomenology* appears to offer, or simply focus on the temporal unfolding of consciousness that *Introspection as Practice* suggests, the method of *Meditation* seems to have a clear potential use within practice-led enquiry such as mine, for it suggests focusing upon something physical, and tangible, in order to
meditate. Both forms of mindfulness focus upon visualising some form or object presented to consciousness, whilst employing the faculty of introspection to monitor the flow of thought towards that object in real-time, rather than using it to examine one's thoughts and then report on the experience afterwards, as *Introspection as Practice* entails. As Wallace (1999, p. 178) describes the method of *Meditation* within the form of mindfulness

Mindfulness is the principal means of accomplishing *Samatha*, but it must be accompanied by the mental faculty of introspection. While it is the task of mindfulness to attend, without forgetfulness, to the meditative object, introspection has the function of monitoring the meditative process.

As Gunaratana (2002, p. 33) states, *Vipassana* mindfulness is a direct and gradual cultivation of awareness, based on the idea that ‘real experience’ flows by in a manner altogether less permanent than we normally acknowledge. Both forms of *Meditation* deal with consciousness as stream-like and regulate their mode of access accordingly. As a form of mental training, the object of *Vipassana* mindfulness is to see the truths of impermanence within the experience of phenomenal consciousness, found by properly attending to consciousness as a ‘flow’ or ‘stream’. The object one focuses upon, for example the rate of breathing is merely a way of anchoring oneself within the flow in order to examine the nature of flow itself. However, the key difference between the two techniques is found in their suggested application - meaning the object one intentionally directs one's attention toward in order to (conversely) gain some ability to reflect inward.

For *Samatha* mindfulness the object was the use of a mental image, often an imagined or remembered visual object such as a pebble, a stick or anything that has a solid form (Wallace, 1999, p. 177). Equally it could also be anything presented via visual perception, like a blot of ink or a drawn mark of some sort, on the basis that all forms of meditation can be undertaken with eyes either open or closed (Smith, 2011, p. 32). Both techniques of mindfulness use objects presented to consciousness to pay attention to the streaming of consciousness, but each has different implications if one wishes to combine the method of *Meditation* with a form of material expression, such a process of serial drawing. For the *Vipassana* mindfulness, the use of the breath as the mental object is employed to keep the mind directed towards the flow of thought in order to focus upon
the most important element for gaining insight - the present moment in time. Although the topic of time is central to all three first-person methods discussed here, focusing on the temporal experience of ‘the present’ within a practical exercise that seeks to clearly and concretely demonstrate my ideas does not at this stage appear clarified in the same manner as drawing something physical, and exterior to my body. So, whereas Introspection as Practice suggests introspectively reflecting and then reporting on the temporal unfolding of events, Meditation suggests one focus on an object presented to consciousness in real-time. The underpinning of both methods have a potential use within a serially developed drawing exercise - introspection to monitor the flow of thought, and mindfulness to focus on drawing something ‘substantive’, like a pebble, or blot of ink etc. How the ‘fringe’ of consciousness as an understanding might potentially emerge from the combination of these I could not say at this stage.

Method 4: Phenomenology

The third and final first-person approach for examining phenomenal consciousness indicated by Varela and Shear (1999) is Phenomenology. As it forms the ‘global idea’ (Vermersch, 1999, p. 17) or epistemology through which my enquiry proceeds I give more weight towards outlining the basis upon which it operates, and the method connected to it. I seek to clarify this prior to testing it in combination with the others described here in the following chapter. On a purely methodological basis I am referring here to Husserlian Phenomenology (1950/1999; 1931/2012) as the original method of practising phenomenology, and that which Varela (1999), Abraham (1995) Depraz (1999) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) all refer to. The method of Phenomenology is different from the previous on the basis that it does not stipulate what to ‘do’ during a period of focused attention on ones ‘stream of consciousness’ - instead, it bookends any such investigation by introducing parts before and after, as I will describe.

Husserl’s method for practising phenomenology is the ‘phenomenological reduction’. This two-part procedure begins with the initial gesture of ‘bracketing’, followed by the search for the invariant that validates it. As discussed in my Introduction (p.3), bracketing means suspending (bracketing) the hypothesis or assumption one wishes to investigate prior to...

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20To be precise, it was cultivating awareness towards the passing of this present that led the subject towards gaining insight on the nature of impermanence: the stream of consciousness as the flux or flow that we find ourselves to simply ‘be’. As Gunaratan (2002, p. 51) explains, ‘the present moment is changing so fast that a casual observer does not seem to notice its existence at all. Every moment is a moment of events and no moment passes by without an event...our mind goes through a series of events like a series of pictures passing through a projector.’
setting out to investigate it. At this stage of my research I am assembling a set of potentially useful methods, and Phenomenology in the form of the ‘phenomenological reduction’ appears to be good candidate, on the basis that my investigation emerges from a largely tacitly understood (and potentially assumed) body of knowledge connected to how I understand drawing. By applying this initial stage of bracketing in the manner required i.e. before I begin my practical research, I will be able to suspend my starting assumption that ‘drawing records thought’ for the duration of the research. In theory, this should allow me to carry out the practical investigation of the assumption using the other methods in a manner which is relatively unbiased (and for which recognition of the assumption as an assumption is deemed necessary) although this is an idea I will be testing as part of my research.

The phenomenological reduction

The phenomenological reduction was Husserl’s cardinal method for ‘doing’ phenomenology essentially - indeed, one could not on his account practise any sensible form of phenomenology without it (Fink, 1988/1995, p. 29). ‘Reduction’ in this case does not mean a limiting of the domain of experience, as the verb reducere might indicate - on the contrary, it refers to a form of, ‘reflective conversion’ (Depraz, 1999, p. 97) whereby one recognizes and suspends ones belief in something as assumed in order to then investigate it as assumed. Once the practical tests are complete, the phenomenological practitioner then looks to engage the second stage of the reduction, clarifying the eidetic invariant from within the series of results that emerge, indicating the eidetic procedure outlined in my definition of terms. The validation for the reduction lies in discovering new territory via this second stage - the eidetic description of the invariant from within a completed series (Depraz, 1999, p. 101) is a critical element of the method of Phenomenology, for it essentially involves ‘removing’ the brackets that were initially placed around the working hypothesis in order to see whether the results either support/do not support the assumption it contained.

However, any practitioner wishing to employ the phenomenological reduction as a practical method also needs to be very aware of its philosophical scope, and the impact this could have on a potential research trajectory. This is due to the more radical ends which Husserl the philosopher was ultimately aimed. It forms part of his transcendental theory of method, which sought to bracket the ‘natural attitude’ - the world as given, or the ‘world-about-me’ (Husserl, 1931/2012, p. 53) in order to grasp the domain of what Husserl called ‘transcendental experience’. The effort involved in this the form of the
reduction resulted in the *epoché* (*Epekho* ‘I stop’) which was a suspended stance that Husserl essentially maintained towards the world ‘as given’ beyond the publication of his *Ideas* (Husserl, 1931/2012)\(^{21}\). It is within this bracketed stance towards being-in-the-world (Fink, 1988/1995, p. 32) that the practising phenomenologist could, on Husserl’s understanding, search within the intentional flow of consciousness directed towards the world for the *apodictic* (secure) evidence to ground all knowledge within a science of subjectivity.

Although the act of the reduction ran counter to Heidegger’s (1953/2010) phenomenology of ‘being-in-the-world’, the impetus behind the *epoché* was not dissimilar to the impetus behind the method of *Meditation* in the form of mindfulness - to metaphorically ‘open the eyes’ of the practitioner and reveal the impermanence of what they hold to be unassailable and assured. Despite the flaws that emerged within Husserl’s attempt to develop a ‘science of subjectivity’, the transcendental endpoint Husserl aimed towards does not concern my practice-led enquiry. My concern is to comprehend the operational principle behind the phenomenological reduction as one of the core methods suggested by Varela and Shear (1999) for approaching the first-person study of consciousness, and one that has particular resonance for my enquiry and its focus on analysing the stream of consciousness as an experience.

As Moran and Cohen (2012, p. 274) point out, Husserl developed a number of forms of the reduction, in addition to the transcendental form of the *epoché*. These went under various headings, including the ‘philosophical reduction’ or the ‘psychological reduction’ (Depraz, 1999, p. 97). Less radical in intent, the purpose of these other forms is to tease out clues in the everyday stance (the natural attitude) which the practitioner adopts towards whatever it is they are investigating, and which might be overlooked as a result. It was on this basis that the Husserlian reduction has been successfully employed in the practice of psychiatry (Naudin, 1999) where imaginatively varying the bracketed

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\(^{21}\) The aim of the transcendental reduction was not the loss of the world however, but quite the opposite - a thought game to win back our stable belief in the world as something we are found to hold despite the flux through which our stream of consciousness presents the ‘world’ as world. For Husserl this meant recognising the ‘natural attitude’ as the (natural) belief we have in the solidity of the world as a stream of experiences. Once bracketed, we can step back from this assumed position and see it for what it really is: a paradoxical position, given that the object (‘the world’) is simultaneously presented as an ever-changing act: the flux (Fluss) or ‘stream’ of consciousness. Fink, Husserl’s assistant, describes the idea behind it thus: ‘what we lose is not the world, but our captivation by the world’ (Fink, 1988/1995, p. 42). As my concern is the recording the stream of consciousness through drawing, the phenomenological reduction appears all the more central as a method to facilitate this because it was a tool designed by Husserl specifically to explore it - to step back from the flow of consciousness in order to reflect upon it as a peculiar form of flow i.e. both unified and stable, yet continually changing.
psychosis in the form in which it is initially presented can result in the psychiatrist ‘grasping’ what is specific regarding the schizophrenia of the patient (Naudin, 1999, p. 164). Against the criticisms from outside the epistemology of Phenomenology\textsuperscript{22}, I set out to follow the advice of Varela (1999, p. 111) when utilising Husserlian methods, whereupon

Drawing from the phenomenological account developed by Husserl does not represent some kind of Husserlian scholastic obsession…I prefer to take my cues from Husserl’s style as an eternal beginner, always willing to start anew: this is the hallmark of phenomenology itself.

\textit{Identification of the invariant}

This second, validating stage of the reduction is the process of eidetic variation referred to in my definition of terms. The phrase ‘invariant’ refers in a strictly eidetic (phenomenological) sense to what is essential, meaning that which emerges from within the facticity of singular instances to suggest the universal trait. Like many other elements of Husserl’s method, it is rarely discussed in detail in his writings (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 160). The purpose of eidetic variation is to allow the essence of a phenomenon to ‘manifest itself as the structure of all its essential possibilities’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 160) i.e. to discover what is invariant across all possible variation. As Moran & Cohen (2012, p. 111) describe it, for Husserl, ‘essence does not relate to what factually exists but defines precisely what is possible’. The essence of something characterizes what belongs to it invariantly, its ‘what’ (\textit{Was}) or ‘whatness’ (\textit{Washeit}) or what it is in terms of universal and necessary predicates’. As both Varela & Shear (1999) and Moran & Cohen (2012) indicate, the process of imaginative free variation is central to Husserl’s methodology using the phenomenological reduction.

\textsuperscript{22} Although first-person descriptions of subjective experience become vulnerable to postmodern constructivist criticisms, this is largely due to such criticisms deciding \textit{apriori} against the description of experience on an epistemological basis. As Haney (1999, p.238) points out, ‘postmodernists…question this experience because their epistemology cannot accommodate a subjective state beyond language and the play of difference. Their deconstructive (constructivist) critique can only investigate the empirical qualities of the rational mind’. This refers back to my earlier footnote detailing my decision to omit extensive consideration of Derrida’s language-bound critique of Husserl. Because it prioritizes the role of ‘lived experience’ over the language used to simply describe experience (and moreover emphasizes that, in epistemological terms, this act of prioritizing is possible), the epistemology of Phenomenology allows for experience to be described in all manner of ways, not just via the conventional characters associated with the alphabet.
In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl (1950/1999, p. 70) does give one rare example of its use, where he describes varying the perception of a table. Perhaps we begin by fictively changing the shape or the colour of the object quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. In other words: Abstaining from acceptance of its being, we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among other quite “optional” pure possibilities - but possibilities that are possible perceptions. We, so to speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if.

The whole purpose of eidetic variation is to identify and bring out those invariant aspects of whatever it is one has bracketed and is investigating. The eidetic is that which belongs to the phenomenon in question, meaning what ‘emerges’ from the process of searching for that which is invariant when the individual instances are varied. This process of variation then describes the *eidos* - the, ‘thought without which the object cannot be intuitively imagined as such’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p.93). Of particular interest to my enquiry is the manner in which selection of the invariant takes place only from within a presented *series*. This means the invariant is found by placing the factually described instances (i.e. the individual drawings) on ‘imaginative parade’ (Depraz, 1999, p. 101) and running through variations in their form until one emerges with their eidetic essence (*eidos*)\(^2\). Rather than querying the philosophical basis for the eidetic procedure as the means to identify ‘true’ essences, my concern is simply to test both parts of the phenomenological reduction in the next chapter in order to see what it reveals when applied to actual practice.

\(^{2}\)However, as Moran & Cohen (2012, p. 161) note, there is also something circular about the search for essences on this eidetic basis: one must already know the type the instance falls under in order to find the essence to which it belongs. For example, Husserl gives an example of starting with a tone, but how does he know that it is a ‘tone’ at all? It was in connection to such difficulties that philosophers like Russell (1946/2000) felt the essence of a thing was merely a verbal convenience, a linguistic question rather than a metaphysical or ontological statement of what something is.
Chapter Two: Practice One

Introduction

This first practical chapter offers a discussion of the initial research practice, and explains how the method of *Serial Drawing* is tested in combination with the first-person methods of *Introspection*, *Meditation* and *Phenomenology*. Prior to discussing the physical development of the drawings, images of Series One are presented in groups of three (fig.10 – fig.15) to give the reader a sense of their development in formal terms. The nominal aim of this test is to address my research question in the initial form in which it was posed: *Streams of consciousness: how does a process of drawing record the phenomenological ‘fringe’ within the flow of thought?* In order to facilitate this aim, I will address three shorter-term objectives related to it.

![Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.1 - 3](image)

Figure 10: Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.1 - 3

Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm, Series of 18

Firstly, I wish to develop a better understanding of this particular phrasing of the initial research question. I do so on the basis that I expect it to become more explicitly understood and possibly develop as a result, given it was formed largely through tacit knowledge on my part as a practitioner. Alongside this is my second objective - to establish a firmer understanding of the balance between practice and theory that I will need to advance my research. To that end I employ Riley’s (2008) ‘functions of drawing’ model to frame this chapter as a demonstrative drawing exercise, based on the three
functions of drawing which he identified: the Experiential, Interpersonal and the Compositional. Although these occur simultaneously within the reception of drawings by the viewer I present them separately here as a way to help explain how I framed my practical test.

Thirdly, in view of the Phenomenological epistemology underpinning my enquiry I am keen to prioritize testing the practical application of the phenomenological reduction as praxis (Depraz, 1999). In order to test the first part of this procedure, bracketing, I begin by trying to suspend the ‘natural attitude’ (Husserl, 1931/2012) that I find myself in upon beginning this test. This means directing my attention towards my research question in order to look for anything that might be uninspected or assumed within it. In undertaking this process of active pre-reflection prior to the test I begin to realise there is one rather large assumption that has hitherto remained invisible - the fact that my research question suggests I implicitly accept drawing records thought. By deciding to investigate the potential for drawing to record such a specific attribute of phenomenal consciousness – James (1890/1950) ‘nucleus/fringe’ model of thought – I realise I have tacitly assumed the wider truth upon which the question stands: that drawing does in some way record or capture the flow of thought at the point at which it emerges.

Although this assumption was derived through practice and could be qualified in all manner of ways, my decision to test the veracity of the phenomenological reduction as praxis means it cannot go unchallenged. It must be bracketed, i.e. ‘put out play’ or suspended for the duration of my test while I look to query it through drawing. As regards a bracketed stance of this nature, Moran & Cohen (2012, p. 52) state, ‘bracketing is not a negation, but rather like putting something in quarantine, a putting out of use, a ‘switching off’ of the activity of the thing’. By suspending my judgement towards the question of what is/isn’t ‘recorded’ within the drawings themselves until the assessment stage, I can then look to validate this assumption (that drawing does record thought) by implementing the eidetic search for the invariant from within the completed series – in other words by looking for what might be invariantly recorded within the drawing themselves.

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24 These three terms are themselves adapted from the system which the socio-linguist Michael Halliday’s first introduced, for identifying the available choices ‘from which specific selections may be related to the functions of language in specific social contexts’ (Riley, 2008, p. 158). Halliday termed these the Ideational, Interpersonal and the Textual through which the process of communication can be understood to operate. Although these were originally developed to describe the functions of language, Riley describes how they can be adapted to describe drawing as a visual means of communication. As my aim in this chapter is to clearly communicate my results to the reader, this system of Halliday’s (under Riley’s headings of Experiential, Interpersonal & Compositional) is deemed highly useful as a means to structure the discussion of my work.
Furthermore, given the status of the fringe as a supposedly real (ontic) form of relation within consciousness as described by James, yet with little concrete evidence to go on for how to either find or represent it in practical terms, I had an intimation that the way to seek it lay with an indirect approach – because the fringe is described as thought of relation *between* other, more ‘substantive’ thoughts. The understanding of the phenomenological fringe suggested I have two possible ways to approach searching for it. On the one hand, I could produce a series of drawings in order to see what might *emerge* from between them as I progressed. And on the other, I could produce a series of drawings and seek a method of actively *extracting* what lay between them once the series was complete. This second option chimed with the latter stage of the phenomenological reduction - eidetic variation, as the search for what is invariantly understood within the series (Varela & Shear, 1999, p. 7).

![Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.4 - 6](image)

Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

**Functions of the drawing test**

*Experiential*

According to Riley’s (2008) semiotic model of drawing, the first element to decide upon when devising this test is the *Experiential* - the question of what experience I, as the drawer in question, wish to convey or represent through drawing. As Riley (2008, p. 158) describes it, ‘the *Experiential* function of drawing relates to a drawing’s ability to represent some aspect of our experience of the world, be it physical, emotional or imaginative.’ The experience I wish to represent is the phenomenological ‘fringe’ within my stream of
consciousness. As described in my definition of terms, the fringe is a theory put forward by James (1890/1950, p. 258) within his description of the stream of thought. The fringe referred to vague or peripheral feelings that were a form of intentional relation within the flow of thought - ‘thoughts of relation’ that held or persisted between other, ‘substantive’ thoughts (James, 1890/1950, p. 242). The connection between them was understood to operate on the basis of consciousness considered to stream i.e. to be a succession of thoughts, perceptions or impressions that formed a subjective unity (James, 1890/1950, p. 239), which the subject is introspectively aware of. This theory seemed to reflect my reality on an experiential level - in any given stream of consciousness I was introspectively aware of vague feelings or thoughts that hovered on the ‘tip of my tongue’ and were not fully formed.

Yet, as Bailey (1999) asserts, there was a great deal of difficulty in trying to articulate how these fringe/transitive parts might manifest themselves. As non-substantive ‘feelings of relation’ they might in fact be imageless, for, ‘transitive parts are precisely those phases of consciousness that we move through rapidly and more or less imagelessly in order to arrive at a substantive ‘conclusion’ (Bailey, 1999, p. 149). It seemed that although one could intuitively feel their presence, and theoretically argue for their existence, there might be quite literally nothing of the fringe as an experience to re-present (record) in terms of a reproducing an image. This is what I was set to find out via the practice of drawing. In view of my phenomenologically framed epistemology they were held therefore potentially translatable in some form, rather than just functioning as a rhetorical device\textsuperscript{25}. As I have bracketed the assumption that I will be able to record thought I need to suspend my doubts about whether or not the fringe is representable and proceed with my practical investigation in order to find out.

To fit within the context of my epistemology, the Jamesian fringe aligns with the Husserlian concept of horizons of experience. In simple terms the ‘horizon’ means that, ‘every lived experience bears within itself a set of unique...possibilities that go to make up what he calls the ‘horizon’ of the experience’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 148). The

\textsuperscript{25} Unlike a poststructuralist epistemology, which operates on the basis of language as ‘knowledge-about’, the phenomenological attitude of James towards the transitive parts is that they transcend language. From this we come to know of them only as ‘felt’ or ‘intuited’, meaning through what James terms ‘knowledge-by-acquaintance’. As Haney II (1999, p.239) says ‘Knowledge by acquaintance, as defined by William James, while still involving a separation between knower and object of knowing, is similar to knowledge-by-identity to the extent that neither must be known linguistically - unlike a language bound deconstructive knowledge’. My attempt to draw the fringe is an attempt to go beyond the domain of linguistic knowledge into a realm of knowing-through-drawing - to secure an understanding of the fringe that emerges on the basis that drawing thinks/speaks in a particular way (Tormey, 2007).
fringe can be thought of as another way to describe the experiential horizon that every phenomenon entails as part of it being a phenomenon. These horizons can be spatially or temporally understood, depending on the nature of the phenomenon being described. In James theory, the fringe was posited as a form of experiential relation between more substantive thoughts or feelings. By ‘substantive’, James (1890/1950, p. 242) was referring to identifiable thoughts, words, or images that the fringe was held to be a relation between. To try and record my experience of the elusive fringe through the practice of drawing therefore, I needed an indirect approach - one that would require me to produce a series of drawings that represented ‘something’ substantial across a number of iterations, in order for the fringe to potentially manifest itself as some form of relation between them.

Figure 12: Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.7 - 9
Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

The method of Meditation will help frame the focus of my test by encouraging me to focus upon something substantial - a blot of ink for example - that I can develop via the method of Serial Drawing. Introspection as Practice has the function of monitoring the temporal unfolding such a process of drawing entails, and then reflecting upon my experience once it is complete. I do not yet know how useful this information will be - my aim at this stage is simply to test Introspection as Practice as a method for reflecting upon my stream of consciousness, in order to see what it will reveal when deployed in combination with the other methods. Although performed for different reasons, similar attempts to record the temporal flow of consciousness through drawing can be found in the work of artists like Michaux (2000) and Frank (1993, p. 34), who described his own process as, ‘the graph traced by the pen has become like that of a seismograph. The pen became the seismographic needle that registers the slightest tremors.’
According to Riley’s code of communication (2008) the Interpersonal element occurs simultaneously with the Experiential – they effectively operate in tandem. The process of defining the experience I wish to represent means I also begin the process of defining my attitude towards how I wish to represent it. My attitude is framed by my research topic, epistemology and the method of Serial Drawing that underpins my overall approach. As Riley (2008, p. 158) explains, ‘the Interpersonal function deals with how drawings may express the maker’s attitude to their experiences, and may position the viewer in terms of attitude and mood.’ My requirement for a ‘substantive’ image to focus upon meant that the method of Meditation could be introduced in the manner just outlined. Meditation in the form of mindfulness encouraged a focus for the subject - a sustained period of attention directed towards something substantial within consciousness. The content of this activity then becomes the theme, meaning, ‘the word whose image I am looking for’ (Vermersch, 1999, p. 33). As a visual artist I can choose to reverse this process, and create instead an image whose word I am looking for.

In practical terms, I will seek to utilise the specifics of the Samatha mindfulness technique, for it recommended focusing on a concrete form, rather than the Vipassana technique that focused on the rate of breathing. Trying to draw a form I could objectively perceive rather than simply ‘feel’ would assist with the process of drawing, and perhaps help counterbalance the subjective nature of my task. In circular fashion this form; the, ‘actual physical object I attended to visually’ (Wallace, 1999, p. 178) would also be a form within the drawing itself – for example a blot of ink. In a phenomenological sense, this blot would then become the object presented to my consciousness. From this I would seek to have it persist within my stream of consciousness while I developed it towards becoming something nameable, hence ‘substantive’.

On the basis of my further reading of James (1890/1950) and framed by Bailey’s (1999) interpretation, I looked to develop a method of Serial Drawing that would be quick and fluid. I did so because I understood from Bailey (1999) that the ‘fringe’ of consciousness was intimately linked to the ‘transitive parts’ of thought, themselves a further element within James overall description of the stream of consciousness. The crossover between the ‘fringe’ and the ‘transitive parts’ operated because Bailey (1999, p. 147) states it is not at all clear from James’ own description how to tell them apart. So in order to try and record the fringe of consciousness through drawing, I also need to clarify how the fringe is related to these supposedly ‘transitive parts’ of thought.
Bailey (1999) offers three possible readings for how to interpret James description of the fringe, including trying to hold the ‘fringe’ and the ‘transitive parts’ apart as understandings (Bailey, 1999, p. 147). The three headings which Bailey puts forward as headings under which to understand them are: content/object, stability and speed. In Bailey’s view, the last option - speed - was the most plausible for understanding the nature of the fringe/transitive parts as frequent moments of ‘imageless thought’. This crossover included James (1890/1950, p. 253) description of the fringe as, ‘psychic transitions, always on the wing, so to speak, and not to be glimpsed except in flight.’ Despite the theoretical complexity which two slightly differing descriptions was now introducing into my practical test, on a purely practical level the notion of speed introduced a resolutely performative element which was deemed useful.

Figure 13: Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.10 - 12
Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

Although I have currently bracketed the idea, a positive basis for recording these fringe/transitive parts through a performative drawing exercise underpinned by the element of ‘speed’ suddenly re-emerges on the logical basis that whatever was

26The context in which Bailey is speaking here is part of his interpretation of James work, specifically in relation to the transitional parts of consciousness and their relationship to the ‘fringe’. In his essay Beyond the Fringe: William James on the Transitional Parts of the Stream of Consciousness (1999) Bailey discusses the ontological implications of considering the fringe as a real (ontic) relation between parts of thought, rather than simply as a rhetorical device. Bailey suggests this aspect of James description has been under-emphasized within the scholarly literature. If we are to treat the stream of consciousness as a subjective unity however, a ‘singular flux’ (Bailey A. R., 1999, p.141), then James original analysis should be returned to, for it contains much that remains to be thought out. In relation to my investigation, I am trying to record the fringe of consciousness through drawing, which means I need to try and clarify whether or not James fringe is understood by others as a real form of relation within thought, or merely a philosophical notion described in language. Bailey’s close analysis of James text is inconclusive in this regard.
understood to move must also be understood as able to be caught i.e. recorded or arrested somehow. It is on this performative basis for understanding how drawing might record the fringe that I now proceed. To begin devising a practical test based on what I have learnt so far, I decide that a meditative focus upon a physical form should be established - the blot of ink mentioned previously. In line with the description of Serial Drawing based upon both ‘process’ and ‘structure’ as given in my Methodology (p.28), the performative process of drawing will engage a degree of swift mark making in order to develop a blot of ink across a series of drawings. The structure of the series will be based around developing the blot of ink towards becoming a substantive, nameable form, in order to then search for the ‘fringe’ as a form of relation between each iteration of this form across the series. I frame my performative approach to drawing within an automatic-type method of Serial Drawing. As Maclagan (2014, p. 14) states, ‘even when it is carried out in solitude there is still a performative aspect of automatic drawing and perhaps the same could be said of many improvised or ‘unconscious’ drawings.’

To reiterate, my interest in the performative aspect of automatism is focused on the possibility that, by swiftly jotting down ink marks that serially develop the physical form of the ink blot that should (I hypothesise) record my meditative experience of it. Once complete, I will use the method of Introspection as Practice to reflect upon the temporal unfolding of the experience, before engaging the second stage of the method of Phenomenology, eidetic variation, to search for the fringe/transitive parts as some form of invariant ‘relation’ that emerges from within the series as a whole. Crucially this approach would align with the stream of consciousness understood as an unbroken unity – whatever the fringe or transitive parts of thought turn out to be, they are considered by James (1890/1950) and Bailey (1999) to be an unquestionable part of the stream - ‘transitions are part of consciousness just as the joint in bamboo is part of the wood’ (Bailey, 1999, p. 144).

This process hinged on consciousness understood as intentional (Husserl, 1950/1999) - whatever I was drawing was what I was thinking of - meaning there would not be anything unintentional either within the drawing, or within my flow of consciousness.

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27 Understanding the performative element within automatic drawing in this manner, one finds a connection with the way in which Jackson Pollock (1979) worked to produce his large-scale drawings and paintings. While the topic of the unconscious is not explicitly connected with Pollock’s working method in the manner of the Surrealists, Bernice Rose (1976, p. 13) finds Pollock’s action painting to be, ‘revelatory – filled with the sense of a confession of secret life – and as totally finished as any painting.’ This outlines another way to understand the supposedly ‘revelatory’ autographic function as connected to the performance of automatism, rather than its conceptual underpinnings.
directed towards the drawing. It is clear that I am basing this highly speculative approach upon a large degree of subjective interpretation, and that the criteria is wholly qualitative rather than quantative. However, on the basis that the theoretical material I am working with (James, 1890/1950; Bailey, 1999) indicates the fringe is an ontologically viable form of temporal relation within the stream of consciousness, then I hypothesise the process just outlined can allow me to coherently translate (record/re-present) this temporal understanding into a spatial form, via the performance of quick, seemingly uncontrolled mark-making.

Figure 14: Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.13 -15
Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

Compositional

I now looked to bring together and develop these theoretical ideas in physical terms. My conceptual ideas needed to be translated, and composed, into a visible, tangible form. As Riley (2008, p. 158) states, ‘the Compositional function deals with the systems of available choices of media, surface and marks that combine to make visible, to realise, the other two functions.’ Having decided to use a method of Serial Drawing via an automatic-type approach that focuses upon developing a form like an ink blot, I select a drawing technique I have used previously, and which I deem to be a good fit - the ‘blot technique’\textsuperscript{28}. Blotting is a method that is directly able to include and develop the formal

\textsuperscript{28} The process of ink blotting referred to here be not explicitly connected to the inkblot technique associated with the Rorschach test. Although the processes are similar in look or form, they differ in terms of intent - the Rorschach technique was designed for scoring and interpreting results as part of a psychodiagnostic method for understanding, ‘the formal and structural aspects of a subjects reactions to random forms’ (Klopfer & Davidson, 1962, p. 4) in order to reveal hidden or
elements I require in order to compose my ideas as a form of picture making - seeking to picture (represent) a ‘nameable’ form over a series of impressions. The process of blotting is loosely automatic in type, and could incorporate the performative element I required into the process of drawing without undue difficulty.

The specific blot technique I had in mind is referred to by Rawson (1969/1987, p. 81) as ‘the blob’ and Hill (1966, p. 34) as the ‘blot’, both of whom describe it in reference to the well known technique developed by Alexander Cozens (1785/1977) within his *New Method of Landscape*. As described by Hill (1966), Cozens ‘New Method’ of drawing landscapes and ‘the Blot’ it used for that purpose, functioned purely as a device – a method of systematising the act of drawing in order to look for landscapes in the chance forms of blots of ink. Although dated in chronological terms, Cozens’ procedure itself is rather timeless in its instructions for the practitioner, and his description so clearly laid out that artists such as myself could look past the lack of contemporaneity to absorb it as a form of inspiration. For example, rather than rely on pure chance in the vein of Surrealist automatism, Hill (1966, p. 37) suggests that Cozens’ Blot was based upon the purposeful deployment of chance to aid artistic conception when producing drawings.

In Cozens’ scheme, the draftsman begins with a general concept that guides him in making the freest sketch. He then responds to forms suggested in the resulting patterns and determines the final forms from successive interpretations. In other words, the results were not premeditated, only the method.

As I was seeking to test the idea of translating ‘fringe/transitive parts’ of thought into drawing via a performative approach this method of blotting appeared attractive, for it provided me a focus for my stream of consciousness in the method of *Meditation* - the blot as the object my thought was aimed towards in an intentional sense. As Petherbridge (2010, p. 156) points out, it is very common for artists and designers to make some favoured gesture upon a surface to initiate an exploratory process, ‘even if that gestural mark is quickly edited and transformed’. A good example of this process is found in Michaux’s (2000) practice, where he advocates ‘murking the paper up’ to begin a wash drawing. The purpose of this was to let other more fringe elements come to the fore - words, thoughts, or dim memories that he was not initially conscious of suppressed personality traits. My approach is not psychological in this sense – rather, it is phenomenological, in that it seeks to use the blot as a device for enabling me to ‘find’ forms in a chance manner.
Once the paper has been murked up, faces emerge from it without knowing what they are doing there and without my knowing either. They have expressed themselves well in advance of me, rendering an impression which I do not recognize and which I will never know if it has previously passed through me. These are the truest faces (Michaux, 2000, p. 32).

![Figure 15: Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.16 -18](image)

Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

The potential to discover an image like a face within blots of ink developed across a series of images fitted with my stated aim to focus on a substantive form using the Samatha Mindfulness technique within the method of Meditation. My focus would begin with making a blot of ink to start the process, which I would then develop into a representation of something nameable across a series. Following Michaux’s example above, this substantive, nameable form could be a ‘face’ of some sort - one that would emerge from the ink blot as the drawing unfolded over time (Vermersch, 1999). The method of Introspection as Practice would be directed towards my stream of consciousness to monitor the temporally unfolding of this serially developed process in order to see how it related to my stream of consciousness. In practical terms the process of blotting would mean direct transference of ink from one drawing to the next, resulting

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29 Blotting was by no means restricted to Cozens’ New Method - artists since Leonardo have been devising innovative ways to begin a drawing using chance forms to focus upon and thus stimulate their imagination. The technique of ‘seeing things’ in this manner is related to what psychologists term pareidolia, or the faculty of deciphering figures in random marks (Carels, 2012, p. 19).

30 The bookwork I had produced prior to the PhD research (Graham, 2012) was produced along similar lines - faces and bodily forms emerged from within a confluence of serially developed graphite transfer marks, where the mechanism of pareidolia (Carels, 2012) was strongly in evidence.
in a joined-up physical impression between one stage and the next. On this basis, each new image will be an imperfect copy of the previous, yet with areas of relation that persisted between them when the structure of the series as a whole is perceived. These areas of relation could potentially be the ‘fringe’ I am looking to record. Unity and continuity within the series can also be accounted for, which would re-present the stream of consciousness according to the theory I currently have of it (James, 1890/1950; Bailey A. R., 1999). Previous drawing experience has taught me that nameable forms only emerge from the intentional act of searching for them. By this I mean they do not occur instantaneously: they occur over time – the time taken to draw. It is also likely that the feature in question i.e. the ‘face’ will belong to the whole series as much as to any individual mark within it. As Husserl (1950/1999, p. 40) says, ‘always we find the feature in question as a unity belonging to a passing flow of ‘multiplicities.’

**Series One Drawings**

The first series of the inkblot drawings produced eighteen ink transfer drawings. In this section I will describe the process of production I developed in detail, using Cozens’ *New Method* (1785/1977) as my guide. With Michaux’s (2000) example in mind, my aim was to gradually find a face or head within the blot of ink by engaging upon the mechanism of *pareidolia* – the process of perceiving forms in chance arrangement of marks, where forms are deciphered (introduced) by the subject in question (Carels, 2012). In a purely artistic sense, I was also interested in what Petherbridge (2010, p. 157) called the ‘vibrancy of becoming’ by using the method of *Meditation* to remain mindful of the phenomenality of form the blot evoked. In beginning the series my aim was to concentrate solely on observing how the ink was transferred from plate to paper through being absorbed, using the element of chance to facilitate the process, rather than on, ‘compositional or ideational invention’ (Petherbridge, 2010, p. 157). That would emerge from the blot, in time.
In beginning the series I followed Cozens’ suggestion that, ‘in order to produce the drawing, nothing more is required than to place a piece of paper, made transparent, upon the blot’ (Cozens, 1785/1977, p. 10). I cut a transparent sheet of acetate to A2 size, laid down flat upon a large drawing table. Within this, I made guide marks for positioning sheets of A3 paper. These sheets form the substrate of the drawings themselves, laid down on top of the acetate in order to be drawn upon. The acetate sheet was included as it provided a non-permeable surface, meaning the ink could be easily transferred onto the paper. I then mixed some black drawing ink with plenty of water and, taking a medium sized watercolour brush, marked a blot of black ink in the centre of the acetate sheet. While this ink was still wet, I laid a sheet of A3 watercolour paper face down on top, positioned within the guide marks. To transfer the ink I rubbed the back of it with the flat of my hand.

This procedure produced the first black mark in my first series - visible in Series One, No.1 (fig.16). In Cozens’ method of blotting, the emphasis was on total design. Despite the exhortation that the blotted shapes should be, ‘rude and unmeaning’ (Cozens, 1785/1977, p. 6) there was in fact a desire that the attention of the drawer be employed
on the whole composition formed by the blot, rather than part. With this in mind I proceed to lay down another few ink blots in brown ochre ink mixed with water, in order to begin organising the outline of a face in the same manner. The method of Meditation was being now being engaged via my intentional focus directed towards the blots on ink I was laying down.

**Development of No.2**

Progressing to the next image in the series I reversed the process. Laying No.1 down face up on the table, I placed the (cleaned) sheet of transparent acetate on top of it, lined up inside the guide marks. Using the same measure of black drawing ink but with a little less water than previous, I proceeded to swiftly trace over the black ink mark visible underneath. While the ink was still wet I placed on top of the acetate a fresh sheet of paper and repeated the process, rubbing the back of the paper to blot the ink from it onto the paper. This drawing performance produced image No.2 - a reverse of the first image along the vertical axis, with slightly thicker and more developed lines due to the reduced amount of water used (fig. 17). I repeated this process to copy the ochre ink marks, which then mingled with the black. The element of pace i.e. speed was emphasised in two areas: when I drew with the ink and in the shortness of time I had to blot the ink before it dried. This meant the element of chance was present but in a controlled fashion – akin to what Hill (1966, p. 34) termed, ‘doodling with purpose’. In making this work, I reflected upon the attitude of the artist Henri Krokatsis (2006). When asked the question ‘why would an artist today want to establish an exposure to chance?’ Krokatsis (2006, p. 14) replied:

> You set up a system to free yourself from the ego in order to procure the unexpected, which you hope is more relevant, more universal, than anything you could achieve through the conceptual conscious mind alone. In Buddhist thought, the strategy - the Dharma (the path) - leads you to understanding Dharmata (the inherent nature of everything).

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31 Krokatsis continues this quote with the following statement: ‘in hobuku (flung ink) drawings of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Cha’an Buddhist throws ink in order to make an image that breaks free from the subject that controls it. These are some of the most extraordinary images I have seen.’ (Krokatsis & Walwin, 2006, p. 14) On a conceptual level I was not seeking to ‘break free’ from my control of my image - I was using the method of chance to find a phenomenal form that would stabilize and persist within my stream of consciousness.
Development of No.3 - No.9

I began No.3 with an intentional focus directed towards the blot, or blots of ink, but this focus very quickly shifted to the face that was gradually emerging - a result of the play in difference between positive and negative space. From No.3 to No.7 I steadily decreased the ratio of water to ink to make the image denser, and increased the surface area I covered (fig.18) in order to fill in the form to a greater degree each time, and help generate a more recognisable representation of a face. I used the method of Meditation via the Samatha mindfulness technique to remain focused on the blot, whilst also introspectively reflecting upon my experience in order to monitor my stream of consciousness. As a ‘face’ started to gradually emerge in the foreground, I aimed towards bringing it out within each new iteration by filling in the area around it - the background as it was now becoming. Upon reaching No.9, I decided that what I was looking at was an animal’s head - a cat or a bat of some sort. I was approaching the point of naming the form that I was drawing: the peak of ‘substantive’ form creation I had desired. In the Husserlian sense, I had been thinking of this developing form as the intentional object that I had meditatively ‘aimed’ towards via an intentional, imaginative act of consciousness (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 166).
By No.10, I had reached the zenith of this particular series. By this I mean I had represented, and named, the image of a bats head with as much emphasis as I desired. I now recognised this effort at deliberate form creation was only a prelude to a more interesting set of developments yet to come, but which I could not yet articulate. Wishing to generate a larger series of results with which to vary in my assessment, as part of testing the second stage of the method of Phenomenology (the eidetic search for the invariant), I decide to reverse the drawing process. I began the gradual process of deforming the representational image of the head across the same number of images as formed it, using the same process as previous but in reverse - gradually increasing the water to ink ratio while simultaneously decreasing the surface area covered by the ink, in order to develop a degree of image ambiguity (fig.19). I also decreased my intentional effort to draw a head – I simply let it dissolve towards becoming a few blots of watery ink. This returned the drawing in the final stage (No.18) to a form that somewhat mirrored its initial state (No.1). Structurally speaking I considered the image of the head to be distributed across the series of eighteen drawings, rather than remain tied to any one. What emerged from the series was the phenomenon of the bats head that ‘appeared’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 251) by being given a name. Conversely, one could argue that an unnamed ‘head’ was already given in the appearance of No.1.
Series Two Drawings

![Series Two Drawings](image)

Figure 20: Series Two, Druckkopf (2012), No.1 - 9
Ink transfer drawings on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

This second series of drawings used exactly the same inkblot technique as the first series, so it is not necessary to re-describe in detail the method used. I also produced the same number of eighteen images for comparative analysis, giving it the same external structure. What I did alter was the internal structure of the series, via the intentionally directed process of forming an image (fig.20). Instead of beginning with a few blots of ink with the aim of finding a head, I began with a ‘head’ image copied from the previous series with the aim of returning it to a few blots of ink. Once this process had occurred, I decided I had reached the ‘mid-point’ (no.9) where the substantive image of the head had dissolved into a much more ambiguous looking form than it began with. From this point I progressed towards seeking to find another bat-like head using the remaining stages (fig.21). The nominal aim of this second series of drawings was to compare it with the results of the first, because the structure and process between them were broadly similar.

However, while producing this second series I began to have serious doubts about my deliberately representational approach for addressing my research question. I instinctively felt this whole attempt was likely to be superseded by a more developed version once further clarity had been achieved via my analysis of the drawings themselves. Initially, these doubts had surfaced because of the introspective effort I was
directing towards the temporal unfolding of my stream of consciousness, which the method of *Introspection as Practice* (Vermersch, 1999) advocated. However, doubts had also begun to surface due to the distance I now had from the bracketed idea that ‘drawing recording thought’. Although this hypothesis was suspended for the test, I became aware of myself standing back, so to speak, to look the assumption that posited the ability of drawing to record the ‘fringe’ of consciousness in a far more critical light.

Figure 21: Series Two, *Druckkopf* (2012), No.10 - 18
Ink transfer drawings on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

**Assessment**

As stated at the beginning of this chapter it has been my intention to use a method of *Serial Drawing* to address my research question and to help test all three first-person methods suggested by Varela and Shear (1999) for approaching the study of consciousness: *Introspection as Practice, Meditation* and *Phenomenology*. To commence my assessment I begin by discussing the first two methods, *Mediation* and *Introspection as Practice* in relation to the experience of drawing (verb), before moving to test the second part of the third method - the eidetic search for the invariant within *Phenomenology* - in relation to the series of drawings (noun) as presented.
The experience of drawing

To test both the method of *Introspection as Practice* and the method of *Meditation* I engaged the act of introspection to monitor the temporal unfolding of my stream of consciousness whilst I drew. Both series of drawings were developed over time as a succession of stages, and I reflected upon my stream of consciousness at various points along this temporal development. As Wallace (1999, p. 178) states on the function of introspection within *Meditation*, ‘while it is the task of mindfulness to attend, without forgetfulness, to the meditative object, introspection has the function of monitoring the meditative process.’ However, this introspective monitoring revealed something rather critical to the comprehension of my research question - although I retained an intentional focus directed towards transforming the blot of ink into a nameable form, there was also a great deal of inward excitation within my stream of consciousness. This manifest itself as a level of phenomenal ‘flux’ within the focus I was maintaining towards drawing a face.

Like James’ (1890/1950, p. 243) other metaphor of consciousness being like a, ‘birds life’, where the flow of thought appeared to alter between passages of ‘flight’ and ‘perching’s’, I became aware that my thoughts were constantly flitting from topic to topic: not just across the series of drawings, or even within a single drawing, but even during a few strokes of the brush. I also noticed that while actually drawing i.e. in the present, I spent a good deal of time looking ahead into the future and back into the past. I was surprised at this realisation - I had always tacitly assumed that drawing quietened my mind, and rooted me firmly to the task at hand. After all, this is the very notion that Franck (1973, p. 16) puts forward as evidence to support his *seeing/drawing* technique, ‘I stand face to face with a hill, a bird, a human face - with myself, in unwavering attention.’ Instead, what testing the method *Introspection as Practice* revealed to me during the performance of drawing was how much my ‘stream of consciousness’ streamed for want of a better term - a process of temporal unfolding that was ceaseless in its form.

My mind appeared to be a very active place, a curious mix of wavering and unwavering attention - a constant cascade of thoughts even while the brush was moving and a part of my mind remained focused on the task at hand. As a reflective practitioner all I could say was that this reflection upon my experience suggested that all the marks I had intentionally made must have been invested with some element of my stream of consciousness – partitioning them on the basis of a theory into ‘substantive’ or ‘fringe’ elements remained just that: theoretical. As this was a phenomenological investigation I needed to look for evidence within the drawings themselves, and on the basis of my
reflective experience I did not find this division to be supported. Yet having already established in the thesis Introduction that my drawings are metaphorical expressions of consciousness, I was not convinced I had got any closer to establishing the depth at which this metaphor operated, or even what were the essential elements of the relationship between drawing and consciousness that allowed it to function. As the topic of the ‘subconscious’ and the ‘unconscious’ lay outside the bounds of my phenomenal investigation, I was seemingly left with little room to develop my understanding beyond this point. With this difficulty in hand, I still had one as-of-yet untested procedure to apply.

This is the second stage of the method of Phenomenology, the eidetic search for the invariant (Depraz, 1999; Husserl, 1931/2012). Seeking the invariant from within the series of drawings in this eidetic manner, via a process of ‘imaginative free variation’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012), is basically an effort to re-interpret the drawings to see what else might emerge. I am hoping this will allow a solution to present itself, potentially one that will permit me to decide what is invariant within my research thus far. In this sense, the eidetic search for what is essentially understood runs parallel to the question of what might be invariantly recorded within the drawings themselves. Via this indirect method of approach I look to push past the difficulties I now encounter, in order to re-attempt my effort in more coherent terms. My desire is to learn more about how the metaphor of ‘recording’ functions in relation to drawing representing the flow of consciousness once the question has become more invariantly understood.

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32 Rawson (1969/1987, p. 25) makes a connected point regarding how drawing is understood to operate in metaphorical terms, via what he describes as the, ‘analogizing function of the human mind’. This details the process by which artistic metaphor works, with one form ‘standing in’ for another form from a totally different sphere of experience. It implies all sorts of forms are registered unconsciously, producing a vast repertory of ‘forms’ and ‘forms of forms’ that are stored in memory. Many of these forms will be visual, but they would also include the kinaesthetic, tactile or sensuous. Yet, for only a few of them are there words available to attribute to the form the quality of being an objective thing, meaning drawn forms can step in as symbols to fill the breach that words leave.

33 Although there is no single principle on which metaphor works, Searle (1993) claims that similarity clearly plays a role, as does one thing ‘reminding’ us of another. However, two important differences between them are, ‘metaphors are both restricted and systematic; restricted in the sense that not every way that one thing can remind us of something else will provide a basis for metaphor, and systematic in the sense that metaphors must be communicable from speaker to hearer in virtue of a shared system of principles’ (Searle, 1993, p.102).
Having established that both the method of *Introspection as Practice* (Vermersch, 1999) and *Meditation* (Gunaratana, 2002; Wallace, 1999) had roles to play in developing the drawings, my aim here is to finish testing the method of *Phenomenology* by searching within my series of drawings for that which invariantly understood. Realising that the path of research I was currently on needed a degree of clarity bringing to it, I decided that re-examining the actual drawings I had produced would be sensible choice. I begin with all eighteen drawings from Series One (fig. 22) as a test of this eidetic method, to see what it might reveal. I laid them out flat on a table and proceeded to view them as a group. According to Depraz (1999, p. 101), the *praxis* of the phenomenological reduction was tied to this eidetic function, validating the initial stage of bracketing by looking within the results for that which is invariantly, or essentially, understood. Via Husserl’s method, this meant imaginatively varying the ‘sensible datum’ i.e. the drawings, in order to allow a procedure of categorization to emerge. The specificity of this categorization stems from a double source - perceptual and imaginative.
The perceptual and so sensible anchorage confers a dose of individual singularity upon the categorical experience; the imaginative support un-ties the real from its exclusively empirical efficacy to open it up upon the infinity of the possible, which latter confers its universality upon the category’ (Depraz, 1999, p. 102).

To test the eidetic procedure I needed to apply it to both phenomena I am investigating (‘drawing’ and ‘the stream of consciousness’) on the basis that my focus is the relationship between them. Picking an image in fig.22 at random, (Series One, No.12) I tried to imaginatively vary the spatial form I am presented with, by imagining a ‘bear’s head’ in place of the ‘bats head’ I had decided to name. I immediately noticed that the ambiguity of the image allowed this to occur with very little difficulty. Looking across the other images at either end of the series (No.3 – No.5 for example) I tried to imagine them as something else entirely - a ‘tree’, a ‘cloud’ or even a ‘house’, all of which I recalled having perceived within the form of the blot(s) when producing the series. Having begun to imaginatively vary the results in order to open them up to the, ‘infinity of the possible’ (Depraz, 1999, p. 102) I then asked - despite these imagined differences in form, what was the purely invariant element that held between them and emerged from within the series as a whole?

The answer lay with the fact that they were all drawn via the movement of my hand. The universal category that united them as a series of singular images presented before me was prior physical movement, recorded in the form of the drawings themselves. I then applied the eidetic procedure to the other phenomenon I was investigating - the ‘stream of consciousness’. While I realise it is not possible to separate this effort from the one focused on the phenomenon of drawing (for drawings are always presented to consciousness) I consider the effort a worthwhile thought experiment for testing the method of Phenomenology. I focused my attention on each of the images in the second series (fig.23). Aided by the instructional method of Introspection as Practice (Vermersch, 1999) to focus upon the temporal unfolding of the stream, I noticed that almost immediately I thought of something else entirely - a memory of something I had said earlier surfaced, followed (in time) by a recollection of the task at hand. This was quickly followed by the idea that I might like to draw another series of these heads at some point.

It rapidly became clear that, while I encountered a continued and unprompted varying to the contents of my consciousness, that included literally anything I could think of, the invariant factor was this factor itself - the streaming of this content. Consciousness appearing to the subject as an on-going succession of thoughts and experiences that
occur both at a time and over time (Dainton, 2000) presented itself as the invariant when comprehending the ‘streaming’ of consciousness. This was a subtly different understanding to the stream of consciousness. The difference was important, because from this realisation I proceeded to affirm to myself that the term ‘stream’ refers not to a movement in space, but to a movement in time. Although the question of how drawing is understood to record the stream of consciousness was not affirmatively decided, a better way to ask the question had now started to emerge.

![Figure 23: Series Two, Druckkopf (2012), No. 1 - 18](image)

Ink transfer drawings on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

**Summary**

While both of these findings might seem startlingly obvious in retrospect, at the time I made them I was simply seeking to test the method of *Introspection as Practice* and *Phenomenology*, particularly the second stage - the eidetic search for the invariant (Depraz, 1999). Yet in finding them I am reminded of Dennett's (1993, p. 80) comment regarding how we might all agree upon the basic facets of our experience: 'in crashing obviousness lies objectivity'. From this analysis I now have what appears to be two distinctly invariant elements that underpin the phenomena I am investigating. The finding that drawings are *drawn* focuses my attention of the indicative form which this act
produces - the drawn line - primarily spatially perceived in terms of its form. The finding that the ‘stream of consciousness’ streams focuses my attention on understanding how this notion is understood in phenomenological terms, given that it is primarily temporally understood in terms of its form. Both the ‘streaming’ of consciousness and the ‘drawn line’ are underpinned by a sense of temporal movement, but whereas within drawing ‘movement’ indicates a resolutely physical gesture recorded in space, how ‘movement’ occurs within the context of consciousness and the experience we have of time is far from clear.

With these questions in hand I launch the next phase of my investigation - acquiring a thorough theoretical understanding of how each phenomena ‘appears’ to the subject in theoretical terms, in order to apply this understanding within a further round of practice. Chapter Three will review the relevant literature to discuss phenomenon of the drawn line in spatial terms, whilst Chapter Four will review the relevant literature to discuss the phenomenon of consciousness in temporal terms. This will permit me to develop a series of ‘thoughts on the phenomenon’ (phenomeno-logy) of the two parts to my research question - drawing and consciousness - described across a number of points that focus on elucidating the kinetic underpinning to each. Once this is complete, I will look to combine these understandings within a newly developed process of serial drawing described in Chapter Five, with the aim of re-addressing my research question in a more competent and coherent manner.

34 In ontological terms it makes no sense to say that anything moves through time - a thing can endure, or persist but these are not quite the same, as Dainton (2000, p. 122) explains. “It is a mistake to suppose anything has moved through time, or that anything could move through time. A thing can move through space, by occupying different places at different times, but it makes no sense to say that a thing could exist at different times at different times - though of course a thing can exist at different times simply by enduring”. Yet, within the phenomenological description that deals with the subjective experience we have of time, consciousness does appear as a metaphorical ‘streaming’ – a strange form of (non) movement that is felt to occur. It is on the basis of this seemingly confused understanding of what the term ‘stream’ actually means in the context of consciousness that I seek to develop a better understanding of it within Chapter Four.
Chapter Three: The Phenomenon of the Drawn Line

Introduction

On the basis of the first invariant finding presented in the assessment of the previous chapter - that when considered as a series, the drawings (noun) invariantly exhibit the appearance of having been drawn (verb) - I now look to explore this concept in more detail. In understanding the verb ‘drawing’ as indicating a movement carried out in time, the focus of this chapter will be upon exploring the phenomenon of the drawn line, considered as perhaps the indicative, spatially understood form that the action of drawing produces. The purpose is to detail a theoretical account of how the drawn line is understood as a phenomenon from the perspective of a subject, before practically applying the results in relation to my own serially developed drawings in Chapter Five.

I select the drawn line as the locus for what the act of drawing produces on the basis it is formed via the movement of the point - the act of drawing. This kinetic understanding emerges from Rawson (1969/1987, p. 15) who claims that, ‘such movement is the fundamental nature of drawing…crystalizing more or less strongly the implicit movement of lines.’ From the movement of the point I then express the phenomenological understanding of the line across a number of topics that describe how it ‘appears’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 252) to the subject who draws. The six points listed below form a series of ‘thoughts on the phenomenon’ (phenomeno-logy) of the drawn line, established via a review of the literature deemed relevant to comprehending it as such. They are as follows:

• The moving point
• The trace of the point
• The intentionally drawn line
• The drawn line as a record
• The dualism of the line
• The rhythm of the line

To describe these points I have focused largely on theoretical or pedagogical accounts of drawing written by artists/writers on drawing, rather than use accounts of personal practice written by artists or practitioners themselves. This is not to say that the line
between writers on drawing and artists is clear-cut, or that theoretical accounts of
drawing are any less subjective than the descriptions of drawing by practitioners,
because they aren’t. Rather, it is simply an epistemological decision I have made based
on the kind of theoretical knowledge I am trying to secure, ahead of applying it to my own
practice. In a Husserlian phenomenological sense (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 111), I
remain interested in describing the kind of knowledge that belongs to the drawn line
invariantly. Not in terms of selecting elements based upon the eidetic procedure of
‘imaginative free variation’, but in terms of deciding the ‘what’ (Was) or ‘whatness’
(Washeit) of the line understood as a phenomenon - the objectively understood elements
that transcend a description of personal style. They are selected as points according to
their ability to open out the kinetic manner in which the progression of the point leaves a
trace of its passage in the form of the line.

By applying this theoretical material within the context of my own drawing practice in
Chapter Five, the subjective dimension associated with my personal method of serial
drawing will be added by default. In addition, these points are by no means exhaustive -
on the contrary, there isn’t sufficient space here to identify all the elements that could
constitute any one of a number of possible interpretations of the drawn line. Likewise,
although they are described separately, each point does not ‘appear’ separately from the
others within the line considered as a spatially perceived phenomenon. As elements they
overlap within the viewer’s experience of the form of the line (noun) when this form is
considered as ‘that which appears’ within ones consciousness of it.

The moving point

Rawson (1969/1987, p. 15) states that, at core, ‘drawings are done with a point that
moves.’ The point may be thick or thin, produced using a fine point, fingers, or bundles of
old brushes dipped in ink. Despite these differences in application, ‘the essential feature

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In the main body of this chapter, I make use of a select number of authors that have proved useful to me as a practitioner in
defining how I understand the drawn line. These primarily include Rawson (1969/1987), Hill (1966), Rosand, (2002),
Maynard, (2005) and Ingold, (2007). As a result I have decided not to use make extensive use in the main text of major
authors such as Petherbridge (2010) or de Zegher & Butler (2010) on the basis I have found their concern to lean more
towards discussing drawing from a curatorial/art historical point of view, although I realise this is a highly debatable affair –
especially in the case of Rawson. I refer to Rawson on the basis that I find his understanding of drawing to be usefully
definitive and largely temporal. Petherbridge suggests Rawson’s continuing appeal for practitioners like myself is because,
‘the combination of universalising narrative and mystification in these revealed truths perhaps accounts for the book’s
continuing popularity with practising artists’. I make no comment on this except to say that, popularity aside, one might
venture to suggest this comment could also summarise the practitioners encounter with the scope and tone of The Primacy
remains that something generically classed as a point, a tool acting as some kind of surrogate for the hand with its fingers, has made a mark that records a two dimensional movement in space’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 15). Rawson calls this the kinetic basis of drawing in recognition of the fact that the act of drawing (verb) indicates a movement from one place to another in space, and leaves a trace of that movement in the form of a line. This line can constitute all, or part of, the drawing (noun) that results. This regard for the moving point as the fundamental underpinning of what drawing ‘is’, is similar to Klee’s (1925/1953, p. 16) pedagogical instruction that the, ‘active line on a walk’ has as its mobility agent, ‘a point, shifting its position forward.’

For Klee, the form of the drawn line is what it is because it was formed by a shift of position of the point. Indeed, Klee’s Pedagogical Sketchbook (1925/1953) may be considered a treatise on what the phenomenon of the line is capable of, beginning within the origins of a moving point. Moholy-Nagy (Klee, 1925/1953, p. 62) gives an eleven-point breakdown of Klee’s instruction, describing the movement of the point from ‘line as point progression’ through to ‘line as symbol of colour mutations and kinetic harmony.’ The progression of Klee’s sketchbook thus describes a pedagogical way to understand the phenomenological arc of the point that moves, forming many kinds of line as a result. Rawson adds to his description the way in which the movement that creates the line is then experienced within it, once the line is drawn. As he says, ‘in reality once drawn a line does not itself change or move. It is fixed as a static mark. But there always lies at the bottom of every drawing an implied pattern of those movements through which it was created’ (Rawson, Drawing, 1969/1987, p. 15). This observation must concern the drawn line considered as a phenomenon, for lines fixed to a surface do not appear to physically move. The presence of underlying movement that the drawn line exhibits constitutes what Rawson (1969/1987, p. 15) refers to as the ‘special charm’ of drawing. This

36 Petherbridge (2010) decides against defining drawing according to its origins with a moving point, on the basis that any definition of drawing would to her understanding fall short of its stated aim, given the complexity of drawing. ‘Any formula would have to encompass the indefinable status and contradictory aspects of drawing, and therefore would immediately dissolve into a web of disclaimers’ (Petherbridge, 2010, p. 16). In place of this is offered an open-ended schema of drawing as a continuum, which can of course be interpreted in any number of ways. As a practitioner, my aim is to focus on a more practically minded definition, despite the disclaimers this may cause, in order to apply it to my development of drawing in Chapter Five. On that basis I follow the definition laid out by Klee (1925/1953) which runs through Rawson (1969/1987) and into Maynard (2005).

37 The paradoxical manner in which the movement underpinning the line is also experienced within its static form is made in reference to an analogy with music. Rawson (1969/1987, p. 15) claims that music takes on ‘physical presence’ only in performance - its structure is properly conveyed in time. This indicates that while music is played in much the same way as drawings are drawn, the act of playing ‘is’ the music, whereas the case with drawing is precisely the reverse, for, ‘drawings seem to have physical presence only as a static object’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 15).
conception of the fundamentally kinetic basis to drawing can be held in opposition to say, the practice of painting, where subsequent brushstrokes or the manner of applying paint can hide whatever movement pattern was originally in evidence underneath. The act of drawing a line through the movement of a point draws away from its original position to leave a trace of this passage, whereas paint is often applied in layers, and operates by covering its tracks.

The movement of the point often (if not always) occurs across a surface, either flat or otherwise formed, meaning the line that is produced by the moving point is in reality a two-dimensional trace. For Rawson (1969/1987, p. 95), the phenomenon of the line considered as a two-dimensional trace on a plane means that it has, ‘in itself no three-dimensional value. When a line is recorded on a flat drawing surface the mind always accepts it first as functionally a separator.’ This suggests the movement of the point produces limits, or borders, that cannot be transcended even when the drawer wishes to move beyond deliberately drawing lines around forms that represent things visibly perceived, such as figures, animals or faces. Even if they for example, wish to think differently about drawing and seek to make the ‘absent appear’ (Berger, 2005) they still need to recognise the movement has created a two-dimensional trace on the surface of whatever it is they draw upon.

Considered phenomenologically, the form of the line not only functions to separate one thing from another, but also to connect - binding itself, ‘closely to the plane of the picture surface, turning it into a two-dimensional silhouette’ (Rawson, Drawing, 1969/1987, p. 95). This is one of the dualisms to the phenomenon of the line, where the form indicates within itself that which it is not, i.e. the plane upon which it sits. Although Rawson states that lines once drawn do not themselves physically move, this notion can be interpreted slightly differently if we treat the drawn line as a phenomenon, referring back to the manner in which it ‘appears’. Taking the metaphor of the stream as the form of consciousness through which the drawn line is presented, the manner in which we encounter the line must also be a form of flow - Hill’s, (1966, p. 2) ‘trajectory of moving life’. Ruskin (1857/1971, p. 91) manages to neatly summarise this phenomenological relationship, between the fundamental movement that underpins the line and the world itself.

Now remember, nothing distinguishes great men from inferior men more than their always, whether in life or in art, knowing the way things are going…Your dunce thinks they are standing still, and draws them all fixed; your wise man sees the
change or changing in them, and draws them so - the animal in its motion, the tree in its growth, the cloud in its course, the mountain in its wearing away. Try always, whenever you look at a form, to see the lines in it which have had power over its past fate, and will have power over its futurity.\footnote{Hoptman (2002) discusses Ruskin’s approach to drawing with a similar focus. Hoptman notices that while Ruskin (1857/1971) argues for drawing to set down a record of things seen and which might be difficult to describe in words, he also adds that drawing can be used to preserve an image of things which pass away. This suggests that for Ruskin drawing was, ‘never a mere visual record, the drawing of an object from nature was for Ruskin almost that objects equivalent’ (Hoptman, 2002, p. 15).}

The trace of the point

Underpinning the phenomenology of the drawn line is its appearance as a \textit{trace}. This is the form of the line understood as the production of the point moved across a surface. The trace of the point not only reveals the path that it took but also the effect such a movement had on the surface it crossed. Ingold (2007) describes the trace or \textit{traces} as one of the two major classes of line, the other one being \textit{threads}. As regards the phenomenon of the drawn line, the thread does not connect to it in the quite the same way as Klee’s (Klee, 1925/1953) description, for it does not imply the movement of a point across a surface. Instead it suggests a, ‘filament of some kind…suspended between points in a three dimensional space’ (Ingold, 2007, p. 41). The trace proper suggests a mark or line left in (or on) a solid surface by a continuous movement - what separates the thread and the trace on this account is precisely the necessity for a surface or substrate of some kind upon which to leave a trace. On this basis, Ingold (2007, p. 43) describes most traces as being either additive or reductive.

A line drawn with charcoal on paper, or with chalk on a blackboard, is additive, since the material of the charcoal or chalk forms an extra layer that is superimposed upon the substrate. Lines that are scratched, scored or etched into a surface are reductive, since they are formed by the removal of material from the surface itself.

The act of drawing a line and leaving a trace of that effort implies manual movement via the gesture of pulling towards, or dragging an implement along. This is where for Ingold (2007, p. 43), the link between drawing and writing operates, for both fundamentally concern a movement carried out by the gesture of the hand. Indeed, the word ‘writing’
referred to incisive or reductive trace making of this kind, where the Old English word *writan* means, ‘to incise runic letters in stone’ (Howe in Ingold, 2007, p. 43). Rosand (2002) begins his own description of the phenomenology of drawing according to these kinds of trace(s), stating, ‘the line will always carry the traces of its surface construction; even when heavily worked, it will reveal the processes of its making and, ultimately, the nature of the surface upon which it operates’ (Rosand, 2002, p. 2).

This understanding of the trace leads towards the Derridean (1993) interpretation of the *trait* as indicating the essential ambiguity within all forms of inscription (drawing, writing) between presence and absence, loss and retrieval. Although a deconstructive approach in the proper sense lies outside the bounds of this phenomenological investigation, a short treatment of the Derridean trace on the grounds it interprets the ‘appearance’ of the line is considered appropriate here.

Newman (1996), heavily influenced by Derrida, found the singularity of the trace to lie within its essential ambiguity. This centred on the Derridean concept of *difference*, as that which operates between loss and retrieval, presence and absence. The ambiguity emerges from a series of substitutions that Newman (1996, p. 276) feels constitutes the phenomenon of the drawn line when considered in terms of how it ‘appears’

> Becoming thus contour through the mediation of the line, the ambiguity of the trace - that it once unites and separates, that relates to both the physical mark and to that which is not visible, that it makes possible presentation while withdrawing from it - is foreclosed.

Thus the phenomenon of the drawn line recalls or *remembers* the absence of the both the implement and the drawer within the presence of the trace it leaves behind. Indeed,

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39 Godfrey (1990) describes the trace as the ‘evidence’ of drawing, which is found in connection with the act of touching - the ‘archaeology of touch’. As he says, ‘wherever two objects or two materials touch (stick and railing, pencil and paper, liquid and earth, rubber and tarmac) evidence of their meeting is left behind. To examine such drawings is to excavate, to muse over the activity of the past. They present us with the archaeology of touching.’ (Godfrey, 1990, p. 9) Although this investigation is not explicitly concerned with the phenomenology of touch, this is an area I could develop the research in connection with the work of Derrida (2005) and Nancy (2013).

40 I include Derrida’s understanding of the *trace* on the basis of Lawlor’s (2002) assertion that Derrida’s deconstruction can be understood to remain within the overall aims of phenomenology as a discipline. Indeed, it is on the basis of deconstruction’s effort to deconstruct the value of presence whilst still relying on a kind of experience that leads Lawlor (2002, p. 43) to describe deconstruction as a ‘super-phenomenological critique.’ It would seem that, far from ‘overcoming’ Husserlian phenomenology, deconstruction owes its central form of movement to the activity i.e. experience of deconstructing texts, and thus Derrida can be seen to stand within an, ‘incontestable tradition of Husserlian interpretation’ (Lawlor, 2002, p 44).
within this Derridean (1993) understanding, the substitutions contained within the appearance of the line must begin with a loss concealed in the trace itself. This is present when we start thinking about the phenomenon of line as a form of authorship, indicating a movement drawn either towards or away from the body. According to Newman, what Derrida (1993, p. 2) refers to as the ‘hypothesis of sight’ indicates this movement between presence and absence within the act of drawing, and in relation to the conscious experience of the drawer, where, ‘the inseparability of present perception from the recollection that enters into its constitution but cannot be appropriated and represented in terms of present experience’ (Newman M., 1996, p. 274). To put this back into Derrida’s own terms, we can say that the hypothesis of drawing evidenced by the phenomenon of line suggests, ‘the drawing is blind…As such, and in the manner proper to it, the operation of drawing would have something to do with blindness, would in some way regard blindness’ (Derrida J., 1993, p. 2)⁴¹. Whether or not one agrees with this uniquely Derridean understanding, it does raise the question of how to attribute the element of intention within the act of drawing, and how such intention is to be understood.

**The intentionally drawn line**

For Hill (1966, p. 2) the ‘making of a single stroke represents a conjuncture of three factors: materials, muscular action, and intention.’ From this simple statement, the intentional basis to the line can be added to Rawson’s (1969/1987, p. 15) kinetic basis, and an axiomatic understanding of it in terms of how it ‘appears’ begins to develop. As Hill (1966, p. 7) clarifies, the artistic intention of a drawing, ‘cannot be reduced to “self-expression”, or “representation” or “investigation,” for this obscures the levels at which most draftsmen operate.’ This account would suggest that the intention underpinning the drawn line exceeds being understood in terms of that which the drawer has purposefully aimed towards. Instead, it simply indicates that the intention is ‘there’, present within the appearance of lines that have been drawn, no matter what subsequent interpretation is.

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⁴¹ To extend this discussion slightly, Tormey (2011) understands the Derridean reference to blindness, ‘as being a consequence of a continuous mediated seeing. In this context specifically, we can say that we are blind because of a filter of conventions in talking about art’ (Tormey, 2011, p 247). This follows Derrida’s (1993, p. 15) idea of seeing as an, ‘infinitely echoing discourse’, which has its origins in Plato’s allegory of the cave, and the concern with freeing, man from the, ‘phenomenal prison of the visible world’ (Derrida J., 1993, p.15). As I understand Tormey (2011) this concern of Derrida’s leads into a way of thinking about the conventions at work within drawing, where, ‘what appears to reside in any particular work is confirmed by its definition and the concepts attached to it, so that it is difficult to distinguish between what we think we see and the knowledge we have of it.’ This discussion of blindness then reveals another way to comprehend the complexity at work within the term ‘seeing’, indicated earlier.
added to them by others. As I am operating within a Husserlian (1950/1999, p. 33) understanding of the stream of consciousness as intentional, Hill’s understanding is deemed concordant. For example, in describing artistic intention in more detail, Hill refers to a self-portrait crayon drawing by German artist Lovis Corinth (Hill, 1966, p. 23). Hill detects at least three levels of intention in play here, which he feels the drawing ‘reflects’, and which he describes as, ‘an intense probing of one’s own image; a testing of a particular interplay of shapes, lines and tones; and the ritual of participation in the wondrous act of drawing itself. Artistic intention in this case is the sum of all these’ (Hill, 1966, p. 7).

Outside the act of interpreting a particular drawing in this manner, Hill’s account would suggest that the intention found within the appearance of the line is simply the result of the intentional i.e. *dynamically* act of drawing itself. From this we come to understand the drawn line as meaning simply: produced by the intentional muscular movement of the body, a mark that leaves a trace of its passage on or within the surface it meets. This notion of intentionality indicates a strictly dynamic affair - the kinetic basis to drawing described in intentional or purposeful terms. It also indicates the drawn line to be a multiplicity of intentions, not just one. Indeed, when the philosophical complexity underpinning the concept of intentionality (Husserl, 1931/2012) is taken into account and added to, ‘the complexity of levels which most draftsman operate’ (Hill, 1966, p. 7) the task to ascertain the full range of intentions remains solely an act of interpretation\(^2\). To go any further involves speculation towards deciding that which the drawer *might* have intended, rather than did. Recognising this, as Hill (1966, p. 8) says, ‘we but barely realise the full sense of what lies within the stroke.’

Maynard (2005, p. 222) characterizes his study of drawing on the basis of perceiving marks in terms of ‘makers purposes and intentions’. Indeed, for Maynard this intentional aspect to the drawn line is bound up with the notion of ‘purpose’ that is introduced with the terms ‘draw’ ‘drawing’, ‘design drawing’ etc. meaning he regards them all as being produced through a, ‘certain kind of intentional physical action’ (Maynard, 2005, p. 4). In

\(^2\) This idea with the conceiving the intentional underpinning of drawing as an act of interpretation in relation to the workings of the mind has links with Newman’s reply in an interview with de Zegher (2003, p. 67). Newman describes how she understands drawing to be, ‘in essence, the materialization of a continually mutable process, the movements, rhythms, and partially comprehended ruminations of the mind: the operation of thought’ (Newman & de Zegher, 2003, p 67). It is through this continually mutable process that, ‘one thing leads to another, whether as the registration of fragmented moments or played out as a finely articulated game of articulation’. One thing *leading* to another is a description of intentionality in non-phenomenological terms, where the understanding of what those stages might be is an act of interpretation on the part of the viewer.
this assessment (as in many others), Maynard quite clearly follows Rawson, declaring
the drawn line to be produced through a point that is ‘intentionally’ moved over a
continuous track on a surface. Accordingly, this action leaves a trace of its path, as a
mark or line of some kind, and is ‘done for that purpose’ (Maynard 2005, 62). The use
of the term ‘purpose’ to mean intentional in connection with the word drawn is clear for
Maynard - the word ‘draw’ appears quite simply as a word for a certain kind of intentional
physical action. Yet, he uses this understanding to distinguish the drawn line from nearly
all other lines that are found or discovered

Most lines made on surfaces by points are not drawn. Indeed, most such markings
are not done by agents at all, others are accidental; thus neither glaciers nor
persons can claim credit for many of the interesting lines they score on the surface
of this and now other planets (Maynard, 2005, p. 62).

The distinctly purposeful nature of drawing a line means that the appreciation of intention
within it goes beyond simply ascribing to it a ‘pictorial intention’ (Hill, 1966, p. 8) in the
sense of representing something like a figure, a face or a house. Drawings are, as
Maynard (2005, p. 222) says, ‘highly purposive things - more so than are simple
displays’. This means that instead of simply adding the appreciation of intention to the
feat of recognising the line depicting an object, intentionality may be ‘internal to that
recognition’ (Maynard, 2005, p. 222). The question this raises is - how is this notion of
‘internal intentionality’ to be interpreted? To elucidate, Maynard returns to Rawson and
the kinetic basis of drawing. The fact that the line is produced through the ‘point that
moves’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 15) means that the phenomenon of drawing should be
understood temporally, according to the intentional sequence of production that
composed it. Yet even without a Husserlian philosophical underpinning to his discussion,
Maynard uses Rawson’s (1969/1987, p. 43) comment, ‘all intentions show in the artefact’
to suggest that drawing is far more intentional than either ‘artistic intention’ or ‘pictorial
intention’ would allow. For example, whether or not a drawing looks like something done
with purpose, one can hardly conceive of a ‘kinetic basis’ without taking all lines as
purposive, meaning they must fall into categories of either purposely controlled or
purposely uncontrolled. From this we realise the point which remains - ‘that drawing, as a
purposive activity, takes place and is perceptible as purposive at each level at which we
may say that something “has been drawn”’ (Maynard, 2005, p. 223).
The drawn line as a record

Once the point has been intentionally moved and left a trace of its passage in the form of a line, one can state this movement has been literally ‘recorded’ within the appearance of the line. This line also infers that the draftsman’s gesture - the movement of the hand, or the body - is recorded within the form of the line. My aim in the thesis is to try and record my experience of the streaming of consciousness in this manner, where the stream of consciousness is given as an intentional temporal experience (discussed in the next chapter on p.89) that is to be re-presented spatially via the intentionally drawn line. It is my contention that this line will form a projection of my body, recording the movement which produced it, and that this will refer back to the stream of consciousness which occurred simultaneous to it, thereby forging the metaphor that states ‘drawing records the stream of consciousness’.

On the theme of recording, in reference to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that, ‘the painter takes his body with him,’ Rosand (2002, p. 15) states, ‘the observation is even truer of drawing, where the movements of the body, actual and imagined, are more directly recorded by the tracing hand’. On this (seemingly) straightforward basis, Rosand understands the phenomenon of the drawn line to be self-reflexively, ‘a record’. This means it presents an indexical form of understanding where the line alludes to both the idea of authorship and to the process of having been made, for it, ‘quite naturally implicates the maker within itself’ (Rosand, 2002, p. 13). This particular understanding of the term record in relation to the manner in which the drawn line appears is, for Rosand at least, exemplified within the figure drawing of the body. Here, the drawn line records the response of the draftsman’s body to the pose of the model - phenomena such as the relative stability or instability of the body coupled with the various tensions that are present are all instinctively felt, rather than objectively analysed. For Rosand (2002, p. 16) this means, ‘the gesture of drawing is, in essence, a projection of the body, and, especially when viewing a drawing of the figure we are reminded of that’.

Going beyond the seemingly literal interpretation of the line serving to re-present the movement that produced it, the term ‘record’ proceeds to become rather more metaphorically understood, and in so doing indicates the term to which it really belongs - representation⁴³. This understanding of recording, where the form of drawing (noun)

⁴³ On this basis, one could identify the term ‘record’ to essentially operate as something of a conceit when used in relation to drawing, given that it refers only to re-presentation. This is something that Zummer (2012, p.63) clarifies succinctly when he
functions to re-present within the present what has gone before - discussed as either individual thoughts or simply the presence of thought/consciousness that must have been present in an intentional sense during the act of drawing - is the sense of the term ‘record’ I am interested in within this investigation. For example, there is often a seeming basis for questioning the intention behind recording by asking whether what was recorded was intended to be recorded or not. As Farthing (2008, p. 142) says, ‘in time all drawings become records, but only some are intended as records’. However, as I am operating within a Husserlian Phenomenological epistemology, which states that any action I carry out is intentional, a question mark over my intention in relation to recording is ruled out.

The question of what the drawn line records can be extended beyond the question of intention towards the idea of drawing recording the specificity of the drawers ‘thoughts’. Discussing the topic of how the drawer’s thoughts are represented within the appearance of drawn lines, Rosenberg (2008) describes what he terms ‘ideational drawing’. Although given in response to the topic of drawing within design, the concept is exportable to other domains that use and investigate drawing. Rosenberg (2008, p. 109) describes the term ideational drawing to mean, ‘types of drawing, and indeed, drawing processes, where one thinks with and through drawing to make discoveries, find new possibilities that give course to ideas and help fashion their eventual form.’ It would seem on this basis that the (bracketed) question of drawing recording thought hinges on how we interpret it as a concept, not on whether it is ‘true’ or not. If we separate the distinction between ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ in terms of present and past tense, then the presence of thought within the work that ideational drawing argues for might make sense, as Rosenberg (2008, p. 110) explains

When drawing is used to ideate it is in a present tense; it is what it is in the immediacy of the thinking-act. Thought, on the other hand, is of the past, in a states, ‘There is a conceit, for example, in the act of drawing, that a semblance has somehow been captured, drawn out or away from, the original which it - as translation, mimesis or semiology - is constrained to re-present.’

This intentional aspect is discussed by Farthing (2008) in the context of drawing used to record one’s participation at an event, where, ‘the purpose of drawing is apparently to record accurately the way things look.’ This suggests the drawer can function as a kind of ‘living recorder’, able to use the form of the line to subjectively record their actual (objective) presence at the event. Such an action involves placing oneself both in an event, yet with the necessary ‘drawing skills’ to carry out the act of recording. In other words, provided, ‘the recorder has sufficient technical skill they simply do their best to get down on paper the essence of the event, then with whatever time that is left over, record as much detail as possible (Farthing, 2008, p. 141)."
sense concluded, settled and in some way objectified. I say ‘in a sense concluded’ because I acknowledge that even when a drawing expresses an ostensibly conclusive thought, there is an on-going creation, a continuing emergence of meaning, produced in the way the drawing is taken up by a spectator.

Rather than anything visual, my aim is to record my temporal experience of the streaming of consciousness, translating the temporal unfolding (Vermersch, 1999) of this phenomenon into spatial terms via the agency of the drawn line. The question of how thought is then interpreted within the form of the drawings I am yet to produce hinges the context in which the drawings sit. As the context of my drawings will be framed within the epistemology of Phenomenology and the topic of consciousness, then the question of whether drawing expresses (present) thinking or (past) thought in the manner identified by Rosenberg (2008) is understood in relation to phenomenal consciousness, which will be discussed in the next chapter as intentional. Regardless of the context however, the question of attributing what has been recorded/re-presented within the form of the line is based upon the intrinsically dualistic form it exhibits. For no matter what spatially described form the line takes, the fact that it was drawn ‘by somebody’ means it maintains that element of the relationship as part of a double identity - the so-called dualism to the line (Maynard, 2005).

The dualism of the line

Once it is suggested that drawn line manages to simultaneously a) record the movement that created it and b) re-present the drawers ‘thoughts’ or the presence of their ‘thinking’ (Rosenberg, 2008), depending on the context it is presented, then an unmistakable dualism to the line emerges. This dualism concerns the paradoxical manner in which the phenomenon of line can be understood on the basis of both what it is - a line or a mark drawn on a surface - simultaneous to what it is not i.e. what it represents or ‘pictures’. This dualism is reinforced via the (phenomenological) context of intentionality which underpins this entire investigation, meaning all drawn lines will be able to picture something for someone, regardless of whether such an intention was purposefully included by the drawer or not.45

45 Pareidolia (Carels, 2012) the psychological mechanism referred to in a previous footnote, also functions on the basis of intentionality. Pareidolia also offers a simple demonstration of the dualism within the line, on the basis that it brings the question of ‘where’ the image is located to the fore. For example, if the image seen by a 3rd party is understood as somehow
For de Warren (2004), the dualistic aspect to the appearance of the line is bound up with the essential ambiguity that creating such a semblance requires. Following Plato’s invocation that art is merely a representation or imitation (mimesis) of an original, the visual ambiguity to artistic representation is epitomised within the form of the line, where it, ‘resides in semblance: a drawing of a bed must look like what it isn’t (a bed)’ (de Warren, 2004, p. 2). The dualistic and fundamentally inventive nature to drawing echoes’ the (Derridean) ambiguity of the trace referred to earlier, for the dualism of drawing presents the image of a bed while the original bed (which the drawing is ‘of’) is absent. This understanding continues for de Warren (2004, p. 6) into the two ‘components of drawing’, used to analyse drawing (noun) and found within the line. The first is the ‘course component’, which indicates the running of a line parallel to the drawing surface, while the second is the ‘pressure component’ - this designates the effect upon the surface produced by the pressure of the drawing implement. Both components are required for the formation of a line, and both describe the stroke as having, as de Warren (2004, p. 6) explains

A double life, one that either records or veils the gesture by which it was produced, the other that either describes or delineates the form that it renders visible. By recording the gesture that produced it (even if the line masks the gesture that created it), every marking establishes the quality of a line’s immediacy: how the line came to be what it looks like, as well as what that line is meant to bring us.

For Rawson (1969/1987) the dualism of the line is centred upon the tension found between the two-dimensional and the three-dimensional. This emerges when a line pictorially depicts that which it is not, in terms of a representing a figure or an object, and in so doing challenges the flatness of the surface and creates the illusion of space. On Rawson’s account, it seems this tension is heightened to positive effect when the

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not intended within the original arrangement of the marks, then as Carels (2012) indicates, the dualistic relationship between subject and object is thrown into relief within the image, because, ‘pareidolia casts the observer as the medium of the message, and throws doubt on the messages’ autonomous existence and veracity’ (Carels, 2012, p. 19).

46 This dualistic understanding of the line can been extended in the direction suggested by de Zegher (2010) in relation to the work of Anna Maria Maiolino. By challenging the flatness of the surface to which it ‘belongs’, the concern within Maiolino’s work was line as, ‘a material presence in real space’ (de Zegher & Butler, 2010, p. 72). This meant the line passed freely between frontal plane and encompassing structure, ‘moving beyond the limits of ink to appear in thread, or in the seam of a fold, the edge of a cut, the cast of a shadow.’ (de Zegher & Butler, 2010, p. 73) While my concern in the thesis is with the dualism of the drawn line in relation to the flat surface only, this discussion does open up a (dualistic) understanding for how line can be considered as both space and body.
differences between the two dimensions are enhanced. For example, although such a combination must be found within all drawings that present the image of three-dimensional space, Rawson feels this is especially developed in those drawings universally recognized as masterpieces, where, ‘there is a vigorous conflict between a highly-developed two-dimensional surface unity, and a highly-developed three-dimensional plasticity. The higher the point to which both are developed, the stronger the drawing’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 79).

Following Rawson, Maynard (2005) is concerned to enlarge the topic of dualism within drawing into the topic of pictorial dualism generally, where the line drawn upon a (real) surface retains the ability to indicate or enclose a (virtual) space. Maynard (2005, p. 211) references the psychologist R.L Gregory on this point, who claims, ‘pictures are paradoxes…unique among objects; for they are seen as both themselves and as some other thing, entirely different from the paper of canvas.’ This again suggests drawing operates as a dualistic paradox; the appreciation of drawing (noun) manages to function because when given as an object it is simultaneously an intentional act. This results in a situation that is puzzling, as Gregory (in Maynard, 2005, p. 211) explains:

Drawings…are objects in their own right - patterns on a flat sheet - and at the same time entirely different objects to the eye. We see both a pattern of marks on paper…and at the same time we see that these compose a face, a house…No object can lie in both two and three-dimensional space.

Rawson’s (1969/1987, p. 15) phenomenological comment about temporal movement constituting the, ‘underlying quality to drawing’ seems to echo the strange form of pictorial movement detailed here. As a psychologist rather than a phenomenologist, this puzzle leaves Gregory only able to state that, ‘pictures are impossible…biologically most odd’ (in Maynard, 2005, p. 211). Maynard disputes this notion of ‘impossibility’ and in doing so grounds the essential dualism to the phenomenon of the line within the phenomenological concept of intentionality. For as he states, there is no more a paradox at work here than there is in a child treating a bit of wood as a living creature - there is, ‘what we actually perceive, and what we make-believe we perceive, the latter including only some of the features of the former’ (Maynard, 2005, p. 212). Such intentionality is ‘biologically normal’ for Maynard, suggesting the child imagining the piece of wood as something else, or the viewer seeing ‘a pipe’ instead of a picture of a pipe, is just how we experience the world in terms of how it appears.
The rhythm of the line

The final element that composes this *phenomeno-logy* of the drawn line is the topic of rhythm. Underpinned by the kinetic basis to the line and given in a dualistic sense (the mark on a surface which can simultaneously appear rhythmical) rhythm is a category of form within drawing (Rawson, 1969/1987). This suggests rhythm is a complex phenomenon, based on measured intervals on one sort or another where, ‘rhythm gives ultimate relationship and meaning to all those various elements of drawn form that have so far been mentioned’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 194). Indeed, the question of the drawn line functioning as a holistic means of expression hinges on the topic of rhythm, where, ‘the expression of any drawing as a whole, and its quality of life, depend ultimately upon the sequences of varied but related rhythmic intervals amongst other formal elements - lines, enclosures etc.’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 194). This element of variety to rhythm is important within the context of my research, considering the method of *Phenomenology* requires a varied series of results with which to seek the invariant.

Continuing the dualistic theme, Rawson identifies a double aspect to rhythm. First is the, ‘unit measure’, the equivalent of the musical time signature, by which the, ‘work is unified and made intelligible’, followed by the, ‘particular shaped rhythmic interventions of the given work, riding over and through its units of measure’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 194). The question this poses is - which perceptible or formal elements within the work carry the rhythm? According to Rawson (1969/1987, p. 195) rhythm can work, ‘both along lines and across them’ in ways that incorporate both unity and variety. Along the length of any one line or linear sequence there will be what he terms, ‘rhythmic punctuations’, which at their simplest are spaced undulations’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 196). These linear punctuations are also intervals across the direction of lines, where even a line that turns back on itself mid-way through its course can be considered rhythmical. As Rawson (1969/1987, p. 197) also says, a major part of any, ‘artist’s invention’ goes into such lines, although the spectator seldom realises this. The issue of how rhythm is perceived within a drawing is bound up with pictorial space, meaning both are, ‘functionally interdependent’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 199).

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47 Rose (1979) discusses rhythm within the work of Pollock in the sense that it was always present in his work in some form – even evident in his exploration of a new pictorialism in the period before his death where he retained the, ‘shallow, interlocking rhythms of the El Greco and Rubens compositions he had studied in his notebooks, combining them with the rhythmic, evenly accentuated analytic Cubist ‘infrastructure’ evolved from his 1943-46 studies of Miro and Kandinsky and Abstract Surrealism’ (Rose in Pollock, 1979, p. 22).
For Speed (1917/1972) the phenomenon of rhythm given within the appearance of drawing works on the basis that it appeals to the viewer directly, operating apart from any deliberate attempt by the drawer to represent or picture a ‘likeness’. Similar to the intentional underpinning that defines drawing in Phenomenological terms, the animating element of rhythm underpinning the structure of drawing is, for Speed, a product of rhythm within ‘lived experience’ itself. To discover rhythm within the work, Speed (1917/1972, p. 131) describes the basis of drawing as being, ‘a structure of lines and masses’ from which particular emotional qualities analogous to music emerge. There are as a result, two principle qualities that a consideration of rhythm within drawing can be separated into - unity and variety. Variety, meaning difference, is in some respects a precondition of lines that are drawn rather than encountered as a pure geometric abstraction in the manner of Euclid. Indeed, as Speed says (1917/1972, p. 132), ‘without variety there can be no life itself’ and the kinetic basis to drawing lines suggests variety between them simply on the basis of their having been drawn.

Summary

This chapter has outlined a review of the literature that describes the drawn line as a spatially understood phenomenon, across six key points that focused on exploring its intentional, kinetic underpinnings, produced via a, ‘point that moves’ (Rawson, 1969/1987, p. 15). My objective is to apply this chapter’s knowledge in Chapter Five by combining it with the knowledge outlined in the following chapter. This will elucidate the phenomenological context that the drawings will be developed within, regarding how consciousness is understood to ‘stream’. Combination of both sets of points will enable me to test the idea that the spatial form of one (the drawn line) can sensibly re-present the temporally experienced form of the other (the ‘streaming’ of consciousness) when they are choreographed via my serially developed practice, and mapped according to the shared points between them. The points discussed here will aid me in that task, for they have developed my understanding of drawing quite considerably over that described in Chapter Two, honing my understanding of drawing within the specific context of the drawn line, and removing any unnecessary elements where possible.

As regards how these key points might be applied to my practice, I add the following thoughts ahead of Chapter Five. For example, producing the line via a ‘moving point’ in my next round of practice means that the focus of my reflection can be placed upon a clearly formed linear trace, rather than distributed across a wash of ink or a rub of charcoal, and this could help distil my understanding of what has been ‘recorded’
accordingly. The dualism of the line allows a purely nonrepresentational line to be considered. By 'nonrepresentational' I mean in the sense of my not intentionally trying to picture a likeness of something other than a line in the manner of the previously developed *Druckkopf* series, for my aim is not to repeat the same set of problems I encountered in Chapter Two. The question of whether thought is re-presented as 'concluded' or presented as 'current' in the manner of ideational drawing (Rosenberg, 2008) is a question I will leave until the assessment of my next series of drawings, for it is a question of interpretation, which relies heavily on the phenomenological context of this enquiry, developed in the next chapter.

The line understood as intentionally drawn is a central pillar in this investigation, not least because it ties in with the phenomenological theory of intentional consciousness discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Shared across both 'drawing' and 'consciousness', the concept of intentionality reinforces the close formal relationship between the flow of drawing and the flow of thought, given the unity and continuity that underpins both. This is an aspect I will look to bring out within my next round of practice in Chapter Five, for I intuitively feel that the metaphor of recording hinges on the question of intention at the most basic, phenomenological level. Finally, despite whatever one seeks to represent, the drawn line conceived as a fundamentally varied and rhythmical form means it could provide a varied record of the act of drawing when developed across a series. This in turn should provide a useful basis for searching for the invariant within my analysis of Chapter Five. Rhythm, like intentionality, is an understanding which bridges the topics of space and time (Lefebvre, 2004/2013), meaning it can potentially bridge the spatially perceived form of the drawn line with the temporally experienced form of consciousness understood to stream. My estimation at this stage is that, as a practically applicable element, rhythm will prove useful for bringing them together within the practice of drawing, once it is defined in relation to consciousness understood to 'stream'.

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48 The form that the 'point that moves' produces is a continuous and unified line, developed for as long as the point is in constant contact with a surface. Likewise, the form that the 'streaming of consciousness' produces is a continuous and unified experience for the subject, encountered for as long as they are continually conscious and awake.
Chapter Four: The Phenomenon of Consciousness

Introduction

On the basis of the second invariant finding presented in my assessment of Chapter Two - that when considered as a varied group of experiences appearing in temporal succession, consciousness is invariably understood to ‘stream’ – I seek here to explore this concept in further detail. In understanding the streaming of consciousness as a phenomenological rather than a cognitive description, I present a series of ‘thoughts on the phenomenon’ (phenomeno-logy) of consciousness with the aim of better comprehending the peculiar sense of temporal movement the term ‘stream’ suggests. The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant phenomenological i.e. philosophical literature, in order to ascertain what it means to say ‘consciousness streams’. I will then seek to apply this understanding in combination with that of the previous chapter when devising my next practical test in Chapter Five, hoping to establish how the form of one can re-present the form of the other.

Like the drawn line, the metaphor of the ‘stream’ indicates kinesis i.e. motion, albeit of a very different kind. As previously discussed, the metaphor emerges from James (1890/1950) original phenomenological description of the stream of thought, where the emphasis was on the temporal connectedness between the various states of consciousness we experience, described by James as ‘parts’ within a flowing whole. As a ‘streaming’ event, consciousness is also understood as an intentionally directed (Husserl, 1931/2012) - thoughts that arrive one after another are nothing jointed: they flow. Hence why the term ‘river’ or ‘stream’ are apt, and constitute the terms by which it is most often described (James, 1890/1950, p. 239). The points I have selected to work through this phenomenon with regards to better understanding the kinetic underpinning it entails are as follows:

- Phenomenal consciousness
- Consciousness as intentional
- The stream of consciousness
- Temporality
- The specious present
- The rhythm of now
Beginning with an outline of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ followed by ‘intentionality’ (as two concepts that underpin the ‘stream of consciousness’ as a distinctly phenomenological understanding) I proceed to explore the metaphor in more detail. It transpires there are certain difficulties attached to saying that consciousness ‘streams’ or ‘flows’, even in metaphorical terms. This difficulty emerges when focusing upon how the term stream refers to the experience we have of time. In discussing the topic of temporality, the peculiar understanding we have to time as a phenomenal experience begins to emerge. As a result, consideration of how the metaphor functions in relation to how we understand time ‘passing’ leads into the topic of the specious present (James, 1890/1950; Varela F. J., 1999). Otherwise described as the feeling of duration we experience now, the specious present is the period within which consciousness is paradoxically understood to stream.

Similar to the previous chapter, these points are selected on the basis of describing consciousness according to what belongs to it invariantly – points that apply to a universal understanding rather than the particular subjectivity of ‘my’ consciousness. Like the personal style of my drawing, this subjective dimension will be added by default in the next chapter. Like Chapter Three, I do not mean these six points are invariant in the strict sense they were found via the eidetic procedure of free variation (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 159). Instead, I refer to those elements that describe the ‘what’ or ‘whatness’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 111) of the phenomenon of consciousness as an experience that appears to stream. These points are by no means exhaustive either – on the contrary, there are many more ways to describe the phenomenon of consciousness than I can hope to provide here. These points are selected to simply work through how to understand the phenomenological sense of movement the term ‘stream’ implies in relation to consciousness, in order to frame the context of my next practical test in a more rigorous manner than I undertook in Chapter Two.

**Phenomenal consciousness**

According to Block (2002, p. 206), ‘consciousness’ remains an ambiguous word: a hybrid, mongrel term that, ‘connotes a number of different concepts and denotes a number of different phenomena’, including the ‘streaming’ element that is the focus of my research. The confusion arises partly as a result that very different concepts of consciousness are often treated as the same concept, hence why a degree of clarity is required towards understanding phenomenal consciousness per se, prior to working through to the idea that it ‘streams’. As stated in the thesis Introduction, the term
'phenomenon' is being used throughout in relation to the Husserlian understanding of the Greek *phainomenon*, meaning appearance or 'that which appears' (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 251). Appearance in this sense also means experience, for consciousness includes everything that is given in experience⁴⁹. Consciousness understood as the experience ‘one is having of it’ falls under the term phenomenal consciousness, which simply means ‘experience’. As Block (2002, p. 206) explains, ‘phenomenal consciousness is experience; what makes a state phenomenally conscious is that there is something ‘it is like’ to be in that state.’ What becomes quickly evident from this description is the circularity it entails: where the ‘experience’ of consciousness is also the ‘consciousness’ of experience. Block does not consider this circularity either a difficulty or an embarrassment, on the basis that there is no clear way to define phenomenal consciousness otherwise - he follows Searle (in Block, 2002, p. 206) in acknowledging that consciousness cannot be defined in a non-circular way. For example, if one proceeds to try to unravel this circular problem in a purely theoretical manner, they are lead towards what Chalmers’ (2002, p. 247) calls, ‘the hard problem – the problem of experience’.

The stream of consciousness, as a description of experience, falls within the remit of this hard problem, in the sense that there is ‘something it is like’ for consciousness to stream. In referring to itself as a state one can be ‘in’, the stream of consciousness is characterized by a, ‘phenomenal character’ (Chalmers, 2002, p. 248) meaning the experience of consciousness as that which ‘streams’. In an effort to break out of this circular understanding, the question of the hard problem centres on whether there will ever be a materialist (physicalist) solution to consciousness, and whether a reductive explanation on the basis of physical principles can be formed as a result, ‘just as there have been reductive explanations of many other phenomena in other domains’ (Chalmers, 2002, p. 248). This outcome does not concern my investigation – instead, the so-called hard problem merely serves to indicate the *difficulties* that underpin the stream of consciousness as an understanding, and the need for such difficulties to be indicated prior to approaching the question of how to sensibly ‘record’ it through drawing.

⁴⁹ As Moran & Cohen (2012, p. 252) explain, the concept of the phenomenon includes, ‘the idea of something that manifests itself and also the experiencing of that manifestation.’ This dualistic understanding of consciousness as both the ‘appearance’ and the ‘experience’ of the same is resolutely circular, and this lies at the core of understanding phenomenal consciousness as a concept.
The question of phenomenal ‘character’ is also important for this research, given that it underpins the metaphor of the stream as an understanding. Dainton (2000) describes ‘experiences’ as states with phenomenal character. The, ‘phenomenal character of an experience refers to the distinctive feel the experience has. A state has a phenomenal character when there is something it is like to have or undergo that state.’ (Dainton, 2000, p. 2). In thinking of the topic of experience Dainton claims we most often tend to think of those experiences which we can see and hear, our thoughts, our memories etc. to the exclusion of those bodily sensations that form the backdrop of our consciousness i.e. warmth or cold, balance, texture and pressure (2000, p. 2). Within my research, I am interested in the streaming of consciousness in relation to the first order of experiences (mental, perceptual) in connection to the topic of time ‘passing’, rather than the presence of bodily sensations that accompany the activity of drawing. This is done to focus my approach and facilitate a more objective understanding of how I worked through my research question, given in terms that others can comprehend.

In thinking of the stream of consciousness as a series of experiences that appear and posses phenomenal character, one realises they do not occur in isolation from one another. As Dainton (2000, p. 2) says, ‘a stream of consciousness is an ensemble of experiences that is unified both at and over time, both synchronically and diachronically.’ This resolutely temporal character to the stream of consciousness echoes the invariant finding I made in Chapter Two, and appears to hold regardless of the content that is presented to consciousness, including bodily sensations. As it is clear to see from this short overview, the experience of ‘what it is like’ to be conscious is something that one can ultimately only point towards as a resolutely circular experience. And, as Dainton (2000, p. 1) adds, ‘there is of course a limit on what can be said on this topic: if you do not know what it is like to have experience, words will not help, and there is probably no ‘you’ there to find out.’ On the basis of phenomenal consciousness being understood as a ‘pointing towards’ one fundamentally phenomenological concept does however emerge – that consciousness is intentional.

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50 As Dainton points out, engaging in any sort of phenomenology is indeed a risky business (Dainton 2000/2006, 20). The difficulty lies in the fact that when anybody refers to the phenomenal character of what ‘they’ experience, a question is immediately begged - how do they know that everyone, or indeed anyone else’s inner life is like theirs? The short answer is, they don’t. One simply has to assume that other people have the same basic traits, so that when presented with competing descriptions, ‘it is reasonable to suppose that we should be able to recognize, compare and finally agree on that which does most justice to the most basic facts concerning our experience’ (Dainton 2000/2006, 20).
Consciousness is intentional

The stream of consciousness understood in Husserlian (1950/1999; 1931/2012) terms is both phenomenal and intentional. Establishing the intentional basis for phenomenal consciousness serves the purpose of noting a potential crossover with the intentionally drawn line detailed in the previous chapter, and with it, the potential to explore them in unison in the subsequent chapter on practice. In principle terms, the concept of intentionality provides a way to comprehend how consciousness is understood to stream. It is also included on the basis I am now operating within a largely Husserlian approach to my research. On Husserl’s account, the phenomenological basis to consciousness concerns the fact it is always intentionally directed towards both the world and itself: ‘consciousness’ simply means consciousness-of (Husserl, 1950/1999, p. 33).  

Consisting of a series of experiences that are unified in time, the stream of consciousness is constantly directed towards the world as given. Indeed, if the world were not already presented to us in this manner, there would be no world to have an experience of – which, like Dainton’s (2000, p. 1) earlier point, would mean no ‘us’ to ponder the question in the first place. Yet it is only via an act of reflection directed towards the appearance of the world via, for example, the phenomenological reduction, that the concept of intentionality emerges in the first place (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xvii). We bracket, or place into abeyance, what we assume to be the world as ‘given’, and reflect upon it as a given. It was on this basis that Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. xviii) clarified the presupposed nature of intentionality and the role of the reduction in identifying it when he states, ‘our relationship to the world, as it is untiringly enunciated within us, is not a thing which can be any further clarified by analysis; philosophy can only place it once more before our eyes and present it for our ratification.’

As Moran & Cohen (2012) claim, the self-evident nature of the relationship between subject and object, ourselves and the world, is the definition of Husserlian intentionality - the, “aboutness” or directedness of our conscious states. The phenomenological approach, for Husserl, broadly means the intentional approach’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 167). Kriegal (2013) more recently discusses what he terms ‘phenomenal

51 For phenomenologists like Husserl (1931/2012) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) the concept of intentionality concerns the unified nature of our experience of the world, which ‘appears’ as such within consciousness of it, and without the need for further reflection. This signifies intentionality as a ‘lived’ or already there concept - it is not something we have to posit via an act of further identification in the manner of a Kantian relation to a possible object (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xvii). Rather, we find the world already given to us within consciousness-of the world.
intentionality’ and updates the Husserlian model, describing intentionality as a kind of tracking relation in broadly similar terms. This is again based upon Block’s (2002) ‘what it is like’ dictum for defining phenomenal consciousness in relation to the subject, and what the concept indicates as a result. Using a slightly different form of understanding to Husserl, Kriegal puts forward the idea that intentionality is, ‘injected into the world with the appearance of a certain kind of phenomenal character. It is when the relevant phenomenal character shows up that intentionality makes its first appearance on the scene’ (Kriegal, 2013, p. 3). This indicates that consciousness is understood to stream on the basis of a phenomenal character that tells us it streams – the tracking relation operates because there is something ‘for it’ to track. Consciousness described as the feeling of flow is an experience we become aware of by tracking it via introspection, which is the same method used by both Husserl (1931/2012) and Brentano (2002) to advance their own theories of intentionality. The idea is quite simple - that by attending to ones own stream of consciousness in the right way brings out that, ‘some conscious episodes are intentional, and intentional because phenomenal’ (Kriegal, 2013, p. 7). This would suggest the phenomenal intentionality is a basic, perhaps even fundamental understanding of how consciousness operates.

Consciousness described as that which self-evidently appears as streaming is similarly circular to Blocks (2002) earlier claim for phenomenal consciousness as the ‘what it is like’ to be conscious. As I am carrying out a first-person investigation, the self-evidently intentional factor to consciousness will have implications. This means that the circularity of trying to intentionally record my own consciousness considered as ‘intentional’ will have to be embraced as an accuracy condition - there is no other way around this in phenomenological terms. Indeed, it is the concept of intentionality itself, indicating a movement towards both itself and the world, which reveals the underlying form of consciousness that I am interested in: that consciousness is understood to stream.

52 Following this argument further permits the idea that conscious experiences are, by virtue of their intentional character, assessable for accuracy. This argument hinges on the philosophical workings of intentionality, where, ‘accuracy conditions’ (Kriegal, 2013) present themselves without the need for interpretation. As Kriegal (2013, p. 7) explains these conditions, ‘suppose you undergo an experience with a squarish phenomenal character. If nothing around you is square, your experience is assessable as inaccurate. If the right object or surface is square, your experience may be accessible as accurate. Thus, phenomenal character can bring in its train accuracy conditions.’

53 A similar ‘accuracy condition’ (Kriegal, 2013) can also be found in Husserl’s (1931/2012) wider work on intentionality, in reference to the noesis and the noema, where every noetic act of consciousness decisively intends its noematic object. Putting this into Husserl’s (1931/2012, p. 187) terms, we say that, ‘every intentional experience...has its “intentional object” i.e. its objective meaning. Or to repeat the same in other words: To have a meaning, or to have something “in mind” is the cardinal feature of all consciousness.’
The stream of consciousness

That phenomenal consciousness is encountered as a succession of experiences that hold together both at a time and over time (Dainton, 2000) has allowed it be described by a number of commentators as akin to a metaphorical ‘flow’ or ‘stream’. This feeling, the ‘what it is like’ (Block, 2002) to be conscious, was famously described by James (1890/1950, p. 239) as the, ‘stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life.’ For James, this particular sense of unity and continuity to consciousness understood as flow was bound up with the sense of the self – meaning we simply are our ‘streams of consciousness’ through and through. As Bailey (1999) indicates, this meant that, for James, personal identity consisted neither in an immutable, introspective self, nor simply a bundle of perceptions and ideas. Instead, ‘selves…are constructed out of the phenomenological data of our continuity. There is no distinction between the thinker and the thought: we are, more or less, just the unbroken flow of our experiences’ (Bailey A. R., 1999, p. 152).

Within the streaming of consciousness understood to refer to ‘the self’, the central characteristic appears to be that we experience ourselves as a unified and continuous flow – any ‘gaps’ we become aware of in connection to consciousness describe periods of either unconsciousness or sleep. This suggests, on James account, that when awake and conscious we are always potentially conscious of something, in a manner that accords with Husserlian intentionality (1931/2012). The unified nature for how we experience consciousness means that, ‘consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 239). Yet within the stream of consciousness considered as a flowing whole, James nonetheless takes note of a kind of jolting and separateness between thoughts, which he refers to as, ‘the breaks that are produced by the sudden contrasts in the quality of the successive segments of the stream of thought’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 239).

This appears as a countersensical statement given the description of the stream as unified, and the previous indication that words like ‘train’ or ‘chain’ do not fit. It is from within this same discussion that James proceeds to develop his theory of divisions within the flow of thought which I focused upon in Chapter Two, contrasting the ‘substantive’ thoughts from the ‘transitive’ or fringe parts (James, 1890/1950, p. 243). This Jameson nucleus/fringe model of thought is the understanding of consciousness with which I began the research. On the basis that I found no compelling evidence to support any
such divisions within my previous drawings, I now look to supersede what is in effect a theoretical partition. To do so I have begun with the wider points – that consciousness is phenomenal, and phenomenal because intentional. This established I advance my discussion to that which remains comprehensible outside any such divisions – that the term ‘stream’ refers to time.

For Dainton (2000), like James and Husserl before him, the critical element for analysing the stream of consciousness as a fundamentally unified phenomenon is that it exhibits unity both at a time and over time. The metaphor functions on the basis that, although a stream of consciousness might be composed of a number of individual experiences, they ‘hold together’ without any difficulty while we are conscious. This dualistic understanding of how consciousness ‘streams’ both at time and over time is discussed under the terms diachronic and synchronic unity (Dainton, 2000, p. 26). However, Dainton’s argument is for something he calls ‘co-consciousness’, which is his theory suggesting the basic relationship or binding agent within our stream(s) of consciousness is a form of, ‘phenomenal glue, as it were, which is responsible for experiential unity’ (Dainton, 2000, p. 27). Rather like the ‘transitive’ and ‘substantive’ parts of thought theory put forward by James (1890/1950) my concern is not to remain focused on partitions within consciousness, which co-consciousness seems also to imply. Instead, my aim is to develop a better understanding of the temporal nature of flow that underpins consciousness outside such divisions, in order not to repeat the same errors made in Chapter Two. The temporal indication is given, like Crane (2013, p. 168) identifies, when we think carefully about the image which James metaphor provides.

The image of a stream flowing suggests motion, and one thing following another. But “following” in the case of consciousness must mean following in time. Events follow one another in time: objects do not. A cat can literally follow a mouse in space (for example, around a room), but the event of the cat’s eating a mouse “follows” the event of the cat’s catching the mouse only in its temporal ordering.

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54 Diachronic unity refers to those experiences that occur in sequence over time (‘along’ the stream), which indicates the way in which we normally think of consciousness as streaming. Synchronic unity however, refers to simultaneous experiences that are co-conscious with each other at a time (‘across’ the stream). Husserl discussed this dualistic understanding of time-consciousness under the terms ‘static’ and ‘genetic’ constitution, for diachronic and synchronic unity respectively (Varela F. J., 1999, p. 125).

55 It could of course be the case, as Crane says, that consciousness appearing to itself as ‘flowing’ or stream-like does not in fact reflect the true reality of the situation. What is presented at the phenomenological level might be constituted by states...
This concern for the fundamentally temporal nature to the stream of consciousness as an understanding brings me to the topic of temporality. As a topic that concerns our relationship to time in terms of how we experience it, the concern with temporality in Husserlian terms from this point on indicates the direction my research took towards understanding the phenomenon of consciousness as that which is felt to ‘stream’.

**Temporality**

According to Moran & Cohen (2012, p. 320) temporality is the foundational element of Husserl’s entire phenomenological enterprise, ‘not only because time is essentially and structurally allied to the movement and the method of the phenomenological reduction, but also…because temporality is, for Husserl, the very modality in which the unity of consciousness is structured.’ The metaphor ‘stream of consciousness’ (Bewusstseinsstrom) invoked for Husserl the unity and continuity found within consciousness understood as temporal flow. Explicating the sense for how the phenomenon of consciousness is both constantly streaming while somehow remaining unified within a single, ‘personal’ egoic consciousness remained at the heart of Husserl’s conception of time-consciousness, the enigma within which intentionality is grounded as a concept. On this basis, and despite the differences in approach, Husserl’s holistic understanding of the stream of consciousness as temporal continuity, ‘can be compared with similar conceptions in William James and Henri Bergson’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 309). Husserl (1931/2012, p. 166) describes his understanding of temporality in the following manner

The essential property which the term “temporality” expresses in relation to experiences generally indicates not only something that belongs in a general way to every single experience, but a necessary form binding experiences with experiences. Every real experience…is necessarily one that endures; and with this duration it takes its place within an endless continuum of durations - a concretely filled continuum.

The Bergsonian concept of durée (duration) as the lived experience of time operates on a similar basis, where temporality indicates a stream of subjective experience that which are ‘discrete at the level of the underlying reality’ (Crane 2013, p.168). Just like a film in the cinema might represent continual motion, it is in fact made up of many single images shown one after another.’
endures, or persists, through time. Bergson (1913/2001; 1911/1998) discussed the topic of duration as the feeling of endurance, where the subjectively felt passage of time is one of uninterrupted change. This feeling of constant change that paradoxically holds together despite changing is what, for Bergson (1911/1998, p. 1), characterises the notion of pure duration, stating, ‘there is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change every moment: if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow.’

Bergsonian felt or pure duration was in itself immeasurable as regards the divisions between states of consciousness, meaning they could not be, ‘regarded as distinct elements. They continue each other in an endless flow’ (Bergson, 1911/1998, p. 3). For Bergson, the desire to unite them via an act of reflective attention directed towards them meant positing an, ‘artificial bond’ in the form of an ego. Our attention forms this bond in order to reunite states it decides are separate, whereas, ‘pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states’ (Bergson, 1913/2001, p. 100). This concern for describing duration as uninterrupted flow rather than the separation of states meant that temporality was construed as temporal flow, ‘the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances’ (Bergson, 1911/1998, p. 4). Bergson’s concern with the ‘self’ as that which is constructed from within the phenomenological data of our continuity echoes Bailey’s (1999, p. 152) earlier point regarding James own understanding – we simply are our temporal ‘stream of consciousness’ through and through.

For Merleau-Ponty (1962) however, the question of temporality became a phenomenological question of the problem with consciousness considered as a ‘flowing river’ or a ‘stream’. Discussing the manner in which we experience time, the concern

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56 A key point for discussion at this juncture would be the topic of memory. As Poppel (1988, p. 91) states ‘without memory duration cannot be experienced. Memory is, then, central to our analysis of time’. On this basis, duration is evaluated according to what we have experienced and how much has remained in our memory. For the purposes of my phenomenological investigation, I am content to include memories as a content of consciousness that is experienced ‘now’, just like a perception, a judgment, an expectation etc. To isolate memory and treat it as a separate understanding is placed beyond the bounds of this enquiry.

57 This treatment of Bergsonian temporality in relation to drawing has a link with Grisewood’s (2010) practice-based PhD thesis ‘Marking Time: investigating drawing as a performative process for recording temporal presence and recalling memory through the line, the fold, and repetition.’ However, the emphasis on temporality in Grisewood’s investigation is focused on drawing used to ‘evvoke’ memory, using a reading of Bergson underpinned by Deleuzian ontology. As just stated my desire is not to focus on memory per se, but on the (phenomenological) experience of the present (as the locus point for the streaming of consciousness), and the degree to which drawing can be understood to record my experience of it ‘passing’.
emerges from the idea that the metaphor is in reality, ‘extremely confused’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 411). The confusion arises when we think through the implications for what the metaphor entails, given in a logical sense. For example, if time is similar to a river it must mean that time flows from the past towards the present and into the future. This interpretation is given on the basis that, like water flowing by from its source to its destination, the present is a consequence of the past, and the future of the present.

However, this creates a problem, for, as Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 411) describes, ‘if I consider the world in itself, there is simply one indivisible and changeless being in it’. Change presupposes a certain position that is taken up and from which things are seen in procession. This means for the metaphor to work we surreptitiously place into the river a witness of its course at various points. This view of flowing change then presupposes a view of the river at these different points. Time on this account, presupposes a view of time. Thinking through the manner of how to interpret the perplexing metaphor led Merleau-Ponty (1962) to say that time is not ‘just like’ a river or stream, or not a classically linear flowing substance at any rate. For the metaphor to function we would need to introduce an observer, whether on the bank or in the river, and the minute we so the understanding of flow is rendered in reverse. The outcome of this reversal suggests we would experience time flowing out to meet us, given that

What is to come is on the side of the source, for time does not come from the past. It is not the past that pushes the present, not the present that pushes the future, into being; the future is not prepared behind the observer, it is a brooding presence moving to meet him, like a storm on the horizon’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 411).

This reversal of the metaphor means that time is not a real process, ‘not an actual succession that I am content to record’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 415). It arises, he says, from my relation to things, which makes of time a fully subjective understanding, meaning time for someone, somewhere spatially placed. On this account, past and future exist only too unmistakably in the world - they exist within the present. For Merleau-Ponty, like Husserl (1931/2012) before him, the question of temporality became the question of the manner in which consciousness deploys or constitutes time within the duration of now. In phenomenological terms this now refers to the duration of the specious present, given the paradoxical, specious way it appears to ‘pass’ i.e. move or stream.
The specious present

Although time can be described as either cyclical or linear in respect of its rhythms, time as we experience it is very different from the movement of the hands of a clock. We look ahead into the future, and back into the past, but in doing so we seem to dwell within the present to a degree that, ontologically speaking, suggests that neither past nor future seems to exist for us in quite the same way. It is on this basis that Dainton (2004) describes the phenomenon of a paradoxically moving present as part of our dynamic conception of time, where although there are different ways to conceptualise it, ‘the central contention, that we inhabit a moving, privileged present, has enormous appeal. After all, as we go about our business, we do seem to be locked into a present of brief duration, a present which is advancing steadily into the future.’ (Dainton, 2004, p. 42).

The word ‘specious’ indicates something that is superficially plausible, but once inspected, found to be misleading in some way. The phrase emerged, like so many others, in James (1890/1950, p. 608) account of the mind, when discussing the perception of time, and in reference to a phrase first used by one E.R.Clay.

Similar to Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) account, whereupon the metaphor of the stream presupposes a prior view of time in order to constitute it as ‘flowing’, James is concerned to elicit an understanding for where this present might be found given that is always (and already) passing away. Indeed, as James (1890/1950, p. 608) says, ‘reflection leads us to the conclusion that it must exist, but that it does exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience.’ It is on this basis that E.R.Clay, whom James quotes (1890/1950, p. 609), comes up with a fourfold division of our experience of time: the obvious past, the specious present, the real present, and the future. If we omit the specious present it consists of three non-entities: the past, which no longer exists, the future, which doesn’t (yet) exist, and the real present, ‘the faculty from which it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious present’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 609). Dainton (2000) interprets this argument as unsound, on the basis that if only the present is real, ‘and nothing exists in either the past or the future – if as Clay put it, the past and the future themselves are nonentities – then anything that occurs or exists will be instantaneous. But this is a highly suspect doctrine’ (Dainton, 2000, p. 122).

Whether or not this metaphysical theory is unsound is not a concern for my phenomenological research, on the basis that the purely ontological discussion of time lays beyond the remit of my investigation. My concern is to establish a way to understand the peculiar form of movement the phenomenon of the now involves, in order to elicit the
sense in which consciousness is understood to ‘stream’. Rather than comprehending the now as an instantaneous division between past and future, James thought that the present moment as now must have duration. This emerged from the feeling we have of the present, and this feeling affects the form we can give it. He described the phenomenological appearance of the present as no knife-edge, but rather, ‘a saddleback with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions in time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern as it were – a rearward and foreword-looking end’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 609). Poppel (1988, p. 63) also describes the phenomenological structure of the now as a period of duration lying, ‘like a saddle thrown over time’ facing both the past and the future, rather than as a non-extensive boundary between them. What both of these accounts share is an intentional relation between past, present and future, where both ‘past’ and ‘future’ are found (intended) within the duration-of the present.

Husserl’s (1931/2012) own account of how to understand the streaming of consciousness also revolved around a tri-partite structure of the present, which he refined through his use of the phenomenological reduction. Similar to James saddleback, Husserl’s structure consisted of a ‘Living Present’ bordered by two fringes, or horizons (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 196). These horizons were retention as the ‘immediately past-present’ (Varela 1999: 113) and interestingly, something he called protention – a passive form of anticipation towards the next moment in time (Husserl, 1931/2012, p. 167). The relationship of the protention to the retention within the speciousness of the present is a complex, but vital theory for understanding how Husserl explains the ‘streaming’ of consciousness as a self-temporalizing phenomenon - a mixture of passive and active constitution within the form of the now. As my research is now largely Husserlian in scope, I give extra weight to trying to understand this concept in more detail, feeling that it will duly influence the interpretation of my Chapter Five drawings as ‘records’ of this phenomenon.

To begin with, Husserl’s term ‘retention’ did not indicate memory – instead, it indicated the intentional retention of the present as it elapses to become memory, where the retention is modified ‘at the same time’ (zugleich) by the protention in doing so58. As

58 This form of modification does not suggest something simply ‘passing’ in time, but a thing altogether rather different in time: ‘becoming’ in the truest sense of the word. This site of difference, the self-temporalization of consciousness, can be described in purely philosophical terms as a: ‘transcendence in immanence’ (de Warren, 2009, p. 268) where consciousness ‘streaming’ is consciousness ‘at the same time’ (zugleich) modifying itself with itself. This self-temporalization of
Moran & Cohen (2012, p. 266) describe this peculiar relationship, ‘retentions motivate protentions and protentions are founded on retentions. Protentions and retentions belong to passive experience’. The German term zugleich can be translated as meaning ‘at the same time’, and is critical for understanding how Husserl describes the streaming of consciousness as the simultaneous modification of protention with retention, rather than the simple repetition of one by the other. Husserl’s theory suggests that consciousness is a simultaneous (zugleich) modification of itself with itself, rather than a ‘blink of an eye’ (Augenblick) repetition (Derrida J, 1973) of something that has already ‘passed’. Indeed, de Warren suggests that Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl – which resulted in Derrida positing the trace i.e. the repetition of the same, as more originary than phenomenological originarity - is based on a fundamental misreading of Husserl, stating, ‘when Derrida speaks of Augenblick we should read more correctly zugleich’ (de Warren, 2009, p. 264). Husserl’s concept of zugleich modification is resoundingly not a representation of the ‘same’ in the manner of the Derridean trace. Rather, it indicates consciousness as a bizarre form of self-modification, a synthesis between anticipation (expectation) and retention, where both affect each other within the duration of now.

The result of this uniquely Husserlian formulation of the speciousness to the present was the idea that temporality ‘temporalizes’ itself – the streaming of consciousness is the self-temporalization of consciousness, found within the form of the now. This self-temporalizing now is a very different kind of saddle to that which either James (1890/1950) or Poppel (1988) suggest, for it indicates that consciousness is a synthesis: an unceasing background of presence and absence, of appearance and non-appearance within the frame of the present, ‘where distinct temporal acts and events with their own duration appear’ (Varela F. J., 1999, p. 126). But even with this decidedly philosophical description of how consciousness is understood to ‘stream’ in place, the concreteness of James’ earlier question remains – how to find the now ‘now’ when it is already passing away in this manner?

consciousness is also described by de Warren (2009, p. 265) as consciousness, ‘throwing itself outside of itself’ within the speciousness of the present.

59 As a simultaneous modification rather than a repetition, this understanding of the self-temporalization of consciousness as a synthesis describes the site of my own becoming (consciousness) as meaning I am found between myself and the other: ‘I am in-between myself and the Other’ (de Warren, 2009, p. 268). Thus, the widely held assumption that Husserlian Phenomenology is a subject-focused philosophy does not quite reflect the full picture. It did not result for example in a strict demarcation between subject and object, but instead cites the ‘subject’ properly understood, as indicating subjectivity-for-objectivity (Moran & Cohen, 2012).
The self-temporalization of consciousness means the ‘present that moves’ is somehow synthesizing itself within itself, presenting a theoretical understanding that cannot easily be unwound. Yet in order to try and find the now in practical terms rather than theoretical, one only has to look for it ‘now’, and from which a rather simple solution does emerge: by counting out a sequence of nows the stream of consciousness is presented as a rhythm of time, one that immediately and intuitively ‘appears’. Heidegger (1953/2010, p. 409) follows Husserl in describing temporality temporalizing itself in terms of the now, and his statement is as follows:

Time is “intuited” becoming, that is, the transition that is not thought but simply presents itself in the succession of nows. If the essence of time is determined as “intuited becoming”, this reveals the fact that time is understood primarily in terms of the now, in the way that such a now can be found through sheer intuition.

The rhythm of now

It appears from the description so far that the ‘streaming’ of consciousness described in Husserlian theoretical terms as the self-temporalization of consciousness, can also be described as the rhythm of now. This understanding will have consequences when I come to devise my next practical drawing test within the subsequent chapter, for I will need a way to physically introduce the theoretical material described here in order to record the experience I have of the stream via drawing. The concept of rhythm will be used for this purpose, and will need to be defined in addition to the way in which it was discussed in the previous chapter in connection with drawing. As a rule, all descriptions of rhythm are associated with the concepts of repetition and number, for there is, ‘no rhythm without repetition in time and in space (Lefebvre, 2004/2013, p. 16). To seek the rhythm of time in relation to the repeated form of the now is to introduce numerical repetition, on the basis that any rhythm of ‘lived time’ would require repetition of the now.

Heidegger (1953/2010, p. 390) interprets duration itself as a numerical succession of nows, a ‘span’, stretched along from one moment to the next⁶⁰. This way of

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⁶⁰ There is however one crucial difference between Husserl and Heidegger’s (1953/2010, p. 391) interpretation of the now given via the fact that Heidegger interprets the now itself as a blink of an eye ‘Moment’ (augenblickliche Existenz) in the Nietzschean sense, rather than as a period of duration in the Husserlian/Jameson/Bergsonian sense. However, as Heidegger borrowed Husserl’s original formulation (within his analysis of present-time consciousness) for how temporality ‘temporalized itself’, the central conception – that the Being of time is the now (Heidegger, 1953/2010, p. 401) – holds true for both beyond the differing descriptions they each give.
understanding lived time through repetition and number is referred to as the ‘vulgar’ concept of time, for it relates to how we ordinarily interpret time for daily use, for example through the use of a clock. The act of measuring time via some form of clock constitutes a key way of understanding the passing of time in relation to the movement of the now, where, ‘looking at the clock and orientating oneself according to time is essentially a now-saying’ (Heidegger, 1953/2010, p. 396). Indeed, Aristotle thought that time was a kind of number, and whom Heidegger (1953/2010, p. 400) translates as stating, ‘this, namely, is time: that which is counted in the motion encountered in the horizon of the earlier and the later’. The horizon of the earlier and the later suggests an intentional underpinning to counting out time, in the sense it means we must expect some form of return. This understanding of rhythmic ‘lived time’ (temporality) operates according to the Husserl’s (1950/1999, p. 75) understanding the protentions that characterize the manner in which the now is expected to return (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 196). Yet, numerical repetition is not the only factor that underpins rhythm, according to Lefebvre (2004/2013, p. 16). He cites another critical factor – difference. The element of difference is given in relation to knowing there is no identical repetition, indefinitely. There is, ‘always something new and unforesen that introduces itself into the repetitive’ (Lefebvre, 2004/2013, p. 16).

One can also find rhythmical repetition and difference within Husserl’s understanding of the peculiar form of movement the now entails, where, ‘the actual now is necessarily something punctual and remains so, a form that persists through continuous change of content’ (Husserl, 1931/2012, p. 167). This continuous change of content through which the now persists suggests repetition and difference – as a punctual form the now is singular and therefore repeatable, but remains indivisible from the flow of nows’. On the Heideggerian (1953/2010, p. 409) basis that every new now is found through sheer intuition, we can see that each new now repeats the form of the previous now, but is also different with respect to the content it contains. Thus, the stream of consciousness as the rhythm of now begins to emerge.\(^{61}\)

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\(^{61}\) The focus on the ‘point’ in relation to a devising a system of mark making has been recently explored by Luzar (2013) in his practice-based PhD ‘Drawing upon multiplicity: mark, body and a trace of thought’. However, Luzar’s concern is with what he calls the ‘post-phenomenological’, which appears to be connected to (the phenomenology of) touch, and the irreducibility of the body as an indexical imprint of thought. This work makes use of Blanchot’s argument that the trace is impossible to both represent and materially depict as ‘presence’, and is framed within the scope of performance drawing. However, the ‘point’ is not used in relation to the phenomenological now but in relation to the concept of the trace as a dislocated gesture, and so departs from my own interests quite substantially.
Abraham (1995) discusses the phenomenon of rhythm from the perspective of Husserlian Phenomenology. In exploring the concept of what he calls ‘rhythmizing consciousness’, Abraham describes the temporality of rhythm as a ‘lived experience’ (Abraham, 1995, p. 65), where the rhythm of the now is framed within the temporal structure of intentionality, on the basis that rhythm expects a return. As Abraham’s (1995, p. 79) says, ‘rhythmizing consciousness, as we know, is rhythmizing from the start. From the first emergence, it is the expectation of a return.’ Abraham claims that rhythm is not found in the object – the ticking of a metronome or the beating of a heart are not rhythms. Rather, these objects of rhythm become rhythms, ‘without the slightest objective modification’ (Abraham, 1995, p. 67) via the intentional act of consciousness that constitutes them as rhythmical. It is on this phenomenological basis that Abraham (1995, p. 70) declares rhythmizing consciousness is an act – a form of rhythmic synthesis that protention and retention produces. This rhythmic activity to phenomenal consciousness is a form of creation, in the sense that it is ‘lived’ rather than found via cognitive analysis after the event.

This persistence of the form of the now as a constant synthesis of ever new ‘nows’ means consciousness is a rhythm, given that it always expects a return of the now. As Abraham (1995, p. 77) states, ‘for rhythm begins at the precise moment when I anticipate a recurrence in the essential mode, that is, at the very moment when consciousness becomes rhythmizing’. Yet seeking the rhythm of now via the expectation of its return involves one final element – measure. As Lefebvre says (2004/2013, p. 18), ‘everywhere there is rhythm there is measure’. Indeed, far from resisting quantity, Lefebvre (2004/2013, p. 18) states that, ‘time (duration) is quantified by measure’. For example, the numbers placed around a circular clock face have the exact same unit of measure between them, and so the passing clock hand produces a rhythmical tick-tock. But the perception of rhythm in objects is not the same as rhythmizing consciousness, found within the repeated duration of the now, because rhythmizing consciousness, like the self-temporalization of consciousness, is a purely lived experience.

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62 According to Abraham (1995, p. 68) this is because, ‘perceived rhythm remains essentially in the mode of the past, as having been perceived’. In other words, the essence of rhythm is that it is ‘lived’. From this it is possible to realise that duration – the very environment of consciousness – forms the structure of temporality and is not perceived, but ‘simply lived’. Hence why Heidegger (1953/2010, p. 409) states that time is, ‘intuited becoming’ given within the form of the now, meaning the present is either recalled or expected within the rhythm of its continual appearance, rather than ever directly perceived (James, 1890/1950, p. 608)
Summary

As Chapter Three’s review of the literature described, across six points, the kinetic phenomenon of the drawn line in spatial terms, so the six points in Chapter Four describe the kinetic phenomenon of consciousness ‘streaming’ in temporal terms. Yet, the movement identified by the term stream is a very different kind of kinesis than the physical propulsion of a point across a physical surface. For although the spatial form of the line is underpinned by the temporally extended act of drawing, the time the line ‘takes up’ is re-presented in spatial terms in and of itself. The temporal form of consciousness understood to ‘stream’ however, leaves no comparable spatial record. Instead, it remains located within the subjectively experienced form of the now, understood in Husserlian (1931/2012) terms as the rhythmic self-temporalization of consciousness. In order to translate this subjective experience into objectively perceived spatial terms (and thus produce a physical record that can be returned to) a physical, temporally extended movement occurring concurrent with consciousness streaming must be carried out - an act such as the effort to draw lines.

With that in mind, my aim is to bring together the theoretical elements of Chapter Three and Four within the practice of Chapter Five, using the rhythmic form the drawn line to re-present (record) the rhythmic form of consciousness understood to ‘stream’. To facilitate this process I will use the points of similarity across both Chapters Three and Four, such as intentionality and rhythm, and the idea of continuity and unity within flow that underpins the form of both. As Abraham (1995) indicates, one way to sensibly understand the paradoxical streaming of consciousness located within a speciously ‘passing present’ is via the rhythm of now – following Husserl’s (1931/2012) position, we say that consciousness protentionally expects the present to return in the sense that it ‘self-temporalizes’. This intentionally conceived rhythmizing consciousness (Abraham, 1995) is something that the intentional, rhythmical form of the drawn line should be able to coherently re-present when produced simultaneously, and in strict accordance with the theoretic context that frames this investigation. My aim in Chapter Five is to devise a practical way to accomplish this task, via the introduction of a metronome to provide me with a rhythm to work with. Use of a metronome as an external drawing aid to count out a series of ‘nows’ that pass within my (inwardly perceived) consciousness of them will provide me with a useful objective frame within which to structure my subjectively orientated task – recording my experience of consciousness ‘streaming’ within the context of a repeated now.
Chapter Five: Practice Two

Introduction

The aim of this second practical chapter is to produce the final test of my ideas, where the theoretical elements detailed in Chapter’s Three and Four are combined in order to develop a demonstrative method of serial drawing that directly addresses my research question. For reasons which I will refresh below, the question I am addressing here is phrased in the second (and final) form, detailed in my thesis Introduction: How is a process of serial drawing understood to record the phenomenological ‘stream of consciousness’ that underpins it?

Figure 24: Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No.1 - 3
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

To describe this test I will follow the format of Chapter Two and re-employ Riley’s (2008) functions of drawing as the frame to present my ideas. This means I will again present the Experiential, Interpersonal and Compositional functions separately in order to describe the manner in which the practical and theoretical elements of the test are combined (Riley, 2008, p. 158). Prior to discussing the physical development of the drawings, I present a selection of images from Series Three & Four in sequence (fig.24 – fig.35). This will provide an opportunity for the reader to perceive the development of the work as a form of rhythm while the surrounding argument is laid out. This operates in line with the manner in which I approached this final stage of my research.

One immediate result of my bricoleur approach (Grey & Malins, 2004, p. 74) is that, while my research question is still contextualised by the topic of drawing recording the stream of consciousness, the focus of how this is to be undertaken has altered as a result of the developments which have occurred since my previous practical test. In relation to the
method of Serial Drawing that is to be used, the inkblot method (Cozens, 1785/1977) is removed - replaced by a focus on the drawn line, developed as an understanding in Chapter Three. In view of the analysis of my drawings undertaken in Chapter Two, the focus on recording James’ (1890/1950) phenomenological ‘fringe’ of consciousness has also been removed, replaced by the now - the ‘specious present’ discovered in Chapter Four, given as the rhythmical, self-temporalizing form of consciousness understood to flow (Abraham, 1995).

As something directly experienced the now can be found as a succession of ‘nows’, and thus potentially recorded (re-presented) in a manner rather different from the hypothetical fringe (James, 1890/1950). In Experiential (Riley, 2008) terms, my concern is to represent the experience I have of the passing of now, understood as a concrete temporal experience in the sense it is simply ‘lived through’. To communicate the thinking behind this attempt in Interpersonal (Riley, 2008) terms I will seek to find a way to frame what is, in effect, an intrinsically subjective experience, giving the now a duration that can be objectively measured (Pöppel, 1988). This effort places my experience of the now on a viable path to being expressed or translated into a concrete, spatial form through drawing. In Compositional (Riley, 2008) terms, I look to complete the circle by combining the temporal and spatial elements of my test together using rhythm (Lefebvre, 2004/2013). This will involve devising a method of serial drawing that physically produces spatially described lines in a rhythmic fashion. These will ‘appear’ through being drawn concurrent to the now ‘appearing’ for me as a temporal experience via the use of a metronome.

It is also pertinent to note that my bricoleur methodology has now become fully Phenomenological in Husserlian (1931/2012; 1950/1999) terms. This means I will be combining the methods of Serial Drawing and Phenomenology (the phenomenological
reduction as praxis) within this test, but will no longer be using the standalone methods of either Meditation (Gunaratana, 2002) or Introspection as Practice (Vermersch, 1999). As standalone methods tested in Chapter Two, these have served their purpose for advancing my research up until this point, and can now be put aside. For example, the metronome will replace my earlier meditative focus on the spatial form of the inkblot. This will provide me with a temporal frame to my task, and more closely align with the understanding I now have for consciousness as a distinctly temporal phenomenon. I will no longer be introspectively reflecting upon the contents of my consciousness in order to see what ‘specific’ elements might have been recorded in the manner of Chapter Two. On the Husserlian basis of intentionality, I consider the intentionally drawn line to form a record of the intentionally directed flow of thought that underpinned it, in and of itself. The question is rather how this notion can be re-interpreted once the drawings are produced and assessed in the context of the theory which frames their production, and what such an interpretation has to say about the way in which the metaphor of drawing ‘recording’ consciousness is understood.

Figure 26: Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No.7 - 9
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

Continuing to use the method of Phenomenology means the question of what definitively is recorded within the serially developed drawings remains bracketed for the duration of the test however, while I produce drawings in response. In the assessment stage, I will remove the brackets and turn to reflect in a more active fashion upon the drawings, treated as evidence in support of my claims, in order to see how the hypothesis has been supported. This assessment will follow the same procedure used in Chapter Two, first discussing the experience of drawing (verb) followed by seeking the invariant from within the series of drawings (noun). My concern will be to ask the question of what the drawn line is understood to have invariantly recorded or re-presented within the context of this test.
Functions of drawing test

Experiential

In devising this test according to my interpretation of Riley’s code (2008), I begin with the *Experiential* function. This requires me to re-clarify the experience I am aiming to represent. As a direct result of the theory developed in Chapter Four, I have a particular focus for what is to be represented via *Serial Drawing* - the rhythm of time, understood as the duration of *now*. I move towards this focus because my research revealed the ‘streaming’ of consciousness is experienced *in* the present. This speciousness to the present also makes it a good contender for the ‘what’ (*Was*) or ‘whatness’ (*Washeit*) (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 111) of the stream of consciousness as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, given that we experience contents of consciousness *flowing within the present*.

![Figure 27: Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No.10 - 12](image)

600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

Dainton (2000, p. 120) clarifies this point, while indicating the critical question that emerges from it, ‘it is a truism that our immediate experience is limited to the present. Only what is going on now is being directly experienced. If our immediate experience is limited to the present, how long is the present?’ As this quote suggests, the question that emerges once the theoretical present is unpacked is: how might one *measure* it as a period of duration? Trying to find a way to address this taxing notion becomes a deciding factor at this stage in my research, for the simple reason that in order to physically try and record the ‘passing’ of the present as a rhythmic feature of consciousness I need a way to measure that experience and provide myself with something to measure out (draw out) in response.
At the end of Chapter Four, I looked at how to comprehend the continual appearance of the present as the rhythm of now (Abraham, 1995). This understanding for how the now might rhythmically ‘reappear’ as a repetitive form suggested a clear element of measure (Lefebvre, 2004/2013). That which can be measured then suggests being re-presented, on the basis that what can be measured in one way can be re-measured in another, and thus re-presented as a result. Building on this notion, my aim is twofold. First, I wish to revisit this understanding of the now as a measurable unit of time in more detail. For practical purposes, this will include empirical research drawn from the discipline of psychology (Pöppel, 1988) rather than relying solely upon the philosophy of Phenomenology (Husserl, 1931/2012; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Dainton, 2000).

On the basis of his own analysis, James (1890/1950, p. 613) felt that the specious present was an experiential reality, one that we encountered as a period of felt duration. Taking a largely psychological approach to the study of the mind meant he decided the duration of the present could indeed be measured. However there is an alternative view, one that is also phenomenological in scope for it tries to deal with the ‘lived experience’ of time. This view suggests that the present has no measurable duration whatsoever. In devising this test, I will begin by briefly outlining this other argument in order to give a greater balance to my own understanding of how I might sensibly measure the present in order to record it through drawing.

Dainton (2000) refers to this other view as the ‘Augustinian argument’ after St. Augustine (1991/1998) who is historically connected with it. Dainton believes it is the same argument from which the use of the term ‘specious present’ originally stems (2000, p. 120). The outline of the argument is this: despite the fact we appear to inhabit a present of some kind, St. Augustine reasoned that it could have no measurable duration on the basis that what is present is evidently neither past nor future. For, if one takes any
temporal interval and makes it as short as possible - not all of this interval can be present because the initial part occurs before the later part. On this account the present, strictly speaking, must appear as a durationless interface between past and future. To follow this line of thinking to its logical conclusion would render existence as literally instantaneous, and therefore immeasurable. St. Augustine (1991/1998, p. 231) describes the scenario for how he feels we experience the present in this manner, and which leads him to this conclusion:

If then, in order to be time at all, the present is so made that it passes into the past, how can we say that this present also ‘is’? The cause of its being is that it will cease to be. So indeed, we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it tends towards non-existence.

This point concerns the manner in which we experience the speciousness or aporia of time understood to ‘pass’ between past, present and future, and remains a highly active philosophical debate within the current philosophy of mind (Dainton, 2000; de Warren, 2009; Crane, 2013). On the basis of the Augustinian argument the now is understood not as duration but as a ‘blinking of an eye’ (Augenblick) moment, finding a resonance with Nietzsche (1974) Heidegger (1953/2010) and Derrida (1973) among others. It cannot easily be discounted or overruled as a result. However, on the basis that it concerns the metaphysical reality (or otherwise) of time, and is therefore ontological in scope, I place it.

Dainton believes the Augustinian argument is fallacious partly on the basis that it confuses the experience of presence with the mathematical ‘present’. As Dainton (2000, p. 123) describes it, ‘whereas the notion of an instantaneous present is a concept drawn from a mathematical way of thinking about time as a dimension, the notion of presence is connected with experience. The fact that we think of time as consisting of a succession of one durationless instants does not entail that phenomenological presence is instantiated instantaneously. If the sensory present has a non-zero duration, presence will also have a non-zero duration.’
beyond the bounds of my phenomenological enquiry. Instead, my practical interest is in
trying to ascertain some form of quantitative measure for the duration of now based on it
being something we do appear to qualitatively experience.

Interpersonal

Having noted the ontological concerns of the Augustinian argument, I put them to one
side. Doing so also puts aside the definite immeasurability of the present as a concept,
allowing the phenomenological question of how this might be sensibly understood to re-
emerge. Abraham (1995, p. 76) states that rhythmizing consciousness is a ‘lived’
experience in a manner that is already there i.e. where the now simply ‘appears’ within
the structure of temporality itself. Yet, in order to successfully communicate my subjective
‘lived experience’ of now outside of myself, I require some form of objective
measurement that can frame my experience of it. This means establishing a concrete,
externally perceived way to measure the duration of the present I experience, and
incorporate this within my practical drawing test.

Figure 30: Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No.19 - 21
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

However, within the selection of philosophers I referenced in Chapter Four one notices a
striking omission. Although they were all concerned with discussing concepts of duration
and temporality in relation to the now, almost none were willing to try and define a
temporal measure to the duration of the present as we experience it – except for James,
who was approaching the question from a psychological rather than purely philosophical
viewpoint. James (1890/1950) presented an account of the estimated duration of the
present (now) based on the fact he considered it an experiential reality as something one
could distinctly ‘feel’.
Via a number of experiments that engaged what he called ‘time-sense’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 611) James estimated the duration of the present to be approximately a dozen seconds or less. Within the context of the experiment used, this sense of duration was measured via tasks that engaged the subject in temporal unit formation, using what he called ‘strokes of sound’ (James, 1890/1950, p. 611). These strokes of sound were produced by a metronome, and relied on the sense of rhythm it generated to give a subjective emphasis to successive strokes that were not themselves objectively present. James’ efforts in this regard have been followed up more recently by the work of Poppel (1988). Crucially for my test, both Poppel and James agreed that the now considered as a nonextensive ‘blink of an eye’ (Augenblick) boundary between past and future did not hold up to scrutiny - this view quite clearly, ‘fails to fit with our experience’ (Pöppel, 1988, p. 53).

Figure 31: Series Four, The Specious Line (2013) No.1-3
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

They share the idea that the feeling of nowness is an experiential reality, meaning within the context of this investigation a (conceptually sound) measurement of the now can be introduced to frame my test in temporal terms, thus providing me with a measurable duration I can re-present in spatial terms. As a result of various laboratory investigations, Poppel and his team reached the conclusion that, within the context of their experiments, for most people the duration of now has an upper temporal limit of only 2.5 to 3 seconds (Pöppel, 1988, p. 54). They conducted a variety of tests on a number of subjects that supported this finding across a range of senses - auditory, tactile and visual. I include only the auditory element in my test, on the basis that the visual component will be taken up by the activity of serial drawing. To give this somewhat counterintuitive notion of measuring the duration of now the context it deserves, I include Poppel’s (1988, p. 54) own words to describe how to interpret the metronome experiment.
I would like to interpret these observations to mean that there is in the brain a temporal limit to the capacity for integrating sequential events. But the capacity to fix subjective accents means fusing two (or more) successive metronome beats into one unit...To have fused things into a unit, however, means for it to be present, to be available experientially now. I conclude, therefore, that a temporally bounded integrative mechanism is the basis for the subjective present, the feeling of nowness.

This psychological approach to measuring the duration of the now decisively frames my attitude and mood when devising this second practical test. My aim is to use a commercial metronome in the exact same manner as Poppel's experiment, in order to frame the manner in which I subjectively experience the now ‘appearing’ as a temporal rhythm. Each now that appears for me in sequence will be three seconds in duration, provided objectively via the duration between beats of the metronome. Despite how one may choose to interpret measuring the duration of now, there remains one very important finding from Poppel's investigations to take note of here - that the now is, ‘nothing independently; rather, it is an attribute of the content of consciousness.

Figure 32: Series Four, The Specious Line (2013) No.4 - 6
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

Every object of consciousness is necessarily always now – hence the feeling of nowness. But now is not itself the content of consciousness: it must be that we make it such in retrospect (Pöppel, 1988, p. 63). This understanding links with the description of the specious present given in the previous chapter – that now is never apprehended ‘now’, meaning it is only ever found in the act of passing away. It also means that the content of consciousness is not now itself (because that has already passed), but whatever one decides one is conscious-of ‘now’, understood in an intentional sense. This philosophical description directly impinges on the practicalities of the drawing exercise I am devising, given that I need to decide upon, and clearly demonstrate, what the content
of my consciousness is to ‘be’ across the temporal duration of each now i.e. between the
strokes of sound. The answer to this is quite simple. I intend the content of what I am
consciously focused towards to be the spatially perceived element of my test: the action
of drawing lines.

**Compositional**

In practical terms, I require a way to compose this information concerning the
rhythmically experienced duration of now, in order to make it visible through a method of
serial drawing and potentially record it as a result. Following Riley’s (2008) framework
means I introduce the third and final function to enable this, the Compositional - stating
the means in which to, ‘make visible and realise the other two functions’ (Riley, 2008, p.
158). Practically speaking I have two elements that I need to combine within the act of
drawing, one primarily spatial in terms of its form - the drawn line - and the other temporal
- the duration of now. Their provisional combination focuses on the process of drawing
lines ‘in time’ with hearing the strokes of sound produced by the metronome, thus re-
representing the form of now according to Poppel’s (1988) criteria. Composing them in this
manner will be facilitated by rhythm, in both practical and theoretical terms, using
Lefebvre’s (2004/2013) structure of rhythmanalysis as my guide.

As a practitioner, I consider myself familiar on a tacit level with how to draw lines in
rhythmic fashion, but this will need to be made explicit through the development of my
drawings. Via the theory laid out in Chapter Three, I now understand more about the
drawn line in phenomenological terms, including how to deploy it here to serve my
research aims. However, prior to doing so the precise details of Poppel’s (1988)
metronome experiment need to be established. This is because the constraints of using
a metronome as a drawing aid will constitute part of the physical media of the test (Riley,
and are, as a result, likely to affect the way in which I draw lines, which will then affect the analysis of the drawings themselves. Poppel’s experiments revealed that the present has an extension (duration) of only a few seconds, in which the now depends on an integrative mechanism that fuses sequential events into perceptual units (Pöppel, 1988, p. 52). Taking a commercially available metronome and setting it to 120, we hear a beat at intervals of half a second. Onto this uniform sequence of beats we can impose a rhythm, by giving every other beat an added subjective weight. Through this process we give the uniformity of the beats a configuration, one that can be increased by widening the number of beats. At the tempo of 120 we continue to give subjective emphasis to every third, fourth or even fifth beat, and thus provide a rhythm that is not objectively present. However, beyond a certain point Poppel (1988, p. 54) claims it is no longer possible via ‘subjective accentuation’ to hear a temporal pattern - the temporal structure breaks apart.

According to Poppel this ‘temporal form boundary’ of three seconds can be even more clearly delineated if we fuse as many beats as possible into a single pattern by fixing an accent (Pöppel, 1988, p. 54). This means fusing two successive beats into a unit - where the subjectively louder one is related to the subjectively softer one - and then increasing the time-interval between them. If a commercial metronome is set at 40, so the interval between ticks measures 1.5 seconds, the formation of a rhythm becomes more difficult to manage, even impossible for some. The inability for subjects to form a rhythm beyond this duration between ticks suggests that 3 seconds is the upper limit for experiencing the feeling of nowness. For Poppel, the key for how to interpret these empirical findings is based upon the integration of consciousness – wherein the felt duration of the present is the result of a synthesis, much like Husserl (1931/2012) indicates.
That which is integrated is the unique content of consciousness that seems to us present. This integration, which itself objectively extends over time, is thus the basis of our experiencing a thing as present. The now has a temporal extension of maximally three seconds (Pöppel, 1988, p. 62).

I now needed to introduce this information into a practically designed test that deploys a method of Serial Drawing, thus bringing the temporal and spatial elements of my test firmly together. To facilitate this I referred back to Lefebvre’s (2004/2013) definition of rhythm to see how both conceptions fitted within it. For Lefebvre, the concept of rhythm was bound up with the concept of movement, but in such a way that the two are often confused with regards to what is attributed as a result. To clear up the confusion, the movement connected to rhythm requires a further element to make it rhythmical - repetition. No rhythm without repetition, in space and time.

Yet this repetition must return - it must have a measure. And within the ‘lived experience’ of rhythm, there is no identical repetition, indefinitely. There is always difference (Lefebvre, 2004/2013, p. 16). Using Lefebvre’s three elements that define rhythm (repetition, measure and difference), I now understood how to introduce the results of Poppel’s (1988) experiment into a method of drawing lines in serial fashion, wherein the form of one would re-present the form of the other. Working ‘in time’ to the ticking of the metronome the lines will be drawn repetitively one after the other in serially developed

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64 The question of how to interpret these findings is of course the critical factor for anyone wishing to engage in a debate regarding the validity of the present as having a ‘measurable’ duration. For this practical test, I was not seeking to dispute the findings on a philosophical level. They were found to hold true on the level of the phenomenological - the ‘lived experience’ the subject has of the duration of the present, but only when framed by experiments utilising subjective unit formation of this kind.
fashion, each drawn via a fluid movement of my hand. The length of time to draw each line will span the three-second temporal measure (duration) of now, meaning each line might also loop back on itself in order to stay within the spatial measure (extension) of the page. Every drawn line will also be different on the purely phenomenological basis that no two hand-drawn lines can ever appear exactly the same. Thus my practical test will bring the now and the line together as a combined spatio-temporal understanding - the physical act of drawing lines occurring simultaneous with the 'streaming' of consciousness directed towards that act, framed within a series of nows that 'pass'.

Series Three Drawings

To begin the first series of drawings in this second test (third series in the investigation overall) I acquired a commercial metronome - a Wittner Taktell Junior model - with settings from 40 to 200. Following Poppel’s (1988) instructions for generating the correct rhythm and taking Lefebvre’s (2004/2013) criteria for analysing it into account, I set the metronome to the slowest setting of 40. This would provide an interval measure of 1.5 seconds. This measure would be half the three-second duration of the now on Poppel’s account meaning the 'strokes of sound' (James, 1890/1950) would need to be repeated. Prior to beginning the test, I thought I would give subjective emphasis to each second stroke ('one…two') in order to help me to draw in time with the rhythm. I set the overall duration of each individual drawing at twenty minutes, a figure that previous experience indicated would be a sufficient length of time to produce a substantial amount of drawn lines. In repeatedly drawing a number of individual lines in time with the rhythm - rather than produce a continuous line drawing - I was seeking to introduce Lefebvre’s element of difference in a more concrete sense. The question of what the drawings will record/re-present remains bracketed until the analysis stage.

Development of No.1

I begin the series by selecting a pad of square cartridge paper, 25cm x 25cm in size. Deciding to loop each line back on itself meant the size of paper did not need to be larger. I selected square paper as I want to physically frame these drawings as equally as possible, and avoid providing emphasis where it was not required - as an artist I decided the portrait or landscape format had an unnecessary connection with trying to depict something in a purely mimetic (representational) sense. My aim was simply to draw lines as time passed and record the movement of the point in doing so, leaving the
question of how to interpret what was represented until after they were produced. With the cartridge paper laid down flat, I set the metronome ticking at 40. The rhythm was noticeably slower than one might expect to use - indeed, it was the slowest setting there was. I used a stopwatch to time three seconds and found that this included three ticks of the metronome, not two as I had originally thought. The double interval of 1.5 seconds began on one tick, crossed over the second tick and ended on the third. These three ‘strokes of sound’ (James, 1890/1950) comprise the temporal duration to each now I was to draw during. I decided to use a digital biro pen65 in order that my drawn movement might be as fluid as possible across the surface of the actual paper, whilst simultaneously recording this movement as a digital file.

Figure 36: Series Three, No.1 (2013)
600dpi digital pen drawing, 25 x 25 cm

Following the material laid out in Chapter Three, I was looking to employ a drawing implement that consisted only of a ‘moving point’ (Rawson, 1969/1987). Thus, my aim was to keep the point of the biro moving across the surface of the paper for the duration of each now. To orientate myself the same for all drawings in the series I made a note for where the middle of each page was - a mark equidistant both horizontally and vertically.

65 I used a Wacom Inking digital pen to produce these drawings. This pen draws on paper using a biro point but simultaneously records the drawing as a 600dpi digital file. Thus, the pen produced two ‘drawings’ from the one action - one that is recorded on the paper and one that is recorded digitally. The digital file (record) is used to present the drawings in the thesis. Given the way the technology works to capture the information in real time, these files are considered as the ‘original drawing’.
Upon this mark, I placed the point of my pen. I waited until the metronome arm had made a number of passes and then, in time with the tick, I set the point into motion (Klee, 1925/1953). Through a fluid movement of my hand I propelled the biro point a short distance away in one direction across the page, and then returning to loop back on itself. To record the passing of each now my aim was to follow the rhythm of the metronome, beginning each line when I heard one tick, continue it across the second, and bring it back in time for the third. I began trying to give subjective emphasis to each second tick while I drew, timing it with the mid-point of each line where it turned back on itself. I did not concern myself with completing a set number of lines within the twenty-minute duration of the drawing. Instead, I simply repeated them one after the other in sequence, always beginning each new line on a new stroke of sound (fig.36).

**Development of No.2 - No.22**

![Figure 37: Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No. 2 - 12](image)
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

After completing the first drawing, I reflected that I had encountered some difficulty placing subjective emphasis on every second beat, while simultaneously counting to myself...and focusing on drawing inside the three-second limit. The duration appeared too short for trying to think through it, yet slightly too long for simply reacting to it, and focusing on all three elements simultaneously became confusing. Looking ahead across the series (fig.37) I decided that trying to find the right balance for how to draw in time with the rhythm would be one of my main objectives for the test. Around the time of completing No.11 I discovered that the optimum method for staying within the duration of three seconds was found by drawing each line slower from the first beat to the second, and then returning more quickly in time for the third.
This physical motion was facilitated by visually watching the movement of the metronome arm, in addition to listening to the ticks. In effect, this refinement developed itself into becoming the rhythm that I used to draw with during the remainder of the series (fig. 38). Across the majority of the drawings, I found I stayed towards the middle of the page, where the build up of marks produced a blacker mass than at the edges. I believe this occurred because of the attention I was expending trying to stay within the form boundary of three seconds. There were also many times when I became restless with following what was, in effect, a monotonous rhythm. The result was that I moved the pen in more erratic fashion, yet still completing the line within the duration of three seconds.

Figure 38: Series Three, *The Specious Line* (2013) No. 13 - 22
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

**Series Four Drawings**

The fourth series of drawings I produced in exactly the same manner as Series Three. During production of this series, I became more practised at drawing via this metronomic method. The effort of producing the previous series had allowed me to develop the rhythm I needed to stay within the three-second duration of now. As a result, the later part of this series slowly developed towards a more open style of drawing, less tightly constrained. For example, No.1 to No.10 (fig. 39) were similar in form to all those of the previous series, in the sense that the majority of marks converged around a singular central mass. However, from No.11 onwards (fig. 40) I began to feel able to widen the spacing between the lines, even slightly. I was still constrained within the activity of drawing by three factors, two temporal and one spatial. The spatial restriction was the size of the page upon which I was drawing. The temporal restriction(s) were related to
the effort of following the metronome beat in order to stay within the set duration of each 
now, coupled with the length of time-gap between drawing each line. Occasionally I left 
longer time-gaps in order to take a ‘breather’ from the activity of drawing, but these were 
by necessity very short, otherwise, I found I lost the momentum of the rhythm.

Although I wasn’t keeping count, these factors combined suggest that the number of 
lines do not vary too much from one drawing to the next, aided by the fact that they were 
all produced in exactly twenty minutes. On the basis of trying to avoid creating a mimetic 
semblance of something other than a series of lines, I decided not to focus upon the 
formal comparison of one drawing to another when producing the series. This was in 
marked difference to Series One and Two drawings, where I deliberately aimed to ‘fit’ 
each individual drawing within the overall structure of the series to which it belonged. I did 
this by placing the previously completed ink drawings on the wall in sequence, to act as a 
visual guide. For Series Three and Four however, I simply placed each completed 
drawing in a drawer once it was done.

Towards the end of this fourth and final series (fig.40) I began to experiment with pushing 
the spatial form boundary of each line as far as I could go, whilst staying within the 
temporal form boundary of the now which I had set myself. The rhythm that I had 
practised and developed through the action of drawing lines was now more fully under 
my control. It had reached the point where I felt I could draw lines that emerged and 
ended across three ticks of the metronome somewhat easier than before. With this 
element of practiced effort came another element that I was not expecting - I felt I had 
more time to think when drawing each line. This extra time included ‘looking ahead’
towards expecting the next line. The lines still came into being on the first stroke of sound, moved in an arc towards the second, and then very rapidly reversed themselves heading into (and ending on) the third. Yet, while remaining opposed to representing anything in particular, I began to play slightly with this restricted pallet. When producing No.18 for example, I decided to draw the first part of the line slowly and then ‘flick’ the reverse leg off at a 45-degree tangent.

Figure 40: Series Four, The Specious Line (2013) No.11 - 22
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

Figure 41: Series Four, The Specious Line (2013) No.21 & 22
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22
I found myself doing this because the duration of each now appeared differently: I became aware of looking ahead and expecting the next line, thus giving me the sensation of having ‘more time’ within the current now to draw. After lapsing back into the usual formal structure in No.19, I repeated this effort in No.20, but in the opposite direction. The final two drawings in the series, No.21 and No.22 (fig. 41) pushed the spatial form boundary of the drawn line even further. After completing these last few drawings I reflected that, although time towards the end of the series appeared to ‘fly by’, the temporal phase of each now that I experienced while drawing seemed to extend rather than shrink. As a pure hypothesis, I might say that the protentions and the retentions (Husserl, 1931/2012) of each now became more apparent as degrees of expectation and withholding, which the rhythm of drawing promoted. The result was that I experienced the sensation of having ‘more time’ - and therefore space - to move the pen. In short, although the objective temporal measure of the metronome rhythm did not change, with practice came the subjective sensation of having more time to draw across each now, not less.

Assessment

The experience of drawing

The sequence of nows I experienced when producing all the drawings in both series was framed by the rhythm of the metronome set at 40. Despite dividing the total time of each drawing up into durations of three seconds, my stream of consciousness remained unified - I encountered the temporal divisions between nows as one might encounter joints in the bamboo of wood (Bailey A. R., 1999). Yet although the objectively understood temporal form boundary (Pöppel, 1988) did not alter - the metronome ‘tick’ never deviated from its metronomic precision at keeping time - I did encounter a change in my subjective perception of time spent drawing within each passing now. As I learnt to better time the rhythm of drawing with the rhythm of the metronome, the motion of my hand became less rushed and more purposefully aimed. Practice brought with it the sensation that I was ‘keeping’ or withholding the rhythm of the lines previously drawn within the act of drawing each new line. Rather than remain focused upon the past, the presence of this rhythm allowed me to look ahead and expect the next line beyond the current one I was drawing.
In theoretical terms I could argue that the rhythmic structure of duration I experienced included the retention and protention of each measured now, where, ‘the present retains the past – a past that is not rigidly fixed, but capable of being recreated in a future synthesis – and extends towards a future in order to deliver this past to it’ (Abraham, 1995, p. 56).

![Image](image_url)

Figure 42: Series Four (2013) No.21
600dpi digital pen drawing, 25 x 25 cm

The physical result of this lived rhythm was that I felt I had ‘more time’ to draw each line towards the end of the series (fig.42). This then became the temporal flow I experienced permeating the entire act of drawing. Yet the rhythmic form of consciousness I encountered was not just directed towards the act of drawing as an isolated event, but my whole body drawing ‘in time’ to the metronome and the movement of the point this involved. This ‘lived temporality’ marked the presence of time I encountered within the rhythmically present act of drawing each line - the sheer immediacy of the duration I was focused upon re-presenting had a presence that seemed to become ‘fuller’ with practice. The subtlety of trying to describe this feeling of rhythmized consciousness (Abraham, 1995) within the act of drawing lies partly in separating the understanding of the term ‘present’ with presence. Dainton (2000) feels that conflating the two can lead to a variety of problems when discussing the phenomenology of time.
As he understands it, presence means, ‘the property of being an immediate object or content of consciousness. Everything that is immediately present in a subject’s experience possesses presence in this sense: it is just there within one’s consciousness’ (Dainton, 2000, p. 122). On the basis of this description, it was the presence of time I encountered that was felt to expand, rather than the speciously ‘passing present’ framed by the rhythm of the metronome. To summarise, I felt with practice came more time to draw, not less, and this was something I encountered in the immediacy of the experience of drawing, not something I discovered in retrospect. My hypothesis is that this development was enabled via the expectation of a return introduced by the rhythm of drawing, but this is only a hypothesis – to go any further I need to examine the drawings themselves as evidence of my claims.

**Seeking the invariant**

![Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No.1 – 22](image)

600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm

The assessment of my experience of drawing (verb) just given is now added to with an examination of all the drawings laid out in series. In line with the method of *Phenomenology*, it is here that I ‘unbracket’ the question of what is recorded within both
series of drawings, and present it to the drawings themselves. My concern is to look within their total variation for that which is invariantly understood to emerge. In order to begin this process I first ask - to what extent do the form of the drawings support my claim of a subjectively altered temporal experience encountered whilst drawing? This question concerns the degree to which the temporal phenomenon just discussed is represented within the (spatial) form of the drawings themselves. On balance I have to say I am not convinced that the drawings as evidence support a statement that says: they have invariably ‘recorded’ my personal experience of drawing in the manner just described. If I say that the drawings do so, it is purely metaphorical in understanding, relying entirely on the preceding context for the metaphor to function, rather than the phenomenological evidence of the drawings themselves. Putting this concern to one side for the moment, I seek to establish what can be conceived of as invariantly re-presented within the drawings themselves.

To enable this I employ the method of imaginative free variation used in Chapter Two, defined by Husserl as integral to the eidetic process (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 159). This means I will seek to vary the results of each series as presented (fig. 43) in order to see what emerges in an eidetic sense\. In a more rigorous manner than Chapter Two, I begin the process by referring to the conceptual elements underpinning the drawn line as developed in Chapter Three. Although these elements were not originally selected on the basis of imaginative free variation, they were developed in order to build up a firm description of the ‘what’ or ‘whatness’ (Washeit) to the drawn line understood as a phenomenon. As a result, they now provide a solid (invariant) foundation for describing how both series of drawings have been produced.

To begin with, each line was produced through a ‘point that moves’ (Rawson, 1969/1987). As an action carried out in time, the movement of the point left a trace of itself in the form of a line (Newman M., 1996). On the basis of intentionality (Husserl, 1931/2012), each line is understood to re-present the movement of the point as an intentional movement (Ingold, 2007). Added to this is the rhythm of the line – a factor that could easily be varied. Yet, given that all the lines were drawn to a metronome set at 40 (Pöppel, 1988) any variation to the set rhythm would have to step outside the manner in

\[66\] The type of essence I am looking for here is what Husserl referred to as ‘morphological essences’ (Husserl, 1931/2012, p. 143). Morphological essences are correlates of descriptive concepts, more ambiguous in form than the exact variety - they are essentially inexact and have vague boundaries. They ‘approximate’ themselves in purely descriptive terms; grasped from the individual entity using imaginative variation of the kind I have already demonstrated (Husserl, 1931/2012, p. 143).
which they were made. This leaves only the so-called dualism to the line (Maynard, 2005). The line as what it is (a line) and the line as what it is not i.e. what it 'represents'. Although each line as a line cannot be varied, the question of what each line represents in the context of their formal arrangement (fig. 44) can be varied to some degree, especially when this query is framed by the theoretical context in which they were produced.

To seek the invariant I try to imaginatively vary the results. This effort focuses on varying the form of any given line across a series (fig. 44), but only to a degree that remains within the confines of the statements I’ve just given. Even without introducing a deliberate desire to make the lines ‘represent’ in the mimetic sense of creating a likeness or a semblance of something other than a line (Zummer, 2012), the arrangement and spacing of the lines on the page can be varied to a degree. Yet - in order to remain within the temporal constraints of their manner of production (a duration of only three seconds) coupled with the need to return each line within the extension of the page, I find the form of any given line cannot be varied to any consequential degree.
The dualism to the line (Maynard, 2005) remains, where it appears to suggest that each line invariably records single fluid gesture that was carried out in a past time, represented in the present one – a specious present that is continually ‘passing’. Treating the line as a phenomenon in relation to how it appears, I find a statement on the invariant line to be: *each line is a record: a re-presentation of a present that passed, presented in a present that moves.* This statement articulates the self-temporalization of the drawn line, for the word ‘moves’ does not suggest that lines physically fixed to paper support move anywhere in space, but rather that such lines temporalize themselves in the previously described Husserlian manner (p.97) through having been drawn.

**Summary**

This assessment has focused only upon what the individual lines re-present according the context of my phenomenological argument. This is deliberate, for I have been seeking to develop an invariant understanding of the drawn line that I can use within my thesis Conclusion. This will expand on the invariant finding just introduced - the self-temporalization of the drawn line - to show how it describes serial drawing ‘recording’ (re-presenting) the streaming of consciousness as a self-temporalizing phenomenon. Already it is possible to see how the underlying temporal movement that Rawson (1969/1987, p. 15) identifies as the ‘special charm’ of drawing can be expanded via this phenomenological approach, for Rawson only describes the retentional part of this self-temporalization. The underlying quality of movement that Rawson speaks of points to what is past - the prior act of drawing as a kinetic form of ‘retentional horizon’, presented within all drawings on the basis they were produced via a point *that* moved.

But according to Husserl’s (1931/2012) theory, where the self-temporalization of consciousness indicates both retentional and protentional horizons within the form of the *now*, the drawn line must also intend within itself a ‘protentional horizon’ (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 265) - an expectation or indication of where it might have been headed had the point continued to trace its path across the surface of the paper. This can be understood as a further dualism (Maynard, 2005), where the line is both a *retentional* re-presentation of what is past coupled with a *protentional* indication of what is yet to come. To reflect on the implication of this singular finding in relation to understanding how drawing records the streaming of consciousness in Husserlian terms, I carry it into my thesis Conclusion.
Conclusion

Throughout this enquiry, my aim has been to formulate a richer account, via a practice-led approach, of the hypothesis with which I began the research: the idea that drawing does fundamentally record/re-present the ‘stream of consciousness’ underpinning it. I have looked to describe this metaphorical notion in practical terms, using the structure and process connected to serial drawing in tandem with the tools of Husserlian (1931/2012) Phenomenology to question the hypothesis as an assumption, with the hope of bringing out a more explicit understanding of it as a result. My thesis is now set to conclude by underlining the following claim for the way in which the evidence I have amassed indicates drawing to ‘record’ (re-present) the streaming of consciousness as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, and the contribution to the existing field of knowledge this finding entails.

Figure 45: Series One, Druckkopf (2012), No.4 - 6
Ink transfer drawing on paper, 29 x 38 cm. Series of 18

Contribution to knowledge

In simple terms, the claim I am putting forward is this: by considering how drawing clearly re-presents (records) the streaming of consciousness as a self-temporalizing phenomenon (Husserl, 1931/2012; Merleau-Ponty, 1962), drawing is also revealed as a self-temporalizing phenomenon. It would appear that the metaphor works both ways. The phenomenon of drawing considered as a form of self-temporalization emerges on the back of the invariant finding presented in the summary of Chapter Five: each line is a
record: a re-presentation of a present that passed, presented in a present that moves. As outlined in the summary of the previous chapter, the notion of ‘moves’ in this phenomenological context does not only indicate a look ‘back’ in time to represent the prior act of drawing in the retentional sense, but also forward in time, described in a Husserlian protentional sense. My claim is that, from the practitioners point of view, the phenomenological appearance of any given drawing seen ‘now’ within the context of Husserlian duration, both re-presents the past act of drawing which created it and points ahead in time: towards the promise of drawings not yet made.

Figure 46: Series Three, The Specious Line (2013) No.13 - 15
600dpi digital pen drawings, 25 x 25 cm. Series of 22

Described in relation to the experience of drawing (verb)

I initially formulated this contribution to knowledge by reflecting on my experience of the act of drawing, framed within the context of my effort to record the specious present (now). Like James (1890/1950) before and Poppel (1988) after, Husserl (1931/2012) described the now as a period of felt duration – a kind of ‘saddle’ upon which we sit perched, looking both forward and backward in time. Phenomenologically speaking, Husserl goes on to describe this saddle as a peculiar and complex synthesis - an intentional form of relation between retention and protention, where each affects the other within the form of the now. By combining a) my practical understanding of drawing with b) this theoretical understanding of duration via c) the notion of rhythm (Lefebvre, 2004/2013) in Chapter Five, I was able to clearly demonstrate how the intentional action of one - the drawn movement of the point through space – rhythmically re-presents the intentional passing of the other - my temporal experience of the now as it ‘moves’ through time. Once this metaphorical description was worked out, I realised it also operated the other way. It clearly re-tells, in Husserlian terms, the story of what drawing is doing for those who draw. The appearance of drawing (noun) does not just provide physical evidence of an act that has passed. It also provides a look ahead towards the
next potential act of drawing (verb) – an intended act that is present within every appearance of every drawing seen ‘now’.

This realisation was brought home to me when I completed my fourth series of drawings. I realised that my effort to draw each line within the set duration of each metronomic *now*, in order to record my conscious experience of *now* as it ‘passed’…collapsed them together. In those moments, the experience of ‘consciousness’ I was trying to record though drawing was simply consciousness of drawing. This raised awareness that the intentional act of drawing is much more than just the intentional movement of the point. Drawing involves drawing together the threads of any given experience – the ‘stream’ of consciousness - *into* the singular movement of a point across a surface. To return to the metaphor of the saddle used to describe duration - we could say that each drawn line is like a saddle, which I the drawer am drawn down upon to sit, Janus-like, facing forwards and backwards in time and space. This ‘collapse’ actually brought *up* to the surface of my research the knowledge that looking ahead is a much a part of drawing for those who draw as looking back to what has been previously traced. While the evidence is not present in the same way – as causes precede effects there can be no literal trace of the future - Husserl’s description of protention within the framework of intentionality supplies the means necessary to make this metaphorical understanding explicit.

This claim offers a way to re-conceive the phenomenon of drawing beyond the focus on ‘trace’ and ‘memory’ that permeates much of the current discourse on drawing (Newman M, 1996; Tormey, 2007; Newman & de Zegher, 2003; Derrida J, 1993). For while this discourse often betrays the influence of Derridean philosophy, where these topics are coherently discussed and can be applied accordingly, I believe it does so at the expense of applying to drawing the Husserlian focus on ‘hope’ and ‘expectation’ that rendered the self-temporalization of consciousness as the (forward looking) consciousness-of time (Husserl, 1931/2012; Depraz, 1999; Moran & Cohen, 2012; Varela F. J., 1999). This intentional approach is encapsulated within Husserl’s notion of protention, the passive expectation of what is arriving ‘now’ within the duration of our living present. Protention indicates how the intentionality underpinning the operation of consciousness indicates the essence of lived experience itself – the silent reach forward that tells us we are going-on living, or going-on drawing, which each new moment both delivers and renews. Which is why the recent re-interpretation of Husserl’s analysis of internal-time consciousness by Nicolas de Warren emphasises the larger meaning for us as subjects of our own self-temporalization: consciousness described as a self-temporalizing ‘stream’ provides us with nothing less than the promise of time (de Warren, 2009).
Described in relation to the experience of drawing (noun)

To describe my contribution to knowledge in relation to my drawings used as evidence in support of my claim, I select one drawing at random (fig.47) and proceed to work through my ‘lived experience’ of it in phenomenological terms. In this I am following Rawson’s (1969/1987, p. 29) stipulation that, ‘artistic forms, including graphic forms, made with metaphorical intent, may be understood to depend for their meaning upon the linked chains of emotive affect they arouse; that is, upon their content.’ To describe how the metaphor of drawing recording consciousness leads to drawing described as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, I examine the content of my drawing in fig.47 within the context of my Husserlian phenomenological argument.

Figure 47: Series Four, No.13 (2013)
600dpi digital drawing on paper, 25 x 25cm

I start by stating that the appearance of fig.47 viewed ‘now’ contains a record of my experience of having drawn it, and a continual re-presentation of that recorded content within the context of time understood to ‘pass’. This describes a lived version of the invariant finding described in the summary of Chapter Five – each line is a re-presentation of the point that I moved, presented in the present which moves. Within this metaphorical framework, the appearance of each line operates according to that found
within the form of Husserl’s *now* – there is both a protentional and a retentional phase presented (intended) as horizons. The retentional indicates the fact that the lines were drawn, coupled with the direction from which the point originated. The protentional indicates the direction that the point was potentially headed. But as a viewer I also find the retentional indicates, to borrow Husserl’s words (1931/2012, p. 167) an interpretation which is, ‘continually “annexing itself”; the impression continuously transforms itself into retention, and this continuously into modified retention, and so forth.’ In other words, my viewing any given drawing ‘now’ involves an on-going modification within my interpretation of how it was drawn, and this constant modification occurs within the (constantly modified) present.

This interpretation continues when looking at the drawing in more detail and reflecting even further on the phenomenology this act of looking entails. For the history of past acts connected to these lines as having been drawn are now overlaid on top of another in space.* The difficulty of identifying ‘where’ each line sits in relation to the next means the question of asking *when* one line appeared in relation to another becomes difficult, if not outright impossible, to define. They form a complicated network of intersecting lines, suggesting many previous temporal spans in virtue of their spatial depth. Thus the appearance of the drawing viewed ‘now’ presents an opposed form of movement within itself - the re-presented trajectories of the point draws me the viewer *in*, simultaneous to my drawing *out* an interpretation from those lines. This interpretation is constantly modified across every new *now* on the basis of the ambiguity which all drawings present – simply because they were ‘drawn’. So, while the appearance of drawing re-presents the retention of a series of points that moved, this is apprehended concurrent with an unceasing protention of discovering the history, or meaning, behind those movements anew.

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67 As de Zegher (2010, p. 23) adds, the temporal sequence of a drawing may not coincide with the spatial juxtaposition of the lines drawn, but they, ‘may overlap in space, and unlike painting, the act of drawing leaves it hard after a while, to distinguish the first line from those that follow. The time of the drawing, as Dirk Lauwaert remarks, fades away as lines accrete, and soon the resulting image erases the sequence, whichever line came first disappearing into the rest.’ The Husserlian argument I am advancing here would not say that time ‘fades away’ – rather, that it remains intended within the drawing as a horizon.

68 Dewey (1934) has described the ‘very special value’ of drawing as a form of expression in similar terms. As he states in relation to the function of drawing within pictures (painting), ‘It is not a means for securing expressiveness in general but a very special value of expression. It is not a means of assisting recognition by means of exact outline and definite shading. Drawing is drawing out; it is extraction of what the subject matter has to say in particular to the painter in his integrated experience’ (Dewey, 1934, p. 96).
A final step involves considering how the metaphor functions for me as the drawer. Here, the protentional horizon of fig.47 extends further forward in time. Each drawn line within it intends within itself a movement towards lines not yet drawn, which reach out even further, towards drawings in the series not yet made. On the basis that the drawing viewed ‘now’ re-presents the streaming of consciousness as a self-temporalizing phenomenon, the appearance of drawing (noun) is revealed as the performance of drawing (verb): a living record of its past self that remains alive by drawing upon present expectations – the exact same expectations that stage an on-going production of its past self playing live towards the future. This description is mirrored in de Warren’s (2009, p. 290) succinct and final summary of Husserl’s theory of internal-time consciousness

With this self-temporalization, consciousness is caught in-between the retentional sedimentation of itself as past - burying itself within itself - and the protentional unearthing of itself as a future without end. In this fashion, as Husserl writes, “an authentic analysis of consciousness is, so to speak, a hermeneutics of the life of consciousness”

Reflecting on de Warren’s claim (discussed on p.98) for how Husserl’s term zugleich was misread by Derrida as Augenblick and influenced the concept of the trace (i.e. the re-presentation of the same) as a result, this can also be brought to bear to support my claim of the self-temporalization of drawing. It indicates the phenomenon of drawing modifying (rather than repeating) the trace of what has passed ‘at the same time’ (zugleich) as it presents itself, pointing ahead towards the expectation, vague or otherwise, for drawings one could draw. The self-temporalization of consciousness describes consciousness, ‘throwing itself outside of itself’ (de Warren, 2009, p. 265), suggesting a bizarre form of continuity and unity within the duration of now. Mapping this back across, we can re-interpret the earlier claim for drawing described as a, ‘perpetual state of becoming’ (Hoptman, 2002, p. 11) to mean that any given drawing is perpetually ‘throwing itself beyond itself’ to become the thought of drawings not yet drawn. Even Rawson’s (1969/1987, p. 15) ‘special charm’ of drawing, the peculiar form of temporality that underpins all drawings on the basis they were drawn, is re-described on this Husserlian basis. Where the drawn line moves as it stands, throwing itself outside of itself to outline the scope for what is not yet drawn.
Applications for the research

Culmination of this project has suggested a number of trajectories for how the research may be applied. As this has been a research project rooted in practice, with a focus on time as the central element underpinning drawing, there is potential for applying this approach to question further assumptions connected to drawing that the practitioner encounters. One such long-standing assumption is the one underpinning the art historical discipline of drawing connoisseurship (Smentek, 2014): the autographic line. This notion indicates the individual presence of the drawer ‘in’ the line they draw (Rosand, 2002). Although it can be argued this question should not be approached from a first-person position (on the basis that attributing authorship lies wholly with the Other i.e. the viewer of drawings) I find it remains valid from the drawer’s perspective on the basis it affords them a way to think about the assumption that posits drawing as unmediated form of ‘authentic’ expression. As Gavin Turk (in Worsdale & Winter, 2007, p 118) describes this concern

The first thing that comes to mind with this relationship between drawing and authorship is that of the signature itself; it is a kind of drawing. It, more than any other mark on a given page, is the thing which needs to be really authentic. The drawing needs not only to be on this particular page but others too and it must appear in a similar, identifiable way almost like some sort of stamp.

Aside from wishing to build upon the results of the current research that posits drawing as a fundamentally temporal phenomenon, there is a further reason for questioning this assumption through the topic of time. This is due to my suspicion that the question of the autographic line is at core a question of persistence through time – how the identity of the drawer persists or endures within their repeated forms of mark making over time. As persistence is a metaphysical question concerning the ontology of time (Dainton, 2004; Sider, 2003), this would mark a shift within my research from phenomenology towards ontology, and would structure the process for how I developed my serial drawing accordingly. This move from the phenomenological towards the ontological has echoes of the move that Derrida made beyond his investigation of the logocentric assumptions of Husserl (Derrida J. 1973; Derrida & Husserl, 1989), towards investigating the metaphysics of presence underpinning Western philosophical thought. As I have been based within a phenomenological epistemology for the majority of my research, I have deliberately not made extensive use of Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of Husserl. But it is my contention that the work Husserl did on the phenomenological concepts of
intentionality, fact and essence can be fruitfully re-examined through Derrida to offer a post-phenomenological way to approach the autographic line as a question of persistence through time.

As Lawlor (2002) describes, Derrida’s deconstructive concept of *différance* is largely derived from Husserl’s concept of intentionality: ‘like intentionality, *différance* consists in an intending to; it is defined by the dative relation’ (Lawlor, 2002, p. 230). Yet Derrida’s concept of *différance* emphasised an important aspect within Husserlian intentionality - that while I am powerless to exit my living present, I am just as powerless to remain within it. Something of me is always already passing away - ‘I am always already *late* for subjective presence’ (Lawlor, 2002, p. 232). This is the paradoxical ‘streaming’ of consciousness understood in Derridean terms. For Derrida this indicated the necessity of the *trace* as a way to ‘make present’ (re-present) through a form of return. Rather than interpreting the trace as the repetition of the same in the manner of de Warren (2009), the trace ‘making present’ indicates the essential ambiguity within expressive forms of inscription such as writing, or drawing.

For Derrida this ambiguity amounts to a double necessity for inscription, ‘to remain within (fact) and to exit to the outside (essence) of the living present’ (Lawlor, 2002, p. 228). On this basis, the inscription is always and already beyond itself, understood in a manner not dissimilar to my thesis conclusion, although I described it in Husserlian terms. This double necessity can also be described in Husserl’s original terms: if we say the *fact* of each drawn line concerns it’s particular manifestation in time and space, then we must also say its authorial *essence* could have occurred elsewhere and otherwise. The question of how this ‘elsewhere’ is understood is an ontological question, for we have no means to physically depart our living present – but on Derridean terms the indication is given that it might be possible to comprehend within the ambiguity of inscription (drawing). The phenomenological understanding of temporality described in the thesis is the dynamic understanding of time, based within the idea of a ‘passing present’. Yet it cannot address the ontological question of how we persist or endure through time - it simply indicates the difficulty of trying to account for it.

On the basis of this difficulty there is within the current philosophy of time growing interest in the four-dimensionalist theory of time (Sider, 2003; Loux, 2006; Dainton, 2004). This is the non-dynamic and seemingly counterintuitive theory of time that offers a line-like ontology of perdurantism in place of the point-like ontology of endurantism (which suggests we are ‘wholly present’ at each moment in time). Husserlian phenomenology
already indicated the difficulty with endurantism, given that now is never ‘now’. Although this would extend the phenomenological discussion of drawing into a highly speculative metaphysics, it might in return offer an intriguing way to interpret drawings made in response, much like the Husserlian discussion of temporality offered this investigation. As way to structure the serially developed process of drawing, this post-phenomenological approach could offer innovative ways to think about those drawings that are not yet drawn as well as those that are, and present a novel way to approach the question of the autographic line as a question of persistence through time.


Appendix

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Transfer drawing
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Transfer drawing
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Transfer drawing

Indian ink on Fabriano watercolour paper, 29 x 38 cm

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Transfer drawing
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