Prejudice as Collective Definition: Ideology, Discourse and Moral Exclusion

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In *Anti-Semite and Jew*, Jean-Paul Sartre draws a portrait of the ‘anti-Semite’ as a sociopsychological type. Sartre’s portrait is not merely a description of a type, but a morality play, where the ‘anti-Semite’ is an actor on the scene of French society of the time. Although it is a particular portrait, general aspects of anti-Semitism as a tradition of persecution can be also identified in Sartre’s account. There is a relevance here to social psychology. A parallel can be drawn between Sartre’s portrait of the anti-Semite and that of the ‘extremist’ offered by social psychologists. The ‘extremist’, like the ‘anti-Semite’, is a certain kind of person - someone who can be described by what he or she thinks, feels, and ultimately, does.

In this chapter I want to offer a consideration of two philosophies by which we can understand the ‘extremist’. The first is a philosophy underpinned by social psychologists’ traditional efforts to conceptualize prejudice as a matter of personality and individual differences. The second - drawing gratefully on the work of Michael Billig - is a philosophy that accounts for prejudice as socio-communicative product. The two philosophies map onto two histories of prejudice. The first conceives of the prejudiced mind outside of history and social context; the second conceives of it as a product of history, social context and ideology (cf. Durrheim, forthcoming). The former emphasizes the value of individual differences and the conditions under which prejudice manifests itself; the latter focuses on the particular ways in which prejudices are formed and reproduced socially, and their influence on the different forms and intensities of prejudice.

To explore the argument, I shall focus on extreme forms of social hostility and moral exclusion as relatively neglected aspects of social psychology of
racism and intergroup relations. Social psychologists conventionally argue that we need to understand first the common and universal occurrence of prejudice, racism and discrimination, rather than one-off extreme and particularistic manifestations of intergroup antipathy and social hostility. Yet experience and research shows us that not all prejudices are the same – they are culturally and ideologically situated, their expression depends on a complex interplay of sociocultural, political and ideological factors, including (but not limited to) social identification and history of intergroup relations. It invites the reader to consider the need of a move from the description of individual differences and personality to presuppositions linked to the social meaning of prejudice, the importance of researching the language of racism, and the various intensities and consequences of ways of talking about people designated as Others.

The central tenet of this chapter is that, in order to understand prejudice as a social phenomenon, one needs to be able to describe the link between argument and thinking. As Michael Billig has argued, when individuals argue with each other, they can be heard to be thinking (Billig, 1996). Billig does not refer solely to individual thinking, but also to a process of collective thinking. If one takes this idea further, one can argue that argument and argumentation are the drivers of collective ‘definition’ of social issues and social problems. One also needs to appreciate the discursive basis of the ideology of prejudice. As Billig has argued, “ideologies are above all discursive, instantiated within discursive actions ... Thus, the categories of ideology, together with shared stereotyping and commonplace social explanations, are framed in language” (Billig, 2002, p. 184). Although understanding racism as individual predisposition can give us many valuable insights into a variety of social and political behaviors, and
manifestations of racism, arguably, this does not tell the whole story. Racism as discursive ideology, product of society and collective definition, needs to be taken into account too.

We live in a world where it is not difficult to find examples of extreme forms of social hostility. The case of elite and everyday discourse directed at the Roma minority in Western and Eastern Europe is a conspicuous, prototypical example of extreme prejudice and moral exclusion. For instance, the various calls for and cases of sterilization of the Roma in some European countries, their forced removal or relocation from town centres, private or public spaces, or declarations of public figures that Roma are “not fit to live among people”, or that they “are animals and behave like animals” are only a few examples of deliberate attempts at removing the Roma minority from the domain of moral acceptability (Bar-Tal, 1990; Opotow, 1990a, 1995).

A recent notorious case of extreme prejudice and moral exclusion can be found in the remarks of Hungarian prominent conservative commentator, and founder of Hungary's ruling party, Zsolt Bayer, following a bar brawl in a small town near Budapest, when two young Hungarian athletes were seriously wounded. Here is his commentary in full as reported by the online English edition of the German newspaper *Spiegel*:

A significant part of the Roma are unfit for coexistence. They are not fit to live among people. These Roma are animals, and they behave like animals. When they meet with resistance, they commit murder. They are incapable of human communication. Inarticulate sounds pour out of their bestial skulls. At the same time, these Gypsies understand how to exploit the 'achievements' of the idiotic Western world. But one must retaliate rather
than tolerate. These animals shouldn't be allowed to exist. In no way. That needs to be solved -- immediately and regardless of the method.

Bayer presents himself as a person that holds clear convictions and who has identified where the 'essence' of the case lies. The Roma are to blame. He projects his ‘intuitive certainty’ (Sartre, 1948/1995) on the yet undecided details and outcome of the case. Both the layperson and the social psychologist would be inclined to ask the same question: What kind of person is this man Bayer? What drives him to say those horrible things about ‘others’? One can single out two types of answers to these questions: first, an answer that emphasizes individual differences and the role of psychological variables; second, an answer that stresses the discursive basis of extreme ideologies and the role of communal thinking and argument. I will explore these in turn.

Extremism as individual predisposition

As Sartre would argue, the prejudiced person does not simply adopt an opinion, he “chooses himself as a person. He chooses the permanence and impenetrability of stone” (Sartre, 1948/1995, p. 53). He chooses ignorance over truth, mediocrity over humanity. Sartre's choice is an existential choice. This bears some similarities with the image of the prejudiced person in social psychology. When it comes to prejudice, some social psychologists tend to assume that the language that people use is in keeping with their 'personality' or 'character'.

In the attempt of Adorno et al. (1950) to offer a general theory of prejudice rooted in the dynamics of the personality and the unconscious mind,
stereotyping was considered to be a general process. Because the prejudiced person had to deal and resolve a number of intra-psychic conflicts, the choice of a particular target group for the projection of aggressive and destructive impulses/tendencies was considered to be secondary. Adorno et al. claim only to offering “some extreme but concrete evidence of the fact that antisemitism is not so much dependent upon the nature of the object as upon the subject’s own psychological wants and needs” (1950, p. 609). The resulting theory was that it is possible to measure prejudice by studying what Adorno et al. have called the ‘authoritarian’ personality without reference to any specific ethnic group. Altemeyer (1981, 1996) went on to simplify the theory’s outlook, but kept many of its assumptions intact, and its spirit is still in the air.

It, for example, held that there is a type of person who “never live(s) comfortably in a modern liberal democracy” (Stenner, 2005). According to Stenner one does not need to delve into the particular case, as the authoritarian mindset is not characteristic to any particular society or era. Authoritarianism is the (universal) result of the interaction between authoritarian predisposition and threat. Stenner distinguishes between ‘authoritarians’ and ‘libertarians’, in terms of their specific responses to threat: ‘authoritarians’ exacerbate their intolerance, whereas ‘libertarians’ avoid intolerance, and show more commitment to human rights.

In the same vein, albeit with a different vocabulary, Fiske distinguishes between subtle and blatant bias. Subtle bias is the preserve of the ‘well-intentioned moderates’, whereas blatant bias is that of ‘ill-intentioned extremists’. Blatant biases are ‘conscious, hot, direct, and unambiguous’. Subtle or moderate bias is much more complex. Subtle prejudice arises out of a “conflict
between relatively implicit, unconscious biases and explicit, conscious ideals to be unprejudiced. The resulting prejudices are subtle, modern, and aversive to the people holding them.” (2002, p. 126). According to Fiske’s description the Hungarian commentator can be safely placed under the label ‘ill-intentioned extremist’. His ‘bias’ is targeted at a particular group; it is direct and unambiguous. Moreover, he is an extremist because perceives the Roma as a threat to the in-group’s life and values, and implicitly espouses the view that superior groups should dominate inferior groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Following Sartre, he can also be described as ‘impervious to reason and to experience’, acting in ‘bad faith’ seeking ‘not to persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and disconcert’ (1948/1995, p. 20).

For contemporary social psychologists, an individual’s expression of attitude is driven their predispositions responding to (or interacting with) changing conditions of threat around them. For instance, it has been demonstrated how attitudes favoring coercive social control relate to or interact with attitudes of obedience to existing authority and attitudes favoring traditional values and lifestyle (cf. Duckitt, Bizumic & Heled, 2010), or how dislike, antipathy, of social groups is mediated by realistic and symbolic threats, and inter-group anxiety (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998; Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan et al., 2002). Changing conditions of threat, interacting with a deep-seated predisposition towards authoritarianism, provides the explanatory leverage for intolerance across ethnic and national groups, and across socio-political contexts (Stenner, 2005).

Blatant biases are considered universal features of the psychology of people. Authoritarianism, social dominance, and so on, as roots of generalized
prejudice (McFarland, 2010), play a role, and are present, in every society. Fiske’s ‘ill-intentioned extremist’ is an actor on every society’s scene; he belongs to every society’s collection of social types. The portrait of the ‘ill-intentioned extremist’ is a universal portrait, with particular aspects linked to a specific sociocultural context fading in the background.

Extremism is both a “passion and a conception of the world” (Sartre, 1948/1995, p. 17). Sartre, as Adorno et al. after him, believed that it is the ‘syncretic totality’ of the characteristics that describe the anti-Semite that one must attempt to describe. In Fascists, Billig has attempted to nuance the syncretic totality view. Extremism does not only belong to a social typology. Billig paints two portraits: the ‘classic authoritarian’ and the ‘man of violence’, as two “contrasting personalities”. He argues that the contrast between the two is “illustrative of contrasts generally within fascism” (Billig, 1978, p. 192). He shows that one does not need to go from the general to the particular, but one can profitably proceed from an examination of particular motivations that can lead to the examination of ideology in general terms. In their search for the ‘representative type’, Adorno (as well as Sartre to some extent) overestimated the internal consistency of ideology of prejudice. Arguing against the idea of ‘representative type’, Billig highlights the “internal inconsistencies of fascism” (p. 234). By talking about themselves and others in a specific ways, the ‘classic authoritarian’ and the ‘man of violence’ make individual, as well as social choices. The language used, the rhetorical choices, the emphasis placed on some aspects of ideology rather than others, uncover a more complex psychological reality that goes beyond the psychological properties of individual fascists.
Contemporary analyses of fascism support Billig’s view (Wodak & Richardson, 2013).

**Extremism as discursive ideology**

“If the social psychologist concentrates only on the properties of individual fascists”, Billig argued, “then only a limited range of questions can be asked about fascism” (1978, p. 235). If we simply dismiss the Hungarian commentator we saw above as an ‘ill-intentioned extremist’ or relegate him to a specific personality type, we restrict the kinds of critical questions that we can ask about the creation and reproduction of extreme prejudice and moral exclusion.

There are two crucial aspects that are missing from a social psychology of racism based on personality and individual differences. First, the idea that racism is a thoroughly socio-communicative phenomenon. As Teun van Dijk argues “the communicative reproduction of ethnic prejudices is not merely a complex and fascinating academic topic, but also a crucial social problem that needs thorough and critical inquiry” (1987, p. 383). Second, the proposal that in order to understand racism as a social phenomenon one needs to be able to describe the link between argument and thinking (Billig, 1996), and the discursive basis of the ideology of prejudice (Billig, 2002).

The Hungarian commentator is not merely making a factual observation about the Roma, which reflects his internal psychology; he offers a (collective) *justification* for why Roma ought to be treated differently and relegated to a subhuman condition. They are not even presented as the “wrong sort” of human beings (Rorty, 1989), they are, essentially, not human beings at all! In Billig’s
terms, eliminationist ideology is being ‘re-argued’, ‘re-thought’ through the words of the Hungarian commentator. What is being re-argued, re-thought is society's common sense, ‘stock’ of prejudices, experiences and knowledge that ordinary people use to operate distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This ‘stock’ of prejudices cannot be simply inferred from ‘personality’, the internal organization of mental processes or proportion of threat. The way that the account is organized points to the fact that the ideas presented by the commentator do not reflect his own subjectivity, but that, anyone, in possession of the clear facts about the Roma, should come to the same conclusion. The eliminationist conclusion connects the commentator to a (national and global) history of persecution.

Moreover, the discourse of the ‘ill-intentioned extremist’, is an argumentative discourse. The commentator does not “merely state a position, but typically one argues for the superiority of one’s own position over that of the rival position” (Billig, 1991, p. 171-172). Whereas not everyone will hold extreme views about the Roma, everyone will have views of some sort or other on the Roma. Although one might be tempted to seek conformity of views, what one finds, in actual facts, is variability of views. These views will vary depending on the rhetorical context, the audience, and so on. The holding of views is a “form of thinking itself as well as simultaneously being the product of thinking which has already occurred” (ibid., p. 191).

Looked at carefully, the commentator’s discourse is not striking only by his eliminationist allusions, or inter-group hostility. What is striking is that his discourse is seeped in anti-Western and anti-EU populist ideology and conspiracy traditions. The Roma are not viewed as weak. On the contrary, they
are clever enough to ‘trick’ gullible European Union bureaucrats. It can be argued that the commentator is aware of the complexity of his position, as well as the implications of his position. He *knows* he is expressing extreme views. As Billig has shown, there is pleasure in bigotry. There is also a sense of moral superiority and self-righteousness. He is not simply concerned with listing the negative attributes of the Roma; he is already a step ahead. He demands a *solution*. This points to the complexity of hatred. Although there is a call for a single solution, the ideology supporting such a call is not one-dimensional.

The ideology of extreme prejudice is underpinned by the complex and fragmented organization of common-sense, what Billig (1992) has called the ‘*kaleidoscope of common-sense*’: a swirling pattern where premises and inferences regularly change places, where shifts are fluidly made between arguments form principle and practice, and where liberal, humanistic and egalitarian values are drawn on for potentially racist effect or to justify and legitimate inequality (van Dijk, 1984; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Condor, 2006). People may inoculate themselves against the potential of their remarks being interpreted as prejudicial or biased, by constructing their views as rationally arrived at (Edwards, 2003), or by finding reasons with a basis in the world rather than their own subjectivity (Tileagă, 2005).

As Henri Tajfel writes, in order to study a social phenomenon “one must take a certain distance from it” (1972, p. 107). At the same time, one must also reduce the distance in order to fully comprehend it as a social phenomenon. When one focuses on extreme prejudice, one way in which one can reduce the distance is to focus on people as subjects of ideology. According to Billig, the ‘subject’ of ideology is a rhetorical being who thinks and argues with ideology
(Billig, 1991). As Serge Moscovici has also written, “social and intellectual activity is, after all, a rehearsal or recital, yet most socio-psychologists mistakenly treat it as if it were amnesic” (1984, p. 10).

The individual is not a blind marionette in the hands of external forces conforming and reacting without deliberation. He or she interacts with and transforms ideas that circulate in the social world (utterances, words, expressions, vocabularies). Individuals and groups create their own social reality of intergroup relations, “create their bonds of solidarity, as well as their differences. Ideologies are their products, communication is their means of exchange and consumption, and language is their currency” (Moscovici, 1972, p. 60). The ideology of extreme prejudice is not straightforward; it cannot be read or inferred directly from the organization of attitudes and personality predispositions. In order to understand the ideology of extreme prejudice one needs to study language in the social world (Thompson, 1984), the “actual uses of language between particular human subjects for the production of specific effects” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 9).

If one takes seriously the idea that ideologies are primordially discursive, they manifest themselves in discursive actions, then extreme prejudice and exclusionary discourses can be conceived as presenting situated and occasioned rhetorical and ideological aspects.

The ideology of extreme prejudice belongs to the category of ‘performative’ rather than ‘constative’ language (Eagleton, 1991, p. 19). As a consequence, it is more helpful to view the ideology of extreme prejudice as a ‘particular set of effects within discourses’ (ibid., p. 194, italics in original). Moral exclusion is one these pernicious effects. Tileagă (2005, 2006, 2007) identifies a
“consensus” around a moral exclusionary discourse against the Roma in Europe (a discourse that is different from prejudiced discourse about other minorities) that denies Roma a moral standing in the world, places them outside the boundary where moral values, and considerations of humanity, fair treatment, equality, apply. Roma are perceived as expandable (Opotow, 2010). Both participants ‘supporting’ extremist politics and those ‘opposing’ it describe the Roma as transgressing civilized conduct and moral conventions, as abject, as repulsive (or inviting repulsion). They are presented as transgressing moral (and spatial) boundaries, and as a consequence are typically classified as matter ‘out of place’. For some people, they are the ‘scum of society’, for others they are not only ‘dirty’; they are literally ‘dirt’. Various metaphors of residue (dirt, scum, etc.) are used as metaphors for residual people. To categorize Roma as residual, as abject, means ignoring their visible human qualities and invite a conclusion with eliminationist connotations.

With extraordinary regularity, elite and lay discourse presents the Roma as a ‘problem’ without a ‘solution’. The message is that there is no rational solution to deal with ‘them’. Being cast as the ‘problem’ that calls for a solution, the Roma are not regarded anymore as moral subjects, on the same moral footing as other members of the same society. The potentially eliminationist premises are explicit, but not the conclusion. The conclusion is something that cannot be stated directly. Immoral and social forbidden desires lurk under the surface of an ideology of extreme prejudice. Both conversational and societal dialogue might create its own unsaid matters. As Billig (1999) put it, dialogue provides the resources for what he calls ‘social repression’. Society’s superego keeps at bay the eliminationist forces of the collective id.
Moral exclusion is part and parcel of the argumentative ‘texture’ of societies, and should be studied as such (Tileaga, 2007; Opotow, 2007). It is the upshot of specific discursive actions, and its source are the flexible cultural repertoires and resources, the ‘stock’ of everyday prejudices, lay beliefs about morality, transgression, etc., that every society gives its members.

Extreme prejudice as collective definition

The position of the Hungarian commentator is part of an unfolding argument about the moral status that should be assigned to the Roma. It is an argument that society conducts with itself. Extreme prejudices against the Roma (as well as other available argumentative positions) are not mental formations, but public argumentative resources. The form and content of the argument that every society conducts with itself will facilitate the demarcation of prejudice from bigotry, or “the mild from the strong” (Billig, 2002, p. 181).

A focus on public argument relocates prejudice from ‘inside’ the heads of people to the flux of conversation and argumentation (Billig, 1996; Danziger, 1997). It has been shown how, in conversation, prejudice is occasioned, and can be thought of collaborative and strategic social action (Condor, Abell, Figgou, Gibson, & Stevenson, 2006; Condor & Figgou, 2012), moderated by the presence and influence of others. In the public sphere, public prejudice is socially occasioned, prompted by the presence of ‘dialogical networks’ (Leudar & Nekvapil, 2004) of opinions, judgments, commentaries on individuals and groups of people. The status of any particular public expression of ethnic dislike or hostility does not lie in people’s heads or personalities, but rather in the
presence and influence of a collective mentality that can accept, challenge, deny or simply ignore the form and content of public expression.

A focus on public argument also invites both researchers and lay people to spell out the general and particular meanings of what it means to be prejudiced. For instance, one cannot deny the existence of a norm against extreme prejudice targeted at the Roma. The only issue is that this is a norm that has to express itself against the social and cultural (sometimes, violent) imaginary of society, and faces the almost impossible task of arguing against the ‘stock’ of everyday prejudices, discursive habits, ways of talking, lay beliefs and representations about morality, race or ethnicity, difference or boundaries.

For instance, Hill (2008) shows how racist metaphors and parodic imitations of Spanish, Arab and Latino accents in American everyday discourse are not even perceived as ‘racist’ because they are engrained in ritualized discursive habits and social practices, and folk theories of race and racism. The examples of Native American, African American English, and U.S. Spanish linguistic ‘appropriations’ that she offers, are, in some way or another, implicitly or explicitly mocking not only the language, but the ‘character’ of people.

Everyday linguistic practice is the symbolic carrier of ‘invisible’ White racism. In the same way, European discourse about the Roma is replete with a variety of tropes, idiomatic expressions, ways of talking, stock of ‘jokes’, deeply engrained in the discursive texture and social practices of some European societies, language that demeans, dehumanizes, yet is not perceived as racist.

The symbolic role that the ‘Gypsy’ has played through the ages in European culture, the range of images, representations that it evokes in people’s minds ensures the relatively stable perpetuation of a racist social imaginary.
There is a historical tradition of talking about the Roma in a way that delegitimizes their behaviour, and dehumanizes them. The words uttered by the Hungarian commentator have a history (a history of persecution), they resonate in each and every country of the European continent. In that sense, they don't pertain to an individual, but to a collective tradition of speaking about the Roma.

The meaning of what it means to be prejudiced is not given once and for all, but is a subject of debate. As previously intimated, as Sartre observed, prejudice is a matter of choosing oneself as a person, as it is a matter of passing social and political judgment. Prejudice is perhaps the only term in the psychological thesaurus that cannot be used in a strictly technical (psychological) sense, without ascribing it a value judgment. Social psychologists tend to forget, perhaps too readily, that what counts as prejudice, is more a political judgment than a psychological description (Drury, 2012). When social psychologists describe the 'personality' or the 'mindset' of the prejudiced person they (the social psychologists) assign themselves a role. They can no longer think of themselves as individuals standing outside society and history; they are active drivers of progressive social agendas. Researching contemporary manifestations of prejudice has slowly taken social psychologists out of the laboratory and brought about an age of social consciousness, collective action and collective mobilization (Reicher, 2012). The task of the social psychologist is to evaluate the relative weight of particular and general aspects of ideologies of prejudice, the quandaries that arise from the interplay of social and individual aspects, the nature and intensities of extreme ideologies. The question is not to explain extreme prejudice but to disentangle its pernicious presuppositions, ideological, existential and material implications.
The belief that prejudices do not reflect ‘people like us’ is engrained in the common sense of societies. Prejudice (especially extreme prejudice), one tends to assume, is the preserve of people with less education, less time, less concern and empathy for the other. It is relatively easy to view prejudice in a way, which assumes that the unprejudiced are liberal and egalitarian, whereas the prejudiced are the repositories of the very opposite values (Billig, 1988). Prejudice affects not just separate individuals, but the collective body of groups, communities and nations.

Prejudices ideas, prejudiced stock of knowledge are not isolated, private, aspects, they move between people, they are formulated and reformulated, resisted or internalized. The commentator’s argument is not one of individual cognition, but one of collective definition (Blumer, 1971) – that is, it draws upon, and constitutes at the same time, and how a particular society chooses to ‘define’ one of its minorities as a social problem. As Sartre has noted, one makes himself an anti-Semite “because that is something one cannot be alone” (1948/1995, p. 22). With the phrases “the Roma are animals”, “these animals shouldn't be allowed to exist” the Hungarian commentator attaches himself to a tradition, and community, of persecution. Prejudices, as well as persecution, belong to a historical tradition. Historical traditions of persecuting others are ideological and political traditions that sustain unequal power relations and domination.

But what provides the ‘ill-intentioned extremist’ with his ‘method’ of thought and conception of the world? Paradoxically, it is democracy that offers the prejudiced individual his ‘method’ of thought and the conception of the world. The commentator’s ‘method’ of thought and conception of the world is not individual; it is collective, imparted with others. His extreme prejudiced
views are not the result of some deep-seated predisposition to hate but rather they are a social product of democracies. His views are easily recognizable as anti-democratic feelings. The problem of some today’s European societies is that extreme prejudice and moral exclusion thrives in democracies, within the framework offered by the nation-state.

A full understanding of the ideological determinants of extreme prejudice should move us away from a focus on personality type to the detailed discursive analysis of actual exclusionary accounts that pervade the supposedly liberal and democratic ‘common-sense’ of societies. Studying the nature of extreme prejudice involves primarily the exploration of the sociocultural context in which prejudiced attitudes develop, are produced and reproduced. An alternative perspective, based on the detailed analysis of text and talk, takes into consideration not only the existence, but also the discursive construction of different types of prejudices and the idea that not all prejudices are the same, and not all groups subjected to the same prejudices.

**Researching extreme prejudice in the ‘real world’**

There is a tendency (both within the academic community and in the public sphere) to paint extremism as the absolute political evil, and to think of moderation as the opposite of extremism. The social reality of extremism is much more complex.

Racist language retains its ability to offend without the presence of deliberate hatred. It is true, as Dixon and Levine have argued recently, that “ideological process need not operate via the attribution of uniformly negative qualities to others. Nor, indeed, is it necessarily accompanied by expressions of
unadulterated hostility” (Dixon & Levine, 2012, p. 311; see also Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012).

Research has also shown that, in order to understand extremism, one needs to understand that its meaning will vary across individuals and social contexts (cf., inter alia, Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009; Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood, 2008; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). For instance, in their study of lives of extreme right activists in Europe, Klandermans and Mayer argue against describing too hastily extremism in terms of an attitudinal cluster comprised of authoritarianism, social isolation, lack of education, economic insecurity. Even when right-wing extremists are found to be authoritarian, ethnocentric, and so on, these are features less of ‘personality’ type, and more of biography, history, personal and organizational context. In a similar vein, Ferguson et al. (2008) show how extremism or radicalism is not solely caused by the frustration of basic human needs, but rather anchored within individual and group identity projects.

Both Klandermans and Mayer, and Ferguson and colleagues, show a different facet of extremism, one that recognizes social actors’ capacity to engage in open-ended, ambivalent thinking and arguments about the social world. In contrast, a large part of social psychology of extremism continues to adopt predominantly what Serge Moscovici has called a ‘differential’ approach, that is, a preoccupation with classifying individuals “by criteria of differentiation which often vary according to the school of thought to which the researcher belongs or the nature of the problem he [or she] is studying” (1972, p. 51). If the purpose of social psychological analysis is to show up bigotry for what it is, then the question that should preoccupy more social psychologists of racism should not
only be why and how individuals differ from one another, or why certain groups are the targets of prejudice. Another worthwhile avenue of enquiry is around the question of how is prejudice accomplished and what are its social, political and ideological consequences.

Some of the most promising lines of research for the future of research on prejudice, racism and intergroup relations include “imaging brain activity beyond the amygdala” or “assessing people’s control over their own seemingly automatic reactions” (Fiske, 2002, p. 128). The ‘unit of analysis’ is the individual not the collective; the focus is on psychological reactions not social reactions. Yet, the real history and effect of prejudice is unlike an experimental script or scenario, or a vignette, that can be adapted, sanitized to suit research objectives; it has existential and material consequences, and reflects a collective history.

The social psychology of racism has become a “psychology of private life” (Moscovici, 1972, p. 63). Social psychology of racism needs a stronger intellectual commitment into problems of collective definition. This might lead to a better appreciation of three interrelated aspects.

First, the idea that researching racism should not be limited to conceiving it as a fundamentally psychological problem. There is a need to relocate prejudice from people’s personalities and mindsets to the unending course of society's conversation with itself. The form and content that this conversation takes is a public record of the activity of societal/collective thinking. Social psychologists interested in the study of racism should be able to describe this activity of collective thinking; they need to reconcile the ‘thinking individual’ with the ‘thinking society’.
Second, the idea that prejudice and discrimination is achieved by means of social and language practices. Prejudices are situated in the ordinary organization of social and language practices. When expressing social meanings we are not merely communicating meaning, but we are ‘doing’ things with words. Prejudice and discrimination is accomplished through words, images, symbols, and material practices.

Third, a deeper understanding of processes of moral inclusion and exclusion sourced in each society’s social theory: the socially shared ‘stock’ of prejudices, stereotypes, morality, spatial transgression, history of oral tradition, folk knowledge and representations about groups and ethnic categories, spatial and material boundaries.

This socially shared ‘stock’ contains not only the seeds of intolerance, but also those of tolerance. Tolerance and intolerance are not just the property of the open-minded opposed to the closed-minded person, but also the upshot of argumentative positions that span the entire political and ideological spectrum of societies. One needs to understand the variety of both intolerant and tolerant discourses. One needs to learn more about what social and cultural resources to mobilize against the normalization of intolerance, what works and what does not. One can achieve this by pointing both to the collective construction and definition of tolerance and intolerance, as well as to its collective discursive history.

The problems faced by the Roma in European societies are very complex. As one very recent European Union document on Roma integration highlights this needs to go ‘beyond rhetoric’, including the multiple discrimination faced by Roma women, the implementation of education, policing and public health
policies that would empower Roma communities rather than disenfranchise and exclude them further (Open Society Institute, 2011). There is an increased recognition that extreme prejudice comes to life, propagate and sustain itself in and through discourse and communication. This is a statement that, unfortunately, resonates more with linguists, anthropologists or historians, rather than social psychologists. As Billig contends, social psychologists need to engage directly with aspects of social and political life that “are not the products of individual motivations”, but rather “powerful and dangerous” ideological mixtures.

The powerful and dangerous ideological mixtures to which Billig refers are not metaphorical, but actual discursive traditions that underpin ways of talking about others that reflect domination, dehumanization, and historical unequal social relations. Traditions and histories of prejudice are symbolic and discursive traditions. By researching them in their own right one can hope to understand intolerance as a social and cultural product, and thus, fight it as a social and cultural creation.
References


It is also true that racist ideologies can be instantiated in ways other than words. Researchers have highlighted the role of ‘pre-discursive’ racism (Hook, 2006), spatial and material arrangements (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005), affective states (Tiedens & Leach, 2004), or semiotic and phenomenological forms of psychological and social life (Pehrson & Leach, 2012).
See, for instance, how opposition to asylum seeking or multiculturalism as ‘racist’ is a hotly subject of debate (see Burke & Goodman, 2012).